Filed 3/12/24 P. v. Maldonado CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

THOMAS MALDONADO,

Defendant and Appellant.

D081541

(Super. Ct. No. SCE408470)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

John M. Thompson, Judge. Affirmed.

Matthew A. Lopas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, 

Eric A. Swenson and Jennifer B. Truong, Deputy Attorneys General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

A jury convicted Thomas Maldonado of arson of property (Pen. Code, 

§ 451, subd. (d)),1 together with other offenses not relevant to this appeal.

Maldonado appeals. He contends (1) the evidence does not support his

arson conviction; and (2) the trial court committed instructional error by 

failing to instruct the jury as to “wrongful act.” We disagree with the first 

contention and conclude he forfeited the second by failing to offer a pinpoint 

instruction in the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS

Maldonado lived on a piece of property that was managed by his 

mother, R.M., and owned by a third party. He lived rent-free at the property

in exchange for helping out as needed, including yard work. At least on one 

occasion, he had received a tax form (form 1099) for his work on the property. 

Many months before the date of the charged incident, while doing yard work 

on the property, R.M. and her sister had piled up branches and shrub 

cuttings in the backyard, intending to remove them at some future date. 

On August 28, 2021, a neighbor called R.M to let her know about smoke 

on the property. R.M. promptly drove there and saw white smoke coming 

from the back. When she ran to the backyard, R.M. saw Maldonado pouring 

lighter fluid on some of the dead shrubs in the yard. R.M. testified that she 

had never instructed Maldonado to burn anything in the yard. She saw some 

areas that had already been burned, and she saw smoke but not flames.2

Hoses were running and the ground was wet. No structures had burned, and 

there was no property damage. Maldonado told her to “get the hell out of 

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 

specified.

2 Deputy Sheriff Anel Rodriguez testified that R.M. told him that she 

had seen flames. 
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here.” Then he ran towards her, picked up a pipe, and struck the fence she 

was standing behind. Maldonado told R.M., “If you don’t get out of here I’m 

going to kill you.” R.M. testified that Maldonado “walked back to the stuff he 

was burning, almost like he was going to start the fire, and [she] said, ‘If you 

start the fire, I’m going to call the police.’ ” Maldonado tried to take R.M.’s 

phone from her, but she ran from him and called 911. The arresting officers 

found a Bic lighter at the scene and observed a “smoldering” section of dry 

vegetation in the yard, approximately 10 feet by 10 feet in size. 

Maldonado was charged in an amended complaint with one count of 

arson, in violation of section 451(d), along with other offenses not relevant to 

this appeal. 

At trial, the prosecution had proposed an instruction to accompany the 

arson instruction, namely that “[b]urning trash that does not belong to the 

defendant is arson. There’s no requirement for arson that the property 

belong to anyone.” The defense objected to the proposed instruction, 

contending that there was no evidence that the burned items were “trash.” 

The court instructed the jury with arson, together with the prosecution’s 

proposed instruction, as follows:

“Mr. Maldonado is charged in Count 1 with arson. This is 

a violation of Penal Code Section 451(b). To prove this 

crime the People have to prove the following: One, the 

defendant set fire or burned or caused the burning of 

property; and, two, he acted willfully and maliciously. To 

set fire to or burn means to damage or destroy with fire 

either all or part of something, no matter how small. 

Someone commits an act willfully when he does it willingly 

or on purpose. [¶] Someone acts maliciously when he does 

a wrongful act or an act with unlawful intent to defraud,

annoy, or injure someone else. Property means personal

property or land other than forest land. A person does not 

commit arson if the only thing burned is [his] or her own 

personal property unless he acts with intent to defraud or 
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the fire also injures someone else or someone else’s 

structure, forest land, or property.”

As requested by the prosecution, the court also instructed the jury that 

“[b]urning trash that does not belong to the defendant is arson. There’s no 

requirement for arson that the property belong to anyone.” The court 

redacted a case citation that had been included with the proposed instruction.

During deliberations, the jury sent a note that read, “Count 1 –

‘Someone acts maliciously when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act.’ 

Wrongful act definition?” (!CT 58)! After consulting with counsel, the court 

responded, “You are referred to jury instruction 200, wherein it is stated: 

‘words and phrases not specifically defined in these instructions are to be 

applied using their ordinary, everyday meanings.’ ”

The jury convicted Maldonado of all counts, including the arson count.

DISCUSSION

I

Sufficiency of the Evidence

On appeal, Maldonado argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

prove that he acted maliciously, because he was paid to maintain the 

property and therefore “the debris piled in his yard was effectively his to 

dispose of.” Put another way, by virtue of his work status on the property,

Maldonado “exercised some dominion and control over the property, including 

effectively taking ownership of the yard debris he burned” and therefore he 

could not have acted maliciously when he set fire to it.

“ ‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine 

“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] “ ‘ “[O]ur 

role on appeal is a limited one.” [Citation.] Under the substantial evidence 
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rule, we must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact 

that the trier of fact could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.’ ” (In 

re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026 (V.V.).) 

In California, the crime of arson is defined by statute: “A person is 

guilty of arson when he or she willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns 

or causes to be burned . . . any structure, forest land, or property.” (§ 451.) 

As noted above, Maldonado contends on appeal that the evidence failed to 

show that he acted “maliciously” as used in the statute.

“ ‘Maliciously’ imports a wish to vex, defraud, annoy, or injure another 

person, or an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or 

presumption of law.” (§ 450, subd. (e).) “In determining whether the second 

type of malice (‘intent to do a wrongful act’) is established for arson, malice 

will be presumed or implied from the deliberate and intentional ignition or 

act of setting a fire without a legal justification, excuse, or claim of right.” 

(V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1028.) 

“[A]rson’s ‘willful and malice requirement ensures that the setting of 

the fire must be a deliberate and intentional act, as distinguished from an

accidental or unintentional ignition or act of setting a fire; “ ‘in short, a fire of 

incendiary origin.’ ” [Citations.] “Because the offensive or dangerous 

character of the defendant’s conduct, by virtue of its nature, contemplates 

such injury, a general criminal intent to commit the act suffices to establish 

the requisite mental state.” [Citation.] Thus, there must be a general intent 

to willfully commit the act of setting on fire under such circumstances that 

the direct, natural, and highly probable consequences would be the burning of 

the relevant structure or property.’ ” (V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1029; see

Mason v. Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 773, 785 [“A necessary 

consequence is not required.”]; see also People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
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76, 89 [arson requires only “a general intent to willfully commit the act of 

setting on fire under such circumstances that the direct, natural, and highly 

probable consequences would be the burning of the relevant structure or 

property”].) 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, as 

we must, we conclude the jury could reasonably find that Maldonado acted 

with malice, i.e. wrongfully, when he intentionally set fire to the lawn debris. 

All of the evidence showed that he had acted intentionally when he burned

the brush debris in the yard; and any suggestion that his action was not 

malicious, i.e. not a wrongful act, is belied by his angry, defiant and 

aggressive response to R.M., his supervisor and mother, when she instructed 

him to desist. Certainly Maldonado could have argued to the jury that he did 

not act wrongfully when he burned the yard debris, even though he did not 

seek or obtain permission from the property owner or from R.M. before 

starting to ignite the piles of debris. Nonetheless, the jury may have 

reasonably inferred that angrily telling R.M. to leave and then acting as if he 

intended to resume the burning despite her orders to stop showed 

Maldonado’s wrongful intent to conduct the burning against the wishes and 

direction of the property owner.

Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence support’s 

Maldonado’s conviction for arson. 

II

Instructional Error / Response to Jury Note

Maldonado further contends that the trial court committed 

instructional error by failing to instruct the jury as to “wrongful act”. 

Specifically, Maldonado argues that “the trial court had a sua sponte duty to 
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instruct the jury on what constitutes a wrongful act and in turn, how to 

determine legal justification, excuse, or claim of right to burn property.” 

We review instructional error using a de novo standard of review. 

(People v. Fiore (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1378; People v. Manriquez

(2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 584.)

Respondent points out that Maldonado did not request an instruction 

as to “wrongful act,” either in the initial jury instruction conference or in 

response to the jury’s question, and further, that Maldonado acquiesced in 

the court’s response to the jury’s question. As a result, Respondent contends, 

Maldonado has forfeited this argument on appeal. However, if, as Maldonado 

contends, the court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on “wrongful act,” then 

it cannot be said that he forfeited the argument. (See People v. Delgado

(2013) 56 Cal.4th 480, 488 [even in the absence of a request, the court must 

instruct the jury on relevant issues necessary for the jury’s understanding of 

a case].)

Contrary to Maldonado’s assertion, the court did not have a sua sponte 

duty to further define the prosecution’s burden to prove a wrongful act. 

Maldonado cites to no authority in support of this proposition, and we are not 

aware of any such authority. Instead, when a defense is in effect a dispute as 

to the sufficiency of the evidence as to an element of the offense, the court 

does not have a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense. (People v. 

Hussain (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 261, 269 [“ ‘ “when a defendant presents 

evidence to attempt to negate or rebut the prosecution’s proof of an element 

of the offense, a defendant is not presenting a special defense invoking sua 

sponte instructional duties” ’ ”].)

Absent a sua sponte instructional duty, the defense is free to offer a 

pinpoint instruction, Hussain, supra; but no such instruction was offered to 
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the trial court (or articulated in this appeal). Thus, we agree with 

Respondent’s contention that Maldonado has forfeited this argument. (See 

People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal. 4th 616, 675.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

DATO, J.