ONCE AGAIN, THE CHALLENGE 

TO THE U.S. ARMY DURING A DEFENSE 

REDUCTION: TO REMAIN A MILITARY 

PROFESSION

Don M. Snider

Volume 4

Professional Military Ethics Monograph Series

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Professional Military Ethics Monograph

ONCE AGAIN, THE CHALLENGE 

TO THE U.S. ARMY

DURING A DEFENSE REDUCTION:

TO REMAIN A MILITARY PROFESSION

Don M. Snider

February 2012

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ISBN 1-58487-521-6
iii

FOREWORD

This monograph places the Army’s 2011 campaign of learning about the Army as profession after 

a decade of war into the context of the just-initiated 

Department of Defense (DoD) reductions. The exact 

shape of those reductions and the defense strategy our 

down-sized land forces are to execute in the future are 

only now becoming clear as this monograph goes to 

press in early 2012. But what is already clear is that 

the U.S. Army will undergo a severely resource-constrained transition to a significantly smaller force than 

it sustained during the past decade of war. As with 

the post-Cold War downsizing during the Bill Clinton administration in the late 1990s, one critical challenge for the Army centers on the qualitative and institutional character of the Army after the reductions. 

Will the Army manifest the essential characteristics 

and behavior of a military profession comprised of 

Soldiers and civilians who see themselves sacrificially 

called to vocation? Will the Army perceive its service 

to country within a motivating professional culture 

that sustains a meritocratic ethic, or will the Army’s 

character be more like any other government occupation in which its members view themselves as filling a 

job, motivated mostly by the extrinsic factors of pay, 

location, and work hours?

To get ahead of this coming challenge, in mid-2010 

the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff directed the Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), then General Martin 

Dempsey, to undertake a broad campaign of learning, involving the entire Department. The intent was 

to think through what it means for the Army to be a 

profession of arms and for its Soldiers and civilians to 

be professionals as the Army largely returns stateside 
after a decade of war and then has to quickly transition to the new era of Defense reductions. That campaign has been ongoing for a year now and several 

new conceptions of the Army as a military profession 

have been produced, along with numerous initiatives 

currently being staffed to strengthen the professional 

character of the Army as it simultaneously recovers 

from a decade of war and transitions through reductions in force. They form the descriptive content of 

this monograph.

One of those conceptions is the renewal of a unique 

aspect of the identity and role of the strategic leaders 

of the Army—the sergeants major, colonels, general 

officers, and members of the Senior Executive Service—as the “stewards of the Army profession.” This 

is true because they are the only cohort of leaders who 

control the Army’s major management and enterprise 

level systems, which have the capability to shape and 

strengthen the Army as a military profession. It is to 

them, and to those who support them in the difficult 

judgments that they must make in the next few years, 

that this monograph is particularly focused.

SEAN T. HANNAH, 

Director

Center for the Army 

Profession and Ethic

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. 

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iv
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Don M. Snider is Emeritus Professor of Political 

Science at West Point, from which he retired in 2008. 

He serves now as Senior Fellow in the Center for the 

Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) at West Point and 

as Distinguished Visiting Professor in the Strategic 

Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. In 

his previous military career, Dr. Snider served three 

combat tours in Vietnam as an infantryman; after battalion command, Dr. Snider served as Chief of Plans 

for Theater Army in Europe, as Joint Planner for the 

Army Chief of Staff, as Executive Assistant in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on 

the staff of the National Security Council, the White 

House. He retired from the Army in 1990. Subsequently, and before joining the Academy’s civilian faculty 

in 1998, for 3 years he was the Olin Distinguished Professor of National Security Studies at West Point. Dr. 

Snider’s continuing research examines American civil-military relations, the identities and development of 

the American Army officer, military professions, and 

professional military ethics. He was research director and co-editor of The Future of the Army Profession, 

(2d Ed., McGraw-Hill, 2005), and Forging the Warrior’s 

Character (2d Ed., McGraw-Hill, 2008). More recent 

publications include, “Dissent and Strategic Leadership of Military Professions” (Orbis, 2008), The Army’s 

Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict

(co-author, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, 2008) and, co-editor with Suzanne Nielsen, 

American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the 

State in the New Era, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 

University Press, 2009). Dr. Snider holds master’s degrees in economics and public policy from the University of Wisconsin and a doctorate in public policy 

from the University of Maryland.

vii

SUMMARY

The U.S. Army has been through three reductionsin-force since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force. 

The first one, roughly 1972-78, actually birthed the 

All-Volunteer Force. The second one occurred in the 

late 1990s after the end of the Cold War when the 

U.S. Army was reduced by approximately one-third 

in both force structure and budget (Total Obligational 

Authority). The third one is just now beginning in 

2011-12 as the Army returns from a decade of war in 

the Middle East.

Critical to the future effectiveness of the Army, and 

thus its trust with the American people, is whether the 

Army will retain the essential characteristics of a military profession—each of the six carefully explicated in 

this monograph—as it transits this era of Department 

of Defense reductions. Unfortunately, that future effectiveness is often not really known until the “first 

battle of the next war,” as the Army learned so painfully in the past, e.g., Task Force Smith in Korea. 

As noted in the Foreword, the Army’s campaign 

of learning about the Army profession has been ongoing for a year, a campaign led by a broad community 

of practice (CoP) drawn from many of the proponent 

Centers (Army schools or agencies for each Army 

branch or functional specialty) in dialogue with cohorts throughout the Army. For purposes of analytical 

capabilities, the CoP is organized by cohort within the 

profession, e.g., officers, noncommissioned officers, 

warrant officers, enlisted Soldiers, Army civilians, etc. 

Throughout calendar year 2011, that CoP conducted 

multiple surveys, assessments, dialogues, forums, 

and exercises across the Army. This monograph highlights some of the outcomes to date, particularly those 
viii

relating to the central research question—what does it 

mean now, after a decade of war, for the Army to be 

a military profession. This question is addressed by 

presenting four initial outcomes of the campaign:

1. The Background Realities of the Army as a Profession;

2. Including Army Civilians: A New Typology for 

the Army Profession;

3. The Process of Professionalization and the Criteria for Individual Certifications; and,

4. The Essential Characteristics of the Army as a 

Profession.

As this descriptive monograph shows, the Army 

is making good strides in its most recent effort to prepare for transition in a period of Defense reductions. 

The Army is doing so by keeping professional capabilities intact and ready for the first battle of the next 

conflict. But it must be understood that the really hard 

work is yet to be done.

The hard work is to conform the daily behavior of 

the institution to that of a profession when almost every tendency during the period of reductions will be 

to behave like a government occupation: centralizing 

authority; bureaucratizing processes; micro-managing within hierarchy, while the force “does more with 

less”; and, taking autonomy away from the very folks 

in whom the future of the institution lies—its junior 

professionals, both uniformed and civilian. To avoid 

such an outcome is now a central challenge facing the 

“stewards” of the Army profession.
1

ONCE AGAIN, THE CHALLENGE TO 

THE U.S. ARMY 

DURING A DEFENSE REDUCTION:

TO REMAIN A MILITARY PROFESSION

INTRODUCTION

The Army’s Campaign of Learning—What does it 

Mean to be a Military Profession after a Decade of 

War.

All professions are by their nature reflective institutions. It is the only way they can continually adapt 

with new expert knowledge and practices to meet the 

evolving needs of their clients. Failing that, they cease 

to be professions. Military professions fall in this category, but as large bureaucratic institutions, they can 

find it difficult to be truly reflective. 

Fortunately, however, they are mindful of their 

history in ways that other professions often are not. 

The study of military history has long been considered 

both an asset (insightful for lessons learned in war) 

and a hindrance (the proclivity to therefore fight the 

last war) for the U.S. Army. As historical reflection has 

shown, it has always been a challenge for the Army to 

come out of periods of significant force and resource 

reductions with its professional capabilities intact and 

ready for the “first battle” of the next war.1

 This is not 

a new challenge, rather a recurring one! 

The primary conclusion of the first study in 3 decades on the Army as a profession, a study undertaken just after the last major Defense reductions—the 

post-Cold War reductions of the 1990s—stated the 

challenge this way:
2

At present, the Army’s bureaucratic nature outweighs 

and compromises its professional nature. This is true 

in practice, but, of greater importance, it is regarded as 

true in the minds of the officer corps. Officers do not 

share a common understanding of the Army profession, and many of them accept the pervasiveness of 

bureaucratic norms and behavior as natural and appropriate. This is the core conclusion of this project, 

underlying everything that follows. . . . Throughout its 

history the Army has had to balance its two natures, 

the Army is at once a government bureaucracy and a 

military profession. Although this dual nature results 

in tension and stress for the Army, both aspects are 

necessary. However, for the U.S. Army to provide the 

military capabilities expected of and needed by a 21st 

Century military force, its professional nature must 

dominate. Our conclusion is that it does not; and in 

fact the current ascendency of the institution’s bureaucratic nature is undermining professional identity and 

performance.2

Now fast forward to 2012, with two wars winding 

down coincident with the start of yet another period of 

severe Defense reductions, such institutional mindfulness toward historical reflection is again serving the 

Army well as it addresses its central challenge. Simply 

stated, as in the title of this monograph, that challenge 

is once again to remain a profession as it transits this 

next era of force reductions. By retaining its professional character, it is understood that the Army will 

have the best chance of having, when the next war 

starts, both the necessary expert knowledge and the 

individual professionals to apply it effectively and 

ethically.3

 But as the Army has recently stated:

In the face of so many challenges, we have demonstrated great strengths such as the determination and 

adaptability of our junior leaders and their dedication 
3

to service shown through numerous deployments. Yet 

we have also struggled in some areas to maintain the 

highest standards of the Profession of Arms. As we 

have at other times in our history, we assess that it is 

time to refresh and renew our understanding of our 

profession.4

So, to once again address this recurring challenge, 

the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff 

directed in October 2010 that the Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 

then General Martin Dempsey, lead a campaign of 

learning to review the Army as a profession. They issued “terms of reference” in which they stated that, as 

a profession, it is now “essential that we take a hard 

look at ourselves to ensure we understand what we 

have been through over the past nine years, how we 

have changed, and how we must adapt to succeed in 

an era of persistent conflict.”5 To do so, pursuing the 

following three questions became the focal point for 

the campaign of learning:

1. What does it mean for the Army to be a Profession of Arms?

2. What does it mean to be a professional Soldier?

3. After 9 years of war, how are we as individual 

professionals and as a profession meeting these aspirations?6

To lead and govern the campaign, General 

Dempsey appointed the Commanding General, Combined Arms Center (CAC), as executive agent who in 

turn organized a broad community of practice (CoP) 

drawn from many of the Army proponent centers 

(Army schools or agencies for each Army branch or 

functional specialty). For purposes of analytical capabilities, the CoP was organized by cohort within the 
4

profession, e.g., officers, noncommissioned officers 

(NCOs), warrant officers, enlisted Soldiers, Army civilians, etc. Throughout calendar year 2011, that CoP 

conducted multiple assessments and dialogues across 

the Army. This monograph highlights some of the 

outcomes to date, particularly those relating to the 

first research question—What does it mean now, after 

a decade of war, for the Army to be a profession? This 

question will be addressed by presenting four initial 

outcomes of the campaign:

1. The Background Realities of the Army as a Profession.

2. Including Army Civilians: A New Typology for 

the Army Profession.

3. The Process of Professionalization and the Criteria for Individual Certifications.

4. The Essential Characteristics of the Army as a 

Profession.

Undoubtedly, the Army is considered a profession 

today. But, as will be discussed below, the Army is 

not a profession just because it says so. The Army is 

now well respected, along with the other services, and 

quite highly rated in every recent poll of public trust, 

even amidst several highly publicized ethical and professional lapses.7

 Such approval, however, cannot be 

taken for granted, particularly in times of urgent budget reductions. The Army’s client, the American people, get to make the judgment of the extent to which 

the Army is a profession, and they will do so based on 

the bond of trust created with them by the effective 

and ethical manner in which the Army continues to 

build and employ its capabilities.
5

THE BACKGROUND REALITIES

The first task of the campaign of learning was to 

reach consensus within the CoP on a common understanding of the social reality in which the Army 

operates, a reality now not well described in Army 

doctrine. It includes the four vital relationships and 

responsibilities that exist between the Army and its 

client (the American people) as well as those within 

the profession: between the institution and its individual members and among Army leaders at all levels, be 

they uniformed or civilian. Summarized, these roles 

and responsibilities are:8

1. The Army cannot simply declare itself to be a 

profession and its Soldiers or civilians to be professionals. In fact, it is a military profession, as opposed 

to a military occupation, only if and when its leaders 

conform its culture and practices to that of an effective and ethical institution and maintain earned trust 

from the American people. Simply stated, the trust of 

the American people is the lifeblood of the Army as 

a profession. That trust has to be earned continually 

by the effective and ethical application of the profession’s expertise with land combat power on behalf of 

the society it serves.

To recall, professions produce uniquely expert 

work, not routine or repetitive work. Medicine, theology, law, and the military are “social trustee” forms of 

professions.9

 Effectiveness, rather than pure efficiency, 

is the key to the work of professionals—the sick want 

a cure, the sinner wants absolution, the accused want 

exoneration, and the defenseless seek security. Thus, 

professionals require years of study and practice before they are capable of expert work. Society utterly 

depends on such professionals for their health, justice, 
6

and security. Consequently, a deep moral obligation 

rests on the profession, and its professionals, to continuously develop expertise and use that expertise 

only in the best interests of society—professionals are 

actually servants. The military profession, in particular, must provide the security which the American 

society cannot provide for itself but without which it 

cannot survive; and the Army must use its expertise 

according to the values held by that client, the American people.10

2. “Profession” is not the default or natural character of the Army, thus the title of this monograph. 

“The Army has not always been a profession in the 

accepted definitions of the term. The Army’s corporate identity—its culture, expertise, ethos, and place in 

society—has evolved over four centuries of American 

history.”11 It is, by its creation under the Constitution, 

a government occupation that took until the end of the 

19th century to earn the status of profession and even 

now will only behave as a profession if its leaders at 

all levels, both uniformed and civilian, conform its culture and practices daily to those of a profession, i.e., if 

they lead it by mission command to be, and therefore 

to behave as, a uniquely military profession. 

As noted in the introduction, the Army’s degree of 

professionalism has waxed and waned over the years, 

sometimes displaying more the characteristics of an 

occupation than a profession—more professional in 

periods of expansion and later phases of war and more 

“occupational” in periods of contraction after wars, 

e.g., post-World War II into Korea and post-Vietnam. 

This trend continued even after the establishment of 

an All-Volunteer Force in 1971 and the rebuilding of 

the Army’s Corps of NCOs post-Vietnam.12 It was 

highly professional in Operations DESERT SHIELD/
7

DESERT STORM in 1990, but then less so through the 

adaption of highly centralized managerial practices 

over the next decade of force reductions, causing an 

exodus of captains and other talent.13 A recent report 

suggests that today’s operating forces after a decade 

of war exhibit fairly well the traits of a profession, but 

that the force-generating, or institutional, side of the 

Army does not—or at least does so to a far lesser extent.14

Learning from our history of post-conflict transitions, the critical point here is that leadership within 

the Army, specifically the competence and character 

of its individual leaders at all levels, uniformed and 

civilian, is the single most influential factor in the 

Army being, and remaining, a military profession. 

The Army’s leaders are the sine qua non of the Army’s 

current and future status as a profession. 

3. Professions uniquely use their Ethic as the primary means of internal motivation and self-control 

and external trust-building. The servant ethic of professions is characterized as cedat emptor, “let the taker 

believe in us.”15 The Army’s professional Ethic enables 

trust externally with the American people and civilian leaders and internally with junior professionals 

within the ranks.16 Such trust can be understood as a 

willingness to be vulnerable, both institutionally and 

individually, which is formed at least in part around 

the expectation that an exchange partner will not behave opportunistically. Those trust relationships must 

be re-earned every day by Army leaders at every level 

living the Ethic, an embodiment of Army values that 

compels followers to live and serve in the same manner. Incidentally, a full narrative of the Army’s Ethic 

cannot be found now in any single document—a doctrinal omission that this campaign will help change. 
8

Because of this trust relationship, the American 

people grant significant autonomy to the Army to create its own expert knowledge and to police the application of that knowledge by its individual professionals. Nonprofessional occupations do not enjoy similar 

autonomy. Thus a self-policing Ethic is an absolute 

necessity for the Army’s status as a profession, especially given the lethality, the moral content, inherent 

in what it does. 

4. Other types of producing organizations motivate their workers through extrinsic factors such as 

salary, benefits, and promotions. In contrast, professions focus more on inspirational, intrinsic factors like 

the lifelong pursuit of expert knowledge, the privilege 

and honor of service, camaraderie, and the status of 

membership in an ancient, honorable, and revered occupation. This is what motivates true professionals; it 

is why the work of a professional is considered a personal calling to vocation—something far more meaningful and fulfilling than merely a job. 

INCLUDING ARMY CIVILIANS

A New Typology for the Army Profession.

The second outcome of the campaign has been to 

refine the Army’s understanding of itself as a profession, a refinement that now facilitates the logical inclusion of Army civilians as members of the profession. When the original White Paper was published 

in December 2010 to kick off internal dialogue within 

the Army, it was cast in the language of the Army as 

a “Profession of Arms.” The reason for this is found 

in the following quotation/discussion extracted from 

the White Paper:17
9

The preeminent military task, and what separates [the 

military profession] from all other occupations, is that 

soldiers are routinely prepared to kill . . . in addition to 

killing and preparing to kill, the soldier has two other 

principal duties . . . some soldiers die and, when they 

are not dying, they must be preparing to die.

James H. Toner18

Among all professions, our calling, the Profession of Arms, is unique because of the lethality of 

our weapons and our operations. Soldiers are tasked 

to do many things besides combat operations, but 

ultimately, as noted in the quotation above, the core 

purpose and reason why the Army exists is to apply 

lethal force.19 Soldiers must be prepared to kill and die 

when needed in service to the Republic. The moral implications of being a professional Soldier could not be 

greater and compel us to be diligent in our examination of what it means to be a profession, and a professional Soldier. 

Very shortly into the campaign, however, it became 

apparent that the necessity to include Army civilians 

in the conceptualization of the Army as a military profession precluded the “. . . of Arms” description for 

all of the Army. After all, Army civilians in arsenals 

and depots throughout Army Material Command, as 

well as the Army Corps of Engineers, many certified 

as professional engineers across the various United 

States in which they serve, do not carry arms nor use 

them in the traditional sense. Yet the truly symbiotic 

relationship between the Army Civilian Corps and 

the uniformed Army, particularly when employed in 

generating land combat power and providing homeland security within the United States, needed to be 

accurately portrayed in the conceptualizations and 

doctrines being formed.
10

The solution within the CoP was to revise, to 

broaden, the description of the Army’s expert knowledge/expertise to:

. . . the design, generation, support, and application of 

land combat power. This land power is normally applied in Joint Operations through the full spectrum of 

conflict and the subsequent establishment of a better 

peace. Such knowledge is unique and is not generally 

held outside the Army profession. The Army’s expertise, then, is the ethical and effective application of that 

expert knowledge by certified individuals and units in 

the support and defense of the American people.20

By expanding the realm of the Army’s expert 

knowledge/expertise to “the design, generation, support, and application” of land combat power, the nonuniformed member of the Army could now, rightly, 

see where their expert service fits within the profession. Such a conceptualization reflects the reality that 

the Army Profession is, in fact, composed of two very 

diffferent, but recognizable and well-known, components both with mutually complementary duties and 

capabilities. It also reflects the reality that both must 

therefore be highly professional for the Army to operate effectively and ethically.

The Army Civilian Corps has made significant 

progress over the past few years to become a professional entity (establishment of the Army Civilian University, creation of an Army Civilian Creed, creation 

of a program for civilian workforce transformation to 

better categorize expert [professional] from nonexpert 

[nonprofessional] skills, etc.) and must continue on 

that path if the Army as a whole is to maintain itself 

as a profession.21 Thus, with this broadened conceptualization, the CoP created a revised typology which 

slightly altered that published earlier in the White Paper. 
11

At the top of the typology now is the American 

Profession of Arms which includes all of America’s 

armed forces. It is our national subset of the larger international Profession of Arms.22 This was the focus of 

American scholars in the early post-World War II era 

of the 1950s and 1960s, notably Samuel Huntington 

and Morris Janowitz.23 Within this American Profession of Arms are three distinct military professions, 

currently the land warfare profession, the aero-space 

profession, and the maritime profession, divided by 

their unique military-technical expertise that traditionally has been focused on the different physical 

domains of warfare—land, air, and sea.

At the second level in the typology is The Army 

Profession, the object of the current Campaign. It is 

the major part of the land warfare profession mentioned above (the other component, on occasion, is 

the U.S. Marine Corps). It is an institution contiguous 

with the Department of the Army, including all direct 

and retired employees of that Executive Department, 

uniformed or civilian. Not included within this category, nor within this typology, are those within the 

Department of the Army employed under contract to 

a profit or not-for-profit entity. 

Logically, then, at the third and final level of analysis are the two components of The Army Profession—

the Army Profession of Arms and the Army Civilian 

Corps. The former is composed of the uniformed 

Army, those skilled in arts of warfare and under unlimited liability in its “killing and dying” aspects. The 

latter is composed of all nonuniformed, civilian members of the Department of the Army who serve to support the design, generation, support, and application 

of such land combat power by the Army.
12

The applicable portion of this typology is displayed 

visually in Figure 1 (the internal boundaries and categories of “aspiring, practicing, and retired” Army 

professionals are explained in the next section). Understandably, given the immense complexity within 

the composition of the Department of the Army, there 

are likely a few exceptions to this typology, those who 

do not fit exactly as described above. Nonetheless, it 

is clear within the Campaign that this typology of two 

separate, but mutually complementary, components 

within the Army Profession best fits the reality that 

exists on the ground. It also offers the best way ahead 

for policy decisions on such critical issues as training, 

education, leader development, and certification of 

Army professionals, regardless of component. 

Figure 1. Revised Typology for the Army

Profession.
13

The Process of Professionalization and the Criteria 

for Certifications.

Recalling the earlier discussion on the “Background Realities,” it is not surprising that during the 

course of the Campaign, the CoP settled on one understanding and depiction of the developmental sequence that produces Army professionals when both 

institution and individual fulfill their respective roles 

and responsibilities; see Figure 2.

Figure 2. Professionalization within the Army.

Note also in Figure 2 that certifications are multiple, 

where professionals are to be sequentially recertified 

as they grow in responsibility or into areas requiring 

new or additional knowledge and skills. The first certification in the sequence, however, is the most critical 

in that it establishes the individual for the first time 

as a “practicing” professional of one of the two components of the Army Profession. Subsequently, the 

individual either exits the Army before a full career 

or retires after a full career, moving to the category of 

“retired” Army professional. In this category, many 
14

are still influential, particularly within the Army’s client, the American people, and must be considered by 

both themselves and the profession’s client as a part 

of the profession, living under its moral obligations, 

etc.24

In all modern professions, the role of certifications 

is at least twofold: for the institution, certifications establish for the client the level of qualification and thus 

legitimacy of the individual professional to practice 

effectively and ethically, e.g., for a unit commander 

to lead America’s sons and daughters in mortal combat. For the individual professional, the Army’s certification is motivational—an earned “rite of passage” 

to the next level in one’s identity and chosen path of 

development, and normally a major point of personal 

pride and satisfaction.

Historically, there have been two primary means 

by which individual certifications were implemented 

by both components of the Army Profession: (1) official promotion systems that used regular performance 

evaluations; and, (2) periodic activities of professional education within the sequential and progressive Army schools system that often included branch, 

skill, or functional area qualifications (e.g., U.S. Army 

War College attendance for certification as a strategic leader; pilot and flight crew certifications within 

Army Aviation, etc.). However, the Army has largely 

relinquished its control over both of these processes of 

certification, especially during the past decade of war. 

For a number of reasons both means have lost legitimacy (e.g., many officers have delayed or altogether 

skipped professional education because of repeated 

deployments; statutory requirements have required 

the promotion of certain numbers of Army leaders 

even though they, in the eyes of their peers, did not 

meet professional standards). For example, an Army 
15

that for a significant period promotes to the rank of 

major 98 percent of those “fully qualified,” and to lieutenant colonel 95 percent, is simply not self-policing 

the development of its professionals. To infer the perception of Army majors at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 

as to the certifications they have been through, one 

only need to note that in one survey, 24 percent of 

them “do not believe the Army is a profession.”25

Restoring a system of professional certifications is 

a vital part of the Army’s re-conception and maintenance of itself as a military profession. Without such 

essential certifications, the Army simply cannot hope 

to maintain its legitimate status as an effective and 

trusted military profession through the coming Defense reductions.

For effective and consistent certifications, the Army 

Profession must have a set of broad, common criteria 

for certifications within the profession, both objective 

and subjective, even though at the component level 

(i.e., within the Army Profession of Arms and within 

the Army Civilian Corps) application of these criteria 

may diverge. As discussed earlier under the mutual 

responsibilities for the development of Army professionals, membership as an “aspiring professional” is 

conferred upon taking the oath of service, so what 

we are addressing here is the professional’s first certification to become a “practicing professional,” and 

the criteria to be used within both components of the 

Army Profession, uniformed and civilian.

Thus, another outcome of the campaign to date 

is the following articulation and rationale for three 

broad criteria for future certifications of all Army professionals, understanding that they will be applied in 

more specific detail by Army branches and force modernization proponents within the two components of 

the Army Profession:26
16

(1) COMPETENCE in Expert Work: The professional’s work is expert work related to the defense 

of the Nation, contributing to the design, generation, 

support, or application of land combat power; and, the 

individual’s personal competence must be certified by 

the Army commensurate with the level of certification 

granted. Rationale:

• “Professions certify; bureaucracies promote,” 

is the reality in the operational world, both 

within and beyond the military. Thus, to maintain professional status as a self-policing institution through the coming transition, the Army 

must certify each professional before beginning 

his or her practice and when advancing to each 

level of more difficult, responsible work.

• Certifications also provide immense motivation as “rites of passage” for individual Army 

professionals. In this sense, the Army owes its 

professionals solid certifications at each level of 

expertise and responsibility.

• To qualify as expert work, the work of the Army 

Professional must be based on expert knowledge, theoretical and practical; such work requires expert judgment and is not inherently 

routine or repetitive. In addition, it requires 

time, study, and practice to create expertise, the 

use of which often entails risk to the professional—physical risk for the warrior, and the risk of 

professional error for all Army professionals.

(2) Moral CHARACTER requisite to being an 

Army professional. Rationale:

• The Army’s expert work creates a moral responsibility to protect those who cannot protect themselves. It demands a moral character 

of sacrifice, service, and respect for human life.
17

• As discussed in the White Paper, the practice of 

each Army professional is the “repetitive exercise of discretionary moral judgments” (at their 

own level of responsibility), followed by actions 

to implement, execute missions, and maintain 

stewardship of the Army’s future capabilities. 

Each of these decisions, whether made in the 

Pentagon or on the battlefield, is of high moral 

content.

• Thus the personal character of an Army professional is a vital aspect of the necessary observations and evaluations for certification: Does the 

individual professional or leader willingly live 

and advance the Army’s Ethic in all of its applications such that the Army Profession is, in 

fact, a self-policing institution?

(3) Resolute COMMITMENT to the Army’s Duty, 

which is far more than a job: By observation and evaluation it is to be clear that the professional has been 

called to a resolute, abiding commitment to effective 

and honorable service in the Army and to the Nation. 

Rationale:

• To be an Army Professional means to be called 

to more than a job and to be primarily motivated by the intrinsic factors of sacrifice and 

service to others and the Nation rather than 

motivated by the extrinsic factors of a job such 

as pay, vacations, work hours, and location.

• At higher levels of leadership certification, 

such a calling entails the leader’s demonstrated 

and increased capability to steward the future 

of the profession.
18

There remains the challenge to specify how these 

criteria are to be applied within each component—

within the Army Profession of Arms and the Army 

Civilian Corps. That application may be different in 

each case, and requires additional analysis, some of 

which is already ongoing. For now, however, based 

on the campaign assessments to date, the focus of the 

CoP is to determine recommendations to restore both 

the Army promotion system and its professional education systems to be effective certifications, along with 

force modernization and branch proponents (Army 

Regulation [AR] 5-22) or their civilian equivalents (AR 

690-950) doing the same for functional expertise. 

THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 

ARMY PROFESSION

The fourth major outcome of the Campaign is the 

identification of those institutional or organizational 

characteristics that the Army considers essential for 

it be a trustworthy profession into the future. These 

attributes, more than nice to have, are those very few 

that are truly essential and without which the Army 

will atrophy into just an obedient military bureaucracy. The belief is that, in the coming transition, if the 

Army focuses on and prioritizes its efforts at both the 

institutional and individual level by these few characteristics, it can be reasonably confident that other desirable attributes will also be appropriately managed. 
19

The White Paper offered the following attributes 

as those that may well be essential for each level:

The rationale for this short list was straightforward. Basically, the argument runs like this:

• The Profession of Arms requires expert knowledge (e.g., doctrine), organizations, systems, 

and materiel, i.e., expertise; that expertise is 

manifested as unique skills in the individual 

professional and ultimately, by Army units.

• The profession exists only by the trust of the client; and that trust is the same trust that enables 

the individual Soldier to develop within the 

Army as a profession, for Soldiers and units to 

bond, for Soldiers’ families to trust the Army 

through myriad deployments, and for Army 

leaders to engage effectively in civil-military 

relations. And that is why trust is the most important principle and attribute sought for the 

Army. It is equally applicable in its simplest 

form to both profession and professional—it is, 

as stated earlier, the lifeblood of the profession.

• To maintain that trust, the profession requires 

the continuous development of human pracTHE PROFESSION THE PROFESSIONAL

Expertise Skill

Trust Trust

Development Leadership

Values Character

Service Duty
20

titioners, i.e., experts who hold high levels of 

resilience, adaptability, wisdom, and other attributes that make them effective members of 

the profession; that development manifests in 

leadership by professionals at all ranks.

• The profession requires unwavering, deeplyheld beliefs and values on which to base its 

Ethic; those values, when well internalized, are 

manifested in the character of individual professionals. Such strength of character would 

include internalization of the Army’s Seven 

Values and the larger content of the Ethic.

• Finally, the profession provides a vital service to 

American society and does so in subordination 

to civil authority; that service is manifested, inspirationally, in the duty of the individual professional.27

When these characteristics of the profession and 

attributes of the individual professional were reviewed by the Army at large (by survey that asked 

respondents to rate the importance of each, etc.), the 

results across all cohorts were consistent. Traditional, familiar attributes of the Army such as Service, 

Duty, Leadership, Expertise, Values, Character, and 

Trust were highly rated. Unfortunately several attributes unique to a profession, such as critical thinking, 

lifelong learning, and stewardship were rated low, indicating the importance and urgency of this campaign 

of learning! 

The final outcome, shown in Figure 3, generally 

adopted the attributes from the White Paper, though 

in some cases different language was adapted with 

more martial terminology that was found by the CoP 

in focus groups and assessments to better communi-
21

cate within Army culture. As approved by TRADOC, 

the essential nature of each attribute is now defined as 

portrayed in Figure 3.28

Figure 3. Essential Characteristics of the Army 

Profession.

Trust: A positive relationship with the American people based on mutual trust and respect is the 

lifeblood of the Army profession. The Army builds 

and sustains such trust through the active and continuous presence of the essential characteristics of the 

profession. Only by military effectiveness performed 

through honorable service by an Army with high 

levels of trustworthiness and esprit de corps, and with 

members who steward the profession’s future and 

self-regulate the profession to maintain its integrity—

can the Army be a military profession that the American people trust to support and defend the Constitution and their rights and national interests.
22

Trustworthiness: Internal to the Army, trust 

serves as a vital organizing principle that establishes 

conditions necessary for an effective and ethical profession. Trustworthiness is the positive belief and 

faith in the competence, moral character, and calling 

of comrades and fellow professionals that permits the 

exercise of discretionary judgment—the core function 

of the Army professional’s work. Such trustworthiness must be shared among comrades both civilian 

and military, between leaders and followers in the 

chains of command, between the Army and each of 

its individual professionals, between units and organizations, and between the Army and its Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) 

and coalition partners.

Military Expertise: The Army creates its own expert knowledge, both theoretical and practical, for the 

defense of the Nation and the design, generation, support, and application of land combat power. This land 

power is normally applied in Joint Operations through 

the full spectrum of conflict and the subsequent establishment of a better peace. Such knowledge is unique 

and is not generally held outside the Army profession. 

The Army’s expertise, then, is the ethical and effective 

design, generation, support, and application of land 

combat power by certified individuals and units in the 

support and defense of the American people. 

Esprit de Corps: To prevail in arduous and chaotic warfare, the Army Profession must have spirited, 

self-aware professionals who compose cohesive and 

effective units embedded in a culture that sustains 

traditions, respects customs, and creates a sense of 

belonging by inspiring martial excellence and the fortitude to never quit. Winning in combat is the only acceptable outcome; the Army cannot fail the American 

people. Thus the obligation to create and maintain a 
23

dominant, winning spirit within the Army Ethic rests 

with leaders at all levels.

Honorable Service: Without an effective and 

ethical Army Profession, the Nation is vulnerable to 

aggression. Thus the Army Profession exists not for 

itself, but for the noble and honorable purpose of preserving peace, supporting and defending the Constitution, and protecting the American people and way 

of life. The Army is called to perform that duty virtuously, with integrity and respect for human dignity 

as the American people expect, in accordance with 

the Army’s Values. Army Professionals are therefore 

fully committed to more than a job—they are called to 

the deep moral obligations of the Army’s Duty. Under that deep commitment they willingly maintain the 

Army as subordinate to civilian authorities and they 

subordinate their own interests to those of the mission, being ready, if need be, to sacrifice in the defense 

of the Republic. 

Stewardship of the Profession: All true professions must self-regulate—they create their own expertise and Ethic which they continually regenerate, 

reinforce, and enforce. The Army has existed for well 

over 2 centuries, but it has been a military profession 

for only half of that period. It will maintain its status 

as a profession with the American people if its leaders 

at all levels, both military and civilian, serve daily as 

stewards investing in the Army’s future—in its evolving expert knowledge, the development of Army professionals and units to use that expertise, and in selfpolicing the institution to maintain the Army Ethic. 

Because of this unique responsibility, Army leaders 

are the sine qua non of the Army as a military profession. 
24

THE WAY AHEAD

From Learning to Policymaking and 

Implementation.

As with any campaign of learning within large 

hierarchical organizations, public or private, the real 

challenge comes after the conceptualizations are done 

and they must be given life by the management processes and structures of the institution. Such is now the 

case in 2012 with this campaign. To recall, the intent of 

the campaign is ultimately to inform and mold Army 

culture into that of a profession, rather than a government occupation, by renewing critical understandings 

within the Army that have, to the extent that they existed previously, atrophied during a decade of war.

Over the course of 2011, the Army has assessed 

itself against these standards through the “lenses” of 

these renewed concepts of the Army as a profession 

in over 60 individual activities. These included: concepts development (e.g., White Paper and pamphlets); 

assessments (e.g., numerous studies by the cohorts 

represented within the CoP, two Army-wide surveys, 

multiple focus groups from among both the operating 

and generating forces, and multiple red team analyses); professional military ethics (PME) curriculum 

redesigns and the development of new training products (e.g., simulators and apps); professional publications (e.g., two special issues of Military Review, U.S. 

Army War College monographs, etc.); and extensive 

efforts at dialog within the Army (e.g., conference presentations, blogs, and forums). 

To date, assessments of the Campaign have led 

to seven Army Profession Strengthening Initiatives 

(APSIs), each drawn from findings within the Campaign assessments and including numerous initiatives 
25

to close the gaps between the Army’s current state as 

a profession and its desired end state. For example, 

sample findings for three of the ASPIs include:29

1. Building and Sustaining Trust Relationships—A 

variety of data indicates that Army leaders are competent professionals who trust each other at their own 

level and believe that their unit will accomplish its 

mission; however, there appears to be less trust in the 

leadership at the institutional Army level. 

2. Improving Standards and Discipline—Discipline 

and adherence to standards has declined and, if this 

continues, it can erode the core Army profession characteristics of trustworthiness and stewardship. As 

operational tempo slows, the Army has an opportunity to evaluate whether some standards have become 

obsolete, to reeducate the force on Army standards, 

to reinforce professional discipline, and to recommit 

to professional excellence that is the hallmark of the 

Army Profession.

3. Certifying Army Professionals—Professional certification criteria and standards of application are not 

perceived as meaningful, allowing some individuals 

to advance prematurely. . . . Currently, the Army lacks 

a common conceptual architecture for the progression 

of professionalism across the Total Force. No consistent set of criteria exists for certification at any level, 

whether for generalists or specialists. The exigencies 

of 10 years of combat have made maintaining quality 

standards difficult, resulting in accelerated promotions and postponed or wait-listed professional military schooling. Existing systems are also not framed 

as “certifications” and thus are not recognized for 

their importance to the long-term stewardship of the 

profession. The idea of what constitutes a professional 

suffers from this confusion and perceived dichotomies 

between what should be and what actually exists.
26

Late in 2011, these APSIs and their recommendations for implementation were further refined and 

validated at an Army profession junior leader forum, 

a part of the Unified Quest exercise series. This gave 

junior Army professionals an opportunity to be heard 

and to validate the campaign findings, as well as to 

provide recommended solutions and initiatives for 

the campaign to further engage the force. 

The many recommendations accompanying the 

seven ASPIs are, as of January 2012, being staffed 

within the Army for implementation in 2012 and beyond. However, some implementation has already occurred. For example, the Soldiers’ Creed has for years 

now clearly expressed to the Soldier that he or she is to 

be “an expert and a professional.” The creed implies 

that elsewhere within Army doctrine and developmental activities the identity, character, and competencies of an Army professional will be taught and the 

individual can avail him or herself of that developmental opportunity. But, rather than doctrine and developmental programs for professionals as such, the 

Army now has a quite comprehensive set for Army 

leaders, but not for professionals per se.

 Thus, the challenge facing the CoP was whether 

multiple lists of individual attributes (one for Army 

leaders, one for Army professionals, etc.) are useful 

within Army doctrine for the development of the 

same individual. After a very brief discussion, it was 

agreed that there should not be multiple lists identifying personal attributes for the development of Army 

Soldiers and civilians; multiple lists simply induce 

confusion, particularly at lower levels, as to what personal attributes the individual should seek, with the 

Army’s help, to develop. In other words, for an Army 

E-5 there should be one unambiguous set of personal 
27

attributes, and both the Soldier and the Army should 

be mutually committed to their development. 

Further, it was recognized that an Army Soldier or 

civilian cannot be a leader without also being a professional; and that by being a professional, if they are not 

a formal leader, then they are likely to still be an informal leader by the example they set and therefore the 

inspiration and influence they would have on other 

professionals. Current Army doctrine on leadership 

(Army Doctrinal Publication [ADP] 6-22, now in prepublication final draft) is applicable to all Army leaders and professionals, uniformed and civilian, further 

reinforcing the rationale for a single list.

It was thus determined that since most of the original draft attributes in the White Paper are covered in 

current Army leadership doctrine, the addition of a 

critical few unique to professionals would suffice for 

a combined, single list. This modified Leader Requirements Model (LRM), as shown in Figure 4, is meant 

to be inspirational and aspirational to the individual, 

while at the same time stating the Army’s expectations of its leaders and professionals. The single list 

is also to be inclusive of Army civilians, as is all of the 

doctrine in ADP 6-22. 
28

Figure 4. Leader Attributes and Competencies.

However, it is understood that members of the 

profession, both military and civilian, are not necessarily required to meet these attributes and competencies comprehensively, maximally, and outright. 

Attainment is to be commensurate with position and 

responsibility. But all members must demonstrate 

a personal desire to meet progressively the requirements of these attributes and competencies. As discussed earlier, professional certification is sequential, 

and there will be multiple subsequent certifications 

during the leader-professional’s career.
29

CONCLUSION 

As this descriptive monograph has shown, the 

Army is making good strides in its most recent effort 

to prepare for and transit a period of Defense reductions with professional capabilities intact and ready 

for the first battle of the next conflict. But, as discussed 

in the previous section, it must be understood that the 

really hard work is yet to be done.

The hard work is to conform the behavior of the 

institution each and every day to that of a profession 

when almost every tendency during the period of reductions will be to behave as a government bureaucracy; most likely centralizing authority, bureaucratizing processes, micro-managing while the force “does 

more with less,” and taking autonomy away from the 

very folks in whom the future of the institution lies—

its junior professionals, both uniformed and civilian. 

About this horrendous possibility, three observations are offered. First is the fact that the last time the 

Army behaved in a highly bureaucratic manner during a Defense reduction, just after the end of the Cold 

War, junior Army professionals “walked” (departed) 

in historic numbers to the immense, long-term detriment of the Army!30

Second, nothing in this analysis indicates that the 

campaign has yet seriously addressed the needed rearticulation of the Army Ethic and its moral narrative—the moral content of land combat power, why 

the Army fights and therefore how it fights, and why 

such a life is a worthy and desirable sacrifice of service 

to the Army’s Duty in the defense of the Republic—in 

ways that will provide the needed motivation and resilience for Army professionals during the transition 

period.
30

Finally, the responsibility to conform the Army 

behavior to that of a moral, military profession vice 

occupation or bureaucracy rests squarely with the senior leaders of the profession—the sergeants major, 

colonels, and general officers and their civilian equivalents. This is so simply because they, rather than 

mid-level uniformed officers and civilians, control the 

major management systems of the Army, particularly 

the human resource systems, which are so vital to the 

Army being a profession.31

Thus the Army is left where it always is, and 

should be, in such a critical situation—depending on 

its senior leaders to act in the best interest of the Nation and to maintain the Army uniquely as a military 

profession. 

ENDNOTES

1. The best historical analysis of the U.S. Army’s experiences 

going to war, and therefore learning just how well it had maintained its professional capabilities through the previous reductions, is Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, America’s First 

Battles, 1776-1965, Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 

1986. For an overview of the same period from the perspective of 

the ebbs and flows of the Army’s professional jurisdictions, see 

Leonard Wong and Douglas V. Johnson II, “Serving the American 

People: A Historical View of the Army Profession,” in Don M. 

Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, eds., The Future of the Army Profession, 2d Ed., McGraw-Hill, 2005, pp. 93-112. For insights into the 

effects of the Army’s more recent reductions, post-Cold War, see 

Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., Shaping America’s Military Capabilities 

After the Cold War, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. 

2. Gayle L. Watkins and Don M. Snider, “Project Conclusions,” Chap. 25, in Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, eds., 

The Future of the Army Profession, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002, 

pp. 537-538.
31

3. It should be recalled that in March 2003, after the successful 

conventional campaign to take down Saddam Hussein’s regime 

in Baghdad, Iraq, the Army had neither the expert knowledge nor 

the professional practices at the tactical level to effectively counter 

the insurgency that ensued, a signal failure by earlier Army leadership. As described by the Army’s new Chief of Staff, General 

Ray Ordierno, “When we first went there, we thought we would 

have a conventional fight, . . . We had a conventional fight, which 

turned quickly into an insurgency that was compounded by terrorism. . . . We were surprised by the changing tactics that we 

saw. We had no idea about the irregular aspect we were about 

to face. We didn’t recognize this was a possibility. And when we 

did recognize this, it took us too long to adjust.” Interview with 

Army Times, September 19, 2011, p. 18, available from ebird.osd.

mil/ebfiles/e20110912841529.html. 

4. An Army White Paper: The Profession of Arms, Ft. Monroe, 

VA: Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, December 

8, 2010, p. 1.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Unpublished brief to General Martin Dempsey by Dr. Leonard Wong, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, August 

18, 2011, copy in possession of the author.

8. These realities are discussed in detail in the various chapters of two book-length research projects undertaken at West 

Point during the past decade—The Future of the Army Profession, 

New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002; and its Second Ed., 2005.

9. For major recent works on professions, see Andrew Abbott, 

The Theory of Professions, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 

1998; and Eliot Freidson, Professionalism Reborn: Theory, Prophecy 

and Policy, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994. 

10. See T. O. Jacobs and Michael G. Sanders, “Principles for 

Building the Profession: The SOF Experience,” Chap. 20, in Don 

M. Snider an Lloyd J. Mathhews, eds., The Future of the Army Profession, 2d Ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005, pp. 441-462.
32

11. Matthew Moten, “A Profession of Arms: A Brief History 

of the United States Army,” unpublished paper prepared for the 

PoA Campaign by the Deputy Head, Department of History, U.S. 

Military Academy, West Point , NY, 2011.

12. The best introduction to the long and continuing debate 

over the appropriate balance between institutional and occupational behaviors in Western militaries is Charles C. Moskos and 

Frank R. Wood, eds., The Military: More Than Just a Job, Washington, DC: Pergaman-Brassey’s Defense Publishers, 1988.

13. For an excellent discussion of the negative impact of this 

issue on the Army Officer Corps, see Mark Lewis, “Army Transformation and the Junior Officer Exodus,”Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 31, No. 1, Fall 2004, pp. 63-74.

14. Seeking Balance: US Army Culture and Professionalism in the 

21st Century, 2009, Ft. Monroe, VA, Army Capabilities Integration 

Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2009.

15. David Segal and Karen DeAngelis, “Changing Conceptions of the Military Professions,” Chap. 10, in Suzanne C. Nielsen 

and Don M. Snider, eds., American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, pp. 194-212.

16. For an explanation of the three main trust relationships of 

the Army as a profession of arms, see Don M. Snider, Dissent and 

the Strategic Leadership of Military Professions, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008.

17. Army White Paper, pp. 2-3.

18. James H.Toner, True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden Of 

Military Ethics, Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 

1995, pp. 22-23.

19. Sean Hannah, “Leadership in the Profession of Arms,” 

The Oxford Handbook of Leadership, Oxford, UK: Oxford University 

Press, forthcoming.
33

20. Memorandum for Commanding General Training and 

Doctrine Command, “Decisions for the Way Ahead, Profession 

of Arms Campaign,” July 29, 2011, copy in possession of author. 

21. Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower and Reserve 

Affairs, White Paper—The Army Civilian Corps, a Vital Component of 

the Army Profession, prepublication draft, December 28, 2011, copy 

in possession of author.

22. See Department of the Army Pamphlet (PAM) 360-302, The 

Profession of Arms, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, November 17, 1966.

23. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory 

and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 

University Press, 1957; Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, A 

Social and Political Portrait, New York: Free Press, 1960.

24. The role of retired Army professionals in American civilmilitary relations is a complex one. See Suzanne C. Nielsen and 

Don M. Snider, eds., American Civil-Military Relations, Baltimore, 

MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, particularly Chapters 

3 and 13.

25. Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, Profession of Arms Interim Report, June 18, 2011, version 17, copy in possession of author.

26. Memorandum for Commanding General Training and 

Doctrine Command.

27. Army White Paper, pp. 5-6.

28. Memorandum for Commanding General Training and 

Doctrine Command.

29. Once approved by the Army leadership in early 2012, all 

documentation of the Campaign assessments and recommendations for implementation will be published in the CY2011 Annual 

Report (anticipated by mid-2012), available at the CAPE website, 

cape.army.mil. 
34

30. Lewis.

31. See Leonard Wong and Don M. Snider, “Strategic Leadership of the Army Profession, “Chap. 28, in Don M. Snider and 

Lloyd J. Matthews, eds., The Future of the Army Profession, 2d Ed., 

pp. 601-624.
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