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VISA SECURITY AND PASSENGER PRE-SCREENING 

EFFORTS IN THE WAKE OF FLIGHT 253 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, 

MARITIME, AND GLOBAL 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 11, 2010 

Serial No. 111–55 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

BEN RAY LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

AL GREEN, Texas 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

MARY JO KILROY, Ohio 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

VACANCY

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio 

I. LANIER AVANT, Staff Director 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas, Chairwoman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JANE HARMAN, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

AL GREEN, Texas 

VACANCY

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

ALISON NORTHROP, Staff Director 

NIKKI HADDER, Clerk 

MANDY BOWERS, Minority Subcommittee Lead 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global 

Counterterrorism .................................................................................................. 1 

The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and 

Global Counterterrorism: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

WITNESSES

Mr. Raymond R. Parmer, Jr., Director, Office of International Affairs, U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9 

Mr. Thomas S. Winkowski, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 13 

Mr. David T. Donahue, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services, Bureau 

of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 17 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 19 

(1) 

VISA SECURITY AND PASSENGER PRESCREENING EFFORTS IN THE WAKE OF 

FLIGHT 253 

Thursday, March 11, 2010 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL

COUNTERTERRORISM, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:32 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Henry Cuellar [Chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Cuellar, Thompson, Pascrell, and 

Souder. 

Mr. CUELLAR [presiding]. The subcommittee will come to order. 

The Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Terrorism— 

Counterterrorism is meeting today to receive testimony on visa security, passenger pre-screening efforts in the wake of Flight 253. 

Today the subcommittee is meeting to examine the visa security 

and passenger pre-screening efforts in the wake of the Flight 253 

incidence—you know, happened around Christmas day of last year. 

It is my hope that we build—we will be using this hearing to 

build on the hearing that the Chairman of the full committee had 

in January. We will be taking his foundation and work from there. 

Mr. Chairman, we want to thank you, of course, for that. 

Now that we have an understanding of the failures that left us 

vulnerable to attack, the subcommittee is examining as to what 

steps DHS, the State Department and the Federal and international partners are taking to address those vulnerabilities. 

Along with other Members of this committee I recently had the 

opportunity to view some of those efforts first-hand. Last week I 

visited—we visited the Customs Border Protection National Targeting Center and was briefed by immigration and customs enforcement about the Visa Security Program. 

I am encouraged by much of what has happened since that and, 

of course, what we have learned. Security in our skies starts with 

what we do on the ground. 

I am glad that CBP is doing more than just screening passengers 

prior to departure for the United States, even though they have a 

limited number of physical presence at a number of the airports. 

They are making the most of existing technology and utilizing relationships with regional carrier liaisons, which makes good sense. 
2 

We must not forget that our airports are also the border ports 

of entry. That is why ICE is deploying additional units under its 

Visa Security Program, or VSP, as it is known, to strategic, highrisk visa issuing posts around the world. 

However, more remains to be done. We need to look how CBP 

can further improve its pre-screening process to target those who 

seek to do us harm, without unduly delaying the legitimate travel. 

That balance is so important between security and, of course, commerce. 

We also must explore whether we are making the most of the 

ICE Visa Security Program, and if it should be deployed to additional high-risk embassies and consulates. 

Furthermore, we should examine how the State Department and 

the Department of Homeland can improve their coordination and 

their cooperation. The coordination, the cooperation, and communication is what we call the Three C’s. 

I have always advocated that as Government agencies, we should 

share more information. The more we can do together, the better 

it is for the people that we serve, our customers, our taxpayers, the 

people of America. 

I know that ICE Assistant Secretary John Morton has been visiting our embassies to conduct outreach and discuss the program. 

However, I do have to say that I was troubled that the State Department’s recent denial of the VSP application for a post in the 

Middle East. My understanding that there is a sign of commitment 

to the interagency cooperation post-Flight 253, and clearly we have 

a ways to go on this. 

But I was pleased to hear that since that, the State Department 

has reversed its decision, and hopefully that will set the tone for 

the future, and the cooperation between ICE and Homeland and 

the State Department is so important for us as the committee. 

Of course, ICE and CBP are only part of the equation. Many of 

the problems that contributed to the Christmas day incident were 

intelligence and information-sharing failures. As Secretary Napolitano has stated, DHS is largely a consumer of the watch list. 

We need to make sure we get ICE and CBP, as our frontline officers and agents at the—at America’s land, sea, and airports the information they need so they can do their job in a proper way. Prescreening passengers is one of our last lines of defense in securing 

our skies. 

Also, Mr. Chairman, as you know, I want to thank you. This is 

my first hearing as Chairman of this subcommittee, and I certainly 

want to say thank you very much for that opportunity, Mr. Chairman. 

Of course I will look forward to working with my Ranking Member, Mr. Souder, who has been very interested and very cooperative 

as we work in a bipartisan way. 

Certainly, we want to do everything we can to address the border 

and maritime security matters that come before this subcommittee. 

My approach as Chairman is going to be very simple. We want 

to work together. It is not us versus you. We are all on the same 

team. You might be the Executive branch. We might be the Legislative branch. But we should work together. There will be no surprises. 
3 

We are hoping, Mr. Chairman, that we get no surprises from our 

agencies also. If there is a problem, we would like to know before 

we read about it in the newspaper, as it happened in the past. I 

think it is a very simple request that we are making. 

I think if we do that, Mr. Chairman, I think we can have a dialogue that will be for the betterment of the folks that we serve. 

So I want to thank the witnesses for joining us here and for the 

courageous work that you all do every day and for keeping us safe. 

We want to say thank you. I look forward to your testimony and 

continuing our dialogue about how we can work together to make 

our Nation more secure. 

I know our Ranking Member is not here. I know there are—they 

have a big meeting. But certainly, I would like to recognize the 

Chairman of the full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, 

Mr. Thompson, for an opening statement. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I associate 

myself with your earlier statement. 

Logistically, they have just called six votes. That is the bad news. 

The good news—those are the only votes for the day, so hopefully 

we can, Mr. Chairman, adjourn and come right back. We can beg 

the indulgence of our witnesses. 

You have made your statement quite clear. Cooperation and coordination is absolutely important in this process. The public expects no less. The assumption is that the right hand really ought 

to know what the left hand is doing. 

In the spirit of cooperation and coordination, Congress has put 

the necessary tools in place with the professional help to make that 

happen. The missteps in Jerusalem you just talked about is unfortunate. Hopefully it won’t happen again. 

We have been assured, I think, at the staff level that that has 

been corrected and hopefully the State Department will work a little closer with us in the future. 

I will, in the interest of time, Mr. Chair, include my formal statement for the record, and I will yield back. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Without objection. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The statement of Mr. Thompson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON

MARCH 11, 2010 

In January, the Committee on Homeland Security held a hearing to examine the 

circumstances surrounding the attempted bombing of Northwest Flight 253 on 

Christmas day. 

From our examination of the chain of events leading up to the incident, it is clear 

there were several failures that allowed the alleged perpetrator to board the U.S.- 

bound flight. 

I am pleased that today’s hearing will build on what we have learned by focusing 

on what we are doing, both now and over the long term, to eliminate the security 

gaps revealed by Flight 253. 

As I stated earlier this year, we will not eradicate all terrorist threats overnight 

nor with a single technology. 

Instead, we must develop a layered security approach that pushes borders out and 

begins far in advance of a passenger boarding a U.S.-bound flight. 

With respect to the Department of Homeland Security, that will require a number 

of initiatives, including enhancing ICE’s Visa Security Program (or ‘‘VSP’’) and 

strengthening CBP’s passenger pre-screening activities. 
4 

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Congress recognized the importance of securing the visa process and required it to be used as a counterterrorism 

tool. 

Mandating the Visa Security Program was one of these efforts. 

By deploying experienced ICE agents at overseas posts, the program attempts to 

identify potential threats before they reach our borders. 

Despite the legislative mandate to deploy Visa Security Units to high-risk posts, 

VSP expansion has been slow. 

The current process can be cumbersome, and there appears to be some resistance 

to expanding the program. 

I was troubled by the State Department’s denial last month of ICE’s application 

for a new VSP unit at a very strategic post—even in the wake of Flight 253. 

At the same time, it is DHS’ responsibility to ensure that applications are submitted in a timely way and that it makes the most of the positions granted. 

In short, improved coordination and cooperation between DHS and the State Department are essential to the success of the program. 

With respect to passenger pre-screening efforts, CBP has recently strengthened 

some of their processes to ensure greater scrutiny of certain passengers prior to departure, rather than waiting until they arrive at U.S. airports. 

I want to hear more about those enhancements and what else we can do without 

unduly delaying legitimate travelers. 

Those who would do us harm do not stick to the status quo, and we cannot either. 

In closing, I would like to congratulate Representative Cuellar on his chairmanship. I look forward to continued good work from this subcommittee under his leadership. 

I thank the witnesses for being here today. 

Mr. CUELLAR. I guess at this time what we are going to do is we 

are going to excuse ourselves so we can go vote. 

How much time do we actually have? About 10 minutes. Well, 

why don’t we at least get the preliminary work out of the way? Let 

me do the introductions, so when we come back we can go ahead 

and get started. 

So, Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me, first—our first witness, 

so we can do the introductions—our first witness is Mr. Raymond 

Parmer, Jr., who is the director of ICE Office of International Affairs, the largest international component within the Department 

of Homeland Security. 

He has served in a variety of key ICE management positions, including as the deputy director of ICE Office of Investigations— 

again, the largest investigative arm of DHS. 

With over 20 years of law enforcement experience, Mr. Parmer 

has served as the special agent in supervisory—special agent in a 

number of U.S. Customs Services Office of Investigation field and 

headquarters offices. 

Again, Mr. Parmer, thank you very much for being here with us. 

Again, our second witness, Thomas Winkowski, was first appointed assistant commissioner for the Office of Field Operations at 

Customs and Border Protection in August 2007. 

In that position he manages an operating budget approaching 

$2.5 billion, directs the activities of 24,000 employees and oversees 

programs and operations of 20 major field offices, 326 ports of 

entry, 58 operational Container Security Initiative ports and 15 

pre-clearance stations. 

Mr. Winkowski, again, we want to thank you. We got that tour 

of the center last week, and we want to thank you for your hospitality and the information that you provided us last week. 

Our third witness is Mr. David Donahue, who has been the deputy assistant secretary for visa services in September 2008. 

Mr. Donahue, thank you very much for being here with us. 
5 

Prior to that, he was the director of the Office of Policy Coordination and Public Affairs in the Bureau of Consular Affairs. He was 

a minister counselor for the consular affairs in Mexico City from 

2005 and 2007. I guess you served there with my friend Tony 

Garza from South Texas, also, Brownsville, Texas. 

Previous to that, he served at posts in the Philippines, Pakistan, 

Singapore, Trinidad, and Washington, DC. Mr. Donahue joined the 

Foreign Service in 1983. 

Again, I want to thank all of you all for being here. Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted in the record, 

and we will ask you to hold at ease for a while, and we will be back 

right after the votes. Thank you very much for being here. 

Committee recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. CUELLAR. All right. The subcommittee will resume again. 

I believe Mr. Souder has a statement, and you want—you just 

want to go ahead and submit that for the record? Okay. Without 

objection, the record will be—the statement will be part of the 

record. 

[The statement of Mr. Souder follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HONORABLE MARK E. SOUDER

MARCH 11, 2010 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would first like to congratulate you on the new subcommittee chairmanship. I know that we have had some briefings prior to this but 

this is your first official hearing as the Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism Chair. I look forward to working with you over the rest of the Congress to 

examine issues under the subcommittee’s purview. 

I am pleased that we are here to examine visa security and passenger 

prescreening efforts in the wake of Flight 253. I also want to thank our witnesses 

for appearing before our subcommittee today to discuss this very important topic. 

I want to say at the outset that, in my view, the Department needs to more aggressively strengthen its capabilities to improve visa security, bolster passenger 

prescreening, and expand border security efforts overseas to prevent potential terrorists from boarding airplanes bound for the United States. 

The events of this past Christmas day show that terrorists remain committed to 

exploiting weaknesses in our homeland security and carrying out horrendous acts 

of violence against American citizens in a very coordinated and methodical manner. 

I am quite concerned that our visa security and passenger prescreening efforts are 

not nearly as comprehensive and robust as they need to be to prevent someone like 

Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab from slipping through cracks in our defenses. 

Unfortunately, we need only look at the Department’s budget request for terrorist 

travel programs related to visa security and passenger prescreening to see those 

cracks. The Department’s fiscal year 2011 budget request fails to sufficiently fund 

key programs and initiatives that can help identify terrorists seeking to travel to 

the United States. It represents a missed opportunity to expand border security efforts overseas and move toward a more coordinated strategy for expanding our Nation’s security perimeter. 

For instance, funding for the Visa Security Program, which places ICE personnel 

in high-risk locations overseas to more carefully scrutinize visa applicants, will not 

allow for expansion of this critical terrorist detection program in needed areas. ICE 

has identified several dozen locations in which Visa Security Units should be located, but insufficient funding and diplomatic resistance from the State Department 

has slowed its expansion, so much so that it would take many years to put units 

where ICE has identified that they are needed. 

The budget for CBP eliminates funding for advanced passenger screening and targeting to help determine whether passengers should be prevented from boarding 

flights prior to their departure for the United States. These programs help assess 

potential passenger risk and determine whether heightened scrutiny of those passengers is necessary. CBP has acknowledged that this reduction will have an operational impact, but insists that the funds used for these programs are needed for 
6 

other priorities. I understand that there is intention to continue to fund this mission 

from within the base CBP budget, while a good step raises transparency issues and 

begs the question of what else is being cut. 

The budget also fails to provide additional funding for tracking foreign students 

in the United States and would eliminate funding for the US–VISIT air exit, which 

is a key program necessary to identify visa overstays. It is extremely disconcerting 

that DHS would present a budget to Congress without funding or a plan to address 

this vulnerability. 

These programs, and other existing capabilities to detect and disrupt terrorist 

travel, should be guided by a strategic plan designed to maximize our ability to connect-the-dots given appropriate information and further enhance the layered security necessary to stop future attacks. Congress has given the Department the tools 

its needs to push our border perimeter far beyond our physical shore so that terrorists are not able to get into the country to commit their despicable acts like they 

did on 9/11. 

I am greatly troubled then that nearly 81⁄2 years after the September 11 attacks, 

the Department either plans to scale back or fails to aggressively move forward on 

initiatives and programs that can help prevent a repeat of such terrible events. 

I hope that we are going to hear from today’s witnesses about how visa security 

has been improved and passenger prescreening has and can be further strengthened 

in the aftermath of the attempted bombing of Flight 253. I certainly have my doubts 

based on the Department’s budget request for these areas for the coming fiscal year. 

Mr. Chairman, I know that you are as committed as I am to ensuring that we 

are doing everything within our power to expand our border security efforts overseas to protect American citizens and prevent terrorists from entering our country. 

I hope today’s hearing will provide insights to help us do that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. CUELLAR. At this time, as you recall—and again, we apologize. As you know, we have had different votes. We just finished, 

I believe, for the day, so what we will do now is that we will go 

ahead and start off with the witnesses. 

Mr. Parmer, as you know, we just introduced everybody right before we left, so we will start off with Mr. Parmer. I would ask you 

to summarize your statement for 5 minutes, and then we will go 

on with Tom, and then other folks here will go ahead and ask the 

questions. 

So, Mr. Parmer. 

STATEMENT OF RAYMOND R. PARMER, JR., DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND 

CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. PARMER. Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Souder, thank 

you on behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Assistant Secretary Morton for the opportunity to discuss the international efforts of ICE 

to protect National security and prevent terrorist attacks. 

Today, I would like to discuss the Visa Security Program in the 

context of the 9/11 Commission’s findings, which emphasized the 

importance of our immigration system more thoroughly vetting individuals entering our country and developing functional counterterrorism measures. 

Within the Department of Homeland Security, ICE’s Visa Security Program is one of a number of programs designed to protect 

the homeland and identify individuals who present a risk before 

they can harm the United States. 

The Visa Security Program places ICE special agents in a U.S. 

embassies to work collaboratively with Department of State consular officers and diplomatic security agents to secure the visa adjudication process. 
7 

Before describing the Visa Security Program, the plans for expansion and challenges of expanding, let me describe ICE’s international efforts more generally. 

As the second-largest Federal investigative agency, ICE has a 

significant international footprint. Through our Office of International Affairs, ICE has 63 offices in 44 countries that are staffed 

by over 300 personnel. 

ICE personnel in these offices collaborate with foreign counterparts to disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal organizations engaged in money laundering, contraband smuggling, weapons proliferation, forced child labor, human rights violations, intellectual property rights violations, child exploitation, human smuggling and trafficking, as well as facilitate repatriation of individuals with final orders of removal. 

ICE’s Office of International Affairs is also responsible for administering and staffing the Visa Security Program. The visa adjudication process is often the first opportunity our Government has to 

assess whether a potential visitor or immigrant presents a threat 

to the United States. 

The U.S. Government has long recognized the importance of this 

function to National security. DHS regards the visa process as an 

important part of the border security strategy, and the Visa Security Program is one of several programs focused on minimizing 

global risks. 

The Visa Security Program relies on trained, experienced investigators to look at an applicant in greater depth and examine their 

social networks and business relationships with a goal of developing information previously unknown to the U.S. Government to 

assess whether individual applicants pose security threats to the 

United States. 

To conduct a thorough investigation, an ICE agent assigned to a 

Visa Security Unit must have the ability to interview the applicant 

of concern and must be exposed to local information to understand 

whether the applicant’s affiliations raise any particular flags. 

Each individual security—Visa Security Unit, with input from 

the State Department, develops a targeting plan based on assessed 

conditions and threats. Depending on the nature of the concern 

that an applicant poses a threat, the ICE agent’s investigation may 

be complex and in depth, and in some cases taking months to complete. 

Of course, not every investigation lasts months. ICE agents assigned to the Visa Security Program are experienced law enforcement agents who have spent years developing interview, interrogation, and other skills while investigating crimes in the United 

States. 

Visa Security Program efforts complement the consular officers’ 

responsibility for interviewing the applicant, reviewing the application and supporting documentation, and conducting automated 

screening of criminal and terrorist databases, with proactive law 

enforcement vetting and investigation. 

ICE now has Visa Security Units at 14 high-risk visa adjudication posts in 12 countries. At these 14 posts, in fiscal year 2009, 

ICE agents screened approximately 905,000 visa applicants and, 
8 

with their State Department colleagues, determined that about 

302,000 required further review. 

Following investigation, in collaboration with State Department, 

ICE recommended refusal of over 1,000 applicants. In every instance, State Department followed the Visa Security Unit recommendation and ultimately refused to issue the visa. Visa Security Program recommendations have also resulted in State Department visa revocations. 

Under the direction of the Homeland Security Council, beginning 

in May 2008, ICE and the State Department collaborated on the 

development of the Visa Security Program site selection methodology. The process for selecting a particular site for a Visa Security 

Unit begins with a site evaluation, which involves a quantitative 

analysis of threats posed and site assessment visits. 

The DHS formal nomination process follows, which involves an 

analysis of ICE’s proposal by DHS. Then, the National Security Decision Directive—38 process, which is a mechanism that gives the 

chief of mission in a particular post control over the size, composition, and mandate of full-time staffing for the post, commences 

within the State Department. Only once the chief of mission has 

approved an NSDD–38 request can ICE begin deployment. 

ICE continues to look for opportunities to establish new offices 

overseas to screen and vet additional visa applicants at high-risk 

visa-issuing posts. 

Based on collaborative site selection methodology with the State 

Department, ICE has conducted additional classified threat assessments in preparation for joint ICE-State Department site visits to 

embassies and consulates abroad. 

Assistant Secretary Morton and his counterpart at the State Department are engaged now in a process of determining a common 

strategic approach to the broader question of how to collectively secure the visa issuance process. 

I would now like to briefly discuss the security advisory opinion 

process, which is administered by the State Department and supported by other Government agencies to provide consular officers 

advice and background information to adjudicate visa applications 

abroad in cases of security or foreign policy interest. 

In May 2007, Congress mandated the creation of a Security Advisory Opinion Unit within the Visa Security Program. The Visa Security Program now supports the SAO process and the Security Advisory Opinion Unit’s findings are incorporated into the overall 

SAO recommendation used by consular officers to adjudicate visa 

applications. 

The Security Advisory Opinion currently has co-located personnel 

at the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center and CBP’s National Targeting Center for Passengers and also has personnel assigned to the National Counterterrorism Center. 

The integration of the Security Advisory Opinion Unit into these 

centers allows for real-time dissemination of intelligence between 

the various stakeholders in the visa adjudication process. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today 

and for the subcommittee’s continued support of ICE and our law 

enforcement mission. 
9 

Assistant Secretary Morton and I, in partnership with State Department, CBP and other vital partners, will continue collaborating 

to ensure the security of the visa while maintaining a fair and efficient process for legitimate visitors and immigrants to enter the 

United States. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions you would have at 

this time. 

[The statement of Mr. Parmer follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RAYMOND R. PARMER, JR. 

MARCH 11, 2010 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Souder, distinguished Members of the subcommittee: On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Assistant Secretary Morton, 

thank you for the opportunity to discuss the international efforts of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to protect National security and prevent terrorist attacks. Today, I plan to discuss the Visa Security Program (VSP) in the context of the 9/11 Commission’s findings, which emphasized the importance of our immigration system more thoroughly vetting individuals entering our country and developing functional counterterrorism measures. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), ICE’s VSP is one of a number of programs designed to protect 

the homeland and identify individuals who present a risk before they can harm the 

United States. The VSP places a DHS law enforcement officer (i.e., an ICE special 

agent) in a U.S. embassy to work collaboratively with Department of State (DOS) 

consular officers and Diplomatic Security Agents to secure the visa adjudication 

process. Before describing the VSP, our budget, the plans for expansion, and challenges of expanding, let me describe ICE’s international efforts more generally. 

ICE’s Presence Overseas 

ICE, as the second-largest Federal investigative agency, has a significant international footprint. ICE, through our Office of International Affairs (OIA), has 63 offices in 44 countries, staffed by more than 300 personnel. ICE personnel in these 

offices collaborate with foreign counterparts in joint efforts to disrupt and dismantle 

transnational criminal organizations engaged in money laundering, contraband 

smuggling, weapons proliferation, forced child labor, human rights violations, intellectual property rights violations, child exploitation, and human smuggling and trafficking, and facilitate repatriation of individuals with final orders of deportation. In 

fiscal year 2009, ICE opened offices in: Amman, Jordan; Brussels, Belgium; 

Cartagena, Colombia; Guayaquil, Ecuador; and Jakarta, Indonesia and continued to 

expand its coordination with U.S. military commands, specifically United States 

Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), United States African Command (AFRICOM), 

and United States European Command (EUCOM). In fiscal year 2010, to increase 

our overseas presence and advance the efforts to investigate crimes that reach beyond our borders, ICE is proposing to open offices in Afghanistan, Israel, Vietnam, 

and Yemen. 

ICE’s OIA is responsible for administering and staffing the VSP. 

The Visa Security Program 

During the creation of DHS, Congress gave DHS some oversight responsibilities 

for the visa process. Specifically, Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act (HSA) 

of 2002 authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security to: Administer and enforce 

the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and other laws relating to visas; refuse 

visas for individual applicants in accordance with law; assign DHS officers to diplomatic posts to perform visa security activities; initiate investigations of visa security-related matters; and provide advice and training to consular officers. In short, 

the HSA directed DHS to assist in the identification of National security threats to 

the visa security process. 

The visa adjudication process is often the first opportunity our Government has 

to assess whether a potential visitor or immigrant presents a threat to the United 

States. The U.S. Government has long recognized the importance of this function 

to National security. DHS regards the visa process as an important part of the border security strategy, and VSP is one of several programs focused on minimizing 

global risks. The VSP relies on trained law enforcement agents to look at an applicant in greater depth and examine their social networks and business relationships 
10 

with a goal of developing information previously unknown to the U.S. Government 

to assess whether individual applicants pose security threats to the United States. 

ICE agents assigned to Visa Security Units (VSU) are professional law enforcement 

agents who focus on selected applicants and any connection the applicants may have 

to terrorism. In the context of the visa security process, they begin by reviewing documents submitted by applicants, and reviewing the results of automated checks 

(from the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), and others). To conduct 

a thorough investigation, an ICE agent assigned to a VSU must have the ability 

to interview the applicant of concern and must be exposed to local information to 

understand whether the applicant’s affiliations raise any particular flags. Each individual VSU, with input from DOS, develops a targeting plan, based on assessed conditions and threats. Depending on the nature of the concern that an applicant poses 

a threat, the ICE agent’s investigation may be complex and in-depth, in some cases 

taking months to complete. Of course, not every investigation lasts months. ICE 

agents assigned to the VSP are experienced law enforcement agents who have spent 

years developing interview, interrogation, and other skills while investigating 

crimes in the United States. 

DHS does not participate in all visa adjudication procedures; rather, DHS becomes a part of the process following initial screening of an applicant. As such, 

where VSUs are present, DOS consular officers and ICE agents must establish effective and productive partnerships in order to enhance the security of the visa process. 

VSP efforts complement the consular officers’ responsibility for interviewing the 

applicant, reviewing the application, and supporting documentation and conducting 

automated screening of criminal and terrorist databases, with proactive law enforcement vetting and investigation. In carrying out this mission, ICE special agents conduct targeted, in-depth law enforcement-focused reviews of individual visa applications and applicants prior to issuance, as well as recommend refusal or revocation 

of applications when warranted. 

ICE now has VSUs at 14 high-risk visa adjudication posts in 12 countries. While 

I can not identify the specific posts in this forum, I will gladly brief the Members 

and staff of this subcommittee in a classified or law enforcement-sensitive setting 

at a later date. At these 14 posts, in fiscal year 2009, ICE agents screened 904,620 

visa applicants and with their DOS colleagues determined that 301,700 required 

further review. Following investigation, in collaboration with their DOS colleagues, 

ICE recommended refusal of over 1,000 applicants. In every instance, DOS followed 

the VSU recommendation and ultimately refused to issue the visa. VSP recommendations have also resulted in DOS visa revocations. 

Expansion of the Visa Security Program 

Under the direction of the Homeland Security Council, beginning in May 2008, 

ICE and DOS collaborated on the development of the VSP Site Selection Methodology. In brief, the process for selecting a particular site for a VSU begins with an 

ICE site evaluation, which involves a quantitative analysis of threats posed and site 

assessment visits. The DHS formal nomination process follows, involving an analysis of ICE’s proposals by DHS. Then, the National Security Decision Directive— 

38 (NSDD–38) process, a mechanism that gives the Chief of Mission in a particular 

post control over the size, composition, and mandate of full-time staffing for the 

post, commences within DOS. Only once the Chief of Mission has approved an 

NSDD–38 request can ICE begin deployment. 

ICE continues to look for opportunities to establish offices overseas to screen and 

vet additional visa applicants at high-risk visa issuing posts beyond the 14 posts at 

which we are currently operating. The fiscal year 2010 budget designated $7.3 million for VSP expansion. With this funding level, ICE estimates that it can deploy 

to four additional posts. ICE has been conducting site visits and facilitating the 

NSDD–38 process in an effort to determine whether it would be beneficial to expand 

VSP operations to additional high-risk visa adjudicating posts. Based on collaborative site selection methodology with DOS, ICE conducted additional classified 

threat assessments on four posts in preparation for joint VSP–DOS site visits to embassies/consulates abroad. The VSP program has continued to grow since its inception. While ICE is continuing to expand the program, further expansion is contingent on ICE’s dedicating existing overseas funding to these efforts and approval of 

NSDD–38 requests at the posts in question. 

ICE will continue moving forward to deploy new offices to the highest risk visa 

adjudicating posts worldwide as resources allow, and will continue to conduct joint 

site visits with DOS to create opportunities for deployment. Moreover, ICE recognizes that the VSP is but one relatively small component in the Nation’s counterterrorism strategy. Assistant Secretary Morton and his counterparts at DOS are en-
11 

gaged now in a process of determining a common strategic approach to the broader 

question of how best to collectively secure the visa issuance process. We look forward to continuing to report back to you with updates on this process. 

Recent Successes 

To put the VSP discussion in perspective, I offer two brief examples of the results 

of including ICE in the visa process. In September 2008, DOS raised concerns about 

visa applicants sponsored by an international non-governmental sports group. ICE 

investigated and determined that the majority of past applicants sponsored by the 

group remained in the United States beyond their period of admission and that the 

sport group’s president had three previous visa denials, with one on National security grounds. ICE disseminated information about potential future applicants 

throughout DHS and to DOS visa-issuing posts. This equipped CBP inspectors stationed at airports and the border and DOS consular officers with detailed information about the sports group to prevent future use of the club as a mechanism to gain 

entry into the United States, and to prevent National security threats from exploiting the scheme to gain entry. 

Second, in July 2009, again while examining visa applications, ICE agents identified an Iranian national who applied for a visitor’s visa to come to the United States 

to attend an information technology (IT) conference on behalf of his employer. Although the Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) process did not reveal a basis to find 

the Iranian national ineligible, ICE’s review revealed that the Iranian national’s employer—on whose behalf he was attending the IT conference—is an Office of Foreign 

Assets Control (OFAC)-designated organization allegedly used by the government of 

Iran to transfer money to terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah, Hamas, the 

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command and Palestinian 

Islamic Jihad. The visa applicant himself stated that he planned to attend the IT 

conference to explore the purchase of technology for his employer. While attending 

the conference alone did not render the Iranian national inadmissible, the combination of attending on behalf of his employer (an OFAC-designated entity) and the 

stated purpose to ‘‘explore purchasing options’’ for IT equipment constituted reasonable grounds for denial of the visa. Therefore, ICE recommended that DOS deny the 

visa on National security grounds, in accordance with the INA, as his purpose for 

coming to the United States was to possibly procure IT equipment for a designated 

OFAC organization. DOS concurred with ICE’s recommendation and denied the 

visa. 

I offer these examples to illustrate in real terms the benefit of a strong working 

relationship with DOS, and how the partnership advances the goal of preventing 

those who may intend to harm the United States from using a visa to enter our 

Nation. 

The Visa Security Program’s Security Advisory Opinion Unit (SAOU) 

The Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) process is the mechanism administered by 

DOS, supported by other Government agencies, to provide consular officers advice 

and background information to adjudicate visa applications abroad in cases of security or foreign policy interest. In May 2007, Congress mandated the creation of a 

Security Advisory Opinion Unit (SAOU) within the VSP. VSP now supports the SAO 

process and the SAOU’s findings are incorporated into the overall SAO recommendation used by consular officers to adjudicate targeted visa applications of 

National security or foreign policy interest. 

The SAOU is currently operating a pilot program that screens visa applicants and 

communicates any potential admissibility concerns to DOS. The SAOU currently 

has co-located personnel at the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC), 

the National Targeting Center-Passenger (NTC–P), both located in the National 

Capital Region, and also has personnel assigned to the National Counterterrorism 

Center (NCTC). The integration of the SAOU into these centers allows for real-time 

dissemination of intelligence between the various stakeholders in the visa adjudication process. 

CONCLUSION

I would like to thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify today and 

for its continued support of ICE and our law enforcement mission. Assistant Secretary Morton and I, in partnership with the State Department and other vital partners, will continue collaborating to ensure the security of the visa while maintaining 

a fair and efficient process for legitimate visitors and immigrants to enter the 

United States. 

I would be pleased to answer questions you may have at this time. 
12 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mr. Parmer, for your testimony. 

At this time I will recognize Mr. Winkowski for 5 minutes for 

your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS S. WINKOWSKI, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND 

BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Thank you, Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Souder, and thank you for the opportunity to appear today to 

discuss the steps U.S. Customs and Border Protection takes to prescreen travelers bound for the United States. 

I appreciate the committee’s leadership and your steadfast efforts 

to ensure security of the American people. 

Also, Mr. Chairman, I would just like to thank you for taking the 

time from your busy schedule to visit us at the NTC a few weeks 

ago. 

Today I want to describe the role that CBP currently performs 

in aviation security and the enhanced security measures implemented in the aftermath of the attempted Christmas day attack. 

As part of our efforts to screen passengers bound for the United 

States, CBP is an end-user of the U.S. Government’s consolidated 

terrorist watch list, which we use to help keep potential terrorists 

off flights bound for the United States and identify travelers that 

require additional screening. 

The majority of travelers bound for the United States are required to either have a visa issued by the Department of State or 

are traveling under the Visa Waiver Program, an electronic travel 

authorization issued through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization, most commonly referred to now as ESTA. 

ESTA enables CBP to conduct enhanced screening of VWP applicants in advance of travel to the United States in order to assess 

whether they could pose a risk to the Nation. When a traveler purchases a ticket for the—for travel to the United States, a passenger 

name record may be generated in the airlines reservation system. 

A PNR may contain various data elements such as itinerary, cotravelers, changes to the reservation and payment information. 

CBP receives PNR data from the airline at various stages, beginning as early as 72 hours prior to departure and concluding at the 

scheduled departure time of the flight. 

CBP uses the Automated Targeting System to evaluate the PNR 

data against targeting rules. It is important to note that PNR data 

received by airlines varies and may be incomplete, thus resulting— 

reflecting different information than the person’s actual travel documentation. 

On the day of departure, when an individual checks in for his intended flight, the basic biographic information from the individual’s 

passport is collected by the air carrier and submitted to CBP’s Advance Passenger Information System, APIS. 

APIS data is far more complete and considered more accurate 

than PNR data. DHS screens APIS information on international 

flights to and from the United States against the Terrorist Screening Database, TSDB, as well as against criminal history informa-
13 

tion, records of lost or stolen passports and prior immigration or 

customs violations. 

At nine airports in seven countries, CBP officers are stationed 

under the Immigration Advisory Program. Working with CBP’s National Targeting Center, IAP officers are provided information on 

certain passengers who may constitute a security risk. 

These officers can then make no-board recommendations to carriers and host governments but do not have the authority to arrest, 

detain, or prevent passengers from boarding planes. 

While flights are en route to the United States, CBP continues 

to evaluate the APIS and PNR information submitted by the airlines. At this point, a further assessment of individuals’ admissibility into the United States is conducted and a determination is 

made as to whether an individual requires additional screening 

prior to admission. 

Upon arrival in the United States, travelers present themselves 

to a CBP officer for inspection. Based on the information gathered 

during the in-flight analysis as well as the on-site CBP officers’ inspection, which includes examining travel documents, observing 

and interviewing the traveler, a determination is made as to 

whether the traveler should be referred for a secondary inspection 

or admitted to the United States. 

Since Christmas day, CBP has undertaken a number of steps to 

enhance our current process. We have expanded the information 

referred to IAP officers. We also began additional pre-screening of 

passengers traveling from non-IAP locations. 

Officers assigned to our Regional Carrier Liaison Group, of which 

we have three around the country working for—working with the 

NTC, makes recommendations to foreign carriers to deny boarding 

to individuals traveling to the United States who have been identified as being a National security risk, are ineligible for admission, 

or are traveling on fraudulent or fraudulently obtained documents. 

Through intelligence-sharing agreements, CBP continues to work 

with our foreign government counterparts as well as CBP and ICE 

attache ́s in order to share information as necessary and appropriate. 

While we address the circumstances behind the specific incident, 

we must also recognize the evolving threat posed by terrorists and 

take action to ensure that our defenses continue to evolve in order 

to defeat them. 

We live in a world of ever-changing risk, and we must move as 

aggressively as possible both to find and fix security flaws and anticipate future vulnerabilities. 

Chairman Cuellar, thank you very much for the opportunity to 

testify, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Winkowski follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS S. WINKOWSKI

MARCH 11, 2010 

Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Souder, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the steps 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) takes to pre-screen travelers bound for 

the United States. I appreciate the committee’s leadership, and your steadfast efforts to ensure the security of the American people. 
14 

The attempted attack on Northwest Flight 253 on December 25 was a powerful 

reminder that terrorists will go to great lengths to defeat the security measures that 

have been put in place since September 11, 2001. As Secretary Napolitano has testified at recent hearings regarding the attempted attack, this administration is determined to thwart terrorist plots and disrupt, dismantle, and defeat terrorist networks 

by employing multiple layers of defense that work in concert with one another to 

secure our country. This is an effort that involves not just CBP, but components 

across the Department of Homeland Security and many other Federal agencies as 

well as State, local, Tribal, territorial, private sector, and international partners. 

Today I want to describe the role that CBP currently performs in aviation security 

and the enhanced security measures implemented in the aftermath of the attempted 

Christmas day attack. 

CBP’S ROLE IN MULTIPLE LAYERS OF DEFENSE

Since 9/11, the U.S. Government has employed multiple layers of defense across 

several departments and agencies to secure the aviation sector and ensure the safety of the traveling public. Different Federal agencies bear different responsibilities, 

while other countries and the private sector—especially the air carriers themselves—also have important roles to play. 

CBP is responsible for securing our Nation’s borders while facilitating the movement of legitimate travel and trade vital to our economy. Our purview spans more 

than 5,000 miles of border with Canada and 1,900 miles of border with Mexico. CBP 

is the largest uniformed, Federal law enforcement agency in the country, with over 

20,000 Border Patrol Agents operating between the ports of entry and more than 

20,000 CBP officers stationed at air, land, and sea ports Nation-wide. These forces 

are supplemented with more than 1,100 Air and Marine agents, and 2,300 agricultural specialists and other professionals. In fiscal year 2009 alone, CBP processed 

more than 360 million pedestrians and passengers, 109 million conveyances, apprehended over 556,000 illegal aliens between our ports of entry, encountered over 

224,000 inadmissible aliens at the ports of entry, and seized more than 5.2 million 

pounds of illegal drugs. Every day, CBP processes over 1 million travelers seeking 

to enter the United States by land, air, or sea. 

In order to counter the threat of terrorism and secure our borders, CBP relies on 

a balanced mix of professional law enforcement personnel, advanced technologies, 

and fully modernized facilities and infrastructure both at and between the ports of 

entry. We deploy a cadre of highly trained agents and officers who utilize state-ofthe-art technologies to quickly detect, analyze, and respond to illegal breaches 

across the borders. These personnel rely upon a solid backbone of tactical infrastructure to facilitate their access to border areas while impeding illegal entry by persons 

or vehicles into the United States. CBP Officers utilize advanced targeting, screening, and inspection technologies to quickly identify persons or cargo that warrant 

additional scrutiny without unduly impeding the traveling public or commerce. 

CBP and Intelligence 

In 2007, CBP created the Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination 

(OIOC), which serves as the situational awareness hub for CBP, providing timely, 

relevant information, and actionable intelligence to operators and decision-makers 

and improving coordination of CBP-wide operations. Through prioritization and 

mitigation of emerging threats, risks, and vulnerabilities, OIOC enables CBP to better function as an intelligence-driven operational organization. The OIOC serves as 

a single, central repository for agency-wide intelligence, while exploring new ways 

to analyze and fuse information. 

As part of our efforts to screen passengers bound for the United States, CBP is 

a consumer of the U.S. Government’s consolidated terrorist watch list, which we use 

to help keep potential terrorists off flights bound for the United States and to identify travelers that require additional screening. Specifically, DHS uses the Terrorist 

Screening Database (TSDB), managed by the Terrorist Screening Center, as well as 

other information provided through the intelligence community, to determine who 

may board flights, who requires further screening and investigation, who should not 

be admitted, or who should be referred to appropriate law enforcement personnel. 

National Targeting Center-Passenger (NTC–P) 

A key tool for DHS in analyzing, assessing, and making determinations based on 

the TSDB and other intelligence information, is the National Targeting Center 

(NTC). The NTC is a 24/7 operation, established to provide tactical targeting information aimed at interdicting terrorists, criminal actors, and prohibited items. Crucial to the operation of the NTC is CBP’s Automated Targeting System (ATS), a primary platform used by DHS to match travelers and goods against screening infor-
15 

1 Exceptions would be citizens of countries under other visa waiver authority such as the 

Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative or the separate visa waiver program for Guam and the 

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or those granted individual waivers of the visa 

requirement under the immigration laws. 

mation and known patterns of illicit activity. Since its inception after 9/11, the NTC 

has evolved into two Centers: the National Targeting Center Passenger (NTC–P) 

and the National Targeting Center Cargo (NTC–C). 

This year, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) began deploying Visa Security Program (VSP) personnel to the NTC–P to augment and expand current operations. Through the VSP, ICE stations agents at embassies and consulates to assist 

the State Department in identifying visa applicants who may present a security 

threat. The focus of the VSP and NTC–P are complementary: The VSP is focused 

on identifying terrorists and criminal suspects and preventing them from reaching 

the United States, while the NTC–P provides tactical targeting and analytical research in support of preventing terrorist and terrorist weapons from entering the 

United States. The co-location of VSP personnel at the NTC–P has helped increase 

communication and information sharing. 

Safeguards for Visas and Travel 

One of the first layers of defense in securing air travel involves safeguards to prevent dangerous people from obtaining visas, travel authorizations, and boarding 

passes. To apply for entry to the United States prior to boarding flights bound for 

the United States or arriving at a U.S. port of entry, most foreign nationals need 

visas—issued by a U.S. embassy or consulate—or, if eligible to travel under the Visa 

Waiver Program (VWP) country, travel authorizations issued through the Electronic 

System for Travel Authorization (ESTA).1

Issuing visas is the responsibility of the Department of State (DOS), which 

screens all visa applicants biographic data against the TSDB for terrorism-related 

concerns and screens their biometric data (fingerprints and facial recognition) 

against other U.S. Government databases for security, criminal, and immigration 

violation concerns. For individuals traveling under the VWP, DHS operates ESTA, 

a web-based system through which individuals must apply for travel authorization 

prior to traveling to the United States. ESTA enables CBP to conduct enhanced 

screening of VWP applicants in advance of travel to the United States in order to 

assess whether they could pose a risk to the United States, including possible links 

to terrorism. On January 20, 2010, CBP began its transition to enforce ESTA compliance for air carriers, requiring all foreign nationals to present a valid authorization to travel to the United States at the airport of departure. 

Pre-departure Screening 

When a traveler purchases a ticket for travel to the United States, a Passenger 

Name Record (PNR) may be generated in the airline’s reservation system. PNR data 

contains various elements, which may include optional information on itinerary, cotravelers, changes to the reservation, and payment information. CBP receives PNR 

data from the airline at various intervals beginning 72 hours prior to departure and 

concluding at the scheduled departure time. CBP officers utilize the Automated Targeting System—Passenger (ATS–P) to evaluate the PNR data against ‘‘targeting 

rules’’ that are based on law enforcement data, intelligence, and past case experience. 

On the day of departure, when an individual checks-in for their intended flight, 

the basic biographic information from the individual’s passport is collected by the 

air carrier and submitted to CBP’s Advance Passenger Information System (APIS). 

APIS data, which carriers are required to provide to DHS at least 30 minutes before 

a flight for all passengers and crew on-board, contains important identifying information that may not be included in PNR data, including verified identity and travel 

document information such as a traveler’s date of birth, citizenship, and travel document number. Carriers are required to verify the APIS information against the travel document prior to transmitting it to CBP. DHS screens APIS information on 

international flights to or from the United States against the TSDB, as well as 

against criminal history information, records of lost or stolen passports, and prior 

immigration or customs violations and visa refusals. APIS is also connected to 

Interpol’s lost and stolen passport database for routine queries on all inbound international travelers. 

Another layer in the screening process is the Immigration Advisory Program 

(IAP), which stations CBP officers at nine airports in seven countries in coordination 

with the host foreign governments. CBP’s National Targeting Center provides the 

IAP officers with non-U.S. Citizen and non-Legal Permanent Resident matches to 
16 

the TSDB, of which the No-Fly list is a subset. CBP also flags anyone whose U.S. 

visa has been revoked, whose Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) 

has been denied, who is using a foreign lost or stolen passport, or who is included 

on a Public Health Record provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. IAP officers can make ‘‘no board’’ recommendations to carriers and host governments regarding passengers bound for the United States who may constitute security risks, but do not have the authority to arrest, detain, or prevent passengers 

from boarding planes. 

Screening While En-Route to the United States and Upon Arrival 

While flights are en route to the United States, CBP continues to evaluate the 

APIS and PNR information submitted by the airlines. At this point, a further assessment of an individual’s admissibility into the United States is conducted, and 

a determination is made as to whether an individual requires additional screening 

prior to admission. 

Upon arrival in the United States, travelers present themselves to a CBP officer 

for inspection. Based on the information garnered during the in-flight analysis, as 

well as the CBP officer’s observations at the port of entry, a determination is made 

as to whether the traveler should be referred for a secondary inspection or admitted 

to the United States. 

ENHANCED SECURITY MEASURES IMPLEMENTED SINCE THE CHRISTMAS DAY ATTACK

Following the first reports of an attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Flight 

253 on December 25, DHS immediately put in place additional security measures. 

Since then, CBP has undertaken a number of initiatives to enhance our security 

posture. 

IAP Referrals 

As explained above, CBP officers stationed abroad under the IAP receive referrals 

from the NTC–P based on matches against the TSDB. Following the attempted attack in December, the NTC–P, in coordination with the OIOC, has expanded the information referred to IAP’s to include all aliens that the State Department has identified as actually, or likely, having engaged in terrorist activity as well, as existed 

in that case. NTC–P and OIOC continue to work with the intelligence community 

to develop new rules to address the ever-changing threat, while implementing specific operations to address these threats. 

Referrals for non-IAP Airports 

On January 10, 2010, CBP also began pre-screening passengers traveling from 

non-IAP locations through the ATS–P framework. To accomplish this goal, the 

NTC–P works in coordination with officers assigned to the Regional Carrier Liaison 

Groups (RCLG). The RCLG are established in Honolulu, Miami, and New York and 

provide regional points of contact and coordination between international carriers, 

foreign immigration authorities, and other DHS entities. The RCLG respond to carrier inquiries concerning the validity of travel documents presented or admissibility 

of travelers. Additionally, CBP officers at the NTC–P work with the RCLG officers 

to make recommendations to foreign carriers that boarding be denied (off-loads) to 

individuals traveling to the United States who have been identified as being National security related threats, ineligible for admission or who are traveling on 

fraudulent or fraudulently obtained documents prior to boarding a flight to the 

United States. However, the final decision to board or not board remains with the 

carrier. This pre-departure initiative mirrors our IAP efforts for flights originating 

from airports that do not currently have an IAP presence. 

Enhanced Operational Protocols 

At home and abroad, CBP officers have been briefed on the current threat stream 

and continue to work with our international partners, air carriers, local police, border control, and counterterrorism authorities to recommend passengers traveling to 

and entering the United States for additional screening as needed. CBP has implemented enhanced operational protocols at 15 preclearance locations and all 300-plus 

ports of entry in the United States. At airports, CBP has enhanced reviews of all 

incoming advanced passenger manifests based on current threats and have increased pre- and post-primary operations. At U.S. ports of entry, Passenger Analysis 

Units (PAU), and Counter Terrorism Response (CTR) teams continue carrying out 

targeted enforcement inspections, and have increased reviews of cargo manifest systems/databases by our Advance Targeting Unit (ATU) teams, and vehicle trunk inspections and truck cab checks. At POEs, the CTR team will normally be formed 

from CBP Officers assigned to special teams, or who possess prior counter-terrorism, 
17 

antiterrorism, or intelligence-related training or experience. These officers are then 

provided additional training in order to target persons or cargo that may warrant 

additional scrutiny. PAU and ATU are specifically designed to target passengers or 

cargo that may require CTR examination before they arrive at the POE. At seaports, CBP has heightened screening with Non Intrusive Inspection (NII) equipment 

of all cargo from countries of interest, and increased cargo and port perimeter 

sweeps. 

Through intelligence-sharing agreements, CBP continues to work with our counterparts in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Mexico, as well as CBP Attache ́s and 

representatives around the world, to share information as necessary and appropriate. 

CONCLUSION

The attempted attack on Christmas day serves as a stark reminder that terrorists 

motivated by violent extremist beliefs are determined to attack the United States. 

President Obama and Secretary Napolitano have made clear that we will be unrelenting in using every element of our National power in our efforts around the world 

to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and other violent extremists. 

While we address the circumstances behind this specific incident, we must also 

recognize the evolving threats posed by terrorists, and take action to ensure that 

our defenses continue to evolve in order to defeat them. We live in a world of everchanging risks, and we must move as aggressively as possible both to find and fix 

security flaws and anticipate future vulnerabilities. CBP will continue to work with 

our colleagues in DHS and the intelligence community to address this ever-changing 

threat. 

Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Souder, and Members of the committee, 

thank you for this opportunity to testify. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mr. Winkowski, for your time. Again, 

thank you for that visit to allow us to be there at the center. It was 

very informative. 

At this time, our last witness is Mr. Donahue. 

Mr. Donahue, if you can summarize your testimony in 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID T. DONAHUE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR VISA SERVICES, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. DONAHUE. Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Souder 

and—I want to thank you for another opportunity to share with 

you how the State Department is making the visa process more secure, the revocation process more expeditious, and how we are enhancing interagency information sharing. 

The failed terrorist attack on Flight 253 revealed systemic failures in the U.S. Government’s efforts to protect the people of the 

United States. The Department of State has been vigorously reviewing visa issuance and revocation criteria and determining how 

technological and procedural improvements can strengthen border 

protection. 

Our immediate response to the Detroit incident was to direct our 

overseas missions to include complete information about any previous and current U.S. visas in all Visa Viper cables. That is happening now. 

We also provided guidance on conducting a wide perimeter fuzzy 

search of our visa records. 

We reviewed our visa revocation procedures. The State Department uses its broad and flexible authority to revoke visa to protect 

our borders. Since 2001 we have revoked more than 57,000 visas 

for a variety of reasons, including over 2,800 for suspected links to 

terrorism. 
18 

We are using this revocation authority as we review our visa 

records against records in our CLASS lookout database, our Visa 

Viper reporting, TSA’s No-Fly and Selectee lists, as well as other 

sources. We confirmed that most individuals in these databases 

hold no visas. Of those few who did, a great many were revoked 

prior to the current review. We also revoked a number of visas in 

consultation with our partners. 

We recognize the gravity of the threat we face and are working 

intensely with our colleagues from other agencies and our embassies and consulates overseas with the goal that no person who is 

known to pose a threat to our security holds a valid visa. 

We have visa offices present in virtually every country of the 

world, staffed by consular officers drawn from the Department’s 

professional and mobile multilingual foreign service officer workforce, trained in analytic interview techniques. 

Our officers know that they are the first line of defense in border 

security. Our global presence, foreign policy mission, and personnel 

structure give us singular advantages in executing the visa function throughout the world. 

Our officers know that U.S. security is paramount. Each consular 

officer is required to complete the Department’s basic consular 

course at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center prior to performing consular duties. 

The course in continuing education places strong emphasis on 

border security and training in counterterrorism, fraud prevention, 

name checking, and other techniques. 

Visa applicants are screened against DHS and FBI name-based 

and biometric databases as well as the 27 million names in our 

own CLASS database. Visas cannot be issued without further review for any applicant in the Terrorist Screening Database. 

Applicants are also screened against our large and ever-growing 

facial recognition database. Our Security Advisory Opinion mechanism provides officers with the necessary advice and background 

information to adjudicate the cases of visa applicants with possible 

terrorist ineligibilities. 

We are not afraid to say no. In fact, we denied more than 2 million visas in fiscal year 2009. 

We also want to encourage legitimate travel to the United States. 

Tourism creates jobs for Americans and encourages understanding 

and appreciation of our values. 

Within the Department we have a dynamic partnership between 

the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 

the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and the Bureau 

of Intelligence and Research that add valuable law enforcement, investigative, and intelligence components to our capabilities. 

We have 145 officers devoted to fraud prevention and document 

security world-wide. Seventy-three consular sections overseas have 

diplomatic security—assistant regional security officer investigator 

positions devoted to maintaining the integrity of the visa and passport process. 

We are deploying an electronic visa application form which will 

provide more information to adjudicating officers and our partner 

agencies and facilities—and facilitate our ability to detect terrorism 

and fraud. 
19 

We are working with our interagency partners on the development and pilot testing of a new intelligence-based SAO system that 

will make full use of the additional application data. 

We give other agencies immediate access to 13 years of visa data 

containing 136 million immigrant and non-immigrant visa records, 

and they use this effectively. In February 2010 alone, more than 

18,000 employees of the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, FBI, and Commerce made just over 1 million queries on our records. 

We embrace a layered approach to border security screening and 

are fully supportive of DHS Visa Security Program. We have a particularly close and productive partnership with our DHS colleagues 

here. 

DHS US–VISIT receives all the information we collect from visa 

applicants, including fingerprint data or use of ports of entry to 

confirm the identity of travelers. 

Visa Security Units of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE, currently operate 14 visa adjudicating posts in 12 countries. 

Since January 2010 chiefs of mission have received requests from 

ICE to open four VSUs and to augment staff at two existing VSUs. 

Using their authority, chiefs of mission have approved all four of 

the new VSUs and one request for expansion has been approved. 

The other is under review. 

In closing, the Department of State is at the forefront of interagency cooperation and data sharing to improve border security. 

We understand the critical importance of our work. We have talented personnel and necessary tools to maintain safe borders that 

welcome the vast majority of legitimate travelers. 

I am pleased to take your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Donahue follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID T. DONAHUE

MARCH 11, 2010 

Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Souder, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address you today. As a result of 

the attempted terrorist attack on Flight 253, the President ordered corrective steps 

to address systemic failures in procedures we use to protect the people of the United 

States. Therefore, the Department of State now is working on reviewing visa 

issuance and revocation criteria and determining how technological and other enhancements can facilitate and strengthen visa-related business processes. 

As I have briefed the Members of the full committee on January 13, 2010, and 

as Under Secretary for Management Kennedy testified before the Senate Judiciary 

Committee on January 27, 2010, our immediate attention is focused on remedying 

shortcomings identified following the attempted attack on Flight 253. Planning for 

the future, incorporating new technology, increasing data sharing, and enhancing 

operational cooperation with partner agencies all contribute to a dynamic and robust visa adjudication process. We constantly review our IT systems and our procedures to adapt and improve our processes to respond to changing times, security 

threats and to incorporate new tools available to us. We have a highly trained global 

team working daily to protect our borders and fulfill the overseas border security 

mission and other critical tasks ranging from crisis management to protection of 

American interests abroad. Within the Department, we have a dynamic partnership 

between the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security that 

adds a valuable law enforcement and investigative component to our capabilities. 

We use these strengths to address the continuing and evolving security threats. 

In the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, on the day following his father’s November 19, 2009 visit to the Embassy, we sent a cable to the Washington intel-
20 

ligence and law enforcement community through the Visas Viper system that ‘‘Information at post suggests [that Abdulmutallab] may be involved in Yemeni-based extremists.’’ At the same time, the Consular Section entered Abdulmutallab into the 

Consular Lookout and Support System database known as CLASS, against which 

all visa applications are screened. In sending the Visas Viper cable and checking 

State Department records to determine whether Abdulmutallab had a visa, Embassy officials misspelled his name, but entered it correctly into CLASS. As a result 

of the misspelling in the cable, information about previous visas issued to him and 

the fact that he held a valid U.S. visa at that time, was not included in the cable. 

The CLASS entry using the correct spelling resulted in a lookout that was shared 

automatically with the primary lookout system used by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and accessible to other partner agencies. DHS has noted that, 

as a result of that record, they planned to meet Abdulmutallab and question him 

upon arrival. 

We took immediate action to improve the procedures and content requirements 

for Visas Viper cable reporting that will call attention to the visa application and 

issuance information that is already part of the data that we share with our National security partners. All officers have been instructed to include complete information about all previous and current U.S. visa(s) when a Visas Viper cable is sent. 

This instruction includes guidance on specific methods to comprehensively and intensively search the database of visa records by conducting a wide-parameter, ‘‘fuzzy 

search,’’ leveraging an existing search capability called ‘‘Person Finder,’’ when 

searching our comprehensive repository of visa records in the Consular Consolidated 

Database (CCD). Searches conducted in this manner will identify visa records despite variations in the spelling of names as well as in dates of birth, places of birth, 

and nationality information. 

In addition to this change in standard procedures on searching visa records, we 

immediately began working to refine the capability of our current systems. For visa 

applications, we employ strong, sophisticated name searching algorithms to ensure 

matches between names of visa applicants and any derogatory information contained in the 27 million records found in CLASS. This strong searching capability 

has been central to our procedures since automated lookout system checks were 

mandated following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. We use our significant 

and evolving experience with search mechanisms for derogatory information to constantly improve the systems for checking our visa issuance records. 

The Department of State has been matching new threat information with our 

records of existing visas since 2002. We have long recognized this function as critical 

to the way we manage our records and processes. This system of continual vetting 

has evolved as post-9/11 reforms were instituted and is now performed by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). All records added to the Terrorist Screening Database are checked against the Department’s Consolidated Consular Database (CCD) 

to determine if there are matching visa records. Matches are sent electronically from 

the TSC to the Department of State to flag cases for possible visa revocation. In addition, we have widely disseminated our data to other agencies that may wish to 

learn whether a subject of interest has a U.S. visa. Cases for revocation consideration are forwarded to us by our consular offices overseas, our domestic visa office, 

DHS/Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) National Targeting Center (NTC), and 

other entities. Almost every day, we receive requests to review and, if warranted, 

revoke visas for potential travelers for whom new derogatory information has been 

discovered since the visa was issued. Our Operations Center is staffed 24 hours per 

day/7 days per week to address urgent requests, such as when the person is about 

to board a plane. I frequently use the State Department’s authority to prudentially 

revoke the visa and prevent boarding. 

Since the Presidentially-ordered Security Review, there have been exigent 

changes in the thresholds for adding individuals to the Terrorist Screening Database, No-Fly, and Selectee lists. The number of revocations has increased substantially as a result. As soon as information is established to support a revocation, an 

entry showing the visa revocation is added electronically to the Department of 

State’s CLASS lookout system and shared in real time with the DHS lookout systems used for border screening. 

The State Department has broad and flexible authority to revoke visas and we 

use that authority widely to protect our borders. Since 2001, we have revoked more 

than 57,000 visas for a variety of reasons, including over 2,800 for suspected links 

to terrorism. 

We have been actively using this revocation authority as we perform internal reviews of our data against watch list information provided by partner agencies. For 

example, we are re-examining information in our CLASS database regarding individuals with potential connections to terrorist activity or support for such activity. 
21 

We are reviewing all previous Visas Viper submissions and cases that other agencies are bringing to our attention from the No-Fly and Selectee lists, as well as 

other sources. In these reviews, we identified cases for revocation and we also confirmed that substantial numbers of individuals in these classes hold no visas and 

of those few who did, a great many were revoked prior to the current review. We 

recognize the gravity of the threat we face and are working intensely with our colleagues from other agencies with the desired goal that when the U.S. Government 

obtains information, no person who may pose a threat to our security, holds a valid 

visa. 

Because individuals change over time and people who once posed no threat to the 

United States can become threats, revocation is an important tool in our border security arsenal; we use our authority to immediately revoke a visa in circumstances 

where we believe there is an immediate threat. At the same time, we believe consultation with National security partners is critical. Expeditious coordination with 

our National security partners is not to be underestimated. Unilateral and uncoordinated revocation could disrupt important investigations undertaken by one of our 

National security partners. 

Finally, the Department is reviewing the procedures and criteria used in the field 

to revoke visas and will issue new instructions to our officers. Revocation recommendations will be added as an element of reporting through the Visas Viper 

channel. We are in the process of providing additional guidance to the field on use 

of the broad authority of visa officers to deny visas on security and other grounds. 

Instruction in appropriate use of this authority has already been a fundamental 

part of officer training for years. 

Beyond revocations, the Department of State is at the forefront of interagency cooperation and data sharing to improve border security, and we have embarked on 

initiatives that will position us to meet future challenges while taking into consideration our partner agencies and their specific needs and requirements. We are implementing a new generation of visa processing systems that will further integrate information gathered from domestic and overseas activities. We are restructuring our 

information technology architecture to accommodate the unprecedented scale of information we collect and to keep us agile and adaptable in an age of intensive and 

growing requirements for data collection, processing, and sharing. 

We are the first line of defense in border security. Our global presence, foreign 

policy mission, and personnel structure give us singular advantages in executing the 

visa function throughout the world. Our authorities and responsibilities enable us 

to provide a global perspective to the visa process and its impact on U.S. National 

interests. The issuance and refusal of visas has a direct impact on our foreign relations. Visa policy quickly can become a significant bilateral problem that harms 

broader U.S. interests if handled without consideration for foreign policy impacts. 

The conduct of U.S. visa policy has a direct and significant impact on the treatment 

of U.S. citizens abroad. The Department of State is in a position to anticipate and 

weigh all those factors. Remember, the vast majority of the more than 2 million 

visas denied last year were denied for reasons unrelated to terrorism. Let me reiterate, however, that the Department of State is fully committed to protecting our 

borders and has no higher priority than the safety of our fellow citizens and the 

legitimate foreign visitors who contribute so much to our economy and society. 

The State Department has developed and implemented intensive screening processes requiring personal interviews, employing analytic interview techniques, incorporating multiple biometric checks, all built around a sophisticated global information technology network. We have visa offices present in virtually every country of 

the world, staffed by consular officers drawn from the Department’s professional, 

and mobile multilingual Foreign Service Officer workforce. These officials are dedicated to a career of worldwide service, and they provide the cultural awareness, 

knowledge, and objectivity to ensure that the visa function remains the frontline of 

border security. Each officer’s experience and individual skill-set contribute to an 

overall understanding of the political, legal, economic, and cultural development of 

foreign countries in a way that gives the Department of State a special expertise 

over matters directly relevant to the full range of visa ineligibilities. 

Consular officers are trained to take all necessary steps to protect the United 

States and its citizens during the course of making a decision on a visa application. 

Each consular officer is required to complete the Department’s Basic Consular 

Course at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center prior to performing consular 

duties. The course places strong emphasis on border security, featuring in-depth 

interviewing and name-checking technique training, as well as fraud prevention. 

Consular officers receive continuing education, including courses in analytic interviewing, fraud prevention, and advanced security name-checking. 
22 

Consular officers refused 2,181,986 nonimmigrant and immigrant visas in fiscal 

year 2009 out of 8,454,936 applications. We now are renewing guidance to our officers on their authority to refuse visas with specific reference to cases that raise security concerns. No visa is issued without it being run through security checks 

against our interagency law enforcement and intelligence partners’ data. And we 

screen applicants’ fingerprints against U.S. databases as well. The results of these 

checks by consular officers and any fraud indicators are brought to the attention of 

VSU officers wherever they are posted abroad. 

In addition, the Department of State’s Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) mechanism provides officers with the necessary advice and background information to adjudicate these cases of visa applicants with possible terrorism ineligibilities. Consular officers receive extensive training on the SAO process, including namechecking 

courses that assist in identifying applicants requiring additional Washington vetting. The SAO process requires the consular officer to suspend visa processing pending interagency review of the case and additional guidance. Most SAOs are triggered 

by clear and objective circumstances, such as nationality, place of birth, residence, 

or visa name check results. In addition, in cases where reasonable grounds exist, 

regardless of name check results, to suspect that an applicant may be inadmissible 

under the security provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, consular officers suspend processing and institute SAO procedures. 

CLASS, our primary visa screening watch list, has grown more than 400 percent 

since 2001—largely the result of this improved exchange of data among State, law 

enforcement, and intelligence communities. Almost 70 percent of CLASS records 

come from other agencies. We have enhanced our automatic check of CLASS entries 

against the CCD as part of our on-going process of technology enhancements aimed 

at optimizing the use of our systems to detect and respond to derogatory information 

regarding visa applicants and visa bearers. We are accelerating distribution to posts 

of an upgraded version of the automated search algorithm that runs the names of 

new visa applicants against the CCD to check for any prior visa records. This enhanced capacity is available currently at 83 overseas posts, with the rest to follow 

soon. We are deploying an enhanced and expanded electronic visa application form, 

which will provide more information to adjudicating officers and facilitate our ability 

to detect fraud. Officers have access to more data and tools than ever before, and 

we are evaluating cutting-edge technology to further improve our efficiencies and 

safeguard the visa process from exploitation. We are working with our interagency 

partners on the development and pilot-testing of a new, intelligence-based SAO system that will make full use of the additional application data. 

The Department of State has a close and productive partnership with DHS, which 

has authority for visa policy under Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act. Over 

the past 7 years both agencies significantly increased resources, improved procedures, and upgraded systems devoted to supporting the visa function. DHS receives 

all of the information collected by the Department of State during the visa process. 

DHS’s US–VISIT is often cited as a model in data-sharing because the information 

we share on applicants, including fingerprint data, is checked at ports of entry to 

confirm the identity of travelers. DHS has broad access to our entire CCD, containing 136 million records related to both immigrant and nonimmigrant visas and 

covering visa actions of the last 13 years. Special extracts of data are supplied to 

elements within DHS, including the Visa Security Units of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). These extracts have been tailored to the specific requirements of those units. 

We are working closely with ICE Visa Security Units (VSUs) established abroad 

and with domestically-based operational units of DHS, such as CBP’s National Targeting Center. VSUs currently operate at 14 visa adjudicating posts in 12 countries. 

Since January 19, 2010, we have received requests from DHS’s component, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to open four additional VSUs and to augment 

staff at two existing VSUs. The Chiefs of Mission have approved the four new VSUs 

and one request for expansion; the other request for expansion is under review. 

We make all of our visa information available to other involved agencies, and we 

specifically designed our systems to facilitate comprehensive data sharing. We give 

other agencies immediate access to over 13 years of visa data, and they use this 

access extensively. In February 2010 alone, more than 18,000 employees of DHS, 

the Department of Defense (DOD), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and 

the Department of Commerce made just over 1 million queries on visa records. We 

embrace a layered approach to security screening and are fully supportive of the 

DHS Visa Security Program. 

Working in concert with DHS, we proactively expanded biometric screening programs and integrated this expansion into existing overseas facilities. In partnership 
23 

with DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), we established the largest 

biometric screening process on the globe. We were a pioneer in the use of facial recognition techniques and remain a leader in operational use of this technology. In 

2009, we expanded use of facial recognition from a selected segment of visa applications to all visa applications. We now are expanding our use of this technology beyond visa records. We are testing use of iris recognition technology in visa screening, making use of both identity and derogatory information collected by DOD. 

These efforts require intense on-going cooperation from other agencies. We successfully forged and continue to foster partnerships that recognize the need to supply 

accurate and speedy screening in a 24/7 global environment. As we implement process and policy changes, we are always striving to add value in both border security 

and in operational results. Both dimensions are important in supporting the visa 

process. 

In addition, we have 145 officers and 540 locally employed staff devoted specifically to fraud prevention and document security, including fraud prevention officers 

at overseas posts. We have a large Fraud Prevention Programs office in Washington, 

DC, that works very closely with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and we have 

fraud screening operations using sophisticated database checks at both the Kentucky Consular Center and the National Visa Center in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Their role in flagging applications and applicants who lack credibility, who 

present fraudulent documents, or who give us false information adds a valuable dimension to our visa process. 

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security adds an important law enforcement element 

to the Department’s visa procedures. There are currently 75 Assistant Regional Security Officer Investigator (ARSOIs) positions approved for 73 consular sections 

overseas specifically devoted to maintaining the integrity of the process. This year, 

the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has approved 48 additional ARSOI positions to 

work in consular sections overseas. They are complemented by officers working domestically on both visa and passport fraud criminal investigations and analysis. 

These highly trained law enforcement professionals add another dimension to our 

border security efforts. 

The multi-agency team effort on border security, based upon broadly shared information, provides a solid foundation. At the same time we remain fully committed 

to correcting mistakes and remedying deficiencies that inhibit the full and timely 

sharing of information. We have and we will continue to automate processes to reduce the possibility of human error. We fully recognize that we were not perfect in 

our reporting in connection with the attempted terrorist attack on Flight 253. We 

are working and will continue to work not only to address that mistake but to continually enhance our border security screening capabilities and the contributions we 

make to the interagency effort. 

We believe that U.S. interests in legitimate travel, trade promotion, and educational exchange are not in conflict with our border security agenda and, in fact, 

further that agenda in the long term. Our long-term interests are served by continuing the flow of commerce and ideas that are the foundations of prosperity and 

security. Acquainting people with American culture and perspectives remains the 

surest way to reduce misperceptions about the United States. Fostering academic 

and professional exchange keeps our universities and research institutions at the 

forefront of scientific and technological change. We believe the United States must 

meet both goals to guarantee our long-term security. 

We are facing an evolving threat. The people and the tools we use to address this 

threat must be sophisticated and agile and must take into account the cultural and 

political environment in which threats arise. The people must be well-trained, motivated, and knowledgeable. Information obtained from these tools must be comprehensive and accurate. Our criteria for taking action must be clear and coordinated. The team we use for this mission must be the best. The Department of State 

has spent years developing the tools and personnel needed to properly execute the 

visa function overseas and remains fully committed to continuing to fulfill its essential role on the border security team. 

Mr. CUELLAR. I want to thank you very much. 

Again, I want to thank all the witnesses for being here with us. 

I remind Members that we have 5 minutes of questions per witness—for the witnesses, should I say, and I will recognize myself 

for 5 minutes. 

Since it is only you and I, Mr. Souder, we are going to probably 

stretch that a little bit and be a little bit more flexible. 
24 

But let me first—let me just start off with some procedure work 

first. Deadlines. The only thing is, as I mentioned, I would ask you 

all and your Congressional liaison folks that when we ask for testimony there are certain time tables. I understand you all were looking at each other’s testimony and got a little delayed. 

But I would ask you to just make sure that if you are going to 

be late, I would just ask, please, you know, talk to our committee. 

Just give us a little advance notice that it is going to be late, and 

would ask you to just do that just as a housecleaning procedure. 

For the State Department, how would you rate your Department’s ability to communicate with ICE? 

Then, ICE, I will ask you the same thing. 

I know that there was—a particular situation got denied, and 

then of course, now they got approved. But how would you rate 

your ability to work together, Mr. Donahue? 

Mr. DONAHUE. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. I can’t 

imagine that there are two U.S. Government agencies that work 

more closely than the Department of Homeland Security and the 

Department of State, particularly in border issues. 

We were just talking during the recess that if we put together 

the number of times that we have been together and that different 

people in my office have been with people in the other offices, both 

in ICE and the Department of Homeland Security, just in the last 

couple months it would probably be in the hundreds, if not more. 

In addition, on the ICE VSU program, we have assigned senior 

officers to that program since the beginning who travel with the 

members of the ICE team in site review. We do the same on visa 

waiver expansion. 

So we have a very close relationship, meeting many times during 

the week, usually. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. 

Mr. Parmer. 

Mr. PARMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would characterize it 

similarly as my colleague from State Department. I think when the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002 mandated the creation of the Visa 

Security Units, there was some skepticism, perhaps, at various levels in the State Department. 

But in every location where—and I visited several of these locations—where we have the Visa Security Units, without exception, 

the naysayers have been overcome and feel that our programs are 

complementary and serve as force multipliers. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. 

Now, let me ask you—using the example of the Flight 253, I— 

and I listened to the three witnesses give us the testimony—can 

you just give me a little checklist of what we did and what we are 

doing now that is different, improved? 

If you can break down into different steps, using the example of 

253, what we are doing now that is different, that has improved, 

so we can provide better security? 

Let’s start with the State Department, because remember, where 

the individual started off, and there were calls to the embassy— 

let’s go step by step as to—and then any time, Mr. Parmer, you 

want to come in, or somebody wants to come in—this is something 

that we are doing differently, because I am—we got lucky. 
25 

You know, we will—you know, we say we got lucky. I am now 

interested in looking forward. What are we doing to provide better 

security? 

Mr. DONAHUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think the first thing 

is that we have sent out to our posts—and we know that there was 

a problem with the spelling and the search engine that was used 

by the officer to check to see whether the traveler had prior visas. 

We have sent out new information about a much more robust 

search engine and instructions on the importance of getting that 

information into the Visa Viper cable and other information that 

they should put in the Visa Viper cable, so that when that arrives 

at the interagency community people have a little—a lot more to 

go on to determine whether they need to do more investigation on 

that. 

We are going out to our posts—we have already had a good response to this on the Visa Viper reporting, where posts are coming 

in, they are telling us a lot. 

We start right away, as soon as we receive that Visa Viper cable, 

discussing that traveler with our partners, particularly with the 

TSC, the Terrorist Screening Center, to determine that we are—to 

deconflict any possible conflicts with people they are watching. 

Then we revoke very quickly. 

I think those are the—probably the two most important things 

in—and the other part is we have been spending a lot of time with 

our interagency partners in ensuring that the watch lists are as effective as they can be. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. All right. 

Mr. Parmer. 

Mr. PARMER. Mr. Chairman—— 

Mr. CUELLAR. Again, just like Mr. Donahue, just give us the 

checklist as to what we are doing now differently. 

Mr. PARMER. That is a difficult question to answer, because the 

Visa Security Units have always maintained a high level of scrutiny for the—working in concert with the—— 

Mr. CUELLAR. But let’s use—— 

Mr. PARMER [continuing]. State Department. 

Mr. CUELLAR [continuing]. Let’s lose—I am sorry, let’s use the 

253 as an example. 

Mr. PARMER. What we have done since then is re-prioritize, that 

we have a list of high-profile posts at which we would like to open 

Visa Security Units. We have re-prioritized that list in light of 

some of the intelligence that has come out of the Christmas day incident. 

Assistant Secretary Morton and others are having high-level discussions with the State Department about things that we can do 

differently in the future toward not only the screening process but 

also a more rapid deployment for the Visa Security Units. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Mr. Winkowski. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Mr. Chairman, at CBP we have done several 

major issues that I think are very, very significant, and let me kind 

of take this in bites as you asked. 

At our IAP locations, the nine IAP locations, prior to 12/25, our 

29 officers out there were getting—from a terrorist-related standpoint were getting notification on their hot list that we showed you 
26 

down at the NTC. They were getting individuals from the no-fly 

and the terrorist screening database on the terrorist-related side. 

Then on the admissibility-related side, the ESTA denials, the 

visa revocation, lost or stolen passports, and the public health notifications, so that was prior to the Christmas incident. 

Since then, we have grown the hot list—continue, of course, to 

get the no-fly. But we have also included the selectees, those individuals that are selected for enhanced inspection as part of the 

TSA program. 

I wanted to make sure that as those individuals went through 

the selectee process that is conducted by security overseas that our 

IAP officers know that we have an individual going on that flight 

that was a selectee, so we can focus in and ask perhaps additional 

questions. 

The other thing that we did was the SO–7 report that we referred to—— 

Mr. CUELLAR. Right. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI [continuing]. A few weeks ago. That particular 

report was only sent to the port of entry domestically. It was not 

sent to the IAP locations. 

A decision had been made early on in the program back in 2004, 

2005 when we stood up the Immigration Advisory Program that we 

were very concerned that we could overwhelm the small number of 

officers that we have over in those locations. 

So we wanted to make sure they got—you know, that the hot 

issues from the standpoint of the no-flys and the TSDB hits and 

the public health alerts—and the decision was made not to give 

them those particular reports. 

I have changed that. All IAP locations now get that report. In 

this particular case, it was sent from State Department. Of course, 

we continue to have the ESTA denials, the visa revocations, the 

loss or stolen passports, and the public health. So that is the IAP 

piece. 

The other major change that we made was as I was looking at 

the gaps and as you—as we talked—opportunities like this, you 

look at gaps. You look at, you know: What went wrong, what do 

we need to do better, where else are we vulnerable? 

We have in those non-IAP locations we don’t have any offices 

there, so you have individuals that perhaps had a visa that was revoked, would still get on that airplane and fly domestically—fly to 

the United States, and we would deal with that admissibility issue 

in the States. 

What we have done is we had a unit called the Regional Carrier 

Liaison Group that you referred to in your opening comments and 

that I have referred to here, located in Miami, New York, and in 

Honolulu. That unit was stood up a number of years ago to really 

reach out to the airlines and work with the airlines on individuals 

with fraudulent documentation. 

Recently down in Miami we have that group well entrenched for 

a number of years, and what we did was we took what were concerned with the IAP locations and overlaid it over into the Regional 

Carrier Liaison Group, so what we have is virtually a virtual net 

over the entire world from a standpoint of the Regional Carrier Liaison Group. 
27 

So what happens is when these—when an individual hits against 

our PNR or our APIS, and they are not at an IAP location, what 

happens is the National Targeting Center gets it on their hot list, 

calls the applicable Regional Carrier Liaison Group, who then notifies the airline overseas and tells the airlines that we have an individual, give them the name, that their visa had been revoked or 

there is an issue with them, and that we are recommending a no 

board. 

We have 100 percent cooperation from all of the airlines on that. 

We are very, very good partners with them. So as a result of 

12/25, not only did we enhance what we were doing at the IAP locations, we took it a step further and addressed the non-IAP locations as well. 

The other thing that we have done is the hot list. It became apparent to me that, you know, we put the hot list out, and we really 

haven’t—we really were not out there challenging that hot list. Do 

we have everything on that list that those officers need? I have implemented that procedure. 

The other thing that we have done is all of these individuals that 

are on the hot list, referred over on the hot list, whether it is the 

IAP locations or the non-IAP locations, we have a FAM that is assigned to the National Targeting Center, and they are given that 

information on every single flight of individuals that are on our hot 

list. 

So there is awareness if a FAM is going to be boarding that particular aircraft so he or she knows who is on that aircraft from a 

standpoint of any type of security issues. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. That is what we have done. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Mr. Winkowski, let me just—I don’t want to complicate this, because we have been talking about airports, and some 

of those lists are for the airlines, but as you know, 88 percent of 

the goods and services come through land ports, roughly. 

Are we doing any additional screening for our land ports? That 

is where—I mean, that is basically where most of our people will 

be coming in. I know some of those lists are—I understand that. 

But anything else extra that we are doing? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Well, on the land border side, of course, we have 

implemented the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, with 

standardized documents, which as—you know, as you mentioned, 

you know, we have job and field operations of balancing preventing 

dangerous people and dangerous things from coming into the country, but at the same time expediting legitimate trade and travel. 

So certainly, I think the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative 

has helped us standardize documents, and what we are seeing over 

time here is we have a very, very high compliance rate down on 

the southwest border, for example. We are about 92 percent compliant. 

We have moving much quicker towards getting the RFID readable documents that the individuals can have—for example, State 

Department is reissuing the border crossing cards. There is 10 million border crossing cards. They are coming up. They are expiring. 

The State Department is reissuing them with the RFID chip. 
28 

So you have got that piece. We have a targeting piece. We have 

an automated targeting system for land. It is a robust system, but 

you don’t get that pre-departure information on the vehicle side, 

that we deal—we don’t have advance information on who is coming 

into the United States on the land border side. 

We have it on the cargo side, but we don’t have it on the—on the 

people side, and I think that is something that we need to work 

towards, and I will make a suggestion on that in a moment. 

So you know, we have got targeting units. Our query rates are 

much higher than they have ever been. Not so many years ago, because of infrastructure problems and because of a lack of the right 

technology, i.e. the WHTI solution, we had a relatively low query 

rate. 

We have grown that tremendously. On the southwest border we 

are over 70 percent query rates, and our goal is to be at 100 by 

the end of this fiscal year. So we have that layered approach in 

there. WHTI has been extremely helpful to us and certainly appreciate what Congress has done to give us a steady stream of funding 

for WHTI. 

But I do think it is time from a standpoint of looking at kind of 

an all modes APIS, advanced information all modes, because we do 

have ferries out there that don’t have any advance information. 

Trains are voluntary. Buses—and—— 

Mr. CUELLAR. Right. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI [continuing]. Certainly, I don’t need to explain to 

you buses coming into Laredo. It is the busiest bus location. We 

need to work towards a solution of getting advance information for 

those bus travelers. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Right, and I think working with Mr. Souder and 

Mr. Thompson and the other Members and our staff, that is an 

issue that we want to talk about at a later time, because, like you 

mentioned, there are other modes of transportation in the United 

States that have no advance notice. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Right. 

Mr. CUELLAR. If somebody gets smart out there, all they have to 

do is look at the other modes of transportation and again, keeping 

in mind, 88 percent of all the goods—people coming into the United 

States are coming through land ports, and I know the focus—because of Flight 253 and this is why we are here. 

Let me just finish one thought, and I am—if the Ranking Member will indulge me on this, and then I will give him all the flexibility he needs to get. 

So we talked about the protocols were in place for Flight 253. We 

talked about that you just gave me a little summary of the new 

protocols that you all added. 

Using the new protocols, the new changes, using the individual 

from Flight 253 that happened last year, under the new protocols, 

where would you have picked up this individual? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. What would have happened with the new protocols—he would have hit against the SO–7 report, the State Department report, and the quasi visa refusal. 

That report would have been—that record would have been 

placed on the hot list for the IAP in Amsterdam. What would have 
29 

happened is the IAP officer would have taken the individual and 

begun the process of questioning him. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Right. Now, what I understand—he was only 

interviewed by CBP when he landed in Detroit. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. That is correct. 

Mr. CUELLAR. How would this have changed under the new protocols? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Well, it would have been placed on his hot list. 

Prior to 12/25, the SO–7 report was not put on the hot list. It was 

viewed as an admissibility issue that—which we could handle 

State-side, because there is a series of Q&As that you have to do 

with the individual and IAP is not designed for that. 

What we have done is for those terrorist exclusion codes for the 

SO–7—they are on the—now the hot list, so that would have come 

up through ether the PNR or the APIS. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Right. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Our officers in Amsterdam would have notified. 

We would have gotten the passenger and questioned him in Amsterdam. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay, good. 

Mr. Donahue and then Mr. Parmer, same question. Under your 

new protocols, new changes, using the example of the individual on 

Flight 253, where would you have stopped this individual from 

your perspective? 

Mr. Parmer, same question. 

Mr. DONAHUE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think 

today two things would have happened. First of all, the officer in 

Nigeria would have known that the traveler had a visa because 

they would have been using a more robust search engine. 

They would have reported that in the Visa Viper cable, and also 

we would have their entry in a—as a P3B with the entry that my 

colleague just referred to. 

Both of those—we are doing constant review of our lists. Any 

time we get a Visa Viper in, we look at that case very seriously. 

A case like this I think we would have—you know, it is hard to 

predict, but I think we would have decided to revoke the visa, ask 

him to come back in to interview, so he wouldn’t have had a visa 

and wouldn’t have—wouldn’t have traveled at all. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. So you feel under the new protocols you 

would have—using that as an example, you would have stopped 

him before he boarded. 

Mr. DONAHUE. For example, there are no—no one with this code, 

this P3B code—there is no one in our records with a P3B code right 

now who has a visa. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. 

Mr. Parmer, same question. New protocols, how would this have 

been different for that individual? 

Mr. PARMER. Chairman, it would purely be speculative on my 

part to—— 

Mr. CUELLAR. We understand. But under the new protocols—— 

Mr. PARMER. Well, there are no—from the perspective of the Visa 

Security Units, there are no different protocols. We were not in the 

post where the visa was issued, so it would be, again, purely speculative for me to comment on that. 
30 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay, fair enough. 

All right, Mr. Souder, thank you for your indulgence, and you 

have got 15 minutes of questioning. 

Mr. SOUDER. Basically, it is the same thrust continued. 

So, Mr. Parmer, are you in Nigeria now? 

Mr. PARMER. No, sir. 

Mr. SOUDER. Did you apply to go to Nigeria now? It is one of the 

more risky countries we have been seeing a lot in the news. 

Mr. PARMER. Yes, sir, it is on the list of countries that we would 

like to establish a post in. I referenced earlier re-prioritization of 

the—of our high-risk list that we have worked on collaboratively 

with the State Department, and it is—— 

Mr. SOUDER. Is it a funding question? 

Mr. PARMER [continuing]. Higher on the list. No, sir, it is not. 

Mr. SOUDER. If it gets re-prioritized to go up, does one get 

bumped off where you had requested? 

Mr. PARMER. Not of those currently pending, or the—of the 

NSDD–38s that were just approved, no, sir. 

Mr. SOUDER. So you can add—there is no problem with adding 

countries? I am trying to figure out why it isn’t there. You said 

that it—you are re-prioritizing to move it up higher. 

Does that mean you didn’t request it before, or it was below the 

funding cut for it before? I am trying to figure out what is the problem here. Is it a funding question? 

Is it a staffing question, which when—then would probably be a 

funding question? Is it an embassy personnel? Is the State Department saying, ‘‘We can only absorb so many in a given year?’’ 

Mr. PARMER. No, sir. No, sir. Before the Detroit incident, it was 

not ranked as highly on the list. We have been working under a 

5-year expansion plan that was approved by the Homeland Security Council, and it is—with the infrastructure and the budget that 

we have in place, we have been seeking expansion that we were 

able to support. 

So it hasn’t been a funding issue or a State Department issue. 

It was just not as high on the list. 

Mr. SOUDER. So Congress mandated that you go to 50, and how 

many are you now, 10, adding four? 

Mr. PARMER. We are in 12 countries at 14 locations. 

Mr. SOUDER. So since it is a mandate, why haven’t you requested 

to move faster? I am trying to figure out what is the holdup. 

Mr. PARMER. The best way to put that, again, is I will refer back 

to the expansion plan that was approved by the Homeland Security 

Council that—where we were moving forward at a rate that our infrastructure could support and as well as the budget—— 

Mr. SOUDER. By the infrastructure, you mean number of agents? 

Is this a computer question? It is not a computer question. 

Mr. PARMER. No, sir. 

Mr. SOUDER. It is not infrastructure that way. It is personnel? 

Mr. PARMER. Our headquarters component, our administrative 

function, as well as the—what we could support through deployment of personnel. 

It is too cumbersome to try to deploy that many people in a short 

period of time, and it was something that we could—our agency 

could comfortably—— 
31 

Mr. SOUDER. Could you—— 

Mr. PARMER [continuing]. Move forward with and responsibly 

move forward with. 

Mr. SOUDER. Could you get back to me with the particulars of 

what is so cumbersome about this? I am trying to—is it that you 

have to divert so many agents from other tasks to go there? 

Is it that, quite frankly, it takes a long time to do the research, 

you don’t have enough research personnel? I am trying to figure 

out what it is, because we said 50. 

The irony here is—in this discussion is that I remember when I 

was over at the Government Reform Committee, and we first debated whether homeland security was going to go in there. 

Initially, we were going to take the entire—and I worked with 

Chairman Ben Gilman at the time—take the entire security process away from the State Department. We worked out a compromise 

because you were supposed to be in all high-risk countries immediately after 9/11. This was a negotiated deal. 

Because partly, visa clearance and that process is a key part of 

the State Department entry level training program. They had language background. When you actually got into it, it was better to 

work a cooperative process. 

Now what I am finding—it has been a little while since 9/11, and 

we are in 2012, and you are resource-challenged, and I am just trying to figure out where it is. Did Congress turn it down? Did you 

not make a request? Are you being blocked from the request from 

OMB, which would be typical in many agencies? We understand 

that. 

But the bottom line is that—and also I am a little perplexed why 

Nigeria wasn’t there, but that is another question. 

Now let me move to another aspect of the—kind of the same line 

of questioning. I was listening with interest as to what is changed, 

because that is one of the fundamentals, and first, if I could start 

with Mr. Donahue—well, let me ask Mr. Winkowski—good to see 

you. 

One of the challenges here of anybody watching is that they 

think there is just like all these initials wandering around at every 

airport and port of entry. That was one of the most amazing performances of numbers of—it would have taken your testimony 

twice as long as if you would have spelled out all what those initials were of the different programs. 

But in the challenge of—my understanding is CBP had the name 

right. It wasn’t a spelling question for CBP and ICE, correct? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. That is correct, yes. 

Mr. SOUDER. But you felt that the information wasn’t actionable 

enough prior to getting on the plane, that it had to be done in Detroit. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Yeah, a decision had been made when we stood 

up the IAPs back in 2004 that those kinds of reports, the quasi visa 

refusals—his visa was not canceled—could be handled State-side 

rather than at the IAP location, okay, because what we are concerned with is the program is very small, and we wanted the individuals assigned to the IAP locations to be focusing in what was 

on the hot list, and at that time these reports were not on there. 
32 

So Detroit got the report, and that was what was supposed to 

happen. The IAP location did not get that report. 

Mr. SOUDER. Okay. Now, one of the confusing things for me, just 

trying to sort through—Mr. Donahue, you have suggested that 

probably, had you spelled it right and had this information, that 

now this person wouldn’t be allowed a visa. 

I am trying to figure out why would it be actionable for you to 

deny an interview and not for CBP, because they determined that 

information—is there a change in what is now actionable? 

Mr. DONAHUE. Thank you for the question. There is. We certainly have looked at everything we do, and one thing that I think 

that we did before this incident was we sent in reports. 

I don’t know that all of us—I certainly didn’t have as full an understanding of the entire interagency process for determining when 

a name gets promoted to watch listing. 

We sent in the reports. We waited to see how that name would 

come out. Would it come out as a watch listing name? Would it be 

something that would go into a TIDE file and not be promoted? 

We did not review all of the Visa Viper cables for a determination of revocation then, although the consular officer has the authority to make a recommendation to do an SAO, for instance. 

So I think the real change here is that we—as soon as we get 

a Visa Viper cable in now, we are reviewing it ourselves also, and 

if there is information that makes us concerned that this person 

may have connections to terrorism, we are going to the interagency, we are saying we would think that we may be—want to revoke this visa, to have the person come in for an interview. 

If there is no objection, we revoke. 

Mr. SOUDER. One of the somewhat disturbing things that we 

heard—because one of the initial defenses was, ‘‘Well, we get family members and people coming in all the time who—who say 

things,’’ which is certainly true. There is all kinds of quarrels all 

over the world where people make cases. 

But this person had been a fairly credible source before. Are you 

making those kind of—in our system, do we have some of those 

kind of cuts that we are becoming a little more aware of? 

Mr. DONAHUE. Well, certainly, everyone is very sensitive to this 

type of reporting now. I also think that the information was very 

thin. It was that he had—as you know, the only information the 

consular officer had was that the son had come under the influence 

of extremists in Yemen. 

That rings lots of bells today and certainly would, I think, any 

of us would revoke at that point. 

Mr. SOUDER. I mean, did that not suggest something might be 

imminent? 

Mr. DONAHUE. It is hard to say. It is hard to be in someone else’s 

mind. But it could be that something is imminent or that the father would like us to use whatever assets we might have had in 

another country to find his son. Looking back, we could look at it 

that way. 

But I think it is hard to reconstruct. I think today we certainly 

see—we have had a lot of threat reporting since then. I think that 

is another item that—to answer the Chairman’s question, it is another item of things that we are doing—is that there is a much 
33 

more robust review of threat assessments and review of this kind 

of information against threat assessments. 

Mr. SOUDER. Basically, meaning that when we get scared, we tilt 

towards caution and re-interviewing? I mean, that is kind of what 

it sounds like here, because—that we relax. I mean, it is not just 

any individual. I mean, the whole system seems to relax, including 

Congress—relaxes, and then we get scared, and then we tilt it. 

It just seems to me we ought to have a pattern that when there 

is doubt you take extra caution. 

Mr. DONAHUE. That is why we have put in—I think all of us 

have put in new systems. But for ourselves, we get a Visa Viper 

in, we will review that immediately, we will discuss it with the 

interagency and revoke. When we receive a request from NTC to 

revoke, we will review that case and revoke quickly. We understand the critical nature of this. 

Mr. SOUDER. The January 27 hearing, I ask for the number of 

visa revocations per year and the number revoked based on terrorism concerns. Do you have that at this point, or what is the status of that request? 

Mr. DONAHUE. Yes, it was in my statement. It was—— 

Mr. SOUDER. Okay. So you have it in the statement with the 

numbers? 

Mr. DONAHUE. It is in the statement and in the—also the—yeah, 

the—— 

Mr. SOUDER. We may have some additional breakdown questions, 

and be interested—because I think it would be useful just for the 

Department and assuming that our regular oversight is going to 

see how that changes. 

Now, obviously, if it changes over time, they are going to change 

their systems, too, so to a degree you are effective, you know, that 

doesn’t—just because it goes up or down doesn’t necessarily prove 

anything. 

But initially, it will be interesting to see whether, in fact, more 

are revoked or less, or what the patterns are. 

Mr. DONAHUE. You mean how many we have revoked since—— 

Mr. SOUDER. No, the original January 27 question and then, say, 

if you can continue to track that data—— 

Mr. DONAHUE. Okay. 

Mr. SOUDER [continuing]. It is likely to—— 

Mr. DONAHUE. We will do that. We—— 

Mr. SOUDER [continuing]. Question. 

Mr. DONAHUE [continuing]. The number is that we have revoked 

57,000 since 2001 and 2,800 of those are terrorist-related. But we 

will continue to track that number. I think it is an important number, too. 

Mr. SOUDER. Then for Mr. Wiskowski, that—you said—or 

Winkowski. I said ‘‘Wis,’’ sorry. Winkowski. In the last part you 

were—in response to his question, you talked about the—for example, the Staten Island and the Washington ferry systems and coming across from Canada where we caught the Millennium bomber— 

the trains and so on—that all challenges—any of those come 

through in a budget request to address it? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. No. What we are doing is we are beginning the 

process of studying how we ought to go about this. Now, for exam-
34 

ple, buses—I think it is going to be very, very challenging, and we 

have got to find the right solution for us as well as the industry. 

So I do not believe any requests came up for budget. We do have 

our WHTI office looking at these different modes and how we are 

going to accomplish that. We just recently, over the last year or so, 

put in eAPIS for general aviation, and it has worked out very, very 

well. 

We have got very, very high compliance. But I think those four 

areas—and I didn’t get to say small boats. I think the small boats 

also coming back and forth—getting some type of advance information with the technology that is out there today—we have done it 

with general aviation. 

I think we have now got to lean forward here and really—again, 

to drill down on what would it take to get advance information on 

those modes. 

Mr. SOUDER. A problem I have—because I believe that was a 

very sincere answer, but having worked narcotics prior to 9/11 and 

continuing to work the border questions, and having been in San 

Diego looking at the small boat question, looking at the aircraft 

question, north and south border, looking at Lake Champlain, we 

knew this was a problem before, like, the last 24 months. 

Why are we just starting to develop the solutions now? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Well, we have put in different boating—for example, small—— 

Mr. SOUDER. Yes. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI [continuing]. Boats—and I think we both would 

agree it is a—it is a—— 

Mr. SOUDER. Incredibly challenging. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Incredibly challenging, and—— 

Mr. SOUDER. The Great Lakes, with all the islands. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI [continuing]. And we have got small boat strategies in there, and we have got the Air Marine working at—looking 

at northern border strategies from a standpoint of how to handle 

it with the Coast Guard and really, the Coast Guard is the lead 

on—in a lot of this area. 

But you know, quite frankly, you know, we spend a lot of our 

time on containers, dealing with containerized cargo, whether it is 

the challenges we have there, with 100 percent scanning. A lot of 

intellectual capital goes into those program areas. 

We are now beginning to really get—drill down on this area—ferries, and trains, and buses and small boats, and I—and there is 

also—there is a legislative fix. 

As I understand it, sir, we need legislation in order to mandate 

that, or the legislation that you all gave us for the cruise ship industry and the airlines and the other modes that we have out there 

requires a legislative vehicle, as I understand it. 

Mr. SOUDER. My concern with this—and I encourage you to do 

this. I encourage your agency to do this—is somebody has to be 

working in a non-panic mode. When people say what do you do for 

a living, I say I am a Congressman; we overreact for our business. 

That is our duty, because we are like the weathervanes of society. 

We run every 2 years, which means constantly we blow with that. 

But somebody has got to be saying what is comprehensive. We 

just can’t have, ‘‘Oh, we are really fortunate this guy didn’t know 
35 

how to do his bomb.’’ We have to be anticipating. We have to have 

you leading. 

It is like, ‘‘Oh, we are going to do 100 percent of cargo here,’’ 

without understanding kind of risk assessment—how are you doing 

on the south and north border, how are you doing on the ports, how 

are you doing on the containers. 

Look, because as we learn in this case, they probe. They test. 

They find out even where we are at at different parts of the airports, that we take a—quite frankly, a retired senior citizen in 

Sarasota and do 18 million searches on her, and we are not doing 

anything on the buses. It is, like, come on. 

We really depend on you all to drive us a little bit, because—you 

are not running right now, and we kind of react when a thing 

comes, and then we put all the funds in there. But we need to have 

a balanced thing. 

It has been a long time since 9/11 and we still don’t have these 

kind of core things that we know are high-risk even though, in fact, 

the Millennium bomber, which would have been the biggest one— 

if it hadn’t been for an agent at the border on a person who came 

over on a ferry more or less thinking that the person looked nervous at the end of the day, we could have had an incredible catastrophe. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. I agree. I don’t want to mislead you or the 

Chairman. I mean, with ferries and trains and buses and small 

boats, we still do our inspections. I mean, and we still run them 

through systems. 

What I am trying—what we need to do is we have got to, you 

know, through the risk management models, get that advanced information, make decisions, get rid of that clutter, that low-risk 

group, spend little time with them and more time with the highrisk. 

One of the ways you do that—and we found in the—with advance 

passenger information is that you are able to make better decisions. 

I think also, sir, that I think we have made tremendous inroads 

since 9/11. I look back at that very unfortunate event and look back 

at the fact that we never had a National Targeting Center for passenger, and we never had a National Targeting Center for cargo. 

We were not advanced from the standpoint of PNR information 

and APIS information and all the advanced information that we 

get on the cargo side. We have made tremendous inroads, but I 

think we have been spending so much time in those areas, on 

cargo, at the expense of some of these other areas, such as small 

boats. 

I mean, we are spending a lot of intellectual capital here looking 

at issues like 100 percent scanning when, in fact, we have put in 

all these layers. I am not saying that it is perfect, but we really 

need to focus in and I get your message very clearly. 

Mr. SOUDER. Let me make it clear. I believe we have made tremendous progress—that we haven’t been attacked. We have had a 

couple that have misfired, but it is a classic law enforcement—layered things—they make mistakes when they get layered, they are 

more nervous, they get tipped off, and that sometimes have been 
36 

fortunate but most of the time we have stopped them, and that we 

just cannot flatline here. 

The danger is—and the good thing that happened here is it has 

got everybody concerned again, because we were flatlining. The 

budget can’t flatline either. There are some things that are the 

clear requirements of the United States Congress to do. 

We cannot have county commissioners and State legislators running around trying to figure out how border security is going to 

work, how we are going to stop terrorists, that when we are working our budget we have to understand which things are clearly our 

responsibility and which things are shared responsibilities. 

We cannot flatline because the challenge is going to get more sophisticated, so we have to keep doing it. But we have made tremendous progress, and I didn’t mean to imply that we didn’t. 

Yield back. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Mr. Souder, thank you again very much. 

Let me ask you just—suggestions that have been thrown out 

there that some have argued that visa issuance is no longer a matter of foreign policy but more—primarily it has become a security 

issue. 

Any thoughts on that? I know that is a big change, but any 

thoughts on that, Mr. Donahue? 

Mr. DONAHUE. I think that visa issuance is both. I think that 

there is a foreign policy aspect to it, but I think it is a security aspect. I think our officers fully understand that in the field. Their 

first thought in every visa adjudication, No. 1 thought, is how am 

I protecting my country. 

I mentioned that we turned down 2 million visas. We don’t know 

how many of those people were either criminals or terrorists, but 

in the interview the officer got a funny feeling in his stomach, 

and—just as the officer did in stopping the Millennium bomber, 

and said, ‘‘This story is not right.’’ 

Part of that is being culturally aware. Part of that is speaking 

in the language of the applicant. Part of that is living in the country, traveling around, knowing—you know yourself. It is hard for 

people to understand the border situation unless you have lived in 

the border. I was told that a million times when I served in Mexico. 

It is the same thing overseas. We believe that we have an advantage that when we are interviewing, we are—we have this mix of, 

No. 1, let’s keep our country safe, but let’s be sure that the vast 

majority of people who are legitimate travelers, people who are 

coming here to study in our great universities, people who are coming here to spend their money, people who are investing, that they 

can get in. 

Making that decision takes critical thinking, takes lots of training, and takes a great eye for security. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Parmer, let’s talk about these additional Visa Security Units 

that ICE plans to stand up this year. What are we doing in the 

meanwhile while we are waiting to stand those up? 

Mr. PARMER. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I don’t understand your 

question. 

Mr. CUELLAR. In other words, we are planning to put those units 

in different places across the world. What are we doing in the 
37 

meanwhile to address that? Because we are saying that there is a 

priority to put them in certain places. 

What are we doing in the mean time? Do we hope that we get 

lucky, or what are we doing during that time? 

Mr. PARMER. What are we doing toward establishing those offices? 

Mr. CUELLAR. Right. 

Mr. PARMER. Well, we are selecting the personnel. We are going 

through the personnel process. We are getting the—looking for 

housing at post, working with the embassy—— 

Mr. CUELLAR. While we are going through that process, that absence from that place that you want to set up the unit—nothing— 

I guess nothing can be done during that time except work through 

your office. 

Mr. DONAHUE. Mr. Chairman, as I said, I was in Mexico last. I 

had a very close relationship with our ICE colleagues. We stopped 

people. We revoked visas of people at the advice of ICE. We also 

depend on the ICE units here in the States that review it. We have 

other—Department of Homeland Security. 

It is a layered approach, and so even in putting this out, we don’t 

know where the next terrorist is going to come from. We have to 

use smart deployment of all of our skills. They won’t be everywhere. But through layered approaches we have a way to cover 

that. 

Mr. CUELLAR. For these units that we want to set up, I know the 

best thing to do is to have ICE individuals there, because you have 

got the individuals. What about using some sort of virtual office? 

Because I am sure there is some resource limitation. 

I know that the best thing is to have somebody there. I understand that argument. But in medicine, for example, in Texas we 

have used telemedicine, where you can have a doctor and, through 

the telemedicine system, you can see, you can hear, you can talk, 

you can show him the documentation, you can do everything. 

Have you all thought about using that technology to help you expand on a faster basis where you can be domestic but still be able 

to connect to certain other areas? I know the argument, Mr. 

Parmer. I know that it is better to have individual. I know that. 

But if doctors can do it, there is no reason why law enforcement 

individuals can’t also do that. Any thoughts of using that to at 

least supplement or at least temporarily use those systems, the 

technology? 

Mr. PARMER. You knew exactly what I was going to say, so I 

won’t belabor that point about the value of having people in country, and it is a similar concept as to why visas aren’t issued remotely. 

But I think that topic is among those being considered by Assistant Secretary Morton, or some exploration of that topic by Assistant Secretary Morton and his counterpart at State, Assistant Secretary Jacobs. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. I would ask you to—and I was just with 

Secretary Morton last night. I think I am supposed to see him next 

week again. But I would ask you—and I will tell him, too, but I 

would ask you all to consider this. 
38 

To have somebody there, I understand, it is the best person. But 

you know, is it better to have somebody or not have anybody at all? 

At least there is some sort of intermediate system on the technology. The new world that we are in, you know, the systems that 

we have—I think I would highly, highly encourage you all to at 

least explore and research this. 

You might not be there, but you might have somebody in one of 

your offices here in the United States be able to work with one of 

your officers there, one of your employees there, and at least do 

that. 

I mean, I will go back. If doctors can do it through telemedicine, 

there is no reason why law enforcement—and I know they are different. I understand. I got three brothers who are peace officers, so 

I understand that. 

But I would ask you at least to explore that, so I would ask you 

to please ask Secretary Morton—I think he is a very innovative, 

bright individual—that I think you all should at least explore this 

possibility. 

Mr. PARMER. Pardon me, Mr. Donahue. 

I just wanted to add that we do have a remote capability that 

we do work in collaboration with State on, and it is the security 

advisory opinion process. That does work remotely. You know, 

again, going back to the—— 

Mr. CUELLAR. Well, then you got the first step there. 

Mr. PARMER. That is right. And—— 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay? Okay? 

Mr. PARMER. But the value of being able to interact with the applicant, work alongside the consular officers, interact with—liaise 

with local law enforcement, follow up with family members, business associates, that sort of thing—there is just no replacement for 

having the ability to do that in country. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Right. Well, again, I would highly, highly encourage you to do that. 

You know, one of the things that we have seen—and I will use 

medicine as an example—you might have a doctor there, general 

practitioner, but then he is able to connect to certain specialist, and 

that doctor can talk to those specialists who are somewhere else. 

If you have certain experts in your office that might not be able 

to go to some remote part of the world, at least they will be able 

to connect and talk to—and use the expertise. Nowadays, with this 

technology, it is like if you are there. Use that. So again, I would 

strongly ask you to consider that. 

I would ask one more thing. What else can we do as Members 

of Congress, as Congress, to help you all? I will go—Mr. Parmer— 

and I know you can’t go into the budget and ask, because I know 

you can’t lobby us, but—well, what are the more generic things 

that we can do to help you? I will go one by one. 

Mr. PARMER. I am not prepared to answer more of a policy-type 

question, but I do—I will reiterate our appreciation for the support 

that you do currently give us. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you. 

I know you are not shy. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Yeah, Mr. Chairman. We already talked about 

one. I think we have got to really drill down here on the all modes 
39 

APIS. I think it is time, and we have done some preliminary work, 

and we will certainly work with the staff on that. 

Mr. CUELLAR. We were just talking right now, as we talked— 

what was it, last week, I believe—— 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Yes. 

Mr. CUELLAR [continuing]. I think we are at that time to start 

looking at—doing that type of work, so we are going to set up a 

meeting, a hearing on this particular issue to talk about it, because 

I still go back—I am a border guy, and I still go back to my numbers. 

Eighty-eight percent of the goods or the people coming into 

United States are coming from land ports. If that is where the majority of the folks coming in, and if I was somebody with bad intentions, I would look at those other areas, whether they are buses— 

for example, in Laredo, Texas we get about 100 buses a day times, 

what, 40 individuals. 

Just one port, doesn’t include California and the other places, 

just one port in Laredo, 100 buses, 40 individuals, and that gives 

you an idea. If you do some of that work before they get there, then 

you can work on the high-risk individuals instead of—everybody 

across the border on that. 

But that doesn’t cover ferries and other—— 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Not only do you work on the high-risk individuals, of course, with APIS you would set up a system where the— 

those that need I–94s—they are all printed by the time these individuals come off the bus, or maybe get to a point where they don’t 

even need to come off the bus. 

Been down there many times, as you know, and see all these 

people going into the office, waiting for I–94s to be done. So I think 

we have got some opportunity there. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Right. I want to thank you, because I want you all 

to continue being forward-thinking. I am glad that the Department 

is looking at those issues I had. So I appreciate that. 

Mr. Donahue, any thoughts? 

Mr. DONAHUE. Well, we are extremely grateful for the information-sharing that Congress has encouraged among the agencies. It 

has changed the way we do business. 

We are getting things like the ADIS information, the Arrival and 

Departure Information System, other systems that are being 

shared across the Government, and they help our officers in the 

field. 

The one request I would make, partially because we are selffunded, is that we really do encourage you and your Members and 

your staff members to visit our consular sections. 

I think a few minutes—just as you enjoyed at the National Targeting Center, I think a visit to some of our busy visa sections 

when you are visiting for other business in a capital city or a consular city is a real eye-opening experience to see our officers using 

the language, protecting our borders, on a daily basis. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes, sir, and I think that is a very good suggestion. 

I want to say thank you to all three of you. Again, I apologize. 

sometimes our schedules are beyond our control. Sorry about the 

delay that we had there. But I really want to thank you all. 
40 

I know that your men and women that you all supervise, that 

you all work with, do a great service to our country, so again, for 

the State Department, and for ICE and CBP, we really appreciate 

the good work that you have been doing. 

Personally, I feel very—I feel good as to the different improvements that you all have made, because I always look at—we saw 

what happened, but I am interested in looking forward—what are 

the lessons learned, what are we learning?—so this doesn’t happen 

again. 

Also keep one thing in mind. Mr. Winkowski, we talked about 

this. We have to be careful about not just relying on the systems 

themselves. As we mentioned, there is still this sixth sense or this 

intuition that our men and women have to use, because you just 

can’t look at everything that is on a computer screen. 

The more we can encourage this—and I know we talked about 

that for all the Department. Of course, for ICE and CBP I would 

ask you to just make sure you tell your folks, you know, to use that 

sixth sense, if I can use that—as my brothers in law enforcement 

told me that little sixth sense on that, so I appreciate that. 

Again, I would ask you, again, to say—you know, I want to say 

thank you very much, and I appreciate you all being here. At this 

time, I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony, Members 

for their questions. 

Again, if there is any additional questions that Members might 

want to submit, I would ask you to go ahead and submit that to 

the committee. 

Hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 2:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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