About the Report

This report outlines the insights and conclusions of a 

conference hosted by the United States Institute of Peace’s 

Center for Security Sector Governance from June 30 to 

July 1, 2011, titled Security Sector Transformation in North 

Africa and the Middle East. The event brought together 

geographic and security sector reform (SSR) experts from think 

tanks and the academic community; officials from the U.S. 

government, United Nations, and a range of other bilateral 

donors and international organizations; civil society groups 

based inside and outside the Middle East; and private sector 

organizations. The conference explored the opportunities for 

SSR in the wake of the Arab Spring, considering potential entry 

points for assistance and the challenges faced by international 

donors and domestic reformers alike. There was a general 

consensus that the Arab Spring presented an unprecedented 

opportunity for democratic change in the region, and that SSR, 

judiciously applied, could help advance that transformation. 

About the Author

Mark Sedra, the conference rapporteur, is a senior fellow at 

the Centre for International Governance Innovation in Ontario, 

Canada. He is also a faculty member of the department of 

political science at the University of Waterloo and the Balsillie 

School of International Affairs. He is an expert on security 

sector reform and has published widely on South Sudan, 

Afghanistan, the Balkans, and the Middle East. The views 

expressed in this report are solely those of the author and do 

not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute 

of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 296 November 2011

© 2011 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Why Security Sector Reform? 3

Where Are the Entry Points? 4

Guiding Principles 8

Obstacles, Challenges, and Risks 11

Conclusion 14

Mark Sedra

Security Sector 

Transformation in 

North Africa and the 

Middle East

Summary

•	 The events of the Arab Spring are a unique and unprecedented opportunity for democratic 

political change for the Middle East and North Africa, but the political transitions in that 

region remain fragile. The United States and other external actors can help the new democratic regimes by supporting their efforts at security sector reform (SSR).

•	 Police corruption, abuse, and impunity—along with the sheer size of police forces—were 

among the catalysts for the protests of the Arab Spring. But the transition governments, 

generally speaking, do not seek to dismantle their police forces and build them anew so 

much as reform them. External actors can work with the new governments in structuring 

police forces to be the appropriate size as well as democratic and accountable for their 

actions. This also involves work in judicial reform.

•	 The United States must approach SSR work in the Arab transition countries with care, as 

it bears the legacy of supporting many of the previous dictatorial regimes in the name of 

preserving its own security. Involving more external actors, under the aegis of the United 

Nations, would be preferable to a unilateral approach, as would seeking out places where 

the interests of the new governments and the international community converge as entry 

points for collaboration.

•	 Any SSR effort must be in response to requests that the new governments make for help, 

and each response should be tailored to the circumstances in each country. In carrying out 

the work, external actors should involve nongovernmental organizations, civil society, as 

well as traditional elites, to ensure that the new security and justice architecture is democratic, accountable, and stable. 

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT
2 

•	 SSR work should be linked to the broader goals of justice, political stability, and economic 

development, which lay at the heart of the Arab Spring protests; doing so could improve 

relations between the United States and the Middle East. 

The events of the Arab Spring present the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) with a 

unique and unprecedented opportunity for democratic political change, and the removal of 

entrenched dictators, such as Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, and 

the late Muammar Gadhafi in Libya, is a step in this direction. But the political transitions 

in these states remain fragile and prone to reversal. A range of factors will determine their 

success, from the effects of reconciliation and transitional justice processes to the results 

of elections and economic reforms. While the revolutions are undoubtedly locally driven, 

external actors will be important to their outcomes. External actors, particularly the United 

States, can play a prominent role in transforming the MENA countries’ security and justice 

architecture—that is, in supporting security sector reform (SSR). The transition states of the 

region have inherited repressive, corrupt, and outsized security institutions with histories 

of acting with impunity; the Arab Spring can partially be considered a reaction not only to 

the excesses of individual dictators, but to the abuses and indignities citizens suffered at 

the hands of their predatory security establishments. 

The international community has accumulated significant experience in supporting 

SSR across a range of postconflict and postauthoritarian states over the past decade. The 

record of success in conflict-affected cases, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, has been mixed. 

Results in postauthoritarian states, which pose an altogether different array of challenges, 

have been more positive. It is now widely accepted in the international development and 

security communities that sustainable development, political stabilization, and long-term 

safety and security are nearly impossible to achieve without an effective, rights-respecting, 

accountable, and legitimate security system that conforms to the rule of law. Over the past 

decade, a broad set of guidelines has emerged to guide security sector reformers in their 

efforts. However, as with economic growth and democratization, there are different routes 

to a well-functioning security sector, and the international community has learned that 

there is no road map or blueprint that can be applied universally. When donors have taken 

a cookie cutter approach to SSR, transplanting homogenous reform templates from one 

context to another with little adaptation, the most clear-cut failures have occurred, and the 

diversity of political dynamics, historical traditions, demographics, security conditions, and 

economic trends in the Middle East makes universal solutions particularly infeasible. SSR 

efforts must be tailored to each state’s needs and circumstances, thinking comprehensively 

but acting locally.

SSR is not an ideologically neutral concept. It is rooted in Western values and integral to 

donor-led democratization and state-building projects. It has been argued that the liberal 

origins of the concept make it inviable outside the West. But the core principles that underpin the SSR normative framework are not alien to the Arab world. A glance at the rhetoric 

and statements of the Arab protest movements reveals a great deal of common ground with 

the core values of SSR, such as transparency, accountability, and respect for human rights. 

Every SSR context is different and thus requires different types of interventions, but SSR 

experience has shown that regardless of context, many people want the same fundamental 

things from their security systems. 

Some form of SSR is needed in the Arab transition states, and donors such as the United 

States will almost certainly be significant in its implementation. But the form that the process will take and the nature and extent of the U.S. and international roles are not yet clear. 

Several factors are crucial to shaping the process, but two stand out. First and foremost 

are the evolving visions of the security sector among the new transitional administrations 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy •

George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor of 

Practice, The George Washington University • Judy Ansley,

Former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser under President George W. Bush • Eric Edelman,

Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins 

School of Advanced International Studies • Kerry Kennedy, 

President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human 

Rights • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, 

LLC • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor 

of International Relations, Stanford University • John A. 

Lancaster, Former Executive Director of the National Council 

on Independent Living • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor, 

George Mason School of Law • Judy Van Rest, Executive Vice 

President, International Republican Institute • Nancy Zirkin,

Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy •

Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
 3

and their restive populations. The emergent regimes are the products of domestic Arab 

revolutions, and thus local ownership is essential to achieving sustainable security. The new 

governments and their civil society partners, not external donors, will outline the contours 

of their own security systems. The second factor involves the type of assistance the new 

regimes ask of the international community. Libya has requested support for police reform, 

demilitarization, and transitional justice. Egypt has been keen to receive aid but wary of 

appealing to the United States due to its legacy of arming the Mubarak regime. 

SSR assistance in the MENA region will have to be demand driven and adopt a problemsolving approach; otherwise it will be perceived as illegitimate. At present there is not a 

good understanding of SSR within the region; external reform in the security field tends 

to be perceived as imperialistic. The role of the United States also will be shaped by its 

own domestic limitations and constraints in a period of fiscal austerity following expensive 

engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan and the global economic downturn. The United States 

and the greater international community should seek out points of convergence between 

demand and supply in SSR assistance that can move the Arab Spring transitions toward 

stable democracy. This report explains why SSR is needed and relevant in the Arab Spring 

transition states, identifies some of the entry points for international assistance, outlines 

the core principles that should frame the interventions, and breaks down the challenges 

facing the United States and other donors.

Why Security Sector Reform?

On December 17, 2011, in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, a street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi 

immolated himself in front of the local governor’s office, triggering a wave of protests that 

would not only end the twenty-three-year reign of Tunisian president Ben Ali, but would 

sweep across the region, claiming regimes in Egypt and Libya and threatening several others. 

Bouazizi’s desperate act of defiance—for the Arab Spring, his martyrdom—was a reaction 

not only to poor economic conditions in Tunisia, which had an unemployment rate of up 

to 15 percent, but to the consistent abuse and mistreatment he had suffered at the hands 

of municipal government officials, primarily food inspectors and the police. It is an all too 

familiar story in many Arab states, where the vanguard security forces of authoritarian 

regimes routinely have acted with impunity. One would be hard-pressed to find an Egyptian 

who cannot recount a story of police corruption or brutality under Mubarak’s reign. The 

Egyptian police’s 2010 beating death of businessman Khaled Said rallied the opposition 

movement that organized over social media to oust Mubarak. 

It is not surprising that the police were one of the main targets of the Egyptian population’s wrath as the Mubarak regime crumbled. Every police station in the Egyptian Sinai 

was burned to the ground, and police across the country shed their uniforms in the face of 

public attacks. While the army in Egypt and other Arab states may enjoy a degree of respect, 

despite their own excesses, the police and intelligence services, or mukhabarat, tend to be 

despised. While the army could stay in its barracks, avoiding clashes with the public, the 

police and mukhabarat were the face of the regime on the street. Creating a new social contract and fostering public trust in the state requires bottom-up reform and public education 

within the security sector. Egyptians, Tunisians, and Libyans need to see drastic change in 

their security establishment if they are to believe in the transition and must correspondingly 

be educated in the responsibilities of security institutions in a democratic polity. These 

goals are at the very heart of SSR.

Notions of justice and accountability have largely been absent in Arab states. When 

people were abused or mistreated they had no recourse, as the lines separating regimes, 

judiciaries, and security forces were thin to nonexistent. The security apparatus was strucSSR assistance in the MENA 

region will have to be demand 

driven and adopt a problemsolving approach; otherwise it 

will be perceived as illegitimate.
4 

tured to control rather than serve the population and featured redundancies among security 

forces to ensure that state institutions did not threaten the regime. These states had too 

much security rather than too little. At the time of the revolution in Egypt, there were sixteen 

or seventeen types of security forces, each watching the others to ensure obedience to the 

leadership. Such structures are antidemocratic and wasteful, diverting resources from other 

areas of state service delivery. SSR can help disentangle this Gordian knot and correctly size 

the security establishments of the Arab transition states. 

In the Arab world, there is a clear need to move away from the train-and-equip philosophy of security assistance. Past U.S. support took the form of strategically driven training, 

equipment drops, private arms sales (some ongoing), and, to a much lesser degree, good 

governance and democracy assistance. The revolutions in the region have shown that this 

technical assistance, eschewing a human security lens, can foster hard but brittle regimes 

prone to collapse. Paradoxically, the events in Egypt also illustrated the soft power of 

long-term education exchanges and professionalization programs. It can be argued that 

the contacts between the Egyptian and U.S. militaries contributed to the Egyptian forces’ 

siding with the democratic protest movement, paving the way for Mubarak’s resignation. 

U.S. military assistance programs exposed the Egyptians to democratic practices, standards, 

and values, which helped to shape their attitudes and outlook. Such professionalization 

programs need to be extended to all levels of the security and justice apparatus, as well as 

civil society. 

The civil society actors who spearheaded the youth protest movements were themselves 

influenced by civil society groups in the West and further afield, a form of soft power the 

United States can continue to employ by supporting global civil society networks committed 

to democratic change and reform. The MENA revolutions have carved out a new role for civil 

society in Arab political life that is still evolving. A core element of SSR is to develop the capacity of civil society—whether it is the media, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or the 

private sector—to engage the security establishment; in the current Arab transitions toward 

democracy, this may be one of many fruitful entry points for international engagement.

Where Are the Entry Points?

Comprehensive SSR, as outlined in framing documents such as the OECD-DAC Handbook on 

Security System Reform,1 entails a rather optimistic process of complete security sector 

transformation intended to replicate Western structures and standards. This Cadillac version of reform demands simultaneous progress across all parts of the security and justice 

spheres, requiring massive external resources, extensive domestic capacity, widespread local 

support, amenable local officials, and an institutional blank slate. It is infeasible in the Arab 

transition states, where these basic conditions for reform are not fully present. In fact, 

those conditions rarely materialize in any SSR context, thus explaining the mixed record of 

Western donor-led SSR programs. 

In states such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, which possess high levels of human and 

institutional capacity, donors would be advised to take an incremental, problem-solving 

approach. The United States and its partners need to respond to requests for assistance 

rather than seek to define needs and reform agendas. This approach means allowing local 

counterparts to emerge organically rather than selecting like-minded clients, which, in turn, 

entails preparing to work with a variety of groups, wearing different political and sectarian 

stripes. Such a hands-off approach may be perceived as dangerous because it could result in 

leaders unfriendly to Western interests, but it is more likely to produce legitimate governments that can own and lead reforms. With domestic politics still volatile in the transition 

states, donors should seek to empower and embolden reform champions, moderate Islamist or 

The revolutions in the region 

have shown that this technical 

assistance, eschewing a human 

security lens, can foster hard 

but brittle regimes prone 

to collapse.
 5

secular, rather than manufacture them. Indications from the U.S. government that it is willing 

to work with the Muslim Brotherhood are accordingly a very positive sign. 

Just as Western support for some of the Arab world’s authoritarian regimes lasted over 

several decades, SSR assistance for transition states also must be conceived as a long-term 

process. The impulse to design reform blueprints in Western capitals before the revolutionary dust has settled must be tempered by the understanding of the fluidity of political, 

economic, and security conditions in the MENA region. This is a time to listen, gather intelligence, and build political capital to set the stage for more ambitious reform assistance. It 

is essential to ask local people—political leaders, civil society actors, government officials, 

and average citizens—what kind of security and justice institutions they want. This will help 

to identify key entry points where external assistance is demanded, external supply exists, 

and progress is possible. Some potential entry points are already beginning to emerge.

Corruption

Corruption is one of the touchstone issues that helped to trigger the Arab Spring. Although 

it is a politically sensitive issue, there is a broad consensus within the region that corruption, cronyism, and graft must be addressed in some manner. It is also a key issue for donors, 

who want to ensure that development aid is not diverted or lost—especially after billions 

of dollars of U.S. aid to Iraqi and Afghan SSR programs disappeared, or ended up supporting 

spoiler and insurgent groups. 

However, dealing with corruption is a complex governance challenge, as each society 

perceives and rates it in a different manner. The impulse among many Western officials is 

to identify grand corruption (e.g., political elites and government officials embezzling large 

amounts of funds) as the central priority while considering petty corruption on the street 

(e.g., traffic police extorting fees from motorists) to be simply too widespread and ingrained 

to control. It is petty corruption, however, that erodes state service delivery, undermines 

legitimacy, and fosters the kind of grating public resentment of the state that fuelled the 

protest movements of the Arab Spring.

That said, corruption in some MENA states also can be conceived as a form of wealth 

redistribution and has, to a certain degree, had a stabilizing effect. Without effective state 

welfare mechanisms, corruption allows wealth to trickle down through society; where the 

public administration is inadequately remunerated, graft helps employees make ends meet, 

keeps supporters in line, and calms dissent. The problem is, of course, that this wealth does 

not tend to trickle down evenly or proportionally throughout society, with regime loyalists 

absorbing the lion’s share. 

As with any area of the security sector, there is a premium on local knowledge. Reformers must develop a keen understanding of the nuances of corruption in the countries in 

which they are operating if they are to craft effective strategies to address it. A number of 

prosaic, technical approaches can be taken, such as establishing more intensive accountability structures and fiduciary controls and investing resources in pay and grading systems 

in the public administration. For their part, donors can have an immediate effect by closely 

monitoring their own aid disbursements to governments, NGOs, and private contractors, 

ensuring that funds are not misallocated. Donors in many of these contexts tend to be part 

of the corruption problem. 

Transitional Justice

Although the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) has stated its intent to minimize 

the international footprint in its transition, it has explicitly requested help in transitional 

justice and police reform. Dealing with the crimes of the previous regimes is at the top of 

Corruption in some MENA states 

can be conceived as a form 

of wealth redistribution and 

has, to a certain degree, had 

a stabilizing effect.
6 

the agenda for the transitional governments in Egypt and Tunisia; Mubarak and his sons have 

already been put on trial, and many other senior officials languish in prison. Transitional 

justice is not a part of SSR, but it is intricately connected to it. Although some despots 

in the region, such as the late Col. Gadhafi and his son Saif al-Islam, have been indicted 

by the International Criminal Court, it is likely that, as we have already seen in Egypt, the 

former leaders will be tried domestically as part of a broader justice and reconciliation process. However, the domestic judiciaries do not yet have the capacity to handle the scale, 

scope, and specialized demands of such processes, and there are serious questions in some 

states about the judiciary’s impartiality. Having supported transitional justice programs in 

Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the international community is well placed to support 

them in the Arab transition states through advice and material assistance. It should do so: 

Amid calls for justice, a spirit of revenge has emerged in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, possibly 

creating new rifts in society and triggering violence. Transitional justice and reconciliation 

programs are designed to help avert this.

Another aspect of transitional justice that is deeply entrenched in the SSR framework 

is vetting of the state administration. The excesses of de-Ba’athification in Iraq, which 

deprived the Iraqi state of vital bureaucratic capacity during the volatile early days of the 

reconstruction process, illustrate the dangers of trying to purge state and society of old 

regime influence. Meticulous processes are needed to remove unfit and tainted staff without 

triggering resentment or leaving major gaps in service delivery. In Tunisia, ad hoc lists of 

officials with links to the previous ruling party have emerged to bar them from taking part 

in public life. Purges in all ministries and departments have taken place in Egypt, also on a 

rather ad hoc basis. Greater control must be exerted over these processes lest they create a 

new aggrieved minority willing to resort to violence. The stability of the transition depends 

on the ability of the new governments to compromise with and accommodate members of 

the old regime—something that seems unlikely at this stage. 

The idea of justice, and its importance in the psyches of individuals and groups, is often 

underappreciated in SSR programs. There is an assumption that if people are given basic 

security they will be appeased, but without access to justice, local actors will feel unsatisfied and compelled to find justice through vigilantism or nonstate judicial mechanisms. 

Supporting transitional justice provides a good foundation for longer-term judicial reform, 

often the poor cousin of the SSR family but indispensable to the project’s success. Developing courts’ capacity and professionalism will equip them to try former regime officials 

and perform their basic function of upholding the rule of law. It will also put the rest of 

the security sector on solid footing. After all, the cop on the beat is nothing but an agent 

without purpose in the absence of a functioning justice system. 

Police Reform

In Egypt the police melted away after the Mubarak regime collapsed. Months later, many 

police had yet to return to their jobs, and a significant amount of police infrastructure 

attacked during the protests remained in tatters. Police reform faces the dual task of quickly 

restoring basic police services while launching a longer-term process to transform the police 

force’s culture. While the police need some material support, particularly to rebuild infrastructure, its overriding need is for new focus, procedures, and institutional culture, which 

cannot be accomplished without overhauling the interior ministry that oversees and directs 

them. Train-and-equip strategies tend to overlook the need for governance and institutional 

reforms within the security ministries, but even the most professional police in the world 

would be hard-pressed to function effectively if the interior ministry were ineffective, politicized, and corrupt. Recognizing this, Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC) has called 

Train-and-equip strategies tend to 

overlook the need for governance 

and institutional reforms within 

the security ministries.
 7

for “assistance with policing to get the public security situation under control and gradually 

develop a democratically accountable public security force.”2

Across the Arab transition states, police reform tends to be more fertile ground for 

external intervention than military reform. The militaries in Egypt and Tunisia have retained 

significant power and public respect, a sort of praetorian role for the state, giving them 

the capacity to resist reforms. Also, the armies in many MENA states, despite their involvement in corrupt practices and repression, tend to be the most professional and effective 

organs of the security sector, their officer corps composed of educated elites who have had 

opportunities to train abroad. The police, by contrast, are more likely to be locally recruited, 

poorly educated, and untrained. Given that the police forces are the principal interface 

between state and society, their transformation should be a high priority in the early stages 

of transition. 

In deciding to focus on the police, the U.S. and other donor governments should resist 

the urge to channel SSR assistance through the militaries in Egypt and Tunisia, due to their 

familiarity with those institutions. The temptation is understandable: Though it is somewhat 

reluctant to actually govern, the Egyptian military has been a central part of the state and 

national political life since the 1952 revolution. Some have even called the ouster of Mubarak a military coup with a civilian face, as the military had been concerned for some time 

about succession plans and could have exploited the tumult to act (or not act on Mubarak’s 

behalf). While this is too simplistic an explanation of the complex and dramatic chain of 

events that led to Mubarak’s fall, it exemplifies the predominant place the military retains 

in Egyptian society. Overreliance on the military potentially undercuts one of the core principles of SSR—democratic civilian control—and could embolden the military to hold onto 

power and resist core reforms. While a military centered approach may seem expedient to 

donors, offering the quickest route to stability and the safeguarding of Western interests, 

it could over time return the status quo ante prior to the Arab Spring. Donors must remain 

cognizant that even like-minded actors who say all the right things have conflicting motivations for continuity and change. The military in each of these transitions will be reticent to 

abandon its primary place in the state, politics, and in the case of Egypt, economic life. This 

is not to say that external actors should not work closely with the military establishments 

of the region; only that they should widen their consultations and partnerships to include 

other key stakeholders, particularly other branches of the security and justice architecture, 

civil society actors, political parties, and traditional elites.

Civil Society

An eclectic mixture of civil society groups, rather than specific political parties, military factions, or external actors, has driven the protests in the Middle East; they have been mostly 

grassroots movements with varied support from internal elites and external patrons, and 

their unprecedented assertiveness presents both opportunities and potential dilemmas for 

the transition and its external supporters. Emboldened by their victories, the protest groups 

have grown more confrontational and outspoken with each passing month, consistently 

challenging the actions and legitimacy of the transitional governments and security establishments, who for their part tend to view nonstate political actors with some skepticism. 

In Egypt, tensions have already emerged between the youth activists and the military command council over the pace and direction of political change. The youth in Egypt are educated, highly disillusioned, and skeptical of anyone associated with the previous regime. 

A central part of the SSR agenda is both to empower civil society to play a productive 

role in the security sphere and to rewire states to interact constructively with civil society, 

emphasizing transparency and state-society partnership. Through civic education, formal 

The U.S. and other donor 

governments should resist the 

urge to channel SSR assistance 

through the militaries in Egypt 

and Tunisia.
8 

training, and societal outreach activities, among other initiatives, external actors can 

contribute significantly to reducing state-society tensions. It may be best for donor governments to work through their own domestic civil society groups, whether it is academic 

institutions or globally focused NGOs, to implement change, fostering international civil 

society networks to share experiences and develop best practices. Considering the dominant 

role of social networking in the Arab Spring, donors could focus their attention on expanding Arab civil society groups’ ability to utilize Web 2.0 technologies to further drive change 

and hold governments accountable. 

Democratic Civilian Control

Democratic civilian control of security forces is one of the primary objectives of SSR. Most 

Arab states’ legislatures tend to be rubber stamps for executive decisions rather than a 

genuine check on executive authority. For instance, Egyptian law mandates parliament to 

provide oversight of the security sector and enables it to question ministers, but parliament 

rarely if ever exercised such powers under Mubarak. With new elections on the horizon and 

a palpable desire among the population for a more responsive government and legislative 

branch, there appears to be room to enable parliament to better monitor the security sector and hold it to account. This accountability could involve a range of donor-supported 

projects, from increasing the institutional capacity of parliament through the building of 

infrastructure and systems to the training and mentoring of legislators. 

Guiding Principles

As mentioned above, addressing local demands requires a sophisticated understanding of 

local political dynamics, history, and culture that reformers often lack. Donors must invest in 

developing this contextual knowledge and situational awareness; otherwise their programming rests on a weak foundation. A number of key principles, adapted from the core SSR 

framework to the Arab transition states, should guide external SSR support.

An International Face

Rather than having each donor create individual bilateral SSR programs, external donors 

should work through an international entity, such as the United Nations. A UN face will 

imbue the mission with greater legitimacy, both within the Arab transition states and 

among the donor community. The United Nations has already carved out a leading role in 

the incipient Libyan transition with full NTC support. With the negative legacy of Western 

state support for MENA military dictatorships, giving assistance efforts a more neutral front 

man is likely to be beneficial. It could also facilitate greater coordination among donors, 

always a problem in complex transitions. 

Demand-Driven

Even as external actors influence local ones to take certain reform routes, external engagement should be demand- and problem-driven, based strictly on requests for assistance from 

host country partners. Too often, SSR programs are driven by supply—that is, Western interests and available resources—rather than local needs. Such an approach is unsustainable. 

The Arab transition states are so protective of their revolutions that even the appearance of 

imposition could undermine the whole effort and set back relations with donors. That said, 

it is also clear that the Arab transition states want donor help. The United States already has 

sent assessment teams to Tunisia and Egypt, and senior Tunisian police officers have visited 

Rather than having each donor 

create individual bilateral 

SSR programs, external donors 

should work through an 

international entity.
 9

the United States to discuss potential reform opportunities. The NTC has been forthright 

about its desire for international support, presenting its plans to the international contact 

group for Libya, even as it prefers a limited international footprint. External actors must find 

the common ground between Arab demands and donor supply and the points of confluence 

between their interests. Finding this space—which does exist—requires good joint assessments led by local actors, with engagement from both the state and civil society. Joint 

donor-recipient assessments can help to ensure not only that reform entry points and goals 

are realistic, but that they have local and donor buy-in. 

Project-Based Problem-Solving Approach

The fluid and volatile political and security environments in the region do not lend themselves to rigid timelines and protracted reform plans. Early in the transition period, quickimpact projects should be launched to produce tangible reforms that meet specific needs, 

address urgent problems, and build local confidence in the process. But a gradual approach 

to SSR is needed to incrementally develop local trust. Donors should not box themselves 

into highly specific reform plans until the political dust has settled and there is consensus 

among key stakeholders. The mantra should be to start small and scale up. 

The transformation of institutional cultures in the MENA countries could best be 

described as a generational project. As a part of this long-term vision, donors should seek to 

construct durable and resilient initiatives. Permanent training facilities could be established 

nationally and regionally to train future generations of Arab personnel according to democratic standards. Solid institutional peer-to-peer links and professional exchanges between 

Arab and Western security and justice officials could deliver significant dividends over time. 

The U.S. International Military Education Dialogue provides a model for such activities, but 

should be extended to other parts of the security and justice spheres, from judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys to police officers and legislators. 

Move beyond the Rhetoric of the War on Terror

A great deal of the security assistance provided to Arab states has been couched in the 

rhetoric of the war on terror. The United States and its allies supported Mubarak, Ben Ali, 

and other regional strongmen because they were a bulwark against radical Islamist groups. 

While containing Islamist terrorism remains a high priority for the United States and its 

allies, these messages do not resonate with Arab populations and will be associated with 

past bankrupt regimes. Stable Arab states with security sectors that are effective, democratically accountable, and respecting of rights will provide the best antidote to terrorism. 

Some infrastructure support may be required to repair damage or modernize facilities, 

but the main need is software rather than hardware. Most MENA states are seeking to change 

their existing but broken security systems rather than building new ones from scratch. Thus, 

among the areas most in need of assistance are training, institutional reform, depoliticization, vetting, and forming systems to promote accountability and transparency. There will 

always be requests for new weapons systems and the latest kit, but donors must bear in 

mind the overarching priority of changing the way these security sectors do business. 

Political Engagement

SSR is inherently political, and overly technocratic approaches will not succeed. While technical assistance forms the backbone of SSR programs, it must be framed within a political 

strategy. The U.S. reform program in the Palestinian Authority made headway because of 

the direct engagement of President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayed. A 

Stable Arab states with security 

sectors that are effective, 

democratically accountable, and 

respecting of rights will provide 

the best antidote to terrorism. 
10 

successful U.S. initiative to establish a coastguard in Yemen grew from careful dialogue and 

engagement with Yemeni officials up to President Ali Abdullah Saleh. 

Achieving the security sector transformation that many Arab activists want requires 

external actors to invest significant political capital in the process. That means entering 

political dialogues with a range of stakeholders, from civil society activists to traditional 

elites, and using incentives and disincentives to encourage reform and adherence to core 

SSR principles. It is about empowering reform champions, containing spoilers, and persuading everyone that the process is in the broad interests of the country. Donors certainly will 

not be perceived as politically neutral, so they must keep lines of communication open with 

all parties to the process. 

Engaging the process politically requires situational awareness, good contextual knowledge, and diplomatic acumen. Deploying the right mix of people on the ground with these 

attributes is critical. There should be representation of geographic, sector-specific, and 

system-wide SSR expertise on SSR missions. Senior diplomats and political officers in the 

country may not have the time to fully engage in the intricacies of SSR programming, but it 

is important for them to be involved politically, providing direction as necessary. For their 

part, program managers need to have a diplomat’s attitude and negotiator’s approach.

Link to Development and Economic Growth

In the Arab transition states, woeful economic conditions are coupled with ominous 

demographic trends. High unemployment rates and rising prices of staple goods in countries facing a youth bulge are a dangerous mix, and one of the contributing factors to the 

revolutions that are still sweeping the region. Aid and investment are needed to alleviate 

immediate suffering and spur economic growth. Over the long term, however, the health of 

these economies will depend on their ability to undertake fundamental structural reforms. 

Although SSR is normatively conceived as one pillar of broader state building and democratization projects, it tends to be treated as a stand-alone program firewalled from other 

reform and development activities. This approach is problematic, given that the SSR concept emerged from the development community and is rooted to development principles 

and practices. The increasing involvement of the World Bank and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in SSR issues illustrates its importance to 

economic recovery; its primary rationale, after all, is to enable sustainable development 

and economic growth.

The link between economic development and SSR should be made more concrete in the 

Arab transition states. Issues of employment and infrastructure development should be factored into SSR programming, as the security sector is typically a major employer and can be 

engaged in infrastructure creation. The judicial system, for its part, provides the legal framework and regulatory environment that anchors a successful economy. Donors can use economic incentives, such as preferential agreements on trade, labor, and customs, in exchange 

for action on SSR priorities. Linking the security and economic agendas, in light of the 

region’s economic turmoil, could catalyze change and crystalize the symbiotic connections 

among security, good governance, and economic prosperity in the minds of local actors. 

Nonstate Actors 

Just as donors need to expand their interaction with key stakeholders beyond military elites 

to include civil society, they must also engage actors and structures outside the state. This 

interaction is particularly important in Libya, where nonstate entities, such as tribes, can 

provide security and justice and are perceived by local populations as more legitimate and 

cost effective than the state. The development and SSR communities are increasingly aware 
 11

of the advantages of encouraging a mutually reinforcing relationship between state and 

nonstate authorities. 

The SSR concept, though, is biased toward centralized national structures rather than locallevel governance institutions and mechanisms, which tend to be the main locus of service 

delivery. As the Arab Spring was partially a reaction to overcentralization and accumulation 

of power by narrow groups of elites, it would stand to reason that an overcentralized approach 

to the transition could be counterproductive. Donors must balance emphasis on nationallevel institutions with attention to local-level service delivery. Donors have a responsibility 

to encourage an inclusive process and caution against the neglect of local-level actors and 

interests, which could reinforce destructive center-periphery or urban-rural divides. 

Obstacles, Challenges, and Risks

There are a number of distinct obstacles, challenges, and risks to international engagement 

in SSR in the Arab transition states. The revolutions in the region offer the chance for democratic political change and a new beginning to the relationship between the MENA region 

and the West. But success is by no means guaranteed, and destabilizing setbacks are almost 

certain. The messiness of such transitions is already on full display in Egypt, where sectarian 

and political tensions run high and the dual desires for rapid change and revenge for past 

crimes cause volatility. Donor governments must clearly assess the risks to engagement and 

develop strategies to mitigate them. 

The Legacy of Western Assistance

For people in the MENA countries, the legacy of Western patronage of several Arab dictatorships, including those of Mubarak, Ben Ali, Saleh, and even Gadhafi, challenges the 

credibility and legitimacy of Western SSR support. U.S. military assistance to Egypt has held 

steady at $1.3 billion per year since 1998 and covers as much as 80 percent of the Egyptian 

military’s weapons procurement costs.3 The United States and Tunisia regularly conducted 

joint military exercises, and the United States provided modest levels of security assistance, 

even as a 2009 State Department cable described Tunisia as a “police state, with little 

freedom of expression or association, and serious human rights problems.”4 Yemen received 

$252.6 million in military assistance between the fiscal years of 2006 and 2010, with over 

60 percent of that aid coming in the final year.5 Most of this money went to counterterrorism operations, to which the U.S. military contributed directly by deploying drones with the 

consent of the Saleh regime. Even Libya and Syria had U.S. ties through intelligence agency 

cooperation, information sharing, and extraordinary rendition, whereby high-value terrorist 

suspects were transferred for interrogation. 

Generally, U.S. aid to the region has been shaped by six goals: counterterrorism, containing Iran, access for naval bases, stabilizing Iraq, maintaining relations with Israel, and 

energy security. These goals are as valid today as they were before the Arab Spring, but 

the approach to achieving them has to be recalibrated. U.S. policy in the region can be 

described as subcontracting protection of U.S. interests to friendly regimes in return for 

tolerance of their repression of internal dissent. To break with this legacy, the United States 

should unambiguously place human security above regime security in conducting SSR and 

embed human rights principles into all its programming. 

Providing space for dialogue among civil society, government officials, and the donor 

community will help to address the West’s credibility problem, as will direct outreach efforts 

to Arab populations. The United States must avoid allowing any one issue or interest—

whether it is terrorism, Israel, or energy security—to dominate or unduly influence its 

reform agenda. This does not mean abandoning core interests but working harder to align 

Donors must balance emphasis 

on national-level institutions 

with attention to local-level 

service delivery.
12 

them with those of the local population. This does not have to be a zero-sum game: Stable, 

free, and democratic Arab states will be the best bulwark against terrorism and will naturally 

share interests with the West. Donors must ask themselves whose security they are seeking 

to advance through reform. The answer should be that of the local population, a goal that 

over the long term will best serve Western security, economic, and political interests. 

Coordination

SSR in the Arab transition states inevitably will be a multilateral enterprise. In a region of 

such acute geostrategic importance, there will be as many competing interests as actors. 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and non-NATO states jockeyed for position in 

Libya to influence the NTC—particularly over economic interests—before the shooting had 

even stopped. Influence over security sector leaders in the Arab world, particularly in oilrich states with plans for defense procurement, is an attractive commodity. Working under 

a UN banner could help to contain or suppress some of this deleterious competition, though 

interests tend to rise to the surface no matter how hard one tries to contain them. 

Competing, conflicting, or even contradictory SSR programming—all too common in many 

SSR cases—could undercut the process before it makes any headway. Western donors must harmonize their interests as much as possible and avoid unhealthy or excessive competition. In the 

Palestinian Territories, the United States has worked closely and effectively with its European 

and Canadian counterparts to implement SSR programming. In Libya, the donor contact group 

similarly has had a positive coordinating role. Such cooperation needs to be replicated across 

the region, perhaps under the auspices of the United Nations or another intergovernmental 

body. Initiatives such as NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the Mediterranean Dialogue, 

which encourage general dialogue, practical bilateral cooperation and partnerships on security 

issues between NATO and non-NATO regional states—including numerous states in the Arab 

world—provide a model for achieving greater regional and donor cooperation. 

Counterrevolution

All the Arab revolutions are vulnerable to reversal. There is no shortage of counterrevolutionary forces at play, from former regime loyalists to radical Islamists. Attacks by radical 

Salafi groups have been reported in both Egypt and Tunisia, raising fears that they could be 

attempting to take advantage of the political vacuum to trigger sectarian conflict, as was 

seen in Iraq, or advance their plans for a government takeover. Such groups remain on the 

fringes of society, but through violence, they can punch above their weight. Not all Islamist 

groups, however, are averse to taking part in the political process. The Muslim Brotherhood, 

for instance, has renounced violence and operates within the confines of the political 

process in Egypt, Yemen, and Tunisia. The Arab transition countries contain population segments that are deeply religious, thus some sectarian-based politics is inevitable. As long as 

these groups operate within the political process and according to the rule of law, this need 

not be viewed as a threat. External donors must recognize the many contradictory forces 

at work and prepare for multiple contingencies in their programming, lest the Arab Spring 

become known more for its counterrevolutions than its revolutions. 

Regional Differences

The Arab Spring has created rifts in the region that could potentially hinder reform. Algeria 

and Saudi Arabia successfully resisted their own protest movements and are eager to halt 

the regional domino effect. Saudi Arabia deployed troops in Bahrain to support the country’s 

teetering monarchy and has dispatched funds to shore up other threatened regimes. U.S. 
 13

silence over the crackdown in Bahrain, which hosts a U.S. naval base, has raised accusations 

of double standards and reinforced the credibility problem. 

Today, the region appears to be drifting into two camps—revolutionary (e.g., Egypt, 

Bahrain, and Libya) and reforming states (e.g., Jordan and Morocco) versus counterrevolutionary states (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Syria)—and it is possible that the latter could 

seek to undercut the reforms of the former. SSR is difficult to implement in unfriendly 

regional neighborhoods due to the interconnected and globalized nature of contemporary 

security challenges. To address this dilemma, donors could provide space for dialogue among 

the various states in the region to secure pledges of noninterference in domestic politics 

and reach an accommodation or common ground on regional reform directions. External 

actors also could encourage the Arab League to engage directly in SSR. Unlike many other 

regional organizations, such as the African Union and the Economic Community of West 

African States, the Arab League has not endorsed SSR or supported such reform among its 

members. With the Libyan NTC requesting Arab League security support after the fall of 

Gadhafi, there may be a window to introduce the concept to the body and stimulate some 

support for its application more broadly. In today’s politically charged atmosphere in the 

Middle East, these steps are not likely to make much headway in the short term, but opportunities could open up over time. 

Donor Domestic Pressures

With looming fears of recession and growing war weariness, the United States may be 

reluctant to make major commitments to the Arab transition states in the security sector. 

The United States was comfortable playing an indispensible but background role in the 

NATO mission in Libya, with France and the United Kingdom leading the charge within the 

alliance. U.S. engagement will be crucial for SSR in the region, but given the range of other 

donor involvement and with the United Nations poised to assume an active role, it will not 

necessarily have to lead. With anti-American sentiment palpable on the Arab street, a more 

subtle U.S. role may even be advisable. 

Nonetheless, it is important that Western governments invest in the Arab transition 

countries from the outset. Without a good start, the chances of success are greatly reduced, 

especially with a range of reactionary forces lining up to stall the transitions. Investment 

in the transitions may not provide as immediate a benefit to U.S. strategic interests as 

supporting client dictators, but over the long term it will pay much greater dividends by 

building stable, enduring partnerships.

Paradigm Shift

The SSR concept has been largely mainstreamed in the international donor community over 

the past five years, but it is still a new concept and has been slower to take root in the United 

States than its European partners. U.S. agencies and departments engaged in SSR have only 

recently developed their own definition of it; the idea that the United States could deliver 

security assistance in a similar manner to development aid has not fully trickled down to the 

operational level or been translated effectively from policy to practice, which continues to 

focus on train-and-equip approaches. The paradigm shift required, particularly within the U.S. 

government, has not yet been consolidated fully. In spite of all of the emphasis on promoting 

joined up government in state-building interventions, U.S. security assistance still tends to 

be stovepiped, marked by gaps in coordination between key U.S. agencies and departments, 

as has been seen in the U.S. support to a number of SSR programs, including those in the 

Palestinian Territories, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This lack of coordination does not mean that 

U.S. departments and agencies have not learned lessons from their experiences with security 

SSR is difficult to implement 

in unfriendly regional 

neighborhoods due to the 

interconnected and globalized 

nature of contemporary 

security challenges.
14 

assistance, but it takes time to translate those lessons into improved strategy on the ground. 

If the U.S. government and its donor partners are to achieve meaningful progress in the Arab 

transition states, they will also have to change the way they do business.

Conclusion

In recent years the SSR discourse has been fixated on conflict-affected cases, such as 

Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. But the concept is far more viable 

and appropriate in postauthoritarian environments, such as the Arab transition states. 

Countries where SSR succeeded in the past—postapartheid South Africa, the former Warsaw 

Pact states of Eastern Europe, and Indonesia—featured conditions comparable to those in 

many of the Arab transition states. They were postauthoritarian transitions seeking to rightsize, rationalize, and transform the cultures of their security sectors. Just as in those cases, 

the Arab transition states do not face the endemic security and human and institutional 

capacity deficits seen in failed and conflict-affected states.

Without question, the United States and its partners have the capability and experience 

in the Middle East to provide effective technical assistance for SSR. The challenge is political: breaking down rigid patronage structures, overcoming ingrained aversion to change 

within the state, and building people’s trust in their security sectors. The Arab transition 

states meet the core criteria for applying SSR and in some ways can be considered highly 

favorable candidates for reform, but external donors also face a range of obstacles, from 

potent anti-Western sentiment to numerous domestic spoilers. Donors must be mindful of 

the risks associated with these interventions and inject some modesty into their approach. 

They should not overestimate their ability to transform local institutional cultures in short 

timeframes. SSR is a generational effort that will invariably experience setbacks. 

It is important to be realistic about what external donors can accomplish in the Arab 

transition states. SSR efforts can provide the new security and justice leadership with targeted advice and aid, provide space for dialogue among various key societal stakeholders, 

empower the citizenry to engage and understand their security systems, and create commitment to reform programs among key local actors. But being aware of what SSR cannot 

do is just as important as understating what it can. SSR cannot completely transform the 

security sector in short donor funding cycles, totally exclude elements that are unfriendly 

to donor interests, or align the partner state to particular policy goals. SSR may produce 

security institutions closely aligned with Western attitudes, standards, and interests, but 

attempting to push this end could arouse a backlash and delegitimize the process. SSR must 

influence and incentivize change, not impose it.

 Changes to the security sector will be a crucial driver of the long-term success of the 

Arab Spring, and Western states have an opportunity to help in this important transition, 

promoting shared values, ideas, and interests. The same concerns about security and justice 

that lay at the heart of the protest movements are also the keys to sustainable development and political stability, as well as improved relations between the United States and 

the Arab world. 
 15

Conference Speakers

•	 Nicole Ball, Center for International Policy

•	 David Bayley, School of Criminal Justice, State University of New York at Albany

•	 Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Princeton University 

•	 Daniel Brumberg, U.S. Institute of Peace

•	 Timothy Edmunds, University of Bristol

•	 Dale Eickelman, Dartmouth University

•	 Paul George, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Canada

•	 Greg Hermsmeyer, Deloitte Consulting LLP

•	 Ellen Laipson, Stimson Center

•	 Ambassador Mokhtar Lamani, Carleton University 

•	 Ambassador James Larocco, National Defense University 

•	 Alex Martin, Coffey International Development

•	 Joseph McMillan, International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense

•	 Alpaslan Özerdem, Coventry University

•	 Robert Perito, Security Sector Governance Center, U.S. Institute of Peace

•	 Jared Rigg, Department for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

•	 Joel Rubin, Ploughshares Fund

•	 Mara Rudman, Deputy Envoy and Chief of Staff to the Special Envoy for Middle East Peace, 

U.S. Department of State

•	 Mark Sedra, Centre for International Governance Innovation 

•	 Charles Snyder, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State

•	 Erwin Van Veen, OECD

•	 Catharina Wale Grunditz, European External Action Service

Notes

1. OECD DAC, The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice (Paris: OECD, 

2007).

2. Margaret Besheer, “UN to Lead Initial Post-Gadhafi Phase in Libya,” Voice of America, August 30, 2011, http://www.

voanews.com/english/news/africa/UN-to-Lead-Initial-Post-Gadhafi-Phase-in-Libya-128716518.html.

3. Jeremy M. Sharp, Egypt in Transition (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 16, http://www.

fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf.

4. Stephen Zunes, “Tunisia’s Democratic Revolution,” The Huffington Post. January 20, 2011, http://www.

huffingtonpost.com/stephen-zunes/tunisias-decmocratic-revo_b_811342.html.

5. Nina M. Serafino, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206”: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, 

DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 6, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22855.pdf.
Of Related Interest

•	 Police Corruption: What Past Scandals Teach about Current Challenges by David Bayley and 

Robert M. Perito (Special Report, November 2011)

•	 Who Controls Pakistan’s Security Forces? by Shuja Nawaz (Special Report, November 2011)

•	 Lessons from Embedded Reconstruction Teams in Iraq by John K. Naland (Special Report, 

October 2011)

•	 The Iraq Federal Police: U.S. Police Building under Fire by Robert M. Perito (Special Report, 

October 2011)

•	 Traveling toward the Rule of Law in the Middle East and North Africa: Avenues and Obstacles by 

Colette Rausch, Jason Gluck, Vivienne O’Connor, and Scott Worden (Peace Brief, April 2011)

•	 Constitutional Reform in Transitional States by Jason Gluck (Peace Brief, May 2011)

•	 Extending Libya’s Transitional Period: Capitalizing on the Constitutional Moment by Jason Gluck 

(Peace Brief, September 2011)

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information on the subject.