1

Filed 3/7/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Shasta)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CARLY SUE EDWARDS,

Defendant and Respondent;

STATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOSPITALS,

Objector and Appellant.

C094784

(Super. Ct. No. 21HB3119)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

STEPHEN MICHAEL BRAUNSTEIN,

Defendant and Respondent;

STATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOSPITALS,

Objector and Appellant.

C095109

(Super. Ct. No. 21HB4778)
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THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

TROY ROBERT HARPER,

Defendant and Respondent;

STATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOSPITALS,

Objector and Appellant.

C095141

(Super. Ct. No. 21HB4779)

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Shasta County, Cara L. Beatty, 

Judge. Reversed with directions.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant Attorney General, 

Gregory D. Brown and Lisa A. Tillman, Deputy Attorneys General for Objector and 

Appellant.

Arthur L. Bowie, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendants and 

Respondents.

The State Department of State Hospitals (DSH) oversees hospitals and other 

facilities that provide treatment to criminal defendants found incompetent to stand trial. 

In these three separate cases, which we have consolidated on appeal, the trial court found 

the defendants were incompetent to stand trial and ordered that they be committed to 

DHS for competency treatment.1 When DSH failed to admit the defendants in a timely 

manner, the trial court issued orders to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed, 

and it directed DSH to admit each defendant by a particular deadline. When the 

1

 The defendants are Carly Sue Edwards (case No. C094784), Stephen Michael 

Braunstein (case No. C095109), and Troy Robert Harper (case No. C095141). 
3

defendants were not admitted by that deadline, the trial court issued sanctions of $1,000 

for each day past the deadline that the defendants were not admitted, for a total of 

$91,000. 

Although only one of the sanctions orders states sanctions are imposed pursuant to 

Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5, both parties have proceeded on the assumption 

that sanctions were imposed pursuant to that section in all three cases, and we will do the 

same. Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 provides, “A judicial officer shall have the 

power to impose . . . sanctions, not to exceed fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500), . . . for any 

violation of a lawful court order by a person, done without good cause or substantial 

justification. . . . [¶] . . . An order imposing sanctions shall be in writing and shall recite 

in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 177.5.)2 

DSH appeals all three sanctions orders, arguing: (1) the trial court erred in concluding 

DSH lacked good cause or substantial justification for failing to admit defendants by the 

court-ordered deadline; (2) the written orders imposing sanctions fail to specify the 

conduct or circumstances justifying the order in sufficient detail; and (3) the amount of 

sanctions imposed in each case exceeds the $1,500 limit provided in section 177.5. We 

reverse and remand.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A court may not try a criminal defendant who is mentally incompetent. (Pen. 

Code, § 1367, subd. (a).) Such a defendant is generally referred to as incompetent to 

stand trial or “IST.” If a defendant is found IST by the court, Penal Code section 1370 

provides that criminal proceedings “shall be suspended until the person becomes 

mentally competent.” (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B).) In order to “promote the 

defendant’s speedy restoration to mental competence,” the court shall commit the 

2

 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
4

defendant to a DSH facility for treatment. (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i).)3 Prior 

to the defendant’s admission, the court must provide DSH with a “1370 packet,” which 

includes copies of the commitment order, criminal history information, arrest reports, 

psychiatric examination reports, and medical records. (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. (a)(3).) 

DSH uses the information in the packet to determine the appropriate placement for the 

particular defendant. (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. (a)(2)(A).) There is currently not enough

space at DSH facilities for immediate admission of all IST defendants, and they, thus, 

“are placed on a statewide waitlist based on the date of their commitment order. DSH 

endeavors to maintain a ‘first in, first out’ system for admission from the waitlist.” 

(Stiavetti v. Clendenin (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 691, 699; see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, 

§ 4710, subd. (a).)4 Until an IST defendant is admitted to DSH, he or she remains 

confined in the county jail and generally receives limited to no treatment towards the 

restoration of competency. (See, e.g., People v. Brewer (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 122, 133 

[IST defendants “received no treatment toward restoration of competency” while in jail 

and awaiting transfer to DSH]; In re Mille (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 635, 648 [“the limited 

pharmacological treatment rendered in the county jail cannot be equated with the broad 

spectrum of care afforded at . . . a fully accredited state mental hospital”].)

Although Penal Code section 1370 contains no deadline for DSH to actually admit 

an IST defendant, it does provide that, within 90 days of an IST defendant’s commitment, 

DSH “shall make a written report to the court . . . concerning the defendant’s progress 

3

 The court may also commit the defendant to some other available public or private 

treatment facility, or place them on outpatient status. (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. 

(a)(1)(B)(i).) All three defendants in this case were committed to DSH. 

4

 DSH may admit an individual earlier based on certain criteria, including “[w]hether the 

individual exhibits psychiatric acuity which may indicate the need for admission to a 

facility, notwithstanding the date the court committed the individual to the Department.” 

(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 4710, subd. (a)(2).) 
5

toward recovery of mental competence.” (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. (b)(1).) Appellate

courts have held an IST defendant must be admitted in sufficient time to allow DSH to 

make this required report: “[T]he statutory scheme requires that within 90 days of the 

order committing a defendant to a state mental hospital for treatment, the defendant must 

be delivered to the hospital, the hospital must examine the defendant and provide the 

defendant with treatment that will promote speedy restoration to competence, and the 

hospital’s medical director must document the defendant’s progress in a report to the 

court. ([Pen. Code, ]§ 1370.) For all of this to occur, a defendant needs sufficient time at 

the state mental hospital to be duly evaluated, potentially to derive some benefit from the 

prescribed treatment, and for such progress to be reported to the court.” (In re Mille, 

supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 649-650.) 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following is an abbreviated version of the factual and procedural background. 

Additional relevant facts will be discussed below.

In each of these three consolidated cases, the trial court found the defendant 

incompetent to stand trial and ordered each of them committed to DSH. In Shasta 

County Superior Court case No. 21HB4778 (the Braunstein case), DHS was directed to 

admit the defendant within 60 days of the order; the orders in the other two cases 

contained no admission deadline.

Each defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus approximately 30 to 75 

days after they were committed, arguing they were being illegally detained in jail rather 

than being admitted to a DSH facility in order to receive care, treatment and education 

needed to restore them to competency. The habeas corpus petitions are largely identical, 

and none requests sanctions or mentions section 177.5 (although all request other relief as 

the court deems appropriate).

In each case, the court issued an order to show cause (OSC) why sanctions should 

not be imposed. Each OSC quoted the portion of Penal Code section 1370 that requires 
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DSH to provide the court with a written report on the defendant’s progress within 90 days 

of commitment, and noted that, for this to occur, “a defendant needs sufficient time at the 

state mental hospital to be evaluated, to ostensibly derive some benefit from the 

prescribed treatment, and for such progress to be reported to the court. This requires the 

petitioner to be timely transported to the state hospital, for the state hospital to receive 

him [or her], and for the state hospital to house and treat the petitioner.” Each OSC 

concluded, “Given the failure of DSH to follow the statutory scheme, the DSH . . . is 

ORDERED to appear and show cause why sanctions should not be imposed.” None of 

the OSCs mentioned section 177.5 or identified any other statute pursuant to which 

sanctions were being considered.

DSH filed similar (albeit not identical) responses in all three cases, arguing 

sanctions were not appropriate and it had good cause for not having admitted each 

defendant because: (1) there were not enough beds available in its facilities to 

immediately admit all IST defendants; (2) it admitted defendants from the waitlist in the 

order in which they were committed and could not prioritize certain defendants over 

others; (3) it was making good faith efforts to address the IST admission delay problem; 

and (4) delays were being caused by precautions it had taken in order to protect patients 

and staff from the COVID-19 pandemic. All three responses were supported by a 

declaration from Melanie Scott, DSH’s acting deputy director, who described DSH’s 

admission procedures, its efforts to decrease wait times for IST admissions, and its 

response to the pandemic. Two of the responses were also supported by a declaration 

from Katherine Warburton, DSH’s medical director, who described telehealth services 

available to IST defendants while they awaited admission, including evaluations 

conducted via videoconference.

In Shasta County Superior Court case Nos. 21HB3119 (the Edwards case) and 

21HB4779 (the Harper case), the trial court set a deadline for the defendants’ admissions 

either at or immediately following the hearing on the OSC.
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The trial court issued sanctions against DSH in all three cases. In each case, it 

imposed sanctions of $1,000 per day for each day past the date it had ordered the 

defendant to be admitted. In the Edwards case, sanctions totaled $10,000; in the 

Braunstein case, sanctions totaled $33,000; and in the Harper case, sanctions totaled 

$48,000. The written orders imposing sanctions in each case will be discussed in more 

detail below. Only the Harper order mentions section 177.5.

In the Edwards case, following the court’s order imposing sanctions, DSH filed a 

request for a written statement of decision pursuant to section 632 and, given the trial 

court’s failure to indicate the statute under which it was imposing sanctions, DSH also 

requested the trial court state whether it was imposing sanctions pursuant to section 

177.5, section 1209, and/or a different statute. The trial court denied the request.

DSH filed a timely appeal in all three cases, challenging the orders imposing 

sanctions. It argues: (1) the trial court erred in finding DSH lacked good cause for its 

inability to comply with the court’s admission deadlines; (2) the sanctions orders failed to 

adequately describe the conduct or circumstances justifying sanctions; and (3) the amount 

of sanctions imposed in each case exceeds section 177.5’s $1,500 limit. 

DISCUSSION

I

Standard of Review

“We review orders imposing sanctions for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] The 

trial court must exercise its discretion in a ‘reasonable manner with one of the statutorily 

authorized purposes in mind and must be guided by existing legal standards.’ [Citation.] 

A mere difference of opinion between the appellate and trial courts is insufficient to 

warrant reversal. [Citation.]” (People v. Hooper (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 685, 691-692 

(Hooper).) “While this standard of review is highly deferential to the trial court’s wide 

discretion in determining the facts, choosing from the array of available sanctions, and 

deciding the severity of any sanction chosen, an abuse of discretion will be found on 
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appeal if a sanctions order rests on incorrect legal premises [citation] or violates due 

process, matters we decide exercising our independent review. Alternatively, an abuse of 

discretion will be found if the findings underlying the order under review are factually 

unsupported [citation], which requires us to ‘assess[] the record for substantial evidence 

to support the court's express or implied findings’ [citation].” (People v. Landers (2019) 

31 Cal.App.5th 288, 304.) “Questions of law, on the other hand, are subject to de novo 

review. [Citation.] When a trial court relies on a statute as authority to award sanctions, 

we review the interpretation of the statute de novo. [Citation.]” (Hooper, supra, at 

p. 692.)

II

Code of Civil Procedure Section 177.5

Section 177.5 provides: “A judicial officer shall have the power to impose 

reasonable money sanctions, not to exceed fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500), . . . payable 

to the court, for any violation of a lawful court order by a person, done without good 

cause or substantial justification. . . . [¶] Sanctions pursuant to this section shall not be 

imposed except on notice contained in a party’s moving or responding papers; or on the 

court’s own motion, after notice and opportunity to be heard. An order imposing 

sanctions shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the conduct or circumstances

justifying the order.” (§ 177.5.) “The evident purpose of Code of Civil Procedure 

section 177.5 is to punish and deter violations of lawful court orders [citation], and to 

compensate the judicial system for the cost of unnecessary hearings [citation].” (People 

v. Landers, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 303.) 

A. Good Cause or Substantial Justification

DSH acknowledges it did not admit the defendants by their court-ordered 

admission deadlines, and that it thus violated a court order (and it does not suggest that 

order was not lawful). It argues, however, that it had good cause or substantial 
9

justification for its failure to timely admit these defendants, and that the trial court abused 

its discretion in concluding otherwise. We disagree.

“Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 differs from Code of Civil Procedure 

section 128.5[5]and from contempt proceedings, both of which require the court to make 

a subjective determination of the party’s intentions. [Citations.] Code of Civil Procedure 

section 177.5 requires only that a court find the person violated the order ‘without good 

cause or substantial justification.’ This does not require ‘a willful violation, but merely 

one committed . . . without a valid excuse.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Kareem A. (2020) 

46 Cal.App.5th 58, 78.) DSH argues it had a valid excuse for its failure to comply with 

the court’s admission deadlines, namely, there are simply not enough beds available to 

immediately admit all defendants found IST, and: (1) it could not have complied with the 

court’s admission deadlines without harming other IST defendants who were higher up 

on the waitlist; (2) it has been working diligently to attempt to resolve the delayed 

admission problem; and (3) its response to the COVID-19 pandemic further delayed 

admissions. 

The first two arguments are identical to arguments DSH raised, and we rejected, in 

People v. Aguirre (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 652. Our decision in Aguirre contains a 

detailed discussion of the trial court’s conclusion that DSH’s proffered justifications for 

failing to admit IST defendants by the court-ordered deadline were insufficient to excuse 

its conduct. We repeat our discussion in full because DSH proffers those same 

justifications in this case: “The Department contends the trial court abused its discretion 

in imposing sanctions because there was good cause or substantial justification for its 

5

 Section 128.5 authorizes a court to order a party or the party’s attorney “to pay the 

reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by another party as a result of 

actions or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous or solely intended to cause 

unnecessary delay.” (§ 128.5, subd. (a).)
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failure to comply with the court’s admission deadlines. It raises two arguments: (1) it 

could not have complied with the admission deadlines without harm to IST defendants 

from other counties; and (2) it has been working diligently with other stakeholders to 

attempt to resolve the waitlist problem but has been unable to do so. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] The 

trial court rejected each of the Department’s arguments in its omnibus order imposing 

sanctions. The court explained in the introduction to the order: ‘Lengthy wait times are 

not new. The Court has previously found the Department in contempt on multiple 

occasions and sanctioned the Department for failing to timely admit defendants to a state 

hospital for competency restoration treatment. The responsibility to fix the problem falls 

squarely on the shoulders of the Department. The Court is convinced that none of the 

collaborative efforts over the past several years have given the Department sufficient 

incentive to carry out that responsibility, and the problem has not been fixed. The 

Department continues to violate the Court’s orders in a large number of cases each year.’ 

[¶] The trial court recognized that the Department is an agency of the State of California, 

not an isolated entity, and any lack of resources is due to a deliberate budgetary decision 

by the State. The court ‘reject[ed] the notion that the State can repeatedly violate the due 

process rights of the mentally ill by denying the responsible agency adequate resources 

necessary to comply with Penal Code [s]ection 1370; and to then subsequently claim that 

the agency’s inability to meet the need constitutes good cause.’ [¶] The trial court also 

rejected the Department’s argument that its efforts to solve the waitlist problem 

constituted good cause or substantial justification. The court found: ‘It goes without 

saying that the ongoing efforts by the Department do not help the individuals whose due 

process rights have already been violated. The Court further notes that after five years of 

holding hearings on the issue the delays in admission are only slightly better today than 

they were when this Court started hearings. In no way has any improvement been 

sufficient to indicate that the need for the orders, or their enforcement, has been 

eliminated. The Department touts improvements but the fact remains that as of the date 
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of this order most defendants are waiting well beyond the 60 day order (from the 

providing of the packet); and do not have a meaningful report within the time period 

mandated by Penal Code [s]ection 1370. The Department continues to violate nearly 

every 60-day admit-by order set by the Court, and Penal Code [s]ection 1370, by a 

considerable margin.’ ” (Id. at pp. 668-669, fn. omitted.) 

For the same reasons we rejected these arguments in Aguirre, we reject them here.

The COVID-19 argument was not raised in Aguirre. DSH argues the delay in 

admitting the three defendants in this case “was directly related to [its] response to the 

COVID-19 pandemic.” The evidence it cites fails to support its argument. 

The evidence proffered by DSH shows it temporarily suspended IST defendant 

admissions in response to a surge in COVID-19 on two separate occasions: (1) from 

March 23, 2020, to May 22, 2020, right after the Governor declared a state of emergency 

and issued shelter-in-place orders; and (2) from January 12, 2021, to no later than 

February 8, 2021. The evidence, however, fails to address how either of these 

suspensions affected the defendants’ admissions, or admissions in general. For example, 

Harper was committed to DSH on June 7, 2021, more than a year after the initial 

suspension of admissions ended, and four months after the second suspension of 

admissions ended. By late July, he was number 827 on the waitlist, and he was finally 

admitted on September 29. DSH states the waitlist in late July was 1,426, but it does not 

state what the waitlist was in February 2020, the month before it first suspended 

admissions due to COVID-19, or in January and February 2021, immediately before and 

after the second suspension. Without this information, we have no way of knowing how 

either suspension affected the waitlist in general, or Harper’s position on the waitlist (if at 

all). 

We note that DSH states in its brief that its “implementation of its COVID-19 

policies resulted in an increased waitlist for admission.” However, DSH does not 

actually cite any evidence that supports it, and it is axiomatic that statements made in 
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briefs are not evidence. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 414, fn. 11 [“It is axiomatic 

that the unsworn statements of counsel are not evidence”]; Acqua Vista Homeowners 

Assn. v. MWI, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1129, 1158, fn. 43 [statements made by counsel 

concerning actions taken by client “clearly do not constitute evidence”].) Moreover, even 

if we assume DSH’s waitlist increased as a result of COVID-19, DSH fails to provide 

evidence as to whether such increase affected these three defendants’ admission dates. 

All of DSH’s proffered evidence suffers from similar problems. For example, it 

states it reduced its patient census in order to establish isolation and quarantine space 

within its facilities, but it does not state by how much or how the reduction affected the 

waitlist. As another example, it states a facility’s rate of admission is dependent on (1) its 

ability to screen, test, observe, and quarantine patients, and (2) any COVID-19 

transmission in the facility. Again, however, it does not state how this affected either the 

size of the waitlist or these three defendants’ admission dates. Finally, it states it took 

numerous actions in response to COVID-19, including: monitoring a rapidly changing 

situation; activating an emergency operation center and incident command centers; 

developing incident plans; updating infection control and pandemic response plans; 

implementing quarantine and social distancing protocols to reduce the risk of COVID-19 

transmission; vaccinating patients and staff once vaccines became available; requiring the 

sending facility to provide an individual’s updated health information relative to COVID19 within 24 hours of transport; and admitting patients in cohorts. Again, however, this 

evidence fails to show how any of these actions affected the size of its waitlist or these 

three defendants’ admission dates.

DSH’s evidence fails to demonstrate that the delay in admitting these three 

defendants was related to COVID-19 or its response thereto. 

DSH has not shown either good cause or substantial justification for not 

complying with the court’s deadlines. 
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B. Written Sanctions Orders

Section 177.5 provides an order imposing sanctions must satisfy two 

requirements: (1) it must be in writing; and (2) it must “recite in detail the conduct or 

circumstances justifying the order.” (§ 177.5.) DSH argues the orders in this case fail to 

comply with the second requirement. 

The purpose of the specificity requirement of section 177.5 “ ‘is to fulfill the 

“rudiments” of due process required for governmental imposition of a penalty . . .—both 

for due process’ own, constitutional sake and to ensure that the power conferred by the 

statute will not be abused. [Citation.] Moreover, in some cases the court’s recitation will 

be an invaluable aid to a reviewing court determining whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in awarding sanctions. [Citation.]’ ” (Caldwell v. Samuels Jewelers (1990) 

222 Cal.App.3d 970, 977.) In order to comply with the specificity requirement, the

“ ‘court’s written order “should be more informative than a mere recitation of the words 

of the statute.” ’ ” (Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Garamendi (2005) 

132 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1388.) It must do more than merely state “ ‘good cause 

appearing.’ ” (Caldwell, supra, at p. 977.) It “must state the specific circumstances 

giving rise to the [sanction], and state with particularity the basis for finding those 

circumstances amount to” violation of a lawful order without good cause or substantial 

justification. (Id. at pp.977- 978.) The requirement for a detailed recitation “may be 

satisfied by incorporating by reference ‘papers setting forth the conduct, circumstances, 

and legal arguments underlying the court’s conclusions.’ ” (Foundation for Taxpayer & 

Consumer Rights, supra, at p. 1388.) Because section 177.5 requires the order to be in 

writing, “A trial judge’s on-the-record oral recitation of reasons for imposing sanctions is 

insufficient.” (Childs v. PaineWebber Incorporated (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 982, 996; see 

also People v. Hundal (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 965, 970 [imposing sanctions “orally from 

the bench” does not comply with § 177.5].) 

With these rules in mind, we discuss each sanctions order separately.
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i. Harper

The order in the Harper case, which was issued on or about October 22, 2021, is 

by far the most detailed of the three.6 It states the court ordered DSH to admit Harper 

within 60 days of the commitment order, or by August 10, 2021, and that Harper was not 

admitted until September 29, 2021, which was 49 days after the court-ordered deadline. 

It notes, “When criminal proceedings are suspended, a defendant’s speedy trial rights are 

obviously implicated. But a defendant’s competency is also of constitutional dimension.” 

It also notes, “During the time the defendant was awaiting acceptance to DSH, he 

decompensated and refused to come to court.” It states DSH “is an agency of the State of 

California. Despite efforts by the DSH to solve the multi-layered problems of delay in 

admissions for committees who have been ordered to be received by the DSH, the Court 

FINDS—on balance—the rights of the committees are violated each day a committee is 

not received in a timely fashion.” It imposes sanctions in “the sum of $1000 per day 

from August 11, 2021 to the date of September 28, 2021. These sanctions are payable to 

the Shasta County Superior Court.” Finally, and importantly, it states, “These sanctions 

are ordered pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 and People v. Aguirre

(2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 652.”

As noted above, the requirement for a detailed recitation “may be satisfied by 

incorporating by reference ‘papers setting forth the conduct, circumstances, and legal 

arguments underlying the court’s conclusions.’ ” (Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer 

Rights v. Garamendi, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1388.) In Hooper, supra, 

40 Cal.App.5th 685, for example, the order imposing sanctions incorporated by reference 

6

 The trial court also issued a shorter order on September 13, 2021, imposing sanctions 

against DSH in the sum of $1,000 per day from September 9, 2021, until Harper was 

admitted. Because the October 22 order is more detailed, that is the order we have 

analyzed for compliance with section 177.5.
15

a 40-page decision in another case (People v. Czirban (Super. Ct. Contra Costa County, 

2017, No. 05-151662-4)), and the court noted the Czirban decision “provide[d] a detailed 

analysis of DSH’s violations and addresse[d] why each of the justifications DSH 

proposed at the time were insufficient to excuse its conduct. Because the court issued 

Czirban in August—in the middle of the hearings for this case—there is no reason to 

require the court to repeat itself to DSH.[7] The sanctions orders were sufficiently 

detailed.” (Hooper, supra, at p. 694.) 

So, too, in this case. Although the trial court does not expressly state it is 

incorporating by reference our reasoning in Aguirre, we find that stating sanctions are 

imposed pursuant to Aguirre is substantially equivalent of doing so. 

Because the Harper sanctions order effectively incorporates this discussion in 

Aguirre, we find it is sufficiently detailed to satisfy section 177.5.

ii. Edwards

The order imposing sanctions in the Edwards case states, in its entirety: “On 

February 10, 2021, the petitioner, Carly Sue Edwards, was committed to the Department 

of State Hospitals (DSH) for competency treatment. On June 14, 2021, this Court 

ordered DSH to receive Ms. Edwards no later than Friday, June 18, 2021. DSH failed to 

comply with this Court’s order to receive the petitioner by June 18, 2021. The Court 

finds that DSH violated the Court’s order without good cause or substantial justification. 

[¶] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Department of State Hospitals is sanctioned 

in the amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000) per day, for every day beyond June 18, 

2021 which the Department failed to receive the Petitioner. Having failed to receive the 

7

 The Czirban decision was never appealed, and thus did not result in a reported 

decision, but it was described in Hooper. (See Hooper, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at pp. 689-

690.)
16

Petitioner until June 29, 2021 (ten full days beyond the Court’s order), the total amount 

of sanctions imposed is $10,000.”

We find this order insufficient because it contains no detail explaining the trial 

court’s finding that DSH lacked good cause or substantial justification for its failure to 

admit Edwards by the court-ordered deadline. Instead, it does no more than recite the 

words of the statute.

In arguing the order is sufficient, the defendants rely largely on statements the 

court made at the hearing on the OSC, which they quote at length. As noted above, 

however, “A trial judge’s on-the-record oral recitation of reasons for imposing sanctions 

is insufficient.” (Childs v. PaineWebber Incorporated, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 996.) 

Instead, the reasons must be recited in detail in the written order. Here, the written order 

is insufficiently detailed, thus we find remand necessary. 

“Having failed to make findings, the trial court is not deprived of this opportunity 

forever. [¶] We remand so that the trial court may either make findings in a manner 

consistent with the views expressed in this opinion, or in the alternative, vacate its award 

of [sanctions].” (Fegles v. Kraft (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 812, 817; see also People v. 

Ward (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1531 [reversing sanctions order that did not contain 

requisite details and remanding “so the trial court can enter a proper sanctions order”].) 

iii. Braunstein

The order in the Braunstein case was issued on September 3, 2021, and corrected 

on September 30, 2021. The September 3 order states, in full: “The Department of State 

Hospitals (‘DSH’) is an agency of the State of California. Despite efforts by the DSH to 

solve the multi-layered problems of delay in admission for committees who have been 

ordered to be received by the DSH, the Court FINDS—on balance—the rights of the 

committees are violated each day a committee is not received in a timely fashion. [¶] 

The Department of State Hospitals is ORDERED to pay County of Shasta the sum of 
17

$1,000 per day from August 2, 2021 forward until DSH receives Stephen Braunstein for 

competency training.”

We note that the August 2 date comes from the court’s June 3 order committing 

Braunstein to DSH and directing that he be admitted within 60 days; 60 days from June 3 

is August 2. As far as our review of the record reveals, the first time daily sanctions from 

August 2 forward were mentioned was at a hearing held on August 25, when the public 

defender stated: “The 60th day was August 2nd. Mr. Braunstein has been waiting a 

significant time to be transported . . . . I would ask that sanctions be ordered back to the 

date of August 2nd at a thousand dollars a day.” The court agreed that if Braunstein was 

not admitted by August 31, it would impose sanctions as requested by the public 

defender.

Braunstein was not admitted by August 31. At a hearing held that day, the court 

stated it was imposing sanctions of $1,000 a day from August 2 until he was admitted.

Another hearing was held on September 14, and Braunstein still had not been 

admitted (although by this time, DSH had provided the court with a written report on 

Braunstein).8 The court stated, “I’m going to issue from today’s date forward the 

sanctions of $1,000 a day . . . . [¶] And should Mr. Braunstein be received by the [23rd] 

of September, I won’t retroactively request those sanctions to be imposed. But if he’s not 

received by that date then I will retroactively impose sanctions to August 31, 2021.”

Braunstein was admitted on September 23.

8

 The report states it “is written pursuant to Penal Code section . . . 1370(b)(1).” It is 

based on DHS’s review of the 1370 package, a 15-minute interview with Braunstein on 

August 30 that was done via Webex, and a 15-minute phone consultation with jail mental 

health staff on August 31. The report is dated September 2, which is 91 days after 

Braunstein was committed. At the hearing on August 14, the court acknowledged 

receiving the report, and noted, “I do feel that the Department is doing what they need to 

do to try to move this along as best they can under the circumstances, but we still have 

Mr. Braunstein here.”
18

On September 30, the court issued what it captioned a “**Corrected** ORDER” 

that stated, “On September 3, 2021, the court ORDERED the Department of State 

Hospitals (DSH) to pay the sum of $1000 per day in sanctions from August 2, 2021 until 

such time as Stephen Michael Braunstein has been received by the DSH. [¶] The 

sanctions ARE PAYABLE TO THE **SHASTA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT**. [¶] 

The sanctions due from August 2, 2021 to September 3, 2021 – the day of the order – are 

in the sum of $1000 per day, a total of $33,000. [¶] This sum is collectible by the Shasta 

County Superior Court.” This corrected order contains no recitation of the conduct or 

circumstances justifying sanctions. 

We find the description of the conduct or circumstances in this case, insufficient to 

satisfy section 177.5’s requirement to “recite in detail the conduct or circumstances 

justifying” sanctions, and as with Edwards, we will remand to the trial court to either 

make sufficient findings or, in the alternative, to vacate its award of sanctions. (Fegles v. 

Kraft, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at p. 817.) 

C. The $1,500 Cap on Sanctions

Section 177.5 provides the court may impose sanctions “not to exceed” $1,500 for 

violation of a lawful court order. Here, the trial court imposed sanctions of $1,000 for 

each day the defendant was not admitted to DSH beyond the court’s deadline. It imposed 

a total of $10,000 in sanctions in the Edwards case, $33,000 in the Braunstein case, and 

$48,000 in the Harper case. DSH argues this was error, and that section 177.5 caps 

sanctions at $1,500 in each of the three cases no matter how long it took to admit the 

defendant. The defendants argue section 177.5 allows sanctions of up to $1,500 a day for 

each day DSH violates a court-ordered admission deadline. 

“In analyzing the scope of Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5, ‘[w]ellestablished rules of statutory construction require us to ascertain the intent of the enacting 

legislative body so that we may adopt the construction that best effectuates the purpose of 

the law.’ [Citations.] ‘ “In determining such intent, a court must look first to the words 
19

of the statute themselves, giving to the language its usual, ordinary import and according 

significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the 

legislative purpose.” ’ ” (People v. Kareem A., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 71.) “ ‘ “If 

the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal 

interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.” ’ ” 

(City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 616.)

Again, section 177.5 provides the court may “impose reasonable monetary 

sanctions, not to exceed fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500), . . . for any violation of a lawful 

court order.” (Italics added.) DSH argues the italicized language caps sanctions at 

$1,500, and does not allow the court to get around this cap by imposing daily sanctions in 

an amount under the cap if the total amount imposed exceeds $1,500.

Both sides cite Hooper, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th 685, to support their respective 

arguments. In that case, the trial court imposed sanctions of $100 per day for each day 

past the court-ordered deadline that DSH failed to admit an IST defendant. The trial 

court imposed a total of $16,500 in sanctions in 11 separate cases, which would mean (on 

average) that it did not impose sanctions exceeding $1,500 for any one defendant. (Id. at 

p. 691.) DSH argued the court lacked authority to impose daily sanctions, but the 

appellate court disagreed, explaining, “It is immaterial that no statute specifically 

authorizes the court to order daily sanctions because section 177.5 ‘do[es] not require the 

court to relate the amount of the sanction to the actual cost to the county traceable to the 

violation of the court order.’ [Citation.] Rather, the sanction amount must only be 

reasonable and within the $1,500 limit. (§ 177.5.) The sanctions orders here do not 

exceed the statutory maximum, and DSH fails to show that the amounts are 

unreasonable.” (Id. at p. 695.) DSH focuses on the court’s statement that “the sanction 

amount must . . . be . . . within the $1,500 limit,” and the defendants focus on the fact that 

the court allowed daily sanctions. We note, however, that the Hooper court was not 

faced with the precise issue raised in this case, because for each defendant, the total
20

amount of daily sanctions were within the $1,500 limit. The Hooper court thus had no 

reason to consider whether daily sanctions were appropriate if the total amount exceeded 

$1,500, and “a ‘case is not authority for an issue not raised by its facts.’ ” (Yao v. 

Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 327, 333.)

Although not discussed by either party, we find it helpful to compare section 177.5 

to sections 1209 and 1218 and the cases interpreting those two sections. Section 1209, 

subdivision (a)(5) defines contempt as including “[d]isobedience of any lawful . . . order 

. . . of the court,” and section 1218, subdivision (a) provides if a person is found guilty of 

contempt, “a fine may be imposed on the person not exceeding one thousand dollars 

($1,000).” This language is substantially similar to section 177.5’s provision that the 

court may “impose . . . sanctions . . . not to exceed fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500) . . . 

for any violation of a lawful court order.” It has long been held that “section 1218 does 

not limit the court to a total fine of [$1,000]. Where separate contemptuous acts are 

committed, the contemner can be fined for each offense in the amount authorized by the 

code.” (Donovan v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1952) 39 Cal.2d 848, 855, 

italics added; see also In re Stafford (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 110, 113 [“Every separate act 

of disobedience of the injunction was a separate contempt” and could be punished as 

such].) “Every separate act of disobedience of [a court order] is a separate contempt. 

[Citations.] [¶] We believe the crucial question is whether separate adjudications of 

contempt were based upon separate insults to the authority of the court, not whether the 

insults happened to occur on the same or different days.” (Reliable Enterprises, Inc. v. 

Superior Court (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 604, 621, disapproved on another ground in 

Mitchell v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal. 3d 1230, 1248, fn. 13; see also, e.g., Conn v. 

Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 774, 786 [upholding finding of contempt where 

the plaintiff turned over documents 38 days after court-ordered deadline, but holding 

court could not impose $38,000 in fines, or $1,000 per day for each day past the court-
21

ordered deadline, because “the circumstances of the case are such that [the plaintiff’s] 

failure to turn over the . . . documents can only be considered one act of contempt”].)

“Where, as here, legislation has been judicially construed and a subsequent statute 

on the same or an analogous subject uses identical or substantially similar language, we 

may presume that the Legislature intended the same construction, unless a contrary intent 

clearly appears.” (Estate of Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904, 915-916.) Since no 

evidence of a contrary intent clearly appears, we presume the Legislature intended to 

limit sanctions under section 177.5 to $1,500, unless separate violations of a court order 

are committed, in which case the violator could be fined up to $1,500 for each separate 

violation. In this case, however, the trial court made no findings on whether DSH 

committed separate violations of a court order on each day beyond the court’s deadline 

that it failed to admit a defendant. We will thus remand this case to the trial court to 

make such findings in the first instance. 

After this case was fully briefed, the First District Court of Appeal issued its 

decision in In re Chunn (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 639 (Chunn), holding, among other 

things, that section 177.5 limits sanctions to $1,500 for each individual IST defendant. 

Chunn involved a challenge by DSH to a standing order of the Solano County Superior 

Court that specified certain deadlines by which DSH had to engage with, begin treatment 

of, and admit IST defendants. (Id. at p. 644.)9 As relevant here, the standing order also 

9

 In particular, the standing order provided: (1) upon DSH’s receipt of the commitment 

packet, if the defendant could not be placed in a DSH facility within 72 hours, DSH was 

required to commence meaningful engagement with, and treatment of, the defendant 

prior to the expiration of those 72 hours; (2) if DSH failed or declined to commence 

meaningful engagement and treatment within 72 hours, then placement in a DSH facility 

had to occur within seven days of the commitment order; and (3) if DSH did not place the 

defendant within seven days, it was required to notify the court when the defendant was 

likely to be admitted, and if admittance was not anticipated to occur within 28 days, DSH 

was required to develop a written treatment plan, and provide a weekly written report to 

the court. (Chunn, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 651-652.)
22

provided, “The Court finds that each day of delay in placement or commencement of 

treatment poses a substantial risk of significant harm and injury for each IST defendant. 

Accordingly, for purposes of both recognizing the gravity of this suffering and 

encouraging prompt DSH compliance with this order, the Court shall deem each 24-hour 

period of non-compliance a new, separate and distinct violation of its orders for purposes 

of imposing potential sanctions under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 177.5. The trial 

court managing each case, may, in its discretion, schedule daily contempt hearings during 

the period of delays in commitment at which time the court may seek to impose daily 

sanctions, presumably in an amount equal to the costs of actually providing these 

defendants treatment each day, but in no circumstances more than $1500 per day or 

event.” (Chunn, supra, at p. 653.) DSH challenged this provision, arguing section 177.5 

limits sanctions “to $1,500 for each individual IST defendant, not $1,500 each day for 

each defendant.”10 (Chunn, supra, at p. 669.) The court agreed, for three reasons.

First, the court noted, “On its face, the plain language of [section 177.5] limits a 

sanctions award to $1,500 and does not include any reference to successive, per-day 

sanctions or state whether each day of noncompliance with a court order would allow for 

a separate violation within the meaning of the statute.” (Chunn, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 670.) It also cited (but did not discuss) two statutes that specifically allow daily fines 

or sanctions: (1) Civil Code section 789.3, subdivision (c)(2), which provides, “Any 

landlord who violates this section shall be liable . . . for . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [a]n amount 

not to exceed one hundred dollars ($100) for each day or part thereof the landlord 

remains in violation of this section” (italics added); and (2) Public Utilities Code section 

10

 We note that section 177.5 is a generally applicable statute that does not mention IST 

defendants, and that it does not limit sanctions to $1,500 for each individual IST 

defendant. It authorizes sanctions “not to exceed” $1,500 for any violation of a court 

order done without good cause or substantial justification. (§ 177.5.) 
23

2108, which provides, “Every violation of the provisions . . . of any order . . . of the 

commission, by any corporation or person is a separate and distinct offense, and in the 

case of a continuing violation each day’s continuance thereof shall be a separate and 

distinct offense.” (Italics added.) Presumably the Chunn court’s point in citing these two 

statutes is to show the Legislature knows how to authorize daily sanctions when it wants 

to, and the fact that it did not expressly do so in section 177.5 supports the conclusion 

that it did not intend to allow them. (See, e.g., Yeager v. Blue Cross of California (2009) 

175 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1103 [“We may not make a silent statute speak by inserting 

language the Legislature did not put in the legislation”].) Although this conclusion is 

colorable, because the language of section 177.5 is so similar to the statutes governing 

contempt, we are more persuaded by the rule, quoted above, that “[w]here . . . legislation 

has been judicially construed and a subsequent statute on the same or an analogous 

subject uses identical or substantially similar language, we may presume that the 

Legislature intended the same construction.” (Estate of Griswold, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 

pp. 915-916.) Because a court may impose separate fines up to the statutory maximum 

for separate acts of contempt, we conclude section 177.5 authorizes a court to impose 

separate sanctions up to the statutory maximum of $1,500 for separate violations of a 

lawful court order. 

Second, the Chunn court noted that Hooper and two other cases (People v. 

Kareem A., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th 58 and People v. Aguirre, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th 652) 

had upheld sanctions of up to $1,500 per defendant. (Chunn, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 670.) None of these cases, however, considered whether daily sanctions were 

permissible under section 177.5, and, as noted above, “ ‘a case is not authority for an 

issue not raised by its facts.’ ” (Yao v. Superior Court, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 333.)

Third, and finally, the Chunn court reviewed the legislative history of section 

177.5, and concluded it “suggests that the Legislature intended to strictly limit the 

amount of sanctions permitted under the statute to $1,500.” (Chunn, supra, 
24

86 Cal.App.5th at p. 670.) We quote its discussion of the legislative history in full: “In 

the original draft of Assembly Bill No. 3573 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 

3573), the proposed statutory language did not include any limitation on the amount of 

sanctions the court could order. (Assem. Bill 3573, § 1, as introduced Mar. 15, 1982.) 

Thereafter, the Assembly amended the bill to include the $1,500 limit. (Assem. Amend. 

to Assem. Bill No. 3573 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) May 3, 1982, § 1.) [¶] Further, a Senate 

Committee on the Judiciary report analyzing Assembly Bill 3573 discussed existing 

options for enforcement of courtroom rules. One of the options it highlighted was 

‘[c]oercive contempt,’ which aims to correct bad acts or omissions that violate court 

orders. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3573 (1981-1982 Reg. 

Sess.) as amended May 3, 1982, pp. 3-4.) This was typically done, the report explained, 

‘through imposition of a fine of so-much-per-day until the contemnor agrees to obey.’ 

(Id. at p. 4.) However, despite this reference to per-day contempt sanctions, the report 

does not indicate that Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 was to operate in a similar 

fashion. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3573, supra, p. 4.) To the 

contrary, the report repeatedly referenced the proposed statute’s plain language, noting 

that sanctions would be permissible ‘up to $1,500.’ (Id. at pp. 5, 7.)” (Id. at pp. 670-

671.) We agree with Chunn that the legislative history of section 177.5 demonstrates the 

Legislature intended to limit sanctions to $1,500; indeed, section 177.5 clearly states that 

sanctions shall not exceed $1,500. However, neither the legislative history nor the 

language of section 177.5 expressly addresses whether multiple sanctions of up to $1,500 

may be imposed for separate violations of a court order.11 

11

 Indeed, because section 177.5 uses language that is substantially similar to the 

contempt statutes, and because the legislative history of section 177.5 demonstrates the 

Legislature was aware that judges had the power to utilize coercive contempt to enforce 

compliance with their orders, one could conclude that the Legislature intended to allow 

trial courts to impose something akin to coercive contempt pursuant to section 177.5 in 
25

For the reasons stated herein, we interpret section 177.5 as allowing sanctions of 

up to $1,500 for each separate violation of a court order, and we remand this case to the 

trial court to determine in the first instance whether DSH committed separate acts of 

violating a court order on each day that it failed to admit the defendants past the courtordered deadline, or whether its failure to admit the defendants can only be considered 

one act of violating a court order. If the trial court determines DSH committed separate 

acts of violating a court order, its written order imposing sanctions “shall be in writing 

and shall recite in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying” that determination. 

(§ 177.5.)

DISPOSITION

The sanctions orders are reversed, and these cases are remanded to the trial court 

with directions to make sufficient findings to support the imposition of sanctions in the 

Edwards and Braunstein cases, and in all three cases, to make findings to support the 

imposition of daily sanctions, if appropriate, or to vacate or reduce its award of sanctions. 

Any order imposing sanctions should clearly identify the statute pursuant to which 

sanctions are being imposed. 

 /s/

EARL, J.

We concur:

 /s/

HULL, Acting P. J.

 /s/

BOULWARE EURIE, J.

order to compel compliance with lawful court orders. We need not decide this issue, 

however, because the trial court in this case did not impose something akin to coercive 

contempt, and instead effectively imposed daily sanctions retroactively.