Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

NORMAN A. ELLIS SR. STACEY M. DAVIS

Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

NORMAN A. ELLIS SR., )

)

Appellant-Respondent, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1201-DR-62

)

SIKANYISO ELLIS, )

)

Appellee-Petitioner. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Heather A. Welch, Judge

The Honorable Caryl F. Dill, Magistrate

Cause No. 49D12-1104-DR-15572

May 23, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BRADFORD, Judge
2

Appellant-Respondent Norman A. Ellis Sr. (“Husband”) and Appellee-Petitioner 

Sikanyiso Ellis (“Wife”) were married on or about February 2, 2002. On April 20, 2011, 

Wife filed for divorce after the parties were involved in some kind of domestic disturbance. 

The trial court issued an order dissolving the parties’ marriage on November 16, 2011. 

Husband raises numerous allegations of trial court error on appeal and requests that the 

matter be remanded with an order that the parties participate in mediation. Finding no error, 

we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

The parties were married on or about February 2, 2003. There were no children born 

to the parties during the marriage. The parties were separated on or about April 11, 2011, 

and Wife filed for divorce on April 20, 2011. Wife did not seek any provisional relief in her 

petition for divorce. 

The matter was set for a preliminary hearing on May 18, 2011. At some point before 

the May 18, 2011 preliminary hearing, Wife filed a petition for an order of protection against 

Husband. The trial court heard evidence on Wife’s petition for an order of protection during 

the May 18, 2011 preliminary hearing. Following the hearing, the trial court found that Wife 

had not satisfied her burden of proof and dismissed her petition for an order of protection.

 

1

 We note that our review of the instant matter was made more difficult by Husband’s failure to

provide this court with a transcript of the divorce proceedings as well as a failure to provide this court with 

certain relevant documents that were allegedly filed with the trial court. In light of the lack of a transcript, we 

will base our review, where necessary, on the Decree of Dissolution issued by the trial court and the 

Magistrate’s Rule 31 Certified Statement of the Evidence that was filed with this court on appeal.
3

On May 27, 2011, Husband filed a Countersuit for Dissolution of Marriage and for 

Preliminary Hearing for Issuance of a Restraining Order. The trial court set a preliminary 

hearing for July 27, 2011. Husband acknowledged that he received notice of this hearing. 

Husband filed a new petition for an order of protection on June 3, 2011. Also on June 3, 

2011, the trial court, on its own motion, issued an order converting the July 27, 2011 

preliminary hearing to a final hearing. On July 14, 2011, Husband filed a request for 

mediation and an ex parte letter to the court. The ex parte letter was not read or considered 

and the request for mediation was denied.

On July 27, 2011, the trial court conducted a final hearing on the parties’ divorce 

petitions. The trial court provided the parties with an expanded time period for the hearing to 

allow each party ample time to be heard. During the hearing, Wife presented a proposed 

valuation and division of property. Husband contested some of the values contained in 

Wife’s proposed valuation of property but presented no alternative valuation. Husband was 

given an opportunity to cross examine Wife and present testimony on his own behalf 

regarding the issue of property value and division. Husband, however, did not offer any 

evidence and merely requested an equal division of the assets while asserting that he was 

unwilling to assume an equal division of the liabilities. The trial court allowed Husband 

seven days after the hearing to file a list of personal items that he believed should be awarded 

to him. The trial court held a subsequent hearing on November 2, 2011, during which the 

court heard arguments relating to the division of the parties’ assets, liabilities, and personal 

property. During this subsequent hearing, Husband apparently agreed that Wife should 
4

receive the parties’ home and a vehicle, along with all debts associated with the home and the 

vehicle. 

On November 16, 2011, the trial court issued an order dissolving the parties’ 

marriage. In this order, the trial court awarded both parties certain personal property. The 

trial court awarded the parties’ residence and vehicle to Wife, and assigned her all liabilities 

associated with these items.2 The personal debts of each party were attributed to that party. 

The trial court’s order also indicated that Wife could retain her last name, which she adopted 

from Husband after the parties’ marriage. This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Initially we note that Husband raises numerous issues on appeal but has largely failed 

to present any argument supported by cogent reasoning or citations to relevant authorities, 

statutes, or parts of the record as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

The purpose of the appellate rules, especially Ind. Appellate Rule 46, is to aid 

and expedite review, as well as to relieve the appellate court of the burden of 

searching the record and briefing the case. [Thacker v. Wentzel, 797 N.E.2d 

342, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).] Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) states that the 

argument section of an appellant’s brief “must contain the contentions of the 

appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each 

contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the 

Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on....” It is well settled that 

we will not consider an appellant’s assertion on appeal when he has failed to 

present cogent argument supported by authority and references to the record as 

required by the rules. Thacker, 797 N.E.2d at 345. If we were to address such 

arguments, we would be forced to abdicate our role as an impartial tribunal 

and would instead become an advocate for one of the parties. This, clearly, we 

cannot do. See id.

 

2

 The property valuation submitted by Wife indicates that the liabilities associated with the residence 

and the vehicle are greater than the value of the items. 
5

Shepherd v. Truex, 819 N.E.2d 457, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). However, despite Husband’s 

failure to provide citations to the record or relevant authority, and his failure to present 

cogent argument in support of his claims, where possible, we will attempt to review the 

merits of Husband’s claims. 

I. Preliminary Hearing

Husband contendsthat the trial court erred by failing to conduct a preliminary hearing 

on the parties’ divorce. The record, however, indicates that the trial court conducted a 

preliminary hearing on May 18, 2011. The trial court held this hearing despite the fact that 

there had not been a request for any provisional relief. During this hearing, the trial court 

allowed the parties the opportunity to discuss any preliminary matters that may have arisen 

and heard evidence relating to a request for an order of protection that was filed by Wife on 

or before the date of the hearing. Husband does not claim that he did not receive notice of 

this hearing. Rather, the record indicates that Husband attended this hearing and was given 

an opportunity to be heard by the trial court. 

Furthermore, to the extent that Husband claims that the trial court erred by failing to 

conduct a second preliminary hearing in the divorce proceedings after Husband subsequently 

filed his counter-petition for divorce, Husband has failed to point to any authority suggesting 

that the trial court was required to conduct an additional preliminary hearing merely because 

Husband filed his counter-petition in the ongoing divorce proceedings.3 In addition, Husband 

has failed to present a cogent argument relating to what, if any, preliminary matters existed 

 

3

 Husband correctly asserts that the trial court initially set the matter for a second preliminary hearing, 

but, on its own motion, subsequently converted the hearing from a preliminary hearing to a final hearing. 
6

but were not considered by the trial court. Husband has failed to demonstrate that the trial 

court erred in this regard. 

II. Notice of Final Hearing

Husband also contends that the trial court violated his fundamental due process rights 

by failing to provide him with adequate notice of the July 27, 2011 final hearing, claiming 

that he did not receive proper notice of the final hearing because he was not made aware of 

the final hearing until approximately fifteen minutes before it was scheduled to begin. In 

support, Husband relies on Marion County LR49-TR40 Rule 214(b) which provides, “In all 

dissolution ... matters, the Moving party or their counsel shall give notice of the time and 

place of the hearing or trial by subpoena, notice of hearing or letter, served upon the adverse 

party at least seven days prior to the trial date and file a copy of said notice with the Court on 

or prior to the trial date.”

In raising this claim, Husband acknowledges that he was aware of the July 27, 2011 

hearing, but claims that he did not receive the trial court’s notice that the hearing had been 

converted from a second preliminary hearing to a final hearing because he was incarcerated. 

The record clearly demonstrates that the trial court issued an order on June 3, 2011, alerting 

both parties that the July 27, 2011 hearing had been converted to a final hearing, and 

Husband did not present any evidence suggesting that he could not have received the trial 

court’s order while in jail. 

Husband also claims that because he was incarcerated prior to the July 27, 2011 

hearing, he did not have the opportunity to present evidence to the trial court. However, 
7

despite Husband’s claims to the contrary, the record clearly indicates that Husband was given 

the opportunity to present testimony on his own behalf, to fill out a financial declaration 

form, and to cross-examine Wife. The record shows that the trial court granted Husband an 

opportunity to submit evidence to the trial court after he was released from incarceration and 

even conducted a subsequent hearing on issues relating to the division of the parties’ assets, 

liabilities, and personal property. This subsequent hearing was conducted after Husband was 

released from incarceration and after he had submitted documentation regarding his proposed 

division of property to the trial court. As such, Husband has failed to demonstrate that his 

due process rights were violated or that he was prejudiced by any action of the trial court. 

Accordingly, we conclude that Husband has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in 

this regard.

III. Presentation of Evidence Relating to Credibility of Wife and Wife’s Son

Husband contends that the trial court erred because he was not permitted to present 

testimony relating to the credibility of Wife or Wife’s son. Husband, however, has failed to 

present any cogent argument in relation to this claim. As such, pursuant to Indiana Appellate 

Rule 46(A)(8)(a), Husband has waived this claim. 

IV. Denial of Request for Court Appointed Attorney

Husband also contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for a courtappointed attorney. In civil matters, the trial court is not required to appoint counsel for a 

party, but may do so under exceptional circumstances. See Ind. Code § 34-10-1-2(b)(2). In 

deciding whether to appoint an attorney, the trial court may consider (1) the likelihood that
8

the applicant will prevail on the merits of his claim or defense, or (2) the applicant’s ability to 

investigate and present his claims or defenses without an attorney, given the type and 

complexity of the facts and legal issuesin the action. Ind. Code § 34-10-1-2(c). A trial court 

should deny a request for court-appointed counsel if it determines that (1) the applicant failed 

to make a diligent effort to obtain an attorney before filing the application, or (2) the 

applicant is unlikely to prevail on his claim or defense. Ind. Code § 34-10-1-2(d). 

Husband asserts that he filed several motions seeking the appointment of counsel. 

Husband, however, did not include these motions in the record on appeal and the 

Magistrate’s Certified Statement of the Evidence merely indicates that Husband’s request for 

appointment of counsel was denied. Accordingly, we are unable to review what evidence, if 

any, Husband presented regarding his financial situation or what determinations the trial 

court made about Husband’s financial status, the complexity of the issues before the court, or 

the likelihood that Husband would prevail on the issues relating to the divorce. As a result, 

we conclude that Husband has failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to court-appointed 

counsel under Indiana Code section 34-10-1-2, or that the trial court erred in this regard.4

V. Division of Assets and Liabilities

Husband also contends that the trial court erroneously divided the parties’ marital 

estate, arguing that he did not receive any community property, only certain items of personal 

property. In raising this claim, Husband makes baseless allegations of fraud and deceit by 

 

4

 To the extent that Husband argues that he was entitled to court-appointed counsel under Article I, 

Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United State Constitution, we 

note that the constitutional provisions relating to the right to counsel extend only to criminal matters and do not 

provide an individual with a right to counsel in a civil matter.
9

Wife and Wife’s counsel with respect to the valuation of the parties’ assets, liabilities, and 

personal property. Husband also makes baseless allegations of unprofessional behavior by 

Wife’s counsel and insinuates that the trial court’s decision regarding the division of property 

could have potentially been retaliation for his filing a complaint with the judicial 

qualifications committee.

The record demonstrates that Husband indicated that he was unwilling to take on any 

debts or liabilities associated with any property owned by Wife, including a vehicle and the 

home in which the parties had resided. Wife, on the other hand, presented a financial 

declaration that included information relating to the value of the home and vehicle as well as 

the outstanding liabilities associated with these assets. Wife indicated a willingness to take 

on the outstanding liabilities, which exceed the value of the items, and to retain ownership of 

the home and the vehicle. In his proposed division of the parties’ property, Husband claimed 

that he should receive half of the value of the home and the vehicle. However, the record 

indicates that during the subsequent hearing before the trial court, Husband apparently 

dropped this claim and agreed that Wife should retain the home and vehicle. Further, with 

respect to personal property, Husband did not present any evidence relating to the value of 

any of the personal property claimed by the parties. As such, we conclude that Husband has 

failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in dividing the parties’ marital estate.

VI. Wife’s Last Name

Husband also contends that the trial court erred in allowing Wife to retain her last 

name, which she adopted after the parties were married. Husband, however, has failed to 
10

present any cogent argument in relation to this claim. As such, pursuant to Indiana Appellate 

Rule 46(A)(8)(a), Husband has waived this claim. 

VII. Issues Relating to Storage Unit

Husband last contends that the trial court erred in some regard with respect to a 

storage unit that was initially rented by Wife and in which some of Husband’s personal 

property was placed. Husband, however, has failed to present any cogent argument in 

relation to this claim. As such, pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), Husband has 

waived this claim. 

CONCLUSION

In sum, we conclude that Husband has failed to demonstrate any error by the trial 

court with respect to any of the claims raised on appeal.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

RILEY, J., and BROWN, J., concur.