FILED

January 26, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

DECEMBER SESSION, 1997

RANDY BLAINE KNIGHT, ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9705-CR-00162

)

Appellant, ) 

) JOHNSON COUNTY

)

V. ) 

) HON. LYNN BROWN, JUDGE 

HOWARD CARLTON, WARDEN, ) 

) 

Appellee. ) (HABEAS CORPUS) 

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

RANDY KNIGHT, pro se JOHN KNOX WALKUP 

N.E.C.C. #101642 Attorney General & Reporter

P.O. Box 5000 

Mountain City, TN 37683 TIMOTHY F. BEHAN 

Assistant Attorney General

2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building

425 Fifth Avenue North 

Nashville, TN 37243

DAVID CROCKETT 

District Attorney General

Route 19, Box 99

Johnson City, TN 37601 

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED 

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
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OPINION

The Appellant, Randy Blaine Knight, appeals as of right from the trial

court’s dismissal of his Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief. We affirm the

judgment of the trial court. 

The record shows that on December 12, 1983, Appellant was

convicted of two counts of second degree burglary, one count of grand larceny,

one count of aggravated rape, and one count of aggravated kidnapping. He

received an effective sentence of seventy (70) years in the Tennessee

Department of Correction. On September 11, 1996, he filed the petition for writ

of habeas corpus relief which is the subject of this appeal. In essence, Appellant

argues that the indictment charging all of the offenses is void because the

culpable mental state for each offense was not alleged in the indictment.

The first count of the indictment, charging Appellant with second

degree burglary, alleged that he did “break and enter a dwelling house during the

daytime . . . with the felonious intent to commit a felony therein, to-wit:

larceny . . . .” The second count of the indictment charged Appellant with the

crime of grand larceny and alleged that the property was taken “with the felonious

intent to permanently deprive the said true owner thereof.” The third count of the

indictment charged second degree burglary by alleging that the Appellant did

“feloniously break and enter a dwelling house by daytime . . . with the felonious

intent to commit a felony therein, to-wit: an aggravated rape . . . .” The fourth

count of the indictment charged that the Appellant committed aggravated rape

and that he did “feloniously, sexually penetrate another, to-wit: [victim] and that
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force or coercion was used to accomplish the act . . . .” The indictment further

alleged that he was armed with a .25 caliber pistol, caused personal injury to the

victim, and penetrated her genital area with his finger. The fifth count of the

indictment alleged that Appellant committed the offense of aggravated kidnapping

and included allegations that he did “seize, confine, inveigled, enticed, decoyed,

abducted, concealed, kidnapped or carried away, [victim] with the felonious intent

to cause the said [victim] to be confined secretly, against her will or to detain the

said [victim] against her will . . . .” The indictment further alleged serious bodily

injury to the victim and that a deadly weapon was used during the commission

of the criminal act.

Counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 plainly and clearly alleged the Appellant’s

felonious intent to satisfy any requirements of allegations of the appropriate mens

rea. 

Appellant places the most emphasis in his argument on the fourth

count of the indictment, which alleges in full as follows:

The Grand Jurors for the State and County aforesaid, upon their

oath present and say that Randy Blaine Knight on or about the 24

day of July, 1983, in the State and County aforesaid did unlawfully

and feloniously, sexually penetrate another, to-wit: [victim] and that

force or coercion was used to accomplish the act and that the

defendant was armed with a weapon, to-wit: a .25 caliber automatic

pistol. The defendant caused personal injury to the said [victim].

The defendant’s penis touched her genital area and he did

penetrate her genital area with his finger several times, and did

injure her by striking her with his gun, and biting her, contrary to the

Statute, [a]gainst the peace and dignity of the State of Tennessee.

In support of his argument, Appellant relies upon the decision of this

Court in State v. Roger Dale Hill, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267, Wayne
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County (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, June 20, 1996). However, our supreme

court reversed this Court’s decision in Hill. See State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725

(Tenn. 1997). 

Furthermore, a panel of this Court has previously held in a similar

case that the ruling of this Court in State v. Roger Dale Hill, was based upon an

interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-301(c), which was

enacted in 1989. See Gregory L. Hatton v. State of Tennessee, C.C.A. No.

02C01-9611-CC-00407, slip op. at 2, Lake County (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson,

Feb. 19, 1997). 

As in Hatton, Appellant was convicted of an offense which occurred

prior to enactm ent of the 1989 revisions to the Criminal Code. We conclude that

the language in the indictment charging appellant with various offenses was

sufficient under the law as it existed at the time of the offenses.

Appellant’s petition may be dismissed summarily if the petition fails

to state a cognizable claim. See Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); State ex rel. Byrd v. Bomar, 381 S.W.2d 280, 283

(Tenn. 1964); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-109. The trial court properly dismissed

Appellant’s petition.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

____________________________________

THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge 
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CONCUR:

___________________________________

DAVID H. WELLES, Judge

___________________________________

DAVID G. HAYES, Judge