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******************************************************21ST MORTGAGE CORPORATION v. CHRISTOPHER N. SCHUMACHER (AC 38219)
Keller, Mullins and Sullivan, Js. Argued November 28, 2016—officially released March 14, 2017 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Danaher, J. [summary judgment as to liability]; J. Moore, J. [judgment of strict foreclosure].)
Richard Lewis, for the appellant (defendant).S. Bruce Fair, for the appellee (plaintiff).Opinion MULLINS, J. The defendant, Christopher N. Schumacher, appealsfromthejudgmentofstrictforeclosure rendered by the trial court in favor ofthe plaintiff, 21st Mortgage Corporation. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly rendered summaryjudgment
as to liability after finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff is the holder of the note and the party entitled to foreclose. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts inform our review. In its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant and Patriot Lending Group, Inc. (Patriot), executed apromissory note in the amount of $877,500 on February 28, 2006. The notewas securedbyamortgage onthe defendant’s Bridgewater property in favor ofMortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as nominee for Patriot.1 The mortgage was executed on February 28, 2006, and recorded on the Bridgewaterland records
on March 7, 2006.
The complaint further alleged: (1) the mortgage then
was assigned to GMAC Mortgage, LLC, on October 27, 2009, and the assignment was recorded on the land records on November 20, 2009; (2) the mortgage ‘‘is to be assigned’’ to the plaintiffby virtue of an assignment ofmortgage ‘‘to be recorded’’ on the land records;2 and (3) the plaintiff is the holder of the note, the note is in default, and the plaintiff has elected to accelerate the balance due on the note, declare the note to be due in full, and to foreclose the mortgage securing the note. In response, the defendant filed an answer, which, in relevantpart, lefttheplaintifftoitsproof. Thedefendant alsofiledthreespecialdefenses, namely, (1)theplaintiff is not the owner of the debt or the holder of the mortgage, (2) the plaintiff’s claim is based on the fraudulent dealings of the plaintiff or its assignors, and (3) the plaintiff’s actions are a continuing course of dealing in violation ofthe ConnecticutUnfairTrade PracticesAct, General Statutes § 42-110b et seq. On November 26, 2014, before filing a responsive pleading to the defendant’s special defenses; see Practice Book § 10-56;3 the plaintiff filed a motion for summaryjudgmentasto liability, withasupportingaffidavit and a memorandum of law. In that memorandum, the plaintiff also attacked each of the defendant’s special defenses. Aftergrantingacontinuancetothe defendant, the court continued the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment to a short calendar hearing on May 4, 2015. On April 30, 2015, the defendant filed a motion entitled ‘‘Notice of waiver of oral argument and/or motion for continuance to hire local counsel.’’ In that motion, the defendant asked for at least a thirty day continuance, and he requested that the court take the motion for summary judgment on the papers. It is not clearfrom the record whether the court took any action on this motion. On May 4, 2015, with the defendant not present, the court heard argument from the plaintiff on the merits of its motion for summaryjudgment. On May 26, 2015, the court, in a memorandum of decision, granted the plaintiff’s motion for summaryjudgment as to liability, and, on July 20, 2015, it rendered ajudgment of strict foreclosure. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. The defendant claims that the court improperly rendered summary judgment as to liability in the instant foreclosure action when there were genuine issues of material fact concerning the ownership of the note in question. The defendant argues that the court improperlyreliedonAmericanHomeMortgageServicingInc., v. Reilly, 157 Conn. App. 127, 132–34, 117 A.3d 500 (2015), because ‘‘[i]n this case, the note was not endorsed in blank, and, thus, the note was not bearer paper. As such, the plaintiff was not a holder as that term is defined in [General Statutes] § 42a-1-201 (b) (21) (A)

. . . . The issue here is not whether the party in possession of a note endorsed in blank is entitled to enforce the note, the issue is whether theplaintiff, or some unknown thirdparty, owns thenote.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Furthermore, the defendant argues that, in support of his opposition to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, he submitted a deposition from a prior foreclosure case between him and the most recent prior holderofthenote, GMAC Mortgage, LLC. Inthatdeposition, a spokesperson for GMAC Mortgage, LLC, admitted that there were additional endorsements to this note andthat the note had broken offinto two separate branches, with two different sets of allonges, thereby callingintoquestiontheplaintiff’sstatusastheholderof thenote andthepartyentitledtoforeclose. He contends thatthe missing endorsementsraised agenuine issue of material fact that must be answered and that summary judgment, therefore, is inappropriate. Although we agree that the defendant has demonstrated that there may be some discrepancies in the allonges to the note, we, nevertheless, conclude that the court properly granted summary judgment.
The following additional facts, although somewhat cumbersome, are necessary to a full understanding of the plaintiff’s claim and our analysis. The plaintiff, in support ofits motionforsummaryjudgment, submitted the November 13, 2014 affidavit of Tiffany Moyer, the legal coordinator for the plaintiff, attesting that the information contained in her affidavit was taken from the plaintiff’s business records. She attested that the defendant and Patriot executed a note in the original amount of $877,500 and that the plaintiff, or its agent, has possession of the original note, the note has beenduly endorsed, and a copy is attached to the affidavit
as exhibit A. Moyer also attested that the defendant, on February 28, 2006, conveyed by mortgage deed his interest in his Bridgewaterproperty to MERS, as nominee for Patriot, and that this mortgage deed was recorded on March 7, 2006 in volume 68 at page 933 in the Bridgewater land records. Sheattestedthatthemortgage deedisattached to her affidavit as exhibit B. Additionally, Moyerattestedthatthe mortgage thereafterwas assignedto GMAC Mortgage, LLC, on October 27, 2009, andthentotheplaintiffonMay7, 2010.4Copies of those assignments are attached to her affidavit as exhibit C. She further attested that the defendant was in default on the note, the plaintiffhad accelerated the note, and the plaintiffwas foreclosing on the mortgage. Interestingly, Moyer made no representations in her affidavit about the chain of title of the note. Exhibit A to Moyer’s affidavit is the adjustable rate note between the defendant and Patriot in the amount of$877,500, executedonFebruary28, 2006, purportedly signedbythe defendant, withseveralattachedallonges. The allonges are as follows: (1) The first allonge to the note is from Patriot to the Ohio Savings Bank; it is not dated; (2) on that same allonge is an endorsement from Ohio Savings Bank to GMAC Bank; it also is not dated; (3) the next allonge is from Ally Bank formerly known
as GMAC Bank to GMAC Mortgage, LLC, signed by Brenda Staehle, ‘‘Limited Signing Officer’’; it also is not dated; and (4) the final allonge isfrom GMAC Mortgage, LLC, to 21st Mortgage Corporation ‘‘By: 21st Mortgage Corporation, it’s attorney-in-fact,’’ signed by Troy Fussell, vice president and authorized signatory, and notarized by Michelle A. Wilson on February 14, 2014.
Exhibit B to Moyer’s affidavit is an open-end mortgage deed. The document provides that the borrower is the defendant and that MERS is acting as nominee for Patriot. At the very top of the document are the volume and page numbers for the Bridgewater land records; page one provides that the document is filed in volume 068, at page 0933. Approximately one third of the way down page one, there is a line across the pagewithanotationinthe middlethatprovides: ‘‘Space Above This Line For Recording Data.’’ Above that line the document provides in relevant part: ‘‘After recording please return to: OHIO SAVINGS BANK ATTN: DOCUMENT CONTROL’’ alongwithanaddress.
Exhibit C to Moyer’s affidavit consists of two mortgage assignments. The first is recorded at volume 075, page0907oftheBridgewaterlandrecords, andprovides that Patriot is assigning the defendant’s mortgage to GMAC Mortgage, LLC. The assignmentis dated October 27, 2009, and is from MERS, as nominee for Patriot, to GMAC Mortgage, LLC. The assignment is signed byBrenda Staehle, vice president of MERS.5 The second assignment is from GMAC Mortgage, LLC, to 21st Mortgage Corporation. The assignment is dated May 7, 2014, and is signed by Troy Fussell, vice president of GMAC Mortgage, LLC.6
In its memorandum of law in support of its motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that there
were no genuine issues of material fact concerning whether it was the holder of the note or whether it
was entitled to foreclose on the mortgage due to the defendant’s defaultonthenote. Theplaintiff, nothaving filed a responsive pleading, also addressed each ofthe defendant’s special defenses, arguing that they ‘‘are not legally sufficient and/or they fail to give rise to any genuine issues of material fact.’’ Specifically, as to the defendant’s first special defense, namely, that the plaintiff is not the owner of the debt or the holder of the mortgage, the plaintiff contended that it had ‘‘duly demonstrated that there
are no genuine issues of material fact concerning its holdership of the subject promissory note, which is endorsed in blank.’’7
As to the defendant’s remaining special defenses, the plaintiff asserted that they failed as a matter of law because they did not set forth any supporting factual allegations, but, instead, relied on mere legal conclusions. OnFebruary24, 2015,thedefendantfiledanobjection to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, along with a memorandum of law and supporting affidavit, with exhibits. In his memorandum, the defendant arguedthattherewereimportantissues offactconcerning the allonges to the note that were attached to the Moyer affidavit. He contended that the plaintiff’s evidence called into question its ownership of the debt, the note, and the mortgage, in that the Moyer affidavit contained discrepancies from the allonges that were attached to her affidavit, some known allonges were omitted, many allonges contained no dates, and the allonge from GMAC Mortgage, LLC, to 21st Mortgage Corporation was not signed by anyone from GMAC Mortgage, LLC. The defendant also alleged that the Moyer affidavit raised questions as to the transfers of the title of the note. In support of his opposition, the defendant also provided his own affidavit. One ofthe documents attached to his affidavit was a January 11, 2012 deposition of AlbertAugustine, amemberofthe document execution team ofGMAC Mortgage, LLC, taken in aprevious foreclosure action instituted by GMAC Mortgage, LLC, againstthedefendant.8Duringhisdeposition,Augustine reviewedtheendorsementstothedefendant’snotewith Patriot, and he stated that they demonstrated that the note was assigned to Ohio Savings Bank from Patriot,and then from Ohio Savings Bank to GMAC Bank, and thenfromGMACBankto GMAC Mortgage. Heacknowledged that the endorsements were not dated and that he had no idea when they took place. The defendant’s attorney in that case then asked Augustine to examine additional allonges to the note that had been marked
as exhibits. The following colloquy occurred: ‘‘Q. Okay. Flipping overto 0030, canyou tell me what this is? ‘‘A. Allonge from Ohio Savings Bank to Residential Funding, LLC. ‘‘Q. Do you know who Residential Funding, LLC, is? ‘‘A. Yes. ‘‘Q. Who is Residential Funding, LLC?’’ ‘‘A. I know them to be an additional mortgage company, another mortgage company slash investor. ‘‘Q. Are they affiliated with GMAC? ‘‘A. No.

. . . ‘‘Q. So, this appearsto be an assignment oranallonge ofthenotefromOhio SavingsBanktoResidentialFunding Company. Do you know when this allonge took place? ‘‘A. No. ‘‘Q. Can you turn to your affidavit

. . . . This allonge is not connected to the note in that affidavit, correct? ‘‘A. No.

. . . ‘‘Q. If you flip to GMAC 0031, seems to be another allonge. Have you ever seen this document before? ‘‘A. No. ‘‘Q. Can you tell me what it is? ‘‘A. It’s another allonge endorsed in blank from Residential Funding.

. . . ‘‘Q. In your affidavit, the allonges that you attached to the note in your affidavit show the note being transferred from Ohio Savings to GMAC Bank, but the allonge that is marked GMAC 0030 showed the note being transferred from Ohio Savings Bank to Residential Funding Company, LLC.

. . . Just want to make
sure that’s correct. ‘‘A. Yeah. ‘‘Q.

. . . Did Ohio Savings Bank endorse only part of the note to GMAC? ‘‘A. I don’t know. ‘‘Q. Is it common for an entity to assign a portion of
a note to another entity in your experience? ‘‘A. I don’t know.‘‘Q. Can there be more than one owner of a note in your experience? ‘‘A. Again, I don’t know.

. . . ‘‘Q. So, staying with exhibit A to your affidavit, the second allonge that is attachedto yournote, to the note in your affidavit, is from

. . . Allied Bank formerly known as GMAC Bank to GMAC Mortgage, LLC, and that’s signed by Brenda Staehle,9 but GMAC 0029 in exhibit D, which purports to be an allonge to GMAC Mortgage, LLC, from Allied Bank formerly known as GMAC Bank, [issignedbysomeonenamed] AlanaGerhart. So, these are two different allonges, correct? ‘‘A. Yes. ‘‘Q. Signed by two separate people? ‘‘A. Yes. ‘‘Q. Any idea why that’s the case? ‘‘A. No. ‘‘Q. And, again, I think you already testified to this, but none of these allonges are

. . . dated, correct? ‘‘A. No. ‘‘Q. So, you don’t actually know when the note was negotiated to

. . . [GMAC Mortgage, LLC] in this case, do you? ‘‘A. No.’’
InaMay26, 2015memorandumofdecision, the court, after stating that it had examined the original note, which the plaintiff had presented at the May 4, 2015 hearing, granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability. The court recognized that, as the holder of the note, the plaintiff is presumed to be the owner of the note and debt. The court found that the plaintiff had made a prima facie showing, and that ‘‘there is no dispute thattheplaintiffpossessedthe note that is endorsedto the plaintiff, noris there any dispute that the plaintiff possessed the note prior to the commencement of this action.’’ (Footnote omitted.) The court also concluded that the defendant’s special defenseswere insufficient, andthattheplaintiff’sprima facie showingwasunrebutted. The courtrenderedsummaryjudgment as to liability and, thereafter, rendered
ajudgment of strict foreclosure.
The defendant contends that the court’s summary judgment was improper because he had demonstrated the existence of genuine issues of material fact both by his examination of inconsistencies in the plaintiff’s motion and accompanying documents and in the documents he provided in his opposition to the plaintiff’s motion forsummaryjudgment. He contends that ‘‘there
can be no serious question that if the special endorsements into the plaintiff in this case are not valid orenforceable, then the plaintiff would not be entitled to summaryjudgment inthis case, [and] it would not even have standing, thus implicating the court’s subject matterjurisdiction.

. . . This issue of fact concerning the missing endorsements, therefore, is material

. . . .’’10 (Citation omitted.) The defendant contends that ‘‘merely being in possession of the original note does not itselfcreate apresumption that the party in possessionisthe owner; thepresumptionis onlycreatedwhen the party in possession of the note is also a holder.’’ (Emphasis in original.) The defendant concludes by arguing that the plaintiff in this case ‘‘is not a holder
as that term is defined in

. . . § 42a-1-201 (b) (21) (A)

. . . because the note at issue in this case was not endorsed in blank.’’ (Emphasis in original.) We disagree. ‘‘Underthe applicable standard ofreview, ourreview of summaryjudgment rulings is plenary.

. . . Pursuant to Practice Book § 17-49, summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding
a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

. . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of anygenuineissue [of] materialfactswhich, underapplicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law

. . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Properties, LLC, 309 Conn. 307, 333, 71 A.3d 492 (2013). ‘‘[B]ecause the

. . . plaintiff sought summary judgment in a foreclosure action, which is an equitable proceeding, we note that the trial court may examine all relevantfactors to ensure that completejustice is done.

. . . The determination of what equity requires in a particularcase, the balancing ofthe equities, is amatter for the discretion of the trial court.

. . . ‘‘Inorderto establishaprimafacie caseinamortgage foreclosure action, theplaintiffmustprovebyapreponderance of the evidence that it is the owner of the note and mortgage, that the defendant mortgagor has defaultedonthe note andthatanyconditionsprecedent to foreclosure, as establishedbythe note andmortgage, have been satisfied.

. . . Thus, a court may properly grant summaryjudgment as to liability in a foreclosure action ifthe complaint and supporting affidavits establish an undisputed prima facie case and the defendant fails to assert any legally sufficient special defense.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bank ofAmerica, N.A. v. Aubut, 167 Conn. App. 347, 358–59, 143 A.3d638 (2016).
In the present case, the defendant’s argument revolves around his claim that the plaintiff is not a ‘‘holder’’ of the note because the note is not endorsed in blank, but, rather, is specially endorsed to the plaintiff.11 At its core, the defendant’s contention is that the plaintiff does not have standing to foreclose. We disagree. ‘‘Standing is the legal right to setjudicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke thejurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.

. . . Where a partyisfoundtolackstanding,thecourtisconsequently without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the
cause.

. . . Our review of this question of law is plenary.

. . . ‘‘A plaintiff’s right to enforce a promissory note may be established under the [Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), General Statutes § 42a-1-101 et seq.].

. . . Underthe UCC, a [p]erson entitledto enforce an instrumentmeans [interalia] (i) theholderofthe instrument, [or] (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder

. . . . A person may be
aperson entitledto enforce the instrument eventhough the person is not the owner of the instrument

. . . .’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis altered; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) J.E. Robert Co.

v. SignatureProperties, LLC, supra, 309 Conn. 318–19.
A ‘‘[p]erson’’ is defined by the UCC as ‘‘an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency or instrumentality, public corporation or any other legal
or commercial entity.’’ General Statutes § 42a-1-201 (b) (27). ‘‘If an endorsement makes a note payable to an identifiableperson, itisaspecialendorsement, andonly the identified person in possession of the instrument is entitled to enforce the instrument. General Statutes §§ 42a-1-201 (b) (21) (A), 42a-3-205 (a) and 42a-3-301.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank, N.A

. v. Ugrin, 150 Conn. App. 393, 402, 91 A.3d 924 (2014); see also footnote 11 of this opinion. The UCC defines the holder of a negotiable instrument as: ‘‘The person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identifiedpersonthatisthepersoninpossession.’’ General Statutes § 42a-1-201 (b) (21) (A).
In the present case, the plaintiff is the person in possession ofthe negotiable instrument that is payable specifically to the plaintiff. Clearly, then, the plaintiff, pursuant to the clear language of § 42a-1-201 (b) (21) (A) is the holder of the note, specially endorsed to theplaintiff. Because the plaintiffis the holder ofthe note, which is specially endorsed to it, it has standing to foreclose the mortgage, which it also holds. Although we acknowledge that the defendant presented some evidence that called into question the possible existence of other allonges to this note, that evidence, even ifcredited, does not negate the fact that the plaintiff possesses both the original note specially endorsed to it and an assignment of mortgage on the defendant’s property, used to secure the note. On this basis, we conclude that the plaintiff had standing to foreclose and that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 ‘‘As one court has explained, MERS does not originate, lend, service, or investinhomemortgageloans. Instead, MERSactsasthenominalmortgagee for the loans owned by its members. The MERS system is designed to allow its members, which include originators, lenders, servicers, and investors, to assign home mortgage loans without having to record each transfer in the local land recording offices where the real estate securing the mortgage is located.

. . . ‘‘The benefit ofnaming MERS as the nominal mortgagee ofrecord is that when the member transfers an interest in a mortgage loan to another MERS member, MERSprivatelytrackstheassignmentwithinitssystembutremains the mortgagee of record. According to MERS, this system saves lenders time andmoney, and reducespaperwork, by eliminating the needto prepare and record assignments when trading loans.

. . . ‘‘If, onthe otherhand, aMERS membertransfers an interestin amortgage loan to a non-MERS member, MERS no longer acts as the mortgagee of record and an assignment of the security instrument to the non-MERS member is drafted, executed, and typically recorded in the local land recording office.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, 310 Conn. 119, 122 n.1, 74 A.3d 1225 (2013).
2 The record demonstrates that the mortgage was assigned to the plaintiff

on May 7, 2014, and recorded on the Bridgewater land records on June 20, 2014.
3 Practice Book § 10-56 provides: ‘‘The plaintiff’s reply pleading to each ofthe defendant’s special defenses may admit some and deny others ofthe allegations of that defense, or by a general denial of that defense put the defendant upon proof of all the material facts alleged therein.’’

4 The date May 7, 2010, likely is a typographical error. The actual date of the assignment is May 7, 2014, approximately one month afterthe institution of this foreclosure action.
5 Staehle also signed one of the allonges to the note from Ally Bank formerly known as GMAC Bank to GMAC Mortgage, LLC, as ‘‘Limited Signing Officer.’’
6 On February 14, 2014, Fussell had signed the final allonge to the note from GMAC Mortgage, LLC, to 21st Mortgage Corporation. He signed that document as vice president and authorized signatory for 21st Mortgage Corporation, acting as the attorney-in-fact for GMAC Mortgage, LLC.

7 The note at issue in this case, a copy of which is attached to Moyer’s affidavit, is specially endorsed to the plaintiff, and not endorsed in blank.
8 The defendant attestedthatthe previous foreclosure case was dismissed without prejudice on August 9, 2012. The plaintiffdid not move to strike anyportion ofthe defendant’s opposition, his affidavit, or its attachments.
9 We note that the allonge in the record from Ally Bank formerly known

as GMAC Bank to GMAC Mortgage, LLC, is signed by Brenda Staehle, ‘‘Limited Signing Officer.’’ Staehle also is the signatory of the assignment of mortgage from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee forPatriot Lending Group, Inc., to GMAC Mortgage, LLC. Onthat assignment, Staehle signed as vice president of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. Augustine also attested that he personally knows Staehle and that she works with him in the foreclosure department.10 During oral argument before this court, the defendant expressed a concernthatifthere exists anotherallonge thatis endorsedinblank, astestified to byAugustine during his deposition, the holder ofthat allonge could bring anotheractionagainstthe defendant. Wefindlittlemeritinsuchanargument considering the existence of General Statutes § 49-1: ‘‘The foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereofwho are made parties to the foreclosure and also against anyperson
orpersonsuponwhomserviceofprocesstoconstituteanactioninpersonam couldhave beenmade withinthis state atthe commencement ofthe foreclosure; butthe foreclosure is not abarto anyfurtheractionuponthe mortgage debt, note or obligation as to any person liable for the payment thereof upon whom service of process to constitute an action in personam could not have been made within this state at the commencement of the foreclosure. The judgment in each such case shall state the names of all persons upon whom service ofprocess has been made as herein provided.’’ We also note that the record establishes that the defendant has been in default since 2009, and that there is neither evidence nor an allegation that some other entity has sought to enforce the note.
11 ‘‘The definitions of the terms blank endorsement and special endorsement are relevant to the defendant’s claims. If an endorsement is made by the holder of an instrument

. . . and the endorsement identifies a person to whom it makes the instrumentpayable, it is aspecial endorsement. When specially endorsed, an instrument becomes payable to the identified person and may be negotiated only by the endorsement of that person.

. . . If an endorsement is made by the holder of an instrument and is not a special endorsement it is a blank endorsement. When endorsed in blank, an instrument becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone until specially endorsed. General Statutes § 42a-3-205 (a) and (b).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank, N.A

. v. Ugrin, 150 Conn. App. 393, 396 n.6, 91 A.3d 924 (2014).