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EMERGING THREATS AND SECURITY IN THE

WESTERN HEMISPHERE: NEXT STEPS FOR

U.S. POLICY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 13, 2011

Serial No. 112–75

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable William R. Brownfield, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State 11

The Honorable Philip S. Goldberg, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Intelligence 

and Research, U.S. Department of State ........................................................... 19

The Honorable Daniel L. Glaser, Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing, 

Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. Department of Treasury ......................................................................................................................... 30

The Honorable Paul N. Stockton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and, Americas’ Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense .. 42

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable William R. Brownfield: Prepared statement ............................... 13

The Honorable Philip S. Goldberg: Prepared statement ...................................... 21

The Honorable Daniel L. Glaser: Prepared statement ......................................... 32

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 70

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 71

The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Missouri: Prepared statement ......................................................................... 73

(1)

EMERGING THREATS AND SECURITY IN THE 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE: NEXT STEPS FOR 

U.S. POLICY 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 13, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The committee will come to order. 

I would like to recognize the visiting delegation from the Afghan 

National Assembly. We have 16 members of Parliament from the 

Afghan National Assembly, mostly from the budget and economic 

committees. We have the secretary of the budget committee, the 

chairman of budget committee. We have many important folks 

here. And the delegation is here to observe how committee hearings 

operate in the House. Good luck with that. 

And if you could please stand. I know that you are over here and 

over here as well. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you, 

ladies and gentlemen. It is an honor for us to have you visit our 

committee, learn from our mistakes, and get a good democracy 

going there in Afghanistan. We so appreciate your efforts and your 

hard work. Thank you so much for honoring us with your presence. 

After recognizing myself and my friend, the ranking member, Mr. 

Berman, for 7 minutes each for our opening statements, I will recognize the chair and the ranking member of the Subcommittee on 

Western Hemisphere for 3 minutes each, and then 1 minute for 

any members who seek recognition. 

We will then hear from our witnesses. And, without objection, 

the witnesses’ prepared statements will be made part of the record. 

Members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions for 

the record, subject to the length limitations in the rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes. 

In light of this week’s foiled Iranian terrorist plot to be executed 

on American soil, this hearing could not be more timely. I want to 

commend the work of the DEA and the FBI and all of our outstanding agencies for their incredible work in uncovering this plot. 

I applaud the efforts of all law enforcement personnel and intelligence officers that continue to protect our homeland and keep us 

safe. Kudos, also, to the Mexican agencies who collaborated with us 

in making this a successful operation. 

2

The issues to be covered by this hearing have been a priority for 

many of us on this committee for some time, as we sought to develop legislative policy and the responses to counter Iran’s increasing activities in the Western Hemisphere, the threat of Islamic extremists in the region, and the threat posed by the narcotrafficking 

networks and related violence in themselves but also as readymade networks to facilitate and support other terrorist activities 

throughout the hemisphere, including right here in the United 

States, as we saw in that plot. 

We must stop looking at the drug cartels today solely from a lawenforcement perspective and consider designating these 

narcotrafficking members as foreign terrorist organizations and 

their leaders as specially designated nationals if they are providing 

material support and assistance to other foreign terrorist organizations and especially designated nationals and their state sponsors. 

The foiled Iranian plot also underscores the need to assess current U.S. strategy and examine what actions the United States 

must now undertake, looking beyond existing initiatives to confront 

the evolving and the emerging threats and security challenges in 

the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. provided nearly $2 billion in security-related assistance 

to the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in last fiscal 

year. Is this assistance advancing U.S. security objectives, and 

what have been the tangible returns on our investment? 

While violent crime in Central America continues to increase, our 

counternarcotics support for these countries remains limited. As 

Central America is ripped apart by drug violence, the State Department continues to dole out counternarcotics funding to regimes 

elsewhere in Latin America that are actively working against U.S. 

interests. 

In Bolivia, for example, State is providing $15 million for Fiscal 

Year 2011 to fight drug trafficking, and yet Bolivia is actively 

working against U.S. interests, has withdrawn from the Single 

Convention on Narcotic Drugs at the U.N., and the former Bolivian 

drug chief, General Rene Sanabria, was sentenced last month to 15 

years in prison for drug-smuggling charges. 

In Peru, State has spent over $70 million in the past 2 fiscal 

years on counternarcotics programs, but, according to the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy, overall coca cultivation increased in 

2010 by 33 percent, which led to a 13-year all-time high, no pun 

intended. Further, the new Peruvian administration temporarily 

suspended U.S.-funded coca-eradication programs earlier this year. 

There is no question that equipment and technology are necessary for protecting the integrity of this region from drug cartels, 

from extremist groups, and from rogue regimes. And I will am 

pleased to see many countries in the region, such as Colombia, assuming a more active role in taking on these threats. However, 

Venezuela and Brazil’s increasing purchase of advanced lethal military equipment from Russia and China is very troubling and may 

lead to an arms race in the region. 

As we formulate and implement our security policy in the hemisphere, it is crucial that we understand the transnational nature 

of the illicit individuals and groups whom we are targeting. Rogue 

regimes, extremist groups, they leverage the resources of their 

3

sympathizers to strengthen their capabilities in the region and advance their hate-filled agendas. For years, the State Department 

has reported on the fundraising activities of Hezbollah and Hamas 

in the region. 

This week’s foiled plot contributes to the growing evidence of the 

potential links between these groups and the drug cartels. As we 

know, such a linkage was not made, because those were our guys 

posing as members of the drug cartels. But it seems that our sworn 

enemy, Iran, sees a potential kindred spirit in the drug cartels in 

Mexico. We see report on the expansions of the FARC into West Africa and its potential links with Hezbollah and al-Qaeda in the 

Lands of the Islamic Maghreb. 

In June, Iran and the rest of the Venezuela-aligned ALBA countries in Latin America inaugurated a military academy in Bolivia 

to educate and train their forces. And we know that Cuban intelligence officers are embedded throughout the Venezuelan Government, as well as spread across the hemisphere, working against 

U.S. national security interests. This week, we also learned that 

Venezuelan and Cuban foreign ministers led a delegation, which 

included representatives of Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, to 

Syria to meet with al-Assad to show their support of his brutal attacks against his own people. And, finally, a Department of Defense report from last year stated that Iran’s Quds Force has an 

‘‘increased presence in Latin America, particularly Venezuela.’’

Our national security interests, the stability of our hemisphere 

as a whole, and this week’s failed plot has reminded us that our 

homeland security is at stake. We must take immediate action to 

counter these threats and to not waste valuable resources on misplaced diplomacy with those who seek to do us harm. 

So I thank all of our witnesses for being here today. And I am 

now so pleased to turn to my friend, the ranking member of our 

committee, Mr. Berman of California, for his statement. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

And I join you in welcoming our brothers and sisters from the Afghan National Assembly. 

I hope nothing you see this morning will cause you to lose faith 

in democracy. But we welcome you here. And what you will probably see is a little bit of disagreement, while hopefully not being 

more disagreeable than usual. And we are glad to have you here. 

This is the first full committee hearing that we have had this 

Congress that touches on our own hemisphere, and the title is revealing. While there are certainly security-related issues in the region that deserve our very close attention, like the foiled plot to 

murder the Saudi Ambassador, I think it is a mistake to view our 

neighborhood as a constellation of threats rather than a series of 

opportunities. 

This approach is not only out of date, it has a real cost for the 

United States. In his first term, the administration of President 

George W. Bush emphasized threats and confrontations in the 

Americas. But in his second term, his administration adopted a 

very different tone. Why? Because it became painfully clear that 

his initial approach did not serve U.S. interests, and, in fact, it did 

considerable damage. The U.S. is still recovering from the colossal 

loss of influence in the region that resulted from those policies. And 

4

our constant post-9/11 lectures on terrorism to a region that has 

suffered from homegrown terrorism for 50 years left a bad taste. 

Today, much of Latin America perceives that we hold them at 

arm’s length or, worse, as the title of this hearing implies, that we 

see them as a problem rather than as partners. 

To its credit, the Obama administration signaled early on that it 

understood the need to chart a different course. In his speech to 

this region’s leaders a few months after taking office, President 

Obama sought to defuse the ‘‘threats and security’’ legacy by emphasizing that trust has to be earned over time and pledging that 

the U.S. seeks an equal partnership in the hemisphere. ‘‘All of us,’’ 

he said, ‘‘must now renew the common stake that we have in one 

another.’’

This administration has made significant strides in regaining 

that damaged trust as well as the influence that flows from it. The 

President’s trip to the region this past March was understated but 

it was self-assured and purposeful. Secretary Clinton’s frequent 

presence and engagement in the region have also paid great dividends. 

In his first State of the Union speech, President Obama said, 

‘‘Our power grows through its prudent use. Our security emanates 

from the justice of our cause and the force of our example.’’ Nowhere is this notion more fitting than in our own hemisphere, and 

much more needs to be done. 

To be sure, the U.S. must remain aware of all security concerns 

in this region, and the list is long. It ranges from the fight against 

barbaric drug cartels in neighboring Mexico to the possibility of 

mass migrations to the U.S. from Cuba or Haiti. These issues must 

be placed in a policy context and in a framework that permits the 

U.S. to understand and forcefully pursue its strategic interest and 

its values. 

The witnesses before us today represent bureaus which deal only 

with, as some call it, the ‘‘drugs and thugs’’ issues in the Western 

Hemisphere. This is no reflection on the panelists, whose work I 

hold in the highest esteem, but it paints an incomplete and skewed 

picture of our relationships with our neighbors. 

Assistant Secretary Brownfield, because of your past work in the 

State Department bureau best positioned to frame these issues for 

us, the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, I would look to you 

to help us understand the complete picture. 

Just last week, the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee held a 

second hearing intended to peddle the notion that in the fight 

against the drug cartels, Mexico is facing a full-scale insurgency 

from politically motivated terrorists. Then a Republican candidate 

for President declared in cavalier fashion that we should send U.S. 

troops into Mexico. This is a clear slap in the face of our Mexican 

neighbors and particularly to our ally President Calderon on an 

issue that both of our governments have declared is a shared problem and that requires a true partnership to solve. 

It is critical that our policy toward the region be based on solid 

facts, yet we sometimes seem to be chasing ghosts or creating caricatures of security threats. We should roundly condemn the horrific 

bombings of the Israeli Embassy and the AMIA Center in Argentina by Iran and Hezbollah back in the 1990s. And if the foiled 

5

Iran-backed plot to murder the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. 

turns out to be true—and I assume it is—this would represent a 

significant escalation of Iranian Government terror tactics, reminiscent of those actions in Argentina decades ago. 

At the same time, the persistent and bizarre statement that Iran 

has built its largest Embassy in the world in Managua or, alternatively, Caracas is simply untrue and only distracts from what 

should be a serious discussion of the true nature and dimension of 

the Iranian threat and what we should do to prepare for it. 

This is neither a semantic nor an academic exercise. The stakes 

are real, and they are high. This hemisphere is, by far, our biggest 

trading partner and our biggest energy supplier. We aspire to the 

same values. Overwhelmingly, the constitutions of these countries 

are based on ours. 

If we don’t keep relations with our neighbors on the right track, 

there is a real risk that the biggest regional threat facing the 

United States could become our own inability to take advantage of 

the irreplaceable ties we enjoy with the diverse and dynamic countries of our hemisphere. 

And I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

And I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the Subcommittee on 

Western Hemisphere chairman, Mr. Mack of Florida, who doesn’t 

peddle but puts forth thoughtful, non-Pollyanna assessments of the 

threats that our Latin American allies face. I am pleased to yield 

him 3 minutes. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I also want to say 

that I want to associate myself with all of your opening statements. 

And thank you for your leadership. 

And I also would like to—for those who are watching or paying 

attention to this, you could not have seen or heard more of a clear 

difference in direction than from the chair of the committee and the 

ranking member. 

The idea that we are going to be safer in our hemisphere, which 

is a shared desire by all of the countries in the Western Hemisphere, that this administration has somehow improved our security in the Western Hemisphere, I think is mistaken, shortsighted, 

and unrealistic. Not wanting to address the real threats creates opportunity for those that wish to do harm on the United States and 

other countries in Latin America. 

I have been suggesting and proposing for years now that Hugo 

Chavez be placed on the state-sponsor-of-terrorism list. There is no 

doubt that Hugo Chavez supports terrorist organizations, whether 

it is the FARC or Iran. We know that there are flights from Iran 

into Venezuela that go unchecked, and that has to stop. And Chavez needs to be held accountable. 

We also know that in Mexico the situation on the ground has 

changed, and there is no denying it. And we have had two hearings 

in the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee focused on Mexico and 

the evolution of the threat of the drug cartels. And I think what 

we have seen over the last couple of days with this assassination 

plot highlights the work of our committee in defining what is happening in Mexico with the cartels as an insurgency that uses terrorist activities to further its cause. You cannot deny it. Now, you 

6

might have a disagreement about wanting to label it as an insurgency, for political means. But I think if you are unwilling to identify the problem correctly, then you are unable to properly put a 

policy forward to help combat it. 

I will say this. Our friends in Mexico, we share the same goal. 

We want freedom, security, and prosperity for all of our people. 

Mexico doesn’t want guns and cash moving south; we don’t want 

drugs and terrorists moving north. We must do something about 

our border. We must secure our border. 

I think the challenges in the Western Hemisphere can be overcome. Things like the free-trade agreements that passed the House 

yesterday are very good starts. Unfortunately, it took a long time 

for those to come, and I have had meetings with the Presidents of 

Panama and Colombia where they almost gave up. So I am glad 

to see that we passed those. 

Madam Chair, thank you for the time. I think there are a lot of 

challenges, and I appreciate this hearing today. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Mack, for 

your leadership on those issues. 

And another leader is my good friend from New York, Mr. Engel, 

who is the ranking member on that Subcommittee on the Western 

Hemisphere. He is recognized for 3 minutes. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. 

Thank you for holding this important hearing today. As the ranking member of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, I am well 

aware, personally, of your longstanding interest in the region. And 

I believe it is good that under your leadership the committee is 

paying close attention to the issues which impact our friends south 

of the border. 

Today’s hearing focuses on security and emerging threats in 

Latin America and the Caribbean. These are important topics, and 

this committee is right to focus on them. Only Tuesday, we learned 

that elements of the Iranian Government tried to hire Mexican 

drug criminals to murder the Saudi Ambassador. With the excellent work of the DEA and the FBI, along with the improved security cooperation with the Mexican Government, we were able to apprehend the perpetrators before they could carry out this terrible 

plot. 

We have spent much time and effort expanding security coordination with Mexico, Colombia, and others in the region, interrupting the drug and crime flows through the Caribbean and Central America, and keeping a close eye on the relationship between 

Venezuela and Iran. As chair of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee during the previous 4 years, I held hearings on all of 

these issues, and I consider them serious and worthy of our attention, as I know our new chairman, Mr. Mack, does as well. 

However, we must recognize that the issues of the region extend 

beyond security. During my tenure in the chair, the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee covered poverty and inequality, flows of remittances, relief in Haiti, press freedoms, and other issues. I share 

the concern of the chair of the full committee and the subcommittee 

and applaud this hearing, but I want to reiterate, we must also not 

forget that the issues which affect the Western Hemisphere go well 

beyond security, and the U.S. relationship with countries in the reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:31 Dec 13, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\101311\70665 HFA PsN: SHIRL
7

gion extend significantly beyond the threats and dangers which 

this hearing will rightfully bring out. 

Yesterday’s passage of the Colombia and Panama FTAs—and I 

was pleased to vote for both of them—are only examples of the 

issues which connect us to this hemisphere. The U.S. also shares 

cultural, linguistic, social, and other links with our southern neighbors. 

I have long said that one of our major problems involving security south of our border is the obscene number of American guns 

which flow down illegally south of the border—come into our country illegally and then go south to Mexico illegally. President 

Calderon has told me personally that he believes 90 percent of the 

crimes committed by the drug cartels are committed with weapons 

that come from the United States south into Mexico. So if we could 

stop that flow, imagine how much we could stop the cartels and the 

drug violence. 

So as we move ahead with today’s important hearing, let’s remember that security is one component of the rich relationship the 

U.S. has with Latin America and the Caribbean, but an important 

component. 

And I am very pleased, Madam Chairwoman, that you called this 

important hearing today. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Engel. 

And I am pleased to recognize members for 1-minute statements. 

Mr. Johnson of Ohio is recognized. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

And thank you to our witnesses for being here today. 

I find that too often we tend to envision serious threats to our 

national security coming from far across the ocean, one or the 

other. What is happening in our own hemisphere is certainly just 

as important, if not more so. 

It is especially disconcerting when these emerging threats happen to reflect a joint venture with those who have declared the destruction of the United States as one of their stated goals. 

Of course, at this hearing today I would be remiss not to mention 

the uncovered terrorist plot of earlier this week and the alleged 

role that the Western Hemisphere played in facilitating a planned 

attack on American soil. Iran’s continued interest in partnering 

with nations so close to home is a legitimate danger to our national 

security, one that should also draw our focus to Iran’s interest in 

conducting mineral exploration in countries that just happen to 

have a large unexploited uranium deposit. 

And, with that, I look very much forward to the testimony from 

our witnesses today. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Sires of New Jersey is recognized. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And welcome to our committee hearing. 

I will be very brief and just say that I hope that what happened 

yesterday serves as a wake-up call to this country. The Iranians 

are not in Cuba or in any other place to go to the Varadero beach 

or anything else other than to try to destabilize and to cause as 

8

much destruction to this country as possible. I really believe that 

in my heart. And I hope that we wake up to that fact. 

And I always believe that we should take a regional approach to 

the security of this country, especially when it comes to South 

America and Central America. The Merida effort is a great effort, 

but I think more of a regional approach should be taken. 

So, with that, I would yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir. 

Ms. Schmidt of Ohio? 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And I just want to dovetail, that the announcement of the plot 

to assassinate the Ambassador from Saudi Arabia in the United 

States by an Iranian operative living in Texas illustrates the dangers that we live in. I mean, this gentleman attempted to hire a 

presumed Zeta drug cartel member from Mexico to help carry out 

the deed. And it showcases what illegal drug activities can do to 

our national security. 

Venezuela’s close relationship with Iran and its tentacles in the 

Western Hemisphere raises further concerns. More investigation 

into illegal activities occurring in the Western Hemisphere is critically necessary, and at least three questions need to be addressed. 

First, exactly what are the threats to our national security in the 

Western Hemisphere? How deep are they, how penetrating? And 

what kind of threats do they also pose to our allies? Two, what are 

we currently doing to address these threats? And, three, what can 

we be doing better, and what more needs to be done? 

And I am looking forward to the testimony, and I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, ma’am. 

Mr. Chandler is recognized. 

Mr. CHANDLER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I just am very interested—I want to thank the panel for being 

here. I am very interested to hear exactly what it is we are not 

doing that we ought to be doing, particularly vis-a`-vis Mexico, and 

what solutions you all have. 

I think all of us have a sense, generally, of what the threats are. 

What are the solutions? What can this country actually do to secure our country from threats to our south that we are not doing? 

And I hope you all will focus on that particular thing as much as 

you can. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Turner of New York is recognized. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I am here to listen 

and learn today. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Connolly of Virginia? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

For a country that is preoccupied with a ‘‘Great Satan,’’ one has 

to conclude that no regime on Earth is more familiar with the Satanic than is the regime in Tehran. 

The outrage that was revealed this week about a plot to assassinate the representative of another sovereign nation in this capital 

of this sovereign nation is unacceptable. And it stretches credulity 

to believe that the highest levels of that government, both in the 

9

clerical circles and in Ahmadinejad’s regime, did not know, were 

not aware, of this plot. 

And it seems to me the policy of the United States Government 

has to be, absent evidence to the contrary provided by that government, that we will hold them accountable as if they plotted this 

from the highest halls of government in Tehran itself. 

I look forward to the hearing, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Ms. Bass is recognized. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

From the comments and opening statements by my colleagues 

today on both sides of the aisle, we all recognize that there are important challenges that must be addressed within the region. The 

United States and other Western Hemisphere nations must increase cooperation and collaboration to successfully and effectively 

address emerging challenges. 

While I know this hearing is focused on the challenges and the 

threats in the Western Hemisphere, there are a couple positive examples, and I thought I would highlight those. 

The U.S. has played a critical role in recovery efforts in Haiti 

since the devastating 2010 earthquake. The U.S., in close collaboration with the Peru Mine Action Center, have successfully located 

and destroyed more than 3,900 land mines left over from the 1995 

conflict between Peru and Ecuador. 

The Department of State continues to pursue Pathways to Prosperity, which links Western Hemisphere countries committed to democracy. And in this regard, one question that I hope will be answered is why we don’t have ambassadors to Ecuador and Bolivia. 

And maybe that will come up in the testimony of the witnesses. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Deutch of Florida? 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member 

Berman. 

Thank you to our witnesses for being here today. 

The events of this week leave no doubt that the Iranian regime 

is expanding its presence, dangerously so, in the Western Hemisphere. While we have been aware of the Iranian presence in South 

America for some time, the possible link between the foiled terror 

plot and the dangerous Mexican drug cartels is particularly troubling. 

There is no doubt that the Iranian regime is looking for additional opportunities to expand its fear of influence, and the regime 

seems to have found a willing partner in Mr. Chavez. Over the past 

year, the emergence of jointly owned Venezuelan and Iranian 

banks has allowed the Iranian regime to continue to move money 

throughout the international banking system and, in turn, continue 

to fund its illicit activities, nuclear activities, and be the leading 

state sponsor of terror. 

Just how Venezuela benefits from these efforts and their effect 

on the rest of the region remain unclear. As I have said before, I 

am concerned about the exploitation of the tri-border area by terrorist organizations through arms and drug trafficking, document 

and currency fraud, and money laundering. It is widely known that 

Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah in particular, has benefitted financially for 

10

the manufacture and moving of pirated goods in the tri-border 

area. 

And I look forward to discussing these issues with our witnesses 

today. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. Poe of Texas, the vice chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. 

Mr. POE. The Western Hemisphere has been ignored for a long 

time, but I think we are starting to remember that what happens 

to our south is important to our national security. Everyone south 

of the border of the United States is our neighbor, after all. 

President Monroe, back in 1823, announced a doctrine called the 

Monroe Doctrine. Many of us learned this in school; I don’t know 

if it is even taught in school anymore. But I like to see if that plays 

anything into what has taken place with our national policy or if 

that has been replaced by something else. Certainly, if it is still a 

policy of the U.S., Iran violated the Monroe Doctrine. And I would 

just like to hear you all’s input on that philosophy of the Monroe 

Doctrine. 

Being a border state with Mexico, I think the border is a national 

security issue. Last year, 663 individuals came from special-interest countries that were caught by our law enforcement at the border. And I would like to hear more about that. And we need to, I 

think, label the drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations and 

deal with them accordingly. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Poe, because 

that is just the way it is. 

And I thank all of our members for wonderful opening statements. 

And now we are so pleased to turn to our witnesses and welcome 

them. 

First, an old friend of our committee, William Brownfield, the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs at the Department of State. Prior to his 

appointment, Ambassador Brownfield served as U.S. Ambassador 

to Colombia from 2007 to 2010 and Ambassador to Venezuela from 

2004 to 2007. 

Welcome. It is great to see you. 

Next, I would like to welcome Philip Goldberg. He is Assistant 

Secretary of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State. He previously served as the coordinator for implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 on 

North Korea and as U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia from 2006 to 2008. 

Welcome, Mr. Goldberg. 

And I would like to welcome, also, Daniel Glaser. He is the Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing in the Office of Terrorism 

and Financial Intelligence at the Department of Treasury. Prior to 

this position, Mr. Glaser served as the Treasury Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial 

Crimes since November 2004. 

Welcome, Mr. Glaser. 

And, finally, I would like to welcome Paul Stockton. 

Thank you, sir. 

11

He is Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 

Americas’ Security Affairs. Paul is responsible on homeland defense activities, defense support for civil authorities, and Western 

Hemisphere security affairs for the Department of Defense. 

I thank all of our witnesses. I kindly remind you that your prepared statements will be made a part of the record, and if you 

could limit your remarks to no more than 5 minutes. And, without 

objection, your written statements will be inserted into the record. 

We will begin with Ambassador Brownfield. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD, 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. I thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Berman, ladies and gentlemen of the committee. Thank you for 

the opportunity to appear before you today. 

Madam Chairman, I have been in the Foreign Service for 32 

years. I mention this not just to make you feel sorry for me but to 

suggest that the answers to today’s theme, emerging threats and 

security in the Western Hemisphere, have evolved over time. 

We are providing a snapshot of a moving train. In many ways, 

the speed and direction of that train are determined by our own 

policies and programs. If you had asked me to assess major threats 

in 1980, I would have pointed to guerrilla insurgencies in Central 

America supported by governments both within and outside of the 

hemisphere. In 1990, I would have answered huge vertically integrated Colombian drug cartels controlling all trafficking in the 

Andes. In the year 2000, I would have said that the threat was the 

nexus between drug traffickers and guerrilla insurgencies in Colombia and Peru. In 2007, I would have argued that the most serious security threat to the United States had moved to Mexico, 

where criminal cartels produce, traffic, and market their product 

into the United States. Today, I believe our greatest threat has 

moved to Central America, where traffickers and criminal gangs 

now facilitate the flow of up to 95 percent of all cocaine reaching 

the U.S. and threaten the very governments themselves. 

Madam Chairman, I suggest there is cause and effect here. We 

correctly focused on Central America in the 1980s, and the 

Medellin and Cali cartels grew. As we broke the backs of the major 

cartels, smaller traffickers developed an unholy alliance with the 

Colombian FARC and ELN and the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso. 

As Plan Colombia squeezed Colombian traffickers, Mexican cartels 

filled the void. And as the Merida Initiative begins to bite against 

those cartels, we see them moving into Central America. 

We still face security threats from drug cartels, guerrilla movements, organized crime, and trafficking networks, but our job is to 

stay ahead of the emerging threats. And right now I believe that 

is Central America. 

The President made that clear last March when he announced 

his Central America Citizen Security Partnership. Our tactical 

challenge is to provide additional resources for Central America 

law enforcement and security programs, link the governments more 

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port our essential Plan Colombia, Merida Initiative, and Caribbean 

Basin programs. And we very much appreciate the committee’s 

support in this effort. 

The committee asked us to consider, as well, security threats 

from outside the hemisphere. They may not be as great as those 

from within, but they very definitely exist. 

I served 3 very long years as Ambassador to Venezuela. When 

I arrived in 2004, the diplomatic list showed fewer than 10 diplomats assigned to the Iranian Embassy. When I left in 2007, the 

number was above 40. The Iranian Ambassador never told me 

what his people were doing, but I assume they were doing something. And if you had asked me when I left Argentina in 1989 

about the prospects for massive terror attacks within 5 years, supported by the Iranian Government, that would kill more than 100 

innocent people in Buenos Aires, I would have said that probability 

was very remote. I would have been wrong—dead wrong. 

Members of the committee, our mission is to assess the threats 

from the hemisphere to the American people and support the programs that solve them. I believe our highest priority right now is 

Central America, but we cannot lose sight of Mexico, Colombia, the 

Caribbean, and the Andes. We must look ahead to tomorrow’s priorities. I see an emerging trafficking threat from South America 

across the Atlantic to West Africa and from there to Europe or back 

to North America. And we must not lose sight of the external players in our hemisphere. We did that in the early 1990s; we should 

never do that again. 

Madam Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity, and I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brownfield follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Now we would like to hear from Ambassador Goldberg. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PHILIP S. GOLDBERG, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. GOLDBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman and Ranking 

Member Berman and members of the committee. Thank you for 

this opportunity to be with you today. 

Although much of the Western Hemisphere is experiencing 

strong economic growth, improving social conditions, and increasingly consolidated democratic institutions, there continue to be 

some threats to U.S. interests in the region and indications of new 

threats from outside the region. 

The drug threat to the United States continues to emanate primarily from the Western Hemisphere. The flow of drugs fuels violence in Mexico and contributes to the survival of terrorist groups 

in Colombia. Populist governments continue to work to undercut 

U.S. influence in the region. We are concerned about increasing 

Iranian activities in the hemisphere and, in particular, by the 

charges that individuals directed by elements of the Iranian Government were conspiring to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States on U.S. soil. 

President Calderon’s ambitious efforts to combat Mexico’s powerful drug cartels have achieved important successes but faces enormous challenges. Mexico is pursuing a multifaceted strategy to 

eliminate the cartels’ leadership, dismantle their networks, and 

strengthen the rule of law. Mexico faces escalated levels of brutal 

violence as drug cartels fight amongst themselves for dominance 

but also seek to intimidate the government and population. 

Mexican drug-trafficking organizations are expanding into Central America, as Ambassador Brownfield said, which is experiencing a citizen security crisis that threatens the democratic gains 

made over the past two decades. Across the region, we have witnessed surges in murder rates, inroads by transnational gangs and 

narcotics traffickers, and rising crime. Political instability, challenged state institutions, rampant corruption and impunity hamper 

efforts to combat increasing threats to citizen safety in the region. 

In Colombia, in the 11 years since initiation of Plan Colombia, 

remarkable success has been achieved in the fight against narcotics 

trafficking and terrorist groups. The Colombian military attacks 

have weakened the FARC’s leadership, and the group’s membership has been cut nearly in half in the last decade. The Colombian 

Government has expanded its presence throughout the country. 

These achievements have accompanied a successful counternarcotics strategy, with aerial and manual eradication eroding one 

of the FARC’s primary revenue sources. 

Despite these successes, Colombia still faces significant security 

challenges. The FARC remains the largest terrorist group in the 

hemisphere, with over 8,000 insurgents. It continues to traffic in 

drugs and inflict casualties on the military and police on a regular 

basis. In addition, criminal bands have emerged as a threat to public safety, having consolidated control over cocaine production and 

trafficking in some areas of the country. 

20

In addition, the INR, the bureau I represent, continues to track 

connections between the Venezuelan Government and the FARC 

and ELN. In July 2010, the Colombian Government publicly exposed the presence of FARC in Venezuela. In the first half of 2011, 

the Venezuelans took stronger action against the FARC, arresting 

two of its members, likely in response to the diplomatic outreach 

initiated by Colombian President Santos. 

INR remains focused on the potential for instability in Cuba as 

a result of the changes Raul Castro has proposed to combat economic deterioration on the island. These plans are proceeding slowly, and the regime strictly limits and suppresses dissent. Although 

some changes are under way, others will take much longer, if they 

are instituted at all. 

Despite the consolidation of democracy in much of the hemisphere, some countries continue to suffer a decline in the quality 

of their democratic institutions. In some countries, we see a narrowing of freedoms of speech and dissent, a delegitimization of political opposition, and a weakening of independent legislatures and 

judiciaries at the hands of populist Presidents. Although elections 

are held regularly in these countries, electoral playing fields are 

skewed heavily in favor of incumbents. 

I say that not just because the issue is one of democracy, which 

has been a longstanding policy goal and, therefore, the intelligence 

community has followed over decades, but also because it has an 

impact on our ability to work with governments in the critical 

areas of counterterrorism and counternarcotics. 

There are continuing regional efforts to diminish U.S. diplomatic 

influence by creating organizations that some members hope will 

supplant the OAS and marginalize the U.S. 

On the international level, Iran continues to reach out to Latin 

America as a way to diminish its international isolation. So far, 

Iran’s relations with Latin America have developed significantly 

only with leftist governments that share its goal of reducing U.S. 

Influence. Since Ahmadinejad took office in 2005, bilateral cooperation between Iran and Venezuela has deepened in the areas of diplomacy and defense and, to a more limited extent, on energy and 

trade. Most moderate governments—and this is important to keep 

in mind—have responded coolly to Tehran’s outreach. 

We remain concerned that Hezbollah is able to tap into the large 

Lebanese diaspora in Venezuela and elsewhere in Latin America 

for fundraising. And we continue to look very closely for any indications of other activities, particularly operational activity. 

I thank you again for the opportunity to be before the committee, 

and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Goldberg follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. Glaser is recognized. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL L. GLASER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR TERRORIST FINANCING, OFFICE OF 

TERRORISM AND FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY 

Mr. GLASER. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member 

Berman, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the 

emerging threats and security challenges in the Western Hemisphere. 

The Western Hemisphere is a region of particular importance to 

the Treasury Department. Our economic and financial institutions 

are fundamentally intertwined with those of our neighbors. Illicit 

financial activity in one corner of the region will inevitably find its 

way across our borders and into our financial institutions. Today 

I would like to talk to you about how we are employing the Treasury Department’s unique tools and capabilities to address this 

threat. 

The threat emanating from narcotics trafficking has been and remains the preeminent illicit financial challenge in the region. Perhaps more than any other illicit financial activity, narcotics-related 

money laundering places our financial institutions at risk and undermines the integrity of financial systems throughout the region. 

Historically, economic sanctions have been our primary weapon 

to target the financial networks of drug-trafficking organizations. 

Over the past several years, the United States has sanctioned nearly 2,300 individuals and entities in Latin America involved in narcotics trafficking. 

Even if sanctions remain a centerpiece of the Treasury Department’s counternarcotics strategy, we recognize the importance of 

drawing upon additional tools to achieve a deeper and more lasting 

impact. This requires enhancing our understanding of the financial 

infrastructure of Mexican drug-trafficking organizations to enable 

more effective disruption. Along with our interagency partners, we 

have been working closely with Mexican counterparts to improve 

bilateral information-sharing and coordination as part of a more 

comprehensive strategy to attack the financial resources of these 

drug-trafficking organizations. 

In addition to demonstrating a commitment to partnership with 

the United States on illicit counter financing, the Government of 

Mexico has proposed or enacted a series of far-reaching domestic 

anti-money-laundering reforms of its own. Further, Mexico has 

shown broad leadership in the region. Recently, for example, my 

counterparts at the Mexican finance ministry and banking commission joined me on a trip to Guatemala and Panama, where we, together, engaged host-country authorities on the importance of taking concerted action to undermine cartel financial networks. 

Although the terrorist financing challenge in Latin America does 

not rise to the level of the narcotics-related financing threat, we 

take terrorist fundraising and facilitation seriously wherever it occurs. While neither al-Qaeda nor its affiliates derive a significant 

amount of support from the region, Hezbollah and the narco-terVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:31 Dec 13, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\101311\70665 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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rorist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or the FARC, remain active. We have, therefore, focused our targeting efforts on 

FARC and Hezbollah fundraising and facilitation activities in Venezuela and Hezbollah activities in the tri-border area of Brazil, 

Paraguay, and Argentina. 

But given this hearing’s focus on terrorist threats within the 

Western Hemisphere, I do think that it is important that I say a 

few words about this week’s revelation that we disrupted an Iran 

Quds Force plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador here in 

Washington. This is a dramatic reminder that the urgent and serious threat we face from Iran is not limited to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 

Earlier this summer, the Treasury Department exposed an alQaeda network operating in Iran, under agreement with the Iranian Government, and now we see new evidence of Iran’s support 

for terrorism. This is why we have been working for several years 

to address the full spectrum of Iranian illicit conduct. And while 

it is in the interest of an increasingly isolated Iran to seek expansion of its economic and financial ties to Latin America, the reality 

is that, to date, Iran has failed to establish a meaningful financial 

foothold in this region. 

When Iran has managed to make inroads, we have been quick 

to act. Most notably, the U.S. designated, along with the European 

Union, Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, a Venezuelan-based subsidiary of the Export Development Bank of Iran. We have also 

proactively engaged with governments and private-sector officials 

throughout the region to warn against the risk of doing business 

with Iran. 

Treasury is also working to build a robust domestic and international anti-money-laundering/counterterrorist-financing framework to safeguard the entire region from these types of threats. 

Through the Financial Action Task Force, we have been working 

for many years to set anti-money-laundering and counterterroristfinancing standards and best practices and hold countries in the region accountable for their implementation. Every country in the region, with the notable exception of Cuba, has been or is scheduled 

to be assessed against the international anti-money-laundering/

counterterrorist-financing standards. These assessments are published and highlight weaknesses in each jurisdiction along with recommendations for remedying those deficiencies. 

Madam Chairwoman, the Treasury Department is committed to 

prioritizing our counter-illicit-financing work in the Western Hemisphere. We will continue to seek ways to disrupt and dismantle illicit financial networks and to develop strong systemic safeguards 

across the region. 

Thank you. And I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Glaser follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. Stockton? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PAUL N. STOCKTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE 

AND, AMERICAS’ SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Mr. STOCKTON. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Berman, 

distinguished members of the committee, the Western Hemisphere 

is in the midst of a transformation. There are two trends of fundamental importance to U.S. security. The first trend is that security 

challenges in this hemisphere are becoming increasingly severe. 

And I look forward to talking about specific threats in response to 

your questions. But there is something else that is important that 

is going on, and that is, we have new opportunities to partner with 

the other nations in this region in order to work together to meet 

the emerging threats. 

The foiled Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to 

the United States exemplifies how these two trends are coming together. On the one hand, we have a very severe threat in our hemisphere from Iran. At the same time, the Government of Mexico was 

an absolutely indispensable partner in helping us meet this challenge. I also want to praise the Government of Mexico for stepping 

up to the plate in a way that was absolutely essential. 

So the two trends are coming together here: Threat and opportunities for partnership. But there is also a broader trend here for 

partnership opportunities that I wanted to address. 

All across the hemisphere, we have nations that are not only increasingly able to handle their own threats to their own countries 

but to be what I would call ‘‘security exporters’’—that is, to partner 

together with the United States to meet the shared challenges that 

we face. 

Just a few examples. I always start with Canada, our most special of partners in the Western Hemisphere. There is nothing like 

NORAD for us. Canada increasingly is helping out in the Caribbean, helping out in Central America, in ways that are very valuable from the U.S. perspective. But it is not only Canada: Chile, 

working in Central America to build police capacity; Brazil, providing an invaluable leadership role with MINUSTAH. And in Colombia—let’s look at Colombia as the exemplar of this trend. Colombia, not only making progress against the FARC, but today 

training helicopter pilots from Mexico to go after the 

narcotraficantes. 

This is the broader trend. We are making progress in building 

these partnerships. But I would suggest, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Berman, there is much more we can do. And I look forward to the opportunity to talk about this. 

Before I close, I want to thank you, the ranking member, and all 

the members of this committee for helping make this progress possible. It is because of the assistance that the United States has provided to our partner nations to build their capacity that enables 

them now to become security providers across our hemisphere so, 

together, we can meet the increasingly severe challenges that we 

face. 

43

Thank you so much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

And I thank all of the panelists. 

I am so glad that you brought up Colombia as being such a stable ally and a security exporter. You wouldn’t know it from the debate that took place on the House floor. You should see that. That 

was—it is like the Cambodia killing fields, you would think. But 

we thank Colombia for everything that it has done to transform 

their country by fighting against these extremists. And we hope 

that Mexico, their leadership is equally as successful before those 

drug cartels destroy that beautiful country. 

I wanted to ask you about the ghost flights from Iran. There 

have been reports that they are no longer going from Iran to Venezuela, that they are shifting to Madrid. Is that so? If so, why the 

change? And what information do we have about who is being 

transported and what is being transported? 

And my second question deals with Hezbollah operations in 

Latin America. Many of you discussed that. What changes have we 

seen in their involvement in Latin America? What are they targeting? You had mentioned money laundering in the tri-border 

area, et cetera. And where do you think that they will expand next, 

and what is their goal? 

Thank you. 

Mr. GOLDBERG. On the flights issue, Madam Chairman, we understand that the commercial flight that existed between Iran and 

Venezuela has ceased, but we do monitor other flights coming back 

and forth. I am somewhat constrained——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. When you say flights that are going—

so you say, in addition to this commercial flight, there were other 

flights that may still be taking place? 

Mr. GOLDBERG. No, I don’t want to leave that impression. And 

any information that we gather from the intelligence would have 

to be discussed——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. In a classified setting. 

Mr. GOLDBERG [continuing]. In a classified setting. 

As for Hezbollah, our interest in it and our understanding of 

their operations are largely in the fundraising area. They tap the 

largely Lebanese Shia expatriate community in Latin America, in 

Venezuela and other countries, the tri-border region, to raise funds. 

We do not know of operational activities, but we watch that very 

closely to see if——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. And what can the U.S. do to put an 

end or to dampen this illicit activity of money laundering in the triborder area? You mentioned these countries that are strong allies 

of the United States with whom we have very strong diplomatic 

and commercial ties. Are we without tools to use against this operation? 

Mr. GOLDBERG. I will defer to my colleague from the Treasury 

Department. 

Mr. GLASER. Thank you, Madam. 

I think, first of all, just any time we talk about Hezbollah fundraising, I think the first thing that is important to flag is, by far, 

the most significant donor to Hezbollah is Iran. All other forms of 

Hezbollah fundraising pale in comparison to the funds that 

44

Hezbollah gets from Iran. That is not to say that we shouldn’t attack all sources of Hezbollah fundraising, but I think it is important to put it into context. Iran is the chief financial supporter of 

Hezbollah, and Hezbollah survives on Iranian support. 

That said, as you point out and as Phil pointed out, Hezbollah 

derives financial support from the Western Hemisphere, as well, 

from fundraisers in Venezuela, from fundraisers in the tri-border 

area. And I think we need to take a broader approach to addressing that. 

One of the most important things to do on a systemic level, as 

I noted in my testimony, is to ensure that all of these countries 

have effective anti-money-laundering/counterterrorist-financing 

regulatory regimes, law enforcement regimes. That is something 

that we are working closely with all the countries in the region on, 

primarily through the Financial Action Task Force and through regional affiliates of the Financial Action Task Force. It is important 

that countries like Argentina, for example, enact money-laundering 

laws that meet international standards. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. So do you believe that in these three 

countries, have they done enough to do away with the Hezbollah 

money-laundering activities? 

Mr. GLASER. Well, I think that there is more to be done on that. 

As I said, I think it is important to enact laws, but then, in addition to enacting the laws—which, for example, in Argentina remain 

to be enacted—it is important to take targeted action with respect 

to Hezbollah fundraising. We at the Treasury Department have 

designated 19 Hezbollah individuals in the Western Hemisphere 

over the years. 

I think an interesting act that we took earlier this year, separate 

from those 19 designations, is when we designated under Section 

311 of the PATRIOT Act Lebanese Canadian Bank, which is a 

bank in Beirut that had ties to the Western Hemisphere and was 

a central node of a narcotics-trafficking organization——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. So we are able to use the PATRIOT 

Act to get to some of these banks that have ties—if they have ties 

to the United States. 

Mr. GLASER. Absolutely. We use the PATRIOT Act to get at Lebanese Canadian Bank. And what Lebanese Canadian Bank also 

showed—the fact pattern that Lebanese Canadian Bank showed is 

that Hezbollah was deriving financial support from the criminal activities of this drug-trafficking ring. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. And that was one case. You have similar success stories where we have been able to use the PATRIOT 

Act to get to these illicit operations in Latin America? 

Mr. GLASER. We have lots of Section 311 success stories. That is 

the 311 success story in the Western Hemisphere, though. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Right. Thank you very much. 

Any other comments from the panelists? 

When it comes to—well, I just have 15 seconds, so I will leave 

it for another time. Thank you so much. 

I would like to recognize my friend, the ranking member, for his 

questions. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

45

And I would like to ask about two different areas. The first—and 

I guess here a little bit I want to pick up on what Secretary Stockton raised at the end. 

The written testimony for Assistant Secretary Goldberg talks 

about three of the top persistent threats: Drugs; populist governments, most particularly Venezuela; and Iran. Assistant Secretary 

Brownfield, in his written testimony and his oral testimony did not 

mention Iran, did not mention populist governments, did not mention Venezuela. 

Obviously, some of that comes from each function that you have. 

But building on what Assistant Secretary Stockton said, could you 

take 2 minutes, Ambassador Brownfield, to give, from your Western Hemisphere background, a broader policy perspective in terms 

of our security and general relationship with the hemisphere, in 2 

minutes? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Sure, Congressman. I will try. 

Obviously, you have correctly noted that Ambassador Goldberg 

and I will attack the same issues from different perspectives, given 

what our responsibilities are, not because we disagree. I have 

known the distinguished Ambassador for some 25 years, and we always agree, at least on fundamental issues. I will also—that does 

not include the Boston Red Sox, by the way. 

I will also try not to move into the terrain of the Acting Assistant 

Secretary for Western Hemisphere, who obviously has the responsibility for overall policy. 

Congressman, I would suggest to you that Latin America, to a 

very considerable extent, is an area that has been in transition for 

the past 10 or 15 years. That transition is evidenced by what both 

Phil and I have attempted to talk about in terms of an appeal in 

some countries of populist governments with fairly simplistic solutions to social and economic problems. So we have that package of 

countries. Call them what you will. 

You have another group of countries that I would suggest are 

those that have committed themselves to a model which, in my 

opinion, has actually proven to work fairly well for the last 50, 60, 

or 200 years, and that is a model driven on market economies and 

governments that provide basic protections but that do not attempt 

to run the economy themselves. 

And then you have a group of countries in between that swing, 

if you will, between one or the other. 

Our challenge, for the last 10 years or so, has been dealing with 

those three sets of countries, attacking the problems—the security 

problems, the law-enforcement problems—the threats, if you will, 

that come from the region, taking into account or overlaying on 

that approach this fundamental issue of transition within the region. 

Personally, I believe we have done a fairly good job at it. I would 

suggest to you that Latin America today, in the year 2011, offers 

a better, more positive picture than 10 years ago and certainly better than 15 or 20 years ago. I think we have some extraordinary 

good-news stories to tell, Colombia foremost among them. I personally believe we are making progress in Mexico, and that progress 

will be increasingly evident in the years ahead. 

46

Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you. I would love to hear you expand 

on this, but I got 1 minute. 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. You only gave me 2 minutes, Congressman. 

Mr. BERMAN. That is right. And you only took 21⁄2. 

Maybe this is for Secretary Glaser, although, Ambassador Goldberg, I would also be interested in your opinion—does the assassination/bombing plot that was stopped—and I will take what Secretary Stockton said, that there is no disagreement among the panelists that the Mexican Government was a partner in helping us 

to apprehend the plotter and stop the plot. But does that change 

the way we understand the threat from the Government of Iran? 

I am asking you in your worldwide hats. 

Mr. GLASER. Sure. 

I don’t think it changes the way we view the threat from Iran. 

As I said in my oral testimony, just earlier this summer we exposed an al-Qaeda facilitation network operating under an agreement with the Iranian Government on Iranian territory. So Iran’s 

support for terrorism and participation in terrorism is not a new 

phenomenon. 

Now, certainly, this most recent plot makes it even more troubling than ever, but from what we do at the Treasury Department, 

this just reaffirms the importance of what we have been doing 

broadly, which is trying to put financial pressure on Iran broadly 

throughout the world, Western Hemisphere and everywhere else, 

trying to isolate Iran as much as possible from the international financial system. 

And, as has been said by numerous people over the course of the 

last couple of days, my hope and expectation is that this most recent plot is going to make it a lot easier to even take it to the next 

level internationally, with respect to our friends and allies and 

partners throughout the world, to demonstrate to them the importance of excluding Iran from the international financial system. 

Mr. GOLDBERG. I would only add, Iran has been on our list of 

state sponsors of terrorism for decades. We go back to the early 

1990s and the attacks that you mentioned, Mr. Berman, in Argentina; the attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq and support for those activities; a nuclear program that is not fully accounted-for, to say the 

least——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Thank you, Mr. Berman. 

Chairman Mack of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

And I want to thank the panel for your insight and for being 

here today. 

Before I get into some of my questions, I just want to make a 

quick observation. My friend and I, Mr. Engel, we share a lot of 

the same goals in the Western Hemisphere. We agree on a lot; we 

disagree in a few places. 

I would suggest that the idea that all of the guns are coming 

from the United States to Mexico—there was a GAO report. As you 

drill down into the report, it is 90 percent of the guns that are 

traceable, and it is only the U.S. guns that are traceable. So I think 

that has to be put on the record for people to understand. 

47

Also, if we are worried about the guns going into Mexico, that 

policy, the Fast and Furious policy—everyone in this room should 

be appalled by that policy. 

Let me first start in Venezuela. Is Hugo Chavez in control of his 

government? 

Ambassador Brownfield? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. I would answer the question this way, Mr. 

Chairman. Virtually his entire government is unwilling to, in my 

opinion, make decisions without hearing what his view would be. 

To that extent, he clearly is in control. 

If the question is, is everything that is going on in his government known to him and controlled by him?, that is a more open 

question. 

Mr. MACK. But you would agree that government officials in Venezuela would not want to go against President Chavez. 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. I would agree with that statement, for sure. 

Mr. MACK. Okay. So we know that Venezuela was selling gasoline in violation of the Iran Sanctions Act, supporting a terrorist 

organization. The Treasury Department, in early September, put 

sanctions on or designated four government officials in Venezuela 

on the drug kingpin—and their quote was, ‘‘Today’s actions exposed 

four Venezuela Government officials as key facilitators of arms, security, training, and other assistance in support of the FARC operations in Venezuela.’’

So my question is, if we have a list of state sponsors of terror, 

and we have a country and a government in Venezuela that is supporting terrorists and terrorist organizations, whether it is Iran or 

the FARC, and we agree that Hugo Chavez is in charge with an 

iron fist of his government, and then we sanction four members of 

his government in support of the FARC, how can we not designate 

Venezuela as a state sponsor of terror? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Mr. Chairman, there is not a human being in 

this room who is less likely to defend the actions, decisions of the 

President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela than your humble servant. That said, you have moved into an area that is beyond 

my area of responsibility, so I am going to defer on answering your 

specific question. 

Mr. MACK. Somehow I thought that would happen. So let me go 

into another question. 

What is the difference between the FARC and the Mexican drug 

cartels? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. You are looking at me, so I will take a crack 

at that one, Mr. Chairman. 

I mean, I could speak for days, but I suppose the fundamental 

differences that I would point to are that the FARC is an organization that claims to have a political, philosophical, and ideological 

philosophy, if you will, and the Mexican drug-trafficking organizations do not. That probably would be what I would describe——

Mr. MACK. Okay. So, going off that, if the cartels in Mexico are 

offering health care, if they are trying to displace the government, 

isn’t that politically motivated? Offering health care, you know, 

going into these communities and putting on barbecues or picnics 

and trying to win the support of the public so the public will listen 

48

to the cartels and not the government, isn’t that a political motivation? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. You know what I am going to respond, Mr. 

Chairman, because you have already gotten me to commit to this 

last week in this very same room. I do acknowledge that many of 

the facts on the ground, the things that are being done by those 

organizations, are consistent with what we would call either ‘‘terrorism’’ or ‘‘insurgency’’ in other countries. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much. 

Madam Chair, it is clear that an insurgency is happening in 

Mexico and that Venezuela must be placed on the state-sponsor-ofterrorism list. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Mack. 

Mr. Engel, the ranking member on the subcommittee, is recognized. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Let me first say to my friend Mr. Mack, we agree on a great deal. 

I don’t really think it matters whether—I mentioned that President 

Calderon told me it was 90 percent. And, in fact, in Jamaica, the 

Prime Minister of Jamaica told me it was more than 90 percent in 

his country. But I don’t think it matters whether it is 70 percent 

or 80 percent or 90 percent. I think what matters is that illegal 

guns are coming into this country and then going south of the border. 

We know that these people who set up gun shops on the TexasMexico border or gun shows or things like that to sell multiple 

guns—we know where these guns are going. And, to me, it goes 

way beyond Second Amendment rights. 

If we are truly going to identify terrorism in Mexico as a threat, 

Mr. Mack, as you say, if we are going to say that this is a real 

problem with the drug cartels, then we have to do something to 

curb the illegal flow the guns coming from the United States and 

south of the border. 

And let me quote Secretary Clinton. In March 2009, she said, 

‘‘We know very well that the drug traffickers are motivated by the 

demand for illegal drugs in the United States and that they are 

armed by the transport of weapons from the United States.’’ So, to 

me, this means, in effect, that the United States has played a role 

in creating the top persistent threat, Ambassador Goldberg, which 

you identify in your testimony. You put drugs at the top of the regional-threats list. 

So how is the U.S. Government response to this threat taking account of our own responsibility for the threat? I am disappointed 

that President Obama hasn’t invoked U.S. law, which was utilized 

by the first President Bush and then by President Clinton, to be 

able to get at these things. 

What are we doing in the government to acknowledge and try to 

stop the flow of illegal weapons south of the border? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Mr. Engel, I would—we are probably—I am 

going to hide, to a certain extent, behind the fact that what we do 

is on the south side of the border, obviously. We do the foreign-relations side of this effort. 

I will say to you that we are supporting programs, organizations, 

and institutions in Mexico that provide their side of trying to conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:31 Dec 13, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\101311\70665 HFA PsN: SHIRL
49

trol the movement of illicit product, goods, and people across that 

border. And just as we have an obligation to control what moves 

across the border from the northern side, we are working with 

them to assure, one, they have the equipment; two, they have the 

skills, the training, and the expertise necessary; and, three, they 

have the coordination and jointness with U.S. institutions to control it. 

That I can tell you from where I sit. If you bring up the larger 

political and policy question, you have moved beyond the area 

where I can offer you useful input. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Let me raise a couple of other things quickly. 

Mr. Goldberg, your testimony points out that U.S. regional muscle is under stress partly because the region’s countries are forming 

competing organizations and are not inviting the United States to 

become a member. The only regional organization in which we are 

members is the OAS. But recently we voted, every majority Member voted, to defund the OAS. I think that is a mistake. 

Can you talk about the importance of the OAS? 

Flawed that it is, I think we are there, we are an influence, we 

are important. And I think these competing organizations—you 

know, if you take some of these other groups—Mercosur, UNASUR, 

whatever—where we are not a part of it, we are much better off 

trying to strengthen the OAS, in my opinion, because we are there 

at the table.

Mr. GOLDBERG. Mr. Engel, my point was strictly analytical and 

speaking about the trends in the region. And I am not on the policy 

side, so I am not able to speak about the utility of OAS. 

As I say, it is an overarching point of what is happening in the 

region, but I take your point, obviously. But the WHA Bureau 

would need to——

Mr. ENGEL. Let me ask you, Ambassador Goldberg. You and I sat 

together in February 2008 in La Paz when you were Ambassador 

to Bolivia. We currently do not have relations with Bolivia. 

Ambassador Brownfield, Venezuela, you were the Ambassador 

there and I think Ecuador, as well. 

Should we by thinking about sending our ambassadors back? 

And, also, in the 4 seconds I have left, I would like if some of 

the people are answering questions of some of my other colleagues 

later on, talk about Russia, China in the region. Should we be worried about their influence? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Engel. 

Mr. Rivera, my Florida colleague, is recognized. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

With your permission, may I yield 30 seconds to Chairman 

Mack? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Absolutely. 

Mr. Mack? 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much. 

To answer the question from the gentleman from New York to 

Ambassador Brownfield, two things we can do to stop these guns 

and the flow: One, we can secure the border, finish the double-layered fence, add more Border Patrol agents and use of technology; 

50

and, two, we can stop the destructive policies like Fast and Furious 

that undermine our foreign policy initiatives in Latin America. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Glaser, or Secretary Glaser, thank you very much for being 

here today. I appreciate it. 

Are you in charge of OFAC? Does OFAC report to you? 

Mr. GLASER. OFAC doesn’t report to me. My office and OFAC are 

both part of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. 

Mr. RIVERA. So you all work together closely? 

Mr. GLASER. Absolutely. 

Mr. RIVERA. So perhaps you could help me, because we had the 

OFAC director, Mr. Szubin I believe it is, testify before another 

committee, and I was asking about one issue of terrorist financing 

which is financing the terrorist state of Cuba, which we all know 

is on the State Department’s list of official sponsors of terror. We 

know they are holding an American hostage right now, we know 

that they have murdered Americans over international airspace, so 

they certainly have earned their label as a terrorist state. And one 

of the ways we finance terrorism from Cuba is by expanding the 

flights and travel and the money that goes to the Cuban dictatorship through these flights, which OFAC regulates. 

And I was trying to get some answers from Mr. Szubin as to how 

many flights are going to Cuba, because the Obama administration 

has expanded those flights, how many passengers, what are the 

costs involved. I want to see how much money the United States 

is facilitating to finance the terrorist activities in Cuba, and I 

couldn’t get answers. He was unaware of how many flights were 

going and how many passengers. 

And maybe if my office could work with you or with your office, 

you could help perhaps facilitate some of that information on how 

we are trying to regulate. If OFAC, indeed, is regulating that activity, perhaps I could appeal to you to intervene to help me get some 

of that information. 

Mr. GLASER. As always, we are at your disposal, and we would 

be happy to answer any questions, to the extent that we have the 

information. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you. I appreciate that. Because it does seem 

a little contradictory that we are trying to fight the financing of 

terrorist activities but we are facilitating that financing of terrorist 

activities by allowing more and more resources, capital resources, 

to go to a terrorist regime like Cuba. 

And let me go to a specific example that you could perhaps also 

help me with, and that is Hezbollah’s activities in Cuba. Information that you could provide, what is—we have seen many recent reports about increased activity of Hezbollah’s terrorist activities and 

cooperation with Cuba. Can you tell us a little bit about that? 

Mr. GLASER. Well, I would defer to Ambassador Goldberg on the 

details of Hezbollah’s relationship with Cuba. I can tell you, from 

the financial angle, which is the angle that we approach it from, 

there is very little financial connectivity between Hezbollah and 

Cuba. But with respect to operational issues or other issues——

Mr. RIVERA. Please. 

51

Mr. GOLDBERG. I would add also, on the operational activity, that 

we haven’t seen such—we have seen allegations of such activity but 

have not been able to corroborate them—or have not corroborated 

them. 

Mr. RIVERA. So have you not seen any of the media reports regarding Hezbollah setting up a base of operations in Cuba regarding something called the Caribbean case? Does that ring a bell at 

all to you? 

Mr. GOLDBERG. I have seen allegations, I have seen press reports. As I mentioned, we have not corroborated that. Perhaps we 

have—actually, we could go into more detail in a closed session, if 

you would like more detailed information. 

Mr. RIVERA. Absolutely. Because I can understand perhaps you, 

to this point, haven’t corroborated it, but I would suspect it is of 

interest that Hezbollah would be setting up operations in Cuba. 

Mr. GOLDBERG. If that were the case, certainly. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Rivera. 

Mr. Chandler is recognized. 

Mr. CHANDLER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Welcome, gentlemen. 

Ambassador Brownfield, nice to see you again. I was particularly 

interested in your very brief history of our efforts in the last several decades in the region. And what struck me about it was that 

it seems like your view is that we put needed pressure on particular areas that are causing problems at a particular time, we 

solve those problems, at least up to a point, at least we made great 

inroads, but then the problem moves elsewhere. It moves from one 

country or one region to another. 

And now your most recent comment is you think it is worse in 

Central America than it is in Mexico or Colombia or elsewhere. 

Seems like it moved. It sounds like you believe we are playing an 

enormous game of Whac-a-Mole. Wherever we hit them, we may 

tamp it down, but it pops up elsewhere. 

And I guess my question—so much of it, of course, has to do with 

illegal drugs, the whole drug-trafficking problem. I guess one of my 

questions would be, are we ever going to be able to truly solve this 

problem, the problem of the supply of illicit drugs into this country? Or do we, as Mexican President Calderon is quick to suggest, 

do we need to solve the demand problem in this country? Will we 

ever be able to do it without solving that problem? 

Also, I would like any of you all’s thoughts, please, on the Chinese efforts here in this hemisphere. They are obviously making 

significant investments in different countries in the hemisphere. Do 

you all consider their efforts to be a serious emerging threat? 

Thank you. 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Why don’t I start, Congressman, and I will try 

to address at least three of the issues you raised. 

One, are we playing Whac-a-Mole? I don’t think so, but I do acknowledge we have to deal with certain realities. One reality is we 

have a finite number of resources that we have available to dedicate to our efforts and programs in the Western Hemisphere. And 

52

you pay us to get maximum value out of the resources that are 

made available to us. 

Personally, I believe we have made progress. The fact that we 

are no longer talking about Colombia as a potential failed state or 

a narco state, the fact that we are now actually seeing progress in 

our large neighbor to the immediate south, to my way of thinking, 

is progress over where we were 10 or 15 years ago. 

Second, you do bring up the issue of demand reduction. You are 

absolutely correct, as is anyone who says part of the solution must 

be demand reduction. But my response to those who believe it is 

the only solution is that, just as it is wrong to put your entire focus 

on eliminating supply, it is equally wrong to put your entire focus 

on eliminating demand. You have to have a balanced approach. 

Surely that is one lesson we have learned the hard way over the 

last 40 years. I, for one, am open to figuring how to adjust the balance between those two, as long as no one tries to convince me we 

should do all on one side or all on the other. 

Third and finally, while I am not an expert on China and Chinese involvement in the region, let me offer you the following very 

personal observation. I was U.S. Ambassador to Chile for 21⁄2

years, to Venezuela for 3 years, and to Colombia for 3 years. And 

my Chinese counterpart was a very important player in each of 

those three countries in this past decade. Thirty years ago I very 

much doubt that would have been the case. 

If Dr. Goldberg wishes to offer more observations, I cede the floor 

to him. 

Mr. GOLDBERG. Just very quickly. 

China clearly has economic interests around the world. It looks 

for raw resources in much of Africa and Latin America, continues 

to do so. It seeks markets for its exports. So these are economic 

challenges, is how I would best describe it. 

And in terms of political relationships, China has a growing relationship with Brazil because of the involvement in the BRICS 

group of countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. 

And so there is some concert of diplomatic positions. But that is 

how I would describe it. 

Mr. GLASER. Just to add very quickly from an illicit-finance perspective, which is what I focus on, I haven’t seen any Chinese activity in the region which would raise an illicit-financing concern. 

However, I do think it is worth pointing out that the black-market peso exchange, which is the primary mechanism through which 

narcotics funds in this hemisphere are laundered—and it has been 

with us for decades; it used to be a closed system within the Western Hemisphere—now has branched throughout the world, including into East Asia. 

So it is important that we work with our Chinese counterparts 

to focus on narcotics money laundering. That is not to that say the 

Chinese are part of the problem, but, definitely, working with them 

will be part of the solution. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Duncan of South Carolina is recognized. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

And thanks to the panel for being here. 

53

Ambassador Brownfield, we were involved in a committee hearing last week I wanted to remind you about. 

You know, I don’t think anyone was that surprised, who have 

been following the issue of the growing Iranian threat in this hemisphere, that Quds Force and Hezbollah, the arm of Iran, used the 

Mexican drug cartel as a proposed conduit for carrying out this assassination attempt which was foiled, thankfully, by the FBI this 

week. The relationship between Hezbollah and the drug cartel already exists, and we have been trying to raise the awareness for 

months. 

It is not Whac-a-Mole of chasing this group or this group. We 

have known that there has been a relationship between the Mexican drug cartel and Hezbollah for a long time. The evidence is 

clear, with a number of Hezbollah agents that have been incarcerated and captured along the border, the IED that exploded in July 

2010, the tunneling that resemble what has gone on in southern 

Lebanon. 

So I don’t believe anyone that has been following this has been 

caught off guard. But I think America, as a whole, is caught off 

guard, and it time for us to wake up in this country that this is 

a real threat in the Western Hemisphere. 

So, Madam Chairman, I want to bring to your attention House 

Resolution 429 that I filed on Tuesday night, which basically says 

that we will urge the administration to include the Western Hemisphere in its 2012 National Strategy for Counterterrorism’s ‘‘Area 

of Focus,’’ which was absent in the 2011 edition; that it will utilize 

an existing counterterrorism task force, to be led by the Department of Homeland Security in coordination with other members of 

the intelligence community, to examine Iran’s present activity and 

relationships in the Western Hemisphere, including the United 

States of America. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I look forward to reading it. Thank 

you, Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. And just for the record, Mr. Higgins 

has cosponsored that, as well, on the other side of the aisle, so it 

is a bipartisan issue. 

I want to remind Ambassador Brownfield that we talked about 

this last week, and I was talking about the tri-border region, talking about the southern border and named a number of countries. 

And you reminded me, let’s not forget Venezuela, one of your past 

posts. And so I wanted to make that point, as well. 

So the question I have for the panel is—and I will address this 

to Ambassador Goldberg—how do links between terrorism and 

drug and arms trafficking increase U.S. vulnerability to attack? 

Mr. GOLDBERG. The point, Congressman, that I was making earlier was that what is new here and what we have found in the last 

few days is a renewed interest by elements within the Iranian Government to carry out an attack on U.S. soil, but in the hemisphere. 

Because we had seen it in earlier times. In terms of——

Mr. DUNCAN. But it was also the backup plan, possibly in Buenos 

Aires again, from some of the knowledge I have heard. And let me 

remind the folks that the last attack and the largest attack prior 

to 9/11 in this hemisphere happened in Buenos Aires, with an attack on the Israeli Embassy. 

54

Mr. GOLDBERG. No, that is true. 

In terms of what has happened, I mean, there is a case before 

a Federal court at the moment, and we need to allow that to play 

out. What I think this case shows more is Iran’s interest in working in Mexico or doing something in Mexico than the other way 

around. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. 

If Hezbollah has a relationship with the cartels and can smuggle 

arms or people through our southern border, what would prevent 

them from bringing WMDs here? 

Mr. GOLDBERG. It is a kind of hypothetical question and one that, 

clearly, we watch, we monitor. We try to prevent any kind of attack 

or use of the hemisphere for these kinds of activities. International 

terrorist groups, of course, are looking for opportunities everywhere, and we have to be vigilant against them in the intelligence 

community and the law-enforcement community. That is what we 

do. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Yeah. 

In the remaining time, Ambassador Brownfield, can you enlighten me a little bit more on the relationship between Iran and 

Venezuela as we have seen it in the last few months? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Congressman, I have been out of Venezuela 

now for more than 4 years, and, as a consequence, much of my personal data is going to be somewhat dated. 

But I would say, very shortly, very briefly and succinctly, first, 

there is a much greater presence, official presence, of the Iranian 

Government in Venezuela today than there was, say, 10 years ago. 

Second, there is obviously a much stronger political relationship, 

visits between the two Presidents and engagement at senior levels, 

than there was 10 years ago. 

Third, there is greater mutual support in international organizations like the United Nations, the IAEA, Atomic Energy Agency, 

than there was 10 years ago. That is evident, it is public, it is in 

the media, and neither side denies it. Other——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Meeks is recognized. He is the 

ranking member on the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia. 

Mr. MEEKS. First, let me just say, it has become clear and I see 

a lot of my colleagues are concerned about terrorism, et cetera. One 

of the things I think that everybody can agree, that President 

Barack Obama has been focused and he has been doing a very good 

job in fighting terrorism and terrorists coming in here and getting 

rid of al-Qaeda and a number of the others. I mean, I think his 

record speaks for itself. And most Americans, even in the recent 

policies, they may argue about one thing, but one thing that they 

agree on is President Barack Obama’s focus and the way that he 

is utilizing all of the intelligence to make sure that he keeps America safe. 

Now, I love this hemisphere. You know, I was sitting and listening, and I believe that we must, indeed, examine the topic of today’s hearing, but we must do so without the polarizing rhetoric 

that is reminiscent of the U.S. policies of decades ago when our NaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:31 Dec 13, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\101311\70665 HFA PsN: SHIRL
55

tion looked at the region through the cold-war prism and chose our 

allies and interventions on that basis alone. We made some poor 

decisions when we were driven by fear and had a single and narrow focus in those days. This is not the time to be fearful of developments in Latin America and the Caribbean. I believe we would 

be better served to look practically and comprehensively at the developments in the hemisphere. 

I think we can reflect on some very positive and meaningful 

changes in recent years that show remarkable progress and promise. I scolded some of my colleagues yesterday when they wanted 

to look at Colombia only through the past. All they were talking 

about Colombia, those who voted against Colombia, was about Colombia’s past. Nobody looked at where Colombia is today and the 

improvements that it made and the direction it was moving forward. We have to stop just looking at the past. Our hemisphere has 

never been this democratic. The social and economic reforms of the 

past decade have done much to shore up most of these nations. 

Clearly, democracy is always a work in progress, and there are 

challenges that must be addressed and objectives to be pursued: 

Poverty eradication, strengthening the rule of law, equal access to 

opportunity, security for all segments of society, eliminating corruption, and protecting human rights. And that is precisely why I 

have argued in this committee that cutting U.S. foreign aid—it is 

such a small but important item of our budget, and it is not in our 

interest to cut foreign aid. 

The emerging threats don’t just stem from outside of our borders. 

A significant number of countries in the Western Hemisphere could 

very well hold a similar hearing on threats that stem from our own 

Nation. If we are going to talk about emerging threats, I hope we 

will include those issues that resonate so deeply south of the border. Mr. Engel has talked about some—the U.S. demand for drugs, 

the flow of guns from America, migration, trade expansion, the embargo against Cuba, to name a few. 

Let me take this opportunity to make a critical but often, in this 

committee, unacknowledged point about regional progress. We are 

seeing for the first time significant participation in democratic life 

on the part of disadvantaged communities who finally feel free and 

feel that they have a voice in a region where black and indigenous 

communities historically suffered without recourse. I speak in this 

instance about the United States, as well. 

Democracy is more inclusive than it has ever been. For the first 

time, many countries have elected Presidents that were born in 

poverty and do not come from their white elite. Take Bolivia, for 

example. The majority and historically marginalized indigenous 

population is more politically involved and take pride in the fact 

that President Morales is the first indigenous person to lead that 

country. 

The biggest threats to our hemisphere are not the personalities 

that some of my colleagues will label today as demagogues and 

ideologues. I would argue that, from the perspective of the people 

in our hemisphere who have chosen these leaders, the biggest 

threats are criminality and poverty. Recent research indicates that 

our regional neighbors live more in the center, politically, than we 

are often willing to acknowledge. Some of any colleagues are quick 

56

to see ideologues, but if we look more closely, we often find pragmatists with whom we might build constructive relationships and 

may ultimately dispel some of our assumptions without simply 

clinging to ideology. 

I remember, a decade ago, when there was a new leader on the 

scene and on the horizon in Brazil. Many worried about him and 

said that he was going to be a bad guy. But we see, years later, 

after the economy was expected to tank and social chaos was to 

ensue, instead what we saw was the movement of Brazil as the rising star among emerging nations, with the President Lula at the 

helm. 

And of course we must not be Pollyannas. There are evildoers out 

there, and the Western Hemisphere does need to confront real security threats head-on. To this end, our alliances with our neighbors are essential. So is continued engagement and continued cooperation and intelligence-sharing, continued assistance to build 

the capacity of our neighbors, intelligence and security institutions, 

and continued joint operations in training. 

I think that the glass is more than half-empty, it is half-full. I 

think that we should salute our friends. I love the progress that 

the people in the Western Hemisphere—we always talk down to 

them. We always say bad things. There are a lot of good things 

going on in the Western Hemisphere, and I think that that is good 

for all of us. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. Deutch of Florida is recognized. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ambassador Brownfield, you spoke in your testimony about the 

difficulty that you would have had in imagining the bombing in Argentina at the time that you were there. The recent foiled Iranian 

terror plot highlights Iran’s growing ties in the Western Hemisphere. But what is, in many ways, the most troublesome is that, 

at the same time, Iranian officials like Defense Minister Ahmad 

Vahidi travel freely in places like Latin America. Just this summer, he spent time in Bolivia. 

The reason I refer back to your comments is because Mr. Vahidi 

has been implicated in the AMIA Jewish center bombing in Argentina. He is subject to an INTERPOL Red Notice. 

What are we doing to prevent sanctioned officials like Vahidi 

from traveling not just in areas of concern but skirting international sanctions by traveling under the guise of official business? 

How are we addressing that, and how can we prevent it? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Congressman, you raise a very valid question. 

I would remind you that it is a question, in the case that you are 

talking about, that involves the countries of Iran, Argentina, and 

Bolivia. The gentleman is actually currently under the equivalent 

of indictment in the Republic of Argentina for homicide-related 

charges. 

At the end of the day, we are members of INTERPOL. We support INTERPOL. To the extent that an INTERPOL warning or notice is out there that would give us and U.S. law enforcement the 

authority to act against an individual, we would exercise that authority. 

57

If your question is asking more what are we doing or able to do 

in Bolivia to get that government to take certain steps, while I am 

not responsible for Bolivia, obviously we have perhaps less ability 

to influence the direction that that government goes than certain 

other governments in the region. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Ambassador. The question really is 

more the former. It is, individuals like Vahidi and others that 

Ahmadinejad, that the regime understands that the sanctions law, 

the ban on travel can be skirted simply by appointing these individuals to official positions which give them the ability to travel 

freely. 

I would throw it open to the other witnesses. I mean, I have suggested, and I think there are others who have looked at this, that 

existing sanctions law gives us the opportunity to sanction perhaps 

not those individuals who should not be traveling but can because 

of our treaty obligations and the like, but to sanction those fuel 

suppliers who provide the fuel for the airlines, for example. 

What else can we do to crack down on those who would otherwise be subject to a travel ban but get around it by their official 

capacity, the official title that they may hold? 

Mr. GLASER. Well, Congressman, it is tangentially related to your 

question, but I think you have part of this in mind because you 

mentioned the whole issue relating to transportation. That is something that we take quite seriously, and it is part of our overall efforts with respect to Iran. As you know, earlier this week, the 

Treasury Department designated Mahan Air. Earlier this summer, 

we designated Iran Air. And we have been focusing our efforts with 

respect to IRISL, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, for 

some time. So I think you are thinking about this the right way. 

Part of our efforts to squeeze Iran, part of our efforts to apply 

pressure on Iran isn’t just related to the financial side, but it is related to isolating Iran on an even broader basis. And from the 

Treasury Department perspective, that is what we are trying do 

when we target entities like Iran Air and when we target entities 

like Mahan Air. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Glaser, just let me follow up then. As we go 

forward and look forward to the debate on further Iran sanctions, 

given the work that you do, what is the most important missing 

piece, what is it that would help you most that you don’t currently 

have? 

Mr. GLASER. Well, I think when we look at our ongoing efforts 

to continue to squeeze Iran, it is about finding where are they finding points of access to the international financial system and closing those off. You know, some of the things that we look at, there 

are numerous branches of designated Iranian banks around the 

world, branches of Bank Saderat, branches of Bank Melli, operating in various countries. Those are banks that we want to focus 

on and isolate as much as possible. 

We continue our efforts to engage with countries and to engage 

with banks around the world with respect to CISADA enforcement. 

That is something we take seriously. 

And so I think that we are on the right track. I think it is just 

a question of finding where are these points of entry into the international financial system and trying to close those off. 

58

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. McCaul, who is the vice chair of the Subcommittee on the 

Western Hemisphere. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And welcome to the panelists. 

Ambassador, it is great to have your presence twice in about a 

week. 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Extreme pleasure. 

Mr. MCCAUL. It is an extreme pleasure for me, as well. 

And the events—and I am sure this has been discussed. I had 

a markup in Homeland Security. But the events of this week clearly call into question, I think, the relationship between terrorists 

and the drug cartels. And it is something that I think we have 

been talking about for quite some time. 

Certainly, the Hezbollah influence is nothing new. We have 

known that has existed in Latin America, particularly with Venezuela. We had Kourani, the operative who was brought across the 

border by a coyote and prosecuted in Detroit several years ago. 

But what happened this week is, again, I think, hard evidence 

that these groups are now trying, attempting at least, from their 

point of view, to reach out to members of the drug cartels, in this 

case the Zetas, to carry out their plots, in this case an assassination of a high-level official, Saudi Ambassador, in the Nation’s capital—a pretty bold, brazen act on the part of Iran. 

And it makes me wonder if they haven’t attempted to make those 

sort of contacts with drug cartels in the past. If anyone is at liberty 

to discuss that issue—I know we are not in a classified setting. 

But, Ambassador, have you heard of any other attempts to contact—or contacts between any terrorist organizations and the drug 

cartels? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Mr. Chairman, so as to avoid being hit over 

the head by Ambassador Goldberg, seated to my immediate side, 

I will say, I am unaware of any hard evidence in that regard. I 

have seen reports, rumors, to the same extent you have. I cannot 

tell you of a specific case where I am comfortable that this has occurred. 

Mr. GOLDBERG. I would prefer to discuss it in a classified setting. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Sure. And I would like to do that. It is hard for 

me to believe that something this high-profile, that this would be 

the first time they have reached out to the Mexican drug cartels. 

Let me ask a couple other questions. 

Ambassador, do you believe that the Mexican drug cartels intimidate the civilian population in Mexico? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. I believe you know my answer to this question, 

Mr. Chairman, since I believe I gave it to you last week. In certain 

communities and certain places at certain times, yes, I do. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And do you believe that they also intimidate or coerce the government in Mexico? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. And to that, I gave you the same answer. It 

depends on location and time, but the answer is, in those cases, 

yes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And do you agree that they carry these acts out by 

extortion, kidnappings, and political assassinations? 

59

Mr. BROWNFIELD. I believe that those are among the tools that 

they use in their efforts. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, that is the definition of ‘‘terrorism’’ under 

Federal law, which is why I introduced my bill, which has been a 

little—it has been provocative—to designate them as foreign terrorist organizations, not to label but, rather, to give us additional 

authorities to go after them far beyond the ‘‘kingpin statute.’’ This 

would be, jurisdictionally, we wouldn’t be limited to just in the 

United States. And I think the 15-year penalty enhancement, the 

freezing of assets in the United States, and the ability to deport 

them would be a valuable tool. 

And I think, in light of what happened this week, I think we 

really have to start taking this pretty seriously. If they are attempting to reach out and, you know, get in bed, so to speak, with 

the Mexican drug cartels, that it is a serious issue. 

My judgment is, this is not some rogue operation on the part of 

Iran. My judgment is, this goes to higher levels within the Iranian 

Government and was sanctioned at higher levels by Iran. 

And that leads me to my next question. To anybody on the panel, 

what should be our response? I mean, I think the Secretary has 

come out—and I think she is a very smart lady—talked about 

harsher sanctions, and I think we will certainly all support that. 

But what else can we do? 

For instance, should we be expelling suspected Iranian intelligence officers that we know may be in the United States and help 

Mexico expel the ones in Mexico? Because the Mexicans will tell 

you, we don’t have a handle on who is down here. We don’t know 

if there are, you know—we know that they are here, but they are 

having a hard time identifying them. And it seems to me we need 

to help Mexico in that effort. 

And I will throw that out to the panel in general. What should 

be our response? 

Mr. GOLDBERG. I think you might have the wrong panel for that. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And that is true, this is Western Hemisphere. 

However, given the influence they have in the hemisphere, what do 

you believe? 

Mr. GLASER. Well, I think I am qualified to talk about our sanctions policy with respect to Iran. It is what I spend a considerable 

part of my job doing. And I think that our overall efforts to date 

have been, from the financial-sanctions perspective, again, to isolate Iran from the international financial system, to isolate Iran 

economically, to apply broad pressure on Iran. And I think that 

that is the right approach; I think that is an approach that this 

government has taken for years——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you so much. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Can I—just one last question? 

Given the level of this——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. McCaul, I like you lots and appreciate and respect you, but I have to be brutal with the time. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, I appreciate that. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I apologize. 

Mr. MCCAUL. All right. 

60

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Connolly is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And if my friend 

Mr. McCaul were to formulate a question, I would yield to him. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you for your generosity. I really appreciate 

that. And I will return the favor in the future. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I know you will. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Just real quickly, if there this was an act at the 

highest levels in the Iranian Government, a political assassination—after all, a political assassination started World War I; it 

started the First World War—would you view this attempt to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador, if it was indeed sanctioned at the 

highest levels, as an act of warfare? 

Nobody wants to answer that? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Mr. Chairman, as Ambassador Goldberg said, 

you have the wrong panel for this one. I could offer you Bill 

Brownfield’s personal opinion, but that is not why we are here. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Uh-huh. 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. I think it is safe for all of us to say—and I bet 

I do speak for all of us on this one—that we share the same personal view of what has been revealed to us this week that you do. 

Where we go from there obviously does require other people with 

other responsibilities to give a useful response to your question. 

Mr. GOLDBERG. And let me just reiterate, this does represent 

something that is very disturbing—the use of Mexico, the proposed 

attempt on the life of an ambassador here in Washington on American soil. So all of those things, the premises are correct. 

Mr. MCCAUL. In fairness to the gentleman from Virginia, I am 

going to yield back. 

And thank you so much for your generosity. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank my colleague. 

Well, if I may follow up a little bit on that, Mr. Ambassador, it 

is disturbing. It is, actually, a lot more than that, presumably. And 

what bothers one is that with impunity these agents provocateurs 

went to Mexico knowing that is where they would find a willing 

partner. 

And so, I guess part of my question is—you know, I went to Mexico and met with Mexican officials over 11⁄2 years ago with a rather 

high-level delegation here from the House, and we expressed great 

concern about violence, especially in the northern part of Mexico. 

And we even raised the question, frankly, of a failed state. The situation in northern Mexico seems to have actually gotten worse, not 

better. 

And so, I guess I would ask, in light of the recent revelations this 

week, how concerned do we need to be about stability in our southern neighbor? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Why don’t I start with a response to that, Congressman? 

And, first, I would like to remind everyone on the committee 

that, at the end of the day, what we have is a positive outcome. 

Let us not forget that a plot was foiled. It was foiled in no small 

measure due to the cooperation between the Governments of the 

United States and Mexico, which, in turn, is a product, perhaps, of 

4 years of unprecedented historic cooperation between our two govVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:31 Dec 13, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\101311\70665 HFA PsN: SHIRL
61

ernments, our two countries, and our two peoples in addressing 

common threats from a perspective of shared responsibility. So I do 

want to remind you that that is our starting point. 

Where do we go from here? The part of this project that I am 

responsible for, which is the Merida Initiative, obviously we want 

to ensure that the support, the equipment, the assistance, the cooperation that we are providing to and with the Government of 

Mexico will also address this sort of threat. Failing to do that 

would make us guilty of stupidity, and while I am willing to be 

many things, I prefer not to be stupid. 

What we obviously have to do and what we are doing is assessing the nature of our programs, the organizations that we are 

working with, the institutions that we are working with, to ensure 

that they are better able to address this sort of threat in the future. 

In my opinion, what we have done over the last 4 years has contributed to foiling this plot. And I think for that we all should owe 

ourselves a debt of gratitude. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I think you make a very good point, Mr. Ambassador. But part two of my inquiry had to do with concern about stability in northern Mexico, because it looks like, frankly, the situation has gotten worse. 

How concerned should we be about a de facto failed state in the 

northern part of Mexico? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Yep. My own view is that the Merida Initiative 

is in transition, and part of the transition directly addresses that 

issue. And that is the transition from support for Federal institutions and organizations to support for state and local organizations 

and institutions—police, prosecutors, courts, municipal governments. 

The extent to which we are able to make that pivot, that transition, to strengthen the states of northern Mexico, particularly the 

five states that border on the United States of America, will address that specific issue. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

And, Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I just——

Mr. MCCAUL [presiding]. Wait a minute. Just let me say, now 

that I have the chair, I will be a little more generous. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. If you would allow me just a point of personal 

privilege, I want to welcome Paul Stockton to the committee. Paul 

and I worked together in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

many years ago, and it is good to see at least one of us did well. 

Mr. STOCKTON. Well, Congressman, I can see who did well. And, 

again, thank you and all the members of the committee for your 

contributions and leadership. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, thank you for that. 

And the Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, 

Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The theme of this hearing is emerging threats. And as important 

as knowing where terrorist activity exists, it is as important to 

know where it will exist in the future. And with a lot of these terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah, it is a new generation. 

62

They are younger, they are more aggressive, they are more technologically sophisticated. 

And in the 12-country region of Latin America, estimates are 

that there are about 138 Hezbollah operatives. This concerns me 

because Hezbollah acts as a proxy for Venezuela, Syria, and Iran. 

It is also estimated that Hezbollah has a presence in the United 

States in 15 major cities and also in 4 major cities in Canada. 

My concern is that they have the presence there. And some will 

say, ‘‘Well, they are not really a threat because they have a presence.’’ Well, again, it is an organization that is committed to violent 

jihad. It is an organization that we identify as a major threat. 

So I would ask each of you to assess the concern of the Hezbollah 

presence, not only generally in the Western Hemisphere but more 

specifically in the United States and in Canada. Because those four 

cities in which Hezbollah has a presence, the sense is that they are 

there so as to have access to major areas of the United States. 

So I would ask you to assess that for us. 

Mr. GOLDBERG. Our view of Hezbollah and what it has been 

doing in the hemisphere, and particularly in South America, has 

been in the area of fundraising for its activities. We talked some 

about that earlier. 

We have not—we follow very closely, we track attempts to do 

operational activity of these groups around the world. And I don’t 

have information to corroborate some of the allegations that I have 

heard over time. But it is something, you can be assured, that we 

watch very closely. 

Mr. GLASER. Well, again, I would defer to the FBI and to the 

Justice Department to speak to the threat that Hezbollah plays 

within the United States. 

With respect to Hezbollah’s broad activities with the region, I 

think Ambassador Goldberg is correct. They engage in a lot of 

fundraising activities within this region. Again, I think it is important to always emphasize when you talk about Hezbollah fundraising that the vast majority of Hezbollah’s funds come from Iran, 

and Iran is the primary donor to Hezbollah. But their fundraising 

activities in the Western Hemisphere are of concern, that is something that we are monitoring, it’s something that we target at 

every opportunity. 

Again, recently, the Treasury Department, in targeting a particular bank in Beirut, had the opportunity to point out that 

Hezbollah does derive financial support from criminal activities of 

criminal networks that span into the Western Hemisphere. 

Mr. STOCKTON. Congressman, I would like to broaden the aperture a little bit and talk about an emerging threat and opportunity 

for collaboration, and that is cybersecurity. 

Both state and nonstate actors increasingly pose a challenge to 

not only the United States but partner nations throughout the 

Western Hemisphere. And we have seen recent denial-of-service attacks against our partner nations in the Western Hemisphere. 

This is a prime example of both an increasing and a transforming threat but also new partnership opportunities so that we 

can share our expertise with our partner nations so they can then 

help us in providing security for the Western Hemisphere. 

63

Mr. HIGGINS. Mr. Chairman, yielding back my time, I would just 

say that it is cold comfort when you hear the assessment that 

Hezbollah’s activities in North America are limited to fundraising 

activity. It seems when there is a physical presence in 15 major cities in the United States and 4 major cities in Canada that the potential of their nefarious activity is certainly there and present, 

and we should be diligent about monitoring that activity moving 

forward. 

I represent an area, Buffalo, New York, which is 90 miles south 

of Toronto. And the Hezbollah presence in Toronto concerns me 

very much, beyond the fundraising activity. And I understand 

clearly that fundraising is a big part of this, but—so that would be 

my concern. 

I thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. And I certainly share your concerns, as 

well. 

The Chair now recognizes the ranking member on Africa, Global 

Health, and Human Rights, Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just ask the general question, in your opinions, is the relationship with the United States to our Central and South American countries in general—take the region in general—in your opinion, is it better today than it was in the immediate past decade, 

say, the same, or worse? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Let me offer you a first cut at that, Congressman. 

This is not our area, because we are not responsible for the regional relationship. However, I said earlier, before you were in the 

room, that, in my opinion, we have made progress in this relationship. And, in fact, our relationship with the region is better today 

than it was 10 years ago or 15 years ago; that there is, to a certain 

extent, a competition for ideas in terms of what best represents the 

vision for the future of the hemisphere; and that I would suggest 

the vision that is more associated with open markets and governments that protect their communities but do not run the economies 

appears to be showing greater success than those with an alternative vision. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

You know, we found that, you know, countries in—poor countries, as we do find in Central and South America—and I know this 

is not your expertise, but I am going to just throw it out anyway—

in many instances, you do get sort of a populist movement, you get 

people who feel that there should be kind of a safety net for the 

peasants or the poor. And, in many instances, our Government reacts because we feel that this is a new socialist threat or it may 

be getting some influence from some of the—I guess, if there are 

any communists left. I don’t know if—I look at China; I wonder 

what China is, you know? 

But what do you think about our positions that, in cases, change 

because of the election of someone that we may not agree with 

their political ideology and what our relationship should be? Because, in a number of instances, we simply change our relationship 

and may be less engaged with them if it is a government or a political ideology that we don’t like. 

64

Mr. GOLDBERG. I mentioned, Mr. Payne, in my statement that 

one of the areas that we look at in the I&R Bureau is the activities 

of some of the populist governments in the region. And it is not for 

ideology that we look at it. The way we may view what is going 

on in the region is, in part, a result of where we sit in the intelligence community or as someone who deals with sanctions, and it 

is a different view. 

But the reason I raised it as a concern in a threat sense is that 

we have seen some of the same governments where we see a decline or a narrowing of democratic space, of ability of oppositions 

to exist, and rule of law especially, that it becomes harder to work 

together. And we see the same countries on issues like counternarcotics or counterterrorism. So that is what we look at from an 

analysis point of view. 

Mr. PAYNE. Well, just finally before my time expires, on the 

Merida Initiative, is there any way that—can you measure the 

human impact positively that this has had on the people of Mexico? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Congressman, you are going to find it hard to 

believe this, but I would argue that it is still early to give you a 

definitive answer to that question. Our experience over the last 40 

years in places such as Bolivia and Peru in the 1980s, Colombia 

in the course of the last 10 years, the past decade, is that it takes 

about 5 years for a major program to actually begin to show an impact. And then, often, your statistics are a couple of years behind 

the reality on the ground. 

What we can measure right now quite clearly is the input: What 

have we delivered to Mexico under the Merida Initiative—how 

many trucks, how much equipment, how many helicopters, and so 

forth? What you have a right to hold us to in the years ahead is 

the impact that that will have: How many senior members of cartels have been arrested or otherwise removed from their activities? 

How has the crime rate, the homicide rate, the violence rate gone 

down? Has the successful prosecution rate improved? 

These are the sorts of statistics which you have every right in 

the world to hold us to. My only suggestion to you is, give it about 

5 years before you grill us on those statistics. And that doesn’t 

mean you have to wait much more than about 1 more year before 

you can haul me up here and rake me over the coals. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I appreciate that. I appreciate—well, we would 

never dream of raking you over the coals up here. 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MCCAUL. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

California, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I would never rake anyone over the coals. 

As the last questioner, perhaps almost all the interesting questions have been asked. 

Mr. Glaser, we are focusing here on raising money for Hamas in 

the Western Hemisphere. There are several instances, at least that 

have been reported, where money has been raised for Hamas here 

in the United States and the Justice Department refuses to do anything about it. Do you find that frustrating? 

65

Mr. GLASER. I am sorry, we are talking about Hamas now and 

not Hezbollah? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Hamas, yeah, another terrorist organization. 

Mr. GLASER. Okay. I think the Justice Department has been 

pretty active in targeting Hamas fundraising. So I would find it 

frustrating if we in the government weren’t taking it seriously. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, wasn’t there a widely publicized delivery of 

valuable assets to Hamas in Gaza by ship spearheaded in part by 

American citizens? And is it not terrorist financing if you deliver 

trucks as opposed to cash? 

Mr. GLASER. I would consider terrorist financing to deliver——

Mr. SHERMAN. Has a single person involved in delivering trucks 

to Hamas been even the subject of a criminal inquiry? Or do you 

want to reevaluate your answer, that the Justice Department is focusing on Hamas financing in the United States? 

Mr. GLASER. I am sorry, Mr. Sherman, I would have to defer to 

the Justice Department on who they are investigating and what 

the status of those investigations are. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We both know that the Justice Department will 

do nothing to those who deliver trucks to Hamas but will send you 

around the world trying to make sure that Hezbollah financing is 

interrupted. 

And let’s shift to another issue, China. To what extent should we 

be concerned about Chinese relationships in Latin America, Ambassador Goldberg? 

Mr. GOLDBERG. I would reiterate that we view China’s activities 

in the region as part of an economic challenge. They have a booming economy. They seek markets for their exports. 

Some of the countries, interestingly, in the region have the same 

issues about currency and Chinese currency valuation as we do in 

the United States——

Mr. SHERMAN. But there is a chance they will actually do something about it. But that is another subject. 

Mr. GOLDBERG. But in political terms, China’s interests have 

been largely on the economic side and in gaining raw materials for 

its economic boom. And on the political side, largely based in the 

BRICS group of countries, coordinating with Brazil on international issues. But, as I say, it is part of a global issue. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We know that Russia is supplying weapons to 

Venezuela. Is China doing the same? And what concerns should we 

have about Russia providing arms to Venezuela? 

Mr. GOLDBERG. Well, Russia’s position in the region is different 

and has a more political kind of tint. Russia has, for example, 

inked deals worth about $11 billion with Venezuela since 2007. So 

there is clearly an interest in selling military goods in the region. 

There is also Russian political goals, traditional ones, of trying to 

promote multipolarity and of world centers of power. 

And so I do think that you would, both in a commercial sense 

when they are selling military goods but also in a political sense, 

you would look at it differently than perhaps some of the Chinese 

activities. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I yield back. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you for your questions. 

66

I just want to close out with just an observation. I mean, 

Hezbollah is a terrorist organization. They are very prevalent in 

Latin America. In 1980, they issued a fatwa that stated its rationale for engaging in drug production and trafficking, and it said that 

it was making these drugs for Satan, America, and the Jews. ‘‘If 

we cannot kill them with guns, we kill them with drugs.’’

Then it was reported that the Mexican Sinaloa drug cartel was 

sending elite assassins to train on weapons and explosives with Islamic radicals in Iran. I don’t know if that is true or not, but if it 

is, it seems to me they are aiding and abetting a known terrorist 

organization. 

And then, finally, three Pakistani citizens pled guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to the TTP in Pakistan as part 

of a human-smuggling operation bringing these Pakistanis into 

South America. 

We don’t have all the answers as to how complicit the drug cartels are with these organizations, and I think that is something 

that we are going to continue to investigate. But the more evidence 

that comes out that they are, the more I am led to the conclusion 

that we need to treat them as terrorist organizations. And I am 

talking about the drug cartels themselves. 

So, with that, let me just say thank you to the witnesses for your 

very interesting testimony. 

And, Ambassador, we hope to have you back again soon. 

One final—when we met with President Calderon—I do want to 

ask you this—he said, ‘‘You know, we are hitting a turning point.’’ 

He said, ‘‘You may not see it right now with all the killings,’’ but 

he said, ‘‘I really believe we are hitting a turning point. We have 

trained 200,000 national Federal police officers.’’ And he was generally, I think, optimistic about what a lot of people view as a very 

pessimistic situation. 

Do you have any observations on that? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Actually, I am delighted to close on this point, 

Mr. Chairman, because I agree with that sentiment completely. 

And I suggest to you, it is one of the lessons that we have 

learned from our Colombia experience. That is, one, it takes a certain amount of time before your efforts begin to bear fruit. We have 

been at this Merida Initiative now for about 4 years. Second, since 

drug-trafficking organizations rarely report their data to government offices and institutions, your data is usually 1 or 2 years behind the reality on the ground. 

That said, look at Mexico, look at what the Mexican Federal police and law enforcement institutions have done. They have taken 

down, I believe, 34 senior cartel members since the year 2009. That 

compares with one in the preceding 6 years. They have beefed up 

their national police from a force of somewhere less than 10,000 to 

a force of about 35,000 to 40,000 within the last 3 years. 

They are better equipped, they are better trained. And I personally agree that we are seeing results from that and will see them 

increasingly in the years ahead. If I am wrong, you have every 

right to bring me up here and berate me. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, I think that is a positive note to end on, Ambassador. 

And thanks to all the witnesses for being here. 

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This committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:22 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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