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VENEZUELA’S SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITY

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

HOMELAND DEFENSE AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND

SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 24, 2011

Serial No. 112–71

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

Serial No. 112–79

Committee on Foreign Affairs

Printed for the use of the Committees on Oversight and Government Reform

and Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov

http://www.house.gov/reform

http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov
(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah

CONNIE MACK, Florida

TIM WALBERG, Michigan

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona

RAU ́ L R. LABRADOR, Idaho

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee

JOE WALSH, Illinois

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina

DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking

Minority Member

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

PETER WELCH, Vermont

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

JACKIE SPEIER, California

LAWRENCE J. BRADY, Staff Director

JOHN D. CUADERES, Deputy Staff Director

ROBERT BORDEN, General Counsel

LINDA A. GOOD, Chief Clerk

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, HOMELAND DEFENSE AND FOREIGN

OPERATIONS

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman

RAU ́ L R. LABRADOR, Idaho, Vice Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Ranking

Minority Member

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

PETER WELCH, Vermont

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
(III)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

RON PAUL, Texas

MIKE PENCE, Indiana

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

CONNIE MACK, Florida

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas

TED POE, Texas

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio

DAVID RIVERA, Florida

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina

VACANT

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida

DENNIS CARDOZA, California

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida

KAREN BASS, California

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

CONNIE MACK, Florida, Chairman

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio

DAVID RIVERA, Florida

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
Page

IV

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman

MIKE PENCE, Indiana

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

CONNIE MACK, Florida

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida

DENNIS CARDOZA, California

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
(V)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on June 24, 2011 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Benjamin, Daniel, Ambassador-at-Large, Coordinator for

Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State; Kevin Whitaker, Acting

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Thomas Delare, Director for Terrorism Finance and

Economic Sanctions Policy, U.S. Department of State; and Adam J.

Szubin, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department

of the Treasury .............................................................................................. 13

Benjamin, Daniel ....................................................................................... 13

Delare, Thomas .......................................................................................... 22

Szubin, Adam J. ........................................................................................ 24

Whitaker, Kevin ........................................................................................ 24

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Benjamin, Daniel, Ambassador-at-Large, Coordinator for

Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, prepared statement of ...... 16

Mack, Hon. Connie, a Representative in Congress from the State of

Florida, prepared statement of .................................................................... 6

Szubin, Adam J., Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury, prepared statement of ............................................. 27

(1)

VENEZUELA’S SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITY

FRIDAY, JUNE 24, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, HOMELAND DEFENSE AND FOREIGN

OPERATIONS, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, JOINT WITH THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE

WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA, COMMITTEE ON

FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:02 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz (chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense,

and Foreign Operations) presiding.

Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Labrador, Platts, Tierney,

Welch, Quigley, and Cummings.

Present from Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western

Hemisphere: Representatives Mack, Schmidt, Rivera, Marino,

Sires, and Faleomavaega.

Present from Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East

and South Asia: Representatives Chabot, Mack, Marino, Ackerman,

Connolly, and Deutch.

Staff present: Thomas A. Alexander, senior counsel; Molly Boyl,

parliamentarian; Kate Dunbar, staff assistant; Adam P. Fromm, director of Member services and committee operations; Linda Good,

chief clerk; Mitchell S. Kominsky, counsel; Cecelia Thomas, minority counsel/deputy clerk; and Carlos Uriarte, minority counsel.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Good morning. The committee will come to order.

Welcome to today’s hearing: Venezuela’s Sanctionable Activity.

This is a joint hearing between the Oversight Committee’s National

Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations Subcommittee, the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, and the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East

and South Asia.

We are joined today by the chairmen of those subcommittees,

Chairman Connie Mack of Florida and Chairman Steve Chabot of

Ohio.

I would also like to welcome Ranking Member Tierney of Massachusetts, Ranking Member Ackerman of New York. Mr. Sires of

New Jersey will be sitting in for the Ranking Member Engel today.

Thank you all for being here.

Today we are examining the administration’s policies to conduct

national security threats abroad through the use of sanctions. For

the past decade, the United States has focused much of its atten-
2

tion on the Middle East. Since the 9/11 attacks, Americans have invested over a trillion dollars fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since 2001, 6,072 Americans have died in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn. Another 44,266 have

been injured. In Afghanistan alone these numbers have risen dramatically since our current President took office in 2009.

Wednesday evening, President Obama announced the intent to

withdraw 33,000 troops from Afghanistan by the fall of 2012. This

will leave approximately 67,000 troops behind, which is twice as

many when President Obama entered office.

While I support a withdrawal, it must be rooted in prudence, not

politics; because it is the right thing to do based on the facts, and

not because it is convenient.

While we combat terrorism in the Middle East, we must not neglect threats that we face in our own hemisphere. In recent years,

Venezuela has grown significantly closer to regimes that are openly

hostile to the United States and its interests. Venezuela has been

a willing partner to countries such as Iran, Syria, North Korea,

and Cuba.

With the exception of North Korea, each of these countries has

been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism by the U.S. Government. Senior officials within the Venezuelan government have also

provided material support to Hezbollah, a terrorist organization.

They have also maintained ties with the Revolutionary Armed

Forces of Colombia, FARC; ELN; and ETA.

President Hugo Chavez has accused the United States of being

‘‘the first state sponsor of terrorism.’’ President Chavez has also

called sanctions against Iran illegitimate and that the Venezuelan

government will ‘‘back Iran under any circumstances and without

conditions.’’

There is little question that Venezuela’s behavior is sanctionable.

The question before us today is how the U.S. Government should

respond to these activities in the future. What options are available? Should we continue to impose anemic sanctions that are

merely cosmetic or should we impose sanctions that truly impact

Venezuela’s ability to threaten the United States of America?

Before we begin that analysis, I want to express my deep frustration with the administration. Time and again this administration

has frustrated the work of this subcommittee by refusing to provide

witnesses it has requested. Instead, it insults this body by sending

only witnesses it believes are ‘‘appropriate.’’ It does so without any

regard to the judgment and prerogative, of elected representatives.

This Congress, and especially the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, has a constitutional obligation to oversee the

management, efficiency, and operations of the executive branch.

This duty is without question and without exception. At the same

time, this administration has a responsibility to provide information the American people seek through their representatives. This

critical check and balance is designed to ensure that the Federal

Government does not overstep its boundaries and adheres to the

will of the people.

When the executive branch does not respond appropriately to

congressional inquiries, it breaches the duty of the American people. This is the third time that Congress has attempted to hold this
3

hearing. On the first two occasions, the administration either refused to provide any witnesses or claimed it had too little time to

prepare. It is unacceptable that the administration requires more

than 2 weeks to formulate a thought about a matter it studies and

briefs to executive branch leaders and policymakers on a regular

basis.

It is equally unacceptable that the administration did not submit

written testimony for today’s hearing until late yesterday. The administration had over 3 weeks to prepare testimony for this hearing and have known about this topic for nearly 3 months. It is unacceptable that the administration was unable to adhere to our

simple 48-hour deadline by submitting testimony at the last possible minute. Perhaps this committee should investigate the management and efficiency of the executive branch in this regard.

I look forward to hearing from our panel of witnesses about the

success and challenges they face. This subcommittee is ready to

work with the Departments in any way possible. We do appreciate

your being here today, but understand the frustration of this committee in not being able to do its work because you are unable to

do your work in giving us the documents that we deserve and need

to have so we can do our job.

I would now like to recognize the distinguished ranking member

for the National Security Subcommittee, the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank the

witnesses for being here today as well.

We all are familiar with the 2010 comprehensive Iran sanctions,

the Accountability and Disinvestment Act of 2010, and we also understand the Secretary has made a finding that gasoline sales have

been made in contravention of that law. So the question really does

come down, as the chairman said, to what are we going to do and

what should we do.

I think that we have to have a real clear understanding of the

current sanctions regime, which I hope you gentlemen will be able

to share with us today; a full appreciation of how much we have

discussed these diplomatic priorities for that region; what are our

goals; how is it exactly that we think we are going to be able to

accomplish them; and what will the current sanctions do to drive

us toward those goals and what would any additional sanctions do

toward moving in that direction and how should they be structured. And we have to understand the impact of any ramping up

of sanctions before we start moving in that direction.

So I think it is a good time for that conversation. I think that,

hopefully, between the four of you, you will be able to give us all

that information in a form that can benefit us as we move forward.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I just ask unanimous consent that my

formal remarks be placed in the record.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Without objection, so ordered.

I now recognize the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, the gentleman from Florida,

Mr. Mack, for his opening statement.

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to associate myself

with your opening statement and also the statement of the ranking

member.
4

Before I begin my formal opening statement, I just want to say

that the frustration runs deep, and I know you guys know this. We

first asked for you to come in front of the Subcommittee on the

Western Hemisphere and you refused. You put up roadblock after

roadblock and just flat out refusal, and I hope this serves as a

warning that next time we ask you to come in front of the subcommittee, you will come, because either you will come there, you

are going to come here, and if we have to use our subpoena power,

we will do it. So let’s not go through this circus another time, okay?

Today, in light of the U.S. State Department’s recent actions in

sanctioning PDVSA, the purpose of this hearing is to review and

better understand the role of the State Department and Treasury

Department in utilizing sanctions as an instrument of U.S. foreign

policy. Specifically, I would like to concentrate on the sanctions

available under U.S. law and discuss their potential application in

cases where Venezuelan individuals, businesses, and the government are able to be sanctioned.

Venezuela has become the Wild West under thugocrat Hugo Chavez. This is true for the following reasons: first, there is rampant

drug trafficking and corruption; second, terrorist organizations like

Hezbollah and the FARC are officially linked to government officials; and, third, Venezuela is supporting Iran and Iran’s desire for

a nuclear weapon.

Under Hugo Chavez, Venezuela has become a hub in our region

for money laundering and transshipment of illicit goods. In recent

years, the relationship between drug trafficking and terrorist organizations has become closely intertwined.

If you will notice up on the screen we have the definition from

the State Department of what a state sponsor of terrorism is, and

I will let you read that on your own.

It is widely acknowledged that terrorist groups have turned to

drug trafficking as a source of revenue.

And if we can put up the other slide. This slide represents, in

2003, the drug trafficking flight patterns in Latin America.

Then if you will go to the next slide. This is what it looks like

in 2007. Unfortunately, we can’t show the slides from today because those are still protected and classified. But the difference between 2003 and this map is in 2005 Hugo Chavez kicked out our

DEA.

As Chavez has provided Venezuela as a safe haven for these

narcoterrorists, the FARC, a drug trafficking and terrorist organization who largely operates in remote sections of Colombia, have

long received assistance, relief, and material support from Venezuelan authorities. And I think this is pretty well documented.

When Colombia took out Reyes and they took the computers,

Interpol was able to review those hard drives and found significant

cooperation with officials from Venezuela, the Venezuelan government and the FARC. So clearly, if we go back to the definition of

state sponsor of terrorism, you can check that box off, that there

is a close tie and relationship between terrorist organizations and

the government in Venezuela.

I also want to talk a little bit more about the drug trafficking.

Recently, the arrest of a drug kingpin by the United States,

Makled, was arrested. Makled was then extradited to Colombia.
5

Makled has said over and over again, and also talked about payments to government officials in Venezuela. So the drug trafficking

organizations know that they have a friend in Hugo Chavez.

We also, as I talked about, know that there is a relationship between the FARC and Hezbollah, and the Treasury has sanctioned

members of the Venezuelan government for their relationship in

Venezuela.

Last, I want to talk about Venezuela and Iran. After many discussions and not until a hearing when I was able to supply the

State Department with specific evidence of the shipment and sale

of gasoline, we finally sanctioned Venezuela. Unfortunately, those

sanctions have no teeth. The things that you sanctioned we currently aren’t engaged in with Venezuela in the first place. So on

one hand I am thankful that we actually did put sanctions on Venezuela, it is a good start, but this is a guy who supports terrorist

organizations, drug kingpins, narcotrafficking, and Iran.

Hugo Chavez should be, and deserves, labeled a state sponsor of

terror, and our Government, the gentlemen in front of us, need to

explain to us why he is not on the state sponsor of terrorism.

With that, I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Connie Mack follows:]
6
7
8

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from New Jersey,

Mr. Sires.

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Chairman Chaffetz, for holding this hearing, and thank you to our witnesses for being here today.

Since leaping to power in 1998, Chavez has cast his revolution

as that of the poor majority against the wealthy oligarch. He continues to impose an authoritarian populist political model in Venezuela, undermining democratic institutions and stifling the freedoms of the Venezuelan people. However, the president’s once stellar approval ratings have stumbled, and in the most recent legislative election his body’s majority shrank below a key threshold, setting the stage for heightened tension with a freshly emboldened opposition. The results of this election show the Venezuelan people

desperately want change and that Chavez is losing his grip.

As anti-Chavez sentiment continues to grow in Venezuela, Chavez has further intensified restriction on freedom of speech and

press. The government has systematically undermined journalists’

freedom of expression, workers’ freedom of association, and the

ability of human rights groups to promote human rights, completely disenchanting all civic engagement within the country.

Officials harassment and intimidation of the political opposition

has grown, including the persecution of elected state and local government officials and media outlets, such as Global Vision and

RCTV International, that have been critical of the government.

Internationally, Chavez continues to cultivate relationships with

countries that are state sponsors of terrorism like Cuba, Iran, and

Syria. I cannot emphasize enough how troubling the relationship

between Venezuela and Iran is.

With weekly flights that connect Iran and Syria with Caracas,

collaboration between these two countries has hit a new height. I

have often discussed before the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee

my concerns about these flights, and I hope that representatives

from the State Department can elaborate on this topic, as well as

acknowledge the threat this poses both to the United States and

the free nations.

I commend the State Department for its most recent sanctions on

two companies in Venezuela who have been connected to Iran’s proliferation activities. Thus far, our strategy has been thoughtful and

pragmatically. Hastily attacking Chavez could prove to have a detrimental effect on progress that has been already made and further

embolden his populist agenda. We must continue to make smart

decisions in regards to U.S. policy toward Venezuela to further disable Chavez’s control and to encourage citizens to support democratic institutions and principles.

Recently, Chavez’s influence seems to have peaked. But we must

remain vigilant, for he is likely to support like-minded political allies and movements in neighboring countries that seek to undermine moderate governments. He continues to oppose nearly every

U.S. policy initiative in the region, including the expansion of free

trade, counterdrugs, and counterterrorism cooperation in the regional security initiatives.

Venezuela continues to extend a lifeline to Colombian

narcotrafficking organizations by providing significant support and
9

safe haven along the border, and it remains one of the most preferred trafficking routes for the transit of cocaine out of South

America. U.S. sanctions have successfully targeted and applied financial measures against narcotic traffickers and their organizations in Venezuela, helping to ensure regional security. Venezuela

has proven that it cannot be trusted and the United States should

take the necessary measures to stifle its powers and ensure regional security, but we must do so in a tactful manner, as not to

further empower Chavez. The national security threats posed by

Venezuela are complex. We must implement the appropriate measures to protect the people of Venezuela and promote U.S. interests.

I would like to, again, thank our witnesses and look forward to

their testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

We will now recognize the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, the gentleman from

Ohio, Mr. Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank my two

fellow chairmen for putting together this important hearing. I

know Chairman Mack and the Western Hemisphere staff have

been trying to hold this hearing for some time and have met with

considerable resistance from the administration, and I commend

my colleague for his persistence.

As chairman of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee,

I and the other folks on the committee frequently confront the

threats posed by Iran and global terrorist networks more globally,

especially, of course, in the Middle East. The possibility, however,

of an Iranian-Venezuelan alliance is particularly concerning.

When not oppressing its own people, the tyrannical regime in

Tehran devotes a great deal of its energy to threatening American

national security, as well as the security of our allies in the region.

The threat posed by Iran takes on a new and more ominous

geostrategic significance when coupled with the potential of an Iran

base of operations in our own hemisphere. This prospect harkens

back to the days of the cold war, when all of a sudden we were no

longer separated from our enemies by oceans, but faced threats in

our own backyards.

Although the nature of the threat may have changed, such a situation is just as unacceptable today as it was decades ago. I hope

that the witnesses today can shed light on the nature of this

threat. More importantly, however, I hope they can outline a clear

and cogent policy to address it.

One of the most fundamental roles of government is to provide

for the security of its citizens. We are having enough trouble combating Iranian meddling and dismantling terrorist safe havens on

the other side of the globe. The last thing we need is for threats

from bad actors even closer to the American homeland.

Again, I want to thank my fellow chairmen and also the ranking

members for holding this hearing today, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

We will now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.

Connolly.
10

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the panelists for being here today. I listened with great interest to my

friend from Florida berate you for not being here previously. I

serve on both the Oversight Government Reform Committee and

the Foreign Affairs Committee, and I must say I have not particularly been struck with the reluctance of the administration to acquiesce to hearing appearance requests, but perhaps in the subcommittee there was a problem I don’t know. In any event, we are

glad you are here.

Each sovereign nation has the right to develop alliances beneficial to its national interests, but not at the expense of its neighbors. That is the point we have reached with Venezuela’s relationship with Iran. As a result, the Obama administration, for example, recently sanctioned Venezuela’s state-owned oil company,

PDVSA, for its business with Iran, several illegal activities in Latin

America connected to the government of Iran. Example, Iranbacked Hezbollah has actually undertaken illicit activities in the

tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.

The terrorist group has profited from film piracy and drug trafficking in that area. The group is also suspected in two bombings

in Buenos Aires that killed a total of 115 people, the 1992 bombing

of the Israeli embassy, and the 1994 bombing of the ArgentineIsraeli Mutual Association. Eight of the nine original arrest warrants issued for that bombing were for Iranian government officials.

Though Iran and Venezuela have been linked since the founding

of OPEC in 1960, the two countries recently strengthened that relationship. It is especially troubling because of potentially harmful

activity undertaken under the guise of diplomatic relationships.

One example is the absence of customs enforcement, for example.

On weekly flights from Caracas to Tehran via the Venezuelan airline Conviasa, it is unclear who or what is being transported, but

reports indicated that the flights do carry weapons for terrorists.

These developments are troubling enough. They are further complicated by Iran’s audacity in the nuclear area, specifically its missile tests and air swell secret enrichment facilities in Kohm. The

nuclear issue is pressing and does not exist in a vacuum. In 2009,

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez expressed his support for

Iran’s nuclear energy development and there have been mixed reports signaling a possible Iranian assistance to Venezuela in its

search for uranium deposits.

The Iran-Venezuela relationship is even more troubling because

Venezuela serves as a diplomatic conduit for Iran, playing an important part in cultivating a relationship between Iran and the

Latin American countries of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. Venezuela’s involvement with Iran is a cause for concern and illegal activities in both hemispheres that have been directly linked to the

Iranian government, and I welcome today’s hearing to explore that

further and to look at U.S. diplomatic options with regard to this

troubling and growing relationship.

With that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

We will now recognize the gentlewoman from Ohio, Mrs.

Schmidt.
11

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very

important hearing. I don’t think it should be any surprise to anyone that there is a special link between Venezuela and Iran, and

perhaps it should be no surprise that Hugo Chavez is aggressively

working to strengthen his countries ties with Iran.

If you look at just what has occurred in the last 7 years, I think

the facts speak for themselves. In 2006, Venezuela integrated itself

with Iran by aligning with Cuba and Syria as the only countries

to vote against the U.N. Atomic Energy Agency resolution reporting Iran to the Security Council for its failures to comply with U.N.

sanctions to terminate its nuclear program.

In April 2008, Iran and Venezuela signed a pact of mutual military support. In April 2009, the two countries inked an agreement

that would create a development bank whereby each country would

invest $100 million for bilateral economic development projects. In

October 2010, the two countries signed 11 mutual cooperation

agreements on such issues as trade, energy, shipping, finance, and

public housing.

According to an article published in the German newspaper Die

Welt, in November 2010 one of the agreements signed between

Iran and Venezuela in October 2010 would establish a military

base on Venezuelan soil to be jointly operated by both countries on

which medium-ranged missiles would be placed. On May 13, 2011,

Die Welt further reported that Chavez met with the commander of

the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s Air Force in February 2011 to

discuss the final details of the construction of the missile base,

which now is being built only 75 miles from the Venezuelan-Colombian border.

It is also believed that Iran is pursuing the exploration of uranium in Venezuela, an obvious ingredient necessary for Iran’s continued development of nuclear weapons.

Last year, RIA Novosti, the Russian international news agency,

reported that Russia, which signed a deal with Iran in 2007 to sell

its five battalions of sophisticated air defense systems, would abrogate the agreement due to the new U.N. sanctions that now had

been imposed against Iran. It is believed that Russia may now sell

the air defense systems to Venezuela—how convenient—who in

turn could sell them to Iran.

Just recently, on May 24, 2011, the United States imposed sanctions on Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, the PDVSA, for assisting Iran in its production of gasoline and petroleum production.

Specifically, the PDVSA was sanctioned for selling $50 million

worth of petroleum products to Iran between December 2010 and

March 2011, in violation of the 1996 Sanctions Act. According to

the State Department’s Web site, the sanctions we have imposed

on PDVSA prohibit the company from competing for U.S. Government procurement contracts, from securing finance from ExportImport Bank of the United States, and from obtaining U.S. import

licenses.

Mr. Chairman, I applaud the Department of State for its decision

to impose these sanctions. Unfortunately, it is not enough. We need

to do more. Every Venezuelan company doing business with Iran

should be investigated and a determination should be made as to

whether it is in violation of the 1996 Sanctions Act. In those in-
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stances where Venezuelan companies are in violation of the act,

sanctions should be imposed immediately.

We need to show Chavez that we are serious and that there will

be penalties to pay for assisting and accommodating the terrorist

Iranian regime of Mohammed Ahmadinejad.

Thank you and I yield back my time.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

We will now recognize the gentleman from American Samoa, Mr.

Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do want to

commend both you gentlemen for calling this joint committee hearing this morning.

I have listened with interest in terms of this issue of providing

sanctions to those countries that violate our laws, as well as international laws. I think we have gotten to the point that we have become sanctionitis. Just about everything we do we put sanctions,

we put sanctions, and I have my own serious questions about the

consistency of how we apply our foreign policies when we apply

sanctions against countries.

I am not suggesting that we don’t put sanctions on Venezuela,

but there seems to be a whole bunch of contradictions here. We put

sanctions and yet I believe Venezuela is one of our biggest suppliers of oil coming to our country, and I am very curious from our

witnesses if you can give us more information on the subsidiary of

Citgo, I believe, that currently is one of the biggest distributors of

oil in our country. It seems to me that every time we put sanctions,

but as long as there are holes in between, allowing these countries

to obtain whatever their needs are, the sanctions become somewhat

useless.

But I am very, very curious and want to hear from our witnesses

this morning in terms of how our whole fabric of applying sanctions

have really been effective or have they just been another sanction

and another thing.

A classic contradiction, as you know, Mr. Chairman, as I indicated, when sometime goes wrong, we put sanctions against Thailand, against Fiji, all these, and yet, at the same time, we waive

sanctions when Musharraf, by a military coup, took over Pakistan

for some 10 years, despite the promises that he made that we were

supposed to have a democracy in that country, and that never happened.

But I am looking forward to hearing from our witnesses in terms

of where exactly Venezuela comes in as far as the whole host of

sanctions that we put against this country.

I will say, interestingly enough, the close ties of Venezuela and

Iran has because of the nuclear issue, I believe that what happened

in Japan recently has caused Mr. Chavez to have second thoughts

about establishing a nuclear relationship with Iran. But I do look

forward to hearing from our witnesses.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

Do any other Members wish to make an opening statement?

[No response.]

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Members may have 7 days to submit opening

statements for the record.
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We will now recognize our panel. The Honorable Daniel Benjamin is the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department; Mr. Thomas Delare is the Director for Terrorism Finance

and Economic Sanctions Policy at the State Department; Mr. Kevin

Whitaker is the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western

Hemisphere Affairs at the State Department; and Mr. Adam

Szubin is the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control at the

Treasury Department.

Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. Please rise and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Let the record reflect that all witnesses answered

in the affirmative. Thank you. You may be seated.

In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your testimony

to 5 minutes. Your entire written statement will be made as part

of the record.

We will now go ahead and recognize Mr. Benjamin.

STATEMENTS OF DANIEL BENJAMIN, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE,

COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; KEVIN WHITAKER, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; THOMAS DELARE, DIRECTOR

FOR TERRORISM FINANCE AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND ADAM J. SZUBIN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

STATEMENT OF DANIEL BENJAMIN

Mr. BENJAMIN. Thank you very much, sir. Distinguished members of the committees, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Venezuela’s sanctionable activities. I am

pleased to be here today with my Treasury colleague, Adam

Szubin, and State Department colleagues Tom Delare and Kevin

Whitaker.

Mr. Chairman, let me be clear from the outset. With respect to

global efforts to counterterrorism, developments in Venezuela over

the last decade have been deeply troubling. Instead of meeting his

international obligations since coming to power in 1999, Hugo Chavez has chosen to develop close relations with Iran and Syria, both

state sponsors of terrorism. Senior members of his government are

directly implicated in providing support to U.S. designated foreign

terrorist organizations, particularly the FARC and the ELN.

The administration has significant concerns about connections

between members of the Venezuelan government and ETA as well.

All of these issues have been reported on in the press, and as we

have reported in the past, Hezbollah has a presence in Venezuela,

and the Department of Treasury has done much to reveal these

connections.

I do, however, want to emphasize that the information available

to us indicates that Hezbollah activity in Venezuela is limited to

fundraising. We remain alert to indications of other activities, particularly operational activity, but to date there is no information to

support any such connection.
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Venezuela must fulfill its obligations under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540, which forms part of the legal basis

of international counterterrorism efforts. These resolutions, adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, require all states, including Venezuela, to take a series of measures to combat terrorism and prevent weapons of mass destruction and their means

of delivery from getting into the hands of terrorists. It is our view

that Venezuela has not done enough in this regard.

The Obama administration is pursuing a policy to press Venezuela to change its behavior. Our approach is about effectiveness.

We are ratcheting up the pressure in a way that our analysis suggests will be most effective. We are increasing the cost on the Chavez government for its actions, including by publicly exposing our

conclusions about that government’s activities. We are carefully

avoiding falling into the trap of providing Chavez with an opening

to increase his demagoguery and exploit nationalist sentiment by

falsely attempting to turn this into a bilateral issue with the

United States rather than what it is, Venezuela’s failure to live up

to its international obligations with respect to counterterrorism. We

believe this approach, combined with regional efforts to moderate

Venezuela’s behavior, is slowly but surely bringing positive change.

Imaginative and effective Colombian diplomacy has taken advantage of this environment. Since President Santos took office a year

ago, we have seen a marginal but significant improvement by Venezuela. Venezuela has arrested and deported to Colombia seven

senior members of the FARC and ELN, including members of the

FARC headquarters section and the FARC’s key European fundraiser. Most recently, Venezuela arrested a member of the FARC,

General of Command Jose Conrado, based on a Colombian arrest

warrant.

The Venezuelan and Colombian ministers of defense have developed a channeled communication to discuss border security. Chavez

has also publicly moved away from the FARC by calling for that

organization to join a political reconciliation process and by disavowing as unauthorized any discussions between Venezuelan government officials and the FARC about establishing bases in Venezuela.

Our actions have been targeted, well justified, and well understood in Venezuela. For the last 5 years, pursuant to Section 40(a)

of the Arms Export and Control Act, Venezuela has been listed as

a not fully cooperating with the United States’ antiterrorist and efforts country. Because of its inadequate response to our

counterterrorism efforts, the effect of this listing is a prohibition

against the sale or licensing for exports to Venezuela, defense articles, or services. This sanction is a useful tool in itself and for signaling that we are not satisfied with Venezuela’s counterterrorism

cooperation, and it is used when a state may not meet the high

threshold for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.

We have also employed an array of targeted sanctions against

elements of Chavez’s government. My colleagues from the Department of the Treasury and our Economic and Energy Affairs Bureau

will explain the work we have done to target elements of the Venezuelan government via the Drug Kingpin Act, via Executive Order
15

13224, and the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and

Divestment Act of 2010.

Much more work remains to be done and we will continue to

closely monitor Venezuela’s actions. We you know, secretaries of

state have used the state sponsor of terrorism action sparingly

since its creation in 1979. In fact, it has been more than 18 years

since this power has been invoked. But this does not mean that we

are unwilling to use this authority. All options are on the table, including designating Venezuela as a state sponsor if the circumstances warrant.

We look forward to working with Congress and with our partners

in the region to further encourage Venezuela to behave as a responsible international actor. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Benjamin follows:]
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Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. It is my understanding that given

that there are three witnesses from the State Department, that

there was going to be just one single statement, or are we doing

individual statements as well? Did I have that right, there is just

the one statement?

Mr. BENJAMIN. No, my colleagues also have brief statements.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Oh, yes.

Mr. Delare.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS DELARE

Mr. DELARE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today with my colleagues.

In the Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs at the

State Department, we have responsibility for the implementation of

sanctions targeting Iran’s energy sector. Naturally, we also have

very serious concerns about Venezuela’s relationship with Iran in

this area.

Venezuela is Iran’s closest political ally in the western hemisphere, as we have heard this morning. President Chavez continues

to define Iran as a strategic ally. The highly publicized bond between Mr. Ahmadinejad and Chavez has led to declarations about

broad economic, military, and political cooperation, although the

extent of actual cooperation is not clear.

Under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act

[CISADA], the State Department is the agency primarily responsible for implementing the provisions which relate to the energy,

shipping, transportation sectors, and sensitive telecommunications

technology non-proliferation and human rights issues. The Department of Treasury has primary responsibility for implementing the

financial sanctions contained in CISADA. I know my colleague,

Adam Szubin, will discuss Treasury’s role in detail. Let me just

add that not only at State do we work extensively and collaboratively with Treasury; we do the same with many other agencies

in the Government.

On May 24th the Secretary of State imposed sanctions on

Petroleos di Venezuela [PDVSA], along with six other companies

for their activities in support of Iran’s energy sector. We sanctioned

PDVSA because on at least two occasions the company provided

cargoes of reformate, an additive used in gasoline, to the National

Iranian Oil Co. These shipments were valued at over $50 million,

well above sanctionable thresholds established in ISA.

Under the Iran Sanctions Act [ISA], the Secretary has the authority to calibrate sanctions on a case-by-case basis, something

that many of you have alluded to this morning. Sanctions can

range from prohibitions on certain types of U.S. Government assistance to a complete blocking of all property transactions subject to

U.S. jurisdiction.

In the case of PDVSA, the Secretary chose three sanctions that

limit PDVSA’s activities in the United States, but do not impact

their subsidiaries or the export of crude oil from Venezuela. It is

important to note that this calibrated approach was chosen because

it is our goal to persuade PDVSA to make the right choice and stop

shipments of refined petroleum to Iran. If PDVSA does not stop,

and we have seen no evidence of any further actions since the im-
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position of these sanctions, we have made it very clear in our conversations with them that we reserve the right to impose additional

and more severe sanctions.

In the case of PDVSA, we do not know what the ultimate result

of these important actions will be. We are confident, however, that

we have their attention based on comments from PDVSA and Venezuelan government officials.

The Department of State has a very good record of convincing

companies to stop supporting Iran’s energy sector. Last fall we secured the formal withdrawal from Iran of five large multinational

energy companies: Royal Dutch Shell, ME, Impacts, Statoil, and

Total. They have all removed themselves from projects in Iran.

These firms have since been joined by scores of other companies,

both in the energy sector and in other sectors, who have simply

recognized that the risks of doing business with Iran are just too

high.

We will continue our dialog with Venezuela about this subject

and we will continue a very vigorous outreach process that we have

engaged in to talk to the business community worldwide about the

risks of doing business with Iran.

I should note that also on May 23rd the State Department imposed sanctions pursuant to the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act [INKSNA]. This was against the Venezuelan Military Industries Co. [CAVIM]. INKSNA provides for penalties on entities that engage in the transfer to or acquisition from Iran, Syria,

or North Korea of equipment or technology controlled by one of the

four multilateral regimes, that is, the Australia Group, the Missile

Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the

Vasinar Convention. These agreements regulate the export of advanced conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and

cruise and ballistic missile technologies.

Let me conclude by stressing that we pay constant attention to

the activities of Venezuela with regard to Iran. We work with all

the relevant agencies of the U.S. Government to utilize the tools

that the Congress has given us, and I can assure you we will react

to concrete examples of sanctionable behavior as we see them.

So at the conclusion of statements I would be happy to address

any questions you might have. Thank you very much.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

I want to go back to this point, though, for a moment here. The

three representatives from the State Department issued one statement. Congress asked that you submit these statements 48 hours

in advance. You couldn’t do that. And now you each have three

statements. We are going to hear from you. We want to hear from

you; that is why you are here. Why couldn’t you submit your statements in accordance with our rules? What was the hindrance?

Mr. BENJAMIN. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for the lateness of the

submission. As you can see from those who are present here, this

is an issue that takes very intricate and complex coordination both

within the Department and across agencies. There was a great deal

of work that needed to be done in preparation for this hearing; we

wanted to have the best information available. We will certainly do

our best to make sure that we meet your deadlines in the future.
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Mr. CHAFFETZ. I would appreciate that. It is unacceptable to do

this. You obviously prepared some opening remarks, yet you failed

to submit them to this body, and we find that unacceptable.

Mr. Whitaker, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF KEVIN WHITAKER

Mr. WHITAKER. Thank you. Chairman, ranking members, distinguished Members, thank you for the opportunity to appear here

today. Let me make just two points.

First, the Department shares your concerns about Venezuela’s

relationship with Iran, its support for the FARC, its failure to cooperate on counterterrorism, and its demonstrable failure to meet

its international counternarcotics obligations. We have taken a series of steps over time, using tools provided by Congress, to address

these failures. We are constantly reviewing all the information pertaining to these matters to determine if the substantial targeted

and interactive steps we have taken are appropriate and sufficient

in light of the information available to us. Taken collectively, these

steps demonstrate our commitment to act responsibly and consistently with legislation and policy to confront specific activities by

Venezuela and Venezuelan persons.

Second, let me draw your attention to Colombia’s superb diplomacy with Venezuela. The resulting rapprochement between these

two nations has resulted in useful and, in context, unusually productive and effective counterterrorism cooperation. Bilateral cooperation on terrorism and security matters is increasing and being

systematized, yielding notable results, including the deportation to

Colombia of seven senior members of the FARC and the ELN.

While we still have serious concerns about Venezuela’s overall cooperation on counterterrorism matters, these are steps in the right

direction and demonstrate that counterterrorism efforts work best

when nations collaborate.

What we seek from Venezuela is its collaboration in confronting

narcotics trafficking and terrorism. In the absence of such cooperation, and when possessing evidence that Venezuela or Venezuelan

entities are not meeting their international obligations or failing to

comply with applicable U.S. laws, we have demonstrated our willingness to act. The Department has strongly urged Venezuela’s

leaders to pursue a path of cooperation and responsibility, rather

than further isolation, and will continue to do so.

We continue to monitor Venezuela, as well as other countries, for

activities that indicate a pattern of support for acts of international

terrorism. No option is ever off the table and the Department will

continue to assess what additional actions may be warranted in the

future.

I am happy to be here and I look forward to your questions.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

We will now recognize Mr. Szubin for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF ADAM J. SZUBIN

Mr. SZUBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Chaffetz,

Chairman Mack, Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Tierney,

Congressman Sires, and distinguished Members, thank you very

much for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
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Venezuela’s sanctionable activities. I am pleased to be testifying

alongside my colleagues from the State Department.

We at Treasury have been intently focused on dangerous activities stemming from Venezuela over the last few years. During this

period, we have uncovered and acted against a range of illicit actors operating out of Venezuela, including terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and those who have facilitated Iran’s pursuit of weapons of

mass destruction.

Our concern regarding the activities of terrorist groups in Venezuela is longstanding, particularly Venezuelan links to the Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah. As but one example, I would draw the

committees’ attention to an action we took in 2008 targeting a

Hezbollah facilitator and Venezuelan diplomat, Ghazi Nasr al Din.

Nasr al Din was a Venezuelan diplomat who served as their

Charge d’Affaires in Damascus, Syria, and utilized his position in

the Venezuelan government, and is the president of a Caracasbased Islamic center, to provide financial support to Hezbollah.

Among his activities were providing Hezbollah donors with specific

information on how to route their contributions such that they

would go directly to Hezbollah. Nasr al Din met with senior

Hezbollah officials in Lebanon to discuss operational issues and facilitated the travel of Hezbollah members to and from Venezuela.

At the same time as we took action against Nasr al Din, we also

exposed and sanctioned another Venezuelan-based Hezbollah supporter, Fawzi Kan’an, and two travel agencies that he operated out

of Caracas.

Of course, Venezuela has also been deepening its economic and

diplomatic ties with Iran, as the committees’ members have noted.

The growing ties between Venezuela and Iran are very worrying,

especially as they stand in such stark contrast to the global trend

in which the world is moving to isolate Iran because of its pursuit

of nuclear weapon and other destabilizing activities.

In 2008, the Iranian government established the International

Development Bank of Caracas, or Banco Internacional de

Desarrollo, in Venezuela. Shortly after its opening, we moved to

sanction this bank under our counterproliferation authorities due

to the bank’s relationship with the Export Development Bank of

Iran. We will act firmly and quickly to deny a purchase to any attempted successor.

We have also named under our sanctions authorities the Iranian

oil company Petropars and targeted its operations in Venezuela in

particular.

Finally, we have been extremely active in the field of combating

narcotics trafficking and have sanctioned thousands of entities

across Latin America, including in Venezuela. Among those we

have sanctioned, high level Venezuelan officials who were involved

with the FARC, including the head of Venezuela’s military intelligence agency, their chief of state security, and their former interior minister.
26

The threats posed by Iran, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking

are complex and we work closely with our interagency colleagues

to bring all of our tools to bear against these threats in Venezuela

as elsewhere, and our work can and must continue.

I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Szubin follows:]
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Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. Appreciate that.

I am now going to recognize the chairman of the Foreign Affairs

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Mr. Mack from Florida,

for 5 minutes.

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all of you for your testimony here today. I don’t

think we need to continue to harp on this, but we look forward to

more open dialog and cooperation from all of you.

So it sounds to me that we are in agreement that Chavez is

sponsoring terrorism, whether through narcotrafficking, through

his cooperation with Iran, through support of Hezbollah and the

FARC and other terrorist organizations. So it sounds to me that

there is agreement. I think where the problem lies is what do we

do about it.

So I first want to make this point, and I will say it again. We

are happy that there were sanctions placed on Chavez. What we

are not happy about is that the three sanctions that were placed

on PDVSA, the denial of export-import bank loans, credits, denial

of licenses for the U.S. export of military and militarily useful technology, and prohibits on U.S. Government’s procurement from entities, these are things that are already not happening. So we can

also agree that these are toothless, is that right?

Mr. DELARE. Chairman Mack, I would respectfully disagree with

that final evaluation. I wouldn’t say they are toothless, because

what we have done is warned the international business community that there is a danger of dealing with PDVSA.

Mr. MACK. Okay, so the designation of being sanctioned is important, but the actual sanctions that took place don’t have any teeth,

because these are things that we are currently not doing with Venezuela.

Mr. DELARE. Chairman Mack, the fact is Congress has given us

a calibrated set of tools to use in instances like this, basically implying that we have to make a very complicated calculation as to

U.S. interest in each one of these instances. Now, we had to judge

whether the sanctions would induce PDVSA to stop its behavior. So

far we have——

Mr. MACK. I understand that. I am sorry. So the fact that you

made the sanctions is important here. What you sanctioned isn’t

important because these things are currently not being done with

Venezuela in the first place. So that is my take, and I think that

is most everybody else’s take. There are other tools that are available.

Mr. DELARE. Yes, we do.

Mr. MACK. Restriction of imports, also prohibiting the sanctioned

entity from acquiring, holding and trading any U.S.-based property.

So there are other sanctions that we can use.

First of all, let me ask you this. Who owns PDVSA?

Mr. DELARE. It is 100 percent owned by the Venezuelan government, sir.

Mr. MACK. So there is no mistake, then, that the actions of

PDVSA isn’t by some company, it is by the government of Venezuela.

Mr. DELARE. I think we can assume there is an intimate relationship there.
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Mr. MACK. I would assume that Chavez has full control over

PDVSA.

Mr. DELARE. But, sir, we also make a calculation as to U.S. interest. And if 10 percent of US. Oil imports are coming from Venezuela, with three U.S. refineries dependent on Citgo, 6,000 gas

stations, 3,000 other employees, we have to weigh those factors as

well, especially, during the period of spiking oil prices.

Mr. MACK. Sir, then I would suggest that the State Department

sign off on the Keystone XL pipeline, which will then be able to

take over for any oil that we are getting from Venezuela. It seems

to me that if you or the State Department, if you are going to continue to say we have a strategic interest in their oil and we have

the ability to get oil from somewhere else, then we ought to get it

somewhere else. Wouldn’t you agree?

Mr. DELARE. I would say generally that is a fair point of view.

Mr. MACK. So we can expect the State Department to sign off on

the Keystone XL pipeline?

Mr. DELARE. I can only promise to take your views back, sir.

Mr. MACK. I think they know my views.

So, again, the definition countries determined by the Secretary of

State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of terrorism,

that is the State Department’s definition of a state sponsor of terror, correct?

Mr. BENJAMIN. That is the basis for the designation, yes.

Mr. MACK. But that is the definition, that is what is posted on

the Web site, that is what the State Department says. So how can

you not designate Chavez as a state sponsor of terror when we

know about the narcotrafficking, the support of Hezbollah? Even if

it is just fundraising. By the way, I thought that was kind of interesting, I don’t remember who said it, that it’s only in fundraising.

But fundraising is the mechanism that allows Hezbollah to work.

So we know drugs, terrorist organizations, support of Iran, all

three of these things would be determined by the Secretary of State

to repeatedly provide support for terrorist organizations.

Mr. BENJAMIN. Well, the statute, sir, allows the Secretary discretion to decide when repeatedly is sufficient enough to merit the imposition of this designation. And as I said in my oral statement, sir,

our approach is very much predicated on effectiveness and what it

is that is going to get Venezuela to stop behavior that we believe

is unacceptable. That is why we have instituted a calibrated

iterative process in which we are escalating pressure, as appropriate, without having follow-on or side effects that we believe

would harm our own national security and harm the interests of

those who we cooperate with very closely, including to contain Venezuela’s behavior.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Given the number of Members on this panel, I would ask Members

to keep within the 5-minutes, but we will allow our witnesses to

answer past that moment.

We will now recognize the ranking member of the committee, Mr.

Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.
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Obviously, when you talk about the sanctions, Congress passed

a bill that allowed the Secretary some discretion into how she applied those sanctions, am I right, Ambassador?

Mr. BENJAMIN. Absolutely correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. So the task for the Secretary at that point in time

is to calibrate, as you say, or to make a determination as to which

sanctions to implement at any given time and try to get the response she wants from that, while at the same time taking into

other considerations of what may happen to impact our allies or

our own interests, is that right?

Mr. BENJAMIN. Correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. So I don’t want to get into negotiating here in public with Venezuela or anything of that nature, so can I ask you to

give us a broad range of all of the competing interests that we have

there? When the balancing is going on, give us a range of what

types of things we are balancing, the cooperation with Colombia in

terms of drugs and borders, other things like that. Just give us

some idea of all the different interests.

Mr. BENJAMIN. Well, I will defer in a moment to my colleagues

from the Regional Bureau from Western Hemisphere Affairs, but

certainly the diplomacy with Colombia is very important. Colombia

would be very, very sharply affected by such a designation. Since

Colombia is at this time making significant progress in dealing

with Venezuela and in curtailing those activities that we find objectionable, it would seem to be counterproductive to do that at this

time.

Additionally, there are such second and third order effects as

catching the business dealings of lots of closely allied countries up

in the state sponsorship net, if you will, that if other countries that

were doing business with Venezuela suddenly found themselves to

be in danger of being sanctioned, that would be problematic. I believe Mr. Delare has spoken to the issue of our energy concerns in

this regard. So there is a whole array of different interests that

need to be taken into effect, and I think Mr. Whitaker may have

more to add on that.

Mr. WHITAKER. If I could just add on a couple of points here. U.S.

policy in Venezuela is a number of folks want democratic development, supporting U.S. persons, U.S. national security, and then

counternarcotics and counterterrorism. All of those are very important to us. We would need to weigh, it seems to me, the effect of

any sanction we take on issues like that. Ambassador Benjamin

mentioned the effect it would have of a sanction against Venezuela

when Venezuela views Colombia as a close ally of the United

States. How would Venezuela then react with respect to its diplomatic efforts in Colombia? That is unknown to me, but it is out

there.

Venezuela consistently tries to define the democratic opposition

in Venezuela as tools of the United States. Again, that might be

an avenue or a place where the Venezuelan government would seek

to identify that group and take some action in response to an action that we took.

Finally, we have many U.S. companies in Venezuela and it is our

goal as the Department of State to understand their interests, defend their interests, and we would need to take into account, as
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well, any impact in that regard with respect to those companies

that continue to do business in Venezuela.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. If the Secretary has just decided to

throw the book at Venezuela and just take the more extreme sanctions on that, what would the anticipated, current anticipated response of the Venezuelan government be?

Mr. WHITAKER. It is hard to say. I have worked on Venezuela

since 2005 and Hugo Chavez can be unpredictable. But one of the

threads of his policy since taking office in 1999 is consistently to

try to turn whatever problem or issue that arises into one of him

versus the United States, whether that is accurate or not. I think

that he would do this, he would seek to turn this into a matter of

a U.S. attack on his government and seek to use it for internal political purposes. How that would manifest itself, whether in diplomatic policy or with respect to democratic opposition in Venezuela

or with respect to U.S. companies, is difficult to predict.

Mr. TIERNEY. So in striking this balance so far, and I assume

that you recalibrate frequently on this, look on that basis, how

would you rate the performance so far? Are you getting the results

you want? Are you considering further sanctions? Are you thinking

that things are moving along the way you want them to or are you

just thinking that we have to do something else, you are just not

sure what yet?

Mr. BENJAMIN. I would say that it is early to issue the report

card given the recent activities, the recent sanctions that have been

imposed. We are, I would say, somewhat optimistic because of the

actions that Chavez has taken in terms of extraditing FARC

operatives from Venezuela to Colombia, encouraged by his apparent solicitousness of Colombian demands, and encouraged as well

by the fact that there haven’t been—and I will let Mr. Delare clarify this, if he wants—that there haven’t been further shipments of

the kinds of petroleum additives, gasoline additives of the kind that

were recently sanctioned. So at the moment we are cautiously optimistic.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired.

We now recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot, for 5

minutes.

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the chairman. Just a couple of questions,

maybe an observation first.

Obviously, in our capacity as Middle East and South Asia, that

is where we devote most of our energy and time, I happened to be

in the region there recently and Saudi Arabia is obviously very concerned at this time about Iran exploiting the so-called Arab Spring,

or whatever terminology one prefers, and they seem themselves as

being encircled, whether it is Yemen, Egypt has closer relations

with Iran than it did before, Bahrain, and we saw the Saudi reaction there.

But certainly Iran is flexing its muscle and I really do welcome

and commend my fellow chairs for talking publicly about this, Venezuela in connection with Iran, because it is of great concern; it

shows that this Iranian threat is really global in nature. And, obviously, Saudi Arabia, you know, a lot of oil there, but the most

known resources in the world at this time, Iran is second or third

depending on the study that you see.
39

But the point I would like to get to at this point is oil is a commodity obviously on the world markets, and what we pay here in

the United States is affected by that supply, so our interest here,

whereas we do import Iranian oil and it affects the price here, depending on how much we get from there and elsewhere, I think

many of us believe that we made really a terrible mistake becoming so dependent upon foreign oil in many ways, and some of that

is by restricting access to our own resources, whether it is Anwar

or the Outer Continental Shelf or a whole range of other things

here.

But relative to Venezuela, and I would invite this from anyone,

are we putting ourselves in a much more vulnerable position when

essentially we are reliant upon this Venezuelan oil; the money goes

down there and they are clearly one of the bad actors in this hemisphere right now, and what they are doing is against our best interest? So this continuing to be so dependent upon foreign sources

of energy, our policies in that area have been counterproductive

here. Would you agree with that, Mr. Delare? I would ask you if

you would like to take that.

Mr. DELARE. Well, I think there is little to argue about in your

statement there, sir, because it is a fact that our sanctions policies

are often directed at those countries who are oil producers and, of

course, we are dependent on that external source of energy. I think

we all wish it were true that we had many alternate sources of energy to depend on, but at this historical point in time we have to

move very carefully as to how we apply some of the tools that have

been provided to us so we can maintain the flow of energy to our

market, while still demonstrating a strong political message that

certain kinds of behaviors are unacceptable.

Mr. CHABOT. And I think it is clear that Venezuela, and Chavez

in particular, has been using American money, essentially, either

to bribe or influence other nations in this hemisphere, and the actions that they are encouraging them to take are oftentimes diametrically opposed to what is in the U.S.’ best interest. I think we

basically have in Venezuela now what we had in Cuba over the last

number of decades, the difference being, of course, Cuba didn’t

really have a resource; they were dependent upon the former Soviet

Union. Venezuela has oil, so it is perhaps even more dangerous

than Cuba was over these last decades.

I would, at this time, I didn’t give them a lot of time there, it

wasn’t much of a question, but I would like to yield to the gentleman for any time I have remaining.

Mr. MACK. Thank you. And to that point I believe that we are

sending basically $117 million a day to Venezuela through PDVSA,

so we are funding someone who we have sanctioned. We are funding this activity that supports terrorist organization through this

funding. And once again I think the State Department needs to

look at alternative ways, instead of continuing to buy oil from Chavez, we need to find alternative ways to get that oil.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The gentleman’s time has expired.

I would like to let Members know we have one vote on the floor.

It is the intention of the Chair to recognize Mr. Sires for 5 minutes

for his questioning, then stand in recess until 10:30, then we will
40

resume the remainder of the hearing. So, with that, we will recognize Mr. Sires for 5 minutes.

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to get back to this question of Iran and the flights into

Venezuela and the activity in Venezuela. I had dinner with a group

of people and they tell me that the amount of people in the Iranian

embassy in Venezuela is one of the largest in the world. I talk to

other people; they tell me that that is not true.

In your best estimation, what is the embassy in Venezuela from

Iran, the personnel, how many people do they have there? How active are they? How many flights a week do they have? Does it conform with the—I don’t want to say conform, but the amount of

flights that you have into Venezuela, would eight people be

enough? Can anybody respond to that?

Mr. WHITAKER. I can try, Congressman. There was, some months

ago, a direct flight initiated between Tehran, Damascus, and Caracas. Our information is that as of September 2010 that flight, the

Tehran link was dropped and it is now a Caracas-Madrid-Damascus flight and return. There are continuing rumors, as I think you

mentioned in your opening statement, that the individuals who arrive in Venezuela are not subject to customs and immigration controls. We have heard those stories too. We don’t have a way of

verifying them.

Since 2006 we have attempted to conduct, DHS has attempted to

conduct the statutorily required inspections of the airports in Venezuela because they are endpoints for flights to the United States.

Because Venezuela refused to permit those inspections, safety inspections, security inspections, in September 2008, DHS issued a

public notice on this point informing passengers of our inability to

do the inspections.

In an example of I am not going to call it progress, but there has

been a change and TSA was able to make a visit to Venezuela last

week. They spoke to Venezuelan security officials. This is not the

end of a process, but for the first time since 2006 we actually had

a meeting on this topic.

Now, in terms of the size of the Iranian embassy in Venezuela,

according to the diplomat list, there are 14 diplomats there. There

are many embassies in Venezuela, including our own, that are far

larger than that. I was DCM in Venezuela. I didn’t consider it to

be a particularly active embassy in terms of diplomatic activities;

showing the face, public diplomacy, etc. What we can’t judge, of

course, is how active they were within the Venezuela government.

But there is additional information on this and, if

appropriate——

Mr. SIRES. So how many flights do you have a week now?

Mr. WHITAKER. It is a weekly flight.

Mr. SIRES. Just one.

Mr. WHITAKER. And it doesn’t go to Tehran.

Mr. SIRES. So all these things, all these rumors that there were

two or three flights a week, all these crates that are coming in and

out, you can’t confirm any of that.

Mr. WHITAKER. There previously was a weekly flight; there is no

more.
41

Mr. SIRES. Currently, Chavez is in Cuba. Do you have any information on that? I mean, supposedly he got an operation in Cuba.

Mr. WHITAKER. What we know, what we can talk about here is

in early May he had what he defined as a knee operation. In June

he came out publicly and said that he had a pelvic abscess drained.

He has not appeared in public for some weeks now. He has——

Mr. SIRES. He is convalescing with Castro, maybe.

Mr. WHITAKER. There was a picture of the two of them together,

and Castro looked better than Chavez in the picture.

Mr. SIRES. Unfortunately.

Mr. WHITAKER. And he has not tweeted in his Twitter account

for some weeks, which sounds jocular, but in fact he is a very active tweeter, and it is interesting that he has gone off line.

Mr. SIRES. I don’t know if that is a good idea.

Are we helping the opposition? I know the opposition is growing

in Venezuela. Are we assisting the democracy process in Venezuela?

Mr. WHITAKER. Sure. Thank you for the question. Since 2002, the

United States, through USAID, has provided support to encourage

the development of civil society and democratic practices in Venezuela. Much of what we have done in recent years has focused on

get out the vote, defend the vote, protect the vote, and these kinds

of activities to ensure that the maximum number of people can vote

in free and fair conditions. I think it is important to note that we

do this in an ecumenical way; it is not designed to approach any

particular political end, but to support democracy as democracy.

Mr. SIRES. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The gentleman’s time has expired.

We have roughly 8 and a half minutes left in the vote. This committee will stand in recess until, let’s call it, 10:35 now, and then

we will resume the remainder of the hearing.

[Recess.]

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The subcommittee will now come back to order.

We thank you for your patience and understanding as we had a

vote on the floor.

We will continue and I am going to recognize myself for 5 minutes and we will go from there.

According to the records, the U.S. Government provides approximately $5 million to Venezuela annually for democracy related assistance. What is happening with that money? Why do we give it

and how do we monitor where it goes?

Mr. WHITAKER. Thank you for the question, Chairman. The purpose of our democracy funding is to encourage the development of

civil society in order to ensure that Venezuelan democracy be as robust and inclusive as possible. We have used a number of different

tactics over time. This program has been in place since 2002 and

has averaged about $5 million a year. It has gone up and it has

gone down.

Initially, the democracy program was intended to encourage reconciliation in the wake of the 2002 coup. Over time, governmentaffiliated, Chavez-affiliated actors have refused to participate in

these programs, which we regret because they are intended to be
42

ecumenical in nature, that is, open to all, politically balanced, and

in support of the process rather than any particular——

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The details of what is going on in that program

and how that money is spent, is that something you can provide

to the committee in, say, 30 days? Would that be fair?

Mr. WHITAKER. Absolutely. More than enough time.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

I would like to yield now to the gentleman from Florida, Mr.

Mack, for the remainder of my time.

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just for the committee’s

knowledge, my recommendation to the full committee is that that

budget be zeroed out moving forward.

I want to go back to kind of the sentiment that Chavez will use

this kind of struggle between the United States for his own benefit.

I have been pretty consistent on the other side of this feeling. So

what we have in Hugo Chavez is a classic bully. So he tries to get

people to do things based upon fear of what he might do.

And I think this is an important point. Instead of looking at

what it is that we are fearful that Chavez might do, we ought to

look at what is the right thing to do for national security, what is

the right thing to do for the people of this country, and what is the

right thing to do for our friends in Latin America and around the

world; not because of threats from a bully. So I hope that—I would

love to hear, if you want to make comment on that, but let me just

add this one other piece to that.

You also talked about that we have had beginnings of some

strides where there has been some extraditions from Venezuela to

Colombia of some drug kingpins. But the reality is that is not due

to the actions of the United States; that is due to the actions of the

president of Colombia, Santos. I will remind you of the Makled case

where we fell asleep at the switch. He was arrested on a war warrant. When they arrested him, the Colombians asked if we wanted

them and we said we are not interested, and then they sent him

to Venezuela. That is why the extraditions are happening, not because of some great policy position or foreign policy by the U.S.

Government.

If you care to react to those two statements, I would love to hear

it.

Mr. WHITAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On the first point, I

think that the reaction or potential reaction of Chavez with respect

to the United States and trying to demonize the United States with

respect to Colombia, with respect to the democratic opposition in

Venezuela are all matters that one can make analysis about. They

are factors. I wouldn’t say that any one is necessarily the determining factor. What we are looking for is results. In the case of the

CISADA sanctions, for examine, there is a very specific result that

we want and the sanctions were designed in order to achieve that

result.

On the extraditions, actually, and I don’t want to overplay this

because there is much more that Venezuela could do, but just since

July 2010 we have gotten on the order of 10 senior narcos who

were deported directly to the United States, removed from Venezuela directly to the United States——
43

Mr. MACK. I am going to go through, because I just want to hammer this point home that Hugo Chavez—well, my time is running

out, so I will thank you and I will apparently have another opportunity to speak with you again. Thank you.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

We now recognize the gentleman from American Samoa, Mr.

Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do thank our witnesses for their testimony this morning. I just

want to follow up on a couple of issues or questions that were

raised, at least I would like to raise at this point.

We do recognize, gentlemen, that you are just simply following

what the statute, or at least what we did in the Congress, passed

laws and statutes. You are just simply trying to enforce these sanctions, laws, whether it be for economic reasons or whatever. I noted

with interest that earlier Chairman Chabot, the subcommittee had

asked the question about Venezuela’s oil supply, and I am just curious, for the record, what is the total dollar value of oil that we

import from Venezuela, say just last year or say in the period of

the last 5 years?

Mr. DELARE. Congressman, the figure I used earlier in my testimony, or maybe I didn’t, was 900,000 to 1 million barrels per day.

I would have to get back to you with a formal response and cost

it out for you.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Yes. I would think it is important that we

need to know. My next question for the record, exactly how many

sanctions do we have against Venezuela at this point in time? You

know, I know there are sanctions against individuals, sanctions

against companies, sanctions against officials of the government,

sanctions for terrorism, sanctions on nuclear transfer, on nonproliferation. What is the total number of sanctions that we currently have against Venezuela?

Mr. WHITAKER. Well, we can go through them. There is not fully

cooperating on counterterrorism matters, which was imposed in

May 2006. Every year since 2005 they have been found to have demonstrably failed in their international counternarcotics

obligations——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, as I listened to your statements, do I

see maybe a count of 9 or 10 different sanctions that we put

against Venezuela, small sanctions?

Mr. WHITAKER. And then there are sanctions against individuals.

So when you net it all out, there are a number of sanctions that

have been applied.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Yes, at least how many, 9 or 10? Be more

specific. I would appreciate it.

Mr. WHITAKER. Some of these are broader sanctions. For example, the not fully cooperating on terrorism implies other actions, for

example, a ban on the sale of defense articles. So do you count that

as a single sanction? Then that would be one sanction.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, here is my whole point——

Mr. MACK. Would the gentleman yield for just a quick second?

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I would be glad to yield to the chairman.

Mr. MACK. Thank you. On the question that you asked earlier,

how much are we sending, it is approximately $117 million a day.
44

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And that includes Citgo Oil Co.?

Mr. MACK. That is what we are sending PDVSA.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. The money that we are paying, the oil that

we are getting from Venezuela?

Mr. MACK. It is $117 million a day.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Do you gentlemen agree to that figure, $117

million a day that we are paying Venezuela?

Mr. DELARE. Well, sir, it obviously goes up and down depending

on the production levels in Venezuela, the consumption levels of

energy in Venezuela and the market. As I mentioned, I would be

happy to give you a more formal reaction in writing.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And I thank the chairman for that figure

because the point I want to make is that we are putting all these

sanctions into one zap, the fact that Venezuela has this whole

bunch of oil that it exports to our country, and doesn’t it make our

sanctions look somewhat a little oblivious to the idea that, so what,

you put sanctions but we are still getting your money? Does this

make our sanctions laws somewhat a little effective?

Mr. DELARE. If I may. The sanctions we are talking about are the

sanctions directed against the government in Tehran. Now, of

course, they capture Venezuelan activities in Tehran. I am sorry,

in Venezuela because of this active economic partnership. But that

is the focus of this particular sanction. So, no, I don’t think it looks

silly. By the same token, we have just sanctioned an Israeli company, a U.K. company, a Singaporian company.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I am not trying to say that it makes it silly.

My point is the point of being effective. Have they been effective

if we really wanted to do as part of our foreign policy toward Hugo

Chavez’s regime and all that he has done, supposedly, contrary to

our basic fundamental principles of democracy and all of this?

Mr. DELARE. Well, sir, I will just speak to the Iran side. We look

at——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. No, I am not talking about Iran; I am talking about Venezuela.

Mr. DELARE. Okay. Well, we continue to provide him, obviously,

with a flow of revenue. Now, if a decision is taken to somehow create another mechanism that we would want to restrict that, or if

PDVSA continues to ship——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. But would you say there is somewhat of a

contradiction that we have here? We are putting a whole bunch of

sanctions against Venezuela and yet, at the same time, we are paying Venezuela $117 million a day for its oil supply.

And I am sorry, my time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired.

We will now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Rivera,

for 5 minutes.

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Congressman Sires alluded moments ago to the relationship or

that nexus between Venezuela and Cuba. I want to try to drill

down a little bit more, and I know we are going to have another

round, so if we don’t get through it all, I will continue on the next

round.
45

For Mr. Benjamin, you are the coordinator for counterterrorism

at the Department of State. How many countries are on the list,

the U.S. State Department list of sponsors of state terrorism?

Mr. BENJAMIN. Currently on the list, Iran, Syria, Cuba, and

Sudan.

Mr. RIVERA. So four countries. And with respect to Cuba, why is

Cuba on that list?

Mr. BENJAMIN. Cuba was put on the list, I believe, in 1982 because of its support, principally for its support of various terrorist

and revolutionary movements within the hemisphere. And I think

it is important to underscore that Cuba has not met the standard

for recision, which is to say that we need to be able to either certify

that there has been a fundamental change in leadership and the

country has ceased to support international terrorism or that the

administration can certify that Cuba has gone 6 months without

support to foreign terrorist organizations and has given assurances

that it will not support any international terrorism in the future.

Because of its continued relationship with the FARC and the ELN,

Cuba has failed to meet that standard.

Mr. RIVERA. So Cuba has a relationship with the FARC, the

ELN, both terrorist organizations. What about ETA?

Mr. BENJAMIN. It is a good question, sir. I don’t recall if there

is any continued relationship with ETA, but I can get back to you

and confirm that.

Mr. RIVERA. What about any Middle East based terrorist organization, Hamas, Hezbollah?

Mr. BENJAMIN. I am unaware of any fundraising activity or operational activity from either of those groups in Cuba, but I would

double check, too, and ensure that is correct.

Mr. RIVERA. Is Cuba harboring any terrorists?

Mr. BENJAMIN. Cuba has, over time, harbored members of the

FARC and the ELN, and I believe also ETA, although I don’t know

if they are currently doing so.

Mr. RIVERA. You don’t know if they are currently harboring——

Mr. BENJAMIN. ETA.

Mr. RIVERA [continuing]. ETA. But currently they are harboring

FARC and ELN terrorists?

Mr. BENJAMIN. Yes, they have.

Mr. RIVERA. How about members of the FBI Most Wanted list?

How many of those do we have in Cuba?

Mr. BENJAMIN. Frankly, sir, that is in the law enforcement channel, and I would have to get back to you on that.

Mr. RIVERA. Well, let me refresh your memory. Does the name

Janet Chesimard mean anything to you? Would you consider her

a terrorist?

Mr. BENJAMIN. Sir, I would have to get back to you. I am not familiar enough with the case.

Mr. RIVERA. You are not familiar with the Chesimard case?

Mr. BENJAMIN. No, not sufficiently to give you a——

Mr. RIVERA. I am going to yield for a moment to Congressman

Sires to perhaps give us a little bit of the background, since this

occurred in his home State.

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Congressman. There is currently a $1 million bounty on Chesimard. She was accused of shooting a State po-
46

lice officer point blank on the highways in New Jersey, so that is

the reason. The State police has put a reward of $1 million. She

has been in Cuba now for a number of years.

Thank you, Congressman.

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Congressman.

And I believe that that was not just a random robbery against

the trooper; it was politically motivated. And I think most people

would consider that a terrorist act. So I hope you will become a little more familiar with that case in particular.

What about narcotraffickers in Cuba?

Mr. BENJAMIN. I think some of my colleagues may have more to

say on the narcotrafficking issue. Mr. Whitaker.

Mr. WHITAKER. Yes. As Ambassador Benjamin noted, there is

evidence in the past of ELN and FARC members having been

present in Cuba. There are continuing allegations of Cuban government involvement in narcotrafficking, but nothing that we have

been able to act upon. Again, as Ambassador Benjamin noted,

much of this is in law enforcement channels. I would note that we

have tried to reach out to the Cuban government and we have a

Coast Guard attache who tries to work with the Cuban government

in order to identify and interdict——

Mr. RIVERA. Before my last few seconds, just let me say that in

my next round I want to follow up on this because it seems as

though we are placing sanctions on Venezuela, which is not on the

terrorist list, but more recently we are lifting sanctions on Cuba,

and I will get into that in the next round, which is on the terrorist

list and in fact is harboring a cop killer from this country. So I will

go into that in the next round.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

I will now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Deutch, for

5 minutes.

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I apologize, I was

a little late getting back, so let me ask if you have addressed this.

Have you spoken about the Venezuela airline Conviasa at this

point?

So my question is as follows: The United States announced that

it is going to sanction Iran Air for its role in shipping sensitive

technology and weapons. Conviasa routinely flies Caracas to

Tehran. Can you speak to the possibility of sanctioning that airline? And wouldn’t it be possible, as well, to sanction any airline

that flies in and out of Tehran if it can be linked to the shipping

of sensitive technology and/or weapons?

Mr. BENJAMIN. I will give the preliminary answer, and then my

colleagues may want to follow up.

As a practical matter, we do not discuss designations in public

because of the possibility of tipping potential designees. Regarding

the hypothetical of whether others who are involved in supporting

Iranian efforts to advance their nuclear program, it is certainly

within the scope of the legislation to do that, and we would certainly look hard at doing that.

But, again, I will let those who deal with sanctions and the Venezuelan case specifically——
47

Mr. DEUTCH. And before they do, Mr. Benjamin, my point here

is I would very much like to tip off, that is the purpose of the question. I would like to tip off any airline that is engaged in transporting this sort of sensitive technology and/or weapons into or out

of Tehran that they would be subject to these sanctions. That is

what I am trying to confirm.

Mr. BENJAMIN. I think that that is a well known fact, that airlines and other businesses in support of that effort can be sanctioned.

Mr. DEUTCH. Then let me just move on to the sanctions regime.

Mr. Delare, your office commences and conducts all of the investigations of the companies that may be subject to sanctions?

Mr. DELARE. Mr. Deutch, no, we primarily work on the energy

side of things.

Mr. DEUTCH. Right.

Mr. DELARE. We work closely, of course, with Mr. Szubin on a

variety of other things, but——

Mr. DEUTCH. But under CISADA, the focus on investments in

the energy sector, those would be your investigations.

Mr. DELARE. Correct.

Mr. DEUTCH. How many people do you have in your office who

are conducting those investigations?

Mr. DELARE. At the present time we have four, plus support from

our legal staff and the intelligence and research bureau.

Mr. DEUTCH. Four full-time employees?

Mr. DELARE. Call it three and a half.

Mr. DEUTCH. Three and a half full-time employees who are responsible for conducting the investigations to determine whether a

company could be subject to sanctions under CISADA?

Mr. DELARE. That is correct.

Mr. DEUTCH. I won’t ask you if whether that is a sufficient number, but I will ask whether it will be possible to—let me do it this

way. How many more investigations could be conducted at one

time? How many can be conducted by one person? Let me start

with that.

Mr. DELARE. That is an interesting question. As it now stands,

we have it divided by sectors, and I have, I think, everyone in the

office doing a number of things simultaneously because various—

let’s face it, a lot of media reports come in the door; they have to

be evaluated. We then begin checking trade press, embassies, businesses, the intelligence community. So it is a constant pushing

things through a process with lots of things at different stages, so

it is hard to answer that correctly.

Mr. DEUTCH. Well, let me be a little more direct. For those of us

who have expressed frustration that the pace of the investigations—well, it is not even the pace; we are not sure the status of

some of these investigations because we are not informed until the

end—but the frustration that they don’t seem to be moving quickly

enough, could that be addressed if you had additional investigators,

if you had more than the three and a half people who are responsible for all investigations?

Mr. DELARE. I think that is a fair assessment. But let me also

make two points in regard to that. CISADA is a relatively new

piece of legislation, even though it dates back to last July. Now, in
48

the intervening period since then we have set up a procedure that

never existed before. We have been exceedingly careful to do due

diligence on everything we have done. Hence, we probably have

spent a little more time as we get used to this than would be necessary, double checking facts——

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Delare, I am sorry, I only have 10 seconds left.

Mr. DELARE. I am sorry.

Mr. DEUTCH. Let me just ask one last question. If companies

were required to disclose in their filings made to the SEC, those

companies that trade on American stock exchanges, whether they

are doing business in Iran, that would be considered credible evidence and should immediately subject them to the possibility of

sanctions, correct?

Mr. DELARE. It seems like that may be so. Let me get back to

you more formally.

Mr. DEUTCH. I appreciate that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

We will now start the second round by recognizing the gentleman

from Florida, Mr. Mack, for 5 minutes.

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, could you tell us again why Cuba was put on

the state sponsor of terrorism list in 1982?

Mr. BENJAMIN. It was put on the state sponsorship list for supporting foreign terrorist organizations engaged in activities primarily in this hemisphere, but, again, for repeated acts of support

of international terror.

Mr. MACK. Okay. And then in answering questions from my colleague, Mr. Rivera, you outlined some of those terrorist activities.

Can you tell me what the difference is between Cuba and Venezuela?

Mr. BENJAMIN. I think it is important to underscore that the

process of putting a state on the list and the process of taking another state off the list are two very different things. We have a

very high bar for taking countries off the list. We want to make

sure that when we put countries on the list, that we are not setting

such a low threshold that we will both incur, create side effects

that will undermine our efforts and our broader national security

interest. As a result, one secretary of state after another has looked

very carefully at a number of different countries over the years for

a possible listing——

Mr. MACK. But you gave us the definition of why Cuba was put

on the state sponsor of terrorism list, which is exactly what Chavez

is doing in Venezuela. So why is it that we have Cuba as a state

sponsor of terror and not Venezuela? And it goes to this point, the

inconsistencies that I think another member brought up. On one

hand we have restricted visas to people in Honduras who have

fought for and defended their constitution, the rule of law, their

freedom, and their country.

On the other hand, there are people in Venezuela who are not

restricted and they are supporting terrorist organizations. So how

can Cuba, under your definition, be put on the state sponsor of terrorism list and then Venezuela, doing the same thing, not be placed

on the state sponsor of terrorism list?
49

Mr. BENJAMIN. First of all, I am not conversant with the Honduran case, but let me just say——

Mr. MACK. Take my word for it.

Mr. BENJAMIN [continuing]. As I said, this is about effectiveness

and about using the appropriate tools at the appropriate time to

elicit the correct response.

Mr. MACK. When is the appropriate time?

Mr. BENJAMIN. I think that is a matter that we have to evaluate

on the basis of the activity going on. And I would say, sir, as we

noted earlier, if the indicators are going in the right direction, it

would seem not to be the right time to——

Mr. MACK. You mean the indicators that are being brought about

because of another country’s actions, not ours?

Mr. BENJAMIN. We judge countries by the totality of their activity, and if other countries can elicit good behavior, then we certainly view that as a positive development.

Mr. MACK. Well, I just want to, real quick, if you can put up the

first slide.

You are familiar with that, right? If it walks like a duck, quacks

like a duck and looks like a duck, then it is a duck, right?

Next slide.

If it walks like a terrorist, talks like a terrorist, and acts like a

terrorist, then it is a terrorist. And you recognize Hugo Chavez and

Fidel Castro, Raul Reyes, and Ahmadinejad. We can agree with

that?

Next slide.

Hugo Chavez, ‘‘Enough of the imperialist aggression. We must

tell the world down with the U.S. empire. We have to bury imperialism this century.’’

Isn’t Hugo Chavez a sponsor of terror?

Mr. BENJAMIN. As I said before, sir, Venezuela is engaged in activities that we find unacceptable, and we are engaged in a sustained effort to get them to stop those activities, and I think that

we are taking the appropriate measured approach to get them to

stop those activities in a way that will produce results. We may

have differences over the means to do it, but I believe that we are

searching for the same goal.

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The gentleman’s time has expired.

We will now recognize Mr. Sires of New Jersey for 5 minutes.

Mr. SIRES. Can you talk a little bit about the arms build-up in

Venezuela? I understand that they have bought a considerable

amount of weapons.

Mr. WHITAKER. That is correct, sir. The principle purchases that

Venezuela has made over the course of the last several years have

been from Russia, and they include high performance jet aircraft

Sukhois, which have been delivered; they include T–72 tanks,

which have not been delivered; air defense systems; and notably in

excess of 100,000 AKM, AK–47 rifles.

So there has been a significant arms purchase program by the

Venezuelan government. Some of these purchases could probably

be defined as purchases to replace superannuated, old, antiquated

equipment. You might, for example, say that with respect to the

Sukhois. Venezuela had long been a nation which purchased U.S.
50

jet aircraft. We sold F–16s to Venezuela in the 1980’s. Those aircraft are at the end of their service life and the Venezuelan government chose to replace them with Sukhois. So that is an example

of replacing superannuated equipment.

Then you have examples of new capabilities, and the T–72 tanks

would be a new capability which traditionally Venezuela has not

had.

Mr. SIRES. Isn’t there also a factory that was built in Venezuela

to make AK–47s or something like that?

Mr. WHITAKER. Venezuela and Russia have signed a contract to

build such a factory that would produce AKM assault rifles. That

factory is not presently in operation. There is actually more that

we can provide to you on this in a different setting.

Mr. SIRES. The reason I ask that is because I had conversation

with members of other countries, and one of the countries that I

had conversations with was Panama, and they have found that

Venezuela has tried to influence the people in the interior of Panama, the farmers, especially, so I am concerned that maybe some

of these farmers are going to find their way through different countries in South America. Do you have any concerns about that?

Mr. WHITAKER. It would be a significant concern if Venezuela

were to start exporting weapons of war to other nations. I think

that what we have seen principally over the course of the last several years is rather than exporting munitions and weapons and

things like that, is more trying to buy influence with money. That

is the tactic that the Venezuelans have engaged in principally, in

Central American, in the Caribbean, in Bolivia, for example. There

are limits to Venezuelan largesse. Venezuela, as a matter of policy,

has chosen to spread a lot of money into the population, and this

has meant less money available to support these foreign activities

that they would engage in.

Mr. SIRES. Talking about money, how much do you think Venezuela is sending to Cuba currently?

Mr. WHITAKER. The truth is we don’t know the answer to that

question. Publicly available information indicates that 50,000 barrels of oil a day go to Cuba, and that would be free or virtually

free. In addition, Venezuela has agreed to re-engineer, rebuild a refinery in Cuba; that activity has not been completed.

And then, finally, Cuba apparently charges for the doctors and

other experts that it provides who work in Venezuela, the numbers

of which, I mean, they are estimates and we don’t have precise figures, but the estimates are 30, 40,000 individuals, and there is a

fee that the Cuban government charges per person to the Venezuelan government.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. SIRES. Yes.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I just wanted to know, from Chairman

Mack’s statement, that we buy $117 million worth of oil a day from

Cuba. By my limited knowledge——

Mr. SIRES. From Venezuela, you mean.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. From Venezuela. I am sorry. It is $42.7 billion worth of oil that we buy from Venezuela each year. That is my

limited knowledge of mathematics. But that is not peanuts, in my

humble opinion.
51

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. SIRES. Now that I lost my train of thought.

I just want to add, following up on my friend, Congressman Rivera, there are more than just one felon in Cuba that are currently,

it is not just Chesimard. There are close to 100 that have escaped

the United States and are in Cuba, basically, with sanction, living

there, enjoying the beach, and everything else. Thank you.

You have any comment about that?

Mr. WHITAKER. All I can tell you, sir, is, actually, in the past I

worked on Cuba and I can tell you this is a regular topic of conversation we have with the Cubans, including with respect to Joanne Chesimard and other fugitives from U.S. justice.

Mr. SIRES. I can tell you that New Jersey State troopers are not

going to ever give up the request to have Chesimard be expelled

out of Cuba so she can be brought here to trial again.

Mr. WHITAKER. And we join them in that.

Mr. SIRES. Okay. Thank you.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The chairman yields back.

I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes.

Mr. Whitaker, isn’t the only reason we haven’t put Venezuela on

the state sponsor of terrorism list, isn’t the only reason because we

consume a lot of their oil? Is that fair to say?

Mr. WHITAKER. Chairman, I would associate myself with what

Ambassador Benjamin said. We are trying to engage in substantial

iterative sanctions designed to accomplish different ends, and there

are a number of factors that go into this process, including the economic effects we talked about, including the effects on democratic

development.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So what other major economic effect is there

other than oil? I mean, oil is a big one; we cited the number several

times. That is the administration’s concern, right? We consume a

lot of their oil. That is the only thing that is holding us back, isn’t

it?

Mr. WHITAKER. Again, Mr. Chairman, I think that it is broader

than that. I think that that is a factor. I think that the economic

relationship, broadly stated, there are dozens and dozens of U.S.

companies that do business in Venezuela today, some of which are

intimately involved in the oil industry, provide oil support, oil services, some of which are international oil companies like Chevron,

some of which are like Xerox, American Airlines. So these kinds of

factors need to be taken into account as well, in addition to the effect on democratic development within Venezuela, the diplomatic

outreach that our neighbors have engaged in.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Let me go to Mr. Szubin there. Let’s talk about

all this money that does flow in. Where does that money go once

it gets to—do we have any idea or sense of where these oil profits

go once they get to Venezuela? Does Treasury not track that at all?

I mean, we send them over $100 million a day, so what is happening with that money?

Mr. SZUBIN. I can’t speak to Venezuelan government revenue allocation. Our office focuses on——

Mr. CHAFFETZ. But it does go to their government.

Mr. SZUBIN. Yes.
52

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I am sorry, did somebody else want to address

that? Mr. Whitaker.

Mr. WHITAKER. PDVSA’s receipts go directly—this is a change

from the past. In the past, PDVSA operated as—it was government

owned, but it operated as an independent entity with its own financial structure. One of the changes that Chavez made was to insist

on PDVSA’s receipts going directly to the government. So if your

assertion is that PDVSA receipts go directly to the government, I

think that is accurate.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. In comparison to other parts of their economy,

what portion of their oil proceeds, of their economic input, how big

is that in their economy?

Mr. WHITAKER. If you are talking about government receipts, it

is about half of government receipts. If you are talking about exports, it is the lion’s share of exports. I can get you the precise

number, but it is in excess of three-quarters of the total receipts

from exports.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Okay. Very good.

Yes, yield to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mack.

Mr. MACK. So half of the receipts to the government come from

the oil that is sold here to the United States, is that what you said?

Mr. WHITAKER. Half of government receipts come from proceeds

to PDVSA. Not all of PDVSA receipts come from the United States.

Mr. MACK. Okay.

Mr. WHITAKER. The majority of exports by PDVSA go to the

United States.

Mr. MACK. Right. So I think what you are hearing from us is

that we want to see some sanctions that affect the oil industry in

Venezuela. And let’s not make—it is not an industry, it is Chavez.

Right now all of that oil, we are funding his ability to continue to

sponsor terror. And, again, I think a lot of us are wondering—and

this is, obviously, a bipartisan issue; everybody is talking about the

same thing.

Why aren’t we putting these sanctions on PDVSA, especially

when the State Department, the Secretary, with the signature of

her pen, can allow the Keystone XL pipeline to move through, move

forward, which then we wouldn’t need to buy the oil from Venezuela. And if we don’t buy the oil from Venezuela, he cannot continue to sponsor terror. So it seems pretty simple. Maybe you can

explain it why it is not that simple.

Mr. DELARE. I would hesitate to ever tell a Congressman that it

wasn’t that simple, but it isn’t.

Mr. MACK. Go for it.

Mr. DELARE. Well, in fact, I fully appreciate your argument about

alternate energy sources and, in fact, the oil sands project will

probably take 10 years to come online.

Mr. MACK. But we get that argument all the time.

Mr. DELARE. Of course.

Mr. MACK. And isn’t it true that there has been study after study

already, all the time the study comes back in a positive way, but

then the environmentalists whip it all up again? I mean, we are

going to continue to buy this oil from Chavez when we can get it

from our friends in Canada.
53

Mr. DELARE. That is very true, but we have to look at the market

as it stands today. And we are in a very difficult economic patch,

as you well know, sir, and——

Mr. MACK. You can’t look at the market in just today.

Mr. DELARE. Well, I will even look at it for the next 5 years and

say we have to make adjustments, but in the meantime we have

to get that energy from somewhere.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I guess, as I wrap up here, I would just say there

is a concerted effort to say we are okay with the terrorism as long

as we keep the price of gas low down here. And that is the concern

that I think a lot of us have. I think the administration is making

a very concerted effort. We can give them half, three-quarters of

their revenue to Hugo Chavez. It is okay, even though they are

participating in terrorism, as long as we keep that price of gas

down at 7–11.

I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Rivera.

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much.

For Mr. Szubin, you are the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, so you are in charge of regulating the Trading with

the Enemies Act, is that correct?

Mr. SZUBIN. Yes.

Mr. RIVERA. Cuba is regulated under that act.

Mr. SZUBIN. Our sanctions against Cuba were issued pursuant to

the Trading with the Enemy Act.

Mr. RIVERA. So Cuba is an enemy of the United States.

Mr. SZUBIN. The title of the statute that Congress passed is the

Trading with the Enemy Act, and that is our authority under

which we use these sanctions.

Mr. RIVERA. So I would presume Cuba is considered an enemy

of the United States.

Mr. SZUBIN. That is not for me to characterize, but you are correct as to the title of the statute.

Mr. RIVERA. How many flights were there between Iran and Venezuela? I heard one flight a week that no longer exists, is that correct?

Mr. SZUBIN. What Mr. Whitaker mentioned earlier is that there

had been a period of one flight a week, and we believe that has

now stopped.

Mr. RIVERA. How many flights are there between the United

States and the other countries who are on the terrorist list, direct

flights, North Korea, you said Sudan and Iran? How many direct

flights a day?

Mr. SZUBIN. I don’t know, but I would be happy to look into that

and get back to you.

Mr. RIVERA. Do you not regulate those? Trading with the Enemy

Act, would that not fall under your purview?

Mr. BENJAMIN. Sir, I can answer that.

Mr. RIVERA. Yes.

Mr. BENJAMIN. There are none.

Mr. RIVERA. There are none. How many flights are there between

the United States and our enemy, Cuba, a day?

Mr. BENJAMIN. If you are talking about——

Mr. RIVERA. Direct flights.

Mr. SZUBIN. Private charter flights?
54

Mr. RIVERA. Airplanes, airplanes that fly between the United

States and Cuba daily.

Mr. SZUBIN. I don’t know the answer to that.

Mr. RIVERA. Do you not regulate?

Mr. SZUBIN. Yes, we do, and I would be happy to get the answer

for you, but I don’t know it offhand.

Mr. RIVERA. You are the Director of OFAC.

Mr. SZUBIN. Correct.

Mr. RIVERA. You regulate the Trading with the Enemies Act.

Flights between the United States and Cuba, an enemy, are regulated by you.

Mr. SZUBIN. Yes.

Mr. RIVERA. The only flights that exist, according to the enemies

list, North Korea, Sudan, and Iran, is zero. Cuba is the only—you

don’t know how many flights?

Mr. SZUBIN. That is right.

Mr. RIVERA. Okay. I would like for you to get me that information.

Mr. SZUBIN. I would be happy to, Congressman.

Mr. RIVERA. And I would like to know not only how many flights,

but who is chartering those flights, what companies own the airplanes that are chartering those flights. Are you familiar with that,

who are chartering or what companies own the planes?

Mr. SZUBIN. What I can tell you is that to operate a charter service with respect to Cuba, you need to be licensed by our office. So

there is an elaborate process which travel service providers or charter service providers need to come in, they need to make all sorts

of showings as to exactly the questions you are talking about, their

ownership and——

Mr. RIVERA. So you should be intimately familiar with these

flights.

Mr. SZUBIN. If I had a better memory, I could recite the names

of all these charter companies for you offhand, but that is not

something——

Mr. RIVERA. Would you say the number is more than 10, less

than 100, more than 1,000?

Mr. SZUBIN. As I said, Congressman, I don’t know the number

of flights a day going to Cuba.

Mr. RIVERA. Mr. Whitaker, recently I understand that there was

a summary that was produced of a phone conversation you had

with the Charges d’Affaires of Venezuela, Angelo Rivero Santos.

Are you familiar with this? Did you recently have a phone conversation?

Mr. WHITAKER. I have spoken to him on the phone. I am not

aware of any transcript being published.

Mr. RIVERA. Well, I received information of it being published

where you did a few things; you congratulated him on the excellent

diplomatic work done on the Honduran crisis, you invited him to

meet with Secretary of State of Venezuela, we assured him that

Venezuela was well represented in the State Department and a desire to work together to improve relations. Does any of this sound

familiar?

Mr. WHITAKER. It does not. That is not a conversation that I had,

sir.
55

Mr. RIVERA. No conversation between you and——

Mr. WHITAKER. As I say, I have spoken with Charges d’Affaires

Rivero on the phone.

Mr. RIVERA. Recently?

Mr. WHITAKER. I would have to go back and check, but that is

not—what you just said is not a conversation that I——

Mr. RIVERA. What was the tenor of that conversation?

Mr. WHITAKER. Sir, I rarely speak with him. I did have a recent

conversation; it was highly operational in nature, and I would be

happy to discuss that with you. But the factors that you just

mentioned——

Mr. RIVERA. Were not part of that conversation?

Mr. WHITAKER [continuing]. Were not part of that conversation

and they are not things that I would say.

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

If there are no further questions, we will thank the witnesses for

appearing here today. I would just implore you again, in the future,

and I would ask that the administration work with us in, A, providing witnesses in a timely manner and providing testimony, the

written statements, 48 hours in advance so that we can do our jobs

as well. I appreciate your patriotism, your commitment to our

country, your sacrifice and your service to the country. I hope you

find that it wasn’t too painful to come before this committee, and

perhaps we will have you here again, but we do appreciate your

testimony here today.

The committee will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:18 a.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.]

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