COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Elder and Humphreys 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

CAROL REMINGTON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2099-02-4 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 MARCH 4, 2003 

GLOBAL ONE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC AND 

 GREAT NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Jeremy Flachs (D. Michael Mullori, Jr., on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Iris W. Redmond (Midkiff, Muncie & Ross, 

P.C., on brief), for appellee. 

 Carol Remington (claimant) contends the Workers' 

Compensation Commission (commission) erred in finding that her 

Claim for Benefits was barred by the statute of limitations and 

in failing to apply the doctrine of imposition. Finding no 

error, we affirm the commission's decision. 

I. Facts 

 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

employer, who prevailed below. See Westmoreland Coal v. 

Russell, 31 Va. App. 16, 20, 520 S.E.2d 839, 841 (1999). The 

commission's factual findings are conclusive and binding on this 

Court when those findings are based on credible evidence. See

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413 this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
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James v. Capitol Steel Constr. Co., 8 Va. App. 512, 515, 382 

S.E.2d 487, 488 (1989), and Code § 65.2-706. "The fact that 

there is contrary evidence in the record is of no consequence." 

Wagner Enters., Inc. v. Brooks, 12 Va. App. 890, 894, 407 S.E.2d 

32, 35 (1991). 

 Claimant, a 25 year employee of Global One Communications, 

LLC (employer), received a diagnosis of bilateral carpal tunnel 

syndrome December 5, 1997 and reported it to her employer 

December 9, 1997. Her employer requested a date of injury and 

claimant said: 

I told Teresa that there wasn't an actual 

date of injury because carpal tunnel doesn't 

happen as an injury, it builds over time. 

She said she had to have a date and to just 

pick one. I said, well, I can't. She said 

just randomly pick a date and so I picked 

June 13 . . . 1997. 

Claimant received a denial letter from the insurance carrier 

dated January 28, 1998. The letter stated: 

On July 1, 1997 the law which prohibited 

Carpal Tunnel Syndrome as a compensible 

[sic] injury has been overturned by the 

state of Virginia. The law still deems that 

any Carpal Tunnel Syndrome injury prior to 

the overturn date is Not Compensible [sic] 

and maybe denied for benefits unless 

medically proved the injury was acquired 

after July 1, 1997. 

 Claimant called the commission and requested a copy of the 

bill referenced in the letter. On February 13, 1998, Chief 

Deputy Commissioner Link sent her a copy of the bill. Claimant 

sent a letter back by facsimile to Chief Deputy Commissioner 
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Link the same day noting that she had filed a "workers' 

compensation claim with my company's insurance carrier" and 

requested further information. The letter was on the letterhead 

of Global One and delineated the subject at issue as being the 

"Carpal Tunnel Syndrome Bill." Claimant asked several questions 

in the letter about filing a claim. They included: "Is the 

determining factor diagnosis and subsequent treatment? Or is it 

the date that I started to have pain, tingling, etc.? What 

timeframe will the insurance company use for my claim?" She 

concluded her inquiry with "I look forward to your response 

about the interpretation of the 'compensable' time frame." 

 Chief Deputy Commissioner Link responded on February 27, 

1998 and informed claimant that "[t]he date on which your 

treating physician diagnosed carpal tunnel syndrome and 

communicated that date [sic] to you is the date from which the 

statute of limitations will be deemed to run and will be deemed 

the date of injury." Claimant amended the date of loss with 

employer, and her claim was accepted as compensable by employer 

on April 2, 1998. Employer reported the claim to the commission 

on April 6, 1998, and the standard notification letter or "blue 

letter" was mailed to claimant April 10, 1998. 

 Claimant acknowledged receipt of the "blue letter" and 

specifically recalled reading paragraph three on the back of the 

letter. Paragraph three states: 
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If the carrier or the self insured employer 

denies your claim or fails to provide a 

Memorandum of Agreement form or if you do 

not receive an Award Order, you should file 

a Claim for Benefits form to protect your 

rights. A form is included in the enclosed 

booklet. 

Your Claim for Benefits form must be filed 

with the Commission within the following 

time: 

* * * * * * * 

Occupational disease - Two years from the 

date you were told by the doctor that the 

disease was related to your work . . . . 

(Emphasis added). 

 Claimant filed her Claim for Benefits form January 29, 

2001, a period in excess of the time required by Code 

§ 65.2-601. Claimant sought payment for permanent disability 

and lifetime medical benefits. She did not seek indemnity 

benefits because her employer paid her short term disability 

benefits for the duration of her leave. 

 At the hearing before the deputy commissioner, claimant 

argued that the statute of limitations was tolled by the payment 

of wages in lieu of compensation, the employer was estopped from 

asserting the statute of limitations by its actions and that the 

doctrine of imposition applied. The deputy commissioner found 

that the claim was time barred, the tolling provision did not 

apply, nor did the doctrines of estoppel or imposition. 

 Claimant appealed to the full commission and for the first 

time added the additional claim that her facsimile of February 
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13, 1998 was a Claim for Benefits. In its decision, the 

commission stated: 

We find that [claimant's February 13, 1998 

facsimile], which inquired regarding the 

timeframe for filing a claim and to which 

the Chief Deputy Commissioner responded by 

informing the claimant of her need to file a 

Claim for Benefits within two years, was not 

a Claim for Benefits. 

* * * * * * * 

[W]e find no action by the employer, the 

carrier, or the Commission that the claimant 

could have reasonably relied on in failing 

to file her claim in a timely manner. 

Therefore, we find the doctrine of 

imposition inapplicable. 

* * * * * * * 

[W]e note that the mere payment of benefits 

does not establish a de facto award. 

Moreover, the Commission has no authority to 

enter a de facto award in cases that involve 

a jurisdictional issue of failing to file 

within two years from the date of injury.1

 Claimant appealed that decision. 

II. Statute of Limitations 

A. Claim for Benefits 

 Appellant first contends that her February 13, 1998 

facsimile to Chief Deputy Commissioner Link constituted the 

filing of her Claim for Benefits. We disagree. 

 Code § 65.2-406 provides: "The right to compensation under 

this chapter shall be forever barred unless a claim is filed 

1

 Claimant abandoned her de facto award argument on appeal. 
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with the Commission within . . . two years after a diagnosis of 

the disease is first communicated to the employee . . . ." 

"[C]laimant . . . must show that [her] original claim was timely 

filed, for such filing within the statutory period is 

jurisdictional." Binswanger Glass Co. v. Wallace, 214 Va. 70, 

73, 197 S.E.2d 191, 193 (1973). 

[The requirement of Code § 65.2-406] is 

satisfied only by filing the claim with the 

commission, not by filing it with the 

employer or anyone else. By giving 

information and filing reports with [the] 

employer the employee did not satisfy the 

requirement that the claim be filed with the 

commission, regardless of her belief that 

this would constitute the filing of a claim 

for workers' compensation. 

Cheski v. Arlington County Pub. Schs., 16 Va. App. 936, 938, 434 

S.E.2d 353, 355 (1993). 

 Commission Rule 1.1(A) provides the requirements for a 

Claim for Benefits: 

An original claim for benefits shall be in 

writing, signed and should set forth: 

1. Employee's name and address; 

2. Employer's name and address; 

3. Date of accident or date of 

communication of occupational disease; 

4. Nature of injury or occupational 

disease; 

5. Benefits sought: temporary total, 

temporary partial, permanent total, 

permanent partial or medical benefits; 

6. Periods of disability, if appropriate. 
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 "The basic nature of the notice 

required by [the Workers' Compensation Act] 

and the necessity for an applicable 

jurisdictional limitation are 

apparent. . . . It is this notice that sets 

in motion the machinery to determine whether 

or not an employee has in fact been injured, 

the nature of the injury, whether it arose 

out of and in the course of his employment, 

whether permanent or temporary, and whether 

compensable or not. This is the notice 

which activates the right of the employee to 

compensation and which invokes the 

jurisdiction of the . . . Commission." 

Massey Builders Supply Corp. v. Colgan, 36 Va. App. 496, 503, 

553 S.E.2d 146, 150 (2001) (quoting Binswanger, 214 Va. at 73, 

197 S.E.2d at 194. 

 All parties stipulated that the date of the communication 

of the diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome was December 5, 1997. 

Thus, claimant was required to file her Claim for Benefits prior 

to December 5, 1999. Claimant's facsimile inquiry to Chief 

Deputy Commissioner Link failed to meet the criteria for a Claim 

for Benefits. While it contained the name and address of Global 

One, it did not specify it was the employer at the time the 

injury was sustained nor did it request any benefits. It merely 

contained questions concerning the time frame for filing a Claim 

for Benefits that Chief Deputy Commissioner Link answered 

clearly and unambiguously. Credible evidence supports the 

commission's finding that the facsimile was not a Claim for 

Benefits. 
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B. Paragraph Three of the "Blue Letter" 

 Claimant next argues that she should be excused from timely 

filing her Claim for Benefits because the commission's 

notification or "blue letter" was unclear. This contention is 

without merit. 

 After the employer sent the first report of injury to the 

commission, the commission sent claimant the standard 

notification letter or "blue letter" which contained the statute 

of limitations information. Claimant admitted she read 

paragraph three which expressly stated that a Claim for Benefits 

must be filed with the commission within two years from the date 

of communication of the diagnosis. The "blue letter" 

specifically addressed the need for claimant to file a Claim for 

Benefits within the applicable statute of limitations, and Chief 

Deputy Commissioner Link's letter repeated that information. 

Paragraph three of the "blue letter" clearly lists the 

triggering mechanisms for filing a claim in the disjunctive. 

If the carrier or the self insured employer 

denies your claim or fails to provide a 

Memorandum of Agreement form or if you do 

not receive an Award Order, you should file 

a Claim for Benefits form to protect your 

rights. A form is included in the enclosed 

booklet. 

Your Claim for Benefits form must be filed 

with the Commission within the following 

time: 

* * * * * * * 
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Occupational disease - Two years from the 

date you were told by the doctor that the 

disease was related to your work . . . . 

(Emphasis added). Usually, phrases separated by a comma and the 

disjunctive "or," are independent. See, e.g., Ruben v. 

Secretary of DHHS, 22 Cl. Ct. 264, 266 (1991). Claimant never 

received either a Memorandum of Agreement or an Award Order. 

Thus, she was required to file a timely Claim for Benefits. 

Claimant's misreading of the "blue letter" requirements does not 

extend her time for filing under the Act. The commission did 

not err in dismissing claimant's Claim for Benefits as time 

barred. 

III. Imposition 

 Lastly, claimant argues that the commission erred in 

failing to apply the doctrine of imposition.2

 Within the principles established by 

statutes and the decisions construing them, 

the commission has jurisdiction to do full 

and complete justice in each case. From 

that principle has developed the concept 

known as "imposition," which empowers the 

commission in appropriate cases to render 

decisions based on justice shown by the 

total circumstances even though no fraud, 

mistake or concealment has been shown. 

 2

 Claimant also argues on brief that the deputy 

commissioner's exclusion of a letter from the insurance carrier 

was error. While the commission did not address this argument 

in its opinion, under the facts of this case, we find no abuse 

of discretion as the letter was cumulative of the evidence 

already before the commission. 
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Avon Products, Inc. v. Ross, 14 Va. App. 1, 7, 415 S.E.2d 225, 

228 (1992) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

"Imposition may result when an employer, using superior 

knowledge and the economic leverage derived from being able to 

withhold benefits, pays less benefits than required without 

consulting or advising the employee of an alternative that would 

require the payment of greater benefits." Cheski, 16 Va. App. 

at 940, 434 S.E.2d at 356. We have held that "the doctrine of 

imposition does not apply where a carrier's or employer's acts 

are consistent with an endeavor to comply with the Act." Odom 

v. Red Lobster # 235, 20 Va. App. 228, 234, 456 S.E.2d 140, 143 

(1995) (citing Cheski, 16 Va. App. at 940, 434 S.E.2d at 356). 

 In the instant case, the actions of the employer and 

carrier show no more than an effort to comply with the 

requirements of the Act. The claim was reported to the 

commission as required, and the claimant received the "blue 

letter" informing her of the need to file a Claim for Benefits 

within the appropriate statute of limitations. The employer 

paid the applicable benefits and while she was still employed, 

accommodated her physical limitations. There is no evidence 

that the employer used "superior knowledge and economic power to 

achieve the payment of less benefits than required by the Act." 

Cheski, 16 Va. App. at 940, 434 S.E.2d at 356. Credible 

evidence supports the commission's finding that "no action by 

the employer, the carrier, or the commission that the claimant 
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could have reasonably relied [upon prevented her] . . . fil[ing] 

her claim in a timely manner." 

 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the commission 

is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.