Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

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National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling

DECISION-MAKING WITHIN THE UNIFIED COMMAND

Staff Working Paper No. 2

Staff working papers are written by the staff of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater 

Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling for the use of members of the Commission. They do not 

necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or any of its members. In addition, they may be 

based in part on confidential interviews with government and non-government personnel.

The response to the Deepwater Horizon spill continues to the present. As of July 15, 

2010—the day the well stopped flowing—the response involved approximately 44,000 

responders; more than 6,870 vessels (including skimmers, tugs, barges, and recovery vessels);

approximately 4.12 million feet of boom; 17,500 National Guard troops from Gulf Coast states; 

five states; multiple corporations; and untold hours of work by federal, state, and local officials;

employees or contractors of BP; and private citizens.1The spill response is governed by the 

National Contingency Plan (NCP), a set of federal regulations that prescribe how the government 

will respond to oil spills. In some respects, the response effectively implemented the provisions 

of the plan and helped to mitigate the most serious negative impacts of the spill. In other 

respects, the plan was inadequate to handle the scale of the spill—its magnitude, duration, and 

effects on many stakeholders. This working paper describes the structure of the spill response 

and the roles of various government and private actors within that structure. The paper identifies

situations in which responders altered, or operated outside of, the National Contingency Plan 

structure and suggests possible recommendations for improvement of that structure in the future. 

Issues for the Commission To Consider:

Scale and Structure of the Response: Was the structure of the response adequate 

for the nature of the spill, and was that structure put into place quickly enough? 

Role of the Responsible Party: Did BP exercise too much control over the 

response? If not, what factors led to the public perception that BP, and not the 

government, was in charge of the response?

Interaction with State and Local Officials: Does the NCP appropriately 

integrate state and local officials in the response, and were such officials 

appropriately involved in this response? Should the NCP and existing 

contingency planning documents be changed to create a larger or clearer role for

state and local officials in oil spill response?

I. Background: The National Contingency Plan and the Unified Command 

Structure

The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, or National 

Contingency Plan (NCP), is the federal government‟s blueprint for responding to both oil spills 

 

1

Press Release, Deepwater Horizon Incident Joint Information Center, Operations and Ongoing Response (July 15, 

2010), available at http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/07/15/operations-and-ongoing-response-july-15-

2010.
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

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and hazardous substance releases.2 Specifically, the NCP establishes the National Response 

System, a multi-tiered and coordinated national response strategy. Key components of the 

National Response System include:

National Response Team: The National Response Team is the organization of sixteen 

federal departments and agencies3responsible for coordinating emergency preparedness and 

response to oil and hazardous substance pollution incidents.

Regional Response Teams: The Regional Response Teams are composed of regional 

representatives of each National Response Team member agency, state governments, and 

local governments.4 The two principal components of each Regional Response Team are (1) 

a standing team, which consists of designated representatives from each participating federal 

agency, state governments, and local governments (as agreed upon by the states); and (2) 

incident-specific teams formed from the standing team when the Regional Response Team is 

activated for a response. The United States Coast Guard leads the Regional Response Teams

during responses to oil spills in coastal waters.

On-Scene Coordinator: The On-Scene Coordinator directs the response efforts and 

coordinates all other efforts at the scene. For spills of oil and hazardous substances in the 

inland zone, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provides the On-Scene 

Coordinator. For oil spills in the coastal zone, the Coast Guard provides the On-Scene 

Coordinator. In general, Coast Guard Captains of the Port serve as On-Scene Coordinators 

for their particular area. On-Scene Coordinators oversee the Unified Area Command.

Unified Area Command: The Unified Area Command is made up of the Federal On-Scene 

Coordinator, the State On-Scene Coordinator, and the responsible party. The Unified Area 

Command, with support from the Regional Response Team, directs the majority of response 

operations as well as any Incident Command Posts established for front-line responders.

5

National Incident Commander: Once an oil spill is classified as a Spill of National 

Significance, the Commandant of the Coast Guard designates a National Incident 

Commander to provide national-level support for the operational response. (In this paper, the 

National Incident Commander will be referred to as such, and the National Incident 

Command post he directs will be referred to as the NIC.) The On-Scene Coordinator

maintains authority for response operations as directed in the NCP. 

Area Committees: Area Committees are composed of personnel from federal, state, and 

local agencies. The primary function of each Area Committee is to prepare an Area 

 

2 The NCP provisions specific to oil spill response are codified in 40 C.F.R. § 300, Subpart D.

3 These agencies include the United States Coast Guard, the Environment Protection Agency (EPA), the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of the Interior, the Department of Justice, and 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), as well as other agencies. 40 C.F.R. § 300.175(b).

4

In the spill-affected area there were two Regional Response Teams corresponding to the two “regions” involved: 

(1) Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas; and (2) Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 

Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Kentucky.

5

For this spill, the Unified Area Command was first located in Robert, Louisiana and later moved to New Orleans, 

Louisiana. Incident Command Posts were established in Houma, Louisiana; Mobile, Alabama; Miami, Florida; and 

Houston, Texas. 
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

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Contingency Plan for its designated area. Each Coast Guard Captain of the Port zone is a 

separate area. Area Contingency Plans are written to set a framework for joint response 

efforts in the event of a spill.6

Congress first established the NCP in 1968 after the 37-million gallon Torrey Canyon

tanker spill off the coast of England. The Federal Water Quality Act of 1970, which became the 

Clean Water Act in 1972, required the President to publish a NCP.7 Although a version of the 

NCP was in place at the time of the Exxon Valdez spill,8 Congress responded to that spill by 

passing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which directed the President to expand the NCP.9 The 

authority to expand the NCP was later delegated to EPA,10 which implemented this mandate with 

amendments to the NCP promulgated in 1994.11

The 1994 amendments to the NCP focused on expanding federal authority to coordinate 

effective communication and deployment of equipment—two problems that plagued the Exxon 

Valdez response.

12

 Specifically, the amendments prescribed additional responsibilities for the 

On-Scene Coordinators and strengthened their ability to direct the on-scene response.13 The 

amendments also called for the creation of Area Committees and Area Contingency Plans under 

the leadership of the On-Scene Coordinator.

14

 To ensure that contingency plans would help 

companies and responders undertake more realistic preparation for future spills than they had for

the Exxon Valdez disaster, the 1994 amendments required contingency plans to consider a worstcase discharge scenario.15

 Finally, the EPA compiled general oil discharge response 

requirements into a single document to aid responders.

16

II. The Unified Command

The guiding concept of the NCP is a “unified command system” that “brings together the 

functions of the Federal Government, the state government, and the responsible party to achieve 

an effective and efficient response.”17 The magnitude of the response to the Deepwater Horizon 

 

6

In the spill-affected states there are two “areas” designated for Louisiana, three areas designated for Texas, three 

areas designated for Northwest/West Florida, and one area designated for Mississippi/Alabama. These areas are 

each a Captain of the Port zone, and each has its own Area Contingency Plan.

7

See Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 311(j), 86 Stat. 816, 862 (1972).

8

In fact, six applicable contingency plans were in place at the time of the Exxon Valdez spill. The five other plans 

that operated along with the NCP were the Alyeska, Captain of the Port (OSC), Regional, Alaska, and Exxon 

contingency plans. See NATIONAL RESPONSE TEAM, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 6-8

(May 1989).

9 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484, primarily codified at 33 U.S.C. 2701 et seq. 

[hereinafter OPA 90].

10 See Exec. Order No. 12,777, 56 Fed. Reg. 54,757 (1991).

11 See Rules and Regulations, Environmental Protection Agency, 40 C.F.R. Parts 9 and 300, National Oil and 

Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 59 Fed. Reg. 47,384 (Sept. 15, 1994).

12 See id.

13 See id.

14 See id. at 47,384 (“These committees and plans are designed to improve coordination among the national, 

regional, and local planning levels and to enhance the availability of trained personnel, necessary equipment, and 

scientific support that may be needed to adequately address all discharges.”).

15 See id.

16 Id. at 47,414; 40 C.F.R. Part 300 Appendix E. This appendix is simply a concise restatement of the regulations set 

forth throughout 40 C.F.R. Part 300; it does not add any substantive regulations.

17 40 C.F.R. § 300.105. 
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

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spill necessitated the build-out of an elaborate organizational structure with accompanying 

delegation of responsibilities. 

A. Setting the Structure

The NCP vests the Federal On-Scene Coordinator with authority over the command 

system. Although the unified command system is designed to bring together different 

stakeholders to make decisions, one individual needs to have ultimate decision-making power in

the event of a conflict. Under the NCP, that individual is the Federal On-Scene Coordinator. 

The Coast Guard pre-designates the official who will serve as Federal On-Scene Coordinator, 

and that individual has responsibilities for contingency planning and coordination even before a 

spill occurs. For example, the Captain of the Port for the coastal zone where a spill occurs will 

generally be the Federal On-Scene Coordinator. The Federal On-Scene Coordinator is required 

to oversee the development of the Area Contingency Plan, which is coordinated through the 

Regional Response Team and designated state and local representatives.18 The Federal OnScene Coordinator can change as the nature of the event changes to require a larger response. 

The NCP gives the Federal On-Scene Coordinator the authority to oversee the incident command 

structure and to expand it as she sees necessary. 

In this case, the first Federal On-Scene Coordinator was the Commander of the Marine 

Safety Unit at Morgan City, Louisiana, Captain Joseph Scott Paradis, because the incident 

occurred in his Captain of the Port zone and his sector was already responding to the fire and 

conducting search and rescue missions. Once the response called for a Unified Area Command

to be stood up, Admiral Mary Landry, as commander of the Eighth Coast Guard District, became 

the Federal On-Scene Coordinator.

19

 In the first days of the spill, responders established a 

Unified Area Command post at Robert, Louisiana in a Shell training facility, and set up an 

Incident Command Post in Houma, Louisiana.

20

 BP had immediately set up a command post in 

Houston, and Coast Guard responders went there to set up a full Incident Command Post as well. 

Responders established an Incident Command Post at Mobile by the end of April as well. 

The response was also supervised at a national level by a National Incident Commander. 

On April 29, 2010, the Coast Guard designated the disaster a “Spill of National Significance”

and Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano announced that Admiral Thad Allen, then 

Commandant of the Coast Guard, would serve as National Incident Commander.21 This disaster 

marked the first time the “Spill of National Significance” designation was used. A spill of 

national significance is defined as “a spill which due to its severity, size, location, actual or 

potential impact on the public health and welfare or the environment, or the necessary response 

effort, is so complex that it requires extraordinary coordination of federal, state, local, and 

responsible party resources to contain and cleanup the discharge.”22 The National Incident 

Command (NIC) can only be established, and the National Incident Commander named, after a 

 

18 40 C.F.R. § 300.120(e).

19 On June 1, Admiral Landry returned to her Eighth District duties to prepare for hurricane season, and Admiral 

James Watson became FOSC. He later transferred the position to Admiral Paul Zukunft. 

20 Captain Paradis became the leader of the incident command post at Houma; he was assisted by Captain Edwin 

Stanton, who would formally take command on May 28. 

21 40 C.F.R. § 300.323; Campbell Robertson, White House Takes a Bigger Role in the Oil Spill Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES

(Apr. 29, 2009). 

22 40 C.F.R. § 300.5.
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

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spill of national significance is declared. The NCP provision creating the position of National 

Incident Commander provides that the Commander “will assume the role of the [Federal OnScene Coordinator] in communicating with affected parties and the public, and coordinating 

federal, state, local, and international resources at the national level.” The NCP is otherwise 

silent on the role of the National Incident Commander, who can serve in the position, or what 

tasks the he or she will handle instead of the Federal On-Scene Coordinator. 

Because of this lack of regulatory guidance, the NIC set up during the Deepwater 

Horizon response was based largely on the National Incident Commander‟s view of what his role 

and the role of his staff should be. The NIC, as envisioned by Admiral Allen, primarily 

functioned as a national coordination and communications center to deal with high-level political 

and media inquiries so that the Unified Area Command and the Incident Command Posts could 

focus on response efforts. The goal was for the NIC not to direct tactics or response operations,

but to deal with political and high-level strategy issues associated with the response. Similarly, 

the goal of the Federal On-Scene Coordinator and the Unified Area Command was not to direct 

all response operations, but rather to coordinate resources, communications, and the relationship 

with the responsible party. Most tactical and operational decisions were intended to be made at 

the Incident Command Post level. 

B. Speed of Establishing Command 

Though some of the command structure was put in place very quickly, in other respects 

the mobilization of resources to combat the spill seemed to lag. For about nine days, Deepwater 

Horizon response efforts continued with the Federal On-Scene Coordinator at the top of the 

command structure. High-level conversations regarding whether a spill of national significance

declaration and a National Incident Commander appointment were necessary occurred in the first 

week of the spill, but the declaration was only made on April 29, 2010.

23

For the first ten days of the spill, it appears that a sense of over-optimism affected 

responders.24 Responders almost uniformly noted that, while they understood that they were 

facing a major spill, they believed that BP would get the well under control. At least one highlevel Coast Guard official thought that the oil would not come ashore and hesitated to open 

additional command posts.25 Responders viewed the event as an “incident” rather than a 

“campaign,” which is what it became.26 While it is not clear that this misplaced optimism 

affected any individual response effort, it may have affected the scale and speed with which 

national resources were brought to bear. In hindsight, some Coast Guard responders thought that 

their initial approach was too slow and unfocused.

27

It is impossible to separate an evaluation of the speed with which the response progressed 

in its early days from the misunderstanding of the actual flow of the well. Responders insist that 

they were responding to a worst-case discharge and would have not acted differently had they 

 

23 Interview with Coast Guard official.

24 Interviews with Coast Guard officials.

25 Interview with Coast Guard official.

26 Interviews with Coast Guard officials.

27 Interviews with Coast Guard officials.
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

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known the true flow rate earlier on.28 They uniformly reported that long-held Coast Guard

policy was to assume the worst-case discharge. They said they did not believe the flow-rate 

estimates they were hearing and assumed the worst. However, it is possible that a better 

understanding of the quantity of oil may have resulted in designating a National Incident 

Commander faster, beginning to move personnel and resources faster, and establishing more and 

better communications with affected stakeholders earlier on. The early estimate that the riser 

was leaking 1,000 barrels per day lasted until April 28, 2010, when Admiral Landry, the Federal 

On-Scene Coordinator, announced an estimated flow rate of 5,000 barrels per day.29 It was only 

after this five-fold escalation in the flow-rate estimate that the NIC structure was added to the 

spill response framework.

Though the response may have been slow to escalate in the first ten days, by at least midMay, 2010, the Coast Guard was fighting a war against the oil. They built out the organizational

structure for the response, and they moved resources into the area from all over the country.30 

To accomplish these tasks they needed more personnel. The spill happened at precisely the 

worst time for the Coast Guard, at the beginning of transfer season, when members are 

reassigned to new posts.31 People were moving around and required new training. Coast Guard 

officials wanted to call up reservists and National Guard members to supplement their active 

duty ranks. This was not without difficulty. Reservists can only be called up for a certain period 

of time, and officials had concerns that they would quickly deplete the reserve numbers, 

especially if the spill lasted into the fall. High-level Coast Guard officials were also unsure of 

their authority to call on the National Guard, which required coordination with the states.

32

 This 

maneuvering took time. 

The majority of Coast Guard personnel interviewed insisted that they had thrown 

everything they had at the spill. By around the end of May, it seems that most responders 

believed they had the equipment they needed—they had skimmers, for example, that were 

adequate for the operating environment of the Gulf of Mexico, and they had enough of them. 

The American public, however, believed that the government could be doing more. When

President Obama first visited the Gulf on May 3, 2010, the president of St. Bernard Parish in 

Louisiana was already suggesting that the government was not moving quickly enough.33 A Pew 

research poll conducted from May 6 to 9, 2010, found that only 38% of Americans approved of 

 

28 These statements relate only to response and clean-up efforts, not efforts to stop or contain the flow of oil at the 

wellhead. Whether a lack of accurate information regarding flow rate impacted containment efforts is explored 

more fully in other work by the Commission and its staff.

29 Press conference, Admiral May Landry, United States Coast Guard, Federal On-Scene Coordinator, in New 

Orleans, LA (Apr. 28, 2010), http://cgvi.uscg.mil/media/main.php?g2_itemId=843309. The source of this estimate 

is discussed more fully in other work by the Commission and its staff.

30 Coast Guard documents. 

31 Interviews with Coast Guard officials.

32 Interviews with Coast Guard officials. The National Guard in a state can be mobilized by the governor when a 

state of emergency is declared, and the Secretary of Defense can call on the National Guard during war or a during 

declared national emergency. National Guard members cannot be individually involuntarily recalled. United States 

Code Title 32 describes state use of the National Guard in peacetime, while Title 10 establishes the federal 

government‟s authority to call on the National Guard. 32 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.; 10 U.S.C. § 12301. There was some 

debate as to the applicable statutory authority. 

33 Robin Bravender, Gulf Coast Residents Send SOS to Obama, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2010). 
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

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the President‟s handling of the spill, compared to 36% who disapproved.

34

 By May 27, 2010, 

polls showed that 60% of adults thought that the government was doing a poor job of responding 

to the spill.35

The government did not take any major steps to respond to this perception until the end 

of May, when President Obama announced that he would triple the federal manpower and 

resources responding to the spill.36 Coast Guard responders believed they were already throwing 

every resource they had at fighting the spill, but they dutifully tripled personnel and tracked their 

progress, at least for the state of Louisiana, in a regular report titled “Status on Tripling.”37 

Responders noted that “tripling” taxed the Coast Guard‟s ability to respond and to conduct its 

other missions and may not have been the most effective use of a thin-spread force in a lengthy 

campaign.38 Tripling, or at least the arguable overreaction to the public perception of a slow 

response, resulted in resources being thrown at the spill in general rather than being targeted in 

an efficient way. For example, NIC staff believed they needed to buy every skimmer they could 

find, even though they were hearing that responders on the ground had enough skimmers.39 It 

was also around this time that responders began deploying boom everywhere they could, even 

though they believed that some areas were not likely to encounter oil and boom could be more 

efficiently directed elsewhere (discussed in greater depth in “The Boom Wars” section below). 

It is not clear whether all resources in all states were actually tripled or merely increased. At the 

very least, tracking the “status on tripling” was probably not the most important task for frontline responders to be undertaking. 

Adding personnel also meant using resources that the Coast Guard believed they needed 

to keep elsewhere or save for a potentially long campaign. This particularly applied to reservists. 

Coast Guard reservists can be recalled for only 60 days of any four-month period and 120 total 

days of every two years.

40

 Coast Guard officials were concerned that they would deplete 

available reserves for the next two years.41 In July 2010, before the well was capped, NIC staff 

began to approach other agencies to determine if they could send additional responders. Some 

agencies, such as EPA and NOAA, were already moving people from their home missions and 

sending them to the Gulf. Other agencies, such as the Department of Defense, did not have a 

strong presence and were willing to send some people to assist. The well was capped and the 

point became moot before the federal government had to implement this strategy. 

 

34 SURVEY REPORT, THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, OIL SPILL SEEN AS ECOLOGICAL 

DISASTER; GOVERNMENT, BP RESPONSES FAULTED (May 1, 2010), http://people-press.org/report/612/oil-spill. 

35 Mimi Hall, et al., Is oil spill becoming Obama‟s Katrina?, USA TODAY (May 27, 2010), 

http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-05-27-Spill-poll_N.htm (reporting results of USA Today/Gallup 

poll). 

36 See, e.g., Obama Pledges to Triple Oil Response Manpower in Gulf, BBC NEWS (May 28, 2010), 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10179369; Paul Rioux, President Barack Obama Promises No Retreat from Gulf of 

Mexico Oil Spill Response, TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 28, 2010). 

37 Interviews with Coast Guard officials; Coast Guard documents.

38 Interviews with Coast Guard officials.

39 Interviews with Coast Guard officials.

40 14 U.S.C. § 712(a).

41 Interviews with Coast Guard officials.
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

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C. Decision-Making Outside the Command Structure

As discussed above, the Deepwater Horizon spill was the first time a spill of national 

significance was declared and a National Incident Commander was named. The spill was also 

unprecedented in terms of size and the technology required to address it. As a result of these 

factors, and of the intense political interest in the spill response, decision-making structures 

outside the unified command, and thus outside the regulatory framework of the NCP, evolved.

The NCP envisions the Coast Guard as the lead agency for oil spill response in the 

coastal zone, anticipating that it will provide the Federal On-Scene Coordinator and a large 

percentage of the responders. Other agency partners, however, have roles under the NCP as 

well. The National Response Team and the Regional Response Team are established interagency and inter-jurisdictional partnerships that can be convened in an emergency to make 

decisions and to utilize each member agency‟s expertise to provide support to the Federal OnScene Coordinator. The Regional Response Team may be activated when a spill exceeds the 

response capability of the Federal On-Scene Coordinator, transects state boundaries, poses a 

substantial threat to public health, or involves a worst-case discharge. Similarly, the National 

Response Team may be activated when a spill exceeds the response capability of the region in 

which it occurs, transects regional boundaries, or involves a substantial threat to public health.42

During the Deepwater Horizon response, these inter-agency groups were activated but 

later marginalized when issues were taken out of their hands and decided by agency heads rather 

than through the established decision-making structure. When the first National Response Team

conference call was held, instead of the designated team members, the principals of the agencies 

were on the line, and Secretary Napolitano chaired the call. The principals or their deputies 

remained very involved in the response and took over addressing key issues. While this was 

valuable in showing how seriously the government was taking the spill and the response, it also 

injected political involvement at the highest levels. Such involvement may have increased 

accountability, and helped to make controversial decision-making more transparent, but it also 

made the decisions more subject to criticism and delay on political grounds.

For example, the NCP provides that the Regional Response Team shall make decisions 

on the use of dispersants. During the earliest days of the response, acting Federal On-Scene 

Coordinator Captain Paradis directed the application of surface dispersants, as pre-approved in 

the Area Contingency Plan.43 Sub-sea application was a novel use, and Coast Guard officials 

sought permission from the Regional Response Team, which elected to allow tests of the 

technique.44 As the issue of dispersant application became more and more prominent in the 

media, the decisions to apply both surface and sub-sea dispersants were taken out of hands of the 

Federal On-Scene Coordinator and the Regional Response Team and given to EPA 

Administrator Lisa Jackson.45 Administrator Jackson elected to bypass the Regional Response 

Team structure and instead issue decisions regarding dispersant policy through directives, which 

Coast Guard representatives co-signed.46 

 

42 40 C.F.R. § 300.110.

43 Interviews with Coast Guard officials.

44 Interview with Coast Guard official.

45 The use of dispersants is explored more fully in other work by the Commission and Commission staff.

46 Interviews with Coast Guard officials.
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

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As explained by a senior official, the National Response Team and the Regional 

Response Team became “report-to” bodies rather than “decision-making” bodies.47 This 

circumvention of the NCP structure made it unclear to the public and to responders who actually 

had authority over decisions on important issues such as dispersants. Responders, who often 

viewed surface dispersants as a powerful response tool that they needed to deploy to protect the 

coastline, and who understood the analysis that went into the decisions during the planning 

process to pre-approve use of surface dispersants, wondered why that advance work was 

suddenly being supplanted by a process led by political appointees who had not been involved in 

prior planning efforts.

On the one hand, it speaks well of the command structure and the NCP that the structure 

could be flexible enough to incorporate new interagency partnerships and new decision-making 

structures. On the other hand, the seeming rejection of the interagency groups specifically 

established by the NCP speaks to a larger issue of the failure of the advance planning required to 

adequately prepare responders for a spill of this magnitude. The National Response Team and 

the Regional Response Teams are institutional structures with membership and responsibilities

designated before a spill occurs. They are organizations that can plan, train, and generally be 

ready to respond in an emergency. It is not clear if the choices to route decision-making around 

those bodies were based on specific demands from politicians or high-level appointees, or simply 

on the scale and exigencies of the situation. Much of the unified command structure is designed 

to push issues down to the most local level at which they can be addressed. Having strong 

agency head participation tended to elevate decisions that might have otherwise been addressed 

closer to the source of the question.

The scientific advisor agencies—EPA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency

(NOAA), and the United States Geological Survey—seem to have possessed the expertise most 

implicated by the spill and were therefore also the agencies most involved in ad hoc decisionmaking taking place outside the command structure. In addition to the issue of dispersants, this 

ad hoc decision-making occurred with regard to fishery closures and flow rate estimates. 

NOAA, the United States Department of Agriculture, and the NIC-created Interagency Solutions 

Group were in control of fishery closures. The Flow Rate Technical Group, also a part of the 

Interagency Solutions Group, and the federal scientific team led by Secretary of Energy Steven 

Chu spoke for the government on flow rate. These issues, and the decision-making structures 

that were created to address them, are discussed more fully in other work by the Commission and 

its staff.

In contrast with the National Response Team and the Regional Response Team, the 

Department of Energy took on a large role during the spill. The NCP does not create any sort of 

role for the Department of Energy in an oil spill response, and yet the Department team was 

integral in the steps to contain the well, eventually directing and exercising what amounted to 

veto power over BP‟s actions with regard to source control. Because the Department of Energy 

team was focused on containment rather than response, the role of the Department is explored 

more fully in other work by the Commission and its staff.

 

47 Interview with Coast Guard official.
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

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Problems with setting up the command structure quickly enough, and with making lines 

of authority clear, arguably contributed to problems explored in the next two sections: public 

perceptions that BP was in charge and that state and local concerns were being ignored.

Suggestions for the Commission’s consideration:

The response structure was established more slowly than it should have been, in 

part because of a perception that the well would be quickly controlled and 

because the geographic scope, scale, and duration of the spill were unprecedented

for responders.

The National Response Team and the Regional Response Teams did not play the 

role envisioned by the NCP, with substitute, ad hoc structures being created in 

their place. The Commission may wish to recommend changes to the mission or 

composition of the National Response Team and the Regional Response Teams to 

make them more useful in the future, particularly in creating a framework to 

provide interagency scientific expertise. 

The Commission may wish to recommend the addition of distinct plans and 

procedures to the NCP to better scale the response to a Spill of National 

Significance and to account for the more prominent role that high-level federal 

and state officials will likely play in the response to such a spill.

III. The Role of BP

Very early in the response, the media and the public began to question whether the 

federal government or BP was truly directing the response. While all on-scene government 

officials with whom we have spoken have asserted that the federal government was fully in 

charge of the response from the outset, the government struggled to control messaging regarding 

who was directing containment and response efforts.

A. The Role of the Responsible Party under the Oil Pollution Act

For oil spills from offshore rigs, the NCP defines the “lessee or permittee of the area in 

which the facility is located” as the “responsible party.” Under the Oil Pollution Act framework, 

a responsible party will be liable for damages resulting from the oil spill and costs incurred by 

the government in responding to the spill.48 

The NCP does not sort out these liability issues—it is a structure for response, not a 

vehicle for assigning blame. However, the NCP does direct that the responsible party play a role 

in the response. One of the principles of the unified command structure the NCP establishes is 

that the responsible party must be included in order to “achieve an effective and efficient 

response.”49 

The NCP provides that “cleanup responsibility for an oil discharge immediately falls on 

the responsible party,” and notes that “in a large percentage of oil discharges, the responsible 

party shall conduct the cleanup.”50 Though the NCP directs the Federal On-Scene Coordinator 

 

48 OPA 90 § 1002(b)(2); 33 U.S.C. § 2702.

49 40 C.F.R. § 300.105.

50 40 C.F.R. Part 300, Appendix E § 2.3(b).
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

- 11 -

to “monitor[] or direct[] all federal, state, local, and private removal actions,” the Federal OnScene Coordinator may “allow the responsible party to voluntarily and promptly perform 

removal actions” if the [Federal On-Scene Coordinator] determines that having the responsible 

party perform such actions will “ensure an effective and immediate removal of the discharge.” 

In this situation, the Federal On-Scene Coordinator supervises the responsible party‟s actions. 

The NCP expresses a preference for setting up the response in this manner—“[w]here 

practicable, continuing efforts should be made to encourage response by responsible parties.”51 

In a spill that “results in a substantial threat to the public health or welfare of the United States . . 

. the [Federal On-Scene Coordinator] must direct all response efforts.”52

There are policy choices behind this preference. First, the responsible party may be in 

the best position to respond because of its knowledge or technical expertise related to the 

processes involved in its own facility. Second, the responsible party bears the ultimate costs of 

removal under the Oil Pollution Act.

53

 Rather than expending further resources on collecting 

response costs in a later civil action, it is more efficient to let the responsible party bear those 

costs up front.

The interests of the responsible party and the public are generally aligned with respect to

stopping an ongoing spill. Under the Clean Water Act, the responsible party can be liable for a 

civil penalty determined by the amount of oil that was spilled,54 so it shares the public‟s interest 

in cutting off the oil flow as quickly as possible. On other issues, the incentives of the public and 

the responsible party may diverge. For instance, the responsible party may, at least in theory,

have an interest in using dispersants even if they cause ecological harm. Environmental damage 

caused by low concentrations of widely dispersed oil may be harder to document than 

concentrated surface harm in coastal areas. Moreover, public opinion may be more likely to be

influenced by easily visible harm to wetlands, beaches, birds, and terrestrial animals. Hence, the 

responsible party may have an incentive to favor greater use of dispersants than is in the public 

interest. Similarly, the public may have an interest in knowing the rate of flow from the well, 

while the responsible party may benefit from obfuscating or underestimating the rate of flow

because high flow means higher liability.

55

 Moreover, a responsible party has a fiduciary duty to 

its shareholders to minimize costs incurred. This fiduciary duty can be at odds with the public‟s 

interest in maximizing cleanup efforts. 

The Oil Pollution Act does not address the responsible party‟s ability to “conduct” the 

cleanup by issue, though it does mandate stronger authority for the government in a catastrophic 

spill, where the Federal On-Scene Coordinator “directs” the response. Similarly, although the 

Oil Pollution Act requires that operators name a “qualified individual” who has full authority to 

implement removal actions,” the Act is silent about circumstances where that individual‟s 

responsibility for cleanup conflicts with her duties to shareholders as a corporate officer.

56

 One 

possibility that has been suggested is to provide for appointment of a “qualified individual” 

 

51 40 F.C.R. § 300.305.

52 Id.

53 33 U.S.C. § 2702.

54 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7).

55 See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(A), (D) (establishing civil liability for spills and increasing the penalty in cases of 

gross negligence or willful misconduct); see also 40 C.F.R. § 19.4.

56 See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(ii).
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

- 12 -

under the Oil Pollution Act that is an independent third party, rather than a corporate officer, 

with authority to deploy the responsible party‟s resources. Such an arrangement might be akin to 

the compensation scheme set up by BP in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon spill, with 

corporate funds disbursed by an independent administrator.

B. BP’s Control in the Command Structure

During the Deepwater Horizon response, BP had decision-makers in multiple locations 

within the command structure. The Incident Command Post at Houston was set up in BP 

headquarters. In the Unified Area Command, most Coast Guard responder positions had a BP 

counterpart, and Coast Guard members and BP employees worked side by side. BP executive 

Doug Suttles was at Unified Area Command. Federal On-Scene Coordinator Watson viewed 

Suttles as his counterpart and the set-up as similar to that of other spill responses he had handled 

in the past. The organizational charts from the Unified Area Command and the Incident 

Command Posts show BP employees scattered through the command structure, in roles ranging 

from waste management to environmental assessment. In some command chains, a BP 

employee was at the top and a Coast Guard member would report up to the BP employee.57

Most critically, BP controlled access to the wellhead at all times from Houston. BP had 

control of the remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) operating 5,000 feet below the surface of the 

water at the riser pipe and wellhead, as well as control of all vessel traffic in the area above. BP 

used ROVs to coordinate nearly every element of the containment response, including gathering 

data, carrying out mechanical containment procedures, and applying subsea dispersants.

58

In its Lessons Learned report, BP details the complexity of coordinating its response to 

the spill.59 BP‟s Simultaneous Operations unit managed ships moving in and out of the area. 

There may have been good reasons for BP‟s control of this issue. Too much traffic over the 

wellhead was dangerous, particularly when large, unproven containment devices such as the 

cofferdam were being tested.60 Also, some of the operations that the containment ships carried 

out required extreme precision—movement by even a few feet could lead to failure of the 

operation.

BP‟s control over the wellhead region, however, also limited scientists‟ access. As 

government and independent scientists began to become involved with determining the flow rate 

of the well and with developing containment solutions, some grew frustrated with what they 

perceived as BP‟s total control over access to the source, and ultimately information about the 

leaking well.61 Scientists with whom Commission staff have spoken reported that they needed 

some type of access to the source—either to take pictures with an ROV, or to acquire samples, or 

to obtain some other source data for determining flow rate. Given that its potential liability 

 

57 Coast Guard documents. 

58 BP, DEEPWATER HORIZON CONTAINMENT AND RESPONSE: HARNESSING CAPABILITIES AND LESSONS LEARNED

15-16 (Sept. 1, 2010) [hereinafter LESSONS LEARNED].

59 LESSONS LEARNED.

60 See Clifford Krauss et al., Acrimony Behind the Scenes of Gulf Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2010).

61 Interview with non-governmental officials; Interview with government official (explaining that government 

scientists were initially able to collect flow-rate information only when doing so did not interfere with other sourcecontrol operations).
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

- 13 -

under the Clean Water Act depended directly on the flow rate, BP had real incentives to maintain 

exclusive control over the ability to estimate that rate. 62

C. Public Perception of Control

At the beginning of the spill, BP and the government would hold joint press conferences. 

This was consistent with the Coast Guard view—shaped by its experience implementing the 

NCP under a unified command system—of the responsible party as a co-combatant in the fight 

against the oil. This was not a view shared by either large segments of the public or by highranking officials in other government agencies, who viewed the relationship as a far more 

adversarial one. On April 29, 2010, at a press conference involving senior Administration 

officials such as Carol Browner, Assistant to the President for Energy and Climate Change;

Administrator Jackson; Deputy Secretary Hayes, and Secretary Napolitano, Coast Guard Rear

Admiral Sally Brice O‟Hara referred to BP as “our partner,” prompting Secretary Napolitano to 

quickly correct the record, saying, “They are not our partner!”63 Secretary of the Interior Ken 

Salazar said the government would keep its “boot on the neck” of BP.

64

 These statements 

seemed to have a two-fold purpose—to provide reassurance that BP would be held accountable 

and to show that government was in control of BP and the situation. With much of the country 

believing that the government had lost control and was managing the response badly, the joint 

press conferences with BP stopped, and Admiral Allen instead began holding a solo daily press 

briefing.

65

When Rear Admiral James Watson took over as Federal On-Scene Coordinator on June 

1, 2010, at around the time of the “tripling” announcement, he contributed to the move to a 

stronger and more visible federal presence. On June 8, 2010, Admiral Watson directed BP to 

“establish system(s) capable of safely collecting the oil and gas flowing” from the well and to 

provide a plan for doing so in 72 hours.66 Though this directive related to source control, the 

intent was to increase the participation and visibility of the government in the response.67 

Another factor that may have affected the public perception of control was the number of 

front-line responders from the federal government versus the number of front-line responders 

either employed directly by BP or employed through a BP subcontractor or oil spill response 

operator. The responders that local citizens saw operating skimming vessels, picking up tarballs, 

or deploying boom were private hired workers and not Coast Guard or other government 

 

62 As originally drafted, this paper contained a preliminary discussion of BP‟s role in the effort to contain the well. 

The discussion is omitted here because BP‟s role in containment is discussed fully in other work by the Commission 

and its staff.

63 Tim Dickinson, The Spill, the Scandal, and the President, ROLLING STONE (June 24, 2010). 

64 See, e.g., Matthew Bigg, U.S. keeps “boot on neck” of BP over spill, REUTERS (May 24, 2010), 

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6430AR20100524; Frank James, BP Will Feel Either „Boot on Throat‟ or 

„Feet to Fire‟, NPR THE TWO-WAY NEWS BLOG (May 2, 1010), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2010/05/bp_will_feel_either_boot_on_th.html. 

65 Mike Allen, Gulf commander to begin solo briefings, POLITICO (May 31, 2010), 

http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0510/37965.html. 

66 Letter from Admiral James A. Watson, Federal On-Scene Coordinator, United States Coast Guard, to Doug 

Suttles, Chief Operating Officer, Exploration & Production, BP America Inc. (June 8, 2010), available at

http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/imported_pdfs/posted/2931/FOSC_letter_to_BP_2008_June_Final.

621367.pdf.

67 Interview with Coast Guard official.
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

- 14 -

personnel.68 BP was providing the money and a large part of the equipment, and BP was 

providing the contractors and response personnel out on the beaches. 

D. Funding Projects Outside the Unified Command 

BP may have heightened the perception that it was running the show by distributing 

money for response costs directly to state and local governments. There is a procedure in the 

NCP by which state governments can seek up to $250,000 from the Oil Spill Liability Trust 

Fund for removal costs.69 The Federal On-Scene Coordinator must approve and then manage the 

request, which must comply with the NCP.

70

 

Funds started flowing from BP to states and communities early in the response. On May 

5, 2010, BP gave $25 million each to Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana to 

“accelerate the implementation of Area Contingency Plans.”71 Two weeks later, BP gave 

Louisiana another $25 million and the other three states $15 million each to promote tourism. 

BP also gave smaller sums of around $500,000 to $1 million directly to Louisiana parishes.72

These sums, provided completely outside of the unified command structure and without any 

requirement that the monies be used in a manner consistent with the NCP, gave states and 

communities reason to believe that BP controlled the means and the methods of the response. 

This money may also have had a detrimental effect on the overall response efforts. For example, 

some of the money was spent by states and parishes to purchase boom directly, limiting the 

overall supply of boom available to the unified command and making it difficult for the unified 

command to make sure that the boom got to locations where it would be most helpful and not 

cause any additional environmental damage.73

E. Appropriate Role of a Responsible Party

It is politically problematic for the government to work with the party responsible for the 

disaster, because it seems inappropriate for the party who created the problem to have a large 

role in deciding how to fix it. However, at the responder level, government and the responsible 

party must work together to have the means to stop the spill. Responders accept this 

fundamental tension between political preferences and practical realities; here, the public did not. 

Admiral Allen referred to the public‟s resistance to BP playing a role in the response as the 

social or political nullification of the NCP.74 The Commission may wish to consider making 

 

68 Private oil spill response operators turned out in force for skimming and shoreline cleanup efforts. Jia Lynn Yang, 

Aftermath spawning profits for many contractors, WASH. POST (June 12, 2010). 

69 40 C.F.R. Part 133.

70 40 C.F.R. §§ 133.13, 133.15.

71 Press Release, BP, BP Announces Tourism Grants to Four Gulf States (May 17, 2010), available at

http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7062187. 

72 Doug Suttles, statement at Commission hearing, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 27, 2010).

73 This problem is one the Joint Industry Task Force observed in its evaluation of the spill response. The Task Force 

recommended that government “establish clear-well understood protocols to discourage shoreline protection and 

cleanup response operations outside scope of [unified command] planning, review, and direction.” JOINT INDUSTRY 

OIL SPILL PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE TASK FORCE, DRAFT INDUSTRY RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE OIL 

SPILL PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE viii (Sept. 3, 2010). 

74 Interview by Melissa Block, NPR with Adm. Thad Allen, (Aug. 5, 2010), 

http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=129005047; see also Joel Achenbach, With BP‟s 

Know-How and U.S. Authority, the Macondo Well was Plugged, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2010).
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

- 15 -

recommendations regarding the proper role of the responsible party and the proper way to 

communicate that role in the context of a major response effort. 

Specifically, three issues deserve mention. First, the oil and gas industry has significant 

expertise that the federal government lacks, so the responsible party can and likely must play a 

substantial role in containment and response efforts. Second, the government may need to 

consider the extent to which the interests of the public and the interest of the responsible party in 

minimizing liability diverge with respect to particular issues, and to consider more detailed 

oversight on issues where divergence is more likely. For example, because the volume of oil 

released directly affects BP‟s liability under the Clean Water Act, the government may have had 

particular reason to have its own or independent scientists determine the flow rate, rather than 

relying on estimates created by scientists employed by the responsible party. Third and finally, 

the government‟s position needs to be explained to the public: the fact that a responsible party 

continues to assist with containment and cleanup does not mean that the government will not 

also hold it responsible via mechanisms such as the Clean Water Act. Continuing to work 

closely with the responsible party while clarifying the nature and extent of government oversight

would likely require significant effort by all governmental entities involved, but it is crucial to 

maintaining public confidence in the containment and response efforts.

Suggestions for the Commission’s consideration:

Consider distinctions in the NCP framework between issues where the responsible 

party may have greater operational expertise, such as source control, and issues 

with respect to which the government possesses equivalent or superior operational 

expertise, such as other response techniques. 

Consider clarifying the extent and nature of government oversight with respect to 

different classes of issues, including issues where the responsible party‟s interests 

in minimizing liability and the interests of the public may be more likely to 

diverge.

Clarify the role of the responsible party both for the public and for other agencies 

when operating within the NCP structure.

Consider changing the NCP to provide for greater government direction and 

oversight during the response to a Spill of National Significance.

IV. The Role of State and Local Governments

Significant differences of opinion existed between the affected states and the federal 

responders regarding each other‟s role and appropriate response tactics. Federal responders were 

employing the NCP, a response structure with which state and local elected officials were 

unfamiliar. That unfamiliarity led to conflicts that hampered the response. The Commission 

may want to consider recommendations that increase awareness of the NCP on the part of state

governments and that alter spill response contingency planning to expand the role of existing 

state and local emergency response structures. 

A. The Stafford Act

State and local elected officials, and perhaps particularly those in the hurricane-stricken 

Gulf states, are familiar with the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

- 16 -

Act.

75

 The Stafford Act describes how the federal government may provide aid to an 

overwhelmed state during an emergency.

76

 The organizing principle of the Act is the funding 

and coordinating, not directing or controlling, role of the federal government.

When a governor determines that local and state resources are insufficient to handle an

emergency response, the governor may ask the President to contribute federal aid pursuant to the 

Stafford Act by declaring an emergency or major disaster.77 When requesting such a declaration 

a governor must describe what the state will do to implement its emergency response plan and 

detail the type and extent of federal assistance needed. The Act broadly defines an emergency as 

any instance where federal assistance is needed to supplement state efforts to avert a catastrophe, 

or to save lives and protect property, health, and safety. Specific forms of aid the government 

may provide during an emergency are: to direct federal agencies to use their resources to 

support state and local efforts;78 to coordinate all disaster relief assistance provided by federal 

agencies, private organizations, and state and local governments;79 and to assist state and local 

governments in the distribution of medicine, food, and other consumable supplies.80 The 

emphasized terms indicate that Congress intended a supportive, not a preeminent role for the 

federal responders.

81

 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers the 

bulk of the aid provided under the Stafford Act.

82

 The Administrator of FEMA appoints a 

federal coordinating officer tasked with determining the types of relief most needed, establishing

field offices, coordinating the administration of relief among organizations that agree to operate 

under his direction, and taking any other action necessary to assist citizens and officials.83 For 

example, the Stafford Act was invoked during Hurricane Katrina to provide aid to the same 

states affected by the Deepwater Horizon spill. Governors of the Gulf States requested and 

received declarations of emergency and major disaster. Admiral Allen was named the Principal 

Federal Officer in that situation, and his role was to provide federal resources and coordinate 

state responders, not to actually direct the response.84 

 

75 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206; 44 C.F.R. §§ 206.1-206.440.

76 See Ross C. Paolino, Is it Safe to Chevron “Two-Step” in a Hurricane? A Critical Examination of how Expanding 

the Government's Role in Disaster Relief Will Only Exacerbate the Damage, 76 GEO WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1394 

(2008).

77 See 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (major disaster); § 5191 (emergency).

78 See id. § 5192(a)(1).

79 See id. § 5192(a)(2).

80 See id. § 5192(a)(7).

81 See id. § 5192(a)(2) provides that the President may “coordinate all disaster relief assistance (including voluntary 

assistance) provided by Federal agencies, private organizations, and State and local governments” (emphasis 

added). This could be read as granting the President the authority to coordinate the entire response. In light of the 

clearly supportive role for federal responders evinced throughout the Act, this provision probably grants authority to 

coordinate assistance from other state governments.

82 See 44 C.F.R. § 206.1; see also id. § 206.62 (delegating emergency response authority to the Administrator of 

FEMA). The Administrator of FEMA serves as the chairperson of the interagency task force created by the 

president to coordinating the implementation of pre-disaster hazard mitigation programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 5134

(2006).

83 See 42 U.S.C. § 5143; 44 C.F.R. § 206.41. The federal coordinating officer also leads the emergency support and 

response teams. See 42 U.S.C. § 5144.

84 The use of the Stafford Act during Hurricane Katrina response and the role of the federal government within the 

response was not without problems. See SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR 

AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, 109TH CONG., A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT 

BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, U.S.
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

- 17 -

B. Oil Spill Response Under the NCP

The NCP provides a fundamentally different role for the federal government. Instead of 

a state-run response supplemented with federal resources and financing, the NCP demands that 

the federal government direct the response through a Federal On-Scene Coordinator with the 

participation of the state through the Unified Command structure. The state then provides a State 

On-Scene Coordinator to represent the state at the Unified Command, and also provides 

personnel to implement the response decisions reached by the Federal On-Scene Coordinator or 

the unified command. Because states and local governments cannot spend funds from the Oil 

Spill Liability Trust Fund without an authorization agreement from the Federal On-Scene 

Coordinator, they are limited in their ability to respond as they may like to the threat of 

encroaching oil. 

State and local elected officials were unfamiliar with this structure and were 

uncomfortable with a federally directed response. Whether the cause was political demands, 

concern that the federal government was ineffective, or genuine confusion about the applicable 

legal framework, state and local elected officials closest to the affected areas complained that 

they were shut out from decision-making, as described in the next section on the boom conflict. 

Meanwhile, federal responders reported their feeling that the message they were hearing from the 

states was “give us the money and go away.”85 

This unfamiliarity and discomfort with the federal response manifested itself in 

competing state structures, which undercut the efficiency of response efforts. This was 

particularly true in Louisiana. Governor Jindal‟s advisors reportedly spent days determining 

whether the Stafford Act or the NCP applied.86 Louisiana declared a State of Emergency on 

April 29, 2010, authorizing the director of the Governor‟s Office of Homeland Security and 

Emergency Preparedness to undertake any legal activities deemed necessary to respond.87 

Roland Guidry, the Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinator and the state‟s pre-designated State OnScene Coordinator, had reported to the Unified Command when summoned at the beginning of 

the spill. He and other experienced career oil spill responders were marginalized, however, and 

he eventually left Unified Area Command. Governor Jindal himself acted as the State On-Scene 

Coordinator.

88

 No one else had the authority to speak for the state, so all decisions had to flow 

through the Governor‟s office, which slowed decision-making and caused problems in the 

response efforts. Louisiana was not the only state where the governor stepped in and removed 

the designated State On-Scene Coordinator. However, based on interviews with Coast Guard 

and state personnel, the conflicts between federal responders and state government appear to 

have been most severe in Louisiana.

 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 146 (Comm. Rep. 2006) available at http://katrina.house.gov/. Some critics felt that 

the federalism concerns embodied in the Stafford Act system contributed to the slow response. See Stephen M. 

Griffin, Stop Federalism Before it Kills Again: Reflections on Hurricane Katrina, 21 ST. JOHN‟S J. LEGAL COMMENT

527, 531-32 (2007).

85 Interviews with Coast Guard officials.

86 Interview with government official.

87 Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Jindal Issues State Declaration of Emergency for Oil Leak (Apr. 

29, 2010), available at 

http://www.gov.state.la.us/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&catID=2&articleID=2137&navID=3.

88 Interview with government official.
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

- 18 -

Federal responders improved their relationship with state and local officials as the 

response progressed. Senior Coast Guard officials were assigned to parishes in Louisiana and 

coastal counties in the other affected states to serve as liaisons.89 Had this system been in place 

earlier, the relationship between the federal responders and local leaders may have been stronger 

and more productive in the early days of the spill response.

C. The Boom Wars

Boom became one of the most visible manifestations of state and local dissatisfaction 

with federal response efforts. Boom is a physical barrier between oil and water or shoreline. 

Ocean boom is placed in the water to try to keep oil in a contained area where it can then be 

skimmed or burned. Absorbent boom is placed along beaches or in marshes to absorb oil before 

it can enter and damage sensitive shoreline environments. Boom is a measurable, physical object 

that visibly stops oil from moving into areas to be protected. In this way it is different from 

source control efforts or skimming far out at sea—efforts that cannot be seen by residents in 

towns waiting for oil to hit.

In part for this reason, boom became a symbol of how responsive the government was to 

local communities.90 Each state wanted the entire shoreline boomed, and each state wanted as 

much or more boom than the next state. This translated down to the parish and town levels as 

well. Federal responders thought that local people complaining about the lack of boom were 

missing the big picture; local people thought that federal responders were not paying attention to 

local needs.91 As a result, boom was eventually distributed according to political imperatives, 

not operational ones, in part because of distrust from state and local officials as to whether the 

federal government was adequately considering and addressing their needs during the response. 

Responders were frustrated with the time they spent laying what was, in their view,

unnecessary boom.92 The Area Contingency Plan does not lay out a specific booming map, as 

the marshy coastal ecosystem frequently changes and any boom plan would be quickly out of 

date. Responders wanted to be able to direct the boom where they thought it most efficient and 

felt hampered by pressure to place boom everywhere. When the oiling risk was highest in 

Louisiana, the Coast Guard directed boom to Louisiana. They then heard complaints from the 

other states: Alabama Governor Bob Riley contended that the decision to move boom from the 

Alabama coast to the Louisiana cost left his shoreline in danger of oiling, and Mississippi and 

Alabama felt that they were being ignored as they had been during the Hurricane Katrina 

response.93

Governor Jindal in Louisiana said at a press conference in mid-May 2010 that the 

supplies, including containment boom, provided by the Coast Guard and BP were inadequate. 

 

89 Interview with Coast Guard official; Coast Guard documents.

90 Interviews with Coast Guard officials.

91 Interviews with Coast Guard officials.

92 One responder deemed this activity laying “political boom.” Interview with Coast Guard official.

93 Holbrook Mohr, Justin Pritchard, Tamara Lush, BP‟s gulf oil spill response plan lists the walrus as a local 

species. Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal is furious., CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (June 9, 2010); Interview with 

Coast Guard official.
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

- 19 -

At the same time, local officials held up pictures of oil-coated birds.94 Governor Jindal said that 

he had requested 5 million feet of hard boom but had received only 786,185 feet, also 

referencing 143,000 feet of boom he said sat idle in staging areas.95 Florida Department of 

Environmental Protection Secretary Mike Sole told reporters, “A lot of the decisions about 

Florida are being made in Mobile,” by Admiral Landry and the Coast Guard-led command. “I 

told [Admiral Landry], „Florida is important. We have 770 miles of shoreline to protect. I‟m 

concerned that we‟re not getting enough focus on Florida.‟”96

Local officials expressed similar views. Billy Nungesser, President of Plaquemines 

Parish, was a vocal critic of the response. President Nungesser deplored the lack of available 

boom, wanting enough material to create a second line of defense along the coast.

97

 From the 

early days of the spill, he sought funds to enlist local fisherman to deploy boom and complained 

of the minimal boom that was available for use.98

The NIC was not deaf to these concerns. Directions went out to “keep the parishes 

happy,” which resulted in operational decisions that may have been politically motivated.99 

Boom was placed everywhere, including in passes where swift tidal currents rendered it 

ineffective, and in places where it was unlikely to encounter oil.

In addition to worries about unnecessary boom, responders had concerns about 

environmentally damaging boom. Boom is not a perfect solution. For example, boom can harm 

environmentally sensitive areas such as marshes if severe weather conditions blow it around and 

onto delicate grasses and habitat. Responders were in a difficult position as they boomed places 

based on local pressures, pulled boom away during bad weather, and then put it out again.100 

Once parishes had boom, they did not want to let it go. On July 22, 2010, President 

Nungesser, opposed the Coast Guard‟s decision to began removing boom in preparation for 

Hurricane Bonnie.

101 He threatened to slash the tires of trucks carrying away protective boom. 

He later explained that his statement was only a joke.102 Other parish presidents, either believing 

they had the authority or hoping to take that authority upon themselves, issued orders prohibiting 

 

94 Campbell Robertson, Louisiana Officials Threaten Action is Spill Response Proves Inadequate, N.Y. TIMES (May 

23, 2010). 

95 David Hammer, Frustration mounting over BP delays, lack of progress in Gulf of Mexico oil spill, TIMESPICAYUNE (May 23, 2010). 

96 Craig Pittman and Rebecca Catalanello, BP plan to protect Florida from oil spill inadequate, officials say, ST.

PETERSBURG TIMES (May 3, 2010). 

97 Dan Murtaugh, Gulf Coast Prepares Oil Defenses, Rallies Volunteers, PRESS-REGISTER (Apr. 30, 2010). 

98 BP‟s Gulf oil spill response plans severely flawed, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 9, 2010).

99 Interviews with Coast Guard officials.

100 Interview with Coast Guard official.

101 “Oren Dorell, Storm Forces Evacuation of Well Site BP Official Says Break Will be 10-12 Days After Federal 

Overseer Halts Gulf Work, USA TODAY (July 23, 2010).

102 See Liz Robbins and Campbell Robertson, Tension Among Officials Grows as Storm Nears, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 

2010).
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

- 20 -

response equipment from being moved out of the parish.103 Coast Guard responders were 

threatened with arrest if they moved equipment.104 

These problems were also a serious distraction that took time away from responders‟ 

ability to focus on the spill. For example, because state and local officials wanted to be able to 

evaluate the response on their own terms, they measured the “feet of boom deployed,” a 

measurement that took time to compile but was of very little value in evaluating the effectiveness 

of response efforts.

The boom wars never reached a resolution. In many instances, responders knew that in 

deploying boom they were responding to the politics of the spill rather than the spill itself. They 

deployed boom along miles and miles of shoreline, and it was still not sufficient to prevent oil 

from washing up on the beaches.105 

D. Potential Problems with the NCP

In addition to the structural issue of differences between Stafford Act and the NCP, 

another factor at the root of the federal-state and federal-local conflicts was likely the failure of 

the contingency plans to adequately involve state and local officials. Coast Guard responders 

were well-connected to career state responders such as the designated State On-Scene 

Coordinators, but not well connected with local officials or political officials at the state level. 

a. State Officials

Even though the various planning documents required by the NCP, including the Area 

Contingency Plans, had been signed by state officials, higher-level state officials did not appear 

to have participated in the planning process such that they understood what the plans called for. 

When confronted with a contingency plan, a state official reportedly told a Coast Guard 

responder, “I didn‟t sign that.” In the opinion of the Coast Guard responder, the state official 

was not denying that his signature appeared on the document; he meant that no one had ever 

properly explained the content of the plan to him.106 When the time came to implement the plans 

as the State On-Scene Coordinator understood them, the governors largely rejected the plans and 

opted to run the response operations in different ways.

107

 This set of circumstances at the state 

 

103 See id.; Angel Gonzalez, Locals to BP: Don‟t Leave Town Yet, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2010); St. Bernard Leader: 

Keep All Spill Equipment Here, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 30, 2010); Parishes Move to Block Movement of Oil 

Protection, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 22, 2010).

104 Interview with Coast Guard official.

105 As originally drafted, this paper contained a preliminary discussion of the Louisiana berms project, which also 

created significant federal-state conflict. The discussion is omitted here because the berms project is discussed fully 

in other work by the Commission and its staff.

106 Interview with Coast Guard official.

107 The governors of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida all declared a state of emergency. Press Release, 

Governor Jindal Issues State Declaration of Emergency (Apr. 29, 2010), 

http://www.gov.state.la.us/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&catID=2&articleID=2137&navID=3; Press 

Release, Gov. Riley Declares State of Emergency to Prepare for Oil Approaching Alabama Coast (Apr. 30, 2010), 

http://governorpress.alabama.gov/pr/pr-2010-04-30-04-emergency.asp; State of Florida, Office of the Governor, 

Executive Order 10-99 (Apr. 30, 2010), 

http://www.dep.state.fl.us/deepwaterhorizon/files/authorizations/043010_eo1.pdf; State of Mississippi, Office of the 

Governor, Executive Order No. 1038 (Apr. 30, 2010), 

http://www.governorbarbour.com/news/2010/apr/Orders%20for%20Coast.pdf.
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

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level may change as a result of this spill; we can expect that high-level state officials will now be 

more involved in contingency planning under the NCP. Though lesser spills had occurred in the 

region before and career state responders had been integral in the associated spill responses, for 

many high-level officials, this was the first large-scale NCP response they had encountered. The 

Area Contingency Plans also did not appear to take state contingency plans into account. A 

Coast Guard responder with responsibility for pre-spill planning indicated that he knew that the 

states had contingency plans but was not familiar with them.108 A requirement that planning 

documents be consistent and incorporate each other might help to ensure the engagement of

responders at all levels.

b. Local Officials

The failure of the planning process to adequately involve state governments was 

magnified at the local level. Local communities were not involved in the contingency planning 

process, nor were they anticipated to play a large role in the response. The applicable Regional 

Contingency Plan, called the One Gulf Plan, has no reference to the role of local officials or local 

communities in general. Two of the Area Contingency Plans included in the One Gulf Plan do

include a section instructing planners to coordinate with state and local officials. The New 

Orleans Area Contingency Plan, for example, instructs the Area Committee planner to work 

“with state and local officials to pre-plan for joint response efforts, including appropriate 

procedures for mechanical recovery, dispersant use, shoreline cleanup, protection of sensitive 

environmental areas, and protection, rescue, and rehabilitation of fisheries and wildlife. The 

Area Committee is required to work with state and local officials to expedite decisions for the 

use of dispersants and other mitigating substances and devices.”109 The Captain of the Port for 

Morgan City, Louisiana reported that he had consistently invited parish representatives to area 

committee planning meetings, but that they did not often attend. Before the Deepwater Horizon

spill, when there had been an incident, Coast Guard responders would telephone parish 

representatives to provide information, but did not seem to expect the parishes to provide 

information in return.

110

 Parish representatives, for their part, said that they had not been invited 

to participate in spill planning exercises, in contrast with the annual hurricane drills in which 

they do participate. Overall, the pre-Deepwater Horizon level of parish involvement in spill 

planning or spill response was low.

In other regions, local officials are sometimes involved through a Local On-Scene 

Coordinator. Area contingency plans in Alaska and in San Francisco both provide for such a 

position.

111

 Planners in San Francisco realized they needed to incorporate a way to address local 

concerns after the Cosco Busan oil spill in San Francisco Bay in November 2007. 

Because local officials did not have a clear role in the Deepwater Horizon response, 

many felt ignored by federal responders. This contributed to their empowerment, as discussed 

above, to go directly to BP for response funding. This problem seemed to be exacerbated in 

 

108 Interview with Coast Guard official.

109 SECTOR NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, GEOGRAPHIC RESPONSE PLAN 8 (1999).

110 Interview with Coast Guard official.

111 See ALASKA REGIONAL RESPONSE TEAM (1999), http://www.akrrt.org/plans.shtml; Meeting Notes from 

California Emergency Management Agency meeting (Aug. 12, 2009), 

http://www.calema.ca.gov/WebPage/oeswebsite.nsf/ClientOESFileLibrary/Coastal%20Region%20Branch/$file/200

9.08.12.pdf. 
Originally Released October 6, 2010

Updated January 11, 2011

- 22 -

Louisiana, where the unique parish structure and home rule provisions gave a great deal of 

autonomy to local governments. In Mississippi and Alabama, though there were local issues and 

local mayors expressed concerns about the response, the unified command was able to work 

more directly with the State On-Scene Coordinator, who in turn worked with county and town 

governments.112 Planning did not take into account the differing governance structures of the 

Gulf states. 

Better incorporation of existing local emergency response structures in spill response 

planning may help to build trust between the federal government and local officials and to utilize 

local expertise and resources. The creation of emergency response structures is currently a high 

priority for many states and local governments, and the federal government has grant programs 

in place to support this priority.113 Incorporating some of these structures would potentially 

require changing the NCP to direct that the Area Contingency Planning process involve local 

leaders in the unified command, either as principal players or on a consulting basis. The regions 

that currently have local on-scene coordinators are very different from the Gulf of Mexico in 

terms of the diversity and sheer number of shoreline communities potentially affected by a spill.

However, there may be ways in which the federal government can use the local on-scene 

coordinator model to access local government emergency response structures. Greater 

participation by a local representative in the planning process could facilitate the inclusion of 

local resources and concerns in contingency plans. A Local On-Scene Coordinator, or 

Coordinators for many communities, could participate in spill response by organizing local 

volunteers, cataloging response resources, and serving as a point of contract for local concerns. 

Suggestions for the Commission’s consideration:

Consider clarifying at the national, state, and local level the differences between 

the Stafford Act and the NCP.

Consider recommending higher-level state involvement in the contingency 

planning process, potentially including political in addition to career officials.

Establish liaisons between the unified command and affected local communities 

early in the spill response process.

Consider recommending ways to incorporate local emergency response structures 

into contingency planning, and consider adding a Local On-Scene Coordinator 

position in the Unified Command structure. 

 

112 Interviews with Coast Guard officials.

113 See, e.g., FEMA, FY2010 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS (EMPG),

http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/empg/index.shtm; Emergency Management; Interview with Coast Guard 

official.