UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19
- 4218

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. WILLIAM RONALD DOUGLAS, II , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina , at Greensboro

. William L. Osteen, Jr. , District Judge. ( 1:10

- cr - 00420

- WO

- 1 )

Submitted : November 21 , 2019 Decided: November 25, 2019

Before KEENAN and DIAZ , Circuit Judges , and SHEDD , Senior Circuit Judge

.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

. Renorda Pryor, HERRING LAW CENTER, PLLC, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael Francis Joseph, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNIT ED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: William Ronald Douglas, II, appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing h im to 48 month s of imprisonment and 1 year of supervised release

. Counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but discussing whether the district court imposed a plainl y unreasonable sentence. In his pro se supplemental brief , Douglas argues that the controlled substances found in his vehicle were the fruit of Fourth Amendment violations . T he Government declined to file a response brief. “A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States v. Webb , 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Slappy , 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To consider whether a revocation sentence is pl ainly unreasonable, we first must determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.” Id. “A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sen tencing Guidelines’ nonbinding Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors

. ” I d. (footnotes and citation omitted)

. “[A] revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the court sufficiently states a proper basis for its conclusion that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed

. ” Id. (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).3 We conclude that the district court did not err when it imposed the 48

- month
sentence. T he district court properly calculated D ouglas’ policy statement range as 18

- 24 months, based on his Grade A violation and his criminal history category of III, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4 (a) , p.s. (2018) (revocation table) . The court heard the parties’ arguments and Douglas ’ allo cution , responded to the parties’ arguments , and explained the selected sentence in terms of the revocation

- relevant statutory factors

. The district court thoroughly explained its rationale for imposing the above

- policy statement

range sentence in terms o f the relevant § 3553(a) factors and specifically addressed counsel’s arguments for a sentence within the policy statement range

. In accordance with Anders , we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We have considered the arguments presented in Douglas ’ pro se supplemental brief and conclude th ey are without merit. * We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Douglas , in writing, of his right to petitio n the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If Douglas requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Douglas. We dispense with

* Douglas ’ claim in his pro se supplemental brief that the drugs seized during his traffic stop should have been suppressed fails because the exclusionary rule does not apply in supervised release revocation proceedings. United States v. Armstrong , 187 F.3d 392, 394

- 95 (4th Cir. 1999).4 oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED