United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted May 3, 2018 

Decided May 4, 2018 

Before 

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

No. 17-3558 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

CHARLES A. WILLIAMS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Illinois. 

No. 16-CR-30127-MJR-2 

Michael J. Reagan, 

Chief Judge. 

O R D E R 

Charles Williams was indicted on one count of conspiring to deal with 

counterfeit securities, 18 U.S.C. § 371, after he cashed fraudulent checks created by a 

coconspirator and recruited others to join the operation. He pleaded guilty to the charge 

under a plea agreement. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B). The district judge imposed a 

within-Guidelines sentence of 54 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised 

release. 

Although his plea agreement includes a broad appeal waiver, Williams filed a 

notice of appeal. His appointed attorney has moved to withdraw his representation 

under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Williams has not responded to 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 17-3558 Page 2 

counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the 

nature of the case and addresses the issues that this kind of appeal might involve. 

Because counsel’s brief appears thorough, we limit our review to the potential issues 

that are discussed in it. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); 

United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996). 

Counsel first reports that Williams does not want to withdraw from his plea 

agreement; thus counsel need not and rightly does not explore whether Williams could 

challenge the validity of his guilty plea. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 

(7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). 

Counsel next considers whether Williams could challenge his sentence but 

correctly concludes that his appeal waiver would foreclose this challenge. In his plea 

agreement Williams waived “the right to contest any aspect of the conviction and 

sentence, including the manner in which the sentence was determined and imposed ... 

except [] if the sentence imposed is in excess of the Sentencing Guidelines as determined 

by the Court (or any applicable statutory minimum, whichever is greater).” Because 

Williams does not seek to overturn his plea agreement, the appeal-waiver portion of 

that agreement stands. See United States v. Zitt, 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013). We 

enforce these valid waivers of appellate rights against sentencing challenges unless the 

district judge based the sentence on constitutionally impermissible criteria such as race. 

United States v. Smith, 759 F.3d 702, 706 (7th Cir. 2014). That limited exception does not 

apply here. Although the district judge condemned Williams’s criminal history and 

emphasized the seriousness of his offense, the judge’s comments were not 

constitutionally impermissible. Rather, they helped explain the judge’s reasoning in 

fashioning an appropriate within-Guidelines sentence. 

 

Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.