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NOBEL PEACE PRIZE LAUREATE LIU XIAOBO AND 

THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

CONGRESSIONAL–EXECUTIVE 

COMMISSION ON CHINA 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

NOVEMBER 9, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov 

CONGRESSIONAL–EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

Senate House 

BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

GEORGE LeMIEUX, Florida 

SANDER LEVIN, Michigan, Cochairman 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

Department of State, To Be Appointed 

Department of Labor, To Be Appointed 

Department of Commerce, To Be Appointed 

At-Large, To Be Appointed 

At-Large, To Be Appointed 

CHARLOTTE OLDHAM-MOORE, Staff Director 

DOUGLAS GROB, Cochairman’s Senior Staff Member 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Opening statement of Hon. Byron L. Dorgan, a U.S. Senator from North 

Dakota; Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China .............. 1 

Appiah, Kwame Anthony, President, PEN American Center .............................. 5 

Economy, Elizabeth C., C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Relations ....................................................................... 7 

Gilley, Bruce, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Mark O. Hatfield 

School of Government, Portland State University ............................................ 10 

Kine, Phelim, China Researcher, Human Rights Watch ...................................... 12 

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS

Appiah, Kwame Anthony ........................................................................................ 30 

Economy, Elizabeth C. ............................................................................................ 32 

Gillley, Bruce ........................................................................................................... 36 

Kine, Phelim ............................................................................................................. 38 

Levin, Hon. Sander, a U.S. Representative from Michigan; Cochairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China ...................................................... 41 

SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD

Leaflet submitted by Kwame Anthony Appiah ..................................................... 43 

(1) 

NOBEL PEACE PRIZE LAUREATE LIU XIAOBO 

AND THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL REFORM 

IN CHINA 

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 2010 

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION ON CHINA, 

Washington, DC. 

The hearing was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in 

room 628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Byron L. Dorgan, 

Chairman, presiding. 

Also present: Representative Sander Levin, Cochairman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA; CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL– 

EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

Chairman DORGAN. Good morning. We’re going to begin the hearing. This is a hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission 

on China. I’m Senator Dorgan and we will have Congressman 

Levin join us in a few moments. I think in the interest of time, I 

want to begin on time, and he is necessarily delayed, but I am 

pleased that he’s on his way, and will be here shortly. 

We’ve called this hearing for one reason, and one reason only, 

and that is that, as much of the world celebrates the awarding of 

the Nobel Peace Prize to a remarkable man, that remarkable man 

stares at the rest of the world from behind a prison door in the 

country of China. 

It’s sending very substantial messages to the rest of the world, 

it seems to me, that someone so talented, so fervent in his support 

of human rights and democratic values is awarded a Nobel Peace 

Prize, and learns of it while in a prison cell. 

The question is, what does all that mean? Is it unusual? What 

can we expect in the future with respect to the government of 

China and the country of China and the path of human rights? 

In announcing the award that was given to Mr. Liu Xiaobo, he 

was celebrated for what is called ‘‘a long and non-violent struggle 

for fundamental human rights in China.’’ It’s a short little phrase 

that speaks so much about work that has gone on for so long by 

Mr. Liu. 

I hope that a number of you who have come to this hearing have 

been able to pick up a copy of the large collection of articles that 

have been published by this Commission available at the door of 

this hearing room, along with a copy of the Commission’s most recently released 2010 Annual Report. That covers Mr. Liu’s case in 

2 

detail. As you will see, this Commission has followed and publicized Mr. Liu’s case for several years. 

The Chinese Government now is punishing this man in part for 

his role in something called ‘‘Charter 08,’’ a document that calls for 

human rights and political reform in China. Mr. Liu is currently 

serving an 11-year sentence in a Chinese prison on the charge of 

‘‘inciting subversion of state power.’’ 

This Commission, which is charged by law to monitor the Chinese Government’s progress toward the development of institutions 

of democratic governance, today will assess debates over political 

reform in China to ask what do Mr. Liu’s writings and advocacy 

mean for China, and what impact, if any, his receiving the Nobel 

Peace Prize may have on democracy and human rights in China. 

These questions have become highly important now not only as 

a result of the actions of the Nobel Committee, but also China’s 

Premier Wen, himself, was recently quoted as saying, ‘‘If there is 

no guarantee of reform of the political system, then results obtained from the reform of the economic system may be lost.’’ I find 

that a peculiar sentence to read from the Premier in as much as 

the Nobel Peace Prize recipient is behind a prison door in his country. 

When China’s leaders make reference to ‘‘reform of the political 

system’’ what do they mean? What exactly do they mean? As China 

prepares now for major leadership changes in 2012, we need to understand exactly what the prospects for political reform in China 

would be today. And as we prepare to do that, I just wanted at this 

hearing to take a moment to say a few words about Mr. Liu. 

He was born in 1955. He grew up in Changchun, an industrial 

city in China’s northeast. As a young man, he wanted to study literature, and he moved to Beijing. He earned a Ph.D. degree in 

Comparative Literature, became a professor, and devoted his days 

to teaching and to writing. 

By 1989, he had the good fortune to travel abroad as a visiting 

scholar. When demonstrations began to grow that year in 

Tiananmen Square, he was a visiting scholar at Columbia University, here in the United States. He cut short his stay in New York, 

and he returned home to China, joining students on Tiananmen 

Square in a hunger strike. Then on the night of June 4, a scholar 

whom the students had grown to trust, negotiated the last minute 

withdrawal of the group of students from the Square, convincing 

them to leave the Square and to save their lives. That scholar was 

Mr. Liu. 

Authorities immediately branded him as a subversive and sentenced him to 18 months in prison. On his release from prison he 

could neither publish nor teach. And he described his plight in 

these words: 

Simply for expressing divergent political views and taking part in a peaceful and democratic movement, a teacher has lost his podium, a writer has 

lost his right to publish, and an intellectual has lost the chance to speak 

publicly. 

Upon his release from prison in 1991, he continued to write, however, and again he was placed under house arrest in 1995, then ordered to a labor camp where he was detained—imprisoned until 

1999. 

3 

In December 2008 after supporting a call for political reform 

known as Charter 08, he was detained once again, later formally 

arrested, and then sentenced to 11 years in prison. 

Let it be known that Charter 08 is a call for such things as 

‘‘guarantee of human rights,’’ ‘‘separation of powers,’’ ‘‘independent 

judiciary,’’ ‘‘rural urban equality,’’ ‘‘freedom to assemble,’’ ‘‘freedom 

to form groups,’’ ‘‘freedom of expression,’’ ‘‘freedom of religion,’’ 

‘‘civic education,’’ ‘‘protection of private property,’’ ‘‘financial and 

tax reform,’’ ‘‘social security,’’ and ‘‘protection of the environment.’’ 

None of which seems subversive to me. 

And so the Chinese Government now tells us that these are 

things—the aspirations—which the people in China have witnessed 

for some while, these are things for which people may be sent to 

prison. And so we ask what does that mean? What does it mean 

for the country of China? What does it mean for our country’s dealings with the country of China? What does it mean for people like 

Mr. Liu who today stares outward from the depths of a dark Chinese prison cell. 

In a recent interview with CNN, Premier Wen stated: ‘‘Freedom 

of speech is indispensible. The people’s wishes for, and needs for, 

democracy and freedom are irresistible.’’ 

That from the lips of Premier Wen. And so one asks, how can one 

say that? How can one assert that? How can one believe that when 

Mr. Liu is in a Chinese prison while the rest of the world celebrates the Nobel Peace Prize given to this remarkable man. 

Again, we’ve held this hearing for one purpose and one purpose 

only. And that is to demonstrate and show the absurdity and cruelty of having one of the celebrated people in this world, someone 

who has now been honored with the Nobel Peace Prize being held 

this morning in a prison in China in the second year of an 11-year 

prison sentence for advocating for human rights and the principles 

of democracy and free speech. 

My hope is that the Chinese Government and Chinese officials 

will understand and listen and hear the voices from around the 

world, the voices from this country, and the voices from in this 

room that say you can’t talk about these principles and then continue to imprison someone like Mr. Liu and have the rest of the 

world have any belief at all in what you say. 

We are joined today by a number of witnesses we have invited 

to this hearing. We will hear from four of them and then have some 

questions. And I appreciate very much their willingness to be here. 

I’m going to introduce all four and then we’ll go down the list. And 

let me hope that I have the names correct—pronounced correctly, 

at least. 

Kwame Anthony Appiah. Mr. Appiah is President of PEN, P–E– 

N, American Center, a global literary and human rights organization. He’s Lawrence Rockefeller University Professor of Philosophy 

at the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University. It was Professor Appiah who nominated Mr. Liu for his Nobel 

Peace Prize. And I have a copy of that nomination letter. And Mr. 

Appiah, it is an extraordinary piece of writing and I appreciate as 

I am sure do most Americans appreciate your nomination of Mr. 

Liu. And as you know the Committee obviously looked at that nomVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:11 Jan 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\9NOV10.TXT DIEDRE
4 

ination as a very significant nomination as well. That’s the basis 

on which they awarded the Peace Prize to Mr. Liu. 

Professor Appiah has received his B.A. and Ph.D. from Cambridge University in philosophy. He’s taught at Yale, Cornell, 

Duke, Harvard, lectured all over the world, joined the Princeton 

faculty in 2002. He’s done extensive writing and lecturing and traveling. And I won’t read all of it, if you don’t mind. You have a remarkable background. 

Then we will hear from Mr. Bruce Gilley, Assistant Professor of 

Political Science in the Mark Hatfield School of Government at 

Portland State University. Mark Hatfield is a man with whom I 

have had the privilege of serving here in the Congress for some 

many years. An extraordinary American and I am pleased to be 

able to say that you represent part of his lineage as well in public 

service. You do research on democracy that is legitimacy in global 

politics. You’ve been a specialist on the comparative politics of 

China and Asia; written a number of books, ‘‘The Right to Rule: 

How States Win and Lose Legitimacy,’’ Columbia Press 2009; ‘‘China’s Democratic Future: How it Will Happen and Where it Will 

Lead’’ in 2004. You’ve traveled extensively, lectured extensively, 

and if people want to know more about you they can go to Google, 

I assume. But you have a very impressive background as well. 

Elizabeth Economy is Director for Asian Studies at the Council 

on Foreign Relations. She is C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director 

for Asia Studies. Her most recent book, ‘‘The River Runs Black: 

The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future,’’ published by 

Cornell University Press, 2004 with the second edition just this 

year. She was named 1 of the top 50—excuse me, it was named 1 

of the top 50 sustainability books in 2008 by the University of 

Cambridge, won the 2005 International Convention on Asia Scholar’s Award for the best social sciences book. Published in Asia, it 

is one of the top 10 books of 2004 by the Globalist. And you’ve published articles in foreign affairs and scholarly journals, and you 

likewise have been involved in so many organizations and traveled 

extensively. And we very much appreciate your being here. You 

have an honorary doctorate of law from Vermont Law School and 

Ph.D. from University of Michigan. And enough about you, but I’m 

impressed. 

And finally, Mr. Phelim Kine, is that correct? 

Mr. Phelim Kine is a researcher, a China researcher at Human 

Rights Watch, a really outstanding organization. He works in the 

Asia Division, a former newswire bureau chief in Jakarta and 

worked as a journalist for more than a decade in China, Indonesia, 

Cambodia, and Taiwan prior to joining Human Rights Watch in 

April 2007. He has written extensively on human rights, military 

impunity, corruption, child sex tourism, human trafficking, and 

more. He’s been printed extensively and in so many journals and 

newspapers and spoken publicly on many of these issues for a long, 

long while. I understand you are based in Hong Kong, Mr. Kine. 

We appreciate very much your taking the time and willingness to 

be with us today. 

So that is a description of four pretty extraordinary people. And 

we appreciate your taking the time to spend part of the morning 

with us. And I’m going to begin with Mr. Appiah. Mr. Appiah, why 

5 

don’t you proceed and I’m told I may have your name pronounced 

incorrectly; is that right? There may be a North Dakota pronunciation—— 

Mr. APPIAH. Given the job that we’re going to do in massacring 

Chinese names, I can hardly complain. I normally say Appiah, 

but—— 

Chairman DORGAN. Appiah. 

Mr. APPIAH [continuing].—There are many ways of pronouncing 

it. 

Chairman DORGAN. All right. Mr. Appiah, thank you very much. 

Why don’t you proceed. 

Mr. APPIAH. Thank you very much, Chairman Dorgan. 

STATEMENT OF KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, PRESIDENT, PEN 

AMERICAN CENTER 

Mr. APPIAH. So I have the honor of being the president of the 

PEN American Center and I am very grateful for the opportunity 

to speak to you today. 

Our center is one of 145 centers in more than 100 countries of 

International PEN which is the world’s oldest literary and human 

rights organization. And for nearly 90 years we’ve sustained literary fellowship between the writers of all nations and defended 

free expression at home and abroad. Part of this effort involves 

supporting our colleague Liu Xiaobo who served as president of our 

affiliated independent Chinese PEN Center from 2003 to 2007, held 

a seat on its board until late 2009, and remains an Honorary President as he’s an honorary member of our own center here in the 

United States. In late January 2010, in connection with our support for him and the cause of democracy in China, I wrote to the 

Norwegian Nobel Committee to urge them to give serious consideration to him as a candidate for the Peace Prize. I should say that 

I wasn’t alone in doing this. I know that Vaclav Havel, President 

of the former Czechoslovakia and Nobel Laureate Desmond Tutu of 

South Africa made similar appeals. 

And, if I may, I’d like to summarize briefly the arguments I 

made in that letter on behalf of my organization. 

As you mentioned, on December 25, 2009—I don’t have to draw 

attention to the significance of the date—a Beijing court sentenced 

Liu to 11 years in prison and an additional 2 years deprivation of 

political rights for inciting subversion of state power. This so-called 

incitement, the verdict made clear, consisted of 7 phrases—a total 

of 224 Chinese characters—that he had written over the last three 

years. Many of these words came from Charter 08, which the 

Chairman mentioned, a declaration modeled on Vaclav Havel’s 

Charter 77 that calls for political reform and greater human rights 

in China and has been signed, at considerable risk, by more than 

10,000 Chinese citizens. 

Liu Xiaobo has a long history as one of the leading proponents 

of peaceful democratic reform in the People’s Republic of China. A 

poet and literary critic, he served as a professor at Beijing Normal 

University and was a leading voice and an influential presence during the student protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989; indeed, his 

insistence on non-violence and democratic process are widely credVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:11 Jan 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\9NOV10.TXT DIEDRE
6 

ited with preventing far more catastrophic bloodshed during the 

subsequent crackdown. 

Charter 08 which he coauthored is a testament to an expanding 

movement for peaceful democratic reform in China. This document 

is a remarkable attempt, both to engage China’s leadership and to 

speak to the Chinese public about where China is and where she 

needs to go. 

As I say, more than 10,000 Chinese citizens, not only dissidents 

and human rights lawyers, but also prominent political scientists, 

economists, writers, artists, grassroots activists, farmers, and even 

government officials have endorsed the document despite the fact 

that almost all of the original 300 signers have been, at one point 

or other, detained or harassed. In doing so they exhibited exceptional courage and conviction. 

We all recall the period of the Cultural Revolution in which millions were uprooted, millions died, and we all acknowledge that 

there’s been substantial progress from that horrendous nadir. We 

know, too, that there are voices within the regime, urging greater 

respect for free expression. 

Chairman Dorgan, you mentioned one statement recently, it 

should be pointed out that that segment is not available on the 

Web in China so Chinese people can’t even know that their own 

Premier has said those things. It’s been removed from the Web in 

China. 

China wants—and needs—to be heard in the community of nations. I—and all of my PEN colleagues—in every one of those more 

than 100 countries believe in a cosmopolitan conversation in which 

we hear from every nation. But we also believe we must let China’s 

rulers know that we can only listen to them respectfully if they 

offer to their own citizens the fundamental freedoms we all claim 

from our governments. 

Since the announcement of the Peace Prize the government of 

China has behaved with exactly the sort of contempt for the rights 

of her people that Liu Xiaobo has long protested. The Chinese Communist Party has demonstrated that it remains unfortunately willing to revert to its least attractive traditions. 

The Chinese Government blacked out television broadcasts on 

CNN and the BBC and the French station TV5 that reported Liu’s 

Nobel Prize. They censored sites on the Web that mentioned him 

or published Charter 08. Indeed, as I said, comically, they have 

censored references to free expression in the recent speeches of 

their own premier. Much less comically, they have harassed Liu 

Xia, Liu Xiaobo’s wife, destroying her cell phone, denying her Internet access, surrounding her house and placing her effectively on 

house arrest. Her friends and family have not been able to be in 

touch with her since October 20. 

The Chinese authorities have also stepped up pressure on members of the Independent Chinese PEN Center [ICPC] as part of 

their campaign to limit information about the awarding of the 

prize. Since the prize was announced on October 8, dozens of 

ICPC’s China-based members have been visited by police and harassed and several of its leading members are living effectively 

under visual house arrest. Most have been warned against speakVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:11 Jan 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\9NOV10.TXT DIEDRE
7 

ing out about the award, a move that appears calculated to keep 

the Chinese people in the dark. 

We believe that it is right that President Obama and Secretary 

of State Clinton have raised Liu’s case with their Chinese counterparts, both before and after his most recent sentence, as we at PEN 

American Center wrote and asked them to do. We are grateful that 

Ambassador Jon Huntsman in Beijing sent representation to Liu’s 

trial last year, though the diplomat that was sent was denied access to what’s supposed to be a public court in China. We believe 

that China should live up to the promise made in its own Constitution; promises it made when it signed the International Covenant 

on Civil and Political Rights, which we hope it will ratify at some 

point. And we believe that it is America’s obligation, as a party to 

the Covenant, to hold China to that standard. But the most fundamental reason why we should do this is that these demands are 

right. They are demands of justice. 

The Chinese Government argues that their treatment of Liu 

Xiaobo is an internal matter, and that international awards and 

advocacy on his behalf amount to what they call ‘‘meddling in China’s internal affairs.’’ But the treatment he has endured is by definition an international matter, because as all violations of human 

rights are matters of legitimate concern to the whole world, to the 

people of the world. By detaining Liu Xiaobo for more than a year 

and then by convicting and sentencing him to 11 years in prison 

in clear violation of his most fundamental, internationally recognized rights, the People’s Republic of China itself has guaranteed 

that his case is not and cannot be a purely internal affair. 

We have no hostility toward China or the Chinese. Indeed, it is 

our respect and concern for China and her people that leads us to 

urge their government to allow them—all of them—the freedom to 

write and to read and to organize that will allow them to be responsible citizens of a democratic society, and will then allow 

China to be a responsible and respected colleague in the community of democratic nations. Thank you very much. 

If I may ask to enter into the record one leaflet on the basis of 

which somebody was arrested in China recently, his name is Guo 

Xianliang and it’s just an example of the sort of thing that’s going 

on and the sort of harassment that the rest of people are exercising 

their fundamental democratic rights. Thank you. 

Chairman DORGAN. Without objection, that will be included in 

the record. 

Let me just say that the full statement that you submit will be 

a part of the record and we’ll also include your oral testimony. 

Elizabeth Economy is the Director for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Thank you very much for being with us 

and you may proceed. 

[The leaflet appears in the appendix.] 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Appiah appears in the appendix.] 

8 

STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, C.V. STARR SENIOR 

FELLOW AND DIRECTOR FOR ASIA STUDIES, COUNCIL ON 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Ms. ECONOMY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It’s a pleasure to have the opportunity to speak before you this morning on 

this very important and timely issue of political reform in China. 

In my five or so minutes, I will make three points. 

First, while China’s leaders are committed to reforming their political system, they have not arrived at any clear roadmap for this 

reform. There is significant debate over what reform means and 

what it should look like. 

Second, as Beijing tries to figure out its path to political reform, 

there is enormous political change occurring outside the system’s 

formal political institutions. This change also contributes to the reform of the political system. 

Finally, political change in China is going to come primarily from 

within the country. However, there are several ways in which the 

United States and the rest of the international community can 

exert real influence on this process. 

To my first point, what does the consensus around political reform look like? Above all, China’s leaders want political reform because they want to root out corruption, which is the major source 

of social unrest and instability in the country. They want it to help 

address their wide-ranging social problems related to the environment, healthcare, education, and income inequality. They recognize 

that the middle class is demanding a greater voice within the political system and that the Internet is facilitating this in ways that 

pose a real challenge to the current system. They are beginning to 

understand that their political system is a liability to their international reputation. 

Although there is consensus on this need for political reform, 

there is a fair amount of debate over what constitutes the greatest 

problem and what ought to be the fundamental solution. I would 

argue that the dominant preference of the current political leadership is what I call ‘‘political modernization’’ which I see as an effort 

to transform institutions of governance to make them more efficient, but at the same time to retain the primacy of the party. Political modernization includes what we see today; experiments in 

public consultation, for example, in the form of polling local people 

about their preferences for how to spend the local budget, have real 

impact in some small cases. 

Political modernization also includes improvements in transparency. China’s 2008 Public Disclosure Law, for example, allows 

data collected by government bodies to be accessed by the public. 

In the environmental realm, a couple of NGOs in China, coupled 

with the U.S.-based Natural Resources Defense Council combined 

to produce the document study, ‘‘Breaking the Ice on Environmental Open Information,’’ which uses the 2008 law to force cities 

in China to report the data on levels of pollution and others. It’s 

a path-breaking document based on this new law. 

There’s also more comprehensive reform under way in Shenzhen 

though other political experiments, reducing the size of the government and eliminating dual positions for political officials so the 

head of a charity cannot also hold office. In some cases, Shenzhen 

9 

is even outsourcing some traditionally governmental responsibilities in social welfare to local NGOs. There’s also talk about holding direct elections but this has yet to materialize. 

At the same time, the government faces pressure from other 

strains of political thought among loose organizations of intellectuals and activists. One group, often termed the ‘‘New Left,’’ focuses on issues of economic justice, the rights of the poor, and the 

emergence of crony capitalism. In many ways, these are the very 

issues that have driven President Hu Jintao’s concept of a ‘‘harmonious society.’’ This group, however, tends to favor a strong statehand in the market. In other words, they have a prescription for 

a political system, yet they are relatively suspicious of Western democracy. 

Then, of course, there are the liberal intellectuals, activists, and 

media elite such as Liu Xiaobo or Hu Shuli from Caixin. This group 

advances what I would call ‘‘revolutionary reform’’: Political reform 

that would fundamentally transform the political institutions of the 

state, universal values, constitutional democracy, and separation of 

powers. 

China’s leaders’ current political modernization efforts draw 

upon both of these strains of thought but don’t abide by either completely. I would argue that there’s a third and important source of 

pressure on China’s leaders as they attempt to plot out a relatively 

controlled path to political reform: The growing role of the Internet 

in civil society. The Internet is a politically organizing force. It can 

inform debate, as in the case of the online discussion of the Dalai 

Lama and Twitter. It can help bring more than 7,000 people to protest in Xiamen and it can bring pressure to bear on authorities for 

unjust decisions by a swell of outrage on the Internet. In a sense, 

every Chinese citizen with a cell phone and Internet access becomes a journalist. As a result, it is becoming far more difficult and 

in some cases impossible for officials to hide blatant wrongdoing. 

In addition, iconic cultural figures such as the blogger Han Han 

and Ai Weiwei use their public stature and the Internet as a bully 

pulpit to advocate for greater openness. China’s leaders are forced 

to respond to this dynamic force for political change on a daily 

basis. 

Finally, how does the international community fit into all of this? 

There are several potential avenues. 

First, and most important, we should openly support those who 

are fighting for change in China such as Liu Xiaobo or Hu Jia making it not a criticism, but rather a suggestion to China about how 

it can and should live up to its own best ideals as represented in 

its own Constitution. 

Second, we should continue our longstanding practice of working 

with those who are trying to strengthen the rule of law transparency and official accountability. 

Third, it is important to help Beijing understand that its political 

system matters to the rest of the world. It is not simply ‘‘an internal affair.’’ What it does domestically has global ramification in 

terms of product safety, the environment, intellectual property 

rights for every transnational issue. China’s global actions are derived from its domestic political system. 

10 

Finally, advancing the cause of political reform in other Asian 

countries can bring pressure to bear on China by undermining the 

idea that there is something uniquely Western in universal values 

and by demonstrating the limited attractiveness of an authoritarian state. Political reform is an issue that is going to be decided 

in China by the Chinese people, but I also think we have significant ability to help them along in this process. 

Thank you. 

Chairman DORGAN. Dr. Economy, thank you very much. We appreciate your testimony. 

Next we’ll hear from Mr. Bruce Gilley, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Portland State University. And Mr. Gilley is an 

Asian scholar. You may proceed. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Economy appears in the appendix.] 

STATEMENT OF BRUCE GILLEY, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF 

POLITICAL SCIENCE, MARK O. HATFIELD SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY 

Mr. GILLEY. Thank you. I am very grateful to have the opportunity to address the Commission this morning. The perspective I’d 

like to offer on Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel Peace Prize is simple and can 

be stated as follows: 

Liu Xiaobo’s award is important because it is a reminder to us 

in the free world, in the West, and even in the United States that 

even though we are entering a period of intense rivalry and possibly conflict with a rising China, the forces of modernization and 

liberalization are at work in that country. This means that in the 

coming decades, even as we manage and challenge potentially disruptive behavior by China’s rulers, its people continue to march toward a democratic society. 

I do not believe the Nobel Prize will have any measurable effect 

on political reform in China, any more than the award of the same 

prize to His Holiness the Dalai Lama in 1989 had any effect on 

Chinese rule in Tibet. But I do believe it will serve as an important 

beacon to policymakers outside of China, reminding them to engage 

and target, and to retain faith in, Liu Xiaobo’s China. The temptation to believe that we are engaged in a life-or-death struggle with 

a hostile new Oriental juggernaut will be strong in the coming decades. We should instead use Liu Xiaobo’s award to think carefully 

about what is going on in China which I will briefly address here, 

and to retain a certain Reaganesque optimism about the potential 

for human freedom everywhere. We should respond to a rising 

China the same way that Liu Xiaobo responded to his state security captors before he was sent to jail: we have no enemies, only 

acquaintances who are still trapped in yesterday’s modes of 

thought and action, acquaintances whom we hope and fervently believe will someday become our friends. 

Honored Commission member, the year is 1975. Russia’s GDP in 

that year is about the same as China’s today. Andrei Sakharov has 

just been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and in a few years he will 

be sent to Gorky under house arrest. Global geo-political rivalries 

are intensifying. The international politics of the Soviet Union are 

entering its most difficult period. We have an Afghanistan, proxy 

11 

wars in Africa, the arms race, martial law in Poland, KAL 007, and 

Chernobyl yet to come. Earlier claims that the Soviet Union is 

modernizing and liberalizing because of the post-totalitarian reforms under Khrushchev are now scoffed at. Smart people, like 

Harvard professor Samuel Huntington, are saying that the chances 

for democratic change in the Soviet Union are ‘‘virtually nil.’’ 

Looking back, we now realize we missed something fundamental. 

By focusing on the international politics of the Soviet Union, we ignored what was happening inside the Soviet Union. The message 

of Sakharov’s prize, as should be the message of Liu Xiaobo’s prize, 

was that we should have been better Marxists, trusting in the ineluctable forces of modernization that would bring about political 

change. Instead, we were Hobbesians, believing we needed to prepare home defense against an increasingly cold and competitive 

world of enemies and invaders. Had we been more ready to respond 

to the good luck of history, perhaps some of the democratic regress 

that we’ve seen in Russia could have been avoided. 

China’s in the same position today. It is easy to get carried away 

by the imagery of China challenging the West. But China is not a 

juggernaut. China is a juggler. Behind the assertiveness and the 

rhetoric is a country that is struggling mightily with the implications of development—social, environmental, financial, economic, 

cultural, and political. The West will retain its indispensability and 

will continue to do so, so long as it continues to represent basic humanistic impulses better than any other part of the world. 

The CCP [Chinese Communist Party] leadership is entering a 

delicate leadership transition in 2012. There are two visions of political reform competing within the leadership today. One of these 

associated with Premier Wen Jiabao who is making a sort of final 

crie de coeur before retiring in 2012 is what we might call grassroots democracy vision. Professor Economy, Dr. Economy has called 

this the Internet and Civil Society vision. This is a bottom up view 

of political reform. It stresses civil society, elections at the grassroots level and is some ways consciously modeled on the experiences of Taiwan. It will be represented in the new leadership by 

Xi Jinping who will be the party general secretary and perhaps depending on who else joins him by two others on the standing committee. 

The second vision is a more top-down view. It stresses party democracy. Ironically, this is the approach that Gorbachev himself 

adopted in seeking political reform in the Soviet Union. 

What is important about this debate, as Dr. Economy mentioned, 

the debate about political modernization is that China’s Communist Party takes political reform seriously. They are divided on 

how to do it, but they believe they can maintain their rule through 

a constant innovation of governance and governing mechanisms. 

And to some extent that’s true. The party has stayed in power 

longer than expected after 1989 by improving its governance, by 

processing passports more efficiently, by providing more open information, by liberalizing more internal migration. I think the mistake is to believe it can maintain its legitimacy forever through 

such governance reforms. That’s where Liu Xiaobo comes in. His vision is the third vision of political reform. What Dr. Economy refers 

to as a revolutionary reform. What I refer to as the liberal democVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:11 Jan 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\9NOV10.TXT DIEDRE
12 

racy vision. It, of course, stresses the same aspects of universal 

rights and democracy that were raised in 1989 and harkens back 

to the revolutionary thinking of the republic era prior to 1949. 

Liu is a reminder of this outcome that awaits China. Just as it 

is hard to imagine that outcome today, it was hard to imagine that 

in the Soviet Union of 1975. Liu Xiaobo helps us to focus on this 

China, not to imagine that the insecure and increasingly aggressive 

external China is the one of the future. He’s a reminder that the 

reason we should not confront or contain China is not some relativistic argument that the Chinese are different or prefer tyranny 

to democracy, not that we need to reach some realistic accommodation with this titan of the East. Instead, we need to respond 

thoughtfully to the China of the current regime because we have 

faith that its days are numbered. 

Reagan, who came into office as a Cold Warrior extraordinaire, 

instinctively realized this about the Soviet Union and changed tack 

in his second term. Liu Xiaobo reminds us of the need to retain 

Dutch’s infectious optimism about the fate of Communist regimes 

especially rapidly modernizing ones. He matters because he will 

appeal to our better instincts in dealing with China to celebrate 

positive change, to defend individuals and rights supporters, and to 

have confidence in the universality of freedom and democracy and 

their triumph everywhere, that’s Liu Xiaobo’s challenge to us. 

Thank you. 

Chairman DORGAN. Mr. Gilley, thank you very much. We appreciate your being here and your testimony. 

And, finally, we will hear from Mr. Kine. 

I welcome my colleague, Congressman Levin. Congressman, 

thank you for being here and we are about to hear from Mr. Kine 

who is the fourth witness and then we’ll begin to ask some questions. Mr. Kine. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilley appears in the appendix.] 

STATEMENT OF PHELIM KINE, CHINA RESEARCHER, HUMAN 

RIGHTS WATCH 

Mr. KINE. Thank you very much. I would like to thank you very 

much, the Commission, for your—you know, inexhaustible efforts 

to promote human rights in China and to expose the ongoing 

abuses that are occurring there, which today we’re talking about 

the emblematic abuse of the rights of Liu Xiaobo. 

I guess the best way to get into this because I’m fourth here and 

there’s been some really good information—I’m a little bit intimidated. But I’ll just say that I think the best way to get into this 

is to talk about how Human Rights Watch works human rights in 

China and works with people like Liu Xiaobo. 

Wherever we work in 90 countries that we cover, we look for natural allies, people who support the same types of beliefs and ideals 

that we do; people who support peaceful evolutionary change who 

work tirelessly for universal rights and freedoms. And in China Liu 

Xiaobo has been the epitome of that. And in another society, Liu 

Xiaobo would be a natural leader in China for holding dear these 

views and for espousing them and articulating them so well. 

Unfortunately, in China Liu Xiaobo isn’t particularly well-known. 

His political critiques, his political writings, to a large extent have 

13 

left him marginalized and censured. He is not the Thomas Freeman or the Christopher Hitchens of China. He is much less than 

that, unfortunately, on a public stage. And, of course, the Chinese 

Government has devoted massive financial, technological, and 

human resources to ensure that remains the case. 

Up until his—well, the only thing you would find about him, 

until recently after his sentencing would be state media reports behind the firewall about his sentencing. And so it’s very difficult to 

get critical mass and get Chinese people to really have an idea of 

who he is. And the fact is that it’s actually dangerous to be known 

in China as a supporter and someone who knows and respects Liu 

Xiaobo. We know that because the report that came yesterday from 

the Chinese non-governmental organization [NGO], Chinese 

Human Rights Defenders, has updated us on information that 

more than 100 people since the October 8 Nobel Prize victory have 

been detained, interrogated, or placed under house arrest merely 

for expressing support for Liu Xiaobo. 

Now, how does the Nobel Prize change this? What’s the hope for 

change in this dynamic? Well, from the outset it looks a little bit 

intimidating because, of course, the Chinese Government has made 

sure that very few people really know about Liu Xiaobo. From the 

outset the Chinese Government, after the announcement of Liu 

Xiaobo’s Nobel Prize, state media was silent. Chinese Central Television, Xinhua, said nothing. Even the nominally independent 

Phoenix Television in Hong Kong chose not to make any statement 

about that. The Chinese Government didn’t make any statement, 

which means the vast majority of Chinese people who are dependent on state media for their information didn’t know until the next 

day. And that was a short, terse statement from the Ministry on 

Foreign Affairs that identified Liu Xiaobo as a criminal and referred to the Nobel Prize award as profane. 

Now, since then the Chinese Government has only ramped up its 

propaganda offensive against both the Nobel Prize Committee and 

Liu Xiaobo. In short order, on the 14th Xinhua ran an article describing the Nobel Committee and the Nobel Prize as a ‘‘political 

tool.’’ A few days later we had a Xinhua report describing the Nobel 

Prize—Nobel Committee as politically motivated, as politically biased. And then things really changed, and they really ramped it up 

on October 28. Xinhua ran a fairly sophisticated, almost a Fox 

News style ‘‘expose’’ of Liu Xiaobo called ‘‘Who is Liu Xiaobo? ’’ And 

what it was, was a selection of quotations allegedly taken from a 

30-year plus writing career which appeared to show Liu as someone who disrespected Chinese culture, as someone who appeared to 

be in the employ of foreign organizations working against China. 

Now, what does that mean? Well, what it means is that to a 

large extent the information that people get about Liu Xiaobo is 

pretty negative. But what’s interesting is, we know that activists 

in China, in Beijing, have gone out onto the streets of Beijing, have 

gotten onto buses in China in Beijing and asked people, do you 

know about Liu Xiaobo? Have you heard about the Nobel Prize? To 

a large extent in the days after they didn’t know. And the reflex 

answer from most people was that they were proud that a Chinese 

person had been honored in this way by an international organization with a prize as auspicious as the Nobel Prize. 

14 

And the second thing is that even if they disagreed, if they knew 

something about Liu Xiaobo, had some idea of the media’s smear 

campaign against him, they expressed support for his willingness 

and his right to express his ideas. So what does that mean? 

Well, looking farther down the road, we’re looking at this idea of 

this debate that this award is prompting within China. Now, I 

think—and in the long-term we’re probably going to see this, is 

that this attention the Chinese Government has placed on Liu 

Xiaobo, this vitriol is inevitably going to pique curiosity amongst 

people who have access to the Internet, who have Internet circumvention techniques so they can get information that’s not state 

controlled, to find out more about him. Which means inevitably his 

ideas and the ideas embodied in Charter 08 are going to be disseminated far more widely. 

The second idea is, the Nobel Prize indicates, and the Chinese 

Government’s reaction to it really shows how the Chinese Government miscalculated badly. This has really put the Chinese Government on the back foot. They did not expect this. They thought that 

when they dispatched a senior foreign ministry official to Norway 

to intimidate and browbeat the Norwegian government into not allowing the Norway Committee to give Liu the Nobel that they had 

won. But that hasn’t happened. And the fact that this has happened has given an attraction for people within the government or 

the elites in society to express support for Liu Xiaobo and the ideas 

in Charter 08. 

One excellent example is within days of Liu’s Nobel a public letter issued by 23 senior retired, former Communist party officials 

and intellectuals called Liu a splendid choice and called on the government to end its censorship regime. 

So these are—this is the beginning of a trend that we’re going 

to see. Obviously the Chinese Government right now there’s going 

to be discussion between moderates and the people who really 

fought for and won in terms of punishing Liu Xiaobo. There’s going 

to be discussion in terms of how this can be handled. 

What the Liu Xiaobo Nobel has created for the Chinese Government is a running sore that’s going to continue as long as he is imprisoned, as long as there’s a new story that refers to imprisoned 

Chinese Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo this is a huge embarrassment 

for the Chinese Government. So the Hu Jintao/Wen Jiabao regime 

is passing on a real toxic legacy to the next group of leaders in 

2012 that’s going to force this new leadership of Xi Jinping and Li 

Kejiang to do a cost benefit ratio of whether it’s worth keeping him 

in prison in the short-term and the long-term in terms of their 

damage control. And in the longer term it’s going to hopefully provoke more debate and more openness in the Chinese Government 

and more support for rule of law and obeying and respecting laws 

and the same principles in China’s own Constitution that Liu 

Xiaobo has advocated. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kine appears in the appendix.] 

Chairman DORGAN. Mr. Kine, thank you very much. We appreciate your being here. 

I wanted to mention at the outset a couple of things. Number 

one, this Commission, the Congressional-Executive Commission on 

15 

China, maintains the most extensive database of those who are imprisoned or those who have been affected by actions of the Chinese 

Government and we have a database of 5,500 Chinese citizens, 

1,400 of them are currently detained or in prison, the remainder 

have been released, have escaped, have finished their terms, or 

died in custody. But we have maintained this extensive database 

which we think is very important in order that the world know 

that these are people who are not forgotten. 

And we have testimony here about the Internet, the difficulty 

that the Chinese Government is now having keeping a lid on the 

free flow of information. The extensive efforts they have made to 

censor the Internet traffic in China. And at a previous hearing just 

some months ago, we had a hearing at which we had representatives of Google, representatives of a company that registers domain 

names and others to talk about this very issue because I think 

that, perhaps more than any other issue, is going to determine 

what happens inside China. Are they able to effectively, in this 

new age of communications—are they able to effectively, for a long 

period of time, contain the information they want to contain behind 

the curtain? I think not. 

But I have a lot of questions here and I know my colleague will 

as well when he is back. 

First of all, Mr. Appiah, do you know Liu Xiaobo? 

Mr. APPIAH. No, I don’t. I mean, we communicate, usually, 

through the independent Chinese PEN Center of which he’s the expresident and through in particular, Tienchi Martin-Liao who is 

their current president. She’s an exiled Chinese writer. 

Chairman DORGAN. Is he able to communicate, and if so, how can 

he communicate while he’s in prison? 

Mr. APPIAH. Not now. I mean, he was. His wife, Liu Xia, was visiting him regularly, as you know, as I mentioned, she’s not been 

seen since the 20th of October by anybody. So we don’t know when 

she’ll be able to meet him next. But she was able to tell him about 

the prize. She was able to go and tell him. And he, in a characteristic way, I think, responded by dedicating it to the—what he 

called the martyrs of Tiananmen and also weeping. 

Chairman DORGAN. Now, a number of you have made the point 

that Premier Wen has made certain statements and representations that seem pretty unusual and nearly unbelievable given the 

circumstances. But you’ve also indicated that the Chinese Government itself has taken steps to censor those expressions. Can you 

give me a little more information about that? What do we know 

about that censorship? Just that steps were taken to try to prevent 

most of the Chinese people from hearing what Premier Wen said, 

is that—— 

Mr. APPIAH. Well, the parts—I mean, you quoted, I think, from 

an interview that he did on CNN—— 

Chairman DORGAN. Yes. 

Mr. APPIAH [continuing].—with Fareed Zakaria. I believe that 

the parts—those parts of that interview are not available in the 

transcription that the Chinese people can see. So—— 

Chairman DORGAN. And then we conclude from that that the 

Chinese Government has affirmatively decided to exclude them, is 

that—— 

16 

Mr. APPIAH. Yes, I mean, it’s part of the sort of irony of the 

present situation. Because there’s a dispute going on between the 

various positions within the regime it’s possible that they don’t, you 

know—as though one part of the apparatus can decide that it 

doesn’t want another part of the apparatus to be seen within China 

and so they may have asked him, they may not. But they certainly 

have took it off the—— 

Chairman DORGAN. Dr. Economy, did you want to—— 

Ms. ECONOMY. I would add that Southern Weekend ran a summary of Premier Wen’s interview with Fareed. Hu Shuli from 

Caixin has referenced his remarks openly. While the full text may 

not be available easily to the Chinese public there are ways to go 

around the firewall and get access to CNN or many other sites with 

access to the full set of his remarks. There have been media in 

China that have referenced it and talked about what he said. In 

some forms, his remarks are in the public domain. 

Chairman DORGAN. And it represents the internal struggles. Let 

me ask about corruption. You indicated that the reforms that some 

leaders in China want are to root out corruption. What kind of corruption are you referring to? 

Ms. ECONOMY. Corruption is at the root of virtually any challenge that China faces today. If you’re looking at land appropriation, environmental protests, or other social instability throughout 

the country, the issue that’s driving it fundamentally has to do 

with officials behaving corruptly, whether appropriating money or 

appropriating land. The government recognizes this and there is 

some effort by people to campaign against corrupt officials by rooting them out wholesale. Increasingly, however, those in the Chinese Government are realizing that the way to root out corrupt officials is, again, by working with NGOs, offering public disclosure of 

data, and working through public consultation. 

So Beijing is beginning to try to find a way—still by maintaining 

the primacy of the party—to increase transparency and official accountability within the system. 

Chairman DORGAN. Would corruption include the judicial system 

that decides to send Mr. Liu to prison? 

Ms. ECONOMY. Absolutely. In many instances protests within 

China don’t simply occur because something happens to somebody 

one day. Oftentimes protests come after groups of people have already sought redress through the legal system to no avail. The protest may come after one or two years’ worth of seeking redress, 

until people’s frustrations erupt. 

Chairman DORGAN. It’s interesting, I was in Hanoi, Vietnam at 

one point and met, among others, the Chamber of Commerce, 

American Chamber of Commerce, AmCHAM, and the American 

Chamber of Commerce in Vietnam had a very unusual message for 

me. They said, ‘‘We need more government.’’ Not something you 

hear from Chambers of Commerce very often. And I said, ‘‘What do 

you mean by that?’’ They said, ‘‘This is a country that’s a Communist country attempting to develop a market system. But in 

order for a system to work, you’ve got to have government. You’ve 

got to have administrative practices and, you’ve got to have courts 

that will enforce contracts.’’ They went through a whole series of 

things. And it is the case that you need all of that and you need 

17 

to have confidence in that before you risk your investments and so 

on. 

So, that happened to be Vietnam. I assume the same circumstances exist in China as it moves with a Communist government toward a market system. It’s now moved in that direction for 

a good number of years. 

Mr. Gilley, you indicated that the issue is for us to respond 

thoughtfully to China. And I guess I want to try to understand, because you indicated that you have an effervescent sense of optimism that things are going to change and ultimately the Chinese 

people will throw the boot off their chest—the boot of Communism 

off their chest and we will see some other kind of approach that 

moves more in a democratic system. What—and maybe you’re 

right. I don’t know. I mean, I think we need to continue to try to 

hasten that along to the extent that we can through our sets of 

policies. But what is your view of how we respond thoughtfully to 

the Chinese—the current Chinese Government? 

Mr. GILLEY. Great question. First of all, I think it’s important 

not to mistake efforts, namely the efforts of the regime to censor, 

to jail a thousand people, for the overall state of information or political freedoms in China. Indeed, the efforts are a response to the 

increasing inability to manage information. 

If human rights were as bad today as they were 20 years ago, 

I would guess that a third of the population would need to be jailed 

for what they do today. So the regime—the response of the regime 

can’t be mistaken for what’s going on in China. It’s precisely because they’ve lost the ability to control information. They’ve lost 

the ability to limit discussions of political reform, human rights. 

People like Qin Xiao, prominent retiring Chairman of China Merchants Bank, one of the five major state banks, goes to Xinhua 

University last—in June and issues a clarion call for implementation of universal values, human rights and democracy. So the important thing to do is to not mistake—— 

Chairman DORGAN. Did anything happen to him? 

Mr. GILLEY. No. No. He’s now a hero and is widely discussed and 

is making a second career now as an advocate of universal values 

and human rights in China. 

Chairman DORGAN. Might you think if he threatens the government of China might they decide that he should join Mr. Liu? 

Mr. GILLEY. I’d say if he organizes a group he might find himself 

in trouble. But the idea of saying that is acceptable, that that 

speech is widely available online. And I must say Wen Jiabao has 

been calling for political reforms, democracy, and human rights 

since at least 2007 when he issued a People’s Daily editorial on 

that topic. Earlier this year he issued a memoir essay on his time 

with the Party General Secretary Hu Yaobong—Hu Yaobong has 

been a person who is not discussed publicly for many years. He’s 

now been rehabilitated in part because of Wen Jiabao. So parts of 

Wen Jiabao have been censored. And I think that the censoring of 

his speech in Shenzhen was simply because the Party General Secretary Hu Jintao was coming the next week, and it was his speech 

which was going to be the official speech. Lots of pro-reform statements from Wen Jiabao are easily available to Chinese Internet 

readers and online readers. 

18 

So my point is that it’s precisely because they’ve lost control of 

the ability to manage political speech and information that we see 

this stepped-up effort to try and plug the holes in the dam. But we 

have to focus, I think, on what’s happening to the dam rather than 

the holes they’re trying to plug. So my question is how to respond 

thoughtfully? Well, this has to do with how we view China internationally and being aware that policies we adopt with respect to 

China’s international posture, it’s security posture in the South 

China Sea, it’s security posture with respect to Taiwan, it’s currency manipulation. That we have to think carefully about the implications of those policies on domestic reform in China and in part 

to realize that Chinese people are less interested and indeed don’t 

want their country to become an international pariah. 

It’s exactly as Mr. Kine has said, they’re very proud to get the 

Nobel Peace Prize, they want their country to be a respected country. And responding thoughtfully for China means in some ways 

trying to respond to China’s need for respectability and for acceptance, and that’s really what is driving the international politics of 

China. 

Now, how you do that in concrete terms we can discuss for a long 

time. But the point is that just as we in some ways mistook what 

was happening in the Soviet Union in the 1980s, we’re in danger 

of mistaking what’s happening in China today. 

Chairman DORGAN. I have a couple of more questions then I’m 

going to call on my colleague. I would observe that there is no 

question that things have changed in China for the vast majority 

of the Chinese people in a positive and beneficial way over the last 

20 years. There’s no question about that. 

I would also observe that the issue of human rights is for Mr. 

Liu or Mr. Gao or others as bad as it was 20 years ago today because in both cases—in Mr. Liu’s case he’s in prison, we’re not 

quite sure what they’ve done with Mr. Gao at this point. But for 

those for whom the Chinese Government has decided to take action 

and trump up charges and throw them in a dark cell somewhere, 

and not to be heard from by the rest of us, the human rights situation is abysmal, not changed at all. 

Mr. Kine, you talked about that there’s even some support 

among government officials and then you described some retired 

government officials which is a little different. You were talking 

about statements by some retired government officials. I assume 

the testimony we’ve heard from others here is that inside the Chinese Government itself they are struggling to try to determine 

where are we headed and how do we contain what we know to be 

the most significant threat to our regime and that is the free flow 

of information and what it does to incite the thirst among the population for freedom and the capability of free speech, human rights 

and so on. 

So, give me your assessment of what you think is happening inside the government? 

Mr. KINE. Excellent question. I’d like to start by echoing what 

Mr. Gilley said, and your comments, you know, we are the first to 

say that things have changed for the better over the last 20–30 

years in China in terms of human rights. It’s a much better place. 

But I think moving into your question, the record really shows that 

19 

from early 2007 human rights in China have really been under attack. And what we’ve seen and what we have documented and 

what you have documented in this Commission is that it appears 

that within the government that the security agencies have been 

in the ascendant. This is a—probably a result of both the government’s response and shock at the ethnic unrest in Tibet in March 

2008 which was compounded by the bloody ethnic violence that occurred in Urumqi, Xinjiang in July 2009. So to a large extent this 

means that the government’s response to citizens’ legitimate quest 

for access to human rights, and particularly those with high profiles who are seen as threatening as with reference to those with 

the comments who might be able to form movements or groups 

have been targeted—high profile dissidents. 

I think it’s important to note that reform in China—it’s really 

not—it’s not rocket science. I mean we can talk about it for days, 

but the bottom line is we’re talking about rule of law. We’re talking 

about the Chinese Government respecting its own laws, respecting 

the tenets and the principles embodied in it’s own constitution. It’s 

not something the United States, the EU, or the international community is trying to impose on China. It’s China’s own laws and 

principles. 

So I think the important thing for us to realize is that what 

we’re dealing with in terms of this idea of reform and what’s going 

on in the government is overall the—you know, the overarching 

main concern and obsession of this government which is the world’s 

first evolutionary Communist Party is maintenance of power. They 

want to maintain their 61-year monopoly on power and they will 

do anything that they need to get that done. And so in terms of— 

so are there voices? Are there more moderate voices from the government? Obviously. 

Okay. Are they in the ascendant? Absolutely not. This is a government that, as you can see from its furious reaction to the Nobel 

Peace Prize of Liu Xiaobo, something that, to a large extent could 

have not gone away, but could have been much better handled if 

they’d just shut up about it. You know, this indicates a government 

that is not particularly confident, that is concerned about where it’s 

going and what the threats are to its own power. 

So in the end what does that mean? It means that reform in 

China comes down to the same meaning, the same currency as 

words like harmony and stability. These are shorthand for mechanisms for the Chinese Communist Party to identify potential 

threats to its power, to target them, to silence them and to make 

sure that they maintain that power. 

Chairman DORGAN. One last question then I’ll call on Congressman Levin. 

Ms. Economy, I think I’ve heard two different views here, one 

Mr. Kine says we have a Communist government—a government 

that is going to do everything it can to retain its power. And I 

think Mr. Gilley’s feeling is it is inevitable over time that things 

will change in China in the direction of greater human rights. Your 

assessment of those two issues. 

Ms. ECONOMY. I think they’re both right. As I suggested earlier, 

the party’s efforts at reform are largely toward modernization. How 

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20 

parency and official accountability, and to some extent the rule of 

law without challenging our own authority for the next 60 years? 

At the same time, I think Dr. Gilley is right that looking ahead, 

it is going to be impossible for them to do that. This is in large part 

because there are forces within the Party that think differently. 

As for the media as a whole—one of the interesting things about 

that group of retired officials, if you look at the list of signatories 

that sent the letter to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress—calling for freedom of speech and an open press, 

you will find many former senior media officials, people who 15 or 

20 years ago we would have thought were the ones responsible for 

controlling information. You can see that some place deep inside 

them, even as they were controlling information, they actually were 

interested in releasing more information. 

It is therefore difficult for us to assess what people are actually 

thinking, believing, and arguing for behind the scenes, when based 

solely on what we see in public documentation. Because of the 

Internet, because of domestic pressures emanating, and because of 

forces within the party, I do think that Dr. Gilley is right. There 

is going to be change. 

Chairman DORGAN. Thank you very much. Prior to this Congress 

the lead on this Commission was Congressman Levin. He’s done a 

lot of work in this area and a lot of really good work. So Congressman, it’s good to see you here. 

And I’d just mention to you that Dr. Appiah, as I mentioned in 

his introduction, is one of those who had recommended Liu Xiaobo 

for the Nobel Peace Prize. I’m sure he must feel pretty good about 

that recommendation. But I appreciate your being here. Why don’t 

you proceed? 

Representative LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Dorgan. I’m so glad that 

you called this hearing. And you’ve been so devoted to the work of 

the Commission. I prepared an opening statement which I, of 

course, will not read, and I ask that it be submitted for the record. 

Chairman DORGAN. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Representative Levin appears in the 

appendix.] 

Representative LEVIN. I do in the statement cover this imprisonment of Liu Xiaobo. And also I talk about the work of the Commission and I thank the increasingly valuable, if I might say, invaluable work of the Commission and all of its talented staff. And I discuss to some extent the database, the political prisoner database 

which is increasingly utilized and I think validates its creation. 

But let me just ask a question. I’m sorry I have to kind of pick 

up at this point. I said at the beginning of my statement that Liu 

Xiaobo’s imprisonment is a personal tragedy, a national shame, 

and an international challenge. So let me just follow up, I haven’t 

been to China now for quite a few years. And you’ve said, some of 

you, that they seek international respectability, and also that it’s 

a much better place for human rights—much better. 

I don’t know how all of this fits together. If they seek international respectability and imprison somebody who is speaking up 

and expressing his views, I don’t quite know how they expect to attain international respectability. 

21 

And number two, if it’s really a much better place, I don’t know 

how that fits into this imprisonment because I think the signal 

that it sends is that if anybody speaks up and is likely to make a 

difference, you’ll end up in prison. And in terms of the international challenge, I think all of this graphically raises the question as to what we do. So I think you’ve already covered some of 

this ground, but how does this all fit together? And why don’t we 

go right to left? 

Thank you very much for coming. 

Mr. KINE. Thank you very much. Thank you for your question. 

Let me start by talking about, yes, what is this, there seems to be 

some contradictions here. 

Well, let’s take a look at the record. I mean, 20–30 years ago 

what rights do Chinese—most Chinese people—Chinese people 

have that they didn’t have back then? Well, now human rights is 

now enshrined in China’s Constitution. People are able to—— 

Representative LEVIN. It was in the Soviet Constitution, too. 

Mr. KINE. People are able to legally buy and own property. Okay. 

People are able to have passports and travel. People are able to access at least portions of the Internet. People have freedom of internal mobility which they did not have, to the extent of which they 

didn’t have 20–30 years ago. So I think the key idea to remember 

in terms of how things have changed, but how things seem not to 

have changed with Liu Xiaobo’s imprisonment is that there are red 

lines and gray lines that citizens are not supposed to cross. And so 

the unspoken compact that the Chinese Government has made 

with the Chinese people in the 30 years of reform and opening is 

that you can go out, prosper, multiply, make money, but be quiet. 

Don’t push the envelope in terms of asking for rights in terms of 

voting, elections, don’t ask us to do things that could make us 

think that you’re a threat to our maintenance of power. So this is 

the dynamic that we’re looking at. 

Representative LEVIN. But some of those references are really 

more to economic rights than to human rights. 

Mr. KINE. Exactly. But to the vast majority—to most Chinese 

people you have to remember that, you know, this is—the 20th century was an absolute catastrophe for the Chinese people. We’ve had 

the civil war, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, 

you know, Chinese people are at a place now where they’ve had extended peace, an extended period which has been absent of the 

dreaded chaos which haunted their fathers, their grandfathers. So 

they are grateful and they understand that this is a special time. 

And they are willing—to a large extent most Chinese people are 

willing to accept that status quo. 

Representative LEVIN. I mean, that’s—we could discuss that, but 

that isn’t quite the same as saying it’s a much better place for 

human rights. I mean, the fact that they can move, the fact that 

they can get a passport under certain circumstances doesn’t—and 

the fact that these changes are popular with the people—that all 

doesn’t mean that in terms of human rights it’s a much better 

place. Unless your definition of ‘‘human rights’’ is so broad that it 

encompasses virtually everything. I mean, it’s surely a better place 

economically for huge numbers. But I think his imprisonment realVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:11 Jan 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\9NOV10.TXT DIEDRE
22 

ly sends the signal that, in terms of the basic human right of expression, it isn’t a much better place. 

Mr. KINE. I think it’s significant to—and I don’t want to look like 

I’m defending the Chinese Government’s human rights record, but 

I think that it’s significant that we’re talking about one person who 

obviously is emblematic of wider abuses, but the fact is that we no 

longer see except in areas such as Tibet and Xinjiang, you know, 

mass arrests. To a large extent most Chinese citizens don’t need to 

worry about the general issue of kicking in the door just for sitting 

around the kitchen table criticizing the government. It’s only when 

they cross these red and gray lines, when they start to mobilize, 

or look like they are forming networks or groups which could be 

seen as a threat to the government, when they cross that line and 

are under a threat and under persecution. 

Representative LEVIN. Of course, in Myanmar it’s ‘‘just one person,’’ and she symbolizes what’s true for anybody who tries to do 

what she did. And doesn’t his arrest, his imprisonment with essentially the house arrest of his wife indicate to citizens throughout 

China, if you try to do anything like he did, you’ll have the same 

fate? 

Mr. KINE. That’s the message in the lesson, exactly. 

Representative LEVIN. So therefore, it isn’t necessarily a much 

better place for human rights? 

Mr. KINE. You know—— 

[Simultaneous conversation.] 

Mr. KINE. I think the key message is that we really need to look 

at China realistically. And I think that we need to give the Chinese 

Government credit where credit is due in the sense that life is 

much better for the vast majority of Chinese people than it was 20, 

30 years ago. It is no longer a totalitarian state in which millions 

are in poverty and which millions are subject to forced migrations. 

I mean, if we’re going to talk about changes over time, that’s what 

we need to discuss. I’m happy to talk with you all day about the 

abuses that are occurring in China today. But when you ask for a 

comparison from past to present, it’s really important to say things 

are better for the vast majority of Chinese people. People no 

longer—to a large extent don’t live under a sense of palpable fear. 

Okay. They don’t. The vast majority don’t. It’s only those who push 

the envelope who violate this unspoken compact and want access 

to those rights and freedoms which we at Human Rights Watch 

and which you here on this Commission advocate for so strongly, 

freedom of media, freedom of association, freedom of expression. 

Those are and remain bit problems in China. But the status quo 

today is far better than it was 30 years ago and it’s important to 

recognize that. 

Representative LEVIN. I think we do. But the essence of this 

hearing is those issues that you mentioned. We’re not discussing 

their economic policy. 

[Simultaneous conversation.] 

Representative LEVIN. Who else wants to chime in? Go down the 

line. 

Mr. GILLEY. I think we can restrict ourselves to political and 

civic freedoms and note that there have been vast improvements. 

More than 1,000 people signed Charter 08 and continue to go about 

23 

their daily lives without interference or police surveillance of any 

sort today. So for those people the right to express support for that 

charter has been realized. That’s political expression. There 

are—— 

Chairman DORGAN. Can I just—I apologize for interrupting—— 

[Simultaneous conversation.] 

Chairman DORGAN. Could I ask a question on that point? I 

thought I had heard previously in the testimony that about 100 of 

those who have signed have been detained or have been otherwise 

tracked by the government. So, I mean, if you’ve got 1,000 people 

that sign and 900 are not bothered, but 100 are detained, that’s 

really not progress; is it? 

Mr. GILLEY. Well, I think—I don’t know what the numbers—a 

number of people were questioned, brought in, asked, put under 

surveillance, I think the number of people who have been imprisoned for their part in Charter 08 is, I believe, a few, including Liu 

Xiaobo. To me if that number of people can issue support for such 

a clarion declaration of liberal democracy, that is—that is something they could not have even imagined doing 10 years earlier. 

Second of all, I think you have to think carefully about the policy 

toward Liu Xiaobo. The likely end game for him is exile. And I 

think from his standpoint that would be a wonderful outcome, he 

would be able to live freely and express himself. 

Representative LEVIN. Why don’t they do that tomorrow? 

Mr. GILLEY. I think they will shortly. I mean, I don’t know, this 

year, next year. But they do crave international respectability. Liu 

Xiaobo will continue to be a thorn in their side. They will calculate, 

as they did previously with people like Wei Jingsheng that it’s simply not worth it. They know that exile implies irrelevance for Chinese dissidents and he’ll be sent abroad. 

That will respect—that will reflect a sensitivity to international 

opinion. It will also reflect the fact that they’re aware of how easy 

it is to marginalize dissidents through exile or silencing. The point 

is to keep in mind that this gray line has to do with forming an 

organization that could challenge the party, challenge its leadership. That’s the line that hasn’t moved. Of course it should move. 

International human rights suggest China is under obligation to 

not jail people for organizing peacefully. But, nonetheless, represents a substantial increase in freedom compared to 20 years ago. 

You asked about international policy. All I’d say is, my point is, 

the important approach to China that we need to adopt is to maintain consensus with allies in dealing with China on international 

issues. So we’re careful, and I think the administration has done 

an excellent job on the South China Sea in acting with our allies 

in Southeast Asia in standing up to China’s territorial claims in 

that region, making sure that that is seen not as a U.S. policy, but 

as a regional policy, a regional response. Likewise in our treatment 

of human rights in China, we need to be aware that we have allies 

in particular in the rest of the Western world who have similar 

concerns and work in coordination with them in dealing with 

China. 

The point is not to reestablish a cold war mentality, or more specifically allow China to use a cold war international opinion climate 

to justify continued repression at home. 

24 

Representative LEVIN. In terms of cold war climate, I think 

there’s agreement. But you can use that argument to essentially respond very little. 

All right. Let’s keep going. 

Ms. ECONOMY. I’ll briefly address each of your three questions. 

First, how does China balance its desire for international respect 

with its decision to imprison a Nobel Peace Prize winner? I think 

it weighs the costs and benefits. In the case of Liu Xiaobo, the challenge to its own rule outweighs its desire for international respect. 

It’s a simple calculation. In the eyes of China’s leaders, it’s far better to imprison Liu than it is to let him speak freely for the sake 

of international respect. 

Second, is the situation in China better now than it was 20 years 

ago? We’ve heard good argumentation for why it is in terms of the 

expansion of economic opportunities. It would be interesting to look 

at what was going on between 1986 and 1989 in terms of the flowering of ideas. This was the time of Zhao Ziyang, and in 1987 there 

was a movement during the 13th Party Congress toward political 

reform, marking the first time there was a slate of ideas put forward on political reform. 

All the arguments here are probably correct. I think it’s worth 

a serious look, however, to think back 20 years or so at the ideas 

that were flowering about political reform and compare that to 

what’s happening now. 

Finally, what do we do? In my written testimony and oral remarks, I make four recommendations. One, individual support for 

people like Liu Xiaobo or Hu Jia and others; the United States has 

to continue to press when President Obama and Secretary Clinton 

meet with their counterparts. Second, continue to work on all of 

those programs that promote transparency in the rule of law and 

we have a lot of them underway now. 

I was just talking with Jennifer Salen, who works for the American Bar Association, and those rule of law programs are hugely 

important. 

Dr. Gilley is correct that we have to be careful not to box China 

into a corner. Putting pressure on China is important, however, because China responds to pressure. If you don’t pressure them, if 

you step back, they will take full advantage and press forward. Indicating to China, for example, that what they do domestically has 

global ramifications is important. We need to point that out continuously. 

Last, it’s been interesting to see how the Chinese press has reported on elections in Vietnam or Burma/Myanmar. To the extent 

that we can push forward on political reform in other Asian countries, in particular, that also will bring pressure to bear on China 

because it’s embarrassing to them. 

Mr. APPIAH. Thank you very much, Cochairman, Congressman 

Levin. I just wanted to say a couple of things. One is, it is important, I think to mention, by name, the people who are currently 

being harassed as a result of the Nobel Prize in particular. So I 

want to mention that Guo Xianliang in Guangzhou is actually 

under criminal charge now for inciting subversion of state power 

for circulating that document that I asked to have entered into the 

record. So there’s a real—there are individuals here and also Ye Du 

25 

or—well, his pen name is Ye Du, his real name, as it were is Wu 

Wei, who is the network committee coordinator and Internet expert 

for the Independent Chinese PEN Center which is the corresponding organization to ours in relation to China has been 

taken in for questioning, his house was raided, they confiscated 

PCs and CDs including information about a Congress that I had 

the honor of attending on behalf of the American PEN Center in 

Tokyo a month—a week before the Prize where we—all of us from 

100 countries voted for a resolution condemning the Chinese Government for its treatment not just of Liu Xiaobo but of named other 

people. I mean, some 10, a dozen, 20 other people whose names we 

know who have had their fundamental rights of free expression 

limited in one way or another. There’s more than one member of 

the ICPC in prison today essentially for free expression offenses. So 

I think it is important to underline the point that not just—it’s not 

just Liu Xiaobo as you said, you have a list of 1,400 people in prison, but just in relation to his Prize, there are people who are currently under criminal charge simply for circulating the information, 

the truth, that he won this prize. 

On the question of sort of what we should be doing, I’m a philosopher and not an expert on foreign policy, but I happen to have 

written a book recently about the ways in which foreigners influenced China in the late 19th century and I do think this question 

of—this question of holding the regime’s feet to the fire about Chinese honor, about the respectability of their country, there’s a historical precedent for thinking that that will work eventually. It 

worked with foot binding in the late 19th century and early 20th 

century, I believe. It’s arguable that it worked in relation to opium 

there though the issues there are somewhat different. 

So I think that this is very important. I’m an American citizen, 

but I have three sisters who are not and they live in three different 

African countries and in every one of those African countries China 

has interests that have to do with economic interests. And they’re 

trying to mine in these countries to take resources out of them and 

they need to be well respected in order for those countries, some 

of which are seriously democratic places, like Ghana where my 

youngest sister lives, the people care—ordinary people care about 

whether they’re dealing with a government that’s respectable, 

that’s worthy of respect. Ordinary people in these places care. 

To the extent that we can make it clear to those in the regime 

who are resisting change that this will be extremely costly to them, 

not just in their dealings with us, though that should matter to 

them, but in their dealings with absolutely everybody in the free 

countries of the world. I think that’s something that we can do and 

it will resonate because Chinese people care about China being respected as has been mentioned all the time, as Americans care 

about the United States being respected, of course. It’s a normal 

part of the psychology of someone who cares about her country. So 

I believe that that’s a very powerful weapon. And I don’t think we 

should back off. It’s perfectly consistent, both to do that and to say, 

that is not a cold war issue, we are not—we don’t hate China, this 

is about caring about the Chinese people. It’s not about being 

against them, it’s about being in favor of them. And it’s about helping them to move forward. In the end they will only move forward 

26 

if the Chinese people themselves are allowed to or choose to or mobilize themselves to move forward. But we can help as we have 

helped in the past and as this country was helped in our revolution 

by people from outside the colonies. 

This happens all the time in world history. All the time people 

in one place can help people in another place move forward. And 

I believe we should do that, we should stick with that, we should 

not back off because we’re worried about their threats to make us 

pay costs in terms of trade or something. They can’t afford to do 

that really and it’s very important, I think, that we stick to our 

principles, principles that are universal principles and principles 

that are largely present in the Chinese Constitution itself. Though, 

of course, the Chinese Constitution does protect the privilege of one 

party which is not something that I believe should be part of our 

international practice. 

Chairman DORGAN. You know, I’m thinking about our response 

to apartheid and the years in which we very aggressively, in most 

cases, said we will not sit idly by and say it doesn’t matter. It does 

matter to us and we’ll take appropriate actions and apply appropriate pressure to the extent that we can, whatever mechanisms 

we have to try to affect change. 

I was thinking also about the gray line you just described about 

organizations that the Chinese Government might well think could 

threaten them. And in the case of Mr. Gao who we have worked 

on and discussed at some length, he was not forming an organization. He was a lawyer who was supporting in court and taking 

cases for people who were charged with human rights violations. 

And so that’s a circumstance that’s well outside of the gray line 

that you’ve described. 

It’s really interesting to me and I suspect to Congressman Levin 

to listen to four people who study an area intensely, understand it 

in substantial detail, we have the attention span of gnats, you 

know, we just—in the Congress. We try to learn as much as we can 

and try to keep up with a lot of issues, but 100 issues come at you 

in a week. So we’re not Asian scholars. We’re not working in areas 

where you work. But your ability to come and give us perspectives 

from four different points on the compass, as Asian scholars, is 

really interesting to me. I mean, there are differences, obviously, 

nuanced differences in how you interpret and make judgments 

about things. But this has really been interesting for me to be able 

to hear your presentations today. And some of you have come some 

long ways to be here and I admire—I didn’t mention how much I 

admire Human Rights Watch. You know, I don’t—I don’t know how 

much money you make working for them, but my guess is you’ve 

not chosen a life of wealth, you’ve chosen a life of advocating on 

behalf of an organization and people around the world. I just—I admire all that you do—all four of you, and the work that that represents. 

I do want to just finally mention today that Charlotte OldhamMoore—if I get her name right—has worked with me for some 

while—some long while as the Staff Director of this Commission 

and has now left and is now working in the State Department. And 

she’s going to do well there as well. She’s an extraordinary talent 

and this Commission was very blessed to have her work with us. 

27 

And Doug Grob is similarly someone who has been Staff Director 

for us and will now continue in Charlotte’s stead. Doug does extraordinary work. So we’ve got a couple of people plus a larger 

staff, all of whom speak Mandarin, all of whom study what is happening, trying to understand for this Congress and interpret for the 

Congress and the Executive Branch what are the changes, what 

are the nuances, what can we expect? What does it mean? What 

are the hints that we get? 

I think all of you have said, properly so, China is going to be a 

significant presence in the life of the United States going forward. 

The question is, what kind of presence and to what effect? And so 

for someone to suggest we take our eye off this, we’d be fools. We 

need to—we’re going to live in a future and in a life with China 

as a significant presence and it’s in all of our interests to try to 

pressure and prod and continue to apply the right kind of approach 

to move China in the right direction. 

Congressman, I said when I started, there’s only one reason that 

I wanted to hold this hearing today. And that is because the Chinese authorities have a Nobel Peace Prize winner behind a prison 

door. And that ought to be a profound embarrassment to them. And 

to the extent that we can hold up for the world the absurdity of 

that circumstance I want to continue to try to do that. 

Mr. Gilley may well be right that they may exile Liu Xiaobo, I 

don’t know. But my hope is that whatever the fate of Mr. Liu 

Xiaobo, whatever his fate, I hope that very soon he’s released from 

a Chinese prison. This man ought to be celebrated, not imprisoned. 

So, let me thank all of you. Congressman, thank you very much 

and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon at 12:03 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(29) 

A P P E N D I X 

30 

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH

NOVEMBER 9, 2010

Chairman Dorgan, Co-Chairman Levin, Members of the Commission: 

My name is Professor Kwame Anthony Appiah, and I have the honor of being 

President of PEN American Center. I am very grateful for the invitation to speak 

to you today. Our center is one of the 145 centers—in more than 100 countries— 

of International PEN, the world’s oldest literary and human rights organization. For 

nearly 90 years we have sustained fellowship between the writers of all nations and 

defended free expression at home and abroad. More recently, we have worked with 

particular assistance from our colleagues in the Independent Chinese PEN Center 

(ICPC), to advance the cause of free expression in China. Part of this effort has involved supporting our colleague Liu Xiaobo, who served as President of ICPC from 

2003 to 2007, held a seat on its Board until late 2009, and remains an Honorary 

President. In late January 2010, in connection with our support for him and the 

cause of democracy in China, I wrote to the Norwegian Nobel Committee, to urge 

them to give serious consideration to him as a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize. 

I was not, of course, alone in doing this. Vaclav Havel, President of the former 

Czechoslovakia, and Nobel Laureate Desmond Tutu of South Africa, among many 

others, made similar appeals. If I may, I would like to summarize briefly the arguments I made in that letter on behalf of my organization. 

On December 25, 2009, a Beijing court sentenced Liu to 11 years in prison and 

an additional 2 years’ deprivation of political rights for ‘‘inciting subversion of state 

power.’’ This so-called incitement, the verdict made clear, consisted of seven 

phrases—a total of 224 Chinese characters—that he had written over the last three 

years. Many of these words came from Charter 08, a declaration modeled on Vaclav 

Havel’s Charter 77 that calls for political reform and greater human rights in China 

and has been signed, at considerable risk, by more than 10,000 Chinese citizens. 

Liu Xiaobo has a long history as one of the leading proponents of peaceful democratic reform in the People’s Republic of China. A poet and a literary critic, Liu 

served as a professor at Beijing Normal University and was a leading voice and an 

influential presence during the student protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989; indeed, his insistence on nonviolence and democratic process are widely credited with 

preventing far more catastrophic bloodshed during the subsequent crackdown. 

Liu’s writings express the aspirations of a growing number of China’s citizens; the 

ideas he has articulated are ideas that are commonplace in free societies around the 

world, and while the Chinese government claims they are subversive they are 

shared by a significant cross section of Chinese society. Charter 08 itself is a testament to an expanding movement for peaceful political reform in China. This document, which Liu co-authored, is a remarkable attempt both to engage China’s leadership and to speak to the Chinese public about where China is and needs to go. 

It is novel in its breadth and in its list of signers—not only dissidents and human 

rights lawyers, but also prominent political scientists, economists, writers, artists, 

grassroots activists, farmers, and even government officials. More than 10,000 Chinese citizens have endorsed the document despite the fact that almost all of the 

original 300 signers have since been detained or harassed. In doing so they, too, exhibited exceptional courage and conviction. 

We all recall the period of the Cultural Revolution, in which millions were uprooted, millions died. We should acknowledge that there has been substantial 

progress from that horrendous nadir. We know, too, that there are voices within the 

regime, urging greater respect for free expression. China wants—and needs—to be 

heard in the community of nations. I—and all of my PEN colleagues—believe in a 

cosmopolitan conversation in which we hear from every nation. But we also believe 

we must let China’s rulers know that we can only listen respectfully if they offer 

to their own citizens the fundamental freedoms we all claim from our governments. 

This is the right moment for the world to show those in China who do not understand that history is on freedom’s side that all the world’s friends of peace and democracy are watching. And that is why this was the right moment to give this 

peaceful campaigner for democratic freedoms the Nobel Peace Prize. 

Since the announcement of the Peace Prize, the government of China has behaved 

with exactly the sort of contempt for the rights of her people that Liu has long protested. The Chinese Communist Party has demonstrated that it remains unfortunately willing to revert to its most unattractive traditions. 

31 

The Chinese government blacked out television broadcasts on CNN and the BBC 

and the French station TV5 that reported Liu’s Nobel Prize. They censored sites on 

the Web that mentioned him or published Charter 08. Indeed, comically, they have 

censored references to free expression in the recent speeches of Wen Jiabao. Much 

less comically, they have harassed Liu Xia, Liu Xiaobo’s wife, destroying her cell 

phone, surrounding her house and placing her effectively under house arrest. Her 

friends and family have not been able to be in touch with her since October 20th. 

The Chinese authorities have also stepped up pressure on members of the ICPC 

as part of their campaign to limit information about the awarding of the prize. Since 

the prize was announced on October 8, dozens of ICPC’s China-based members have 

been visited by police and harassed and several of its leading members are living 

under virtual house arrest. On November 2, Wu Wei (whose pen name is Ye Du), 

ICPC’s Network Committee coordinator and the organization’s webmaster, was summoned for questioning by the Guangzhou Public Security Bureau after Internet 

writer Guo Xianliang was arrested for ‘‘inciting subversion of state power’’ on October 28 for handing out leaflets about Liu’s Nobel. Police reportedly believe that Wu 

Wei is behind the leaflets, and he stands accused of ‘‘disturbing public order.’’ He 

was questioned for four hours and his home was raided. Police confiscated two computers and information from PEN’s annual international congress, which took place 

last month in Tokyo, Japan, including a video clip that was shown at the conference 

of Liu Xia reading a letter from Liu Xiaobo, as well as a video about ICPC that included clips of Liu Xiaobo speaking about freedom of expression in China in 2006. 

On November 4, exiled poet Bei Ling, who is a co-founder of ICPC and recently 

wrote movingly about his friend Liu Xiaobo in a Wall Street Journal editorial, arrived at Beijing International Airport on a flight from Frankfurt for a brief stopover 

on his way to Taipei, where he was invited to participate in a discussion at Dongwu 

University and stay as a writer in residence. He was met by 20 police officers as 

soon as he disembarked and was taken to an empty room at the airport, where he 

says he was questioned for two hours and told that someone high in the government 

ordered that he not be permitted to travel on to Taiwan. He was instead manhandled and put on a plane back to Frankfurt. His baggage, which included two 

manuscripts about underground and exile literature, was confiscated and not returned. 

These are only a few of the outrages of recent weeks—many of which appear calculated to keep the Chinese people in the dark about Liu Xiaobo’s award. 

We believe that it is right that President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton 

have raised Liu’s case with their Chinese counterparts, both before and after his 

most recent sentence, as we at PEN American Center have asked them to do. We 

are grateful that Ambassador Jon Huntsman in Beijing sent representation to Liu’s 

trial last year, as we urged him to do. We believe that China should live up the 

promises made in its own Constitution; promises it made when it signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. And we believe that it is America’s 

obligation, as a party to the Covenant, to hold China to that standard. But the most 

fundamental reason why we should do this is that these demands are right. 

We specifically recommend to the Commission and to the Obama administration 

and Members of Congress, that in all communications with the Chinese government, 

you: 

1. Continue to press for the release of Liu Xiaobo at all available opportunities; 

2. Call for the release of all other writers imprisoned in violation of their right 

to freedom of expression; 

3. Urge the government of the People’s Republic of China to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 

The Chinese government argues that their treatment of Liu Xiaobo is an internal 

matter, and that international awards and advocacy on his behalf amount to meddling in China’s internal affairs. But the treatment he has endured is by definition 

an international matter, just as all violations of human rights are matters of legitimate concern to the whole world. By detaining Liu Xiaobo for more than a year, 

and then by convicting and sentencing him to 11 years in prison in clear violation 

of his most fundamental, internationally recognized rights, the People’s Republic of 

China itself has guaranteed that his case is not and cannot be a purely internal affair. 

We have no hostility toward China or the Chinese. Indeed, it is our respect and 

concern for China and her people that leads us to urge their government to allow 

them—all of them—the freedom to write and to read and to organize that will allow 

them to be responsible citizens of a democratic society, and will then allow China 

to be a responsible and respected colleague in the community of democratic nations. 

32 

* The Council on Foreign Relations takes no institutional position on policy issues and has 

no affiliation with the US government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained herein are the sole responsibility of the author. 1 ‘‘Vigorous, steady efforts urged to advance political structural reform,’’ People’s Daily Online 

(October 27, 2010). 2Qingyuan Zheng, ‘‘Political orientation crucial,’’ People’s Daily Online (October 29, 2010). 

3 C. Fred Bergsten et al. China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics and Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

2008: p. 62. Web. Accessed 1 November 2010. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY* 

NOVEMBER 9, 2010

INTRODUCTION

Within China, there is widespread agreement on the need for political reform. 

There is no agreement, however, on precisely what a ‘‘politically-reformed’’ China 

should look like, much less a road-map for how to get there. 

While discussions of political reform have been ongoing in one form or another 

since the Chinese Communist Party assumed power in 1949, the debate has assumed new life over the past few months. A series of commentaries by Premier Wen 

Jiabao raising the issue more directly than previously, the awarding of the Nobel 

Peace Prize to political dissident and activist Liu Xiaobo, and calls for bolder political action by retired party elders and intellectuals have all placed the reform issue 

front and center in Chinese political discourse. Such discussion is given added 

weight by the fact that it is occurring against a backdrop of a far more vibrant print 

and Web-based media and an engaged civil society. China’s rise and obligations as 

a global power also mean that foreign policy experts are now entering into the country’s domestic policy debate. They realize that China’s global image and impact-on 

the environment, health, and security-rests in large part on Chinese domestic politics and practices. 

POLITICAL MODERNIZATION

In most official contexts—leaders’ speeches and officially-sanctioned editorials— 

political restructuring or reform means making the system more efficient and representative, while at the same time preserving the authority of the Communist 

Party. The communique ́ of the fifth plenum of the 17th Party Congress in mid-October 2010, which sets the tone for the work of the party over the next five years, 

stated, ‘‘Great impetus will be given to economic restructuring while vigorous yet 

steady efforts should be made to promote political restructuring.’’ A series of People’s Daily editorials published in October articulated the central party leadership’s 

interest in a reasonably constrained version of political reform. The editorials argued that in the process of political restructuring, it is ‘‘imperative to adhere to 

party leadership, to the socialist system and to socialism with Chinese characteristics,’’ 1 and that the aim of political reform is to ‘‘enhance the vitality of the Party 

and the country and to mobilize people’s enthusiasm.’’ 2

In practical terms, Beijing has launched several notable initiatives to develop a 

system of official accountability and advance transparency within the political system. There have been anti-corruption campaigns; regulations to promote public access to information in areas such as the environment and to govern ‘‘the convening 

of Party congresses, selection for and retirement from official posts, and fixed-term 

limits’’; 3 and experiments in budgetary reform. Beijing has also permitted a few 

non-Communist Party members to hold key positions within the government, including Wan Gang, the Minister of Science and Technology, and Chen Zhu, the Minister 

of Health. 

With social unrest on the rise, the Party is also searching for ways to be more 

responsive to the interests of the Chinese people, without transforming the system. 

One effort is a online bulletin board, ‘‘Direct Line to Zhongnanhai,’’ where the Chinese people can leave messages for the top leaders, and both President Hu Jintao 

and Premier Wen Jiabao have participated in active Web-based dialogues with the 

Chinese people. Local officials may appear on radio shows and some delegates to 

the National People’s Congress (NPC) and District Congresses have also established 

times to meet with their constituents to listen to their concerns, although there has 

been discussion within the NPC that these meetings are problematic because officials may develop individual constituencies and popular followings. 

33 

4Wendao Liang, ‘‘The Etymology of Social Stability,’’ Caixin online (October 18, 2010). 

Accessed at http://english.caing.com/201O-10-18/1001. 

REVOLUTIONARY REFORM

While a significant segment of China’s political elite works to ‘‘modernize’’ the political system, others seek to revolutionize it. Political activist and Nobel Peace prize 

winner Liu Xiaobo represents the boldest of those who call for such revolutionary 

reform with his online human rights manifesto, Charter 08, and his calls for universal values, direct elections, and multi-party democracy. 

Fundamental political reform is viewed as a necessity by many Chinese intellectuals and media elite. After Liu’s award, a group of 100 journalists, scholars, writers 

and ordinary citizens signed a public letter calling on the Party to realize the goals 

of democracy and constitutional government espoused by Liu. Just prior to Liu’s 

award, a group of retired Party elders submitted a letter to the Standing Committee 

of the National People’s Congress calling for freedom of speech and press, and the 

abolition of censorship. This group included many former senior media officials, such 

as the former director of People’s Daily, editor-in-chief of China Daily, deputy director of Xinhua News Agency, and even the former head of the News Office of the 

Central Propaganda Department. 

Such reformers clearly view Premier Wen Jiabao as their patron within the Chinese leadership. Premier Wen, in a set of speeches over the past year, as well as 

a much heralded interview with CNN, has argued that freedom of speech is ‘‘indispensable for any country,’’ and that ‘‘continuous progress and the people’s wishes 

for and needs for democracy and freedom are inevitable.’’ He further has noted that 

the Party has to evolve—one that served as a revolutionary party should not look 

the same as a governing party. Wen’s concluding remarks in the CNN interview further suggest that he was pushing for change outside generally-accepted party principles: ‘‘I will not fall in spite of a strong wind and harsh rain, and I will not yield 

till the last day of my life.’’ 

These highly public calls for revolutionary reform are not taking place in isolation. 

There is also a vibrant discourse in the print and online media that supports such 

high profile efforts. Journalists, scholars and Web activists all maintain a constant 

stream of advocacy for more fundamental political reform. They lodge their calls for 

such reform as essential to the achievement of key Communist Party priorities. 

One popular argument for revolutionary political reform, for example, is that it 

is necessary for continued economic growth. An editorial ‘‘The Only Answer is Political Reform,’’ published by the board of the Economic Observer in late October 2010, 

makes precisely this point: ‘‘Without reforming the political system, we cannot guarantee the benefits that economic reform brings, nor will we be able to continue to 

push ahead with reforms to the economic system and social reform will also 

fail. . .In fact, whether it’s breaking the deadlock on economic reform or making a 

breakthrough on social reform, both rely on pushing ahead with political reform.’’ 

Political reform advocates also often suggest that stability—one of the Party’s top 

priorities—can only be ensured by more fundamental reform. Hu Shuli, the outspoken editor of Caixin and Century Weekly, for example, argues that political reform has stagnated because of ‘‘fears that a misstep would lead to social unrest.’’ 

She goes on to note, however, that ‘‘Overblown worries that delay what’s needed 

only exacerbate the very tensions threatening to destabilize society.’’ Similarly, 

Liang Wendao, a host on Phoenix Satellite TV, wrote an editorial detailing a number of social challenges, such as ‘‘carcinogenic tea oil being sold in supermarkets, 

rumors of deadly tick bites and the resistance to forced demolitions’’ and argued 

that all of these are counterproductive to the official goal of ‘‘maintaining stability.’’ 

His conclusion is that ‘‘If these subjects are open for discussion and criticism, the 

darkest truth from these three events may finally arise: the stability that the authorities were trying to maintain is precisely a kind of instability.’’ 4

The role of political reform in improving China’s foreign policy and image is also 

becoming a popular theme. Wang Jisi, head of Peking University’s International Relations Department, for example, has stated that the only way to overcome the unfortunate oscillation within Chinese political thinking and commentary between 

claiming superiority and inferiority or victimization is by more exposure to the outside world, better education within China and improving ‘‘our own society and rule 

of law.’’ An editorial in Century Weekly, entitled ‘‘At Last, A Magic Moment for Political Reform,’’ echoes this theme, noting that social problems, such as forced evictions, have strained relations between the government and people, causing people 

to lose faith in their country and damaging China’s image abroad. 

34 

5The following discussion is taken from Elizabeth C. Economy, ‘‘The Game Changer: Coping 

With China’s Foreign Policy Revolution,’’ Foreign Affairs (November/December 2010), p. 145. 

A VIRTUAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

The growing role of the Internet in Chinese political life poses a significant challenge to the Party’s efforts to constrain political reform. While the Internet is a valuable tool for the Party, both in learning what the Chinese people are thinking and 

in promoting transparency within the political system, it raises serious concerns as 

well. Central Party School official Gao Xinmin raised several issues in an off-therecord speech that was later made public on the Web: ‘‘Against a backdrop of a diversity of social values, new media have already become collection and distribution 

centers for thought, culture and information, and tools for the amplification of public 

opinion in society. They are a direct challenge to the Party’s thought leadership and 

to traditional methods of channeling public opinion. Traditional thought and education originates at the upper levels, with the representatives of organizations, but 

in the Internet age, anyone can voice their views and influence others. Many factual 

instances of mass incidents are pushed by waves of public opinion online, and in 

many cases careless remarks from leaders precipitate a backlash of public opinion.’’ 

The Internet is, in fact, evolving into a virtual political system in China: 5 the Chinese people inform themselves, organize, and protest online. As the blogger Qiu 

Xuebin writes, ‘‘When the interests of the people go unanswered long term, the people light up in fury like sparks on brushwood. The internet is an exhaust pipe, already spewing much public indignation. But if the people’s realistic means of making claims are hindered, in the end we slip out of the make-believe world that is 

the internet and hit the streets.’’ In July 2010, bloggers provided firsthand accounts 

of a large-scale pollution disaster in Jilin Province, contradicting official reports. 

Thousands of people ignored government officials, angrily accusing them of a coverup, and rushed to buy bottled water. Chinese are also ‘‘voting’’ online. In one instance, a journalist sought by the police on trumped-up charges of slander took his 

case to the Internet. Of the 33,000 people polled, 86 percent said they believed he 

was innocent. The Economic Observer then launched a broadside against the police, 

condemning their attempt to threaten a ‘‘media professional.’’ The authorities subsequently dropped the charges against the journalist. 

Activists have also used the Internet to launch successful canpaigns—some involving physical protests—to prevent the construction of dams and pollution factories 

and to oppose the removal of Cantonese on television programs airing in 

Guangdong. Most striking perhaps, has been the emergence of iconic cultural figures 

who use the Internet for political purposes. The renowned artist Ai Weiwei, for example, has pursued justice for families whose children died in the Sichuan earthquake, even documenting his encounters with recalcitrant officials on YouTube. The 

racecar driver and novelist-turned-blogger, Han Han, routinely calls for greater 

media and cultural freedom. Since its launch in 2006, his blog has received more 

than 410 million hits. 

The social network site Twitter, despite being blocked in China, has become a particularly politicized Internet venue. According to the popular netizen Michael Anti, 

Twitter is the most important political organizing force in China today. He notes 

that more than 1.4 million yuan was raised for the beleaguered NGO Gongmeng 

(Open Constitution Initiative) via Twitter. And he points to the uncensored discussion held between the Dalai Lama and Chinese citizens in May 2010 as an example 

of the political influence that Twitter can exert. According to Anti, the people who 

participated stopped referring to the Dalai Lama as Dalai and now call him by the 

more respectful Dalai Lama. Anti reports that there are over 100,000 active Chinese 

Twitter users, and he anticipates that there will be 500,000 or more within the next 

two to three years. 

Anti’s claim of the importance of Twitter as a political force is supported by others. A poll of 1,000 Chinese Twitter users found that of the top twenty reasons why 

people access the site, almost a third of them are political: ‘‘to know the truth and 

open the horizon’’; ‘‘no censor here’’; ‘‘this is the taste of freedom that I enjoy’’; ‘‘it 

allows me to keep my independent citizen conscious’’; ‘‘feel that as a party member 

I should learn more about this world’’; ‘‘it is an inevitable choice for a journalism 

student’’. Moreover, according to the media critic Hu Yong, as Beijing has moved 

to strengthen its censorship efforts, Twitter has become more political in its orientation. He sees Twitter as particularly important because it brings together opinion 

leaders from around the world to sit at a virtual table. There, public intellectuals, 

35 

6 Yong Hu, ‘‘The Revolt of China’s Twittering Classes,’’ Project Syndicate (October 14, 2010). 

Accessed at http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/hu2/English. 7 Xiao Qin, ‘‘In China, A Rising Tide for Universal Values,’’ Caixin online transcript (October 

25, 2010) from a speech presented by Qin at the Seminar on Enlightenment and China’s Social 

Transition on July 4,2010. 8Zhiyue Bo, ‘‘Guangdong Under Wang Yang: ‘Mind Liberation’ and Development,’’ East-Asia 

Institute Background Brief No. 405 (September 12, 2008), pp. 10–11. 9Zhiyue Bo, ‘‘Guangdong Under Wang Yang: ‘Mind Liberation’ and Development,’’ p. 10–11. 

10 Jeremy Page, ‘‘China Tests New Political Model in Shenzhen,’’ Wall Street Journal (October 

18, 2010). Accessed at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 

SB10001424052702304250404575558103303251616.html. 11 ‘‘China has to pursue gradual political reform,’’ Global Times (October 15, 2010). Accessed 

at http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/editorial/2010-10/582245.html. 

rights advocates, veterans of civil rights movements and exiled dissidents can all 

converse simultaneously.6

LOOKING AROUND THE BEND

Implicit, and often explicit, in the debate over the nature of China’s future political reform is the role of the outside world. A recurrent theme is a willingness to 

learn from the West but a rejection of a Western model. Qin Xiao, the former Chairman of China Merchant Bank Group, speaks the need for such a balance: ‘‘An historic theme in modern China is the search for a unique model and way to modernize. A major part of this theme revolves around a ‘dispute between the west and 

China and a debate of the ancient and modern.’ . . . It misreads and misinterprets 

universal values and modern society. It is a kind of narrow-minded nationalism that 

rejects universal civilization . . . Adhering to universal values, while creating Chinese style approaches, is truly the objective for our time.’’ 7 And the Global Times 

notes, ‘‘China has to continue its political reforms in the future, including drawing 

beneficial experiences from Western democratic politics, however, China will never 

be a sub-civilization, and it will only follow its roadmap in a gradual manner.’’ 

This cautious blending of political modernization and revolutionary reform will 

most likely find a home in China’s system of experiments. Much in the way that 

China began its economic reform process with special economic zones, it may well 

be initiating similar special zones for political reform. 

In Shenzhen, where Premier Wen delivered one of his recent speeches on political 

reform, there is a novel political experiment underway. Supported by both Wen and 

Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang, Shenzhen’s political reform is at the outer 

edge of the political modernization approach. The stated goal is strictly in line with 

the Party’s constrained vision of political reform: to build a socialist democracy and 

a rule-of-law system, to develop a clean, efficient and service-oriented government, 

and to construct a complete market system, a socialist advanced culture, and a harmonious society.8

At the same time, the approach has some potentially revolutionary reform elements: gradually expanding direct elections, introducing more candidates than there 

are positions for heads of districts, and considering allowing candidates to compete 

for positions of standing members of district or municipal Party committees by organizing campaigns within certain boundaries.9 Already, Shenzhen has ‘‘cut one-third 

of its departments, transferred or retired hundreds of officials, and forced officials 

to give up parallel positions on outside associations and charities.’’ Shenzhen’s 

greatest innovation, however, has been to allow civic organizations to register without a government agency oversight, to seek private funding outside China, to hire 

foreigners, and to sell their services to the city in areas such as the mental health 

of migrant laborers.10

The Shenzhen experiment and the others that will follow may provide at least 

part of the much needed roadmap for China’s political future. Even as the Party 

attempts to keep up with the demand for change generated by the Chinese people, 

as the Global Times points out, the life of ‘‘an ordinary Chinese’’ has been transformed over the past thirty years: the way of accessing information, freedom of 

speech, the right to decide his own life and protect individual property are ‘‘drastically different from 30 years ago.’’ 11 Whether led by the party, the people, or both, 

it is clear that political change of an equal magnitude is well underway. 

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The role of the international community in encouraging and bolstering those who 

seek to transform China is limited but not inconsequential. As those within China 

push for their country to respect and adhere to the ideas of universal values, there 

36 

are several avenues through which the outside world can engage with China’s process of political change: 

• International recognition for those who work within China to promote these 

values, such as the decision to award the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, 

sends an important signal that the outside world supports their efforts and 

sends a message to Beijing that the country is not living up to the best of its 

own ideals. 

• The international community should establish the linkage between China’s 

governance failures domestically on issues such as environmental protection, 

public health, and product safety and its impact abroad reinforces to the Chinese leadership why China’s political practices at home matter to the rest of the 

world. 

• The United States should continue its traditional efforts to raise the cases of 

individual Chinese human rights activists who have been imprisoned and to 

work with Chinese partners to advance political reform through the legal system or through efforts to promote transparency. At the same time, it is important to remove the human rights issue from a uniquely bilateral focus and work 

with other democratic countries in and outside Asia to raise issues of political 

reform with Chinese officials. 

• To the extent that the United States and others can advance the cause of political reform in other non-democratic states in Asia, such as Vietnam, this may 

also serve as an important source of pressure on Chinese elites. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRUCE GILLEY

NOVEMBER 9, 2010

LIU XIAOBO AND DUTCH’S OPTIMISM

Honored Commission Members, 

I am grateful to have the opportunity to address the committee this morning on 

the important and inspiring award of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to China’s Liu 

Xiaobo. The perspective I would like to offer is simple and can be stated as follows: 

Liu Xiaobo’s award is important because it is a reminder to us in the free world, 

the West, and the United States that even though we are entering a period of intense rivalry and possibly conflict with a rising China, the smiling forces of modernization and liberalization are at work in that country. This means that in the 

coming decades, even as we manage and challenge potentially disruptive behavior 

by China’s rulers, its people continue to march toward a democratic society. 

I do not believe that the Nobel prize will have any measurable effect on political 

reform in China, any more than the award of the same prize to His Holiness the 

Dalai Lama in 1989 had any effect on Chinese rule in Tibet. But I do believe it will 

serve as an important beacon to policy-makers outside of China, reminding them to 

engage and target, and to retain faith in, Liu Xiaobo’s China. The temptation to believe that we are engaged in a life-or-death struggle with a hostile new Oriental juggernaut will be strong in the coming decades. We should instead use Liu Xiaobo’s 

award to think more carefully about what is going on in China, which I will address 

briefly here, and to retain a certain Reaganesque optimism about the potential for 

human freedom everywhere. We should respond to a rising China the same way 

that Liu Xiaobo responded to his state security captors before he was sent to jail: 

we have no enemies, only acquaintances who are still trapped in yesterday’s modes 

of thought and action, acquaintances whom we hope and believe fervently will someday become our friends. 

Honored Commission members, the year is 1975. Russia’s GDP per capita in that 

year is about the same as China’s today. Andrei Sakharov has just been awarded 

the Nobel Peace Prize and in a few years will be put under house arrest in Gorky. 

Global geo-political rivalries are intensifying. The international politics of the Soviet 

Union is entering its most difficult period—we have the invasion of Afghanistan, 

proxy wars in Africa and Latin America, arms races, martial law in Poland, KAL 

007, and Chernobyl yet to come. Earlier claims that the Soviet Union is modernizing 

and liberalizing because of the post-totalitarian reforms ushered in by Khrushchev 

are now scoffed at. Smart people, like Harvard professor Samuel Huntington, are 

saying that the chances for democratic change in the Soviet Union are ‘‘virtually 

nil.’’ 

Looking back, we see that we missed something fundamental. By focusing on 

SALT talks, or by dismissing Sakharov as a vain hope of the West, we did not see 

how this great authoritarian creation was entering its last decades. The message of 

37 

Sakharov’s prize, in retrospect, was that we should have been better Marxists, trusting that the ineluctable forces of modernization would bring political change, although not the sort Marx imagined. Instead, we were Hobbesians, believing we 

needed to prepare home defense in the face of a Spanish Armada, an increasingly 

cold and competitive world of enemies and invaders. Had we been more ready to 

respond to the good luck of history, some, but not all of the democratic regress that 

subsequently occurred in Russia, might have been avoided. 

China is in the same position today. Externally, whether in its assertive claims 

in the South China and East China Seas, its attempts to use coercive economic diplomacy, or its domestic silencing of dissent, we see another juggernaut. Yet this 

is not a juggernaut. This is a juggler. Behind the assertiveness and rhetoric is a 

country struggling mightily with the implications of development—social, environmental, financial, economic, cultural, and, political. It is easy to get carried away 

in the Orientalist imagery of Moors or Mongols challenging the West. But China 

represents no fundamental challenge to the West. It’s contributions to key global 

issues like terrorism, the environmental, financial restructuring, global health, disaster relief, peacebuilding, and weapons proliferation are marginal. The West retains its indispensability and will continue to do so as long as it continues to represent the basic humanistic impulse better than any other part of the world. Internally, while the CCP continues to suppress dissent and control information, it does 

so against the backdrop of an increasingly outspoken and informed citizenry. 

The CCP leadership, which is entering a delicate transition in 2012, is deeply divided on the question of political reform. There are two visions of political reform 

competing within the leadership today. One, associated with premier Wen Jiabao 

and earlier with his mentor Zhao Ziyang, purged in 1989, is what we might call the 

grassroots democracy vision. This vision imagines a China with an increasingly vigorous electoral and civil society-based democracy at the local level up to and including provinces. This vision is all about bottom-up accountability. It is often consciously modeled on the Taiwan experience, and includes a leading role for the CCP 

at the national level for some transitional period. Wen has championed the expansion of direct elections to the township level. It is the approach likely to be favored 

by incoming party general secretary Xi Jinping, who experienced and supported the 

lively civil society and local politics in Zhejiang and Fujian provinces during his periods there. 

The second vision is what we might call the party democracy view, which is promoted by party general secretary Hu Jintao. It is about top-down accountability. 

Ironically, this is the approach that was adopted by Gorbachev. The focus here is 

on fighting corruption within the party, increasing internal debates and even elections within the party, and using party mandates to strengthen the accountability 

of local governments. In the new leadership of 2012, this vision will be represented 

by premier Li Keqiang. 

What is important about this debate is that it reminds us of the party’s race 

against time to maintain its legitimacy. We often assume that the regime’s legitimacy comes from economic growth and nationalism alone. It does not. It also comes 

from the steady expansion of social and economic freedoms as well as real improvements in governance that have been seen in the last 20 years. The amount of energy 

and creativity being poured into both the grassroots democracy and the party democracy visions of political reform tell us that China’s leaders—if not China’s foreign 

admirers—think that political reform matters to their future. And to be sure, this 

same authoritarian adaptability has succeeded in delivering improvements in rights 

and governance that have satisfied most Chinese for the past 20 years. 

The mistake is to think that the party can satiate the thirst for freedom forever 

with, for instance, fewer limits on internal migration or more efficient passport processing bureaucracies. There is still probably several more years in which such performance will work to maintain legitimacy. But experience elsewhere tells us that 

social demands for democracy will eventually delegitimize the current regime—and 

then it is a question of how long the regime decides to cling to power or how quickly 

it undertakes preemptive moves toward real democracy. 

This is where Liu Xiaobo comes in. Liu represents a third vision of political reform, one of liberal democracy. Emerging from the 1989 Tiananmen movement, and 

tracing its origins back to the late 19th century and early republican thinkers of 

China, this vision seeks a deliberate transition to a liberal democratic political system, in today’s situation through a gradual implementation of existing PRC constitutional provisions, minus the CCP’s messianic leading role. Liu is a reminder of 

this stirring outcome that plausibly awaits China at the end of this long race— 

namely a thoughtful, tolerant, inventive, and liberal social and political system, infused with the richness and wisdom of Chinese civilization. That outcome seems impossible to imagine at present just as it was of the Soviet Union of 1975. Yet it is 

38 

more likely to occur and (unlike Russia) to endure because, unlike the Soviet Union, 

China has already completed its transition to a market economy and it will not face 

a humiliating loss of its world power. Political scientists Ronald Inglehart and 

Christian Welzel conclude in their 2005 book on ‘‘The Human Development Sequence,’’ using extensive cross-national data on value transformation and democratization, that ‘‘China will make a transition to a liberal democracy within the next 

two decades.’’ As Moshe Lewin presciently saw in his 1988 book ‘‘The Gorbachev 

Phenomenon’’ about Russian society and the CPSU, Chinese society will slowly outgrow the CCP. 

Liu Xiaobo helps us to focus on this China, and not to imagine that the insecure 

and increasingly aggressive external China is the one of the future. He is a reminder that the reason we should not confront or contain China is not some relativistic argument that the Chinese are different or prefer tyranny to democracy, 

nor that we need to reach some realistic accommodation with this titan of the East. 

Instead, we need to respond thoughtfully to the China of the current regime because 

we have faith that its days are numbered. 

Reagan, who came into office as a Cold Warrior extraordinaire, instinctively realized this about the Soviet Union and changed tack in his second term. Liu Xiaobo 

reminds us of the need to retain Dutch’s infectious optimism about the fate of communist regimes, especially rapidly modernizing ones. He reminds us of the need to 

have confidence in the universal values of elections, the rule of law, pluralism, and 

human rights that are today so widely discussed in China. Who truly could imagine, 

just a few years ago, that the outgoing chairman of key state enterprise would 

choose to use his valedictory address to urge China’s young people to reject the socalled ‘‘China Model’’ of authoritarian development and instead embrace ‘‘universal 

values’’ with democracy at their core, as retiring China Merchants Group chairman 

Qin Xiao did at Tsinghua University’s School of Economics and Management this 

past summer? For China’s communist regime, the Cold War never ended and it 

never will. Our role is to avoid that same mistake, to realize that the Cold War is 

in fact over and that China’s regime is being swept along by the forces of modernization like dozens before it. 

Recently, a Zhejiang University professor named Liu Guozhu, who is a senior fellow of that institution’s Center for Civil Society and of the China Foundation for 

Human Rights, wrote an essay on the National Endowment for Democracy. The 

essay attacked the NED as a relic of the Cold War. It was quickly reprinted in party 

and Maoist Web sites and periodicals in China. After making some inquiries, I 

learned that Dr. Liu had originally written quite a different article, one with a 

largely positive view of the NED and its role in promoting democracy in Latin 

America, Africa, and East Asia. It was based on research that he conducted while 

visiting at San Diego State University in 2007 and 2008. But no official publication 

would run the original article. Only after party editors rewrote the article in a critical tone was it published. This is a microcosm of contemporary China—the exterior 

face can seem oppositional, bellicose, and deeply illiberal. It is easy to see much evidence of hostile intent and behavior. But the interior mind is swirling, changing, 

seeking acceptance, and humanistic. 

Liu Xiaobo matters because he appeals to our better instincts in dealing with 

China. To celebrate positive change, to defend individuals and rights supporters, 

and to have confidence in the universality of freedom and democracy and their triumph everywhere is his challenge to us. ‘‘I have no enemies,’’ his words, should be 

ours too. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHELIM KINE

NOVEMBER 9, 2010

The Nobel Committee’s October 8, 2010, decision to award the Nobel Peace Prize 

to imprisoned Chinese writer and human rights activist Liu Xiaobo has put China’s 

human rights deficit squarely back on the international agenda. It does so at a time 

when rights and freedoms guaranteed by both China’s constitution and international law are under renewed attack by the Chinese government. 

Liu Xiaobo is an outspoken critic of the Chinese government, a 54-year-old former 

university professor imprisoned in 2009 on ‘‘subversion’’ charges for his involvement 

with Charter ’08, a political manifesto calling for gradual political reforms in China. 

Liu was also jailed in 1989 for his role in the Tiananmen Square protests and again 

in 1996 for criticizing China’s policy toward Taiwan and the Dalai Lama. Human 

Rights Watch honored Liu Xiaobo with the 2010 Alison Des Forges Award for ExVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:11 Jan 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 U:\DOCS\9NOV10.TXT DIEDRE
39 

traordinary Activism for his fearless commitment to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly in China. 

WHAT DOES THE AVERAGE CHINESE PERSON KNOW ABOUT LIU XIAOBO? WHAT DO THOSE

WHO KNOW WHO LIU XIAOBO IS THINK ABOUT HIM?

To a large extent, the debate about Liu Xiaobo and his winning the Nobel Prize 

has occurred outside China due to strict censorship of state media and the Internet. 

Inside China, Liu Xiaobo has been relatively unknown outside of literary and intellectual circles, dissidents, human rights defenders, and civil society activists. 

That’s because even prior to his arrest in December 2008, his works as a writer 

were officially marginalized or censored because of their implicit or explicit political 

critiques. 

Those in China who might want to learn about him are only able to access a government-approved portrait. After his arrest in December 2008, Internet searches on 

Liu’s name in China behind the government’s so-called ‘‘great firewall’’ resulted 

overwhelmingly in state media reports on his sentencing. As recently as March 

2010, Internet searches on references to Liu Xiaobo behind the firewall produced 

nothing more than a frozen Web browser. The vast majority of Chinese citizens cannot—without considerable difficulty—know of his struggle for universal human 

rights, rule of law, and respect for the freedoms embodied in China’s constitution. 

The government’s 21-year cover-up of the June 1989 massacre of unarmed protesters in Beijing and other cities means that most Chinese know little about the 

event at all, let alone that it was Liu Xiaobo who brokered the agreement with military authorities that allowed the peaceful exit of thousands of students from 

Tiananmen Square on the night of June 3, 1989. That intervention saved countless 

lives. 

For those Chinese citizens who do know Liu and who have worked with him, he 

is renowned as a tireless advocate of universal rights and freedoms and of peaceful 

political reform. More importantly, they see him as a high-profile symbol of the silent struggle of millions of others in China for the same goals. He has come to represent countless Chinese citizens languishing in secretive ‘‘black jails,’’ under house 

arrest, in re-education through labor camps, or serving prison sentences for advocating those same rights and freedoms. 

WHAT DOES THE AVERAGE CHINESE PERSON KNOW ABOUT HIS WINNING THE NOBEL?

WHAT DOES HE OR SHE THINK ABOUT IT?

For the majority of Chinese citizens, whose news come via censored media, news 

of Liu’s Nobel Prize was not immediate, as would occur in most countries, but came 

the following day. 

That’s because the immediate official Chinese government reaction to Liu’s Nobel 

Prize was silence. Neither Chinese China Central Television nor Hong Kong’s nominally independent Phoenix TV mentioned Liu’s Nobel Prize on the day of the announcement. Chinese censors quickly scrubbed, or ‘‘harmonized’’ Chinese-language 

Internet commentary, text messages, Web pages, and foreign television broadcasts 

which broadcast news of Liu’s Nobel Prize. 

The only official comment available to Chinese citizens came later that day in the 

form of Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ October 9, 2010, statement that described Liu 

as a ‘‘criminal’’ and criticized Liu’s Nobel Prize victory as an act that ‘‘profanes the 

Nobel Peace Prize.’’ Chinese journalists were told to report only on the basis of the 

official statement. 

However, since October 9, the Chinese government has expanded its coverage of 

Liu winning the Nobel Prize. That coverage has been uniformly unflattering, including an October 14 Xinhua report describing the Nobel Prize as a ‘‘political tool of 

the West.’’ Three days later, Xinhua published a round-up of foreign commentary 

from countries including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Russia, and even Norway that 

criticized Liu’s Nobel as politically motivated and inappropriate. On October 24, 

Xinhua described the members of the Nobel Committee as politicized and ‘‘ignorant 

of world affairs.’’ 

The most detailed official media coverage of Liu’s Nobel Prize is an October 28, 

2010, Xinhua report titled ‘‘Who is Liu Xiaobo? ’’ The article intensified the official 

smear campaign against Liu by listing a selective survey of quotes allegedly taken 

from Liu’s three decades of written work designed to cast doubt on his credibility, 

patriotism, and even his sobriety. According to the article, Liu is a ‘‘traitorous operative’’ for foreign organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy. The 

piece featured quotes allegedly sourced from Liu’s works that appeared to make him 

sympathetic to China’s colonization by foreign powers and critical of the physical 

and psychological strength of the Chinese people. Among some Chinese citizens, this 

40 

intensifying official smear campaign is triggering a combination of cynical dismissal 

and angry nationalism about the award. 

At the same time, the award is also piquing curiosity in China about who Liu 

really is and why the government is so critical of him and his work. We know that 

Chinese activists have gone out onto the streets of Beijing and boarded buses to fake 

informal surveys of people’s knowledge of Liu and his Nobel Prize. The majority of 

those quizzed in this very unscientific poll have never heard of Liu Xiaobo, but they 

express reflexive pride that a Chinese has won a Nobel Peace Prize and for endorsing rights and freedoms which they themselves support. Those individuals who have 

heard of Liu Xiaobo and have negative opinions of him through official state media 

coverage relate that they are still supportive of Liu’s right to speak out despite their 

apparently divergent views. 

Paradoxically, the Chinese government’s intensifying smear campaign of Liu 

Xiaobo is boosting Chinese citizens’ awareness of who he is and an interest in what 

he had done to be the target of such official vitriol. This curiosity will inevitably 

prompt those citizens with Internet access and the interest and capability to use 

firewall circumvention tools to search for information about Liu Xiaobo that doesn’t 

come from the Chinese government. Human Rights Watch’s Chinese-language 

website has registered a record number of browsers accessing our site (blocked in 

China) through proxy servers since the October 8 Nobel announcement. On that day 

alone, our Chinese-language website recorded more than 1,600 visits by Internetusers in China, compared to a usual daily average of about 60 visits. 

WHAT DEBATE, IF ANY, HAS LIU XIAOBO’S WINNING THE NOBEL SPARKED IN CHINA

AMONG BOTH ORDINARY PEOPLE (laobaixing) AND ELITES?

Among elites interested in peaceful political change, Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel Prize has 

provided a platform for expressing support for him and the ideals embodied in Charter ’08. Just days after the prize was announced, a group of 23 senior Communist 

Party officials and intellectuals issued a public letter that praised Liu as a ‘‘splendid 

choice’’ for a Nobel Peace Prize, and echoed calls for his immediate release and an 

end to the ‘‘invisible black hand’’ of official censorship. 

Within the Chinese leadership, Liu’s Nobel Prize appears to have been profoundly 

unsettling. Confident that its warning to the Norwegian government prior to the 

Nobel Prize announcement had averted any chance of Liu’s victory, senior leaders 

appear to have been taken aback by the Nobel Committee’s decision. 

On October 3, 2010, in a CNN interview, Premier Wen Jiabao advocated easing 

government restrictions on basic rights and freedoms, and stated that ‘‘freedom of 

speech is indispensable.’’ Wen’s views, at odds with the policies of a government that 

since 2007 has steadily tightened its chokehold on dissidents, civil society activists, 

and journalists, suggested ongoing divisions in the leadership about those restrictions. Official censors responded by purging all video and transcripts of the CNN 

interview from Chinese Internet sites. 

Liu’s Nobel Prize is a globally-known example of the gap between the Chinese 

government’s lofty rhetoric on support for rule of law and human rights and the 

grimmer reality on the ground—an image the Chinese government has strenuously 

worked to cover up for over a decade, particularly in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing 

Olympics. As Liu’s writings and the text of Charter ’08 circulate virally across China’s blogosphere among those interested in the country’s most famous political prisoner, familiarity and support with universal rights and freedoms and the Chinese 

government’s unwillingness to deliver on those becomes more widespread. 

The Chinese leadership will no doubt be debating whether it was a mistake to 

imprison Liu in the first place. Hardliners decided to make an example of Liu 

Xiaobo by sentencing him in 2008 to the longest possible prison term for ‘‘inciting 

subversion’’ since it became a crime in 1996; moderates, who had argued that Liu 

could continue to be tolerated though kept under surveillance, probably resisted imprisoning him for fear he would become a cause celebre. Those fears have now come 

to pass, but it remains unclear whether officials such as Xi Jinping and Li Kejiang, 

due to take over the leadership of China in 2012, will think seriously about freeing 

Liu before his imprisonment does even more damage to the Chinese government’s 

reputation. 

41 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SANDER LEVIN, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM

MICHIGAN; COCHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

NOVEMBER 9, 2010

We hold this hearing today not only to shine a light on the Chinese government’s 

mistreatment of Nobel Laureate, Liu Xiaobo, but to underline that China once again 

is at an important crossroads, and seems to be turning in the wrong direction. This 

has implications not only for the development of institutions of democratic governance in China, which it is the charge of this Commission by law to monitor, but 

also for the United States in managing our relations with China. 

The imprisonment of Liu Xiaobo is a personal tragedy, a national shame, and an 

international challenge. The answer is clear: Mr. Liu should be released immediately. For his more than two decades of advocating for freedom of speech, assembly, religion, peaceful democratic reform, transparency and accountability in China, 

Mr. Liu is currently serving an eleven-year sentence in a Chinese prison for ‘‘inciting subversion of state power.’’ Those in China, like Mr. Liu, who have penned 

thoughtful essays or signed Charter 08 seek to advance debate, as the Charter 

states, on ‘‘national governance, citizens’ rights, and social development’’ consistent 

with their ‘‘duty as responsible and constructive citizens.’’ Their commitment and 

contribution to their country must be recognized, as the Nobel Committee has done, 

and as we do today and their rights must be protected. 

The Chinese government has said that awarding the Nobel Prize to Liu Xiaobo 

‘‘shows a lack of respect for China’s judicial system.’’ I would like to take a moment 

to examine this claim. For it seems to me that what truly showed a lack of respect 

for China’s judicial system were the numerous and well-documented violations of 

Chinese legal protections for criminal defendants that marred Mr. Liu’s trial from 

the outset. I refer here to matters such as the failure of Chinese prosecutors to consult defense lawyers, and the speed with which prosecutors acted in indicting Mr. 

Liu and bringing him to trial, effectively denying his lawyers sufficient time to review the state’s evidence and to prepare for his defense. Chinese officials prevented 

Mr. Liu’s wife from attending his trial, in which she had hoped to testify on behalf 

of her husband. Mr. Liu’s lawyers reportedly were ordered by state justice officials 

not to grant interviews. It is these abuses, committed by Chinese officials in China, 

not the actions of a committee in Oslo, that demonstrated ‘‘a lack of respect for China’s judicial system.’’ 

All nations have the responsibility to ensure fairness and transparency in judicial 

proceedings. The effective implementation of basic human rights and the ability of 

all people in China to live under the rule of law depend on careful attention to, and 

transparent compliance with, procedural norms and safeguards that meet international standards. It is in this connection that I would like to take a moment also 

to say a word about this Commission’s Political Prisoner Database. The database, 

which is available to the public online via the Commission’s Web site, contains information on thousands of political prisoners in China. These are individuals who have 

been imprisoned by the Chinese government for exercising their civil and political 

rights under China’s Constitution and laws or under China’s international human 

rights obligations. The enhancement of the Database that the Commission announced this past summer roughly doubled the types of information available to the 

public, enabling individuals, organizations, and governments to better report on political imprisonment in China and to more effectively advocate on behalf of Chinese 

political prisoners. And people around the world have been doing just that. The 

number of ‘‘hits’’ to the database from individual users, NGOs, academic institutions 

and governments around the world has skyrocketed. The Database makes clear that 

political imprisonment in China is well-documented, it is a practice whereby the 

Chinese government has shown disrespect for human rights and the rule of law in 

case after case, and it must end. 

Unfortunately, that does not appear likely. Since the Nobel Committee’s announcement, Mr. Liu’s wife, Liu Xia, has been harassed relentlessly, and remains 

under what appears to be house arrest. In the weeks following the Nobel Committee’s announcement, several people who signed Charter 08 also have been harassed 

and detained. Chinese authorities have attempted to limit the dissemination of information about Liu’s receiving the Nobel Prize, harassing members of the Independent Chinese PEN Center, a group that advocates for the rights of writers, 

whose American counterpart organization we are pleased to have represented on our 

panel here today. Diplomats report that the Chinese Embassy in Oslo has sent official letters to foreign embassies in the Norwegian capital asking them not to make 

statements in support of Liu, and not to attend the Nobel awards ceremony on December 10. This is not the behavior of a strong, responsible government. 

42 

As Liu Xia said the morning her husband was selected to receive the Nobel Prize, 

‘‘China’s new status in the world comes with increased responsibility. China should 

embrace this responsibility, and have pride in his selection and release him from 

prison.’’ As Nobel laureate Vaclav Havel correctly noted, ‘‘intimidation, propaganda, 

and repression are no substitute for reasoned dialogue. . . .’’ And as Nobel laureate 

Desmond Tutu recently wrote together with Vaclav Havel, 

We know that many wrongs have been perpetrated against China and its people 

throughout history. But awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu is not one of 

them. Nor is the peaceful call for reform from the more than 10,000 Chinese 

citizens who dared to sign Charter 08. . . . China has a chance to show that 

it is a forward-looking nation, and can show the world that it has the confidence 

to face criticism and embrace change. . . . This is a moment for China to open 

up once again, to give its people the ability to compete in the marketplace of 

ideas. . . . 

In a recent interview with CNN, Premier Wen Jiabao stated that, 

Freedom of speech is indispensable. . . . The people’s wishes for, and needs for, 

democracy and freedom are irresistible. 

We ask our witnesses today to help us assess the likelihood that these words will 

become the new basis for government action in China, and to describe for us their 

understanding of the prospects for political reform in China today. 

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