S. HRG. 112–80, PT. 7 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 AND 

THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

S. 1253 

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY 

CONSTRUCTION, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

PART 7 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

MARCH 30; APRIL 6, 13; MAY 11; JUNE 3, 2011 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

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68–090 PDF 2012

S. HRG. 112–80 PT. 7 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 AND 

THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

S. 1253 

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY 

CONSTRUCTION, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

PART 7 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

MARCH 30; APRIL 6, 13; MAY 11; JUNE 3, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

DAVID M. MORRISS, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska, Chairman 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION

MARCH 30, 2011

Page 

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, and Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, Department of 

Energy; Accompanied by Hon. Donald L. Cook, Deputy Administrator for 

Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department 

of Energy; ADM Kirkland H. Donald, USN, Deputy Administrator for Naval 

Reactors, and Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy; Michael R. Anastasio, Director, 

Los Alamos National Laboratory; George H. Miller, Director, Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory; and Paul J. Hommert, Director, Sandia 

National Laboratories .......................................................................................... 5 

STRATEGIC SYSTEMS

APRIL 6, 2011

Benedict, RADM Terry J., USN, Director of Strategic Systems Program, U.S. 

Navy ...................................................................................................................... 127 

Kowalski, Lt. Gen. James M., USAF, Commander, Air Force Global Strike 

Command, U.S. Air Force .................................................................................... 131 

Chambers, Maj. Gen. William A., USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic 

Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, U.S. Air Force ........................................ 138 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

APRIL 13, 2011

O’Reilly, LTG Patrick J., USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency ...................... 175 

Roberts, Bradley H., Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy ......................................................................... 182 

Macy, RADM Archer M., Jr., USN, Director, Joint Integrated Air and Missile 

Defense Organization, The Joint Staff ............................................................... 190 

Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 200 

(III) 

Page

IV 

MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS

MAY 11, 2011

Schulte, Hon. Gregory L., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space 

Policy ..................................................................................................................... 247

Zangardi, John A. Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Information Operations, and Space .............................................................................................. 252 

Helms, Lt. Gen. Susan J., USAF, Commander, Joint Functional Component 

Command for Space, U.S. Strategic Command ................................................. 256 

Formica, LTG Richard P., USA, Commander, U.S. Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command ....................................... 260 

Titley, RADM David W., USN, Oceanographer and Navigator of the Navy, 

Director, Maritime Domain Awareness and Space ........................................... 266 

Hyten, Maj. Gen. John E., USAF, Director, Space Programs, Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition ......................................... 267 

Shelton, Gen. William L., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command ....... 270 

Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 278 

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

JUNE 3, 2011

Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command ............. 326 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE 

PROGRAM 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS OF THE NATIONAL 

NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:38 p.m. in room 

SR–232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E. Benjamin 

Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Nelson, Shaheen, and 

Sessions. 

Committee staff members present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations 

and hearings clerk; and Jennifer L. Stoker, security clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; 

and Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Daniel A. Lerner, professional 

staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Hannah I. Lloyd and Brian F. Sebold. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Ann Premer, assistant 

to Senator Ben Nelson; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator 

Shaheen; and Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, 

CHAIRMAN 

Senator NELSON. This is the first of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearings in review of the fiscal year 2012 budget request. 

I’m going to go ahead and start with my opening statement. I 

think my ranking member is on his way. 

We have hearings now scheduled for April 6, which will address 

the strategic systems, bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles 

(ICBM), and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM); for 

April 13, which will address ballistic missile defense programs; and 

on May 4, which will address national security space programs. 

Today, we have with us Mr. Tom D’Agostino, the Administrator 

of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). With Mr. 

D’Agostino are Dr. Donald Cook, the Deputy NNSA Administrator 

2 

for Defense Programs, and Admiral Kirkland Donald, Deputy 

NNSA Defense Administrator for Naval Reactors. We also have the 

directors of the three NNSA National Laboratories: Dr. Michael 

Anastasio, Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Dr. 

George Miller, Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL); and Dr. Paul Hommert, Director of the Sandia National Laboratories. 

We welcome you all to the hearing. 

I would note that this is the first time that Admiral Donald and 

Dr. Cook have testified before the subcommittee. Sadly, this will be 

the last time that Dr. Anastasio will testify before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee in his capacity as Director of LANL, 

having announced his retirement, later this summer. You have had 

a long and distinguished career, and we wish you all the best in 

your future endeavors and thank you for all your service. 

Last year, the Armed Services Committee, and the Senate as a 

whole, devoted considerable time and effort to consideration of the 

New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The Senate Armed 

Services Committee alone held 11 hearings and briefings on the 

subject. The debate on the floor went on for almost 2 weeks before 

the New START treaty was ratified. One of the major issues discussed by the committee and the Senate was the ability of NNSA 

to maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile safely, securely, and reliably into the future. 

A part of that debate and discussion was the overall well-being 

and funding of the nuclear complex, particularly, the new facilities 

that were needed at NNSA Y–12 facility in Oak Ridge, TN, and at 

LANL. Parts of this complex were described as ‘‘decrepit’’ by the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission. I would note that each of 

these new facilities—the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at Y– 

12, and the new facility to replace the current Chemical and Metallurgical Resource Replacement (CMRR) facility, at Los Alamos— 

are multibillion-dollar facilities. The Government Accountability 

Office has put the NNSA on its high-risk list as a result of the difficulties that NNSA has had delivering major construction, and 

other projects, on scope, schedule, and budget. We look forward to 

hearing how NNSA will position itself to successfully deliver two 

new multibillion projects, both of which will be under construction 

at the same time. 

The long-term ability of the NNSA laboratories to provide the 

technical support to the stockpile was also a topic of considerable 

discussion. Over the 5 years prior to 2010, funding for nuclear 

weapons work was substantially reduced. The labs went through 

significant layoffs. The result was a system that was beginning to 

lose its technical capability to support the stockpile for the long 

term. 

To sustain the abilities of the nuclear weapons complex, President Obama laid out a 10-year plan last fall which included substantial annual increases in funding for fiscal years 2011, 2012, 

and beyond. 

From the $6.4 billion appropriated for weapons activities in fiscal 

year 2010, the fiscal year 2011 funding was to be $7 billion, and 

the fiscal year 2012 budget request is $7.4 billion. This increase 

was to continue over the 10-year period. Some Senators argue that 

3 

even these substantial increases weren’t enough, and voted against 

the New START treaty. 

With the Continuing Resolution (CR), the long-term funding for 

NNSA isn’t clear and, based on the proposals coming from the 

House of Representatives, could be substantially less than the 

funding requested by the President for both 2011 and 2012. One 

of the main issues of the hearing today will be the impact of the 

current funding uncertainty and the projected funding levels on the 

ability of NNSA to maintain the nuclear stockpile. 

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) determined that it was essential for the United States to maintain a triad of nuclear delivery 

system: bombers, land-based ICBMs, and the submarine-launched 

ICBMs. To sustain the triad into the future, the NPR outlined the 

need for replacement programs for the current bomber fleet and a 

replacement for the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines. The Office of Naval Reactors, which Admiral Donald heads, is a dual-entity of the NNSA and Department of the Navy, with responsibility 

for the design, development, operations, maintenance, and disposal 

of the nuclear propulsion plants on naval surface ships and submarines. 

One of the primary ongoing missions of the Office of Naval Reactors is the development of a new reactor for the Ohio-class replacement ballistic missile submarines. The funding requested in the fiscal year 2011 and 2012 budgets is critical to keeping the reactor 

design process in sync with the overall design of the submarine. 

Admiral Donald, we also look forward to discussing with you the 

impacts of the current funding situation on the Ohio-class replacement, as well as the other work of your offices. 

I thank you all. 

Now, it’s my pleasure to turn this over to my good friend and 

ranking member, Senator Sessions. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great pleasure for me to work with you. You know how much I respect and 

admire your leadership. I think, together, we’ll do our best to fulfill 

our responsibilities to the taxpayers and to the security of America. 

This hearing focuses on the President’s fiscal year 2012 request 

for NNSA. Never has a nuclear weapons complex faced a turning 

point as significant, I think, as the one before us today. As highlighted by the bipartisan Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission, a commission that I helped put the language in to create, 

both physical and intellectual infrastructure are ‘‘in serious need of 

transformation and require significant attention and investment. 

After years of neglect, the infrastructure has degraded to the point 

where we decide to recapitalize or forego the ability to certify and 

produce safe, secure, and reliable weapons.’’ Today’s hearing provides an opportunity to discuss the 2012 budget, assess its adequacy, and deliver a credible deterrent that is safe, secure, and reliable. 

So, I welcome the commitment that the President has made for 

modernizing the nuclear weapons complex. While we may disagree 

on the likelihood that we’ll have a nuclear-free world sometime in 

the future, the President has clearly recognized that the world we 

4 

live in today requires a strong nuclear deterrent and that efforts 

toward reducing the size of the stockpile depend on a modernized 

weapons complex, a robust ability to produce, refurbish, and replace legacy weapons with weapons that are safer, more secure, 

and reliable. 

The 1251 report that’s part of the New START Treaty was a key 

first step in ensuring the future viability of the complex. But, it 

was only a first step. A long-term sustained commitment that 

spans future administrations and Congresses alike is essential. 

Now, that’s not always easy to do, to maintain a long-term defense 

project like this. 

I am, however, already concerned that some in Congress have 

forgotten the national security importance of the weapons complex, 

and have neglected to appropriate what seems to be the necessary 

amount of funds for 2011. In fact, in the most recent full-year fiscal 

year 2011 appropriations bills, the House appropriators cut the fiscal year 2011 budget by $312 billion, and the Senate appropriators 

cut the weapons program by $185 billion. After countless hours of 

debate to fully fund the administration’s 10-year-plus proposal during this Treaty debate, this failure to recognize the national security importance of complex modernization, I think, is disappointing. 

Hopefully, I’m wrong, and you can do the job without as much 

money as we originally thought. But, I’m worried about it. 

Going forward, I intend to advocate for the restoration of the 

funds necessary to meet the goals that we set when we worked on 

the treaty together. The construction projects at Y–12 and LANL 

are the foundations of the modernization effort, and are the key enabler to a long list of warhead Life Extension Programs (LEP) over 

the next 20-plus years. I look forward to hearing more about these 

programs, understanding how NNSA intends to ensure that both 

facilities are delivered on time and on cost. 

Cost is a big question on these projects, to me. In the report that 

accompanied the New START Treaty, and has since been updated, 

the current cost estimate for the CMRR is a range between $3.7 

and $5.8 billion. That’s a lot of money. Alabama’s general fund 

budget is $2 billion a year. The cost estimate for the UPF is between $4.2 and $6.5 billion. Together, these buildings would cost 

between $7.9 and $12.3 billion. If necessary, okay. That’s what we 

have to do. It’s critical to our defense, so we have to do it. But, I 

don’t think it’s wrong for Congress to ask some questions about 

those high figures. 

When it was released last year, the NPR included some troubling 

language that threatens to restrict the tools necessary for our 

weapons designers to design weapons with the highest degree of 

safety, security, and reliability. According to the NPR, warhead 

LEPs will ‘‘give strong preference to options for refurbishment or 

reuse,’’ thus restricting the ability of the labs to pursue the benefits 

associated with the replacement option. 

I remain concerned by this guidance, and associate myself with 

the concerns raised by 10 distinguished former lab directors who 

stated, in a letter to the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, that 

the NPR ‘‘will stifle the creative and imaginative thinking that 

typified the excellent history of progress and development at the 

5 

National Laboratories.’’ I think that’s a serious point that we must 

consider. 

I look forward to hearing what steps have been taken to ensure 

our weapons designers will not be restricted from utilizing the tools 

necessary for developing the most credible, safe, secure, reliable 

stockpile possible. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the witnesses. 

Senator NELSON. Well, thank you, Senator Sessions. It’s always 

a pleasure to work with you. 

Senator Shaheen, do you have any opening remarks? 

Senator SHAHEEN. No, thank you. 

Senator NELSON. Okay. Mr. D’Agostino, I understand that you 

will present an oral opening statement on behalf of the panel. I 

would note that your prepared statement, as well as the statements of the three lab directors, will all be included in the subcommittee hearing record. Please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

AND UNDER SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; ACCOMPANIED BY HON. DONALD L. 

COOK, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS, 

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; ADM KIRKLAND H. DONALD, USN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR NAVAL REACTORS, AND DIRECTOR, NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; MICHAEL R. ANASTASIO, DIRECTOR, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL 

LABORATORY; GEORGE H. MILLER, DIRECTOR, LAWRENCE 

LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY; AND PAUL J. 

HOMMERT, DIRECTOR, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, Senator Shaheen. It’s a real pleasure to have the opportunity 

to address you today on a variety of investments that the President’s proposing in the future for our Nation’s nuclear security enterprise. 

I’d like to begin by thanking all of the Senators on the committee 

for your continued support of our program, the Department of Energy (DOE), the NNSA, as well as the 35,000 men and women who 

work every day to keep our Nation safe. 

We couldn’t do our work without strong bipartisan support and, 

from my standpoint, the engaged leadership by Congress. It’s absolutely critical, and this is actually what we’ve seen over the past 

number of years, in moving forward. 

I’d also like to take a few moments to discuss our role in providing response to the tragic events in Japan. Mr. Chairman, the 

earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan on March 11, 2011, 

causing significant damage to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear powerplant. Some of the radioactive materials have been released as a 

result of the damage. First and foremost, our thoughts and prayers 

are with the people of Japan during this very difficult time. 

To assist in the response, we’ve deployed over 45 people and 

more than 17,000 pounds worth of equipment, including NNSA’s 

aerial measuring system and consequence management response 

6 

teams. Our response teams are on the ground and they’re utilizing 

their unique skills and expertise and equipment to help with our 

partners in Japan. 

Since arriving in Japan, NNSA teams have collected and analyzed data gathered from more than 130 hours of flights aboard Department of Defense (DOD) aircraft and thousands of ground-monitoring points to get actual data on the ground and pass that information back to the Government of Japan. 

But, in addition to that, in order to ensure that this information 

is available to every single government agency, we’ve been moving 

this information throughout the government, as well as posted information online at our Web site, energy.gov, so members of the 

public can see this information themselves, evaluate it for themselves, and be informed. We’ll continue to monitor this situation. 

We continue to provide detailed technical support for the Japanese; 

in fact, on a daily basis. It changes dramatically on a daily basis. 

DOE is also monitoring activities throughout—with a nuclear incident team that we have manned 24/7, with our naval reactors, as 

well. We get together and exchange data. We report our assets at 

our National Laboratories to provide ongoing predictive atmospheric monitoring capabilities based on a variety of different scenarios. 

It’s important to note that all of the data that we have seen to 

this point reaffirms what the President has said from the beginning, that we do not expect any harmful levels of radiation from 

Japan to reach the United States. 

Mr. Chairman, I come before you today to discuss the President’s 

fiscal year 2012 budget request. I do so at a time when the capabilities NNSA offers the Nation, and indeed the world, are on display in real time. The resources President Obama is requesting for 

fiscal year 2012 make a critical investment in the future of the nuclear security enterprise which will allow us to continue to implement his nuclear security agenda and respond to global crises like 

the one in Japan. 

Despite the challenging economic times facing our country, President Obama has requested $11.8 billion for NNSA, up from $11.2 

billion in 2011. As I see it, the budget request can be broken down 

into three key themes. 

First, we’re investing in the future. This budget request reflects 

the President’s commitment, made last November, to invest more 

than $85 billion over the next decade to assure the safety, security, 

and effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile and to modernize the nuclear security infrastructure and revitalize the science and technology base that supports the full range of nuclear security missions that we have. It provides $7.6 billion for the weapons activities account to support our efforts to leverage the best science and 

technology and research in the world to maintain our deterrent and 

modernize the infrastructure that supports the deterrent. This will 

enable us to enhance our surveillance of the stockpile, proceed with 

key LEPs for the B61 and the W78 weapons systems, and continue 

to design the UPF at Y–12 National Security Complex, and the 

CMRR facility at LANL. These two facilities will provide the necessary capabilities that are absolutely critical to maintaining the 

Nation’s expertise in uranium processing and plutonium research. 

7 

Investing in a modern nuclear security enterprise is critical to our 

Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), but it also supports the full 

range of NNSA’s nuclear security missions. 

Which brings me to the second theme in this request, which is 

implementing the President’s nuclear security agenda. President 

Obama has made strengthening nuclear security and the nuclear 

nonproliferation regime one of his top priorities. As he said in his 

speech in Prague in April 2009, the threat of a terrorist acquiring 

and using a nuclear weapon is the most immediate and extreme 

threat we face. This budget makes the investments needed to continue to implement the President’s nuclear security agenda. To power the nuclear Navy, President Obama has requested $1.1 

billion for NNSA’s naval reactors program. The NPR highlighted 

the need to build a replacement for the Ohio-class submarine, 

which will start to be retired from Service in 2027. Our fiscal year 

2012 request continues the design work on the propulsion unit for 

that Ohio-class replacement submarine in order to meet the Navy’s 

required procurement date of 2019. 

This budget request also includes critical investments in a modern and sustainable spent nuclear fuel infrastructure at the naval 

reactor site at the Idaho National Laboratory. This will allow us to 

move fuel away from wet to dry storage, and ultimately, to dispose 

of it, while we maintain the capacity necessary to receive spent fuel 

generated during a sustained intense period of fuel handling at our 

shipyards. 

Finally, the budget request seeks the resources to refuel the 

land-based prototype reactor in upstate New York. 

These are all critical elements of the President’s nuclear security 

agenda defined in the national security strategy and in the NPR. 

Mr. Chairman, we recognize that this request for increased investments in the nuclear security enterprise comes at a time of 

acute financial challenges to our Nation. We recognize that we 

have the need to be effective stewards of the taxpayers’ money. 

This brings me to the third key theme outlined in this budget, 

and that is our commitment to improving the way we do business 

and manage our resources, including budget resources, people resources, projects, and our infrastructure. I realize that you, the 

ranking member, and all members of this committee have many 

competing requirements. While I believe that nothing is more important than our shared responsibility to ensure our Nation’s security, I also recognize that it’s my responsibility to assure you that 

we can manage those resources wisely. That’s why we are working 

with our management and operating partners to streamline our 

governance model to devote more resources to critical mission work 

and maximize our ability to complete our missions safely and securely, and do that in a cost-effective way. We’re making sure that 

we have the right contracting strategy in place. We are improving 

our project management by ensuring we have qualified project 

managers leading our major projects, setting costs and schedule 

baselines on construction projects when design work is 90 percent 

complete, subjecting those estimates to rigorous independent reviews, and placing renewed focus across our enterprise on project 

management. That’s why we recently created a new Policy and 

Oversight Office for managing major projects that reports directly 

8 

to me and my office to make sure that this project management responsibility gets the high level of management attention it deserves. 

We’re continuing to find innovative ways to save money across 

our enterprise. Take, for example, our supply-chain management 

center. Since 2009, it has used new technologies and pooled purchasing power to drive efficiencies across our enterprise. The result 

has been more than $213 million in auditable cost savings in the 

last 31⁄2 years. 

All of this is part of our effort to create one NNSA, a true partnership between all of our programs and all of our Management 

and Operations (M&O) partners across the country to fulfill our 

common mission. We must break down our stovepipes, work collaboratively across our programs and organization, make sure our 

headquarters, site offices, and M&O partners are coordinated, and 

leverage all of our resources to meet a common objective, ultimately making the world a safer place. 

Taken together, these steps will ensure that we have a modern 

21st-century nuclear security enterprise that is safer, more secure, 

more efficient, and organized to succeed, and an enterprise that 

can address broader national security needs. 

We’re already realizing positive benefits as a result of our work. 

Last year, our Kansas City plant won the Malcolm Baldrige Award 

for quality. Since October, two NNSA projects have won separate 

Project Management Institute (PMI) awards, including our Global 

Threat Reduction Initiative that became the first Federal project to 

ever win PMI’s Distinguished Project Award. That’s the vision outlined in this budget request. It supports our full range of NNSA 

missions and, more importantly, invests in the infrastructure, in 

the people, in the science and technology and engineering required 

to fulfill our missions. 

I look forward to working with you and the members of the committee. 

With that, we’d be happy to take any questions that you may 

have. 

[The prepared statements of Mr. D’Agostino, Dr. Anastasio, Dr. 

Miller, and Dr. Hommert follow:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify regarding our nuclear security posture and 

the President’s fiscal year 2012 budget request for the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA). 

I am pleased to be joined at the table by Dr. Don Cook, Deputy Administrator 

for Defense Programs and Admiral Kirk Donald, Director for Naval Nuclear Propulsion. We are also pleased to have the Directors of the National Laboratories—Dr. 

Michael Anastasio from Los Alamos National Lab, Dr. George Miller from Lawrence 

Livermore National Lab, and Dr. Paul Hommert from Sandia National Laboratories—join us for this hearing. 

The NNSA has the important mission to enhance global security through nuclear 

deterrence, nonproliferation, counterterrorism, naval nuclear propulsion, and national leadership in science and technology. Today I am going to focus on how we 

at NNSA are: (1) investing in the future of the nuclear security enterprise, (2) implementing the President’s nuclear security agenda, and (3) improving the way we 

do business and manage our resources from the standpoint of the status of the nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure. These key mission areas are interdependent, and the men and women who support them make a direct contribution 

to advancing national and international security. 

9 

Now more than ever, we must remain vigilant in ensuring that nuclear security 

programs and activities are properly managed in this tough budget climate. The national consensus that has developed following the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 

and the New START treaty ratification on the need to modernize our arsenal and 

promote all aspects of nuclear security across the spectrum of deterrence, proliferation prevention, counterterrorism and response further underpins the need to execute this mission responsibly and effectively. 

THE NUCLEAR SECURITY POLICY CONTEXT AND NNSA’S ROLE

The policy context remains one in which the advancement of global nuclear security is a priority. When President Obama revealed his vision for reducing nuclear 

dangers and moving toward a world without nuclear weapons, he made clear that 

‘‘as long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and 

effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and to guarantee that defense to our allies.’’ 

NNSA has been implementing the NPR guidance to ensure a safe, secure and effective arsenal and promote global nuclear security. With the entry into force of the 

New START treaty we are able to project what the stockpile will look like, to plan 

an integrated program that meets established military requirements, and to modernize the stockpile and infrastructure to support a leaner, modern 21st century Nuclear Security Enterprise. 

The ratification of the New START treaty brought the administration and Congress together on the need to modernize the Nation’s nuclear arsenal, and to provide 

greater resources to the science and technology missions, the aging physical infrastructure, and the people that support our strategic deterrent. We have agreed with 

the Russian Federation and within the United States to decrease the number of 

operationally deployed nuclear weapons, but we must not lose sight of the commitment needed to maintain the current stockpile and ensure it is safe, secure and effective. The President’s budget requests in fiscal year 2011 and again in fiscal year 

2012 reflect this commitment in the clearest and most comprehensive terms. 

21ST CENTURY NUCLEAR SECURITY ENTERPRISE

While NNSA’s primary mission is to maintain and deliver the Nation’s nuclear 

deterrent to the Department of Defense, the expertise and tools used to accomplish 

that task have resulted in a multitude of other national security applications. The 

network of laboratories, production plants and sites that make up the Nuclear Security Enterprise evidences not only a shift from the Cold War capacity-based nuclear 

weapons complex, but a vision for preserving and enhancing one of our Nation’s 

greatest national assets. 

This shift from a weapons complex into a nuclear security enterprise is about 

making adjustments to the program in order to prevent and respond to current and 

emerging global threats, particularly in relation to countering a wide-ranging set of 

nuclear threats such as preventing—or minimizing the impact of—the explosion of 

an improvised nuclear device or radiological dispersal device. It is about staying 

ahead and advancing cutting edge science and technology to carry out this mission. 

BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS

The President’s fiscal year 2012 budget request provides $11.78 billion to invest 

in a modern, 21st century nuclear security enterprise, implement the President’s 

nuclear security agenda, and improve the way the NNSA does business and manages its resources. 

The fiscal year 2012 request represents an increase of 5.1 percent over the $11.2 

billion requested for fiscal year 2011, reflecting a commitment to investing in a modern enterprise that can support the full range of nuclear security missions. The request highlights the vital role NNSA plays in implementing the President’s nuclear 

security agenda and the broad, bipartisan consensus that has developed regarding 

the role NNSA plays in enhancing our Nation’s security and the resources needed 

to get the job done. 

Investing in the Future 

Secretary of Energy Chu and I work closely with Secretary of Defense Gates and 

other Defense Department (DOD) officials to ensure that NNSA remains focused on 

a strong interagency partnership that meets our national security requirements and 

promotes NNSA’s sustainability. As a result, the President’s request includes $7.6 

billion for the Weapons Activities appropriation, an 8.9 percent increase over the 

President’s fiscal year 2011 request and a 19.5 percent increase over the fiscal year 

2010 appropriation to invest in the future of the nuclear security enterprise. These 

10 

resources will support, among other things, the operation and construction of the 

modern research facilities needed to do cutting edge science and attract the next 

generation of nuclear security experts. It continues implementation of the President’s commitment to invest $85 billion over the next decade to sustain the nuclear 

deterrent and to modernize the infrastructure that supports it, as well as to implement the agenda outlined in the NPR, the Stockpile Stewardship and Management 

Plan, and the updated Section 1251 Report submitted to Congress. 

NNSA’s budget request also includes associated out-year projections in the Future-Years Nuclear Security Program that identifies resources needed to meet the 

continuing requirements for significant long-term investments in the deliverables, 

capabilities, and infrastructure of the enterprise. 

These resources will help us invest in a modern, 21st century Nuclear Security 

Enterprise that can sustain the stockpile and support our full range of nuclear security missions. With these investments, NNSA will be able to continue to move toward an enterprise that is safer, smaller, more secure, more efficient, more sustainable, and more adaptable. 

The request includes an increase of 3.1 percent over the fiscal year 2011 level to 

protect and advance the scientific capabilities at the U.S. national security laboratories and a 21 percent increase for infrastructure improvements, including continuing work on the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y–12 National Security Complex and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility 

(CMRR) at Los Alamos National Laboratory. These capital projects are key elements 

for ensuring safe, secure, and reliable uranium and plutonium capabilities for nuclear security and other important missions. 

To power the nuclear navy, the budget request includes $1.2 billion for the 

NNSA’s Naval Reactors program, an increase of 7.8 percent over the President’s fiscal year 2011 request. The programs in this appropriation support the U.S. Navy’s 

nuclear fleet. Specifically, the request supports the administration’s decision to recapitalize the sea-based strategic deterrent. The Ohio-class ballistic submarines, the 

most survivable leg of the Nation’s strategic deterrent, are reaching the end of their 

operational life. The request will enable Naval Reactors to continue reactor plant 

design and development efforts begun in 2010 for procurement of long-lead reactor 

plant components in 2017, in support of Navy procurement of the first Ohio Class 

submarine replacement in 2019. Providing the Ohio-class replacement a life-of-theship reactor core will require substantial advances in manufacturing technology to 

provide new cladding and a new fuel system. The request also supports the refueling of a land based prototype reactor, providing a cost effective test platform for 

these new technologies. 

Increased funding is also requested for the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization 

Project, which will replace the over 50-year old Expended Core Facility as the location for naval spent nuclear fuel receipt, inspection, dissection, packaging, and secure dry storage. Fiscal year 2012 funding continues the conceptual design for the 

facility, equipment, and related systems, as well as continues meeting the National 

Environmental Policy Act’s requirements and project oversight (e.g., engineering 

procurement and construction management). Detailed project engineering and design work will commence in fiscal year 2013 and construction will commence in fiscal year 2015. 

These vital projects will replace facilities that date back to the dawn of the Cold 

War with modern facilities that can support the full range of nuclear security missions—including maintaining the nuclear deterrent, preventing proliferation, securing vulnerable nuclear material, powering the nuclear Navy and providing the Nation with the best emergency response and counterterrorism capabilities possible. 

They will also ensure that NNSA continues to work with the Department of Defense 

and other interagency partners to keep the Nation safe. 

Implementing the President’s Nuclear Security Agenda 

The fiscal year 2012 budget request also provides the resources required to continue to work toward the President’s commitment to secure the most vulnerable nuclear material around the world within 4 years, a key national security goal. The 

budget request includes $2.5 billion for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation in fiscal 

year 2012 and $14.2 billion over the next 5 years to reduce the global nuclear threat 

by detecting, securing, safeguarding, disposing, and controlling nuclear and radiological material worldwide, as well as promoting the responsible application of nuclear technology and science. Working together across the nuclear security enterprise, and in collaboration with our colleagues in a range of U.S. agencies, as well 

as with international organizations and partners in over 100 countries, we carry out 

these efforts globally on a daily basis. 

11 

This request reflects the significant accomplishments of NNSA’s nuclear nonproliferation programs and seeks the resources needed to complete the President’s 

goals and prepare to respond to new challenges. This budget request provides the 

resources required to meet commitments secured from international partners during 

the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit to remove all remaining highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Belarus, Ukraine, Mexico, and other countries by April 2012, expand our efforts to prevent nuclear materials trafficking, encourage global implementation of higher standards for the physical protection of nuclear material and 

nuclear facilities and work with the Defense Department to improve international 

nuclear security cooperation. The request of $2.5 billion is a decrease of 5.1 percent from the President’s fiscal 

year 2011 Request, but an increase of 19.6 percent over the fiscal year 2010 appropriation. This 5.1 percent or $138 million decline flows logically from the fiscal year 

2011 request which was ‘front loaded’ to accelerate the effort to secure vulnerable 

nuclear materials within the President’s stated timeframe. Even with this decrease, 

the NNSA’s budget request remains consistent with our overall strategy to ensure 

that programs supporting the President’s commitment to lead an international effort 

to secure the most vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in 4 years are 

fully funded in the Request. The Global Threat Reduction Initiative efforts related 

to radiological material, as well as the International Nuclear Material Protection 

and Cooperation program’s activities to enhance the ability of our foreign partners 

to detect nuclear smuggling at border crossings and in Megaports have been 

prioritized to accelerate nuclear material lockdown efforts. The decrease in the request for Fissile Materials Disposition reflects the completion of long-lead procurements for the MOX and Waste Solidification projects, as well as the decision to defer 

funding associated with the $400 million U.S. pledge for the Russian Surplus Fissile 

Materials Disposition program until agreement is reached on milestones for the program. Prior Year unobligated balances of $30 million associated with contingency 

funds for construction under the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production Program are proposed for cancellation, due to the program’s anticipated completion of CD–4 activities in the June 2011 timeframe. 

Improving the Way NNSA Does Business 

In 2010, the NNSA observed 10 years of major accomplishments since its inception. We have secured and removed hundreds of nuclear weapons-worth of nuclear 

material around the world; we have built the world’s fastest supercomputers and 

largest laser; we have pushed the frontiers of science and discovery on a daily basis; 

and we maintain an aging stockpile to ensure that it will remain a safe and effective 

deterrent. In the next decade, we have major projects to complete: the First Production Unit of the life extended B61 by 2017; addressing the W78 Life Extension Program and the potential commonality with the W88; and completing the design and 

construction of our plutonium and uranium capability at CMRR and UPF by 2020, 

with operations by 2023 and 2024 respectively. We also continue to reduce our security footprint by consolidating nuclear missions and materials. We are on track to 

complete removal of Category I/II Special Nuclear Materials from the Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory by the end of 2012, which will enable NNSA to reduce security risks and costs there. 

We recognize that the fiscal year 2012 request for increased investments in the 

nuclear security enterprise comes at a time of acute financial challenges for our Nation, and we recognize the need to be effective stewards of the taxpayer’s money. 

We have made a series of management decisions and put in place reforms and reorganizations to better reflect a 21st century mission and prepare us for the next 10 

years of the NNSA. 

Consistent with the President’s commitment to deliver on critical national nuclear 

security missions at the best value to the American taxpayer, the fiscal year 2012 

budget request will enable NNSA to continue to improve the way it does business 

and manages resources. The President’s budget request for Federal oversight and 

staff included in the Office of the Administrator appropriation is $450.1 million, an 

increase of 0.4 percent over the fiscal year 2011 request and an increase of 7 percent 

over the fiscal year 2010 appropriation. 

To maintain congressional support for NNSA’s programs, the enterprise has a responsibility to work together as ‘‘One NNSA,’’ a fully integrated enterprise that operates efficiently, is organized to succeed, that performs its work seamlessly, and 

speaks with one voice. This ‘‘One NNSA’’ needs to be a true partnership among 

Headquarters, the Site Offices and our Management and Operations (M&O) partners. We are working from the senior management level to ensure all 35,000 employees develop a culture where we all work in a more integrated and interdependent fashion. 

12 

Changing the way NNSA does business is an important part of the effort to transform a Cold War nuclear weapons complex into a 21st Century Nuclear Security Enterprise. NNSA simply cannot expect Congress to support major investments in its 

programs and its facilities unless the enterprise can demonstrate that the Department of Energy is a responsible steward of the taxpayer’s money. 

NNSA needs to do better, which is why the Federal sector leadership is working 

with its M&O partners to streamline the enterprise governance model in order to 

devote more resources to critical mission work and maximize NNSA’s ability to complete its mission safely and securely. 

NNSA is making sure that it has the right contracting strategy in place. The 

agency is improving its project management by, for example, ensuring that NNSA 

no longer sets cost and schedule performance baselines on construction projects 

until design work is 90 percent complete, ensuring it has the right leadership teams 

in place, and performing independent cost reviews. NNSA has also created a new 

policy and oversight office for managing major projects, the office of ‘‘Acquisitions 

and Project/Construction Management.’’ The new office reports directly to the Administrator. This will help ensure that project management gets the high level focus 

it requires. In addition, we are moving to Federalize pilots for our secure transportation program in order to gain efficiencies and maintain operational control. Finally, as the Facilities Infrastructure and Recapitalization Program comes to an 

end, we will create the Capabilities Based Facilities and Infrastructure activity to 

continue to focus on maintaining the infrastructure we have. 

We are already beginning to see results. NNSA is increasingly recognized for its 

efforts to be an effective steward of tax dollars. For example, since 2007, NNSA’s 

Supply Chain Management Center has saved $213 million by using pooled purchasing power to drive efficiencies across the enterprise. In the last year NNSA’s 

Kansas City Plant won the prestigious Malcolm Baldrige Award, America’s highest 

honor for innovation and performance excellence. Two other NNSA programs were 

recognized with Project Management Institute (PMI) awards. In 2010, the Global 

Threat Reduction Initiative became the first Federal project to receive PMI’s Distinguished Project Award, while the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory received PMI’s project of the year. 

CONCLUSION

Our Nation has carefully evaluated its security needs in an international landscape that remains challenging and uncertain. NNSA has charted a path forward 

that shows our unwavering commitment to the Nation’s security and enhances our 

formidable capabilities to address broader security challenges. 

The NNSA is a technically based organization with a strong nuclear heritage that 

serves as the base for our contribution to a wide range of national security solutions. 

NNSA is rooted in the management of our Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile, the 

application of nuclear energy for naval propulsion and its nonproliferation programs. 

Additionally, NNSA capabilities support a broad range of U.S. and international activities that address existing dangers, identify and prepare for future challenges, 

and advise the U.S. Government and our international partners on nuclear security 

matters. 

This 5 year budget request takes the NNSA well into its second decade and 

strengthens the capabilities that are integral elements of our nuclear deterrent. Our 

challenge is to retain the essential capabilities and to identify and develop those 

needed for the future. 

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL

Following are more detailed descriptions of each of the four specific NNSA appropriations. 

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PREPARED STATEMENT DR. MICHAEL R. ANASTASIO

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Nelson and Ranking Member Sessions, I would like to thank you for 

your invitation to appear before the subcommittee on the ‘‘challenges and tasks confronting the laboratories in fiscal year 2012 and the out-years.’’ I am pleased to appear today along with National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Administrator Tom D’Agostino, Director for Naval Nuclear Propulsion Admiral Kirk Donald, 

Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs Dr. Don Cook, and my fellow laboratory directors from Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories. I am 

currently in my 31st year in the weapons program and in my 9th year as a laboratory director, having served first as director of Lawrence Livermore and now since 

2006 at Los Alamos (LANL). As you likely know, I will be retiring as director this 

summer, and I wanted to take this opportunity to thank this committee for all its 

support of the Laboratory and the NNSA mission over the years. 


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Los Alamos is one of the Nation’s two nuclear weapons design laboratories. Although the Laboratory and its mission evolve over time, the primary focus of LANL 

remains to ensure the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and effective. 

More broadly, Los Alamos is a national security science Laboratory. We conduct 

work in the national interest in a broad range of areas including nonproliferation, 

support to the intelligence community and homeland security, and energy security 

and the science that underpins all these mission areas. 

Per the request of the subcommittee, I will focus my remarks today on the health 

and vitality of the Laboratory as it relates to our ability to meet the national security requirements of the Nation. Since I last appeared before the U.S. Senate in July 

2010 much has happened here in Washington which will potentially have profound 

impacts on the future of Los Alamos. With the passage of the New START treaty 

last December and the preceding debate on the health of the United States’ nuclear 

weapons complex and strategic stockpile, a baseline strategy was formed. 

The administration announced a nuclear policy in the form of its Nuclear Posture 

Review (NPR) in April 2010 and a budget outline to support it, through the so-called 

1251 Report, which was released in May 2010 and then updated later that year in 

November. Along with my colleagues from Livermore and Sandia, we issued a statement on the NPR in April, parts of which I include here: ‘‘We believe that the approach outlined in the NPR, which excludes further nuclear testing and includes the 

consideration of the full range of life extension option’s (refurbishment of existing 

warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads and replacement of 

nuclear components based on previously tested designs), provides the necessary 

technical flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future with an acceptable level of risk.’’ 

I addressed these issues further in my testimony before this Committee in July 

2010, where I stated in general that I was encouraged by the policy, and I said further that I viewed, ‘‘the NNSA’s fiscal year 2011 budget request as a positive first 

step . . . ’’ However, I added that, ‘‘ . . . I have concerns about sustaining the focus 

and an appropriate budget over the several decades for which it will be required.’’ 

As I will discuss further in my testimony today, this continues to be a concern. 

The three laboratory directors were once again asked our opinion of the updated 

1251 Report, when it was released in November 2010. In response to a December 

2010 letter from the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the three of us stated that ‘‘We are very pleased by the update 

to the 1251 Report, as it would enable the laboratories to execute our requirements 

for ensuring a safe, secure, reliable and effective stockpile under the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan.’’ We continued further that, ‘‘We believe that, if enacted, the added funding outline in the Section 1251 Report update—for enhanced 

surveillance, pensions, facility construction, and Readiness in Technical Base and 

Facilities (RTBF), among other programs—would establish a working funding level 

for a balanced program that sustains the science, technology and engineering base.’’ 

I recognize, however, that in the interim, the country is now confronting some 

very significant financial challenges. My comments today recognize that situation 

and are cognizant that all Federal programs will be facing budget constraints in the 

months and years ahead. 

HEALTH AND VITALITY OF THE LABORATORY IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL MISSION

When I testified before the Senate last July, the focus of my remarks was on the 

ability of the Laboratory to execute the new national strategy based on the funding 

in the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget submission. At the subcommittee’s behest, 

I would like to outline what I believe are key elements for maintaining a healthy 

and vital Los Alamos, one that can support the national needs of the country. At 

the fundamental level, the Laboratory needs the best scientists, engineers, technicians and support staff that can work in multi-disciplinary teams on national security science challenges facing the country. In order for us to be able to attract and 

retain the best people, I believe that the following elements form a strong foundation for the Laboratory: 

• A strong national commitment to compelling national security missions; 

• Stable and adequate funding; 

• Diverse and broad cutting-edge scientific programs, which attract the 

best and brightest scientific talent; and 

• Tools, facilities and infrastructure to accomplish the above, such as: the 

Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE), the proposed Matter Radiation Interactions in Extremes (MaRIE) facility, and exascale computing, 

among others. 

39 

If all the above elements are in place, the Nation will be able to reap the benefits 

of a healthy Los Alamos. As director, I am responsible to ensure that this is as true 

15 years in the future as it is today, even though no one can predict what then will 

be the compelling challenges facing the country. I will address the current status 

of each of these elements below. 

STRONG NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO COMPELLING NATIONAL SECURITY MISSIONS

The Obama administration in April 2010 released its NPR that updated the Nation’s nuclear weapons policy. One of the five key objectives of the NPR was ‘‘sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.’’ The NPR discussed that this 

would be accomplished by studying ‘‘options for ensuring the safety, security, and 

reliability of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the congressionally-mandated Stockpile Management Program. The full range of LEP [Life Extension Program] approaches will be considered: refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components.’’ The NPR provided further detail on the fact that the ‘‘U.S. nuclear stockpile must be supported by a modern physical infrastructure . . . ’’ and that 

the ‘‘science, technology and engineering base, vital for stockpile stewardship as well 

as providing insights for non-proliferation, must be strengthened.’’ 

The NPR was followed by a program plan and funding profile (the revised 1251 

Report) with an accompanying request for substantial funding increases in the fiscal 

year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 budget submissions. These policies and plans commit 

the NNSA’s national security enterprise to an aggressive body of work for the next 

20+ years that includes completion of the current Life Extension Program (LEP) for 

the W–76, starting studies to complete LEPs of the B61, W78, and W88 and the 

construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility 

(CMRR) at Los Alamos and the Uranium Production Facility (UPF) at the Y–12 

plant. 

The workforce at LANL is excited and energized to meet these challenges which 

are daunting. Certifying the stockpile in the absence of the ability to test (the last 

U.S. nuclear test was in 1992) has provided one of the greatest technical challenges 

to ever face the nuclear weapons complex and led to the creation of the sciencebased Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP). At a high level, the SSP is critical both 

to the annual assessment of the stockpile, as well as to maturing the next generation of tools and technologies that will support certification of future LEPs. It requires powerful experimental capabilities to probe key questions facing an aging 

stockpile, as well as the most capable supercomputers in the world to integrate our 

new knowledge from experiments and validate this through comparison with the 

data that we have from our underground test history. 

I want to stress that we have learned a great deal about the science and engineering of weapons and the detailed phenomena that have to occur for a weapon to function properly. Contrary to what some have argued, we are definitely not ‘‘done’’ with 

science—there are many significant areas of work that remain to be done. There are 

critical open questions that remain to be solved to retain our confidence in the 

stockpile, and we cannot fully predict the scientific challenges that are still ahead 

as it continues to age and goes through modernization. As a nuclear weapons enterprise, we need to be fully utilizing the tools of Stockpile Stewardship that are now 

online, ranging from the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility and LANSCE at Los Alamos, to the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Livermore. 

We also need to continue what will likely be a decade long march to the next level 

of supercomputing performance, known as ‘‘exascale computing.’’ One of the largest 

successes of Stockpile Stewardship has been our advances in supercomputing capability, and specifically our ability to model the complex phenomena that occur in a 

weapon. What we have discovered is that with each improvement in simulation performance, we see greater fidelity and develop an improved understanding, as well 

as a further awareness of what we still do not understand. Thus, moving to the next 

generation of computing is not a luxury or simply speed for the sake of speed. It 

is essential to our understanding of the challenges we face with the stockpile, in 

particular as we move further away from our underground test experience. 

If funded according to the profile in the 1251 Report, this program of work constitutes national commitment to a compelling national security mission. 

STABLE FUNDING

Stable funding is another sign to the workforce that there is a national commitment to the mission. In the national security science area and weapons activities 

in particular, scientists of necessity become involved in classified research and deVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
40 

velopment (R&D). Consequently, they disappear from the traditional forums of publication and conferences that lead to advancement in their fields and once out of 

sight it is very difficult to find opportunities to reenter this very competitive arena. 

Before forgoing this career path, scientists must judge if there is an opportunity for 

a career over several decades and the best of them have many other choices available. A national commitment and stable funding to go with it are essential elements 

to enable that personal decision. 

For a laboratory like Los Alamos, stable funding allows institutional workforce 

planning to ensure that the right mix of skills with the right mix of experience are 

available to the programs to execute work today and into the future. With funding 

uncertainty and the associated worries about downsizing coupled with pay freezes, 

increased contribution to pension and medical plans, the best of our workforce is difficult to retain. Currently for Los Alamos, with the uncertainty in the fiscal year 

2011 and fiscal year 2012 budgets, I don’t know what actions I should be taking— 

increasing the size of the workforce or decreasing the size of the workforce. 

BROAD AND DIVERSE SCIENCE PORTFOLIO THAT CAN ATTRACT THE BEST AND BRIGHTEST

Over the years, I have engaged the national leadership about my concern that the 

scientific capability that underpins the nuclear weapons program has been squeezed 

by eroding funding, increasing costs for facilities and security, and uncertainty over 

the future of the program. This squeeze has impacted our ability to advance the 

science to address the gaps in our understanding that must be closed for our continued confidence in the nuclear deterrent. For example, we have had to forgo some 

areas of research and have not fully utilized our major experimental facilities like 

DARHT, LANSCE, and NIF. Additionally, we have not consistently provided the 

most capable diagnostics and instruments for our research. It is the knowledge developed from this broad range of experimentation that is essential to validate our 

simulation tools that forms the basis for confidence through the science-based SSP. 

In order to mitigate the consequences of these shortfalls in support for our scientific capabilities, we have consciously found funding from other sponsors that utilize some of the same science as that needed by the weapons program, and in that 

way sustain and enrich our capabilities that reside in the more than 2,500 Ph.Ds 

that are the core of our science base. For instance, our technical staff does work that 

is competitively selected for the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Offices of Science 

and Nuclear Energy, and NNSA’s Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation, that is, of 

course, very important in its own right. Our researchers fare well in these competitions as they are recognized as among the top scientists in the country, by numerous 

measures, including the number of peer-reviewed publications. These non-weapons 

programs serve to both attract top scientists to the Laboratory, and they also build 

up fundamental scientific capability that can then be further leveraged and applied 

to our core weapons program work. 

In the case of Los Alamos, the intellectual seed corn has to be attracted and 

incentivized to join our staff because of our remote location and the heavy recruitment of U.S. citizens with technical degrees from large corporations and research 

universities. As a March 25, 2011, New York Times article highlighted, we have 

tough competition from today’s Silicon Valley that can provide high salaries, stock 

options and free iPads to new recruits. The good news is that typically once we get 

the scientific talent to the Laboratory, they tend not to leave because of the diverse 

set of scientific opportunities we are able to offer. This is particularly true when our 

early-career scientists develop a better understanding of our national security missions in nuclear weapons, conventional explosives, materials research, radiography, 

intelligence activities, and actinide chemistry and plutonium science, to name just 

a few. 

One common example of the path that many of our employees take from newly 

hired postdoctoral candidate to highly trained weapons engineer or designer can be 

found at our linear accelerator LANSCE. LANSCE is a DOE national user facility, 

the largest such facility at an NNSA site, as measured by the number of visits. 

LANSCE is a perfect microcosm of the overall Laboratory. The facility is a proton 

accelerator supported by NNSA. This single accelerator, however, among other 

things supports Office of Science-funded work at our neutron scattering facility 

(Lujan Center) and our isotope production facility; Weapons Activities work at a proton radiography center, as well as at the Weapons Neutron Research facility; and 

work for the Office of Nuclear Energy. A new physicist will be hired to do unclassified science at LANSCE on the fundamentals of materials, for instance, and then 

over time they have the opportunity to start working on elements of our classified 

national security activities. The people who remain in the program do so because 

they believe in its scientific challenge and importance. 

41 

This same underlying science that supports the weapons program is applied to 

other real national challenges, whether it is analyzing data from radiation detectors 

in Japan to help understand the status of the reactors and spent fuel rods or responding to the Gulf of Mexico crisis. For example, our staff experienced in radiography were able to immediately deploy to the Gulf of Mexico last year and quickly 

develop a new capability to x-ray the Deep Horizon blowout preventer. At more than 

a mile beneath the surface, we provided imagery using a sealed source to help national decisionmakers better understand what was occurring inside that device. 

TOOLS, FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

The Nation has invested billions of dollars over many decades in the scientific 

tools, facilities and infrastructure at Los Alamos. The reality, though, is that much 

of that infrastructure has aged, and more than 50 percent of our facilities are more 

than 40 years old. Los Alamos has been working closely with NNSA to build strategies that update the site’s aging infrastructure. 

A key element of that infrastructure, in terms of the required national capability, 

is the replacement facility for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility that 

was completed in 1952 and was discovered years later to reside on a seismic fault. 

The CMRR will provide the infrastructure required for the Nation’s ongoing plutonium work, just as the Uranium Production Facility (UPF) at Y–12 will provide the 

Nation’s ability to work with uranium. The currently operating plutonium and uranium facilities have both served our country well over the last 60 years. However, 

with evolving safety and security standards, these aging buildings now need to be 

replaced with more efficient structures designed to meet modern-day requirements. 

It is important to recognize, especially when I look at the overall health and vitality of the Laboratory, that the infrastructure needs at Los Alamos are much broader 

than just CMRR. Clearly, CMRR will be one of the biggest line-item projects in front 

of this subcommittee, but other smaller investments will be required that will help 

maintain the science at the Laboratory. One example of this is LANSCE. We have 

been working with this subcommittee, as well as with NNSA to ensure a path forward for the enhanced maintenance of this machine that supports not only NNSA’s 

Defense Programs, but also our efforts with DOE’s Offices of Science and Nuclear 

Energy. We have been charting a path with DOE and NNSA for the future of 

LANSCE and a follow-on materials science capability called MaRIE. As I discussed 

earlier, it is the broader set of science programs that enable us to attract the next 

generation of scientists. Absent these types of tools, we will be hard pressed to accomplish our recruitment goals. 

CHALLENGES

We at Los Alamos, like most Americans, appreciate the significant fiscal constraints we are facing as a nation. However, I am increasingly concerned about the 

final outcome of the fiscal year 2011 budget process and whether proposed reductions below the 1251 baseline will be enacted, and if so, whether that will be a trend 

into fiscal year 2012 and beyond. At Los Alamos alone, the differential in funding 

shifts that may arise from the current debate in Congress amounts to the equivalent 

of 20 percent of our annual budget. Absorbing such a contraction beyond fiscal year 

2011 would undoubtedly result in workforce actions, not to mention the destabilizing effect that would take years to correct. 

Pressure from mounting pension requirements and on carryover balances have 

left very little flexibility remaining should our budget fall below the 1251 Report 

guidance. This concern is compounded, if not amplified, by the proposed funding reductions to the DOE’s Science and Energy programs and NNSA’s Nuclear Nonproliferation programs which would have significant negative impacts on the capabilities supporting the weapons program at Los Alamos, and the overall health of 

the Laboratory. As I discussed above, our research base is very broad, and we have 

significant crosscutting activity that provides additional support apart from the 

weapons program. A significant loss of funding in these areas will have impacts on 

our R&D workforce in the areas that the weapons program has not been able to 

fully support. It is the aggregate expertise and varied capabilities derived from multiple sources that comprise this great institution’s technical strength in addressing 

issues of national importance. 

In addition, the re-commitment to the nuclear weapons enterprise embodied in 

the NPR has, I believe, engendered a sense of stability and dedication in our workforce over the past year. To reverse course and curtail our modest hiring efforts at 

this point will result in losing that momentum and, I predict, will result in a drain 

of technical experts via retirements and the pursuit of careers in institutions that 

can offer that stability. I would offer that the people, infrastructure and science that 

42 

underlie our nuclear defense represent an expertise that warrants stability over the 

long term, independent of short-term fiscal constraints. 

CONCLUSION

With all the turmoil and uncertainty in the world, now more than ever, the Nation needs a strong national defense. Los Alamos is proud of the contributions we 

have made for more than 65 years, providing innovative and effective science and 

engineering to confront a broad range of the country’s evolving security challenges. 

For our nuclear deterrent, the Nation has a clear policy together with a program 

of work and a funding profile for its execution. Regrettably, at the same time, the 

Federal budget is under tremendous strain. The uncertainty in the budget process 

and its eventual outcome puts that policy and program, as well as the health of the 

Laboratory, at risk. The disconnect between the budget, on the one hand, and the 

policy and program on the other, leads to instability and the inability to ultimately 

meet the goals. 

Los Alamos is prepared, as always, to do its very best to deliver on our missions 

with our most creative science and engineering. However, aligning the budget with 

a program balanced across near-term goals and the underlying science will be essential for success. If the budget cannot support the current program then the policy 

framework and program to carry it out must be revisited. 

Mr. Chairman, I again want to thank you for the opportunity to come before the 

subcommittee and outline my concerns. I would be happy to answer any questions 

you might have. 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. GEORGE H. MILLER

OPENING REMARKS

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for your continuing 

support for the Nation’s Stockpile Stewardship Program. I am George Miller, Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). We are one of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) nuclear design laboratories responsible for helping sustain the safety, security, and effectiveness of our strategic deterrent. 

The Nation not only depends on the success of our efforts in stockpile stewardship 

but also leverages the capabilities of the NNSA Laboratories to develop innovative 

solutions to major 21st century challenges in nuclear security, international and domestic security, and energy and environmental security. 

SUMMARY

• I believe that the program outlined in the President’s budget request for 

fiscal year 2012 provides a measured approach to meeting the mission 

needs and sustaining the capabilities and deterrent value of the Nation’s 

nuclear security enterprise through investments in a skilled, knowledgeable, and able workforce; advanced scientific facilities and production facilities; and a safe, secure, and effective stockpile. 

• The tools of stockpile stewardship are being effectively applied to assess 

and, where necessary, refurbish and sustain our Nation’s nuclear deterrent. 

Your investment in ‘‘flagship’’ capabilities in high-performance computing 

and the National Ignition Facility at LLNL are producing excellent results. 

• It is important that we continue to move forward with refurbishing the 

aging stockpile. The inevitable changes that we detect through our surveillance and assessment programs increase risk with every year and must be 

mitigated. In particular, it is imperative that we begin the study of options 

for refurbishing the W78 warhead to address evolving issues identified in 

the annual assessment of this weapon system. 

• High-performance simulations accomplished using the tools available 

today have demonstrated that still unresolved issues will require exascalelevel computing to continue to stay on top of the stockpile concerns and 

challenges ahead. Achieving exascale computing is a technically challenging 

endeavor, similar to the effort in the 1990s to develop terascale computing. 

This new capability will have other positive impacts on our country’s national security and competitiveness. I am pleased that a program to initiate 

this effort is included in the President’s budget request and strongly urge 

support for an aggressive research and development effort to create the 

technologies necessary to achieve and apply exascale computing. 

43 

• The science, technology, and engineering capabilities that are the foundation of the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the core capabilities of the 

NNSA Laboratories have been successfully leveraged to help solve some of 

the country’s most important and urgent issues in defense, energy, and environment. 

• The national investment in the Stockpile Stewardship Program has produced impressive science, technology, and engineering capabilities at the 

NNSA Laboratories that should be carefully nurtured and preserved. However, like all treasures, if these assets are neglected, they and the key personnel that we rely on will disappear very quickly. I believe that they deserve your careful consideration as the country faces both very difficult 

budget decisions and a challenging future in a dangerous world. 

INTRODUCTION

I am here to provide my technical assessment of the NNSA weapons program activities as outlined in the President’s fiscal year 2012 budget request and of the ability of our Laboratory to sustain capabilities and fulfill mission requirements. The 

request reflects the need to deal with an aging stockpile and ensure the long-term 

health of the Nation’s nuclear security enterprise by making substantial investments in a skilled workforce, facilities, and life-extension program activities. My testimony will focus on activities at Livermore and the importance of the budgeted investments to allow our Laboratory to accomplish the missions assigned to us. Without a healthy nuclear security enterprise, the Nation puts in jeopardy the safety, 

security, and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent over the long run as well as the 

ability of the NNSA Laboratories to apply outstanding science, technology, and engineering to a wide range of important national security challenges. 

The Nation’s nuclear security strategy requires a stable and measured Stockpile 

Stewardship Program that is supported by the long-term commitment of successive 

administrations and Congress with sufficient funding to meet mission requirements. 

The President’s proposed budget increase reverses the declining trend of the last 

several years and restores funding to a level sufficient to reinvigorate and sustain 

the Nation’s program. These investments are urgently needed—in the face of enormous overall budget pressures—in all three major areas of stockpile stewardship: 

(1) life extension programs; (2) modernization of facilities and infrastructure; and (3) 

the science, technology, and engineering base. In my view, delays in providing adequate funding has both immediate, short-term consequences and raise longer-term 

sustainment issues. 

LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAMS

It is very important that we address the specific issues discovered in our aging 

stockpile through the surveillance program and the review processes supporting our 

annual assessments before these concerns worsen. The role of any Life Extension 

Program (LEP) is to fix issues that impact—or will soon impact—overall system effectiveness and take actions that will extend the stockpile life. Failure to address 

these issues can have immediate and drastic consequences for the viability of the 

deterrent our national security strategy relies on. 

Included in the request is funding for the Life Extension Study of the W78 Air 

Force Minuteman III ICBM warhead. This effort is vitally needed. $26 million was 

requested in fiscal year 2011 to begin a 6.1 Phase study to identify and evaluate 

the LEP. I am concerned because the start of the 6.1 Phase study has been delayed. 

In fiscal year 2012, the administration requested $51 million to continue W78 LEP 

development in the 6.2/6.2A Phase (feasibility, planning, and costing studies). The 

official NNSA guidance designates LLNL as the lead nuclear design laboratory for 

the W78 LEP. 

It is important to begin the study activities on the W78 warhead because today 

it constitutes the majority of the ICBM leg of the triad and it has been deployed 

on the Minuteman III for more than 31 years. The warhead is currently beyond its 

planned service life and it will take a 10-year effort to study and then refurbish the 

necessary systems. We need to address concerns identified in surveillance of W78 

units and reported in annual assessments. There are issues with material aging and 

compatibility, which can impact components within the nuclear explosive package. 

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has been monitoring W78 aging characteristics and has assessed that aging ‘‘has not affected the safety, reliability, or performance of the W78 to date;’’ however, ‘‘the condition is progressive and beyond 

current predictive capabilities.’’ LLNL has concurred with these concerns in our peer 

review role as part of the annual assessment process. An important function of the 

study is to evaluate the different approaches available to refurbish the warhead— 

44 

as were outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review—and assess the impacts of including additional safety and security features. 

MODERNIZATION OF FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Infrastructure modernization projects account for the largest portion of the proposed budget increase, and two of the projects are particularly high in cost and high 

in priority: the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility 

at LANL and a new Uranium Processing Facility at the Y–12 Plant in Oak Ridge, 

TN. I fully support these modernization projects and urge that as the cost baselines 

are further defined, any cost changes that occur be accommodated without upsetting 

the overall delicate balance of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. 

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ENGINEERING BASE

The fiscal year 2012 President’s budget request for science, technology, and engineering capabilities is, in my view, prudent but constrained and austere: the level 

of activity will be less than that in fiscal year 2007. This level of capability provides 

the fundamental stockpile stewardship activities that permit surveillance, assessments, experiments, and computer simulations to ensure the aging stockpile and the 

refurbished weapons are safe, secure, and effective. 

Weapons Surveillance 

Weapons surveillance activities aim to predict and detect the effects of aging and 

other stockpile issues. The programmed increase in funding is vitally needed to step 

up the rate of stockpile surveillance and become more proficient at detecting and 

predicting potential problems early enough for our smaller complex to take measured action within limited resources. This area has suffered over the last few years 

and more sophisticated tools are needed to study how aging alters the physical characteristics of weapon materials and how these changes affect weapon effectiveness 

and safety. 

Assessments 

The Stockpile Stewardship Program includes a comprehensive set of activities to 

annually assess each weapon system and to address issues that arise. It is particularly important for processes to actively engage both centers of nuclear design expertise—LLNL and LANL—to provide independent assessments. In all areas of importance, advice from more than one independent source is crucial to the decisionmaking process. Our assessments require rigorous scientific and engineering demonstration and evaluation and are benefiting from the development of Uncertainty 

Quantification, a methodology that is increasing the rigor of weapon certification 

and the quality of annual assessments. 

Experiments and Simulations 

Because we do not perform nuclear tests, simulations are a major tool for providing assessment of the stockpile. These simulations require experimental validation, which in the absence of nuclear testing, is provided by very sophisticated nonnuclear experiments. Through these experiments and simulations, Laboratory scientists and engineers improve their understanding of nuclear weapon performance 

and exercise the necessary base of specialized skills in support of stockpile stewardship. 

There remain several key areas, such as energy balance and boost physics, where 

we still lack adequate knowledge. Predictive Capability Framework campaigns utilize our advanced stockpile stewardship tools to fill gaps in knowledge about nuclear 

weapon performance relevant to existing or expected issues about stockpiled weapons. These activities integrate the use of state-of-the-art high-performance computers, high-fidelity simulation models, and data gathered from state-of-the-art experimental facilities. This cutting-edge research provides both the basis for stockpile 

stewardship and the tools by which the Laboratory experts make judgments about 

the health, safety, security, and effectiveness of the stockpile. 

Overall, LLNL conducts a wide range of experiments in support of the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program. For example, to enhance weapons surveillance, we developed 

and applied state-of-the-art radiographic methods to evaluate the health of the highexplosive system used to initiate weapon detonation. In fiscal year 2010 we also conducted important hydrodynamics experiments at the Contained Firing Facility at 

LLNL and at the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamics Test Facility at LANL 

and many types of experiments to better understand material properties at extreme 

conditions. These include experiments at the National Ignition Facility. 

I will focus on high-performance computing and activities at the National Ignition 

Facility, which illustrate the outstanding work at our Laboratory in support of 

45 

stockpile stewardship and the challenging science and technology efforts required 

for the Stockpile Stewardship Program. 

HIGH-PERFORMANCE COMPUTING AND SIMULATIONS

Since the Stockpile Stewardship Program began in 1985, the NNSA weapons laboratories—working closely with industry—have made remarkable strides in highperformance computing. Our initial goal was to have a machine that could perform 

100 trillion floating point operations per second (teraflops) available within a decade. Through a very concerted effort, the community achieved that goal, which provides the capability projected to be the minimum threshold for initial 3D simulations of weapons performance. With simulations on the 100-teraflops IBM Purple, 

we observed important phenomena that had never been seen before. We also 

learned that to accurately simulate these phenomena we needed supercomputers 

that perform much better and modeling techniques that are significantly more powerful and capable. 

Computer technology has since advanced by about a factor of 10 (1,000 teraflops 

or 1 petaflops). Currently China leads the world with a 2.5-petaflops machine. The 

expanding international interest in supercomputing superiority is indicative of the 

technology’s great value in advancing science and technology on many fronts and 

accelerating product development in industry. 

Improved high-performance computing capabilities are to better meet stockpile 

stewardship challenges. To better understand phenomena in areas such as boost, 

improvements in both the physics models and resolution are required. Model improvements, in turn, necessitate further advances in computing: 1,000-petaflops 

technology (1 exaflops) is required. Exascale computing is also needed to fully implement Uncertainty Quantification, the formal methodology to increase the rigor of 

LEP weapon certification and the quality of annual assessments. The methodology 

requires thousands of three-dimensional weapon simulations to be run to estimate 

uncertainties. Simulations with today’s capability tell us that we need better resolution, better physics models, and the running of many more simulations than possible with today’s machines to reach the level of understanding and analysis required to fulfill mission needs. 

Sequoia 

Through the NNSA ASC program, Livermore and IBM are poised to make the 

next major advance in supercomputing. Delivery of the 20-petaflops IBM Sequoia 

is to begin in December 2011. Sequoia’s processing speed is equivalent to every person on Earth completing 3 million calculations per second. This nearly-factor-of-10 

leapfrog advance over current capabilities is based on third-generation IBM 

BlueGene technology. Unclassified science calculations will be performed on Sequoia 

in 2012, transitioning after these tests to classified use in 2013. 

Since 2009, researchers have been using Dawn, a 500-teraflops initial delivery 

system for Sequoia. All three NNSA Laboratories run cutting-edge weapons science 

problems on Dawn and use the machine to prepare codes for use on Sequoia. For 

example, LANL performed the largest ever high-resolution turbulence simulations 

and uncovered new phenomena related to important open questions. The results are 

being used to improve physics models under development within Advanced Simulation and Computing. Sandia has been testing and improving the speed at which 

some of the key algorithms in their large simulation codes will run on Sequoia’s 1.6 

million processors. 

Among other applications, LLNL scientists are developing new tools on Dawn to 

study complex laser-plasma interactions and to predict and interpret the results of 

experiments at the National Ignition Facility. More generally, in preparation for Sequoia’s arrival, we are making significant progress in the development of algorithms 

that will run efficiently on the machine’s architecture, applications that are tolerant 

to the many ‘‘faults’’ that can be expected in long runs using over a million processors, tools to analyze and help balance the workload among processors, debugging 

methodology, and a variety of data visualization and interpretation tools. 

Exascale Initiative 

I am very pleased to note that the fiscal year 2012 President’s budget request includes $126 million to support start of an exascale initiative in an effort to sustain 

U.S. leadership in supercomputing to support DOE/NNSA missions. This is a joint 

effort between NNSA and DOE’s Office of Science. The path forward beyond the 20- 

petaflops IBM Sequoia toward exascale computing offers exciting opportunities to 

address a wide range of vital national needs, but it presents tremendously difficult 

technical challenges. We are working with DOE and NNSA leadership, other laboratories, and industry to size and scope the technical work program. 

46 

THE NATIONAL IGNITION FACILITY

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is the world’s premier laser facility. Since the 

facility’s dedication in May 2009, NIF with its 192 laser beams has performed exceptionally well. It is proving to be a remarkably reliable and precise system. Citing 

groundbreaking technical achievement and exemplary project management, the 

Project Management Institute (PMI) named NIF as the 2010 Project of the Year. 

PMI honored NIF for ‘‘pushing beyond the state-of-the-art’’ and lauded the effort as 

‘‘a stellar example of how properly applied project management excellence can bring 

together global teams to deliver a project of this scale and importance efficiently.’’ 

NIF is the focal point for the National Ignition Campaign (NIC). The purpose of 

NIC is to determine the feasibility of fusion ignition and transition NIF from a construction project to routine experimental operations for weapons and basic science 

by the end of fiscal year 2012. With respect to fusion, NIC has two major goals: execution of DT ignition experiments starting in fiscal year 2010 for the purpose of 

demonstrating ignition and development of a reliable, repeatable ignition platform 

for weapons physics, basic science, and energy research by the conclusion of NIC 

at the end of fiscal year 2012. A national program, NIC includes as partnering institutions the three NNSA Laboratories, the University of Rochester Laboratory for 

Laser Energetics, and General Atomics. The NIC team has established collaborations with the Atomic Weapons Establishment in United Kingdom, Commissariat &

l’Energie Atomique in France, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lawrence 

Berkeley National Laboratory, and many others. 

The campaign is guided by the NIC Execution Plan (currently, NIC EP Revision 

4), which describes the scope, schedule, and budget for the campaign. NIC is an exceedingly complex, frontier science and engineering project. Adjustments to the optimal path forward are made based on information learned from experiments. Accordingly, NIC accomplishments and plans are scrutinized by several external high-level 

committees: the NNSA Ignition Review Panel chaired by DOE Undersecretary for 

Science Steve Koonin, the NIC Technical Review Committee chaired by former Oak 

Ridge National Laboratory Director Al Trivelpiece, and the LLNL Directorate Review Committee chaired by former NNSA Administrator General John Gordon, 

USAF, Ret. The NIC reviews have been very positive and encouraging. 

The Ignition Campaign 

There have been a number of important successes at NIF. In the hohlraum 

energetics campaign, the NIC team demonstrated that the interaction between the 

laser beams and the target could be satisfactorily controlled and that the conditions 

necessary to implode the hydrogen fuel could be achieved. Creation of the proper 

implosion conditions was a major concern of the original National Academies of 

Science Study that led to the construction of NIF. 

We have also demonstrated the integration of all of the subsystems needed for ignition. Cryogenically cooled ignition targets with a layer of solid tritium, hydrogen, 

and deuterium have been successfully created and imploded. One shot in particular 

achieved a record-setting 1.3 x 1014 neutrons in a purposely low-yield configuration. 

NIC continues to make excellent progress and the results of implosion experiments are very encouraging. We continue to learn much from the experiments and 

see no ‘‘show stoppers.’’ We are optimistic about success in achieving fusion ignition 

but mindful that NIC is an extremely challenging undertaking that is at the frontiers of science and technology. Current plans are to complete the current fusion ignition and burn campaign in spring or summer of 2012. 

Stockpile Stewardship and Science Experiments 

In late February-March 2011, we conducted the most recent series of highly successful campaigns of high-energy-density physics experiments in support of stockpile 

stewardship on NIF. One campaign focused on radiation transport to gather data 

to validate the capability of our physics simulation codes to model phenomena very 

important to weapon performance. Altogether, 16 experiments were performed in 11 

shot days. These included the first experiments performed that included diagnostics 

to provide time-resolved radiographic data. Preliminary comparisons of data taken 

are in reasonable agreement with pre-shot predictions. A second campaign focused 

on developing and using a technique for gathering equation-of-state data to characterize the properties of highly compressed (but unheated) materials—in this case, 

tantalum and carbon. Gathered data from such experiments are needed for scientific 

advances that underpin both stockpile stewardship and planetary science. These experiments are important steps on the path toward transforming NIF to a national 

and international user facility in fiscal year 2013. 

47 

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND COUNTERTERRORISM

A key aspect of our nuclear security efforts is applying our expertise in nuclear 

weapons science and technology, nuclear sensors and detection, and arms control 

verification technologies to programs in the NNSA Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. For example, to help secure vulnerable weapons-useable and radiological materials, Livermore-led teams have been recovering radioisotopic thermonuclear generators, which contain highly radioactive heat sources, from remote 

areas of Russia. Additionally, we are developing advanced technologies to detect nuclear and radiological materials. Two of the technologies received R&D100 Awards, 

the Oscars of invention, in 2010. Complementing these efforts is a program focused 

on nuclear counterterrorism. 

The Laboratory provides both technical support to ongoing arms control negotiations and technology development. Livermore’s underground nuclear explosion monitoring program is a longstanding nonproliferation program that provides the technical underpinning for both the domestic and international monitoring needed to uncover clandestine underground nuclear tests. We couple data from global seismic 

networks with LLNL’s supercomputing capability to interpret the seismic data and 

model the earth, thereby improving U.S. capability to detect possible proliferation. 

This program also has strong links to international seismic safety and science engagement activities. 

IMPORTANCE OF PEOPLE AND PROGRAM GROWTH TO THE HEALTH OF STOCKPILE

STEWARDSHIP

Long-term success in stockpile stewardship fundamentally depends on the quality 

of people in the program. If the Nation is not confident in the expertise and technical judgments of the stewards, the Nation will not have confidence in the safety, 

security, and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent. The specialized technical skills 

and expertise required for nuclear weapons work take a long time to develop 

through hands-on experience and mentoring by our very best. Program stability— 

based on sustained bi-partisan support and sufficient funding over the long term— 

is critically important to executing a balanced, integrated Stockpile Stewardship 

Program. We welcome the support provided by the administration and Congress on 

the importance of the NNSA Laboratories’ work in maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent. 

Program Leverage 

An important benefit of a strong Stockpile Stewardship Program is that this 

foundational program enables the NNSA Laboratories to meet broader national security objectives by applying their unique capabilities and multidisciplinary approach to problem solving. With a focus on national security, the NNSA Laboratories are a vital part of the Nation’s science and technology infrastructure. We 

partner with non-NNSA components of DOE, the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, the Department of Homeland Security, and many other agencies such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the National 

Institutes of Health. In particular, nuclear weapons expertise at LLNL is directly 

applicable to the nuclear security challenges of proliferation and terrorism. Other 

areas of national defense, domestic and international security, and energy and environment security also benefit from the Laboratory’s broad scientific and technical 

base and international leadership in areas such as high-performance computing. 

These activities also further strengthen our science and technology workforce, add 

vitality to the Laboratory, and spin new ideas and additional capabilities into and 

out of the weapons program and other national security programs. Very importantly, they serve as a pipeline to bring top talent to LLNL so that we continue to 

provide the Nation with outstanding stockpile stewards. A broader base of national 

security programs at the NNSA Laboratories can never be a substitute for a strong 

Stockpile Stewardship Program. Likewise, these programs are not a distraction from 

our defining mission and responsibilities to sustain the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. 

Continuing to foster partnerships between Livermore and the broader national security community is a key component of our strategy for helping solve the country’s 

most important problems and sustaining science and technology excellence and intellectual vitality at the Laboratory. I am very concerned about the possibility of 

drastic reductions in the investments in science and technology broadly across Federal departments and agencies in these times of very constrained budgets. Investments in science, technology, and engineering provide an important spark of innovation that is a basis for our country’s national security, energy and environmental 

security, and continuing economic competitiveness. 

48 

Leveraging High-Performance Computing 

I emphasize the importance of high-performance computing in my testimony because it is a cornerstone of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, a core strength of 

our laboratory, and critical to many of our programs for non-weapons-program sponsors. Some of our recent accomplishments provide a sense of the breadth of our 

high-performance computing activities and the many program areas they support: 

• Support in response to environmental emergencies. The DOE’s National 

Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) at LLNL is providing timely, state-of-the-art, predictions of fallout from the damaged nuclear reactors 

after the recent earthquake/tsunami in Japan. As the hub of the Department of Homeland Security’s Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC), NARAC also provided plume predictions of the 

fire on the Deepwater Horizon oil platform and forecast the particulates 

that might be released from surface-oil burns. 

• Persistent surveillance. Laboratory scientists developed an innovative 

data-processing ‘‘pipeline’’ designed to help the Department of Defense monitor tens of square kilometers of terrain from the skies and provide combat 

support by detecting in real time potentially important events in streaming 

video data. 

• Third-generation conventional munitions. LLNL is using state-of-the-art 

engineering codes, advanced design capabilities, and expertise in materials 

to pursue, with the Department of Defense, development of third-generation 

munitions that are more effective against precision targets while, at the 

same time, limiting collateral damage. This effort represents a superb example of the power of high-performance simulation: a munitions program 

went from concept to completion of qualification testing in 10 months, providing significant advantages to the warfighter. 

• Nuclear test monitoring. Laboratory seismologists developed improved 3D 

models of seismic wave travel time, greatly increasing the accuracy with 

which seismic events can be located and the ability to differentiate earthquakes and nuclear explosions. 

• Cyber security and intelligence support. Livermore has developed advanced methods for gleaning information from extremely large-scale relational databases (graphs) and analyzing networks together with fast, accurate tools for large-scale text analysis. 

• Microbial detection. Expertise in bioinformatics enabled Laboratory researchers to develop microbial detection array with 388,000 probes that fit 

on a glass slide, able to detect or identify more than 2,000 viruses and 900 

bacteria within 24 hours. 

• Aerodynamic drag reduction for semi-trailer trucks. Simulations with 

LLNL’s fluid dynamics codes identified critical drag-reduction regions 

around semi-trailer trucks, with results verified by full-scale wind tunnel 

tests. Properly placed drag reduction devices could increase semi-trailer 

truck fuel efficiency by as much as 12 percent. 

• Award-winning software tools. Livermore researchers have developed advanced tools—including several R&D100 Award winners—for solving linear 

equations, debugging and compiling programs, and visualizing extremely 

large data sets that are made available to and downloaded thousands of 

times per year by the user community. 

• Fusion energy. New developments at LLNL in lasers and materials technologies could provide a much shorter path to carbon-free energy. 

• Directed energy. Laboratory researchers are developing exciting new capabilities in lasers that could have important impacts on national security. 

• Carbon capture. Laboratory scientists are using supercomputers to design 

small-molecule catalysts that can be adapted to capture CO2 from powerplant emissions. 

CLOSING REMARKS

Again, I thank the subcommittee for its continuing support for the Nation’s Stockpile Stewardship Program and the terrific people at the LLNL. As I have stated, 

I believe that the program outlined in the President’s budget request for fiscal year 

2012 provides a measured approach to meeting the mission needs and sustaining 

the long-term health of the Nation’s nuclear security enterprise through investment 

in a skilled workforce, facilities, and the stockpile. 

The investments will help us move forward refurbishment programs in response 

to inevitable changes in aging weapons that require our attention. In particular, iniVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
49 

1Sandia Corporation is a subsidiary of the Lockheed Martin Corporation under Department 

of Energy prime contract no. DE–AC04–94AL85000. 

tiating the study of the options for refurbishing the W78 warhead is urgently needed. 

The heart of our successful Stockpile Stewardship Program is our skilled workforce, who are the current generation of a worthy line of stewards in the service of 

our Nation. I have emphasized the importance of investing in the workforce and the 

tools that Laboratory scientists and engineers are effectively applying to assess and 

refurbish the nuclear deterrent. Our accomplishments in the areas of NIF experiments and high-performance computing are particularly noteworthy. In both areas, 

future opportunities are very exciting, and in particular, I urge that the Nation undertake a forceful effort in exascale computing because of its importance to stockpile 

stewardship and, more broadly, the Nation’s security and economic future. 

With sustained support for the Stockpile Stewardship Program, our Laboratory 

can best serve the country as a broad-based national security laboratory, developing 

innovative solutions to major 21st century challenges in nuclear security, international and domestic security, and energy and environmental security. 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. PAUL J. HOMMERT

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members of the 

Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I am Paul Hommert, President and Director of Sandia National 

Laboratories. Sandia is a multiprogram national security laboratory owned by the 

U.S. Government and operated by Sandia Corporation 1 for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). 

Sandia is one of the three NNSA laboratories with responsibility for stockpile 

stewardship and annual assessment of the Nation’s nuclear weapons. Within the 

U.S. nuclear weapons complex, Sandia is uniquely responsible for the systems engineering and integration of the nuclear weapons in the stockpile and for the design, 

development, and qualification of nonnuclear components of nuclear weapons. While 

nuclear weapons remain Sandia’s core mission, the science, technology, and engineering capabilities required to support this mission position us to support other aspects of national security as well. Indeed, there is natural, increasingly significant 

synergy between our core mission and our broader national security work. This 

broader role involves research and development in nonproliferation, counterterrorism, energy security, defense, and homeland security. 

My statement today will provide an update since my testimony of July 15, 2010, 

before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Starting from an overall perspective 

of the nuclear weapons program and the challenges facing us since the beginning 

of the Cold War, I will refer to the following major issues: (1) the U.S. nuclear stockpile assessment, (2) the life extension programs (LEPs) with emphasis on the B61 

LEP, and (3) the status of the capability base needed to support our mission. All 

these issues will be viewed within the context of the administration’s request to 

Congress for the fiscal year 2012 budget. 

MAJOR POINTS OF THIS TESTIMONY

1. It is my view that we are now entering a new era for the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The nuclear weapons enterprise must address for the first time the following 

three imperatives: continuing to further the tools of stewardship, upgrading production infrastructure, and importantly, modernizing the nuclear stockpile. Such an environment creates funding demands not seen in recent decades, and it will require 

rebalancing the program, along with continued emphasis on strong program management. 

2. The most immediate stockpile challenge is the B61 life extension. In the context 

of my responsibilities, it is my judgment that the full nonnuclear scope of the B61 

must be executed on the proposed schedule. Both the current scope and the schedule 

are demanding and can be achieved only by continuing the accelerating effort called 

for by the current program. 

3. Our nuclear weapons competencies impact our broader national security work. 

In turn, to sustain and sharpen those competencies, Sandia relies on this broader 

work. The symbiotic relationship between the nuclear weapons and broader national 

security missions prevents insularity and creates a challenging, vigorous scientific 

50 

and engineering environment that attracts and retains the new talent that we need. 

Such an environment is essential to succeed against the challenges we now face. 

PERSPECTIVE OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

It is my view that we are now entering a new era for the U.S. nuclear deterrent. 

The nuclear weapons enterprise must address for the first time the following three 

imperatives: continuing to further the tools of stewardship, upgrading production infrastructure, and importantly, modernizing the nuclear stockpile. Such an environment creates funding demands not seen in recent decades, and it will require rebalancing the program, along with continued emphasis on strong program management. Our nation has been and continues to be fully committed to the U.S. nuclear 

deterrent as reflected by the near- and long-term nuclear weapons policy outlined 

in the National Posture Review (April 2010). The contribution of Sandia National 

Laboratories is crucial to the success of the next era of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. 

The current nuclear stockpile was largely developed, produced, and tested in the 

1970s and 1980s, during the Cold War. It was the time of the arms race, as new 

nuclear systems were frequently being developed and fielded. 

After the 1992 moratorium on underground testing, the nuclear weapons program 

went into its next phase, science-based stockpile stewardship. For the first 15 years 

of this program, creating the scientific tools and knowledge required in the absence 

of underground nuclear testing was a compelling grand challenge for the U.S. nuclear weapons program. At Sandia, the primary challenge following the moratorium 

was to find best solutions for sustaining, assessing, and certifying the stockpile 

against a full range of environments—most notably, the numerous radiation environments our products must survive. The advanced tools and deeper scientific understanding we developed have been applied to our annual assessment of the stockpile, to stockpile maintenance activities such as replacement of limited-life components, and to the qualification of the W76–1 life extension program. Science-based 

stockpile stewardship has been immensely successful in generating the required scientific competencies and resources, but it was not accompanied by a broad-based effort to extend the lifetime of the nuclear arsenal. 

Now, some 20 years since the end of the Cold War, we have a stockpile that has 

become significantly smaller and older. Considering our insights into and the average age of the stockpile, we have clearly reached a point at which we must conduct 

full-scale engineering development and related production activities to extend the 

service life of the nuclear arsenal. This work can be accomplished only by relying 

on the tools of stewardship and a revitalized, appropriately sized production capability. Let me restate that, in my view, the nuclear weapons enterprise has never 

before faced the combined need to further stewardship, address production infrastructure, and importantly, modernize the stockpile. 

As we enter the new era of the nuclear deterrent, I am pleased to see that a clear 

strategic direction has been outlined for U.S. nuclear weapons policy in the Nuclear 

Posture Review and that a collective guidance for implementation has been provided 

through the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, the updated section 1251 

report, and the administration’s fiscal year 2012 budget request to Congress. The 

strategic direction for the nuclear weapons policy is also consistent with the New 

START, which was ratified by the U.S. Senate in December 2010 and the Russian 

Federation Duma in January 2011. In this context, we are actively positioning 

Sandia to fulfill its responsibilities in support of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. We 

are confident in our ability to do so. 

In their totality, the documents describing the future of the U.S. nuclear deterrent 

represent a well-founded, achievable path forward, which I understand and support. 

However, we must recognize that a significant body of work is required to sustain 

a strong nuclear deterrent into the next two decades, and we must ensure that the 

resources are commensurate with the requirements and expectations. Specifically, 

I can be confident that, as an institution, we are positioned to execute stockpile 

management and deterrence policy to the priorities delineated in the policy documents referred above if the fiscal year 2011 budget is appropriated at the level of 

the administration’s request. Furthermore, the overall fiscal year 2012 weapons activities budget, if authorized and fully appropriated as requested by the President, 

will provide the basis for continuing the program consistent with national policy. 

This level of funding reflects a national commitment to strengthening the security 

of our country and allies by sustaining a smaller nuclear stockpile that is safe, secure, effective, and reliable. Deviation from this funding, however, will impact the 

scope and/or schedule of the life extension programs. 

51 

THE U.S. NUCLEAR STOCKPILE ASSESSMENT

Mission and Product Space 

Sandia is responsible for the systems engineering and integration of the nuclear 

weapons in the U.S. stockpile, and it is the nonnuclear component design agency 

for NNSA. The components that we design ensure that the weapons will perform 

as intended when authorized through the U.S. command and control structure, and 

that they remain safe and secure otherwise. These critical functions are provided 

through our core products of arming, fuzing, and firing systems (AF&Fs), neutron 

generators, gas transfer systems, and surety systems. As we prepare to execute 

these responsibilities for 21st century strategic deterrence, we are facing new challenges. 

While many critical tools were developed in the stewardship era, full-scale engineering development was almost entirely absent during this period. In addition, 

since we last put a system such as the B61 into the stockpile, the technologies on 

which nonnuclear components rely have changed dramatically. Thus we must ensure that a new generation of component and system engineers is prepared to work 

to the exacting standards of nuclear weapons and that we can fully adapt to and 

take advantage of new technologies. I am confident that Sandia is prepared to meet 

these challenges due in no small measure to the fact that, over the past 20 years, 

work we have done in other national security arenas has allowed us to attract and 

train the talent that will bring new technology to high-consequence high-reliability 

engineering applications. In the decade since we began design on the W76–1 LEP, 

one additional challenge has grown in complexity. Sandia’s products must also be 

robust against cyber risk. We believe it is vital to assess cyber risk and develop 

technologies to manage this risk for the next generation of life extension programs. 

All these realities bear directly and significantly on Sandia’s responsibilities as we 

embark on the next era of the nuclear deterrent. 

Stockpile Surveillance and Assessment 

Stockpile surveillance and assessment play a crucial role in assuring the nuclear 

deterrent. Through these activities, we develop knowledge about the safety, security, 

and reliability of the stockpile. This knowledge provides the technical basis for our 

annual assessment findings and is reported to the President through the annual assessment process. Through this process, we have been, and remain, able to assess 

the Nation’s stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable. The Department of Energy fiscal 

year 2011 Congressional Budget Request places high priority on stockpile surveillance. I strongly agree with this emphasis, but there is important further work to 

be done. Specifically, the surveillance transformation plan was established to better 

align our surveillance program with the challenges of an aging and smaller stockpile. My fiscal year 2010 stockpile assessment letter to the secretaries of energy and 

defense and to the chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council noted the need for a 

strong focus to complete surveillance transformation, which aims to shift the program from being reactive to becoming predictive and thus allowing us to better anticipate stockpile performance degradation and to schedule required actions. 

Today we are surveilling a stockpile for which most of the weapons were designed 

at a time when long design life was not typically a high-priority design requirement. 

The radar for the first B61 bomb, for example, was originally designed for a 5-year 

lifetime; today there are B61s in the stockpile with components manufactured in the 

late 1960s. It is a credit to our stockpile stewardship program that we have the 

technical knowledge base to support continued confidence in these weapon systems 

as they age. However, our surveillance efforts, coupled with the fact of the age of 

the stockpile, indicate that it is imperative that we begin to execute on replacing 

the aging components as the lead time for these activities will be 5 to 10 years on 

a system-by-system basis. 

THE LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAMS

The B61 Life Extension Program 

The most immediate stockpile challenge for sustaining the deterrent is to extend 

the service life of the B61 bomb under expansive product requirements and a demanding schedule. The primary driver for the schedule of the B61 LEP is the fact 

that critical nonnuclear components are exhibiting age-related performance degradation. Another driver for the schedule is the deployment of the F35 Joint Strike 

Fighter, which requires a new digital interface for the B61. Specific component 

issues, as well as the overall age of the system, lead me to conclude that we need 

to approach this LEP with a resolute commitment to address end of life, degradation, and technology obsolescence to ensure long-term safety, security, and effectiveness. 

52 

Notably, the scale and complexity of this LEP will be much larger than that of 

the W76 Trident II SLBM warhead LEP, which is now in production. To extend the 

lifetime of the B61 with a first production unit in 2017, full appropriation of the 

fiscal year 2011 funding requested by the administration is critical. We must complete the design definition in fiscal year 2011 to create a firm understanding of system requirements and thus fully establish future-year funding needs. Total cost estimates for the B61 LEP are subject to change until the design definition and requirements are finalized at the end of fiscal year 2011. 

To overcome technology obsolescence, it is important that we develop new technologies to insert into the B61. That is why we are conducting considerable technology maturation work in fiscal year 2011. Technology maturation is a rigorous approach Sandia applies to developing new technologies, from the earliest conceptual 

designs through full-scale product realization and ultimately to insertion into the 

stockpile. We use a construct of technology readiness levels, first implemented at 

the Department of Defense and then NASA, and we implement a series of technical 

and programmatic reviews to ensure that the maturity level of new technologies is 

understood and associated risks are effectively managed before the new technologies 

are used in a life extension baseline design. For the B61 LEP, we have more than 

40 product realization teams designing components and subsystems and maturing 

technologies. We are aggressively staffing this program to accomplish our objectives 

on the current schedule. In July 2010, we had a core of approximately 80 staff on 

the B61 project. Staffing levels are now more than 3 times that number and will 

continue to increase. We are planning to have a core of 400 staff on the project by 

the end of fiscal year 2011. These staffing levels are enabled by fiscal year 2011 

funding provided through the continuing resolutions. However, should fiscal year 

2011 funding deviate significantly from the current levels, we will not be able to 

sustain staffing levels, and the scope and/or schedule of the project will have to be 

adjusted. 

The B61 LEP schedule and scope are also, of course, heavily dependent on the 

appropriated funding in fiscal year 2012 and beyond; multiyear sustained funding 

is required to bring this program to successful completion. The success of the B61 

LEP also requires the necessary support for the nuclear explosive package agency 

(Los Alamos National Laboratory) and the production complex. 

Other Life Extension Programs 

The B61 LEP is one in a series of programs with timelines extending to 2035 that 

have been documented in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. Among 

them are the W88 ALT, the W78 LEP, and likely a weapon system associated with 

long-range stand-off delivery vehicles. 

Funding for the W88 ALT has been identified in the updated Section 1251 Report. 

Sandia is pursuing work on the W88 ALT, which involves replacing the AF&F system and the neutron generators. 

The Nuclear Posture Review recommended ‘‘initiating a study of LEP options for 

the W78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility of using the resulting warhead 

also on SLBMs to reduce the number of warhead types’’ (p. xiv). Although the Department of Energy fiscal year 2011 Congressional Budget Request includes funding 

for a W78 LEP with completion of a first production unit in 2021, work for this program has not been authorized by the continuing resolution under which we are operating. Should the W78 LEP be authorized, Sandia is ready to support the warhead 

systems engineering and integration effort and to fully leverage the work done on 

the recently completed feasibility study for a common integrated AF&F system. 

Using an envelope of the requirements for the W78 and the W88, and even the W87 

and the U.K. system, our study concluded that this approach was technically feasible, including improvements in safety and security enabled by miniaturization of 

electronics. Savings in weight and volume, at a premium in reentry systems, can 

be used for those additional safety and security features. The study results have 

been briefed to the Nuclear Weapons Council and are being used to inform decisions 

regarding the scope, schedule, and interplay between the W78 and W88 life extensions. Such an approach offers the potential for significant cost savings for the overall Department of Defense and Department of Energy nuclear weapons enterprise. 

Our Capability Base Supports the Mission 

Over the next 25 years, we will rise to meet the challenges of a demanding program described in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, but we also 

must establish the basis for long-term stability. For Sandia, stability should be 

viewed in the context of three pillars: infrastructure, broad national security work, 

and workforce. 

53 

Essential Infrastructure and Capabilities 

Sandia’s capabilities are essential to its full life cycle responsibilities for the stockpile: from exploratory concept definition to design, development, qualification, testing, and ultimately to ongoing stockpile surveillance and assessment. Let me point 

out a few examples. 

The NNSA complex transformation plan designated Sandia as the Major Environmental Test Center of Excellence for the entire nuclear weapons program. Our facilities and equipment in this area are extensive: (1) 20 test facilities at Sandia-New 

Mexico; (2) the Tonopah Test Range in Nevada; and (3) the Weapon Evaluation Test 

Laboratory in Amarillo, TX. We use environmental test capabilities to simulate the 

full range of mechanical, thermal, electrical, explosive, and radiation environments 

that nuclear weapons must withstand, including those associated with postulated 

accident scenarios. In addition to these experimental and test facilities, Sandia’s 

high-performance computing capabilities are vital tools for our mission responsibilities in stockpile surveillance, certification, and qualification, and they have proved 

to be indispensable in our broader national security work. 

I am very pleased that Test Capabilities Revitalization Phase 2 funding has been 

requested in the fiscal year 2012 weapons activities budget. This funding will enable 

us to renovate our suite of mechanical environment test facilities, many of which 

were commissioned in the 1950s and 1960s. These facilities are essential to support 

the design and qualification of the B61 life extension and subsequent LEPs. 

Across the nuclear weapons complex, there is a shortage of funding for infrastructure, maintenance, and operation upgrades included in the Readiness in the Technical Base of Facilities program. However, mentioned in the updated Section 1251 

Report is the Tonopah Test Range in Nevada, one example that I want to highlight 

not so much as a funding issue but as an essential mission requirement. Starting 

in fiscal year 2013, development flight tests must be conducted at the Tonopah Test 

Range for the B61 life extension. 

Another capability that Sandia stewards for the nuclear weapons program and 

also for the Department of Energy’s nonproliferation payloads is the microelectronics research and fabrication facility, where we design and fabricate an array of 

unique microelectronics, as well as specialty optical components and microelectromechanical system devices. This capability includes a national ‘‘trusted foundry’’ for 

radiation-hardened microelectronics. We have been providing microelectronic components to the nuclear stockpile at the highest level of trust since 1978 and to the 

Department of Energy’s nonproliferation payloads since 1982. In 2009, Sandia received Class 1A Trusted Accreditation (the highest level of accreditation) from the 

Department of Defense for Trusted Design and Foundry Services and is the only 

government entity with this accreditation for both design and foundry operations. 

We must recapitalize the tooling and equipment in our silicon fabrication facility, 

much of which dates back about 15 years in an industry where technology changes 

almost every 2 years. Recapitalization will ensure production of the radiation-hardened components required by the B61 LEP and W88 ALT; this facility is the only 

source for the key microelectronics required for the life extension work specified. Recapitalization must begin soon in order to eliminate the risk of running existing 

equipment to failure. Sandia is therefore working with NNSA on a 4-year funding 

plan to stage the retooling (starting in fiscal year 2013). We have plans for meeting 

programmatic requirements with a staged funding profile. 

I mentioned earlier the need to continue strengthening the tools of stewardship. 

Let me mention two such areas for Sandia. First, a stable funding position is essential for the material science that underpins the broad range of materials for nonnuclear components in order to move to a more predictive basis for an older, smaller 

stockpile and prepare for the life extensions. We continue to work with NNSA to 

ensure adequate prioritization for nonnuclear components material science in fiscal 

year 2012 and out-year budgets. Second, I am pleased to see budget stability being 

brought to the area of radiation hardness. As I discussed in my July 2010 testimony, I believe this is an essential element of our strategic nuclear deterrent. We 

continue to advance the scientific basis for confidently certifying the stockpile to radiation hardness requirements in the absence of nuclear testing. We are also pursuing intrinsically radiation-hardened designs for use in future life extensions such 

as the W88 ALT and W78 LEP. 

Synergy between Our Nuclear Weapons Mission and Broader National Security Work 

Today’s national security challenges are highly diverse. The NNSA laboratories 

are contributing solutions to the complex national security challenges. Indeed, as 

mentioned in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan Summary, ‘‘while 

NNSA nuclear weapons activities are clearly focused on the strategic deterrence aspects of the NNSA mission, they also inform and support with critical capabilities 

54 

other aspects of national security’’ (p. 7). In turn, to sustain and sharpen these competencies, Sandia relies on its broader national security work. The symbiotic relationship between the nuclear weapons and broader national security missions prevents insularity and creates a challenging, vigorous scientific and engineering environment that attracts and retains the new talent that we need. Such an environment is essential to succeed against the challenges we now face. The following examples highlight the way in which this symbiotic relationship works. 

Sandia developed synthetic aperture radar (SAR) technology, which was made 

possible by our extensive design and development work for radars for nuclear weapon fuzing. This technology has been enhanced and is currently used by the Department of Defense. The extensive SAR work has sharpened our radar design competencies and kept Sandia aligned with advances in radar technology, such as radar 

frequency integrated circuits. We are now applying these modern technologies to the 

design of the replacement radar for the B61 LEP. 

Another example is our work in cyber security. Sandia’s responsibilities for nuclear weapons include weapon system architectures and components to support the 

highest standards of command and control—U.S. nuclear weapons must always 

work when authorized by the President, and never work otherwise. Our technical 

expertise in this area was the foundation for contributions to broader national security problems associated with cyber threats. In turn, our life extension work will 

take advantage of the modern, state-of-the-art capabilities developed for broader national security. 

A third example demonstrates how these synergies have worked within the NNSA 

family of programs. For the past 10 years, Sandia has been leveraging the unique 

capabilities of our microelectronics research and fabrication facility for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. In this effort, we designed, developed, and deployed the next 

generation of satellite-based treaty monitoring technology, called the ‘‘enhanced optical sensor.’’ In turn, we have used the advancements of the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation satellite project in the nuclear weapons program. 

Finally, I want to acknowledge an important step in institutionalizing the relationship between the nuclear weapons and broader national security missions. In 

July 2010, NNSA, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence have signed a governance charter, which provides a framework for the participating agencies to coordinate shared, long-term planning for the science, technology, and engineering capabilities of Department of Energy national laboratories that will contribute to the Nation’s broader national security missions. 

Workforce 

Our talented people are our most fundamental capability. Given the scope and nature of our work, it is mandatory to continue attracting, retaining, and training a 

highly capable workforce. To do so, we must: (1) ensure that our work is aligned 

with the national purpose; (2) create a climate of innovation and creativity that inspires our workforce; and (3) create a balanced work environment that is both responsive to the fiscal realities of our times and attractive to the talented staff we 

need in the future. 

Today we are facing a number of challenges. Currently, 37 percent of the experienced technical staff in Sandia’s weapon system and component design organizations are over the age of 55. Their remaining careers will not span the upcoming 

life extension programs. This reality puts a premium going forward on stable commitment to the LEPs. The life extensions provide opportunities for our new technical staff to work closely with our experienced designers: from advanced concept 

development to component design and qualification, and ultimately to the production and fielding of nuclear weapon systems. Finally, fiscal realities have forced us 

to reduce costs by addressing the funding liabilities in our pension program, restructuring the healthcare benefits, and simplifying internal processes. All these actions 

were necessary, but in my view, they can go no further without compromising our 

ability to attract and retain. 

At Sandia, we are focused on creating an environment that reflects our management’s vision for success by coupling the experience acquired from our past work 

with new tools and modern technologies. Such an environment will foster innovation 

and provide foundational technical and scientific strength to support the stockpile 

over the long term. The multidisciplinary team we are assembling for the B61 LEP 

reflects this environment in which the powerful stewardship tools we acquired in 

the past are being adapted to meet future needs and the latest technologies and innovative designs are coupled with the rigor that comes from experience. 

55 

CONCLUSIONS

As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, ‘‘as long as nuclear weapons exist, the 

United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal’’ (p. iii). As 

we enter the new era of the nuclear deterrent, I am pleased to see that a clear strategic direction has been outlined for U.S. nuclear weapons policy in the Nuclear Posture Review and that a collective guidance for implementation has been provided 

through the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, the updated Section 1251 

Report, and the administration’s fiscal year 2012 budget request to Congress. The 

strategic direction for the nuclear weapons policy is also consistent with the New 

START, which was ratified by the U.S. Senate in December 2010 and the Russian 

Federation Duma in January 2011. In this context, we are actively positioning 

Sandia to fulfill its responsibilities in support of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. We 

are confident in our ability to do so. 

The documents referenced above represent a well-founded, achievable path forward, which I understand and support. However, we must recognize that a significant body of work is required to sustain a strong nuclear deterrent into the next 

two decades, and we must ensure that the resources are commensurate with the requirements and expectations. Specifically, I can be confident that, as an institution, 

we are positioned to execute stockpile management and deterrence policy to the priorities delineated in the policy documents referred above if the fiscal year 2011 

budget is appropriated at the level of the administration’s request. Furthermore, the 

overall fiscal year 2012 weapons activities budget, if authorized and fully appropriated as requested by the President, will provide the basis for continuing the program consistent with national policy. This level of funding reflects a national commitment to strengthening the security of our country and allies by sustaining a 

smaller nuclear stockpile that is safe, secure, effective, and reliable. Deviation from 

this funding, however, will impact the scope and/or schedule of the life extension 

programs. The fact that the three national security laboratory directors were invited 

to speak before you today and answer your questions is a clear indication of the 

leadership role of Congress in authorizing a path forward for U.S. nuclear deterrence. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

In the interest of time, we asked you to sort of consolidate all the 

statements here, but I would like to take the opportunity to ask 

each of you what might be your major concern or primary issue 

that you might like to address at this point, in case we don’t raise 

a question about it. 

Why don’t we start over on this side. Dr. Hommert? 

Dr. HOMMERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In my written testimony, I raised three issues. The first is something that has already been mentioned, that we’re at a very pivotal 

time with respect to the program and the multiple demands of 

maintaining the strength of our science base. The need to execute 

the LEPs, and the need to have the infrastructure commensurate 

with that, is creating a very substantial demand on the system. I 

think we have to look at that very actively. We have to demand the 

highest standards of project management, as Tom has alluded to. 

But, it is a very fundamental shift of the state of our weapons program, to take on that breadth of commitment. 

The second thing I’ll mention that’s most immediate, for us at 

Sandia, is the execution of the B61 LEP. The target First-Production Unit (FPU) date for that is 2017. To be at an FPU in that 

timeframe, that’s right upon us now. So, the urgency of the resolution of the fiscal year 2011 budget, where we’re staffing up now to 

hold to that timeframe, is an immediate issue for us at our laboratory. As an example, we need to be flight testing development units 

in 2013. So, there’s very little time for us to adjust, if we’re to hold 

that schedule. Very important issue. 

56 

The last thing I would just highlight is an issue of sustaining the 

people competence, long term, for the institution and in support of 

the deterrent, and to highlight—I think this is true for all of the 

laboratories—the importance of the broader national security work 

that we do and what I would call the mutual reinforcing value of 

the work we do in other national security challenge areas to 

interplan and strengthen the basis of our workforce for supporting 

a nuclear deterrent, going forward. That’s an important issue that 

I think now has become almost inseparable from how we would 

support the deterrent, going forward. 

So, thank you. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Dr. Miller. 

Dr. MILLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for inviting 

us today, and for your continuing support of these critically important national programs. 

The main points I’d like to summarize are, first that the fiscal 

year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 budgets that have been submitted 

by the President for your consideration are good first steps. As 

many of us have mentioned, I think the critical issue is sustaining 

those budgets over successive administrations and successive Congresses, is critical to the long-term prospect of putting the nuclear 

deterrent on a firm footing. 

The tools that you have so wisely invested in, are now being effectively used to assess the stockpile today. It’s critically important 

that we move forward and take the necessary actions that we learn 

from those assessments. In the case of an issue that LLNL is concerned about, it’s getting on with a study to look at how we might 

refurbish the ICBM warhead, the W78. It is aging. We know there 

are issues. We just need to get on with a study to tell us and you, 

the decisionmakers, what options are the best ways of refurbishing 

this warhead so that it can continue to provide the deterrence that 

is so important. 

The final area that I would again emphasize is the importance 

of the science and technology that is derived from our NNSA mission, and the way in which that is leveraged to help the laboratories work on some of the country’s most important problems. 

These are issues from supporting our warfighters in Afghanistan 

and as Administrator D’Agostino mentioned support of national 

and international emergencies, like what happened in the Gulf and 

what has happened in Japan, and at the other end of the spectrum, 

working to help defend this country against terrorists and 

cyberthreats. 

So, this is a very precious resource, in my view. In these very difficult budget times, I think it deserves your careful consideration. 

In my judgment, it’s critical not only for national security, but also 

for the economic future of this country. 

Senator NELSON. Admiral Donald? 

Admiral DONALD. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sessions, and 

Senator Shaheen, thank you very much for allowing me to appear 

before you today and discuss my program, the Naval Reactors Program. 

I would start off, first and foremost, by just acknowledging that 

what I spend the bulk of my time doing—I wake up every morning 

57 

and go to bed every evening with my charter, and that is the safe 

and effective operation of naval nuclear propulsion plants. I don’t 

think it should be lost on anyone that we operate 103 reactor 

plants. We operate them around the world, globally. We are welcome in over 150 ports worldwide. The reason we are able to do 

that, and including operating in the vicinity of cities in the United 

States, is that people trust us. They trust us because of our record 

of success. They trust us to deal with small problems before they 

become big problems, and to also be open and transparent with 

them, as far as how our program operates, and to ensure that we’re 

doing good technical work. 

The success of the program: We’ve been around now for over 60 

years. We’ve been operating reactor plants at sea since 1955, when 

Nautilus went to sea. We’ve steamed 145 million miles safely without a reactor accident, without a radiological incident that effects 

the environment or people. That record is attributable to a couple 

of things; first and foremost, technical expertise and the devotion 

to the work that we do. But, as much as anything, it has been the 

very strong and committed support from this subcommittee and 

from Congress in general. It allows us the latitude to do the technical work that we need to do and to work on small problems before they become big problems, and again, a key to our success. 

Mr. D’Agostino has highlighted three key projects that we’re 

starting right now in support of national security. Those are certainly challenging projects. We understand that. But, it’s also certainly within our expertise and experience to be successful in those 

projects. We’ve completed ship designs; most recently, the Virginia 

is the new class of submarine at sea, is held up as the hallmark 

of acquisition programs in the United States Navy right now. We’re 

completing another design for the A–1B reactor plant; this is for 

the CVN–78, the Gerald R. Ford. So, we know how to do these 

things, and are ready to do it. 

What’s critical right now, though, is, we’re in the early stages of 

these very complex projects. The funding, early on, is critically important, because now we’re setting design parameters, we’re setting 

operational concepts for these plants that will, for the large part, 

define what the cost, schedule, and capabilities of these plants will 

be by the time they arrive at sea, when the first Ohio replacement 

goes to sea in 2029. We’re doing that right now. Since our equipment tends to be the first that has to be there for the construction 

start in 2019, we are really in the very meat of the work to do to 

define what this plant is going to look like and what it’s going to 

cost. 

That is where I would ask for your consideration, looking at our 

budgets, looking at the request that we’ve made, to ensure that we 

get off to a good start on these projects, that we have the design 

maturity that will guarantee success, and that we will be successful in what it is we go about doing. 

Thank you very much for your time. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Dr. Cook. 

Dr. COOK. My principal issue, concern, and direction is to execute 

the national strategy that was outlined in the NPR, the Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management Report, something we call the secVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
58 

tion 3113 report, 1251 report, as you mentioned, and now a ratified 

New START Treaty. 

As the program has changed, we’ve modified our program structure and management structure for execution. As you look at the 

President’s budget, you’ll see a 3.1-percent increase in science and 

weapons activities, a 4.8-percent increase in stockpile support, and 

a 21-percent increase in infrastructure. The reason for that ties to 

many of the things that you’ve mentioned and problems that we’re 

well aware of across the complex. 

So, to name a few. Although we often talk in terms of projects, 

the UPF at Y–12 and the CMRR facility at LANL, in fact, these 

are basic capabilities for the Nation. One deals with uranium components, one deals with plutonium components and the necessary 

underpinning of science, technology, and full manufacturing. For 

example, when one really looks at UPF, it is a factory. It’s not just 

a building. It’s the basic capability of the Nation for dealing with 

uranium components. At LANL, it’s not only a facility we’re putting 

in place for actinide research and development, but will have the 

plutonium stores for the Nation. It will allow us to use other capabilities in a more effective way. 

I mentioned the management structure. In order to enable effective execution, we’ve asked the management and operations contractors, both at Y–12 and at LANL, who have parent companies 

who are, in fact, experienced and capable in nuclear areas, Bechtel 

and BWXT, to name just a few. That is based on the fact that we 

know we have to do these new builds. They are capability builds, 

but they’re new nuclear builds, and they have to be done to modern 

safety and security standards. 

This all ties into stockpile deliveries for DOD. While, a few years 

ago, we had just one LEP in operation—and we still do, that’s the 

full build of the life-extended W76 warhead that goes out to sea— 

we, today, have, also, the B61 study—the engineering prestudy and 

the cost study that we’ll complete at the end of this year. We have 

requested approval to begin the study for the W78 warhead, as Dr. 

Miller mentioned, and look for adaptable interoperability we could 

have in two legs of the deterrent. 

That’s quite a set of things. There are certainly other things, 

such as high explosives pressing at Pantex, which we have turned 

on to execute. But, that’s what’s on our screen. 

Thank you, sir. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Dr. Anastasio. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, Senator 

Shaheen. 

First, let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind remarks in 

your opening. 

I would just like to personally thank this committee for not only 

all the support the NNSA missions have received over many years, 

but also LANL and myself, personally. I really appreciate the support of this committee. So, thank you for that. 

When I think about LANL, my number-one thought is about the 

general role of the laboratory. We’re a national security science laboratory, and the thing that I worry the most about is, are we a 

healthy, vital institution to carry out our missions and responsibilVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
59 

ities? As we’ve heard, those are clear, from the NPR that flow down 

through Stockpile Stewardship and Management plan and the 

budget profile the administration has submitted. The question before this committee and Congress is, is there funding available, in 

these difficult times the country faces, to fund this activity? 

For me, as lab director, one of the special responsibilities we all 

have is not only, ‘‘Can we carry out our mission today?’’ but will 

we be able to do that 15 or 20 years from now, as well. Of course, 

that’s all about, not only ‘‘Do we have adequate funding now?’’ but 

also we have a stable funding profile that we can plan to, so that 

we can make sure that the workforce is available that has all the 

special diverse and deep capabilities that are necessary to meet 

these mission requirements that are so challenging technically?’’ 

Of course, the budget’s been under some stress for some time. We 

have been working hard to try to mitigate that budget stress, and 

you’ve heard some of the strategies. Not only can we take the 

science and engineering that’s so important for the nuclear weapons program, and use it to support other critical national missions 

around nonproliferation or countering terrorist threats, Intelligence 

Community work, DOD support, et cetera—not only can we do 

that, but we’ve also designed the efforts that we go after with other 

sponsors to supplement the science and technology base of the laboratory that the core program, and Mr. D’Agostino’s program, is 

not fully able to support. So, we’ve tried to mitigate the constraints 

he has on his budget by seeking funds from other sponsors to help 

support that fundamental capability. 

So, when I think about the future, it’s not only, ‘‘Do we have adequate funding?’’—the challenge that you face for the NNSA programs—but, it’s even the broader spectrum of national security 

programs that this Congress is contemplating that will really impact the health and vitality of the institution and our ability to 

carry out our mission today and well into the future. 

Thank you, sir. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

We’ll begin 8-minute rounds for questioning. 

My first question relates to weapons funding and gets right to 

the heart of it. It goes to, once again, Dr. D’Agostino and Dr. Cook. 

Under the CRs, the weapons activities budget request for fiscal 

year 2011 for NNSA was provided. This is a substantial increase, 

some $625 million above the fiscal year 2010 funding level. On the 

other hand, there is now talk that a permanent budget for the balance of fiscal year 2011 may be $200 to $300 million lower than 

the fiscal year 2011 budget request, the level at which the weapons 

program has been operating. What impact would a reduction in fiscal year 2011 funding have on the weapons activities programs, 

given that we’re now half way through the fiscal year? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I’ll be glad to start, sir. I’d ask Don to follow 

up. 

Senator NELSON. That would be fine. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. It would have a significant impact, Mr. Chairman. Our ability to execute funds effectively depends a great deal 

on knowledge of the path forward. We’re blessed to have the President request it and Congress follow, and allow us to proceed at the 

President’s request in this area. Even with this uncertainty, Don 

60 

has been executing, with the laboratories, to work on the program 

that we have requested and that the Senate has allowed us to 

move forward with. 

There is this uncertainty, of course, when we look at the debates 

that happen back and forth. It tends to color the ability to plan and 

has me thinking about, ‘‘Well, should I hire up in order to do the 

B61 work at Sandia?’’ For example—the many tens, and even hundreds, of people that are required to put this in place. Because, if 

it doesn’t come through, I might have to fire them. This kind of cycling is very bad for the workforce. It’s very inefficient. At the 

lower levels themselves, if we ended up with a lower level, of 

course—what would be authorized and appropriated—then, of 

course, we would have to start making some very significant cuts, 

because we’ve started the year at this higher rate. 

Don, you might be able to provide some more specifics. 

Dr. COOK. Yes. My answer, sir, would be that it would be a substantial change from where we are. With the anomaly in the CR, 

we have chosen not to waste time. We have a number of weapon 

systems that are operating beyond their original design lifetime. 

The infrastructure projects that we must execute across the board 

are at very key and sensitive steps in design, preparing for execution. The hiring has been going on. The national strategy has been 

made clear. So, at this point—and particularly now shortly close to 

halfway through the fiscal year—in fact, any reduction would have 

a very substantial effect. 

Senator NELSON. The effect of halfway through the year is, of 

course, doubling the impact, also catching you in the middle of hiring decisions, no ability to plan until we know what the number 

would be. So, we would appreciate you making that clear for the 

record. 

My colleague has also indicated a concern about that. We’re 

going to engage in cuts, we need to know exactly what we’re doing, 

and we have to do it in a responsible way, consistent with what decisions we’ve made and expectations we have following the New 

START treaty ratification, as well. 

Admiral Donald, we’re going to talk a little bit about naval reactors funding. The fiscal year 2012 funding level for the Office of 

Naval Reactors is approximately $127 million below the fiscal year 

2011 request and the amount available for your office under the 

CR. Can you explain to us what impact this CR has had on Office 

of Naval Reactors development work for the Ohio-class replacement 

reactor? Are there other areas where the CR is impacting the naval 

reactors? 

Admiral DONALD. Yes, sir. What it has meant, so far, as I discussed in my earlier statement, is, it’s put us behind, as far as the 

work that we’re doing to do the concept development and the design work to prepare ourselves to get into construction of key components and to do the work we need to do to make sure that design 

is mature at the time we start construction in 2019. 

Specifically, on the Ohio replacement program, this is the design 

for the reactor plant, and I have to be in synchronization with the 

Navy as they’re designing the rest of the ship, and as I am designing, from the Navy side, the remainder of the steamplant that goes 

with it. So, there’s a very closely coupled relationship here. If I get 

61 

out of sync with them, then that will not only potentially delay the 

ship, it’ll also increase cost. 

When we look at where we are right now, if I were held at the 

CR level, our estimate is, is that we’d be looking at a 6- to 9-month 

delay in the delivery of the ship. Now, that’s a long way out, but 

if you look at the compression of the schedule and what we have 

to do between now and 2019, compared to what we have done in 

the past, on Virginia, on the Ford aircraft carriers, we are pretty 

comfortable in saying that will be a delay of somewhere between 

6 to 9 months. 

Similarly, on the Navy side, if there were reductions in funding 

on the Navy side that remained in the CR for the rest of the year, 

you looked at the entire ship, you would be talking to a 1- to 2- 

year delay, potentially, in the delivery of the ship. 

There are also personnel costs associated with that, and hiring. 

We would not be able to hire, our estimate right now is, somewhere 

on the order of 100 to 150 people to support the designers that we’d 

need to get in place to do that work. You can’t ramp that up overnight, because these are highly technically sophisticated individuals. They need experience in what they’re doing. We’re in the middle of a demographic change in our business, where we have a lot 

of senior folks ready to retire. We want to transfer that knowledge 

over to the younger folks and help them become more effective at 

what they’re doing in the design work. 

Then we would be looking at potentially having to lay people off, 

both in the shipyards and in our laboratories. Our estimate, if we 

stayed at the CR level, would be somewhere on the order of 50 people. That would just be the beginning of where we would start. 

So, it’s a significant impact. Again, very early in the design work, 

where there are really two key technical challenges that we’re looking at in this design. The first is, we want to build a reactor 

plant—a reactor core that will last for the life of the ship. This is 

a 40-plus-year ship. We’ve done life-of-the-ship cores for Virginia- class at 33 years. We’ve never gone to 40. You would ask, ‘‘Why 

would you want to do that?’’ If we can do that and eliminate that 

lengthy refueling overhaul in midlife, like we do for the Ohios right 

now, then the potential exists that we would not have to have as 

many Ohio replacements right now as we do Ohios. We have 14. 

We would be looking to buy 12 of those ships instead of 14, because 

you’ve bought more operational availability if it’s not sitting in the 

shipyard. There are technical challenges to that. We believe we are 

capable of meeting that challenge. That’s key to this early design 

work that we’re doing. 

The second thing we’re putting on this ship is an electric drive. 

We’re changing the propulsion mode from the standard steam turbine reduction to electric drive. What that brings you is enhanced 

quieting. In a submarine, stealth is everything. A deterrent is not 

really a deterrent if people can find it. So, we want to make sure 

it cannot be found. Given the fact that this ship will be operating 

out to 2080, we feel that it’s necessary to make the investment upfront in this stealth technology to ensure that it is a viable asset 

well into the future, long after we’re gone from this business. 

So, those two key technical challenges, the importance of the 

early investment in the design, that’s where I’m concerned. If I 

62 

can’t get that investment now, and get those parameters and that 

design work done now, and the right people in place, puts that at 

risk. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you very much. 

It’s difficult to overstate the fiscal crisis this Nation is in. Admiral Mullen has said it’s the greatest threat to our national security—our debt. This year, we will spend $3.8 trillion and we’ll bring 

in $2.2 trillion. Forty cents of every dollar is borrowed that we’re 

spending today. People know that I believe in a strong Defense Department, so the reporters, first thing they want to ask is, ‘‘Well, 

is the Defense Department immune, Senator Sessions? You want 

to cut everything else. But, is Defense Department immune?’’ DOD 

is not immune. I’m just telling you, and neither is DOE. DOE came 

forward with a budget request for next year of 9.5-percent increase. 

They’re not going to get a 9.5-percent increase. We don’t have the 

money. 

What would happen in a private world? Since I’m the ranking 

Republican on the Budget Committee and I’m living with these 

numbers every day, forgive me; but you have to get in your head 

that things have changed. That’s all I’m telling you, that things 

have changed. The ability to go first-rate on everything we did and 

be able to proceed and pay big salaries and bonuses and build new 

buildings and all—of course, I guess the weapons complexes 

haven’t seen a lot of increases in a long time, there’s no doubt 

about it. That’s why we have to go forward. But, every dollar has 

to be fought for, Mr. D’Agostino. If you can build a building for a 

little less, you have to do it. 

So, to follow up a little bit on the Chairman’s question, the House CR version calls for a $312-million reduction; the Senate’s; 

$185 million. Can you give us any more information about how 

much could be sustained and how much can’t be sustained to reach 

your mission? Because I am of the long-term view, I think that all 

of you share, that we have diminished the weapons complex for a 

very, very long time, and it’s at a very dangerous stage. We made 

a national commitment. The President made a commitment as part 

of this START Treaty. 

What can we do? What can you tell us about how much you have 

to have to stay on track without doing damage to the program and 

ending up costing more than otherwise would be the case? 

Mr. D’Agostino? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. I might start, and then, as you wish, 

I’ll let our colleagues add in, as well. 

You had talked specifically about the $312 million and the $185 

million numbers, the differences, maybe, between House and Senate at various stages of the bills. One is a 50-percent reduction to 

our plans on increases and—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Fifty-percent reduction of what, now? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The $312 million is about 50 percent of the $624 million that was requested, the difference between—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Six-—the 624 increase. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. All right. 

63 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Right. 

Senator SESSIONS. See, the American people are getting a little 

confused about all this. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Right. 

Senator SESSIONS. You get an increase of 600 and you reduce 

that increase to 300, and you say you have a cut. I guess you 

have—since we started the year at the higher number, I guess you 

can say that. But, the way our budget projections work is that 

somebody projects it’s going to increase it 3 percent, and you say 

we’re only going to increase 2 percent; they say that’s a cut. But, 

to the average American, that’s not a cut. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I understand, Senator. As you mentioned, we 

are digging ourselves out of a hole. 

Senator SESSIONS. But, you only get half as much increase as you 

hoped to get. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. As a result of that, we won’t be able to do the 

type of program we put forward that we believe is necessary for the 

NPR, specifically in three broad areas. We can delve into the details as we have time to. 

The first area is our work on the stockpile itself. At a 50-percent 

reduction—and, of course, we’ve been spending at the higher rate, 

as authorized in the CR, so it is—it has a magnifying effect—will 

result in significant changes to our B61 life extension work, just to 

carry that particular problem forward, this life extension is absolutely critical if we’re going to get the system modernized in place 

so that it continues to support the Nation from fiscal year 2017 and 

beyond. So, if we don’t do this life extension work that we have 

planned, it will have a grave impact on our ability to maintain that 

particular warhead for our stockpile, which DOD and the President 

both believe is necessary to do. That’s a huge upfront impact. 

Senator SESSIONS. So, no money invested in that except for the 

new money that you got? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Certainly, we have existing money to maintain 

the B61, which is what we call surveillance work. It’s like lifting 

the hood and looking inside the warhead and maintaining it. But, 

our ability to move forward with the life extension in time to meet 

our 2017 date will be impacted, and we would have to scale back 

significantly the type of work, and do the bare minimum necessary 

on that particular warhead. 

The other significantly large area—that’s an example in directed 

stockpile work—that would be impacted, I believe, is our ability to 

bring on board, for the Nation, a uranium and plutonium capability. It will be impacted. It’ll be pushed out a few years. These 

are what have been called projects, but which Dr. Cook correctly 

describes as national capabilities. I believe the committee understands that these aren’t just capabilities to take care of our stockpile. They are, at a minimum, that. They are a lot more than just 

taking care of our stockpile. These are the capabilities that are absolutely critical in order to work with plutonium and uranium, 

which is absolutely necessary for us to do nuclear counterterrorism 

work and do the nuclear nonproliferation work which many—including myself—feel is part of our integrated national security—our 

nuclear security mission space. All of this ties together. 

64 

We want to get out of buildings and capabilities that were put 

in place in 1952. Even if we proceed at the President’s requested 

level, we’ll have been in these facilities for close to 70 years, as a 

matter of fact, because the capability won’t come on board for another 10 years or so. So, moving forward is absolutely essential in 

order for us to maintain our stockpile and to maintain the nuclear 

security work. 

I’ve talked plenty. If you will, sir, I’d like Dr. Cook to provide 

some background. 

Senator SESSIONS. All right. 

Dr. COOK. I’ll add a few words. Let’s see, the difficulty is that, 

at the same time, we must replace 60-year-old capabilities in special nuclear materials, uranium and plutonium. We have weapon 

systems that are now operating beyond their original design lifetimes. The President’s fiscal year 2012 request is for the 20th year 

in which we have had a moratorium on underground testing. So, 

if I start with one point, it is, we must effectively put the complex 

to work, that waiting further, not investing, is a clear decision to 

take on additional risk in all three areas that I mentioned. Those 

are fairly severe. 

Now, if I can look to hope at all here, it is that we can reform 

our management practices, as the Administrator said, improve the 

way in which we’re doing work. So, we’re looking at the industrial 

suppliers—I’ve already mentioned the parent companies of LANL 

and Y–12, people who bring to the government sector the best industrial practices. We’re already moving forward to directives reform, reform of the DOE directives in which we are seeking to 

adopt consensus standards—ISO–2000, ISO–9000, ISO–14000. I’ll 

state an assertion that, in many areas, not nuclear areas, is a better way to go to improve speed, efficiency, and the conduct of all 

work. We can clearly improve our management disciplines. 

But, the core issue I’d start with is, if we don’t effectively put the 

complex to work, all aspects—research and development, project 

development, rebuilding the capabilities, and mainly manufacturing warheads, but based only on the previously tested designs, 

with no new military capabilities or requirements—that is clear. 

That’s national policy. Waiting will not make it better. I’m sure you 

understand that. But, we could improve some of our business practices. 

Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Donald. 

Admiral DONALD. I wouldn’t want to walk out of here and leave 

you with the impression, Senator Sessions, that we don’t understand the significance of the fiscal problem that we face. But, also, 

I want to leave you also knowing that we view it as our obligation 

to do the best that we can to operate as efficiently as we possibly 

can. If you look at our budgets over the last—really, since I’ve been 

in this job now, 61⁄2 years, we’ve been relatively flat, essentially adjusted for inflation. Even within that budget, we took on the project 

to put our spent-fuel handling capability in place so that we could 

transition from wet fuel storage in Idaho to dry fuel storage to keep 

us in compliance with our Idaho agreements that we entered into 

in the mid-1990s. We did that within our budget and didn’t come 

and ask for any additional funding to do that. That came at a price, 

though, because the assumption was, if we were tasked with new 

65 

projects, we’d have to come to you and ask you for some additional 

resources. What you see in our increase in funding—the $125 million between fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2011, and then the additional into fiscal year 2012—really reflects those three projects 

that Mr. D’Agostino had mentioned. We’re working against the 

clock on all three of those projects. The Ohio replacement, I’ve already mentioned, if we make decisions today to delay, it’ll have the 

impact in 2029, when a replacement ship is not there to cover for 

the one that went out in 2027. The prototype refueling, I’m working 

against physics, because the fuel is being depleted in that prototype 

right now. Not only is that where we’re going to do the derisking 

of the technology to build a core for Ohio replacement, but that also 

is going to provide the training platform for one-third of our nuclear operators that go out into the fleet. So, I need to go and replace that capability, as well. 

Then finally, the spent fuel handling facility in Idaho—I have a 

water pit out there that has 25 metric tons of spent fuel in it, and 

some parts of it are over 50 years old. It needs to be replaced. It’s 

not at current code. It’s not particularly efficient. From our perspective, technically, it’s not a situation we want to live with much 

longer in the future. 

That’s the timeline that we’re working to and why we’ve come to 

you to ask you for this assistance for these programs. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, it’s $84 billion over 10 years on total 

program, and that’s a lot of money. We just need you to be thinking 

any way possible to keep those numbers at as reasonable level as 

possible. But, the United States of America cannot not have a reliable nuclear arsenal. It is not acceptable. So, we have to find the 

money. I hope that you won’t take the view that some government 

people seem to take sometimes that, ‘‘I’m not going to affect any 

efficiencies. You either give me money or I won’t do the new project 

you want me to do.’’ But, no business operates that way, what businesses have to wrestle with every day. Families have to make priority choices, and we’re asking you to do that because I want to 

protect this program. 

I do think $300 million is clearly too much of a reduction, Mr. 

Chairman. Hopefully we can figure out a way not to go that far. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all very much for being here this afternoon. 

Mr. Chairman, I know that the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee normally handles the nonproliferation portfolio, 

but it’s come up a little bit in testimony, and so I would like to 

raise the issue here and follow up on some of the budget questions. 

As you pointed out in your testimony, Mr. D’Agostino, President 

Obama, in talking about the threat to this country, pointed out 

that a nuclear weapon in the hands of terrorists is probably the 

biggest threat that we all stay up nights worrying about. I was 

really horrified to see that, according to International Panel on 

Fissile Materials, the global stockpile of highly enriched uranium, 

which is the easiest material for terrorists to use to make a nuclear 

weapon, in 2010 was enough to make more than 60,000 nuclear 

weapons. So, given the insecure nature of these materials around 

66 

the world, clearly this is a threat that we should all take very seriously. 

While I appreciate, and know that you all do, the need to address 

efficiencies in our budget, and to deal with the country’s debt and 

deficit, I am concerned about the proposal in the House’s budget 

that would have cut $600 million from nuclear nonproliferation 

programs. I wonder if you, Mr. D’Agostino, or any of the other 

panel members, could speak to what that would mean, in terms of 

what would not get done if that cut is realized. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Okay. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Absolutely. 

There is clearly a connection between these investments in the 

weapons activities account of the subcommittee’s jurisdiction and 

how it impacts other elements of NNSA. The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program absolutely counts on Y12, for example, in 

order to be able to have a place for this highly enriched uranium 

that we’re bringing back to be processed, characterized, put in a 

situation so it can eventually be used as part of the national stockpile to support the naval reactors program for propulsion out into 

the future, as well as be available for downblending into low-enriched uranium to turn this into, ultimately, electricity for peaceful 

uses here in this country. So, these investments in the weapons account are directly connected to the nonproliferation program. I 

think that’s an important point. I think the subcommittee understands that. 

I’m deeply concerned with the reductions in the nonproliferation 

program. Again, these are reductions from the request as Senator 

Sessions has pointed out—because what we are in the process of 

doing is implementing an aggressive but important program to lock 

down nuclear materials worldwide in 4 years. We don’t do it by 

ourselves, of course. We do this in partnership with over 100 countries. But, we do require expertise from this country. Work that 

happens at Sandia, LANL, and LLNL, in fact, provide the core expertise in order to say, ‘‘What’s the best security system to design 

in Russia? Or—and how do we put it in place? How do we know 

that it is actually in place and working as it should be?’’ So, these 

laboratories provide the foundational element of that. That $600 

million would have a direct impact on our ability to implement the 

security—what we call first line of defense—secure the material in 

place. It would also have an impact on our ability to convert research reactors from highly-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium, a plan that we have laid out. We’ve converted 70 reactors so 

far, but there are many more research reactors that we know exist 

that we have a plan laid out to convert these research reactors 

from HEU to LEU. It would impact the ability for us to put radiation detectors at seaports, land border crossings, airports, and the 

like. 

Obviously, if we are faced with a reduction, if you will, from our 

original plan, we will seek to fund the highest-priority work, the 

most important work, first. But, an element of maintaining nuclear 

security isn’t just doing the security work in place, it’s making sure 

that other nations who are in the process of bringing civil nuclear 

power do so in a way with the appropriate nuclear safeguards in 

place. So, we have an element of our program that is designed in 

67 

order to help other nations have the right nuclear safeguards in 

place. 

I believe it would have a significant impact on our 4-year 

lockdown effort. I think this is the effort where we have a very 

clear direction that everyone feels is an important direction to go 

to. That’s essentially where we are right now. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Do we have a limit on our time? 

Senator NELSON. Eight minutes. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Okay. 

Dr. Miller, you talked about your concern that we may lose some 

of the best scientists and technicians if we’re not able to ensure future funding and a commitment to the program. I wonder if you 

feel like we’re currently investing enough in our future workforce, 

and what kinds of things we ought to be doing to ensure that we 

can attract the best and the brightest people to the program. 

Dr. MILLER. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Picking off of the recent conversations with Senator Sessions and 

yourself at the laboratories—LLNL, in particular—we have reduced 

the overall staffing at the laboratory by about 2,000 people over the 

last 5 years. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Two thousand out of how many? 

Dr. MILLER. Out of about 8,000. So, there were 8,000. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Wow. 

Dr. MILLER. There are about 6,000 now. 

Two years ago, I testified that I thought we were in danger of 

losing the fundamental science, technology, and engineering capability that the country relied on. That decline was stabilized in 

2010. We have seen, again in my words, modest increases. Dr. 

Cook talked about 3 percent. That’s only a slight—a percent increase or so above the rate of inflation, but it is positive. We have 

begun, under the CR and the President’s planned budgets for 2011 

and 2012, we have started growing that back to a level that, in my 

judgment, would be sustainable over the long term. The same issue 

would occur if there were substantial cuts in the nonproliferation 

program. Again, these are substantial investments in fundamental 

people that provide the technical capability to build radiation monitors, and provide advice to the government. 

In my view, as I testified 2 years ago, the most important part 

of securing the talent at the laboratory is that the scientists and 

engineers understand that they have a stable future. They are very 

highly trained, very highly technically qualified, and they want to 

be assured that they can work on some of the country’s most important problems. If they can, we don’t have difficulty hiring them, 

nor do we have difficulty retaining them. But, when there are 

budget ups and downs and uncertainties, that’s when we have difficulty. 

My judgment is, as Dr. Anastasio talked about earlier, one of my 

fundamental responsibilities is the long-term health of the laboratory so it’s capabilities are there when the country needs them to 

apply to whatever the country’s most important problems are. For 

me to do that, the most important thing is stability and national 

consensus on what we’re doing. I think we have the national consensus in the Congressional Bipartisan Commission that has been 

68 

referred to, the NPR, and now the START treaty. We have that 

consensus. What we need now is to fund the programs that support 

that policy. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. My time is up. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator. 

Let’s take a second and talk about extending the replacement facilities, and what that implication is, in terms of being able to deal 

with a $100 million shortfall in 2011 and whatever we might face 

in 2012. Admiral Donald, in looking at replacing the facility that 

you have under your authority, we have 40.6 million for conceptual 

design, and that would be a new spent-fuel building to support the 

NR program. In fiscal year 2012, the request for conceptual design 

is $53.8 million. The construction wouldn’t start until 2013. What 

would be the implications, in terms, first, of fiscal impact, and then 

the second implication, in terms of what it would do to our national 

security if this were to be extended 1 or 2 years into the future? 

Admiral DONALD. This is our spent-fuel facility in Idaho. All of 

the spent fuel, when we refuel aircraft carriers and submarines, or 

defuel them at the end of their lives, this fuel is shipped by rail 

to this facility. What we do is, we put it in a large water pit and 

it cools down for a period of time. We also examine it to make sure 

it’s performing the way it was designed to perform. Then we process it for dry storage, to be in compliance with the agreements that 

we have with the State of Idaho, for all spent fuel to be out of wet 

storage by 2023. 

So, the issue with this facility right now is, as I’ve mentioned before, it’s aging. Most parts of it are 50 to 40 years old. It is not in 

compliance with current code. In fact, it has cracks in it. We know 

that for a fact. We manage those cracks, and we deal with it. It 

does have some seismic liabilities that we manage. But, from a 

point of view of just stewardship, this is a facility that, in fact, 

needs to be replaced. 

There’s another element, as well, in that we are in a very intense 

period of fuel handling in our shipyards that’s being driven by the 

Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. They’re all coming in for their midlife 

refuelings. They’re heel-to-toe. Right now, the USS Theodore Roosevelt is completing hers. Next will be USS George Washington. We 

will be heel-to-toe in these refuelings now for a very long time, all 

the way out through the retirement of the most recent ship, 50 

years from now. There will be one in some sort of a fueling availability. We have to be able to move that fuel out of the shipyards. 

To do that, you have to have an efficient and capable facility. It has 

to be configured to take the fuel as it is designed when it comes 

out of a ship. 

We have had to, because of this heel-to-toe refueling, redesign 

how we take the fuel out, reconfigure it into a new system, and the 

facility has to be redesigned to accept this new fuel. Otherwise, I 

would have aircraft carriers backing up in the shipyards. They 

wouldn’t be available to do what they’re supposed to do. Or, we 

could have fuel that we have no place to put. 

So, the target is 2020. That’s when I have to have the new facility in place. The construction starts in 2015. The construction design starts in 2013. 

69 

What we’re talking about in a delay is, it’s really a day-for-day, 

because it’s a fairly structured process of design, design maturing, 

and then buying the pieces, the heavy equipment that you need to 

go do this. So, you’re talking about slipping out beyond 2020. When 

that happens, we’re going to have to have another place to put that 

spent fuel from the aircraft carriers. 

The best way we would do that would be with new shipping containers—more additional shipping containers. Each one of these 

shipping containers costs about $22 million. For a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, that’s nine shipping containers that you would need. 

So, that’s a $200 million bill that you’d be talking about if we 

couldn’t get the facility done by 2020, for each Nimitz-class aircraft 

carrier that comes for refueling. 

That’s the timeline that we’re on, the impact that we’re talking 

about. Then, there’s a day-to-day impact of just doing work in an 

aging facility. Things break, and you have to go and fix them. It 

results in inefficiencies in how we deal with our business. 

So, I think that should capture it for you, the subject of your 

questions. 

Senator NELSON. Let’s talk just a second about the delays in the 

naval reactors. The construction project to receive and handle M– 

290 spent-fuel shipping containers is about a year late. Would 

these be the shipping containers that you’re talking about? 

Dr. COOK. Yes, sir, they are. 

Senator NELSON. They’re a year late. The most recent schedule 

indicated that the approval would start construction CD–3 in the 

second quarter of fiscal year 2011. That ends tomorrow—or, it begins—second quarter fiscal starts tomorrow. No, I guess it ends tomorrow. Can you give us some idea of the delay? Because, if there’s 

already a shortfall, in terms of what we’re looking at, in terms of 

money to be able to do, does this delay just add to that problem? 

Admiral DONALD. Well, where we are—the CD–0 was—that was 

completed in 2009, I believe it was—CD–1, we have—we want to 

complete by fiscal year 2012—the end of fiscal year 2012. Because 

of the delays in funding we’ve seen so far, we are, in fact, behind 

in the design. We’ve been able to—at least to date, because the 

numbers have been relatively low, we have been able to continue 

some of the fundamental work. We’re engaged, right now, in the 

environmental impact statement and the concept design work, and 

continuing that. But, really, this year and in 2012 is when we have 

to get the work completed to make the selection at CD–1 of the 

type of facility, what it’s really going to look like, where it’s going 

to be located, and how it’s actually going to work—be configured to 

do the work that we need it to do. So, this is really a crucial point 

in the design, because you do set the basic parameters that define 

the cost and schedule for the rest of the program. 

Senator NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, I am one who has been very interested in the efficiencies initiative at DOD. Secretary Gates has 

directed all elements of that Department to identify efficiencies 

that can be reutilized. I heard earlier discussion—I think Dr. Cook 

said—about efficiency and management programs and what you 

can do. Could you identify, maybe, for us some of the efficiencies 

that perhaps—a project that has been identified for the next 5 

years. Have you gotten to the point where you can do that? 

70 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. I mentioned one in my oral statement. 

We talked about the supply chain management center. This is 

something that I started in 2007, when we realized the way we 

were operating whereas, more or less—and this isn’t quite a fair 

statement—I mean, there are no completely independent sites, but 

eight sites. We felt there were great efficiencies to be achieved by 

operating as an integrated and interdependent organization, where 

we would look to drive efficiencies in not having three capabilities 

to do the same thing, but dropping us down to one or two capabilities, when it’s—where we need redundancy for a national capability, then we would have that. At that time, we felt we could go 

from 35 million square feet—take 9 million square feet off of our 

35-million-square-feet enterprise of buildings and things like that. 

So, we have 9 million square feet of space that we’re moving out 

of. 

Another area of efficiency that we hope to implement, and have 

implemented part of the way, is to reduce the amount of security 

space that we have to protect in our enterprise, to consolidate nuclear materials to fewer geographic locations and to fewer sites 

within those geographic locations. Because, the fewer locations that 

we have to protect, the less expensive it is to maintain. As a result 

of those efficiencies, more recently, we’ve been able to take our 

$765 or $770 million security budget and drop it down to, like, 

about $22 million or so. 

At Y12, we plan on going from 150 acres of high security space, 

ultimately to 15 acres of high security space. That shift—and this 

is where this uranium processing capability that we want to shift 

into—will allow us to move forward and save what we believe is 

a total of $200 million of operating expenses, both in security costs 

per year, as well as operating efficiencies, by getting the whole enterprise right-sized, if you will, leaving, kind of, the cold-war enterprise behind us, and shifting to a much smaller, more integrated 

future enterprise. Those are the macro pieces that we have before 

us. 

There are a number of other specific initiatives we have, looking 

forward. One of them is to look at putting together a common work 

breakdown structure. This is something that Dr. Cook is implementing in the weapons program. We’re looking at linking the formulation of the budget to the execution of the budget in a real way. 

We’ve brought into our organization some folks that have direct 

budget formulation and execution experience from OMB. Phil 

Calbos is here in the room. He really understands this work, and 

he works for Dr. Cook directly in this particular area. 

I’m optimistic. I could talk for a while, but you probably don’t 

want me to. 

Dr. COOK. If I could add—and give you one past one and one future one. 

A past one that we had in this year. We knew that, when we got 

the training and the tooling in place at Pantex, that we would be 

able to do some of the disassembly work more rapidly and completely safely. That was proven. So, we had a target of number of 

disassemblies, and the Pantex operation, with the training and the 

tooling in place, exceeded that target—in fact, there was another 

26 percent—so, 126 percent on 100—and in a year in which there 

71 

was a major flood at Pantex; if you recall, more than 10 inches of 

rain on a very bad day in the city of Amarillo, and the ground 

couldn’t absorb that much rain. In our programs, we’re taking account of that effect. We’re using efficiencies to make sure that we 

can recover from that. 

Now, that’s the past. I said there was a future. When you look 

at the—it often is called ‘‘common’’—we really mean ‘‘adaptable 

and interoperable’’ study for the ICBM warhead, the W78 and the 

SLBM warhead, the W88. Provided that we can get authorization 

to move ahead on that, we have the potential to save cost and to 

have interoperability in the arming and fusing—arming, fusing, 

and firing units, that Dr. Hommert could address, or in the nuclear 

explosive packages, that Dr. Miller or Dr. Anastasio could address. 

What we do know is, if we don’t do that work in a joint way, it’s 

going to cost more, and so, some of this may be cost avoidance. It 

doesn’t matter. It’s still cost savings in the end. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Admiral Donald may have one, as well, if you 

have time, sir. 

Admiral DONALD. Yes, sir. The Ohio replacement has been one 

that we’ve obviously been focused on here for several years now. 

But, in the name of efficiencies, one of the issues is, we work 

through DOD’s acquisition process. We were the first program 

through that new process that Dr. Carter headed up. But, we were 

challenged to drive the cost of that ship down. As far as our part 

was concerned, one of the key decisions that was made, that helped 

us in that regard, was the decision to go from 20 missile tubes to 

16 missile tubes. Because, what that allowed us to do was to 

downrate the propulsion power that was needed. So, obviously, it’s 

a smaller reactor that you would need. But, what it also allowed 

us to do was to go back—the size fell into the envelope where we 

could go back and use components that we had already designed 

for the Virginia-class and bring those into this design—not have to 

do it over again—but, several of the mechanical components, to use 

those over again. It enabled us to drive the costs of that propulsion 

plant down and rely on proven technology that’s—pumps and 

valves and things like that don’t change like electronics do. So, 

we’re pretty comfortable putting that in a ship that will be around 

til 2080. But, we were allowed to do that. 

Senator NELSON. Well, in the absence of my colleagues, perhaps 

I’ll just continue. 

Last March, when we held subcommittee hearings, we were focused on the protective forces that guard the nuclear weapons and 

materials at DOE sites. Mr. D’Agostino, are you suggesting that 

you’ve been able to consolidate some of those sites, which now 

means that the actual cost of security for those has been reduced? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. The security costs have been reduced. 

We are also looking, very much so, at other opportunities to go forward even more. Dr. Miller and Dr. Anastasio are quite familiar 

with our joint effort to look at, instead of the Nation maintaining 

two separate plutonium capabilities to deal with large quantities of 

plutonium material, one at LLNL and one at LANL, we’ve decided 

to consolidate to one plutonium capability, and it’s a national capability. It doesn’t belong to LANL. It belongs to the Nation. But, 

both laboratories can work in one particular facility. That effort to 

72 

reduce the amount of plutonium—we have a commitment to get 

this done by 2012—will allow us to change the size and the nature 

of the security forces at LLNL. Dr. Miller may be able to add to 

that, if he’d like. 

There are other things that we’re doing in the security area. 

We’re pushing towards common uniforms, for example, which get 

the security force together in a particular fashion to essentially 

show that this is a cohesive unit. Even though they’re managed 

under different contracts, there are opportunities to drive some 

commonality there. 

We’re using what I would call life extension activities for the security vehicles that we have in place. We’re using technology to put 

in long-range detection capabilities and look out, further out, and 

rely less on humans, if you will, and guards—guns and gates—and 

put technology into the picture. We’re introducing this in our training capability. 

All of these things have saved tens of millions of dollars a year. 

Brad Peterson, who runs that particular activity, working with the 

labs and our production plants, have been able to do that. That’s 

why they’ve—we’ve been able to reduce it. I keep challenging Brad 

in this area. I do think that, as we get to fewer sites with large 

quantities of nuclear material, there are some further opportunities. 

But, we can’t do it in a way that this whole purpose is just to 

drive costs down. I mean, in—or, to try to spend less money. We 

obviously want to make sure the security—as we’re making these 

changes, we don’t lose that kind of operational focus that we’ve had 

in the past. 

Senator NELSON. Now, the goal is, obviously, to create the best 

security at the most reasonable cost. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. 

Senator NELSON. So, I understand that. It’s obvious that the primary goal here is to protect the materials and the weapons. So, 

we’ll have to deal with that. 

In December, NNSA made a significant change in the way you 

manage the aviation program of the source of Office of Secure 

Transportation (OST). As part of this change, the DOE aviation 

program will have increased oversight responsibilities for the 

NNSA program, in lieu of the FAA. Is there a plan that’s in place 

for DOE Aviation Office to oversee this NNSA program? Dr. Cook, 

would that be your area? 

Dr. COOK. Yes, it is my area, sir. 

If I could address some of the driving factors and where we are, 

I’d like to do that. 

The focus that we have in the aviation area is looking forward 

to the LEP work that we have to the material moves, whether 

they’re special nuclear materials or not, and to the limited-life component exchanges that are required across the country. In order to 

focus on the efficiency and the effectiveness, we’ve taken a look 

across the board at the OST and have concluded—and we had a 

plan to replace our aging fleet of three DC–9s with 737s that would 

still be used airplanes, but would have perhaps only 10 years of life 

on them. We’re part way through that effort. One of the DC–9s has 

been sold. Two 737s have now been acquired. In parallel with that, 

73 

we’re looking at the equipping contracts, the maintenance contracts, and the nature of the pilots. We also have taken the opportunity to sell aircraft that we no longer needed. We’ve sold a couple 

of Twin Otters and one other airplane, and are focusing now on 

those things that tend to be inherently Federal functions. Specifically, the aviation fleet for OST will be focused on moving the 

emergency response teams for radiological or nuclear threats effectively and as rapidly as we have in the past. As far as maintenance, given that we’re going to have different aircraft, three 737s, 

rather than three DC–9s—we intend to competitively place the 

maintenance contract that is currently in place. Given the future 

need, we’ve taken a look at the nature of the pilots, although there 

are a small number of pilots, 15 or fewer, to operate around-theclock and have the emergency response capability. We’re looking at 

whether it makes sense to Federalize those pilots, or not. 

There are different standards that the FAA requires for different 

types of aircraft flights and different missions. We are working 

hand-in-hand with the FAA. We also work with the Office of Aviation Management within DOE, but outside NNSA, and I’ve given 

you the base for looking forward with this. The core objective here 

is to focus the activity that we have even more tightly on the mission, while we replace the aircraft, and then put in place the maintenance contracts for future years and for pilots to do that. 

Senator NELSON. Going back to the question about the security 

guards, has—have you addressed the—Mr. D’Agostino—the need to 

deal with the retirement issue for the Guards? Are we having some 

sort of a program that—perhaps an accelerated 401k program— 

some system of reduction of that guard force? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, there was a report that had 29 recommendations in it to address, frankly, a whole waterfront, if you 

will, of security guard issues that had cropped up over the previous 

5 years. We’ve worked our way through 14 of those recommendations, I think smartly, dealing with making sure that there was a 

career path and a progression with those guards. In fact, we didn’t 

do it just with ourselves. We made sure that we had security guard 

representation to identify these areas and work through these. 

We’re now dealing with, if you will, the second half of those. 

We’re undertaking a study right now. Some of them have to do 

with the question of whether there should be a 20-year retirement. 

What are the differences between a security force that’s a static security force around a fixed location, versus a dynamic security 

force, such as the OST discussion we were just having earlier, 

that’s moving about? How equivalent is that to the U.S. military, 

which has the 20-year retirement? These are the more difficult and 

more challenging questions, the ones that you’ve described, and 

we’re looking at how to put that forward. 

But, I think what we have is a path forward, with the unions’ 

representatives that are there, to kind of address these 29 recommendations systematically, and work our way through them. We 

haven’t finished the job. Right now, we’re in the process of comparing the different types of retirement systems. 

Senator NELSON. The retirement systems could be different, depending upon the requirements for the employment and what’s required for employment. In other words, what kind of background, 

74 

what kind of education requirement there might be as part of the 

job. So, I would think that would be a good thing to work on, because of the—it looks to me like you’re going to be seeing a further 

reduction, at some point along the way, and having that taken care 

of upfront is almost always better than dealing with it after the 

fact. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think, with respect to the 

security guard force, what we’ve observed—because we do have a 

few different models across our enterprise, and we’re looking to 

drive—taking the best approaches out of each of these models. One 

of the main concerns is, particularly for those particular guards 

that are in a very active, what we call, a fighting position, is, we 

want to make sure that if they end up getting hurt—the knee 

hurts; that they aren’t now, all of a sudden, laid off. We’ve observed 

that there’s some value to have the security guards be actually a 

part of the M&O contractor workforce. That way, if there’s a difficulty in meeting the physical requirements to continue in this position, they can be retrained and stay and have a full career, if you 

will, and serving our country as an active worker in the M&O contract. 

We’re very much in tune to that. The guard force, particularly, 

is concerned about making sure they’re not in a position of, ‘‘Well, 

if you get hurt, then, I’m sorry, you’ve lost your job.’’ We definitely 

don’t want that. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. Anastasio, I don’t want you to think that 

your trip here was not worthwhile, not having asked very many 

questions. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Every trip here is worthwhile, Senator. 

Senator NELSON. Is there anything that we haven’t asked here 

that we should have asked or would be important for us to have 

asked, as you think about the budget issue, trying to cut, not slash, 

appropriate reductions, recognizing any cut has some implication? 

What we want to do is avoid the unfortunate implications, or the 

unfortunate consequences, of something that was not well thought 

through. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Yes sir, I’d have a few comments along those 

lines. First, as far as efficiencies we’ve been talking about, of 

course, not only at the administration’s level, at the Federal level, 

that the laboratories were working on that, too. As an example, 

last year, in fiscal year 2010, at LANL, we increased our purchasing by $209 million, and we did that with fewer staff. So, we 

were able to get a lot more work done, and actually were able to 

downsize the staff. 

The laboratories really made great strides in improving our efficiency. In the hearing we had last summer, I was worried about 

the pension system, and one of the ways we’ve been dealing with 

the pension system is to use some of the savings that we’ve accrued. That’s available for us to put not back into science, unfortunately, but at least to cover the pension costs. 

You ask about what would happen with delay of major facilities. 

I had a few thoughts on the CMRR facility, what would happen 

with the delays there. Senator Shaheen talked about nonproliferation. Just a reminder that this facility, the CMRR facility, is where 

all the inspectors from the IAEA that go around the world that 

75 

look at nuclear facilities, we bring them out to Los Alamos and 

train them. That’s the facility that that’s done in. So, again, it’s a 

multi-use facility, a national capability, as Mr. D’Agostino said. 

With a delay, of course we’ll have to continue to operate in our 

old facility, which right now is almost 60 years old. It happens to 

be literally on top of an earthquake fault—not the best place for 

a nuclear facility. We have a reminder of that with what’s going 

on in Japan. 

By delaying it, also we put at risk when we’ll be able to increase 

the capacity for pit production at the laboratory. The LEPs that we 

have planned are going to require some pits to be made even with 

the reuse of existing pits, we may run out of them. So, it’s building 

more of the same pits that we already have in the stockpile. Of 

course, the CMRR facility will not build pits, but all the samples 

that are taken to qualify a new pit are used in the existing facility. 

We don’t have the capacity or the efficiency to get that done in 

time. So, if we are delayed with CMRR, then that’s going to delay 

the time we’ll be available. 

Of course, the other thing we do is—the facility is separated from 

our pit production facility, and then we’re shipping samples of plutonium around on the road. So by doing that, of course, that’s a security risk. By bringing a new facility online, we’ll reduce our security posture. 

Then the most important thing, perhaps, is—of course, any delay 

in a project ultimately costs you money. So, if we delay the start 

and the process of this facility, it means, in the end, the integrated 

costs—although in 1 year you might save money, over the life of 

the project, it’s going to cost you money. 

So, I think those are some of the difficult challenges that Congress has to face. I think the simple version is, if you think of this 

in a project space, saving money this year may well cause you to 

spend more money in the long run. 

The other pieces we’ve harped on are—or, not harped on, but emphasized with you—is the people issue. Right now, our workforce 

sees pay freezes, sees increased contributions to pensions, increased costs of medical care, and now an uncertain budget. 

They’ve been very excited about the new commitment that the 

country has made. There’s exciting consensus to work on. But, at 

the same time, these uncertainties make the younger ones start to 

wonder, is there a career here for them? We understand the challenges that the country faces, but if we can have a stable-looking 

budget out into the years, whatever level it’s at, whatever the country can afford—and if it’s too different than the one we’ve talked 

about, ultimately I think we have to go back to the policy and say, 

‘‘If the country can’t afford this program, then perhaps we have to 

go rethink the policy and come up with a policy framework that the 

country can afford.’’ I’m not sure I know what that is, but that’s 

the sort of challenge that you face. 

Thank you, sir. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

I’ll ask the same question of everyone else. Is there something 

that we should have asked, or something you would like to add, 

after all the discussion so far? 

Dr. Hommert? 

76 

Dr. HOMMERT. I have a few quick comments. 

Just to continue a theme that Dr. Anastasio highlighted about 

cost efficiencies and our sensitivity to that. At Sandia, in the last 

year, we took decisions in our pension and our medical benefits and 

in cost efficiencies that have reduced the cost of our labor base by 

approximately $1 billion over this decade. The positive news in that 

is that our workforce has gone through that. They remain dedicated. We did not see an uptick in losses due to that, in part, because of their excitement about the program that they see the national policy laying out in front of them. So, again, I echo that, if 

that changes, that could have a different impact. 

Then, the last thing I’ll say is to return to, I think, really the 

question that Senator Sessions raised about, Well, what are our options if we cannot afford? I’ll focus it on the B61 for a moment. It’s 

important to understand that every day—that the 61 is older than 

any other bomb system we’ve ever had. We’re in unchartered territory. It—whatever budget the country can afford, our commitment 

is that we will work to minimize risks of sustaining that weapon 

and ensuring its safety, security, and reliability. But, there’ll be 

limits to how much we can control that risk, either in schedule or 

in the scope of what we do. It will require a possible relook at policy. I hope that won’t be the case. We will work diligently to extract 

every bit of efficiency for the funds you can authorize to execute 

that. But, it is a bit, again I’ll emphasize, of uncharted territory for 

us on that weapon system. 

Thank you. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. That is clearly something we have 

to keep in mind. The irony is inescapable, that a year ago we were 

making certain that the administration would ask for enough 

money. Now we’re talking about—it’s too much, because we can’t 

afford it. It’s an inescapable irony. I do understand it. I would 

imagine that employees and those who are committed to the project 

might think that Washington has a bit of a sleight of hand: now 

you see it, now you don’t. 

Thank you all for your candid comments. We appreciate it. 

This hearing is now adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON

SAFETY OF NAVAL NUCLEAR REACTORS

1. Senator NELSON. Admiral Donald, the Nuclear Navy has had an exemplary 

safety record over its almost 60 years of operations. Nevertheless, the recent events 

in Japan, a country with as much expertise in nuclear power as anyone, have 

taught us that even redundant redundancies can fail. What actions are you taking 

to reassure yourself that appropriate emergency contingencies and plans are in 

place and that these contingencies would avert a tragedy? 

Admiral DONALD. There are no immediate changes planned to how U.S. naval reactors used onboard submarines and aircraft carriers are operated as a result of the 

Fukushima nuclear power plant failures. However, as we have done in response to 

other major accidents, nuclear or otherwise, the U.S. Navy will assess and implement lessons learned from the event that can be applied to further strengthen the 

U.S. naval nuclear propulsion program. I have already initiated an assessment of 

the implications of the Fukushima reactor accident to the Naval Nuclear Propulsion 

Program. 

U.S. nuclear powered warships have safely operated for more than 50 years without experiencing a single reactor accident or release of any radioactivity sufficient 

to harm human health or have an adverse effect on the environment. U.S. naval 

77 

reactors have an outstanding record of over 146 million miles safely steamed on nuclear power, and they have amassed over 6,300 reactor-years of safe operation. 

Because of their military-unique missions, naval reactors are significantly different from commercial nuclear reactors. All nuclear powered warships are designed 

to survive wartime attack and allow the warships to continue to fight while protecting their crews against hazards. Survivability requires rugged designs, well-developed damage control capabilities, and redundant systems that also provide enhanced safety capability in the event of natural disasters. 

The earthquake and subsequent tsunami in Japan caused an extended loss of 

electrical power which resulted in the inability to properly cool the reactor cores at 

the Fukushima Daiichi site. Unlike the Fukushima nuclear power reactors, U.S. 

naval reactors have long-term decay heat removing capability that depends only on 

the physical arrangement of the reactor plant and on the nature of water itself (natural convection driven by density differences), not on electrical power, to cool the 

core. This is one example of the means available to nuclear-powered warships that 

assure, even in the unlikely event of multiple failures, naval reactors would not 

overheat and the fuel would not be damaged by heat produced in the reactor core. 

Further, there are multiple barriers that work to contain radioactivity on nuclear 

powered warships. Naval nuclear fuel contains fission products and prevents their 

release into the coolant loop during normal operations. Although commercial power 

reactors have similar barriers, barriers in nuclear powered warships are more robust, resilient, and conservatively designed. For example, U.S. naval nuclear fuel is 

solid metal, unlike the ceramic nuclear fuel used in commercial power reactors. U.S. 

naval nuclear fuel is designed for battle shock and can withstand combat shock 

loads 50 times the force of gravity without releasing fission products. This is greater 

than 10 times the earthquake shock loads used for designing U.S. commercial nuclear plants. 

Notwithstanding the enhanced capability of nuclear powered warships to survive 

natural disasters and continue to operate safely, other factors serve to mitigate the 

impacts of natural disasters on these ships. The fact that a moored nuclear powered 

warship sits in the water serves as a buffer against the ground forces felt during 

an earthquake; the earthquake forces on a moored nuclear powered warship, even 

those like the March 11 earthquake, would not be severe. 

Commercial nuclear power plants are designed to operate at high power levels for 

long periods to produce electricity. Because naval reactors are designed for warships, they are smaller and have a much lower power rating than commercial reactors. The rated power levels of the largest naval reactors are less than one-fifth of 

a large commercial reactor plant. Additionally, naval reactors typically operate at 

a fraction of their full power levels, since ships usually operate at speeds less than 

their maximum. Furthermore, because naval reactor power level is primarily set by 

propulsion needs when the ship is at sea, naval reactors are normally shutdown 

shortly after mooring and they are usually started up only shortly before departure. 

As a result of these facts, the amount of radioactivity potentially available for release from a reactor core of a U.S. nuclear powered warship moored in a port is typically less than about 1 percent of the levels for a typical commercial reactor. Naval 

cores also have significantly less heat buildup from fission product decay to be 

cooled when the reactors are shutdown. In addition, the reality that nuclear powered warships can be moved is a safety option that is not available to land-based 

nuclear facilities. 

U.S. nuclear powered warship crews are rigorously trained to respond immediately to any emergency in the ship. Naval operating practices and emergency procedures are also well-defined and rigorously enforced. The fact that the crew works 

in close proximity to the reactor ensures vigilant monitoring of even the smallest 

change in plant status. This is part of what we call ‘‘Defense in Depth’’ and is an 

element of our overall culture of maintaining high standards for design, manufacturing and operations—addressing small problems aggressively before they become 

larger ones. Because of the rugged design of the reactor plant, multiple safety systems, and fully trained and capable crew, the safety of U.S. nuclear powered warships is extremely high. In order for an accident that affects the operation of the 

ship or the crew to happen, the ship must simultaneously experience numerous unrealistic equipment and operator failures. Even though such an accident scenario is 

extremely unlikely, the U.S. nuclear powered warships and their support facilities 

are required to simulate such situations as they conduct meaningful training. In the 

extremely unlikely event of a problem involving the reactor of a U.S. nuclear powered warship, the U.S. Navy would initiate necessary actions to respond to the situation and could call on other U.S. national response assets if necessary. 

78 

NUCLEAR SAFETY AT THE LABORATORIES

2. Senator NELSON. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, what have each 

of you done to ensure that your emergency contingencies and plans are adequate, 

and that they will operate as designed to avert a nuclear incident at any of the nuclear facilities at your labs? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Los Alamos is committed to maintaining the highest safety standards at all of its facilities. All Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) nuclear facilities are required to have an in-depth safety analysis in place that reviews postulated accident scenarios and puts in place appropriate controls to prevent and mitigate such situations. This includes very severe scenarios which can include a combination of events, such as a large seismic event coupled with a facility-wide fire 

which is the most severe event postulated for the plutonium facility at LANL. As 

a result of these analyses, LANL has initiated a series of safety improvement activities to address identified issues such as implementing: strict controls over combustible materials to reduce the chance of a fire; seismic cut-off switches for electrical 

power to non-safety systems to eliminate a seismically-induced electrical fire; repacking nuclear material into robust containers to survive appropriate impacts and 

fires; upgrading the fire suppression, air handling and filtration systems, and storage infrastructure, and minimizing the nuclear material that is being processed at 

any given time. Additionally, in 2007 LANL adopted an updated site-wide seismic 

hazard analysis standard which incorporates new geologic data. Since that time, 

LANL has been conducting detailed structural analyses of its nuclear facilities using 

this updated hazards to identify potential structural issues that would result from 

a large seismic event. LANL is now completing these analyses and has identified 

some additional areas that will be reinforced to improve performance. 

For the 3 active nuclear facilities (WETF, CMR, and PF–4) 11 drills and/or exercises were conducted last year. Each drill/exercise is evaluated and observations are 

documented to develop lessons learned to be shared with response, operations, facilities, and programmatic science staff. We also include first responders from the community to participate in these drills. All issues are tracked and corrected per the 

site corrective actions process. 

With regard to emergency response, each facility or facility complex at LANL has 

a written plan that evaluates the response in the event of an accident and describes 

the specific actions to be taken for each potential scenario. Last year LANL performed over 45 drills and exercises designed to test the responses to a variety of 

accident scenarios such as spills, fires (including Wildland fire), criticality accidents, 

severe personnel injuries, transportation accidents, and facility-specific events. 

Dr. MILLER. Safe and secure operations are a top priority at Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory (LLNL). We have comprehensive programs to protect the 

health and safety of our workforce and rigorous policies governing conduct of operations to ensure the safe operation of our high explosives and nuclear facilities. 

These critical activities are funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) program. Finally, 

we constantly review ourselves to keep up with best practices and welcome the oversight provided by the NNSA in this area. 

Nuclear safety at the Laboratory is vigorously pursued and continually reviewed 

against a wide variety of accident scenarios to ensure we take a very conservative 

approach to protecting the environment, our workers, and the public. Routine nuclear safety operations include: 

• Frequent review of operations protocols. LLNL’s continuity of operations 

program was reviewed and updated in 2010 to consider catastrophic events. 

• Current safety documents analyze operational hazards, hazards from external events, and natural phenomena hazards to determine which safety 

systems would be required to stay operational during such events. Comprehensive maintenance and testing programs ensure continuous operability. Consistent with Federal regulations, safety documentation is continuously reviewed by LLNL and U.S. Government oversight organizations 

to ensure that, as changes are made or new information received, hazards 

are evaluated and appropriate reliable controls are maintained to avert nuclear incidents. 

• Critical safety systems (e.g., those safety systems relied upon to protect 

the general public) are intentionally redundant by design for selected active 

components, and fail-safe modes are designed with seismic and other credible natural phenomena hazards in mind. These systems are examined frequently to ensure their functionality and operability. 

Dr. HOMMERT. Sandia National Laboratories has two nuclear research reactor facilities: The Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) and the Sandia Pulsed Reactor 

79 

Facility/Critical Experiments (SPRF/CX). The ACRR is an open-pool research reactor, similar to those used at universities with capability for Pulse and Steady-State 

Operation. It is used to support Sandia National Laboratories’ Nuclear Weapons 

Strategic Management Unit stockpile stewardship activities and external customers. 

SPRF/CX is a laboratory scale research reactor used to explore the physics of commercial nuclear reactors. 

The nuclear facilities were examined pursuant to Department of Energy (DOE) 

Safety Bulletin 2011–01, ‘‘Events Beyond Design Safety Basis Analysis’’ issued by 

Secretary Chu on March 23, 2011. The review showed that the time-integrated fission power associated with ACRR and SPR–CX is sufficiently low to preclude the 

need for electrical power for post-emergency core cooling or any other safety system 

action. The review also found that radionuclide inventories at the facilities are so 

low that safety class systems are not required. Public and worker consequences for 

the full spectrum of accidents have been extensively analyzed in previously approved safety documents. Emergency response plans were also reviewed. Sandia is 

participating in the DOE-wide lessons-learned process to identify specific and systemic safety gaps and mitigate any gaps discovered. To date, Sandia has not identified any significant gaps in hazard protections or emergency response that would 

require immediate actions to ensure the safety of the public, workers or the environment. Nevertheless, Sandia continues to emphasize worker and public safety and 

continuously improve our emergency preparedness procedures. We are working to 

guard against complacency. 

HEALTH OF THE LABORATORIES

3. Senator NELSON. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, as I mentioned 

in my opening statement, there was a lot of discussion on the amount of weapons 

funding for the labs during the New START treaty debate. What was not discussed 

much is the breadth of the work that the labs carry out, beyond weapons work, and 

how this non-weapons work is a key element in maintaining world-class science and 

engineering. Could each of you describe the percentage of your lab’s annual budget 

that is nuclear weapons activities, and describe the work that comprises the balance 

of the budget and why this work is important? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. LANL’s core mission is to ensure the continued safety, security, 

and effectiveness of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. Los Alamos is more broadly a 

national security science laboratory. Engaging in this broader work is vital to the 

long-term health of the Laboratory and to our ability to address future national security missions. In fiscal year 2011, 56 percent of our operating budget is NNSA 

weapons program activities, 7 percent is associated Safeguards and Security, 9 percent is NNSA nonproliferation funding, 8 percent of our budget is from DOE environmental management (for cleanup activities), 7 percent is from DOE science and 

energy programs, and 13 percent is work for other agencies, the majority of which 

are other Federal national security agencies (Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS), Department of Defense (DOD), and the Intelligence Community). 

Much of the non-weapons work is still associated with nuclear security and 

leverages directly on expertise developed to sustain the Nation’s deterrent. Essentially all of the non-weapons activity is at Los Alamos because of sponsor selection, 

i.e. whether Los Alamos is the sole provider or part of a team with other labs, a 

sponsor made the decision to fund this activity rather than others. Those activities 

make important, often critical contributions to national interests. 

While the core nuclear weapons program provides a majority of the capabilities 

(both scientific and personnel), these broader scientific security missions allow 

LANL to sustain and develop the science, technology, and engineering that enable 

us to respond to unplanned technical challenges both now and into the future. As 

an example, last year our staff experienced in radiography was able to immediately 

deploy to the Gulf of Mexico to quickly develop a new capability to x-ray the Deep 

Water Horizon blow out preventer. At more than a mile beneath the ocean surface, 

we provided imagery using a sealed source to help national decisionmakers better 

understand what was occurring inside that device. 

In addition, engagement with this broad range of different challenges helps extend key science, technology, and engineering at Los Alamos that is essential to our 

long-term core mission. Competitive selection and awards also help demonstrate to 

allies and potential adversaries that our technical capabilities remain world-class. 

Finally, the open science at Los Alamos supports a strong student and postdoctoral 

research program that is essential for our pipeline of the Nation’s top science and 

engineering talent. Last year, Los Alamos hosted over 1,300 summer students, as 

one example. 

80 

Dr. MILLER. The NNSA laboratories have exceptional staff covering a broad range 

of scientific, technical and engineering capabilities-as well as unique, world-class facilities, which are leveraged to develop innovative solutions to major 21st century 

challenges in nonproliferation, intelligence, defense, homeland security and 

counterterrorism, and energy technology and climate science. 

Nonproliferation 

With globalization and worldwide interest in expanding nuclear power, proliferation challenges are evolving and covering a wider geographic area. LLNL has made 

important contributions to NNSA’s mission in monitoring for signatures of proliferation activity, addressing problems posed by legacy materials and capabilities in the 

Former Soviet Union (FSU), providing technologies and experts to enhance nuclear 

safeguards through the International Atomic Energy Agency, and engaging with the 

international community to promote U.S. Government nonproliferation goals and objectives. Nonproliferation activities have broadened to address new regional challenges beyond the FSU through international cooperation and engagement and 

through enhanced monitoring and detection technologies. This work provides the 

technical basis for expanding the benefits of nuclear power without expanding the 

nuclear threat. 

An example of LLNL contributions to nuclear signatures detection is nuclear explosion monitoring. For more than a decade, LLNL seismologists have used available seismic data to develop empirical corrections to seismic event processing algorithms to adjust for specific source and monitoring station location. Today, with 

high-performance supercomputers, seismologists can capture three-dimensional 

earth structure to calculate these corrections with physics-based models for any 

source-receiver pair. This will enable more precise detection, location, and identification of explosions, potentially anywhere on the globe, and even at the low energy 

releases that might occur from a weapon development test. Development of new 

monitoring methods with three-dimensional earth models can proceed using current 

supercomputer capability, however, exacale computing is required to make these 

new techniques operational. Exascale computing will not only improve our country’s 

ability to monitor nuclear explosions but will also allow researchers to better define 

seismically active faults where small earthquakes may occur. 

Intelligence 

The NNSA laboratories have a long and distinguished history of support to the 

Intelligence Community. The LLNL intelligence program is strongly focused on the 

activities of nuclear-capable states, unsafeguarded and clandestine programs and 

terrorist groups, cyber threats and countermeasures, and biological and chemical 

weapon development and deployment efforts. LLNL’s intelligence support relies on 

our diverse, multidisciplinary professional staff, drawing in experts from across the 

Laboratory. For example, several insights and advances in the cyber security program have been informed by experience gained through LLNL’s high-performance 

computing efforts. The contributions of the NNSA laboratories cut across the entire 

spectrum of the U.S. Government’s efforts in prevention, deterrent, defense, consequence management, and related areas where detailed technical knowledge provides decision advantage. 

The Counterproliferation Analysis and Planning System (CAPS) is an example of 

decision support that LLNL has provided military planners for actual and potential 

operations against over 37,000 facilities that support or could support the production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). CAPS is used by over 1,500 planners 

and operators on a daily basis. Chosen in 1998 by then Secretary of Defense Cohen 

to be the preferred planning tool for use by U.S. Armed Forces to combat WMD, 

CAPS has played a significant role in supporting operations during the Kosovo conflict, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. CAPS engineers 

provide in-depth assessments of WMD facilities to include isolating critical nodes, 

assessing the potential for collateral damage from interdiction attempts, and quantifying those signatures that can reflect real-time operations under way at selected 

sites. The engineering staff at CAPS also provides a daily technical reach-back capability that responds to hundreds of requests for assistance from troops presently engaged in combat. 

Defense 

For more than 6 decades, our military has benefitted from the depth and breadth 

of integrated, systems-level solutions developed at the NNSA laboratories. Beyond 

stewardship of the Nation’s nuclear stockpile, the three NNSA laboratories provide 

high value to DOD in munitions, explosives science and engineering, and conventional weapons design; directed energy systems; cyber and network sciences; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; operational warfighter support; countering 

81 

the nuclear threat; nuclear weapons effects predictions and analysis; countering the 

chemical and biological threat; and space systems. Two examples of defense missions where LLNL is currently engaged are: 

Third Generation Conventional Munitions: The Laboratory was tasked by 

DOD to develop a next generation conventional munition with a more precise lethal radius, thus significantly mitigating collateral effects concerns in 

close air support or peacekeeping operations. We successfully combined and 

applied our high explosives expertise with our unique understanding of case 

materials and our High Performance Computing (HPC) capability to model 

and simulate the new munition, resulting in a significantly reduced concept 

to product timeline (10 months from concept to qualifications testing), providing the warfighter with a focused lethality weapon. 

The Diode Pumped Alkali Laser (DPAL): Sponsored by DOD, DPAL is a 

leap-ahead technology that will provide a laser that is up to 500 times more 

lethal per kilogram than any other currently demonstrated or contemplated 

laser weapon, thus enabling the deployment of high energy laser capabilities on a broad array of platforms. These advances take advantage of 

LLNL’s rich history of laser science and technology development. 

Homeland security and counterterrorism 

The NNSA laboratories’ role in homeland security and counterterrorism began 

nearly 30 years ago with the formation of the Nuclear Emergency Search Teams 

(NEST) and related nuclear threat assessment activities. Today, LLNL’s efforts 

cover a wide range of programs and sponsors, from threat and risk assessments, to 

detection of threat materials, to understanding and mitigating the consequences of 

attacks, to forensic analysis, to aiding in the attribution of responsibility for WMD 

attacks. Our work encompasses chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and highexplosive threats. Today’s programs take advantage of significant historical investments by the NNSA in key infrastructure and most importantly in our multidisciplinary technical staff. Together these capabilities provide a major component of the 

Nation’s defenses against the catastrophic threat posed by the malicious use of 

weapons of mass destruction. 

An example of LLNL support for homeland security and disaster response is the 

National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC). NARAC has been on call 

since the Three Mile Island incident of 1979. NARAC can deliver an initial prediction to Federal, state, and local responders of the fate and atmospheric transport 

of hazardous materials for almost any kind of release in 5 to 15 minutes; it responds 

to roughly 25 events in a typical year (and simulates, for the purpose of exercises, 

10,000 more). Right now, NARAC is applying LLNL’s computing capabilities in support the U.S. response to recent events in Japan. As the hub of the Department of 

Homeland Security’s Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center 

(IMAAC), NARAC also provided plume predictions of the fire on the Deepwater Horizon oil platform and forecast the particulates that might be released from surfaceoil burns. NARAC and IMAAC are unique capabilities to the Nation that take advantage of LLNL’s expertise, and exceptional computational and modeling capabilities. 

Energy technology and climate science 

The NNSA laboratories develop and deploy science, technology, and operational 

protocols to increase utilization of our Nation’s large and secure Reserves of conventional and unconventional fossil fuels while safely reducing carbon dioxide emissions 

through innovations in carbon capture and long-term geologic sequestration. In addition, the NNSA labs have made seminal contributions to climate science, including 

participation in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. At LLNL, scientists are working on programs to expand the use of renewable energy through innovative technology, improved efficiency, new resources, systems integration, and 

reduced costs; deliver climate simulations at the regional scale to understand the 

critical processes that drive climate change; develop advanced nuclear fuels and reactor systems that are proliferation-resistant and provide for expanded safe, secure, 

carbon-free, cost-competitive nuclear power; and provide science and advanced technology needed to effectively store nuclear waste for long times or eliminate the nuclear waste altogether. Specific examples of LLNL efforts in energy and climate are: 

Energy, Water, and Carbon Dioxide Flow Diagrams LLNL specialists produced the first diagrams illustrating U.S. energy use. Portraying U.S. energy resources and their ultimate use, these diagrams, called energy flow 

charts, help scientists, analysts, and other decisionmakers to visualize the 

complex interrelationships involved in powering the Nation. Today, flow 

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diagram concept has been extended to cover water use and carbon dioxide 

emissions, in reports that separately cover the 50 states and 136 countries. 

The Program for Climate Model Diagnosis and Intercomparison (PCMDI): 

Established in 1989, LLNL’s DOE-sponsored PCMDI is an internationally 

recognized research group that focuses on understanding climate change 

and analyzing and diagnosing the performance of climate models. The climate research community relies on PCMDI to help organize and manage 

internationally-coordinated modeling studies. Through a PCMDI-led federated alliance of major data centers, output from the world’s climate models is made freely accessible to thousands of researchers who evaluate the 

models and analyze their projections of future climate change. This widespread scrutiny of climate models is accelerating advancement of climate 

science and provides a multi-model perspective that has been a basis for 

reaching robust conclusions in major assessments of climate science (e.g., 

the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 

FUNDING SUMMARY 

Fiscal Year 2010 

Percent Funds In 

Fiscal Year 2011 

Percent Funds 

Anticipated 

Nuclear Weapons ..................................................................................................................... 64 66 

Nonproliferation ....................................................................................................................... 6 6 

Defense and Intelligence ........................................................................................................ 14 13 

Homeland and Counter Terrorism ........................................................................................... 7 7 

Energy Technology and Climate Science ................................................................................ 4 4 

Other Basic Science ................................................................................................................ 5 4 

100 100 

Dr. HOMMERT. Nuclear Weapons activities are Sandia’s core mission, and in fiscal 

year 2011, comprise 47 percent of our total budget. We have other important missions that address a broad spectrum of U.S. national security needs. These other 

mission areas include Defense Systems and Assessments (30 percent); Energy, Climate and Infrastructure Security (12 percent); and, International, Homeland and 

Nuclear Security (11 percent). 

Our work in these other mission areas has direct national security impact for our 

customers, and is conducted in a way that is mutually reinforcing of the capabilities 

and competencies required for our core nuclear weapons mission. Often a unique 

Sandia capability is leveraged to address common or similar interagency needs. For 

example, in fiscal year 2011 the $44 million investment by the nuclear weapons program in our microelectronics/microsystems capabilities enables $119 million in 

project work for a number of national security agencies. 

4. Senator NELSON. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, if as set forth 

in the Continuing Resolution (CR), the funding for the nonproliferation programs of 

the NNSA is at or slightly above the fiscal year 2010 levels, does this also impact 

the health of the labs? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. NNSA’s office of defense nuclear nonproliferation performs critical 

science for national security, drawing upon the entire national R&D enterprise. 

These programs solve problems associated with very real threats against the Nation. The capabilities and expertise that support these programs require substantial 

long-term investment. NNSA’s nuclear nonproliferation budget has increased from 

$2.13 billion in fiscal year 2010 to an estimated $2.27 billion in fiscal year 2011, 

after rescissions. The administration’s fiscal year 2012 request of $2.54 billion demonstrates a commitment to harness the power of technology to address real challenges in nonproliferation research and development. Technological advances such 

as next generation nuclear detection capabilities and methods to detect foreign nuclear materials and weapons production facilities and processes are among the advances gained by investment in this area. We are working within the bounds of the 

current appropriation, but budgetary cuts would severely limit science and technology momentum against constantly evolving terrorist threats. 

Dr. MILLER. As the question points out, the NNSA’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation total budget under the Continuing Resolution for the rest of fiscal year 

2011 is slightly above the fiscal year 2010 appropriation. Because of uncertainties 

in some large budget items at other NNSA sites (the Satellite Program and the National Center for Nuclear Security), the Nonproliferation R&D budgets for activities 

83 

at LLNL and other laboratories currently are significantly less than their fiscal year 

2010 levels. Assuming the successful resolution of those uncertainties we expect to 

receive approximately the same amount of funding in our nonproliferation programs 

as last year, but we will likely receive it late in the year. We are planning now to 

make sure that these late-arriving funds are obligated against our programmed 

deliverables. 

Dr. HOMMERT. The funding for nonproliferation programs under the CR does not 

currently impact the health of Sandia. However, if funding is sustained at these levels in the out years, or if the amount of funding that Sandia receives from NNSA 

is decreased from current levels, an erosion of capability will occur at Sandia, both 

in the quality of staff and, more significantly, their experience. This will negatively 

impact the Nation’s ability to obtain critical technical support for addressing current 

treaty obligations and objectives as well as for accomplishing key policy objectives 

in future negotiations. 

5. Senator NELSON. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, is the same true 

for reductions in science funding for DOE as well as reductions at DHS? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. DOE is the largest funder of physical science in the United States, 

and support at Los Alamos in science is essential to the health of our open, peerreviewed science and key experimental user facilities. DHS is also an important 

sponsor at Los Alamos. This funding allows Los Alamos to develop prototype technologies that leverage our innovations to protect the public from threats to the 

homeland. These non-weapons programs serve to both attract top scientists to the 

laboratory and build up fundamental scientific capability that can be further leveraged and applied to LANL’s core weapons program work. Depending on the level 

of cuts in these programs, the impact on the Laboratory and the Nation could be 

significant. We recognize that funding for these and other agencies is constrained 

and in each case we work with the sponsoring programs to offer those agencies excellent technical options to address their mission priorities within the available 

budget. 

Dr. MILLER. Impact on projects funded from the DOE Office of Science (SC) is not 

known for certain at this time. However, the reductions to the SC budget appear 

to be small. Specific impacts will depend on how the available budget is allocated 

throughout the DOE laboratory complex. 

SC program provides funding for the following LLNL R&D activities: 

• Fusion Energy Sciences - research in experiments, theory, and modeling 

in magnetic fusion energy science; high energy density laboratory plasmas; 

and fusion technology and materials. 

• Advanced Scientific Computing Research - development of advanced numerical methods for solving complex physics applications on high performance computers, basic research on the tools and methods necessary to allow 

scientists to effectively use the current and next generation of high performance computers, and technologies that increase our insight and understanding into massive scientific data sets. This research is particularly synergistic with LLNL NNSA missions and long-term strategic objectives; particularly as they pertain to the development and use of simulation and 

exascale computing environments. 

• Biological and Environmental Research - includes analysis of different climate models; the Program for Climate Model Diagnosis and Intercomparison, which is an internationally recognized research group at LLNL that focuses on understanding climate change, developing assessment methods 

and maintaining large data bases widely shared by the climate modeling 

community, and analyzing and diagnosing the performance of climate models; research on cloud and aerosol physics and atmospheric chemistry; microbial systems biology relevant to both biofuel development terrestrial carbon sequestration; the biogeochemistry of the subsurface reactive transport 

of plutonium; and the development of an artificial retina. These programs 

lie at the scientific core of the LLNL’s mission to advance the energy and 

environmental security of the Nation. 

• Basic Energy Sciences - fundamental investigations in the fields of materials science, chemical sciences, geosciences, and biomaterials. This includes 

research efforts in the areas of materials science at ultrafast timescales, 

actinide science, radiation-resistant materials for advanced energy applications, nanoscale materials science, and materials characterization for geosciences. This work is aligned with the Laboratory’s long-term strategic objectives in support of national and energy security mission needs. 

• High Energy Physics - includes fundamental research in advanced detector development, dark matter searches, the properties of neutrinos and the 

84 

search for the Higgs and supersymmetry, as well as theoretical investigations of physics beyond the standard model. The scientists engaged in this 

research apply their skills and expertise across the span of programmatic 

work at LLNL which include nonproliferation, stockpile stewardship, homeland security, the National Ignition Facility (NIF) and the HPC facilities. 

• Nuclear Physics - fundamental research in a broad range of topics including theoretical work spanning the range from quantum chromodynamics, to 

ab initio nuclear structure and reaction theory, to fissioning heavy nuclear 

systems. Experimental efforts include neutrinoless double-beta-decay 

searches, the elucidation of nuclear structure off of stability, and the study 

of relativistic heavy ion collisions at both the Relativistic Heavy Ion 

Collider and the Large Hadron Collider. These programs complement the 

national security work; the same scientists support homeland security activities in attribution, stockpile stewardship and the NIF. 

Department of Homeland Security 

Details on the budgetary impact to LLNL’s fiscal year 2011 funding from the DHS 

are still unknown at this time. Current funding to LLNL from DHS S&T is about 

$48 million, and DHS S&T’s budget for research and development has been reduced 

by about 20 percent from fiscal year 2010. While DHS S&T has yet to make key 

decisions on their R&D priorities for fiscal year 2011, LLNL expects some changes 

in priorities from their original plan that might result in reductions to LLNL’s R&D 

program. 

LLNL has ongoing scientific and engineering projects in several important areas 

including explosives/aviation security, bio detection and bio forensics, bio threat 

awareness, chemical agent science and chemical forensics, response and recovery, 

and transit infrastructure protection. 

Examples of LLNL DHS funded research include: 

• Explosives/Aviation Security: LLNL’s scientists and engineers support a 

broad range of research and development programs in explosives and aviation security including: understanding the properties of homemade explosives, developing detection technologies for aviation security applications including both passenger check point and checked baggage screening, testing 

of screening technologies in support of TSA’s technology acquisition programs, and modeling and simulation of aircraft vulnerabilities to a broad 

range of homemade explosive threats. These R&D programs are critical to 

the development and deployment of effective aviation security technologies 

at our Nation’s airports. 

• Biodetection and Bioforensics: LLNL’s biosecurity research and development programs include: development of biodetection signatures to detect 

virulence genes in multiple biological pathogens, development of underlying 

technologies to support Gen-3 biowatch, development of integrated 

bioforensics database to support bioforensics analysis, and operation of the 

DHS BioKnowledge Center, which is focused on providing a deep understanding of the risks and countermeasures associated with current and future bio threats. 

• Chemical Agent Science and Chemical Forensics: LLNL’s chemical security programs include: development of comprehensive understanding of the 

fundamental mechanisms of chemical agents including novel threat agents 

and development of an integrated experimental and high-performance computing-based modeling capability to predict the effects and degradation of 

chemical agents. These R&D programs are critical to mitigating the impact 

of future chemical weapons-related terrorist events. 

• Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Restoration Projects: LLNL brings 

unique technical capabilities and operational experience to multiple WMD 

restoration projects. These programs support critical partnerships with multiple Federal, state and local agencies as they work to improve our Nation’s 

resiliency and facilitate the recovery from a WMD attack. 

DHS, DOE and NNSA have made significant investments in LLNL’s infrastructure dedicated to Homeland Security S&T challenges. Unique facilities for explosives research, development, test and evaluation are in place at LLNL to ensure the 

development and assessment of the effectiveness of the current and next-generation 

of explosives screening technologies designed to counter the emergent threat of 

home-made explosives (HMEs). This infrastructure is critical to supporting TSA’s 

acquisition of screening technologies for aviation security. In addition, LLNL operates the only select-agent research facility at the BSL–3 level at the DOE national 

laboratories. This capability is fundamental to our understanding of human pathogens and enables research and development in their detection, characterization and 

85 

post-event remediation. LLNL also has the safe and secure infrastructure needed 

to synthesize and characterize small quantities of chemical weapons including novel 

threat agents. This secure research and development environment is critical in developing a predictive capability for mitigating the impacts of novel chemical weapons agents. 

Dr. HOMMERT. Based on the final fiscal year 2011 budget that was passed by Congress and signed by President Obama, Sandia’s budget for Office of Science activities is expected to be $55 million, a reduction of ∼$6 million or roughly 10 percent 

from the fiscal year 2010 level. This will reduce our ability to pursue research in 

areas of Basic Energy Sciences, Advanced Scientific Computing Research, and Fusion Energy Sciences. Our research in these areas creates the ideas and future innovations for advanced energy technologies and national security applications, and 

supports the overall health of the laboratories. While we realize that the Nation is 

in a difficult budgetary period, a reduction in our science budget makes it difficult 

to attract and retain the best and the brightest of the Nation’s scientists and engineers, and this puts at risk our support of critical national security needs. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget of $688 million for the DHS Science and Technology 

(S&T) Directorate reflects a reduction of 20 percent relative to the fiscal year 2010 

level of $863 million. Because DHS S&T has not yet fully distributed these cuts 

across existing or planned programs, specific impacts are not yet known. Our current assumption is that Sandia will receive a proportional negative budget impact 

of approximately $5 million. 

Looking forward, the new fiscal year 2012 House spending bill approved by the 

House Appropriations Homeland Security Subcommittee on May 13, 2011, includes 

an additional 40 percent cut to DHS S&T. While these cuts are not at a scale to 

impact the overall health of Sandia, they will have enormous negative implications 

on the ability of the United States to reap the operational benefits of innovative new 

technologies in the homeland security arena. 

URANIUM PROCESSING FACILITY AND THE PLUTONIUM LABORATORY

6. Senator NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) in 

Tennessee, and the new plutonium facility, the Chemical and Metallurgical Research Replacement (CMRR) facility at the LANL, are technically complex, new, 

multi-billion facilities. These are also the last two large, new facilities slated for the 

weapons complex, completing a plan put in place almost 20 years ago to modernize 

major production and research facilities. In November of last year, the Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report on the UPF, which made several recommendations specific to the UPF, but was also applicable generally to NNSA management of large construction projects. One of the issues raised by GAO was the 

maturity of new technologies. GAO’s view is that prototypes of new technology 

should be successfully demonstrated in an operating environment prior to the start 

of construction. This level of maturity is a Technical Readiness Level 7 (TRL–7) on 

a scale of 1 to 10. This scale is widely used by DOD. Will the new technologies at 

the UPF and the CMRR be at a TRL–7 as recommended by GAO at the start of 

construction of UPF and CMRR? If not, why not? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. NNSA continually monitors and evaluates technology readiness 

levels for new processes in UPF in alignment with best practices as identified in 

the GAO review. The UPF project is being planned and executed in accordance with 

the recently updated DOE Order 413.3B, Program and Project Management for the 

Acquisition of Capital Assets, which requires significant critical technology element 

modification subsequent to CD–2. NNSA is encouraging achievement of a TRL–7 

prior to CD–3 as a recognized best practice. However, in instances where a lower 

readiness level of development is acceptable, because of our robust understanding 

of the technology, we will recognize the risks of proceeding with demonstrating the 

technology at the next lower level and ensure appropriate contingencies are identified. 

DOE agrees that achieving TRL–7—demonstration of a prototype in an operational environment—is a level of technological maturity that constitutes low risk 

for starting a product development program but has determined that Technical 

Readiness Assessments coupled with Technology Maturity Plans are also an acceptable way to manage and mitigate technology risk when there are very low quantities of each type of technology. In contrast to DOD’s air, sea and sub-surface weapons platforms, where large production quantities of new critical technologies must 

operate in mobile, extreme and very dynamic environments, UPF technologies exist 

only in UPF, are stationary and will operate in a stable, known environment. Further, demonstration with actual Special Nuclear Material in an operational environVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
86 

ment would require construction of essentially the final system. For these reasons, 

a lower technology level (TRL–6, demonstration of prototype with simulate material 

in an operational environment) is acceptable in this instance, given the cost/benefit 

associated with further development of each individual new technology. Appropriate 

rationale and contingency will be incorporated into the baseline where a project 

technology is short of TRL–7. 

7. Senator NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, you have committed to having the design for 

the UPF and the CMRR 90 percent complete before the construction project baseline 

for cost and schedule is established. Under the DOE construction management 

order, construction projects must receive senior level approval at certain critical decision (CD) milestones. These milestones are CD–0, CD–1, etc. CD–2 is the milestone where the cost and schedule baseline is established. CD–3 is the start of construction. At which milestone will the cost and schedule baselines be set for UPF 

and CMRR? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The cost and schedule baselines for UPF and CMRR will be set 

at the CD–2 milestone. NNSA has committed to having UPF and CMRR projects 

at a minimum 90 percent design completion prior to seeking CD–2. NNSA will have 

greater confidence and less risk of exceeding performance baselines with this advanced level of maturity in design at CD–2. Both projects are currently planning 

to request CD–2 approval for the full project scope in fiscal year 2013. 

8. Senator NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, will NNSA do an Independent Cost Estimate 

(ICE) for each project before CD–2? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes. In accordance with DOE 413.3B, an External Independent 

Review (EIR) is required as part of CD–2 approval. For projects such as UPF and 

CMRR that are greater than $100 million, an ICE is a required component of the 

EIR and must validate the proposed total project costs. The EIR, conducted by the 

Office of Engineering and Construction Management (within DOE, but accountable 

to the Secretary and completely independent of the NNSA), must validate the proposed scope, cost and schedule baselines as a condition of CD–2 approval. 

9. Senator NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, in the National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011, there is a provision, section 3114, which requires 

NNSA to report to Congress when the baseline is established for a major project. 

From that baseline, Congress and the NNSA will measure progress. Will CD–2 

serve as the baseline for purposes of section 3114? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, the baseline will be approved at CD–2 for the purposes of 

Section 3114 of the NDAA. CD–2 is the milestone where project scope, cost and 

schedule baselines are established and approved by the Acquisition Executive. 

10. Senator NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, GAO also recommended that once the baseline cost and schedule is established, the NNSA Administrator must ensure that the 

baseline is ‘‘consistent with NNSA’s future years budget and spending plan prior to 

approval of . . . critical decision 2.’’ Will GAO’s recommendation be followed for the 

UPF, CMRR, and the new Naval Reactors Expended Core Facility (ECF)? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. NNSA will establish budget requests and spending plans for 

UPF, CMRR, and the new Naval Reactors ECF to support the projects’ cost, scope, 

and schedule as part of baseline approval at Critical Decision-2. NNSA is seeking 

as much certainty as possible in securing a budget profile and spend plan once the 

projects have been baselined, and will emphasize the importance of maintaining 

these budgets and spend plans until project completion. In the case of UPF and 

CMRR, NNSA’s current project execution plan aligns with the 10 year budget profiles outlined in the Section 1251 Report of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011. 

11. Senator NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino and Dr. Anastasio, is there anything specific 

in the design of the UPF or the CMRR facilities that you are reviewing in light of 

the events in Japan? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes. UPF and CMRR are being designed in accordance with 

modern seismic design standards for nuclear facilities. Nevertheless, NNSA has retained independent seismic experts to study these projects for risks similar to the 

Japan event. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The CMRR Nuclear Facility design is based on a very significant 

seismic event determined using geological analysis. The design was based on the 

most recent seismic hazard analyses (2007 and 2009 revision). This includes very 

severe scenarios which include a combination of events, such as a large seismic 

event coupled with laboratory fires, the most severe event postulated for a facility 

of this type. In line with recent guidance from the Secretary of Energy, LANL is 

87 

conducting a thorough evaluation of the seismic hazards coupled with other accident 

scenarios as factors in the CMRR facility design. As the design for the facility continues to mature the results of accident evaluations will continue to be incorporated 

as engineering inputs to structural, facility systems and equipment design criteria. 

REPLACEMENT OF THE IDAHO EXPENDED CORE FACILITY

12. Senator NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino and Admiral Donald, last year the Office of 

Naval Reactors (NR) requested $40.6 million for conceptual design for the replacement building for the new ECF in Idaho. This new facility would be a new spent 

fuel building to support the NR program. In fiscal year 2012 the request for conceptual design is $53.8 million. The actual construction project would not start until 

2013. What is the anticipated total project cost for this new facility? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO and Admiral DONALD. The Total Project Cost for the Spent Fuel 

Handling Recapitalization Project (SFHP) is estimated to be $1,249 million, and will 

recapitalize the over 50-year-old ECF as the location for naval spent nuclear fuel 

receipt, packaging, and secure temporary dry storage. This estimate of the Total 

Project Cost is based on scoping studies conducted for a range of alternatives that 

could provide the required capabilities. Actual costs to design and fabricate similar 

equipment used at the ECF were considered in forming the basis of the approximate 

$400 million cost estimate for the required equipment. The cost estimate also includes approximately $650 million for the construction of new facilities as well as 

potential cost saving measures, such as modification of existing facilities for continued use with new facilities. Also included is approximately $200 million of Other 

Project Costs that include items such as conceptual design, National Environmental 

Policy Act (NEPA) work, analysis, safety oversight, development of procedures and 

manuals, training, general facility engineering startup support, and technical support. This Total Project Cost estimate has been reviewed by industry experts with 

experience in delivering large, complex construction project associated with nuclear 

material handling. 

Included within the scope of the SFHP: 

• Evaluation and selection from existing technology and processes for spent 

nuclear fuel handling. 

• Design and delivery of a facility and facility systems in which the spent 

nuclear fuel handling will be performed. 

• Design and delivery of infrastructure specifically needed to support spent 

nuclear fuel handling operations (power distribution substations, rail service to new facilities, etc.). 

• Design and delivery of equipment needed for handling spent nuclear fuel. 

• Design and delivery of equipment needed for packaging and disposal of 

waste generated during spent nuclear fuel handling operations. 

• Ability to perform initial cursory external visual examinations. 

• Test, operating, and preventive maintenance procedures, and drawings 

for the spent fuel handling process systems, equipment, facilities, and facility systems. 

• Personnel training and development of training programs for the facilities, facility systems, and spent nuclear fuel handling equipment. 

• Project management. 

• Support services needed for the project. 

• Management for subcontracts supporting the design and construction of 

the facilities, facility systems, and spent nuclear fuel handling equipment 

needed for this project. 

• Reports and submittals, including those submittals required for Critical 

Decisions. 

• NEPA analyses and actions. 

Full funding in the early years of the project remains critically necessary to ensure that the facility and equipment are sufficiently defined such that requests for 

fiscal year 2013 Project Engineering and Design funds and fiscal year 2015 Construction funds are fully justified and support the overall project schedule. 

88 

A breakdown of the costs for labor and materials and subcontracts is provided 

below. 

13. Senator NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino and Admiral Donald, would that amount include the demolition of the old facility? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO and Admiral DONALD. The project cost of the SFHP does not include the demolition of the current ECF. The current ECF mission includes the unloading, examination, processing and temporary dry storage of spent nuclear fuel, 

in addition to the examination of irradiated material from the Idaho National Laboratory Advanced Test Reactor. All of these aforementioned operations must continue while the SFHP is constructed and placed into operation. For example, ship 

refuelings will continue to require that spent nuclear fuel is unloaded from the limited number of spent fuel shipping containers available, and critical core examinations necessary to validate fuel performance must continue. Consequently, an inventory of spent nuclear fuel and irradiated materials will exist in ECF at the time 

SFHP becomes operational. It is impractical and cost-prohibitive to move the spent 

nuclear fuel present in ECF to SFHP to complete processing operations for dry storage in the new facility. In addition, there are a number of important core examinations underway later this decade that must not be interrupted in support technical 

decisions for the operating fleet. Due to these factors, final disposition of ECF will 

be deferred until after the completion of the currently identified ECF mission. 

14. Senator NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino and Admiral Donald, can NNSA afford another expensive building? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO and Admiral DONALD. The SFHP will recapitalize the over 50- 

year-old ECF as the location for naval spent nuclear fuel receipt, packaging, and 

secure temporary dry storage. Naval Reactors’ ability to continue work in Idaho is 

dependent upon a viable, efficient fuel-handling infrastructure. Although the ECF 


330str35.eps 330str36.eps
89 

continues to be maintained and operated in a safe and environmentally responsible 

manner, further deterioration of the infrastructure could profoundly impact the 

Naval Reactors mission. Uninterrupted receipt of naval spent nuclear fuel is vital 

to the timely, constant throughput of ship refuelings and return of these warships 

to full operational status. If an interruption in ECF operations were to extend over 

long periods, the ability to sustain fleet operations would be negatively impacted 

since there would be no capacity available to receive naval spent fuel, thereby tying 

up shipping containers and halting defueling operations. Completion of the recapitalization of the spent nuclear fuel infrastructure is needed by 2020 to support the 

Navy’s tight refueling and defueling schedule for nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. 

A delay to delivery of this new facility will result in costly and time-consuming 

workarounds (e.g. procurement of additional spent fuel shipping containers and associated equipment) or delays to the defuelings of nuclear powered warships. 

In this constrained funding environment, Naval Reactors recognizes the need for 

prudent project management to constrain costs. Naval Reactors will leverage its extensive project management experience to do exactly that. The Program routinely 

manages significant projects, such as the design and construction of the Virginia- class submarine and the Ford-class aircraft carrier reactor plants. Naval Reactors 

also routinely manage large ship projects, including nuclear powered aircraft carrier 

and submarine refueling overhauls. These efforts include the planning and scheduling of the refueling; design and development of specialized equipment; planning 

and technical approval of shipyard facilities and equipment; transportation and handling of spent fuel, and reviewing and approving detailed procedures for conduct of 

refueling operations. Additionally, Naval Reactors has managed the development, 

operation, and maintenance of over 25 classes of nuclear powered submarines and 

three classes of nuclear powered aircraft carriers; as well as the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of eight land-based prototypes. The Naval Reactors 

professionals that are assigned to the SFHP have many years of Naval Reactors 

project management and oversight experience. 

In addition, the SFHP is being managed consistent with DOE Order 413.3B (Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets) as implemented by Naval Reactors. The Program is also capitalizing on established requirements and lessons learned from management of our Navy projects, including the use 

of formalized nuclear safety, refueling equipment, and refueling system design processes. These combined processes, along with the rigorous budgeting and accountability processes routinely employed by Naval Reactors, ensures capability of executing a project of this size. 

Finally, Naval Reactors has contracted with an experienced Engineering, Procurement, and Construction Management contractor and is leveraging relevant experience through our prime contractor, Bechtel National Inc. 

15. Senator NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino and Admiral Donald, will the ECF have a 

design that is 90 percent complete by CD–2? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO and Admiral DONALD. The SFHP is being managed consistent 

with DOE Order 413.3B (Program and Project Management for Acquisition of Capital Assets). Consistent with that order, the preliminary design will be 100 percent 

complete by CD–2. The preliminary design provides the detail needed to provide a 

reasonable assurance that the design will be implementable within the approved 

performance baseline. Consistent with DOE Order 413.3B, the fully completed preliminary design will form the basis of the Performance Baseline which is approved 

at CD–2. 

16. Senator NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino and Admiral Donald, will the project baseline 

for the ECF for the purposes of section 3114 be established by CD–2? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO and Admiral DONALD. Yes. Naval Reactors approval of the SFHP 

CD–2, Performance Baseline, will establish the SFHP project cost and schedule 

baseline, consistent with the requirements of DOE Order 413.3B, Program and 

Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets. CD–2 approval requires 

that the design be sufficiently mature to provide a reasonable assurance that the 

design will be achievable within the approved performance baseline. The SFHP Performance Baseline will include the key project performance, scope, cost, and schedule parameters, and will be provided to the congressional defense committee in accordance with section 3114 of NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011. 

17. Senator NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino and Admiral Donald, will an ICE be performed for the ECF? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO and Admiral DONALD. Yes, Naval Reactors will perform ICEs 

prior to CD–1 and prior to CD–2, consistent with DOE Order 413.3B, Program and 

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Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets. The ICEs will help validate that the program estimates are well-documented, comprehensive, accurate, and 

credible by ensuring that the included costs are reasonable and that no costs were 

omitted, that they reflect a realistic schedule with technically-reasonable assumptions, and that risks and uncertainties are appropriately accounted for and quantified. 

18. Senator NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino and Admiral Donald, will all new technologies be TRL–7 at construction start, as well as CD–3? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO and Admiral DONALD. The SFHP will not pursue new technologies since the fundamental technology to unload, examine, process, and package 

naval spent nuclear fuel currently exists. While Naval Reactors does not use technology readiness levels to manage its technical efforts, the Program judges that the 

technologies included in the SFHP to be equivalent to a level 8 (total system completed, tested, and fully demonstrated). This assessment is based on the fact that 

the design of the spent fuel handling and processing equipment for the SFHP uses 

technology that has been demonstrated in existing equipment that is currently operating in a production environment at the ECF. The SFHP is being designed to improve the production capacity of the existing ECF infrastructure and will integrate 

lessons learned from over 50 years of operating within the current ECF. 

DELAYS IN NAVAL REACTORS M–290 IDAHO FACILITY CONSTRUCTION

19. Senator NELSON. Admiral Donald, the construction project at the NR Idaho 

facility to receive and handle M–290 spent fuel shipping containers is about a year 

late, both in the start of construction and in the start of operations. The most recent 

schedule indicated that the approval to start construction, CD–3, would be in the 

second quarter of fiscal year 2011. What was the reason for the delay and has the 

delay resulted in increased costs? 

Admiral DONALD. As part of the fiscal year 2010 budget request, Naval Reactors 

requested money for the ECF M–290 Receiving/Discharge Station. At that time, the 

project was scoped only to modify (e.g., installation of larger capacity crane) the current ECF to allow the receipt and handling of M–290 shipping containers. Although 

the performance baseline for the project was not yet established, Naval Reactors included in the budget request documentation outlining a schedule, in which construction was scheduled to begin (CD–3) in the first quarter of fiscal year 2010. The fiscal 

year 2010 budget request also identified the need for a separate Naval Reactors Facility (NRF) Storage Overpack Complex in fiscal year 2011. 

After the fiscal year 2010 budget request was submitted, Naval Reactors recognized it could not meet its spent fuel handling requirements under this arrangement. Specifically, the Program would not be able to concurrently conduct two significant program missions in ECF: 

(1) Return of spent naval fuel from the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) 

(2) Aircraft carrier refueling/defuelings using the M–290. 

If left unchanged, this would have had a direct negative impact to both the State 

of Idaho settlement agreement and operational needs of the nuclear aircraft carrier 

fleet. 

Accordingly, Naval Reactors modified the construction plan to ensure the Program 

could continue to meet its spent fuel handling requirements. Rather than modify the 

existing ECF as originally planned, Naval Reactors determined the mission required 

a new facility for the receipt and handling of M–290 shipping containers. That facility, the ECF M–290 Receiving/Discharge Station project, would also incorporate the 

NRF Storage Overpack Complex project identified above. This single Major Construction Project (MCP) will eliminate workflow conflicts and will provide the capability for concurrent receipt of fuel from INTEC and receipt and handling of M–290 

shipping containers. 

The current or revised scope of the project and schedule was outlined in the fiscal 

year 2011 budget request to Congress. That schedule indicated that CD–2 would be 

completed in the first quarter of fiscal year 2010. CD–2, including the new performance baseline for the project, was approved on 30 November 2009. This approved 

performance baseline states that CD–3 will occur in the second quarter of fiscal year 

2011. CD–3 for the project was approved by Naval Reactors on 25 April 2011. In 

addition, the project is within the cost estimate included in the performance baseline. 

91 

20. Senator NELSON. Admiral Donald, has construction approval been received? If 

not, why not? 

Admiral DONALD. Yes, construction approval (CD–3 (Start of Construction)) for 

the M–290 Receiving/Discharge Station (CSRF/OSE2) rail siding was provided in 

the first quarter fiscal year 2011. The CD–3 for the CSRF/OSE2 facility has been 

approved by Naval Reactors on 25 April 2011. 

21. Senator NELSON. Admiral Donald, what is the status of the design, is it 90 

percent complete as is the NNSA requirement? 

Admiral DONALD. The 100 percent final design for the ECF M–290 Receiving/Discharge Station (CSRF/OSE2) has been submitted by the contractor. Construction 

began on the project in fiscal year 2011 with approval of the CD–3 for the CSRF/ 

OSE2 rail siding. The CD–3 for the CSRF/OSE2 facility was approved by Naval Reactors on 25 April 2011. 

22. Senator NELSON. Admiral Donald, is this considered a new start and thus construction cannot begin under the CR? 

Admiral DONALD. The ECF M–290 Receiving/Discharge Station is not considered 

a new start and construction may begin under a Continuing Resolution. Identified 

as a MCP since fiscal year 2008, this project received $545,000 in fiscal year 2008, 

$300,000 in fiscal year 2009, and $3,236,000 in fiscal year 2010 in project engineering and design (PED) funding. The project received an additional $6,264,000 in fiscal year 2010 to support long-lead procurement of a 310 ton crane with a 75 ton 

auxiliary hook. 

The PED funds provided Architect-Engineering services for the ECF M–290 Receiving/Discharge Station construction project, allowing the project to proceed from 

conceptual design into preliminary design and final design. The design effort assured project feasibility, defined the scope, provided detailed estimates of construction costs based on the approved design and working drawings and specifications, 

and provided construction schedules, including procurements. 

PROTECTIVE FORCES

23. Senator NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, last March, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee held a hearing on the protective forces that guard the nuclear weapons 

and materials at DOE sites. The majority of these sites are NNSA sites. It was clear 

from that hearing that NNSA and DOE needed to look at the career path options 

for these highly trained forces, particularly with respect to retirement eligibility. 

The rigorous physical requirements of these forces merit the possibility of a 20-year 

retirement program along the lines of some law enforcement, military, and NNSA 

courier retirement programs. Shortly after that hearing, DOE was supposed to provide an implementation plan to address the retirement and other issues. This report 

was not submitted until January of this year and it did not include a plan, just a 

recitation of the issues and a promise to study the options again. This issue has 

been unresolved for over 3 years. The current contracts for the Guard forces expire 

in just over a year and it is possible that the forces will strike if these issues are 

not resolved. One site did have a strike over these issues when the last contract 

expired. The DOE representative at the March hearing testified that the issue needed to be resolved promptly. But here we are 1 year later and with the issue still 

unresolved. It is important to ensure that the nuclear materials and weapons continue to be protected. When is NNSA planning to resolve this retirement issue for 

the protective forces? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. NNSA and the Department as a whole continue to evaluate all 

measures that seek to enhance career longevity for contractor protective force employees. In furtherance of its goal to study retirement benefit options for protective 

force employees, NNSA commissioned a study to evaluate costs associated with a 

variety of different benefit options for contractor protective force employees. The 

study evaluated three benchmark retirement plans as the first step toward understanding the costs and comparative benefits associated with each type of plan. The 

three benchmark design alternatives were: (1) the Hanford Multi-Employer (Defined 

Benefit) plan applicable to the Guards union; (2) a Defined Contribution plan similar to the one offered to certain contractor employees at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; and (3) the Nuclear Materials Couriers Plan, which includes elements of both Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution plans. A fourth ‘‘Notional 

Alternative Plan,’’ which mirrors the Couriers’ plan but excludes some of the more 

costly features, was also included in the analysis. 

92 

To be clear, the protective force members are employees of the contractors, not 

NNSA. The contractor protective force employees at all but one of the NNSA sites 

are represented by labor unions. Accordingly, any changes to existing benefits plans 

would have to be agreed to during the collective bargaining process between the contractor and the union representing the protective force employees. Therefore, the 

study that was performed provides objective cost estimates for the liabilities that 

the government would be responsible for reimbursing pursuant to its contracts with 

NNSA contractors if the protective force employees were to participate in benefit 

plans that resemble the benchmark plans. 

The study has been completed, and NNSA senior management is conducting a 

thorough review of the report. The Department owes its stakeholders, the taxpayers, 

and all potentially affected employees deliberate and careful consideration of these 

options. 

24. Senator NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, my understanding is that there is a way to 

address this by establishing an accelerated 401K system. Would you look into this 

and report to us, before the time we mark up the National Defense Authorization 

Bill for Fiscal Year 2012, as to how we might fix this issue? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. As part of the Department’s protective force career options initiative, DOE and NNSA have encouraged protective force contractors and unions to 

offer ideas and concepts as to how career longevity and retirement options might 

be addressed, and we continue to receive input from these sources. One NNSA contractor and the protective force union at that site have discussed an ‘‘accelerated 

401(k) system’’ and this option will be included in the broader Departmental discussion of this issue as details of this notional plan emerge. All legal and feasible options that are brought to the Department’s attention will be considered by DOE 

management. If the full accelerated 401(k) proposal is presented to the NNSA before 

the markup the fiscal year 2012 defense authorization bill, we will report to you on 

this recommendation. 

AVIATION

25. Senator NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino and Dr. Cook, in December, NNSA made a 

significant change in the way it manages the aviation program of the Office of Secure Transportation. As part of this change, the DOE Office of Aviation will have 

increased oversight responsibilities for the NNSA program in lieu of the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA). Is there a plan in place for the DOE Office of Aviation to oversee the NNSA program? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO and Dr. COOK. There will be no change to the manner in which 

the DOE Office of Aviation Management will conduct its responsibilities. Currently, 

OST is studying a move to Federalize pilots. Based on the outcome of this study, 

the FAA will conduct the appropriate surveillance of OST’s aviation program pursuant to FAA regulations. 

26. Senator NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino and Dr. Cook, the FAA had previously determined that the NNSA served in both a civil and public function and thus had to 

comply with part 119. Has FAA approved the NNSA plan to move away from FAA 

regulations under part 119? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO and Dr. COOK. NNSA’s Office of Secure Transportation continues 

to operate both public and civil flights and will comply with applicable sections of 

Part 119 and all other applicable FAA regulations. As such we will operate under 

Part 125 as approved by the FAA. Public flights are conducted to support the agency’s governmental function such as moving Limited Lifetime Components. All other 

flights are considered civil unless approved otherwise by the FAA administrator. An 

example of a civil flight would be to move passengers to training. All civil flights 

must be cost justified and compared to commercial air transport before utilizing government aircraft for civil flights. Historically over the last 3 years, approximately 

90+ percent of our flights are public. 

27. Senator NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino and Dr. Cook, I would note that the explanatory statement accompanying the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 said with respect to 

the operation of the Secure Transportation Asset (STA) aircraft: 

The Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the NNSA are directed to consult with the FAA to determine whether the operations of the STA aircraft are public or civil operations, or a combination, and the appropriate equivalency standard 

under which the STA aircraft should be operated, maintained, and managed. In addition, the Secretary and the Administrator are directed to submit a report to the 

93 

congressional defense committees that sets forth the FAA determination, the ability 

of the NNSA to meet the requirements of the DOE orders if NNSA will operate as 

a self-regulated entity, and whether the DOE Office of Aviation is capable of conducting FAA like oversight and inspections. This report should be completed before 

737 operations begin. 

When do you expect 737 operations to begin? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO and Dr. COOK. NNSA’s Office of Secure Transportation’s (OST) 

Aviation Program will comply with the applicable portions of FAA regulations found 

at 14 C.F.R. (Aeronautics and Space) and 41 C.F.R. 102–33 (Management of Government Aircraft). Flight Operation of the aircraft is expected to begin in August 2011. 

Mission support availability expected to begin on 1 December 2011. 

28. Senator NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino and Dr. Cook, when will the report be submitted to Congress? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO and Dr. COOK. NNSA will comply with the requirements as set 

forth by the FAA. The FAA accepted a letter of application from NNSA that outlines 

our proposed operating construct to operate under Part 125 of 14 CFR. NNSA sees 

no operational, management or legal constraints that would result in a denial of authorization. At this point the only limiting factor before final consideration by the 

FAA is the hiring of pilots. NNSA owns one aircraft and is currently finalizing the 

acquisition of the second. At that point NNSA will have adequate information and 

direction from the FAA and can submit a report shortly thereafter. 

COMPUTATIONAL AND EXPERIMENTAL CAPABILITIES

29. Senator NELSON. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, all of the experimental tools that were identified when the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) 

was established are now operational. Have you considered what experimental tools 

might be needed in the future? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The experimental tools, DARHT, and Los Alamos Neutron Science 

Center at Los Alamos, and NIF at Lawrence Livermore that were first identified 

when the SSP began some 15 years ago are just beginning to provide remarkable 

data that scientist and engineers are using to better understand and evaluate the 

safety, security, and effectiveness of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. Contrary to 

what some have suggested, we are definitely not ‘‘done’’ with science. There are 

many significant areas of work that remains to be done. There are critical open 

questions that remain to be solved to retain our confidence in the stockpile and we 

cannot fully predict the scientific challenges that are still ahead as it continues to 

age and goes through modernization. 

As we seek to sustain the deterrent and improve our understanding of the Nation’s aging stockpile through the SSP, LANL believes that future mission needs require investment in new and more capable experimental facilities and computational capabilities. As an example, we are examining materials in extreme environments, exploiting in situ, transient measurements to study materials in relevant dynamic and irradiation extremes. Constructing such a facility would revolutionize 

material performance in extremes by conquering ‘‘the micron frontier’’—the domain 

in which materials microstructure and defects dominate performance AND our predictive capability for the stockpile is the weakest—and advancing the transition 

from observation and validation of materials performance to prediction and control 

of materials functionality. 

LANL has engaged the weapons science community including our colleagues at 

LLNL and Sandia as well as in the UK, and the broader scientific community to 

define such a facility and is currently performing a pre-conceptual design study for 

a facility that we call MaRIE, for Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extremes, including the identification of scientific and systems requirements, analysis of alternatives 

that would meet those requirements, and trade studies that would assess the costrisk-benefits of a variety of technical options. LANL believes that a facility such as 

MaRIE would provide needed dynamic observations of microstructure to the SSP, 

validating theoretical descriptions and ultimately yielding control of materials needed to reduce cost and increase confidence in the stockpile. MaRIE provides not only 

multiple, simultaneous in situ measurements of multi-granular materials with subgranular resolution, but also synthesis capabilities to predictively design high performing materials for these environments as well as multiple probes of materials 

mixing in extremes, a known consequence of materials damage and failure. 

Dr. MILLER. From an experimental point of view, the most important thing right 

now is to provide the funding to adequately utilize the tools we have established, 

such as the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT), the NIF, 

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and the Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) facility; requirements for additional experimental facilities have not emerged from our research. An area in which additional capability is need is HPC and simulation. 

There remain key areas, such as boost physics, where we still lack adequate 

knowledge. Predictive Capability Framework campaigns utilize our advanced stockpile stewardship tools to fill gaps in knowledge about nuclear weapon performance 

relevant to existing or expected issues about stockpiled weapons. These activities integrate the use of state-of-the-art high-performance computers, high-fidelity simulation models validated by data gathered from state-of-the-art experimental facilities. 

This cutting-edge research provides both the basis for stockpile stewardship and the 

tools by which the Laboratory experts make judgments about the health, safety, security, and effectiveness of the stockpile. 

In addition to the experimental facilities we rely on, we need to continue to advance our HPC capabilities to provide the weapons program with computing platforms for modeling and simulation (M&S) at the exascale level. To assure that 

NNSA’s future mission critical needs are met, a decadal, sustained R&D investment 

is necessary to advance supercomputing to exascale-class platforms (1 x 10 18 or 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 floating point operations per second)-supercomputers on 

the order of 1,000 times more powerful than the fastest in existence. Current 

petascale supercomputing has manifestly improved M&S capabilities, but users remain limited by speed or length of run time in performing calculations, or inability 

to perform adequate uncertainty analyses of complex systems. A central R&D challenge is power consumption. If the current HPC technology were used and the number of processors simply scaled up, an exascale machine would take hundreds of 

Megawatts of power costing tens of millions of dollars annually to operate—making 

the machine more expensive to operate than procure. Therefore, significant technological innovations are needed to improve efficiency—gains approaching the order of 

100—will be necessary to reach an optimal next-generation exascale platform. 

The NIF is a critical experimental facility required to meet the Nation’s stockpile 

stockpile stewardship goals and validate our computational models. It is very important that the NIF be funded at a level consistent with the current implementation 

plan to meet required deliverables and maximally benefit from the investments 

made in the facility and its operation. The SSP relies on NIF for ignition and nonignition experiments. 

NIF has been operational since the facility’s dedication in May 2009. NIF with 

its 192 laser beams has performed exceptionally well. It is proving to be a remarkably reliable and precise system. 

NIF is the focal point for the National Ignition Campaign (NIC). The purpose of 

NIC is to determine the feasibility of fusion ignition and transition NIF from a construction project to routine experimental operations for weapons and basic science 

by the end of fiscal year 2012. With respect to fusion, NIC has two major goals: execution of DT ignition experiments starting in fiscal year 2010 for the purpose of 

demonstrating ignition and development of a reliable, repeatable ignition platform 

for weapons physics, basic science, and energy research by the conclusion of NIC 

at the end of fiscal year 2012. 

There have been a number of important successes at NIF. In the hohlraum 

energetics campaign, the NIC team demonstrated that the interaction between the 

laser beams and the target could be satisfactorily controlled and the conditions necessary to implode the hydrogen fuel could be achieved. 

We have also demonstrated the integration of all of the subsystems needed for the 

ignition. Cryogenically cooled ignition targets with a layer of solid tritium, hydrogen, 

and deuterium (THD) have been successfully created and imploded. One shot in particular achieved a record-setting 1.3 x 10 14 neutrons. 

NIC continues to make excellent progress and the results of implosion experiments are very encouraging. We continue to learn much from the experiments and 

see no ‘‘show stoppers.’’ We are optimistic about success in achieving fusion ignition 

but mindful that NIC is an extremely challenging undertaking that is at the frontiers of science and technology. Current plans are to complete the current fusion ignition and burn campaign in spring or summer of 2012. 

NIF also executes ‘‘non-ignition’’ experiments in support of the SSP. In late February-March 2011, we conducted the most recent highly successful campaigns of 

high-energy-density physics experiments in support of stockpile stewardship on NIF. 

One campaign focused on radiation transport to gather data to validate the capability of our physics simulation codes to model phenomena. Altogether, 16 experiments were performed in 11 shot days. These included the first experiments performed that included diagnostics to provide time-resolved radiographic data. Preliminary comparisons of data taken are in agreement with pre-shot predictions. A 

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tion-of-state data to characterize the properties of highly compressed (but unheated) 

materials-in this case, tantalum and carbon. Gathered data from such experiments 

are needed for scientific advances that underpin both stockpile stewardship and 

planetary science. 

Dr. HOMMERT. The challenging work necessary over the next two decades to extend the lifetimes of key weapon systems in the US nuclear arsenal will require application of the new experimental facilities and tools created during the ScienceBased Stockpile Stewardship era, and will also require upgrades and recapitalization for a number of legacy capabilities. Several key investments are required in 

order for Sandia to successfully execute our warhead systems engineering and integration responsibilities and our design and qualification activities for non nuclear 

components and subsystems. Some of our major environmental test facilities were 

first commissioned in the 1950s, and they must be upgraded to modern standards 

to support the design and development testing for the B61 Life Extension Program 

(LEP). Facility and equipment enhancements are needed at the Tonopah Test Range 

where we will perform critical development flight testing of the B61 LEP. Sandia 

will provide critical radiation hardened microelectronics for upcoming LEPs and 

ALTs. Our capabilities are officially accredited with ‘‘trusted’’ status for both the design and manufacture of microelectronics, which is critical in an age of growing 

cyber threat concerns about microelectronic supply chain surety. Our silicon fab facility requires recapitalization because the tooling is 10–15 years old, and this is an 

industry where the technology turns over every couple of years. Of 137 tools in the 

silicon fab, more than 25 percent have only 3rd party support, and another 25 percent have no OEM support or spare parts. The recapitalization must begin soon to 

address the ever-increasing risk of running existing equipment to failure. 

The unique pulsed power capabilities associated with Sandia’s Z facility are advancing our understanding of the performance of nonnuclear components in extreme 

radiation environments, and providing valuable Equation of State experimental data 

for the physics labs in the critical area of dynamic material response. We also apply 

this expertise in High Energy Density Physics more broadly to the diagnostics and 

experimental design needs of the National Ignition Campaign and the Predictive 

Capabilities Framework. 

30. Senator NELSON. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, underpinning 

all of the experiments and past nuclear tests are the world’s leading computational 

and modeling capabilities, which have been developed by NNSA. The ability to 

model the performance of nuclear weapons using the new experimental data and 

past data from the days of nuclear testing is essential to maintaining the nuclear 

weapons stockpile, safely, securely, and reliably into the future. How important is 

this computation capability to your work? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The computational capability to model and understand the performance of nuclear weapons is essential to our work, and it always has been. One 

of the largest successes of the Stockpile Stewardship has been our remarkable advances in supercomputing capability, and specifically our ability to model the complex phenomena that occur in a weapon. What we have discovered is that with each 

improvement in simulation performance. We see greater fidelity and develop an improved understanding as well as further awareness of what we still do not understand. Thus moving to the next generation of computing (exascale) is not a luxury 

or simply speed for the sake of speed. It is essential to our understanding of the 

challenges we face with the stockpile, in particular as we move further away from 

our underground test experience. 

Dr. MILLER. HPC serves as the integrating element of the SSP and has been instrumental in the success of the SSP to date. The significant resources the country 

has expended over the past few decades in HPC have proven to be a very worthwhile investment. Nuclear weapons are highly engineered 3–D systems with complex materials that change over time. HPC simulations of stockpile performance, security, and safety help identify problems in the stockpile, assess the impact, and devise solutions. Without HPC, the SSP would not have been successful in sustaining 

confidence in the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear stockpile in 

the absence of nuclear testing. However, there are still unresolved issues that require continued growth in our HPC capabilities to exascale computing in order to 

stay on top of stockpile concerns and meet future challenges. Achieving exascale 

computing is a technically challenging endeavor, similar in magnitude to the effort 

expended in the 1990s to develop terascale computing. This greatly increased capability will have other positive impacts on our country’s national security and competitiveness. I am pleased that a program to initiate this effort is included in the 

President’s Budget Request and strongly urge support for an aggressive research 

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and development effort to create the technologies necessary to achieve and apply 

exascale computing. 

Dr. HOMMERT. Computational capabilities, which encompass both engineering 

simulation codes and high performance computational platforms, are essential tools 

in meeting our stockpile modernization and stewardship commitments over the coming decades. As our Nation moves towards a smaller stockpile, confidence in the 

safety, security, and effectiveness of the arsenal must be characterized more rigorously through quantification of margins and uncertainties (QMU) of these engineered systems. Computational simulation allows us to create age-aware performance models and thereby predict the future impacts of fundamental materials aging 

mechanisms on stockpile performance. This predictive understanding provides lead 

time for decisions on required stockpile actions. HPC capabilities are also important 

to our coverage of environmental requirements for the stockpile. While it is not possible to perform physical tests in all of the environments and credible scenarios that 

a weapon could potential encounter during its lifecycle, computational simulation 

can simulate these environments and inform our technical understanding. Computational simulation plays a significant role in many lifetime extension program activities including: environments definition, engineering design and integration, and systems qualification. It is critical that our computational tools and platforms provide 

the confidence and credibility required to inform high-consequence stockpile decisions. 

31. Senator NELSON. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, is the development of the capability keeping pace with stockpile requirements? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Since the advent of the SSP, the increase in our computational 

capabilities has been impressive. What we have discovered is that with each improvement in simulation performance we see greater fidelity and develop an improved understanding as well as further awareness of what we still do not understand. 

With this increased capability, Los Alamos and the other national nuclear laboratories have been able to deal with stockpile maintenance for the past 18 years and 

have been able to introduce additional margin into the nuclear weapons systems 

where possible. The national laboratories have also been able to more accurately 

quantify the uncertainties associated with nuclear weapons as they age. However, 

after a decade and half of stockpile maintenance we have exhausted many of the 

maintenance options certifiable with our current computational capability. 

Throughout this process, we have been able to identify computational infrastructure and code improvements advancements needed to accurately understand the 

physics and chemical changes occurring in the stockpile as it ages or to further understand options available for future LEPS. From these examinations, it is clear 

that higher levels of computational power are required to assess and certify the current and future stockpile. This will require greater investments (platforms and 

codes) than is projected in the FYNSP. An enhanced computational capability that 

allows us to advance the scientific understanding of our maintenance options in the 

absence of nuclear testing is required. This will increase the number of options 

available to us as we maintain the stockpile, ensuring that we keep pace with stockpile requirements. 

Dr. MILLER. In terms of experimental tools, additional tools are not required at 

this time. However, providing adequate funding to fully utilize the existing tools 

such as the DARHT, the NIF, and the JASPER facility is essential. In the HPC and 

simulation area, the additional capability of exascale computing and simulation 

platforms is necessary. 

The SSP has been extraordinarily successful in maintaining the nuclear deterrent 

without needing to resort to underground testing. Through our success in coupling 

advanced HPC simulation capabilities with data gathered from nuclear weapons 

science experimental facilities like LLNL’s Contained Firing Facility and LANL’s 

DARHT facility and high energy density physics data from NIF, we have largely resolved the energy balance anomaly. We now have a key piece of the puzzle to attack 

the many resulting science challenges and LEP design issues. We are also moving 

forward to complete the second keystone of SSP, developing a fundamental understanding and predictive capability for boost. 

Nuclear weapons are highly engineered 3–D systems with complex materials that 

change over time. The accumulation of small changes that are inherent in component aging, material compatibility issues, and refurbishment of aging components, 

take our warheads away from their original designs whose safety and reliability 

were certified in the era when nuclear tests were still being conducted. Recently 

identified warhead issues (that were not identified when certain warheads were first 

introduced into the stockpile) further complicate assessments. These factors increase 

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uncertainty in the performance of existing warheads, but have not undermined 

weapon certification. Experience has shown that at least one major new and unanticipated issue is discovered about every 5 years. 

SSP is focused upon an extraordinary challenge: predicting how a nuclear weapon 

changes in time with quantified uncertainties. We do not currently have the computing power needed to simulate weapons performance in 3–D at the required resolution while incorporating the needed detailed physics and age-aware material models. Additionally, we do not have the computing power to conduct the tens of thousands of high-resolution 3–D simulations needed to quantify the uncertainty in our 

predictions. Today’s available technology forces us to choose between simulating 

weapon performance in 2–D with high resolution and physics fidelity or simulating 

in 3–D. While 2–D simulations were sufficient to establish the physical principles 

behind aging effects, applying that understanding to the stockpile requires high-fidelity 3–D simulations. Therefore, a new architecture enabling exascale computing 

is needed. 

Dr. HOMMERT. The challenge we face going forward is the application of the powerful computational stockpile stewardship tools to the now urgent life extension 

needs of the stockpile. Our design and development work for multiple LEPs over the 

coming decades will rely extensively on our engineering simulation capabilities. We 

must sustain the investment in computational tools to ensure that capacity keeps 

pace with the LEP design workload as we integrate these new tools into the design 

process. The scope and complexity of Sandia’s responsibilities for warhead systems 

engineering and integration, and non nuclear component design, requires state of 

the art computational capabilities. The competency base in computational science 

that underpins these capabilities is strengthened by the NW program research in 

this area, and effectively applied to broad national security needs associated with 

cyber threats. The extensive and growing national security challenges in this area 

will drive the need for continued investments to transition codes and computational 

platforms to exascale architectures expected over the next decade. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

NUCLEAR TESTING

32. Senator SHAHEEN. Mr. D’Agostino, is there any technical reason for the United 

States to resume nuclear explosive testing in the foreseeable future? Why or why 

not? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Currently, there are no known technical reasons for the United 

States to resume nuclear explosive testing in the foreseeable future. As a result of 

our successful Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, NNSA has been 

able to maintain and enhance the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without resuming nuclear explosive testing. We are now in 

the 20th year of the underground testing moratorium, and the need for sciencebased stockpile stewardship is greater than ever. Our weapons systems are beyond 

their original design lifetimes, and while we have been able to certify them as safe, 

secure and effective, the stockpile contains some components that are based on technologies up to 60 years old and those components must be replaced and re-certified. 

Our ability to continue to certify the stockpile over the longer term requires a sophisticated physics-based understanding of the weapons, science-based tools that 

provide new means, other than underground tests, to solve complex problems, and 

predictive capabilities to reduce uncertainties. Furthermore, each of those pieces requires advanced computing capabilities to support them. We have made significant 

advancements in these areas in the past two decades; however, challenging goals 

remain such as achieving ignition at the NIF and providing a physics-based predictive capability for the stockpile. The success of the Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan—in particular the infrastructure and human capital investment 

components—will allow NNSA to continue to maintain and enhance the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without resuming nuclear explosive testing. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

CHEMISTRY AND METALLURGY RESEARCH REPLACEMENT FACILITY AND URANIUM

PROCESSING FACILITY

33. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. D’Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and 

Dr. Hommert, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, the construction projects at 

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Y–12 in Tennessee and LANL in New Mexico are the foundation of the complexwide modernization plan and are the key enabler to the many future LEP efforts. 

Together, cost estimates for these facilities range between $7.9 and $12.3 billion. 

What is driving the cost? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. UPF and CMRR are modern and highly sophisticated nuclear facilities where unique and highly complicated operations will be conducted on sensitive materials. Safety and security standards for modern nuclear facilities require 

robust infrastructure, one-of-a-kind equipment and rigorous validation that all components meet specifications and operate appropriately under established adverse 

conditions. These factors have driven costs above traditional construction projects. 

Dr. COOK. I agree with Mr. D’Agostino and add that, at 50 percent design, these 

projects are still in preliminary maturity. As their designs have matured these 

projects have acquired better definition of how the requirements for seismic ground 

motion, nuclear quality assurance, and security affect the design. We will not set 

the performance baseline for cost and schedule until the engineering design has 

reached 90 percent completion. Their scheduled completion is more than 10 years 

from now, and cost estimate ranges include appropriate contingency to address 

known uncertainties. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The CMRR facility will support many programs involving plutonium and other actinides. Those programs include direct support for the stockpile, 

nonproliferation and counter-proliferation programs, counter-terrorism programs, 

energy programs, and plutonium science. To meet the mission requirements, these 

facilities must be designed to safely and securely handle and control nuclear material not only for the personnel working in the facility and for the public, even in 

major postulated and coupled accidents, such as earthquakes. The CMRR facility is 

being designed for personnel to safely handle all forms of plutonium, including bare 

metal. We expect these facilities to serve a broad array of national security programs over many decades. In addition, we must protect significant quantities of nuclear materials. These requirements have driven us to a design with multiple, redundant safety systems and security features. 

Dr. MILLER. I would respectfully defer to my colleagues at the NNSA for specific 

information on the cost estimates for the UPF at Y–12 and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) facility at LANL. However, I would observe 

that the type of work performed by NNSA often requires very complex, one-of-a-kind 

facilities. The nature of these one-of-a-kind facilities makes out-year budgeting quite 

challenging. For these types of facilities, it is very important to provide flexibility 

and appropriate contingencies that reflects the various elements of uncertainty 

within each project. 

Dr. HOMMERT. I defer to Mr. D’Agostino, Dr. Anastasio, and the institutions accountable for executing these MCPs. 

34. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. D’Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and 

Dr. Hommert, why do these facilities cost so much? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. UPF and CMRR are modern and highly sophisticated nuclear facilities where unique and highly complicated operations will be conducted on sensitive materials. Safety and security standards for modern nuclear facilities require 

robust infrastructure, one-of-a-kind equipment, and rigorous validation that all components meet specifications and operate appropriately under established adverse 

conditions. These factors have driven costs above traditional construction projects. 

Moreover, the nuclear facility construction industry has been inactive for many 

years and there are no comparative construction costs that indicate the UPF and 

CMRR costs are above market price. NNSA acknowledges that the UPF and CMRR 

facilities are costly because they are unique and modern nuclear facilities that are 

being designed to modern nuclear, safety and security standards. As their designs 

have matured these projects have acquired better definition of how the requirements 

for seismic ground motion, nuclear quality assurance, and security affect the design. 

We will not set the performance baseline for cost and schedule until the engineering 

design has reached 90 percent completion. Their scheduled completion is more than 

10 years from now, and cost estimate ranges include appropriate contingency to address known uncertainties. 

Dr. COOK. I agree with Mr. D’Agostino. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The CMRR facility (and likewise, the UPF) must be able to perform the assigned mission programs for multiple decades in a safe and secure manner. To meet the mission requirements, these facilities must be designed to safely 

and securely handle and control nuclear material not only for the personnel working 

in the facility but also for the public, even in major postulated accidents. The CMRR 

facility is being designed for personnel to safely handle all forms of plutonium, including bare metal. Dealing with special nuclear materials such as plutonium reVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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quires high levels of security and safety, requiring multiple, redundant safety systems and security features. All of these requirements tend to increase the facility 

cost. 

Dr. MILLER. The NNSA facilities are one-of-kind facilities that have never been 

built anywhere in the world before in most cases. Regardless of the design and engineering challenges these projects present, I believe they are absolutely critical to our 

national security. Without both the stockpile stewardship research and development 

centers and production facilities, the country would not be able to support our nuclear deterrent. I fully recognize that they are costly, but I would also maintain that 

they are critical to our national security. 

Dr. HOMMERT. I defer to Mr. D’Agostino, Dr. Anastasio, and the institutions accountable for executing these MCPs. 

35. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. D’Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and 

Dr. Hommert, when does NNSA plan to have better confidence in the cost and 

schedule for these buildings? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. NNSA will gain more confidence in the cost and schedule for 

UPF and CMRR as the designs mature. The design is maturing at a rate of approximately 1 percent-2 percent per month. Both projects are on schedule and will be 

ready to establish project cost and schedule baseline (CD–2) in fiscal year 2013 after 

they have achieved 90 percent design completion. I will only approve the baselines 

once the project teams have sufficiently demonstrated and DOE support offices have 

validated that the projects can be delivered at the CD–2 specified level of cost, 

schedule, and defined scope. 

Dr. COOK. I agree with Mr. D’Agostino and add that a requirement of CD–2 approval includes an External Independent Review and ICE that supports, and provides additional confidence in, the proposed cost and schedules. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The next major step in the CMRR NF will be when the performance baseline is set at 90 percent complete, currently planned for mid-fiscal year 

2013. 

Dr. MILLER. I understand that the NNSA has worked diligently to address this 

very question and is moving toward obtaining more frequent ICEs during the critical decision process, as well as hiring and training professional large scale project 

managers. I would respectfully defer to NNSA for a more detailed answer. 

Dr. HOMMERT. I defer to Mr. D’Agostino, Dr. Anastasio, and the institutions accountable for executing these MCPs. 

36. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. D’Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and 

Dr. Hommert, what steps are being taken to ensure that taxpayers’ dollars will be 

spent wisely and that the buildings will come in on time and at cost? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The UPF and CMRR project teams are continually being challenged to identify cost effective opportunities while meeting all operational, safety, 

and security requirements. NNSA has supported numerous internal and external reviews to identify cost savings and validate that the requirements are current and 

support mission deliverables. NNSA will continue to challenge the projects to find 

more savings and to ensure that the proposed costs are appropriate for all elements 

of the projects’ scope. 

Dr. COOK. I agree with Mr. D’Agostino. As an example of our commitment, DOD 

is currently conducting an independent review of CMRR and UPF to validate the 

costs of the project scopes. NNSA has established that the upper ends of the cost 

range estimates represent the maximum Total Project Costs for the projects, and 

that cost growth beyond these figures will not be supported. If the costs trend toward the upper end of the cost estimate ranges, NNSA is prepared to make scope 

adjustments as needed to maintain mission capabilities. As detailed in the DOE/ 

DOD Memorandum of Agreement on DOD’s funding for NNSA, another approach 

if costs increase is to slip schedules to the right. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Los Alamos recognizes that the Nation is confronted with very serious financial challenges and is committed to spending taxpayers’ dollars wisely. 

We have assembled a strong team to design and construct this facility. I personally 

evaluate the CMRR project and we have driven the budgeted cost of this facility 

down over the last year. In addition, we support a large number of reviews that 

evaluate our plan and have learned from lessons from other MCPs. 

Dr. MILLER. I understand that the NNSA has worked diligently to address this 

very question and is moving toward obtaining more frequent ICEs during the critical decision process, as well as hiring and training professional large-scale project 

managers. I would respectfully defer to NNSA for a more detailed answer. 

Dr. HOMMERT. While, as indicated above, we are not directly involved in the detailed cost and schedule planning for these facilities, we strongly support the NNSA 

100 

decision to apply rigorous project management tools and approaches to these MCPs. 

At Sandia, we are proud of our track record in completing MCPs ahead of schedule 

and under budget (for example with our MESA facility in 2007) and if called upon, 

we stand ready to support the NNSA with our relevant experience in this area. 

37. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. D’Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and 

Dr. Hommert, if Congress were to not provide funding for CMRR and UPF, what 

are some of the anticipated consequences to the nuclear stockpile and weapons complex? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Delaying UPF and CMRR places our ability to execute the current LEP schedule at a high risk—that risk will continue to increase every year. 

Nuclear component work would need to be performed in existing facilities like 

Building 9212 at Y–12 and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) Facility 

at Los Alamos. However, the safety, security, and environmental issues associated 

with the aging existing facilities are mounting, as are the costs of addressing them. 

NNSA manages the risks associated with the aging facilities and will continue to 

do so, but as the facilities and their equipment continue to age, the ability to maintain them will diminish. NNSA will of course exhaust all options for keeping these 

facilities open until a new UPF and CMRR have been constructed. However, in the 

event that either of these facilities had to be shut down due to safety, security, or 

environmental concerns, the loss of work force and critical skills would be considerable, and it would likely be extremely expensive to restart operations. If there are 

delays in delivery of the CMRR and UPF, significantly more maintenance and infrastructure improvement measures would be needed in the existing facilities, at a significant cost, to avoid a potential shut down and ensure NNSA can meet delivery 

schedules for LEPs. 

For the manufacture of plutonium pits, the current CMR facility has limited analytical capability, and the PF–4 vault is inadequate. Therefore, NNSA will not be 

able to achieve the required 80 pits per year rate until the new CMRR facility is 

in operation. This capability is required for the W78 LEP by 2021. 

Dr. COOK. I agree with Mr. D’Agostino. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. We cannot continue to operate the current CMR facility forever 

because of inherent safety risks of a 60+ year old facility that will continue to increase into the future. Los Alamos has already closed three wings of CMR by transferring mission work to TA–55 and curtailing other activities. The CMRR facility 

will support many programs involving plutonium and other actinides for decades to 

come. Those programs include direct support for the stockpile including support to 

the pit production activities in TA–55/PF4, weapons complex, nonproliferation and 

counterproliferation programs, counterterrorism, energy programs, and plutonium 

science. Impacts can be significant, including the inability to support these required 

mission programs. 

Dr. MILLER. The fiscal year 2011 and 2012 budgets represent a positive first step 

toward reversing the recent declining budget trends and revitalizing the nuclear 

weapons complex necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The requested 

budget increase for the NNSA Weapons Activities account balances the funded program of work across the three primary areas in the SSP: (1) the science and technology that underpins our understanding of an aging stockpile and supports a reinvigorated surveillance program; (2) the LEPs that are necessary to keep the systems 

safe, secure and effective; and (3) the modernization of the facilities and infrastructure. Funding shortfalls in any one of the three primary areas of SSP will likely 

impact the other elements of SSP. For instance, if Congress were not to provide 

funding for the CMRR facility and the UPF, the LEPs would be impacted. More specifically, the availability of CMRR could affect the extent to which new safety and 

security features are introduced into the stockpile, the performance margin of the 

LEP, and the interoperability between systems like the W78 and W88. 

Dr. HOMMERT. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) assumes 

the availability of these facilities in the early to mid 2020s. A fundamental change 

to the SSMP plan for the stockpile would be required if Congress decided not to provide the required funding. An alternative approach for ensuring U.S. capabilities for 

working with Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) would need to be developed and 

funded. 

38. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. D’Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and 

Dr. Hommert, given the long list of LEPs over the next 20-plus years, how could 

a delay in the construction of CMRR and UPF impact future LEPs? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Delaying UPF and CMRR places our ability to execute the current LEP schedule at a high risk—that risk will continue to increase every year. 

Nuclear component work would need to be performed in existing facilities like 

101 

Building 9212 at Y–12 and the CMR Facility at Los Alamos. However, the safety, 

security, and environmental issues associated with the aging existing facilities are 

mounting, as are the costs of addressing them. NNSA manages the risks associated 

with the aging facilities and will continue to do so, but as the facilities and their 

equipment continue to age, the ability to maintain them will diminish. NNSA will 

of course exhaust all options for keeping these facilities open until a new UPF and 

CMRR have been constructed. However, in the event that either of these facilities 

had to be shut down due to safety, security, or environmental concerns, the loss of 

work force and critical skills would be considerable, and it would likely be extremely 

expensive to restart operations. If there are delays in delivery of the CMRR and 

UPF, significantly more maintenance and infrastructure improvement measures 

would be needed in the existing facilities, at a significant cost, to avoid a potential 

shut down and ensure NNSA can meet delivery schedules for LEPs. 

For the manufacture of plutonium pits, the current CMR facility has limited analytical capability, and the PF–4 vault is inadequate. Therefore, NNSA will not be 

able to achieve the required 80 pits per year rate until the new CMRR facility is 

in operation. This capability is required for the W78 LEP by 2021. 

Dr. COOK. I agree with Mr. D’Agostino. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Future plans for LEPs will require replacement pits to be produced in the TA–55/PF4 building. While CMRR will not produce pits, this facility 

does provide the science to ensure that TA–55 pits meet the exacting chemistry and 

material properties needed to ensure the pits will function as designed. As such, a 

delay in CMRR construction creates significant delays in completion of delaying future LEPs. 

Dr. MILLER. A delay in CMRR and/or UPF could impact the range of options 

under consideration for the upcoming LEPs. Today, the production complex is capable of producing components for weapons refurbishments. However, the facilities 

that CMRR and UPF will replace are more than 50 years old, oversized, increasingly obsolete, and costly to maintain. They are also safety, security, and environmental concerns. When completed, both CMRR and UPF will be able to operate 

more efficiently in support of the nuclear weapons enterprise. While the B61–12 is 

independent of CMRR and UPF construction, a delay in CMRR could have an impact on replacement or reuse design options for the W78 LEP. The availability of 

CMRR could affect the extent to which new safety and security features are introduced into the stockpile, the performance margin of the LEP, and the interoperability between systems like the W78 and W88. 

CMRR’s original construction completion date has been pushed out to the early 

2020s according to the current schedule. LANL and LLNL continue to work with 

NNSA to ensure that sufficient capability for plutonium R&D is available to accommodate the workload of the complex to support the LEPs while CMRR is under construction. These same R&D capabilities are also required should the country need 

to characterize and/or attribute a nuclear terrorism related event. The country has 

no other capable facilities outside of the NNSA design laboratories. 

Dr. HOMMERT. The current sequence and timing of the LEPs called for in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and documented in the SSMP would not be achievable, 

and would need to be revised. Delays in the LEPs for certain systems could impact 

our confidence in the state of health of the US nuclear deterrent. 

39. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. D’Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and 

Dr. Hommert, what is being done with respect to conducting an ICE for each facility? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Both UPF and CMRR project teams have ongoing ICEs being 

performed. The GAO has performed an independent review of the UPF project, and 

the UPF project team retained the US Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) to conduct 

an ICE for the project. The USACE results are being examined and compared to 

the project team’s cost estimate to reconcile differences. The GAO has initiated a 

review of the CMRR project. The cost range estimates for CMRR and UPF are being 

independently validated by the DOD’s Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation 

(CAPE) group. 

Furthermore, in accordance with DOE 413.3b, an External Independent Review 

(EIR) is required as part of CD–2 approval. For projects such as UPF and CMRR 

that are greater than $100 million, an ICE is a required component of the EIR and 

must validate the proposed total project costs. The EIR, conducted by the DOE’s Office of Engineering and Construction Management, must validate the proposed 

scope, cost and schedule baselines as a condition of CD–2 approval. 

Dr. COOK. In addition, an independent cost reasonableness review was conducted 

on both projects in July 2010. The cost reasonableness review concluded that the 

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102 

priate. Also, the former Office of Cost Analysis conducted an ICE on UPF and an 

initial review of CMRR. All reviews—the ones cited by the Administrator and myself 

plus others to be done as the cost estimates mature—will be considered in the final 

budgeting for both projects. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. We continue to support a large number of reviews of the CMRR, 

including DOD, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), GAO, and Independent Cost Evaluations (ICE). We expect to support comprehensive ICE reviews 

as the project proceeds to baselining in 2012 and 2013. In addition, the project will 

continue to support reviews throughout the Construction Execution Phase. 

Dr. MILLER. I would respectfully defer to my colleagues at the NNSA for specific 

information on the cost estimates for the UPF at Y–12 and the CMRR facility at 

LANL. 

Dr. HOMMERT. I defer to Mr. D’Agostino, Dr. Anastasio, and the institutions accountable for executing these MCPs. 

40. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. D’Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and 

Dr. Hommert, in what way will CMRR and UPF influence U.S. Strategic Command’s (STRATCOM) requirements for the overall size of the stockpile? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. As described in the NPR, the non-deployed stockpile currently 

includes more warheads than required to hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise, due to the limited capacity of the NNSA complex to conduct LEPs for deployed weapons in a timely manner. Progress in restoring NNSA’s production infrastructure will allow these excess warheads to be retired along with other stockpile 

reductions planned over the next decade. 

Dr. COOK. I agree with Mr. D’Agostino. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The CMRR facility will support many programs involving plutonium and other actinides. Those programs include direct support for the stockpile, 

weapons complex, nonproliferation and counter-proliferation programs, counter-terrorism, energy programs, and plutonium science. It is important to note that CMRR 

will not produce pits but will provide the science to ensure that pits manufactured 

at TA–55/PF–4 meet the exacting chemistry and material properties needed to ensure the pits will function as designed. STRATCOM’s current, and projected stockpile size requirements will be supported, as required with manufacturing in TA–55/ 

PF–4 building. While the CMRR facilities size is capability based, a small capacity 

for the stockpile is inherent in the capability base. 

Dr. MILLER. This question is best answered by STRATCOM. I would note that 

even though today the production complex is capable of producing components for 

warhead refurbishments, the facilities that the CMRR facility and the UPF will replace are more than 50 years old, oversized, increasingly obsolete, and costly to 

maintain. They are also safety, security, and environmental concerns. Confidence in 

and demonstrated performance of the production complex is clearly important in the 

sizing of the stockpile with respect to its ability to respond to future strategic policy 

uncertainties and the need to protect against technological failures in the stockpile 

itself. 

Dr. HOMMERT. These facilities are part of the NNSA plan for a responsive infrastructure. In principle, a responsive infrastructure could enable a smaller hedge 

force which would be consistent with a smaller overall stockpile. 

41. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. D’Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and 

Dr. Hommert, without these facilities, would NNSA be able to meet STRATCOM’s 

current warhead requirements? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO and Dr. COOK. Should NNSA not have access to the capabilities 

in the planned new facilities, the ability to produce uranium components and conduct analysis for pit certification would be limited to rates existing today, which 

would erode as the existing facilities decay. Our ability to support the stockpile and 

the planned LEPs would be jeopardized. Without UPF and CMRR, it’s not a question of whether these capabilities would be lost, but only when. Although NNSA is 

taking all measures to continue to operate the existing facilities, their age and single point of failure capability raise the costs of safe operation each year and will 

eventually exceed NNSA’s ability to keep them operational. 

Furthermore, CMR presently enables the National Laboratories to conduct surveillance of plutonium components in the stockpile. Should the facility become unusable, it will negatively impact our ability to assess and certify the status of the current stockpile. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Without these facilities, STRATCOM’s requirements for extended 

life warheads starting with the W78 LEP will be significantly impacted if the replacement option is selected by the DOD and funded by Congress. 

103 

Dr. MILLER. Today, the production complex is capable of producing the required 

components for current warhead refurbishments underway. However, the facilities 

that the CMRR facility and the UPF will replace are more than 50 years old, oversized, increasingly obsolete, and costly to maintain. They are also safety, security, 

and environmental concerns. When completed, both CMRR and UPF will be able to 

provide components more efficiently. A delay in CMRR and/or UPF could impact the 

range of options for the upcoming LEPs and the ability of LEPs to meet new military requirements. 

Dr. HOMMERT. The current NNSA plan calls for these facilities to become operational in the 2020s. In the near term, the stockpile can and will be maintained 

with existing facilities to meet requirements. However, these facilities will be needed to meet anticipated future requirements. 

SSBN(X) LIFE OF HULL REACTOR

42. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Donald, what is the current technology readiness 

level for the life of hull reactor anticipated for the SSBN(X)? 

Admiral DONALD. Naval nuclear reactor designs are evolutionary rather than revolutionary. The reactor for Ohio Replacement SSBNs will incorporate technologies 

that provide greater energy and a longer lifetime than any previous submarine core. 

Initial development of the materials required to achieve the life-of-ship core were 

part of previous research, design and manufacturing efforts. The knowledge gained 

from these efforts identified the additional steps needed to be ready for production. 

Naval Reactors is confident in the feasibility of the life-of-ship core and will validate 

this through rigorous testing and manufacturing demonstrations. A final decision on 

the core material for Ohio Replacement is planned to be made in February 2012 

based on manufacturing demonstrations to date. 

While Naval Reactors has not historically used technology readiness levels to 

manage its technical efforts, the Program judges that the life-of-ship core technology 

would represent a level 5 (component and/or breadboard validation in a relevant environment). This assessment is based on the fact that a prototype test cell incorporating the new material has been inserted in an operating, land-based reactor 

plant. Manufacturing development at the ship-production scale needs to be demonstrated. 

43. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Donald, how are the requirements for the life of 

hull reactor design for SSBN(X) different from those in current Virginia-class submarines? 

Admiral DONALD. SSBNs spend more time at sea than SSNs in order to meet the 

requirements for strategic patrols. Ohio Replacement will also be designed for a life 

of 42 years, vice 33 for Virginia. The Ohio Replacement core will operate at sea for 

more than twice as many days as Virginia’s core. In order to achieve this increase 

in energy and lifetime demand, Naval Reactors is designing a core with new materials based on previous research. A more detailed, classified briefing can be provided. 

44. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Donald, I understand that the current milestone 

and decision point for determining the technical feasibility of developing a life of 

hull reactor for SSBN(X) is in February 2012. If it is determined that a life of hull 

reactor for the SSBN(X) is not possible, how will that impact the overall number 

of boats required to meet STRATCOM requirements? 

Admiral DONALD. The resources in our DOE budget are based on completing the 

additional development needed to ensure success of production of a life-of-ship core 

in Ohio replacement. Without a life-of-ship core, two additional ships will be required to meet STRATCOM’s requirements, thereby costing taxpayers approximately $10 billion in ship construction. 

45. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Donald, would additional boats be required to compensate for refueling? 

Admiral DONALD. Yes. Without a life-of-ship core, two additional ships will be required to meet STRATCOM’s requirements, thereby costing taxpayers approximately $10 billion in ship construction. 

46. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Donald, in the House-passed version of H.R. 1, the 

fiscal year 2011 full year CR, the Energy and Water Subcommittee of the House 

Appropriations Committee cut the President’s fiscal year 2011 NR budget by $103 

million. What is the anticipated impact of that reduction? 

104 

Admiral DONALD. The $103 million cut proposed in H.R. 1 grew to $111 million in P.L. 112–10 signed by President Obama on 15 April 10. The impacts of that $111 

million cut are as follows: 

• a 6- to 9-month delay to the Ohio Replacement Program and resultant 

loss of synchronization with the Navy’s work on the ship. 

• staffing reduction of over 50 contractors at shipyards and Naval Reactors’ 

laboratories. 

• deferral in planned hiring of 150 contractors at shipyards and Naval Reactors’ laboratories. 

• deferral in Ohio Replacement reactor plant component design subcontract 

placements. 

• a reduction in pension contributions. 

• other impacts to Naval Reactors, including deferral of previously planned 

General Plant Projects (GPP). 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN CORNYN

PANTEX PLANT

47. Senator CORNYN. Mr. D’Agostino, on July 7, 2010, the Pantex Plant was impacted by a severe thunderstorm, causing significant flooding throughout the plant, 

as well as equipment and facility damage. Pantex received $8.8 million in fiscal year 

2010 for flood recovery efforts. It is my understanding that Pantex requires an additional $17.2 million for repair and recovery efforts, as well as $2.25 million to mitigate the impact of future flood events. The President’s fiscal year 2012 budget request for operating requirements at Pantex is $649.3 million. Does this figure cover 

all remaining flood repair, recovery, and mitigation efforts required at Pantex? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The Pantex rain event occurred in July 2010, after the fiscal 

year 2011 President’s budget had been submitted to Congress. NNSA committed 

$8.8 million in fiscal year 2010 for immediate flood recovery efforts. This funding, 

along with Pantex internal efficiencies, addressed the most critical issues faced by 

the site to restoring operations. NNSA continues to evaluate the available fiscal 

year 2011 funding in the RTBF program, and will work to determine the best option 

for addressing the most urgent needs. The President’s fiscal year 2012 budget request includes $164.8 million for Pantex RTBF Operations of Facilities, which is sufficient to fund any remaining flood repair, recovery, and mitigation activities. 

48. Senator CORNYN. Mr. D’Agostino, the fiscal year 2012 budget request also covers resumption of work on a new 45,000-square-foot high-explosives pressing plant 

at Pantex. Design work for this facility was completed in 2009 and then put on hold, 

and it is my understanding that projected completion of this project is now by 2017. 

What is the current timeline for construction, and what is your department doing 

to ensure that no further delays are experienced? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The project completion date is now September 2016. An External 

Independent Review (EIR) has been conducted to validate the new cost and schedule 

and the project’s baseline revised per the EIR findings. Costs have increased due 

to the need to add more contingency for risk and the added cost escalation due to 

delay. The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is the Construction 

Services Manager and will manage the cost, schedule and technical performance of 

this project to ensure no further delays and cost overruns are experienced. The 

USACE has received bids for the project on March 1, 2011 and expects to award 

the construction contract in third quarter fiscal year 2011. The contract will be a 

firm-fixed price contract with fixed cost and completion date. 

49. Senator CORNYN. Mr. D’Agostino, according to the 2009 report by the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, ‘‘excessive regulation originating outside the NNSA but within a risk-averse DOE was raising cost 

and hampering production at Pantex.’’ The report found that two broad attitudes 

are often cited as contributing to excessive regulation: ‘‘the failure of the NNSA and 

DOE to distinguish between what to do (a government function) and how to do it 

(a contractor responsibility),’’ as well as the government’s ‘‘tendency to respond to 

problems by imposing new rules that will ‘guarantee’ that the problem does not 

recur.’’ What efforts have the NNSA and DOE taken to alleviate this excessive regulation, promote production, and reduce costs at Pantex? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. In 2009, I established and chaired a Governance Board consisting of senior leaders from NNSA and its contractors to develop an approach to 

transforming the way we govern our contractors and ourselves. The efforts of the 

105 

Board resulted in a number of short- and long-term actions to drive transformation 

in governance and oversight programs. The ultimate goal of these actions is to 

streamline how NNSA does business and allow resources to be focused and directed 

in a way that maximizes mission accomplishment, while ensuring that safety and 

security are integral components of that mission. 

Upon completion of the governance and oversight transformation effort, NNSA expects to have the following: 

• Clearer roles, responsibilities, and accountability 

• Stronger Contractor Assurance Systems 

• Better balanced Federal requirements 

• More focused, integrated, effective and efficient Federal and contractor 

oversight systems, and 

• Improved contractual performance accountability 

The effort to better balance Federal requirements directly addresses the concern 

regarding the ‘‘two attitudes’’ cited from the 2009 report by the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. NNSA has implemented a 

number of changes to its contract requirements to address duplication and redundancy in requirements and to eliminate unnecessary prescription. NNSA established 

the expectation that a team of senior managers review proposed new requirements 

or changes to requirements promulgated by DOE. As part of its review, the team 

ensures new or modified requirements focus on performance outcomes. The team 

also helps ensure those requirements are not an inappropriate response to addressing a performance problem at an individual site. This team of managers has worked 

with other DOE organizations responsible for internal requirements and regulations 

to effect significant change in those requirements; many of the changes address the 

concerns raised in your question. However, this is a work in progress as the same 

pressures and attitudes that led to the concerns raised by the Commission still exist 

internal and external to NNSA and DOE. 

DOE has also undertaken initiatives to improve its requirements. In 2010, the 

Deputy Secretary initiated DOE’s 2010 Safety and Security reform effort. This effort 

is intended to streamline DOE requirements in the areas of safety and security. 

NNSA has worked with DOE on this effort. As part of the security reform initiative, 

and in partnership with the DOE’s Office of Health, Safety and Security, NNSA has 

completed the initial phase of a Zero-Based Security Review that will improve 

NNSA’s ability to implement its nuclear security mission while maintaining a robust security posture at all of its sites. These reforms will demonstrate to Congress 

and others that the NNSA effectively accomplishes its safety and security requirements in a manner that is reasonable, defensible, and consistent across the Nuclear 

Security Enterprise. 

NATIONAL LABORATORIES

50. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, was there an 

assessment made 4 years ago that the W78 should be replaced within a decade, 

meaning that weapon won’t begin replacement work until 6 years after you stated 

it needs to be replaced? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The W78 warhead entered the stockpile in 1980. LANL has been 

monitoring the health of the W78 since then, principally through the surveillance 

program, which includes flight testing. In each of the last 15 years, the Laboratory 

has issued a W78 annual assessment report, and the respective Laboratory Directors have issued an annual assessment letter that included the W78. 

LANL has been monitoring one particular W78 aging characteristic for over a decade. When I became Director in 2006, and annually thereafter, I received technical 

briefings on the health of all the warheads and bombs for which LANL is responsible, including the W78. I mentioned this aging issue in my first annual assessment 

letter (2006) and updated my comments and assessment each year thereafter. 

In my 2007 annual assessment letter, I recommended that the W78 be replaced 

or enter a comprehensive life extension activity to correct this specific aging condition, but I did not specify a timeframe for execution. 

Dr. MILLER. LANL has been monitoring the W78’s aging characteristics and has 

assessed that aging ‘‘has not affected the safety, reliability, or performance of the 

W78 to date;’’ however, ‘‘the condition is progressive and beyond current predictive 

capabilities.’’ LANL Director Dr. Michael Anastasio first made this assessment 

about 4 years ago and at that time stated that a life extension would be needed 

within a decade. LLNL has concurred with these concerns in our peer review role 

as part of the annual assessment process. Issues identified include material aging 

106 

and compatibility issues, which can impact components within the nuclear explosive 

package (NEP). 

The W78 warhead constitutes the majority of the ICBM leg of the triad and has 

been deployed on the Air Force’s Minuteman III for more than 31 years. It is beyond 

its planned service life and requires a 10 year effort to study and then refurbish 

the necessary systems. It is important to begin the study activities on the W78 LEP 

in order to explore options to extend this warhead’s life to address concerns identified in surveillance of W78 warheads and reported in annual assessments. An important function of the study is to evaluate the different approaches available to refurbish the warhead—as were outlined in the NPR—and also to assess the impacts 

of including additional safety and security features. 

Dr. HOMMERT. The technical issue driving the need for a life extension of the W78 

warhead is associated with the NEP which is the design responsibility of LANL. I 

defer to Dr. Anastasio regarding the assessment of the W78 issue and the timelines 

required for the life extension. Regarding Sandia design responsibilities, we perform 

tests and analyses on the non-nuclear components and subsystems each year, adding data to the technical basis for assessing whether the requirements for the W78 

warhead are met. Our current assessment, based on 30 years of data collected, is 

that we see no evidence of degradation of the non-nuclear components that would 

require their urgent replacement. However, the Sandia designed electronics in the 

W78 warhead are now 30 years old and we believe it would be prudent to replace 

them when a LEP is undertaken for the warhead. The insertion of modern non nuclear technologies will likely be required to enable surety improvements and flexibility in Nuclear Explosive Package (NEP) options. 

51. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, what prompted 

that statement? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. In my 2007 annual assessment letter, I recommended that the 

W78 be replaced or enter a comprehensive life extension activity to correct a specific 

aging condition, but I did not specify a timeframe for execution. 

The basis for that statement in 2007 was my assessment of the surveillance and 

research that had been accomplished. The specific aging condition is progressive and 

must be addressed in the future. 

The basis for that statement in 2007 was my assessment of the surveillance and 

research that had been accomplished. The specific aging condition is progressive and 

must be addressed in the future. 

Dr. MILLER. LANL has been monitoring the W78’s aging characteristics and has 

assessed that aging ‘‘has not affected the safety, reliability, or performance of the 

W78 to date;’’ however, ‘‘the condition is progressive and beyond current predictive 

capabilities.’’ LLNL has concurred with these concerns in our peer review role as 

part of the annual assessment process. Issues identified include material aging and 

compatibility issues, which can impact components within the NEP. The classified 

LANL Annual Assessment Letters, starting in fiscal year 2004 through the present 

(fiscal year 2010), offer the best detailed classified summary overview regarding the 

recent history associated with the warhead. The W78 warhead is already well beyond its planned service and requires a 10-year effort to complete the life extension 

options study and physical refurbishment of the warhead. 

Dr. HOMMERT. Please see my response to QFR #50. 

52. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, has your assessment of the W78 changed in the following years? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Additional surveillance data and analysis has improved the Laboratory’s understanding of this condition. However, my assessment that the W78 

should be replaced or undergo a comprehensive life extension activity has not 

changed. 

Dr. MILLER. No, LLNL’s assessment has not changed. The W78 warhead is beyond its original design lifetime. Material aging and compatibility concerns increase 

as warheads continue to age and concerns about other possible changes invariably 

grow as a warhead type exceeds its original design lifetime. Results from surveillance of W78 units have identified issues associated with material aging and compatibility, which have the potential to impact components within the NEP. This has 

resulted in increased attention on this warhead by LANL. The classified LANL Annual Assessment Letters, starting in fiscal year 2004 through the present (fiscal 

year 2010), offer the best detailed classified summary overview regarding the recent 

history associated with the warhead. 

Dr. HOMMERT. Please see my response to QFR #50. 

107 

53. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, how long have 

you recognized the aging and reliability concerns found in the W78? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The specific W78 aging issue was first reported in an annual assessment letter by then-Director John C. Browne. 

LANL assesses that this aging issue has not affected the safety, reliability or performance of the W78 to date. 

Dr. MILLER. LANL has been monitoring the W78 aging characteristics and has 

assessed that aging ‘‘has not affected the safety, reliability, or performance of the 

W78 to date;’’ however, ‘‘the condition is progressive and beyond current predictive 

capabilities.’’ Dr. Anastasio first made this assessment about 4 years ago and at 

that time stated the life extension would be needed with a decade. LLNL has concurred with these concerns in our peer review role as part of the annual assessment 

process. Issues identified include material aging and compatibility issues, which can 

impact components within the NEP. The classified LANL Annual Assessment Letters, starting in fiscal year 2004 through the present (fiscal year 2010), offer the 

best detailed classified summary overview regarding the recent history associated 

with the warhead. 

Dr. HOMMERT. Please see my response to QFR #50. 

54. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, what is the 

consequence of additional delays in the start of the LEP study, if for example the 

study does not commence in fiscal year 2011? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Delaying the start of the W78 LEP study results in delaying the 

work that will be required to extend the life of the system. Within the limited nuclear weapons complex capabilities, delays in the W78 LEP schedule will delay future LEPs. 

We have been delaying the start of the W78 life program for several years. The 

specific condition in the W78 is progressive and must be addressed in the future. 

The longer we delay the LEP, the greater the risk is to the W78 and the missions 

that this weapon supports. As I mentioned earlier, at the current time, LANL assesses that this aging issue has not affected the safety, reliability or performance 

of the W78. 

Dr. MILLER. There are a number of potential consequences associated with delays 

in starting the LEP study for the W78 warhead, which would, in turn, delay start 

of the effort to refurbish this vitally important weapon system that is already beyond its design life. At the highest level, delaying the study will increase the risk 

of meeting the proposed first-production-unit which is currently slated for fiscal year 

2021. In addition, delays will also put at risk achieving the high level goals currently being put forward for the warhead attributes associated with this life extension (for example improving warhead safety, security, and use control). Delays in 

initiating the W78 LEP study would also impact the ongoing joint Navy and Air 

Force effort to develop a common Arming, Fusing, and Firing assembly for their respective reentry vehicles. Delays in the W78 study will also result in missing the 

opportunity to work synergistically with the ongoing B61–12 LEP to develop and 

mature technologies and processes that could potentially be used in both warhead 

life extensions. 

Dr. HOMMERT. Please see my response to QFR #50. 

55. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, is the W78 the 

most likely candidate for a ‘‘replacement’’ LEP? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The W78 is the first possible candidate for a ‘‘replacement’’ LEP, 

as the W76–1 LEP is currently being built, and the B61 is not designed as a ‘‘replacement’’ LEP. With regards to the W78 LEP, many options have been proposed 

as possible solutions for the W78 LEP, but until the study is complete it is impossible to decide what the optimal solution is. LLNL has the responsibility for this 

LEP. Los Alamos will provide a critical analysis of any options that LLNL proposes 

in this process (red-teaming the design). 

Dr. MILLER. LLNL looks forward to commencing the study on the W78 LEP. At 

this time it would be premature to decide which life extension option (refurbishment, reuse, or replacement) is the best technical option for the Laboratory to 

present to leadership in the Departments of Energy and Defense. 

Based on direction from the Secretary of Energy and the NNSA Administrator, 

the laboratories will explore all options. With information at hand on all options, 

stockpile decisions will be based on U.S. national security and stockpile requirements, informed by our best scientific judgment, and consistent with the guidance 

contained in the NPR and the plans outlined in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. I consider it my critical responsibility as a Laboratory Director to asVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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sure that all options authorized by Congress and the President are explored when 

LEPs option are evaluated. 

Dr. HOMMERT. Per the national policy guidance in the NPR, the full range of options will be considered for the W78 LEP, and a ‘‘replacement’’ approach would require Presidential authorization. The final decision on which LEP approach is best 

for a given warhead is based primarily on characteristics of the NEP, and I therefore defer to Dr. Miller. 

56. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, can you explain 

why it is important to study the W88 warhead, in terms of potential commonality 

with the W78 LEP? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. One of the advantages of having a warhead that is compatible 

with both delivery systems (ICBMS and SLBMs) is that it allows different options 

to address potential and or unanticipated failures in the stockpile. The laboratories 

have examined the possibility of common adaptable warheads for a variety of applications over several decades. The key issue in all these evaluations is ‘‘how common 

do the warheads need to be?’’ 

The studies indicate that if the goal is to maintain a credible deterrent with fewer 

warheads in the stockpile, stockpile diversity is critical. Ideally, the design of the 

physics packages for the W78 and W88 should be different yet able to fit and fly 

in ‘‘common’’ reentry bodies. 

Dr. MILLER. A high level goal for all future LEPs is to develop options that would 

enable the life-extended warhead to be used in multiple delivery platforms. We need 

to explore if this is a viable approach to reducing the number of different warhead 

types in the future stockpile without adversely impacting overall stockpile reliability, and if this approach offers the potential to reduce the number of hedge (nondeployed) warheads required. For the W78 LEP, this goal entails developing options 

that would enable the resulting warhead to be interoperable with (able to be used 

in) the Air Force Mk12 A and the Navy Mk5 reentry vehicles. (The W88 is currently 

fielded in the Mk5 Reentry vehicle.) Therefore, this requires the W78 LEP to address the life cycle/stockpile-to-target requirements for both of these warheads and 

both delivery vehicles and missile systems. 

Dr. HOMMERT. The NPR recommends ‘‘initiating a study of LEP options for the 

W78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility of using the resulting warhead also 

on SLBMs to reduce the number of warhead types.’’ The development of an interoperable warhead that could be mated to either an ICBM or SLBM delivery platform would support a hedge strategy that includes ‘‘cross-leg’’ hedging which would 

allow desired reductions in the size of the overall stockpile. Cross leg hedging means 

that a weapon system from one leg of the triad would be used to cover a shortfall 

created from a systemic defect or problem in a weapon system from another leg of 

the triad. 

A feasibility study of a common Arming, Fuzing, and Firing (AF&F) system for 

the W78/Mk12A and W88/Mk5 warheads was conducted by Sandia with excursions 

that examined extensions of the AF&F for high-surety warheads and the existing 

W87/Mk21 system. This 90-day study, which was completed in February 2010, considered enveloped functional and environmental requirements that were derived 

from Air Force, Navy, and STRATCOM inputs. While it is not possible to make one 

AF&F that can be used without modification on multiple delivery platforms or reentry systems, the study found that significant levels of AF&F commonality are possible with existing system architectures and enable additional surety features compatible with the existing NEPs and future high-surety warhead designs. The results 

of this Sandia study will be incorporated into the W78 LEP Phase 6.1 study once 

it is authorized by Congress. 

57. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, is there capacity in the enterprise to undertake an LEP on the W80? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The complex has limited capacity to execute several LEPs at the 

same time. In addition, several LEPs are needed in the next decade. It is critical 

for the DOD and NNSA to work out the national priorities in the context of limited 

resources. If it is a national priority to do the W80 LEP simultaneously with the 

other LEPs, there will be significant cost impacts and likely LEP schedule impacts 

as the nuclear weapons enterprise works towards increasing its capacity. 

Dr. MILLER. The current NNSA LEP Plan includes the W80 undergoing a life extension in 2030. NNSA continually reviews the scheduling of LEPs with the aim of 

best supporting the U.S. nuclear deterrent. 

Dr. HOMMERT. The current Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan sustains 

the W80 in the U.S. stockpile through the end of the next decade, with an LEP or 

another Long-Range Standoff option activity at that point in time. If this timing 

109 

holds, there should be capacity in the enterprise to undertake this work. In the 

meantime, a strong surveillance program for the W80 is essential. 

58. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, what risks is 

the United States taking in view of the current status of that warhead? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. On October 1, 2004, the NNSA transferred design agency responsibility for the W80 warhead from LANL to LLNL. In May 2006 Nuclear Weapons 

Council (NWC) decided to cancel the LEP for the W80. 

Dr. MILLER. LLNL has certified the W80 for a planned service life through 2030, 

barring any unforeseen issues with the system. Like the W78, a life extension of 

the W80 will require a 10-year effort for study of options and refurbishment. If a 

critical performance issue were to be identified, a delay in commencing the life extension could affect the status of the system. 

The risk to the stockpile is best mitigated by a balanced and well-funded SSP, 

which increases the nuclear weapons enterprise’s agility and ability to adapt to unforeseen events. The fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 budget increases are positive first steps toward revitalizing the nuclear weapons complex necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent, reversing the recent trend of declining budgets, and 

manage risk. The requested budget increase to the NNSA Weapons Activities account balances the funded program of work across the three primary areas in the 

SSP: (1) the science and technology that underpins our understanding of an aging 

stockpile and supports a reinvigorated surveillance program, (2) the LEPs that are 

necessary to keep the systems safe, secure and effective; and (3) the modernization 

of the facilities and infrastructure. 

Dr. HOMMERT. In Sandia’s non nuclear component space, concerns about technology obsolescence and aging are significant. We have very limited data associated 

with components fielded for more than 30 years. Our current experience with the 

B61 indicates an increasing likelihood of degradation and performance impacts as 

components age. 

59. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, when will the 

CMRR and UPF be required for the W78 production? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Many options have been proposed as possible solutions for the 

W78 LEP, but until the study is complete it is impossible to decide what the optimal 

solution is. CMRR will be available to support pit production in TA–55/PF–4 starting no later than 2023 if the pit replacement option for the W78 is selected by the 

NNSA and approved and funded by Congress. 

Dr. MILLER. The CMRR facility and the UPF are both scheduled to be operational 

in the 2021–2022 timeframe to support production requirements. This is fully consistent with the current W78 LEP’s current production schedule. While it is important that the facilities follow the current schedule to meet its targeted FPU of the 

W78 LEP, it is equally important that potential cost growth in facility construction 

does not adversely affect the science and technology that underpins stockpile assessment. A balanced and well-funded SSP is required to support the deterrent. The requested budget increase for the NNSA Weapons Activities account balances the 

funded program of work across the three primary areas in the SSP: (1) the science 

and technology that underpins our understanding of an aging stockpile and supports 

a reinvigorated surveillance program, (2) the LEPs that are necessary to keep the 

systems safe, secure and effective; and (3) the modernization of the facilities and 

infrastructure. 

Dr. HOMMERT. I defer to Dr. Anastasio and Dr. Miller. 

60. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, what are the 

risks to the stockpile if the facilities follow the current schedule? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Stockpile risks can be grouped in two areas. First, ongoing stockpile stewardship activities (surveillance and manufacturing assessments) that are 

dependent on the chemistry and materials capabilities planned for the CMRR nuclear facility and currently housed in the existing CMR, a facility that is more than 

60 years old. Second, planned schedules for new facilities are being factored into 

LEP planning such as W78. Given this advanced planning risks to the stockpile are 

currently manageable. However, pit production in TA–55/PF–4 at the necessary rate 

cannot be supported by CMRR nuclear facility until 2023. 

Dr. MILLER. The risk to the stockpile is best mitigated by a balanced and wellfunded SSP, which increases the nuclear weapons enterprise’s agility and ability to 

adapt to unforeseen events. The fiscal year 2011 budget increase is a positive first 

step toward reversing the recent declining budget trends and revitalizing the nuclear weapons complex necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The requested budget increase for the NNSA Weapons Activities account balances the 

110 

funded program of work across the three primary areas in the SSP: (1) the science 

and technology that underpins our understanding of an aging stockpile and supports 

a reinvigorated surveillance program; (2) the LEPs that are necessary to keep the 

systems safe, secure, and effective; and (3) the modernization of the facilities and 

infrastructure. Funding shortfalls in any one of the three primary areas of SSP will 

likely impact the other elements of SSP; hence, affect the deterrent. While it is important that the facilities follow the current schedule and are available for the FPU 

of the W78 LEP, it is equally important that potential cost growth in facility construction does not adversely affect the science and technology that underpins stockpile assessment. 

Dr. HOMMERT. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) assumes 

the availability of these facilities in the early to mid 2020s. If the facilities follow 

the current schedule, the enterprise will be able to execute the stockpile LEPs as 

documented in the SSMP. 

61. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, what are the 

risks to the stockpile if the facilities are delayed? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. If the pit replacement option for the W78 is selected by the NNSA, 

and approved and funded by Congress, the risk to delays will be determined by the 

existing pit build capacity. Without CMRR’s chemistry and analytic capabilities, 

necessary pit production rates in TA–55/PF–4 cannot be supported, delaying the 

W78 LEP and future LEPs. 

Dr. MILLER. The risk to the stockpile is best mitigated by a balanced and wellfunded SSP, which increases the nuclear weapons enterprise’s agility and ability to 

adapt to unforeseen events. The fiscal year 2011 and the fiscal year 2012 budgets 

are positive first steps toward reversing the recent declining budget trends and revitalizing the nuclear weapons complex necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The requested budget increase for the NNSA Weapons Activities account balances the funded program of work across the three primary areas in the SSP: (1) 

the science and technology that underpins our understanding of an aging stockpile 

and supports a reinvigorated surveillance program, (2) the LEPs that are necessary 

to keep the systems safe, secure and effective; and (3) the modernization of the facilities and infrastructure. Funding shortfalls in any one of the three primary areas 

of SSP will likely impact the other elements of SSP; hence, affect the deterrent. 

While it is important that the facilities follow the current schedule and are available 

for FPU of the W78 LEP, it is equally important that potential cost growth in facility construction does not adversely affect the science and technology that underpins 

stockpile assessment. 

A delay in the CMRR facility and/or the UPF could impact the range of options 

for the upcoming LEPs. While the B61–12 is independent of CMRR and UPF construction, a delay in CMRR could have potential impact on replacement or reuse design options for W78 LEP. For the W78 LEP, the availability of CMRR could affect 

the W78 LEP’s performance margin and the potential warhead interoperability between systems like the W78 and W88. Also, the facilities that CMRR and UPF will 

replace are more than 50 years old, oversized, increasingly obsolete, and costly to 

maintain, and they are safety, security, and environmental concerns. 

Dr. HOMMERT. The current sequence and timing of the LEPs called for in the NPR 

and documented in the SSMP would not be achievable, and would need to be revised. Delays in the LEPs for certain systems could impact our confidence in the 

state of health of the US nuclear deterrent. 

62. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, do you support 

the acceleration of the construction of these facilities? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Completing these projects sooner reduces risk to execution of required life extensions. Continuing to rely on greater than 60+ year old facilities to 

support the Nation’s nuclear deterrent cannot be sustained. 

Dr. MILLER. In the out-years, the uncertainties associated with the baselines for 

the planned LEPs and the construction of large facilities are my primary source of 

concern. Without detailed designs for the CMRR facility and the UPF and the corresponding cost analysis, funding requirements will remain uncertain. The laboratories and plants are working with the NNSA to develop baselines for these projects, 

but the total costs are not yet known. It is critically important to budget for adequate contingency in large construction projects to ensure sufficient flexibility to accommodate the detailed design issues that typically arise in constructing these complex, one-of-a-kind facilities. It is equally important to ensure that funding for these 

construction projects does not erode available funding for the science and technology 

activities that underpin the maintenance and assessment of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. 

111 

The fiscal year 2011 and the administration’s proposed fiscal year 2012 budget increases are positive first steps toward revitalizing the nuclear weapons complex necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The nation’s nuclear strategy requires a SSP that is balanced, integrated, and sustained over time. The level of investment, consistent with planned nuclear warhead reductions, must grow over time 

to capitalize construction of essential new facilities; sustain a healthy science, technology, and engineering core; manage the aging stockpile; support an increased level 

of LEP work; and maintain a critically skilled workforce. Until the baselines are 

completed, we will not have an accurate and reliable estimation of the resources required. It is clear that sustained effort will be necessary to ensure the appropriate 

balance within the program across all of its requirements. 

Dr. HOMMERT. The current schedule is aligned with the life extension plans for 

the stockpile and therefore should be sufficient. I don’t believe the overall budget 

profile for the NNSA over the next decade will support both the acceleration of these 

facilities and the required work on the stockpile. 

63. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, what steps is Los Alamos taking to accelerate 

the construction of the CMRR? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The project will be executed in a cost effective and phased manner 

where possible with available funding. For example, we plan to execute some site 

preparation activities such as establishing a concrete batch plant while the facility 

design is finalized. That way, construction can begin once the design is approved 

and the project receives authorization and the needed appropriations to begin facility construction. 

64. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, what is your understanding of the timeline 

for the CMRR to be completed and to be fully operational? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Formal direction from NNSA requires that CMRR be completed 

no later than 2020 with operation no later than 2023. 

65. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, why are different completion dates (2020 and 

2023) provided in the Section 1251 report? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The 2020 date is for completion of construction. Readiness and 

startup activities leading to full operation of the analytical chemistry and material 

characterization operations is 2023. 

66. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, after your retirement, how many weapon designers at Los Alamos will have direct nuclear test experience? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. After I retire there will be 8 nuclear weapon designers at Los Alamos with nuclear test experience. They range in age from 50 to 70 years old and 

in experience from a single nuclear test to being involved in greater than ten nuclear tests. In addition, we have 10 Laboratory-Affiliate weapon designers (retired 

staff who work on a part-time basis) with nuclear test experience that helps train 

the next generation of designers. 

67. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, what are the risks associated with the eventual condition when no weapon designers will have designed, tested, and deployed 

a new weapon? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. I have confidence in our design experts with and without nuclear 

weapons testing experience. The upcoming LEPs provide an essential element in 

continuing to develop new expertise in our design staff. I have also worked to develop new tools and methods for ensuring our confidence in the stockpile in the absence of new nuclear testing opportunities. In addition, the design labs have, for 

many years, instituted a rigorous training program for our incoming designers in 

anticipation of the time when our weapons staff with test experience would no 

longer be available. Another important element to ensure the continuing reliability 

of the stockpile will be in maintaining two distinct design laboratories, where we 

have two separate teams; one at each lab, reviewing the annual data will ensure 

good overall confidence in our systems. 

68. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Miller, how many weapon designers at Livermore will 

have direct nuclear test experience? 

Dr. MILLER. There are presently 12 active nuclear weapons designers at LLNL 

with direct nuclear test experience. These designers continue to make vital contributions to maintaining the stockpile and assessing foreign threats. Additionally, there 

are a handful of LLNL managers with direct nuclear test experience who continue 

to share their expertise with the next generation of designers. 

112 

69. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Miller, what are the risks associated with the eventual 

condition when no weapon designers will have designed, tested, and deployed a new 

weapon? 

Dr. MILLER. The SSP has been extraordinarily successful in developing the tool 

set required to maintain the stockpile in the absence of testing and using those tools 

to train the next generation of stockpile stewards. The program was specifically designed to maintain the skills necessary in the absence of nuclear testing. The SSP’s 

above-ground experimental facilities, such as the NIF and DARHT, not only provide 

data required for stewardship, but also provide our weapons designers with opportunities to carry out complex, integrated physics experiments that stress and hone designer judgment as issues are investigated or potentially new phenomena are revealed. Additionally, judgment is developed through computational simulation. Detailed simulations of weapons system performance continue to give new insight into 

weapons physics, often times beyond that available during the era of underground 

nuclear testing. 

Of equal importance is providing adequate opportunity to exercise skills in the 

complete design through production cycle, which is essential for training laboratory 

and production plant personnel. For example, the NNSA’s assignment of responsibility for the W78 LEP to LLNL provides an essential path for maintaining the competency and capability of its design and engineering cadre through the exercise of 

an integrated system design/engineering/manufacturing program. Finally, involvement in the annual assessment process provides a basis for developing and exercising the judgment of new nuclear weapons staff in dealing with difficult issues related to nuclear design and engineering, in much the same way that the development of nuclear weapons and underground testing did. 

The NNSA and the laboratories have made a concerted effort to mentor, train and 

validate the skills of the next generation of the Nation’s stockpile stewards at a time 

when scientists and engineers, who were trained during the period of extensive 

weapon development programs and nuclear testing, are still available. I am confident in the capabilities and competencies of LLNL’s workforce. Because of this, 

and the success of the SSP, I believe that the risks associated with the eventual 

condition when there are no weapon designers who have designed, tested, and deployed a new weapon are minimal. 

70. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, the Strategic 

Posture Commission led by Secretaries Bill Perry and James Schlesinger recommended that DOE, NNSA, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the DNFSB 

be realigned, and that NNSA should be a separate agency from the DOE. Has this 

occurred? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. No. The Strategic Posture Commission recommendations, as outlined in Chapter 6, include the realignment of the DOE/NNSA, Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission and the DNFSB and the establishment of NNSA as a separate agency. 

Implementing these recommendations requires actions on the part of Congress in 

cooperation with the executive branch. 

Dr. MILLER. Not to my knowledge. 

Dr. HOMMERT. No, this has not occurred. 

71. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, what efforts, 

if any, have NNSA and DOE taken to streamline Federal operations to facilitate 

laboratory productivity? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. We continue to work with DOE and NNSA to seek improvements 

in process efficiency and to reduce and streamline Federal rules and regulations and 

their interpretation impacting laboratory operations and productivity to ensure the 

long-term vitality of the Laboratory. As the Strategic Posture Commission warned, 

NNSA has become part of the problem, ‘‘adopting the same micromanagement and 

unnecessary and obtrusive oversight that it was created to eliminate’’ As the 

Stimson Center recommended in its report (pg 41) Leveraging Science for Security 

A Strategy for the Nuclear Weapons Laboratories in the 21st Century ‘‘NNSA 

should configure its oversight of the Laboratories and NTS to ensure performance 

meets the national security priorities within the bounds of budget, policy, and law. 

The DOE should provide oversight in an audit capacity, not in a compliance capacity, to minimize unnecessarily intrusive and bureaucratic intervention.’’ 

Dr. MILLER. In December 2009, NNSA Administrator Tom D’Agostino launched an 

Enterprise Re-engineering Reform Initiative aimed at dramatically rethinking and 

redesigning what is widely perceived to be a compliance and enforcement-driven relationship between Federal and contractor entities in NNSA. The goal is transform 

to a more constructive Federal/contractor partnership using NNSA’s effort with the 

Kansas City Plant (KCP) as a model. 

113 

LLNL submitted in June 2010 an Implementation Plan to the NNSA Livermore 

Site Office (LSO) for a governance approach implementing aspects of the KCP Oversight Model for Non-Nuclear Operations. Considerations included streamlining DOE 

orders and directives, implementation of a Management Assurance System, and 

changes to the Performance Evaluation Plan (used by NNSA to assess each site’s 

performance) to focus it on more strategic issues. 

Some progress is being made. The DOE Office of Health, Safety intends to 

streamline 107 directives. A LLNL/LSO Change Control Board has been chartered 

that will determine implementation of changes to DOE directives. In addition, our 

Laboratory has been taking significant steps to strengthen its Contractor Assurance 

System and transform it into a fully-functioning Management Assurance System 

that would serve as a means to eliminate Federal-contractor inefficiencies in management and controls and reduce fixed costs. We are not yet at a stage where the 

NNSA LSO has significantly modified oversight processes based on its use of our 

Contractor Assurance System. 

Dr. HOMMERT. Since 2009, DOE, NNSA and Sandia have been working at DOE 

Secretary Steven Chu’s direction to reengineer and transform the way DOE runs 

the enterprise and manages its contractors. Reform is necessary because the cost 

of doing business has outpaced the budget. Costs are being driven by management 

by directive, unclear Federal and contractor roles and responsibilities, and the government-owned contractor-operated (GOCO) contracting mechanism that needs updating. 

To address the problems of overly prescriptive requirements that are open to inconsistent interpretation and application, NNSA and the contractors have focused 

reform on: (1) thorough reviews of all requirements by Federal/contractor boards; (2) 

use of voluntary consensus standards where they exist and are appropriate; (3) riskbased tailoring to each work situation; and (4) decisionmaking pushed to the lowest 

appropriate levels. 

At all steps of this process, we are assuring that the referenced changes will enable continued improvement in our safety and security environments. 

72. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, do you have 

extra layers of administration and expense because of the current management 

structure involving NNSA and DOE? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. We have still not fully implemented the approach where the Federal Government establishes our goals and we find the most efficient and effective 

means of delivering those goals. 

Dr. MILLER. Safe, secure, efficient, and environmentally responsible work performance is a top priority at LLNL. Our management structure and our systems reflect 

that priority and are designed to ensure that our work is performed safely and securely and meets environmental quality standards. 

Many aspects of the way we operate are driven by DOE orders and directivesoften requiring more manpower than is ideally necessary to ensure the quality of 

work performance. We are working with DOE and the NNSA to streamline applicable DOE orders and directives without compromising operational quality while implementing a Management Assurance System that can be used by the NNSA Livermore Site Office to modify and streamline oversight processes. 

Dr. HOMMERT. We do have to meet administrative and management requirements 

at both the DOE and NNSA levels. For the most part, these requirements are specific to different components of the organization and are addressed accordingly. 

However, in my view, there is some level of redundancy. 

73. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, the Strategic 

Posture Commission also recommended that laboratories be recognized for their involvement in the assessment of weapons in ways not involving an award fee. Has 

this recommendation been implemented? If so, how? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The Strategic Posture Commission recommended that Congress 

and the administration create a formal mechanism (not involving awarding fee) to 

recognize the importance of the involvement of the directors of the weapons laboratories in the annual certification process. I am not aware of any action to bring this 

recommendation to fruition. 

Dr. MILLER. The Commission recommended creation of a formal mechanism ‘‘to 

recognize the importance of the involvement of the directors of the weapons laboratories.’’ The Annual Assessment of the Stockpile is singularly my most important 

responsibility as director of LLNL. It is a responsibility that I—and prior directors— 

have taken on with full diligence and utmost seriousness. 

To my knowledge, no direct action has been taken on the Commission’s recommendation. However, the importance of my weapons assessment responsibilities 

114 

is properly recognized within the Federal Government. I have had access to all necessary audiences on any occasion where I have felt it necessary to voice a concern 

or issue about the stockpile. In addition, it is noteworthy that the fundamental importance to national security of independent, critical assessments of the condition 

of the Nation’s nuclear stockpile by trained, knowledgeable experts at the NNSA 

laboratories was made clear in the 2010 NPR. This recognition is being supported 

by proposed necessary budget increases. Your continued support for the SSP is a 

highly valuable form of recognition of the importance of the work of the NNSA laboratories and their directors. 

Dr. HOMMERT. The majority of Sandia’s fee is fixed rather than award fee. While 

the award fee is associated with the overall laboratory performance, and some of 

the performance measures and milestones are associated with our stockpile evaluation and assessment responsibilities, in practice, I do not find any conflict between 

our fee structure and the ability to independently conduct the assessment of the 

stockpile. Going forward, I believe it is important to maintain our technical independence and that our technical judgment not be impacted by fee. Any changes to 

our fee structure should be carefully assessed to ensure appropriate incentives are 

established that do not compromise this technical independence. 

74. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, do you worry 

about the management structure of the laboratories? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. I do have concerns that in practice, the DOE/NNSA structure 

overseeing management of the Laboratory has room for improved efficiency and effectiveness, in balancing between enabling our support of technical work activities 

for our national security science missions (and which are aligned with the strategic 

views of both DOE and NNSA), and oversight of our operations. Related to this is 

the challenge of ensuring adequate investment in science, technology, and engineering capabilities and facilities that are essential to our mission, but extend beyond 

the near-term needs of the weapons program. This concern has also been identified 

in several previous external studies and assessments of the management and oversight structure under which the Laboratories function. Some studies, such as the 

report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United 

States, have suggested profound restructuring. We continue to work with DOE and 

NNSA to seek improvements in process efficiency and to work with them and other 

agencies to ensure the long-term vitality of the Laboratory. 

Dr. MILLER. Under the new contract and management structure, the Lawrence 

Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS) partnership has assembled a prestigious 

Board of Governors consisting of leaders of the parent organizations and national 

experts in science and technology, mission, business, operations, and security. Oversight of Laboratory performance is maintained through a number of standing committees of the Board and regular corporate assessments. The Laboratory Director 

is also the President of LLNS and reports to this Board of Governors. The Federal 

Government through the LLNS Board of Governors has access to a broad range of 

commercial and academic expertise. The Board facilitates ‘‘reach back’’ to the parent 

organizations for augmenting the talent and expertise at the Laboratory when the 

need arises. Parent organizations have organized Assess, Improve, Modernize (AIM) 

Teams, and Functional Management Assessment (FMA) reviews are regularly 

scheduled throughout the year to help drive continuous improvement. 

Over time, this has allowed the Laboratory to more cost effectively and efficiently 

fulfill its mission to provide exceptional science and technology to help solve the Nation’s most important problems. 

Dr. HOMMERT. I believe there is an effective management structure in place today. 

Within the construct of the GOCO model, further refinements and modernization 

are required to optimize our contributions to the broad set of national security challenges faced by our full customer set. 

75. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, has there been 

a change in the emphasis on scientific research and academic freedom since the conversion to the for-profit model? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Our emphasis on scientific research and academic freedom has not 

changed-it is critical to our mission. Los Alamos’ national security mission, and its 

role as the premier national security science laboratory, requires a strong emphasis 

on scientific research. We continue to lead the national laboratories in the number 

of peer-reviewed scientific publications, we continue to win a significant number of 

R&D 100 awards each year, and our staff continues to be recognized by professional 

societies for their work. Our annual external reviews of our technical capabilities 

also help us validate our strengths and identify any weaknesses. Our mission requires that we act first and foremost in the best interests of the Nation, and repVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00120 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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resent our best technical judgments with integrity and objectivity. Our internal policies therefore continue to protect academic freedom to publish, and to demand intellectual integrity and expect scientific objectivity even in the face of possibly competing interests. Without scientific integrity, we would fail both ourselves and the 

Nation. 

Dr. MILLER. In my view, the importance of scientific research and academic freedom has not been impacted by the change in the organization that manages the 

Laboratory for the Federal Government. These remain important cores values of the 

institution. I highlighted in my written testimony some of the many outstanding scientific and technical accomplishment made at LLNL in fiscal year 2010. The Lawrence Livermore National Security (LLNS) Board of Governors shares my belief that 

the Laboratory’s continuing success ultimately depends on the strength of its 

science, technology, and engineering, which in turn, depends on the quality of people 

at the Laboratory and their ability to pursue scientific research in the national interest. 

As I also stressed in my written testimony, the national investment in the impressive science, technology, and engineering capabilities at the NNSA laboratories 

needs to be carefully nurtured and preserved. My concerns are budgetary. If these 

assets are neglected, they will quickly erode and disappear. This issue merits your 

careful consideration as the country faces both very difficult budget decisions and 

a challenging future in a dangerous world. 

Dr. HOMMERT. Please see my response to QFR #73. 

76. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, do you worry 

about the independence of the laboratories now and in the future? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The Laboratories remain independent today and must in the future, to continue to properly serve the Nation. As I noted in my answer to the previous question, our mission requires both a strong emphasis on science and to provide out best technical judgments with integrity and objectivity independent of possibly competing interests. Los Alamos maintains that independence today-from both 

political and commercial interests. I have no concern that this is changing, today. 

Among other things, the presence of the University of California among the parent 

companies in Los Alamos National Security, LLC helps support that historical—and 

vital—tradition. However, retaining this independence requires vigilance. It is important that future Congresses and administrations recognize the importance to the 

Nation of the independence of the Laboratories and help the Laboratory guard it, 

for it is certainly possible for future decisions on management and structure to undermine it. 

Dr. MILLER. I do worry about the continuing independence of the NNSA laboratories in the future because it is an essential element and core strength of the Laboratory—not only for our assessments of the safety, security, and performance of the 

nuclear weapons stockpile and certification of changes made to weapons to extend 

their lifetime, but also to ensure the quality of the other vitally important national 

security work we perform. 

Our continuing independence depends on three key factors. First is continuing 

recognition by the executive branch and Congress of the importance of the laboratories and their independence. Second, funding for the laboratories over the long 

term must be sufficient for them to sustain the scientific skills and technical knowhow required to competently deal with challenging nuclear weapons issues and 

merit the confidence of the American people in the judgments of our stockpile stewards. Finally, the NNSA national laboratories must continue to attract and retain 

top-notch talent to address the major scientific and technical challenges of stockpile 

stewardship and the many national security issues facing the U.S. Vigilance is required in each of these areas to sustain laboratory independence. 

Dr. HOMMERT. It is important that the laboratories live up to the principles of the 

FFRDC model by ‘‘operating in the public interest with objectivity and independence 

and to be free from organizational conflicts of interest’’. In my view, this model 

needs to be continually reinforced and while I believe the national laboratories continue to render effective independent advice to the government; constant vigilance 

is required to retain this independence. 

77. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, is the Federally 

Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) model intact at the NNSA laboratories? If not, what has changed? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Under the Federal Acquisition Regulations, an FFRDC ‘‘meets 

some special long term research or development need which cannot be met as effectively by existing in-house or contractor resources’’ and ‘‘is required to operate in 

the public interest with objectivity and independence.’’ The Laboratories are 

116 

exemplars for both attributes. The FFRDC model is excellent. However, I am concerned that our current contractual environment has led to an overemphasis on 

managing the Laboratory as a procurement contract and that this constrains the 

implementation of the FFRDC model at the Laboratories, and limits the efficiency 

and effectiveness with which we can offer support to Federal agencies in the way 

that the FFRDC model intends. 

Dr. MILLER. LLNL is a FFRDC, operated as a GOCO entity. The paradigm for 

GOCO model is that the Government tells the contractor ‘‘what to do,’’ and the contractor determines ‘‘how to do it.’’ 

The GOCO model needs attention. The DOE Secretary, the Deputy Secretary and 

the Under Secretaries have made it a high priority to improve the efficiency of the 

Departmental processes and mechanisms for governance. In December 2009, NNSA 

launched an Enterprise Re-engineering Reform Initiative aimed at dramatically rethinking and redesigning what is widely perceived to be a compliance and enforcement-driven relationship between Federal and contractor entities in NNSA. We are 

working with NNSA to identify governance/oversight issues and address them with 

the goal of transforming to a more constructive Federal/contractor partnership. 

Dr. HOMMERT. For the most part, the FFRDC model is intact at the NNSA laboratories. However, these laboratories are much more diverse in their national security 

roles than when the FFRDC model was first created. There is an interplay between 

the GOCO and FFRDC models that can impact the ability of the laboratories to fulfill their FFRDC roles. For these reasons, I believe a re-examination of the model 

is appropriate. 

78. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, what is the role 

of the national laboratories in doing deterrence analysis, targeting analysis, model 

development, analysis validation, etc.? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. The nuclear weapons laboratories bring critical technical capabilities to bear on numerous national security problems. While the core mission of Los 

Alamos is assuring the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. stockpile, the 

skills and personnel required for this mission also contribute to addressing other national challenges. The Laboratory was heavily involved in Cold War deterrence modeling and analysis, as well as in assessing weapon effects. Today, we are working 

on deterrence, stability and other related national security issues. Los Alamos is 

also involved in providing detailed analysis on nuclear nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, foreign weapon intelligence, and event response capabilities. Much of this 

work performed at Los Alamos involves and/or benefits from the development of applicable models to help inform decisions. Wherever possible, validation tools are also 

used to increase confidence in the robustness of such analyses. 

Dr. MILLER. LLNL personnel have supported decisionmaking at the highest levels 

of government since the establishment of the Laboratory. LLNL has played a significant support role by providing in-depth technical analysis across the full spectrum 

of the Nation’s ‘Strategic Assessment’ efforts. 

Generally, a strategic assessment capability consists of three broad areas of capabilities: 

(1) Deterrence Theory. This includes its translation into nuclear policy and doctrine. This effort draws on the intellects of our most experienced academics, 

former and current senior policy advisors, and former and current senior military officers. Over the years, the national effort has been informed by studies 

conducted at LLNL on the impact of systems and technologies that might be 

deployed in the future. 

(2) Decisionmaking. Background and context support of the necessary government 

decisions is required to turn nuclear policy guidance into practical implementation plans. This is the area where LLNL’s history of integrating science, 

technology and engineering has fundamentally contributed to the assessment 

of U.S. and foreign nuclear weapons systems and capabilities-as well as the 

impact of potential and proposed arms control agreements. Three examples 

are ICBM basing analysis, studies of strategic stability with the deployment 

of ballistic missile defenses, and the analysis of modernization of tactical nuclear forces in Europe. 

(3) Development of execution plans for our nuclear forces. This is comprised of direct support to the Nation’s nuclear warfighting apparatus and involves a 

myriad of technical analyses. We serve in technical advisory roles for such systems as the STRATCOM’s S&T Advisory group, Red on Blue type exchange 

studies, and technical issue reviews associated with targeting studies such as 

‘‘hard and deeply buried targets.’’ 

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Dr. HOMMERT. The 1953 Agreement between the AEC and DOD directs the laboratories to perform analyses of weapons effects, target interactions, and weapon options. The nuclear weapons laboratories have a long history of performing these 

analyses, often in partnership with the DOD. DOD has the lead in weapons effects/ 

target interaction analysis methodology while the national laboratories are primarily responsible for weapons performance and output modeling. 

79. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, what is the status of these capabilities at the laboratories? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Los Alamos prides itself on being a national resource, where as 

a trusted advisor for the government, we provide technical input and support on a 

variety of key national security issues. As a result of our broad mission space, our 

national security scientific capabilities have grown and strengthened over the past 

several years to new levels (e.g., nonproliferation and counterterrorism). Unfortunately, other critical areas have experienced significant atrophy, resulting in areas 

where we are manpower and/or resource limited (e.g., radiochemical analysis and 

assessment, and weapon targeting and effects analyses). For now, I remain confident that we are able to deliver on the missions we are asked to address today, 

but I am concerned about the future for some of these critical programs. 

Dr. MILLER. Today, the strategic assessment capability that exists at the Laboratory is significantly less than the capabilities we had at the height of the Cold War 

and what continued to exist up through the early 2000s. Some of this reduction had 

begun, understandingly, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the halt in the 

development of new nuclear weapons systems. The remaining reductions were a direct result of a combination of circumstances: (1) budgetary pressures on the nuclear 

enterprise such that the Laboratory could no longer continue this mission-supportive effort as a funded priority; (2) the lack of a government agency willing to 

sponsor and sustain the special skill base required for these types of analyses; and 

(3) the attrition of the high caliber, experienced individuals able to lead these types 

of specialized assessments without any replacement planning. 

While LLNL has a number of very talented individuals who can do technical analyses, we will have to ‘‘grow’’ the necessary skill sets of these individuals. They would 

provide leadership in LLNL’s efforts to rebuild the Nation’s efforts in this critical 

area. Essentially, if we are to develop such a sustainable, focused capability in a 

short amount of time, we would need to ‘‘mentor’’ a few handpicked individuals 

drawing on those experienced strategic systems analysts at LLNL who have led previous efforts and are either semi-retired but still available or about to retire in the 

next few years. This would require a concerted effort that must be planned and executed before the opportunity vanishes. 

It is important to note that this is a widely prevalent situation for the Nation’s 

Strategic Assessment Capability, and that high-quality analyses require an interconnected network of skill sets. The nation would need a multi-year commitment 

from DOD and the NNSA to restore a sustainable Strategic Assessment Capability 

and a coordinated, interagency plan on what to specifically refresh, restore, and/or 

refocus. 

Dr. HOMMERT. At Sandia, these capabilities are strong. We have maintained a 

core group of systems analysts who have the appropriate clearances, access to data, 

and the broad understanding of nuclear weapons, weapons effects, target response, 

and military operations required for such assessments. The weapons modeling activity is a core activity for the laboratories and has been strongly supported. Sandia’s 

recent focus in these efforts has been on supporting both DOD and NNSA decisions 

regarding LEPs, and on maintaining nuclear deterrence with the smallest possible 

number of weapons. 

80. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, how have those 

capabilities been enhanced or decreased over the last 20 years? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. As I mentioned in my previous answer, Los Alamos has had some 

capabilities increase over the past 20 years, while others have atrophied. Some of 

our enhanced capabilities include the advancement of simulation, modeling, and 

computational capabilities, improved validation supporting not only the weapons 

program, but also nuclear nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, foreign weapon intelligence and event response capabilities. One area where skills have atrophied includes the tri-laboratory (LANL, LLNL, SNL) efforts on targeting analysis and 

weapon effects modeling. The current expertise in these areas resides mainly in increasingly senior staff, whose skills are not exercised regularly and whose capabilities must be transferred to create the next generation of experts. 

Dr. MILLER. Despite the need to deal with a number of new technologies and innovations in the strategic area that have strong implications for our national security, 

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there has been little government agency interest in conducting the type of rigorous 

analytical assessments that have supported decisionmaking in the past. This atrophy in capability began with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent 

peace dividend and was followed by a shift of the Nation’s focus to conventional 

wars and countering terrorism. In terms of our remaining capabilities, it would be 

fair to say that current capability is largely aimed at support for the warfighter and 

the development of nuclear force execution plans. 

A major concern I have—in addition to the erosion and potential loss of our Strategic Assessment Capability—is the fact that we are not developing and applying 

necessary assessment capabilities to address the new realities we are beginning to 

face today from technical innovations and potential threats that are lurking just 

over the horizon. For example, we have limited ability to do assessments that incorporate advanced conventional capabilities, cyber, space warfare, hypersonic and 

boost glide delivery technologies, and advances in stealth and directed energy weapons. Dr. HOMMERT. In the area of weapons modeling, Sandia’s capabilities have been 

substantially enhanced over the past 20 years. The Science-Based SSP strengthened 

our ability to predict weapon system behavior in a variety of environments. This has 

increased our confidence in assessments of the reliability of the stockpile. In the deterrence and targeting analysis areas, Sandia’s capabilities are longstanding and 

have been enhanced in the last 20 years by the close interaction and relationships 

established with the organizations responsible for building the Nation’s war plans 

(e.g., STRATCOM, JFCC Global Strike, OSD, DIA, and the military services). 

81. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, is there appropriate expertise to assess a potential major shift in U.S. nuclear weapon policy? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. There is a small core group of dedicated individuals at Los Alamos 

with a broad range of experience involving issues related to nuclear weapons policy. 

In 2009 and 2010, this core group provided technical guidance on, and input into, 

the development of the government’s policy positions for the 2010 NPR, the NPT 

Review Conference, the Nuclear Security Summit, and the New START treaty. 

Often on short timelines, this team helped engage the broader scientific capabilities 

of the laboratory to provide direct assistance to the administration on the technical 

issues involved in these important events and documents, helping to enable informed decisions that affect the future of U.S. nuclear weapons, nonproliferation 

and arms control policies. 

Dr. MILLER. Assessing a major shift in U.S. nuclear weapons policy is a very complex undertaking requiring an integrated set of analytical skills that includes policy, 

sociological, and technical expertise. LLNL has participated in studies of this character in the past, but recent experiences and current capabilities are limited. The 

strategic assessment capability that exists at LLNL is significantly less than the capabilities we had at the height of the Cold War and what continued to exist up 

through the early 2000s. 

LLNL has a number of very talented individuals who can do technical analyses, 

but we will have to ‘‘grow’’ the necessary skill sets of the individuals at the Laboratory that would provide leadership in our efforts to support the Nation’s efforts to 

carry out such an assessment. Most importantly, an integrated set of analysis capabilities—here at the Laboratory or elsewhere—largely does not currently exist and 

would have to be rebuilt. However, key pieces exist at LLNL. We can build on technical expertise and capabilities in areas such as weapons reliability and effectiveness, weapons enterprise production capabilities, issues related to monitoring nuclear weapons and their production, technologies and challenges related to 

verification, emerging strategic technologies and threats, and the capabilities of 

other nation states. 

Dr. HOMMERT. The appropriate expertise does exist to both assess the pros and 

cons of various policy options, as well as assess the detailed implications of any 

given policy. Close interaction and coordination among the major stakeholders mentioned previously is required. Sandia’s contributions stem primarily from our broad 

understanding of nuclear weapons and possible future stockpile scenarios, including 

implications for deterrence policy and the nonproliferation and arms control regime. 

82. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, what additional 

measures are needed? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. As the Nation continues to rely on a safe, secure, and effective 

nuclear deterrent for its security and that of its allies, the national nuclear laboratories play a critical role. 

Included in this role is providing technical support to policy makers. One of the 

concerns at the national laboratories is that the set of individuals, which hold both 

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in-depth technical and policy capabilities in nuclear weapon policy, is small in number and getting older. One of our goals in the coming years will be to engage more 

young laboratory staff in technical/policy issues involved in sustaining an effective 

deterrent, while also addressing broader national security issues including nonproliferation and arms control—and to help these staff develop the experience needed to support future policy discussions and decisionmaking. Their informed technical 

input will be critical for the future, especially as it relates to the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and enterprise, and to the development and effective implementation 

of nonproliferation, nuclear security, counterterrorism and arms control monitoring 

and verification capabilities. 

Dr. MILLER. The experienced, skilled analysts and integrated set of analysis capabilities needed to carry out a thorough assessment of a major shift in U.S. nuclear 

weapons policy largely does not exist—at LLNL or elsewhere—and would have to 

be rebuilt. The nation would need a multi-year commitment from DOD and the 

NNSA to restore a sustainable Strategic Assessment Capability and a coordinated, 

interagency plan on what to specifically refresh, restore, or refocus. 

Rebuilding a Strategic Assessment Capability is also important for addressing the 

new realities we are beginning to face today from technical innovations and potential threats that are lurking just over the horizon. For example, the Nation currently has limited ability to do assessments that incorporate advanced conventional 

capabilities, cyber, space warfare, hypersonic and boost glide delivery technologies, 

and advances in stealth and directed energy weapons. 

Dr. HOMMERT. It will be important for the United States to develop a better understanding of future adversaries to maintain deterrence at lower stockpile numbers 

while simultaneously strengthening global non-proliferation construct. This can be 

accomplished by more regular and robust interagency collaborations that seek to 

cost-effectively enhance analytic capabilities. In addition, we need a stronger emphasis on assessments of aging and technology obsolescence as we move forward 

with the modernization of the stockpile. 

83. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, how would you 

rate expertise in nuclear weapons effects analysis? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Los Alamos has expert-level capability in certain areas, and a 

lesser level of expertise in other areas. While the number of staff with these skills 

are limited, expert-level capabilities exist in definition of the weapons-effect source 

term (all radiation outputs emanating from a nuclear explosion); in the transport 

of radiation (e.g., neutrons, gamma-rays, x-rays) and the radioactivity levels they induce; in nuclear forensics; in electromagnetic pulse assessment; in air-shock and 

ground-shock environments; in certain nuclear-explosion space environments; and in 

assessment of nuclear weapon effects on U.S. warheads. Los Alamos has some expertise on modeling radiation plume dispersal; thermal-pulse environments; and 

structural damage. 

Dr. MILLER. I believe that the integrated set of capabilities to perform weapons 

effects analysis has degraded significantly. Today, the skill to perform weapons effects analysis resides in a mere handful of people. At LLNL, we continue to be 

mindful of the importance of maintaining the expertise in this essential analysis 

area within the context of limited resources. 

However, it is important to note that with the tools developed by the SSP, the 

ability of the community to significantly advance our understanding of nuclear 

weapons effects has greatly increased. HPC advances make it possible to develop 

and apply far more detailed simulations of weapons effects than were possible even 

a decade ago. Tools like the NIF have enormous potential to conduct weapons effects 

tests and to gather detailed data that can be used to validate simulation models. 

In fact, the first campaign of weapons effects experiments was performed in 2010. 

A cadre of critically skilled weapons scientists and engineers is available to execute 

the task rebuilding weapons effects analysis capabilities. 

Dr. HOMMERT. Our nuclear deterrence depends on the capability of our stockpile 

to hold an adversary’s assets at risk. To guarantee this, nuclear weapons must be 

designed and built to withstand extreme levels of radiation and still function as intended. The laboratories must have a deep scientific understanding of how radiation 

can damage systems and be able to model the effects of radiation on our stockpile. 

We can no longer do the testing that was done at the Nevada Test Site or at other 

facilities that are no longer operating, such as the Sandia Pulsed Reactor. We are 

more dependent than ever on our remaining experimental facilities and our ability 

to model effects. 

Our expertise in modeling weapons effects is extensive but fragile. This capability 

depends on scientific expertise in a wide range of esoteric subjects, such as electromagnetic effects, shock and mechanical response, equation of state of exotic mateVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00125 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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rials, radiation transport, radiation damage in semiconductors, high-voltage breakdown, nuclear and plasma diagnostics, pulsed-power and reactor technologies, density functional theory, and molecular dynamics. In some areas our expertise is very 

robust, but in other areas it depends on just one or two people. In a couple of cases 

we have lost important capability, and we are trying to rebuild it. Many of our best 

scientists are nearing retirement, and we are aggressively recruiting people to work 

on the upcoming stockpile refurbishments. It takes some time for newly hired staff 

to become fully effective in working on our unique technologies. We face significant 

technical challenges in understanding the performance of aging weapons and in refurbishing the stockpile. Our research programs in these areas are essential to supporting the stockpile and to training the staff of the future. 

84. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, in terms of the 

connection between stockpile stewardship and assessing the targeting value of a 

weapon, what are the consequences of warhead aging and reliability for 

STRATCOM on targeting, especially at reduced stockpile numbers? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Intended weapon targeting is factored into the Military Characteristics and Stockpile-to-Target sequence requirements associated with each type of 

U.S. weapon system. Weapons must sustain the rigors of warhead launch and delivery, and may be intended to fly through and survive defended target space (so-called 

hostile encounters). In general, nuclear weapons were designed with margins to sustain the rigors of warhead delivery, including hostile encounters. Weapon aging can 

lead to internal weapon changes that reduce those margins, which, in principle, can 

impact STRATCOM targeting options. Los Alamos has the capability to assess the 

impact of weapon aging, as well as the rigors of warhead delivery and hostile encounters, in evaluating reduced weapon margins. Accordingly, inputs are made 

available to STRATCOM to help inform their decisions on targeting. These inputs 

become more important at reduced stockpile numbers and as the stockpile continues 

to age. 

Dr. MILLER. As the number of weapons decrease, the importance of optimal selection of targets and reliable weapon performance greatly increases. At some point, 

a fundamental shift in approach will be necessary. During the Cold War, with large 

numbers of weapons and targets, consideration of a statistical average of expected 

weapon reliability was sufficient and if a target were especially important, more 

than one weapon could be designated. At much smaller numbers, knowledge of the 

health of each individual warhead becomes increasingly important. Such information will require a fundamental change in the nature of the surveillance stockpile 

program and use of technical options such as imbedded sensors that would allow 

assessment on a weapon-by-weapon basis rather than reliance on statistical ‘‘average’’ behavior. 

Dr. HOMMERT. Today, the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is assessed to be safe, 

secure, and reliable. We strive to continuously strengthen the scientific underpinnings of our assessments, and thereby improve our understanding of the state 

of health of the stockpile. For the future, concerns we have about aging and technology obsolescence associated with our non-nuclear components must be addressed 

through the LEPs. 

85. Senator CORNYN. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, should there 

be consideration given to increased reliability/survivability requirements as the 

stockpile is reduced? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Consideration for stockpile reliability and survivability requirements is extremely high today, and would remain so as the stockpile is reduced. 

Dr. MILLER. It is important to ensure the reliability of stockpile remains high as 

the stockpile is reduced. It is equally important that the Nation have high confidence in the quality of the weapon performance and reliability assessments of the 

stockpile stewards. A balanced and well-funded SSP is key to ensuring the stockpile 

is safe, secure, reliable, and effectively meets evolving military requirements and assuring decisionmakers that the weapons scientists and engineers making those assessments have the necessary training, skills, and ability. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget increase is a positive first step toward reversing the 

recent declining budget trends and revitalizing the nuclear weapons complex necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The necessary program of work to 

create a balanced SSP includes: (1) the science and technology that underpins our 

understanding of an aging stockpile and supports a reinvigorated surveillance program; (2) the LEPs that are necessary to keep the systems safe, secure and effective; 

and (3) the modernization of the facilities and infrastructure. Funding shortfalls in 

any one of the three primary areas of SSP will affect the deterrent, particularly as 

the stockpile is reduced. 

121 

Dr. HOMMERT. The requirements for stockpile reliability and survivability are 

high today, and should be maintained as the size of the stockpile is reduced. As we 

go forward to reduced numbers, we must address aging and technology obsolescence 

associated with non nuclear components to ensure that our stockpile continues to 

meet these requirements. 

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

(123) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE 

PROGRAM 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

STRATEGIC SYSTEMS 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in room 

SR–232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E. Benjamin 

Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Nelson and Sessions. 

Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel. 

Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner, professional 

staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang, Hannah I. Lloyd, and 

Brian F. Sebold. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Ann Premer, assistant 

to Senator Nelson; and Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator 

Sessions. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, 

CHAIRMAN 

Senator NELSON. Good afternoon. The Strategic Forces Subcommittee convenes today to discuss the strategic systems of the 

Military Services, the bombers, the submarine-launched ballistic 

missiles (SLBM), and the land-based ballistic missiles. They’ll all 

be in the inventory of U.S. strategic systems for many years, but 

in smaller numbers. At the same time that we’re reducing the overall numbers of strategic systems, we must also be modernizing 

them. Most of these systems will support U.S. deterrence through 

2030. 

To discuss these systems today, we have with us: Lieutenant 

General James M. Kowalski, Commander, Air Force Global Strike 

Command; Rear Admiral Terry J. Benedict, Director, Navy Strategic Systems Programs (SSP); Major General David J. Scott, Director, Air Force Operational Capability Requirements, Deputy 

Chief of Staff, Force Operations, Plans and Requirements; Major 

General William A. Chambers, Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff 

for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration; and Brigadier 

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General Garrett Harencak, Commander, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center. 

Welcome to all of you here today. We appreciate your being here. 

At approximately 3:30 p.m., we’ll adjourn here and reconvene in 

a closed session in room 217 of the Senate Visitors Center. Lieutenant General Mark D. Shackelford, Military Deputy, Office of the assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, will brief the 

members of the committee on the Air Force plans for the new 

bomber program. 

Last year the administration completed the congressionally-directed Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which set forth the nuclear 

force structure for the next decade. This force structure is reflected 

in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) which entered into force in February. Under the terms of the treaty, the 

United States will maintain no more than 700 deployed strategic 

missiles and nuclear-capable bombers and no more than 800 nondeployed strategic missile launchers and nuclear-capable bombers. 

While the United States has 7 years to come into compliance with 

the treaty, planning is already underway. 

We look forward to hearing from each of our witnesses this afternoon about the plans for implementing the New START treaty. 

While reducing the number of delivery systems, they must also be 

sustained, modernized, and eventually replaced. Each of the systems today is highly capable, but maintaining that capability well 

into the next decade will take significant focus and funding. 

All three of the bombers will need significant modernization until 

the new bomber can replace them. The B–52, the oldest of the 

bomber fleet, will be almost 70 years old when it’s replaced. While 

old, the bombers remain formidable, as evidenced by recent events 

in Libya and the ongoing deployments in support of the war in Afghanistan. 

The Trident D5 SLBM will continue in production, with targeted 

upgrades, as it transitions from the current ballistic missile to the 

Ohio-class replacement submarine. Planning and design for that 

new submarine is already underway. 

The Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) has 

recently been upgraded to last through 2020. To continue to be a 

viable system through 2030, updates will be needed. 

While most of the attention is focused on the delivery systems, 

the infrastructure that sustains these systems is fragile and must 

also be maintained and modernized. The support, test, and training 

equipment, the command and control systems, and even the helicopters that provide access to the missile fields must all be updated 

or replaced. 

Since the events of August 2007, when the Air Force unknowingly flew nuclear weapons on the wings of a B–52 bomber from 

Minot Air Force Base to Barksdale Air Force Base, the Air Force 

has undertaken significant changes in its management, organization, and support of the nuclear enterprise. The positions that Lieutenant General Kowalski, Major General Chambers, and Brigadier 

General Harencak now hold were all established as the result of 

that mistake. The Air Force has made considerable progress in an 

effort to ensure that its nuclear enterprise is sound. 

125 

We look forward to hearing from each of you about the changes 

that have been made, the progress that has been achieved, and the 

plans to ensure that the progress is sustained. 

Now it’s my pleasure to turn to the attention of Senator Sessions, 

my good friend and ranking member, for any opening comments 

you may have. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just so much 

enjoy working with you and respect you and your knowledge of 

these issues and commitment to America, to the defense of our 

country. I know you deeply share those views. 

I thank the distinguished panel for being with us and your service to your country. Given that appropriate policy officials couldn’t 

be here today, I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, your commitment to 

hold another committee hearing next month to address critical 

issues regarding the modernization and future plans for further potential reductions, and I’m afraid unwise, reductions in the size of 

our nuclear stockpile with the U.S. Strategic Command 

(STRATCOM) and Department of Defense (DOD) policy officials. 

Last week’s hearing focused on the cost for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex. The effort is a critical recapitalization program which the administration estimates will cost at least $84 billion over 10 years. 

I came up, Mr. Chairman, and I asked about those two buildings. 

They would cost a lot of money. We just had the biggest industrial, 

I think, announcement in America in Alabama, Thyssenkrupp steel 

mill, $5 billion, 3,700 acres, 7 million square feet under roof, 160 

acres under roof, 11 million cubic yards of Earth moved, twice that 

for Hoover Dam; 75,000 pilings laid end to end would stretch from 

Mobile, AL to Houston, TX; 1 million cubic yards of concrete, and 

much more. That was including their equipment, a $5 billion 

project. 

I think our two buildings that they’re talking about were $4 or 

$5 billion each, and I think we need to ask about the cost of those 

buildings as we go forward. We need them, though. I really do believe that there’s no alternative to modernizing our infrastructure 

at our labs. 

Today’s hearing focuses on the triad of nuclear delivery vehicles 

and its modernization, which is estimated to cost more than $120 

billion over that same period. In sum, for the foreseeable future our 

country must commit itself to approximately $20 billion a year to 

sustain and modernize our strategic deterrent. This, I think, is necessary investment. If we can make it successful for less, we need 

to try to do that. But we just have to assume this, because we neglected real investments in this area for many years. 

I fully agree with the bipartisan Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission finding that: ‘‘The triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems should be maintained for the immediate future and 

this will require some difficult investment choices.’’ I think that bipartisan commission is correct. Characterizing the choices before us 

as ‘‘difficult’’ might be an understatement, but one thing that is absolutely clear is that the recapitalization of our deterrent will reVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00131 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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quire a sustained, smart, and long-term commitment spanning future Congresses and administrations. 

I look forward to discussing the overall importance and crucial 

need for this modernization effort. I also look forward to discussing 

the timeline during which these modernization efforts must be accomplished, our ability to sustain what we currently have, and the 

steps being taken early on in emphasizing the affordability of the 

systems. 

DOD unfortunately is not immune to the current fiscal situation 

that we find ourselves in. This year we’ll spend $3.7 trillion and 

we take in $2.2 trillion. Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, has told us that our biggest national security threat 

is our debt. 

Everybody will be challenged, but there are certain things we 

have to have. We have to have a triad. We have to have nuclear 

deterrence and it needs to be safe and reliable. A robust triad of 

nuclear delivery vehicles is essential and the recapitalization is 

critical to national security. 

One of the biggest unanswered questions in the future is the 

ICBM force. According to section 1251 of the report’s November 

2010 update, the administration intends to begin to study what a 

follow-on ICBM might look like, but it is doing so with the concerning caveat, we note. That is, in a way that ‘‘supports continued 

reductions in the U.S. nuclear weapons.’’ 

Recent statements by the President’s National Security Adviser 

have shed new light on the administration’s intention. In his 

speech before the Carnegie Endowment, Mr. Donilon stated ‘‘The 

administration is currently making preparations for the next round 

of reductions’’—we’ve hardly gotten through this one, or approved 

this one, and that DOD will ‘‘review our strategic requirements and 

develop our options for further reductions in our current nuclear 

stockpile.’’ He continued to mention in that speech the, as he said, 

the President’s declared vision for ‘‘achieving peace and security in 

a world without nuclear weapons.’’ I’m confident that I won’t live 

to see that, unless we do have a second coming. 

Mr. Donilan continued by stating that in meeting these objectives 

the White House will direct DOD to consider ‘‘potential changes in 

targeting requirements and alert postures.’’ 

Last month, along with 40 of my colleagues, I sent a letter to the 

President regarding our desire to be consulted on any further reduction plans to the nuclear stockpile. The New START treaty was 

only signed a few weeks ago. Yet the administration is moving forward in my opinion in a pace that justifies the phrase ‘‘reckless,’’ 

pursuing more reductions at an expedited and potentially destabilizing pace. 

I am very concerned and I look forward to discussing with our 

witnesses today what guidance and assumptions they have been 

given or told to follow in the design, development, and posture for 

modernizing the triad, and we’ll have the policy people to discuss 

at a later date. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing and for the 

excellent team of witnesses we have before us. 

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Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator Sessions. I appreciate very 

much your opening comments and look forward to the opportunity 

for questioning. 

We have a large panel this afternoon and limited time. All of the 

prepared statements will be included for the record. It’s my understanding that Lieutenant General Kowalski, Rear Admiral Benedict, and Major General Chambers will be making the opening 

statements. I guess we should start with you, Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF RADM TERRY J. BENEDICT, USN, DIRECTOR 

OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAM, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral BENEDICT. Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, distinguished members of the subcommittee: It is an honor 

to testify before you today representing SSP. SSP’s mission is to design, develop, produce, support, and protect our Nation’s sea-based 

strategic deterrent, the Trident II D5 strategic weapon system. 

The recently ratified New START treaty increases the dependence on the submarine leg of the triad. The reductions in warheads 

and launchers will result in ballistic missile submarines carrying 

approximately 70 percent of the Nation’s strategic commitment. 

I have focused on four priorities since returning to SSP: nuclear 

weapons security, the D5 life extension program (LEP), the Ohio 

replacement program, and the solid rocket motor industrial base. 

The first priority I would like to address and arguably the most important priority is the safety and the security of the Navy’s nuclear 

weapons. Our Marines and Navy Master-at-Arms provide an effective and integrated elite security force at our two Strategic Weapons Facilities, in King’s Bay, GA, and Bangor, WA. U.S. Coast 

Guard units have been commissioned at both facilities to protect 

our Ohio-class submarines as they transit to and from their dive 

points. 

The second priority I would like to discuss is SSP’s life extension 

efforts to ensure an effective and reliable sea-based deterrent. The 

D5 weapon system continues to demonstrate itself as a credible deterrent and exceeds the operational requirements established for 

the system almost 30 years ago. Last month the USS Nevada conducted the 135th consecutive successful flight of the D5 system. 

SSP is extending the life of the D5 weapon system through an 

update to all the subsystems: launcher, navigation, fire control, 

guidance, missile, and reentry. These life extension efforts will provide the Navy with the system we need to meet the operational requirements. 

My next priority and one of the highest Navy priorities is the 

Ohio Replacement Program. To lower development costs and leverage the proven reliability of the Trident II D5, the Ohio replacement SSBN will enter service with the D5 strategic weapon system 

beginning in 2029. 

Finally, I would like to discuss the importance of the solid rocket 

motor industrial base. The Navy is maintaining a continuous production of rocket motors. However, we have faced significant cost 

challenges as both the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Air Force demands have declined. We are 

working with our industry partners, DOD, and Congress to sustain 

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the solid rocket motor industrial base and find ways to maintain 

successful partnerships. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and at the end of 

the other two opening statements I would be pleased to take your 

questions, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Benedict follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY RADM TERRY BENEDICT, USN 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, distinguished members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for this opportunity to discuss Navy’s strategic programs. It is an honor 

to testify before you this morning representing the Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs (SSP). 

SSP’s mission is to design, develop, produce, support and protect our Navy’s seabased strategic deterrent, the Trident II (D5) Strategic Weapon System (SWS). The 

Trident II (D5) Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) represents the Nation’s most survivable strategic deterrent capability. The men and women of SSP 

and our industry partners remain dedicated to supporting the mission of our Sailors 

on strategic deterrent patrol and our Marines and Sailors who are standing the 

watch ensuring the security of the weapons we are entrusted with by this nation. 

It has been 11 months since I assumed command as the 13th Director of SSP. 

This is a relatively small number of incumbents since the inception of the program 

55 years ago. Since returning to SSP, I have focused on four priorities: Nuclear 

Weapons Security; the Trident II (D5) SWS Life Extension Program; the Ohio Replacement Program; and the Solid Rocket Motor Industrial Base. Today, I would 

like to discuss my four priorities and why these priorities are keys to the 

sustainment of the Navy’s sea-based strategic deterrent and its future viability. I 

will also provide an update on our SSBN force and our flight test program. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY

The first priority I would like to address, and arguably the most important priority, is the safety and security of the Navy’s nuclear weapons. Navy leadership has 

clearly delegated and defined SSP’s role as the program manager and technical authority for the Navy’s nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons security in Secretary 

of the Navy (SECNAV) Instruction 8120.1. 

At its most basic level, this priority is the physical security of one of our Nation’s 

most valuable assets. Our Marines and Navy Masters at Arms provide an effective 

and integrated elite security force at our two Strategic Weapons Facilities in Kings 

Bay, GA, and Bangor, WA. U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Force Protection Units have 

been commissioned at both facilities to protect our submarines as they transit to 

and from their dive points. These coast guardsmen and the Navy vessels they man 

provide a security umbrella for our Ohio-class submarines. Together, the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard team form the foundation of our Nuclear Weapons Security Program. 

SSP’s efforts to sustain the safety and improve the security of these national assets continue at all levels of the organization. On October 1, I stood up a new division within SSP responsible for overseeing all nuclear safety and security operations, as well as managing the future acquisition planning for this mission. SSP 

continues to maintain a safe, reliable, and secure environment for our strategic assets as well as focus on the custody and accountability of the nuclear assets that 

have been entrusted to the Navy. 

D5 LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM

The next priority I would like to discuss is SSP’s life extension efforts to ensure 

an effective and reliable sea-based deterrent. We are executing the Trident II (D5) 

Life Extension Program in cooperation with the United Kingdom (U.K.), under the 

auspices of the Polaris Sales Agreement. I am pleased to report that our longstanding partnership with the U.K. remains strong. 

The Trident II (D5) SWS continues to demonstrate itself as a credible deterrent 

and meets the operational requirements established for the system almost 30 years 

ago. We have successfully conducted 135 consecutive flight tests of the D5 missile 

and continue to exceed our required performance. This record of success demonstrates our Navy’s ability to respond if called upon. Our allies and any potential 

rivals are assured the U.S. strategic deterrent is ready, credible, and effective. 

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However, we cannot simply rest on our successes. The Trident II (D5) SWS has 

been deployed on our Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines for over 20 years, and 

is planned for operational deployment for at least another 30 years, making it operational longer than any other missile system SSP has deployed. We must remain 

vigilant of age-related issues to ensure a continued high level of reliability. 

The Navy is proactively taking steps to address aging and technology obsolescence. SSP is extending the life of the D5 Strategic Weapon System to match the 

Ohio-class submarine service life and to serve as the initial baseline mission payload 

for the Ohio replacement submarine platform. This is being accomplished through 

an update to all the Trident II (D5) SWS subsystems: launcher, navigation, fire control, guidance, missile and reentry. Our flight hardware—missile and guidance—life 

extension efforts are designed to meet the same form, fit, and function of the original system, in order to keep the deployed system as one homogeneous population 

and to control costs. We will also remain in continuous production of energetic components such as solid rocket motors. These efforts will provide the Navy with the 

missiles and guidance systems we need to meet operational requirements. 

SSP previously restructured the D5 Life Extension Program to ensure sufficient 

time for additional missile electronics design evolutions. I am pleased to report that 

our restructured program is on track. SSP successfully conducted a system Critical 

Design Review of the missile electronics in January 2011. Our life extended guidance system also completed its Critical Design Review and is scheduled for its first 

flight test in fiscal year 2012. Our first flight test of a D5 life extended missile is 

scheduled in fiscal year 2013. The Initial Operating Capability of the combined missile and guidance systems is scheduled in fiscal year 2017. 

Another major step to ensure the continued sustainment of our SWS is our SSP 

Shipboard Integration (SSI) efforts, which utilizes open architecture and commercial 

off-the-shelf hardware. The first increment of this update is now being installed 

throughout the fleet and training facilities. To date, installation is complete on four 

U.S. SSBNs and two U.K. SSBNs. This effort is a technical obsolescence refresh of 

shipboard electronics hardware and software upgrades, which will provide greater 

maintainability of the SWS and ensure we continue to provide the highest nuclear 

weapons safety and security for our deployed SSBNs. The first end-to-end operational test of the SSI Increment 1 was successfully conducted in March 2011 on 

the USS Nevada (SSBN 733). 

To sustain the SWS, SSP is extending the life of the W76 reentry system through 

a refurbishment program known as the W76–1. This program is being executed in 

partnership with the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. The W76–1 is now in full production and has achieved Initial Operating Capability. The W76–1 refurbishment maintains the military capability of the original 

W76 for approximately an additional 30 years. This program successfully incorporated commercial off-the-shelf hardware and other economies to achieve Navy 

component production costs 75 percent less than previous nuclear arming, fuzing, 

and firing systems. 

In addition to the W76–1, the Navy is in the initial stages of refurbishing the W88 

reentry system. The Navy is collaborating with the Air Force to reduce costs 

through shared technology. This refurbishment will reach Initial Operation Capability in the SLBM Fleet in 2018. These programs will provide the Navy with the 

weapons we need to meet operational requirements throughout the Ohio service life 

and the planned follow-on platform. 

OHIO REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

My third priority and one of the highest Navy priorities is the Ohio Replacement 

Program. The continued assurance of our sea-based strategic deterrent requires a 

credible SWS as well as the development of the next class of ballistic missile submarines. The Navy team is taking aggressive steps to ensure the Ohio Replacement 

Program is designed, built and delivered on time with the right capabilities at an 

affordable cost. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Defense Acquisition 

Board approved the Ohio Replacement Program Milestone A in January 2011 and 

authorized entry into the Technology Development Phase. 

The Navy team has the benefit of leveraging the success of the Virginia class 

build program and the opportunity to implement many of those lessons-learned to 

help ensure we design the Ohio replacement for affordability both in terms of the 

acquisition and life cycle maintenance. Maintaining this capability is critical to the 

continued success of our sea-based strategic deterrent now and into the future. 

The Ohio Replacement Program will replace the existing 14 Ohio-class submarines. To lower development costs and leverage the proven reliability of the Trident II (D5) SWS, the Ohio replacement will enter service with the Trident II (D5) 

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SWS and D5 life-extended missiles onboard beginning in 2029. These D5 life extended missiles will be shared with the existing Ohio class submarine for approximately 13 years until the Ohio-class retires. Maintaining one SWS during the transition to the Ohio-class replacement is beneficial from a cost, performance, and risk 

reduction standpoint. 

A critical component of the Ohio Replacement Program is the development of a 

Common Missile Compartment that will support Trident II (D5) deployment on both 

the Ohio class replacement and the successor to the U.K. Vanguard Class. The 

United States and the United Kingdom have maintained a shared commitment to 

nuclear deterrence through the Polaris Sales Agreement since April 1963. The 

United States will continue to maintain its strong strategic relationship with the 

U.K. for our respective follow-on platforms, based upon the Polaris Sales Agreement. 

As Director, SSP I am the U.S. executor of this agreement. Our programs are tightly 

coupled both programmatically and technically to ensure we are providing the most 

cost effective, technically capable nuclear strategic deterrent for both nations. 

The New START Treaty, which entered into force on February 5, and the Nuclear 

Posture Review (NPR) reinforce the importance of strategic submarines and the 

SLBMs they carry, as the most survivable leg of the Triad. The reductions in warheads and launchers will result in ballistic missile submarines carrying the majority 

of the Nation’s strategic force. Our continued stewardship of the Trident II (D5) 

SWS is necessary to ensure a credible and reliable SWS is deployed today on our 

Ohio class submarines, as well as, in the future on the Ohio replacement. 

The Ohio replacement will be a strategic, national asset whose endurance and 

stealth will enable the Navy to provide continuous, uninterrupted strategic deterrence into the 2080s. The development of this follow-on capability requires the cooperation of the executive branch and Congress to deliver an effective sea-based deterrent on time with the right capabilities to sustain the most survivable leg of our 

Triad at the right cost for many decades to come. 

SOLID ROCKET MOTOR INDUSTRIAL BASE

The fourth priority I would like to discuss is the importance of the defense and 

aerospace industrial base. In particular, the decline of the Solid Rocket Motor industry has placed a heavy burden on Navy resources. The Navy is maintaining a continuous production capability at a minimum sustaining rate of 12 rocket motor sets 

per year through the Future Years Defense Plan. However, we have faced significant cost challenges as both the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA) and Air Force demands have declined. We will continue to experience those 

cost increases if demand shrinks further in coming years. 

Reduced industrial demand has resulted in overhead costs spread over a smaller 

customer base. The Navy’s growing percentage of the Solid Rocket Motor business 

base has already resulted in increased unit costs. In addition, Trident II (D5) is the 

only program in production of Class 1.1 type propellant. This type of propellant is 

highly energetic and necessary for use in submarines due to volume constraints. 

Navy added funding to the budget to address the unit cost increase. While these 

additional funds are essential for the continued production of D5 rocket motors, the 

long-term sustainment of this vital national capability must also be addressed. 

We are working with our industry partners, the Department of Defense and Congress, to sustain the Solid Rocket Motor industrial base and find ways to maintain 

successful partnerships. The OSD (Industrial Policy)-led Interagency Task Force, 

with membership from Navy, the Air Force, OSD along with the Missile Defense 

Agency and NASA, is developing a Solid Rocket Industrial Base Sustainment Plan. 

SSP is an integral part of this process. We look forward to continuing this collaborative process to find an interagency solution to maintain this crucial national capability. 

TODAY’S FORCE

The final topic I would like to address is our SSBN force. Our 14 U.S. Navy 

SSBNs, 8 of which are homeported in the Pacific and 6 in the Atlantic Fleet, continue to provide a credible, survivable and reliable sea-based strategic deterrent for 

our national leadership. 

Last month, the USS Nevada (SSBN 733) successfully conducted her Demonstration and Shakedown Operation involving the launch and flight test of a Trident II 

(D5) missile and is now ready to return to strategic service. The completion of this 

test marks the 135th consecutive successful flight test of a D5 missile. Therefore, 

I am pleased to report to you the Trident SWS continues to demonstrate itself as 

a credible deterrent and meet the operational requirements established for the system almost 30 years ago. 

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USS Tennessee (SSBN 734) will soon complete her Engineering Refueling Overhaul, enter post availability testing, prepare for her Demonstration and Shakedown 

Operation, and return to the operational force in the spring of 2012. Two more of 

our SSBN submarines are undergoing Engineering Refueling Overhauls, which will 

maintain the viability of these platforms through the service life of the Ohio class. 

We must continue to be vigilant of age-related issues to ensure the high reliability 

needed for our SWS. With the Trident II (D5) missile planned for operational deployment through the service life of the Ohio class and as the initial payload on the 

Ohio replacement, D5 hardware will age beyond our previous experience base and 

will be operational almost twice as long as any previous sea-based strategic deterrent. Therefore, SSP has adjusted our flight testing philosophy to focus on older 

flight hardware in order to best predict aging characteristics. We tested our oldest 

missile to date from the USS Nevada last month. The first and second stage rocket 

motors were nearly 22 years old. 

CONCLUSION

This is an exciting time to be the Director at SSP. The New START Treaty reduces both deployed and nondeployed nuclear weapons, which will require the 

United States to continue to rely heavily on the survivable capability provided by 

ballistic missile submarines. The ballistic missile submarine is only one leg of the 

nuclear Triad. Land-based ICBMs, nuclear capable heavy bombers, and the SSBN 

force work together to provide the total U.S. nuclear deterrent. Each leg of the deterrent provides unique capabilities. 

The 2010 NPR also committed to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce 

the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of 

making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners 

the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons. SSP stands ready to support and participate in future Conventional Prompt Global Strike efforts should leadership authorize our participation. However, the NPR makes clear that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will sustain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent. This includes modernizing nuclear weapons infrastructure; sustaining the 

science, technology and engineering base; investing in human capital; and ensuring 

that these goals remain a senior leadership focus. As the Navy’s primary stakeholder, SSP is accountable for the technical oversight, safety, and security of Navy 

nuclear weapons and we understand the vast responsibility entrusted to us. 

Our Nation’s sea-based deterrent has been a critical component of our national 

security since the 1950s and will continue to assure our allies and deter our enemies 

well into the future. I am privileged to represent this unique organization as we 

work to serve the best interests of our great Nation. 

Senator NELSON. General Kowalski. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES M. KOWALSKI, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND, U.S. AIR 

FORCE 

General KOWALSKI. Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, I’m honored to appear before you today for the first time as 

commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, representing 

nearly 24,000 airmen and civilians. With strong support from Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, we have pursued three parallel efforts: the standup of a new major command, execution of 

current operations in support of our combatant commanders, and 

establishing a culture that embraces the special trust and responsibility nuclear weapons require. 

We’re now fully engaged on our core organize, train, and equip 

tasks. Our new headquarters is about 81 percent of our authorized 

strength and we’ve established the organizational structure and 

processes necessary to execute the mission. Our work in revitalizing the nuclear enterprise is ongoing, as we build upon relationships between all the stakeholders representing the Services, the 

combatant commands, and other Federal agencies. 

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We established a number of new training programs tailored to 

the nuclear and global strike missions. These programs develop expertise throughout the nuclear enterprise, to include operations, 

maintenance, intelligence, and security forces. As we worked to 

equip our forces, we assumed lead major command responsibilities 

for the Minuteman III, UH–1N helicopter, B–2 and B–52 bombers, 

air-launched cruise missiles, gravity nuclear weapons, and Air 

Force nuclear command and control. 

As we go forward, I see three major challenges for the command. 

First, we must consolidate the gains of the last few years across 

the nuclear enterprise. We will continue to mature our headquarters and be rigorous in the examination of our processes. Second, we have to achieve enduring cultural change in our nuclear 

enterprise, while also aggressively supporting the current conventional fight. Our bomber forces are more than just dual-capable; 

they are full spectrum. Recent B–2 and B–1 missions into Libya 

from bases in the United States show how quickly a crisis can develop and how long-range bombers can rapidly bring flexible combat power to a joint commander. 

Finally, we must sustain and enhance our current force while 

preparing to meet the challenges of the future. At Air Force Global 

Strike Command we recognize our responsibility to be efficient and 

effective stewards of resources. Our goal is to instill a culture that 

consistently encourages innovation and fosters productivity. 

Our central mission remains unchanged: to develop and provide 

combat-ready forces for nuclear deterrence and global strike operations in support of the President and the combatant commanders. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the members of the committee again for the opportunity to discuss the status and future 

of Air Force Global Strike Command, and I look forward to your 

questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Kowalski follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. JAMES M. KOWALSKI, USAF 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee; I am honored to appear before you today for the first time as the 

Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, representing nearly 24,000 dedicated airmen and civilians. 

I would like to update you on the current status of the command, some of our 

progress since my predecessor, Lieutenant General Klotz, last testified in March 

2010, and what I see as our central challenges. 

CURRENT STATUS

On 30 September 2010, Air Force Global Strike Command declared full operational capability. As we built this command, the first completely new Air Force 

major command (MAJCOM) in 27 years, the rest of the world did not pause. Some 

of the events that have shaped our development over the last year include the Nuclear Posture Review, the New START, and as a reminder of our conventional responsibilities, ongoing operations in support of U.S. Africa Command. 

Our efforts during the last year to strengthen the nuclear enterprise involved 

three parallel efforts: the methodical stand-up of a new major command and headquarters, the disciplined execution of current operations in support of U.S. Strategic 

Command (STRATCOM) and the geographic combatant commanders, and the enduring effort to establish a culture that embraces the special trust and responsibility of nuclear weapons. 

As we approach our planned manpower levels and have the initial tasks associated with standing up the Headquarters behind us, we must now focus on building 

133 

the relationships and processes both internal and external to the command. We are 

pleased by the progress the headquarters has made in assuming responsibilities for 

guidance and oversight of our forces. We continue to mature our processes in developing fiscal guidance and plans within the Air Force corporate structure. The connective tissue between organizations within the command is getting stronger as the 

units align to our priorities, metrics, and battle rhythm. In declaring full operational 

capability, we closed out 696 specific action items under Programming Plan 09–01 

that ranged from the broad task of establishing the initial Air Force Global Strike 

Command structure to specific tasks such as the identification of formal training 

quotas. 

On any given day we have 1,100 airmen deployed or on standby to support 

STRATCOM in the missile complexes and about another 1,100 deployed in support 

of our regional combatant commanders. In addition, we stand ready to deploy up 

to 16 B–2s and 44 B–52s along with a range of combat support capabilities to support national taskings. 

AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND PROGRESS

With the completion of initial stand-up activities, we were able to fully focus on 

our strategic master plan and make headway on our goals, objectives, and tasks. 

Although much work remains, I would like to share some of the progress we have 

made in our core areas of organize, train, and equip. 

AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND—ORGANIZE

Our ongoing efforts to organize the Air Force’s newest MAJCOM have included 

standing up the Headquarters, defining our role within the nuclear command, control, and communications system (NC3), establishing the 69th Bomb Squadron at 

Minot Air Force Base, the stand-up of General Officer Steering Groups in support 

of each of our weapons systems, providing Air Force Office of Special Investigations 

support to our missile convoys, and re-establishing the presence of Intelligence Officers in our Missile Wings. 

Standing up the headquarters presented a unique challenge the Air Force had not 

faced in 27 years. We are now operating at 81 percent of our authorized strength 

and we have established the Headquarters organizational structure, battle rhythms, 

metrics, and reviews necessary to execute the mission. 

‘‘Air Force Global Strike Command serves as the lead MAJCOM for 14 major NC3 

systems. In that capacity we provide a clear and strong voice for NC3 sustainment 

and modernization. Additionally, our staff has successfully integrated 14 previously 

dispersed NC3 programs into a unified and cohesive Global Strike Command NC3 

portfolio. This translates into greater command situational awareness and management of these vital programs.’’ 

On 30 June of this year, the 69th Bomb Squadron will declare Full Operational 

Capability under the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot Air Force Base. The Air Force activated the 69th in September 2009 to better balance operational taskings with the 

addition of a fourth B–52 squadron, with two at Minot and two at Barksdale. 

We have also organized new General Officer Steering Groups (GOSGs) dedicated 

to sustaining each of our assigned weapon systems. These GOSGs focus on 

warfighter concerns, prioritize sustainment initiatives, and remove obstacles in 

order to keep Air Force Global Strike Command’s assigned weapons systems capable 

and available. GOSG participation includes members of the Headquarters staff, senior representatives from Air Force Material Command and the Defense Logistics 

Agency, leadership from each of Air Force Global Strike Command’s wings, and the 

National Nuclear Security Administration. Through this steering group process, 

funds and focus have been reprioritized to address issues with aging support equipment, diminishing manufacturing resources, supply parts support, and parts availability. 

We are now organized to provide the sole Response Task Force for any Air Force 

nuclear incident in the continental United States and stand ready to assist the Department of Energy and U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). An aggressive training 

schedule will culminate with participation in our first full scale national response 

exercise in May 2012. 

Another organizational initiative is the revitalization of the Nuclear Weapons 

Stakeholder Partnership Meeting. This semi-annual meeting is the framework for 

discussion on specific nuclear weapon issues and is a forum for building relationships and trust between organizations from the Air Force, Navy, STRATCOM, 

USAFE, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Department of Energy, and the National 

Labs. We look forward to our next meeting at Barksdale Air Force Base later this 

month. 

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Over the course of the past year Air Force Global Strike Command and the Air 

Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) has teamed up to close a 4-year gap in 

Federal law enforcement support to off-base nuclear convoys. Air Force OSI agents 

have joined our Security Forces in the convoy, and provide an important link to 

local, state, and Federal law enforcement. 

Conducting inspections is a critical MAJCOM function, and we have made significant progress in this area as well. Over the course of the last year, our Inspector 

General, starting from scratch, built an 86-person inspection team fully capable of 

inspecting our bomber and missile wings. This team has been able to combine the 

inspection philosophies and instructions from Air Combat Command and Air Force 

Space Command to produce specific Air Force Global Strike Command direction for 

inspections throughout the nuclear enterprise. 

Finally, I am pleased to report that for the first time in nearly a decade, we have 

taken the steps necessary to send Intelligence Officers back into Missile Wings. Improving intelligence support to our nuclear forces was a key recommendation of the 

Schlesinger report and will enhance missile crew situational awareness, their understanding of strategic threats, and the vital role they play in the defense of our Nation. 

AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND—TRAIN

In December 2008, the Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on Department of Defense (DOD) Nuclear Weapons Management identified the need for more 

nuclear-qualified and experienced personnel. Filling positions designated for personnel with nuclear experience is a command priority, and tailored training plays 

a major role in consolidating the gains we have made across the nuclear enterprise. 

Therefore, we established a number of programs to build upon the excellent basic 

military training and initial skills training that other Air Force organizations provide. 

On 30 March 2009, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force approved the creation of 

an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Weapons Instructor Course (WIC) at the U.S. 

Air Force Weapons School (USAFWS), Nellis Air Force Base, NV. The mission of 

the ICBM WIC is to produce weapons officers to lead weapons and tactics development and provide in-depth expertise throughout the ICBM community and the nuclear enterprise. On 19 December 2010, the USAFWS graduated the first four students from the ICBM WIC. Three of these graduates have returned to our ICBM 

units to stand up the first weapons and tactics flights. These weapons officers, well 

versed in the nuclear enterprise, can serve as the lead integrator on issues related 

to operations, maintenance, and security forces at the missile units. The ICBM WIC 

is on track to produce eight graduates per year. 

One of our newest programs is an Intelligence Formal Training Unit designed to 

help our unit intelligence teams support the nuclear and global strike mission. We 

will host 5 courses in fiscal year 2011 and will train approximately 100 nuclear intelligence professionals to fully understand the daily deterrence mission. 

For our security forces, helicopter crews, and convoy drivers, we conduct graduate 

level training at Camp Guernsey in Wyoming and expect to expand our investment 

there over the next few years. We have significantly increased our nuclear security 

training program with emphasis on tactical expertise, marksmanship, and small 

unit leadership. This training allows integration of security forces, helicopter crews, 

and maintenance personnel into a cohesive and effective security team. Training together as a team, these warfighters maximize the capabilities necessary to protect 

our Nation’s most vital resources and most powerful weapons. Additionally, we expanded our training capacity to include 8th Air Force’s nuclear bomber security 

forces alongside the 20th Air Force intercontinental ballistic missile security forces 

in our tactical security training classes. 

AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND—EQUIP

Air Force Global Strike Command assumed lead command responsibilities for the 

Minuteman III and UH–1N helicopter weapon systems from Air Force Space Command on 1 December 2009, and for the B–2 and B–52 dual capable bombers from 

Air Combat Command on 1 February 2010. Our four major weapons systems are 

on average, over 40 years old, and this includes our ‘‘new’’ 22-year-old B–2 bombers. 

EQUIP: B–52S

We have been successful in investing in multiple B–52 platform improvements to 

address both modernization and sustainment. The Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT) program is the most significant B–52 modernization 

program since 1980 and will add 21st century capability to the aircraft. CONECT 

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ground testing is ongoing at Edwards Air Force Base. We have also recently tested 

a bomber flight control software block upgrade that will significantly improve Advanced Targeting Pod capabilities and provide the interface to employ Miniature 

Air-Launched Decoys, and have started the Military Standard-1760 Internal Weapons upgrade program which will enable the carriage of 8 modernized smart weapons 

in the bomb bay, such as the Global Positioning System-guided Joint Direct Attack 

Munition, increasing the total aircraft load-out from 12 to 20 Precision Guided Munitions. 

In the near-term, the B–52 needs upgrades to its anti-skid system, it needs airspace access upgrades such as the Mode S/5 transponder for real-time aircraft identification, data, and position, and it needs a new radar as the current radar is based 

on 1950s technology and may be unsupportable by 2016. We also need to resolve 

a safety of flight issue with the installation of the MultiMode Receiver 2020 Instrument Landing System Receiver that brings the aircraft in compliance for frequency 

modulation immunity, a requirement that previously restricted B–52 aircraft 

transiting European airspace and using European airfields. 

EQUIP: B–2S

We made significant progress with the B–2 Radar Modernization Program during 

the past year, completing 4 aircraft and bringing the fleet total to 12 upgraded aircraft. Air Force Global Strike Command increased maintainability of the upgraded 

radar system by accelerating technical data deliveries and by maximizing antenna 

diagnostic and prognostic capabilities through software enhancements. We have also 

completed integration of the Massive Ordnance Penetrator with the B–2 aircraft, 

giving the warfighter increased capability against hardened and deeply buried targets. 

We made progress in addressing B–2 aircraft parts obsolescence issues through 

weekly teleconferences across the B–2 enterprise to track current problem parts and 

project future parts issues. Improved communication, proactive planning, and procurement, as well as new logistics models for small fleet management, have decreased the B–2 monthly non-mission capable supply rate by one third since February 2010. 

For the B–2, we also must meet national requirements for nuclear command and 

control—the program of record is the extremely high frequency satellite communications. This upgrade not only meets nuclear requirements, it provides wideband ‘‘netready’’ beyond-line-of-site connectivity for full spectrum operations. 

EQUIP: UH–1NS AND CVLSP

Bombers are not the only aviation weapons systems vital to our mission in Air 

Force Global Strike Command. The UH–1N (Huey) Helicopter has served the Air 

Force well since 1970, primarily in providing missile field support, convoy security, 

and ferrying missile crews and maintenance teams to and from the missile complexes and providing aerial security surveillance of remote ICBM facilities. However, mission requirements changed in the late 1990s, and again after the terrorist 

attacks on September 11. 

The Air Force currently operates 62 UH–1N aircraft which do not meet all of the 

vertical lift requirements in our missile fields, nor in the AF District of Washington. 

Post-September 11, DOD determined an urgent need for vertical lift improvements 

over the current UH–1N. For AF Global Strike Command, the Huey’s primary role 

is to provide a robust and agile missile field security capability. Presently, the UH– 

1N fleet does not meet missile complex security requirements for endurance, speed, 

and payload. In addition to the UH–1N’s clearly defined capability gaps, there are 

not enough UH–1N aircraft to meet the security needs for our nuclear enterprise 

and the missions in the Military District of Washington. Finally, the UH–1N’s advanced age is manifesting itself in the form of airframe cracks. Cracks in the UH– 

1N’s lift beam area and tail boom assembly present the challenge of keeping a 40- 

year-old aircraft combat mission ready while working through the issue of parts 

availability and obsolescence. 

The risk we assume with the current helicopter is unacceptable and the need for 

a replacement helicopter is both urgent and compelling. As lead MAJCOM, we will 

continue to advocate for the Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP) to ensure the safety and security of missile field operations and to meet the requirement 

posed by Air Force District of Washington continuity of operations and government 

missions for the National Capital Region. 

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EQUIP: ICBMS

Turning now to ICBMs, the Minuteman III is congressionally mandated to be in 

service until 2030. We’re in a modernization program to reach 2020, and Air Force 

Materiel Command is exploring what will be required to reach 2030. Since 1962, the 

Minuteman ‘‘family’’ has been updated from the MMI, to the MMII, to the MMIII, 

and there have been upgrades and modifications to each of those respective models. 

We made significant strides in the past year toward completing the Propulsion Replacement Program, which marks the full deployment of new solid fuel stage motors 

and refurbished flight controls across the entire force to extend booster service life 

through the end of this decade. We will reach completion on this major effort when 

the last two boosters are in place this month. 

While the Minuteman missiles have been upgraded and modified, the infrastructure supporting these missiles is still early 1960s era equipment and we will ensure 

our reviews include this element of the weapon system. Along those lines, we began, 

with the support of Air Force Materiel Command, a depot overhaul program for the 

fleet of 23-year-old Transporter Erector Vehicles and silo emplacement vehicles. We 

have established requirements for a Transporter Erector Vehicle replacement and 

have begun development of the new Payload Transporter vehicle. The new ICBM 

Payload Transporter will introduce physical security technologies into the reentry 

system transport vehicle, to include advanced security delay features with stand-off 

command and control activation capability. I want to thank Congress for funding 

this program at $117.8 million across the Future Years Defense Program, and we 

should see the first Payload Transporter deliveries in fiscal year 2015. 

These handling equipment sustainment efforts will significantly enhance the safety and security of daily operations across our three ICBM bases and supports modernization and upgrade necessary to extend Minuteman III through 2030. Additionally, these efforts will enable the Air Force to execute activities required for implementation of New START. 

EQUIP: ICBM SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS

We have taken a number of steps to provide our security forces with the equipment and technology they need to protect and defend our Nation’s nuclear deterrent. 

Air Force Global Strike Command has purchased 152 armored vehicles to better 

protect our security forces and meet DOD requirements. Some of these new armored 

vehicles have been delivered to our wings, and delivery will be complete no later 

than calendar year 2013. 

We are in the process of fully deploying new Remote Visual Assessment (RVA) 

equipment to assist security forces monitoring of the ICBM missile complexes. RVA 

enhances situational awareness, and helps security forces tailor the responding 

forces in accordance with the assessed threat. We are transitioning from a satellite 

dependent RVA system to a terrestrial system that increases both performance and 

responsiveness at a lower long term operating cost. In addition, we are modernizing 

our security sensor systems used to protect our above-ground weapons storage 

areas, with completion of the upgrade at Minot Air Force Base, ND, this year. 

EQUIP: LONG-RANGE STRIKE FAMILY OF SYSTEMS

We are strong advocates and partners in the development of a long-range strike 

(LRS) family of systems that will provide a visible deterrent and global strike capability well into the future. The Air Force LRS strategy uses a family-of-systems construct consisting of three precision-strike pillars: a long-range strike platform, a 

long-range standoff missile, and a conventional prompt global strike capability. Both 

Secretary Gates and Secretary Donley have made a commitment to a new nuclear 

capable, long-range penetrating bomber. 

CHALLENGES

Air Force Global Strike Command faces three central challenges. First, we must 

consolidate the gains we have made across the nuclear enterprise. Second, we must 

achieve enduring cultural change in our nuclear enterprise while also aggressively 

supporting the current conventional fight. Finally, we must sustain and enhance our 

current force while preparing to meet the challenges of the future with innovative 

solutions. I am proud of the progress our airmen have made, and as I address these 

challenges through this testimony, I will share my perspective on Air Force Global 

Strike Command’s significant accomplishments. 

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CONSOLIDATING OUR GAINS

Now that we have established the Command and declared full operational capability, we must consolidate our gains, sustain momentum, and provide stability to 

the enterprise while continuing to pursue improvements. One example is our recent 

initiative to capture and categorize recommendations or findings relating to our nuclear alert forces. In partnership with the Air Force Materiel Command, we are reviewing studies, assessments, reports, and other documents dating back to 1990 to 

audit the recommendations and follow through with the findings that have not been 

executed, funded, and/or mitigated. Any open recommendations will be worked to 

resolution or prioritized and tracked for later action according to fiscal constraints 

and level of risk. 

SUSTAIN CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES

Our second challenge is to achieve enduring cultural change in our nuclear enterprise while also aggressively supporting the current conventional fight. Our bomber 

forces are more than just dual-capable—they are full-spectrum. Having both a nuclear and conventional mission is not something new for our bomber units. Nuclear 

capable bombers participated in numerous conventional operations from Korea 

through Operation Desert Storm. During the Cold War, the conventional employment of bombers was seen as a distraction from the core mission of nuclear deterrence. However, since the end of the Cold War, providing support to conventional 

operations has been a core mission enhanced by developments in stealth; precision; 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and joint connectivity. Our nuclear 

capable bombers, with enhanced conventional capabilities and training, have excelled in Operations Southern Watch, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and Odyssey Dawn. 

To help our commanders strike this balance, we executed a year-long review of 

our Designed Operational Capability statements for every unit in the command. We 

ensured that the units’ missions, resources, and readiness metrics are clearly linked 

to the combat power or the combat support required by the joint warfighter. 

Today, our B–52s and B–2s rotate to Guam to provide continuous long-range 

strike presence and proven combat capability to the commander of U.S. Pacific Command. Furthermore, our recent B–2 missions into Libya show how quickly a crisis 

can develop, and how long-range bombers can rapidly bring flexible combat power 

to a joint commander. As a command, we must continue to evolve long-range strike 

as a core competency to ensure no adversary has complete freedom of action. 

PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE CHALLENGES

Finally, we must sustain and enhance our current force while preparing to meet 

the challenges of the future. Sustaining our aging platforms and meeting current 

commitments competes for the resources we need to modernize our forces in advance 

of future threats. 

Secretary Gates has directed a thorough and vigorous scrub of military bureaucratic structures, business practices, modernization programs, civilian and military 

personnel levels, and associated overhead costs. At Air Force Global Strike Command we recognize our responsibility to be efficient and effective stewards of resources. To achieve both efficiency and effectiveness requires a commitment to creating a climate where productivity improvements—faster, better, cheaper—thrive. 

As Secretary of Defense Gates has said, ‘‘We have not seen the productivity growth 

in the defense economy that we have seen and expect from the rest of the economy.’’ 

This is an opportunity to achieve not just efficiency targets for the next few budget cycles, but to institutionalize the processes, education, and mindset to encourage, 

reward, and implement operational innovation. Our goal is to instill a culture that 

consistently encourages innovation and to foster airmen for whom productivity improvements are second nature. We will ensure they have a command structure that 

allows their ideas to be raised, vetted, and implemented. We must be more productive in ways we have not been in the past while remaining focused on the daily execution of our missions. 

SUMMARY OF CHALLENGES, SPECIAL TRUST, AND RESPONSIBILITY

In conclusion, we have made great strides in the last year, and Americans can 

be proud of what the Airmen assigned to Air Force Global Strike Command accomplished since we last testified before your committee in 2010. We must now consolidate those gains and continue to forge a culture that recognizes the special trust 

and responsibilities of the most powerful weapons in our Nation’s arsenal; we must 

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do this while aggressively supporting the current fight; and we must sustain and 

enhance our force while preparing for future challenges. 

The existence of Air Force Global Strike command reflects the commitment of the 

Air Force to ensure the United States maintains a safe, secure, and effective nuclear 

deterrent, and the importance of the global strike mission. 

Thank you. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, General. 

General Chambers. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM A. CHAMBERS, USAF, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE 

AND NUCLEAR INTEGRATION, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General CHAMBERS. Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss your Air Force’s 

strategic deterrent forces. Your Air Force nuclear enterprise consists of 450 ICBMs, 96 bombers, squadrons of F–16C and F–15E 

dual-capable fighters, and the thousands of dual-capable airmen 

who operate and sustain them. These weapons systems and dedicated airmen maintain the credibility of a strategic deterrent that 

requires a long-term visible commitment. 

Continuing to strengthen our nuclear enterprise remains the 

number one Air Force priority. Our Secretary and Chief of Staff 

have ingrained the Air Force’s commitment to and are sustaining 

the focus on the nuclear enterprise. My written statement lays out 

their specific strategic guidance and I respectfully request that 

statement be entered into the record. Today I simply highlight the 

following areas: human capital, modernizing and recapitalizing, the 

NPR and New START. 

When the Air Force established reinvigoration of the nuclear enterprise as our top priority, we included our most precious resource, our airmen, as an integral part of that effort. In response, 

the nuclear and personnel communities jointly created an analytical process resulting in a comprehensive nuclear enterprise human 

capital effort which lays out the active management steps required 

to deliberately develop airmen and their nuclear expertise. 

From investing in our people to investing in our systems, every 

weapons system in the Air Force’s nuclear enterprise is undergoing 

some form of modernizing or recapitalizing. Successful deterrence 

over the next 2 decades requires sustaining and modernizing our 

force structure in a consistent, year-by-year deliberate manner. 

During the next 7 years, implementation of the NPR and New 

START will bring a reduction in the role and numbers of nuclear 

weapons in our national security strategy. Our final force structure 

will meet the combatant commander’s requirements and maintain 

overall effectiveness of the deterrent force. 

The President’s fiscal year 2012 budget request reflects the positive steps we are taking to improve this Air Force core function. 

Across the FYDP, Air Force investment in nuclear deterrence operations totals $28 billion. The Air Force is committed to ensuring 

this investment results in systems and capabilities that best 

operationalize strategic deterrence for our Nation. 

The national military strategy acknowledges our Nation’s security and its prosperity are inseparable and preventing wars is as 

important as winning them and far less costly. In this time of constrained resources, the efficacy of nuclear deterrence operations is 

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evident in the fact that for approximately 3 percent of the Air 

Force total obligation authority your Air Force continues to deliver 

the bedrock of global strategic stability, providing the ICBM and 

bomber legs of the triad, as well as dual-capable fighter capability 

24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. 

Thank you for this subcommittee’s continued support of America’s Air Force and particularly its support to our airmen and the 

strategic deterrence they provide. 

[The prepared statements of General Chambers, General Scott, 

and General Harencak follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM A. CHAMBERS, USAF 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss your Air Force’s strategic deterrent forces. 

In pursuit of the President’s vision as outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review to 

‘‘reduce U.S. nuclear weapons and their role in U.S. national security strategy,’’ the 

Air Force takes to heart its responsibility to uphold the entirety of his vision and 

pledge, ‘‘ . . . [that] as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain 

a safe, secure, and effective arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America’s security commitments.’’ We employ that arsenal to produce strategic deterrence that remains vital at a time when our National Military Strategy notes, ‘‘ . . . ongoing shifts 

in relative power and increasing interconnectedness in the international order indicate a strategic inflection point.’’ Maintaining credibility of our strategic deterrent 

requires a long-term, visible commitment to our nuclear capabilities. 

CONTINUE TO STRENGTHEN—THE AIR FORCE’S #1 PRIORITY

Continuing to strengthen our nuclear enterprise remains the number one Air 

Force priority. A year ago, testimony before this committee recounted Air Force efforts to reinvigorate our nuclear enterprise. That focus significantly advanced our 

structure, processes, and culture. Our focus now is on making sure those advances 

endure. 

Since last year’s testimony, Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), as the 

first major command stood up in 27 years, is the most visible structural change 

taken to ensure focused operational oversight and proper support to U.S. Strategic 

Command. AFGSC now has full operational command of our Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and nuclear-capable bomber forces and is continually focused 

on the airmen and their weapon systems that produce strategic deterrence every 

day. Additionally, the Air Force designated Nuclear Deterrence Operations as 1 of 

12 Service Core Functions to ensure alignment of policy and resources. These are 

just two of the many changes to structure, process and culture that reflect a concerted effort to institutionalize our reinvigoration initiatives and maintain safe, secure, and effective nuclear capabilities. 

The Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force articulated strategic guidance to ingrain the Air Forces’ commitment to sustained focus on the nuclear enterprise. 

• Strengthen Positive Inventory Control of Nuclear Weapons Related Materiel 

• Refine Inspection Processes 

• Fulfill Human Capital Plan to Ensure Appropriate Expertise at All Levels 

• Modernize and Recapitalize Nuclear Deterrent Capability 

• Implement New START 

• Craft a Comprehensive Deterrence and Crisis Stability Vision that Builds 

on the Nuclear Posture Review 

The initiatives in the President’s budget request will build on successes achieved 

since 2008 and enable the Air Force to Continue to Strengthen along these Strategic 

Steps to maintain safe, secure, and effective nuclear capabilities. 

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STRENGTHEN POSITIVE INVENTORY CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS RELATED

MATERIEL

Efforts continue to tighten, assess, and automate accountability for Nuclear Weapons Related Materiel through a completely revamped Positive Inventory Control 

process. To improve accountability, sustainment activities such as these have been 

consolidated under a vastly revitalized Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center. The Air 

Force now has improved visibility of our worldwide inventories and accountability 

continues to improve. 

REFINE INSPECTION PROCESSES

We have seen positive results from the current inspection regime across the 

board. We have reinforced our long-held nuclear standards and we will continue to 

examine the size and scope of the inspections required to ‘‘sustain’’ excellence, focusing on effectiveness. We will continue critical self-inspection, Nuclear Surety Staff 

Assistance Visits, and Nuclear Surety Inspections. The goal is to bolster resolute attitudes of exacting compliance and strict adherence to prescribed standards with 

continual self-assessment. We now perform Root Cause Analysis on all major writeups, track them and brief progress of corrective actions to Air Force leadership. Senior Air Force leaders continue to review inspection results and other key indicators 

on a frequent and recurring basis. 

FULFILL HUMAN CAPITAL PLAN TO ENSURE APPROPRIATE EXPERTISE AT ALL LEVELS

When the Air Force established reinvigoration of the Nuclear Enterprise as our 

top priority, we included our most precious resource . . . our airmen . . . as an integral 

part of the effort. 

In response, the nuclear and personnel communities jointly created an analytical 

process resulting in a comprehensive Nuclear Enterprise Human Capital Execution 

Plan. This action plan focuses on synchronizing the Air Force’s Continue to 

Strengthen objectives that relate to development of airmen and their nuclear expertise. 

As a result of collaborative efforts across all nuclear specialties, we have instituted changes to improve the long-term professional fitness of our people. Over the 

past year, we have scrutinized our small, critical nuclear career fields, and recognized that in this era of small total force numbers and dual capability requirements, 

we must take innovative steps to optimally manage, grow, and retain this specialized expertise. As a result, several initiatives are now underway that will improve 

operational effectiveness in these critical areas. In addition, the Air Force is testing 

a new Enlisted Developmental Team process starting with the nuclear enterprise, 

to ensure deliberate development of our senior noncommissioned officers to create 

a sustainable leadership bench. We have also moved out aggressively to retain nuclear talent, ramping up programs to target expertise and critical skills through retention incentives. 

Recently, my organization was designated the Functional Authority for the 

Human Capital performing the Nuclear Deterrent Operations. As such, we are responsible for injecting strategic perspective in the array of nuclear-related human 

capital programs. This broadens the perspective of the human capital policy arm to 

the needs of the nuclear enterprise career fields, brings attention to some unintended consequences of broader policies, and allows for refinements in leveraging 

our skilled dual-capable nuclear airmen. 

These changes allow us to deliberately develop and manage our nuclear-capable 

personnel. Air Force senior leaders have energized these efforts through advocacy, 

continuous, focused attention and regular review of nuclear initiatives. 

MODERNIZE AND RECAPITALIZE NUCLEAR DETERRENT CAPABILITY

From investing in our people to investing in our systems, every weapon system 

in the nuclear enterprise is undergoing some form of modernization or recapitalization. Successful deterrence requires sustaining and modernizing our force structure 

in a consistent and deliberate manner. This is a vital contribution to the long-term 

credibility of our deterrent. 

Air Force funding efforts maintain ongoing investment for the Minuteman III and 

support equipment programs to extend life expectancy through 2030, as directed by 

the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act. Ensuring consistent, adequate 

sustainment of MM III requires an investment strategy addressing cryptographic 

upgrades, ICBM fuze refurbishment, and modernizing data transfer technology. Additionally, the Air Force and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) 

plan to start a life extension program for the W78. 

141 

Although a decision on a follow-on ICBM is not needed for several years, the Nuclear Posture Review recognized the need for studies to inform a decision on 

Ground-Based Strategic Deterrence beyond 2030. In January 2011, AFGSC initiated 

study efforts appropriate to the early stages of the ICBM follow-on. Once these are 

complete, the study will move into a Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) phase, which 

will include an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). We plan to complete the MSA phase 

in fiscal year 2014. 

Air Force modernization plans for our current B–52s and B–2 bomber fleet continue an effort to maintain a viable force. The B–2 is the only aircraft capable of 

long-range delivery of direct attack munitions in an anti-access environment. To ensure the B–2 can continue to operate in high threat environments, we have programs to modernize communication, offensive, and defensive systems. For the B–52, 

we have programs to modernize and sustain the communication, radar, and weapon 

delivery systems. 

Beyond modernization of existing platforms, we recognize the changing threat environment of the future requires improved capabilities. To meet that need, the Air 

Force is programming for a long range, nuclear capable, penetrating bomber. This 

program will leverage mature technologies and follow streamlined acquisition processes and focus on affordability with unit cost targets informing design trades and 

ensuring sufficient inventory. The program will begin in fiscal year 2012 delivering 

an initial capability in the mid-2020s with a planned production of 80–100 bombers. 

The Air Force will sustain the current Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) until 

a follow-on advanced penetrating long-range stand off (LRSO) missile capability is 

fielded. We have multiple service life extension programs to ensure viability of the 

propulsion systems, guidance and flight control systems, and warhead arming components. Preparation activity began in November 2010. The AoA final report is due 

in May 2012. The Air Force has programmed for research, development, test and 

evaluation over the next 5 years for the development of LRSO. 

The Air Force continues to program for a nuclear-capable F–35 to modernize the 

Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) fleet. The investment over the Future Year Defense 

Plan (FYDP) for F–35 DCA ensures effective transition of this capability from our 

legacy fleet. 

The B61 Life Extension Program continues to be a top priority. The Air Force is 

committed, with the NNSA, to improve the safety and security of the B61 and ensure the Tail Kit Assembly acquisition schedule remains on track for a fiscal year 

2017 First Production Unit delivery. The B61 will remain compatible with current 

nuclear capable platforms to maintain effectiveness against projected target sets for 

years to come. This will also ensure the United States retains the capability to forward-deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons in support of Alliance commitments. 

The Air Force started the Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP) program to address capability gap shortfalls in helicopter nuclear security support, and 

Continuity of Government/Continuity of Operations missions. The CVLSP program 

seeks to replace existing UH–1N fleet with an off-the-shelf, nondevelopmental aircraft. We are currently evaluating acquisition strategies to best meet warfighter requirements with a goal of an fiscal year 2015 Initial Operational Capability. 

There are many other initiatives required to maintain a safe, secure, and effective 

arsenal. The Air Force will spend approximately $1 billion over the FYDP in critical 

areas, such as Transporter Erector Hoists, Weapons Load Trailers, Electronic Systems Test Sets, Weapons Storage and Security System (WS3), and Reentry System 

Test Set cables. The Air Force also continues its commitment to maintaining its history of safe and secure resource transportation. To this end, AFGSC is actively programming to rapidly replace the current Payload-Transporter vehicle with a model 

with improved safety and security features. 

IMPLEMENT THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW & NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION

TREATY

During the next 7 years, implementation of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review 

(NPR) and New START Treaty (NST) will bring a reduction in the role and numbers 

of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. Under the NPR, the Air Force 

will remove multiple warheads from its ICBMs. Under NST, which entered into 

force on February 5, 2011, the United States and Russia will reduce the number 

of accountable strategic warheads from the current Moscow Treaty warhead limit 

of 2,200 to 1,550. Within the treaty’s central limits on Strategic Delivery Vehicles, 

the Air Force will reduce the numbers of deployed ICBMs and convert some nuclearcapable B–52s to conventional-only capability. Final force structure will be based on 

meeting the combatant commander’s requirements and maintaining overall effectiveness of the deterrent force. We are currently developing options to reach the 

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force levels specified in the treaty and have initiated the appropriate planning, programming, logistics, engineering and environmental studies to support these decisions, inform Congress, and meet treaty obligations. 

For its part, the Air Force began formal data exchanges with Russia in March. 

Inspections and exhibitions of bombers and missiles will start this month. The Air 

Force will also begin actions necessary to reduce deployed bombers and missiles, 

convert some nuclear-capable B–52 bombers to conventional-only capability, and 

eliminate other assets such as, Peacekeeper silos, 564th Missile Squadron silos, and 

B–52s to comply with central treaty limits. These actions must be completed by February 2018. 

Global Strike Command will lead the Air Force portion of this effort. Lieutenant 

General Kowalski and his team of dedicated professionals are finalizing implementation and compliance plans to ensure the safety and security of our nuclear force 

as we draw down to NST mandated levels, all the while preserving the ability to 

deter adversaries, and assure allies and partners. 

In preparing for the new verification regime, the Air Force is also working closely 

with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S. Strategic Command. 

CRAFT A COMPREHENSIVE DETERRENCE AND CRISIS STABILITY VISION THAT BUILDS ON

THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

As we think about providing deterrence in the 21st century, it’s important to remember that not only is the Cold War over, the post-Cold War is over. Airmen who 

started active duty service after the fall of the Soviet Union are now retirement eligible. A generation has passed. That does not mean that strategic deterrence and 

nuclear forces are anachronisms. What it does mean is that we need to hit fast-forward on how we think about Nuclear Deterrence Operations in the complex security 

environment of today and tomorrow. The 2010 Joint Operational Environment declared: ‘‘For the past 20 years, Americans have largely ignored issues of deterrence 

and nuclear warfare. We no longer have that luxury.’’ Successful strategic deterrence in the 21st century requires stability-based analysis that goes beyond traditional numbers-based assessments to determine optimal deterrence force structure 

and posture. The Air Force is revitalizing deterrence thinking to meet the challenges of our complex ‘‘multi-nodal’’ security environment. 

CONCLUSION

Our ability to enable other nations to achieve their security goals, serve as a convener to cooperatively address common security challenges, or lastly, act as a security guarantor, preferably with partners and allies, but alone if necessary, rests on 

a foundation of U.S. nuclear capabilities and the strategic deterrence they provide. 

Your Air Force is continuing to strengthen our strategic deterrent force. This will 

be a long-term, systematic effort to refine and solidify earlier ‘‘reinvigoration’’ initiatives and to codify institutional changes ensuring safe, secure, and effective nuclear 

capabilities for the Nation. 

The President’s budget request reflects the positive steps we are taking to improve this Air Force core function. Across the FYDP, Air Force investment in Nuclear Deterrence Operations totals $28 billion. The Air Force is committed to ensuring this investment results in systems and capabilities that best operationalize strategic deterrence for our Nation in the multi-nodal security environment we face. 

The National Military Strategy acknowledges, ‘‘Our Nation’s security and prosperity are inseparable’’ and ‘‘Preventing wars is as important as winning them, and 

far less costly.’’ In this time of limited resources, the efficiency of Nuclear Deterrence Operations is evident in the fact that for approximately 3 percent of the Air 

Force Total Obligation Authority, your Air Force continues to deliver the bedrock 

of global strategic stability providing the ICBM and Bomber legs of the Triad as 

well as dual-capable fighter capability 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a 

year. 

Thank you for the committee’s continued support of America’s Air Force and particularly to its airmen and their contributions to strategic deterrence. 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. DAVID J. SCOTT, USAF 

Today, the Air Force flies, fights, and wins in air, space, and cyberspace—globally 

and reliably—as a valued member of our Joint and coalition teams. Last year the 

Air Force conducted more than 45,000 sorties supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom/ 

New Dawn and almost 101,000 sorties supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. 

Just recently, the Air Foprce led the way in executing and supporting Operation OdVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00148 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
143 

yssey Dawn in Libya, flying hundreds of sorties to date. As we continue to accomplish our current mission sets and plan for future threats, we must remain mindful 

of the increasing age and costs of operating our aging air fleet which is 33.7 years 

old, on average. Our Air Force leadership is scrutinizing programs and budgets to 

find acceptable solutions to meet growing demands that are competing for limited 

funds. 

Our fleet of 156 bombers remains engaged in today’s fight while retaining an ability to meet future challenges. Air Force bombers have maintained a continuous 

presence in Southwest Asia since shortly after September 11. Bombers have also 

provided the U.S. Pacific Commander with a continuous presence throughout the 

area of responsibility (AOR) since 2004. The Air Force continues its commitment to 

future long-range strike capabilities as part of a comprehensive, phased plan, valued 

at $5.5 billion over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), to modernize and 

sustain our bomber force. 

B–1

The B–1 currently provides long-range persistent airpower in direct support of 

NATO/ISAF, U.S. and Afghan troops in three major operations. The B–1 also provides real-time intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance with full-motion video, 

enhanced situational awareness and a demonstrable overwatch presence. The Air 

Force added the SNIPER Advanced Targeting Pod capability to B–1 aircraft in summer 2009 to provide aircrews with positive identification capability and the ability 

to share video with ground forces. The B–1 has proven to be the workhorse of current combat operations, flying the majority of the bomber combat sorties in the Central Command AOR. Most recently, two B–1s launched from Ellsworth AFB, and 

dropped munitions in Libya in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn. With less than 

2 days from first notice to takeoff, Ellsworth airmen prepared several aircraft and 

hundreds of weapons to provide the combat configuration needed halfway across the 

globe. This is the the first time the B–1 fleet has launched combat sorties from the 

continental United States to strike targets overseas. The B–1 is beginning to show 

its age and requires multiple upgrades to maintain critical combat capability. B–1 

modernization and sustainment programs include the Integated Battle Station program, combining Fully Integrated Data Link (FIDL), Vertical Situational Display 

Upgrade (VSDU), and Central Integrated Test System (CITS) programs under one 

installation contract. Four B–1 upgrades are required to prevent grounding of the 

B–1 fleet. The four grounding modifications are: VSDU, CITS, Radar Maintainability and Improvement Program (RMIP), and the Inertial Navigation System 

(INS). 

B–1 upgrades are a must, but funding has proved challenging. The Air Force has 

decided that force structure adjustments can provide the necessary cost savings that 

will allow us to keep the B–1 fleet viable. As such the Air Force is retiring 6, from 

an overall force of 66, B–1s to fund the 4 grounding modifications plus Fully Integrated Data Link through the remainder of the B–1 fleet. This is strictly a programming action, taking acceptable (moderate) risk to the overall bomber capability requirement. This retirement will not impact current operations because real-world 

taskings will always take priority over home-station training missions. 

B–1 aircraft availability rates remained relatively level for fiscal year 2002–2007 

with a drop in fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 primarily driven by modernization efforts. To mitigate manpower shortages and reduced maintenance experience 

levels, B–1 bases have been augmented by contract field teams which will continue 

through April 2011. Manning authorizations have been approved but B–1 aircraft 

availability will be affected into the distant future while personnel are trained and 

gain experience. The Air Force places great emphasis on sustaining and maintaining 

the B–1 fleet, ensuring that this key capability and keeping it available to support 

our warfighters. 

B–2

The B–2 has participated in every combat action, including Odyssey Dawn, since 

Operation Allied Force and is pivotal to U.S. Strategic Command’s plans as well as 

to U.S. Pacific Command’s (PACOM) Continuous Bomber Presence to assure allies 

and support U.S. interests in the Pacific. The B–2 Spirit provides a lethal combination of range, payload, and stealth. It remains the world’s sole long-range, low observable dual-role bomber. It is the only platform capable of delivering 80 independently targeted 500-lb Joint Direct Attack Munitions (GBU–38). It is the only platform capable of carrying the developing Massive Ordnance Penetrator; a weapon 

crucial to our capabilities against hardened, deeply buried targets. While B–2 availability has steadily increased over the past 5 years, in part due to enhancements 

144 

in low observable maintenance such as the highly successful Alternate High Frequency Material program, it faces increasing need for upgrades to avionics originally 

designed over 20 years ago. 

The Extremely High Frequency Satellite Communications and Computer Upgrade 

Program (EHF SATCOM and Computer Upgrade) has three increments. Increment 

1 upgrades the B–2‘s flight management computers and main data bus as an enabler for future avionics efforts. Increment 2 integrates the Family of Beyond-lineof-sight Terminals (FAB–T) along with a low observable antenna to provide secure, 

survivable strategic communication, and Increment 3 connects the B–2 into the 

Global Information Grid. Increment 1 of EHF SATCOM and Computer Upgrade is 

beginning procurement this year for fleet installations beginning at the end of fiscal 

year 2013. 

We will finish replacing the B–2’s original radar antenna, upgrade selected radar 

avionics and change the radar operating frequency as part of the Radar Modernization Program (RMP). Thanks in large part to Congressional support, the RMP acquisition strategy was modified to include life-of-type component buys to avoid diminishing manufacturing source issues during the production run. 

The Department is also investing in B–2 Defensive Management System (DMS) 

modernization to ensure continued survivability. This will allow the B–2 to continue 

operations in more advanced threat environments while decreasing the maintenance 

required to operate the system. The DMS faces obsolescence in light of threat system advances and diminishing manufacturing sources for critical components. $41 

million is being invested in fiscal year 2012 with $560 million across the FYDP to 

maintain B–2 penetration capability. We just completed an Analysis of Alternatives 

and are preparing to move towards the technology development phase. 

B–52

The B–52 Stratofortress is our Nation’s oldest frontline long-range strategic bomber with the last airframe entering service in 1962. It amplifies the consistent message of long-range U.S. airpower in a theater like PACOM where distances drive 

decisions. Equipped with an advanced targeting pod, the B–52 can also provide realtime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance with full-motion video, enhanced 

situational awareness, a demonstrable overwatch presence and precision joint fires 

in support of PACOM‘s objectives. The Air Force has invested in modernization programs to keep the B–52 platform viable and operationally relevant. Major B–52 

modernizations include the Combat Network Communications Technology 

(CONECT), EHF SATCOM, Strategic Radar Replacement (SR2), and the 1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade programs. CONECT provides an integrated communication and mission management system with machine to machine data link interfaces 

for weapons delivery. The digital infrastructure provided in CONECT is the backbone for EHF SATCOM. The EHF SATCOM program integrates the FAB–T providing assured, survivable two-way strategic command and control communications. 

The SR2 program, starting in fiscal year 2010, integrates a modern nondevelopmental radar to address systemic sustainment issues, replacing the legacy APN–166 

radar. Finally, the 1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade provides internal J-series 

weapons capability through modification of Common Strategic Rotary Launcher and 

an upgrade of stores management and offensive avionics software. Updated with 

modern technology the B–52 will be capable of delivering the full complement of 

jointly developed weapons and will continue into the 21st century as an important 

element of our Nation‘s defenses. 

LONG RANGE STRIKE (LRS)

Our existing bomber force has performed exceptionally well and has provided our 

Nation an unmatched global strike capability. However, these systems will eventually reach the end of their service lives. Our bomber fleet also faces challenges in 

the face of advancing threat capabilities and emerging Anti Access/Area Denied (A2/ 

AD) environments. The Air Force must look ahead to the next generation of long 

range strike capability in order to provide future presidents the ability to hold any 

target at risk, anywhere on the globe. 

On January 6, 2011 the Secretary of Defense announced that the Air Force would 

initiate a new bomber program as the cornerstone of the future of our Long Range 

Strike portfolio for the United States Air Force. Our intent is to field a new longrange penetrating bomber to join the joint portfolio of deep-strike capabilities. He 

directed this new penetrating bomber would be nuclear capable, and envisioned to 

accommodate both unmanned and manned operations. The SecDef also directed the 

Air Force to procure 80–100 of these new highly survivable bombers, which should 

begin delivery in the mid-2020s. The fiscal year 2012 President’s budget provides 

145 

funding for the long range penetrating bomber program, following an extensive 18 

month, OSD-led review of long range strike requirements. By leveraging proven 

technologies and streamlining program management during development, the Air 

Force will ensure the new bomber can be delivered before our current fleet goes out 

of service. Though details of the program, including specific system performance attributes such as range, payload and speed are classified, the total annual budget 

will be executed by regular appropriation of funds, with the Air Force making capability tradeoffs as necessary to hold procurement costs down to ensure affordability 

for the full purchase of the program of record. The President’s budget requests $197 

million in fiscal year 2012 and $3.7 billion over the FYDP for the new penetrating 

bomber. 

In the mid-term (2017–2030), we plan to field the new penetrating bomber while 

continuing to develop its capability as the threat and the technology mature. Longterm (2031–2050) plans aim to complete fielding of the fleet while continuing to 

evolve the weapon system as the threat environment and technology mature. The 

Air Force LRS strategy provides present and future leaders continued and affordable global strike options within emerging anti-access area denial environments. 

CLOSING

The Air Force stands ready to win today’s joint fight and plan for tomorrow’s challenges. We are committed to working together to determine the right procurement, 

sustainment and retirement strategy to remain prepared for the current fight as 

well as posturing for future demands. Dominance of air, space, and cyberspace continues to be requisite to the defense of the United States. We appreciate your continued support and look forward to working in concert to ensure our decisions enable us to strengthen our Air Force to meet future requirements. 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY BRIG. GEN. GARRETT HARENCAK, USAF 

Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, and distinguished members of the Strategic 

Forces Subcommittee thank you for this opportunity to discuss our continuing improvements to the Air Force’s nuclear sustainment efforts. As a result of the dedication of our talented team of military personnel, civilians and industry professionals, 

I can attest that the Air Force nuclear enterprise is considerably stronger today 

than at any point prior to the Nuclear Weapon Center’s establishment in 2006. The 

vitality that we see today represents a reversal in a decades-long de-emphasis of 

America’s strategic forces that was first documented in studies ranging back to 

1998. In the years that followed, a series of reports called for a single manager for 

nuclear weapons sustainment, a consolidation of management sustainment activity 

and a unified funding strategy. In response to these reports, Air Force Materiel 

Command (AFMC) developed a two-phase strategy to establish a new center responsible for nuclear sustainment activities. The first phase was completed in March 

2006 when the Nuclear Weapons Center was activated. AFMC and the Center then 

began the lengthy task of pulling together the fragmented pieces of the Air Force 

nuclear enterprise. Phase II was accomplished in April and May 2008 with the assignment of the first flag-level officer as Center commander and the assignment of 

the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Systems Program Office to the Center. 

Phase III began in February 2009 with the signing of Program Action Directive 

(PAD) 08–05 which directed further integration of the enterprise. 

I am pleased to tell you that on January 20, 2011, General Hoffman, the AFMC 

Commander declared that the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center had achieved Full 

Operational Capability (FOC). This is a measure of General Hoffman’s confidence 

that AFNWC has successfully created and codified staff best practices and standards, that we are sufficiently capable of advocating for the resources necessary to 

execute our plans, that our staff is sufficiently manned and capable and that we 

have put in places processes and procedures that are measurable, repeatable and 

auditable, all contributing to our primary mission: support for the warfighter. 

Most assuredly, this does not represent any sort of watershed moment in the 

strengthening of the nuclear enterprise . . . the pursuit of the nuclear zero defect culture requires continuous improvement and oversight and we still have a long way 

to go to get to where we want to be. The declaration of FOC does, rather, show how 

far we have come in applying common-sense leadership and organizational principles to a difficult problem. There can be no letting up, however, on tracking down 

and eliminating remaining problems that confront the enterprise. We will continue 

to perform self-assessments, independent inspections and progress reviews to ensure 

that focus is maintained on critical factors that define the health of our strategic 

146 

deterrent. The Nation will not tolerate any less of the stewards of the Air Force’s 

most potent weapons. 

In addition to the completion of Phase III of AFNWC’s standup and declaration 

of FOC, AFMC and the Air Force as a whole have made significant strides in reorganization that have reinvigorated and strengthened the nuclear sustainment enterprise. The Air Force vested the AFMC Commander as the single four-star officer responsible for nuclear sustainment. It is important to note that since the inactivation 

of Strategic Air Command in 1992, no single four-star officer had been charged with 

understanding and articulating the needs of the Air Force with regard to nuclear 

sustainment below the Chief of Staff. In contrast, today the Air Force has a onestar officer overseeing the day-to-day sustainment issues of the enterprise, while a 

four-star officer keeps the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, and the 

Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command informed and engaged in issues 

involving the sustainment of nuclear weapons and the health of the various delivery 

vehicles and pieces of support equipment which comprise the Air Force strategic deterrent. A series of recurring reviews, culminating in the Nuclear Oversight Board, 

chaired by the Secretary and Chief of Staff and comprising all Major Command 

(MAJCOM) commanders ensure high-level oversight of trends, developments and attention to emergent issues. Additionally, AFMC created a new directorate specifically focused on nuclear matters and tasked with representing the Command to 

other MAJCOMs, the Air Staff and the Joint warfighter. 

As members of the subcommittee are well aware, a number of studies were conducted in the wake of the 2007 and 2008 incidents that brought the shortcomings 

of the Air Force nuclear enterprise into the public eye. While the studies revealed 

a large number of discrete process failings, organizational issues, and leadership 

problems, in the macro sense, they all bore out the same root cause: that the focus 

on standards had atrophied over the years and that this root cause ended up manifesting itself in three serious ‘‘seams’’ that had to be addressed immediately. These 

seams are: (1) a lack of nuclear expertise; (2) a lack of nuclear focus; and (3) a lack 

of authority. These seams ‘‘opened’’ under the weight of competing priorities and the 

stress of continuous combat operations since 1991. AFNWC has been working with 

its numerous mission partners to close these seams by making thoughtful and deliberate changes to the way in which things get done in the nuclear enterprise. 

There are three overarching ways in which we as a center are working these problems. The first is by enabling collaborative partnerships. We realized from the very 

beginning that, given the large number of players in the nuclear arena, we simply 

cannot have a stovepiped view of the enterprise. From other Air Force agencies, 

such as the Air Staff’s nuclear directorate, AFMC’s nuclear directorate, Air Force 

Global Strike Command, other centers and commands, and the joint warfighter, to 

other government organizations such as the National Nuclear Security Administration and beyond to colleges, universities, and national laboratories, AFNWC has 

been working hard cultivating contacts and associates. By doing this, we’re ensuring 

that we can meet requirements more rapidly, find answers and recruit the right 

people to get the job done for the warfighter and the Nation. One of our most vital 

collaborations is with the newly created office of the Program Executive Officer 

(PEO) for Strategic Systems. The PEO position was created in response to specific 

recommendations made by the Schlesinger Report, and has assumed responsibility 

for the development and acquisition of future systems and for modernization efforts 

while AFNWC focuses on day-to-day operations and sustainment. The PEO, Brigadier General John Thompson, who reports to the Air Force Service Acquisition Executive, Mr. David Van Buren, is colocated with AFNWC at Kirtland Air Force Base, 

NM. 

The second way we’re sealing the seams is by improving our ability to spot problems and come up with solutions before they become crises. As our nuclear stockpile 

ages, it is becoming apparent that any number of serious problems may be waiting 

around the corner. By using sound engineering principles, we are becoming increasingly able to spot trends with weapons, delivery systems and their associated support equipment and determine practical, effective and timely solutions before the 

problem reaches a critical stage, at which point they become difficult and expensive 

to address. Like other complex systems, our nuclear arsenal is dependent upon a 

vast number of components and processes, the failure of any one of which can be 

very serious for a given weapon system. Many of these components have not been 

updated in decades and, while expertly maintained, are not immune to deterioration. As former U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Commander, General Kevin 

Chilton stated in 2008, nuclear weapons, even when sitting on the shelf, are chemistry experiments. They are constantly changing from chemical reactions inside of 

them. This extends as well to other equipment as well, some of which is affected 

by wear and tear on top of everything else. Metal fatigue, corrosion and chemical 

147 

changes all take their toll. If a weapon, delivery system or a piece of support equipment only had to last to the end of its 10-year design life before replacement, like 

much of our equipment was intended to have, it wouldn’t be as crucial that all these 

very long term issues be taken into account. However, if we extend this to the 30, 

40, or 50 year lives we now expect from our current weapons, it becomes vitally important that we understand the relationship between the various components and 

use sound engineering practices to determine the correct course of action to maintain reliability and availability for the warfighter. 

The third way we’re closing the seams is by deliberately maintaining a forwardlooking view, both in order to be proactive to possible problems on the horizon and 

to ensure that nuclear sustainment equities are thoroughly considered in the planning and development of future systems. AFNWC is heavily involved in the LongRange Standoff Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) process and is helping lay the 

groundwork for the forthcoming Ground Based Strategic Deterrence AoA. We are 

also working with the PEO for Strategic Systems on acquisition and modernization 

programs for the various systems which make up our strategic deterrence force. We 

are looking to the future in other ways as well, reaching out to universities and national laboratories to recruit new talent, helping to rebuild the nuclear expertise 

that has been lost in the years of atrophy. Finally, AFNWC is involved in ensuring 

that adequate qualified military personnel are available to perform the difficult task 

of maintaining the arsenal and that they have available the necessary equipment 

and tools to do their job. 

I am a strong advocate of keeping a big picture, strategic view. With so many discrete tasks requiring attention, this is sometimes difficult. However, it is vital that 

our perspective be kept broad and that we always question what effect changes will 

have on the health of the force. As we have found in the past, there are often 

second- and third-order effects that can result from decisions we make now. Decisions such as how reductions for the New START treaty are executed, for instance, 

will have long-term repercussions, for good or ill that will continue for decades. We 

are committed to providing thoughtful solutions and advice based on sound engineering and logistical principles and always moving no faster what we have termed 

‘‘the speed of nuclear surety.’’ 

AFNWC’s most important mission is to provide direct support for the warfighter, 

in this case, STRATCOM. To that end, as part of Phase III of AFNWC’s stand-up, 

we assumed command of the Air Force’s remaining five CONUS Weapons Storage 

Areas (WSAs)—which had previously been split between three commands—AFMC, 

AFSPC, and Air Combat Command (ACC). This was done with the goal of standardizing publications, procedures and leadership in mind. In addition to this, we created a Directorate of Nuclear Surety within AFNWC to work with the WSAs as a 

coherent and integral weapon system. This Directorate recently published a detailed 

study of the Air Force WSAs, further pointing out their need for standardization 

across civil engineering, communications, security and safety disciplines. The Nuclear Surety Directorate has also brought together WSA stakeholders from across 

the Air Force and Navy in recurring council sessions to deliberately work through 

requirements and to better advocate for needed modernization and upgrades. 

In addition to WSAs at CONUS bases, the Air Force Nuclear Weapon Center responsibilities include direct support to force providers in Europe—the U.S. Air 

Forces, Europe (USAFE). We manage programs for support equipment sustainment 

in the European Theater, including weapons storage vaults and the weapons maintenance truck, both of which are vital to the safety, security, and sustainment of 

the B61. Additionally, we are working closely with the AFPEO for Strategic Systems 

on life extension modifications to the B61 to ensure that it continues to meet the 

requirements of USAFE and our NATO allies. 

Furthermore, to ensure that the Air Force’s ICBM force remains robust and capable through 2030, as required in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2007, we are currently undertaking a number of critical actions to sustain today’s aging forces. First among these is a two-pronged approach to providing sufficient Mk21 fuzes to support the warfighter. We have instituted an aggressive 

screening program to identify fuzes requiring few or no repairs. Those which pass 

the screening are returned to the field for installation into the Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle modified Minuteman III ICBMs. Those failing the screening tests become candidates for refurbishment. Initial attempts in 2008 to refurbish Mk21 fuzes 

were unsuccessful, in large part due to their level of sophistication and complexity. 

Our two-pronged approach to refurbishment has enlisted the assistance of the original manufacturer, which has been successful in demonstrating its ability to refurbish the fuze. Additionally, an organic production line at Hill Air Force Base is in 

the process of performing its proof-of-concept trials and will begin fielding refurbished fuzes in fiscal year 2012. Along with the screening process, these two producVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00153 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
148 

tion lines, operating simultaneously, will be able to provide enough operational 

Mk21 fuzes to meet initial warfighter requirements in the mid-term. We are also 

working closely with our mission partners at Ogden Air Logistics Center which is 

currently completing their first refurbishment cycle for the Mk12A fuze. This refurbishment effort is on schedule and meeting production goals. AFNWC is also working with AFGSC and the NNSA to ensure that they have our full support in the 

field of testing. By bringing on board a dedicated Center Test Authority (CTA), we 

are not only ensuring that there will be no surprises related to ICBM test 

supportability, but we are also looking to the future to ensure that testing requirements are included in AoAs and studies for follow-on systems. The value of the CTA 

had been validated by recent cooperative work between the ICBM Systems Division, 

AFGSC and the ICBM Prime Contractor on emergent issues with the Minuteman 

III Command Destruct system. Finally, we are working closely with the PEO/SS on 

requirements and considerations for a joint fuze, which is envisioned as a replacement for both the Navy Mk5 fuze and the Air Force Mk12A fuze, with the goal of 

realizing benefits in standardization, functionality and cost. 

As I mentioned previously, possibly our greatest challenge is with our most important asset—our people. From where we are right now, we can see that we are far 

from healthy with regard to our pool of available talent. Years of atrophy have reduced the overall number of nuclear-experienced personnel available, and the recent 

reinvigoration of the nuclear enterprise has made competition for the scarce talent 

severe. Additionally, the available personnel are tending to be toward the top and 

bottom of the demographics. We have a number of experienced senior level personnel and the Air Force is doing a good job bringing in inexperienced but enthusiastic junior people, but we currently lack the strong mid-career professionals, both 

military and civilian, who are the backbone of a successful organization. While time 

and experience will resolve this problem eventually, the Air Force has embarked on 

an aggressive program to identify its nuclear experienced personnel and to ensure 

that they are tracked and placed appropriately to make the best use of their experience. Furthermore, AFNWC has created the Air Force Nuclear Fundamentals 

Course, which encompasses nuclear weapons fundamentals, force structure, nuclear 

stockpile guidance and planning, nuclear surety and the nuclear enterprise. We are 

also working with the Air Staff and Air Force Personnel Center to rebuild a strong, 

well-managed nuclear science and engineering workforce. We’re trying to ensure 

that our people receive everything they need in order to thrive in the difficult nuclear environment, including a solid organization with strong, repeatable processes, 

training, education and meaningful experience as well as the necessary support 

equipment and processes to do the job. 

In closing, I would like to emphasize the hard work and dedication of AFNWC’s 

professionals and their efforts to address the most pressing concerns in the nuclear 

enterprise. The American public rightly holds its nuclear stewards to the very highest standards, and we will not let them down. I would like to thank the committee 

for the opportunity to address these issues and look forward to your questions. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, General. Thank you all. We’ll commence a 6-minute round of questions. 

General Kowalski and General Scott, the B–1 and B–2 bombers 

each flew in Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya. What is your assessment of the mission success of each of these bombers and did 

either have any equipment or other problems? 

General KOWALSKI. Chairman Nelson, the bombers and their 

weapons performed exactly as we expected them to. The crew members’ performance was superb, and the command and control of the 

operation also was executed very well from organizations within 

the U.S. 

Senator NELSON. General Scott, anything to add? 

General SCOTT. Sir, I would just add that if you looked at the B– 

1, for the first time in history they flew from the States to a target 

in another nation and then returned, not back to the States, but 

to a point in space. So they flew a 24-hour sortie. If you remember 

that particular day where they were launching those aircraft 42 

hours after they got notified, it was in the snow and ice. Those 

were some pretty tough conditions for our young men and women 

149 

loading those aircraft up and getting them airborne to do the mission that they did. Sir, it was absolutely flawless. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Also, to the two of you, the last time the longevity of the current 

fleet was reviewed, all the bombers would begin to start retirement 

around 2035 to 2037. Can you tell us now, what is the expected retirement date for the B–52, the B–1, and B–2 based on current expectations and current projections? 

General KOWALSKI. All of those bombers, based on longevity in 

terms of the aging and surveillance information that we get on the 

airframes as they go through depot and other studies, have them 

all going out past 2040. The limiting factor on the B–2s is the rudder attachment point right now. The limiting factor on the B–52s 

is the upper skin of the wing, and on the B–1s it’s the lower skin 

on the wing. 

General SCOTT. That’s absolutely right. In the B–1 fleet, we have 

it from right now structurally out to 19,900 hours. That takes it 

out to the ’40s. If we also look at it, by 2018 we will be doing a 

fleet viability board and a structural test on it to see where we 

need to go further with that aircraft. 

Senator NELSON. Now, continuing with this, all of the current 

bomber aircraft have modernization programs of varying types to 

try to reach that 2040 point in time. Do we have a comprehensive 

plan developed for each bomber aircraft that would help us understand what it’s going to take to sustain and modernize each bomber 

so that we can be certain that each platform remains capable 

through that period of time? Is there an overall program for each 

one of the birds? 

General KOWALSKI. Senator, for both the B–2 and the B–52 there 

are existing roadmaps. With the standup of Air Force Global Strike 

Command, we have put into place a larger strategic master plan 

to sort of guide our efforts from our mission and vision all the way 

down to specific tasks to be done during any current year. We’re 

in the process right now of integrating the roadmaps for the B–2 

and the B–52 into that strategic master plan so we can track it and 

work tasks on a regular basis. 

Senator NELSON. General Scott, several of the upgrade programs 

are needed to prevent the bombers from being grounded. For example, the B–1 had three programs that had to be in place this year 

to prevent grounding. These three programs are the central integrated test system, the vertical situation display, and the radar 

modernization improvement program. Are all the programs that 

I’ve just outlined on track to complete by the end of the year to 

avoid having any grounding? 

General SCOTT. Sir, they are on track. The end of the year is not 

the timeline. The actual timelines are for these specifically, are in 

2012 and 2013. But the funding is in place for the B–1 to do this. 

As we look at this, we look at it in four different ways: the sustainability, lethality, responsiveness, and the survivability. That’s how 

we tie the things that the Air Combat Command (ACC) is working 

on to maintain this modernization of this fleet. 

They are on track, but the timelines are in second quarter of 

2012 and 2013. 

150 

Senator NELSON. General Kowalski, the Global Strike Command 

is now fully operational. Are there any plans to move the B–1 to 

Global Strike? 

General KOWALSKI. Senator, I’m not aware of any plans at this 

time. 

Senator NELSON. Is anybody else aware of any plans to do that? 

General CHAMBERS. No, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NELSON. General Scott, in the fiscal year 2012 budget request the Air Force has proposed to retire six B–1 bombers. Could 

you explain why these bombers are being retired and what are the 

cost savings associated with the retirements? 

General SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, as we look at our fleet and as we 

look at the entire bomber fleet, we look at how we can balance and 

manage capability and capacity. As we look at the modernization 

pieces that we’re doing with the B–1 and as we look at these specific aircraft, the six that we’re reducing, we’re not retiring the 

fleet; we’re reducing the number that we are. It’s to enable us to 

be able to take those 60 aircraft, continue that modernization on 

time to maintain that combat capability that we give to the 

COCOM commanders. 

Senator NELSON. Do you think that the 60 will be sufficient for 

that by reducing it by 6, or will we be shorting ourselves of our capabilities for cost savings? 

General SCOTT. Sir, the analysis that we have done looking at all 

of the force planning structure and the analytical agendas that we 

have been given show that the 60 will be—with, again, as you look 

across the fleet of the bombers and the combat air forces, working 

with Global Strike Command and ACC—yes, sir, the total number 

of bombers is still well within the capability of the risks that we 

accept. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

General SCOTT. Yes, sir. 

Senator NELSON. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

I’ll submit some questions to each of you concerning the modernization of our strategic deterrent and the cost. I know you’re 

wrestling with that and I’d like to have as much information as we 

can as we wrestle with it. I happen to be the ranking member on 

the Budget Committee, which makes all this no fun to talk about. 

Let me ask, Admiral Benedict, about the solid rocket motor industrial base. Or maybe General Kowalski mentioned that earlier. 

The fiscal year 2012 budget shows an almost 85 percent per unit 

increase, Mr. Chairman, $8.5 million more than the cost for the 

same motors in 2011, for the purchase of the D5 solid rocket motors. How much of that price is related to the cancellation of the 

Constellation and lack of NASA’s decision to have a clear path for 

heavy lift, and what can be done about that if that’s the problem? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir. We have seen the unit cost increase 

from approximately $10.7 million to approximately $19.2 million. 

Of that, part of it is due to overhead increases. We calculate motor 

costs to be about 60 percent of that increase. The other 40 percent 

is due to requalification, material increases, and the retooling in 

order to continue production of the original D5 design. 

151 

We have worked very closely with Lockheed Martin and Alliant 

Techsystems Inc. (ATK), our industry partners, to try and mitigate 

the cost of the uncertainty and the cancellation in the NASA programs. We have seen ATK reduce their indirect overhead by approximately 24 percent. We have seen ATK reduce their current 

work force by approximately 42 percent. 

In parallel with that, we have taken significant process and quality improvements. We estimate savings of about 17,000 man-hours 

or about $10 million a year cost avoidance. 

So as we look at this issue today, we have a requirement to 

STRATCOM to continue to provide the survivable strategic deterrent. We are the only program today in current production. So we 

are working very closely with the industry partners as they try to 

develop not only a business plan, but understand the larger plan 

for this national capability solid rocket motor industry. 

Senator SESSIONS. Do I understand that the decline in numbers 

of purchases driven by NASA’s situation has increased the cost? 

What part of the cost increase do you attribute to that? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir. If you look at it in just terms of pure 

volume, NASA is about 70-plus percent of the solid rocket motor 

industry. We’re about 20 percent. Another baseline point is it 

would take 10 Trident motors—first, second, and third stages—in 

order to make one solid rocket motor booster for the Shuttle. So in 

pure volume, the NASA decision is one that causes the overhead 

to be spread amongst the remaining programs. 

We have worked closely with the Air Force. Their Minuteman 

program is in a smart shutdown. The NASA program is significantly ramped down. We are the only strategic program of solid 

rocket motors that are currently in production, so we are currently 

bearing that overhead shift. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, we’ve tried to work on that because I 

think NASA needs to maintain its role, and through our budget 

and other reasons we haven’t been able to do that. It’s had the perverse result of driving up DOD’s costs. 

General Kowalski and General Chambers, as I mentioned in my 

opening remarks, the 1251 report that accompanied the New 

START treaty stated that the administration intends to begin to 

study a follow-on ICBM in a way that ‘‘supports continued reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons.’’ Can you elaborate and provide 

some context for that statement? Do you know precisely what was 

being referred to there? 

General KOWALSKI. Senator, I’m not sure what’s being referred 

to there. In terms of the ground-based strategic deterrent, our command is working with headquarters Air Force on a capabilitiesbased assessment and we plan to move to pre-ICD activities next 

year. 

Senator SESSIONS. ‘‘ICD’’ is? 

General KOWALSKI. Initial capabilities document, and analysis of 

alternatives by fiscal year 2013. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, could this guidance that you conduct 

this review for the follow-on ICBM in a way that supports continued reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons—is it possible that such a 

statement could influence the results that you produce, the nature 

152 

of the study? Have you been directed to consider that as you make 

your study? 

General KOWALSKI. Senator, the guidance we have right now is 

in the nuclear posture report and that’s the guidance that we’re 

using for the capability-based assessment. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Chambers? 

General CHAMBERS. Yes, sir. The exact context of that wording 

is unclear. However, the section 1251 report does indicate, of 

course, that the ground-based leg of the triad the Air Force will retain up to 420 ICBMs from a current force of 450. So the ‘‘up to 

420’’ is the baseline for the New START level of ICBMs, and so the 

follow-on ICBM uses that as the starting point. 

Now, if further policy looks are made at further reductions, we 

are not yet tasked to go any further than that. So the ‘‘up to 420’’ 

is our guiding baseline right now. 

Senator SESSIONS. The problem I want to know is that, here we 

have the report suggesting that anything you say, anything you 

conclude, should support continued reductions. Are you prepared to 

issue a report if you so decide that does not recommend reductions? 

It seems like to me otherwise you’re having a political interference 

or a political override of military best judgment. 

General KOWALSKI. The efforts that we’re pursuing right now in 

ground-based strategic deterrence won’t address the policies. It will 

simply address what we see as the capability requirements based 

on the 2010 nuke posture review. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Chambers? 

General CHAMBERS. Yes, sir. As General Kowalski indicated, the 

entire material solution analysis phase for this new—for this potential Minuteman follow-on, will continue into fiscal year 2014. 

Between now and fiscal year 2014, if there are national policy decisions made with regard to force structure, I know I’m very confident that my chief of staff will be involved in providing military 

advice to those discussions. But they will certainly inform the final 

force structure number. But right now we’re starting this study effort with a baseline of up to 420. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, ultimately the political leaders make 

final decisions on the matter, there’s no doubt about it. But I would 

trust that all of you—and I guess I’ll ask you to state for the 

record: Do all of you understand it would be your duty, if asked in 

hearings or within DOD, that your duty would be to give your best 

military judgment as to how to best defend America, even if it’s not 

in accord with us politicians? General Scott? 

General SCOTT. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Benedict? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Kowalski? 

General KOWALSKI. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Chambers? 

General CHAMBERS. Most definitely, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I just wanted to raise that, because 

sometimes, even in the military, cultures and climates get established and people feel like they should try to make their judgment 

comply with what higher officials would like to see. But this is so 

153 

important and so critical, and I appreciate your willingness to 

speak the truth as you see it. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

To comply with the New START treaty, the Air Force will draw 

down the number of nuclear-capable bombers, as has been discussed, the number of deployed Minuteman III ICBMs, and the 

Navy will reduce the number of deployed D5 SLBMs. Let’s start 

with the bombers. General Scott, the B–1 became a conventionalonly bomber over a decade ago. Nevertheless, they were counted 

under the old START Treaty. Do we know when the efforts will 

begin to modify all the B–1 aircraft so that they’re not nuclear-capable any more under the new treaty? 

General SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I’ll start with the answer but 

then I’ll pass it to General Chambers as the guy that works the 

treaty. 

Under the old START treaty, all of the B–1s, I think as of about 

a week ago, General Chambers will say, have been retrofitted nonnuclear. So under old START they are non-nuclear. Now, there are 

some timelines on when we notify the Russians, and again I’ll let 

General Chambers follow on with that, for the New START inspection process. But currently today the B–1s are conventional platforms. 

Senator NELSON. Great. 

General Chambers? 

General CHAMBERS. Mr. Chairman, one of the first provisions of 

the new treaty was to provide the Russian Federation an exhibition 

of a B–1. That has now been completed in compliance with the 

treaty, and that was the last hurdle to converting the last B–1. So 

the entire B–1 fleet has now either been converted or eliminated, 

and thus the Russian Federation now has 60 days to confirm that 

using inspection means. Then some time late this summer, early 

fall, the database for New START will no longer reflect B–1s as an 

accountable nuclear delivery platform. 

Senator NELSON. It’s my understanding, General Kowalski, that 

all the B–2 aircraft will remain nuclear-capable. Is that accurate? 

General KOWALSKI. Mr. Chairman, yes, that’s accurate. 

Senator NELSON. Has there been any decision as to how many 

B–52s will be modified to no longer be nuclear-capable? 

General KOWALSKI. Mr. Chairman, that conversation is ongoing. 

We expect a decision will be made soon on the force structure options. 

Senator NELSON. Has there been a decision as to the actual 

modification that will be needed to remove the B–52 from being 

counted as a nuclear-capable bomber under that New START treaty? 

General KOWALSKI. No, that decision has not been made yet. 

Senator NELSON. Do we have some idea when it may be made? 

General KOWALSKI. I’d turn that over to General Chambers. 

General CHAMBERS. Mr. Chairman, the conversion method for 

the bomber, for the B–52, has to be reviewed by a body called the 

Compliance Review Group. It’s a bilateral group of Russians and 

American specialists. That Compliance Review Group will meet 

later this spring, I believe in the month of May, but we can check 

that for sure. 

154 

The command has given their method of converting and that 

method will be reviewed, and we hope to get a good answer soon. 

Senator NELSON. Okay. If you would, for the record respond to 

us with that information when it’s available. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

When is the next CRG to discuss bomber conversion method? How long will it 

take for a decision? What’s the CRG membership? 

(1) Date of the next Compliance Review Group (CRG): CRGs do not meet regularly; rather they convene in reaction to Services (or DOD Agencies) bringing 

forward proposed activities that raise issues of compliance with arms control 

treaties. For B–52 conversion, the Air Force’s aim is to meet the Treaty’s requirement to render the converted bombers incapable of employing nuclear armaments while simultaneously preserving full conventional functionality. We 

have found that the more due diligence we conduct before approaching the 

CRG, the more rapidly they can reach compliance decisions. With this in 

mind, the Air Force is currently fleshing out a proposal for converting some 

number of operational B–52Hs to a non-nuclear role. We currently envision 

approaching the CRG with a thoroughly developed package within the next 

couple of months. 

(2) How long will it take: Engaging the Compliance Review Group marks the beginning of the process leading to a compliance decision. Experience reveals 

that the decision process can sometimes be an iterative one. We have seen 

some issues settled in a matter of weeks to months while in some rare cases 

others have taken years. As a result, it can be difficult to predict the point 

where a decision will be made. 

(3) CRG membership: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology 

and Logistics is the DOD official responsible for ensuring that DOD activities 

are conducted in compliance with treaties. The Under Secretary is supported 

by Compliance Review Groups—one for each treaty. The individual membership may change from treaty to treaty. However, the organizational composition remains the same—senior-level experts from OSD (Policy), OSD (General 

Counsel), the Joint Staff, and is chaired by OSD(AT&L). 

Senator NELSON. Admiral Benedict, my understanding is that 

the Navy will retain the current number of Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines under the New START treaty, and that’s 14, but 

will remove missiles from the missile compartment of the deployed 

submarines. Each submarine can carry 24 missiles. How many D5 

missiles will be removed from each deployed submarine, and will 

this process start soon and how long might it take? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir. The Navy’s current planning is to 

remove four missiles per deployed submarine, so we would go from 

24 to 20. We are currently programmed to do that beginning in fiscal year 2015, and we expect that to be accomplished within a 2- 

year timeframe. 

Senator NELSON. General Kowalski, the Air Force plan is to reduce to approximately 400 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs from 

the current 450, and my understanding is that each squadron of 50 

missiles is interdependent, but the Air Force is exploring options 

as to how to reduce the number of ICBMs. In other words, will a 

whole squadron be deactivated or will the Air Force pick and 

choose among missiles and among the squadrons? 

General KOWALSKI. Mr. Chairman, the force structure options 

will be determined soon in terms of the Chief and the Secretary 

looking, reviewing them, and then making their recommendations 

back to the Secretary of Defense. 

Senator NELSON. Because there’s some sort interdependence, is 

it going to be possible to take out of the various different locations 

maybe one or two, or do you have to remove an entire set at once? 

155 

General KOWALSKI. The options that we’re looking at—as we put 

forward the 1251 report, if you do the math on that you see that 

we end up with about 720. So there’s about 20 strategic delivery 

vehicles that we’re trying to get—trying to get our arms around in 

terms of how we get from 720 to 700. So whether that 20 is bombers or whether that 20 is missiles to go from 420 down to 400 is 

what we’re wrestling with right now. 

Once we determine what is the best way to get there, then 

there’s a follow-on discussion of that. For example, if we do decide 

that it is to go to 400 on the ICBMs, then the decision then is do 

you spread that out among the force? We have 45 flights of 10 missiles out there in the field right now, so if you took one from each 

that would get you to about 45. Or whether you pursue an entire 

squadron. There are pros and cons to both, and that will inform the 

decision as we go forward here in the next few weeks. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. With regard to the solid rocket motors, has 

there been a consideration, Admiral Benedict, of working with 

NASA to try to achieve a reduction in cost per unit as a result of 

more numbers? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir. I met with the director of NASA’s 

Huntsville location just last Friday. We have been very collaborative with NASA, MDA, and other Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) groups. OSD industrial policy led the review in response to the congressional direction for a report on the future of 

the solid rocket motor industry. 

My understanding as of this morning, that report has been approved by Dr. Carter and will be released. We provided an interim 

report last summer on what we believed within the Department 

was the proper path forward for the solid rocket motor. The final 

was just signed this morning, sir. So we have been working very 

collaboratively with all the other solid rocket motor users. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

General Chambers, can you tell us about the current status of 

the dual-capable, nuclear-capable variant of the F–35? Is it scheduled for the 2017 delivery date still? 

General CHAMBERS. Senator Sessions, the F–35 as a platform, of 

course, is part of the larger F–35 program both for the United 

States and the allies. That program overall is now undergoing a 

technical baseline review. That technical baseline review will later 

this summer and fall probably give us a new timeline. The timeline 

for production and delivery of the F–35 is going to slip to the right. 

The amount of time is unknown, but that will impact the delivery 

of that capability with the new B61 life extended—B61 Mod 12, to 

the alliance in Europe. 

Thoroughgoing planning is under way to cover any potential gap 

that this slip may require. Sir, the current mission is being fulfilled 

by F–16s and F–15Es stationed in Europe. Those units that conduct that mission continue to conduct it, continue fully certified to 

conduct it. Some portion of those airplanes will continue to perform 

the mission until the F–35 is ready and fully integrated and deployed to Europe. 

156 

Senator SESSIONS. Are you not prepared to give us a date of the 

F–35? 

General CHAMBERS. Yes, sir. The F–35 Joint Program Office, of 

course, is working this very hard, and we just know that, writ 

large, the F–35 program is approximating a 2-year slip. That 

doesn’t mean that every piece of F–35 capability is going to slip to 

the right 2 years. So we are also very confident that the piece of 

that F–35 development program which calls for it to carry a nuclear weapon is still the first block of software after the development phase, which is a good thing. But the exact date I can’t name 

yet. 

Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Benedict, according to recent press 

reports the Navy rejected the recommendations of STRATCOM to 

design the next generation of ballistic missile submarines with 20 

missile tubes instead of opting for only 16 per boat. What is the 

basis for the Navy’s decision of 16? I’m sure cost is a factor. In 

what ways will that decision impact overall nuclear force structure 

associated with the command? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir. SSP supported the Navy analysis, 

STRATCOM’s analysis, as well as the OSD analysis as we proceeded forward and towards the Milestone A decision that Dr. 

Carter conducted based on our input, which was the technical 

input, as the Director of SSP. Other factors were considered. As 

you stated, cost was one of them. 

But as the Secretary, as the CNO, and I think as General Kehler 

submitted in their testimony, given the threats that we see today, 

given the mission that we see today, given the upload capability of 

the D5, and given the environment as they saw today, all three of 

those leaders were comfortable with the decision to proceed forward 

with 16 tubes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Does that represent your judgment? To what 

extent were you involved in that? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Sir, we were involved from a technical aspect 

in terms of the capability of the missile itself, what we can throw, 

our range, our capability. Based on what we understand the capability of the D5 today, which will be the baseline missile for the 

Ohio Replacement Program, as the Director of SSP I’m comfortable 

with that decision. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NELSON. General Harencak, you have recently assumed 

command of the Nuclear Weapons Center, another organization established to address the problems with the nuclear enterprise, particularly the incident where a missile nose cone was mistakenly 

shipped to Taiwan mismarked as a battery. I have two or three 

questions that I’d like to ask. 

Do you think you have positive control over all nuclear-related 

parts? 

General HARENCAK. Absolutely, sir. We’ve made significant 

progress over the years in developing positive inventory control 

(PIC) and merging of databases, and we are absolutely positive 

that we have fixed that problem. 

Senator NELSON. Could you describe what kind of a database 

you’ve put together to make sure that all the parts are accounted 

for, incoming, outgoing, and in supply? 

157 

General HARENCAK. What we’ve developed is what we call PIC 

fusion. What it does is, it merges all of the databases into one. We 

take in-transit databases. We take databases that are in base supply, any type of database that may be even indirectly under our 

control or not. For example, we’re right now beginning to merge the 

nuclear weapons-related material (NWRM), that is ours, that the 

Department of Energy currently holds for us at Pantex and the 

Kansas City plant, for example. So we’ve merged this. It’s been 

under development. It’s a constantly evolving system that gives us 

very, very solid visibility on where all this is. 

I might also add that when it comes to actually the nuclear 

weapons themselves, there is one general in the Air Force that 

knows at all times where every weapon is, whether it be in storage 

or in transit, and that is me. We do that through our Sustainment 

and Integration Center (SIC), which is headquartered at my headquarters in Albuquerque. It has complete control and focus on 

where everything is. 

Senator NELSON. Much of the maintenance and test equipment 

supporting the missiles and the nuclear weapons is old and needs 

to be replaced. Now that we have knowledge of where everything 

is, do you have any plans to begin replacing the old equipment? 

General HARENCAK. Absolutely, sir. We have spent and plan on 

spending almost $1 billion from 2009 to 2016 on specifically ensuring the capabilities are retained through refurbishment and repair 

and getting ahead of the systems. For example, the reentry system 

test tabs, which are cables that have to be repaired. We’re getting 

out ahead of them. While we’re refurbishing, while we’re fixing 

these and getting them out to the field as quick as possible, we’re 

also fast-tracking the designing and building of replacements. 

So we are very focused on keeping a whole weapons system, specifically the Minuteman III, viable through a focused sustainment 

life cycle cradle-to-grave approach. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

General Kowalski, much of the support equipment for the missiles, it’s very old. What are your plans to address the issue of 

aging equipment, including, for example, the need to replace the 

Vietnam-era helicopters that support the missile fields? Are there 

new helicopters needed, and if so why, and can the Air Force replace these helicopters with very little, minimal, or no development 

costs? 

General KOWALSKI. Mr. Chairman, we’re working with the system program offices and with the Nuke Weapons Center on a lot 

of the test equipment issues for the ICBM. We also have a missile 

engineering squadron that’s currently based at Peterson Air Force 

Base, that does a lot of the facility kinds of sustainment for it. 

On the requirements for the helicopters, when the UH–1 was introduced it was introduced primarily as a lift platform for support. 

It really wasn’t identified as part of the security. When we did a 

series of stressing reviews of the security requirements of the missile fields, what was identified was a need for a helicopter that 

could carry more security forces members, could get them to launch 

facilities or convoys faster, and which had greater range, and that’s 

what we have been working on since the mid- to late-1990s. 

158 

Senator NELSON. From your testimony, it appears that the mission for the new helicopters will be missile field support, as you’ve 

just indicated, and to meet the continuity of government needs for 

the military district of Washington. Is it clear that the new common vertical lift support platform will support only those two missions and won’t serve as a combat search and rescue function? 

General KOWALSKI. I think the acquisition decision has yet to be 

made in terms of the final elements and the strategy to go forward. 

Right now, in the capability document that we had put together it 

is a lift support platform for the missile field security, for continuity of ops, continuity of government here in Washington, DC, 

and there is also some platforms that are used out in the Pacific. 

Senator NELSON. How many helicopters do you expect might be 

needed to achieve each mission? Do you have a number in mind? 

General KOWALSKI. Senator, I would probably have to give you 

for the record a precise number. That number is probably somewhere between 80 and 100. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Air Force needs 42 Common Vertical Lift Support Platform helicopters for 

missile field security and 27 to meet the continuity-of-government requirements for 

the Air Force Military District of Washington. There are 24 additional helicopters 

required for Pacific Air Forces, Air Force Materiel Command, Air Force Special Operations Command, and AETC training and transport needs. 

Senator NELSON. I guess that’s everything that I have. There’s 

a personnel concern. We should try to address this and then I 

think we can go to the secure location. When you work in the nuclear fields, obviously that can be difficult for personnel. Do either 

of you have any challenges bringing young airmen and sailors into 

the nuclear enterprise, and are these sought-after assignments or 

do they just sort of happen? Are they actually sought after by 

young men and women coming into the Service? 

General KOWALSKI. Mr. Chairman, we don’t really have any 

issues with getting airmen to join the Air Force and then being assigned tasks out in the missile fields. Probably the larger challenge 

that we face is getting our younger airmen, once they’ve reached 

that decision point, if they have been stationed in one of our northern bases where the environment’s a little bit tougher, the smaller 

communities around them, they tend to leave the Service. 

So we have been very concerned about that. We’ve been watching 

it very closely in cooperation with headquarters Air Force in terms 

of how do we improve quality of life and things up there for them. 

But at the end of the day our airmen really want two things from 

us: they want to know what it is that they have to do and they 

want to know that what they do is important. The Secretary and 

the Chief have established Air Force Global Strike Command. I 

have been to each base at least three times. I’ve talked to these airmen. The functional directors on my staff have been out talking to 

the airmen. 

They get the clear message that what they do is important and 

they also have the clear message about what it is that we need 

them to do. So I think we’re making real headway, and we see it 

right now in our younger officers when they get to the decision 

point. Because of the numbers of ICBM missileers that we take in, 

the crew members, we don’t need them at about the 5-year point. 

159 

A lot of them are allowed to do other things in the Air Force. Right 

now we have more volunteers to stay in the ICBM community in 

the nuclear enterprise than we have spots for. So right now that’s 

a good sign on how the enterprise has turned around in the last 

few years. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you for that update. Thank you all for 

your testimony today. We appreciate your being here and your 

service. 

Senator SESSIONS. Just one question. 

Senator NELSON. Sure. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Kowalski, or maybe Chambers or 

whoever, the 1251 report stipulated a force structure of up to 420 

ICBMs. That’s a reduction of 30. When will the decision be made 

as to what that number will be? Have you decided that? 

General KOWALSKI. Senator, I expect that decision to be made 

here shortly, within the next 3 months. 

Senator SESSIONS. Will that allow you appropriate time to analyze all the factors necessary? 

General KOWALSKI. Senator, yes. We have been looking at this 

for about 7 to 9 months already in terms of analyzing the costs and 

working down this path. Then as the Secretary of Defense has stated, the entry into force will be toward the end of the treaty. What 

we see right now as we look at the different options that we have 

is that, frankly, the critical path to make sure we’re in compliance 

with the treaty is eliminating a lot of the phantom silos out there. 

So there’s a lot of work to be done out in eliminating the silos. 

But in terms of the force structure decisions, that’s not a particularly driving force right now. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Senator NELSON. Again, thank you all. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON

BOMBERS—UPGRADES AND FUTURE CAPABILITIES

1. Senator NELSON. General Kowalski and General Scott, the last time the longevity of the current fleet was reviewed, all of the bombers would begin to start retirements around 2035 to 2037. What is the expected retirement date for the B–52, 

the B–1, and B–2, based on current projections? 

General KOWALSKI and General SCOTT. The Air Force expects to begin retiring 

legacy bomber platforms once the Long-Range Penetrating Bomber (LRPB) achieves 

Initial Operational Capability (IOC). Until that time, the Air Force will continuously 

assess the overall capacity and capability of our combat forces, including bombers, 

to ensure that the overall force is appropriately sized to provide for the Nation’s defense. Potential legacy bomber retirements as a result of LRPB IOC will likely be 

a mix of B–1s and/or B–52s (numbers and dates to be determined). Legacy bomber 

retirement decisions will be based on operational requirements, operating costs, economic service life, and treaty compliance mandates. The Air Force plans to maintain 

the B–2 fleet to beyond 2040. 

2. Senator NELSON. General Kowalski and General Scott, what are the serious 

life-limiting factors for each aircraft? 

General KOWALSKI and General SCOTT. The Structural Service Life for each bomber is based on when a key component within the aircraft structure reaches the point 

where further repair is not economically viable. Key components are tracked and 

service life is updated through the Aircraft Structural Integrity Program. The current limiting factor for the B–52 is the wing upper surface. For the B–1 it is the 

wing lower surface. For the B–2 it is the rudder attach points. All three bomber 

types are currently projected to reach their Structural Service life beyond 2040. 

160 

3. Senator NELSON. General Kowalski and General Scott, all of the current bomber aircraft have modernization programs of varying types underway. Has a comprehensive plan been developed for each bomber aircraft to sustain and modernize 

each bomber to assure that each platform remains capable through the projected future life for each bomber and to meet the retirement date outlined above? 

General KOWALSKI and General SCOTT. Air Force Global Strike Command 

(AFGSC) possesses the B–2 and B–52 dual-capable bombers. These aircraft each 

have plans detailing current and future sustainment and modernization requirements. The most recent B–2 Long Range Capability Flight Plan is dated November 

2009 and addresses sustainment and modernization requirements to ensure the 

platform remains capable through 2058. The most recent B–52 Road Map is dated 

December 2007 and outlines sustainment and modernization requirements to ensure 

the platform remains capable through 2040. AFGSC is currently writing Bomber 

Master Plans for both of these platforms. The Master Plans will build on these previous plans and provide updated sustainment and modification requirements designed to keep the platforms capable through their life expectancies. AFGSC will 

publish these plans later this year and look to publish future plans until the new 

bomber attains IOC. 

Air Combat Command (ACC) possesses the B–1 conventional bomber. The B–1 

Roadmap dated October 2007 addresses sustainment and modernization requirements to ensure it remains capable through 2025. The Bomber Force Structure 

Study from February 2008 estimates the structural life of the platform out to 2040. 

ACC and the B–1 Systems Program Office (SPO) at Tinker Air Force Base are currently producing a Strategic Action and Investment Plan (SAIP) that will update 

and validate the sustainment and modernization efforts for the B–1 to ensure that 

it remains viable through its expected service life of 2040. The SAIP will be published later this year. 

4. Senator NELSON. General Scott, several of the upgrade programs are needed 

to prevent the bombers from being grounded. The B–1, for example, had three programs that had to be in place this year to prevent grounding. These three programs 

are the Central Integrated Test System (CITS), the Vertical Situation Display, and 

the Radar Modernization and Improvement Program (RMIP). Are all these programs on track to be completed by the end of the year to prevent grounding? 

General SCOTT. All three modification programs are on track to begin installations 

early enough in 2012 to prevent grounding. The RMIP production contract was 

awarded on 30 September 2010. First kit deliveries begin in the spring of 2012 with 

the first aircraft modification scheduled for June 2012. The CITS program has completed development, and the production contract award is projected for June 2011. 

The Vertical Situation Display Upgrade (VSDU) program is scheduled to begin 

flight test this summer. Early procurement of critical kit parts has been authorized, 

and the contract award is projected for June 2011. Kit deliveries for both CITS and 

VSDU are scheduled to begin in September 2012 with first aircraft installation 

starting in November 12. 

5. Senator NELSON. General Kowalski and General Scott, the Global Strike Command is now fully operational. Are there any plans to move the B–1 to Global 

Strike? If not, why not? 

General KOWALSKI and General SCOTT. Currently there is no plan to move the 

B–1 from ACC to AFGSC. The decision to transfer only the nuclear capable bombers 

to AFGSC was focused and deliberate, given their primary mission of safe, secure, 

and effective nuclear deterrence. Maintaining the B–1 within the ACC portfolio supports ACC’s tasked role as the lead integrator for the Combat Air Force. 

B–1 RETIREMENTS

6. Senator NELSON. General Scott, in the fiscal year 2012 budget request the Air 

Force has proposed to retire six B–1 bombers. What are the cost savings associated 

with these retirements? 

General SCOTT. The retirement of six B–1s will provide a total fiscal year 2012 

savings of $62M in procurement and sustainment funding. 

7. Senator NELSON. General Scott, how much of the savings will go to each of the 

B–1, other bombers, and Air Force higher priorities? 

General SCOTT. The Air Force is reinvesting $33 million in fiscal year 2012 into 

critical B–1 sustainment and modernization programs to ensure the health of the 

remaining fleet. These programs include procurement and installation of VSDU and 

161 

CITS sustainment efforts, Fully Integrated Data Link capability upgrade, and procurement of critical initial spares for these modifications. The Department applied 

the remainder of the savings from the B–1 reduction to other Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) priorities to include continuing to strengthen the nuclear enterprise and investing in Building Partnerships. 

8. Senator NELSON. General Scott, will the retirement have any impact on the Air 

Force ability to meet any operational plan or other requirements? 

General SCOTT. The retirement of six B–1 bombers will free up funding to modify 

the remaining B–1 aircraft. The modifications to the remaining aircraft will improve 

their ability to respond to Combatant Commander operational taskings and ensure 

their viability in the future. 

Tactical and campaign level analysis conducted by Air Force Studies and Analysis 

has indicated a reduction of six B–1 primary aircraft authorizations (three combat 

coded and three training coded) can be taken with limited risk against currently approved Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Analytic Agenda scenarios. Cost per 

flying hour and mission capable rate analyses further supported a modest B–1 reduction as a wise reinvestment strategy geared toward increasing the pool of equipment spares and freeing funds to source critical sustainment and capability modifications. The Air Force expects to achieve an increase in aircraft availability in the 

near-term as a result of these retirements and monies reinvested, in part, to fund 

fleet modernization programs. Funded programs include fully integrated data link, 

vertical situation display, and CITS upgrades, providing a capabilities-based bridge 

to the future Long Range Strike platform. 

START REDUCTIONS

9. Senator NELSON. General Kowalski, Admiral Benedict, and General Chambers, 

the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) allows 800 nondeployed missile 

launchers and nuclear capable bombers. Has there been a decision as to how the 

800 nondeployed systems will be allocated? 

General KOWALSKI and General CHAMBERS. The fiscal year 2012 Annual Update 

to the Report Specified in Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 (Section 1251 Report) allocates the 800 total deployed 

and nondeployed launchers as follows: submarine-launched ballistic missiles 

(SLBM)—280; intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)—up to 454; and nuclear capable bombers—up to 66. Within the bomber force we will maintain all 20 B–2s as 

dual capable bombers. Up to 700 of these systems may be deployed (as defined by 

the treaty). We are assessing how the nondeployed systems might be allocated during the treaty period. 

Admiral BENEDICT. One of the New START treaty central limits is a limit of 800 

deployed plus nondeployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and deployed plus nondeployed heavy bombers, to be achieved by 7 years after entry into force of the treaty. In order to meet this limit, current U.S. plans call for a total of 280 deployed 

plus nondeployed SLBM launchers. Of this total, 240 will be deployed launchers (20 

launchers on each of 12 strategically-loaded SSBNs) and 40 will be nondeployed 

launchers (20 launchers on each of 2 SSBNs in extended overhaul). 

10. Senator NELSON. General Kowalski, Admiral Benedict, and General Chambers, has there been a decision on what constitutes a nondeployed missile launcher? 

General KOWALSKI and General CHAMBERS. Under the New START treaty, a silo 

launcher at an operational ICBM base that does not contain an ICBM is considered 

a nondeployed launcher. In addition, those silo launchers at ICBM test ranges and 

space launch facilities are accountable as nondeployed launchers. Plus, all ICBM 

silo training launchers are accountable as nondeployed launchers, of which the Air 

force currently has no launchers that fit this definition. Finally, non silo-based fixed 

launchers of ICBMs and space launch vehicles (i.e., ‘‘soft-site’’ launchers) at any of 

these facilities are not accountable as nondeployed or deployed launchers. 

Admiral BENEDICT. As defined in the treaty: 

The term ‘‘nondeployed launcher of SLBMs’’ means an SLBM launcher, 

other than a soft-site launcher, that is intended for testing or training, or 

an SLBM launcher that does not contain a deployed SLBM. 

In simpler terms, a nondeployed SLBM launcher is an accountable missile tube 

that is empty; thus, if the Navy were to remove an SLBM from its launcher, the 

status of that launcher (and the status of the SLBM) would change from deployed 

to nondeployed. A nondeployed SLBM launcher is accountable under the New 

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START treaty towards the central limit of 800 deployed plus nondeployed ICBM 

launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers. 

SOLID ROCKET MOTOR INDUSTRIAL BASE

11. Senator NELSON. General Chambers, the cost of solid rocket motors (SRM) 

continues to grow. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s decisions 

to halt the Constellation/Aries programs have, as we discussed last year, increased 

the portion of overhead costs borne by DOD. Now that the Air Force has completed 

Minuteman III upgrades and it will be several years before a new engineering effort 

is needed to sustain the Minuteman III through 2030, the Air Force is apparently 

not planning to invest in the SRM infrastructure. What are your thoughts on how 

to ensure the industry has the ability to support an additional life extension for 

Minuteman III and a replacement ICBM in the future? 

General CHAMBERS. The Air Force is committed to support the industrial base for 

current and future strategic SRMs needs. The Air Force is developing a Minuteman 

III SRM Modernization concept which proposes a modernization program to leverage 

latest SRM technology development into replacement SRMs for MM III (expected 

need date post-2020). The proposal would operationally qualify modernized motor 

designs; replace current MM III motors with new SRM technology; utilize modern 

industrial practices; and posture DOD for future SRM requirements with transferable technologies. Many of these technologies are currently being matured in the 

ICBM Demonstration and Validation Program specifically designed to support industrial base by exercising the critical SRM systems engineering and design skills. 

We believe that this Modernization program will be able to provide the needed SRM 

development to sustain the Industry until the time comes for a replacement for the 

current MM III ICBM. 

LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR CRUISE MISSILE

12. Senator NELSON. General Kowalski, in your prepared testimony you talk 

about the process for fielding a new long range nuclear cruise missile, starting with 

an analysis of alternatives (AoA) that will be completed in 2010. What is the assumption on the life of the existing nuclear cruise missile? 

General KOWALSKI. The Air Force has two service life extension programs (LEP): 

one to sustain the air launched cruise missile (ALCM) through 2020, which is fully 

funded; and another to sustain the ALCM through 2030, currently being programmed for in the fiscal year 2013 Program Objective Memorandum (POM). 

13. Senator NELSON. General Kowalski, when does the replacement need to be in 

place? 

General KOWALSKI. Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) must be in place by 2030, which 

aligns with the projected end date for the ALCM service LEP. 

14. Senator NELSON. General Kowalski, has there been any discussion about the 

warhead that will be used in the new cruise missile? 

General KOWALSKI. Recommendations on the specific warhead for use in the new 

cruise missile are being developed by a cross-organizational Warhead Working 

Group with participation from Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), AFGSC, Air 

Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC), and Air Armament Center. There are 

several warhead candidates being considered, including the W80. Data from the 

LRSO AoAs will be used to help finalize the warhead recommendation. Final recommendations for warhead selection will be completed prior to Milestone A, which 

is currently scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013. 

GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND—HELICOPTERS

15. Senator NELSON. General Kowalski, much of the support equipment for the 

missiles is very old. What are your plans to address the issue of aging equipment, 

including the need to replace the Vietnam-era helicopters that support the missile 

fields? 

General KOWALSKI. Support equipment is a critical component of the ICBM Master Plan, our overarching planning document for sustaining the Minuteman III 

through 2030. All ICBM support equipment needs are prioritized within the Master 

Plan to support our planning and programming process for building the POM submission. Two specific examples of support equipment needs highlighted in the MasVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00168 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ter Plan and included in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) are replacements for the ICBM Payload Transporters and Transporter Erectors. The 17-yearold Payload Transporter fleet is currently funded in fiscal year 2011 for replacement 

with first deliveries projected to begin in fiscal year 2015. A program to replace the 

21-year old Transporter Erector fleet is being considered as part of the fiscal year 

2013 POM. 

We intend to replace the UH–1N with the Common Vertical Lift Support Platform 

(CVLSP) with an initial operating capability in fiscal year 2015. 

16. Senator NELSON. General Kowalski, why are new helicopters needed? 

General KOWALSKI. The UH–1N does not have the four critical/fundamental key 

performance parameters (KPP) of speed, range, endurance, or payload capacity for 

the nuclear security mission or meet the continuity of government requirements for 

the Military District of Washington. 

17. Senator NELSON. General Kowalski, when are new helicopters needed? 

General KOWALSKI. Our continued reliance on the UH–1N platform for the missile 

field security results directly in 11 nuclear security deviations now. Those deviations 

will not be resolved until the CVLSP is fully fielded in our Missile Wings. Given 

this compelling need, AFGSC is pressing for an initial operating capability of fiscal 

year 2015 and an full operational capability (FOC) by fiscal year 2019, with FOC 

for the remainder of the Air Force fleet by fiscal year 2022. 

18. Senator NELSON. General Kowalski, can the Air Force replace these helicopters with minimal or no development costs? 

General KOWALSKI. Yes. The CVLSP program intends to procure a non-development, off-the-shelf, in-production helicopter that will require minimal or no development effort. The CVLSP program currently has $21.7 million budgeted for RDT&E 

from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2014. 

19. Senator NELSON. General Kowalski, from your testimony it appears that the 

mission for the new helicopters will be missile field support and to meet the continuity of government requirements for the Military District of Washington. Is it 

clear that the new CVLSP will support only those two missions and will not serve 

a combat search and rescue function? 

General KOWALSKI. The CVLSP program will replace the UH–1N fleet that is supporting AFGSC nuclear security support, AFDW continuity of government missions, 

and a variety of other secondary missions, not including Combat Search and Rescue 

(CSAR). CSAR missions are currently performed with HH–60 helicopters. There is 

a separate acquisition program to address recapitalization of the HH–60 CSAR fleet. 

20. Senator NELSON. General Kowalski, how many helicopters will be needed for 

each mission? 

General KOWALSKI. The Air Force needs 42 CVLSP helicopters for missile field 

security and 27 to meet the continuity of government requirements for the Military 

District of Washington. There are 24 additional helicopters required for PACAF, 

AFMC, AFSOC and AETC training and transport needs. 

21. Senator NELSON. General Kowalski, what is the total number that will be purchased? 

General KOWALSKI. The CVLSP program plans to procure 93 helicopters for the 

various CVLSP missions. This will include 42 helicopters for AFGSC nuclear security support, 27 helicopters for the Air Force District of Washington continuity of 

government mission, and 24 helicopters for training and other CVLSP missions at 

four other MAJCOMs. 

22. Senator NELSON. General Kowalski, when will there be a decision on the acquisition strategy for the helicopters? 

General KOWALSKI. On 12 April 2011, the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) and 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) approved a full and open acquisition strategy 

for the CVLSP program. The funding in the fiscal year 2011 Appropriation and fiscal year 2012 President’s budget will support the planned acquisition strategy that 

seeks to provide an IOC in fiscal year 2015. 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

FURTHER REDUCTIONS

23. Senator SESSIONS. General Kowalski, General Shackelford, Admiral Benedict, 

General Scott, General Chambers, and General Harencak, the President’s National 

Security Advisor recently made comments at the Carnegie Endowment that the administration is currently ‘‘making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions’’ and that DOD will ‘‘review our strategic requirements and develop options 

for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile.’’ He continued by stating 

that in meeting these objectives, the White House will direct DOD to consider ‘‘potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures.’’ What guidance and 

assumptions have you been given or told to follow in the design, development, and 

posture for modernizing the nuclear triad? 

General KOWALSKI, General SHACKELFORD, General SCOTT, General CHAMBERS, and General HARENCAK. We have not received further guidance or assumptions 

from DOD. As stated in the fiscal year 2012 Annual Update to the Report Specified 

in Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act, ‘‘DOD will invest in its 

nuclear delivery systems to ensure that existing capabilities are adequately sustained with essential upgrades and modifications. Additionally, DOD will seek to 

modernize systems to ensure continuing capability in the face of evolving challenges 

and technological developments.’’ 

Admiral BENEDICT. Strategic Systems Programs has been tasked to extend the life 

of the Trident II (D5) Strategic Weapon System to match the hull life of the Ohioclass submarine and to serve as the initial payload of the Ohio Replacement. SSP 

is extending the life of the W76 reentry system through a refurbishment program 

known as the W76–1. This program is being executed in partnership with DOE, 

NNSA. In addition to the W76–1, the Navy is in the initial stages of refurbishing 

the W88 reentry system. The Navy is collaborating with the Air Force to reduce 

costs through shared technology. 

24. Senator SESSIONS. General Kowalski, General Shackelford, Admiral Benedict, 

General Scott, General Chambers, and General Harencak, in your best military 

judgment, how prudent is it to begin consideration of reductions past the New 

START levels? 

General KOWALSKI, General SHACKELFORD, General SCOTT, General CHAMBERS, 

and General HARENCAK. It is prudent to begin consideration of reductions past the 

New START levels only to the degree that such consideration is based on national 

strategy. That strategy continues to affirm the central role of Deterrence. Deterrence applied to the complexities of the 21st century strategic and operational reality requires deliberate analysis and planning. Such analysis of 21st century requirements for strengthening strategic Deterrence must also deliberately include 

Extended Deterrence and Assurance as a requisite, as our reliance on Allies and 

partners is fundamental. 

National strategy also continues to affirm the efficacy of the Triad. Any strategybased look at further reductions needs to carefully assess the effects on the complementary capabilities inherent in the three legs of the Triad. Such an assessment 

will show that consideration of further reductions is not accomplished by application 

of mathematical formulae alone, but via thorough analysis of the attributes of each 

leg at lower levels; indeed, fewer warheads and fewer platforms can fundamentally 

alter overall deterrent attributes. 

So, then, the prudence of beginning consideration of reductions past New START 

levels is based on the comprehensive analysis a strategy-to-task methodology requires. Such analysis may soon be underway, and the Air Force is prepared to fully 

engage with OSD and the combatant commands in providing analytical support and 

military advice. 

Admiral BENEDICT. Issues involving reductions of nuclear systems past the levels 

specified in the New START treaty is a consideration for the executive branch, in 

consultation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and the responsible combatant commander, STRATCOM. 

BALANCE BETWEEN AFFORDABILITY AND CAPABILITY

25. Senator SESSIONS. General Kowalski, General Shackelford, Admiral Benedict, 

General Scott, General Chambers, and General Harencak, as I mentioned earlier, 

the modernization and sustainability of strategic deterrent is an immense yet critical investment that will cost around $20 billion per year for the foreseeable future. 

Within each of your portfolios what steps are being taken to address affordability? 

165 

General KOWALSKI, General SHACKELFORD, General SCOTT, and General CHAMBERS. Our ability to sustain the current systems we have is viable. DOD will invest 

in its nuclear delivery systems to ensure that existing capabilities are adequately 

sustained with essential upgrades and modifications. Additionally, DOD will seek to 

modernize systems to ensure continuing deterrent capability in the face of evolving 

challenges and technological developments. 

The Minuteman III will be sustained through 2030. Weapon system requirements 

are continuously reviewed and if sustainment programs not previously programmed 

become necessary they will be implemented to ensure we meet the requirement

‘‘ . . . to maintain a sufficient supply of launch test assets and spares to sustain the 

deployed force of such missiles through 2030.’’ (ref: H.R. 5122 Section 139) 

The Air Force plans to maintain heavy bombers for the indefinite future to provide long-range conventional and nuclear attack. 

DOD will sustain the current ALCM until a classified follow-on capability is fielded. 

Dual-Capable aircraft will continue to carry the B61 gravity bomb. The B61 will 

be sustained through LEPs and the Air Force will provide a new tail kit during the 

LEP. Additionally, the F–35 will be equipped to carry the B61. 

Admiral BENEDICT. A low-rate production continuity procurement strategy was extensively reviewed and approved by DOD and Congress. We have been in execution 

for nearly 15 years. This procurement strategy has proven successful, based on the 

demonstrated superb performance of the Trident II (D5) weapon system. The Navy 

submitted a report to Congress in December 2002 that detailed the impact of alternative full-funded procurement strategies and recommended continuation of the current production continuity procurement strategy. Continued production of critical 

components represents the best balance of cost and risk to extend the life of the D5 

missile. 

In addition, examples of other affordability initiatives SSP has implemented are: 

(1) Integrated Support Facility consolidation for missile guidance increased efficiency and improved supportability by consolidating the missile guidance infrastructure to support the MK6 and deploy MK6LE. 

(2) Shipboard Electronics Repair Facility established to repair and recertify shipboard Strategic Weapons Systems and Attack Weapon Systems electronic 

equipment. A common repair facility has yielded both cost avoidance and savings for SSP in the out-years by eliminating duplicate repair capabilities 

across four locations. 

(3) Moving Navigation efforts to Heath, Ohio, which provides co-location with the 

Air Force efforts and also is a lower cost-of-living area. 

General HARENCAK. There can be no doubt that nuclear weapons are expensive. 

Everything about them and their delivery vehicles is meticulously designed, overengineered, and has multiple, redundant failsafes. Add to this the fact that many 

of the weapons and delivery vehicles are being sustained well beyond their design 

lives, and costs will inevitably be high. However, one of the Nuclear Weapons Center’s 5 Priorities, as defined in its strategic plan, is entitled ‘‘Ensure Resource Stewardship,’’ and that is something we take very seriously. 

By using smart engineering and logistics processes, we’re constantly improving 

our ability to determine what hardware can be refurbished and what must be replaced. As a result, we’re planning integrated roadmaps and schedules to avoid bottlenecks in production that result in higher costs. As we continue to streamline our 

sustainment processes, we’re beginning to get a better understanding for the effects 

of advancing or deferring certain sustainment actions, which will allow us to plan 

more efficiently with an eye to reducing costs and to ensure that the needs of the 

warfighter are met. 

In partnership with the AF Program Executive Officer for Strategic Systems 

(AFPEO/SS), we’re also looking at innovative teaming opportunities to produce 

needed technology. For example, in the past, if an Air Force warhead required a 

new fuzing assembly, the Air Force would foot the entire bill. Now, we’re looking 

at combining efforts with Navy SSP in the Integrated ICBM Fuze Program. Since 

the requirements for these fuzes are similar—though not identical—we plan to develop a common family of components for the Air Force Mk12A and Mk21 reentry 

vehicles as well as the Navy’s MK 5 reentry body. These building block components 

should be adaptable into fuzes for all three systems. The savings vice three separate 

programs should be very significant. 

The bottom line is that the Center will do nothing that will compromise nuclear 

safety or security. However, as conscientious stewards of the Air Force nuclear arsenal, we are acutely aware of the fiscal environment and will continue to seek innoVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00171 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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vative ways to serve the vital goals of meeting warfighter needs, preserving nuclear 

surety and ensuring fiscal responsibility. 

26. Senator SESSIONS. General Kowalski, General Shackelford, Admiral Benedict, 

General Scott, General Chambers, and General Harencak, within each of your portfolios, what is the timeline these modernization efforts must be accomplished? 

General KOWALSKI, General SHACKELFORD, General SCOTT, General CHAMBERS, and General HARENCAK. The timeline for the below key modernization efforts is an 

estimate and will change as required. Current projected delivery dates are: 

1. B–52 1760 IWB: 2013 

2. CVLSP: 2014 

3. B61 LEP: 2017 

4. Joint Fuze: 2019 (Mk21); 2020 (Mk12A) 

5. B–2 DMS: 2018 

6. LRSO: 2023 

Acronyms: 

CVLSP: Common Vertical Lift Support Platform 

DMS: Defensive Management System 

IWB: Internal Weapons Bay 

LEP: Life Extension Program 

LRSO: Long-Range Standoff 

Admiral BENEDICT. Modernization efforts are occurring now for the Trident II 

(D5) weapon system. The Navy and OSD agreed to extend the life of the D5 missile 

to match the Ohio class submarine service life and to serve as the initial payload 

on the Ohio Replacement based on programmatic advantages and the ability to meet 

effectiveness requirements that are derived from the national deterrence strategy. 

The life extension is being accomplished through an update to all the Trident II (D5) 

Strategic Weapons System (SWS) subsystems: launcher, navigation, fire control, 

guidance, missile, and reentry. Our flight hardware—missile and guidance—life extension efforts are designed to meet the same form, fit and function of the original 

system, in order to keep the deployed system as one homogeneous population and 

to control costs. The Initial Operating Capability of the D5 Flight Hardware Life 

Extension efforts is scheduled in fiscal year 2017. The Shipboard Systems efforts are 

ongoing and will support the baseline configuration for the Ohio Replacement Program Strategic Weapon System. 

27. Senator SESSIONS. General Kowalski, General Shackelford, Admiral Benedict, 

General Scott, General Chambers, and General Harencak, within each of your portfolios, what is our ability to sustain the systems we currently have? 

General KOWALSKI, General SHACKELFORD, General SCOTT, and General CHAM- BERS. In support of the Secretary of Defense’s efficiency initiatives, program managers are required to treat affordability as a requirement. Specifically, at Milestone 

A, the Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) will contain an affordability target 

to be treated by the program manager as a KPP. At Milestone B, program managers 

will present a systems engineering tradeoff analysis showing how cost and risk varies as major design parameters and time to complete are varied. 

Furthermore, new ‘‘Will Cost/Should Cost’’ direction will incentivize both industry 

and the program office to aggressively scrutinize every element of program cost as 

they pursue affordability solutions to our nuclear deterrence capability requirements. 

Admiral BENEDICT. The fiscal year 2012 President’s budget is sufficient to sustain 

the safety and reliability of the Trident II (D5) SWS. However, D5 SWS has just 

completed 20 years of deployed service and is fast approaching its 25-year design 

life goal. To address aging concerns, the Strategic Systems Programs has been 

tasked to extend the life of the Trident II (D5) SWS to match the hull life of the 

Ohio class submarine and to serve as the initial payload of the Ohio Replacement. 

Life extension efforts are being accomplished through an update to all the Trident 

II (D5) SWS subsystems: launcher, navigation, fire control, guidance, missile and reentry. These efforts will provide the Navy with the SWS needed to meet operational 

requirements throughout the Ohio service life and will serve as the initial SWS on 

the planned follow-on platform. 

General HARENCAK. Within the AFNWC portfolio, we have the LGM–30G Minuteman III ICBM, the AGM–86 ALCM, and support equipment for these systems. 

AFNWC also sustains the support equipment and handling gear for gravity bombs 

and weapons storage areas. 

AFNWC’s ability to sustain the Minuteman III ICBM is good. As an aging system 

now 50 years old (the original Minuteman infrastructure was emplaced starting in 

167 

1961, most of the flight equipment dates from the 1970s), there are issues with 

aging components and infrastructure, parts obsolescence, diminishing manufacturing, loss of industrial base, and other concerns. However, 50 years of experience 

has taught us how to be good stewards of this system, and we have conducted dozens of LEPs over that period. We have developed comprehensive roadmaps that 

show the way for us to sustain this weapon system through 2030 and minimize 

risks. Additionally, the Air Force participates in a robust Force Development Evaluation (FDE) program, which includes flight, ground and C2 testing to ensure that 

any weaknesses with a force-wide impact are detected as early as possible so that 

a fix can be planned and executed as quickly as possible. We also monitor facility 

hardness to ensure that ICBM infrastructure remains survivable in the event of attack. Support equipment is another area that requires constant monitoring. Equipment that has worked and been well maintained for decades eventually wears out 

and requires refurbishment or replacement. AFNWC is currently working on refurbishing and replacing a number of pieces of support equipment that are well past 

their designed lifespans. In many cases, it is becoming increasingly difficult to find 

manufacturers who can build systems and components that can still integrate effectively with the Minuteman system. As we continue to look at a successor to the Minuteman ICBM, we remain mindful that this system has served with unsurpassed 

reliability for a half-century and can continue for some time into the future, though 

the cost of sustaining such an old system will eventually start to increase more and 

more rapidly if modernization of infrastructure, ground equipment and flight equipment do not continue. 

Sustainability prospects for the ALCM are also good. As this system is significantly newer than the Minuteman ICBM, it has fewer problems with disappearing 

suppliers, industrial infrastructure and obsolete technology. We continue to conduct 

a robust FDE program on ALCM as well, and have discovered some issues with 

aging and/or problematic components, which we are in the process of addressing. 

Additionally, we are refurbishing and upgrading some ALCM ground equipment, 

such as the Electronic System Test Set to improve reliability through funding of the 

long term modernization plan, as this test set is crucial to sustaining the ALCM 

through 2030. Though AFNWC is involved in the LRSO AoAs to determine the requirements for the successor to the ALCM, we fully realize that this system is 

amply capable of serving through 2030. 

In addition to the Minuteman and ALCM, AFNWC sustains the loading and support equipment for gravity bombs, both in CONUS and overseas. We’ve recently 

been executing a Service LEP for the Weapons Maintenance Truck (WMT) used to 

sustain gravity bombs in Europe. Prior to AFNWC intervention, the WMT was in 

very poor repair and frequently necessitated sharing a single working vehicle between multiple air bases, hundreds of miles apart. At this time, each base has its 

own working WMT. Additionally, the Air Force Program Executive Officer for Strategic Systems (AFPEO/SS) is working to replace the WMT system entirely with a 

much newer and more capable system (the Secure Transportable Maintenance System). 

The bottom line is that AFNWC and its allies in the nuclear sustainment business 

understand what it will take to keep the systems in our portfolio going and we will 

take the necessary steps to preserve their surety and effectiveness. This task becomes harder and more expensive as the systems continue to age, but there is no 

point in the future we can identify beyond which the systems become unsustainable 

ICBM SUSTAINMENT AND MODERNIZATION

28. Senator SESSIONS. General Kowalski and General Chambers, a recent article 

in the Air Force Times cited a failure review board’s conclusion that an equipment 

failure was responsible for the hour-long communication outage at F.E. Warren Air 

Force Base that affected 50 nuclear missiles last fall. Given the age of the current 

ICBM infrastructure, some have speculated that the incident may be indicative of 

the aging ICBM infrastructure. Do you believe the incident is indicative of the aging 

ICBM infrastructure? 

General KOWALSKI and General CHAMBERS. No, the Minuteman III Weapon System continues to perform as a safe, secure, and effective deterrent. Our newest 

Major Command, AFGSC, conducted an extensive review of last fall’s event and determined this was an isolated incident and is not indicative of age-related systemic 

problems within the ICBM force. The Minuteman III ICBM weapon system alert 

rate exceeds 99 percent. 

In addition, consistent with the NDAA Section 1251 Report, the Air Force, 

through the leadership of AFGSC, has developed sustainment and modernization 

168 

plans, specified in the ICBM Master Plan, to ensure the infrastructure necessary 

to support and operate our ICBM fleet. We feel these plans will meet the challenges 

required to sustain the MMIII to 2030. 

29. General Kowalski and General Chambers, do you believe it was an isolated 

incident? 

General KOWALSKI and General CHAMBERS. Yes, the Minuteman III Weapon System continues to perform as a safe, secure, and effective deterrent. Our newest 

Major Command, AFGSC, conducted an extensive review of last fall’s event and determined this was an isolated incident and is not indicative of age-related systemic 

problems within the ICBM force. The Minuteman III ICBM weapon system alert 

rate exceeds 99 percent. 

Consistent with the NDAA Section 1251 Report, the Air Force, through the leadership of AFGSC, has developed sustainment and modernization plans, specified in 

the ICBM Master Plan, to ensure the infrastructure necessary to support and operate our ICBM fleet. We feel these plans 

30. Senator SESSIONS. General Kowalski and General Chambers, how confident 

are you that the Air Force will be able to sustain the current ICBM force through 

2030? 

General KOWALSKI and General CHAMBERS. Very confident. The AF is committed 

to sustaining and modernizing the existing Minuteman III ICBM system through 

2030. The fiscal year 2012 PB request includes approximately $1.9 billion of investment funding over the FYDP (fiscal year 2012–2016) to extend the existing MM III 

ICBM weapon system through 2030. All aspects of the ICBM Federal and contractor 

community are being exercised and funded to sustain and/or modernize (through refurbishment or replacement due to obsolescence and/or diminishing vendor base) the 

MM III ICBM force and associated infrastructure. 

31. General Kowalski and General Chambers, when should a decision be made for 

pursuing the development of a follow-on ICBM? 

General KOWALSKI and General CHAMBERS. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review 

stated that studies are needed now to inform a decision on a follow-on ICBM. To 

meet this need, pre-AoA efforts have already begun. AFGSC has already initiated 

a Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent Capability Based Assessment (CBA). The CBA 

supports development of the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) which establishes 

baseline requirements for any future Minuteman III replacement program. The next 

step is the actual AoA which will be accomplished in fiscal year 2013–2014. 

Once the AoA is completed it will be used to recommend the best ICBM followon options from a broad range of alternatives. A final decision is needed sometime 

in the fiscal year 2015 timeframe. 

AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE

32. Senator SESSIONS. General Chambers, are there any challenges associated 

with sustaining the ALCM until 2030? 

General CHAMBERS. Yes. ALCM faces the common, yet manageable challenges you 

might expect any weapon system to face that is having its service life extended. Any 

system that has been in the inventory for more than two decades must manage diminishing manufacturing source issues, weapon system reliability concerns and 

service life extension priorities. The Air Force has a robust FDE (flight test), functional ground test, analytical condition inspection and aging and surveillance program to assist with managing these challenges. 

33. Senator SESSIONS. General Chambers, the fiscal year 2012 budget includes 

$884 million over the next 5 years for the development of a new ALCM. Has the 

Air Force decided if this new ALCM will be nuclear capable at the outset? 

General CHAMBERS. Yes, the Air Force has decided that the new ALCM will be 

nuclear capable at the outset. 

34. Senator SESSIONS. General Chambers, if nuclear, does the Air Force intend 

to use the W–80, and if so, when would the LEP on the W–80 have to begin so that 

it will be available for the new cruise missile? 

General CHAMBERS. The Air Force has decided that the new ALCM will be nuclear capable at the outset. Recommendations on the specific warhead for use in the 

new cruise missile, and requisite LEP start date are being developed by a cross-organizational Warhead Working Group with participation from NNSA, STRATCOM, 

169 

AFGSC, AFNWC, and AAC. There are several warhead candidates being considered, 

including the W80. The Warhead Working Group is also supporting the development 

of an integrated master schedule that will include a required LEP start date. Data 

from the LRSO AoAs will be used to help finalize the warhead recommendation. 

Final recommendations for warhead selection and LEP start date will be completed 

prior to Milestone A, which is currently scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal 

year 2013. 

B–61

35. Senator SESSIONS. General Chambers, what is the current status of the Air 

Force’s efforts on the B–61’s tail subassembly development and overall integration 

efforts? 

General CHAMBERS. The Air Force is currently preparing for a combined Material 

Development Decision (MDD)/Milestone A Defense Acquisition Board, scheduled for 

the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2011. Preparations include developing and finalizing technology development and acquisition strategies, contracting strategies, requirements, and cost estimates. The Air Force is also drafting statutory and regulatory documents required for MDD and Milestone A. In addition, the Air Force is 

gathering data from three ongoing concept development contracts and has established integration working groups that include participation from platform program 

offices and the DOE/NNSA. 

36. Senator SESSIONS. General Chambers, do any challenges currently exist in 

meeting the fiscal year 2017 deadline for the first production unit (FPU)? 

General CHAMBERS. Yes, challenges do exist, but both the DOD (Air Force) and 

DOE (NNSA) efforts are on track to meet an fiscal year 2017 FPU. At this stage 

of the acquisition program, the primary challenge we have identified is synchronizing the DOE and DOD acquisition efforts, and emphasis has been placed on communication at all levels. One specific forum we have established to ensure communication between the Air Force and NNSA is a flag officer level Senior Management 

Team (SMT). The SMT meets monthly to review progress and provide guidance to 

the Air Force and NNSA program management teams. 

AIR FORCE REPLACEMENT HELICOPTERS

37. Senator SESSIONS. General Kowalski and General Chambers, what is the current acquisition strategy for the Air Force procurement of the CVLSP, the helicopter 

replacement program for the current fleet of UH–1s? 

General KOWALSKI and General CHAMBERS. The SECAF and CSAF approved a 

full and open competition acquisition strategy for the CVLSP program on 12 Apr 

2011. Schedule milestones include request for proposals in late fiscal year 2011, contract award in later part of fiscal year 2012, leading to an IOC in fiscal year 2015. 

The funding in the fiscal year 2011 Appropriation and fiscal year 2012 President’s 

budget request is considered adequate to support this acquisition strategy. 

38. Senator SESSIONS. General Kowalski and General Chambers, will this be a 

new development program or do any current DOD airframes exist that could meet 

requirements at a lower cost? 

General KOWALSKI and General CHAMBERS. The CVLSP program intends to procure a non-development, off-the-shelf, in-production helicopter that will require 

minimal or no development effort. There are helicopters currently in production including DOD airframes that could potentially satisfy CVLSP requirements. 

START TREATY IMPLEMENTATION

39. Senator SESSIONS. General Kowalski and General Chambers, what is the anticipated cost for Air Force implementation of the New START treaty? 

General KOWALSKI and General CHAMBERS. The Air Force continues to evaluate 

projected cost for implementation of the New START treaty. However, until a final 

decision is made on deployed Air Force strategic delivery vehicles, as well as elimination methods for the ICBM silos and conversion method for the B–52, an accurate 

cost is not feasible at this time. 

40. Senator SESSIONS. General Kowalski and General Chambers, what is the Air 

Force plan for meeting New START levels for deployed ICBM launchers? 

170 

General KOWALSKI and General CHAMBERS. Our ICBM planning efforts are focused on complying with the limit as dictated in the NDAA Section 1251 Report of 

up to 420 deployed ICBM launchers. While a final force structure decision has not 

been made, the Air Force continues to analyze several options to meet the New 

START limits. 

41. Senator SESSIONS. General Kowalski and General Chambers, the 1251 report 

that accompanied the New START treaty stipulated an ICBM force structure of up 

to 420 (a reduction of 30). When will a decision on the actual number be made? 

General KOWALSKI and General CHAMBERS. The Air Force is currently working 

with the Joint Staff to evaluate force structure options and to make a final decision 

on the number of deployed ICBMs and nuclear-capable bombers. When the actual 

decision will be made is still to be determined. 

42. Senator SESSIONS. General Kowalski and General Chambers, does the Air 

Force intend to spread reductions across multiple ICBM wings or would it be more 

economical to eliminate a block of silos at an individual base? If so, why? If not, 

why? 

General KOWALSKI and General CHAMBERS. The Air Force has not made a final 

decision on how reductions in deployed ICBMs would be made across the force. 

Some of the considerations involved in this decision are the method of reduction 

(elimination vs. nondeployed status), ongoing modification programs, technical characteristics of the Minuteman III weapon system, the conditions of specific launchers 

and the actual number of reductions that have to be made. The Air Force continues 

to evaluate options. 

[Whereupon, at 3:34 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

(171) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE 

PROGRAM 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 13, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Washington, DC. 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in room 

SR–232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E. Benjamin 

Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Nelson, Levin, Udall, 

Shaheen, and Sessions. 

Committee staff member present: Mary J. Kyle, legislative clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; 

Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and Jessica L. 

Kingston, research assistant. 

Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner, Professional 

Staff Member. 

Staff assistants present: Hannah I. Lloyd and Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Ann Premer, assistant 

to Senator Nelson; Casey Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; and Lenwood 

Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, 

CHAIRMAN 

Senator NELSON. The subcommittee today meets to consider the 

ballistic missile defense (BMD) policies and programs of the Department of Defense (DOD) supported in the fiscal year 2012 budget request. We’re pleased to have four distinguished public servants 

as witnesses today and we all appreciate your service to our country. 

Dr. Brad Roberts is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy. He’s been deeply involved 

in developing missile defense policy and strategy, including last 

year’s comprehensive Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). He 

continues to develop our strategy and is also working to ensure the 

implementation of those policies and strategies. 

172 

Lieutenant General Patrick O’Reilly is the Director of the Missile 

Defense Agency (MDA), which is responsible for conceiving, developing, testing, building, and delivering an integrated and operationally effective ballistic missile defense system (BMDS), including its component elements, to the Services and combatant commanders. 

Rear Admiral Arch Macy is the Director of the Joint Integrated 

Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO) at the Joint Staff. 

He has been leading the joint warfighter assessment of our missile 

defense needs and has just completed an important study called 

‘‘The Joint Capabilities Mix III (JCM–III),’’ which will help guide 

our future missile defense program and budget decisions. I would 

note that Admiral Macy is planning to retire at the end of this 

month, so this is likely his last hearing with the committee, but at 

his suggestion, not ours. We thank you for your many years of 

service to the Nation, Admiral Macy, and we wish you and your 

family the very best in your future. 

Cristina Chaplain is the Director of Acquisition and Sourcing 

Management for the Government Accountability Office (GAO). She 

and her team have recently completed their annual assessment of 

MDA’s progress on the development and acquisition of the BMDS, 

focusing particularly on issues of transparency and accountability. 

As the BMDR emphasized last year, BMD is an essential national priority to protect the Homeland from the possibility of a 

missile attack from countries such as North Korea and Iran and to 

protect our forward-deployed forces, our allies, and partners overseas against the large and growing threat of regional missiles. As 

Admiral Winnefeld indicated last week, with our Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense (GMD) system we’re ahead of the Homeland 

threat from North Korea and Iran, and we want to keep it that 

way. Our regional missile defenses, using the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA), are designed to meet the existing threat and adapt 

to future threats. 

Developing effective BMDS is an extremely complex technical endeavor. Consequently, it often takes longer than we would like. 

However, it’s essential that we develop the systems carefully, test 

them adequately and realistically, and demonstrate that they work 

effectively before we produce and deploy them. Lives depend on it. 

BMD is also expensive. This is particularly notable under the 

current constrained budget environment. The fiscal year budget request for missile defense is $10.7 billion and the planned budget 

for MDA for fiscal years 2011 through 2016 is roughly $52 billion. 

As GAO notes, the BMDS is the largest single acquisition program 

within DOD. So it’s important that the administration has a policy 

that missile defenses must be fiscally sustainable and affordable 

and that we have appropriate accountability and transparency for 

the program. 

Within this context, there are a number of issues we hope to discuss today. For example, concerning Homeland defense, we’re interested to hear about proposed fixes, enhancements, and hedging options for the GMD system. We’re interested to know what the implementation of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) 

to missile defense is, to know more about that. This includes the 

development, testing, production, and deployment of the planned 

173 

elements for the EPAA, such as the Standard Missile 3 interceptor 

variants to be deployed with each successive phase. We’d also like 

to learn more about our efforts to expand other international cooperation, including efforts to cooperate with Russia on missile defense. 

We thank all of you for your contributions to improving missile 

defense and to our security and we look forward to your testimony. 

Now it’s my pleasure to turn to my ranking member and good 

friend, Senator Sessions, for any opening comments he may have. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is an important hearing and an important subcommittee. Thank you for your 

leadership. I’ve enjoyed working with you and respect you and your 

judgment on these issues very highly. 

Today’s hearing focuses on the President’s 2012 budget for the 

MDA. I’m pleased that the top line of $8.6 billion includes a modest 

increase over last year, but I’m concerned that the overall 5-year 

budget represents a more than $2.2 billion reduction below last 

year’s planned future defense budget. So I have concerns whether 

we have the ability to support the full cost and on-time delivery of 

the weapons systems we’ve invested so much in. 

I’ve long urged that we focus more on the GMD system, the only 

system solely responsible for protecting the Homeland at this time. 

Unfortunately, the budget request continues to deprive GMD, I’m 

afraid, of the resources necessary to provide and refine the system. 

General O’Reilly, you tout the improvements of GMD such as the 

emplacement of 30 interceptors and upgrades to the missile to Fort 

Greely area. Those accomplishments are welcome and appreciated, 

but without additional resources, the GMD program may not succeed, and the two recent test failures should serve as key reminders that more must be done to ensure the capability we have works 

and that it will improve over time. I’m confident that the difficulties we are having will and can be solved, but we have to spend 

some time and effort on that. 

I look forward to understanding why you believe you can achieve 

and sustain success in a program that needs more attention with 

a budget that’s $1.4 billion below what you said you needed in the 

Fiscal Year 2011 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). After all the 

money we’ve spent on developing this program, it’s really not the 

time to take our eye off the ball. It really needs to be completed. 

I think it would just be a tragedy if we didn’t follow through here 

after all the decades of work. 

The GAO questions the plan for the sustainment and modernization of GMD. Last year, GAO reported that DOD ‘‘still lacks full 

knowledge of GMD’s capability and limitations’’ and that, although 

there is a need to continue development until 2020, the ‘‘acquisition 

of major GMD assets is nearly complete,’’ and that DOD has shifted its focus to ‘‘improving its knowledge of GMD’s capabilities and 

improving integration.’’ 

Given the two recent failures, I look forward to discussing whether or not we need to look back a bit here and make sure we’re not 

ahead of ourselves. 

174 

The Aegis weapon system remains one of our most promising capabilities and its legacy of incremental development, refinement, 

and proven design is a cornerstone of its success. Last week, MDA 

awarded its first contracts for the new Aegis evolution, the SM–3 

Block IIB, and I look forward to hearing more about the development plan for the IIB. 

Nonetheless, I remain concerned that the schedule is overly optimistic. Development of the SM–3 Block I was an 8-year effort for 

an incremental upgrade of the proven SM–2 Block IV. The SM–3 

Block IIB concept appears to be a far more significant upgrade and, 

according to some initial descriptions, could represent a significant 

departure from Standard Missile variants. 

Furthermore, I question the decision not to include the Aegis program office in the early stage development, ignoring in my opinion 

the design philosophy that has epitomized success. 

The PAA to missile defense establishes a global framework for 

regional uncertainties. If executed correctly and on time, it will 

represent a good approach that is both relocatable and scalable. According to the BMD review, the fourth phase of the PAA and SM– 

3 Block IIB will improve the defense of the Homeland. As we are 

all aware, this layered protection could have come earlier with the 

prior plan that we had from the prior administration. However, I 

agree that defending both Europe and the U.S. from Iran with only 

10 interceptors was not sufficient—it was not going to provide the 

inventory necessary to deter Iranian aggression. 

So I look forward to learning more on the anticipated Homeland 

defense capabilities of SM–3 Block IIB, how they compare to the 

previously planned two-stage GBIs, while the two-stage GBI has 

been designated as a contingency if the recent development of IIB 

takes longer than anticipated. 

The JCM–III study to provide warfighter input on necessary 

global force requirements for sensors, interceptors, and launchers 

has just been finalized. I look forward to hearing more about this 

study. 

Let me close by offering a special thanks to Admiral Macy for 

being here today. I understand you plan to retire this month and 

we congratulate you on your service and thank you for your commitment to your country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Udall, do you have any opening comments that you 

might like to make? 

Senator UDALL. I’m eager to hear from the witnesses. 

Senator NELSON. Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. No. 

Senator NELSON. If it’s okay with everybody, let’s have a 7- 

minute round. Is that satisfactory? [No response.] 

General O’Reilly, you know we’re more than halfway through fiscal year 2011 and DOD is still—oh, excuse me, yes. I guess you get 

a chance to talk first. That doesn’t happen often enough. But thank 

you, Richard. Thank you. 

You may even answer the question before I ask it, now that I’ve 

tipped you off. Will you start first, General O’Reilly? 

175 

STATEMENT OF LTG PATRICK J. O’REILLY, USA, DIRECTOR, 

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY 

General O’REILLY. Good afternoon, Chairman Nelson, Ranking 

Member Sessions, other distinguished members of the subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today 

on the MDA’s $8.6 billion fiscal year 2012 budget request to develop protection of our Nation, our Armed Forces, allies, and 

friends against the continually growing threat, the proliferation of 

increasingly capable ballistic missiles. 

In fiscal year 2012 we propose to continue our enhancement and 

integration of sensor, fire control, battle management, and interceptors in the BMDS, to improve the reliability and performance of 

our Homeland defense, and to defeat large raid sizes of a growing 

variety of regional ballistic missiles. By the end of fiscal year 2012 

we will complete the initial fielding of a GMD system for Homeland 

defense against first generation intercontinental ballistic missiles 

(ICBM) potentially being developed by current regional threats. We 

will also continue our initial fielding of regional defenses against 

today’s short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles 

that are in direct support of our combatant commanders. 

I should note that our fiscal year 2012 budget request was predicated on receiving the fiscal year 2011 requested budget. Therefore, 

we will adjust our program accordingly once the final fiscal year 

2011 budget is approved. 

We have had significant accomplishments over the past year, including the conduct of 8 out of 8 planned flight tests using 13 successful targets, the first flight of a two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI), the third successful missile intercept by the Japanese 

Aegis program, a successful low-altitude intercept by the Terminal 

High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD). We destroyed two 

boosting ballistic missiles with our Airborne Laser Testbed; and we 

proved sufficiently accurate missile tracks from two Space Tracking 

and Surveillance System satellites to enable a missile defense 

intercept without using ground radars. 

Additionally, we supported Israel’s successful intercept of a 

threat missile earlier last month. We also delivered 25 SM–3 IA 

interceptors, began the THAAD interceptor production, emplaced 

the 30th GBI, and completed the upgrade of the early warning 

radar in Thule, Greenland. 

Today, MDA’s top priority is to confirm the root cause of the 

most recent GBI flight test failure, then verify the resolution of the 

problem and successfully repeat the previous flight test. While the 

failure review board has only produced preliminary results, it is 

clear more ground testing and an additional non-intercept flight 

test of an upgraded GBI exoatmospheric kill vehicle will be required before the next intercept. 

For the GMD, in fiscal year 2012 we are requesting funding for 

procuring five new GBIs, completing the construction of the GMD 

Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely, AK, the construction of a missile 

communications system on the east coast of the United States, 

placing Missile Field 1 in a storage mode for possible upgrade and 

operations in the future, and upgrading the early warning radar in 

Clear, AK. 

176 

Today 30 operational GBIs protect the United States against a 

limited ICBM attack launched from current regional threats. We 

closely monitor intelligence assessments with the intelligence community and if this capability is determined to be insufficient we are 

developing options to increase the number of operational GBIs and 

accelerate the delivery of new sensor and interceptor capabilities. 

DOD is committed to brief Congress soon on our strategy to 

hedge against uncertainties in threat estimates. Additionally, I’ve 

answered questions in other hearings that I’ve testified to that it 

is my personal judgment that, in light of the two GBI test failures, 

the need for an additional non-intercept test, and the need to repeat the failed test, we will need to reassess the total number of 

GBIs we are procuring and reflect that assessment in the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2013. 

Our execution of the EPAA is on track for meeting the timelines 

outlined by the President in September 2009. For phase 1, or our 

initial capability in Europe, our first Aegis ballistic missile ship deployment, the U.S.S. Monterey, is on station. The latest command 

and control system upgrades are being installed at the U.S. European Command, and the Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY–2) forward-based radar will be available in August 

for deployment in southern Europe by the end of this year. 

Finally, in a few days we will conduct a major test in the Pacific 

to verify the readiness of the phase 1 architecture against an intermediate-range ballistic target. 

For phase 2, or our enhanced capability against medium-range 

ballistic missiles by 2015, we will conduct the first flight test of the 

next generation Aegis missile interceptor, the SM–3 Block IB, this 

summer and certify the associated upgrade of the Aegis fire control 

system in 2012. The design of the adaptation of the Aegis system 

for land basing, called Aegis Ashore, began last summer and the 

test site will be installed in Hawaii in 2013 and flight tested in 

2014. The installation of the Aegis Ashore in Romania will also 

occur in 2014 and be fully operational by 2015. 

For phase 3, or an enhanced capability against intermediaterange ballistic missiles by 2018, the SM–3 Block IIA interceptor is 

completing its preliminary design this year in support of flight testing in 2015 and deployment in 2018. We are preparing the Airborne Infrared sensor for early missile tracking using the Air 

Force’s next generation sensor in fiscal year 2012, and we will 

begin the design process of the Precision Tracking Space System. 

For phase 4, or medium and intermediate-range and ICBM early 

intercept capability in Europe by 2020, we competitively awarded 

concept design contracts for the SM–3 IIB interceptor to three industry teams last week. The SM–3 IIB development timeline is 

consistent with the average development timeline of other missile 

interceptors of its class to ensure a low development risk approach. 

While not necessary for the defense of the United States against 

limited attacks by early generation ICBMs, the SM–3 IIB will complement the GMD, Aegis, and THAAD systems to greatly increase 

the cost-effectiveness of our missile defenses. 

Beyond PAA phase 4, we are pursuing advanced technologies for 

more effective missile defenses in the future, to develop high-energy, compact, lightweight laser technologies. 

177 

Finally, the MDA continues to engage in international missile defense projects, studies, and analyses with over 20 countries and the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 

In conclusion, our fiscal year 2012 budget request funds the development of BMD capabilities that are flexible, survivable, cost-effective, and tolerant of uncertainties of intelligence estimates of 

both nation state and extremist ballistic missile threats. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to answering your 

subcommittee’s questions. 

[The prepared statement of General O’Reilly follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LTG PATRICK J. O’REILLY, USA 

Good afternoon, Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, other distinguished 

members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you 

today on the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) $8.6 billion fiscal year 2012 budget 

request to develop protection for our Nation, our Armed Forces, allies, and friends 

against a growing threat—the proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic missiles. 

We continue to enhance and integrate sensor, fire control, battle management, and 

interceptor systems into the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to improve 

the reliability and performance of our homeland defense and defeat large raids of 

a growing variety of regional ballistic missiles over the next decade. By the end of 

fiscal year 2012, we will complete the initial fielding of the Ground-based Midcourse 

Defense (GMD) system for homeland defense against first generation Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) potentially being developed by current regional 

threats. We will also continue our initial fielding of regional defenses against today’s 

short-range (1,000 km or less), medium-range (1,000 to 3,000 km), and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (3,000 to 5,500 km), or short-range ballistic missiles 

(SRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), and intermediate-range ballistic 

missiles (IRBMs), respectively. 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 ACCOMPLISHMENT HIGHLIGHTS

During this past year, we have improved our homeland defense by emplacing the 

30th Ground Based Interceptor (GBI), upgrading two additional GBIs, installing a 

training node at Fort Greely, AK (FGA), and completing a significant upgrade of the 

Early Warning Radar in Thule, Greenland. Additionally, we had a successful twostage Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) booster test and conducted a three-stage GBI 

intercept test where we did not achieve our primary objective, but we did demonstrate integrated sensors and command, control, battle management, and communication (C2BMC) during the longest range flight test to date. During the past year, 

we also improved our regional defenses by converting 2 Aegis BMD ships, delivering 

25 SM–3 IA interceptors, and increasing the Aegis BMD fleet to 20 operationally 

configured BMD ships. Aegis BMD ships carrying SM–3 IA interceptors are currently deployed and on-station in forward operating areas, including the USS Monterey as part of the first phase of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). 

We also commenced production of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 

Batteries 3 and 4 and the associated interceptors. We accelerated the refurbishment 

of an AN/TPY–2 radar for phase 1 of the EPAA and installed a C2BMC system and 

prepared a second AN/TPY–2 for deployment to U.S. Central Command. Moreover, 

we successfully flew 14 target missions, including a successful intercept of a separating MRBM with our Japanese allies using an SM–3 IA interceptor (thus completing the first BMD Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case), and conducted a successful intercept of a unitary SRBM with THAAD. For future capabilities, we demonstrated the ability of the two Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites to provide stereo, high-fidelity tracking capabilities and transfer tracks into 

C2BMC. Our Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) successfully destroyed two boosting 

ballistic missiles. We achieved our goal of demonstrating NATO Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense interoperability with the U.S. C2BMC in Joint Project 

Optic Windmill. Finally, we completed U.S. and Israeli Government project agreements on the Arrow 3 Upper Tier Interceptor, the David’s Sling Weapon System, 

and an Israeli Test Bed. Recently, we supported Israel’s successful intercept mission 

of a separating threat missile off the coast of California. 

178 

ENHANCING HOMELAND DEFENSE

MDA’s top priority is to confirm the root cause of the most recent GBI flight test 

failure, verify the resolution of the problem, and successfully repeat the previous 

flight test. While the Failure Review Board has only produced preliminary results, 

it is clear more ground testing and an additional non-intercept flight test of an upgraded GBI Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) will be required before the next 

intercept. 

We are requesting $1.16 billion in fiscal year 2012 in Research, Development, 

Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding for the GMD program (including completing 

the construction of Missile Field 2 at FGA), which will complete the initial fielding 

of the defense of our homeland against limited ICBM attacks. In fiscal year 2012, 

we also will continue to upgrade existing GBIs and acquire new GBIs to meet our 

minimum requirement of 26 operational GBIs at FGA, 4 at Vandenberg Air Force 

Base (VAFB), CA, and 22 GBIs for testing, stockpile reliability testing, and spares. 

Key to an effective GBI sustainment program is examining the results of flight tests 

(including the loss of two GBIs during recent flight testing) and reliability testing. 

In parallel, we continue GBI component vendor requalifications for the future GBI 

avionics upgrade and obsolescence program. Given the two flight test failures and 

the need for a new non-intercept flight and a repeat of the last flight test, we need 

to assess the procurement quantity of additional GBIs as part of the fiscal year 2013 

President’s budget request. The new missile field (Missile Field 2) will replace the 

prototype Missile Field 1, which will be placed in a storage mode for possible upgrade for operational use in the future. We will complete the construction of a second fire control node at FGA to allow testing or exercises to be conducted while simultaneously controlling the operational system. In addition to completing the upgrade of our new hardened backup power plant at FGA in fiscal year 2011, we will 

also complete the upgrade of the communications system at FGA in fiscal year 2012. 

Additionally, we will begin the planning, design and environment work for a GBI 

In-Flight Interceptor Communication System (IFCS) Data Terminal (IDT) on the 

east coast of the United States by 2015. This East Coast IDT will enable communication with GBIs launched from FGA and VAFB on longer flights, thus improving 

the defense of the eastern United States against potential ICBM threats from the 

Middle East. We also are requesting $177.1 million in RDT&E funding for the SeaBased X-band radar in fiscal year 2012 for software upgrades to improve its discrimination capability. 

In addition to GMD upgrades, we are requesting $222.4 million in fiscal year 2012 

for BMDS Sensors for homeland defense, including support of the Upgraded Early 

Warning Radars (UEWRs) and AN/TPY–2 radars. Integration of the Thule, Greenland radar in fiscal year 2012 will make it a fully operational UEWR in the BMDS. 

We continue to upgrade the Clear Early Warning Radar in Alaska for full missile 

defense capability by 2016. In addition, a forward-based AN/TPY–2 X-band radar 

will be deployed to southern Europe to provide early tracking for both enhanced 

homeland and regional defense. We will continue to upgrade system software to address new and evolving threats, including enhancing Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle 

discrimination algorithms by 2015, improving GBI avionics, and increasing GBI 

interoperability with the Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) system. 

After last year’s successful initial flight of a two-stage GBI, we plan to conduct 

an intercept flight test with a two-stage GBI as a potential hedge to allow for a 

longer intercept window of time if ICBMs were launched against the United States 

from Northeast Asia or the Middle East. However, as a consequence of the need to 

repeat the failed three-stage GBI flight tests, we plan to delay the first intercept 

test of the two-stage GBI from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2014. Finally, we will 

continue development of the Standard Missile 3 (SM–3) IIB to protect our homeland 

in the future by having the capability to intercept first generation ICBMs within 

the regions from which they were launched. 

HEDGE FOR PROTECTION OF THE UNITED STATES

Today, 30 operational GBIs protect the United States against a medium ICBM 

raid size launched from current regional threats. If this capability is determined to 

be insufficient for protection of the U.S. Homeland based on intelligence estimations 

of future threats, we have options to increase the number of operational GBIs and 

accelerate the delivery of new sensor and interceptor capabilities. The Department 

is committed to brief Congress soon on the results of our ongoing BMD analysis and 

our recommended hedge strategy. 

179 

ENHANCING REGIONAL DEFENSE

We are also currently deploying our initial missile defense capability against 

SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs. Over the next decade we are enhancing this initial 

capability by developing increasingly capable missile defenses that can be adapted 

to the unique circumstances of each combatant command region. In regions where 

ballistic missile threats are a concern, the United States will tailor Missile Defense 

Phased Adaptive Approaches (PAAs) (like the European PAA (EPAA)) to plan the 

establishment of command and control, sensor, fire control, and interceptor infrastructures to provide fundamental defenses and facilitate the effective surge of 

transportable missile defense assets to their regions when needed. 

The EPAA focuses on addressing missile defense interoperability with NATO and 

our allies and partners as the threat from the Middle East is anticipated to increase 

over the next decade. In November 2010, NATO Heads of State and Government 

agreed to develop an Alliance territorial missile defense capability to ‘‘provide full 

coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces 

against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.’’ The 

United States has committed to provide the EPAA as a national contribution to this 

capability, built on the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense command 

and control system, and we are encouraging our allies to field and provide national 

capabilities as well. 

Phase 1: Initial SRBM, MRBM, and IRBM Defense in Europe—to be completed 

by the end of 2011. In this phase, our goal is to achieve an initial missile defense 

capability in Europe using the Aegis BMD 3.6.1 weapon system with SM–3 IA interceptors, forward-based AN/TPY–2 and SPY–1 radars, and the C2BMC system at 

Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany, which will improve connections to NATO command and control structures. The USS Monterey is at sea today and, when paired 

with the AN/TPY–2 radar, will provide initial BMD protection of southern Europe 

from existing SRBM, MRBM, and IRBM threats. While no decision on the location 

of the radar has been made, we expect to meet our 2011 deployment timeline. Additionally, THAAD batteries will be available for deployment in this and subsequent 

phases. The Army activated a second THAAD battery in October 2009, which is 

scheduled to complete training by the end of calendar year 2011. We are requesting 

$290.5 million in RDT&E funding to enhance communications and enable THAAD’s 

launch-on-sensor network capability, which will allow THAAD to intercept threat 

missiles tracked by many different missile defense sensors. We also request $833.2 

million for the production of 68 THAAD interceptors, 6 launchers, and 1 Tactical 

Station Group to be delivered by fiscal year 2014, and $380.2 million for the production of 2 AN/TPY–2 radars. 

Phase 2: Enhanced MRBM Defense in Europe by 2015. Our goal in this phase is 

to provide a robust capability against SRBMs and MRBMs by launching several different interceptors to engage each threat missile multiple times in its flight. This 

architecture includes the deployment of the Aegis BMD 4.0.1/5.0 weapon fire control 

systems with SM–3 IB interceptors at sea and at an Aegis Ashore site in Romania. 

When compared to the current SM–3 IA, the IB will have an improved two-color 

seeker for greater ability to discriminate threat Reentry Vehicles from other objects, 

and it will have improvements to enhance reliability and producibility of the SM– 

3 IB’s divert and attitude control system. These improvements also provide greater 

capability against larger sized raids. We are requesting $565.4 million for the production of 46 SM–3 Block IB interceptors to be delivered by fiscal year 2014 and 

$960 million for Aegis BMD to fund continued development and testing of the SM– 

3 IB as well as upgrades to Aegis 5.0 fire control software to support the operation 

of the SM–3 IB and IIA interceptors and associated flight tests. In fiscal year 2012, 

we are requesting $306.6 million to begin acquiring Aegis Ashore Missile Defense 

Systems (land-based SM–3) batteries—one for testing at the Pacific Missile Range 

Facility, and one for deployment in Romania by fiscal year 2015. We request $364.1 

million for the C2BMC program for continued development of software and engineering to incorporate enhanced C2BMC capability into the C2BMC battle management architecture and enable interoperability among the BMDS elements, incorporate boost phase tracking, and improve system-level correlation and tracking. 

Phase 3: Enhanced IRBM Defenses in Europe by 2018. The SM–3 Block IIA interceptor, being co-developed with the Japanese Government, is on schedule to be deployed at the Aegis Ashore site in Romania and at an additional Aegis Ashore site 

in Poland, and at sea, in 2018 to provide enhanced protection for European NATO 

countries from all ballistic missile threats from the Middle East. The fiscal year 

2012 request for SM–3 Block IIA co-development is $424.5 million. Additional 

BMDS improvements during this phase include expanded coordination of missile defense fire control systems and improvements to radar discrimination. Likewise, beVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00185 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ginning with their first launch in 2017, the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS) 

satellites will detect and track hostile ballistic missiles over their entire flight and 

enable earlier engagements to improve homeland and regional defense. Furthermore, the deployment of the Airborne Infrared (ABIR) sensor will provide the capability to provide early track of large ballistic missile raids from forward locations, 

decreasing the time between the enemy’s launch of the first ballistic missile and the 

first launch of a ballistic missile defense interceptor. 

Phase 4: Early Intercept Defense in Europe by 2020. The SM–3 IIB will provide 

an early intercept (pre-apogee) capability against MRBMs and IRBMs and provide 

an additional layer for a more enhanced homeland defense against ICBMs launched 

from today’s regional threats. In fiscal year 2012, we are requesting $123.5 million 

to fund three industry teams to begin concept development of the SM–3 IIB design 

while MDA develops advanced propulsion and lightweight material technologies relevant to the SM–3 IIB interceptor. Advanced discrimination technologies also will 

be deployed during EPAA Phase 4 including GMD’s use of fused data from the entire network of BMDS sensors (including enhancements from PTSS and ABIR sensor capabilities) to improve homeland defense. 

PROVING MISSILE DEFENSE WORKS THROUGH ENHANCED TESTING

In fiscal year 2012, we are requesting nearly $1 billion of RDT&E funding for 

Testing and Targets. In collaboration with the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation and the Operational Test Agencies (OTAs), MDA updated its Integrated Master Test Plan. The updated test plan (version 11.1), consisting of 53 flight tests and 

74 ground tests from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2016, promotes cost-effectiveness by conducting fewer, but more complex, flight tests to achieve more objectives and enhance the realism of each test. 

It is the Agency’s plan to conduct later this month an Aegis BMD flight test using 

an SM–3 IA interceptor using data from the AN/TPY–2 radar passed through the 

C2BMC system to intercept an IRBM target. Later this summer we will also demonstrate Aegis BMD 4.0.1 fire control and the first flight test of the SM–3 IB interceptor. Additionally, we will conduct two critical ground tests this year to demonstrate the EPAA Phase 1 capability for defending European allies and deployed 

forces from multiple and simultaneous SRBM and MRBM threats. 

We will hold a series of system-level operational flight and ground tests to demonstrate the initial capability against SRBMs and MRBMs for theater/regional defense as well as planning in fiscal year 2012 the first entirely operational test of 

the defense of the homeland by 2015. Each operational test will be conducted as realistically as possible and involve multiple targets of different ranges. This is where 

the Agency will test how well these layered defenses work. These tests are being 

planned and will be executed in concert with the BMDS Operational Test Agencies 

and under the oversight of the Department of Defense Director for Operational Test 

& Evaluation.. The BMD system under test will be operated by the soldiers, sailors, 

and airmen assigned to their respective missile defense equipment and placed under 

realistic wartime conditions to truly document the capabilities and limitations of the 

system. Finally, in fiscal year 2011, THAAD will execute a near-simultaneous engagement of an MRBM and SRBM. 

DEVELOPING NEW CAPABILITIES

In fiscal year 2012, we plan to develop BMDS capabilities and technologies that 

can adapt as threats change and are fiscally sustainable. Early intercept capabilities 

enabled by satellites, forward based sensors and the SM–3 IIB interceptor will provide additional opportunities to kill threat missiles, enlarge protection areas, and 

improve the overall performance of the BMDS. 

After completing all of their original on-orbit testing in 2010, we continue to operate the two STSS demonstration satellites to conduct cooperative tests with other 

BMDS elements and demonstrate the capability of STSS satellites against targets 

of opportunity. These tests demonstrate the ability of space sensors to provide high 

precision, real-time, tracking of missiles and midcourse objects that enable the fire 

control solutions BMDS interceptors. We are requesting $96.4 million for the STSS 

system in fiscal year 2012. Lessons learned from the two STSS demonstration satellites inform PTSS development decisions. We are requesting $160.8 million for 

PTSS in fiscal year 2012. The PTSS, a new program start in cooperation with Johns 

Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Navy Research Laboratory, Air 

Force SPACECOM, and industry will use simple designs and mature technologies 

to provide persistent classification and tracking capability of enemy ballistic missiles 

for areas of the globe that have ballistic missile activity. PTSS project scope includes 

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the delivery of PTSS ground segments and the launch of the first two PTSS spacecraft in fiscal year 2017. 

In fiscal year 2012, we are requesting $46.9 million for the ABIR program. The 

ABIR program will provide a capability to track large ballistic missile raids with 

an airborne forward-based sensor, decreasing the time between the enemy’s launch 

of the first ballistic missile and the first launch of a ballistic missile interceptor. Initially, we will integrate a sensor from the Multi-spectral Targeting System family 

of infrared sensors onto an MQ–9 Reaper Remotely Piloted Vehicle to prove that we 

can enable Aegis fire control solutions with forward-based airborne assets. In fiscal 

year 2012, using platforms and operators supplied by the Air Force, and working 

closely with the Navy, we propose to demonstrate the ability to provide external 

cueing, sensor performance, and timely and accurate ballistic missile tracking. Our 

objective is to integrate the ABIR sensor into a pod that can be attached universally 

to the wing of a variety of aircraft. Additionally, in fiscal year 2012 we are enhancing our command and control capability to handle larger threat missile raid sizes 

and leverage airborne and space sensor missile tracking data networks. We will continue our development and testing of a multi-sensor application (ABIR and space 

sensors) tasking and signal processing capability that will provide data with sufficient quality to enable Aegis, THAAD, and GMD fire control solutions for launching 

interceptors. 

In fiscal year 2012, we are requesting $96.3 million for Directed Energy Research 

($92.6 million for ALTB). Following the successful shoot downs of liquid-fueled and 

solid-fueled boosting ballistic missile targets with an airborne laser in fiscal year 

2010, the Assistant Secretary for Defense Research and Engineering designated the 

ALTB as a science and technology test bed for high power laser research and development. In fiscal year 2012, we are teaming with the Air Force’s Research Laboratory to use the ALTB for testing advanced directed energy technologies and conducting beam propagation and lethality testing. A primary objective of our directed 

energy program is to continue our partnership with Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory to develop Diode Pumped Alkaline-gas Laser System technology, which 

offers great potential for high efficiency, electrically-driven, compact, and lightweight high energy lasers for a wide variety of missions of interest to MDA and the 

Department of Defense. 

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

As stated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, developing international 

missile defense capacity is a key aspect of our strategy to counter ballistic missile 

proliferation. In Europe, we remain committed to working with our NATO allies to 

make NATO lower layer missile defense assets interoperable with U.S. upper-tier 

missile defense assets deployed under the EPAA through NATO’s territorial missile 

defense capability. In East Asia, we are improving missile defenses through bilateral relationships. In the Middle East, we continue to work with long-term partners 

and pursue strengthened cooperation with other countries that have expressed interest in missile defense. MDA is currently engaged in missile defense projects, 

studies and analyses with over 20 countries, including Australia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, NATO, Poland, Romania, 

Saudi Arabia, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. 

MDA continues its close partnership with Japan on the SM–3 IIA interceptor 

(Japan is leading the development efforts on the SM–3 IIA second and third stage 

rocket motors and the nosecone), studying future architectures, and supporting that 

nation’s SM–3 IA flight test program. We also continue collaboration with Israel on 

the development and employment of several missile defense capabilities that are 

interoperable with the U.S. BMDS. Last month, at a U.S. test range off the coast 

of California, the Arrow Weapon System successfully intercepted a target representative of potential ballistic missile threats facing Israel today. We are requesting 

$106.1 million for Israeli Cooperative Programs (including Arrow System Improvement and the David’s Sling Weapon System) in fiscal year 2012. We are working 

with our partners from the United Arab Emirates on the development of a FMS 

case for the THAAD system that would represent the first sale of this capability. 

Additionally, MDA is actively engaged with the Russian Federation through three 

missile defense working groups led by the State Department, Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, and the Joint Staff. We are optimistic from the outcomes of both the 

NATO Russia Council meeting at Lisbon and the U.S. bilateral working groups that 

we will make meaningful progress this year in cooperating with the Russian Federation on missile defense, including considering leveraging the combined early warning and surveillance radars of both countries. 

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CONCLUSION

Our fiscal year 2012 budget funds completing the initial deployment of SRBM, 

MRBM, IRBM, and ICBM defenses while meeting the warfighters’ near-term missile 

defense development priorities. Subsequently, we will build on that initial capability 

with the long-term goal of creating an international and enhanced network of integrated BMD capabilities that is flexible, survivable, affordable, and tolerant of uncertainties of estimates of both nation-state and extremist ballistic missile threats. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering the committee’s questions. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, General, and I want to make it 

clear that we’ll insert all your prepared statements in the record, 

so if you are able to summarize, as General O’Reilly did, that 

would be good. Thank you. 

Dr. Roberts. 

STATEMENT OF BRADLEY H. ROBERTS, PH.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND MISSILE 

DEFENSE POLICY 

Dr. ROBERTS. Thank you, Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member 

Sessions, members of the subcommittee. I’m grateful for the opportunity to be here today and look forward to your questions. I just 

have a brief oral statement. The written statement begins with a 

review of the scope and conclusions of the BMDR, with the hope 

that that might be of general interest to this subcommittee. But my 

focus here today is on the key issues that have emerged in our dialogue as we have shifted from the phase that was policy development to policy implementation. 

From my perspective, there have been four main issues in discussion between us of a policy kind. The first relates to developments 

in the threat. In the missile defense review we made a commitment 

to closely monitor developments in the threat and to assess our defense investment priorities in light of new information about the 

threat. Of course, in the last year we’ve had a lot of new information that simply reconfirms the fact that we have an accelerating 

development of threat, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and 

this new information has simply reinforced the commitment, our 

commitment as reflected in the missile defense review, to a balanced approach that ensures that we continue to improve protection of the Homeland while at the same time accelerating regional 

protection. 

The second main issue that’s been of continuing discussion 

among us relates to Homeland defense. In the missile defense review we made the commitment to firstly continue to improve our 

GMD of the Homeland in order to, in your words, stay ahead of the 

threat as it develops, and to keep ahead over the long term. But 

we made a related commitment to be well-hedged, and we’ve had 

some continuing discussion about what that means. 

I would emphasize that we made a series of commitments in the 

last budget and some new commitments in the current budget to 

take steps to continue to improve the performance of the GMD system. Enhanced performance of the system can add future capability 

in meeting quantitative and qualitative threat developments clearly. 

But the focus of discussion has been about the hedge. What is 

it, first of all, we seek to hedge against? In shorthand, it’s the appearance of a second generation threat before we’re ready for it. 

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Now, what does that mean? The posture we have today is one that 

has us well-protected against the initial ICBMs that might be deployed by states like North Korea and Iran, that are few in number, relatively slow, and lack sophisticated countermeasures. 

Against this threat we have the current posture of 30 GBIs and the 

expected enhancements to come in the defense of the Homeland 

with the future deployment in the 2020 timeframe of SM–3 IIB. 

The hedge problem is what happens if we have a number of 

ICBMs deployed by states like North Korea, Iran, or sophisticated 

ICBMs with sophisticated countermeasures before the availability 

of the SM–3 IIB to enhance the protection of the Homeland? For 

that problem, we have already taken steps to hedge, as reflected 

in the BMDR, principally providing additional silos into which we 

could place additional GBIs if required to do so. This year we took 

the additional step of mothballing rather than decommissioning 

some additional number of silos so that when that’s implemented 

we would have the ability to increase from 30 to 44, roughly 50 

percent, the number of GBIs as a part of the hedge posture. We’ve 

also committed to maintaining development of the two-stage GBI 

as a part of this hedge. 

The question that we’ve been engaged with now internally in 

DOD for a few months is what more do we need to do to ensure 

that the hedge posture is sufficient to deal with the possible threat 

developments in the timeframe before 2020? As we’ve stated in various venues, we’re committed to bring that work forward to you as 

soon as our Secretary is satisfied that it’s complete, and we expect 

to do so soon. 

The third topic of continuing discussion between us has been on 

implementing the PAA. Our attention has naturally been attracted 

to Europe because this is the approach that attracted the most political discussion and required the biggest push over the last year 

politically. But this is a global approach to the regions and one that 

has to be tailored to each of the regions. 

In a general summary, General O’Reilly has already given you 

good detail on the technical aspects of this. But our first priority 

in implementing PAA is to ensure that we are growing the capabilities that are available that are relocatable and flexible and 

adaptive to the different security environments. So we’ve been 

ramping up procurement in order to meet the rising demands of 

the combatant commands (COCOMs), and politically we’ve been 

working within the multilateral framework at NATO, bilaterally 

with our allies in East Asia and elsewhere, to define needed next 

steps. 

Lastly, the fourth issue I’d like to touch on relates to expanding 

international cooperation. This is again a global agenda from our 

perspective, but our focus here today, I think, is on Russia. You’ve 

posed some specific questions there. We believe, as I think you do, 

in the potential benefits of cooperation with Russia. We believe also 

in the potential risks. 

We see the benefits as potentially significant for the United 

States, for the European security environment, and for NATO, but 

also for Russia. We’re mindful of the challenges. We reject cooperation that would in any way limit our missile defenses. You know 

the shorthand: NATO will defend NATO, but Russia will defend 

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Russia, and we will seek to reinforce each other’s defense where 

there’s mutual benefit in doing so. 

We will not compromise essential technologies. There’s no discussion of sharing hit-to-kill with Russia. We have made clear that cooperation will require successful conclusion of the defense technology cooperation agreement. This has been under discussion with 

Russia since it was proposed by the Bush administration in 2004. 

We’ve also made it clear that any classified information that’s required for discussion with the Russians on this topic would only be 

discussed after thorough review under our national disclosure policy. 

So we hope that we’re being mindful of the risks while being 

clear about the opportunities. We’re working two parallel paths: 

the NATO-Russia Council pathway with Russia, where we are exploring the possibility of cooperative systems in defense of common 

spaces, where we’ve resumed the theater missile defense cooperation that was being pursued under the Bush administration and 

where we’re developing a joint analysis for a future framework of 

cooperative activities. 

Bilaterally, we’re also working to pursue parallel work on a joint 

analysis in order to better understand the capabilities we would 

each contribute and on the defense technology cooperation agreement. 

With that, let me close my opening remarks and look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Roberts follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. BRAD ROBERTS

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Department’s ballistic missile defense 

(BMD) programs. BMD is a key strategic issue for the United States and I look forward to testifying and answering your questions about our policies and plans. 

THE 2010 BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW

A year has passed since the Obama administration released its review of BMD 

policy. It is important to recall that this was the first ever comprehensive review 

of BMD policy and that it was undertaken with congressional direction in order to 

inform our national debate about policies, strategies, plans, and programs. As we 

continue to work within the framework set out in that report, it is useful here to 

recall its main elements. 

The review began with an assessment of the ballistic missile threat. Among its 

key findings were the following: 

• The threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively and is likely to continue to do so over the coming decade. 

• Several States are developing nuclear, chemical, and/or biological warheads for their missiles and may attempt to use the resulting capabilities 

for military advantage in conflict but also to coerce States near and far. 

• Regional actors such as North Korea and Iran continue to develop longrange missiles that will be threatening to the United States. There is some 

uncertainty about when and how this type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat to the U.S. Homeland will mature. 

• But there is no uncertainty about the existence of regional missile 

threats. They are clear and present and increasing at a particularly rapid 

pace. 

• Although confident predictions about the future of the threat are difficult 

to make, there are some clear trends. These include the progress from 

short- to longer-range missiles and an increasingly open market in technologies, materials, and expertise. There is also the troubling possibility 

that non-state actors might acquire weapons of mass destruction and the 

means to deliver them. 

185 

We drew two key conclusions from this threat analysis. First, U.S. defense investments must be balanced in a way that enables the effective defense of the U.S. 

homeland and of U.S. forces, allies, and partners overseas in both the near and long 

term. Second, our defensive capabilities must be adaptable to unexpected threat developments. Threats may mature more rapidly or more slowly than predicted, may 

appear in unexpected locations, or may involve novel technologies or concepts of operations. It is essential that the United States be well hedged and has a strong posture against unpredicted threat developments. 

The Review identified the administration’s main policy priorities. 

1. The United States will continue to defend the homeland from limited ballistic 

missile attack. These efforts are focused on protecting the homeland from a 

ballistic missile attack by a regional actor such as North Korea or Iran. The 

U.S. Homeland is currently protected against limited threats and possesses a 

capacity to counter the projected threats from these States. But the United 

States must maintain this advantageous position as the threat matures. 

Through our continued commitment to maintain and develop the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, the United States seeks to dissuade such 

States from developing an ICBM, deter them from using an ICBM if they develop or acquire such a capability, and defeat an ICBM attack by States if deterrence fails. 

2. The United States will defend against regional missile threats to U.S. forces, 

while protecting allies and partners—and enabling them to defend themselves. 

Regional approaches must be tailored to the unique deterrence and defense requirements of each region, which vary considerably in their geography, in the 

history and character of the threat, and in the military-to-military relationships on which to build cooperative missile defenses. The review reflected our 

commitment to strengthen regional deterrence architectures with missile defense. It also set out the phased adaptive approach to regional missile defense. 

It is phased in that it will incorporate improving U.S. capabilities as they become available. It is adaptive in that it is tailored to unique regional requirements and opportunities. Because the demand for missile defense assets within 

each region over the next decade will exceed supply, we must focus on developing capabilities that are mobile and relocatable. 

3. Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing that enables 

assessment under realistic operational conditions. This commitment reflected 

our assessment that it is no longer necessary to pursue a high-risk acquisition 

strategy that simultaneously develops and deploys new systems. The Integrated Master Test Plan announced in June 2009, and updated every 6 months 

since, reflects the Missile Defense Agency’s new approach. 

4. New capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long term. This commitment reflects our leadership’s assessment that tough decisions must be made 

to ensure the long-term viability of the investment program. As such, we are 

pursuing lower-cost interceptors and enabling early intercepts to minimize the 

inventory required to negate a missile launch. The more constrained fiscal environment has only reinforced our sense of resolve on this matter. 

5. BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as threats change. This conclusion derives from the threat assessment described above. 

6. The United States will seek to lead expanded international efforts for missile 

defense. This is essential to the implementation of the phased, adaptive approach to regional missile defense. More broadly, it supports the objective of 

creating an environment in which the development, acquisition, deployment, 

and use of ballistic missiles by regional adversaries can be deterred. 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW IMPLEMENTATION

Over the last year, our focus has shifted from policy formulation to policy implementation. In the continuing executive-legislative discussion of implementation, four 

key issues have emerged, and I will address each in turn. 

1. Monitoring the threat: the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) expressed 

a commitment to maintain a strong focus on threat developments and to rigorously assess defense planning in light of new information. What have we 

learned? 

2. Protecting the Homeland: the BMDR expressed a commitment to continue to 

improve the GMD system in order to maintain the currently advantageous offense-defense balance against limited strikes, and to be well hedged against 

threat developments. What additional steps are needed at this time? 

3. Pursuing phased adaptive regional missile defense: the BMDR expressed a 

commitment to deploy the phased adaptive approach in Europe and apply the 

186 

approach in East Asia and the Middle East. How much progress has been 

made? 

4. Seeking expanded international cooperation: the BMDR expressed a commitment to lead expanded international efforts for missile defense. This includes 

a commitment to work to establish a cooperative BMD relationship with Russia. What opportunities and challenges have emerged? 

MONITORING THE THREAT

The last year has brought abundant confirmation that the threat is continuing to 

grow quantitatively and qualitatively. A central focus remains on Iran and North 

Korea as sources of potential threat to the United States and to our allies. In addition, a number of States are developing or acquiring Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities such as anti-ship cruise missiles or anti-ship ballistic missiles. These capabilities are intended to deny our forces access to key regions, and to blunt the operations of forces that do deploy forward. 

Iran already possesses the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle 

East, and is developing more of them. In addition to its growing missile and rocket 

inventories, Iran is boosting the lethality and effectiveness of those stockpiles, 

through accuracy improvements, new submunitions, and salvo launch capabilities. 

Furthermore, Iran’s Simorgh space-launch vehicle shows that Iran is making the 

technological progress needed for the development of an ICBM. 

Iran also shows continued interest in pursuing its nuclear-related programs, 

though the Obama administration’s economic sanctions program has clearly begun 

to bite more deeply than the present regime might have expected. Although we do 

not know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons, the prospect of 

a nuclear-armed Iran is deeply concerning to the United States and the global community, and there is a risk that Iran’s continued efforts along these lines may 

prompt neighboring States to pursue national nuclear programs. 

North Korea is modernizing every aspect of its deployed missile forces—including 

short-, medium-, and intermediate-range systems. It has reinforced its long-range 

artillery forces near the DMZ with a substantial number of mobile ballistic missiles 

that could strike targets in South Korea, Japan, and U.S. bases in the Pacific. North 

Korea has not successfully tested an ICBM, but we expect it to continue to testlaunch missiles, including the Taepo Dong-2 (TD–2). With further TD–2 tests, North 

Korea may develop an ICBM capable of reaching the United States. In addition, 

Pyongyang has a long history of ballistic-missile proliferation, and likely will continue to market and potentially export missile technologies to a number of countries—including Iran and Syria. 

North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program only increases our concerns about that 

nation’s missile capability. According to the Director of the Defense Intelligence 

Agency, ‘‘The North may now have several plutonium-based nuclear warheads that 

it can deliver by ballistic missiles and aircraft as well as by unconventional means.’’ 

The ballistic-missile threat from North Korea is especially relevant in light of recent provocative behavior by the regime. A multinational Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Team concluded that a North Korean midget submarine sank South Korea’s naval corvette Cheonan on March 26, 2010 near the contentious Northern 

Limit Line in the West Sea, causing the loss of 46 South Korean sailors. Then, in 

the first attack against a civilian-inhabited area since the Korean War, North Korea 

shelled Yonpyong Island on November 23, killing two South Korean marines and 

two civilians. 

These assessments reinforce the administration’s commitment to a balanced approach that continues to improve the defense of the homeland while also accelerating protection against regional threats. 

DEFENDING THE HOMELAND

As noted above, the BMDR expressed a commitment to continue to improve the 

GMD system in order to maintain the currently advantageous offense-defense balance against limited strikes, and to be well hedged against threat developments. 

What additional steps are needed at this time? 

The assessment that the United States is currently protected against limited 

strikes derives from the strength of the current posture against the current threat 

to the homeland. Today, the United States is protected against limited ICBM attacks as a result of investments made over the past decade in the GMD system. 

Thirty Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) are now deployed to defend the homeland. 

To enable successful intercepts by these missiles, radars are now in place in Alaska, 

California, Greenland, and the United Kingdom. They are also deployed at sea 

aboard Aegis destroyers and cruisers, at Shariki, Japan, and in the form of the SeaVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00192 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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based X-band radar. These capabilities are enabled by a sophisticated command and 

control infrastructure. Looking to the future, this posture will provide continued 

protection against initial ICBM deployments. 

The commitment to continue to improve the GMD system is reflected in a number 

of ongoing activities and in the associated fiscal year 2012 budget. We continue to: 

• Test and upgrade the system to increase reliability and survivability • Develop and upgrade Ballistic Missile Defense System sensors • Procure GBIs (in fiscal year 2012, we will procure five more) • Implement GBI refurbishment and reliability sustainment programs (in 

order to sustain the fleet for another two decades) 

• Upgrade GMD Fire Control ground system software • Enhance the Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications system to handle larger raid sizes 

• Develop and deploy new sensors in a variety of settings—including forward bases in Europe, unmanned vehicles in the skies, and platforms in 

space 

• Develop early-intercept concepts to help defeat countermeasures and reduce the inventory required to negate missile launches 

Additionally, we are developing the Standard Missile-3 (SM–3) Block IIB for deployment against future IRBM and ICBM threats in the regional defense architectures (as discussed further below), which is an important part of the long-term defense against future ICBM threats to the homeland. 

The performance of the GMD system will also be strengthened with new investments that will result in better sensor information reaching the GBI during its 

flight. The fiscal year 2012 budget includes new funding for an In Flight Interceptor 

Communications System Data Terminal on the East Coast and for upgrades to the 

Early Warning Radars at Clear, AK, and Cape Cod, MA. Looking to the longer term, 

the administration is also investing to develop next generation missile defense capabilities. This includes continued work to research the potential of directed energy 

systems for missile defense. 

We are sustaining these commitments even as the Department has identified efficiencies and cuts as a result of government-wide budget limitations. 

These capability enhancements will contribute significantly to preservation of the 

currently advantageous posture of the United States against limited strikes if or as 

ICBM threats develop from Iran and North Korea, or other regional threats. But 

they may not be enough. The United States must also be well hedged against the 

possibility that threats might evolve more rapidly than planned capability enhancements. It must also be well hedged against the possibility that those capability enhancements may be delayed for technical reasons. After all, development programs 

involve inherent technical risk. 

To strengthen the U.S. hedge posture, the administration has taken the following 

steps: 

• Construction of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely, AK, is being completed in 

a 14-silo configuration to accommodate a contingency deployment of eight 

additional GBIs if needed. 

• Six GBI silos at Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely are being mothballed instead of decommissioned, allowing their return to service within 2 years if 

necessary; and 

• Testing and assessment of a two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor is continuing in order to preserve future deployment options. 

The administration is considering additional steps to strengthen the U.S. hedge 

posture. We have been studying threat developments, future capabilities, and deployment options for a range of scenarios. We have been evaluating the deployment 

timelines associated with fielding additional capabilities with an eye to enabling 

rapid responses to triggering events. Our objective is to enable aggregate improvements that increase probability of kill, raid capacity, and battle space. This work 

involves a significant amount of classified information from both the intelligence 

community and the system developers. We have committed to brief this subcommittee on the results in a classified setting in the next several weeks. 

A key issue of continuing congressional interest is the role of the two-stage GBI 

in the hedge strategy. The BMDR explicitly recognized this role. The classified analysis addresses this matter directly, as well as the continued role of GBIs more generally. DOD will ensure that it preserves the capacity to provide additional GBIs 

to missile field two and possibly missile field one should such decisions be taken in 

the future. As General O’Reilly said in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on March 31, several of the assumptions we used to arrive at a total 

purchase of 52 GBIs are no longer valid, primarily due to test failures and the need 

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for additional testing. Some increased number of GBIs that will be necessary, but 

we must conclude the investigation of the most recent test failure before we can 

make a determination about the number of additional GBIs that will be required. 

The decision to procure five additional GBIs, together with the ongoing refurbishment program, will keep GBI production lines warm for several years. This in effect 

provides us with additional decision time to procure additional GBIs without letting 

the production lines go cold. 

PURSUING PHASED ADAPTIVE REGIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

The BMDR expressed a commitment to deploy the phased adaptive approach 

(PAA) in Europe and apply the approach in East Asia and the Middle East. How 

much progress has been made? In brief, the progress has been significant. 

Required Capabilities 

To support PAA implementation, we are procuring a pool of missile defense assets 

that will allow us to address current regional threats and surge missile defenses 

into troubled regions in a time of political-military crisis. To date, MDA has delivered two THAAD batteries and seven AN/TPY–2 radars. By the end of fiscal year 

2012, a total of 29 Aegis ships will have BMD capability and there will be a total 

of 15 U.S. PAC–3 battalions. The fiscal year 2012 budget continues the procurement 

of additional THAAD batteries, forward-based radars, as well as the conversion of 

additional Aegis ships, and SM–3 interceptors. This commitment to additional regional capabilities will allow for increasingly robust regional architectures over the 

decade. 

Europe 

The BMDR set out the main elements of the application of the phased adaptive 

approach in Europe. The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is phased to 

incorporate improving U.S. capabilities and adaptive to the particular geopolitical 

landscape of Europe. The Obama administration is committed to the deployment of 

all four phases. Toward that end, it has begun to deploy initial capabilities. It has 

also developed a diplomatic strategy with allies and partners in Europe. 

The first deployment of EPAA capabilities came on March 7 when the guided missile cruiser USS Monterey, carrying SM–3 Block IA interceptors, deployed to Europe. 

This deployment is supported by other decisions within a comprehensive force management process, led by the Joint Staff, that adjudicates competing requirements 

from the combatant commands. 

We are currently in discussions with potential host nations for the deployment of 

an AN/TPY–2 forward-based radar to southeastern Europe. While no decision has 

been made, we expect to meet our 2011 deployment timeline. Looking ahead to 

Phase 2 in 2015 and the deployment of land-based SM–3 interceptors in southeastern Europe, Romania has agreed to host the site. Looking further ahead to 

Phase 3 in 2018, Poland has agreed to host the second land-based SM–3 site. 

Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), considerable progress has 

also been achieved. This past November at the Lisbon Summit, NATO’s leaders took 

the unprecedented step of deciding to pursue full coverage and protection for the 

Alliance’s populations, territories, and forces in Europe against ballistic missile attacks. NATO also decided at Lisbon to expand its existing missile defense command 

and control backbone—the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense—to encompass territorial missile defense, which will make current and future Alliance 

missile-defense assets interoperable. These decisions send a strong signal that 

NATO will not allow itself to be defenseless against ballistic missile coercion or attack. 

Other Regions 

The same basic approach is being pursued in East Asia and the Middle East, but 

in a way that is tailored to the existing foundations of cooperation and unique regional requirements. Capabilities will be phased in as they become available for deployment, but in a manner adapted to specific regional circumstances. 

In East Asia, a strong foundation of missile defense capabilities and cooperation 

already exists. The U.S. deploys Aegis BMD-capable ships in the region. Japan has 

a layered missile defense system that includes Aegis BMD ships with SM–3 interceptors, PAC–3 fire units, early-warning radars, and a command-and-control system. Japan also hosts an AN/TPY–2 radar. U.S. and Japanese forces regularly train 

together and have successfully executed simulated cooperative BMD operations. We 

are also engaged in cooperative development of the next generation SM–3 Block IIA 

interceptor, which is projected to enter service in 2018. 

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Australia participates in our Trilateral Missile Defense Forum with Japan, and 

takes part in the Nimble Titan missile-defense exercise series hosted by U.S. Strategic Command. Australia is also acquiring ships that would be compatible with 

U.S. Aegis BMD systems, should they choose to pursue that capability. 

With South Korea, we have engaged in bilateral missile-defense cooperation discussions and have recently signed a Terms of Reference and an agreement that will 

enable our two nations to carry out a requirements analysis so that South Korea 

can make informed decisions about the utility of any future BMD program. 

One of the key differences between East Asia and Europe is the absence of a multilateral alliance framework based on collective defense. Thus our plans to strengthen the regional missile defense architecture have had to be built on the foundations 

of bilateral cooperation and a variety of security interests and perceptions. 

The administration has also sought dialogue with China on BMD, with little success. We have sought to explain U.S. intentions and capabilities and also to better 

understand China’s concerns that such defenses might negate China’s strategic deterrent. We have also sought to convey longstanding U.S. concerns about the pace 

and scope of China’s current military modernization efforts, which encompass a 

wide range of advanced air, air-defense, naval, missile, space and cyberspace capabilities. We believe that such a dialogue could help to reduce mistrust, enhance mutual understanding, and broaden cooperation. China deploys a limited but growing 

number of conventionally armed, medium-range ballistic missiles, and it likely is 

nearing deployment of a medium-range anti-ship ballistic missile. It has more than 

1,000 conventional short-range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan for a variety of 

precision-strike missions. China is also forming more missile units, upgrading some 

older missile systems, and developing methods to penetrate missile defenses. 

In the Middle East as in East Asia, the absence of a multilateral security framework means that the regional approach must be built on the foundation of bilateral 

relationships. 

In the Persian Gulf, the United States maintains a robust mix of missile-defense 

assets to protect our troops and facilities in the region. We have built a series of 

bilateral missile defense agreements with the Nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to address the regional ballistic missile threat from Iran. U.S. Central 

Command continues to work on establishing air defense and missile defense architectures for the GCC nations. In addition, the United States has approved the sale 

of Patriot and THAAD systems to the United Arab Emirates. We are also working 

with Saudi Arabia to refurbish its Patriot systems and recertify the interceptors for 

those systems. 

We have also taken steps to ensure that Israel will remain capable of countering 

the full range of Iranian ballistic missile threats that may emerge. In doing so, we 

have built on a longstanding relationship with Israel on BMD. In addition to conducting major missile-defense exercises over the last several years, the United 

States and Israel meet regularly and coordinate extensively on a range of missiledefense programs, including the Arrow weapon system and a new program for defeating short-range ballistic missiles, known as David’s Sling, as well as various 

other shared plans and operations. 

In both East Asia and the Middle East, new capabilities will be phased in as appropriate to address regional threats, and as they become available through the 

comprehensive joint force management process identified above. This will help to ensure that the requirements of the different combatant commands are met in a responsible manner as additional asserts become available. 

Seeking Expanded International Cooperation 

The BMDR expressed a commitment to lead expanded international efforts for 

missile defense. The intent here is global—to work with allies and partners generally to strengthen cooperation. A key priority is to establish a cooperative BMD 

relationship with Russia. Significant opportunities have emerged, along with some 

challenges. 

Our pursuit of missile defense cooperation with Russia occurs against the backdrop of broader changes in U.S.-Russian relations. Over the past year, there has 

been important progress in these relations such as ratification and entry into force 

of the New START Treaty, the joint pressure applied to Iran’s nuclear program, and 

new steps to strengthen the NATO-Russia Council. Russia’s leaders have accepted 

proposals from the United States and NATO to pursue cooperation on missile defense to enhance our common security against common threats and as part of the 

broader re-set of U.S.-Russia relations. 

Cooperation with Russia on missile defense would be significant for a number of 

reasons. Cooperation could offer tangible security benefits to Europe, Russia, and 

the United States in the form of stronger protection against missile threats than 

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would be possible if pursued separately. Most significantly, by beginning missile defense cooperation now, Russia, the United States and NATO will gain information, 

experience, and confidence that will strengthen strategic stability and help to shape 

and bring closer together our security strategies. 

Officials from the Department of Defense and Russian Ministry of Defense have 

been working to initiate a joint analysis of opportunities for enhanced missile defense cooperation. In addition to our bilateral efforts, NATO and Russia agreed to 

resume missile defense cooperation, and to study ways in which we might cooperate 

on territorial missile defense in Europe. 

As President Obama has stated, we are pursuing BMD cooperation ‘‘even as we 

have made clear that the system we intend to pursue with Russia will not be a joint 

system, and it will not in any way limit United States’ or NATO’s missile defense 

capabilities.’’ NATO alone will be responsible for defense of NATO territory, just as 

Russia should be responsible for defense of Russian territory. We would operate our 

respective systems independently but cooperatively, in a way that reinforces their 

performance without putting them at risk. 

A requirement for the safeguarding of sensitive information in support of cooperation is a Defense Technology Cooperation (DTC) Agreement, which will provide the 

legal framework for undertaking cooperative efforts. The proposed DTC Agreement 

(which we began to negotiate in 2004) contains an annex that addresses the sharing 

of classified information. But this on its own will not constitute authorization to provide classified information to Russia. Exchange of classified information with Russia 

would still be subject to U.S. National Disclosure Policy and the associated careful 

review, just as it is with other partners. 

Expectations for cooperation with Russia are running high, but it is important to 

be realistic about both the opportunities and challenges ahead. That said, I do believe we have an opportunity for meaningful cooperation that will enhance the security of the United States, our NATO allies, and Russia. 

CONCLUSION

A year after release of the BMDR, implementation is well launched. Capabilities 

are in place to protect the homeland from limited attack, and steps are being taken 

to continue to improve those capabilities. Capabilities are also in place to protect 

U.S. forces, their families, and our allies from regional attacks, and the first steps 

have been taken to implement the phased adaptive approach. We have put in place 

investment programs aligned with our policy priorities. 

We have also tried to put in place the political foundations for a long-term commitment by the United States in this area, building on the important work of our 

predecessors. Missile defense is a long-term challenge that requires sustained support from a succession of administrations and Congresses. As Secretary Gates has 

argued, ‘‘The protection of the United States from the threat of ballistic missile attack is a critical national security priority. The threat to our deployed military 

forces and to our allies and partners is growing rapidly. This threat has significant 

implications for our ability to project power abroad, to prevent future conflicts, and 

to prevail should deterrence fail.’’ 

I am grateful for the opportunity to be here today to make our case for your support and I look forward to your questions. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Admiral Macy. 

STATEMENT OF RADM ARCHER M. MACY, JR., USN, DIRECTOR, 

JOINT INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION, THE JOINT STAFF 

Admiral MACY. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, 

ranking member, and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate 

the opportunity to testify on the JIAMDO and our contribution to 

BMD. Let me also take a moment here to thank you both for your 

comments on my behalf, and I very much appreciate your attention 

and the opportunity to work with this subcommittee over the last 

2 years. It’s been truly a pleasure. 

JIAMDO supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

Joint Staff, and the combatant commanders. Our mission is to 

identify and coordinate joint requirements for air defense, cruise 

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missile defense, and BMD to support the development of solutions, 

to deliver capabilities for the warfighter. We provide expertise, 

analysis, planning, and coordination across the combatant commanders and the Services in a number of vital efforts relative to 

both air threat and BMD. These include advocating for the 

warfighters’ desired air and missile defense capabilities, where we 

facilitate COCOMs and Services’ collaborative efforts to identify 

and develop operational concepts, joint requirements, system interoperability, and operational architectures for integrated air and 

missile defense. 

We provide support to the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command 

(STRATCOM), in his role as the air and missile defense integrating 

authority. We provide support for, and interaction with, other elements of the Joint Staff for global force management of the highdemand, low-density BMD assets and systems. 

We represent the United States to NATO for matters of air and 

missile defense policy and planning, and we conduct assessment, 

analysis, and validation of integrated air and missile defense capabilities to inform both warfighter planning and system development 

and acquisition. 

The Chairman has directed JIAMDO to be at the intersection of 

the requirements processes for air defense and BMD and to act as 

an integration mechanism for harmonizing both common and differing needs across multiple services, platforms, and systems. Several recent JIAMDO key activities in BMD capability development 

highlight this integration responsibility. These include follow-on efforts from the BMDR, initial steps in fielding the EPAA, and conducting the JCM–III study that the chairman referred to earlier. 

During the BMDR, completed approximately a year ago, I was 

one of the three co-directors of the review, which holistically assessed U.S. BMD policy and strategy. Since that time, JIAMDO 

serves as a nexus within the Joint Staff for tracking and enabling 

implementation of the recommendations and characteristics of the 

BMDR report and, critically, providing support to the COCOMs 

and the interagency in fulfilling the goals of that review. 

These efforts have included examining how BMD capability 

needs fit into DOD’s global force management processes to apportion, allocate, and assign BMD elements in a process to adjudicate 

competing COCOM requirements. 

As the Director of JIAMDO, I am the U.S. representative to the 

NATO Air Defense Committee, responsible for addressing air and 

missile defense-related issues in NATO and for drafting and coordinating U.S. positions. In this role, I have the privilege of working 

with the NATO staff and member countries to discuss the application and implementation of the PAA in Europe and the potential 

for regional missile defense capability in a NATO context. 

As was mentioned already, the first BMDS element deployment 

in support of phase 1 EPAA capability occurred on March 7 of this 

year when the cruiser USS Monterey deployed to Europe. Two 

weeks ago, the permanent representatives to the North Atlantic 

Council, the NATO Military Committee, the NATO Air Defense 

Committee, and other NATO senior policy and technical committees and international staff received tours and demonstrations 

aboard the ship during a port call on Antwerp. For the rest of this 

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year, Monterey will spend the spring and summer helping to develop, test, and verify the command and control processes, the data 

pathways, tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary for the 

phase 1 capability to become operational later this year. 

In the course of this, two areas have become clear in my dealings 

with the allied nations. First is the criticality of being able to integrate partner nations into the missile defense architecture and 

structure through networking. This builds coalition unity and provides other nations the opportunity to actively participate in both 

their own defense and a larger collaborative defense, and results in 

shared responsibility and costs. 

Second is the value of satellite systems, such as the STSS, to provide a means to rapidly increase the level of protection in designated areas or extend protection to an undefended area. This is 

an unprecedented level of flexibility and responsiveness for combatant commanders to offer their allied partners should the need 

arise. 

Finally, as was mentioned, JIAMDO recently completed the base 

case in the third of a series of air and missile defense inventory 

sufficiency analyses called the JCM–III study, to examine the implications and opportunities for the PAA to our overall capability 

for BMD. This study has been reviewed by DOD. We’re in the process of briefing the base case results to appropriate parties, including this committee, and we are continuing the analytic efforts of 

JCM–III to examine a number of excursions and alternatives that 

we have developed. 

The JCM–III study assesses warfighters’ requirements for BMD 

elements for the Homeland and for each of the European, Central, 

and Pacific Commands’ areas of responsibility (AOR) as the commanders anticipate using BMD capabilities within their overall 

operational planning. Working with the COCOMs, the Services, 

and the MDA, we looked to understand how many interceptors, 

launchers, and sensors were needed to counter various future scenarios and, most critically, the effect those numbers had on 

warfighting capability. We took into account how the COCOMs intend to employ the BMD elements, their desire for a layered defense, what the threats are, and generally how the threat will be 

expected to be employed. 

The significant level of warfighter and developer involvement in 

the process gives us a high level of confidence in the results. It also 

shows that the development programs are correctly focused on 

warfighters’ desires for forward-based airborne and satellite systems that enable earlier intercepts, larger engagement areas, more 

shot opportunities, and increased effectiveness against countermeasures. 

You may remember that we previously conducted JCM–I in 2005 

and 2006 and JCM–II in 2007 and 2008. These focused on the 

number of interceptors that might be required under different scenarios against specific threats. There are three main differences between these earlier studies and JCM–III. 

First, JCM–III examines all the elements of the regional BMDS, 

including sensor systems, launcher systems, and interceptors, 

whereas the previous studies looked only at interceptors. 

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Second, JCM–III examines performance against threat ballistic 

missiles that employ a range of countermeasures. We had not done 

this previously. 

Third, as I have previously noted, JCM–III is a study of 

warfighting sufficiency rather than inventory acquisition objectives. 

We examine the ability of the application of PAA architectures in 

the different AORs of the COCOMs and for the defense of the 

Homeland to determine how BMDS contributes to their overall 

plan to deter aggressors and, if necessary, to end enemy ballistic 

missile attacks should they occur. We do not attempt to simply answer how much to buy. We give alternatives to the warfighter on 

how to achieve his overall warfighting goals. 

The specific study results cannot be discussed in this open forum, 

but I’m prepared to discuss the classified results in a closed session 

following our time this afternoon or at another time at the subcommittee’s convenience or that of the individual Members. 

Overall, JIAMDO continues to provide the Joint Staff and the 

combatant commanders a linchpin resource for the development, 

refinement, planning, and fielding of, among other things, BMD for 

our Homeland, our deployed forces, citizens, partners, and friends 

overseas. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Macy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY RADM ARCHER M. MACY, USN 

Thank you, Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, and distinguished members of 

the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify. It is an honor and pleasure to join Dr. Roberts, LTG O’Reilly, and Ms. Chaplain to discuss ballistic missile 

defense (BMD) and inform you how the Joint Staff and the Joint Integrated Air and 

Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO) contributes to this important mission area. 

JOINT INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AS A PART OF THE JOINT

STAFF

As a reminder, JIAMDO supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

Joint Staff, and the combatant commanders. Our mission is to identify and coordinate joint requirements to support efforts developing air defense, cruise missile defense, and BMD solutions for the warfighter. 

We are a Chairman’s Controlled Activity tailored to provide current operational 

expertise in air and missile defense and our members are drawn from across the 

Services. The background and experience of these military experts allows them to 

relate at an operational level with the warfighter and enables them to translate 

operational needs into requirements documents, analysis and study activities, and 

demonstrations. 

JOINT INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION’S KEY CONTRIBUTIONS TO

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

In support of the Chairman and the Joint Staff, JIAMDO provides expertise, analysis, planning, and coordination across the combatant commanders and the Services 

in a number of vital efforts relative to BMD. These include participating in, and following up on the results of, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) that concluded last year; support for BMD weapon system fielding processes; support to U.S. 

Strategic Command (STRATCOM) as the Air and Missile Defense Integrating Authority; support for and interaction with other elements of the Joint Staff for Global 

Force Management of High Demand/Low Density BMD assets and systems; representing the United States to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for matters of air and missile defense policy and planning; and Integrated Air and Missile 

Defense Assessments and Analysis. I’ll address each of these briefly, but first I’d 

like to discuss JIAMDO and the Combatant Commands (COCOMs). 

194 

A key part of our contribution is advocacy for the COCOMs. JIAMDO is focused 

on ensuring the Department is delivering capabilities that support COCOM operational plans and address their air and missile defense gaps. We assist the 

COCOMs in the Department’s annual Capability Gap Assessment process that addresses their critical warfighting capability gaps in their Integrated Priority Lists 

that identify risk in accomplishing their specific Unified Command Plan missions. 

In addition to JIAMDO’s role in the Joint Staff capabilities processes, we have liaison personnel at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S. European Command 

(EUCOM), STRATCOM, Joint Forces Command, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), 

U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. North American Aerospace Defense 

Command, and U.S. Forces, Japan. The liaison provides a direct link between 

JIAMDO and the COCOMs as they work air and missile defense issues day-to-day 

for both the hosting command and JIAMDO. 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review 

JIAMDO had four key roles in the BMDR. As the Director of JIAMDO, I was one 

of the three directors of the review; other JIAMDO personnel served as co-chair of 

the Programmatic Process and Execution Working Group; led the Requirements 

Issue Team; and served in the Directorate of Activities. In short, JIAMDO played 

a central role in the development of the BMDR. Subsequent to the completion of 

the Review, we have continued to work with the offices of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the Joint Staff, and members of the 

Interagency as we develop and advance the principles and policies for BMD, such 

as the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA), that were enumerated in the BMDR report. 

Ballistic Missile Defense Elements System Fielding 

The fielding plan for new missile defense systems developed by MDA identified 

a need for the department to develop a process to transition and transfer those systems from MDA to the Services. JIAMDO worked closely with Service staffs and 

MDA to develop business rules and processes to handle this, and was the lead to 

take the new process to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for approval. 

Support to the Air and Missile Defense Integrating Authority 

STRATCOM is designated the Air and Missile Defense Integrating Authority 

(AMD IA) and serves as the COCOMs’ representative for air and missile defense. 

JIAMDO is formally tasked to provide operational expertise and analytic support to 

the AMD IA as it documents BMD requirements to MDA. Currently, we are assisting in developing the expanded Prioritized Capability List that will provide transparency and insight for Service developers and MDA for missile defense, and a common requirements view for senior decisionmakers. 

JIAMDO and Global Force Management 

JIAMDO is also assisting the Joint Staff J–3 to formalize the inclusion of Missile 

Defense in the Global Force Management Process to address the force sourcing and 

mitigation options for BMD assets. This would assure that, like other high demand/ 

low density assets, missile defense is included in the assignment, allocation, and apportionment process to adjudicate competing COCOM requirements. 

JIAMDO and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Closely associated with COCOM relationships are the NATO responsibilities of 

JIAMDO. The Director, JIAMDO is the U.S. Representative to the NATO Air Defense Committee (NADC), responsible for addressing air and missile defense related 

issues in NATO. The Director’s unique position allows insight into policy and military issues from both a U.S. and Alliance point of view, and enables the United 

States to understand and address tactical level integration of allies and partners in 

analysis and studies, and during the development of employment concepts. In this 

regard I have had the privilege of working with the NATO staff and appearing before the North Atlantic Council to discuss the application of the PAA in Europe and 

the potential for regional missile defense capability in a NATO context. Most recently, the NADC led the senior policy and technical committees from NATO Headquarters on tours and demonstrations on the Aegis BMD ship USS Monterey (CG 

61). 

Integrated Air and Missile Defense Assessments and Analysis 

A concurrent responsibility for JIAMDO is assessing and validating operational 

concepts and architectures, and helping COCOMs and Services define and refine air 

195 

and missile defense requirements. This is performed primarily through studies and 

analyses, modeling and simulation, and the conduct of wargames. Study activities 

vary from inventory analysis to examinations of surveillance coverage and options 

for various mixes of surveillance sensors. JIAMDO recently completed the third of 

a series of quantitative performance analyses, the Joint Capability Mix III (JCM III) 

Study, to determine the warfighter requirements for elements of the BMD System 

required for BMD; I will discuss this in some more detail later in my testimony. 

A centerpiece of JIAMDO’s analysis is the Nimble Fire modeling and simulation 

activity. Nimble Fire is a classified operator-in-the-loop simulation where Air Force, 

Navy, Marine Corps, and Army operational personnel come together to simulate the 

execution of joint air and missile defense missions. The events are structured to 

allow operational personnel to employ their systems and forces as they deem appropriate and the data we obtain is used to define and refine capability gaps, requirements, concepts, and in some instances employment techniques. It is a fully functional joint architecture capable of executing current and future concepts with operationally representative positions for Aegis, Patriot, Airborne Warning and Control 

System, E–2, F/A–18, F–15, F–22, and JLENS among others. The simulation can 

conduct distributed operations to U.S. and overseas military locations and annually 

executes a combined air, cruise missile, and BMD event in conjunction with MDA’s 

Missile Defense Integrated Operations Center simulation at Colorado Springs. Analysis events are based on COCOM war plans and routinely have participants from 

the commands in the operational positions. Results are out-briefed to the COCOMs 

as well as the Services and agencies. Nimble Fire is a one-of-a-kind capability that 

has proven to be invaluable in analyzing concepts and requirements. 

JIAMDO also provides analytical support and coordinates COCOM participation 

and input into two of the premier BMD wargames, Nimble Titan and the Ballistic 

Missile Defense System (BMDS) Wargame. Nimble Titan is sponsored by 

STRATCOM and led by the Joint Force Component Command, Integrated Missile 

Defense (JFCC IMD). It is a policy and military wargame designed to assess and 

evaluate coalition and allied participation in missile defense. U.S. and international 

missile defense experts from both ministries of foreign affairs and ministries of defense take part in the events. Eight nations currently participate, with more countries to be added in 2012. Insights from these wargames allow the U.S. and its partners to identify potential policy and military issues such as command and control, 

information sharing, and coalition decisionmaking. The BMDS Wargame, sponsored 

by MDA, is a U.S.-only classified tactical level simulation that brings together 

warfighters and developers to collaboratively examine the optimal employment of 

the future BMDS. This wargame explores areas such as shot doctrine, sensor control, interceptor inventory management, and force employment. JIAMDO leverages 

findings from these events to support other analyses, and used the shot doctrine developed during the BMDS wargame in the models for the JCM studies. 

The Department has recognized that air and missile defense is a complex mission 

area and has committed to joint warfighting. JIAMDO is part of that commitment 

and we are working hard to ensure that warfighter needs are met. I would next like 

to discuss the PAA for BMD as mentioned earlier. 

THE PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH CONCEPT

The concept of a PAA to missile defense was an outgrowth of the BMDR, which 

took a holistic look at the different aspects of our missile defense strategy and its 

programs. These ranged from trends in threat development, U.S. missile defense 

technology development, operational fielding needs and opportunities, and capability 

requirements from COCOM war plans. The particular focus of PAA is the regional 

missile threat coming from short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and is responsive to both congressional direction, and the warfighters’ needs, 

to place more emphasis on these types of threats. In short, it is a more effective 

and efficient approach to missile defense. I think it is important to emphasize here 

that the PAA is not an acquisition program, or a single plan to be applied unchanged across all areas of the globe. It is a conceptual approach to providing BMD 

capability for our deployed forces, allies and partners, and additional capability for 

homeland defense, in different regions, circumstances and times. 

The recently completed NATO Summit of Heads of State and Governments at Lisbon adopted the new Strategic Concept for NATO, which explicitly affirms that, in 

the face of ‘‘ . . . the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which pose a real and growing 

threat to the Euro-Atlantic area,’’ the Alliance will ‘‘develop the capability to defend 

our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of 

our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance.’’ 

196 

We view this as a ringing affirmation of the priority to develop missile defense for 

our European NATO allies and our deployed forces. 

I would like to point out that although there has been significant focus and discussion on Europe, the PAA is much more than just the defense of Europe. The PAA 

concept provides the United States with an enhanced capability to respond to regional threats worldwide, no matter where they emerge, and to strengthen defense 

of the Homeland. It also provides us with the flexibility to tailor the type and size 

of that response by being able to adapt to the threats, partners’ capabilities, and 

geography of each region. The PAA is ‘‘phased’’ to advances in our own technical 

and operational capabilities for BMD, and it is ‘‘adaptive’’ to trends and advances 

in potential adversary threats. The European version of the PAA has four phases 

based upon projected advances of our technical capabilities; however, in other 

COCOM’s areas of responsibility (AOR) the number and timing of individual phases 

will vary based upon their unique circumstances. The geographic COCOMs are developing plans for phases for each AOR, with the European PAA currently being the 

most advanced. 

The PAA has not resulted in a wholesale change in what the Department had previously planned to develop, but it does adjust the timing and quantity of some of 

the systems. A key enabler for this flexibility is the structured and disciplined approach to development and fielding of the BMDS. MDA is providing the Department 

with an impressive array of very capable systems that give us the freedom to maneuver and adapt to different and changing environments and threats. To fully capitalize on this range of capabilities, the Joint Capability Mix studies help guide decisions on maximizing COCOM capabilities and provide senior leaders with a riskrelevant assessment based on operational plans. This is a critical effort, particularly 

in light of the need to maximize every dollar spent. I would now like to address the 

operational benefits of the PAA. 

OPERATIONAL BENEFITS OF PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

As has been noted before, Congress and our warfighters have said the most pressing threat for our deployed forces today is the increasing number of Short-Range 

Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs). Without 

going into classified details, suffice it to say that the sheer number and types of 

these threats grows daily and the Nation needs to find a way to deal with them. 

The PAA addresses these issues head on. The United States cannot afford to build 

the number of launchers, interceptors, and sensors it would take for each COCOM 

to have his own dedicated BMDS capability that can address all the potential 

strikes that could be launched. What the PAA provides instead, is a balanced investment that has the capacity to engage the range of threats; can be tailored to the 

geography, political circumstances, capabilities of regional partners; and has the 

flexibility to rapidly deploy more assets where and when they are needed. 

EUROPEAN PAA PHASE I (2011) INITIAL SHORT-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES AND MEDIUMRANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES CAPABILITY IN EUROPE

European PAA Phase I is focused on the near-term essentials to go against the 

SRBM and MRBM threats. We are already giving the overseas combatant commanders more of what we already have by increasing the number of Patriot interceptors to complement the existing inventory of Patriot and Aegis with Standard 

Missile-3 (SM–3). The European PAA Phase I will also add SM–3 Block IA. This 

is a simple and direct operational counter. As the threat grows, we increase the 

number of our defensive interceptors. While this is workable to a point, it rapidly 

becomes unaffordable as the threats continue to grow in numbers over time. 

To break out of the spiral of trying to match the threat missile-for-missile, the 

European PAA Phase I also begins the introduction of operational leverage by placing a forward-based AN/TPY–2 radar in Southern Europe. The addition of this AN/ 

TPY–2 radar will allow the combatant commander to use Aegis to launch interceptors against ballistic missiles tracked by either the ship itself or the AN/TPY–2 

radar. This significantly increases the size of the area that can be defended, and 

we will examine this architecture in a live intercept test mission in the near future. 

Phase I also includes the Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) upgrade to the air operations center at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. C2BMC controls the AN/TPY–2 and also ties it and any Aegis ships into our 

command and control structure in Europe. C2BMC is a major operational leverage 

point for PAA because it provides the pathway for data exchange throughout a theater and from a theater to the Homeland. 

The first BMDS element deployment in support of Phase I European Phased 

Adaptive Approach (EPAA) capability occurred on March 7, of this year when the 

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USS Monterey (CG 61) deployed to Europe. Monterey will spend this spring and 

summer helping to develop, test, and verify the command and control processes, 

data pathways, tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary for the Phase I capability to become operational later this year. 

This phase is also concurrent with efforts to enhance our capability for Homeland 

defense with early warning radar upgrades, adding more Ground-Based Interceptors 

(GBIs) in Alaska, and developing improved GBIs. In the instance of the European 

PAA the radar tracks from the AN/TPY–2 in Southern Europe will be provided to 

NATO for defense of the territory and populations of the European members of the 

Alliance, and will be used by the United States to provide early tracking information to enhance our Homeland defense assets. This linkage enables very efficient 

management of radar data and missile engagements. C2BMC will ensure threats 

are detected, tracked, and efficiently engaged. It will both prevent inadvertent ‘‘overengagement’’ where too many shots are taken at an incoming threat; and the worse 

alternative, ‘‘underengagement’’ where no shots are taken, because each shooter is 

operating independently. The operational bottom line on Phase I is that it gets us 

greater ability to engage the SRBM and MRBM threats, and just as important, it 

begins fielding a netted sensor and weapons infrastructure. 

EUROPEAN PAA PHASE II (∼2015) ENHANCED MRBM DEFENSE IN EUROPE

Phase II of the European PAA further embodies operational innovation. From a 

developmental point of view, the introduction of Aegis with SM–3 IB interceptors 

and AN/TPY–2 radars gives us expanded capability against MRBMs. We also significantly increase the size of area that can be defended. The true operational innovation in this phase comes from the increasing use of integrated and networked systems and the concept of placing SM–3 on land in Romania as a part of Aegis Ashore. 

Aegis Ashore is a shift away from forward based GBIs in fixed launch sites, to 

a relocatable land-based Aegis radar with land-based SM–3 IB interceptors. This approach provides all the engagement range and capability of an Aegis ship but without the requirement to keep a ship in a fixed location for extended periods of time, 

nor the cost of maintaining the rest of the multi-mission capability of an Aegis warship. Operationally this allows a combatant commander to provide long-term coverage for his assets or allies, establish a presence, and have a visible deterrent in 

theater. Similarly, a land-based SM–3 system can be augmented with Aegis warships and other BMDS assets to provide a very robust defense if the situation warrants. This is a very operationally responsive concept for the combatant commanders. 

A more significant development beyond deployment of a new weapon system is 

the operational leverage gained from the improvements in the SM–3 Block IB interceptor. The SM–3 IB seeker’s discrimination capability improves its performance 

during intercepts. The SM–3 IB will be deployed with Aegis Ashore and Aegis ships 

at sea. Because the missile seeker has been improved, both Aegis at sea and on land 

will be able to launch on remote sensor data (for example, using data from one of 

the land based radars). The operational impact of this concept is not obvious until 

you understand that the SM–3 missile has a fly-out range that goes well beyond 

where the Aegis radar can detect. The establishment of networks combined with the 

ability to use remote sensor data enables a combatant commander to take full advantage of the SM–3 range and reach out to extremely long ranges to engage targets. Operationally, this equates to a much larger defended area and a greater number of defended assets with the same force structure. The ability to use multiple 

weapons systems, and particularly systems that are not in the immediate area, does 

several things. First, it prevents an enemy from being able to tell which assets are 

being defended. Second, it makes it impossible to determine ahead of time which 

defensive systems have a shot at an incoming missile. Lastly, it prevents an adversary from being able to take down our defenses by targeting a single node. I would 

summarize Phase II as the transition phase where we move from classic concepts 

of single asset employment to a modern networked concept. 

EUROPEAN PAA PHASE III (∼2018) ENHANCED IRBM DEFENSE IN EUROPE AND PHASE IV

(∼2020) EARLY INTERCEPT DEFENSE IN EUROPE

European PAA Phases III and IV add significant operational capability and continue to leverage and build on the netted infrastructure of the earlier phases. The 

key capability in Phase III is the addition of the SM–3 IIA, to be deployed in Poland, which will expand the defended area against MRBMs and Intermediate Range 

Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs). SM–3 IIA will be fielded with both Aegis ships and landbased SM–3 systems. Phase IV adds SM–3 IIB to our Aegis Ashore sites which will 

be capable of engaging potential future ICBMs from today’s regional ballistic missile 

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threats. This is the first capability beyond GBIs to defend against ICBMs, and provides enhanced defense of the Homeland. The SM–3 IIB also adds the ability to 

intercept MRBMs and IRBMs earlier in their flights which allows the warfighter to 

thin out large raid sizes, and suppress the use of countermeasures by engaging a 

missile before they are deployed. Phases III and IV will both continue the use of 

netted employment and its inherent advantages. 

At the completion of Phase IV, Commander EUCOM will have multiple defensive 

capabilities across the entire ballistic missile threat regime from SRBMs to ICBMs. 

It’s worthwhile at this point to contrast the European PAA with the previous approach for defense of Europe to further illustrate the operational impact. Under the 

previous GBI approach we could defend portions of Europe, but the primary benefit 

was defense of the U.S. Homeland. Under EPAA we defend increasing areas of Europe, enhance defense of the Homeland, and develop capabilities that can be deployed worldwide. So operationally, PAA does much more than support a specific 

combatant commander, it provides capabilities that can be employed by every combatant commander. This is major step forward in protection for the United States 

and its allies and partners. 

Before I leave the operational discussion of the EPAA Phases, I wanted to reinforce the point that BMD, such as we embody in the EPAA, is not an isolated mission but part of a larger campaign against an adversary. Fundamentally, the BMDS 

is not, and cannot be, the sole method by which we defend ourselves against the 

threat or use of aggressor ballistic missiles. Many potential aggressors already have 

larger threat missile inventories than we have, or expect to have, numbers of interceptor missiles. BMDs can prevent an adversary from winning the fight with the 

first wave of the attack, limit damage to friendly forces and civilians, and provide 

time for our other elements of national and military power to be brought to bear 

to end the conflict. Further, the possession of a capable BMD such as provided by 

the EPAA, assists in deterring potential aggressors from the use of ballistic missiles, 

as they have to contemplate that they will not be successful in achieving their aims 

from the use of these weapons. 

ANALYSIS SUPPORTING PAA DEVELOPMENT

The analytic efforts that JIAMDO leads are used to support operational planning 

by the warfighters, and support the resources and acquisition communities in research and development, production, budget, and programming decisions on missile 

defense. We have recently completed the base case of the JCM III to examine the 

implications and opportunities of the PAA as an element of our overall capability 

for BMD. The study has been reviewed by the Department; we are in the process 

of briefing the results to appropriate parties including this committee; and, we are 

continuing the analytic efforts of JCM III to examine a number of excursions and 

alternatives that we have developed. The study results cannot be discussed in this 

open forum, but I will discuss the process used at this point. I am prepared to discuss the classified results in a closed session following our time this afternoon, or 

at another time at the committee’s convenience or that of some of the members. 

Building a BMD capability is a blend of determining what the right technology 

is, how many of each system is acquired, and how are the elements to be applied 

in different contexts of threat, geography, and international political and military 

environments of allies and partners. In operational terms this gets shortened to 

‘‘how much PAA do we need, and where?’’ A simple phrase, but a very complex problem. 

We previously conducted JCM I in 2005–2006 and JCM II in 2007–2008. These 

focused on the number of interceptors that might be required under different scenarios against specific threats. 

There are three main differences between these earlier studies and JCM III: 

First, JCM III examined all the elements of the regional BMD system, including 

sensors systems, launcher systems, and interceptors, whereas the previous studies 

only looked at interceptors. 

Second, JCM III examined performance against threat ballistic missiles that employed a range of countermeasures; we had not done this previously. 

Third, JCM III has been a study of warfighting sufficiency rather than inventory 

acquisition objectives. We examined the ability of the application of PAA architectures in different AOR of the combatant commanders to determine how BMDS contributed to their overall plan to deter aggressors and, if necessary to end enemy ballistic missile attacks should they occur. We do not attempt to simply answer how 

much to buy; we give alternatives to the warfighter to best achieve his overall goals. 

I would also like to spend a couple of minutes discussing the study methodology. 

In order to determine force needs at this level of granularity, we had to take into 

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account how the COCOMs intend to employ them, what the threats are, and generally how the threat will be expected to be employed. COCOMs provided operational employment information, to include asset laydowns and shot doctrine. For 

system performance, we went to the experts at MDA. The analysis was executed by 

JIAMDO in conjunction with representatives from CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, 

STRATCOM, NORTHCOM, MDA, the Services, and the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation. The significant level of 

warfighter and developer involvement in the process is why we have such a high 

level of confidence in the results. The results have been briefed to the JROC, the 

Missile Defense Executive Board, and finally to the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s 

Advisory Working Group. I have included a graphic on the Senior Review Group of 

the study to illustrate the inclusive approach we use for our analysis. 

EUROPEAN PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH AND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

As I mentioned earlier, NATO has just taken the decision that BMD is ‘‘ . . . a 

core element of our collective defence.’’ In both my role as the Director of JIAMDO, 

and as the U.S. head of delegation to the NADC, I have spent a significant amount 

of time discussing the EPAA with various allies and friends throughout Europe. The 

United States is not building a missile defense system in isolation. Our allies are 

appreciative of our efforts to include them in our discussions and explain our missile 

defense concepts and approaches. The EPAA concept and implementation provides 

the opportunity for allies and partners across the globe to participate with and 

alongside U.S. systems. Not only is this the right thing to do, it is a very effective 

and efficient approach to missile defense that allows all participants to leverage the 

investment the other nations are making. The recent MDA demonstration of 

C2BMC with NATO’s Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence is a premier 

example of the right approach to follow. 

Now that NATO has made the decision, the U.S. BMDS capabilities of the European PAA will constitute our national contribution to this mission. We will work 

closely within the Alliance to craft the appropriate command and control structure 

to provide for the effective defense of ourselves and our partners from ballistic missile threats in the region. 

SUMMARY

The Department is investing a significant portion of its budget in missile defense 

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tively and wisely. The PAA is shaping the integration and networking of our systems across the COCOMs, Services, and allies which is the correct path to successful and effective missile defense. We have established a solid process and analytic 

approach to monitor and guide the implementation of the PAA and expect to develop 

and field the phases in the most operationally effective and cost efficient manner 

possible. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Admiral. 

Ms. Chaplain. 

STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and 

members of the subcommittee: Thank you for inviting me to discuss 

accountability and transparency for the BMDS. As you noted earlier, the BMDS is DOD’s largest single acquisition program. It is 

also likely the most challenging, not only because of the inherent 

technical challenges involved with the missile defense mission, but 

because of the wide range of assets involved, the global nature of 

the system, and the need for a high degree of integration and 

jointness. 

While the inherent risks are substantial, intense early schedule 

pressures driven by presidential directive exacerbated acquisition 

risks, as they required MDA to take on a high degree of concurrency in development. That concurrency continues. More recently, budgetary pressures have further challenged MDA. A faster 

pace of acquisition and development activity often comes with a 

higher price tag. Yet, fiscal conditions require DOD to reexamine 

all of its programs with an eye toward achieving greater cost efficiencies and savings. 

Taken together, these conditions create a high risk environment 

for the MDA and thus call attention to the need for strong oversight, accountability, and transparency. Yet, the flexibilities given 

to MDA in order to field initial capability quickly have made accountability and transparency elusive. Our testimony and report 

detail the differences between the BMDS and DOD’s largest acquisition programs. I would just like to highlight a few. 

First, while other large programs have been required to create 

baselines and report variances once they enter into the engineering 

and manufacturing development cycle, until recently MDA has not 

been required to do so for pieces of the missile defense system. 

Second, while other programs must obtain approval of a higher 

level acquisition executive before making changes to their baselines, MDA does not. In fact, the Director of MDA serves as both 

approving acquisition executive and as the program manager. 

Third, while other programs must obtain independent life cycle 

cost estimates, MDA does not. 

Fourth, while other programs must complete initial operational 

test and evaluation before proceeding beyond low rate initial production, MDA does not. 

This broad flexibility enabled MDA to make decisions faster than 

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advantages. The lack of baselines for BMDS along with high levels 

of uncertainty about requirements and program cost estimates effectively set the missile defense program on a path to an undefined 

destination at an unknown cost. 

I’m pleased to report, however, that the MDA has recently made 

significant strides in increasing transparency and accountability. 

Specifically, in the last year MDA established resource, schedule, 

test, operational capacity, technical, and contract baselines for several BMDS components. MDA also identified three phases where 

baselines are approved to help ensure the appropriate level of 

knowledge is obtained before acquisitions move from one phase to 

the next. 

In addition, MDA implemented a process under which product 

development and initial production baselines can be jointly reviewed by MDA and the military Service senior leaders, as a number of missile defense systems are expected to eventually transition 

to the Services for operation. These improvements were made subsequent to recent improvements to test planning to better link testing to models and simulations needed to assess performance and to 

extend test planning into the future. 

Given the breadth, scope, and complexity of the systems involved 

in the missile defense mission and the wide range of stakeholders 

and gaps in past data, these improvements were not easy achievements. Significant progress has been made. Nevertheless, there is 

still much work ahead to ensure oversight and management data 

is clear, complete, accurate, and reliable. My statement and our report detail improvements that are needed, particularly in the areas 

of cost reporting and testing. 

Moreover, improvements to oversight reporting should be complemented by other actions, including stabilizing the approach to 

acquisition efforts, improving transparency and accountability for 

the EPAA, and lastly embracing knowledge-based acquisition practices that ensure programs complete developmental activities before proceeding in production, that test plans are stabilized and 

adequately reported, and that targets used for testing are reliable, 

available, and affordable. 

This concludes my statement and I’m happy to answer any questions you have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY CRISTINA CHAPLAIN

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the transparency and accountability 

progress made by the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA). MDA has been charged with developing and fielding the Ballistic Missile 

Defense System (BMDS), a system expected to be capable of defending the United 

States, deployed troops, friends, and allies against ballistic missiles of all ranges in 

all phases of flight. The BMDS is DOD’s single largest acquisition program—spending between approximately $7 billion to $9.5 billion per year—to develop and field 

nine elements and supporting efforts. The system’s architecture includes spacebased and airborne sensors as well as ground- and sea-based radars; ground- and 

sea-based interceptor missiles; and a command and control, battle management, and 

communications system to provide the warfighter with the necessary communication 

links to the sensors and interceptor missiles. 

In fulfilling this charge, MDA began delivering an initial defensive capability in 

2004. In meeting this challenge, MDA was afforded much more flexibility than 

DOD’s other major weapons programs. However, this flexibility also introduced 

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1 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–107, § 232(g) 

(2001); Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 

108–375, § 233 (2004); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 

109–163, § 232; John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. 

No. 109–364, § 224 (2006); and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. 

L. No. 110–181, § 225. 2GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and Accountability, GA0– 

11–372 (Washington, DC: March 24, 2011). 3 10 U.S.C. § 2435 requires an approved program baseline description for major defense acquisition programs before the program enters system development and demonstration, production 

and deployment, and full rate production. The system development phase of the DOD acquisition cycle is now known as the engineering and manufacturing development phase. 4 10 U.S.C. § 2434. 

5 10 U.S.C. § 2432. 

6 10 U.S.C. § 2433, also known as ‘‘Nunn-McCurdy’’. 

transparency and accountability challenges that persisted after the 2004 date for 

initial capability. Today, I will highlight significant progress that MDA has recently 

made to strengthen accountability and transparency and also the shortfalls that still 

need to be addressed in order to further strengthen MDA’s oversight posture and 

ensure new capabilities are fiscally sustainable for the long term. 

Since 2002, the National Defense Authorization Acts have mandated that we prepare annual assessments of MDA’s ongoing cost, schedule, testing, and performance 

progress.1 In March 2011, we issued our report covering MDA’s progress toward 

achieving its goals during fiscal year 2010 as well as its efforts to improve transparency, accountability, and oversight.2 My statement today will focus on the issues 

covered in that report. We conducted this performance audit from March 2010 to 

March 2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our fmdings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional information on our scope and methodology is available in the issued report. 

ACQUISITION FLEXIBILITY GIVEN TO MDA HAS DOWNSIDES FOR OVERSIGHT AND

ACCOUNTABILITY

MDA is a unique agency with extraordinary acquisition flexibility and a challenging mission, however while that flexibility has helped it to rapidly field systems, 

it has also hampered oversight and accountability. 

Over the years, Congress has created a framework of laws that makes major defense acquisition programs accountable for their planned outcomes and cost, gives 

decisionmakers a means to conduct oversight, and ensures some level of independent program review. Application of many of these laws is triggered by the 

phases of the Department of Defense’s acquisition cycle, such as entry into engineering and manufacturing development. Specifically, major defense acquisition programs are generally required by law and policy to do the following: 

• Document program parameters in an acquisition program baseline that, 

as implemented by DOD, has been approved by the Milestone Decision Authority, a higher-level DOD official prior to the program’s entry into the engineering and manufacturing development phase.3 The baseline provides 

decisionmakers with the program’s best estimate of the program’s total cost 

for an increment of work, average unit costs for assets to be delivered, the 

date that an operational capability will be fielded, and the weapon’s intended performance parameters. 

• Once approved, measure the program against the baseline, which is the 

program’s initial business case, or obtain the approval of a higher-level acquisition executive before making changes. 

• Obtain an independent life-cycle cost estimate prior to beginning engineering and manufacturing development, and/or production and deployment.4 Independent life-cycle cost estimates provide confidence that a program is executable within estimated cost. 

• Regularly provide detailed program status information to Congress, including information on cost, in Selected Acquisition Reports.5

• Report certain increases in unit cost measured from the original or current program baseline.6

• Covered major defense acquisition programs and subprograms are required to complete initial operation test and evaluation before proceeding 

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7 10 U.S.C § 2399 requires completion of initial operational test and evaluation of a weapon 

system before a program can proceed beyond low-rate initial production. According to DOD policy, low-rate initial production is intended to result in completion of manufacturing development 

in order to ensure adequate and efficient manufacturing capability and to produce the minimum 

quantity necessary to provide production or 1production-representative articles for initial operational test and evaluation, establish an initial production base for the system; and permit an 

orderly increase in the production rate for the system, sufficient to lead to full-rate production 

upon successful completion of operational (and live-fire, where applicable) testing. 8 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–181, § 223(g); Ike 

Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111–383, § 225. 9GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Transition Provides Opportunity to Strengthen 

Acquisition Approach, GA0–10–311 (Washington, DC. Feb. 25, 2010). 

beyond low-rate initial production.7 After testing is completed, the Director 

for Operational Test and Evaluation assesses whether the results of the 

test confirm that the system or components are effective and suitable for 

combat. 

When MDA was established in 2002, it was granted exceptional flexibility in setting requirements and managing the acquisition, in order that its BMDS be developed as a single program, using a capabilities-based, spiral upgrade approach to 

quickly deliver a set of integrated defensive capabilities. This decision deferred application of DOD acquisition policy to BMDS until a mature capability is ready to 

be handed over to a military service for production and operation. Because the 

BMDS program has not formally entered the DOD acquisition cycle, application of 

laws that are designed to facilitate oversight and accountability of DOD acquisition 

programs and that are triggered by phases of this cycle, such as the engineering 

and manufacturing development phase, has also effectively been deferred. This gives 

MDA unique latitude to manage the BMDS and it enabled MDA to begin delivering 

an initial defensive capability in 2004. However, the flexibility also came at the expense of transparency and accountability. 

Specifically, a BMDS cost, schedule, and performance baseline does not have to 

be established or approved by anyone outside MDA. Recent laws have created some 

baseline-related requirements for parts of the BMDS.8 In addition, while most major 

defense acquisition programs are required by statute to obtain an independent 

verification of cost estimates, MDA has only recently developed cost estimates for 

selected assets and plans to work with the DOD Office of the Director for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to develop independent cost estimates for more 

MDA elements. Further, assessments of a system’s suitability and effectiveness in 

combat have only been accomplished, with limitations, for the currently deployed 

Aegis BMD weapon system. The limited amount of testing completed, which has 

been primarily developmental in nature, and the lack of verified, validated, and accredited models and simulations prevent the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation from fully assessing the effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of the 

BMDS in annual assessments. MDA has agreed to conduct an operational flight test 

in 2012. 

As we concluded in a prior report, having less transparency and accountability 

than is normally present in a major weapon program has had consequences.9 The 

lack of baselines for the BMDS along with high levels of uncertainty about requirements and program cost estimates effectively set the missile defense program on a 

path to an undefined destination at an unknown cost. Across the agency, these practices left programs with limited knowledge and few opportunities for crucial management oversight and decisionmaking concerning the agency’s investment and the 

warfighter’s continuing needs. At the program level, these practices contributed to 

quality problems affecting targets acquisitions, which in turn, hampered MDA’s 

ability to conduct tests as planned. 

NUMEROUS STRATEGY CHANGES HAVE EXACERBATED TRANSPARENCY AND

ACCOUNTABILITY CHALLENGES

MDA has employed at least three strategies to acquire and deploy missile defense 

systems, which has exacerbated transparency and accountability challenges. From 

its inception in 2002 through 2007, MDA developed missile defense capability in 2- 

year increments, known as blocks, each built on preceding blocks intended to enhance the development and capability of the BMDS. However, there was little visibility into baseline costs and schedules associated with the systems that comprised 

the blocks or how the blocks addressed particular threats. 

In response to our recommendations, in December 2007, MDA announced a new 

capabilities-based block structure intended to improve the program’s transparency, 

accountability, and oversight. Instead of being based on 2-year time periods, the new 

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10GAO, Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach Acquisitions Face Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability Challenges, GAO–11–179R (Washington, DC: Dec. 21, 

2010). 11GAO, Ballistic Missile Defense: DOD Needs to Address Planning and Implementation Challenges for Future Capabilities in Europe, GA0–11–220 (Washington, DC: Jan. 26, 2011). 12Pub. L. No. 110–181, § 223(g). 13Pub. L. No. 111–383, § 225. 

blocks focused on fielding capabilities that addressed particular threats. Because the 

new block structure was not aligned to regular time periods, multiple blocks were 

under way concurrently. This approach included several positive changes, including 

a DOD commitment to establish total acquisition costs and unit costs for selected 

block assets, including only those elements or components of elements in a block 

that would be fielded during the block and abandoning deferrals of work from one 

block to another. 

MDA was still transitioning to this new capabilities-based block approach when 

the Director, MDA terminated it in June 2009. According to MDA, this was done 

in order to address congressional concerns regarding how to structure MDA’s budget 

justification materials. This termination marked the third acquisition management 

strategy for the BMDS in the prior 3 years and effectively reduceo transparency and 

accountability for the agency. The agency then began to manage BMDS as a single 

integrated program but planned to report on cost, schedule, and performance issues 

by each element within the program. 

Changing the acquisition strategy is problematic because each time it is changed, 

the connection is obscured between the old strategies’ scope and resources and the 

new strategy’s rearranged scope and resources. This makes it difficult for decisionmakers to hold MDA accountable for expected outcomes and clouds transparency of 

the agency’s efforts. 

We also reported in December 2010 that the adoption of the European Phase 

Adaptive Approach (PAA) for deploying missile defense assets has limitations in 

transparency and accountability.10 Specifically, we reported that DOD made 

progress in acquisition planning for technology development and systems engineering and testing and partial progress in defming requirements and identifying stakeholders but had not yet developed a European PAA acquisition decision schedule or 

an overall European PAA investment cost. We found that the limited visibility into 

the costs and schedule for the European PAA and the lack of some key acquisition 

management processes reflect the oversight challenges with the acquisition of missile defense capabilities that we have previously reported. We concluded that for the 

European PAA, the flexibility desired by DOD is not incompatible with appropriate 

visibility into key aspects of acquisition management. Moreover, as DOD proceeds 

with the European PAA acquisition activities, it is important for Congress and the 

President to have assurance that the European PAA policy is working as intended 

and that acquisition activities are cost-effective. We made recommendations also in 

January 2011 regarding the development of life-cycle cost estimates and an integrated schedule for the acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities to help 

identify European PAA implementation risks.11 DOD partially concurred with the 

first recommendation and fully concurred with the second. 

PRIOR GAO RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS TO IMPROVE

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Congress has taken action to address concerns regarding the acquisition management strategy, accountability, and oversight of MDA. For example, in the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Congress required MDA to establish 

acquisition cost, schedule, and performance baselines for each system element that 

has entered the equivalent of the engineering and manufacturing development 

phase of acquisition or is being produced or acquired for operational fielding.12 Most 

recently, the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 

requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that MDA establishes and maintains an 

acquisition baseline for each program element of the BMDS.13

Since our first MDA report in 2004, we have made a series of recommendations 

to improve transparency and accountability, many of which are designed to adapt 

the key transparency and accountability features already embedded in the DOD acquisition regulation and apply them to MDA. Some of our key recommendations include: 

• Establishing and reporting to Congress costs and unit costs, including development costs in unit costs, including sunk costs in cost estimates, reporting top-level test goals, obtaining independent cost estimates and taking 

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14 A knowledge-based acquisition approach is a cumulative process in which certain knowledge 

is acquired by key decision points before proceeding. 15GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned, GA0–09–338 (Washington, DC: March 

13, 2009). 16GA0–10–311. 

steps to ensure the underlying cost estimates are high quality, reliable, and 

documented reporting variances. 

• Improving transparency by requesting and using procurement funds instead of research, development, testing and evaluation funds to acquire 

fielded assets. 

• Strengthening the test program by establishing baselines for each new 

class of target in development, including sufficient schedule and resource 

margin, including spare test assets and targets, and strengthening the role 

of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation in assessing missile defense progress. 

• Implementing a knowledge-based acquisition strategy 14 consistent with 

DOD acquisition regulations, and ensure that items are not manufactured 

for fielding before their performance has been validated through testing. 

MDA HAS RECENTLY MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN INCREASING TRANSPARENCY AND

ACCOUNTABILITY

DOD has committed to take action on many of these recommendations. While 

agreeing with our recommendations to enhance baseline reporting, there are differences in MDA’s perspectives on such issues as sunk costs and changes in unit 

cost. 

In 2010, MDA made significant progress in implementing some of these recommendations by fmalizing a new baseline phase review process in which the agency set detailed baselines for several BMDS elements, or portions of elements, for the 

first time. Specifically, MDA established resource, schedule, test, operational capacity, technical, and contract baselines for several BMDS components. It reported 

these to Congress in its June 2010 BMDS Accountability Report. 

MDA also identified three phases of development where baselines are approvedtechnology development, product development, and initial production phases-and 

specified the key knowledge that is needed at each phase. MDA officials stated that 

they expect that aligning the development efforts with the phases will help to ensure that the appropriate level of knowledge is obtained before the acquisitions 

move from one phase to the next. 

In another key step, approval of the product development and initial production 

baselines will be jointly reviewed by the Director of MDA and the respective service 

acquisition executive, as a number of missile defense systems are expected to eventually transition to the military services for operation. In addition, in regard to 

these new phases, the agency established a process for approving baselines. As a 

result of MDA’s new baseline phase review process, its 2010 BMDS Accountability 

Report is more comprehensive than its 2009 report. 

MDA also undertook a new approach to testing in recent years to address our 

prior findings. In March 2009, we reported that MDA’s Integrated Master Test 

Plan—its test baseline—was not effective for management and oversight because it 

was revised frequently, only extended through the following fiscal year and was not 

well integrated with other key aspects of testing such as target acquisitions.15 In 

addition, the BMDS Operational Test Agency identified several limitations in the 

previous BMDS test program, including unaccredited models and simulations, flight 

test artificialities, and inadequate modeling of some environmental conditions.. Congress also expressed concern with MDA’s test approach. For example, in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 conference report, conferees 

noted that MDA failed to ensure an adequate testing program and that its test and 

targets program needed to be managed in a way that fully supported high-priority 

near-term programs. 

We reported last year that MDA extensively revised the test plan to address these concerns.16 MDA’s new approach now bases test scenarios on modeling and simulation needs and extends the test baseline to cover the Future Years Defense Program 

which allows for better estimation of target needs, range requirements, and test assets. Also, as part of its new test plan, MDA scheduled dedicated periods of developmental and operational testing, during which the system configuration will remain 

fixed to allow the warfighter to carry out training, tactics, techniques, and procedures for developmental and operational evaluation. Additionally, the new test plan 

is expected to provide sufficient time after test events to conduct a full post-test 

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analysis. As we reported last year, these improvements are important because 

BMDS performance cannot be fully assessed until models and simulations are accredited and validated and the test program cannot be executed without meeting its 

target needs. 

These steps represent significant progress in providing a better foundation for 

managing and overseeing the missile defense system. Given the breadth, scope, and 

complexities of systems involved in the missile defense mission and the wide range 

of stakeholders and gaps in past data, these were not easy achievements. Nevertheless, there is a significant amount of work ahead to ensure oversight and management data is clear, complete, accurate, and reliable. Specifically: 

• We found that the cost baselines that have been established are not clear, 

consistent and complete nor are they based on high quality estimates and 

therefore we remain unable to assess cost progress for the 8th year until 

MDA develops high-quality, reliable cost estimates. For example, we found 

that the unit cost baselines and the baselines for portions of and sometimes 

all the life cycle costs reported to Congress did not provide clear, consistent, 

and complete information. We also assessed the 12 life cycle cost estimates 

that were the basis for these baselines and found that half did not support 

the baselines and the other half were insufficient to be considered highquality, reliable cost estimates. 

• Our assessment of the schedule baselines determined that we could not 

compare the asset delivery schedule to the prior year’s baseline because 

MDA has stopped reporting a comprehensive list of planned asset deliveries. 

• Finally, we found the test baseline to be well documented. However, because it is success oriented, any problems encountered in executing the plan 

can cause ripple effects throughout remaining test events. The frequent 

changes that continue to occur undermine the value of the test baseline as 

an oversight tool. 

RAPID PACE OF FIELDING ASSETS MAKES TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY EVEN

MORE IMPORTANT

Over the past 10 years, we have conducted extensive research on successful programs and have found that successful defense programs ensure that their acquisitions begin with realistic plans and baselines prior to the start of development. We 

have previously reported that the key cause of poor weapon system outcomes, at the 

program level, is the consistent lack of disciplined analysis that would provide an 

understanding of what it would take to field a weapon system before system development begins. We have reported that there is a clear set of prerequisites that must 

be met by each program’s acquisition strategy to realize successful outcomes. These 

prerequisites include establishing a clear, knowledge-based, executable business 

case for the product. An executable business case is one that provides demonstrated 

evidence that: (1) the identified needs are real and necessary and can best be met 

with the chosen concept; and (2) the chosen concept can be developed and produced 

within existing resources—including technologies, funding, time, and management 

capacity. Knowledge-based acquisition principles and business cases combined are 

necessary to establish realistic cost, schedule and performance baselines. Without 

documented realistic baselines there is no foundation to accurately measure program progress. Our work has shown that when agencies do not follow a knowledgebased approach to acquisition, high levels of uncertainty about requirements, technologies, and design often exist at the start of development programs. As a result, 

cost estimates and related funding needs are often understated. 

MDA has begun to institute some key aspects of a knowledge-based approach to 

acquisition as we noted. Moreover, in its Ballistic Missile Defense Review, DOD emphasized that it is no longer necessary to pursue a high-risk acquisition strategy 

that simultaneously develops and deploys new systems. However, we continue to 

identify and report on areas of high levels of acquisition risk associated with the 

rapid pace of fielding assets. We see this effect most pronounced in three key 

areas—testing, the Aegis Ashore program and the Ground-based Midcourse Defense 

(GMD) program. 

• Testing and Targets: As in previous years, failures and delays in testing 

have continued to delay the validation of models and simulations used to 

assess BMDS performance. Target availability was a significant, though not 

the only, driver to the test plan delays. Since 2006, we have reported that 

target availability has delayed and prompted modifications to planned test 

objectives. This trend continued in 2010. We reported this year that five 

tests scheduled for fiscal year 2010 were canceled because of a moratorium 

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17To meet urgent needs, DOD can issue undefinitized contract actions, which authorize contractors to begin work before reaching a final agreement on contract terms. Undefinitized contract action means any contract action for which the contract terms, specifications, or price are 

not agreed upon before performance is begun under the action. Department of Defense Federal 

Acquisition Regulation Supplement 217.7401(d). 

on air launches of targets. The moratorium was imposed following the failure of an air launched target participating in MDA’s December 2009 Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) flight test. A failure review 

board investigation identified the rigging of cables to the missile in the aircraft as the immediate cause of the failure and shortcomings in internal 

processes at the contractor as the underlying cause. Additionally, target 

shortfalls contributed to delays in flight tests, reduced the number of flight 

tests, and altered flight test objectives. 

Another area of risk related to targets identified in this year’s report is 

MDA’s extended use of an undefmitized contract action to acquire targets 

from its incumbent prime targets contractor.17 This action, signed in April 

2010, asked the prime contractor to build a new type of medium-range airlaunched target. The contract action initially included three targets; the 

quantity was then increased to five targets in September 2010. The current 

‘‘not-to-exceed’’ level for the contract action is $496 million. MDA has allowed this undefinitized contract action to continue for an extended period. 

According to MDA officials, the delay in defmitization is due to changes in 

its requirements for the targets, and they anticipate definitization in July 

2011, by which time the contract action will have remained undefinitized 

for about 450 days. MDA officials stated that this new acquisition was to 

obtain a second procurement source for air-launched targets following the 

December 2009 THAAD flight test failure. The extended use of 

undefinitized contract actions has previously been identified by GAO and 

others as risky to the government. Because contracting officers normally reimburse contractors for all allowable costs they incur before definitization, 

contractors bear less risk and have little incentive to control costs during 

this period. The government also risks incurring unnecessary costs as requirements may change before the contract is definitized. 

• Aegis Ashore: Aegis Ashore is MDA’s future land-based variant of the 

ship-based Aegis BMD. It is expected to track and intercept ballistic missiles in their midcourse phase of flight using Standard Missile-3 (SM–3) interceptor variants as they become available. However, while Aegis BMD 

has demonstrated performance at sea, these demonstrations used the currently fielded 3.6.1 version of Aegis BMD with the SM–3 IA interceptor, not 

the newer variant of the Aegis operating system and new interceptor that 

Aegis Ashore will use. Aegis Ashore is dependent on next-generation 

versions of Aegis systems—Aegis 4.0.1 and Aegis 5.0—as well as the new 

SM–3 IB interceptor, all of which are currently under development. Moreover, a series of changes are required to further modify these new variants 

of Aegis BMD for use on land with Aegis Ashore. These modifications include changes to the Vertical Launching System; suppression or disabling 

of certain features used at sea; design, integration, and fabrication of a new 

deckhouse enclosure for the radar, and potential changes to the SM–3 IB 

interceptor. Changes to those existing Aegis BMD components that will be 

reused for Aegis Ashore may reduce their maturity in the context of the 

new Aegis Ashore program, and new features will require testing and assessment to demonstrate their performance. MDA plans to make production 

decisions for the first operational Aegis Ashore before conducting both 

ground and flight tests. We concluded in this year’s report that it is a highly concurrent effort, with significant cost, schedule, and performance risk. 

• Ground-based Midcourse Defense: GMD is a ground-based defense system 

designed to provide combatant commanders the capability to defend the 

homeland against a limited attack from intermediate, and intercontinentalrange ballistic missiles during the midcourse phase of flight. The GMD consists of a ground-based interceptor—a booster with an Exoatmospheric Kill 

Vehicle on top—and a fire control system that receives target information 

from sensors in order to formulate a battle plan. GMD continues to deliver 

assets before testing has fully determined their capabilities and limitations. 

The Director, MDA testified on March 31, 2011 that he considers the GMD 

interceptors essentially prototypes. In the urgency to deploy assets to meet 

the Presidential directive to field an initial capability by 2004, assets were 

built and deployed before developmental testing was completed. During the 

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ongoing developmental testing, issues were found that led to a need for retrofits. GMD intercept tests conducted to date have already led to major 

hardware or software changes to the interceptors—not all of which have 

been verified through flight testing. In addition, manufacturing of a new 

variant called the Capability Enhancement II is well underway and more 

than half of those variants have already been delivered although their capability has not been validated through developmental flight tests. To date, 

the two flight tests utilizing this variant have both failed to intercept the 

target. According to MDA, as a result of the most recent failure in December 2010, deliveries of this variant have been halted. Again, because of the 

urgency to deploy some capability, limited work was undertaken on longterm sustainment for the system which is critical to ensure the system remains effective through 2032. In September 2010, MDA finalized the GMD 

Stockpile Reliability Program Plan, a key step in developing the knowledge 

needed to determine the sustainment needs of the GMD system. 

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

This year MDA has made significant strides in providing a better foundation for 

Congress and others to assess progress and hold senior leadership accountable for 

outcomes. Undoubtable progress has been made in terms of implementing new acquisition reviews and reporting detailed baselines, but critical gaps remain in the 

material reported, particularly the quality of the underlying cost estimates needed 

to establish baselines. We look forward to continuing to work with DOD and MDA 

in addressing these gaps and further strengthening the underpinnings for sound 

oversight. Moreover, as we have recommended previously, improvements to oversight reporting should be complemented by knowledge-based acquisition approaches 

that ensure programs complete developmental activities before proceeding into production; that test plans are stabilized and adequately resourced; and that targets 

used for testing are reliable, available, and affordable. Given the breadth and scope 

of the European Phased Adaptive Approach it is also important that Congress have 

assurance that this policy is working as intended and is cost-effective. 

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the subcommittee, 

this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have at this time. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

I guess now I get to ask a question. General O’Reilly, as I was 

starting to say, and I think you began to address it, being more 

than halfway through fiscal year 2011 and DOD still operating 

under a continuing resolution at fiscal year 2010 funding levels, 

can you tell us what the impacts on your missile defense program 

has been on operating under the continuing resolution (CR), and 

will you be able to mitigate some of those impacts if Congress 

passes a year-long funding resolution with most of the fiscal year 

2011 defense appropriation levels soon? 

General O’REILLY. Thank you, sir. The impact of the CR, series 

of CRs, for 2011 on the MDA’s program has been significant. One 

area, for example, is the GMD system, which the President had requested a $324 million increase in fiscal year 2011 over fiscal year 

2010, so we’re still operating at the fiscal year 2010 position. That 

is significant when it comes to construction, for example, of the 

GMD system in Alaska. We’re approaching the construction season, 

where most of the work is done, and if we were not able to get a 

budget this week I would be in a significantly diminished position 

in order to hire the construction crews on time and we could perhaps lose most of the year’s construction. 

The mitigation to that is, if it does look like and if we do receive 

a budget for fiscal year 2011 I will be able to accomplish about 80 

percent of the construction I was intending. But I must tell you 

that across our programs the CRs have prevented us from starting 

new starts for fiscal year 2011, such as our satellite programs that 

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were to support EPAA, and they have caused a tremendous inefficiency in allowing contracts to only move forward, very large contracts, for several weeks at a time. 

So the combined impact is a significant inefficiency and a reduction in, now with this budget, how much I can accomplish over the 

remaining months of this fiscal year. I do believe I’m going to have 

to readjust what I intended to accomplish in fiscal year 2012 because the budget was received in April and before all of the funding 

will be received will be many weeks later than that. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

I see we’re joined by the chairman of the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, Senator Levin. Senator Levin, would you have any 

comments you’d like to make? 

Chairman LEVIN. I would have questions later on, but Senator 

Shaheen was here first, so please go in the regular order. Thank 

you, though. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You all have alluded to the current budget situation that we’re 

facing and clearly it’s going to affect everyone across the board. As 

you look at the budget situation, can you talk about how you expect 

to be able to keep programs on track? Specifically—I guess this 

goes to you, General O’Reilly, and perhaps Dr. Roberts—can you 

talk about the balance between development and testing versus deployment and what potential risks there are if you misjudge on one 

side or the other? 

General O’REILLY. Senator, I will start first. As far as the budget 

impacts are, as I said, they’re very significant across the board. In 

some cases where we’ve just lost at least half a year’s worth of program and we will not—for example, the start of my satellite surveillance program, our new program—we will now be allowed our 

new start at the end of this week if we receive a budget, which is 

more than half a year. I don’t believe we’re going to be able to 

catch up on that time. 

So in some cases we can’t. In other cases, with production lines 

and so forth, we will try to acquire larger lots of supplies and accelerate the production line on some of our interceptors. But again, 

I don’t believe we’re going to be able to mitigate the total impact 

of the CRs this year. So what we set out to accomplish in 2011, 

some of it’s going to have to occur in 2012. 

As far as the balance between testing and development, we have 

taken a look several years ago at all of the data that was required 

for testing in order to do two things: one, to confirm for the operational test agencies, independently confirm, that missile defense 

systems are suitable and operationally deployable and effective. 

The second reason is to support the accreditation of our models and 

simulations. Our testing is so expensive—a typical GMD test can 

cost $300 million. So to fully test its full operational capability, especially against large raid sizes of missiles, it’s critical that we 

have independent verification of our models and simulations which 

our combatant commanders will use. 

So we have set out and restructured our programs to ensure that 

every new deliverable product has gone through a testing regime 

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sufficient for the operational test agencies to make an independent 

assessment, are they ready. 

The penalties we can see in the approach for GMD, for example: 

I can understand why we fielded GMD as quickly as we did, but 

we will still be testing some of the original fundamental operations 

of the system for many years. As we discover that we need to upgrade the system because of something we found in flight testing, 

we will go back and refurbish the missiles we have. So that’s why 

we’ve started a stockpiling of missiles to do that. But that is much 

more expensive than to completely qualify, what we call, for production all of our systems on the ground before we go into flight 

testing. 

But I understand why we did it in GMD. We have a strategy to 

increase over time the reliability of the system through testing. But 

we will not approach that, nor have we, as a result of the BMDR 

for the rest of our systems. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So when you do those independent 

verifications of your models, since we’re not actually testing in real 

time, do you have any evidence that there’s ever a problem? 

General O’REILLY. Senator, there are two levels where we find 

problems, actually three. The first is in the component testing on 

the ground. To the greatest extent possible, we replicate the performance of the missile components on the ground as if they were 

flying. We do that hundreds of times. It occurs in very severe environments. That’s our first confidence level that these components 

work right. 

In our latest GMD test, we did find we had a failure mode that 

could not be replicated on the Earth and that’s why I am going to 

request an additional test to verify we fixed it. The Earth’s gravitation is one problem with testing it on the ground, and literally the 

rotation of the Earth. These are very sensitive items and you must 

be in flight testing, and the frequencies and shocks that we can 

replicate on the ground are limited, even with our best capabilities, 

our best facilities. 

So one of the problems is until you’re into flight testing you can’t 

totally replicate on the ground. But you can do a lot. 

Second is to integrate the system in extensive ground testing. We 

do it in laboratories and then we repeat it actually in the field with 

the soldiers, sailors, and airmen operating the system, and we simulate threats on the system and we run those hundreds of times 

in order to gain a confidence level. But the Director of Operational 

Test and Evaluation—and each Service has its own independent 

operational test agency—makes the final assessment on my products, not the MDA, so that there’s some independence. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

In competing for some of the scientists and engineers that we’re 

going to need for the future to continue the work of the MDA and 

also for DOD, are you comfortable that the current budget actually 

supports our ability to recruit and train the scientists and engineers and mathematicians that we’re going to need? I have an ulterior motive in asking this question because I think we’re not doing 

enough to train the folks in the science, technology, engineering, 

and mathematics subjects that we’re going to need for the future 

211 

to continue to lead this country, and obviously in your agency 

there’s a critical need for people with those degrees and training. 

General O’REILLY. Ma’am, I couldn’t agree more. Senator, our 

issue with qualified young engineers and scientists has been increased or exacerbated by the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure 

Act. We moved our technical workforce from Washington, where I 

had over 3,000 engineers. I will now have 300 people here by the 

end of September. We moved those to Huntsville, AL, and Colorado 

Springs and Dahlgren, VA. 

The problem was the average age of my workforce was 49, so 

most of them were not willing to move. So I needed to hire over 

1,000 engineers. We went to the universities and there were two 

aspects that we observed. One, I think it takes personal engagement. I have personally engaged with universities, as well with the 

chairman, out on trips. We’ve gotten a tremendous response from 

that. 

Two is, unfortunately, the economy. For every engineering position I have had as we hire the college graduates, we have had between 18 to 26 highly qualified applicants for every position. So the 

MDA as a consequence, unintended, of the economy, we’ve received 

tremendously qualified applicants. The average person we receive 

has over a 3.8 average. 40 percent are master’s degrees or Ph.Ds. 

But I do spend a lot of time in the universities, also with research. Key to this is investing in research with the faculty members so they in fact can talk to the students and the postdocs and 

they can see opportunities in government such as this. 

Finally, I have outreach to historically black colleges and universities because our agency had 12 percent minorities, but in the engineering field 2 years ago, .3 percent of our engineers were minorities. Today it’s 4 percent. So it may not seem like a lot, but it took 

a significant amount of effort to reach that. 

So in all of those areas, Senator, I couldn’t agree more. The 

young folks really respond to personal energy and personal appearances and that’s what I have been pursuing. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I’m out of time, but how many women? 

General O’REILLY. In some universities over 70 percent of the engineering students are women, and that’s reflected today. In the 

group that we have hired since I first mentioned, over 40, I believe 

it’s 42 or 44 percent are women engineers. So we previously had 

less than 10 percent—significant growth in that area, too. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So what’s the final number? Where are you at 

today? 

General O’REILLY. We have hired 380 new college graduates in 

the last 2 years. What I’m trying to do is prevent a demographic 

bump again in my organization. So we hire 100 at the end of every 

semester, to smooth out the demographics. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me go over. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

General O’Reilly, as I mentioned in the opening statement, after 

two recent test failures it’s clear that GMD is in need of some additional resources. More I think is needed to ensure the capability 

212 

that we have works to the advanced degree that you’d like it to operate at. 

I would first note—see if I’m correct—that the initial guidance 

system’s kill vehicles have performed ably and I believe 20 of those 

are in the ground today and you believe are capable of defeating 

the kind of incoming missiles likely to be received from an Iran or 

North Korea; is that correct at this point in time? 

General O’REILLY. I can’t get into the actual number of that configuration, but our original configuration, yes, sir, we have had five 

flight tests and three intercepts out of three attempts and have 

found no indication of the type of problem we found in the newest 

version, where we have failed twice. 

Senator SESSIONS. The new version was designed to be even 

more sophisticated to deal with more sophisticated threats; is that 

correct? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. It had more accurate guidance instrumentation on board. 

Senator SESSIONS. So it’s going to take some effort to get that 

under control. I think you’ve indicated you need more interceptors 

to facilitate the kind of realistic testing that you believe is necessary. Is that correct? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. Before the first generation of GBI, we 

flew a test where we did not have an intercept, and I’m asking for 

another test in order to verify that we’ve resolved the problems on 

this latest interceptor version. 

Senator SESSIONS. Could you give an estimate of what that test 

might cost, say one test? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, since it does not involve a target, the cost would be primarily of the interceptor, which would be around $70 

million, and then an additional $30 to $40 million of support for 

that test. So it’s approximately $100 million for that test. 

I have also, sir, determined that we’re going to need significant ground testing of at least $50 to $100 million more on the ground, 

again to verify that we have absolutely resolved this problem. 

Senator SESSIONS. We’ve had such a long and basically successful 

effort to establish the capability to defend the United States 

against a missile attack, we don’t need to stop, allow our adversaries to develop more sophisticated missiles, and then all of our 

efforts have been not productive. 

So you would say that it does make sense that we continue to 

develop the more sophisticated capabilities that the threats may 

pose to us in the years to come? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. I would agree with, for example as 

Admiral Winnefeld said, to stay ahead of the threat. 

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts indicated that the threat is qualitatively and quantitatively advancing, I believe. 

Now, with regard to this money that’s going to be needed, maybe 

$250 million you just referred to, where do you plan to get that and 

how can you obtain that? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, for this year I’ve had to stop the production of seven GBIs in production because we don’t want to go forward until we’ve absolutely assured we’ve identified and resolved 

this design issue that’s caused the most recent failure. So I am proposing to divert the funding that we would have had to build those 

213 

seven interceptors and to do more refurbishments and to support 

this ground testing, than we had originally planned. 

Senator SESSIONS. So that looks to me like you’re robbing Peter 

to pay Paul, and it raises the fundamental question, of does this 

budget give you enough money to keep the program on track and 

actually fix the failures. I know that you have difficulties. All of us 

in Congress, the White House, and the Secretary of Defense are 

saying watch spending, try to contain spending, and we all believe 

in that, trust me. 

However, when we’ve done this much work and we’re down to 

maybe $40 billion more has been spent on this project and we’ve 

hit a difficulty, we need to be able to go forward with it and we 

don’t need to stop short of the number of interceptors we need in 

the ground and prepared. 

So I guess my question is, in your personal professional opinion—and we ask you for that—do you have enough money to keep 

this program on track and to fix the challenges from the GMD system? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, for fiscal year 2011 and for fiscal year 

2012, because I have had to stop the production of the current 

GBIs and I am diverting that funding to fixing this problem and 

I’m using funding that was reserved for a flight test next year of 

the two-stage interceptor, which will have to move another 

year—— 

Senator SESSIONS. That will push the two-stage interceptor back. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, without additional funding in fiscal year 

2013 and beyond, there will need to be a delay of about a year of 

our overall flight test program that we were trying to complete by 

2017. So that’s one way to do it. 

Right now, sir, I have the funding I need to address this problem 

because I’ve stopped my production line. 

Senator SESSIONS. That has costs and ramifications also. 

So I guess what I would say, Mr. Chairman, is that the DOD 

budget is tight. Just looking at the basic numbers on the MDA 

budget, DOD gets an increase as requested by the President, I 

think, in the House. But you have a reduction of, I estimate, about 

5 percent in MDA’s budget request; is that correct? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, for fiscal year 2012 it’s $48 million higher than fiscal year 2011, and fiscal year 2011 was $324 million higher 

than fiscal year 2012. So for this budget it’s actually higher than 

last year. 

Chairman LEVIN. You mean fiscal year 2010? 

General O’REILLY. I’m sorry. I meant 2010. Fiscal year 2010 to 

fiscal year 2011 was $324 million higher than fiscal year 2010. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think we should take a note here how alert 

the chairman is over here. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. I apologize. 

Senator SESSIONS. Somebody is watching the store. You get an 

A, Mr. Chairman. I’m asking the questions. I wasn’t following 

that—I wasn’t that quick. 

Chairman LEVIN. I didn’t mean to interrupt. 

Senator SESSIONS. No, you do a fabulous job of keeping up with 

things. 

214 

General O’REILLY. Sir, I do believe in the near term, for fiscal 

year 2011 and 2012, however, as I’ve said before—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Next year you begin to bite. 2013, the budget 

is less than originally projected, is it not, the 5-year? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. Across the following 5 years, two 

things. First, we’re finishing the heavy construction over fiscal year 

2012. So the remainder of the work is focused on interceptors, 

flight testing, and upgrades. So that accounts for about half of it. 

The other half is the efficiencies we’re approving, sir. We have 

not reduced what we intended to accomplish, even though there’s 

$2.4 billion less in the MDA budget. We have identified all of the 

steps we’re taking so they can be accounted for and it will be evident we’re either achieving it or we’re not, these efficiencies, for the 

same amount. 

Senator SESSIONS. Excuse me. You just noted, though, that 

you’re delaying the two-stage testing and you’re stopping the production of your interceptors. Both of those will add costs to the future. 

We can talk more about where we are financially. I applaud you 

for the efficiencies that you’ve found, but I think there’s no doubt, 

with the unfortunate failures of these tests, that it’s going to hit 

our budget more than we expected, and we really need to see what 

we can do to keep your already-reduced plans from putting us in 

a situation we don’t want to be in. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Chairman Levin. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You say you stopped the production of the interceptors. I thought 

it was the kill vehicles which you’ve stopped production on. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, it is the kill vehicles. I can’t deliver the 

interceptor without the kill vehicles. 

Chairman LEVIN. No, that’s fine. But you said the production of 

the interceptors and I think you meant kill vehicles; is that correct? 

General O’REILLY. That part of the interceptor, yes, sir, the kill 

vehicles. 

Chairman LEVIN. On the funding issue, you’re stopping production not to save money, but because you want to do testing first to 

make sure that what you produce will work; is that fair? 

General O’REILLY. That’s absolutely the case, sir. We did not anticipate this failure, and especially when it happened when the 

budget was already developed. So that was not to save any money. 

It is solely driven by we need to confirm the design works before 

we go back into production. 

Chairman LEVIN. I totally agree with that philosophy, because I 

think you should know whether something works before it’s produced and deployed, and there’s been too many times where we’ve 

deviated from that course in the past, particularly in missile defense, for my comfort level. 

But you’re satisfied. Let me ask the other witnesses too. Do you 

all agree that it makes sense to not produce further kill vehicles 

until we have corrected the problem, so that when we do produce 

them we know that they’re going to properly behave? Admiral, 

would you agree with that? 

215 

Admiral MACY. Absolutely, sir. It was one of the basic results of 

the BMDR that we would, if you will, fly before we buy. We would 

ensure that to the best of our ability within costs of testing and 

modeling and simulation that we would understand the performance of the systems. So when they are fielded, from my perspective 

representing the warfighter, I have confidence in their level of performance. So that I can build my operational plans to meet the 

need. 

Chairman LEVIN. Dr. Roberts, do you have any difference with 

that? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Ditto. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, General, last year I believe you displayed 

some frustration with the quality of some contractors’ work, and 

you and I discussed the need to improve the MDA contracts to try 

to get more protection for the government against defects, which 

would require some defects clauses in the contracts. 

Have you made any progress towards including defects clauses in 

the contracts? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, we’ve worked with industry to get their 

feedback. I’ve worked with the leaders, the chief executive officers, 

of the major aerospace corporations and asked them for their ideas 

and help on this, so that it is most effective, these clauses. 

The clause that we’re looking at is not to indemnify industry 

from trying to achieve an unprecedented technical goal. That is the 

reason why we have cost-plus contracts. Unfortunately, when we 

find a failure mode that was caused by a quality, what we refer to 

as a quality escape—they didn’t follow their own processes, their 

supervisors didn’t catch it, and ultimately it caused a defective 

product—that’s also today under our contracts protected by a costplus contract. It’s the cost just went up. 

An example is the first of the two GMD failures was caused because of a quality problem, and no matter how much additional 

money we added that wouldn’t have resolved the root cause of that 

problem. 

So where I am today is looking at the fee and looking at the profit that we’re providing contractors and having the ability to go beyond the limited scope that we currently have in our award fees 

for quality control and extending it to a much greater pool of award 

fee money, even past-awarded money, so that the government can 

be compensated for egregious errors in quality control. 

Chairman LEVIN. I hope you’ll pursue that. As I understand it 

from our conversations, that first flight failure was due to a lock 

wire, if I have the right word, not being in place; is that accurate? 

General O’REILLY. That is accurate, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. It was not where it was supposed to be? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, that is not something that the government should be losing money over as far as I’m concerned. I agree 

with you that you want the industry to be creative and if things 

fail because there’s design problems and because we’re taking 

risks, that’s fine. That’s what research is all about. But if you have 

a plan that says the lock wire, whatever that is, has to be here and 

instead it was put over here and we have a missile test failure because of that, that’s a totally different deal as far as I’m concerned. 

216 

There is a role for cost-plus. We use it much too much, and I 

commend, by the way, Senator McCain and others on this committee for really joining in an effort to go after cost-plus contracts 

where they shouldn’t be cost-plus. But I’m very much troubled by 

this. When you have a missile failure, a test failure, and it costs 

hundreds of millions of dollars and it’s because something was not 

put in the right place according to the plan, then I think that the 

taxpayers should not be paying for that, and I hope you’ll pursue 

that approach that you’re using vigorously. 

Do I have time? I don’t know. 

Senator NELSON. Go ahead. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’d like to talk to you, Admiral, about the PAA 

to missile defense in Europe. As I understand it, you are responsible for assessing missile defense capability requirements of the 

combatant commanders. I believe that, after input from the combatant commanders, the Joint Chiefs unanimously recommended 

the PAA to missile defense in Europe. If that’s true so far, can you 

tell us why from a warfighter perspective the military benefits of 

the EPAA to missile defense make sense? 

Admiral MACY. Thank you, Senator. Yes, it makes sense because 

it provides us two opportunities. The first is an opportunity in time 

and the second is an opportunity in planning. 

In the role of time, the PAA allows us to address the closer 

threat to Europe, the threat of medium-range, and intermediaterange missiles coming from the Middle East, whereas previously 

we did not have a method to do so prior to 2017 at the earliest with 

the so-called third site plan, which because of physics also would 

have had some limitations in defending some of the parts of Europe, those more to the south. 

The PAA, being phased to our own technologies and adapted to 

the threat, gave us a way in which to organize our thoughts and 

our plans to take advantage of the near-term capabilities that are 

present in Aegis and in THAAD, developed by MDA, to address 

those near-term threats to Europe. So that’s a time issue. Basically, we can address the threats to Europe much sooner than we 

would have been able to. 

The second is in the flexibility and the capability of the system. 

It allows us to adapt to changes that may appear in enemy intent 

and the emergence of threats from another area. We have done 

most of our planning for threats coming from one particular country or set of countries and part of the region. If another were to 

develop this capability, it would allow us to adjust faster. 

It would allow us to increase or decrease the capability based on 

the amount of threat. It allows us opportunities for partners to 

take part in the missile defense of Europe by having more opportunities for ways in which they can connect with our system and 

come up with an allied approach. Whereas previously it was a unitary system linked to the homeland defense BMD capability and 

there was not a real practical way to have the partners involved. 

So we have flexibility in capability, we have flexibility in the alliance, and we have the opportunity to address threats on a more 

timely basis. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

217 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Chairman Levin. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome to all of you. Thank you for being here today. 

Let me start with this. As we develop active defense networks to 

counter advanced ballistic missiles, deployed American forces and 

some of our allies, as we know all too well, are faced with the 

threat of low-tech rockets and missiles. Some of these weapons 

don’t require a lot of technical knowledge for the user. They can be 

launched from the backs of pickup trucks and they’re easily hidden. 

How do we strike a balance between countering complex systems 

and those that are basically flying improvised explosive devices 

(IED)? 

Admiral MACY. Senator, that falls into the, if you will, larger 

realm of which I am responsible, which is integrated air and missile defense (IAMD), where we look at the defense of the Homeland, of own forces and partner forces from all threat objects arriving in the atmosphere, regardless of source. So we look at the 

IAMD architecture, the IAMD capability, across the board to address that. 

We have an IAMD operational architecture, a formal way of looking at what decisions and information are there made at each stage 

in that process, who has to make them, and who they have to provide it to. This has been done in a very rigorous and organized 

fashion, in accordance with the operational architectural framework. 

We coordinate with program providers across the spectrum of air 

and missile defense at the program level, how they fit into that 

operational architecture, and how they address these issues. Recently we’ve had a number of discussions with the Army in particular on countering rockets, artillery, and mortar issues, and 

what needs to be done, what are the requirements, what are the 

current capabilities, and what are the shortfalls. 

We serve, as I said earlier, at the nexus of how this is done within DOD. We participate with the Services in their development of 

classic air defense systems through the joint capabilities process, 

and we participate with STRATCOM, who has the responsibility as 

the air and missile defense integrating authority to look at those 

requirements across the spectrum of threat. 

In the BMD world, we look at the prioritized capabilities list, the 

achievable capabilities list, that’s generated by STRATCOM with 

the combatant commanders, and the dialogue that goes on with 

MDA over the programs that General O’Reilly is asked to provide. 

So we are the nexus across that span of questions from rockets, 

artillery, mortars, long-range rockets, short-range ballistic missiles, 

manned bombers, fighter aircraft, et cetera. I don’t know if that answers your question, but that’s how we try to put it together, then 

integrate both solely service programs—Army air defense, Navy air 

defense, Air Force air defense capabilities—with joint programs, 

how they work together. 

We conduct a number of studies on that, one of the most significant being a series of exercises known as Nimble Fire, where in a 

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218 

bilities of all of the Services and see how they interact. We’ve been 

involved in all of these discussions that we’ve had here today. 

Senator UDALL. I may want to follow up with some additional 

questions for the record. 

General, did you have anything to add, or Dr. Roberts? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, in my charter it does not cover the very 

short-range rockets you referred to. So I develop typically a Scud 

threat and beyond. I have been asked by Congress and we do comanage some Israeli programs that are short-range, such as the 

David’s Sling. But even what you’re referring to is more in the 

realm of the Iron Dome system, which was not part of our development, but I have been watching that and I have seen it’s been successful in its recent deployment against very short-range rockets. 

Admiral MACY. Senator, I’d like to add, if I may, sir, that I’m 

frankly very proud of the very close liaison between my staff and 

that of MDA, where we look at these intersections very closely to 

understand where there are opportunities for exchange of information, exchange of data and capabilities. 

So it’s not that one part of JIAMDO is doing air defense and another part is doing ballistic missiles. We are very closely integrated 

with MDA as well as with the service engineers. We understand 

this is a spectrum of capability. 

Senator UDALL. It’s hard to see it being a threat in a broad-based 

way to our forces, but General O’Reilly mentioned the situation in 

Israel and I think that that has political elements as well as military elements, and the political elements can affect the military situation and the stability in the region. The more we develop the capacity to counter flying IEDs, in some ways the better. 

I’ll follow up with some additional questions on cost and so on. 

I want to use the second half of my time, if I have some left, to 

turn to GAO. Ms. Chaplain, you’re here, and thank you for your 

good work. You talked about some aspects of MDA’s flexible acquisitions process that create what the report describes as ‘‘down 

sides’’ for oversight and accountability. I know that DOD concurred 

with some of the GAO recommendations and that MDA has made 

some significant progress. But there are some recommendations 

that DOD still disagrees with, and I’d like you just to discuss those, 

if you would, and then give General O’Reilly a chance to respond. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Yes, there were some disagreements. Our recommendations focused on where we thought MDA could further 

improve the reporting that it had started. One issue, for example, 

was with regard to sunk costs for targets, and we believe those 

sunk costs should be reported and pretty clear, and MDA only partially agreed with that. They didn’t feel like that would fit the way 

they want to report targets and that it’s difficult to report some of 

the heritage costs in targets. 

But our concern was even MDA sunk costs weren’t reported and 

we felt that they need to be, and to the extent the other costs can 

be or cannot be found that needs to be disclosed. 

We also had some partial disagreements on the way testing is 

planned. We encouraged MDA to make test plans more realistic. 

There are often failures in testing and a lot of rework going on. We 

thought maybe some additional time and resources should be built 

into the plan, and they only partially agreed with that recVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00224 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
219 

ommendation. I think it’s just part of the issues involved with testing. As General O’Reilly said, they’re very expensive tests to conduct and it might require more resources upfront. 

But our goal is to avoid a lot of the rework that goes along with 

a test plan that’s not fully stabilized yet. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

I think my time has expired, so, General O’Reilly, I’ll have you 

respond for the record, if I might, so that Senator Shaheen can ask 

some questions. 

I would just add that when I was a businessman I on the one 

hand loved seeing my auditors and on the other hand I wasn’t all 

that happy to see my auditors. So thank you for what you do. I 

know General O’Reilly and I have had some conversations and he 

takes seriously your insights and has made some real improvements and is notably and understandably proud. I look forward to 

your responses for the record. I did want to yield so Senator 

Shaheen can ask her questions. 

Thank you. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Ms. Chaplain raised two issues, one regarding reporting sunk costs of targets and 

one on adding additional time and resources to execute our test programs. I will respond to both. 

Target sunk costs are not reported in MDA program baselines. Targets are developed in support of separate and distinct Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) 

test events and do not follow a traditional DOD weapon system procurement process. As the test program adjusts, the quantity of targets in the baseline adjusts as 

well. Additionally, each target is inherently a test article and no two are truly identical. As such, there is not a clear quantity of targets to be procured over the 

lifecycle in order to amortize the non-recurring engineering costs. 

MDA strives to reuse previously developed and procured strategic missile components in our targets program, so including all sunk costs would not accurately reflect program costs. Accordingly, MDA uses the costs incurred or planned during the 

Future Years Defense Program to calculate unit costs. 

The Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) is defined well enough over a 6-year period to provide a reasonable baseline from which target needs can be defined and 

targets can be procured. 

With respect to the second issue raised by Ms. Chaplain, MDA builds available 

schedule and resource margin into the test baseline in order to stabilize, to the extent possible, the test program and minimize rework in test planning and execution. 

MDA continuously evaluates the availability and allocation of test resources to ensure all components of the test program (e.g., range availability, target availability, 

range safety systems, data collection assets, et cetera) are synchronized. MDA thoroughly analyzes all test results (successes and failures) to ensure test objectives 

were met. When analysis determines an objective was not fully met, it is assessed 

for inclusion in a future test event. This continuous evaluation allows MDA to reallocate resources based upon test results, priorities, and warfighter requested capabilities. The IMTP has defined flight and ground test plans, at both the system and 

element levels, that can be adjusted based upon emerging test results or changing 

warfighter requirements. Test delays, accelerations, cancellations, and additions are 

analyzed using established MDA processes to update the IMTP and maximize the 

use of planned test events for additional data collection. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. Roberts, you in your testimony referred to 

the hedge options. It’s my understanding that DOD has been planning to implement a number of these hedge capabilities and I understand that DOD is currently conducting an analysis. Do you 

have some idea of when this analysis of the hedge options would 

be finished, and is it possible that you would brief us at the time 

that you have those options analyzed and under consideration? 

220 

Dr. ROBERTS. Yes, we’re committed to brief you as soon as we 

have the Secretary’s review and decisions in this area. Frankly, we 

expected that to be by now. We thought we’d have more to say in 

this hearing about the hedge. But of course, other events have intervened and we expect within a matter of a few short weeks. 

Senator NELSON. General O’Reilly, are you confident that the 

MDA will be able to deploy additional GBIs at the eight extra silos 

at Fort Greely in a timely manner if DOD chooses to do so? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, we’re going to need to complete the additional missiles that are currently stopped in production in order to 

do that. As soon as we have those completed, we will have at that 

point, I believe, over 10 missiles additional for those 8 silos, sir. So 

I will get back to you on the record the exact delivery dates for 

those remaining missiles. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Pending the outcome of the Failure Review Board, once the corrections to the missiles are made, MDA will prioritize repair of both emplaced missiles and GroundBased Interceptors (GBIs) in production. While no decision has been made to fill additional silos in Missile Field 2, if directed to do so, eight additional GBIs will be 

available for emplacement by the end of fiscal year 2015. 

Senator NELSON. Okay, thank you. 

Admiral Macy, can you explain how DOD assesses how many 

missile defense interceptors are required to meet the needs of the 

combatant commanders? I presume it’s not as simple as planning 

to have at least two interceptors for each adversary ballistic missile 

so we can shoot at every missile. But if you could help us understand how the COCOMs and the military view the actual role of 

missile defense and the force structure that they need. 

In other words, how does missile defense fit into the larger picture of a COCOM’s missions and capabilities? 

Admiral MACY. Yes, sir. I’m looking forward to addressing that. 

To begin with, it’s important to note that BMD capability as we 

have been talking about it today is not an isolated mission. As you 

pointed out, it’s on the warfighters’ planning. It’s part of a larger 

campaign against an adversary. 

I shorthand it sometimes that BMD does not defend you against 

ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles are an action taken by an adversary for a political result. BMD provides part of the national capability to deal with that potential threat or to deal with the event 

should it occur. 

So what BMD allows us to do is to prevent the adversary from 

winning the fight with the first wave. What it does is to provide 

the requisite level of protection for critical forces and nodes and capabilities sufficient for the combatant commander to bring all the 

other elements of national power to bear to get the enemy to 

change his behavior, because in the end that’s what you’re trying 

to do, is to change the enemy’s behavior. 

The goal is not to just simply sit there and keep taking 

incomings. As you pointed out, it’s not practical. The number of 

threat missiles in the world already exceeds our inventory and will 

continue to do so. So buying missiles equal to twice the number is 

just not practical. 

So what we look for and what we have done in the JCM–III 

study is to look at that from a warfighting perspective: How long 

221 

can BMD capability provide the requisite level of protection to 

those critical assets that the combatant commander has identified 

so that he can take other steps necessary to change the enemy’s behavior, to stop the enemy’s use of ballistic missiles? 

That’s from an operational perspective. From a planning perspective, demonstrating that having sufficient capability may assist in 

deterring the enemy from contemplating the use of ballistic missiles, knowing that he will not be successful in his initial attacks, 

and he can remain confident that the reaction of the United States 

is going to be significantly more than simply defending against the 

incoming. 

Senator NELSON. How does the Joint Staff allocate the number 

of missile defense systems to the various combatant commanders, 

who I’m sure are competing to one degree or another for those assets? 

Admiral MACY. Yes, sir. It’s a safe bet that each of them has a 

list which is a little bit longer than the one I have. 

It is part of our global force management process, which is our 

formal process to assess the operational plans and requirements of 

each combatant commander, to understand the risks and the rewards of allocating them different capabilities. This is true across 

the board, whether it’s BMD ships, whether it’s long-range bombers, whether it’s infantry brigades, for their different needs. 

We have an ongoing process through the Global Force Management Board to understand their needs and their requirements, to 

balance across the forces what we have available, and to use that 

information to essentially do two things. One is to feed back 

through the Secretary to the development community and the 

budget community what we need to increase because we assess the 

overall risk as being too high and, until we have those, to give to 

the Secretary that information he needs to make the decision on 

what risks he’s going to take and where he’s going to take them. 

Last year we looked very carefully at the issue of BMD forces 

with the Global Force Management community. We are folding that 

into the community. STRATCOM is currently leading an effort 

among the three COCOMs plus U.S. Northern Command to understand how all of their different plans fit together and to understand 

how we would apportion and allocate forces in the near term and 

over time as we get more capability to each one of those. 

Senator NELSON. So at the end of the process, is it the Secretary 

who makes the decision or is it brought to the Secretary’s attention 

and the Secretary either assents or dissents to it? 

Admiral MACY. Every deployment order is a decision by the Secretary in his role on behalf of the President as the command authority, whether it’s for a ship or for a brigade. We have a process 

that goes on every week. It’s called the Dep Ord Book. It’s the Deployment Order Book, where the movement of forces, the reassignment of forces, goes through a review process among the COCOMs, 

goes through the Joint Staff, is reviewed by the Chairman in his 

role of providing military advice, and then is presented to the Secretary, and he literally signs off each page. His initials go on: ‘‘yes’’, 

‘‘no’’, or ‘‘come see me’’. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Senator Shaheen. 

222 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just have a final question. I was interested in the back and 

forth around Israel’s Iron Dome and David’s Sling program and the 

Arrow program, because I had the opportunity to visit Israel last 

summer and be briefed by their director of the missile defense program on those systems. I actually think we should take a lesson 

in terms of naming our systems. I think theirs are quite descriptive. 

But what I was interested in is, you mentioned that the Iron 

Dome technology was Israeli and I know that we contribute to the 

work that’s being done there, so I wonder if you could talk about 

what we have learned from the technology that’s been developed 

and how much of that is shared and whether we are actually incorporating any of that into what we’re doing here. 

General O’REILLY. Senator, actually the Iron Dome is one of the 

few Israeli programs that’s totally developed by them. So we do not 

have a sharing agreement with them. David’s Sling, we provide 50 

percent of the funding and they provide 50 percent of the resources. 

Our companies, such as Raytheon, work with that development so 

that they have the proprietary rights and the information rights to 

develop that type of capability should we want David’s Sling. The 

same with Boeing on Arrow 3. Those two programs, in which we 

are investing approximately half of the resources, we do not—first 

of all, our industry team is working on those programs, so they see 

the details of the technology, and we have the rights to that technology. There are certain limitations, but all that is pre-agreed to 

prior to the start. 

But in the Iron Dome, that is not a MDA program. I have been 

asked to provide funding out of my budget for the procurement of 

Iron Dome. So we’re ready to follow the guidance of Congress in 

that regard. But I don’t participate in the actual management or 

the development of that capability. But I’ve reviewed it. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Where are we in terms of the procurement? 

There has been a request from Congress, but have we done anything on that? 

General O’REILLY. Senator, I need this year’s budget, fiscal year 2011. It’s in the fiscal year 2011 budget, $205 million for the MDA 

for the procurement of that for Israel. 

Senator SHAHEEN. If we do contribute to that, what would we 

learn from that and will we be able to take advantage of any of the 

procurement efforts? 

General O’REILLY. Once we have the budget, I will begin that 

process. But we have not begun that, those agreements with the— 

and the office in Israel that you were referring to, they also were 

not responsible for the development of Iron Dome. That office, we 

work together closely every day. So this is something we’re going 

to have to determine ahead of time of the agreements. That hasn’t 

occurred yet. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So who developed the Iron Dome technology? 

General O’REILLY. I know the company is Rafael and I’ve been 

out there. I’ve seen their testing. It’s very impressive for what it 

can do. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

223 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator. 

Ms. Chaplain, when GAO makes recommendations for MDA to 

improve its program management, DOD formally indicates its view 

of those recommendations. I believe in response to recommendations in your report in March, DOD either agreed or partially 

agreed with all your recommendations. Your report and your testimony indicate that MDA has made significant progress in improving the accountability and transparency of its programs. 

If MDA implements the recommendations in your report, how far 

will it have come toward what you would consider an acceptable 

level of transparency and accountability? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. If they implemented all the recommendations, 

they will have come a very long way in getting the things that we 

want to see for accountability and transparency. There are some 

actions that need to be taken that shouldn’t be taken lightly. One 

thing we’re looking for, for example, are independent cost estimates 

(ICE) and MDA has just started that process. So that’s going to 

take some time. 

Another thing we’re looking for is backing cost estimates with all 

the data and documentation you need to trace and verify them and 

to really understand them in an easy way. That wasn’t present this 

round. I think they’ll be more present the next round. 

Along with the transparency and accountability of just what they 

report to Congress, we would like to see a few other things happen. 

One is just stabilizing the acquisition approach. We’ve had three 

different ways of reporting on progress for the missile defense system and each time we change those ways it becomes very difficult 

for us to go backwards and track costs back in time and schedule 

and progress. 

We’d also like to see some of the things we recommend extend 

to the efforts like EPAA, where we can learn more about costs and 

schedule within that effort. Then we’d also like to see the structure 

and the clarity of MDA’s budget request improve as well. 

So there’s more beyond just what you see on paper, but I think 

if everything that we’re asking for in this round is implemented it 

will be just a huge amount of progress that’s been made. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

General O’Reilly, have you determined what or how many of the 

recommendations you may be seeking to implement? 

General O’REILLY. Senator, we believe GAO has accurately captured the challenges which missile defense has to operate in, but 

at the same time—the management challenges. At the same time, 

we are on a path to accomplish the ICE. As she has said, there’s 

been recent changes. I’ve made most of those changes, to enhance 

the baseline reporting. 

This was the second year we’ve done it in a row. This year’s report that we submitted to Congress wasn’t taken into account. The 

delivery was after this GAO audit was done. We believe that has 

each year more enhanced accuracy and the level of detail they’re 

looking at. 

The one area in which we disagree with the GAO’s recommendation—Ms. Chaplain just referred to it before—is in the area of our 

targets. We feel that we reuse—because we have to find intermediate-range and ICBM-type targets, instead of buying brandVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00229 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
224 

new targets. We go out and work with the Air Force and the Navy 

and we identify retired missiles, and then we modify those missiles 

and make them into a target. 

Now, the cost of the original missile we don’t believe accurately 

reflects the cost to MDA of achieving that target. I know GAO 

looks at it as the cost to the government, but those missiles were 

bought for a particular reason, they were retired, and we’ve taken 

them out of retirement. We do agree with GAO we should capture 

all of the costs of modifying those missiles, but there’s a difference 

there that we’re still in discussions with the GAO on. 

Senator NELSON. In that regard, I know that you’ve changed 

some of your acquisition requirements and contracting requirements now where you get competitive bidding for contracts. Could 

you tell us a little bit about what you’ve been doing there and 

maybe some of the cost savings that the agency has achieved? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, of our $2.4 billion that was identified in 

efficiencies by MDA this year, almost a half a billion was due to 

the way in which we acquire contractor support for government 

agencies or government staff. In the past, we used to hire—we determined and told our contractors how many engineers we needed 

and of what seniority and what were the particulars of the resources we wanted these companies to provide us to augment our 

staffs. Instead, we’re taking a different approach. We define the 

task that we want these companies to provide for us and we leave 

it up to the companies to determine the seniority and number of 

engineers. 

We do this in a competitive fashion, so they know they’re competing for cost, schedule, and performance of their competitors, 

against their competitors. This year we’ve identified so far over 

$100 million in savings because of the way that contractors have 

proposed. It may be an equal amount of personnel or it may be 

even more, but it might be fewer senior engineers that cost more, 

more mid-level, and then some junior engineers, which industry 

has told me in the past the way we were contracting was preventing them from literally hiring and developing a new generation 

of engineers. 

So this has worked quite effectively for us, sir. We do have about 

$30 billion more of contracts over the next 5 years which we are 

looking to compete. 

Senator NELSON. General O’Reilly, given the two failed GMD 

flight tests, you’re planning to conduct two more flight tests to 

verify the solution for the problem encountered in the test, and 

you’ve indicated that you will need some additional GBIs for the 

GMD test program, but that number hasn’t yet been determined. 

I understand that you plan to assess the need for additional GBIs 

after the flight tests verify and demonstrate the solution to the GBI 

problem we’ve been discussing. 

Is that correct? Since the GBI production line will remain open 

for several years and the refurbishment and target programs will 

also keep that production line busy, we’ll have several years in 

which to decide how many additional GBIs are needed. In other 

words, we don’t need to decide that this year; is that assumption 

accurate? 

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General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. We believe that through this failure 

review board process one of the outcomes will be what is the right 

number and the strategy for testing GBI reliability in the future. 

We already have a program that we plan over the next 10 years 

to test over 900 components off the missiles that are currently in 

the missile fields as we refurbish, as you say. But we will reassess 

what additional testing is needed beyond that. 

Senator NELSON. This is to both General O’Reilly and Dr. Roberts. Your prepared statements discuss a number of planned enhancements to the existing GMD system to increase the capability 

to defend the Homeland over the coming decade. General O’Reilly, 

can you summarize the enhancements briefly and describe the degree to which they are expected to improve our defenses and over 

what period of time are we looking? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, there are several studies that are being 

done independently and they all indicate that—one of them, including Admiral Macy’s study that he just finished—one of the key indicators to the effectiveness of missile defense is not actually the 

number of interceptors—you do need a certain amount—but it is 

the sensor system and our ability to discriminate objects and determine which is the reentry vehicle (RV) with enough certainty in 

order to affect your firing doctrine, how many missiles are you 

going to shoot at that cluster of objects? 

All missiles when they’re launched have associated objects that 

come with them—upper stages, shrouds, other components that 

come off the missile during powered flight. So we have to have the 

ability to determine where is the RV to hit it. Those types of upgrades to the sensor systems, as I’ve mentioned, Clear, AK, those 

algorithms will have a significant impact on our capability. 

Also, the East Coast communications system will, in fact, significantly enhance the protection of the United States because we can 

communicate with the GBI late in flight before it has to intercept 

any threat that’s coming from the Middle East. 

Those are, the ability to discriminate, the ability to use our new 

sensors like our satellite systems and even our forward-based airborne platforms and forward-based radars, those totally combined 

give us a very early track, and with the SM–3 IIB we would be 

able to intercept. Our cost estimate of that interceptor is about $15 

million, so it’s very cost-effective for the first layer of defense for 

Homeland defense. It doesn’t replace the GMD system, though, 

that still is necessary. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. Roberts, how do you see these GMD enhancements fitting into our overall missile defense strategy? 

Dr. ROBERTS. To go back to your opening formulation, we’re 

ahead of the threat of limited strikes from states like North Korea 

and Iran, and we want to make sure that we stay ahead. A part 

of that is on the quantitative side. We want to be sure that we 

have the ability to provide sufficient interceptors, a sufficient number to match the requirement. 

But we often forget the qualitative side, and we can significantly 

enhance the performance of the current system and prepare it for 

substantially enhanced performance when the SM–3 IIB becomes 

available to us. So we see these capabilities enhancements as essential. They are separate from the hedge, meaning these are 

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things we’re going to do in any case because they’re important to 

staying ahead, and the hedge involves a set of things that we 

might want to do that are in addition, in the case of a more early 

emergence of capabilities that would overwhelm the GMD system. 

Senator NELSON. In that regard, my colleague, Senator Sessions, 

was raising questions about the budget for what I would call the 

out years, from 2013 on, and raised a question about whether or 

not that was sufficient funding for that period of time. Dr. Roberts, 

do you have any thoughts about how you might respond to that? 

Dr. ROBERTS. You had two good answers from the same military 

advisers that we listen to in Policy on this topic. We are satisfied 

that the budgets as projected are sufficient to our purpose. We 

don’t see any opportunity for additional savings. 

We have a clearly emerging threat in the regions. We have the 

challenge of staying ahead in the defense of the Homeland. We 

have future technologies that we’d like to be invested in to ensure 

that we remain competitive over the very long term. We have a 

testing program that we’ve all accepted needs to be robust and sustained over the long term. There’s no significant opportunity there 

for additional savings. 

So Policy clearly has the view that there are not significant new 

savings to be realized in the BMD budget if we’re committed to the 

policy principles articulated in the BMDR. 

Senator NELSON. General O’Reilly, do you have any thoughts 

you’d like to share? 

General O’REILLY. Senator, as Dr. Roberts laid out, our current 

budget, the question that Senator Sessions was referring to, it was 

aimed at efficiencies. We’re still intending to accomplish the same 

scope, and we’ve done this in a way that’s auditable to determine 

are we more efficiently buying this capability. It was not determined nor is it our intent to reduce the amount of work that we 

plan to do in fiscal year 2011. 

As Dr. Roberts was saying, the hedge strategy would be additional, if we executed those hedges, would be beyond what was in 

our current budget. 

Senator NELSON. So we would have to increase the budget at 

some point down the road to take into account these additional efforts at defense? 

General O’REILLY. If those efforts are turned on, yes, it would require additional funding. 

Senator NELSON. My final question is, is there anything we 

should have asked that we didn’t ask? 

General O’REILLY. No, sir. 

Senator NELSON. Very politic. 

Thank you very much, all of you, and thank you for your service 

to our country. We appreciate it. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

1. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Roberts, General O’Reilly, and Admiral Macy, in September 

2009, the President announced his decision to accept the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue the Phased 

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Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense in Europe. He described each of the 

four phases of the PAA, including the planned deployment timeframe for each 

phase. As explained in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), it is U.S. policy that ‘‘before new capabilities are deployed they must undergo testing that enables an assessment under realistic operational conditions against threat-representative targets to demonstrate that they can reliably and effectively help U.S. forces 

accomplish their mission.’’ Do you each agree that this central fly-before-you-buy 

policy criterion should be applied to each phase of the European PAA (EPAA), so 

that we have confidence that the systems will work before we deploy them, and so 

that we only deploy systems that have demonstrated that they will work? 

Dr. ROBERTS and Admiral MACY. The fly-before-you-buy policy as outlined in the 

BMDR should and will be applied to each phase of the EPAA. The EPAA was specifically designed to take advantage of capability developments as they became operationally available, which includes realistic testing of the systems as they are fielded. 

General O’REILLY. A key tenet of the BMDR is to sufficiently test the capabilities 

and limitations of a missile defense system before we begin procurement, or fly-before-we-buy. 

FUTURE CONTRACT IMPROVEMENT OPPORTUNITIES

2. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, you have indicated that future Missile Defense Agency (MDA) contracts will provide opportunities for increasing value and 

protection to the taxpayer, including through increased competition and enhanced 

contract terms to protect against defects or other unsatisfactory contractor performance. What are your plans and objectives for improving these future MDA contracts, 

and what enhancements do you expect to achieve, in terms of savings or other enhancements? 

General O’REILLY. MDA awards contracts for hardware and services using both 

competitive and noncompetitive procedures. We continually look at our existing contracts and all new requirements for future competition opportunities. By conducting 

market research, we are able to define the extent to which system components or 

services can be competed in the future. Where necessary, we plan to obtain technical 

data under existing contracts to facilitate future competition. Additionally, MDA has 

implemented a competitive procurement strategy for the acquisition of our advisory 

and assistance service support requirements. This support is obtained using competitively awarded task orders under multiple award contracts. We are committed 

to ensuring maximum competition is planned for and considered in all acquisitions. 

To address recent unsatisfactory contractor performance, MDA has developed a 

draft contract provision, titled ‘‘Contractor Accountability for Quality.’’ This provision will allow MDA to reduce or even eliminate the amount of performance incentive fee awarded when our prime and subcontractors fail to follow their own best 

practices, internal processes, or accepted industry standards which then result in 

quality problems. We intend to include this provision for the first time in the 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense Development and Sustainment Contract. We plan 

to incorporate a contract provision holding contractors accountable for quality in all 

applicable MDA contracts. 

COUNTERFEIT ELECTRONIC PARTS

3. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, the committee has initiated an investigation 

into the presence of counterfeit electronic parts in the defense supply chain. MDA 

has taken steps to mitigate the risk of counterfeit electronic parts finding their way 

into our missile defense systems. From MDA’s perspective, how serious is the problem of counterfeit electronics? 

General O’REILLY. MDA recognizes the seriousness of counterfeit electronic parts 

in the defense supply chain and has developed an effective process to identify and 

remove them. Specifically, to date MDA has experienced six instances of counterfeit 

parts within our supply chain which is made up of thousands of unique parts and 

materials provided by hundreds of suppliers providing hundreds of assemblies. One 

of the counterfeit part incidents required a recall of 49 mission computer assemblies 

which necessitated the removal of approximately 800 parts from inventory. Counterfeit electronic parts in the defense supply chain can affect overall system quality 

and reliability if not properly addressed. 

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4. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, what national security risks result from the 

presence of counterfeit electronic parts in the Department of Defense’s (DOD) supply 

chain? 

General O’REILLY. The predominant risk is reduced reliability and availability of 

weapon systems due to the failures related to counterfeit parts and materials. A 

counterfeit part may pass all production testing. However, it is possible that the 

part was damaged during unauthorized processing (e.g., removing the part from a 

previous assembly, or sanding the surface in order to place a new part number) 

causing the deployed system to fail. Similarly, reliability may be affected because 

a counterfeit part may be near the end of its useful life when it is installed. Should 

any mission critical component fail, that system fails and national security is impacted. 

A more insidious risk is the potential for access or the ability to disable a weapon 

system or communication network through malicious circuits embedded in counterfeit devices. Testing for this type of defect is extremely difficult. 

5. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, many of our defense systems rely on parts 

that are no longer in production, forcing agencies to purchase them from places 

other than the original manufacturer. What steps has MDA taken to ensure that 

their sources of supply for obsolete parts are trustworthy? 

General O’REILLY. Understanding and controlling the source of parts and materials is critical in reducing the counterfeit part risk. Our MDA Parts, Materials, and 

Processes Mission Assurance Plan (PMAP) requires parts and materials for new or 

modified mission and safety critical hardware to be purchased only from the original 

manufacturer or an authorized distributor. MDA realizes that there are cases when 

obsolete parts are no longer available from the original manufacturer or an authorized distributor. In these cases, MDA PMAP requires that the contractor justify the 

reason why an authorized source was not available and provide a plan for verifying 

authenticity of the part. MDA Policy Memo #50, released in June 2009, extended 

these requirements to also include heritage mission and safety critical hardware. 

6. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, has MDA adopted any policies or procedures 

to mitigate the risk of counterfeit electronic parts that DOD should consider adopting? 

General O’REILLY. MDA established requirements for mitigating counterfeit parts 

dating back to October 2006. At this point, MDA’s requirements sufficiently mitigate 

the risk of counterfeit parts. There are other standards that are being developed. 

For instance, SAE is currently developing a comprehensive standard. MDA is participating in its development. DOD may want to look at all the standards and determine how such requirements should be imposed. 

MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

7. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Roberts, your prepared testimony states that, ‘‘a key priority is to establish a cooperative [ballistic missile defense] relationship with Russia. 

Significant opportunities have emerged, along with some challenges.’’ You also state 

that you believe ‘‘we have an opportunity for meaningful cooperation’’ that will enhance security. Why do you believe such missile defense cooperation would be in our 

security interests, and do you believe it could send an important signal to Iran that 

the United States and Russia are both opposed to its developing nuclear weapons 

and long-range missiles? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Cooperation with Russia in our missile defense efforts would send 

an important signal to Iran that Russia and the United States are working together 

to counter the acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles. Effective Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMD), including a potential U.S.-Russia cooperative architecture, can also devalue Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal by reducing its confidence 

that an attack would be successful. This would help undergird a broader strategic 

objective: to strengthen deterrence in key regions through the integrated and innovative use of military and nonmilitary means that adapt regional deterrence architectures to 21st century requirements. 

8. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, your prepared testimony states that you are, 

‘‘optimistic . . . that we will make significant progress this year in cooperating with 

the Russian Federation on missile defense.’’ Why are you optimistic, and what sort 

of cooperation do you anticipate? 

General O’REILLY. We continue to support expert dialogue on cooperative efforts 

with the Russian Federation whose surveillance radars would enhance our ability 

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to monitor ballistic missile development and flight testing in Southwest Asia. There 

are opportunities for us to cooperate in sharing our sensor data, our future research 

and development, and our command and control activities and exercises in order to 

build confidence between both sides that we’re not threatening each other, but we 

are building ourselves a defense against the proliferation of these missiles. 

DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA

9. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Roberts, your prepared testimony describes the administration’s effort to conclude a Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement (DTCA) with 

Russia as a ‘‘requirement for the safeguarding of sensitive information in support 

of cooperation’’ on missile defense. Please describe the role and purpose of such a 

DTCA, and why you believe such an agreement would be necessary to permit missile defense cooperation with Russia. 

Dr. ROBERTS. To facilitate greater cooperation with Russia, we need to conclude 

a DTCA, which will be beneficial not only for missile defense cooperation, but for 

cooperation in other areas, such as counterterrorism. 

We have made clear to Russia that we must complete a DTCA in order to undertake more extensive BMD cooperation. The DTCA will contain an annex that addresses the exchange of classified information. Even with a DTCA in place, a National Disclosure Policy review will still be required to provide classified information 

to Russia. 

NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY

10. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Roberts, you indicated that, in the context of possible missile defense cooperation, the United States would not share classified information 

with Russia unless and until we have conducted a National Disclosure Policy review. Please describe what such a review entails and how it would protect our information. 

Dr. ROBERTS. The DTCA will provide a legal framework to support defense technology cooperation between DOD and the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense 

for projects (classified or unclassified) to include missile defense and counter-improvised explosive device projects. 

All projects involving classified information that will be undertaken with the Russian Federation under the DTCA will require review and approval by the interagency National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC). An exception to the National 

Disclosure Policy must be authorized prior to the release of any information on a 

program involving classified information. Exceptions to the National Disclosure Policy may be authorized personally by the Secretary of Defense or his Deputy or the 

NDPC. 

NDPC reviews result in well-coordinated and informed interagency decisions regarding the types and level of classification of military information and projects authorized for disclosure, as well as specific conditions and limitations to be applied 

when sharing classified information and technology with a foreign government. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON

FLIGHT TEST FAILURES

11. Senator NELSON. General O’Reilly, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense 

(GMD) system currently has 30 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) deployed to provide defense of the Homeland against limited missile attacks from countries such 

as North Korea and Iran. However, the last two flight tests of the system failed to 

intercept the target. Can you explain what happened, what you are doing to fix this 

problem, and whether these test failures affect the deployed interceptors? 

General O’REILLY. For FTG–06 in January 2010, the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle 

(EKV) lost attitude control during the acquisition phase and failed to intercept the 

target. The failure was traced to an EKV quality control problem, a missing 

lockwire on an attitude control system thruster. Corrective action, manufacturing, 

and inspection procedures have been modified and there was not a recurrence of 

this problem in the two subsequent flight tests: BVT–01 in June 2010 and FTG– 

06a in December 2010. This issue impacts both CE–I and CE–II interceptors; however, records and photographic evidence have been reviewed for every delivered GBI 

to support a comprehensive risk assessment and no other instances were identified. 

During FTG–06a in December 2010, the EKV lost track of the target during the 

discrimination phase and failed to intercept the target. The failure investigation is 

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ongoing and final determination of root cause/corrective action has not been made. 

However, GMD is developing/testing multiple potential corrective actions and plans 

to validate the correction during the next flight test (non-intercept test FTN–01) in 

fiscal year 2012. Preliminary indications are that the failure is unique to the CE– 

II GBIs. Testing and analysis that the original deployed interceptors are not affected by the failure mode seen in FTG–06a is underway. 

12. Senator NELSON. General O’Reilly, will you brief this committee when the 

Failure Review Board has completed its review and you have decided on a plan for 

how to fix the problem? 

General O’REILLY. Yes. 

PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

13. Senator NELSON. Admiral Macy, it appears that some view the PAA as a specific system or architecture, with a fixed number of assets and capabilities. However, as explained in the BMDR, it appears more like a strategy or an approach 

than a system or architecture. Can you provide your view of whether the PAA is 

an approach to missile defense or a specific system architecture? 

Admiral MACY. The PAA is not a specific system architecture or acquisition program. It is a conceptual approach that provides BMD capability for our deployed 

forces, allies, and partners, and additional capability for Homeland defense, in different regions, circumstances, and times. The PAA provides a balanced investment 

with the capacity to engage the range of threats that can be tailored to the geography, political circumstances, and capabilities of regional partners. It also has the 

flexibility to rapidly deploy more assets where and when they are needed. 

14. Senator NELSON. Dr. Roberts, you helped develop the policy and strategy for 

the PAA. What is your view? 

Dr. ROBERTS. I agree with Admiral Macy that the PAA is not a specific system 

architecture or acquisition program. It is a conceptual approach that provides BMD 

capability for our deployed forces, allies, and partners, and additional capability for 

Homeland defense, in different regions, circumstances, and times. The PAA provides 

a balanced investment with the capacity to engage the range of threats that can be 

tailored to the geography, political circumstances, and capabilities of regional partners. It also has the flexibility to rapidly deploy more assets where and when they 

are needed. 

15. Senator NELSON. Ms. Chaplain, as explained in the BMDR, DOD developed 

the EPAA as a regional policy approach for missile defense of Europe, not as a specific acquisition program. Can you explain why the Government Accountability Office (GAO) seems to be evaluating this policy approach as if it were a new major 

defense acquisition program? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. At the request of the House Armed Services Committee, GAO conducted a broad assessment of DOD’s planning for implementation of the EPAA policy. Although we understand that the EPAA is a policy approach, not an acquisition 

program, it is an investment in a subset of MDA’s systems requiring coordination 

and technical integration to be deployable in the European region, and to meet the 

timelines set out in the policy. In our view this represents a significant acquisition 

challenge. The criteria we applied in our assessment, however, represent sound 

management principles for guiding complex, highly integrated efforts. They reflect 

DOD’s acquisition guidance as well as the Office of Management and Budget’s guidance for capital programming across Federal agencies, particularly as it relates to 

bringing together and synchronizing multiple development efforts. We continue to 

believe these acquisition management principles serve as a useful, appropriate, and 

beneficial standard to assess DOD’s EPAA acquisition activities. Importantly, these 

six principles are not just acquisition principles, they reflect general management 

principles for any major initiative: Identify what you need; identify the players and 

their roles; put together a plan with timeframes; ensure the pieces of the initiative 

are organized for success; test your assumptions; and determine how much it’s going 

to cost to see the initiative to completion. 

DECISION TIMEFRAME FOR MORE GROUND-BASED INTERCEPTORS

16. Senator NELSON. General O’Reilly, you have indicated that you believe there 

will be a need for additional GBIs because of the two failed GBI flight tests last 

year. You stated that you plan to complete two additional flight tests to confirm and 

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demonstrate that MDA has properly diagnosed and corrected the problem encountered in the most recent flight test failure. The second verification flight test, designated FTG–06b, is not expected to take place until late 2012, which means during 

fiscal year 2013. You have also stated that after you have studied the results of that 

second verification flight test, then you will assess the need for any additional number of GBIs, and any additional elements for the test and sustainment plan for the 

GMD system. During the hearing, you acknowledged that—because the GBI production line will remain open for several years—we have several years to decide how 

many additional GBIs we might need. Given this plan, is it correct to understand 

that your assessment and recommendations about additional GBIs would not be 

completed until sometime during fiscal year 2013, and could be ready for inclusion 

in the budget request for fiscal year 2014? 

General O’REILLY. Successful ground testing of the EKV modifications to resolve 

the previous flight test issues could be successfully concluded this fall. Based on 

those results, the PB13 request will reflect whether we propose additional procurement of GBIs at that time. The non-intercept flight test in the winter of 2012 and 

intercept in summer of 2013 will inform congressional budget deliberations. If these 

tests are delayed or unsuccessful, Congress will be in an informed position to delay 

the request for additional GBIs beyond the fiscal year 2013 budget request. 

17. Senator NELSON. Dr. Roberts, does this notional schedule fit within our GMD 

enhancement strategy and plans? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Several of the assumptions we used to arrive at a total purchase 

of 52 GBIs are no longer valid, primarily due to test failures and the need for additional testing. Some increased number of GBIs will be necessary, but we must conclude the investigation of the most recent test failure before we can make a determination about the number of additional GBIs that will be required. Based on the 

outcome of the investigation, the PB13 request will reflect whether we propose additional procurement of GBIs at that time. 

SIGNIFICANCE OF NATO DECISION ON MISSILE DEFENSE

18. Senator NELSON. Dr. Roberts, last November at the Lisbon Summit, the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided to adopt missile defense of NATO Europe as a core mission. As part of this decision, NATO decided to expand its missile 

defense command and control system, endorsed the U.S. plan for the EPAA to missile defense, and invited Russia to cooperate with NATO on missile defense. Can 

you tell me your view of the significance of NATO’s decision, and how it could benefit security in Europe? 

Dr. ROBERTS. I believe the Lisbon decision reflects NATO’s determination to remain the world’s premier defense alliance by adapting to new challenges. Allies recognized that a new threat to our homelands comes primarily from non-traditional 

sources such as ballistic missile and WMD proliferation. Therefore, NATO’s decision 

to pursue a territorial missile defense capability is a key step that sends a clear 

message—NATO is serious about responding to new threats, and is willing and able 

to pursue critical capabilities to counter those threats. 

19. Senator NELSON. Admiral Macy, you are the U.S. military representative to 

the NATO Air Defense Committee and you have worked closely with NATO on the 

new missile defense plan. What steps is NATO taking to implement the new plan? 

Admiral MACY. NATO is fully engaged in incorporating territorial missile defense 

of Europe. Per the decisions from the Lisbon Summit, November 2010, NATO has 

made the decision that missile defense is ‘‘its core task of collective defence’’ and 

our allies are appreciative of our efforts to include them in our discussions regarding 

our missile defense concepts and approaches. Now that NATO has made the decision, the BMDS capabilities resident within the EPAA will constitute our national 

contribution to the mission of collective defense. Implementing the EPAA provides 

the opportunity for NATO to contribute national systems and participate alongside 

the United States, and it is a very effective and efficient approach to NATO missile 

defense that allows all participants to leverage the investment other nations are 

making. The recent MDA demonstration of the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) system interfacing with NATO’s Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program is a premier example of 

this implementation. In addition, NATO has committed to expand the ALTBMD program from beyond the protection of NATO deployed forces to also protect NATO European populations, territory, and forces. Finally, the alliance is increasing its participation in missile defense exercises progressing from simply observing to active 

232 

participation in the Nimble Titan 2012 exercise. We will work closely within the alliance to craft the appropriate command and control structure to provide for the effective defense of our forward deployed forces, allies, and our partners from missile 

threats in the region. 

STANDARD MISSILE-3 BLOCK IIB SCHEDULE RISK

20. Senator NELSON. General O’Reilly, DOD plans to deploy a new variant of the 

Standard Missile-3, the Block IIB, on land in 2020 for Phase 4 of the EPAA to missile defense. This interceptor is intended to defend Europe against medium-, intermediate-, and long-range missiles, and to supplement the GMD system for additional defense of the Homeland against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) 

from North Korea or Iran. Your agency awarded contracts in early April to three 

companies to help define the concept and development plan for the new missile, 

through the end of 2013. Consequently, there is not even a design yet for this interceptor. In addition, MDA is just starting to develop new technology needed for the 

missile, and the Aegis BMD program office is not expected to manage the program 

until 2013. Given these considerations, how confident are you that this new missile 

will be ready to deploy in 2020, and how will you manage schedule risk? 

General O’REILLY. I am confident that we will deploy the SM–3 Block IIB interceptor in the 2020 timeframe to support Phase 4 of EPAA. The SM–3 Block IIB 

schedule is based on recent government experience developing similar successful 

missile defense interceptor programs. Product development for SM–3 Block IIB 

spans 7 years, beginning in third quarter fiscal year 2013 and continuing through 

initial operational capability (IOC) in 2020. The time between product development 

and a production decision for this program is 51⁄2 years. This development to production decision timeline is consistent with the average of BMD interceptors including 

Patriot, THAAD, SM–6, and SM–3 Block IB as reported by GAO (see attached). 


413str2.eps
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Concept Definition and Program Planning contracts we recently awarded to three 

potential SM–3 Block IIB development prime contractors add a broad industry analysis to further inform our schedule projections. Each contractor is conducting missile 

trade studies to define SM–3 Block IIB concepts, challenges, and program plans for 

Product Development. For the next 2 years we are executing technology risk reduction efforts to mature key interceptor components that increase performance and potentially reduce cost. Specifically, we are investing now with multiple vendors in kill 

vehicle divert and attitude control systems, upper stage propulsion, focal plane arrays, and lighter weight structures and materials to reduce inert mass. These investments reduce risk in key technology areas to further minimize our Product Development schedule risk. 

GAO VIEW OF AEGIS ASHORE RISK

21. Senator NELSON. Ms. Chaplain, the Aegis Ashore program planned for deployment in Europe is based on the existing Aegis BMD program. As your prepared 

statement notes, and as the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation has also 

stated, the Aegis BMD program is the most mature in terms of development and 

operational suitability. If the Aegis Ashore program is based on the most mature 

existing Aegis BMD system, can you explain why GAO believes the Aegis Ashore 

program still has a degree of developmental risk? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. While Aegis Ashore is being developed out of the Aegis BMD program, it is not based on the configuration that has been tested and is deployed 

today, which is the 3.6.1 Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) with the 

Standard Missile 3 Block 1A. The high levels of risk we see are based on the commitment to produce the weapon system before the design is proven through ground 

and flight testing. This commitment increases the chances for discovering issues 

with the hardware and software that could lead to costly redesign, rework, and 

doubts about the performance of the system. 

The Aegis Ashore will use the new 4.0.1 and 5.0 systems currently in development, and the new version of the interceptor also in development. Yet MDA has decided to commit to procure the system starting in 2012, well before results of ground 

and flight testing are available. We have repeatedly found in our reviews of major 

acquisitions that basing commitments, such as the decision to manufacture systems 

for operational use, should be based on demonstrated knowledge. One key step before that commitment is demonstrating a production representative system in a realistic environment. That will not occur until 2014 when the test version demonstrates the ability to successfully launch and engage a target. However, in order 

to meet the schedule that requires the Aegis Ashore to be operational by 2015, manufacture must begin in 2012. 

We discuss additional acquisition risks related to Aegis Ashore in Appendix IV of 

our March 26, 2011 report (GAO–11–372). 

IMPACT OF EPAA RADAR ON GMD CAPABILITY

22. Senator NELSON. General O’Reilly, there has been discussion of the importance of a forward-deployed AN/TPY–2 radar in Phase 1 of the EPAA for the defense of Europe. However, that radar would also improve the performance of the 

GMD system to defend the United States. Can you tell me how that radar would 

enhance the GMD system, and how significant that improvement would be? 

General O’REILLY. [Deleted.] 

23. Senator NELSON. Dr. Roberts, would you consider this radar deployment to be 

an enhancement of the GMD system, even though it is placed in a regional missile 

defense context? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Yes, the deployment of a forward-based radar in southern Europe 

improves the missile defense protection of both Europe and of the United States. 

U.S.-ISRAELI COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS

24. Senator NELSON. General O’Reilly, for the cooperative missile defense programs we are developing jointly with Israel, you have established a joint program 

management structure including representatives from both nations. Has this joint 

program management structure worked as you had hoped it would? 

General O’REILLY. The joint management structure implemented in the two most 

recent U.S.-Israeli cooperative Project Agreements (Upper Tier and David’s Sling) 

is working as expected. Older agreements for programs such as the Arrow System 

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Improvement Program did not specify joint management practices. This created a 

potential problem where MDA was informed of progress and actions after the fact, 

and without performance metrics. In the newer agreements, visibility and accountability have increased through the establishment of program baselines, configuration control boards, jointly-defined and approved Knowledge Points, and joint decision authority for major program decisions (e.g., contract issuance, concurrence to 

proceed with test events, and design review entrance and exit criteria). These practices have all contributed to better U.S. understanding of progress, challenges, and 

risk to both schedule and resource planning for these programs. 

25. Senator NELSON. General O’Reilly, in the past, you expressed concern that the 

Arrow-3 interceptor being developed jointly by the United States and Israel had 

high technical and schedule risk. What is your current assessment of the level of 

technical and schedule risk in the Arrow-3 program, and has the program met its 

required knowledge points? 

General O’REILLY. While significant progress has been achieved in the Arrow-3 

development program, I believe that my original assessment of high technical and 

schedule risk is still valid. Of the 20 Knowledge Points, 6 of 7 planned have been 

successfully accomplished thus far. One Knowledge Point related to the booster 

motor was not met due to a static test failure, and the re-design and re-test is in 

progress. As we have proceeded into more complex component ground tests leading 

up to the first flight test, additional technical issues have surfaced. These technical 

issues are driving slight schedule delays (first quarter so far) for the first flight test, 

but there is very little schedule margin to be able to accommodate any additional 

issues. The remainder of the schedule through IOC declaration is also success-oriented with no room for error. Execution of the first flight test at the end of this 

year will be a major program milestone from which additional technical and schedule assessments will be made. 

DEVELOPMENT OF SENSOR SYSTEMS

26. Senator NELSON. General O’Reilly, MDA is developing two sensor systems to 

improve tracking and interception of large numbers of regional missiles. These systems are the Airborne Infrared (ABIR) and the Precision Tracking Space System 

(PTSS). The ABIR would be an unmanned aerial vehicle, and the PTSS is a satellite 

system. Can you explain the role of these two systems, and whether you believe 

they would both be necessary—or if one of them would be sufficient? 

General O’REILLY. While the PTSS provides the most cost-effective and assured 

comprehensive coverage of the Northern Hemisphere, I believe both systems, ABIR 

and PTSS, are necessary for the success of the BMDS. 

PTSS is planned because it offers the advantages of assured access to the greatest 

regions of threat launch activity and provides persistent tracking coverage of ballistic missiles over their entire flight. Because of Space Tracking and Surveillance 

System (STSS) demonstrations and our work with the SBIRS community, we believe 

that the technological basis for satellite-to-shooter engagements is available today. 

PTSS post-boost and midcourse tracking accuracies are suitable for any of our 

BMDS interceptors to achieve a high probability engagement over the widest possible geometries. The estimated annual O&M costs of a globally deployed PTSS constellation is $75 million/year. 

ABIR is being demonstrated now because of the flexibility that UAV-based systems have to rapidly extend sensor coverage and battle space beyond fixed radar 

sites outside the PTSS coverage of the Northern Hemisphere, provide early ascent 

phase tracking, and integrate readily with the existing Service infrastructures and 

BMDS network. Further, while today’s sensors are useful and complementary to the 

BMDS radars, advanced ABIR sensors will significantly improve tracking accuracies, threat identification, and timeliness of reporting to the regional shooter. The 

estimated annual O&M cost of an ABIR Combat Air Patrol (CAP) of 3 aircraft is 

greater than $56 million per CAP. Of note, ABIR will require overflight permission 

from countries required for viewing access. 

Both of these systems promise improvements to the warfighter in earlier and 

higher confidence threat awareness and ability to address the highest priority ballistic missile threats. Given the actual annual O&M costs to operate an AN/TPY– 

2 radar of more than $50 million per year per radar and the requirement for Host 

Nation basing agreements to locate a radar in a region of interest, the PTSS is a 

critical system for affordable, unrestricted, and responsive missile defense in the future. The PTSS provides persistent broad earth coverage and ABIR provides flexible 

regional surge capability. 

235 

27. Senator NELSON. Admiral Macy, can you give me a military perspective on the 

importance of these two systems to our future missile defense capability? 

Admiral MACY. The ABIR sensor and the PTSS are vital to the future BMDS. 

Both systems will enhance the combatant commanders’ ability to defend against ballistic missiles by increasing their capability and capacity to counter these threats. 

Any further discussions of the importance of these systems and the contribution 

that they make must be conducted in a classified setting. 

28. Senator NELSON. Admiral Macy, do you view them as both being necessary 

to the capabilities that the combatant commanders will need? 

Admiral MACY. The capabilities of the ABIR system and PTSS will be vital to the 

combatant commanders’ future ability to defend against ballistic missiles. Any further discussions of the importance of these systems and the contribution that they 

make must be conducted in a classified setting. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

AN/TPY–2 PROGRAM

29. Senator SHAHEEN. General O’Reilly, the forward deployment of AN/TPY–2 radars will be fundamental to the success of the EPAA and will be important in meeting the combatant commands’ (COCOM) needs for regional missile defense around 

the globe. In your written testimony, you note several accomplishments with respect 

to the AN/TPY–2 program, including the refurbishment of an AN/TPY–2 radar for 

phase 1 of the EPAA as well as the preparation of a second radar for deployment 

to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). You also note that the fiscal year 2012 

budget request includes support for additional AN/TPY–2 radars. Is DOD currently 

planning for the possibility of a multi-year procurement of the AN/TPY–2 radar and 

what would be the reasoning behind such a decision? 

General O’REILLY. MDA is evaluating the merits of a multi-year production procurement for AN/TPY–2 radars. This strategy reflects DOD’s initiative to identify 

efficiencies that reduce costs of delivering warfighting capability. No decisions have 

been made at this time due to considerations of obsolescence changes and the need 

for subsequent testing prior to proposing a multi-year procurement. 

30. Senator SHAHEEN. General O’Reilly, would you anticipate cost savings to accrue from a multi-year procurement of the AN/TPY–2 radar? 

General O’REILLY. MDA anticipates there would be cost saving from a multi-year 

procurement. We are evaluating the merits of a multi-year production for AN/TPY– 

2 radars. This strategy reflects DOD’s initiative to identify efficiencies that reduce 

costs of delivering warfighting capability. No decisions have been made at this time 

due to considerations of obsolescence changes and the need for subsequent testing 

prior to proposing a multi-year procurement. 

31. Senator SHAHEEN. General O’Reilly, are you confident that the current AN/ 

TPY–2 development plans are adequate to match our COCOM near-term requirements as well as the requirements of the EPAA? 

General O’REILLY. MDA remains confident that current AN/TPY–2 capability, increased quantities, and delivery timelines included in the budget will provide the 

warfighter the capability to address near term emerging threats and the EPAA. 

32. Senator SHAHEEN. General O’Reilly, do you anticipate that any of the emerging challenges faced by our COCOMs will require additional development in the 

near-term? 

General O’REILLY. Depending on how and when the challenges emerge, MDA has 

options for additional near-term development of the AN/TPY–2. We conducted a 

2010 summer study to evaluate investment options in response to challenging scenarios. The study concluded that while additional development to the AN/TPY–2 

was not expected to be necessary, several investment options could add operational 

margin to help improve defense against an uncertain threat including dynamic resource management and debris mitigation. 

236 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

EAST COAST MISSILE DEFENSE DATA TERMINAL

33. Senator GILLIBRAND. General O’Reilly, I appreciated your testimony that an 

east coast interceptor communication terminal for the GMD system will significantly 

enhance the security of the United States by improving defense of the east coast 

against a potential future missile threat from North Korea or Iran. I understand 

that Fort Drum in New York is under consideration as the site for such a terminal. 

Can you explain why you are pursuing this new capability and why Fort Drum 

would be a good site for the data terminal? 

General O’REILLY. An east coast interceptor communications terminal improves 

the ability of the GMD system to defend the east coast of the United States by providing data updates to Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) launched from Fort Greely, 

AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, later in flight, thus increasing its probability of engagement success. The performance region was determined based upon 

current projections of the threat capability by 2015 and on the planned BMDS architecture in the same timeframe. Fort Drum, NY, was selected because it is within 

the required performance region and previous site surveys, environmental assessments, and use permits are already in place. 

34. Senator GILLIBRAND. Dr. Roberts, how does this planned east coast missile defense data terminal fit into the planned enhancements you mentioned for the GMD 

system? 

Dr. ROBERTS. An east coast interceptor communications terminal improves the 

ability of the GMD system to defend the east coast of the United States by providing 

data updates to GBIs launched from Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force 

Base, CA, later in flight, thus increasing its probability of engagement success. 

35. Senator GILLIBRAND. Admiral Macy, from a military perspective, would this 

east coast data terminal provide a useful improvement to our Homeland missile defense capability? 

Admiral MACY. A data terminal on the east coast would improve our overall defense capability by providing better information to the GBIs in flight. This data terminal will enable communication with GBIs launched from Alaska and California 

on longer flights that will improve the defense of the eastern United States against 

potential ICBM threats. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

FUTURE BUDGET AFFORDABILITY

36. Senator SESSIONS. Ms. Chaplain, it seems quite clear that there will not be 

enough money in future budgets to cover the costs of the weapon system programs 

currently underway. In your opinion, is MDA’s current portfolio of acquisition programs affordable at the funding level set forth in the President’s fiscal year 2012 

and Future Years Defense budgets? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Judgments about affordability need to be made in the context of 

the overall DOD budget, the Nation’s priorities, and reliable cost data. I can only 

comment on the last point. We have reported that MDA’s cost estimates are not yet 

reliable or credible nor do they meet our criteria for high quality estimates. Our 

March 2011 report details where cost estimates need to improve and how. 

PHASE 1 OF PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

37. Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts, General O’Reilly, and Admiral Macy, what is 

the current status for deployment of Phase 1 of the PAA to missile defense in Europe? 

Dr. ROBERTS and Admiral MACY. The first BMDS element deployment in support 

of Phase 1 of the EPAA capability occurred on March 7 of this year when the USS 

Monterey (CG 61) deployed to Europe. Monterey will spend this spring and summer 

helping to develop, test, and verify the necessary command and control processes, 

data pathways, tactics, techniques, and procedures. In addition, the C2BMC upgrade 

to the air operations center at Ramstein Air Base, Germany has been installed to 

control the AN/TPY–2 forward based radar and connect it and any Aegis ships into 

our command and control structure in Europe. Finally, negotiations are continuing 

to finalize plans to locate and operate the AN/TPY–2 radar in support of the EPAA. 

237 

General O’REILLY. USS Monterey CG 61, Aegis BMD 3.61 with SM–3 Block 1A 

missiles is currently deployed in theater. AN/TPY–2 radar is currently undergoing 

refurbishment and is on schedule to be available to MDA on August 31, 2011, with 

a proposed movement date of September 20, 2011. C2BMC systems are available 

and scheduled to deploy on August 31, 2011. Current schedule meets test program 

timelines. A critical EPAA phase 1 milestone was achieved in March 2011 when an 

IRBM-range target was intercepted in the Pacific by a SM–3 IA interceptor using 

the current Aegis fire control system and the EPAA forward based AN/TPY–2 and 

command and control architecture. Finally, negotiations are continuing to finalize 

plans to locate and operate the AN/TYP–2 radar in support of the EPAA. 

38. Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts, General O’Reilly, and Admiral Macy, do you 

foresee any obstacles for meeting full deployment of Phase 1 by the end of the year? 

Dr. ROBERTS. We have already deployed the USS Monterey as part of the seabased missile defenses that are part of Phase 1 of the EPAA. 

While I do not see any insurmountable obstacles, there may be challenges to 

reaching a host-nation agreement and deploying the AN/TPY–2 radar by the end of 

the year. However we still intend to deploy the radar as part of Phase 1 of the 

EPAA. 

General O’REILLY. We are awaiting host nation agreement to field the AN/TPY– 

2 in support of Phase 1. 

Admiral MACY. In order to achieve full deployment of Phase 1 by the end of the 

year, a host nation agreement must be achieved to support deployment of the AN/ 

TPY–2 radar. Once this host nation agreement is obtained and deployment preparations begin, we will have better fidelity on when full deployment will actually occur. 

At this time, there are no obstacles that cannot be overcome, however, full deployment of Phase 1 may be delayed. 

39. Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts, General O’Reilly, and Admiral Macy, what is 

the current status of basing negotiations for the forward-based radar in southern 

Europe? 

Dr. ROBERTS. We are currently in discussions with potential host nations for the 

deployment of an AN/TPY–2 forward-based radar to southern Europe. No final hostnation decision has been made. 

General O’REILLY. MDA provides programmatic and technical support for basing 

negotiations. Current status of basing negotiations is more authoritatively addressed by OSD(P) and the Department of State. 

Admiral MACY. The current status of basing negotiations is best addressed by 

OSD(P) and the Department of State. 

40. Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts, General O’Reilly, and Admiral Macy, in order 

to consider Phase 1 fully deployed by the end of 2011, when must a basing decision 

be made for the radar in southern Europe? 

Dr. ROBERTS and General O’REILLY. We expect that the deployment of the radar 

will take several months from the time that a basing decision is made. The actual 

timeline may vary due to the specific basing agreements and legal arrangements associated with the deployment. 

Admiral MACY. While we are already inside the window of the optimal deployment timeline, it is still technically possible to achieve a 2011 deployment given a 

favorable host nation decision, rapid approval of the necessary legal framework, 

strong and active host nation support, and selection of a prepared site that requires 

little to no additional development to accommodate the radar. 

EUROPEAN PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

41. Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts, General O’Reilly, Admiral Macy, and Ms. 

Chaplain, according to a recent GAO report, ‘‘DOD has not fully implemented a 

management process that synchronizes European Missile Defense acquisition activities and ensures transparency and accountability.’’ Without these key metrics, the 

ability to conduct effective oversight is greatly impeded. Given that each of the four 

phases of the PAA are closely tied to concrete timeframes, what tools will be used 

to ensure that planned capabilities are delivered on time? 

Dr. ROBERTS and General O’REILLY. The tools the MDA uses to ensure on time 

delivery of the PAA planned capabilities include an Integrated Master Schedule 

(IMS), the BMDS Specification, the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP), the MDA 

budget, and the program baselines from the contributing BMDS component programs. 

238 

BMDS component programs use six baselines for each system element being developed. These include a Technical Baseline, Operational Capacity Baseline, Test 

Baseline, Schedule Baseline, Resource Baseline, and Contracts Baseline. Critical 

milestones are captured in each, and specifically in the schedule and technical baselines including key events such as planned capability delivery in support of the 

EPAA. 

The MDA Baseline Execution Review (BER), Technology Baseline Review (TBR), 

and Development Baseline Review (DBR) are the tools used to ensure that planned 

capabilities are being developed and delivered on time. These baselines are reviewed 

monthly to monitor program performance and ensure alignment with the schedule 

for delivering the PAA. The MDA Director conducts quarterly BERs. MDA annually 

provides the BMDS Accountability Report (BAR) to Congress which contains detailed information on all of the baselines for each MDA program. 

Admiral MACY. As the programmatic and technical lead for acquisition and development in support of the EPAA, the tools necessary to deliver these planned capabilities on time is more authoritatively addressed by MDA. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Given the extent of acquisition activity associated with implementing the EPAA, GAO believes that the following basic acquisition management 

tools and principles should be used to ensure that the EPAA effort can be successfully implemented. We found MDA had partially adopted these principles as described below. 

• Well-defined requirements - DOD and MDA continue to define architectures, systems, and quantities needed to accomplish the missile defense 

mission set across the four phases. We have reported over the years that 

stable requirements are necessary to fully understand and plan for successive steps in the acquisition process, such as development and testing. As 

the series of acquisitions supporting the EPAA proceeds, we believe a clear 

business case is important to inform tradeoffs leadership may have to accept among cost, schedule, and performance to deliver capability within desired EPAA phase timeframes. 

• Stakeholders and decisionmakers identified and roles defined - DOD and 

MDA’s acquisition management and oversight process is structured around 

reviewing and approving activities of individual missile defense elements 

through a phased decision process. It remains unclear whether, how, and 

which various bodies reviewing MDA acquisitions are specifically reviewing 

the overall progress in acquiring integrated capability for EPAA phases 

within the timeframes called for by that approach. We continue to believe 

top level reviews of EPAA acquisitions would be useful. 

• Integrated schedule and decision reviews - DOD and MDA manage and 

oversee MDA acquisitions through several mechanisms including the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) and its associated subcommittees. It 

remains unclear whether the MDEB has a management or oversight role 

in acquisition decisionmaking related to EPAA specifically. 

• Integrated planning for technology development and system engineering 

- MDA’s planning efforts for development and system engineering reflect 

the interdependencies of the BMDS elements and the integrated performance expected under the EPAA. Executing these development plans remains challenging under the EPAA deployment schedule. 

• Integrated testing - MDA’s test plan is structured around the PAA, and 

includes plans to test key capabilities expected as part of EPAA. The twiceyearly process of updating the test plan facilitates the participation of a 

wide variety of stakeholders in MDA’s testing approach; however while the 

test plan itself is sound, we continue to have concerns about the plan’s 

executability. MDA’s practice of eliminating or deferring important developmental and operational tests limits knowledge available for management 

decisions. 

• Integrated view of financial commitment - We continue to believe that a 

life cycle cost estimate for the subset of capabilities to be deployed as part 

of EPAA would help to ensure that DOD’s investment decisions are fully 

informed. 

42. Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts, General O’Reilly, Admiral Macy, and Ms. 

Chaplain, has MDA developed a life-cycle cost estimate for the EPAA? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The EPAA is a capability deployment approach and not an acquisition program, and therefore it does not have a life cycle cost estimate. EPAA is the 

phased deployment of individual BMDS capabilities as those capabilities are developed, tested, produced, and deployed within the BMDS architecture. MDA produces 

life cycle cost estimates for the individual BMDS acquisition programs that comprise 

239 

the EPAA and other deployments globally. MDA can provide the cumulative deployment costs of the EPAA and the lifecycle costs of the individual elements that comprise the Joint Staff deployment plans of each COCOM. Due to its adaptive nature, 

no fixed inventory can be established for EPAA due to the possibility that differing 

regional security environments may require the surging of missile defense capabilities into other regions. 

General O’REILLY. EPAA itself is a capability deployment approach and not an acquisition program, and therefore it does not have a life cycle cost estimate. EPAA 

is the phased deployment of individual BMDS capabilities as those capabilities are 

developed, tested, produced and deployed within the BMDS architecture. MDA produces life cycle cost estimates for the individual BMDS acquisition programs that 

comprise the EPAA and other deployments globally. We can provide the cumulative 

deployment costs of the EPAA and the lifecycle costs of the individual elements that 

comprise the Joint Staff deployment plans of each COCOM. Due to its adaptive nature, no fixed inventory is established for EPAA vice the simultaneous deployment 

needs of other COCOMs. 

Admiral MACY. The EPAA is not a system for which a single life-cycle cost estimate can be developed. Rather, the EPAA is a framework that provides an adaptable strategy for missile defense in Europe. While some components within this 

framework possess life-cycle costs that can be readily attributable to EPAA (e.g., 

Aegis Ashore), many of the components that have dual or multi-use purposes (e.g., 

Aegis ships) cannot. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. MDA has not developed a life-cycle cost estimate for the EPAA. 

While MDA did produce an informal estimate in the fall of 2009, it does not reflect 

the current EPAA architecture. As we reported in January 2011, DOD has not developed and does not plan on developing EPAA life-cycle cost estimates because it 

considers EPAA an adaptive approach that will change over time. However, best 

practices for cost estimating include methods for developing valid cost estimates 

even with such uncertainties. These estimates could serve as a basis for DOD and 

Congress to assess the goal of fielding affordable and cost-effective BMDs as well 

as determine if corrective actions are needed. We therefore recommended in January 2011 that DOD develop a life-cycle cost estimate for EPAA. 

43. Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts, General O’Reilly, Admiral Macy, and Ms. 

Chaplain, now that the Joint Staff has completed its Joint Capabilities Mix III 

(JCM III) study, shouldn’t MDA have a better understanding of the total costs associated with the deployment of the architecture envisioned for Europe? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The JCM III results are a useful component for developing the total 

costs associated with the deployment of the architecture envisioned for Europe. 

However, the study did not include deployment costs in its assessments. 

While the results of the JCM III are not sufficient for MDA to establish the total 

cost of the architecture envisioned for Europe, its findings will be helpful as we determine future missile defense needs. 

General O’REILLY. MDA considers the JCM III results as a useful component of 

our developing the total costs associated with the deployment of the architecture envisioned for Europe. However, the study did not include deployment costs in its assessments. Furthermore, the radar location in Europe that JCM III assumes may 

still change due to political considerations. Any changes in radar basing would impact the number and deployment costs of interceptors as well as the deployment 

costs of the radars themselves. 

The JCM III study shows the capability of the currently funded PAA against 

intel-based threats, and analyzes improvements that could be achieved with increased resources. The study made a number of assumptions about system track 

correlation and weapons system deconfliction, hit assessment, and C2BMC capability that are still under development. In addition, the study did not factor in the 

platform costs of fielding the number of ABIR systems employed in their analysis. 

While the results of the JCM III are not sufficient for MDA to establish the total 

cost of the architecture envisioned for Europe, we will support the study as it moves 

to the next phase and incorporate its findings into our cost estimation. 

Admiral MACY. The JCM III study was a qualitative performance analysis to determine the warfighters’ requirements for elements of the BMD System required for 

BMD. This study focused on warfighting sufficiency rather than inventory acquisition objectives by examining the application of architectures to deter aggressors and 

end enemy ballistic missile attacks should they occur. JCM III did not attempt to 

simply answer how much to buy, but rather give alternatives to the warfighter to 

best achieve their overall goals. As such, JCM III provides utility to senior leaders 

on resourcing and allocation decisions, not total costs. 

240 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. DOD should have a better understanding of the total costs associated of EPAA after completion of JCM III. DOD has not briefed GAO on the study. 

Given that DOD, led by the Joint Staff, has used the JCM III study to examine all 

elements of the regional BMDS, to examine the performance against threat ballistic 

missiles that employed a range of countermeasures, and to identify alternatives that 

the warfighter can employ to best achieve his overall goals, the results of the study 

should yield additional information needed to better understand costs associated 

with each phase of the EPAA. As we reported in January 2011, the Joint Staff-led 

JCM III along with a U.S. Strategic Command study should help to better define 

force allocation and quantity needs for PAA in Europe and other regions. It is clear, 

however, that DOD faces a management and operational challenge since there is 

greater demand for missile defense assets than there will be a supply of those assets. 

Best practices for cost estimating include methods for developing valid cost estimates even with the uncertainties associated with EPAA architectures. These estimates could serve as a basis for DOD and Congress to assess the goal of fielding 

affordable and cost-effective BMDs as well as determine if corrective actions are 

needed. However, we reported in January 2011 that DOD needs to determine 

whether the EPAA schedule is realistic and achievable, to identify potential problems, and to analyze how changes will affect the execution of this effort. 

SM–3 BLOCK IIB

44. Senator SESSIONS. General O’Reilly, as I mentioned in my opening statement, 

I am concerned that the schedule for development and deployment of the SM–3 IIB 

is overly optimistic. How confident are you that the SM–3 IIB will be delivered by 

2020 for Phase 4 of the PAA? 

General O’REILLY. I am confident that we will deploy the SM–3 Block IIB interceptor in the 2020 timeframe to support Phase 4 of EPAA. The SM–3 Block IIB 

schedule is based on recent government experience developing similar successful 

missile defense interceptor programs. Product development for SM–3 Block IIB 

spans 7 years, beginning in third quarter fiscal year 2013 and continuing through 

IOC in 2020. Within that interval, 51⁄2 years is projected between the product development and production decisions. This time allocation is consistent with the average 

of typical BMD interceptors including Patriot, THAAD, SM–6, and SM–3 Block IB 

as reported by the GAO. 

Concept Definition and Program Planning contracts we recently awarded to three 

potential SM–3 Block IIB development prime contractors add a broad industry analysis to further inform our schedule projections. Each contractor is conducting missile 

trade studies to define SM–3 Block IIB concepts, challenges, and program plans for 

Product Development. For the next 2 years we are executing technology risk reduction efforts to mature key interceptor components that increase performance and potentially reduce cost. Specifically, we are investing now with multiple vendors in kill 

vehicle divert and attitude control systems, upper stage propulsion, focal plane arrays, and lighter weight structures and materials to reduce inert mass. These investments reduce risk in key technology areas to further minimize our product development schedule risk. 

45. Senator SESSIONS. General O’Reilly, what is the anticipated SM–3 IIB capability against ICBMs from Iran? 

General O’REILLY. [Deleted.] 

46. Senator SESSIONS. General O’Reilly, do you agree with the Aegis weapons system development philosophy of incremental development, refinement, and proven 

design? If so, why did you decide to not involve the Aegis program office in early 

SM–3 IIB development efforts? 

General O’REILLY. The MDA fully supports a development philosophy of incremental development, refinement, and proven design. The Aegis program office has 

been involved with the SM–3 Block IIB program. The SM–3 Block IIB program office employs 12 full-time Aegis BMD personnel to support Aegis Weapon System integration and program planning activities. Following the proven technology approach of the current family of SM–3 interceptors, the program currently falls under 

the leadership of the MDA Program Executive for Advanced Technology because the 

Block IIB is currently in the Technology Development Phase. As in our Navy/BMDO 

Terrier Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP) technology demonstration 

program which developed the technical concepts used in today’s SM–3 family of 

interceptors under the management of our Technology Directorate, we will prove the 

241 

fundamental kill vehicle and booster technology was ready for product development. 

As with the original LEAP program, the SM–3 IIB program takes advantage of 

MDA’s advanced technology efforts to develop new concepts in propulsion, lightweight materials, and sensors to reduce the risk associated with achieving the velocity and divert capabilities necessary for the SM–3 Block IIB. After these concepts 

and technology mature over the next 2 years, the program will then shift to product 

development and will transition under full Aegis BMD Program Office management 

in fiscal year 2013. 

MDA OVERSIGHT BY CONGRESS

47. Senator SESSIONS. General O’Reilly, responses to requests for information 

from MDA have never been slower. Countless requests from both personal offices 

and committee staff take weeks and in many instances months for responses. Are 

you aware of this? If so, how do you intend to ensure that requests from Congress 

are responded to in a timely manner? 

General O’REILLY. My Deputy Director and I personally review all responses to 

congressional questions. To respond effectively to congressional inquiries, MDA coordinates closely with the Services, the combatant commanders, and the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (AT&L, Policy, and the Comptroller) to ensure our answers 

are accurate, consistent with DOD objectives, and our programs are executable. This 

past year has been more challenging due to uncertainty of fiscal year 2011 funding. 

However, I fully concur that MDA should respond more rapidly to congressional 

inquiries. I recently completed a congressional response process review with my senior executive staff. As a result, we have improved our internal processes for responding to congressional inquiries by elevating questions to the attention of our senior 

executive leaders and increasing visibility of the staffing process within our command group. 

48. Senator SESSIONS. Ms. Chaplain, I understand that GAO has had issues with 

MDA transparency and timely responses to requests for information. Is this true? 

If so, have you requested that MDA improve access to information necessary for conducting effective oversight? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. GAO has experienced issues with MDA’s timely responses to our 

requests for information. We reported in 2010 that we experienced significant delays 

in obtaining information from MDA. During that audit, MDA did not always provide 

GAO staff with expeditious access to requested documents and articles of information, which delayed some audit analysis and contributed to extra staff hours. We 

reported in 2011 that we again experienced significant delays in obtaining information from MDA. In early 2011, MDA’s Director agreed to meet with GAO in an effort 

to improve our access to data and our working relationship. These efforts have produced new guidance on access which has been signed by both MDA and GAO and 

we are currently beginning to implement the guidance as we begin our new missile 

defense-related engagements. We see the guidance as a positive step forward, although it is too soon yet to see significant outcomes from its implementation. Improved access to information will be vital to ensuring we are in a position to assist 

Congress as it oversees MDA’s missile defense efforts. 

PRECISION TRACKING SPACE SYSTEM

49. Senator SESSIONS. General O’Reilly, this committee is painfully aware of the 

troubles associated with space system acquisition. What is your acquisition strategy 

for the PTSS and why do you feel you are better suited than Air Force Space Command to execute this strategy? 

General O’REILLY. PTSS is to be developed as an integrated part of the BMDS. 

This will require extensive participation of all BMDS elements as the preliminary 

design is developed. While the Air Force Space Command is a critical partner in 

the PTSS development, the PTSS development phase must also have involvement 

of Federally Funded Research Laboratories (Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Naval Research Laboratory, Space Dynamics Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratory); dedicated Service Cells of the Air Force and 

Navy; and an industry-partnered Integrated System Engineering Team (Ball Aerospace, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Orbital Sciences, and 

Raytheon). These PTSS stakeholders will develop non-proprietary, governmentowned intellectual property to enable full and open competition for industry to 

produce the PTSS. FFRCs are well-suited to perform this technical management 

role for MDA and Air Force Space Command. 

242 

MDA’s charter is to develop and test all missile defense capabilities, including but 

not limited to missiles and radars. The development of space-based remote sensing, 

and the integration of the data into BMD fire-control loops, are integral to the 

MDA’s development of early intercept capability. MDA is better able to lead the systems engineering and testing between the BMDS elements, including PTSS, prior 

to making production decisions. To support this strategy, the MDA and the Air 

Force Space and Missile Systems Center agree to assign Air Force personnel to the 

MDA’s programs (included the PTSS program). 

50. Senator SESSIONS. Ms. Chaplain, DOD space programs are a part of your GAO 

portfolio. Do you have any concerns with MDA’s acquisition of space systems? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Our concerns about space acquisitions extend across DOD. As I recently testified before this subcommittee, despite the significant investment in 

space, the majority of large-scale acquisition programs in DOD’s space portfolio have 

experienced problems during the past two decades that have driven up costs by hundreds of millions and even billions of dollars, stretched schedules by years, and increased technical risks. To address the cost increases, DOD altered its acquisitions 

by reducing the number of satellites it intended to buy, reducing the capabilities of 

the satellites, or terminating major space system acquisitions. Moreover, along with 

the cost increases, many space acquisitions have experienced significant schedule 

delays—of as much as 9 years—resulting in potential capability gaps in areas such 

as missile warning, military communications, and weather monitoring. These problems have been evident in Air Force, Navy, and MDA space programs. However, as 

I testified, the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have taken a 

wide range of actions to prevent them from occurring in new programs. 

We have not performed an in-depth review of the PTSS in particular nor of MDA’s 

broader capability to acquire space systems. An assessment of MDA’s capability to 

acquire space systems may be worthwhile given the broader concerns we have identified of a shortage of space acquisition expertise within DOD. 

Further, an in-depth review of PTSS may also be worthwhile given issues we 

highlighted in our March 2011 report. As we reported in March, we have concerns 

regarding the PTSS program’s optimistic schedule. MDA has developed an optimistic PTSS acquisition approach to field an operational constellation by fiscal year 

2018. The agency plans to conduct prototyping efforts beginning in fiscal year 2011 

and launch two prototype satellites in fiscal year 2015. MDA also plans to launch 

a minimum of seven additional satellites by fiscal year 2018. We are concerned 

about this compressed schedule because it took MDA about 8 years to refurbish and 

develop its predecessor—the two demonstration STSS satellites—which launched in 

2009 and took almost 15 months after launch to reach full operational capability. 

PTSS intends to develop and launch two prototype satellites in approximately 5 

years and subsequently launch seven operational satellites in approximately 3 

years. 

We also reported that delays in fielding a PTSS constellation in fiscal year 2018 

would significantly affect the implementation of the PAA to defend Europe and the 

United States against regional ballistic missile attacks. MDA discovered that there 

were sensor coverage gaps in its ability to acquire and track large ballistic missile 

raid sizes, intercept ballistic missiles earlier in their trajectories, assess intercept attempts in real time, and launch additional interceptors, if necessary. Currently, the 

sensor systems of the BMDS consist of radar sensors, such as SBX and AN/TPY– 

2. According to MDA, infrared satellites such as PTSS would have advantages over 

terrestrial radars because they can limit the affect of weather conditions, eliminate 

the need for host nation agreements, and observe ballistic missile launches occurring in remote locations. In addition PTSS is being designed to track large missile 

raid sizes soon after launch to enable earlier intercepts. Such capabilities would alleviate sensor coverage gaps and reduce the need for terrestrial sensors. 

ACQUISITION REFORMS

51. Senator SESSIONS. General O’Reilly, 1 of the 23 principal actions outlined in 

Dr. Carter’s September 2010 Better Buying Power memo was mandating affordability as a requirement for new weapon programs. How is MDA determining what 

is affordable? 

General O’REILLY. The MDA performs government cost estimates on all BMDS 

component programs to create a basis for affordability reviews. BMDS component 

programs that require an Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics) production decision typically have an Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation) Independent Cost Estimate conducted 

243 

to support the decision. All BMDS component programs are reviewed by a MDA Director-level program change board to prioritize activities within the BMDS and 

within individual BMDS component programs. Affordability initiatives from the program manager, program executive staff, and functional staff are applied at this 

time. These reviews form the basis for the overarching MDA budget request and ultimately determine what each of the BMDS component programs are provided to 

execute their programs. 

52. Senator SESSIONS. General O’Reilly, how will programs be held accountable 

for meeting affordability targets? 

General O’REILLY. BMDS component programs are reviewed quarterly at the 

MDA Director-chaired BERs. BERs review all six baselines to include the Resources 

Baseline (the Resource Baseline includes cost and affordability). Any changes to 

baselines must be approved by the program manager, program executive, and functional manager responsible for the baseline to ensure integration with other BMDS 

component programs and other baselines. The program manager must account for 

any variations from the baselines, and significant variations are reported to Congress in the annual BAR. 

53. Senator SESSIONS. General O’Reilly, will affordability targets be reported to 

Congress in the BAR? 

General O’REILLY. Yes. 

ISRAELI PROGRAMS

54. Senator SESSIONS. General O’Reilly, the fiscal year 2012 budget included a $5 

million efficiencies-related reduction for Israeli missile defense cooperative programs. I understand that this reduction is below the funding level agreed to by the 

United States and Israel. Is that correct? 

General O’REILLY. The agreement allows for each partner to execute in accordance 

with its own national laws and regulations, and those obligations are subject to 

availability of funds. Thus, the agreement allowed for U.S. efficiency directives to 

be implemented on our Israeli cooperative programs. $5.0 million in savings was 

identified in U.S.-Israel Cooperative Programs in fiscal year 2012 through a refined 

test approach. For example, the completion of U.S.-based flight testing in 2011 

(Caravan-2), and the decision to move additional planned flight testing (Caravan3) to Israel, reduced U.S. test planning and personnel requirements in fiscal year 

2012. Thus, the original objectives and scope of U.S. contribution to these Israeli 

programs will be met. 

TWO-STAGE GROUND-BASED INTERCEPTOR

55. Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts and General O’Reilly, while the two-stage GBI 

has been designated as a contingency in the event development of the IIB takes 

longer than anticipated, I remain concerned that DOD has yet to identify a serious 

hedging strategy for testing and potential deployment. If it is determined that the 

SM–3 IIB will not be technologically feasible in time for a 2020 deployment, how 

much time would be needed to deploy the two-stage GBIs in its place? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The hedge strategy is in the process of being developed and refined. 

We have committed to brief this committee on the results once it has been approved 

by the Secretary of Defense. The hedge strategy will include a discussion of hedge 

options to mitigate the effect of a delay to the SM–3 IIB interceptor. 

General O’REILLY. The hedge strategy is under development and will be briefed 

to Congress by the Office of the Secretary of Defense once it has been approved by 

the Secretary of Defense. Hedge strategy decision timeline triggers include both the 

threat assessment and SM–3 IIB developmental progress. The hedge strategy will 

include timelines for deployment. 

56. Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts and General O’Reilly, has the administration 

outlined a plan that ties two-stage GBI procurement and basing agreements with 

the schedule and technological milestones for the SM–3 IIB? 

Dr. ROBERTS. DOD is reviewing its hedge strategy, including ensuring a sufficient 

hedge to a potential delay to the SM–3 IIB interceptor. DOD is committed to briefing Congress as soon as the Secretary has approved the hedging strategy. 

General O’REILLY. As Dr. Roberts stated in his testimony, DOD is reviewing what 

more needs to be done to ensure the hedge posture is sufficient to address the posVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00249 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
244 

sible threat developments in the timeframe before 2020. DOD is committed to briefing Congress as soon as the Secretary has approved the hedging strategy. 

57. Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts and General O’Reilly, how will delaying the 

test for the two-stage GBI next year to pay for corrective measures related to the 

two recent three-stage GBI test failures impact the availability of the two-stage as 

a hedge to the SM–3 IIA and IIB? 

Dr. ROBERTS and General O’REILLY. The repeat of FTG–06a will consume a majority of the resources previously estimated for funding FTG–08 (the first intercept 

test of a two stage GBI). There are two remaining two-stage flight tests necessary 

prior to a two-stage GBI deployment decision, FTG–08 and FTG–17. FTG–08 has 

been delayed by 2 years from the second quarter of fiscal year 2012 until the fourth 

quarter of fiscal year 2014. FTG–17, with upgraded avionics, is delayed from the 

third quarter of fiscal year 2016 to the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2019. However, 

we could accelerate flight testing if it is deemed necessary. 

The repeat of FTG–06a will consume a majority of the resources previously estimated for funding FTG–08 (the first intercept test of a two stage GBI). There are 

two remaining two-stage flight tests necessary prior to a two-stage GBI deployment 

decision, FTG–08 and FTG–17. FTG–08 has been delayed by 2 years from the second quarter of fiscal year 2012 until the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2014. FTG– 

17, with upgraded avionics, is delayed from the third quarter of fiscal year 2016 to 

the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2019. If a threat change was to dictate an earlier 

need, we could accelerate flight testing to accommodate. 

[Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

(245) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE 

PROGRAM 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 11, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m. in room 

SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator E. Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Nelson and Sessions. 

Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations 

and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel. 

Minority staff members present: Daniel A. Lerner, professional 

staff member; and Michael J. Sistak, research assistant. 

Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang, Hannah I. Lloyd, and 

Brian F. Sebold. 

Committee members’ assistant present: Ann Premer, assistant to 

Senator Ben Nelson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, 

CHAIRMAN 

Senator NELSON. I call this hearing to order. My good friend, 

Ranking Member Senator Sessions, is on his way, but they’ve suggested we go ahead and start, given the fact that we’re interrupted 

by a vote and the White House. 

I’d like to welcome all of you this afternoon and our many witnesses. Today we meet to discuss military space programs. Often 

there is little appreciation or understanding either in the Senate or 

in the general public of the advantages that space systems provide 

the U.S. military, the Intelligence Community (IC), and our economy in general. Somehow a satellite flying over a football game 

just isn’t the same as a flyover by a B–2. It just hasn’t gotten there 

yet. 

We as a Nation would be greatly diminished without our space 

assets. Thank you for your commitment and dedication to space 

and I look forward to a good discussion today. 

246 

Our witnesses this afternoon are: Ambassador Gregory L. 

Schulte—we welcome you to your new position, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; Dr. John A. Zangardi, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Information Operations, and 

Space. Is there anything left? [Laughter.] 

Dr. ZANGARDI. No, sir, there is not. [Laughter.] 

Senator NELSON. All right. 

General William L. Shelton, USAF, Commander, Air Force Space 

Command (AFSPC), we welcome you. Lieutenant General Susan J. 

Helms, USAF, Commander, AFSPC, Strategic Command, Joint 

Functional Component Commander for Space (JFCC Space); Lieutenant General Richard P. Formica, USA, Commander, U.S. Army 

Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command (ASMDC/ARSTRAT); Rear Admiral David W. Titley, USN, 

Oceanographer and Navigator of the Navy and Director, Maritime 

Domain Awareness and Space; Major General John E. Hyten, 

USAF, Director, Space Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of the Air Force for Acquisition; and Ms. Cristina T. Chaplain, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office (GAO). 

First, congratulations, as I said, are in order for the successful 

launch of the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) GEO–1 last 

Saturday. This satellite is years behind schedule and substantially 

over budget, but it’s finally in orbit. 

General Shelton, this is your first opportunity to testify before 

the subcommittee since your confirmation as the new Commander 

of AFSPC. Welcome. 

I’d also like to note that we have included Lieutenant General 

Formica in our hearing today representing the Army’s small but 

growing interest in space. General Formica may not think it’s 

small, but by comparison some others do. We’ve not had the Army 

testify on space issues in many years and we look forward to hearing from you today. 

Finally, Lieutenant General Helms, congratulations on your induction last week to the Astronaut Hall of Fame. 

This past year has been a very active one in the space community. The first Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite was launched in August, although as a result of a failure in 

the satellite propulsion system it is not yet in its proper orbit. We 

would appreciate any update on the satellite’s progress. As I understand it, AEHF–1 is supposed to be in the right orbit by later this 

summer. 

The first Global Positioning System (GPS)–3F satellite launched 

just after our hearing last year and the second one should launch 

later this year, this summer even. The first Space-Based Space 

Surveillance (SBSS) satellite launched in September. Operational 

Response Satellite 1 (ORS–1) should launch in June and TacSat– 

4 will also launch later this summer. Both of these satellites are 

awaiting resolution of a launch vehicle issue. Of course, the SBIRS 

launched last week. Quite a year of firsts. 

As we all know so well, the Air Force and Navy have struggled 

for many years with their satellite programs and, while it appears 

that the many design, development, and manufacturing issues are 

247 

mostly resolved, it’s been a long and expensive process. The question we have is, what are the lessons learned that can be applied 

to future programs? 

One satellite program is not out of the woods, however, and that 

is the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS), the successor to 

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). Even though the NPOESS program was cancelled 

a year ago, the acquisition plan for the much-needed DWSS is not 

finished. We’d like to know the schedule for this program and when 

there will be an acquisition decision. 

While the Navy appears to have solved the technical problems 

with the antenna on the Mobile User Objective Satellite (MUOS), 

a communications satellite which just last year was about 11 

months late, with a launch date of September of this year. I now 

understand that MUOS is approximately 21 months late and will 

not even be delivered until mid-next year. In the mean time, the 

Navy just put the fifth satellite on contract. We’ll be anxious to 

hear, learn, and discuss more about this delay as well. 

The Air Force has two proposals on the table this year. One is 

to look at block buys of satellites starting with AEHF satellites 5 

and 6. The second proposal is to look into a commitment to buy at 

least eight booster cores per year for the Evolved Expendable 

Launch Vehicle (EELV). This would entail a much-needed restructuring of the EELV contract and a better understanding of the actual launch costs. We look forward to a thorough discussion of the 

very successful, but expensive, EELVs. 

The final issue is the space industrial base. From rocket motors 

and engines to the smallest satellite parts, the supply base is getting smaller. We’d like to hear your thoughts on how to strengthen 

this industrial base. 

We have a large panel today, so I will conclude and ask Senator 

Sessions for his comments. What I’m hopeful is that our panelists 

know that we have to leave at 3:20 p.m., we have a vote at 3 p.m., 

and for a late-breaking meeting to the White House. You’ve submitted prepared statements, they will be included in the record. If 

we could maximize the time and, very briefly, identify your highest 

priority in about 2 minutes. 

Ambassador Schulte, we’ll begin with you. Then Zangardi, 

Shelton, Helms, Formica, Titley, Hyten, and Chaplain. Thank you. 

Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GREGORY L. SCHULTE, DEPUTY 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY 

Ambassador SCHULTE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify this afternoon. In February, Secretary Gates and 

Director of National Intelligence Clapper submitted to Congress a 

first-ever National Security Space Strategy (NSSS). This new strategy starts with dramatic changes in space, a domain that remains 

vital to our national security, but that is increasingly congested, 

contested, and competitive. 

In the face of these challenges, this new strategy seeks to protect 

the strategic advantages that we derive from space while also protecting the domain itself and the industrial base that is so important to our capabilities there. My prepared statement summarizes 

248 

the strategy. I would like to focus briefly on three important aspects: first, promoting responsible use of space; second, partnering 

with other countries; and third, deterring attacks on our space systems. 

Promoting the responsible use of space is one of the new strategy’s key approaches. A more cooperative, predictable environment 

enhances our national security and discourages destabilizing behavior. The United States is leading by example. We are preparing 

to begin providing pre-launch notifications of our space launches, 

just as we have notified ballistic missile launches in the past. 

U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has signed agreements 

with some 23 satellite operators across the world to share data and 

warnings of possible collisions. The United States is also looking to 

promote international transparency and confidence-building measures for space. With that in mind, we are currently evaluating the 

European Union’s (EU) proposed International Code of Conduct for 

Outer Space Activities. Our preliminary review suggests that such 

a code could provide a positive approach to promoting responsible 

space—responsible behavior, but the administration has not yet 

made a final determination on the code or changes that would be 

necessary for us to accept it, and the Department of Defense (DOD) 

is assessing its operational impact. 

Partnering with other countries is another key approach of the 

new strategy. Partnerships allow us to benefit from the growing 

space capabilities of allies and other countries, to make our space 

systems more diverse and resilient, and to improve our ability to 

operate in coalition. As an important step in that process, we are 

looking at transitioning STRATCOM’s Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) into a combined space operations center with allies. 

Another good example of partnership is the Wide-Band Global 

satellite communications (SATCOM). Australia has bought into the 

constellation and the Air Force is negotiating with other allies to 

also buy in. This expands the number of satellites, adds coverage 

and resiliency, and shares the cost, a welcome benefit at a time of 

budget constraints. 

The new strategy also reflects a new multi-layered approach to 

deterring attacks on our space systems, which is important as 

space becomes increasingly contested. The first layer of deterrence 

is the establishment of norms of responsible behavior, as I discussed. The second layer of deterrence is the establishment of 

international coalitions so that an attack on the capability of one 

becomes the attack on the capability of many. 

The third layer of deterrence is increasing our resilience and capacity to operate in a degraded environment. The fourth layer of 

deterrence is a readiness and capability to respond in self-defense 

and not necessarily in space. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, DOD has adopted a new space 

strategy to protect the national security advantages that we derive 

from a domain that is increasingly congested, contested, and competitive, and we look forward to working with you and Congress in 

implementing this strategy. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Schulte follows:] 

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PREPARED STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GREGORY L. SCHULTE

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify on Department of Defense (DOD) space policy. I am honored to join my distinguished colleagues from the Army, Navy, Air 

Force and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Today, I am pleased to discuss the recently released National Security Space Strategy (NSSS). 

Maintaining the benefits afforded to the United States by space is central to our 

national security. Space systems allow our warfighters to see with clarity, communicate with certainty, navigate with accuracy, and operate with assurance. However, 

an evolving strategic environment increasingly challenges U.S. space advantages. 

The current and future strategic environment is driven by three trends—space is 

increasingly congested, contested, and competitive. 

Space is increasingly congested. Growing global space activity and testing of China’s destructive anti-satellite system have increased congestion in important areas 

in space. DOD tracks approximately 22,000 manmade objects in orbit, of which 

1,100 are active satellites. Another area of increasing congestion is the radiofrequency spectrum. As many as 9,000 satellite communications transponders are 

expected to be in orbit by 2015. As more transponders are placed in service, the 

greater the probability of radiofrequency interference. This congestion is complicating space operations for all those that seek to benefit from space. 

Space is increasingly contested in all orbits. Potential adversaries are seeking to 

exploit perceived space vulnerabilities through a range of counterspace threats that 

may deny, degrade, deceive, disrupt, or destroy space assets and supporting infrastructure from widely available jamming technology to highly-sophisticated, kinetic 

anti-satellite weapons. As more nations and non-state actors develop counterspace 

capabilities over the next decade, threats to U.S. space systems and challenges to 

the stability and security of the space environment will increase. Irresponsible acts 

against space systems could have implications beyond the space domain, disrupting 

worldwide services upon which the civil and commercial sectors depend. 

Space is increasingly competitive. More than 60 nations and government consortia 

currently operate satellites. Although the United States maintains an overall edge 

in space capabilities, the U.S. competitive advantage has decreased as market-entry 

barriers have lowered. Some U.S. suppliers are at risk due to inconsistent acquisition and production rates, long development cycles, and a more competitive foreign 

market. A decrease in specialized suppliers further challenges U.S. abilities to maintain assured access to critical technologies, avoid critical dependencies, inspire innovation, and maintain leadership advantages. All of these issues are compounded by 

challenges in recruiting, developing, and retaining a technical workforce. 

However, the challenges of a congested, contested, competitive environment also 

present the United States with opportunities for leadership and partnership. The recently released joint DOD and Intelligence Community NSSS charts a path for the 

next decade to respond to the current and projected space strategic environment. 

The NSSS seeks to maintain and enhance the national security benefits the 

United States derives from its activities and capabilities in space while addressing 

and shaping the strategic environment and strengthening the foundations of our 

space enterprise. The strategy identifies three U.S. national security space objectives: strengthen safety, stability, and security in space; maintain and enhance the 

strategic national security advantages afforded to the United States by space; and 

energize the space industrial base that supports U.S. national security. Achieving 

these objectives will ensure our military continued access to space-based assets national security purposes. 

The United States will retain leadership in space by strengthening our space capabilities and improving our collaboration with others worldwide. Leadership cannot 

be predicated on declaratory policy alone. It must build upon a willingness to maintain strategic advantages while working with the international community to develop collective norms, share information, and collaborate on capabilities. Thus the 

United States will pursue a set of five interrelated strategic approaches to meet our 

national security space objectives and enhance U.S. leadership in space, as outlined 

in the NSSS. 

PROMOTE RESPONSIBLE, PEACEFUL, AND SAFE USE OF SPACE

The United States will promote the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space 

as the foundational step to addressing the congested and contested space domain. 

A more cooperative, predictable environment enhances U.S. national security and 

discourages destabilizing crisis behavior. The United States will encourage responsible behavior in space and will support development of data standards, best practices, transparency and confidence-building measures, and norms of behavior for reVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00255 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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sponsible space operations. The United States will consider proposals and concepts 

for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance 

the national security of the United States. 

With increasing congestion in the space domain, efforts to develop and share situational awareness can help bring order to the congestion and prevent mishaps, 

misperceptions, and mistrust. DOD will continue to improve the quantity and quality of the space situational awareness (SSA) information it obtains and, in coordination with other government agencies, will seek to establish agreements with other 

nations and commercial firms to enhance spaceflight safety for all parties. DOD is 

also pursuing opportunities to expand sharing of space situational awareness data 

to increase transparency and cooperation in the domain. U.S. Strategic Command 

(STRATCOM) has entered into agreements with 23 companies, including both 

launch providers and satellite owners and operators, to improve spaceflight safety. 

The United States is pursuing a number of initiatives to promote the responsible 

use of space. In keeping with the new strategy and the President’s National Space 

Policy, we are currently evaluating the European Union’s (EU) proposed international Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities as a pragmatic first set of 

guidelines for safe activity in space. We are also discussing the Code with other 

space-faring countries, including our key allies, as well as Russia, China, and India. 

The administration has not made a final determination on the EU proposal, and 

DOD is assessing its operational impact. However, our preliminary assessment finds 

it a positive approach to promoting responsible behavior in space, enhancing our national security in the process. 

Promoting transparency for responsible space operations will enhance the security 

of the United States by singling out those actors who seek to disrupt peaceful uses 

of outer space. As a concrete step towards transparency, DOD recently revised its 

pre-launch notification policy to include space launch vehicles in addition to ballistic 

missile launches. DOD will continue to work with the Department of State and 

other departments to promote responsible behavior worldwide that will help ensure 

the long-term sustainability of the space environment. 

PROVIDE IMPROVED U.S. SPACE CAPABILITIES

Ensuring U.S. capabilities are developed and fielded in a timely, reliable, and responsive manner is critical for military forces to plan and execute effective operations. Improving our acquisition processes, energizing the U.S. space industrial 

base, enhancing technological innovation, and deliberately developing space professionals are critical enablers to maintaining U.S. space leadership. 

The United States seeks to foster a space industrial base that is robust, competitive, flexible, healthy, and delivers reliable space capabilities on time and on budget. 

International advances in space technology have put increased importance on reforming U.S. export controls to ensure the competitiveness of the U.S. space industrial base while addressing technology security. Secretary Gates has actively called 

for an overhaul of our export control system. Reforming export controls will facilitate U.S. firms’ ability to compete in the international marketplace for capabilities 

that are, or will soon become, widely available globally, while strengthening our 

ability to protect the most significant U.S. technology advantages. The NSSS reaffirms the necessity of these reforms and echoes the National Space Policy’s call for 

giving favorable consideration for export of those items and technologies that are 

generally available on the global market, consistent with U.S. national security interests. 

We are exploring innovative acquisition strategies for buying spacecraft, with a 

focus on block buys. As part of the Secretary of Defense’s broader efficiency initiatives, our goals are to: (1) reduce unit cost for ‘‘production ready’’ satellites; (2) enable the Department to acquire these systems more efficiently and affordably; and 

(3) stabilize production including the industrial base. Our innovative acquisition 

strategy will include full-funding of two satellite classes—Advanced Extremely High 

Frequency (in fiscal year 2012) and Space Based Infrared System (in fiscal year 

2013)—through the use of advance appropriations. We ask for your support of this 

approach. 

PARTNER WITH RESPONSIBLE NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND

COMMERCIAL FIRMS

The United States will pursue additional opportunities to partner with responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial firms to augment the 

U.S. National Security Space Posture. Decisions on partnering will be consistent 

with U.S. policy and international commitments and will consider cost, protection 

of sources and methods, and effects on the U.S. industrial base. U.S. military perVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00256 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
251 

sonnel will ensure the appropriate review and release of classified information to 

enhance partner access to space information. 

With our allies, we will explore the development of combined space doctrine that 

endorse and enable the collaborative sharing of space capabilities in crisis and conflict. DOD is already exploring transforming STRATCOM’s Joint Space Operations 

Center into a Combined Space Operations Center operated with international partners. A Combined Space Operations Center will allow our allies to work side-by-side 

with U.S. commanders, integrating a coalition approach to space into our day-to-day 

operations. DOD, in conjunction with the State Department and other appropriate 

U.S. Government agencies, will work to expand mutually beneficial agreements with 

key partners to utilize existing and planned capabilities that can augment U.S. national security space capabilities. Wideband Global Satellite Communication is a 

good example—Australia has joined the constellation and other allies are looking at 

doing the same. A larger, more international constellation adds resilience and augments our space-based capabilities and forces a potential aggressor to contemplate 

attacking space systems used by a coalition of countries instead of one country. 

We will explore sharing space-derived information as ‘‘global utilities’’ with 

partnered nations. We will continue to share SSA information to promote responsible and safe space operations and will pursue enhanced sharing of other space 

services such as missile warning and maritime domain awareness. We will explore 

the establishment of a collaborative missile warning network to detect attacks 

against our interests and those of our allies and partners. 

Strategic partnerships with commercial firms will be pursued in areas that stabilize costs and improve the resilience of space architectures upon which we rely. 

Such partnerships enhance national security capabilities by providing opportunities 

to host national security payloads on commercial spacecraft or by offering innovative 

opportunities to buy or lease capabilities on-orbit. In an era of limited resources, the 

DOD will develop space systems only when there is no suitable, cost-effective commercial alternatives or when national security needs dictate. We will also actively 

promote the sale of capabilities developed by U.S. companies to partner nations. 

Such capabilities could then be integrated into existing U.S. architectures and networks through arrangements that enhance and diversify U.S. capabilities. 

PREVENT AND DETER AGGRESSION AGAINST SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE THAT SUPPORTS

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

The United States is pursuing a multilayered approach to prevent and deter aggression against U.S. and allied space systems that support our national security. 

The Department seeks to enhance its capability to dissuade and deter the development, testing, and employment of counterspace systems and prevent and deter aggression against space systems and supporting infrastructure that support U.S. national security. 

Many elements of this strategy contribute to this approach. DOD will: support 

diplomatic efforts to promote norms of responsible behavior in space which may dissuade and impose international costs on irresponsible behavior; pursue international 

partnerships that encourage potential adversary restraint; improve our ability to attribute attacks; strengthen the resilience of our architectures to deny the benefits 

of an attack; and retain the right to respond, should deterrence fail. 

SSA will continue to be a top priority, as it decreases the risk that an adversary’s 

action could occur without warning or attribution. We are working with the Director 

of National Intelligence to improve our intelligence posture—predictive awareness, 

characterization, warning, and attribution, to improve our understanding of activities in the space domain. When combined with efforts to promote responsible behavior, such transparency will facilitate the quick identification of actions that threaten 

U.S. interests. 

Furthermore, the United States will deny adversaries meaningful benefits of attack by improving protection and strengthening the resilience of our architectures. 

Partnerships as well as alternative U.S. Government approaches such as cross-domain solutions, hosted payloads, responsive options, and other innovative solutions, 

can deliver capability, should our space systems be attacked. This also will enable 

our ability to operate in a degraded space environment. 

Finally, the United States is developing a range of options to deter, and if necessary, defeat efforts to interfere with U.S. or allied space systems consistent with 

the inherent right of self-defense and other longstanding principles on international 

law. Such options could include necessary and proportional responses outside of the 

space domain. 

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PREPARE TO DEFEAT ATTACKS AND TO OPERATE IN A DEGRADED ENVIRONMENT

Notwithstanding our efforts to deter, some actors may still pursue counterspace 

actions as a means of achieving military or political advantage. Our military capabilities must be prepared to operate through a degraded environment and attacks 

targeted at our space systems and supporting infrastructure. We must deny and defeat an adversary’s ability to achieve its objectives. 

As DOD invests in space capabilities, it will include resilience as a key criterion 

in evaluating alternative architectures. Resilience can be achieved in a variety of 

ways, to include cost-effective space system protection, cross-domain solutions, 

hosting payloads on a mix of platforms in various orbits, drawing on distributed 

international and commercial partner capabilities, and developing and maturing responsive space capabilities. 

To enhance resilience, DOD will continue to develop mission-effective alternatives, 

including land, sea, air, and space-based alternatives for critical capabilities currently delivered primarily through space-based platforms. In addition, DOD will 

seek to establish relationships and agreements whereby we can access partner capabilities if U.S. systems are degraded or unavailable. We will be prepared to use 

these capabilities to ensure the timely continuity of services in a degraded space environment. 

Preparing for attacks must extend to the people and processes relying on space 

information, operating our space systems, and analyzing space-derived information. 

Ensuring that our servicemen can operate effectively during an attack on our space 

assets reduces the benefit of attack. DOD is also developing exercises and training 

to ensure our ability to access the requisite capabilities and information, from space 

or through cross-domain solutions, in the event of interference with space capabilities. 

CONCLUSION

Our strategy requires active U.S. leadership enabled by an approach that updates, 

balances, and integrates all of the tools of U.S. power. DOD, in coordination with 

other departments and agencies, will implement this strategy by updating guidance, 

plans, doctrine, programs, and operations to reflect the new strategic approach. 

DOD included initial steps towards implementing the strategy in its fiscal year 

2012 budget and will use the coming year to lay the foundation for changes in fiscal 

year 2013 and beyond. DOD looks forward to working closely with Congress, industry, and allies to implement this new strategy for space. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Dr. Zangardi. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN A. ZANGARDI, PH.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION 

OPERATIONS, AND SPACE 

Dr. ZANGARDI. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very 

much for giving me the opportunity to testify this afternoon on 

issues of space. 

The Navy continues to provide narrow-band SATCOM for U.S. 

forces worldwide through the legacy Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) 

Follow-On (UFO) constellation. We will continue to lease commercial UHF services to supplement existing capacity as required in 

support of the warfighter. The Navy looks forward to the first onorbit capability of Satellite No. 1 of the MUOS in 2012. As subsequent MUOS satellites are delivered to replace the fragile UFO 

constellation, it is critical that the Navy remain postured to provide 

uninterrupted UHF SATCOM services for the warfighter, including 

preserving the ability to launch MUOS satellites as they are delivered, in order to mitigate a loss of UFO satellite on-orbit. 

Sir, that completes my statement. Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Titley and Dr. 

Zangardi follows:] 

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JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY RADM DAVID W. TITLEY AND DR. JOHN A ZANGARDI

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, we are honored to appear before you today to address the Navy’s space activities. Successful Naval operations in the 21st century demand increased global situational awareness and proficiency in the areas of intelligence, cyber defense, ballistic missile defense, information management, and space. To achieve this primacy, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) directed the realignment of his staff a year ago to bring all Navy information-related capabilities and systems under a single resource sponsor—the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance. In the area of space, the 

OPNAV N2/N6 Information Dominance Directorate has established a single focal 

point to oversee Navy’s space related policies, programs, requirements, investments, 

and resourcing. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet, established over a year ago 

to be the Navy’s operational lead for information and cyberspace, continues to execute Navy’s space operations today. 

Our maritime strategy demands a flexible, interoperable and secure global communications capability to support the command and control requirements of highly 

mobile, geographically dispersed U.S., joint, and coalition forces. Our satellite systems provide a decisive advantage to our deployed forces across the broad spectrum 

of military operations, from peacetime engagements to humanitarian relief efforts 

to major combat operations. The Navy relies upon space-based capabilities to 

achieve information dominance over potential adversaries and enable commanders 

to exercise effective command and control at all warfare levels and across multiple 

information enclaves in all domains. 

NAVY SPACE REQUIREMENTS

The Navy’s interests in space include communications, intelligence, surveillance, 

reconnaissance, positioning, navigation, timing, missile warning, meteorology, and 

oceanography capabilities. The Navy continues to engage with the other Services 

and our interagency partners to ensure that all of our space equities, interests, and 

requirements are well understood so that the combatant commanders and Navy’s 

operating forces have the space capabilities they need to succeed in their missions. 

The Navy remains critically dependent on space to conduct not only its wartime 

mission, but also its core capabilities of forward presence, deterrence, sea control, 

power projection, maritime security, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response. Space capabilities are vital to our Nation’s maritime operations and are 

foundational to our ability to operate in a networked and dispersed manner. As the 

recently signed Navy Space Strategy states, space provides the ultimate crow’s nest 

for maritime operations. 

The Navy’s mission of ensuring the security of our citizens at home and abroad 

requires a global reach and persistent presence. Our ability to conduct missions of 

mercy or rapidly deploy decisive combat power, in concert with the other Services 

and our coalition partners, depends on assured space capabilities with inherent 

flexibility and responsiveness to support our worldwide responsibilities. In accordance with the National Space Policy and National Security Space Strategy (NSSS), 

commercial and foreign partner capabilities have become increasingly useful in 

bridging the gap between requirements and capabilities. The Navy will continue to 

work with the commercial sector and foreign partners to explore options that address multiple maritime mission requirements. Decisions to exploit these partnerships, though, must include consideration of the information assurance risks inherent in the capabilities being employed. Further, these decisions must be based on 

feasibility and affordability assessments and cost, benefit, and risk analysis. 

Due to the long lead times involved in fielding complex space programs, it is essential that Navy requirements and maritime missions are factored into the prelaunch design and planned on-orbit operation of future satellite acquisitions. The 

Navy is actively engaged with key national and joint space-related organizations to 

ensure current and future Navy needs in space are identified and incorporated. Further, we welcome the opportunity to participate in the recently chartered Defense 

Space Council as a senior-level forum to discuss Navy space equities with the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and the Services who are 

represented at the Secretary and Under Secretary level. 

NAVY SPACE INVESTMENTS

Nearly 50 percent of Navy’s current fiscal contributions to space remains dedicated to the acquisition, development and management of the Ultra High Frequency 

(UHF) Follow-On (UFO) and Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) communicaVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00259 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
254 

tions satellite systems. The remainder is predominantly apportioned to acquisition 

of the various satellite receiver terminals and equipment for Navy units, and spacebased navigation, oceanography, and meteorology. 

Additionally, the Navy invests in space-related Science and Technology/Research 

and Development efforts that address maritime-related capability gaps critical to 

the successful execution of our Nation’s maritime strategy. In this fiscally-constrained environment, investments have been modest. 

The Navy depends on space capabilities now, and expects the demand for space 

capabilities to grow in the future, especially in the area of satellite communications 

(SATCOM). The Navy’s major space segment responsibility to the joint community 

is the UHF narrowband SATCOM constellation. Today this constellation consists of 

eight UFO satellites, two residual Fleet Satellites (FLTSAT), one Leased Satellite 

(LEASAT–5), and leased capacity on SKYNET–5C. MUOS will begin to replace 

these systems in May 2012. Based on evolving warfighting concepts, UHF SATCOM 

requirements are expected to grow, and MUOS, as designed, will support those requirements. 

MOBILE USER OBJECTIVE SYSTEM

The increasing joint demand for SATCOM access at ever-higher data rates requires moving beyond current legacy UHF satellite capabilities. MUOS will help 

satisfy those demands when initial operational capability is reached in fiscal year 

2012. The first satellite in the planned constellation of four operational satellites, 

with one on-orbit spare, is now scheduled for on-orbit capability in May 2012. Previously, Navy planned for the first MUOS satellite to achieve on-orbit capability in 

December 2011; however, the launches of several higher priority spacecraft have dictated a primary launch date in February 2012. Over the past year, the MUOS program made significant progress completing electromagnetic interference testing of 

spacecraft #1, propulsion and satellite bus mating of spacecraft #2, and development 

of the ground infrastructure required to support MUOS launch. MUOS program performance continues to support a Fall 2011 launch should a date become available. 

Navy’s fiscal year 2012 budget submission continues our investment in MUOS to 

replace the aging UFO constellation. 

MUOS will support Unified Commands and Joint Task Force Components, Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD agencies, and our coalition partners by 

providing worldwide tactical narrowband netted, point-to-point, and broadcast voice 

and data services in challenging environments, including double-canopy foliage, 

urban environments, high sea states, and all weather conditions. MUOS will carry 

two distinct payloads. The legacy UHF payload will provide the capability of a UFO 

satellite, while a new UHF waveform payload will significantly increase the number 

of accesses while also increasing available throughput to the warfighter. 

MUOS will be the common denominator for future command and control, enhancing the capability to communicate from the tactical edge to theater headquarters. 

MUOS will allow more comprehensive and coordinated support to regional engagement efforts, providing the capability to synchronize actions with other Services and 

agencies. This capability will be realized through the fielding of MUOS capable 

Joint Tactical Radio System terminals and by upgrading existing legacy UHF software programmable terminals. 

DELIVERING MUOS

The timely delivery of MUOS is a high priority for Navy, and we recognize both 

our responsibility and commitment to providing this vital warfighting capability to 

all our DOD, Intelligence Community and Interagency partners. The delay in delivery of the MUOS system, coupled with the age and fragility of the current UHF satellite constellation, has our full attention and focus. 

Navy has taken several proactive steps to minimize the operational impact if a 

gap in UHF satellite availability occurs. We have completed a payload reconfiguration on UFO satellite Flight 11 that significantly increased the number of available 

channels. We completed this action at no cost and with very low risk to the spacecraft. A recent modification to the frequency plan on FLTSAT 8 allowed us to optimize the UFO satellite Flight 7 and provide two additional channels at no cost. Additionally, the Navy continues to lease supplemental UHF resources from two commercial satellite systems, LEASAT and SKYNET. Our total mitigation efforts to 

date are providing the equivalent capacity of an additional UFO satellite. Navy has 

also explored options using commercially hosted payloads, but all possible material 

solutions would not address potential near term gaps. We will keep these options 

in reserve if their use becomes necessary. 

255 

We are also continuing efforts to make more efficient use of our currently available satellite resources. The Integrated Waveform (IW), a software upgrade to UHF 

SATCOM tactical terminals and control system, completed operational testing and 

is currently being deployed. IW will optimize our use of UHF satellite channels by 

doubling the number of accesses that can be supported by a single 25 kHz channel. 

DOD has also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Australian Ministry of Defense (MOD) for use of channels on an Australian-hosted payload covering 

the Indian Ocean region. In exchange, the United States will provide the Australian 

MOD use of equivalent UHF SATCOM accesses in the Pacific Ocean region commencing in 2018. Finally, we are exploring the use of TACSAT–4, an Office of Naval 

Research and Naval Research Laboratory co-led development that supports Operationally Responsive Space Office efforts. TACSAT–4 may provide a very limited 

operational capability when it reaches on-orbit capability later this summer. 

ENVIRONMENTAL REMOTE SENSING

The Navy provides DOD with global atmospheric modeling, and global and regional ocean modeling. We rely on partnerships with the Air Force, and civil and 

international agencies to meet our space-based environmental sensing requirements. 

Meeting these requirements is critical to the execution of missions that enhance 

safe, effective military operations. For our future, the Navy is engaged in defining 

the requirements for the DOD Defense Weather Satellite System and the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Joint Polar Satellite System, which will 

together satisfy a large portion of the Navy’s environmental sensing requirements 

over the next 15 years. 

In support of the new National Space Policy, the Navy is adopting a new strategy 

to meet its unique space-based ocean altimetry requirements. We have deferred procurement of the Navy Altimeter satellite (GEOSAT follow-on) until fiscal year 2016 

with full operational capability achieved in fiscal year 2021. In the interim, the 

Navy is seeking to enter partnerships with civil and international agencies to satisfy 

our altimetry requirements. 

POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND TIMING

The Navy continues to rely upon the Air Force’s Global Positioning System (GPS) 

to meet the vast majority of our positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) requirements. The Navy intends to award a contract this year for the GPS-based PNT service which will modernize our aging shipboard PNT systems and provide enhanced 

PNT assurance by implementing jam-resistant antennas, a Selective Availability 

Anti-Spoofing Module, and a foundation for future M-code implementation. The 

Navy is also investigating the impact of a GPS-challenged environment on maintaining synchronized timing across our full suite of combat and communications systems. 

The Navy is continuing the technology development phase of the Joint MilliArcsecond Pathfinder Survey satellite, transitioning from Science and Technology to 

a major acquisition category program, which will update the DOD star catalog to 

meet positioning and orientation accuracy requirements for the next several decades. 

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

A robust architecture of signals and geospatial intelligence systems to meet current and emerging requirements remains crucial to successful maritime operations. 

It is imperative that Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities be 

funded and fielded in sufficient quantity and capacity to sustain continuity of essential space-based intelligence data throughout the maritime domain. Accordingly, we 

fully support Office of the Director of National Intelligence collaboration with combatant commands and Services to ensure emerging requirements are adequately 

supported by future Intelligence Community collection systems. 

These intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities are indispensable 

contributors to maritime domain awareness. As the Nation continues to develop and 

field these and future capabilities, persistent coverage in the maritime domain remains a key requirement. A constrained fiscal environment will no doubt make this 

challenging, but, in accordance with the National Space Policy and NSSS, emerging 

capabilities are being explored with our coalition and commercial partners in an effort to reduce costs while increasing capability. 

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COMMERCIAL SPACE SYSTEMS

Commercially provided systems provide the ability to augment, but not replace, 

existing national and military systems. These commercial capabilities have become 

increasingly useful in bridging the gap between requirements and capabilities. The 

Navy has used commercial communications satellites since the early 1990s to augment bandwidth requirements not fully satisfied by military communications satellites. Technical advances in the commercial sector provide opportunities for rapid 

capability implementation not only for communications, but in other mission areas 

as well, such as safety of navigation and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Navy continues to work with the commercial sector to explore options 

to address multiple maritime mission requirements, and we continue to field systems, such as Commercial Broadband Satellite Program terminals, to fully leverage 

available commercial capability. Potential cost savings and capability supplementation should continue to be evaluated for all commercially-provided space-based capabilities at every opportunity. 

SPACE CADRE

Our Navy equities, requirements, operations, and management of space resources 

are the responsibility of a small but agile corps of space professionals that make the 

Navy’s use of space possible. The Navy’s Space Cadre is comprised of approximately 

1,350 Reserve, civil, and active duty service personnel from all warfighter designators and communities, and is a key component of the DOD’s 15,000 military and 

civilian space professionals. Part of our Total Workforce strategy is to ensure that 

fully qualified Navy Space Cadre personnel are consistently assigned to our most 

critical and influential space billets. This strategy requires the Navy to continue to 

recruit and retain a talented and highly skilled workforce to fill vital space leadership positions now and into the future. We continue to assign personnel with a proven capacity to represent unique Navy requirements for space systems in the joint 

acquisition processes at the National Reconnaissance Office. To enable us to do this 

more efficiently, we are developing specific career progression plans to actively manage space experts’ individual career paths to ensure that Navy and joint space-related assignments complement and enhance career progression and promotion opportunities while infusing naval operational expertise back into the space community. 

CONCLUSION

In closing, we would like to reiterate that space capabilities will continue to be 

critical to our Nation’s success in the maritime domain. We operate in an increasingly dynamic and challenging global environment, demanding additional capability 

and more capacity to operate in a networked but geographically dispersed fashion. 

A robust space layer is essential to providing the Nation’s soldiers, sailors, airmen, 

and marines with the situational awareness and force capacity to operate, fight, and 

succeed in a myriad of missions. 

Navy is leaning forward in the use, advocacy, and development of space capabilities. We are building and fielding the necessary space-based systems across multiple 

mission areas and the plan we have submitted will deliver the future space-based 

capabilities within the fiscal constraints of the budget. 

Thank you for the opportunity to share our efforts with you today. Continued support from this subcommittee and Congress is deeply appreciated. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

General Helms. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. SUSAN J. HELMS, USAF, COMMANDER, JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR 

SPACE, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND 

General HELMS. Good afternoon, Chairman Nelson. I am honored 

to appear before you as STRATCOM’s Commander for JFCC Space. 

This is my first opportunity to come before you as the Commander 

and I look forward to working with you and the other subcommittee members to enhance the United States’ standing as a 

global leader in space. 

257 

It’s an honor to represent the more than 3,000 soldiers, sailors, 

airmen, and marines of JFCC Space, as well as our exchange officers from Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. These men 

and women form a tireless and innovative Joint Force supporting 

our warfighters 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. 

Operating within an increasingly congested, contested, and competitive space environment requires strategically reexamining our 

processes, planning flexibility, improving awareness of the space 

environment, and expanding collaboration efforts with all 

spacefaring nations and corporations. Correctly adapting our operations will allow JFCC Space to continue to provide the following 

capabilities to the Joint Force: Unmatched position, navigation, 

and timing information; missile warning and missile defense; communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) support; and technical intelligence and characterization of the operational environment. 

In today’s strategic world, JFCC Space is at the forefront of defending our ability to operate freely within space. We continue to 

search out better ways to support those in harm’s way. We will 

continue to develop and employ systems to enhance our comprehensive space situational awareness. We will strive to strengthen our 

relationships with allied and industry space partners, ensuring our 

global capabilities remain available for those requiring them. 

You can be proud of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines of 

JFCC Space. I thank the subcommittee for your continued support 

as we work to preserve and enhance our space capabilities for our 

Nation. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General Helms follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. SUSAN J. HELMS, USAF 

Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, and members of the subcommittee, I am honored to appear before you as U.S. Strategic Command’s (STRATCOM) Commander 

of the Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC Space). This is my 

first opportunity to come before you as the Commander for JFCC Space and I look 

forward to working with you to enhance the United States standing as a global leader in space. 

It’s an honor to represent the more than 3,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines of JFCC Space. In addition to our active duty military members, JFCC Space 

has more than 1,000 National Guard, Reserve unit members and Individual Mobilization Augmentees, as well as, exchange officers from Australia, Canada, and the 

United Kingdom. These men and women form a tireless and innovative Joint Force, 

working hard to provide position, navigation, and timing information; missile warning and missile defense; communications; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support; and technical intelligence and personnel recovery to our warfighters 

24 hours a day, 365 days a year. 

The space environment has become increasingly congested, contested and competitive. Operating within space is correspondingly more uncertain than ever in our 

past. Addressing the changes in the environment requires strategically rethinking 

our processes, integrating extra flexibility in our planning, improving our awareness 

of the space environment and expanding our collaboration with all space faring nations and corporations. Correctly adapting our operations within the space environment before we are required to respond to an unforeseen circumstance will allow 

JFCC Space to continue to provide space capabilities to our Joint Force throughout 

these uncertain times. 

One of our premier responsibilities is to deliver space effects to the Joint Force. 

As the most prevalent space effect delivered by my operators, we have continued 

to operate and improve the most widely used space capability on the planet, the 

global positioning system (GPS) constellation. In January we completed the first 

phase of our ‘‘Expandable 24’’ operation, the largest satellite repositioning effort in 

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GPS program history. This two phase operation repositioned three satellites to optimize GPS coverage for terrain-challenged environments, such as cities and the 

mountains and valleys of Afghanistan. We also began operations of the newest GPS 

variant, the GPS IIF, which will add a second civilian safety-of-life signal and provide more robust signal availability for military users. 

Our Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) capabilities in space are the stalwart 

to providing critical ballistic missile warning to field commanders and national leaders. At least 20 nations currently have nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, and 

the technology to deliver them over long distances. According to intelligence estimates, during the next 10 years, additional countries will develop the technology 

and capability to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles at the United States. Our 

detection systems provide both strategic warning for intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and space launches as well as tactical warning for shorter-range ballistic missile launches. Space based missile warning satellites are able to provide 

continuous global coverage. These systems are capable of providing missile warning 

to the Joint Force and coalition partners in the event of a short-range ballistic missile attack. In addition, deployed units throughout the world provide Geographic 

Combatant Commanders the means of receiving missile warning data direct from 

the Defense Support Program (DSP) constellation for their area of responsibility. 

Space OPIR continues to ensure missile threats are detected and reported in a timely fashion but the technology continues to advance and we are constantly finding 

new ways to provide better battlespace awareness and technical intelligence to the 

ground commanders beyond our foundational ballistic missile warning mission. The 

Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) in its highly elliptical orbit (HEO) gives significant coverage over the northern hemisphere for infrared detection and technical 

intelligence gathering. We can now detect and report, in near real-time, natural and 

man-made infrared events. The quality of data provided by SBIRS HEO is a key 

part in our ability to characterize launches and predict threats within minutes. Following its operational acceptance, the first SBIRS in its geosynchronous orbit will 

give us the ability to paint a picture for national leadership of new foreign technology development and proliferation information. This capability is so significant 

that the SBIRS community is developing a pre-certified use plan to get valuable information to the Joint Force as soon as practical. 

These space based sensors are only one portion of our missile warning capability. 

Ground-based radars provide warning by detecting, tracking and counting individual objects in a missile attack early in their trajectory. Several of the ground 

based radars are integrated into the Ballistic Missile Defense System used by the 

Missile Defense Agency to improve midcourse sensor coverage by providing critical 

early warning, tracking, object classification and cueing data. 

Information technologies have truly revolutionized our capability to operate globally. From combat operations to humanitarian assistance, we use military satellite 

communications every day. In addition to GPS and OPIR capabilities, JFCC Space 

provides to the Joint Force protected, wideband and narrowband satellite communication capabilities. 

Protected communications make possible the ability to command and control 

forces and support national decisionmakers in a contested communications environment, including the high end nuclear environment. 

Wideband satellite communication provides automatic Digital Network/automatic 

Secure Voice Communications, Secret Internet Protocol Router Network and Joint 

Worldwide Intelligence Communication System access from space. Additionally 

wideband communications include relays for Defense Message System, Defense 

Switched Network, Diplomatic Telecommunication Service Communications and 

real-time Unmanned Aerial Vehicle video for ground mobile forces. 

In the category of narrowband communications, our ultra-high frequency followon (UHF) satellite system, is the space-based portion of the Department of Defense 

(DOD) communication system that enables reliable communications among aircraft, 

ships, submarines, ground stations and the presidential command network as well 

as a multitude of joint and allied users. UHF satellite communications is a primary 

enabler for distributed command and control, critical for dispersed maritime operations, and provides critical communications for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts such as the Haitian and Japanese earthquake. DOD provided 

more than 20 UHF satellite communications channels dedicated for supporting tsunami relief efforts in Japan. 

JFCC Space is forging ahead in our efforts to provide new, operationally responsive space effects to the Joint Force. We are actively engaged with Air Force Space 

Command and STRATCOM in developing the concepts and command relationships 

that may allow us to quickly transition rapid development capabilities to operational 

use. For example, the TACSAT–3 satellite has an experimental, hyper-spectral imVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00264 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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agery payload that has shown great promise in support for ground troops as well 

as in disaster relief and recovery operations. We are also working with Service partners to deploy the Operational Responsive Space (ORS)–1, a small spacecraft that 

will supply urgently-needed imagery to Central Command. 

Day to day, JFCC Space tasks our space based assets to provide standard space 

support to the Joint Force. We maintain a close and dedicated relationship with 

each theater’s Space Coordinating Authority (SCA). Through the SCA relationship 

JFCC Space is proactively postured to rapidly adapt to changing mission requirements based on combatant commander’s changing needs. JFCC Space, through the 

Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC), coordinated specific support to the U.S. response to the March 11 earthquake and tsunami in Japan and ongoing coalition 

military operations over Libya. These efforts include using data from the 

hyperspectral sensor on TACSAT–3 to help contain the damage at the Fukushima 

Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. In support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 

Operation Unified Protector, JFCC Space tailors theater missile warning coverage, 

strike assessment and technical intelligence support for coalition forces protecting 

Libyan civilians and civilian-populated areas. 

Space situational awareness (SSA) is the cornerstone of JFCC Space operations 

and the space surveillance network (SSN) is the workhorse of our SSA. The data 

provided by the space surveillance network are analyzed at the JSpOC by a collection of military and civilian analysts. These analysts keep track of what satellites 

are active, predict when pieces of debris or satellites will re-enter the atmosphere 

or collide, and provide vital information to decisionmakers about when a payload 

can be safely launched. Over the past 2 years, we have increased daily conjunction 

screening at the JSpOC from 110 primary satellites to all active satellites (over 

1,100). Due to this increase in number of satellites screened, we have seen conjunction warning notifications increase from 5 to up to 25 per day, up 46 percent from 

2009 and we have had a corresponding increase in our interaction with commercial 

and foreign government space operators. Information sharing with commercial and 

foreign entities is now a routine occurrence executed via a formalized process within 

JFCC Space. We currently have data sharing agreements with 23 commercial and 

foreign partners. 

However, we still suffer from an aged and limited sensor network to gather our 

most important SSA resource: orbital observations. Many of our SSN sensors operate on a one-object-at-a-time system and a majority of the SSN sensors are not 

networked with one another. The Continental United States (CONUS)-based space 

fence and our Eglin SSN sensor are currently the only machine-to-machine network 

between SSN radars. These networked sensors are resulting in 30,000 observations 

per year that would otherwise go undetected due to sensor limitations with Eglin’s 

space surveillance fence. We could see a huge benefit to our SSA through greater 

machine-to-machine networking between our SSN sensors. The CONUS-based space 

fence can detect and observe multiple objects at one time and contributes more observations to our network than any other sensor. Additionally, we have considerable 

gaps in coverage in the southern hemisphere. Placement of a space fence in the 

southern hemisphere will improve our coverage considerably. Another sensor that 

will improve our capability is the Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) satellite 

launched in September. This sensor operates from space, free of boundaries, borders, 

or atmospheric effects to distort or obscure viewing. With a potential capability to 

track objects much smaller in size than what our older sensors can track, SBSS will 

detect significantly more objects in orbit and produce a corresponding increase in 

the volume of SSA data. Current analytic and processing capacity in the JSpOC is 

not sufficient to exploit the full capacity of this or other future sensors. This shortfall is driving an urgent need to upgrade JSpOC systems. The JSpOC Mission System (JMS) is the Air Force’s program of record for solving this problem and ensuring the JSpOC is properly equipped to handle the mission is part of my service function as commander of 14th Air Force. 

The JMS is planned to replace our legacy command and control systems designed 

in the 1980s and fielded in the 1990s. We are working closely with the acquisition 

team to prioritize our mission requirements. In the months ahead we intend to employ an early JMS release that will significantly enhance our ability to understand 

the space situation with an integrated operating picture, as well as the ability to 

respond to a dynamic space environment. We will continue to build upon this initial 

capability to ensure our operators on the JSpOC floor have the tools, and the infrastructure, they need to accomplish the mission. 

We cannot properly equip the JSpOC without addressing our current facilities and 

the need for modern infrastructure to house the state of the art command and control system and the JSpOC personnel. Today the JSpOC performs its operational 

mission from a converted missile assembly building. Over 50 years old and designed 

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for an entirely different purpose, the building presents significant challenges towards meeting our integrated space operations mission. Successful integration with 

U.S. and coalition forces, as well as commercial partners will depend upon a future 

military construction project for new facilities designed specifically for space command and control. 

SSA is not only an understanding of the physical objects within space but also 

includes characterizing disruptions to services provided by satellite signals transmitted through space. JFCC Space provides the capability to monitor the service 

quality of U.S. and coalition satellite communications systems in order to detect interference which may ultimately be determined to be either unintentional incidents 

or purposeful acts. When an interference event is detected, JFCC Space receives 

support from other elements of STRATCOM to geolocate the source of interference. 

In these efforts, we continue to build on the early successes of current programs 

leading to the development of new systems to be deployed later this year in order 

to conduct electromagnetic interference detection in different frequencies and different locations throughout the world. These efforts support broader U.S. Government efforts—in cooperation with civil, commercial, and foreign partners—to identify, locate, and attribute sources of radio frequency interference, and take necessary 

measures to sustain the radiofrequency environment in which critical U.S. space 

systems operate. 

Consistent with the President’s National Space Policy and the National Security 

Space Strategy, we are working with the Department of State to expand our current 

partnerships and develop new partnerships through transparency and cooperation 

with partners and allies, including industry partners. The United States will continue to promote safe and responsible space operations both for ourselves and with 

other space faring nations and industry partners. Our leadership in the development of best practices and bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence 

building measures to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, 

space, is of critical importance. As the National Space Policy states, it is the shared 

interest of all nations to act responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, 

misperceptions, and mistrust. 

A Combined Space Operations concept is a starting place and we will work with 

our closest allies to flesh out and mature the concept toward mutually supportive 

goals. The concept must be expandable and tailorable to allow the flexibility to incorporate partners beyond our own U.S. Government agencies and closest allies. 

As resources permit, we plan to continue expanding the SSA information and 

services we offer. In coordination with the Department of State and civilian departments and agencies, we intend to enter into SSA Sharing agreements with foreign 

governments and international organizations, and build upon our bilateral space cooperation dialogues with key allies and partners. These dialogues have already resulted in agreements in principle for SSA cooperation between DOD and its counterparts in Australia, Canada, and France. SSA Sharing agreements—combined with 

ongoing discussions on SSA cooperation with other allies as well as the European 

Space Agency and European Union—will put us on a path to improve collective 

awareness of the space domain and work to preserve its advantages for all. 

Space operations continue to evolve rapidly and JFCC Space is at the forefront 

of defending our ability to operate within space. We continue to search out better 

ways to support Joint Forces around the globe, especially those in harm’s way. We 

will continue to develop and employ systems to enhance our comprehensive SSA. We 

will strive to strengthen our relationships with allied and industry space partners, 

ensuring our global capabilities remain available for those requiring them. You can 

be proud of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines of JFCC Space. I thank the 

committee for your continued support as we work to preserve and enhance the critical space capabilities of our Nation. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

General Formica. 

STATEMENT OF LTG RICHARD P. FORMICA, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND/ARMY FORCES STRATEGIC COMMAND 

General FORMICA. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and again 

thank you for your ongoing support of our soldiers, civilians, and 

families. I appear today as the Commander of the Army’s Space 

and Missile Defense Command and Army Forces Strategic Command. I’m honored to testify before this committee. You’ve been a 

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strong supporter of the Army and the key capabilities that space 

affords our warfighters and we value your continued support. 

My purpose today is to inform the committee about the Army as 

a user of space capabilities, to summarize the Army’s space strategy and policy, and to discuss the space capabilities provided by 

the Army. These are provided in more detail in my written statement which was prepared and provided for the record. I’ll briefly 

summarize those three, sir. 

As a user of space capabilities, the Army depends on position, 

navigation, timing, communications, ISR, assured missile warning, 

and weather. The space-based services are critical enablers to our 

forces and assured access to space-based capabilities is a critical 

element in the Army’s ability to shoot, move, and communicate. 

While we may face localized tactical disruptions, our Army does not 

want to face a day without space-based capabilities. 

The Army’s space policy and strategic plan provide our priorities 

and equities for space capabilities and forces. Our focus is on 

leveraging DOD and national space assets in partnership with the 

joint community to provide assured access of space-based capabilities in support of full-spectrum operations. 

The Army provides critical space capabilities for the combatant 

commanders and to the warfighter. In our space role, we have 

three core tasks: providing trained and ready space forces and capabilities to combatant commanders and to the warfighter; building 

future space forces; and researching, developing, testing, and integrating future space capabilities. 

Our command is uniquely organized in the Army to perform 

these three tasks, with operations, capability development, and materiel development functions. We are also geographically well-positioned in Huntsville, AL, and Colorado Springs, CO, to capitalize 

on the tech bases there. Our space capabilities are positioned in 14 

other locations around the globe to accomplish these 3 core tasks. 

In conclusion, the Army is critically dependent upon the capabilities that space brings to the battlefield and seeks assured access 

to those capabilities. I appreciate the opportunity to speak on these 

important matters and I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Formica follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LTG RICHARD P. FORMICA, USA 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for your ongoing support of our soldiers, civilians, and families, as well as the opportunity to testify before this panel. This marks my first appearance before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, a body that has been a strong supporter of the Army and the key capabilities that space affords our warfighters. Your continued support is important as 

we pursue our joint efforts to provide critical space capabilities in support of our 

Nation, our fighting forces, and our allies. 

In my current assignment, I wear three hats: first, as the commander of the U.S. 

Army Space and Missile Defense Command, I have Title 10 responsibilities to train, 

maintain, and equip space and missile defense forces for the Army. Second, as the 

Army Forces Strategic Command, I am the Army Service Component Commander 

(ASCC) to the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) charged with the responsibility for planning, integrating, and coordinating Army forces and capabilities in 

support of strategic missions. Third, I serve as STRATCOM’s Commander of the 

Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC–IMD) 

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in order to leverage the capabilities and skill sets of U.S. Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command (ASMDC/ARSTRAT). 

In my role here today as the Commander of ASMDC/ARSTRAT and the ASCC to 

STRATCOM, I am honored to testify before you with these distinguished witnesses—all providers of critical space capabilities to the warfighter and as essential 

contributors to the joint space planning process and our Nation’s continued advances to effectively operate in space. Within the Army, space operations and spacerelated activities are pursued as an enterprise and are not the exclusive domain of 

the ASMDC/ARSTRAT or any other single branch or functional proponent. 

My purpose today is to outline the Army as a user of space capabilities; to articulate the Army’s space strategy and policy; and to inform the committee about the 

Army as a provider of space capabilities. 

THE ARMY AS A USER OF SPACE CAPABILITIES

As America’s principal land force, our Army must be organized, trained, and 

equipped to provide responsive and sustained combat operations in order to fight as 

a joint team and to respond, as directed, to crises at home and abroad. Geopolitical 

uncertainties and nearly a decade of continuous combat have necessitated a high 

degree of operational adaptability. The Army’s Operating Concept identifies six 

warfighting functional concepts that contribute to operational adaptability: mission 

command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, protection, fires, and sustainment. 

Space-based capabilities leveraged and employed across the Army Space enterprise 

enable each of these warfighting functions. Simply put, space-based capabilities are 

critical elements to the Army’s ability to shoot, move, and communicate. 

The Army is reliant on space-based systems, such as global positioning satellites, 

communication satellites, weather satellites, and intelligence collection platforms. 

They are critical enablers to our ability to plan, communicate, navigate, and maintain battlefield situational awareness, engage the enemy, provide missile warning, 

and protect and sustain our forces. For example, the Army is dependent on the 

DOD’s Defense Weather Satellite System capabilities to meet its military weather 

forecasting requirements. The Army continuously works with the Air Force to define 

our requirements in order to ensure future warfighters have access to essential 

weather data. Most of these services are so well integrated into weapon systems and 

support processes that Soldiers are unaware of the space connection. This seamless 

integration is due in large part to the coordination and cooperation of space professionals at the Air Force Space Command, STRATCOM’s Joint Functional Component Command for Space, the Navy, the Army, and other Department of Defense 

(DOD) and joint agencies. 

The Army’s unrelenting dependency on space-based capabilities requires active 

participation in defining space-related capability needs. The identified needs serve 

to ensure necessary joint force structure, systems, and concept of operations are developed and acquired, thereby enabling the land force to conduct the full range of 

military operations now and in the future. 

Ensuring tactical and assured access to space is our focus—reassuring the requisite capabilities and effects are delivered to the tactical warfighter on time, every 

time demands that our space capabilities and architectures become more resilient 

against attacks and disruption. We must ensure that our Army does not face a day 

without space and space-related capabilities. 

THE ARMY’S SPACE POLICY AND STRATEGIC PLAN

The Army Space Policy, most recently updated in 2009, focuses on the operational 

and tactical needs of land forces and assigns space related Army organizational responsibilities. It follows implemented DOD space policies and procedures, reestablishes objectives for Army space, and continues the Army Space Council. The Army’s 

Space Policy outlines four broad space related objectives: 

• To maximize the effectiveness of current space capabilities in support of 

operational and tactical land warfighting needs. 

• To influence the design, development, acquisition, and concepts of operation of future space systems that enable and enhance current and future 

land forces. 

• To advance the development and effective use of responsive, timely, and 

assured joint interoperable space capabilities. 

• To seamlessly integrate relevant space capabilities into the operating 

force. 

The Army recently drafted its Army Space Strategic Plan, which is in final coordination with the Chief of Staff of the Army. This document is shaped by national 

level guidance, such as the National Space Policy and the National Security Space 

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Strategy. The draft plan, coupled with the Army’s Space Policy, outlines the Army’s 

space enterprise path for strategic planning, programming, and resourcing. 

The essence of our space strategy and the guiding vision of the Army space enterprise are to assure access to resilient and relevant space-enabled capabilities to ensure Army forces can conduct full spectrum operations. To achieve this, our draft 

space strategy rests on three tenets that link Army strategic planning and programming for space to the guidance in national and DOD space policy and strategy. The 

three essential tenets are: 

• To enable the Army’s enduring mission by providing requisite space-enabled capabilities to support current operations, as well as future transformation efforts. 

• To leverage existing DOD, national, commercial, and international spacebased capabilities. 

• To pursue cross-domain solutions to create a resilient architecture to 

mitigate threats, vulnerabilities, and assure access to critical capabilities 

needed to sustain land force operations. 

THE ARMY—A PROVIDER OF SPACE CAPABILITIES

The Army is a provider of space capabilities. Historically, our greatest investment 

in space capabilities has been in the ground segment—the integration of space capabilities into operational forces through command and control systems, communication terminals, and intelligence feeds. However, due to the critical importance of 

space capabilities, the Army has strengthened and broadened its investment to include exploitation of national and strategic space capabilities, defensive 

counterspace, leveraging the capabilities of space to enhance missile defense systems, and training and development of space professionals and space enablers. 

In 2012, the Army plans to invest approximately $500 million in pursuing space 

and space-related activities, evolving from a position of simply exploiting strategic 

space-based capabilities to a position where the Army is fully integrated into the 

planning, development, and use of theater-focused operational and tactical space applications. 

ASMDC/ARSTRAT is the Army’s space proponent, and coordinates with the Army 

Intelligence and Signal communities, STRATCOM, and other members of the joint 

community to bring space-based capabilities to the warfighter. ASMDC/ARSTRAT 

is at the forefront—providing trained and ready space forces and capabilities to the 

combatant commanders and the warfighter and building future space forces. Aside 

from delivering and integrating space products and trained professionals to joint 

warfighter operations, ASMDC/ARSTRAT also conducts space mission related research and development activities. I would like to highlight our space provider role 

within three core tasks: providing trained and ready space forces and capabilities 

to the combatant commanders and the warfighter; building future space forces; and 

researching, developing, testing, and integrating future space capabilities. 

Providing Trained and Ready Space Forces and Capabilities 

Over 1,100 soldiers and civilians serving with ASMDC/ARSTRAT’s 1st Space Brigade provide access to products and services that are essential in all phases of combat operations. The brigade’s three battalions, comprised of Active, National Guard, 

and Reserve soldiers, support combatant commanders by providing satellite communications, space operations, missile warning, and forward deployed space support 

teams. These Space Operations Officers, along with members of the Army’s Space 

Cadre, directly influence the execution of strategic operations in support of tactical 

level ground maneuver forces. Their principal duties include planning, developing, 

resourcing, acquiring, integrating, and operating space forces, systems, concepts, applications, or capabilities in any element of the DOD space mission areas. 

During the 1990s, realizing the essential need of space professionals, the Army 

created Functional Area (FA) 40—Space Operations Officers—within our commissioned officer corps. ASMDC/ARSTRAT is the Army’s personnel developer for FA 40 

officers. The approximately 300 FA 40s serve in Army, joint, and DOD commands 

and organizations across all echelons—tactical, operational, and strategic. The 

Army’s Space Cadre, initiated in 2007, is comprised of both military and civilian 

personnel who represent the Army’s interests in space operations, policy, science 

and technology, and acquisition. The Cadre consists of soldiers and civilians from 

a wide variety of branches, career fields, disciplines, and functional areas. 

As part of the DOD overarching effort, the Army has integrated Space Operations 

Officers into the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Air Staff, 

the North American Aerospace Defense Command, the Air Force Space Command, 

and other space focused organizations and academic institutions. In each of these 

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organizations, personnel not only provide the Army perspective of space related capabilities, they articulate requirements from an operational standpoint in the joint 

and combined environments. A summary of the critical space capabilities provided 

by Army’s space professionals is highlighted below. 

• Army Space Support Teams: During operations, including those in Afghanistan and Iraq, the ASMDC/ARSTRAT’s Army Space Support Teams 

continuously provide space-based products and services to combatant commanders and other international government agencies. The teams are onthe-ground space experts, pulling key commercial imagery, forecasting the 

impact of space weather, and providing responsive space support to their 

units. Just last month, 3 new teams deployed to theater to provide their 

capabilities for the next 9 months—60 teams have now provided invaluable 

on-the-ground responsive expertise to combatant commanders and the 

warfighter in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

• Satellite Communication Support Centers: ASMDC/ARSTRAT provides 

and operates the DOD’s Regional Satellite Communications Support Centers and Wideband Satellite Communications Operations Centers, located 

both in the United States and overseas. These centers are the regional 

management hubs for a majority of the DOD’s satellite communications capabilities, providing reliable and responsive support. In close partnership 

with our Air Force and Navy partners, we ensure essential communications 

lifelines are available to our ground, air, and sea forces, as well as the diplomatic corps around the world. 

• Friendly Force Tracking: Situational awareness is particularly vital given 

the challenges of conducting operations in urban areas. As the Army has 

the greatest number of warfighters and systems to track on the battlefield, 

our Friendly Force Tracking assets help deliver timely situational awareness and identify friendly forces during combat. In support of Operation 

Tomodachi, we provided the friendly force tracking architecture that enabled the U.S. Forces Japan and the U.S. Pacific Command to see its 

ground support elements via a common operational picture. 

• Ballistic Missile Early Warning: Critical to the Joint Force Commander’s 

theater force protection, the Army provides ballistic missile early warning 

and missile defense support from within the theater or region. The 1st 

Space Brigade’s Joint Tactical Ground Stations (JTAGS) Detachments, operated by Army personnel, monitor enemy missile launch activity and other 

infrared events of interest and share the information with members of the 

air and missile defense and operational communities. Presently, our JTAGS 

Detachments are forward-stationed across the globe, providing assured missile warning to theater commanders and joint warfighters. 

• Geospatial Intelligence Support: The Army, as an operational element of 

the National System for Geospatial-Intelligence, provides geospatial intelligence production in direct support of the combatant commands. The 

Army’s space and intelligence experts perform exploitation of a variety of 

commercial, civil, and DOD imagery data derived from space and airborne 

sources. Current support includes providing imagery to U.S. Africa Command in support of contingency operations in Libya, as well as imagery and 

exploitation products to U.S. Pacific Command regarding the extent of damage to the Fukushima nuclear power site in Japan. Additionally, they aid 

in the exploration of emerging spectral system technologies and in 

transitioning new capabilities to the warfighter. 

• Operations Reach-back Support and Services: The ASMDC/ARSTRAT Operations Center, located at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, 

CO, provides reach-back support for our space experts deployed throughout 

the operational force and allows us to reduce our forward-deployed footprint. This center maintains constant situational awareness of deployed elements, continuously responds to requests for information, and provides the 

essential reach-back system of connectivity with technical subject matter 

experts. 

• Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities: The Army Special Program 

Office is the Army focal point for the exploitation of national intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and products through the Tactical 

Exploitation of National Capabilities program. The Army is fully integrated 

into the National Reconnaissance Office and the Intelligence Community 

and has numerous deployed units providing support throughout the intelligence battalions and brigades. 

• Strategic Space Surveillance: The Army also operates facilities and assets 

that are of upmost importance to advancing the Nation’s use of space. The 

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U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll/Reagan Test Site (RTS), located in the Marshall 

Islands, is a national asset that provides unique capabilities to monitor objects in deep space. The RTS maintains a vigilant watch, providing critical 

space situational awareness and contributing to a variety of missions. 

Building Future Space Forces 

The Army uses established and emerging processes to document its space-based 

needs and pursue Army and joint validation of its requirements. This disciplined approach helps ensure limited resources are applied where warfighter operational utility can be most effectively served. We continue to pursue and develop the necessary 

adaptability across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and 

Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) to mitigate threats and 

vulnerabilities while sustaining land force operations. Within the DOTMLPF combat 

development arena, the Army has focused tremendous efforts on the development 

of our space professionals. For example, the Army Space Personnel Development Office develops policies, procedures, and metrics for the Army Space Cadre and executes the life-cycle management functions of FA 40 Space Operations Officers ensuring the Army has trained personnel to meet national security space needs. Without 

well-trained and motivated Army soldiers and civilians, we cannot maintain our advantage on the battlefield that our Nation’s space superiority affords us. 

To properly train space professionals, the Army developed the Space Operations 

Officer Qualification Course and the Army Space Cadre Basic Course. These two 

courses provide the necessary foundation for the Space Cadre. The Army also 

leverages the high-quality space training developed and administrated by the Air 

Force. Finally, numerous space officers complete additional post-graduate studies at 

the Naval Postgraduate School, accredited civilian institutions, and training with industry. The Army is committed to growing, training, developing, tutoring, and advancing space professionals. 

Researching, Developing, Testing, and Integrating Future Space Capabilities 

The Army is an instrumental joint partner in addressing tomorrow’s space requirements to ensure land warfare dominance. Each year, the Army plans and programs funding for space related technology research and development. Despite the 

current and projected resource constrained environment, the Army recognizes the 

need to prioritize, leverage, and invest in promising space research and development 

technologies. I would like to briefly highlight three technology endeavors that have 

potential to provide space support to the ground warfighter. 

• Space and Missile Defense Command—Operational Nanosatellite Effect: 

To achieve enhanced capabilities for the warfighter from space, an approach 

that holds great promise is the deployment of constellations of very small 

satellites into low earth orbit. The Space and Missile Defense CommandOperational Nanosatellite Effect is an initiative to meet specific Army space 

related operational needs via the use of nanosatellites. The Army recently 

built eight, nine-pound satellites for use in a technology demonstration. The 

first of these nanosatellites was placed into low earth orbit last December. 

This marked the first launch of an Army designed and manufactured satellite in more than 50 years. The primary objective was to receive data from 

a ground transmitter and relay that data to a ground station. The demonstration was successful and offers evidence that the means may be available to provide the Army—the largest user of space data—with an ability 

to economically provide non-line of sight sensor data from non-permissive 

environments to remote located soldiers. 

• Kestrel Eye: Kestrel Eye is an Army endeavor to manufacture a small 

imaging satellite that will provide near real-time, medium resolution imagery to the tactical warfighter. Since its manufacturing costs will be relatively inexpensive, Kestrel Eye may have the ability to be robustly deployed into orbit, providing a potential solution to present existing imagery 

needs to tactical forces. The satellite is designed for operational theater 

command capabilities, providing dedicated space-based support to the tactical commander. Kestrel Eye is scheduled for its initial launch in 2012. 

• Vertical/Horizontal Integration of Space Technologies and Applications: 

We are successfully progressing in a technology demonstration to integrate 

space-based data into our ground forces at the tactical level. The Vertical/ 

Horizontal Integration of Space Technologies and Applications (VISTA) provides the capability to seamlessly distribute relevant space developed products and services to all levels of Army battle command—from corps and theater needs to the specific needs of individual warfighters. The capability to 

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identify what specific pieces of space-developed information are relevant to 

individual warfighters is a key component of VISTA’s support capability. 

CONCLUSION

The Army is dependent upon the capabilities that space brings to the battlefield— 

space is the ultimate high ground. Space capabilities continue to be inextricably 

linked to warfighting. In present and future conflicts, we rely on and advocate for 

space products and services provided by the DOD, other government agencies, our 

allies and coalition partners, and commercial entities to shoot, move, and communicate. The Army will continue to provide trained and ready space forces and capabilities to the combatant commanders and the warfighter, build future space forces, 

and research, develop, test, and integrate future space capabilities. Fully integrated 

capabilities will provide depth, persistence, and reach capabilities for commanders 

at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Assured space systems and welltrained and experienced space professionals significantly reduce the fog, friction, 

and uncertainty of warfare. The Army depends on space for everything we do in our 

military operations. This committee’s continued support is essential in enabling us 

to maintain and further improve our space capabilities and provide the best-trained 

space professionals to combatant commanders. The courageous warfighters that 

serve to protect the safety and welfare of our Nation deserve nothing less. 

I appreciate having the opportunity to speak on these important matters and look 

forward to addressing any questions you or the other committee members may have. 

Secure the High Ground and Army Strong! 

Senator NELSON. Senator Sessions, what we’ve done is we’ve 

started the 2-minute comments summarizing their testimonies. We 

have three more, so then we’re open for your opening comments. 

Admiral Titley. 

STATEMENT OF RADM DAVID W. TITLEY, USN, OCEANOGRAPHER AND NAVIGATOR OF THE NAVY, DIRECTOR, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS AND SPACE 

Admiral TITLEY. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions. I’m honored to appear before you today on behalf of our Nation’s sailors to address your Navy’s space activities. The Navy is 

critically dependent on space to meet our maritime strategy’s demands for a flexible, interoperable, and secure global communications capability to support the command and control requirements 

of highly mobile, geographically dispersed, U.S., joint, and coalition 

forces. 

Our Navy’s interests in space include communications, ISR, positioning, navigation, timing, missile warning, and meteorology and 

oceanography capabilities. 

The Navy expects the demand for space capabilities to grow in 

the future, especially in the area of space communications. Our 

major space contribution to the joint community is the UHF 

narrowband SATCOM constellation. Beginning in 2012, the new 

system, MUOS, will begin to replace those legacy UHF systems. 

Timely delivery of MUOS is a high priority for the Navy and our 

fiscal year 2012 budget submission continues our investment in 

this vital warfighting capability. 

In closing, sir, I would like to reiterate that space capabilities 

will continue to be critical to our Nation’s success in the maritime 

domain. As the recently-signed Navy space strategy states: ‘‘Space 

provides the ultimate crow’s nest for maritime operations.’’ 

Thank you, sir, and I look forward to answering any questions 

you or Senator Sessions may have. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

General Hyten and then General Shelton. 

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STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF, DIRECTOR, 

SPACE PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION 

General HYTEN. Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, it’s an 

honor for me to be here today representing the thousands of men 

and women involved in the Air Force space acquisition business. It 

is undeniable that the Air Force has experienced significant challenges controlling cost, schedule, and performance in our space acquisition programs over the last decade. We acknowledge this and 

we understand that we must improve our acquisition practices to 

both continue to deliver the critical capabilities our warfighters 

need while at the same time achieving better value for the taxpayers. Mission assurance remains fundamental to what we do, but 

not at any cost. 

We believe we’ve taken important steps to recapture space acquisition excellence. We are finally finishing the development phase of 

many of our programs, delivering new capabilities, and moving into 

more stable production. We are placing new and additional emphasis on efficient space procurement that includes new acquisition 

strategies for acquiring space and launch vehicles included in our 

fiscal year 2012 budget submission. 

We are working to stabilize funding requirements and personnel 

to ensure programs are more affordable, executable, and delivered 

as planned. This is hard work and it’s going to take time for these 

changes to have measurable impact on performance. Nonetheless, 

we’re confident that the space acquisition community is moving in 

the right direction and creating a fundamentally different space acquisition culture. 

Again, let me express my thanks and appreciation to the members and staff of this subcommittee for your continued and dedicated support of our space capabilities. More importantly, thanks 

to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. I also look forward to 

answering your questions, sir. Thank you very much. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, General. 

[The prepared statement of General Hyten follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF 

I. INTRODUCTION

Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, distinguished members of the subcommittee; 

I’m honored to be in front of you to discuss a challenging but exciting topic: space 

acquisition. I’m also honored to be with these leaders of the National Security Space 

Enterprise including members of other Services, displaying the inherent joint nature 

of space. This subcommittee oversees some of the most important aspects of our national security—nuclear weapons, ballistic missile defense, and our space programs. 

I want to thank you for everything that you do for our airmen and, specifically, our 

space cadre. 

II. CHALLENGES IN SPACE ACQUISITION

It is well documented that the Air Force has experienced significant challenges 

controlling cost, schedule, and performance of space acquisition programs over the 

last decade. We were often criticized for ‘‘over reaching’’ on space programs. The developmental systems promised giant single-step leaps in technology, but often over 

ran program budgets and failed to meet requirements in a timely manner. I acknowledge these challenges as areas where the Air Force needs to improve our acquisition practices to deliver better capabilities to the warfighter while achieving 

better value for the taxpayer. We have not ignored these challenges; rather, we have 

taken important steps to recapture space acquisition excellence. 

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Over the last year, the Air Force made both structural and strategic changes improving space acquisition. Structurally, my Space Directorate was recently moved 

back under the Air Force Assistant Secretary for Acquisition better aligning space 

acquisition policies and programs with those of the greater Air Force. This move 

consolidates all Air Force programs under one Service Acquisition Executive providing better oversight of the full Air Force acquisition portfolio. The new organization also optimizes total obligation authority and allows greater funding flexibility 

to manage all Air Force systems. Air Force acquisition can now provide an integrated, balanced Service position toward our investments in weapon systems acquisitions. 

In addition, we are placing new and additional emphasis on Efficient Space Procurement that includes new acquisition strategies for acquiring space and launch 

vehicles in the fiscal year 2012 PB. One element, the Evolutionary Acquisition for 

Space Efficiency (EASE) approach for procuring satellites employs the following key 

tenets: block buys of satellites, fixed-price contracting, stable research and development investment, and a modified full funding approach. Block buys and fixed-price 

contracts are key tenets to bring satellite unit costs down and reinvest realized savings in research and development for next generation capabilities. The modified 

funding approach enables affordability of the block buys by funding the satellite procurement over multiple years—specifically, under EASE, we plan to fully fund our 

satellite procurements by using advance appropriations. The Air Force envisions implementing the EASE approach to drive down costs, improve stability in the fragile 

space industrial base, and invest in advanced technology development and critical 

capabilities to lower risk for future programs. We appreciate the dialogue we’ve already had with your staff on EASE and look forward to working with the committee 

further, as needed. 

The National Security Space enterprise couldn’t reach space without our reliable 

launch capability. The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) launch systems 

have a record of unparalleled success since the first launch in 2002. The Air Force 

recently completed the 40th consecutive successful launch of EELV, demonstrating 

our continuing commitment to assured access to space. In a separate and distinct 

acquisition strategy, the Air Force is proposing a block buy approach for the EELV 

program. If approved, the National Security Space enterprise would commit to block 

buys of at least eight launch vehicle cores per year to stabilize launch industrial 

base production rates and control launch cost. We will also support competition from 

vendors with proven capabilities. Our revised EELV acquisition strategy will include 

a new entrant approach that we are coordinating with the National Reconnaissance 

Office and National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Future competition 

could further drive cost savings and enhance the domestic industrial base and our 

operational flexibility. However, we must still closely scrutinize mission assurance 

practices to ensure we are safely and reliably getting our valuable space assets to 

orbit. 

In both strategies, the Air Force is working to stabilize funding, requirements, 

and personnel to ensure programs are more affordable, executable, and delivered as 

planned. Again, we want to attain better capabilities for the warfighter while 

achieving better value for the taxpayer. 

III. COMPLETED DEVELOPMENT AND LAUNCH OF SPACE SYSTEMS

Despite the challenges encountered in space program development, our resilient 

workforce has persevered ensuring the warfighter receives greater capability in key 

mission areas. Over the past year, we have completed development of essential, 

first-of-their-generation systems. Just last week, we achieved the launch of the first 

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) satellite to 

enhance our Overhead Persistent Infrared capability. The SBIRS GEO system will 

provide improved infrared capabilities with a faster revisit scanning rate and greater sensitivity than the legacy Defense Support Program system. Moreover, with a 

taskable staring capability, it will provide higher fidelity and persistent coverage for 

areas of interest. 

Last September, we launched the Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) Block 

10 system to enhance awareness of deep space objects of interest for safety of flight, 

threat detection, and warning. SBSS Block 10 significantly improves the timeliness 

of data on space objects in transit to deep space orbits. This satellite is currently 

in operation and is exceeding performance expectations, demonstrating excellent 

focus, high stability, and superb photometric sensitivity. 

This past August, the Air Force launched the first Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite. While we encountered initial issues with the propulsion 

system, the team revised the orbit-raising plan and has been successful in executing 

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this plan to achieve the required on-orbit design life. The AEHF team’s dedication 

and resolve is a testament to government and industry space team cooperation. 

AEHF satellites accommodate ten times the throughput and greater than five times 

the data rate of the current Military Strategic and Tactical Relay II Satellite Communication System. 

Finally, in May 2010, we launched the first of 12 Global Positioning Satellite 

(GPS) IIF satellites that will broadcast a third civil signal, in addition to legacy signals provided. These satellites will sustain a healthy, but aging, GPS constellation 

providing ubiquitous position, navigation, and timing capabilities for military and 

civil users. 

IV. MODERNIZING OUR MISSION AREAS

While the Air Force provides new space capability for the joint warfighter today, 

we are keeping an eye on the needs of the future and developing the next generation 

systems to meet those requirements. For example, the GPS III program is progressing on schedule to deliver the first IIIA satellite in 2014. The next generation 

of GPS will deliver significant enhancements including better anti-jam capabilities, 

a Galileo-compatible L1C civil signal, and improved accuracy, availability and integrity. The GPS IIIA program received its Milestone C approval in January 2011, following a very successful Critical Design Review—2 months ahead of schedule. The 

program office is also advancing the Next Generation Control Segment and Military 

GPS User Equipment programs. 

Regarding defense space weather, the DOD approved a plan to modify the existing 

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System contract to procure two Defense Weather Satellite System spacecraft for the early-morning orbit, 

with the first launch planned for 2018. This system will replace the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program in the early-morning orbit, ensuring continuity of detailed overhead weather imagery and sensing information. 

In the space situational awareness mission area, the Air Force awarded two Space 

Fence contracts early in 2011 for Phase A development leading to a Preliminary Design Review in early 2012. Ultimately, the Space Fence will replace the Air Force 

Space Surveillance System, which is rapidly becoming unsustainable. The two 

ground-based radar sites comprising the Space Fence will provide timely information on launch detection, maneuvers and breakups to support protection of space assets. We are also seeking international cooperation on the Space Fence program 

through establishment of a space situational awareness (SSA) partnership with Australia to jointly employ and operate a site in Australia. This partnership will establish a foundation for continuing nation-to-nation cooperation. 

Similar to efforts on the Space Fence program, the Air Force is taking steps on 

international partnerships in our Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS). In addition to 

providing critical communications capabilities, WGS has also become the keystone 

for international cooperation measures in space, with our Australian allies funding 

WGS–6 in return for a portion of the overall bandwidth. In accordance with the National Security Space Strategy, the Air Force is pursuing other international agreements to further expand space-based communication capability through the procurement of a ninth WGS satellite. 

Finally, as discussed earlier, we are proposing the EASE strategy for procurement 

of AEHF satellites five and six in fiscal year 2012 and SBIRS GEO satellites five 

and six in fiscal year 2013. These procurements will enhance our protected communications and overhead persistent infrared mission areas, respectively. 

V. FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGING THE WAY WE DO BUSINESS

To effectively modernize our space systems, the Air Force must fundamentally 

change the way we do business in space acquisition and incorporate these changes 

into our strategies going forward. We have already made adjustments by adopting 

a ‘‘Back to Basics’’ approach to space system procurement, which ensures more rigorous systems engineering and program management enacted early in development 

and maintained throughout its lifecycle. ‘‘Back to Basics’’ focuses on: mission success 

through clear and achievable requirements; disciplined systems engineering; proven 

technology; and appropriate resourcing. The Air Force has also implemented the Acquisition Improvement Plan to establish an experienced, skilled, empowered, and accountable workforce, and ensure proper requirements and adequate and stable funding. Improvement of acquisition processes and training of our personnel is essential 

to the success of space system development. 

As we incorporate these changes, it is critical that space acquisition professionals 

gain a better understanding of the business principles behind system development 

and procurement. Mission assurance is fundamental, but not at any cost. Not only 

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do we have a responsibility to the warfighter in achieving better capability, we also 

have an equal responsibility to the taxpayer in achieving better value. Striking that 

balance is essential to acquiring affordable systems for the future. These fundamental shifts in acquisition perspective require a considerable culture change in our 

space acquisition workforce. It will take time for these changes to have measured 

impact on performance, but I’m confident the space acquisition community is moving in the right direction. 

VI. CONCLUSION

The Air Force has been, and continues to be, committed to achieving excellence 

in space acquisitions. Our effort in refining acquisition practices and proposing efficiency initiatives coupled with our work to modernize and recapitalize the space inventory exemplifies our dedication to supporting the Nation’s national security space 

objectives. The Air Force fiscal year 2012 budget reflects that commitment as we 

seek to maintain critical space capabilities for our Nation and our warfighters. 

I am grateful for the continued and dedicated support of the space capabilities we 

provide for this Nation and the service of each member of this committee. I look 

forward to answering your questions. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM L. SHELTON, USAF, 

COMMANDER, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND 

General SHELTON. Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, it’s a true 

honor for me to appear before you today as the Commander of 

AFSPC. I’m also honored to appear with these distinguished witnesses, and I’d like to also publicly congratulate Susan Helms on 

her induction into the Astronaut Hall of Fame. Her people 

launched SBIRS last Saturday and then shortly after that she was 

inducted into the Hall of Fame, so all around not a bad Saturday 

for the Helms household. I’m fortunate to have this talented officer 

and role model in my command. 

In AFSPC, I am privileged to lead over 46,000 Active Duty, 

Guard, and Reserve airmen, government civilians, and contractors 

who deliver space and cyberspace capabilities around the world for 

our Nation. AFSPC space and cyberspace capabilities are integral 

to the joint fight. Our professionals work extremely hard to continually ensure excellence and mission success in global combat as 

well as humanitarian operations, ranging from Afghanistan and 

Libya to Japan. 

I thank the committee for your continued and steadfast support 

of AFSPC and the capabilities we provide for this Nation. I look 

forward to your questions. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General Shelton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. WILLIAM L. SHELTON, USAF 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is my honor to appear before you today as the Commander of Air 

Force Space Command (AFSPC). 

I am privileged to lead over 46,000 Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve airmen; government civilians; and contractors delivering space and cyberspace capabilities 

around the world for our Nation. The men and women of AFSPC accomplish our 

mission at 84 worldwide locations, yet we operate in domains where borders are 

often indiscernible. AFSPC space and cyberspace capabilities are integral to the 

Joint fight and our professionals continually ensure excellence and mission success. 

Based on the unique responsibilities of the Command, I have established three 

priorities. First, AFSPC must support the Joint fight. We are focused on supporting 

our deployed compatriots with our best efforts, and we will not fail them. Second, 

we must address space system costs and deliver capabilities on time and on budget. 

In a very constrained budget environment, it is essential that we drive down costs 

to maximize our buying power. Finally, for the purposes of organizing, training and 

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equipping, we must operationalize and normalize cyberspace to conduct Air Force 

operations. Cyberspace cuts across the spectrum of military operations; therefore, it 

is imperative that Airmen understand the special requirements and operational considerations of cyberspace. As the lead Air Force Major Command for cyberspace, we 

will continue to work with other Major Commands to ensure we have the same level 

of rigor which has served the Air Force well in air and space. 

I look forward to a strong and mutually supportive working relationship with the 

subcommittee as we seek to deliver critical space and cyberspace capability to our 

forces. Likewise, I am committed to working with our space and cyberspace partners, including U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), U.S. Cyber Command 

(CYBERCOM), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), to advance our collective interests. 

MORAL OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT THE JOINT FIGHT

I strongly believe we have a moral obligation to do everything in our power to 

provide outstanding support to our brothers and sisters in arms who are in harm’s 

way. Whatever we can do operationally, whatever we can procure that would make 

their task easier and bring them home safely, we will pursue. In that vein, AFSPC 

has many capabilities which are central to today’s fight, and we are posturing these 

systems to be even more capable in the future. The President’s fiscal year 2012 

budget requests $12.1 billion for AFSPC to field and operate vital space systems and 

critical cyberspace capabilities. 

Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) 

As stewards of the world’s ‘‘gold standard’’ for PNT information, AFSPC is significantly improving the Global Positioning System (GPS) for military and civilian 

users alike. This past January, we completed the first of a two-phased operation 

called ‘‘Expandable 24,’’ the largest satellite repositioning effort in GPS program history. This operation was planned and executed under the outstanding leadership of 

Lieutenant Colonel Mike Manor, Captain Dan Highlander, and Captain Blake 

Hajovsky of the second Space Operations Squadron (SOPS) at Schriever Air Force 

Base (AFB), CO. Each phase repositions three satellites to optimize terrestrial coverage of the constellation for terrain-challenged environments, such as cities and the 

mountains and valleys of Afghanistan. 

The second and final phase of this operation is already underway and it is scheduled for completion this summer. 

The fiscal year 2012 budget request of $1.7 billion (Operations and Maintenance 

[O&M]; Research, Development, Test and Engineering [RDT&E]; Procurement; and 

Military Personnel [MILPERS]) also will advance PNT capability by procuring and 

launching upgraded satellites (GPS IIF and GPS III), funding a significant upgrade 

to the operational control segment (OCX) and building new Military GPS User 

Equipment (MGUE). GPS III, OCX and MGUE will improve user collaboration, incorporate an effects-based approach to operations and establish a net-centric ground 

architecture, thereby accelerating the mission application of positioning and timing 

information. 

Last May, AFSPC launched the first of 12 GPS IIF satellites, which provides improved timing technology, a more jam-resistant military signal and a higher-powered civilian signal. Captains Vivian Elmo and Linda Gostomski, both from our GPS 

Reserve Associate Unit, 19 SOPS, Schriever AFB, CO, led the way as integrators 

of contractor, booster, satellite vehicle and ground network teams to ensure a successful launch and on-orbit checkout of this new capability. 

Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) 

The demand for satellite communications continues to grow as warfighters increasingly depend on information relayed from space, especially for today’s distributed operations in this era of information-enabled warfare. This past June, the first 

block of Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) satellites became fully operational with 

the acceptance of WGS–3. Launches of the next block of WGS satellites (4–6) are 

planned for 2011–2013, with funding for WGS–6 coming from Australia. This partnership is an example of the international cooperation envisioned in the National 

Space Policy and National Security Space Strategy. The fiscal year 2012 request includes $481.5 million (RDT&E and Procurement) for WGS to meet combatant commander requirements to deliver voice, data, and imagery, as well as full motion 

video from Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA). 

The first satellite in the next generation of protected and survivable 

MILSATCOM, our Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite, was 

launched last August. Compared to its predecessor, Milstar, AEHF will soon provide 

a 10-fold throughput increase in secure, jam-resistant communications for national 

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leaders and combatant commanders, as well as support for our international partners including Canada, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom. 

While the launch was perfect, a spacecraft propulsion system anomaly left AEHF– 

1 well short of its intended geosynchronous (GEO) orbit. A team of experts from the 

Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC), led by Lieutenant General Tom Sheridan 

and Mr. Dave Madden, developed a plan to innovatively use the remaining much 

smaller thrusters to save this vital asset. The team worked around the clock addressing the immediate need to conserve fuel, developing the recovery plan and 

demonstrating the recovery could be done safely and effectively. Thanks to the outstanding engineering and hard work of these space professionals, the AEHF–1 orbit 

is progressing toward geosynchronous altitude and we expect to begin initial testing 

later this year. The budget includes $974.5 million (RDT&E and Procurement) in 

fiscal year 2012 to fund AEHF. 

Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) 

Data from the legacy Defense Support Program (DSP), as well as the highly elliptical orbit (HEO)-based Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) sensors, provides 

real-time missile warning and missile defense information to national decisionmakers and commanders. Last year, we provided the U.S., coalition members and 

our allies assured warning for over 200 missile launches and 4,500 special infrared 

(IR) events, a 150 percent increase over 2009. This is due, in part, to the vastly improved battlespace awareness capability of the latest HEO payloads. To further assist Geographic Combatant Commanders, and in cooperation with STRATCOM, we 

substantially improved our missile warning reporting criteria, thanks to the herculean efforts of Captain Christopher Castle, First Lieutenant Michael Mariner and 

Technical Sergeant Michael Johns of the 2d Space Warning Squadron, Buckley 

AFB, CO. This new criteria will provide more timely and accurate warning information to our entire force. 

The 40th anniversary of the DSP was celebrated in 2010. This constellation provides outstanding service to the Nation and Captains Barry Croker and Zach Lehmann are creatively finding ways to extend the lives of these satellites. They led 

a team of professionals who have developed a series of new system procedures to 

wring every last drop of capability from these assets. The team’s actions already are 

credited with forestalling disposal of one of these valuable satellites. 

While DSP has a long history of proven strategic, operational and tactical value, 

we are entering the era of SBIRS GEO, the replacement for DSP. Each SBIRS GEO 

has a staring infrared sensor to allow detection of dimmer, faster burning missiles 

and more accurate missile launch and impact point predictions, as well as a scanning sensor that covers an entire hemisphere in its field of view. The fiscal year 

2012 budget request includes $1.22 billion (O&M, RDT&E, Procurement and 

MILPERS) to continue the development of additional OPIR capability. 

Operationally Responsive Space 

The Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) philosophy seeks to rapidly deliver 

warfighter-demanded capability at reduced cost through innovative acquisition approaches with shorter timelines. Last June, TacSat-3, a hyperspectral imaging satellite, transitioned from an Air Force Research Lab experiment to a warfightertaskable, Department of Defense (DOD)-operated, system in support of Combatant 

Commands (COCOMs) worldwide. TacSat-3 support of the Haitian earthquake recovery efforts and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill demonstrated the value of 

hyperspectral imagery, and it is now being used by COCOMs to support daily operations. Leading these efforts is Lieutenant Colonel Darren Johnson, from the Headquarters AFSPC ORS Division, who deployed to Afghanistan as Chief, International 

Security Assistance Force Space Operations. His experience with TacSat-3 expedited 

theater usage of this unique space-based imager for improved location and targeting 

of threats to coalition forces in harm’s way. 

The next ORS satellite on the horizon, currently scheduled to launch later this 

spring, is ORS–1 which will support U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) multispectral imagery needs. The fiscal year 2012 budget request includes $86.5 million 

(RDT&E) to develop these ORS systems. 

Weather 

As part of the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) restructure, AFSPC will support Joint forces by developing the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS), a fiscal year 2012 request of $444.9 million 

(RDT&E). The acquisition of DWSS will maximize NPOESS-developed capabilities 

to best preserve program schedules and reduce costs. DWSS will replace the military’s weather workhorse, the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), 

now in its sixth decade. We will continue to leverage longstanding partnerships with 

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the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA) and NASA as we develop the morning orbit satellite to accompany their 

Joint Polar Satellite System’s afternoon orbit satellite, on which both defense and 

civil users rely. 

Currently, DMSP is operated at the NOAA Satellite Operations Facility in Maryland with a backup control station operated by 6 SOPS, a Reserve unit at Schriever 

AFB, CO. This blended partnership works well for all parties. As an example, in 

January, an emergency situation at NOAA required activation of the backup unit. 

Within an hour, Major Jeremy Edwards and his crew—on hot standby—mobilized 

and assumed full command of all DMSP satellites, continuing delivery of critical environmental intelligence information to worldwide forces. 

Space—Contested, Congested, and Competitive. 

Space Situational Awareness (SSA) 

As the National Security Space Strategy states, ‘‘space is becoming increasingly 

contested, congested and competitive.’’ In light of these challenges to the space domain, we must maintain adequate resiliency of space capabilities to ensure spacebased information delivery and access for Joint forces and allies. Foundational to 

our ability to ‘‘operate through’’ the growing threats is SSA, which is enabled by the 

fusion of Space Surveillance Network (SSN) sensor information at the Joint Space 

Operations Center (JSpOC). Behind the scenes providing this capability daily are 

Space Event Duty Technicians, like Staff Sergeant Adrian Cervantes, ensuring the 

accuracy of the SSA data by working closely with fellow space, cyber and intelligence operators. In 2010, the JSpOC routinely tracked over 22,000 space objects, 

an approximately 10 percent increase in objects from the previous year. Each week 

JSpOC conducts over 7,000 space object conjunction (collision potential) screenings 

which are critically important to the 23 commercial and agency partners in the SSA 

Sharing Program. Last year, there were 126 collision avoidance maneuvers, a 180 

percent increase over 2009, the year of the very unfortunate Cosmos and Iridium 

satellite collision. 

Our ability to maintain leadership in SSA depends on SSN modernization and 

adding increased SSA capability to track smaller objects, increase timeliness of revisit rates and mitigate coverage gaps. Replacing the Air Force Space Surveillance 

System, which employs a 1960’s era Very High Frequency radar, is important to 

this overall objective. The Space Fence and its S-band radar capability will significantly aid the detection of smaller objects and provide uncued tracking of space objects. 

Last September, the first operational launch of a Minotaur IV delivered the Space 

Based Surveillance System to orbit, the first dedicated on-orbit SSA satellite, which 

provides us the capability to track an object, day or night, without weather interference. The satellite’s first image was taken in October by a team of SMC, one 

SOPS and seven SOPS (Reserve Associate Unit) personnel as part of planned calibration and characterization activities, and the initial data is superb. Another new 

potential SSN contributor is the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s 

(DARPA) Space Surveillance Telescope (SST), based in New Mexico, which is currently undergoing extensive testing. SST has the potential to provide AFSPC with 

new capability to detect and track faint space objects at geosynchronous distance. 

Foundational to all the space surveillance architecture improvements is ensuring 

that we have the processing and data fusion capabilities to conduct SSA. The 

JSpOC Mission System, with a fiscal year 2012 budget request of $122.1 million 

(O&M, RDT&E, and Procurement) will replace legacy technology with improved 

data processing, integration, visualization and exploitation capabilities. Without the 

capability to receive, process, fuse, and exploit the data we receive from SSA 

sources, we will not meet the challenges of an increasingly congested and contested 

space environment. 

Space Protection Program (SPP) 

SPP continues to inform the national space community by raising awareness of 

space threats and system vulnerabilities, as well as identifying material and nonmaterial solutions to mitigate those threats. The Air Force’s fiscal year 2012 budget 

request is for $9.8 million (RDT&E) to continue this work to gain architectural insights for the future. Through several analytical studies, SPP provided AFSPC and 

NRO leadership significant recommendations and mitigation options to protect 

space assets. For instance, Lieutenant Colonel Gary Samson led an analysis and 

software demonstration activity which illustrated how some immediate operational 

changes could reduce the effects of known threats and regain reconnaissance mission capability. Another study, led by Lieutenant Colonel Dan Bates, provided several recommendations to sustain PNT capabilities in a contested environment. SPP’s 

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analytical work also supports real world events, exercises and wargames. Finally, 

SPP supports national efforts to develop policy, strategy and architecture options 

across the national security space community. 

Schriever Wargame 2010 

The Schriever Wargame series generates leadership insights in contested space 

and cyberspace environments. The most recent iteration, Schriever Wargame 2010, 

brought together military and civilian experts from more than 30 government agencies. Under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Joe Wurmstein, Headquarters 

AFSPC Wargaming Branch Chief, and Major Jim Pedersen, the Game Director, this 

version focused on space and cyber deterrence, escalation control, response options, 

policy, planning, and national command relationships and authorities. The wargame 

featured expanded international and industry participation, including Australia, 

Canada, Great Britain, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization observer cell and cyber 

industry representation. As AFSPC prepares for the next iteration in 2012, we will 

use a comprehensive approach to gain additional insights, integrating instruments 

of national power to deter, prevent, and contain conflict. 

Space Innovation and Development Center 

The SIDC, as the name implies, is our center for space and cyber innovation. 

Among other responsibilities, it is home to the Air Force Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities, which works to deliver game-changing increases in capability for 

the joint fight. Other Space Innovation and Development Center (SIDC) projects include on-demand commercial Synthetic Aperture Radar distribution to warfighters, 

distribution of fifth generation aircraft data into legacy fighter aircraft and C2 platforms, and a prototype Data Integration and Fusion Center (DIFC) capable of providing a robust common operating picture to COCOM decision-makers by fusing 

multiple sources of non-traditional and national level information. 

X–37B 

Several AFSPC organizations supported DOD’s first-ever operational space plane 

mission, the X–37B Orbital Test Vehicle (OTV). Through lessons learned from the 

first flight, the SIDC’s 3rd Space Experimentation Squadron has identified concepts 

of employment, training, education and technical skill sets required for future X– 

37B operations. Also crucial to this success was First Lieutenant Gordon Barnhill 

of the 45th Launch Support Squadron at Patrick AFB, FL, who was the launch 

site’s lead engineer and developer of ground-breaking procedures for the launch and 

landing of this unique space plane. Additionally, the Western Range Team at Vandenberg AFB, CA, developed and tested new procedures for X–37B pre-recovery operations. Mr. Dennis Pakulski, the Chief Mission Engineer, applied both ingenuity 

and experience to replace 658 steel runway plates that posed a danger to the X– 

37’s landing gear. Captain Dariusz Wudarzewski, the Range Operations Commander, led more than 250 landing team members and provided the complex final 

recommendation for ‘‘clear to land’’ for the safe return of the OTV after nearly 8 

months of successful on-orbit operations. The second launch of the X–37B took place 

March 5. 

Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) 

The AFSCN is our capability to receive mission data and control many of our Nation’s satellites. In fiscal year 2010, the AFSCN conducted over 150,000 satellite 

contacts, supported 21 launches and 39 vehicle emergencies. The fiscal year 2012 

budget requests $328 million (O&M, RDT&E and Procurement) for AFSCN. The 

AFSCN recently underwent a major upgrade, replacing decades-old communication 

and switching equipment, and upgrading communication circuits to handle Internet 

Protocol traffic. Considerable downtime over a 4-day period was required to make 

these changes. First Lieutenant David Rothzeid of SMC’s Satellite Control and Network Systems Division orchestrated the outages site-by-site, working with multiple 

organizations and contractors to ensure the network could maintain its average 450 

per day satellite contact rate during the transition. 

Electromagnetic Spectrum Management 

In 2010, the Air Force Frequency Management Agency, Alexandria, VA, was redesignated the Air Force Spectrum Management Office (AFSMO) to better reflect 

the broader responsibilities of that organization. Colonel Brian Jordan, the AFSMO 

Commander, is the strategic thinker and visionary dealing with the difficult challenges that accompany preserving access for essential Air Force capabilities. The 

backbone of information flow is the electromagnetic spectrum which is the common 

link among networks, sensors, weapon systems, commanders and combat forces. In 

the Presidential Memorandum, Unleashing the Wireless Broadband Revolution, 

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issued on June 28, 2010, Federal agencies were directed to cooperate in the effort 

to locate 500 megahertz of Federal and non-Federal spectrum suitable for wireless 

broadband use. As a result of the memorandum and at the direction of the Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 

AFSMO will lead the Air Force’s evaluation of the 1755–1850 megahertz spectrum 

sought by wireless companies to determine if it can be made available without 

harming critical capabilities. 

This spectrum is used by a wide array of critical Air Force systems, including precision guided munitions, airborne telemetry systems, RPAs and the C2 of numerous 

satellite systems, including GPS. As the Air Force designs, tests and deploys new 

or modified systems, spectrum management is of paramount importance to supporting the joint fight. 

Silent Sentry 

Since 2005, Operation Silent Sentry, a capability initially designed for a 120-day 

demonstration, has provided CENTCOM with spectrum monitoring for electromagnetic interference (EMI) of satellite communications in the AOR. Spearheaded 

by personnel from the 16th Space Control Squadron (SPCS), Peterson AFB, CO, and 

its collocated Reserve Associate 380 SPCS, this nine-person team is instrumental in 

detecting and geo-locating sources of EMI events—both intentional and unintentional—including monitoring of RPA satellite links used for C2 and mission data. 

The current deployment team is led by Lieutenant Colonel Blake Jeffries (16 SPCS) 

and Master Sergeant Scott Westfall (380 SPCS). 

In-Theater Space Professionals 

Many of our space professionals have deployed to critical positions in the 

CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) to ensure timely space support is available 

to the warfighter. Included in this group is the Director of Space Forces 

(DIRSPACEFOR). The DIRSPACEFOR, currently Colonel Dave Buck, brings seniorlevel space perspective and harnesses the expertise of our mid-level space professionals who are integrated in theater units, directly supporting Joint and coalition 

forces. Additionally, the DIRSPACEFOR reaches back to the Joint Functional Component Command for Space and the JSpOC at Vandenberg AFB, CA, for access to 

all DOD space forces. 

Captains Aaron Cochran and Peter Norsky are just two examples of these midlevel theater space professionals, in this case assigned to the 504th Expeditionary 

Air Support Operations Group. They provide critical forward-based space expertise 

enabling integration of space capabilities into air and ground operations in 

Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan. Their presence allows expert knowledge 

transfer to tactical users, including Army brigades and battalions, Joint Terminal 

Attack Controllers and other battlespace owners. 

Space and Cyberspace Capabilities at Red Flag 

Another milestone for AFSPC is tactical level integration of space and cyber capabilities with traditional air capabilities at the Air Force’s premier training exercise, 

Red Flag, held at Nellis AFB, NV. Recently, a space officer was designated the overall mission commander during one of the exercise days—a Red Flag first. Captain 

Warren Riner, 76th SPCS, Peterson AFB, CO, led a multi-faceted air, space and 

cyberspace force, which highlighted the diverse, yet synergistic, mission capabilities 

of the Air Force. Captain Riner’s team was also responsible for all air, space and 

cyberspace nonkinetic capability integration during all exercise missions. I believe 

this is the future of our force: seamless integration of multiple capabilities, where 

the result is greater than the sum of the parts. 

CONTROL SPACE SYSTEM COSTS

AFSPC is implementing significant changes as part of the Air Force’s ‘‘Recapture 

Acquisition Excellence’’ priority. From requirements definition to contracting to 

hard-nosed program management, we must work to reduce our space system acquisition costs. In cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force 

is redefining acquisition strategies for buying military satellites. Anticipated savings 

will allow for research and development investment for future performance improvements and to lower cost of follow-on systems. We will closely collaborate with the 

Headquarters Air Force acquisition staff to implement this new strategy for the next 

blocks of AEHF and SBIRS satellites. We look forward to working with Congress 

to obtain the necessary legislative authorities to execute this strategy and achieve 

our vision. 

The record of successful national security launches since 1999 is truly remarkable. 

Nevertheless, we treat each launch as if it were our first, applying sound mission 

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assurance principles to ensure success. Unfortunately, the space launch industrial 

base is very fragile, resulting in significantly increased costs of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. To arrest this cost growth, we are implementing a new launch vehicle purchasing strategy. Our plan is to commit to an annual production rate of launch vehicles, alongside the NRO, with block buy procurement. We believe this will provide predictability, economic order quantity opportunities and a more stable industrial base, thereby lowering overall costs. A team of acquisition and launch experts, including NRO, NASA, and industry partners, is developing an improved approach to maintaining EELV’s outstanding mission success 

record while controlling costs and providing more operational flexibility. The Air 

Force request for EELV is $1.76 billion (RDT&E and Procurement) in fiscal year 

2012. 

A Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Air Force, 

NASA and the NRO commits the organizations to closer coordination in the acquisition of launch vehicles, liquid-fueled engines for boosters and upper stages, and the 

development of launch bases and ranges. This is recognition of the continued need 

for collaboration to help assure the Nation’s access to space, especially in a challenging fiscal environment for all the agencies involved. 

OPERATIONALIZE AND NORMALIZE CYBERSPACE FOR AIR FORCE OPERATIONS

As the Air Force’s lead Major Command for cyberspace, AFSPC is making significant strides in leveraging existing resources, applying appropriate lessons learned 

and new processes, and working toward increasing our effectiveness within cyberspace for 21st century military operations. Using this approach, we have rapidly developed the organizational structure, C2, career field management, education and 

training, and technical capabilities in cyberspace. Last October, Twenty-Fourth Air 

Force (24 AF) achieved Full Operational Capability status and in December was 

designated Air Forces Cyber to signify its role as the Air Force’s operational component to CYBERCOM. 

We are applying lessons learned from the Space Professional Development Program to build a counterpart cyberspace program. The focus of the Cyberspace Professional Development Program is to build 21st century cyberspace warriors with a 

mindset and skill set tailored to operational roles. Last year, we produced our first 

graduates from Undergraduate Cyberspace Training, Cyber 200 and Cyber 300 

classes, forming the beginnings of a highly trained cyber force. 

Cyberspace integration into the Joint fight is beginning to take shape. A recent 

milestone was the integration of RPA mission assurance efforts, also called ‘‘cyber 

escort missions,’’ into the operations section of the CENTCOM Air Tasking Order. 

This signifies the first major, sustained employment of cyber capability into day-today air operations. Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Ramsey, who is assigned to the 624th 

Operations Center, Lackland AFB, TX, currently leads one of the first deployments 

of the Cyberspace Operations Liaison Element (COLE) to the CENTCOM AOR. The 

COLE ensures cyber effects are fully integrated into contingency planning efforts 

from initial planning through execution. The COLE also provides mission assurance, 

exercise planning and development, and cyber intelligence support to joint operations. 

Our 689th Combat Communications Wing (689 CCW) already is fully integrated 

in warfighter support. Last year, the 689 CCW deployed 700 Airmen to 54 locations, 

highlighted by establishing initial communications capability on four bare bases in 

hostile areas. Additionally, they provided support to homeland defense and disaster 

relief efforts, including Secret Service support and crucial involvement in humanitarian and disaster relief operations in Haiti and Chile. Staff Sergeant Alexander 

Yessayan, a combat communication specialist, received the Air Force Combat Action 

Medal and Army Combat Action Badge for his heroic actions in defending his Provincial Reconstruction Team against a Taliban ambush while in Afghanistan. Major 

Noland Greene, Commander of the 34th Combat Communications Squadron, led a 

47-member team of cyber warriors to Shindand Air Base, Afghanistan, where they 

built and operated a network that provided all required communication services for 

the Army at this forward operating base. 

While AFSPC and 24 AF have swiftly reached significant cyberspace milestones, 

much work remains. Our top priority is to consolidate into a single Air Force network. This single network will be a major step toward achieving real-time situational awareness, allowing better defense of the network, and facilitating efficient 

enterprise solutions for the Air Force. This will standardize and simplify delivery 

of services to our force, thereby reducing operations and maintenance costs. 

In addition to terrestrial network consolidation, the Air Force Network Integration Center leads the Single Integrated Network Environment (SINE) initiative. 

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Under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Dunnells, SINE is an overarching framework for how the Air Force will provide seamless information flow 

across terrestrial, air and space domains. Information flow among domains is critical for efficient and effective mission accomplishment and SINE is a path forward 

to provide resilient, risk-mitigated infrastructure for increased operational reliability, availability, C2 and situational awareness. AFSPC’s cyberspace portfolio request is for $1.9 billion in fiscal year 2012. Ap- proximately $1.2 billion of this request is for operations and maintenance and over 

$700 million is allocated for developing additional capability. Operationalizing and 

normalizing the cyberspace mission for the Air Force is in its nascent stages, but 

beginning to take root as we build a strong foundation 

with deliberate speed and thought. These efforts will enhance the asymmetric advantages of our Joint forces and provide the vehicle for synergistic benefits through 

integration of air, space and cyberspace. 

AFSPC PROFESSIONALS

The talented men and women of AFSPC and the families who support them are 

essential to achieving the Command’s three priorities. We have trained and ready 

Airmen who deliver for the joint fight every single day in technically demanding domains. I strongly believe the continued development of our space and cyberspace 

professionals is key to our future. Last year we broke ground on the new $14.4 million Space Education and Training Center, which will give a permanent, on-base 

residence for the National Security Space Institute (NSSI) and Advanced Space Operations School (ASOpS). Each year, ASOpS provides advanced training to more 

than 1,600 DOD space professionals, while NSSI, the Air Force’s space professional 

development school, provides unique education to approximately 800 space professionals from all Services. Again in compliance with the new National Space Policy, 

this year the NSSI will provide its first course offerings to our Australian, British 

and Canadian international partners. 

In addition to the training we provide for our people, a professional, non-discriminatory environment creates the opportunity for all to achieve their full potential. We 

steadfastly support the Air Force’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response program and its role in fostering a healthy unit environment. AFSPC is proud of our 

bystander intervention video, shared AF wide, which captures the experience of Airman First Class Edward Todd of the 21st Dental Squadron, Peterson AFB, CO. The 

video recreates how he applied his training to assist a young woman in a dangerous 

situation, averting a potential assault. Further, I believe a focus on the resiliency 

of our people is foundational to developing a wellness culture that combats not only 

suicides, but alcohol and substance abuse, and other self-destructive behaviors. We 

are working hard to provide education and training to raise the resiliency of our entire command, thereby providing better tools to our people as they deal with the 

stressors of daily life. 

Total Force Enterprise 

The contributions of our Reserve and Guard forces to the Joint fight simply cannot be overstated. In AFSPC, the Air Reserve Component (ARC) comprises approximately 40 percent of our Airmen. Space and cyberspace operations require high-caliber individuals with in-depth technical skills. As many AFSPC missions are 24x7 

and deployed-in-place, the ARC can augment active duty units as part-time force 

multipliers providing needed technical expertise, especially in cyber where industry 

is currently leading innovation. The ARC enables a superb intersection of military 

and civilian experience, which is mutually beneficial to both active duty and ARC 

Airmen in our Command. 

CONCLUSION

Significant technological advances in space and cyberspace have transformed the 

way we conduct military operations—and even the way we live our daily lives. Recognizing the mandate to keep pace with this high rate of change, AFSPC will proceed with a sense of urgency as we deliver global capabilities, which are so crucial 

in this age of information-enabled warfare. We will focus on our three priorities: 

support the joint fight, get control of the costs of space programs, and operationalize 

and normalize cyberspace for Air Force operations. Above all, our workforce of highly trained and motivated professionals will continue to produce excellence, global 

and beyond. 

I consider it a deep personal honor to command AFSPC, and again, I appreciate 

the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to represent my Command. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, General. 

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Ms. Chaplain. 

STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our focus at GAO is 

on acquisition oversight. If I have to sum up my remarks very 

quickly, I would just say that space acquisition has been broken, 

it is being fixed, but more needs to be done. I just want to spend 

a few minutes telling you what’s on our watch list in terms of what 

needs to be done. I want to say that a lot of credit should go to 

both the Air Force and DOD for the actions they have been taking, 

and they are all detailed in our statement. 

First, there are some major programs that face considerable 

schedule pressures and schedule risks. Although they are attempting to incorporate best practices, it’s still unknown at this time the 

extent that these practices can shorten the schedules by years. 

Second, many of the systems on the ground that support space 

activities and that enable satellite capabilities to be used, are still 

facing a high degree of acquisition risk. These include ground systems like the operational control segment (OCX) program for GPS, 

user terminals for the AEHF system, some of the sensors involved 

with space situational awareness, and the control system for space 

situational awareness, known as the JSpOC mission system (JMS), 

which is the linchpin in that mission and it’s very critical that it 

be done successfully. 

Third, while there’s been a number of organizational changes 

made over the past year, it’s just unclear at this point how they’ll 

shake out and whether they’ll really streamline oversight and 

strengthen it for space acquisitions. 

Fourth, there’s more organizations involved in space now. You 

have the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) taking on a new major 

program, the Army is taking on some space efforts, and you need 

to balance this with the dwindling workforce. There’s key areas of 

space expertise that have been decreasing in recent years. There’s 

a question as to how we have that capability, is it being stretched 

too far across DOD. 

Lastly, there’s just budget pressures that we all know are out 

there. At the same time, space is very costly. The question going 

forward is: can we still start new major efforts or is that going to 

be unaffordable? When we do start them, are we going to be pressured to take shortcuts, including testing and important mission 

assurance activities? 

That’s just what’s on our list for this year. I thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s (DOD) space 

acquisitions. Each year, DOD spends billions of dollars to acquire space-based capabilities to support current military and other government operations, as well as to 

enable DOD to transform the way it collects and disseminates information. Despite 

the significant investment in space, the majority of large-scale acquisition programs 

in DOD’s space portfolio have experienced problems during the past two decades 

that have driven up costs by hundreds of millions and even billions of dollars, 

stretched schedules by years, and increased technical risks. To address the cost inVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00284 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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creases, DOD altered its acquisitions by reducing the number of satellites it intended to buy, reducing the capabilities of the satellites, or terminating major space 

system acquisitions. Moreover, along with the cost increases, many space acquisitions have experienced significant schedule delays—of as much as 9 years—resulting in potential capability gaps in areas such as missile warning, military communications, and weather monitoring. These problems persist; however, the Air Force 

and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have taken a wide range of actions to 

prevent them from occurring in new programs. 

My testimony today will focus on: (1) the status of space system acquisitions, (2) 

results of our space-related reviews over the past year and the challenges they signify, (3) the efforts DOD has taken to address causes of problems and increase credibility and success in its space system acquisitions as well as efforts currently underway, and (4) what remains to be done. Notably, DOD has acknowledged the acquisition problems of the past and recognizes the need for better management of the acquisition process and oversight of its contractors. More important, several high-risk 

space programs appear to have finally resolved technical and other obstacles and 

have started to or are close to beginning to deliver capability. However, other space 

acquisition programs—including the Global Positioning System (GPS) IIIA and Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)—continue to face challenges in meeting their 

cost and schedule targets and aligning the delivery of space assets with the ground 

and user systems needed to support and take advantage of new capability. Moreover, it may take years for acquisition improvements to take root and produce benefits that will enable DOD to realize a better return on its investment in space. Importantly, DOD has taken steps to decide how to best organize, lead, and support 

space activities. But more may be needed in light of the wide range of stakeholders 

and past issues with diffuse leadership. 

The work that supports this statement was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our scope and methodology are provided in appendix II. 

STATUS OF SPACE ACQUISITIONS: CHALLENGES PERSIST

A longstanding problem in DOD space acquisitions is that program and unit costs 

tend to go up significantly from initial cost estimates, while in some cases the capability that was to be delivered goes down. Figure 1 compares original cost estimates 

and current cost estimates for the broader portfolio of major space acquisitions for 

fiscal years 2010 through 2015. The wider the gap between original and current estimates, the fewer dollars DOD has available to invest in new programs. As shown 

in the figure, cumulative estimated costs for the major space acquisition programs 

have increased by about $13.9 billion from initial estimates for fiscal years 2010 

through 2015, almost a 286 percent increase. The declining investment in the later 

years is the result of mature programs that have planned lower out-year funding, 

cancellation of several development efforts, and the exclusion of space acquisition 

efforts for which total cost data were unavailable (such as new investments). 

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When space system investments other than established acquisition programs of 

record—such as the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS) and Space Fence 

programs—are also considered, DOD’s space acquisition investments remain significant through fiscal year 2016, as shown in figure 2. Although estimated costs for 

selected space acquisition programs decrease 21 percent between fiscal years 2010 

and 2015, they start to increase in fiscal year 2016. According to current DOD estimates, costs for two programs—Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and 

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High—are expected to significantly increase 

in fiscal years 2017 and 2018. The costs are associated with the procurement of additional blocks of satellites and are not included in the figure because they have not 

yet been reported or quantified. 


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Figures 3 and 4 reflect differences in total program and unit costs for satellites 

from the time the programs officially began to their most recent cost estimates. As 

figure 4 shows, in several cases, DOD has increased the number of satellites. The 

figures reflect total program cost estimates developed in fiscal year 2010. 


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Several space acquisition programs are years behind schedule. Figure 5 highlights 

the additional estimated months needed for programs to launch their first satellites. 

These additional months represent time not anticipated at the programs’ start 

dates. Generally, the further schedules slip, the more DOD is at risk of not sustaining current capabilities. For example, delays in launching the first MUOS satellite have placed DOD’s ultra high frequency communications capabilities at risk 

of falling below the required availability level. 


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Some Acquisition Programs Appear to Have Overcome Problems, but Other Programs 

Still Susceptible to Cost and Schedule Overruns 

DOD had longstanding difficulties on nearly every space acquisition program, 

struggling for years with cost and schedule growth, technical or design problems, 

as well as oversight and management weaknesses. However, to its credit, it continues to make progress on several of its high-risk space programs, and is expecting 

to deliver significant advances in capability as a result. The Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) demonstration satellites 

were launched in September 2009. Additionally, DOD launched its first GPS IIF 

satellite in May 2010 and plans to launch the second IIF satellite in June 2011— 

later than planned, partially because of system-level problems identified during testing. It also launched the first AEHF satellite in August 2010—although it has not 

yet reached its final planned orbit because of an anomaly with the satellite’s propulsion system—and launched the Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) Block 10 

satellite in September 2010. DOD is scheduled to launch a fourth Wideband Global 

SATCOM (WGS) satellite broadening communications capability available to 

warfighters—in late 2011, and a fifth WGS satellite in early 2012. The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program had its 41st consecutive successful operational launch in May of this year. 

One program that appears to have recently overcome remaining technical problems is the SBIRS High satellite program. The first of six geosynchronous earthorbiting (GEO) satellites (two highly elliptical orbit sensors have already been 

launched) was launched in May 2011 and is expected to continue the missile warning mission with sensors that are more capable than the satellites currently on 

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1The $18 billion does not include the cost of two replenishment sensors, which the Air Force 

does not include as part of the SBIRS High baseline. 

lion for six GEO satellites,1 representing a program unit cost of over $3 billion, 

about 233 percent more than the original unit cost estimate. Additionally, the 

launch of the first GEO satellite represents a delay of approximately 9 years. The 

reasons for the delay include poor government oversight of the contractor, unanticipated technical complexities, and rework. The program office is working to rebaseline the SBIRS High contract cost and schedule estimates for the sixth time. Because of the problems on SBIRS High, in 2007, DOD began a follow-on system effort, which was known as Third Generation Infrared Surveillance (3GIRS), to run 

in parallel with the SBIRS High program. DOD canceled the 3GIRS effort in fiscal 

year 2011, but plans to continue providing funds under the SBIRS High program 

for one of the 3GIRS infrared demonstrations. 

While DOD is having success in readying some satellites for launch, other space 

acquisition programs face challenges that could further increase cost and delay delivery targets. The programs that may be susceptible to cost and schedule challenges 

include MUOS and the GPS IIIA program. Delays in the MUOS program have resulted in critical potential capability gaps for military and other government users. 

The GPS IIIA program was planned with an eye toward avoiding problems that 

plagued the GPS IIF program and it incorporated many of the best practices recommended by GAO, but the schedule leaves little room for potential problems and 

there is a risk that the ground system needed to operate the satellites will not be 

ready when the first satellite is launched. Additionally, the National Polar-orbiting 

Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) was restructured as a result 

of poor program performance and cost overruns, which caused schedule delays. 

These delays have resulted in a potential capability gap for weather and environmental monitoring. Furthermore, new space system acquisition efforts getting underway—including the Air Force’s Joint Space Operations Center Mission System 

(JMS) and Space Fence, and MDA’s Precision Tracking and Surveillance System 

(PTSS)—face potential development challenges and risks, but it is too early to tell 

how significant they may be to meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals. 

Table 1 describes the status of these efforts in more detail. 

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2GAO, Global Positioning System: Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading Capabilities Persist, GAO–10–636 (Washington, DC, Sept. 15, 2010) and Space Acquisitions: Challenges in Commercializing Technologies Developed under the Small Business Innovation Research Program, 

GAO–11–21 (Washington, DC: Nov. 10, 2010). 

RESULTS OF GAO SPACE-RELATED REVIEWS OVER THE PAST YEAR

Over the past year, we have completed reviews of sustaining and upgrading GPS 

capabilities and commercializing space technologies under the Small Business Innovation Research program (SBIR),2 and we have ongoing reviews of: (1) DOD space 

situational awareness (SSA) acquisition efforts, (2) parts quality for DOD, MDA, and 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and (3) a new acquisition strategy being developed for the EELV program. These reviews, discussed further below, underscore the varied challenges that still face the DOD space community as it seeks to complete problematic legacy efforts and deliver modernized capabilities. Our reviews of GPS and space situational awareness, for instance, have 

highlighted the need for more focused coordination and leadership for space activities that touch a wide range of government, international, and industry stakeholders; while our review of the SBIR program highlighted the substantial barriers 


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3GAO, Global Positioning System: Significant Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading Widely Used Capabilities, GAO–09–325 (Washington, DC: Apr. 30, 2009). 4The Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–219, established 

the SBIR program to stimulate technological innovation, use small businesses to meet Federal 

research and development needs, foster and encourage participation by minority and disadvantaged persons in technological innovation, and increase private-sector commercialization of innovations derived from Federal research and development. 

and challenges small business must overcome to gain entry into the government 

space arena. 

• GPS. We found that the GPS IIIA schedule remains ambitious and could 

be affected by risks such as the program’s dependence on a ground system 

that will not be completed until after the first IIIA launch. We found that 

the GPS constellation availability had improved, but in the longer term, a 

delay in the launch of the GPS IIIA satellites could still reduce the size of 

the constellation to fewer than 24 operational satellites—the number that 

the U.S. Government commits to—which might not meet the needs of some 

GPS users. We also found that the multiyear delays in the development of 

GPS ground control systems were extensive. Although the Air Force had 

taken steps to enable quicker procurement of military GPS user equipment, 

there were significant challenges to its implementation. This has had a significant impact on DOD as all three GPS segments—space, ground control, 

and user equipment—must be in place to take advantage of new capabilities. Additionally, we found that DOD had taken some steps to better coordinate all GPS segments, including laying out criteria and establishing 

visibility over a spectrum of procurement efforts, but it did not go as far 

as we recommended in 2009 in terms of establishing a single authority responsible for ensuring that all GPS segments are synchronized to the maximum extent practicable.3 Such an authority is warranted given the extent 

of delays, problems with synchronizing all GPS segments, and importance 

of new capabilities to military operations. As a result, we reiterated the 

need to implement our prior recommendation. 

• Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR). In response to a request 

from this subcommittee, we found that while DOD is working to commercialize space-related technologies under its SBIR program by transitioning 

these technologies into acquisition programs or the commercial sector, it 

has limited insight into the program’s effectiveness.4 Specifically, DOD has 

invested about 11 percent of its fiscal years 2005–2009 research and development funds through its SBIR program to address space-related technology needs. Additionally, DOD is soliciting more space-related research 

proposals from small businesses. Further, DOD has implemented a variety 

of programs and initiatives to increase the commercialization of SBIR technologies and has identified instances where it has transitioned space-related technologies into acquisition programs or the commercial sector. However, DOD lacks complete commercialization data to determine the effectiveness of the program in transitioning space-related technologies into acquisition programs or the commercial sector. Of the nearly 500 space-related contracts awarded in fiscal years 2005 through 2009, DOD officials 

could not, for various reasons, identify the total number of technologies that 

transitioned into acquisition programs or the commercial sector. Further, 

there are challenges to executing the SBIR program that DOD officials acknowledge and are planning to address, such as the lack of overarching 

guidance for managing the DOD SBIR program. 

Under this review, most stakeholders we spoke with—DOD, prime contractors, and small business officials—generally agreed that small businesses participating in the DOD SBIR program face difficulties 

transitioning their space-related technologies into acquisition programs or 

the commercial sector. Although we did not assess the validity of the concerns cited, stakeholders we spoke with identified challenges inherent to developing space technologies; challenges because of the SBIR program’s administration, timing, and funding issues; and other challenges related to 

participating in the DOD space system acquisitions environment. For example, some small-business officials said that working in the space community 

is challenging because the technologies often require more expensive materials and testing than other technologies. They also mentioned that delayed 

contract awards and slow contract disbursements have caused financial 

hardships. Additionally, several small businesses cited concerns with safeguarding their intellectual property. 

290 

• Space Situational Awareness (SSA). We have found that while DOD has 

significantly increased its investment and planned investment in SSA acquisition efforts in recent years to address growing SSA capability shortfalls, most efforts designed to meet these shortfalls have struggled with 

cost, schedule, and performance challenges and are rooted in systemic problems that most space system acquisition programs have encountered over 

the past decade. Consequently, in the past 5 fiscal years, DOD has not delivered significant new SSA capabilities as originally expected. Capabilities 

that were delivered served to sustain or modernize existing systems versus 

closing capability gaps. To its credit, last fall the Air Force launched a 

space-based sensor that is expected to appreciably enhance SSA. However, 

two critical acquisition efforts that are scheduled to begin development 

within the next 2 years—Space Fence and JMS—face development challenges and risks, such as the use of immature technologies and planning 

to deliver all capabilities in a single, large increment versus smaller and 

more manageable increments. It is essential that these acquisitions are 

placed on a solid footing at the start of development to help ensure that 

their capabilities are delivered to the warfighter as and when promised. 

DOD plans to begin delivering other new capabilities in the coming 5 years, 

but it is too early to determine the extent to which these additions will address capability shortfalls. 

We have also found that there are significant inherent challenges to executing and overseeing the SSA mission, largely because of the sheer number of governmentwide organizations and assets involved in the mission. 

This finding is similar to what we have reported from other space system 

acquisition reviews over the years. Additionally, while the recently issued 

National Space Policy assigns SSA responsibility to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary does not necessarily have the corresponding authority 

to execute this responsibility. However, actions, such as development of a 

national SSA architecture, are being taken that could help facilitate management and oversight governmentwide. The National Space Policy, which 

recognizes the importance of SSA, directs other positive steps, such as the 

determination of roles, missions, and responsibilities to manage national security space capabilities and the development of options for new measures 

for improving SSA capabilities. Furthermore, the recently issued National 

Security Space Strategy could help guide the implementation of the new 

space policy. We expect our report based on this review to be issued in June 

2011. 

• Parts quality for DOD, MDA, and NASA. Quality is paramount to the 

success of DOD space systems because of their complexity, the environment 

they operate in, and the high degree of accuracy and precision needed for 

their operations. Yet in recent years, many programs have encountered difficulties with quality workmanship and parts. For example, DOD’s AEHF 

protected communications satellite has yet to reach its intended orbit because of a blockage in a propellant line. Also, MDA’s STSS program experienced a 15-month delay in the launch of demonstration satellites because 

of a faulty manufacturing process of a ground-to-spacecraft communication 

system part. Furthermore, NASA’s Mars Science Laboratory program experienced a 1-year delay in the development of the descent and cruise stage 

propulsion systems because of a welding process error. We plan to issue a 

report on the results of a review that focuses specifically on parts quality 

issues in June 2011. We are examining the extent to which parts quality 

problems are affecting DOD, MDA, and NASA space and missile defense 

programs; the causes of these problems; and initiatives to detect and prevent parts quality problems. 

• EELV acquisition strategy. DOD spends billions of dollars on launch 

services and infrastructure through two families of commercially owned and 

operated vehicles under the EELV program. This investment allows the Nation to launch its national security satellites that provide the military and 

intelligence community with advanced space-based capabilities. DOD is preparing to embark on a new acquisition strategy for the EELV program. 

Given the costs and importance of space launch activities, it is vital that 

this strategy maximize cost efficiencies while still maintaining a high degree of mission assurance and a healthy industrial base. We are currently 

reviewing activities leading up to the strategy and plan to issue a report 

on the results of this review in June 2011. In particular, we are examining 

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tion strategy and the extent to which there are important factors that could 

affect launch acquisitions. 

DOD HAS TAKEN AND IS TAKING ACTIONS TO ADDRESS SPACE AND WEAPON ACQUISITION

PROBLEMS

DOD continues to work to ensure that its space programs are more executable 

and produce a better return on investment. Many of the actions it has been taking 

address root causes of problems, though it will take time to determine whether 

these actions are successful and they need to be complemented by decisions on how 

best to lead, organize, and support space activities. 

Causes of Acquisition Problems and Best Practices for Avoiding Them 

Our past work has identified a number of causes of the cost growth and related 

problems, but several consistently stand out. First, on a broad scale, DOD has tended to start more weapon programs than it can afford, creating a competition for 

funding that encourages low cost estimating, optimistic scheduling, overpromising, 

suppressing bad news, and for space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify 

and assess potentially more executable alternatives. Programs focus on advocacy at 

the expense of realism and sound management. Invariably, with too many programs 

in its portfolio, DOD is forced to continually shift funds to and from programs—particularly as programs experience problems that require additional time and money 

to address. Such shifts, in turn, have had costly, reverberating effects. 

Second, DOD has tended to start its space programs too early, that is, before it 

has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within available resources and time constraints. This tendency is caused largely by the funding 

process, since acquisition programs attract more dollars than efforts concentrating 

solely on proving technologies. Nevertheless, when DOD chooses to extend technology invention into acquisition, programs experience technical problems that require large amounts of time and money to fix. Moreover, when this approach is followed, cost estimators are not well positioned to develop accurate cost estimates because there are too many unknowns. Put more simply, there is no way to accurately 

estimate how long it would take to design, develop, and build a satellite system 

when critical technologies planned for that system are still in relatively early stages 

of discovery and invention. 

Third, programs have historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single 

step, regardless of the design challenges or the maturity of the technologies necessary to achieve the full capability. DOD has preferred to make fewer but heavier, 

larger, and more complex satellites that perform a multitude of missions rather 

than larger constellations of smaller, less complex satellites that gradually increase 

in sophistication. This has stretched technology challenges beyond current capabilities in some cases and vastly increased the complexities related to software. Programs also seek to maximize capability on individual satellites because it is expensive to launch them. Figure 6 illustrates the various factors that can break acquisitions. 

292 

Many of these underlying issues affect the broader weapons portfolio as well, 

though we have reported that space programs are particularly affected by the wide 

disparity of users, including DOD, the intelligence community, other Federal agencies, and in some cases, other countries, U.S. businesses, and citizens. Moreover, 

problematic implementation of an acquisition strategy in the 1990s, known as Total 

System Performance Responsibility, for space systems resulted in problems on a 

number of programs because it was implemented in a manner that enabled requirements creep and poor contractor performance—the effects of which space programs 

are finally overcoming. We have also reported on shortfalls in resources for testing 

new technologies, which, coupled with less expertise and fewer contractors available 

to lead development efforts, have magnified the challenge of developing complex and 

intricate space systems. 

Our work—which is largely based on best practices in the commercial sector—has 

recommended numerous actions that can be taken to address the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended that DOD separate technology discovery 

from acquisition, follow an incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and requirements at program start, and use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move to next phases. We have also identified 

practices related to cost estimating, program manager tenure, quality assurance, 

technology transition, and an array of other aspects of acquisition program management that could benefit space programs. These practices are highlighted in appendix 

I. 

Actions to Improve Space and Weapon System Acquisitions 

Over the past several years, DOD has implemented or has been implementing a 

number of actions to reform how space and weapon systems are acquired, both 


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through its own initiatives as well as those required by statute. Additionally, DOD 

is evaluating and proposing new actions to increase space system acquisition efficiency and effectiveness. Because many of these actions are relatively new, or not 

yet fully implemented, it is too early to tell whether they will be effective or effectively implemented. 

For space in particular, DOD is working to ensure that critical technologies are 

matured before large-scale acquisition programs begin, requirements are defined 

early in the process and are stable throughout, and system design remains stable. 

DOD also intends to follow incremental or evolutionary acquisition processes versus 

pursuing significant leaps in capabilities involving technology risk and has done so 

with the only new major satellite program undertaken by the Air Force in recent 

years—GPS IIIA. DOD is also providing more program and contractor oversight and 

putting in place military standards and specifications in its acquisitions. Additionally, DOD and the Air Force are working to streamline management and oversight 

of the national security space enterprise. For example, all Air Force space system 

acquisition responsibility has been aligned to the office that has been responsible 

for all other Air Force acquisition efforts, and the Defense Space Council—created 

last year—is reviewing, as one of its first agenda items, options for streamlining the 

many committees, boards, and councils involved in space issues. These and other 

actions that have been taken or are being taken that could improve space system 

acquisition outcomes are described in table 2. 


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5GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Strong Leadership Is Key to Planning and Executing Stable 

Weapon Programs, GAO–10–522 (Washington, DC: May 6, 2010). 

At the DOD-wide level, and as we reported last year, Congress and DOD have 

recently taken major steps toward reforming the defense acquisition system in ways 

that may increase the likelihood that weapon programs will succeed in meeting 

planned cost and schedule objectives.5 In particular, new DOD policy and legislative 

provisions place greater emphasis on front-end planning and establishing sound 


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6 In December 2008, DOD revised its acquisition instruction—Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–23, was enacted May 22, 2009. 7Pub. L. No. 111–383. 

business cases for starting programs.6 For example, the provisions require programs 

to invest more time and resources to refine concepts through practices such as early 

systems engineering, strengthen cost estimating, develop technologies, build prototypes, hold early milestone reviews, and develop preliminary designs before starting 

system development. These provisions are intended to enable programs to refine a 

weapon system concept and make cost, schedule, and performance trade-offs before 

significant commitments are made. In addition, DOD policy requires establishment 

of configuration steering boards that meet annually to review program requirements 

changes as well as to make recommendations on proposed descoping options that 

could reduce program costs or moderate requirements. Fundamentally, these provisions should help (1) programs replace risk with knowledge and (2) set up more executable programs. Key DOD and legislative provisions compared with factors we 

identified in programs that have been successful in meeting cost and schedule baselines are summarized in table 3. 

Furthermore, the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2011, signed into law on January 7, 2011, contains further direction aimed at improving acquisition outcomes, including, among other things, a requirement for the 

Secretary of Defense to issue guidance on the use of manufacturing readiness levels 

(including specific levels that should be achieved at key milestones and decision 

points), elevating the role of combatant commanders in DOD’s requirements-setting 

process, and provisions for improving the acquisition workforce.7

While it is too soon to determine if Congress’s and DOD’s reform efforts will improve weapon program outcomes, DOD has taken steps to implement the provisions. 

For example, in December 2009, the department issued a new implementation policy, which identifies roles and responsibilities and institutionalizes many of the requirements of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. DOD has also 

filled several key leadership positions created by the legislation, including the Directors for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Developmental Test and Evaluation, Systems Engineering, and Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses. 

To increase oversight, the department embarked on a 5-year effort to increase the 

size of the acquisition workforce by up to 20,000 personnel by 2015. Furthermore, 

the department began applying the acquisition reform provisions to some new programs currently in the planning pipeline. For example, many of the pre-Milestone 

B programs we reviewed this year as part of our annual assessment of selected 

weapon programs planned to conduct preliminary design reviews before going to 

Milestone B, although fewer are taking other actions, such as developing prototypes, 

that could improve their chances of success. With respect to space system acquisitions, particularly GPS III—DOD’s newest major space system acquisition—has emVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00301 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB

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8 In May 2010, the Secretary of Defense announced the Defense Efficiencies Initiative to increase efficiencies, reduce overhead costs, and eliminate redundant functions in order to improve 

the effectiveness of the DOD enterprise. The goal is to apply savings from this initiative to force 

structure and modernization. 

braced the knowledge-based concepts behind our previous recommendations as a 

means of preventing large cost overruns and schedule delays. 

Additionally, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force are proposing new acquisition strategies for satellites and launch vehicles: 

• In June of last year, and as part of the Secretary of Defense’s Efficiencies Initiative,8 the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics began an effort to restore affordability and productivity in defense spending. 

Major thrusts of this effort include targeting affordability and controlling cost 

growth, incentivizing productivity and innovation in industry, promoting real 

competition, improving tradecraft in services acquisition, and reducing nonproductive processes and bureaucracy. As part of this effort, the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense and the Air Force are proposing a new acquisition strategy 

for procuring satellites, called the Evolutionary Acquisition for Space Efficiency 

(EASE), to be implemented starting in fiscal year 2012. Primary elements of 

this strategy include block buys of two or more satellites (economic order quantities) using a multiyear procurement construct, use of fixed-price contracting, 

stable research and development investment, evolutionary development, and 

stable requirements. According to DOD, EASE is intended to help stabilize 

funding, staffing, and subtier suppliers; help ensure mission continuity; reduce 

the impacts associated with obsolescence and production breaks; and increase 

long-term affordability with cost savings of over 10 percent. DOD anticipates 

first applying the EASE strategy to procuring two AEHF satellites beginning 

in fiscal year 2012, followed by procurement of two SBIRS High satellites beginning in fiscal year 2013. According to the Air Force, it will consider applying 

the EASE strategy—once it is proven—to other space programs, such as GPS 

III. We have not yet conducted a review of the EASE strategy to assess the potential benefits, challenges, and risks of its implementation. Questions about 

this approach would include the following: 

• What are the major risks incurred by the government in utilizing the 

EASE acquisition strategy? 

• What level of risks (known unknowns and unknown unknowns) is being 

assumed in the estimates of savings to be accrued from the EASE strategy? 

• How are evolutionary upgrades to capabilities to be pursued under 

EASE? 

• How does the EASE acquisition strategy reconcile with the current Federal and DOD acquisition policy, acquisition and financial management regulations, and law? 

• The Air Force is developing a new acquisition strategy for its EELV program. 

Primarily, under the new strategy, the Air Force and National Reconnaissance 

Office are expected to initiate block buys of eight first stage booster cores—four 

for each EELV family, Atlas V and Delta IV—per year over 5 years to help stabilize the industrial base, maintain mission assurance, and avoid cost increases. 

As mentioned earlier, we have initiated a review of the development of the new 

strategy and plan to issue a report on our findings in June 2011. Given concerns raised through recent studies about visibility into costs and the industrial 

base supporting EELV, it is important that this strategy be supported with reliable and accurate data. 

ADDITIONAL ACTIONS LEADERSHIP, ORGANIZATION, AND SUPPORT MAY STILL BE NEEDED

The actions that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force have 

been taking to address acquisition problems listed in tables 2 and 3 are good steps. 

However, more changes to processes, policies, and support may be needed—along 

with sustained leadership and attention—to help ensure that these reforms can take 

hold, including addressing the diffuse leadership for space programs. Diffuse leadership has had a direct impact on the space system acquisition process, primarily because it has made it difficult to hold any one person or organization accountable for 

balancing needs against wants, for resolving conflicts among the many organizations 

involved with space, and for ensuring that resources are dedicated where they need 

to be dedicated. This has hampered DOD’s ability to synchronize delivery of space, 

ground, and user assets for space programs. For instance, many of the cost and 

schedule problems we identified on the GPS program were tied in part to diffuse 

leadership and organizational stovepipes throughout DOD, particularly with respect 

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9GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System Components, GAO–10–55 

(Washington, DC: Oct. 29, 2009). 10 Institute for Defense Analyses, Leadership, Management, and Organization for National Security Space: Report to Congress of the Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and 

Management of National Security Space (Alexandria, VA, July 2008), and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Challenges and Recommendations for United States 

Overhead Architecture (Washington, DC, Oct. 2008). 11 Institute for Defense Analyses, Launch Broad Area Review 2010 (BAR–X) (Alexandria, VA, 

June 2010). 12GAO, Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program 

Pose Management and Oversight Challenges, GAO–08–1039 (Washington, DC: Sept. 26, 2008). 

to DOD’s ability coordinate delivery of space, ground, and user assets. Additionally, 

we have recently reported that DOD faces a situation where satellites with advances 

in capability will be residing for years in space without users being able to take full 

advantage of them because investments and planning for ground, user, and space 

components were not well coordinated.9 Specifically, we found that the primary 

cause for user terminals not being well synchronized with their associated space 

systems is that user terminal development programs are typically managed by different military acquisition organizations than those managing the satellites and 

ground control systems. 

Recent studies and reviews examining the leadership, organization, and management of national security space have found that there is no single authority responsible below the President and that authorities and responsibilities are spread across 

the department.10 In fact, the national security space enterprise comprises a wide 

range of government and nongovernment organizations responsible for providing 

and operating space-based capabilities serving both military and intelligence needs. 

While some changes to the leadership structure have recently been made—including revalidating the role of the Secretary of the Air Force as the DOD Executive 

Agent for Space, disestablishing the Office of the assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Networks and Information Integration and the National Security Space Office, and 

aligning Air Force space system acquisition responsibility into a single Air Force acquisition office—and others are being studied, it is too early to tell how effective 

these changes will be in streamlining management and oversight of space system 

acquisitions. Additionally, while the recently issued National Space Policy assigns 

responsibilities for governmentwide space capabilities, such as those for SSA, it does 

not necessarily assign the corresponding authority to execute the responsibilities. 

Finally, adequate workforce capacity is essential for the front-end planning activities now required by acquisition reform initiatives for new weapon programs to be 

successful. However, studies have identified insufficient numbers of experienced 

space system acquisition personnel and inadequate continuity of personnel in project 

management positions as problems needing to be addressed in the space community. 

For example, a recent Secretary of the Air Force-directed Broad Area Review of 

space launch noted that while the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center 

workforce had decreased by about 25 percent in the period from 1992 to 2010, the 

number of acquisition programs had increased by about 41 percent in the same time 

period.11 Additionally, our own studies have identified gaps in key technical positions, which we believed increased acquisition risks. For instance, in a 2008 review 

of the EELV program, we found that personnel shortages in the EELV program office occurred particularly in highly specialized areas.12 According to the EELV program office and Broad Area Review, this challenge persists. 

CONCLUDING REMARKS

DOD is working to position itself to improve its space system acquisitions. After 

more than a decade of acquisition difficulties—which have created potential gaps in 

capability, diminished DOD’s ability to invest in new space systems, and lessened 

DOD’s credibility to deliver high-performing systems within budget and on time— 

DOD is starting to launch new generations of satellites that promise vast enhancements in capability. In 1 year, DOD has or expects to have launched newer generations of navigation, communications, SSA, and missile warning satellites. Moreover, 

given the Nation’s fiscal challenges, DOD’s focus on fixing problems and implementing reforms rather than taking on new, complex, and potentially higher-risk efforts is promising. However, challenges to keeping space system acquisitions on 

track remain, including pursuing evolutionary acquisitions over revolutionary ones, 

managing requirements, providing effective coordination across the diverse organizations interested in space-based capabilities, and ensuring that technical and programmatic expertise are in place to support acquisitions. DOD’s newest major space 

system acquisition efforts, such as GPS IIIA, DWSS, JMS, Space Fence, and the folVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00303 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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low-on to the SBSS will be key tests of how well DOD’s reforms and reorganizations 

have positioned it to manage these challenges. We look forward to working with 

DOD to help ensure that these and other challenges are addressed. 

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or other members of the 

subcommittee may have at this time. 

CONTACTS AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For further information about this statement, please contact Cristina Chaplain at 

(202) 512–4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Pubic Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this statement include Art Gallegos, assistant Director; Kristine Hassinger; Arturo Holguı ́n; Rich Horiuchi; Roxanna Sun; and 

Bob Swierczek. 

APPENDIX I: ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS SPACE AND WEAPON ACQUISITION PROBLEMS

Before undertaking new programs 

Prioritize investments so that projects can be fully funded and it is clear where 

projects stand in relation to the overall portfolio. 

Follow an evolutionary path toward meeting mission needs rather than attempting to satisfy all needs in a single step. 

Match requirements to resources—that is, time, money, technology, and people— 

before undertaking a new development effort. 

Research and define requirements before programs are started and limit changes 

after they are started. 

Ensure that cost estimates are complete, accurate, and updated regularly. 

Commit to fully fund projects before they begin. 

Ensure that critical technologies are proven to work as intended before programs 

are started. 

Assign more ambitious technology development efforts to research departments 

until they are ready to be added to future generations (increments) of a product. 

Use systems engineering to close gaps between resources and requirements before 

launching the development process. 

During program development 

Use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to make go/no-go decisions, 

covering critical facets of the program such as cost, schedule, technology readiness, 

design readiness, production readiness, and relationships with suppliers. 

Do not allow development to proceed until certain thresholds are met—for example, a high proportion of engineering drawings completed or production processes 

under statistical control. 

Empower program managers to make decisions on the direction of the program 

and to resolve problems and implement solutions. 

Hold program managers accountable for their choices. 

Require program managers to stay with a project to its end. 

Hold suppliers accountable to deliver high-quality parts for their products through 

such activities as regular supplier audits and performance evaluations of quality 

and delivery, among other things. 

Encourage program managers to share bad news, and encourage collaboration and 

communication. 

APPENDIX II: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

In preparing this testimony, we relied on our body of work in space programs, including previously issued GAO reports on assessments of individual space programs, 

common problems affecting space system acquisitions, and DOD’s acquisition policies. We relied on our best practices studies, which comment on the persistent problems affecting space system acquisitions, the actions DOD has been taking to address these problems, and what remains to be done, as well as Office of the Secretary of Defense and Air Force documents addressing these problems and actions. 

We also relied on work performed in support of our annual weapons system assessments, and analyzed DOD funding estimates to assess cost increases and investment trends for selected major space system acquisition programs. The GAO work 

used in preparing this statement was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

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the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I sincerely apologize for not being able to be here when the hearing started. I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here. 

Let me start by congratulating the Air Force for the successful 

launch of the first SBIRS. The long-anticipated launch of this first 

of a kind, state-of-the-art satellite is a significant accomplishment 

and I congratulate the Air Force upon this major milestone. 

I don’t need to remind our witnesses of the many challenges that led to the 9-year delay or the estimated $11.5 billion increase in 

total program cost. We just have to insist that DOD reverse that 

trend, as we go forward, that’s been taking place over 2 decades. 

Maybe GAO can help. We must ensure that the taxpayers’ money 

is spent wisely and that capabilities are delivered without delay or 

extra expense. 

As DOD, and in particular the Air Force, enters a new era of 

space acquisition driven by decreasing budgets, and we will have 

some of that, we’ll try to protect the military as much as we can. 

We know space assets cannot be eliminated from our future budgets. Some might think so, but they cannot. Our whole infrastructure, as the chairman knows, and communications systems are 

space-based that are so critical to DOD, we can’t allow that to be 

eroded. 

Being on the Senate Budget Committee, I have to tell you a lot 

of people are in denial about how serious our financial condition is. 

We’re borrowing 40 cents of every dollar we spend, that cannot and 

will not continue. I would just share that with you. All of you are 

committed to the kind of procurement programs and expense reductions that help us strengthen our capabilities. 

I’m pleased that GAO has joined us and look forward to hearing 

their latest assessment of space acquisition efforts. In the past 

GAO has expressed a number of valid concerns over cost overruns, 

schedule slips, and capability gaps. In the fiscal year 2012 budget, 

the Air Force announced its intent to change the way it procures 

our multi-billion dollar space capabilities, and I look forward to 

GAO’s comments on that. 

The fiscal year 2012 budget marks a fundamental shift for defense space. I appreciate that the Air Force has been working to 

ensure that its space programs are more executable and produce a 

better return on investment. However, I am concerned that some 

of this refocusing has come at the expense of needed investments 

in future technologies. The lack of sufficient technology risk reduction is a key reason we often experience cost overruns. Without 

that appropriate level of investment, we risk exacerbating the cycle 

of schedule slips, cost overruns, and credibility gaps. 

With the release of the NSSS, DOD and the IC have proposed 

a framework for responding to the current and projected strategic 

space environment. The NSSS aptly characterizes the congested, 

contested, and competitive nature of the space domain. 

However, I have significant concerns regarding the administration’s stated intention of pursuing proposals and concepts for arms 

300 

control measures. Since the release of the NSSS in February, it appears the administration is planning to go forward and maybe sign 

the EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. 

According to recent comments by Ambassador Schulte, the Deputy Assistant Secretary, who I thank you for joining us today, DOD 

has tentatively concluded that the EU Code of Conduct should be 

adopted and is consistent with the Obama administration’s policy 

interests. I’m uncomfortable with these comments and have a number of questions. 

Any pursuit of a multilateral arms control agreement on space 

capabilities could have a number of highly damaging implications 

for our national security interests. To date, the administration has 

not consulted with the Senate on its intent, nor shared any specific 

provisions. Furthermore, it remains unclear if the administration 

has the authority to enter into such agreement without advice and 

consent. 

Mr. Chairman, this is an excellent panel. Thank you for convening it and thank you for your leadership and commitment to the 

defense of America. It’s an honor for me to work with you. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator Sessions. I feel likewise. 

We’ve worked on so many different things for so long; it’s a pleasure to continue to do so. 

I thought what we might do is have 6-minute rounds. 

General Shelton, you assumed command of the AFSPC in January. On a broad basis, what do you see as your greatest challenges? 

What did you see when you took your responsibilities? What was 

the greatest challenges that you could see out there? 

General SHELTON. Senator, there’s probably three things that I 

have established as top priorities. First, is to continue to support 

the joint fight and continue to support our brothers and sisters in 

harm’s way. Second, is to get control of the cost of space programs, 

and you both have talked some about that, and we are at that work 

mightily. Third, is to operationalize and normalize the cyberspace 

domain within the Air Force. Those are the three things that we’ve 

been focused on at the top level. 

Senator NELSON. What plans do you have, on item number 2, to 

get control over the costs, which is one of the things that is foremost in our minds as we deal with budgetary issues? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. A couple of things. First, is to do a 

better job of writing the requirements, such that we are not pushing the state-of-the-art of the technology, but rather that we accept 

very mature technologies. SBIRS is a very good case in point, we 

pushed pretty hard on the state-of-the-art and we ended up with 

long development timelines, over cost, and certainly over schedule. 

Second, I would tell you, is to manage the kinds of contracts that 

we write. We have in the past gone with much more of a development approach, as opposed to acquiring with a fixed-price approach. Where government has shared the cost with the contractor, 

now we want the contractor to identify the cost upfront such that 

we can be much more deterministic in how we develop our cost estimates. 

Senator NELSON. General Shelton, in some recent remarks at the 

National Space Symposium, you discussed the growing problem of 

space debris. You mentioned that the Air Force tracks approxiVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00306 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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mately 20,000 objects, most of which is debris, and there are probably 10 times more objects that are too small to track at the same 

time, any one of which could be lethal to a satellite. 

I’d note that when China tested its anti-satellite weapon in 2007, 

space debris increased by as much as 25 percent. The collision of 

two satellites in 2009 added even more debris. 

Is there any possibility to remove some of that debris? For instance, we’ve heard of proposals to use a laser to remove that debris. Is there any other concept that’s technologically possible that 

you might think of or that we might be able to develop? If it were 

feasible to have it, who would pay for it? Not just the United 

States, I would hope, but others who have contributed. 

If it can’t be removed and we’re faced with it, what indeed are 

the options? One of the concerns, of course, is that more debris increases the chances of a collision that, oddly enough, creates more 

debris. Perhaps you can share your thoughts on that? 

General SHELTON. Senator, you’re exactly right. Debris begets debris, just from a probabilistic point of view. We have not found a 

way that is either technically nor economically viable to eliminate 

debris. What we have done, both nationally and internationally, is 

encouraged the conduct of space operations in a way that it minimizes debris. As we launch new satellites, as we reach end of life 

on satellites, we think about disposal of those satellites. We think 

about mitigation and minimization of debris. We’re encouraging 

others across the world to do the same. 

Senator NELSON. General Helms, to protect satellites you have to 

know what you’re protecting them from. Improving space situational awareness, including the ability to detect and determine interference, is one of your major responsibilities. Obviously, there 

are many sensors that provide or could provide space situational 

awareness data. One of the problems, however, is the computer 

system that the JMS that utilizes this data to provide meaningful 

information, is old and no longer is able to handle the available 

data. 

Upgrading this system has proven to be an acquisition challenge. 

Do you have, and if you do, what’s your vision for how this system 

should work in the future? 

General HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, we do have a vision, and you’re exactly right. The Space Defense Operations Center system is currently the capability that we use in order to track 

objects in space, including our satellite operations and pieces of debris. We have a sensor suite that’s all over the world, that contributes to a catalogue and allows us to have knowledge of what is 

going on in space. 

The system on which that catalogue resides is aging rapidly. It’s 

pretty much past its design life. It will become unsustainable due 

to the nature of the computer system that it rides on. This JMS 

capability is, in effect, a critical capability that we need to get in 

order to continue to do the mission that I’m responsible for, which 

is to have space situational awareness of all objects in space. 

The vision is that, first, we get that replacement in a timely 

manner so that we don’t have a gap, which I would call an absolutely critical gap, between what we have today and being able to 

302 

sustain what we have today, and then bring something on board 

that replaces it. 

Second, we need to have a vision of an open architecture. What 

I mean by that is there are sensors that we have in JFCC Space, 

but there are also other sensors that are available, potentially 

through the MDA, for example. If we set this up right, we’d have 

an open architecture that will, in effect, allow us to leverage the 

exposure of sensor data from all over the world, not just from my 

own sensors, but from others’ as well. 

If we build a system with an open architecture such as that, then 

what we will have is a multiplying capability that will allow us to 

bring more capability to bear, to fuse data, and to watch the space 

environment. 

Third, the JMS capability would bring interface to the space professionals. Right now, they’re faced with lines of text. I’ve seen the 

products myself. It’s very cumbersome to work with. It slows them 

down. They have to use sneakernet, as we call it, in order to manage the knowledge that’s necessary to understand what’s happening in the space environment. 

If we were to be able to put some user interfaces in front of them 

that were more pictorial and much more comprehensive than what 

we’re working with today, as is envisioned with the JMS capability, 

my young space professionals will take off. They will become much 

more sophisticated. They are really sharp. What they need is to 

have their creativity unleashed. 

The way that the JMS capability is envisioned will allow that to 

happen. We will have some pretty amazing forces at work here to 

try to understand what’s happening in the domain as we acknowledge it as congested, competitive, and contested. 

Thank you. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, General. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Ambassador Schulte, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, I 

am concerned about the EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. Can you tell us whether the administration intends to inform Congress prior to signing any multilateral commitments in 

space activities? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. The headline that came out of my speech 

in Colorado Springs was: ‘‘Pentagon tentatively okays EU code.’’ 

That headline was wrong. I trust that never happens here. 

Let me step back and explain what we’re trying to achieve, 

where we are, and try to address some of the concerns that you, 

Senator, and at least 36 other Senators have raised, too. The national space policy from the President says, as you mentioned, we 

will consider arm control in space. It sets out three criteria: It has 

to be effectively verifiable, it has to be equitable, and it has to 

serve our national security interest. 

So far we haven’t found an arms control agreement that does 

that. There’s one on the table. It’s been proposed by Russia and 

China. We have declared it, not very politely, but we’ve said it’s 

fundamentally flawed because it’s not verifiable and it’s not clear 

it would even capture a lot of the Chinese counter-space systems 

that worry us. 

303 

Instead of pursuing arms control at this point, we’re open to it, 

we’re looking at what we call transparency and confidence-building 

measures, voluntary measures to encourage responsible use of 

space. 

The one such set of measures that we are currently evaluating 

is the proposal from the EU, its proposed Code of Conduct for 

Outer Space Activities. 

Senator SESSIONS. Let me tell you my concern, and I’ve seen this 

for a number of years since I’ve been in the Senate. We have, in 

space, the most capable program in the world by far. We’ve advanced further technologically, in development, and actual deployment of systems than anyone else. Agreements, codes of conduct, 

tend to constrain our military. Our military is fundamentally configured so it depends on space capability. 

I would be a bit nervous, am a bit nervous, and want to examine 

carefully whether or not through some agreement we’ve constricted 

our ability to effectively defend our interests. 

Let me ask you a few questions and see if you can answer them 

briefly, and if you can I’d appreciate it. Has the AFSPC or 

STRATCOM reviewed and provided an assessment at this date to 

the draft code of conduct? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. Senator, in DOD, we are currently conducting an operations assessment of the EU code to see what the 

impact would be. Our goal isn’t to constrain ourselves. We think we 

act pretty responsibly in space. The goal is to try to constrain new 

emergent space powers, to ensure they adopt procedures that 

would, for example, mitigate the creation of debris and avoid mishaps and instability in space. 

The goal of the IC and DOD is to protect our national security 

equities. We also, as the strategy says, have a stake in a domain 

in which others are operating that’s a bit more predictable. We 

want to encourage other countries to apply the same type of standards that we do in space. 

Senator SESSIONS. Would there be any impact such as this in 

such an agreement, would there be anything that would impact a 

U.S. decision to deploy missile defense interceptors of any sort in 

space? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. Sir, the EU code is about behavior in 

space, it’s not about capabilities in space. It would not, for example, 

prohibit the deployment of space-based interceptors. Now, if somebody wanted to do that and they’re going to create a lot of debris 

by doing so, we might say that’s a bad approach. But it doesn’t prohibit deployment of space-based interceptors. 

Senator SESSIONS. As a practical matter, would it or could it impede our ability to do that? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. No, sir, not as we understand it. 

Senator SESSIONS. Is there anything in it that would impact the 

development, test, or deployment of an anti-satellite weapon such 

as the one successfully used in the 2008 Operation Burnt Frost? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. Sir, it would not do that. It doesn’t constrain capabilities; it constrains behavior. In fact, Operation Burnt 

Frost, and I was in Vienna at the time and we did very well there, 

not just from a technical standpoint, but from a diplomatic standpoint, we showed how we were acting responsibly to minimize deVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00309 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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bris. In fact, the draft EU code as it now stands would allow such 

operations in the future. 

Senator SESSIONS. Would it impact, in any way, the research, development, testing, or deployment of a kinetic defensive system in 

outer space, one that could take out a satellite and let’s say we’re 

in an area of hostilities. There’s a satellite that’s providing intelligence information that places our military personnel at risk. Is 

there anything that would in any way impact our research, development, and testing of such a kinetic defense system in outer 

space? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. No, sir. It would discourage any activities 

that, again, would create a lot of debris. 

Senator SESSIONS. But it would be hard under our current technology to destroy a satellite that’s spying on our military. Would 

this agreement keep us from doing that? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. Senator, actually there are many ways, 

that we can’t discuss entirely here, to neutralize another satellite, 

and you can certainly do it without creating a lot of debris. 

The other thing I should mention, sir, if I could, is that—— 

Senator SESSIONS. I’m not sure that I’m totally sold on that, that 

you can necessarily impact all satellites without creating debris. 

Are you sure that’s accurate? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. Sir, we could go into another session for 

that, certainly the Chinese, for example, are looking at ways of 

neutralizing satellites that don’t create a lot of debris. 

The other thing that—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Looking at it and doing it are two different 

things. Excuse me; go ahead. 

Ambassador SCHULTE. Sir, I just wanted to mention, the code is 

voluntary, it can be put aside if you have to. It’s not a treaty. It’s 

not legally binding. It also is full of references to the inherent right 

of self defense, and you can imagine at DOD we appreciate that. 

It allows actions to be taken for self defense. 

As General Kehler told another panel recently, we see it as largely consistent with our operations plans, with our current practice, 

but we are doing a detailed assessment. 

Senator SESSIONS. What are your plans about advising and briefing Congress on this before anything is signed? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. Sir, I would actually defer to the Department of State (DOS) about how to handle that with Congress. Having said that, though, in response to the letter that you and many 

of your colleagues signed, there was a response. We offered briefings to your staff. I’m happy to come meet with you separately on 

this. We understand that many have concerns about this and we’re 

prepared to come and talk to you about them. 

Senator SESSIONS. Are Russia and China involved in these discussions? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. Russia and China are interesting. The two 

countries that are most nervous about the EU code are Russia and 

China. Part of that is because they see the code as a competitor to 

the arms control agreement that they’ve proposed, which we’ve 

found as fundamentally flawed. They’ve been a little bit reluctant 

to look at the code. 

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As they see more and more countries looking at the code they’re 

thinking, gee, maybe we should look at this, too. We have encouraged them to consider it, making clear we haven’t made a final decision. Again, we see this as a possible way to get the Russians and 

the Chinese to act more responsibly. 

Only if we sign the code along with the EU, otherwise it’s meaningless. We want to get the Russians and the Chinese into this 

type of framework. We want to get the Indians in there and we 

want to get Brazil. Again, the goal is in many ways to export the 

best practices that we use, to other parts of the world, to create a 

more predictable space environment, while still protecting our defense equities. 

Senator SESSIONS. We’ve spent billions of dollars to produce a 

fabulous SATCOM network that is a critical part of our defense 

structure. I would hate to see us take any action that would neutralize any part of that capability we’ve invested so much to 

achieve. 

Thank you. 

Ambassador SCHULTE. Thank you, sir. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator. 

General Formica, the Army is heavily dependent on space systems for much of what you do, particularly in theater. This subcommittee is worried about disconnects between the equipment 

that enables the warfighter to utilize space systems, particularly 

GPS and communications, and the satellites themselves. Improved 

capability is on orbit, but the equipment is not fielded. Do you see 

this as an issue for the Army? What are your thoughts? 

General FORMICA. Senator, thank you. As you said, the Army is 

invested in space capabilities and requires them in order to function our operating forces in theater and around the world. We are 

dependent on GPS SATCOMs, among others. Having reliable 

ground systems and being able to push those down to the lowest 

level is important to us and it is a capability that is something that 

needs to be developed and that we count on. 

Senator NELSON. In your statement, you mention the Army space 

support teams. Apparently these teams play a vital function in providing space support to commanders in the field. In your view, do 

these teams have all the support they need or do they need additional support or access to information? 

General FORMICA. Senator, again, thank you for the question. 

The Army space support teams and the space support elements 

which go at the various levels of Army commands and our operational forces are an essential part of our space cadre. We manage 

over 300 space professionals as part of the space cadre and they 

are well-trained. They train in a joint environment. They train not 

only at schools that we’ve developed at Space and Missile Defense 

Command, but we rely on the Air Force National Strategic Space 

Institute for some of the advanced training that these space professionals get. They go to the Navy Postgraduate School and other advanced civil schooling. They’re very well-trained. 

We’ve deployed now our 60th Army space support team rotation 

in support of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. They provide 

reachback capability to those forces to access the space capabilities 

that our joint forces provide. They are a very essential part of what 

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it is we do. We maintain the capability to continue that rotation. 

They get the support that they need, and they’re clearly a capability that operational commanders seek when they get ready to deploy. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Dr. Zangardi and Admiral Titley, as I mentioned in my opening 

statement, last year the first MUOS satellite was expected to 

launch in September of this year. Now it looks like the first satellite will not launch until mid-2012. In your prepared statement 

you indicate that there’s an issue with scheduling the launch. Is 

that the only reason for the delay, and what is the cost of the 

delay, both in terms of dollars and operational capacity? 

Dr. ZANGARDI. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question, sir. We 

project that the launch will occur in February 2012. We’ve been 

provided with a launch slot and that was firmed up a few months 

ago. The on-orbit capability for the first space vehicle of MUOS will 

be available in May 2012. 

As far as the cost for that delay, we’ll have to take that as a 

question for the record. I’m not prepared to answer that today. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

In March 2011 the assignment of Mobile User Objective Satellite (MUOS) 1 to a 

February 2012 launch slot was finalized by the Air Force as the earliest slot available since higher-priority National Aeronautics and Space Administration missions 

had been assigned to August 2011 and November 2011 launch slots. Current UltraHigh Frequency (UHF) Follow-On (UFO) availability models project that the UFO 

constellation will meet its availability requirement beyond MUOS 1 On-Orbit Capability in May 2012, so no impact to operational capacity is expected. The program 

incurred an additional cost of approximately $3.7 million due to the extension of 

contractor program management and system engineering effort for 4.5 months. 

Senator NELSON. Okay. Is there any danger that that program 

might experience a Nunn-McCurdy breach? 

Dr. ZANGARDI. Sir, in my view, and having talked with the program manager extensively before coming here, our view is that it 

will not at this point in time. 

Senator NELSON. Is there anything that could cause that to happen that you’re aware of? 

Dr. ZANGARDI. Sir, at this time there’s nothing that I’m aware of 

that could cause that. That does not preclude the possibility that 

something can occur, because, as we know, space is very complicated. 

Senator NELSON. Admiral Titley, how do you approach this from 

your perspective? 

Admiral TITLEY. Yes, sir, Senator. Thank you for the question. 

As we look at the amount of UHF capability that is in orbit today 

and how between a combination of some legacy Fleet Satellite Communication Systems, some leased satellites, and some Skynet as 

well as our UFO constellation, we believe that we will have in excess of 70 percent of that constellation still available by the time 

that the first MUOS bird achieves on-orbit capability in May 2012. 

There’s a number of reasons for that. STRATCOM has worked 

very hard along with the UFO program office. We have been able 

to squeeze more capability out of the existing constellation. We’re 

careful on how we reprioritize. We’ve been careful with how we’ve 

used the leases. That has us to the point where we believe we will 

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have again in excess of 70 percent of our capacity, which is the 

benchmark, by the time MUOS No. 1 achieves on-orbit capability. 

Thank you, sir. 

Senator NELSON. What are your thoughts about a potential 

Nunn-McCurdy breach? 

Admiral TITLEY. I would just echo Dr. Zangardi’s comments 

there, sir. From my perspective, I have not seen anything from the 

program briefs that at this point in time trigger that concern. As 

Dr. Zangardi said, this is something you always have to keep 

watching for. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Shelton, Ambassador Schulte, and 

Ms. Chaplain, over the 5-year Future Years Defense Program 

budget for 2012, the cost for space launch vehicles has risen. Last 

year the budget called for 26 launch vehicles from fiscal year 2012 

to fiscal year 2016 at a cost of $6.4 billion. This year’s budget for 

the same time period reduces the number of launch vehicles by 

three, but the cost appears to have risen from $6.4 billion to $9.8 

billion. That’s three less rockets, but a $3.4 billion increase in cost. 

How much of this price increase is related to the cancellation of 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Constellation program, which I know is some of it, and a lack of a clear 

NASA pathway for heavy lift? Would you comment on that? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. Senator, I’d be glad to. First, we need to 

start with an economic order quantity buy of piece parts for the 

rockets that started with the beginning of the EELV program. 

When we first started that program, we thought we were going to 

have a very robust commercial launch market. The vendors went 

out, bought a lot of parts, and got good deals on the buys of those 

parts. We are entering the end of those parts and it’s time to buy 

new. 

We’re buying smaller quantities. A lot of the vendors that we 

used before are no longer in business. In terms of the cost of upper 

stages, individual components that go on larger components, those 

prices have increased, as well as the engines for the rockets themselves. 

As we go through with this new strategy to buy eight rockets per 

year, five for DOD, three for the National Reconnaissance Office, 

we will try to bring those costs down by going at it with a much 

more fixed-price mindset and again get back to an economic order 

quantity capability for the United Launch Alliance, our launch provider, and get down to lower costs as much as we can. 

This is just a relatively small market that we’re in here and it’s 

just very difficult to contain the costs, but we’re working hard at 

it. 

Senator SESSIONS. The Air Force is dependent and required to 

provide the entire support now that NASA has reduced its play, 

participation, and consumption, NASA used to consume 70 percent 

of this capability. Has that impacted the price for the Air Force? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. Senator, you’re talking about the solid 

rocket capability? 

Senator SESSIONS. Right. 

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Ambassador SCHULTE. We’re not a big player in the big solid 

rocket business. That’s the business of the strategic programs of 

the Air Force and the Navy, the strategic missile programs. In the 

space launch business we use liquid propulsion. 

Senator SESSIONS. Ms. Chaplain, would you like to comment on 

that, please? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Yes. Specifically about the engines, their effect on 

price, and what’s going on in the NASA Constellation program. I 

do believe the engine prices are supposed to be increasing because 

there is a lot of uncertainty of what NASA’s going to do in terms 

of the Constellation program and that could be factoring into the 

prices considerably. 

When will we know what NASA’s going to be doing? It should 

be this year, but there’s still a lot of unknowns about how NASA’s 

going to answer its own authorization requirements. The Senate 

Commerce Committee laid out an architecture that it desires to see 

and NASA has not come back yet and answered how they’re going 

to answer that architecture. 

We still have uncertainty and until that certainty comes it’s likely that those engine prices are going to be higher. 

Senator SESSIONS. I agree. I talked to one of the Chief Executive 

Officers involved in this said the number one thing going on in our 

supply base right now is uncertainty, and really it’s uncertainty on 

what NASA is going to do. So we’re trying to work on that problem. 

Let me ask this. In their mark of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, the House Armed Services Committee chose not to fund MDA’s request for $160.8 million for the 

Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS). I talked to General 

O’Reilly about that and he is concerned that this is a decision that 

could increase costs. 

Ms. Chaplain, the MDA programs are part of your GAO portfolio. 

Do you have any concerns with the MDA’s strategy for PTSS or 

MDA leading the acquisition of a major space system? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. A couple months ago in our MDA report we reported on the PTSS program along with all the other MDA systems, and it’s still fairly early in the program. We did note that the 

program is adopting some practices that we like to see in space 

programs, one being that they want to build prototypes before operational satellites. 

Senator SESSIONS. In other words, DOD would basically build the 

prototypes and own the proprietary data, the patents or the rights 

to procure? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Yes. They would be working with the U.S. Naval 

Research Laboratory and the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab 

up the road, the two labs, to build prototype satellites. It’s unclear 

whether the prototypes are going to be what the operational satellites are going to end up being. It’s also something else we’re trying to pursue as to the extent to which the schedules for developing 

the prototypes overlap the operational satellite schedules; are we 

giving enough time there to actually learn from the prototypes and 

feed that into the subsequent effort by contractors? 

The other thing MDA has been trying to do that we thought was 

good, is keep requirements simple for PTSS. There are pressures 

and ideas for other things that PTSS could do. 

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We do have a concern about capability in terms of managing the 

large space program at MDA in terms of broader workforce issues 

across DOD and are we stretching the space workforce and the acquisition capability for space a little too thin. We haven’t reported 

on that issue and we haven’t done enough exploration about what 

MDA has versus what the Air Force has to be able to make reasonable comparisons. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I would just say that it’s possible the House didn’t have all the information that’s necessary on 

this system. General O’Reilly suggests that it could actually save 

a lot of money and get more capability. 

General Shelton, do you have any thoughts about that, briefly? 

General SHELTON. Senator, I talked to General O’Reilly just before coming over here and by what he has shown me it looks like 

a very capable system. Certainly not my area, but in terms of the 

way he described the capability and what it brings to missile defense and potentially to space situational awareness as well, it 

looks like a very valuable capability. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. It may be that we can work together to determine what would be the best thing to do, because 

a satellite could do more than other systems at less cost. 

General FORMICA. Senator Sessions, would it be appropriate for 

me to comment? 

Senator SESSIONS. Please. 

General FORMICA. I actually speak from my operational perspective as STRATCOM’s JFCC for Integrated Missile Defense. I can’t 

speak to the programmatics of the PTSS. I will leave that to General O’Reilly. But the operational implications of having PTSS or 

a capability like that is the ability to defend against larger raid 

sizes. It has increased capability. It would reduce our reliance on 

terrestrial-based radar systems which require host nation basing 

agreements, or even airborne platforms that require air space. It’s 

a persistent satellite-based contributor to the missile defense and 

would provide quality control tracking data that we would need. 

It is a viable capability and there are operational implications to 

not having it. Again, I’ll defer the programmatic discussions to 

General O’Reilly. 

Senator SESSIONS. Briefly, he indicated that it has exceeded your 

expectations when you started with that program technologically? 

General FORMICA. We know that the Space Tracking and Surveillance System, which is its predecessor capability, was recently successful in being able to transmit data during the flight test mission-15 a couple weeks ago. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator Sessions. I have to go to 

the White House following the vote, but I’ll be glad to leave this 

open and it will be in your very capable hands. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. I appreciate this panel. I might 

have a question or two and then we’ll wrap it up. 

Senator NELSON. That sounds fine. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, and make sure you figure a way 

to balance that budget, and not on the backs of the military. 

Senator NELSON. I’ll do my best. 

Senator SESSIONS [presiding]. Thank you. 

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General Shelton, in January the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

voiced significant concerns to the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regarding the FCC’s provisional authorization of LightSquared’s new wireless broadband proposal and 

the potential for interference with GPS signals, which our DOD relies on in a lot of different ways. 

Secretary Lynn states that there’s a ‘‘strong potential for interference to these critical national security systems,’’ and that ‘‘DOD 

strongly recommends the FCC defer final action until proper interference analysis and mitigation studies can be conducted.’’ 

Do you agree with the concerns expressed by Secretary Lynn and 

what are the national security implications if we have interference 

problems? 

General SHELTON. Senator, at the time he signed that letter and 

a subsequent letter in March, we had analytical data from an 

equipment manufacturer and some of the information that our program office in Los Angeles had been able to gather. We have since 

conducted actual testing using LightSquared’s equipment, civil, 

commercial, and military GPS receivers at Kirtland Air Force Base. 

Although the data is still being analyzed, I would tell you that the 

empirical data appears to be consistent with the analytical data. 

Yes, sir, we have concerns for commercial, civil, and military applications. 

Senator SESSIONS. People with a GPS in their car could have 

problems also? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. We have to look at these things as we go forward and I think it’s very appropriate to ask FCC to look at it 

hard. 

I realize the vote time is winding down. I thank all of you for 

your service. We believe in what you do. People do not appreciate 

the extent to which our space capabilities help sea, air, and land 

teams, unmanned aerial vehicles, Army squad leaders all over the 

world, and Navy ships and capabilities. It’s an extraordinary thing 

that this Nation has accomplished. No nation in the world has ever 

achieved so much in this regard. It costs a good deal, but it saves 

a lot of money too in a lot of different ways in making our military 

more capable and requiring less support. 

Thank you for your attendance. We will be submitting some written questions and I hope that you’ll be able to answer those within 

the time required. Thank you. 

We are adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON

PROTECTING SPACE ASSETS

1. Senator NELSON. General Helms, to protect satellites, you have to know what 

you are protecting them from. Improving space situational awareness (SSA), including the ability to detect and determine interference, is one of your major responsibilities. There are many sensors that provide or could provide SSA data. One of the 

problems, however, is the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission System 

(JMS), that utilizes this data to provide meaningful information is old and no longer 

able to handle the available data. Upgrading this system has proven to be an acquisition challenge. What is your vision for how this system should work? 

General HELMS. My vision for the JMS is that information technology be a modern, scalable, service-oriented architecture that is capable of collecting, processing, 

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displaying, and disseminating data across multiple security levels. Information technology should be able to receive and transmit data to and from current and future 

military, commercial, and allied sources to enable rapid, proactive decisionmaking 

and effective operations. 

To do this effectively JMS should be designed on an open architecture with an 

efficient, user-definable interface. Information technology should be easily expandable in terms of capacity, throughput, and storage. Its interfaces with all space systems and current and future SSA sensors should be efficient and effective. Finally, 

JMS must be net-centric to enable distributed operations, rapid dissemination of information, and continuity of operations. 

To achieve this, the acquisition process must allow for rapid identification, development, testing, integration, and operation of new capabilities to address emerging 

threats and to support current, future, and unanticipated future missions. Close collaboration with the user is key. The legacy systems have been primarily focused on 

integrating space surveillance metric track data. JMS, as a modern, flexible, and extensible platform, should be able to incorporate additional intelligence and nonSpace Surveillance Network data to enhance the JSpOC’s ability to collaborate with 

mission partners to identify and characterize threats interfering with U.S. space assets. 

2. Senator NELSON. General Shelton, you recently made a decision to take a pause 

in developing a new JMS, and move the acquisition responsibility to the Space and 

Missile Systems Center. What was your reasoning behind that decision and what 

impact does this have on new operating capability? 

General SHELTON. The combination of the JMS program cost estimate growth to $1 billion or more and the required sustainment of legacy systems until 2019 levied 

an unacceptable risk to space operations and the Air Force Space Command 

(AFSPC) budget. In January 2011, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OSD AT&L) directed an Independent Program Assessment (IPA) of the program. Although the IPA found the operational needs and 

system requirements compelling, information technology found the current acquisition strategy and approach inadequate. The IPA made several recommendations including a revised acquisition strategy and the extension of the prototyping phase to 

provide critical capabilities and reduce the risk for an agile information technology 

strategy. 

The IPA results provided an opportunity for a strategic pause, and the Air Force 

and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) evaluated potential courses of action that would incorporate the IPA recommendations. The result is an approach 

that fully leverages multiple prototype development efforts while capitalizing on the 

initial JMS service-oriented architecture and user-defined operational picture. This 

approach will provide early-use capability, allow JMS to provide more timely space 

effects, and utilize new data sources quicker. Information technology allows decommissioning of the legacy SSA systems soonest, avoiding an extended legacy 

sustainment bill. Finally, information technology establishes rigorous systems engineering and test and training processes early, enabling successful rapid integration. 

In evaluating the JMS course of action, information technology was also determined the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) was best suited to conduct this 

acquisition. Among SMC’s core competencies is SSA which is the foundation of the 

capabilities we must deliver in JMS. The impact is key mission capability delivered 

to the warfighter sooner. 

3. Senator NELSON. General Hyten, in your view is the acquisition system simply 

not structured to buy a new JMS, and if not, what has to change? 

General HYTEN. Air Force leadership agrees with the 2009 Defense Science Board 

(DSB) Task Force report on the Acquisition of Information Technologies that there 

are challenges associated with acquiring agile information technology under the current Department of Defense (DOD) 5000.02 acquisition policy. The DSB concluded 

that, ‘‘The conventional DOD acquisition process is too long and too cumbersome to 

fit the needs of the many systems that require continuous changes and upgrades— 

a reality driven by the short half-life of commercial information technology, 

supportability of hardware (which is often a commodity), software applications, and 

operational requirements.’’ 

DOD is progressing toward developing a new acquisition process for information 

capabilities (as initially described in the November 2010 report to Congress titled, 

‘‘A New Approach for Delivering Information Technology Capabilities in the Department of Defense’’), that embraces the tenets of section 804, paragraph (b) of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010, to include: (1) early 

and continual involvement of the user; (2) multiple, rapidly executed increments or 

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releases of capability; (3) early, successive prototyping to support an evolutionary 

approach; and (4) a modular, open-systems approach. A new policy designed with 

these tenets in mind will provide DOD and the Air Force the flexibility to develop 

agile information technology while providing the foundation and structure to ensure 

programmatic success and fiscal responsibility. 

In January 2011, OSD AT&L directed an IPA of the JMS program. Although the 

IPA found the operational needs and system requirements compelling, information 

technology found that the JMS acquisition has not incorporated agile information 

technology acquisition practices. 

JMS is being restructured to better implement these concepts and has been reassigned to Program Executive Office (PEO) Space at SMC. SMC is synergistically 

aligned with AFSPC and 14th Air Force and has the requisite space domain expertise. They will be better poised to successfully develop this critical space capability 

in the timeframe necessary to migrate off the increasingly unsustainable legacy systems. 

4. Senator NELSON. General Helms, as the Joint Functional Component Commander for the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), you work with commercial 

space companies and other countries to share SSA data. You mentioned in your 

statement that there are now 23 data sharing agreements in place. How is the data 

sharing working in practice, is information technology valuable, is the data reliable, 

are you seeking additional agreements, and are there any implementation problems? 

General HELMS. As of 1 June 2011, we have 24 signed SSA Sharing Agreements. 

The program is working very well. Companies with agreements submit data requests directly to Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC Space), 

and if the request is consistent with national security interests and we have the resources available, we provide the information to the company. Additionally, as an 

emergency service, we provide all global operators with alerts when there will be 

a close approach between their satellites and other objects. Data sharing is invaluable to our space operations. It has improved our SSA, increased our capabilities, 

and resulted in greater cooperation between allied, coalition, and commercial partners. Our partnerships have allowed us to better understand domestic and international commercial space operations and processes to include satellite status, orbit 

maneuver plans, and launch windows and parameters; information that would have 

been almost impossible to get without these agreements in place. These agreements 

will be even more important as space becomes more congested, competitive, and contested. For example, companies notify us of planned maneuvers and launches which 

enables us to proactively posture sensors for tracking and understand a change in 

status before it occurs, rather than reacting to events. This program is extremely 

valuable as an example of U.S. leadership and international confidence-building. 

Data reliability is good and getting better. We receive operator information, compare it to our own, and incorporate the useful information. Demand for SSA sharing 

services is growing. We are currently talking with two additional interested companies and we will begin entering agreements with international governments once we 

receive Department of State (DOS) and DOD approval. 

5. Senator NELSON. General Helms, there are many other sensors that could provide SSA data that are not currently incorporated to the JSpOC. AFSPC is providing a small amount of operational support to an array of radio receivers to determine if these privately owned receivers could provide additional SSA. Could you 

look into these and provide your thoughts? 

General HELMS. The Allen Telescope Array (ATA) is capable of providing SSA 

data that could supplement current sensors, track transmitting satellites without 

disruption from the sun or most weather, and provide a ‘‘special event’’ RF observation capability. Air Force Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities has successfully demonstrated that the ATA can provide position data on transmitting satellites 

and conduct secure direct-to-disk observations. We are always interested in ways to 

improve our SSA capabilities and the surveillance network. We support AFSPC desire to further assess ATA through a military utility assessment to determine the 

benefit it could provide to SSA and whether such a capability could be provided in 

a cost effective manner. 

MOBILE USER OBJECTIVE SYSTEM SATELLITE

6. Senator NELSON. General Helms, as I mentioned in my opening statement, last 

year the first Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellite was expected to 

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launch in September of this year, now information technology looks as if the first 

satellite will not launch until mid-2012. If the launch of the first MUOS is late solely as a result of congestion in the launch schedule, what is the plan to manage the 

schedule? 

General HELMS. Satellite vehicles are assigned launch slots as early as 24 months 

in advance. If they fail to meet these slot dates, a backup will be scheduled in its 

place and the satellite vehicle will have to compete for subsequent launch slots 

based on booster availability and national priorities. 

The MUOS–1 launch was delayed when the satellite vehicle did not complete 

thermal vacuum testing on time, a major processing milestone. Launch slot priority 

was given to a mission more likely to meet the launch slot date. Unfortunately, the 

next two launch slots support National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s 

(NASA) two inter-planetary missions scheduled to launch from Cape Canaveral Air 

Force Station with fixed launch windows and no launch opportunity between the 

two missions. The length of MUOS–1 delay is based on booster availability and national priorities rather than congestion. 

MUOS–1 is currently scheduled for the February 12, 2012, Atlas V launch slot. 

7. Senator NELSON. General Helms, how are launch priorities determined? 

General HELMS. The quarterly Current Launch Schedule Review Board integrates 

a wide range of inputs to determine the Current Launch Schedule (2 year schedule). 

Inputs are received from AFSPC, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 

NASA, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), STRATCOM, Constellation 

Sustainment Assessment Teams (CSAT) and other organizations who have spacecraft preparing to launch. Launch priority is then based on all inputs, national priorities, and satellite/launch vehicle readiness to meet assigned launch dates. 

ACQUISITION LESSONS LEARNED

8. Senator NELSON. Ms. Chaplain, you and your colleagues at the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have spent many years following space acquisition programs. As most of these challenging programs are on the cusp of operations, what 

are the lessons learned from years of late and over budget programs? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Key lessons on acquiring space systems have been learned the 

hard way over the past decade. These lessons mirror many of the best practices 

identified in our prior reports. Principally, information technology is vital that programs start with as much critical knowledge on requirements, technology, schedule, 

and cost as possible, and that they not be allowed to move into more complex phases 

of development without demonstrating that defined levels of knowledge have been 

attained. Most of the programs that have experienced significant delays and overruns lacked critical knowledge at the start and throughout. Another key lesson is 

that programs be set up in achievable increments versus revolutionary advances. In 

other words, not every military satellite initially needs to serve all the needs of multiple communities. Lastly, while acquisition ‘‘reform’’ and adopting ‘‘commercial’’ 

practices intuitively seem like the right things to do, DOD has learned that information technology needs to stay knowledgeable and involved in its acquisition efforts 

and provide adequate oversight. Many of the problems we have identified in the 

past decade can be linked back to reform initiatives that loosened oversight, quality 

standards, and government involvement. Table 1 highlights practices we have recommended that could benefit space programs. 

Table 1: Actions Needed to Address Space and Weapon Acquisition Problems 

Before undertaking new programs: 

• Prioritize investments so that projects can be fully funded and information technology is clear where projects stand in relation to the overall portfolio. 

• Follow an evolutionary path toward meeting mission needs rather than 

attempting to satisfy all needs in a single step. 

• Match requirements to resources—that is, time, money, technology, and 

people—before undertaking a new development effort. 

• Research and define requirements before programs are started and limit 

changes after they are started. 

• Ensure that cost estimates are complete, accurate, and updated regularly. 

• Commit to fully fund projects before they begin. 

• Ensure that critical technologies are proven to work as intended before 

programs are started. 

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• Assign more ambitious technology development efforts to research departments until they are ready to be added to future generations (increments) 

of a product. 

• Use systems engineering to close gaps between resources and requirements before launching the development process. 

During program development: 

• Use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to make go/no-go decisions, covering critical facets of the program such as cost, schedule, technology readiness, design readiness, production readiness, and relationships 

with suppliers. 

• Do not allow development to proceed until certain thresholds are met— 

for example, a high proportion of engineering drawings completed or production processes under statistical control. 

• Empower program managers to make decisions on the direction of the 

program and to resolve problems and implement solutions. 

• Hold program managers accountable for their choices. 

• Require program managers to stay with a project to its end. 

• Hold suppliers accountable to deliver high-quality parts for their products 

through such activities as regular supplier audits and performance evaluations of quality and delivery, among other things. 

• Encourage program managers to share bad news, and encourage collaboration and communication. 

Source: GAO. 

9. Senator NELSON. Ms. Chaplain, do you see these lessons being applied to new 

programs, such as the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS)? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. In general, DOD is working to ensure that critical technologies are 

matured before large-scale acquisition programs begin, requirements are defined 

early in the process and are stable throughout, and system design remains stable. 

DOD also intends to follow incremental or evolutionary acquisition processes versus 

pursuing significant leaps in capabilities involving technology risk and has done so 

with the only new major satellite acquisition program undertaken by the Air Force 

in recent years—GPS IIIA. DOD is also providing more program and contractor 

oversight and putting in place military standards and specifications in its acquisitions. Additionally, DOD and the Air Force are working to streamline management 

and oversight of the National Security Space Enterprise. Regarding DWSS, we have 

not conducted a detailed review of the development effort to determine the extent 

to which lessons learned are being applied. 

FUTURE FOR OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE

10. Senator NELSON. Ambassador Schulte and General Shelton, the Operationally 

Responsive Space (ORS) Office has had several successful space efforts, including 

TACSAT–3, demonstrating the military utility of small satellites to the warfighter. 

Two more small satellites, TACSAT–4 and ORS–1, should be launching shortly. 

What are your views on the future utility of small satellites from an operational and 

a policy perspective? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. Small satellites can play a role in making our space architectures more resilient and in providing tailored capabilities to the warfighter, goals 

that help fulfill several strategic approaches in the National Security Space Strategy 

(NSSS). Resilient architectures contribute to deterring aggression against space infrastructure that supports U.S. national security, and provide a means to operate 

in a degraded environment should deterrence fail. One approach to improve resilience is to disaggregate specific missions or payloads, and satisfy requirements by 

flying multiple smaller satellites. Smaller, more responsive space capabilities also 

improve our ability to operate in a degraded environment by enabling the DOD to 

respond quickly to urgent needs or reconstitute a capability after it is lost. Small 

satellites can also help address the challenges of our space industrial base, providing a steady requirement for many smaller satellites spread over many years and 

offering opportunities to incorporate new technologies and innovations rapidly. 

General SHELTON. As you mentioned, the TACSAT–3 spacecraft built by the Air 

Force Research Laboratory has demonstrated the military utility of a hyper-spectral 

imaging sensor. We believe that both the Naval Research Laboratory TACSAT–4 

and ORS Office/AFSPC ORS–1 spacecraft will provide unique capabilities to the 

warfighter and useful data regarding small spacecraft performance. 

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The National Space Policy (NSP) directs DOD to develop and exercise capabilities 

and plans for operating in and through a degraded, disrupted, or denied space environment. We need to think about new ways to field our future satellite constellations in terms of higher resiliency and increased assurance. Smaller satellites may 

be one approach to the problem. There may be other creative ways to disaggregate 

capabilities or distribute sensors and networks to provide adequate space capabilities. Many applications, such as communications, navigation, or missile warning, require a constellation of spacecraft to provide persistent global coverage. In the future, a strategy of greater distribution of spacecraft constellations, responsive 

launch for critical capabilities and/or on-orbit spares may provide needed resilience 

in a contested space environment. 

11. Senator NELSON. General Formica, the Army has been putting a lot of effort 

into small satellites, including a small satellite called Kestrel Eye. What is driving 

this attention on small satellites? 

General FORMICA. Space capabilities are required for the Army to shoot, move, 

and communicate. Small satellites have the potential to provide responsive and cost 

effective alternatives to augment existing space capabilities. With the changing nature of ground warfare, this added capability would provide the potential for persistent communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to 

warfighters at the tactical level, including those in remote locations. 

EXPORT CONTROLS

12. Senator NELSON. Ambassador Schulte, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations restrictions on the export of space-related technologies, many of which are 

global commodities today, have had a negative impact on the U.S. space industrial 

base—especially on lower-tier suppliers. The new NSSS acknowledges this situation 

and states the need for export control reform. What is the status of these export 

control reforms? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. On May 6, 2011, DOS and DOD transmitted a joint interim report to Congress in response to section 1248 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 

2010. The ‘‘Risk Assessment of United States Export Control Policy’’ report is a conservative starting point for transferring satellites and related items from the United 

States Munitions List (USML) to the Commerce Control List (CCL). It recommends 

that, under certain conditions, commercial communications satellites, systems, subsystems, and components be controlled on the CCL. In addition, the report recommends that the President be provided with the authority to determine the export 

licensing jurisdiction of satellites and related components, which are currently required by statute to be on the USML. 

A more comprehensive assessment of controls on satellites, related items, and 

technology is currently underway, as part of the administration’s Export Control Reform (ECR) initiative. DOD, with its interagency partners, is expected to complete 

this review of USML Category XV, Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment, 

by July 2011. The draft will include recommendations for what items should remain 

on the USML and what items can be moved to the CCL. No items controlled on the 

USML by statute will be moved off that list unless and until the authority to do 

so is provided by Congress. 

We expect to provide the final section 1248 report to Congress later this year, 

based on the findings from the ECR initiative. Implementation of the interim report’s recommendations would represent a significant step forward in export control 

reform for satellites, which we hope will boost U.S. content in foreign satellites, increase opportunities for partnering with foreign manufacturers, and help energize 

the U.S. space industrial base. 

SPACE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY

13. Senator NELSON. Dr. Zangardi and Admiral Titley, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 

2010 directed the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence to 

develop a Space Science and Technology (S&T) Strategy, which was recently delivered to Congress. Is the Space S&T Strategy being used by the Navy to guide or 

inform investments in space systems? 

Dr. ZANGARDI and Admiral TITLEY. Yes, the Office of Naval Research’s and Naval 

Research Laboratory’s current space capability development efforts are focused on 

the following DOD Space S&T Strategy goals: (1) Satellite Communications including communications-on-the-move; dedicated/theater controlled, space-enabled tactical communications; enhanced flexibility and resilience in challenged environVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00321 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ments; and support to ISR collection platforms (e.g., TACSAT–4 communications 

satellite (scheduled to launch 27 September 2011)); (2) Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance (ISR) including increased persistence of space-based ISR and 

improved cross-cueing for space-based assets (e.g., Detection and Fusion of Remote 

Sensors Future Naval Capabilities Initiative)); and (3) Space Environmental Monitoring including improved understanding and awareness of the Earth-to-Sun environment; improved space weather forecast capabilities and tools to predict operational impacts; and improved space weather forecasting and enabling real-time 

threat warning (e.g., a Space Weather Discovery and Invention Initiative.) These efforts illustrate the Navy’s application of this strategy as a tool to guide its space 

S&T initiatives and investments. 

14. Senator NELSON. General Shelton and General Hyten, is the Space S&T Strategy being used by the Air Force to guide or inform investments in space systems? 

General SHELTON and General HYTEN. The report was completed less than 2 

months ago and is still being reviewed by our organizations. Air Force inputs were 

primarily provided by the Air Force Research Laboratory and they were consistent 

with the outputs from yearly S&T reviews conducted by the Air Force Space Command Commander, the Air Force Research Laboratory Commander, and the Space 

and Missile Systems Center Commander. 

15. Senator NELSON. General Formica, is the Space S&T Strategy being used by 

the Army to guide or inform investments in space systems? 

General FORMICA. Yes, the Space S&T Strategy is being used by the Army to 

guide our investments in space systems. The strategy captures and reflects the guidance set forth to the Army outlined in the NSP and the NSSS regarding priorities 

and investment strategies for space. 

16. Senator NELSON. Ambassador Schulte, do you know who in DOD will be responsible for oversight of the execution of the strategy? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering is responsible for oversight of the execution on the Space S&T Strategy. 

SPACE LAUNCH

17. Senator NELSON. General Hyten, what is the Air Force plan to reduce launch 

costs, and rethink how launch vehicles are purchased, particularly the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)? 

General HYTEN. The recently appointed Air Force PEO for Space Launch is 

crafting a new EELV acquisition strategy that supports a minimum production rate 

by implementing a lot-buy approach to procuring launch vehicles. This strategy also 

includes a ‘‘new entrant’’ approach to allow for near-term opportunities and future 

competition in all lot buys. The Air Force, NRO, and NASA are working together 

to develop and publish a coordinated strategy for certification of new entrants, targeted to begin in fiscal year 2013. Key elements of the strategy are an initial Atlas 

V and Delta IV lot buy of sufficient size to ensure economic order quantity prices 

and a steady launch vehicle production rate. An AF/NRO study team and the Broad 

Area Review 2010 recommended an annual minimum production rate of eight 

launch vehicle cores plus associated upper stage engines, payload fairings, and solid 

rockets to sustain our spacelift industrial base. With lot buys, a steady production 

rate, and a ‘‘new entrant’’ approach, we believe launch costs can be controlled. 

18. Senator NELSON. Ms. Chaplain, GAO has an ongoing review of the development of the new EELV acquisition strategy. When will this review be completed and 

do you have any preliminary thoughts on how to reduce launch costs? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. We plan to issue a report on the results of our EELV review in 

July 2011. In this review we are examining whether DOD has the knowledge and 

information technology needs to develop a new EELV acquisition strategy and the 

extent to which there are important factors that could affect launch acquisitions. 

Given concerns raised through recent studies about visibility into costs and the industrial base supporting EELV, information technology is important that this strategy be supported with reliable and accurate data. Without such data, efforts to manage launch costs may not be effective. Additionally, deficiencies in the space acquisition workforce in general and those in the Air Force’s Launch and Range Systems 

Directorate in particular, increase the challenge of implementing the new strategy 

effectively. 

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19. Senator NELSON. General Shelton and General Helms, what do you see as the 

advantages and disadvantages to having new launch providers? 

General SHELTON. There are two advantages: (1) new providers may be able to 

bring innovative approaches that result in lower costs, and (2) creating competition 

in space launch. The disadvantage we have identified thus far is that the launch 

market may not be sufficiently robust to support multiple providers at efficient production levels. 

General HELMS. The advantages of a new provider for space launch are innovative 

approaches with lower costs. Additionally, competition provides incentive for current 

providers to find ways to lower costs. At any point in time, a more experienced provider will be perceived to have a matured reliability advantage over a less experienced launch provider. If a new launch provider experiences ‘‘growing pains’’ while 

establishing its position in the launch business, it may expose the government to 

unique schedule, cost, and performance risk. 

20. Senator NELSON. General Shelton and General Helms, what are the general 

performance objectives and goals that you would want to see from an operational 

perspective to ensure that a new launch provider can successfully launch a satellite? 

General SHELTON. Our current requirements documents state that a launch provider must be able to meet the range of lift requirements to launch national security 

payloads and demonstrate launch vehicle reliability of 98 percent or better. The 

launch vehicle must adhere to standard interface specifications to enable spacecraft 

to fly on the new rocket without being redesigned, and it must be able to launch 

from both the east coast and the west coast. We are evaluating new entrant criteria 

to encourage competition and allow a path for new launch providers to certify readiness for national security missions. 

General HELMS. Our requirements are specified in the EELV operational requirements document. For example, a new provider must be able to meet the variety of 

lift requirements to launch national security payloads and demonstrate launch vehicle reliability of 98 percent or better. The launch vehicle must adhere to the EELV 

standard interface specification to enable spacecraft to fly on the new rocket without 

being redesigned and be able to launch from both coasts. 

As a goal, the new provider should be able to deliver lower cost launches and 

bring long-term stability to Air Force launch services. 

DEFENSE WEATHER SATELLITE SYSTEM

21. Senator NELSON. General Hyten, in February 2010, the President restructured 

the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) 

weather satellite program. This decision directed the acquisition and development 

of separate military and civil weather satellite programs for the Air Force and the 

National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), rather than the 

joint NPOESS program. NPOESS had experienced technical problems that had resulted in cost and schedule increases and had a management structure that was not 

workable. The Air Force plans to acquire the DWSS to satisfy military weather requirements, and the NOAA will acquire the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS). 

Both NOAA and the Air Force will continue to use a shared common ground system 

to address weather and environmental requirements. The DWSS program is expected to launch two satellites with the first launch in 2018. What is the status of 

the DWSS effort? 

General HYTEN. The DWSS program is proceeding according to last year’s plan. 

The Air Force retained the NPOESS prime contractor, Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems (NGAS) and modified the contract for DWSS development. This restructured contract was awarded on 24 May 2011. The Air Force also transitioned 

the NPOESS climate sensors and the common ground system from the NPOESS 

contract to NOAA/NASA to support development on the JPSS contracts. 

DWSS is the result of a presidentially-directed restructure, not an NPOESS termination, and is consequently bound to the NPOESS acquisition baseline for annual 

acquisition reports to Congress. As a result, the restructure led to a significant 

Nunn-McCurdy breach of the NPOESS Program Acquisition Unit Cost. This breach 

was detailed in the 15 April 2011 NPOESS Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) and 

a 29 April 2011 notification to Congress by the Secretary of the Air Force. 

This year the Air Force and NGAS are focused on early development of the two 

DWSS satellites, finalizing contract restructure efforts, and completing the transition of non-DOD payloads to NOAA/NASA for JPSS. DWSS development activities 

will ramp-up considerably over the next year. Significant planned efforts in 2012 include continued spacecraft redesign to a smaller and lighter bus, continued developVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00323 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ment of the two primary sensors—the Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite and 

Microwave Imager Sounder—and development of algorithms to satisfy DOD-specific 

requirements in the common ground system. Following Milestone-B approval by the 

Defense Acquisition Executive in early 2012, the contractor will conduct the Preliminary Design Review in late 2012. 

The DWSS program is still on track to launch the first DWSS spacecraft no earlier than 2018. 

22. Senator NELSON. General Hyten, we have heard that a major program review 

of DWSS has been postponed indefinitely because of scheduling issues. What is the 

status of and schedule for the program review? 

General HYTEN. The DWSS Program Review Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 

was replaced by a program update to the Defense Acquisition Executive, Dr. Carter, 

which was held on 31 March. This update provided Dr. Carter with a summary of 

the program’s annual SAR delivered to Congress on 15 April and also addressed acquisition schedule, contract status, and sensor design. 

23. Senator NELSON. Ambassador Schulte, Earth environmental monitoring, 

weather sciences, and related technologies were not included in the 2011 Space S&T 

Plan. Do you know why these technologies were omitted? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. Historically, the vast majority of DOD S&T programs that 

address meteorological and atmospheric issues have not been considered a part of 

the Space S&T domain. However, future Space S&T strategies will more clearly 

identify significant space-specific S&T goals in Earth environmental monitoring, 

weather sciences, and related technologies. 

The Space S&T Strategy’s ISR core mission area incorporates DOD-funded S&T 

for sensors, electronics, and modeling, including terrestrial, atmospheric, and space 

weather. These S&T efforts support development of future technology options that 

address military needs in the ground, air, and space operational domains, including 

monitoring of seismic activity, typhoons, and the coastal ocean environments. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

AIR FORCE SPACE ACQUISITION PROPOSAL

24. Senator SESSIONS. General Shelton and Major General Hyten, the Air Force 

has proposed an efficiency initiative to adopt a new method for acquiring satellites 

called Evolutionary Acquisition for Space Efficiency (EASE). We have recently heard 

that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for AT&L does not believe that the use of 

multiyear contracts to procure additional Advanced Extremely High Frequency 

(AEHF) assets is appropriate at this time. We understand, however, that AT&L is 

considering other, more conservative block buy approaches that may be more appropriate for buying high technology-risk military satellites. In pursuing this contracting strategy, what sort of accountability does the Air Force intend to place on 

the prime contractor of these satellite systems? 

General SHELTON and General HYTEN. The best approach for accountability under 

EASE is the fixed-price, incentive fee contract. Once the contract is negotiated and 

put into action, the government’s obligation is limited. Government liability is constrained if the contractor experiences problems directly related to the contractors’ 

responsibilities within the scope of the contract. Contract penalties for unmet milestones or premature failure in on-orbit performance will also apply. Along with 

these provisions we hope to bring improved industrial base stability that will help 

avoid the conditions that have contributed to past cost overruns. 

In addition, designating block buys as Subprograms will provide congressional insight into actual space vehicle block costs. The resulting visibility ensures Air Force 

and DOD accountability to the costs and funding requirements to which they committed at the block Milestone Decision. 

25. Senator SESSIONS. General Shelton and Major General Hyten, given AEHF– 

1 has yet to reach its operational orbit and won’t do so until August, why should 

Congress write the check now for two more until we know if the satellite works and 

can meet its intended requirements? 

General SHELTON and General HYTEN. The AEHF program requirements are 

solid, the design is stable and mature, and the experienced government and contractor team is in place. We are making great progress on AEHF–1 orbit raising 

having reached the third of a four-phase revised orbit raising strategy and expect 

to have a full 14-year mission life. Once in the proper orbit, AEHF–1 checkout will 

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commence verifying that AEHF–1 can meet its intended requirements. In addition, 

AEHF–2 is in storage awaiting launch, and AEHF–3 and –4 are in various stages 

of production. The block buy of AEHF–5 and –6 will comprise a smooth continuation 

of the production line. Design maturity and stability lend well to a fixed-price contracting strategy for future production. If, for some unexplained reason, we discover 

unforeseen problems with AEHF–1, we believe they will be resolved before any final 

decisions are made concerning the production of AEHF–5 and –6. 

26. Senator SESSIONS. General Shelton and Major General Hyten, shouldn’t the 

Air Force be required to demonstrate the reliability of these systems before asking 

Congress to authorize buying these assets in bulk? 

General SHELTON and General HYTEN. AEHF–1 is scheduled to reach GEO by October 2011 and commence the 6-month on-orbit checkout process. Barring any 

schedule changes, the Air Force will complete AEHF–1 on-orbit checkout by April 

2012 and will have proven satellite reliability. The Air Force does not plan to award 

the AEHF–5 and –6 block buy contract before April 2012. 

27. Senator SESSIONS. Ms. Chaplain, has the GAO reviewed the Air Force EASE 

strategy? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. While we have not yet fully assessed the EASE strategy, this new 

approach appears to offer various benefits, such as ensuring technologies are mature 

and requirements are stable, accruing cost savings from economic order quantities, 

supporting the industrial base, and reducing the workload burden on government 

acquisition program offices. However, the strategy also appears to pose several challenges, including the potential to limit competition and innovation, as well as developing accurate and reliable cost and schedule estimates for acquiring state-of-theart satellites so that a fixed-price contracting strategy can be successfully employed. 

An overarching architecture could help implement and ensure the EASE strategy 

meets future needs. Additionally, a knowledgeable workforce would be essential for 

effectively implementing the strategy and developing adequate insight into costs 

and industrial base capabilities. 

28. Senator SESSIONS. Ms. Chaplain, do you have any concerns, particularly about 

the use of multiyear contracts, to buy high technology-risk military satellites? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Spreading the high procurement costs of satellites over several 

years should help to stabilize space system acquisition funding needs. However, the 

use of advance appropriations in conjunction with multi-year contracting would commit future budget authority for these procurements and thus tend to limit flexibility 

in future Congress’ budget decisionmaking. For this reason, we remain more concerned with the use of advance appropriation than the use of multiyear contracts. 

29. Senator SESSIONS. Ms. Chaplain, what other acquisition strategies should the 

Air Force consider that can both depressurize the appropriated funding vis-a ́-vis increasingly expensive satellite programs, but also allow the Air Force to procure 

high-risk space assets responsibly and in a way that allows for robust and meaningful congressional oversight? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Similar to major satellite acquisitions, the Navy’s major ship acquisitions are characterized by high cost items and low quantities. In some instances, the Navy procures its high cost ships by spreading procurement costs over 

multiple years without utilizing advance appropriations. A similar approach may be 

beneficial and applicable to procuring high cost satellites. Additionally, a strategy 

that calls for constellations of smaller and less technically complex satellites—such 

as single-mission satellites with shorter planned lifespans—could help DOD meet 

cost goals, bolster the space industrial base, allow capabilities to be fielded faster, 

and facilitate constellation sustainment in case of a launch or unexpected on-orbit 

failure. Finally, enterprise planning across the space acquisition programs portfolio 

could also significantly help normalize the spikes and valleys in space funding. Efforts under these scenarios would allow for robust and meaningful congressional 

oversight. 

SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: JOINT SPACE OPERATIONS CENTER MISSION SYSTEM

30. Senator SESSIONS. General Shelton and Lieutenant General Helms, one of 

your top priorities is the development of a modern SSA system for analyzing and 

monitoring activity in space. I am concerned that the traditional defense acquisition 

process is not optimal for the development of software-based service-oriented architectures like the one envisioned for the JSpOC management system. I understand 

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that recently you decided to reevaluate the acquisition strategy for this program. 

What is the current status of the JSpOC management system? 

General SHELTON. In January 2011, OSD/AT&L directed an IPA of the JMS program. Although the IPA found the operational needs and system requirements compelling, it found the JMS acquisition had not incorporated agile information technology acquisition practices. 

The IPA recommended a revised acquisition strategy which included the extension 

of a prototyping phase to reduce the risk. The Air Force has now embarked on an 

approach that fully leverages multiple current prototype development efforts while 

capitalizing on the initial JMS service-oriented architecture capabilities. This approach will provide early-use capability, utilize new data sources quicker, and allow 

decommissioning of the legacy SSA systems soonest. Finally, it establishes rigorous 

systems engineering, test and training processes early, enabling successful rapid integration. 

We are now in the process of transferring program responsibility to the SMC to 

implement this prototyping approach for more rapid delivery of mission capability 

to the warfighter. 

General HELMS. In January 2011, OSD/AT&L directed an IPA of the program. Although the IPA found the operational needs and system requirements compelling, 

it found the current DOD acquisition policy, and therefore the JMS acquisition, has 

not properly incorporated agile information technology acquisition practices. The 

IPA recommended DODI 5000.2 (Operation of the Defense Acquisition System) be 

amended to reflect the Information Technology Box concept and incorporate DOD’s 

section 804 response to Congress for agile acquisition. 

In addition, the IPA recommended a revised acquisition strategy including the extension of the prototyping phase to reduce the risk for an agile information technology strategy. To comply, the Air Force is proposing an approach that fully 

leverages multiple prototype development efforts while capitalizing on the initial 

JMS service-oriented architecture and user-defined operational picture already at 

the JSpOC. This approach will provide early-use capability, utilize new data sources 

quicker and allow decommissioning of the legacy SSA systems soonest. Finally, it 

establishes rigorous systems engineering and test and training processes early, enabling successful rapid integration. 

AFSPC is now in the process of transferring program responsibility to the SMC 

to implement this prototyping approach to more rapidly deliver mission capability 

for the JSpOC. 

31. Senator SESSIONS. General Shelton and Lieutenant General Helms, what is 

the expected timeline and cost? 

General SHELTON. We will transition off of legacy SSA core processing systems by 

the end of fiscal year 2014. The schedule for the remaining JMS capabilities is now 

being developed. 

The total cost of the new rapid prototyping approach is expected to be less than 

the previous approach. We are finalizing the detailed program baseline and acquisition strategy. 

General HELMS. We hope to transition off of legacy SSA core processing systems 

by the end of fiscal year 2014. The schedule for the remaining JMS capabilities is 

now being developed. 

The new rapid prototyping approach, as informed by the OSD directed IPA, is expected to cost significantly less than the previous approach. At this time, detailed 

program baseline and acquisition strategy are still being finalized. 

32. Senator SESSIONS. Ms. Chaplain, does GAO have any thoughts or insights on 

the JMS acquisition strategy? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. We have not reviewed the latest changes to the JMS acquisition 

strategy resulting from the recently-conducted IPA. However, in our review of the 

acquisition effort last year, we raised several concerns about the then-current draft 

JMS acquisition strategy including the following: 

• The potential for deferring requirements could be an oversight consideration given the Air Force’s history of consistently deferring requirements in 

previous attempts to upgrade information technology systems that support 

SSA. 

• The JMS acquisition was not adopting an incremental approach—the effort instead consisted of a single increment delivered in a series of releases—as exemplified by its plans to proceed without knowledge of all critical technologies and deferral of other planning activities. This lack of 

knowledge could result in unanticipated costs and other programmatic risks 

to the acquisition effort. 

321 

• The program planned to award a contract for developing a high accuracy 

catalog without first conducting limited development or developing prototypes. The high accuracy catalog is foundational for most JMS capabilities 

and is intended to be a net-centric data repository of information about 

earth-orbiting objects. 

• Support for use of a service-oriented architecture was relatively new 

under DOD policy and the practice was not yet widely used—although service-oriented architectures offer significant benefits, they also pose integration and information assurance challenges. 

QUALITY CONTROL

33. Senator SESSIONS. Ambassador Schulte, Dr. Zangardi, General Shelton, Lieutenant General Helms, Lieutenant General Formica, Rear Admiral Titley, Major 

General Hyten, and Ms. Chaplain, contractor quality issues have had significant impacts on major defense space programs over the years. In your opinion, what more 

can be done to address quality control? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. Energizing the space industrial base is one of the three 

strategic objectives of the NSSS. This includes working with the Intelligence Community and our industrial base partners to revalidate current measures and implement new ones, where practicable, to stabilize program acquisition more effectively, 

and to improve our space acquisition processes. Stabilizing our acquisition programs 

will allow prime contractors and suppliers to work over the long-term to increase 

quality. Suppliers will tend to provide higher quality where there is longevity to a 

production run. 

DOD also needs to engage the supplier community more strategically about farreaching issues concerning the industrial base. The existing Space Industrial Base 

Council is intended to serve this purpose and will be used to address this and other 

supplier issues as needs arise. 

Dr. ZANGARDI and Admiral TITLEY. Navy’s primary space responsibility is the procurement, sustainment, and operation of DOD’s Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) communications satellites. While fulfilling this responsibility, it has been Navy’s experience that a majority of the systems that comprise the current UHF constellation 

have operated well beyond their design lives. The satellites and their sub-systems 

are well engineered, so the Navy can’t comment on negative impacts from quality 

control problems. Navy space programs leverage lessons learned from other space 

programs and utilize numerous proven quality control mechanisms that conform to 

industry standards. The Navy Communications Satellite Program Office along with 

our contractors are fully engaged in ensuring Navy space programs continue to 

produce high quality systems. 

General SHELTON and General HYTEN. The Air Force, as a whole, continues to 

move away from the Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) approach to 

acquisition embraced in the mid-1990s. The crux of the TSPR approach was to 

transfer government tasks to the contractor in order to gain efficiencies by taking 

full advantage of the contractor’s overall management approach and commercial 

best practices with minimal government oversight. As a result of minimizing that 

government oversight, critical acquisition and engineering skills within the Air 

Force atrophied resulting in less and less ability to provide quality oversight. 

Today, the Air Force is aggressively improving its acquisition corps, to include 

focus on the systems engineering discipline. Robust up-front systems engineering, 

detailed design reviews, and continuous risk analysis and mitigation will design 

quality into the system from the beginning, rather than solely relying on quality 

control officials to validate checklist compliance during final production and integration. Robust systems engineering and acquisition oversight of contractor performance during the engineering phase will lead to the quality product we require for 

the warfighter. 

We also believe stable production runs underwritten by stable funding will benefit 

the industrial base and enhance quality. 

General HELMS. I believe there are a few ways we can improve quality control. 

First, we can increase contractor financial responsibility for poor quality control of 

subcontractor work. Second, provide contractor greater predictability for orders and 

production enabling the contractor to retain expertise. Third, we should make award 

fees large enough to incentivize contractor behavior. Finally, more block buy purchases with smaller steps in technologies will avoid large technological leaps that 

are complex and costly. 

General FORMICA For the government to achieve improved quality control, we 

must focus our efforts on strong quality assurance programs and enhanced conVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00327 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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tractor oversight. We must increase our collaborative efforts with quality assurance 

specialists to ensure that appropriate quality clauses and provisions are included in 

contracts. Additionally, the government should assess and build its organic capability to effectively measure and validate contractor quality and procure essential 

technical data for effective contractor oversight. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Over the years, we have identified practices related to technology 

transition, quality assurance, and other acquisition program management approaches that could benefit space programs. Approaches that could improve the 

quality of space systems acquisitions include: 

• Improving quality systems engineering. 

• Holding suppliers accountable to deliver high-quality parts for their products through such activities as regular supplier audits and performance 

evaluations of quality and delivery. 

• Providing effective oversight during the development process. 

• Providing an adequate workforce capacity for the front-end acquisition 

planning activities. 

• Capturing manufacturing knowledge in a timely manner. 

DOD has developed policies that address the need for adopting commercial quality 

standards, using good systems engineering practices, and overseeing supplier quality. However, DOD still has difficulty acquiring high-quality weapon systems in a 

cost-efficient and timely manner. While many problems are caused by poor prime 

contractor practices related to systems engineering, manufacturing, and supplier 

quality, an underlying cause lies in the fact that DOD typically assumes most of 

the financial risk associated with development of complex systems. Moreover, risks 

associated with this situation are exacerbated because DOD generally enters into 

development contracts without demonstrated knowledge or firm assurance that requirements are achievable, which too often result in inefficient programs and quality problems. 

34. Senator SESSIONS. Ms. Chaplain, I understand that GAO has conducted comprehensive quality review on contractor quality. Could you please share some of 

your findings and recommendations? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. We were asked by the Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations, to assess: (1) the extent to which parts quality problems are affecting DOD 

and NASA space and missile defense programs; (2) the causes behind these problems; and (3) initiatives to prevent, detect, and mitigate parts quality problems. We 

reviewed 21 space and missile programs at DOD and NASA that were, as of October 

2009, in development, projected to be high cost, and had demonstrated through a 

critical design review that the maturity of the design was appropriate to support 

proceeding with full scale fabrication, assembly, integration, and test. Each program 

provided a list of the top 5 to 10 parts, materials, or processes problems, as defined 

by that program, affecting that program’s cost, schedule, or performance. In addition, they provided an explanation of the root cause and contributing factors that 

may have led to each problem reported. Through our discussions with agency officials, we were able to obtain information on working groups and initiatives to prevent, detect, and mitigate parts quality problems. At this time, we are unable to discuss our specific findings and recommendations given that the report is in draft and 

not final. We expected to issue the report in mid-June 2011, at which time we will 

provide you with a copy. 

[Whereupon, at 3:13 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

(323) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE 

PROGRAM 

FRIDAY, JUNE 3, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Bellevue, NE 

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:33 a.m. in 

Bellevue Public Schools/Offutt Air Force Base, Welcome Center, 

1600 Highway 370, Bellevue, NE, Senator E. Benjamin Nelson 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee member present: Senator Nelson. 

Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel. 

Staff assistant present: Hannah I. Lloyd. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Ann Premer, assistant 

to Senator Nelson; and Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator 

Shaheen. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, 

CHAIRMAN 

Senator NELSON. The Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on 

Strategic Forces will come to order at this time. 

General Kehler, welcome. It is a pleasure to be with you here in 

Bellevue today, just up the road from Offutt Air Force Base, the 

historic home of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and today the 

home of the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and the Fighting 55th. 

I also want to acknowledge and welcome two retired military 

leaders, Lieutenant General Bob Hinson and Vice Admiral Bob 

Bell, who are close advisors to me and continue to serve this community and the Nation. You may know that Vice Admiral Bell retired after 37 years in the Navy and then was President and CEO 

of the Greater Omaha Chamber of Commerce from 1988 until 2001. 

Lieutenant General Hinson, prior to his retirement, as did Admiral 

Bell, served as Vice Commander of the Air Force Space Command 

and also served as Deputy Commander of STRATCOM. 

In 2001 they, along with other leaders in the community, established the Military Support Coalition to champion Offutt Air Force 

Base, the Fighting 55th, and STRATCOM. For many years before 

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that, however, they worked to improve and support Offutt. We are 

certainly grateful that the military service brought both of these officers to Omaha and the community kept them. 

The command has a proud history, dating back to its Cold War 

roots. Since the creation of STRATCOM in 1992, the reach and 

breadth of the command has continued to grow, particularly following the merger of STRATCOM with U.S. Space Command 

(SPACECOM) in 2002. 

Today STRATCOM is truly a global command. Today its missions include nuclear deterrence, protecting space, thwarting cyber 

attacks, global strike, combating weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD), overseeing missile defenses, providing real-time battlefield 

intelligence, and more. It is probably safe to say that STRATCOM 

plays one of the most important but perhaps not one of the best 

known roles in America’s national security. 

General Kehler, this is your second appearance before the Senate 

Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, but your first 

opportunity to discuss the full scope of the command and its activities. Although you assumed your responsibilities of this command 

just a little over 4 months ago, you are not new to these issues and 

most of your career has been involved with strategic and space systems. You are not new to the command, having previously served 

as Deputy Commander. Maybe I should say welcome back and welcome home. 

But before we begin today, I would also like to recognize the men 

and women who serve around the world as members of the military 

services in support of STRATCOM and their families as they support and enable their loved ones to carry out the wide range of important global missions. 

The global strike responsibilities have been repeatedly demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq. The B–2, the B–52, and the B– 

1 bombers have all rotated through Iraq or Afghanistan, providing 

large amounts of ordnance where and when needed. The B–1 has 

been able to do double duty by providing both ordnance and intelligence. 

With the stand-up of the new U.S. Cyber Command, which is 

part of STRATCOM, there is now a military force to protect and 

defend military cyber assets and to respond to a cyber attack on 

the United States when and if necessary. This is a significant challenge. The Department of Defense (DOD) is targeted for thousands 

of cyber attacks per month. Some estimates range as high as 5,000 

attacks per month. 

STRATCOM also manages the unmanned aircraft such as Global 

Hawks, Reapers, and Predators that help the forces in Afghanistan 

gather intelligence and see over the next hill or mountain. These 

unmanned aircraft stay in the air for hours and constantly provide 

eyes in the sky and the fire power necessary to track and, if needed, attack Taliban and others who are attacking U.S. and NATO 

forces. 

STRATCOM is also responsible for implementing the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia, the New 

START treaty, which the Senate ratified this past December. This 

new treaty will reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear 

weapons and non-deployed nuclear delivery systems that each 

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country has. We look forward to hearing your thoughts on implementing this important new treaty. 

The U.S. military remains a superior military force due in large 

part to the advantages and capabilities that the military and other 

national security space systems provide. This advantage is not a 

secret, and others are constantly trying to reduce that advantage. 

STRATCOM is responsible for protecting those satellites and finding whoever it is that is trying to interfere with those satellites. 

Space is also full of space debris, junk that moves around in 

space and that can damage our space satellites. STRATCOM is responsible for keeping track of these objects and providing advanced 

warning so the junk does not collide with the satellites. In 2009, 

unfortunately a dead Russian satellite collided with a U.S. commercial communications satellite. The two satellites broke apart from 

the impact and, unfortunately, created even more space debris. 

STRATCOM also provides warning information to the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to protect the astronauts on the Space Station from space debris. Even the Space Station has had to change its location on several occasions to avoid 

that space debris. 

The most important role of the STRATCOM is to maintain a 

safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. Maintaining the nuclear deterrent is an everyday event at STRATCOM. 

There is also another piece to deterrence for which STRATCOM 

is also responsible, and that is preventing states and non-state actors from acquiring nuclear weapons, materials, and technologies. 

This equally important mission is one that is often not well understood by the public or even Congress for that matter, but one that 

is growing. 

Finally, STRATCOM is the responsible command for ensuring 

that missile defenses are militarily effective. As missile capabilities 

of countries such as Iran and North Korea grow, the threat to deployed U.S. forces and allies in these regions also grows. The 

United States has begun, in cooperation with NATO, a missile defense program that will protect our troops and our allies from existing and anticipated regional missile threats, including those from 

Iran. 

So it is a pleasure for me to be here and to welcome all of you 

to be able to listen to and discuss these issues and all of the work 

of STRATCOM. General Kehler, your prepared remarks and statement will be included for the record. 

Before your opening remarks, I just wanted to thank Hannah 

Lloyd, our subcommittee staff assistant, and your staff, General 

Kehler, for all their hard work organizing the hearing today. We 

do not get the chance to do many field hearings, as they require 

a little extra preparation being outside of Washington, but I do 

honestly believe they are important as part of our transparent government and the opportunities that we have to explain to the 

American public what, in fact, STRATCOM in this case does for 

our national defense. 

General Kehler, I welcome your opening remarks. 

326 

STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, 

COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND 

General KEHLER. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

on behalf of STRATCOM and the Offutt Air Force Base community. 

We appreciate this opportunity to appear before the subcommittee 

again and discuss STRATCOM’s missions, responsibilities, and requirements. 

On a personal note, Marge and I are very happy to be back in 

Omaha and Bellevue and part of the Offutt Team again. As you 

say, we get tremendous support from the local communities here, 

and I will say a word about that in just another minute. 

There is a reason for that and that reason is that the Bellevue 

and Omaha and Offutt communities share more than 143 years together, beginning with the establishment of what was called Sherman Barracks back in 1868 which later became Fort Omaha and 

continued with the building of Fort Crook in 1894. Of course, I live 

in a set of quarters that were completed in 1896. It has been occupied by, I think at last count, 62 leaders that have been assigned 

here throughout those intervening years. Those quarters have been 

continuously occupied for all that time. 

Of course, Fort Crook added Offutt Field to its purview in 1924 

which eventually became Offutt Air Force Base. 

Other important milestones include—we, of course, had heavy 

bomber production for World War II which began in the 1939–1940 

timeframe; SAC headquarters, which was established here in 1948; 

the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, which was established 

here in 1966, which became the present day 55th Wing in 1991; the 

stand-down of SAC and establishment of STRATCOM as a joint 

command initially in 1992; transition of Global Weather Central 

into the Air Force Weather Agency in 1997; and of course, the new 

STRATCOM after merging with SPACECOM in 2002. 

I would like to take just a minute to introduce some of 

STRATCOM’s Team Offutt partners whose leaders are with us 

today. Brigadier General Don Bacon is here. He is the commander 

of our host unit, the 55th Wing. He took command there in March 

and leads the second largest wing in the United States Air Force. 

As I said, the Fighting 55th is our host wing. It operates 48 aircraft 

from locations around the world. They conduct essential reconnaissance, command and control, treaty verification, presidential support, and airlift missions. 

Last March, Don’s command passed 7,500 consecutive days deployed in support of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) operations. That is a tremendous milestone. They did all of this while 

providing great host unit support for all of Team Offutt’s people, 

our families, and the retirees that make Omaha home. 

Colonel Bob Russell is also with us this morning. He commands 

the Air Force Weather Agency. That includes 1,400 Active Duty, 

Reserve, civilian, and contract people that are at locations around 

the world. Through its groups in observatories, the agency provides 

global weather products and services, including space weather support to the Air Force, Army, Special Operations, Intelligence Community, and other DOD activities. Notably he claims no credit for 

the increased rain that has fallen in Nebraska that are causing 

some worries as we are thinking about the potential for flooding, 

327 

and our sympathies are with those that are having to deal with 

those problems right now. 

Of course, our three organizations are all successful and these 

two commanders would say the same thing that I say about this. 

We are successful because of the extraordinary men and women we 

are privileged to lead. 

So I would like to recognize four of STRATCOM’s enlisted members who represent the best of America’s soldiers, sailors, airmen, 

and marines. From the U.S. Army, Sergeant Ralph Pohlman who 

was the 2010 STRATCOM Soldier of the Year; from the U.S. Navy, 

Petty Officer 2nd Class, Erica Bushell, the STRATCOM 2010 Junior Sailor of the Year; Tech Sergeant Alicia Maharaj, the 

STRATCOM Mid-Tier Enlisted Person of the Year; and from the 

U.S. Marine Corps, Sergeant Kelly Nielson, STRATCOM’s Joint 

Functional Component Command for Global Strike Marine of the 

Year. 

Senator NELSON. Excuse me. Let us have them stand and let us 

give them a round of applause. 

General KEHLER. Yes, please. [Applause.] 

So together, Team Offutt’s 35,000 Active Duty warriors, civilians, 

reservists, contractors, dependents, and retirees share deep bonds 

with Omaha, Bellevue, and the communities throughout Eastern 

Nebraska and Western Iowa. As I said, for well over 140 years, our 

heartland neighbors have opened their arms to welcome our warriors, our families, and our children, which is an interesting side 

note to where this hearing is located today, one of the unique facilities in my experience in 36 years of military service now where a 

community has actually dedicated its educational institutions to 

the support of our military children and how welcome that is as 

our people struggle with these often moves and the conflict that 

that shows. I think that says something about Bellevue and the 

great support that we get from the community here. 

In addition, community support and care for our wounded warriors has always been important, and today it has a new and greater sense of emphasis and is an important resource for commanders 

at every level. On behalf of Team Offutt, and especially to anyone 

who ever hosted a young service member in your home on a holiday, mowed the lawn of a deployed service member, cared for our 

wounded warriors, reached out to a new family on the block, or just 

visited with a deployed member’s spouse, I want to say we owe you 

a very deep and very heartfelt thanks. This bond that we have with 

this community—as I say, the roots are deep and they go back a 

very long time. 

In this challenging era of protracted conflict, constant change, 

and enormous complexity, the demands on our servicemembers and 

their families are great. You may never know how much your many 

acts of kindness means to those of us who are blessed to receive 

them, but we are very grateful. 

Indeed, today’s Armed Forces face a significantly different operating environment than in the past. This is a modern operating environment that is characterized by extraordinary technological advances, rapid changes in the number and type of actors, and hybrid 

combinations of strategies, tactics, and weapons. We operate in a 

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cused effort, flexible approaches, and innovative responses. We 

must think strategically, plan with flexibility, assess comprehensively, and share information in unprecedented ways. 

STRATCOM’s mission is to detect, deter, and prevent attacks 

against the United States and our allies and to join with the other 

combatant commands to defend the Nation should deterrence fail. 

At subordinate commands, task forces, and bases around the globe, 

more than 54,000 Active Duty, Reserve, National Guard, and civilian members of our team execute this mission every day. 

STRATCOM’s mission priorities and responsibilities are complex 

and far-reaching, and we have five priorities that guide our work. 

First, we are to deter nuclear attack with a safe, secure, and effective deterrent force. Our men and women operate the Nation’s 

strategic deterrent forces 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. They 

also produce the Nation’s nuclear employment plans that provide 

the President with credible response options to deter attack and 

achieve national security objectives should deterrence fail. Today 

we are working closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

the Joint Staff, and the Services, as you said, Mr. Chairman, to implement both the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the New 

START treaty. In particular, we are working to implement the 

treaty’s provisions safely, securely, efficiently with the right resources and the right timeline and with the right force structure. 

The administration’s 10-year plan for investment in our nuclear 

capabilities, as reflected in the President’s budget, is absolutely essential. As affirmed by the 2010 NPR, we must sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons complex, the triad of nuclear forces, our 

human capital, and key supporting command/control/communications and ISR capabilities. Mr. Chairman, we appreciate Congress’ 

strong support in fiscal year 2011 and we urge full funding again 

as you consider the fiscal year 2012 President’s budget proposal. 

Our second priority is to partner with other combatant commands to win today’s fight. Ongoing operations demand our full 

commitment, and in partnership with other combatant commands, 

we are working to improve plans, procedures, and capabilities to 

address regional problems, including the development, proliferation, and delivery of WMD and to bring unity of effort, especially 

where problems and capabilities requirements cross geographic 

boundaries. 

Our third priority is to respond to new challenges in space. As 

you pointed out, sir, space is increasingly contested, congested, and 

competitive, and its importance goes far beyond national security. 

We must ensure uninterrupted access to space and space-based capabilities, improve our awareness of objects and activities in space, 

and enhance the protection and resilience of our most important 

systems. 

Our fourth priority is to build cyberspace capability and capacity. 

In cyberspace, our greatest challenge is to improve our ability to 

operate and defend DOD’s networks at cyber speed, to make sure 

our vital activities can continue even in the face of attempts to 

deny or disrupt, something that happens thousands of times every 

day. 

With our subunified command, U.S. Cyber Command, we are 

working hard to improve organizations and relationships, enhance 

329 

network situational awareness and protection, increase technical 

capacity, and develop the human capital we need as we look to the 

future. 

Finally, fifth, we must prepare for uncertainty. Today’s adversaries and tomorrow’s potential challengers closely watch our actions, our plans, and our capabilities to understand our values, our 

operations, and our vulnerabilities. These actors are not static, and 

combined with environmental, economic, and other factors, these 

potential adversaries could present surprising and asymmetric conventional, digital, or WMD challenges against which we must constantly be vigilant. 

Tying together this range of truly global responsibilities and associated capabilities must be a reliable and assured national command, control, and communication capability from the President to 

the nuclear forces and across the range of military capabilities. Our 

current systems require investment to ensure reliability and to address looming capability gaps. A new STRATCOM and control complex and nuclear command and control node at Offutt Air Force 

Base is the center of our nuclear C3 plans for the future. 

STRATCOM operates a unique national command and control capability, and today’s complex command center and IT systems lack 

the capability and capacity to support our missions in the long 

term. 

Sir, again, we appreciate your support and the subcommittee’s 

support for the President’s request for funding in fiscal year 2012 

for this new nuclear and national command and control node. 

So in conclusion, sir, the Active Duty, Reserve, National Guard, 

and civilian members of STRATCOM’s team perform their difficult 

mission with remarkable skill and dedication. I am proud to be associated with them and look forward to working with you and the 

subcommittee as we address these important national security 

issues. 

Again, we appreciate the opportunity to appear in front of the 

subcommittee. We especially appreciate the opportunity to do so 

right outside our gate in Bellevue. With that, sir, I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Kehler follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF 

Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, and members of the subcommittee, thank 

you for the opportunity to present my views on U.S. Strategic Command’s 

(STRATCOM) missions and priorities. I am especially pleased to have this hearing 

here in Nebraska, just down the road from STRATCOM’s headquarters and Offutt 

Air Force Base. We have a great team here and throughout our distributed command. Today is an important opportunity to showcase STRATCOM’s Active Duty, 

Reserve, National Guard, and civilian members, who are standing watch this very 

minute at locations across the country and around the globe. They truly exemplify 

the best of today’s joint force. I look forward to discussing the command’s missions 

with you today, especially our role in the Nation’s nuclear command, control, and 

communications (NC3) architecture and essential NC3 capability requirements. 

America’s strategic forces proudly continue their longstanding role as the foundation of our national security posture. The President of the United States has assigned STRATCOM the responsibility to detect, deter, prevent, and defeat attacks 

against the United States, its territories, possessions and bases, and to employ appropriate force to defend the Nation should deterrence fail. The Command’s specific 

mission responsibilities include planning, synchronizing, advocating, and employing 

capabilities to meet the Nation’s strategic deterrence, space operations, cyberspace 

operations, information operations (IO), global strike, missile defense, intelligence, 

330 

surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and combating weapons of mass destruction 

(CWMD) objectives. We conduct these activities in close coordination with other 

combatant commands around the world. Today, I would like to describe the strategic 

context in which we operate and STRATCOM’s priorities for addressing our many 

challenges. 

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

The national security landscape continues to be marked by protracted conflict, 

constant change, and enormous complexity. While war remains a difficult struggle 

between human beings, today’s operating environment is significantly different than 

those we experienced in the past. The number and type of actors (state, non-state, 

terrorist, criminal) are rapidly changing, and the distinction between combatants 

and non-combatants is less clear. Friend and foe alike can span global distances in 

seconds through space and cyberspace, and technological advances allow adversaries 

to cross traditional geographic and military boundaries with ease. Adversaries seek 

advantages by using asymmetric means to find and exploit our vulnerabilities and 

to defeat our advanced capabilities in air, sea, space, and cyberspace. At the same 

time, these adversaries wield hybrid combinations of capabilities, strategies, and 

tactics and operate in the shadows to present us with ambiguous indications and 

situations. Rapid technological evolution and the wide civil availability of formerly 

advanced military capabilities have also reduced .entry costs,. making available 

completely new weapons and enabling actors to access capabilities that would not 

have been available to them in the past without significant investment. Indeed, surprise may be our deadliest foe, because it can make our plans ineffective, our training irrelevant, and, therefore, our organizations vulnerable. 

The need to foster strategic stability and deter strategic conflict, ensure uninterrupted capabilities from and access to space and cyberspace, respond to traditional 

and non-traditional threats, and deal with surprise in an era of rapid technological 

advances presents STRATCOM with significant challenges. Of the threats we face, 

weapons of mass destruction clearly represent the greatest threat to the American 

people, particularly when pursued or possessed by violent extremists or state 

proliferators. The potential of nuclear uncertainties in unstable regions adds special 

significance to this concern. 

At the same time, today’s fiscal environment will pose additional challenges regarding the means and manner with which we address the difficult global, strategic 

landscape. Last year, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates challenged us to foster an 

efficient ‘‘culture of saving’’ throughout the Department of Defense (DOD). The resulting review emphasized our responsibility to maximize both mission effectiveness 

and taxpayer value. STRATCOM’s exhaustive assessment of our missions identified 

some functions that we could reduce, consolidate with other DOD organizations, or 

eliminate in favor of higher priority operational requirements. We are now evaluating these initiatives with the DOD leadership and will realign resources as directed at the conclusion of this assessment. 

In summary, the challenges are great, the choices are hard, and there is no textbook solution. 

PRIORITIES

The 21st century security environment demands fast, comprehensive awareness, 

strategic thinking, flexible planning, decentralized execution, rapid innovation, and 

an unprecedented emphasis on sharing information. In this environment, 

STRATCOM has been uniquely organized and positioned to shape and employ global 

capabilities to deter, enable, and, when needed, join with the other combatant commands to fight and win the ever changing joint fight. 

First and foremost, we must guarantee a safe, secure, effective, and ready nuclear 

deterrent force. As affirmed by the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), sustaining 

and modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, the triad of nuclear forces, the 

human capital, and key supporting command/control/communications (C3) and intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities is essential to retain confidence in the deterrent’s long-term credibility, provide tools to combat proliferation, 

and assure our scientific and innovation edge. 

Next, in full partnership with the other combatant commands, we must improve 

our plans, procedures, and capabilities to address trans-regional problems. Ongoing 

operations demand our full commitment, and STRATCOM’s activities both enable 

and support joint operations around the world. The Command’s work to synchronize 

and advocate for missile defense, ISR, electronic warfare, and combating WMD 

plans and capabilities helps bring unity of effort and flexible capabilities to transregional operations. Whether providing space-based communications or position, 

331 

navigation, and timing (PNT) information, rapidly transmitting data around the 

world, or ensuring tested, capable missile defenses or other globally significant capabilities are developed, positioned, and optimally managed, STRATCOM is instrumental in winning today’s dynamic joint fight. 

Finally, we must continue to improve our capabilities and operating concepts in 

the important civil and national security areas of space and cyberspace. Ensuring 

uninterrupted access to space and space-based capabilities, improving our awareness of objects and activities in space, integrating their effects with all operational 

phases, improving space access, protection, and resilience, and expanding our planning and implementation for partnership operations requires that we continue our 

investment and that we demand acquisition results. For cyberspace, we must enhance network protection and mature our organizations, capabilities, workforce, and 

partnerships to ensure effective operations. 

STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

In today’s complex security environment, the concept of strategic deterrence must 

encompass strategies to deter adversaries and dissuade competitors across the full 

range of their capabilities. We must consider actors and capabilities in aggregate, 

not in a vacuum, a need that highlights the importance of a better understanding 

of adversaries’ values, motivators, capabilities, intentions, and decisionmaking processes. Not every potential adversary has or seeks nuclear weapons, and modern deterrence requires broad coordination, tailored strategies, effective capabilities, international cooperation, and focused capabilities like conventional prompt global strike. 

Still, STRATCOM’s first priority is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, 

our allies, and our partners. Last year, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the 

NPR, and the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) discussions produced an important national consensus that affirmed the necessity of the United 

States’ nuclear deterrent and the funding required to sustain it. The president has 

pledged that the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear 

deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. STRATCOM is now committed to implementing New START and to advocating for planned investment in the deterrent 

force. The updated ‘‘1251 Report’’ submitted in February of this year outlines both 

DOD and Department of Energy nuclear funding requirements through fiscal year 

2021. While budget estimates will be refined as major program baselines evolve, 

these important investments must begin immediately. I very much appreciate Congress’ strong fiscal year 2011 support and urge you to fully fund the President’s request in fiscal year 2012. 

Nuclear Enterprise 

The fiscal year 2011 and 2012 budget requests reverse several years of downward 

trend in nuclear enterprise funding. These budgets provide investments in the facilities, equipment, and personnel dedicated to sustaining and managing the Nation’s 

nuclear weapons, as well as to dismantling weapons no longer needed. To emphasize 

the importance of this investment and to better understand the conditions, urgent 

needs, and impending challenges across the complex. I made visiting each lab and 

production facility a high priority upon taking command, and to date I have visited 

all three nuclear weapons laboratories and most other related facilities—with plans 

to complete these visits soon. 

The men and women of America’s nuclear weapons complex perform uniquely difficult, highly technical, and demanding work. As our stockpile ages well beyond each 

weapon’s originally designed lifespan, robust stockpile surveillance and assessment 

programs will enable strategic deterrence and stability at New START force levels. 

Weapon safety, reliability, and performance may change in ways we cannot fully 

predict, and surveillance activities permit confidence and continued stockpile certification without nuclear testing. Dedicated surveillance and life extension studies constitute the best means of informing the President and Congress of our nuclear weapons’ health, status, and requirements. The NPR’s case-by-case approach to studying 

and selecting from the full range of life extension options (refurbishment, reuse, 

and, if needed, replacement) ensures the best future for our stockpile. 

Today, a narrow window is available to synchronize weapon sustainment efforts 

for the W76–1 and B61 (full scope) life extension activities—cost-effectively introducing improved safety and security features, avoiding a second B61 nuclear refurbishment in the 2020s, and potentially reducing the stockpile by consolidating four 

legacy B61 variants into a single weapon. In addition, a Nuclear Weapons Council 

study of W78 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and W88 submarinelaunched ballistic missile life extension program options will examine opportunities 

to use modular fuze components and develop a possible common warhead, potentially reducing costs and supporting long-term capability sustainment. These and fuVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00337 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ture actions that evaluate ways to reduce warhead numbers and types through 

stockpile commonality and flexibility offer the opportunity to continue accomplishing 

our strategic deterrence mission while also achieving the goal of a smaller, more efficient stockpile. 

Strategic Delivery Vehicles 

The NPR also affirmed the continuing need for the nuclear triad, which provides 

the President with multiple options for a variety of scenarios. The value of the triad 

lies in its flexibility and responsiveness to the changing world environment and in 

its ability to hedge against technical failure, geopolitical change, or a breakthrough 

in another nation’s capabilities. America’s strategic forces require continued investment to ensure their future capability, and STRATCOM is actively engaged with 

our Service partners to define and advocate for necessary nuclear force modernization and recapitalization programs. 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 

The widely dispersed and responsive Minuteman III ICBM force provides high 

readiness, low operating costs, and sovereign basing with multiple aim points that 

complicate adversary targeting. The Air Force is successfully concluding decade-long 

efforts to enhance safety and security and to sustain the Minuteman force through 

2020. The Air Force is also evaluating requirements to sustain the force through 

2030. STRATCOM supports these programs and is working with the Air Force on 

a Capabilities Based Assessment and pre-analysis of alternatives activities that 

begin to define options for a follow-on land-based strategic deterrent beyond 2030. 

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles 

Ohio-class SSBNs provide an assured and highly survivable response capability, 

and the highly accurate Trident II D5 strategic weapon system continues to exceed 

the demanding operational reliability standards established almost 30 years ago. By 

the time they begin to retire in 2027, the Ohio-class SSBNs will have served for 

more than 40 years. The Navy completed an Ohio-class follow on platform AoA and, 

with STRATCOM, continues to refine specific replacement requirements. 

STRATCOM fully supports Navy efforts to maintain the current fleet, fund the necessary research and development for its replacement, and sustain the Trident II D5 

ballistic missile and associated infrastructure to satisfy future deterrent requirements. For example, current infrastructure at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor, WA lacks 

sufficient Explosive Handling Wharf (EHW) capacity to meet growing missile handling requirements. A second Pacific EHW wharf at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor, WA, 

is essential to long-term SSBN readiness. 

Bombers 

America’s B–2s and B–52s ensure that the President has visible and flexible conventional and nuclear global strike and deterrence options. Affirming their critical 

deterrent role, the nuclear-capable bomber force transitioned to STRATCOM’s dayto-day operational control in 2010. STRATCOM now has a far stronger voice in balancing this unique, dual-capable nuclear and conventional bomber force’s day-to-day 

readiness, training, and operational employment. While the Air Force continues to 

sustain mission-critical systems, it will also soon begin developing a new long-range, 

dual-capable penetrating bomber. Coupled with the development of a new bomber, 

two additional capabilities will ensure the viability of the air-breathing leg of the 

Triad for decades to come. Air Force investments will sustain the Air Launched 

Cruise Missile through 2030 (or until a suitable replacement is fielded), ensuring 

standoff capability for the long term. Further, the bomber force must be supported 

by a fleet of new aerial refueling tankers to extend their range and assure the 

bombers’ strategic and extended deterrence roles. STRATCOM supports Air Force 

progress toward ensuring the long-term health of the airborne component of our 

strategic capability. 

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications 

A reliable, assured C3 capability from the President to the nuclear forces is fundamental to an effective strategic deterrent. National leaders, commanders, ISR assets, and strategic forces must share assured linkages to confidently understand and 

effectively address nuclear mission demands. Current systems require investments 

to ensure reliability and address looming capability gaps in our National Leadership 

Command Capability. 

A new Strategic Command and Control Complex and Nuclear C3 node at Offutt 

Air Force Base, NE, is at the center of our nuclear C3 plans. The fiscal year 2012 

budget seeks a first increment of $150 million to begin replacing the aging and fragile Curtis E. LeMay building and colocated facilities. Today’s building, command 

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center, and computer systems took shape long before the IT revolution and now lack 

the capacity to support current mission demands. The buildings’ systems strain to 

support numerous computer and communication systems, and the spaces occasionally experience serious heating and cooling problems, electrical failures, and other 

outages. For example, in December 2010 and January 2011, two water pipe ruptures 

caused significant system outages and dislocated staff for several days, although the 

Command remained capable of performing its missions due to extraordinary 

workarounds and the remarkable efforts of the dedicated staff and a small army of 

outside emergency help. 

Prior to defining the current requirement, STRATCOM—in consultation with the 

Army Corps of Engineers and the Air Force—evaluated sustaining the status quo, 

renovating the existing facility, or engaging in new construction. The evaluation 

concluded that new construction offered the most operationally efficient solution to 

support STRATCOM’s missions, operations, and nuclear C3 needs. The new facility 

will ensure an EMP-protected, flexible, sustainable, reliable, and collaborative environment with an infrastructure that meets the security challenges of today and tomorrow. 

Conventional Prompt Global Strike 

A limited, credible, conventional Prompt Global Strike (PGS) capability would provide the President with an important deterrent option in some strategic scenarios. 

Today, we still lack the ability to rapidly deliver conventional effects against fleeting 

or geographically isolated targets, allowing a potential adversary to establish a sanctuary using mobility and strategic depth. Research, development, test, and evaluation projects continue making progress, and I ask you to continue supporting these 

PGS efforts. 

International Engagement 

Deterring and dissuading nuclear threats in today’s national security environment 

also requires careful attention to international relationships. While the specter of 

global nuclear war may be more remote than decades ago, the possibility for miscalculation between nuclear-armed states remains a perilous threat to global security. As noted in the NPR, ‘‘Enduring alliances and broad-based political relationships are the foundation of strategic stability and security.’’ Indeed, many nucleararmed states are important partners in combating proliferation. New START lowers 

the maximum number of U.S. and Russian strategic offensive arms, restores an important, confidence-building verification regime, and provides opportunities to continue military-to-military engagement. China’s willingness to consider and study 

Secretary Gates’ proposal for a strategic security dialogue represents an important 

avenue for growth between our two militaries in this area as well. STRATCOM will 

continue to support DOD, Department of State, and geographic combatant command 

activities to develop stable and cooperative relations with other responsible nuclear 

powers and will be prepared to provide advice on other arms control measures that 

could encompass a greater range of weapons. 

SPACE

Throughout the 20th century, the United States and other countries developed 

and exploited the space domain’s extraordinary potential, including changing how 

we navigate, communicate, and understand our world. However, the domain is increasingly congested, contested, and competitive. Guaranteeing mission assurance 

through adequate Space Situational Awareness (SSA), resilience, and critical-asset 

protection is essential. The new National Space Policy, signed by the President, and 

the National Security Space Strategy (NSSS), co-signed by the Secretary of Defense 

and Director of National Intelligence, emphasize the need to continue developing resilient capabilities which will improve our ability to satisfy combatant commanders’ 

requirements for uninterrupted ISR, expanded military satellite communications, 

and PNT support. Implementing the NSSS will position the national security space 

enterprise to shape and strengthen the space domain’s safety, stability, and security; to maintain and enhance U.S. advantages in space; to energize the U.S. industrial base by engaging a broad range of partners; to prevent and deter aggression; 

and to improve sustainability, acquisition, and flexibility of U.S. space capabilities. 

Situational Awareness 

SSA is central to mission assurance and increasingly important. As part of its 

SSA mission, STRATCOM now tracks more than 22,000 orbiting objects. Approximately 1,100 of these objects are active satellites, but the remaining debris litter 

a variety of orbits and threatens both critical systems and human spaceflight. While 

space surveillance is improving, we do not yet have robust, assured, and real-time 

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situational awareness of the orbital domain. Current and future investments should 

expand data integration, sharing, and exploitation; improve object detection, identification, and tracking; and advance our ability to characterize potential collisions 

(conjunctions). Notably, the proposed Space Fence promises to expand detection capacity more than tenfold from just two or three locations outside the continental 

United States and to construct a more comprehensive orbital picture. Increasing the 

number of objects tracked will be largely useless, however, without corresponding 

improvements in data integration and exploitation technologies. As part of its SSA 

mission, the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) must also be prepared to identify and attribute purposeful space system interference and provide timely recommendations to address the interference. Without space situational awareness of 

the orbital domain, link segment, and supporting ground infrastructure, any plans 

for resilience, mission assurance, augmentation, and reconstitution will have a weak 

underpinning. STRATCOM fully supports funding for both the JSpOC Mission System (JMS) and planning and design work for a modern JSpOC facility that will facilitate a generational leap from static displays to automated, real-time visual conjunction analyses—improving our ability to protect critical space-based assets and 

maintain our free access to and use of space. In addition, technology will soon allow 

us to link multiple sensors together in a single network that will meet the needs 

of many users. 

Cooperation 

As a global domain, space and space-based capabilities operate irrespective of geographic or military boundaries. As more nations join the space-faring ranks each 

year and the number of objects in earth orbit grows, the need to establish norms 

of behavior and to improve the cooperation and collaboration among responsible 

space users grows as well. Our objective is to sustain a safe, stable, and secure 

space domain while maintaining the national security advantages space systems 

provide. U.S. efforts to share SSA data represent an important step toward greater 

international space cooperation, which should eventually help to integrate sensors 

and data from allies and partners worldwide and ultimately move towards a combined space operations center. 

Today, the STRATCOM SSA sharing community includes more than 41,000 users 

in 141 countries. Our efforts promote the safe and responsible use of space by providing satellite operators with highly accurate predictions of close approaches between space objects for every satellite operator. Since the Secretary of Defense delegated his authority to enter into agreements with commercial entities to the 

STRATCOM Commander last September, we have concluded 23 agreements and are 

processing others. Each partner and each agreement signifies an operational relationship that can yield important exchanges, perhaps someday leading to a broad, 

international partnership for space situational awareness. STRATCOM fully supports expanded planning and implementation for space partnership operations 

among allies, coalition partners, and commercial interests and will work with our 

partners in the DOD and elsewhere to help review proposals to establish normalized 

behavior. 

Space-Based Capabilities 

Enabling better situational awareness will improve the overall U.S. space posture; 

however, long-term, uninterrupted capability from space requires equal dedication 

to protection, resilience, augmentation, and reconstitution of assets in space, supported by timely design and development, cost-effective acquisition, and high-confidence space launch. Today’s operating forces rely on space capabilities throughout 

the kill chain and beyond. Putting already stressed space capabilities that allow the 

joint force to navigate, communicate, see the battlefield, and strike under all conditions in the kill chain places those same valuable capabilities on any potential adversary’s target list. STRATCOM fully supports DOD efforts to improve resilience 

and increase the protection of key space assets. 

Launch 

Reliable space capabilities also require an assured ride to orbit. Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs) are the DOD’s primary launch vehicles and the sole 

U.S. vehicles for much of the national security manifest. STRATCOM supports further Air Force investments in this and other programs that will assure our access 

to space. Additionally, improvements in manifest and scheduling processes and investments designed to sustain and ensure national launch facilities’ availability for 

future demand will maximize synergies between launch management and national 

priorities. 

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Industrial Base Concerns 

Beneath our national security space requirements lies the need for a stable, responsive, and innovative national industrial base. Since the space age began, we 

have rarely been so reliant on so few industrial suppliers. Many struggle to remain 

competitive as demand for highly specialized components and existing export controls reduce their customers to a niche government market. Careful interagency 

planning that more tightly defines and oversees requirements, supported by stable 

budgets and production rates will help sustain a national industrial base essential 

to commercial users, military space, and the strategic deterrent. The retirement of 

the Space Shuttle and other changes at NASA also injected significant concern into 

the solid rocket motor industrial base—an industry we cannot afford to lose. Substantial weakening of this capability would impede current strategic system 

sustainment and follow-on development. While industry adjustments are inevitable, 

DOD, in consultation with NASA and other agencies, is working to sustain the solid 

rocket motor industrial base to ensure we retain right-sized, cost-efficient, and viable design, development, and production capabilities. STRATCOM supports these 

important DOD efforts to improve program stability, increase the quantity and quality of the acquisition workforce, strengthen clarity and articulation in the requirements process, and stimulate scientific and technological advancements. 

CYBERSPACE

Last fall in Foreign Affairs, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn noted that, 

‘‘Every day, U.S. military and civilian networks are probed thousands of times and 

scanned millions of times.’’ Like space, cyberspace capabilities have rapidly become 

critical but also increasingly vulnerable. Cyberspace’s pervasive presence, high importance, difficulty of attribution, and low cost of entry highlight some of our challenges. Combined with a growing, global reliance on cyberspace and its hosted capabilities, this constant evolution challenges mission assurance efforts—particularly as 

the threat moves from exploitation to disruption. Ensuring reliable, sustainable networks, freedom of access, and freedom of maneuver is not just a DOD problem. This 

is a national security problem. Assuring access demands sustained, resilient, and 

flexible approaches to maturing our defense capabilities, our capacity, and our cooperative relationships within and beyond the U.S. Government. 

Capabilities 

The most important asset any commander can have is robust, up-to-date situational awareness. Cyberspace is dynamic, and specific threats require specific countermeasures. The Maginot Line failed because it was static and the defense failed 

to anticipate and address technological and tactical changes. .After the fact. detection and attribution don’t work in cyberspace today either. The offense always has 

a strong advantage, overwhelming, subverting, or defeating static defenses. Continued advances in system and organization teamwork, coupled with the development 

and deployment of information-based capabilities and intelligence-driven sensors 

that .see. intrusions and can respond at equivalent speed is essential. Driven by 

strong, capable organizations, dynamic, agile, and informed capabilities that comprehend the network and mitigate threats at the boundary will significantly 

strengthen defense of DOD networks. 

In response to the growing threat, last year the DOD established U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) at Fort Meade, MD as a subunified command to STRATCOM. 

STRATCOM delegated responsibilities to CYBERCOM to coordinate, plan, synchronize, and execute cyberspace operations in order to better defend DOD networks 

and to support other combatant commanders. We must accelerate the acquisition of 

comprehensive, shared cyber awareness tools to expand opportunities to secure critical information, reduce points of vulnerability, and develop responses to ensure 

warfighter access to essential information systems. 

Capacity. Today, operators at CYBERCOM and its subordinate Service components work to defend against and attribute numerous information network intrusion 

attempts. The cyber workforce is growing, but our organizations and capabilities 

must also grow to keep pace with ongoing operations. STRATCOM is working with 

CYBERCOM to improve the cyber awareness of every DOD member with access to 

an information system, strengthen organizations, resolve roles/responsibilities, expand partnerships, build technological and human capacity for full-spectrum cyberspace operations, and integrate cyber capabilities into every commander’s plans and 

operations. Recruiting adequately trained and equipped cyber warriors is challenging, but fortunately young Americans grow up learning and adapting to new 

technological platforms from a young age. Service cyber career paths are still being 

developed, and these critical, technical skills need both time to develop and susVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00341 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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tained investment to prevent their atrophy. Sustained force development emphasis 

and investment is essential. The U.S. is also home to the world’s premier educational and commercial information technology entities. We must continue to capitalize on this capacity and partner with these organizations on our requirements 

and to spur domestic math and science interest. Doing so will help develop, expand, 

and sustain a base of cyber expertise and adapt DOD personnel processes to attract, 

develop, and retain the cyber professionals necessary to protect critical DOD infrastructure and preserve U.S. freedom of action in cyberspace. 

Cooperation 

Cyber defense must include a wide range of partners. After all, this is truly a national security issue, making interagency and allied partner engagement and information sharing essential to a robust defense. Military operations depend on the 

broader U.S. information technology infrastructure, and defending military networks will net fewer benefits if the wider civilian infrastructure remains at much 

greater risk. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is ultimately responsible 

for coordinating the protection of the ‘‘.gov’’ and domestic ‘‘.com’’ domains, but DOD 

has much to offer in terms of intelligence and technical support. The DOD–DHS 

Memorandum of Understanding signed last fall lays important groundwork for enhanced cooperation, mutual support, and synchronized operations. 

WINNING TODAY’S FIGHT

In strategic deterrence, space, and cyberspace, STRATCOM both operates forces 

and supports the full range of military operations. The broad scope of our responsibilities and trans-regional capabilities is clearly woven into the fabric of today’s 

operations. Winning the fight, whether we are either a supported command or are 

supporting the geographic combatant commands, is something our team strives to 

do each and every day. However, STRATCOM also has responsibilities to integrate, 

synchronize, and advocate for other capabilities with trans-regional impact, and we 

are dedicated to partnering with other combatant commands to improve the 

warfighting effectiveness of these capabilities. 

Information Operations 

Consistent with our mission to improve strategic joint capabilities, STRATCOM 

participated in a 2010 Secretary of Defense directed Strategic Communication (SC) 

and IO Front-End Assessment, designed to evaluate and recommend improvements 

for DOD roles, missions, definition, management, and resources for SC and IO. As 

a result of the assessment, STRATCOM will reorganize the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC) at Lackland AFB, TX. Existing JIOWC resources 

and missions not specific to electronic warfare will be realigned to the Joint Staff, 

and STRATCOM will remain the DOD lead for Electronic Warfare (EW). 

Electronic warfare 

The electromagnetic spectrum spans almost every modern technological convenience. While operational plans normally assume unfettered spectrum access, this assumption is not assured. Changing industry standards, global growth of civilian devices, military bandwidth requirements, and disruptive or destructive adversary 

electronic warfare capabilities all threaten to pinch or sever the shrinking electromagnetic links between national security platforms and the operating forces that 

rely on them. 

Recognizing future threats, potential limitations, urgent warfighter needs, and the 

need for unified DOD advocacy, JIOWC completed several Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) tasks to examine capability gaps and solutions for emerging 

electromagnetic spectrum threats. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 required DOD to develop an EW strategy, submitted to Congress last 

year. That EW strategy concluded that we must move beyond the traditional understanding of EW by combining it with other kinetic or non-kinetic capabilities to increase U.S. combat effectiveness and achieve electromagnetic spectrum superiority. 

STRATCOM is planning to establish a Joint Electronic Warfare Center to advocate 

for and support DOD Joint EW capability requirements, resources, strategy, doctrine, planning, training, and operational support. 

Missile Defense 

The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) exists to meet combatant commands’ theater defense needs and to provide for the limited defense of the United 

States. Working with geographic combatant commands and the Missile Defense 

Agency (MDA), our efforts focus on building tailored, regional missile defense architectures using the concept of a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) and on meeting 

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urgent warfighter capability needs. STRATCOM’s work provides a comprehensive 

assessment of the fielded BMDS’s suitability and effectiveness and combines 

warfighter needs for air, cruise missile, and ballistic missile defense capabilities to 

inform programmatic actions and guide future R&D investment priorities. 

At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO allies affirmed the PAA for missile defense as a means to address the continued qualitative 

and quantitative growth of global ballistic missile programs. The Allies also invited 

the Russian Federation to participate in missile defense cooperation. As a strategy, 

PAA applies to several geographic combatant commands, and STRATCOM’s current 

challenge is to make sound, analytically-based recommendations to balance limited 

BMD assets worldwide. The European PAA’s four phases of increasing capability 

are designed to defend against existing and near-term threats posed by short- and 

medium-range ballistic missiles and to build up defenses against long-range ballistic 

threats over time as those threats mature. As stated during the New START debate, 

the U.S. will not agree to any ballistic missile defense limitations or constraints and 

indeed intends to continue developing and deploying systems consistent with U.S. 

interests. The U.S. missile defense program is not designed to counter the strategic 

forces of Russia or China, but rather to address limited ballistic missile threats such 

as those posed by Iran and North Korea. 

As various regional PAAs develop, STRATCOM will continually re-evaluate the 

standing Global Integrated Missile Defense Concept of Operations and other acquisition, deployment, basing, and employment plans for missile defense capabilities 

between and across all areas of responsibility. Our analysis will ensure that the 

joint warfighters’ requirements receive deliberate management and readiness structures to ensure timely, flexible deployment, employment and redeployment of tested, 

understood BMD capabilities during and after crises. 

Consistent with the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, new advancements and allied technologies must be made interoperable with existing systems, including required improvements in discrimination capabilities essential to the efficient employment of limited missile defense resources. 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

Timely, useable situational awareness and intelligence analysis is essential to all 

military operations. Airborne, submarine, and space-based ISR capabilities all provide key indications and warning information to commanders facing an array of traditional adversaries, nontraditional threats, and challenging intelligence problems. 

For the past decade, ISR efforts focused primarily on meeting the expanding demand in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. As overseas 

contingency operations change, DOD must carefully examine force requirements to 

ensure we organize, train, and equip a balanced force across the range of requirements, including anti-access environments and New START verification. An objective, multi-domain, capabilities-based architecture that improves the ability to identify requirements across geographic boundaries and the range of potential threats 

is essential to appropriately balancing risk against necessary programmatic, budgetary, and acquisition decision points. 

STRATCOM’s ISR efforts achieved significant resource efficiencies and shaped 

ISR capability decisions through initiatives like the ISR Force Sizing Construct 

project, the High Altitude Transition study, the Synoptic Operational Area Reconnaissance Study, and the Mobile Nuclear Air Sampling Study. STRATCOM also successfully advocated for a critical CENTCOM ISR capability—designed and executed 

in approximately 30 months and at a lower cost than traditional acquisition processes. The Services and Intelligence Community must continue to strive for better 

integration in order to reach greater efficiencies—not only for the collection platforms themselves but also across the still-limited processing, exploitation, and dissemination architecture needed to transform collections into actionable intelligence. 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Another mission area requiring sustained attention is CWMD, since the pursuit 

of WMD by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional states remains 

the primary threat to the United States, our allies, and our partners. STRATCOM 

received the responsibility to synchronize DOD CWMD activities in 2005 and has 

made discouraging, detecting, deterring, and, if necessary, defeating these threats 

a priority for theater operations and strategic deterrence. Some actors seek nuclear, 

biological, or chemical weapons to coerce their neighbors or to deter U.S. intervention in regional conflicts. Others may seek such weapons to use them in terrorist 

attacks or as weapons of war. Diffuse networks of non-state entities, secretive state 

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ments that enable global CWMD. STRATCOM continues to pursue further national 

CWMD capability improvements with interagency partners to coordinate CWMD objectives, plans, and activities. 

Among current and future CWMD enhancements are technological improvements 

to detect, analyze, and assess WMD developments. The 2010 QDR affirmed the need 

to enhance National Technical Nuclear Forensics capabilities which, along with accurate intelligence and other information, support nuclear threat attribution and 

may thereby deter those considering the diversion, transfer, development, or use of 

nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear devices, radiological dispersal devices, and 

other nuclear or radiological threats. In the past year, the STRATCOM Center for 

CWMD (SCC WMD) embedded Proliferation Security Initiative activities within 

U.S. Africa Command, CENTCOM, and U.S. Southern Command exercises and supported planning and funding efforts to expand exercise participation and training 

synchronization across geographic combatant commands. Finally, SCC WMD collaboratively operates the Interagency Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Database of Responsibilities, Authorities, and Capabilities (INDRAC) System with 

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. INDRAC provides a strategic level information reference resource to inform CWMD operations, planning, advocacy, training, 

and exercises across the government. 

In the 2010 QDR, the Secretary of Defense directed DOD to establish a Joint Task 

Force Elimination Headquarters to ‘‘better plan, train, and execute WMD-elimination operations . . . with increased nuclear disablement, exploitation, intelligence, 

and coordination capabilities.’’ Last December, Secretary Gates tasked STRATCOM 

to execute this task and stand up a Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination of WMD with ‘‘standing exploitation and intelligence cells in order to plan, 

train for, and execute global WMD elimination operations.’’ STRATCOM is currently 

analyzing the requirements necessary to implement the Secretary’s direction. 

CONCLUSION

Great challenges lie ahead of the United States and STRATCOM, but so too do 

great opportunities. The Command is dedicated to being an effective steward of taxpayer resources while maintaining a strategic force structure ready and able to 

deter aggression, preserve U.S. freedom of action, and defeat adversaries when necessary. The uncertainty inherent in today’s complex, multi-domain security environment requires that we summon our best efforts to develop and deploy the plans, systems, and forces needed to sustain America’s deterrent, ensure unfettered access to 

and through space and cyberspace, and win the dynamic joint fight. I look forward 

to working with Congress as we pursue these priorities together, and I appreciate 

your support and counsel in the months and years ahead. Thank you again for the 

opportunity to be here today, and welcome back to Nebraska and the BellevueOffutt community. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you very much, General. 

The advantage of being the only member here is I get to ask all 

the questions. I do not have to share the time with anybody else. 

So there is an advantage. It was not why I thought we ought to 

do it here, but it is certainly an added benefit. 

Thank you for your very thoughtful comments, and I do have a 

couple of questions. 

In your prepared statement, you described the mission of 

STRATCOM and it includes the responsibility to foster strategic 

stability and, as you have said, ensure uninterrupted capabilities 

from and access to space and cyberspace, respond to both traditional and nontraditional threats, and deal with surprise in an era 

of rapid technological advances as we talked about this morning, 

a very complex but related set of missions. 

Now that you have been in your new responsibilities as commander, what are the three most difficult challenges that you see 

in being able to fulfill these missions? 

General KEHLER. Mr. Chairman, the first challenge that I would 

continue to highlight is this dramatically different operating environment that we find ourselves in today. I think my colleagues in 

the other combatant commands would share my assessment of this. 

339 

I do not think we have ever seen an operating environment like today’s. When we look at the range of activity that we are engaged 

in around the world today, when we look at the complexity of the 

national security environment that we find ourselves engaged with 

today, when we look at the differences for us—for example, when 

we talk about space and cyberspace, items that we have talked 

about in military planning for years about distances and time do 

not mean the same thing when you can span global distances 

through space and cyberspace in milliseconds. 

When we talk about boundaries—and typically we have focused 

on geographic areas as areas of interest for our military activities— 

those boundaries are not the same when we talk about space and 

cyberspace. 

When we talk about asymmetric challenges to us—and those 

come frequently in space and cyberspace. This ambiguity—actors 

can act in cyberspace and you never know who they are or you do 

not know for quite some time until you do the forensics and discover who someone was when they were actually doing some criminal activity, for example, in cyberspace. 

So the changed operating environment is one of the toughest 

challenges that we face. 

The second one with aging systems, in particular, is to ensure 

the level of readiness that we need to meet those challenges in this 

new operating environment. We find that continued investment is 

required certainly across the nuclear enterprise. We have testified 

to that before, as you well know. The President’s budget contains 

requests to continue our investment in the existing forces that we 

have for strategic deterrence, as well as the support and command 

and control, as well as the weapons complex that underpins all of 

it. 

In addition to that, I am equally concerned about aging weapons 

systems today. We were very gratified with the selection by the Air 

Force of a new tanker and the ability to move forward there. We 

are very gratified that Congress has given us approval to move forward with a replacement to the Ohio-class submarine. We have 

been very encouraged by decisions inside DOD in the proposal now 

to Congress to go forward with a new bomber platform. In the 

meantime, we have to make sure that we are sustaining those platforms that are out there to include our space systems, to include 

the new area that we have for cyberspace. 

Finally, the third challenge that I have that I think about every 

day is preparing for and responding to surprise. Surprise can be 

particularly decisive when it involves things like space and cyberspace potentially or the nuclear world, for example. This is where 

our concern about combating WMD, not just maintaining this strategic stability we have with Russia, for example, but combating 

WMD and especially WMD in the hands of violent extremists or 

state proliferators are things that we must pay attention to. 

I have other concerns but those are the top three that keep me 

awake at night. Significantly, by the way, when people ask if anything keeps me awake at night, nothing operational keeps me 

awake at night because of the magnificent people that you see here 

with me today. Once the missions are in their hands, I stop worVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00345 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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rying about it. It is all the things that I am supposed to do to make 

sure that they have the tools that they need that keep me awake. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

You made reference to the fact that the President’s budget request includes the money to start construction of a new headquarters for STRATCOM. I think you gave us some indication why 

this is an important investment as part of our national security. 

Could you maybe expand on that just a little bit? 

General KEHLER. Mr. Chairman, STRATCOM performs a unique 

mission among the Nation’s military forces. We occupy a unique 

place, not only a unique physical place, but we occupy a unique 

operational place in our Nation’s defense infrastructure. We have 

a unique location here in terms of our abilities to conduct planning, 

in terms of our capability to do national level command and control 

of our strategic deterrent forces, in the ability for us to pull together the pieces of our strategic deterrent with our space activities, with our cyberspace activities, with our national nuclear defense activities, to pull all of those pieces together to perform a 

uniquely important job. 

The facilities that we perform that job from today were designed 

in the early 1950s, constructed in the middle 1950s, and are much 

like we were talking earlier this morning. The multiple electronic 

devices that you bring into your house today or have carting 

around, in my case in my car—I have a lot of different things that 

I carry around with me. Those have all come along pretty late, and 

yet none of my infrastructure in my home supports any of that. I 

have more of those plug-in power strips around my house, for example, than I do have anything else. So that is one example of the 

facility that we have here not supporting the mission demands any 

longer. 

Power is an issue for us. Cooling air is an issue for us. We have 

essentially cobbled together over the years a number of systems on 

top of systems. We find ourselves in a position here where, if we 

are not careful, we have created a very vulnerable place from either a simple accidental problem with the infrastructure to other 

more significant problems dealing with cyber threats and other 

things. 

Our assessment has been that for this unique mission we need 

to go back and reconstruct a new command and control facility, and 

while we tend to look at that as a building, the building surrounds 

it. What is important here is what goes in the building and the 

building that is built to support it. So we have made a budget request that is working its way through your committee and others 

to essentially bring the infrastructure here to the point where it 

matches now the mission responsibilities that we have been given. 

Senator NELSON. If a terrorist, for example, were able to obtain 

nuclear materials, plutonium or uranium, build an improvised nuclear device, and blow that device up in a U.S. city, obviously, the 

devastation would be significant. First, what is STRATCOM’s role 

in making sure that this does not happen? Second, if it does happen, what is STRATCOM’s role in responding to that kind of an 

event? 

General KEHLER. Sir, one of the mission responsibilities that 

STRATCOM has is what we would call collectively combating 

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WMD. As I said in my opening remarks, the current national security strategy says very clearly that the most significant threat that 

we are facing today is WMD in the hands of a violent extremist or 

in the hands of a state proliferator, which is why we are so concerned about North Korea and Iran, for example. 

STRATCOM has been given planning responsibilities to be the 

synchronizer, if you will, for the global planning that goes on in 

every one of our combatant commands, to include U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). We are given the responsibility to 

sit, if you will, at the top of the pyramid and make sure that all 

of the plans fit together. The problem is not unique to STRATCOM. 

I think if you had the other combatant commanders here, which 

you have done, I know, in your subcommittee at some length and 

in front of the full committee, every one of the geographic combatant commanders stated their concerns about proliferation of WMD. 

It is a concern for all of the combatant commanders today. 

Our responsibility is to make sure that all the plans fit together. 

And we host some planning conferences, which does not sound as 

important as what it is, where we make sure that all of the combatant commands have the appropriate plans in place to both detect such activity, track it, if necessary, and then offer the President alternatives for how to deal with that if it should ever arise, 

all the way up to and including U.S. Northern Command 

(NORTHCOM) which would have the responsibility to assist civil 

authorities in dealing with the horrible scenario that you laid out 

for us. 

We also have responsibility to work with the Joint Staff and the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the interagency to make 

sure that our activities are coordinated along with those of law enforcement, the Intelligence Community, and other parts of our Government to make sure that we are all focused on this issue with 

the attention that it deserves. 

Had we been having a conversation here 20 years ago and you 

said to me, ‘‘point out to me the number one plan that is on the 

top shelf in your office,’’ I would have pulled out our nuclear deterrence master plan, and I would have said, ‘‘here it is. This is the 

number one most important thing that we are doing today.’’ 

If you ask me today, I would say there are two plans up there. 

One would be the nuclear deterrence plan, which always has to be 

there in my view, but the other would be a plan called ‘‘combating 

WMD.’’ It is our plan to pull these pieces together to make sure 

that we are in the position, even though we do not have a lot of 

the forces that would be used to deal with such a problem, that we 

are in a position that we have the appropriate plans in place and 

we have either deterred or dissuaded or prevented that kind of 

thing from happening to begin with. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

You have touched on this by mentioning North Korea, but let us 

say countries like North Korea and Iran proliferate WMD, as well 

as the delivery systems such as missiles. Is there anything in particular that you do in connection with proliferating countries as opposed to, let us say, a terrorist or an effort at an attack? 

General KEHLER. For counterproliferation, sir, we are part of a 

big team that is an intergovernmental team. In fact, that team exVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:41 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00347 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68090.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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tends outside DOD into the rest of our U.S. Government and from 

there through state and other means to our allies and friends 

around the world as well. 

To effectively counter the proliferation of either ballistic missiles 

or WMD is a hierarchy of steps that we take. Beginning with treaties, international legal arrangements, norms of behavior, all of 

those things that would typically fall in the Department of State’s 

realm are complemented by things that would fall within the Intelligence Community’s realm, within DOD’s realm, and then ultimately at the combatant commander level a series of plans that we 

could offer to the President if he chose to take action in response 

to proliferation. 

The real objective here is to dissuade it or deter it or prevent it. 

Those actions are underway through a variety of means. Of course, 

you are well familiar with your former colleagues, Senator Nunn 

and Senator Lugar, the actions that have gone on there that have 

been counterproliferation to try to secure WMD materials around 

the world, the treaty structure that has surrounded some of these 

activities as well, and then beyond that, ultimately the activities 

that would go on in the regional combatant commands and then in 

STRATCOM, SOCOM, and elsewhere to be supportive of whatever 

other steps might need to be taken. 

Senator NELSON. Maybe you could help us understand a little bit 

about how the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) actually works and 

how there would be coordination through STRATCOM and MDA to 

protect against any kind of an attack, but in the event that there 

were an attack, how that could work. 

General KEHLER. Mr. Chairman, first of all, our U.S. missile defense system is a global system. The national part of this is aimed 

at a small, very limited number of missiles that would be launched 

against the United States from one of these smaller state actors. 

Specifically, our orientation today is on North Korea where they 

have both demonstrated that they have the capability to produce 

a nuclear weapon and they have demonstrated in a very aggressive 

way their ability to field ballistic missiles that today are capable— 

they have not yet put all the pieces together—of reaching our allies 

in the western Pacific as well as ultimately the testing that they 

are doing on longer-range missiles that eventually will have the capability to reach the United States. 

Our missile defense system today that is oriented for national defense is intended to deal with that problem and, hopefully, it is a 

part of our overall effort to dissuade that kind of activity on the 

part of the North Koreans from having them put all those pieces 

together eventually. 

It also, though, is oriented toward those that are considering 

going forward here, Iran, for example. 

It is not oriented against Russia and China with larger, far more 

sophisticated arsenals. The way we maintain stability there, although we do not consider either Russia or China an enemy, with 

their capabilities is through the arms control and stability, confidence-building transparency measures that we have going on elsewhere, and then ultimately through our strategic deterrent force 

which is still there and sized and shaped to be that stabilizing force 

and deterrent force, vis-a-vis both Russia and China. 

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So we work very closely with the MDA. We set the requirements 

for national missile defense. We do the assessment of its military 

utility. We are working very carefully with NORTHCOM that 

would have the responsibility to use that system under the direction of the President and Secretary of Defense if that were ever 

necessary, and we pull all of the combatant commanders together 

to make sure that the needs of the warfighters are being met, in 

particular, now that we have a good start and an effective system 

in place for national missile defense, to begin to orient that missile 

defense system now on where the very large threat and real threat 

is to our forces and our allies, and that is at the feeder level, which 

is why we have begun to focus as intensely as we have on the feeder-related pieces of this. 

Senator NELSON. Our goal is, obviously, to make sure that others 

know what we can do to prevent their being successful in attacking 

us. If they understand that we can deter, we can prevent, deflect 

any effort on their part, hopefully then that dissuades them from 

trying to go forward and spend additional time trying to find ways 

to further defeat our defensive system. 

Do you think that we have been successful in some respects at 

least? I understand North Korea is controlled by a very unusual 

person who does not seem to deal with reality the same way the 

rest of us do. But apart from that, do you think that we perhaps 

have been able to dissuade some of the other countries from looking at trying to defeat our systems of defense? 

General KEHLER. It is hard to say, Mr. Chairman. There are two 

things I would say. 

First, I believe in the assessment that we have done on our limited defensive posture that we have for the Nation today, I believe 

that is an effective system, and I believe that system would work 

as advertised in response to a limited threat. So, number one, the 

credibility of how others would view it, I think, is linked to the assessments that we have made about its potential effectiveness. I 

believe that it is to the point where our assessment of this from 

a military standpoint is that it is effective for the purpose that it 

is intended. That does not mean that it would be capable of responding to some overwhelming strike. It could not do that, and yet 

that is why we also still retain offensive weapons to make this a 

package of things that we would use for deterrence purposes. 

The second point I would make is we do not see one-size-fits-all 

deterrence any longer. We think that deterrence is a combination 

of things. Missile defense is one piece of that. Offensive forces is 

another piece of that. Our conventional forward forces is another 

piece of that. Our ability to command and control is another piece 

of that. So there are lots of pieces that make up the deterrence 

equation. 

I believe that any potential adversary, certainly nation states, 

take those factors into account in their decisionmaking. They wind 

up making their decisions based upon lots of things. It is hard to 

tell why the North Korean Government makes the decisions that 

it makes sometimes, but we assume some amount of rationality to 

other actors out there at the nation state level. My view is that all 

of them take this into account. How effective it is depends on their 

own assessment of benefit/risk/reward, and all the things that they 

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will go through and the behavior that we will see based upon their 

own decision calculus. But I believe very firmly that they all take 

all of these issues into account when they are making those decisions. 

Senator NELSON. As you indicated, STRATCOM is responsible for 

implementing the New START treaty with Russia. Your predecessor, General Chilton, was a strong advocate for the treaty. The 

treaty has now been ratified by the Senate. It is in place. Can you 

give us your thoughts on how effective you think this treaty may 

be and what our objectives will be in reducing mutually the arms 

race and hopefully stop the proliferation in the world of the arms 

race? 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. First of all, I too am a firm supporter 

of the New START treaty. The Senate did ratify it. It has entered 

into force in February. We have 7 years to implement the provisions of the treaty. However, we are moving out to implement those 

provisions. A number of things are already underway. We have exchanged data with the Russians. We have done other things. There 

have been some preliminary inspections done. There have been 

some demonstrations and expositions, if you will. So a number of 

steps are underway. 

We have not yet made final decisions on what our force structure 

will look like within the treaty limits. The treaty does not require 

us to do anything other than meet its limits, 1,550 operational warheads, 700 deployed operational launchers, up to 800 deployed and 

non-deployed. How we structure our force remains to be seen, and 

that decision process is underway both inside the combatant command here, inside the Joint Staff, as the Chairman is working his 

way through all of this, ultimately en route to discussion with the 

Secretary of Defense and ultimately en route to a discussion with 

the White House over how we should structure our forces. 

So we are moving forward. I think the single, most valuable 

thing about the treaty is that it does, in fact, place limits on those 

weapons that threaten the United States of America most significantly and most immediately. So that was a very positive step. 

A second very positive step is the fact that we have a treaty with 

the Russians at all. I think that what that does is it creates a dialogue with the Russians. We have found that to be a useful dialogue from well before the end of the Cold War. We have found that 

that is helpful for transparency reasons. It forces us to deal with 

one another on all kinds of levels, and it, in fact, allows us to continue this pathway that we have been on with the Russians since 

before the end of the Cold War, which is to reduce the overall number of weapons in a way that promotes stability and yet continues 

to allow us to have the strategic deterrent force that we think we 

need to meet our deterrence objectives. I see all of those as 

positives, and we see this as a positive way forward to work the 

implementation details as we decide what that force structure 

should ultimately look like. 

Senator NELSON. I think there were a lot of questions raised during the debate on the floor of the Senate about the treaty, whether 

or not there would be enough nuclear weapons for our offense and 

defense. So I guess the question is are there enough for our mutually assured destruction given what Russia will have and what we 

345 

have, which is not our goal, but there was some concern that we 

are getting down to maybe a manageable level but an unsafe and 

insecure level. 

General KEHLER. Sir, I do not think we are unsafe or insecure 

at all given the levels in the New START treaty. I would not characterize this any longer as mutually assured destruction. That 

means a lot of things. 

Senator NELSON. It is still something to think about. 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. That means a lot of things to a lot of 

people. 

What I would say is that at this force level that I am confident 

that we can meet our deterrence objectives. The force level that 

was agreed to and the assessments that were made which were 

prior to my time but which I fully agree with—those assessments 

were made based upon a series of deterrence objectives that have 

been in place for quite some time. The next step is to go back and 

look, and the NPR said that we would do this. Once the New 

START treaty has been put into force, now the question is, what 

is next. So we have begun to work with the rest of DOD and others 

to think our way through what is next. 

Senator NELSON. There was also a question about whether or not 

this would, in the words of President Reagan, permit us to trust 

but verify, and being able to have a certain level of verification 

was, in fact, part of what this treaty was about. So are you comfortable with the ability that we have to verify what Russia is 

doing as they would have the ability to verify what we are doing, 

as I described it, looking under each other’s hood of the vehicle to 

see what is there? 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. I am comfortable with this. I believe 

that the verification mechanism that was put in place for this treaty fits the treaty. There was some discussion about whether this 

verification process would have fit the last treaty, and the answer 

is it would not have but it does fit this one and I am comfortable 

with it, with the provision, of course, that we continue to source 

those verification methods to include the national technical means 

that we use to help us enforce the verification provisions of the 

treaty. 

Senator NELSON. Turning to the area that I think a lot of people 

are paying close attention to or beginning to learn about, cyberspace, you referred to the Cyber Command as being a subunified 

command under STRATCOM. Maybe you could help us understand 

exactly what a subunified command is. We are all trying to learn 

how to speak the military language. I do not know that I have mastered it all, but I am trying to learn more about it. 

General KEHLER. Sir, I can just say as an aside, the military people in here have not mastered it all, I can guarantee you. [Laughter.] 

We stand up a subunified command when there is a specific mission responsibility that requires focused attention is, I think, the 

best way to say it. For example, U.S. Forces-Korea is a subunified 

command to the U.S. Pacific Command. We stood that up years ago 

because there is such a unique set of challenges associated with 

what is still a standoff, of course, on the Korean Peninsula that we 

346 

felt it was necessary to put a separate senior officer in charge of 

worrying about that every day, 24 hours a day. 

We did the same thing for U.S. Forces-Japan some years ago, 

and we have done that from time to time over the years when a 

specific issue was significant enough, required such detailed activities and awareness and specific responses that it required the fulltime attention of a senior officer every day. 

That is what we have done in this case with cyberspace. We have 

stood up U.S. Cyber Command as a subunified command. It is commanded by a four-star officer, General Keith Alexander, of the U.S. 

Army. He wears another hat as well as the Director of the National 

Security Agency. The headquarters is at Fort Mead. That is a center of gravity for this kind of activity for the Nation that we have 

charged him. In fact, we have delegated the responsibilities that 

are given to STRATCOM to operate and defend DOD’s networks. 

We have delegated those responsibilities to him, and what we find 

is the uniqueness of cyberspace demands that kind of attention 

where we have made, I believe, very good progress. Certainly we 

have a long way to go but we have made very good progress. 

The other thing this does is it gives a specific focal point for the 

rest of the government to interact with when they are talking 

about how do we do cyberspace business as a complete government. 

It also gives a way to reach out to commercial. As you well know, 

sir, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) retains responsibilities here for defending the Nation’s critical infrastructure, to 

include the cyberspace critical infrastructure. What we are trying 

to work our way through with Cyber Command is not how do we 

completely reinvent the role of the U.S. military related to cyberspace, but how do we apply our traditional military activities to 

cyberspace. That is everything from defense support of civil authorities to protecting our own DOD activities to conducting military operations. 

So Cyber Command is in the thick of all of that conversation. We 

are, of course, working with them from STRATCOM. In fact, yesterday we spent an entire day, both staffs together, back at Cyber 

Command headquarters outside of Washington. I think that putting a subunified command together for this subject at this time 

has been exactly the right thing to do. 

Senator NELSON. Statistics are now showing that criminals engaging in cyber crime make more money today in that cyber crime 

than via the drug trade for the first time. Obviously, we have to 

deal with criminal efforts in cyber or terrorist activity that could 

be criminal but for a different purpose not necessarily for profitability but to try to destroy our networks to adversely impact us. 

In working with DHS, how does this work? If you are not reinventing the wheel, trying to work with DHS, which would be concerned primarily, not entirely, with terrorists but with cyber crime, 

how do you distinguish or how do you divide up those responsibilities or follow up after they are discovered? 

General KEHLER. Sir, first of all, those relationships are still 

being established. There has been a memorandum of agreement 

signed between DHS and DOD that lays out an initial relationship 

between the two departments. I think it is important to note that 

the Department of Justice (DOJ), for example, is a key player in 

347 

all of this as well. There are other Federal departments that are 

also key players in here, and so the question is really one of relationships across the entire Federal Government. 

But let us take the DHS example for a second. Our friends in 

NORTHCOM and Admiral Sandy Winnefeld who commands that 

command today—we have worked through a series of relationships 

that allow him to do what we would call defense support for civil 

authorities. He supports DHS in the physical world in many ways 

whether it is from wildland fire fighting, whether it is flood activities, whatever it is where DHS turns to DOD and says, ‘‘I need 

help, you have unique capabilities, unique tools that we need, 

unique manpower, unique training, whatever it happens to be, and 

we need that to support civil authorities and their activities.’’ This 

is the same set of lanes in the road, if you will, that we need to 

carve out with DHS for cyber. It is different in that cyber is a different animal for us to deal with, but I am confident—and I think 

we are all confident—that we can establish those relationships. 

You asked how would we respond. In some cases, those relationships are in place today, and we have ways to respond. In other 

cases, they are not. If you listen to the conversations that go on 

from our Deputy Secretary of Defense and others, I think we would 

all acknowledge today that there is much more to do to position the 

Nation to be able to deal with cyberspace in terms of the amount 

of activity that we see from all different directions. 

But I think the final point I would make here is very significantly, in some cases things that happen in cyberspace, while the 

press headlines might use the word ‘‘attack,’’ when the word ‘‘attack’’ is used for people like us with uniforms like these, that 

means something to us that is not always necessarily the same 

thing we mean when we talk about attacks in cyberspace. In some 

cases, as you pointed out, those are criminal activities and best 

handled by our criminal activity handlers, whether that is the Federal Bureau of Investigations or whether that is local law enforcement or whether that is the State patrol or whatever, whether it 

is DOJ. Those are the kinds of questions that we are asking ourselves to make sure that we are not wanting to pick up the phone 

and call DOD for the wrong reasons. 

Senator NELSON. This is sensitive because I am going to make 

reference to China. There have been a lot of penetrations of U.S. 

Government and industrial computer systems with data theft that 

have been traced back to China, and while it is not possible to determine with certainty that these attacks are coming from or directly directed by the Chinese Government, the evidence over a 

number of years might cause some people to draw that conclusion. 

But at a minimum, if these attacks are not sponsored or officially 

sanctioned by the Chinese Government, it appears to most of us 

that the Chinese Government has done little or nothing to stop 

them, almost reminiscent of intellectual property theft as well. 

Is this something that is being looked at? I know it is a very delicate sort of a question, but is this something that is being looked 

at right now militarily? If you can even answer that in this environment. 

General KEHLER. Sir, what I would say is about a week and a 

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ment. I may get the title a little bit wrong, but I think it is called 

‘‘The International Strategy for Cyberspace.’’ I think that is what 

it was called. If it was not called that, that is close. 

One of the highlights of that document is the idea that everyone 

will have to behave responsibly in cyberspace, that there is some 

expectation that to get the benefit out of cyberspace, that people 

will behave responsibly. I think that gets to your point here, that 

there needs to be responsible behavior at all levels. 

I will not comment on the specifics of any country, et cetera, because the other thing that you pointed out with your question is 

how difficult it is to determine who is doing what in cyberspace. 

Ambiguity is almost a hallmark of people’s behavior in cyberspace. 

That is not a bad thing because we all want our privacy, of course. 

But it provides us with some difficult problems in trying to attribute behavior to various actors out there. So that is going to be 

a problem for us, I think, to work our way through for quite some 

time to come. 

Senator NELSON. Is that something that we could gather as a 

group of countries who have this capability as governments? We 

recognize there are private citizens located all around the world 

that have the capabilities that sometimes astound us that individuals would develop those levels of capability. But is that something 

where you think we might, as we have with the New START treaty, enter into some sort of an agreement with other countries 

where it is actual signatories to try to police that back home, wherever we possibly can, whether it is our country or another country? 

General KEHLER. Mr. Chairman, I do not know what the mechanism would be, nor would I suggest a mechanism to do it. But I 

would say that the new national strategy suggests that we need to 

band together in some way as some type of a community of nations 

to make sure that our behavior is consistent with what our objectives are for the Internet, which is free and open activity for everybody. 

The interesting thing here is going to be, I think, whether by engaging nation states, you have everyone that you need in such an 

agreement. If you think about some of the issues we have seen in 

the last several years, there have been a couple of cases where we 

have non-nation states accusing nation states of bad behavior. So 

you have companies accusing nations; nations accusing companies. 

This is going to be very interesting, I think, for policymakers to 

sort out who you include in these kinds of agreements, which is 

why I think the strategy for cyberspace was pretty insistent on this 

idea that everyone has to behave responsibly. 

Senator NELSON. There is the distinction that we talked about 

between that that is just criminal for profit type efforts versus terrorists or nation state efforts that are the equivalent of spying to 

try to access our secrets and inveigle their way into our systems. 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. Vandalism, criminal activity, espionage, military activity, all of those things are happening in there 

at some level, and sorting all that out is one of our big challenges. 

Senator NELSON. I mentioned and you mentioned as well space 

debris. Can you give us some relative understanding of how much 

stuff is up there? Obviously, we think of space as being unlimited 

349 

and we think about it as expanding the globe. How congested and 

contested is space right now with all that debris? 

General KEHLER. I think two things that I have seen that have 

been really dramatic changes in my time on Active Duty, one was, 

of course, the end of the Cold War and the reduction of our nuclear 

forces. The other has been the change in space from the start of 

the Space Age which, of course, I was not on Active Duty for, but 

from the late 1950s to today, how much the nature of our space activities has changed, how much our reliance has changed on those 

space things, how much the participants have changed, and how 

much the number of manmade objects has changed. 

So if I just focus on the objects for a second, I think in 1957 there 

was one manmade object on orbit. Today we are sitting here in 

2011 and there are well over 20,000 manmade objects. About 1,000 

of those are active satellites. So 19,000-plus pieces of debris of one 

kind or another. That is those things that we can see, some sized 

around a softball or so larger. Our estimates are that there are 

probably 10 times that amount of debris that is smaller than what 

we actually actively would look at on a case-by-case basis. So pretty 

soon we are talking about a lot of objects here. 

You would say big space, little object theory, but you have to 

think about this, that there are some places on orbit that are more 

crowded than others, that are more desirable than others, not unlike driving. There are a lot of cars that transit Nebraska, but most 

of them are on the interstate, I would hazard a guess, and a lot 

of them go through the intersection out here of I–80 and 480. So 

that is the same thing on orbit, that there is a lot of stuff up there 

but it is channeled in certain places, and in some places it goes 

through intersections. 

So that in and of itself is a risk, first, to human space flight, and 

we put a protective observation bubble, if you will, around the 

Space Station and human space flight. Second, we put an observation bubble, if you will, around our active satellites, and then we 

are in agreements with others around the world to provide that 

kind of service for them as well. 

The final thing about this that makes it so potentially damaging 

is the speed at which things are traveling on orbit. Even though 

they are small objects, they are going at a very high speed, and 

therefore impacts cause a tremendous amount of damage. When 

you are talking about things moving at 17,000 miles an hour, for 

example, collisions that occur at those speeds—that is faster than 

.30–06 round, by the way, that would go down range. Those kinds 

of speeds are particularly damaging if you talk about the unintended collision. 

Senator NELSON. In addition to worrying about space debris, we 

also have to be concerned about our adversaries perhaps trying to 

bring down or jam our satellites. What are we doing in a general 

sense to protect against having somebody, another country or a bad 

operator, find a way to effectively render inoperative one of our 

military satellites? 

General KEHLER. Sir, the threat to our space capabilities is real. 

The threat that we are concerned about is predominantly a groundbased jamming threat, for example, GPS. GPS, as universally used 

as it is, is essentially in its orbital component a radio transmitter. 

350 

It does not transmit at particularly high power, and so it is not a 

terribly difficult signal to jam, if you have the right pieces of equipment in place. So jamming is one of the issues. 

We see the development of jammers in militaries around the 

world. We know Sadaam Hussein in the early days of Operation 

Iraqi Freedom actually operated GPS jammers. They were not effective. He did not have many of them and they were not used particularly well. They were not employed effectively, and ultimately 

they were taken out. 

But we see a proliferation of jammers. We see satellite communications jamming. Sometimes we see that today in an unintentional way because the frequency spectrum is getting more crowded, but we have also seen it in an intentional way as well. 

Then, of course, we have seen the demonstration by the Chinese 

and we had seen years ago the demonstration of anti-satellite 

weapons by the Russians. So we know that those types of capabilities exist out there in the world and we have to be mindful of 

those. So we are taking a number of steps. 

At some level, some of this is an engineering solution. 

We have to design the satellites differently. In some cases, they 

are pretty well protected today from a lot of things, but they are 

not protected against everything. We get into difficulty in determining what those other satellites that are on orbit—what is their 

real purpose? They can all look like communications satellites, but 

that may not be their purpose. So we have a better job that we 

have to do in situational awareness so we get advance warning of 

things that could happen, and then we can take some additional 

protective steps. In some cases, we have not put much in the way 

of protective steps in place. Resilience in the capability will come 

maybe from airborne platforms or elsewhere instead of space. 

Senator NELSON. There is a certain amount we can do to protect. 

Whatever we do can in some way or another be defeated if the 

other side develops the capacity to do that. We cannot protect anything and everything. 

General KEHLER. No, we cannot. Resilience is the ultimate way 

to take care of these vulnerabilities. That is true in cyberspace as 

well. But ultimately mission assurance, which means that you can 

operate through something even in the face of duress of some kind, 

and then resilience, multiple ways to get the job done, is really the 

way that we are ultimately trying to get at these vulnerabilities. 

Senator NELSON. This question is about our men and women in 

uniform who are part of the STRATCOM. On any given day, how 

does STRATCOM support our troops in, let us say, Afghanistan? 

General KEHLER. Sir, I tell my colleagues in the other combatant 

commands—and I actually believe this firmly—that there is no 

military operation that goes on out there that is not being impacted 

by STRATCOM in some way. The number one example is GPS. 

There is not a military activity that is going on out there somewhere today that is not impacted or touched somehow by GPS. Satellite communications is another one that there is either voice traffic or data going over satellite communications somewhere in the 

world right now in large volumes that is supporting military activities. We are providing the networks over which their data and communications are flowing. We are providing a strategic umbrella, I 

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believe, a deterrent umbrella over top of them. We are ensuring 

that the missile defensive capabilities that they need are in place 

and effective. We are taking steps with them to combat WMD. We 

can provide expertise forward when they need expertise. We can 

provide other planners that go forward to conduct, for example, 

global strike operations. 

Let me use a couple of examples here. You asked about Afghanistan. The reason I believe that we can operate the way we do in 

Afghanistan is because of space and cyberspace. It allows our 

troops to navigate with accuracy. It allows them to communicate 

with certainty. It allows them to strike with precision. It allows 

them to do those kinds of things that have essentially become the 

American way of warfare in a place like Afghanistan. It allows 

troops to operate in geographically dispersed locations, which we do 

in Afghanistan. It allows us to put forward operating locations in 

places where their only communications might be through satellite 

communications means. It allows us to fly remotely piloted aircraft 

using a combination of cyberspace and space so that you do that 

half a world away. All of those things are either provided by the 

Service components of STRATCOM or somehow planned via a global synchronization effort through STRATCOM. 

Finally, in the early stages of the Libyan operations, 

STRATCOM conducted, on behalf of U.S. Africa Command, global 

strike operations as well. 

I believe we have a supporting role that we live every single day 

with those forward commanders that are out there. We are touching them in ways that they do not really realize we are touching 

them in. We are also helping to manage the global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets that they are relying on every 

minute of every day. 

I feel very proud of the men and women of STRATCOM and 

what they do not only when we are supported in our efforts to 

deter the strategic end of the spectrum, but also in the supporting 

activities that they put out to support what they would call the 

warfighters. I think you would find that if you went around and 

talked to any STRATCOM assigned people today in any of our operating locations, they would say that they are there for that. So 

I am very proud of them. 

Senator NELSON. I think the American public is probably fascinated with the unmanned aerial vehicles and the way in which 

they operate. Could you give us maybe a little bit of an overview 

of how you can operate a machine halfway around the world with 

precision and that it does not have to be operated like a model airplane with a local control right on the ground close to the vehicle? 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. Well, actually it does. 

It is both. 

Senator NELSON. Yes, it can be both ways, but it does not have 

to be. 

General KEHLER. Right. 

The way I think about it, sir, is I split it into two pieces. One 

is actually flying the aircraft itself. The other is operating the sensors or the systems that are on the airplane. 

So to do the airplane operations in the immediate vicinity of the 

airfield, we do it a lot like a model airplane. There is somebody 

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there in the local vicinity to get it airborne and bring it home when 

it is on final approach, if you will. But the whole rest of that operation is being flown remotely. The vehicle itself is being flown by 

a pilot who is remote, and sitting next to that pilot is a sensor operator or a mission operator of one kind or another. That is all 

being done through cyberspace. It is all being done through a network. It is all being done through a combination of things, by the 

way, which is some military pieces, but mostly it is commercial 

pieces. There is probably a commercial satellite link that is involved in there somewhere. There may be some commercial fiber 

optic that is involved in there somewhere which, by the way, reinforces with us why the nature of cyberspace is largely in the civil 

and commercial domain when we use it. We are talking about protecting ourselves in cyberspace. A very interesting point of contact 

between DOD and the other departments and commercial industry 

is in just that kind of a thing for just that kind of a purpose, for 

example, flying remotely piloted aircraft. 

That is the way it is done. It is done from places that are relatively small rooms. I know you have seen some of them and been 

with the crews that do that. What strikes me is if they are flying 

over Afghanistan, if you enter a shelter with them and close the 

door behind you, you do not know where you are. After a while you 

forget that you are in the United States somewhere. You are not 

in Afghanistan with them. You are not where the vehicle is. After 

a while, I think the mindset that the people have that do this is 

the same. 

That goes all the way out to the tactical level. There are some 

smaller vehicles that are flown at the tactical level. There are some 

that are actually flown like model airplanes from some person forward on the ground who is doing almost the same thing that we 

did as kids, but they have sensor packages on them that allow 

them to see and perceive things that are out there that might be 

threats. 

I think it is a remarkable testament to space and cyberspace that 

we do those things today. 

Senator NELSON. It is a little bit like science fiction. There is no 

fiction to it but there is a lot of science associated with it. 

This question relates to the fact that STRATCOM is very technically oriented and requires a lot of dependence on scientists and 

engineers and other people with a high degree of technical specialty. Are we seeing enough young people and others in the educational system today who are taking that kind of background 

coursework to fill the needs that we are going to have tomorrow 

and the next day and the day after that for the kind of capacity 

that STRATCOM has in the future that is not that very far ahead? 

General KEHLER. No, sir, I do not think we are seeing enough. 

It may very well be that if we were to visit the major universities 

around the country—and certainly we have had a little bit of this 

conversation with the University of Nebraska—I think you would 

find that they are producing high quality engineering students, and 

I think you would find that every one of our major engineering 

schools around the country are producing high quality engineering 

students and I think you would find that they are producing maybe 

significant numbers of them. I think you would find that of those 

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numbers, the percentage who stay in the United States and enter 

the national security business is way too small. So there are interesting issues here with recruiting, with retention, with making 

sure that we have identified what skills we need, and making sure 

that we have put in place the incentives, I think, for people to 

enter the national security business and stay there when it is a little more difficult to do that. 

NASA is shifting its directions and is in a period where we are 

coming to the end of the Space Shuttle. There is going to be a period of time here as they are reorienting to go off and do some 

other things. 

I think it is going to be a challenge for us to attract and retain 

the kinds of people that we need. Cyberspace is another one of 

those areas and particularly when there is highly competitive demand on people to go to industry as well. So I think educating 

them, keeping them, going back to the secondary education as well 

and then post-secondary is something that is very concerning for 

us. 

Senator NELSON. It is something that obviously we need to work 

on because if we do not have the workforce coming into the command, we are not going to be able to continue the command as it 

is or we will have to structure it differently and that is not in anybody’s best interest. So I hope that we can keep pushing to get that 

kind of effort and capacity growing. Otherwise we will not have any 

seed corn and we definitely have to have that. 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator NELSON. STRATCOM is responsible for, as we talked 

about, the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or as it is 

referred to in military terms, ISR. We know that ISR played a role 

in the successful raid that took out Osama bin Laden. Can you talk 

about any kind of support that STRATCOM might have provided 

in that mission? 

General KEHLER. Sir, not really. 

Senator NELSON. You can say that we had some involvement. 

You just do not have to say what it is. 

General KEHLER. We did have some involvement. We provide involvement across the board to the activities in CENTCOM all the 

time. So most of what we do for ISR, anyway, in those forward 

areas is planning and recommendations on what assets they should 

get. How they use them and what they are using them for is not 

always apparent to us. 

Senator NELSON. That is my final question. Is there anything 

that I did not ask that I should have asked? 

General KEHLER. No, sir. Thank you for the opportunity to appear again. 

I will say again in closing, on behalf of the men and women of 

STRATCOM, we certainly appreciate the support of Congress. We 

appreciate the support of the entire Senate Armed Services Committee and your support and your subcommittee, in particular. 

These are difficult issues and you know and I know both that there 

will be fiscal pressures as the President’s budget works its way 

through. 

I would just make one final advocacy comment about the need 

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larly for these critical items related to sustaining our nuclear 

forces, the nuclear infrastructure that backs them up, the command and control systems that we have in place, our need to increase both our space and cyberspace situational awareness and 

the investments that are there to do that, the investments that we 

have in place to sustain our force. 

Then finally, I would remind all of us again that those steps that 

you all have taken to support the men and women who actually are 

the heart and soul of what we do—the hardware is one thing. But 

it is not the hardware that ultimately is important. It is the men 

and women that are in STRATCOM and throughout the rest of our 

military. So the support that we have for them I would continue 

to advocate in the strongest possible way. 

Other than that, sir, thanks for the opportunity. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, General Kehler, for your very candid remarks and responses to questions. Thank you and the men 

and women of STRATCOM for their service to our country, to wish 

you and all of them the very best and to thank the young men and 

women who are here with us, as well as the Fighting 55th and the 

‘‘Weather Command’’ as well. 

The colonel was quick to point out that it is the Chaplain who 

is responsible for the rain. [Laughter.] 

So thank you so very much. 

I also want to thank the staff here at this wonderful facility, once 

again, for hosting one of our field hearings. We thank you. 

We thank all who are here and hope that you have perhaps some 

idea, if not a better idea, of the role of STRATCOM which we are 

all so proud is located here in this part of our wonderful State. We 

hope that we will be able to continue to have hearings of this kind 

for transparency and for enlightenment to the men and women who 

are relying on this kind of protection for our national defense and 

the taxpayers who continue to support them. Thank you all. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

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