NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

THOMAS HEATON SPITTERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2018-1078

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:17-cv-00950-EJD, Senior Judge Edward 

J. Damich.

______________________ 

Decided: February 8, 2018

______________________ 

 THOMAS HEATON SPITTERS, Santa Clara, CA, pro se.

 MICHAEL D. SNYDER, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by CHAD A. READLER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

ELIZABETH M. HOSFORD. 

______________________ 

Before O’MALLEY, REYNA, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
2 SPITTERS v. UNITED STATES

PER CURIAM. 

Appellant Thomas H. Spitters appeals an order from 

the U.S. Court of Federal Claims dismissing his complaint 

for lack of jurisdiction. See Order of Dismissal, Spitters v. 

United States, No. 17-950 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 7, 2017), ECF 

No. 9 (“Dismissal Order”). The Court of Federal Claims 

found it lacked jurisdiction over Spitters’s complaint 

because his claims “all sound in tort,” and therefore fell 

outside the scope of the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1491(a)(1). Dismissal Order, slip op. at 1. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

On July 5, 2017, Spitters filed a lawsuit against the 

government in the Court of Federal Claims, charging the 

government with “invasion of privacy, laying in wait 

(pursuant to a plan), deliberate misrepresentation and 

deceit, acts of violence, (suspicion of) attempted capital 

crime against petitioner by respondent, [and] conspiracy.” 

J.A. 1–2. On July 17, 2017, he filed a memorandum 

providing additional information regarding his complaint, 

characterizing his complaint as asserting causes of action 

for “theft,” “larceny,” certain penal code violations, and 

other crimes. [J.A. 3–7]

On September 7, 2017, the Court of Federal Claims 

issued an order of dismissal, holding that Spitters’s 

claims “all sound in tort.” Dismissal Order, slip op. at 1. 

The court explained that, “[p]ursuant to the Tucker Act, 

the Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction 

over claims sounding in tort.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1491(a)(1); Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 

(Fed. Cir. 1997)). The court entered final judgment on the 

same day, stating that “plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed 

for lack of jurisdiction.” J.A. 9. 

Spitters thereafter filed a letter reasserting his claims 

and requesting that the court “re-examine the order of 

dismissal . . . .” J.A. 10. The Court of Federal Claims
SPITTERS v. UNITED STATES 3

construed this letter as a motion for reconsideration, 

which it denied. J.A. 11. Spitters appealed. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

The sole question presented on appeal is whether the 

Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that it does 

not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Spitters’s complaint. “In a given case, whether Tucker Act jurisdiction 

exists is a question of law that we review without deference to the decision of the trial court.” Metz v. United 

States, 466 F.3d 991, 995 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). As the petitioner below, Spitters “bears the burden 

of proving that the Court of Federal Claims possessed 

jurisdiction over his complaint.” Sanders v. United States, 

252 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Rocovich v. 

United States, 933 F.2d 991, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 

Because “[t]he Court of Federal Claims is a court of 

limited jurisdiction,” it “lacks jurisdiction over tort actions 

against the United States.” Brown, 105 F.3d at 623 

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a); Keene Corp. v. United States, 

508 U.S. 200, 214 (1993)). The Court of Federal Claims 

likewise lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate claims brought 

under federal or state criminal statutes. See Joshua v. 

United States, 17 F.3d 378, 379 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

The Court of Federal Claims properly dismissed Spitters’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Each of the claims asserted by Spitters in his complaint 

and July 17, 2017 memorandum sounds in tort, is based 

upon violations of criminal laws, or is based upon violations of federal antitrust laws. See, e.g., Restatement 

(Second) of Torts § 525 (1977) (fraudulent misrepresentation); id. §§ 876, 889 (conspiracy); id. § 103 (assault); id.

§ 652A (invasion of privacy); see also Marrese v. Am. Acad. 

Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379–80 (1985) (federal antitrust claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction 

of the federal district courts). The Court of Federal 
4 SPITTERS v. UNITED STATES

Claims lacks jurisdiction over any of these claims. It is of 

no moment that the Court of Federal Claims did not pass 

judgment on whether it can exercise jurisdiction over 

Spitters’s criminal claims, as “[a]n appellate court may 

affirm the [trial] court on a ground not selected by the 

[trial] judge so long as the record fairly supports such an 

alternative disposition of the issue.” Banner v. United 

States, 238 F.3d 1348, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted).1

CONCLUSION

We have considered Spitters’s remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the Order of 

Dismissal of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims is

AFFIRMED 

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

 

1 We have considered Spitters’s Request and Motion 

to Proceed, filed December 26, 2017, in which he appears 

to reiterate that each of his alleged causes of action 

sounds in tort or is criminal in nature. See Req. and Mot. 

to Proceed, No. 18-1078 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 26, 2017), ECF No. 

13. Because no relief is requested in this document and 

because the document confirms that Spitters’s claims are 

of the type over which the Court of Federal Claims cannot 

exercise jurisdiction, we deny his request as moot. On 

February 5, 2018, Spitters filed a letter, which contains 

information that is not part of the record below. See 

Notice, No. 18-1078 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2018), ECF No. 

17. As such, the court construes the letter as a motion to 

supplement the record on appeal, which it denies pursuant to Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.