alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

DAY ELEV

 3,465.03

 3,465.28

 3,465.47

 3,465.94

 3,466.26

 3,466.50

 3,466.76

 3,466.94

 3,467.12

 3,467.38

 3,467.74

 3,468.17

 3,468.60

 3,470.33

 3,471.63

 3,471.37

 3,471.25

 3,471.38

 3,471.38

 3,471.37

 3,471.31

 3,471.30

 3,471.38

 3,471.19

 3,471.06

 3,471.19

 3,471.50

 3,471.50

 3,471.31

 37,272

 37,426

 37,543

 37,833

 38,032

 38,181

 38,343

 38,455

 38,567

 38,730

 38,956

 39,227

 39,499

 40,602

 41,441

 41,273

 41,195

 41,279

 41,279

 41,273

 41,234

 41,227

 41,279

 41,156

 41,072

 41,156

 41,357

 41,357

 41,234

STORAGE

+147

+154

+117

+290

+199

+149

+162

+112

+112

+163

+226

+271

+272

+1,103

+839

-168

-78

+84

+0

-6

-39

-7

+52

-123

-84

+84

+201

+0

-123

CHANGE

87.1

82.8

69.5

160.3

110.4

86.3

94.1

70.3

63.4

92.6

120.9

151.1

147.3

567.1

683.3

34.1

27.7

164.3

126.5

118.0

75.5

87.5

152.2

-13.0

-20.3

95.3

294.1

191.0

37.0

INFLOW

 12

 4

 9

 12

 9

 10

 11

 12

 5

 9

 6

 11

 9

 10

 8

 10

 11

 9

 13

 13

 14

 14

 13

 14

 19

 18

 17

 16

 18

CONDUIT

 .0

 .0

 .0

 .0

 .0

 .0

 .0

 .0

 .0

 .0

 .0

 .0

 .0

 .0

 251.1

 106.9

 55.4

 111.6

 111.6

 106.9

 79.8

 75.5

 111.6

 34.1

 2.3

 34.1

 174.0

 174.0

 79.8

SPILL

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

 1.0

PK CR

 0.0

 0.2

 0.5

 1.1

 0.1

 0.2

 0.4

 0.8

 0.9

 0.4

 0.0

 2.5

 0.2

 0.0

 0.3

 0.8

 0.0

 0.0

 0.5

 0.0

 0.2

 0.0

 0.0

 0.0

 0.0

 0.0

 0.8

 0.0

 0.0

C.F.S.

 .000

 .011

 .026

 .053

 .005

 .009

 .021

 .037

 .045

 .021

 .000

 .120

 .010

 .000

 .014

 .040

 .000

 .000

 .026

 .001

 .009

 .000

 .000

 .000

 .000

 .000

 .040

 .000

 .000

INCHES

 .02

 .00

 .00

 1.53

 .02

 .00

 .00

 .00

 .00

 .58

 .81

 1.62

 1.18

 3.06

 .25

 .46

 .37

 .02

 .00

 .01

 .39

 .05

 2.17

 .01

 .05

 .01

 2.29

 1.43

 .38

PRECIP

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION-CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT-CALIFORNIA

FEBRUARY 2000 JENKINSON LAKE DAILY OPERATIONS RUN DATE: 03/14/2000

IN LAKE

EVAPORATION

INCHES

C.F.S.

COMPUTED*

ACRE-FEET

RELEASE - C.F.S. 

TOTALS +4,109 3,956.4 336 29.0 1,508.7 9.9 .488 16.71

ACRE-FEET +4,109 7,847.5 666 57.5 2,992.5 19.6

COMMENTS:

* COMPUTED INFLOW IS THE SUM OF CHANGE IN STORAGE, RELEASES AND EVAPORATION.

DATA BASED ON 24 HOUR PERIOD ENDING 0800.

SUMMARY

RELEASE (ACRE-FEET)

CAMINO-CONDUIT 666.5

SLY PARK CREEK

SPILL

 57.5

 2,992.5

 593.1

PRECIPITATION

THIS MONTH =

JULY 1, 1999 TO DATE = 42.94

 37,125

 73.4 16.71

CAMINO SLY

CAMP

CREEK

C.F.S.

 76

 76

 70

 96

 88

 80

 71

 65

 63

 79

 86

 91

 120

 684

 300

 0

 0

 182

 150

 144

 138

 126

 128

 0

 0

 98

 216

 170

 0

 3,397

 6,738

E.I.D. PROJECT

E.I.D. WATER RIGHTS
§ 24.255 Bottling or packing wine. ( a ) *General.* Proprietors of a bonded wine premises and a taxpaid wine bottling house premises shall be held strictly responsible for the correct determination of the quantity and alcohol content of wine removed as well as for the correct determination of carbon dioxide in artificially carbonated hard cider and in sparkling hard cider. As required by § 24.170, appropriate and accurate measures and instruments for measuring and testing the wine will be provided at each wine premises.
( b ) *Bottle or other container fill.* Proprietors of bonded wine premises and taxpaid wine bottling house premises shall fill bottles or other containers as nearly as possible to conform to the amount shown on the label or blown in the bottle or marked on any container other than a bottle; but in no event may the amount of wine contained in any individual bottle, due to lack of uniformity of the bottles, vary from the amount stated more than 1.0 percent for 15.0 liters and above, 1.5 percent for 1.0 liter to 14.9 liters, 2.0 percent for 750 mL, 3.0 percent for 375 mL, 4.5 percent for 187 mL and 100 mL, and 9.0 percent for 50 mL; and in such case, there will be substantially as many bottles overfilled as there are bottles underfilled for each lot of wine bottled. Short-filled bottles or other containers of wine which are sold or otherwise disposed of by the proprietor to employees for personal consumption need not be labeled, but, if labeled, need not show an accurate statement of net contents.
( c ) *Tax tolerance.* The net contents of bottles or other containers of untaxpaid wine in the same tax class filled during six consecutive tax return periods, as determined from the bonded wine premises proprietor's fill test records, shall not vary by more than 0.5 percent from the net contents as stated on the bottles or other containers. The bonded wine premises proprietor is liable for the tax on the entire amount of wine in the same tax class when that wine is removed from bond, without benefit of tolerance, when the fill of bottles or other containers exceeds a 0.5 percent average of a period which consists of six consecutive tax returns, or when filling is not conducted in compliance with good commercial practice.
( d ) *Fill tests.* The proprietor shall test at representative intervals wine bottled or packed during the bottling or packing operation of each bottling or packing line to determine if the wine contained in the bottle or other container is in agreement with that stated on the label, bottle, or other container.
( e ) *Alcohol tests.* The proprietor shall test the alcohol content by volume to determine the tax class of the wine and to ensure the alcohol content to be stated on the label is in agreement with the requirement of § 24.257.
(Sec. 201, Pub. L. 85-859, 72 Stat. 1381, as amended (26 U.S.C. 5368))
(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control numbers 1513-0115 and 1513-0092) [T.D. ATF-299, 55 FR 24989, June 19, 1990, as amended by T.D. TTB-147, 82 FR 7664, Jan. 23, 2017]
###### Editorial Note on Part 41

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 41 (formerly part 275) appear at T.D. ATF-460, 66 FR 39093, July 27, 2001.

#### § 41.236 Trade name certificate.

Every person that files an application for a permit as an importer of processed tobacco operating under a trade name must furnish with the application for the permit required by § 41.231 a true copy of the certificate or other document, if any, issued by a State, county, or municipal authority in connection with the transaction of business under such trade name. If no such certificate or other document is so required, a written statement, in duplicate, to that effect by such person will be sufficient for the purpose of this section.
CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002







In
      connection with the Report of Caribbean American Health Resorts
      Inc, a Minnesota corporation (the “Company”), on Form 10-QSB for the
      quarter ended September 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
      Commission on the date hereof (the ”Report”),I, Halton Martin, certify pursuant
      to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge and
      belief:





1.   The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.   The
      information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all
      material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of operations of the
      Company.








Dated:
      November 28, 2007








Caribbean
      American Health Resorts, Inc.




By:/s/
      Halton
      Martin


Halton
      Martin


Chief
      Executive Officer and


Chief
      Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                           41353
<SECURITIES>                                    169605
<RECEIVABLES>                                    17221
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                228179
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  228179
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                          1000
<OTHER-SE>                                      227179
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    228179
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                         0
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-7472

DEREK J. BROWN,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

WARDEN OF PERRY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Timothy M. Cain, District Judge. 

(0:12-cv-02988-TMC)

Submitted: January 22, 2014 Decided: January 31, 2014

Before KING, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Derek J. Brown, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Derek J. Brown appeals the district court’s order 

adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and 

dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. On appeal, 

Brown contends that he did not receive the magistrate judge’s 

report and recommendation, providing documentary support for

this assertion from the postal director at his correctional 

institution. 

A party who fails to object in writing to a magistrate 

judge’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is not 

entitled to de novo review of the magistrate judge’s 

determinations and is barred from contesting these 

determinations on appeal. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-

46 (4th Cir. 1985). The waiver is a result of procedural 

default and does not affect jurisdiction. Thomas v. Arn, 474 

U.S. 140, 154 (1985). When a litigant is proceeding pro se, he 

must be given fair notice of the consequences of failing to 

object before a procedural default will apply. Wright, 766 F.2d 

at 846. 

From the record presented, we cannot fairly determine 

whether Brown received a copy of the magistrate judge’s report 

and recommendation, or was notified of his right to file timely 

objections and the consequences of failing to do so. 

Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the district court and 
3

remand so that the district court can make that determination. 

Should the district court find Brown credible in this regard, it 

can provide him with the report and requisite information and an 

opportunity to file objections. If, on the other hand, the 

court finds that Brown did receive the report in its initial 

mailing, it can reenter its original order, with any necessary 

modifications.

We deny as moot Brown’s motion to abey. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

VACATED AND REMANDED
###### Editorial Note on Part 478

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 478 appear by T.D. ATF-411, 64 FR 17291, Apr. 9, 1999, T.D. ATF-487, 68 FR 3750, Jan. 24, 2003, and ATF-11F, 73 FR 57240, Oct. 2, 2008.

#### § 478.25 Disclosure of information.

The Director of Industry Operations may make available to any Federal, State or local law enforcement agency any information which is obtained by reason of the provisions of the Act with respect to the identification of persons prohibited from purchasing or receiving firearms or ammunition who have purchased or received firearms or ammunition, together with a description of such firearms or ammunition. Upon the request of any Federal, State or local law enforcement agency, the Director of Industry Operations may provide such agency any information contained in the records required to be maintained by the Act or this part.

[T.D. ATF-270, 53 FR 10493, Mar. 31, 1988]
###### Editorial Note on Part 40

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 40 appear by T.D. ATF-460, 66 FR 39094-39096, July 27, 2001; T.D. ATF-464, 66 FR 43479, Aug. 20, 2001; and T.D. TTB-91, 76 FR 5479, Feb. 1, 2011.

#### § 40.104 Change in control of a corporation.

Where the issuance, sale, or transfer of the stock of a corporation, operating as a manufacturer of tobacco products, results in a change in the identity of the principal stockholders exercising actual or legal control of the operations of the corporation, the corporate manufacturer shall, within 30 days after the change occurs, make application on TTB F 5200.3 for a new permit. Otherwise, the present permit shall be automatically terminated at the expiration of such 30-day period, and the manufacturer shall dispose of all tobacco products on hand, in accordance with this part, make a concluding inventory and concluding report, in accordance with the provisions of §§ 40.201 and 40.202, respectively, and surrender his permit with such inventory and report. If the application for a new permit is timely made, the present permit shall continue in effect pending final action with respect to such application.

(72 Stat. 1421, 1422; 26 U.S.C. 5712, 5713, 5721, 5722)

[T.D. 6871, 31 FR 33, Jan. 4, 1966. Redesignated at 40 FR 16835, Apr. 15, 1975, as amended by T.D. ATF-232, 51 FR 28081, Aug. 5, 1986; T.D. ATF-243, 51 FR 43194, Dec. 1, 1986]
### §3809. Committee staff

The grant of trade promotion authority under this chapter is likely to increase the activities of the primary committees of jurisdiction in the area of international trade. In addition, the creation of the Congressional Oversight Group under section 3807 of this title will increase the participation of a broader number of Members of Congress in the formulation of United States trade policy and oversight of the international trade agenda for the United States. The primary committees of jurisdiction should have adequate staff to accommodate these increases in activities.

(Pub. L. 107–210, div. B, title XXI, §2109, Aug. 6, 2002, 116 Stat. 1019.)
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 02-2096 AFAF KANAZEH, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus KENNETH CROSSON; ARLEEN L. PRIEPETON, Defendants - Appellees, and MICHAEL K. MANN; PANTONG MANN; LAUREN SHEA; LOCKHEED MARTIN PC, Defendants.

No. 02-2260 AFAF KANAZEH, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus ARLEEN L. PRIEPETON; LOCKHEED MARTIN, PC, Defendants - Appellees,2 and MICHAEL K. MANN; PANTONG MANN; LAUREN SHEA, Defendants. No. 02-2261 AFAF KANAZEH, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus ARLEEN L. PRIEPETON; LOCKHEED MARTIN, PC, Defendants - Appellees, and MICHAEL K. MANN; PANTONG MANN; LAUREN SHEA, Defendants. No. 02-2402 AFAF KANAZEH, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus ARLEEN L. PRIEPETON; LOCKHEED MARTIN PC; KENNETH L. CROSSON, Defendants - Appellees,34 and MICHAEL K. MANN; PANTONG MANN; LAUREN SHEA, Defendants. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior District Judge. (CA-02-1083-A) Submitted: January 27, 2003 Decided: March 10, 2003 Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Afaf Kanazeh, Appellant Pro Se. Geoffrey Martin Bohn, CUNNINGHAM & ASSOCIATES, Arlington, Virginia; Carol Thomas Stone, JORDAN, COYNE & SAVITS, L.L.P., Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).5 PER CURIAM: In these consolidated appeals, Afaf Kanazeh appeals district court orders granting the Appellees’ motions to dismiss. We have reviewed the record and the district court orders and affirm on the reasoning of the district court. SeeKanazeh v. Priepeton , No. CA02-1083-A (E.D. Va. filed Aug. 2, 2002, entered Aug. 5, 2002; filed Aug. 30, 2002, entered Sept. 3, 2002; entered Oct. 21, 2002; filed Nov. 1, 2002, entered Nov. 4, 2002). We deny motions to strike filed in Nos. 02-2096 and 02-2260, the motion for appointment of counsel filed in No. 02-2096, and the motion for general relief seeking to add a new party filed in all appeals. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
(No. 74-CC-293

#### Amity Hospital Service, Claimant, *vs.*State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

*Opinion filed March 25, 1974.*

Amity Hospital Service, Claimant, pro se.

William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.

Per Curiam.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Damien Deshong COUNCIL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-41575.

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided Feb. 23, 2006.

Ernest Gonzalez, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Texas, Sherman, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

James Patrick Whalen, Burleson, Pate & Gibson, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

*632PER CURIAM: *

Damien Deshong Council appeals his conviction following a jury trial and sentence for possession of a controlled substance (“crack”) with the intent to distribute, possession of a firearm by a felon, and using, carrying, or possessing a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(c)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Council challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for possession of a firearm by a felon and for using, carrying, or possessing a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. We have determined that a rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence established Council’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to both counts. *Jackson v. Virginia,*443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Thus, we AFFIRM Council’s conviction as to these counts.

Council argues that the district court enhanced his sentence based on his career offender status in violation of the Sixth Amendment. We have held, however, that a judge’s determination of career offender status does not implicate *United States v. Booker,*543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), because, except for the defendant’s age, “[cjareer offender status is not ‘a sentencing judge’s determination of a fact other than a prior conviction.’ ” *United States v. Guevara,*408 F.3d 252, 261 (5th Cir.2005), *cert. denied,*— U.S. —, — s.ct. -, — L.Ed.2d- (2006) (No. 05-7643). The Government concedes, however, that it cannot meet its burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court’s error in sentencing Council pursuant to a mandatory sentencing guidelines scheme, so-called “Fanfan” error, was harmless. *See United States v. Walters,*418 F.3d 461, 464 (5th Cir.2005). Therefore, Council’s sentence, which included alternative sentences, is VACATED in its entirety and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with *Booker.*

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED SE PTEMBER 2, 2016

NO. 03

- 16

- 00263

- CV

Stacey Hammer, Appellant

v.

University Federal Credit Union; Wayne Morgan a/k/a El Campo Real Estate, LP a/k/a The Morgan Children, Inc. a/k/a Preferred Properties; Venessa Zapata Peters; and Kerry L. Haliburton , Appellee s

APPEAL FROM THE 261S T DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, PE MBERTON, AND FIELD

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE FIELD

This is an appeal from the judgment signed by the tr i a l court on June 11, 2015. Having reviewed

the record , it appears that the C ou rt lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. Therefore, the C ourt

dismisses the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Because appellant is indigent and unable to pay

costs, no adjudication of costs is made.
Exhibit 23.2

INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

We
consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement 333-41130 of Lone Star Technologies, Inc. on Form S-3, and Registration
Statement Nos. 33-64805, 333-38458, 333-46310 and 333-46312 on Form S-8, of our report dated January 17, 2002 appearing in
this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Lone Star Technologies, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2002.

BDO-Hernández
Marrón y Cía., S.C.
Veracruz, Veracruz, Mexico
April 17, 2003

---

QuickLinks
(No. 74-CC-124

#### Xerox Corporation, Claimant, *vs.*State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

*Opinion filed March 25, 1974.*

Xerox Corporation, Claimant, pro se.

William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.

Per Curiam.