SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0364-16T4

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CECILLE JARRETT, individually

and as executrix of the estate 

of ADVIRA WALLACE, DECEASED,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

MR. JARRETT, husband of Cecille

Jarrett; MIDDLESEX COUNTY COLLEGE

OF NURSING; STATE OF NEW JERSEY and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants.

___________________________________

Submitted October 30, 2017 – Decided 

Before Judges Ostrer and Rose.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Middlesex County, Docket 

No. F-016118-15.

Cecille Jarrett, appellant pro se.

Reed Smith LLP, attorneys for respondent 

(Henry F. Reichner, of counsel and on the 

brief; Brian P. Matthews, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

June 25, 2018
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PER CURIAM

In this mortgage foreclosure appeal, defendant Cecille 

Jarrett appeals from the trial court's order granting summary 

judgment to plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. As we discern no 

genuine issues of material fact regarding Wells Fargo's right to 

foreclose, we affirm.

On February 5, 2002, Advira Wallace borrowed $144,000 from 

Weichert Financial Services (WFS) to purchase a residential 

property in Piscataway. The thirty-year note was secured by a 

mortgage on the property in favor of Mortgage Electronic 

Registration Systems, Inc., as WFS's nominee. Wallace died in 

2008, and her daughter Jarrett took title. On April 27, 2012, WFS 

assigned the mortgage to Wells Fargo. The assignment was recorded 

five days later.

Jarrett presents no competent evidence to dispute Wells 

Fargo's contention, based on its payment records, that the loan 

has been in default since January 1, 2013. On April 18, 2013, 

Wells Fargo served its notice of intention to foreclose, asserting 

a total net delinquency of $5,261.79. After Jarrett sought 

bankruptcy protection, Wells Fargo obtained an order vacating the 

automatic stay. Shortly thereafter, Wells Fargo filed its 

foreclosure complaint. The Vice President of loan documentation 
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certified that before filing the foreclosure complaint, Wells 

Fargo possessed the note, which was indorsed in blank. 

The following year, Wells Fargo filed its summary judgment 

motion. Jarrett opposed the motion and cross-moved to dismiss the 

complaint. On May 2, 2016, the trial court granted Wells Fargo's 

motion, and denied defendant's cross-motion. In a written 

statement of reasons, Judge Frank M. Ciuffani noted that Wells 

Fargo, as a holder of the note, possessed standing to enforce the 

note. This was evidenced by the vice president of loan 

documentation's certification. This appeal followed.

We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de 

novo, applying the same standard that governs the trial court. 

Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 330 (2010). 

"[T]he appellate court should first decide whether there was a 

genuine issue of material fact, and if none exists, then decide 

whether the trial court's ruling on the law was correct." Ibid. 

We extend no special deference to the trial court's legal 

determinations. Ibid. However, we deferentially review the trial 

court's evidentiary decisions. Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. 

& Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 382 (2010); MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 

191 N.J. 240, 253-54 (2007).

"The only material issues in a foreclosure proceeding are the 

validity of the mortgage, the amount of the indebtedness, and the 
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right of the mortgagee to resort to the mortgaged premises." Great 

Falls Bank v. Pardo, 263 N.J. Super. 388, 394 (Ch. Div. 1993), 

aff'd, 273 N.J. Super. 542 (App. Div. 1994). Jarrett presents no

competent evidence to contest the first two elements. Rather, she

argues Wells Fargo lacked standing. She contends that is so

because: Fannie Mae, not Wells Fargo, owns the mortgage note; 

Wells Fargo presented insufficient proof it possessed the note 

when it filed its complaint; and the assignment of the mortgage 

was invalid. We reject these arguments.

It is by now well settled that generally "either possession 

of the note or an assignment of the mortgage that predate[s] the 

original complaint confer[s] standing." Deutsche Bank Trust Co. 

Ams. v. Angeles, 428 N.J. Super. 315, 318 (App. Div. 2012). Here, 

Wells Fargo met both prerequisites.1

Through an appropriate certification of counsel, Wells Fargo 

presented to the court a true and accurate copy of the filed 

assignment of the mortgage by MERS, as WFS's nominee, to Wells 

 

1 We recognize that the court in Capital One, N.A. v. Peck, ___ 

N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2018) (slip op. at 7), held in a 

case in which the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, also 

known as "Freddie Mac," owned the loan, that possession of the 

note and a valid assignment must precede a complaint. The court 

still affirmed the foreclosure where the servicer did not possess 

the note, on equitable grounds. Id. at 8-9. However, as we 

discuss, Wells Fargo both possessed the note and was an assignee 

of the mortgage. 
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Fargo. Jarrett contends the assignment is invalid "because Fannie 

Mae is still the owner, holder, and controller of the mortgage 

instruments." We need not reach Wells Fargo's argument that 

Jarrett lacks standing to challenge the assignment's validity.2 

At most, Jarrett presents evidence – in the form of a "lookup" on 

Fannie Mae's website – that Fannie Mae owned the loan, although 

the website also stated that the servicer may physically possess 

the mortgage note. The website printout says nothing about control 

of the mortgage. Thus, Jarrett's evidence falls short of 

establishing that MERS, on behalf of WFS, lacked authority to 

assign the mortgage, or that the assignment was otherwise invalid.

Furthermore, according to an admissible certification of 

Wells Fargo's vice president for loan documentation, Wells Fargo 

possessed the note before it filed its complaint. That provides 

an alternative basis for Wells Fargo's standing. Deutsche Bank 

Trust Co. Ams., 428 N.J. Super. at 318. Jarrett's challenge to 

the certification itself is meritless. Furthermore, even if Fannie 

Mae owned the loan, that did not deprive Wells Fargo of standing

to foreclose. "As a general proposition, a party seeking to 

 

2 Therefore, we need not address whether a third party has standing 

to challenge a void assignment, even if he or she lacks standing 

to challenge a voidable assignment. See, e.g. Yvanova v. New 

Century Mortg. Corp., 365 P.3d 845, 848 (Cal. 2016); Mruk v. Mortg.

Elec. Registration Sys., 82 A.3d 527, 536-37 (R.I. 2013). 
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foreclose a mortgage must own or control the underlying debt." 

Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 

222 (App. Div. 2011) (emphasis added); See also N.J.S.A. 12A:3-

301 (stating that a person may enforce a note if the person is a 

holder, a non-holder in possession with rights of the holder, or 

it is entitled to enforce pursuant to N.J.S.A. 12A:3-309, or 

N.J.S.A. 12A:3-418(d), even if not in possession of the 

instrument).

To the extent not addressed, defendant's remaining arguments 

lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.