About the Report

This report originates from a view shared by the authors that 

the myriad challenges facing the future Republic of Sudan 

require a more comprehensive and holistic approach, to be 

adopted by both Sudanese and the international community. 

The report examines the political landscape in the future 

Republic of Sudan leading up to South Sudan’s secession in 

July, analyzes ongoing political processes intended to resolve 

critical issues, and makes recommendations for implementing 

a more comprehensive approach. The authors conclude that 

fundamental governance issues must be addressed in an 

inclusive manner if the future Republic of Sudan is to address 

its chronic instability and reduce violent conflict. 

About the Author

Jon Temin is the director of USIP’s Sudan program, overseeing 

the Institute’s efforts to increase stability and peacebuilding 

capacity in Sudan. Theodore Murphy is a consultant who has 

worked for more than seven years on Sudan in humanitarian, 

political analysis, and mediation capacities, including with the 

African Union–United Nations Joint Mediation Support Team 

(JMST) as a Darfur expert. This report is based on research 

conducted by both authors in Khartoum and elsewhere in the 

early months of 2011. They are grateful to several reviewers 

who provided detailed feedback on drafts of the report.

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 278 June 2011

© 2011 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Jon Temin and Theodore Murphy

Toward a New Republic 

of Sudan

Summary

•	 Approaches to Sudan’s challenges—by both Sudanese and the international community—

have been fragmented and regionally focused rather than national in scope. They overlook 

fundamental governance challenges at the roots of Sudan’s decades of instability and the 

center of the country’s economic and political dominance of the periphery, which marginalizes a majority of the population. Such fragmentation diffuses efforts into fighting 

various eruptions of violence throughout the periphery and confounds efforts to address 

governance and identity issues.

•	 Ongoing processes in the future Republic of Sudan, sometimes referred to as north Sudan, 

continue this trend. While Darfur negotiations and popular consultations in Blue Nile and 

Southern Kordofan states should continue, they should eventually be subsumed into a 

national process aimed at addressing the root causes of Sudan’s governance failures. The 

process should feed into, and then be reified by, development of a new national constitution. Even now the goal of these regional processes should be re-envisaged as steps toward 

a national process. 

•	 Sudanese negotiations largely occur between elites. Negotiators often cannot claim genuine 

representativeness, resulting in lack of broad buy-in and minimal consultation with the 

wider population. The ongoing Darfur negotiations are a case in point. To avoid prolonging 

the trend, a more national process should be broad-based and consultative. It should feature an inclusive dialogue, involving representatives from throughout the periphery, about 

the nature of the Sudanese state and how to manage Sudan’s considerable diversity. 

•	 Southern secession in July 2011 presents an opportunity for Sudanese to take a more 

comprehensive, holistic approach to their governance problems. Significant adjustments are 

warranted by the end of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, such as the development of 

a new constitution. The opportunity to initiate fundamental governance reform may be ripe 

because the ruling National Congress Party is under intense political and economic pressure. 

The Arab Spring revolts, the economic shock of lost oil revenue, and the proof of governance 

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Contents

The Shifting Political Landscape 3

The Problem of Individual Processes 6

A More Comprehensive Approach 8

Conclusion 12
2

failure that southern secession represents have inspired, among some NCP leaders, a belief 

in the necessity of preemptive change.

•	 Any reform of northern governance should be led by Sudanese. Perceptions that external 

actors are forcing change can be counterproductive. The international community can 

support a reform process but should tread carefully. International efforts should focus on 

promoting an enabling environment in which nascent Sudanese-led efforts can take root 

and grow. Support to constructive voices and aid to inchoate political initiatives should be 

available when requested.

•	 Supporting a national process poses a challenge for the international community as 

its capacity, pressure, and incentives are already distributed across the various regional 

political processes. Pressures and incentives are tied to specific benchmarks defined by 

those processes, making it difficult to reorient them toward the new criteria dictated by a 

national process.

Africa’s largest country will soon divide in two, but the bulk of the world’s attention has 

focused on only one side of that split. Following the overwhelming vote by southern Sudanese to secede from the rest of Sudan, the Republic of South Sudan will declare independence in July 2011. But the excitement and anxiety concerning the future of southern Sudan 

triggered by the successful referendum crowds out a focus on the future of the other state 

emerging from secession: the future Republic of Sudan.1

The remaining Sudan’s future may be bleak. The war in Darfur persists despite multiple 

international efforts to broker peace. Two northern states along the north-south border are 

agitating for increased autonomy through the popular consultation process prescribed in the 

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). A peace agreement between the government and rebels in the east is tenuous. The future status of the contested Abyei area remains unresolved. 

The northern economy is in dire straits due to inflation, corruption, and the loss of oil revenue that will accompany southern secession. The Arab Spring revolts threaten governments 

throughout North Africa and the Middle East; the fall of Hosni Mubarak in neighboring Egypt 

sent shock waves through Khartoum, prompting an evaluation of the government’s stability 

and ability to contend with newly invigorated demands for democratization.

Sudan’s decades of instability are, by and large, the product of internal dynamics and 

decisions, not misfortune or outside intervention.2 Fundamentally, successive Sudanese 

governments—including those preceding the current National Congress Party (NCP) government—have failed to accommodate Sudan’s considerable diversity. That more than 98 

percent of southern Sudanese voted to secede provides ample affirmation of this fact. These 

governments also have failed to offer a compelling vision of the nature of the Sudanese 

state, beyond the NCP’s declarations that the state is Islamic and Arab,3 which made former 

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) leader John Garang’s vision of a new Sudan 

appealing to so many. This inability, or perhaps unwillingness, to manage diversity and 

articulate a positive vision results in forms of governance that are exclusionary and radically 

unequal in their distribution of wealth and resources. For decades, political and economic 

power and resources have been concentrated in the country’s center (i.e., Khartoum and 

the surrounding cities and towns in the Riverine area), to the detriment of the periphery 

(essentially everywhere else in Africa’s largest country). This approach to governance disproportionately benefits elites in the center and often takes particularly brutal forms in the 

periphery, witnessed most recently in Darfur.4

Such exclusionary governance is ultimately unsustainable. Through tactics and maneuvering it can be prolonged for years, even decades, but it inevitably leads to resurgent 

conflict. The NCP had inherited this governance paradigm when it ascended to power, but 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy •

George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor of 

Practice, The George Washington University • Judy Ansley,

Former Assistant to the President and Deputy Security 

Adviser under President George W. Bush • Anne H. Cahn,

Former Scholar in Residence, American University 

• Chester A. Crocker, James R. Schlesinger Professor of 

Strategic Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown 

University • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy 

Center for Justice and Human Rights • Ikram U. Khan,

President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC • Stephen D. Krasner,

Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, 

Stanford University • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive 

Director of the National Council on Independent Living 

• Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor, George Mason School of Law 

• Judy Van Rest, Executive Vice President, International 

Republican Institute • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy •

Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
3

then proceeded to prolong it. The party’s early attempts to use Islamism to create a national 

identity that could supersede and subsume the dominant tribalism and regionalism failed to 

change this dynamic and manage Sudan’s diversity.5 Now, even with the separation of the 

south removing the majority of Sudan’s non-Muslim population, the so-called perfecting of 

the Islamist project6 will do nothing to address the underlying center-periphery asymmetry. 

Thus the government’s current moves to reinvigorate the Islamist project will likely be only 

a distraction unless accompanied by progress toward inclusive governance.7 Fundamental 

changes are needed in the way the future Republic of Sudan is governed if its roughly 30 

million citizens are to enjoy a more stable and prosperous future after the south secedes. A 

new Sudanese political compact is required.

Remarkably, governance is rarely the focus of international engagement with Sudan.8

Instead, Sudan’s seemingly endless crises are often fragmented and addressed in piecemeal fashion; in recent years, international attention has oscillated between north-south 

relations and the Darfur conflict. This is understandable given the urgency of finding solutions, even temporary, to these vicious conflicts that destroy too many lives. But it marginalizes any focus on ending Sudan’s cycle of violence, which is driven by poor governance. A 

more comprehensive, holistic approach to Sudanese governance is required to break 

that cycle.

The ongoing Darfur negotiations and the popular consultation processes in Southern 

Kordofan and Blue Nile states are examples of the fragmenting of Sudan’s problems along 

geographic lines. These regional processes are vitally important and should continue, but 

they eventually should be subordinated to a more national and comprehensive dialogue 

process, aimed to conclude with the development of an improved system of governance 

captured by a new constitution. These regional processes touch on national issues, 

such as federalism, wealth, and power sharing, but they do so from a regional perspective 

that prioritizes local over national solutions. Each of these processes also potentially sets 

a precedent, but too many precedents—and too many special governance arrangements 

for particular regions—may render the whole of the future Republic of Sudan ungovernable, a country full of exceptions and competing precedents. Because the popular consultations and Darfur negotiations are, at their core, about so many of the same issues, they 

should be tied together into a single conversation addressing and involving the 

entire north. 

There are crucial unanswered questions about whether the NCP leadership has the political will to undertake the reforms needed to transform northern governance and whether 

progressive elements among opposition parties, civil society, and youth can amass the 

pressure needed to compel reform. The NCP finds itself under significant political and economic pressure resulting from southern secession. Developments in the months immediately 

before and after southern secession in July may yield some answers. There has been intense, 

ongoing debate within the NCP on the need to reform. Currently the party wing opposed to 

reform appears ascendant. 

This report highlights some of the key challenges to governance and the nature of the 

Sudanese state following southern secession and suggests options for how Sudanese can 

address these challenges if they choose to do so. It first briefly assesses the current political 

landscape and the players positioned to catalyze the creation of a comprehensive approach 

to governance. It then examines two ongoing political processes, the popular consultations 

and the Darfur negotiations, which address governance issues but do so from a regional 

perspective, risking further fragmentation of issues and solutions. It then offers suggestions 

for a more national process of redefining governance that revolves around inclusive dialogue 

and the constitutional development process. 
4

The Shifting Political Landscape

Gaining real insight into politics in the north is challenging.9 Alliances shift constantly, and 

marriages of convenience frequently form and dissolve. Politicians—some of whom have 

been on the scene for forty years or more—regularly reinvent themselves and show vastly 

different faces to different audiences. Power is often exercised through informal networks 

rather than formal institutions. It is certain that the NCP calls the shots, but the party is 

not a monolith, and internal divisions are increasingly apparent. Some of these are over the 

issues examined here: whether to reform the party and its governance of Sudan, or to adhere 

to the status quo that has kept it in power for more than twenty years. 

One understanding of the current NCP is that it is a collection of business, religious, 

military, and security interests that collaborate to maintain their positions and control. 

The influences of these various interests rise and fall within the coalition, but their mutual 

dependence results in most of them remaining in the coalition and protecting one another. 

President Omar al-Bashir and his inner circle conduct this orchestra of interests, with various 

subordinates rotating in and out of favor but rarely deserting the party entirely. While many 

doubted the party’s resilience and Bashir’s political savvy when he came to power in 1989, 

Bashir and the NCP have demonstrated impressive survival skills. The party may have been 

motivated by ideology early in its reign, but many agree that its overriding current goal is 

to remain in power, particularly because, should they leave government, Bashir and others 

may be subject to international criminal prosecution.

The NCP struggles to think big, or at least to agree on and implement a big strategic 

vision. The party and the Khartoum government—which are virtually synonymous—manage 

portfolios reasonably effectively, but fail to foresee and prepare for challenges over the 

horizon. In many ways the NCP is issue- and crisis-driven, but it fails to link issues together 

and address the sources of Sudan’s steady stream of crises; instead, it practices governance 

by crisis management, and is itself the source of many of these crises. However, the failure 

to think big and plan for the long term may be a strategy in itself: muddling through, from 

deal to deal, prevents any large-scale changes that may not be in the NCP’s interests while 

distracting from the key transformative aspects of the CPA.

The party lacks a single unifying vision and common set of values that could help it chart 

the way forward. Islamism has been the party’s ideology, but this never has translated into 

a vision of successful national governance, evolving instead into an exclusionary concept 

for what became defined as Sudan’s non-Arab peoples.10 Sudan’s struggles are closely linked 

with the failure of the Islamist project to change the preexisting center-periphery asymmetry. Though its Islamist credentials are discredited with many Sudanese, the NCP still 

sees Islamism as an important rallying force and thus seeks to preserve its ability to use 

Islamism by remaining (however nominally) an Islamist party with an Islamist project. One 

way forward may be for the NCP to find a means of crafting a more inclusive iteration of the 

Islamist project coupled with real governance reform, which could shore up the legitimacy of 

the ideology with concrete change. The risk is that it does the opposite, ramping up Islamist 

rhetoric to distract from its shortcomings while also appealing to Islamist-minded northern 

constituencies, garnering their support for the government. There is also opportunity in 

the NCP’s governance failures. While party hard-liners fall back on the exclusionary rallying 

power of Islamism as a means of generating legitimacy, ignoring the need for real change, 

other more progressive voices in the NCP see that the party must move beyond ideology to 

genuine change in order to create a new means of defining the party that will resonate more 

broadly across Sudan’s diverse population. 

The NCP is confronted by an unprecedented combination of political, economic, and 

regional pressures. It faces blowback for presiding over the division of the country, which 

Sudan’s struggles are closely 

linked with the failure of the 

Islamist project to change 

the preexisting centerperiphery asymmetry.
5

successive governments have resisted for decades. A portion of the northern population may 

view this in a positive light, as a final resolution to the so-called southern problem, but 

many are saddened by the split. Economically, the north is in dire straits, with inflation on 

the rise, a yet undetermined amount of oil revenue to be lost to the south, and a massive 

debt burden (though there are efforts in some quarters to write off large portions of this 

debt). Austerity measures have been implemented as the north struggles to diversify its 

economic base. As northern leaders contend with these domestic pressures, they also watch 

as revolts emerge in one Arab country after another and longstanding governments falter, 

with some succumbing completely. 

The medley of pressures may encourage NCP leaders to engage in meaningful governance 

reform, but this is far from certain. The NCP is engaged in heated internal debate concerning 

the benefit of genuine reform. Those in favor argue that the ruling party needs to articulate 

a new vision for the future Republic of Sudan. For them, the south’s secession proves the failure of the Islamist project, as does the continuing crisis in Darfur. The possibility of getting 

out in front of the Arab Spring by taking proactive steps11 and the coming change in government structure after southern secession12 both lend immediacy to the argument. Lacking its 

previous oil revenues, they say, the north cannot ignore the economic price of continuing 

or potentially starting new armed conflicts driven by the existing political dynamic. For 

this group, change is not optional but essential to the party’s survival. Another NCP camp, 

however, favors the status quo. Change is risky, they argue, and where the political opening 

may lead is unpredictable. Other northern political forces are weak and the Sudanese street 

is manageable; the threat of the Arab Spring is negligible. 

The divergence of views and resulting lack of agreement have opened space for a number 

of concurrent initiatives resembling nascent national dialogue, none of which is grounded in a 

solid mandate by the NCP leadership based on partywide consensus. The issue of succession to 

party leadership further complicates these differences. The NCP senior strata are jockeying for 

pole position in a post-Bashir party following the announcement that the president will not 

contest the next presidential election.13 The camps break down largely into supporters of the 

current second vice president, Ali Osman Taha, and the presidential advisor Nafie Ali Nafie.14

The traditional northern opposition parties—most notably the National Umma Party15

and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)—are weak. Each is led by a longtime figurehead16

who has resisted handing the party reins to a younger generation. Consequently, many 

see these parties as being out of step with the current political realities. They performed 

relatively poorly in the flawed 2010 elections, with each boycotting to varying degrees but 

gaining little political traction as a result. There have been efforts to form an opposition 

coalition including Umma, the DUP, the Communist Party, Popular Congress Party (PCP), and 

others, and commitments made to negotiate as a single opposition entity with the NCP but 

simultaneously Umma and DUP have pursued their own parallel negotiating tracks with the 

NCP to discuss some degree of power sharing following southern secession. Many opposition supporters in the future Republic of Sudan, especially among the youth, are resigned 

to the likelihood that one or both parties will eventually cut a deal with the NCP benefiting 

senior party members but preserving much of the status quo.17 The PCP, the product of a 

split within the NCP in 1999, is openly encouraging the overthrow of the government, but 

many are suspicious of the motives of its leader and former Bashir mentor, Hassan al-Turabi; 

rumors of back-channel negotiations between the two only heighten wariness.

An important factor in northern politics is the SPLM-Northern Sector. While the majority 

of SPLM supporters are southerners, the party enjoys a substantial following in the Blue 

Nile and Southern Kordofan states on the northern side of the north-south border, with the 

Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) drawing many troops from there. The SPLM also has 

supporters elsewhere in the north, especially in and around Khartoum, and its presidential 

Lacking its previous oil revenues, 

the north cannot ignore the 

economic price of continuing or 

potentially starting new armed 

conflicts driven by the existing 

political dynamic.
6

candidate in the 2010 elections, Yasir Arman, performed reasonably well despite officially 

withdrawing soon before the vote. The SPLM is going through its own reorientation, with 

the northern sector set to spin off from the rest of the SPLM and possibly operate under a 

new name. The northern sector leadership faces some crucial decisions about the party’s 

future trajectory, including whether it will be a largely regionally based party, focusing on 

Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, or aspire to effect change across the north in a way the 

SPLM never did during the CPA interim period. If it chooses the latter, the party may prove 

to be a force in northern politics. But to achieve this, its political partnerships will need 

to expand beyond its traditional ideological fellows (such as the communists) to the more 

influential Umma and DUP. Arman is trying to popularize the concept of a new south in the 

north—a union of marginalized, peripheral populations that can challenge the center—

which suggests an attempt to broaden the party’s horizon. However, there is little precedent 

in Sudanese history to suggest that peripheral regions can unify around a common cause for 

an extended period of time.

But perhaps the greatest force in northern politics will be the same force at the center 

of much of the ongoing change in the Middle East and North Africa: youth18 and civil society. Both have been marginalized, coopted, and manipulated to varying degrees, but show 

impressive resilience. Youth within the political parties feel constrained by sclerotic leadership. Those affiliated with the NCP, who are probably the most organized of Sudan’s youth, 

have recently been agitating for change within the party as they search for opportunities to 

take on leadership positions. A similar dynamic plays out within the younger cadres of the 

main opposition parties. As in other countries in the region, Sudan’s population is relatively 

young, with an estimated 70.6 percent of the population, including southern Sudan, under 

the age of twenty-nine19 and hungry for employment opportunities and political inclusion. 

Tech-savvy youth have organized several small demonstrations in Khartoum and elsewhere. 

Civil society in the north is underdeveloped and often accused of being politicized, in part 

because the political space is so narrow that some politicians retreat to civil society. But 

it is growing in competence and influence, and needs to be included in any dialogue about 

the future Republic of Sudan.

The Problem of Individual Processes: Missing the Forest 

for the Trees

A dialogue about the future of Sudan is impeded by the habitual treatment of Sudan’s 

problems in isolation from one another, even if the problems have a common cause. This 

leads to fragmented responses from Sudanese and the international community and limits 

the ability of northern political actors beyond the NCP to gain traction. An inventory of 

current peace agreements and special protocols shows the extent of the trend: they include 

the CPA between the SPLM and the government of Sudan, which includes special provisions 

for the border region of Abyei, the northern states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, and 

the national capital area in Khartoum; the largely defunct Darfur Peace Agreement; and the 

often overlooked Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement.20

All the agreements have a particular regional focus. The CPA comes closest to articulating a national agenda and vision for democratic transformation throughout Sudan, but as 

opposition politicians frequently observe, it is not truly comprehensive because it is an 

agreement between only the government of Sudan and the SPLM. Nor does it address Darfur 

or eastern Sudan in any meaningful way. The vision of democratic transformation over the 

course of the six-year interim period was scuttled early on, and may have died with John 

Garang, the former SPLM leader. Assertions that the CPA has been fully implemented show 

little grounding in reality, especially when it comes to the agreement’s democratic transforA dialogue about the future 

of Sudan is impeded by the 

habitual treatment of Sudan’s 

problems in isolation from one 

another, even if the problems 

have a common cause.
7

mation agenda. In retrospect, the CPA in many ways was adapted into a regional agreement 

for governing the south and north-south relations during the interim period21; the southern 

leadership viewed the CPA’s provision for the southern referendum as by far its most crucial 

component, and made little effort at national reform. 

None of Sudan’s regional agreements or protocols effectively address fundamental governance issues. The CPA aspires to address some of these issues, but falls well short in implementation. The current agreements largely reflect the government’s disposition toward the 

conflict at that time—an urgency to settle, the strength of the parties—rather than a rational evolution of criteria for determining the degree of devolution. The negotiating parties 

frequently bargain out of self-interest, in the worst case treating governance negotiations 

(power sharing) as a vehicle for their own entry into government. Furthermore, the regional 

agreements distract from a more national focus. When they touch on national issues, such 

as degrees of federalism and autonomy, they do so only from a regional perspective. They 

address fundamental governance issues in a partial, insufficient manner, with specificities 

to the region in question. When such agreements focus only on specific regions, they can 

produce negative consequences by infringing on the substance of issues that are national 

in character. National-level questions demand national-level approaches, tackling the issues 

comprehensively and at once, not piecemeal. 

Two ongoing regional processes risk perpetuating the trend of partial solutions if 

not included as parts of a greater whole: the Darfur negotiations and the popular consultation processes in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states. Each is described in further 

detail below.22

Darfur Negotiations

Common visions of a Darfur political settlement comprise a mix of local and national issues, 

with the predominant focus on the larger national issues: wealth and power sharing.23

Because Darfur’s woes are primarily a result of the Sudanese center-periphery dysfunction, a 

Darfur peace agreement can only be a partial solution. But, as with popular consultation, by 

addressing a greater problem in piecemeal fashion, Darfur-specific negotiations complicate 

matters. Darfur deserves special compensation, but political redress should be based first on 

an analysis of what specifically is required in Darfur to restore normalcy, and second on what 

should be part of a greater renegotiation of the Sudanese political compact. For the moment 

the two are conflated, confusing peacemaking efforts in Darfur and distracting attention 

from the necessary comprehensive process. 

An exhaustive cataloguing of the Darfur issues under negotiation is beyond the scope of 

this report, which instead focuses on elements relevant to the argument for a more national 

process. It is possible to divide the issues under negotiation in Darfur roughly between 

those of a local and national character. The local issues are more complex and less suited to 

resolution in large international fora, but they are of greater relevance to the Darfur population, whose primary interest is a return to normalcy, security, justice, and compensation. 

They include the intertwined issues of land administration, security for returning displaced 

communities, and the status of the traditional authority structures severely affected by the 

war. Justice and compensation round out the package; less essential to hard security on the 

ground, their impetus is the moral and psychological necessity of recognizing wrongdoing.24

This aside, these demands have been invoked so often that they reverberate as rights among 

the population, making it impossible to jettison them.

International negotiations have gravitated toward demands of a national-level character. 

Various rounds of rebel-government talks center on reconfiguring wealth and power sharing, 

invoking Darfur’s percentage of Sudan’s total population as justification for an increased 

National-level questions 

demand national-level 

approaches, tackling the issues 

comprehensively and at once, 

not piecemeal. 
8

share. The result is an inversion of efforts. Local demands and issues should be the focus of 

Darfur peacemaking efforts. Successful conclusion of the local process would allow Darfur 

to participate in the national-level dialogue to address its concerns with wealth and power 

sharing as well as Darfur’s internal boundaries. 

Popular Consultation

An afterthought for much of the CPA interim period, popular consultation is increasingly 

a focus of attention. Chapter Five of the CPA, dealing with the resolution of the conflict 

in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states, defines popular consultation as a “democratic 

right and mechanism to ascertain the views of the people of Southern Kordofan/Nuba 

Mountains and Blue Nile States on the comprehensive agreement reached by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement.”25 If those views suggest that 

citizens of either state see shortcomings in the CPA, the relevant state legislature “shall 

engage in negotiations with the National Government with the view of rectifying these 

shortcomings.”26 The CPA provides little additional detail on the popular consultation process, though the legislation governing popular consultation, passed acrimoniously in late 

2009, provides some additional guidance. 

Many in the two states view popular consultation as a mechanism for negotiating stronger state rights and a greater degree of autonomy from Khartoum.27 Consultations in Blue 

Nile state have proceeded relatively smoothly, in part due to generally positive NCP-SPLM 

cooperation at the state level and significant international support. Through April 2011, 112 

citizen hearings were held, involving more than 70,000 state residents. But largely due to 

the delay in state-level elections, there has been little progress in Southern Kordofan state 

outside of preparatory activities, including civic education about the process focusing on 

the state and locality levels. While every other state held elections for governor and state 

assembly in 2010, elections in Southern Kordofan were postponed due to disagreement over 

state census results. They were finally held in May 2011, but as of this writing, the popular 

consultation process in the state had barely gotten off the ground.

The principles behind popular consultation—listening to citizen demands, transparency, 

inclusivity, and renegotiating center-periphery relations—are laudable. As has been argued 

elsewhere,28 if popular consultation is a constructive process in these two states, it could 

be a model for citizen engagements and inclusive decision making for the whole future 

Republic of Sudan.29

A More Comprehensive Approach: Advancing the Process

To make comprehensive national dialogue and reform a reality, the NCP must be convinced to 

lead; the realpolitik of the moment leaves no alternatives. The most effective argument for 

persuading NCP leaders to engage in genuine reform is likely that it increases their chances 

of political survival, with the Arab Spring revolts providing some evidence of an alternative: 

in two neighboring countries, lack of or inadequate reform has imperiled governments.30

Important economic benefits may also be realized if increased international investment in 

the economy is a product of reform. Some in the NCP rightly see the urgent need for revenue 

diversification, which could happen if investors grow more confident that Sudan is politically 

stable and can be convinced that its market is worthy of investment. Fundamentally, the 

NCP should embark on a reform process out of its own rational interests.

Much is made of providing incentives to the NCP. Normalizing ties with the United States 

is important to the NCP, but it has a jaundiced view of the U.S. administration’s ability to 

deliver, given that multiple branches of the U.S. government must be dealt with to make 
9

normalization a reality. Incentives that support the ailing economy may be particularly 

attractive at this stage, but whether the international community can mobilize a critical 

mass of these incentives (such as increased international investment), or the NCP will find 

them credible, or hold up its end of any incentive-based agreement, are open questions.

To embark on reforms, the NCP’s short-term concerns for survival should be addressed. 

NCP leaders sometimes articulate two red lines sacrosanct to them: the legitimacy of their 

rule and sharia.31 The NCP’s opponents should reassure the party that, in the short term, 

regime change is not intended if party members engage in a meaningful national dialogue 

and reform process, which should include in its agenda methods for making the next elections more fair and legitimate than the 2010 elections. The dialogue should be about how 

the future Republic of Sudan is governed, not who governs. Concerning sharia, it may be 

advantageous to shift the conversation from whether or not sharia is the source of legislation to what type of sharia is under consideration, as there are many different variations, 

and to whom sharia applies. 

The reform process should be nationally designed and driven, not internationally 

imposed, with the designers representing a wide array of interests well beyond the NCP. The 

NCP may reject what it perceives as any external infringement. The natural counterpoint, 

that the NCP proactively launch the initiative and then shape any international engagement, resonates with the pro-dialogue NCP camp, but may elicit skepticism from the international community. Initiating the process is partially about creating the right conditions 

and incentives, but is also intertwined with methodology. A key question concerns how a 

national process can encompass existing processes—the Darfur negotiations and popular 

consultations—and angle them toward a single destination.

It is unlikely that the NCP will decide whether to reform and what methodology to use, 

and then proceed. This complicates matters, as a neat sequencing from the process perspective begins with intra-NCP consensus on the need to open a dialogue, with the next step 

being an exploration of the dialogue’s contours with actors outside the NCP. More likely, 

and consistent with the current state of play, various exploratory tracks will launch without 

internal NCP consensus and with competition among the strands. This competition may constitute a form of natural selection, with opposing camps shutting down inchoate initiatives, 

leaving only the most credible to progress. But this survival of the politically fittest does 

not guarantee that the best initiatives survive. The result may instead be counterproductive, 

as rivalries obstruct progress on all tracks, delaying or terminating any hope of progress 

while burning the hands of those involved. If party consensus is achieved, but in opposition 

to reform, then these exploratory tracks have almost no prospect. Instead, pursuing such 

initiatives will grow more risky, perhaps causing all such activity to desist. 

Two Views on Process

In practically shaping a national process, there are at least two options for the initial step: 

a top-down, elite-driven approach and an unofficial consensus-building tack.32 The latter 

takes a soft approach to exploring positions among the main political actors by working 

with second-tier, proxy figures. Think tank representatives, senior but formally semi-dissociated individuals, and others could meet without the commitment and high stakes that 

a meeting of principals entails. The informal environment would allow for an exploration 

of ideas and positions to be communicated back to the principals. Hopefully, the common 

ground and trust generated would prove sufficient to create the confidence necessary for 

the main players to formally engage. 

The former approach prioritizes the need for the direct engagement of power and the main 

actors. Dealing with proxies, this approach implies, risks a process not anchored in reality. The 
10

bona fides of the proxies are in question and the principals may disavow the process (though 

proponents of the other approach may argue that this is a selling point). Instead, the way 

forward would be to build consensus directly among the most powerful established political actors. There is a sequencing envisaged here that would mirror, to a degree, the current 

bilateral talks. The first step could be an NCP-Umma accord, then NCP-DUP, possibly followed 

by NCP-SPLM-Northern Sector, with the smaller northern parties following suit. 

Regardless of how the process starts, it is crucial that once a general consensus is 

established at the higher levels, the process broadens to embrace civil society and other 

sectors, potentially drawing on the popular consultation model of conducting large-scale 

consultations. These need to include the entire periphery, including representatives from 

the east and far north, because so many northern Sudanese are not represented by any of 

the elites. When this occurs, three core principles should be paramount. First, the process 

should be participatory, meaning that many Sudanese from a variety of backgrounds have an 

opportunity to participate and express their views. Second, it should be inclusive, meaning 

that northern Sudan’s considerable diversity is represented, and people not captured by the 

Arabic-Islamic paradigm are included. Third, it should be transparent, meaning that citizens 

have access to the grassroots discussions and an opportunity to follow and understand the 

process. Inevitably, some of the elite-level negotiations will be conducted in secret, but 

when the larger population is engaged, the discussions should be accessible to all.

If the process fails to be inclusive, it risks missing out on the real political capital that 

could be accrued. Given the major opposition parties’ weak popular constituency, large 

swaths of the population, including the burgeoning youth sector, risk being marginalized 

from the process. If increasing popular enfranchisement and thereby government stability is 

a major goal of the process, there is little point if it remains an elitist process and the means 

of engaging the broader population are sidelined. Those in the NCP who recognize this may 

debate the sequencing and timing of such an outreach, but agree on the importance of a 

popular consultation–type outreach at some point. Without that component the process will 

fail to be legitimate, making it ultimately irrelevant.

Third-party facilitation of the process is also in question. The pro-reform NCP camp recognizes the need for facilitation, as it is a party to the process and so cannot simultaneously 

be an impartial arbiter. There is a gulf of trust that a third party can help bridge. But NCP 

skeptics reflexively distrust external mediation; having been subject to many mediations in 

the past, they see it as a concession of sovereignty to grant only under duress. The debate 

around seizing the initiative thus comes back into play, with those favoring it arguing that 

the international community and facilitation can be used to their benefit if the NCP acts 

as the initiator. 

The normative determinants of a suitable third party are its impartiality and knowledge 

of the context. Securing acceptability among all the parties is difficult and may only be 

achieved by demonstrating even-handed, competent action. The current reality is that 

nonacceptance by the NCP would be a nonstarter. Among potential facilitators, the U.S. 

government’s support will be important, as always, but it is likely not positioned to play a 

facilitating role, given the current roadmap that governs U.S.-NCP relations and the lack of 

trust in both directions. The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), with its uncertain 

future and the hangover of NCP antipathy linked to its role in the CPA, may find itself in a 

difficult position. Norway and the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) 

may have the proper profile and political track record. Nontraditional facilitators with decent 

relations with both the NCP and the opposition also may be considered, such as Ethiopia, 

South Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), or one of the Gulf 

states. Regardless of which organizations play what roles, the international community will 

need to remain exceptionally unified in its support of a comprehensive national process.

If increasing popular 

enfranchisement and thereby 

government stability is a major 

goal of the process, there is 

little point if it remains an 

elitist process and the means 

of engaging the broader 

population are sidelined.
11

Ultimately, whichever approach is adopted, and whether or not there is outside facilitation, the dialogue process should feed into the development of a new constitution. The 

future Republic of Sudan will need a new constitution to replace the interim national 

constitution soon after southern secession, as many provisions in the interim constitution 

will no longer apply and have already been repealed.33 The document produced will be the 

foundation for governance for the foreseeable future.34 As mentioned above, this report 

argues for a reorientation of political efforts in the future Republic of Sudan from diffuse 

local processes toward a single primary track, which should lead to a new constitution. 

Embarking on this national process is a political choice. The only existing trigger for the 

process is the constitutional review called for in the CPA. Of course, only Sudanese can make 

the decisions associated with any dialogue and reform process. It is apparent, however, that 

reforms should address several key issues, so that an important opportunity is not missed. 

Those issues include the nature of the relationship between the center and the periphery 

and the degree of federalism to be employed; the role of sharia in the future Republic of 

Sudan—not only whether it is a source of legislation, but which form is to be employed 

and to whom is applies; diversity in Sudan, and how it can be managed; democratization 

and agreement on the timing and conduct of the future Republic of Sudan’s next elections 

at various levels; and implementation of agreements, ensuring that they are not selectively 

implemented but implemented in their entirety.

Managing the Existing Processes

If a comprehensive reform approach is to move forward, it raises the question of what 

becomes of the ongoing regional processes. This report cautions against continuing to 

address national-level issues through separate processes, as this diffuses efforts into fighting various eruptions of the center-periphery dynamic throughout the periphery. 

In the case of Darfur there are further rationales for creating a single reform process. The 

rebels ostensibly representing Darfur in the Doha negotiations do so with ever-increasing 

dubiousness. The splintering of the rebels and the implications for their representativeness are 

well known. Less debated, though equally important, is the question of apportioning power 

through securing a seat at the table, in the (understandable, given the current war) absence 

of a democratic process. The most recent negotiations in Doha focus on two issues, currently 

at an impasse, that are presented as requisite to peace in Darfur but of a national character. 

The first is the redrawing of Darfur’s administrative boundary, creating a single region out of 

the present three states, which is a priority for the armed movements. The second is demands 

for power sharing and a dedicated vice president who must hail from Darfur. 

There is a comprehensible logic behind the desire for a single region for Darfur. It 

strengthens Darfur’s bargaining power with the center, limiting the possibility of a diffusion 

of its electoral bloc, and centralizes the region’s government (and therefore increases its 

national weight) rather than spreading it thinly with individual ties between each state and 

Khartoum. The government counters that creating a single region for Darfur sets a precedent 

that will ignite a chaotic chain reaction: observing Darfur’s increased autonomy—or, for 

that matter, the increased autonomy of Southern Kordofan or Blue Nile—will inspire other 

northern regions to demand the same, leading to a spiral of increasing negotiations with 

different actors. There is a fear in Khartoum that devolution is only the first step toward 

secession. Some believe that the greater autonomy of Darfur, Southern Kordofan, or Blue 

Nile re-creates—though not identically—the trajectory of southern Sudan. 

Given the above, we argue that the Darfur peace process should be re-envisaged and ultimately made subordinate to a larger northern process. Efforts toward peace in Darfur should not 

seek to fix only Darfur’s ailments but aim to create the conditions by which Darfur can participate 
12

in a national dialogue on governance of the future Republic of Sudan. Issues particular to Darfur 

should still be addressed separately. The important issues of returns, traditional authority, justice, 

and compensation are specific to Darfur and essential. They cannot be completely isolated from 

issues of a national character—there is no such clean division—but they are more local than 

national. The question of the region of Darfur, and the issues of power and wealth sharing, should 

be a national discussion, with the referendum on Darfur’s administrative status postponed.35

To participate in the national dialogue, Darfur must make major strides. It is arguably 

the furthest behind in its ability to participate by virtue of the ongoing hostilities and the 

lack of agreed-upon representation and mechanisms for consulting with the wider population. Current leadership structures are contested between the new leaders—that is, the 

Darfur rebels and the camp leaders—and traditional authorities. Somewhere in between is 

the local government, nominated through flawed elections in 2010, which does not enjoy 

sufficient popular support to act on Darfur’s behalf. Thus, Darfur requires most immediately 

a cessation of hostilities, which could create an environment conducive to the next step: 

establishing means of widespread consultation, resulting in a mechanism for representation 

in a national process. The popular consultation methodology may be instructive in this 

regard. The future of Darfur’s rebel movements and other emergent and existing leadership 

lies in reconfiguring them as political players. Ideally, the process to resolve the local-level 

issues will conclude before Darfur engages in a national process. But should this prove too 

ambitious, scope and capacity should be reserved to allow for some concurrency. 

Careful handling of the shifts in Darfur’s politics and political position is essential. The 

ceiling of expectations has been raised through the Darfur Peace Agreement signed in Abuja 

in 2006 and the Doha negotiations. Redirecting focus to the national dialogue is possible but 

subject to blowback. If goodwill and serious efforts are not exerted in the first stage of settling 

local Darfur issues, the chance for a wider national process will be lost. This caveat aside, there 

is a growing awareness among Darfuris that the solution lies in broadening the vision of reform. 

Seizing this opening with a deft touch and strong commitment could be enough. 

The same careful handling is required with the popular consultations. Regardless of the 

outcome, it will be important that the consultation process and the states involved in it are not 

isolated or excluded from national processes, especially regarding constitutional development. 

Many of the issues being negotiated in popular consultation—power sharing, wealth sharing, 

natural resource management, land, security, antidiscrimination measures, and sharia—are 

not unique to the two states but of great concern to every state. As with Darfur, seeking to 

address these issues only in the two states will rankle other peripheral states and their populations, particularly if concessions are made to the two states that are out of reach for other 

states. Such an outcome may be acceptable to leaders in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile 

states, and even to some of the Khartoum leadership, but it will only perpetuate the trend of 

fragmentation that produces partial and ultimately insufficient agreements.

That the central government is not obligated to adopt the recommendations that will 

conclude the popular consultations is often lamented as a shortcoming.36 But viewed with 

the primary aim of consolidating Sudan’s varied processes into a singular national process, 

the open-endedness of the consultations is beneficial.37 Rather than acting as another local 

process encroaching on national issues, it can be a vanguard for the methodology of broadbased citizen consultation, and its conclusions can be taken as a more advanced stage of 

the national dialogue that other regions will take part in eventually. 

Conclusion

Northern Sudan is at a turning point. Its leadership needs to articulate a vision of what the 

country will look like in the years to come, something that goes beyond the rhetoric of its 

If goodwill and serious efforts are 

not exerted in the first stage of 

settling local Darfur issues, the 

chance for a wider national process 

will be lost. 
13

Islamic, Arab character. Former South African president Thabo Mbeki has suggested that 

such a vision could be more African in orientation:

We hold firmly to the view that northern Sudan is no less “African” than southern 

Sudan, and that Islam is a religion of Africa, just as the Arabs of Sudan and the 

Mahgreb are people of Africa. As pan-Africans we are proud of the achievements of 

the Arab and Muslim civilizations on this continent, which we regard as an integral 

part of our heritage.38

Sudanese and international efforts should focus on addressing the central issue of governance through a process of national dialogue that leads to a new constitution. To achieve 

this, existing processes and finalized agreements cannot be ceased or disavowed. But a new 

conceptual approach can be adopted that would see its final product as national reform. To 

do this requires a shift in ongoing local processes. These processes—Darfur negotiations 

and popular consultations—should no longer be seen as self-contained, nor should their 

conclusion be viewed as an end in itself, but rather a step that allows people from these 

regions to participate in the greater national dialogue. To get there, these processes should 

be divided into two levels: on one level, the local issues necessary to address in order to 

create conditions for Darfur, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile to participate in a broader 

national dialogue; and on the other level, issues of a national character to be dealt with in 

that national dialogue.39

The benefits to the above approach are many. From the government’s perspective, agreeing to concessions is more logical if they are made at the national level and understood to be 

singular and final. Making concessions once and comprehensively ends the fear of precedent 

setting and one-upmanship with each successive local process. Agreeing to a single region 

in Darfur is not the same as agreeing to reform the number of states and their administration. Confident that the process addresses the issues finally, the government need not hold 

concessions in reserve. The concern that another region’s war will demand further negotiations is abrogated. A comprehensive approach creates incentives for the future Republic of 

Sudan’s disassociated peripheries to engage the center and interact with each other, building a base for national unity, instead of turning in on themselves and only confronting the 

center in hostility. 

However logical the national approach may be, significant challenges await. Time is short 

prior to southern secession in July. Leaders in Blue Nile, and to a lesser extent Southern 

Kordofan, may be eager to conclude some popular consultation agreements before July. 

Darfur requires significant progress to be stable enough to engage in a national approach. 

Developing the means for its political representation in the process will depend on whatever 

agreement is reached on the rebel-government track. It remains uncertain whether the NCP 

would genuinely engage in a comprehensive national process and dialogue. Hard-line elements may stand in the way and increasingly appear to be doing so. But the alternative to 

a more national approach and a new political compact—continued fragmentation of issues 

and more firefighting in the periphery—only condemns the future Republic of Sudan to 

further instability. 

Making concessions once and 

comprehensively ends the fear 

of precedent setting and oneupmanship with each successive 

local process.
14

Notes

1. In this report, future Republic of Sudan refers to the existing Sudanese state following the secession of southern 

Sudan; it is also frequently referred to elsewhere as north Sudan or northern Sudan.

2. Though, as elsewhere in Africa, the colonial borders created a challenging mix of ethnic polities to unite into a 

nation.

3. Even if such assertions are only meant to placate a certain northern audience.

4. The African Union Panel on Darfur reached a similar conclusion in its seminal 2009 report, writing that “the roots 

of Darfur’s crisis lie in a history of neglect of the Sudanese peripheries, dating from colonial times and continuing 

during the years of Sudan’s independence. The crisis in Darfur is a manifestation of Sudan’s inequitable distribution 

of wealth and power.” See African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), “Darfur: The Quest for Peace, 

Justice, and Reconciliation,” AUPD, October 2009, available at http://www.sudantribune.com/African-UnionPanel-on-Darfur-AUPD,32905 (accessed May 19, 2011).

5. The center-periphery pattern of governance in Sudan is well illustrated in Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes 

of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Oxford: James Currey, 2003). 

6. This view is less espoused in the NCP’s public statements but has been communicated via interviews with some 

NCP interlocutors and by Sudanese figures close to the NCP. 

7. Examples include new calls for the more complete implementation of sharia and the definition of the cultural 

identity of the north as essentially Islamic and Arab. 

8. As discussed below, the CPA made important efforts to address governance in Sudan, but many governancerelated provisions of the CPA were not fully implemented.

9. For a detailed description of the current northern political landscape and an in-depth description of the NCP, 

see International Crisis Group, “Divisions in Sudan’s Ruling Party and the Threat to the Country’s Stability,” 

Africa Report no. 174, May 4, 2011, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/

sudan/174-divisions-in-sudans-ruling-party-and-the-threat-to-the-countrys-future-stability.aspx (accessed May 

19, 2011).

10. The National Islamic Front’s original Islamist vision did not ignore governance for a singular focus on religious 

ideology. In their view, Islamism was meant to provide a complete package of government, including social and 

economic provisions. But over time, most elements of this vision faded, leaving behind a government with a 

veneer of ideology that it lacked in practice. 

11. Sudan may be less likely to witness Arab Spring revolts for several reasons, among them the loyalty of the 

intelligence services to the government, the general supremacy of the intelligence services over the military, and 

the relative lack of strength and organization among the opposition.

12. Southern members of the Government of National Unity and national assembly in Khartoum will lose their 

positions upon southern secession, requiring those positions to be filled or a shake-up of northern governance 

structures.

13. “Sudanese President Bashir Won’t Run for Election Again in 2015, Party Says,” Bloomberg, February 21, 2011, 

available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-21/sudanese-president-bashir-won-t-run-for-electionagain-in-2015-party-says.html (accessed May 19, 2011).

14. International Crisis Group, “Divisions in Sudan’s Ruling Party.”

15. There are also several splinter Umma parties.

16. Sadiq al-Mahdi for Umma, who twice served as prime minister, and Muhammad Osman Al Mirghani for the DUP.

17. There is already some dialogue among northern political elites concerning the way forward. At the time of writing, 

negotiations between the NCP and Umma as well as the DUP continue, albeit fitfully. But the northern opposition 

is torn between existential expediency and loyalty to higher principle. Rather than focusing on the need for 

national governance reform, less altruistic deals may be under discussion. Weak showings in the last elections 

drive the opposition’s analysis that, lacking a strong constituency, bilateral deals with the NCP could be the best 

way forward. The substance of these talks is shrouded in secrecy. If they tend toward the narrow interest of the 

parties involved, then they likely include positions for opposition figures in the government. A second topic is 

the future of the national assembly. Details emerging on this issue outline two scenarios under discussion. One 

sees the appointment of seats resulting from a bilateral deal, with a number of seats apportioned to the northern 

opposition. To accompany the inflation of numbers, some have suggested increasing the assembly seats from the 

existing 450 to 600. Another scenario leaves the apportioning of seats to be determined by coming elections at 

a yet undefined date. 

18. In Sudan, people under thirty-five years of age are generally considered to be youth.

19. U.S. Census Bureau, “International Data Base,” available at http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/

informationGateway.php (accessed May 19, 2011).

20. Dealing with each conflict in isolation may be a government strategy, so as to better control the negotiation process.

21. Mahmood Mamdani has characterized the CPA as “power-sharing without democratization.” See Mahmood 

Mamdani, “Africa: South Sudan—Rethinking Citizenship, Sovereignty and Self-Determination,” May 5, 2011, 

available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201105060738.html (accessed May 19, 2011).

22. It is not a focus of analysis here, but another ongoing process and potential venue for discussing the future 

of northern Sudan is the negotiation between the NCP and SPLM on postreferendum arrangements mediated 

by the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan, chaired by former South African president 

Thabo Mbeki. Those negotiations focus largely on the details of dividing one state into two, such as sharing oil 

revenue, citizenship rights, and border management. Some of those issues, especially economic issues, will bear 

significantly on the future of the north. 

23. Commensurate with the immensity of the war’s carnage, the ceiling of demands has been elevated; the normative 

consensus almost unconsciously forming is that the severity of suffering can only justify negotiation at the 

highest level.

24. The issue of compensation also has an important practical element, as funds would facilitate the return of the 

displaced families. 

25. See the text of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 74, available at http://www.usip.org/publications/

peace-agreements-sudan (accessed May 19, 2011).
15

26. See the CPA.

27. Some residents of both states see popular consultation leading to a referendum on joining the Republic of South 

Sudan or even becoming an independent country, but there is no provision for that outcome in the legislation 

and little appetite for such a result outside the states. Of particular concern is the host of armed elements present: 

both states are home to a volatile mix of Sudan armed forces, Popular Defense Force militias, SPLA troops, and 

other allied militias.

28. See Jason Gluck, “Why Sudan’s Popular Consultation Matters,” USIP Special Report no. 260, November 

2010, available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR260%20-%20Why%20Sudan%27s%20Popular%20

Consultation%20Matters.pdf (accessed May 19, 2011).

29. But there are many questions about whether Khartoum will make meaningful concessions to the two states, 

citizens’ expectations can be managed, and armed elements can be kept at bay. The process is based on the 

constitutional review process employed in Kenya and can be a model for creating a national constitution. These 

consultative processes have proved to be important to reconciliation and national consensus building elsewhere. 

They can also, of course, be problematic if the government is not seen to be responding to popular will.

30. Of course, one could learn the opposite lessons: that a crackdown, not reform, maximizes the chances of staying 

in power.

31. Zuleikha Abdul Raziq, “NCP: Abyei to Remain with North,” Sudan Vision, March 29, 2011.

32. If intra-NCP consensus emerges beforehand, the first option—elite-level dialogue as a beginning—will be the 

avenue of choice for the party. 

33. A transitional constitution could be put in place to buy time for a process of developing a permanent constitution, 

as is the plan in southern Sudan; or northern leaders could try to move straight to a new permanent constitution. 

In either scenario, there is an opportunity to use the constitutional development process as a vehicle for dialogue 

about the nature and trajectory of the future Republic of Sudan. But to be effective, that dialogue will need to 

include a diverse array of participants.

34. Sudan’s current constitution, the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan, is generally a fair 

and progressive document that makes important commitments to democratization and human rights. But the 

implementation has not lived up to the promise of the document, as is often the case in Sudan.

35. At the time of writing, the government is planning to conduct the referendum on Darfur’s status in July and has 

proposed creating two additional states in Darfur, as opposed to consolidating the existing three states into a 

single region.

36. There are, however, provisions within the popular consultation legislation that allow for international arbitration 

if there is no agreement.

37. Technically, the popular consultation processes are supposed to end by the conclusion of the CPA (July 9), but 

there seems to be a general acceptance that they will go beyond that date.

38. Thabo Mbeki, “Sudan in Africa: A Vision for the Future,” January 5, 2011, available at http://blogs.ssrc.org/

sudan/2011/01/05/sudan-in-africa-a-vision-for-the-future (accessed May 19, 2011).

39. Of course, it should not be only these three regions participating in national dialogue but every region of the 

future Republic of Sudan, including the east and far north.
United States 

Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

Of Related Interest

•	 Oil in Sudan by Jill Shankleman (Special Report, June 2011)

•	 Why Sudan’s Popular Consultation Matters by Jason Gluck (Special Report, November 2010)

•	 Civic Education and Peacebuilding: Examples from Iraq and Sudan by Daniel H. Levine and 

Linda S. Bishai (Special Report, October 2010)

•	 Local Justice in Southern Sudan by Cherry Leonardi, Leben Moro, John Ryle, Martina 

Santschi, and Deborah Isser (Peaceworks, October 2010)

•	 Scenarios for Sudan’s Future, Revisited by Jon Temin and Jaïr van der Lijn (Peace Brief, 

August 2010)

•	 Improving Natural Resource Management in Sudan by Paul Sullivan and Natalie Nasrallah 

(Special Report 242, June 2010)

•	 Scenarios for Sudan: Avoiding Political Violence through 2011 by Alan Schwartz (Special 

Report, August 2009)