## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Jordan v. Bangl

oria , 2011 IL App (1st) 103506

Appellate Court Caption SEAN J ORDAN, Pla i n tiff-Appe llee, v. HASI B BA NGL ORIA, Def endant- Appellant (Par

rillo, W eiss & O ’Ha lloran, Appe llant).

District & N o. First District, Second D ivision Docke t No. 1-10-3506

Opinion filed Rehea ringdenied Modified opinion filed Dec ember 30, 2011 April 24, 2012 May 1, 2012

Held (Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s n o par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) In an action for persona l injuries and proper ty damag e arising from an automobile acc ident, the t rial court prope rl y en tere d an order debarring defe ndant from reje cting the arbitration awa rd, assessing attorney fee s for defe ndant’s failure to participate in the arbitra tion in g ood faith, and

as s essi ng additional attorney fee s pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 1 3 7 based on defe ndant’s frivolous objections to plaintiff’s reque sts to admit under Supre me Court Rule 216.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Co ok County
, No. 10-M2-0085; the Hon. Rog er G . Fe in, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Parillo, Weiss & O’Ha lloran, of Chicag o (Ke ely Hillison, of counsel), for appellants.

DiMonte & L izak, L L C, of Park Ridge (Chester A. L izak, of counsel), for appellee

.

Panel J USTI CE CUNNI NGHAM delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion. Presiding J ustice Quinn and Just ice Connors concur red in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 This a

ppeal arises f

rom a Septembe r 2, 2010 order enter ed by the circ uit c ourt of Cook County that debar

red the defe ndant’s reje ction of an arbitra tion awa rd, assessed attorney fee s under I llinois Supreme Court Rule 91(b) (ef f. J une 1, 1993) for t h e d ef endant’ s failure to participate in the arbitra

tion in g ood faith, and assessed additional attorney fee s under I llinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (ef f. Fe b. 1, 1994) for frivolous objections to the plaintiff’s reque st to admit fac ts. The defenda nt filed a motion to rec onsider the trial court’s ruling. The trial
court denied the defe ndant’s motion to rec onsider. On appea l, the defe ndant argues that: (1) the trial court err ed in e ntering judgme nt on the arbitra tion awa rd beca use the court did not g ive 60 day s’ written notice of the a rbitration hea

ring ; (2) the tria l court er

red in de barr ing his reje ction of the arbitration awa rd and assessing attorney fee s for failure to participate in the arbitration in g ood faith; and (3) the trial court er re d i n as sessing sanctions for his response s and objections to the plaintiff’s reque st to admit. For the following re as o ns, we aff irm the judg ment of the c ircuit court of Cook County

.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 On J anuar

y 14
, 2 0 1 0, plaintiff-a

ppellee Sean J ordan (Sean) filed a personal i njury and proper ty damag e lawsuit in the circ uit court of Cook County ag ainst defe ndant-a ppellant Hasib Ba ng loria (Ha sib), as a result of an automobile acc ident that occur red on J anuar

y 16, 2009. On J anuar

y 27, 2010, Parrillo, Weiss & O’Ha lloran (def ense counsel) filed its appea ranc e and a jury demand on behalf of Hasib. Around Fe b ru ary 4, 2010, Sean serve d Hasib, throug h defe nse counsel, with a reque st to admi t fac ts. Also on Fe bruar y 4, 2010, Sean’s counsel s en t d ef

ense counsel a notice to appea r at arbitration. On Marc h 2, 2010, 1 Hasib ser ved Sean with written objections to the reque st to a dmit. On March 30, 2010, the

We not e t hatth e no ti ce to app earatarbit ra ti on wa s no t f il ed s ta m pedby the cou rt

. 1

-2-trial court e ntere d an orde r closing discovery as of April 30, 2010, and tra nsfer red the case to the mandatory arbitration c alenda r. On April 9, 2010, Sean filed a motion reque sting the trial court to overr

ule Hasib’s objections to his reque st to admit. On M ay 3, 2010, Sean

serve d defe nse counsel with Supreme Court Rule 90 documents, re lating to the conduct of the mandatory arbitra

tion he aring

. I ll. S. Ct. R. 90 (ef f. J uly 1, 2008). A J une 2, 2010 order

overr uled Hasib’s objections, order ed Hasib to res p o n d
, an d indicated that an arbitration hear ing set for J une 9, 2010 would stand. Prior to the J une 2, 2010 order
, there is nothing in the record that would indicate Hasib rec eived any notice of the ar bitration hear ing date. I n

a separ ate order that day
, Hasib was order ed to appea r for a deposition prior to J une 9, 2010. The order further indicated that the arbitration hearing was set for J une 9, 2010. At that time, the plaintiff’s attorney s wer e advised that the defe nse counsel had first located Hasib within the “last fe w day s.” ¶ 4 Hasib never appea red for his deposition, nor did he appea r for the arbitra

tion hear ing in response to Sean’s notice to appea r. On J une 9, 2010, an arbitration hear ing was held and defe nse counsel was prese nt. An awa rd of damag es was enter ed in favor of Sean and ag ainst Hasib in the amount of $5,000 with no costs. T h e arbitrators did not make a finding that Hasib and defe nse counsel failed to participate in g ood faith. On J une 23, 2010, Hasib filed

a reje ction o f t h e aw ar d

. On J uly 21, 2010, Sean filed a motion to “quash reje ction of arbitration a

war d.” The motion also soug ht the assessment of attorney fee s ag ainst defe nse counsel for bad faith in failing to produce Hasib at the arbitration hear ing pursuant to Sean’s notice to produce
, for Hasib’s failure to appea r for the deposition, and for Hasib’s frivolous objections to Sean’s reque st to admit. Sean als o fi l ed a s epar ate motion for assessment of attorney fee s under I llinois Supreme Court Rule 137, claiming that Hasib’s objections to the reque st to admit wer e frivolous. On September 2, 2010, the trial court g rante d Sean’s motion
to bar the reje ction of the arbitration awa rd, enter ed judgme nt on the awa rd, and assessed the

sum of $3,375 for attorney fee s ag ainst Hasib and defe nse counsel. The trial court found that defe nse counsel did not participa te i n g ood faith “in c onnection with and at the arbitration hear ing, pr ior there to, and there afte r.” The trial court also assessed $3,175 in attorney fee s under Supreme Court Rule 137 ag ainst defe nse counsel only
, finding that the objections to Sean’s r equest to admit wer e “f rivolous.” ¶ 5 On September 29, 2010, Hasib filed a motion to rec onsider supported by two aff idavits. One aff idavit was from Cook County Arbitration Admin i s t ra t or Kimberly Atz O’B rien, which stated that written n o t i ce o f the arbitration hear ing date was only mailed to the plaintiff’s attorney s. The second aff idavit was from Steven Har ris, an attorney with defe nse counsel, which stated t hat he appea red in co u rt i n this case on J une 2, 2010, that the court stated the arbitration date would stand, and that Mr. Har ris did not then rea liz e that defe nse counsel ha d not been notified of the ar bitration hear ing. ¶ 6 On November 12, 2010, Hasib’s motion to rec onsider was denied. The trial court found that defe nse counsel “ig nore[d] the profe ssional responsibility of his law firm to keep on top of schedule d dates for filings and app ea ra n ce s in Court or in connec tion with arbitration hear ings.” On November 19, 2010, Hasib and de fense counsel filed a notice of a

ppeal. On November

30, 2010, Hasib and de fense counsel filed a n amende d notice of a

ppeal.

-3-¶ 7 ANALYSI S

¶ 8 The parties disagree on what standard of re v i ew s h o u l d b e u t i l i z ed by this court. Gene rally
, a trial court’s decision to bar reje ction of an arbitration awa rd is revie wed for an abuse of discretion. W

illiams v. Dorsey , 273 I ll. App. 3d 893, 901, 652 N.E.2d 1286, 1292 (1995). Abuse of discretion occur s when the trial court rules arbit ra ri l y o r when its ruling exceeds the bounds of rea son. Id

. Howeve r, a trial court’s ruling that depends solely on the court’s construction of a statute or a supreme court rule is revie wed de novo

. Paul H. Schwende ner, Inc. v. Larrabee Commons Partners
, 338 I ll. App. 3d 19, 28, 787 N.E.2d 192, 200 (2003). De novo consideration means we perf orm the same analy sis that a trial judge would perf

orm. Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP
, 408 I ll. App. 3d 564, 578, 948 N.E.2d 132, 146 (2011). ¶ 9 Hasib and defe nse counsel argue that the trial court err ed in debar ring the reje ction of the arbitration awar d and in enter ing judgment beca use the c ourt did not give 60 day s’ written notice of the hear ing. I llinois Supreme Court Rule 88 (e ff. June 1, 1987) require s that “not less than 60 day s’ notice [of an arbitration hear ing] shall be g iven to th e p ar t i es o r their attorney s of rec ord.” I llinois S up re m e Court Rule 91(a) (ef f. J une 1, 1993) provides that “[t] he arbitration hearing shall proce ed in the absenc e of any party who, afte r due notice, fails to be pre sent.” ¶ 10 We find Juszczyk v. Flores
, 334 I ll. App. 3d 122, 777 N.E.2d 454 (2002), instructive on this issue. In Juszczyk
, we found that the failure to provide at least 60 day s’ notice of an arbitration hearing date rende rs a judgme nt on an arbitration awa rd voidable. Id

. at 125-26, 777 N. E

. 2d at 457. A previous appellate court decision, in Ratkovic h v. Hamilton
, 267 I ll. App. 3d 908, 914, 642 N.E.2d 834, 838 (1994), that found such a judgme nt to be void is not followed beca

use it is in dir ect conflict with our I llinois Supreme Court’s decision holding that only order s enter ed by a court lacking persona l or subject matter jurisdiction are void. “B oth I llinois Appellate and Supreme Court case law have consistently held that a judgme nt

or order is void [onl y ] wher e it is enter ed by a court or ag ency lacking persona l jurisdiction, subject-matter

jurisdiction, or the inhere nt pow er to e nter the particula r judgme nt or

order
, or wher e the judgme nt or order is procur ed by fra ud.” Juszczyk
, 334 I ll. App. 3d at 125, 777 N.E.2d at 456 (citing Johnston v. City ofBloomington
, 77 I ll. 2d 108, 112, 395 N.E.2d 549, 5 50 (1979), People v. Davis
, 156 I ll. 2d 149, 155, 619 N.E.2d 750, 754 (1993), In r e Marriage of

Mitchell
, 181 I ll. 2d 169, 174-75, 692 N.E.2d 281, 284 (1998), Steinbreche r v. Steinbreche r , 197 I ll. 2d 514, 530-31, 759 N.E.2 d 5 0 9, 519 (2001), and LaSalle National Trust, N .A. v. Lamet , 328 I ll. App. 3d 729, 731-32, 767 N.E.2d 464, 467 (2002) ). ¶ 11 Now, once we have a voi dable judgment, our ne x t inquiry conce rns t he conduct of t he p ar t i es and their attorney s. In Juszczyk
, the defe ndant and his attorney s wer e not g iv en at least 60 day s’ notice and they did not appea r at the schedule d arbitration date. Juszczyk
, 334 I ll. App. 3d at 123, 777 N.E.2d at 4 5 5

. T h e arbitration panel subsequently awa rded the plaintiff $20,000 in damag es, pl us costs. Id . The plainti ff then filed a motion for an awa rd of costs, defe nse counsel appea red and argued the motion, and the trial court awa rded $520

as costs. Id

. Two and a half months later, the defe ndant fi l ed a petition to vacate the arbitration jud gm ent under section 2-1401 of the I llinois Code of Civil Procedur e (Code) (735 I L CS 5/2-1401 (West 1998)), on the g rounds that the defe ndant never rec eived notice

-4-of the arbitration hear ing or the initial judgme nt order

. Id

. at 123-24, 777 N.E.2d at 455-56.

The trial court g rante d the petition, f inding the arbitration judgment void. Id

. We r ever sed, finding that defe nse counsel failed to show due diligenc e beca use the l aw fi rm waited 21⁄2 months after the y

had knowledg e of the judgme nt. Id . at 127-28, 777 N.E.2d at 458-59. ¶ 12 Alth o u gh t h e ca se at bar does not involve a section 2-1401 petition to vacate, which require s due diligenc e, it does involve the conduct of defe nse counse l r ep r e s enting Hasib. We find the fac ts of this c ase simil ar to the fac ts in Till er v. Semonis
, 263 I ll. App. 3d 653, 635 N.E.2d 572 (1994). In Till er , the plaintiff filed suit afte r his car was struck by the defe ndant’s

car

. Till er , 263 I ll. App. 3d at 655, 635 N.E.2d at 573. Plaintiff’s counsel and defe ndant’s counsel exchang ed corr espondenc e as they took steps to prepa re for trial. Id

. On Dec ember 20, 1991, the court order ed that the case be transfe rre d to the mandatory arbitra tion cale ndar. Id

. Around J anuar

y 16, 1992, plaintiff’s counsel rec eived postcard notice from the court that the matter was set for arbitration on Marc h 24, 1992. Id

. The defe ndant and d efe ndant’s counsel failed to appea

r at the heari n g and the plaintiff was awa rded $10,000. Id

. Def endant’ s counsel claimed that they never rec eived an y n o t ice of the hear ing. Id

. The circ uit court enter ed judg ment on the ar bitration awa

rd and the defe ndant appea led. Id . On ap peal, the defe ndant argued that the t rial court err ed in deny ing her emerg ency motio n t o

vacate the arbitra

tion awa rd beca use she did not rec eive 60 day s’ notice of t h e arbitration hear ing as presc ribed in I llinois Supreme Court Rule 88 (ef f. J une 1, 1987). Id

. at 656, 635 N.E.2d at 574. ¶ 13 This c ourt aff

irmed the trial court’s order denying the defe ndant’s motion to vacate the judgme nt on the arbitration awa rd. Id

. at 657, 635 N.E.2d at 574. Notably
, the defe ndant and defe ndant’s counsel failed to appea r for the hear ing on their own motion to vacate. Id

. This
court held that the defe ndant’s lack- of-postc ard- notice argument was rooted in the trial court’s assessment of cre dibilit y , and since the defe ndant and defe ndant’s counsel routinely appea red late or failed to appea r at multipl e court proce eding s, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deny

ing the defe ndant’s moti o n t o v acate. Id

. Additionally
, this court

rea soned that althoug h defe nse counse l claimed that they wer e not awa

re of the date of the arbitration hear ing, the court’s order of Dec ember 20, 1991 transfe rre d th e case to the mandatory arbitration cale ndar. Id

. This court held that “[a]tt orney s have a leg al and ethical duty to act with rea sonable diligenc e in repr esenting their client’s interests. [C itations.] This duty includes t rac king t h eir cases and lear ning the date upon which a hear ing is to occur .” Id

. Moreve r, this court held that “[t] he failure of a litigan t t o b e notified of the date of a hear ing does not constitute an excuse for failing to appea r at the hear ing.” Id

. (citing Hall v. Hall , 15 I ll. App. 3d 599, 603, 304 N.E.2d 763, 767 (1973))

. ¶ 14 In this case , the Cook County arbitration administrator stated in an aff idavit that she only sent postcar d notice of the arbitration date to S ean’ s counsel bec ause at the time there w as

no attorney of rec ord for th e d ef en d an t. Def

ense counsel claims that as a result of not

rec eiving postcard notice, it was not awa re of the arbitration date until J un e 2
, 2 0 1 0
, just seven day s befor e the hear ing. However, t he record contradic ts this claim. On J anuar y 27, 2010, defe nse counsel filed an appea ranc e on behalf of Hasib. On Fe bruar y 4, 2010, Sean’s counsel sent defe nse co u n s el a n otice to appea r at arbitration. On M arc h 30, 2010, a court order transfe rre d the m at t er t o the mandatory arbitration cale ndar. In the trial court’s

-5-September 2, 2010 order enter ing the judgme nt on the arbitration awa rd, the trial court held that the Fe bruar

y 4, 2010 notice to appea r at arbitration complied with t h e notice require ments of I llinois Suprem e C o u rt Ru l e 237 (ef f. J uly 1, 2005). Fur

ther, in the trial court’s N ovember

12, 2010 order

denying H asib’s motion to reconsider , the cour t rejec ted defe nse counsel’s a

rgument that it was not provided with 60 day s’ notice of the arbitration and noted that defe nse counsel knew that the matter h ad b ee n s en t to the mandatory arbitration calenda

r as of Marc h 30, 2010. ¶ 15 Pursuant to Till er , we hold that defe nse counsel had a profe ssional responsibility to ke ep trac k of schedule d dates for court and arbitration hear ings. Although defe nse counsel did not eng ag e in the misconduct of being late and failing to appea r at court p ro ce ed i n gs l ike the defe ndant’s counsel in Till er , counsel in this case is still require d t o b e aw ar e of the important dat es in his case , including the arbitration date. Despite not being g iven the specific date, defe nse counsel cannot claim that he did not know that an arbitration hear ing would be schedule d since he was awa re that the case had been transfe rre d to the mandatory arbitration cale ndar and he was serve d with notice to appea r at arbitration as well. Counsel’s

ar gu ment taken to its logic al extreme seems to sug g est that he need not be proac ti v e i n trac king and advanc ing his case toward resolution. Rather, he may simply wait to be notified of important dates witho u t any obligation on his part to act. There fore
, Hasib and defe nse counsel’s argument that Hasib’s due proce ss rights we re violate d beca use of lack of notice is also not persua sive for the rea sons discussed. There fore
, we hold that the trial court did not

err in enteringjudgme nt on the arbitration awar d, and the judg ment enter ed wa s not void. ¶ 16 Ha s i b an d defe nse counsel further argue that the trial court cannot consider c o n du ct which occur s outside of the arbitration hear ing itself. Her e, the trial court imposed sanctions ag ainst Hasib and defe nse counsel for failure to participa te in g ood faith “in connec tion with and at the a

rbitration hea

ring , prior ther eto, and ther eaf ter.” ¶ 17 When the trial court finds that a party has failed to participate in the arbitration he aring in g ood faith, it may in its discretion impose sanctions. Smith v. Gleash
, 325 I ll. App. 3d 79, 83, 757 N.E.2d 101, 104 (2001); W est Bend Mutual Insurance Co. v. Herrera
, 292 I ll. App. 3d 669, 674, 686 N.E.2d 645, 648 (1997). We will not reve rse the trial court’s imposit ion of sanctions absent an abuse of discretion. See g ener ally Smith
, 325 I ll. App. 3d at 84, 757 N.E.2d at 105. Such a finding will not be deeme d an abuse of discretion unless it is arbitra ry

or excee ds the bounds of re ason. Id

. ¶ 18 Parties proce eding in g ood faith is essential to the integ rity of the mandatory arbitration proce ss. Employe r’s Consorti um, Inc. v. Aaron
, 298 I ll. App. 3d 187, 191, 698 N.E.2d 189, 193 (1998). Ar

bitration is not to be considere d simply a hurdle to c ross on the way to trial. Id

. at 189, 698 N.E.2d at 191. Supreme Court Rule 91(b) require s the prese nce of the party and g ood faith and mea ningf ul participation in the arbitration hearing. See Martinez v. Gaimari
, 271 I ll. App. 3d 879, 883, 6 4 9 N.E.2d 94, 97-98 (1995). A party ’s prese nce is require d espec i all y wher e it has not been excused by the court and espec ially when it is require d to appea

r pursuant to a written notice to produce
, which was filed in the case at bar. See id

. ¶ 19 Rule 219(c) provides that the trial court may awa rd as sanctions the “re asonable expenses

-6-incurre d as a result of the [offending party ’s] m i s conduct, including a rea sonable attorney

fee .” I ll. S. Ct. R. 2 1 9(c) (ef f. J uly 1, 2002). Gene rally
, parties are responsible for paying their own attorney fee s. Abreu v. Unica Industrial Sales, Inc.
, 224 I ll. App. 3d 439, 452, 586 N.E.2d 661, 671 (1991). Howeve r, as n o t ed
, pursuant to Rule 219(c)
, the trial court may

awa rd attorney fee s as sanctions when a party ’s misconduct has cause d another party to incur fee s. Dyduc h v. Crystal Gree n Corp.
, 221 I ll. App. 3d 474, 480, 582 N.E.2d 302, 307 (1991). The only restric tion imposed by Rule 219(c) is that the awa rd of attorney fee s must be related
to misconduct arising from failure to comply with proce dural rules relating to discovery

. See g ener ally Hartnett v. Stack
, 241 I ll. App. 3d 157, 175, 607 N.E.2d 703, 715 (1993), Dyduc h
, 221 I ll. App. 3d at 480, 582 N.E.2d at 307. ¶ 20 Sean arg

ues that participating in g ood faith cover s more than t h e arbitration hearing. Whil e we agre e gen er all y with that argument, as the trial court noted, Hasib and defe nse counsel’s conduct in its totality did not measure up to g ood faith. In W alikonis v. Halsor
, 306 I ll. App. 3d 811, 816, 715 N.E.2d 326, 330 (1 9 9 9 ), the court held that prospec tively debar ring a motorist from reje cting the arbitration a war d on the basis of his conduct befor e the arbitration hear ing was an abuse of discretion. In Smith
, the amount of sanctions was limit ed to those fee s incurre d in r elation to the arbitration he aring

. See Smith
, 325 I ll. App. 3d at 85, 757 N.E.2d at 106. ¶ 21 The trial court here found that “def endant and defe ndant’s counsel did not participa te in g ood faith in connec tion with and at the arbitra tion hear ing, prior there to, and there afte r.” We can affir m the trial court’s finding as l ong as the co rr ec t ru l i ng is supported by the record. L eg i o n Insurance Co. v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. , 354 I ll. App. 3d 6 9 9
, 7 0 3
, 822 N.E.2 d 1, 5 (2004). Fur ther, Rule 219(c) g ives the trial court the authority to impose sanctions as wa s done in this case

. We note that Hasib and defe nse counse l did not contest the amount or the dates and time spent for the attorney fee s

. Al s o , all of the attorney fee s appea r to be related to the arbitration hear ing and for the prosec ution of the motion for sanctions. The fac t that no explanation was g iven for Hasib’s failure to appea r at the arbitration hearing pursuant to a notice to produce is sufficie nt to support a finding that Hasib and defe nse counsel did not participate in g ood faith at the hear ing. There fore
, the t ri al court’s sanctions of debar ring Hasib and defe nse counsel’s reje ction of the arbitration awa rd and the entry of attorney fee s for their failure to participate at the arbitration hear ing in g ood faith we re pr oper. ¶ 22 W e n ex t examine Hasib and defe nse counsel’s argument that the trial court erred i n assessing attorney fee s ag ainst defe nse counsel for the response s and o b j ections to Sean’s reque st to admit. Sean attempted to obtain an admission from Hasib that a proper ty damag e estimate was prepa

red on behalf of Hasib and wa s the rea sonable e x pense of the nece ssary repa irs of the damag e to Sean’s vehicle cause d by Hasib’s neg lige nce. Sean reque sted Hasib to make the f

ollowing a dmissions : “1. The Certified Estimate attache d here to as Ex hibit ‘A’ was prepa red on behalf of Def endant, Ha sib Bang loria. 2. I f the reque st for admission set forth in para g rap h 1 i s d en i ed, Def endant is reque sted to admit that the Certified Estimate attache d her et o as Ex hibit ‘A’ was

-7-prepa red for Apollo Casualty Insuranc e Company
, acting as ag ent for its insured, Hasib Ba ng loria. 3. That the Certified Estimate att ac h ed as Ex hibit ‘A’ sets forth the rea sonable expense of nece ssary repa ir of the damag e to Sean’s vehicle arising from the acc ident with Defe ndant. 4. That the diff

ere nce be tween the fair ma rket va lue of Sea

n’s vehicle immediately befor e the acc ident and the fair marke t value of the unrepa ired vehicle immediately afte r the ac cident is g reater than the rea sonable e x pense se t forth in Ex hibit ‘A’.” Hasib’s re sponse was a s follows:
“1-4 Objection. Requests are improper, askin g fo r opinions that are not true fac ts. Fur thermore
, said reque st is in violation of Supreme Court Rule 213
, b y failing to disclose the defe ndant as g iving such opinions and fails to proper ly authenticate and lay a prope r founda

tion.” ¶ 23 In overr

uling Hasib and defe nse counsel’s objections to Sean’s reque st to admit, the trial
court ruled that “def

endant’ s blanket declination to respond substantively to the Request to Ad m i t an d his objections there to are found to be without merit, and basele ss, and unsupported by

any case law.” ¶ 24 In Hasib and defe nse counsel’s brief be fore the appe llate cour t, they now argue for the first time that “ ‘informing a jury in a neg lige nce action that a defe ndant is or is not insured constitutes reve rsible err or’ ” (quoting Neyzelman v. Treitman
, 273 I ll. App. 3d 511, 514, 652 N.E.2d 1300, 1303 (1995))

. Howeve r, ar guments and objec tions that were not madein the trial court cannot be made in the appellate court, a nd those arguments are deeme d waived. Hamilton v. Conley
, 356 I ll. App. 3d 1048, 1053, 827 N.E.2d 949, 955 (2 0 0 5 ) (issues not raised in the trial court are deeme d waived and cannot be argued for the first time on appea l). Def ense counsel is an experience d lawyer who is well awa re t h at if the reque st was

answe red, all ref

ere nces of insurance would have been deleted at trial upon its reque st to do

so. ¶ 25 Ne x t , Ha s i b and defe nse counsel argue that the rea sonablene ss of a proper ty dama ge repa ir estimate, the nece ssity of the repa irs estimated, and the differ ence in marke t value of

a vehicle befor e and afte r a traff ic acc ident are not deeme d proper in a persona l injury action. Although, that may be true, this case is not only a persona l injury action, but it is also a proper ty damag e action. Thus, the damag e to the vehicle cause d by Hasib’s neg lige nce and its value now ar e prope r. ¶ 26 Next, Hasib and defe nse counsel claim that a re qu es t t o admit must not call for leg al conclusions or opinions of law. Robertson v. Sky Chefs, Inc.
, 344 I ll. App. 3d 196, 200, 799 N.E.2d 852, 856 (2003) . We agree ; howeve r, S ean’ s reque st to admit did not request leg al conclusions or opinions of law. It mere ly reque sted a verific ation t h at Ha s ib’s insurance company had estimated the damag es to Sean’s ve hicle at $414.04. ¶ 27 The purpose of I llinois Supreme Court Rule 216 (ef f. Aug

. 1, 1985), is to do awa y with litigation involving matters that are not in dispute. People v. Mindham
, 253 I ll. App. 3d 792, 799, 625 N.E.2d 835, 841 (1993). In Sean’s motion for sanctions for bad-f aith response s to the reque sts to admit, Sean claimed Hasib’s objections violated Supreme Court Rule 137

-8-beca use they are not “we ll g rounded in fac t, [nor are they] war ranted by exis ting law or a g ood-fa ith argument for the extension, modification, or reve rsal of exis ting law.” I ll. S. Ct. R. 137 (eff

. Fe b. 1, 1994). Supreme Court Rule 137 states: “Eve ry pleading
, motion and other paper of a party repr esente d by an attorney shall be signe d by at least one attorney of rec ord in his individual name, whose addre ss sha ll be stated. A party who is not repr esente d by an attorney shall sign his pleading
, motion,

or other paper and state his addre ss. Ex cept when otherwise specific ally provided by rule

or statute, pleading s need not be verifie d or acc ompanied by aff idavit. The signa

ture of

an attorney or party constitutes a cer tificate by him that he has rea d the pleading
, motion

or other paper ; that to the best of his knowled ge, i n fo rmation, and belief formed afte r

rea sonable inquiry it is well g rounded in fac t and is war rante d by exis ting law or a g oodfaith argument for the extension, modification, or reve rsal of exis ting law, and that it is
not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to hara ss or to cause unnece ssary delay

or needle ss inc rea se in the cost of litigation. I f a pleading
, motion, or other paper is not signe d, it shall be stricken unless it is signe d promptly afte r the omission is called to the attention of the pleade r or movant. I f a pleading
, motion, or other paper is signe d in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signe d it, a repr esente d party , or both, an appropriate sancti o n , which may include an order to pay to the oth er p ar ty or parties the amount of rea sonable expenses incurre d beca

use of the filing of the pleading
, motion or other paper , including

a re asonable attorney

fee

. All proce eding s under this rule shall be brought w ithin the civil a ction in which the pleading
, motion or other paper ref erred t o has been filed, and no violation or alleg ed violation of this rule shall g ive rise to a separ ate civil suit, but shall be considere d a claim within the same civil action. Motions brought pursuant to this rule must be filed within 30 day s of the entry of final judgme nt, or if a timely postjudgment motion is filed, within 30 day s of the rulingon the postjudgme nt motion.

*** Where a sanction is imposed under this rule, the judge shall set forth with specific ity the rea sons and basis of any sanction so imposed either in the judgme nt order itself or in a sepa rate written orde r.” I ll. S. C t. R. 137 (eff. F eb. 1, 1994). The trial court awa

rded Sean attorney fee s for 12.7 hours or $3,175. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that defe nse counsel violated Supreme Court Rule 137 and awa

rding S ea n att orney fee s of $3,175. There fore
, we hold that the trial court proper ly assessed attorney fee s under Supreme Court Rule 137 ag ainst defe nse counsel for frivolous objections to Sean’s r equest to admit. ¶ 28 For the fore g oing rea sons, the judgme nt of the circ uit court of Cook County is a ffirme d.

¶ 29 Affir

med.

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