ABOUT THE REPORT

On October 27, 2009, Berghof Peace Support, Conciliation

Resources, the HD Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and the

U.S.Institute of Peace convened a workshop in Washington,

D.C., to foster debate on modes of engagement with proscribed 

armed groups(e.g., armed groups,such asthe LTTE in Sri Lanka

and Hamasin the Palestinian Territories), the violent tactics of

which lead governmentsto restrict third partiesfrom engaging

with them. High-level mediators and policy expertsfrom various

institutional backgrounds discussed how different methods of

engagement and lessonsfrom previous cases can favorably

affect the practice of mediation, as well asthe implications of

antiterrorism laws and regulationsfor mediators. Thisreport

summarizesthe policy debate at the conference,synthesizing 

the discussions and recommendationsregarding the main criteria

and rationale for engaging with armed groups, possible risks of

engagement, best practicesin mediation, and potentialstepsto 

reform proscription regimes and advance peace.

Véronique Dudouet is a senior researcher at Berghof Conflict

Research in Berlin (Germany), where she coordinates a research

program on nonstate armed groups in transition. She holds a

PhD in conflict resolution from Bradford University. The author

would like to thank A. Heather Coyne (U.S. Institute of Peace),

Andy Carl (Conciliation Resources), Luc Chounet-Cambas (HD

Centre), Joshua Gross (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

at Tufts University), Susan Huntner (Davis Polk & Wardwell,

LLP), Cynthia Petrigh (Conciliation Resources), Teresa Whitfield

(HD Centre and Conciliation Resources), Oliver Wils (Berghof

Foundation for Peace Support), and Virginia M. Bouvier (U.S.

Institute of Peace).

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Véronique Dudouet

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t Reforms to antiterrorism legislation are required to improve its effectiveness and fairness 

and make it possible to engage diplomatically with proscribed armed groups. The legal 

basesfor proscription should be clarified and the criteria for delisting published. Listing and 

delisting instruments should be more nuanced and flexible. In addition, a separate legal 

and political component should facilitate engagement with proscribed groups in peace 

processes and humanitarian work. 

t Political engagement with proscribed armed groups is possible and desirable when, first, 

the conflict parties (state and nonstate alike) are interested in exploring political solutions 

to a conflict; second, the parties are seen as legitimate representatives of social, political, 

or cultural interests by their community; third, parties have the capacity to deliver a ceasefire or peace agreement; fourth, engagement could generate significant behavioral change 

on the part of the actors involved; and fifth, strategic national interests favor engagement, 

or there is a strong demand by allies or the conflict victims to engage politically.

t Potential mediators working with proscribed groups should be aware of the risks of conferring legitimacy to a violent group, undermining moderates, and possibly extending the conflict if parties use negotiationsto buy time orstrengthen themselves militarily. Engagement 

also is not recommended when the position and demands of an armed group are so radical 

and outrageous that there is no possibility of finding an acceptable common ground.

t To enhance the chances of effective negotiations, mediators should thoroughly analyze 

the situation, set realistic expectations, and regularly evaluate the process and outcome 

of engagement. Various state and nonstate interveners should collaborate and divide labor 

among themselves. All significant armed groups and unarmed stakeholders should be 

involved in negotiations through multiple forms and tactics of engagement, recognizing 

that all conflict parties are entitled to continue pursuing their goals through nonviolent 

political means. 

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CONTENTS

Political Engagement with Armed Groups 2

Criteria and Conditions for Political Engagement 5

Mediation Strategies in Complex Armed Conflicts 6

Antiterrorism Proscription Regimes and Their

Effect on Mediating Peace Processes 8

Steps to Reform Proscription Regimes 11
2

The Obama administration has expressed its willingness to engage politically hostile 

states,such as North Korea, Syria, Sudan, and Iran, and has begun to phase out the nomenclature of the global war on terror. Whether the new U.S. willingness to engage in dialogue 

will be applied beyond state-to-state diplomacy to include nonstate armed groups (NSAGs) 

is uncertain. President Obama has hinted at the possibility of holding talks with moderate 

elements of the Taliban,

1 but generally, the post–September 11 demonization of NSAGs has 

proved resilient and is unlikely to change; no major shift in policies toward any particular 

proscribed armed group has been floated. In this political environment, states and international organizations have been increasingly likely to institutionalize their political preferences into more permanent legal frameworks, with consequences for their ability to deal 

with hostile states and organizations. Terrorist listings and proscription regimes are often 

crafted in a way that does not obtain the desired effect, and they lack the flexibility necessary to accommodate the nuances ofthe problem.In addition,the regulatory framework can 

take on a life of its own, separate from the politics that generated it, creating disincentives 

and obstacles to removing an organization from an antiterror list once it is placed there—

even when there is widespread consensusthatthe listing is no longer productive or relevant. 

Finally, the legal framework can affect how organizations calculate the costs and benefits 

of engagement, as many organizations err on the side of caution even if diplomatic activity 

is not formally prohibited. 

In short, current incentive structures and decision-making processes within the regimes 

do not give adequate weightto the value and potential benefits of nonmilitary engagement, 

impairing states’ and organizations’ abilitiesto move toward potentially lasting peace agreements with NSAGs. The need for third-party political engagement is great, and while there 

should be criteria and preconditionsforsuch engagement by state and nonstate actors alike, 

through past experience, strategies and best practices for mediation within complex conflicts have emerged. Current proscription regimes can be improved, making these regimes 

more effective and contributing more fully to peace processes. 

This report presents the main lessons learned from a policy debate among high-level 

mediators and policy experts on the challengesto international engagement with proscribed 

armed groups in peace processes and the implications of antiterrorism laws and regulations 

for mediators and negotiating political settlements.

2 The workshop was organized jointly 

by the United StatesInstitute of Peace (Washington, D.C.), Conciliation Resources(London), 

Berghof Peace Support (Berlin), and the HD Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Geneva). 

These organizations are part of the recently created Mediation Support Network, a forum 

for discussions and information exchange related to the provision of process-oriented and 

thematic advice to peace processes.

The participants brought along a wide range of U.S., UN, and European (Swiss, Norwegian, German, UK) experiences in scholarship, policymaking, policy advice, and facilitation 

of humanitarian dialogue or peace talks in various conflict contexts. The discussions drew 

most heavily from the cases of Hamas in the Palestinian Territories, the Liberation Tigers of 

Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN), and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), though other cases—Iraq, Afghanistan, South Africa, Somalia, Sudan, El 

Salvador, Colombia—were mentioned as well.

3

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Possible forms of interaction with NSAGs can be classified along a spectrum of policy 

options ranging from hard-power to soft-power interventions (see box 1). The former 

include pressure or punishment mechanisms used by states and international organizations 

to contain, exclude, or confront armed groups. The latter imply a range of diplomatic tools 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace,

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials,

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent,

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress.

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts,

promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

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CONTRIBUTING ORGANIZATIONS

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HD Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue


of direct or indirect engagement. Where a state falls on the spectrum between proscription or counterinsurgency and diplomatic engagement depends not only on the policies 

of a particular administration, but also on its role in international relations. A state that 

guaranteesinternationalsecurity arrangements has a different attitude toward engagement 

with proscribed groupsthan does a state thatseesitsrole as an honest broker and mediator. 

U.S. policies tend to fall toward the highly regulated, restricted end of the spectrum, while 

the Swiss approach, with its explicit national policy of holding dialogue with all groups, is at 

the other extreme of maximizing engagement.In addition, differenttypes of actors—states 

as compared with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or international organizations—

operate undersignificantly different constraints and rewardssystemsregarding engagement 

with NSAGs. Actions that would be impossible for an official representative of a national 

government might be routine for a privately funded organization with a lower profile.

How can the different engagement approaches be combined and coordinated to the best 

advantage? The United States in particular is often overly focused on bringing the policies 

of others in line with its own. A multipronged approach or division of labor that accepts 

and even encourages alternate engagement strategies might be more effective. A good 

cop–bad cop routine, in which some actors apply pressure and others offer dialogue, might 

have more effect than either exclusion or engagement alone. A more sensitive proposition 

relates to cooperation between mediation teams and the International Criminal Court (ICC). 

Although the ICC strongly objects to any political manipulation of the justice process, early 

consultation on strategies might lead to better outcomes, for both justice and the conflict 

resolution process.

Could the spectrum of approaches be institutionalized to carve out a protected space, 

or separate compartment, for engagement in such a way that it would not be demonized? 

The UN secretary-general, historically, was in a position to be able to talk with everyone, 

until restrictions on UN envoy engagement with Hamas altered that standard operating 

procedure. This indicated a shift toward the secretary-general’s office limiting its own 

engagement, instead following the bidding of Security Council members. As a result, some 

NSAGs see the office as a party to conflict and a legitimate target. 

Reasons to Engage

Arguments for engaging with proscribed armed groups encompass both pragmatic and moral 

perspectives. First, it is almost a truism in the field of mediation that an agreement that does 

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not include main stakeholders is unlikely to hold. Groups with grievances and the power to 

continue a conflict must be part of itsresolution. Otherwise,they may use their powerto spoil 

the agreement and continue the violence. For instance, can a durable agreement be made 

on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that does not include the Hamas government? Can Hamas 

be excluded and contained to the point that it can no longer prevent or spoil an agreement, 

or is the prospect of an accommodation with Hamas so unacceptable to Israel or Fatah that 

continued conflict is preferable? If not, one must thus find a way to include Hamas and its 

constituency in a peace process, and the question of engagement perhaps should be widened 

beyond the United States, the Quartet,

4 and other governments and governmental agencies

to consider possible roles for nonstate peacemakers and other actors.

Second, engagement can push an NSAG toward a change in the status quo, forcing 

it to face hard choices and make a move. This can bring armed groups into the political 

mainstream. Moderation and compromise often come as a result of engagement rather than 

the other way around. Conversely, nonengagement—the politics of isolation—can further 

radicalize a group that sees no option except continued intransigence. Regardless of the 

direction that engagement pushes, seizing the initiative and forcing a response gives the 

engager the upper hand.

Third, even if engagement does not result in a resolution to the conflict, it can address 

humanitarian concerns and save lives by mitigating the effect of violence on populations. 

The LTTE ceasefire in Sri Lanka, negotiated through the Norwegian channel, is a case in 

point. Even low-level engagement can be valuable because it allows for a presence in the 

conflict zone that can monitor humanitarian conditions. In Sri Lanka after 2006, the lack of 

any engagement made it impossible to monitor or check human rights abuses. 

Fourth, engagement can promote democratic principles, while refusal to engage may 

be perceived to be a violation of principles of inclusion and democratic process. The 

West’s refusal to engage with Hamas after it was democratically elected was interpreted 

in much of the Arab world—fairly or unfairly—as a dismissal of election results. This 

interpretation has done considerable damage to the West’s standing and its ability to 

promote democracy.

Finally, there is no such a thing as a bad conversation. If dialogue is unproductive, there 

is always the option to withdraw. Listening and talking to an actor should not be equated 

with legitimizing it or endorsing its position—though this equation is often made, as is 

discussed further below.

Given the advantages of engagement, some conference participants argued that, rather 

than being treated as an exception to a standard rule of exclusion and confrontation, dialogue could be the first approach thatstates and organizationstake with NSAGs, only giving 

it up in extreme cases. Other participants, however, highlighted the risks of engagement, 

arguing that these risks outweigh the potential advantages. 

Pitfalls, Risks, and Possible Side Effects of Engagement

Even as the realities of peacemaking processes ultimately demand the engagement of all 

relevant stakeholders, engaging armed groups might have serious negative consequences 

that require consideration and mitigation. Talking is not cost free. No matter how carefully engagement is framed, some parties are likely to perceive it as conferring a certain 

legitimacy on the parties engaged. Engagement with armed or extremist actors might 

also risk marginalizing moderates who had opted for peaceful means. Moreover, although

humanitarian engagement, including ceasefires, might save lives in the short term, it 

could contribute to extending the conflict if parties use it to buy time or strengthen 

themselves militarily; humanitarian action could reduce the pressure to resolve a conflict. 

No matter how carefully 

engagement is framed, some 

parties are likely to perceive 

it as conferring a certain 

legitimacy on the parties 

engaged.

Groups with grievances and the 

power to continue a conflict

must be part of its resolution. 


Opening talks with armed groups might cause them to split or proliferate, as was seen in

Darfur. More fundamentally, engagement that seems to reward violence violates ethical 

imperatives.

As in any peacemaking effort, there is no easy answer or blueprint to follow for whether 

to engage NSAGs, and it is essential to assess and weigh possible costs and gains before 

making a decision. Such an evaluation should continue throughout the engagement; the 

decision to engage should not be a permanent grant. The only guidance that applies to 

all cases is the self-evident point that mediators should seek to maximize the benefit of 

engagement while minimizing the costs. The critical question for the field of mediation, and 

for those working on cases directly, is how to accomplish this.

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When, with whom, and to what end to engage? Before opting for dialogue with representatives of armed groups in conflict contexts, national foreign-policy advisers and decision 

makers ought to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of alternative modes of intervention, according to several considerations.

Strategic Interests of Intervener and Allies

The decision of whether or not to engage is made primarily by assessing whether such a 

policy complies with strategic national interests, though governments can and regularly do 

pursue conflicting foreign policy objectives. The policy interests and preferences of key strategic allies,such asforeign governments and the United Nations, as well as concerned communities, such as domestic or foreign NGOs, are an additional decision-making factor. While 

these criteria are certainly valid for state actors, they might not necessarily apply to human 

rights NGOs or unofficial mediators, the actions of which are “supposed to be independent. 

. . . Making [these actors] subject to foreign policy goals is an infringement of [their] rights 

as citizens.” The interests of the victims of violence and human rights violations also should 

be considered before any decision to engage politically with conflict stakeholders. This is 

all the more important as strategic interests in peace talks can be at odds with the ethical 

imperatives of transitional justice.

Consent and Interest of Parties

The parties’ consent to intervention—as well as their genuine interest in engaging in a 

peace process, or at least in preliminary talks about talks—is a strict precondition for

humanitarian engagement, political dialogue, or peace facilitation with conflict stakeholders in war-affected countries. Two very dissimilar examples underscore the variation

in stakeholders’ readiness for engagement. At one end of the spectrum, the South African

peace process represents an ideal case. The main conflict parties—the apartheid state 

and the African National Congress (ANC)—believed that negotiations could end positively and had faith in both their opponent and their own capacity to pursue that goal. 

By contrast, the Peruvian guerrilla movement, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), never 

showed any interest in political talks with the government, and no international mediation attempts ever took place. Instead, the rebels were defeated militarily, at tremendous 

human cost. The South African and Peruvian examples remind us that not all NSAGs are 

the same, and thus, the nature and features of such movements are important criteria 

that can influence the strategy of intervention, tilting the balance toward or against 

political engagement. 


NSAG Beliefs and Objectives

According to some experienced international mediators, when the position and demands 

of an armed group are so radical and outrageous that there is no possibility of finding 

acceptable common ground, engagementis notrecommended. Al Qaeda advocates complete 

eradication of the state system. However, Hamas’s position within the spectrum of political 

Islam is less extremist than is often portrayed.

The famous greed-versus-grievance debate is also a factor in the choice of engagement 

strategy.

5 While there might be firmer ground for engaging with groups that have clear 

political agendas, negotiating with organizations that are fomenting conflict mainly for 

economic gain, that are pursuing purely criminal interests, or that have developed such 

interests over the course of a conflict might be counterproductive or ineffective. Such 

groups are unlikely to foresee any interest in a peace deal that would cut off their business 

opportunities, and war victims might perceive dialogue as offering them undue recognition 

as legitimate political actors. On the other hand, groups that are primarily driven by greed 

might be more easily coopted into endorsing nonviolent strategies than movements with 

strong ideological principles, especially if they can be convinced that peace will allow them 

to continue pursuing their business interests legally. 

Representativeness, Cohesiveness, and Spoiling Capacity

The size and leverage of armed groups also might influence the decision regarding whether 

or not to engage them politically. When rebel movements are strong and cohesive, represent valid social or ethnic interests, and enjoy a considerable degree of social legitimacy in 

their community, they can bring their constituency to the negotiating table with them and 

enforce compliance with their commitments, be they temporary cessations of hostilities or 

more comprehensive ceasefires. If a movement with these same characteristics is isolated 

or excluded from a dialogue platform, it can spoil or derail a peace process. Therefore, it 

might be argued that irrespective of the nature of the group, engagement might be seen as 

the default mode of action if there is a possibility that it might bring a peace settlement 

at best, or at least a reduction in the level of violence. Even the Lord’s Resistance Army in 

northern Uganda, cited several times as the archetype of an irrational organization, with 

a radical theocratic ideology and extremely brutal methods of rebellion, was deemed to be 

amenable to moderation through political bargaining—that is, in exchange for a deal at the 

International Criminal Court, which has indicted its top leaders.

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Third-party facilitation or mediation in violent intrastate conflicts is a crucial form of 

engagement with armed groups. Any decision to intervene, however, should be preceded 

by extensive analysis of the constantly evolving context, looking for windows of opportunity for mediation. In Somalia, Sudan, and Afghanistan, the conditions of and actors 

in the conflict shift continuously, for worse and for better regarding chances to begin 

dialogue. In South Sudan the U.S. administration concluded that that the Sudan People’s 

Liberation Movement (SPLM) had evolved and was ready to engage in peace talks with 

the Khartoum government. In deciding when to intervene, analysts should pay attention 

to the need to intervene early, before conditions worsen; on the other hand, potential 

mediators might test the watersthrough bilateral exploratory talks with each party before 

facilitating joint dialogue.

When the position and demands 

of an armed group are so radical 

and outrageous that there is no 

possibility of finding acceptable

common ground, engagement is

not recommended.
7

Intervention Goals, Framework, and Roadmap

As mentioned above, dialogue for the sake of dialogue is not recommended. Facilitators 

should clarify the purposes of their intervention, set reasonable expectations for its desired 

outcome, and keep their objectives in mind at all times throughout the process. The goals 

of dialogue initiatives might range from more minimalist humanitarian agendas, such as 

halting or reducing violence, to more substantive political objectives, such as reaching a 

comprehensive peace settlement. 

Once the purpose of the dialogue has been defined, mediators should devise, together 

with the parties, an appropriate long-term strategy and process design to reach the intended outcome. Dialogue formats could be very simple, concentrating on the most essential 

issues only; they could also be quite comprehensive, while still manageable. A possible 

middle ground is to adopt a gradual, step-by-step format, identifying and insulating some 

issuesthat are ripe for mediation, while leaving others(e.g., land disputes) for a laterstage, 

perhaps to be resolved by the parties directly once the level of mutual trust increases. 

Should one deal with security (e.g., ceasefire, disarmament, prisoners’ release) and political (e.g., power-sharing) components of peace processes in parallel or consecutively, and in 

which order? In subregional conflicts, such as in Darfur, should the discussions on substantive issues proceed from the national to the local level or inversely? Analysts must consider 

these and other questions in putting together a negotiation process.

Regular evaluation and analysis must be an integral component of mediation frameworks 

afterthey are implemented as well,so thatinterventions can be regularly revisited according 

to the evolving context. Analysts should pay particular attention to assessing the possible 

unintended consequences of engagement with armed groups,such asthe marginalization of 

nonviolent or moderate voices. Finally—and especially in situations where all past mediation attempts have proved unsuccessful—the solution might be to stand back and let local 

parties resolve the conflict themselves. Such a withdrawal strategy could be appropriate in 

Somalia, which has seen fifteen failed interventions since the early 1990s.

Inclusivity

As mentioned above, when dealing with conflicts involving a multiplicity of stakeholders, 

mediators must strive to give a voice to as many interests and affected parties as possible. 

Every armed movement that has a stake in the conflict and the ability to spoil a peace 

process should be invited to take part in humanitarian or peace talks, consistent with the 

pragmatic principle of sufficient inclusion invoked during the South African negotiations 

between the apartheid government and liberation forces. However, not only armed actors 

have a say in the mediation process; care must be taken to avoid disenfranchising actors 

who do not carry arms. Broader constituencies, such as political parties or civil-society 

actors, including women’s groups,should be involved in relevant discussions and substantive 

negotiations on the conflict’s root causes, either by inviting them to the table or through 

multitrack engagement, by organizing parallel roundtables, or by implementing other consultation mechanisms.

Coordination and Division of Labor

It is valuable to combine peace facilitation efforts by state, international (e.g., UN), and 

nonstate (e.g., international NGO) actors. Such coordination could range from joint decisions 

at the international level as to who should engage or initiate contact, to the more formal 

setting up of mediation teams under the aegis of the United Nations to avoid possible competition among intervening countries. In sharing the job of negotiating peace, there should 

Care must be taken to avoid 

disenfranchising actors who do 

not carry arms. 
8

be a clear partition of roles among foreign facilitators, with some third parties performing 

public lecturing tasks and others acting as informal facilitators behind the scene. The Norwegians faced challenges when trying to combine these different roles simultaneously in 

their intervention in Sri Lanka.

U.S. engagement in a negotiation need not be direct; it can be accomplished through 

the United Nations or NGOs. During the peace process in El Salvador when the U.S. government could not engage directly with the Farabundo Mart’ National Liberation Front (FMLN), 

it relied on UN representative Alvaro de Soto, whose mandate entailed talking to all parties. 

The Italian NGO Sant’Egidio also served as an informal peace broker in Mozambique. Such 

unofficial interventions help to provide plausible deniability forstates wishing to be in indirect dialogue with pariah groups. The U.S. State Department has also encouraged U.S. NGOs 

to provide legal assistance to nonstate armed groups as a contribution toward sustainable 

conflict resolution. In highly asymmetric conflicts, providing NSAGs with specific negotiation skills is sometimes required to enhance their ability to devise fair and equitable peace 

agreements, as well as their readiness to abide by their commitments.

Rules of Engagement in Delicate Negotiations

When direct engagement with an armed group is impossible for political, ethical, or legal 

reasons, it might be possible to put a thin veil between a UN, state, or unofficial mediator 

or negotiating party and the NSAG to bypasssuch restrictions.In Northern Ireland, engagement with the Republican political party, the Sinn Fein, rather than the IRA directly, made 

the 1997 Good Friday Agreement possible. However, such ambiguity should remain a shortterm option, as it might become counterproductive if the NSAG does not feel the need to 

abide by the commitments that the surrogate organization makes. 

During the negotiations, the parties should not be asked to give up their aspirations. 

In Northern Ireland, former U.S. mediators expressed in a written statement that parties 

in peace talks should be allowed to “hold on to their dreams,” provided that they agree to 

“pursue them exclusively through peaceful and democratic means.”6 Members of armed 

groups should not be made to feel that there will be no role for them in a postwar system 

and should be encouraged to play an active part in peacebuilding. In Iraq, this lesson was 

broughtto light during informal meetingsin Amman in 2004 between U.S. officials and Iraqi 

Sunni sheiks and former officials. The Iraqi representatives made it clear that disbanding 

the Iraqi army in the wake of the 2003 U.S. victory had fueled anger and strengthened the 

insurgency. The army’ssoldiersshould have been invited to participate in the reconstruction 

of the country in the post–Saddam Hussein era.

7

Given the value of low-key, private talks with armed groups to complement public 

forms of engagement, top-level politicians should be brought in when it is most effective, 

which requires strategic planning and time management. Once the politicians’ engagement 

becomes publicly known, diplomats should think very carefully about how to explain their 

involvement to the public. During Norway’s substantive engagement with the LTTE in Sri 

Lanka, the Norwegian government needed to convince its constituencies back home that, 

though the sponsorship of the 2002–06 peace process had not brought peace and security, 

it might have led to thousands of civilian lives being saved.

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The legal proscription of suspected terrorist organizations has serious consequences, 

both intended and unintended, not only for the targeted entities, but also individuals or 

Members of armed groups should 

not be made to feel that there 

will be no role for them in a 

postwar system and should be 

encouraged to play an active part 

in peacebuilding.


organizations interacting with them—including individuals and organizations facilitating

peace processes. Reforms of proscriptive policies, particularly in U.S. legislation, could 

improve the policies’ effectiveness in enticing or pressuring armed groups to shift their 

strategies from armed struggle to peace talks and nonviolent politics. 

Effects on Conflict Parties and Peace Processes

Sanctions imposed on blacklisted individuals or groups include travel restrictions, trade 

bans, or property freezes. They also have a symbolic and diplomatic effect, isolating the 

target group from the international scene. In some instances, such sanctions—or the 

threat of sanctions—have pressured conflict stakeholders into changing the course of their 

actions, joining the negotiation table or moderating their repressive policies (e.g., South 

Africa, Guinea, Madagascar). However, a number of concerns have emerged regarding the 

lack of effectiveness of proscription regimes, as well as their possible negative or counterproductive effect in weakening target groups or forcing them to terminate their violent 

activities. First, blacklists seem to have more leverage on above ground entities, such as 

governments or army leadership. These groups are more sensitive to the restrictions and 

moral stigma that sanctions and diplomatic isolation bring, as they have more to lose. By 

contrast, nonstate actors, such as underground guerrilla organizations, are less likely to be 

affected by international sanctions.

Second, the broadening of terrorist listings since the September 11, 2001, attacks and 

the war on terror has led to the listings’ trivialization as a tool of U.S. or EU diplomacy, and 

has blurred the boundaries between legal and proscribed political activities. Blacklisting 

political or social movements runs counter to more nuanced and targeted sanctions against 

individuals by turning unarmed activists and their constituenciesinto terrorists—especially 

when political or social entities close to armed groups are also added to blacklists. The EU 

proscription of the proindependence party Batasuna in the Basque country is a case in 

point, as is the U.S. listing of Al-Shabaab in Somalia—a movement with no formal members 

but mostly sympathizers—or international sanctions against the Hamas-led government 

in the Gaza strip, which has effectively led to the blockade and collective punishment of 

1.5 million Palestinians.

Third, lawyers criticize proscription policiesfortheir potential unconstitutionality, astheir 

imposition may violate the rights to association and free speech as well as due process. For

example,the listing is usually based on classified information; without accessto thisinformation, designees and their lawyers have little, if any, chance for a meaningful defense.

Fourth, such counterterrorism measures create impediments for peace negotiations. The 

proscription of one conflict party that has agreed to a ceasefire and is engaged in an ongoing peace process—such as the LTTE in Sri Lanka or CPN in Nepal—breaks the parity usually 

assumed to be a precondition for talks in good faith.

Fifth, to be effective as a pressure-and-inducement strategy, counterterrorism measures

should not only punish proscribed terrorist activities, but also offer incentives for the targeted individuals or groups to modify their behavior in line with the desired outcome. Existing proscription mechanisms are so rigid and nontransparent that it is extremely difficult for

listed entities to subsequently become delisted. The CPN in Nepal argued that it was never 

informed about the requirementsfor its delisting by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control

(OFAC), and its designation under the Specialist Designated Nationals (SDN) list still has not

been revoked, more than three years after they signed a peace agreement, renounced violence, and entered the realm of conventional politics. Thislack of flexibility can be attributed

to a bureaucratic impediment—namely,the absence of clear criteria and legal mechanismsfor 

delisting groups—but also to a political impediment, as U.S. decision-makers can enlarge the

Blacklisting political or social 

movements runs counter to more 

nuanced and targeted sanctions 

against individuals by turning 

unarmed activists and their 

constituencies into terrorists.
10

list to boost their terror-fighting credentials, but they see no electoral benefits in delisting 

designated entities. 

Finally, proscription regimes can fuel radicalism instead of encouraging moderation 

from targeted entities. Listing armed groups and their political or social allies tends to 

disadvantage political actors and strengthen hard-liners and militants, as has occurred in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. In Sri Lanka, the EU listing of the LTTE led the movement to reject 

an EU-supported mission monitoring the 2002 ceasefire, which partly caused the peace 

process to collapse. In the Palestinian territories, the banning and isolation of Hamas after 

its 2006 electoral victory seems to have halted its willingness to move toward mainstream 

politics—described as “the sound of a fist unclenching” and led instead to a reradicalization 

of its discourse and tactics.

Effect on Third-Party Engagement with Armed Groups

The legal proscription of suspected terrorist organizations has serious consequences for 

peacemaking intermediaries who are trying to play a constructive role in conflict resolution. 

In effect, the engagement of mediators in conflict areas becomes contingent on U.S. government (or EU) licensing, which severely impedes their freedom to act. Thus the terrorist 

lists unintentionally have created disincentives for mediation in conflict zones.

Under OFAC regulations, neither U.S. persons—that is, U.S. citizens and permanent 

residents, NGOs, or other organizations—nor non-U.S. NGOs contracted by or receiving 

funds from the U.S. government may engage in transactions with listed groups that can be 

interpreted as providing material support or resources. In practice, this might include providing transportation, offering coffee during a meeting, giving advice or technical support, 

or even advising a group to join a negotiation. Third parties providing peacemaking services 

to listed organizations are thus vulnerable to criminal prosecution in a U.S. court. Although 

in practice this is unlikely to happen—criminal intent would have to be proven—these 

restrictions and the ambiguities related to what is permitted under OFAC regulations might 

discourage any interaction with armed groups. In response, U.S. organizations and policymakers seem to have introduced a degree of self-censure, by having “taken themselves out 

of the job [of peace facilitation]” and thus “abdicating their international leadership role.”

The only way for state agencies, embassies, or NGOs to bypass these restrictions is to 

obtain a specific OFAC license allowing them to interact with designated armed groups, 

subject to limitations or conditions stated in the license. The flexibility and audacity of

individual bureaucrats or diplomats can also provide a certain amount of leeway; within a 

civil service, the more senior leadership is involved, the more room there is to maneuver. 

Some U.S. diplomatic staff have sought creative waysto engage with listed entitiesthrough 

international cooperation, such as by attending receptions and events at other embassies, 

before obtaining an OFAC waiver to be able to invite—that is, offer tea and biscuits to—

government representatives from listed political entities in their own embassies.

In Europe, EU proscription regimes may appear to be less restrictive regarding the provision of services to members of proscribed entities, such as consulting or advice, which do 

not involve financial transactions. But in practice, proscription laws impede most forms 

of direct engagement. It is no accident that non-EU members—Norway, Switzerland, and 

Iceland—played prominent roles in the Sri Lanka peace processes. European diplomats 

argued that they became seriously restricted in their peace facilitation work when several of 

their dialogue counterparts, such as the National Democratic Front (NDF) in the Philippines, 

the National Liberation Army (ELN) in Colombia, and the LTTE in Sri Lanka, were added to 

the EU blacklist. Even actors once characterized by their ability to talk to everyone, such as 

some international NGOs or the UN secretariat, now feel that they too need to request U.S. 
11

permission before engaging with armed groups. Their capacity to act has become seriously 

devalued as a result.

Meanwhile, local governments engaged in counterinsurgency operations against armed 

groups proscribed by the United States or European Union are taking advantage of the terror lists to criminalize and harass international or grassroots NGOs involved in peacemaking, 

humanitarian, or development activities. This is especially damaging to local communitybased organizations that lack the foreign backing or protection that their international 

counterparts enjoy, making them particularly vulnerable to attack.

4UFQT UP 3FGPSN 1SPTDSJQUJPO 3FHJNFT

In the United States, the change in administration presents an opportunity to consider a 

more innovative approach to engaging with NSAGs and to reform the current proscription 

regime. Practical steps can be taken to relax the legal and political restrictions placed on 

international engagement with armed groups for humanitarian and peacemaking purposes. 

In particular, the Obama administration could

t carry out a proper evaluation of the effectiveness of existing proscription and deproscription regimes in the context of the greater political objectives of promoting successful 

peace processes and political settlements, leading to improved governance and social and 

economic development.

t improve the transparency of the designation process and incentivize its effects by publishing information on which activities warrant sanctions, how to obtain a waiver, and what 

the criteria and procedures are for deproscription.

t design more nuanced and flexible listing and delisting instruments that account for 

constantly evolving conflict contexts, actors, and behavioral patterns. These instruments 

should punish violence but encourage or reward moves toward peace talks and peaceful 

transition. This would imply clarifying and modifying the criteria, conditions, and mechanisms for delisting.

t create separate legal and political compartments or exemption protocols that facilitate 

mediation and constructive engagement with proscribed groups. Antiterrorism policies 

should recognize the specificities of peacemaking and peacebuilding work, and clearer 

distinctionsshould be drawn between such activities and commercialtransactions with—or 

financialsupport to—proscribed entities. Possible strategies could include more systematic 

waivers for mediators engaged in peace processes or humanitarian work to allow contact 

and dialogue in the interest of finding peaceful solutions, as well as the creation of separate legal entities under proscription regimes for groups engaged in peace talks, as a form 

of incentive or reward for constructive political engagement.
/PUFT

1. “Obama’s Interview Aboard Air Force One,” transcript, The New York Times, March 7, 2009.

2. The content of this report represents the views of participants in the above-mentioned workshop and not 

necessarily those of the report’s author. 

3. Direct quotesthat are notreferenced in thisreport are excerptsfrom the October 27, 2009, workshop. The authors 

of the quotes (workshop participants) are not named, in compliance with the Chatham House rule. 

4. The Quartet is composed of representatives from the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United 

Nations.

5. According to this debate, rebels choose to take up arms due to either greed (they see armed conflict as a way 

to improve their economic lot) or grievance (they see armed conflict as a way to settle identity-based disputes, 

related to, e.g., ethnicity, religion, or class). A focal point in the debate is Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed

and Grievance in Civil War,” Policy Research Paper no. 2355, World Bank, Washington, DC, which argues strongly 

that civil wars are motivated mostly by greed, in “contrast with conventional beliefs” (Collier and Hoffler, 

summary) that grievances are at the heart of most conflicts.

6. Richard N. Haass and George J. Mitchell, “Irish Lessons for Peace,” International Herald Tribune, May 7, 2007.

7. See David Rose, “Heads in the Sand,” Vanity Fair, May 12, 2009.

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