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i 

71–447 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–76] 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 

AND THE UNITED STATES MILITARY TEN 

YEARS AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES OF 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LEON PANETTA 

AND CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS 

OF STAFF GENERAL MARTIN DEMPSEY 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

OCTOBER 13, 2011 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

JENNESS SIMLER, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

LAUREN HAUHN, Research Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, October 13, 2011, The Future of National Defense and the United 

States Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives of Secretary of Defense 

Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin 

Dempsey ................................................................................................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, October 13, 2011 .................................................................................... 53 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 13, 2011 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES 

MILITARY TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES OF SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE LEON PANETTA AND CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT 

CHIEFS OF STAFF GENERAL MARTIN DEMPSEY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Dempsey, GEN Martin, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ........................... 8 

Panetta, Hon. Leon E., Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense ....... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Dempsey, GEN Martin ..................................................................................... 65 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 57 

Panetta, Hon. Leon E. ...................................................................................... 61 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 59 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

U.S. Army Commands and Organizations ..................................................... 73 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 83 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 86 

Mrs. Davis ......................................................................................................... 82 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 90 

Mr. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 93 

Mr. Jones ........................................................................................................... 77 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 88 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING—Continued 

Mr. Owens ......................................................................................................... 87 

Mr. Palazzo ....................................................................................................... 96 

Mr. Rigell .......................................................................................................... 92 

Mrs. Roby .......................................................................................................... 97 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 82 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 77 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 79 
(1) 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED 

STATES MILITARY TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LEON PANETTA 

AND CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

GENERAL MARTIN DEMPSEY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, October 13, 2011. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m. in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. Before I begin. 

Please let me welcome members of the public who are in attendance, but remind our audience that our committee will tolerate no 

disruptions of this proceeding. This including standing, holding up 

signs, or yelling. If anyone disturbs these proceedings, we will have 

the Capitol Police escort you out immediately. 

The House Armed Services Committee meets to receive testimony on the future—the committee will stand in recess until the 

Capitol Police escort the disruptive individuals out of the room and 

restore order. 

[Disturbance in hearing room.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The House Armed Services Committee needs to 

receive testimony on ‘‘The Future of National Defense and the U.S. 

Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives of the Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey.’’ This hearing is part of our ongoing series 

to evaluate lessons learned since 9/11, and to apply those lessons 

to decisions we will soon be making about the future of our Force. 

As our series draws to a close, we have received perspectives of 

former military leaders from each of the Services, former chairmen 

of the Armed Services Committee, as well as outside experts. 

Today we will change direction as we look to the viewpoints of 

our sitting Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. Our witnesses today have spent decades serving our Nation. Thank you both for being with us and for your public service. 

As I continue to emphasize our successes in the Global War on Terror and in Iraq and Afghanistan, we appear to be lulling our Nation into a false confidence of a September 10th mindset. Too many 

appear to believe that we can maintain a solid defense that is driven by budget choices, not strategic ones. While I agree that the 
2 

military cannot be exempt from fiscal belt tightening, we have to 

put this debt crisis into perspective if we are to find our way back 

into fiscal responsibility. 

Defense has contributed more than half of the deficit reduction 

measures taken to date. There are some in government who want 

to use the military to pay for the rest, to protect the sacred cow 

that is entitlement spending. Not only should that be a non-starter 

from a national security and economic perspective, but it should 

also be a nonstarter from a moral perspective. Consider that word, 

‘‘entitlements.’’ Well, entitlements imply that you are entitled to a 

certain benefit and I cannot think of anyone that has earned that 

right ahead of our troops. By volunteering to put their lives on the 

line for this country, they are entitled to the best training, equipment, and leadership our Nation can provide. But all this talk in 

Washington lately about dollars doesn’t translate well into actual 

impacts on the force and the risk to our Nation. 

Yesterday, former chairman Duncan Hunter encouraged us all to 

answer these questions before we voted to cut anymore from defense. Isn’t our primary constitutional duty to defend our Nation? 

Is the world suddenly safer today? Is the war against terrorism 

over? I hope our witnesses today can help us understand the ramifications of these possible cuts in relation to our force structure as 

well as our ability to meet future needs of our national defense. 

How can we make sure that the Department of Defense is a good 

steward of the taxpayer’s dollar without increasing risk to our 

Armed Forces? 

The U.S. military is the modern era’s pillar of American strength 

and values. In these difficult economic times, we recognize the 

struggle to bring fiscal discipline to our Nation, but it is imperative 

that we focus our fiscal restraint on the driver of the debt instead 

of the protector of our prosperity. 

With that in mind, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses 

today. The committee will be in recess while the disrupters are removed. 

The committee will be in order and I yield now to the ranking 

member of the committee, Mr. Smith from Washington. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 57.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope my comments will 

perhaps have a more calming effect on the audience. I doubt it. I 

thank you very much for having this hearing. We have had a series 

of hearings with a number of experts analyzing our national security needs and the budget threats that they face, but now of course 

we have the two people who are most in charge of making those 

decisions. It is a great honor to have the Secretary of Defense and 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff here. They do not have 

an easy job as they try to wrestle with the budget challenges we 

face. And I agree with the chairman, that the cuts that we are facing in our Department of Defense budget do place national security 

issues at risk. We have difficult decisions to make to figure out how 
3 

to accommodate even the cuts that have already been put in place 

for the next 10 years. There will be difficult challenges that are 

contained in that. 

And I think we should also point out in addition to the sequestration threat, and it is not just that sequestration would require 

further cuts in defense, and I should say further cuts in all discretionary spending. And I am concerned about infrastructure and 

education and innovation and a number of other areas that face— 

that have already been cut, number one, and, number two, face the 

severe cuts of sequestration, but I think it is really important that 

the committee understands the way that was crafted, it requires 

across-the-board cuts. If we go to sequestration, every line item in 

the defense budget, and frankly, every line item in all discretionary 

spending has to be cut by the exact same amount, which is, frankly, insane. I mean, it will get us to the point where we would have 

to build, like, one and a half aircraft carriers. Well, you really can’t 

do that. 

So if we go to sequestration, it is not just the cut, it is the crazy 

way it was written that would frankly make it impossible to budget. The second piece that I don’t think that folks have a full understanding of is how devastating running a government on continuing resolutions is. The gentlemen before us have to make budget decisions, week in and week out when we can’t pass appropriations bills, and they have to do it on a CR [continuing resolution] 

which doesn’t really fund the Government the same way as an appropriations bill. It continues it from last year, but it doesn’t give 

clear guidance on what programs are to be continued. That costs 

us money and creates problems. So I would strongly urge this Congress to pass appropriations bills so that we can fund our Government in a responsible and reasonable way. It is costing us money 

and leading to inefficiencies and making it more difficult certainly 

at the Department of Defense, but throughout all discretionary 

spending to do their job. 

So both of those things are threats. But as I mentioned before 

with this committee, I am also mindful of the budget challenges 

that we face. They are real. Our budget is 40 percent out of whack. 

We borrow 40 cents of every dollar we spend. That is not sustainable, and it needs to be fixed and in fixing it, I believe everything 

has to be on the table. Now, I am very much aware of the choices 

that are faced by the Department of Defense, the threats and risks 

that are contained in making those cuts, certainly above all, the 

impact on our troops and our ability to continue to adequately provide for them and to make sure of the one thing that I think should 

always be without dispute and bipartisan agreement. We can disagree about what the mission of our military should be, but once 

that mission is set, there should be no disagreement, that we have 

the highest obligation to make sure that we give our troops the 

support, equipment, everything they need to carry out the mission 

that we have told them to do. It would be irresponsible not to. And 

with that challenge, I believe that we need to put everything on the 

table in trying to deal with our budget deficit. As I have said before 

in this committee, I am so concerned about cuts, not just in DOD 

[Department of Defense], but in other parts of our budget, that I 

am willing to say we need more revenue, that we can’t take that 
4 

piece off the table if we are truly going to meet the concerns that 

I think we are going to hear expressed today, and again, as I will 

continue to emphasize that also exists for other parts of the budget 

as well. 

So I hope we will consider that. I look forward to the testimony 

of our witnesses and their guidance on how to deal with the challenges we face both on the budget side and on the national security 

side, and I will just close by saying we could not have two more 

able people in those positions. And I look forward to their testimony. I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 59.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Now, let me welcome our witnesses 

here this morning. We have Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey. 

Gentlemen, welcome to your first hearing in your new positions before this committee. I look forward to a candid dialogue. And the 

time is now yours, Secretary Panetta. 

[Disturbance in hearing room.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will resume. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LEON E. PANETTA, SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary PANETTA. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, distinguished members of the committee, it really is an honor for me to 

have the opportunity to appear before you. For the first time as 

Secretary of Defense, I would also like to join you in recognizing 

General Dempsey. Marty Dempsey is a brilliant soldier, and he is 

someone who is a proven leader on the battlefield and off the battlefield. And I am delighted to have him alongside of me in his new 

capacity as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. 

On behalf of the men and women of the Department of Defense, 

I want to thank the Members of this committee for your support 

and for your determination to join me in every way possible to try 

to ensure that these men and women succeed in their mission of 

protecting America. As a former Member—— 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will suspend. 

[Disturbance in hearing room.] 

Secretary PANETTA. As a former Member of the House for 16 

years, I really do believe that Congress must be a full partner in 

our efforts to protect the country. And for that reason and in that 

spirit, I have had the opportunity to consult with many of you and 

will continue to consult with you as we face the challenges that the 

Department of Defense must confront in the days ahead. These are 

difficult times, and I really do need your full guidance, your full 

counsel, and your full support. 

I would like to thank you for convening these series of hearings. 

This is an important effort that the committee has engaged in, 

looking at the future of national defense and the U.S. military 10 

years after 9/11, and for giving me the opportunity to be here today 

to add my perspective to that discussion. We have been at war for 

10 years, putting a heavy burden on our men and women in uniform to defend our Nation and to defend our interests. More than 

6,200 have given their lives, and more than 46,000 have been 
5 

wounded during these wars that we have engaged in since 9/11. 

The conflicts have brought untold stresses and untold strains on 

our service members and on their families. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will suspend. 

[Disturbance in hearing room.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will proceed. 

Secretary PANETTA. These conflicts have brought untold stresses 

and strains on our service members, and obviously on their families 

as well. But despite it all, we really have built the finest, most experienced, most battle-hardened, All-Volunteer Force in our Nation’s history. Our forces have become more lethal and more capable of conducting effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 

operations. 

New or enhanced capabilities, including the growth of special operations forces, unmanned aerial systems, counter-IED [Improvised 

Explosive Devices] technologies and the extraordinary fusion that 

I personally witnessed between the military and intelligence operations have provided the key tools that we need in order to succeed 

on the battlefields of the 21st century. 

And make no mistake, we are succeeding. Ten years after 9/11, 

we have significantly rolled back Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda’s militant 

allies. We have undermined their ability to exercise command and 

control and to do the kind of planning that was involved in the attack on 9/11. We are closer than ever to achieving our strategic objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq. And we continue to be a bulwark 

for democracy in confronting countries like Iran and North Korea 

and others that would constitute a threat to our security. 

The bottom line here is that these conflicts that we have been 

through, that while we are moving in the right direction, the fact 

remains that we are at a turning point, a turning point not only 

with regards to the challenges we face, but a turning point with regards to the military as a whole. 

As the current mission in Iraq comes to an end, as we continue 

to transition security responsibility in Afghanistan and as we near 

the goal of disrupting, dismantling and ultimately defeating Al 

Qaeda, the Department is also facing a new fiscal reality here at 

home. As part of the debt ceiling agreement reached in August, the 

Department must find more than $450 billion in savings over the 

next decade. Our challenge is taking a force that has been involved 

in a decade of war and ensuring that as we build the military for 

the future, we are able to defend this country for the next decade 

at a time of fiscal austerity. We need to build a force that can confront a growing array of threats in the 21st century. 

As I pointed out to some Members the other day, one of the differences is that as we came out of past wars, we essentially were 

able to enjoy a peace dividend at a time of relative peace. Now as 

we confront the fiscal challenges that this Nation faces, we are 

doing it at a time when we are continuing to confront a series of 

very real threats in the world to our national security. We continue 

to confront the threat of terrorism. Regardless of what we have 

been able to achieve and we have achieved a great deal, there remain real threats out there, not only in Pakistan, but Somalia, 

Yemen, North Africa and other places. Those terrorists who continue to plan attacks in this country. We continue to have to deal 
6 

with nuclear proliferation in the world. We continue to have to confront rising powers in the world. We continue to have to confront 

cyber attacks and the increasing number of those attacks that 

threaten us every day. And yet as we confront those threats, we 

have to meet our fiscal responsibilities. That will require setting a 

very clear set of strategic priorities and making some very tough 

decisions. 

Working closely with the service chiefs, the service secretaries 

and the combatant commanders, I intend to make these decisions 

based on the following guidelines: First, we have and we must 

maintain the finest and best military in the world, a force capable 

of deterring conflict, a force capable of projecting power, and a force 

capable of winning wars. 

Second, we absolutely have to avoid a hollow force and maintain 

a military that even if smaller, will be ready, agile and deployable. 

As I said after every major conflict, World War I, World War II, 

Korea, Vietnam, the fall of the Soviet Union, what happened was 

that we ultimately hollowed out the Force, largely by doing deep, 

across-the-board cuts that impacted on equipment, impacted on 

training, impacted on capability. 

Whatever we do in confronting the challenges we face now on the 

fiscal side, we must not make that mistake and we will not make 

that mistake of hollowing out the Force. 

Third, it demands a balanced approach and we have to look at 

all areas of the budget for potential savings, from efficiencies that 

trim duplication and bureaucratic overhead to improving competition and management and operating and investment programs, 

procurement programs; tightening personnel costs that have increased by almost 80 percent over the last few years, and reevaluating our modernization efforts. All of that needs to be considered, 

all of that needs to be on the table if we are going to do a responsible job here that addresses the areas where we can find savings 

without hollowing out the Force. 

And finally, and most importantly, we cannot break faith with 

our men and women in uniform. The All-Volunteer Force is central 

to a strong military and central to our Nation’s future. We have a 

lot of very effective weapons at the Pentagon and at the Department of Defense, a lot of very sophisticated technology, but very 

frankly, we could not be the finest defense system in the world 

without the men and women who serve in uniform. They are the 

ones that have made us strong, and they are the ones that put 

their lives on the line every day in order to protect this country. 

We have got to maintain our faith with those that have deployed 

time and time and time again. And that is something I intend to 

do. If we follow these four principles, I am confident that we can 

meet our national security responsibilities and do our part to help 

this country get its fiscal house in order. 

To achieve the required budget savings, the Department also 

must work even harder to overhaul the way it does business and 

an essential part of this effort will be improving the quality of financial information and moving towards auditable financial statements. Today, DOD is one of only two major agencies that has 

never had a clean audit opinion on its financial statements. That 

is inexcusable and it must change. The Department has made sig-
7 

nificant progress toward meeting the congressional deadline for 

audit-ready financial statements by 2017, focusing first on improving the categories of information that are most relevant to managing the budget. But we need to do better. And we will. 

Today I am announcing that I have directed the Department to 

cut in half the time it will take to achieve audit readiness for the 

statement of budgetary resources, so that by 2014, we will have the 

ability to conduct a full budget audit. This focused approach 

prioritizes the information we use in managing the Department, 

and will give our financial managers the key tools they need to 

track spending, identify waste, and improve the way the Pentagon 

does business as soon as possible. 

I have directed the DOD Comptroller to revise the current plan 

within 60 days to meet these new goals and still achieve the requirement of overall audit readiness by 2017. We owe it to the taxpayers to be transparent and accountable for how we spend their 

dollars. And under this plan, we will move closer to fulfilling that 

responsibility. 

The Department is changing the way it does business and taking 

on a significant share of our country’s efforts to achieve fiscal discipline. We will do so, but we will do so while building the agile 

deployable force we need to confront the wide range of threats that 

we face. But I want to close by cautioning strongly against further 

cuts to defense, and for that matter, to other discretionary accounts, particularly with the mechanism that has been built into 

the debt ceiling agreement called sequester. It is a blind, mindless 

formula that makes cuts across the board, hampers our ability to 

align resources with strategy and risks hollowing out the Force. I 

understand this formula. When I was in Congress serving on the 

Budget Committee, I served on the conference that developed the 

so-called Gramm-Rudman approach to dealing with these kinds of 

cuts. But even then, every time the cuts were to take place, Congress basically postponed it because it was mindless, because it 

was across the board. It was designed as a gun to be put to the 

head of Congress so that it would do the right thing. 

And I guess what I am urging the committee, the ‘‘super committee’’ [Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction] to do is do 

the right thing. Come up with the decisions that should be made, 

frankly, on the two-thirds of the budget that is still yet to be considered for deficit reduction. You are working with one-third of the 

budget in discretionary spending and it is taking a trillion dollar 

hit, and Defense is going to have to pay up almost half of that. If 

you are going to be responsible in dealing with the deficit, you have 

got to consider the mandatory programs and you have got to consider obviously revenue spending as part of that as well. 

I truly believe that we do not have to make a choice between fiscal security and national security. But to do that, to do that will 

require that we have to make some very tough choices. And I have 

to be frank with you, they are choices that could have some impact 

on the constituencies that you care most about. As a Member of 

Congress, I have been through this. I represented an area that had 

significant military installations, Fort Ord, and a number of other 

installations. During the period following the reductions after the 

fall of the Soviet Union, during the BRAC [Base Closure and Re-
8 

alignment] process, I lost Fort Ord. Fort Ord was taken down. That 

represented 25 percent of my local economy. So I know what it 

means to go through this process. 

We have to do this right, and we can do it right and we can do 

it responsibly. But to do that I need your support to do everything 

possible to prevent further damaging cuts and to help us implement a coherent, strategy-driven program and budget that we will 

identify in the months ahead as critical to preserving the best military in the world. This is tough, it is challenging, but I also view 

this as an opportunity to create a military for the future that will 

meet the threats that we have to confront. I pledge to continue to 

work with you closely as we confront these challenges and I thank 

you once again for all of your tireless efforts to build a stronger 

military for our country that can protect our people in the future. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Panetta can be found in 

the Appendix on page 61.] 

STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Chairman McKeon, Ranking 

Member Smith, Members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on the future of national defense and our military 10 years after the attacks on September 

11th. I want to begin by introducing the handsome Marine over my 

right soldier here who I just recently appointed as my senior enlisted advisor. So this is Sergeant Major Bryan Battaglia, 32 years 

United States Marine Corps, served this country and the Corps 

with great distinction and great honor. And he has now been appointed as my senior enlisted advisor, so that he can help us accomplish the tasks that you just heard the Secretary articulate and 

ensure we remain in contact with the young men and women 

who—America’s sons and daughters who we place in harm’s way. 

So if you will join me. 

[Applause.] 

General DEMPSEY. As this is my first time before you as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, I want to make note that I look forward 

to our continued cooperation for all of the very important reasons 

outlined by the Secretary of Defense. I also want to affirm that I 

take seriously our shared responsibility of maintaining a military 

that preserves the trust that is placed in our hands by the citizens 

of the United States. And I believe we can sustain that trust while 

also being good stewards of our Nation’s resources. 

In the past decade, over 2 million men and women have deployed 

overseas in support of operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Our Joint Force has demonstrated great initiative, great 

strength and great resolve. The security landscape has also shifted 

during this period, and our military has demonstrated its ability to 

adapt and to learn. So from my vantage point and in keeping with 

the theme of these meetings, let me point out a few lessons that 

stand out. First, we live in an increasingly competitive security environment; capabilities that previously were the monopoly of nation-states are now proliferated across the security landscape. As 
9 

a consequence, we must learn faster, understand more deeply and 

adapt more quickly than our adversaries. 

Second, relationships matter more than ever. Coalitions and 

partnerships add capability, capacity and credibility to what we see 

as shared security responsibilities. Therefore we are committed, 

even in the face of some of the budget pressures that have been described to expanding the envelope of cooperation at home and 

abroad. 

Third, our Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and our Coast Guard 

brothers and sisters combine to field a truly unmatched team. We 

still need our Services to maintain and be the masters of their core 

competencies and their unique service cultures, but they must operate as a single cohesive team. We must continue to value and advance joint interdependence. 

Fourth, innovation is instrumental to the future of our Joint 

Force. We have expanded many of our—what we referred to in 

years past as low-density capabilities and we fielded many new 

technologies. We must continue to unleash innovation in the ranks 

and challenge ourselves to leverage these emerging capabilities in 

new and creative ways. 

And finally, leadership remains at the core of our military profession. It is why we have been able to learn, adapt and achieve the 

results that I have described over the past decade. Now, developing 

the next generation of joint leaders will preserve our Nation’s decisive advantage over any would-be adversary. 

With these lessons in mind, we are working to build, to conceive, 

and then build the Joint Force we need in 2020. This Force must 

be powerful, responsive, resilient, versatile and it must be admired. 

It must preserve our human capital and have the capability and capacity to provide military options for our Nation’s leaders. And it 

must be affordable. Be assured, I am fully committed to reducing 

costs without compromising our Nation’s security needs. We must 

make hard choices that balance risk and as the Secretary mentioned, avoid hollowing the Force. These choices need to be deliberate and precise. Indiscriminate cuts would cause self-inflicted 

and potentially irrevocable wounds to our national security. 

To close, I would like to again thank the committee for your commitment, your support to the men and women in uniform as well 

as to our families. They deserve the sacrifice—they deserve the future that they have sacrificed to secure. Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Dempsey can be found in the 

Appendix on page 65.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Chairman. Congratulations, Sergeant 

Major, on your new appointment. President Reagan once said that 

many people go through their lives wondering if they have had any 

impact on their fellow men, if they made a difference in life, and 

he said Marines don’t have that problem. 

Chairman, the first round of cuts from the Budget Control Act 

will reduce the funding for the military over the next 10 years by— 

from $450 to $480, $490 billion. What types of risks does the Department of Defense face as you implement these cuts over the 

next 10 years? Will there be any missions that you can no longer 
10 

do? Or is there a fallacy? Will you simply have to do the same missions with less? 

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Chairman. And as you know, we 

are involved in trying to figure out exactly the answer to that question. But I can share some emerging insights with you. The emerging insights are that it will require us to look at what our national 

security strategy has been, as articulated currently in the Quadrennial Defense Review. To your point about missions, in my statement, I mention that what we owe our Nation’s leaders and our 

Nation’s citizens are options. 

It is somewhat inconceivable to me that we would roll back into 

this committee, to the national—to the leaders of our national security apparatus and say we are not going to do this because if the 

Nation needs us to do it, you know we have to find a way to do 

it. That is going to require us to build in—we will have to 

prioritize, but we have got to build in some versatility, because as 

many have testified to this committee and elsewhere, we generally 

find that we don’t predict the future with any degree of accuracy. 

So it has got to be a combination of options and versatility. It has 

got to be capabilities, and it has got to be capacity. We need the 

capability to do things and we need the ability to sustain those capabilities over time. That is capacity. Tell me what you want me 

to do, how often you want me to do it, I can build you a Joint Force 

and we are working on that now. But the risks will accrue as we 

determine where we have to limit capabilities, if we get to that 

point, and it could accrue as we determine that we need less and 

then find ourselves using it more and asking more and more of our 

young men and women on a rotational basis that we can’t sustain. 

So the risks are both to mission but also to the institution. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, many have said that 

defense has to be on the table, and I understand that. In the first 

tranche of cuts of the Deficit Reduction Act, the military paid for 

about half of the table. You know, I have made the comment that 

we can’t solve the financial problem that we have on the backs of 

the military, or who will have our backs the next time we are attacked? 

I don’t believe that the DOD should have to pay one penny more 

in discretionary budget cuts. I know you commented on this in your 

opening statement, and based on our conversations and our visits 

up to this point, I think we are of a like mind, but I would like 

to confirm your position, get it on the record. Do you agree with 

me that the national defense has contributed enough to deficit reduction and that no further cuts should be recommended? 

Secretary PANETTA. Absolutely. The fact is we are having to cut 

a half trillion dollars, almost a half trillion dollars out of the defense budget. And that is going to take, as I said, some very difficult choices. I think we agree that as tough as it is, it is manageable. We can do this in a way that protects our Force for the future, but it is going to take us to the edge. And if suddenly on top 

of that we face additional cuts, or if this sequester goes into effect 

and it doubles the number of cuts, and then it will truly devastate 

our national defense, because it will then require that we have to 

go at our force structure, we will have to hollow it out, we will RIF 
11 

[Reduction in Force] people. It will badly damage our capabilities 

for the future. 

I don’t say that as scare tactics, I don’t say it as a threat. It is 

a reality. And the reason I can say it is a reality because we have 

been going through how we take $450 billion-plus out of this budget, what weapons systems do we look at? What force structure reductions do we make? What kind of benefits in terms of personnel 

and compensation do we have to look at? What do we do with regards to areas that have to be tightened up in terms of procurement, et cetera? These are all going to be tough decisions. 

Now, as I said, there is an opportunity here and we can do this 

the right way. But if suddenly we are facing additional cuts, and 

if suddenly we are facing a doubling of those cuts, a responsible approach to doing this right is going to be impossible. That is what 

I am saying. 

The CHAIRMAN. And I think you mentioned the word RIF. If it 

came to that, we would be breaking faith with the very men and 

women who have been laying their life on the line for us. I think 

that is inexcusable, and I think no one on this committee would 

support that. Thank you very much. Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do think it is important 

to emphasize that, you know, we have not said take defense off the 

table. In fact, defense has already been on the table. It was, along 

with the rest of the discretionary budget, what was cut as part of 

the debt ceiling agreement cut as has been mentioned by somewhere in the neighborhood of $450 to $490 billion, depending on 

how you add it up, and that is the challenge you gentlemen are 

faced with, is how to make that work. 

So we are not suggesting it should be taken off the table. I think 

as we look at how we are going to deal with those cuts and then 

about the potential of sequestration and trying to prevent that, it 

is helpful to sort of understand what the threat is. And a couple 

of phrases that are used frequently that I would like you gentlemen to explain a little bit better is we have heard that it increases 

the risk. But that is never actually explained. What does that 

mean? And another way of looking at it is, what missions would 

we not be able to do specifically, in terms of, you know, a given region of the world, a given threat that we wouldn’t be as robust 

against? I mean, throw it open to both of you. Can you tell us a 

little more specifically when you say ‘‘it increases the risk’’? What 

risks specifically? What won’t we be able to do that you think we 

should be able to do for national security reasons? Mr. Secretary, 

if you want to start and then, General. 

Secretary PANETTA. Congressman, obviously we are going 

through the process now of—what we want to do is establish what 

is that larger strategy? So this isn’t just numbers driven. It is not 

budget driven. It is driven by a strategy that we can shape that 

tells us, okay, what kind of force do we need, we know it is going 

to be smaller, we want it to be agile, we want it to be deployable, 

we think we have to have multimission kinds of weapon systems 

to help support that force. You know, if that is the larger strategy 

and we are still shaping that in conjunction obviously with the 

service chiefs, but also with the President, once we have done that, 

then obviously we are going to have to start making specific deci-
12 

sions about, you know, where the reductions are made. I mean, you 

know, without—without telling you that decisions have been made 

and no decisions have been made. You know, I can give you an example. For example, if we decide that we have got to maintain our 

force structure presence in the Pacific in order to deal with China, 

and China’s expanding role in that part of the world, and because 

of the other issues that exist obviously in that very sensitive part 

of the world, and if we decide that the Middle East is also a very 

important area where we have to maintain a presence as well, then 

just by virtue of the numbers that we are dealing with, we will 

probably have to reduce our presence elsewhere, presence perhaps 

in Latin America, presence in Africa, and so if you are talking 

about risks, part of the risks would be, you know, having less of 

a presence in those areas. 

Mr. SMITH. Play out a little bit what that presence does for us? 

I could do it, but I am curious to hear what your answer is so the 

American people understand. So we are there, what does that do 

for us? Why is that in our national interests? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, sir. If I could elevate 10,000 feet or so 

and look down and I will eventually land on the African continent. 

The way we measure risk is the likelihood of something occurring 

and the consequence of it. So thermonuclear war is highly unlikely 

with an enormous consequence, and therefore our nuclear deterrent—we will be able to assess the risk to our nuclear deterrent as 

it is affected by potential budget cuts. If you work your way from 

nuclear deterrents down to irregular conflict, we can do that at 

every grade, if you will, of the kind of threats we face. But to your 

point about what do we get by our presence on the African continent? We are engaged in a conflict today and have been probably, 

if we look back carefully enough at our history—if we look back to 

about 1993, the attack on the World Trade Center, the first time, 

we have been involved in a conflict with violent extremist organizations, call them terrorists, who are networked globally, who are 

syndicated and who are decentralized. So they are not sitting in 

one place to be acted against. They are networked. One of the 

places they sit is Pakistan. One of the places they sit, or sat, is Afghanistan. One of the places they sit is the African continent. In 

order to defeat a network of adversaries, we have to be a network. 

We can’t be this hierarchal cold war military, and we are not any 

longer. 

So our presence on the African continent is part of our network 

of building partners, of gaining intelligence and then when targeting approaches, or targeting reaches the level of refinement, we 

can act on it. But we have to be networked against the specific 

threat you are talking about and part of that requires our presence 

in Africa. 

Mr. SMITH. That is an excellent answer. I think also part of our 

presence is deterring our enemies from doing things. You know, it 

is an instructive point that we are now dealing with the high likelihood that Iran felt comfortable, you know, doing an assassination 

on our soil, and part of that has to be at least a calculation that 

they don’t fear what the consequences of that would be. And you 

can extrapolate that out to a North Korea, to a whole lot of other 
13 

places, and there are consequences in those choices. Excellent answers. I thank you gentlemen. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We will now proceed to the Members 

having the opportunity to ask questions. I know you all want to 

ask questions, so I will be following the 5-minute rule and ask you 

to consider that in your questions and our witnesses to consider 

that in their answers, please. Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. Usually the resolution of big issue 

matters requires the aggregation of decisions about a number of 

smaller issues, and today I have a question about two of our programs that I think could be very effective in reducing our costs and 

improving our capabilities. The first relates to the C–27J. Mr. Secretary, yesterday in our subcommittee hearing, near the end of the 

day, your generals voluntarily brought up the issue of the C–27J. 

As you may know, sir, there has been a confirmed requirement for 

78 of those planes for a number of years now. We have procured 

only 38 of them as a result of that. As one of your generals said 

yesterday, we are flying the blades off the lift helicopters to meet 

these lift requirements and these helicopters are enormously more 

expensive than the C–27J. Mr. Secretary, just yesterday I think a 

letter reached your desk signed by 12 Members of Congress relative to the C–27J. We would appreciate your personal attention to 

that, Mr. Secretary, if that is possible. 

Secretary PANETTA. You will get that. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. The second issue, the 

original acquisition strategy for the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter included a competitive engine program because of the thousands of 

engines projected to be procured to reduce costs and development 

risks through competition, and because of the Department’s positive experience with the alternative engine for the F–16 beginning 

in the mid-80s. Contrary to assertions by some, there never has 

been an F–35 engine competition where the 135 [F135 engine] won. 

In fact, in 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed a memorandum of understanding with the F–35 international partners to 

procure the competitive engine. That same year, the Department, 

due to cost pressures on the F–35 program, sought to cancel the development of the competitive engine, change its acquisition strategy and use the R&D [Research and Development] funding planned 

for the competitive engine to cover overruns in the F–35 aircraft 

program. In spite of these department actions, Congress funded the 

competitive engine program through 2010. 

Now the manufacturer of the competitive engine wants to selffund the R&D for its engine beginning as soon as possible. The Department of Defense continues to be a major proponent of the competition in its programs, except for the F–35 competitive engine, 

opposing self-funded competition of the F–35 competition engine 

program. 

In your speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center, you said, and I 

quote, ‘‘We will look to procurement reforms and improve competition, cost control and delivery when examining modernization operating costs.’’ 

Mr. Secretary, what kind of message is the Department sending 

to all contractors by opposing the efforts of the competitive engine 

manufacturer to self-fund R&D for its own program? 
14 

Secretary PANETTA. Congressman, I am a strong supporter of 

competition, but I don’t want competition to cost me more money. 

I want it to be cost efficient. And with regards to the program, you 

have identified the problem is that all of those that have looked at 

it indicate that it is going to result in more costs to the Defense 

Department to proceed on that path. 

Now, I will say this, that the manufacturer that wants to engage 

in self-funding has developed an approach. I think we need to look 

at it to determine whether in fact it is cost efficient. If, in the end, 

it is going to cost me more money, that is not what I call good competition. If in the end it saves me money, then I am willing to look 

at it. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Secretary, isn’t it true that GAO [Government Accountability Office] continues to contend that pursuing the 

136 engine [F136 alternative engine] will probably save us money? 

Secretary PANETTA. There are those that have indicated that 

there is some savings here and that we could achieve, you know, 

better competition. But frankly, it is disputed within the Department, and I have got to work through that dispute. 

Mr. BARTLETT. We would appreciate your attention to that, sir. 

As you know, competition always makes things better and makes 

them cheaper. It should be no exception here. Thank you very 

much for your commitment to look at this personally. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, and, General, thank you for being here and thank you for your leadership 

in these critical times that face our Nation. The other night, Mr. 

Secretary, I made mention about the concerns that were expressed 

to me last week in a number of meetings with military families. 

Today I want to ask a question about military retirement reform 

because there is, or there are a number of proposals, largely 

through the Internet that are concerning our retirees. Recent budget pressures within the Department of Defense have resulted in 

greater awareness of the increasing cost of military personnel programs to include military compensation, health care and military 

retirement. The defense business board recently declared that the 

military retirement system was unaffordable and proposed a plan 

that would convert the military retirement system from a defined 

benefit plan to defined contribution plan that is common in the private sector. Benefits would vest at 3 to 5 years, as opposed to 20 

years, in today’s system and would not be payable until age 60 or 

65 as opposed to immediately upon retirement under the current 

system. This would seem to be a very significant change in the culture of our military retirement benefit. 

So the questions I have, Mr. Secretary, and also, General, if you 

want to comment, have we arrived at the point where reform of 

military retirement is necessary? Second, is the proposal of the Defense Business Board the right solution to maintain retention and 

combat readiness? If the Defense Business Board proposal is not 

the right solution, what would be a model that you believe might 

work? 

And finally should the payment of benefits immediately upon retirement be continued as part of any proposed reform initiative? I 
15 

ask those questions because those are concerns that have been expressed to me several times last week. 

Secretary PANETTA. Yeah. No, I understand. And as a result of 

that report that came out, there were a lot of people that were 

nervous that somehow that would be implemented, and again, the 

bottom line is that we have made no decisions with regards to that. 

As a matter of fact, the President has proposed a commission—one 

of the recommendations to the committee was a proposal to establish a commission that would look at retirement and provide grandfather protection for those in the service, and I would support that. 

But, look, this is what it comes down to. When we are looking at 

$450 billion-plus in terms of where we find savings, I have got to 

put everything on the table and take a look at it. And compensation in the retirement area is one of those. But at the same time, 

I have made very clear that we can’t break faith with those in the 

service. We have made a promise to people who are on duty that 

we are going to provide a certain level of retirement. We are not 

going to back away from that. We have to maintain that promise. 

Those people have been deployed time and time again, they have 

put their lives on the line in the battlefield. And we are not going 

to pull the rug out from under them. We are going to stand by the 

promise that was made to them. 

So one of the commitments that I have made is that in any circumstance related to this issue, we are going to protect those that 

are in the service today. And we are going to grandfather them in. 

Now, having said that, you know, are there areas in the retirement 

area that need to be looked at, for example, there are individuals 

that serve 12, 14, 15 years, when they get out, they have no retirement to take with them and, you know, is that an area that we 

ought to look at to determine whether or not they ought to be able 

to move some of those benefits to other areas? 

Are there some reforms that can be made along those lines? I 

mean, I think those are the kinds of issues that we ought to be 

open to consider. But I only think it ought to be done recognizing 

that we have to protect those that are on duty. 

General DEMPSEY. And, sir, if I could—thanks for the opportunity to comment on this, because I do want to address something 

I have seen in the discussions about this. I reject the characterization of our military retirement program today as kind of gilt-edged, 

and the comparison to civilian retirement programs. Look, it might 

turn out that our current plan is unaffordable and we will have to 

do something about it. But when we put a retirement program together, it is because these young men and women who become old 

men and women who serve for 20 years, who put themselves in 

harm’s way, who move 10 or 15 times, who some of them can buy 

a house, some of them can’t, their spouses rarely can have employment because we move them around, not voluntarily, they move because we tell them to go where the Nation needs them. That retirement program needs to be fundamentally different than anything 

you find in the civilian sector in my view. We can figure it out. We 

need the time to do so. If it is unaffordable, we will react. But I 

want to reject outright the idea that somehow my retirement program, or more important, that Sergeant Major Battaglia should be 

compared to someone else’s. 
16 

Mr. REYES. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, 

today and when I have heard you previously, you have seemed 

quite clear that you believe that we should make no further cuts 

in the defense budget beyond those which have already been enacted. Is that true? 

Secretary PANETTA. Correct. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Does the President share your view on that? 

Secretary PANETTA. He does. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. So as Commander in Chief, I think it is important for him to be able to speak out and also say we have gone as 

far as we can go, we have gone to the edge, to use your words, and 

that no more cuts should come from the defense budget. I am hopeful we can have bipartisan agreement on that. 

General Dempsey, you used a word that caught my attention in 

your statement. You said if there are further cuts, there could be 

irrevocable damage to our military. Now, a fair number of folks 

here, I think, have the opinion that, okay, so if there are cuts either enacted by the super committee or through sequestration, we 

can always make up for that the next year and put some more 

money and everything will be okay. Explain to us what you mean 

by ‘‘irrevocable,’’ and how can a cut do damage that can’t be corrected the next year with some extra money? 

General DEMPSEY. It comes down to what I have described in the 

statement, Congressman, as the core of our profession and that is, 

the men and women who comprise it and who we develop as leaders. You know, we are the military. We consider ourselves the preeminent leader development institution in America. And I think we 

have a case to make that. If some of the cuts occur in the magnitude, and more important, with the targets as they are described 

right now in sequestration and it causes us to RIF—this goes back 

to the notion of do we have the time to reduce the force over time 

responsibly and predictably? That is one thing. If we don’t, if we 

begin to have to RIF to meet the budget targets imposed by sequestration, we lose that core. 

We have seen this happen in the 1980s—correction, 1990s, right 

after Desert Storm where we created a ‘‘bathtub’’ [chart bathtub 

curve], if you will, of captains and majors who exited the service 

and then when we had to regrow the Army by 65,000 as a result 

of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, where we suffered was not 

in the basic rifle infantry men. We can grow them. We can grow 

them in 20 to 30 weeks. You can’t grow a captain, a major, a lieutenant colonel, a sergeant major in 20 to 30 weeks. And if we 

don’t—if we are not careful with this and we have a migration of 

that talent out of the Army, that is irrevocable for probably 10 or 

15 years. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Secretary, let me turn back to you for one 

other question. This series of hearings has been about 9/11. Ten 

years ago, one could see a clear trend towards terrorism, but the 

method of attack was certainly unexpected. It is undoubtedly true 

we will face unexpected things in the next 10 years that will be affected by our actions here. 
17 

One of the concerns I have is that, for things like research and 

development, those kinds of not specific programs, you don’t know 

how they are going to play out, and yet they lay the foundation for 

our future. As you all go through implementing what has already 

been passed—and hopefully that is it—tell me how you take into 

account preparing for uncertainty. Because it seems to me that 

that is absolutely central to national security in a complex world. 

Secretary PANETTA. Absolutely. In all of the past planning that 

has gone into developing the defense budget, the one thing that everybody agrees is that no one has accurately predicted the future 

and has anticipated the kind of attacks and crises we have had to 

confront. You can identify kind of large areas where you would expect that a future crisis might lie. But the reality is that if we are 

going to have a strong defense, we have got to be prepared to react 

to a surprise. We have got to be prepared to react to something we 

are not expecting. And that is the reason—I mean, I think you 

have hit on something very important, which is we need to have 

research and development. We need to have those kinds of creative 

areas of the Department that look at those kinds of potential problems, that develop approaches to those kinds of possible crises in 

the future. I mean, to have that kind of imaginative look at where 

we will be, what kind of potential enemy will we confront, that 

gives us the capability to begin to design a truly agile force that 

can respond to those kinds of threats. That is the difference. And 

I need that. I can’t lock in, you know, there are three or four 

threats out there and we are just going to deal with those. We have 

got to be flexible and agile enough to respond to any threat, wherever it comes from. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to you 

both for your leadership and also thank you for your statements 

about the military and their families. I think that is very important 

for them to hear and for us to obviously be very engaged in. And 

I certainly would encourage all my colleagues here to join us on the 

Personnel Subcommittee. Sometimes the committees are a little 

slim, and we need all of your support. 

I wanted to ask you about our commitments and how we close 

the gap because we do know that our resources—if we wouldn’t use 

the word ‘‘shrinking,’’ they certainly would be diminishing, unlike 

the unprecedented rise that we saw in the last 2 years. Is there 

anything in addition to what has been said that you would like to 

share about how we close that gap? 

Secretary PANETTA. Explain that question. 

Mrs. DAVIS. The gap between our resources and our commitments. I think the General did speak to that. But I am just wondering if there is anything additionally from where you sit, Mr. 

Secretary, as well that you would like to say about that. 

Secretary PANETTA. Well, let me reemphasize a point that I have 

made time and time again. You know, the problem is, yes, we need 

to make these reductions. We know we are dealing with more limited resources. But at the same time, I have got a responsibility to 

defend this country. And neither Congress nor the President did 

away with the challenge of terrorism. That is still very real out 

there. We have got terrorists out there who continue to plan to at-
18 

tack our country. We have got to stay on top of that. We have got 

to be able to go after them and dismantle those kinds of operations. 

We still have two wars that we are in. Now admittedly, we are 

drawing down in Iraq but we are still fighting a war in Afghanistan, and we are trying to transition there. But we are in a war. 

We have got the threats from Iran and North Korea. They are engaged in nuclear proliferation. They are trying to develop a nuclear 

capability. As we saw within the last few days, these are pariah 

nations that constitute a threat to our security, they constitute a 

threat to the security of the world. They are still there. We have 

still got to deal with them. 

We have got cyber attacks that are coming at us left and right. 

We have got to deal with that threat. It is the battlefield of the future. We have got rising powers in the world that constitute a challenge to us. I mean, China in the South China Sea has created concerns for us as to our ability to be able to use international waters. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Mr. Secretary, if I could just interrupt. 

Secretary PANETTA. Those are the threats. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Is there a way that Congress and the committee can 

better assist you in that strategic planning over what our role has 

been today? 

Secretary PANETTA. You sure can. As we go through the process 

of developing that larger strategy, I need to be able to sit down 

with you and brief you on that and get your best input on that because that will be the place where we have to make choices as to 

what are those threats, what are the things we have to be ready 

for, and also consider what are the risks. The issue was raised, you 

know, what are going to be the risks involved here? There are 

going to be risks here. I am not kidding you. When you cut the 

budget by $450 billion, when you make the choices we are going 

to have to make, there are going to be some risks that are going 

to be out there. Those risks have to be acceptable, but there are 

going to be risks. We need to know that. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. When General Pace testified just a few 

weeks ago, he mentioned that we don’t really have a cohesive national security strategy, and he suggested that we need something 

more akin to Goldwater-Nichols when it comes to interagency collaboration, looking at the whole-of-government approach. Would 

you agree with that? And what, again, do you think that we should 

be doing to promote it? Should there be more reporting mechanisms to the committee in terms of what actually is being done 

about that? We know things have changed since we entered Iraq, 

certainly great progress in many ways. But on the other hand, I 

think a lot of us would agree we are not there yet. 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, Congresswoman. I am not going to sign 

up for the extra reporting here. But I would like to respond to the 

question about, what are we doing to get after General Pace’s advice. The Secretary has us embarked on a strategic review, the idea 

being that we really need to understand what we must do for the 

Nation, and we have projected it out to 2020 so we can look back 

and have four program operating memorandums to march toward 

it. So we are trying to jump across the immediate fiscal crisis, determine what does the does the Nation need—not what does the 

Department of Defense need—what does the Nation need. And one 
19 

of the answers to that question is, in fact, greater—we have tremendous integration with other agencies of government in which 

those relationships have accrued over the course of the last 10 

years in ways that are absolutely remarkable. We have got to keep 

that going, and those are also some of the ways we can close this 

gap you describe between what the military has to do and what the 

Nation has to do. That work is ongoing, and it is on a very fast 

timeline, being led by the Secretary of Defense. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And Mr. Secretary, General Dempsey, thank you for being here today. 

On Tuesday I had the privilege and honor of visiting Walter 

Reed Bethesda and saying thank you to so many soldiers and marines who have lost both legs that it brings me to this point. A 

lance corporal, his mother sitting in the room, asked me this question: Why are we still in Afghanistan? Mr. Secretary, I have great 

respect for you. You are on board and I know you will develop your 

own policies and that leads me to my question. In February of this 

year, we had Secretary Gates to testify before this committee. And 

I am going to read enough that I think you will understand the 

question. ‘‘By the end of this calendar year, we expect less than 

100,000 troops to be deployed in both of the major post-9/11 combat 

theaters, virtually all of those forces being in Afghanistan.’’ This is 

the key point. ‘‘That is why we believe that beginning in fiscal year 

2015, the United States can, with minimal risk, begin reducing 

Army active duty end strength by 27,000 and the Marine Corps by 

somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000. These projections assume 

that the number of troops in Afghanistan would be significantly reduced by the end of 2014 in accordance with the President’s strategy. If our assumptions prove incorrect, there is plenty of time to 

adjust the size and schedule of this change.’’ 

Well, you are here today, and I support the chairman and most 

members of this committee that we don’t want to see cuts to the 

military that would just decimate the military. But with $120 billion being spent each year in Afghanistan, Karzai is a corrupt leader—in fact, a marine general. I hand this out to everybody that 

comes to my office. It has got the marines carrying a flag-draped 

coffin. And it says the number of people who have been killed in 

Afghanistan and the cost. And everybody that wants to see me 

about any issue, I hand this to them and I say, Please call the 

White House, the Speaker of the House, and the leader of the Senate and tell them to get our troops home before 2014, 2015. 

So my question is this: How do I answer the lance corporal who 

has been there twice, severely wounded the second time, and many 

of them who have been over there four, five, or six times, you can 

testify to that. Will you reevaluate and not just accept what Secretary Gates said that we will be there until late 2014 and significant reduction in 2015? Because, Mr. Secretary, you know it is a 

no-win situation, and the General—I am going to read this and 

then please, I will give you the time to answer. 

I have had a marine general as my adviser for 21 months. Any 

time I email him, he emails me back. What do we say to the mother and father, the wife of the last soldier or marine killed to sup-
20 

port a corrupt government and a corrupt leader in a war that cannot be won? We continue to stay there until 2015. How many more 

have to die? How many more have to lose their legs and Uncle Sam 

will take care of them, as he should take care of them, for the next 

50 years of their lives? So, Mr. Secretary, if you would give me an 

answer. Are you willing to reconsider what Secretary Gates testified to before this committee? 

Secretary PANETTA. Congressman, our present strategy in Afghanistan is one that was developed by the President of the United 

States and by our allies in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] at the Lisbon conference which was to gradually transition 

our forces out of there by the end of 2014. And that is what we are 

doing, and that is what we will continue to work at in order to do 

it right. 

We are in the process of making that transition. We have already 

taken down, by the end of this year, the first 10,000 of the surge 

that was put in. We will take out the remaining part of that surge 

next year by the end of the fighting season. We will then begin to 

take down the remaining force through the end of 2014. So we are 

on a path to gradually transition down and remove our combat 

forces from that area. 

I have to tell you that, talking with General Allen, I feel that as 

difficult as that war has been, that the fact is that good progress 

has been made in terms of security. We have trained the Afghan 

army and police. They are operational now. We are making transitions. We have already transitioned seven areas. We are going to 

transition another group of areas in the fall to Afghanistan security 

and governance, and we are going to continue that process through 

the end of 2014. 

Yes, there are concerns. Yes, there are problems that you have 

identified. But in the end there is only one reason for this mission 

and that lies in the fact that Afghanistan was a safe haven for the 

Taliban and for Al Qaeda to conduct the 9/11 attack on this country. And one thing we do not want is Afghanistan becoming a safe 

haven again for Al Qaeda. That is what this mission is all about. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Secretary—last point, Mr. Chairman—we got bin 

Laden, and Al Qaeda has dispersed all around the world. Let’s 

bring them home. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank 

you, Secretary and General, for testifying today. And as we say in 

Guam, hafa adai, welcome. My first question is for you, Secretary 

Panetta, and has to do with the military buildup on Guam. In a 

recent Senate hearing, now-Deputy Secretary of Defense Carter indicated that the Guam realignment was on the table for cutting. 

I fear this comment is in direct contravention of our country’s 

agreement with Japan which was reaffirmed in June of this year. 

These comments along with certain actions by the Navy have created a sense of uncertainty about the buildup and that is 

unhelpful. 

Does DOD remain supportive of the Guam realignment as outlined in the Guam international agreement and the agreed implementation plan? 
21 

Secretary PANETTA. Congresswoman, we made an agreement 

with Japan related to the situation in Okinawa. Obviously we continue to stand by that agreement. We will continue to work with 

Japan on this. The challenge is going to be to try to make sure that 

we do it in a cost-effective way. That is going to be the challenge. 

But as to what we need to do, as to, you know, the effort to try 

to reduce our presence there, I think that is something we are committed to. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. That is 

what I wanted to have on the record. 

General DEMPSEY. Congresswoman, could I add just very briefly? 

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes, General. 

General DEMPSEY. I mentioned the strategic review we are undergoing. One of the questions we have to confront, and we are, is 

the issue of forward presence vice power projection. How much forward, how much from CONUS [Continental United States], how 

much rotational? And this conversation will occur in that context. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. 

The next question is for you, General, as well. There have been 

a number of positive developments this year for the military buildup. But the Senate has raised concerns and suggests that we 

rethink the entire program. I believe this is unwise, given the current threat environment in the Asia Pacific region. What are we 

doing as DOD and other interagency partners in getting the Government of Japan to achieve tangible progress in Okinawa? And 

further, what is our Government—specifically DOD—doing to help 

the Government of Japan achieve tangible progress? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, Congresswoman. Thanks. To kind of spin 

off of my earlier answer. I mean, what we are trying to do is become articulate with our friends and allies about our intentions. 

We are not the only nation in the world that is facing a new fiscal 

reality. And so our Japanese partners are facing some similar 

cases, and we have got some issues on the Korean Peninsula as 

well related to our future strategy and the new fiscal environment. 

I can just assure you those conversations are ongoing. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Good. 

Secretary, another problem here is, can the Hill expect to see a 

final master plan for the military buildup from DOD? Cost increases are becoming an issue. I think that is what you mentioned. 

Can you give us an answer on that? 

Secretary PANETTA. First of all, I am not sure about a military 

buildup at this point. I think what we are engaging in right now 

as a result of the number we have been handed by Congress is 

going to be an effort to reduce the budget in a responsible way. But 

what I can share with you is that as we develop a strategy for what 

we are going to need in the future and as we develop obviously the 

decisions that will be part of our budget presentation early next 

year, I fully intend to consult and advise with you in that process. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. 

And one final question. General, as we move to a post-Iraq and 

Afghanistan military, what are some of the biggest challenges that 

you see that face the military? And what areas of the world do we 

need to refocus on to put more emphasis on in the coming years? 
22 

General DEMPSEY. Again, that conversation is occurring even as 

we sit here among those who have been charged by the Secretary 

to answer that question. But I mean clearly we have got some 

emerging regions of the world that we have somewhat neglected 

because of the demands in Iraq and Afghanistan. You asked what 

concerns me in the post-Iraq/Afghanistan. I am concerned that we 

will convince ourselves that the job of defending this Nation is complete and that we can somehow go back to where we may have 

been in the mid-eighties, which is a military that wasn’t sure of 

itself or its support. And that concerns me. 

And again, back to one of the earlier questions about leaders. We 

have got to keep the right leaders in our military. That means we 

have got to train and educate them. We have to continue to inspire 

them so that when we need them—and we will—they will still be 

there. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you heard 

the chairman say we only have 5 minutes. If I had longer, I would 

compliment you more on all the things you have done, which I 

think have been very good up to this particular point in time. 

I will go right to my question. Less than a month ago when you 

appeared in a Senate committee similar to ours, you made a statement that if we allowed the trigger of the sequestration to take 

place and had $600 billion of additional cuts, it would be like shooting ourselves in the head. I think that was a good analogy. But I 

will also come back and say, that was more than just the fact that 

these are across-the-board cuts. Because even if we said $600 billion but you allocate to cuts, it would still be like shooting ourselves in the head. But I took it from that, that what you really 

mean is that for us to ask to make $600 billion of additional cuts 

to defense before we have done a strategic analysis and review 

would be perhaps reckless, irresponsible, even dangerous to the 

country. Is that a fair depiction? 

Secretary PANETTA. All of that. 

Mr. FORBES. If that is the case, Mr. Secretary, then would it not 

also be reckless, irresponsible, and dangerous for us to do the $450 

billion of cuts we have already done before we did a strategic review and analysis in the same way? And if not, differentiate for me 

the two. 

Secretary PANETTA. Well, the reality I am dealing with is that 

Congress—— 

Mr. FORBES. I am not blaming you. 

Secretary PANETTA. No, I understand. But I am dealing with the 

reality of having to reduce $450 billion and do it over these next 

10 years. I mean, obviously the better approach—had we the resources in this country and had we managed our budgets more responsibly, the better approach would have been to develop the 

strategy to be able to discuss exactly what we need, determine 

what the resources would be in order to meet that strategy and 

then come to you and say, this is what we need in order to do the 

job. 
23 

Mr. FORBES. But the two are essentially the same. So if one of 

them was perhaps reckless and irresponsible and dangerous, you 

can make the argument that the other one would be too. And the 

other thing that I wanted to raise is we have heard a lot about 

risk. And both you and the chairman mentioned that there were 

risks to missions and institutions. 

But as you probably know, yesterday we had three former chairmen in here, all who had tremendous wisdom and expertise. 

Former Chairman Skelton made an interesting observation. I 

asked him to give us the biggest warning that he would offer us 

as a committee, a Congress, and a Nation. And he said was over 

his tenure in Congress he had seen 13 different contingencies, conflicts; 12 of them were unpredictable. That means that the President, whoever he might be, is going to have similar unpredictable 

missions that we can’t foretell right now. When we talk about acceptable risk, isn’t it true that we are not just talking about risk 

to the mission or the institution but we are talking about risk to 

the men and women’s lives who are performing those missions, if 

we make those and we are wrong? 

Secretary PANETTA. You are absolutely right. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank 

you both for your service to our country and for being here today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 

the witnesses and congratulate them on your new positions. 

I also want to take a moment to at least highlight your announcement today about moving up the auditability target to 2014. 

I sit on the subcommittee with Mr. Conaway and Mr. Andrews. 

This committee actually has been moving on this issue. That is no 

mean feat, what you have announced here today. But it will in fact 

help us get towards the goals that we are talking about this morning in a smart way. And certainly waste, fraud, and inefficiencies 

are things that I think having an auditable set of books really 

helps us accomplish and doesn’t affect our ability to defend ourselves. So congratulations on that announcement. 

Secretary PANETTA. Thank you. 

Mr. COURTNEY. You said a moment ago that you want to have 

a military that is capable of reacting to surprises. Last March, 

President Obama had to react to a situation that arose in Libya 

where we had a humanitarian disaster in Benghazi on the brink 

of happening. What he did at that time, which I think was the 

right call, was exercise what I think he described as ‘‘unique capabilities.’’ To help NATO intervene, we had a submarine fleet in the 

Mediterranean, the Scranton, the Providence, the Florida which in 

a matter of 48 hours neutralized Qadhafi’s air defenses. And you 

know in this era—I mean there are some people who feel that our 

submarine fleet is sort of a cold war relic. Obviously the events in 

Libya demonstrated that it gave this country the ability to react to 

a surprise. We are at a point though where all three of those boats 

are going to be going offline in roughly 10 years. We are now at 

a point where our sailors are being deployed at 7-month stints undersea as opposed to 6 months, which has always been the 

Navy’s—again, to deal with a shrinking fleet size. 
24 

And I just wanted to ask you, Mr. Secretary, to just sort of get 

your views on the roles of our submarine fleet post-9/11, particularly in terms of other areas of the world that you mentioned earlier where undersea warfare seems to be sort of on the upswing 

with some of our potential threats. 

Secretary PANETTA. I have always considered our submarine fleet 

to be an essential part of our forward presence, our projection, and 

also the capability of being able to respond to the kind of surprises 

that we run into in the defense business. 

I think we need a full range of capabilities in order to be able 

to address the threats of the future and the threats of the present. 

Submarines have actually provided that additional arm, particularly with regards to our fleets, that I think is absolutely essential 

to our defense in the future. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Good. Well, thank you. And maybe we can get 

you to come up for the commissioning of the Mississippi in December in Groton, Connecticut. 

Secretary PANETTA. I suspect I will do that. 

General DEMPSEY. And if I could add, Congressman, except for 

one Saturday every year in December, I completely support the 

United States Navy. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

A corollary though to that issue is obviously the SSBN [Ballistic 

Missile Submarine] replacement program which, again, we have 

spent a lot of time in this committee and in the Seapower Subcommittee. You mentioned, General, the issue of nuclear deterrence 

which is, thankfully, a low risk situation right now but nonetheless 

a risk. And I just wonder if you could share your thoughts in terms 

of the need to move forward with the SSBN replacement program 

that the Navy has worked hard on. 

General DEMPSEY. Well, as you know, we have been studying 

and must continue to study the capability given to us by the triad. 

And of course the SSBN fleet is our most survivable leg of the 

triad. And therefore, I consider it to be indispensable. 

As we go forward and as we understand the future of nuclear 

nonproliferation talks, I mean, that could change. But for now, I 

think we are exactly where we need to be. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. One last question. 

Mr. Secretary, Secretary Gates about a year and a half ago announced an initiative within the Department of Defense to really 

look at our regime of export controls. 

Secretary PANETTA. Yes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Which, again, really are sort of in a cold war 

mentality. Again, I realize you are pretty new into the saddle. But 

any updates you can give us in terms of how that is progressing 

in your own views in terms of how we get there. 

Secretary PANETTA. I fully support what Secretary Gates is trying to do in that arena. We really do have to update our export 

laws and begin to bring them into the 21st century, frankly. Not 

only for purposes of the technology and the industries that we have 

here, but I think we are at a stage now where, very frankly, as we 

develop those alliances, as we develop—I mean NATO performed 

pretty well in terms of Libya. And the real question is, if we are 

going to develop those kinds of capabilities, if we are going to de-
25 

velop those kinds of alliances, they have got to be able to have the 

latest in terms of technology and in terms of weaponry. And that 

means that we have got to be able to share that kind of technology. 

So I am working very hard to try to see if we can try to do away 

with some of the barriers that were established by those laws. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Some of us would want to work with you on that 

effort. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. This would probably be a good time 

to wish the Navy a happy birthday. 

Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dempsey, General Amos has been pretty adamant about 

the F–35B, and I agree that it does increase capacity certainly in 

range. But I am interested in knowing, since this is the first opportunity we have had to hear from you directly, do you share his enthusiasm for that aircraft? And will you commit to helping make 

sure that we move forward with it? 

General DEMPSEY. I am supportive, without caveat, of the development of a fifth generation fighter. I am concerned about the 

three variants and whether, as we go forward in this fiscal environment, whether we can afford all three. But I am eager to learn 

more about that. And I do have great respect for General Amos’ 

judgments. But I will tell you, that is something we have to keep 

an eye on. Three variants create some fiscal challenges for us. 

Mr. MILLER. Secretary Panetta, good to see you. I look forward 

to working with you in your new capacity. Also talking about the 

STOVL [short take off and vertical landing] aircraft, I watched a 

video last week of it landing on the Wasp and my question is, with 

sea trials ongoing now, basically, and the aircraft appears to be 

performing well, it has been on probation—which the term ‘‘probation’’ doesn’t exist in any of the acquisition areas, and I think probably it has created or could be considered a black mark on the 

STOVL aircraft. But what remains now as far as items that would 

allow it to be removed from its probationary status? 

Secretary PANETTA. You know, all of these planes are now being 

fully tested, and that is one of the good things. I mean, this is the 

fifth generation fighter. It is something we absolutely need. It is a 

remarkable plane, and it really does the job well. 

But what we want to do is to make sure that as it goes through 

this test period we are able to understand all of the issues involved 

with it, that we are able to be fully confident that this plane, once 

it goes into production, is going to be something that will be totally 

effective and will be totally capable of serving the mission that it 

is required to do. So, yeah. I mean, the term ‘‘probationary’’ is out 

there. But frankly, what that essentially means is, give us a chance 

to test it, give us a chance to see how it performs, and if it performs well then obviously it will be able to make the grade. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. And the other thing was, OMB [Office 

of Management and Budget] released guidelines for 2013 in the 

budget where it actually states that the Department should identify programs to double down on because they provide the best opportunity to enhance economic growth. I did have the opportunity 

to go visit the line in Fort Worth for the F–35. 127,000 direct and 
26 

indirect jobs right now. Certainly if we can remove some of the instability in our purchasing of this aircraft and move forward with 

what we originally intended to do—and I understand the budgetary 

constraints that we are in right now. I still contend—and I don’t 

think you meant it the way you said it. We have the resources. We 

don’t have a tax revenue problem in this country. We have a spending problem and an allocation of where those dollars go. But I 

would hope that if that is what the administration would like and 

we are trying to increase jobs and this is an aircraft that we do 

want to go forth, looking at what China is doing and how fast 

China is producing their aircraft now, significantly quicker than 

what we originally anticipated, I hope that you would look at the 

F–35 very carefully as meeting OMB’s challenge. 

Secretary PANETTA. I will certainly do that. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Loebsack. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to thank both of 

you for your service. I look forward to continuing to work with you 

into the future. I think we can all agree that under the current fiscal constraints that we are operating under we have got to make 

wise decisions, the best decisions we can make. I think we can all 

agree with that on a bipartisan basis, make sure that we don’t 

draw down too much because, as Mr. Forbes said, Ike Skelton said, 

there are contingencies, things are going to happen. We are going 

to have to be prepared. There is no doubt about it. And I have two 

areas of inquiry I want to explore with you briefly. 

The first has to do with our organic manufacturing base at installations like the Rock Island Arsenal. In the past I think it could 

be argued that we probably drew down too much. And so when contingencies came up, when issues came up, it took too long for us 

probably to go back to that organic base, build that up again and 

those capabilities. Congressman Schilling and I and this committee, we have been working across the Mississippi River, across 

the political aisle to make sure that facilities like the Arsenal can 

engage in unlimited public-private partnerships so we can maintain those skills of those workers there, not let the organic manufacturing base decline to such an extent as we did before. 

The second issue has to do with the Reserve components, the 

Guard and Reserve. A lot of us have concerns that as we begin to 

draw down that we are going to see the capabilities of those forces 

also decline and across the spectrum, including Title 32 duties that 

they have as well. 

So first I would like to ask the both of you to respond to the issue 

of the organic manufacturing base. How does that fit into the overall plan, making sure those capabilities remain, that they don’t decline the way they did before. 

Secretary PANETTA. Congressman, thank you for the question. 

Two very important issues. One, one requirement that I have with 

regards to our overall strategy is to make sure we maintain our industrial base. I absolutely have to have that. If we are going to be 

able to have a strong defense, if we are going to be able to maintain a strong defense, if we are going to be able to respond to the 

crises of the future, I have got to have an industrial base that can 

respond to that. If we have to mobilize quickly, if we have to 
27 

weaponize quickly, I have got to have that industrial base in place. 

And if we cripple that, we will cripple our national defense. So 

what I am asking is, as we develop a strategy and as we go 

through some of these decisions, we make very sure that we are 

protecting the base that you talked about so that those skills, those 

capabilities are always going to be there for us when we need 

them. It is going to require some decisionmaking here. We are 

going to have to be able to get the cooperation of the private sector 

as well in this effort. But I have met with them, and I am fully 

confident that we can get that done. 

On the Reserve and Guard—and I will let the General speak to 

that. The Reserve and Guard, we have gone through a remarkable 

period where the Reserve and the Guard have really performed in 

an outstanding fashion with regards to the wars that we have been 

in. We have been able to rotate them in. They have gotten battle 

experience. They are better. They are more capable. They are more 

experienced. I don’t want to lose that. And as we go into the future, 

what I want to do is, A, try to retain that kind of experience to the 

best we can. But secondly, I would like to keep them on some kind 

of operational capability so that we can basically move them into 

roles that will continue to benefit from that experience that we 

have gotten from them. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you. General. 

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, sir. 

I don’t have anything to add on the defense industrial base, other 

than to assure you that it is prominent in our strategy review. As 

far as the Reserve Component, if we are true to what we say we 

are, which is a learning organization, we need to learn some lessons as our relationship with the Reserve Component has changed 

over the last 10 years. And as we develop this strategy, we might 

find things that we decide we don’t need immediately; they can be 

placed into the Reserve Component; and things that were in the 

Reserve Component that we now realize we need immediately, we 

might migrate them into the active. So I would say what you will 

see and what is ongoing right now is a very healthy discourse 

among the three components, Active, Guard and Reserve, to determine what is our new relationship now based on the last 10 years 

of war. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. I thank both of you for your service, for your support for these issues. And General, just one little area of disagreement, in December, that we are going to disagree on the outcome 

of that game. I have two children who are Naval Academy graduates. I apologize. But that is how it is. Thanks very much. 

General DEMPSEY. Congratulations. I have two children who are 

West Point graduates. So we are really at odds. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you. And I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Secretary, for being here and General Dempsey. Thank you both for 

your service. Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for your clarity of 

your response that there should be no further cuts in our military 

defense. Equally, I appreciate you stating your belief that that is 

the position of the President. This is so important that our country 

know and that our adversaries around the world know that we will 
28 

be prepared and we will be able to defend the American people. 

And General Dempsey, in fact with the number of threats the Secretary identified that are rising—not being reduced—it is very important that we be able to fight a two-conflict war. I am very concerned with the drawdown, the Army below 520,000, the Marines 

below 186,600, that that puts us at risk. Will we be able to face 

a two-front war? 

General DEMPSEY. That analysis is ongoing, Congressman. But 

what I can assure you is that I would never advocate a strategy 

for this Nation that would limit us to being able to do one thing 

at a time because that is not the world we live in. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. And Mr. Secretary, I am 

really honored. I work with Ranking Member Susan Davis to promote military families, service members, veterans. An extraordinary benefit that they have is the resale system, PXs [Post Exchanges], NAVXs [Navy Exchanges], MCXs [Marine Corps Exchanges], commissaries. They operate in the most bizarre locations 

around the world. It is a really great morale builder, a way of 

showing our respect to our military. And we have extraordinary facilities, such as at Fort Jackson in Parris Island that I represent. 

What is your view about our military resale system? In light of the 

budget constraints, can we count on this benefit to be available? 

Secretary PANETTA. I view that as a very important benefit for 

the families that are out there. I mean having served 2 years myself and had my family benefit from that, I understand how important that is. And it is something we will continue to provide. As 

we go through the process of looking at the infrastructure, there 

may be some areas where we may have to reduce the presence. But 

for the overall benefit, that is one that we think we believe we 

ought to maintain. 

Mr. WILSON. And a side issue that has been raised is the number 

of military families that work in the resale in remote areas around 

the world that simply couldn’t find employment otherwise. And so 

it has so many side benefits that should be considered. And I am 

really pleased that Congressman Loebsack has really already 

brought this issue up, the importance of the National Guard and 

Reserves. As a 31-year veteran of the Reserves National Guard and 

extremely proud father of three sons in the Army National Guard, 

as we really get into the circumstance of budget cutting and determining prioritization, if you could state further—I can’t hear 

enough because I do know firsthand of the extraordinary success, 

like the 218th Brigade in South Carolina of their service in Afghanistan, how much our Guard and Reserve appreciate serving overseas and in the country. 

Secretary PANETTA. There is another factor here that I think is 

extremely important to the Reserve and the Guard, which is that 

the Reserve and the Guard reaches out into every community 

across this country and it makes every community a part of our national defense system. And to some extent, every community has 

to participate not only in service but in the sacrifice that is involved when we defend this country. So for that reason, I think the 

grassroots operation of having a strong Reserve, strong Guard that 

can help us as we confront the crises of the future is something 
29 

that I want to assure you we are not only going to maintain but 

strengthen. 

General DEMPSEY. And I will add, Congressman, that having 

served multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and having—most of 

the time when I get on a C–130 to go someplace, it is an Air National Guardsman. I have driven up Route Irish between the airport and the center of Baghdad and being defended by the fighting 

69th out of New York. And the highest compliment I think we can 

pay the Guard and Reserve now is, you can’t tell what soldier is 

an Active, what soldier is a guardsman, and which soldier is a Reserve component soldier. We are truly one force now. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you so much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Welcome. It is so good to see you both here for 

your first testimony before this committee, and we look forward to 

many more to come. 

I don’t relish the job you have. You have a very difficult task in 

view of the extraordinary challenges we face as a country. We all 

have known for some time that, as we face the debt and the deficit, 

the Defense Department was going to have to absorb its fair share. 

But we all know we want to do it in as thoughtful a way as possible. And what I appreciated, General Dempsey, was when you 

said you are a learning organization. And as you have talked about 

the assessment of risks, how you develop strategies as you assess 

those risks, just a comment, I would hope you also take into account that not every risk can be dealt with through a military response, that there are limits to our capacity to deal with every 

threat militarily, that there are perhaps other ways as well. So just 

a comment for the record. And as a learning organization, I am 

sure that that is something you will take into account as well. 

And also, I wanted to reiterate the importance of the National 

Guard and Reserves. I know in the Fifth District of Massachusetts, 

most who are serving today are doing it through either one of those 

great organizations, and they have done it with such dignity and 

professionalism. 

But I wanted to go in a slightly different direction. Yesterday the 

former chairman of our committee, Ike Skelton, testified in a hearing that ‘‘The strength of the U.S. military flows from the dedication and skill of our All-Volunteer Force. Indeed, the new Defense 

budget must maintain our Nation’s security by keeping ‘the profession of arms’ professional.’’ And I believe this is a view you both 

share. 

With women now playing an ever-increasing role in our military, 

supporting our All-Volunteer Force requires an understanding of 

the issues and challenges confronting both the serviceman and the 

servicewoman. An issue I would like to address today is the issue 

of sexual assault in the military which is reported with alarming 

frequency. Mr. Secretary, in 2010, there were 3,230 reported sexual 

assaults in the military. But by the Pentagon’s own estimate, as 

few as 10 percent of sexual assaults are reported. The VA [Department of Veterans Affairs] estimates that one in three women veterans report experiencing some form of military sexual trauma. 

And I can tell you that from the anecdotal evidence I hear, the stories I hear, from returning women veterans but also the VA organi-
30 

zations in Massachusetts, that those numbers are accurate. Obviously it is unconscionable to begin with that so many of our brave 

service members are subjected to this criminal and predatory behavior. However, what also concerns me is that this systematic 

abuse will hurt our readiness by deterring highly skilled and patriotic women from enlisting or re-enlisting in our Armed Forces. 

In a time of two wars and massive budget cuts, our military 

needs to attract and retain the most capable personnel possible. In 

2008, when Ann Dunwoody became the first woman in our Nation’s 

history to be confirmed as a four-star general, women made up 14 

percent of our Active Duty personnel. We must make sure these 

women’s needs are being met. 

The House version of this year’s National Defense Authorization 

Act, which passed in May, takes several important steps to address 

sexual assault in our Armed Forces. This work has been done 

through the combined efforts of many of my colleagues, Representative Davis, Representative Pingree and Representative Turner. 

When he appeared before our committee in February, I raised this 

matter and our responses to it with your predecessor Secretary 

Gates and asked him why the Department had previously resisted 

efforts to put certain protections in place. He responded he hadn’t 

realized that the Department had resisted. He would look into it 

and find out why they oppose it, why not, and why they shouldn’t 

go forward. 

I have a very simple question to Secretary Panetta. In this time 

of austerity where we face massive budget cuts to the Department 

of Defense and potentially threatening cuts, if the sequester is exercised, can I count on your support to fund new initiatives aimed 

at preventing sexual assault in our Armed Forces? I don’t want to 

see this budget environment become an excuse to not fund these 

initiatives. 

Secretary PANETTA. Absolutely. I thank you for your leadership 

on that issue. It is an issue that I am paying a lot of attention to 

because women are performing in an outstanding fashion for the 

Department of Defense. They put their lives on the line. They are 

doing great in terms of helping to defend this country. And I think 

we have to make sure that we provide all of the protections necessary so that what happens in these horrendous sexual assault 

cases, A, should not happen but, B, if it does happen that justice 

is rendered quickly. 

Mr. TSONGAS. Thank you. I look forward to working with you on 

this. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, in your discussion of the range of threats that we might 

face, you said that nuclear conflict is unlikely. It is unlikely because of the strength of our nuclear deterrent. It is both credible 

and reliable. Cuts that are currently pending before Congress to 

our nuclear deterrent could affect both that credibility and its reliability. At a time where China and Russia are investing in nuclear 

weapons infrastructure, we are looking at proposed cuts that would 

create vulnerability and instability. After years of disinvestment, 

our current proposed plan for modernization really looks at the 

issue of deferred costs. 
31 

Mr. Secretary, I am going to ask you a question that I know your 

answer—because we had the opportunity to discuss this at the Pentagon on Tuesday. I appreciate your commitment to fully funding 

the modernization program of the NNSA, of our National Nuclear 

Security Administration. It is important though in this venue to 

have you express those opinions because, as you know, we are right 

now heading to the prospects of an omnibus in which there could 

be significant cuts that occur to our nuclear weapons infrastructure. 

Now I know you are aware that as the New START [Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty was being proposed, the President 

came forward and was asked for a commitment to modernization 

of our program. The President and the Senate, taking up the issue, 

recognized that as you go to lower numbers that you actually have 

to set aside increased dollars so that we can have both security 

and, understanding that we have had deferred maintenance, that 

we need to go forward with our modernization program. The President said, ‘‘I recognize nuclear modernization requires investment 

for the long term. In addition to this 1-year budget increase, this 

is my commitment to Congress, that the Administration will pursue these programs and capabilities for as long as I am President.’’ 

The program included an $85 billion investment for modernization. 

And I know, as you both are aware, that this program resides in 

DOE, the Department of Energy, as opposed to DOD, the Department of Defense. And Secretary Gates, in showing his commitment 

to that program, set aside $8.3 billion over the next 5 years to invest in that program. Gates, then saying, ‘‘This modernization program was very carefully worked out between ourselves and the Department of Energy. And frankly, where we came out on that I 

think played a fairly significant role in the willingness of the Senate to ratify the New START agreement. So the risks are to our 

own program in terms of being able to extend the life of our weapons systems. This modernization project is in my view both from 

a security and political standpoint really important.’’ 

Mr. Secretary, so my question to you is, do you agree with Secretary Gates and the importance of this modernization program? 

And what is your assessment of the proposed cuts? As we know, 

the modernization program, in addition to coming across from the 

President’s budget as fully funded, was included in the House 

budget as fully funded. It came out of this committee with our National Defense Authorization Act as fully funded and then stumbled as it came out of the Appropriations Committee, both the 

House and the Senate Appropriations Committees taking a whack 

at the program. 

As we know, with the omnibus moving forward, your statements 

are even more important now. And I want to highlight that one of 

the issues with Gates’ and your support of $8.3 billion to the Department of Energy programs is that as those funds come out of 

the Appropriations Committee with cuts, in effect your funds with 

being stolen for water projects across the country, and I think you 

might have an opinion about that. 

Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary PANETTA. Well, as a former Member, I know in those 

committees, they are going to reach for whatever they can in order 
32 

to try to see if they can fund those projects. I mean, I understand 

that process. But I think it is tremendously shortsighted if they reduce the funds that are absolutely essential for modernization. 

I and Secretary Gates are in lockstep with regards to our positions and, frankly, with the President that we have got to fully 

fund—fully fund the modernization effort with regards to the nuclear area. I mean, this is too important. We have always been at 

the cutting edge of this technology, and we have to stay there. 

There are too many other countries that are trying to reach out to 

develop this capability. And if we aren’t staying ahead of it, we 

jeopardize the security of this country. So for that reason, I certainly would oppose any reductions with regards to the funding for 

weaponization. 

Mr. TURNER. I appreciate it. Because your statement is very important to identify that this is not an area where we can find savings, this is an area where cuts actually expose risks. 

Secretary PANETTA. That is right. 

Mr. TURNER. General, if you might wish to comment on the modernization. As our warheads continue to age, the infrastructure 

continues to atrophy, and it becomes a decrepit state that we look 

to our nuclear deterrent. As we look to lowering numbers, we lessen our ability to hedge as our nuclear weapons infrastructure ages 

and has disinvestment. 

Do you have a comment on that? 

General DEMPSEY. Just to reinforce what you said. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, could you please do that for the record? 

General DEMPSEY. I can. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Ms. Pingree. 

Ms. PINGREE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General, for being before our committee today and for your diligence in answering a great diversity 

of questions. 

I want to first just echo the remarks of my good friend and colleague Mr. Jones. And I know he is no longer in the room, but I 

really do appreciate his vigilance and courage in continuing to 

highlight the importance of ending the war and bringing the troops 

back home. I know we started the day with protesters in the room, 

and sometimes they seem disruptive or their tactics are some we 

might argue with. But frankly, we are facing a time when there are 

protesters in almost every city where we reside or represent. And 

there is huge dissatisfaction in our country about the representation that they feel many of us them give in Congress. And one key 

area is about ending the war, the fatigue that people have. Many 

people feel we were misguided getting into Iraq, that we have been 

in Afghanistan for too long, and in this time of budget deficits we 

can just not justify $120 billion a year. 

And I just want to echo Mr. Jones in saying that I have been on 

this committee only—this is my third year. But I have that feeling 

that we find ourselves often in somewhat of an unconscionable inertia around the war. It is hard to end. 2014 turns to 2015 turns 

to 2016, and people continually wonder when will we end the war, 

particularly after the capture of bin Laden, after the reduced number of Al Qaeda operatives and, in fact, in the light of, as you said, 
33 

huge security concerns in countries all over the world which we are 

not adequately prepared for or perhaps ready to defend ourselves. 

I don’t think it is unrelated that we are facing these huge needs 

for budget cuts and there is this dissatisfaction out there with the 

way we do things. On the right, it is about our growing deficits and 

the irresponsibility many people feel around that. On the left, it is 

this idea of, why don’t we end the war and why are we spending 

$120 billion if we significantly need to cut defense? 

Ms. PINGREE. And I think that is why we are facing such difficult 

cuts today. And I just feel—it is important to echo that. I agree 

with so many of my colleagues that we need to have a strong defense, and I am proud to represent the Bath Iron Works and the 

greatest shipbuilders in the world, the naval shipyard where we 

keep our submarines safe and working, and I understand that we 

don’t have a strong enough Navy, that there are pending threats 

from China, and we don’t want to be a smaller force than they are 

there. There are true needs in our military. There are huge security needs around the country. I just believe that this war, which 

has been crippling us as a Nation, which has had excessive costs, 

which has forced us to prepare for exclusively ground wars and not 

be prepared in other areas has to end. 

All that said—and I know you have stated your own opinion on 

that, so I just feel the importance of reinforcing it and think that 

I reflect the thoughts of many, many of my colleagues in Congress, 

and certainly the majority of residents in my district. It is an issue 

I hear about frequently. 

On a completely different topic, as you are pondering the difficult 

cuts that will need to be made one way or the other, I want to echo 

the remarks of my colleague, Mr. Reyes, who talked about the Defense Business Board. And I do appreciate your response to that, 

that it is still a plan that is under consideration. 

Thank you very much, General Dempsey, for really talking about 

the difference in a retirement system for the military than in civilian life. You, I think, said it extremely well, that people move constantly, they serve their country in ways that we don’t do in other 

lives, that people’s spouses often can’t work and build a retirement, 

and I strongly oppose that plan. I disagree with the idea of making 

those kinds of cuts. And I, frankly, would say that with the Commission on Wartime Contracting funding, that we have wasted between $30 and $60 billion in Iraq and Afghanistan and a billion 

more—billions more in wasted weapons programs that never make 

it in warfighters’ hands, it is hard to justify targeting military families, those that serve our country when it seems to me, again, 

there are other places to be cut. 

You have stated your opinions eloquently on both of these things. 

If you have other comments, I am pleased to hear them, but I 

wanted to add my voice to others who feel like we are not moving 

fast enough on ending the war. 

Secretary PANETTA. Obviously, I respect your concerns and I recognize the frustration, you know, having been through these wars 

and the losses that we have incurred. But we are—you know, we 

are in the process of ending the war in Iraq. By the end of this 

year, we will have withdrawn all of our combat forces from Iraq. 

That is going to happen. And with Afghanistan, I am fully con-
34 

fident that the President of the United States is committed to ensuring that we transition our combat forces out of their by 2014. 

We just have to do this right. I mean, what I don’t want to happen and I think what all of us need to be concerned about, if we 

do this in the wrong way, if we do it so fast that all of a sudden 

Afghanistan falls apart again, it becomes a safe haven for the 

Taliban or Al Qaeda and suddenly we are subject to attacks again, 

then, you know, the world is going to look at us and say how could 

you have let that happen? So that is what I am trying to prevent, 

is to be able to do this, but do it responsibly. 

Ms. PINGREE. Thank you for your comments. 

General DEMPSEY. I would like to answer that for the record too, 

Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Would you please. Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen. And congratulations on your appearance here in your new 

roles. I want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your comments about 

responsibly disengaging from Afghanistan and not precipitously so. 

I mean, we have many, many of our sons and daughters who have 

served, are serving and will serve there. It would be a terrible, terrible disservice to them for them to serve with no chance of succeeding as well as an incredible danger to our own country. 

So thank you for that. And I want to congratulate you sort of. 

I want to congratulate you on your announcement about 2014 and 

2017, way, way, long overdue to have an audit. 2017, I daresay 

that perhaps neither one of us will be here, so I am cautiously optimistic that that might occur. But nevertheless, I really appreciate 

your take in the bit in the teeth so to speak and trying to get that 

done. 

Looking at these budget cuts, those in the works and horrifyingly 

those that are potentially out there, I am mindful of a former chief 

of staff of the Army who used to talk about the tyranny of personnel costs. And I know that is of some concern as we have 

stepped up to meet our obligations to the men and women who are 

serving in terms of medical care, pay raises, retirement benefits 

and so forth. And I am very concerned that we honor your pledge 

to keep faith with those who have served, and I want to get to the 

question and underscore a discussion that I think was started by 

Mr. Reyes about retirement benefits. 

As it happens, I was recently in Fort Bliss, Texas visiting my favorite soldier and his family and talking with families and soldiers 

about the story that was ripping around the United States Army 

in The Army Times and elsewhere and the high, high level of concern that the retirement benefits that they had served and worked 

for were going to be yanked away. And clearly, I think that would 

be breaking faith with those who have served and horribly irresponsible. And the same can be said of other benefits that we have 

put forward. 

But I want to focus on this retirement rumor which is ripping 

through and which they were taking as real and which was being 

actively considered, that after having served 20 or 15 or a number 

of years, that they were going to get something substantially less 

than what they had signed up for. 
35 

So for the record, I am absolutely clear, I would like to hear from 

both of you that you are adamantly opposed to that happening, to 

changing those retirement benefits for our serving men and 

women. 

General DEMPSEY. I am adamantly opposed to changing the retirement benefits for those who are currently on active duty, but 

I am also open to look at potential changes to the retirement system as part of our overall look at compensation for the future. 

Mr. KLINE. Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary PANETTA. Absolutely. We cannot break faith with those 

that have served and deployed time and time again and were 

promised the benefits of this retirement program. Those benefits 

are going to be protected under any circumstance. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. Outstanding. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Panetta, 

General Dempsey, I want to congratulate each one of you all for 

your new positions and look forward to working with you. I have 

served on this committee for almost 5 years now and one thing I 

have noticed is that from time to time, we have needed the presence of our Capitol Hill police officers to maintain order in the 

room while we conduct our business, and I certainly respect the 

rights of people to come in and protest what we are doing, but you 

don’t have a right to interrupt our meetings. 

We had a large contingent of protesters today and we were able 

to proceed with the meeting because we had adequate resources to 

maintain order, the Capitol Hill Police Department. I appreciate 

their service. I have also noticed during history that, from time to 

time, there are disturbances throughout the world, and these disturbances may interrupt some of our various interests around the 

world, and it is necessary for us to have some kind of force to maintain order. And I hate that human beings have to have some protection, the weak over the—excuse me. The strong over the weak, 

the weak who seek to get stronger and then take over from the 

then-strong folks. But this is just something, it is like competition, 

like capitalism. It is just a natural human phenomenon. And we 

must have sufficient force when necessary to bring about the kind 

of relief that we need in terms of maintaining order throughout the 

world. And that is why we need a sufficient military force that is 

ready to respond immediately to whatever the circumstances may 

be. 

And, of course, people are always trying to get more innovative 

and coming up with new ways of doing things of hurting people, 

and hurting us, Americans. So we have got to stay a few steps 

ahead of that at all times. If we don’t, then we are not taking care 

of our business as elected officials in this country. 

That having been said, Mr. Secretary, I believe that global nuclear disarmament is necessary if our country and our species are 

to survive and flourish. I understand the need to maintain a deterrent capability for the time being, but we can, nevertheless, dramatically cut our stockpiles and slow investment in new weapons. 

Mr. Secretary, do you agree that nuclear weapons programs should 

be on the table as the Department of Defense determines how to 

reduce its spending over the next 10 years? 
36 

Secretary PANETTA. Again, you know, we obviously, strongly believe that we have to maintain a strong deterrent against those 

countries that could potentially use nuclear weapons against us. 

With regards to reducing our nuclear arena, I think that is an area 

where I don’t think we ought to do that unilaterally, we ought to 

do that on the basis of negotiations with the Russians and others 

to make sure we are all walking the same path. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Certainly. And I definitely agree with that com- ment. The Army has spent $2.7 billion trying to build an intelligence analysis platform, the Distributed Common Ground Systems, a program known as DCGS–A. That program is now 5 years 

behind schedule, vastly over budget and fails to meet the needs of 

our soldiers. An article appeared in Politico earlier this summer detailing some of those failures and it explained that the program 

was unable to perform even the simplest tasks and frequently 

crashes. Is this system—we have already spent $3 billion on this 

system. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Secretary, 

and, Mr. Chairman, I welcome you both to the committee also. And 

I congratulate you both on your new responsibilities, I think. And 

I look forward to many more sessions with you. My first question 

has to do with missile defense. Mr. Secretary, as you know, the 

President’s budgets to date have cut a total of $1.65 billion out of 

the ground-based missile defense system, the only missile defense 

system currently in place to defend our homeland. Are you committed to the adequate resourcing of the ground-based missile defense system in the future? 

Secretary PANETTA. I am committed to adequately resourcing 

what we have in place. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, then as a follow-up, do you believe there are 

now an adequate number? I think it is too limited of a number, but 

do you think there is an adequate number of ground-based interceptors both to counter the threat to our homeland and to provide 

for testing? 

Secretary PANETTA. I have had the chance to visit NORAD 

[North American Aerospace Defense Command] and STRATCOM 

[U.S. Strategic Command] as well. And I had a chance to really 

look at our capabilities. I mean, I think we are in good shape with 

regards to our ability to respond. It doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t 

continue to upgrade. It doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t continue to 

look at other ways to try to expand that capability. But, you know, 

we really do have a very remarkable defense system set up to deal 

with that challenge. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Well, I look forward to continued conversations on this with you both. And now a separate question, but it 

has to do with capability. This is for both of you. As already scheduled budget cuts to the Department of Defense in excess of $400 

billion for the next 10 years begin to take place and apart from sequestration, do you anticipate the Army reducing the number of 

brigade combat teams? 

General DEMPSEY. As the former chief of staff of the Army and 

currently chairman, I do anticipate that the Army will reduce the 

number of brigade combat teams, but not just because of the pres-
37 

sure of a new fiscal environment. Again, I am all about trying to 

understand what the Nation needs in 2020. What have we learned 

over the last 10 years of war? 

So there is a plan that General Odierno, the current chief, is 

working with my support, to take a look at how many brigade combat teams you need if you change the nature of the brigade combat 

team. So roll back in another maneuver battalion, some intel assets. Things that we didn’t know we needed 10 years ago, now we 

know we need them. So we will reduce the number of brigade combat teams, but the number remaining will be more capable. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Are you talking about doing something simultaneously with anticipated drawdowns of the numbers of troops in 

both Iraq and Afghanistan? 

General DEMPSEY. Stated another way, even if we had all of the 

money we needed, we would want to make some changes based on 

the lessons of the last 10 years of war. So we need to do that. 

Mr. LAMBORN. But are you mostly anticipating a reduction of the 

number of teams that would correspond to the number of troops 

being brought home from those two countries? 

General DEMPSEY. No, sir. There is a relationship between what 

the combatant commanders establish as a demand. So we know 

what a steady state demand is. And part of that demand is articulated by what we see as the future of Iraq and Afghanistan. So we 

know, for example, if the demand is 10, we have to have a minimum of 30, because there is one in the demand cycle, one just out, 

one getting ready to go. 30 is not the number, but I am just using 

that illustratively. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Now, if there is sequestration, how would 

that impact the ability of our military to address the kinds of 

threats that you both talked about earlier in your testimony? 

Secretary PANETTA. All bets are off because it would—sequestration would demand such drastic across-the-board cuts that it is 

pretty clear that the force structure would be reduced drastically. 

We would be looking at having to increase the number of risks 

within the military. And in addition to that, there is no question 

that we would hollow out the force because it would require these 

drastic, deep across-the-board cuts that would affect training, 

equipment and everything else. It would really be devastating in 

terms of our national defense. 

Mr. LAMBORN. General, is there anything you would care to add 

to that? 

General DEMPSEY. As a former service chief, the way that a service chief maintains the balance of his force, as he has three rheostats. One is manpower, end strength, one—that is one. One rheostat. The other end strength is modernization and equipment. The 

other is training and maintenance. The impact of the sequestration 

is not only in its magnitude, it is in what it does, what it directs 

the service chiefs to do in each of those rheostats. We lose control. 

And as we lose control, we will become out of balance and we will 

not have the military this Nation needs. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Ms. 

Hanabusa. 
38 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And thank you, General. Let me begin, first, with Mr. Secretary. My questions are on the line of the future. As you know, 

the chairman has put the series of hearings together about 9/11 

and the future. And you are the fifth in the series. 

General Cody, retired, said this in his testimony, and I have 

written it down because it is something that stuck with me. He 

says the real question with regard to Services budget are simple: 

What missions do you want our military to continue to perform? 

What threats do you want our military to counter? What level of 

readiness do you want the military to sustain? And history has 

taught us that we are not very good at any of that. We don’t predict well. But we are here and that is almost what we are kind of 

forced to do. 

So, Mr. Secretary, from your vantage point, what is this vision 

that you want to share with us that you perceive this military has 

got to look like? And, General. So you can start thinking about 

your response, I am very curious about your 2020 Joint Force statement and if you could start with that. But, Mr. Secretary, could 

you begin with that, first? 

Secretary PANETTA. I think the General who testified, you know, 

hit the right buttons. We have got to look at the threats that are 

out there. And as I indicated, we are dealing with a variety of 

threats that remain out there that are serious and that challenge 

our security. It begins with terrorism, the ability to respond and 

keep the pressure on terrorism so that people can’t attack this 

country, the ability to bring these wars that we are engaged in to 

an end. We are involved in those wars. We have got to bring them 

to an end. 

Thirdly, the area of dealing with Iran and North Korea and not 

only the nuclear proliferation from those countries, but the threats 

that they constitute in the regions that they are involved in. We 

have got to be able to deal with the Middle East and the unrest 

that is going on in the Middle East. We have got to be able to deal 

with the challenge of China and rising powers. We have got to be 

able to deal with cyber. 

That is a quick rundown of the threats that are out there. We 

have got to be able, if we are going to defend this country, be able 

to have an agile, deployable, effective Force that can respond to 

each one of those threats. That is what we have got to do. And that 

is the vision that we have got to create. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Before I get to the General. But, Mr. Secretary, 

isn’t that the problem? I mean, I have had these discussions and 

I represent Hawaii. And, of course, China and North Korea, they 

are very real. Is the fact that—to be agile, aren’t we looking at different types of forces? I mean, we have always thought about, I 

think force-on-force, I think, is one of the words that the General 

used before, but we have counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and 

all of that are different to attack different kinds of problems. Now, 

if you have got a limited amount of resources, what rises to the 

top? Or can anything not rise to the top and we have just got to 

do it all? 

Secretary PANETTA. You have got to be damn flexible, and that 

is what we are going to have to be in the future. 
39 

Ms. HANABUSA. General. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

General DEMPSEY. And I thank you, Congresswoman. Well, this 

is exactly the conversation we are having with ourselves. So if you 

are not too busy, we wouldn’t mind having you on our committee. 

Ms. HANABUSA. I would love to come. 

General DEMPSEY. Okay. The sort of intellectual framework is 

that when we get to 2020, we need to have taken into account the 

capabilities that we—10 years ago, we didn’t have a capability in 

cyber. Ten years ago our special operating forces were nowhere 

near as capable as they are today. These two areas are exponentially more capable. So what we are looking at in 2020 is what is 

this exponential improvement in capability in those two areas that 

didn’t exist 10 years ago 10 years from now, what will that allow 

us to do with the conventional Force and how do we integrate those 

capabilities, not just keep piling them on top of each other? Because as we continue to pile, we run the risk that you just articulated of becoming unaffordable. So that is one answer to your question. 

Secondly, we will have to make some decisions about where in 

the world we will take more or less risk. And that is a matter of 

understanding demographic change, climate change, economic 

change and which countries in the world are appearing to align 

themselves against our interest. And our interests are actually not 

going to change. We need access to resources, we need to have freedom of navigation, and we need to be partnered on issues of common interests with our allies and partners. 

So we will be able to articulate that world and then look back 

at where we are today, and use the next 4 years when we submit 

4 POMs [Program Objective Memorandum], 1317 through 1620, to 

build that Force. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Panetta, 

General Dempsey, thanks so much for joining us today. Thanks for 

your service to our Nation. And thanks for coming here to discuss 

with us what we know to be some of the most important decisions 

that we all will make in a long time. Secretary Panetta, I begin 

with you. Your statement earlier talking about those four decision 

making guideline, I am in full agreement with clear strategic priorities, making sure we have a ready, agile and deployable force, 

making sure we have the capability and the capacity as was spoken 

of. I think those are absolutely critical. 

As we look at that clear strategic program plan, whatever you 

want to call it, for the Department of Defense, as you spoke of, 

there are going to be some risks that are out there within that decisionmaking framework. The question then becomes, as you are 

faced—both of you are faced with $450 billion in reductions in the 

next 10 years is how do you calculate those risks? How do you 

make priority decisions in a realm that, as you said, is very dynamic, changes all the time, threats emerge, threats disappear? 

My question is this: As you look at prioritizing, can you tell us 

this: Prioritizing—what are the three areas that you say have to 

be preserved and what are three areas most likely to be cut? 
40 

Secretary PANETTA. You know, again, it really wouldn’t be fair to 

try to throw those issues out there because we are really in the 

process of looking at all of those areas and trying to decide, you 

know, as we deal with the threats that are out there, what do we 

need to confront those threats and how can we respond, and where 

is it that we can seek some reductions? 

Now, you know, look, let us just begin with what I think is going 

to be, you know, something that is pretty clear. We are going to 

have a smaller force. If you have a smaller force, you are not going 

to be able to be out there responding in as many areas as we do 

now. So the decision then is going to be, you know, what are the 

areas we have to prioritize? For example, Korea, you know, we 

have a large presence in Korea. Korea remains a real threat. I 

think we have got to maintain our presence there. Are there other 

areas, then, where we deploy, for example, in Europe, we have got 

a base structure in Europe that is pretty broad. You know, do we 

need to maintain all of that at the same time we are dealing with 

these other needs? 

So you can see the kind of tradeoffs that are going to have to be 

made, based on the threat, based on the nature of the threat. But 

by doing that, you know, I guess what I need to make clear to everyone, particularly on this committee, is that when you do that, 

then there are some risks associated with that. What are the risks, 

for example, if we reduce our presence in Europe? Well, it is the 

relationship with NATO, and the role that NATO plays. You know, 

are we going to be able to provide the kind of support that NATO 

needs in order to do its job. Those are the kinds of issues that I 

think are going to have to be. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. General Dempsey. 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, Congressman. Just to be clear about the 

end state, I mean, we—I didn’t become the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs to oversee the decline of the Armed Forces of the United 

States, and an end state that would have this Nation and its military not be a global power. So you are never going to hear us say, 

we are going to be really good in the Pacific but we are going to 

completely ignore the Indian Ocean and its littorals. We just can’t 

do that. That is not who we are as a Nation. 

And so we will remain a global power and the Armed Forces of 

the United States will remain the most dominant military on the 

planet. I mean, we owe the country and we owe the young men and 

women we send into harm’s way that. 

So as we look at the future and prioritization, it is not a matter 

of ignoring anything, because again, we can say that, it will look 

good on a PowerPoint® slide, it will make us feel good, but at the 

end of the day we are not going to ignore anything that threatens 

our Nation or threatens our interests. 

Risk is generally managed in terms of time. Now, that is kind 

of an indelicate answer. I could certainly flesh it out for you over 

time. So if we were to say that we have to do two, three, four 

things at a time, we could add up the resources required, I could 

put a bill on the table for the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] and 

say here is what we need, but I know you don’t have that kind of— 

so you are going to take all the risk. I am just telling you that. And 

that is not where we need to go. Where we need to go is say, look, 
41 

there are ten things we need to be able to do. These we can actually take some risk in terms of time, whether it is the time to activate the Reserve component, whether it is the time to generate it. 

So time is the independent variable here, and we are trying to determine how to use it. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ryan. 

Mr. RYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And congratulations to 

both of you. Secretary Panetta, my mom is 100 percent Italian, so 

congratulations on being the second Italian-American Secretary of 

Defense. Let me associate myself first with Congressman 

Loebsack’s remarks regarding the defense industrial base. I represent a district in northeast Ohio, as you know, and it is critical 

that we have this money that we are spending, the billions of dollars invested back into our country. And I spent years when I was 

first on this committee dealing with the Berry amendment. And 

sometimes the waivers that were granted through the Berry 

amendment for specialty metals was happening way too often when 

we have American companies, titanium and others, who could provide the materials for the military. 

So I hope as you continue to push down through the bureaucracy, 

your view and your vision that some of this is taken into consideration. The one issue I do want to talk to you about, we see often 

in our districts when young kids come back and they have been 

killed in action, they are on the front page of the paper and we 

have parades and gut wrenching services with their high school 

buddies and the whole nine yards. One of the issues that I have 

been concerned with too is the issue of the kids who come back, can 

never get reestablished. They are dealing with high levels of PTSD 

[post-traumatic stress disorder], and they are in the obituary section in the back of the paper and there aren’t parades, and there 

is no banners and there is not huge services and community recognition. 

And one of the issues I think that is dealing this blow to these 

kids is the extreme and prolonged levels of stress that they have 

in multiple tours and being able to deal with this. Not only as combat troops, but also trying to deal with the stress afterwards. So 

I want to call to your attention a program called the Mindfulness 

Base Mental Fitness Training Program that was established by a 

woman named Liz Stanley at Georgetown. And it is beginning to 

show both in trials within the Army and in the Marines. There was 

an article in the Marine Corps Times a couple of weeks ago called 

‘‘Bulletproofing Your Brain.’’ And it basically helps these folks deal 

with the stress levels that they deal with in combat. And we see 

with high levels of stress, prolonged and extreme levels of stress, 

you have diminishment in your cognitive abilities, diminishment in 

your situational awareness, your ability to focus and causes a lot 

of problems while in theater. But what they are starting to see 

here and study in the field of neuroscience is that you can actually 

change the shape of your brain. You can make new neural connections, and I think this is important when you begin to teach these 

soldiers, both to raise their performance and improve their performance as soldiers being able to focus better, having more efficient use of their faculties as they are dealing with this stuff, in-
42 

creased levels of situational awareness, but also being able to deal 

with the stressful situations afterwards when they come back. 

And I think this program, if you will look at it, and start looking 

at what some of the studies are suggesting, I think it can have a 

transformational effect. It is my own personal opinion. The science 

is still—the case is being built. But I think it can have transformational effects on giving these soldiers the tools that they need 

for when they go back home. Benefits now and benefits when they 

go back home. And the reports we are getting back in some of these 

articles from people in the Marines and the platoons is that they 

think something is there. They feel it work and one quote from the 

Marine Times article was a soldier who has been to, I think, Afghanistan once and Iraq twice learned this program after he got 

back and he said, boy, I wish I would have had this before I went 

over. 

So I want to bring that to your attention, ask your opinions on 

trying to look at some of these alternative approaches to training 

our soldiers and getting them maybe prepared in better ways to 

deal with what they are going to see, hear, smell and have to deal 

with in war. So—— 

Secretary PANETTA. Congressman, I want you to know that I am 

willing to look at anything, anything that can help be able to serve 

these men and women when they come back from the battlefield 

to be able to adjust and be able to deal with the pressures and the 

stresses that they bring back with them. This is a real problem. 

You know, we have too high a rate on suicides taking place. And 

it is an issue that bothers me terribly because I am writing condolence letters now to those families, and that just—you know, it is 

unacceptable. We have got to—we ask these guys to go into horrendous conditions, they put their lives on the line, they have to face 

incredible threats to them and to their buddies and suddenly, you 

know, they are pulled out of that and brought back to this country 

and having to face some of the pressures here of having to adjust. 

Whatever—— 

Mr. RYAN. I would love to work with you on this program and 

with the General as well. Hopefully at some point we could have 

a committee hearing on it and bring the neuroscientists, bring Liz 

and bring the crew here from some of the folks who have experienced it already. 

The CHAIRMAN. Good idea. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and General, for your service and dedication to duty. And 

it is an honor to be with you today. One, General, I am reassured 

by your comments you just made. It sounds like you just said not 

having a global influence is not an option, but it is if a trillion dollars’ worth of cuts goes into effect over the next 10 years. 

So a lot of folks and my colleagues on both sides have hit on the 

high-level points, but I think what we need to do is have the conversation with the American people that if we have, like, a Checkpoint Charlie Berlin situation in the Luzon Strait or the Strait of 

Taiwan, we have to build up there for some reason and we have 

a humanitarian disaster, we have a nuclear fallout in Japan like 

we had with their nuke plants, the Mediterranean, the Indian 
43 

Ocean like you mentioned, other parts of the South China Sea, Atlantic, Pacific, there is not going to be a way for us to respond to 

everything if we break down the military with those cuts. 

So we are going to have to have the conversation with the American people, do you not want to help Israel? Because we can’t help 

Israel if we have a buildup at Taiwan or some other area where 

we have to stare the bad guys in the eye and build up in that region. I just think we have to have that conversation because I don’t 

think the American people realize that not helping Israel, for instance, is one of the options that will need to be on the table if one 

of those cuts go through. So bringing it down from that 10,000 foot 

view down to ground level, let us talk about IEDs. I think that a 

lot has happened under Secretary Gates. You had the UAV [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle] Working Group, the IED Working Group, 

Dr. Carter, General Paxton, JIEDDO [Joint Improvised Explosive 

Device Defeat Organization], all of these different groups getting 

together. But it still takes a long time, sometimes months, sometimes years to feel deployed, do R&D and get stuff to the field, even 

if it is only an 80 percent solution. 

For instance, the newest thing with the Marine Corps—I was 

there literally not as a Marine, but as a civilian when they got the 

silk underwear because of the IEDs and the way that things were 

going with IEDs and the types of injuries they have. But that is 

the extent of what the American might and the American industrial base can provide to our Marines and soldiers, is hopefully a 

cleaner extraction of the fragmentation as opposed to a way to combat. 

So my question is, what fresh thinking, what kinds of outsideof-the-box ideas are you bringing to the fight on the number one 

threat to our men and women, 70 percent of our casualties and 

KIA [killed in action] are caused by that. Historically, low casualty 

rates compared to any other war in human history, but it is still 

there and that is my question. 

And then if I could, how will these budget cuts if they go into 

effect, affect our counter-IED fight? Thank you. 

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Congressman. Thinking of defeating the IED is thought about in three aspects. You have to defeat 

the device. You also have to defeat the network that produces it, 

which is the supply chain, the leadership, the facilitation, the financing of it. And then there is an issue called signatures, which 

is one of the creative ways we have been getting after identifying 

with—through various sensors the signature component of an IED 

so you can track the network and defeat the device. And that work 

is ongoing. What we have done in the Army is essentially said the 

IED is the enduring threat to our force for the foreseeable future. 

So we need to institutionalize—it can’t any longer be thought of as 

a one-off threat. It is there and it will always be there because the 

enemy knows that asymmetrically they can attack us that way. 

JIEDDO is an important organization. It is fully funded in the 

budgets that we have submitted so that we can do the kind of work 

that you are describing. And so at this point, I can tell you that 

even in the $450 billion-plus cut or reduction, we can account for 

what you said. If the reduction goes deeper than that, I would have 
44 

to—we will have to take a look. But everything will be affected if 

there is another phase of this thing. 

Secretary PANETTA. I think one of the real success stories in my 

predecessor was the ability to develop the vehicles that had to be 

done on a quick timetable to get them out to the battlefield. Under 

most circumstances, that would have taken 8 or 10 years. What 

they did was they basically said we need them, we need them now. 

They made the contract. They required that it be produced within 

a timeframe. They got it done. We got it out there and we provided 

it out in the battlefield. That is the model I think we have to follow 

as we deal with these kinds of threats. We can’t just sit back and 

allow this thing to go over a long period of time. We have got to 

get it and get it done now. 

Mr. HUNTER. The normal acquisition process had to be bypassed 

by this Congress and by your predecessor for that to happen. 

Thank you both. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. 

Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Gentlemen, thank you very much. Mr. Panetta, 

it is always good to share a table or at least an opportunity with 

you. And, General, thank you for your service. I have a series of 

questions. Actually three. I will send them to you in writing and 

save a little bit of time around here. In discussions about maintaining our industrial base, which we like to call Make It in America, 

there are numerous questions that have arisen about the outsourcing to other countries of key military equipment. For example, the 

fuel for the hellfire missile is made in China. It raises a bit of a 

question. Many of the components that deal with the targeting of 

critical weapons are also made overseas in China and other places. 

This is a major concern, and I will send you a more detailed question on it. 

The other point that I will just make is that from the far left to 

the far right, various think tanks have been thinking about what 

to do with the military. A very interesting matrix can be put together. It was put together by my military fellow, and it is very interesting where both come down from the far left to the far right 

and in the middle about things that can be done. I will send you 

that matrix and I think you might find it a useful exercise—maybe 

you have already done it—about where at least those two spectrums, far out spectrums, find similar potential. I will let it go at 

that. You can comment if you would like. Take a deep breath and 

take a pass. Thank you very much. 

Secretary PANETTA. Thank you, John. 

Mr. PALAZZO. [Presiding]. At this time, Mrs. Roby from Alabama. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you. I just want to say personally what an 

honor to be here in front of you both today and I just appreciate 

your willingness to serve our country in this capacity. I want to 

touch on something a little bit more on the personal side as it relates to our troops. We have talked about strategic planning and 

certainly that is very important as we move forward with these 

cuts. But we have got to talk about the morale of the men and 

women who are currently serving our country, both here and 

abroad and what this whole discussion is doing to them as they 
45 

move forward in their day and nights away from their families and 

really what that looks like. 

I had the opportunity several months ago to sit down with some 

soldiers at Fort Rucker, Alabama, and talk to them about what can 

we do to help support them. And this one soldier looked at me and 

his pregnant wife was sitting at his side and he looked at me with 

tears in his eyes and said, Mrs. Roby, don’t worry about me, just 

take care of her. 

And we are fast approaching, as we move towards the realness 

of the sequestration, because as I have said many times, that this 

Joint Committee in a lot of ways is a microcosm of all of the problems we already have in Congress. And as we move towards this 

deadline date, it is that soldier and his wife and his family that is 

the real victim in this. Time and time again over the course of my 

short time here in Congress, our military families have been the 

ones that have been the insurance policy against political debate 

here in Washington, and I think it is unconscionable, and I think 

what all of your answers that you have provided today are important as they relate to specific operations within our military. But 

I just really want to give you both an opportunity to talk about the 

effectiveness, and with the 24/7 news cycle, our military families 

are certainly not immune to the very discussions that we are having here. And I have small children and I work, my husband and 

I, very hard to ensure that they know that they are loved and that 

they feel secure. And when you have a soldier serving overseas 

whose spouse is at home having to worry about whether or not that 

paycheck is going to come for them to put groceries on the table 

or to make the car payment or the house payment. 

You, General, said that no matter how awesome our technology 

is at moving forward as a progressive military, our men and 

women in uniform are what make this military great. So I just 

wanted to give you an opportunity to both respond to that aspect 

of what we are looking at down the road. 

Secretary PANETTA. Congresswoman, I thank you for that question. Our men and women are out there putting their lives on the 

line in order to defend our democracy. I think that one of the great 

national security threats is the dysfunctionality of Congress and its 

inability to confront the issues that we face now. And I think your 

concern is that this committee that has been established might fail 

to provide the leadership that it has been given, or the responsibility it has been given to be able to come up in a responsible way 

with additional deficit reduction. That concerns me as well. 

I have to share with you, I served in this House for 16 years. 

During that 16 years, we faced a lot of great threats. We faced a 

lot of problems. But the leadership was there on both sides of the 

aisle, Republicans and Democrats, to work together to try to find 

solutions to these issues, not to walk away from them. And I think 

what is very important for this super committee and for all Members of Congress is to take the time to think about the sacrifice 

that those men and women go through to put their lives on the line 

in order to be able to defend this country. And if the Members of 

Congress would be willing to engage in the same kind of sacrifice, 

then I think they will have earned the right to represent those constituents in Congress. 
46 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you, I appreciate that. General. 

General DEMPSEY. It is hard to do a better job of answering your 

question and the concern behind it than the Secretary just did. In 

everything we are doing right now, in every deliberation about 

strategies and how we are going to absorb different reductions, the 

family, the soldier, the family, the veterans, the wounded warriors, 

gold star families are always the first issue that we discuss. And 

if we only end up with 1 dollar at the end of all of this, it will go 

to a family. 

Mrs. ROBY. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. PALAZZO. The chair now recognizes Mr. Coffman from Colorado. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, thank you 

so much for your decades of distinguished service. Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, and for your dedication to maintaining a 

strong military. I am reminded of the history of Great Britain after 

World War II where they still saw themselves as a world power but 

they came out heavily in debt, they were weakened by World War 

II. They were still engaged in anti-communist operations in Greece 

and Turkey but then they had to turn to the United States, and 

we assumed that role and there is nobody behind us. 

China is a rising power and I don’t think we would ever want 

to turn that responsibility over to China. So we have to maintain 

that strong military, that global power as both of you have so well 

articulated today. Let me put three questions forward and if we 

run out of time in terms of answering them, then if you could answer them on the record. The first one is that we still have a Selective Service system in place. Yet, according to the Army recruiting 

command, individuals between the ages of 18 and 22, 75 percent 

of them, I believe, are ineligible today for enlistment in the United 

States Army of young people between the ages of 18 and 22. 

In 1973 was the last year that we had the draft. In 1974, we disbanded Selective Service. In 1979, Jimmy Carter put it back on the 

table as a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And it 

still exists today, and it is not even in your budget. It is an independent agency and it is under the Financial Services Committee. 

It is not even under this committee. So the question is, do we still 

need it? The second is in South Korea, I believe we are moving 

from 1-year assignments to 3-year unaccompanied—3-year accompanied tours for our 28,000-force presence there. That decision was 

made, I think, really during the height of the Iraq war when dwell 

times were next to nothing. But we are phasing out of Iraq now, 

we will be phasing down in Afghanistan, dwell times will expand 

and the question is, do we really need to spend the $13 billion that 

I believe is necessary in military construction to accommodate that 

change in policy? Can we do something that is more cost effective 

given the expansion of dwell times like deploying battalions for 6- 

month rotations to and from CONUS. 

The last issue is concerns—I think we have rank inflation in the 

military and I would like you to take a look at that. I believe if 

we look at the height of the cold war when I was in the United 

States Army, we had a military much larger than. But I believe 

that there are more 4-star flag officers in the military today and 

a much smaller Force. I think we have as many admirals as we 
47 

have ships in the United States Navy. And I think that that is duplicative to the rest of the military. And I would certainly like you 

to take a look at that and the costs associated with that. Could you 

go through those three questions, please. 

General DEMPSEY. I will go from bottom to top and the Secretary 

will take the question about Selective Service. We are looking at 

rank. Some of the rank inflation is a result of international partners and their desire for flags, but we are looking at that, believe 

me. Secondly, on Korea, tour normalization, it is part of our strategy review to look at our forward presence—wherever we happen 

to be, but notably in Korea and in Europe, and again, to determine 

how best to do it in an affordable way and I assure you that we 

are alert to the fact that tour normalization to 3-year tours might 

become cost prohibitive. We do need some structure there with 

families because of the message it sends and the readiness increases when you have soldiers there for a longer period of time. 

Secretary PANETTA. I mean, we are in the process of looking at 

everything that costs a lot of money and that is one of the things 

that costs a lot of money that we need to look at and determine 

whether or not we can find some savings in the way we approach 

that. On the selective service, the registration, registration is still 

required. You are right, that there is a system. It is not associated 

with us. But, you know, my view is that we ought to maintain the 

registration aspect because particularly as we go through these 

budget cuts, particularly as we go into the future, if we face, you 

know, one of those surprises, if we face one of those crises that suddenly occur, we have to have some mechanisms in place in order 

to be able to respond. And while right now I have to tell you the 

volunteer force is the best, I wouldn’t trade it for anything, it really 

has served its purpose, but I think we always have to be ready for 

that possible contingency in the future if we suddenly had to face 

an unexpected event. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. May I have 30 more 

seconds? 

Mr. PALAZZO. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In terms of looking at 

forward bases and whether or not we can demonstrate our support 

for our allies, whether NATO or South Korea through scheduled 

regular routine joint military exercises, we are spending almost 4 

percent of our GDP [Gross Domestic Product] on defense. I think 

only 4 of our 28 NATO allies are spending the required 2 percent 

required under the NATO charter. 

In South Korea, they are spending 2.7 percent of their gross domestic product on defense. I believe we are at north of 3.6 percent. 

It seems like we care more about defending the South Koreans and 

the Europeans than the Europeans and the South Koreans. So I 

think that we need to strike a balance in that. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. PALAZZO. The chair now recognizes Mr. Scott from Georgia. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, Mr. Secretary, I 

appreciate you being here and we have talked a lot about the cuts 

on the top line. And I represent Robins Air Force Base in Georgia 

and we have Moody to my south, Benning to my west, Kings Bay 

to my east, Stewart, Gordon. I should not have started naming all 
48 

of the bases, but the military industrial base and the men and 

women of the Armed Services are very important to us, and I did 

not vote for the sequestration. I think it is too much. 

Now, I do believe that properly managed, we can take our cuts 

and I believe that—I couldn’t think of a better person to help us 

manage through that than you, Mr. Secretary. One of my concerns 

is when I look at the things that we are doing that are cost drivers, 

the Energy Policy Act of 2005 says that, in our new facilities, we 

can have zero percent of fossil fuels in providing the energy for 

those facilities by 2030. That means no natural gas, it means no 

coal, it means no petroleum. And I guess one is, is that realistic? 

And two is, I think this is just one example I would say of a policy 

that has been put in place with well-meaning intentions, that is 

going to take energy as a percentage of your operations from approximately 3, 31⁄2 percent as I understand today, up to a much 

more significant portion of your budget. And I guess my question 

is, what other cost drivers are there like that that we could make 

some changes to that would help you in reducing your costs? 

Secretary PANETTA. Congressman, you know, as part of the strategy approach to look at, first of all, the overall needs and then determine where we go, I really do have to—I have got to put everything on the table including what you just discussed. I mean, I 

think we have to look at all of that to make sure that we are implementing the most cost-efficient approach to dealing with these 

issues. I mean, I understand, you know, at a time when, you know, 

we we’re getting a blank check and things were doing fine, you 

could do all kinds of things. But now I am in a situation where I 

frankly have to tighten the belt, and that means I have to look at 

everything. And I think the areas you have pointed out are something we have to look at to make sure it makes sense. 

Mr. SCOTT. I hope you give us a list of the things that you need 

us to help you with along those lines because I do believe that in 

order for us to reach our top line goals without affecting national 

security, that we are going to have to look at the cost drivers like 

that. And with that said, I know that you all waited 3 hours for 

me to ask that question. I will just tell you we are ready, willing 

and able to work with the two of you to solve this challenge. I yield 

back my time. 

Mr. PALAZZO. The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Young, from Indiana. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General Dempsey, so much for visiting us today. I have 

to say I have been incredibly encouraged, more so than any HASC 

[House Armed Services Committee] hearing I have attended thus 

far during my first term here because you discussed, in a very direct way, the need to assess risk, to accept risk, to articulate precisely which risks we are willing to accept, to do the whole probability of risk times anticipated costs of any given threat. That is 

exactly the sort of analysis that I have been pushing for months 

here and I know others have as well. 

So I thank you for your leadership. Coming out of that analysis, 

of course, we will be able to, of course, prioritize missions and that, 

in turn, will inform our spending decisions here in Washington, 

where do we fund personnel? Where skills sets are needed? What 
49 

weapons platforms? That is the way we do business and it is really 

refreshing. 

I am going to pivot a bit having given you those kudos to the war 

in Afghanistan where I see less clarity and I hope in coming weeks 

and months, perhaps years, we will be required to get some more 

clarity as to what our Nation’s doctrine is. Mr. Secretary, you indicated that we are in Afghanistan to keep Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorism. True, it seems. And I hear that from 

many. It is a bit too vague for me. We did, as Mr. Jones said earlier, we got bin Laden. Al Qaeda has dispersed around the world. 

If a safe haven for terrorists exists, it is right next door in Pakistan. 

So what is this doctrine that justifies a massive ground presence 

in Afghanistan? How do we measure success in that theater in particular, but also in other theaters, if it is justified, to have an 

American presence there? What is the exit strategy? It is going to 

take well past my reserve time here for you to be able to answer 

that. But as you get halfway into answering the first question of 

that litany, my time will expire. 

So I just want to encourage you to clarify these things. People 

are losing their legs, people are dying and we owe it to all of them 

and their families and the United States of America. I am going 

to focus narrowly on one aspect of our exit strategy, though. And 

that is our fiscal commitment to the region. It remains open-ended. 

Right now we are spending $120 billion a year, and as far as the 

eye can see from my vantage point, we are going to continue to 

spend money in that region in the form of foreign aid and military 

assistance to harden the police and military forces there. 

What is this Administration, Mr. Secretary, what is this Administration’s economic strategy for Afghanistan, which, under the law, 

it was required to present to this Congress before you were sworn 

in back in June. We are still waiting on it. 

Secretary PANETTA. Congressman, again, I really understand the 

concerns and all of the issues you raised, and I think we frankly, 

both of us, can more fully respond to it. But I mean I didn’t support 

going into Iraq. But when you look at Iraq today, Iraq is a more 

stable country and in a very important region that is exercising 

self-government, is exercising the kinds of rights and responsibilities that it never enjoyed in the past. And as a result of that, it 

becomes a more secure area and it becomes an area in which they 

can govern themselves. And more importantly, they themselves can 

exercise the responsibility of maintaining stability there. That is an 

important achievement. That is an important achievement. I hope 

that we can do the same in Afghanistan. 

Mr. YOUNG. And so that is, as you have articulated at least in 

summary fashion, the economic strategy for Afghanistan? That is 

narrowly what I am asking for here. And if you wish to follow up, 

I would certainly understand that. 

Secretary PANETTA. Well, I think—obviously in Iraq, the economic strategy is a lot easier because they have an oil resource. In 

Afghanistan, it is much tougher. Now they do have minerals. They 

do have resources. None of that has really been fully developed. 

But I think providing that kind of support and allowing them to 
50 

be economically independent is going to be part of the solution 

here; otherwise, it is not going to work. 

Mr. YOUNG. And as you say independent, I think trade. Might 

trade be part of the answer, not just in Afghanistan but regionally? 

Secretary PANETTA. Yes. Very much. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I am very encouraged to hear that and I look 

forward to working with the administration, this Department, and 

others to move that ball forward. Thank you. 

Mr. PALAZZO. The chair now recognizes Mr. Platts from Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, General Dempsey, I am honored to be with you. 

And I first want to thank both of you for your many, many years 

of dedicated service to our Nation. We certainly are blessed by both 

of you, what you have done in the past and what you continue to 

do now in your new positions. 

I want to first express, on policy, gratitude to the frank assessment of where we are; that while we are addressing the fiscal challenges of our Nation that we don’t do it on the backs of our courageous men and women in uniform and at the risk of our national 

security. And you both play very important roles in your assessment of where we are with the $450 billion-plus cuts that are already coming and what that will do to national security and our 

commitment to our men and women in uniform and their families 

is so important to this dialogue, this debate that is ongoing. So I 

thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, I want to also commend you and your testimony. 

I am running back and forth between a markup in Oversight and 

Government Reform. But I did get to hear on C–SPAN radio your 

opening statements, although I wasn’t here in the room, and your 

focus on financial management within the Department. In the 

Oversight and Government Reform Committee, I chair the Subcommittee on Financial Management. Just 3 weeks ago, I had 

Under Secretary Hale’s deputy before us and talking about where 

DOD is, moving to 2017. I was delighted as I listened to the radio 

this morning and heard your reference to trying to expedite the 

process in getting to that clean audit. And just, I guess two words 

of caution is one that it is so important that we get there because 

it will allow a better management of your resources, especially in 

tight fiscal times, but that it be true systemic changes, not ultimately a heroic effort to get a clean audit. And you reference in 

your testimony financial controls. Internal controls is where it is at. 

And the second is that we not repeat the errors of the past with 

the DIMHRS plan, Defense Integrated Military Human Resource 

System, that over 12 years, we spent over $1 billion on and unfortunately did not get a result from $1 billion of taxpayer funds. We 

learned from that and not to repeat that. But your leadership on 

financial management on the civilian side and General Dempsey on 

the uniformed side is going to be key. And this ultimately is making sure we have the resources to provide the training, the equipment that our men and women need and we do right by them and 

their families. So your focus on that. 

A final one, really maybe beyond the general scope of today’s 

hearing. But just a concern I have regarding our efforts in Afghani-
51 

stan. And that is, when the President announced the surge, which 

I commended, back in December of 2009, and then the goal of 

starting to draw down troops this year, an important aspect of his 

statement was based on the facts on the ground. And I accept the 

decision. He is Commander in Chief and our military leadership at 

the Department that we can begin that 10,000-troop drawdown this 

year. My concern is that we are already committed to 23,000 next 

year when we don’t know what the facts on the ground will be next 

year. And if we are going to stick by that number, I hope within 

the Department and with the Joint Chiefs that we will look at at 

least moving it back to December 31st once the winter sets in and 

the true fighting season is over because now I think it is currently 

September 30th, and I think that creates a hardship for our commanders on the ground in how to deal with the full fighting season 

in Afghanistan next year. 

So no questions. I will let you wrap up. You have been very patient with all of us. But again, I will just conclude with thanks for 

both of your leaderships. We are blessed because of both of you 

being in the position you are in. 

Secretary PANETTA. Congressman, thank you for all of your remarks. 

On the last point, I want to assure you, General Allen has just 

been outstanding in the way he has addressed his command position there. And I am going to rely a great deal on his recommendations as we go through this process. 

Mr. PLATTS. Great to hear. Thanks again. And I wish you both 

great success in your new assignments. And again, as a Nation, to 

have both of you in those positions is a blessing for our Nation and 

for our security. 

With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PALAZZO. All right. The gentleman yields back. And seeing 

no more questions, I will reserve the last question for myself. 

Secretary Panetta, as others advocate for immediate and sharp 

cuts to defense, the actual implementation of such cuts are rarely 

discussed. I am concerned that such a rapid decline in funding 

could result in an increase, not a reduction in short-term costs for 

things such as termination cost on contracts you have already committed to and increased unit procurement costs as production quantities are reduced. Can you describe to the committee how such unplanned reductions, should they result, be implemented? And what 

liability could we face because of the termination of many of the 

planned procurements? 

Secretary PANETTA. I think we have got to take those issues into 

consideration. Otherwise I don’t want to cut off my nose to spite 

my face in this process. And if we try to get savings that we have 

identified, and it will wind up costing us more because we have 

done it in a stupid fashion, I think that is a mistake. As I mentioned earlier in my testimony, I went through the BRAC process. 

And I know that all of the dollars that people looked at for, you 

know, huge savings in BRAC. And yet they didn’t take into consideration the cleanup. They didn’t take into consideration all of the 

work that had to be done. They didn’t take into consideration all 

of the needs that had to be addressed. And in many cases, it wound 

up costing a lot more. I don’t want to repeat that mistake. 
52 

Mr. PALAZZO. Very well. Again, seeing no questions, Members 

may have additional questions. Please respond to them in writing. 

I want to thank the witnesses for their service to their country 

and for their testimony here today. The witnesses are excused. This 

hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:11 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

OCTOBER 13, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

OCTOBER 13, 2011 

(57) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

The Future of National Defense and the U.S. Military Ten 

Years After 9/11: Perspectives of Secretary of Defense 

Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

General Martin Dempsey 

October 13, 2011 

The House Armed Services Committee meets to receive testimony on ‘‘The Future of National Defense and the U.S. Military 

Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives of Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin 

Dempsey.’’ 

This hearing is part of our ongoing series to evaluate lessons 

learned since 9/11 and to apply those lessons to decisions we will 

soon be making about the future of our force. As our series draws 

to a close, we have received perspectives of former military leaders 

from each of the Services, former chairmen of the Armed Services 

Committees, as well as outside experts. Today we will change direction as we look to the viewpoints of our sitting Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Our witnesses 

today have spent decades serving our Nation. Thank you for being 

with us and your public service. 

As I continue to emphasize, our successes in the global war on 

terror, and in Iraq and Afghanistan, appear to be lulling our Nation into the false confidence of a September 10th mindset. Too 

many appear to believe that we can maintain a solid defense that 

is driven by budget choices, not strategic ones. While I agree that 

the military cannot be exempt from fiscal belt-tightening, we have 

to put this debt crisis into perspective if we’re to find our way back 

into fiscal responsibility. Defense has contributed more than half of 

the deficit reduction measures taken to date. There are some in 

government who want to use the military to pay for the rest, to 

protect the sacred cow that is entitlement spending. 

Not only should that be a non-starter from a national security 

and economic perspective, but it should also be a non-starter from 

a moral perspective. Consider that word, entitlements. Well, entitlements imply that you are entitled to a certain benefit, and I can’t 

think of anyone who has earned that right ahead of our troops. By 

volunteering to put their lives on the line for this country, they are 
58 

entitled to the best training, equipment, and leadership our Nation 

can provide. 

But all this talk in Washington lately about dollars doesn’t translate well into actual impacts on the force and risk to our Nation. 

Yesterday, former Chairman Duncan Hunter encouraged us all to 

answer these questions before we voted to cut any more from defense: 

• Isn’t our primary Constitutional duty to defend our Nation? 

• Is the world suddenly safer today? 

• Is the war against terrorism over? 

I hope our witnesses today can help us understand the ramifications of these possible cuts in relation to our force structure as well 

as our ability to meet future needs of our national defense. How 

can we make sure DOD is a good steward of the taxpayers dollar, 

without increasing the risk to our Armed Forces? 

The U.S. military is the modern era’s pillar of American strength 

and values. In these difficult economic times, we recognize the 

struggle to bring fiscal discipline to our Nation. But it is imperative 

that we focus our fiscal restraint on the driver of the debt, instead 

of the protector of our prosperity. 
59 

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

The Future of National Defense and the U.S. Military Ten 

Years After 9/11: Perspectives of Secretary of Defense 

Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

General Martin Dempsey 

October 13, 2011 

I would like to join the Chairman in welcoming Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey in their first appearance before the 

House Armed Services Committee. In these times of budgetary uncertainty, your testimony is particularly important. 

Secretary Panetta, as a former chairman of the House Budget 

Committee and director of the Office of Management and Budget, 

you know the realities as well as, if not much better than, any of 

us sitting on this dais. 

Our country faces a budget dilemma—we don’t collect enough 

revenue to cover our expenditures. According to the House Budget 

Committee, we currently must borrow about 40 cents for every dollar the Federal Government spends. This problem must be addressed in two ways: Spending will have to come down, and we’re 

going to have to generate new revenues. 

Like many, if not most, of our members here, I share the view 

that large, immediate cuts to the defense budget would have substantially negative impacts on the ability of the U.S. military to 

carry out its missions. I am sure that both our witnesses share this 

view, and I hope General Dempsey can help us understand the impacts of additional potential cuts. I am also deeply concerned about 

cuts to all non-entitlement spending, which bore the brunt of the 

recent deficit deal. If the ‘‘super committee’’ fails to reach a deal, 

then cuts through sequestration will only impose deeper and more 

dangerous cuts to our military and non-entitlement spending such 

as infrastructure, education and homeland security. 

I believe that we can rationally evaluate our national security 

strategy, our defense expenditures, and the current mission sets we 

ask the military to undertake and come up with a strategy that requires less funding. We on this committee like to say that strategy 

should not be driven by arbitrary budget numbers, but by the same 

token not considering the level of available resources when developing a strategy is irresponsible. To that end, I congratulate our 

witnesses, and their predecessors, for undertaking a comprehensive 

review of our current strategy. I know we all are looking forward 

to the results of that ongoing review, and I hope that you can give 

us some insight into how and where it is going. I for one believe 

that we can and must spend smarter and not just more. 

It is also important that we address the revenue side of our 

budget problem. We must consider raising additional revenue. In 
60 

order to avoid drastic cuts to our military and other important programs, revenue streams must be enhanced. 

It is my hope that this hearing will help remind everyone here 

that we have to make some serious choices. Our budget must be 

looked at in a comprehensive manner. If we are serious about not 

cutting large amounts of funding from the defense budget, something else has to give. Large, immediate, across-the-board cuts to 

the defense budget, which would occur under sequestration, would 

do serious damage to our national security. In order to avoid large 

cuts to the defense budget, we’re going to have to stop repeating 

ideological talking points and address our budget problems comprehensively, through smarter spending and increased revenue. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. And 

thank you to our witnesses for appearing here today. 
61 
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65 
66 
67 
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

OCTOBER 13, 2011 

(73) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

OCTOBER 13, 2011 

(77) 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES 

Mr. JONES. Yesterday in the hearing, I was not able to stay for the second round 

of questions. As you recall, you agreed with former Secretary Gates’ Afghanistan 

withdrawal assessment. He made these before the HASC on February 16, 2011. I 

have enclosed his testimony for your information. Please write back to me as to your 

assessment on how many American service members will be killed and wounded in 

action by the time we withdraw our forces in Afghanistan by the end of 2014? 

‘‘As we end the U.S. troop presence in Iraq this year, according to the agreement 

with the Iraqi government, the overall deployment demands on our force are decreasing significantly. Just three years ago, we had some 190,000 troops combined 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. By the end of this calendar year we expect less than 

100,000 troops to be deployed in both of the major post-9/11 combat theaters, virtually all of those forces being in Afghanistan. That is why we believe that, beginning in FY 2015, the U.S. can, with minimal risk, begin reducing Army active duty 

end strength by 27,000 and the Marine Corps by somewhere between 15,000 and 

20,000. These projections assume that the number of troops in Afghanistan would 

be significantly reduced by the end of 2014, in accordance with the President’s strategy. If our assumptions prove incorrect, there’s plenty of time to adjust the size and 

schedule of this change.’’ 

Secretary PANETTA. The United States’ focus in Afghanistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaida and to ensure Afghanistan does not again become a 

safe haven from which terrorists attack the United States. We are extraordinarily 

fortunate that so many brave Americans are willing to defend the country from 

those who wish us ill. Through their service we are all safer. The risks of the battlefield are very real, and casualties are a consequence of war not taken lightly. 

The Department of Defense is doing everything it can to give servicemen and 

women the training, equipment, and support required. I can assure our forces and 

their families that my commitment, and the commitment of our military leadership, 

is to ensure they have the resources and training they need to carry out their missions. Our forces are made up of our nation’s finest, and they deserve nothing less. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. I want to call your attention to a legislative issue that has national 

security and budgetary implications for our efforts in Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, and elsewhere. The current CR does not include an explicit extension of certain 

counternarcotics (CN) authorities that expired in FY2011. Extensions are included 

in both the House and Senate versions of the FY12 NDAA and were included in 

the Department’s requests for the CR. 

We do not believe it was the intent of Congress for these activities to stop, but 

due to a decision by the DOD GC, the lack of an extension for these authorities, 

particularly for section 1004 support for law enforcement, is causing considerable 

difficulty and jeopardizes a wide range of CN activities, including some key efforts 

in the Afghanistan theatre. Is there a way you can help us bridge the gap until the 

NDAA is passed or ask the DOD GC to re-visit his decision? 

Secretary PANETTA. As several Combatant Commanders, the Director for National 

Drug Control Policy, and others have argued, the temporary lapse in DOD’s counternarcotics authorities is indeed having significant national security implications for 

programs in Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, and along the Southwest border. While 

I agree that it does not appear it was Congress’s intent for these activities to stop, 

the fact that these authorities do not exist in law left the Department no other 

choice but to suspend certain counternarcotics support activities. 

For the past six weeks, the Department has been working with the committee and 

other congressional leaders to resolve this situation. I understand that last week the 

DOD General Counsel briefed you and Chairman McKeon on the rationale behind 

his determination, and I am unaware of any legislation or other information that 

would contradict the Department’s position. DOD made every effort to mitigate the 

impact of this lapse in authority, but many of these efforts are incomplete and/or 

temporary solutions. Unfortunately, there is simply no way to ‘‘bridge the gap’’ any 
78 

further. In fact, many of the mitigation efforts will have run their course over the 

next several weeks, since alternative authorities and related funding sources will 

have been exhausted. The Department has therefore asked the committee to provide 

legislation extending these authorities in the next continuing resolution. I would ask 

that this issue be given the highest priority consideration as you complete work on 

the continuing resolution and the FY 2012 Defense Authorization bill. 

Mr. SMITH. We focus on GTMO, but I understand there are issues involving detainees charged with serious offenses in Iraq (Daqduq) and the UN report regarding 

humanitarian concerns in Afghan prisons. How do these affect our ability to detain 

enemy fighters? What is the Administration planning to do regarding Daqduq? Are 

we reaching a point in Afghanistan where US prisons will reach capacity? If so, 

what is our plan? 

Secretary PANETTA. The President recently announced that all U.S. military forces 

will leave Iraq by December 31, 2011. In this context, the Administration continues 

to look at its options for adequately mitigating the threat posed by Daqduq. Regarding Afghanistan, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) 

report involved several detention centers run by the National Directorate of Security 

and the Afghan National Police. The Commander, International Security Assistance 

Force (COMISAF) has suspended the transfer of detainees captured by ISAF forces, 

including U.S. forces operating under NATO operational control of COMISAF, to 

these Afghan detention centers and jails pending further investigations of the allegations, inspections of the Afghan facilities implicated in the report, and other remedial measures. We will continue to support the actions of the Afghan government 

to investigate allegations of human rights abuses and hold those responsible accountable. This temporary suspension does not affect detainees captured by U.S. 

forces operating under U.S. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) authority and 

transferred to the U.S.-run Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP), since such detainees are not sent to the Afghan facilities implicated in the report. 

U.S. detention capacity at the DFIP is nearing its current capacity due to the persistently high rate of new captures by U.S. forces conducting combat operations 

under OEF authority and the limited capacity of the Afghan government to accept 

detainee transfers for purposes of criminal prosecution or other appropriate disposition. To address these issues, DOD is expanding the DFIP and reassessing how best 

to transition detention facilities and operations to Afghan control. Building the judicial capacity of the Afghan government remains a top priority. 

Mr. SMITH. There is much concern raised about the risk of transferring detainees 

from GTMO. Is there similar risk if we don’t transfer anyone else from GTMO? 

What would it be? 

Secretary PANETTA. The inability to transfer detainees from Guantanamo attracts 

criticism from non-governmental organizations and the international community. 

Presidential Executive Order 13492 mandated the closure of detention facilities at 

Guantanamo Bay and directed a review of each Guantanamo detainee. A Department of Justice-coordinated Guantanamo Review Task Force completed its work in 

January 2010 and recommended that a number of detainees be transferred from 

GTMO, subject to appropriate security assurances from the countries to which the 

detainees would be transferred. 

Mr. SMITH. I want to call your attention to a legislative issue that has national 

security and budgetary implications for our efforts in Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, and elsewhere. The current CR does not include an explicit extension of certain 

counternarcotics (CN) authorities that expired in FY2011. Extensions are included 

in both the House and Senate versions of the FY12 NDAA and were included in 

the Department’s requests for the CR. We do not believe it was the intent of Congress for these activities to stop, but due to a decision by the DOD GC, the lack 

of an extension for these authorities, particularly for section 1004 support for law 

enforcement, is causing considerable difficulty and jeopardizes a wide range of CN 

activities, including some key efforts in the Afghanistan theatre. Is there a way you 

can help us bridge the gap until the NDAA is passed or ask the DOD GC to revisit his decision? 

General DEMPSEY. We agree that it was not the intent of Congress for these activities to stop. As you mention, both the House and the Senate versions of the FY12 

NDAA contain language extending these authorities. It is my understanding that 

an agreement has been reached between the Department and Congress on resolving 

the expiration of the CN authorities in the Statement of Managers that will accompany the next continuing resolution (CR). The proposed language directs the Department of Defense to continue to carry out, for the duration of the CR, the CN programs conducted in fiscal year 2011. Once the CR is signed, the Department will 

begin to restore CN programs impacted by the expiration of the CN authorities. All 
79 

geographical combatant commands, Special Operations Command, and the Services 

implemented temporary fixes to minimize the impacts caused by the expiration of 

the CN authorities. However, temporary fixes were not necessarily a ‘one for one’ 

replacement and in some cases there were no temporary fixes, requiring the subsequent cancellation or postponement of a mission or program. 

Mr. SMITH. We focus on GTMO, but I understand there are issues involving detainees charged with serious offenses in Iraq (Daqduq) and the UN report regarding 

humanitarian concerns in Afghan prisons. How do these affect our ability to detain 

enemy fighters? What is the Administration planning to do regarding Daqduq? Are 

we reaching a point in Afghanistan where US prisons will reach capacity? If so, 

what is our plan? 

General DEMPSEY. As you know, the President recently announced that all U.S. 

military forces will leave Iraq by 31 December 2011. The Administration continues 

to look at its options for adequately mitigating the threat posed by Daqduq. Regarding Afghanistan, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) 

report involved several detention centers run by the National Directorate of Security 

and several jails operated by the Ministry of Justice. The Commander, International 

Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) has suspended the transfer of detainees captured by ISAF forces, including U.S. forces operating under NATO operational control of COMISAF, to these Afghan detention centers and jails pending further investigations of the allegations, inspections of the Afghan facilities implicated in the report, and other remedial measures. We will continue to support the actions of the 

Afghan government to investigate allegations of human rights abuses and hold 

those responsible accountable. This temporary suspension does not affect detainees 

captured by U.S. forces operating under U.S. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 

(OEF) authority and transferred to the U.S.-run Detention Facility in Parwan 

(DFIP), since such detainees are not sent to the Afghan facilities implicated in the 

report. 

U.S. detention capacity at the DFIP is nearing its current capacity due to the persistently high rate of new captures by U.S. forces conducting combat operations 

under OEF authority and the limited capacity of the Afghan government to accept 

detainee transfers for purposes of criminal prosecution or other appropriate disposition. To address these issues, DOD is expanding the DFIP and reassessing how best 

to transition detention facilities and operations to Afghan control. Building the judicial capacity of the Afghan government remains a top priority. 

Mr. SMITH. There is much concern raised about the risk of transferring detainees 

from GTMO. Is there similar risk if we don’t transfer anyone else from GTMO? 

What would it be? 

General DEMPSEY. Presidential Executive Order 13492 ordered the closure of the 

detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay and directed a review of each Guantanamo 

detainee. The Department of Justice-led Guantanamo Review Task Force completed 

its work in January 2010. The task force recommended that a number of detainees 

be transferred from GTMO, subject to appropriate security assurances. The inability 

to transfer detainees from Guantanamo attracts criticism from both domestic 

groups, including non-governmental organizations, and the international community. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. Do you agree with Secretary Gates that the modernization project 

is very important both from a national security standpoint and from a perspective 

of sustaining political support for the New START Treaty? 

Secretary PANETTA. Yes. The nuclear enterprise remains, today and for the foreseeable future, a foundation of the U.S. deterrence strategy and defense posture. 

The U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure requires significant investment. In order 

to remain safe, secure, and effective, the U.S. nuclear stockpile must be supported 

by a modern physical infrastructure and staffed by the most promising scientists 

and engineers of the next generation. 

Mr. TURNER. What is your assessment of the cuts proposed for NNSA, given that 

DOD transferred top-line authority specifically to support these important defense 

programs? 

Secretary PANETTA. The Department of Defense (DOD) relies upon the NNSA to 

provide and sustain the nation’s nuclear warheads, and develop and maintain the 

Navy’s nuclear reactors in support of our strategic deterrence mission. As stated in 

the Nuclear Posture Review, U.S. nuclear weapons have endured well beyond their 

originally planned lifetimes. The 1251 report submitted to Congress last February 

outlined DOD and Department of Energy (DOE)/NNSA nuclear enterprise funding 
80 

requirements. If authorized and appropriated by Congress, a fully funded NNSA enables weapon Life Extension Program (LEP) execution and investment in a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. These investments are necessary for continued 

confidence in the nuclear deterrent. Reducing or diverting Fiscal Year 2012 appropriations from the U.S. nuclear weapons program, as proposed in the Energy and 

Water Appropriations Subcommittee, will compromise the ability to carry out the required modernization of the nuclear weapons complex and sustainment of the nation’s nuclear weapons. Without the refurbishment and modernization of existing 

nuclear weapons and associated infrastructure, the military will need larger quantities of hedge warheads to ensure that military capabilities can withstand potential 

failures of aging nuclear weapons. It also will adversely affect our ability to certify 

the stockpile’s nuclear performance without the need for underground nuclear testing. 

Mr. TURNER. It seems unlikely that Secretary Gates was trying to pay for water 

projects when he gave this DOD money to NNSA, do you agree? How do you propose 

we solve this problem? What are your concerns about DOD’s budget contributions 

being diverted to parochial water projects instead of their intended national security 

purpose? 

Secretary PANETTA. I am concerned that there is insufficient transparency to determine whether the $8.3 billion DOD transferred will be utilized as agreed upon 

by the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Secretaries of Defense 

and Energy making key Life Extension Programs and other deliverables at risk. 

However, I also understand the change in economic realities that occurred since the 

transfer and the development of the MOU. DOD is currently working with NNSA 

and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop a plan with which to 

move forward into the future. This makes even more critical the full support of Congress in authorization and appropriation of both DOD and NNSA nuclear weapon 

budgets each year. 

Mr. TURNER. We’re aware that the Administration is claiming that every Administration conducts a targeting review. That is not disputed. What appears unique 

here, however, is that it sounds like the Administration has already decided to go 

lower, is that right? In view of robust Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons programs, the illicit nuclear weapons programs of North Korea, Iran and Syria, is this 

mini-NPR pre-ordained to only recommend reductions to U.S. nuclear forces? 

Secretary PANETTA. The Administration is conducting a Nuclear Posture Review 

implementation study to determine the nuclear force size and structure needed to 

support U.S. national security requirements and meet international obligations in 

a dynamic security environment. The President directed the ongoing study as part 

of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. As stated in the NPR, the United States intends to pursue further reductions in nuclear weapons with Russia. When complete, 

the analysis of deterrence requirements and force postures will inform the development of any future arms control objectives. 

The analysis from this study will provide options for the President’s guidance to 

the Departments of Defense and Energy on nuclear planning with respect to the 

force structure, force posture, and stockpile requirements needed to protect the 

United States and its Allies and partners and to inform plans for the employment 

of nuclear weapons in the event that deterrence fails. 

Mr. TURNER. Chairman McKeon and I sent you a letter on September 13 asking 

you to assist this Committee in its oversight of the nuclear weapons guidance by 

reconstituting an oversight process that existed while you were in the Congress in 

the early 1990s. Can you tell us when we might expect an answer? 

Secretary PANETTA. You should receive a reply in the near future. A formal response is being drafted. 

Mr. TURNER. Because of your experience as a former senior member of Congress 

(and Budget Committee Chairman), former director of the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB), and now current Secretary of Defense, you bring a unique perspective to a question I have: What is your assessment of the cuts proposed for 

NNSA, given that DOD transferred top-line authority specifically to support these 

important defense programs? 

Secretary PANETTA. The Department of Defense (DOD) relies upon the National 

Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to provide and sustain the nation’s nuclear 

warheads, and develop and maintain the Navy’s nuclear reactors in support of our 

strategic deterrence mission. As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, U.S. nuclear 

weapons have endured well beyond their originally planned lifetimes. The 1251 report submitted to Congress last February outline DOD and Department of Energy 

(DOE)/NNSA nuclear enterprise funding requirements. If authorized and appropriated by Congress, a fully funded NNSA enables weapon Life Extension Program 
81 

(LEP) execution and investment in a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. 

These investments are necessary for continued confidence in our nuclear deterrent. 

Reducing or diverting Fiscal Year 2012 appropriations from the U.S. nuclear 

weapons program, as proposed in the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee, will compromise the ability to carry out required modernization of the 

nuclear weapons complex and sustainment of U.S. nuclear weapons. Without the 

critical refurbishment and modernization of our nuclear weapons and associated infrastructure, the military will need larger quantities of hedge warheads to ensure 

that military capabilities can withstand potential failures of aging nuclear weapons. 

It also will adversely affect the ability to certify the U.S. stockpile’s nuclear performance without the need for underground nuclear testing. 

Mr. TURNER. On October 7, 2011 four members of the Joint Select Committee on 

Deficit Reduction sent a letter to President Obama urging that he direct the Office 

of Management and Budget to re-examine and consider ‘‘to make more efficient use 

of federal government spectrum and reallocate some of it for commercial broadband 

use. In particular, we should put every effort into making available paired, internationally-harmonized spectrum below 3 GHz in sufficient block sizes to support 

mobile broadband services within the next 10 years.’’ We understand that this involves spectrum (specifically 1755–1850MHz) that is currently allocated to and 

being used by the Department of Defense and other federal agencies for a variety 

of critical capabilities. How is the DOD addressing this issue and by what process 

will the decisions be made? Additionally, what are the technical, cost, and schedule 

impacts to the DOD of the potential reallocation? 

Secretary PANETTA. The Department is addressing this issue through the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the National Telecommunications and Information 

Administration (NTIA), in cooperation with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). These efforts are in line with the President’s directive to identify an additional 500 MHz of spectrum for broadband. Specifically, as directed by NTIA in 

January 2011, DOD is involved in a year-long study to determine the feasibility of 

relocating systems from the 1755–1850 MHz band. The results of the study are documented in an NTIA report that is currently being coordinated through the Office 

of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Inter-Agency Review process. 

Decisions are guided by P.L. 106–65 which directs that DOD not surrender the 

use of a band of which it is a primary user until the Secretaries of Commerce and 

Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, jointly certify to the House and Senate 

Armed Services and Commerce committees that alternative spectrum with comparable technical characteristics is identified to ensure no loss in essential military 

capability. 

Following report coordination, DOD anticipates that the FCC will solicit industry 

comments through a Public Notice Process on the results of the report, to be followed by rulemakings that set service rules and auction rules. Industry comments 

will influence future negotiations regarding the 1755–1850 MHz band and any potential alternative spectrum relocation scenarios/studies, as the Commission considers feedback in order to hold a successful auction. 

DOD’s 1755–1850 MHz study results indicate that it is feasible to relocate from 

the 1755–1850 MHz band within 10 years, provided that $12.93B is afforded to accommodate the relocation, comparable spectrum (2025–2110 MHz and 5150–5250 

MHz) is made available for DOD systems to relocate, and exclusion zones are established to protect critical capabilities in the transition. 

Note: DOD studied the feasibility of relocating from the entire 1755–1850 MHz 

band (95 MHz) within 10 years. Also, DOD studied the feasibility of an early transition from the 1755–1780 MHz band (lower 25 MHz) within 5 years as an interim 

step to the full relocation. Deviations from the original study requirements (i.e. alternative scenarios, etc.) will require additional time to study the technical, operational, cost, and schedule impacts. 

Mr. TURNER. In what way does the military rely on NNSA’s defense activities? 

What are the military implications of not carrying out this modernization, particularly as the warheads continue to age and as the infrastructure continues to atrophy 

from its already ‘‘decrepit’’ state—as it was described by the Strategic Posture Commission? 

General DEMPSEY. The Department of Defense (DOD) relies upon the National 

Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to provide and sustain the nation’s nuclear 

warheads, and develop and maintain the Navy’s reactors in support of our strategic 

deterrence mission. NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan compliments DOD’s force structure plans to ensure sufficient capability to keep our 

stockpile safe, secure and reliable. 
82 

As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), our nuclear weapons have endured well beyond their originally planned lifetimes. If authorized and appropriated 

by Congress, a fully funded NNSA will enable weapon Lifetime Extension Program 

(LEP) execution and investment in a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. 

These investments are absolutely necessary for continued confidence in our nuclear 

deterrent. 

Mr. TURNER. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review says that, ‘‘by modernizing our 

aging nuclear facilities and investing in human capital, we can substantially reduce 

the number of nuclear weapons we retain as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise.’’ It goes on to say that these modernization investments ‘‘are essential to facilitating reductions while sustaining deterrence under New START and 

beyond.’’ If we do not carry out the modernization program, what is your military 

opinion of the risks associated with nuclear stockpile reductions? 

General DEMPSEY. As long as nuclear weapons exist, we must have a national 

commitment to sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. I believe 

the NPR outlined the goals and capabilities required to modernize our nuclear enterprise to ensure lasting confidence in our Nation’s nuclear deterrent force. The 

NPR articulates the importance of a modern nuclear infrastructure for our ability 

to size our nuclear weapons stockpile appropriately. 

While I recognize the nation’s fiscal realities will constrain spending on national 

security programs, our nuclear enterprise investments are critical to ensure longterm viability. The long-term sustainment of the nuclear investments is critical to 

facilitating a shift away from the recent U.S. strategy of retaining large numbers 

of non-deployed warheads as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise. Our 

weapons and delivery systems need life extension programs. Our industrial base requires safe and modern facilities with adequate capabilities and capacity. Lastly, we 

must attract the brightest young minds to scientifically verify the safety, security, 

and effectiveness of today’s weapons without a return to underground testing and 

to dismantle unneeded weapons. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS 

Mrs. DAVIS. Can you tell me more about the group that is currently working on 

the strategic 2020 assessment? Is this group looking at strategy with regard to 

budget constraints and the limited resources that you have mentioned (unlike the 

QDR which is required to not take budget constraints into account)? Can you provide me with a list of names or positions of those who comprise this group? When 

can we expect to see the final result? 

Secretary PANETTA. The strategic choices group is one venue in which the Department is considering the emerging defense strategy and the translation of that strategy to the FY13–17 and future Presidential Budget Submissions. The group is composed of the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Service Chiefs, and the 

Under Secretaries of Defense in direct support of the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The group will help determine 

the desired attributes and capabilities of the future joint force, and weigh the capacity of that force to provide needed capabilities against cost and risk. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Can you tell me more about the group that is currently working on 

the strategic 2020 assessment? Is this group looking at strategy with regard to 

budget constraints and the limited resources that you have mentioned (unlike the 

QDR which is required to not take budget constraints into account)? Can you provide me with a list of names or positions of those who comprise this group? When 

can we expect to see the final result? 

General DEMPSEY. The strategic choices group is one venue in which the Department is considering the emerging defense strategy and the translation of that strategy to the FY13–17 and future Presidential Budget Submissions. The group is composed of the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Service Chiefs, and the 

Under Secretaries of Defense in direct support of the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The group will help determine 

the desired attributes and capabilities of the future joint force, and weigh the capacity of that force to provide needed capabilities against cost and risk. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. As the Defense Department considers possible cuts I think there has 

been an evolution since the early 1990s in new Commands and organizations that 

should be reviewed. Please provide me a list of all the Army Commands and organi-
83 

zations that have been formed or realigned, outside the BRAC recommendations, 

and numbers of people that are currently assigned to those commands/organizations. I also ask that you provide me with the increased number of General/Flag 

Officer and Senior Service positions that have been created to lead or manage the 

new Commands and organizations. 

Secretary PANETTA. In October 1992, the Army organized under fifteen Major 

Army Commands (MACOMs). In 2005–2006, the Army Command Structure was reviewed and reorganized to better support Combatant Commands and the Army’s 

modular formations. This established three (3) types of command organizations: 

Army Commands (ACOMs), Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) and Direct Reporting Units (DRUs). 

The Army currently has 23 commands: 3–ACOMs, 10–ASCCs and 10–DRUs. The 

significant difference in the number of commands from the 1990s is due to the 

Army’s establishment of four ASCCs (U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Strategic Command, U.S. Army North, U.S. Army Africa/Southern European Task Force, and U.S. Army Cyber Command) to support newly formed Combatant Commands, and the re-designation of U.S. Army Central as an ASCC. The 

Army also activated the U.S. Army Installation Management Command to oversee 

the Army’s facilities and standardize base operations services across the Army. In 

addition, the Army designated the following existing organizations as DRUs: United 

States Military Academy, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, and U.S. Army 

Acquisition Support Center. Throughout the period considered, the documented 

Army general officer requirements always exceeded the Title 10 general officer authorization limits. Consequently, there was no growth in the number of general officers to meet structure requirements. Rather, changes to the Army’s organizational 

structure require the Army leadership to make recurring assessments about which 

positions to support/fill with a general officer based on roles/missions/priorities. 

The Army reduced more than 30 Senior Executive Service (SES) allocations between the 1990s and today. During that same period, there were changes to organizations that resulted in both additions and deletions in executive positions. However, since agencies are expected to manage their executive resource needs within 

the levels set during the biennial allocation process, leadership needs for new organizations were met by reprogramming existing resources to meet the agency’s highest priority requirements and unanticipated needs. [See the document on page 73 

for more information.] 

Mr. ROGERS. How do you plan to protect and preserve the organic depot structure 

and enforce statutory provisions to assure the viability of an organic logistics capability necessary to ensure military readiness? 

Secretary PANETTA. The Department agrees that it is essential for national defense that the United States maintains organic depot maintenance capabilities that 

enable our forces to respond to national defense contingencies and other emergency 

requirements. DOD policies and actions support the preservation of core capabilities 

and balance the maintenance workload across the public and private sectors. 

The Department applies and enforces the core concept through a biennial capability and workload review, completed by the Military Services and reviewed by the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense. The purpose of this review process is to ensure 

a ready and controlled source of technical maintenance capability owned and operated by the Government. The Department’s organic depot maintenance capability is 

subject to title 10, U.S.C., section 2466, which directs that no more than 50 percent 

of each Military Department’s annual depot maintenance funding can be used for 

work done by private sector contractors. The Department provides this comprehensive information of depot maintenance spending in a report to Congress annually. 

In addition to these formal processes and reporting requirements, the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness oversees programs and initiatives designed to support the effective execution of the Department’s maintenance requirements. A key element of these programs is the stewardship of the U.S. organic depot structure. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. As you are aware, Public Law 110–229, the Consolidated Natural 

Resources Act of 2008, converted the Guam-specific visa waiver program into a joint 

Guam-CNMI regional visa waiver program. P.L. 110–229 expressly intended to include visitors from countries of ‘‘significant economic benefit’’ to the CNMI in the 

Guam-CNMI VWP. As Congress intended, and as DHS acknowledged in implementing the rule, these countries were the China and the Russia. However, the interim final rule promulgated by DHS did not include China and Russia. Instead, 
84 

in October 2009, Secretary Napolitano exercised her discretionary parole authority 

to allow Chinese and Russian tourists to travel to the CNMI only. The ability of 

Chinese and Russian tourists to visit Guam visa-free is crucial to the development 

of Guam’s economy. DHS is currently considering the final rule implementing the 

Guam-CNMI VWP. DHS indicated that it has requested DOD’s opinion on whether 

either the expansion of the visa waiver program to China and Russia or the extension of the existing parole authority to Guam would present any concerns with respect to security of local DOD bases on Guam. Local military commanders on Guam 

have stated publicly that they are not opposed to expanding the visa waiver program to Chinese or Russian visitors, and that any security-related concerns can be 

effectively mitigated. This position comports with DOD’s long-standing view, as expressed in the Guam & CNMI Military Relocation EIS, that the military build-up 

on Guam must be balanced with Guam’s economic development. Can you confirm 

that: (a) DOD is actively working to provide DHS with the requested response regarding any security concerns to DOD from expanding the Guam-CNMI VWP or extending parole authority to Guam; (b) as expressed by the local military commanders on Guam, any potential security concerns to DOD can be sufficiently mitigated, either within the visa waiver mechanism or through conditions imposed pursuant to DHS’ parole authority? 

Secretary PANETTA. The Department of Defense is currently evaluating the merits 

of the application of this program to Guam as they relate to Departmental equities 

and requirements. DOD looks forward to interagency discussion once the Department of Homeland Security provides its formal proposal to all relevant Departments 

and Agencies. 

Ms. BORDALLO. As you know, 10 USC 235 states that ‘‘In the budget justification 

materials submitted to Congress in support of the Department of Defense budget 

for any fiscal year . . . the Secretary of Defense shall include the information described in subsection (b) with respect to the procurement of contract services . . . the 

number of full-time contractor employees (or the equivalent of full-time in the case 

of part-time contractor employees) projected and justified for each Department of 

Defense component, installation, or activity based on the inventory of contracts for 

services required by subsection (c) of section 2330a of this title and the review required by subsection (e) of such section.’’ 

How can DOD have the ‘‘ability to conduct a full budget audit’’ if DOD is not able 

to prepare a compliant budget in accordance with section 235 because DOD doesn’t 

have an inventory that is compliant with section 2330a(c) or conduct the review required by section 2330a(e)? 

Secretary PANETTA. The 2010 NDAA requires that DOD financial statements be 

validated as ready for audit by September 2017. The Department has a plan to accomplish that goal and is making significant progress as described in the latest biannual report to Congress. I have also directed that this effort should be expedited, 

with a 2014 target to make out statements of budget resources audit ready. The 

first priority in the plan focuses improvements on the controls and systems associated with budgetary information. The goal is to improve information to better inform decisions—not just to ensure the funds are spent. 

The financial statements and the budget justification are prepared from the same 

data and processes which the DOD is focused on improving. While the audit of DOD 

financial statements will not validate our budget justification materials directly, I 

feel that the audit will provide Congress assurance that our underlying financial information is reliable. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In response to the GAO report on the inventory of contracts for 

services released in January 2011, DOD indicated that it ‘‘would develop a plan of 

action, including anticipated timeframes and necessary resources, to facilitate the 

Department’s stated intent of collecting manpower data . . . ’’ and ‘‘assess ways to 

improve the Department’s approach to estimating contractor full-time equivalents 

until the department is able to collect manpower data from contractors.’’ 

What specifically has the department done since then to meet these objectives? 

Secretary PANETTA. Following the GAO’s report issuance in January 2011, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD(P&R)) 

began formal coordination of a proposed policy issuance, ‘‘Development, Review, and 

Analysis of the Inventory of Contracts for Services’’ (ICS). This issuance establishes 

policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides uniform definitions and guidelines to 

ensure consistency DOD-wide for the development, review, and analysis of the 

ICS—consistent with the statutory requirements of sections 235 and 2330a of title 

10, United States Code. 

This proposed issuance requires that as new contracts for services are issued, and 

as options for existing contracts are exercised, DOD requiring activities ensure that 

each statement of work (SOW) include specific data elements required to meet the 
85 

requirements of Title 10. Specifically, the requirement to collect direct labor hours 

and associated costs would be included as a deliverable. All services provided in support of, or of benefit to, a DOD organization, regardless of the source of the funding 

or acquisition agent and the dollar amount of the vehicle, would be reported in the 

inventory of contracts for services. Additionally, the issuance proposed guidance 

with regards to completing a thorough review and analysis of the contracted services to ensure they are validated against mission requirements, as well as being justified against current and proposed expenditures during annual program and budget 

reviews. 

Based on feedback from the coordination process and as a result of the passage 

of Public Law 112–10, OUSD(P&R) determined to reassess the scope and content 

of this proposed issuance. Section 8108(c) of Public Law 112–10 required each military department, agency, and activity of the Department to develop a plan to collect 

direct labor hours and associated costs from contractors. Nearly all Components 

have submitted their plan in accordance with section 8108(c). 

On November 22, 2011, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, jointly with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics, delivered a consolidated Department-wide plan to the Congressional defense 

committees. Based on individual Component submissions, this plan delineates both 

short- and long-term actions to be taken by the Department to begin collecting data 

from private sector firms and fully comply with requirements of sections 235 and 

2330a of Title 10, United States Code. Among the long-term actions delineated in 

this plan is the completion of a comprehensive DOD issuance that would formalize 

Department-wide processes and responsibilities for compliance with these provisions. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In a recent prepared statement to the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, Dr. Clifford Stanley stated OUSD Personnel and Readiness is working 

with all DOD organizations to move towards collecting data from the private sector 

firms providing services for the department. 

What progress has been made and have DOD organizations begun steps to collect 

such data? 

Secretary PANETTA. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness’ 

May 2011 statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee was based on his request to each of the Department’s organizations to designate representatives to comply with the reporting requirements of section 8108(c) of the Public Law 112–10, the 

Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011. These 

representatives comprised a working group including the three Military Departments, 27 Defense Agencies/Field Activities, Joint Staff, 9 Combatant Command organizations, OSD staff, and other DOD organizations. Led by OUSD(P&R), this 

group discussed (1) how to respond to the specific requirements of section 8108 and 

(2) how to improve the Departments inventory of contracts for services both in the 

near and long term. 

In coordination with P&R, each Component developed a plan to collect data from 

the private sector firms providing services for their organization. On November 22, 

2011, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, jointly with the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics (USD (AT&L)), 

delivered a consolidated Department-wide plan to the Congressional defense committees. Based on individual Component submissions, this plan delineates both 

short- and long-term actions to begin collecting data from private sector firms and 

fully comply with requirements of sections 235 and 2330a of title 10, United States 

Code. The Department’s plan will follow the Army’s best practice to modify statements of work/performance work statements to require reporting of contractor manpower data into a web-enabled database. To support these plans, the Army made 

the source code for its web-enabled data system available to all Components for 

modification and DOD will support a review of the system to modify it and make 

it available to their organizations. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Additionally, Dr. Stanley stated that OUSD(P&R) ‘‘is engaged to 

assist the Departments of the Navy and Air Force, to enhance their service contracting governance ability by leveraging the Army system as directed in the FY11 

appropriations bill; and to also assist the Defense Agencies and Field Activities as 

they report their plans to collect this information.’’ In July, in a letter to the chairman, Dr. Stanley stated that the Components would be sending their plans. 

The Committee has yet to see those plans or any indication from the department 

that steps are being taken to leverage the Army process. Why? 

Secretary PANETTA. With passage of Public Law 112–10, the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Personnel and Readiness) (USD (P&R)) sent a memo to all DOD organizations, dated April 27, 2011, to designate representatives to comply with the report-
86 

ing requirements of section 8108(c). These representatives comprised a working 

group including the three Military Departments, 27 Defense Agencies/Field Activities, Joint Staff, 9 Combatant Command organizations, OSD staff, and other DOD 

organizations. Led by OUSD(P&R), this group discussed (1) how to respond to the 

specific requirements of section 8108 and (2) how to improve the Departments’ inventory of contracts for services both in the near and long term. 

As a result of these meetings, on July 18th, USD (P&R) signed an interim response to Congress. Following that OUSD(P&R) continued to work with all Components of the Department to develop and coordinate on those plans. On November 

22, 2011, the USD (P&R), jointly with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics (USD (AT&L)), delivered a consolidated Departmentwide plan to the Congressional defense committees. Based on individual Component 

submissions, this plan delineates both short- and long-term actions being taken by 

the Department to begin collecting data from private sector firms and fully comply 

with requirements of sections 235 and 2330a of Title 10, United States Code. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In June, Dr. Stanley submitted the report on ‘‘Public-Private Competitions’’ in accordance with Section 325 of the FY10 NDAA, recommending lifting 

the suspension on A–76. That same provision requires the Department to certify 

compliance with 10 USC sections 235 and 2330a in order for the suspension to be 

lifted. 

Considering the lack of observed progress per the above, could the Department 

justify certification to lift the suspension on public-private competitions within 

DOD? 

Secretary PANETTA. No, the Department is not currently prepared to certify compliance with 10 USC sections 235 and 2330a, as required by section 325 of the FY10 

NDAA, in order to lift the suspension on public-private competitions within DOD. 

While the recent report to Congress noted the utility in having the public-private 

competition tool as a process by which to shape the workforce and appropriately 

align functions between the public and private sectors, there remains a lack of true 

visibility and fidelity regarding the contracted services element of the Total Force. 

The Department made progress in the past six months to meet the spirit and intent 

of 10 USC 2330a, and will improve the reliability of data reported in accordance 

with 10 USC 235. Once the recommended improvements to the inventory of contracts for services are implemented, the Department will be better able to make the 

certifications required by section 325 of the FY10 NDAA. 

Ms. BORDALLO. With respect to the component plans that were coordinated by 

OUSD P&R, how many committed to follow the Army’s plan to modify SOW/PWSs 

to require contractors to report direct labor hours and costs annually, and to use 

the Army system directly, or asks for a DOD-wide Contractor Manpower Reporting 

Application (CMRA)-like system to report this data? 

Secretary PANETTA. Of 44 DOD Components, P&R reviewed and coordinated on 

41 plans. Of these, 23 follow the Army’s plan to modify SOW/PWSs requiring contractors to report direct labor hours and costs annually. These 23 organizations intend to either use the Army system, or have requested a DOD-wide Contractor Manpower Reporting Application (CMRA)-like system to report data. The other organizations submitting plans proposed implementing contract clauses, modifying existing 

agreements, or in the case of the intelligence agencies, already have processes in 

place to capture data. Some of these organizations also have data systems in place 

to record this information, or would like to use a DOD-wide Contractor Manpower 

Reporting Application (CMRA)-like system to report data. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Mr. CONAWAY. Secretary Panetta, I want to applaud your initiative to make financial management reform and auditability a priority for the Department of Defense. 

I am encouraged that you have directed the Department to accelerate key elements 

of the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) plan, but also recognize 

there will be challenges in achieving these goals. I am interested in more information on how you determined the 2014 Statement of Budgetary Resources audit readiness date. In addition, as the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) works to 

update the FIAR plan, I request to be kept informed on the status. 

Secretary PANETTA. Shortly after I took office, I directed the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer (USD(C)/CFO) Robert Hale to review 

DOD/Component FIAR plans with appropriate DOD leaders to determine what improvements could be made to speed progress, given my keen interest in audit readiness. Two of the military Services (Navy and Marine Corps) had plans for their 

Statement of Budgetary Resources to be audit ready by 2013, Army would be ready 
87 

in 2015 and the Air Force would be ready by 2017. In consultation with USD(C) 

Hale, I established reasonable but aggressive stretch goals in order to push the organization to meet the overall 2017 goal for auditability of all financial statements. 

The resulting goal for the Statement of Budgetary Resources cuts in half the time 

for the whole Department to achieve auditability of the Statement of Budgetary Resources for general funds. With CEO involvement, this is achievable. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS 

Mr. OWENS. Secretary Panetta, as we draw down forces overseas, training for our 

UAS operators will need to take place in the United States. There is a pressing need 

to integrate UAS operations into the National Airspace System (NAS) so pilots and 

sensor operators can maintain combat effectiveness and flight proficiency. Currently, UAS operations are limited to very small segments of airspace. The process 

for securing Certificates of Authorization from the FAA to expand access is lengthy 

and cumbersome. 

For example, in my district, Fort Drum is where the 174th Fighter Wing will soon 

be launching and recovering the MQ–9 (Reaper) aircraft. After two years of working 

with the FAA, the unit is close to receiving permission to fly in restricted airspace 

and above 18,000 feet in special use airspace. 

In order to conduct more appropriate and realistic training, the MQ–9 will need 

to fly between restricted airspace, special use airspace (military operating areas— 

MOAs) and the National Airspace System (NAS) and take advantage of the entire 

airspace (from 5000 feet to 30,000 feet). This is required to avoid weather and to 

train with the full capability of the weapons system. This is the ability to train dynamically. Ultimately the Air National Guard needs to be able to fly from joint civil 

military use airports. 

Can you share with us how the Department of Defense is working to solve this 

problem and expedite the approval process? For example, what kind of research or 

pilot programs is the Department of Defense conducting to facilitate the integration 

of UAS into the NAS? 

Secretary PANETTA. The Department of Defense (DOD) is addressing the major 

issues enabling Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) integration into national airspace through a joint, unified effort led by the DOD UAS Task Force. The UAS Task 

Force serves as the Department’s advocate for shaping the regulatory policies, procedures, certification standards, and technology development activities that are critical to the integration of DOD UAS into the NAS. The Task Force developed the 

DOD Airspace Integration (AI) Plan and the Joint Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 

for UAS AI, which guides development of DOD policy and Service CONOPS development. The Task Force AI effort is broken down into short-term and long-term activity. 

As part of the short-term activity, UAS Task Force leadership, in partnership 

with the DOD Policy Board on Federal Aviation, serves and supports the multiagency UAS Executive Committee (ExCom). One of the ExCom’s key goals is to coordinate and align efforts among member agencies (Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA), DOD, Department of Homeland Security, and NASA) to ultimately achieve 

routine safe Federal public UAS operations in the National Airspace System. 

Through the ExCom, the Department recommended specific improvements to FAA 

policy and guidance that it believes will simplify the Certificate of Waiver or Authority (COA) approval process while greatly reducing the time and effort it takes 

to process and approve a COA application. These recommendations are under active 

consideration by the FAA, and the larger ExCom is awaiting formal notification of 

adoption or other disposition. 

The Department’s long-term goal is to reduce, and ultimately eliminate, the need 

for the FAA’s COAs for the vast majority of DOD UAS operations. The Department 

has a number of efforts underway to achieve that goal, including development of 

Sense and Avoid (SAA) capabilities. Over the past 3 years, the Department made 

significant investments in SAA technologies enabling broader access to the NAS for 

DOD UAS. During this time period, DOD engineers and technicians worked closely 

with designated FAA staff to clarify the requirements and standards that would enable approval and eventual certification of ground-based systems for broad deployment throughout the Department and across the United States. 

The Department’s laboratories, program offices, and industries have long been involved in technology development and flight testing of airborne SAA (ABSAA) systems to provide even broader, more flexible NAS access for military UAS. The Navy 

and Air Force are working together to leverage a common ABSAA functional baseline for the RQ–4B Global Hawk (GH) and Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 
88 

(BAMS) aircraft. The Navy is leading development of a joint solution, building upon 

Air Force Research Laboratory and Global Hawk technology efforts to develop a 

Pilot-In-The-Loop capability, which will then be leveraged to develop an autonomous 

SAA capability for GH/BAMS. This technology can provide future capability for the 

Air Force MQ–9 Reaper and the Army MQ–1C Gray Eagle. 

Some of the potential technology solutions being evaluated include radar systems 

and associated algorithms specifically designed for autonomous SAA, commercial-offthe-shelf electro-optical (EO) sensors for sensing non-cooperative aircraft, and short 

wave infra-red sensors that have greater sensitivity for detecting air traffic under 

conditions that are difficult for EO cameras. Other longer-term technology options 

to improved SAA include Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast implementation that will leverage coming improvements to the NAS under the FAA’s NextGen 

effort. 

The Department remains committed to achieving safe and efficient UAS NAS access as quickly as technology and regulatory revisions will allow. DOD is closely engaged with industry and academia to cross-leverage both technology and aviation 

processes that will accelerate this effort as much as possible. 

Mr. OWENS. Secretary Panetta, I have heard from a number of constituents regarding the economic development implications of the F–35 for Upstate New York. 

I understand that today the F–35 program supports some 127,000 direct and indirect jobs across the country, with potential for greater benefits down the road. Is 

the Department still fully committed to this platform, and do you believe as others 

have testified in the past that the F–35 presents a critical capability for which there 

is no alternative? 

Secretary PANETTA. The Department is committed to the F–35 program. The program was reviewed following a Nunn-McCurdy cost breach, and in June 2010 the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics certified that 

there are no alternatives to the program that will provide acceptable capability to 

meet the joint military requirement at less cost. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. The President’s budgets have cut a total of $1.65 billion out of the 

ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system, the only missile defense system currently in place to defend the United States. It was this system that Secretary Gates 

turned to in 2006 when information and warning revealed potential launch activity 

of long-range ballistic missiles by North Korea. Can you update us on the status 

of the ‘‘hedging strategy’’ this committee has been waiting on for almost two years? 

This strategy, as you know, is supposed to provide the answer of how we will respond to developments of the ballistic missile threats to the United States, such as 

a more rapid development of long-range ballistic missiles by Iran or North Korea? 

Secretary PANETTA. Protecting the United States from the threat of ballistic missile attack is a critical national security priority, and missile defense of the homeland remains the first priority of the Department’s missile defense efforts. 

The United States now possesses a capacity to counter the projected threats from 

North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future with the current Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. Because of the uncertainty about the future 

ICBM threat, it is important that the United States maintain this advantageous position. In order to maintain this advantageous position, the Department has committed to implementing additional steps to maintain and enhance protection provided by the GMD system. These improvements to the program of record include: 

• Procurement of additional GBIs (which will keep production lines warm 

through 2016); 

• The deployment of additional sensors; 

• Upgrades to the Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications system; 

• Placement of an additional In-Flight Interceptor Communications System 

Data Terminal on the East Coast; 

• Upgrades to the Early Warning Radars at Clear, Alaska and Cape Cod, Massachusetts; and 

• An aggressive GBI reliability improvement program in order to reduce the 

number of GBIs required per intercept, which will increase the number of 

ICBMs that can be defeated by the GMD system. 

In addition to the improvements to the GMD system, the Administration is also 

implementing a number of measures to strengthen the U.S. hedge posture, including: 
89 

• The construction and activation of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely, Alaska, 

which will accommodate a contingency deployment of eight additional GBIs, 

if needed; • Placement of six GBI silos at Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely in storage mode 

instead of decommissioning, allowing their return to service within 18–24 

months, if necessary; and • The continued development and assessment of a two-stage GBI, which will 

continue to preserve future deployment options. 

The Administration is also committed to implementing all phases of the European 

Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), including developing and fielding the SM–3 IIB 

interceptor. The EPAA will improve our homeland defenses while providing missile 

defense against the regional threat to our deployed forces, Allies, and partners in 

Europe. The EPAA augments homeland BMD defense by deploying a forward-based 

radar in Turkey, which will provide data to augment the missile defense coverage 

of the United States. Additionally, the SM–3 IIB interceptor will provide an earlyintercept capability against potential Iranian ICBMs targeting the United States. 

The United States continuously analyzes threat developments and future capabilities to identify additional measures that could be taken should new threats emerge. 

The analysis conducted for the hedge strategy is informing the budget decisions 

under consideration as part of the development of the Department’s fiscal year 2013 

budget request. The Department will ensure that Congress is briefed on the results 

of the hedge strategy at that time. 

Mr. LAMBORN. As you know, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June, 

outgoing-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that, ‘‘With the continued development of long-range missiles and potentially a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile and their continued development of nuclear weapons, North Korea is 

in the process of becoming a direct threat to the United States.’’ And two weeks 

later he said, ‘‘North Korea now constitutes a direct threat to the United States. The 

president told [China’s] President Hu that last year. They are developing a roadmobile ICBM. I never would have dreamed they would go to a road-mobile before 

testing a static ICBM. It’s a huge problem. As we’ve found out in a lot of places, 

finding mobile missiles is very tough.’’ Do you concur with Secretary Gates’ statements? If North Korea begins fielding an array of road mobile ICBMs, and if they 

proliferate this technology to Iran and other countries as in the past, what does 

such activity do to current judgments about the adequacy of the current inventory 

of Ground Based Interceptors? 

Secretary PANETTA. One of the most significant threats to the U.S. homeland is 

the continued progress of regional actors in developing weapons of mass destruction 

and the means to deliver them by ballistic missiles. North Korea’s demonstrated nuclear ambitions and continued development of long-range missiles remain a primary 

focus of the development and deployment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System 

(BMDS). 

At present, the capabilities developed and deployed as part of the integrated 

BMDS protect us from the potential emergence of an ICBM threat from Iran or 

North Korea. To maintain this advantageous position, the Administration is taking 

steps to improve the protection of the homeland from the potential ICBM threat 

posed by Iran and North Korea. These steps include the continued procurement of 

ground-based interceptors (GBIs); the deployment of additional sensors; and upgrades to the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications system. 

Improvements to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, in particular, 

will better protect us against future ICBM threats, whether from Iran, North Korea, 

or other regional actors. The Department’s BMD hedging strategy, to be provided 

to Congress in the coming months, is addressing how to best posture ourselves to 

address potentially larger threats. 

Mr. LAMBORN. The National Missile Defense Policy Act of 1999 requires the U.S. 

to develop a missile defense system capable of dealing with threats to the homeland 

from rogue regimes as well as unauthorized or accidental launches from other 

states, presumably Russia and China. Would you be surprised to learn that neither 

NORTHCOM nor MDA have developed training to deal with the unauthorized or 

accidental launch scenario? Would you please take steps to learn why and to resolve 

this situation and would you report back to the Committee? 

Secretary PANETTA. The Department of Defense developed and deployed an operational missile defense capability to defend the homeland against limited ballistic 

missile attack. In the event of an accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile attack 

by any state, the U.S. would employ the GMD system in defense of the U.S. homeland. 

U.S. Northern Command is responsible for determining how the system is employed, as well as for oversight of the training for assigned Ground-based Midcourse 
90 

Defense (GMD) mission crews. Personnel assigned to GMD crews routinely train on 

different types of launch scenarios, with the primary focus of training on actions required to defend against a missile threat to the homeland. Training ensures proficiency in the execution of the system for launches against the United States regardless of their origin. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Do you believe, as you execute budget drills to implement the $489 

billion in cuts that have already been sustained to the Defense Department budgets, 

that the country can continue to afford a robust national missile defense as well as 

a regional missile defense architecture like the EPAA, which will not contribute 

anything to the defense of the United States until, perhaps 2020—though this is 

now in doubt thanks to the cuts sustained to the SM–3 IIB development by the Senate Appropriations Committee? Is it your understanding that the U.S. is deploying 

the EPAA to defend Europe as its ‘‘national contribution’’ to NATO? If so, how much 

will that cost the United States to defend Europe in this way? 

Secretary PANETTA. The Administration is committed to sustaining and enhancing 

the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program for the protection of the homeland, 

while also implementing phased adaptive approaches to regional missile defense 

starting with NATO with Phase I of the European Phased Adaptive Approach 

(EPAA). The administration is committed to all four phases of the EPAA including 

the SM–3 IIB in Phase 4. 

Beginning in 2011, as part of Phase I, the EPAA augments defense of the U.S. 

homeland, and is the United States national contribution to NATO. Since President 

Obama’s September 2009 announcement of the EPAA, a key U.S. goal has been to 

implement the EPAA in a NATO context. At the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, Allies agreed to pursue a territorial missile defense capability to protect 

NATO European populations and territories. 

The Department has a budget and acquisition schedule for regional missile defense, including elements associated with the EPAA. The costs specific to EPAA are 

relatively modest, and associated with the planned forward based AN/TPY–2 radar 

and fixed Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland. There are regional missile defense costs that cannot be assigned exclusively to the EPAA (or to any other specific 

region) because the research, development, and operation of these systems is conducted in the context of ballistic missile defense writ large. For example, the development and procurement costs for advanced versions of the SM–3 interceptor and 

Aegis BMD software upgrades are part of the EPAA, but will also be available for 

deployment in other regions. The costs of the elements of the BMDS are provided 

annually to Congress in the BMDS Assessment Report (BAR). 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Secretary, please tell me and the House Armed Services 

Committee how much the Department of Defense is planning to spend on the Overseas Contingency Operations Account between 2012 and 2025? Please provide a 

year-by-year breakdown. Based on best estimates, how much will this spending contribute to anticipated budget deficits each year? Do you see the rising deficit as a 

problem for our national security? 

Secretary PANETTA. The Department of Defense (DOD) requested approximately 

$118 billion in its FY 2012 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) President’s 

Budget request for war requirements, a drop of 26 percent from the FY 2011 OCO 

enacted level. The DOD OCO budget is a bottom-up budget preparation each year, 

and it is configured to support current military strategy and the Commander’s assessment of needs on the ground. Consequently, the Department does not project 

OCO requirements beyond the budget year. The Office of Management and Budget 

included a ‘‘placeholder’’ of $50 billion per year for FY 2013 through FY 2021 in the 

President’s FY 2012 Budget request. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Secretary, I’d like to get your thoughts on the decline of the 

U.S. manufacturing base and the implications you see for our nation’s security interests. We must make it in America. Unfortunately, all too often, we do not. For example, Department of Defense officials have testified that the propellant for Hellfire 

missiles is no longer going to be produced in the U.S. and that we will have to procure it from foreign sources—reportedly China. We are now dependent on China for 

supplies of rare earth minerals, which they continue to ration. Those elements are 

critical to a vast array of products, including the guidance system in our Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMS). Are you concerned with the decline of our manufacturing base? What do you view as critical to our security and therefore, should be 

produced in the U.S.? 
91 

Secretary PANETTA. The Department has a deep interest in the health of the manufacturing base and the larger industrial base supporting defense. Several factors 

play into actions that are considered to ensure DOD maintains a healthy, robust 

base. First, certain defense industrial activities rely on specific labor skills—highskill jobs that depend on experience learning a craft for which future workers cannot readily be hired to replace workers laid off today. Second, the Department has 

greater responsibility for maintaining defense-unique capabilities, whereas the Department does not need to be as concerned to ensure the long-term health of capabilities that draw readily on the commercial marketplace. Third, the Department is 

most concerned with industrial capabilities that are the most likely needed in the 

future; the least likely to be superseded by innovation or changes in the strategic 

environment; and the most expensive to reconstitute if a capability had to be rebuilt 

later to replace one lost today for lack of demand. The U.S. defense industrial base 

is critical to equipping our military with superior capabilities; and a strong, technologically vibrant, and financially successful defense industry is therefore in the national interest. 

The Department recognizes that the overall industrial base is increasingly global 

and DOD must deal with the implications and mitigate risks when warranted. Buying from a more global environment offers many benefits including increasing competition and reducing costs; allowing for the introduction of new technologies and 

concepts; and supporting coalition warfighting efforts through increased interoperability with allies and partners. On the other hand, while there are many benefits, 

I am well aware that there are also potential risks. 

The Department is committed to ensuring sources of supplies, whether U.S. or foreign, are reliable. The Department complies with the Buy American Act, the Berry 

Amendment, and other domestic content laws. In general, the Department does not 

support imposing additional domestic restrictions on its sources of supply. However, 

the Department has the authority to formally establish restrictions on the use of 

foreign products, when necessary, to ensure the survival of domestic suppliers required to sustain military readiness. These foreign product restrictions are imposed 

by administrative action, as opposed to statute, and they have been imposed, where 

necessary, to ensure national security. 

In terms of the two examples raised, the Department is currently procuring one 

ingredient—butanetriol (BT)—for the Hellfire missile propellant from China. The 

sole domestic supplier of BT decided to exit the business due to a small market and 

environmental implications. After an exhaustive global search for a supplier, the 

only company able to supply the chemical was in China. DOD is actively working 

with industry to develop a domestic source since it became aware of the BT source 

issue in 2007 and continued development efforts show promise. Regarding rare 

earth materials, most of the domestic supply chains are intact in the sense that U.S. 

producers are typically available to make rare earth products, components, and systems. The major exception is sintered neodymium-iron-boron magnets, for which 

there is no current U.S. production. In the case of the Joint Direct Attack Munitions 

(JDAM) Program, while some potential risks to the supply of neodymium-iron-boron 

magnets for the system do exist, the Department believes that existing JDAM inventories mitigate risk significantly for that particular system at this time, and performance would not be diminished by the substitution of different magnets. Beyond 

the JDAM inventory, the Department devoted intensive attention to rare earth elements over the past several years and continues to monitor the issue carefully to 

ensure the critical elements upon which our systems depend continue to be available 

to system integrators. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Do you believe maintaining anywhere from 100,000 to 68,000 

troops in Afghanistan over the next three years is the most efficient and/or effective 

way to address the threat of international terrorism? If so, why? Are there other 

strategies that might be more efficient or effective? General Dempsey, you seemed 

to refer to a network approach; can you please expand on your idea? 

Secretary PANETTA. I believe our strategy in Afghanistan is critical to the disruption, dismantlement, and ultimate defeat of al-Qa’ida and to ensuring that Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven from which al-Qa’ida and its network of 

extremist affiliates can threaten the United States or our allies. It was in Talibancontrolled Afghanistan that al-Qa’ida found the safe haven it needed to conduct the 

attacks on our country ten years ago, and we have a compelling national security 

interest in preventing such a situation from arising again. 

As the President announced in June 2011, we are now drawing down our 33,000 

surge forces, so that by the end of summer 2012 we will have a total of 68,000 forces 

in Afghanistan. We are working closely with the Afghans and our NATO Allies and 

other partners to train and develop Afghan forces capable of taking the lead role 
92 

for security in Afghanistan so that Afghanistan can never again be used as a safe 

haven to attack others. We will complete this transition process by the end of 2014. 

The end of this transition does not mean the end of our efforts to address the 

threats that emanate from the region, which remains a nexus for insurgents and 

terrorist facilitation networks. A network approach links the efforts of US, NATO, 

and other partners and maximizes the effectiveness of Special Operations Forces, 

intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance systems, cyber, and other capabilities 

to collectively attack the insurgent network. Investing in the sustainability of the 

ANSF and negotiating a strategic partnership with Afghanistan beyond 2014 will 

assure Afghanistan—and the region—that it will not again be abandoned. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Secretary, as you know several organizations have proposed 

recommendations for Department of Defense savings. My staff developed a matrix 

to compare the various programs which we provided to your office. Across the political spectrum there are numerous similarities. Therefore, as you consider your proposed cuts please tell me and the House Armed Services Committee why those cuts 

that both the left and right agree on, should or should not be made? 

Secretary PANETTA. Many of the proposals listed in your matrix are under consideration for how the Department will achieve cutting over 450 billion dollars out of 

the budget over the next 10 years. Everything is on the table. DOD is looking at 

reducing force structure; it is looking at slowing the growth of compensation and 

benefits; and it is pushing further for efficiencies and tightening areas like procurement. These are all going to be tough decisions, and the Department must pursue 

savings in areas that were previously considered sacrosanct. 

Every decision will entail some form of risk but the Department must make the 

right cuts in the right places to meet this nation’s security strategy and manage 

risk. DOD is working hard to deliver in the months ahead a coherent, strategy-driven program and budget that preserves the best military in the world. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Do you believe maintaining anywhere from 100,000 to 68,000 

troops in Afghanistan over the next three years is the most efficient and/or effective 

way to address the threat of international terrorism? If so, why? Are there other 

strategies that might be more efficient or effective? General Dempsey, you seemed 

to refer to a network approach; can you please expand on your idea? 

General DEMPSEY. Following the recovery of surge forces, approximately 68,000 

U.S. troops and thousands of international forces will remain in Afghanistan. These 

forces will continue to work side-by-side with over 300,000 Afghan National Security 

Forces (ANSF) as they begin their transition to security lead. Moreover, the ANSF 

continues to demonstrate growth in quantity, quality, and operational effectiveness 

increasing their capacity and capability to counter the influence of insurgent safehavens in Pakistan and limiting the ability of those insurgents from re-occupying 

ungoverned space in Afghanistan. 

However, the insurgency is a complex network that is most effectively countered 

through a network approach. Our approach must cast a comprehensive net that includes threads from our interagency partners, conventional and special operations 

forces, ISR, and cyber capabilities to find and disrupt the multiple layers of an insurgency. Addressing only one facet of the insurgency allows it to continue to recover and to adjust. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RIGELL 

Mr. RIGELL. In the hearing, you testified that we have cyber-attacks coming at 

us left and right. 

1. To what degree are those attacks planned and executed or in close collaboration 

with foreign governments compared to an individual actor or actors? 

2. Would you please identify the top three countries where those attacks originate? 

3. Also, if the attack originated from a foreign government, would the Department 

of Defense consider that to be an act of war? 

Secretary PANETTA. 1 and 2. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

3. The phrase ‘‘act of war’’ is frequently used as shorthand to refer to an act that 

may permit a state to use force in self-defense, but more appropriately it refers to 

an act that may lead to a state of ongoing hostilities or armed conflict. Contemporary international law addresses the concept of ‘‘act of war’’ in terms of a ‘‘threat 

or use of force,’’ as that phrase is used in the United Nations (UN) Charter. International legal norms, such as those found in the UN Charter and the law of armed 

conflict, that apply to the physical domains (i.e., sea, air, land, and space) also apply 

to the cyberspace domain. As in the physical world, a determination of what is a 
93 

‘‘threat or use of force’’ in cyberspace must be made in the context in which the activity occurs, and it involves an analysis by the affected states of the effect and purpose of the actions in question. 

Mr. RIGELL. If the adverse consequences of operating under a series of continuing 

resolutions, as compared to operating under a properly legislated budget and appropriations, could be quantified and expressed as a percentage (with the percentage 

representing inefficiencies), what would you estimate the percentage and cost to be? 

Secretary PANETTA. There are many different aspects of the continuing resolution 

(CR) process that create inefficiencies in the Department of Defense. It would be impossible to adequately quantify the impacts of operations under repetitive continuing resolutions. 

Each account in the budget is affected by a CR in different ways because of the 

various legal restrictions on use of funds. For example, Military Construction accounts (totaling over $13.4 billion in the FY 12 request) require both Authorization 

and Appropriation of each individual construction project. Since each year’s budget 

contains an entirely different set of construction projects, a CR that is an extension 

of the previous year’s budget means that all new military construction stops—these 

accounts could be said to be more than 90% inefficient during a CR. As another example, in Procurement accounts (totaling over $113.0 billion in the FY 12 request), 

the Department is unable to start production of a new item or to increase the rate 

of production of an existing item, despite the fact that DOD planned to do so for 

years, have carefully budgeted the funds, and negotiated the contracts for these purchases. For the FY 2012 budget request more than 30 major programs were precluded from starting or increasing the rate of production due to operation under the 

CR. For these aspects of the Department’s long range modernization plan, this is 

virtually complete inefficiency. 

The impact on other accounts within the budget is not as easy to quantify. There 

are untold costs associated with contract delays, work stoppages/restarts, and discounts forgone. These effects often carry into future years, as they impact the longterm costs of projects. Additionally, operations under continuing resolution are complex—beginning with the calculations, and further complicated by the interpretation 

of what the law allows—determining what we can and cannot execute is often very 

difficult. Lack of a National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) also affects the Department’s execution during a CR because many of these authorities are not included in the CR legislation, and the Department is required to cease operations 

until a new NDAA is enacted. I cannot quantify the long-term costs of the CR, either in terms of dollars or inefficiencies, but I can assure you they are great. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON 

Mr. JOHNSON. The Army has spent $2.7 billion trying to build an intelligence platform, Distributed Common Ground Systems–Army (DCGS–A). It is years behind 

schedule, significantly over budget, and under-performing. 

A Politico article (‘‘Army’s faulty computer system hurts operations,’’ 6/29/11) detailed some of its failures. It quoted one former intelligence official: ‘‘Almost any 

commercial solution out there would be better.’’ Another added: ‘‘It doesn’t work. It’s 

not providing the capabilities that they need.’’ 

An article in Defense News (‘‘U.S. Army Intel Software Crashes During Exercise, 

10/22/11) describes another failure during recent military exercises: 

‘‘When American intelligence analysts tried to use the software to track simulated 

North Korean troop movements, the screens on their DCGS–A workstations sometimes went black, forcing them to reboot the software. . . . ’ What happened is the 

volume of information essentially crashed the software,’ the senior intelligence official said. ‘We learned to manually do [data retrieval] in chunks of information so 

DCGS would not crash.’ ’’ 

I am concerned that DCGS–A is an incompetently developed program that is 

wasting money and might fail our forces during real conflict, risking American lives. 

DCGS–A has been in development for more than a decade, costing taxpayers more 

than $2.7 billion, with an additional $2 billion slated to be spent in coming years. 

Version 4 of DCGS–A was supposed to be delivered in 2007/2008 and we have 

spent upwards of $355 million on it. Since it is now October 2011 and we still 

haven’t seen Version 4 in the field, can you give this Committee an update on this 

project? 

And can you explain to taxpayers whether continued DCGS–A development is a 

good use of scarce DOD resources when other services use other tools to accomplish 

the same objectives at less expense and with greater reliability and effectiveness? 
94 

Secretary PANETTA. The DCGS–A program is meeting the requirements outlined 

in the Joint Urgent Operational Needs statement and continues to improve the intelligence architecture in Afghanistan to increase capabilities and support to disadvantaged users. The accelerated DCGS–A program of record meets all of the requirements of the Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON) statement, moreover initial feedback from theater indicates that users are pleased with the DCGS–A program. 

As they exist today, stand-alone commercial capabilities do not provide access to 

all DCGS–A data sources and do not interoperate with Army mission command systems. Additionally, other proprietary capabilities are not interoperable with our Coalition and mission partners’ systems and do not deliver the broad range of multiintelligence, full spectrum capabilities that DCGS–A provides. To date, no other 

Service or stand-alone commercial intelligence capability is able to address the operational needs and intelligence requirements of our commanders and Warfighters as 

well as DCGS–A. 

The DCGS–A system is an open architecture, government-owned system that allows the Army to integrate the newest capabilities from industry while reducing 

costs by maintaining a common architecture controlled by the Government. In direct 

coordination with several agencies in the Intelligence Community, DCGS–A provides a sustainable framework for continued modernization as new capabilities and 

technologies become available. The Tactical Cloud Integration Lab at Aberdeen 

Proving Ground, Maryland also provides industry and DOD partners the opportunity to collaborate on cutting edge technologies and advanced analytics, and to 

test the viability of integrating their capabilities within the DCGS–A enterprise. 

Specific to the JUON in question, the Army established one Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) and one Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Cloud 

node in Afghanistan, with Initial Operational Capability (IOC) achieved in April and 

May 2011, respectively. To interoperate with the clouds and to provide enhanced intelligence capabilities, the DCGS–A client software required upgrading to Version 

3.1.6. Additionally, the Army added 253 Portable Multi-Function Workstations (P– 

MFWS) and 12 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Fusion Servers 

(IFS) to theater provided equipment. With Army units’ organic DCGS–A systems, 

there are 981 P–MFWS and 67 IFS in support of JUON CC 0419, throughout the 

theater. 

Data from the worldwide DCGS–A fusion brain architecture is made available to 

the cloud data stores. Within the DCGS–A architecture, the IFS provides a subset 

of data to Brigade Combat Teams, Battalions, and some remote locations in theater. 

This subset of data provides the ability to conduct limited analysis while disconnected. When reconnected, data feeds begin to update. Additionally, through the 

units’ organic communications, disadvantaged users may leverage some cloud capabilities due to the low bandwidth queries made possible by the ‘‘widget’’ web applications and Ozone framework on the P–MFWS. 

In August 2011, PM DCGS–A began the integration of DCGS–A cloud software 

on a series of ‘‘tactical edge node’’ servers. Tactical edge nodes extend the cloud architecture and provide more robust advanced analytics capabilities and even greater 

storage capacity compared to the IFS. The tactical edge nodes will interface with 

the larger SIPR and AMN cloud nodes. This will provide theater users full cloud 

capabilities without requiring constant direct communications. The ISAF Joint Command in theater has opted to wait until the release of DCGS–A Standard Cloud 

baseline (V) 1.5.3 in January 2012 for the deployment of the initial tactical edge 

nodes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. In a July 2, 2010 Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement 

(JUONS), General Michael Flynn, then the top U.S. intelligence officer in Afghanistan, wrote that ‘‘intelligence analysts in theater do not have the tools required to 

fully analyze the tremendous amounts information currently available in theater,’’ 

that ‘‘this shortfall translates into operational opportunities missed and lives lost,’’ 

and requested a specific ‘‘Advanced Analytical Capability in Afghanistan.’’ 

DCGS–A was available to U.S. forces in Afghanistan at the time General Flynn 

issued this Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement, demonstrating that DCGS– 

A was not meeting the needs of U.S. forces. 

General Flynn specified that the capability needed included ‘‘the ability to support 

low-bandwidth or frequently disconnected users with a data sub-set tailored to their 

area of operations and the applications use it, as well as the capability to report 

and updated information when re-connected to the network.’’ The JUONS specified 

that ‘‘This data set should update while the user is connected to the network and 

should also feed user reports/work back to the central database for wider use.’’ 

Does DCGS–A currently provide ‘‘the ability to support low-bandwidth or frequently disconnected users with a data sub-set tailored to their area of operations 
95 

and the applications use it, as well as the capability to report and updated information when re-connected to the network,’’ and can such data set ‘‘update while the 

user is connected to the network and should also feed user reports/work back to the 

central database for wider use’’? 

Have DOD efforts to meet the requirements outlined by General Flynn in the 7/ 

2/10 JUONS been in compliance with 10 USC 2377 (proven commercial alternatives, 

partial or whole). And have other DOD services or government agencies adopted 

more successful approaches to solve these requirements at a lower cost? 

Secretary PANETTA. The DCGS–A program is meeting the requirements outlined 

in the Joint Urgent Operational Needs statement and continues to improve the intelligence architecture in Afghanistan to increase capabilities and support to disadvantaged users. The accelerated DCGS–A program of record meets all of the requirements of the Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON) statement. Moreover, 

initial feedback from theater indicates that users are pleased with the DCGS–A program. 

As they exist today, stand-alone commercial capabilities do not provide access to 

all DCGS–A data sources and do not interoperate with Army mission command systems. Additionally, other proprietary capabilities are not interoperable with our Coalition and mission partners’ systems and do not deliver the broad range of multiintelligence, full spectrum capabilities that DCGS–A provides. To date, no other 

Service or stand-alone commercial intelligence capability is able to address the operational needs and intelligence requirements of our commanders and Warfighters as 

well as DCGS–A. 

The DCGS–A system is an open architecture, government-owned system that allows the Army to integrate the newest capabilities from industry while reducing 

costs by maintaining a common architecture controlled by the Government. In direct 

coordination with several agencies in the Intelligence Community, DCGS–A provides a sustainable framework for continued modernization as new capabilities and 

technologies become available. The Tactical Cloud Integration Lab at Aberdeen 

Proving Ground, Maryland also provides industry and DOD partners the opportunity to collaborate on cutting edge technologies and advanced analytics, and to 

test the viability of integrating their capabilities within the DCGS–A enterprise. 

Specific to the JUON in question, the Army established one Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) and one Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Cloud 

node in Afghanistan, with Initial Operational Capability (IOC) achieved in April and 

May 2011, respectively. To interoperate with the clouds and to provide enhanced intelligence capabilities, the DCGS–A client software required upgrading to Version 

3.1.6. Additionally, the Army added 253 Portable Multi-Function Workstations (P– 

MFWS) and 12 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Fusion Servers 

(IFS) to theater provided equipment. With Army units’ organic DCGS–A systems, 

there are 981 P–MFWS and 67 IFS in support of JUON CC 0419, throughout the 

theater. 

Data from the worldwide DCGS–A fusion brain architecture is made available to 

the cloud data stores. Within the DCGS–A architecture, the IFS provides a subset 

of data to Brigade Combat Teams, Battalions, and some remote locations in theater. 

This subset of data provides the ability to conduct limited analysis while disconnected. When reconnected, data feeds begin to update. Additionally, through the 

units’ organic communications, disadvantaged users may leverage some cloud capabilities due to the low bandwidth queries made possible by the ‘‘widget’’ web applications and Ozone framework on the P–MFWS. 

In August 2011, PM DCGS–A began the integration of DCGS–A cloud software 

on a series of ‘‘tactical edge node’’ servers. Tactical edge nodes extend the cloud architecture and provide more robust advanced analytics capabilities and even greater 

storage capacity compared to the IFS. The tactical edge nodes will interface with 

the larger SIPR and AMN cloud nodes. This will provide theater users full cloud 

capabilities without requiring constant direct communications. The ISAF Joint Command in theater has opted to wait until the release of DCGS–A Standard Cloud 

baseline (V) 1.5.3 in January 2012 for the deployment of the initial tactical edge 

nodes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Colonel Peter A. Newell wrote in a July 28, 2010 letter to Congressman Norm Dicks of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense that the 

DCGS–A Cloud would be deployed to Afghanistan in November 2010. 

According to Army records, by the end of Fiscal Year 2011, the Army will have 

spent nearly $120 million to develop the DCGS–A Cloud. 

Given that Colonel Newell estimated that the DCGS–A Cloud would have been 

deployed in the field eleven months ago, and we’ve already spent $120 million on 

its development, I would expect that this system is currently widely used by our 

forces in Afghanistan. 
96 

Can you please provide me with the exact number of U.S. Army BCT personnel 

who are currently using the DCGS–A cloud while deployed in Afghanistan? 

Secretary PANETTA. The Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) 

Cloud equipment shipped to theater in November 2010. The SIPRNet Cloud 

achieved Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in April 2011. The Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Cloud reached IOC in May 2011. Thus, the clouds have been available 

for use for five-to-six months. In the DCGS–A architecture in Afghanistan, there are 

6,128 unique accounts (users) operational in Afghanistan. As of November 2011, 

there are over 115 regularly active users of the cloud widgets supported by the cloud 

capabilities in Afghanistan. These users are supporting the intelligence requirements for the commanders of seven (7) Brigade Combat Teams and 14 Brigade sized 

combat enablers. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Finally, Mr. Secretary, I want to address the possibility of expanding the DCGS program to serve the Department of Justice or the Department of 

Homeland Security, as some have discussed. 

As a member of the House Judiciary Committee, in light of this program’s decadelong track record of failure and disappointment, its high cost and poor performance, 

and its flawed underlying technological architecture, I’d like the record to reflect 

that I would have grave reservations were the Department of Justice to acquire and 

use the DCGS system. 

Secretary PANETTA. Each Service maintains a Distributed Common Ground System program of record. Joint Forces Command successfully evaluated and exercised 

multiple Service DCGS programs and their interoperability with Coalition Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems at the Empire Challenge 

event in July 2011. Empire Challenge 2011 proved that the DCGS Integration Backbone (DIB) provides timely information with access to all Enterprise intelligence dissemination nodes. The DIB filters data to achieve relevant results and supports 

real-time Cross-Domain data queries and retrieval across Coalition and other security domains. The joint standards that are set and maintained by DIB nodes allow 

DIB users access to terabytes of data from the Services as well as Coalition and 

Agency partners. The whole DCGS enterprise is greater than the sum of its parts. 

Specific to the performance of DCGS–Army, in August 2011, the Army Test and 

Evaluation Command (ATEC) conducted a forward operational assessment of 

DCGS–A in Afghanistan. ATEC concluded that DCGS–A supported Warfighter 

needs by providing access to theater and national intelligence collection, analysis, 

and early warning and targeting capabilities. DCGS–A provides access to hundreds 

of tactical, strategic and national data assets on Coalition, Secret and Top Secret 

networks. One key success of the DCGS–A system (like the larger DIB network) is 

that the data is available via a DCGS–A web portal, to anyone allowed access to 

the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) or Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). If interested, the Department of Justice 

and Department of Homeland Security could register for accounts and gain access 

to the same information provided to our Warfighters. The DCGS–A brain web portal 

provides limited analytical tools compared to the full suite of DCGS–A thick client 

applications; however, the DCGS–A Cloud widgets on the SIPRnet are intuitive and 

easy to use. Audit information of DCGS–A usage shows that DCGS–A provides DIA, 

CIA, NGA, COIC, JSOC, USASOC and other Services with large volumes of data 

each month. While the ingestion of certain types of data regarding the Justice Department or dealing with US persons would require special restrictions, the simple 

addition of the DOJ and DHS staff members to our user base would be easily established. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO 

Mr. PALAZZO. Recent news reported ‘‘the Pentagon which previous warned that reliable military spending figures could not be produced until 2017, has discovered 

that financial ledgers are in worse shape than expected and it may need to spend 

a billion dollars more to make DOD’s financial accounting credible, according to defense officials and congressional sources.’’ 

Mr. Panetta, this seems opposite of your written statement where you believe that 

the Department can be audit-ready by 2014. 

For months now my colleagues on the Panel on Defense Financial Management 

and Auditablity Reform have been asking what we can do to streamline this process 

and this is the first time I have heard anything about additional funds being needed 

to achieve this goal. Could you respond to these reports? 

Secretary PANETTA. The article you reference mischaracterized the extent of resources expected to be required for Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness 
97 

(FIAR) efforts. As the Department reported in the November 2011 FIAR Plan Status 

Report, it is devoting significant resources, approximately $300 million per year, to 

achieving auditable financial statements. DOD is not spending $1B more than reported in our recent reports to Congress. I directed DOD Components to revise their 

FIAR plans to achieve auditability in the Statement of Budgetary Resources for general funds by 2014. As part of these efforts, Components are assessing whether additional resources are required to achieve the accelerated goal. Reasonable requests 

for additional funds will be considered and future reports to Congress will reflect 

any updated funding approved. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY 

Mrs. ROBY. One focus has been about making the defense programs more efficient, 

cost-effective, and with high performance. How do we assess research and development programs that often have with it a high risk in developing cutting-edge research but at the same time has significant and large payoffs? 

Secretary PANETTA. The Department’s research and development program is a 

balanced investment between higher risk, high payoff technology and lower risk, 

and evolutionary technology. Throughout the past several decades, both the Department and the country benefited from high-risk defense research; among the advances, there was the Internet, stealth technologies, the Global Positioning System, 

and other advanced capabilities. As DOD moves forward to improve efficiency, it is 

important to place higher risk development under scrutiny. The Department must 

continue to develop new, high payoff technologies—but it also must be ready to terminate efforts that are not cost-effective. One successful model was the way the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency assesses high risk projects with interim 

milestones or development gates. If the research is not progressing, the program is 

stopped. Using this model, DOD is able to continue high-payoff projects with enhanced efficiencies. 

Mrs. ROBY. One focus has been making the defense program more efficient, costeffective, and with high performance. What impacts, both short-term and long-term, 

would a reduction in current RDTE accounts, particularly basic research, have on 

military capability? 

Secretary PANETTA. In this fiscal environment, every program, contract and facility will be scrutinized for savings that does not reduce readiness or the ability to 

perform essential missions. These cuts must be carefully targeted to avoid a hollow 

force, to ensure a robust industrial base, and to protect the new military capabilities 

required to sustain military strength. Research, development, test and evaluation 

(RDT&E) accounts are a large part of the equation. While the Department must be 

cost conscious, it must also take every possible step to protect emerging military capabilities. 

DOD cannot make a linear extrapolation of the impacts of RDT&E cuts to the future force; but I can say that without RDT&E investment, future military capabilities will be greatly reduced. 

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