IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JEFFREY CAMPBELL , Defendant Below, Appellant,

v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. § § No. 247, 2021 § § § Court Below

– Superior Court § of the State of Delaware § § Cr. ID No s . 1906003541A (N) § 1906003541B (N) § § Submitted: December 27, 2021 Decided: March 8 , 2022 Before SEITZ , Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN , Justices. ORDER
After careful consideration of the appellant’s brief filed under Supreme Court Rule 26(c) , his attorney’s motion to withdraw, the State’s response, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: (1) On January 22, 2020, the appellant, Jeffrey Campbell, resolve d two
criminal cases and two violations of probation in an unrelated case (the “Sussex case”) by pleading guilty to one count of unlawful sexual contact by a sex offender against a child and three counts of dealing in child pornography. In exchange, the
State (i) nolle prosequied seven charges of dealing in child pornography and one
count of sexual solicitation of a child and (ii) agreed to cap its sentencing recommendation to fifteen years of unsuspended Level V incarceration. T he2

Superior Court ordered a presentence investigation and deferred sentencing. Sentencing , initially scheduled for July 10, 2020, was continued several times
because in

- person proceedings were temporarily suspended because of COVID

- 19 safety concerns and Campbell pr eferred to be sentenced in person . On July 9, 2021, the Superior Court sentenced Campbell to a total of sixteen years of unsuspended Level V incarceration, followed by decreasing levels of supervision , and discharged Campbell as unimproved from probation in the Sussex c ase . This is Campbell ’s direct appeal. (2) Campbell ’s counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw under Rule 26(c). Counsel asserts that he has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law and has conclude d t hat the appeal is wholly without merit

. Campbell ’s attorney informed Campbell of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief. Counsel also informed Campbell of his right to supplement his attorney’s presentation. Campbell has submitted points for this Court’s consideration. The State has responded to Campbell’s arguments and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. (3) The standard and scope of review applicable to the consider ation of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying br ief under Rule 26(c) is twofold. First, the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious3

examination of the record and the law for claims that could arguably be raised on appeal. 1 Second, the Court must conduct its own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation. 2 (4) In his points, Campbell : (i) complains that his sentence exceeds the State’s recommendation; (ii) challenges the number of times he ha d been found in violation of the terms of his probation in the Sussex c ase ; (ii) alleges that the Superior Court unduly emphasized his use of a “s ecret” phone

— the use of which gave rise to the c onvictions at issue in this appeal

— because he only possessed it for six weeks; (iv) complains that he has been disproportionately punished because he was unable to participate in Department of Correction prog rams and earn good

- time credit because he agreed to postpone his sentencing until in

- person court proceedings
resumed

. (5) As this Court has held repeatedly, “a voluntary guilty plea constitutes a waiver of any alleged errors or defects [that occurred] p rior to the entry of the plea.” 3 Campbell complains that certain facts

— the number of times he ha d been found in violation of the terms of his probation in the Sussex c ase and the length of time he

1 Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis. , 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. Cal ifornia , 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 2 Penson , 488 U.S. at 81

- 82. 3 Benner v. State , 2007 WL 4215005, at *1 (Del. Nov. 30, 2017).4

possessed a secret phone

— were misrepresented at sentencin g hearing. Notably, Campbell does not challenge the voluntariness of his decision to plead guilty or his actual guilt . In any event, the sentencing transcript reflect s that (i) counsel clarified for the court that Campbell had only been found in violation of the terms of his probation in the Sussex case on eight prior occasions and (ii) Campbell , himself, told the sentencing judge that he had possessed the hidden phone fo r somewhere between six weeks and two months

. (6) To the exte nt that Campbell complains that the Superior Court sentenced him in excess of the State’s recommendation, our review of a sentence is “limited to whether the sentence is within the statutory limits prescribed by the General Assembly and whether it is based on factual predicates [that] are false, impermissible, or lack minimal reliability, judicial vindictiveness or bias, or a closed mind.” 4 As Campbell acknowledge d at the plea colloquy, he is guilty of the crimes to which he pleaded guilty. And, as Campb ell candidly admits on appeal , his sentence falls within the statutory limits prescribed by the legislature . Finally, we have reviewed the sentencing transcript carefully and find no evidence that the court sentenced him with a closed mind. (7) Campbell’s claims regarding good

- time credit also lack merit. The awarding and calculation of good time credit is left to DOC’s discretion , subject to

4 Weston v. State , 832 A.2d 742, 746 (Del. 2003).5

its rules and regulations. 5 “Good time does not exist as a matter of constitutional right.” 6 To the extent tha t Campbell argues he was not permitted to participate in DOC programs during the time he was incarcerated and awaiting sentencing, this inability was Campbell’s own doing: he chose to postpone his sentencing in order to appear in court in person

. ( 8 ) The Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that Campbell ’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable
issue. We also are satisfied that Campbell ’s counsel has made a conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly determined that Campbell could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the S uperior Court is AFFIRMED. C ounsel’s motion to withdraw is moot.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura Justice

5 Morgan v. State , 2015 WL 4066768, at *1 (Del. July 1, 2015).
6 Snyder v. Andrews , 708 A.2d 237, 242 (Del. 1998).