NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NOEL JACKSON, 

Petitioner-Appellee, 

 v. 

RONALD BROOMFIELD, Warden of 

California State Prison at San Quentin, 

Respondent-Appellant.

No. 22-55937 

D.C. No. 2:97-cv-03531-MWF 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 7, 2024

Pasadena, California

Before: H.A. THOMAS and DESAI, Circuit Judges, and MÁRQUEZ,** District 

Judge.

Appellant Ron Broomfield, Warden of San Quentin Rehabilitation Center,

appeals the district court’s grant of habeas relief to Appellee, Noel Jackson, who is 

serving a sentence of life in prison without parole. Broomfield contends that the 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Rosemary Márquez, United States District Judge for 

the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

FILED

APR 1 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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district court erred in finding that the prosecutor at Jackson’s trial impermissibly 

struck all Black potential jurors in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 

(1986).1 Specifically, Broomfield argues that the district court erred when, after 

conducting a comparative juror analysis, it held that the state trial court 

unreasonably accepted the prosecutor’s race-neutral justifications for striking these 

jurors.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We review de novo

a district court’s decision to grant or deny a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. See

Avena v. Chappell, 932 F.3d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir. 2019). Pursuant to the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), we defer to 

the last reasoned state-court decision on the merits of any claim unless the state 

court’s ruling was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly 

established Federal Law,” or “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented at the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1)–(2); see also Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 924–25 (9th Cir. 

2008).2In evaluating a Batson claim, we must look to the “totality of the relevant 

facts,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, being mindful that “the Constitution forbids striking 

1 Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we do not discuss them 

in detail. 

2 Here, the last reasoned state-court decision was the decision of the California 

Supreme Court. People v. Jackson, 920 P.2d 1254, 1268–70 (1996).
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even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.” United States v. 

Vasquez- Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1994). Applying these standards, we 

affirm.

Broomfield argues that, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, none of 

the race-neutral justifications provided by the prosecutor for striking the three 

Black potential jurors were pretextual. We disagree. While some of the reasons 

provided by the prosecutor for striking the three potential jurors may have been 

legitimate, others were not. The prosecutor struck one Black potential juror 

allegedly because that potential juror was “too fair minded.” But this justification 

is contradicted by the record, given the number of seated jurors who described 

themselves similarly. For example, one non-Black seated juror stated they “would 

be very fair.” Another non-Black seated juror stated they would be “fair and 

impartial.” And a third non-Black seated juror stated that they have “never been 

one to jump to conclusions or make initial judgment” and that they give “people 

the benefit of the doubt.”

The prosecutor justified his strike of another Black potential juror by 

pointing to that juror’s statement that “[i]f a psychiatrist or psychologist ha[s] 

interviewed the person, they would know quite a bit about that person.” According 

to the prosecutor, that statement suggested that the Black potential juror “may give 

too great a weight to psychiatric testimony.” But again, when compared to the 
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responses provided by seated jurors, the prosecutor’s proffered justification is not 

supported. For example, two seated jurors indicated that psychiatric/psychological 

evaluations may “always” be considered to understand human behavior, whereas 

the Black potential juror indicated that such evaluations may only “sometimes” be 

considered. Another non-Black seated juror, a longtime registered nurse, indicated 

they had a favorable experience with psychiatric professionals and expressed no 

reservations about considering expert psychiatric or psychological evaluations.

The prosecutor’s strike of another Black potential juror on the basis that the 

potential juror “enjoy[ed] soap operas” bore no explained relation to that 

individual’s ability to serve as a juror. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239 

(2005) (“[T]he prosecutor must give a clear and reasonably specific explanation of 

his legitimate reasons for exercising the challeng[e].” (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 

98 n.20) (some alterations in original)). And the prosecutor often failed to question 

and follow up with Black potential jurors regarding his purported subjects of 

concern, which casts further doubt on the legitimacy of his justifications. 

Other evidence bolsters our conclusion that at least some of the prosecutor’s 

race-neutral justifications were motivated by a discriminatory purpose. One 

hundred percent of Black potential jurors were struck from the venire as opposed 

to approximately a third of non-black jurors. Ervin v. Davis, 12 F.4th 1102, 1107 

(9th Cir. 2021) (finding that statistical anomalies were “too disparate to be 
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explained away or categorized as mere happenstance” (quoting Flowers v. 

Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2248 (2019))); And the prosecutor eliminated all 

Black potential jurors using the first seven of his eighteen peremptory strikes. The 

sequence of the prosecutor’s strikes here is suspect, and “give[s] rise to an 

inference of discrimination.” Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2246 (quoting Batson, 476 

U.S. at 97). 

Given the “totality of the relevant facts,” we conclude, as did the district 

court, that race was at least a “substantial motivating factor” in the prosecutor’s 

exercise of at least one strike. Currie v. McDowell, 825 F.3d 603, 605, 614 (9th 

Cir. 2016) (first quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005); and then 

quoting Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 2010)). We therefore agree 

with the district court’s conclusion that the state court’s decision to the contrary

was unreasonable on the record before it. 

AFFIRMED.