About the Report

The militarization and politicization of humanitarian efforts 

have led to diminishing effectiveness on the ground and greater 

dangers for humanitarian workers, leaving humanitarian action in 

a state of crisis. Without a vigorous restatement of the principles 

of humanitarianism and a concerted effort by the international 

community to address the causes of this crisis, humanitarian 

action will, as this report concludes, progressively become a tool 

selectively used by the powerful and possibly fail in its global 

mission of protecting and restoring the dignity of human life.

About the Author

Søren Jessen-Petersen is a former assistant high commissioner 

for refugees in the office of the UN High Commissioner for 

Refugees (UNHCR) and UN special representative for Kosovo. 

He has served UNHCR in Africa and the Balkans as well as 

at its headquarters in Geneva and New York. He is currently 

teaching migration and security at the School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University, and at the School of Advanced 

International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He was a 

Jennings Randolph guest scholar at the United States Institute 

of Peace from November 2006 to June 2009.

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 273 June 2011

© 2011 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Søren Jessen-Petersen

Humanitarianism 

in Crisis

Summary

•	 With the end of the Cold War, internal conflicts targeting civilian populations proliferated. As 

international political institutions struggled to figure out how to deal with these conflicts, 

humanitarian action often became a substitute for decisive political action or, more worryingly, 

was subsumed under a political and military agenda. 

•	 The increasing militarization and politicization of humanitarian efforts have led to growing 

ineffectiveness of humanitarian action on the ground and greater dangers for humanitarian 

workers. Without a vigorous restatement of the principles of humanitarianism, humanitarian 

action will remain in a state of crisis and continue to be a selective tool for the powerful 

and hence fail in its global mission of protecting and restoring the dignity of human life. 

•	 There are six main causes of the humanitarian crisis, which first began to manifest itself 

in the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo and later in Afghanistan and Iraq. These causes are 

principally structural and operational in nature.

•	 The new post–Cold War types of conflict have thrown humanitarian workers and organizations into the middle of conflicts, with a constant risk of being perceived as taking sides.

•	 Many humanitarian agencies and their donors too easily and uncritically accept the conditions for involvement set by the military in those increasingly frequent operations where 

security forces are part of the integrated response to a crisis. This problem is aggravated 

by the fact that key military forces often come from the countries that are also donors to 

the humanitarian organizations.

•	 As recent events in the Arab world demonstrate, there can be no stability if human security 

is not protected. The main protection responsibility is the legal protection of the displaced 

and refugees. Today, humanitarian staff is often obliged to provide physical protection and 

assistance in the midst of conflict zones.

•	 There are far too many humanitarian organizations present in new and major emergencies. 

For example, in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, there were more than nine 

hundred international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on the ground. 

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Contents

Introduction 2

Causes of the Crisis 3

Conclusions and Recommendations 8
2

•	 Although there has been considerable improvement in the coordination among humanitarian agencies, a continued lack of coherence among political, security, development, 

humanitarian, and human rights agencies continues to pose serious problems. 

•	 In too many operations, the presence of a noticeable number of humanitarian NGOs from 

the North and the West give weight to the perception in many countries in the South that 

humanitarian operations are an integral part of a political strategy to maintain and increase 

the power and dominance of the North and West. 

•	 The challenges confronting humanitarian action have no easy answers. To begin to address 

the crisis, the international community should pay more attention to conflict prevention 

to minimize human costs and to mitigate the need for humanitarian action. Militaries should 

be trained in how to respect humanitarian principles in their operations, and humanitarian 

organizations should be proactive in maintaining impartiality and independence of action. 

Introduction

With the end of the Cold War, internal conflicts proliferated as hitherto oppressed people 

rose up against totalitarian regimes. As international political institutions struggled to 

figure out how to deal with the new type of conflicts, humanitarian action often became a 

substitute for decisive political action or, more worryingly, was subsumed under a political 

and military agenda, including the so-called war on terror. 

Operations in the former Yugoslavia (early 1990s), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and 

Iraq (2003) not only tested the principles of humanitarian action but also jeopardized its 

integrity. In all these operations the distinction between humanitarian and military operations became blurred, and thus the principles of independence, impartiality, and neutrality 

underlying the latter have become increasingly confused, diluted, and eventually disregarded. 

The lack of clear political objectives (former Yugoslavia), the lack of an international mandate 

covering the military intervention (Kosovo and Iraq), and operations that explicitly targeted 

one side of the conflict (Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq) compounded the problem.

Collectively, these operations have left humanitarian action in a state of crisis. The militarization and politicization of humanitarian efforts have led to growing ineffectiveness on 

the ground and greater dangers for humanitarian workers. Without a vigorous restatement 

of the principles of humanitarianism, humanitarian action will remain in a state of crisis and 

continue to be a tool used selectively by the powerful and might fail in its global mission 

of protecting and restoring the dignity of human life.

The crisis in humanitarian action comes at the worst possible time. For the foreseeable 

future, there is no doubt that conflicts, disasters, and displacement will pose humanitarian 

challenges of levels and dimensions as never before and will require humanitarian support. 

The growing spread and effectiveness of the social media will put potent means at the disposal of societies’ marginalized people and pose mounting challenges to regimes prioritizing state security to the detriment of human security. The world faces—indeed, is already 

facing—natural disasters of unprecedented dimensions and complexities. Conflicts will 

proliferate as competition grows between ethnic, religious, and social groups over dwindling 

resources. Displacement and migration will increase significantly, whether internally from 

rural to urban areas or externally as whole lands and islands disappear or become uninhabitable. As the Financial Times reported in June 2009, there are estimates that the world may 

experience climate change—or natural disaster—induced migration of up to 200 million 

people in the coming years. 

Respect for the human being and wherever possible relief of human suffering without 

regard to nationality, race, religion, class, or politics is at the heart of mankind’s common 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor 

of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, 

D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American 

University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, James R. 

Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. • Kerry 

Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and 

Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Ikram U. Khan, President, 

Quality Care Consultants, LLC, Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. 

Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of 

Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA • Judy Van Rest, 

Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute, 

Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, 

Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C. 

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy •

Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
3

humanity. As a humanitarian active in the field for more than thirty years, I understand the 

dilemmas that humanitarian workers and agencies face, yet strongly believe that humanitarian action should not become a football of international politics. It is important that 

humanitarian values, principles, and the continued relevance of impartial and independent 

delivery of humanitarian aid be reaffirmed. To this end, this report first examines the causes 

of the crisis and then offers a series of recommendations for resolving it. 

Causes of the Crisis

There are six main causes of the crisis, which first began to manifest itself in the cases of the 

former Yugoslavia and Kosovo and later in Afghanistan and Iraq. These causes are principally 

structural and operational in nature.

The Changed Nature of Conflict

The new post–Cold War type of conflict is mostly internal, often a struggle over identity—be 

it ethnic, religious, cultural, or social—and frequently targeted against the civilian population. Humanitarian workers and organizations are often thrown into the middle of these 

conflicts, with a constant risk of being perceived as taking sides. And even if humanitarian 

agencies are doing their utmost to remain impartial, many rebel and other groups consider 

those not taking their side as automatically siding with the opponent and thus working 

against them. In other words, impartiality is perceived as complicity with the adversary. In 

whatever they do, humanitarian workers risk being perceived as part of a political strategy 

or operation.

The killings of humanitarian workers have more than doubled in the last seven years 

both in Afghanistan and across the globe as aid workers are lumped together with Western 

governments and military forces. UN humanitarian agencies are at particular risk when one 

arm of the United Nations takes positions that are deemed to be unfriendly by the host 

government or by insurgent groups. In many countries there is no understanding of the 

diversity of the United Nations and other international organizations or the distinction 

between political, judicial, development, and humanitarian groups. For example, when the 

International Criminal Court decided to indict President Omar Bashir of the Sudan, many 

Sudanese political and rebel groups from the northern part of Sudan made no distinction 

between the decision by this body and the action of UN humanitarian staff in Darfur. 

Attacking humanitarian staff workers is also relatively simple as they will always be softer 

targets than UN peacekeepers, although the latter are also increasingly targeted. During the 

conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, and mainly in Bosnia, many resolutions adopted by the UN 

Security Council were considered by the Serb separatists to be anti-Serb and often caused serious threats and security risks for the staff of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 

and other humanitarian agencies. As the special representative of the UN secretary-general for 

Kosovo and head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), I had to go to 

great lengths in making clear to the people of Kosovo that the indictment of the former prime 

minister of Kosovo was an action by the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 

Yugoslavia, an independent body, and that the United Nations in general and UNMIK in particular had neither the mandate nor the means to influence or interfere with its decisions.

As a result of the inevitable or at times intentional confusion between what is political 

and what is humanitarian action, the logo and flag of the United Nations, which are used 

by all UN organizations and agencies, rather than providing a distinct identity and a degree 

of protection for UN staff, now draw attacks by insurgents and rebel groups and even at 

times by states. Furthermore, the logos of both the United Nations and the International 

The killings of humanitarian 

workers have more than doubled 

in the last seven years both 

in Afghanistan and across 

the globe.
4

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), until recently an acknowledged sign of neutrality, are 

drowned in a sea of multiple logos and flags belonging to nongovernmental organizations 

that invade every new emergency. Undisciplined rebel and insurgent groups and sometimes 

national militaries may be ignorant and completely confused by all the flags, logos, and 

vehicles flying around. In the process, operational efficiency has decreased and security 

risks for humanitarian staff have increased. 

The operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, both launched by Western powers as part of the 

so-called war on terror, have sharpened this confusion. The Taliban have been declared the 

enemy, and for the fighters of the Taliban, there is little difference between Western political or military forces and Western humanitarian workers. The exposure of the humanitarian 

agencies is further increased when civilians are killed inadvertently by NATO forces. The 

civilian population finds it difficult to understand how actors in what they consider to be 

an assistance mission can kill with one hand and offer aid with the other hand, and the 

Taliban are never slow to exploit this apparent contradiction. It is difficult to suggest what 

humanitarian agencies can do to maintain their independence and neutrality in such situations, but it is obvious that political and military actors in Afghanistan should and could 

be much more mindful of the importance of not undertaking any humanitarian action that 

is not strictly respecting humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality. A strict 

separation of mandates, and respect for the separation, would go some way in reducing the 

risks of the public and insurgent forces ignoring or exploiting the confusion. 

The Militarization of International Action

Many humanitarian agencies and their donors too easily and uncritically accept the conditions for involvement set by the military in those increasingly frequent operations where 

security forces are part of the integrated response to a crisis. This problem is aggravated 

by the fact that key military forces often come from the countries that are also donors to 

the humanitarian organizations. It seems that some humanitarian organizations worry more 

about being present and visible in a major operation than the reasons why they should be 

there—in other words, to provide impartial and independent protection and assistance to 

the victims of conflict. In many situations, there will be a need for a military presence to 

provide a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and while there 

is a growing understanding among some in the military for the independence and nature 

of humanitarian action, it is often the humanitarian organizations that are too timid in 

defending their need for impartiality and independence and often fail to speak out loudly 

and clearly on these imperatives out of fear of losing donor support. Organizations must 

insist on acting in a humanitarian operation with military support rather than in a military 

operation with humanitarian support. 

A special responsibility lies with senior officials in the United Nations. The UN secretarygeneral should be the first to speak out when humanitarian operations and principles are 

disregarded by political or military forces, as the former UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, 

often did. And the senior UN humanitarian official, the emergency relief coordinator, should 

be the advocate and guardian of these principles both with the UN political bodies and the 

UN Security Council, and with governments and donors. Two former humanitarian chiefs in 

the United Nations, Sergio Viera de Mello and Jan Egeland, were powerful voices for the 

victims and the principles ensuring their protection and survival—possibly because they 

both, like Kofi Annan, had a background in the humanitarian world and understood that if 

they did not speak out, humanitarian action would lose its integrity and the often voiceless 

victims would not be heard and helped.

The civilian population finds 

it difficult to understand how 

actors in . . . an assistance 

mission can kill with one hand 

and offer aid with the other 

hand, and the Taliban are never 

slow to exploit this apparent 

contradiction.

Organizations must 

insist on acting in a 

humanitarian operation with 

military support rather than 

in a military operation with 

humanitarian support. 
5

A New Operational Focus

The changed nature of conflict has led to a need for a new type of response. In the more 

traditional situations of displacement, the main protection responsibility was and still is 

the legal protection of the displaced and refugees. The international protection of refugees, 

defined in the mandate of the UNHCR and codified in the 1951 Convention on the Status 

of Refugees, consists in rendering back to refugees the status they lost because of their 

flight, meaning the rights and responsibilities that come with citizenship, including the 

right to travel documents. The most important protection responsibility is to ensure that 

refugees are not forced back to the country where their lives and freedom are threatened, 

the principle of nonrefoulement.

In the first forty years following UNHCR’s establishment in 1950, its role as a guardian of 

the convention was mainly a judicial function. As such, UNHCR promoted the ratification by 

states of the relevant refugee conventions, advised states and their authorities on how to 

carry out their responsibilities, and oversaw that the conventions were respected and implemented. Operationally, UNHCR’s legal role consisted in ensuring that refugees were admitted 

into a safe country and given asylum, mainly in developing countries, and then given access 

to both survival assistance and more long-term assistance, aiming at self-reliance and eventually a durable solution to their plight.

Beginning in the early 1990s, with the emergence of internal conflicts that targeted 

civilian populations, a growing need emerged for UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies 

to focus also on the physical protection of the victims. This kind of response, throwing 

humanitarian personnel right into the middle of conflicts, has tested the security of staff 

and the agencies’ understanding of politically sensitive involvement, courage, and stamina. 

It has also severely exposed the difficulties in combining such action with the fundamental 

principles of impartiality and neutrality. How do you maintain your neutrality and impartiality when a forceful Sri Lanka military embarks on a final onslaught on the military forces of 

the Tamil Tigers and in the process indiscriminately targets the civilian population whom 

you are trying to protect? Do you speak out and risk incurring the wrath of the authorities 

and expulsion, leaving the civilians to their own fate, or do you silently try to do what you 

can against formidable odds? Can you and, indeed, should you be neutral in the face of such 

blatant atrocities on the civilians?

The protection of affected civilians should not be seen as the exclusive responsibility of 

just a few mandated agencies but as the raison d’être for any humanitarian activity. Lives 

cannot be rebuilt if the focus is not on saving and protecting them in the first instance. 

At the same time, protection should not primarily be an international responsibility but 

should first and foremost be a crucial part of responsible sovereignty, a principle anchored 

in and rightly seen as the first step of the responsibility to protect. In many of today’s 

humanitarian operations, the focus often seems to be on delivery of assistance without a 

clear understanding of assistance as part of a protection-oriented strategy. It is important 

that assistance activities are designed and implemented in such a way that they promote 

the protection of civilians and do no harm to the beneficiaries or to the principles underpinning the integrity of humanitarian action. It is essential that all parties to an integrated 

humanitarian operation, be they political, security, development, or humanitarian actors, 

understand and respect that the operation’s primary goal must be protection and that any 

activity should be carried out with that in mind.

The Security Council has also recognized that intervention in today’s conflicts requires 

a much stronger focus on the protection of civilians. I addressed the very first session 

of the Security Council in 1997, focusing on the protection of civilians in my capacity as 

UNHCR director in New York. Vital progress has been made since then. There is an increased 

The protection of affected 

civilians should not be seen as 

the exclusive responsibility of 

just a few mandated agencies 

but as the raison d’être for any 

humanitarian activity. 
6

awareness of the issues involved, and a number of resolutions have established an ambitious framework for action. The challenge now is to realize that ambition and to ensure that 

resolutions mandating international action in conflicts whenever appropriate contain a clear 

authority for peacekeeping forces and humanitarian agencies to ensure the protection of 

civilians caught up in the conflict. Furthermore, it is essential that the peacekeeping operations be given the means and resources to carry out their mandate lest they risk becoming 

a toothless tiger and doing further damage to the credibility of the United Nations. 

The Proliferation of Humanitarian Actors

There are far too many humanitarian organizations present in new and major emergencies. 

In the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, there were more than nine hundred international NGOs on the ground, adding to the confusion and lack of coherence and coordination on operational and strategic goals. The United Nations organizations, the ICRC, and 

major international voluntary agencies, as well as national authorities, which in the case of 

Haiti was already considerably decimated and understandably paralyzed by the dimensions 

and complexity of the disaster, waste too much time in having to monitor hundreds of small 

NGOs that run around in circles and cause more havoc than help. 

It is not only major emergencies that attract an inordinate amount of agencies but also 

high-profile ongoing operations. A September 2008 op-ed piece by Anne Applebaum in the 

Washington Post talked about the “chaos that is foreign aid in Afghanistan . . . where the 

alphabet soup of aid agencies . . . are driving up real estate and food prices . . . where the 

minister of rural development admits that he doesn’t know what all the NATO reconstruction 

teams in rural districts do.”

The Lack of Coordination

Humanitarian agencies and political, security, development, humanitarian, and human 

rights bodies must coordinate and cohere their strategies and efforts to ensure the effective 

and principled delivery of protection and assistance to the victims of conflict. A lot of time 

and energy have been spent over the years among humanitarian agencies and donors to 

discuss coordination. In particular, the United Nations, with its obsessive focus on process, 

has often given the impression that coordination was becoming an end in itself rather than 

the means toward the end. Humanitarian coordination should not be a bureaucratic exercise 

but a hands-on daily sharing of planning, information, implementation, and risks among 

staff and operational agencies in the field. Lately, considerable improvement has been 

made, with a much stronger focus on cooperation in the field rather than endless meetings 

in the UN corridors in New York and Geneva. In particular, the agreement among humanitarian agencies, under the leadership of the UN emergency relief coordinator, to establish the 

cluster approach to the response of situations of internal displacement, whereby selected 

agencies are given chief responsibility in providing assistance to various sectors such as 

camp management, protection, shelter, water, sanitation, and food, has clearly led to a 

much better and more predictable and effective response in addressing emergency situations of displaced. This approach became necessary as there is no mandated agency in 

charge of response to situations of internal displacement, unlike in the case of refugees, 

where UNHCR has the mandate based on the Statute of the Office of the UNHCR and various 

other General Assembly resolutions. However, the relatively slow response to the admittedly 

unprecedented and overwhelming crisis resulting from the 2010 earthquake in Haiti showed 

that there is still room for improvement in the cluster response. 

While donors continue to insist on better coordination among humanitarian agencies, the donor response is often completely uncoordinated and, with the growing focus 

Humanitarian coordination 

should not be a bureaucratic 

exercise but a hands-on 

daily sharing of planning, 

information, implementation, 

and risks.
7

on bilateral support, aimed at increasing national visibility and “showing the flag.” As a 

result, donors make it difficult for the United Nations to take charge of better coordination 

although the donors always urge the United Nations to do. A former UN special representative for Afghanistan, who at international conferences had been given a strong mandate to 

coordinate the donors, often complained, and rightly so, that donors did not respond to his 

efforts to coordinate them. I faced the same problem as the special representative of the 

UN secretary-general for Kosovo when I urged donors to coordinate their capacity-building 

projects in a more strategic operation to prepare Kosovo for statehood. Despite my appeals 

and concrete proposals, most donors continued their bilateral, uncoordinated efforts, with 

the result that the new state of Kosovo is still facing major problems of administrative and 

governing capacity.

Whereas there has been noticeable improvement in the coordination among humanitarian agencies, a continued lack of coherence among political, security, development, 

humanitarian, and human rights agencies continues to pose serious problems. On one hand, 

humanitarian agencies need to recognize that only political action can prevent or resolve 

conflicts. They have an interest in linking up with political bodies to ensure that humanitarian issues are factored into political discussions whether aimed at mediation efforts or 

peace agreements, and to insist on respect for the humanitarian principles of independence, 

impartiality, and neutrality in the conduct of integrated missions in the field. On the other 

hand, political bodies must respect humanitarian action as an integral part of the pursuit 

of durable peace and understand the need for humanitarian actors to act in a nonpolitical 

manner. Some politicians still look at humanitarian assistance as charity and the work of 

do-gooders. Political agreements are too often pursued with scant regard for humanitarian 

principles or interests, which is shortsighted at best and irresponsible at worst. No political 

agreement is sustainable if the root causes of conflicts are not addressed or resolved, which 

means listening to the grievances of victims on, among other issues, the need for justice, 

compensation for lost property, the return of the displaced to their places of origin, and 

efforts of reconciliation.

Concurrently, humanitarian actors must be consistent and united in their defense of the 

essential humanitarian principles and be prepared to speak out loudly and clearly if those 

principles are not being respected. More importantly, humanitarian agencies need to decide 

whether the short-term pursuit of donor support of an integrated mission—where political 

and military interests are overriding the humanitarian imperatives—is in the long-term interest of the integrity of humanitarian action. Organizations such as the ICRC and Médecins 

Sans Frontières (MSF) have already made up their minds both by speaking out forcefully 

against the politicization and militarization of humanitarian action and by not hesitating to 

pull out of operations where humanitarian principles are not being scrupulously respected. 

For example, MSF pulled out of the militarized operation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa 

in the mid-1990s and ICRC temporarily withdrew from the operation in Iraq.

To stay or not to stay—that is not just the question but also a huge dilemma for organizations that see their mission first and foremost as a protection responsibility. A decision to 

remain when humanitarian principles are being overridden by political and military considerations puts the long-term integrity of humanitarian action at risk. But a decision to withdraw 

puts at immediate risk the victims of conflict and beneficiaries of the humanitarian presence. 

As a senior official in UNHCR, I experienced that dilemma in the mid-1990s, when those 

responsible for the genocide in Rwanda moved hundreds of thousands of civilians, mainly 

women and children, across the border to what was then Zaire (today, Congo) and effectively 

took control of the running of the refugee camps, with no regard for humanitarian principles 

and with constant violations of the rights of the refugees. MSF and Care decided to pull out in 

protest against the military nature of the refugee camps. In UNHCR, while sharing the concern 
8

of the NGOs, we struggled for days with what to do, but we decided to remain in order to not 

leave the refugees isolated and at the mercy of the killers and “genocidaires” and in the hope 

that our presence might eventually have a positive impact on the protection of the refugees 

and the pursuit of a solution to their plight. It was one of those situations where a decision to remain was wrong and a decision to leave was equally wrong. We chose a pragmatic 

approach and what we considered to be the lesser of two evils and were heavily criticized 

by many governments, organizations, and media representatives. I have no doubt that we 

would also have been subjected to much criticism if we had opted to pull out. The lesson in 

this and in many similar situations is that decisions need to be made that consider the best 

interest of those whom you are mandated to protect, preferably based on consultations with 

them if that is feasible, and carried out with full transparency and clear communication on 

the reasons for the decision. 

The Lack of Diversity within Humanitarian Organizations

There are still too many workers from the northern and western hemispheres in humanitarian aid projects. In too many operations, the presence of a noticeable number of humanitarian staff from that part of the world gives weight to the perception in many countries 

in the South that humanitarian operations are an integral part of a political strategy to 

maintain and increase the power and dominance of the North and West—a perception evidently reinforced when the humanitarians are embedded in the operation and the military, 

literally, are calling all the shots. How can the United States expect an Afghan civilian to 

respect the neutrality and commitment of an American humanitarian worker if U.S. or other 

Western military forces launch indiscriminate or inadvertent attacks against targets in civilian environments? They become part and parcel of the same image of the foreigner and the 

enemy. In the process, the ability of the humanitarians to deliver support decreases and the 

risks to their security increase. 

A more visible and active presence of national and local organizations from the South 

would go a long way in dispelling the perceptions that humanitarians are part of a Northern 

and Western agenda. It would also underline the universality of humanitarian principles that 

have suffered greatly over the last decade with invasions and interventions in Afghanistan 

and Iraq. Furthermore, involvement of agencies from the south would also reduce the security risks to humanitarian staff coming from the same countries as the military contingents. 

It is a positive trend that today more than 75 percent of UN staff members around the world 

are nationals of the host country. But it is a sad fact that 80 percent of UN civilians killed 

during the same period have been local staff. It is essential that security precautions not 

only include local staff but that the particular exposure of such staff be addressed in any 

security plan as they easily risk being perceived as siding with one party to the conflict in 

view of their ethnic, religious, or social origin. When that risk does not exist or measures are 

taken to preempt such risks, local staff are often better than international staff in assessing the risks, crossing the front lines, negotiating passage at checkpoints, and resolving 

other problems on the way. I recall, for example, that the real and often unsung heroes in 

the humanitarian operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s were the local staff of 

UNHCR and other agencies. 

Conclusions and Recommendations

The challenges confronting humanitarian organizations have no easy solutions if any at all. 

If they get involved, they may be identified with a one-sided mission driven by political and 

military objectives. If they leave the military to take charge in the delivery of humanitarA more visible and active 

presence of national and 

local organizations from the 

South would go a long way in 

dispelling the perceptions that 

humanitarians are part of a 

Northern and Western agenda.
9

ian action because of security risks and problems of access, they jeopardize the future of 

humanitarianism. If they withdraw, either because of security concerns or in objection to 

conditions for the delivery of services set by political or military actors that run counter to 

humanitarian principles, they risk leaving the victims of conflict without protection and 

assistance or by default to assistance driven by the very political goals of the conflicting 

parties that prompted their withdrawal in the first place.

Humanitarian organizations and their supporters have often voiced concern over these 

challenges and the threats to the integrity and future of independent humanitarian actions 

that such challenges pose. Their voices of concern and objections have, however, been either 

too timid or silenced by the involvement of other agencies that may be prepared to accept 

involvement in operations without the necessary respect for humanitarian principles. At the 

same time, they have been ignored by political and military forces who either use humanitarian action in pursuit of their own strategies or who have scant regard for the importance 

of safeguarding humanitarian principles in their pursuit of what they consider to be broader 

and more important military or political goals.

Recognizing that there are few easy solutions to address the crisis in humanitarianism, 

humanitarian agencies and political actors could consider the following six actions:

1. Devote more attention and action to conflict prevention and, once deployed, 

recognize the specific role of humanitarian action. The new types of conflicts increasingly affect civilians. Massacres, atrocities, and population displacement are frequently part 

of a deliberate strategy for political control. Humanitarian assistance toward survival and 

recovery is important but must be an integral part of an overall strategy of safeguarding the 

physical and human security of the civilian population, meaning both ensuring its protection and empowering people to shape their own livelihood and dignity. As such, action to 

prevent and combat the targeting of the civilian population should not be taken solely by 

humanitarian agencies. More importantly, it should be initiated by political action and, if 

necessary, backed up by the support of peacekeeping forces.

Early preventive action, among other things based on early warning signals often originating from humanitarian staff in the field, would preempt both a humanitarian crisis and 

often save considerable costs both in terms of human lives and money. In case the crisis 

is not prevented, humanitarian action can buy time and space for political action but must 

not become a substitute for political action nor a reason to slow down the momentum and 

urgency in settling the conflict. In a postconflict settlement, humanitarian issues such as 

the return of the displaced, reconciliation, and demobilization must figure prominently. 

Any peace agreement can only lead to durable peace if it addresses the root causes of the 

conflict. Humanitarian actors cannot perform what the political institutions fail to do, and 

tackling the root causes should not be left to those charged with the implementation on the 

ground. Doing so would throw the humanitarian actors into a political role. As special envoy 

of UNHCR for the former Yugoslavia, I was in charge of an operation promoting the return of 

the some four million people who had been displaced during the wars. Unfortunately, while 

the Dayton Peace Accords stopped the war, the Accords did not address the root causes of 

the conflicts, which were the forceful change of territories and the forcible displacement 

of civilians. Rather, the Accords left in place the results of the war—new borders, new 

majorities, and the permanent displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. I soon 

realized that appealing to those same leaders who had conducted the ethnic cleansing in 

the first place to reverse what the war had been all about was a hopeless political task for 

a humanitarian official.

2. Train the military in humanitarian principles. The nature of today’s conflicts, 

many of which are internal, target the civilian population, and are fought by undisciplined 

groups, means that security for and access to the humanitarian operation will often require 

Humanitarian action can buy 

time and space for political 

action but must not become a 

substitute for political action 

nor a reason to slow down the 

momentum and urgency in 

settling the conflict. 
10

military support. It is essential that security forces be trained to understand and accept the 

fundamental principles of impartiality and independence guiding a humanitarian operation, 

and it is equally important that humanitarian organizations be trained to cooperate with 

security forces and ready to stand up and defend those principles to maintain the integrity 

of humanitarian action. Donor support must be based on performance and not conditioned 

upon agencies accepting being part of an integrated operation where the military literally 

call the shots. Humanitarian agencies should be able to count on the support of UN senior 

executives in defending their principles. 

If considering whether to withdraw from an operation that blatantly violates the principles of independence, impartiality, and neutrality, humanitarian agencies should carefully 

weigh considerations of the short- and long-term threat to the integrity of humanitarian 

actions and the implications of withdrawal on the protection of and assistance to the 

beneficiaries of humanitarian action and choose the “least bad” decision to resolve such 

dilemmas. Any decision should be based on the best interest of the beneficiaries, ideally 

based on consultations with them, and carried out with full transparency and clear communications on the reasons for the decision. Military institutions should also understand that 

compromising humanitarian principles may constitute short-term gains but long-term losses 

as doing so would weaken future humanitarian involvement and make it difficult if not 

impossible for humanitarian agencies to engage in a postconflict recovery and reconstruction mission that had been preceded by the use of force against one party to the conflict. 

3. Operationalize the concept of the responsibility to protect. The protection of civilians is a crucial part of responsible sovereignty, a principle anchored in and rightly seen as 

the first step of the responsibility to protect (R2P), the concept endorsed by the UN General 

Assembly at its summit in 2005. It is important that the concept of R2P, which is first and 

foremost a responsibility to prevent conflicts and human suffering, not primarily a means 

of intervention, be operationalized. The concept proposes a whole range of actions from 

diplomatic pressure, to sanctions, to international criminal prosecutions, and ultimately to 

the use of military action if all previous peaceful steps have failed and then only with the 

blessing of the UN Security Council. 

Since the late 1990s, the UN Security Council has recognized that internal conflicts 

targeting civilians are a threat to peace and security and require a much stronger focus on 

the protection of civilians, and has passed a number of successive resolutions that have 

established an ambitious framework for action. However, key Security Council member 

states, including permanent members such as China and Russia, seem increasingly reluctant 

to mandate any action that would suggest interference in the domestic matters of states. As 

long as member states fail to assume their responsibilities in maintaining peace and security, R2P and the UN Security Council resolutions on the protection of civilians will remain 

dead instruments. Just as the protection of civilians is a matter of responsible sovereignty, 

collective action through the Security Council to protect civilians in and from conflicts 

must be regarded as a matter of responsible solidarity. The continued opposition from many 

member states of the United Nations to putting the concept into practice has limited the 

UN Secretariat in its options. The appointment of a special adviser to the secretary-general 

and regular debates on the concept in the General Assembly are process rather than practice 

and, as such, harmless to member states not in favor of taking any further steps and harmful 

to all those victims, past, present, and future who might be saved and supported by more 

decisive national and international action protecting victims of conflict.

As recent events in the Arab world have demonstrated, there can be no stability if 

human security is not protected, respected, and promoted. The action by the international 

community to implement R2P and to take all appropriate necessary measures to protect the 

civilian population so directly targeted by the regime in Libya was a defining moment both 
11

for the concept of R2P and for the credibility of the United Nations to move from words to 

action. Events in Libya serve as yet another example of the importance of timely humanitarian 

assistance; apart from saving and supporting lives, it can buy time and space for political 

action, but it should not be a substitute for political action. 

4. Limit the number of humanitarian agencies and strengthen initiatives to hold 

humanitarian agencies accountable for their performance. The proliferation of humanitarian agencies in new and major emergencies and in some ongoing high-profile operations 

like those in Iraq and Afghanistan is not conducive to efficient, credible, coordinated, 

and accountable delivery of survival assistance. The multiplicity of actors is a drain and 

distractive on often limited host government capacity. Too much precious time is spent 

on coordinating and organizing timely and crucial response to the emergency. It leads 

to duplication of efforts and often is not in sync with the priorities of the humanitarian 

operation but rather driven by the priorities of the organization than by the needs of the 

host population.

There are several groups focusing on humanitarian performance. For example, the 

Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP International) acts as a quality assurance scheme 

for humanitarian agencies and vets members’ compliance with standards of accountability 

and management. An ideal approach—but one that would probably be difficult to realize—

would be a universal project of humanitarian accountability with certificates of competence 

awarded only to organizations that meet basic humanitarian principles and guidelines for 

humanitarian action and that recognize existing models of leadership and coordinating 

structures of the humanitarian response should act as a screening mechanism by both the 

host government, international agencies, and donor governments. The UN emergency relief 

coordinator should monitor the compliance with this requirement and should inform both 

the host government and donors accordingly. No agency without a “humanitarian certificate” should be allowed into the operation nor supported by donor money.

5. Improve coordination among humanitarian agencies. Coordination among humanitarian agencies must always be a hands-on daily sharing of planning, information, implementation, and risks among staff and operational agencies in the field, supported and backstopped 

by coordination activities at the headquarters of agencies, and aimed at mobilizing donor 

support and filling gaps in the delivery of protection and assistance. Donors must support 

the coordination of multilateral humanitarian action, and whether channeling their support 

bilaterally or multilaterally, they should coordinate better among themselves and ensure that 

bilateral or multilateral support does not undermine or complicate attempts at operational 

field coordination. Coordination of assistance efforts should be aimed at a more speedy, efficient, and effective delivery of support to those in need and toward more streamlined, simpler, 

and fewer calls on host governments, which are often severely overworked and underresourced. 

Support should not be used to promote national agendas or international mandates. 

6. Diversify and encourage participation of local organizations and staff. The universality of humanitarian principles and the effectiveness of humanitarian action would be 

strengthened by a more visible and active involvement in operations of staff and agencies 

from countries in the South. Such involvement would also be helpful in changing the perception that humanitarians are part of a Northern/Western agenda of dominance and, in 

the process, reduce the security risks to humanitarian staff from those parts of the world. 

At the same time, national authorities and international organizations and donors should 

invest more resources in strategic and operational capacity building, training, and providing 

special security measures for national staff of the host country. National authorities should 

be aware of their special responsibility in protecting both national and international personnel, and be mindful that attacks on humanitarian staff are crimes falling under the mandate 

of the International Criminal Court. National staff should be involved in all phases of an 
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www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

operation, eventually leading, planning, monitoring, and reporting from the first stages of 

a new operation, bringing to the exercise their better knowledge of local conditions, key 

players, including spoilers, and dangers. Donors should set aside earmarked funding for the 

support and involvement of national agencies and staff, whether operating as implementing 

partners of international organizations or as part of local agencies or authorities. 

In conclusion, humanitarian organizations must take the lead in launching a new debate 

aimed at defining and reaffirming the identity of humanitarian action and agencies as well 

as recovering the prominence and relevance humanitarian organizations once enjoyed. And 

they should lead a discussion of how and who should confront and tackle the many new 

humanitarian challenges the world will be facing over the next couple of decades—not for 

their own sake but in the interest of those millions of people who today, tomorrow, and in 

the coming years will rely on humanitarian staff to save and rebuild lives and societies in all 

parts of the world. While there will continue to be situations that, as a last resort, call for 

nonpeaceful means to stop the oppression of a civilian population, such situations should 

be addressed by military intervention based on an international mandate. Humanitarian 

action should not be intervention. It should be based on the fundamental principles of 

independence, impartiality, and neutrality. In turn, political and military institutions should 

see their own interest in supporting the integrity of humanitarian action so that their own 

primary mission is not deflected by a need to undertake humanitarian action. Further, such 

support may allow humanitarian action on the ground to buy time and space for political 

initiatives and conflict resolutions. 

Civilians are the targets of many of today’s man-made conflicts and the victims of an 

increasing number of natural disasters. They should not be the political targets of humanitarian aid but the beneficiaries of independent, impartial, and neutral support. Safeguarding 

humanitarian principles is a reflection of our common humanity.