J-S25045-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.A.S., JR. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: S.S., SR., NATURAL FATHER

 No. 38 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order December 10, 2014 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County 

Orphans' Court at No.: 20004 of 2014 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED JUNE 02, 2015

S.S., Sr. (Father) appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Lawrence County, entered on December 10, 2014, that terminated his 

parental rights to his son, S.A.S., Jr. (Child), born in October of 2011. We 

affirm.1

Lawrence County Children and Youth Services (CYS) first became 

involved with Child when Father and Mother took him to a hospital on July 

24, 2012, “and claimed worms were coming out of [his] skin.” (N.T. 

Involuntary Termination, 5/08/14, at 18). The hospital referred Child to 

CYS, which took legal and physical custody of Child on July 25, 2012. The 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

1

 N.R. (Mother) consented to the termination of her parental rights to Child. 
J-S25045-15 

- 2 - 

trial court adjudicated Child dependent and placed him in the custody and 

control of CYS on August 9, 2012. CYS placed Child in kinship care with the 

consent of his parents. Child has resided in the same kinship home 

throughout his placement and has had no contact with Father since October 

17, 2012. 

CYS created a Child Permanency Plan (CPP) for Father that Father 

signed on September 19, 2012. The CPP goals established for Father were: 

(1) complete a parenting course through Children’s Advocacy Center; (2) 

obtain a drug and alcohol assessment and follow any and all 

recommendations; (3) obtain and maintain a safe, stable home environment 

for himself and Child; (4) visit Child regularly; and (5) sign necessary 

releases for CYS. 

Father reviewed the plan with CYS caseworker, Gary Zarilla, and 

informed him that he would soon go to jail, and that he would not be able to 

complete the goals of the plan prior to his incarceration. 

Father was incarcerated in November 2012 and, in January of 2013, 

was sentenced to a term of incarceration of not less than three to not more 

than six years related to his operation of a methamphetamine lab in the 

home. Father’s anticipated release date is November of 2015. CYS revised 

Father’s CPP goals after his incarceration. Father’s new goals were: (1) 

address his drug and alcohol use; (2) learn parenting skills; (3) demonstrate 

financial and personal stability; (4) learn to plan long-term; and (5) 
J-S25045-15 

- 3 - 

demonstrate mental and emotional stability. Father was not able to begin 

work on his goals while at SCI Camp Hill but had to wait until he arrived at 

his “home” prison of SCI-Mercer. 

Father owns a house in New Castle, Pennsylvania, where he will reside 

upon his release from prison, and he expects to have a job upon his release. 

CYS filed its petition to terminate Father’s parental rights on January 

22, 2014, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1),(2), (8), and (b). The 

trial court entered its decree terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (8), and (b) on December 10, 2014. 

Father timely appealed on January 2, 2015, and filed his statement of errors 

complained of on appeal on January 6, 2015.2

Father raises the following questions on appeal: 

[1] Whether the [trial] court erred in finding that [CYS] proved 

by clear and convincing evidence that sufficient grounds existed 

to terminate the parental rights of [] Father[?] 

[2] Whether the [trial] court erred in not finding that [CYS] 

failed to provide [] Father with reasonable efforts to promote 

reunification with [Child?] 

[3] Whether the [trial] court erred in finding that [CYS] 

provided [sic] by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the 

best interest of [Child] that the rights of [] Father be 

terminated[?] 

____________________________________________ 

2

 Because there was no objection or claim of prejudice from Appellee, we 

have accepted the late filing in reliance on our decision in In re K.T.E.L., 

983 A.2d 745 (Pa. Super. 2009). 
J-S25045-15 

- 4 - 

(Father’s Brief, at 5). 

Our standard of review is as follows: 

. . . In an appeal from an order terminating parental 

rights, our scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the 

evidence presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings 

and legal conclusions. However, our standard of review is 

narrow: we will reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude 

that the trial court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or 

lacked competent evidence to support its findings. The trial 

judge’s decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury 

verdict. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

Further, we have stated: 

Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by

competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court 

even though the record could support an opposite result. 

We are bound by the findings of the trial court 

which have adequate support in the record so long 

as the findings do not evidence capricious disregard 

for competent and credible evidence. The trial court 

is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility 

determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. 

Though we are not bound by the trial court’s 

inferences and deductions, we may reject its 

conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are 

clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court’s 

sustainable findings. 

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). 

In order to affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need 

only agree with any one subsection of Section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 

843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 

1141 (Pa. 2004). 
J-S25045-15 

- 5 - 

Requests to have a natural parent’s parental rights terminated are 

governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, which provides, in pertinent part: 

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds: 

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing 

of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose 

of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has 

refused or failed to perform parental duties. 

* * * 

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b). 

It is well-settled that a party seeking termination of a parent’s rights 

bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by “clear and convincing 

evidence,” a standard that requires evidence that is “so clear, direct, 

weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In 

re T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Further, 
J-S25045-15 

- 6 - 

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve 

the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness 

in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the 

parent-child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by 

waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s 

parental responsibilities while others provide the child with his or 

her physical and emotional needs. 

In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted). 

To terminate parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), the 

person or agency seeking termination must demonstrate “through clear and 

convincing evidence that: for a period of at least six months prior to the 

filing of the petition, the parent’s conduct demonstrate[d] a[] settled 

purpose to relinquish parental rights or that the parent has refused or failed 

to perform parental duties.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 

1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)). 

With respect to section 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has held: 

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental 

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the 

court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s 

explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment 

contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the 

effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to 

Section 2511(b). 

In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 1998) (citation 

omitted). Further, 

. . . the trial court must consider the whole history of a given 

case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory 

provision. The court must examine the individual circumstances 

of each case and consider all explanations offered by the parent 
J-S25045-15 

- 7 - 

facing termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if 

the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly 

warrants the involuntary termination. 

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 872 

A.2d 1200 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted). 

The Adoption Act3 provides that a trial court “shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). It does not make specific 

reference to an evaluation of the bond between parent and child, but our 

case law requires the evaluation of any such bond. See In re E.M., 620 

A.2d 481, 483 (Pa. 1993). However, this Court has held that the trial court 

is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation 

performed by an expert. See In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. 

Super. 2008). 

 Concerning incarcerated persons, our Supreme Court has stated: 

. . . incarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a determinative 

factor, in a court’s conclusion that grounds for termination exist 

under § 2511(a)(2) where the repeated and continued incapacity 

of a parent due to incarceration has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence and that 

the causes of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied. 

* * * 

. . . [W]e now definitively hold that incarceration, while not a 

litmus test for termination, can be determinative of the question 

of whether a parent is incapable of providing “essential parental 

____________________________________________ 

3

 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938. 
J-S25045-15 

- 8 - 

care, control or subsistence” and the length of the remaining 

confinement can be considered as highly relevant to whether 

“the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent,” sufficient 

to provide grounds for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(2). See e.g. Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d [883,] 891 

[(Pa. 1986)] (“[A] parent who is incapable of performing 

parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one who refuses to 

perform the duties.”); [In re] E.A.P., 944 A.2d [79,] 85 [(Pa. 

Super. 2008)] (holding termination under § 2511(a)(2) 

supported by mother’s repeated incarcerations and failure to be 

present for child, which caused child to be without essential care 

and subsistence for most of her life and which cannot be 

remedied despite mother’s compliance with various prison 

programs). If a court finds grounds for termination under 

subsection (a)(2), a court must determine whether termination 

is in the best interests of the child, considering the 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child pursuant to § 2511(b). In this regard, trial courts must 

carefully review the individual circumstances for every child to 

determine, inter alia, how a parent’s incarceration will factor into 

an assessment of the child’s best interest. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 828, 830-31 (Pa. 2012).4

 In response to Father’s first issue, whether CYS presented sufficient 

evidence to terminate his parental rights pursuant to subsection (a), we 

quote the trial court with approval where it stated: 

Gary Zarilla, the [CYS] caseworker assigned to [Child’s] 

case, testified with respect to Father’s compliance with the 

[CPP]. Father wrote to CYS upon placement in his assigned 

penitentiary. Father informed CYS that he had signed up for a 

parenting class, but was placed on a waiting list for the class. To 

____________________________________________ 

4

 The Supreme Court cited its decision in In re: Adoption of McCray, 331 

A.2d 652, 655 (Pa. 1975), for the proposition that termination may be 

appropriate for an incarcerated parent who has failed to perform his parental 

duties for a six-month period of time. See In re Adoption of S.P., supra

at 828. 
J-S25045-15 

- 9 - 

date, Father has not completed a parenting class. Father did not 

complete a drug and alcohol assessment, and he has not 

maintained suitable housing for [Child]. Father’s last visit with 

[Child] was on October 17, 2012, one month prior to his 

incarceration. During the three visits Father had with [Child] 

prior to [his] incarceration, [he] failed to behave appropriately. 

Furthermore, Father failed to provide CYS with releases for his 

service providers. 

On May 1, 2013, Father was provided with a modified

[CPP]. The second plan was designed to accommodate Father’s 

ability to reach the goals during [his] incarceration. Under the 

second [CPP], Father had to inquire as to the availability of drug 

and alcohol services at his current facility; take all necessary 

steps to register for any drug and alcohol classes that may be 

available; learn parenting skills; demonstrate financial and 

personal stability; develop long-term planning goals and display 

mental and emotional stability. 

Father did complete a drug and alcohol assessment at the 

Mercer State Correctional Institution, but documentation of 

Father’s compliance indicates that Father completed the 

assessment following the filing of the Petition for Involuntary 

Termination. Similarly, Father signed up for parenting classes 

while incarcerated, but Father was put on a wait list for this 

program. Father did not establish any programs [sic] towards 

achieving any of the remaining goals under the second [CPP]. 

(Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/14, at 8-9). 

The record demonstrates that Father’s incarceration was not a factor in 

his refusal or inability to parent Child. Therefore, Father’s first claim is 

without merit.

We also find the trial court’s reasoning persuasive in its response to 

Father’s second claim that CYS did not make reasonable efforts to reunite 

him with Child: 

. . . [The trial c]ourt has not made any finding that CYS has 

failed to provide Father with reasonable efforts to promote 
J-S25045-15 

- 10 - 

reunification with [Child]. In fact, the record clearly supports the 

alternative. In this case, CYS initially established a [CPP] with 

Father. Father displayed poor parenting skills and no compliance 

with any of the established goals. When Father became 

incarcerated and his circumstances changed, CYS established a 

second [CPP] that reevaluated Father’s goals based upon his 

new situation. Again Father failed to establish any significant 

compliance with the second [CPP]. 

(Id. at 12). 

Our Supreme Court recently rejected the argument that the provision 

of reasonable efforts by the county children’s services agency is a factor in 

termination of the parental rights of a parent to a child. See In re D.C.D.

105 A.3d 662, 673-74, 676 (Pa. 2014) (rejecting suggestion that an agency 

must provide reasonable efforts to enable parent to reunify with child prior 

to termination of parental rights). Thus, based on our Supreme Court’s 

holding in In re D.C.D., we find no merit to Father’s second argument. 

 Furthermore, the record establishes that termination is in the best 

interest of the Child. Child has been in placement with his half-siblings since 

he was nine months old. At the time of the hearing in this matter, he was 

three years of age. Child has had no contact with Father since October 17, 

2012, more than two years prior to the termination hearing. Our 

examination of the record reveals that there is sufficient evidence to permit 

the trial court to conclude that there is no evidence of a bond between 

Father and Child. “[I]n cases where there is no evidence of a bond between 

a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.” In re 

Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). 
J-S25045-15 

- 11 - 

Our review of the record reveals that the trial court’s decision to 

terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1) 

and (b) is supported by clear and convincing evidence, and that there was 

no abuse of the trial court’s discretion. See In re L.M., supra at 511. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 6/2/2015