UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

DEREK I. ALLMON, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v. R. WILEY, Warden; MR. CHURCH, Captain; L. BRAREN, SIS Tech, Defendants–Appellees. No. 11-1498 (D.C. No. 1:08-CV -01183-MSK-CBS) (D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before LUCERO , O’BRIEN , and MATHESON , Circuit Judges.

Derek Allmon, a federal inmate proceedin g pro se, appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant prison officials on his civil rights claims. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 12 91, we affirm.

* The case is unanimously ordered subm itted without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctri nes of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disf avors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### May 21, 2012
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court-2- I Allmon is serving multiple concurrent te rms of life imprisonm ent for trafficking drugs and attempting to kill w itnesses set to testify agains t him. The sentencing court recommended that Allmon “be placed at the high est security federal correctional facility” and ordered various rest rictions on Allmon’s ability to corresp ond with the outside world. One restriction requires prison officials to open, copy, and forward to the United States Attorney any mail not addressed to Allmon’ s counsel of record. Due to Allmon’s repeated attempts to circumvent screening an d to convince individuals on the outside to carry out crimes on his behalf, the sentencing c ourt increased these restrictions in 2010. United States v. Allmon, 4:04-CR-00169-01- WRW, 2010 WL 9365 60, at *1-2 (E.D. Ark., Mar. 15, 2010 ) (unpublished). Since October 3, 2007, Allmon has been incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum (“ ADX”) in Florence, Colorado. AppelleeDefendant Braren is an empl oyee at ADX whose duties include monitoring inmate mail. On November 15, 2007 Braren intercepted a letter from Allmon to “Miles Davis,” an individual not affiliated with Allmon’s counsel of record. In the letter, Allmon asked Davis to include four Bureau of Prison (“BOP”) employees in a civil complaint and to “place liens against their assets.” BOP regulations prohibit in mates from interfering with a BOP employee’s performance of her duties, in cluding by filing false lie ns against them. As such, Braren issued an in cident report against Allmon. A discipline officer conducted a hearing, found that Allmon violated the rules by soliciting Davis to file a fraudulent-3- lien, and imposed various sanctions. During this time, Allmon, who had recen tly been transferred to ADX from another institution, was housed in a special temporar y unit while awaiting formal placement. Allmon maintains that he was originally to be placed in general po pulation housing. However, on November 28, 2007, Warden Wi ley and Associate Ward en Church assigned Allmon to the H unit, a highly restrictiv e housing unit where inmates’ communications can be closely monitored. According to Wiley and Church, ADX’s practice at the time was to house all inmates subject to court-im posed communications restrictions, or special administrative measures, in the H unit. Allmon brought suit against Braren, Wile y, and Church unde r Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bure au of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that they retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment: Braren by initiating disciplinary proceedings against him, and Wiley and Church by assigning him to the H unit. 1 Concluding that the defendants were entitled to qualif ied immunity, the district court granted summary judgm ent on each of Allmon’s claims.
II We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standards applied by the district court. Roberts v. Barreras, 484 F.3d 1236, 1239 (10th

1 Allmon’s initial suit included additional claims against Wiley and Church, as well as claims against other defendants. Th e district court dismissed those claims, and they are not at issue on appeal.-4- Cir. 2007). Viewing the evidence and reasonabl e inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, id., we w ill affirm a grant of summary judgment only if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a ). “When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to s how that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) the co nstitutional right was clearly established” under Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit preceden t. Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009). A Allmon first claims that Braren retaliate d against him in violation of the First Amendment by issuing an incident report afte r intercepting his letter to “Miles Davis.” However, an inmate’s exercise of his Fi rst Amendment rights may be limited by rules reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Allmon does not challeng e the discipline officer’s findi ng that his letter ran afoul of BOP regulations that prohibit inmates from interfering with st aff members in the performance of their duties. Nor has he sh own that a rule preventing inmates from filing fraudulent liens is illegitimate under the Turner test. 482 U.S. at 89- 90. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Allmon has not demonstrated a clearly established constitutional violation. In reaching this conclusion, we rej ect Allmon’s contention that constitutional protection for his statements was “restored” when, two months after the incident, Braren-5- allegedly mailed his letter to Davis. Even accepting Allmon’s a ssumption that the BOP prohibits employees from mailing communicati ons that violate prison regulations, the fact that Braren ignored this instruction does not undo Allmon’ s violation of prison rules.
B We also agree that summary judgment in favor of Wiley and Church was proper. Allmon alleges that Wiley and Church placed him in the H unit because he “fil[ed] grievances,” wrote “the disliked letter to Mi les Davis,” and used a racially charged slur against Wiley. As discussed above, Allmon’s statement regarding liens in the letter is not protected by the First Amendment. We ther efore focus our attention on whether Allmon has shown that defendants retaliated agains t him because he lodged complaints or insulted them. On appeal, Allmon primarily attacks the district court’s finding that defendants did not alter his original housing assignment, but rather assigned him to a restrictive unit in the first instance. But even if the district c ourt erred in this regard, Allmon cannot prevail on his claims against Wiley and Church. To survive summary judgment, Allmon “mus t prove that ‘but for’ the retaliatory motive, the incidents to which he refers . . . would not have taken place.” Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1144 ( 10th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitte d). “[A]n inmate is not inoculated from the normal conditions of conf inement . . . merely because he has engaged in protected activity.” Id. Before the di strict court, Wiley and Church presented evidence that they assigne d Allmon to the H unit because of his court-ordered communications restrictions and past attempts to circumvent these restrictions. In the H-6- unit, prison officials could closely monito r Allmon’s communications and better prevent him from passing along correspondence through inma tes not subject to strict restrictions. Aside from a handful of conclusory statem ents, Allmon presented almost no rebuttal evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that defendants were motivated because he filed grievances or insulted W iley. Although Allmon may have described Wiley in offensive terms shortly before th e wardens made the assignment, “we have consistently held that temporal proximity between protected activity and a challenged prison action does not, in itself, demonstrat e the causal nexus for a retaliation claim.” Strope v. Cummings, 381 F. App’x 878, 8 83 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (citing Friedman v. Kennard, 248 F. App’x 918, 922 (10th Cir. 2007 ) (unpublished) (collecting cases)). Allmon has therefore failed to sh ow that appellants violated his clearly established constitutional rights.
III
We AFFIRM the district court. Because Allmon has not presented a reasoned, non-frivolous argument in support of the issu es he raises on appe al, DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (1 0th Cir.1991), his motion to pr oceed in forma pauperis is DENIED

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Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge