About the Report

The United States Institute of Peace, in conjunction with 

Mobile Accord, TechChange, the UN-mandated University for 

Peace, and the National Defense University, hosted a Smart 

Tools for Smart Power event on June 24, 2010, entitled 

“Can You Help Me Now? Mobile Phones and Peacebuilding in 

Afghanistan.” The meeting brought together a cross section of 

the leading innovators in the use of mobile phones in difficult 

environments with Afghanistan specialists and government 

policymakers. Mobile telephony has significant potential 

to further peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan. This report 

summarizes the key points addressed during the meeting and 

expands on them with additional research and analysis.

Sheldon Himelfarb is executive director of the Center of 

Innovation for Science, Technology, and Peacebuilding of 

the United States Institute of Peace. Cecilia Paradi-Guilford, 

a recent graduate of the Fletcher School of Tufts University, 

works for the World Bank on information and communications 

technology policy and operations in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, 

and India. Nick Martin (president, TechChange) and Anand 

Varghese (senior program assistant, Center of Innovation for 

Science, Technology, and Peacebuilding) provided additional 

research assistance.

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 259 November 2010

© 2010 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Sheldon Himelfarb

with contributions from Cecilia Paradi-Guilford

Can You Help Me Now?

Mobile Phones and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan

Summary

•	 A decade ago, mobile phone usage in Afghanistan was almost nonexistent; now there are 

13 million subscriptions for a total of 29 million citizens, and the annual growth rate of 

subscription is estimated at 53 percent. A number of factors have fueled this dramatic 

increase, including the sheer popular demand for communication, an absence of viable 

landline substitutes, government deregulation, and a competitive market that flourishes 

despite the conflict.

•	 Each of the major telecommunications companies in Afghanistan identifies the same five 

challenges to future expansion: poverty, high illiteracy rates, corruption, an untrained workforce, and lack of security. Despite these challenges, Afghanistan has proved an exceptional 

case study in the use of mobile phones for social change in support of peacebuilding, as it 

has been the focus of numerous pilot application programs conducted by the government, 

non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector.

•	 Mobile money transfer (MMT) applications have proved to be powerful mechanisms for 

helping to reduce corruption, foster security sector reform, and promote economic development. Yet neither the international community nor the Afghan government has shown 

the will or the capacity to move MMT programs forward at a pace commensurate with their 

demonstrated potential. At least two other high-value mobile applications were cited during the June summit as having improved conditions for stability and reconstruction in early 

deployments: (1) the provision of market information through mobile phones, especially in 

the agricultural sector, and (2) the use of mobile phones to strengthen local governance 

and civil society. Both applications have sufficient promise to warrant large-scale rollouts 

and merit careful consideration by international donors, whose support is vital during the 

transition to sustainability.

•	 Other applications on the horizon that hold tangible if still aspirational promise for peacebuilding are those that use mobile phones for land dispute resolution, election monitoring, 

and gender empowerment and education.

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Contents

Opportunities and Challenges of Mobile Telephony 2

The Mobile Telephone Landscape in Afghanistan 2

Slowing Growth 3

Demonstrable Potential 4

Conclusions and Recommendations 12
2

•	 Across nearly all mobile phone applications in Afghanistan, two overarching needs appear 

essential to adoption: user training and an interactive voice response system to accommodate a largely illiterate population.

•	 International organizations operating in Afghanistan play a vital role in helping the country 

realize the promise of mobile telephony, bringing lessons learned from other conflict environments and the development sphere. Yet there is currently no mechanism in-country for 

coordinating across these organizations and with Afghan stakeholders, despite the obvious 

need for shared infrastructure and security. A mobile applications working group would be 

a powerful step toward promoting accelerated rollout, ongoing innovation, and greater 

cooperation and efficiencies among donors, NGOs, and telecommunication companies 

themselves.

Opportunities and Challenges of Mobile Telephony

Mobile phones and their potential contributions to peacebuilding efforts and development 

in Afghanistan have attracted increasing attention and resources. The narratives fluctuate 

between excitement about the latest new application of mobile telephony and profound 

disappointment with the uptake of those applications owing to insurgent attacks, vandalism, corruption, or sheer incompetence.1

The reality, of course, is more complex. Mobile phone usage has increased dramatically 

across the country, connecting citizens on a hitherto unimaginable scale, raising new hopes, 

and presenting new challenges. In this report we reflect on both the challenges and the 

opportunities in an effort to assist policymakers in optimizing the expanding resources 

being applied to the mobile phone sector in Afghanistan. Although mobile phones certainly play a significant role in development and stabilization across a number of sectors 

in Afghanistan, much more can be done to realize this technology’s potential. At the same 

time, much of this potential cannot be realized without fundamental changes in the broader 

political and rule-of-law environment in which the mobile sector operates.

The Mobile Telephone Landscape in Afghanistan

Nine years ago, Afghanistan had between 10,000 and 20,000 fixed lines, and mobile telecommunications were virtually nonexistent. Since then the country has seen explosive 

growth in mobile subscribers, network providers, and physical infrastructure. The total number of subscriptions is approximately 13 million for a total population of roughly 29 million 

people, and the annual growth rate of subscription is estimated at 53 percent (2009–10).2

A 2009 Asia Foundation survey found that 52 percent of households had mobile phones 

(compared to 81 percent for radio, 41 percent for television, and 6 percent for computers). 

Moreover, 44 percent of rural households reported having a mobile phone, and 11 percent of 

those surveyed said they used short message service (SMS) to receive news and information 

about current events at least once a week.3

Afghanistan is a sparsely populated, volatile country with a largely rural population. 

Almost all of its thirty-four provinces contain rugged, mountainous terrain and lack developed 

transportation infrastructure and a stable electricity supply. These characteristics, combined 

with the violent conflict that has engulfed the country since 1979, have imposed serious 

limitations on the expansion of fixed telephone line infrastructure and postal services.4

Once mobile telephony was identified as the optimal information and communications 

technology, the government of Afghanistan, with technical assistance from the U.S. government and international organizations, began to design a regulatory policy to encourage 

growth.5 They created a market regime based on “aggressive liberalization, transparent 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor 

of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, 

D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American 

University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, James R. 

Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. • Ikram U. 

Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, 

Nev. • Kerry Kennedy, Human Rights Activist • Stephen D. 

Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor 

of Law, George Mason University, Arlington, Va. • Judy Van 

Rest, Executive Vice President, International Republican 

Institute, Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy •

Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
3

regulation, fair competition and private sector participation.”6 Today there are five competitors in the Afghan market: Afghan Wireless (AWCC), a partly state-owned company; Roshan, 

a domestic company; MTN Afghanistan and Etisalat, which have operations across the Middle 

East and Africa as well; and Afghan Telecom, which is fully owned by the state. According 

to estimates, each of the private companies has at least a 20 percent market share, with 

AWCC and MTN emerging as the dominant players. Most important, competitive market conditions have driven down prices by about 70 percent since 2003, expanding7 affordability 

and ultimately making telecom, according to Mohammad Stanekzai, the former minister of 

communications and current adviser to President Hamid Karzai, “the fastest growing sector 

in Afghanistan today.” In fact, taxes on the mobile sector account for about 15 percent of 

government revenue,8 and the sector has become one of the largest employers of the local 

labor force, second only to the agriculture sector.

Slowing Growth

Despite their competition and differing public-private constituencies, leaders from the five 

mobile network operators (MNOs) in Afghanistan interviewed for this report agreed that 

the continued pace of expansion would be determined by their ability to grapple with five 

principal challenges. 

•	 Poverty. More than a third of the Afghan population lives below the poverty line, which 

poses unique pricing difficulties for MNOs.9 At the time this report was written, it cost 

four Afghanis (AFN) per minute to make a phone call. Insofar as the annual income for 

the average Afghan citizen is 18,524 AFN, a one-hour monthly mobile call requires about 

one-sixth the average user’s annual salary.10 These per-minute usage rates are prohibitive 

for most low-income users. 

•	 Illiteracy. Only about 28 percent of the population is literate, making Afghanistan the second most illiterate country in the world.11 Though mobile phones are more accommodating 

to illiterate populations than other communication media, they still require basic literacy 

and numeracy to be used easily. User training and interactive voice response (IVR) systems 

help address this problem but greatly increase the cost per user. 

•	 An untrained labor force. Only 16 percent of boys and 8 percent of girls attend secondary school in Afghanistan. Consequently, MNOs must recruit from a severely untrained 

labor force and invest much more than their counterparts in other countries on employee 

training. At one point, MNOs tried to recruit skilled labor from abroad, but the worsening 

security situation largely ended this initiative. The problem is compounded by a lack of 

ICT-related skills among the Afghan government staff and ministers, who are now receiving 

some support and training from USAID, the UN, and other international organizations.12

•	 Corruption. The Afghan telecom sector has identified widespread corruption as a major 

cause of drastically increasing business costs. In 2008, the World Bank rated the amount 

of “informal payments it takes to get things done” in Afghanistan as roughly 40 percent 

higher than the world average.13 Bribery mainly involves midlevel bureaucrats, particularly 

customs officials, though in some cases provincial leaders are also involved. Some MNOs 

pay bribes to gain bureaucratic support, and the fierce competition between MNOs only 

fuels such behavior.14

•	 Security. The Afghan state is unable to protect its citizens or their property, or to enforce 

the rule of law.15 In the telecom sector, this means that insurgents and vandals are able 

to disrupt communications either by attacking mobile towers, which cost about $250,000 

each, or by stealing the electrical generators the towers run on.16 During the 2009 presidential elections the Taliban blew up eighteen Roshan towers alone, costing the company 

Taxes on the mobile sector 

account for about 15 percent 

of government revenue, and the 

sector has become one of the 

largest employers of the local 

labor force, second only to the 

agriculture sector.
4

$14 million in total damages—a figure that could have been markedly reduced had Roshan 

agreed to pay insurgents the extortion money they demanded for protection, which Roshan 

cannot do according to its company rules.17

Taliban forces have also shut down mobile service because of the ability of international 

military forces to monitor their transmissions.18 The Taliban even issued a fatwa demanding 

that mobile towers be switched off or risk being blown up, an order that was later amended 

to apply only to overnight operations. Thus, in the southern and eastern areas of the country, where the insurgents are strongest, MNOs generally turn off their towers at night.

However, innovative protection programs are beginning to show good results. Roshan, 

for example, introduced the Community Protection Plan (CPP) in 2009. The CPP empowers 

local communities to manage security threats by providing them with tangible economic 

benefits in the form of both revenue and energy sharing from the use of solar panels on 

mobile towers. Community members receive compensation tied to the productivity of the 

mobile towers they protect. Today Roshan has a thousand towers covered by the CPP. It has 

seen a $13 million increase in revenue through gains in productivity and a roughly twothirds reduction in losses, in part attributable to the success of the CPP.19

Demonstrable Potential

Despite these daunting challenges, Afghanistan’s MNOs not only continue to expand operations at an impressive pace, as noted earlier, but have also experienced noteworthy success 

in a few high-profile mobile programs with potentially profound implications for the country’s stability and peacebuilding efforts. These programs are 

•	 mobile money transfer, 

•	 increased market information access, and

•	 measures to strengthen local governance and civil society.

All three have demonstrated tangible impact in either pilot programs or small-scale 

implementations, with MMT showing the most potential, according to the experts surveyed, 

to transform accountability in such critical areas as salary payments to police and other government workers.20 It should also be noted that in the first two of the three applications, 

Roshan is the leading implementing MNO, a function of its unusual mandate to engage in 

social and economic development by virtue of the majority ownership held by the Aga Khan 

Fund for Economic Development (AKFED).21 While three of the other mobile providers, Etilasat, AWCC, and MTN Afghanistan, have devoted resources to corporate social responsibility 

programs, Roshan has specifically utilized its mobile networks and products to support such 

programs in Afghanistan. 

Mobile Money Transfer: A Vitally Important Application

A staggering 97 percent of the population of Afghanistan is unbanked, and most customers earn so little income that their business is of little interest to most commercial banks. 

This leaves microfinance institutions and numerous informal lenders as the only financial 

resources available to most Afghans.22 It is against this backdrop that MMT has become one 

of the most exciting mobile applications in Afghanistan to date, with proven value for not 

only facilitating economic development and commerce but for helping to curb corruption.

M-Paisa, the debut MMT project in Afghanistan, was launched two years ago by Roshan 

in partnership with Vodafone and with support from USAID’s Agriculture, Rural Investment 

and Enterprise Strengthening (ARIES) program. Modeled after the highly successful M-Pesa 

program in Kenya (pesa means “money” in Swahili, as does paisa in Dari), it allows users 

to deposit and withdraw cash from mobile-based accounts, pay bills, secure microfinance 

A staggering 97 percent of the 

population of Afghanistan is 

unbanked, and most customers 

earn so little income that their 

business is of little interest to 

most commercial banks. This 

leaves microfinance institutions 

and numerous informal lenders 

as the only financial resources 

available to most Afghans.
5

loans, purchase goods with e-currency, and transfer money between users with their mobile 

phones. Customers are required to have identity documentation to create an account, and 

their transactions can be tracked, making money laundering and other crimes difficult. 

The planned electronic national ID system in Afghanistan will further help MNOs adhere 

to Know-Your-Customer regulations and prevent the creation of ghost accounts. After each 

transaction, users immediately receive an SMS confirming the amount exchanged. Roshan 

had 130,000 M-Paisa customers at the end of March 2010. Since April 2010 it has been 

acquiring between five hundred and eight hundred new M-Paisa customers daily.23

Other mobile operators in Afghanistan are beginning to develop plans for MMT systems of 

their own. According to AWCC, for example, the company is actively working on implementing 

a “full-fledged mobile financial services platform” that would include salary and retail payments, among other services, which it hopes to begin deploying within the next year.24

Roshan has delivered MMT services to a number of private companies, allowing them to 

electronically administer salaries to their employees. Perhaps most significant in terms of 

the conflict has been the use of M-Paisa to distribute salaries to members of the Afghan 

National Police. Fifty officers in the 2009–10 pilot program in Wardak province received 30 

percent larger payments with the program and did so about twenty days sooner than prior 

to their enrollment, because salary poaching from their commanding officers and manual 

transport methods were reduced. This is critical when, according to accounts from policemen 

that were aired on Radio Afghanistan, the timeliness of their salary payments has greatly 

affected force retention. One Kabul-Kandahar highway patrolman interviewed said that 

fifteen to twenty of his fellow policemen in the same area had left the service as a result of 

tardy payments, which have been known to arrive as much as five months late.25

Even in its preliminary stages, M-Paisa has produced several benefits, in addition to the 

shortened pay cycle and transparency noted above:

•	 Expanded cash distribution systems. All the banks in Afghanistan combined manage to 

reach only 2.2 million people, and there are only thirty-eight ATMs in the entire country. 

M-Paisa agents are present in all thirty-four provinces, and more are being added all the 

time. This offers end-users unprecedented access to cash distribution systems in both rural 

and urban areas, a foundational requirement for economic development. The central bank 

(Da Afghanistan Bank, or DAB) has successfully tested its Afghan Funds Transfer System, 

but owing to widespread distrust of the banking system, Afghans continue to depend 

on informal money vendors known as hawallahs and personal networks. MMT provides a 

cheaper and more transparent alternative to these informal systems.26

•	 Expanded reach of microfinance institutions. Microfinance institutions report that by utilizing M-Paisa for microfinance loan repayments, they have been able both to leverage their 

resources more efficiently and to expand their footprint into remote and rural areas using 

fewer personnel. By the end of March 2010, almost seven thousand clients of First Microfinance Bank were using M-Paisa, out of about forty thousand total active borrowers. Of the 

bank’s twenty-one full-service branches, seventeen already have M-Paisa-trained agents, 

and First Microfinance Bank has been so enthusiastic about the system that it has actively 

encouraged other telecom companies to begin developing similar services.27

•	 Reduced financial transaction fees. Fees charged to customers, both individual and institutional, are negligible compared with fees charged using current methods, for using M-Paisa 

eliminates the need to travel with cash in high-threat areas and other opportunities for 

cash skimming. 

Using M-Paisa eliminates the 

need to travel with cash in 

high-threat areas and other 

opportunities for cash skimming. 
6

Challenges to Mobile Money Transfer

In the case of M-Paisa, perhaps the greatest technical hurdle to the implementation of MMT 

was resolved early on: the widespread illiteracy that required enhancement of the system 

with IVR technology. The system now responds to English, Dari, and Pashto instructions.28

Yet major challenges to the wider adoption of MMT in Afghanistan remain. 

•	 Electronic money and financial sector regulations and cooperation with banks. The country’s 

electronic money regulations need adapting to embrace the expansion of an effective 

MMT system. Yet MMTs are regulated by the central bank (DAB) through its money service 

provider (MSP) and electronic money institution regulations, and it is the banking system 

that derives substantial profits from transaction fees, interest payments, and other charges 

under the status quo. According to some estimates, if the M-Paisa program alone were 

scaled up to its full potential, more than $60 million a year that is currently lost in the 

financial system because of corruption and banking fees could be retrieved.29 Roshan, 

with assistance from CGAP, the World Bank, and USAID, worked with DAB30 to produce a 

revised version of MSP regulations that would accommodate more prevalent MMT.31 Yet 

the banking sector remains wary of, if not hostile to, MMT, because it reduces profitable 

customer transaction costs up to sixfold.32 As Roshan’s Shainoor Khoja pointed out during 

the June summit in Washington, D.C., “With the efficiency that the telco brings, you are 

now disrupting the ecosystem.”33

•	 Fraud. MMT customers must own a mobile phone to enroll in the service.34 Because mobile 

devices cost at least $10, and a third of Afghans live below the poverty line, Afghan 

households often share phones, which adds additional complexity to security of funds.35

However, this problem is not insurmountable if each MMT user has his or her own SIM card 

to insert into the shared handset. More challenging has been the problem of police commanders taking the SIM cards from their officers and presenting them to M-Paisa agents 

en masse as a way to continue their practice of skimming money from each paycheck. The 

need for personal identification numbers to draw money with each SIM card prevented this 

threat from being realized. Nonetheless, it underscores the more intractable problem of 

officers determined to stymie the program for reasons of personal gain.

•	 Training and marketing. Despite the availability of user-friendly IVR technology, Afghans 

who have lived in a cash-based society are unaccustomed to the concept of handling 

money through a technology-enabled platform. In order to scale the program, acquire subscribers, and address the general lack of public awareness about the benefits of MMT, more 

customer training, product agents, and marketing are required. When the mobile-based 

salary payment was first introduced to pay policemen in Wardak, some of them became 

frustrated as they could not use the system, which prompted Roshan and its partners to 

deliver more extensive training to its agents. However, this is time-intensive and expensive, 

as training agents costs between $5,000 and $6,000 per agent per year. 

•	 Liquidity. Another challenge to wider scaling is smooth cash management and sufficient 

liquidity for M-Paisa agents, who may receive and disburse large amounts of cash. This 

will be an issue for any MMT system being deployed for large-scale salary disbursement. 

Tackling this problem requires far greater partnership with banks, which has been difficult 

for reasons already stated. 

The bottom-line conclusion of virtually every expert consulted for this report, whether 

authorities on Afghanistan’s financial industry, telecommunications experts, or experts on 

endemic corruption, was that the opportunities for MMT in Afghanistan are vast and the 

challenges surmountable. If the practice of mobile-based salary payment were to expand, 

for example, it could allow the Afghan government to deduct taxes at the source, resulting 

in enhanced government revenues and more transparency in taxation. Reportedly, more than 

If the M-Paisa program 

alone were scaled up to its 

full potential, more than $60 

million a year that is currently 

lost in the financial system 

because of corruption and 

banking fees could be retrieved.

Afghans who have lived in 

a cash-based society are 

unaccustomed to the concept 

of handling money through a 

technology-enabled platform. 
7

$3 billion in cash has left Kabul in recent years, which is more than what the Afghan government collects in taxes and customs revenue each year. Some suspect that the greatest part 

of this cash has been siphoned from international aid money and U.S., NATO, and European 

contracts and flown out of the country in suitcases or transferred through the national 

system of informal money vendors or hawallas.

36 A nationwide rollout of the pilot project to 

pay Afghan National Police salaries through M-Paisa, estimated to cost approximately $50 

million, could be a first step in reducing this kind of corruption.

Despite the stunning success of the pilot program, however, Roshan’s repeated efforts to 

secure U.S. government funding assistance have met with little success to date. Similarly, 

the Afghan government has done little to facilitate this expansion. According to one expert 

who attended the June summit in Washington, D.C. (and who asked for anonymity), “The 

reason why the police salary payment scheme hasn’t been rolled out on a national basis 

is the Ministry of the Interior. Hanif Atmar signed off on it, but after he was sacked, the 

program lacked support. Why? Perhaps the biggest reason is that the senior police chiefs all 

take their cut—for instance, it costs a $200,000 bribe to become the provincial police chief 

of Balkh (or at least it did)—and they make their investment back partly by farming out the 

district police chief and other senior roles, and at all levels they want the ghost salaries.”

While it has been impossible to verify the specifics of this comment, similar sentiments 

have been echoed by others who have seen MMT programs transform banking in countries 

such as Kenya and Uganda: “It is unconscionable,” observed another summit participant, 

Emrys Schoemaker from iMedia, “that a program as powerful as this one for helping to fight 

corruption and promote economic development is not being aggressively deployed while so 

much blood and treasure is spilled to achieve the very same things.”

Other mobile applications, such as those discussed in the next section of this report, 

have also met with considerable success in Afghanistan. Judging from expert opinion, 

however, MMT appears to have the greatest near-term potential for affecting peacebuilding 

objectives such as reducing corruption. The full impact will only be realized, however, if the 

mobile-based salary payment program is expanded to encompass all police, as well as others 

on the government payroll. 

Finally, it should be noted that a 2007 strategy report by the Afghan Ministry of Communications and Information Technology lists the following as one of its priority goals: 

“By the end of 2008, mobile commerce should be possible on a nationwide basis and also 

facilitate standard commercial transactions amongst users and vendors.”37 This goal is still 

far from being achieved.

Two High-Value Mobile Applications

Accessing market information through mobile phones. Recent successful innovations around 

the globe in the use of mobile-based information exchanges for commodity pricing to assist 

small farmers and fishermen have inspired similar deployments in Afghanistan. In Niger, for 

example, the marketing and distribution of millet, a household staple sold via traditional 

markets scattered across the country, have been dramatically improved by making SMSbased information about pricing, surpluses, and shortages available to traders. Similarly, in 

the Indian coastal state of Kerala, the economist Robert Jensen found that mobile phones 

reduced price differences across fish markets by almost 60 percent between 1997 and 2001. 

Further, mobile phones significantly reduced the amount of catch left unsold at the end of 

the day by providing fishermen with information on the markets with the best prices and 

demand for their catch.38

In Afghanistan, organizations such as Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI), Mercy Corps, 

Roshan, and USAID have adapted lessons learned from Niger, India, and elsewhere to introduce 

It is unconscionable that a 

program as powerful as this 

one for helping to fight 

corruption and promote 

economic development is not 

being aggressively deployed 

while so much blood and 

treasure is spilled to achieve 

the very same things.
8

a range of programs—TAMAS, TradeNet, Malomat—that use mobile phones to inform Afghans 

of agricultural prices in markets beyond their immediate vicinity. Although the security situation limits the mobility between markets seen in Kerala (India) and elsewhere, the information 

itself has enabled greater efficiency in sales and distribution. 

The TAMAS program, developed by DAI’s USAID-funded agriculture program, for instance, 

provides five hundred producers, suppliers, and salesmen with price updates on twenty-five 

commodities at eleven different locations, all through an SMS system in the eastern part of 

Afghanistan. The system receives sixty to eighty price requests through SMS each day, allowing users to know how much farmers elsewhere are charging on the open market, or what 

the market is willing to pay for their products.39 The program is currently being expanded 

to the northern and western regions of Afghanistan and enhanced to incorporate IVR, given 

the inability of so many farmers to read text messages. Usage is rising steadily, reports DAI, 

which is also expanding TAMAS to cover animal stock, leveraging work that USAID and Mercy 

Corps have already done to develop a livestock market information system.40

TradeNet provides essentially the same service with similar usage rates, and its users 

indicate they would like to expand the system to include international market prices from 

neighboring countries.41 Roshan and DAI, the creators of TradeNet and TAMAS, respectively, 

have recently decided to work together more closely and consolidate these programs, expand 

into other regions of Afghanistan, and then expand into neighboring Pakistan as well. This 

collaboration represents a welcome development in light of the promise of these systems 

and the economic realities of Afghanistan. Donor funding is variable and sustainability is a 

core concern; eliminating such redundancies is essential. Until a sufficient revenue stream 

can be generated, interim financing is vital for subsidizing the cost of getting to scale.

Mobile phones to improve local governance and civil society. The discussion of mobile telephony vis-à-vis the political dimensions of the conflict has been dominated by the Taliban’s 

use of the medium for propaganda and threats. In particular, summit participants noted 

the increasing use of mobile phone videos distributed by the Taliban, to some effect—a 

point echoed in a report prepared for the British Department for International Development, 

whose author, Nick Fielding from iMedia, described how a “gateman at the compound had 

just received a video sent to his mobile phone. It turned out to be a martyrdom video showing a young Afghan man preparing to carry out an IED attack on Coalition troops. The video 

was accompanied by songs extolling the prowess of the mujahideen fighters and ended with 

an explosion.”42

Viewing these videos requires handsets that are multimedia capable—still relatively 

limited in-country but increasing rapidly. Nevertheless, the prevailing sentiment of summit 

experts was that the most effective way to oppose the extremists lies not in countering 

their propaganda with more propaganda but in leveraging the power of mobile phones to 

enhance the ability of citizens to communicate directly with their government on key issues 

of daily concern, as well as to communicate with each other in new, “networked” ways. 

In terms of the former, enhancing local governance, Afghanistan has evolved rapidly as a 

test bed for mobile-based programs at the district level that have the potential to improve 

both communication with government officials and transparency. This is exemplified by the 

work done by the UK-managed Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), which has 

launched two mobile-based programs that deserve careful consideration for broader rollout 

in other districts: a specialized call-in radio program and a crime-reporting hotline. The team 

has demonstrated initial success in holding local government officials accountable for their 

response to emergencies and crime while engaging civil society anew, and the programs 

make for worthwhile case studies.

Radio call-in shows are not new to Afghanistan. What distinguishes this weekly program 

in Helmand is the expanding audience it has, thanks to its regular use of provincial officials 

The most effective way to 

oppose the extremists lies not 

in countering their propaganda 

with more propaganda but in 

leveraging the power of mobile 

phones to enhance the ability of 

citizens to communicate directly 

with their government on key 

issues of daily concern. 
9

as hosts who take questions from citizens about civil administration. The show is hosted 

on local station Bost and is funded by the UK government, which purchases commercial 

airtime for the show. Radio is the most popular and easy-to-use communication medium in 

Afghanistan, but call-in programs have had varying degrees of success. This show, however, 

has proved to be very popular by allowing provincial officials, who are constrained in their 

ability to travel because of security concerns and poor transport, to speak about the state 

of affairs in their sectors and address the concerns of constituents. Nick Lockwood of the 

Helmand PRT underscored the potential of this forum when he described a program that 

had led a senior police chief to make a number of changes to his unit in response to listeners’ complaints about corruption among his officers. Subsequent programs hosted by other 

district police chiefs benefited by attracting ever bigger audiences. 

In an information-starved environment like Afghanistan, where such call-in programs 

meet with notable success, officials should also consider using an IVR-based news system 

to combat the rumors that can be so dangerous. In fact, the Institute for War & Peace 

Reporting launched its IVR-based news service around the September 2010 elections in 

Afghanistan. Its Cell Phone Voter Project provided users with a toll-free number to access 

news stories about the elections via their phones in Dari, Pashto, and English.43

MobileActive.org’s Katrin Verclas, a pioneer in mobile phone deployments, pointed to 

Zimbabwe, where MobileActive.org had helped to implement an information system with 

features that could be adapted for similar purposes. On hearing of an event or news story, 

users can send an SMS to the system, which then replies with a phone call that provides 

accurate information about the event or news. Users can listen to messages in three different languages. In the first week of its implementation in Zimbabwe, this program received 

over three thousand phone calls and is helping to create a more politically engaged public. 

Verclas further noted that mobile telephony is likely to be used more frequently in this way 

to raise awareness of critical issues of citizen concern, share documented stories of local 

crime and corruption, record user responses to questions and prompts, and poll citizens 

about local issues. Lockwood of the Helmand PRT confirmed this observation in the Afghan 

context, indicating plans to explore ways of promoting the agenda, activities, and meetings 

of the District Community Councils (DCCs) as a way of creating a sense of ownership of the 

DCCs among their constituent populations and instilling a demand for services. USAID also 

has plans to create a service called Mobile Khabar (khabar means “news” in Dari and Pashto) 

to use mobile phones as a delivery system for news and information.44

Lockwood further recounted the Helmand PRT’s establishment of an emergency call-in line 

called Crimestoppers that allows citizens to report incidents of violence and crime over their 

mobile devices. People are encouraged to call when they see crime or need help. The Helmand 

PRT stresses that this is not designed for counterinsurgency but rather is a form of traditional community policing, akin to the Neighborhood Watch programs in communities across 

America. Shortly after being established, the line received an average of 1,060 calls a week, a 

volume that was both encouraging and problematic. When first established, the program had 

only one active phone line and one operator, creating frustration for callers. Plans are under 

way to create ten more lines and hire additional operators. But even when those lines are in 

place, coordinating an effective government response to users’ concerns will be a challenge, 

and Lockwood cautioned against raising unrealistic expectations among citizens.

Siddhartha Raja of the World Bank indicated that the bank is working with the government of Afghanistan to launch multiple initiatives to assist the government in using mobile 

technologies to strengthen program management and public service delivery. The goal is a 

functional ICT ecosystem, created and used in cooperation with government ministries and 

the private sector, that will be able to leverage mobile applications as both a mechanism 

to monitor the progress of various government programs and a means to connect more 

In an information-starved 

environment like Afghanistan, 

where such call-in programs 

meet with notable success, 

officials should also consider 

using an IVR-based news system 

to combat the rumors that can 

be so dangerous.
10

Afghans to finance, information, and markets. As seen from the pilot programs launched 

in Helmand province and elsewhere, however, there is already much to be learned from the 

provincial programs’ experience in using mobile telephony to improve governance and civil 

society development. 

Finally, summit participants encouraged policymakers to draw on lessons learned from 

similar programs that have been deployed in the region. In Pakistan in October 2009, the 

State Department, in collaboration with Mobile Accord, launched the mobile-based social 

networking platform Humari Awaz (“Our Voice” in Urdu). It allows users to create communities around various interest areas, sharing information with one another via SMS text messages. The program surpassed its initial projection of 24 million text messages in five weeks, 

a volume it expected would take a year to reach. The State Department funded these first 24 

million text messages. The program connected over one million people and, by the time of 

the summit, had delivered more than 300 million messages, at times to groups numbering in 

excess of fifty thousand users. Enabling a similar kind of social network platform in Afghanistan appears to be eminently feasible, observed Mobile Accord founder James Eberhard at 

the summit. The U.S. embassy in Kabul has subsequently issued a request for proposals to 

create a similar platform in Afghanistan.45

Others at the summit, such as Ivan Sigal of Global Voices, emphasized the importance 

of capitalizing on lessons learned in Pakistan. For example, there was a dramatic drop in 

usage in Pakistan once texting was no longer free, and Afghanistan will certainly be more 

price sensitive. In addition, the IVR component of the system will be more vital to success 

in Afghanistan than it was in Pakistan. 

Aspirational Mobile Applications

Numerous mobile applications being used around the world were discussed at the Washington summit for their potential value in the rapidly evolving mobile landscape of Afghanistan. Reference was made to English-language-learning programs in Bangladesh and mobile 

health programs in Malawi and Zambia; the latter have already been adapted on a small 

scale for prenatal care in Afghanistan.46 However, three applications were identified as 

particularly noteworthy, for different reasons, and should be given careful consideration by 

ICT planners going forward:

•	 land dispute resolution,

•	 election monitoring and citizen reporting, and

•	 gender empowerment and education.

Land dispute resolution. Land ownership is a major source of conflict in Afghanistan, 

particularly in remote and rural regions. Eighty-five percent of Afghans rely on the land’s 

resources as their primary source of livelihood. The recent announcement of a trillion dollars’ 

worth of lithium and other mineral resources in Afghanistan only magnifies the issue.47

The Internet Bar Organization (IBO), a nonprofit organization that focuses on the use of 

technology tools for justice and dispute resolution, is developing the Silk Road Initiative, 

a project that will train Afghan dispute specialists to leverage mobile telephony to collect 

information vital to resolving land disputes through peaceful arbitration. This includes 

using smart phones to record GPS coordinates of boundaries, taking photographs, noting 

information about the disputed properties, and then sending the data via SMS to Silk Road’s 

main hub for arbitration. This information will be kept in a digital repository with free and 

open access. In addition, a panel of arbitrators (either trained by IBO or drawn from local 

elders) will be empowered to render decisions, which will be transmitted back to disputants 

via mobile phones.

There was a dramatic drop 

in usage in Pakistan once 

texting was no longer free, and 

Afghanistan will certainly be 

more price sensitive.
11

Currently, the promise of this program seems to be mainly in capturing land data in 

digital form through the use of smart phones in order to convert handwritten and woefully 

inadequate land records into reliable digital repositories. The actual arbitration via mobile 

phone of the project is decidedly more problematic. Although a great deal of preparatory 

work has been done, considerable cultural challenges remain, given Afghanistan’s traditional 

justice system. Most of the Afghanistan rule-of-law experts who were consulted expressed 

great skepticism about the willingness of local communities to abide by decisions rendered 

by officials, however impartial, who are remote and unfamiliar to them. 

Election monitoring and citizen reporting. The Afghan presidential and Provincial Council 

elections held on August 20, 2009, were marked by violence and fraud. Ballot-box stuffing 

and voter intimidation were rampant, and roughly one-fourth of all votes were discarded 

as a result.48

At the time of that election, a unique mobile phone–enabled mapping platform known as 

Ushahidi was deployed by the Afghan organization Pajhwok News with support from Small 

World News, an international NGO, to document election irregularities. The project was 

called Alive in Afghanistan. Eighty designated election monitors from Pajhwok News circulated to various polling centers around the country and were instructed to use their mobile 

phones to text and call in incidents of violence and fraud, along with other relevant news 

about the elections. The information was then verified at Pajhwok’s central command station and plotted on a Web-based map. Citizens were also invited to submit data via SMS.

There were problems, however. On the day of the election, a rumor spread that the 

Afghan government was monitoring the mobile phone traffic. This rumor was never substantiated, but nevertheless it intimidated people who might otherwise have contributed useful 

information, and the number of reports received was disappointing, given the extent of the 

irregularities. In addition, the system was set up relatively late in the election cycle, which 

also meant fewer people were aware of the reporting option available to them. But some 

valuable lessons were learned from this initial effort, and the prospects of success are much 

greater for future elections, judging from similar efforts to leverage the Ushahidi platform 

for monitoring elections in other conflict-prone societies.49 A consensus view developed 

at the Washington summit regarding the importance of investing sufficient resources in 

advance of the next milestone election to ensure an effective mobile phone–based election 

monitoring program is in place. 

Gender empowerment and education. The Taliban regime significantly constrained the lives 

of Afghan women, banning them from education and other activities. As a consequence, 

women are the most illiterate group in the country, with only 8 percent of girls enrolled in 

secondary school.50 Those who do attend school in areas where the Taliban remain in control 

face extreme risks such as acid attacks.

Nonetheless, Afghanistan has seen some progress in recent years in providing women 

with opportunities for both education and economic empowerment. In partnership with 

AfghanAid, Roshan launched the Women’s Public Call Office (WPCO) in 2007. The WPCOs are 

essentially phone booths run by women that can be used for domestic and international 

calls. These franchises are also operated by men, but female managers receive special microfinance loans at lower interest rates and a 60 percent discount on airtime they use.51

But the program has encountered strong social and cultural resistance. Women who 

received media attention for their participation were forced to leave their businesses 

because of local peer pressure and outrage from male colleagues. Consequently, programs of 

this sort are still very rare in Afghanistan, despite their evident success in other countries 

with similar literacy and poverty profiles, such as Bangladesh, where the Grameen Village 

Phone System and Mobile Women programs have developed huge followings. Similarly, 

Most of the Afghanistan 

rule-of-law experts who were 

consulted expressed great 

skepticism about the willingness 

of local communities to abide by 

decisions rendered by officials, 

however impartial, who are 

remote and unfamiliar to them. 

Women who received media 

attention for their participation 

were forced to leave their 

businesses because of local peer 

pressure and outrage from male 

colleagues.
12

mobile-based educational platforms have enormous untapped potential for Afghanistan, 

judging from the results that organizations such as UNESCO are reporting for projects such 

as Literacy by Mobile Phone that they have launched in other countries, including Pakistan. 

Neither will be possible, however, without tackling the social stigma faced by women in the 

community, let alone women wanting to use cell phones. If there is a lesson to be learned 

from the mobile phone–based gender empowerment programs to date, it is that participants 

and sponsors alike must be mindful of the extreme dangers to women in these programs, 

and must be vigilant to protect them.

Conclusion and Recommendations

With the tremendous growth in mobile connectivity and the presence of so many organizations devoted to positive social change, Afghanistan has become an incubator for high-value 

mobile-based applications and their use in peacebuilding. Their potential is considerable, 

and the following recommendations are designed to help the country realize this potential 

as quickly and as fully as possible. 

•	 Create a coordinating mechanism. A mobile applications working group with staff support should be created that is tasked with promoting accelerated rollout, innovation, 

and greater cooperation and efficiencies among donors, NGOs, and telecom companies 

themselves. The Washington summit surfaced several programs that have shown great success on a local or pilot program level and are poised for larger-scale implementation. The 

working group would be separate from, but communicate with, the Telecom Adviser Team 

being set up to coordinate the broader ICT strategies of ISAF, the U.S. Department of State, 

USAID, the Afghan Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, and MNOs. 

•	 Facilitate shared adoption among MNOs of community-based security models. 

Roshan’s Community Protection Plan, which combines productivity incentives with renewable energy production to engage communities in tower protection, has demonstrated the 

value of this approach for infrastructure security and revenue generation. 

•	 Integrate IVR into plans for scaling applications. IVR should be integrated into applications going forward to avoid unnecessary delays. IVR has proved to be a foundational, 

“need-to-have” technology, owing to Afghanistan’s pervasive illiteracy. 

•	 Make MMT a priority in the fight against corruption. The importance of MMT in fighting corruption should be communicated unequivocally to the Afghan government and 

financial support provided for MNOs to roll out nationwide public and private sector salary 

payment programs. Whenever possible, international governments should use MMT to pay 

their own contractors and employees to facilitate greater transparency and more effective 

cash management. 

•	 Collaborate with the Afghan government to incorporate mobile platforms for public 

services delivery. The U.S. government and international development organizations such 

as the World Bank should step up efforts to work with the Afghan government to expand 

the use of mobile telecommunication technology for internal government systems as well 

as for public services delivery, such as education, administration, and taxation.

If there is a lesson to be learned 

from the mobile phone–based 

gender empowerment programs 

to date, it is that participants 

and sponsors alike must be 

mindful of the extreme 

dangers to women in these 

programs and must be vigilant 

to protect them.
13

Notes

1. Chris Bold, “In Afghanistan, Going Where No Bank Has Gone Before,” Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 

(CGAP), January 1, 2010, http://technology.cgap.org/2010/01/19/in-afghanistan-going-where-no-bank-hasgone-before/.

2. Afghan Ministry of Communication, http://www.mcit.gov.af/.

3. Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2009, 137–45, http://asiafoundation.org/country/afghanistan/2009-poll.php.

4. Euromonitor, “Towards Universal Mobile Coverage,” http://www.euromonitor.com/Special_Report_Towards_

universal_global_mobile_phone_coverage (accessed September 29, 2009).

5. Larry Wentz, Frank Kramer, and Stuart Starr, “Information and Communication Technologies for Construction and 

Development: Afghanistan Challenges and Opportunities,” January 2008, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/

documents/Info%20and%20Comm%20Afghan%20NDUJan08.pdf (accessed January 20, 2010).

6. Ken Zita, “Afghanistan Telecom Brief” (Network Dynamics Associates, USDTA South Asia Communications 

Infrastructure conference, New Delhi, April 21–23, 2004).

7. B. Bhatia and N. Gupta, “Transforming Telecoms in Afghanistan,” Gridlines, 1 (Washington, D.C.: Public-Private 

Infrastructure Advisory Facility/World Bank, April 2006), 3.

8. M. Stanekzai, former minister of communication and current adviser to the president of Afghanistan on 

internal security, e-mail interview, November 4, 2009; C. Paradi-Guilford, “Managing Socio-political and Security 

Challenges in the Afghan Mobile Telecommunications Sector,” master’s thesis, Tufts University, March 2010.

9. CIA Factbook—Afghanistan, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html.

10. Bank Development Indicators Database, World Bank, July 9, 2010, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/

DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf.

11. CIA Factbook—Afghanistan. 

12. Wentz, Kramer, and Starr, “Information and Communication Technologies for Construction and Development.”

13. World Bank Group, Doing Business Report 2009, http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreEconomies/

?economyid=2.

14. Interview with Roshan executive, in Paradi-Guilford, “Managing Socio-political and Security Challenges in the 

Afghan Mobile Telecommunications Sector.”

15. V. Nasr, professor at the Fletcher School, Tufts University, and adviser to U.S. Special Representative to 

Afghanistan-Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, lecture (Tufts University, Medford, MA, January 2010).

16. S. Khoja, head of corporate social responsibility, Roshan, interview, July 23, 2010.

17. S. Khoja, remarks at the conference “Can You Help Me Now?” (United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 

June 24, 2010).

18. N. Lockwood, remarks at the conference “Can You Help Me Now?” 

19. Paradi-Guilford, “Managing Socio-political and Security Challenges in the Afghan Mobile Telecommunications 

Sector.”

20. Khoja, remarks at the conference “Can You Help Me Now?”

21. Roshan, http://www.roshan.af/Roshan/About_Roshan/Shareholders/Aga_Khan_Development_Network.aspx.

22. Microfinance Investment and Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA), Update 2010, http://www.misfa.org.af/ 

(accessed July 10, 2010).

23. A. Bantug-Herrera and S. Adinofli, “Enabling Mobile Money Interventions: Full Primer,” Financial Sector Knowledge 

Sharing—USAID, FS Series (Washington, D.C.: USAID, April 2010), www.mfw4a.org/resources/documents/

documents-details/enabling-mobile-money-interventions.html?dl=1 (accessed July 12, 2010).

24. Albert Lopez, Afghan Wireless (AWCC), e-mail correspondence, September 15, 2010.

25. “Afghan President Promises to Look into Non-payment of Police Wage,” BBC Monitoring: International Reports 

(London: BBC, June 10, 2005).

26. Wentz, Kramer, and Starr, “Information and Communication Technologies for Construction and Development.” 

27. Bantug-Herrera and Adinofli, “Enabling Mobile Money Interventions.”

28. S. Khoja, e-mail correspondence, July 25, 2010.

29. Ibid.

30. International Finance Corporation, “Telling Our Story: Focus, Delivery, Results,” November 2008, http://www.ifc.

org/ifcext/media.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/TellingOurStory_Nov08/$FILE/TellingOurStory_Nov08.pdf.

31. Bantug-Herrera and Adinofli, “Enabling Mobile Money Interventions.”

32. S. Khoja, interview, July 23, 2010.

33. Khoja, remarks at the conference “Can You Help Me Now?” 

34. “Afghans Wealthier, Remain among Poorest,” Asia Times Online, January 29, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/

atimes/South_Asia/LA29Df04.html.

35. “An Industry on the Line: Telecommunications in Afghanis,” India Knowledge @ Wharton, March 29, 2009, 

http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/india/article.cfm?articleid=4361.

36. M. Rosenberg, “Billions of Dollars Leaving Afghanistan Suspected to Come from Drugs and Corruption,” AFP, June 

28, 2010, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/news/billions-of-dollars-leaving-afghanistan-suspected-tocome-from-drugs-and-corruption/story-e6frg90x-1225885283332.

37. Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, Afghanistan, “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: 

ICT Sector Strategy (DRAFT),” October 2007, http://www.mcit.gov.af/Documents/Strategy/MCIT%20ICT%20

strategy%20ANDS%202007-10-01-Second%20%20Draft.pdf.

38. Jenny C. Aker and Isaac Mbiti, “Africa Calling: Can Mobile Phones Make a Miracle?,” Boston Review, July/August 

2006, http://www.bostonreview.net/BR35.2/aker_mbiti.php (accessed July 15, 2010).
14

39. Development Alternatives Inc., “Making a Difference: The Evidence of Success,” http://www.dai.com/work/

success_stories_detail.php?stid=70 (accessed July 20, 2010).

40. USAID Afghanistan, “Pastoral Engagement, Adaptation and Capacity Enhancement (PEACE) Project,” http://cnrit.

tamu.edu/peace/pdfs/Afghanistan%20PEACE%20Project-LOP%20Final.pdf.

41. Roshan, Altai Consulting, and Mercy Corps, TradeNet—Mid Pilot Short Survey, May 4, 2009 (restricted-distribution 

document).

42. Nick Fielding, Internet Media Strategy in Afghanistan, report for Department for International Development (UK), 

July 2008 (restricted-distribution document).

43. Institute for War & Peace Reporting, “IWPR Reaching Millions of Afghan Voters,” September 2010, http://iwpr.

net/report-news/iwpr-reaching-millions-afghan-voters.

44. “Request for Proposals (RFP) RFP-306-10-0031, Afghanistan Media Development and Empowerment Project 

(AMDEP) Mobile Khabar—Mobile Phone News and Information Service,” July 2010, https://www.fbo.gov/index?

s=opportunity&mode=form&id=43733d52c5f80c47a43a5f397be25468&tab=core&_cview=1.

45. U.S. Department of State, “Short Message Service Project,” June 28, 2010. https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opport

unity&mode=form&id=ac9a8c3419f9a6cda9a3753b20ef0fde&tab=core&_cview=0.

46. Ron Poropatich, e-mail correspondence, September 14, 2010.

47. J. Risen, “US Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan,” New York Times, June 13, 2010, http://www.nytimes.

com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html.

48. S. Tavernise and H. Cooper, “Afghan Leader Said to Accept Runoff after Election Audit,” New York Times, October 

19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/20/world/asia/20afghan.html.

49. Rob Baker, technical director and trainer, Small World News, e-mail interview, July 29, 2010; Erik Hersman, 

“Uchaguzi: Kenya Video and Press Release,” http://blog.ushahidi.com/index.php/2010/08/03/uchaguzi-kenyavideo-and-press-release/,

50. CIA Factbook—Afghanistan. 

51. Khoja, interview, July 23, 2010.
15

Appendix: Expert Participants at the Conference

•	 Jeff Aresty, Internet Bar Organization

•	 Ruha Devanesan, Internet Bar Organization

•	 James Eberhard, Mobile Accord

•	 Eric Gundersen, Development Seed

•	 Sheldon Himelfarb, United States Institute of Peace

•	 Adam Kaplan, USAID

•	 Shainoor Khoja, Roshan

•	 Nick Lockwood, UK Stabilisation Unit, Helmand PRT

•	 Patrick Meier, Ushahidi

•	 Shahmahmood Miakhel, United States Institute of Peace

•	 Josh Nesbit, FrontlineSMS: Medic

•	 Margaret Orwig, Development Alternatives Inc., IDEA-NEW program

•	 Siddharta Raja, World Bank

•	 Jake Schaffner, U.S. Department of Defense

•	 Merrick Shaefer, UNICEF Innovation

•	 Emrys Schoemaker, iMedia

•	 Ivan Sigal, Global Voices

•	 Vikram Singh, SRAP

•	 Col. J. M. “Matt” Venhaus, United States Institute of Peace

•	 Katrin Verclas, MobileActive.org

•	 Dave Warner, MindTel

•	 Scott Worden, United States Institute of Peace
Of Related Interest

•	 Make it Theirs: The Imperative of Local Ownership in Communications and Media Initiatives 

by Simon Haselock (Special Report, October 2010)

•	 Crowdsourcing Crisis Information in Disaster-Affected Haiti by Jessica Heinzelman and Carol 

Waters (Special Report, October 2010)

•	 Advancing New Media Research by Sean Aday, Henry Farrell, Marc Lynch and John Sides 

(Special Report, September 2010)

•	 Blogs and Bullets: New Media in Contentious Politics by Sean Aday, Henry Farrell, Marc Lynch, 

John Sides, John Kelly, and Ethan Zuckerman (Peaceworks, September 2010)

•	 Media and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan by Sheldon Himelfarb (Peace Brief, March 2010)

•	 Media and Conflict: Afghanistan as a Relative Success Story by Yll Bajraktari and Christina 

Parajon (Special Report, January 2008)

•	 Developing Media in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations by Yll Bajraktari and Emily 

Hsu (Practitioner Tool, October 2007)

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Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.