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OAR Box 1190 

Prepped by Candice Davis 

Document Number: 

47) ll-A-39 

Docket Number: 

A-90-28 

Printed 5/5/2008 9:13:51 AM Sheet 47 of 106 
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State of California 

Air Resources Board 

§ 

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li g IS 11 f fi 

AUG I 51995 

EPA AIR DOCKET 

Final Statement of Reasons for Rulemaking Including 

Summary of Comments and Agency Response 

PUBLIC HEARING TO CONSIDER TECHNICAL STATUS AND PROPOSED 

REVISIONS TO MALFUNCTION AND DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS FOR 

1994 MODEL-YEAR PASSENGER CARS, LIGHT-DUTY TRUCKS, AND MEDIUMDUTY VEHICLES AND ENGINES (OBD II) 

Considered: 

Agenda Item No: 

December 8, 1994 

94-12-2 

I. GENERAL 

The "Staff Report: Initial Statement of Reasons for the Proposed Rulemaking: ("Staff 

Report"), released October 21, 1994, is incorporated herein by reference. 

In this rulemaking, the staff proposed a number of modifications to its regulations 

establishing on-board diagnostic system requirements for 1994 and later model year 

passenger vehicles, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty vehicles and engines (OBD II), 

Title 13, California Code of Regulations (CCR), Section 1968.1. These amendments address 

manufacturer concerns related to the implementation of OBD II systems. These amendments 

include near-term relief from both the catalyst monitoring requirements for low-emission 

vehicles, and the requirements for enhanced misfire detection. Regarding the latter 

requirements, the amendments provide some additional leadtime for compliance and restrict 

the region of engine operation for which misfire detection is required. The amendments also 

provide manufacturers with additional leadtime for compliance with the OBD II requirements 

for alternative fuel vehicles and additional flexibility in certifying OBD II systems with one 

or more deficiencies. 

The staff also proposed amendments intended to increase the effectiveness of OBD II 

systems. First, it proposed an amendment that would require the phase-in of evaporative 

system leak detection strategies capable of detecting leaks equivalent in magnitude to a 0.020 

inch diameter hole. The proposed phase-in would extend from the 1998 model year to the 

2000 model year. Second, it proposed to strengthen the tamper resistance requirements to 

better ensure that the integrity of OBD II systems is maintained in-use. 

Finally, the amendments provide manufacturers with additional leadtime to develop 

fully compliant OBD II systems for vehicles using alternate fuels. For purpose of 

consistency, the ARB also amended Title 13, CCR, Sections 2030 and 2031 and the 
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certification procedures for alternate fuel retrofit systems which are incorporated by reference 

therein. The amendments provide manufacturers with similar leadtime to comply with the 

OBD performance requirements. 

Following a public hearing on December 8, 1994, in which extensive testimony from 

manufacturers and other interested parties was considered, the Air Resources Board (ARB or 

Board), by Resolution 94-67, approved the amendments, with modifications, for adoption. 

The modifications to the amendments were made available to the public between January 19, 

1995, and February 3, 1995 as part of a "Notice of Availability of Modified Text" (Notice), 

a copy of which is incorporated by reference herein and enclosed as part of the rulemaking 

record that has been submitted. The ARB mailed a copy of the Notice to each person 

described in subsection (a) through (d), inclusive of Section 44, Tide 1, California Code of 

Regulations, on January 19, 1995. As set forth in the Notice the ARB modified: 

Section (b)(1.2.2) was modified to reduce the 1998 and 1999 model year phase-in 

percentages for the low emission vehicle catalyst monitoring requirements. The staff had 

originally proposed that manufacturers be required to certify 40 percent of its low emission 

vehicle applications to the 1.5 times the standard emission threshold for the 1998 model year, 

60 percent for the 1999 model year, and 100 percent in the 2000 model year. In response to 

comments from industry, the ARB modified the phase-in percentages for the 1998 and 1999 

model years to 30 and 60 percent respectively. 

Section (b)(4.2.2) was modified to delay implementation for the phase-in of 

evaporative system leak detection strategies capable of detecting leaks as small as the 

equivalent of a 0.020 inch diameter hole. As proposed by the ARB staff, the more stringent 

requirement was to be phased-in beginning with the 1998 model year. As modified, section 

(b)(4.2.2) delays initial introduction of such systems from the 1998 model year to the 2000 

model year. The projected sales volume phase-in percentages would be 50 percent with the 

2000 model year, 75 percent for 2001, and 100 percent for the 2002 model year. Small 

volume manufacturers would not be required to meet the 2000 and 2001 model year phase-in 

percentages. 

Section (b)(10) was modified to require illumination of the Malfunction Indicator 

Light (MIL) only for affected components and systems that are capable of causing emissions 

to increase by more than 15 percent of the FTP standard. Section (b)(10.4) was modified to 

eliminate the need for manufacturers, in most instances, to illuminate the MIL for those 

components not capable of causing such an emissions increase. For such components, 

manufacturers would only be required to store a fault code. However, if such an electronic 

component or system is used as part of the diagnostic strategy to satisfy another monitoring 

requirement, manufacturers would still be required to have the MIL illuminated. This 

exception would ensure that vehicle operators are alerted to malfunctions that may potentially 

impair the functioning of the OBD II system. 

Section (a)(2.2) was modified to require that the readiness code be cleared (i.e., all 
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bits set to "test not complete") while the power take-off (PTO) unit is active, but that, once 

the PTO unit is de-activated, the readiness code can be restored to the state that existed prior 

to activation. 

Section (b)(1.1.2) was modified to allow manufacturers of spark-ignited lean-burn 

engines to request Executive Officer approval for exemption from the OBD II catalyst 

monitoring requirements if the manufacturer can demonstrate that technology is not available 

that would allow for reliable monitoring of the catalyst system. 

Section (b)(1.2.1) was modified to clarify that in instances when the malfunction 

criteria are based on the applicable emission standards, the certification reactivity adjustment 

factor would be applied to hydrocarbon emissions on low emission vehicle applications. 

Section (b)(3.2)(B) was modified to remove an unnecessary restriction on the 

establishment of the malfunction criteria for misfire monitoring. With the modification, 

manufacturers would be permitted, but not required, to use the data from a single durability 

demonstration vehicle for all engines that have the same number of cylinders as the 

demonstration vehicle. 

The title for section (g), and section (g)(1.0) itself were to further clarify that the 

demonstration requirements do not apply solely to engine families for which a Durability 

Demonstration Vehicle (DDV) is available. Similarly, in section (g)(4.5) the term "DDV" 

was replaced by "vehicle." 

Section (g)(2.6.1) was modified to clarify the catalyst monitoring demonstration 

requirements for non-low emission vehicles. Consistent with the monitoring requirements for 

such vehicles, the modification makes clear that the baseline emission test is to be conducted 

with a representative 4000 mile catalyst system. 

Section (g)(3.0) was modified to further clarify that for successful completion of OBD 

II demonstrations, manufacturers shall not require the demonstration vehicle to be cold 

soaked prior to running preconditioning cycles. 

Section (m)(5.1) was modified to clarify that the implementation requirements 

specified in the section apply to alternate fuel engines as well as vehicles. 

The ARB issued a second Notice of Availability of Modified Text and Supporting 

Documents and Information on April 3, 1995 and was available for public comment through 

April 18, 1995. In the second notice, the ARB notified the public about additonal documents 

and information that the ARB relied upon in adopting the subject amendments. The second 

notice also modified section 1968.1(k)(5.0) of the regulations to correct an inadvertent 

reference to Draft SAE Practice J1939, "Serial Control and Communications Vehicle 

Network," January 1994. 
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Pursuant to Government Code section 11346.9, the ARB has determined that this 

regulatory action does not impose a mandate on local agencies or school districts. 

Title 13, CCR, section 1968.1 incorporates by reference several Society of 

Automotive Engineer (SAE) and International Standards Organization (ISO) recommended 

practices and documents. Most of these documents were included in the regulations as they 

existed prior to this rulemaking and several have been updated by these amendments. The 

SAE and ISO documents that are incorporated by reference in the regulations include: 

SAE Recommended Practice J1930, "Electrical/Electronic Systems Diagnostic Terms, 

Definitions, Abbreviations, and Acronyms," June 1993; 

SAE J1939 Committee Draft "Recommended Practice for a Serial Controlled 

Communications Vehicle Network," January 1994; 

SAE Recommended Practice J1962, "Diagnostic Connector," June 1992; 

SAE Recommended Practice J1978, "OBD II Scan Tool," June 1994; 

SAE Recommended Practice J1979, "E/E Diagnostic Test Modes," June 1994; 

SAE Recommended Practice J1850, "Class B Data Communications Network 

Interface," May 1994; 

SAE Recommended Practice J2012, "Diagnostic Trouble Code Definitions," January 

1994; 

ISO 9141-2,"Road Vehicles - Diagnostic Systems - CARB Requirements for 

Interchange of Digital Information," February 1994. 

Existing administrative practice of the ARB has been to have technical recommended 

practices, such as the SAE documents, and test procedures of the type found in Title 13, 

CCR, section 2030-2031 incorporated by reference rather than printed in the CCR. These 

procedures are highly complex and technical documents. They include "nuts and bolts" 

engineering protocols and have a very limited audience. Because the ARB has never printed 

SAE documents or test procedures in the CCR, the affected public is accustomed to the 

incorporation format utilized in sections 1968.1 and 2030-2031. SAE, ISO, and ARB test 

procedures are extensive and complex procedures with a limited audience. Moreover, 

printing portions of the documents in the CCR when the bulk of the procedures are 

incorporated by reference would be unnecessarily confusing to. the affected public. 

In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Mail-out #94-38, pursuant to former 

Government Code section 11346.53 (now section 11346.5), the ARB declared that the 

proposed regulations may have an adverse economic impact on California businesses engaged 

in the manufacture of aftermarket parts. Accordingly, it solicited proposed alternatives from 

interested parties that would lessen any adverse economic impact upon such businesses. To 

date, the industry has suggested no alternatives other than deleting the tamper resistance 

requirements that have been proposed. As discussed in the summary of comments and 

Agency Responses below, the ARB has not found that suggestion to have merit. The ARB 

continues to believe that the OBD II systems are a vital part of the State's plan to achieve 

significant emission reductions from on-road motor vehicles and that the potential for 
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tampering is great, with the consequence that the OBD II program would be undermined. 

Thus, the ARB has not found the suggested alternative to be more effective in carrying out 

the purposes for which the regulations were proposed or which would be as effective and less 

burdensome to affected private persons or to small business than the adopted regulations and 

procedures and procedures. . 

II. SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND AGENCY RESPONSES 

Prior to the public hearing on December 8, 1994, written comments were received 

from: American Automobile Manufacturers Association (AAMA), Automotive Parts and 

Accessories Association, Inc. (APAA), California Natural Gas Vehicle Coalition, Chrysler 

Corporation (Chrysler), Engine Manufacturers Association (EMA), Fiat Auto R&D U.S.A 

(Fiat), Ford Motor Company (Ford), The Gas Company, General Motors (GM), IMPCO 

Technologies, Inc. (IMPCO), Nissan Research and Development, Inc. (Nissan), and 

Specialty Equipment Manufacturers Association (SEMA). 

c 

Jack Heyler of the Automotive Services Council (ASC) commented in response to the 

15. day "Notice of Availability of Modified Text." 

At the Board hearing, AAMA, Ford, GM, Chrysler, Cummins Engine Company 

(Cummins), Lamborghini, (SEMA), Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association 

(MEMA), APAA, ASC, and Chris Weaver testified. 

Vehicle manufacturers generally supported the amendments that provide clarification 

of the requirements and address OBD II implementation concerns. However, concerns were 

expressed with respect to certain requirements, most prominently, the staffs proposed 

requirement for the detection of smaller evaporative system leaks. Aftermarket manufacturer 

representatives opposed the proposed enhancements to the tamper resistance requirements 

specified in the regulation. A summary of these comments and the agency responses are set 

forth below. 

Catalyst Monitoring 

1. Comment: Manufacturers would be able to comply in a much more cost effective 

manner with the more stringent malfunction criteria that is to be phased-in between the 1998 

and 2000 model years if the phase-in percentages were modified from 40, 70 and 100 percent 

to 30, 60 and 100 percent. (AAMA) (Ford) (GM) 

Agency Response: The staff has modified the phase-in percentages according to 

industry's suggestion. 

2. Comment: The ARB should hold a workshop in calendar year 1996 to assess 

manufacturers' progress in meeting the revised catalyst monitoring requirements for low-
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emission vehicles. (AAMA) (Ford) (Nissan) 

Agency Response: The staff stated in the Staff Report that it intends to conduct such 

a workshop, and the Board in its resolution has directed the staff to report back to the Board 

should modifications to the adopted requirements be necessary. 

3. Comment: For Low Emission Vehicles (LEVs) and Ultra Low Emission Vehicles 

(ULEVs), the requirement for catalysts to be detected as malfunctioning before hydrocarbon 

emissions exceed 1.5 times the standard should be delayed until feasibility has been 

demonstrated. Making necessary catalyst system design changes may be extremely 

expensive. Further, it has not been demonstrated that vehicles can be designed to meet the 

LEV and ULEV emission standards, including new off-cycle requirements (known as Bag 4 

requirements), and the OBD II catalyst monitoring requirements. Once this has been 

demonstrated to be feasible, the requirement must be phased-in over a period of many years 

to avoid prohibitive expense. (GM) 

Agency Response: In formulating the proposed amendments to the catalyst 

monitoring requirements, the staff conducted testing on a prototype ultra low-emission 

vehicle (ULEV) at the ARB's facilities. The data, which are presented in the Staff Report, 

show that a significant decrease in front catalyst efficiency can occur without vehicle 

emissions exceeding 1.5 times the standard. Based on such data, and discussions with other 

manufacturers, the staff believes the feasibility of the proposed amendments has been 

demonstrated. 

As part of its comment, GM states that modifications to existing catalyst configuration 

plans may have to be changed. The staff has acknowledged that such changes may be 

necessary. For this reason, the staff proposed to phase-in the requirements through the 1999 

model year to allow for such changes to be made consistent with other planned powertrain 

modifications. In this manner, the cost of making whatever catalyst system design changes 

are needed should be significantly reduced. In fact, the Board reduced the 1998 and 1999 

model-year phase-in percentages at the request of industry to further minimize such costs (see 

Comment 1). 

The commentor lastly states that it may not be possible to design vehicles to meet new 

and existing emission standards as well as the OBD II catalyst monitoring requirements. The 

staffs testing, however, revealed that monitoring systems meeting the OBD II standards can 

be successfully designed for ULEVs (the most stringent emission category). Currently, offcycle emission standards (or Bag 4 standards), have not been adopted; therefore, it is 

difficult to comment with any great certainty on the challenge of designing a vehicle that can 

meet off-cycle requirements and the catalyst monitoring requirements simultaneously. 

However, in discussions related to the development of off-cycle standards, it appears that 

manufacturers will not have to make significant catalyst system design changes as a result of 

the requirements currently under consideration by the staff. The staff believes that fuel 

system calibrations (rather than the design of the catalyst system) will be most impacted by 
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such standards. 

Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, the staff will continue to follow 

manufacturers' progress regarding these requirements.- Should it appear after further 

development that feasibility issues do exist with respect to existing or future emission 

requirements, the staff would propose appropriate amendments for the Board's consideration. 

4. Comment: The exemption from the catalyst monitoring requirements that has 

been given for diesel vehicles should also be given to lean-burn natural gas engines because 

the same technological barriers exit for compliance. (Chris Weaver) 

Agency Response: Based on this comment, section (b)(l. 1.2) has been modified to 

allow manufacturers of spark-ignited lean-burn engines to request Executive Officer approval 

for exemption from the OBD II catalyst monitoring requirements if the manufacturer can 

demonstrate that technology is not available that would allow for reliable monitoring of the 

catalyst system. 

Evaporative System Leak Detection 

5. Comment: Major monitoring system design changes may be needed to detect 

smaller (i.e., 0.020 inch diameter) evaporative system leaks when using vacuum-based 

monitoring strategies. Should this prove to be true after further development, it will be 

necessary for the requirement to detect such leaks to be postponed from the 1998 model year 

to at least the 2001 model year. (AAMA) (Ford) (GM) (Nissan) 

Agency Response: At the Board's direction, the staff modified the regulation to 

delay the phase-in of the requirement for detection of 0.020 inch diameter leaks from the 

1998 model year to the 2000 model year. Nevertheless, the staff will continue to follow 

manufacturers' progress towards meeting the more stringent malfunction criteria, and will 

propose modifications to the adopted requirements, which could include additional leadtime, 

should that be necessary. 

6. Comment: Prior to requiring the detection of evaporative leaks as small as 0.020 

inches in diameter, the ARB should better quantify the number of small system leaks in the 

field and their emission impact. Also, feasibility and cost effectiveness need to be better 

addressed. (GM) 

Agency Response: As presented in the Staff Report, the staff analyzed extensive data 

from in-use vehicles which estimate that a very significant number of older vehicles on the 

road have small evaporative system leaks that would likely not be detected without the 

enhanced evaporative system leak detection requirement. Nearly 2000 vehicles were 

included in this analysis. 

Regarding feasibility and cost effectiveness, the staff conducted tests on four ARB 
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vehicles, ranging from a small passenger vehicle to a full size pick-up truck. This testing 

indicates that the detection of small evaporative leaks (down to a 0.020 inch hole) appears 

feasible using the monitoring technology currently being implemented to detect larger leaks. 

As such, it appears that only software modifications to the monitoring strategy are necessary 

to meet the enhanced requirement. Software costs, when the cost is spread out over a 

manufacturer's product line over several model years, generally do not result in any 

significant increase in vehicle cost. Further, manufacturers have five model years of 

leadtime to implement this requirement (the phase-in does not start until the 2000 model 

year). Should costs or feasibility issues exist that have not been fully addressed, the ARB 

staff would address such concerns in front of the Board. 

7. Comment: It is critical for this monitoring requirement that the average run 

length restriction to be increased from six to ten, so as to allow for optimization of the 

exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) protocol. (AAMA) 

Agency Response: Manufacturers have requested permission to use special statistical 

algorithms in determining when a malfunction is to be indicated. The adopted amendments 

permit the use of such algorithms, provided the manufacturer can demonstrate that a 

malfunction will be detected on average in six trips or less (Section (a)(1.8)). The 

commentor is requesting that the maximum number of trips be increased from 6 to 10 to 

improve the reliability of monitoring strategies designed to detect leaks as small as a 0.020 

inch hole. The staff is generally opposed to statistical algorithms taking more than 6 trips on 

average to detect a malfunction (see Agency Response to Comment 35) 

Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, the staff plans to follow manufacturers' 

progress toward developing strategies to detect small evaporative system leaks. Should it be 

determined that modifications are necessary for the requirement to be successfully met, the 

staff would propose appropriate amendments to the Board. These amendments could include 

a special provision for the use of the requested slower statistical algorithms to detect 

evaporative system leaks. 

8. Comment: The ARB has greatly overestimated the emission impact of small 

evaporative system leaks by relying on data from 1990 vintage vehicles. These vehicles do 

not employ the latest evaporative system improvements that will be included on vehicles 

meeting the new evaporative system test procedures. (GM) 

Agency Response: The staff has reviewed data from the commentor that is based on 

their latest prototypes. The data do indicate that evaporative emission increases resulting 

from system leaks may be significantly lower on future vehicles as compared to current 

technology vehicles. However, in discussing this issue with the commentor, it appears that 

such improvements are highly dependent on evaporative system design. Specifically, those 

systems that are designed to maintain low evaporative system pressures emit less evaporative 

emissions when a leak is present. It is not at all clear that all manufacturers will design their 

evaporative systems to operate at such low pressures. The requirements for evaporative 

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systems allow manufacturers to design systems that achieve pressures up to 10 inches of 

water. At such pressures, emission impact of leaks will be much greater than the 

commentor's data suggest. 

Even if the emission impact is reduced on future vehicles, the data presented still 

indicate that excess emissions resulting from leaks will be significant, especially when 

compared to expected tailpipe emission levels from future vehicles. Should excess 

evaporative emissions be reduced to as low as 3 grams per test when a leak is present, the 

gram per mile equivalent, based on average driving patterns, would be in excess of 0.1 

grams per mile. This emission rate is greater than the 0.075 gram per mile Low Emission 

Vehicle standard, and more than double the 0.04 gram per mile Ultra-Low Emission Vehicle 

standard. 

Further, in terms of cost effectiveness, the requirement would still be reasonable 

should the emission impact of leaks be less than originally thought. This is especially true 

when considering that only software changes should be necessary to meet the enhanced 

requirements (see Agency Response to Comment 6). Significant additional costs should not 

be incurred to implement monitoring systems to detect small evaporative system leaks. 

Nevertheless, the ARB staff will continue to follow developments regarding both 

evaporative system design, and the design of monitoring strategies for these systems. Should 

it become clear that excess evaporative emissions resulting from leaks will not be significant, 

or that the costs involved in detecting smaller leaks are excessive, the staff would consider 

amendments to these requirements. 

9. Comment: Service technicians will not be able to find evaporative system leaks 

smaller than 0.04 inches in diameter should they occur. Therefore, there will be no 

significant emission benefit resulting from the detection of smaller leaks. (GM) 

Agency Response: The ARB staff believes that the service industry will be able to 

find small evaporative system leaks detected by the OBD II system. Technicians for decades 

have been able to find very small leaks in vehicle air conditioning units even though the leaks 

are sometimes in locations that are very hard to access, such as under the instrument panel. 

Further, the ARB staff has had success in detecting such leaks using a commonly available 

hydrocarbon "sniffer" device. 

Misfire Monitoring 

10. Comment: The modifications proposed by the staff will significantly increase 

the probability of meeting this major technological challenge (i.e., meeting the misfire 

detection monitoring requirements). However, because concern still exists with respect to a 

few of the most difficult engines, a workshop is requested for calendar year 1996 to assess 

manufacturers' progress. (AAMA) (Ford) (GM) 
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Agency Response: In the Staff Report, the staff stated that a 1996 review of the 

modified requirements will take place should implementation concerns regarding the misfire 

detection requirements continue to exist. Further, Resolution 94-67 directs the staff, if 

necessary, to report back to the Board in 1996 with amendments to the adopted requirements. 

11. Comment: The ARB should allow for additional delays in compliance with the 

misfire monitoring requirements, particularly for small volume manufacturers. Some small 

volume manufacturers lack the developmental resources necessary to ensure compliance with 

these requirements at the present time. This is especially true for companies like 

Lamborghini that have very limited sales and produce 10 and. 12 cylinder engines which are 

more difficult to implement misfire monitoring on. (Lamborghini) 

Agency Response: As part of the rulemaking, the Board adopted additional leadtime 

for compliance with the expanded misfire detection monitoring requirements, up to the 2000 

model year for small volume manufacturers. With this additional leadtime, small volume 

manufacturers should be able to investigate and implement one of the several misfire 

detection technologies that have been identified by the ARB. Nevertheless, the ARB will 

continue to follow manufacturers progress towards meeting these requirements and will act 

should it appear that the requirements cannot be reasonably satisfied for larger engines. 

For vehicles that are not required to meet the expanded misfire detection monitoring 

conditions, the regulation requires misfire monitoring only during conditions encountered 

during an FTP test. This requirement has been shown to be feasible for larger engines in 

that one manufacturer, also a small volume manufacturer, has already certified an OBD II 

equipped vehicle with a V12 engine for 1995 model year. Therefore, the staff does not 

believe that additional leadtime with respect to the current misfire detection requirements is 

necessary. Nevertheless, should a manufacturer find that it cannot meet these requirements 

for a particular model year, the regulation in sections (m)(6.1) and (m)6.2) allow for the 

certification of OBD II systems although one or more of the monitoring requirements is not 

fully met. 

12. Comment: The ARB should permit manufacturers to present data showing the 

necessity of suspending misfire diagnosis under certain defined conditions, in order to 

prevent misdiagnosis. (Nissan) 

Agency Response: Sections (b)(3.3.1) and (b)(3.3.3) provide for temporary 

disablement of misfire detection systems when conditions exist that could cause the system to 

be unreliable. 

Diesel Misfire Monitoring 

13. Comment: Although misfire detection may be possible using cyclic variation 

detection, this technology has not yet been proven feasible for reliably detecting misfire on 

diesel engines. Additional leadtime may be necessary in order to successfully meet the 

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requirement. Therefore, a 1996 workshop is requested to review manufacturers' progress. 

(AAMA) 

Agency Response: Should additional leadtime prove necessary, the staff will propose 

a modification to the requirement at a 1996 Board Hearing. 

14. Comment: In addition to the 1996 workshop, the diesel misfire detection 

requirements should be delayed from the 1998 to the 1999 model year. (GM) 

Agency Response: The misfire detection requirements for diesels require much less 

sophisticated diagnostic strategies than those cunently in production for gasoline vehicles. 

This is because diesel engines are not subject to many of the causes of misfire in sparkignited engines (i.e., ignition system failures). As a result, the ARB staff believes that 

sufficient leadtime has been provided for diesel vehicles to meet these requirements. Should 

unique implementation problems arise in the future, the ARB could as part of its review, 

propose additional leadtime for this requirement. 

Comprehensive Component Monitoring 

15. Comment: The OBD II regulation requires monitoring of any electronic 

component that can affect emissions during any reasonable in-use driving condition. 

Manufacturers do not have the resources to perform the extensive testing and analysis work 

that would be necessary to meet this requirement as written. For practical reasons, testing 

and liability should be limited to defined test conditions and procedures associated with FTP 

cycle conditions, or driving cycles for which there is an emission standard. (AAMA) (GM) 

Agency Response: The ARB believes that it is necessary that the OBD II monitoring 

systems be capable of detecting malfunctions that may increase off-cycle emissions as well as 

FTP emissions. It has become increasingly apparent that excessive vehicle emissions occur 

from off-cycle emissions as well as from FTP cycle emissions. In passing the California 

Clean Air Act of 1988 (CCAA), the Legislature found that despite significant reductions in 

vehicle emissions that had been achieved in recent years, continued growth in population and 

vehicles miles traveled throughout the state was preventing the state from attaining state 

standards and, in fact, worsening air quality. (Health and Safety Code section 43000.5(a).) 

Up until that time, state emission control standards had been directed toward certifying 

vehicles by measuring FTP cycle emissions. In addressing the serious problems identified 

above, the Legislature specifically directed the ARB to implement short- and long-term 

programs to achieve additional reductions in vehicle emissions. (Health and Safety Code 

sections 43000.5(d) and 43018(c).) The OBD II regulations arise in part from this vestment 

of authority. Similarly, the need for the ARB to adopt OBD II requirements for monitoring 

off-cycle emissions arise out from these same legislative findings and directives. 

The proposed amendments to this section have been made only to clarify the 

regulation, and are not considered to constitute a new or modified requirement. In previous 

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rulemakings involving section 1968.1, the staff attempted to minimize concerns related to 

having to test every vehicle component for its impact on emissions by modifying the 

regulation to make clear that only electronic powertrain components are subject to the 

requirements of section (b)(10). 

Manufacturers have been able to avoid burdensome testing in this area by meeting 

with the staff and reaching agreement on what components need to be monitored. In most 

cases, manufacturers have presented to the ARB staff a list of components that they believed 

required monitoring. Upon review of the list and consideration of the component's function, 

the ARB and manufacturers have been able to agree upon the potential of a component's 

malfunction to cause increased emissions. In other cases, the parties have been able to agree 

on a specific testing procedure to provide the data necessary to determine whether or not 

monitoring is appropriate. This testing is limited and the burden associated with it is not 

great. Even the limited costs associated with such testing is minimized because the 

components used in vehicle powertrains are not expected to change significantly from model 

year to model year. 

Some manufacturers have expressed concern with respect to having increased recall 

liability should an unmonitored component be found to increase emissions in-use when 

malfunctioning. The ARB believes that manufacturers could avoid increased liability by 

discussing their monitoring plans with the ARB staff prior to certification. After reviewing a 

manufacturer's monitoring plans, the staff could assist the manufacturers by identifying what 

it believes to be an appropriate plan. If the parties could then agree on a specific monitoring 

plan, the ARB would not be inclined to pursue a recall if it is subsequently determined that 

additional components should have been monitored. Instead, on a case by case basis, the 

ARB would be willing to work with the manufacturers to assure implementation of 

alternative monitoring strategies for such components in future model years. 

16. Comment: Section (b)(10.1) should be revised to apply only to electronic 

powertrain components that can cause exhaust emissions to increase by an amount greater 

than 25 percent of the applicable standard, under FTP test cycle conditions only. (AAMA) 

(GM) 

Agency Response: See Comment 15 above for a discussion regarding the 

requirement to monitor components that can affect emission during non-FTP driving 

conditions. The remainder of this response will pertain to the comment that only components 

that can substantially increase emissions (by more than 25 percent) should be monitored. 

The requirement to monitor components that can measurably affect emissions was part 

of the regulation prior to the December, 1994, rulemaking. In originally formulating the 

OBD II requirements, the staff considered requiring manufacturers to detect multiple 

component failures that would lead to excessive vehicle emissions. Manufacturers opposed 

such a requirement due to the burden associated with trying to determine which of many 

potential malfunction combinations could cause high emissions. As an alternative, the ARB 

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included in the OBD II regulation separate monitoring requirements for each component that 

can measurably affect emissions. Thus, manufacturers are not required to detect emission 

increases due to the deterioration of multiple components so long as a malfunction is 

indicated when any component that can affect emissions no longer functions properly. 

Monitoring of all electronic powertrain components that can affect emissions is necessary to 

protect against excessive vehicle emissions resulting from the combined failure of multiple 

components. 

Nonetheless, after considering this comment, the Board modified the requirements of 

section (b)(10) such that illumination of the MIL is required only for affected components 

and systems that can potentially cause emissions to increase by more than 15 percent of the 

FTP standard. 

17. Comment: In some cases, when a component malfunctions that is used as part 

of another monitoring strategy, the OBD II monitoring strategy will ignore the information 

provided by the component and will continue to operate using default information. The ARB 

should not require monitoring of such components because they will not adversely affect 

OBD II system performance or emissions. 

Agency Response: Section (b)(10.1) requires monitoring of components that are used 

as part of another monitoring strategy. This is to ensure that the driver is alerted to any 

malfunctions that would cause other portions of the OBD II system to be permanently 

disabled, or unreliable. Should manufacturers, as the commentor suggests, stop using the 

component as part of other diagnostic strategies when it fails, illumination of the MIL or the 

storage of a fault code would not be required when the failure occurs. However, such 

components must still be monitored by the on-board computer to ensure that OBD II 

monitoring strategies do not use information from faulty components or systems. 

18. Comment: The Comprehensive Component Monitoring Requirements should be 

as strong as possible so that technicians will have diagnostic information necessary to fix 

vehicles with high emissions wherein the excess emissions are the result of the deterioration 

of several more minor malfunctions. (ASC) 

Agency Response: The requirements should be sufficiently strong in that any 

component that can affect emissions will be monitored. In cases where the emission impact 

is small, the MIL may not illuminate when a failure occurs; however, a fault code will be 

stored to help technicians repair vehicles with excess emissions as a result of a number of 

minor malfunctions, which would satisfy the commentor.. 

Tamper Resistance Requirements 

19. Comment: The proposed enhancements to the tamper resistance requirements 

could require vehicle manufacturers to make major investments in order to comply. (AAMA) 

13 
P.15 

Agency Response: The tamper resistance requirements, as amended, require 

manufacturers to implement security measures including the use of data encryption, and a 

centralized computer that would track reprogramming activity. The purpose of these 

requirements is to prevent illegal alteration of OBD II system performance or even complete 

disablement of these systems on in-use vehicles. The staff recognizes that investments would 

be necessary to develop reprogramming systems that use such strategies to deter tampering. 

For this reason, the regulation provided the vehicle manufacturers with several years 

leadtime in order to allow for such strategies to be developed efficiently. Further, the 

regulation allows for equally effective alternatives, giving the manufacturers the opportunity 

to suggest methods that cost less. 

20. Comment: The ARB should defer revised tamper resistance requirements to a 

future rulemaking, following the EPA's final rule on service information and after more 

evidence has been obtained to indicate that tampering will occur. (AAMA) (GM) (SEMA) 

• -\ 

21. Comment: The ARB should delay adoption of the anti-tampering amendments 

until after workshops between the aftermarket industry and vehicle manufacturers are 

concluded so that better anti-tampering language can be proposed. (MEMA) 

Agency Response: Given the number of known incidents of fraud that have been 

committed in the Inspection and Maintenance (I/M) program and the high incidence of 

computer tampering, in general, it is reasonable to anticipate that a significant amount of 

tampering with OBD II systems will occur in-use absent effective tamper resistance 

requirements. The staff is especially concerned that a high incentive to tamper with OBD II 

system calibrations will exist should California implement an I/M program test based on the 

use of OBD II systems, given the high cost repair limits that are likely to be part of the 

program. As acknowledged by the service industry at the hearing, security of the OBD II 

systems is crucial or else the vehicle and the OBD II system cannot be repaired. (Testimony 

of Jack Heyler, Transcript, page 185.) 

The staff recognizes that manufacturers need to have adequate leadtime to implement 

tamper resistance requirements. Should the ARB simply defer the issue until tampering is 

evident in the field, and this in and of itself may be difficult to detect, years of leadtime 

would have to be provided from that point. By the time improved tamper resistance 

strategies would go into production, a great number of OBD II equipped vehicles would be 

on the road with inadequate on-board computer security, potentially reducing the 

effectiveness of the OBD II program, and jeopardizing the use of OBD II systems for a more 

efficient I/M program. Therefore, the staff believes it is necessary to require that reasonable 

tamper resistance measures be implemented with this rulemaking. The ARB staff will 

continue to meet with both the vehicle manufacturers and the aftermarket industry to monitor 

progress, including costs, in developing the tamper resistance measures. 

22. Comment: Should the ARB determine that enhanced tamper resistance 

requirements are needed with this rulemaking, they should be modified to require either 

14 
electronic access to an off-site computer or the use of encryption, but not both. (AAMA) 

(GM) 

Agency Response: In formulating the OBD II tamper resistance requirements, the 

staff has determined that both of the above security measures are needed to adequately 

protect against tampering. The use of an off-site computer is specified to allow the 

manufacturer to monitor reprogramming activity and to detect unusual reprogramming 

patterns that could indicate illegal tampering. With information generated from the central 

computer, such unusual reprogramming patterns could be further investigated. Knowing that 

the computer will generate such information, the computer will help deter unlawful 

tampering. The use of data encryption will deter individuals from monitoring 

reprogramming data using a recording device for the purpose of illegally modifying the data 

and installing the altered calibration into the on-board computer. As such, these strategies 

are not redundant, but are supportive of each other. If only one or the other is implemented, 

detenence will not be as effective. Nonetheless, as mentioned previously, the regulation 

does allow alternative, equally protective methods of deterrence. If manufacturers can 

demonstrate that either method is equally effective as both measures taken together or if they 

can identify other equally effective strategies, the ARB will likely accept them. 

23. Comment: Security of the OBD II system is not guaranteed by restricting 

reprogramming. (ASC) 

The staff acknowledges that it is virtually impossible to make computers tamper 

proof. Even the most sophisticated systems are sometimes broken into. The intent of the 

tamper resistance requirements are to deter tampering to a reasonable extent. It has been 

demonstrated in other industries that computer security measures can be implemented that 

adequately guard against unauthorized access or alteration. A good example is the use of 

automated teller machines in the banking industry. Such systems are on occasion violated; 

however, as a whole, the security measures taken are adequate as evidenced by the fact that 

virtually every bank utilizes these systems. In the same manner, it cannot be guaranteed that 

OBD II systems will not be tampered with in the field; however, the tamper resistance 

requirements should be effective in minimizing such occunences. 

24. Comment: The ARB does not have authority to promulgate these anti-tampering 

provisions based on section 202 (m) of the federal Clean Air Act (CAA) which states that 

access to the emission control diagnostics system shall be unrestricted and shall not require 

any access code or device available only from a vehicle manufacturer. (APAA) (SEMA) 

Agency Response: The legislative history of the 1990 amendments to the CAA 

indicates that section 202(m) was amended by then Senator Gore to protect consumer 

freedom of choice in servicing OBD systems and competition in the vehicle service, 

diagnostic and repair industry. In reviewing the language of the amendments and the 

legislative history, the ARB believes the term "access" as used in section 202(m)(4)(b) refers 

to the diagnostic information generated by the OBD system (i.e., fault codes and vehicle 

15 
operation parameters) for use in repairing malfunctions that have been detected by the 

system. Previously, some manufacturers have permitted only franchised dealers to access 

such information, forcing independent repair establishments to use conventional tools such as 

voltmeters and vacuum gauges to diagnose malfunctions, which can be less efficient. 

Therefore, such dealers would have a market advantage. The commentors interpret access 

with respec 

t to modifying the function of the OBD system for the purposes of making aftermarket parts 

OBD compatible. The ARB does not believe that such is the intent of the section. 

The California Legislature has been equally concerned that independent service and 

repair facilities be given equal access to information necessary for proper diagnosis and 

repair of OBD systems as is given to vehicle manufacturer franchised dealers. (See Health 

and Safety Code Section 44036.2.) 

25. Comment: The ARB has not complied with the CAA in that the CAA does not 

delegate to California the authority to require anti-tampering restrictions. (SEMA) 

Agency Response: Section 209(b) of the CAA specifically allows California to 

request waivers from the general preemption of section 209(a) which prohibits individual 

states from adopting emission standards and other requirements for motor vehicles. The 

ARB has requested that the Administrator of the U.S. EPA grant California a waiver for the 

OBD II regulations. That request which is presently pending will be amended to include the 

most recent amendments to the anti-tampering sections of the regulations. The ARB believes 

that the Administrator will approve California's request for a waiver. Although the 

requirements of section 202(m) of the CAA are not expressly considered as part of the 

waiver determination, the ARB believes that the anti-tampering provisions in the OBD II 

regulations are consistent with the intent and purpose of the CAA. 

26. Comment: The ARB has not complied with the requirements of the California 

Administrative Procedures Act calling for necessity, non-duplication and authority in 

promulgating the anti-tampering regulations. (SEMA) 

Agency Response: Regarding necessity, the commentor states that there is nothing in 

the record indicating that the anti-tampering provisions are mandated by California or federal 

statute or that they are necessary to carry out the purposes of the OBD II regulations. As the 

commenter noted in Comment 23, the CAA specifically requires the U.S. EPA to adopt 

OBD regulations by the 1994 model year. (See 202(m).) Although section 202(m) of the 

CAA does not specifically direct California to adopt OBD regulations, section 43018(c) of 

the California Clean Air Act mandates the ARB to adopt standards and regulations that will 

result in the most-cost effective combination of control measures on all classes of motor 

vehicles and such measures shall include, but not be limited to, reductions in motor vehicle 

exhaust and evaporative systems and reductions in in-use emissions from motor vehicles 

through improvements in emission system durability and performance. The ARB's authority 

'16 
to adopt the OBD II regulations arise from this specific delegation. The anti-tampering 

provisions have been an integral part of the adopted regulations from their initial inception 

and are consistent with the general delegation of Health and Safety Code section 39600, 

which requires the ARB to do such acts as may be necessary for the proper execution of the 

powers granted to and imposed upon the ARB. The provisions are also consistent with the 

more specific delegation granted to the ARB by section 43018. As to the latter section, the 

anti-tampering provisions help insure the integrity of the OBD systems so that the systems 

will remain useful over the life of the vehicle. 

The ARB identified the need for the anti-tampering amendments in the Staff Report 

and in Response to Comments 19-21 above. As the regulations have developed since 1989, 

and industry progress with on-board computers has developed, the need for greater security 

to protect the reliability and integrity of the OBD system has become more apparent. 

Specifically, the ARB is concerned with the increasing popularity of vehicles using 

electronically erasable programmable read only memory (EEPROM). These computer chips 

can be recalibrated without physically modifying or replacing any on-board computer 

components and the concern is that these chips will be reprogrammed illegally to enhance 

vehicle performance and to escape detection. 

At the ARB hearing to consider these regulatory amendments, the ARB staff provided 

additional detailed testimony of the need for the anti-tampering provisions. As stated by Mr. 

Bob Cross, Assistant Division Chief of the Mobile Source Division: 

[T]he problem is that the amount of information that goes on those chips now 

is basically the complete calibration of the engine and the complete calibration 

of the diagnostic system. And so, the chip basically has all the parameters that 

control emissions on it and all of the codes which decide whether or not a 

component is broken or not on it; in other words, all the fault codes' [sic] 

decisions. [S] And so, when you're talking about programming access to these 

computers, you're really basically talking about the issue of completely 

redoing the calibration of the vehicle or completely...turn of[fJ OBD...and 

have it give a smog check station code that there was nothing wrong with the 

car. (Transcript of the Meeting Before the California Air Resources Board, 

December 8, 1994, to consider amendments to the OBD II regulations, at 

' pages 194-195.) 

Regarding unnecessary duplication, the. commenter states that both California and 

federal statutes and regulations currently prohibit tampering with vehicles in a manner that 

would defeat or render inoperative vehicle emission control systems. As stated by Mr. Cross 

above, the concern is that present regulations approach tampering by imposing penalties if 

and when tampering can be detected. The concern of staff is that with reprogrammable 

EEPROMs tampering can be difficult, if not impossible, to detect. Thus, present statutes 

and regulations do not sufficiently protect the enhanced computer monitoring systems 

required by the OBD II regulations. 

17 
P.19 

Finally, regarding authorization, the commenter states that the California Legislature 

has not addressed the need for tampering prevention regulations in connection with the OBD 

II program. As stated above, the California Legislature has delegated to the ARB authority 

to establish the OBD II regulations and to make such regulations enforceable and effective. 

The anti-tampering provisions is an integral part of the such regulations. 

27. Comment: Sufficient anti-tampering provisions already exist in federal and state 

statutes and regulations. (MEMA) 

28. Comment: Alteration of software programs can be detected at the time of 

inspection under the I/M programs. (MEMA) 

Agency Response: The ARB disagrees with the commenter. Present statutes and 

regulations although prohibiting tampering and providing for the assessment of penalties are 

inadequate. Because of modern technology and skilled reprogramming, tamperers could 

reprogram OBD II systems to shut-off, causing malfunctions to escape detection during I/M 

or other testing. As mentioned in the Agency Response to Comment 25, such action, once it 

has taken place would presently be very difficult to detect. Thus, there is a need for the 

adopted amendments that will deter tampering before it takes place. To not have the new 

amendments would risk the reliability of the OBD II systems with the consequence of 

increased vehicular emissions. 

Regarding the second comment, it may be possible, as the commentor suggests, to 

verify that vehicles are properly programmed as part of an I/M test. The staff will continue 

to discuss this issue with the automotive industry as a potential alternative to the current 

requirements, as amended. The amendments to the OBD II regulation provide the ARB with 

this latitude. However, methods to verify computer programming in a practical manner 

during an I/M test are not currently available, and the effectiveness of such a strategy in 

deterring tampering has not been fully evaluated. 

29. Comment: In view of the ARB's stated interest in minimizing unnecessary 

conflicts with federal OBD regulations, it is noteworthy that the U.S. EPA recently withdrew 

its anti-tampering provisions from the federal OBD regulations. (SEMA) 

Agency Response: The ARB acknowledges that the U.S. EPA vacated its regulations 

regarding anti-tampering as part of a settlement agreement with the aftermarket industry of a 

challenge in the federal appellate courts. The ARB understands that the U.S. EPA is 

redrafting the regulations and is planning to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking on the 

revised regulations in the coming months. As stated above, the ARB believes that the OBD 

II regulations are consistent with the OBD provisions of section 202(m) of the CAA and will 

be consistent with the regulations being developed by the U.S. EPA. 

30. Comment: Restricted access to the OBD system will prevent independent 

service providers from being able to reprogram vehicles, and will also hinder the 

18 
P.20 

development of replacement parts and specialty (modified) parts by aftermarket companies. 

Therefore, car owners which will face higher repair costs in having to obtain service and 

parts from franchised dealers. (APAA) (ASC) (SEMA) 

Agency Response: The ARB does not believe that the antitampering restrictions will 

result in vehicle owners having to obtain service from only franchised dealers. The first part 

of the comment appears to be with respect to the installation of revised vehicle programming. 

For vehicles using electronically erasable memory devices (EEPROMs), manufacturers often 

provide dealerships with software changes (referred to as "field fixes") that the dealerships 

then install on vehicles to fix driveability or other problems. Currently, when independent 

service providers have a vehicle which needs updated software, they have to take it to a 

franchised dealer, which can result in increased cost and inconvenience compared with taking 

the vehicle to a franchised dealer in the first place. The staff understands franchised dealers 

have somewhat of an advantage in this sense; however, this problem exists with respect to 

non-OBD II vehicles currently in production and was not created by the tamper resistance 

requirements, or other OBD II requirements. Vehicle manufacturers on their own initiative 

restrict software and reprogramming equipment to franchised dealers. This issue is currently 

being addressed by the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency which is considering 

regulations that would require vehicle manufacturers to provide independent service 

companies with the equipment necessary to install manufacturer developed software 

modifications. Further, the California Legislature is currently considering a similar 

requirement as part of Assembly Bill 1457. The OBD II tamper resistance requirements 

would not impact such a requirement. 

Regarding the development of replacement parts, the staff does not believe that access 

to the OBD II software is necessary in most cases. As long as replacement parts perform 

comparably to stock components, they should not be falsely detected as malfunctioning by 

the OBD II system. For aftermarket companies that produce replacement components that 

function differently than original equipment components, and for companies that produce 

specialty parts to enhance or otherwise modify vehicle performance, it may be necessary for 

the vehicle software to be modified to ensure that the product is compatible with the OBD II 

system and does not increase vehicle emissions. These companies will most likely have to 

work with vehicle manufacturers or intermediaries to develop necessary software 

modifications. This type of working relationship is already required to some extent because, 

as mentioned above, manufacturers on their own initiative restrict access to information 

necessary to implement such changes to vehicle programming. However, as manufacturers 

implement improved security measures, these businesses may have to rely increasingly on the 

manufacturers for help in developing and implementing vehicle software revisions. 

Cognizant of this, the ARB acknowledged in the Staff Report that the amended 

antitampering requirements may have an adverse economic impact on some members of the 

aftermarket parts industry because of this increased difficulty in developing and certifying I 

parts for the marketplace. However, determining exact economic impact on these members ' 

is difficult given the diversity of products manufactured. The ARB believes that any adverse | 

19 i 
P.21 

impact may be mitigated by the affected aftermarket and vehicle manufacturing industries 

developing ongoing business relationships that will allow the aftermarket parts manufacturers 

to acquire information necessary to design compatible parts. At this time, it is impossible to 

determine the additional cost to manufacturers that will result from establishment of these 

relationships, and how such additional costs will directly affect individual manufacturers. 

While some aftermarket parts makers may be adversely affected by the OBD II antitampering requirements, other aftermarket parts companies may benefit economically as a 

result of the OBD II regulations. OBD II systems will provide for more timely detection of 

deteriorated and/or malfunctioning components, with the consequence that there will likely be 

a greater demand for replacement parts. Realizing that some manufacturers may benefit and 

others may be disadvantaged, the staff concluded that on balance the impact on employment 

and business growth in California would be minor at worst. 

As stated in the agency's response to Comments 19-21 and 25, the amendments to 

the antitampering requirement were necessitated because of increasing likelihood of 

tampering because of EEPROMs and other advanced technology. To assure the reliability 

and integrity of the OBD system, and to achieve the maximum emission reductions possible, 

the ARB balanced its needs for greater security of the OBD system against the needs of the 

aftermarket industry to obtain information necessary for proper design of replacement and 

performance parts. To this end, the ARB determined that the most reasonable course of 

action would be to tighten security measures and concurrently to endeavor to facilitate the 

development of ongoing business relationships between the aftermarket and motor vehicle 

manufacturing industries. The ARB staff believed that this would ultimately result in the 

aftermarket industry being able to implement modifications necessary for the manufacture 

and certification of parts. 

The ARB determined that it was necessary to impose the additional antitampering 

measures at this time because of the leadtime that would be required in developing secure 

systems and the realization that if technology forcing regulations were not adopted, the 

research and development of necessary technology would not likely be invested. To achieve 

maximum emission reductions from OBD II systems it is envisioned at this time that such 

systems will become an integral part of the I/M program. Tampering of the OBD systems, 

much of which could go undetected, could undermine the benefits of the I/M programs and 

delay use of the OBD II systems as part of those programs. This would have an adverse 

impact on emission reductions and would impede California's efforts to achieve state and 

federal attainment standards. 

As stated, in adopting the amendments, the ARB fully realized that initially some 

burdens could be imposed on aftermarket part manufacturers. To this end, the ARB 

scheduled the first of possibly a series of workshops to address the problems facing the 

industry and to attempt to facilitate dialogue between the vehicle manufacturing and 

aftermarket parts industries. Ultimately it is hoped that this will foster development of 

business relationships that will assure that aftermarket parts makers will have the ability to 

20 
P.22 

make their products compatible with OBD II systems and emission requirements. The first 

workshop was held on February 7, 1995. The ARB plans to hold other workshops as it 

continues to develop revisions to the aftermarket certification test procedures that will 

specifically address the issue of aftermarket parts and OBD II systems. The ARB believes 

that the successful development of business relationships will assure the continued viability of. 

the aftermarket industry. 

31. Comment: An amendment should be added that requires manufacturers to 

provide the same information and equipment provided to franchised dealers to independent 

repair facilities on a contractual basis at a reasonable cost. (ASC) 

32. Comment: A standardized system (methodology) for reprogramming must be 

made accessible to independent service repair facilities. (APAA) (ASC) 

Agency Response: The OBD II regulation addresses service information availability 

relative to the use of OBD II systems in diagnosing and repairing emission related 

malfunctions. The regulation contains requirements for standarizing diagnostic information 

so that independent service technicians will be able to access this information with commonly 

available diagnostic equipment (section (k)). Further, this section requires publication of 

service procedures that reference the use of this type of equipment. However, the ARB 

believes requirements for information and equipment not directly related to the use of OBD 

II systems, such as information and equipment relating to reprogramming of vehicles, would 

be inappropriate within the context of the OBD II regulations. 

Service information concems are currently being addressed by the U.S. EPA and the 

California Legislature. As mentioned in the ARB's response to Comment 29 above, both are 

considering requirements for access to reprogramming equipment. Further, the California 

Legislature recently enacted section 44036.2, which requires manufacturers to make the 

service procedures they provide to franchised dealers available at reasonable cost to 

independent service facilities. 

With respect to standardization of reprogramming methodologies, neither the EPA or 

the California Legislature is considering such a requirement to the best of the ARB staffs 

knowledge. The ARB believes such standardization could be beneficial to the independent 

service industry; however, reprogramming methodologies are complex and can differ 

significantly between manufacturers. A significant amount of additional discussion and 

development is necessary before such a requirement would be reasonable. Nevertheless, the 

ARB staff plans to continue to investigate the feasibility of standardized reprogramming 

equipment, and the potential benefit of such equipment to reduce vehicle emissions in-use. 

33. Comment: There is a need to standardize and facilitate access to service 

information databases by requiring the on-board system to electronically identify the vehicle, 

its current calibration status, and any approved modifications which have been introduced. 

(ASC) (MEMA) 

21 
Agency Response: The commenters are refening to the development of a service 

information database that could be linked directly to a vehicle's on-board computer. The onboard computer would transmit the vehicle identification number (VIN) to the database along 

with an identification number for the software version contained in the on-board computer. 

The database would then use this information to automatically access the relevant service 

procedures for the vehicle, and would indicate if the vehicle contains the most recent 

software version available. The development of such a database is currently being 

considered by the Society of Automotive Engineers' E/E Diagnostic Standards Committee. 

The ARB believes that the use of technology to improve access to emission related 

service information will help the service industry to better diagnose and repair vehicles with 

excess emissions, and the ARB is interested in doing what it can to further such efforts. 

However, as mentioned in the Agency Response to Comments 30 and 31, it is not the ARB's 

intent to address all service information concerns as part of the OBD II regulation. The 

regulation only requires manufacturers to implement diagnostic systems to detect vehicle 

malfunctions, and to generate related diagnostic information as a tool to help in repairing 

such problems. 

Statistical MIL Illumination Protocols 

35. Comment: The current regulatory language limits the average run length for 

alternative MIL illumination protocols to six trips on average. The maximum average run 

length should be increased to ten to allow for optimization of strategies such as the 

Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA). (AAMA) (GM) 

Agency Response: The ARB staff has studied statistical algorithms such as EWMA 

and believes that they can be used effectively as an alternate MIL illumination protocol. For 

this reason, the regulation contains a provision for their use, and allows up to six trips on 

average for malfunction detections to occur (three times longer than generally specified in the 

regulation). The staff believes it is necessary to limit the "run-length" of these algorithms to 

six on average in order to ensure the detection of malfunctions in a timely manner. Even 

with a limit of six on average, some malfunctions will not be detected until 10 or more trips 

due to the variation associated with the algorithm. Should the limit be extended to 10 on 

average, the variation would also increase, causing malfunction detections to be delayed until 

20 trips or more in some cases, which is not reasonably timely. 

In-use Recall Protocol 

36. Comment: The in-use recall provisions are too broad and could lead to the 

recall of a vehicle without its emissions having exceeded the standards. Further, because 

manufacturers are still gaining experience with OBD II systems, there should be a 

moratorium on OBD II system recalls for model years 1994 through 1996. At a minimum, 

the current two times the standard recall threshold for model years 1994 and 1995 should be 

extended to model year 1996. (AAMA) (GM) 

- . . 22 
Agency Response: As discussed previously (see Comment 14) the OBD II regulation 

requires monitoring of individual components that have an impact on emissions, but would 

not cause vehicle emissions to exceed 1.5 times the standard. The purpose of this 

requirement is to prevent excessive vehicle emissions that could result from a combination of 

such malfunctions. To this extent, it is necessary for the ARB to ensure that these 

monitoring systems be able to detect malfunctions occuning in-use. Without the ability to 

recall vehicles that do not properly detect such problems, the ARB could have no recourse 

should vehicles operate on the road with high in-use emissions and no indication of a 

malfunction because manufacturers are not required to detect combinational failures. 

However, as stated in the response to Comment 14, the ARB staff is willing to work with 

individual manufacturers on a case by case basis to help identify components that need to be 

monitored and which would subject the vehicle to recall. 

A moratorium on in-use recall through the 1996 model year would prevent the ARB 

from seeking corrective action should OBD II systems fail to perform reasonably in-use. It 

is not the staffs intent to vigorously pursue in-use recalls of OBD II systems in the early 

years of production, as is evidenced by the higher emission thresholds for in-use recall 

through the 1995 model year for non-low emission vehicles, and through the 2000 model 

year for low emission vehicles. However, without retaining some authority to recall 

vehicles, there is no assurance that manufacturers will take adequate measures to ensure 

reasonable in-use operation of these systems. 

Finally, regarding the commenter's request for an extension of the higher emission 

thresholds for in-use recall on non-low emission vehicles from the 1994 and 1995 model 

years through the 1996 model year, the staff believes that the two years of relief that has 

already been provided should be sufficient for these vehicles. These vehicles are certified to 

higher emission standards, with the consequence that a higher in-use recall emission margin 

is to some extent inherent. Further, by the 1996 model year, manufacturers will have had 

sufficient leadtime to ensure proper in-use performance of these systems. 

Other Comments 

37. Comment: The provision by which retrofit conversion system manufacturers can 

request Executive Officer approval to disable certain monitoring strategies should be 

extended to at least the 1999 model year so that the provision is consistent with that for 

vehicle manufacturers. (IMPCO) 

Agency Response: As amended the regulations allow manufacturers of original 

equipment vehicles certified to run on alternative fuels to request that the Executive Officer 

waive specific monitoring requirements until the 1999 model year. The waiver would apply 

through the 1998 model year and the manufacturer would be expected to fully comply in the 

1999 model year. Similarly the present rulemaking amended Title 13, California Code of 

Regulations sections 2030-2031 and the test procedures incorporated therein. These 

amendments allow retrofit manufacturers to request from the Executive Officer that OBD II 

23 
monitoring requirements not apply up through the 1998 model year. Thus, the regulations as 

they apply to original equipment manufacturers and retrofit manufacturers are consistent. 

The ARB believes these provisions provide vehicle and retrofit manufacturers with adequate 

leadtime to ensure that all OBD II monitoring strategies are compatible with.alternate fuels. 

38. Comment: The ARB has not gotten an EPA waiver for the OBD II regulation, 

making it without force or effect. (SEMA) 

Agency Response: To the extent that this question is referring to California's 

authority to enforce these regulations without a waiver, the comment is outside the scope of 

this rulemaking. California has adopted the regulations and these amendments under 

authority granted to it by the California Legislature. To comply with the requirements of 

section 209(b) of the Federal Clean Air Act, the ARB has formally submitted a request for a 

waiver to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). However, knowing that it 

would be proposing these amendments in response to concerns raised from industry, the ARB 

requested that the U.S. EPA delay consideration of the waiver request until these 

amendments were formally adopted. The ARB will be requesting in the near future that the 

waiver request be reactivated. 

39. Comment: The incorporation of SAE J1979 and J1939 may potentially represent 

a further unlawful delegation of authority. The proposed regulation does not clarify whether 

later changes to these SAE standards will have no effect on the regulation or if such later 

changes will be deemed incorporated. (SEMA) 

Agency Response: As with these amendments, the ARB will follow its practice of 

formally amending the OBD II regulations if it decides to adopt and apply a later version of 

the incorporated SAE documents. (See section k(2.0) in which the regulations were amended 

to incorporate the latest version of SAE J1979.) 

40. Comment: The regulation should allow for reactivity adjustment factors to be 

applied to hydrocarbon emissions in determining malfunction criteria. (Chris Weaver) 

Agency Response: A footnote was added to the regulation to make clear that 

reactivity adjustment factors can be used in this manner. 

41. Comment: The regulation should give the Executive Officer the discretion to 

provide leniency with respect to complying with the OBD II requirements in instances where 

the introduction of new technology has make compliance difficult to achieve. (Fiat) 

Agency Response: An amendment to the regulation was adopted that allows 

manufacturers to certify OBD II systems with identified monitoring system deficiencies 

through the 2000 model year. The provision permits the certification of OBD II equipped 

vehicles with two deficiencies without penalty through the 1996 model year, and one 

24 
deficiency for model years 1997 through 2000. Fines in the amount of 25 or 50 dollars per 

deficiency would apply should additional deficiencies be identified. The staff believes this 

provision provides manufacturers with adequate leniency to address most implementation 

concerns. Should it be determined that manufacturers will not be able to meet the OBD II 

requirements without additional leniency, the ARB staff would propose additional 

amendments to the Board. 

25