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CLEAN-UP GOVERNMENT ACT OF 2011 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, 

AND HOMELAND SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON

H.R. 2572 

JULY 26, 2011 

Serial No. 112–70 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas, Chairman 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

DENNIS ROSS, Florida 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

[Vacant] 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Majority Chief of Staff and General Counsel 

PERRY APELBAUM, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., Wisconsin, Chairman 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas, Vice-Chairman 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

CAROLINE LYNCH, Chief Counsel 

BOBBY VASSAR, Minority Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

JULY 26, 2011 

Page 

THE BILL 

H.R. 2572, the ‘‘Clean-Up Government Act of 2011’’ ............................................ 3 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Wisconsin, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security .......................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Robert C. ‘‘Bobby’’ Scott, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security .......................................................................... 22 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary ......... 24 

WITNESSES 

Mary Patricia Brown, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 26 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 29 

Lisa K. Griffin, Esq., Professor of Law, Duke University 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 38 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 41 

Timothy P. O’Toole, Esq., Partner, Miller & Chevalier 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 47 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 49 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Material submitted by the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Wisconsin, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security ................................ 21 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Response to Post-Hearing Questions submitted to Mary Patricia Brown, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of 

Justice, from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice ............................................................ 83 

Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Timothy P. O’Toole, Esq., Partner, 

Miller & Chevalier ............................................................................................... 87 

Prepared Statement of Julie Stewart, President, Families Against Mandatory 

Minimums (FAMM) ............................................................................................. 92 

Letter from Steven H. Cook, President, National Association of Assistant 

United States Attorneys ...................................................................................... 96 

(1) 

CLEAN-UP GOVERNMENT ACT OF 2011 

TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2011 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM,

AND HOMELAND SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn Office Building, the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Sensenbrenner, Gohmert, Poe, Marino, 

Adams, Quayle, Scott, Conyers, Cohen, Jackson Lee, and Quigley. 

Staff present: (Majority) Caroline Lynch, Subcommittee Chief 

Counsel; Sam Ramer, Counsel; Lindsay Hamilton, Clerk; (Minority) 

Bobby Vassar, Subcommittee Chief Counsel; Joe Graupensberger, 

Counsel; and Veronica Eligan, Professional Staff Member. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The Subcommittee will come to order. 

Without objection, the Chair will be authorized to recess the Subcommittee during votes today. 

The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes for an opening statement. 

On November 19, 1863, Abraham Lincoln delivered the Gettysburg Address. In dedicating a portion of the battlefield, President 

Lincoln said that the dead did not die in vain; that the Nation 

would have a new birth of freedom; and that government of the 

people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the 

Earth. 

A government that is by the people and for the people is the very 

foundation of a democracy. If elected officials decide to pursue a 

course of greed, to profit from their positions, they betray the sacred trust and responsibility of the office, and weaken the very 

foundation of our democracy. 

While citizens may have differing views as to how much the government should be involved in their daily lives, and they may have 

differing opinions of their government and of their elected officials, 

every citizen has the right to expect an honest government. 

Ideally, an oath of office or the ballot box should be sufficient to 

hold public officials accountable to their constituents. But in reality, it is not. 

The criminal justice system, with its ability to investigate and 

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tem investigates and prosecutes public corruption and related 

frauds in order to ensure an honest government. 

The FBI identified the investigation of public corruption as a top 

priority and recognized that public corruption poses a fundamental 

threat to our national security and way of life. It impacts everything from how well our borders are secured and our neighborhoods protected to verdicts handed down in courts, to the quality 

of our roads, schools and other government services. And it takes 

a significant toll on our pocketbooks, wasting billions in tax dollars 

every year. 

Today’s hearing examines the gaps in our Federal corruption 

laws that limit their effectiveness and allow corruption to persist. 

I and my colleague from Illinois, Mr. Quigley, introduced H.R. 

2572, the ‘‘Clean Up Government Act of 2011,’’ to strengthen our 

public corruption laws. This bill restores tools that prosecutors had 

previously relied upon that have been eroded over the years by the 

courts. The bill also enhances other Federal statutes used to fight 

and deter public corruption. Additional penalties and more robust 

investigative techniques will ensure that public corruption and related offenses are addressed. 

A significant statute for prosecuting corruption was diluted as a 

result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Skilling v. the United 

States. In this case, the Court held that the honest services fraud 

statute does not apply to prosecutions involving undisclosed selfdealing by a public official, but only to cases that involve traditional bribery or kickback schemes. 

Both types of honest services fraud prosecutions are equally essential to maintaining government integrity while ensuring that 

decisions made by public officials are made in the best interests of 

the people. Many instances of public corruption do not involve a 

classic bribery or extortion scenario, but, rather, public officials 

who exploit their positions and influence to benefit outside entities 

or individuals. 

Undisclosed self-dealing is not covered by any other area of Federal law. It is imperative that Congress restore the statute to its 

original intent. Although the Skilling decision seriously eroded the 

ability to prosecute both public officials and corporate officers for 

their undisclosed self-dealings, this bill restores the honest services 

fraud statute only as it relates to public officials. 

The bill also improves the government’s ability to prosecute public officials who accept gifts because of their official position, and 

amends the definition of ‘‘official act’’ to include conduct that falls 

within the range of official duties of a public official. The bill extends the statute of limitations for serious public corruption offenses, increases the penalties for certain public corruption offenses, and gives investigators additional tools to address these related crimes in the form of additional wiretap and RICO predicates. 

There is bipartisan support from both houses for reforming our 

Federal public corruption laws, and this bill proposes commonsense 

and straightforward reforms to achieve this goal. 

The bill, H.R. 2572, follows:] 

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Mr. SENSENBRENNER. And before recognizing the gentleman from 

Virginia, Mr. Scott, for his opening statement, let me ask unanimous consent to insert in the appropriate part of the record a letter 

from the FBI Agents Association and a letter from the Citizens for 

Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, or CREW for short, in 

support of this legislation. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

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Mr. SENSENBRENNER. And I now recognize the gentleman from 

Virginia, Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling 

today’s hearing. 

I welcome today’s hearing about proposed changes in our laws 

against public corruption. Certainly the fight against public corruption is one of the most important functions of our Federal prosecutors. 


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As we consider whether to modify the existing laws in this area, 

or whether to adopt new ones, I want to make sure we carefully 

examine these proposals. 

Before discussing the proposals to expand these laws, I want to 

caution that we should resist calls to increase statutory levels without specific evidence that current sentences are too low. The Justice Department’s prepared statement supports increased penalties 

for public corruption offenses, but does not provide specific justification for raising the statutory maximums, in some cases, drastically. 

So while we may want to ask the U.S. Sentencing Commission 

to review the current sentencing guidelines for certain offenses and 

make changes if appropriate, we should not direct the commission 

to adjust sentences upward if, upon review, they calculate that it 

is not warranted. 

At least we know that the Sentencing Commission will study the 

need for sentences before acting, which is more than Congress usually does when we increase maximum levels. 

I will note, Mr. Chairman, that you do not require in your bill 

mandatory minimums, so intelligent, well-prepared, and well-reasoned sentences can be applied by the Sentencing Commission and 

judges. Even if the maximum sentence is increased significantly, or 

even unreasonably, intelligent sentences can still prevail. 

In regard to proposals to expand the public corruption laws, I 

note that there are a number of statutes on the books that Federal 

law enforcement uses to prosecute public corruption offenses, such 

as antibribery statutes, anti-gratuity statutes, anti-extortion statutes, and the mail and wire fraud statutes. Mail and wire fraud 

statutes are already extremely broad and allow Federal authorities 

to pursue public corruption related to fraud or if someone uses a 

mail or wire communication to obtain money or property. 

Expanding these laws even further raises concerns that we are 

overcriminalizing behavior that is properly investigated by State 

authorities. When we broaden the terms of a criminal statute even 

just a little bit, with language which prohibits in generalities and 

not too specific, we invariably end up covering a range of conduct 

sometimes unforeseen, which may arguably be covered but we did 

not intend to cover. 

The vagueness stemming from lack of notice to the public as to 

about what specifically is prohibited is unfair, and it is our job to 

avoid it. 

This has been a problem with some well-intentioned statutes on 

the books dealing with various issues of bribery and public corruption. If a statute is too broad, reasonable people may disagree 

about how the statute should be applied, and sometimes it is applied in an overzealous and unfair way. The courts are left to sort 

out the mess, and we are called up to clarify the law. 

In many respects, that is what brought us here today. And the 

bill, in large part, is a response to several court cases which limited 

the scope of existing statutes. 

In the Cleveland case, the Supreme Court ruled that fraudulent 

schemes to obtain business licenses did not violate the mail fraud 

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pands coverage to mail and wire fraud, to cover schemes to obtain 

anything of value. 

The Sun-Diamond Growers case, the Supreme Court ruled that 

prosecutors must prove a link between the gratuities and a specific 

act performed by the official accepting the gratuities. In response, 

this bill expands the anti-gratuity statute to those given because of 

an official’s position, and not just because of an official act performed. 

In the Valdes case, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 

ruled that the police officer who provided information about citizens from a police database to someone who paid him for the information was not criminally liable because his action was not 

deemed to be an official act. This bill would extend liability for receiving gratuities received for any act within the official’s duties. 

And as you mentioned in the Skilling case, the Supreme Court 

held that the honest services fraud statute only applies to bribes 

and kickbacks and may not be used to prosecute other schemes. In 

response, the bill establishes a new crime of undisclosed self-dealing. 

We obviously need to address these cases, but if we act, I hope 

we will do so in a way that avoids problems that leads to courts 

having to step in to limit them. 

Today our witnesses will present opinions about whether or not 

we should update the laws. If there is reason to expand the coverage of some of these statutes, I want to make sure that we do 

so in a way that is not overbroad and gives clear notice to the public of the conduct which violates the statutes. 

If there are criticisms of the bill, we need to hear them, and we 

need the Justice Department to respond. And I hope that any criticisms will also be constructive, in that alternatives will be presented when possible. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the witnesses. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member 

of the full Committee, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers? 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Sensenbrenner and Subcommittee Ranking Member Scott. I am happy to be here today to 

join you in this discussion. 

You would think that public corruption legislation would have 

been taken care of long before now, I mean all the public corruption cases we have. But my hat is off to Chairman Sensenbrenner, 

who works closely with me on civil rights cases; on the data retention bill; on the issue of Haiti, the poorest country in the Western 

Hemisphere; and Bobby Scott, with whom I work regularly. 

Now, there is only one problem with this bill, so we might as well 

get down to business on it, and that is it increases sentencing in 

at least five or six areas. And that has prevented me from cosponsoring the bill, and I am now more disposed to voting for this bill 

when it comes out of Committee. 

But we incarcerate more people, proportionately, than any country on Earth. So why in the world would I come here and vote to 

lengthen and toughen sentences? That is why Scott isn’t on the bill, 

and he probably has even more and better reasons than I for not 

being a cosponsor. 

25 

But that, I say to my good friend, the Chairman, is the problem 

that we have. 

Now, what is good about the bill? Well, the first thing is that 

Sensenbrenner and Quigley use some restraint in the extension of 

the statute of limitations for prosecuting certain public-corruption 

offenses. This bill originally sentenced from 5 to 10 years; they lowered it from 5 to 6—they increased it from 5 to 6. That was a good 

thing. 

It is a good thing in this bill that we prohibit public officials from 

receiving bribes to perform any act within their official duties. 

Maybe you will explain to me why, on July of 2011, we are proposing to prevent public officials from receiving bribes. I mean, is 

that saying that there is no law about that? That unless we do this, 

public officials can bribe and get away with it? Well, I don’t think 

so. 

And then I think there is a good case to be made in the law that 

we expand the law to prohibit undisclosed self-dealing; that is, 

when a public official conceals material information, when their 

conduct or their acts would benefit their financial interests, and 

when the official has a duty to disclose it. 

I would like to work with Chairman Sensenbrenner and Ranking 

Member Scott on a statute that covers that particular area. 

And then, of course, I am always watching to make sure that the 

Department of Justice doesn’t overreach too frequently. My history, 

my experience, tells me—am I over time? 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. You can—— 

Mr. CONYERS. I am getting there. The light isn’t on. Oh, okay. 

All right. I get the message. 

Oh, now somebody turned the red light on. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. It was the machine that did that. The yellow light isn’t working. 

Mr. CONYERS. Oh, I see. 

Okay, but let me just conclude by counseling my friends at DOJ, 

and I have lots of them, that they are always using the law to overrule or curtail a court’s interpretation of the law, or to try to make 

the criminal law fit some unusual case that may be before them. 

And I wanted to give that friendly warning as well. 

Thank you for the additional time, if that is what you gave me, 

Chairman Sensenbrenner. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. You are welcome, and it was. 

Let me say that the Chair is very willing to work with the gentleman from Michigan, the gentleman from Virginia, and others, 

because there have been some holes that have been blown into the 

public corruption statutes by the Court that need to be plugged, 

and the quicker, the better. 

It is now my pleasure to introduce today’s witnesses. 

Mary Pat Brown has been with the U.S. Department of Justice 

since 2009, first acting as the acting counsel for the Office of Professional Responsibility. She currently serves as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General overseeing the Criminal Division’s Public Integrity Section and the Office of Enforcement Operations. 

After law school, she worked as a litigation associate at the firm 

of Dickstein Shapiro until she joined the U.S. Attorneys’ Office for 

the District of Columbia in 1989 as Assistant U.S. Attorney. She 

26 

became a supervisor in 1997, serving first as the Deputy Chief of 

the Appellate Division in the Fraud and Public Corruption Section, 

and then as Executive Assistant U.S. Attorney for Operations, and, 

finally, as Chief of the Criminal Division. 

She received both her bachelor of science in Foreign Service and 

her juris doctor degrees from Georgetown University. 

Ms. Lisa Griffin has been professor of law at Duke University 

since 2008. She teaches courses on a variety of topics, such as 

criminal procedure, investigation, and evidence. Before coming to 

Duke University, she was a lecturer at the UCLA School of Law. 

And prior to her work as a professor, Ms. Griffin was an Assistant 

U.S. Attorney from 1999 through 2004 in Chicago. 

After law school, she clerked for Judge Dorothy W. Nelson in the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and also for Justice 

Sandra Day O’Connor in the Supreme Court. 

She received her bachelor of arts and master of arts degree in 

Georgetown University, and her juris doctor degree at Stanford. 

Timothy O’Toole is a partner at Miller & Chevalier in Washington, D.C. Prior to joining Miller & Chevalier, he served as the 

chief of the Special Litigation Division of the Public Defenders 

Service for the District of Columbia, where he supervised and handled cases in local and Federal courts. 

He is also a former assistant Federal public defender in Las 

Vegas, Nevada. And he served as a member of the board of directors of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and 

co-Chair at large of the NACDL White Collar Crime Committee. 

He received both his bachelor of arts and juris doctor from the 

University of Virginia. 

Each of the witness statements will be entered into the record in 

its entirety. 

I will ask that each witness summarize his or her testimony to 

5 minutes or less. 

And I recognize Ms. Brown. 

TESTIMONY OF MARY PATRICIA BROWN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Ms. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman Ranking Member 

Scott, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you 

for the opportunity to discuss the Department of Justice’s efforts to 

combat public corruption and to speak to you about H.R. 2572, the 

‘‘Clean Up Government Act of 2011.’’ 

The Department strongly supports the bill, and we appreciate 

the Subcommittee’s efforts to strengthen our ability to fight public 

corruption in all of its forms. 

Protecting the integrity of our government institutions is one of 

the highest priorities for the Department of Justice. Our citizens 

are entitled to know that their public servants are making decisions based upon the best interests of those they serve, not based 

on bribes, extortion, or hidden financial interests. 

Let me give you just a few examples of the Department’s sustained efforts to prosecute public corruption in all its forms. 

Last month, the Department’s Public Integrity Section began a 

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ists for their roles in a wide-ranging conspiracy to buy and sell 

votes on pro-gambling legislation. They also recently obtained a 

jury conviction against a senator from Puerto Rico and a local business owner for engaging in a bribery scheme in which a lavish trip 

was given to the senator in exchange for his vote on certain pieces 

of legislation. 

As we all know, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Chicago recently 

convicted the State’s former Governor on substantial public corruption charges. 

And right next door to us in Maryland, the U.S. Attorney’s Office 

recently secured the conviction of former Prince George’s County 

executive and others in connection with a scheme involving extortion and evidence tampering. 

Despite the Department’s successes, we believe there are some 

gaps in our public corruption statutes that must be closed, and we 

thank the Subcommittee for its leadership on this issue. Let me 

mention some of the key elements of the bill. 

First, the bill would remedy problems that have arisen from judicial interpretations of the Federal bribery statutes. For example, 

right now a corrupt police officer who searches restricted law enforcement databases in exchange for money slipped to him under 

the table can act without fear of Federal prosecution. This bill ensures that this corrupt behavior falls within the meaning of ‘‘official 

act’’ in the statute. 

Likewise, under current law, a Federal public official may repeatedly accept, without fear of repercussions, lavish gifts such as 

plane tickets, sports tickets, expensive art objects, and cash that 

are given to him in a general effort to curry favor. 

Because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sun-Diamond, the 

government must prove that there is a direct link between a payment and a specific official act. This is almost, and often, impossible to establish a one-to-one link. 

The bill would ensure that public officials cannot cash in on their 

official positions. To be clear, this last category of payments does 

not, and never has, included lawful campaign contributions. Nor 

does it include de minimis gifts that are permitted by existing government rules and regulations. 

The bill would also allow government to use court-ordered wiretaps to gather evidence in cases involving Federal program bribery, 

theft of United States Government property, and major fraud 

against the United States. It would also make clear that these 

crimes can form predicate offenses under the RICO statute. 

The bill also would expand the statute of limitations for public 

corruption offenses. Public corruption allegations, by their very nature, may not surface until years after the crimes were committed. 

Expansion of the statute of limitations, even modestly, will help ensure that we are able to uncover and address the full extent of 

these schemes, and to address the corruption allegations fairly and 

thoroughly. 

Finally, the bill would fill the substantial gap left by the Supreme Court’s decision last year in Skilling v. United States. 

For decades before Skilling, honest services fraud covered 

schemes involving bribes and kickbacks and hidden financial dealings. However, the Supreme Court held that the honest services 

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fraud statute was vague, and limited it only to kickbacks and 

bribes. But not all public corruption is about bribes or kickbacks. 

If a mayor were to solicit tens of thousands of dollars in bribes 

in exchange for giving city contracts out to unqualified bidders, unquestionably that would be bribery. But if that same mayor wants 

to make even more money, he could instead secretly create his own 

company and funnel those same city contracts to his company. 

Although this second type of scheme is clearly corrupt and plainly undermines public confidence in the integrity of government, it 

can no longer be reached after Skilling. 

The Department of Justice is committed to prosecuting public 

corruption offenses at all levels of government, using all the tools 

available to us. We support the Subcommittee’s effort to bolster the 

Department of Justice’s ability to carry out this mission. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today, and I would 

be pleased to take any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Brown follows:] 

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Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The time of the gentlewoman has expired. 

Ms. Griffin? 

TESTIMONY OF LISA K. GRIFFIN, ESQ., PROFESSOR OF LAW, 

DUKE UNIVERSITY 

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committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify about the purpose and shape of public corruption prosecutions. 

The criminal statutes enforcing public integrity now fail to reach 

a significant group of cases in which public officials abuse their positions for personal gain. 

The Supreme Court’s decision in Skilling v. United States limited 

prosecutions for honest services fraud to cases of bribes and kickbacks, and excluded concealed conflicts of interest from the reach 

of the fraud statutes. When it did so, it created a rare Federal 

criminal shortfall. 

Congress can act not only to close that gap, but also to clarify 

the scope of Federal enforcement and address problems of vagueness and over-breadth in the statutory scheme. Let me illustrate 

with some examples. 

Consider a public official who accepts a substantial and unreported sum of money with no particular strings attached, who is 

later moved to take action favorable to the benefactor; or an individual who takes advantage of public office to steer contracts to a 

company in which he has a concealed financial interest; or a politician seeking private-sector employment, who fails to disclose that 

connection, yet votes favorably on legislation that affects her prospective employer. 

These are all acts that would no longer fit within the statutory 

scheme or any other statute of which I am aware. Yet in each case, 

there is leverage over the public officials, self-interested deception, 

and hidden financial motivation every bit as corrosive as straightforward bribery. 

The harm of secret self-dealing is serious, because it distorts official action and detracts from the legitimacy of government. It deprives the public of neutral decisionmaking and of the information 

it needs to determine whether public officials are faithful agents. 

A conflict of interest provision focuses on the source of that harm, 

financial gain that is knowingly concealed from the public. 

Accordingly, I support the provisions of the proposed legislation 

that restore the government’s ability to prosecute undisclosed conflicts of interest and also refine the definition of self-dealing. Overturning the restrictive interpretations of bribes and gratuities in 

United States v. Sun-Diamond, and expanding that concept to include benefits conferred because of official position, is one step toward closing the enforcement gap, but it does not address all of the 

scenarios I described. 

More importantly, I urge Congress to deal directly with the problem of undisclosed self-dealing. A freestanding conflict of interest 

offense modeled on the prohibitions in 18 U.S.C. Section 208 that 

govern Federal employees would accomplish that. Alternatively, I 

agree that the fraud enforcement scheme should be enlarged 

through the proposed Section 1346(a) to include self-enriching conduct by public officials. 

Overcriminalization is a real concern when confronting new or 

expanded Federal crimes, and it is critical for public officials to 

know the boundaries of the law. It should be clear what prosecutors must prove and what officials can and cannot do. 

This statute has the potential, though, to rein in prosecutorial 

overreaching. It does not reinstate the very spare terms of the 

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former honest services provision, but rather makes an effort to be 

quite specific about the harm that justifies criminal sanction. 

First, tying the offense to a preexisting disclosure requirement 

under Federal, State, or local law addresses a major inconsistency 

in the application of the honest services provision pre-Skilling. 

That requirement, paired with an official act taken to benefit the 

concealed interest, protects against liability for unwitting deception. 

A defendant who knowingly conceals material financial information is aware that disclosure is mandated and acts with the requisite specific intent to defraud can hardly claim a failure of notice. 

I also believe it would be helpful to add an exemption for small 

benefits falling below a certain threshold. One of the reasons the 

Supreme Court was moved to curtail honest services fraud was 

that the statute could be read to reach ordinary and harmless exchanges. It might be prudent to take benefits like restaurant reservations and team jerseys off the table, to preempt that obvious 

criticism and ensure that the statute does not extend to de minimis 

interests in disclosure. 

If a public official is acting to benefit or further her own financial 

interests, then there is presumptively a breach of the public’s trust. 

But the criminal sanctions should extend only to nontrivial harms, 

and therefore cover only those gains that could actually give rise 

to hidden incentives. 

Some of the ethics codes and disclosure obligations already folded 

into the proposed legislation would include such thresholds, but the 

statute might also establish a general Federal standard that provides a safe harbor. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Griffin follows:] 

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Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman’s time has expired. I 

grant you that the yellow light hasn’t gone on. We have a mechanical aberration up here. 

Ms. GRIFFIN. Thank you, Chairman Sensenbrenner. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you. 

Mr. O’Toole? 


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TESTIMONY OF TIMOTHY P. O’TOOLE, ESQ., 

PARTNER, MILLER & CHEVALIER 

Mr. O’TOOLE. Good morning. My name is Timothy O’Toole, and 

I am a practicing criminal defense lawyer at the law firm of Miller 

& Chevalier. I am appearing today on behalf of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 

It is difficult to stand up and publicly announce myself as being 

opposed to something that has been named the ‘‘Clean Up Government Act.’’ Like you, I believe that public corruption is an insidious 

crime that undermines the public’s trust in those who serve us. 

So let me be very plain, I am not here today to defend public corruption, nor am I recommending that you do so. But I am here 

today to remind the esteemed Members that we already have a 

very powerful set of over 20 Federal laws that punish those public 

officials who trade on their public office for private gain, just as we 

heard in some of the earlier statements. 

Twice over the past 2 years this Subcommittee came together, 

under the bipartisan leadership of Bobby Scott and Louie Gohmert, 

to learn about the problem of overcriminalizing conduct. 

Duplicative statutes, federalization of conduct traditionally belonging to the States, vague laws that can be applied to innocent 

conduct, excessive prison sentences, this is overcriminalization. 

My written testimony contains a discussion of exactly how H.R. 

2572 would have such an effect, despite the well-meaning intentions that might have motivated its drafters. 

Specifically, the bill proposes to overrule three decisions in which 

the entire Supreme Court bench thought there would be dramatic 

and negative consequences to doing precisely what this bill proposes, and the bill would also substantially increase what are already decades-long sentence lengths. 

Section 2 would expand the conduct covered by Federal mail and 

wire fraud to cover false statements made in obtaining licenses 

issued by States and municipalities. Any misrepresentation on a 

Virginia marriage license, or a Wisconsin fishing license, or a license to sell a hotdog in Illinois, would suddenly serve as a basis 

for Federal prosecution. 

In Cleveland v. the United States, every member of the Supreme 

Court rejected such an application of the mail fraud statute, concluding it would dramatically intrude on areas properly regulated 

by State and local law. This attempt to overrule Cleveland is an 

example of overcriminalization and certainly has nothing to do 

with either public corruption or cleaning up government. 

Section 16 would create a Federal crime of undisclosed self-dealing by any public official. This decision, as we have heard, would 

overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in the United States v. 

Skilling, in which every member of the Court agreed that this undisclosed self-dealing theory was unconstitutionally vague. In fact, 

the Court identified a host of questions that such a theory would 

need to answer in order to pass constitutional muster. 

And yet Section 16 leaves many of these same questions unanswered. The bill fails to define the significance of the conflicting financial interests. It fails to define the extent to which the official 

action has to further that interest. And it fails to explicitly define 

the scope of the disclosure duty. 

48 

In addition, State and local jurisdictions often have their own extensive anticorruption laws, yet this bill allows the Federal Government to override the laws that locals have adopted to address the 

conduct of their own officials. 

Take the part-time citizen legislator in Texas who also owns a 

car dealership. Does this law apply to him when he votes on a 

State bill to increase highway funding, because better roads mean 

more people buying cars? It could, if the legislator does not disclose 

the interest, maybe because he cannot imagine that a disclosure 

rule applies to him, because everybody knows he owns the car dealership. 

The Federal prosecutors could pursue this charge even if the 

punishment for such nondisclosure would normally be administrative and the rule had never been construed to require disclosure 

like this one. Thus, if Section 16 becomes law, Federal prosecutors 

get to decide what Texas disclosure rules mean and get to bring 

one-size-fits-all prosecutions without any understanding of the jurisdictions in which these prosecutions are brought. 

Section 8 is a response to United States v. Sun-Diamond, in 

which the Supreme Court unanimously held that that the gratuities law could only be used to prosecute individuals who had given 

gifts based on their official acts. The proposed amendment adopts 

the government’s losing position in Sun-Diamond, criminalizing 

any gift given at any time to any public official in any situation 

where that gift was given as a result of the public official just being 

a public official. 

As the Supreme Court unanimously noted in Sun-Diamond, the 

broader provision urged by the government could result in the 

criminalization of many kinds of legitimate gifts, such as replica 

jerseys given to the President by championship teams. 

Section 6 seems to attempt to avoid this absurd result by permitting gifts that are expressly allowed under existing laws or regulation. But the vast network of administrative rules weren’t written 

to serve that purpose, and the effect Section 6 will actually have 

in preventing unfair prosecutions is unclear. 

Sections 4, 5, 6, and 12 substantially increase the maximum 

terms of imprisonment for certain offenses. Section 10, moreover, 

orders the Sentencing Commission to increase already high penalties for corruption offenses. But there is simply no evidence that 

the current lengthy statutory maximums and guidelines fail to provide adequate punishment and deterrence. 

Thank you for the opportunity to express NACDL’s concerns. My 

written statement sets forth several other serious concerns we have 

about the bill, but which I did not have time to address with you 

this morning. 

We urge the Committee to consider the wide array of existing 

criminal laws that already prevent and punish public corruption 

before it acts further. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. O’Toole follows:] 

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Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you very much. The gentleman’s 

time has expired. 

The Chair will defer his round of questions until the end. 

And for the first 5 minutes of questioning, the Chair recognizes 

the gentlewoman from Florida, Ms. Adams. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


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65 

Ms. Brown, you said something earlier, and I am confused, and 

I have listened to all three of you. You said that if a police officer 

searches a database, there is no way to prosecute him. However, 

there are NCIC rules and regulations in States, and local agencies 

will prosecute, is that not correct? 

Ms. BROWN. For—— 

Mrs. ADAMS. For using the database illegally. In other words, 

going in and getting information because, if I remember my days, 

and it has been a while since I have been a police officer, my training and my certification through NCIC, there was prosecution 

available if you abuse that system, correct? 

Ms. BROWN. There may be prosecution or administrative remedies when a police officer or law enforcement officer abuses that 

privilege, but in this way, the police officer and the person who is 

doing the bribing can be brought together under one statute and 

prosecuted for it. 

So I don’t know what the State law is in Florida, but I do know 

here, in the District of Columbia, where I work with the Metropolitan Police Department and with the U.S. Attorney’s Office, we 

would have brought that matter in Federal court, and we did in 

that particular case. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Okay. Well, I just wanted to make sure that I was 

remembering correctly, and it is possible things have changed since 

I was a police officer. 

Ms. Griffin, from your perspective, what if anything is not being 

prosecuted that should be? 

Ms. GRIFFIN. I think the cases of undisclosed self-dealing that 

both Ms. Brown and I described. Probably the most serious offense 

is the example given of a public official who steers public contracts 

into a company in which that official has an interest. I am not 

aware of a Federal statute that currently would criminalize that 

conduct, and I believe that this legislation closes that gap. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Is that the only thing that you can think of that 

wasn’t already covered currently? 

Ms. GRIFFIN. Other varieties as well. One aspect of it would be 

closed in terms of the gap by another part of the proposed legislation, and that is the retainer theory of bribery, or a stream of benefits conferred on a public official with no immediate strings attached that later produces a stream of favors. That theory is currently not accessible to Federal prosecutors, because of Sun-Diamond and Skilling. This statute remedies that either through overturning the limitation on bribes and gratuities in Sun-Diamond or, 

more broadly, criminalizing undisclosed self-dealing. 

And then of course there is the example of an official who is 

seeking employment in the private sector subsequent to public 

service who acts to benefit the potential employer and has not disclosed the future interest in that employment. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Well, what about the part-time legislator who owns 

the car dealership? Is this language vague enough that they could 

be pulled in, based on the comments that Mr. O’Toole said? 

Ms. GRIFFIN. I actually do not believe that a legislator whose interests in a car dealership is known to constituents would be 

criminalized. 

66 

There are two important elements to the new or renewed provision in the statute. One is to tie it to actual disclosure requirements that have not been met, so we are talking about, let’s say, 

a mayor of a small town who works part time and also happens to 

own the car dealership. If everyone is aware of that interest in the 

car dealership, then I don’t believe there is corruption, if voters can 

assess whether that mayor is a faithful public agent when making 

decisions that might affect the car dealership. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Mr. O’Toole said something different. What he said 

was, as a car dealership owner, a part-time legislator votes on a 

transportation bill, could it be construed as not disclosing and, 

therefore, cause this person to be charged, even though there was 

really no intent to violate the law? 

Because I know a lot of States, a lot of localities, have their own 

corruption laws, and he may have complied to those requirements 

but may not have realized, based on the Federal law, could he then 

be charged? 

Ms. GRIFFIN. As I read the provision, the mental state standards 

are quite stringent. The official would need to know of the mandatory disclosure of the interests, knowingly fail to disclose that interest, and then act as well with the specific intent to further his or 

her own personal financial interests and conceal that from the public. 

I think by combining each of those steps with the strict mental 

state requirement actually does go quite a long way toward preventing prosecutorial overreaching. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Ms. Brown, you look like you wanted to answer. 

Ms. BROWN. Yes, I do. Thank you so much. 

I want to emphasize that this is not like the citizen legislator, 

because for the exact same reasons. It is all about transparency, 

these public corruption laws. The voters need to know what their 

public officials are doing. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Agreed. 

Ms. BROWN. In this case, under this statute, you must show that 

he knew it, he intended to violate it, he kept it secret. The car dealership analogy just doesn’t fit. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Thank you. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman’s time is expired. 

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers? 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Scott, for allowing me to precede you both. 

I wanted to commend all of the witnesses. First, I want the representative of the Department of Justice to know that I appreciate 

her career in DOJ and being here today. 

And, of course, Attorney Griffin, you did a great job. I think you 

have raised some very good points. 

But the consideration that I am raising to Chairman Sensenbrenner is the comments of Attorney O’Toole. 

Now, I didn’t hear anybody refute the fact that we may be overcriminalizing this whole area. 

Does anybody contradict his assertion that the way this bill is 

written, a mistake on a marriage license or the seeking of a fishing 

permit would make you subject to the law? 

Ms. BROWN. I would be happy to answer that. 

67 

Mr. CONYERS. All right, please do. 

Ms. BROWN. Thank you. 

This honest services fraud statute was never intended, and never 

covered in the past, someone who gets a fishing license in the State 

of Texas, or operates the local hotdog stand. 

Again, one must show that the misrepresentation on that was intentional. It was intended to defraud. It was intended to be kept 

secret. 

Those stringent things do not cover those sort of situations and 

never have. 

It is all about public officials taking actions in secret for their 

own financial gain, so the average citizen who goes and gets a fishing license is not a public official hiding something on the fishing 

license for personal gain. 

Mr. CONYERS. Okay. 

O’Toole is talking about the Cleveland case, and you are talking 

about the Skilling case, right? 

What do you say, Counsel O’Toole? 

Mr. O’TOOLE. Yes, my testimony was directed toward Section 2, 

which is the provision of the bill which would overrule the Cleveland case by defining an application for a license as a form of property that would be subject to the fraud laws. And then the Cleveland case was specifically about a misrepresentation on a gambling 

license, and there is no reason that this definition wouldn’t apply 

to the sorts of licenses that I had in my testimony. 

It is not about the undisclosed conflict of interest theory, which 

I think has other problems, but that was not one of them. 

Ms. BROWN. If Professor Griffin wants to jump in here about the 

Cleveland case, I am happy to defer to her, but my response to that 

stands. You can’t read the Cleveland case without reading the 

Skilling case and Sun-Diamond. 

And I don’t want to repeat myself, but it goes back to the issue 

of it is undisclosed self-dealing by a public official who intends to 

do that. 

So an honest mistake on any type of license is not going to be 

covered by the statute, and it never has been. 

Now, we are not overcriminalizing or overfederalizing, because 

this legislation really is to fill gaps that have been created over the 

course of judicial interpretation. 

As I mentioned, judicial interpretation of the bribery statutes in 

the Skilling decision—the Skilling decision was very careful when 

it said absolutely does the legislator, does Congress, have to be 

careful in how this fix is made. And we agree with that. But it 

didn’t say there is no possible fix available. 

That is why the Department of Justice is happy to work with the 

Subcommittee to make it fit, back to the way it was 20 years ago. 

Mr. CONYERS. You are pretty persuasive. 

Now, Chairman Sensenbrenner, would it meet with your approval that your staff and mine continue working on this important 

bill that you and Judge Louie Gohmert and Quigley all participated 

in, so that—I am moving more to a supportive position and—— 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. CONYERS. Yes. 

68 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman knows that my door is always open. It has been in the past. You haven’t made me mad 

enough to slam it yet. [Laughter.] 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, yeah, but we come pretty close to it sometimes. [Laughter.] 

But at any rate, I appreciate your response, and I will continue 

to work with it. 

And I’d like to bring the former Chairman of the Subcommittee 

on Crime in on this too, because, you know, let’s face it, he’s got 

some reservations and we would like Sensenbrenner’s name to get 

on another bill here, if we can, during this session of Congress. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, with the caveat that Senator Durbin 

said negotiating with me is like eating somebody for lunch and 

spitting out the bones, I will be happy to negotiate with you. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. I yield back my time. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Texas, the Vice-Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Gohmert. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I am trying to muddle my way through the legislation. I 

didn’t participate in the preparation of it, so I am just trying to understand some of these things. 

But, Ms. Brown, you had mentioned that when someone searches 

a crime data for money, and they cannot be federally prosecuted, 

that that is a problem. You are not saying there are not State laws 

against doing such a thing, are you? 

Ms. BROWN. Sometimes there are State laws. In the District of 

Columbia, we—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. But if they are not, then you feel the Federal Government needs the use of that power and jump in for the States? 

Ms. BROWN. That is one reason. The other reason—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Would you feel the same way if a State didn’t 

have a burglary statute, that then we would need to federalize burglary and make it a Federal crime if the States chose not to? 

Ms. BROWN. No. What I think that is appropriate is that there 

are Federal statutes and State statutes that cover the same 

thing—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, let me ask you, do you think the language 

that says inserting, quote, ‘‘anything or things of value,’’ unquote, 

is a T-shirt a thing of value, or a baseball cap? Would those be 

things of value? 

Ms. BROWN. Well, that is where the State and local regulations 

do come in, Congressman, because—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. So if they don’t have a de minimis exception in 

State or local regulations, then that would be something of value, 

correct? 

Ms. BROWN. It is not a matter of whether it is a de minimis. It 

is a matter of transparency and reporting. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Right. And I am familiar with the fact that the 

public normally assumes, if someone is a legislator in a State or 

Federal legislature, the public just kind of presumes that since 

they make the law, they surely must know them, and the presumption normally goes against a legislator. 

69 

Because I am thinking you had pointed out that a legislator must 

know of disclosure requirements, but if the evidence shows that 

someone is a member of the legislature and didn’t disclose something, then usually the public will say, well, he surely knew, he 

makes the laws. 

But I want to get to something else. 

You, Mr. O’Toole, mentioned one example, but here on page 14 

of the bill, where it defines undisclosed self-dealing: A public official performs an official act for the purpose in whole or in material 

part of furthering or benefitting a financial interest of. 

And then I come down, and like you all talked about, it involves 

self-interest: The public official; the spouse; a minor child; a general business partner of a public official; a business or organization 

in which the public official serves as an employee, officer or director, trustee, or general partner. 

So if a Member of Congress, Mr. O’Toole, were a director of a 

charitable organization, and I understand there are a lot of Members of Congress that are, and he were to commit the official act 

of cosponsoring or voting for a charitable donation to be deductible, 

do you have any concerns that that might be subject to meeting 

this definition of a corrupt act? 

Mr. O’TOOLE. I do. I think this is part of the problem that I described before, which is that the law doesn’t describe the significance of the financial interest, which is what the Supreme Court 

said must be defined. And so here there may be some—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Wouldn’t it be clear in that situation that charitable organization would definitely benefit, and benefit in a financial way, correct? 

Mr. O’TOOLE. That is correct. 

Mr. GOHMERT. There is no doubt, right? 

Mr. O’TOOLE. Right. And so, since this law defines any benefit, 

I certainly think that a creative prosecutor could easily look at this 

and find it covered by the law. 

And I am not even sure it takes a creative prosecutor, because 

I do think the plain language of the law, as you point out, does 

cover exactly the sort of conflict of interest situation where someone is—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Do you think that is a conflict of interest? That 

if you think, in your heart, that a charitable institution should be 

able to have donors deduct, that that is good for the overall benefit 

of the entire country, that even though that benefits one—he’s a director, or she’s a director on that, that that is corrupt? 

Mr. O’TOOLE. Absolutely not corrupt. I think that that is part of 

the problem, is that this law would criminalize ordinary conduct 

that the average, everyday person would recognize is not corrupt, 

and is an important and completely legitimate part of the way that 

our government does business. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, it sounds like, then, as long as the prosecutors are not ever upset with a legislator, there shouldn’t be any 

problem. 

Mr. O’TOOLE. And I am sure that never happens. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Okay, thank you. 

I yield back. 

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Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. O’Toole, do you want to qualify that, 

before I say that Mr. Gohmert’s time is up? 

Mr. O’TOOLE. Qualify? 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. That it never happens. 

Mr. O’TOOLE. I will—— 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I think all of us on the Committee know 

it has. 

Mr. O’TOOLE. And I’d say, I guess I should qualify by saying I 

hope it never happens. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Conceded. Without objection, the gentleman may revise and extend his remarks. 

I am happy to announce that the yellow light is now working, 

and recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, obviously we need to make some changes. But as 

I said, we need to be careful about what we do. 

And I wanted to ask, we have gone back and forth on this business license thing, where if a guy lied and got a business license, 

if he lied and committed fraud to get the business license unbeknownst to the agency or any official, does this law address that? 

Ms. BROWN. The honest services fraud addresses, as do the mail 

and wire fraud statutes, always involve a specific intent to defraud, 

regardless of the property at issue. 

Mr. SCOTT. Wait a minute. If the business license is obtained by 

fraud, lying on the form, and you got your business license, that 

is obviously something of value. But it was unbeknownst—if you 

bribe the official to get it, colluded with the official, that is easy. 

Ms. BROWN. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Is the person who lied on the form guilty for having 

illegally obtained a business license, because he did it by lying and 

fraudulent activity? 

Ms. BROWN. If he intended to commit that, yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Right. Does this bill cover that? 

Ms. BROWN. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. And the person who obtained the license by fraud 

would be guilty? 

Ms. BROWN. If he had the specific intent. 

Mr. SCOTT. Right, he lied. He straight up lied. 

Ms. BROWN. Well, there is a lie and then there is—— 

Mr. SCOTT. He lied. He fraudulently—— 

Ms. BROWN. Yes, then this bill covers that. 

Mr. SCOTT. Now, why wouldn’t that same—and we went to the 

fishing license, why wouldn’t the person, the individual lying on a 

fishing license, be in the same boat? 

Ms. BROWN. Is the person applying for the fishing license a public official? 

Mr. SCOTT. No. The person getting a business license wasn’t a 

public official. 

Ms. BROWN. Yes. It has to be a public official. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay, you didn’t say that. If an individual, not a public official, lied to get a business license—— 

Ms. BROWN. I am not bringing that case in Federal court. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, I am not sure—that is you. Does this bill cover 

it? 

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Ms. BROWN. No. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. 

Ms. GRIFFIN. I think that there is a provision of the bill which 

would enlarge the definition of money and property in Sections 

1341 and 1343, and thereby extend the definition of mail and wire 

fraud. And it would include within the definition of property licenses as a thing of value, as property. 

That is a separate provision from the ones that have been the 

primary—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, let’s back up a step. 

If you lie and mail the application in on a form, you are not a 

public official, you lied to get your business license, does this legislation cover that individual? Now Ms. Brown said no. 

Ms. BROWN. That would be mail fraud. That would be under 

1343. 

Mr. SCOTT. So the bill would cover that, so if you mail in the application, if you mail in your fishing license, you are now covered? 

Ms. BROWN. If you are a public official—— 

Mr. SCOTT. No, wait a minute. Wait a minute. You are going 

back to—— 

Ms. BROWN. You want a private citizen? 

Mr. SCOTT. A private citizen—— 

Ms. BROWN. Sure. A private citizen—— 

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. Mails in the fraudulent license. That is 

wire fraud. 

Ms. BROWN. That is mail fraud. 

Mr. SCOTT. And if we change it under this bill, and now we are 

covering that situation, the fishing license? 

Ms. BROWN. This bill does not cover private individuals. It covers 

public officials. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay, but Ms. Griffin said you just did cover the private official, because he mailed it in. 

Now is a private official covered under this legislation? Is he now 

at risk? He’s not at risk now, would he be at risk if we changed 

this for lying on the fishing license? 

Ms. GRIFFIN. It is a separate section of the bill. It has not been 

the subject of our testimony or the thrust of most of the discussion 

today. 

There is a section of the proposed legislation that separately 

makes a change. That refers back to the earlier discussion—— 

Mr. SCOTT. So, well, maybe you can respond in writing, since I 

am having trouble, I don’t want to use my 5 minutes on a simple 

question: Is a fishing license covered or not? 

Mr. O’TOOLE. If I could try to clarify this? Section 2 of the bill 

does expand Section 1341 and Section 1343, which I believe Professor Griffin will confirm applies to private individuals. Those are 

the mail and wire fraud—— 

Mr. SCOTT. So if you mail in your fishing license, two out of three 

think it is covered? 

Ms. BROWN. No, I agree with that. I said that mail fraud—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay, so the fishing license is covered now? 

Ms. BROWN. Under mail fraud. 

Mr. SCOTT. Under the bill. 

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Ms. BROWN. Under the bill, under the honest services fraud, it 

could, as in the Skilling case. In the Skilling case—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, wait a minute. That is a simple yes or no question, and I’d like to ask another question—— 

Ms. BROWN. Then I will answer yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. And you answered no to begin with, and now it is 

yes. 

Ms. BROWN. I am saying, yes, but—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

There is a difference between bribes and gratuity. Under the 

bribes section, the bill reduces the threshold for a bribe from 

$5,000 to $1,000. But the gratuities section, as we have noted, covers any kind of gratuity. 

There are no exceptions for the gratuities? We talked about baseball caps and T-shirts. What about written material? 

Ms. BROWN. I am sorry, what about written? 

Mr. SCOTT. Written material. If a lobbyist comes in with research that cost him $1,000 to put together, he gives it to me to support 

his position on a bill, is that a gift? 

Ms. BROWN. No. 

Mr. SCOTT. Why? 

Ms. BROWN. Because he’s lobbying. It is not a gift. A gift is something that is given personally to an individual. 

And the ones we were talking about in the statute, the ones that 

were involved in Sun-Diamond, were things like tickets to the 

World Series, free plane tickets, cut-crystal balls, artwork. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, I mean, I know what’s covered, but what else 

is covered? 

Ms. BROWN. Things like that. 

Mr. SCOTT. But written material is not, and there is no written 

exception to it? 

Ms. BROWN. No. 

Mr. O’TOOLE. I actually would disagree. I think, based on the 

broad language of the statute, if it is anything of value, which I 

think written material would clearly be, and it is given because of 

your official position under this bill, which it would be, because it 

would be given to you as a congressman, it would seem to clearly 

be governed by the new gratuities law of the bill. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Quigley? 

Mr. QUIGLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your 

efforts on this legislation. 

Mr. O’Toole, forgive me, let me ask you a question. What did one 

Illinois prisoner say to the other Illinois prisoner? 

Mr. O’TOOLE. I have no idea. 

Mr. QUIGLEY. The food was better here when you were Governor. 

I mention that for a reason. I am from Illinois, and I know the 

association you work for, and I suppose I am a traitor to the cause, 

because I was a criminal defense attorney for 10 years at 26th 

Street, so I get what you are getting to. 

But I hear those jokes all the time, right? Hunting for corruption 

in Illinois is like hunting for cows. 

So we have to recognize that the public is strongly desirous of 

getting something done. And so what I am getting to with you is, 

73 

you and your association may be uniquely suited to help us clear 

up that which you have concerns about. 

So what I am asking you, and I would mention to Ms. Brown, 

is what I hear most concerns about with this legislation are making sure it is not vague, that we don’t repeat the same mistakes. 

And the questions today seem to evoke those same concerns, some 

sense of uniformity of what is de minimis. 

And I know transparency is first and foremost. But from transparency there appears to be a need for some uniformity in what is 

disclosed. 

I remember a colleague of mine at the county. They showed her 

disclosure statement as a county elected official and what she had 

to disclose, and then when she ran for senate, what she had to disclose. And it was a whole different game. 

And across this country, it is extraordinary the difference of what 

elected officials have to disclose, and what that means for transparency. 

And wouldn’t you agree that those aspects of uniformity are critical to having the public’s trust that they know what’s happening 

and that the prosecution is on an equal playing field? 

Ms. BROWN. Yes, I do. But one of the things I wanted to emphasize in response to that remark, Congressman, is that one of the 

things we have to be careful about is making sure that the public 

official knows what needs to be reported and knows what is illegal. 

But each State, each legislature, each local community, and the 

Federal Government agencies and Congress, you are right, has different disclosure forms. 

But at least the way that this bill is designed is that those disclosure obligations are linked to what is required. So when you take 

your ethics course at your new employer, or when you become a 

State legislator, presumably you are advised of those things. 

But you are right, it is certainly a problem that there are all different kinds of reporting requirements. 

Mr. QUIGLEY. There is no way to help, in this legislation, protect 

those that you are prosecuting, and also give the American public 

a sense of what is being done uniformly across the country? 

Ms. BROWN. Well, I think that the first instance is there is a specific reporting requirement under law and that has been violated. 

Then the public will know that has been violated. 

There was a reporting requirement—I mean, your average citizen doesn’t go online to see the financial disclosure forms for people who are running for public office, or who are public employees. 

Mr. QUIGLEY. Yes, but the editorial boards do, and others—— 

Ms. BROWN. Right. 

Mr. QUIGLEY [continuing]. That will help trumpet this and get it 

out there. 

Ms. BROWN. Right. 

Mr. QUIGLEY. It makes it easier. And it is part of the same sense 

of continuity. 

Mr. O’Toole, you talked about the auto dealer. Is it the uniformity of what is private interest versus public interest? And obviously in the example you gave, the fact of the matter is, and what 

seems to be the dividing line in our ethics rules, is that, you know, 

74 

you may be or have friends who are auto dealers, but improving 

all the roads helps everyone. 

So while it may help you, but it is also helping many others, and 

that seems to be the dividing line. 

Don’t you see an opportunity to create sharper lines and prevent 

problems with court enforcement? 

Mr. O’TOOLE. Well, I think the sharper lines are important. And 

I think that with that example, I was trying to point out a problem 

with the lack of sharp lines that are in the current bill. Because 

I think the language of the bill would include the State legislator 

who owns a car dealership as someone who is taking action to benefit themselves. 

I know that my colleagues here pointed out the other reasons 

that they think that that legislator wouldn’t be prosecuted. But I 

think the bill is very clear that that sort of interest, even though 

I think you and I may well agree that it is not something that the 

public would call a conflict of interest, would be classified as a conflict of interest under this bill. 

Mr. QUIGLEY. I am sorry. Go ahead. 

Ms. GRIFFIN. I think precisely because motivations can be difficult to disentangle, in terms of the difference between the public 

and the private, that a focus on private financial gain at a certain 

level is important. 

I mean, I agree with you, and I think the thrust of your question 

is, can there be clarity in this legislation—— 

Mr. QUIGLEY. Yes. 

Ms. GRIFFIN [continuing]. Over and above the clarity that comes 

from State and local disclosure laws? 

And I think it is something to consider, that I think is important, 

whether there might be a general Federal safe harbor for things 

that are insignificant, because we are looking for those motivations 

that give rise to distorted decisionmaking. And very minor benefits, 

like the team jerseys, and the restaurant reservations, and some of 

the things in the parade of horribles that have not actually been 

prosecuted, but certainly get mentioned in a lot of pieces and commentary, could be taken off the table with a general Federal safe 

harbor. 

Mr. QUIGLEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the extended time. 

I appreciate your efforts on this bill. I apologize for the weak attempt at humor, but unfortunately there is more jokes about Illinois corruption than we have time for. 

You know, I will be here all week. [Laughter.] 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, the Chair recognizes himself for 5 

minutes to say that usually the retirement home for Illinois Governors is in Wisconsin, in Adams County, in particular. 

That is where one of them is and one of them may be going. 

I want to get some clarification. I agree with both what Mr. Scott 

and Mr. Quigley have been saying relative that there be need for 

clarification. 

Ms. Brown, you talked about having a secret arrangement as one 

of the predicates for this crime. Congress and most state legislators 

have to file financial disclosure statements, which are public. Does 

that completely blow apart the secrecy business, if you disclose that 

you are a car dealer and you still take some type of gratuity? 

75 

Ms. BROWN. Yes. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. It does? Okay. 

Ms. BROWN. Yes, it does, because it lets the public know. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. 

Now we all know that a state legislator who owns a car dealership can vote for more money for roads. We have gone through 

that. What about if the legislation before the general assembly 

talks about changing the laws for disputes between car dealerships 

and the manufacturer from a judicial remedy to an arbitration 

remedy, which applies specifically to car dealerships as a class, and 

he does not recuse himself. Would that be a violation, if he voted 

in favor of that legislation? 

Ms. BROWN. Not if he had disclosed it on his form. I think in 

those circumstances he would do well to recuse himself from being 

part of that legislation, because the interests are so closely related. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Now let me talk about de minimis exceptions. I think we have gone through the T-shirt example issue as 

de minimis, and maybe written material, which I assume would be 

a coffee table book that would talk about the wonderful things that 

a specific industry does. But how about a volunteer fire department 

awarding a legislator or a Member of Congress a coat with that legislator’s name embroidered on it, and the coat would probably cost 

a couple hundred dollars? 

Ms. BROWN. To me, it depends upon the reporting requirement 

for that particular Member of Congress. If the rules and regulations under which that congressmen or State legislator operates 

permits that—for example, I am allowed to have a friend take me 

to lunch, so long as it is less than $20—if those regulations allow 

it, he certainly could keep it. 

And he reports it. That is the other thing. I could go on something that is more expensive than that, but I have to report it. 

And so it is all, again, it is all about the transparency. Can he 

keep it? Sure, but he has to report it 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, I think that this was in the instance 

involving one Member of Congress after the definition of gift or 

gratuity was changed here, where the Member of Congress didn’t 

know that he or she was going to get this embroidered jacket. And 

there was such a question about it, that everybody ended up getting embarrassed when the fire chief presented her with the jacket 

and said it is illegal for me to take that in front of a whole crowd 

of people. 

Are we setting up traps where people can end up embarrassing 

themselves? 

Ms. BROWN. I think these, particularly the honest services fraud 

statute, is not a trap for the unwary. In these circumstances when 

we have been talking about, you don’t know—— 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. We are talking about the gratuity statute 

here. 

Ms. BROWN. Oh, well, the gratuity statute certainly. If there are 

reporting requirements—excuse me, I thought we were talking 

about the honest services fraud. Forgive me. 

But again, it is all about the reporting requirements. And if that 

is reported as a gift and on the forms, as opposed to—and the other 

thing is, you have to think about, is it something that is going to 

76 

go in someone’s office, that is going to go on the wall for everybody 

to see when the citizens—— 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. A $200 volunteer fire department jacket, 

that would be pretty tough to hang on the wall of one of our offices. 

Ms. BROWN. We have fire hats all over the place in the department. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I am not talking about hats. 

Ms. BROWN. No, no, I know—I am not being frivolous. I am just 

saying that if it is reported, if it is not secret, personal gain in exchange for a favor, if it is not a thank you under the gratuity statute, or a quid pro quo under the bribery statute, then it is fine to 

be able to receive that. 

Then you move into different things about conflict of interest and 

reporting requirements and things like that. But under gratuities 

and bribery, if there is no link between secret dealing between the 

legislator and the volunteer fire department, then it is not going 

to be—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that you be 

given an additional minute to follow through on this. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Without objection. 

Mr. SCOTT. And because—— 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia. 

Mr. SCOTT. And because the question on the gratuity statute is 

just a gratuity. You are given a particular gift because of your position. And this fire jacket is given to you because of your official position. There is no disclosure requirement. There is no disclosure 

connection on that section. It is a violation. 

Ms. BROWN. What is it for, is the real question. 

Mr. SCOTT. No, the gratuity—that is the bribery section, ‘‘What 

is it for?’’ The gratuity section is that you got a gift because of your 

position. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, my time has expired. 

I guess I would make the observation that I am the author of 

this bill with Mr. Quigley of Illinois. You know what I can say is 

that the whole purpose of this bill is to try to have very clear definitions, so that public officials know what is a violation and what 

isn’t. And I am afraid that the testimony on the part of all three 

of our witnesses today indicate that there isn’t any agreement on 

what is a violation and what isn’t. 

We have got to update the statute, as a result of a couple court 

decisions. But when we do the updating of the statute, I hope that 

we will be able to put this issue to rest, so that everybody, including the courts, knows what is inbounds and what is out-of-bounds. 

So this bill needs quite a bit of work, and as I told the gentleman 

from Michigan, Mr. Conyers, we are going to have to work on this, 

and I hope to get some constructive input from the Justice Department. 

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cohen? 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Sensenbrenner. 

I understand and certainly appreciate and favor, and always 

have, trying to make laws as specific as possible. 

But what has been thrown up here by Mr. O’Toole about a marriage license or a fishing license, and you mentioned a jersey, the 

honest services statute has been on the books for how many years? 

77 

Ms. BROWN. Twenty. 

Mr. COHEN. Twenty. How many times has it ever been used for 

somebody that got a jersey or restaurant reservations or any of 

these other innocuous, de minimis things that you all have thrown 

out here, that now seems to be a problem with the law? 

Ms. BROWN. I don’t have those—— 

Mr. COHEN. Do you know of any times it has ever been used for 

something like that? 

Ms. BROWN. I don’t. But I can’t—— 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. O’Toole, do you know of any times that a wedding license, a fishing license, a jersey has been the basis of a prosecution in a Federal court? 

Mr. O’TOOLE. Well, it cannot currently be. Under the Cleveland 

decision, the fraud laws do not apply to State and local applications. That is the holding of Cleveland. 

And so currently, the Federal statutes cannot apply to that. This 

change would allow that. And so I know of none, because the law 

currently doesn’t apply to—— 

Mr. COHEN. But under honest services, which is Skilling, right? 

Mr. O’TOOLE. Yes. 

Mr. COHEN. That anything that you do that gets some public, you 

get some benefit for yourself—and Ms. Griffin, Professor Griffin, 

talked about having a big business, and you are shuffling contracts, 

you could have a small business and shuffle a jersey over there. 

But that has never happened, has it, Professor Griffin? 

Ms. GRIFFIN. Well, there are examples of cases in which prosecutors brought charges under the former honest services provision, 

where it is difficult to identify the harm, where we are not just 

talking about an intangible harm, but an insubstantial harm. 

I think one of the better examples is the Thompson case from the 

Seventh Circuit, where an official acted in a way that the prosecutors construed as intended to impress her supervisors. She received 

a salary bonus because she directed some contracts toward approved contractors who were favored for political reasons by her supervisors. But she did not gain financially in any direct way from 

that. And the only benefit that could be articulated that she received was institutional benefit of pleasing her supervisors. And 

that is literally the way it was articulated by prosecutors. 

And her conviction was reversed. And it is one of the cases that 

is often cited as abusive under the former honest services provision. 

That type of case led to the parade of horribles that, for example, 

Justice Scalia cited in his dissent from the denial of cert in the 

Sorich case, which is another Illinois case, which really primed the 

Supreme Court to take the Skilling case and reach the decision 

that it did. 

So there are some cases where the harm is quite insignificant, 

and therefore could hardly be said to distort the political process 

in a way that Congress would have—— 

Mr. COHEN. And how could you possibly draw a statute to distinguish between the two? 

Ms. GRIFFIN. Well, I think there are two answers to that. It is 

absolutely the case—Mr. O’Toole is right in much of what he says. 

78 

It is definitely the case that there are due process concerns with 

any new statute, and the Supreme Court articulated those in the 

Skilling decision, and Congress should be responsive to those. 

But it can do so in a variety of ways, including by clearly linking 

liability to the failure to disclose under an existing requirement. 

And it is not the failure to disclose itself that is being punished. 

That is why there shouldn’t be so much concern about patchwork 

requirements in State and local jurisdictions. It is the failure to 

disclose combined with taking advantage of the official position to 

then benefit financially from whatever that undisclosed interest 

might be. 

Mr. COHEN. And, Ms. Brown, what do you think, in the decision 

in Skilling, do you think it needs to be more clear? 

Ms. BROWN. I agree 100 percent with what Professor Griffin just 

said, that the gist of this bill is to link those actions to reporting 

requirements, whether they be State, local, municipal. 

That is the limit that it has provided. That is the knowledge to 

the individual legislator or public official to know—— 

Mr. COHEN. What if there is no reporting requirement in this at 

all in a city or—I mean, States have it. They may or may not affect 

a municipal official. Sometimes they cover municipal officials, 

sometimes they don’t. 

What if the city doesn’t have any disclosure requirement? Is it 

‘‘Olly, Olly, in free’’ for the mayor? 

Ms. BROWN. I don’t know the answer to that question. I am 

sorry. I’d be happy to get back to you, but I—— 

Mr. COHEN. Why do we need to increase the penalty provisions? 

Don’t you think—I mean, I am all for the bill and for the concept, 

and I think if a public official does any of these acts, they ought 

to be prosecuted and they ought to be convicted, and they ought— 

but they lose their reputation, they lose their job, they are probably 

never going to get elected again. 

I don’t know what the sentences are now, but why do they need 

to be increased? I mean, is that really going to be more of a deterrent than this public shame, embarrassment, loss of office and 

prestige? 

Ms. BROWN. We think so, because that could be said in any 

white-collar case. 

Mr. COHEN. What is the penalty now for a violation? What was 

it under honest services? 

Ms. BROWN. It was 5 years. 

Mr. COHEN. Five years—— 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And I think all of us have a sense of understanding for the legislation. You have a sense of pride regarding the importance of public service and the necessity of ensuring that we are held to the 

highest standards. 

I raised questions, and I have been listening to my colleagues, 

and so let me pursue some, sort of, out-of-the-ordinary kinds of 

questions. 

79 

To the representative from the Department of Justice, how extensive is public corruption? Do you have some statistics? Have you 

been in this for a long time? What is your sense of it? 

Ms. BROWN. I don’t have statistics at my fingertips. But having 

worked on public corruption cases for over 20 years, I can say that 

it is quite widespread and quite common. 

Just today I read in the newspaper about a police officer here in 

Washington, D.C., who agreed to plead guilty and was sentenced 

to 7 months in prison, in addition to having to resign from her job. 

We know what is happening in Prince George’s County. We know 

what is happening in Chicago. I know what is happening in the 

case today in Alabama. There are many, many cases about this. 

And I will tell you, as a prosecutor who has been in court for 

these sentencings, that it really undermines the public’s confidence 

in their public officials when they see that people who are convicted of these offenses, who have been taking hundreds of thousands of dollars, or even less, are getting, in essence, a slap on the 

wrist. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. What was the police officer’s charge? 

Ms. BROWN. The police officer was charged, in the District of Columbia, for aiding and abetting a burglary. She acted as a lookout. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would that almost be like a mass murderer, 

where he draws the attention of the world, but yet there are millions of individuals walking the Earth and walking in America that 

are not mass murderers? 

I mean, don’t the cases that are most conspicuous draw the most 

attention, while there are throngs who are doing their job every 

day? 

Ms. BROWN. There are throngs who are doing their jobs—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But when you say widespread—let me do it 

this way: Are 90 percent of the public servants in America corrupt? 

Ms. BROWN. I don’t have any statistics for you, Congresswoman. 

I would be happy to get statistics for you about how many public 

corruption cases the 94 U.S. Attorney’s Offices handle across the 

country. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes, I would appreciate it. And I would also 

appreciate—and I guess that will be under the Federal system, because I guess it would be important to note as well how they are 

addressed in the present framework of the legal system, meaning 

the tools that you have. 

So what is the one tool that you believe this legislation gives you 

that you need? 

Ms. BROWN. I think restoring the honest services fraud postSkilling is one of the most important things that—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Say it again? 

Ms. BROWN. Restoring the concept of honest services fraud as applied to undisclosed financial interests. That existed before 

Skilling. I think that is the most important thing that we are talking about. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So if you are involved in some actions in your 

company, or involved in that you don’t let it be known publicly that 

you have a vested interest or someone has an interest? 

Ms. BROWN. Right, that you are keeping it secret. You are doing 

it to defraud, and you are—— 

80 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So the clear delineation of that language is 

what you think is helpful as notice to the public servant, and then 

notice—or basis upon which you can bring a case? Is that what you 

are saying? 

Ms. BROWN. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me go to Mr. O’Toole. 

I think you see my line of questioning. It is not so much embedded in this bill. I think we all need to have a level of oversight. 

But what are the Achilles’ heels? 

My Achilles’ heels for all of these is that, no matter what you are 

standing, you deserve due process. And the broader the bill, the 

lesser due process, even if there is clarity. 

Mr. O’Toole, what do you say? 

Mr. O’TOOLE. Yes, if I could respond to a couple of things. I 

mean, first, we at the National Association of Criminal Defense 

Lawyers believe that 99 percent of public servants are honest, 

hardworking people who do not fall into the area of public corruption at all. And so I do think that it is a problem that is limited 

to a small number of people. 

Second, those people, as everyone agrees, are currently being 

prosecuted, and pleading guilty and getting long sentences. 

And if I could correct one statement earlier, the honest services 

maximum sentence is already 20 years. It is not 5 years. It is 20. 

And so those sentences are already very long, very tough. People 

go to jail when they do these sorts of things. 

And so what we are concerned most about is that if you are going 

to change the law, that you do so in a way that is very clear. 

Because, again, these are unanimous Supreme Court decisions 

that are being overruled. It is not a 5-4 decision, where the liberals 

or the conservatives split. 

These are decisions that all nine justices, bipartisan, came together and said not only is this not the law, but it would be a very 

bad situation if it was the law. 

And so I think going slow is really what we would urge here. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman’s time is expired. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Marino? 

Mr. MARINO. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. 

Well, thank you very much, everybody. Let me say what I said 

a few minutes ago, that I think this bill needs to be fine-tuned to 

provide clarity. 

Again, as long as the gentleman from Virginia and his mentor, 

the gentleman from Michigan, don’t make me angry, the door is 

open. And I hope that we can have some input from all of you as 

we try to make this bill much clearer, so that everybody, from the 

Justice Department, to a school board member in a very small 

school district, realize what can be done and what can’t be done. 

I would ask unanimous consent that the witnesses respond 

promptly to any questions that Members of the Subcommittee may 

send to them, in order that we may complete the record. 

81 

And hearing that, the purpose of the Committee’s session this 

morning having been completed, without objection, the Committee 

stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:23 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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