COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Frank and Kelsey 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

RONALD WRIGHT 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0224-02-1 JUDGE D. ARTHUR KELSEY 

NOVEMBER 19, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 

Robert W. Curran, Judge 

 Charles E. Haden for appellant. 

 John H. McLees, Senior Assistant Attorney 

General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 The appellant, Ronald Wright, claims the trial court erred 

by not suppressing evidence found during a search incident to 

his arrest. The arrest, Wright argues, took place within the 

curtilage of his home without the benefit of a search warrant. 

Finding Wright's complaint meritless as a matter of law, we 

affirm the trial court's denial of the suppression motion. 

I. 

On appeal from a denial of a suppression motion, we review 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

giving it the benefit of any reasonable inferences. Bass v. 

 

*

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413(A), this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475, 525 S.E.2d 921, 924 (2000); Sabo 

v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 63, 69, 561 S.E.2d 761, 764 (2002). 

 On November 30, 2000, the police received a report that 

Ronald Wright stabbed his live-in girlfriend and assaulted her 

daughter. Police arrived at the scene of the attacks that 

evening but did not make any arrests because Wright had already 

left. The girlfriend and daughter went to a local hospital for 

treatment. Arrest warrants were issued charging Wright with 

malicious wounding, use of a knife in the commission of a 

stabbing, assault and battery, grand larceny auto, and driving 

without a license. 

The following evening, Officer Perry A. Bartels of the 

Newport News Police Department visited Wright's neighborhood to 

continue the investigation. While questioning neighbors about 

the incident, Bartels noticed lights on in Wright's home. 

Knowing that Wright's girlfriend and her daughter —— two of the 

home's three occupants —— were not staying at the house at that 

time, Bartels suspected that Wright might have returned to the 

home. Bartels approached Wright's house, positioned himself in 

the yard where he could view the front and side doors, called 

for backup, and drew his weapon. 

 A few minutes later, the lights in the house turned off and 

Wright emerged from the side door. Pointing his gun at Wright, 

Bartels identified himself as a police officer and ordered 

Wright to drop a bag he was carrying and place his hands in the 

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air. Wright cooperated. Bartels held Wright at gunpoint until 

the other officers arrived and then placed him under arrest. 

After handcuffing Wright, Bartels turned his attention to the 

bag that Wright had been carrying. Intending to search the bag, 

Bartels asked Wright whether the bag contained anything that 

would concern him. Without further prompting, Wright responded, 

"Yeah, there's a gun in the bag." Bartels then reached into the 

bag and discovered a loaded, semi-automatic handgun. 

 A grand jury returned an indictment charging Wright, a 

convicted felon, with illegal possession of a firearm. Shortly 

before trial, Wright filed a motion to suppress all evidence 

obtained by Bartels, claiming that his entry onto Wright's 

private property invalidated the arrest. In his opening remarks 

to the trial judge, Wright's trial counsel conceded: "There 

were I guess warrants out for malicious wounding, assault and 

battery, things of that nature which is why he was arrested." 

The trial court heard testimony from Officer Bartels, who 

confirmed that he had arrest warrants charging Wright with these 

offenses, but did not have any search warrants. 

 In his closing argument, Wright's counsel argued that the 

absence of a "search warrant" rendered illegal Bartel's entry 

onto Wright's property. The prosecutor disagreed, pointing out 

that the "arrest warrant" entitled Bartels to arrest Wright 

"wherever he decided to secrete himself." In reply, Wright's 

counsel again insisted that Bartels "did not have a search 

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warrant to enter the dwelling area. Based on that, Your Honor, 

we would submit it." The trial judge overruled the motion, 

holding that the "arrest warrant . . . takes care of it." A 

jury later found Wright guilty of possession of a firearm by a 

felon, resulting in the imposition of a five-year prison 

sentence. The trial judge appointed an attorney, who was not 

Wright's trial counsel, to handle Wright's appeal.1 

 

1

 Appellant's opening brief did not mention the existence of 

the outstanding arrest warrants or that the trial judge 

specifically denied the suppression motion because of these 

warrants. During oral argument before this Court, Wright's 

appellate counsel suggested the omission was inadvertent and 

that he did not become aware of these facts until reading the 

Commonwealth's brief of appellee. Before Wright's counsel ever 

saw the Commonwealth's brief of appellee, however, he received 

and presumably reviewed: 

(i) the trial transcript included in the joint 

appendix, which clearly mentioned these facts; 

(ii) the Commonwealth's brief in opposition to the 

petition for appeal, which repeatedly mentioned 

these facts and argued that they were 

dispositive of this appeal; and 

(iii) this Court's order of May 7, 2002, granting in 

part and denying in part the petition for 

appeal, which likewise made clear that "Bartels 

arrested appellant pursuant to arrest warrants 

for malicious wounding, use of a knife in the 

commission of a stabbing, grand larceny, 

assault and battery, and driving without a 

license." 

Rule 5A:20(d) requires an appellant to provide a "clear and 

concise statement of the facts that relate to the questions 

presented" by the appeal. The ethical duty of candor, implicit 

in Rule 5A:20(d), requires the disclosure of any obviously 

material fact —— particularly one identified by the trial judge 

as the basis for his ruling being challenged on appeal. 

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II. 

Though the ultimate question whether the officers violated 

the Fourth Amendment triggers de novo scrutiny on appeal, the 

trial court's findings of "historical fact" bind us due to the 

weight we give "to the inferences drawn from those facts by 

resident judges and local law enforcement officers." Davis v. 

Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 421, 429, 559 S.E.2d 374, 378 (2002) 

(citing Neal v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 233, 237, 498 S.E.2d 

422, 424 (1998)). We examine the trial court's factual findings 

only to determine if they are plainly wrong or devoid of 

supporting evidence. See Mier v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 827, 

828, 407 S.E.2d 342, 343 (1991). If reasonable jurists could 

disagree about the probative force of the facts, we have no 

authority to substitute our views for those of the trial judge. 

In addition, the appellant must shoulder the burden of 

showing that the trial court's decision "constituted reversible 

error." McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197, 487 S.E.2d 

259, 261 (1997) (en banc) (citations omitted); see also Davis, 

37 Va. App. at 429-30, 559 S.E.2d at 378. "Absent clear 

evidence to the contrary in the record, the judgment of a trial 

court comes to us on appeal with a presumption that the law was 

correctly applied to the facts." Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 

217 Va. 971, 978, 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977); Oliver v. 

Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 286, 297, 544 S.E.2d 870, 875 (2001) 

("The trial court's judgment is presumed to be correct."); Dunn 

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v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 217, 219, 456 S.E.2d 135, 136 

(1995). 

 III. 

Wright argues that Officer Bartels needed a search warrant 

to justify his entry onto Wright's property to effect his 

arrest. This contention fails as a matter of law. It is true 

that, absent exigent circumstances or consent, the Fourth 

Amendment will invalidate any warrantless police entry into a 

suspect's home, whether the officer intends to conduct a search 

or to arrest someone within. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 

573, 586 (1980); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 479, 484, 

524 S.E.2d 171, 173 (2000); Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 27 

Va. App. 1, 16, 497 S.E.2d 474, 481 (1998). It is entirely 

untrue, however, that the warrant must be a search warrant. 

An officer may lawfully enter a suspect's home if the 

officer has an arrest warrant for the suspect. See Payton, 445 

U.S. at 602-03. "If there is sufficient evidence of a citizen's 

participation in a felony to persuade a judicial officer that 

his arrest is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to 

require him to open his doors to the officers of the law." Id. 

A properly issued arrest warrant, therefore, provides "limited 

authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when 

there is reason to believe the suspect is within." Id.; see

also Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130, 135, 360 S.E.2d 196, 

200 (1987) (police can arrest suspect residing in another's 

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apartment without need for search warrant); Archer v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 9-10, 492 S.E.2d 826, 830-31 

(1997); cf. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 219 (1981) 

(subject of an arrest warrant cannot complain of absence of 

search warrant when arrested in home of another, but residents 

of home not named in warrant have Fourth Amendment protection 

from search for anything other than subject of warrant). Once 

inside, however, the Fourth Amendment limits the scope of the 

officer's authority —— he can search only for the suspect and, 

upon finding him, perform the arrest and an incidental search. 

Archer, 26 Va. App. at 9-10, 492 S.E.2d at 830. 

These principles apply to the curtilage of the home as well 

as to the home itself. The Fourth Amendment's prohibition 

against warrantless searches of one's home stretches beyond the 

walls of the house and embraces the home's curtilage. 

Jefferson, 27 Va. App. at 16, 497 S.E.2d at 481 (citing Oliver 

v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)). Encompassing both 

land and structures, the curtilage comprises the area 

"immediately surrounding" the home, Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180, 

that is so "intimately linked" both "physically and 

psychologically" to the home as to be its functional equivalent. 

California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986). 

Upon making a lawful arrest, a police officer can conduct 

an incidental search of the suspect to gather weapons and search 

for contraband. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 

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(1973) ("It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful 

arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of 

the Fourth Amendment."); Commonwealth v. Brunson, 248 Va. 347, 

357, 448 S.E.2d 393, 399 (1994); Clarke v. Commonwealth, 32 

Va. App. 286, 296, 527 S.E.2d 484, 489 (2000). 

For these reasons, the arrest warrants provided Officer 

Bartels with authority to arrest Wright within the curtilage of 

his residence. To be sure, had Bartels decided to do so, he 

could have entered Wright's home and taken him into custody 

there. Bartels had a reasonable basis to believe that Wright 

was present in the home and was the person who came out the side 

door. Nothing in the record, moreover, suggests that Bartels 

exceeded the scope of his authority by searching Wright incident 

to his arrest. 

 IV. 

 Settled Fourth Amendment principles govern this appeal and 

legitimate the legality of Wright's arrest. Wright provides 

neither legal authority nor persuasive argument for invalidating 

his arrest because of the absence of a search warrant 

authorizing entry onto his property. We thus affirm the trial 

court's denial of Wright's motion to suppress. 

 Affirmed. 

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