SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3242-22 

BRITTANY McHUGH and 

CINDY OZIEGBE, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v.

CARLOS ORTIZ and ORTIZ 

TRANSMISSIONS, LLC, 

 Defendants-Respondents. 

___________________________

Submitted April 23, 2024 – Decided May 16, 2024 

Before Judges Sumners and Torregrossa-O'Connor. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Hudson County, Docket No. DC-000129-20.

Brittany McHugh and Cindy Oziegbe, appellants pro 

se. 

Respondents have not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3242-22

 Plaintiffs, Brittany McHugh and Cindy Oziegbe, appeal the Special Civil 

Part judge's May 9, 2023 order denying their claims against defendants, Ortiz 

Transmissions, LLC, and its owner Carlos Ortiz, for relief under the New Jersey 

Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -20 and for additional damages. 

Because the judge failed to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of 

law supporting denial of the CFA claims or the determination of damages, we 

reverse and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 

I.

A.

We draw the relevant facts and procedural history from our prior decision 

remanding this matter, McHugh & Oziegbe v. Ortiz, No. A-2788-20 (App. Div. 

June 1, 2022), and the record. In July 2019, plaintiffs delivered their car for 

repairs to defendants, providing a downpayment to Ortiz. Months passed and 

defendants did not repair or return plaintiffs' car, despite repeated requests and 

inquiries. On December 30, plaintiffs filed their first self-represented complaint 

against Ortiz seeking the car's return and monetary damages; Ortiz failed to 

answer. 

On June 1, 2020, the judge granted plaintiffs' "order to show cause seeking 

temporary injunctive relief against defendant" for return of the car. McHugh & 
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Oziegbe, slip op. at 2. Plaintiffs recovered the car only to find it damaged and 

inoperable. Plaintiffs next filed a motion "to 'reopen' [the] case and amend the 

complaint . . . . to add defendant's limited liability company, Ortiz Transmission, 

LLC, as a defendant and to seek monetary damages for breach of contract and 

violations of the Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -20." Id. at 2-3. 

Defendants failed to respond. Id. at 3. Despite the lack of opposition, the judge 

nonetheless denied plaintiffs' motion and opined that "[p]laintiff[s] [have] not 

provided any authority to the [c]ourt to support [their] motion." Ibid. (all but 

first alteration in original). 

Plaintiffs successfully appealed that decision and, on June 1, 2022, we 

reversed and remanded "with the direction that the trial court consider plaintiffs' 

contentions anew, and make detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law on 

all the issues raised." Id. at 4. We concluded the judge's decision was unclear 

as to whether the case concluded with the June 1, 2020 order or the judge 

"merely granted temporary injunctive relief . . . ." Id. at 2. Finding "the judge 

did not make any findings of fact concerning plaintiffs' contentions, state what 

specific arguments she considered, or explain her conclusions of law in 

connection with her terse ruling," we held that "the resolution of this matter 
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'required a careful analysis and the requisite findings to insure a just result.'" Id. 

at 3-4 (quoting Bailey v. Bd. of Rev., 339 N.J. Super. 29, 33 (App. Div. 2001)). 

B.

On remand, on July 15, 2022, the judge granted plaintiffs' motion to 

amend the complaint adding defendant Ortiz Transmissions, LLC, as well as 

claims for a breach of contract and violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud 

Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -20. The judge identified the amended complaint 

attached to plaintiffs' motion, which plaintiffs filed along with a certification in 

support of default judgment after the complaint once again went unanswered. 

Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleged thirty paragraphs of facts, spanning 

from the parties' first repair agreement through plaintiffs' retrieval of the 

inoperable car from defendants in further disrepair. The first count alleged 

breach of contract, claiming damages "including but not limited to costs to clean 

and repair the car, parking fees incurred . . . and the value of the time that 

[p]laintiffs were without the car." Count two expressly claimed "an 

unconscionable business practice under the [CFA]" seeking "triple damages, 

costs of suit, attorneys' fees . . . and any other relief the court deems equitable 

and just." Count three alleged specific violation of "the [CFA] Auto Repair 

Deceptive Practices Regulations," specifically citing N.J.A.C. 13:45A-26C.2. 
5 A-3242-22

The complaint itemized prohibited conduct under the CFA and enumerated facts 

claiming that defendants engaged in such behavior. Plaintiffs submitted 

supporting documentation including what appear to be receipts, estimates, and 

handwritten calculations of repair costs from a different repair shop. 

Apparently considering the complaint without a proof hearing or 

argument, the judge entered a May 9, 2023 order with a brief statement of 

reasons granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs' requested relief. 

Specifically, the judge granted plaintiffs' damages against defendants in the 

amount of $669.71 stating only that the amount represented the "towing charge, 

mechanical work, parking tickets, and toll charge per R[ule] 4:43-2(b) and 

R[ule] 6:6-3(c) because the proofs were competent and persuasive." The judge 

did not specify the "mechanical work" she referenced or the proof of that loss. 

The judge denied damages for mileage, opining that the proofs were not 

"'reasonably certain and definite,' 'as distinguished from mere quantitative 

uncertainty.' Schwartz v. Menas, 251 N.J. 556, 571 (2022) (citing Weiss v. 

Revenue Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 116 N.J.L. 208, 209-[]10 (E. & A. 1936)." 

Without further discussion, the judge found plaintiffs' proofs were "insufficient 

to quantify the damages of travelling while the vehicle was in the [d]efendants' 

possession." 
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The judge denied entirely plaintiffs' requested relief under the CFA, 

finding without specific reference to the pleadings that plaintiffs "did not plead 

a CFA claim in their [c]omplaint" and "fail[ed] to establish unlawful conduct as 

defined by the CFA" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. Recognizing viable CFA 

claims allege "(1) unlawful conduct . . .; (2) an ascertainable loss . . .; and (3) a 

causal relationship between the defendants' unlawful conduct and the plaintiff's 

ascertainable loss," the judge without further explanation viewed plaintiffs' 

"claim[s] against [d]efendant [a]s more like a breach of contract . . . ." The 

judge accordingly determined: "[Plaintiffs] assert that they had a contract with 

[d]efendants to repair the vehicle, and [d]efendant breached that contract by 

failing to perform. Accordingly, they are not entitled to an award of treble 

damages available under the CFA." 

Plaintiffs raise the following issue on appeal: 

The [d]efendant[s'] actions constitute[] an 

unconscionable business practice under the Consumer

Fraud Act. The [d]efendants['] violation of the 

Consumer Fraud Act entitle the plaintiff[s] to an award 

of triple damages up to the jurisdictional limit of the 

Special Civil Part of $20,000. The default judgment is 

against the weight of the evidence. 

II. 
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 "The scope of appellate review of a trial court's fact-finding function is 

limited." In re D.L.B., 468 N.J. Super. 397, 416 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting 

Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998)). Ordinarily, the trial court's findings 

"are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible 

evidence." Ibid. (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12). Such deference "is 

especially appropriate when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves 

questions of credibility." Ibid. (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). The "court's 

interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established 

facts," however, "are not entitled to any special deference” and are subject to de 

novo review on appeal. Accounteks.Net, Inc. v. CKR L., LLP, 475 N.J. Super. 

493, 503 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of 

Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). Moreover, our ability to resolve an 

appeal is largely dependent upon the trial court's compliance with its obligation 

to state its findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 1:7-4. To 

comply, the court must articulate factual findings and correlate them with the 

principles of law. Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980). Applying these 

standards to the Special Civil Part judge's findings, and viewing the judge's 

decision against the backdrop of the applicable law and the plain language of 
8 A-3242-22

plaintiffs' amended complaint, we cannot discern a basis for the judge's denial 

of plaintiffs' claims. 

 "Construe[d] liberally to accomplish its broad purpose of safeguarding 

the public," Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 11-12 (2004), the CFA 

"establishes 'a broad business ethic' applied 'to balance the interests of the 

consumer public and those of the sellers,'" D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 

168, 184 (2013) (quoting Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 543-44 (1971)). 

"There is no precise formulation for an 'unconscionable' act that satisfies the 

statutory standard for an unlawful practice." Ibid. The CFA recognizes three 

broad categories of consumer fraud violations: "affirmative acts, knowing 

omissions, and regulatory violations." Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local No. 

68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., Inc., 192 N.J. 372, 389 (2007) (quoting Cox 

v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 17 (1994)). 

To state a claim pursuant to the CFA, a plaintiff must allege "three 

elements: (1) unlawful conduct . . .; (2) an ascertainable loss . . .; and (3) a 

causal relationship between the defendants' unlawful conduct and the 

plaintiff[']s ascertainable loss." Ibid. (quoting N.J. Citizen Action v. ScheringPlough Corp., 367 N.J. Super. 8, 12-13 (App. Div. 2003)). Furthermore, the 

CFA "essentially replaces reliance, an element of proof traditional to any fraud 
9 A-3242-22

claim, with the requirement that plaintiff prove ascertainable loss." Ibid. (citing 

Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234, 246 (2005)). An

ascertainable loss is a "loss that is quantifiable or measurable." Thiedemann, 

183 N.J. at 248. 

"In cases involving breach of contract or misrepresentation, either out-ofpocket loss or a demonstration of loss in value will suffice to meet the

ascertainable loss hurdle and will set the stage for establishing the measure of

damages." Ibid. The evidence of the loss presented to the court must not be

"hypothetical or illusory" and "must be presented with some certainty 

demonstrating that it is capable of calculation . . . ." Ibid. Ascertainable loss

will be sufficiently demonstrated even with "[a]n estimate of damages, 

calculated within a reasonable degree of certainty . . . ." Id. at 249 (quoting Cox, 

138 N.J. at 22). Plaintiffs, consequently, must "demonstrate a cognizable and 

calculable claim of loss due to the alleged CFA violation." Ibid. (citing 

Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 173 N.J. 233, 254 (2002)). "When a plaintiff has 

proven the defendant's unlawful conduct, demonstrated an ascertainable loss and 

established a causal relationship between the conduct and the ascertainable 

loss, N.J.S.A. 56:8-19 requires an award of treble damages and provides for 

other remedies . . . ." D'Agostino, 216 N.J. at 185. 
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To further the CFA's protections in specific consumer situations, 

corresponding regulations identify conduct constituting unconscionable 

practices under the CFA. See Scibek v. Longette, 339 N.J. Super. 72, 78-79 

(App. Div. 2001). A violation of these regulations violates the CFA. See 

Sprenger v. Trout, 375 N.J. Super. 120, 131 (App. Div. 2005). Specific 

regulations address CFA requirements and violations concerning automotive 

repairs, including N.J.A.C. 13:45A-26C.2, which was cited by plaintiffs in their 

amended complaint. 

III.

 We first consider the judge's determination that plaintiffs "did not plead a 

CFA claim in their complaint," in light of the applicable law and allegations in 

the amended complaint. In our view, plaintiffs alleged specific facts and cited 

applicable statutory provisions and CFA regulations in support of their claims. 

Almost mirroring the prohibited conduct listed in N.J.A.C. 13:45A-26C.2, 

plaintiffs enumerated grounds for relief, including defendants: "making false 

promises" to repair when they "made no attempt to repair;" failing to identify 

and list the parts they intended to use to make repairs; "fail[ing] to provide a 

clearly and separately itemized list of the charges for parts and labor and did not 

identify whether the parts were new, rebuilt or used;" and failing to "post in a 
11 A-3242-22

conspicuous place a sign" which informed that dealers "must provide a written 

estimate, copies of all receipts, detailed invoices, a copy of any guarantees" and 

return any "replaced parts" on request. Plaintiffs expressly pleaded that 

defendants provided no "final invoice" and "no paperwork or documentation of 

any kind." As such, we disagree with the judge's finding that plaintiffs' 

complaint did not allege a CFA claim. To the contrary, plaintiffs' complaint 

sufficiently alleges violations of the CFA, including violations of its regulatory 

provisions. See Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc., 405 N.J. Super. 105, 114 

(App. Div. 2009) (recognizing that "mere[] statements of a legal conclusion" are 

not "sufficient facts that, if proven, would establish that defendants engaged in 

a 'method, act or practice' that is unlawful under the CFA"). 

Further, it appears the judge, as if concluding breach of contract and 

violation of the CFA are somehow mutually exclusive and conflicting causes of 

action, found without further discussion that plaintiffs' claims were "more like 

a breach of contract . . ." and therefore plaintiffs were "not entitled to an award 

of treble damages available under the CFA." While certainly "a simple breach 

of warranty or breach of contract is not per se unconscionable," D'Agostino, 216 

N.J. at 189 (quoting Gennari v. Weichert Co, Realtors, 288 N.J. Super. 504, 533 

(App. Div. 1996), aff'd as modified, 148 N.J. 582, 590 (1997)), unconscionable 
12 A-3242-22

breaches of consumer contracts can certainly trigger application of the CFA. 

See Manahawkin Convalescents v. O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 122 (2014). Because 

the judge's decision lacked sufficient discussion of both applicable law and fact, 

we cannot determine if the judge in finding breach of contract erroneously 

believed she could not also find a violation of the CFA. 

We next consider the judge's award of damages to plaintiffs. We similarly 

cannot decipher the judge's reasons for limiting damages to the "towing charge, 

mechanical work, parking tickets, and toll charge" and denying the remaining 

damages without detail, particularly in light of defendants' default. While we 

recognize that plaintiffs' attached records are somewhat confusing, we see no 

indication that the judge afforded plaintiffs a proof hearing or some ability to 

present argument or testimony as permitted by Rule 4:43-2(b). As in this case, 

proof of liability and damages after default requires only a prima facie standard 

of proof. Kolczycki v. City of East Orange, 317 N.J. Super. 505, 514-15 (App. 

Div. 1999); see also Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.2.2 

on R. 4:43-2 (2024) (stating that "unless there is intervening consideration of 

public policy or other requirement of fundamental justice, the judge should 

ordinarily apply to plaintiff's proofs the prima facie case standard of R[ule] 4:37-

2(b) and R[ule] 4:40-1, thus not weighing evidence or finding facts but only 
13 A-3242-22

determining bare sufficiency"). If uncertain as to the precise damages, given 

defendants' default status and plaintiffs' presentation of sufficient information 

to indicate further loss, the judge should have held a hearing to determine "the 

amount of damages or . . . the truth of any allegation." R. 4:43-2(b). We 

therefore reverse the denial of plaintiffs' CFA claims and remand for a proof 

hearing as to both liability and damages pertaining to their breach of contract 

and CFA claims. 

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.