Slip Op. 13-156

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

Before: Claire R. Kelly, Judge

Consol. Court No. 12-00071 

Public Version 

OPINION 

[Sustaining Commerce’s antidumping duty administrative review] 

Dated: 12/27/2013 

Ellen J. Schneider, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom, LLP of Washington, DC 

argued for Plaintiff. With her on the brief were Robert E. Lighthizer and Jeffrey D. Gerrish. 

Timothy C. Brightbill, Wiley Rein, LLP of Washington, DC argued for PlaintiffIntervenor. With him on the brief was Alan H. Price.

Tara K. Hogan, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for Defendant. With her on the 

UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, 

Plaintiff,

and 

NUCOR CORPORATION, 

Plaintiff-Intervenor, 

v.

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant, 

and 

HYUNDAI HYSCO, POHANG IRON & STEEL 

CO., LTD., and POHANG 

COATED STEEL CO., LTD., 

Defendant-Intervenors. 
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 2 

brief were Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. 

Davidson, Director, and Reginald T. Blades, Jr., Assistant Director. Of counsel on the 

brief was Nathaniel J. Halvorson, Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel for Import 

Administration, United States Department of Commerce, of Washington, DC.

Jarrod M. Goldfeder, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP, of Washington, DC, 

argued for Defendant-Intervenors. With him on the briefs were J. David Park, and Sally 

S. Laing. 

Kelly, Judge: This matter is before the court on motions for judgment on the 

agency record by Plaintiff, United States Steel Corporation (“U.S. Steel”), and by PlaintiffIntervenor, Nucor Corporation (“Nucor”), (collectively “Plaintiffs”), both members of the 

domestic industry, pursuant to USCIT Rule 56.2. Plaintiffs’ action, brought pursuant to 

section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930 (“Tariff Act” or the “Act”), as amended, 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1516a (2006),1 challenges the United States Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) 

final determination in the administrative review issued in Certain Corrosion-Resistant 

Carbon Steel Flat Products From the Republic of Korea, 77 Fed. Reg. 14,501 (Dep’t 

Commerce Mar. 12, 2012) (“Final Results”) which found de minimis margins for two 

respondents, Defendant-Intervenors herein. Defendant, United States, and DefendantIntervenors, Pohang Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. and Pohang Coated Steel Co., Ltd. (collectively 

“POSCO”), and Hyundai HYSCO (“HYSCO”) oppose this action. The administrative 

review arises from the antidumping duty order covering certain corrosion-resistant carbon 

steel flat products (“CORE”) from Korea. See, e.g., Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 1, Mar. 23, 2012, 

ECF No. 6; see also Certain Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products and Certain 



1 Further citations to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, are to the relevant provisions of 

Title 19 of the U.S. Code, 2006 edition, and all applicable supplements.
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 3 

Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products From Korea, 58 Fed. Reg. 44,159 (Dep’t 

Commerce Aug. 19, 1993) (antidumping duty order). Commerce initiated the 17th 

administrative review on September 29, 2010, for, among others, POSCO and HYSCO. 

See Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews and 

Requests for Revocation in Part, 75 Fed. Reg. 60,076, 60,077 (Dep’t Commerce Sept. 

29, 2010).

BACKGROUND

Both POSCO and HYSCO produce and sell several different product types 

of CORE subject to the dumping order in question. Commerce based its review of the 

subject merchandise on twelve different model-match criteria, one of which is temper 

rolling.2 HYSCO produces and sells temper rolled (“TR”) and non-tempered rolled 

(“NTR”) merchandise in both the United States and its home market. In its review, 

Commerce chose the date of shipment as the date of sale for POSCO’s U.S. sales in 

order to determine the dumping margin. Further, it considered HYSCO’s NTR home 

market sales to be made within the ordinary course of trade. Finally, after it found a de 

minimis margin for POSCO for the third consecutive review, Commerce revoked the order 

with respect to POSCO. Final Results at 14,501; Issues and Decision Memorandum for 

the Final Results of the 17th Administrative Review of the Antidumping Duty Order on 

Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from the Republic of Korea 

(2009-2010) cmts 3, 5, 6, A-580-816, (Mar. 5, 2012) (“Issues and Decision 



2 Temper rolling “refers to a finishing operation that smoothes [sic] the surface of the 

steel.” Mem. Def.-Interv. HYSCO Opp’n to Pl.’s Rule 56.2 Mot. J. at 4, Feb. 25, 2013, 

ECF No. 68.
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 4 

Memorandum”), available at http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/Koreasouth/2012-5937-1.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2013).

Plaintiffs challenge Commerce’s selection of the shipment date as the date 

of sale for POSCO, see, e.g., Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 10-11, and Commerce’s determination 

that certain sales of NTR merchandise by HYSCO were within the ordinary course of 

trade. Id. at ¶ 16-17. Further, Plaintiffs challenge Commerce’s revocation of the dumping 

order with respect to POSCO. Id. at ¶ 12-13. 

 For the reasons set forth below, the court sustains Commerce’s selection 

of the shipment date as the date of sale for POSCO’s U.S. sales, its findings that 

HYSCO’s sales of NTR merchandise were within the ordinary course of trade, and its 

decision to revoke the antidumping duty order with respect to POSCO. 

JURISDICTION

The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2006),3 and 19 

U.S.C. § 1516a(a). 

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review 

 “The court shall hold unlawful any determination, finding or conclusion found 

. . . to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law . . . .” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). To be in accordance with law, 

a decision must not be arbitrary and capricious, contrary to regulations, statutes or the 



3 Further citations to Title 28 of the U.S. Code are made to the 2006 edition, and all 

applicable supplements.
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 5 

Constitution, and must be supported by substantial evidence and reasoned explanations. 

See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 

41-43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2866-67 (1983); SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 630 F.3d 1365, 

1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Substantial evidence exists on the record when there is “such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 

(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 

126, 140 (1938)). However, the “substantiality of evidence must take into account 

whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 

340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 464, 95 L.Ed. 456, 467 (1951). Nevertheless, “the 

possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not invalidate 

Commerce's conclusion as long as it remains supported by substantial evidence on the 

record.” Zhaoqing New Zhongya Aluminum Co. v. United States, 36 CIT __, __, 887 F. 

Supp. 2d 1301, 1305 (2012) (citing Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 488, 71 S.Ct. at 

465, 95 L.Ed. at 467-68). 

Date of Sale 

Commerce’s determination that POSCO’s date of sale should be based on 

the date of shipment is supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law. 

Commerce calculated dumping margins in this case on a constructed export price (“CEP”) 

basis, so the date of sale for purposes of determining the U.S. price of the subject 

merchandise was the date the merchandise was first sold to a party not affiliated with 
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 6 

POSCO. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b). The regulation instructs Commerce how to identify 

the date of sale generally. It provides: 

Date of sale. In identifying the date of sale of the subject merchandise or 

foreign like product, the Secretary normally will use the date of invoice, as 

recorded in the exporter or producer’s records kept in the ordinary course 

of business. However, the Secretary may use a date other than the date of 

invoice if the Secretary is satisfied that a different date better reflects the 

date on which the exporter or producer establishes the material terms of 

sale.

19 C.F.R. § 351.401(i)(2013). Thus, the regulation sets forth a presumption that “the 

Secretary normally will use the date of invoice” for the date of sale but “may use a date 

other than the date of invoice if the Secretary is satisfied that a different date better reflects 

the date on which the exporter or producer establishes the material terms.” 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.401(i)(2013). See Sahaviriya Steel Indus. Pub. Co. v. United States, 34 CIT __, 

__, 714 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1279 (2010) (“Thus, Commerce’s date of sale regulation 

provides for a ‘rebuttable presumption’ that invoice date will normally be identified as the 

date of sale.” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 649 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Although 

Commerce’s regulation provides that the date of sale will normally be the invoice date, 

Congress has “expressed its intent that, for antidumping purposes, the date of sale be 

flexible so as to accurately reflect the true date on which the material elements of sale 

were established.” Allied Tube and Conduit Corp. v. United States, 24 CIT 1357, 1370, 

127 F. Supp. 2d 207, 219 (2000).

Implicated in this case is what discretion the Secretary has to be “satisfied” 

that a date other than the invoice date is more appropriate as the date of sale. In other 

words, the question is whether record evidence supports a conclusion by the Secretary 
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 7 

that the shipment date better reflects the date on which the exporter or producer 

established the material terms of sale. Material terms include price and quantity among 

others. See Sahaviriya Steel, 34 CIT at __, 714 F. Supp. 2d at 1280.

Commerce found that “the material terms of sale were set at the time of 

shipment.” Issues and Decisions Memorandum at cmt 6. Commerce relied on POSCO’s 

questionnaire response regarding the date of sale, record documentation regarding when 

the material terms of sale were set, a long-standing business practice in the Korean steel 

industry, and the U.S. sales process for all four respondents. Issues and Decision 

Memorandum at cmt 6 nn.95-99. Further, it noted “HYSCO has reported ship date as 

date of sale consistently in previous reviews which the Department has accepted.” Id. at 

nn.99.

POSCO’s questionnaire responses and supporting documentation in the 

record establish POSCO’s sales process. POSCO’s U.S. affiliate, POSCO America 

Corporation (“POSAM”), negotiates and executes purchase orders with United States 

customers.4 Def.’s Opp’n. Pl.’s Mot.’s J. at 19, Feb. 27, 2013, ECF No. 72; see also Mem. 

POSCO POHANG Coated Steel Co., Ltd., Opp’n Pl.’s and Pl.-Interv.’s 56.2 Mots.’ J. at 

25-27, Feb. 25, 2013, ECF No. 70; POSCO’s Dec. 20, 2010 Sect. A Resp. at A-18, A-24, 

PD I 52, CD I 8 (Dec. 20, 2010), ECF No. 32 (May 7, 2012). Then, on a monthly basis 

the U.S. customer sends an email to POSAM outlining the quantities and types of 

products it would like to order. Def.’s Opp’n. Pl.’s Mot.’s J. at 19. Next, POSAM enters 



4 Although POSAM is the importer of record for the goods shipped by POSCO, POSAM 

does not take possession of the goods.
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 8 

the order into POSCO’s computer system, “which is the basis for generating an order 

sheet.” Id. POSCO then manufactures the products and, after shipping arrangements 

are made, ships the products directly to the U.S. customer. Id.

Based upon the foregoing description of the sales process as supported by 

POSCO’s questionnaire responses, a reasonable mind could conclude the parties intend 

the quantity and delivery terms to be fixed when POSCO ships the merchandise to the 

U.S. customer. In Commerce’s Section A questionnaire dated October 29, 2010, 

Commerce requested POSCO to report its date of sale for home market sales and U.S. 

sales. See POSCO’s Dec. 20, 2010 Sect. A Resp. at A-22.5 POSCO responded on 

December 20, 2010 and stated that “[f]or U.S. sales, POSCO has reported the date of 

shipment from the mill in Korea as the date of sale. The invoice issued to the customer 

by POSAM is issued long after the date of shipment.” Id. at A-23. POSCO’s response 

supports its intention as to the date of sale. However, Commerce did not accept this 



5 In particular Commerce’s question asks: 

Sales Process: The date of sale for your sales to the United States and the 

foreign market is important to the Department's analysis. It will determine 

which sales are reported in response to sections B and C of this 

questionnaire and the exchange rate used to convert normal value into US 

dollars. Note, however, that the Department's criteria for determining date 

of sale may differ from those that you apply in the normal course of 

business. A description of the Department's criteria is included in the 

Glossary of Terms at Appendix I; please use these criteria in preparing your 

response to this questionnaire. If you have difficulty deciding which date to 

use as the date of sale, please contact the official in charge by no later than 

fourteen calendar days after the issuance of this questionnaire (the 

issuance date of this questionnaire appears on the first page of the cover 

letter). Describe the sales process for each method or channel of 

distribution described in response to question 3 above. Include a 

description of each step in the sales process. 

POSCO’s Dec. 20, 2010 Sect. A Resp. at A-22.
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 9 

assertion at face value but followed up with a supplemental questionnaire on April 6, 2011. 

In that questionnaire it asked POSCO for more information regarding its date of sale. 

Commerce stated, 

Please provide a copy of all sales documents which set the material terms 

of sale, including quantity and price, agreed upon between POSCO America 

Corporation (POSAM) and your unaffiliated U.S. customer for the top five 

largest U.S. sales by quantity: SEQUs [[ ]].

Furthermore, please state if there were any changes to the material terms 

of sale following shipment for any of your U.S. sales during the period of 

review.

POSCO’s May 4, 2011 Supp. Sect. A-C QNR at 1, PD I 124, CD I 39 (May 4, 2011), ECF 

No. 32 (May 7, 2012). POSCO responded that “POSAM and its unaffiliated customers 

generally set price and quantity terms through e-mail correspondence.” Id. POSCO 

further cites documents attached at Exhibit S-1. Each sequence at Exhibit S-1 contains 

several documents including a purchase order, an order sheet, an invoice issued between 

POSCO and POSAM, a packing list, a bill of lading, an entry summary, and finally a 

commercial invoice between POSAM and the U.S. customer. See id. at Ex. 1.

POSCO also discusses possible changes to material terms including 

quantity and delivery destination that can occur after the purchase order but before 

shipment. Id. at 1. Finally, POSCO states that shipment date is the best date of sale:

because it reflects the date on which the material terms of sale become 

firmly established. Indeed, the two changes noted above occur on or before 

the date of shipment, which is subsequent to the date of the initial order. 

Using shipment date as the date of sale is also consistent with the 

Department's longstanding practice, including in this proceeding, that the 

date of sale cannot be later than the date of shipment of the subject 

merchandise to the unaffiliated U.S. customer. 

Id. at 1-2.
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 10 

In this supplemental questionnaire, Commerce also noted [[ 

 

]] and asked for “calculation worksheets and source documentation 

[[ ]].” Id. POSCO responded to this query by 

stating “[t]he difference between POSCO’s price to POSAM and POSAM’s price to the 

unaffiliated customer is attributable to [[ 

 

 ]].” Id. 

POSCO provided a worksheet showing calculations at Exhibit S-3. The worksheet 

provided by POSCO shows the values it placed on each of these expenses. After adding 

them all together the total equals the price invoiced from POSAM to the U.S. customer.

Commerce probed further and on July 20, 2011 Commerce issued another 

supplemental questionnaire. See Dept.’s July 20, 2011 Supp. Sect. A-C QN, PD I 167, 

CD I 58 (Jul. 20, 2011), ECF No. 32 (May 7, 2012). It asked for more date of sale 

information. Id. at 2. 

1. You state that "there were no changes to the material terms of sale 

following shipment for any of {your} U.S. sales during the POR" on page 

1 of your May 2, 2011, supplemental questionnaire response (May QNR 

Response). Please provide the documents that finalizes [sic] the 

material terms of sale (i.e., price, quantity, delivery terms, and payment 

terms) at the date of shipment and that shows that such terms did not 

change after the shipment date for (i.e., SEQUs [[ 

]] your U.S. sales during the POR. 

2. You stated in your May QNR Response that "POSAM and its unaffiliated 

customers generally set price and quantity terms through email 

correspondence." However, [[ 

 

 ]]. All of the 

other sales documents which you submitted [[ 
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 11 

 ]]. Please provide sales documents which set the 

material terms of sale between POSAM and the unaffiliated U.S. 

customer for your top five largest U.S. sales by quantity (i.e., SEQUs 

[[ ]]).

3. You stated that [[ 

 

 ]] For SEQUs [[ 

 ]], provide invoices or other source documentation clearly 

showing the actual amounts paid for the following expenses: 

[[ 

 ]] In addition, you only 

provided a calculation worksheet for SEQU [[ ]]. Please provide 

calculation worksheets for the other four sales, specifically SEQUs [[

 ]].

Id. POSCO responded to the July 20, 2011 questionnaire on August 3, 2011 providing 

Commerce with documents and worksheets regarding international freight, U.S. 

brokerage and handling, marine insurance, and U.S. duty. POSCO’s Aug. 3, 2011 Supp. 

Sect. A-C QNR, PD I 171, CD I 62 (Aug. 3, 2011), ECF No. 32 (May 7, 2012). 

The record taken as a whole contains substantial evidence for a finding by 

Commerce that the shipment date reflected the date on which the parties established the 

material terms. POSCO asserted that the shipment date was the date of sale in its 

questionnaire. As discussed above, Commerce did not merely accept this assertion at 

face value but probed further and elicited information and documentation concerning the 

circumstances surrounding POSCO’s sales. Commerce reasonably made its date of sale 

determination based upon the responses it received, Commerce’s knowledge of the 

industry, and the lack of any evidence, that would undermine or contradict its findings.

The Plaintiffs claim that the lack of any one single document memorializing 

the material terms being fixed at the time of shipment precludes shipment date as a viable 

date of sale. See Mem. Supp. Pl. U.S. Steel Mot. J. at 15, Sept. 24, 2012, ECF No. 46; 
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 12 

Br. Supp. Nucor 56.2 Mot. at 18-19, Sept. 24, 2012, ECF No. 45; Oral Arg. at 1:08:28-54, 

Oct. 28, 2013, ECF No. 100. Nothing in the regulation requires Commerce to base its 

decision upon such a single document. This argument ignores the language of the 

regulation. Commerce may choose a date other than the date of invoice as the date of 

sale if it satisfies itself that another date better represents when the parties established 

the material terms. Here, it relied upon the questionnaire response, its knowledge of the 

industry, and its understanding of how the transactions took place as supported by record 

evidence. 

Moreover, despite protestations to the contrary, no documents or evidence 

relied upon by the Plaintiffs undercuts Commerce’s findings. Plaintiffs point to the offer 

sheet, the purchase order, and the commercial invoice, note that the prices on each are 

different, and argue that therefore the commercial invoice is the only possible evidence 

establishing when the material terms are set. However, no one argues that the offer sheet 

or the purchase order represented or showed the final price. Commerce determined 

according to record evidence that the terms were fixed upon shipment. The existence of 

these other documents, or the fact that they show different amounts, does not detract 

from that finding. While it is conceivable that Commerce might have drawn another 

conclusion from these documents, “the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions 

from the evidence does not invalidate Commerce's conclusion as long as it remains 

supported by substantial evidence on the record.” Zhaoqing New Zhongya Aluminum, 36 

CIT at __, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 1305 (citing Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 488, 71 

S.Ct. at 465, 95 L.Ed. at 467-68).
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 13 

Plaintiffs argue strongly that Commerce’s practice of using the shipment 

date as the date of sale when shipment date precedes invoice date is not in accordance 

with law because it “contradicts Commerce’s own regulations.” Mem. Supp. Pl. U.S. Steel 

Mot. J. at 20. This argument holds some weight. The regulation states that the Secretary 

“normally will use the date of invoice” for the date of sale. 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(i)(2013). 

A determination that relied solely on a practice to use shipment date when it precedes 

invoice date would appear to contradict this language. See Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. 

v. United States, 31 CIT 638, 647, 491 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1231 (2007) (stating that 

Commerce’s practice “is in contradiction to Commerce’s statement in the [regulation’s] 

preamble” but noting other courts have “implicitly approved” the practice), aff’d, 548 F.3d 

1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

While the second sentence of the regulation allows Commerce to choose a 

date other than the invoice date, it requires that Commerce be “satisfied that a different 

date better reflects the date on which the exporter or producer establishes the material 

terms of sale.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(i)(2013). The second sentence therefore clarifies 

that while normally the invoice date will be the date of sale, another date can be chosen 

if Commerce makes a determination in a particular case so as to “satisfy” itself. This 

second sentence requires Commerce to make a fact-specific determination in a particular 

case that another date better reflects the date on which the material terms were 

established.6 It would seem that, by definition, a general practice cannot satisfy such a 



6 One could argue that the second sentence does not exhaust the range of circumstances 

in which Commerce could deviate from its “normal” practice. However, to the extent that 

there could be any ambiguity in the regulation, Commerce foreclosed the possibility that 
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 14 

fact-specific command. While Commerce’s knowledge of the industry, including how 

business is done, is not irrelevant, any purported practice alone would seem not to be 

enough to satisfy the standard that the regulation, written by Commerce, provides.7

However, here Commerce did not rely solely upon the practice. Commerce 

made a specific finding that the shipment date better reflected the date on which the 

material terms were set by the parties. It did so based upon evidence in the record and 

the Plaintiffs have failed to point to any evidence which detracts from this finding. The 

court sustains Commerce’s date of sale determination.

Ordinary Course of Trade 

Antidumping duties should be “an amount equal to the amount by which the 

normal value exceeds the export price (or the constructed export price) for the 

merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1673. Thus, Commerce must calculate both a CEP and a 

normal value. The statute defines normal value as the price of the subject merchandise 

“at a time reasonably corresponding to the time of the sale used to determine the export 



it could develop a practice in which shipment date would be the preferred date. See 

Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties, 62 Fed. Reg. 27,296, 27,348-49 (Dep’t 

Commerce May 19, 1997) (final rule) (rejecting shipment date as the uniform date of sale). 

7 In its Issues and Decision Memorandum Commerce said “[i]t is the Department’s normal 

practice not to consider dates subsequent to the date of shipment from the factory to the 

customer as appropriate for the date of sale because once merchandise is shipped, the 

material terms of sale are established.” Issues and Decision Memorandum at 28. At oral 

argument POSCO argued that while this practice appeared to contradict Commerce’s 

regulation, “in the last 16 years they have modified their practice.” Oral Arg. at 12:21:30, 

Oct. 28, 2013, ECF No. 100. Modifying a regulation in this manner would not be 

permissible. If Commerce has determined through subsequent implementation of the 

regulation that a date other than the invoice date normally will better reflect the date of 

sale there are adequate procedures for changing the regulation. See, e.g., Administrative 

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 15 

price or constructed export price,” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(A), where the price is “the 

price at which the foreign like product is first sold . . . for consumption in the exporting 

country, in the usual commercial quantities and in the ordinary course of trade . . . .” 

19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B). Thus, for Commerce to include a particular sale in its 

calculation of a respondent’s normal value, the sale must have been made in the ordinary 

course of trade. Congress defines ordinary course of trade as:

the conditions and practices which, for a reasonable time prior to the 

exportation of the subject merchandise, have been normal in the trade 

under consideration with respect to merchandise of the same class or kind. 

The administering authority shall consider the following sales and 

transactions, among others, to be outside the ordinary course of trade:

(A) Sales disregarded under section 1677b(b)(1) of this title.

(B) Transactions disregarded under section 1677b(f)(2) of this title.

19 U.S.C. § 1677(15).8

Other than for the two statutory exclusions mentioned above, the Tariff Act 

provides “little assistance in determining what is outside the scope of that definition.” NSK 

Ltd. v. United States, 25 CIT 583, 599, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1296 (2001). The court 

has held that Commerce has discretion to determine what sales are outside the ordinary 

course of trade. See, e.g., Bergerac, N.C. v. United States, 24 CIT 525, 536-37, 102 F. 

Supp. 2d 497, 507 (2000); Torrington Co. v. United States, 25 CIT 395, 402-03, 146 F. 

Supp. 2d 845, 861 (2001), aff’d, 62 Fed. Appx. 950 (Fed. Cir. 2003); U.S. Steel Group v. 

United States, 25 CIT 1293, 1300, 177 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1333 (2001). Commerce’s 



8 Although not relevant here, sales disregarded under § 1677b(b)(1) are sales made at 

prices less than the cost of production, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b)(1), and transactions 

disregarded under § 1677b(f)(2) are transactions between affiliated parties. 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1677b(f)(2). 
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 16 

regulations in 19 C.F.R. § 351.102(b)(35)(2013) establish Commerce’s methodology for 

evaluating when sales are made outside the ordinary course of trade: 

[t]he Secretary may consider sales or transactions to be outside the ordinary 

course of trade if the Secretary determines, based on an evaluation of all of 

the circumstances particular to the sales in question, that such sales or 

transactions have characteristics that are extraordinary for the market in 

question. Examples of sales that the Secretary might consider as being 

outside the ordinary course of trade are sales or transactions involving offquality merchandise or merchandise produced according to unusual 

product specifications, merchandise sold at aberrational prices or with 

abnormally high profits, merchandise sold pursuant to unusual terms of 

sale, or merchandise sold to an affiliated party at a non-arm's length price.

19 C.F.R. § 351.102(b)(35)(2013). Therefore, Commerce may find that sales are outside 

the ordinary course of trade if it determines that sales “have characteristics that are 

extraordinary,” based on a totality of the circumstances. Id. See also NSK Ltd., 25 CIT 

at 599, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 1296 (“Commerce’s methodology allows it, on a case-by-case 

basis, to examine all conditions and practices which may be considered ordinary in the 

trade under consideration and to determine which sales or transactions are, therefore, 

outside the ordinary course of trade.”).

In applying its totality of the circumstances test, Commerce does not give 

particular weight to any single factor. Instead, Commerce determines which factor may 

be more or less significant based on the case at hand. See, e.g., Murata, 17 CIT at 263, 

820 F. Supp. at 606. In making its determination, Commerce looks “at market conditions, 

practices, and other sales” in the home market, U.S. Steel Group, 25 CIT at 1300, 177 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1333, and “it then compares the transactions in question to see if they exhibit 

characteristics that are extraordinary for the market.” Id. See also Mantex, Inc. v. United 

States, 17 CIT 1385, 1403, 841 F. Supp. 1290, 1306 (1993). Commerce has discretion 
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 17 

to determine when an unusual circumstance will render sales outside the ordinary course 

of trade. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.102(b)(35)(2013); see also Koenig & Bauer-Albert AG v. 

United States, 22 CIT 574, 589, 15 F. Supp. 2d 834, 850 (1998) (finding that “Commerce 

has the discretion to decide under what circumstances highly profitable sales would be 

considered to be outside of the ordinary course of trade.”), vacated on other grounds, 259 

F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001); NTN Bearing Corp. of Am. v. United States, 27 CIT 129, 169-

71, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1289-91 (2003) (finding that Commerce’s inclusion of 

respondent’s sample sales and sales with high profits in the normal value calculation was 

properly within Commerce’s discretion because the mere existence of an extraordinary 

factor does not negate the totality of the circumstances test for determining whether sales 

are representative of the home market). 

In addition to the regulations, the court has commonly looked to the 

Statement of Administrative Action (“SAA”) to discern Congress’ intent regarding ordinary 

course of trade. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. United States, 12 CIT 937, 940, 698 F.Supp. 

275, 278 (1988) (stating that the “commonly understood purpose of the ordinary course 

of trade provision is to prevent dumping margins from being based on sales which are not 

representative, for example, sales of obsolete merchandise.”). The SAA states that

Commerce may consider other types of sales or transactions to be outside 

the ordinary course of trade when such sales or transactions have 

characteristics that are not ordinary as compared to sales or transactions 

generally made in the same market. Examples of such sales or transactions 

include merchandise produced according to unusual product specifications, 

merchandise sold at aberrational prices, or merchandise sold pursuant to 

unusual terms of sale. As under existing law, amended section 771(15) 

does not establish an exhaustive list, but the Administration intends that 

Commerce will interpret section 771(15) in a manner which will avoid basing 

normal value on sales which are extraordinary for the market in question, 
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 18 

particularly when the use of such sales would lead to irrational or 

unrepresentative results. 

Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc. No. 103-

316, vol. 1, at 834 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4171 (“SAA”). Thus, 

although Commerce’s regulations reflect some of the language of the SAA, the SAA 

demonstrates a particular concern with extraordinary sales that would lead to “irrational 

or unrepresentative results.” Id. 

Finally, without “adequate evidence of extraordinary characteristics,” U.S. 

Steel Group, 25 CIT at 1300, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 1333, Commerce presumes the 

contested sales were made in the ordinary course and includes them in its margin 

calculations. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Group, 25 CIT at 1300, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 1333; 

Bergerac, 24 CIT at 538, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 509; NTN Bearing Corp. of Am. v. United 

States, 19 CIT 1165, 1172, 903 F.Supp. 62, 68–69 (1995). The court has characterized 

the burden imposed on the party challenging this presumption as requiring “a complete 

explanation of the facts which establish the extraordinary circumstances rendering 

particular sales outside the ordinary course of trade . . . .” NTN Bearing Corp. of Am v. 

United States, 19 CIT 1221, 1229, 905 F.Supp. 1083, 1091 (1995). See also Bergerac, 

24 CIT at 538, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 509; Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 20 CIT 772, 783, 

932 F.Supp. 1488, 1497-98 (1996).

 The court sustains Commerce’s determination that HYSCO’s NTR sales 

were made within the ordinary course of trade as made in accordance with law and as 

supported by substantial evidence. Commerce properly considered the totality of the 

circumstances, including the number and types of customers that purchased NTR 
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 19 

merchandise, the circumstances surrounding those sales, the average quantities 

purchased, the channels of distribution, and terms of sale. Issues and Decision 

Memorandum at cmt 3. It found that the number of customers was significant. Id. (citing 

to HYSCO’s Rebuttal Brief at 17, CD II EXT_051205 (Jan. 17, 2012), ECF No. 32 (May 

7, 2012)). It found “none of those customers were otherwise unique in their purchases,” 

Issues and Decision Memorandum at cmt 3 (citing to HYSCO’s Rebuttal Brief at 17), and 

found no evidence that the categories of customers for NTR sales were different from TR 

sales. Issues and Decision Memorandum at cmt 3. Neither did Commerce find anything 

unusual about the average purchase quantities. Id. It found no evidence that the terms 

of sale or channels of distribution were different for NTR sales than for TR sales. Id. U.S. 

Steel points to no evidence in the record that refutes any of these findings. See Mem. 

Supp. Pl. U.S. Steel Mot. J. at 24-30. Commerce’s decision, based upon the totality of 

the circumstances, that HYSCO’s NTR sales were not outside the ordinary course of 

trade is therefore reasonable and made in accordance with law.

Instead of directly challenging Commerce’s factual findings on appeal, U.S. 

Steel contends that Commerce’s inclusion of HYSCO’s NTR sales in the normal value 

calculations was not in accordance with law. Id. at 25. U.S. Steel claims the SAA 

standard is controlling, and that it requires Commerce to exclude extraordinary sales 

when those sales produce irrational or unrepresentative results on the dumping margin.9



9 U.S. Steel argues the SAA “establishes that Commerce must not base its margin 

calculations on sales that are ‘extraordinary for the market in question’ and cannot use 

non-ordinary sales that lead to ‘irrational or unrepresentative results.’” Mem. Supp. Pl. 

U.S. Steel Mot. J. at 26. As such, plaintiff argues “Commerce does not have any 

discretion in the matter,” because when there exists “a class of extraordinary sales that 
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 20 

See id. at 25-26. See also SAA at 834. U.S. Steel asserts that Commerce acted contrary 

to law by “ignor[ing] the straightforward directive of the SAA,” Mem. Supp. Pl. U.S. Steel 

Mot. J. at 25, because HYSCO’s home market NTR sales were “plainly extraordinary for 

the market in question.” Id. at 26. In support of its argument that Commerce was required 

to exclude HYSCO’s NTR sales, U.S. Steel makes two arguments. First, U.S. Steel 

argues that [[ ]] between HYSCO’s home market TR and NTR sales 

renders the NTR sales extraordinary. Id. at 26. Second, U.S. Steel argues that HYSCO’s 

NTR “sales are extraordinary because they took place without leaving any paper (or 

email) trail.” Id. at 27. Further, U.S. Steel asserts that HYSCO’s NTR sales have an 

irrational effect on the dumping margin and, therefore, the SAA requires Commerce to 

exclude them.10 Id. at 28. 

U.S. Steel’s argument relies partly on the fact that [[ ]] of the time 

HYSCO’s home market sales are TR. However, neither Commerce’s regulations nor the 



by themselves produce an irrational result,” the SAA requires those sales to be excluded 

from NV calculations. Id. at 26. 

10 U.S. Steel contends

if the [[ ]] of sales that were designated as non-temper rolled were 

classified as temper rolled, the dumping margin would have been over 

[[ ]]. And if the [[ ]] of non-temper rolled sales had been excluded 

from the margin calculation as outside the ordinary course of trade (i.e., so 

that HYSCO’s dumping margin would be based on [[ ]] of its home 

market sales that were not unusual), HYSCO’s dumping margin would have 

been [[ ]].

Mem. Supp. Pl. U.S. Steel Mot. J. at 28. HYSCO questions U.S. Steel’s conclusion 

regarding the impact these sales have on the margin. See Mem. Def.-Interv. HYSCO 

Opp’n to Pl.’s Rule 56.2 Mot. J. at 28. HYSCO argues that “U.S. Steel's claimed result is 

unsubstantiated in the record by a single computer program or calculation. Correctly 

implementing the change that U.S. Steel suggests would require multiple changes 

throughout the Department's programs, given the complexity of the Department's 

calculations, and thus is highly prone to clerical error.” Id. at 29 n.5.
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 21 

SAA requires sales to be excluded because they are comparatively [[ ]] in volume, but 

only if, for some reason, those sales are not representative of the market in question. 

See NTN Bearing Corp. of Am., 27 CIT at 171, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 1291 (upholding 

Commerce’s determination that respondent’s sample sales and high profit sales were in 

the ordinary course of trade because there was no evidence that “the transactions at issue 

possessed some unique and unusual characteristic that make them unrepresentative of 

the home market. . . ”), appeal dismissed on motion to withdraw, 81 Fed. Appx. 318 (Fed. 

Cir. 2003).11 Indeed, the court has explicitly held that a [[ ]] on its own, 

is not enough to warrant a finding that the contested sales were made outside the ordinary 

course of trade. See Murata, 17 CIT at 263-64, 820 F.Supp. at 606-07. See also Koyo 

Seiko Co., 20 CIT at 783, 932 F.Supp. at 1498.

Some potentially extraordinary sales characteristics that Commerce might 

consider in administering this test include sales where the merchandise is “off-quality,” 

made with “unusual product specifications,” or “sold pursuant to unusual terms of sale.” 

19 C.F.R. § 351.102(b)(2013). See also SAA at 834. All of these examples may involve 



11 In NTN Corp. v. United States, plaintiff and respondent, NTN, argued Commerce 

incorrectly treated its sample sales as made in the ordinary course of trade. 28 CIT 108, 

136, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1344 (2004) aff’d, 125 Fed. Appx. 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

NTN claimed “Commerce acknowledged that these sales were relatively few in number, 

but then found that NTN's sample sales were not rare or uncommon.” NTN Corp., 28 CIT 

at 136, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 1344. In rebutting Commerce’s rationale, NTN argued the 

same thing as plaintiff herein. Specifically, NTN argued that a determination of whether 

a particular sales’ factor is unusual should be based on a comparison of the contested 

sales with overall sales. See NTN Corp., 28 CIT at 136, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 1344. The 

court found that “Commerce reasonably exercised its discretion in requiring NTN to 

provide evidence that its sample . . . sales were outside the ordinary course of trade.” 

NTN Corp., 28 CIT at 139, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 1347.
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 22 

a relatively [[ ]] comparative volume of sales in the home market, but merely declaring 

that there is a [[ ]] volume is not sufficient to show that the sales were extraordinary. 

Commerce must consider the totality of circumstances in each case to determine whether 

the sales or transactions at issue would not be representative of the market. See U.S. 

Steel Group, 25 CIT at 1299, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 1332.

U.S. Steel argues that the NTR sales do have unusual physical and 

production characteristics because they represent [[ ]] of HYSCO’s subject home 

market sales and therefore they are, by definition, different from [[ ]] of HYSCO’s 

subject home market sales both in terms of their physical characteristics and how they 

are produced. Mem. Supp. Pl. U.S. Steel Mot. J. at 26. This argument, if accepted, would 

inappropriately convert an inquiry concerning physical characteristics or production 

process into a question of numbers. U.S. Steel makes no argument that the sales 

themselves have unusual attributes, such as sales of off-quality merchandise, or of 

merchandise made pursuant to unusual specifications. See id. at 26-29. 

Second, U.S. Steel points to the lack of paper documentation for HYSCO’s 

NTR sales to argue that they are “inherently unverifiable” and, as such, extraordinary. Id. 

at 27-28. This contention fairs no better. Commerce found that the way in which the NTR 

sales were made was not unusual. Issues and Decision Memorandum at cmt 3. In the 

Issues and Decision Memorandum, Commerce found that “the number of customers that 

purchase non-temper rolled merchandise is significant, and that none of those customers 

were otherwise unique in their purchases of home market sales of subject merchandise 

from HYSCO.” Issues and Decision Memorandum at cmt 3. U.S. Steel says nothing 
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 23 

about whether the lack of a paper trail is unusual either for HYSCO or sales of NTR 

merchandise in the home market generally. Mem. Supp. Pl. U.S. Steel Mot. J. at 27-28. 

U.S. Steel then argues that, per the SAA standard, these sales should be 

excluded because of their unrepresentative impact on the dumping margin. Id. at 28. 

U.S. Steel contends that it would be irrational to allow [[ ]] of sales “to control the 

outcome of a case . . . .” Id. at 28. U.S. Steel relies upon the language of the SAA which 

provides that Commerce is to “avoid basing normal value on sales which are 

extraordinary . . . particularly when the use of such sales would lead to irrational or 

unrepresentative results.” SAA at 834. For Commerce to consider the impact of the sales 

on the dumping margin, the language of the SAA first requires that the sales exhibit 

extraordinary characteristics. However, if based on the totality of the circumstances, 

Commerce, as it did here, appropriately finds that the contested sales were not 

extraordinary then the impact of those sales on the margin is irrelevant.

Based on the foregoing, Commerce’s decision to reject U.S. Steel’s 

argument that HYSCO’s NTR home market sales were outside the ordinary course of 

trade was made in accordance with law and supported by substantial evidence. 

Revocation 

Congress provided for the revocation of an antidumping order in 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1675(d). The statute provides in relevant part: 

(d) Revocation of order or finding; termination of suspended investigation 

(1) In general 

The administering authority may revoke, in whole or in part, a 

countervailing duty order or an antidumping duty order or finding, or 

terminate a suspended investigation, after review under subsection 

(a) or (b) of this section. . . . 
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 24 

19 U.S.C. § 1675(d). Commerce’s regulations set forth the requirements for a request 

for revocation. 

(e) Request for revocation or termination— 

(1) Antidumping proceeding. During the third and subsequent 

annual anniversary months of the publication of an antidumping 

order or suspension of an antidumping investigation, an exporter or 

producer may request in writing that the Secretary revoke an order 

or terminate a suspended investigation under paragraph (b) of this 

section with regard to that person if the person submits with the 

request:

(i) The person’s certification that the person sold the subject 

merchandise at not less than normal value during the period of 

review described in §351.213(e)(i), and that in the future the person 

will not sell the merchandise at less than normal value; 

(ii) The person’s certification that, during each of the consecutive 

years referred to in paragraph (b) of this section, the person sold the 

subject merchandise to the United States in commercial quantities; 

and

(iii) If applicable, the agreement regarding reinstatement in the order 

or suspended investigation described in paragraph (b)(2)(iii) of this 

section.

19 C.F.R. § 351.222(e)(1)(2013). Commerce’s regulations discuss Commerce’s 

determination when to revoke in part: 

(2)(i) In determining whether to revoke, an antidumping duty order in part, 

the Secretary will consider: 

(A) Whether one or more exporters or producers covered by the 

order have sold the merchandise at not less than normal value for a 

period of at least three consecutive years; 

(B) Whether, for any exporter or producer that the Secretary 

previously has determined to have sold the subject merchandise at 

less than normal value, the exporter or producer agrees in writing to 

its immediate reinstatement in the order, as long as any exporter or 

producer is subject to the order, if the Secretary concludes that the 

exporter or producer, subsequent to the revocation, sold the subject 

merchandise at less than normal value; and

(C) Whether the continued application of the antidumping order is 

otherwise necessary to offset dumping.
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 25 

(ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in paragraphs 

(b)(2)(i)(A) through (C) of this section, that the antidumping duty order as to 

those producers or exporters is no longer warranted, the Secretary will 

revoke the order as to those producers or exporters.

19 C.F.R. § 351.222(b)(2)(i)-(ii) (language effective until June 20, 2012).

The statute “provides minimal guidance” to Commerce and is “silent as to 

the conditions that might warrant the revocation of an antidumping duty order or the 

particular circumstances that would trigger such an action.” Sahaviriya Steel Indus. Pub. 

Co. v. United States, 649 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Thus, Commerce has 

discretion in making a revocation determination including whether the requesting party 

satisfied the criteria for revocation. See, e.g., Feili Group (Fujian) Co., v. United States, 

34 CIT __, __, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1369 (2010).

Commerce’s determination is supported by substantial evidence and in 

accordance with law. Commerce explained that it was satisfied POSCO fulfilled the 19 

C.F.R. § 351.222(e) certification requirements. Issues and Decision Memo at cmt 5, n.78 

(citing POSCO Letter to the Dept., PD I 4 (Aug. 31, 2010), ECF No. 32 (May 7, 2010)). 

Next, Commerce applied the criteria in 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(b)(2)(i) (language effective 

until June 20, 2012). It was undisputed that POSCO had de minimis margins for three 

consecutive years. Commerce found that POSCO had sold “at not less than normal value” 

for those years. 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(b)(2)(i)(A) (language effective until June 20, 2012); 

Issues and Decision Memorandum at cmt 5, nn.79-80. Commerce presumes continued 

application of the order is unnecessary after three consecutive findings of an absence of 

dumping unless the petitioner comes forward with information to rebut. Id. at n.82 (citing 

Amended Regulation Concerning the Revocation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 26 

Orders, 64 FR 51236 (Sept. 22, 1999)). Commerce’s application of its standard is 

reasonable.

Plaintiffs’ arguments that revocation was unsupported by substantial 

evidence or otherwise not in accordance with law are unavailing. First, as discussed 

above, Plaintiffs’ claim that the revocation was based in part on Commerce’s erroneous 

date of sale determination lacks merit.

Second, Plaintiffs argue that Commerce failed to address record evidence 

of specific market and economic factors which showed a likelihood of future dumping and 

thus that the continued application of the dumping order was necessary. Without nuance, 

U.S. Steel argues that POSCO’s increasing production capacity and other business 

practices along with lost market share by domestic producers show a likelihood of future 

dumping. Mem. Supp. Pl. U.S. Steel Mot. J. at 23-24. In greater detail, Nucor argues 

that future dumping is likely because: (i) the economic downturn made the last three 

reviews unrepresentative, (ii) POSCO’s shipment volumes and market share in Korea 

have declined while its production has increased, and (iii) it has established a “strategic 

partnership” with Union Steel Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (another respondent). Br. Supp. 

Nucor 56.2 Mot. at 12-16. However, assertions of market conditions are not evidence 

that the order is “otherwise necessary to offset dumping.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(b)(2)(i) 

(language effective until June 20, 2012). Plaintiffs would have Commerce speculate that 

these facts support the conclusion that POSCO is likely to sell at less than normal value 

in the future. While Commerce must “address significant arguments and evidence which 

seriously undermine its reasoning and conclusion” it does not need to address every 
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 27 

assertion made by the petitioners. Altx, Inc. v. United States, 25 CIT 1100, 1117-1118, 

167 F.Supp.2d 1353, 1374 (2001), aff’d, 370 F.3d 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also 19 

U.S.C. § 1677f(i)(3)(A). Here, where the assertions do no more than ask Commerce to 

speculate, it is reasonable to conclude that Commerce considered the assertions and did 

not credit them.

Finally, Nucor argues that Commerce was unable to complete verification 

with regard to POSCO and thus, its determination was unsupported by substantial 

evidence and otherwise not in accordance with law. Commerce has discretion in how it 

conducts its verification process. See Floral Trade Council v. United States, 17 CIT 392, 

398-99, 822 F. Supp. 766, 771-72 (1993). In its Issues and Decision Memorandum, 

Commerce correctly notes that it is “afforded [] a degree of latitude in implementing its 

verification procedures, and that the Department is not required to verify each item 

submitted in respondents’ questionnaire.” Id. at cmt 5, n.88; see also Floral Trade 

Council, 17 CIT at 399, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 772 (internal citations omitted). Contrary to 

Nucor’s assertion that Commerce must conduct a “completeness test,” Br. Supp. Nucor 

56.2 Mot. at 11-12, “verification is an audit process that selectively tests accuracy and 

completeness of a respondent’s submissions.” Issues and Decision Memorandum at cmt 

5, n.89 (citing Bomont Indus. v. United States, 14 CIT 208, 209, 733 F.Supp 1507, 1508 

(1990)); see also Floral Trade Council, 17 CIT at 398, 822 F. Supp. at 771. Although 

verification was not completed, it did not need to be complete for this court to sustain 

Commerce’s finding. See Floral Trade Council, 17 CIT at 399-400, 822 F. Supp. at 772; 

Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 11 CIT 710, 726, 673 F.Supp. 454, 469-70 (1987)).
Consol. Court No. 12-00071 Page 28 

Therefore, Commerce’s decision to revoke the order with respect to 

POSCO is supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the agency 

record is denied. Judgment will be entered accordingly. 

 ___/s/ Claire R. Kelly 

 Claire R. Kelly, Judge 

Dated: December 27, 2013 

 New York, New York