### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Fe bruary2, 200 6 S es sio n

PA UL DEN NIS R EID, JR. v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE App e al b y P e r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 97-C- 1834 Cheryl Blackbu rn, Judge

No. M2005- 00260-SC-S09-P C - F iled on Ju ne 26, 2006

We gr anted interlocutory revie w in this post-c o n v i ct i o n capital c ase to c larify the proc edure for determining compe tency

to proce ed in a post-c onviction action. For the re asons explained here in, we hold that the c ivil st andar d for menta l incompetenceadopted in State v. Nix, 40 S .W.3d 459 (Tenn. 2001) , applies to a c ompet e n cy determination during post-c onviction proce eding s. To trig g er a hea ring on competenc y , a petitioner must make a prima fa cie showing of incompete nce by submissi on of aff

idavits, de positions, medica l r eports, or other cre dible evidenc e. A pe titioner bear s the burde n of proving that he or she is inc ompetent by clea r and convincing evidenc e. A finding of incompetenc e re quires neither a stay of the post-conviction proce eding s nor abe y anceof individual issues. A trial court should appoint, if necessa ry , a “ne x t friend” or g uardia n ad litem to pursue the action o n b e h a lf o f th e p e ti ti o n e r
. A c c o r d in g ly , th e d e c is io n o f th e tria l c o u rt is a ffirme d as mod if ie d, a ndth e case is re ma nd e d to thetria l c ou rt fo r f urthe r p ro c e e din g s c on sis te nt w iththi s opinion.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 9 (c ); Judg m e nt of t he Tr ial Co ur t A ffirm e d as M odi fie d; Rem anded to the Trial Court
C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C.J ., and E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , an d J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J J ., joined. A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., J ., filed a
concur ring /dissenting opinion.
Michae l J . Passino, Nashville, Tennesse e; and Ke lly A. Glea son and N i ch o l as D. Ha re, A ssistant Post-Convi ction Def

ender s, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or Appe llant, Paul Dennis Reid, J r. Paul G. Summers, At t o rn eyGene ral a nd Reporter ; Michael E. Moore , Solicitor Genera l; J ennife r L . Smit h, Associate D eputy Attorney G e n e r al; V ic tor S. J ohnson, I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; Tom Th urma n, De pu ty Di stric t Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l; an d Rog e r Moo re , Ass ist a nt Dis tric t Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l, for Appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.T he C our t deni ed R ei d’ s P et i t i on for Rehe ar i ng on di r ect appeal on D ece mb er 1 9, 2 00 2. U nder T enn es s ee 1 Code An n ot at ed s ec t i on 40- 30- 102( a) (2003) , t h e on e- y ea r s t at u t e of l i mi t at i on s for pos t

- con v i ct i on a ct i on s be g i n s on t he “ dat e of

t he f i nal ac t i on of

t he hi gh es t s t at e a pp el l at e c our t t o whi ch an appeal i s t ake n. ”

2 J oseph D. Ty dings, Washing ton D.C., and F. Clay Bailey , Nashville, TN, f or Ami cus Curiae , Counsel for the National Alliance on Me ntal I llness.
OP IN ION
BACK GR OUND
I n this case, the petitioner, Paul D ennis Reid, J r., was convicted of the first deg ree murders of two employ ees of

a Captain D’ s restaur ant in Donelson. The jury sentenc ed R eid to death f or eac h o f t h e t wo murders. Reid a lso was convicte d of espe cially ag g ravated robbe ry

for whic h he
re c e ive d a se nte nc e of tw e nty -f ivey e ars to b e se rv e d c on se c uti ve ly to the tw o d e a th s e nte nc e s. Th is Cou rt a ff irme d th e c on vic tio ns a ndse nte nc e s. State v. Re id , 9 1 S. W.3 d 2 47 (T e nn . 2 00 2) , c e rt

. denied, 540 U.S. 828 (2003) . Reid subsequently was c onvicted of the first deg ree murders of two employ ees of

a Baskin-Robbins ice cream store in Clarksville and thre e employ ees of a McD onald’s
r e s ta u r a n t i n N a s h v il le

. Re idr e c e iv e d f iv e a d d it io n a l de ath s entenc e s f o r th e s e mu r d e r s
. We aff irmed the c onvictions and sentenc es in the Ba skin-Robbins ca se. State v. Reid, 164 S.W .3d 286 (Tenn. 2005) . The Court of Criminal Appea ls affirme d the conv i cti ons and sentenc es in the M c D o n a ld ’ s c a s e , State v
. Pau l D e n n is Re id , Jr

. , N o
. M 2 0 0 3

- 0 0 5 3 9

- CC A

- R3

- D D , 2 0 0 5 WL 13 15 68 9 ( Te nn . Crim. App

. J un e 3, 20 05 ), a ndthedir e c t app e a l is c ur re ntl y pe nd ing be fo rethi s Court on automat i c re v i ew under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-206. In the B askinRob bin s c a se , w e re c e ntl y he ld that t he tr ial c ou rt

la c ke d auth ority

to c on sid e r a

pe tit ionfo r p os tconviction re lief filed by

the Post-Conviction Defende r on beha lf of Reid whe re the petition was not signe d or verified by

Reid and whe re the Def

ender failed to e stablish a “n ex t friend” basis upon which to pr ocee d. Dary l K eith Holton v. State and Paul D ennis Reid, J r. v. State, Nos

. M2005- 01870-SC-S10-PD, M2005-02398-SC- S1 0

- PD , _ _ _ S. W. 3 d

_ _ _ , 2 0 0 3 WL

2 4 3 1 4330 (Tenn. May

4, 2006).
Re id d id no t rai se theiss ue of c omp e te nc y

du ri ng thetria l in thi s c a se . H e su bs e qu e ntl y ar gu ed t h ath e w as i n co m p et en tt o s t an d tri al i n t h e o t h ert wo ca s es
. Fo l l o wi n g co m p et en cyh ea ri n gs befor e ea ch of the other two trials, Reid wa s found compete nt to stand trial. Thes e ru l i n gs were a f f irme d o n ap p e a l. Re id , 1 6 4 S. W. 3 d a t 3 0 8 ; R e id , N o
. M 2 0 0 3

- 0 0 5 3 9

- CC A

- R3

- D D , 2 0 0 5 WL 1315689. Whil e the other two appea ls wer e pending, the Court set an ex ecution date of April 29, 2003, in this case
. Reid, 91 S.W .3d at 288. Reid’s counse l filed a motion asking this Court t o stay the execution to g ive Reid a full y ear in w hich to de cide whether to file a post-c onviction petition. 1 Counsel expressed conc ern a bout R eid’s compe tence to decide to f oreg o post-conviction re view. I n an order filed on April 22, 2003, this Court denied the reque st for a stay , observing that Reid was found compe tent to stand trial in both of the other two cases after le ng thy evidentiary

hearings and that Reid’s counsel ha d failed to present any truly new f actua l assertions ca lling into doubt Reid’s3

prese nt capa city

to understand his leg al positi o n and options or to make a rational c hoice a mong these options.
On Ap r i l 2 8 , 2 0 0 3 , j u s th o u r s b e f o r e h i s s c h e d u l e d e xe c u t i o n , R e i d f i l e d a p r o s e po stconviction petition seeking relief from the c onvictions and sentences i n t h i s case . The trial c ourt stay ed Reid’s e x ec u t i o n and appointed the Post-Convi ction Def ender to repre sent Reid. On November 30, 2004, Reid’s counsel filed an amende d post-conviction petition. The a mendment was not verified by

Reid but included the following statement of counsel: “Counsel ha ve not re quested that Petitioner sign this Amended Petition as require d by Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-104( d) and Te nn. Sup . Ct . R. 28 § 5 (E)( 2) du e to C ou ns e l’ s f irmly he ld o pin ionthat Pe tit ion e r i s c ur re ntl y incompetent.” Counsel a lso filed a motion asking t h e t ri al court to declar e Reid incompete nt and to s ta y thepo st- c on vic tio n p ro c e e din g s.
On J anuary

10, 2005, the trial court entere d an order setting forth a proce dure f or dete rmining
c omp e tency to pro ceed a t th e po st- c on vic tio n le ve l. In th e or de r, thetria l c ou rt a do pte d th e Ni x stand ard fo r me nta l inc omp e te nc e . The or de r r e qu ir e d th a t Re id’ s c ou ns e l ( 1) mus t e sta bli sh a prima fac ie ca se of incompe tency by attaching to an amended petition affida vits, depositions , medical
re po rt s, or oth e r c re dib le e vid e nc e that c on ta ins sp e c if ic fa c tua l a lle g a tio ns de mon str a tin g that Re id
me e ts the Ni x stand ard ; (2) mus t set ou t thos e iss ue s tha t ar e pu re ly le g a l in natur e a ndse pa rate ly
enumer ate those f

actua l issues that require Reid’s input or assistance ; and (3) mu st ex plain why Reid’s assistance is nece ssar y o n t h e fac tual issues and why the nec essary

information is not available from other

source s. T he trial c ourt followed Nix by deciding that Reid would bear the burden of proving incompetenc e by clea r and convincing evidenc e. Finally , the order provided that if Reid was found to be incompetent, the tria l court would pro ceed on those cla ims that can be resolved w ithout his assistance and hold in abey ancethose fac tually based c laims requiring his input until he reg ains compete ncy
. Reid filed an a

pplication for an extraordinary appea l under Rule 10 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Ap p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e c h a l l e n g i n g t h e p r o c e d u r e
. B o t h t h e C o u rt o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s a nd thi s Court denied the a

ppeal. On J anuary 17, 2005, counsel for the parties appea

red be fore the trial court for a previously

schedule d evidentiary

hearing on the post-conviction petition. W h en t he hea ring beg an, Reid’s c ounsel filed both a motion to continue the matter and, in ac cor d an ce w ith the pr oc e du re a do pte d by the tria l c ou rt , a se c on d a me nd e d pe tit ion

. Re id’ s c ou ns e l a lso su bmi tte d to the court an af

fidavit from Dr . Pamela Auble, a neuropsy cholog ist, stating that Reid was i n c o mp e te nt to proce ed. TheState arg ued that Reid had not made a threshold showing of mental incompe tence

. With ou t ma

kin g a ny fi nd ing s as t o Re id’ s p re se nt c omp e te nc y , th e tria l c ou rt g rante d Re id an interloc utory

appea l under Rule 9 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Appellate Procedur e from the tria l court’s or der e stablishing the procedur e for determining compe tency

to proce ed on post-convic tion. Th e Cou rt

of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls d e nie d in te rl oc uto ry re vie w. We the n g rante d p e rm iss ionto a pp e a l.4 STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW This appea l presents the f ollowing issues of la w: (1) what is the pr o p er standa rd for
c omp e te nc y

to p ro c e e d ina

po st- c on vic tio n a c tio n; ( 2) wh a t th re sh old sh ow ing mus t bema de to trig g er a hearing on c ompetency ; (3) who be ars the bur den of pr oof; and (4) how does a finding of incom p etenc e af

fec t the proce eding s. We review issues of law under

a de novo sta ndard w ithout
acc ording any

presumption of cor

rec tness to the lower court’s conclusions. See State v. Walton, 41 S.W .3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001)

. AN AL YSI S
I. Interlocutor y Appeal
As a pr e lim ina

ry matte r, theState arg ue s th a t th e pr oc e du ra l qu e sti ons pres ent ed inthi s app ea l do not meet the criteria for interlocutory

revie w under

Rule 9 of the Te nnessee Rules of Appellate Proc edure . Rule 9 lists three non-exclusive fac tors for de termining whether an interlocutory

appea l should be g rante d: (1) the ne ed to pre vent irre para ble i njury , g iving consideration to the severity of the potential injury , the proba bilityof its occur

renc e, and the proba bilitythat revie w upon en t ry of final judg ment will be ineffe ctive; (2) the need to pr event ne edle s s , ex pensive, a nd protrac ted litigation, g iving c onsideration to w hether the cha lleng ed order would be a ba sis for reversa l upon entry of a f inal judgme nt, the pr ob abil ity

of re ve rs a l, andwh e ther an in te rl o c u t ory app e a l w ill re su lt in a net reduc tion in the duration and expense of the litigation if the challeng ed orde r is reve rsed; and ( 3) the ne ed to deve lop a uniform bo d y o f la w , g iv in g c o n s id e r a ti o n to th e e xis te n c e o f in c o n s is te nt order s of other courts and w hether the question prese nted by the challeng ed orde r will not otherwise be revie wable upon entry of final jud g me nt. Tenn. R. App. P. 9(a)

. No tin g that th e iss ue of

c omp e te nc y

to p ro c e e d o n p os t- c on victio n is a n is su e of fi rs t impression in Tennessee , the trial court found that the mere possibili ty that its procedur e could be altere d on appea l warr anted immediate r eview of the pr o ce d u re before its requireme nts were imposed. T h e tria l c o u rt g a v e th e s e c o n d c r it e r io n

– th e p r e v e n ti o n o f n e e d le s s , e xp e n s iv e , and protrac ted litigation – the g reatest weig ht. The trial court stated:

Capital case post-conviction proceeding s are leng thy by their very nature . The pre paration for pre sentati o n o f the pe tition and the eventua l evidentiary

hearing of

ten re sult in a significant investment5 of time on beha lf of petitioner, the State and the trial court. I n issues of first impress i o n such as this compete ncy proce dure, imp le me ntatio n o f a

pr oced ure not y e t va lid a te d b y ou r S up re me Court co u l d be an e x erc ise in futility . I f the Court finds that the proce dure a s a whole or

any subpart i s u n wa rranted or should be
a me nd e d, thepo st- c on vic tio n p ro c e e din g s w e refo r n aug ht. Finally , the trial court found that interlocutory revie w was ne cessa ry to establish a uniform body of law, noting ag ain that the compe tency proce dure is an issue of

first impression.
I nterlocutory appea ls to revie w pretria l or ders or ruling s are g ener al l y“disfavor ed,” espec ially in criminal ca ses. State v. Gilley , 173 S.W .3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2005) . I n Gilley , we he ld that the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appea ls erre d in gr anting interlocutory revie w of the tria l
c o u rt ’ s e v i d e n t i ar y

ru l i n g s u n d e r

R u l e 4 0 4 ( b ) o f t h e T e n n e s s e e R u l e s o f E v i d e n c e
. Id

. a t6

. In c on tr a st, we re c e ntl y

app ro ve d o f g ranti ng the de fe nd a nt a n int e rl oc uto ry app e a l in a c ri min a l c a se wher e ther e wa s a nee d to e stablish a uniform body of law. See State v. Delaw renc e Willi ams, No. W2004-01682-SC-R11-CD, ___

_ S

. W

. 3 d ____, 2006 WL 1408411 (Tenn. May

23, 2006) (suppre ssion issue involvi ng whether defe ndant’ s estrang ed g irlfriend w as consider ed “c itiz en informant” f

or purpose s of information provide d for se arc h war rant).
I nterlocutory

revie w may

be espe cially

appropriate whe re, a s here , issues arise in a capital
case for which no proce dure is otherwise specifica lly presc ribed. I n State v. Reid, 981 S.W .2d 166 (T e nn . 1 99 8) , we g rante d inte rl oc uto ry re vie w to co ns ider pr oc e du re s ado pte d by the tria l c ou rt wi th
re g ard to n oti c e , exam inatio n, a nddis c los ur e re qu ir e me nts wh e rea c apit a l de fe nd a nt i nte nd s to introduce e x pert testimony relating to mental c onditi o n as mitigation proof during the sentenc ing ph a se of thetria l. T he c ir c ums ta nc e s o f this app e a l aresim ila r to the e arl ie r int e rl oc uto ry app e a l in Reid. I n both instances, the trial court ex erc ised its inhere nt authority to adopt appropriate rule s of proce dure to a ddress an issue of first impression. See id. at 170. On the issue o f p o s t -c o nviction
c omp e t e n c y , t h e r e i s a

n e e d t o d e v e l o p a

u n i f o r mb o d y o f l a w a n d a

n e e d t o p r e v e n tn e e d l e s s, expensive, and protra cted litigation. W e ther efor e conc lude that an interlocutory appea l is proper to clarify the standar d and proc edur e fo r d et ermining competenc y to proce ed in a post-c onviction action.
II. Stand ard for Com petency
Compe te nc y

to p ro c e e d ina

po st- c on vic tio n a c tio n is a n iss ue of fi rs t imp re ssi on be fo rethi s Court. To determine the proper standard for competenc y , we must fir st e x amine the nature of the rig ht. I t is well established that a de fendant has a constitutional rig ht to competenc y during the trial itself

. Se e Re id , 1 6 4 S. W. 3 d a t 3 0 6 ( h o ld in g th a t to b e c o mp e te n t to s tan d tria l a d e f e n d a n t in a
c ri min a l c a se mus t ha ve the c apa c ity to un de rs ta nd the natur e a nd ob je c t of thepr oc e e din g s a g a ins t him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in prepa ring his defense ). The c onviction of a pe rson who is mentally incompetent viol ates the basic concepts of due process under the Fourteenth Amendme nt to the United States Constit ution and article I , section 8 of the Tenne ssee Constitution. I d. At theIn ad o p t i ng a co gni t i ve t est fo r det erm i ni ng co m p et ency t o be execu te d , r a t her t han t he m o re s t ri ngent 2

a ssista n c e tes t t h a t i s a p p lica b le w h e n d e te rm inin g c o m p e te n c y to sta n d trial, w e o b se rv e d th a t “o n c e th e c o n v ic tio n is f i nal , t her e i s a l es s ene d nee d f or a defendan t t o as s i s t i n h i s or her defens e gi ven t he ava i l abi l i t y of bo t h s t at e a nd f eder al
c o llate ra l re v ie w o f t ria l er ro rs , an d the e x p a n sio n o f t h e rig h t t o c o m p e te n t co u n se l at tria l.” Id

.

In H o u se , w e c ited w ith a p p ro v a l l a n g u a g e in M u rr a y v. G ia rr a ta n o , 4 9 2 U .S

. 1 , 1 0 (1 9 8 9 ), “‘d e c lin[in g ] to 3

r ea d e i t h er t h e Ei g h t h Amen dmen t or t h e D u e Proc es s Cl au s e t o r equ i r e y et a n ot h er di s t i nct i on be t we en t h e r i g h t s of
ca pi t al c as e def

en dan t s a n d t h os e i n n on ca pi t al c as es
. ’ ” 911 S. W

. 2d a t 712.

T en n
. Code An n
. §§ 40- 30- 101 e t s eq. 4
6 other e nd of the spec trum of the criminal proce ss, a prisoner has a constitutional rig ht to competency to b e e xec ute d. Se e Van T ran v. State , 6 S.W. 3d25 7, 26 6 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) (h old ing that a priso ne r i s not c ompetent to be executed if he lacks the mental capa city to unde rstand the fa ct of the impending execution and the re ason for it). This rig ht is grounde d in the Eig hth Amendment’s ban on crue l 2 and unusual punishment rather than the Due Proc ess Clause. I d. at 263-64.
These c onstitut ional require ments of compete ncy do n o t i mp ly

a c o o r d in ate

rig h t o nc o llatera l
re vie w. We h a ve re pe a te dly re cogni z ed that po st- c on vic tio n p ro c e du re s a reno t c on sti tut ion a lly require d. Pike v. State, 164 S.W .3d 257, 262 (Tenn. 2005). Many of the rig hts applicable to trial no longer at t ac h

. For

example, there is no constitutional rig ht to counsel in post-conviction proce eding s, even in c apital ca ses. House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705, 712 (Tenn. 1995). 3

I n Tenne ssee, the Post -Conviction Procedur e Act is a statutory reme dy , and the nature a nd 4 availability of post-conviction relief lies within the discretion of the leg islature. Pike, 164 S.W.3d at 262. Neither

the Act nor

the rules ap p l i ca b l e t o i t addre ss the issue of compe tency . The Ac t provides for

the appointment of c ounsel wher e a pe titioner is not repre sented a nd is indigent. See Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 30 -1 07 (b )( 1) . We de c lin e to r e a d in to the Ac t, h ow e ve r, a statut ory ri g ht t o competenc y

from this rig ht to counsel. Cf. House, 911 S.W.2d at 712 (holding that provision requiring appointment of counse l does not cre ate statutory rig ht to eff ective assistance of counsel).
Our c on c lu s io nth at i np o s t- c o n v ic ti o n proce eding s there is no c onstitut ional or statutory rig ht to c omp e te nc y

do e s n ot e ndtheinq uiry . Due pr oc e ss co nc e rn s may ne ve rthe le ss b e imp lic a te d in the post-conviction conte x t where a potential litigant is denied an opportunity for the pr esentation of cla ims at a meaning ful time and in a meaningf ul manner. B urfor d v. State, 845 S.W .2d 204, 208 (T e nn . 1 99 2) . In B ur fo rd , th e pe tit ion e r fo un d hims e lf c aug ht in a “p ro c e du ra l tra p” a ndun ableto initiate liti g ation despite the a pproac h of the statute of

limit ations. I d. We concluded that, while not unconstitutional on it s fac e, the statute of limit ations was unconstitutional as applied to B urfor d’s
case . I d. at 210.
Threey ear s later, in Watkins v. St ate, 903 S.W .2d 302 (Tenn. 1995), we applied the B urfor d du e pr oc e ss ana ly sis to the iss ue of wh e the r m e nta l in c omp e te nc e tol le d the po st- c on vic tio n s tatut e of lim itatio ns
. We co nc lud e d that for the se pr oc e du ra l pur po se s a post -c on vic tio n pe tit ionsh ou ldT e n n . C o d e A n n . § 2 8 -1 -1 0 6

. 5

T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 3 0

- 1 0 2 (a). 6

A m ic u s C u ria e , C o u n se l fo r t h e N a tio n a l A lli a n c e o n M e n ta l Illne ss, a d v o c a te s a sim ilar sta n d a rd a n d su g g e sts 7

as gu i dance t he s t andar d f or det er mi ni ng comp et enc y of a pet i t i oner t o wi t hdr aw a post

- convi ct i on pet i t i on i n a ca pi t al
cas e, na mel y : “ whe t her t he pet i t i oner poss es s es t he pres ent ca paci t y t o app r eci at e t he pet i t i oner ’ s posi t i on an d m ake a 7 be conside red c ivil in nature and thus subject to t he gene ral savings statute. Watkins, 903 S .W.3d 5 at 305. We further

held that, even in the absence of a statute tolling the statute of limitations, due proce ss require d some rea sonable opportunity for post-c onviction relief: Even thoug h the petitioner’s inter estis not a fundamenta l rig ht entitl ed t o heig htened due proce ss protection, bec ause a petitioner who w a s in c o mp e te n t th r o u g h o u t th e li mi tati o n s p e r io d w o u ldbe denied the oppor t u nity

to challeng e his conviction in a meaningf ul
manner , the fa ilure to toll the lim itations period would deny such a petitioner a f

air a nd rea sonable opportunityfor the bringing of the pe tit ion , a ndthu s, wo uldvio late du e pr oc e ss.
I d. at 307.
I n Seals v. State, 23 S.W .3d 272 (Tenn. 2000) , we a ddresse d the same issue unde r the c urre nt po st- c on vic tio n s tatut e of

lim itatio ns , w hic h s pe c i f

i c al l y i n c l u d e s a n a nti -t oll ing pr ov isi on
. We h e ld 6 that the saving s statute was inapplicable under the pl ain t erms of the pos t-conviction st atute. I d. at 276. We nevertheless conc luded, under Watkins, that due pr ocess r equire s tolli ng of the statute of limit ations wherea petitioner is denied the reasonable opportunity to assert a claim in a meaning ful time and manner

due to mental incompete nce. Sea ls, 23 S.W .3d at 279.
I n St a te v. Ni x, 40 S.W. 3d45 9 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) , w e turne d to the qu e sti on le ft un a ns we re d in Watkins and Seals: what standard of mental incompetenc e must a petitioner sat i sfy befor e due proce ss require s tolli ng of the statute of limit ations. Emphasizi ng ag ain that a pe tition er h as no fundame ntal rig ht to collatera lly attack a conviction and due proce ss require s only that a petitioner be provide d an o p p o rt unity for the pr esentation of the claim at a meaning ful time and in a meaning ful manner , we concluded that the competency standard a pplied in civil cases in Te nnessee satis fi e s th e du e pr oc e ss c on c e rn s a sso c iate d w ithtol lin g of thepo st- c o n v i c ti o n s tatut e of lim itatio ns
. Ni x, 40 S.W. 3da t 46 4. Un de r the stand arda do pte d inNi x, a pe tit ion e r i s in c omp e te nt i f “h e is unable e ither to manag e his persona l aff airs or to understand his leg al rig hts and liabiliti es.” I d. at 463.
The State arg ues that the Nix standard likew ise satisfies the due proce ss conce rns associated with p rese ntation of claims in post-conviction proc eeding s. Reid counters that the sta ndard f or c omp e te nc y

to p ro c e e d ina

po st- c on vic tio n a c tio n s ho uldbe wh e the r a pe tit ion e r i s a bleto c on su lt with counsel with a reasona ble degr ee of rational unde rstanding

. Reid relies on the c onstitut ional 7ra tio n a l ch o ic e w ith re sp e c t t o c o n tinu ing o r a b a n d o n ing furth e r liti g a tio n o r o n the o the r h a n d w h e the r th e p e tit io n e r is

s u f fer i n g f r om a me n t al di s ea s e, di s or der , or def ec t w h i ch ma y s u bs t an t i al l y a f fec t t h e pet i t i on er ’ s c apa ci t y
. ” T en n
. S. C t

. R. 28, § 11 ( B ) ( 1). T he s t andar d i n R ule 2 8 , sec t i on 11(B ) ( 1), wh i ch para l l el s t hat adop t ed by t he U ni t ed St at es Supre me C our t i n Rees v. P ey t on, 384 U

. S. 312 , 314 ( 19 66 ) , i s l i mi t ed, howev er , t o t he un i que c i r cums t anc es i nv ol ved
w h e n a p e tit io n e r in a c a p ital c a se se e k s to w ithd ra w a n a lre a d y-f iled p o st-co n v ic tio n p e tit io n a n d w a ive furth e r p o stc o n v ic tio n re lief. 8 ri g ht t o b e c omp e te nt to st and tr ia l a ndstatut ory pr ov isi on s, su c h a s th e lim itatio n to on e po stconviction proc eeding and the requireme nt that the petit ioner testifywhen substantial questions of fac t are raised. SeeTenn. Code Ann. §§ 40- 30-102(c ), -110( a)

. R eid also attempts to tie a
c omp e te nc y

re qu ir e me nt t o c ou ns e l’ s pro fe ssi on a l ob lig a tio ns un de r the ru le s a pp lic ableto the Pos tConviction P roce dure A ct. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 6(C)(2) (re quiring counsel to revie w the pro
se petition, f

ile an ame nded petition if nec essary , “intervie w re levant witnesses, inc luding pe titioner and prior c ounsel, and diligently investigate and prese nt all rea sonable claims”). I n arg uing f or a level of competenc y commensurate wit h that require d for tria l, Reid misconstrues the nature of the rig ht. As discussed above , competenc y to proce ed on post -convic tion is neither a constitutional nor
a statut ory ri g ht. Due pr ocess r equire s only that a petiti oner be provided an opportunity for the pr esentation of c la ims a t a

me a nin g fu l ti me a ndin a me a nin g fu l m ann er. The c ivi l st a nd ardof c omp e te nc e is sufficie nt to meet that require ment. At trial , a defenda nt must m ake f undamental de cisions that requirethe adviceof counse l but a re ultimately persona l to the defe ndant. See, e .g ., Momon v. St ate, 18 S.W .3d 152 (Tenn. 1999) (wa iver of rig ht to testify ). Thus, the ne cessity for r ational consultation is appare nt. On post-conviction, the dec ision-making a uthority shifts to counsel. See L eslie v. State, 36 S.W. 3d34 , 3 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) . A lth ou g h c ou ns e l is re qu ir e d to int e rv iew th e petitio ne r andto consult with him “w here fea sible,” counse l “re tains the rig ht to make strateg ic and tac tical dec isions – including the determ i n at i o n o f which issues a re r easona

ble and should be r aised a nd pursued – ba se d o n c ou ns e l’ s p ro fe ssi on a l ju dg me nt. ” I d. Th ro ug h th e a ssi stanc e of c ou ns e l, wh o ha ve a c c e ss to the appellate rec ord and tria l counsel’s files and who operate under an af firmative mandate from this Court t o i n v estig ate and prese nt all “re asonable claims,” Te nn. Sup. Ct . R. 28, § 6(C)(2), a petitioner is aff

orded the opportunity

for the pr esentation of claims in a meaning ful manner

. Under the civil standard of

competenc e, a pe titioner must unde rs t an d h i s leg al rig hts and liabiliti es. Implicit in our holdi ng in Nix is the determination that this level of c om p etenc y sufficie ntly

prov i d es a petitioner with the opportunity to challeng e his or her

conviction in a meaning ful manner . Due pr ocess considerations do not mandate differ ent levels of c ompetency at differ ent stage s o f post-convic tion procee dings. Alevel of c ompetency sufficie nt to commence a post-conviction ac tion is sufficient to pursue the matter to conclusion.
We hold that the civil standard o f m en t al incompetenc e adopte d in Nix applies to the determination of whether a petitioner is compe tent to proce ed in a post-c o n v i ct i on action. A petitioner i s, there fore , incompetent to pursue post-c onviction proce eding s only if he is unable e ither to manag e his persona l affairs or to understa nd his leg al rig hts and liabiliti es.T h e cl ea r an d con v i n ci n g s t an dar d al s o appl i es t o mot i on s t o r eope n pos t

- con v i ct i on pr oce edi n g s
. T en n
. Code 8 A n n . § 4 0 -3 0 -1 1 7 (a )( 4 ). 9 III . Thr e sho ld Sho wing
Re c og nizi ng that men ta l illne ss is not the e qu iva le nt of me nta l inc omp e te nc e , the Cou rt in Nix require d a prima fa cie showing of mental incompe tence to warr ant a c ompetency hearing. 40 S.W .3d at 463-64. We emphasized that “[u] nsupported, conc lusory , or g ener al alleg ations of mental ill ne ss” areins uf

fi c ie nt t o me e t th e re qu ir e d th re sh oldsh ow ing . I d. a t 46 4. We e xpla ine d:
The re quired prima f

acie showing may be satisfied by attaching to the petition aff idavits, depositions, m edica l reports, or othe r cr edible evide nce that contain spec ific fa ctual alleg atio n s showing the petitioner’s inc ompetence

. . . . Whil e af

fidavits and deposition s of mental he alth profe ssionals may be utiliz ed, they

are not e ssential, and a pe titioner may rely upon aff idavits and depositions from family

members, prison officials, attorne y s, or any other person who ha s knowledg e of fa ct s t hat demonstrate either the petitioner’s ina bil ity to m a na g e his pe rs on a l a ff a ir s o r the pe tit ion e r’ s in abil ity to understand his leg al rig hts and liabiliti es.

I d. We rec ently

adopted a simil ar pr ocess f or dete rmining w hether

a petition for post-c onviction relief may be filed by

a “ne x t friend” on behalf of an inmate who does not sign or verify the petition due to alleg ed mental incompetenc y
. See Holton, ___ S.W .3d at

___ (citing Nix , 40 S.W .3d. at 464).
Con sis te nt w ithNi x an d H olt on , we a do pt a ru le that pl a c e s th e bu rd e n o n th e pe tit ion e r t o make a threshold showing that he is incompetent to procee d i n a post -convic tion action. The pet iti on e r mus t su bmi t a

ple a din g a lle g ing his or

he r i nc omp e te nc e to p ro c e e d a nda tta c h th e re to aff idavits, depositions, m edica l re p orts, or other c redible e vidence that contain spec ific fa ctual alleg ations demonstrating either the petitioner’s inability to manag e his or her persona l affairs or the petitioner’s inability

to unde rstand his le g al rig hts and liabiliti es. I f a prima fac ie showing is made, then a c ompetency

hearing should be held. I n prepa ration for the c ompetency hearing, the trial court
ma y e nte r a sc he du lin g or de r r e qu iring thepa rt ie s to pr ov ideno tic e of a ny e xpe rt wi tne sse s a ndto provide a written re port of the e x pert’s opinions at a de signated time prior to the hea ring

.

IV. Burden of

P roof
Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-30-110(f) provides that at a po s t -c o nviction evidentiary hearing “[t] he petiti oner shall have the burden of proving the alleg ations of fa ct by clea r and convinc ing e vidence.” Citi ng this ge nera l burden of pr oof imposed by the post-conviction 8 statute, we he ld in Nix that at a competenc y hearing a petitioner bea

rs the burde n of proving by clea r and convinc ing e vidence that the statute of limit ations should be tolled f or incompetenc e. 40 S.W .3dAmi cu s Cur i ae a l s o pr opos es t h e pr epon der an ce s t an dar d. 9
10 at 464. Th e St a tear g u e s th a t th e r e is n o ju s ti f ic a ti o n f o r d e p artu r e f

r o m th e c le ar

a n d c o n v incing standard f or purpose s of a hearing to determine competenc y to proce ed in a post-convic tion action. We ag ree
. We find no merit in Reid’s contention that neither party should be ar the burden of proof at a competenc y hearing. Reid sug g ests that the intent of the leg islature to re cog nize competency as a non-adve rsarial conce pt is evidenc ed by a re cent amendment to the statute g overning competenc y e va luatio ns in c ri min a l matte rs , w hic h p ro vid e s:

Du ri ng thepo st -con vict ionsta g e of a c ri min a l pr oc e e din g , if

it i s be lie ve d th a t a

de fe nd a nt is inc omp e te nt t o a ssi st c ou ns e l in prepa ration for , or otherw i s e participate in, the post-conviction proce eding , the court may , u pon its own moti on, order that the defe ndant be e valuated on e ither an outpatient o r i n p at i ent basis, as may be appr opriate. If the de fendant i s i n d i g ent, the amount and payment of the costs for any such evaluation sha ll be determined and pa id f or by the a dmi nis tr a tiv e of

fi c e of the c ou rt s. I f the de fe nd a nt i s no t ind ig e nt, the c os t of the e va luatio n sh a ll be c ha rg e d a s c ou rt

c os ts. I f the eval uati on c a nn ot b e do ne on a n o utp a tie nt b a sis a ndif it i s nece ssary to hospitalize the defe ndant in a depa rtment fac ility , such hospitaliz ation shall not be for more than thirty (30) day s and shall be
su bje c t to thea vai lab il ity of su ita blea c c omm od a tio ns . A ny c os ts incurre d by the admini strative off ice of the courts shall be absorbe d within the curre nt appropriation for the indig ent def ense f und. Tenn. Code Ann. § 33- 7-301(a )(4) (Supp. 2005).
Reid’s relianc e on this provision is misplaced. When c onstruing statutes, leg islative intent i s d er ived from the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory lang uag e. H ic k man v
. St ate, 153 S.W .3d 16, 22 (Tenn. 2004)

. The a mendment addr esses ne ither the standard of competenc y nor the proce dure f

or dete rmining c ompetence

. Th e s t at u t e’ s primary purpose is to clarify

the sourceof funding for c ompetency evaluations in post-conviction proce eding s. Whil e also authorizing a trial
c ou rt , o n it s o wnmot ion , to or der a me nta l he a lthe va luatio n d uring po st- c on vic tio n p ro c e e din g s, nothing in the lang uag e of the statute indicates that the le g isla t ure intende d competenc y to be adjudicate d without a burden of proof.
We al s o re

ject Reid’s a lternative a

rg ument that, if a pe titioner must bear the bur den of pro v in g in c o mp e te n c e , it s h o u ldb e b y

a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f

th e e v id e n c e
. T h e p r e p o n d e r ance 9 standard a

pplies to the issue of competenc y to stand trial, Reid, 164 S.W .3d at 307, and the issue of compe tency

to be ex ecute d. Van Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 270-71. As we e x plained above , howeve r, these c onstitut ional rig hts are disti ng uishable fr om competenc y to proce ed in a post-c onviction11

action. Rely ing on Howell v. State, 151 S.W .3d 450 (Tenn. 2004) , Reid arg ues that imposing a clea r and convinc ing sta ndard w ould violate due proc ess. I n Howell, this Court addresse d the prope r burden of proof whe re a

petitioner for the first time, in either an initial petition for post-c onviction relief or in a motion to reope n post-conviction proce eding s, is a ble to r aise a cl ai m o f m ental reta rdation to avoid ca

pital punishment under Van T ran v. State, 66 S.W .3d 790 (Tenn. 2001), and Atkins v. Virg inia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). This Court noted that under curr ent law a defe ndant who raises the issue of mental re tardation at trial has only to pr ove the claim by a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e. Howe ll, 151 S.W .3d at 463 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203( c))

. This Court held:

As Van Tr a n a nd Atkin s make c le ar, me nta lly re tard e d in div idu a ls have a constitutional right not t o be ex ecute d. We rec og nize that our holding today

is at odds with the s tandar d set out in TennesseeCode Annotated section 40-30-117. How ever , wer e we to apply the statut e ’s “cl ear

a ndc on vin c ing ” stand ardin l ig ht o f the ne wl y de c lare d c on sti tut ion a l rig ht ag ain st the e xec uti on of theme nta lly reta rded, the s t at u t e would be unconstituti onal in its application. There fore , in light of the f act that the pe titioner could n o t have litigated his c laim at any earlier proc eedi n g, we hold that at an evidentiary

hearing, hewill h av e t he opportunity to prove menta l reta rdation by

preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Howell, 151 S.W.3d at 465 (footnote omitted). Howell is distinguish ab l e. T he issue of the constitutional right of a mentally reta rded individual not to be ex ecute d is the sam e wh et h er it is raised at trial or on post-c onviction. Ac c or din g ly , the bu rd e n of pr oo f sh ou ld no t dif fer de pe nd ing up on wh e the r the de fe nd a nt m ake s h is
c la im o f r e tard a tio n at tria l or on po st- c on vic tio n. Re id’ s c la im o f i nc omp e te nc y to p ro c e e d w ithhis post-convictio n p ro ce ed ing is not ana logous to How ell’s claim of r etar dation beca use thereis no constitutional right to compete ncy during post-conviction proc eeding s. Sim ilarly , th e i ssue of
c omp e te nc y

to s ta ndtria l is se pa

rate a nd dis tin c t fr om the iss ue of c omp e te nc y to pr oc e e d in a po stconviction action. There fore , any disparity betwee n the burde n place d on defe ndants with respe ct to their compete ncy

to be tried a nd/or executed a nd the burde n place d on p et i tioners alleg ing incompetenc y

to proce ed with a post-c onviction action does not raise due proc ess conc erns.
We are g uided by

our treatment of the bu rd en o f p roof in the c losely analog ous tolli ng context. For a pe titioner alleg ing that the post-conviction statute of limit ations should be tolled, the
c on se qu e nc e s o f an e rr on e ou s det e rm inatio n of co mpe te nc e aresig nif ic a nt i n th a t th e pe tit ion e r w ill be precluded from prese nting his or her claims. Neve rtheless, we have c oncluded that the c lear and
con vi nci ng stand ardis a

pp ro priate in this c on te xt. Se e Ni x, 40 S.W. 3da t 46 4. Af te r the tim e ly filing of a post-convic tion petition, t he conse quence s of an e rrone ous determination of c ompetence are compar atively

less signific ant bec ause, w hile the manner of the prese ntation of the claims mayT h e trial c o u rt h a s n o t yet fo u n d tha t R e id ha s m a d e a p rim a fac ie c a se o f i n c o m p e te n c y, an d R e id re q u e sts 10 i n hi s b ri ef

t hat thi s C o urt “f

i nd suf f i ci ent e vi d ence o f

a p ri m a f aci e case p ri o r t o rem and t o t he [t ri al ] court

. ” Si nce t he tria l co u rt h a s n o t yet m a d e fi n d ing s o f fa c t o n this issu e , w e d e c line to gr a n t R e id ’s re q u e st.

B o th R e id a n d A m ic u s C u ria e re ly o n R o h a n e x re l. G a te s v . W o o d fo rd , 3 3 4 F .3 d 8 0 3 (9 th C ir. 2 0 0 3 ), in 11 whi ch t he N i nt h C i rcui t C o urt of A p p eal s hel d t hat a dis t ri ct co urt m ust s t ay ca p ital h a b e as proc eed i ngs d uri ng a p e tit io n e r’s inc o m p e te n c e , b u t t h a t ca se is i n a p p o site. T h e ru ling re ste d o n th e p re m ise tha t t h e fed e ra l ha b e a s sta tute inc o rp o ra te s a s ta tuto ry rig h t to c o m p e te n c e
. Id . a t 8 1 4

. W e h a v e d e c line d to fin d s u c h a sta tuto ry rig h t un d e r o u r sta te po s t

- convi ct i on s t at ut e. 12 be a ff e c te d, thec la ims the mse lve s a reno t pr e c lud e d. I f the c le ar andcon vi nci ng stand ardis adequate to ensure due proc ess in the tolling conte x t, t h en we d ee m it proper for purposes of the post-conviction proc eeding itself. Consist ent wit h Nix , we therefor e conclude that at a competenc y he ari ng a pe tit ion e r b e ars thebu rd e n o f p ro vin g by c le ar an d co nv inc ing e vid e nc e that he or sh e is incompetent to proc eed in a post-conviction ac tion.
V. Eff ect of Findin g of In com petence Finally , we must determine how a f indin g o f incompetenc e will aff ect the post-c onviction proce eding s. Under

the proc edure adopted by the trial court in this case , purely leg al claims and 10 fac tual claims that do not require the petitioner’s input would proc eed. Fa ctual claims that require the petitioner’s input would be he ld in abey an ce pe nding the petitioner’s re turn to competenc y , at which time such claims could be raised in a mot ion to reope n. This type of bifur cate d approa ch has been a dopted in sever al states

. See, e.g ., Carter v. Florida , 706 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1997) ; Council v. Catoe, 597 S.E.2d 782 (S.C. 2004); St ate v. De bra A .E., 523 N.W.2d 727 (Wis . 1994).
Ne i t h er t h e State nor Reid supports this approa ch. Reid cor rec tly points out t hat the pr oc e du re a do pte d by the tria l c ou rt in this c a se , w hic h s ta y s so me c la ims a ndpr oc e e ds wi th o the rs , wo uldc re a te a

g re a t de al of u nc e rt a inty a ndov e rl y

c omp lic a te a n “ a lr e a dy

la by ri nth ine ” pr oc e ss, espec ially in light of the statute of limit ations under the fe d er al habe as statute. More over, incompetenc y

is not one of the limited gr ound s fo r re o p ening a post-convic tion procee ding. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-117. We do not ag ree with Reid, however , that a stay should apply to all claims. Given that the 11 purpose of

post-conviction proc eeding s is to obtain r el i ef from an unc onstitut ional conviction or sentenc e, a stay

of the proc eeding s could be ha rmful to a petitioner by

causing him or her to suff er from the de lay

of meritorious claims. At t h e s am e t ime, permitting c ollatera l review to proce ed despite a pe titioner’s incompete n ce ad vance s the interest of the State in the expeditious administration of the criminal just ice sy stem. S ee Bu rf o rd , 845 S.W .2d at 207 (noting that preve nting the litig ation of stale a nd g roundless cla ims is the governmental intere st repre sented by post-conviction statute of lim itations). Both the pe titioner and the State ha ve an inter est in resolving claims while wit nesses are available and their m emories of the events are fre sh. See id. A stay of the proc eeding s advanc es neither the intere st of t he S tate nor, to the ex tent the claims presented a re valid, the intere st of the petitioner.13

We ag ree , there fore , with the State that a finding of incompete nce r equire s neither a partial
n o r c o mp le tes tay

o f th e p r o c e e d in g s
. I n s te a d , th e tria l c o u rt sh o u ld ap p o in t, if n e c e s s ar y , a “ n e xt frie nd ” or g ua rd ia n a d li te m to pu rs ue thea c ti on on be ha lf of thepe tit ion e r. Suc h a

pr oc e du reis consistent with our rec ent decision in Holton allowing a “next friend” to initi ate a post-conviction action on beha lf of an inc ompetent petitioner. We noted that in applying f eder al habe as cor

pus pr oc e du re s, theUn ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cou rt ha s r e c og nize d th a t a

“ ne xt frie nd ” may “‘a

pp e ar i n court on be half of de tained prisoner s who areunable, usua lly beca u s e of incompete nce or inacces s i b i l ity , to seek re lief themselves.’ ” Holton, ___ S.W.3d at ___ (quoting Whitm ore v. Ar ka ns a s, 49 5 U .S. 14 9, 16 2 (1 99 0) ). As e xpla ine d in Wh itm or e , a “ ne xt frie nd ” do e s n ot “ be c ome a pa rty to the ha be a s c or pu s a c tio n in wh ic h he pa rt ic ipate s, bu t si mpl y

pu rs ue s th e c aus e on be ha lf of the de tained per son, who remains the rea l party in interest.” 495 U.S. a t 1 6 3

. I n that sense, a “next friend” r esembles a

g uardia n ad litem who prosec utes or defe nds a ca se fr om start to finish on b eh al f o f a n o t h er
. M o rga n v
. P o t t er , 1 5 7 U. S

. 1 9 5 , 1 9 8 (1 8 9 5 ). T h e “ n ex tfr i en d ” m aych al l en ge a crimi na l ju dg me nt o n b e ha lf of a no the r i f i t is sh ow n th a t “ there a l pa rty in i nte re st i s un ab le to lit iga te his own c au se du e to m e nta l in c ap ac ity , lack of acc ess to court, or othe r similar disability .” Whit more, 495 U.S. at 165 (e mphasis added)

. Thus, while mental incompete nce may be a ba sis for allowing a “ne x t friend” to initi ate a post-conviction ac tion, it does not require c essation of the pr oc e e din g s.
CO NC LU SION
We affirm as modified t he ruling of the trial court re g arding the proc edure for de termining competenc y

to proce ed in a post-c onviction action. We rema nd the case t o the t rial court for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.
It appea ring th at t h e petitioner, Paul Dennis Reid, Jr., is i ndige nt, costs of this appeal a re taxed to the St ate of

Tenne ssee.

___________________________________ CO RN ELI A A . CLAR K, JUSTI CE