J-S15032-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

NANCY CAMPBELL 

Appellant

v.

THE ESTATE OF SEVERIN 

FAYERMAN, DECEASED BY AND 

THROUGH TONI HUNTER FAYERMAN, 

EXECUTRIX, TONI HUNTER 

FAYERMAN, INDIVIDUALLY, GEORGE 

NEIRA, KATE NEIRA, KARI NEIRA, 

KELLI GOUKER AND TERRI GRUVER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1547 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered October 4, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County 

Civil Division at No(s): 17-20108

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 13, 2023

Nancy Campbell (“Campbell”) appeals from the order granting the 

motion for summary judgment filed by the Estate of Severin Fayerman (“the 

Estate”), deceased, by and through Toni Hunter Fayerman (“Hunter 

Fayerman”), individually and executrix of the Estate.1 We affirm. 

Campbell and Decedent were married in 2004. Prior to the marriage, 

Campbell acquired real estate in Berks County which was secured by a 

mortgage in her name. In 2008, Campbell and Decedent signed a post-nuptial 

agreement (“Agreement”) which provided, in relevant part:

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1 The remaining parties identified in the caption are not involved in this appeal.
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[Decedent] acknowledges that [Campbell’s] mortgage 

payment with respect to the aforesaid real estate totals $5,591.80 

per month, including principal and interest, and the note is due 

and payable on December 1, 2011. [Decedent] agrees that, in 

the event [Campbell] shall, from time to time, make additional 

principal payments on said mortgage, he will match said principal 

payments (upon receipt of satisfactory proof from [Campbell] . . .. 

[Decedent] further agrees that, in the event [Campbell] chooses

not to make additional principal payments on the mortgage, he 

will pay down twenty-five percent (25%) of the then outstanding 

principal balance on December 1, 2011. [Decedent] further 

agrees that, in the event the said mortgage is still outstanding at 

the time of his death, the then[-]principal balance shall be paid by 

[Decedent’s] estate, and that [Decedent’s] Will shall so provide.

Agreement, 9/22/08, at ¶ 35.

Following the execution of the Agreement, Campbell and Decedent 

divorced, and Decedent married Hunter Fayerman. Campbell did not make 

any additional principal payments on the mortgage; accordingly, per the terms 

of the Agreement, Decedent was required to pay down twenty-five percent of 

the outstanding principal balance on the due date (i.e., December 1, 2011). 

Decedent did not make the payment by December 1, 2011; however, he made 

the requisite 25% payment ($159,351.44) several weeks later, on January

24, 2012. 

In February 2012, Campbell refinanced the mortgage on the subject real 

estate. In so doing, she satisfied the mortgage that had been referenced in 

the Agreement, and the satisfaction of that mortgage was recorded in the 

Office for the Recorder of Deeds. 

In 2015, Decedent died, leaving the entirety of his estate to Hunter 

Fayerman, whom he named as the Executrix of the Estate. 
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In 2017, Campbell again refinanced the mortgage on the real estate. 

She thereafter initiated the present lawsuit against, inter alia, the Estate and 

Hunter Fayerman, individually and in her capacity as Executrix.

2

 In her 

complaint, Campbell averred that, pursuant to the Agreement, the Estate was 

required to satisfy the balance of the refinanced mortgage on the real estate 

($478,434.09). In 2021, the Estate and Hunter Fayerman filed a motion for 

summary judgment seeking dismissal of the complaint on the basis that the 

Estate had no obligation to pay Campbell any further mortgage amounts under 

the Agreement. On October 4, 2022, the trial court granted the motion for 

summary judgment and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Campbell 

filed a timely notice of appeal, and both she and the trial court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Campbell raises the following issues for our review:

I. Did the trial court correctly interpret the terms of the 

[Agreement] when it concluded that [Decedent’s] obligation 

to [Campbell] ended in January 2012 when he made a 

payment of 25% principal toward [Campbell’s] loan, and 

thus [Campbell] had no cause of action against appellees?

II. Does the Agreement’s language reflect the parties’ 

understanding and intent that the loan would be refinanced 

after [Decedent] made the 25% principal payment in 

January 2012, and that [the E]state would satisfy the 

balance due on the refinanced loan when he died?

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2 Campbell claimed that the remaining defendants received monetary gifts or 

benefited from payments made on their behalf by Decedent shortly before he 

died in order to render the Estate insolvent, and therefore unable to satisfy

Decedent’s purported obligation to pay off Campbell’s refinanced mortgage.

See Complaint, 11/16/17, at ¶¶ 39-52.
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III. Does the parties’ course of conduct after signing the 

Agreement as well as Campbell’s pleadings[,] other 

evidence[,] including but not limited to the Estate’s 

admission that [Campbell] was its creditor under the 

Agreement, show the parties’ intent that [the E]state would 

be liable for Campbell’s refinanced debt when he died?

IV. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgement [sic] 

against [Campbell]?

Campbell’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Our standard of review of an order granting or denying summary

judgment is well-settled:

We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue 

of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only

where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is

clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law will summary judgment be entered. Our scope of review of

a trial court’s order granting or denying summary judgment is

plenary, and our standard of review is clear: the trial court’s order

will be reversed only where it is established that the court

committed an error of law or abused its discretion.

Daley v. A.W. Chesterton, Inc., 37 A.3d 1175, 1179 (Pa. 2012).

In her first two issues, Campbell argues that the trial court 

misinterpreted the language of the Agreement. In addressing this issue, we 

observe that “[t]he determination of marital property rights through

prenuptial, post[-]nuptial and settlement agreements has long been

permitted, and even encouraged. Both prenuptial and post-nuptial

agreements are contracts and are governed by contract law.” Holz v. Holz,

850 A.2d 751, 757 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted). In
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determining whether the trial court properly applied contract principles, the

reviewing Court must decide, based on all the evidence, whether the trial court

committed an abuse of discretion or error of law. See Lewis v. Lewis, 234

A3d 706, 711 (Pa. Super. 2020). An abuse of discretion:

is synonymous with a failure to exercise a sound, reasonable, and 

legal discretion. It is a strict legal term indicating that an appellate 

court is of the opinion that there was commission of an error of 

law by the trial court. It does not imply intentional wrong or bad 

faith, or misconduct, nor any reflection on the judge[,] but means 

the clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment—one that is clearly 

against logic and the effect of such facts as are presented in 

support of the application or against the reasonable and probable 

deductions to be drawn from the facts disclosed upon the hearing; 

an improvident exercise of discretion; an error of law.

Id. To the extent we must decide a question of law, our standard of review

is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. See id. 

Additionally:

The fundamental rule in interpreting the meaning of a

contract is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the 

contracting parties. The intent of the parties to a written 

agreement is to be regarded as being embodied in the writing 

itself. The whole instrument must be taken together in arriving at

contractual intent. Courts do not assume that a contract’s 

language was chosen carelessly, nor do they assume that the 

parties were ignorant of the meaning of the language they 

employed. When a writing is clear and unequivocal, its 

meaning must be determined by its contents alone.

Only where a contract’s language is ambiguous may 

extrinsic or parol evidence be considered to determine the intent 

of the parties. A contract contains an ambiguity if it is reasonably 

susceptible of different constructions and capable of being 

understood in more than one sense. This question, however, is 

not resolved in a vacuum. Instead, contractual terms are 

ambiguous if they are subject to more than one reasonable 

interpretation when applied to a particular set of facts. In the
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absence of an ambiguity, the plain meaning of the agreement will

be enforced. The meaning of an unambiguous written instrument

presents a question of law for resolution by the court.

Ramalingam v. Keller Williams Realty Grp., Inc., 121 A.3d 1034, 1046

(Pa. Super. 2015) (emphasis in original). “Further, absent fraud,

misrepresentation, or duress, spouses should be bound by the terms of their

agreements.” Stackhouse v. Zaretsky, 900 A.2d 383, 386 (Pa. Super.

2006).

Campbell contends that the trial court misinterpreted paragraph 35 of 

the Agreement. Campbell points out that the Agreement does not define the 

words “mortgage” or “note,” or limit their use to the mortgage that was in 

existence at the time the Agreement was executed. Campbell’s Brief at 11. 

Campbell also argues that the inclusion of the word “further” renders the 

agreement to pay off the mortgage at the time of Decedent’s death as a 

separate obligation which exists “in addition” to paying down 25% of the 

balance on the due date. Id. 11-12. While Campbell concedes that paragraph 

35 contains limiting language in that it refers to the “said mortgage,” which is 

defined by its monthly payment amount ($5,591.80) and due date (December 

1, 2011), she nevertheless claims that “the only way a loan balance could 

exist on Campbell’s loan after [Decedent’s] 25% payment on the (twice) 

specified due date is via refinancing.” Id. at 12 (unnecessary capitalization 

omitted). Campbell additionally points out that, whereas the parties identified 

other notes and mortgages within the Agreement by referencing their account 
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or instrument numbers, or by specifying the payoff balances, they did not do 

so in paragraph 35. Campbell insists that “[t]he reason is because of the [sic] 

parties understood that for Campbell’s note and mortgage, the account and/or 

instrument numbers and payoff balance would change once the loan was 

inevitably refinanced after [Decedent’s] 25% [p]ayment.” Id. at 13. 

Campbell further asserts that the parties could have specified that Decedent’s

obligation to Campbell ended after making the 25% payment, or that the 

Estate’s liability to pay off the mortgage would only arise if Decedent died 

prior to the due date; however, no such limiting language was included in the 

Agreement.

The trial court considered Campbell’s first two issues and concluded that 

they lacked merit. The court reasoned:

The plain language in [paragraph] 35 provides Decedent 

would pay (a) 25% of the outstanding balance on the mortgage 

on or before December 1, 2011, and/or (b) the balance of the 

existing mortgage upon his death, if the mortgage still existed.

Although “mortgage” is not a defined term in the Agreement, from 

a simple reading of the plain language in [paragraph] 35, it is clear 

this refers to the loan secured by the real estate in 2006. Because 

of refinancing and satisfaction, at the time of Decedent’s death, 

the mortgage did not exist. That obligation was, instead, 

refinanced and replaced with a new instrument and obligation.

Although [Campbell] and Decedent may have contemplated 

something different, the trial court may not speculate about what 

the parties intended, nor may it look to extrinsic evidence to hold 

the Estate liable for the refinanced debt, as the Agreement is a 

fully integrated instrument. [See Agreement, § 13]. Further, 

whether Decedent or the representatives of his Estate had 

knowledge of the refinancing is not relevant. Neither is the 

Estate’s admission as to creditor status in the matter involving the 

Estate that remains open in the Berks County Orphan’s Court.
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That admission—to the extent that is an admission—does not 

create a contractual obligation in this litigation.

Finally, [Campbell] argued in her brief in opposition to the 

motion [for summary judgment] that “had there been no 

expectation of a loan balance after the [date of maturation], 

additional language would have been unnecessary because 

[Decedent’s] obligation would have ended with the 25% payment 

on the [date of maturation] and, ipso facto, the loan would no 

longer exist.” [See [Campbell’s] Brief in Opposition, p.8]. This is 

anything but clear. The Agreement contains a mechanism for

[Campbell] to pay down principal debt with Decedent matching 

that amount. Had [Campbell] elected to drastically reduce 

principal prior to the date of maturation through lump sum or

monthly payments, as matched by Decedent, the mortgage 

clearly could have been paid off prior to Decedent’s death. 

Further, had Decedent predeceased maturation and refinancing, 

the Estate would have been liable for the entire amount. Neither 

event, however, occurred.

Put simply, although the outcome may be harsh, the trial 

court could not create an obligation from whole cloth. Although 

[Campbell] now uses the terms “loans” and “mortgage”

interchangeably, they are not the same thing. Anticipating the 

original maturity date on the mortgage, had the parties wished to 

make Decedent and/or his Estate responsible for the payment of 

the refinanced obligation, they could have done so clearly in the 

Agreement. They did not. As a result, when Decedent made his 

25% payment in January 2012, he satisfied his obligation under 

the Agreement with regard to the mortgage. For this reason, no 

cause of action could stand against moving defendants.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/4/23, at 5-7 (footnote and unnecessary capitalization 

omitted, emphasis in original).

We discern no abuse of discretion or error of law by the trial court in 

interpreting the Agreement. Paragraph 35 of the Agreement contemplates 

the specific mortgage which was in place at the time the Agreement was 

executed in 2008; namely, the mortgage under which Campbell was required 
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to pay a monthly amount of $5,591.80, and which had a specified due date of 

December 1, 2011. Campbell acknowledges that the mortgage which was in 

place at the time the Agreement was executed in 2008, and which was subject 

to those specific terms, was satisfied in 2012. See Campbell’s Brief at 13. 

The plain language of paragraph 35 simply does not contemplate that 

Decedent would be obligated to pay off an entirely different mortgage, 

particularly one that may have a larger balance or a different due date.

3

 

Accordingly, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by determining 

that, pursuant to the clear and unambiguous terms of the Agreement,

Decedent had no further obligation to Campbell with respect to the mortgage 

upon her satisfaction of same in 2012. As such, Campbell’s first two issues 

merit no relief. 

In her third issue, Campbell contends that the stipulation by the Estate

in the orphans’ court proceedings—that Campbell was a creditor of the 

Estate—constitutes an admission by the Estate that it is obligated to pay off 

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3

Indeed, the trial court observed that, following Campbell’s refinancing of the 

mortgage in 2012, the refinanced mortgage had a balance which was $20,000 

higher than the mortgage which was in place at the time the Agreement was 

executed in 2008. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/4/23, at 7 n.2. Campbell again 

refinanced the mortgage in 2017 (after Decedent’s death) and averred in the 

complaint that the Estate was obligated to pay off the mortgage, as refinanced 

in 2012 and 2017. See Complaint, 11/16/17, at ¶ 10.
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the balance of the mortgage upon Decedent’s death.4 However, Campbell’s 

argument regarding this issue consists of a single sentence: “in the orphans’ 

court matter that preceded filing the instant action the Estate stipulated that

Campbell was a creditor of the Estate by virtue of the Agreement.” Campbell’s 

Brief at 17. Pursuant to our appellate rules, an appellant’s argument must 

contain citation to relevant legal authorities as well as reference to the 

portions of the record and evidence that support the issue on appeal. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b)-(d). Campbell has fallen far short of this standard. See 

Keller v. Mey, 67 A.3d 1, 7 (Pa. Super. 2013). This Court will not develop 

arguments on behalf of an appellant or comb the record for factual 

underpinnings to support an appellant’s position. See Bombar v. West

American Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 78, 93 (Pa. Super. 2007). Accordingly, we find 

this issue waived for Campbell’s failure to adequately develop it. See J.J.

DeLuca Co., Inc. v. Toll Naval Associates, 56 A.3d 402, 411 (Pa. Super. 

2012) (holding that issue on appeal is waived where appellant fails to develop

argument of trial court error or provide pertinent supporting authority).

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4 Campbell additionally argues that the parties’ course of conduct following 

Decedent’s payment of 25% of the mortgage evidences his knowledge that 

the Estate would be obligated to pay off any refinanced mortgage on the real 

estate upon his death. However, Campbell failed to preserve this issue for 

our review, as it was not raised in the concise statement. See Concise 

Statement, 11/30/22; see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)

(providing that issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be 

raised for the first time on appeal).
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In her final issue, Campbell contends that the trial court improperly 

granted summary judgment in favor of Hunter Fayerman and the Estate. Once 

again, Campbell’s argument is woefully undeveloped. Her entire argument for 

this issue consists of the following:

Given the fact that the Agreement sets for [sic] the 

parties[’] understanding and intent that the Estate would be 

responsible for Campbell’s refinanced loan when he died, the court 

erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Hunter 

[Fayerman] and the Estate.

Using the applicable standard of review in summary 

judgment cases[,] an examination [of] the evidence and pleadings 

in the light most favorable to Campbell as the non-moving party 

in the summary judgment motion, there are a genuine issues [sic]

of material fact regarding the parties’ knowledge and intent 

regarding the Estate’s responsibility for the refinanced debt. See, 

Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2.

In addition to all the fact[s] set forth above, Campbell’s 

Affidavit also states the parties’ intent when drafting the 

Agreement was that the Estate that Severin’s [sic] would pay off 

the balance of the refinanced debt. (R. 156a) 

Campbell’s Brief at 17-18.

This brief argument consists of a boilerplate recitation of the standard 

of review for granting summary judgment and bald statements that Hunter 

Fayerman and the Estate were not entitled to summary judgment. There are 

no citations to or discussion of pertinent legal authority, and Campbell fails to 

meaningfully develop the basis for her claim that the trial court erred in its 

decision to grant summary judgment. Accordingly, we could find waiver of 

the issue on this basis. See Keller, 67 A.3d at 7; see also Bombar, 932 

A.2d at 93; J.J. DeLuca Co., Inc., 56 A.3d at 411.
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Nevertheless, in light of our conclusion that the terms of the Agreement 

impose no obligation on the Estate to satisfy Campbell’s refinanced mortgage,

we discern no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court in granting 

summary judgment in favor of Hunter Fayerman and the Estate. Thus, even 

if not waived, Campbell’s final issue warrants no relief.5 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/13/2023

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5 The trial court explained that, although the remaining defendants named in 

the complaint did not file dispositive motions in the trial court, the court 

dismissed the claims asserted against them because such claims were also 

premised on Campbell’s theory that Decedent was obligated under the 

Agreement to pay Campbell’s refinanced mortgage. See Trial Court Opinion, 

1/4/23, at 7.