# W5JM/5 An 9: 12

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent,

v. MILORD GELIN, 

### Appellant. No. 71204-7-1 DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED: June 15, 2015


### Per Curiam

— We previously affirmed MilordGelin's convictions for 

### burglary and assaultwith a deadly weapon and theft of a motorvehicle. Afterthe mandate issued inthat appeal, the superior court, at the State's request, entered


### an amendedjudgment and sentence correcting errors inthe originaljudgment and sentence. Gelin now appeals the amendedjudgment and sentence, arguing for the first time thatthejury's deadly weapon findings were not supported by sufficientevidence. In a pro se statement ofadditional grounds for review, Gelin 

### argues forthe first time that his offenses encompass the same criminal conduct, 

### that his burglary and assault convictions violate doublejeopardy, and that his exceptional sentence is not supported by sufficientfindings 

### Assuming without deciding thatthe amendedjudgment and sentence is appealable, the issues raised on appeal are, with one exception, beyond the scope ofour review. The proceedings below occurred after Gelin's direct appealNo. 71204-7-1/2



### was final and mandated. The State initiated the proceedings to correcterrors on the face ofthejudgment and sentence. An appeal from such proceedings is limited to review of the actions taken by the court and does not afford Gelin an 

### opportunity to raise otherchallenges to his conviction and sentence.1 Because the superior court simply corrected errors on the face ofthejudgment and sentence, our review is limited to those corrective actions. In his statement of 

### additional grounds, Gelin questions the court's sentence corrections butfails to 

### adequately inform this court ofthe nature ofthe alleged error as required by RAP 10.10(c). 

### The remaining claims on appeal are beyond the scope ofreview and amount to collateral attacks on Gelin's conviction and sentence.2 To the extent

11ngeneral, a defendant may not raise issues, including constitutional, double jeopardy, and sentencing issues, in a second appeal that were or could have been raised in an initial appeal unless the superiorcourt exercised discretion on those issues in the proceedings from which the second appeal is taken. See State v. Wheeler, Wn.2d , P.3d (2015)(in appeal following remand ofpersonal restraint petition, court rejected attempts to raise new issues under RAP 2.5(c) and RAP 12.2, holding that appellant could raise issues not raised inearlier direct appeal only ifthe court on remand exercised its independentjudgmenton such issues); State v. Kilqore, 167 Wn.2d 28, 37-41, 216 P.3d 393 (2009) (noting that new issues may be raised in a second appeal if they were addressed on remand following the initial appeal or in postjudgment motions, but holding that Kilgore could notchallenge his sentence in his appeal following remand because the court on remand merely made corrective changes to his sentence and exercised no discretion); State v. Mandanas. 163 Wn. App. 712, 717, 262 P.3d 522 (2011) (holding that double jeopardy claim could not be raised for the firsttime insecond appeal, that "even an issue ofconstitutional importcannot be raised in a second appeal," and that Mandanas still had an avenue of relief viapersonal restraint petition); State v. Barberio, 121 Wn.2d 48, 50, 846 P.2d 519 (1993) (refusing to review new challenge to an affirmed exceptional sentence not reconsidered at resentencing); State v. Tonev. 149 Wn. App. 787, 791, 205 P.3d 944 (2009) (defendantcould not raise double jeopardy and sentence issues insecond appeal following remand because remand was for ministerial corrections). We note that same criminal conduct issues involve factual determinations and are therefore waived if not raised at sentencing, State v. Jackson, 150Wn. App. 877, 892, 209 P.3d 553 (2009), and Gelin's claim that the courtentered nofindings supporting its exceptionalsentence appears to be contradicted by the record in his prior appeal. 2Gelin admits as much in his statement ofadditional grounds, stating that his other claims "collaterally attack[] his sentences pursuant to RAP 16.3, and RAP 16.4." -2-No. 71204-7-1/3 

### they are nottime-barred, such claims must be raised in a personal restraint petition. RAP 16.4; State v.Wheeler. Wn.2d _ , _ P.3d _ (2015). 

## Affirmed. 

# dmJ- FOR THE COURT: 

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