NOT P REC EDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR T HE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 2 0

- 1 4 3 2

__________

D O L O R E S L L O Y D

,

App ellant

v.

P R E S B Y ’ S I N S P I R E D L I F E ;

F A T I M A H B E Y

, S e n i o r P r o p e r t y M a n a g e r f o r I n t e r f a i t h H o u s e

_______________________ _________ ___ _

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the E a s t e r n District of P e n n s y l v a n i a

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2

- 1 5

- c v

- 0 6 8 8 0 )

District Judge: Ho norable E d u a r d o C

. R o b r e n o

____________________ ______ __________

Submi tted Pursuant to Third Ci rcuit LAR 34. 1(a)

N o v e m b e r 1 9

, 2 0 2 0

Before: J O R D A N

, M A T E Y a n d N Y G A A R D

, Cir cuit Judges

(Opinion filed Novem be r 24, 2020 )

___________

OPINION *

___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition i s not a n opinion of the full C ourt a nd pursuant to I.O .P . 5.7 doe s not

constitute binding precedent.2

P r o s e a ppellant Dolores Lloyd a p p e a l s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ’ s o r d e r d e n y i n g h e r

m o t i o n u n d e r F e d e r a l R u l e o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e 6 0 ( b )

. F o r t h e r e a s o n s d i s c u s s e d b e l o w

,

w e w i l l a f

f i r m

.

I n D e c e m b e r 2 0 1 5, L l o y d fil ed a n action i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r t h e

E a s t e r n D i s t r i c t o f P e n n s y l v a n i a against her landlord and property manager

, claimin g that

t h e y committed housing discrimination, failed t o reasonab ly accommodate her di sa bility,

and retaliated against her for filing a complaint with the Department of Housing and

Urban Development and the Human Relations Commission. After allowing discovery to

pro ce ed, the District C ourt awarded partia l summary judgm ent to the a p p e l l e e s on May 1,

2017

, and granted their second motion for summary judgm ent on the remain ing claims in

a Ma rch 26, 2018 order

. 1 L l o y d f i l e d s e v e r a l m ot i o n s i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r r e l i e f

u n d e r F e d e r a l R u l e o f C i v i l Procedur e 6 0 ( b )

, p r i m a r i l y r e q u e s t i n g t h a t h e r c a s e b e

r e o p e n e d b ecau s e t h e a p p e l l e e s h a d e n g a g e d i n f r a u d

. T h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e n i e d t h e m

a l l

. 2 L l o y d n o w a p p e a l s t h e d e n i a l o f h e r l a t e s t m o t i o n

.

W e h a v e juri sdiction u n d e r 2 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 2 9 1

. W e r e v i e w t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ’ s

o r d e r d e n y i n g L l o y d ’ s m o t i o n u n d e r F e d e r a l R u l e o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e 6 0 ( b ) f o r a n a b u s e

1 Ll o yd file d a n ap peal f

rom that or der in J an uary 2019 . T his Court dism issed it for lack

of jurisdiction because it was un timely filed. Llo yd v. Pres by ’ s Ins pi r ed Li fe , C.A. N o.

19

- 104 6 (o rder entered on Ap ri l 23, 201 9).

2 The Di strict Cour t denied Llo yd ’ s first Rule 60(b) mo tio n ( com bi ned fili ngs at ECF

No s

. 30 and 34 ) in an order entered on Ju ne 5, 2019 ( E CF No. 38) ; it denied her second

motion on June 19, 2 019 (ECF No. 40) ; and her thir d on February 10, 2020 (ECF No.

42 )

. As we will explain, o u r r ev iew here i s limited to t he l ast order.3

o f d i s c r e t i o n

. S e e B u d g e t B l i n d s

, I n c

. v

. W h i t e

, 5 3 6 F

. 3 d 2 4 4

, 2 5 1 ( 3 d C i r

. 2 0 0 8 )

. A

c o ur t a b u s e s i t s d i s c r e t i o n w h e n i t g r o u n d s i t s d e c i s i o n “ u p o n a c l e a r l y e r r oneous f i n d i n g

o f f a c t

, a n e r r o n e o u s c o n c l u s i o n o f l a w o r a n i m p r o p e r application o f l a w t o f a c t

. ”

R e f o r m P a rty of A l l e g h e n y C t y

. v

. A l l e g h e n y C t y

. De p ’ t o f E l e c t i o n s

, 1 7 4 F

. 3 d 3 0 5

, 3 1 1

( 3 d C i r

. 1 9 9 9 ) ( e n banc) ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n m a r k s a n d citation o m i t t e d )

. T h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n h e r e

.

A t t h e o u t s e t

, w e n o t e t h a t t h e b u l k o f L l o y d ’ s c l a i m s c o n c e r n i n g t h e a l l e g e d f r a u d

w e r e r a i s e d i n h e r p r e v i o u s R u l e 6 0 ( b ) m o t i o n s d e n i e d b y t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

. L l o y d d i d

n o t f i l e t i m e l y a p p e a l s a s t o t h e d e n i a l s o f t h o s e p r i o r m o t i o n s ( n o r h a s s h e i n c l u d e d t h e m

i n h e r n o t i c e o f a p p e a l

, s e e F e d

. R

. A p p

. P

. 3 ( c ) ( 1 ) ( B ) )

, a n d t h e t i m e l y a p p e a l o f t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t ’ s F e b r u a r y 1 0

, 2 0 2 0 o r d e r d o e s n o t b r i n g u p t h o s e e a r l i e r o r d e r s f o r r e v i e w

.

S e e T o r r e s v

. C h a t e r

, 1 2 5 F

. 3 d 1 6 6

, 1 6 7 ( 3 d C i r

. 1 9 9 7 ) ( “ A n o r d e r d e n y i n g r e l i e f u n d e r

R u l e 6 0 ( b ) i s a n a p p e a l a b l e o r d e r

, b u t t h e a p p e a l b r i n g s u p o n l y t h e c o r r e c t n e s s o f t h e

o r d e r i t s e l f

. ” ( q u o t i n g D a i l y M i r r o r

, I n c

. v

. N. Y

. N e w s

, I n c

. , 5 3 3 F

. 2 d 5 3

, 5 6 ( 2 d C i r

.

1 9 7 6 ) ) )

. 3 H e r m o t i o n did no t s p e c i f y u n d e r w h i c h s u b s e c t i o n o f R u l e 6 0 ( b ) s h e i n t e n d e d

t o p r o c e e d

, n o r d i d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n v o k e a p a r t i c u l a r s u b s e c t i o n i n i t s F e b r u a r y 2 0 2 0

o r d e r

. W e w i l l c o n s i d e r h e r m o t i o n u n d e r t h e s u b s e c tion s o f R u l e 6 0 ( b ) m o s t p l a u s i b l e t o

t h e g r o u n d s r a i s e d in he r moti on : ( b ) ( 2 ) ( n e w l y d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e ) ; ( b ) ( 3 ) ( f r a u d

,

3 Lloyd did not file the Rule 60(b) motion at issue here within 28 days of the District

Cour t ’ s order denying her previo us Rule 60(b) motion, so it did not toll the tim e to appeal

that previous order under Fed. R. A pp. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi).4

m i s r e p r e s e n t a t ion

, o r m i s c o n d u c t b y a n o p p o s i n g p a r t y ) ; a nd ( b ) ( 6 ) ( “ a n y o t h e r r e a s o n

t h a t j u s t i f i e s r e l i e f ” )

.

U n d e r R u l e 6 0 ( c ) ( 1 )

, m o t i o n s m a d e u n d e r R u l e 6 0 ( b ) ( 2 ) o r ( b ) ( 3 ) m u s t b e f i l e d

“ n o m o r e t h a n a y e a r after the e n t r y o f t h e j u d g m e n t or o r d e r o r t h e d a t e o f t h e

p r o c e e d i n g

. ” F e d

. R

. C i v

. P

. 6 0 ( c ) ( 1 )

. A s n o t e d a b o v e

, t h e D is t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d t h e

o r d e r L l o y d a t t a c k s i n h e r R u l e 6 0 ( b ) m o t i o n

— t h e judgment g r a n t i n g a p p e l l e e s ’ s e c o n d

m o t i o n f o r s u m m a r y jud gment

— o n M a r c h 2 6

, 2 0 1 8

. L l o y d f i l e d t h e R u l e 6 0 ( b ) m o t i o n

a t i s s u e h e r e o n J a n u a r y 3 1

, 2 02 0

, a l m o s t t w o y e a r s a f t e r t h a t

. T h u s

, c o n s t r u e d u n d e r

e i t h e r R u l e 6 0 ( b ) ( 2 ) o r ( b ) ( 3 )

, t h e m o t i o n w a s n o t t i m e l y f i l e d

, a n d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

p r o p e r l y d e n i e d i t

.

M o t i o n s m a d e u n d e r s u b s e c t i o n ( b ) ( 6 ) a r e n o t s u b j e c t t o t h e o n e

- y e a r t i m e

p r o v i s i o n b u t m u s t b e made “ w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e

. ” F e d

. R

. C i v

. P

. 6 0 ( c ) ( 1 )

.

H o w e v e r

, a party g e n e r a l l y may not i n v o k e R u l e 6 0 (b)( 6) to e v a d e application o f the one

y ear ti m e limitation p r e s c r i b e d f o r ( b ) ( 2 ) a n d ( b ) ( 3 )

. A p ar t y m a y use (b ) ( 6 ) t o a v o i d t h e

t i m e b a r o n l y w h e n s h e s h o w s t h a t “ t h e r e l ie f s o u g h t i s b a s e d u p o n a n y o t h e r r e a s o n t h a n

a r e a s o n w h i c h w o u l d w a r r a n t r e l i e f u n d e r 6 0 ( b ) [ ( 2 ) a n d ( 3 ) ]

, ” a n d t h a t ex traordinary

c i r c u m s t a n c es f

o r d i s t u r b i n g t h e j u d g m e n t e x i st

. S t r a d l e y v

. C o r t e z

, 5 1 8 F

. 2 d 4 8 8

, 4 9 3

( 3 d C i r

. 1 9 7 5 ) ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n m a r k s a n d c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d )

.

H e r e

, L l o y d ’ s m o t i o n c a m e u p s h o r t i n b o t h r e s p e c t s

. L l o y d a r g u e d t h a t s h e h a d

“ n e w e v i d e n c e ” t h a t a p p e l l e e s ’ attorney a n d t h e c o u r t r e p o r t e r e n g a g e d i n “ s e c r e t

communications” w h i l e t a k i n g h e r J u l y 2 0 1 6 d e p o s i t i o n

. As she has in h er other Rule5

60(b) motion s, s h e a l s o claim e d t h a t t he court r e por t e r e d i t o r i a l i z e d ; d e l e t e d s t a t e m e n t s ;

c o n f u s e d L l o y d ’ s s t a t e m e n t s w i t h t h o s e o f a p p e l l e e s ’ co u n s e l ; i n s e r t e d l i e s a t t h e

i n s t r u c t i o n o f a p p e l l e e s ’ c o u n s e l ; o r c h a n g e d L l o y d ’ s t e s t i m o n y t o s o u n d a r g u m e n t a t i v e

a n d c o n f u s e d

. S e t t i n g a si de for th e m o m e n t t h a t t h e s e a l l e g a t i o n s l a c k e d a n y s u p p o r t

, w e

o b s er ve that they w o u l d m o s t p r o p e r l y b e b r o u g h t i n a m o t i o n u n d e r ( b ) ( 3 ) f o r “ f r a u d [ ]

,

m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n

, o r m i s c o n d u c t b y a n o p p o s i n g p a r t y

. ” L l o y d ’ s m o t i o n t h u s c a n n o t

e s c a p e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e t i m e

- b a r

.

W e a l s o a d d t h a t L l o y d l i k e w i s e d i d n o t d e m o n s t r a t e t h e “ e x t r a o r d i n a r y

c i r c u m s t a n c e s ” r e q u i r e d t o p r o c e e d u n d e r ( b ) ( 6 )

. S e e Cox v. Horn , 757 F.3d 113, 115

(3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc. , 989 F.2d 13 8, 140 (3d Cir. 1 993))

.

L l o y d ’ s a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t t h e o p p o s i n g p a r t y e n g a g e d i n f r a u d a m o u n t e d t o n o t h i n g m o r e

t h a n s p e c u l a t i o n a n d c o n

j e c t u r e

. A l t h o u g h s h e h a s a t t e m p t e d n u m e r o u s t i m e s t o c r a f t a

c l a i m o f m i s c o n d u c t s u r r o u n d i n g h e r d e p o s i t i o n ( h e r l a t e s t b e i n g t h a t t h e c o u r t r e p o r t e r

a n d a p p e l l e e s ’ c o u n s e l p a s s e d n o t e s o r s i g n a l e d e a c h o t h e r d u r i n g the d e p o s i t i o n ) h e r

c l a i m s l a c k a n y s u p p o r t

. S h e h a s n o t s h o w n “ e x t r a o r d i n a r y c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h e r e

, without

s u c h r e l i e f

, a n e x t r e m e a n d u n e x p e c t e d h a r d s h i p w o u l d o c c u r

. ” I d

. ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) ; s e e

a l s o B o hus v . Belo f

f

, 9 5 0 F

. 2 d 9 1 9

, 9 3 0 ( 3 d C i r

. 1 9 9 1 ) ( n o t i n g t h a t such relief s houl d b e

g r anted only “ w her e e x t r a o r d i n a r y j us t i f y i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r e p r e se n t ” ) ( c i t a t i o n

o m i t t e d )

. 4

4 In her appellate b rief, Lloyd also argue d that the D istrict C o urt erre d in its June 5, 2019

order by finding her claim untime ly. A s sta ted above

, that pre vious order is not properly6

F o r t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s

, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n d e n y i n g

L l o y d ’ s m o t i o n u n d e r R u l e 6 0 ( b )

. W e w i l l a f f i r m t h e o r d e r d e n y i n g r e l i e f

.

b efore us

. See T o r r e s

, 1 2 5 F

. 3 d at 167

.