Edited by 

Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher Yung, 

Michael Swaine, and Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang

Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES 

National Defense University

The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities

Evolving Roles

ders,

ng,

aine,

Yang

The Chinese Navy

Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles

NE COVER 1 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY COVER.indd 3 11/29/11 
The Chinese Navy:

Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 1 11/29/11 12
990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 2 11/29/11 12
The Chinese Navy:

Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles

Edited by Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher D. Yung,

Michael Swaine, and Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang

Published by National Defense University Press for the

Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Washington, D.C.

2011

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Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely 

those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of 

Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution 

unlimited.

Chapter 5 was originally published as an article of the same title in Asian Security 5, no. 2 

(2009), 144–169. Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. Used by permission.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The Chinese Navy : expanding capabilities, evolving roles / edited by Phillip C. Saunders ... [et al.].

 p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. China. Zhongguo ren min jie fang jun. Hai jun. 2. Sea-power--China. 3. Naval art 

and science--China. 4. China--Military policy. I. Saunders, Phillip C. (Phillip Charles), 1966-

VA633.C57 2011

359.00951--dc23

 2011020795

First printing, December 2011

NDU Press publications are sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office. For ordering information, call (202) 512-1800 or write to the: Superintendent of Documents, 

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. For the U.S. Government Online Bookstore, go to: http://bookstore.gpo.gov

For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, consult 

the National Defense University Web site at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 4 11/29/11 12
The editors respectfully dedicate this volume to the memory of Ellis Joffe, 

who attended and contributed to many of the Chinese Council on Advanced Policy 

Studies/RAND conferences, including the one that formed the basis for this book. 

His many contributions as a scholar, colleague, mentor, and friend are sorely missed.

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 vii

Contents

List of Illustrations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Foreword. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

Christopher D. Yung and Phillip C. Saunders 

Chapter 1

Rising Powers and Naval Power. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Peter M. Swartz

Chapter 2

Recent Developments in Naval and Maritime Modernization 

in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Regional Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Richard A. Bitzinger

Chapter 3

Beyond the Moat: The PLAN’s Evolving 

Interests and Potential Influence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

M. Taylor Fravel and Alexander Liebman

Chapter 4

Toward a Maritime Security Strategy: 

An Analysis of Chinese Views Since the Early 1990s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Daniel M. Hartnett and Frederic Vellucci

Chapter 5

The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: 

From “Near Coast” and “Near Seas” to “Far Seas”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Nan Li

Chapter 6

PLAN Force Structure: Submarines, Ships, and Aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Ronald O’Rourke

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viii 

Chapter 7

Getting Rid of the Rust: Preparing 

Chinese Navy Leaders for High-tech War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

Susan M. Puska

Chapter 8

The PLA Navy’s Antiaccess Role in a Taiwan Contingency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

Michael McDevitt

Chapter 9

The PLA Navy as an Instrument of Statecraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

Eric A. McVadon

Chapter 10

Informatization and the Chinese People’s Liberation 

Army Navy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287

Phillip C. Saunders and Christopher D. Yung

Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

About the Contributors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315

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 ix

Illustrations

China and Adjacent Seas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxii

3-1. The Taiwan Dispute in Core Newspapers 

(Title Search). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

3–2. Maritime Sovereignty Disputes in PLA Daily

(Title Search). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

3–3. Maritime Sovereignty Disputes in Modern Navy

(Full-text Search). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

3–4. The Spratlys Dispute in Core Newspapers 

(Title Search). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

3–5. The Senkaku Dispute in Core Newspapers 

(Title Search). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

3–6. Modern Navy Coverage of “Maritime Resources” (海上资源)

and “Oil Reserve and China” (石油储备。中国). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

3–7. People’s Daily Coverage of “Maritime Resources” (海上资源)

and “Oil Reserve and China” (石油储备。中国). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

3–8. Modern Navy and National Defense Coverage 

of “Maritime Resources” (海上资源). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

3–9. Modern Navy Coverage of “Energy Security” (能源安全)

and “Resource Security” (资源安全) (Full-text Search). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

3–10. National Defense Coverage of “Energy Security” (能源安全)

and “Resource Security” (资源安全) (Full-text Search). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

3–11. People’s Daily Coverage of “Energy Security” (能源安全)

and “Resource Security” (资源安全) (Full-text Search). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

3–12. Modern Navy, National Defense, People’s Daily, 

and PLA Daily Coverage of “Sea Lanes” (海上通道). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

3–13. Modern Navy, National Defense, People’s Daily, 

and PLA Daily Coverage of “Sea Lane Security” (航线安全). . . . . . . . . 64

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 9 11/29/11 12
x 

3–14. Modern Navy, National Defense, and People’s Daily

Coverage of “Malacca Strait and Security” (马六甲。安全)

(Full-text Search). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

3–15. Modern Navy, PLA Daily, and People’s Daily

Coverage of “Pirates” (海盗) (Full-text Search). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

3–16. People’s Daily and PLA Daily Coverage 

of “Indian Navy” (印度海军) (Full-text Search). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

3–17. Modern Navy and National Defense Coverage 

of “Indian Navy” (印度海军) (Full-text Search). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

3–18. Modern Navy Coverage of “Andaman” (安达曼)

(Full-text Search). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

4–1. First and Second Island Chains. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

4–2. Extent of China’s Claimed South 

China Sea Territory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

5–1. China’s “Near Seas” and “Far Seas”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

8–1. Soviet Concept for Sea Denial and 

Sea Control During the Cold War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

8–2. Chinese Concept for Offshore Defense: “Island Chains”. . . . . . . . . . 201

9–1. Chinese Use of Force—Examples of Gunboat Diplomacy. . . . . . . . . 222

Tables

6–1. PLA Navy Submarine Commissionings Actual 

(1995–2006) and Projected (2007+). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

6–2. New PLA Navy Destroyer Classes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

6–3. New PLA Navy Frigate Classes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

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 xi

Foreword

Few issues are as important to U.S. national security analysts as China’s 

military modernization, a process that has benefited directly from the past two 

decades of dramatic economic expansion. This book addresses the Chinese 

navy—the People’s Liberation Army Navy, or PLAN—the service that has most 

dramatically benefited from increased defense funding.

This collection of essays surveys and analyzes the most important aspects of China’s naval modernization. The book’s 10 chapters represent papers 

delivered at a 2007 conference, but have been updated and, most importantly, 

framed by expertly written introductory and concluding chapters that bring 

the book firmly into the century’s second decade. 

The first substantive chapter is a superb essay by Peter Swartz, one of our 

most experienced and perspicacious historians of maritime strategy. Swartz 

sets the tone for this impressive collection by placing China’s naval modernization into historical context. Especially relevant is his conclusion that “a 

rising naval power need not mean rising chances of war,” effectively discrediting 

the often heard comparison between current China-U.S. naval developments 

and those of Germany and England in the years preceding World War I. 

There are no weak essays in this carefully edited volume. Particularly 

strong, in addition to that by Swartz, is Susan Puska’s chapter on PLAN leadership and personnel development—accomplishments more meaningful than 

the acquisition of new platforms. Her efforts are supported by the essay by 

Andrew Erickson and Michael Chase, who place their discussion of “informatization” in a common sense context of the centralization/decentralization of 

command and control. 

The conclusion authored by Phillip Saunders and Christopher Yung is 

a model of its kind. They update the information provided in their volume’s 

essays and note the problems still lying in the path of China’s drive to deploy 

a 21st century navy—problems too often overlooked by popular commentators. What this volume demonstrates convincingly is that while Beijing is undoubtedly modernizing and expanding its navy, significant problems still confront any Chinese maritime strategist who believes that a new age is dawning 

in Asian waters.

The PLAN’s most significant accomplishment to date has been the continuous deployment of three-ship task groups to the Gulf of Aden for more 

than two-and-a-half years, but this feat also reveals the PLAN’s limited ability to project power away from home waters. No less a personage than China’s 

defense minister, General Chen Bingde, in a speech at National Defense 

University in Washington, DC, on May 18, 2011, described these deployments 

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xii 

as “greatly stressing” his navy’s capability and implied that they would have to 

be ended in the near future.

In fact, PLAN composition and capabilities are markedly different from 

previous major naval construction programs conducted by emerging world 

powers. China’s new navy relies more on unmanned cruise and ballistic missiles than on manned aircraft, and more on submarines than surface vessels. 

It also remains entangled in serious service rivalries within a Chinese military 

still dominated by the army and has no combat, and little operational, experience on the high seas.

Nonetheless, China is deep into the process of creating its strongest navy 

since that built and commanded by Zheng He, the famous admiral who led 

seven major expeditions to the far reaches of the Indian Ocean in the early 

16th century. Admiral Zheng’s navy accomplished little of lasting importance, 

however, as domestic political considerations and shifting national security 

concerns drove Beijing to other priorities. There certainly is no assurance that 

a similar fate awaits today’s PLAN, but its emergence as a modern navy of note 

is just that. This book, The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving 

Roles, is aptly titled.

Bernard D. Cole

Washington, DC

July 2011

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 xiii

Acknowledgments

This book’s chapters are mostly revised versions of papers originally presented at the 2007 conference in Taipei cosponsored by the Chinese Council 

on Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS), the RAND Corporation, the Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), and the Institute for National 

Strategic Studies (INSS) of the U.S. National Defense University (NDU). The 

editors thank all those who contributed to making that conference a resounding success. This especially includes the conference paper writers, most of 

whom are represented in this book, and in a few cases colleagues who presented papers on behalf of writers unable to attend. The editors would particularly 

like to thank Evan Medeiros (then at RAND, now at the National Security 

Council) for his contributions in shaping the agenda and helping to recruit 

paper writers. They also gratefully acknowledge support for the conference 

from their host institutions and the RAND Corporation.

The conference benefited greatly from the discussions, questions, and 

comments by conference participants. In particular, the editors would like to 

thank conference panelists and discussants Jonathan Pollack (then at the Naval 

War College, now at the Brookings Institution), Ken Allen (then at the Center 

for Defense Analyses, now at Defense Group Inc.), Arthur Ding (the S. 

Rajaratnam School of International Studies and CAPS), Craig Koerner (Naval 

War College), James Fitzsimonds (Naval War College), Alan Vick (RAND), and 

Bernard Cole (National War College), who all provided insightful commentary 

and analysis. 

Special thanks go to the Chinese Council on Advanced Policy Studies in 

Taipei, especially Andrew Yang and Yi-Su Yang, for their tremendous work in 

organizing and hosting the conference. 

Michael Kiselycznyk of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and Dr. 

Cynthia Watson of the National War College compiled the National Defense 

University conference report, which was a helpful reference in crafting the introduction of this volume. George Maerz of National Defense University Press 

was responsible for copy-editing the manuscript and managing production of 

this volume. 

The editors are also indebted to Nan Li (Naval War College) for his 

chapter “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From ‘Near 

Coast’ and ‘Near Seas’ to ‘Far Seas’” and to Asian Security for granting permission to republish it in this volume. 

The editors would also like to thank Don Mosser, Deborah Jefferson, 

and Michael Kiselycznyk at National Defense University’s Institute for 

National Strategic Studies, who provided administrative support in facilitating 

the conference and in the publication of this volume.

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 xv

Introduction

Christopher D. Yung and Phillip C. Saunders

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has shifted to the forefront 

of Chinese military modernization. Aided by increased budgets and improved 

domestic shipbuilding capabilities, the PLAN is making significant progress in 

its modernization efforts. This includes unprecedented procurement in recent 

years of seven classes of modern destroyers and frigates, five classes of submarines (two of which are nuclear powered), and other force enhancements such 

as three types of capable maritime interdiction aircraft, fast missile boats, and 

amphibious warfare ships. The PLAN has also been on the cutting edge of military diplomacy and a key player in efforts to accomplish the New Historic Missions proclaimed by Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist 

Party (CCP) and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). The 

2008 Gulf of Aden deployment of three PLAN surface combatants followed 

up by seven similar follow-on missions suggests that the PLA Navy’s role in 

military diplomacy will continue to grow. The Gulf of Aden deployment, the 

Chinese navy’s global circumnavigation in 2002, and the increased frequency 

of exercises with Southeast Asian, South Asian, and Russian navies highlight 

the PLAN’s increasingly important role as an instrument of People’s Republic 

of China (PRC) national policy.

Given these important trends, the RAND Corporation, the Chinese 

Council on Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS), the Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace (CEIP), and the Institute for National Strategic Studies 

(INSS) of the U.S. National Defense University chose the Chinese navy as the 

topic of their 19th annual conference on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). 

The conference that convened in Taipei in November 2007 brought together 

many of the top PLA experts along with leading specialists on naval issues to 

discuss a wide range of topics related to the PLA Navy. This volume collects the 

best papers presented at the conference, most of which have been updated to 

reflect post-conference developments.

This book is divided into four thematic sections. The first section (chapters 1 and 2) sets the scene for later chapters via a historical discussion of the 

experience of other rising major powers in relation to their maritime capabilities and by examining the naval modernization efforts of other Asia-Pacific 

countries. The second section (chapters 3, 4, and 5) addresses the range of rationales for China’s naval modernization that animate Chinese debates. In the next 

section, chapters 6 and 7 address the specifics of PLA Navy force capabilities. 

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xvi YUNG AND SAUNDERS

Finally, chapters 8, 9, and 10 address how the PLA Navy might use its improved 

naval capabilities. The concluding chapter summarizes the overall findings of 

the conference and the individual chapters.

Captain (USN, Ret.) Peter Swartz’s “Rising Powers and Naval Power” 

opens the first section. This chapter reviews the history of “previous rising 

powers” and the rationales for, use of, and effect of their naval development 

during the modern era. Using this historical framework the chapter draws a 

set of preliminary observations and conclusions that help address five critical 

questions concerning rising naval powers: 1) How have previous rising powers 

viewed and utilized naval power? (as a tool for expanding their wealth, power, 

and influence); 2) What were the key arguments and objectives that led previous rising powers to invest in naval modernization? (finite domestic resources, 

other needs, and sustaining national and imperial economies); 3) What were 

the geopolitical consequences of the decision to invest in naval modernization? (fostering of the expansion of trade and overseas commerce and changes 

in balance of power); 4) What factors made naval arms races among rising 

powers and others more or less likely? (wealth of nations, nature of the international political system, public opinion, national enmities, and deliberate 

government decisions); and 5) How should current Chinese and Indian 

efforts to build naval capabilities be viewed in light of this historical experience? Swartz notes that “previous rising great powers have generally viewed 

naval power as an important—indeed, often vital—tool for expanding their 

wealth, power and influence” and characterizes current Chinese and Indian 

efforts as “normal” in light of this historical experience. The chapter concludes 

that although past historical experience of rising naval powers shows “no 

dearth of conflict and blood,” a “rising naval power need not mean rising 

chances of war.” Rather than the traditional “zeal for empire” or a quest for a 

“place in the sun,” there are a number of legitimate traditional and nontraditional security interests that motivate any rising power to deploy naval power 

commensurate with its rising national status. 

The next chapter is Richard Bitzinger’s “Recent Developments in Naval 

and Maritime Modernization in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Regional 

Security.” This chapter offers an assessment of naval modernization in contemporary East Asia, including Japan, Korea, Australia, India, and Southeast Asia. 

First, it outlines the drivers and enablers of naval modernization and buildup in 

the Asia-Pacific region. These include China, regional competition, changing 

military requirements, rising defense budgets, a buyers’ market, and an 

element of national prestige. Bitzinger describes the trend underway in East 

Asia today as “modernization plus,” which is not quite a “revolution in military 

affairs” but more than merely replacing and updating existing hardware. In 

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 16 11/29/11 12
 INTRODUCTION xvii

many cases, nations are developing new capabilities to increase interoperability 

with U.S. forces, to improve their ability to contribute to coalition operations, 

or to serve as counter-China capabilities. China is a factor in regional naval 

modernization (especially in the cases of Japan and possibly India), but is not 

necessarily the main driver. For many states, other issues such as sovereignty 

enforcement, economic interests, and local security concerns are more crucial. 

Bitzinger describes the changes under way in East Asia as promoting “arms 

competitions, not arms races.” 

The second section addresses rationales for Chinese naval modernization. M. Taylor Fravel and Alexander Liebman, in “Beyond the Moat: The 

PLAN’s Evolving Interests and Potential Influence,” analyze how the PLA Navy 

sees its roles and responsibilities changing as China’s economy and national 

interests expand. It also assesses the extent to which the PLAN is an influential policy actor as defined by its ability to shape or influence “national policy goals and priorities beyond the arena of naval affairs.” The authors analyze 

the frequency of articles on key naval topics in the PLA’s leading newspapers 

and the frequency and content of relevant articles in military publications. The 

chapter finds evidence of “change and continuity” on both accounts. Traditional 

and long-standing concerns over Taiwan, territorial sovereignty in the South 

and East China Seas, and defense of China’s coast remain “crucially important.” However, the PLAN is increasingly “casting itself as the protector of 

China’s economy” and using this reasoning as a “selling point” to increase the 

PLAN budget and resources. The PLAN is making four main arguments for 

an increased role in national security policy: 1) protection of China’s maritime resources; 2) protection of the developed East Coast and its sea lanes; 

3) creation of a strong navy to stimulate or generate a stronger economy; and 

4) carrying out major peacetime missions and functions. Specific areas where 

the PLAN may shape the national policy debate include international maritime 

law (an area where the government has yet to clarify its position), the development of a strong and centralized maritime law enforcement agency similar to 

the U.S. Coast Guard, and sea lane security. 

Daniel Hartnett’s and Frederic Vellucci’s “Toward a Maritime Security 

Strategy: An Analysis of Chinese Views Since the Early 1990s” also addresses 

Chinese rationales for naval modernization. The chapter samples articles written by Chinese military and civilian maritime security specialists from the early 

1990s to the present to construct an overview of China’s internal debate on 

maritime strategy concepts. Based on the amount of disagreement in authoritative open source writings, the chapter concludes that although China does 

not yet have a fully defined maritime strategy, it is in the process of creating 

one. Many Chinese authors advocating greater emphasis on the maritime 

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xviii YUNG AND SAUNDERS

domain invoke the need to develop a concept of “sea consciousness” among the 

Chinese people. On topics such as “command of the sea,” the amount of debate 

varied between “differences of opinion” to “hotly contested disagreement.” The 

chapter identifies several trends likely to emerge in any future Chinese comprehensive maritime strategy. Taiwan is not the sole issue used in justifying 

PLAN development; maritime rights and economic interests are also very 

important. As China becomes more dependent on maritime resources, its 

security strategy will expand further into the maritime arena. The operational 

range of the PLAN is likely to expand to protect maritime access and security. 

In any future scenarios other than Taiwan, the PLAN will likely play “a large—

but not central—role” in tandem with a maritime police force and various 

forms of international cooperation. 

Although it was not originally part of the conference, the editors have 

included Professor Nan Li’s chapter as part of this volume because it provides 

an excellent description of Chinese maritime strategy that illuminates the 

larger context for Chinese naval modernization and Chinese naval activities. 

This chapter first shows that China’s naval strategy has undergone two major 

changes: from “near-coast defense” prior to the mid-1980s to “near-seas active 

defense” after the mid-1980s, and then to the advancement of a “far-seas 

operations” strategy. This chapter also argues that changes in naval strategy and 

capabilities can be explained by a combination of major variables, including 

the role of naval leadership and personal experience, endorsement of civilian 

leadership, changing perception of external security environment, availability 

of funding and technologies, and institutionalization of naval research.

The third section of this volume focuses on the specific capabilities of 

the PLA Navy. Ronald O’Rourke’s “PLAN Force Structure: Submarines, Ships, 

and Aircraft” provides a thorough examination of the force structure of the 

Chinese navy. It includes an analysis of the submarine force, discusses possible Chinese aspirations for an aircraft carrier, and reviews developments in 

PLAN destroyers, frigates and fast attack craft, amphibious ships and landing craft, and naval aircraft. The ability of the different parts of the PLAN 

force structure to operate together varies greatly depending on the prospective 

operations the PLAN would conduct in a potential Taiwan contingency. These 

different components can also be used in support of China’s broader and 

longer-term goals, including diplomatic port calls and day-to-day presence and 

engagement, humanitarian or disaster-relief operations, amphibious operations 

on disputed maritime territories, escorting merchant shipping, or (in the case 

of submarines and land-based aircraft) collecting day-to-day surveillance and 

intelligence information.

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 18 11/29/11 12
 INTRODUCTION xix

Colonel (USA, Ret.) Susan Puska’s “Getting Rid of the Rust: Preparing 

Chinese Navy Leaders for High-tech War” examines the PLAN’s attempts to 

integrate its new advanced equipment with competent and qualified personnel. Framing the question in Chinese terms, Puska asks whether the Chinese 

navy can acquire and develop personnel and leaders who are both “red” and 

“expert.” Despite understanding the increased importance of “people” to the 

operation of technologically advanced equipment, the PLAN still struggles 

over the red versus expert debate. The chapter looks at the major impediments 

that the PLAN faces in leadership and personnel management and the steps 

necessary for the PLAN to address these shortfalls. The chapter concludes that 

the PLAN has taken some steps to address these problems including changes 

to the quality of personnel accessions, the development of a noncommissioned 

officer (NCO) corps, and improvements in training. The role of the Party 

committee, Party corruption, the army’s dominance of the navy, and a host of 

other obstacles still inhibit PLAN attempts at personnel improvements, however. The development of the NCO corps is a work in progress and the PLAN 

still lacks well-educated personnel at all levels who can take advantage of new 

high-tech equipment. 

The final section addresses how the PLA Navy might use its emerging 

capabilities. Rear Admiral (USN, Ret.) Michael McDevitt’s “The PLA Navy 

Antiaccess Role in a Taiwan Contingency” analyzes how the PLAN could conduct antiaccess operations during a Taiwan assault scenario. McDevitt first 

examines the Soviet experience in antiaccess warfare, noting that the PLAN 

faces the same operational problem that the Soviets faced: defense against attacking carrier forces. The chapter discusses how the PLAN is currently approaching 

antiaccess operations and how Chinese experts see Chinese antiaccess operations developing in the future. The chapter argues the PLAN is centering antiaccess strategy on open ocean surveillance, land-based aircraft capable of firing 

cruise missiles, submarines, and the prospect of maneuverable warhead ballistic missiles. The PLAN needs considerable improvement in all these areas to 

successfully carry out this antiaccess strategy. In particular, the PLAN will have 

to develop better ocean surveillance to reliably and consistently utilize the antiaccess “weapons triad.” McDevitt argues that the United States will continue 

to develop ways to counter these Chinese capabilities, likely resulting in “an assured access versus antiaccess capabilities competition between the United 

States and China.”

Rear Admiral (USN, Ret.) Eric McVadon’s “The PLA Navy as an Instrument of Statecraft” discusses how the PLA Navy is employed as an instrument 

of statecraft through both the “use” (implying readiness to employ or actually 

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 19 11/29/11 12
xx YUNG AND SAUNDERS

use weapons) and “nonuse” (existence and imposing presence without overt 

readiness or threat to use firepower) of naval power. The author explains that 

the Chinese may view the “development and deployment” of a capable navy 

but the exercise of “caution and restraint” in its use as best serving China’s 

interests. Employment of the PLA Navy in a “nonuse of force” role has become 

an increasingly relevant element of China’s comprehensive national power, fitting well with a general strategy favoring nonmilitary tools to achieve security. 

The chapter considers three other categories of the PLA Navy’s statecraft roles 

in recent years. The 2005 deployment of a Sovremennyy-led Task Group to the 

Chunxiao gas field in the East China Sea represents a case of decisive “reversion to gunboat diplomacy” in confronting Japan. The F–8 and EP–3 aircraft 

collision, Han and Song submarine encounters, and survey ship intrusions are 

examples of the PLA Navy’s use as an instrument of statecraft vis-à-vis Japan 

and the United States. However, this is naval statecraft with Chinese characteristics—sometimes inept and often representative of Beijing’s unique view 

of maritime affairs. Finally, China also uses the PLA Navy to perform military 

diplomacy in a conventional manner through port visits around the world, 

exercises with foreign navies, and senior officer visits. The chapter concludes 

that despite cases of reckless or irresponsible use of the PLA Navy, there 

are also “legitimate,” positive roles which the international community can 

encourage and reinforce. McVadon argues that this creates a realistic prospect 

of maritime cooperation between the United States and the PRC. 

No discussion of PLAN modernization (or PLA modernization in general) would be complete without reference to the issue of “informatization.” 

Andrew Erickson and Michael Chase of the U.S. Naval War College 

discuss this subject in the chapter “Informatization and the Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army Navy.” This chapter explores PLAN efforts at informatization and its implications for command and control and joint operations. The 

research draws on a variety of Chinese-language publications to survey how 

the concept of informatization is defined in naval terms and how it relates to 

current PLAN capabilities in integration of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), 

conducting joint operations, training and education, and the modernization of 

PLAN command and control. The chapter concludes that implementation of 

informatization and modernization of Chinese C4ISR have clearly become top 

priorities for the PLAN. However, there are still many gaps between the theory of informatization and the operational practice and implementation. There 

appears to be a debate on PLAN “connectivity” theories and between 

advocates of centralization and decentralization of command and control. 

Will increased C4ISR capabilities push information to lower levels or will 

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 20 11/29/11 12
 INTRODUCTION xxi

they further empower the center? The Chinese leadership may hold an overly 

optimistic expectation that informatization can fully relieve the fog of war and 

battlefield uncertainty. This new reliance on modern C4ISR capabilities will 

also leave China more vulnerable to command and control warfare. Finally, the 

chapter considers if the PLAN has the same metric for integration of C4ISR as 

the U.S. Navy. The PLAN could approach the concept not from a “one weapon, 

one target” approach relying on individual operators, but instead by emphasizing a large arsenal of missiles meant to overwhelm the defenses of a targeted 

naval group without concern for individual accuracy or collateral damage.

Collectively, these chapters provide considerable insight into the drivers 

of Chinese naval modernization, how this is being reflected in PLAN hardware 

acquisitions and personnel policies, and how the PLAN may use its new capabilities both in peacetime settings and in event of military crisis or conflict. In 

most instances, the authors were able to update the papers that they presented 

at the original conference to reflect new information. However, in a few instances, the authors were unable to update their papers due to time constraints 

or other unavoidable circumstances. Although the content of those papers 

remains valid, we should highlight some of the developments that have 

taken place since the conference in November-December 2007. These include 

the 2008 Gulf of Aden deployment and the PLAN’s subsequent missions to 

that area for the purposes of conducting counterpiracy operations; increasingly open discussion by PLA officers about Chinese plans to acquire aircraft 

carriers; problems in flight testing of the JL–2 submarine-launched ballistic 

missile that have delayed the operational capability of the Jin-class nuclearpowered ballistic missile submarine; and heightened regional tensions over 

China’s disputed maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea and East 

China Sea, and within its exclusive economic zone. These developments will be 

discussed in greater detail in the concluding chapter of this volume.

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 21 11/29/11 12
China and Adjacent Seas

Source: Based on U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 

People’s Republic of China 2010 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2010), 23.

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 1

Chapter 1

Rising Powers and Naval Power

Peter M. Swartz

This chapter will address the following five questions:

■ How have previous rising powers viewed and utilized naval power? 

■ What were the key arguments and objectives that led them to invest in 

naval modernization?

■ What were the geopolitical consequences of that decision?

■ What factors made naval arms races more or less likely?

■ How should current Chinese and Indian efforts to build naval capabilities be viewed in light of this historical experience?

First, however, it is necessary to review the history of “previous rising 

powers.” And second, it will be useful to draw some preliminary observations, 

comparisons, and conclusions from this history before addressing the five 

questions directly.1

Previous Rising Powers

The potential list of “previous rising powers” is enormous. At one time 

or another, dozens of the nation-states and empires that have existed in this 

world could have been termed “rising.” This is true even when we limit the 

discussion to the modern era—say, since 1500 or so. Examples might include 

Sweden, Austria, the Ottoman and Mughal Empires, the Qing Dynasty, 

post-unification Italy, and Mao Zedong’s China. 

For purposes of this study, however, the list has been limited to nine: Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, France, Britain, Russia, Germany, Japan, and the 

United States. Two were—and are—small continental countries. Three are medium-sized continental nations. Two are medium-sized island states. Two are 

vast continent-spanning entities. All at one time or another burst the confines 

of their own immediate neighborhoods to expand their influence throughout a 

significant part of the globe.2

 All except the United States can be said to have 

risen and fallen at least once so far in their historical experience. And all have 

a history that includes friendship as well as enmity toward other powers, great 

and small.

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2 SWARTZ

Portugal

During the late Middle Ages, Portugal managed to expel Arab armies 

occupying part of its territory and to conclude an alliance with England that 

would endure for centuries—although not without some notable lapses. 

During the 15th century, Portugal began to produce highly effective seagoing 

ships and to study and perfect the art and science of blue-water navigation. 

Technologically superior at sea to most other nations of the time, Portugal 

began to expand a vast trading network eastward around Africa to the Far East 

and westward across the Atlantic via the Atlantic Islands to Brazil. This network 

became the earliest—and ultimately the longest-lived—of the modern 

European overseas empires, and was backed for half a millennium by naval 

power. Portuguese voyages of exploration and discovery led to expeditionary 

voyages of economic expansion and exploitation. In the 16th century, Portugal 

set up trading posts throughout the Indian Ocean littoral. Arab and Indian 

dominance of that sea was smashed by superior Portuguese naval technology, 

employed in blockades and expeditionary amphibious landings and assaults. 

Portugal grew rich on transoceanic trade in spices, slaves, and other products.

For over two centuries, Portugal was one of the world’s major economic, military, and political powers. Portuguese naval forces predominated 

in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans and the China Seas throughout the 

16th century, and it was a contemporary Portuguese mariner who first called 

Taiwan Ilha Formosa—“beautiful island” (although Portugal did not colonize 

Taiwan). Portuguese hegemony in the Indies was, however, contested and 

then eclipsed by the Dutch during the first half of the 17th century—in part 

as a result of a 60-year Portuguese union with Spain. The Portuguese were, on 

the other hand, able to hold their own against the Dutch onslaught in Brazil.

A small country with a population of little more than one million and 

with little industry, early modern Portugal—despite its commercial successes—

became badly overstretched overseas. The country could not effectively defend 

its posts and possessions against larger, richer, and more developed rivals. Its 

technological lead was eclipsed by the superior economic, scientific, and engineering resources of other rising European states. The money that Portugal 

made was spent in large part on policing its empire—often with little success. 

That empire became greatly reduced, especially in Asia, and during the early 

19th century, Brazil—Portugal’s largest possession—declared its independence. 

Toward the end of the 19th century, however, Portugal carved out a large 

new overseas empire in western and southern Africa. As an ally of Britain and 

France during World War I, Portugal increased these African holdings after the 

war, although by only a slight amount. The inhabitants of Portugal’s African 

territories fought wars for independence in the 1960s and 1970s, until freed 

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 RISING POWERS AND NAVAL POWER 3

as a consequence of Portugal’s democratic revolution in 1974. Macao—one of 

the last remnants of the old Portuguese Empire—reverted to China in 1999. 

Today’s Portugal is a small, prosperous country of 11 million—albeit with 

the smallest economy in Western Europe—and still deploys a tiny blue-water 

naval force, allied with other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

navies for over 50 years.

Spain

Spanish kingdoms had employed powerful naval forces in their wars 

to expel the Arabs from Iberia, especially in the Mediterranean. Once the 

Arabs were completely gone from the peninsula in 1492—and with expeditionary Conquistadors staking out huge empires in the newly discovered 

Americas and the Philippines—Spanish fleets attempted to dominate not only 

the Mediterranean but also the Atlantic and Pacific. For 300 years, Spanish 

naval forces contested those seas with the fleets of Portugal, the Netherlands, 

Britain, and France, while at the same time supporting major expeditions 

ashore. During the 16th and part of the 17th centuries (Spain’s “Golden Age”), 

Spain was Europe’s leading great power and arguably the modern world’s 

first superpower, with vast wealth derived from colonial possessions and 

commerce, backed by a large naval force. Spain achieved the world’s first global 

empire, with possessions in Europe, Asia, Africa, the Americas, and Oceania. 

Spain even united with Portugal and its own huge empire—an arrangement 

that only lasted, however, from 1580 to 1640. 

Spain was able to launch—albeit unsuccessfully—an armada of over 125 

warships against England in 1588. (Less well known is the Spanish victory the 

following year over an “English Armada” sent to attack Spain, Portugal, and the 

Azores.) The Spanish Empire was supported by a powerful, globally deployed 

navy, which protected merchant shipping; suppressed piracy; escorted and 

carried expeditionary troops, merchants, missionaries, and administrators; 

and fended off attacking naval units from rival nations. Central to Spanish 

wealth—and protected by its naval power—were immense annual convoys of 

gold, silver, and other New World commodities back to the mother country. 

Unable to keep the Netherlands within its empire, Spain lost its preeminence at sea and status as a great power by the end of the 18th century, having become an enduring ally of France in its struggles with the British. In the 

early 19th century, its main battle fleet—still the world’s third most powerful—

was all but destroyed off Trafalgar, alongside that of the French. A few decades 

later, most of Spain’s American colonies won their independence. War with 

the United States at the end of the century destroyed most of Spain’s then-existing residual warships. Neutral during both 20th century world wars, Spain 

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4 SWARTZ

today is a highly developed country with an economy among the world’s 10 

largest. A NATO ally for a quarter of a century, Spain has an excellent small 

blue-water navy, with ships capable of operating as integrated parts of U.S. 

Navy carrier strike groups.

The Netherlands

During the 16th and early 17th centuries, the Netherlands wrested its 

independence from Spain and became one of the major seafaring and 

economic powers of the world. Often allied with England, the Netherlands assisted the English in their defeat of the Spanish Armada. The principal roles 

of the Netherlands navy became protection of the Dutch homeland from seaborne attack and protection and expansion of Dutch commercial operations 

worldwide—first in the North Sea and Baltic, and then farther afield. 

The country developed a global trading network of colonies and trading posts, often through seizing Portuguese and Spanish trading posts in 

Africa, the Indian Ocean, and East Asia. Striving to dominate the international 

seaborne spice trade, the Dutch developed a large naval force that broke 

the back of Portuguese naval and commercial power in the Indian Ocean, 

employing more effectively the same Western naval technologies and operations 

(such as blockades and expeditionary amphibious landings) that Portugal had 

used to such good effect against the Arabs and Indians. The Netherlands even 

occupied Taiwan for almost 40 years (until expelled by Chinese military and 

naval expeditionary forces) and seized a Spanish silver fleet. The 17th-century 

Dutch dominated world trade, especially the traffic in slaves.

Dutch naval forces held sway east of Africa throughout the first half of 

the 17th century, until contested and then eclipsed by the rising power of its 

former ally England. During the shifting great power alliances of the 18th and 

early 19th centuries, the Netherlands found itself sometimes fighting alongside 

England and sometimes fighting against it, in fleet-on-fleet actions as well 

as blockades and amphibious landings. By the end of the 18th century, the 

Netherlands had clearly ceded its preeminent global maritime position to Great 

Britain. The Napoleonic era saw the Netherlands on the side of the Emperor of 

the French, with devastating results to its empire and fleet at the hands of the 

British. 

By the mid-19th century, the Netherlands was no longer a great power—except as a colonial power—or a great naval power. The Dutch Empire 

had been reduced to only a few small possessions in the Americas but also 

a vast archipelagic territory in the East Indies, requiring the Netherlands to 

maintain an important second-tier navy, especially for suppressing piracy 

and guarding against further encroachment on its possessions by the world’s 

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 RISING POWERS AND NAVAL POWER 5

contemporary great powers. The country allied its navy and empire with 

Britain and the United States during World War II and joined NATO in 1949. 

The Indies received their independence as Indonesia after World War II, but the 

Netherlands continued to deploy a competent, medium-sized navy throughout 

the Cold War. Today, the Netherlands is one of the world’s 20 largest economies despite a population of only 16 million, and the Dutch navy remains 

a small, modern blue-water force.

France

The French monarchy reached its height during the 17th century. With 

the largest economy and population in Europe, France wielded great influence over European politics and economics. French naval strength was built 

up considerably, especially by Cardinal Richelieu, and France developed 

colonies in Africa, Asia, and America. The 17th-century French navy was competent, rich, and strong enough to deploy worldwide and contest command of 

the seas with the battle fleets of England and the Netherlands, as well as conduct 

blockades and expeditionary amphibious raids against those nations and their 

possessions, as well as Spain and Portugal. 

The 18th century, however, saw a series of titanic global struggles between France and Great Britain that ended in British world colonial and naval 

supremacy. The French navy was, however, able to intervene decisively during the American War for Independence to ensure victory for the Americans 

and the establishment of the United States of America. In the early 19th century, Napoleonic France’s fleet was decimated along with that of Spain by Nelson 

in a fleet-on-fleet action off Trafalgar. France, however, doggedly remained a 

significant naval power throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, joining Britain 

in combined naval campaigns during the Crimean War, World War I, parts of 

World War II, and the Suez crisis in 1956. With its own interwar fleet largely 

rendered inoperable during World War II, postwar France received significant 

naval assistance from Britain and the United States, especially the provision of 

aircraft carriers and naval aircraft. 

France today has one of the world’s half-dozen largest economies. France’s 

current navy is a robust, medium-sized blue-water force, deployed worldwide 

and rivaling the Royal Navy as NATO’s second most powerful national naval 

component. French navy ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) have deployed 

France’s strategic nuclear deterrent since the 1970s.

Britain

Britain’s navy descended from that of England, which was already a powerful combat force at sea by the 15th century, thanks in large part to the navalist 

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 5 11/29/11 12
6 SWARTZ

policies of King Henry VIII. For the next four centuries, England—later Great 

Britain—famously spent and fought its way to maritime supremacy over all 

other possible rivals, including the navies of Portugal and Spain (1585–1660), 

the Netherlands (1650–1675), France (1689–1815), the nascent United States 

(1775–1783 and 1812–1815), and Russia (1853–1856). By the beginning of the 

18th century, Britain had achieved supremacy over the Portuguese, Spanish, and 

Dutch navies; by the beginning of the 19th century, it had unequivocally bested the French. Through all these centuries, English—later British—economic, 

commercial, and financial strength grew until Britain became the world’s 

leading power in those areas. This enabled the country to adequately fund 

outsized naval fleets, and those same fleets protected the trade and achieved 

the victories that enabled the British economy to flourish.

England invested heavily in naval technology. For example, its battle fleet was technologically superior to the Spanish Armada in 1588. Britain 

also developed sophisticated financial techniques that later enabled it to deploy the world’s largest navy without bankrupting the country. British fleets 

mastered the techniques of blockades and expeditionary amphibious landings, 

as well as fleet-on-fleet actions. Despite its naval superiority, however, Britain 

often reinforced its maritime superiority by allying with other naval powers, 

including Portugal, the Netherlands in the early 17th century, Russia during the 

Napoleonic Wars, and France during the Crimean War. 

British naval and expeditionary superiority both allowed and benefited 

from Britain’s colonial empire. British soldiers, traders, missionaries, and 

administrators came by sea to what became Britain’s Mediterranean, Asian, 

African, American, and Oceanic possessions. In this, they were backed by the 

Royal Navy. At the same time, that navy built key bases in certain of those possessions to suppress piracy; ensure freedom of commerce throughout the empire; and serve as expeditionary forward bases against rival nations in Canada, 

Bermuda, the West Indies, the Falklands, Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, 

South Africa, Aden, India, Ceylon, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Australia. 

By the end of the 19th century, however, Britain was unable to deal 

singlehandedly with the simultaneous challenges of the new or rebuilt 

battle fleets of Germany, Japan, and the United States, now arrayed alongside traditional European naval powers France and Russia, and all backed 

by robust and growing industrial economies. A relatively declining 

Britain therefore entered into a series of alliances that allowed it to defeat 

Germany—its greatest rival—by mobilizing all the other great naval and 

economic powers of the world alongside it, even Japan and the United States. 

During the interwar period, Britain struggled to maintain its position 

as the world’s leading naval power, but that position became unequivocally 

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 6 11/29/11 12
 RISING POWERS AND NAVAL POWER 7

ceded to the United States by early in that country’s participation in World War II. 

That war saw the Royal Navy fighting again alongside the Americans, as well 

as the Dutch, the Free French, and others. During the Cold War, Britain was a 

staunch NATO alliance member, and maintained the world’s third most powerful navy. Britain remains one of the world’s half-dozen largest economies 

and deploys a sophisticated, medium-sized navy capable of integrating well 

into U.S. Navy formations. Royal Navy SSBNs have deployed Britain’s strategic 

nuclear deterrent since the 1960s.

Russia

Russia scarcely had a seacoast, let alone a navy, before the reign of Tsar 

Peter the Great in the 17th and 18th centuries. But Peter founded and built up 

fleets for the Black Sea and the Baltic, borrowing technology and advisors from 

the naval powers of Europe, especially Holland. A succession of subsequent 

tsars gained extensive seacoasts for Russia along the Baltic, Black, and White 

Seas and the Pacific Ocean, largely by overland conquest. Successful operationally in the Black Sea against Ottoman fleets, by the mid-18th century Russia 

ranked as one of the world’s great powers. In the 19th century, Russia deployed 

the world’s third strongest navy, using it in the Mediterranean during the initial decades of the century and sending its squadrons at mid-century on visits 

to the United States. 

With most of its Pacific and Baltic fleets destroyed by the Japanese 

navy in 1905, Tsarist Russia did not deploy significant naval forces in combat 

during World War I, despite a strong battleship rebuilding program. After 

the overthrow of the Tsarist regime, Soviet dictator Josef Stalin maintained 

an underresourced Red Fleet as a defensive arm of the Soviet state prior to 

World War II, but the fleet did not conduct many significant naval campaigns 

during that war. Among the most important operations that it did conduct 

however, were amphibious assaults in Sakhalin and the Kurils, made possible 

by the transfer to the Soviets of 150 American patrol and landing ships and craft 

and the training of 12,000 Soviet sailors in American patrol and amphibious 

tactics, techniques, and procedures. The Soviets likewise learned from operating 

Lend-Lease and other warships that the United States and Great Britain loaned 

to them during the war, and later from captured German and Italian ships, 

equipment, and naval designers.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union deployed four increasingly powerful fleets around its periphery and planned to use those fleets to protect 

its strategic SSBN forces, ward off NATO attacks on the homeland from the 

sea, assist the Red Army, and interdict NATO sea lines of communications. 

With an economy not particularly dependent on seaborne trade and with no 

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 7 11/29/11 12
8 SWARTZ

important overseas allies, the specter of an Allied economic blockade of its 

coasts gave the Soviets little fear. By the 1980s, the Soviet Union had a global 

naval presence, powerful anticarrier ships and aircraft, and an enormous and 

powerful—albeit relatively noisy—submarine force. The Soviets maintained 

forward stations in all the world’s oceans, working out of client states in the 

Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. 

Much of that navy melted away with the collapse of the Soviet Union, 

although the current Russian navy is showing some signs of revival. Revive 

it can, since Russia still remains the world’s largest country in the area, with 

vast energy resources; one of the world’s dozen largest populations and 

economies; a considerable industrial, technical, and educational base; and one 

of the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals.

Russia’s naval history has been marked by wars at sea with Turkey, 

France, Britain, Japan, Germany, and other powers, and by amphibious landings on Japanese-held islands. Russia participated in coordinated coalition 

operations in the Mediterranean in the 19th century (especially at Navarino), 

as well as in the combined and joint Boxer intervention in China in 1900. 

During World Wars I and II, Russia (later the Soviet Union) was allied with 

other maritime powers, but few major coordinated or cooperative naval 

operations were conducted. During the Cold War, Russia dominated the small 

navies of other Warsaw Pact members like Poland, East Germany, Romania, 

and Bulgaria. Russia and its navy may have had the least experience as allies and 

coalition members of all the countries discussed here.

Germany

Pre-unification German states were not significant naval powers, despite the expanding Prussian Baltic seacoast and great shipping centers like 

Hamburg and Bremen. By the 1880s, however, a unified German Empire was 

deploying a significant naval force to provide coastal defense as well as secure 

trade routes and far distant colonies for the rapidly industrializing and expanding German economy. Then, in the late 1890s, German Emperor Wilhelm II 

and his government embarked on building a world-class battle fleet that could 

even challenge the Royal Navy as a “risk fleet.” Wilhelmine Germany was the 

quintessential “rising power,” searching for ways in which it could achieve its 

“place in the sun.” One of those ways would be a modern battleship-centered 

steel navy, supported by a long-range cruiser force with some expeditionary 

capabilities. Contemporary British, French, Italian, Austrian, and Russian 

naval technologies all provided early models for the Germans to consider and 

emulate. Later, German naval technology would develop its own momentum, 

especially regarding submarine warfare.

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 RISING POWERS AND NAVAL POWER 9

Germany entered World War I with the second strongest fleet in the 

world and squadrons forward deployed all over the world. Most of what 

remained of that fleet postwar, however, wound up scuttled at Scapa Flow 

in 1919 while the war’s victors were looking the other way. During the war, 

Germany had been allied with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, but 

their naval cooperation was minimal due to the widely dispersed operating 

areas of each of their navies. 

A small but powerful Nazi German surface fleet was built in the 1930s, 

but it was all but destroyed by the Royal Navy during World War II, as was a 

large and dangerous commerce-destroying submarine fleet in both world wars. 

During World War II, Germany was allied with numerous other naval powers, 

including not only Japan and Italy, but also Finland, Romania, and Bulgaria. 

Mutual mistrust, disparate capabilities, and dissimilar and widely separated operational theaters vitiated the effectiveness of Axis naval cooperation, however.

During the Cold War, West Germany became an essential member of 

the NATO alliance, and East Germany joined the Soviet Union and other Eastern European communist states in the Warsaw Pact. Both East and West Germany built up competent but modest naval forces, and today’s reunited Germany—the world’s third largest economy3

—deploys a competent, mediumsized navy capable of sending units to waters as far afield as the Indian Ocean. 

German industry still produces some of the very best contemporary warship 

designs, especially diesel-powered submarines.

Japan

Japan built its first large blue-water warships in the beginning of the 17th

century, following contacts with the Portuguese and Dutch. From 1640 on, however, the Japanese adopted a policy of international seclusion, prohibiting the 

construction of oceangoing vessels. Henceforth, Japan was more known at sea 

for its pirates than for its naval forces, until the American Commodore Matthew 

Perry arrived with his squadron in 1853 to open Japanese ports to world trade. 

In 1855, with Dutch assistance, Japan acquired its first naval steamship, and in 

1857, it gained its first screw-driven steam warship. In 1863, Japan completed its first domestically-built steam warship. In 1865, a French naval engineer 

designed modern Japanese naval arsenals, and in 1867–1868, a British naval 

mission was sent to Japan to assist in naval development and organize a naval 

school. By 1867, the Japanese shogun’s navy was already the largest indigenous 

navy in East Asia, although basically a coastal defense force in capabilities and 

mission. In 1874, however, Japan launched its first joint expeditionary operation—the Taiwan Expedition—to punish tribesmen who had beheaded some 

Okinawan merchants.

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10 SWARTZ

During the last quarter of the 19th century, Japan built a modern navy 

and defeated in succession over the next two decades the Qing Chinese 

navy, the Russian navy, and a few scattered German naval forces. Japan also 

developed significant expeditionary capabilities, following in a long tradition 

of historic Japanese expeditions to the East Asian mainland, some of which 

were successful and some not. As a result, Taiwan, Korea, and numerous 

Pacific islands were added to the Japanese Empire. The Japanese navy was 

one of many powerful instruments of state created in a very short time by 

Japan to support its status as a “rising power.” Allied with Britain since 1903, 

Japan joined the allied powers in World War I, sending destroyers to the 

Mediterranean as well as seizing German Pacific Ocean and Chinese possessions. By the end of the war, Imperial Japan possessed the world’s third most

powerful navy, after Britain and the United States. The Washington Treaty 

of 1922 ended Japan’s alliance with Britain, but Japan later joined with Nazi 

Germany and Fascist Italy in the Axis of 1940.

Japan developed powerful carrier striking forces during the interwar 

years. However, its bid to destroy the U.S. fleet during World War II proved 

unsuccessful, and the warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy had almost all 

been destroyed by 1945. It had received little naval support from its German 

and Italian allies. 

Today, however, Japan has been allied with the United States for over half 

a century, and remains the world’s second largest economy.4

 Japan deploys arguably the most modern and powerful naval force among East Asian nations, 

and ranks among the world’s half-dozen or so leading naval powers, as it was 

a century ago.

The United States

The United States started off as a country without a navy, although with 

a considerable industrial base to develop one, if and when it so chose. Threats 

to its commerce caused it to so choose, however. Throughout the 19th century the United States deployed a respectable medium-sized navy—arguably the 

fourth strongest in the world, most of the time. It used this navy to fend off 

successive French, North African, British, and Caribbean pirate attacks on its 

commerce early in the century, and less successfully against British attacks on 

its homeland during the War of 1812. Notably, however, the U.S. Navy would 

never fight Britain or France again (and has never engaged in a shooting war 

with Russia or the Soviet Union).

Later in the 19th century, the United States used the navy to good effect 

to support its army in the war with Mexico. During the American Civil War, 

there were two American navies fighting each other. To counter its weaker 

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Confederate opponent and to support the army in its campaigns, the Union 

built up a naval force that by the end of the war was arguably the second most 

powerful in the world. 

Mostly, however, the 19th century U.S. Navy was used in forward 

station operations to back up its merchants, missionaries, and other nationals 

all over the world—including in and around China. In these operations, U.S. 

Navy commanders often entered into local ad hoc coalitions with other naval 

powers, especially the British. 

The United States by the 1880s was a world power by most economic 

standards. Yet its army was minuscule and its navy ranked no higher than 

12th among the world’s navies. By the end of the 19th century, however, 

the United States had joined the other great and medium-sized powers of 

the world in building up a national battle fleet centered on battleships, and 

was a major player in the global naval arms race that characterized world 

relationships in the years before World War I. American navy attachés and 

engineers were deployed to the great naval centers of Europe to learn and 

later apply the latest European naval developments. 

Certainly a great world power economically and now navally, the 

United States until World War I, however, had been loath to act as a player in many aspects of the European-centered Great Power System. The 

United States did, however, spawn Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, a prodigious writer on naval history and international relations, whose advocacy 

of large, consolidated battle fleets heavily influenced naval strategic, operational, and tactical theory not only in the United States, but in all other 

countries of the world with significant naval forces. The United States also 

began in this period to deploy expeditionary naval forces in the Caribbean 

and East Asia, including participation in the multinational Boxer expedition to 

Beijing in 1900, alongside the British, Russians, French, Germans, Japanese, 

and others. 

When the United States finally entered World War I in 1917, 

however, its naval forces were not deployed in a Mahanian way. Rather, 

they were divided into numerous separate force packages in the Atlantic 

and Mediterranean in order to more effectively carry out its principal 

missions: troop and cargo transport, convoy protection, antisubmarine and 

antisurface raider warfare, and blockade. American naval officers worked 

closely for a year and a half with their British counterparts, and learned 

a great deal about Royal Navy ship and weapons system design and tactics, 

techniques, and procedures. The United States emerged from that war as the 

world’s number two naval power, and treated both number one (Great Britain) 

and number three (Japan) as rivals throughout the 1920s. 

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By the 1930s, however, Japan had emerged as the U.S. Navy’s principal potential adversary, and indeed after December 7, 1941, the two 

countries were at war. Britain, meanwhile, had drawn close to America and 

the two naval powers prosecuted a coordinated global war at sea against 

the Axis powers during World War II. To attack Japan—a nation located 

on the far side of the world’s largest ocean and protected by powerful 

battle fleets and island fortresses—the U.S. Navy built up the largest and 

most powerful navy the world had yet seen, totally eclipsing the Royal 

Navy and all other world navies. That navy was organized, trained, and 

equipped to carry out a wide range of naval missions, including destruction 

of enemy battle fleets, bombing and landing troops to seize objectives ashore, 

sinking enemy commerce, protecting allied shipping, and blockade.

Although the U.S. Navy during the Cold War and post–Cold War eras 

has never been more than a fraction of the size of its World War II ancestor, 

it has remained the world’s dominant naval force since at least 1944, with 

significant at-sea and expeditionary combat capabilities, as well as an important role as part of the Nation’s strategic nuclear deterrent. In 1949, the United 

States joined NATO, and during the 1950s concluded defense agreements with 

numerous other nations, especially in East Asia. As the predominant naval 

power, the United States was the West’s naval leader throughout the Cold War, 

coordinating and cooperating closely with the navies of several former great 

powers and world naval powers including Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, 

France, Britain, Germany, and Japan. 

Observations, Comparisons, and Conclusions

Analyzing the historical record above, some salient points can be gleaned:

Rising navies are usually a feature of rising political, military, and economic powers. All of the powers discussed in this paper were bent on becoming powerful global or regional states, and all used naval power as one of the 

important means to that end. There have been, however, exceptions: 19th century America could have built and deployed far more powerful naval forces 

than it usually did; arguably the interwar Soviet Union could have done the 

same. In both instances, the countries focused their impressive economic and 

technological resources on building up their domestic economies and infrastructure, despite well-known naval requirements. Also, in both instances, the 

countries eventually built up powerful naval forces as well.

When a rising economic and political power decides to build a formidable navy, it usually can do so. That said, naval forces always compete for the 

resources of rising states with land forces and other appurtenances of power.5

Few rising powers can devote the bulk of their available resources to their 

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navies. Even Portugal and the Netherlands, small nations with small populations, needed significant land forces to conquer and maintain their empires, 

and even more importantly to guard against more powerful neighbors at home. 

And the world’s most storied naval powers—Great Britain and 20th century 

Japan and the United States—have had to devote significant treasure to their 

ground forces and later, to their air forces, in order to rise and to maintain and 

defend their status as major powers.

A country has to be rich and smart to be a rising naval power. When 

it stops being either, it falls. That seems to be the lesson one can draw from 

this history. Fifteenth century Portugal had special maritime technological 

prowess and extensive recent military experience. It was as wealthy as any 

other state in that early modern, pre-industrial age. As Portugal’s technological lead withered, other richer, more populous states challenged it for naval 

supremacy. By the 19th century, Portugal was an economically impoverished 

state, and hardly a naval power at all. The Netherlands, Spain, France, and 

Britain were all economically vibrant and strong countries during their eras of 

naval ascendancy, as later were Russia, Germany, Japan, and the United States.

All rising powers with rising navies have eventually collided with other great naval powers in combat—sometimes with other rising powers and 

sometimes with powers that had achieved supremacy. Portuguese naval power successfully challenged Arab and Indian sea power in the Indian Ocean. 

Dutch and English sea power eventually eclipsed the Portuguese in the same 

ocean, but had less success in the South Atlantic. Portugal, Spain, England, the 

Netherlands, and France all jockeyed for naval advantage across the 17th century. By the 18th century, two great naval powers had emerged—France and 

England—although Russia was now building battle fleets as well, and the other traditional naval powers still deployed powerful forces on occasion. By the 

early 19th century, the Royal Navy had vanquished all the others, especially 

the French and Spanish, and was clearly globally supreme at sea, despite the 

continued existence of strong French and Russian navies. 

At the end of the 19th century, however, the rising national and naval powers of Germany, Japan, and the United States joined and expanded the old naval triumvirate, making British naval supremacy problematic unless Britain 

could ally itself with one or more other naval powers—which it did against 

Germany during the two 20th century world wars. Meanwhile, a relatively small 

and war-exhausted Britain could not contend for global maritime supremacy 

against its American ally, and so command of the world’s oceans passed to the 

United States Navy, the victor in a largely naval war against Japan. Somewhat 

later, the Soviet Union—heir to Russia’s naval tradition—embarked on a Cold 

War naval buildup that, while formidable, never led to actual combat. When the 

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Soviet economy and then the Soviet state failed, the Soviet navy withered, and 

the U.S. Navy triumphed over its most recent naval rival without having to go 

to war.

When a rising power builds a strong navy, other strong powers 

strengthen their own navies. Rising powers and their navies may incur the 

enmity of other powers, and arms races may ensue. Some of these arms races 

precede actual wars. Others do not. Naval forces are usually involved in 

overall international arms races, and are occasionally their centerpieces. 

The most famous example is the Anglo-German arms race in battleships 

that occurred just a century ago. At the same time, Japan and the United 

States were also building up their battle fleets, as were France and many 

other European and South American countries. (Chinese and Russian battleship 

fleets had been eliminated from the race over the preceding decade and a half 

by Japan.) Other examples would include:

■ the competition in ships of the line and forward colonial trading posts 

among Portugal, Spain, France, Britain, and the Netherlands in the 

16th and 17th centuries

■ the great struggle for world domination between Britain and France 

in the 18th century

■ Britain’s maintenance of maritime superiority and France’s attempts 

to challenge it through innovative doctrines such as the Jeune Ecole in 

the 19th century

■ the Sino-Japanese naval arms race of the 1880s and 1890s, culminating 

in the Sino-Japanese War and Japanese control of Taiwan

■ the treaty-constrained maintenance and buildup of fleets among the 

five major world naval powers between 1922 and 1937

■ the buildup of nuclear deterrent forces by the Soviet Union and the 

United States in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, which included significant strategic nuclear submarine forces and submarine-launched 

ballistic missiles

■ the buildup of Soviet general purpose naval forces in the wake of the 

1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and the corresponding U.S. and allied 

naval responses.

Technological superiority matters in the short run, but in the long run, 

naval technology flows more or less freely across borders among the world’s 

most powerful nations—both reflecting and fueling naval arms races. Portugal 

led the world in maritime technology in the 15th century, but had lost its lead 

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by the 16th. In the 20th century, the introduction of submarines, dreadnought 

battleships, airships, aircraft carriers, and nuclear-powered warships by one 

navy all led within a very short time to their widespread emulation elsewhere. 

Navies are often allied with other navies during specific periods, when it is in 

the interests of both sides to share tactical and technological secrets. When 

those alliances dissolve—as was the case, for example, with the Anglo-Japanese 

alliance of 1903–1922 and the Anglo-American alliance of 1917—the navies 

involved are free to use the knowledge they had gained for their own purposes, 

even in planning war on their former allies.

Rising naval powers have always had multiple objectives in the world 

and faced a variety of threats, perceived and real. Consequently, their navies 

have had to be capable of a wide variety of missions. Portugal needed naval 

forces to defeat Arab warships at sea as well as ground expeditionary troops to 

invest cities and fortresses. Britain needed to guard against rival battle fleets in 

Europe as well as police its empire worldwide. The Soviet navy had to deploy and 

protect a strategic deterrent, defend the homeland from seaborne attack, support the Soviet army, cut NATO and Pacific sea lines of communications, and 

show support for client states around the world. All these various demands require investment in different types of ships and aircraft, different types of officer 

and enlisted specialists, and different weapons and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems, as well as strong general 

oversight and decisionmaking to maintain the most appropriate balance. 

Naval policy and doctrine matter. Even powerful naval nations can 

build too little of some important ship and weapons system types, and employ 

the types they do have sub-optimally. Examples include America’s over-reliance on inshore gunboats during the War of 1812; Japan’s reluctance to use its 

submarines to attack U.S. military and civilian shipping during World War II; 

and Soviet navy reliance on noisy and therefore easy-to-interdict submarines 

during the Cold War.

Operational art and tactics matter. A powerful navy is no guarantee of a 

rising or great power’s success in a particular war or campaign. Poor decisions 

by naval commanders contributed significantly to the defeats of the Spanish 

Armada off England in 1588, the Royal Navy off the Virginia Capes in 1781, 

the French and Spanish off Trafalgar in 1805, the British and French at the 

Dardanelles during World War I, the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor during 

World War II, and the Imperial Japanese Navy at Midway during that same war.

Rising powers and their navies may also earn the respect and friendship of others. The rising power may actively seek allies. At the same time, 

other powers may well seek cooperation and alliance with the rising power 

and its navy, with some of those alliances enduring for decades. During the 

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15th through 18th centuries, alliances among Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, 

France, and Britain often shifted, although some alliances among naval powers—like Spain and France in the 18th century—proved long-lasting. Eight 

naval powers—including Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, and the 

United States—allied themselves in a temporary coalition in response to the 

Chinese Boxer rebellion of 1900. 

Despite fighting two wars of independence against Britain in the early 

days of the American republic, by the 20th century the United States Navy was 

normally an ally of the Royal Navy. Since 1940, the U.S. Navy–Royal Navy 

relationship has been one of the closest military-to-military relationships among major naval powers of all time. And the seldom-discussed 

Soviet-American naval alliance of 1945 in the North Pacific facilitated the swift 

Soviet conquests of the Japanese Empire’s northern islands.

All the formerly rising powers we have chronicled—except the United 

States—have also later become declining powers. Nevertheless, most remain 

today among the world’s most powerful nations economically and, to some 

extent, politically. In short, rising economic powers still stay in the game for 

the long run.

Most formerly rising powers still deploy very powerful residual navies,

in part because they still remain economically powerful and can easily afford 

to do so.6

 In short, most traditional naval powers still see themselves continuing to wield naval power in the long run.

Most of these navies of formerly rising powers are in turn still closely 

allied with the United States Navy and capable of easy integration into its 

combat formations. Previous enmity, rivalry, and even warfare do not preclude 

naval cooperation at some later date.

Addressing the Questions

Having first presented some historical data, and then drawn some observations, comparisons, and conclusions from that data, it is now possible to 

directly address the five questions that are properly the subject of this chapter:

How have previous rising powers viewed and utilized naval power?

Previous rising great powers have generally viewed naval power as an 

important—indeed, often vital—tool for expanding their wealth, power, and 

influence. This has also been true of smaller, regional powers (for example, 

Italy, Austria-Hungary, Sweden, Denmark, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Greece, 

Turkey, and South Korea). They have used that naval power to:

■ ward off attacks on their homeland by rival powers

■ protect their international commercial trade

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■ establish forward trading posts, colonies, client states, and naval 

stations ashore

■ attack the international commercial trade of their rivals and blockade 

their ports and coasts

■ support the land power of their armies

■ contest command of the seas and oceans with rival fleets

■ in some modern cases, deploy significant portions of their strategic 

nuclear deterrent.

What were the key arguments and objectives that led previous 

rising powers to invest in naval modernization? The arguments and objectives flowed naturally from the way they viewed and used naval power. 

In all cases, however, the arguments made and objectives cited met with 

domestic resource limitations and other needs of rising powers, especially the 

requirements for powerful ground and (later) air forces, and the need to sustain 

vibrant national and imperial economies. 

Developing and maintaining significant naval power has been expensive. 

Only rich countries have been able to afford it, and only very rich countries can 

maintain navies capable of exerting or contesting world naval supremacy on 

important oceans and seas. In the 17th century, those countries were Portugal, 

Spain, France, the Netherlands, and England. By the 18th century, only England 

and France could make that kind of investment, and by the 19th century only 

heavily industrializing Britain could do so. Yet by the late 19th century, as the 

industrial revolution spread well beyond the British Isles, many more countries 

had the economic wherewithal to contest the seas: Britain and France, but also 

Russia, Germany, the United States, Japan, and Italy.

In the 20th century, two world wars and a cold war reduced the naval 

capabilities of Germany, Japan, and Russia, while Britain and France saw their 

economies—and thus their navies—far outstripped by that of the United 

States. But even in the contemporary United States, arguments for a strong 

navy must contend with arguments for a strong army and air force, as well as 

domestic economic and social demands.

What were the geopolitical consequences of the decision to invest in 

naval modernization? Geopolitical consequences of decisions to invest in naval 

modernization have been enormous. Decisions by the European naval powers of 

the 15th through 19th centuries helped foster huge expansions of their trade and 

led to the founding of vast overseas commercial and colonial empires. Britain’s 

decisions over time to build up what became easily the world’s most powerful 

navy were major contributors to the creation and extension of the British Empire, 

the largest empire in area, population, and wealth that the world has yet seen. 

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German and Japanese decisions to build up strong cruiser navies during the 1870s and 1880s helped enable the former to establish a global network 

of colonies and the latter to defeat its chief regional rival (Qing China), occupy 

Taiwan, and begin its imperial march across the Asia-Pacific region. The 

decisions by these two latter powers to transform their cruiser navies into 

top-of-the-line battle fleets gave Germany a counterweight to the British 

Grand Fleet during World War I, and helped enable Japan to defeat the Russian 

Empire, seize Korea, take over German possessions in the Pacific, and dominate 

the western Pacific. 

Russia’s decisions to become a naval power, dating back to the time of 

Peter the Great, helped attain important ports and seacoasts for that previously 

almost landlocked country. Recall that, four hundred years ago, St. Petersburg 

had been Swedish, Novorossysk was Ottoman, and Vladivostok Manchu. It 

was Russia’s naval power that enabled it to become a Mediterranean political 

and military player in the early 19th century. And naval power facilitated the 

mid-20th–century Soviet Union’s ability to develop client states in such places 

as Aden, Somalia, Ethiopia, Angola, Guinea, Libya, Syria, and Cuba.

For the United States, investing in naval power in much of the 19th century mostly enabled the new republic to protect its then-vast global commerce. It 

also, however, proved useful in helping the U.S. Army wrest large western territories from Mexico, and essential—again alongside the Army—in ensuring 

that the country stayed together, through its operations during the American 

Civil War. It was newly minted American naval power at the end of the 19th

century that enabled the seizures of Caribbean and Pacific islands from 

Spain and of a canal zone in Panama from Colombia, and assured American 

domination of Caribbean and Central American island nations and a certain 

American influence in China. 

During World War II, the American investment in naval power 

was a major contributor to the geopolitical reordering of East Asia and the 

Pacific, as well as helping enable the securing of Western Europe from totalitarian rule, both actual and potential. The U.S. Navy during the Cold War 

became an essential component of the geopolitical balances in northern and 

southern Europe, the Middle East, the Caribbean, and East Asia. Today it 

remains vital to the geopolitical balance in Northeast Asia and the Middle 

East, and very important elsewhere. Were the U.S. Seventh Fleet to decamp 

from its Japanese bases, pull back to the United States, and then dissolve, it 

would be a destabilizing event on the scale of a successful domestic revolution 

in one or more Northeast Asian countries.

Not all the geopolitical consequences of the rise of past naval powers 

have worked themselves out. Some of the world’s areas of tension today have 

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their origins in the rise of bygone rising naval powers. Examples include East 

Timor, the southern Philippines, the southern Kuriles, Gibraltar, Cyprus, the 

Falkland Islands, and the current status of Taiwan.

What factors made naval arms races among rising powers and others 

more or less likely? The wealth of nations, the nature of the international 

political system, public opinion, national enmities, and deliberate government 

decisions have been the key factors behind naval arms races. The navies 

themselves are not necessarily culpable. All navies pressure their governments 

for more resources, but it is the government, not the navy, that ultimately 

provides them. U.S. naval officers throughout the 19th century argued 

vociferously that the United States should take its place as a great power and 

deploy a much more powerful navy. Washington seldom listened, however, 

except during the American Civil War. It was not until the country was 

more than a century old that the United States entered into the international 

naval competition in a big way. Nineteenth century French naval officers likewise tried to get successive French governments to open the financial spigots 

more and enable them to more effectively challenge Britain at sea, with only 

occasionally successful results. 

On the other hand, 16th and 17th century English and Dutch governments 

made deliberate and calculated decisions to build up their naval forces so as to 

challenge Portuguese and Spanish treasure ship convoys at sea and rich colonial possessions ashore. Turn-of-the-last-century Germany and Japan likewise 

sought deliberately to build up their naval forces, despite the potential for triggering arms races, believing—erroneously as it turned out—that the game was 

worth the candle. The cases of Imperial Germany and Japan are instructive too, 

in that in these examples, the navies themselves became powerful players in 

domestic politics in their own right—positions seldom afforded their counterparts in other countries, especially the United States, France, and Russia.

Also, the turn of the last century saw the spread of a widespread belief 

among elites and publics—stoked by the writings and speeches of Mahan and 

others—that battleship numerology was an appropriate yardstick of national 

power. Likewise, during the Cold War, numerous pro-U.S. Navy Congressmen 

craved and wielded statistics-laden charts showing “them” overtaking “us” in 

arguing for increased U.S. Navy appropriations.

How should current Chinese and Indian efforts to build naval capabilities be viewed in light of this historical experience?In a word, as “normal.” 

Rising world economic and political powers have usually also been rising 

world naval powers. China and India cannot be expected to be exceptions. 

A glance at a current listing of the top 10 countries in the world in terms 

of gross domestic product yields one naval superpower (the United States), 

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20 SWARTZ

seven medium naval powers (Japan, Germany, China, Britain, France, Italy, 

and Spain), and two formerly mid-level naval powers who have recently 

made national decisions to forgo extensive naval forces (Canada and Brazil). 

Numbers 11 through 20 include six medium naval powers (Russia, South Korea, 

India, Australia, the Netherlands, and Turkey).

The history shows, however, no dearth of conflict and blood. Countries with significant naval power can always be tempted to use it. Yet history 

also shows that rising naval power need not mean rising chances of war. The 

United States began its rise to naval preeminence a little over a hundred years 

ago. Yet that vast naval power of the United States has never been used in 

combat against its most powerful contemporary naval rivals—Britain and 

the Soviet Union—despite serious rivalry with the former in the 1920s, and 

45 or so years of Cold War with the latter. In fact, enormous confluences of 

political and economic interests by both the United Kingdom and the United 

States have led those counties to what is perhaps the closest and strongest 

naval alliance of all time. Likewise, war among those countries’ navies and the 

powerful Japanese, French, Spanish, and Italian fleets of today is equally 

unthinkable.

But then, if war among like powers may be unthinkable, why should 

these successful and rising powers deploy naval power at all? There are several 

good reasons, in fact:

■ to protect the national homeland

■ to assist friendly nations

■ to protect economic resources and commerce

■ to suppress piracy, terrorism, and the illegal trafficking in people, 

drugs, and weapons of mass destruction

■ to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

■ to reassure their domestic populations that they are capable of dealing 

with all these contingencies.

It is these reasons—rather than a zeal for empire, the desire to seize foreign territory, or quests for “a place in the sun”—that one can only hope will 

motivate the rising powers of China and India as well.

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Notes

1For broader and deeper treatment of the issues discussed in this chapter, see Jan Glete, Navies 

and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500–1860, 2 vols. (Stockholm: 

Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1993); Colin S. Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies at War (New York: The Free Press, 1992); Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett, eds., Seapower and Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989); Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British 

Naval Mastery (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976); Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987); John J. 

Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001); 

George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Seapower in Global Politics, 1494–1993 (Seattle: University of 

Washington Press, 1988); E.B. Potter, ed., Sea Power: A Naval History, 2d

 ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 

Press, 1981); Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires (New 

York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1974); and Lawrence Sondhaus, Naval Warfare, 1815–1914 (London and New York: Routledge, 2001).

2Ottoman Turkey and post-unification Italy both were, for a time, rising European and Middle 

Eastern powers. Both deployed significant naval forces. But neither deployed those forces often outside the 

Mediterranean and adjacent small seas, and neither exerted significant influence far beyond their immediate 

geographic locales. Leaving them out of this discussion may make it somewhat less complete, but their omission probably does not greatly affect the observations, comparisons, and conclusions of this chapter; also, 

leaving them out helps make its substance more manageable and keeps it within its mandated length limits. 

Rises and falls of Chinese naval power are the subject of numerous other contributions to the present effort, 

and therefore need not be covered here.

3Editors’ note: At the time that this paper was presented, Germany enjoyed this ranking. The German economy is now ranked as the sixth largest economy measured in gross domestic product (purchasing 

power parity). See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, 2010, available at <https://www.cia.gov/

library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html>.

4Editors’ note: At the time this paper was presented in 2007, the Japanese economy was considered 

the second largest economy. Since that time Japan’s economy ranking has dropped to the third largest economy measured by gross domestic product (purchasing power parity). China’s economy is now considered the 

second largest economy. See CIA World Factbook, 2010.

5Regarding the requirements of nations for land as well as sea power in the period 1500 to 1800, see 

Dennis Showalter, “European Power Projection,” MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History 20 (Winter 2008), 46–55.

6Note that this is also true of Turkey and Italy, other former rising powers with strong naval traditions.

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 23

Chapter 2

Recent Developments in Naval and 

Maritime Modernization in the Asia-Pacific: 

Implications for Regional Security

Richard A. Bitzinger

Over the past 15 years or so, the navies of the Asia-Pacific region have 

experienced an extraordinary bout of modernization and growth. This buildup has in most cases been quantitative, but, more important perhaps, regional maritime forces from Japan to Southeast Asia to India have expanded 

qualitatively as well. Local navies have greatly improved their capabilities for 

projecting force and firepower. In particular, navies that used to be mainly 

“brown-water” forces operating close to shore—and therefore equipped mainly with coastal patrol vessels and smaller surface combatants—have added 

larger warships, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft that in turn have 

extended their theoretical ranges of operation in neighboring seas and oceans. 

Those more traditional seafaring countries—Australia and Japan in particular—have increased their ocean-going capacities and their capabilities for 

amphibious assault, power-projection, and open-ocean operations. Finally, 

aspiring great powers like China and India—which traditionally emphasized 

land power over other forces—have come to appreciate the value of large 

navies with large surface ships, sophisticated submarines, organic air support, 

and even aircraft carriers. In sum, few regions in the world have gone through 

so much naval expansion and development in the past decade and a half.

This paper seeks to address three basic issues surrounding the naval buildup in the Asia-Pacific. First, what is driving this naval expansion; in 

particular, how much of this is a reaction to the recent growth in Chinese 

maritime power, and how much have other factors influenced the buildup? 

Second, what specific types of maritime weapons platforms and systems are 

individual Asia-Pacific nations adding to their navies, and how do they affect 

national capabilities for projecting maritime power? Finally, what might be 

the possible end results of such a buildup for regional security and stability; in 

particular, what are the worrisome and also the potentially benevolent effects of 

such naval modernization?

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24 BITZINGER

What Is Driving the Naval Buildup in the Asia-Pacific?

First of all, what is driving this relatively recent buildup of maritime 

combat capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region? Several factors appear to be at 

work. Certainly, an expanding and increasingly assertive Chinese naval force is 

at least partly responsible. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), for example, has greatly increased its procurement of large surface combatants and 

submarines over the past decade. The PLAN has acquired 12 Kilo-class submarines and four Sovremenny-class destroyers (armed with supersonic SS–N–

22 antiship cruise missiles) from Russia, as well as a navalized version of the 

Russian Su–30 fighter-bomber. Just as important, there was a significant 

expansion in Chinese naval shipbuilding beginning around the turn of the 

century. Between 2000 and 2008, China constructed six destroyers of three 

different types, 16 Song-class and four Yuan-class diesel-electric submarines, 

and at least two Type–093 Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarines.1

In addition, China is building a new class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile 

submarines (the Type–094 Jin-class SSBN), two of which have been delivered 

so far to the PLAN. Finally, China has built 12 new frigates—including one 

class that features a stealthy design—as well as a new-generation catamaranhull missile fast attack craft (of which several dozens may be built).2

Additionally, the PLAN is starting to expand its capabilities for power 

projection and expeditionary warfare. China has recently launched the Type–

071, a 20,000-ton LPD (landing platform dock) amphibious warfare ship, 

equipped with two helicopters and two air-cushioned landing craft (LCAC), 

and capable of carrying up to 800 troops; up to eight Type–071s could eventually be built, and this vessel could be complemented by a new larger LHD-type 

(landing helicopter dock) amphibious assault ship.3

 In addition, rumors persist 

that the PLAN will add at least one aircraft carrier to its fleet by 2015–2020.4

Finally, the PLA is building up—both quantitatively and qualitatively—its 

arsenal of conventional missile systems, including reportedly developing a 

medium-range missile with an antiship capability, most likely for use against 

large warships such as aircraft carriers.5

The recent Asian-Pacific naval expansion is also taking place partly to 

compensate for a perceived reduction in U.S. military interest and presence in 

the region. Washington’s preoccupation with fighting the war on terror, and 

its extensive ongoing involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, have diverted not 

only attention but also America’s military capacity away from the Asia-Pacific. 

The U.S. Army, for example, plans to pull 12,500 troops out of South Korea, 

while the U.S. Marines will withdraw 8,000 Marines of the III Marine Expeditionary Force from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. Accordingly, the U.S. military 

will consolidate and rationalize the deployment of its forces in the Asia-Pacific 

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region. Moreover, U.S. troops stationed overseas are to be restructured and 

reorganized to operate less as static defenses operating in a relatively small 

sphere of interest—such as defending South Korea or Japan. Rather, they will 

be reoriented as forwardly deployed and operationally flexible forces capable of 

dealing with both global as well as regional contingencies; they will be more 

mobile, more expeditionary, and more rapidly deployable.6

 

Consequently, countries in the region have to anticipate the necessity 

of becoming more self-reliant in the face of a declining U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific and growing concerns about the long-term reliability 

of America as a strategic partner. At the same time, as U.S. armed forces 

become more globally expeditionary, the more they will likely attempt to 

pull their allies along with them. Future U.S. missions will likely involve more 

and closer cooperation, not less, with Asian-Pacific allies and friendly states, 

particularly when it comes to combating terrorism, countering weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) proliferation, engaging in peacekeeping and stabilization 

operations, and deterring or contending with more traditional threats. 

Interoperability, therefore, will be a much higher priority for the U.S. military in the future, meaning that future allied forces will have to develop their 

own capacities for force projection, expeditionary and amphibious operations, 

lethality and precision strike, long-range surveillance and reconnaissance, 

and integrated command and control. 

Finally, beyond concerns over a rising “China threat” or a waning U.S. 

military presence in the region, more localized security and military concerns are also compelling many countries in the Asia-Pacific to beef up their 

maritime combat capabilities. In particular, many states in the region have 

longstanding and ongoing territorial disputes with each other that, while 

waged ostensibly over relative flyspecks of land, have taken on heightened 

significance for reasons of history, economics, or power politics. These conflicts 

have in turn stimulated the expansion of naval power as a means of demonstrating resolve and even capability to press forward with these claims. So, 

for example, we see South Korea and Japan contesting sovereignty over the 

Liancourt Islets (known as Dokdo to the Koreans, Takeshima to the Japanese); 

Singapore and Malaysia each laying claim to an outcropping of rocks called 

Pedra Branca or Pulau Batu Puteh; and Indonesia and Malaysia clashing 

militarily over the Ambalat sea block. And, of course, several nations—including Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam—have 

conflicting claims over the Paracel and Spratly island chains. In some 

cases, these islets barely break the ocean’s surface, but they are adjacent both 

to major sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and to potentially lucrative 

maritime natural resources (fisheries, oil and gas deposits). Many of these 

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countries have attempted to enforce their claims by establishing garrisons and 

other structures on the islands, and by acquiring the means to patrol these areas.

One should also not discount such factors as prestige and arms competitions in driving the recent expansion in maritime military power in the region. 

South Korea and India, for example, are both keen to make clear their determination to become regional great powers through their buildup of national 

military power, and this includes the creation of blue-water, oceangoing navies. 

Japan, too, in its efforts to become a “normal” country, has sought to modify 

its post–World War II self-restrictions on national defense in order to allow it 

to play a more active, global role militarily. Moreover, tit-for-tat, non-aggressive arms competitions7

 between neighboring powers (such as Malaysia buying 

Su–30 Flankers following Singapore’s decision to purchase the F–16) have also 

played a role in at least some arms procurement decisionmaking.

Finally, rising defense budgets, although more of an enabler than a 

driver, have certainly underwritten Asian-Pacific naval expansion of the past 

decade. The PLA has long been the beneficiary of a long-term expansion in 

defense spending. Between 1997 and 2005, Beijing increased defense 

spending by double-digit doses every year: 13.7 percent per annum in real

(after inflation) terms, according to China’s own statistics.8

 China’s official 2008 budget of US$78 billion, for example, constituted a 7.5 percent rise 

over the previous year. Consequently, Chinese military expenditures have 

more than quintupled in real terms since 1997, thus permitting Beijing to 

invest considerable additional monies in its military modernization efforts. 

China now outspends Japan, France, and the United Kingdom on national 

defense, and likely Russia as well.

Other Asian-Pacific nations have followed suit, with India increasing its 

military expenditures by two-thirds between 1998 and 20089

; by 2010, Indian 

military expenditures totaled approximately $32 billion. Australia has increased 

defense spending by 46 percent over the same period, while South Korea has increased by 48 percent.10 Of the larger countries in the region, only Japan has had 

a relatively stagnant defense budget, a product of its unofficial policy of pegging 

military expenditures to 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). In Southeast Asia, meanwhile, Malaysia’s military budget more than doubled in real terms 

between 2000 and 2008, while Indonesian military spending has increased 72 

percent over the same period, Thailand 43 percent, and Singapore 26 percent.11 

Recent Developments in Asian-Pacific Navies

This section addresses recent developments in the expansion of maritime 

combat capabilities in the leading Asian-Pacific nations, including Australia, 

Japan, South Korea, India, and the larger countries of Southeast Asia. 

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Australia

As Australia shifts the focus in its security strategy away from a static, 

continental defense in favor of expeditionary operations both in the “immediate neighborhood” (e.g., East Timor) and farther afield (e.g., Afghanistan 

and Iraq), concepts of mobility, flexibility, precision strike, jointness, and 

networking have found particular favor in the Australian Department of 

Defence. Overall, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) wants to be capable of 

making a significant contribution to coalition and allied operations, while at 

the same time maintaining an independent operational capability. Overall, the 

ADF must be more (and more quickly) deployable, more sustainable over long 

periods and across long distances, and capable of engaging in both low-level 

and high-intensity high-tech wars. 

As a practical result, the ADF is currently seeking to improve its 

capabilities in five key areas: amphibious and expeditionary capacity; 

precision strike; intelligence-gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance; 

interservice and interallied jointness; and logistical support. One priority, for 

example, is acquiring the ability to move and sustain a force of 3,000 soldiers. 

Consequently, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) plans to acquire two new 

28,000-ton Canberra-class amphibious power projection (LHD-type) ships, 

at a cost of A$3 billion, each capable of transporting 1,000 troops and 150 

vehicles, and carrying both landing craft and a mix of transport and battlefield 

support helicopters. The first Canberra-class ship is due to enter service around 

2013.12 Although the Canberra-class is not intended to serve as a platform for 

fixed-wing aircraft, it is at least conceivable that short takeoff and vertical 

landing (STOVL) aircraft, such as the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), could be 

deployed on such a vessel. The Royal Australian Air Force is actually buying 

the JSF (although the conventional, not the STOVL, version), and the original 

Spanish design included a ski jump for fixed-wing aircraft.13

Additionally, Australia is building three air warfare destroyers (AWD), 

known as the Hobart-class, based on the Spanish F100 frigate and built in 

Australia under license at the ASC Shipyards in Adelaide. This program will 

cost A$8 billion and the ships are scheduled to enter service between 2013 and 

2017. These ships, which will be outfitted with the U.S. Aegis combat system and 

the SM–2 Standard surface-to-air missile, are intended to provide protection 

to new amphibious, sealift, and support ships from aircraft and antiship cruise 

missiles.14 In addition, the new AWDs would likely be upgradeable to an SMD 

(Seabased Midcourse Defense) standard, as their Aegis combat systems are 

likely to incorporate a modular, open architecture, while at the same time space 

and weight considerations for accepting the SM–3 ballistic missile interceptor 

are being factored into the ship’s design and construction.15 It is worth noting 

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that in March 2004 the U.S. and Royal Australian navies signed a Statement of 

Principles to expand cooperation on naval surface warfare, one element of 

which could be improved Australian access to state-of-the-art U.S. technology 

regarding naval air-defense systems for its AWD program. 

Finally, although they have been in service for more than a decade, 

Australia’s sizable submarine force—the six-boat Collins-class fleet—is worth 

noting. Despite its considerable teething problems—the program was late, over 

budget, and plagued with mechanical and other problems (such as a combat 

system that never worked properly and had to be eventually replaced)—the 

Collins-class submarine is by now a reasonably effective underwater weapon 

and will probably remain in service until around 2025–2030. 

Japan

Current Japanese naval expansion coincides with a period of significant evolution in Japan’s postwar security policy. Under former Prime 

Minister Koizumi and subsequent Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) prime 

ministers, Japan tried to pursue a foreign and defense policy more befitting a 

“normal” nation and to allow the country’s military to play a larger and more active role. This included legitimizing the role of the Self-Defense Force (SDF) as a 

military force, and permitting these forces to be used in international contingency operations. At the same time, Japan’s security interests have expanded far 

beyond Northeast Asia and its once-vaunted 1,000-mile defensive perimeter. Now, the SDF has to contend with possible contingency operations much 

farther afield, for example, in contributing to international military stabilization operations (such as in Iraq), or in patrolling sea lines of communications 

in the Straits of Malacca (to safeguard access to energy supplies).16 

As a consequence, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) has 

greatly increased its expeditionary capabilities, firepower, and C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities. The MSDF is now larger than the British Royal 

Navy and comprises 44 destroyers, nine frigates, and 15 submarines. In particular, the MSDF has expanded its capacities for power projection through the 

acquisition of high-speed sealift ships (for logistics and transport) and three 

large amphibious warships of the Osumi class. The 13,000-ton Osumi can carry 

330 troops and up to 10 tanks, and is outfitted with four helicopters and two 

LCAC hovercraft transports. Ostensibly designated as an LST (tank landing 

ship), the Osumi-class vessel is of a size and design (including a large open deck 

for helicopters) more resembling an LPD.

Additionally, the MSDF is currently acquiring four Hyuga-class “helicopter destroyers” (DDH). At 13,500 tons and with an open-deck design and 

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below-deck hangars, the Hyuga DDH resembles a small aircraft carrier, similar 

to the Royal Navy’s Invincible-class carriers, which operate the Harrier. However, the Hyuga DDH is intended only for helicopters, and it lacks a “ski jump” 

deck for fixed-wing aircraft (although this could be retrofitted at a later date).

Japan is currently building a new class of diesel-electric submarines 

(the Soryu) equipped with the Stirling engine for air-independent propulsion (AIP). At least four boats in this class are under construction and five 

more are planned, to be built at a rate of approximately one submarine a 

year. In addition, Tokyo is developing a new indigenous maritime patrol aircraft, the P–X, to replace P–3C Orions currently in-service with the SDF. 

The P–X will expand the MSDF’s surveillance capabilities as far out as the 

South China Sea. 17

Of particular note, Japan is using its maritime forces as a key platform for 

constructing a national missile defense system. The centerpiece of this system 

involves upgrading MSDF destroyers equipped with the U.S.-developed Aegis 

air defense system to the Sea-based Midcourse Defense (SMD) mode. The 

SMD missile defense system entails improvements to the current Aegis SPY–1 

multifunction phased-array radar and fire-control system to increase the range 

and altitude of its search, detection, track, engagement, and control functions, 

in order to handle exo-atmospheric antimissile engagements. This program 

also entails the codevelopment (with the United States) of a new interceptor 

missile, the Standard SM–3 Block IA missile, which includes a third-stage for 

extended range and a Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP) kinetic 

warhead for terminal homing and intercept. Japan and the United States 

successfully tested the SMD missile defense system off the coast of Hawaii in 

June 2006, and Japan performed a solo test of a missile intercept with the SM–3 

in late 2007.18 

Japan will incorporate the SMD system into four current and two 

planned Aegis-equipped air-defense destroyers, and should be fully deployed 

by 2011. Until then, the U.S. Navy will provide limited missile defense coverage 

of Japan utilizing its own Aegis-class SMD destroyers based in the Sea of Japan. 

Despite building up its power-projection capabilities, the MSDF is still 

essentially a defensively oriented force, and one that is mostly “channeled 

through the U.S.-Japan alliance.”19 In terms of roles and missions, therefore, 

it is likely that U.S. forces will continue to act as the “spear,” while the SDF—

and particularly the MSDF—will continue to act as the “shield,” that is, operating mainly in a defensive stance, in terms of both posture and capabilities.20

However, even this traditional defensive-defense posture could change, if the 

security situation in the Asia-Pacific worsens or if Japan feels that it must take 

on more responsibility for its defense. Important markers of such a sea change 

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30 BITZINGER

in Japan’s defense posture would be the acquisition of offensive maritime 

weapons, such as Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles.

South Korea

Whereas Japan endeavors to expand its power-projection capabilities (particularly its maritime capabilities) mainly through coalition-based 

activities and interoperability with U.S. military forces, the Republic of 

Korea (ROK) is currently pursuing a defense policy of “cooperative self-reliant 

defense” in order to revisit and “rebalance” the U.S.-South Korean alliance.21

Consequently, Seoul is pursuing military acquisition programs intended to 

increase the capacities of the ROK armed forces to act more independently 

of the U.S. military and in support of a more nationalistic, self-reliant, and 

self-assertive foreign and defense policy. 

One critical reason for this new approach to security is the declining and redefined role of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula. U.S. Forces 

Korea (USFK) plans to remove 12,500 troops permanently from South 

Korea over the next several years. Additionally, the remaining 25,000 U.S. 

soldiers are to be redeployed from 43 bases scattered around the country 

to 16 bases mainly concentrated in two areas south of the Han River; in 

particular, the U.S. military—including the USFK Command headquarters, 

United Nations (UN) Command, and Combined Forces Command—will 

vacate the Yongsan Garrison in downtown Seoul. More importantly, U.S. forces in Korea will, under the rubric of “strategic flexibility,” be reoriented toward 

more multifunctional, expeditionary missions and therefore will use the ROK 

more as a base for regional contingencies beyond the peninsula. To underscore 

this new strategic flexibility and regional focus, the United States will transfer 

its 8th Army headquarters from Seoul to Hawaii.

U.S. force realignments on the peninsula—and especially the reorientation of USFK toward more extrapeninsular operations—have provided 

the ROK with both the need and the justification to expand its self-defense 

capabilities. Consequently, Seoul has undertaken a major, multiyear recapitalization of its armed forces in order to bolster its independent defense 

capability. With regard to the ROK Navy (ROKN), this entails the development 

of a blue-water maritime capability. For example, the ROKN is in the process 

of accepting into service two new amphibious assault (LPD-type) vessels of the 

Dokdo-class. The Dokdo displaces 14,000 tons and is capable of carrying 700 

troops, 10 tanks, 15 helicopters, and two air-cushioned landing craft.22 The first 

ship was commissioned in 2007, and the ROKN may eventually deploy up to 

four Dokdos.

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The Dokdo is intended to serve as a multifunctional vessel—in particular, serving as a fleet command ship. Consequently, it has been outfitted with a 

digital C4ISR combat system which can manage, control, and coordinate support vessels, aircraft, and weapons systems on a real-time basis. Additionally, 

its size (larger in length and beam than many current vertical short takeoff and 

landing aircraft carriers) and open flight deck make it conceivable that the design could be modified so as to permit the deployment of fixed-wing fighters 

such as the Harrier.

In addition, the ROK Navy has greatly expanded its oceangoing 

fleet. Under its KDX (Korean Destroyer Experimental) program, Seoul is 

currently engaged in a three-phased effort to move from a coastal defense–

oriented ROKN to a blue-water navy. The first vessels in this program, the 

KDX–I, were small (3,900-ton) vessels intended mainly as “proof-of-concept” 

ships and only three were built, in the late 1990s. These ships were followed by 

the KDX–II class, which displace around 5,000 tons and are equipped with the 

Standard SM–2 Block IIIA surface-to-air missile (for countering air-breathing 

threats), Harpoon antiship cruise missiles (ASCM), and the indigenously developed Hyunmoo IIIC land-attack cruise missile (LACM) similar to the U.S. 

Tomahawk. These weapons are all deployed in vertical-launch systems (VLS). 

Six KDX–II destroyers were delivered to the ROKN between 2002 and 2006. 

While these ships were indigenously designed and constructed, most of their 

subsystems—the VLS, radar, electronic warfare suites, combat management 

systems, etc.—were imported from the United States and Europe.

Currently, the ROKN is acquiring the much larger (7,700 ton) KDX–III 

destroyer, also known as the King Sejong the Great-class. The KDX–III is outfitted with the U.S.-supplied Aegis air-defense radar and fire-control system, 

and utilizes the Standard SM–2 Block IIIB air-defense missile. Other armaments include the Hyunmoo IIIC LACM and either the Harpoon or the indigenous Hae Sung (Sea Star) ASCM. All in all, the KDX–III packs considerable 

firepower, as it has 128 VLS cells, compared to 64 for the KDX–II. The ROKN 

is currently building three KDX–III destroyers, with an option on three more.

The ROKN is also increasing its submarine fleet. During the 1990s, it acquired nine German-designed Type–209 diesel-electric submarines, designated the KSS–1 Changbogo-class, which were subsequently built in South Korea 

under license. These are now being gradually replaced by the KSS–II Type–214 

Chungji-class, also originally designed and developed in Germany. The Type–

214 is equipped with fuel cells for AIP, permitting it to remain submerged for 

up to 3 weeks. South Korea has already procured three Type–214 submarines 

(again, built under license), and it holds options on six more.23 However, South 

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Korea may instead attempt to design and build its own class of submarine.24 Ultimately, the ROKN will operate a fleet of up to 18 submarines by 2020–2025.

What is particularly interesting about ROK naval developments is that 

they are not necessarily tied to peninsular security concerns. In fact, building 

up its blue-water maritime capabilities appears to be as much directed against 

Japan as against North Korea or a notional Chinese threat. It is worth noting, 

for example, that the Dokdo LPD is named after the group of islands (called 

Takashima by the Japanese) claimed by both South Korea and Japan. 

India

India, as an aspiring great power, has over the past decade put considerable resources in building up its military capabilities. This is evident in its 

nascent nuclear weapons program (including land- and sea-based missile 

delivery systems) and its continuing interest in how the country might be able 

to harness its growing expertise in information technologies (IT) in order to 

pursue an IT-led revolution in military affairs.25 Accordingly, while the country’s military remains an Army-heavy force oriented toward a ground war with 

Pakistan, it increasingly stresses long-range surveillance and intelligence, force 

projection, and expeditionary warfare.26 These taskings particularly favor the 

Indian navy (IN), which in turn is increasingly becoming the Indian military’s 

“high-tech” arrow in its quiver of resources.27 

The Indian navy has a specific responsibility for a “constabulary role” 

in the Indian Ocean. This includes the protection of SLOCs (90 percent of the 

country’s trade, particularly oil and gas, transits through the Indian Ocean), 

sovereignty enforcement, and sea area denial to adversaries.28 Consequently, 

the IN has put considerable effort into building up and maintaining its bluewater oceangoing capabilities. 

India, for example, is one of the few countries in the world—and certainly the only one in the Asia-Pacific so far—to operate large-sized aircraft 

carriers. The IN had for many decades operated at least two carriers—until 

recently, ex-Royal Navy ships (including one dating from World War II)—flying Harrier STOVL aircraft from their flight decks. Currently, India is in the 

process of acquiring two new carriers—one a former Soviet navy vessel, and 

the other an ambitious project to design and build an indigenous carrier.29

The Soviet-based carrier is the former 45,000-ton Admiral Gorshkov, 

a Kiev-class carrier (operating the Yak–38M, a STOVL aircraft similar 

to the Harrier) that was laid down in 1978 and commissioned into the 

Soviet navy in 1987. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the downsizing of the Russian military, the Gorshkov was decommissioned in 1996. 

After several years of negotiations, the Indians finally acquired the Gorshkov

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in 2004. Under this agreement, Russia is providing the carrier for free, and 

India is paying the Russians US$974 million to refit the vessel—including 

adding a ski jump to the bow—so as to be capable of flying navalized MiG–29 

fighters off its deck in a STOBAR (short take-off but assisted recovery) 

configuration.30 In addition, India will pay another US$700 million for 

the aircraft and weapons systems, including twelve single-seat MiG–29K 

“Fulcrum–D” fighter jets, four dual-seat MiG–29KUB trainer aircraft, and 

six “Helix” helicopters.31 

The carrier, renamed the INS Vikramaditya, was supposed to have been 

delivered to the IN sometime around mid-2008, but refitting the vessel has 

turned out to be much more challenging than originally envisioned, resulting 

in considerable cost overruns and delays (Moscow has asked for an additional 

US$1.2 billion to finish the upgrade). Consequently, the Vikramaditya is 

unlikely to enter service before 2013.32

India’s shipbuilding industry has also been tasked with constructing 

the Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC), formerly known as the Air Defense 

Ship (ADS). The IAC, designated the INS Vikrant, is a 37,500-ton vessel, 

also utilizing a STOBAR arrangement, and capable of operating either the 

MiG–29K or a navalized version of India’s indigenous Tejas Light Combat 

Aircraft (LCA). Construction began in 2005 and the IAC was supposed to 

enter service by 2012, but production setbacks have delayed this until 2015 

at the earliest.33 Consequently, the Indian navy will have to keep its 50-yearold INS Viraat (ex-HMS Hermes, operating the Harrier) in service for several 

more years.34

The IN is also in the process of substantially upgrading and expanding its submarine force, which currently consists of 16 diesel-electric boats 

(mostly Russian Kilo-class and German Type-209 submarines). After 

protracted negotiations, India has finally signed an agreement to acquire 

six Franco-Spanish Scorpène-class submarines, which will be constructed 

under license at India’s Mazagon Docks shipyard; six additional subs may be 

subsequently ordered.35 In addition, the country is keen to develop a nuclear 

submarine fleet, both hunter-attack (SSN) and ballistic missile-carrying 

(SSBN) types. India has been working on its nuclear-powered Advanced 

Technology Vessel (ATV) program since the early 1970s, and it launched its 

first ATV in 2009. Its first priority is an SSBN, and the IN hopes to deploy a 

fleet of at least three boats by 2015, armed with an indigenously developed 

submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).36

Finally, the Indian navy is also procuring additional destroyers and frigates, and for the first time is buying eight P–3C long-range maritime patrol 

aircraft from the United States.37

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Southeast Asian Countries

As with the rest of the Asia-Pacific, the countries of Southeast Asia have 

put considerable effort into building up their naval forces over the past decade 

or so. Naval developments in this area are propelled by a variety of national and regional concerns, including territorial disputes (such as conflicting 

claims over the Spratly Islands) and lingering regional suspicions, protection 

of large exclusive economic zones (EEZs), sovereignty enforcement in various 

SLOCs around Southeast Asia (such as the Malacca or Lombok straits), and, 

of course, growing concern over China’s “creeping assertiveness” in the South 

China Sea.38 In many ways, these countries’ naval modernization efforts, while 

on a much smaller scale than the larger countries in the region, are all the more 

impressive, since they expanded or are expanding their capabilities from a 

much lower starting point. 

The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), for example, has grown 

substantially over the past decade. The RSN has either acquired or is in the 

process of acquiring several new types of maritime systems for force projection, increased mobility, and expanded firepower. In particular, it is currently 

acquiring six Formidable-class frigates, which are based on the Frenchdesigned Lafayette-class “stealth” frigates. These frigates will mainly be used to 

patrol sea lines of communications around Singapore and will be armed with 

Harpoon ASCM and the French Aster–15 air defense missile, which is capable of providing antiballistic missile defense. Just as important, the Formidable-class frigate will be equipped with state-of-the-art sensors and combat 

management and communications systems, and thus will constitute a “key 

node” in Singapore’s 3G capability program and consequently “push the regional

envelope of naval capabilities . . . in their undoubted networking capabilities.”39

Besides these new frigates, the RSN has also bought four used A12-class 

submarines from Sweden, and more recently two more ex-Swedish submarines 

(the A17 class) outfitted with the Stirling AIP system. It also operates two indigenously designed and constructed Endurance-class landing ships, each capable 

of carrying 350 troops, 18 tanks, four helicopters, and four landing craft.

The naval branch of the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) is dedicated to 

building a “green-water” capacity by 2020, and it is consequently consolidating 

the size of its naval task force by phasing out its obsolete ships (i.e., the large 

fleet of East German frigates and corvettes acquired in the early 1990s) and 

replacing them with newer and more capable vessels. For example, Jakarta is 

currently acquiring four new Sigma-class corvettes from the Netherlands, four 

Korean-built platform LPD amphibious support ships, and Chinese C–802 

ASCMs. Older ships are being converted into patrol boats, forward operating bases in the eastern part of the archipelago are being established, and the 

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TNI Marine Forces are being expanded and strengthened. In addition, the TNI 

Navy operates a sizable fleet of maritime patrol aircraft (two CN–235MPAs 

and 25 ex-Australian Defence Force N–22 Nomad Searchmasters), and is 

currently acquiring 17 additional patrol aircraft of various types.40

Malaysia is in the midst of a multiyear program to expand and modernize its armed forces. Kuala Lumpur, under its current VMAF21 (Versatile 

Malaysian Armed Forces of the 21st Century) program, is in the process of 

transforming its forces according to principles of joint-service operations, force 

projection, and new combat capabilities. This means expanding firepower, 

adding new revolution in military affairs (RMA)–related capacities for information gathering and processing, extending the operational range of its air force, 

and building blue-water naval capability.41 This program, therefore, includes the 

purchase of new fighter jets, advanced trainer aircraft, airborne early warning 

(AEW) aircraft, long-range transport aircraft, submarines, and patrol corvettes.

In 2005, Malaysia established a national coast guard (the Malaysian 

Maritime Enforcement Agency or MMEA) to patrol the country’s 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. Eventually, it will be responsible for providing maritime security through the country’s 200-nautical-mile exclusive 

economic zone, leaving the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) free for force 

projection and warfighting in the open ocean.42 The MMEA currently operates 

72 vessels, including 15 ex-RMN patrol boats.

Kuala Lumpur is in the process of procuring two Franco-Spanish 

Scorpène-class submarines for the RMN. In fact, for several years, it has been 

training future submariners overseas in the absence of hardware so that the 

proper expertise could be developed prior to acquisition. Other RMN acquisitions include six German-designed MEKO A100 offshore patrol vessels and 

two British-built Lekiu-class frigates.

Despite being more of a land power, Thailand has considerable maritime 

interests, including the protection of offshore oil and gas reserves, counterterrorism, counterpiracy, and combating illegal trafficking in its territorial 

waters.43 The Royal Thai Navy (RTN), therefore, has considerable responsibility in providing littoral, EEZ, and blue-water maritime security. More recently, 

the RTN has acquired or is in the process of acquiring two new frigates from 

the United Kingdom and missile-carrying offshore patrol vessels from the PRC, 

as well as helicopters and refurbished maritime patrol aircraft. The RTN has 

expressed interest in acquiring submarines, but current budget constraints 

have made this unlikely for the near future.44

It is worth noting that the RTN operates the only aircraft carrier in the 

region—the 10,000-ton, Spanish-built Chakri Nareubet, which is outfitted with 

used (ex-Spanish) AV–8A Harrier jump jets and S–70B Seahawk helicopters. 

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36 BITZINGER

The carrier is intended for air defense and antisubmarine warfare during 

wartime and disaster relief during peacetime. Since the Chakri Nareubet was 

delivered to the RTN in the late 1990s, however, it has spent most of its time 

in port due to its high operating costs, although it was employed during the 

2004 tsunami relief.

Vietnam has obvious interests in protecting its maritime EEZ resources and in deterring further Chinese expansion in the disputed Spratly Islands 

chain. After years of neglect, the country is beginning to rearm itself and 

as a result has begun to increase defense spending and procurement.45 The 

Vietnamese navy has done particularly well out of this increased emphasis on 

self-reliant defense and has greatly enhanced its capabilities in recent years. The 

navy is currently acquiring three new corvettes, outfitted with German engines 

and British and American radars, as well as up to a dozen Svetlyak-class fastattack craft patrol vessels and various second-hand surface combatants from 

South Korea and Poland. Of particular note, in late 2009 Hanoi announced that 

it would buy six Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines from Russia, at a cost of $2 

billion.46 It also signed a major arms deal with Poland in 2005 for 10 maritime 

patrol M–28 aircraft and 40 surplus Su–22M aircraft, some of which may have 

a maritime strike role. Finally, Vietnam is building up to 40 new indigenous 

400-ton offshore patrol vessels and six 150-ton coastal patrol boats.47

Conclusions: Toward a “Post-Modern” Navy?

The expansion of regional maritime combat capabilities has many implications for militaries in the Asia-Pacific. At the very least, these new types 

of armaments promise to significantly upgrade and modernize the potential 

for warfighting in the region. The addition of modern submarines and surface 

combatants, amphibious assault ships, and long-range maritime patrol aircraft 

has extended these countries’ navies’ theoretical range of action and empowered 

them with new capabilities for force projection and sustained expeditionary 

operations. Additionally, the acquisition of modern antiship, antiair, and even 

land-attack missiles has greatly increased the lethality, versatility, and flexibility 

of their maritime forces. Beyond simply modernizing their navies, however, the 

Asian-Pacific militaries are overall acquiring greater lethality and accuracy at 

greater ranges, improved battlefield knowledge and command and control, and 

increased operational maneuver and speed. Standoff precision-guided weapons, such as cruise and ballistic missiles and terminal-homing (such as global 

positioning system or electro-optical) guided munitions, have greatly increased 

combat firepower and effectiveness. Additionally, through the increased use 

of stealth and active defenses (such as missile defense and longer range air-toair missiles), local militaries are significantly adding to their survivability and 

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 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NAVAL MODERNIZATION 37

operational capabilities. Advanced reconnaissance and surveillance platforms 

have considerably expanded their capacities to look out over the horizon and 

in all three dimensions. Consequently, conflict in the region, should it occur, 

would likely be more “high-tech”: faster, more long-distance and yet more 

precise, and perhaps more devastating in its effect. 

Additionally, some Asia-Pacific militaries—particularly China and 

Singapore—are acquiring the types of military equipment that, taken together, 

increasingly provide them with the kernel of what is required to fundamentally transform their militaries.48 In particular, those systems related to precision strike, stealth, and above all C4ISR and networking comprise some of the 

key hardware ingredients essential to implementing a modern revolution in 

military affairs. These emerging capabilities, in turn, have the potential to 

significantly affect strategy and operations on tomorrow’s battlefield and hence 

to alter the determinants of critical capabilities in modern warfare. 

But what do these new capabilities imply for security in the Asia-Pacific? 

Do they contribute to regional stability, by increasing the deterrent and defensive capabilities of states? Or do they exacerbate regional tensions, as tit-fortat arms acquisitions may often have the unintended consequence of fostering 

mutually reinforcing insecurities and suspicions (i.e., the “security dilemma”)? 

Certainly, many countries may—justifiably—wish to strengthen their defenses 

to counter a militarily rising and increasingly assertive China. At the same time, 

many countries in the Asia-Pacific are acquiring modern naval combat capabilities as much in reaction to each other’s procurement activities, leading to arms 

competitions (South Korea vs. Japan, Malaysia vs. Singapore)—or for “sovereignty enforcement” issues (such as protection of EEZs or defending territorial 

claims over disputed territories) that are hardly conducive to regional stability.

Still, expanding regional maritime combat capabilities may ultimately 

offer benefits to regional security and stability in ways that until recently were 

almost inconceivable. For example, as regional maritime forces become more 

proficient in such areas as sustained expeditionary operations and force projection, it could have a positive effect in terms of disaster relief, peacekeeping, 

antipiracy and counterproliferation patrols, and security and stabilization 

operations. In addition, as regional navies acquire common weapons systems 

and (in particular) common systems for surveillance, target acquisition, and 

command and control—such as the Aegis air defense system—it could greatly 

enhance interoperability and combat coordination among the various navies. 

This would be particularly desirable for coalition operations. Additionally, 

it could probably be particularly attractive from the standpoint of the U.S. 

Navy, in that it could perhaps expand and “internationalize” its Cooperative 

Engagement Capability (CEC) by drawing allies and friendly countries into a 

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38 BITZINGER

networked and interoperable military environment. The U.S. Navy and Japan’s 

MSDF already plan to coordinate SMD-equipped destroyer patrols in the Sea 

of Japan for missile defense; this mission could conceivably be expanded to 

include other countries (particularly those already outfitted with the Aegis 

system) in some kind of pan-Asian missile shield.49

If recent trends and developments in naval modernization in the 

Asia-Pacific are able to play out in a way that enables greater cooperation and 

collaboration among maritime forces, we could be witnessing the emergence 

of a new paradigm in naval development, one that Geoffrey Till terms the 

“post-modern Navy.”50 According to Till, concepts of the post-modern navy 

derive “from more positive attitudes towards globalization,” with “relatively more focus on the international system, and the nation’s place within that 

system.”51 Consequently, post-modern navies are less focused on “the exclusive 

defense of national interests and sovereignty”52 and instead seek to control the 

seas for the benefit of all law-abiding users as part of maintaining “good order 

at sea” and in the interest of protecting the “global commons.” Additionally, 

sea-based expeditionary operations—which, Till argues, are part and parcel 

of “the post–Cold War . . . concept of liberal interventionism”53—are focused 

less on what navies can do “at sea,” than “what they can do from it,” in order to 

maintain global stability and security (“good order from the sea”).54

Perhaps the best example of this effort to create a post-modern 

“global Navy” can be found in former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral 

Mike Mullen’s 2005 proposal for a network-enabled, joint, interoperable, and 

expeditionary-oriented “Thousand-Ship Navy.” In proposing this concept, he 

challenged naval leaders to:

Imagine [a] fleet operating with the navies and naval infantries of a host 

of other nations, again, fully netted and interoperable. They could be anywhere the national and international political leadership wanted them to 

be . . . ready to go at a moment’s notice—and they could contribute in all 

manner of ways. Not just as a force to wage war, but a force to wage peace 

as well. A force for good.55

It is, of course, way too early to speak of a genuine post-modern global 

navy, but the ongoing and substantial naval expansion in the Asia-Pacific 

region raises reasonable questions as to what effect this buildup might have 

on regional security and stability. Naval modernization need not in itself 

constitute a dangerous state of affairs. Technology is neutral—how it is used 

determines its benevolence or ill will. But it is not too early to start considering 

the impact and implications of the expansion of maritime combat capabilities 

in the Asia-Pacific.

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 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NAVAL MODERNIZATION 39

Notes

1Ronald O’Rourke, “PLAN Force Structure: Submarines, Ships, and Aircraft,” paper presented to 

the conference held by the Chinese Council on Advanced Policy Studies, RAND Corporation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the National Defense University, on “The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles?” (Taipei, November-December 2007), 4-9, 13–18; Sinodefense.com, 

at <http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/vessel.asp>.

2 Sinodefense.com, at <http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/vessel.asp>.

3 O’Rourke, 19; Sinodefense.com, “Type 071 Landing Platform Dock,” at <http://www.sinodefence.

com/navy/amphibious/type071.asp>.

4Richard A. Bitzinger, Aircraft Carriers: China’s Emerging Maritime Ambitions, RSIS Commentary 

Series (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, April 2009).

5 Timothy Hu, “Country Briefing—China: Ready, Steady, Go...” in Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 13, 

2005; Office the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 

2008 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2008), 2, 24.

6Richard A. Bitzinger, U.S. Defense Transformation and the Asia-Pacific Region: Implications and Responses (Canberra: Australian Strategy Policy Institute, 2006), 12–15.

7As opposed to aggressive, destabilizing arms races, such as between China and Taiwan.

8 “Chapter IX: Defense Expenditure,” China’s National Defense in 2006 (Beijing: Information Office 

of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, December 2006).

9 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” available at <http://milexdata.sipri.org>.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Office of the Minister of Defence, $3 Billion Amphibious Ship Will Strengthen ADF, Boost 

Australian Industry, June 20, 2007, available at <http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/NelsonMintpl.

cfm?CurrentId=6780>.

13 The Spanish version, the Juan Carlos I, will in fact serve as a combination aircraft carrier/amphibious assault ship and will carry a contingent of Harrier or possibly JSF fixed-wing combat aircraft.

14 Ian Bostock, “Country Briefing: Australia—Reaching Out,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 3, 2004.

15 Ian Bostock, “Australian Destroyers, Radars to Form Part of US Missile Shield,” Jane’s Defence 

Weekly, June 30, 2004.

16 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Japan’s New Defense Posture,” Strategic Comments, October 2004.

17 Ibid.

18 Steven Trimble, “US and Japan Celebrate Ballistic Missile Intercept,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 

28, 2006; Eric Talmadge, “Japan and U.S. Erect Missile Shield,” International Herald Tribune, January 29, 2008.

19 IISS, “Japan’s New Defense Posture.”

20 Sugio Takahashi, “The Japanese Perception of the Information Technology-Revolution in Military 

Affairs: Toward a Defensive Information-Based Transformation,” in Emily Goldman and Thomas Mahnken, eds., The Information Revolution in Military Affairs in Asia (Palgrave-MacMillan, 2004), 84–86, 89–90.

21 Hoon Noh, South Korea’s “Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense”: Goals and Directions, KIDA Paper 

No. 10 (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, April 2005), 5; The Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense (MND), 2004 Defense White Paper (Seoul: MND, 2004), 92–98.

22Globalsecurity.org, “LP-X Dokdo (Landing Platform Experimental) Amphibious Ship,” available at 

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/lp-x.htm>.

23 Tim Fish, “Seoul Commissions Type 214 Sub,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 23, 2008.

24Robert Karnoil, “Team Prepares for 2007 Start on KSS–III Design,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 20, 2006.

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 39 11/29/11 12
40 BITZINGER

25 Thomas G. Mahnken and Timothy D. Hoyt, “Indian View of the Emerging Revolution in Military 

Affairs,” National Security Studies Quarterly, Summer 2000.

26Rahul Bedi, “Getting in Step: India Country Briefing,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 6, 2008.

27Rahul Bedi, “Indian Navy Strives for Regional Dominance,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 21, 2005.

28 Bedi, “Getting In Step: India Country Briefing.”

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31Globalsecurity.org, “The Vikramaditya [ex-Gorshkov] Aircraft Carrier,” available at <http://www.

globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/r-vikramaditya.htm>.

32 Edward Hooten, “Modernizing Asia’s Navies,” Asian Military Review, January 2008, 18; Bedi, 

“Getting in Step: India Country Briefing.”

33 Ibid., 8; Globalsecurity.org, “The Vikrant-class Air Defense Ship,” available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/ads.htm>.

34 Bedi, “Getting In Step: India Country Briefing.”

35Rajat Pandit, “India Plans to Buy 6 New Subs, Says Navy Chief,” The Times of India, December 2, 2007.

36 Sandeep Unnithan, “The Secret Undersea Weapon,” India Today, January 17, 2008.

37 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Central and South Asia—Defense Economics,” 

in The Military Balance 2007 (London: Oxford University Press, 2007), 310.

38 See Richard A. Bitzinger, The China Syndrome: Chinese Military Modernization and the Rearming of Southeast Asia, RSIS Working Paper No. 126 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2007), 6–7, 22–28.

39 Paul T. Mitchell, “Networks, Navies, Subs, and Security: ASEAN Navies in 2006,” unpublished 

paper, October 2006, 3; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Singapore’s Military Modernization,” Strategic Comments, December 2007.

40 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Responding to the Maritime Challenge in 

Southeast Asia” in The Military Balance 2006 (London: Oxford University Press, 2006), 255–256.

41 Ibid., 255.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., 256.

44 Ibid., 257.

45Robert Karniol, “Country Briefing: Vietnam—Off the Ground” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 22, 2005.

46 Nga Pham, “Vietnam to Buy Russian Submarines,” BBC News, December 16, 2009.

47Karniol; IISS, “Responding to the Maritime Challenge,” 257.

48 Bitzinger, U.S. Defense Transformation and the Asia-Pacific Region, 30–31, 33–37; Richard A. Bitzinger, “Come the Revolution: Transforming the Asia-Pacific’s Militaries,” Naval War College Review, Fall 

2005, 48.

49Richard A. Bitzinger, Time for a Pan-Asian Missile Shield? RSIS Commentary No. 22/2008 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, February 28, 2008).

50 Geoffrey Till, Globalization: Implications of and for the Modern/Post-Modern Navies of the AsiaPacific, RSIS Working Paper No. 140 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, October 15, 

2007).

51 Ibid., 1.

52 Ibid., 20–21.

53 Ibid., 8.

54 Ibid., 8–11.

55 Quoted in Mitchell, 3.

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 41

Chapter 3

Beyond the Moat: The PLAN’s Evolving 

Interests and Potential Influence 

M. Taylor Fravel and Alexander Liebman

As China’s economy grows and national interests expand, how do the 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in general, and the PLA Navy (PLAN) in particular, see their roles and responsibilities changing? In addition, how might the 

PLAN exert influence in debates over national policy? In this paper, we find evidence of both change and continuity in the PLAN’s sense of its missions at sea 

and areas in the future where it may shape Chinese policies beyond the domain 

of naval affairs, such as the interpretation of international maritime law. On the 

one hand, longstanding interests such as the prevention by force of Taiwan’s de 

jure independence, the defense of China’s eastern coast, and the preservation of 

China’s claims to sovereignty over islands in the South China and East China 

Seas, remain crucially important. However, we also show that issues related to 

China’s economy, namely, maintaining the conditions for continued growth and 

protecting China’s links to the international economy, are growing in salience. 

Increasingly, the PLAN is casting itself as the protector of China’s economy, and 

using that as a selling point for increasing the navy’s budget.

New understandings of China’s national interests are reflected in changing definitions of haiyang quanyi (海洋权益), commonly abbreviated to haiquan, 

(海权), or China’s “maritime rights and interests.” This term has been in use since 

at least the 1980s, and while there is no consensus on its precise meaning, there is 

no question that its scope has dramatically expanded. In a 2000 issue of Modern 

Navy, staff writer Niu Baocheng (牛宝成) laid out three conceptions of haiquan, 

arguing that “as human society develops, and especially as our understanding 

of the oceans increases, the meaning and implications of haiquan are also continuously changing.”1

 In the past, Niu argues, China has held a narrow view of 

haiquan, including only the protection of the coast and coastal waters, China’s 

contiguous zone, and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Today, China holds 

a broader definition of haiquan that includes the ability to travel through 

international waters and the capability to develop resources at sea. Eventually, 

Niu argues, China must move toward what he calls “military maritime rights 

and interests” (junshi haiquan, 军事海权), referring to the ability of military 

Authors’ Note: The research for this paper was completed in 2007 and does not use more recent materials.

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42 FRAVEL AND LIEBMAN

vessels to move freely through the oceans and protect sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the event of war, as well as the ability to prevent the enemy from 

having similar freedom. While Niu’s argument should not be taken to represent the official view of the PLAN, his article does make explicit what is implicit 

in much writing in military journals and newspapers: that China’s interests are 

expanding and the PLAN must prepare to protect these interests.

... Two If by Sea

While the PLAN’s concept of haiquan has grown to include economic 

interests, the concept of haifang (海防), or “maritime defense,” is also evolving. For at least 20 years, naval authors have routinely noted that since 1840, 

the main threats to China’s security have come from the ocean.2

 For this 

reason PLAN authors have long tried to change the “emphasize land, ignore 

the sea” (zhonglu qinghai, 重陆轻海) thinking within the military. Starting in 

the mid 1990s, however, naval authors have gone further. It is not enough just 

to emphasize naval defense, they argue; instead, the conception of what maritime defense means should be expanded. China must stop seeing its oceans 

merely as a “moat” (huchenghe, 护城河) that protects China’s landmass, and 

instead realize that the oceans themselves hold vital interests that must be 

defended. These interests include 300 million square kilometers of “blue 

territory” (lanse guotu, 蓝色国土)—China’s claimed area of maritime sovereignty), three main groups of disputed islands and reefs, an exclusive economic zone rich in natural resources, and shipping lanes which supply China with 

energy and resources and connect it to the international economy.

Overall, we find a growing emphasis in naval sources casting the PLAN 

as the protector of China’s economy. In many cases this is directly connected 

to naval appeals for more military resources, and even to arguments that the 

proportion of the military budget spent on the navy should be increased. While 

the prevention of Taiwan’s independence remains a mainstay in PLAN arguments for funding, newer and subtler arguments are being made that portray 

spending on the navy as a sound investment in China’s economy. Specifically, 

the PLAN is trying to shape policy debates over offshore islands, the interpretation of maritime law, energy security, and how to secure sea lanes.

This paper explores these changing conceptions of the PLAN’s role 

and its potential influence by adopting an “inside-out” approach. We first 

consider those areas which China considers its own territory—Taiwan and the 

disputed islands in the South and East China Seas. Second, we examine 

evolving views of China’s EEZ and potential exploitation of its natural resources. Finally, we move farthest away from China’s coast and look at attitudes 

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 BEYOND THE MOAT: EVOLVING INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE 43

toward protecting shipping lanes, the “Malacca Dilemma,” and the security of 

China’s energy imports from the Middle East. Our primary goal is to lay out 

the PLAN/PLA viewpoint on each issue, and to illuminate the military’s point 

of view in comparison to civilian views on the same topic to determine how the 

PLAN might be a factor in national policymaking. Second, where possible, we 

have also looked for evidence of differences in position between the PLAN and 

the PLA, although this is substantially more challenging.

Research Design

The purpose of this paper is to assess the extent to which the PLAN is 

an influential actor, which is defined as possessing an ability to shape or influence national policy goals and priorities beyond the arena of naval affairs. This 

is a daunting analytical task, given the paucity of reliable data and the general 

secrecy that surrounds national security decisionmaking in China. Often, only 

the outcome of the policymaking process can be observed; thus we focus on how 

the PLAN articulates its interests in areas where it might readily influence national policy and examine how the PLAN’s articulation of its interests in these 

areas has changed over time. Space-permitting, we then compare PLAN or PLA 

sources on maritime affairs to relevant civilian sources to identify similarities 

or differences in conceptions of China’s national interest in the same issue.

Recent PLAN and PLA writings on “maritime defense” (haifang) and 

“maritime rights and interests” (haiyang quanyi or haiquan) outline a set of national policy issues where the PLAN influence might be most easily observed. 

These issues are as follows: sovereignty disputes over offshore islands as well as 

Taiwan; the assertion and defense of maritime rights under international law, 

especially rights to offshore resources within China’s EEZ; and the security of 

sea lanes and freedom of navigation on the high seas. The PLAN has a clear 

organizational interest in promoting these issues, as each has an unambiguous 

role for the navy and can be framed as a rationale for increased budgetary resources and operational missions beyond coastal defense (jin’an fangyu). While 

these rationales are important, the PLAN’s potential for influence over national 

policy can be inferred in several ways. First, PLAN or other PLA sources may 

place a different emphasis than government sources on the same issue, which 

would suggest policies that the PLAN might seek to shape or alter. Second, 

in their writings, PLAN or PLA officers may advocate for specific changes in 

national policy, which might suggest one fault line in internal debate over a 

given issue and highlight an area where the PLAN could exert influence.

In this paper, we use several methods to tackle these issues. First, we 

compare the frequency of articles on key topics in the PLA’s leading newspaper, 

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44 FRAVEL AND LIEBMAN

the PLA Daily (Jiefangjun Bao), and the Chinese Communst Party’s (CCP’s) 

main newspaper, the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao). Depending on the specific 

topic, we count either the number of articles with the keyword in the title or the 

number of articles in which the keyword appears in the full text of the article. 

As the PLA Daily electronic archive is available from 1987 to 2005, almost two 

decades of newspaper articles can be examined. Although the People’s Daily is 

a CCP newspaper and not a government source, the close links between the 

party and the government suggest that it is a useful proxy for civilian viewpoints. By comparing the frequency of issues discussed in these two sources, 

we can draw a rough baseline for potential differences between the military 

and the civilian government. As the PLA Daily is the PLA’s newspaper, the results must be interpreted as reflecting the naval or maritime issues deemed 

important or newsworthy by the PLA as a whole, not just the PLAN. Nevertheless, if the number of articles on a given maritime issue is increasing in 

one paper and decreasing in the other, one could reasonably infer a change 

in the importance of the issue for the military or the government. Even if the 

yearly frequency is roughly the same, the magnitude of articles in each paper 

may also reveal information about the relative importance of different issues 

for the PLAN and the government.

Second, we examine both the frequency and content of relevant articles 

in military publications, especially journals and magazines. The most important magazines for this study are Modern Navy (Dangdai Haijun) and National Defense (Guofang). Modern Navy is especially important, as it is published 

by the PLAN’s party committee (dangwei) and can be used to “take the temperature” of China’s navy and its corporate interests. One limitation of these 

sources, however, is that many articles are penned by cadre in the Political 

Warfare Department, not by military or naval strategists. In addition, the 

authoritativeness of magazine articles can be questioned when the author’s 

institution or military rank is not listed. We also consult other military 

sources on naval issues, including, for example, the relevant sections of the last 

two editions of Zhanyi Xue (The Science of Campaigns) as well as articles in 

Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science).

Maritime Sovereignty Disputes: Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the 

East China Sea

Almost all analyses of maritime security published by PLAN or PLA 

sources stress the prominence of sovereignty disputes over contested offshore 

islands, especially given the resolution of the majority of China’s territorial disputes on its land border. As a result, if the PLAN exerts influence over 

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 BEYOND THE MOAT: EVOLVING INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE 45

national policy, it perhaps should be most easily observed in discussion of 

disputes over offshore islands. In addition to sovereignty, the islands are 

seen as key to the assertion of maritime rights under the United Nations 

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as well as important for the 

security of adjacent SLOCs. Thus, analysis of how the PLA and PLAN 

portray China’s interests in these disputes cannot be separated from the 

following two sections of this paper.

The analysis of PLAN and other PLA writings on maritime sovereignty 

disputes highlights several trends. First, the dispute over Taiwan receives more 

attention than China’s other offshore island disputes. Moreover, attention to 

the Taiwan dispute in PLA sources has increased markedly since 2000. Second, 

although China’s other maritime sovereignty disputes are portrayed as “more 

prominent” than before, discussion of these disputes appears not to be increasing and by some measures actually declining. Third, interestingly, the PLA has 

focused more attention on those disputes where China maintains a strong position in relative terms, publishing significantly more articles on the Spratlys 

(where it occupies seven reefs) compared to the Senkakus (where it holds none 

of the features that it claims). Fourth, the content of PLA and PLAN writings 

on these disputes focuses on maintaining and consolidating claims as well as 

providing a rationale for “maritime defense construction” (haifang jianshe). 

Little evidence exists to suggest an active effort to shape policy in the offshore 

island disputes, though continued affirmation of China’s sovereignty claims 

suggests that the PLA would oppose substantial compromises in any future 

negotiations with the other claimants.

Taiwan

A brief analysis of PLAN and PLA discussions of Taiwan provides a 

useful context for assessing the relative importance of China’s maritime sovereignty disputes. A search of articles in the PLA Daily and the People’s Daily

that contain “tai” (台) in the title and “taidu” (Taiwan independence, 台独) 

in the full-text reveals several trends.3

 As shown in figure 3–1, the frequency 

of articles on the Taiwan dispute in both newspapers has increased steadily 

since 1987. In particular, the number of articles reached an inflection point 

in 2000, the year when Chen Shui-bian was elected president of Taiwan. 

Likewise, as shown in figure 3–2, Taiwan receives substantially more coverage in the PLA Daily than do other territorial disputes with a maritime 

component. Finally, as shown in figure 3–3, the number of articles in 

Modern Navy that contain “Taiwan” in the full text reflects a steady increase 

in coverage, while reporting on China’s other maritime territorial disputes 

has not increased. 

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46 FRAVEL AND LIEBMAN

Figure 3–1. The Taiwan Dispute in Core Newspapers (Title Search)

Figure 3–2. Maritime Sovereignty Disputes in PLA Daily (Title Search)

Note: The Taiwan search used “tai” in the title and “tai-du” in the full text.

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 BEYOND THE MOAT: EVOLVING INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE 47

Figure 3–3. Maritime Sovereignty Disputes in Modern Navy (Full-text Search)

These results, of course, are not surprising. Taiwan is a key issue for 

China’s military and provides a clear rationale for force modernization, including naval modernization. Given the sheer volume of Taiwan-related articles 

in military sources, PLAN or PLA influence—or potential influence—over 

China’s Taiwan policy is difficult to determine. Nevertheless, for our purposes, two trends should be noted. First, in absolute terms, the People’s Daily has 

published more articles on Taiwan in the search described above than the PLA 

Daily. Moreover, the PLA Daily appears to publish little original content on 

Taiwan, as most articles appear to be sourced from Xinhua and not “benbao” 

(本报) reporting. In the Taiwan dispute, then, the PLA Daily fulfills its mission 

to communicate CCP policies throughout China’s armed forces. At the same 

time, given the clear advantages of a Taiwan scenario for justifying PLA force 

modernization, the PLAN and PLA arguably face less of a need to push this 

issue to secure increased budgetary resources.

Second, the PLA Daily has occasionally sent deterrent signals during 

periods of crisis across the Strait, publishing articles with an even more aggressive and assertive tone than contained in official government statements or 

the People’s Daily. In 1999, amid the crisis sparked by Lee Teng-hui’s articulation of the “two state theory” (liangguo lun), the PLA Daily issued articles by 

a “staff commentator” (benbao pinglunyuan). The first appeared in July 1999, 

warning “Lee Teng-hui Don’t Play With Fire” [Li Denghui buyao wanhuo].”4

 In 

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early March 2000, just before Taiwan’s presidential election, the PLA Daily published a commentary entitled “Taiwan Independence Means War” [‘Taidu’ ji 

yiwei zhanzheng].5

 Since 2000, however, the PLA Daily has not published a staff 

commentary on Taiwan. As the PLA Daily falls under the supervision of the 

Central Military Commission (CMC), these articles can be interpreted as representing the PLA’s perspective on the Taiwan issue, which certainly has an impact 

on China’s Taiwan policy. Nevertheless, as the PLA Daily represents all of the 

PLA, and not just the PLAN, any specific naval influence is difficult to ascertain.

Although the role of the PLA and PLAN in the Taiwan dispute cannot be addressed fully in this paper, writings on Taiwan increasingly stress 

a maritime dimension. That is, the importance of Taiwan is cast in terms 

of its strategic value for China, not just the imperative of national unification.6

 For Jiang Zhijun, the head of the China Naval Research Institute, “As 

long as the Taiwan issue isn’t resolved, we will always be hindered in our 

capacity to defend our nation’s maritime regions.”7

 According to one academic at the Shenyang Artillery Academy who specializes in maritime defense, 

Taiwan along with other coastal islands such as Changshan and Zhoushan 

serve both as military buffers for the mainland and a battlespace that links 

the land and the sea.8

 An article in Modern Navy likewise noted Taiwan’s role 

as China’s “gate to the Pacific,” allowing it to break through the “first island 

chain” and as a key to the defense of one-fifth of China’s population along 

the east coast.9

South China Sea—the Spratly Islands

Not surprisingly, the South China Sea disputes receive less attention 

in news media sources than the Taiwan dispute. As China has controlled the 

Paracel Islands that Vietnam also claims since the early 1970s, this section 

focuses on China’s claims to the Spratlys. Among China’s maritime disputes 

over the sovereignty of offshore islands, the Spratlys receive much more attention in PLA media than the dispute with Japan over the Senkakus. Figure 3–4 shows the number of articles per year in the PLA Daily and People’s 

Daily where “Spratlys” (nansha) appears in the title. Although both figures 

demonstrate the prominence of South China Sea disputes when compared 

with the Senkakus, coverage of these disputes has not increased over time, 

especially coverage of the Spratlys. The PLA Daily published 24 articles with 

“Spratlys” in the title in 1994, but only 5 such articles in 2005. Likewise, 

as shown in figure 3–3, the number of articles in Modern Navy containing 

the word “Spratlys” in the full text has remained steady and not increased 

appreciably since 1994.

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Figure 3–4. The Spratlys Dispute in Core Newspapers (Title Search)

As the Spratlys played a role in efforts to justify PLAN modernization in 

the 1980s, the lack of continued increased coverage of this dispute is noteworthy. This trend, however, could be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, 

it may be that growing conflict across the Strait has provided the PLAN with 

a much more suitable rationale for force modernization. On the other hand, 

the PLAN may have succeeded in the 1980s in framing China’s interests in 

the South China Sea, especially after it occupied six features in early 1988 and 

Mischief Reef in late 1994. As a result, this dispute requires less attention 

than before, since the Spratlys are commonly accepted as an intrinsic part of 

Chinese territory that the PLA must defend. 

Two aspects of news coverage of the Spratlys dispute support this second interpretation. First, in contrast to coverage of the Taiwan dispute, the 

PLA Daily has published more articles on the Spratlys than the People’s Daily 

has published. Second, the timing and content of articles in the PLA Daily

support the view that the PLA has taken the lead in framing this issue for the 

public. In contrast to articles about Taiwan (or the Senkakus discussed below), 

much of the PLA Daily reporting on the Spratlys contains original content, 

not Xinhua reports. Many of the PLA Daily–written articles discuss relatively benign topics, including how soldiers endure the hardship of such a remote 

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50 FRAVEL AND LIEBMAN

posting or the diversity of fish in the surrounding waters. In tone and content, 

these stories are similar to PLA Daily articles on garrison troops defending the 

first line of China’s land borders, especially at high altitude and in harsh climates. Although relatively benign, such articles also help to “construct” China’s 

interest in defending its position in these disputes and consolidate China’s sovereignty claims by demonstrating the links between these distant islands and 

the Chinese mainland, links created by the presence of Chinese troops. Indeed, 

some of these “fluff” pieces in the PLA Daily about the troops stationed on the 

reefs and atolls in the South China Sea appear to be reprinted in the People’s 

Daily, reversing the pattern of coverage in the Taiwan dispute.

The development of China’s operational campaign doctrine suggests one 

explanation for the lack of a substantial increase in the attention given to the 

Spratlys in PLAN and PLA sources. Unlike its predecessor, the 2006 edition of 

The Science of Campaigns contains a new type of naval campaign, described as 

“attacks against coral islands and reefs” (dui shanhu daojiao jingong zhanyi), 

a campaign scenario that appears to be tailored to the South China Sea disputes where China might consider attacking islands and reefs held by other 

claimants. The discussion of the campaign is brief, only five pages long. Moreover, most of the discussion highlights the obstacles and challenges that the 

PLAN would face, including the distance from the mainland and difficulties in 

command, air defense, and logistics support along with the harsh natural 

environment characterized by typhoons and subsurface obstacles. The emphasis on the difficulties in the discussion of this campaign is noteworthy and 

suggests one reason for decreasing prominence.10

Although the Spratlys dispute is not attracting increasing attention within the PLAN or PLA, these sources stress several themes about the dispute in 

addition to reiterating China’s sovereignty claim. The first is the threat that 

China faces from the other claimants. One survey of maritime hot spots on 

China’s periphery published in Modern Navy, for example, notes that other 

claimants have “seized” (qinzhan) China’s islands in the South China Sea, 

stolen its maritime resources (especially petroleum), and threatened the lives 

and property of Chinese fishermen.11

As this article suggests, a second and closely related theme is the link between control of disputed offshore islands and China’s broader maritime rights 

and interests. In a Modern Navy article, popular military commentator Zhang 

Zhaozhong stresses that the islands in the South China Sea are the focal point 

for drawing baselines used to claim territorial waters and EEZs.12

A third theme is the challenge posed by outside powers to China’s 

claims. One article in Modern Navy, for example, notes that the United 

States seeks to use the South China Sea disputes as a “trump card” (wangpai) 

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with which to contain China after the Taiwan conflict is resolved. The U.S. 

strengthening of military ties with other claimants in the dispute through 

cooperative military agreements, joint exercises, and ship visits is noted as 

evidence of such intentions. Likewise, Japan is seen as using its treaty with 

the United States to participate in efforts to protect the freedom of navigation 

in the adjacent sea lanes. At the same time, Japan’s engagement of ASEAN 

(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) states is cast as “internationalizing” 

the dispute to China’s disadvantage.13

Directly or indirectly, these three themes provide rationales for 

strengthening China’s naval power. At the same time, there is little evidence even in PLAN sources that China should abandon Deng Xiaoping’s 

strategy for pursuing China’s claims in these disputes, which calls for “setting aside conflict, pursuing joint development” (gezhi zhengyi, gongtong kaifa). Thus the islands serve as a rationale for force modernization, 

but not necessarily a change in China’s policy. Critique of Deng’s dictum 

in PLAN or PLA sources would signal an important change and potential 

effort to influence national policy. At the moment, however, Deng’s strategy 

continues to receive broad-based support in PLA publications. If the military differs slightly from discussion of Deng’s policy, it is to stress the phrase 

“zhuquan gui wo” and the idea that sovereignty is nonnegotiable even while 

pursuing joint development.14

The other aspect of the dispute in which the PLAN might carry weight 

regards the role of international law. China’s claim in the South China Sea is 

often depicted on maps by a series of 9 or 11 “dotted lines” (duanxian). The 

status of these lines in international law, however, is unclear. Noted PLA strategist at the Academy of Military Sciences, Pan Shiying, forcefully argued after his retirement that the dotted lines refer to “historical waters” and that 

China can claim sovereignty over all of the territorial features in the South 

China Sea contained within these lines, including contested islands and reefs 

as well as the adjacent waters.15 UNCLOS, however, contains no provision for 

“historical waters” and the concept itself was developed to describe rights to 

enclosed areas, such as the Bohai Gulf, not waters abutting other states. At 

the same time, when China issued its territorial baselines in 1996, it did not 

draw baselines for the Spratlys, which indicated that the government’s position 

was likely still being debated and thus room for PLAN influence exists on this 

issue. Zhang Zhaozhong, for example, appears to join Panin pushing for claiming historical waters in the South China Sea on the basis of the dotted lines.16

If the PLAN, or PLA, maintains a perspective in the Spratlys dispute distinct 

from the government, it is likely in the interpretation of international law and 

how it should be applied in this conflict.

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The Senkakus

What is striking about coverage of China’s dispute with Japan over the 

Senkaku Islands is the lack of coverage. As figure 3–5 shows, the total number 

of articles with “Senkaku Islands” (diaoyu dao) in the title in the PLA Daily and 

People’s Daily is low, roughly one-tenth of those published on the Spratlys.17

Moreover, no clear trend exists in the frequency or timing of articles on the 

Senkakus. Analysis of individual news reports suggests that the timing results 

from events linked to the dispute, such as attempts by activists from both sides 

to land on the islands in support of each country’s claim. As figure 3–3 demonstrates, only 32 articles in Modern Navy since 1994 even mention the Senkakus 

anywhere in the text. Since this is a maritime sovereignty dispute with China’s 

main rival in East Asia, one might expect the PLA to stress this conflict and to 

do so with increasing frequency since the mid 1990s as relations with Japan 

entered a more turbulent phase.

In addition, in contrast to coverage of the Spratlys, PLA Daily coverage 

of the Senkakus consists almost entirely of articles from Xinhua or the People’s 

Daily. With just three exceptions, the PLA Daily has published no original

Figure 3–5. The Senkaku Dispute in Core Newspapers (Title Search)

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content or reporting on the dispute, focusing instead on official government 

statements and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) press conferences. Most of 

the reporting on the Senkakus is not on the first page, but on the inside of the 

paper. No staff commentaries have been authored that mention the Senkaku 

dispute. 

An exception to the lack of original content occurred in early 2003. In January, the Japanese government announced that it would lease three of the disputed islands from a private Japanese citizen. This report unleashed a flurry of 

protests throughout the month in Beijing, as it appeared that Japan was consolidating its claim in the dispute. Although the PLA Daily printed the MFA’s protest 

on January 5, two named articles by PLA Daily journalists appeared toward the 

end of the month. Nevertheless, these articles only reinforced the government’s 

objections and did not adopt a more assertive or aggressive position.18

What does this mean? First, there appears to be close coordination between the government and PLA over the Senkakus dispute, at least in the area of 

propaganda. Overall, the goal is to minimize public discussion of the conflict, 

but demonstrate China’s “resolute” stance on the question of sovereignty when 

the Japanese government is viewed as challenging China’s claim. Second, both 

the PLA and the government likely do not want to raise expectations among the 

public regarding China’s ability to make progress in the dispute. The islands have 

been under Japanese administration since 1972 and the United States indicated 

in the mid-1990s that the defense of the islands was included in the U.S.-Japan 

alliance. The islands are perhaps also a referent in the chapter on attacks against 

coral islands in the 2006 edition of The Science of Campaigns discussed above.

In the limited publications on the Senkakus, several themes emerge in 

PLA and PLAN writings. To start, several articles on the Senkakus offer short 

summaries of the historical basis for China’s sovereignty claim. These articles 

lack an aggressive tone and do not appear to push the government to take a 

more assertive stance. Instead, they simply review the history of China’s claims 

as the government has articulated publicly in the past.19 

In addition, discussion of the Senkakus highlights their economic and 

military value. As one article in National Defense notes, for example, Japanese 

sovereignty over the islands would allow it to exploit resources in 200,000 square 

kilometers of “maritime national territory” (haiyang guotu).20 Other articles 

stress the military value of the islands, which are located only 90 nautical miles 

from Taiwan. One author in Modern Navy notes that the islands could extend 

Japan’s defensive range more than 300 nautical miles to the west from Okinawa, 

threatening China’s coastal regions and Taiwan through the placement of radar 

or missile systems.21 Because of this strategic value, this article concludes that 

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the United States is currently examining the strategic value of the islands and 

“plotting” with Japan to deploy troops there. According to Jin Yinan, a professor 

of strategy at the PLA’s National Defense University, the military importance of 

the islands is to serve as a “protective screen” (pingzhang) for the East China Sea. 

At the same time, in contrast to the article in Modern Navy, Jin notes that the 

islands lack suitable conditions for the placement of military assets and stresses 

that their primary importance is economic.22

Interestingly, Chinese writings differentiate between Japan’s current administration of the islands (sometimes described as “actual control” 

(shiji kongzhi) and any potential or future Japanese “occupation” of the islands. 

By implication, occupation, described as “qinzhan” or “zhanling,” appears to 

refer to any permanent military use of the islands, especially for assets that 

could be used in a conflict over Taiwan.23 Thus, although only by implication, 

these writers have highlighted what might be viewed as a “red line” for China 

in its dispute with Japan. 

Finally, one article on the Spratlys deserves mention, as it offers an 

instance of the PLAN seeking to influence national policy with respect to 

maritime law enforcement and the establishment of a coast guard–type capability. Published in Modern Navy, the article reviews the development and 

application of Japan’s coast guard under the alarmist title of “Warning: Japan’s 

Coast Guard’s Threat to Our Maritime Space.” The author first reviews the 

expansion of Japan’s coast guard as a military force (junshi liliang), highlighting its role in the Senkakus and East China Sea disputes, such as preventing 

Chinese protestors from landing on the islands while protecting right-wing 

Japanese activists. The author laments diffusion of authority for maritime law 

enforcement in China among a number of agencies, arguing through example that China should develop a centralized system to strengthen its ability 

to defend its interests at sea. Currently, China has a Maritime Safety Agency 

(海事局) under the Ministry of Transportation and a Maritime Patrol Detachment (海监总队) under the State Oceanic Administration (海洋局), among 

others. The author also notes how Japan has used its coast guard to defend its 

sovereignty claims, both to the Senkakus as well as in the East China Sea.24

Maritime Rights and Resource Security

PLAN Focus on Maritime Resources

As China’s economy has grown, so has its demand for natural resources. This phenomenon is well reported in the Western press, and it is now common knowledge that China became a net energy importer in 1993. Since 1993, 

China’s imports of oil, gas, and uranium, as well as metals like tin and copper, 

have grown rapidly. This phenomenon has generated discussion among naval 

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authors along two lines. First, how can China secure more resources within its 

own territory to reduce import dependence? Second, for products that must be 

imported, how can China secure its supply in the event of a crisis? In this section 

we evaluate the PLAN’s position on developing the resources in China’s EEZ. In 

the next section we look at the PLAN’s attitude toward protecting SLOCs.

How should China solve its growing dependence on foreign resources? 

Civilian and military views on this question tend to follow that iron law of 

bureaucratic politics: where you stand depends on where you sit. There are 

many potential ways for China to ameliorate its position: building a strategic 

oil reserve, exploiting offshore resources, increasing energy efficiency at home, 

just to name a few. On this issue, the PLAN has shown much more interest 

in developing offshore resources and placed almost no emphasis on building 

a strategic oil reserve; the People’s Daily, on the other hand, has shown very 

little interest in offshore resources but much interest in building a strategic 

oil reserve. Consider figures 3–6 and 3–7:

Figure 3–6. Modern Navy Coverage of “Maritime Resources” (海上资源) and 

“Oil Reserve and China” (石油储备。中国)

Comparing Modern Navy’s and National Defense’s coverage of maritime resources, it also appears that the PLAN has shown more interest than the PLA

as a whole. Coverage in Modern Navy started earlier and has continued to grow 

after 2004. In National Defense, on the other hand, coverage grew more slowly 

and has been declining since 2004.

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Figure 3–7. People’s Daily Coverage of “Maritime Resources” (海上资源) and 

“Oil Reserve and China” (石油储备。中国)

Figure 3–8. Modern Navy and National Defense Coverage of “Maritime 

Resources” (海上资源)

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These graphs suggest that the PLAN places more importance on the development of maritime resources to improve China’s energy security situation than 

either the PLA as a whole or the civilian leadership. This is not surprising: it is the 

one area over which the PLAN might play a leading role. But what is the case that 

naval authors are making for the importance of these offshore resources?

The PLAN’s Case For Maritime Resources

Numerous authors in Modern Navy and naval authors in National 

Defense propound a similar case for focusing on maritime resources. They 

start with the common premise that China’s population, along with the world’s 

population, continues to increase. As a consequence of both population 

increase and economic growth, demand for natural resources has risen.25

The problem, they argue, is that “land resources are gradually being exhausted.”26 Seventy-one percent of the world’s surface, they happily remind us, is 

covered by the oceans, but to date only minimal efforts have been made to 

exploit maritime resources. For most of history, getting at these resources was 

extremely difficult or impossible; today, technological progress has made these 

resources accessible in a way they never have been before.27 Exploiting the 

oceans is thus an ideal way to improve China’s resource security.

The catch—and this is where the PLAN comes in—is that in order to 

get at maritime resources, China’s territory and EEZ must be protected from 

other countries who want to take those resources. As Luo Xianlin, a Senior 

Captain in a command post in Huai Bei (淮北舰艇长), put it in 1994: “Protecting and developing the ocean’s resources is a historic responsibility that our 

navy cannot shirk.”28 This new mission has been emphasized by numerous 

naval authors. In a series of interviews with naval academics and officers, Liu 

Zhenhuan (刘振环), a Senior Captain at the China Naval Research Institute (海

军军事学术研究所), argued in a 2000 piece in Modern Navy that the PLAN must 

make itself capable of “protecting China’s ‘maritime territory’ and the development of its resources . . . the scope of China’s maritime defense must be enlarged 

to include the entirety of the waters under China’s jurisdiction, including the 

EEZ and continental shelf.”29 This requires expanding traditional conceptions 

of maritime defense and pushing out China’s defensive line. In the same series, 

Liu Xuxian (刘续贤), a researcher at the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) 

and vice chair of the AMS Military Science Research Guidance Department 

(军事科研指导部), argued that the navy must change its strategy:

The most important elements of shifting strategy are: the navy’s activities 

and war-planning areas should move from the coast towards nearby seas; 

our main tasks in warfare are shifting from protecting the country’s landmass towards protecting maritime territory, from defeating an enemy attack 

in nearby waters towards protecting our country’s rights and interests at sea.30

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Zhang Shiping (章示平), an AMS researcher in the Campaign and Tactics Department (zhanyi zhanshu bu, 战役战术部), argued that China must 

change its understanding of “naval forces” to include five elements: 1) naval 

ships, including aircraft carriers; 2) civilian shipping vessels; 3) fishing ships; 

4) oil and resource exploration ships, and 5) law enforcement ships.31 The 

significance of this is that Zhang defines naval strength not only in terms of 

the PLAN’s ability to defeat foreign navies, but in terms of the navy’s ability to protect the exploitation of the ocean’s resources by Chinese vessels. In 

doing so, Zhang defines naval strength in economic as much as in military 

terms. He emphasizes that “protecting the development of natural resources 

from being stolen or ruined is one of the basic tasks of our navy.”32

Effect of UNCLOS 

While the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 

receives a fair amount of attention among naval authors, its effect is probably not that anticipated or hoped for by the framers of that document. 

International regimes are intended to increase cooperation and reduce 

conflict. In helping states to see that they can protect their interests through 

agreed-upon rules, rather than through military force, international regimes 

ideally slow the pace of arms races and military buildups. Such, at least, is the 

theory. The PLAN’s reaction to UNCLOS, however, has not followed such 

logic. Instead, naval authors see UNCLOS as increasing the scope of China’s 

sovereignty and thus the maritime area to be administered and secured from 

external threats. If UNCLOS laid down a law, the PLAN argues that there must 

be an entity responsible for enforcing that law—the PLAN itself.

In a 1996 piece in National Defense, Liu Zhenhuan (刘振环), then head 

of the China Naval Research Institute, analyzed the effect of UNCLOS on 

China’s maritime interests. UNCLOS had notable positive effects: it increased 

the amount of territory under China’s jurisdiction and thereby provided much 

space for development; it provided a legal basis for China’s exploitation of deep 

sea mining; it also provided for free navigation of the Tumen River; and finally, 

it provided military and civilian vessels free access through crucial straits and 

international waters. But for Liu, this does not mean that the PLAN’s responsibilities have decreased; on the contrary, it implies that they have increased. Most 

fundamentally, it means that China must stop thinking of its navy as a military 

force that spends most of its time preparing for conflict but only a short time 

actually fighting (yangbing qiari, yongbing yishi, 养兵千日, 用兵一时) and instead 

think of it as a force that is not only being built and improved every day, but is 

actually in constant use in both wartime and peacetime (tiantian jian haifang, 

riri yong haijun, 天天建海防, 日日用海军).33

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In a piece 10 years later in China Military Science, Tang Fuquan (唐复

全), a professor at the Dalian Naval Ship Academy (大连舰艇学院), reiterated 

many of the same themes. The navy no longer need only prepare for a military showdown with another navy, but now must execute numerous functions 

to protect economic well-being—most important, China must be able to protect its EEZ and continental shelf. On the one hand, they argue that UNCLOS 

has played a “positive role in protecting the world’s economic development.” At 

the same time, however, they emphasize that it has also “complicated” many 

issues. First, because many developed countries such as the United States 

have not signed the convention, it is often unclear whether or not it applies. 

Second, countries which have signed hold different interpretations of how the 

law affects their claim to their maritime boundaries and to their islands. As 

a result, the law will cause “conflicts over maritime interests throughout the 

world to become more fierce.”34 Similarly, Liu Zhenhuan argued that UNCLOS 

did not obviate the need for a strong navy: “In today’s complicated conditions 

in China’s surrounding waters, without a strong naval force as a shield, it is 

very difficult to implement scientific exploration, economic development and 

common development [of natural resources] in disputed waters.”35 Thus, by 

expanding China’s maritime rights, UNCLOS has also “increased the area of the 

navy’s maritime activities and its enforcement responsibilities.”36

Other authors have picked up on this theme. Xu Xuehou (徐学厚) of the 

Jinan Ground Forces Academy (济南陆军学院) argued that UNCLOS “brought 

us new opportunities to develop ocean resources, but has also brought us new 

challenges.”37 A 2001 article in Modern Navy goes so far as to argue that because UNCLOS has given coastal countries different rights (in other words, 

some countries have been given more than others), UNCLOS has “to a certain 

extent become an incentive for both contradictions and conflict, and has even 

become a potential focus for regional maritime wars and military clashes.”38

While this position is extreme, what is representative about his thinking is that 

UNCLOS does not reduce, and probably increases, the need for naval development. A 1999 article in Modern Navy similarly argues that since the 1990s, 

with the expansion of maritime interests to include EEZs, coastal Third World 

countries gained huge amounts of fishing and mineral resources, but that this 

creates a real challenge, namely, how to protect territory that is 200 nautical 

miles off the coastline.39 Indeed, these articles conclude China’s navy remains 

unable to accomplish these tasks and thus unable to protect China’s haiquan. 

Therefore, to meet these new challenges, China must continue to build up 

its navy.

Some PLAN sources raise questions about certain provisions within 

UNCLOS. For example, PLAN authors question both the “right of innocent 

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passage” within a country’s territorial waters as well as through “freedom 

of navigation and overflight” in a country’s EEZ, especially for military 

ships. This provision is seen as allowing “hegemonic” states to pursue “gunboat diplomacy.”40 During the 2001 EP–3 incident, the PLA Daily issued a 

staff commentary, charging that it represented a serious violation of China’s 

sovereignty. In particular, the commentary charged that the U.S. plane had 

disregarded the international legal regulations on freedom of overflight by 

conducting surveillance in the airspace above the coastal areas of China’s 

EEZ.41 The implication was that UNCLOS prohibits (or should prohibit) 

military activities in a country’s EEZ, a theme that a Chinese international legal 

scholar echoed in the People’s Daily on the same day.42

As a result, Dalian Naval Vessel Academy Professor Tang Fuquan 

proposed several ways in which China could improve its position in the competition over maritime rights created by the passage of UNCLOS. First, China 

should conduct extensive surveys of its maritime boundaries in preparation 

for delimitation negotiations. Second, China should strengthen its maritime 

legal regime, citing gaps in current domestic and international laws that China 

could use to protect its maritime rights. Third, China should enforce maritime 

law through a centralized system that would enable effective monitoring of 

areas under China’s jurisdiction and through increased range and frequency of 

patrols in these areas.43

In sum, Chinese naval authors see the protection of China’s EEZ as a 

vital means of developing offshore natural resources. While these rights are 

legally protected by UNCLOS, PLAN authors believe that they themselves 

must be able to enforce the terms of that treaty. In order to do so, China must 

continue its naval buildup.

Energy Security vs. Resource Security 

In discussions of China’s growing dependence on imported raw materials, the concepts of “resource security” and “energy security” seem to be used 

interchangeably. In fact, however, while related, the two concepts actually 

address slightly different issues. Keyword searches of both concepts in a variety of 

journals show that the PLA has consistently been more interested in the concept 

of resource security, while civilians have emphasized energy security. Consider 

figures 3–9 and 3–10 below. A full-text search in Modern Navy for both concepts 

shows that while both have been growing rapidly, there is greater emphasis on 

resource security. This is even more pronounced in National Defense.

It is worth comparing these charts with data from the People’s Daily for 

the same two searches; as can be seen in figure 3–11, the results are basically 

opposite. 

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Figure 3–9. Modern Navy Coverage of “Energy Security” (能源安全) and 

“Resource Security” (资源安全) (Full-text Search)

Figure 3–10. National Defense Coverage of “Energy Security” (能源安全)

and “Resource Security” (资源安全) (Full-text Search)

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Figure 3–11. People’s Daily Coverage of “Energy Security” (能源安全) and 

“Resource Security” (资源安全) (Full-text Search)

These searches may suggest that the PLA has a broader conception 

of import dependence than the civilian leadership has. Indeed, authors in 

Modern Navy and National Defense talk not only about energy security (see 

the next section on SLOCs for more), but also about resource security in 

general. This includes mined products from the ocean (hence the higher 

amount of attention paid to maritime resources), and also food. In fact, several authors emphasize that as China’s population grows and land is paved over 

for industrial or commercial use, food imports will increase. One place where 

China can make up some of the difference is in food products harvested from 

the ocean; this, in turn, requires a navy able to protect fishermen in Chinese 

waters and beyond.44

Sea Lines of Communications

The difficulty of analyzing the PLAN’s attitude toward the protection of 

sea lines of communications (SLOCs) is that there is no issue on which there is 

a greater diversity of opinions, both within the Chinese military and between 

the Chinese military and civilians. Some are convinced that there is no problem at all; others argue the problem is primarily political and not military; and 

others argue that China must rapidly build up the capability to escort oil resources home. At the same time, because the issue is politically sensitive in 

the United States, it can often be interpreted as a litmus test among Chinese 

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officers for their level of hawkishness. A quick glance at a search for “sea lanes” 

below (figures 3–12 and 3–13) shows that while National Defense did increase 

its coverage of the issue slightly in the early 2000s, that coverage has since fallen back to just above original levels in the early 1990s. Similarly, the People’s 

Daily has seen only a modest increase. In Modern Navy, however, the issue has 

continued to grow in importance. The case is even more pronounced when 

searching for the related concept of “sea lane security” (航线安全). The issue 

gets a large and growing amount of attention in Modern Navy, with minimal 

and non-increasing coverage in the other three.

No geographic region is a greater source of concern than the Malacca 

Strait. When Hu Jintao regularly uses the phrase “the Malacca Dilemma” (马

六甲困境), he is referring to the fact that a large and growing percentage of 

China’s imported oil (about 75 percent) is shipped through that strategic 

waterway. This growing concern over the security of the Malacca Strait is 

reflected in the following full text search (figure 3–14). As can be seen, 

Modern Navy has been writing about the Malacca Strait security issue since 

1994, while the People’s Daily only began real coverage of the issue in 2002. 

Interestingly, National Defense has paid only minimal attention to the issue. As 

these two charts show, sea lane security has become an increasingly important 

issue for the PLAN, suggesting that this may be one policy area in the future 

where the navy exerts special influence.

Figure 3–12. Modern Navy, National Defense, People’s Daily, and PLA Daily

Coverage of “Sea Lanes” (海上通道)

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Figure 3–13. Modern Navy, National Defense, People’s Daily, and PLA Daily

Coverage of “Sea Lane Security” (航线安全)

The issue of “sea lanes,” however, is not monolithic: it is composed of 

many smaller issues which deserve to be analyzed separately. This is because 

sea lanes can come under threat for a variety of reasons and in a variety of locations from a variety of different sources. In this section, therefore, we first 

focus on two potential threats to sea lanes—piracy and terrorism. We discuss 

the PLAN’s attitude toward the risk of a great power blockade and who might 

potentially instigate such a blockade. Here we find an unexpected amount of 

attention paid to the intentions and capabilities of the Indian navy. Finally, we 

provide two opposing viewpoints from civilian and military sources, which 

argue that China’s SLOC problem is actually a problem best solved by market 

or diplomatic, not military, means.

Piracy and Terrorism

What are the threats to Chinese shipping through the Malacca Strait? 

One clear threat is pirate attacks (or a potential terrorist attack). On this issue, 

though, there is a variety of opinion among naval authors. The People’s Daily, 

the PLA Daily, and Modern Navy have all focused quite a bit of attention on 

the topic. In fact, the full-text searches (figure 3–15) indicate the navy was, if 

anything, led by the civilians in terms of drawing attention to the issue, with 

Modern Navy having very little coverage in the early 1990s but increasing its 

coverage throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s.

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Figure 3–14. Modern Navy, National Defense, and People’s Daily Coverage of 

“Malacca Strait and Security” (马六甲。安全) (Full-text Search)

In general, naval authors are less afraid of piracy itself than they are 

of the prospect that other countries (the United States, Japan, India) will use 

piracy as an excuse to set up bases or increase naval activity in the Malacca 

Strait region. It is worth noting that both the 2000 and 2006 editions of The 

Science of Campaigns do not discuss operations to protect against piracy. To be 

sure, though, there are authors who acknowledge that piracy or a terrorist attack would have a devastating impact on the East Asian economy. A July 2006 

article in Modern Navy by staff writer Zhang Gang (张刚) points out that pirate attacks are increasing in the region, and that a terrorist attack which closed 

down Singapore could cost the world $200 billion a year.45 The PLA Daily

has run reports that al Qaeda has as many as 25 ships, and that a terrorist attack could devastate shipping.46 Most of the articles on piracy in Modern Navy

are written by staff writers, and tend to be largely descriptive.47 To the extent 

that these authors discuss dealing with the piracy problem, the focus tends to 

be on supporting the efforts of the countries bordering the strait (Singapore, 

Malaysia, and Indonesia), and engaging in cooperative police efforts. For example, Zhang Gang praises the statement made at the 2003 ASEAN Regional 

Forum (ARF) meeting that promises to deal with the piracy problem.

Naval publications, however, tend to be less worried about both piracy and terrorism than they are about the use of those problems as an excuse 

for foreign navies to increase their presence in the region. A 2000 piece in 

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Figure 3–15. Modern Navy, PLA Daily, and People’s Daily Coverage of 

“Pirates” (海盗) (Full-text Search)

Modern Navy describes Japanese policy after a 1999 hijacking of a Japanese 

ship (carrying aluminum) which ended up costing $20 million. The Japanese responded by sending their navy into the Malacca Strait. But this article 

argues that piracy is merely an excuse: tracing Japanese naval policy from 

before World War II to the Gulf War, the author argues that Japan has used any 

opportunity to increase the range of its navy. While Japanese actions have thus 

far been cooperative, the size of the Japanese navy is expanding, cooperation 

with India is increasing, and military exercises are becoming more frequent. 

The article ends by saying that Japanese warships, 56 years after the end of 

the “Southern Advance” policy, are now returning to Southeast Asia, and 

asking: “When thinking about this, people will always wonder: ‘is this really 

to defeat piracy?’”48

A similar tack is taken in response to American efforts to fight terrorism 

in the region. A July 2004 piece in Modern Navy acknowledges that terrorism 

is a real threat, but that the United States (and Japan) now claim that “the entire 

world has become a terrorist world . . . fighting terrorism has already become 

a kind of fashion, and fighting terrorism has become a perfect excuse for some 

countries to interfere in other countries’ affairs.”49 The real reason the United 

States wants to control the Malacca Strait is both to protect trade and to protect 

the U.S. Navy’s route from Japanese bases to the Persian Gulf should the need 

arise. But this severely affects China’s interests:

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The Malacca Strait is an important node in China’s ocean oil lifeline, and 

is directly related to China’s economic security. According to statistics, 

of all the ships that cross the Malacca Strait every day, almost 60% are 

bound for China, and of those the vast majority carry oil. So we can say 

that whoever controls the Malacca Strait can control China’s strategic oil 

lifeline, and can thereby threaten China’s energy security at any time.50

Furthermore, for China’s navy to sail out to the rest of the world, it must cross 

the Malacca Strait; for example, the PLAN’s 2002 global tour went through it. 

In his 2006 article, Zhang Gang makes a similar case: that the United States, 

Japan, and India are all using the piracy/terrorism issue as an excuse to get a foothold in the Malacca region. To counteract this trend, Zhang proposes that China 

provide more aid to the regional countries so as to balance (抗衡) American 

and Japanese efforts. This will “increase China’s influence in the region, and also 

accords with ASEAN’s traditional policy of balance in foreign diplomacy.”51

The Indian Threat

Three countries are the focus in discussions of how to protect China’s 

SLOCs: Japan, the United States, and India. Japan’s efforts to extend the reach of 

its navy are worrisome for both territorial reasons and the historic animosity between the two countries; the United States cannot be ignored because of the power of its navy. And, as shown above, there is coverage of both countries; in particular, American efforts to secure a base of operations in the region after leaving 

Subic Bay in the Philippines are reported.52 Indeed, articles in Modern Navy often 

refer to the United States’ 1986 declaration to control the world’s 16 key straits, 

and put the Malacca Dilemma into that context.53 Surprisingly, though, attention 

to the Indian Ocean and the Indian navy are growing rapidly in naval discussions. This anxiety stems from geography: China’s most important SLOCs run 

through the Indian Ocean. These authors go on to analyze both India’s intentions 

and its capabilities, and infer both from Indian statements and from growing cooperation with the United States and Japan (for example in the Malabar Exercises 

of 2007) that China’s oil from Africa and the Middle East may be threatened.

Consider the full-text searches for “Indian Navy” shown in figures 

3–16 and 3–17. While the PLA Daily dramatically increased its coverage of 

the Indian navy starting in the late 1990s, the People’s Daily only increased 

slightly in 2004, and has since fallen back to original levels. A similar phenomenon can be observed in comparing Modern Navy and National Defense. 

While coverage in Modern Navy increased by the mid 1990s, that in National 

Defense has remained constant over the past decade. This suggests that increasing coverage in the PLA Daily was driven by increasing attention to the PLAN’s 

point of view, similar to coverage of the Malacca Strait.

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Figure 3–16. People’s Daily and PLA Daily Coverage of “Indian Navy” 

(印度海军) (Full-text Search)

Figure 3–17. Modern Navy and National Defense Coverage of “Indian Navy” 

(印度海军) (Full-text Search)

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Indian Intentions 

What are naval authors actually writing about the Indian navy? First, 

they are worried about India’s desire to control the Indian Ocean. The Indian 

Ocean holds China’s most crucial SLOCs—those that link it to its supplies of 

oil in the Middle East and Africa. In 2002, Modern Navy published an article 

written by a Pakistani naval officer who argued that India wanted to turn the 

Indian Ocean into “India’s lake.” In addition to representing a grave threat to 

Pakistan, India’s increasingly powerful navy poses a threat to Chinese SLOCs. 

The author concludes by exhorting China to build up its navy faster.54 As early 

as 1994, the PLA Daily asserted that India’s navy “intends to control the Indian 

Ocean”55 and even to “make the Indian Ocean ‘India’s Ocean.’”56 By 2001, however, naval authors were asserting much larger ambitions as part of India’s “go 

East” policy to develop a presence in the Pacific. A September 2001 article in 

Modern Navy argued that India had a four directional strategy: defend against 

China in the North, attack Pakistan to the West, occupy the Indian Ocean to 

the South, and increase its sphere of influence to the East. The goal of all these 

activities is to “contain China” (qianzhi zhongguo, 牵制中国).57

Naval authors also infer Indian intentions from growing cooperation 

with the United States and Japan. In 2002, Modern Navy translated an article 

from a U.S. naval officer describing the reasons for the increasing U.S. cooperation with India, which even asserted that, while there are obstacles, the U.S. 

Navy hopes to build a level of cooperation with the Indian navy equal to that 

of its cooperation with Japan and Great Britain.58 A 2001 article in Modern 

Navy described growing Japanese and Indian “global cooperation,” with military exercises in Southeast Asia, followed by joint antipiracy exercises in 2001. 

The author asserts that Japan must really want to cooperate with India because 

Japan broke with its own precedent and downgraded sanctions against India 

for its nuclear test.59 The Malabar Exercises of 2007 undoubtedly strengthened the PLAN’s worries. Not only has India increased cooperation with Japan 

and the United States, but it also enjoys close relations with ASEAN. Indeed, 

while Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have been cautious about accepting help from the American or Japanese navies, they have sought more active 

cooperation with India. For example, in the 2004 antipiracy exercises, India 

was invited to participate while the United States was not.60

Indian Capabilities 

If PLAN sources perceive Indian intentions to be aimed at containing China, they also see India rapidly building the capabilities necessary to do 

so. Modern Navy has covered India’s naval buildup fairly extensively. In April 

2003, it ran an article titled: “Will the South China Sea Become the ‘Second 

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Persian Gulf?’” that laid out India’s 2003 plan to spend $62 billion over the next 

22 years to modernize the navy, and also detailed India’s growing interactions 

with ASEAN. In a December 2005 article, National Defense asserted that India 

seeks to have a top four navy by 2010.61 An October 2005 article in the PLA 

Daily described the efforts India is making as part of its new strategy to “destroy 

the enemy in distant seas” (远海歼敌). As part of this effort, India spent $3.5 

billion buying submarines from France, and plans under “Project 75” to build 

20 nuclear attack submarines equipped with long distance cruise missiles over 

the next 30 years. In addition, India is building aircraft carriers, with the first 

homemade aircraft carrier expected to be operational in 2012.62 Indeed, the PLA 

Daily also reported that India wants to develop an aircraft carrier fleet on a par 

with England’s, and that this fleet will allow it to move into the Pacific.63

The concern over growing Indian capabilities is perhaps most clear in 

the increasing attention Modern Navy paid to the Indian naval base in the 

Andaman Islands. Consider the full-text keyword search in figure 3–18.

The Indian decision to build a naval base in the Andaman Islands is significant due to its strategic location. In his July 2006 article in Modern Navy, 

Zhang Gang argues that India intends to use the Andamans/Nicobar as a base 

for extending influence or controlling the Sunda Strait (between Java and 

Sumatra); the Palk Strait (between India and Sri Lanka); the Mandab Strait 

(between Yemen and East Africa); and the Hormuz Strait (Persian Gulf outlet).64

A June 2004 article is worth quoting at length:

India is telling the world that the purpose of its base in the Andaman 

Islands is to stop weapons smuggling and piracy, to protect its naval 

rights and interests, and to improve its military cooperation with ASEAN, 

etc. But hidden in this action is their true intention to contain China’s 

activities in the Indian Ocean, and also to control the Malacca Strait, 

and gradually to enlarge their sphere of influence into the South China 

Sea and Pacific Ocean area. India sees China as a long term potential 

opponent, and the Indian military has on numerous occasions repeated this nonsense about China having ambitions in the Indian Ocean, 

helping Burma build military bases, and rapidly building up its navy 

so that within fifteen years it can cross the Malacca Strait and into the 

Indian Ocean, which is a challenge to India’s naval strategy. Using this 

groundless excuse, the Andaman Islands have become a forward base for 

Indian’s containment of China.65

The article goes on to accuse India of trying to become the hegemon of the 

Indian Ocean, but also worries about India’s statement in 2001 that it should be 

a part of protecting SLOCs all the way to Japan.

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Figure 3–18. Modern Navy Coverage of “Andaman” (安达曼)

(Full-text Search) 

Chinese naval authors seem to worry about India for two reasons. First, because it is in the process of military buildup, its future power remains unknown. 

Compared to the United States, therefore, the future of the Indian navy is difficult to predict. Second, the Indian navy enjoys a political position in Southeast 

Asia which neither the United States nor Japan can claim. Japan, due to its World 

War II history, and the United States, due to its power, both draw suspicions 

in Southeast Asia. India, on the other hand, has no historical burden and is 

much less powerful, and therefore finds it easier to cooperate with ASEAN states.

Opposing Viewpoint 1: SLOCs Can Be Protected by Free Trade

The question of whether the PLAN needs the capabilities to protect 

SLOCs is becoming controversial. A 1999 article in Modern Navy reviews the 

past 100 years of trade over the oceans, concluding that “free trade” is often just 

a “façade for hegemony.” For example, during the Cold War the United States 

did not promote free trade with the Communist world, and at various points 

imposed sanctions on China, which, he argues, can help to explain China’s 

underdevelopment. The implication is that “free trade” cannot be depended on to provide for China as it can always be cut off by the hegemon.66

Similarly, an August 2004 article in Modern Navy argues that economics and 

free trade cannot protect China’s oil supply, claiming that “The market decides 

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the price of oil, but politics determines where it flows. . . . It is easy to see that 

without economic and military power, it is very hard to control the effects of 

geopolitics, and very hard to protect energy security.”67 The article goes on 

to suggest that, just as India, the United States, and Japan have done, China 

too should use piracy and terrorism as reasons to expand its naval presence. 

Building its navy will allow China to “stabilize the supply chain.”

These mercantilist views clearly favor the institutional interests of 

the navy (see the conclusion), but there is some evidence that civilians are 

starting to push back. In a provocative June 2007 piece in Contemporary 

International Relations, Zhao Hongtu (赵宏图), a researcher at CICIR (China 

Institute of Contemporary International Relations) who focuses on energy 

and resource issues, lays out a comprehensive case against China developing 

such naval capabilities. He states bluntly, presumably referring to the kinds 

of arguments made above, that some “lack an understanding of a market 

economy, and this has led people to an inadequate understanding of mutual 

dependence in global oil markets and in the globalized economy.”68 Zhao’s 

argument is that the United States is extremely unlikely to impose a blockade of 

the Malacca Strait because doing so would cause a huge spike in global oil prices, which would hurt it just as badly as everyone else. Mikkal E. Herberg, the 

research director of the Energy Security Program at the National Bureau of Asian 

Research (NBR), told the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission that while mercantilist ideas about locking up supplies still exist, more 

and more the Chinese are understanding that oil is one global market and 

that barrels are always available at the market price.69 Presumably, Zhao and 

others in China are helping to spread this understanding. Second, any blockade 

of the Malacca Strait would affect Japan and Korea—two U.S. allies—as badly 

as it affected China, because distinguishing which ships are bound for which 

ports is no easy task. He also cites a report from the CATO Institute saying that 

the United States does not have the capability to block the Malacca Strait.

More important, though, Zhao argues that China should not be making policy based on “in the event something happens [一旦有事],” or “under 

special circumstances [特殊情况下].” Zhao levels a variety of critiques of such 

thinking. First, such thinking is only related to energy supply in the event of a 

war—but if war can be avoided, then there is no need for military protection of 

the energy supply. Second, in the event of a war China has more than enough 

oil domestically produced to supply the military itself, and simpler methods 

such as a strategic oil reserve can provide a buffer for the domestic economy. 

But it is unrealistic to think that in the event of war there would be some way 

to completely insulate the domestic economy from ill effects. Third, even if the 

Malacca Strait is blockaded or blocked due to piracy or terrorism, having tankers sail around through other Indonesian straits would only add marginally 

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to the price of oil and is hardly worth fighting over (he refers to the blockade 

on oil shipping through the Suez Canal when Western countries had to start 

going around the Cape of Good Hope, which did not devastate the economy). 

Fourth, he argues that efforts on the part of the Chinese navy are already beginning a spiral of hostility, and therefore that such efforts are likely to bring 

on precisely the sort of threat to energy security that China should try to avoid. 

Finally, he argues that piracy and terrorism are threats, but not of the sort that 

can dramatically alter China’s energy situation, and should be handled with 

military-to-military cooperation. It will be interesting to see whether and how 

Zhao’s argument is responded to by the PLAN (and others whose interests he 

implicitly attacks—he argues against pipelines, for example, claiming that they 

are even more vulnerable to terrorism than shipping).

Opposing Viewpoint 2: SLOC Protection Is a Political, Not a Military, 

Problem

If Zhao asserts that the market rather than the military will solve China’s 

SLOC problem, another school of thought argues that politics is the appropriate means to protect China’s SLOCs. In the January 2007 issue of China 

Military Science, Feng Liang (冯梁) and Duan Yanzhi (段延志) of the Naval 

Command Academy (海军指挥学院) repeat familiar arguments about China’s 

growing dependence on international markets, but come to a very different 

conclusion. They argue that

on the surface, the SLOC issue appears to be an issue of the security of 

sea lanes; in reality it is an issue of [political] stability in the oceans. Suppose we don’t have close security cooperation with countries bordering 

crucial SLOCs, then even if we have a strong naval force, we still won’t be 

able to protect the security of long SLOCs . . . creating a secure geopolitical environment in the oceans has become an important condition for 

China’s sustained development in this new century.70

In other words, building a powerful navy is inadequate for the protection of 

China’s vital sea lanes and can be at best only one part of a larger strategy to 

protect them. The bulk of the focus must be on political and diplomatic efforts 

to improve coordination and cooperation with countries astride key sea lanes 

and, presumably, with countries whose navies control those sea lanes. This line 

of thinking is also endorsed by Bi Yurong (毕玉蓉) of the PLA’s Academy of 

International Relations, who advocates a variety of measures for protecting 

China’s SLOCs, including improving relations with ASEAN states and diversifying the sources of supply and transportation routes (he refers to creating a 

“spider web” [蛛网式] of supply lines).71

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It is interesting to note that one political method under discussion by naval authors in the context of UNCLOS is passing domestic laws to supplement 

areas in which UNCLOS is vague. In a 2006 article in China Military Science, 

Tang Fuquan and coauthors discuss the relationship between domestic law and 

international law. They argue that while international law provides an overall basis, UNCLOS has areas which are not clear or are not fair, and domestic 

law can thus help to “reinforce and enrich particular countries’ maritime legal 

system.”72 The authors refer to several laws that China has already passed, the 

most important being the “Law of China’s Territorial Waters and Contiguous 

Zone” (passed in February 1992) and the “Law of China’s EEZ and Continental Shelf” (passed in June 1998). The idea of passing more domestic laws has 

been suggested by others as well73 and suggests that the Anti-Secession Law of 

2005 may be inspiring other attempts to enshrine international goals in domestic laws. Unfortunately, what to do if various parties to UNCLOS pass mutually 

conflictual domestic laws is not addressed.

What these approaches—pursuing international agreements, friendly diplomacy, and passing domestic laws—share is the belief that the 

protection of China’s international interests depends on more than just a 

strong navy. But it is clear that a debate is brewing over how best to protect 

China’s energy supply; in China Military Science’s second 2007 issue, Wang 

Shumei and others argue that China’s SLOCs can only be protected by building a stronger navy.74

Conclusion: Navy and the Budget

One assumption in bureaucratic politics is that every institution tries 

to make itself as essential as possible so as to increase its share of the budget. 

There is some evidence to suggest that the PLAN is no exception. First, in addition to generic calls for China to build a powerful navy, some authoritative 

authors have directly called for an increase in the percentage of the military 

budget that is devoted to the PLAN. In the July 2007 issue of National Defense, 

a vice-head of the PLAN political department, two star Admiral Yao Wenhuai 

(姚文怀), writes that China should

gradually increase the proportion [of money] spent on naval development. In military development, whether the amount of money spent on 

each branch is reasonable is decided by the country’s security situation 

and the military tasks it faces. For a long period of time, our military’s 

main task has been to protect the borders and defend our territory, so the 

army always had a relatively large proportion. For a while, this proportion accorded with the demands of the times. But as the world political 

situation has changed, as the revolution in military affairs and the forms 

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of warfare have changed, as well as the needs of the country’s development and security, our army’s traditional system of having a “big land 

force” is no longer suitable for today’s situation and tasks, and we must 

therefore increase the percentage spent on the navy.75

But what are these new needs that Yao refers to? Overall, the PLAN 

seems to be casting itself not only as a consumer of China’s rapid economic growth, but as the protector of and potential contributor to that economic 

growth. To a certain extent, naval authors acknowledge that spending on the 

military means less money that can be spent on economic development and 

improving living standards for the people. A January 2006 article in National 

Defense argues that in a market economy, “the relationship between national 

defense building and economic development is both mutually contradictory 

[相互矛盾] and mutually promoting [相互促进].”76 It is obvious that military 

spending and economic development can be at odds, but on what grounds are 

naval authors arguing that the relationship can be productive?

Naval authors rely on four main arguments, some of which, as suggested by Yao, follow directly from new interests generated by Chinese economic 

growth. First, the PLAN is the only branch of the military that can protect the 

exploitation of China’s maritime resources. Given the risk that a lack of resources becomes a bottleneck in the Chinese economy, spending on the PLAN 

may well turn out to be a good investment for the future. Second, the PLAN is 

the only branch of the military capable of protecting China’s developed eastern 

coast and its sea lanes. Yao writes:

The heart of our country’s economy is more and more concentrated in 

coastal areas; if the coastal areas are not safe, then we can’t even begin to 

talk about the safety of our economy; maritime shipping and energy and 

resource SLOCs have already become the vital vein of our economy and 

societal development, especially oil and other important imported materials; our dependence on maritime shipping is big, and so protecting our 

country’s SLOCs is extremely important.77

Third, naval authors are also making more subtle arguments for increased funding. Yao makes the case that naval spending can stimulate the 

economy by comparing China to America. He argues that much of the technology which led the American economy to boom came out of research done 

by the military. To achieve similar results, the navy is precisely the branch of 

the military to invest in because it is the branch which requires the highest 

technology, and therefore has the highest likelihood of spillover to the civilian economy. Fourth, naval authors insist that the PLAN is the only branch of 

the military that has major peacetime missions to accomplish (fighting piracy, protecting sea lanes, defending areas with natural resource development). 

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Further, they argue that it is the service with the farthest reach, as it can show 

the flag all over the world in a way no other branch can. 

The PLAN, of course, also continues to assert that the situation with 

Taiwan is only growing more and more dangerous—and hence the continued 

need to fund the PLAN. But even on the Taiwan issue we can observe a shift 

in PLAN arguments; while the unification of China was long simply assumed 

to be an important end goal of China’s foreign policy, there is some evidence 

to suggest that it is also being viewed as a means to other ends, namely, the 

creation of a platform upon which to defend China’s EEZ, contested islands, 

and vital sea lanes, all of which in turn protect China’s economy. Thus even the 

Taiwan issue is starting to be portrayed in the same way: that spending on the 

navy is an investment in China’s economy.

In addition, the analysis presented in this paper highlights a number of 

specific issues where the PLAN may seek to shape national policy debates. One 

issue concerns how China will interpret international maritime law. PLAN 

and PLA sources promote the concept of “historical waters” as the basis of 

China’s claim to islands in the South China Sea as well as surrounding waters, 

but the Chinese government has not clarified its position. Likewise, several 

sources indicate dissatisfaction with elements of UNCLOS and support an 

interpretation of certain provisions such as freedom of navigation to strengthen China’s influence. A second issue concerns the importance of establishing a 

strong and centralized maritime law enforcement agency along the lines of the 

U.S. Coast Guard, an issue likely to build support from certain sectors within 

the government. A third issue is the current emphasis on sea lane security and 

potential threats that China faces.

Beyond these specific issues, the overall unifying theme has been to cast 

the PLAN as the protector of China’s economy. Indeed, there is a tendency to 

reverse the common logic of “rich country, strong army” (富国强兵). PLAN authors do acknowledge that a big economy allows the material basis for a strong 

army, but also assert that without a strong army, one cannot have a strong 

economy. Yao argues that excessive military spending without economic 

development spells doom (he cites the Soviet Union), but that no military 

spending with excessive wealth also spells doom (he cites Kuwait). This logic is 

laid out even more bluntly by Wang Shumei et al.:

The strength of rights and interests at sea and a country’s rise and fall are 

correlated phenomena . . . if the navy does not have great strength, then 

it may be a burden on the country, becoming merely a consumer [消耗, 

of resources]; but if the navy is a strong force, then it can create a positive 

effect, and create a virtuous cycle with promoting overall development. 

Naval power is directly proportional to the development of a country’s 

maritime interests.78 

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 BEYOND THE MOAT: EVOLVING INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE 77

In other words, if small amounts of money are spent on naval development, it 

will be a drag on the economy, but if large amounts are spent and a strong navy 

is created, then it will actually promote economic development. The overall 

point here echoes Yao’s: strong navies don’t just emerge from strong economies; rather, strong navies can help to generate strong economies.

Notes

1 Niu Baocheng, “Cong haiquan dao junshi haiquan” [From Rights and Interests at Sea to Military 

Rights and Interests at Sea], Dangdai Haijun, no. S1 (2000), 32. No rank or affiliation is listed for the author.

2 For detailed statistics on invasions China has suffered from the sea, see Yao Wenhuai, “Jianshe 

qiangda haijun weihu woguo haiyang zhanlue liyi” [Build a Powerful Navy and Protect Our Country’s Strategic Maritime Interests], Guofang, no. 7 (2007), 1. The author is a Rear Admiral and the director of the 

PLAN’s Political Department.

3 These search criteria were intended to return articles linked clearly with the dispute over Taiwan 

and not the mention of Taiwan for reasons related to cross-Straits trade and communication. “Taidu” refers 

clearly to the nature of the dispute.

4 Jiefangjun Bao, July 15, 1999, 1.

5 Jiefangjun Bao, March 6, 2000, 1.

6 For an excellent review of the geostrategic rationales for the importance of Taiwan to the CCP, see 

Alan M. Wachman, Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity (Stanford: Stanford 

University Press, 2007), especially chapter 7.

7 Quoted in ibid., 145. For the original interview with Jiang Zhijun, see “Zhongguo haijun junshi 

xueshu yanjiusuo suozhang tan Zhongguo haishang youhuan” [China Naval Research Institute Director Discusses China’s Maritime Concerns], PLA Daily Web site, January 2, 2004, available at <http://www.pladaily.

com.cn/gb/pladaily/2004/01/02/20040102001237_zgjs.html>.

8 Gao Xinsheng, “Daoyu yu xin shiji zhongguo haifang jianshe” [Islands and China’s Maritime Defense Construction in the New Century], Guofang, no. 11 (2006), 47. 

9 Qiao Li, “Taiwan, hezhi shi ‘bu shen de hangkong mujian’” [Taiwan, Much More Than an Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier], Dangdai Haijun, no. 2 (1998), 14. The author’s rank and affiliation are not given.

10 Zhang Yuliang, ed., Zhanyi Xue [The Science of Campaigns] (Beijing: Guofangdaxue chubanshe, 

2006), 535–538.

11 Qing Zhou, “Guanzhu woguo zhoubian haiyang redian wenti” [Pay Attention to Our Country’s 

Maritime Hotspots on the Periphery], Dangdai Haijun, no. 9 (2004), 63. No rank or affiliation is noted for 

the author.

12 Zhang Zhaozhong, “Nan Zhongguo hai wenti zhi wo jian” [The South China Sea Problem in My 

Eyes], Dangdai Haijun, no. 5 (2000), 3.

13 Li Xiaonian and Chen Liejing, “Nan zhongguo hai cheng wei ‘di er bosiwan’ ma?” [Is the South 

China Sea Becoming a “Second Persian Gulf”?], Dangdai Haijun, no. 4 (2003), 9–10. The authors are journalists for Modern Navy.

14 Zhang, “Nan Zhongguo hai wenti zhi wo jian,” 5.

15 Pan Shiying, Nansha qundao, shiyou zhengzhi, guoji fa [The Spratlys Archipelago, Oil Politics, 

International Law] (Xianggang: Xianggang jingji daobao chubanshe, 1996), 131–171. Also, see Pan’s 1995 

interview in Modern Navy, in Qu Shiqiang, “Nansha, Dang shu sheijia?: Fang Zhongguo haiyang zhanlue 

zhuanjia Pan Shiying jiaoshou” [Spratlys, Who Do They Belong To? Interview with China Maritime Strategy 

Expert Professor Pan Shiying], Dangdai Haijun, no. 4 (2005), 20.

16 See, for example, Gao Xinsheng, “Zhongguo haifnag fazhan mianlin de zhuyao tiaozhan yu 

duice” [Key Challenges Facing the Development of China’s Maritime Defense and Policy Countermeasures], 

Guofang, no. 11 (2005), 63; Zhang, “Nan Zhongguo hai wenti zhi wo jian,” 3–5; “Jin Yinan tan Zhongguo 

Diaoyudao xianzhaung” [Jin Yinan Discusses the Present Condition of China’s Diaoyu Islands], online content on PLA Daily Web site, at <http://www.pladaily.com.cn/site1/ztpd/2006-01/25/content_393925.htm>. 

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78 FRAVEL AND LIEBMAN

17 This paper was written before the 2010 incident involving the arrest of a Chinese fisherman by the 

Japanese Coast Guard. Undoubtedly, the number of articles related to the Senkakus and the East China Sea 

will have increased in this time period.

18 Jiefangjun Bao, January 20, 2003, 11 and Jiefangjun Bao, January 27, 2003, 7.

19Yao Bailin, “Diaoyudao zhuquan sukao” [Reflecting and Examining the Diaoyu Islands Sovereignty], Guofang, no. 5, (2004), 54; and Lin Mu, “Diaoyudao wenti huigu” [Reflections on the Diaoyu Islands 

Problem], Dangdai Haijun, no. 5 (2000), 33–34. Yao is affiliated with the Political Warfare Department in the 

Guangzhou MR Joint Logistics Department.

20 Gao Xinsheng, “Daoyu yu xin shiji zhongguo haifang jianshe” [Islands and China’s Maritime Defense Construction in the New Century], Guofang, no. 11 (2006), 46. Gao is affiliated with the Shenyang Artillery Academy.

21 Du Chaoping, “Meiguo miaozhun Diaoyudao” [America Takes Aim at the Diaoyu Islands], Dangdai Haijun, no. 7 (2003), 36. No affiliation or rank for Du is reported.

22 “Jin Yinan tan Zhongguo Diaoyudao xianzhaung.” 

23 Du, “Meiguo miaozhun Diaoyudao,” 37; and Gao, “Daoyu yu xin shiji zhongguo haifang jianshe,” 47.

24Chen Shangjun, “Jingti: Riben haishang bao’an ting dui wo haiyu de weixie” [Warning: Japan’s 

Maritime Safety Agency’s Threat to Our Country’s Maritime Space], Dangdai Haijun, no. 1 (2005), 30–31. 

No affiliation or rank for Chen is reported.

25 See, for example, Xu Xuehou, “Shidai huhuan haiyangguan” [The Era Calls for Understanding of 

the Oceans], Guofang, no. 5 (1999), 13. The author is from the Jinan Ground Forces Academy. 

26 Qiao Lin, “Haishang zhengba yibai nian” [One Hundred Years of Struggle to Control the Ocean],

Dangdai Haijun, no. 6 (1999), 53. No rank or affiliation is given for the author.

27 Qing Dan, “Guanzhu woguo zhoubian haiyang redian wenti” [Pay Attention to Our Country’s 

Controversal Ocean Issues], Dangdai Haijun, no. 9 (2004), 62. No rank or affiliation is given for the author. 

28 Luo Xianlin, “Haiyang yishi: Yige buneng huibi de huati” [Ocean Consciousness: A Topic Which 

Cannot Be Avoided], Dangdai Haijun, no. 5 (1994), 15. 

29 Liu Zhenhuan et al., “Zoujin haiyang shiji qiangda Zhongguo haijun” [Enter the New Century of 

the Ocean, Strengthen China’s Navy], Dangdai Haijun, no. 1 (2000), 4.

30 Ibid., 5.

31Also see Feng Liang and Duan Yanzhi, “Zhongguo haiyang diyuan anquan tezheng yu xin shiji 

haishang anquan zhanlue” [Characteristics of China’s Sea Geostrategic Security and Sea Security Strategy for 

the New Century], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, no. 1 (2007), 29. They also emphasize more than just military 

ships in the definition of naval strength.

32 Liu, “Zoujin haiyang shiji qiangda Zhongguo haijun,” 6.

33 Liu Zhenhuan, “Lianheguo haiyangfa gongyue pingshu (xia)” [An Appraisal of the UN Law of the 

Sea (Part II)], Guofang, no. 11 (1996), 15.

34 Tang Fuquan et al., “Zhongguo haiyang weiquan zhanlue chutan” [Initial Thoughts on the Strategy to Protect China’s Ocean Interests], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, no. 6 (2006), 63.

35 Liu, “Lianheguo haiyangfa gongyue pingshu (xia),” 15.

36 Ibid., 15. 

37Xu, “Shidai huhuan haiyangguan,” 13. 

38 Luo Qing, “21 Shiji shenhai zuozhan yanxi” [An Analysis of Deep Ocean Fighting in the 21st Century], Dangdai Haijun, no. 4 (2001), 37. No rank or affiliation is provided for the author.

39 Qiao, “Haishang zhengba yibai Nnan,” 55.

40 Tang, “Zhongguo haiyang weiquan zhanlue chutan,” 63.

41 “Zhongguo zhuquan burong qinfan” [Violations of China’s Sovereignty Will Not Be Tolerated], 

Jiefangjun Bao, April 6, 2001, 1.

42 Renmin Ribao, April 6, 2001.

43 Tang, “Zhongguo haiyang weiquan zhanlue chutan.”

44 See, for example, Oing; and Xu.

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 BEYOND THE MOAT: EVOLVING INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE 79

45 Zhang Gang, “Dongnanya haishang tongdao anquan yu daguo boyi” [The Security of Southeast 

Asia’s SLOCs and the Great Power Game], Dangdai Haijun, no. 7 (2006), 33. No rank or affiliation is given 

for the author.

46 Jiefangjun Bao, “Maliujia anliu yongdong” [Undercurrents in the Malacca Strait], July 26, 2004, 11.

47 See, for example, Wang Zhicheng, “Haidao changjue Maliujia” [Pirates Are Rampaging in the Malacca Strait], Dangdai Haijun, no. 9 (2004), 38. No rank or affiliation is given for the author.

48 Han Ding, “Maliujia qiandong riben mingan shenjing” [The Malacca Strait Is Hitting a Sensitive 

Nerve in Japan], Dangdai Haijun, no. 5 (2000), 18. No rank or affiliation is given for the author.

49Chen Angang and Wuming, “Mei yu zai mMaliujia haixia bushu jundui” [America Is Trying to 

Deploy Troops in the Malacca Strait], Dangdai Haijun, no. 7 (2004), 58. No ranks or affiliations are given 

for the authors.

50 Ibid.

51 Zhang Gang, “Dongnanya haishang tongdao anquan yu daguo boyi,” 35.

52Wu Daihai, “Meiguoren zujie Jinlanwan nan ruyi” [America Is Having a Hard Time Getting Its 

Way in Leasing the Jinlan Bay], Dangdai Haijun, no. 4 (2002), 5. No rank or affiliation is given for the author.

53 Shi Ping and Si Ping, “Meiguo haijun yanhou quanzhan” [America Surveys All Vital Shipping 

Choke Points], Dangdai Haijun, nos. 5, 6 (1996), and no. 1 (1997). No ranks or affiliations are given for the 

authors.

54 Han Asade, trans. Long Dongxiao, “Zai Yinduyang jianli xin de zhanlue pingheng” [Create a New 

Strategic Balance in the Indian Ocean], Dangdai Haijun, no. 7 (2001), 15. The author is a Senior Captain in 

Pakistan’s navy.

55 Sun Tunda, “Jinglue haiyang” [Planning and Managing the Ocean], Jiefangjun Bao, November 

14, 1995, 6. 

56 Li Zhenglun et al., “Yindu haijun shixian xiang yuandong gongjixing zhuanhua” [India’s Navy is 

Realizing Its Shift Toward Being Able to Attack in the Far East], Jiefangjun Bao, August 2, 1994, 4.

57 Hai Yun, “Riyin chengle haishang zhanlue huoban” [Japan and India Have Become Strategic Partners in the Ocean], Dangdai Haijun, no. 9 (2001), 7. No rank or affiliation is given for the author.

58Kemo, Sikete A, trans. Niu Junxiao. “MeiYin liangguo haijun haoshang la!” [The American and 

Indian Navies Are Growing Fond of Each Other!], Dangdai Haijun, no. 6 (2002), 20.

59 Hai.

60 Jiefangjun Bao, “Maliujia nnliu yongdong” [Undercurrents in the Malacca Strait], July 26, 2004, 11.

61 Gao Xinsheng, “Zhongguo haifang fazhan mianlin de zhuyao tiaozhan yu duice” [The Main Challenges and Answers to the Development of China’s Maritime Defense and Policy Countermeasures], Guofang, no. 11 (2005), 62. The author is from the Shenyang Artillery Academy, Basic Maritime Defense Tactics 

Teaching and Research Office (沈阳炮兵学院基础部海防战术教研室).

62 Jiefangjun Bao, “Yindu tuijin yuanhai jianmie de xin zhanlue” [India Pushes a New Strategy of 

Destroying the Enemy in Distant Seas], November 9, 2005, 12.

63 Jiefangjun Bao, “Hangmu youyixia de Yatai zhanlue qiju” [Asia’s Strategic Chessboard of Aircraft 

Carriers], July 20, 2005, 9.

64 Zhang Gang, “Dongnanya haishang tongdao anquan yu daguo boyi,” 35. 

65 Du Chaoping and Liang Guihua, “Yindu xin jian yuandong zhanlue fangyu jidi” [India Builds a 

New Far Eastern Strategic Defense Base] Dangdai Haijun, no. 4 (2004), 26. No ranks or affiliations are given for the authors.

66 Qiao Lin, “Haishang maoyizhan bainian sikao” [Thinking About One Hundred Years of Trade 

Wars on the Oceans], Dangdai Haijun, no. 4 (1999). No rank or affiliation is given for the author.

67 Gu Zuhua, “Weihu haishang shiyou anquan xuyou qiangda haishang biandui” [To Protect the Security of Ocean Oil We Must Have an Ocean Force,” Dangdai Haijun, no. 8 (2004), 49. No rank or affiliation 

is given for the author.

68 Zhao Hongtu, “Maliujia kunju yu Zhongguo nengyuan anquan zai sikao” [Rethinking China’s Energy Security and the Malacca Dilemma], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, no. 6 (2007), 37.

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80 FRAVEL AND LIEBMAN

69 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on “China’s Energy Consumption and Opportunities for U.S-China Cooperation to Address the Effects of China’s Energy Use,” 

June 14–15, 2007. Transcript available at <http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2007hearings/transcripts/

june_14_15/07_06_14_15_trans.pdf>.

70 Feng Liang and Duan Yanzhi, “Zhongguo haiyang diyuan anquan tezheng yu xin shiji haishang 

anquan zhanlue,” 27.

71 Bi Yurong, “Zhongguo haiwai liyi de weihu yu shixian” [The Protection and Realization of China’s 

Overseas Interests], Guofang, no. 3 (2007), 8.

72 Tang, “Zhongguo haiyang weiquan zhanlue chutan,” 66.

73 Passing domestic laws to reinforce UNCLOS is also discussed by Feng and Duan.

74Wang Shumei et al., “Luxing jundui liushi shiming shuli kexue haiquanguan” [Carry Out the Historic Mission of the Army and Establish the Scientific Concept of Sea Right], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, no. 2 

(2007), 141. The author is a postdoctoral fellow at the Academy of Military Sciences.

75Yao, “Jianshe qiangda haijun weihu woguo haiyang zhanlue liyi,” 6.

76Yi Sheng and Li Hua, “Zhongguo de heping fazhan yu janshe qiangda de guofang” [China’s Peaceful Development and the Building of a Strong National Defense], Guofang, no. 1 (2006), 3. No ranks or affiliations are given for the authors.

77Yao, “Jianshe qiangda haijun weihu woguo haiyang zhanlue liyi,” 6.

78Wang Shumei et al., “Luxing jundui liushi shiming shuli kexue haiquanguan,” 142.

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 81

Chapter 4

Toward a Maritime Security Strategy: 

An Analysis of Chinese Views Since the 

Early 1990s

Daniel M. Hartnett and Frederic Vellucci1

Since at least the early 1990s, China—historically a continental nation—

has been increasingly looking to the sea as a strategic arena vital for its future economic growth and development. Arguably, for the first time in history, 

China’s continued economic growth is dependent on maritime access and 

security. In 2009, for example, China’s international trade accounted for almost 45 percent of its total economy.2

 China’s containerized shipping industry 

has increased by a factor of 15 in the course of the past decade, and 42 percent 

of the world’s shipping containers (by tonnage) traversed Chinese ports in 

2007.3

 China has been a net importer of oil since 1993, and Beijing imported 55 

percent of its oil in 2008.4

 As China’s energy needs and volume of trade continue to expand, Chinese analysts have increasingly come to view secure access to 

shipping lanes as a necessity for sustained development and growth.

Chinese maritime security specialists, both civilian and military, have 

been writing in open sources over the past two decades about how China 

should best secure its maritime interests. Analysis of these writings suggests an 

ongoing debate about the present and future roles and missions of the Chinese 

People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). This research paper analyzes a sample 

of articles written by military and civilian maritime security specialists from 

the early 1990s to the present to provide the reader with an overview of these 

debates on China’s maritime strategy.5

 Our research illustrates the range of 

Chinese views concerning the components of China’s maritime strategy and the 

navy’s role within that strategy, and provides outside observers with a baseline 

to better ascertain possible future Chinese naval policies.6

First, the concept of sea power has been heavily debated in the Chinese 

press, and Chinese writings reveal a general consensus that sea power is important. However, there appeared to be little consensus on the actual definition of 

sea power. Definitions ranged from regional administrative control of the maritime environment, to the military concept of “command of the sea.” In addition, 

some authors called for a new definition of sea power, one that more closely 

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82 HARTNETT AND VELLUCCI

fits China’s actual conditions and needs. As China continues to develop both its 

navy and civilian maritime capabilities, it is probable that debates on the meaning and significance of sea power will continue to appear in Chinese writings.

Second, on the frequently cited need to develop Chinese citizens’ “sea 

consciousness,” there appears to be no significant debate among the authors 

we reviewed. All authors who discussed this issue agreed that sea consciousness is necessary for developing China’s sea power. As Jiang Zemin mentioned 

the need to increase sea consciousness in 1995, it is possible that this concept 

has been incorporated into the “Party line.” If that is the case, then regardless of whether China is a continental or maritime power, the likelihood that 

China is aspiring to enhance its sea power is even stronger since increasing sea 

consciousness is seen as the foundation for developing sea power.

Third, concerning the role of the PLAN in China’s maritime strategy, all 

authors surveyed advocated some role for the PLAN in China’s maritime strategy. However, there is still disagreement as to whether that strategy should focus exclusively on using the navy for maritime security, or whether the navy 

represents only one component of a more comprehensive maritime strategy 

that also includes civilian law enforcement as well as other diplomatic, economic, and cultural methods. 

Fourth, the various authors who write about the role and status of international law and cooperation disagreed on how these two factors should 

be integrated into China’s maritime strategy. Several authors advocated increasing reliance on a national maritime police force, while others thought 

that international cooperation is the linchpin to Chinese maritime security. 

Significantly, even though the authors disagreed on whether increased reliance 

on the law and international cooperation should be components of China’s 

maritime strategy, nearly all advocated strengthening the PLAN—just in case.

Finally, there was generally broad agreement among the articles surveyed that the operational range of the PLAN needed to be expanded. There 

was some divergence of opinion, however, as to how much expansion was necessary or desirable, or exactly how far the PLAN should expand its operational 

capabilities. The vast majority of authors surveyed agreed that at a minimum, 

the PLAN’s operational range should extend to the borders of China’s claimed 

exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf. Beyond that limit, 

there was much more disagreement over the costs and benefits of PLAN forces 

operating beyond various geographical markers including the first and second 

“island chains.” This ongoing debate suggests that Chinese security analysts 

are still attempting to identify the right mix of missions and capabilities for 

China’s navy, even as the PLA Navy has slowly expanded the scope of regular 

operations to increasingly greater distances beyond China’s shores.

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 CHINESE VIEWS SINCE THE EARLY 1990s 83

Theme 1: “Sea Power with Chinese Characteristics”

Chinese articles discussing the concept of sea power (haiquan, 海权) 

first emerged in the mid-1990s.7

 However, most of the early articles merely described Admiral Alfred T. Mahan and his sea power theory and did not present a discussion of how that theory should be applied to China. Since 2000 and 

continuing into the present, however, articles have begun to discuss the actual 

definition of sea power and its significance for China. Yet, Chinese writings 

on the definition and significance of sea power appear to vary widely, ranging 

from the ability to exert administrative control over a regional sea area, to the 

military term “command of the sea” (zhihaiquan, 制海权).8

 Adding more confusion into the mix, a few recent articles call for revising the Mahanian theory 

of sea power to account for China’s specific characteristics. 

Chinese writings on sea power provide varying definitions. For example, 

one 2002 article defined sea power using regional terms, as “a nation’s ability to 

administer, control, and protect its territorial waters [linghai, 领海] (including a 

nation’s internal waters [lingshui, 领水] and the air space above them),the contiguous zone [pilianqu, 毗连区],9

 and their exclusive economic zones.”10 Wuhan 

University Professor Liu Xinhua (刘新华) wrote that sea power is the “power to 

freely move in the maritime arena.”11 On the other hand, Professor Lu Rude (陆

儒德) from the Dalian Vessel Academy appeared to adopt the more traditional, 

Western concept when he argued that sea power signifies “possession of actual 

and potential forces to control and develop the seas, and to effectively protect 

and realize [a nation’s] maritime interests in accordance with the law.”12 Zhang 

Wenmu (张文木), a researcher at the Ministry of State Security think tank—the 

China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)—posited a 

definition that bears more of a resemblance to the military term of “command 

of the sea” (zhihaiquan, 制海权).13 Peking University Professor Ye Zicheng 

(叶自成) appeared to rebuke other writers when he wrote that some people in 

China incorrectly equate sea power with possessing powerful navy vessels.14 In 

2008, Liu Zhongmin, professor at the Law and Politics College of the Ocean 

University of China, lamented how people in China continue to confuse the 

definitions of “sea power” and “maritime rights and interests.”15

Several recent authors have maintained that China needs to have a new 

definition of sea power that is not based upon the Western, traditional Mahanian concept. Instead, a Chinese sea power definition should reflect China’s 

current circumstances. Peking University Professor Ye Zicheng (叶自成), for 

example, argued that Chinese sea power implies the ability to research, develop, use, and control the seas, as well as China’s influence over these areas.16

Dalian Vessel Academy Professor Lu Rude (陆儒德), countering Ye’s proposal, 

also offered his own new definition for Chinese sea power, which includes:17

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84 HARTNETT AND VELLUCCI

■   a nation’s comprehensive power and maritime strategy

■   a nation’s sea consciousness and views on the sea

■   a comprehensive maritime education system

■  skilled maritime technicians

■   advanced maritime technology and equipment

■   a powerful navy, as well as ocean-going commercial, fishing, surveying, and engineering fleets

■   a set of maritime laws

■   a powerful maritime law enforcement force.

Similarly, the War Theories and Strategic Studies Department of the 

Academy of Military Science (AMS) wrote that China cannot follow the 

Western path of sea power, and instead needs “sea power with Chinese characteristics” (zhongguo tese de haiquan, 中国特色的海权).18 According to this 

department, sea power with Chinese characteristics is:

■  Limited in both goals and operational range: it focuses solely upon 

China’s maritime rights and interests only within the context of national sovereignty and the United Nations Convention on the Law of 

the Sea (UNCLOS).

■  Diverse in content: it includes national territorial, sea lane, and maritime

nontraditional security; the safeguarding, development, and use of maritime resources; and the safety of China’s important overseas interests.

■  Comprehensive in nature: it is a combination of military, political, 

economic, diplomatic, and cultural methods.19

The Extent of Chinese Sea Power

Based on the writings we surveyed, China’s views on the roles and extent 

of sea power in its maritime strategy began to appear after 2000, and can be 

roughly divided into three groups. Some held that sea power is of the utmost 

importance to China’s future. Others argued that sea power should have the 

same value as land power, not more. Finally, some stated that sea power is less 

important than land power. The three schools of thought will be fleshed out in 

the following paragraphs. 

One group of authors argued that China desperately needs sea power. 

CICIR researcher Zhang Wenmu (张文木) made no qualms about the importance of the navy and sea power to China’s future when he stated: “The navy 

is concerned with China’s sea power, and sea power is concerned with China’s 

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 CHINESE VIEWS SINCE THE EARLY 1990s 85

future development. As I see it, if a nation lacks sea power, its development has 

no future.”20

A Dangdai Haijun (Modern Navy) article further posited that “whoever 

controls sea power controls the key to the gate of future existence and sustainable development.”21 Similarly, Rear Admiral Yao Wenhuai (姚文怀), Deputy 

Director of the PLAN Political Department, succinctly noted that China’s fate 

lies with the sea.22

A second group of authors maintained that China should not develop its 

sea power at the expense of its land power, but rather develop both simultaneously. For example, a former PLAN Political Commissar, Yang Huaiqing (杨怀

庆), argued that China is simultaneously a great continental nation (海洋强国) 

and a great coastal nation (binhai daguo, 濒海大国), and needs to act as such. 

This point is also held by Dalian Vessel Academy Professor Lu Rude (陆儒德).23

An article in the PLAN journal Modern Navy pointed out that although China 

needs to develop its sea power, ignoring land power is not an option as both 

affect China’s strategic initiative and security.24

Finally, the third group, consisting of only two identified authors, maintained that sea power should be subordinate to land interests. In two different 

articles, Peking University Professor Ye Zicheng (叶自成) argued that China can 

have sea power, but since China is a continental nation, it must be a land power 

with strong sea power, not a strong maritime nation.25 Xu Qiyu (徐弃郁), a 

researcher from the National Defense University’s Institute for Strategic Studies, 

struck a similar tone when he stated that simultaneously developing the military 

in both land and sea directions could waste already limited resources, create new 

adversaries, and even lead to nations balancing against China. Xu argued that 

in the end, it is comprehensive national power that decides sea power, not sea 

power that determines comprehensive national power.26

Arguments for Increasing Chinese Sea Power

The various Chinese authors who argue for increasing China’s sea power 

cited different reasons for why China needs to develop in the direction of the 

sea. These arguments can be generally categorized as follows:

■   Regional economic interests and the need to protect them are among the 

most frequently cited reasons for needing to expand China’s sea power. According to one estimate, China’s maritime economy accounted 

for 10 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) in 2006, and that 

percentage is growing.27 Problems exist, however, because much of 

China’s claimed maritime territory is exploited or controlled by other nations.28 By expanding China’s sea power, it is believed that China 

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can bolster its claims to its disputed natural resources in the Asia 

Pacific region.29 The War Theories and Strategic Studies Department 

of the AMS went so far as to point out that these resources are the sole 

guarantee for China’s continued economic development.30

■  Territorial integrity was cited by many authors, and can be further divided into two parts: the Taiwan issue, and the disputed maritime 

islands and reefs in the East China and the South China Seas. Concerning 

Taiwan, Taiwanese independence forces (Taidu liliang, 台独力量) are 

seen as seriously threatening China’s sovereignty and security.31 Some 

authors believed that without the deterrence of sea power, national 

reunification will be impossible.32 In addition to citing Taiwan, Chinese 

writers frequently pointed out that a large section of China’s maritime 

territory is in dispute. According to one source, roughly half, or 1.5 

million square kilometers, of the approximately 3 million square kilometers of maritime territory under China’s legal jurisdiction is in dispute 

or already controlled by other regional nations.33 The importance of 

Taiwan and other maritime territories was a recurring theme in Chinese 

writings on maritime security from the early 1990s through the present.

■   Traditional security threats were quoted in some articles as still likely 

to occur.34 This concept predominantly refers to military combat between states, such as invasions and military incursions from the sea. 

China’s Maritime Disputes

1. Taiwan

2. Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and location of overall maritime 

boundary with Japan

3. Paracel Islands and surrounding waters with Vietnam

4. Spratly Islands and surrounding waters in the South China 

Sea with Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and 

Malaysia

5. Maritime border with Vietnam

6. Fisheries areas and quotas with North Korea, South Korea, 

Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines

Source: Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-first Century, 2d ed. (Annapolis: 

Naval Institute Press, 2010), 19.

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Because traditional security threats to China still exist, some argued that China 

should fully use geostrategic locations—such as islands—within its peripheral 

seas in order to defend itself.35 In a surprisingly detailed article, Liu Yijian (刘

一建) from the Naval Command Academy argued that China needs to build up 

and prepare a naval battlefield, using the Spratly and Paracel Islands as forward 

positions.36 Some writers held the view that the buildup of the U.S. military and 

other regional navies in Asia was an attempt to slowly contain China within the 

first island chain, and count this as a future traditional security threat.37 Interestingly, Da Wei (达巍) from CICIR pointed out in 2005 that the era of traditional 

security threats to China from the maritime direction has more or less passed.38

■   Expanding overseas economic concerns were also a factor in recent articles that some saw as necessitating Chinese sea power. For example, 

in 2003, Zhang Wenmu (张文木) from CICIR stated, “Wherever our 

interests go ... our military force needs to go there too.”39 Another author from the Logistics Command Academy wrote: 

The Navy is a necessary investment for a nation to safeguard and develop 

its overseas trade. A nation’s overseas trade requires strong naval support. 

This positive interaction is the basic rule of sea power development.40

An article published in the military journal Junshi Jingji Yanjiu (Military 

Economic Research) in 2005 captured the growing importance of overseas economic interests best when it stated: 

The degree of development of the external-facing economy, regardless 

if it is the protection of maritime passageways, the expansion of foreign trade, the spreading of the overseas market, or defending overseas 

production, all require having a powerful military force as a guarantee, 

otherwise China will be possibly caught being passive.41

Within this category also fall energy security issues. For example, it has 

become very clear to Chinese scholars in recent years that 70 percent of China’s 

petroleum imports pass through the Strait of Malacca. In 2003, Wuhan University’s Liu Xinhua (刘新华) and Qin Yi (秦仪) maintained that by developing its 

sea power, China can ensure the security of maritime oil deliveries.42 Two years 

later, Da Wei (达巍) from CICIR referred to this shipping route as the “lifeline” 

for China’s economic development.43

The number of authors stressing the importance of safeguarding overseas economic concerns will likely continue to grow along with China’s growing dependence on overseas markets and foreign energy supplies. 

■   Security of overseas Chinese was also mentioned in two recent articles as 

a reason for China to continue increasing its sea power. CICIR’s Zhang 

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Wenmu (张文木) stated that unless Chinese workers feel that they will 

be secure when they go abroad, they will be unwilling to go overseas 

for work. This sense of security can only be provided by the PLAN.44

Similarly, Modern Navy staff reporter Xu Lifan (徐立凡) while calling 

for an expanded role for the PLAN, pointed out that anti-Chinese sentiment in some nations could seriously affect overseas Chinese, and 

that China “as the motherland” needs to take the safety of these overseas Chinese into consideration.45 This sort of thinking is continuing to 

grow as increasing numbers of Chinese venture abroad for work. 

Theme 2: The Necessity of Sea Consciousness for China’s Maritime 

Strategy

In the mid–1990s, as the debate on the importance of China’s developmental strategy became increasingly focused on the sea, academic journals and 

news media began publishing articles that called for China to increase “sea

Figure 4–1. First and Second Island Chains

Source: Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall At Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute 

Press, 2001), 165.

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Figure 4-2. Extent of China’s Claimed South China Sea Territory

Source: Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall At Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute 

Press, 2001), 33.

consciousness” (haiyang yishi, 海洋意识) among the population. According to 

Chinese authors, increasing sea consciousness is an attempt to create and mold 

Chinese citizens’ views on various maritime issues. The idea of increasing sea 

consciousness to promote sea power bears striking resemblance to Alfred 

Mahan’s 1890 seminal work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–

1783, which is worth quoting here:

The government’s policies can favor the natural growth of a people’s industries and its tendencies to seek adventure and gain by way of the sea; 

or it can try to develop such industries and such sea-going bent, when 

they do not naturally exist; or, on the other hand, the government may, 

by mistaken action check and fetter the progress which the people left to 

themselves would make.46

Thus by increasing the sea consciousness of its citizenry, China hopes 

that the people will have a clearer understanding of the importance of the sea 

to China and of China’s maritime efforts. 

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“Sea consciousness” appears to be an umbrella term that encompasses several different maritime issues. According to one Chinese author, when 

someone has sea consciousness, that person understands the following:

■   China’s maritime national territory (haiyang guotu, 海洋国土)

■   China’s maritime economy (haiyang jingji, 海洋经济)

■   China’s maritime politics (haiyang zhengzhi, 海洋政治) 

■   China’s maritime rights and interests (haiyang quanyi, 海洋权益)

■   maritime resources (haiyang ziyuan, 海洋资源)

■   maritime environment (haiyang huanjing, 海洋环境)

■   maritime science and technology (haiyang keji, 海洋科技)

■   China’s national security (guojia anquan, 国家安全)

■   China’s maritime military space (haiyang junshi kongjian, 海洋军事空间).47

One of the earlier calls in the open press for increasing the Chinese people’s sea consciousness appears in a 1994 article in the journal of the Dalian 

Vessel Academy’s Political Department, Zhenggong Xuekan (Journal of Political 

Work). In that article, the author argued that because global maritime disputes 

are intensifying, PLAN officers and sailors need to have a new understanding

Maritime rights and interests (haiyang quanyi, 海洋权益) is 

a frequently encountered term in Chinese writings on maritime 

strategy. It refers to the right to:

■   Exercise sovereignty over one’s maritime national territory

■   Have jurisdiction over and develop one’s contiguous zones, 

exclusive economic zones, and continental shelf

■   Carry out transportation and military activities during both 

peacetime and wartime

■   Develop and use the resources of the high seas, the seabed, 

and subsoil, as well as carry out scientific investigation of 

these areas.

Source: Zhang Xusan, ed., Haijun Dacidian [The Navy Dictionary] (Shanghai: Shanghai Dictionary Press, 1993), 9.

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of what he terms “maritime territory consciousness” (haiyang guotu yishi, 海洋 

国土意识).48 Later that year, Lieutenant Commander Luo Xianlin (罗仙林) expanded upon this concept, calling for sea consciousness to be spread among 

the entire Chinese nation.49 Jiang Zemin echoed these thoughts during a 1995 

inspection of a PLAN unit on Hainan Island:

Developing and using the sea will have more and more significance to 

China’s long-term development. We certainly need to understand the 

sea from a strategic highpoint, and increase the entire nation’s sea 

consciousness.50

Since then, many Chinese authors writing on China’s sea power 

and maritime strategy have emphasized the importance of developing the 

Chinese people’s sea consciousness. For example, one AMS researcher noted 

that sea consciousness is necessary in order to defend China’s national 

development.51 As Zhang Dengyi (张登义), a member of the Chinese People’s 

Political Consultative Conference and former director of the State Council’s 

State Oceanic Bureau, pointed out, increasing the people’s sea consciousness 

establishes within them a conviction “to build a strong maritime nation 

[haiyang qiangguo, 海洋强国].”52 The call for establishing a Chinese sea 

consciousness continues up to today, as an April 2009 article demonstrates. 

Fifteen years after some of the first calls for establishing sea consciousness in China, Wen Yufu writes that sea consciousness in China is still weak, 

hindering China’s maritime development.53 Based on the openly available literature, the necessity of developing sea consciousness does not appear to be a 

divisive issue. 

Chinese authors feel that increasing sea consciousness is important 

because China has neglected the seas for so long. As noted in 1995 by former State Oceanic Bureau Director and PLAN Training Department Deputy 

Director Luo Yuru (罗钰如), most Chinese people downplay the importance 

of the ocean for their survival.54 Luo believes that such thinking is not only 

wrong, but also dangerous. A decade later, Liu Shuiming (刘水明) and Chen 

Lu (陈璐), both from PLA’s Nanjing Political Academy, argued the same 

point, stating that although the sea is important to China’s prosperity, a number of factors—including history, tradition, and geography—have caused the 

Chinese to ignore or downplay the sea’s importance.55 As a result, China’s 

maritime defense has been habitually weak, allowing overseas enemies to repeatedly invade China. Professor Gao Xinsheng (高新生) from the Shenyang 

Artillery Academy argued that fostering a sense of sea consciousness in the 

people would help to prevent similar events from recurring in the future.56

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Theme 3: Toward a Navy-centric or Comprehensive Maritime Security 

Strategy?

This section categorizes the various Chinese views on what the components of China’s maritime security strategy should look like. The authors who 

write about this topic can be generally divided into two groups: 

■   those advocating a navy-centric maritime security strategy

■   those calling for a more comprehensive maritime security strategy.

The authors in the navy-centric group didn’t necessarily argue that a 

strong navy is the only guarantee for China’s maritime security, but rather think 

that the PLAN should be the main or dominant actor. Those in the second 

group call for a more holistic approach to maritime security, arguing that the 

PLAN is but one tool in the toolbox—some even advocate a relatively minor 

role for the navy. First evidence of this debate in open sources was observed 

around 1995, and can still be seen in 2007 print media articles. 

Navy-centric Maritime Security Strategy

Those who advocated a navy-centric strategy argue that China’s maritime security should predominantly rely upon a strong military (specifically, 

a strong navy). Therefore, China needs to emphasize the importance of using the PLAN as the primary component of its maritime security strategy. 

In a 1995 article, former State Oceanic Bureau Director and PLAN Training 

Department Deputy Director Luo Yuru (罗钰如) pointed out that although 

China must focus on developing its maritime comprehensive national power (haishang zonghe guoli, 海上综合国力), it must pay particular attention 

to the modernization and development of the navy.57 He also argued that 

“the PLAN must be elevated to a higher strategic level and become a unified 

force for administering the seas and oceans.”58 Liu Zhenhuan (刘振环) from 

the Naval Research Institute pointed out that although sea power is comprised of such factors as science and technology, economics, and the military, the navy is “the most solid and crucial maritime force.”59 Another Chinese author wrote in 1999 that only with a strong, modern PLA and PLAN 

that are focused on territorial integrity and national unity, can China fulfill 

its goals for becoming a “strong and prosperous, territorially sovereign, and 

moderately developed country.”60 Vice Admiral Feng Liang (冯梁), deputy 

director of the Navy Command Academy’s Strategy Teaching and Research 

Office, addressed economic issues when he wrote that the navy “is the basic force for protecting the state’s overseas economy (haiwai jingji, 海外经

济) and maritime rights and interests.”61 Modern Navy staff writer Gu Zuhua 

(顾祖华) went even further, stating that regardless of what the problem is—

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energy security, a Taiwan crisis, or other national defense problems—priority must be given to building a strong navy.62

Comprehensive Maritime Security Strategy

Others argue that while developing the PLAN is beneficial, China 

should not ignore other actors or processes of maritime security, such as 

political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, or scientific methods. In 1996, 

Dalian Vessel Academy Professor Lu Rude (陆儒德) argued that the maritime security situation had become very complex, and that maritime 

defense must now be coordinated with various government departments—

such as Public Security, Communications, Tax Administration, Customs, 

Fishing Industry, Environmental Protection, and Health Departments.63

Almost a decade later, a 2004 article in Liaowang (Outlook) mirrored Lu’s 

argument by pointing out that the military is but one aspect of a more 

comprehensive strategy:

In reality, concerning the content of China’s interests in the maritime 

direction, they are present not only in the military arena, but also 

appear at the mutual intersection and melding of the many arenas of 

politics, diplomacy, economics, environment, and information. Defending these interests cannot simply depend upon one measure; only 

by systemic and comprehensive use of many mutually supporting 

measures, each shining more brilliantly than the other, can China acquire the greatest national interest.64

In a book sponsored by CICIR, the Ministry of State Security think tank, 

Da Wei (达巍) outlined the composition of a “comprehensive maritime force” 

(zonghe haiyang liliang, 综合海洋力量) as consisting of military, economic, and 

scientific research capabilities.65

Finally, the War Theories and Strategic Studies Department of the Academy of Military Science asserted that the role of nonmilitary force in sea power 

is actually on the rise, as compared to military force:

The position and use of a maritime non-military force in the development of sea power is increasing daily, and only when military force is 

joined together with political, economic, and diplomatic measures will it 

give play to the effective use [of sea power].66

We should point out, however, that we found no arguments that totally 

dismissed the PLAN’s role in maritime security. Even Peking University Professor Ye Zicheng (叶自成), arguably the PLAN’s greatest detractor in China, 

took the view that the PLAN has a role to play, albeit a limited one.67

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Several Chinese authors posited specific details about what China’s 

comprehensive maritime security structure should look like. For example, 

some agreed that a maritime law enforcement force (haishang zhifa liliang, 海

上执法力量) is an important component of Chinese maritime security strategy.68 Others wrote that cooperation with foreign nations and international 

organizations should be a key aspect of China’s maritime security.69 Both of 

these aspects will be discussed further in the following section. 

Theme 4: Role of the Law and International Cooperation in Maritime 

Dispute Management

In this section we will analyze the role of international cooperation and 

the law in safeguarding China’s sovereignty, security, and maritime rights and 

interests. Significantly, the first article calling for increased reliance on international laws and principles to manage China’s maritime territory appeared in 

1995, just 1 year after the UNCLOS became effective, and 1 year before China 

ratified that treaty.70 Chinese authors on this subject can be divided into three 

broad groups: 

■   first, those who advocated stronger reliance on domestic and international laws

■   second, those who argued for increased cooperation with regional 

navies, multilateral security organizations, and the United Nations

■   third, those who argued that the only effective guarantor of China’s 

rights and interests is a powerful navy—in other words, that China 

must be prepared to “go it alone.”

As we will show, these three groups do overlap somewhat. Significantly, most authors surveyed—including those who advocated increased reliance 

on the law and international cooperation—argued that the PLAN should be 

strengthened as a backup in case peaceful multilateral means fail to safeguard 

China’s interests.

Increase Reliance on the Law

Of the articles calling for increasing reliance on domestic and international law to protect China’s maritime rights and interests, most called for 

strengthening some type of Chinese maritime law enforcement force. Noting 

that the legitimacy of China’s maritime territorial claims is based on law, including the UNCLOS as well as several domestic laws, in 2001 former State 

Oceanic Administration Director Zhang Dengyi (张登义) argued that China 

should use maritime law enforcement forces (haishang zhifa liliang, 海上执法

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力量) to safeguard its sovereignty, rights, and interests within that territory.71

In particular, this author called for centralizing all civilian maritime security 

forces from the center to the localities and enhancing the Chinese maritime 

police forces’ ability to accompany maritime traffic, monitor fishing, expand 

the force’s zone of operations, and effectively safeguard China’s maritime rights 

and interests.

In 2007 Xiu Bin (修斌), a professor from the Ocean University of 

China in Qingdao, Shandong Province, wrote an article exploring how China 

could protect its maritime rights and interests within the context of its 

“peaceful development” strategy.72 He argued that China must use the law to 

protect its rights and interests because “non-military force and peaceful means 

have become the main methods for safeguarding national maritime interests 

in the context of peaceful development.” Noting that China’s development 

requires a stable regional environment, this professor argued that if China were 

to use more forceful means of securing its maritime rights and interests, the 

regional security environment would deteriorate and China’s prospects for 

development would be harmed. However, Xiu Bin noted that countries can 

easily violate agreements and treaties. As a result, 

China must establish a powerful maritime police force to protect the 

rights entrusted to us in the UNCLOS, and safeguard our national interests. This civilian police force must supervise and manage other nations’ 

activities in the sea areas under China’s jurisdiction.73

While the two arguments described above were both written by civilians, military authors also argued that China should rely on international 

law to protect China’s maritime rights and interests. In 1996, Dalian Vessel 

Academy Professor Lu Rude (陆儒德) argued that China needed to strengthen 

its system of domestic maritime laws to ensure Beijing enjoyed all of the 

maritime rights and interests specified in the UNCLOS.74 In a 2001 article 

written by Feng Liang (冯梁) and Zhang Xiaolin (张晓林), two professors 

from the Naval Command Academy, the authors argued that “while in wartime nations can rely on armed force to obtain their objectives, in peacetime 

a responsible member of the community of nations must conduct itself within the boundaries permitted by international law.”75 Similarly in 2005, Gao 

Xinsheng (高新生), a professor from the Shenyang Artillery Academy, argued that China should “rely on international law for managing and resolving 

maritime disputes to the greatest extent possible.”76

However, and perhaps not surprisingly, while the civilians argued for 

strengthening civilian maritime police forces as a backup plan, the military authors argued that while China should rely on international law to the greatest 

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extent possible, it should strengthen the PLAN as a deterrent force. The two 

Naval Command Academy authors referred to above noted, “International law 

is still incapable of dealing with the increasingly complex maritime disputes between nations. As such a naval deterrence force is required.”77 Shenyang Artillery Academy Professor Gao Xinsheng argued that to deal with the uncertainty 

of international law, China must “spend more money on the navy, incorporate 

advanced foreign technology and experience, increase research on highly effective maritime defense weapons, and strengthen maritime air defense.”78

Increase Regional Cooperation

Like those who advocate relying on the law to protect maritime rights and 

interests, proponents of increased international cooperation on maritime security issues noted that China should take the utmost care to preserve regional peace 

and stability. Several articles advocated increasing cooperation with regional navies, including those of the United States, Japan, India, and the ASEAN states, as 

an effective means of assuaging regional fears of a rising Chinese navy, ensuring 

maritime security, and preserving regional peace.79 As Gu Zuhua (顾祖华), a staff 

writer for the PLAN’s official journal, Dangdai Haijun (Modern Navy), argued, 

While simultaneously developing the navy, we should participate in even 

more exchanges with global navies, especially the navies of developed 

nations, to build up trust. We will then be able to effectively eliminate the 

China Threat Theory and establish an image of a peaceful rise.80

One interesting aspect of the debate on how much cooperation is good 

for China’s maritime strategy is that the advocates of increased regional cooperation include authors with very different views on the PLAN’s role in Chinese 

maritime strategy. For example, in 2005, three authors from the Naval Command Academy argued that China should increase regional cooperation as an 

acceptable means by which the PLAN could take a more active role throughout 

the Asia Pacific region.81 These authors argued that if China assumed a more 

assertive role in working with regional nations for the maintenance of peace 

and stability in Asia, regional nations would accept the increasingly powerful 

navy that it is building. They argued:

The PLAN should participate in naval military activities arranged by the 

United Nations or other international organizations, and participate in 

bilateral or multilateral naval military exercises; we could also routinely 

or occasionally venture outside [qianchu, 前出] the first island chain to 

conduct training and patrols. In short, we need to expand the influence 

of China’s navy within the Asia Pacific region and in the world, making it 

become an important, indispensable force for safeguarding Asia Pacific 

regional stability, and safeguarding world peace.82

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The most vocal proponent of limited PLAN expansion, Ye Zicheng (叶自

成), also argued that China should increase its cooperation with regional powers as a component of China’s developing maritime strategy.83 However, instead 

of seeing this as socializing regional powers to the existence of an increasingly 

powerful PLAN, Ye viewed it as an alternative to a greatly expanded PLAN that 

would divert scarce resources required for land-based military and economic 

development.

Another viewpoint raised was that China should increase its diplomatic cooperation in order to reassure its maritime neighbors—especially in 

Southeast Asia—that the growing power of China’s navy poses no threat to 

them. Zhai Kun (翟崑), a Southeast Asian expert at CICIR, stated that those 

advocating for a more forceful approach to maritime issues were wrong, and 

following such a policy would cost China in the long run. Zhai felt that it was 

better to work cooperatively with the various nations, to include the United 

States, to resolve any problem that might arise.84

Go It Alone 

The third view concerning the law and international cooperation is that 

neither is an effective means of protecting China’s sovereignty, security, and 

maritime rights and interests. According to Ni Lexiong (倪乐雄), a professor 

at Shanghai Normal University, “The idea that China could rely on ‘international cooperation’ instead of the capability of ‘fighting by ourselves’ is simply 

incorrect . . . Most of the ‘cooperative’ efforts in the world today, such as the 

proliferation security initiative and energy security are dominated by the U.S. 

and primarily serve U.S. hegemonic interests.”85 Liu Shuiming (陆水明) and 

Chen Lu (陈璐), two scholars from the PLA Nanjing Political Academy, agreed 

with this assessment, noting:

While the UNCLOS granted China exclusive jurisdiction over a large 

area of maritime territory, current maritime politics teaches us that without a powerful at-sea military force [qiangda de haishang junshi liliang, 

强大的海上军事力量], we will very likely encounter a situation where 

we will be unable to enjoy the rights granted to us by international law. 

Therefore, to protect our legal rights and interests [hefa quanyi, 合法

权益] we must strengthen our maritime defense construction [haifang 

jinshe, 海防建设].86

Theme 5: Operational Range of the PLAN

This final section will outline the various Chinese arguments concerning the operational range of the PLAN. The vast majority of the Chinese writings since the mid-1990s advocated increasing the PLAN’s operational range 

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(zuozhan fanwei, 作战范围) or operational zone (zuozhan haiqu, 作战海区). 

Significantly, most articles supported the view that China needs to adapt to an 

increasingly competitive international maritime environment, and to revise its 

concept of maritime defense so that instead of focusing on defending the coast 

(hai’an, 海岸) and territorial waters (linghai, 领海), it will focus on a larger portion of the sea. While most authors agreed that the PLAN’s operational range 

should be expanded, there was some divergence of opinion as to how much 

expansion was necessary or desirable. 

Many arguments called for an expanded PLAN zone of operations to 

protect Chinese interests and national security. Depending on how the authors 

defined “Chinese interests and national security,” they advocated a PLAN operational zone demarcated variously by the 200–350 nautical mile (nm) exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the first or second island chain, or beyond. Most 

authors argued that the range of PLAN operations should focus on the “offshore area” (jinhai haiyu, 近海海域). However, this fact reveals very little about 

the PLAN’s operational range since “offshore” is a vague concept that could be 

interpreted to mean anything as close as China’s coastal waters (24 nm) or as 

far out as the Pacific Ocean beyond the second island chain. On the conservative end (less expansion), even Ye Zicheng (叶自成), the most vocal opponent 

of PLAN development, argued that PLAN operations should be focused on the 

“offshore area” (jinhai, 近海).87 Analysis of these arguments will help shed light 

on the question of how Chinese commentators believe Beijing should choose 

to exercise its increasingly capable navy.

Controlling the Exclusive Economic Zone

One central theme in arguments supporting an expanded range for the 

navy’s operational activities is that China must acquire the ability to control its 

exclusive economic zone. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the 

Sea (UNCLOS), which became effective in 1994, provided new international 

legitimacy for China’s claims to an expanded scope of “maritime national territory (haiyang guotu, 海洋国土).” Beginning at that time, and continuing into 

the present, many articles argued that the PLAN must develop new capabilities and increase its operational range out to the limits of the continental shelf 

and the EEZ to protect China’s newly expanded sovereignty and territorial interests, as defined by international law.88 The first such argument that we identified was put forth in 1995, when former State Oceanic Bureau Director and 

PLAN Training Department Deputy Director Luo Yuru (罗钰如) argued that as 

a result of UNCLOS, the PLAN must be prepared to protect maritime national 

territory out to the continental shelf, the EEZ, and in international waters.89 As 

a Dangdai Haijun (Modern Navy) editorial argued a few years later:

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We must broaden our focus to the entire area of the ocean that we have jurisdiction over. We also need to keep in mind that our maritime defensive 

mission is more than just resisting invasion from enemies. This mission also 

includes protecting the sovereignty of China’s maritime islands and protecting China’s maritime rights and interests [haiyang quanyi, 海洋权益].90

In 1999, Naval Command Academy professor Liu Yijian (刘一建) argued 

that the PLAN must develop the capability to operate within and beyond the 

“offshore area” [jinhai haiyu, 近海海域]—which he defined as 200–350 nautical miles out to sea—to protect the newly expanded realm of Chinese maritime 

rights and interests. Liu argued:

Since the nation’s maritime rights and interests have extended beyond 

the range of the offshore sea area [jinhai haiyu, 近海海域], the PLAN 

must possess highly mobile mid- to long-range at-sea operational platforms [zhong-yuancheng haishang zuozhan pingtai, 中远程海上作战平

台] equipped with intermediate- and long-range weapons and attack capabilities. While at present, the PLAN does possess some long-distance 

operational capabilities, overall the PLAN is still an offshore-type navy.91

Island Chains and Beyond

Significantly, while a number of articles identified certain distances or 

geographic island chains as demarcation lines for future PLAN zones of operation, these geographic targets appear to be merely benchmarks of progress 

rather than end goals. For arguments that used geographical boundaries, the 

distance of the boundary identified depended on the time frame of the author’s 

argument. For example, in 2001 Wuhan University Professor Liu Xinhua (刘新

华) argued that for the PLAN to execute its current maritime security missions, 

it must develop the capability to control “the entire sea area within the first 

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

In 1996, China ratified the 1982 3d

 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This law provided an international 

legal basis for China’s claims to “maritime national territory” 

(haiyang guotu, 海洋国土) out to 200–350 nautical miles from 

the coastal baseline depending on the terminal location of the 

continental shelf.

Source: “Maritime Zones and Maritime Delimitation,” United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and Law 

of the Sea, available at <http://www.un.org/DEPTS/los>.

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island chain.”92 Another article took a much longer perspective: Naval Command Academy Professor Liu Yijian (刘一建) argued that by 2050 the PLAN 

must transition from “an offshore navy [jinhai haijun, 近海海军] to a regional 

navy [quyu haijun, 区域海军] . . . capable of operating and attaining control of 

the sea [haiyu zhihaiquan, 海域制海权[ [beyond the first island chain].”93 He 

continued, arguing that China’s active defense strategy [jiji fangyu de zhanlue, 

积极防御的战略] must use international waters and freedom of the seas to be 

effective. In terms of the operational range of the PLAN, Liu argued:

[By 2050] the Chinese navy’s strategic operational zone should not be restricted to the offshore area [jinhai, 近海]. It must extend from the forward 

edge of the offshore area to the Northwest Pacific . . . To guarantee the nation’s security in the maritime direction [haishang fangxiang, 海上方向], 

a modern navy must possess the capability to intercept and attack the enemy’s forces at sufficient distance (more than 1,000 nm) from the coast.94

To achieve these operational capabilities, Liu Yijian outlined a threephase development strategy for the first half of the 21st century:95

■   Phase 1, 2000–2010: The PLAN must focus on developing its operational capabilities in the offshore area (jinhai, 近海). This includes the 

development of large-scale operational platforms (zuozhan pingtai, 作

战平台) and intermediate-and long-range precision-guided munitions.

■   Phase 2, 2011–2020: The PLAN should evolve into a force that has 

a core of large- and medium-sized operational platforms capable of 

effectively controlling the offshore sea area (jinhai haiyu, 近海海域) 

within the first island chain. 

■   Phase 3, 2020–2050: The PLAN must begin its transition into a regional navy. It will have a core of large-scale operational platforms, 

and possess not only the ability to operate throughout the Northwest 

Pacific, but also the ability to attain command of the sea (zhihaiquan, 

制海权) in this area. 

Some authors maintain that the extent of China’s operational maritime zone is directly related to its economic development. According to the 

2006 Theory of National Security Strategy (Guojia Anquan Zhanlue Lilun, 国

家安全战略理论), authored by the AMS War Theories and Strategic Studies 

Department, as China’s economic power and level of technology increase, “the 

PLAN’s operational sea zone will gradually expand to the second island chain 

of the North Pacific.”96 Writing in 2009, two naval officers from the Dalian 

Vessel Academy point out that the navy’s operating area has expanded—and 

will continue to expand—with the strategic needs of the nation.97 Another 

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volume published by the National Defense University, Science of Service 

Strategy (Junzhong Zhanlue Xue, 军种战略学), also argued that the strategic 

range of PLAN operations will not be confined to any geographic location.98

“Offshore” is not a simple geographic concept, it is a strategic concept. 

The operational range [zuozhan fanwei, 作战范围] of the offshore defense includes the offshore sea area [jinhai haiyu, 近海海域] defined as 

the area of the sea that is under China’s legitimate jurisdiction as well as 

any area that can be used by an enemy to threaten China’s security. The 

strategic range of PLAN operations is any area where operations must be 

conducted to protect the entirety of China’s “maritime national territory 

[haiyang guotu, 海洋国土],” safeguard national unity, territorial integrity, maritime rights and interests, and conduct strategic control over “hot 

spot” sea zones around the boundaries of Chinese territory. As China’s 

strategic environment evolves and the PLAN’s strategic capabilities are 

enhanced, the future range of “offshore operations” could be expanded 

as required to effectively guarantee China’s national security.

As noted above in the section on sea power with Chinese characteristics, 

Chinese authors argue that the PLAN must develop the capability to protect 

China’s increasing numbers of enterprises and nationals located abroad.99 The 

telling comment “wherever our interests go, our military force must be capable 

of following,” also supported the notion that the PLA Navy should have an unlimited operational range.100 Other articles advocating an essentially unlimited 

operational range for the navy argued that the PLAN must possess blue-water 

capabilities to show a military presence at sea, provide deterrence, and conduct 

military diplomacy missions.101

Since the PLA Navy began participating in antipiracy operations off the 

Horn of Africa, there have been muted calls for establishing overseas bases—

primarily logistics and supply hubs.102 One of the earliest calls for this was in 

a February 2009 article in the PRC-owned Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times). 

In this article, the author, PLA Air Force Colonel Dai Xu (戴旭), openly calls 

for establishing bases overseas in order for China to fulfill its international 

obligations and truly act as a “mature power.”103 Later that same year, Yin Zhuo 

(尹桌), director of the PLA Navy’s Informatization Experts Advisory Committee and member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, also 

discussed the need to set up a “supply and repair base” in the Horn of Africa in order to support the navy’s escort missions there.104 Within less than a 

week, the English-language newspaper China Daily ran an article that appeared 

as a weak attempt at damage control. In this article, Jin Canrong, a professor 

from Renmin University, stated that while the opinions of Yin were just those 

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102 HARTNETT AND VELLUCCI

of a “retired admiral,” the idea of establishing such a base should not be ruled 

out entirely.105 A few months later, Yin appeared to retreat slightly from his 

original statement, and likened any future Chinese supply points to a port call 

for restocking:

Concerning how the outside world is surmising whether China will establish overseas military bases, Yin Zhuo directly replied in the negative. 

He said, our escort task force only needs supply points (bujidian, 补给

点), it doesn’t require establishing military bases. Just like when a U.S. 

aircraft carrier enters Hong Kong, it is only to carry out a resupply.106

Another article that argues for supply points that are temporary in nature 

appeared in January 2010, and quotes a supposed military expert who makes 

the analogy that China’s overseas supply bases should not be permanent military bases, but rather should be temporary in nature—akin to “renting a house” 

for a longer period of time.107 All of these articles state that the reason for overseas bases is to make logistics and supply support more efficient and affordable.

Conclusions

The existence of these various, persisting debates in Chinese open source 

writings over the past 20 years concerning fundamental aspects of maritime 

security reflects China’s lack of a coordinated maritime security strategy. Of 

the five themes presented in this paper, only the importance of building sea 

consciousness does not appear to be under debate. The level of debate on the 

other issues we identified varied from slight differences of opinion (operational range of the PLAN), to hotly contested disagreement (meaning of sea power, 

the role of the PLAN, as well as other actors and processes). In other words, the 

importance of the sea to China is not contentious. Rather, how to coordinate 

Chinese economic, diplomatic, military, and political strategies to adequately 

account for the importance of the sea is much more controversial.

Second, the large and increasing number of articles and books focused 

on the topic of China’s maritime security strategy over the past 20 years suggests 

that China is working to create a coordinated maritime security strategy. The 

sample of articles and books exploited for this paper included Chinese security analysts representing a broad spectrum of society. It included not only PLA 

and PLAN officers, but also military-affiliated civilians, former government 

officials, and civilian academics from prestigious universities and government 

think tanks. These authors have written articles published in a wide variety 

of sources, including credible civilian, party-affiliated, and military journals. The substantial variance among the authors’ views on maritime security 

strategy suggests that this may be an officially sanctioned debate intended to 

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help create a comprehensive maritime strategy. If the Chinese government 

had already implemented a maritime security strategy, it is unlikely that such 

debates would exist in public media.108

Third, based on an analysis of these debates, we may identify certain trends 

that are likely to emerge as components of a future Chinese maritime strategy:

(1) As the Chinese economy becomes increasingly dependent upon 

maritime resources, as well as overseas trade and energy, its security 

strategy will increasingly focus in the maritime direction. Safeguarding these maritime interests requires developing China’s maritime 

capabilities, including economic, military, diplomatic, scientific, and 

cultural capabilities.

(2) Closely related to the first trend, the PLAN’s operational range is 

likely to expand in the near future. Although Chinese debates on 

this issue vary widely, almost all authors advocated expanding the 

operational range of the PLAN to adapt to China’s increasing need for 

maritime access and security. Signs of this are already occurring, as 

evidenced by the growing frequency of PLAN out-of-area operations.109

(3) Any future maritime security strategy that China creates will likely 

be comprehensive in nature. Although the PLAN will probably play 

a large role, it will not be the only actor. Other actors, such as a maritime police force, or processes, such as international cooperation forums, will also be key components. A strengthened PLAN will likely exist as a means of last resort in contentious international situations when peaceful means have failed to protect Chinese sovereignty, security, and maritime rights and interests. China’s frequent use of 

non-PLAN maritime security forces, such as its China Maritime Surveillance forces, in recent maritime disputes confirms this point.110

Finally, from the Chinese writings on maritime security sampled here, 

it is clear that most Chinese security analysts concerned with maritime affairs 

are looking beyond the Taiwan issue. Although mention of using the PLAN 

to safeguard territorial integrity (i.e., Taiwan) appeared throughout the timeline of articles surveyed, not all articles focused on or even discussed this 

issue. Other issues, such as defending China’s maritime rights and interests 

and safeguarding overseas economic interests, also frequently appeared in the 

writings. Surprisingly, the need to defend maritime rights and interests was 

actually mentioned more often than territorial integrity as the main reason 

for strengthening the PLAN and defining a coordinated maritime strategy. 

This demonstrates that although reunification with Taiwan remains an 

important issue, other drivers of PLAN modernization also exist; even if the 

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current cross-strait disagreement was resolved, the PLAN would likely remain 

on the same fast-paced developmental trajectory.

In conclusion, it is important to continue following Chinese writings on 

this subject to better understand the methods and objectives of China’s future 

maritime security strategy. Following the evolving Chinese debates on maritime strategy will allow foreign observers to anticipate any changes to China’s 

maritime security strategy prior to their inception, and will enable those 

nations most affected by China’s evolving maritime security strategy to respond 

accordingly.

Notes

1At the time of writing, both authors were China Analysts at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) 

China Studies, and can be reached at: daniel.hartnett@gmail.com and vellucf@cna.org. The views expressed 

in this paper are solely those of the authors, and do not constitute the views or opinions of the Center for 

Naval Analyses, or any other groups with which the authors are affiliated. 

2Central Intelligence Agency, “China,” The World Factbook, available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>.

3 “China container shipping industry annual growth seen at 10 pct – researcher,” AFX News Limited, Forbes Online, April 24, 2006, available at <http://www.forbes.com/markets/feeds/afx/2006/04/25/

afx2693887.html>. World Shipping Council, “Trade Statistics,” 2009, available at <http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/global-trade/trade-statistics>. The 42 percent includes containers traversing 

the port of Hong Kong as well.

4Central Intelligence Agency, “China.”

5 The research for this paper focused exclusively on Chinese-language materials that addressed the 

issue of Chinese maritime strategy, including books, journals, and news articles written by both civilian and 

military authors. In this paper, we surveyed 21 articles and one book published by civilian professors and 

commentators, and 39 articles and three books published by military personnel, primarily professors who 

teach at the PLA’s military academies. 

6 For a discussion of the value of Chinese open source writings for illuminating official policies, see 

David Finkelstein, “Thinking about the PLA’s ‘Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs,’” in James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein, eds., China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs, CNA Publications Online (November 2005), 21, 

available at <http://www.cna.org/documents/DoctrineBook.pdf>.

7 For example, see Kong Li, “Mahan yi Xiandai Haijun de Fazhan” [Mahan and the Development of 

a Modern Navy], Guofang, no. 6 (1995), 6; Liu Yongtao, “Mahan ji qi ‘Haiquan’ Lilun” [Mahan and His ‘Sea 

Power’ Theory], Fudan Xuebao, no. 4 (1996), 69–73; Du Mingcai, “Mahan ‘Haishang Shili Lilun’ Jianshu” [A 

Simple Narration of Mahan’s ‘Maritime Power Theory’], Junshi Lishi, no. 6 (1998), 36, 40.

8 The term “Command of the Sea” (Zhihaiquan, 制海权) is often translated into English as “sea 

control,” “sea superiority,” “sea dominance,” or “maritime superiority.” However, this paper will use the term 

“command of the sea” as this is how both the official PLA Encyclopedia and the PLA Navy Dictionary translate this term. 

9 “Territorial waters” are defined by Chinese and international law as extending 12 nautical miles 

(nm) out to sea from the coastal baseline. The “contiguous zone” extends an additional 12 nm out to sea from 

the end point of “territorial waters.” Source: “Maritime Zones and Maritime Delimitation,” United Nations 

Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, available at <http://www.un.org/DEPTS/los>.

10 Niu Baocheng, “Cong Haiquan dao Junshi Haiquan” [From Sea Power to Military Sea Power], 

Dangdai Haijun, vol. S-1 (December 2000), 32.

11 Liu Xinhua, “Shilun Zhongguo Fazhan Haiquan de Zhanlue” [Dealing with the Development of 

China’s Sea Power Strategy], Fudan Xuebao, no. 6 (2001), 69. 

12 Lu Rude, “Zai Da Zhanlue zhong gei Zhongguo Haiquan Dingwei” [Defining Sea Power in 

China’s Grand Strategy], Renmin Haijun, June 6, 2007, 4.

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13 Zhang Wenmu, “Jingji Quanqiuhua yu Zhongguo Haiquan” [Economic Globalization and Chinese Sea Power], Zhanlue yu Guanli, no. 1 (2003), 92–100. According to one author, the confusion between 

the terms “sea power” and “command of the sea” in Chinese writings has been present for some time, and 

could negatively affect China’s maritime security and sea power in the long run. For more on this see Liu 

Xinhua, “Shilun Zhongguo Fazhan Haiquan de Zhanlue” [Dealing with the Development of China’s Sea 

Power Strategy], Fudan Xuebao, no. 6 (2001), 69.

14Ye Zicheng and Mu Xinhai, “Dui Zhongguo Haiquan Fazhan Zhanlue de ji dian Sikao” [Some Reflections on China’s Sea Power Development Strategy], Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu 97, no. 3 (2005), 5.

15 Liu Zhongmin, “‘Haiquan’ yu ‘Haiyang Quanyi’” [“Sea Power” and “Maritime Rights and Interests”], Zhongguo Haiyang Wang, April 16, 2008, available at <http://www.lrn.cn/science/seaknowledge/200804/t20080416_220158.htm>.

16 Ibid., 9–12.

17 Lu Rude, “Da Zhanlue.”

18 Ge Dongsheng, ed., Guojia Anquan Zhanlue Lun [Theory of National Security Strategy] (Beijing: 

Military Science Publishing, 2006), 225. This book was written by the War Theories and Strategic Studies 

Department of the Academy of Military Science, thus increasing its authoritativeness. 

19 Ibid.

20 Zhang Wenmu, 96.

21 Niu Baocheng. 

22Yao Wenhuai, “Jianshe Qiangda Haijun, Weihu Woguo Haiyang Zhanlue Liyi” [Build a Powerful 

Navy, Defend China’s Maritime Strategic Interests], Guofang, no. 7 (2007), 1–2.

23Yang Huaiqing, “Zhidao Renmin Haijun Jianshe de Qiangda Sixiang Wuqi” [The Great Ideological Weapon Guiding Construction of the People’s Navy], Qiushi, no. 15 (August 2000), 26. Lu Rude, “Da 

Zhanlue.”

24 Zhang Huayun, “Jinglue Haiyang—Kouxiang Da Zhanlue zhi Men” [Strategic Uses of the Sea—

Knocking on the Door of a Grand Strategy], Dangdai Haijun (May 2007), 19.

25Ye Zicheng and Mu Xinhai, 5. Ye Zicheng, “Zhongguo Haiquan xu Congshu yu Luquan” [China’s Sea Power Must Be Subordinate to Its Land Power], Guoji Xianqu Daobao, March 2, 2007, available at 

<http://news.phoenixtv.com/mil/4/200703/0302_342_82091.shtml>.

26Xu Qiyu, “Haiquan de Wuqu yu Fansi” [Long-standing Mistaken Ideas and Rethinking on Sea 

Power], Zhanlue yu Guanli, no. 5 (2001), 16.

27 Lu Rude, “Da Zhanlue.”

28 Gao Xinsheng, “Zhongguo Guofang Fazhan Mianlin de Zhuyao Tiaozhan yu Zhance” [Main Challenges and Countermeasures Facing China’s Maritime Defense Development], Guofang, no. 11 (2005), 63.

29 Liu Xinhua and Qin Yi, “Zhongguo de Shiyou Anquan ji qi Zhanlue Xuanze” [China’s Oil Security 

and Its Strategic Choices], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, no. 12 (2003), 39. This journal is published by the Ministry of State Security’s think tank, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). See also 

Zhang Dengyi, “Guanhao Yonghao Haiyang, Jianshe Haiyang Qiangguo” [Manage and Use the Ocean Wisely, 

Establish a Strong Maritime Nation], Qiushi, no. 11 (2001), 46; and Hou Songling and Chi Dianting, “Zhongguo Zhoubian Haiyu de Zhanlue Diwei he Diyuan Zhanlue Jiazhi Chutan” [Preliminary Explorations on the 

Strategic Position and Geostrategic Value of China’s Peripheral Sea Area], Dangdai Yatai, no. 10 (2003), 47.

30 Ge Dongsheng, 223.

31 Ibid., 363.

32 Liu Shuiming and Chen Lu, “Haiyang Yishi yu Haifang Jianshe” [Sea Consciousness and Maritime 

Defense Construction], Nanjing Zhengzhi Xueyuan Xuebao, no. 1 (2005), 84.

33 Ge Dongsheng, 223.

34 Feng Liang and Zhang Xiaolin, “Lun Heping Shiqi Haijun de Zhanlue Yunyong” [A Discussion of 

the Navy’s Strategic Use in Peacetime], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, no. 3 (2001), 78.

35 Hou Songling and Chi Dianting, 47.

36 Liu Yijian, “Zhongguo Weilai de Haijun Jianshe yu Haijun Zhanlue” [The Future of China’s Naval 

Development and Naval Strategy], Zhanlue yu Guanli, no. 5 (May 1999), 98.

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106 HARTNETT AND VELLUCCI

37 Ge Dongsheng, 223. See Appendix II for a map of the island chains.

38 Da Wei, 363.

39 Zhang Wenmu, 96.

40 Lang Dangyang and Liu Fenliang, “Hailu zhi Zheng de Lishi Jianshi” [Historical Exploration into 

the Land-Sea Dispute], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, no. 1 (2007), 46.

41 He Jiacheng, Zou Lao, and Lai Zhijun, “Guoji Junshi Anquan Xingshi ji Woguo de Guofang Jingji 

Fazhan Zhanlue” [The International Military Situation and China’s Strategy of National Defense Economic 

Development], Junshi Jingji Yanjiu, no. 1 (2005), 12.

42 Liu Xinhua and Qin Yi, “Zhongguo de Shiyou,” 39.

43 Da Wei, “Zhongguo de Haiyang Anquan Zhanlue” [China’s Maritime Security Strategy], in Yang 

Mingjie, ed., Haishang Jiaodao Anquan yu Guoji Hezuo (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2005), 365. This book 

is the result of a conference sponsored by the Ministry of State Security think tank, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR).

44 Zhang Wenmu, 96.

45Xu Lifan, “San da Xianshi Tiaozhan Yaoqiu Zhongguo cong Haiyang Daguo Chengwei Haiyang 

Daguo” [Three Big, Actual Challenges That Require China to Go from a Great Maritime Nation to a Strong 

Maritime Nation], Huaxia Shibao (July 12, 2005).

46Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660–1783 (Charleston, SC: Bibliobazaar, 2007), 101.

47 Jiao Yongke, “Hongyang Haiyang Wenhua, Fazhan Haiyang Jingji” [Enhance Maritime Culture, 

Develop the Maritime Economy], Zhongguo Haiyangbao, no. 1407 (unknown date), available at <http://

www.soa.gov.cn/zhanlue/14073a.htm>.

48Yin Dunping, “Shuli Xiandai Haiyang Guotu Yishi” [Establish a Modern Sea Territory Consciousness], Zhenggong Xuekan, no. 2 (1994), 10.

49 Luo Xianlin, “Haiyang Yishi: yi ge bu Neng Huibi de Huati” [Sea Consciousness: A Subject That 

Cannot Be Avoided], Dangdai Haijun, no. 5 (1994), 14.

50 Jiao Yongke.

51 Tao Shelan, “Zhuanjia: Zhongguo Jundui Poqie Xuyao Cengqiang Weihu Haishang Anquan de 

Nengli” [Expert: Chinese Military Urgently Needs to Improve Its Ability to Safeguard Maritime Security], 

Xinwenshe, online (January 11, 2007), available at <http://www.heb.chinanews.com.cn/news/gnzx/2007-01-

12/13242.shmtl>. 

52 Zhang Dengyi, 48.

53Wen Yufu, “Bie Rang Shili Paiming Chonghun Tounao” [Avoid Getting Carried Away by Rank in 

Terms of Real Strength], Guofang Bao (April 23, 2009), 3.

54Wu Xiangshu and Wang Shengrong, “Haiyang, Haiyangguan, Haiyang Changcheng: Guojia Haiyangju Yuanjuzhang Luo Yuru Fangtanlu” [The Sea, Sea Concept, and the Great Wall at Sea: An Interview 

with Former State Maritime Bureau Director Luo Yuru], Guofang, no. 10 (1995), 4. According to the article, Luo Yuru has served as the deputy director of the PLAN Military Training Department, director of the 

PLAN Military Academy Department, and director of the State Council’s State Oceanic Bureau.

55 Liu Shuiming and Chen Lu, 81.

56 Gao Xinsheng, 63.

57Wu Xiangshu and Wang Shengrong, 6.

58 Ibid.

59 Liu Zhenhuan, “Guanyu ‘Lianheguo Haiyangfa Gongyue’ yu Zhongguo Xinshiqi Haifang Jianshe 

de Sikao” [On the UN Law of the Sea and Thoughts on China’s New-Age Coastal Defense Establishment], 

Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, no. 2 (1997), 98.

60 Liu Yijian, 96.

61 Feng Liang and Zhang Xiaolin, 78.

62 Gu Zuhua, “Weihu Haishang Shiyou Anquan Xuyou Qiangda Haishang Biandui” [Protecting 

Maritime Oil Security Must Have a Strong Maritime Formation], Dangdai Haijun, no. 8 (2004), 49.

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63 Lu Rude, “Cong Guoji Hayangfa Tan Xin de Guotu Guannian” [Discussing a New Concept of Territory from the International Law of the Sea], Zhongguo Ruankexue, no. 9 (1996), 22. 

64 Zheng Hong, “Dazao Zhongguo Qiangda Haijun” [Forge a Powerful Chinese Navy], Liaowang 

Xinwen Zhoukan (July 26, 2004), 35.

65 Da Wei, 365.

66 Ge Dongsheng, 224.

67Ye Zicheng and Mu Xinhai, 16.

68 Zhang Dengyi, 48. Lu Rude, “Da Zhanlue.” Xiu Bin, “Zhongguo ‘Heping Fazhan’ Zhanlue Shiye xia de Haiyang Quanyi Weihu” [Safeguarding Maritime Rights and Interests under the Field of Vision of 

China’s ‘Peaceful Development’ Strategy], Zhongguo Haiyang Daxue Xuebao, no. 1 (2007), 1–5.

69 Liu Xinhua and Qin Yi, “Zhongguo de Shiyou Anquan ji qi Zhanlue Xuanze” [China’s Oil Security and Its Strategic Choices], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, no. 12 (2002), 39; Ye Zicheng and Mu Xinhai, 16; Da 

Wei, 372. Gao Xinsheng, 63; Wang Bo, “Haiyang Zhoubian: Jinnian Pin Chushi” [Regional Seas: Frequent 

Trouble This Year], Shijie Zhishi (December 1, 2009), 4–25.

70Wu Xiangshun and Wang Shengrong.

71 Zhang Dengyi, 46–48.

72Xiu Bin, 4.

73 Ibid.

74 Lu Rude, “Guoji Haiyangfa,” 21.

75 Feng Liang and Zhang Xiaolin, 83.

76 Gao Xinsheng, 62–63.

77 Feng Liang and Zhang Xiaolin, 83.

78 Gao Xinsheng, 62–63.

79 See variously: Liu Xinhua and Qin Yi, “Shiyou Anquan,” 39; Feng Liang and Zhang Xiaolin, 81. 

Gu Zuhua, 49.

80 Gu Zuhua, 49.

81 He Jiacheng et al., 10–14.

82 Ibid., 13. Significantly, the PLAN conducted its first search and rescue (SAREX) exercise with a 

foreign navy (Pakistan) in 2003. 

83Ye Zicheng and Mu Xinhai, 5–17.

84Wang Bo, 25.

85 Ni Lexiong, “Haiquan yu Zhongguo de Fazhan” [Sea Power and China’s Development], in Guo 

Shuyong, ed., Zhanlve Yanjin Lu [Lectures on Strategy] (Peking: Peking University Press, 2005), 115.

86 Liu Shuiming and Chen Lu, 81–84.

87Ye Zicheng and Mu Xinhai, 5–17.

88 See variously: Lu Rude, “Guoji Haiyangfa,” 19–22. Liu Zhenhuan, 51–54; Lu Rude, “Shuli Haiyang 

Zhanlue Yishi Jianshe Haishang Jingji Qiangguo,” Zhongguo Ruan Kexue, no. 4 (1997), 13–17; Niu Baocheng, 

32–33; Yang Huaiqing, 26–29; Liu Shuiming and Chen Lu, 81–84; Gao Xinsheng, 62–63.

89Wu Xiangshun and Wang Shengrong, 4–6.

90 Niu Baocheng, 33.

91 Liu Yijian, “Weilai de Haijun,” 96.

92 Liu Xinhua, “Shilun Zhongguo Fazhan,” 71.

93 Liu Yijian, 96–100.

94 Ibid., 97.

95 Liu Yijian, 100. Significantly, the time-frame of this 1999 strategy corresponds exactly with the 

PLA’s overall “three step development strategy” outlined in China’s 2006 defense white paper, China’s National Defense in 2006. According to that report, “China pursues a three-step development strategy in modernizing its national defense and armed forces, in accordance with the state’s overall plan to realize modernization. 

The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the 

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third is to basically reach the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces and being capable of 

winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century.” China’s National Defense 2006, Section 2, available at 

<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/whitepaper/defense2006/defense2006.html>.

96 Ge Dongsheng, 227–228.

97Tang Fuquan and Han Yi, “Renmin Haijun Yanzhe Dang Zhiyin de Hangxiang Polang Qianjin” 

[The People’s Navy Sails Forward Along the Course Set by the Party], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, no. 4 (2009), 19.

98 Huo Xiaoyong, ed., Junzhong Zhanlue Xue [The Science of Service Strategy] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006), 242.

99 Zhang Wenmu, 90–91. See also Xu Lifan, 2005.

100 Ibid., 91.

101 Feng Liang and Zhang Xiaolin, 77–84. Ge Dongsheng, 227. 

102 On December 26, 2008, Beijing dispatched a three-ship task force to the Gulf of Aden to conduct escort patrols as part of an international effort to combat piracy in the region. As of this writing, China 

continues this exercise, and is on its eighth rotation. For an excellent analysis of Chinese views on the need 

for some sort of overseas infrastructure to support deployed naval forces, see Daniel Kostecka, “Places and 

Bases: The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean,” Naval War College Review 64, 

no. 1 (Winter 2011).

103 Dai Xu, “Zhongguo Ying Jianli Yuan Yang Jidi” [China Should Establish Far Sea Bases], Huanqiu 

Shibao (February 3, 2009), 11.

104 Sun Li, “Haijun Zhuanjia Yin Zhuo: Zhongguo Haijun Ke Tanguo Jianli Changqi Anji Buji Jidi” 

[Navy Expert Yin Zhuo: The Chinese Navy Can Explore Establishing Long-term Coastal-based Supply Bases], Zhongguo Wang (December 26, 2009), available at <http://www.cri.cn>.

105 Zhang Haizhou, “China Rules out Overseas Naval Base Now,” China Daily (January 1, 2010), 

available at <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-01/01/content_9254142.htm>.

106 Zhai Xuan, “Haijun Zhuanjia Yin Zhuo: Zhongguo bu Hui Zai Haiwai Jian Junshi Jidi” [Navy Expert Yin Zhuo: China Cannot Establish Overseas Military Bases], Chinagate.com (March 4, 2010), available 

at <http://cn.chinagate.cn/society/2010-03/04/content_19518948.htm>.

107Yu Zhong, “Zhongguo Haijun Haiwai Bujidian Jian Zai Na?” [Where to Set up Chinese Overseas 

Supply Points?], Guoji Xianqu Daobao (January 8, 2010), 8.

108 See, for example, the calls for the creation of a national maritime security strategy during the 2011 

National People’s Congress. Russell Hsiao, “Military Delegates Call for National Maritime Strategy to Protect 

Expanding Interests,” China Brief 11, no. 4 (March 10, 2011).

109 See for example, Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici with Isaac Kardon and Joshua Wiseman, 

China’s Out of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles, and Potential Solutions, China 

Strategic Perspectives 3 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, December 2010).

110 BBC, “China Boosts Maritime Surveillance Fleet Amid Disputes,” October 28, 2010, available at 

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11646489>; and Lyle J. Goldstein, “Five Dragons Stirring 

Up the Sea: Challenges and Opportunities in China’s Improving Maritime Enforcement Capabilities,” China 

Maritime Study 5 (April 2010).

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 109

Chapter 5

The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and 

Capabilities: From “Near Coast” and “Near 

Seas” to “Far Seas”1

Nan Li

How have China’s naval strategy (haijun zhanlue, 海军战略) and capabilities evolved over time? What factors drive this evolution? What are 

the major implications for future Chinese naval development? Answering 

these questions is important mainly because such answers have important 

implications for Asian security. This essay addresses these research questions in 

order to offer empirical insights to scholars, military planners, and strategists. 

Empirically, scholarly literature on the People’s Liberation Army Navy 

(PLAN) illuminates significantly the dynamics of China’s naval modernization. 

It addresses issues such as how change in China’s overall military strategy has 

affected the PLAN, particularly in terms of a new emphasis on local war, on 

offense, and on technical expertise over politics;2

 whether and when the PLAN 

will acquire an aircraft carrier;3

 how mature the PLAN is; and what strategic 

dilemmas Washington might encounter as a result of China’s modernizing 

submarine force.4

 It also offers detailed accounts of the historical, geostrategic, 

and economic contexts underlying China’s maritime and naval development, 

and the PLAN’s organization, hardware, and personnel.5

 Because these studies 

have specific analytical emphases, they are relatively unconcerned with a diachronic comparison of China’s naval strategy and capabilities over time, or with 

issues such as what has changed in China’s naval strategy and capabilities over 

time, and what drives these changes. This study provides a systematic answer 

to these questions, and thereby fills a significant void in the existing literature.

This study first shows that China’s naval strategy has undergone two 

major changes: from the “near-coast defense” (jin’an fangyu, 近岸防御) strategy 

prior to the mid-1980s to the “near-seas active defense” (jinhai jiji fangyu, 近

海积极防御) after the mid-1980s, and then to the advancement of a “far-seas 

operations” (yuanhai zuozhan, 远海作战) strategy by the mid-2000s.6

 Related 

to the evolution of the naval strategy is the change in naval capabilities: from 

limited capabilities for coastal defense to more expansive capabilities to 

This chapter was originally published as an article of the same title in Asian Security 5, no. 2 (2009), 144–169. 

Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. Used by permission.

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operate more effectively in China’s near seas by the late 2000s. The new strategy 

of “far-seas operations” endorsed since the mid-2000s may have major implications for the future development of PLAN capabilities.

Second, this study argues that changes in naval strategy and capabilities 

cannot be accounted for by just one variable or factor, but rather by a combination of major or more important variables or factors. These include the role 

of naval leadership and personal experience, endorsement by the civilian leadership, changing perception of the external security environment, availability of funding and technologies, and institutionalization of naval research. A 

related point is that while a major change in naval capabilities may be related 

to a change in naval strategy, sometimes it may be driven more by other highly 

contingent or idiosyncratic reasons.

This study employs an approach of what Arend Lijphart calls “diachronic 

comparison”: identifying changes/differences over time in a single country, 

and attempting to explain these changes/differences. An ideal approach to 

explanation is, first, to concentrate on major or more important variables, 

and second, to control for all other variables, or to establish the condition of 

“other things being equal,” similar, or constant. This is because such a control 

increases the confidence level that a particular change/difference is caused by a 

particular variable or factor that the researcher has hypothesized, but not by 

others.7

 But what is closer to reality, particularly for social sciences, is that a 

particular change/difference may not be caused by a change in one variable, but 

by changes in a few major and more important variables. As a result, a more 

realistic and reasonable approach to an explanation is a multivariable explanation based on “necessary and sufficient” conditions, which this study employs. 

An endorsement of a change by the naval leadership in naval strategy, for 

instance, is necessary but not sufficient to cause a change in naval capabilities. 

For such a change to take place, other things also need to take place: civilian 

leadership needs to endorse the new strategy, naval analysts need to articulate 

and socialize the new strategy, and money and technologies need to become 

available. Indeed, this second approach can explain why a particular change 

takes place at a particular time and place but not others. 

The study has four sections. The first discusses the “near-coast defense” 

strategy and related capabilities. The second examines the “near-seas active defense” strategy and related capabilities, and answers the question of what drove 

the shift from near-coast defense to near-seas active defense. The third section 

discusses the advancement of the “far-seas operations” strategy and addresses 

the question of what accounted for this new development. The concluding 

section discusses major implications of the findings.

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 EVOLUTION OF STRATEGY: FROM “NEAR COAST” TO “FAR SEAS” 111

Near-Coast Defense

Any conceptualization of military strategy should address two issues: 

the nature of military operations in terms of defense and offense and the geographic bounds of such operations. By these criteria, the concept of near-coast 

defense reflects accurately the People’s Republic of China’s naval strategy from 

the time of its founding in 1949 to the 1980s.

Near-Coast Defense Strategy

The near-coast defense strategy refers to the defense of up to a dozen or 

so nautical miles (nms) of waters that extend seaward from China’s coastline 

and the land territory of about 300 kilometers (kms) that stretches inland from 

the coastline, a region where China’s politically and economically important 

cities are located. Because China’s coastline is arguably as long as 18,000 kms 

and it is difficult to establish effective control of such a long and narrow span 

at all times, naval defense was largely focused on particular straits and waterways of strategic importance, or those that could be exploited by the enemy to 

invade China by sea to conquer strategically important land targets. These include the Strait of Bohai, which is the maritime gateway to Tianjin and Beijing 

and concerns the security of China’s north coast; the Strait of Taiwan, which 

relates to the security of China’s east coast, the reunification of Taiwan with the 

mainland, and the security of sea lines of communications (SLOCs) around the 

island; and the Strait of Qiongzhou, which is central to securing Hainan Island 

and China’s south coast. The deployment of the three PLAN fleets, namely the 

North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet, correlates well with the 

defense of the three straits and the adjacent seas. 

During the 1950s and 1960s, the central concern of the People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA) was small-scale incursions of the coastline by the 

Taiwan-based Kuomintang (KMT) forces, which were usually suspected as 

preparations for major offensives to recapture the mainland. To repel such 

incursions, the PLA relied on ground coastal defense forces more than on 

the PLAN. Occasionally, however, the PLAN did play a more important and 

offensive role, particularly in amphibious-landing operations to capture inshore 

islands controlled by the KMT forces.8

By the late 1960s, however, China’s relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated to the level where both sides engaged in armed skirmishes on their 

common border. As a result, guided by Mao Zedong’s notion of “people’s war,” 

the PLA began to shift its defense emphasis from the east and the south to 

preparing against a massive Soviet invasion of China from the north. Faced 

with a technologically superior opponent such as the Soviet Union, the PLA 

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would compensate for its technological inferiority with its abundance in 

space, manpower, and time. The vast, familiar territory of China, coupled 

with a protracted, manpower-intensive people’s war of dispersion, mobility, 

harassment, and attrition, would gain China sufficient time. This would allow 

China to gradually weaken the overextended invading forces, identify their 

vulnerabilities, reconstitute resistance forces, and finally win the war through 

decisive, strategic offensives. Such a strategy of “luring the enemy in deep,” 

however, would render the PLAN almost irrelevant because, in such a scheme, 

coastal defense became virtually unnecessary.

By the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping became the paramount leader, 

however, the notion of people’s war was replaced by “people’s war under modern 

conditions,” in which naval operations were deemed necessary, but still largely 

supportive to land operations. A major war with the Soviet Union would be 

continental in nature and primarily fought by the land forces. But because 

China has a long coastline where important strategic assets are located, it 

constitutes the maritime flank of China’s landmass, which is strategically 

important but also exposed and vulnerable. As a result, for the purpose of 

accelerating a land offensive or averting a negative strategic posture, the 

invading Soviet forces might foreseeably launch an offensive on the maritime 

flank through amphibious-landing operations to capture straits, islands, and 

strategic assets. This could serve the purpose of creating a posture of “advancing 

on both land and sea” and “two-pronged assault from both south and north.”9

To deal with such an offensive from the sea, the PLAN would assist 

the land-based defense by providing counter-amphibious-landing operations 

to thwart the invading forces from driving straight inland. The PLAN was 

also responsible for defending naval bases, harbors, and coastal airfields to 

prevent the enemy from paralyzing the PLA defense with one stroke. Finally, 

because Soviet offensive operations would consume a large amount of materiel 

and the enemy forces would be far away from their homeland, the Soviets 

would be dependent on vulnerable merchant ships for resupply. So the PLAN 

would launch ambush and sabotage operations against the enemy’s merchant 

supply vessels as they approached the Chinese littoral, thus weakening the 

enemy’s land-war effort.10

Specifically, counter-amphibious-landing operations constituted the 

PLAN’s central task during this period and such operations would give full 

play to the PLAN’s relative advantages and the invading forces’ moments of 

vulnerability. Numerous islands, for instance, spread over China’s coastal waters. Because of the coastline’s geographical complexity, it offers many natural 

bays, harbors, berth places, and caves for accommodating and constructing 

naval, air, artillery, missile, and forward observation facilities, and these 

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offer the PLAN comparative advantages in concealment, maneuverability, 

coordination, and detection. Also, the PLAN ships had smaller profiles, were 

more agile and faster, were more numerous in number and kind than the 

Soviet ships, and carried some weapons (such as missiles and torpedoes) that 

were quite powerful. They also operated within the range of land-based intelligence and firepower support. These factors made it possible for an effective 

concealment followed by surprise attacks of multiple directions and means.11

In tactical terms, the first issue to be addressed in counter-amphibiouslanding operations was how to survive the first wave of enemy strikes. Because 

“the enemy is on the offensive and has the technological superiority,” the first 

phase of such operations was to “hide,” i.e., “to preserve our strength through 

concealing and dispersing ships, and transferring planes to the second-line 

bases. This is accompanied by organizing electronic interference and air defense 

operations to reduce the damage and increase the difficulties of the enemy 

offensive.” The purpose of self-preservation, however, was to strike back, “otherwise, self-preservation serves little purpose or becomes increasingly difficult.”12

For strikes, naval and air strike zones would be established “within 

the coastal waters of several dozen kms” to exploit the advantages of concealment and land-based firepower support. Also, strike groups consisting of 

missile, torpedo, and gun boats capable of attacks from multiple routes would 

be organized, and would be supported by torpedo bombers if possible. Strikes 

would be launched when the enemy landing force switches ships, removes 

obstacles, and organizes into columns to drive to shore. These were the enemy’s 

moments of vulnerability mainly because the formation would become denser, the maneuver more restricted, and the communications and coordination 

more confused. Also “sinking one enemy ship at these moments is equivalent 

to wiping out one enemy company or battalion later.” Another method was to 

combine barriers, including mines and engineered obstacles, with firepower 

to prevent the enemy from removing obstacles and from driving to shore.13

To put this strategy in practice, the PLAN had planned a major counteramphibious-landing exercise for 1984, and various drills had been conducted 

during 1983, involving primarily the North Sea Fleet and elements from the 

East Sea Fleet. The exercise, however, was apparently cancelled partly because 

of a major submarine accident.14 

Generally speaking, the central objectives of near-coast defense during 

this period were concerned with ensuring national survival in a major war with 

the Soviet Union, but not with capturing lost or disputed territories, or with securing maritime resources and SLOCs for shipping traded goods and imported oil. It was also a purely defensive strategy, even though it involved guerrilla 

warfare–type attacks of the enemy forces by smaller ships and boats. Compared 

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to those of the Soviet Navy, the ships of the PLAN were too small and vulnerable and ill-equipped in early warning, communications, and firepower. 

Most of them had only a singular role, and suffered from a limited radius of 

operations and poor sustainability. As a result, the success or failure of the 

near-coast defense strategy was highly dependent on land-based intelligence 

and firepower support and particularly on whether the land war would succeed. Faced with a much more powerful enemy such as the Soviet Navy, the 

PLAN even had major difficulties in establishing local and temporary coastal 

sea denial, not to mention that it was completely unable to develop some level of 

“sea control” (zhihaiquan, 制海权) in these waters. With few exceptions, all the 

fighting methods seem to have amounted merely to delaying tactics.15

Naval Capabilities

In keeping with their role in a naval strategy of near-coast defense, the 

PLAN fleets in the 1950s and 1960s consisted mainly of such ships as minesweepers and torpedo, gun, and missile boats, supplemented by a few Sovietmade light destroyers and frigates and land-based, short-range naval bombers. 

The PLAN also had a fleet of Soviet-designed, conventional-powered Romeoclass (Type 033) submarines (SS).16 The surface ships were relatively small and 

had a limited radius of operations and therefore low sustainability. The surface 

ships had singular roles and were weak in early warning, command and control, 

communications, and protection. As a result, they were vulnerable to sea and air 

attacks, and were highly dependent on land-based intelligence, command and 

control, and air cover for operations. In comparison, the PLAN submarine force 

was more capable of operating in areas farther away from home waters. This 

is because these submarines were larger and more sustainable,17 and they were 

more concealed. But they were poor in communications and as a result incapable of operating in groups. They were also noisy and had to resurface regularly 

to recharge batteries. Because of these shortcomings, the submarines were also 

quite vulnerable and largely confined to shallow coastal waters.

Since the early 1970s, however, a number of China’s first-generation 

Luda-class (Type 051) guided-missile destroyers (DDG) and Jianghu-class 

(Type 053) guided-missile frigates (FFG) were built and commissioned by the 

PLAN. China had also begun to deploy its small contingent of first-generation 

Han-class (Type 091) nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN). Because they 

were larger, had better endurance, and therefore could operate farther away 

from home waters, these surface and underwater combatants changed the composition of the PLAN to some degree.18 But the long range and high speed of 

the surface combatants were hampered by the lack of effective air-defense and 

antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Neither did they have a combat 

direction system (CDS) to integrate the on-board sensors with the weapons 

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 EVOLUTION OF STRATEGY: FROM “NEAR COAST” TO “FAR SEAS” 115

systems so that they could react quickly to incoming attacks. A few of these 

ships were later modified to incorporate surface-to-air missiles (SAM), ASW 

helicopters, better surveillance and fire-control radars, electronic warfare (EW) 

capabilities, CDSs, and more powerful antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs). But 

the newly installed HQ–7 SAM system has a maximum range of only 8–12 

kms and therefore is incapable of dealing with long-range air strikes, nor can it 

handle effectively attacks by sea-skimming ASCMs. Because it is a point-defense 

system, it cannot provide air defense for other ships. The nuclear submarines 

suffered from deficiencies such as radiation leakage, reliability problems, and 

inability to launch missiles while submerged. These shortcomings hampered 

their ability to operate effectively in far and deep oceans. 

What Drove the Change in Capabilities in the 1970s?

In spite of the just-mentioned inadequacies, changes in capability such 

as acquisition of DDGs and SSNs in the 1970s represent significant improvements in China’s naval capabilities and deserve an explanation. It is commonly assumed that change in military strategy and doctrine would drive 

change in military capabilities.19 But such an assumption may be inadequate to 

account for the change in PLAN capabilities in the 1970s. No major change 

in China’s naval strategy had taken place in the 1970s, while DDGs and SSNs 

had been acquired. These platforms may not have been optimized for coastal 

defense, mainly because they were too large and their ranges were too long. The 

motivations for having these platforms actually have less to do with naval 

strategy per se. The immediate reason for deploying the DDGs, for instance, 

was to provide escort, salvage, search and rescue, and supply for ships at 

China’s long-range rocket testing sites in the Pacific. These ships were there 

because they were involved in missions such as the retrieval of instrument 

packages from long-range ballistic missiles (LRBMs) and submarine-launched 

ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and measurement, tracking, telemetering and 

control, and recovery of satellites.20

The purpose of building nuclear submarines, on the other hand, was to 

overcome the two technological “bottlenecks” for constructing nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs): the propulsion technology and the 

technology to launch missiles from a submarine while submerged.21 Also, because of the economic hardship caused by the disastrous “Great Leap Forward” 

and withdrawal of Soviet aid, China had to terminate its nuclear submarine 

program in 1962. The program was revived in 1965 partly because Mao 

insisted that China “needs to build its own nuclear submarines even if it takes 

10,000 years.” To the extent that China’s nuclear submarines had not helped 

very much in overcoming the technological “bottlenecks” because the single 

Xia-class (Type 092) SSBN remained mostly inoperational, building nuclear 

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submarines may be understood as Mao’s project to construct the Chinese 

national identity. Indeed, in 1989, after China’s successful test of the JL-1 SLBM, 

Liu Huaqing, then vice chair of the Central Military Commission (CMC), 

stated, “As Comrade Deng Xiaoping has said, if we did not have atomic bombs, 

[strategic] missiles, [and] satellites, then we would not [enjoy] our present 

international status.”22

Near-Seas Active Defense

Beginning in the late 1970s, however, the near-coast defense strategy 

was gradually abandoned and a new naval strategy of near-seas active defense 

was adopted.

Change in Naval Strategy

As an official strategy, the new concept of near-seas active defense was 

first proposed by Deng Xiaoping when he met with those who attended an 

expanded conference of the PLAN’s Party Committee Standing Committee in 

July 1979.23 It was further fleshed out by Liu Huaqing in the following years, 

couched in the notion of “defend actively, operate in the near seas” (jiji fangyu, 

jinhai zuozhan, 积极防御, 近海作战).24 The concept was extensively socialized 

among the PLAN leadership as well as the PLA’s central institutions, which 

contributed to a general consensus reached implicitly by 1987 to treat the 

concept as China’s new naval strategy.25

In comparison to the near-coast defense strategy, the near-seas active 

defense strategy covers much larger sea areas and requires much more 

substantial naval capabilities. In such a strategy, for instance, the PLAN is 

regarded as a “strategic service,” which means that it would operate more 

independently and have its own geographical bounds of operations, a clear 

departure from the near-coast defense which regards the PLAN as a supportive 

service primarily for assisting land operations. For operational bounds and 

space, near-seas active defense is defined as covering 1) the first island chain, 

which stretches from the Kurile islands through the islands of Japan, Ryukyu 

Archipelago, Taiwan, the Philippines to Borneo Island (see figure 5–1); 2) the 

Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea, or the three near seas within 

the inner rims (neiyan, 内沿) of the first island chain, and 3) sea areas adjacent 

to the outer rims (waiyan, 外沿) of this island chain, and those of the north 

Pacific.26 “The scope to be defended in China’s sea defense strategy is ‘near seas’ 

but not ‘near coast.’” On the other hand, this concept “does not cover the south 

Pacific and the Indian Ocean.”27 Still, the geographical space defined as “near 

seas” is larger than the traditional understanding of the concept as covering the 

extension of 200 nautical miles seaward from China’s coastline.

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 EVOLUTION OF STRATEGY: FROM “NEAR COAST” TO “FAR SEAS” 117

Figure 5–1. China’s “Near Seas” and “Far Seas”

Australia

Source: Based on U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2010.

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Near-seas active defense aims to reunify Taiwan with the mainland, 

restore lost and disputed maritime territories, protect China’s maritime resources, secure major SLOCs in times of war, deter and defend against foreign 

aggression from the sea, and achieve strategic nuclear deterrence. In operational terms, near-seas active defense requires the PLAN to acquire the capabilities 

for capturing and maintaining sea control in the primary operational direction of the near seas within the required time; for establishing effective control 

of major SLOCs in the near seas within the necessary time; for operating 

effectively in the near seas; and for nuclear retaliation.28

After the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, however, the PLAN planners had 

largely focused their analytical attention on the issue of how to establish local 

and temporary sea-control for sea-crossing and amphibious-landing operations. 

To the PLAN strategists, the navy has several relative advantages in such operations. Because the PLAN is the offensive side, for instance, it has the initiative to launch surprise and concentrated attacks. It can also choose and control 

the direction, space, and pace of operations. Moreover, because the opponent 

has limited depth of defense, targets are relatively concentrated and therefore 

it is easier to inflict serious losses. Finally, the PLAN strategists believe that the 

PLA has relative superiority in campaign and tactical missiles and absolute 

superiority in offensive air and submarine capabilities. The specific objectives for the PLAN operations include 1) “destroying props,” or bases and logistics facilities that can sustain the opponent’s counter-sea-control operations; 

2) “crushing outposts” or hedges that can enable the opponent to strike back; 

3) “destroying main forces,” or the opponent’s main naval capabilities for counterattack; and 4) “controlling sea areas,” or maintaining the security of captured 

sea lanes for sea-crossing operations.29

To accomplish these objectives, several warfighting methods are specified. One is “blockade and isolation,” which involves the employment of 

water mines, submarines, and air capabilities to establish layered blockade 

of the opponent’s naval bases and harbors, sea lanes, and water areas. The 

purpose is to prevent the opponent’s ships from exiting bases and harbors in 

order to enhance the strike effect. The other is “joint strike,” which refers to 

the use of conventional missile, air, naval, and special operations capabilities 

to strike the opponent’s reconnaissance and early warning systems, command 

and control, naval and air bases, and logistics infrastructure, for the purpose of 

crippling the opponent’s capabilities to counter the PLAN’s sea-control operations. The third method is “suppression of outlaying islands,” which involves 

the use of coastal firepower, ground-attack aircraft, and light surface combatants to strike the defense systems of these islands. This serves the purpose of 

suppressing and reducing their role as the forward platforms for countering 

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 EVOLUTION OF STRATEGY: FROM “NEAR COAST” TO “FAR SEAS” 119

sea-control and amphibious-landing operations. The fourth method is “search 

and annihilation,” which involves the use of submarines, major surface combatants, and sea-attack aircraft to search and destroy the opponent’s major 

naval combatants outside the blocked areas, for the purpose of capturing and 

maintaining sea control. Such a method may involve flanking movements, 

deception, and inducement and compulsion to lure the opponent’s ships into 

the designated sea areas, thus creating favorable fighting opportunities. The 

final method is “comprehensive barrier removal,” which refers to employing 

various means to remove the threat of water mines to ensure the security and 

freedom of sea-crossing and amphibious-landing operations.30

Two more operational scenarios related to a Taiwan campaign have also 

been intensively analyzed: a naval blockade of the island, and fighting aircraft carrier battle groups. For a naval blockade, analytical attention has been 

focused on harmonizing the relationships between military objectives and 

political objectives, between naval operations and operations of the other 

services, between the offensive to impose a blockade and the defense against 

the opponent’s counter-blockade operations, between a protracted campaign 

of attrition and “quick battle and quick resolution,” and between abiding by 

international law and employing the law for blockade goals.31 Moreover, 

methods of blockade such as employing mines in early operations and 

conducting air-sea operations to fight the opponent’s air-sea counterblockade 

operations during the blockade are intensively explored.32 For fighting aircraft 

carrier battle groups, various fighting methods have been analyzed, including submarine warfare, electronic warfare, mine warfare, air operations, and 

air-submarine operations.33

The PLAN’s strategy of near-seas active defense appeared to be stuck in 

planning for a Taiwan campaign during the second half of the 1990s. In such 

a scenario, the PLAN has an offensive role to play, i.e., to capture and maintain local and temporary sea control for sea-crossing and amphibious-landing 

operations, or to impose a naval blockade. It also gains independent operational time and space, i.e., it dominates the sea-control operations phase of the 

overall campaign. On the other hand, while the Taiwan issue helps the PLAN 

planners to think more about the independent and offensive role of the navy 

and required capabilities, it also constrains and confines the PLAN to the 

littoral waters around the island. As a result, the hands of the PLAN are tied 

when it comes to conducting operations in blue-water seas beyond the 200 

nms from China’s coast, which was envisioned by Liu Huaqing in his original 

conception of the new naval strategy. Consequently, naval operations were still 

highly dependent on land for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR) and missile and air firepower support. No major surface combatants 

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capable of advanced ISR and command and control, area air-defense, and high 

sustainability were added to the PLAN fleets during the 1990s. Finally, no 

systematic thinking had been done on how to organize naval battle groups that 

can operate independently and effectively in the seas farther away from the 

home waters.

Change in Naval Capabilities

Associated with the new naval strategy of near-seas active defense, the 

PLAN had commissioned its second-generation Luhu-class (Type 052) and 

Luhai-class (Type 051B) DDGs since the mid-1990s. Second-generation Jiangwei-class (Types 055 and 057) FFGs had also begun to enter into service since 

the early 1990s. Moreover, since the early 1980s, the PLAN had begun to deploy a handful of Ming-class (Type 035) SSs, an improved variant of the Romeo. 

China’s single Xia-class SSBN, the sea component of China’s nuclear deterrence 

force, also became operational in the early 1980s.34 While these two types of 

platforms had less to do with introduction of the new naval strategy, they have 

nevertheless contributed to the PLAN operational capabilities in the near seas.

The two Luhu DDGs and one Luhai DDG, however, are much larger 

than the old Luda DDGs, just as the Jiangwei FFGs are larger than the old 

Jianghu FFGs.35 This means they have better endurance and can operate in sea 

areas farther away from home waters. They are also equipped with improved 

CDSs. The CDS of the Luhu, for instance, is said to be connected to the offboard sensors through a data-link, making it possible to track several hundred 

targets simultaneously and designate targets to on-board weapons systems. 

These ships are also equipped with ASW helicopters and some are armed with 

ASW missiles. Their air-defense systems, however, are severely inadequate. 

Their SAM systems, for instance, have ranges between 10 and 14 kilometers, 

making them vulnerable to multidirectional attacks from high-speed, lowaltitude aircraft and sea-skimming missiles. What is ironic is that the Luhu has 

a long-range air-search radar that can detect targets 150 kilometers away, but 

its SAMs cannot engage these targets because their range is insufficient. Also, 

the lack of stealth design for most of these ships means that they are easy to 

locate and attack. 

In comparison to the old Romeo, the Ming SS has better speed, maneuverability, sea-keeping, and underwater endurance. But the design of 

these boats is too old and they seem to have serious safety problems.36 Their 

noise level can be relatively high and therefore they are relatively easy to 

detect and attack. The single Xia is reported to have limited capabilities 

and remains mostly inoperational, and test firings of its missiles were not 

satisfactory because of fire control problems. Because of these deficiencies and 

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vulnerabilities, these surface and underwater combatants are extremely 

difficult to operate effectively in either near or far seas.

Since the late 1990s, however, the PLAN has embarked on a more serious path to enhance its capabilities compared to previous efforts, and this new 

round of modernization has apparently provided important remedies to the 

major deficiencies in China’s naval capabilities. The PLAN, for instance, has 

acquired four Sovremenny-class (Type 956E and Type 956EM) DDGs from 

Russia. By 2008, the PLAN had also commissioned two Luyang I-class (Type 

052B) and two Luyang II-class (Type 052C) DDGs. The construction of two 

Luzhou-class (Type 051C) DDGs was also completed. Moreover, two Jiangkaiclass (Type 054) FFGs were commissioned, and four of a new variant of Jiangkai (Type 054A) were built. Furthermore, the PLAN has acquired eight Kiloclass (Project 636) SSs from Russia, adding to the four Kilos of earlier versions 

acquired in the mid-1990s. The PLAN has also deployed at least 10 indigenously 

built, modified Song-class (Type 039G) SSs. The construction of one Yuan-class 

(Type 039A) SS was also completed, and as of early 2008, three more had been 

built. Finally, two Shang-class (Type 093) SSNs and a pair of Jin-class (Type 094) 

SSBNs have been launched, with additional units to follow.

Acquisition of these surface and underwater platforms has filled major 

capability gaps in ISR, strike range and lethality, and self-protection. The surface 

combatants, for instance, are comparatively larger, have better endurance, and 

therefore can sustain operations in sea areas farther away from home waters.37

These ships also have powerful antiship capabilities. The Sovremenny DDGs 

carry supersonic ASCMs with ranges of 160 kms (Type 956E) and 240 kms 

(Type 956EM), and Luyangs and Luzhous carry subsonic ASCMs with ranges 

of 150 kms (Luyang I and Luzhou) and 280 kms (Luyang II). These ships also 

have improved ASW capabilities because they carry improved sonar and ASW 

helicopters. Moreover, most of these ships have incorporated stealthy design to 

make them more difficult to detect and attack. They also have more advanced 

CDSs that integrate the on- and off-board sensors, command and control, and 

weapons systems.

But more importantly, they now possess area air-defense capabilities 

against air and missile attacks of different ranges and altitudes. The SAMs 

on Sovremennys have ranges between 25 kms (Type 956E) and 45 kms (Type 

956EM). The Luyang II DDG has a U.S. Aegis-type missile-guidance system, 

where an automatic detect-and-track, multidimensional phased-array radar 

(PAR) system embedded in the ship’s forward superstructure is integrated 

with eight 6-cell vertical launching systems (VLSs), or 48 VLS-based SAMs 

with a range of 90 kms. The Luzhou DDG is armed with an air-defense system 

that integrates a PAR with 48 VLS-based SAMs with a range of 120 kms. The 

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Jiangkai Type 054A variant has 32 VLS-based SAMs with a range of 80 kms. 

Finally, these ships are equipped with close-in weapons systems (CIWS). As 

the last line of defense, CIWS can automatically search, detect, track, and 

engage the enemy’s high-speed, low-level aircraft and sea-skimming missiles. 

Similarly, the acquisition of the Kilos has enhanced the PLAN’s underwater capabilities to operate effectively in the littoral waters and sea lanes of the 

near seas. These platforms are substantial enough to carry a variety of weapons systems and have good endurance.38 Some carry SAMs and have digitized 

CDSs to integrate sensors and weapons systems. More importantly, Kilos have 

very quiet propulsion and are covered with sound-absorbing tiles, and as a 

result are difficult to locate and attack. Those of the newer Project 636 model 

are fitted with ASCMs with a range of 300 kms, making them a potent force 

to carry out sea-denial missions in the near and middle seas. Compared to the 

Ming, the Song 039G variant has a smoother hydrodynamic design and quieter propulsion. Anechoic tiles have also been applied to reduce the acoustic 

signature. These boats are also armed with ASCMs with a range of 40 kms, 

and these missiles can be launched while submerged.39 The Yuan, on the other 

hand, is estimated to be comparable to the newer Project 636 variant Kilo in size, 

sensors, command and control, weapons systems, and performance. 

Finally, the deployment of the Shang- and Jin-class submarines would 

clearly enhance PLAN capabilities in the far seas and for nuclear deterrence. 

The Shang, for instance, is sufficiently large to sustain operations in the far 

and deep oceans, and to carry a variety of weapons systems, including ASW 

missiles, ASCMs, and land-attack cruise missiles (LACM).40 It has an efficient hydrodynamic design and quiet propulsion, and its acoustic signature is 

further reduced by the application of sound-damping tiles. Compared to 

the single Xia, the Jin has better sensors, more reliable propulsion, and more 

application of quieting techniques.41 More importantly, the Jin is armed with 12 

strategic ballistic missiles with a range of over 7,200 kms, which are alleged to 

be multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)-capable. 

Driving Factors for Change in Naval Strategy

What can account for the change from the near-coast defense strategy 

to the near-seas active defense strategy? It is clear that a major driving factor 

for this change was Liu Huaqing himself. Liu, as PLAN commander from 1982 

to 1988, was central in explicating and promoting near-seas active defense to 

replace the old concept of near-coast defense. But what has influenced the 

thinking of Liu so that he was able to develop the concept? Some suggest that 

Sergei Gorshkov, the Soviet admiral who steered the Soviet navy from a coastal 

defense force to a blue-water navy of global reach, had a strong influence on 

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Liu, because Liu studied under him at the Voroshilov Naval Academy in St. 

Petersburg from 1954 to 1958.42 In his memoirs, however, Liu makes no mention of taking a course with Gorshkov, even though he mentions that Gorshkov 

graduated from that academy and that he did study naval strategic employment 

in the third year as a student. Regarding his Soviet experience, Liu complains 

several times about the difficulties stemming from the almost total lack of 

training in Russian and mathematics.43

Moreover, instead of Gorshkov’s writings, Liu highlights Alfred 

Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History in his memoirs. For 

instance, he particularly appreciates Mahan’s argument that oceans are 

central to growing the wealth and power of a nation, because by establishing 

control of SLOCs, a nation can develop commercial shipping and trade in 

times of peace, and accomplish military objectives in times of war.44 While 

some Western analysts compare Liu to China’s Gorshkov, Liu writes that 

other Western analysts actually consider him China’s Mahan, a comparison 

he humbly dismisses.45 

Some argue that Liu’s idea of employing island chains as the defensive and 

offensive perimeters is influenced by Gorshkov’s notion of establishing layers 

of defense that become increasingly difficult for the invading force to break the 

closer it approaches the coast. But a more careful reading of the Chinese literature shows that such a strategy may be influenced by the PLA’s own warfighting 

experience instead. PLA strategists, for instance, usually divide a battlefield into 

two realms: a near and narrow realm where a relatively clear front would develop to define the engagement of the two sides, which is known as the interior line; 

and a far and vast realm where the PLA elements can maneuver to and operate 

in. Because this second realm is outside but close to the exterior flanks and rear 

of the enemy’s deployment, such maneuverings are also known as exterior-line 

operations. These operations usually aim to regain battlefield initiative or create 

momentum in order to shift enemy forces and generate vulnerable targets, thus 

creating more favorable fighting opportunities.46

In the minds of the PLAN planners, operations within and around the 

first island chain constitute the interior-line defense and offense, while the 

space beyond this chain is the far and vast realm for exterior-line operations. 

This explains why Liu writes that as China’s sea power grows, the PLAN would 

“employ the guiding thought that if the enemy advances, we advance as well, 

i.e., when the enemy launches attacks on our coastal region, we launch attacks 

on the enemy’s rear.”47 Such a strategy may be different from Gorshkov’s in 

that while Liu places emphasis on maneuver-based offense to deal with the 

enemy’s offense, the latter stresses reinforced and expanded defense against 

the enemy’s offense.

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Moreover, the preponderant view of the civilian leadership must also 

have had a major impact on Liu’s thinking about naval strategy. Liu, for instance, 

writes that he was influenced by a State Council research report which argued 

that China needs a “strategic navy” to restore China’s historical position as a 

maritime power and develop the “maritime consciousness” among its people.48

Also, as shown earlier, Liu promoted a new naval strategy only after Deng had 

proposed it. It is possible that Liu’s advocacy of the new naval strategy since 1983 

contributed to Deng’s 1985 decision that requires the PLA to make the “strategic 

transition” from preparing for “early, total and nuclear war” against a possible 

Soviet invasion to peacetime army-building with an eye toward preparing for 

“local, limited war.” This is because Liu had a close relationship with Deng developed while serving under him during the war years, and the new naval strategy 

deals mainly with local, limited conflicts in China’s maritime direction and, as a 

result, the PLAN would benefit more from the “strategic transition.”49 But it was 

not until after Deng’s 1985 decision, which also required all PLA services to formulate long-term development strategy, that Liu formally introduced the new 

strategy at a PLAN operational planning meeting.50 These show that Liu was 

cautious enough not to impose his idea on the civilian leadership.

Furthermore, the 1985 “strategic transition” was based on the assumption of a decline in the Soviet threat. But there were still lingering doubts 

among China’s military planners on whether such an assumption was correct.51

By 1987, however, it became clearer that the threat might have indeed declined 

because of Gorbachev’s new thinking on foreign policy. Such a development 

may have influenced Liu’s decision to officially endorse the new naval strategy 

that year in a report that was forwarded to the CMC and the General Staff 

Department (GSD). The new naval strategy would have looked much less 

credible and persuasive had the Soviet threat continued to look real and imminent, mainly because such a threat would have made it virtually impossible for 

the PLAN to move away from the near-coast defense. 

Finally, by the mid-1980s, the PLAN had made some progress in its surface and underwater operational capabilities. Its fleet of Luda-class DDGs had 

become fully operational, as did the Han-class SSNs. The construction of the 

second-generation multi-role DDGs such as the Luhus had also been planned 

by 1984. Being much larger than their predecessors, these ships could operate 

beyond China’s coastal waters. These developments may have enhanced Liu’s 

confidence in endorsing the new naval strategy.

While Liu may have been instrumental in driving the change in China’s 

naval strategy, there were major constraints that also limited his ability to 

translate change in strategy into change in capabilities. Even among the PLAN 

leadership, for instance, some argued that the PLAN did not have to have a 

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separate strategy, but rather should implement the overall military strategy formulated by the CMC.52 Such an argument implies that the PLAN should continue to function as a service supporting land operations. Such thinking may have 

had some level of credibility mainly because many of the more serious threats 

to China at the time were land-based. The PLA, for instance, had been waging 

a protracted war with Vietnam along their common border for some years, and 

there was no sign that it would end soon. Even though the Soviet threat had 

declined, the Sino-Soviet dispute over border boundaries had not been fundamentally resolved, nor had the border dispute with India. All these made it 

difficult to argue that attention and resources should shift to maritime issues and 

the emphasis of military modernization should be reoriented toward the navy.

Furthermore, Deng’s policy of economic reform and opening up had 

been implemented for only a few years. Such a policy had not yet triggered the 

rapid economic growth that would generate substantial revenue to sustain more 

spending on the military. The 1985 “strategic transition” actually led to a drastic 

decrease in military spending, because Deng wanted the funds to be spent on 

economic development. As a result, the PLA had to go into business in order to 

generate funds to supplement its expenditures. This made it difficult to argue 

for expanding the navy, which would involve the construction of capital-intensive and technology-intensive operational platforms. Also, Chinese technologies 

crucial to naval development in areas such as shipbuilding, propulsion, and 

information were quite backward at the time. These technologies needed to be 

developed to a level close to the world standards before they could be utilized for 

constructing naval operational platforms and software. Otherwise, investment 

would have been wasted by producing an expanded navy with obsolete technologies, which might be incapable of operating effectively in the near seas. 

Moreover, some maritime issues such as Taiwan were not ranked high 

on the agenda of the PLA planners at the time, mainly because “pro-independence” forces in Taiwan were not as pronounced, and the cost of building up a 

force to conquer Taiwan would be too high. The Spratlys dispute was a more 

urgent issue in the eyes of the PLA planners. But the archipelago is too distant, 

too shallow and small, and too exposed, and therefore easier to capture than 

to defend. It was unclear at the time whether the cost of building an aircraft 

carrier to defend the Spratlys was worth the benefit of keeping these islets. 

Also, the Chinese economy had just begun to shift from agriculture-based 

self-sufficiency to export-oriented manufacturing. Its dependence on overseas 

markets and energy supply was still low. This means that China at the time had 

not yet developed and felt the vulnerability associated with the SLOCs on which 

the shipment of traded goods and imported oil depends. These reasons should 

have reduced the persuasiveness of Liu’s argument for a naval expansion.

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These constraints may explain why Liu was not able to turn his planned 

aircraft carrier program into a reality.53 In terms of major naval combatants, 

all he could accomplish during his tenure as the PLAN commander and the 

CMC vice chair between 1982 and 1997 was the construction and deployment 

of two Luhus. What is ironic is that by building these two ships, Liu became 

politically vulnerable. Because these ships incorporated more than 40 foreign 

technologies, for instance, some considered them as representing “allied forces 

of the eight foreign countries,”54 and examples of “national humiliation.” As a 

result, Liu had to defend the policy of integrating foreign technologies by 

arguing that such a policy can save cost and time and expose Chinese engineers to the more advanced technologies so that they could learn and adapt, 

and that the most advanced countries such as the United States also incorporate foreign technologies while building military hardware.55 

Finally, if one argues that Liu’s personal influence is decisive in bringing about China’s naval modernization, then after his retirement in 1997, we 

should have seen some level of decline of Chinese interest in the navy, or even 

of naval capabilities. But a more rapid naval buildup in China began after 

2000, a few years after Liu’s retirement from the PLA. This shows that there are 

other factors that are just as important as Liu’s personal influence in driving 

naval modernization in China. Liu’s contribution was indispensable, not just in 

promoting a new concept, but more importantly in institutionalizing research 

on naval technological and doctrinal issues. Under Liu’s auspices, for instance, 

the Research Center for Evaluating Naval Equipment was launched in 1983, 

and the Navy Military Art Research Institute was founded in 1985.56

The influence of individual leaders is important. But such an influence can also be highly unpredictable and elusive, because leaders come and 

go. These research institutions, however, remain. Being more stable, they can 

mobilize resources to do more systematic and sophisticated research, and as a 

result develop technical and functional expertise in their areas of specialization. 

The development and control of expertise should enhance their credibility 

and legitimacy further, and make it easier to mobilize more resources for more 

persuasive research.

Does Change in Strategy Drive Change in Capabilities?

While it is true the new strategy of near-seas active defense can explain 

the acquisition of two Luhus and one Luhai in the 1990s, it is also important to note that deployment of these ships would in itself not turn the PLAN 

from a coastal defense navy to one capable of near-seas active defense, mainly 

because their number was too few. Liu wanted a navy capable of near-seas 

active defense by 2000, but little had happened for more than a decade between the mid-1980s when the new strategy was endorsed, and the projected 

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time-line for possessing the required capabilities. As discussed earlier, the perceived dominance of land-based threats and the lack of funding and technologies had largely neutralized the role of the new strategy in catalyzing a major 

change in capabilities. 

Acquisition of the Ming-class submarines in the 1980s also had less to 

do with the new strategy. Liu, for instance, was particularly critical of building 

obsolete submarines based on the Soviet designs of the 1940s and 1950s.57 Lack 

of a better alternative, the scale requirement of the PLAN submarine force to 

replace Romeos, and relatively low cost may have been the motivating factors 

for the construction and deployment of the Ming-class.

Some may argue that the more serious modernization that began in 

the late 1990s is the best evidence that the new strategy of near-seas active 

defense had made a difference in capabilities, even though the change lagged 

behind the timetable by a few years. While this is largely true, some aspects of 

this change may have been driven by the contingent issue of Taiwan and by 

the possibility of a U.S. military intervention if a military conflict over Taiwan 

occurred. The acquisition of the Sovremenny-class and the Kilo-class, for 

instance, can be seen as part of a PLAN strategy to deter the intervention of 

the U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups in a Taiwan conflict. This is because these 

platforms are armed with powerful antiship capabilities. 

But preparation for a military conflict over Taiwan does not contradict 

the new naval strategy, because it is one type of operations that the PLAN has 

been prepared for in the near seas. Also, according to China’s naval researchers, 

developing capabilities to operate effectively in the near and far seas was a more 

solid basis for resolving the issue of Taiwan.58 Moreover, in the eyes of PLA 

analysts, the chances of war over Taiwan have declined over time.59 Naval modernization, on the other hand, continues. This shows that the PLAN modernization may be indeed driven by a more systematic and coherent naval strategy.

A coherent naval strategy is necessary but not sufficient to bring about 

a major change in capabilities. The lack or availability of funding and technologies also determines whether capabilities change. Such a difference may 

explain why not much had changed in capabilities for more than a decade 

after the endorsement of the near-seas active defense strategy, but a significant 

change has occurred since the late 1990s. Because of the rapid growth of the 

economy, for instance, Chinese defense spending has grown steadily in recent 

years. In the meantime, the PLA has completed three rounds of downsizing 

since 1985, leading to the demobilization of about 1.7 million personnel.60 As 

a result, more funding has become available for developing the technologyintensive services such as the navy. 

But more importantly, major “bottlenecks” in producing platforms 

and weapons systems were removed due to availability of key technologies. 

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Such technologies include more advanced stealth design of hulls; combined 

diesel or gas (CODOG) propulsion; quieting propulsion, techniques, and materials for submarines; more advanced CDS based on data-link technology; 

the automatic detect-and-track, multifunctional and multidimensional PAR 

system; the VLS-based SAM system; and CIWS. The construction and deployment of two Luyang Is and two Luyang IIs in a relatively short period of time 

also show that the shipbuilding industry is now capable of modular design and 

construction, where ships with different functional emphases and on-board 

systems can be built quickly with standardized modules. Finally, China has 

made substantial progress in developing space-based surveillance, navigational and guidance, and telecommunications systems and in developing airborne 

warning and control systems (AWACS). These systems would clearly enhance 

the operational capabilities of the PLAN platforms by providing assistance in 

detecting and tracking targets, in navigation and weapons guidance, and in 

telecommunications.

The availability of these technologies can be attributed to several 

sources. First, the central government has invested heavily in research and 

development (R&D) in basic science and technologies in areas such as information, automation, new materials, ocean, and space.61 Many results of such 

R&D have been applied to developing naval technologies. Moreover, China’s 

naval planners now believe that development of naval technologies should 

be based on the notion of “more research, more technological accumulation, 

but less armament.”62 This means that more trial and improvisation of new 

technologies are necessary before they are incorporated into production. Also, 

production should involve only a small number of platforms so that there 

would be more trial and improvisation of these platforms. Based on trial and 

improvisation, a few more modified platforms would be built. This is a key 

lesson learned from past experience, in which the PLAN paid a high price by 

mass-producing platforms based on immature or obsolete technologies, or on 

technologies with no accessory systems.63 This partially explains the lack of 

major progress for more than a decade after the endorsement of the near-seas 

active defense strategy. By the late 1990s, however, major technologies had 

become more mature through trial and improvisation. As a result, they were 

incorporated into production of major platforms that contributed to the 

important improvements in capabilities. 

Importing complete systems or buying key technologies and systems 

of technologies from foreign sources have also contributed to developing 

China’s naval technologies. This is because they make it possible for China 

to reverse-engineer the technologies or for Chinese scientists and engineers 

to learn and develop new technologies.64 Furthermore, development of naval 

technologies has benefited from civil-military integration (CMI) in China’s 

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shipbuilding industry. Chinese civilian shipyards, for instance, have been 

modernizing their production technologies through technical cooperation 

and joint ventures with foreign shipbuilding firms. By being located in civilian 

shipyards, military shipbuilding programs can benefit from their civilian 

counterparts in ship design, development, and construction.65 

Far-Seas Operations

While the official discourse continues to employ “near-seas active defense” as the strategic guide for China’s naval modernization, the new concept 

of “far-seas operations” has also been advanced since the late 1990s.

Change in Naval Strategy 

When Liu Huaqing fleshed out the near-seas active defense strategy in 

the mid-1980s, he stated that the PLAN would operate within and around the 

first island chain, or in China’s “near seas,” for a long time to come. But he also 

suggested that the growth of the economy and strengthening of science and 

technology would translate into expansion of Chinese naval power in the long 

run. This in turn would allow the PLAN to extend its operational range from 

the first island chain to the second island chain, which extends from northern 

Japan to the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and farther southward (see 

figure 5–1). By the time the PLAN is capable of operating independently and 

effectively around and beyond the second island chain, it would become truly 

a regional blue-water navy.66

 In December 2001, China’s third generation leader Jiang Zemin stated 

that while continuing to implement the near-seas active defense strategy, the 

PLAN should “in the long run pay attention to enhancing the far-seas defense 

and operations capabilities [yuanhai fangwei zuozhan nengli, 远海防卫作战能

力].” After Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang as China’s fourth generation leader in 

2002, he also stressed the need for the PLAN to “make the gradual transition 

to far-seas defense, enhancing the far-seas maneuvering operations capabilities 

[yuanhai jidong zuozhan nengli, 远海机动作战能力].”67 As a result, the PLAN’s 

think tank set out to flesh out the new concept of “far-seas operations.”68

In terms of operational scope, because “all the sea areas beyond the 

‘near seas’ are ‘middle and far seas’ [zhongyuanhai, 中远海],”69 the sea areas 

adjacent to the inner and outer rims of the second island chain and the maritime space beyond this chain can be understood as the PLAN’s definition 

of the “far seas.” This is clearly a vast area that stretches from the northwest 

Pacific to the East Indian Ocean. Such a definition also implies that in order 

for the PLAN to encompass this vast area effectively, it must develop substantial capabilities to project power up to and beyond 1,000 nautical miles from 

its territorial waters. 

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In operational terms, analytical attention has begun to shift to specific 

issues related to middle- and far-seas operations. On tasking formation, 

for instance, one newly developed concept is the “small battle group,” 

which means organizing major naval surface and underwater combatants 

of different functions but of similar maneuvering speed into a battle group. 

Such a group should be based on complementarity of functions such as 

ISR, command and control, antiship, air defense, ASW, and electronic 

warfare. Such a group would have the benefits of synchronized maneuver, 

easier coordination, and smaller profile and therefore better survivability, 

particularly if it operates in distant waters with no land-based intelligence 

and firepower support. Because firepower precision is more important than density in modern naval warfare, such a group can also be quite 

lethal because it has a sufficient number of ASCMs. Such a group can fulfill versatile naval missions to serve political objectives. Finally, several such 

groups can be coordinated at the campaign level to deal with the opponent’s large-scale battle group, by posing a threat from multiple directions 

and making it difficult for the opponent to determine the operational 

intentions of these groups, and by having superiority in numbers.70

Besides tasking formation, far-seas operations also require battlefield 

preparation and sustainable logistics. New naval sea and air platforms that 

the PLAN is acquiring, for instance, are generally larger ones that would 

allow longer-range operations. To accommodate these operations, it is now 

necessary to construct large-scale and multifunctional in- and on-shore infrastructure capable of command and communications, active defense, stationing 

and berth, training, technological and technical support, materiel supply, and 

cultural entertainment. Therefore, “navy cities” (haijun cheng) that incorporate 

networks of central and satellite ports and airfields need to be built. Furthermore, off-shore facilities should shift the emphasis from defense to offense. 

This means forward bases on islands far away from home waters need to be 

developed to accommodate facilities for ISR, for navigation and communications, for ocean geological, hydrological, and meteorological observation and 

forecast, and for naval and air operations, and some of these facilities need 

to be built in deep oceans or on the ocean floor. Finally, because new naval 

platforms would consume large amounts of materiel, logistics becomes more 

important in sustaining naval operations in the far seas. Therefore, at-sea 

supply-replenishing capabilities need to be enhanced, particularly those 

that can conduct synchronized parallel and vertical replenishment of large 

moving platforms. Also, materials such as fuel, munitions, equipment, and 

technical maintenance can be predeployed in forward locations or floating 

logistics bases.71

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Driving Factors for Change in Naval Strategy

A major driving factor for the advancement of far-seas operations strategy is clearly the Navy Military Art Research Institute, because researchers 

from this institute promoted and articulated the concept of far-seas operations. 

Since doctrinal research is more institutionalized, it becomes more systematic 

and sophisticated. Also, many of the constraints that limited Liu Huaqing from 

translating his vision into reality had been removed by the mid-2000s, and 

these changes provided empirical materials that can be utilized by the naval 

researchers to rationalize the new concept.

According to Chinese naval researchers, for instance, China has resolved 

its border disputes with most of its land neighbors by signing treaties to delineate the boundaries, and these countries include Russia, Vietnam, and the 

Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. Most of China’s disputes 

with its maritime neighbors over maritime territories, however, have not been 

resolved. Neither has reunification of Taiwan with the mainland been accomplished, and possible U.S. intervention may complicate the issue. Therefore, future threats to China’s traditional security are projected to come from the sea.72

Moreover, the integration of the Chinese economy with the world’s 

economy means not just opportunities but also vulnerabilities. Foreign trade 

grows rapidly over the years, and 95 percent of traded goods and materials are 

shipped by sea.73 China has both one of the world’s largest merchant fleets and 

major shipping lines that connect China to the major ports of the world.74 Also, 

China has become increasingly dependent on imported oil to fuel its economy. 

As a result, it has been acquiring major overseas oil equities and facilities, and 

imported oil has mostly been shipped to China through major SLOCs and the 

associated “chokepoints.” The continental shelves, exclusive economic zones, 

and islands over which China has disputes with its maritime neighbors are 

thought to have rich deposits of oil and natural gas.75 Furthermore, major types 

of minerals for China’s economic and technological development need to be imported, but can be found in the oceans.76 Also, the value of China’s maritime 

economy has been growing rapidly over the years.77 Moreover, 40 percent of the 

Chinese people live in the coastal region, which produces 60 percent of China’s 

annual gross domestic product (GDP).78 Finally, Chinese overseas investment 

has been growing, as has the number of Chinese students, visitors, and immigrants going abroad.79 Major SLOCs, ships and goods, maritime territories and 

resources, the coastal region, and Chinese assets and people overseas, however, 

are either exposed, contested, or controlled by others, and therefore are highly 

vulnerable.

To reduce threats and vulnerability from the sea, according to naval researchers, the geostrategic disposition of China in its maritime direction is 

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highly unfavorable. China’s coastal front is too wide and its flanks are highly 

exposed, and as a result, are difficult to defend. China’s near seas, which 

constitute the close forward position and where the PLAN operates, are also 

vulnerable, because the battlespace in these “three seas” is quite constrained. 

This is so mainly because these seas are partially blocked by the first island 

chain, which leaves too few exits to the far and vast west Pacific that can 

provide the necessary space for the PLAN’s maneuvers. The straits and 

channels constituting these exits are mostly narrow and controlled by 

others. Also, navies operating in these near seas are quite formidable. They 

include Russia’s Pacific Fleet in the north and the Japanese Navy in the east, 

and the latter is shifting from a posture of “defensive defense” to that of 

“offensive defense.” Both the Taiwanese Navy and the ASEAN navies, which 

operate in the southeast and the south, are modernizing. The Indian Navy, 

driven by a strategy to control the Indian Ocean, is moving eastward into the 

South China Sea. Finally, the 7th Fleet of the U.S. Navy, which is more powerful 

than all the others, is forward deployed in the region. These fleets render the 

PLAN more vulnerable, and limit and reduce the effectiveness of the near-seas 

active defense strategy for both deterrence and warfighting.80

To alleviate vulnerability and enhance effectiveness, according to 

Chinese naval researchers, the PLAN needs to break out of the interior-line constraints, or those associated with the narrow and near seas within and around 

the first island chain. Acquiring capabilities to operate in the far seas, or the vast 

space beyond the first island chain, would allow the PLAN to regain initiative 

and momentum. While “interior-line operations require near-seas capabilities, 

exterior-line operations are based on far-seas capabilities. . . . Far-seas capabilities make it possible to carry out offensive operations and ambush and sabotage 

operations in the far and vast naval battlespace beyond the first island chain, 

and would have the effect of shock and awe on the enemy.” Forward operations 

and offense are central to naval combat also because oceans have few invulnerable physical objects to base the defense on, and naval platforms are difficult to 

recover once crippled. An emphasis on offense also helps to optimize naval 

force structure and is more cost-effective. This is because as strikes are more 

long-range, precise, and powerful, and therefore more lethal, defense becomes 

more expensive to maintain. History also shows that a strategy of close and 

static defense led to the decisive defeat of the Qing Navy in the first SinoJapanese War of 1894.81 

Moreover, according to the Chinese naval researchers, the Chinese 

economy has grown rapidly to the extent that it has contributed to a more solid industrial base and infrastructure and more revenue, both of which make it 

possible to develop the navy based on the new strategy of far-seas operations. 

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It has also contributed to the rapid development of technologies in shipbuilding, propulsion, information, aviation, and aerospace, which are indispensable 

to sustain the development of better naval platforms and software.82 Finally, 

a revolution in military affairs (RMA) favors naval development and far-seas 

operations. Compared to some other services, for instance, the navy is smaller, 

less bureaucratic, and more technology-based and therefore can accommodate 

information technology (IT) faster and better. It also has its own sea, air, and 

land services and therefore can be employed as the experimental service for ITbased integrated joint operations. Naval operations under informatized conditions require the deepening and widening of the operational space to enhance 

survivability and initiative, and this is consistent with the notion of far-seas 

operations. The concept of net-centric warfare also originated from the navy 

for the U.S. military transformation.83

While institutionalization of doctrinal research is crucial to articulating 

and socializing the new naval strategy, it is important to note that this would 

not have been possible had the naval researchers not received general guidance and instructions from the higher leadership. Therefore, the higher leadership, particularly the civilian leadership, is a major factor in driving the change. 

Unlike the time of Liu Huaqing when research institutions were either nonexistent or underdeveloped and, as a result, Liu had to personally articulate 

and socialize the new idea, the institutionalization of research means naval 

researchers would articulate and socialize the idea, but not the PLAN leadership. This may explain why PLAN Commander Zhang Dingfa was not as vocal 

as Liu in propagating the new concept.84 However, Zhang probably gave general 

guidance on the doctrinal change. More importantly, however, the articulation 

and socialization of the new concept by naval researchers can be understood 

as an attempt to operationalize the general instructions given by the central 

civilian leadership, and in this case, those given by Jiang Zemin.

With the death of Deng and retirement of Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen 

from the CMC in 1997, Jiang’s position as the CMC chair became more secure. 

As a result, he became more active in military affairs. As mentioned earlier, 

Jiang was the first civilian leader to endorse the new concept of far-seas operations. But unlike Liu Huaqing, Jiang did not offer any specifics on why and how 

to develop naval operations capabilities in the far seas. So it was left to the naval 

researchers to flesh out the details of Jiang’s general instructions. 

Major Implications

This study shows that China’s naval strategy and capabilities have been 

shifting from near-coast defense, to near-seas active defense, to far-seas operations. This finding has several important implications. First, the current 

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naval modernization effort clearly intends to transform the PLAN from a 

coastal defense navy to one capable of near-seas active defense. It also aims to 

lay the basis for further development of the PLAN into one capable of far-seas 

operations around the time of 2020.85 It is likely that the process is incremental, 

with several units of new platforms built each time for trial and improvisation. 

This makes it possible for the new platforms and technologies to be improved, 

and for the next round of development to incorporate these mature technologies. In this way, the PLAN would limit costs but not become technologically 

obsolete. Because of such a pattern of development, one should not expect to 

see a quick and sharp surge in China’s naval capabilities.

Second, the new strategy of far-seas operations shows that the PLAN is 

clearly interested in having regional blue-water capabilities, or those to operate 

effectively in the far seas. To achieve such capabilities, the PLAN will probably 

make several necessary preparations in the coming years. First, it may build 

aircraft carriers in order to have exterior-line operations capabilities. Currently, the newly acquired PLAN ships may provide area air defense, but they do 

not have the offensive air capabilities to “attack the enemy’s rear.” But carriers 

can provide such capabilities. Also, the PLAN may acquire long-range strategic bombers, which can support far-seas naval operations as well as “attack 

the enemy’s rear.” Moreover, the current strait garrison-oriented fleets may be 

reorganized into multifunctional battle groups for operations in spaces of 

different ranges such as the coastal waters, the near seas, and the far seas.86

The PLAN may also attempt to acquire overseas facilities for ISR and logistics 

support of its far-seas operations.87 Finally, the PLAN may enhance its at-sea 

supply-replenishing capabilities to sustain operations in the far seas. 

As this study shows, it took almost two decades for the near-seas active 

defense strategy to translate into capabilities that are more or less appropriate 

for accomplishing the objectives of such a strategy. For the new strategy of farseas operations to translate into appropriate capabilities, however, it may take 

less time, mainly because the budgetary and technological constraints that the 

PLAN faces are less formidable. There are other major challenges, however, 

that the PLAN may need to overcome in order to translate the new strategy of 

far-seas operations into appropriate capabilities. 

First, compared to the near-coast defense and near-seas active defense 

strategies, where the PLAN had specific issues such as the Soviet threat and 

Taiwan independence to deal with, the new strategy of far-seas operations 

seems to lack concrete objectives on which the PLAN can concentrate 

attention, energy, and resources.88 As a result, the new strategy does not sound 

as persuasive and convincing. Second, acquiring aircraft carriers and overseas bases for power projection seems to contradict China’s desire to project 

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the image to the world that unlike the rise of other great powers, China’s rise 

will be more peaceful. Finally, there seems to be a school of thought in China 

that argues that rather than striving to be a maritime power, China should be 

content to remain a land power. This means policy priorities should be given 

to resolving domestic problems such as official corruption, uneven wealth 

distribution, environmental pollution, and most recently, ethnic unrest in 

China’s land frontiers such as Tibet and Xinjiang.89 These priorities also seem 

to be more cost-effective if compared to building capital-intensive and technology-intensive naval platforms. Whether the PLAN can negotiate these 

issues successfully may also determine whether China will develop a genuine 

blue-water navy.

Notes

1 The author would like to thank Andrew Erickson, Peter Dutton, Bill Murray, and Jonathan Pollack 

for their valuable comments on an earlier draft. The author, however, is responsible for all the shortcomings.

2 See Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “The Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense Strategy: Conceptualization and Implications,” Naval War College Review 47, no. 3 (Summer 1994).

3 Ian Storey and You Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors,” Naval 

War College Review 57, no. 1 (Winter 2004); Andrew Erickson and Andrew Wilson, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Dilemma,” Naval War College Review 59, no. 4 (Autumn 2006). 

4 Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “Undersea Dragons: China’s Maturing Submarine Force,” International Security 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004); Eric McVadon, “China’s Maturing Navy,” Naval War College 

Review 59, no. 2 (Spring 2006); Lyle Goldstein and Andrew Erickson, “China’s Future Nuclear Submarine 

Force: Insights from Chinese Writings,” Naval War College Review 60, no. 1 (Winter 2007). 

5 See Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China’s Quest for Seapower (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982); Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First 

Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001); Gabriel Collins, Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, 

and William Murray, China’s Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008).

6 “近岸” can also be translated as “in-shore.” “近海” is sometimes translated as “off-shore.” But “offshore” is too vague to reflect the relative distance that the Chinese term intends to express. To the extent the 

Eurocentric terms of Near East, Middle East, and Far East are translated as 近东, 中东, and 远东, it is appropriate to translate the Sinocentric terms of “近海,” “中海,” and “远海” as “near seas,” “middle seas” and “far 

seas” to reflect the relative distance from China’s shores.

7 See Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (September 1971).

8A major example is the PLA’s sea-crossing and amphibious-landing operations to capture the Yi 

Jiangshan Islands off the coast of Zhejiang Province in January 1955. See Liang Guanglie et al., eds., Duhai 

denglu zuozhan [Sea-Crossing and Landing Operations] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2001), 

192–210.

9 See Liu Jixian et al., Haiyang zhanlue huanjing yu duice yanjiu [Research on the Maritime Strategic 

Environment and Policy Response] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1997), 355. 

10 Ibid., 355–356. The PLAN’s submarine force is primarily responsible for ambush and sabotage 

missions.

11 Zhang Feng, “Kang denglu zuozhan ying queli jianjue burang diren shanglu de zhidao sixiang” 

[The Guiding Thought That the Enemy Must Not Be Allowed to Land Should Be Established for the Counter-Amphibious-Landing Operations], Junshi xueshu [Military Art Journal], no. 8 (1983), collected in Military Art Journal, Editorial Department, ed., Junshi xueshu lunwenji, xiace [A Collection of Academic Papers

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on Military Art, Book Two](Beijing: Military Science Press, 1984), 463–464; Xiong Shuozhi, “Guanyu daoyu 

kang denglu zuozhan wenti de tantao” [An Inquiry into the Question of the Islands-based Counter-Amphibious-Landing Operations], Military Art Journal, no. 11 (1980), collected in A Collection of Academic Papers, 

470; Zheng Guozhong, “Jin’an daji di haishang jidong biandui wenti zhi wojian” [My Opinion on the Question of Striking Enemy Maneuvering Formation on the Seas from the Near Coast], Military Art Journal, no. 

10 (1979), collected in A Collection of Academic Papers, 478.

12 Zhan, “The Guiding Thought,” 467.

13Chen Jingsan, “Kang denglu ruogan zhanshu shouduan de yanjiu” [Research on Several Tactical Means to Counter Amphibious Landing], Military Art Journal, no. 12 (1981), collected in A Collection of 

Academic Papers, 442; Rao Shoukun, “Shilun kang denglu zhanyi zhong de luhaikong sanjun xietong” [An 

Exploratory Comment on Coordinating Ground, Naval and Air Forces in Counter-Amphibious-Landing 

Campaign], Military Art Journal, no. 6 (1983), collected in A Collection of Academic Papers, 457–458; Zhang, 

“The Guiding Thought,” 467–468.

14 See Liu Huaqing, Liu Huaqing huiyilu [Liu Huaqing’s Memoirs] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 

2004), 482–485.

15An exception to this highly vulnerable and defensive posture is the Chinese naval operations over 

the Paracels in early 1974. See John Garver, “China’s Push to the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests,” China Quarterly, no. 132 (1992). 

16 The PLAN’s self-characterization of its capabilities during this period was “aircraft, submarines, 

and fast attack crafts” [“fei, qian, kuai,” “飞, 潜, 快”].

17 The standard displacement of a Romeo is 1,710 tons. See Jane’s Information Group, Jane’s Fighting Ships, available at <http://jfs.janes.com/docs/jfs/browse_country_results.jsp?&SelPub=jfs&bucket=Co

untry&selected=China>; John Pike (director), Global Security, at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/

world/china/navy.htm>; and Huitong, Chinese Military Aviation, at <http://mil.jschina.com.cn/huitong/index.html>. The analysis of PLAN capabilities in this article is largely based on these three sources.

18 The full-load displacement of a Luda ranges from 3,670 to 3,730 tons (for the improved variant), 

while that of a Jianghu ranges from 1,702 to 1,925 tons (for improved variant). The displacement of a Han is 

estimated to be between 4,500 and 5,500 tons while submerged. Ibid.

19 PLA analysts, for instance, argue that development of PLA capabilities should be guided more by 

strategic and doctrinal innovation, citing U.S. “Air-land battle” and “Star War” concepts as examples. They 

also cite the German doctrine of “Blitzkrieg” as central to developing required capabilities quickly, leading 

to victory against France at the early stage of World War II. See Hu Guangzheng and Xiao Xianshe, Yingxiangdao ershiyishiji de zhengming [Contention Affecting the 21st Century] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 

1986), 202–204. For an English account explaining early German victory in World War II, see Ernest May, 

Strange Victory (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001). I want to thank Lyle Goldstein for bringing my attention 

to Ernest May’s book.

20 Liu Huaqing’s Memoirs, 314. 

21 Ibid., 316. 

22 Both Mao and Liu cited in ibid., 476.

23 Deng Xiaoping, “Haijun jianshe yao jiang zhenzheng de zhandouli” [Real Combat Effectiveness 

Should be Stressed for Navy Construction], in Deng Xiaoping lun guofang he jundui jianshe [Deng Xiaoping 

on National Defense and Army Construction] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1992), 63; Deng cited in Tang 

Fuquan and Wu Yi, “A Study of China’s Sea Defense Strategy,” Zhongguo junshi kexue [China Military Science] no. 5 (2007), 92. As a general concept to guide future naval development, the strategy was advanced as 

early as 1970 by Zhou Enlai. See Liu Jie, “The Strategic Thought of Zhou Enlai on Navy Construction and 

Revelations,” Junshi lishi [Military History], no. 2 (2008), 22. 

24 Liu was the PLAN commander during 1982–1988 and a CMC vice chair during 1988–1997. The 

new strategy was particularly substantiated in his speech delivered to a military research class of high-ranking naval officers, entitled “Several Questions Regarding Implementing the Strategic Principle of Active Defense by the Navy.” See Liu Huaqing’s Memoirs, 434.

25 Liu promoted the idea at several high-level meetings of the PLAN leadership between 1984 and 

1986, and by early 1987, he was able to formulate a formal report entitled “On the Question of Clarifying the 

Naval Strategy,” and forwarded it to the CMC and the General Staff Department (GSD). This was followed by 

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a GSD Operations Department meeting where representatives from nine PLA central institutions were invited to discuss the report. The participants of the meeting largely endorsed the concept. See ibid., 434–439.

26 Ibid., 432, 434, 436, and 437.

27 Ibid., 437; Tang and Wu, “A Study of China’s Sea Defense Strategy,” 92–93.

28 Liu Huaqing’s Memoirs, 437–438.

29 See Yang Yushu, “Shilun lianhe denglu zhanyi zhong duoqu he baochi zhihaiquan wenti” [An Exploratory Comment on the Question of Capturing and Maintaining Sea-Control in Joint Amphibious-Landing Operations], in NDU Scientific Research Department and Campaign Teaching and Research Section, 

eds., Gaojisu tiaojianxia zhanyi lilun yanjiu [Research on Theory of Campaign under High-Technology Conditions] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1997), 188.

30 Ibid., 189, 189–190, 190–191; Wang Yongguo, “Haishang fengsuo zuozhan tantao” [An Inquiry 

into the Question of Sea-Blocking Operations], in Research on Theory of Campaign, 197–198; Li Dingwen, 

“Lun haijun bingli zai lianhe duhai jingong zhanyi zhong de diwei he zuoyong” [On the Status and Role of 

the Naval Force in Joint Sea-Crossing Offensive Campaign], in Research on Theory of Campaign, 201–202, 

205.

31 Zhao Shengtang, Fan Jinfa, “Haishang fengsuo zuozhan ying chulihao liuge guanxi” [Six Relationships That Should Be Handled Well in Sea-Blockade Operations], in Hu Wenlong et al., eds., Lianhe 

fengsuo zuozhan yanjiu [Research on Joint Blockade Operations] (Beijing: NDU Press, 1999), 34–39. See also 

Zhao Rongtang, “Haishang fengsuo zhanyi zuozhan zhidaoshang ying bawo de jige wenti” [Several Questions That Should Be Grasped in the Operational Guidance of Sea-Blockade Campaign], in Research on 

Joint Blockade Operations, 30–31; Mou Yuefu, “Tantan fengsuoqu he haizhanqu wenti” [A Discussion of the 

Question Regarding Blockade Zone and Naval Operations Zone, in Research on Joint Blockade Operations, 

40–45.

32 Zhao Rongtang, “Several Questions,” 31–32; Chen Li, Lai Qiaoguo, “qiantan dui di daxing daoyu 

zhuyao chuhaikou de fengsuo” [A Preliminary Discussion on Blocking the Main Exits of the Enemy’s Large 

Islands to the Sea], in Research on Joint Blockade Operations, 46–49; Zhang Baoshan, “Shuilei fengsuo zai 

haishang fengsuo zuozhan zhong de zuoyong” [The Role of Water Mine-Based Blockade in Sea-Blockade 

Operations], in Research on Joint Blockade Operations, 78.

33 Ding Yiping, “Da di daxing jianting biandui de zhuyao zhanfa” [Major Methods to Strike the Enemy’s Large-Scale Combatants Formation], in Research on Joint Blockade Operations, 55–59; Yuan Caijin, 

“Da di daxing jianting biandui ying zhongshi fahui qianting bingli de zuoyong” [The Role of Submarine 

Force Should Be Stressed and Given Full Play in Striking the Enemy’s Large-Scale Combatants Formation] 

in Research on Joint Blockade Operations, 69–74; Wu Lianqing, “Hangkongbing xietong qianting da di daxing jianting biandui de jige wenti” [Several Questions Regarding Coordinating Aviation Force and Submarine Force to Strike the Enemy’s Large-Scale Combatants Formation], in Research on Joint Blockade Operations, 60–63.

34A Ming-class submarine weighs 2,100 tons while submerged. The displacement of a Xia-class submarine is estimated to be between 6,500 and 8,000 tons. See Jane’s Information, Jane’s Fighting Ships; Pike, 

Global Security; and Huitong, Chinese Military Aviation. 

35 The full displacement of a Luhu is 4,800 tons, while that of the single Luhai is 6,600 tons. The displacement of a Jiangwei ranges from 2,250 to 3,000 tons (for the upgraded variant). See ibid.

36According to a Chinese official report, one Ming was lost in the Bohai Bay in late April or early 

May of 2003 because of a critical mechanical failure. In late May of 2005, another Ming was crippled by a fire 

on-board in the South China Sea, and had to be towed back to the home port on Hainan Island.

37 The full displacements of a Sovremenny, Luyang I, Luyang II, and Luzhou are 7,625 tons, 6,600 

tons, 7,000 tons, and 7,000 tons, respectively. The full displacement of a Jiangkai is estimated to be between 

3,000 and 4,000 tons (for Type 054A). Jane’s Information Group, Jane’s Fighting Ships; Pike, Global Security; 

and Huitong, Chinese Military Aviation. 

38 The submerged displacement of a Kilo is estimated to be 3,076 tons. Ibid. 

39 The submerged displacement of a Song is 2,250 tons. Ibid. 

40 The full displacement of a Shang is estimated to be between 6,000 and 8,000 tons. Ibid.

41 The displacement of a Jin is estimated to be between 8,000 and 9,000 tons. Ibid.

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42 Ian Story and You Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors,” Air Power 

Journal 1, no. 2 (September-December 2004), 126.

43 Liu Huaqing’s Memoirs, 265, 266, 268, 269–270, 271.

44 Ibid., 432–433.

45 Ibid., 439. To determine whether Liu is influenced by Gorshkov or Mahan is important mainly 

because it may help to understand whether the PLAN would stress bastion defense or power projection in 

its future development. 

46 See Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving Campaign Doctrine and Strategies,” in James Mulvenon and 

Richard Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 

165. 

47 Liu Huaqing’s Memoirs, 437. While serving as a brigade political commissar in the Second Field 

Army led by Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, Liu participated in one of the most well-known PLA exteriorline operations in 1947, known as “advance a thousand li into Mount Dabie.” Such an experience cannot have 

an insignificant influence on Liu’s thinking about China’s naval strategy.

48 Ibid., 435. 

49 The 1985 decision led to downsizing of the PLA by a million personnel, or elimination of four 

military regions and 12 infantry corps. See ibid., 329. It is quite clear that the PLA land forces suffered much 

more from the downsizing than the PLAN.

50 Ibid., 435–436.

51 See Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving War-fighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985–1995,” in David Shambaugh and Richard H. Yang, eds., China’s Military in Transition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 185.

52 Liu Huaqing’s Memoirs, 434.

53 For Liu’s aircraft carrier program, see ibid., 477–481.

54 This refers to the foreign forces that entered Beijing in 1900 following the suppression of the Boxer 

Rebellion. For a discussion of the PLA’s difficulties in integrating foreign technologies, including the example 

of Luhu-class DDGs, see Eric McVadon, “Systems Integration in China’s People’s Liberation Army,” in James 

Mulvenon and Richard Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 1999), 217–244. 

55 See Liu Huaqing’s Memoirs, 665.

56 Ibid., 449, 451.

57 Ibid., 351.

58 See Ye Xinrong and Zuo Liping, “Guanyu haijun you jinhai zouxiang yuanhai de zhanlue sikao” 

[Strategic Reflections Regarding the March of the Navy from the Near Seas to the Far Seas], Military Art 

Journal, no. 10 (2004), 30.

59 PLA analysts, for instance, believe that a combination of military, diplomatic, economic, and legal 

strategies employed in recent years has had the effect of convincing the leaders and people in Taiwan that the 

cost of pursuing formal independence is too high and the benefit too low. Some also acknowledge that without Taiwan’s declaration of formal independence, the PLA lacks the legitimacy to attack Taiwan because the 

people in Taiwan are considered Chinese. The election of the anti-independence KMT candidate Ma Yingjeou as Taiwan’s new president in 2008 seems to have reinforced this view.

60 The 1985–1987 round of downsizing led to demobilization of a million personnel. The 1997–2000 

round removed 500,000, while the 2002–2005 round demobilized another 200,000. These numbers represent the positions that have been eliminated. They do not include those that are regularly demobilized every 

year, whose positions are replenished by new recruits.

61 See “863 jihua gaikuang” [A General Introduction of Plan 863], available at <http://www.chinatech.com.cn/techachieve/intro/plan863.htm>. 

62Yang Chunchang, Deng Xiaoping xinshiqi jianjun sixiang yanjiu [Study of Deng Xiaoping’s Thought 

on Army Construction in the New Period] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1989), 277.

63 See Liu Huaqing’s Memoirs, 353. Liu argues that the United States and the Soviet Union had also 

adopted an incremental approach in their naval development.

64 See ibid., 678. This is especially true with the air defense system, the propulsion system, the CDS 

system, and the CIWS, which are all based on either a Russian or Dutch system. The author wants to thank 

Bill Murray for fleshing out this point. 

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65 See Richard Bitzinger, “Dual-Use Technologies, Civil-Military Integration, and China’s Defense 

Industry,” in Nan Li, ed., Chinese Civil-Military Relations (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 183–184.

66 See Liu Huaqing’s Memoirs, 437. The PLAN planners divide the world’s navies into three categories: the far-oceans offensive type (yuanyang jingong xing, or global blue-water type), regional defensive and 

offensive type (quyu fangyu jingong xing, or regional blue-water type), and coastal defensive type (yan’an 

fangyu xing). The U.S. Navy belongs to the first category, while the British, French, German, Italian, Japanese, and Russian Navies belong to the second category. The Indian Navy is alleged to be “sub-regional” (“ci 

quyu”), or somewhere between the second and the third categories, while other navies belong to the third 

category. The medium-term (around 2020) goal of the PLAN is to become the second type. This type of navy 

can operate effectively for control of the seas within its own region. In the meantime, it also possesses the 

capabilities to project power beyond its own region and compete effectively for sea-control and impose seadenial in the seas of the other oceans, as did the British Navy during the Falklands War. The concept of “far 

seas” is in line with the second type, while the concept of “far oceans” (yuanyang, 远洋) is compatible with 

the first type. China’s medium-term goal is to develop a far-seas but not a far-oceans navy.

67 Jiang and Hu cited in Tang and Wu, “A Study of China’s Sea Defense Strategy,” 93; Jiang cited in 

Wang Zhigang, “Haijun shi hanwei guojia liyi tuozhan de zhongyao liliang” [Navy Is an Important Force in 

Defending the Extension and Development of National Interests], Guofang daxue xuebao (Journal of NDU), 

no. 10 (2005), 24, and in Chen Xuesong, Du Kai, “Zhongguo de haiquan yu haijun fazhan jianshe” [China’s 

Sea Power Consciousness and Navy Development and Construction], Military History, 4 ( 2008), 72. 

68 See particularly Ye Xinrong and Zuo Liping, “Strategic Reflections Regarding the March of the 

Navy from the Near Seas to the Far Seas,” Military Art Journal, no. 10 (2004), 30–33. Both authors are from 

the Navy Military Art Research Institute.

69 Liu Huaqing’s Memoirs, 434. 

70 Su Jinrong, “Haijun zhanyi ying guanche ‘xiaojiqun jidong zuozhan’ de zhidao sixiang” [Navy 

Campaign Should Implement the Guiding Thought of Small Group Maneuvering Operations, Journal of 

NDU, no. 3 (2004), 30–32. See also Wang Yemin, “Haishang zhandouqun daji di jidong biandui de zhuyao 

yangshi” [Major Ways for Sea Battle Group to Strike the Enemy’s Maneuvering Formation], Military Art 

Journal, no. 1 (2004), 62–64. Such a multifunctional battle group clearly can serve as an escort flotilla to secure SLOCs far away from the home waters. It can also serve as the organizational basis for incorporating 

much larger platforms such as aircraft carriers in the future.

71 See Jiang Kaihui, “Youhua Haizhan huanjing, jiaqiang zhanchang jianshe” [Optimize Sea Operations Environment, Enhance Battlefield Construction], Military Art Journal, no. 5 (2005), 51–52; Zhou 

Hanrong, “Xinxihua tiaojianxia haishang zuozhan houqin baozhang yanjiu” [Research on Logistics Services 

for Sea Operations under Informatized Conditions], Military Art Journal, no. 1 (2005), 62–64; Sun Baolong, 

“Yitihua lianqin baozhang tizhi xia haishang zuozhan houqin baozhang mianlin de wenti yu duice” [Problems Faced by the Logistics Services for Sea Operations under the System of Integrated Joint Logistics Services and Policy Response], Journal of NDU, no. 3 (2005), 15–17.

72 See Cheng Xiaochun, Hu Limin, “Jiawu haizhan dui xinshiqi zhenxin haijun de qishi” [Revelations of the Sino-Japanese War on Rejuvenating the Navy in the New Period], Military Art Journal, no. 10 

(2004), 6; Zhang Wei, Zheng Hong, “Lun wo haijun fazhan de zhanlue xuqiu yu jiyu” [On the Strategic Necessities and Opportunities for Developing Our Navy], Military Art Journal, no. 10 (2004). 34. All four authors are from the Navy Military Art Research Institute.

73China’s value of foreign trade in 1978 was $20.6 billion. It grew to $620.79 billion by 2002 and 

reached $851.2 billion by 2003. By 2005 it grew to $1.42 trillion, up 23.2 percent from a year earlier and 

nearly tripled the figure in 2001. For the first three figures and shipping by sea, see Ye and Zuo, “Strategic 

Reflections,” 31; Zhang and Zheng, “On the Strategic Necessities,” 34; Liang Fang, “Haiyang zai guojia anquan zhong de diwei zuoyong ji duice” [Status and Role of Oceans in National Security and Policy Response], Military Art Journal, no. 1 (2005), 66. For the rest, see Chris Buckley, “China Urged to Step up to 

WTO Plate,” Reuters, August 29, 2006. See also Wang, “Navy Is an Important Force,” 23.

74China’s merchant fleet is allegedly the fifth largest in the world, and China has more than 30 shipping lines reaching more than 600 ports in 150 countries and regions. It is predicted that Chinese shipping 

will handle businesses that will be worth $720 billion by 2010 and $1.08 trillion by 2020. Ye and Zuo, “Strategic Reflections,” 31; Liang, “Status and Role,” 66. 

75China imported 80 million tons of oil in 2000. The figure reached 91.12 million tons by 2003, the 

year China overtook Japan as the second largest consumer of oil. China’s dependence on imported oil grew 

from 36.1 percent in 2003 to more than 40 percent by 2004, and is predicted to reach 80 percent by 2020. 

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 139 11/29/11 12
140 NAN LI

Also, four-fifths of China’s imported oil has to be shipped to China through the major SLOCs in the Indian 

Ocean and the South China Sea, and “chokepoints” such as the Strait of Malacca. See Ye and Zuo, “Strategic 

Reflections,” 31; Zhang and Zheng, “Strategic Necessities,” 34; Liang, “Status and Role,” 66; Hou Zhiping, 

“Dui weihu woguo shiyou anquan de zhanlue sikao [Strategic Reflections on Safeguarding the Oil Security 

of Our Country], Journal of NDU, no. 8 (2005), 86. 

76 Half of the 45 types of strategic minerals, including oil, natural gas, zinc, manganese, molybdenum, and silver must either be imported or mined from the oceans. See Ye and Zuo, “Strategic Reflections,” 

31; Liang, “Status and Role,” 66. 

77 In 1978, China’s maritime economy was worth $8 billion. In 2003, the figure grew to about $129 

billion. Zhang and Zheng, “Strategic Necessities,” 34; Liang, “Status and Role,” 66.

78 Zhang and Zheng, “Strategic Necessities,” 24; Liang, “Status and Role,” 65.

79 By 2003, the total value of the Chinese overseas investment was $13.2 billion. Excluding those in 

the banking sector, China had 7,720 overseas enterprises. By 2005, the total value reached $57.2 billion and 

the number of the Chinese overseas enterprises reached more than 10,000, largely due to the growth of the 

Chinese direct investment overseas, which hit $12.26 billion, a 123 percent increase from 2004. The Chinese 

investment overseas for the first 6 months of 2006 was $6.44 billion, a 65.3 percent increase from the same 

period in the previous year. For 2003 numbers, see Zhang and Zheng, “Strategic Necessities,” 24. For others, 

see “China Overseas Investment Reaches Record,” United Press International, September 4, 2006; Zhu Zhu, 

“Overseas Investment Expected to Increase,” China Daily, September 6, 2005; Caijing shibao (Financial and 

Economics Times), September 9, 2006.

80Ye and Zuo, “Strategic Reflections,” 31; Zhang and Zheng, “Strategic Necessities,” 34; Liang, “Status and Role,” 66.

81 For quotation, see Ye and Zuo, “Strategic Reflections,” 31. For others, see Cheng and Hu, “Revelations of the Sino-Japanese War,” 29. See also Liang, “Status and Role,” 67.

82Ye and Zuo, ‘Strategic Reflections,” 32; Zhang and Zheng, “Strategic Necessities,” 34. Naval researchers predict that the Chinese economy will constitute 17.5 percent of the world’s total GDP by 2015 

and 22 percent by 2020. 

83Ye and Zuo, “Strategic Reflections,” 31; Zhang and Zheng, “Strategic Necessities,” 34–35; Zhang 

Jiyu, Mu Yongpeng, “Jiji tuijin haijun xinxihua jianshe” [Actively Carry Forward Navy Informatization Construction], Guofang bao [National Defense News], June 24, 2004, 3; Li Jie, “Meiguo haijun ‘wangluo zhongxin zhan’ jianshe ji qishi” [Construction of ‘Net-centric Warfare’ by the U.S. Navy and Lessons], Military Art 

Journal, no. 10 (2004), 36. Li is from the Navy Military Art Research Institute.

84 Zhang had been ill for sometime, and this may have also contributed to his subdued profile. He 

recently died and his position was taken over by Wu Shengli. Wu once commanded the 6th DDG Flotilla of 

the East Sea Fleet and was a deputy chief of the PLA General Staff. 

85 This is also the timetable set by Jiang Zemin for completing the PLA mechanization.

86 Partly for technical maintenance reasons, the antiship DDGs newly acquired from Russia are deployed in the East Sea Fleet, while the indigenously built air-defense DDGs are deployed in the South Sea 

Fleet and North Sea Fleet. This may also have to change in order to organize multifunctional battle groups.

87 The development of such facilities on the Paracels and similar ones reported to be developed in 

Burma and Pakistan for the future may serve such a purpose. See Bill Gertz, “China Builds up Strategic Sea 

Lanes,” Washington Times, January 18, 2005. For a discussion of the validity of the claims on Chinese bases 

in Burma, see Andrew Selth, “Burma, China and the Myth of Military Bases,” Asian Security 3, no. 3 (2007).

88 The author wants to thank Peter Dutton for highlighting this point.

89 See Ye Zicheng, Luchuan fazhan yu daguo xingshuai [Land Power Development and Rise and Decline of Great Powers] (Beijing: New Star Press, 2007). Author’s interview with Ye, Beijing University, Beijing, 

April 22, 2008. 

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Chapter 6

PLAN Force Structure: Submarines, Ships, 

and Aircraft

Ronald O’Rourke

Introduction1

Force-Structure vs. Non–Force-Structure Changes

China since the 1990s has been modernizing its naval force structure 

by replacing older and technologically obsolete or obsolescent submarines, 

surface ships, and aircraft with foreign-made and indigenously produced units 

that are technologically much more modern and capable. This force-structure 

modernization effort is one of the most directly observable elements of China’s 

effort to turn its navy into a modern and capable fighting force—an effort 

that also includes improvements, some of them less directly observable, in 

non–force-structure elements of military capability such as supporting C4ISR 

(command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance) capabilities, information warfare capabilities, and military 

doctrine, education, and training.

With enough money and industrial capability—and China has plenty of 

both—force structure can be modernized fairly quickly.2

 In contrast, certain 

non–force-structure elements of military capability, particularly those relating 

to personnel quality, education, and training, can take longer to improve. While 

the non–force-structure elements of China’s military are improving, they might 

not in all cases be improving as quickly as some of the force-structure elements. 

If so, an analysis that focuses solely on the more rapidly modernizing elements 

of China’s force structure could lead to an overstatement of China’s military 

effectiveness.

Maritime Relevant Force-Structure Changes Outside the Navy

It should also be noted at the outset that China’s military modernization effort includes some force-structure changes outside the navy that are 

potentially relevant to military operations in the Taiwan Strait area and the 

Western Pacific. The addition of modern aircraft to China’s air force (PLAAF, 

or People’s Liberation Army Air Force) is one potential example; China’s 

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rapidly growing number of theater-range ballistic missiles (TBMs) is another. Of 

particular note, China reportedly is developing TBMs armed with maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs) that will be capable of hitting moving ships at sea.3

Such weapons, if combined with a surveillance and targeting system of sufficient 

range, could pose a kind of threat that the U.S. Navy and other navies have not 

previously faced.

Near-Term and Broader/Longer-Term Goals

Changes in China’s naval force structure are better understood when 

placed in the context of the apparent near-term goals and the apparent broader or longer-term goals of China’s military modernization effort. There is a 

consensus among observers that a near-term goal of China’s military modernization is to develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. 

Consistent with this goal, observers believe, China wants its modernized 

military to be capable of acting as a so-called antiaccess force—a force that can 

deter U.S. intervention in a military crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait area, 

or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of U.S. intervention 

forces, particularly U.S. naval and air forces. The U.S. Department of Defense 

(DOD) states that “If a quick resolution [to a situation involving Taiwan] is not 

possible, Beijing would seek to deter U.S. intervention or, failing that, delay 

such intervention, defeat it in an asymmetric, limited, quick war; or, fight it to 

a standstill and pursue a protracted conflict.”4

China’s emerging maritime antiaccess force can be viewed as broadly 

analogous to the sea-denial force that the Soviet Union developed during the 

Cold War to deny U.S. use of the sea or to counter U.S. forces participating in a 

NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. One significant potential difference between the 

Soviet sea-denial force and China’s emerging maritime antiaccess force is that 

China’s force could include the previously mentioned MaRV-equipped TBMs 

capable of hitting moving ships at sea.

Some analysts have speculated in recent years that China may attain (or 

believe that is has attained) a capable maritime antiaccess capability, or important elements of it, by about 2010.5

 Other observers believe China will attain 

(or believe that it has attained) such a capability some time after 2010. DOD 

states that “The Intelligence Community estimates China will take until the 

end of this decade or later to produce a modern force capable of defeating a 

moderate-size adversary.”6

 The term “moderate-size adversary” would appear 

to apply to a country other than the United States. 

In addition to a near-term focus on developing military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan, DOD and other observers believe that 

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broader or longer-term goals of China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, include the following:

■   asserting China’s regional military leadership, displacing U.S. regional military influence, prevailing in regional rivalries, and encouraging 

eventual U.S. military withdrawal from the region

■  defending China’s claims in maritime territorial disputes, some of 

which have implications for oil, gas, or mineral exploration rights

■  protecting China’s sea lines of communication, which China relies 

upon increasingly for oil and other imports.

These broader or longer-term goals are significant for at least three 

reasons. First, they imply that if the situation with Taiwan is somehow resolved, 

China will find continuing reasons to pursue its modernization effort. DOD 

states that: “China’s near-term focus on preparing for military contingencies in 

the Taiwan Strait, including the possibility of U.S. intervention, appears to be 

an important driver of its modernization plans. However, analysis of China’s 

military acquisitions and strategic thinking suggests Beijing is also generating 

capabilities for other regional contingencies, such as conflict over resources 

or territory.”7

 The U.S. Director of National Intelligence has similarly stated: 

“Beijing continues its rapid rate of military modernization, initiated in 1999. 

We assess that China’s aspirations for great power status, threat perceptions, and 

security strategy would drive this modernization effort even if the Taiwan 

problem were resolved.”8

Second, if these broader or longer-term goals eventually become more 

prominent in the mix of reasons for China’s military modernization effort—

either because the situation with Taiwan has been resolved, or because the 

buildup of Taiwan-related force elements has been completed—it could prompt 

a shift in the composition of the naval modernization effort toward a greater 

emphasis on force-structure elements that are more closely associated with these 

broader or longer-term goals, such as aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered attack 

submarines (SSNs) as opposed to nonnuclear-powered attack submarines (SSs), 

serial production of destroyers as opposed to the recent production of new 

destroyer designs in ones and twos, at-sea logistics, and overseas bases.

Third, these broader or longer-term goals suggest that even if China’s 

military never fires a shot in anger at an opposing military, its military forces, 

including in particular naval forces, will still be used on a day-to-day basis 

to promote China’s political position in the Pacific. This creates an essentially 

political (as opposed to combat-related) reason for the United States or other countries to maintain a competitive presence in the region with naval and 

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144 O’ROURKE

other forces that are viewed by observers in the Pacific as capable of effectively 

countering China’s forces.

Key Trends in Force Structure Composition and Capabilities

Submarines

China’s submarine force-structure modernization effort has attracted 

substantial attention and concern. The effort in recent years has involved the 

acquisition of at least five classes of submarines that are expected to be much 

more modern and capable than China’s aging older-generation submarines. 

China by the end of 2006 completed taking delivery on eight Russian-made 

Kilo-class nonnuclear-powered attack submarines that are in addition to four 

Kilos that China purchased from Russia in the 1990s. China has also built in 

recent years, or is currently building, four other classes of submarines, including the following:

■   a new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) design 

called the Jin-class or Type 094

■   a new nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) design called the 

Shang-class or Type 093

■   a new SS design called the Yuan-class or Type 041

■   another (and also fairly new) SS design called the Song-class or Type 

039/039G.

China’s submarines are armed with one or more of the following: antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), wire-guided and wake-homing torpedoes, 

and mines. Although ASCMs are often highlighted as sources of concern, 

wake-homing torpedoes can also be very difficult for surface ships to counter. 

In addition to some combination of ASCMs, torpedoes, and mines, Jin-class 

SSBNs will carry a new type of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), 

and Shang-class SSNs may carry land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs).

Jin-class (Type 094) SSBN. The first Jin-class boat is expected to 

become operational as a submarine in mid-2007 and as an SSBN in 2008–09, 

depending on progress with the new JL–2 SLBM.9

 Additional units are expected, perhaps at 2-year intervals, and a total of four are expected.10 The Jin-class 

design may be derived from the Shang-class (Type 093) SSN design discussed 

below. The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) states that China “wishes 

to develop a credible, survivable, sea-based deterrent with the capability to 

reach the United States” and that the Jin-class design “benefits from substantial 

Russian technical assistance.”11 The Jin-class design is expected to be armed with 

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12 JL–2 SLBMs. DOD estimates that these missiles will enter service between 

2007 and 2010, and that they will have a range of 8,000+ kilometers (about 

4,320+ nautical miles).12 Such a range could permit Jin-class SSBNs operating 

in protected bastions close to China to attack U.S. targets in Hawaii, Alaska, 

and locations in the continental United States that are north and west of a line 

running from central or southern California to northern Minnesota.13

Shang-class (Type 093) SSN. The Shang-class SSNs are generally viewed 

as replacements for China’s aging Han-class SSNs, which entered service between 1974 and 1990.14 (The first Han-class boat was reportedly decommissioned in 2003, and observers expect the other four will be decommissioned 

as Shang-class boats enter service.15) DOD states that the first Shang-class SSN 

began sea trials in 2005.16 The first boat was expected to be commissioned in 

2006 and the second in 2007; the operational service dates for the two boats 

are expected to be 2007 and 2008. Construction of a third boat (possibly to 

a modified design) may have begun, but has not yet been confirmed. A total 

of five boats is generally expected, but one source states that “[the] Pentagon 

estimates 3–4 [units] in commission by 2010, with requirements likely to run 

to eight to ten submarines (providing mostly escort for ‘Jin’ [Jin-class SSBNs] 

and the ‘Xia’ No. 406 SSBN.)”17 ONI states that the Shang-class “is intended 

primarily for antisurface warfare at greater ranges from the Chinese coast 

than the current diesel force. China looks at SSNs as a primary weapon against 

aircraft carrier battle groups and their associated logistics support.”18

Observers believe the Shang-class SSNs will likely represent a substantial improvement over the reportedly fairly noisy Han-class boats.19 The Shangclass reportedly was designed in conjunction with Russian experts and is 

derived from the Soviet Victor III-class SSN design that was first deployed by 

the Soviet Union around 1978. The Victor III was the first in a series of quieter 

Soviet SSN designs that, by the mid-1980s, led to substantial concern among 

U.S. Navy officials that the Soviet Union was closing the U.S. lead in SSN technology and thereby creating what Navy officials described as an antisubmarine 

warfare (ASW) “crisis” for the U.S. Navy.20 Observers expect the Shang-class 

boats to be armed with a modern ASCM and also with a LACM broadly similar 

to the U.S. Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile. 

One set of observers states that

the emergence of China’s [Type] 093 SSN and [Type] 094 SSBN has been 

anticipated for some time. Nevertheless, these programs remain shrouded 

in mystery, and there is little consensus regarding their operational and 

strategic significance. In the broadest terms, it can be said that a successful [Type] 093 program will significantly enlarge the scope of Chinese 

submarine operations, perhaps ultimately serving as the cornerstone of a 

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146 O’ROURKE

genuine blue-water navy. The [Type] 094 could take the survivability 

of China’s nuclear deterrent to a new level, potentially enabling more 

aggressive posturing by Beijing in a crisis. Moreover, these platforms are 

entering the PLA Navy (PLAN) at a time when reductions are projected to 

occur in the U.S. Navy submarine force; that fact was duly noted by a 

senior PLAN strategist recently in one of China’s premier naval journals.21

Kilo-class SS. China ordered its initial four Kilo-class SSs from Russia in 

1993; the first two were of the less capable (but still fairly capable) Project 877 

variant, which Russia has exported to several countries; the other two were of 

the more capable Project 636 variant that Russia had previously reserved for 

its own use. China ordered its next eight additional Kilos from Russia in 2002; 

they reportedly are all of the Project 636 design. ONI states that the delivery of 

these eight boats “will provide the Chinese Navy with a significant qualitative 

increase in warfighting capability,”22 while another observer states that the Kiloclass boats are “among the most worrisome of China’s foreign acquisitions. . . .”23

The eight recently delivered Kilos are reportedly armed with the highly capable 

SS–N–27 Sizzler ASCM, while the four older ones reportedly are to be refitted in 

Russia, with the upgrades likely to include the installation of the SS–N–27. One 

source states that the boats might also be fitted at some point with the Russianmade Shkval, a supercavitating, high-speed (200-knot) torpedo.24

Yuan-class (Type 041) SS. The first Yuan-class boat, whose appearance 

reportedly came as a surprise to Western observers,25 was launched (i.e., put into 

the water for the final stage of construction) in 2004. Observers expected the 

first Yuan-class boat to enter service in 2006 and the second to enter service in 

2009. One source states that in addition to the first two units in the class, “Two 

further units are currently building at Wuhan [Shipbuilding Industry Co.]. By 

2010, boats No. 9 & 10 will likely commission. Twenty of [the] class are expected 

to be built and [the] Jiangnan Shipyard (Shanghai) is expected to be integrated 

into [the] programme during 2006 with completion of [the] last ‘Song-II’ class.”26

Some observers believe the Yuan class may incorporate technology from 

Russia’s most recent SS design, known as the Lada or Amur class, as well as 

technology from the Kilo design. One observer states: “There are few details 

at present but the design appears to exhibit some features of the Song class, although it appears to be shorter and broader, and possibly also of the Russian 

Kilo class. The design of the fin [i.e., the sail] is similar to that of the former 

while a distinctive ‘hump’ on top of a teardrop shaped hull is characteristic of 

the latter. It is possible therefore that the boat is of double-hulled construction. 

[The boat is] fitted with a seven-bladed propeller. It is not known whether an 

AIP [air-independent propulsion] system has been incorporated.”27

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Song-class (Type 039/039G) SS. The first Song-class boat entered service 

in 1999, and a total of 13 were in service by 2006. Further ships in the class 

are not expected. The first boat reportedly experienced problems, resulting in 

design changes that were incorporated into subsequent (Type 039G) boats. 

Some observers believe the Song-class design may have benefitted from PLA 

Navy experience with the Kilo class. One set of observers states:

The design and production rates of China’s new Song-class diesel submarine represent a significant advance over its predecessor, the Mingclass submarine. The Song class has a hydrodynamically sleek (teardrop) 

profile, possesses new cylindrical environmental sensors, and relies on 

German engines for propulsion. Most significantly, the Song is much 

quieter because it is fitted with an asymmetrical seven-blade skew 

propeller, and the Song uses anechoic rubber dampening tiles on the hull 

and shock absorbency for the engine to reduce its acoustic signature. 

The Song may also be able to launch cruise missiles when submerged, 

another design advance for China’s conventional submarines.28

Older Ming-class (Type 035) and Romeo-class (Type 033) SSs. China’s 

submarine force in 2007 also included about 19 older Ming (Type 035) SSs and 

about 8 even-older remaining Romeo-class (Type 033) SSs. The first Ming-class 

boat entered service in 1971 and the 20th was launched in 2002. If China decides 

that Ming-class boats have continued value as minelayers or as bait or decoy submarines that can be used to draw out enemy submarines (such as U.S. SSNs), it 

may elect to keep some of them in service even as new submarines enter service. 

China’s Romeo-class boats entered service between the early 1960s and the late 

1980s. Of the eight still in service as of 2007, one is a modified boat that has been 

used as a cruise missile test ship. With the possible exception of this missile test 

ship, the remaining Romeos are expected to be decommissioned soon.

China’s submarine modernization effort is producing a substantially 

more modern and capable submarine force. As shown in table 6–1, observers 

expect China to have a total of 31 Jin-, Shang-, Kilo-, Yuan-, and Song-class submarines in commission by the end of 2010.29

The figures in table 6–1 show that between 1995, when China took 

delivery of its first two Kilos, and 2007, China placed into service a total of 

37 submarines, or an average of about 2.8 submarines per year. This average 

commissioning rate, if sustained indefinitely, would eventually result in a 

steady-state submarine force of 57 to 85 boats of all kinds, assuming an average 

submarine life of 20 to 30 years. Excluding the 12 Kilos purchased from Russia,30

the total number of domestically produced submarines placed into service 

between 1995 and 2007 is 25, or an average of about 1.9 per year. This 

average rate of domestic production, if sustained indefinitely, would result in a 

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148 O’ROURKE

steady-state force of domestically produced submarines of 38 to 58 boats of all 

kinds, again assuming an average submarine life of 20 to 30 years.

Only two of the submarines placed into service between 1995 and 2007 

are nuclear powered. If the mix of China’s submarine-production effort shifts 

at some point to include a greater proportion of nuclear-powered boats, it is

Table 6–1. PLA Navy Submarine Commissionings Actual (1995–2006) and 

Projected (2007+)

Year

Jin

(Type 094) 

SSBN

Shang

(Type 093) 

SSN

Kilo SS

(Russian-made)

Yuan

(Type 041) 

SS

Song

(Type 039) 

SS

Ming

(Type 035) 

SSa

Total

1995 2b 1 3

1996 1 1

1997 2 2

1998 1b 2 3

1999 1b 1 2

2000 1 1

2001 2 1 3

2002 1 1

2003 2 2

2004 1 3 4

2005 4 3 7

2006 1 3 1 2c 7

2007 1d 1

2008 1 n/a n/a

2009 n/a 1 n/a

2010 1e n/a n/a n/a

2011 n/a n/a n/a

2012 1e n/a n/a n/a

2013 n/a n/a n/a

2014 1e n/a n/a n/a

Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007–2008, and previous editions. n/a = data not available.

a

 Figures for Ming-class boats are when the boats were launched (i.e., put into the water for final construction). Actual 

commissioning dates for these boats may have been later.

b

 First four boats, commissioned in the 1990s, are to be refitted in Russia; upgrades are likely to include installation of the 

SS–N–27 antiship cruise missile.

c

 No further units expected after the 12th and 13th shown for 2006.

d

 Construction of a third ship (possibly to a modified design) may have started but has not been confirmed. A total of five 

boats is expected.

e

 Additional units are expected, perhaps at 2-year intervals. A total of four boats is expected. One news article, citing 

information from the Office of Naval Intelligence, states that a total of five are expected. (Bill Gertz, “China Expands Sub 

Fleet,” Washington Times, March 2, 2007.)

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possible that the greater resources required to produce nuclear-powered boats 

might result in a reduction in the overall submarine production rate. If so, and 

if such a reduced overall rate were sustained indefinitely, it would eventually 

result in a smaller steady-state submarine force of all kinds than the figures 

calculated in the preceding paragraphs.

ONI stated in 2004 that “Chinese diesel submarine force levels are stabilizing as quality replaces quantity,” and published a graph accompanying this 

statement suggesting that the figure may stabilize at a level between 25 and 

50.31 The 2007–2008 edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships states: “Looking ahead, further modern conventional boats are expected to be constructed as the 27 older 

and less capable units (Romeo and Ming classes) are paid off [i.e., retired] and, 

while predictions are hazardous, an overall force level of about 40–50 boats is 

expected.”32 A third observer states: “China will have at least 34 advanced submarines deployed in the Pacific by 2010—some analysts expect as many as 50 

to 60— assuming that those under construction will be completed within three 

years. China will certainly have over 60 advanced submarines by 2020.”33 A 

fourth observer states: “Although China is modernizing its submarine force, it 

is not ‘expanding’ it. Since the mid-1980s, the force has been in steady decline 

from nearly 120 boats to roughly 55 operational submarines today. The U.S. 

Navy expects the force will level out around 40 boats in the next decade. The 

decline of the submarine fleet is part of a transition where large older classes 

are being phased out and replaced with newer but less numerous submarine 

classes.”34

Aircraft Carriers

The issue of whether and when China might deploy one or more aircraft 

carriers, and what the design and capabilities of Chinese aircraft carriers might 

be, has been a topic of discussion among government and nongovernment 

observers for the last several years.35 Developments since mid-2005 have suggested to some observers that China now intends to complete the unfinished exRussian carrier Varyag, which it purchased from Russia several years ago, and 

place it into service in the near future, possibly as an aviation training ship.

The Varyag has an estimated full load displacement of about 58,500 tons, 

compared to about 100,000 tons for a U.S. Navy Nimitz-class (CVN–68) aircraft carrier, about 42,000 tons for the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle

(which was commissioned in 2001), and about 65,000 to 70,000 tons for aircraft carriers that the United Kingdom and France plan to commission into 

service between 2013 and 2016. It is estimated that the Varyag can embark an 

air wing of 18 Su–33 Flanker fighters, compared to 70 or more aircraft on a 

Nimitz-class carrier, 36 aircraft on the Charles de Gaulle, and 40 to 45 aircraft 

on the future UK and French carriers.

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One source states that “Beijing statements allude more consistently to a 

3-carrier force requirement, which may or may not include the ex-Varyag. . . . 

Were a Chinese carrier contract finalised in 2006, it would be 2011 

before launching and 2014 before commissioning; a second ship could follow 

in 2016.”36

DOD states the following:

In October 2006, Lieutenant General Wang Zhiyuan, vice chairman 

of the Science and Technology Commission of the PLA’s General Armament Department stated that the “Chinese army will study how to manufacture aircraft carriers so that we can develop our own. . . . [A]ircraft 

carriers are indispensable if we want to protect our interests in oceans.”

China first began to discuss developing an indigenous aircraft carrier in the late 1970s. In 1985, China purchased the Australian carrier the 

HMAS Melbourne. Although the hull was scrapped, Chinese technicians 

studied the ship and built a replica of its flight deck for pilot training. 

China purchased two former Soviet carriers—the Minsk in 1998 and the 

Kiev in 2000. Neither carrier was made operational; instead, they were 

used as floating military theme parks. Nevertheless, both provided design information to PLA Navy engineers.

In 1998 China purchased the ex-Varyag, a Kuznetsov-class Soviet carrier that was only 70 percent complete at the time of the Soviet Union’s 

collapse. Recent deck refurbishment, electrical work, fresh hull paint 

with PLA Navy markings, and expressed interest in Russia’s Su–33 fighter has re-kindled debate about a Chinese carrier fleet. The PLA’s ultimate 

intentions for the Varyag remain unclear, but a number of possibilities 

exist: turning it into an operational aircraft carrier, a training or transitional platform, or a floating theme park—its originally-stated purpose.

Regardless of Beijing’s final objective for the ex-Varyag, PLA Navy 

study of the ship’s structural design could eventually assist China in creating its own carrier program. Lieutenant General Wang stated that, “we 

cannot establish a real naval force of aircraft carriers within three or five 

years.” Some analysts in and out of government predict that China could 

have an operational carrier by the end of the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–

2015); others assess the earliest it could deploy an operational aircraft 

carrier is 2020 or beyond.37

The 2007–2008 edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships expected that China would 

return the Varyag to service in 2008, possibly under the name Shi Lang, and that 

the ship would become fully operational as an aviation training ship in 2010:

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Procurement of an aircraft carrier capability has been a high priority for the Chinese Navy since the 1990s. Ex-Varyag, the second of the 

Kuznetsov class (the first of class, Admiral Kuznetsov, remains in service 

in the Russian Navy) was between 70 and 80 per cent complete by early 

1993 when building was terminated after an unsuccessful attempt by the 

Russian Navy to fund completion. Subsequently the ship was bought by 

China and, having been towed through the Bosporus on 2 November 

2001, arrived at Dalian in March 2002. Since then, there have been conflicting reports about Chinese plans for the ship but, following its emergence from dock in mid-2005 painted in military colours, it is likely that 

it is intended to bring the ship into operational service. Work in 2006 included the apparent application of a non-skid surface to the flight deck. 

Reports in November 2006 that China was negotiating to procure up to 

50 Sukhoi Su–33 fighters was a further indicator of Chinese intentions. 

A further major docking period is probably required to fit shafts and/or 

propellors and to complete survey and renovation of hull fittings. . . .

Initial sea trials are expected to start in 2008 after which an extensive 

period of trials and training is likely to follow. It is unlikely that the ship 

will begin operational flying training until about 2010. The ship’s (unconfirmed) pennant number [83] suggests that her initial status will be as a 

training ship. The aircraft inventory is not yet known but is likely to comprise a mixture of Russian-built fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. The 

ship’s name has also not been confirmed; Admiral Shi Lang was commander-in-chief of the Manchu fleets which conquered Taiwan in 1681.38

Another observer stated in May 2007 that:

For over a year, the PLAN has been more or less open about China’s 

eventual deployment of an aircraft carrier battle group. Except for the 

carrier, China has all the elements of a carrier battle group in place, according to Lieutenant General Wang Zhiyuan of the PLA General Armaments Department. China will finish constructing its first aircraft carrier 

by 2010, according to an unnamed lieutenant general (probably General 

Wang again), but its first operational carrier will likely be the Varyag, the 

former Soviet carrier bought from Ukraine.

China’s once-secret naval aviation program appears to be underway at 

full steam. At its center is the massive 67,000-ton former Ukrainian aircraft carrier, which the Chinese government extracted from the Black 

Sea in 2001 after considerable costs in both treasure and political capital 

with Turkey. In March 2002, the Varyag finally completed its 15,200-mile 

journey to its new home port of Dalian, where it was immediately placed 

under heavy security at the PLAN dry docks.

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China has reportedly negotiated a contract for 48 Sukhoi–33 jet fighters, 

the carrier-based version of the Su–27, and is now preparing the Varyag’s 

flight deck for flight operations. Reports in the PRC media indicate that 

China will also configure its new Jian–10 fighter for carrier operations.

The PLAN Air Force (PLANAF) schedule apparently envisions developing a carrier air wing by the time China launches its own aircraft carrier, despite official Beijing’s continuing protestations that while “China 

already is capable of building an aircraft carrier, a final decision on construction has not yet been made.”39

Another observer stated in 2006 that:

The year 2005 marked a turning point in China’s willingness to continue to deny or obfuscate its ambitions to build aircraft carriers. Last May 

it moved the old Russian uncompleted aircraft carrier hulk the Varyag, 

that it purchased and moved to Dalian harbor in 2002, from dockside 

into a drydock. It then emerged in early August painted in PLA Navy 

grey, and the most recent Internet-source photos show that the carrier 

deck is receiving new multiple coatings. China’s ruse was that the Varyag would be turned into a casino and Chinese officials have repeatedly 

denied they were developing carriers. But on March 10, Hong Kong’s 

Wen Wei Po quoted General Wang Zhiyuan, a Deputy Director of the 

Science and Technology Committee of the General Armaments Department, that in “three to five years,” “The Chinese army will conduct research and build an aircraft carrier and develop our own aircraft carrier 

fleet.” He went on to add that the escort and support ships for this carrier group are either being built or have already been built. These would 

likely include the new Luyang 1, Luyang 2 and Luzhou class air defense 

destroyers launched from 2003 to 2005, new Type 093 nuclear powered 

attack submarines, and new Fuchi class underway replenishment ships.

If General Wang is to be believed, then the carrier Varyag, now undergoing what appears to be substantial refurbishment, will be used for some 

kind of military mission. These could include the refinement of China’s 

anti-aircraft carrier doctrine and tactics, training and development of a 

new carrier air wing, and future aerial and amphibious support combat 

missions. In August 2005 Russian sources interviewed at the Moscow 

Airshow offered confirmation of China’s carrier plans in that two Russian 

companies offered that China was interested in two types of future carrier combat aircraft, the Sukhoi Su–33 and the Chengdu J–10 modified 

with a new Russian engine thrust vector to enable slower carrier landing 

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speeds. The Russians also used the Moscow Airshow to market the twinseat Su–33UB, but modified with thrust vector engines. It is quite likely 

that all three will be upgraded with new more powerful Russian Al–31 

engines, have new active-phased array radar, and carry a range of active guided and helmet display sighted air-to-air missiles and precision 

ground attack missiles. As such both could offer some performance parameters that equal or even exceed that of the U.S. Boeing F/A–18E/F, 

the main U.S. carrier combat aircraft. Internet sources also indicate that 

China is developing a carrier-sized AWACS aircraft that could also be 

developed into antisubmarine and cargo support variants. While the U.S. 

Navy benefits from its over 70 years of constant practice and employment of effective carrier aviation, it is nonetheless a major shock that 

China’s carrier fleet could commence with combat capabilities that could 

neutralize those of the U.S. Navy in some scenarios.40

Destroyers, Frigates, and Fast Attack Craft

China since the early 1990s has purchased four Sovremenny-class 

destroyers from Russia and built nine new classes of destroyers and frigates 

that demonstrate a significant modernization of China’s surface combatant 

technology. China has also deployed a new kind of fast attack craft that uses 

a stealthy catamaran hull design. One observer stated in 2005 that by 2010, 

China’s surface combatant force “could exceed 31 destroyers and 50 frigates, 

backed up by 30 ocean-capable stealthy fast attack craft.”41

Sovremenny-Class Destroyers. China in 1996 ordered two Sovremennyclass destroyers from Russia; the ships entered service in 1999 and 2001. 

China in 2002 ordered two additional Sovremenny-class destroyers from 

Russia; the ships entered service in 2005 and 2006. Sovremenny-class destroyers 

are equipped with the SS–N–22 Sunburn ASCM, a highly capable ASCM. DOD 

says the two ships ordered in 2002 “are fitted with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and wide-area air defense systems that feature qualitative improvements 

over the [two] earlier Sovremennyy-class DDGs China purchased from Russia.”42

China reportedly has an option for another two Sovremenny-class ships.

Five New Indigenously Built Destroyer Classes. China since the early 

1990s has built five new classes of destroyers. Compared to China’s 16 older Luda-class (Type 051) destroyers, which entered service between 1971 and 1991, 

these five new destroyer classes are substantially more modern in terms of their 

hull designs, propulsion systems, sensors, weapons, and electronics. A key area 

of improvement in the new destroyer designs is their antiair warfare (AAW) 

technology, which has been a significant shortcoming in China’s navy. Like the 

older Luda-class destroyers, these new destroyer classes are armed with ASCMs.

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As shown in table 6–2, China to date has commissioned only one or 

two ships in each of these five classes, suggesting that a key purpose of at least 

some of these classes may be to serve as stepping stones in a plan to modernize destroyer technologies incrementally before committing to larger-scale 

series production.43 One source says the limited production runs of these four 

designs to date “might be financially related, or may relate to debate over what 

ships should follow the Type 051C air defence and Type 052C multi-role classes, or that once the Type 054A [frigate design] is accepted as the future missile 

frigate design, three or four of the major warship shipyards will all be assigned 

to construction of this design, delaying a future CG/DDG class.”44 If one or 

more of these destroyer designs are put into larger-scale production, it would 

accelerate the modernization of China’s surface combatant force.

Table 6–2. New PLA Navy Destroyer Classes

Class name Type Number built Hull number(s) In service (actual or projected)

Luhu 052 2 112, 113 1994, 1996

Luhai 051B 1 167 1999

Luyang I 052B 2 168, 169 2004

Luyang II 052C 2 170, 171 2004, 2005

Luzhou 051C 2 115, 116 2006, 2007

Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007–2008.

The Luhu-class ships reportedly were ordered in 1985 but had their construction delayed by a decision to give priority to the construction of six frigates that were ordered by Thailand. The Luhai-class ship is believed to have 

served as the basis for the Luyang-class designs. One set of observers states that 

the Luhai-class design 

represented a significant design advance over China’s second-generation Luhu-class destroyer. In terms of overall size, the Luhai is 20 percent 

larger. It has a widened hull beam to enhance stability, armament-carrying capacity, and crew living space. In particular, the Luhai’s larger size 

permits four quad launchers for C801/C802 anti-ship missiles, which is 

double the number, deployed on the Luhu. The Luhai also uses a gas turbine engine, which is more powerful than the Luhu’s diesel gas turbine 

system. In addition, the design of the Luhai’s bridge and superstructure 

exhibits a number of stealthy characteristics (particularly in comparison to the Luhu’s structure). These design features include a streamlined 

superstructure with inclined angles and two solid masts with fewer protruding electronic sensor arrays. The stepped superstructure may have 

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been designed with the intention to equip the Luhai with vertical launch 

systems, possibly for SAMs [surface-to-air missiles] for an enhanced area-defense capability. The absence of such a system on the Luhai suggests 

that option was deferred for a time.45

Compared to the Luhai, the Luyang I-class ships appear stealthier. DOD 

states that the Luyang I design is equipped with the Russian-made SA–N–7B 

Grizzly SAM and the Chinese-made YJ–83 ASCM.46 The Luyang II-class ships 

appear to feature an even more capable AAW system that includes a Chinesemade SAM system called the HHQ–9 that has an even longer range, a vertical launch system (VLS), and a phased-array radar that is outwardly somewhat 

similar to the SPY–1 radar used in the U.S.-made Aegis combat system.47

One set of observers states that the Luyang I and II classes

represent important advances in the shipbuilding industry’s overall design and production techniques. . . . The latter have a similar design as 

the former, but they appear to be optimized for air-defense missions.

These four new destroyers represent an important evolution in shipbuilding design capabilities, production techniques, and management 

practices. The hulls are larger than the Luhai’s, which increases their 

weapons capacity, versatility, and stability on the high seas. The designs 

of these vessels are even stealthier, with sloped sides and a superstructure 

with a reduced profile—attributes that, collectively, reduce the vessel’s 

radar signature. Also, these hulls were built using modular shipbuilding, a technique increasingly widespread in China’s most modern shipyards. Modular construction (as opposed to keel-up) allows for work to 

be done on different sections at the same time, increasing the efficiency 

and speed of the production process. One of the most significant aspects of the new destroyers is the fact that China constructed these four 

new destroyers at the same time and quite quickly as well, at least compared with past experiences. This serial production of an indigenously 

designed vessel is a first in the PRC’s naval history and a testament to 

improved project management. The four new 052B– and 052C–class 

vessels have been built or have been under construction within the past 

four years. By comparison, in the entire decade of the 1990s China only 

built a second Luhu (1993) and one Luhai (1997) destroyer.

The 052C–class destroyer, in particular, possesses several important 

attributes. First, according to Goldstein and Murray, it uses a phased array or planar radar on the four corners of the bridges’ vertical superstructure, which would be used with a SAM vertical launch system (VLS) for 

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air-defense missiles—a second important innovation. Both of these attributes are a first for a Chinese combatant and help the PLAN resolve its 

long-standing weakness with air defense. In the past, Chinese combatants relied on short-range SAMs for air defense. A medium-range VLS 

SAM system would provide the Chinese navy with its first, real area-defense vessel, and a collection of such ships could allow the PLA Navy to 

operate surface action groups. If China is able to successfully reverse engineer Russian-purchased SAMs, then it may deploy them on the 052C 

destroyer. Some reports indicate that China may deploy its HQ–9 system (a Chinese version of a Russian SAM with a range of about 120 km) 

on the new destroyers. Such a system on the front of the new platform, 

combined with older Chinese SAMs in the stern, would give the Chinese 

their first fleet air-defense vessels.48

Regarding the radar to be carried by the Luyang II class, a January 2006 

journal article states: “The two Chinese Project 052C destroyers have fixed 

array radars that are often described as active arrays, though that cannot be 

certain.”49 Active radar arrays use a technology that is more modern and more 

capable in certain respects than the technology used in the SPY–1 radars on the 

U.S. Navy’s Aegis ships.

Regarding the HQ–9 SAM believed to be carried by the Luyang II-class 

destroyers, ONI states:

The most challenging threat to aircraft and cruise missiles comes from 

high-performance, long-range [SAM] systems like the Russian SA–10/

SA–20 family. The system combines very powerful three-dimensional 

radar and a high-performance missile with engagement ranges in excess 

of 100 nautical miles against a conventional target. The SA–10/SA–20 

has been marketed widely and has enjoyed some success in the export 

market, but its high cost has limited its proliferation. Technology from 

the SA–10 is being incorporated into China’s 50-nautical mile range 

HQ–9 SAM, which is intended for use on the new Luyang destroyer. The 

HQ–9 will provide China’s navy with its first true area air defense capability when the SAM becomes operational in the next few years.50

DOD says the Luzhou-class “is designed for anti-air warfare. It will be equipped 

with the Russian SA–N–20 SAM system controlled by the TOMBSTONE 

phased-array radar. The SA–N–20 more than doubles the range of current 

PLA Navy air defense systems marking a significant improvement in China’s 

ship-borne air defense capability.”51 Both Luzhou-class ships have conducted 

sea trials and were expected to enter service during 2007.52

Four New Indigenously Built Frigate Classes. China since the early 

1990s has built four new classes of frigates that are more modern than China’s

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31 older Jianghu-class (Type 053) frigates, which entered service between 

the mid-1970s and 1989. The four new frigate classes, like the new destroyer 

classes, feature a number of improvements over earlier-generation ships, including improved AAW capabilities. Unlike the new destroyer designs, two 

of the new frigate designs have been put into larger-scale series production. 

Table 6–3 summarizes the four new classes.

Table 6–3. New PLA Navy Frigate Classes 

Class name Type Number built 

or building Hull number(s) In service (actual or projected)

Jiangwei I 053G H2G 4 539-542 1991–1994

Jiangwei II 053H3 10 between 521 and 567 1998–2005

Jiangkai I 054 2 525, 526 2005

Jiangkai II 054A 4 530 (lead ship) 2007–2008

Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007–2008.

One set of observers states that the Jiangkai I-class design

is larger and more modern than that of China’s Jiangwei II-class frigates. 

Like China’s new destroyers, the new frigate has a more streamlined 

design and has a larger displacement. These changes augment the new 

vessel’s warfighting capabilities and its seaworthiness. Some sources note 

that the [Type] 054 frigate resembles the French Lafayette-class guidedmissile frigate because of the minimalist design of the Type 054’s superstructure. The design of the new frigate also offers greater options for outfitting the vessel with various weapon suites. Some estimates indicate that 

the new frigate will have a significantly enhanced set of weapon capabilities over the Jiangwei-class frigates, possibly including VLS capabilities.53

The Jiangkai II-class ships are a modified version of the Jiangkai Iclass design that features a VLS system for its SAMs. The 2007–2008 edition 

of Jane’s Fighting Ships states that “Under construction at two shipyards, it is 

likely that this design will be built in sufficient numbers to replace the ageing 

Jianghu class frigates.”54 Another source similarly states that a total of 28 to 30 

Type 054A frigates “are believed scheduled” for production to replace China’s 

older-generation frigates.55

Fast Attack Craft. In addition to its 190 older fast attack craft (including 37 armed with ASCMs), China in 2004 introduced a new type of ASCMarmed fast attack craft, called the Houbei or Qiuxin class, that uses a stealthy, 

wave-piercing, catamaran hull. Observers believe the hull design—one of the 

more advanced used by any navy in the world today—is based on a design 

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developed by a firm in Australia, a country which is a world leader in highspeed catamaran designs. The Houbei class is being built in at least six shipyards. At least 25 were in service as of 2007, and a total of at least 40 are expected.56 In addition to the Houbei class, one source states that China in 2005 

ordered 24 to 30 Project 12421 Molniya-class ASCM-armed fast aircraft from 

Russia. The Molniya-class is an upgraded version of the Tarantul-class design 

that might be armed with four SS–N–22 ASCMs. The first four, according to 

this source, may be delivered by late 2007 or early 2008.57

Amphibious Ships 

DOD states that: 

The PLA has increased amphibious ship production to address its lift 

deficiencies; however, the [U.S.] Intelligence Community believes these 

increases alone will be inadequate to meet requirements. The PLA is 

also organizing its civilian merchant fleet and militia, which, given adequate notification, could augment organic lift in amphibious operations. 

Transport increases were accompanied by an increase of 25,000 troops, 

200 tanks, and 2,300 artillery pieces in the military regions opposite 

Taiwan, according to the latest figures from the Defense Intelligence 

Agency (DIA). The increased troops and equipment in these military 

regions all appear capable of participating in expeditionary operations.58

Type 071 Amphibious Ship. China has built a new class of amphibious ship 

called the Type 071 class. The first Type 071 ship was expected to enter service 

in 2008. Since then, the Type 071 or Yazhao did enter service in the PLAN 

in 2008.59 The Type 071 design features a clean, slope-sided hull design that 

resembles the hull designs of modern Western amphibious ships and appears 

intended to reduce the ship’s visibility to radar. The design has an estimated 

displacement of about 17,600 tons, compared to about 15,900 tons to 16,700 

tons for the U.S. Navy’s Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry-class (LSD–41/49) 

amphibious ships, which were commissioned into service between 1985 and 

1998, and about 25,900 tons for the U.S. Navy’s newSan Antonio-class (LPD–17) 

amphibious ships, the first of which was commissioned into service in 2006. 

The 2007–2008 edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships states that the Type 071 

program

constitutes a key component of the PLA(N)’s plan to improve its sealift and power projection capabilities. . . . The principal features of the 

ship include a large well deck area to accommodate four Air Cushion 

Vehicles (ACV) in the aft two-thirds of the ship. The ACVs are likely to 

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access the ship through a stern gate. The ship may have to ballast down 

for operation. There is a large stern helicopter flight deck and a hangar. An internal garage deck for vehicles may be accessed via side ramps 

(port and starboard). There is space for the HQ7 launcher which may be 

fitted at a later date. . . . This ship represents a major enhancement of 

amphibious capability.60

Jane’s also states that:

The construction of such a vessel had been anticipated for several years 

as the logical next-step in the modernisation of amphibious forces. The 

new ship, and expected follow-on units, is intended to overcome shortcomings in command and control and rapid cross-beach movement that 

have constrained amphibious capability. This despite the introduction 

into service of three new classes of landing craft, comprising 30 ships, 

since 2003. The principal methods of landing troops from the LPD are to 

be by heavy helicopters and by air-cushion vehicles, four of which can be 

accommodated. The ship is unlikely to be commissioned until 2008 and, 

thereafter, a long period of trials can be expected as the Chinese Navy 

evaluates and learns to operate in its first major [amphibious] unit.61

Another observer states that the Type 071 “was built in about six months 

in the second half of 2006 and appears to be the first of four LPDs. The Type 

071 appears to be designed to land 500–800 troops and 25–50 armored vehicles and supplies using 15 landing craft or several large hovercraft. It will carry 

at least two Changhe Z–8 helicopters, each capable of transporting 30 soldiers 

inland beyond the beachhead.”62

Report of Potential Type 081 Amphibious Ship. In August 2007, it was reported that 

at the May 2007 IMDEX naval technology show in Singapore, a Chinese 

industry source confirmed to Jane’s that China has a programme for a 

LHD [i.e., a large amphibious assault ship], but did not disclose details 

other than to note: ‘We can now build that ship.’ However, late 2006 reports in India’s Force magazine noted that China would build up to three 

Type 081 LHD ships and six Type 071 LPD vessels, the first of which 

was launched in late December 2006. One Asian military source has told 

Jane’s that the flat-deck Type 081 will displace about 20,000 tonnes, and 

as such, would be similar in size to the French Mistral LHD. There have 

been no reports so far that China has started building LHDs. China’s interest in LHDs has been noted since the late 1990s and would form a 

logical compl[e]ment to its Type 071 LPDs. Asian military sources put 

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the Type 071 also at about 20,000 tonnes displacement with a capacity to 

carry up to 800 troops plus scores of armoured vehicles. One Asian military source tells Jane’s that China could build two to eight Type 071s.63

Other New Amphibious Ships and Landing Craft. In addition to the new 

Type 071 class amphibious ship, three other new classes of smaller amphibious ships and craft entered service between 2003 and 2005:

■  Yuting II-class helicopter-capable tank landing ships (LSTs). Three of 

these 4,800-ton ships entered service in 2003, another six in 2004, and 

a tenth in 2005. Each ship can transport 10 tanks and 250 soldiers, and 

has a helicopter landing platform for two medium-sized helicopters. 

The ships were built at three shipyards, and observers believe additional units might be built.

■  Yunshu-class landing ships (LSMs). Ten of these 1,850-ton ships entered service in 2004. Each ship can transport 6 tanks or 12 trucks 

or 250 tons of supplies. The ships were built at four shipyards, and 

observers believe additional units might be built.

■  Yubei-class utility landing craft (LCUs). Eight of these landing craft 

entered service in 2004 and another two in 2005. Each craft can transport 10 tanks and 150 soldiers. The ships were built at four shipyards, 

and observers expect additional units.

Older Landing Ships and Craft. China also has numerous older landing ships and craft of various designs, including 10 Yuting I class (Type 072 IV) 

helicopter-capable tank landing ships (LSTHs) displacing 4,800 tons each that 

entered service between 1992 and 2002.

Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Ships 

China is building one or two new classes of mine countermeasures 

(MCM) ships called the Wozang class and the Wochi class. The 2007–2008 

edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships states that “modernisation plans for the minecountermeasures force are difficult to discern. The first Wozang-class [ship] 

entered service in 2005 and was expected to replace the [existing] T–43s [class 

mine warfare ship], albeit that the design looked very similar. This ship was 

then followed in 2006 by a longer version known as the Wochi class. Little is 

known about the capabilities of either vessel.”64

Naval Aircraft 

As with its submarines and surface ships, China’s navy has modernized 

its aircraft force structure in recent years through a combination of purchases 

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of foreign made aircraft, including fourth-generation fighters, and indigenous 

aircraft production. Despite advancements in Chinese aircraft manufacturing, 

China’s navy appears to remain substantially dependent on foreign suppliers 

for both complete aircraft and key aircraft components.

Negotiations Regarding 48 to 50 Su–33 Flanker D Carrier-Capable Fighters. As mentioned earlier in connection with China’s aircraft carrier 

development program, China reportedly has been negotiating with Russia 

on the purchase of 48 to 50 carrier-capable Su–33 Flanker D naval fighters. 

The Su–33, a derivative of the Su–27 design, can operate from carriers using a 

ski-jump ramp and is capable of in-flight refueling. One source states that

China has acquired one of the T–10K naval FLANKER prototype[s] from 

the Ukraine. Shortly after EURONAVAL 2006, Russian authorities confirmed that two Sukhoi Su–33 FLANKER aircraft had been ordered by 

China. [The] Anticipated order—by Moscow’s estimates—is [that another] 48–50 [are] likely to follow over the coming five years in batches of 12 

to 18 aircraft each, with [a] total contract value of about US$2.5Bn. Such 

numbers would likely equip three PLA-N Air Regiments (squadron[s]), 

plus a smaller dedicated training squadron. . . .

The SU–33’s Mach 2+ speed, 3,000km [kilometer] range and great variety of weapon options, enhances current PLA-N offshore capability, should a limited number be based on the ex-Varyag in the next few 

years. Weapons likely to be acquired by China would include the Novator KS–172 300km range ASM, Kh–59MK anti-ship and Kh–31 ARM 

missiles, plus Vympel R–77 AAM[s], and with PLA-N already buying 

sub-launched Novator[s], the air-launched 3M–54E ALCM is very likely 

to be eventually added to Su–33 weapon options.65

J–10 Fighters. As noted earlier in the discussion of China’s aircraft carrier program, one source states that “Reports in the PRC media indicate that 

China will also configure its new Jian–10 fighter for carrier operations,”66 while 

another similarly states that “In August 2005 Russian sources interviewed at 

the Moscow Airshow offered confirmation of China’s carrier plans in that two 

Russian companies offered that China was interested in two types of future carrier combat aircraft, the Sukhoi Su–33 and the Chengdu J–10 modified with a 

new Russian engine thrust vector to enable slower carrier landing speeds.”67

24 Su–30 MKK 2 Flanker Land-Based Fighters. China’s naval aircraft inventory includes 24 Russian-made Su–30 MKK 2 Flanker land-based 

fighters whose delivery was completed in 2004. The Su–30, like the Su–33, 

is a derivative of the Su–27. Some of the navy’s Su–30s might eventually be 

fitted with the Russian-made Kh–35 ASCM. Jane’s Fighting Ships also notes that 

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162 O’ROURKE

China’s air force operates at least 130 Su–27s, and that these aircraft might be 

used for fleet-defense operations.

36 JH–7 Fighter-Bombers. China’s navy operates 36 JH–7 fighter-bombers that were delivered between 1998 and 2004. The JH–7 is broadly comparable in outward appearance to the Russian-made Su–24 Fencer or the British Tornado. The planes can be armed with Chinese-made C–701, C–801, or 

C–802 ASCMs or laser-guided bombs, and might be fitted in the future to carry Russian-made Kh–31 ASCMs.

Other Land-Based Airplanes. China’s other front-line naval aircraft 

include, among other models, 110 J–8–Finback fighters (with another 450 

or more in the air force); 70 Q–5 (Fantan-A) fighters (a derivative of the 

J–6 design); 100 J–7 (MiG–21–like) fighters; about 30 H–6D/H–6X (Tu–16 

Badger-type) maritime bombers/reconnaissance aircraft; 3 KJ–2000 AWACS 

aircraft based on the A–50 Mainstay/Il–76 airframe; perhaps 30 older H–5 (Il–

28 Beagle-type) maritime strike aircraft; 4 SH–5 amphibious ASW/multipurpose airplanes, and 3 Y–8X maritime patrol aircraft. One source states that 

“Xian Aircraft has also begun test flying a new variant of the BADGER, designated H–6K. Redesigned to accommodate Russian DA–30 turbo fans, the 

aircraft has been seen with six pylons for air-launched anti-ship missiles. If 

tests go well, the fuel economy of the DA–30 and greater reliability will likely 

result in the replacement of all H–6D aircraft.”68

Ship-Based Helicopters. China’s inventory of naval ship-based helicopters includes 20 Changhe Z–8/Super Frelon ASW helicopters (8 made in France, 

the other 12 made in China); 25 Z–9C (Dauphin 2-type) ASW and anti–surface-warfare helicopters, with possibly more under construction; and 10 Ka–28 

Helix ASW and SAR helicopters. One source states: “While most analysts believe [the] ex-Varyag will be employed as an air doctrine and development ship, 

some permanent basing of helicopters is likely. Helicopters will include Ka–28 

HELIX ASW and Ka–31 (Ka–252 RLD) AEW&C [models]. China has been making inquiries regarding the Ka–252TB (Ka–29) assault and fire-support version, 

but this is probably intended for the new Type 071 LPD and [the] LST force.”69

UAVs and UCAVs. In addition to manned aircraft, China’s navy in the future might acquire land-based and ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 

and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) of various kinds for use as reconnaissance and surveillance platforms, decoys, and weapon launchers. DOD 

states that “acquisition of UAVs and UCAVs, including the Israeli HARPY 

[UCAV], expands China’s options for long-range reconnaissance and strike.”70

Open-Source Force Level Projections 

Given China’s lack of transparency regarding its shipbuilding and 

aircraft construction plans, and its planned naval ship and aircraft force 

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structure, projecting China’s future naval force structure becomes, for outside 

observers, a matter of semi-informed guesswork or speculation. Readers looking 

for open-source projections of China’s warship and naval aircraft force structure 

can find an online example at the Internet site maintained by the organization 

GlobalSecurity.org.71 When accessed on November 4, 2007, GlobalSecurity.org’s 

projection of China’s warship force structure extended out to 2020 and stated that it was last modified on October 23, 2007,72 while its projection of 

China’s naval aircraft force-structure extended out to 2010 and stated that it 

was last modified on April 27, 2005.73 GlobalSecurity.org’s figures are in some 

cases not consistent with figures discussed elsewhere in this paper, which 

come primarily from the Jane’s Information Group. The data sources underlying GlobalSecurity.org’s presentations are not cited in the presentations. 

Projections presented by other organizations might differ in various ways; 

GlobalSecurity.org’s projections are mentioned here without endorsement and 

merely as an illustrative example of an easily-accessed open-source projection.

Ability of China’s Naval Forces to Work Together

China in recent years has increased the complexity and realism of its military exercises, which, other things held equal, would be expected to improve 

the ability of China’s submarines, surface ships, and naval aircraft to operate 

with each other. At the same time, however, the delivery in recent years of the 

various new classes of submarines, surface ships, and naval aircraft discussed 

above might, for a time at least, require the operators of all this new equipment 

to concentrate on gaining proficiency in operating these units as individual 

platforms, which could, for a time at least, reduce the amount of time available for gaining proficiency in coordinated operations. Improvements in the 

capability for conducting coordinated operations might also be held back by 

personnel-related factors. As a consequence, where, exactly, China’s naval forces 

currently stand on the coordinated operations learning curve is not clear.

At the higher joint (i.e., interservice) level, observers believe China 

has a ways to go before it achieves proficiency in complex, coordinated 

operations. DOD states that “Since 2004, the PLA has conducted a number of 

exercises designed to develop the PLA’s joint operational concepts and demonstrate new capabilities, command automation systems, and weapons. The PLA 

hopes eventually to fuse service-level capabilities with an integrated network 

for command, C4ISR, a new command structure, and a joint logistics system. 

However, it continues to face deficiencies in inter-service cooperation and 

actual experience in joint operations.”74

Similarly, another set of observers states that China’s military “confronts 

many obstacles,” including the following:

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164 O’ROURKE

The sophistication of new equipment generally exceeds current joint 

command-and-control capabilities. Its reliance on a blend of obsolete 

and modern equipment makes effective large-scale planning, training, 

and operations difficult. Its dependence on multiple foreign arms suppliers makes it hard to build efficient supply chains and maintenance regimes. It has a shortage of technically knowledgeable, innovative, initiative-taking personnel who can operate high-tech systems, a deficiency 

exacerbated by China’s lack of a professional corps of noncommissioned 

officers. . . . None of these obstacles can be overcome swiftly, and none 

can be overcome merely by throwing more money at the problem.75

Since coordinating operations within a single service can be less complex than coordinating operations between services, one might speculate that 

the ability of China’s navy to coordinate the operations of its submarines, surface ships, and naval aircraft is somewhat greater than the ability of China’s 

military as a whole to conduct complex joint operations. It can also be noted 

that the significance of China’s ability to coordinate the operations of its submarines, surface ships, and naval aircraft can vary with the kind of operation 

in question. At one extreme, an ability to coordinate such operations would 

be critical in undertaking a major amphibious landing, while at the other extreme, an ability to coordinate such operations could be of little importance 

for surface ships making diplomatic port calls or conducting other simple 

“show-the-flag” missions. Certain approaches to implementing a blockade 

could require substantial coordination among different naval force structure 

elements. Other kinds of operations might fall elsewhere between these two 

extremes in terms of the need for coordinating actions among different kinds 

of naval platforms.

How China’s Naval Forces Might Be Used

A key question is how the PLAN envisions using its improving capabilities and the different parts of its force structure to perform its various 

missions. This section discusses how these capabilities might be used in a 

Taiwan contingency, as part of antiaccess strategies, and in operations away 

from Chinese waters.

Potential Use in Taiwan Contingencies

DOD lists China’s potential military options regarding Taiwan as follows:

■   limited force options that “could include computer network attacks 

against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to 

undermine the Taiwan population’s confidence in its leadership. PLA 

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special operations forces infiltrated into Taiwan could conduct acts of 

economic, political, and military sabotage. Beijing might also employ 

SRBMs [short-range ballistic missiles], special operations forces, and 

air strikes against air fields, radars, and communications facilities on 

Taiwan. . . .”

■   air and missile campaign, in which “Surprise SRBM attacks and precision air strikes against Taiwan’s air defense system, including air 

bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities could support a campaign to degrade Taiwan defenses, neutralize 

its military and political leadership, and rapidly break its will to fight 

while attempting to preclude an effective international response.”

■  blockade, in which “Beijing could threaten or deploy a naval blockade 

as a ‘non-war’ pressure tactic in the pre-hostility phase or as a transition to active conflict. Beijing could declare that ships en route to 

Taiwan ports must stop in mainland ports for inspections prior to 

transiting on to Taiwan. It could also attempt the equivalent of a blockade by declaring exercise or missile closure areas in approaches and 

roadsteads to ports to divert merchant traffic, as occurred during the 

1995–96 missile firings and live-fire exercises. Chinese doctrine also 

includes activities such as air blockades, missile attacks, and mining 

or otherwise obstructing harbors and approaches. More traditional 

blockades would have greater impact on Taiwan, but tax PLA Navy 

capabilities. Any attempt to limit maritime traffic to and from Taiwan 

would likely trigger countervailing international pressure, and risk 

military escalation. Such restrictions would have immediate economic 

effects, but would take time to realize decisive political results, diminishing the ultimate effectiveness and inviting international reaction.”

■   amphibious invasion, about which DOD states that “Publicly available Chinese writings offer different strategies . . . the most prominent 

being the Joint Island Landing Campaign. The Joint Island Landing 

Campaign envisions a complex operation relying on supporting subcampaigns for logistics, electronic warfare, and air and naval support, 

to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish and build a 

beachhead, and then launch an attack to split, seize, and occupy the 

entire island or key targets.”76

In the limited-force options described by DOD, China’s submarines 

could play a role in covertly inserting special operations forces in Taiwan. In 

both the limited-force options and the air and missile campaign described by 

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166 O’ROURKE

DOD, Chinese naval strike aircraft, perhaps supported by Chinese naval fighters and naval AWACS aircraft, could play a role in air strikes against air fields, 

radars, and communications facilities on Taiwan.

Analysts disagree regarding China’s potential for mounting an effective blockade, particularly with its submarine force.77 In the blockade options 

described by DOD, submarines, surface combatants, and land-based aircraft 

could all be used to lay mines, patrol shipping lanes, and threaten or carry out 

attacks on merchant ships, and the surface combatants could additionally be 

used to intercept ships and conduct boarding operations.

In the amphibious invasion option described by DOD, amphibious ships 

and landing craft would be used to land the primary forces ashore, surface combatants could be used to protect the amphibious ships and provide naval gunfire support, submarines might be employed to covertly insert supporting special operations forces and counter enemy surface ships attempting to attack the 

amphibious ships or surface combatants, and land-based aircraft would be used 

to strike targets ashore and counter enemy aircraft, surface ships, or submarines 

attempting to attack the amphibious ships, surface combatants, and submarines.

Potential Use in Antiaccess Strategies

A 2007 RAND report based on an analysis of Chinese military doctrinal writings presents an extensive analysis of potential Chinese antiaccess 

strategies.78 The report states that elements of Chinese military strategy with 

potential implications for U.S. access to the theater of operations include:

■   attacks on C4ISR systems (including computer network attacks, electromagnetic pulse [EMP] attacks, and attacks against satellites)

■   attacks on logistics, transportation, and support functions

■   attacks on enemy air bases

■   blockades

■   attacks on sea lanes and ports

■   attacks on aircraft carriers

■  preventing the use of bases on allied territory.

The report’s summary states in part:

Although the Chinese military doctrinal writings we examined for 

this study do not explicitly discuss antiaccess as a separate and distinct 

strategy, they do suggest that Chinese doctrine for defeating a militarily superior adversary, such as the United States, includes a number 

of tactics that are clearly antiaccess in intention or effect. The PLA has 

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identified the U.S. military’s reliance on information systems as a significant vulnerability that, if successfully exploited, could paralyze or degrade U.S. forces to such an extent that victory could be achieved. In 

particular, PLA analysts believe that attacks against information systems 

can delay the deployment of U.S. military forces by disrupting communications or denying the U.S. military access to information on enemy 

whereabouts. PLA analysts note that information warfare can employ 

either “soft-kill” or “hard-kill” methods. Soft-kill methods include computer network attacks and electronic jamming, while possible hard-kill 

methods include directed energy weapons, explosives, and kinetic energy attacks. Targets could include computer systems based in the United 

States or abroad, command and control nodes, and space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and communications assets. . . .

Noting the great distances that U.S. forces would need to travel in a 

conflict with China, attacks against logistic systems are also discussed. 

The goals of these attacks would be to delay the deployment of additional U.S. forces to the region and to render existing forces in the region less 

effective or more vulnerable by preventing timely supplies of the materiel needed for warfighting. Attacks against logistic systems described in 

PLA writings include blockades, attacking supply depots, and striking at 

air or sea supply missions. . . .

PLA writings also discuss attacks against air bases and ports. Such attacks would prevent or disrupt the inflow of personnel and supplies, as 

well as the basing of air and naval assets. PLA analysts state that attacking these targets is the most efficient way to gain air or sea superiority, 

although the difficulty of achieving success is not understated. While no 

source specifically indicated which U.S. bases might be attacked, the importance that bases in the western Pacific would have for U.S. military 

operations in a conflict with China suggests that they may be key targets 

for PLA planners. . . .

Similarly, the importance of naval aviation to U.S. operations is of great 

concern to the PLA. Chinese sources describe the disproportionate role 

aircraft carriers sometimes play in conflict but also make clear their belief that aircraft carriers can be defeated. Massed attacks using air- and 

sea-launched cruise missiles can be used to overwhelm an aircraft carrier’s defenses, and submarine-launched torpedoes can be used in ambush. 

Ballistic missiles are also discussed as possible anticarrier weapons. . . .

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168 O’ROURKE

In addition to military strategies, China might also use diplomatic and 

political strategies to deny or limit the use of forward bases, most notably 

in Japan. While Chinese writings are not explicit in discussing strategies 

to limit or deny support to the United States, interviews with Chinese 

military officers suggest that deterrence and coercion, including threats 

of force, could be used against Japan.79

The RAND report discusses China’s military forces in general, mixing together comments about various force elements. The report does not 

systematically separate out the specific roles of various Chinese naval units in 

potential antiaccess operations.

As part of an antiaccess strategy, China’s naval aircraft and LACMarmed submarines could contribute to attacks on regional air bases, ports, 

and other logistics nodes. Submarines, surface ships, and aircraft (and also 

merchant vessels) could be used to lay mines outside ports or across sea routes. 

China’s amphibious forces, supported by other naval units, could seize small 

islands considered important to establishing a stronger antiaccess perimeter. 

And Chinese naval units of various kinds could form a significant part of a 

multilayer force for more directly confronting U.S. naval and air forces moving 

to the theater of operations. In addition to “regular” TBMs and MaRV-equipped 

antiship TBMs, the outermost layer of this force could include SSNs and 

maritime bombers and reconnaissance aircraft. Some of these SSNs might operate close to U.S. shores in an attempt to tie down some portion of U.S. naval 

forces far from the Taiwan Strait. The next layer inward could additionally 

include SSs and shorter-ranged land-based fighters and strike aircraft. A third 

layer farther inward could additionally include the surface combatants (and 

also land-based surface-to-air missiles).

Potential Use in Support of Broader/Longer-Term Goals

In support of the broader or longer-term goals of China’s military 

modernization effort that were discussed earlier, surface combatants, amphibious ships, and (in the future) aircraft carriers could be used for 

making diplomatic port calls and for carrying out other day-to-day presence 

and engagement operations. Surface combatants, amphibious ships, and (in 

the future) aircraft carriers might be used to contribute to humanitarian- or 

disaster-relief operations. Surface ships, perhaps supported by land-based naval aircraft, submarines, or (in the future) carrier-based aircraft, could be used 

to land forces on disputed islands or atolls, or otherwise back up Chinese diplomacy in maritime territorial disputes. China’s naval forces have already 

been used, or are now being used, for some of these purposes, such as the port 

calls.80 Surface combatants additionally could be used to escort merchant ships 

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through areas that are subject to piracy, and surface combatants, submarines, 

and (in the future) carrier-based aircraft could be used to provide some measure of defense against a perceived threat of open-ocean attack on, or interdiction of, merchant ships by U.S. or other naval forces.

Submarines (particularly SSNs), surface ships, land-based aircraft (especially longer-ranged types), and (in the future) carrier-based aircraft, could 

be used to conduct day-to-day intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

operations directed at other naval forces and near-shore installations and 

activities. The submarines’ contribution to such ISR operations could include 

not only making observations from the submarine itself, but also covertly 

inserting and recovering spies or special operations forces. Submarines, 

surface ships, and land-based aircraft could also be used on a day-to-day basis 

in the future to maintain a protected bastion for China’s SSBNs.

Notes

1 The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the 

views of the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Library of Congress, or any other part of the U.S. 

Government. This paper is based on open-source information. Unless indicated otherwise, information in 

this paper is taken from the 2007–2008 edition and previous annual editions of Jane’s Fighting Ships, a widely 

used reference source on world navies. Information on China’s navy presented by other open sources differs 

somewhat from the information presented in Jane’s Fighting Ships, but tends to paint a similar overall picture 

of changes in China’s naval force structure. Portions of this paper are adapted from CRS Report RL33153, 

China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by 

Ronald O’Rourke. This CRS report, which is based on open-source information, was first published in November 2005 and has been updated numerous times since then. As of this writing, the most recent update 

was published on December 1, 2010.

2 It should also be noted, however, that China remains substantially dependent on foreign suppliers 

for key ship systems, aircraft, and aircraft components, and that foreign or domestic bottlenecks in the production of these items can restrain the rate of force structure modernization.

3 In January 2007, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence stated: “The Chinese are developing 

more capable long-range conventional strike systems and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles with 

terminally guided maneuverable warheads able to attack US carriers and airbases.” (John D. Negroponte, 

Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence, January 

11, 2007, 10.)

4 U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of 

China, 2007 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, released May 25, 2007), 5–18, 32. (Hereafter cited as 2007 DOD CMP; previous annual editions cited similarly.)

5 One observer states: “By 2008, China will have the capability to credibly conduct short-term sea 

denial operations out to about 400 nautical miles from its coastline; and by 2010 may be able to sustain such 

operations for a few weeks. Obviously, this capability does not accrue to the Straits of Malacca and the Indian Ocean—China can at best hope to ‘show the flag’ for coercive and/or defensive purposes in those waters 

until after 2015.” (Statement of Cortez A. Cooper III before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission [hereafter referred to as USCC], March 16, 2006, 3.) This observer also states: “Looking at a net 

assessment of emerging Chinese capabilities and U.S. power projection in the Pacific theater, there is a window of concern between roughly 2008 and 2015. Many Chinese programs focused on Taiwan and the near 

periphery (new cruise and maneuverable ballistic missiles, submarines, and destroyers) will be fully online 

around 2008; but some of the US capabilities to defeat China’s sea denial strategy (missile defenses, littoral 

strike assets, a state-of-the-art, integrated ASW network) may not be in place until around the middle of the 

next decade.” (Ibid., 8.)

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170 O’ROURKE

Another observer states: “Because the Chinese submarine fleet will operate in nearby waters and in 

the mid-Pacific, China need not wait until 2020 to challenge the U.S. at sea. It will likely have a home-field 

advantage in any East Asian conflict contingency as early as 2010, while the U.S. fleet will still have operational demands in the Middle East, and in tracking Russian ballistic missile submarines elsewhere. (Statement of John J. Tkacik, Jr., at hearing on China grand strategy and military modernization before the House 

Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2005, 8.) See also the statement for this hearing of Richard Fisher, which 

cites the year 2010 on pages 3, 4, 7, 9 (twice), 11, and 16 in discussing China’s military modernization and the 

resulting impact on the regional military balance, and Fisher’s statement for a USCC hearing held on February 6, 2004, which states on page 85, “It is possible that before the end of the decade the PLA will have the 

capability to coordinate mass missile attacks on U.S. Naval Forces by submarines and Su–30s.” On page 88, 

Fisher prints his table summarizing potential PLA anticarrier forces by 2010. Another observer states: “QDR 

[Quadrennial Defense Review] planners have recently moved forward (to 2012) their estimate of when key 

warfighting capabilities might be needed to fight China, and have postulated conflict scenarios lasting as 

long as seven years.” (Loren B. Thompson, “Pentagon Fighter Study Raises Questions,” Lexington Institute 

Issue Brief, August 22, 2005.)

6 2007 DOD CMP, 15. 

7 Ibid., page I (Executive Summary). Similar statements can be found on pages 8–9, 15, and 22–24. 

8 Negroponte, 10.

9 Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007–2008, 116. See also 31 (Executive Overview).

10 One news article, citing information from the Office of Naval Intelligence, states that a total of five 

is expected. (Bill Gertz, “China Expands Sub Fleet,” Washington Times, March 2, 2007.)

11 U.S. Department of the Navy, Worldwide Maritime Challenges 2004 (Washington, DC: Office of 

Naval Intelligence), 37. (Hereafter cited as 2004 ONI WMC.)

12 2007 DOD CMP, 3, 19 (figure 3), and 42 (figure 14). Editors’ note: As mentioned in the introductory chapter, since the presentation of this paper in 2007, the JL–2 has reportedly been delayed in production.

13 2007 DOD CMP, 19 (figure 3).

14 See, for example, Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007–2008, 31 (Executive Overview).

15Another source paints a somewhat different picture of plans for the Han class, stating: “Type 

091/09 (Han) #403 underwent modernization and overhaul during 2003–04, including [an] 8m hull extension possibly to accommodate [a] new towed passive array, [a] new bow sonar, plus [the] ability to fire Yingji–82 ASuW [antisurface warfare] torpedoes. Others are expected to be modernized in similar fashion. #401 

is non-operational, [and] maybe [it will be] next scheduled for re-build and modernisation beginning 2007.” 

Keith Jacobs, “PLA-Navy Update,” Naval Forces, no. 1 (2007), 24.

16 2007 DOD CMP, 3.

17 Jacobs, 20. Editors’ note: Since the author wrote this paper, current assessments indicate that production of the Shang-class submarine will stop at two boats, and may be followed up by the production of 

a new SSN design possibly referred to as the Type 095 class submarine. See Jane’s Fighting Ships 2010–2011, 

and Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and 

Issues for Congress, December 1, 2010, Congressional Research Service, 10 and 13. 

18 2005 ONI WMC, 14.

19 One set of observers states: “Chinese sources universally recognize that noise reduction is one of 

the greatest challenges in building an effective nuclear submarine. PRC scientists have long been conducting 

research concerning the fundamental sources of propeller noise. For instance, experts at China Ship Scientific Research Center developed a relatively advanced guide-vane propeller by the late 1990s. This, and the fact 

that China already has advanced seven-blade propellers with cruciform vortex dissipaters on its indigenous 

Song-class and imported Kilo-class diesel submarines, suggests that the [Type] 093 and [Type] 094 will have 

significantly improved propellers. A researcher in Qingdao’s 4808 Factory also demonstrates Chinese attention to the need to use sound-isolation couplings to prevent transmission of vibrations to the ocean from 

major fresh-water circulating pumps in the steam cycle. Advanced composite materials are credited with capability to absorb vibrations and sound.” These observers continue: “One Chinese researcher states that the 

[Type] 093 is not as quiet as the U.S. Seawolf class or Virginia class but is on a par with the improved Los Angeles class. Another analyst estimates that the [Type] 093’s noise level has been reduced to that of the Russian 

Akula-class submarine at 110 decibels. He states that the [Type] 094’s acoustic signature has been reduced to 

120 decibels. According to this report, this is definitely not equal to that of the Ohio class, but is on a par with 

the Los Angeles. There is no additional information given to evaluate concerning the origins or comparabil990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 170 11/29/11 12
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ity of these ‘data.’” Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s Future Submarine Force: Insights from 

Chinese Writings,” Naval War College Review (Winter 2007), 67.

20 See, for example, Ronald O’Rourke, “Maintaining the Edge in US ASW,” Navy International (July/

August 1988), 348–354.

21 Erickson and Goldstein, 55–56.

22 2004 ONI WMC, 12.

23 Tkacik, 8; see also the statement for this hearing of Richard Fisher, 11–12.

24 In discussing the weapons to be carried by China’s Kilos, this source states that “China in late2005 also firmed contracts” for Shkval torpedoes, and that “The Russians viewed it as a ‘last ditch’ weapon 

for use against either ships or submarines.” Keith Jacobs, “PLA-Navy Update,” Naval Forces, no. 1 (2007), 21.

25 Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005–2006, for example, states: “It is fair to say that the intelligence community was caught completely unawares by the emergence of the Yuan class.” (Executive Overview, 30). See also 

Bill Gertz, “Chinese Produce New Type of Sub,” Washington Times, July 16, 2004, 1.

26 Jacobs, 20. Editors’ note: Since the presentation of this paper in 2007, China has already put four 

Yuan-class submarines into service and may be planning to construct 15 additional hulls. See O’Rourke 

(2010), 10.

27 Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007–2008, 118.

28 Evan S. Medeiros et al., A New Direction for China’s Defense Industry (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, 2005), 148. (MG-334, RAND Project Air Force. Hereafter cited as 2005 RAND report.)

29 See O’Rourke (2010), 11. 

30 Some observers might view purchase of the 12 Kilos as a one-time event intended to jump-start 

the modernization of China’s submarine force. Other observers, while conceding the value of the 12 Kilos in 

jump-starting the modernization effort, might argue that additional foreign purchases of Russian-made submarines in the future are still quite possible.

31 2004 ONI WMC, 11. The range of 25 to 50 is based on visual inspection of the graph. 

32 Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007–2008, Executive Overview, 31.

33 John J. Tkacik, Jr., China’s Quest for a Superpower Military, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder 

No. 2036, May 17, 2007; Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007–2008, 9–10. A footnote at the end of this quoted passage 

states: “Including at least five Type–94 Jins, five Type–093 Shangs, five Type–095s, one Yuan, 13 Songs, and 

13 Kilo 877s and 636s.”

34 Federation of American Scientists (FAS), “China’s Submarine Fleet Continues Low Patrol Rate,” 

published online at <http://fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/02/>.

35 For an article that discusses at length the question of China’s potential development and acquisition of aircraft carriers, see Andrew S. Erickson and Andrew R. Wilson, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Dilemma,” 

Naval War College Review (Autumn 2006), 13–45.

36 Jacobs, 24.

37 2007 DOD CMP, 22–24. Brackets and ellipses as in the original.

38 Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007–2008, 122. This source similarly states at another point that work being 

done on “the ex-Russian carrier Varyag (possibly to be named Shi Lang) continued at Dalian during 2006 

and there now seems little doubt that the ship is destined to become the first Chinese aircraft carrier. The announcement in October 2006 by Rosoboronexport, Russia’s arms export agency, that the Chinese government 

was in negotiations to buy up to 50 Su–33 naval fighters was a clear indication of intentions. A tentative timetable is for the ship to begin sea trials in 2008 with a view to commencing operational flying training in about 

2010. It may be some years after that before the ship becomes fully operational and its initial status is likely 

to be as a training ship and as a test-bed for the development of China’s indigenous carrier programme,” (Executive Overview, 31). Editors’ note: A more recent August 2009 unclassified Office of Naval Intelligence Report indicates that China is “undertaking a program to both operationalize [the Varyag] (likely as a training 

platform) and build an indigenous carrier to join the fleet between 2015 and 2020.” See O’Rourke (2010), 15.

39 Tkacik, 12–13.

40 Testimony of Richard D. Fisher, Jr., for a hearing held on March 16, 2006, before the U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission, 5–6. See also David Lague, “An Aircraft Carrier for China?” 

International Herald-Tribune, January 31, 2006; Norman Friedman, “Varyag Redux?” U.S. Naval Institute 

Proceedings (December 2005), 91.

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172 O’ROURKE

41 Statement of Richard Fisher at hearing on China grand strategy and military modernization before the House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2005, 12. (Hereafter cited as Fisher 7/27/05 testimony.)

42 2007 DOD CMP, 3. The DOD report spells Sovremenny with two “y’s” at the end.

43 The 2006–2007 edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships states: “It is of note that the Chinese navy has chosen to adopt an incremental approach, in which only two ships of each class are built, rather than opt for a 

longer shipbuilding line with corresponding economies in development and building costs and equipment 

commonality. A possible explanation is that the navy is on a steep learning curve and that, rather than being 

cautious about the introduction of new technology, it is keen to ensure that every ship introduced into service reflects the latest developments” (Executive Overview, 30). Another set of observers states that “China 

was forced to cancel its production of the Luhu class of destroyers because the U.S.-made gas turbine engines 

were no longer available after the United States imposed export restrictions on military-related goods following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. China’s newest operational destroyers use Ukrainian, not 

Chinese, engines” (2005 RAND report, 140).

44 Jacobs, 24. Italics as in the original.

45 2005 RAND report, 144–145.

46 2007 DOD CMP, 3–4.

47 For a detailed article about the Luyang II-class, see James C. Bussert, “China Debuts Aegis Destroyers,” Signal, July 2005, 59–62. See also the statement of Richard Fisher at hearing on China grand strategy and military modernization before the House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2005, 12.

48 2005 RAND report, 146–147.

49 Norman Friedman, “A New Role For Active Radar Arrays?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (January 2006), 91.

50 2004 ONI WMC, 29.

51 2007 DOD CMP, 3.

52 Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007–2008, Executive Overview, 31. The Luzhou-class destroyers indeed were 

commissioned between 2006 and 2007. See O’Rourke (2010), 19.

53 2005 RAND report, 147.

54 Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007–2008, 129. This source states at another point that on October 12, 2006, 

China launched (i.e., put into the water for final construction) “the first of what is expected to be a large class 

of Jiangkai II [class] ships. Noteworthy features include a vertical-launch system for the HHQ-16 missile.” 

Executive Overview, 31

55 Jacobs, 26.

56 Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007–2008, Executive Overview, 31 and 136. See also Fisher 7/27/05 testimony, 13; “PRC Appears Ready to Field New Trimaran Fast Missile Warship,” Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, 

October 5, 2004; Yihong Chang, “First Sight of Chinese Catamaran,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 26, 2004.

57 Jacobs, 27.

58 2006 DOD CMP, 30. See also Fisher 7/27/05 testimony, 13.

59 See O’Rourke (2010), 21.

60 Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007–2008, 139.

61 Ibid., Executive Overview, 31.

62 Tkacik, 13.

63Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “Naval Gazing, Emerging Expeditionary Capabilities in the Western Pacific,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (August 2007), 55.

64 Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007–2008, Executive Overview, 31, and 136.

65 Jacobs, “PLA-Navy Update,” 21, 24.

66 Tkacik, 12–13.

67 Testimony of Richard D. Fisher, Jr., for a hearing held on March 16, 2006, before the USCC, 5–6. 

68 Jacobs, 30.

69 Ibid., 24.

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70 2007 DOD CMP, 18. The report states further that “The Israelis transferred HARPY UCAVs to 

China in 2001 and conducted maintenance on HARPY parts during 2003–2004. In 2005, Israel began to 

improve government oversight of exports to China by strengthening controls of military exports, establishing controls on dual-use exports, and increasing the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in export-related 

decisions,” 28.

71 For more information about GlobalSecurity.org, see <http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/index.

html>.

72 <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/navy.htm>.

73 <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-af-equip.htm>.

74 2007 DOD CMP, 15.

75Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course, 

Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, 

2007, 47. (Hereafter cited as 2003 CFR task force report.)

76 2007 DOD CMP, 32–33. DOD further notes that “Amphibious operations are logistics-intensive, 

and their success depends upon air and sea superiority in the vicinity of the operation, the rapid buildup of 

supplies and sustainment on shore, and an uninterrupted flow of support thereafter. An amphibious campaign of the scale outlined in the Joint Island Landing Campaign would tax the capabilities of China’s armed 

forces and almost certainly invite international intervention. Add to these strains the combat attrition of 

China’s forces, and the complex tasks of urban warfare and counterinsurgency—assuming a successful landing and breakout—and an amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be a significant political and military risk 

for China’s leaders” (32–33). See also 2003 CFR task force report, 2, 3, and 53.

77 For an analysis that casts a skeptical eye on the potential, see Michael A. Glosny, “Strangulation 

from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan,” International Security (Spring 2004), 125–160. For an 

analysis that expresses more concern about this potential, see the statement of Lyle J. Goldstein and William 

Murray as printed in the transcript of a February 6, 2004, hearing before the USCC, 132–133, 147–151. See 

also Michael C. Grubb, “Merchant Shipping in a Chinese Blockade Of Taiwan,” Naval War College Review

(Winter 2007), 81–102.

78Roger Cliff et al., Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications 

for the United States, MG–524–AF, RAND Project Air Force (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), 

129.

79 Ibid., xvi–xvii.

80 See, for example, [U.S.] Office of Naval Intelligence, China’s Navy 2007 (Washington, DC, 2007), 

111–119 (chapter 15).

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Chapter 7

Getting Rid of the Rust: Preparing Chinese 

Navy Leaders for High-tech War

Susan M. Puska

We should turn our mourning to strength and draw lessons from the accident [of the No. 361 submarine] to advance our national defense capacity and 

speed up the PLA’s modernization drive.

—Hu Jintao (2003)1

Because of my involvement in economic crimes, I had been stripped from 

the post of deputy navy commander and thus I am no longer qualified to be 

a deputy in the NPC [National People’s Congress]. Please remove me from my 

position.

—Vice-Admiral Wang Shouye (2006)2

Introduction3

The twin embarrassments of the 2003 Ming submarine accident and the 

2006 relief and prosecution of Vice-Admiral Wang Shouye for economic corruption were dramatic low points for an aspiring navy at the beginning of what 

has been called “the Chinese Century.”4

 Both incidents raise questions about 

the professional competence of China’s military leadership to guide navy modernization to the realization of a blue-water navy.

Striving toward this goal, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy 

(PLAN) today is pursuing change on an unprecedented scope and pace. 

Modernization encompasses the entire naval force from its submarines, to 

surface vessels, which will eventually include aircraft carrier capability, to its 

naval air force, all within the three fleets—North Sea Fleet (NSF), East Sea 

Fleet (ESF), and South Sea Fleet (SSF). Advanced weapons and equipment, 

however, are only one aspect of China’s naval modernization. People—from the 

senior commander and political commissar levels down to the most junior and 

least experienced sailors—will be key to achieving a more capable naval force. 

Without a core of long-term, well-trained, and experienced personnel at all 

levels throughout the fleets, headquarters, and navy educational system, the 

Chinese navy will encounter significant difficulties in effectively employing 

and maintaining the new technology it is acquiring and developing to outfit a 

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high-tech navy. The PLAN’s challenges will be further complicated by its continuing multigenerational and foreign-China mix of weapons and equipment, 

which require a corresponding mix of personnel with skills to effectively 

operate, maintain, and support the Frankenstein-like inventory of equipment 

and weaponry.

Although the PLA has always recognized the importance of people, it 

now realizes that its armed forces need more people who can effectively employ modern equipment and weapons based on ever-advancing technology. 

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) preference for politically reliable (red) 

military personnel, who have the right thought, right background, and even 

the right family, remains a preoccupation in selecting personnel for entry into 

service; however, political correctness is now matched by a critical need for 

increasing numbers of well-educated and skilled (expert) personnel who can 

learn complicated tasks more quickly to operate and maintain sophisticated 

weapons and equipment. 

Whether or not the Chinese navy can acquire and develop a higher concentration of red and expert personnel and leaders is the focus of this paper. 

It examines key problems in leadership and personnel management that the 

PLAN faces as it develops its navy, the steps it is taking to address these shortfalls, and an assessment of what it is achieving. An added area of the paper is 

a discussion of the global navies with whom the PLAN is cooperating, what it 

may be learning from these foreign navies, and how these interactions may be 

influencing China’s naval modernization.

Leadership and Personnel Management Shortfalls

You can never get rid of all the rust, and you can never learn everything 

about a submarine’s structure. 

—Chinese Submariner saying5

It is required to “foster the firm conviction that the officers and men are . . . 

trustworthy and dependable.”

—Dai Mingmeng, PLA delegate to 17th Party Congress (October 2007)6

Operational Deficiencies

The Ming Submarine No. 361 accident, which occurred east of the 

Neichangshan Islands near Shangdong Province, in April 2003, was the 

first time the PLA publicly reported an accident at sea. The openness of the 

announcement in late April was more remarkable for admitting that all 

aboard (70 people) were killed. Coming on the heels of the pressured 

acknowledgment of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic, 

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the submarine incident was quickly investigated by the Central Military 

Commission (CMC) during April 2003.

The official findings of the accident investigation were never publicly 

released, leaving room for speculation and rumor, including conclusions that 

the accident was caused by technical malfunctions in the aged submarine.7

In early May 2003, however, the CMC officially announced that “operational 

errors” caused the accident, and held North Sea Fleet senior military and 

political leaders responsible for “improper direction of the vessel’s operations.” 

Then-Vice Admirals Ding Yiping, Commander of the North Sea Fleet, and 

Chen Xianfeng, political commissar, were subsequently relieved of duty and 

demoted, along with eight other officers who were also demoted or dismissed.8

Although the exact nature of leadership failings in the submarine accident has not been revealed, the accident, nonetheless, illustrates a number of 

problems in leadership and personnel management that are relevant to the entire PLAN force. Many of these can be inferred or have been directly identified 

in public Chinese military writings in the years since the accident. Hu Jintao’s 

emphasis on military safety after he replaced Jiang Zemin as the Chairman 

of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in late 2003 was the first obvious conclusion from the lost submarine personnel. But a more comprehensive 

list of deficiencies can be inferred from an interview with model submariner 

Captain Ma Lixin in 2006, discussed below.9

The Ming Submarine No. 361 accident highlighted deficiencies such 

as leadership failures to ensure that proper safety, maintenance, and operational procedures were established and followed; a lack of sufficient technical 

training and experience within the crew to allow for execution of appropriate 

operational procedures and for capable response and problem-solving during 

a crisis; and a failure within the cadres (captain and other senior leaders on 

board) to respond quickly during a crisis. 

During a well-choreographed Jiefangjun Bao interview in 2006, in which 

Captain Ma was directly asked about recent submarine accidents, he observed 

that submarine operations are “characterized by high Science and Technology 

content,” but also “great risk” as a submarine operates in a “difficult environment” at sea. The key attributes of a good Chinese submarine captain, Ma said, 

must be balanced among technical, physical, and mental (often meaning ideological) characteristics, such as firm ideals and convictions, tried and tested 

military skills (including advanced technical and tactical capabilities), strong 

and healthy physique, indomitable will, excellent psychological qualities, and a 

vigorous work style.10

The most important attributes a captain must have, according to Ma, are 

a strong professional dedication and sense of responsibility. If these are lacking, 

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he said, the captain will not withstand the “tests of time and difficulties,” which 

could lead to “carelessness or mishap on a sub captain’s part” and to “destruction of the boat and loss of life.”11

In addition, Ma stressed the necessity to develop sufficient outstanding 

crewmembers and “back-up talent” for safe submarine operations. The entire 

crew, he said, must have comprehensive talent—“study-type, knowledge-type, 

and expert-type”—to operate a vessel safely and competently during normal 

operations and emergency situations. Contrary to the past emphasis placed 

on experience on the job, Ma said that any crew member who serves on a 

vessel, such as a submarine, which combines high-technology digitization, 

integration, and automation on a combat operations platform, must understand structural principles, operations, care and maintenance, and how to clear 

malfunctions. 

Ma’s picture of the ideal captain reflects the official findings of the 

submarine accident, which condemned Admiral Ding and other navy 

leaders while highlighting the key importance of leaders rather than 

equipment—a theme that resonates throughout navy personnel management 

and development, discussed below.

Corruption

As a lesson in failed dedication and lack of responsibility, Vice-Admiral 

Wang Shouye’s corruption case provides its own example, which touches on 

the nerve of Party corruption and abuse of authority. Despite Hu Jintao’s notolerance policy for Party corruption, it is hard to assess how strongly the 

Wang case resonates within the PLAN’s leadership and personnel management 

system, particularly since many senior officers were involved in the corruption, 

and Wang may have had links to President and Party General Secretary Jiang 

Zemin.12 During his tenure at the PLA General Logistics Department (GLD), 

where he was responsible for barracks construction and land management 

throughout the PLA, Wang was rumored to be involved with unsavory land 

deals in preparation for the 2008 Olympics in Beijing that reflected endemic 

corruption. Wang may have gained Jiang Zemin’s favor for constructing the new 

headquarters of the Central Military Commission in grandiose style and carrying out other purported schemes on Jiang’s behalf, but his ability to operate with 

impunity within the military over a period of several years, only to be undone 

by the threats of public exposure from his mistress, raises questions about the 

degree of official tolerance for corruption throughout the military leadership. The 17th Party Congress’s renewed efforts to fight Party corruption, even 

in the military, indicate how widespread and deeply intertwined corruption is 

throughout the Party system, even though it is recognized as a potential threat 

to Party rule.

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Wang’s death sentence (later commuted to life in prison) for economic 

crimes and “loose morals,”13 had some effect on the PLA, including the PLAN, 

particularly since Wang cooperated with investigators to provide the names 

of dozens of military officers. Of these, five were reportedly expelled from the 

PLA and six were demoted.14 After this purge of officers, however, the emphasis 

seems to have been more on rejuvenation of the Party, including expanding the 

size of the Party and recruiting accomplished personnel into the Party.

For the PLAN, Wang’s corruption case may also have made an important point about the custom of appointing army officers to senior positions in 

other services, where they have no background or experience. As the PLAN 

continues to transform itself into a more advanced navy, it will not only need 

more seats at the head table of China’s military leadership, which is dominated 

by the ground force, it will also need navy leaders who have worked their way 

up through their own service and intimately understand the resource needs 

and priorities to realize a modern blue-water navy, including the employment 

and support of high technology. 

The Ming submarine accident and the Wang Shouye corruption case 

illustrate critical personnel problems facing the Chinese navy leadership and 

personnel management system as it seeks to recruit and develop better educated 

cadres (officers and noncommissioned officers) who will achieve a higher level 

of technical competence, perform with a strong sense of dedication and responsibility, remain loyal to the Party, and achieve uncorrupted professionalism.

Addressing the Problems

Navy transformation to integrate more complex and sophisticated 

high-technology weapons and equipment during peacetime, war, and crisis 

situations, calls for a higher proportion of officers, noncommissioned officers 

(NCOs), and sailors with an ability to more quickly acquire advanced skills than 

in the past. Peasants from the countryside, who are less educated and lack the 

technological savvy of their city counterparts, may still be able to fill less skilled 

jobs in support of the navy on land and at sea, where they can learn on the job, 

but the proportion of such positions can be expected to decline over time as navy 

weapons, equipment, and vessels become more uniformly advanced throughout the active force. To meet this challenge, the PLAN has taken several steps 

within the overall reform of PLA leadership and personnel management, to 

develop the type of leaders and personnel it will need to man a blue-water force. 

These efforts focus on programs to raise the quality of officers to lead a modern navy, expand the proportion of noncommissioned officers to serve as the 

technical backbone of the navy, including providing on-the-job training to 

recruits, and recruit and appoint college-educated civilian graduates.

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The Accessions Problem

To meet the goal of developing a more advanced leadership core 

by 2010 and to make a dramatic breakthrough by 2020,15 the PLAN has 

steadily increased the proportion of civilian accessions to naval academy 

graduates, as well as other sources of commissioning, including highly competitive officer accessions from conscript and noncommissioned officer ranks. 

During the 11th Five Year Plan, the proportion of civilian graduates to be 

accessed into the PLAN commissioned officer programs is projected to reach 

40 percent of the yearly total.16 These civilians will enter commissioned officer 

ranks via two main programs: (1) the National Defense Student Program; and 

(2) recruitment of college graduates, who receive 3 months of military-political 

training prior to assignment to units.17 The National Defense Student Program, 

which was instituted in 2000, recruits students as reserve officers and provides 

a stipend and summer training, similar to the U.S. Reserve Officer Training 

Corps (ROTC) programs. The students are required to join the Navy after they 

graduate from university.18

By raising the proportion of college-educated officers, particularly within key technical specialties, the PLAN hopes to inject a higher proportion of 

young officers who can achieve technical competency faster and who can meet 

the needs of a higher-tech navy. 

Professional Education and Training

While civilian university graduates have provided a growing proportion of navy accessions since 2000, civilian schools have also augmented 

military education by opening on-campus courses to sponsored military members.19 The closer relationship that has developed between the military and 

university students could scarcely have been imagined after the civil-military 

schism that erupted with use of military force against students on June 4,

, 1989, 

in Tiananmen Square, but the passage of time and a concerted effort on the 

military’s part to reestablish the PLA-serves-the-people myth and encourage 

patriotism among young intellectuals may be paying off over time. 

For example, military indoctrination training for incoming freshmen—a program that began in the 1980s and which was firmly reemphasized 

after the Tiananmen incident—has flourished on college campuses across 

China. In 2007, several Web sites in China posted pictures of university 

presidents, some dressed in military uniforms, conducting military reviews 

of the graduating freshmen upon completion of their military training at 

Shandong University of Science and Technology, Changchun University of 

Science and Technology, Guangxi Normal University, Sanjiang University, 

Zhejiang University, and Remin University.20 Although netizens criticized the 

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militaristic style of the college presidents, few questioned why Chinese college 

students should be exposed to military training prior to the start of their freshman year. A survey conducted by China Youth Daily reported that 69 percent 

of the 1,510 students who were polled in the survey said the military training 

was “a worthy and unforgettable experience.”21

Although Chinese society traditionally disdains the military as a career 

choice, and economic opportunities during the last 20 years have competed 

with the military to attract educated youth, changes over time (demographic 

shifts, economic trends, and international threats) could occur that make 

the military a more attractive alternative to a more receptive pool of college 

students and graduates. 

Military academies, which have been significantly reduced as part of the 

overall reduction of the PLA, have also adjusted their curricula in response to 

complaints from navy units that academy training for both officers and NCOs 

placed too much emphasis on theory and classroom time. Accordingly, the 

study of theory has been reduced and more stress has been placed on practical 

experience with actual units. Greater reliance on simulation also augments 

classroom study and allows practical application of military procedures and 

concepts. Training and education targeted to support duty positions have also 

been developed to enhance leaders’ preparation to perform in units. 

Self-study and continuing education are now augmented with shortterm courses tailored to develop expertise in specific skills. Overall there is 

greater emphasis on combat-oriented training, employing less formalism and 

more realism, including psychological toughening to better withstand the 

stress of combat and heighten the ability to perform in a crisis.

Operational Changes

To develop an NCO corps that will provide a stronger backbone for 

the active force, a shift in the division of labor has occurred between officers 

and NCOs. Additional duties, such as mess officer, that a commissioned 

officer would normally do, have shifted to NCO duties. NCOs also are being 

developed to train the trainer (other NCOs) and provide training to enlisted

 personnel that fell to a commissioned officer in the past. The result is the transition toward more stratified levels of work, responsibilities, and skills sets in 

which the NCO plays a key bridging role between the commissioned officers 

and conscripts. This not only frees the commissioned officers to focus on more 

administrative duties, including oversight and spot-checking, it also reinforces 

a more top-down command structure. 

Greater emphasis has been placed on experience and practical application at sea. Spending more time at sea to train and develop skills under 

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pressure is the ideal, but on-shore preparation training on simulators is also 

helping to lay a more solid foundation for operations at sea. Testing and checking to ensure a higher level of safety and proper adherence to operational procedures have also been strengthened based on more realistic combat 

conditions and standards. 

Additionally, the Party Committees, which continue to play a key 

role in collective decisionmaking, even at sea, have been encouraged to elevate their military competence and skill levels to better support high-tech 

modernization.

Retention

To keep the personnel the Navy would like to retain to promote as 

NCOs and officers, a number of benefits have been improved, such as pay and 

allowances and educational opportunities. The importance of post-demobilization treatment has also been emphasized, although the burden still largely 

rests with localities to provide. Propaganda plays an important role in highlighting praise and reward of navy models of self-sacrifice, self-study, perseverance, and innovation, as well as the punishment and relief of leaders who violate rules and regulations and fail to carry out their duties and responsibilities. 

Noncommissioned Officers

A key reform of the PLAN personnel system is the development of a 

noncommissioned officer corps to serve as the navy’s foundation and link between officers and conscripts. NCOs are primarily accessed from the enlisted 

conscription ranks. Some have also been recruited from civilian schools.22

The duties and responsibilities of the NCOs are expanding to fill their 

roles as experts in multiple skills and as trainers of junior NCOs and conscripts. 

Some duties that previously fell on commissioned officers have also migrated 

to NCOs, who can also serve as acting platoon leaders and command smaller 

PLAN vessels.23

The education goals for NCOs presently are either a secondary technical degree (high school equivalent) or senior technical degree (associate level—

the first class of NCOs to graduate was in 2003), which puts them well above 

the education levels of conscripts, but also below commissioned officers. The 

PLAN has one NCO School located in Bengbu, Anhui Province. It provides 

2- to 3-year courses in maritime and ground-based services, including 24 

specialties in nine categories, such as chemical defense, communications, 

navigation, logistics, machinery, mechanical, electrical, and weapons. In 

addition, NCOs can also attend programs at the Dalian Vessel Academy, 

Naval Engineering University, Service Arms Command Academy, Submarine 

Academy, Logistics Academy, and Aviation Engineering Academy.24

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Challenges

The proportion of NCOs PLA-wide is estimated to be about one-third. 

Estimates vary as high as 50 percent to 60 percent, depending on the technical specialty (e.g., Second Artillery). While having sufficient numbers of NCOs 

will be key to establishing a corps, the greater challenge will lie in developing a 

sufficient and consistent level of training, education, and practical experience 

throughout the entire corps of NCOs to provide backbone leadership and 

expertise to the force.

While training and education of NCOs are increasing, they still are 

insufficient and must compete for funds for officer training and other 

improvements. Reports of corruption within the NCO system selections and 

promotions are not encouraging, but may be fueled by the yearly up-or-out 

testing of NCOs, and risk undermining the pace and scope of the establishment of an NCO corps. At present, NCOs are primarily technical experts who 

are evolving into a greater training and leadership role, which will take time, 

training, and experience to realize. Additionally, the weight given to the voice 

of an NCO in decisionmaking may be limited by power relationships between 

the officers, who appear to be becoming more elite, and the heavily burdened 

but relatively weak NCO base. Although the power and influence of the NCO 

corps may grow over time, their limited membership in Party Committees will 

work against this development, even if the commissioned officers encourage it. 

At this time in the development of the Chinese navy’s NCO corps, it appears 

that their roles may be too broad and diverse, relieving commissioned officers 

of extra duties, while providing force continuity and expertise for daily naval 

operations and training. The normal tension that exists between NCOs and 

officers will likely be accentuated as the Chinese navy finds its way through this 

transition and duties, responsibilities, and roles, as well as power relationships, 

are further developed.

Party Matters: Addressing Personnel Problems

Any denial or neutralization of the Party leadership will be uncompromisingly fought against.

—Minister of Defense General Cao Gangchuan (17th Party Congress)

As the vanguard party in command of the gun (i.e., the PLA), the 

Chinese Communist Party oversees the modernization of the PLAN and 

armed forces. Its propaganda role is key to encouraging the right people (educated and skilled young people) to join the PLA in the right numbers, while 

also convincing families that it is their patriotic duty to allow their children 

to volunteer for the armed forces, particularly in the cities, where education 

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is higher, but where other opportunities are also more abundant. One-child 

families, who are reluctant to give up their only child to military service, may 

also be attracted to Party-led enhancements to military benefits, especially education and other opportunities for their sons and daughters, and better 

placement and treatment after leaving the armed forces. 

The 17th Party Congress’s explicit stress on the leading role of the Party, 

including the military, as well as the urgent need for rejuvenation of the 

Party and elimination of corruption at all levels, does not indicate that 

the Party feels confident and secure in its role. For the PLAN and other services, Party corruption beyond tolerable limits can undermine the military 

competency, cohesion, and resilience needed to respond to a crisis, which can 

be devastating to military modernization. While the Party seems to recognize 

the potential threat that corruption brings to its continued rule, at the same 

time old habits die hard, and the Party, even in the military, seems to continue 

to just nip around the edges of corruption without sinking into its heart. 

The Party’s latest reincarnation of the red-versus-expert dichotomy in 

the military stresses, first, the paramount position of Party leadership, and, second, Party member development of a higher level of military competency and 

professionalism more suitable to its vanguard role in leading high-tech modernization. It is debatable, however, how political officers, who have limited 

field experience as young officers before they are recruited into the political 

specialty at the platoon or company levels, can develop high-tech military expertise sufficient to make informed decisions, particularly in crisis, when they 

reach more senior levels. Although they are encouraged to raise their military 

competence, this aspect will likely remain secondary to their political duties 

and responsibilities. The navy’s model Party member in 2007, Fang Yonggang, 

PLA Dalian Naval Academy Political Science Professor, may be more representative of what the Party seeks of its members. Fang was praised more for his 

dedication to self-sacrifice, clean living, and innovative propaganda, than for 

any knowledge of the needs of a modernizing Navy.

Nonetheless, the unquestioned authority of the Party Committee in all 

major decisionmaking, as emphasized by General Cao Gangchuan, Minister of 

Defense, at the 17th Party Congress, makes it clear that the Party will not be taking a back seat anytime soon to more professional military officers to lead the 

navy or other armed forces in their quest for high-tech capabilities. 

Foreign Influences on Navy Modernization

The main reasons given [for the withdrawal of Soviet technical advisors 

in July and August 1960] were that: the Chinese did not follow Soviet technical 

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advice and often expressed their scorn for it; the Chinese created intolerable 

conditions for the Soviet advisors, spying on them, searching their belongings, 

opening their mail; in some cases, Soviet specialists had been molested and even 

attacked.”

—Mikhail Klochko25

However great the disagreements between [China and the Soviet Union]

may be, we hope that we can gradually find a way to eliminate those disagreements, since unity between us is very important.

—Deng Xiaoping, July 20, 196326

Russian influence in Chinese military modernization has spanned almost 20 years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, 

including during the 1950s, until military relations were severed in 1963, and 

beginning again after the normalization of relations in 1989. High-level military ties between China and the former Soviet Union were resumed in 199027

and continued to develop even after the Soviet Union disintegrated, making 

Russia the most consistent source of potential influence on the PLA. Since 

the 1990s, this influence has focused on arms sales from Russia to China, 

particularly relatively high technology for the navy and air forces.

The PLAN has also looked to other more advanced navies as potential models for its modernization. Several years after the normalization of 

relations with the United States in 1979, U.S.-China navy relations developed as part of the overall bilateral relationship between the two militaries. 

In the mid-1980s, the United States agreed to allow China to purchase four 

Honeywell MK46 Mod.2 antisubmarine torpedoes and associated equipment 

under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.28 From the mid-to-late1980s, military-to-military contacts included technical exchanges and highlevel visits, with the potential for further development. In anticipation of 

more FMS cases in the future, military attachés in that period of the 1980s received special training in managing military sales, and plans to add officers 

to monitor the programs were shaping up. This level of military-to-military 

contacts was severed, however, by the June 1989 Tiananmen incident, when the 

United States suspended FMS cases. These remained in limbo for several years 

until an agreement was brokered to close out the cases in 1993. The uncompleted projects were packed up, as is, and shipped back to China, removing 

a key obstacle to resuming military contacts. The suspension and close-out 

left behind a mutual understanding (that was hardened on the U.S. side by 

Congressionally mandated restrictions and bitterness, distrust, and embarrassment on the Chinese side) that FMS to China were no longer possible, and 

have limited the scope of U.S.-China military contacts since. 

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186 PUSKA

While contacts with the U.S. Navy since 1989 have ebbed and flowed, 

ongoing Chinese navy contacts with other countries have steadily developed 

to the point that China now even conducts joint navy exercises with foreign 

navies. Most of the exercises, with the exception of those with Russia, are 

limited to maritime search and rescue drills, but they provide a basis for further development in the future. Between 2003 and 2006, China conducted nine 

Joint Maritime Exercises with foreign navies, as reported in the 2004 and 2006 

National Defense White Papers. These exercises began with two exercises in 

2003 with the Pakistan and India navies in 1-day exercises on October 21 and 

November 14, respectively. In 2004, China conducted three Joint Maritime 

Search and Rescue exercises with France on March 16, the United Kingdom 

on June 20, and Australia on October 10. At the end of 2005, the Chinese navy 

conducted three exercises in quick succession with Pakistan on November 24, 

2005, India on December 1, and Thailand on December 13. During the end 

of 2006, China also conducted a two-phase Joint Maritime Search and Rescue 

Exercise with the United States. The first phase was held on September 20 and 

the second phase was conducted during November 18–19. 

The roster of foreign navy officer representation within the Beijing 

Attaché Corps (as of October 2007) covers the global naval capabilities of large 

and small naval forces including the following: Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, 

Cameroon, Ecuador, France, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic 

of Korea, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United States.29 These officers 

interact with the PLAN directly through social and professional associations, as well as during coordination of port visits, exchange of high-level and 

technical delegations, maritime exercises, and other activities.

Although the proportion of PLAN officers assigned to Chinese 

embassies abroad is unknown, the army tends to fill the higher percentage of 

military attaché positions worldwide. In 2006, for example, only two Chinese 

naval officers served in the Chinese Embassy, Washington, DC. In any case, 

Chinese military attachés are often less knowledgeable of their own service 

and the PLA in general, than they are of foreign militaries of interest. Additionally, Chinese military attachés often lack significant practical experience 

in leadership and technical operations. Nonetheless, they provide a window 

for the Chinese armed forces into areas of interest in foreign military capabilities, which can assist the PLA in better understanding the operations, 

organization, weapons, doctrine, etc., of foreign militaries. The access also 

allows Chinese military representatives abroad to make foreign military information of interest more accessible to the PLA through their translations into 

Chinese, interpretation of concepts, and other ways.

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 PREPARING CHINESE LEADERS FOR HIGH-TECH WAR 187

Transparency in Military Ties—A “Smiling Warning”

A recent opinion piece in China Daily by a researcher of the Second 

Artillery Corps, Yang Chengjun,30 acknowledged the utility of foreign military ties to promote PLA transparency, which help project an “image of 

trustworthiness” throughout the international community, while also providing a “smiling warning” to countries that “play power politics”—an indirect 

reference to the United States. The author argued that military ties promote 

mutual trust and provide a better understanding of each side’s strategic intentions. But they also benefit the Chinese military by closing the gap with other 

countries through exposure to foreign military expertise, ideas, and technologies in areas such as nuclear strategy, military expenses, and organization. 

Military ties, he wrote, have enabled the Chinese Armed Force to upgrade its 

weaponry over the last decade, and the Chinese ability to conduct military ties 

reflects its self-confidence.31

Whatever steps the PLA in general, and the PLAN in particular, take 

to transform the officer and personnel management system, the process must 

conform to the Chinese military culture and operational system. Dramatic importation of foreign ideas into the PLAN may prove useful only if the PLAN 

can fully integrate and Sinicize these ideas with their own culture—civilian and 

military. Otherwise, foreign ideas that are not fully understood or integrated 

could become a liability, particularly as change accelerates and the force is 

subjected to routine and exceptional crises. 

Conclusions—Will PLAN Personnel Transformation Work?

The PLAN has taken a number of positive steps to improve officer and 

enlisted leadership to support naval modernization. Among these, changes to 

the level of quality of accessions, development of an NCO corps throughout 

the navy, and improvements in training, particularly by enhancing the practical application of schoolhouse training, can raise the quality and depth of 

navy leadership at the operational level. The NCO corps can help stabilize the 

PLAN, achieve higher levels of expertise, and reduce the excessive dependency 

on 2-year recruits. 

But the role of the Party Committee and Party corruption, as well as 

the continued operational dominance of the navy by the army, are countervailing conditions that work against personnel improvements. The goal to 

strengthen the Party Committee role, in particular, which was emphasized at 

the 17th Party Congress, may work against the enhancement of military capability. Raising the military competency of the Party when the PLAN does not 

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188 PUSKA

have enough resources to train its line officers and NCOs seems unrealistic 

for Party members. The development of the NCO corps and its relationship to 

the commissioned officer corps and the Party Committee is a work in progress, and problems between the two groups may emerge without resolution 

for some time as the navy transitions. For now, the development of both the 

NCO and commissioned officers corps is challenged by the need for more 

well-educated personnel at all levels, including junior enlisted ranks, to take 

better advantage of high-tech weapons and equipment. The 2-year conscription 

process will likely not meet the needs of the PLAN in the future, and it may shift 

to a more graduated personnel system that allows for long terms for enlisted 

sailors, as well as conscripts.

Notes

1Xinhua News Agency, accessed October 13, 2007, at <http://www.dcfp.navy.mil/mc/articles/other/

MingSub.htm> while Hu was the Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission under Jiang Zemin. 

2 “Former Chinese Navy Deputy Commander Stripped of Parliamentary Post,” posted June 29, 

2006, by the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America. Accessed October 

13, 2007, at <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t260594.htm>.

3 Special thanks to Rear Admiral (Ret.) Eric McVadon, Barry Kaye, Frank Coleman, Brad Kaplan, 

Bud Cole, Brad Murphy, Cynthia Watson, and Carol Yee for their assistance in preparing this paper. Any errors or omissions are the author’s. The perspectives and conclusions presented in this report are the author’s 

alone, and do not reflect those of the Defense Group Inc. or any of its clients.

4 Ted C. Fishman, “The Chinese Century,” The New York Times, July 4, 2004, accessed October 13, 

2007, at <http://nytimes.Com/2004/07/04/magazine/04CHINA.html>. Also see, for example, Laurence J. 

Brahm, China’s Century: The Awakening of the Next Economic Powerhouse (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 

1991); and Oded Shenkar, The Chinese Century: The Rising Chinese Economy and Its Impact on the Global 

Economy, The Balance of Power, and Your Job (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Wharton School Pub., c2005).

5 Li Weixing: “Responsibility: A Submarine Captain’s Number One Character Trait,” Jiefangjun Bao, 

October 24, 2006, 7. 

6CPP2007102001 Beijing Jiefangjun Bao WWW-Text in English, October 19, 2007. 

7 “Ming-class Submarine Incident Won’t Stop Chinese Navy from ‘Going Blue,’” Washington Observer, accessed October 13, 2007, at <http://68.165.165/en/document.cfm?documenytid=1&charid-3>.

8 “Senior Naval Officers Punished for Submarine Accident,” People’s Daily, June 14, 2003, accessed 

October 13, 2007, at <http://english.peopledaily.com>. 

9 Li, “Responsibility: A Submarine Captain’s Number One Character Trait.”

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Mark O’Neill, “A Corruption Trail Leads to Jiang Zemin,” Asia Sentinel, March 7, 2007. Accessed October 14, 2007, at <http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option-com_content&tak-view&id409&Itemid-31>.

13Xinhua News Agency, “Former Navy Deputy Commander Stripped of NPC Post,” June 29, 2006. 

Accessed October 13, 2007, at <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-0/29/content_629565.htm>.

14 O’Neill. 

15 Office of Naval Intelligence, “China’s Navy 2007,” 69. Available for download at numerous postings online, such as <militarytimes.com>. Accessed October 28, 2007.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

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 PREPARING CHINESE LEADERS FOR HIGH-TECH WAR 189

18 Ibid. and Roy D. Kamphausen, “ROTC with Chinese Characteristics: Training the PLA in Civilian 

Universities,” China Brief, The Jamestown Foundation 7, issue 6 (March 21, 2007).

19 Office of Naval Intelligence.

20 “Slideshow: A University President’s Military Dream,” posted by Sophia Cao, September 3, 2007. 

Accessed October 29, 2007 at <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/china/military-training/2007/>.

21 “Military Training for College Students—20 Years On,” accessed October 29, 2007, at <http://

www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Oct/144153.htm>.

22 Office of Naval Intelligence, 73–74.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Mikhail A. Klochko, Soviet Scientists in Red China, 178, quoted in Roderick MacFarquhar, The

Origins of the Cultural Revolution 2: The Great Leap Forward 1958–1960 (New York: Columbia University 

Press, 1983), 278–279.

26 From records of meetings held between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party in Moscow during the summer of 1963 before the split between the two countries 

occurred. Odd Arne Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance 1945–1963

(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 390.

27 Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisitions from Abroad: A Quest for “Superb and Secret 

Weapons,” SIPRI Research Report No. 11 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 51.

28 Ibid.

29While other countries not listed above also have naval attachés, these officers are predominately 

from their respective armies. Russia presently has an army general as its defense attaché, although this officer has been navy in the past. Military Attaché Corps, Beijing, People’s Republic of China, accessed October 

14, 2007, at <http://www.bjmac.org>.

30Yang Chengjun, “More Transparency Will Benefit the PLA,” China Daily, July 27, 2007.

31 Ibid.

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 191

Chapter 8

The PLA Navy’s Antiaccess Role in a Taiwan 

Contingency

Michael McDevitt

Introduction

“Antiaccess” and “area denial” are coined U.S. terms, first introduced 

into the official Defense Department lexicon in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense 

Review.1

 Both are now commonly used to characterize attempts to prevent the 

U.S. military from intervening should China elect to attack Taiwan. The basic 

idea is to prevent approaching U.S. Navy aircraft carrier strike groups from getting within tactical aircraft operating ranges. Or, as the Commander of the U.S. 

Pacific Command Admiral Robert Willard recently testified, “to challenge U.S. 

freedom of action in the region.”2

In Pentagon terminology “antiaccess” (A2 in Pentagonese) is often used 

synonymously with the term “area denial,” or AD. They are normally referred 

to together, as in antiaccess/area denial, or A2/AD. A very recent report by the 

influential research organization, The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), differentiates between the two by equating antiaccess as the 

attempt to deny access to large fixed bases, such as Kadena Air Force base in 

Okinawa, so U.S. Air Force fighters cannot become involved in a cross-strait 

conflict.3

 CSBA’s parsing now defines area denial as those capabilities intended 

to defeat mobile maritime forces. When this paper was originally drafted, antiaccess was most commonly used to characterize both A2 and AD which is, 

I believe, how most analysts still think about the issue. I will continue to use 

antiaccess as a generic term to capture the ideas resident in both A2 and AD.

It goes without saying that these are U.S. and not Chinese terms. They 

are useful characterizations because they describe the operational objective (or 

military effect) the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is trying to accomplish if 

operations are successfully executed. The PLA does not use these terms—

it speaks to “active defense.” A good discussion of the strategic concepts that 

underwrite the antiaccess concept is found in the PLA’s Science of Military 

Strategy: “Active defense is the essential feature of China’s military strategy and 

is the keystone of the theory of China’s strategic guidance.” The PLA argues 

that “active defense” is actually a “strategic counterattack,” because if an enemy 

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192 McDEVITT

“offends our national interests, it means the enemy has already fired the first 

shot.” It is the mission of the PLA “to do all we can to dominate the enemy by 

striking first.” It goes on to instruct that “we should try our best to fight against the 

enemy as far away as possible, to lead the war to the enemy’s operational base ... 

and to actively strike all the effective strength forming the enemy’s war system.”4

It is important to recognize that while the focus of this paper is the PLA 

Navy, China’s approach to antiaccess should in fact be considered a joint military operation—in that it involves more than one service. It involves the PLA 

Navy, PLA Air Force, and the Second Artillery. Even though most of the fighting would take place off China’s littoral at sea or on neighboring islands with 

U.S. bases, many of the most important capabilities that the PLA would employ 

are in the other PLA services and not the PLA Navy.

It is also important to recognize that from China’s perspective, an antiaccess campaign is inherently defensive; it is a responsive operational concept 

designed to react to the problems posed by U.S. forces close to or closing on 

the Chinese mainland. While it is being developed with a Taiwan contingency 

in mind, the concept itself has broader applicability than simply a Taiwan conflict scenario. This is a central point; these capabilities are important to China 

beyond a Taiwan contingency. The operational concept and attendant military 

capabilities resident in antiaccess are also very important to the defense of the 

Chinese mainland from attack from the sea, a vulnerability that has plagued 

China since the Opium War era. Thus, even if the prospect of conflict over 

Taiwan evaporates at some point in the future, the PLA capabilities associated 

with antiaccess will almost certainly not disappear.

This paper will attempt to put antiaccess into some historic context, 

and briefly discuss the similarities and differences between China’s current 

approach and what the Soviet Union had put in place to deal with a similar 

strategic vulnerability during the Cold War, namely, how to cope with the 

threat posed by U.S. Navy aircraft carrier task forces. 

Finally, although Beijing’s wartime antiaccess strategy must take into 

account U.S. Air Force bases in Okinawa, Guam, and potentially South 

Korea, the operational aspects of dealing with this problem are straightforward. Conventionally armed ballistic missiles have been used to attack fixed 

land targets since 1944, without much strategic or operational success because of small conventional explosive payloads and missile inaccuracy. Today, 

this situation is very different. In the era of global positioning system (GPS)–

enabled precision weapons, attacking fixed land bases with ballistic missiles is 

no longer operationally challenging because air bases do not move. There is a 

reasonable expectation that, after launching GPS-equipped ballistic missiles at 

a specific latitude and longitude, the missile will hit very close to the intended 

geographic aimpoint. 

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Because these missiles carry a relatively small amount of conventional 

explosive, the key to the successful use of ballistic missiles to put airfields out 

of commission is determined by missile accuracy and the number of missiles 

available to attack and reattack versus the adequacy of active missile defenses, 

the effectiveness of passive defenses such as hardened aircraft shelters, and the 

efficacy of rapid runway repair capabilities. To conduct a detailed examination 

of these factors is beyond the scope of this paper. Happily, recent testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission by a RAND 

expert provides a useful summation:

RAND has looked at the effects of various TBM [theater ballistic missile] 

and cruise missile warheads against airbase targets, and numbers on the 

order of 30–50 TBM per base appear to be sufficient to overload and kill 

air defenses, cover all of the open parking areas with submunitions to destroy aircraft parked there, and crater runways such that aircraft cannot 

take off or land. If 30–50 cruise missiles were fired along with the TBMs, 

they would complicate the air defense problem and could also damage 

or destroy a squadron’s worth of aircraft shelters. There would likely also 

be damage to other critical airbase systems such as fuel storage and handling or maintenance facilities and equipment. Following such an attack, 

U.S. forces would have to extinguish burning aircraft, clear the airfield 

of debris and unexploded ordnance, repair runway craters and fly in replacement aircraft and support equipment before the base could generate useful combat sorties.5

This statement should not be construed as suggesting the problem is 

hopeless. Countermeasures such as hardening against the small conventional 

warheads these missiles carry and improved techniques in rapid runway repair 

should not be dismissed out of hand. 

The much more problematic issue for Beijing is in reaching a political 

decision to broaden the war by attacking U.S. facilities on the territory of Japan 

or South Korea.6

 Would Beijing be willing to add to its enemies by attacking its 

neighbor’s territory? Exploring this issue is also beyond the scope of this paper, 

but the problem should be kept in mind as yet another of the many difficult 

choices that the leadership of China will have to confront when determining 

whether or not to use force against Taiwan.

Historic Context—Finding and Attacking Ships at Sea Before Radar 

and Satellites

For most of recorded history, when ships went to sea and sailed beyond 

the sight of humans on the coast or on other ships—typically 12–18 nautical 

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194 McDEVITT

miles depending on the height of eye of the observer above sea level—they 

“disappeared.” They were literally “over the horizon” and vanished from shorebased surveillance until they once more returned to within sight of land—

often with little or no advanced warning. Officials responsible for the defense 

of their countries from enemies with navies had only one option in dealing 

with the surprise of warships suddenly showing up—build and man forts along 

vulnerable coastlines. As a result, over the millennia coastal defense fortifications were constructed to protect strategically important ports and cities.7

Wealthy countries were also able to build navies in the hopes they could 

seek out and defeat hostile navies before they could “materialize” off their coast. 

But before 20th century technology made it possible to search wide expanses of 

the ocean, finding a hostile fleet at sea was also very difficult. A classic example 

is the 4-month search by Lord Nelson in 1798 for the French fleet that eluded 

the British blockade and carried Napoleon’s army to Egypt.8

 Nelson was eventually successful; he found and destroyed the French Fleet at Aboukir Bay, but 

not before Napoleon landed and successfully conquered Egypt.

Building forts and coastal fortifications to defend against hostile navies—especially those carrying invasion forces—is something that reached its 

apogee in World War II. In this great struggle, both the Germans and Japanese 

found that if you did not defeat the approaching naval force before it arrived at 

its objective area, it was virtually impossible to keep the invasion forces from 

coming ashore. Between late 1942 and the end of the war in 1945, neither the 

Germans nor the Japanese were able to either intercept or throw the invading force back into the sea. As the Japanese themselves demonstrated in their 

1941–1942 campaigns throughout Southeast Asia, a powerful naval force that 

suddenly appeared in unexpected places could enable stunningly successful 

ground campaigns.

Thus the issue for any country worried about being attacked or invaded 

from the sea is finding a hostile naval force in the vastness of the open ocean 

so that the approaching navy could be attacked before it was too late. Clearly, 

reconnaissance by long-range patrol planes was used to find warships at sea 

with some success in World War II—the location and eventual sinking of the 

German battleship Bismarck being a classic example.9

 There was also the intelligence practice of intercepting radio transmissions from naval forces at sea, a 

tactic practiced since World War I. Using the navigation technique of triangulation, a group of intercepting shore stations could develop the approximate 

location of the radio signal being sent from a ship at sea. Signal intercept is still 

in use by the PLA but it depends upon a “cooperative” enemy who is willing to 

actually use radios or in the modern era any electronic equipment that emits 

electronic signals that travel great distances, such as high-power radars. If the 

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naval force elected to remain “radio silent,” it still took the human eye or aircraft radar to find a naval force at sea.

Finding a force at sea is the basic problem, but determining what to do 

next is just as important. During World War II the German Navy combined 

the techniques of radio signal intercept, code-breaking, and aircraft surveillance to locate convoys sailing across the North Atlantic. They used centralized 

command from the shore to alert and position the submarines they had at sea. 

German U-boat commanders were directed by routine radio signals from 

U-boat headquarters where to go to intercept allied convoys. 

In the early years of the war before radar was installed on allied aircraft 

and convoy escorts, the U-boats could surface and travel at a relatively high 

rate of speed to get into attack position. But once radar made the surface of 

the ocean inhospitable for surfaced U-boats, the inherent weakness of the slow 

submerged speed and limited battery life of diesel submarines greatly limited 

the effects the boats could achieve no matter how effective the shore-based 

command and control. It is worth wondering, and is strategically very relevant, 

why German U-boats were never able to intercept and interrupt any of the vast 

allied invasion fleets that landed armies successively in North Africa, Sicily, 

Italy, Normandy, and Southern France. The answer, I believe, is that they could 

not “find” them. Nonetheless, the techniques implemented by the Germans 

to command their submarine forces remain in use to this day, largely because 

the very nature of how a submarine operates limits its ability to develop a 

comprehensive surveillance picture of its ocean operating area.10

The Soviet Experience in Dealing with a Threat from the Sea

As the Cold War developed, the Soviets became increasingly concerned 

about their vulnerability to attack from the sea. They elected to pursue a defensive maritime strategy oriented to defeating sea-based strikes against the 

Soviet Union and its allies. Not that they feared an invasion by the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the United States acting alone—the 

1940 Nazi invasion was simply the latest unhappy example of what happens 

to nations that try to invade Russia. Rather, what the Russians feared was U.S. 

aircraft carrier task forces with air groups trained to deliver nuclear weapons.

It is forgotten by most today, but in the 1950s the U.S. Navy made major 

investments to ensure that its carriers could employ nuclear weapons against 

the Soviet Union. The argument that was successfully made on Capitol Hill 

was that the mobility of carrier groups would pose key targeting problems for 

the Soviets and thereby increase deterrence. This was how the Navy continued 

to justify maintaining a carrier force structure in the face of U.S. Air Force 

arguments that bombers alone were sufficient.11

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196 McDEVITT

It turns out the Navy arguments were correct. The problem of coping 

with aircraft carrier airwings carrying nuclear weapons made the Soviets realize they had to develop an ocean surveillance system (subsequently dubbed 

by U.S. intelligence as Soviet Ocean Surveillance System [SOSS]) in an attempt 

to keep track of U.S. carrier task forces. Over the years they built an elaborate global network of electronic intercept stations that attempted to track the 

electronic emissions of U.S. naval forces. Eventually, space-based satellites optimized to detect radar signals entered the SOSS inventory. The Soviets also 

commissioned a small fleet of purpose-built oceangoing surveillance auxiliaries especially equipped to locate and track U.S. carrier forces. Finally, the 

Soviet Navy developed a tactic that capitalized on the fact that in international waters any ship could sail in proximity to any other ship. They assigned 

selected surface combatants to essentially shadow U.S. carrier forces at sea, by 

staying within visual contact, and often actually “joining” the U.S. formation—

known as “tattletales,” these surface combatants had the primary mission of 

reporting every few hours on the exact location of the U.S. carrier.12

The Soviets also realized that simply knowing the location of the 

carriers was not good enough; they also had to be able to deal with them if war 

broke out. The Soviets developed a defensive maritime strategy with thresholds established at various distances from the Soviet Union’s coasts. The first 

threshold was called the sea control zone, about 200 nautical miles from the 

coast. The second was the sea denial zone which reached some 1,250 nautical 

miles from the Soviet coast.13 The high point of the Soviet approach to maritime defense was realized by the mid 1980s when the Kremlin had in place 

a force structure of about 270 attack submarines, 280 major surface combatants, and over 1,300 naval aircraft allocated among the North Atlantic, eastern 

Mediterranean, and Pacific maritime approaches to the Soviet Union.14

The Soviet concept of the combination of open ocean surveillance, 

long-range land-based aircraft with cruise missiles, and nuclear-powered 

submarines with large loads of antiship cruise missiles formed an imposing 

antiaccess capability when the Cold War ended. Happily, the United States 

and the Soviet Union never had the opportunity to determine whether the 

antiaccess concept of operations would succeed or not. What is clear in 

retrospect is that it was a sensible way for the Soviets to plan on how to keep 

a threatening naval force at bay so it could never approach close enough to 

launch nuclear-equipped tactical aircraft against targets in the Soviet Union.

China, as a continental power that only recently is coming to grips with 

defending itself from a serious attack from the sea, has apparently made a 

series of sensible decisions to adopt an approach that is remarkably similar 

to what the Soviets did. This is not a surprise since the concept is at once 

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affordable and militarily practical. By affordable, I imply a cost comparison 

with trying to build a 21st century version of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s balanced blue-water fighting force, which would be able to slug it out with the 

U.S. Navy in a battle for sea control of the Western Pacific. China is not pursuing that solution to the sea control problem, although what it is doing does not 

prejudice future attempts to replicate a capability similar to the one that Japan 

possessed between 1919 and 1944.

The discussion thus far has explored the concept of antiaccess specifically without regard to China’s geostrategic situation, which is what generates 

the “demand signal” that creates the military requirement for “antiaccess” in 

the first place. 

Why an Antiaccess Concept—The Geostrategic Context

Throughout China’s long history, its strategic orientation could be categorized as continental and hence its strategic tradition—its way of thinking 

about and framing strategic issues—has been largely focused on land war. A 

PLAN Senior Captain writing in 2004 in the journal China Military Science

characterized this land-based geostrategic perspective “from beginning to 

end” as emphasizing “land power at the expense of sea power.”15 While this was 

historically accurate and probably was a widely held perspective among many 

PLA naval officers when written, the truth is that by 2004 the leadership of the 

PLA had long since recognized China’s growing dependence on the sea and its 

historic vulnerability along its seaward approaches.

China’s strategic situation began to change with the collapse of the 

Soviet Union. The risk of cross-border aggression moderated. The threat of 

invasion—the primary worry of Chinese or indeed most Eurasian strategists 

for many centuries—has all but disappeared. All the while, China’s economic 

growth is dependent on trade, most of which is carried in containers loaded on 

ships. As a result, the importance of the maritime domain is a growing preoccupation for China.16

Specifically, the newfound interest in the maritime aspects of China’s 

security can be dated to August 1985, when then-Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Yang Shangkun addressed an enlarged meeting of the 

PLA Navy Party Committee and directed that the concept of “offshore defense” 

become the strategic concept that should guide naval modernization. In effect, 

the PLAN was told to become more than merely a coastal defense force.17 As 

former Navy Commander Vice Admiral Shi Yunsheng put it, “Following the 

enlarged Central Military Commission meeting in 1985, we established the 

Navy’s strategy of offshore defense . . . and defined the strategic mission of the 

Navy in the new period.”18

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One of the most important considerations that PLA Navy strategic planners faced was synchronization with top-level defense planning 

guidance, which is known as the “major strategic direction”—that is, the 

direction and nature of the primary threat.19 For the PLA the major strategic 

direction forms the basis for making operational plans and deciding what 

operational capabilities are required. In effect, this is the PLA’s approach to what 

in the United States is called threat-based planning. As The Science of Military 

Strategy makes clear, “the major strategic direction” forms the basis from which 

operational plans are then developed and appropriate forces are procured, 

postured, and trained.20 It is “the focal point of the struggle of contradictions 

between ourselves and the enemy . . . in the overall strategic situation; it is the 

vital point of greatest importance [emphasis added].” The Science of Military 

Strategy goes on to say, “The major strategic direction is basically determined 

according to the national strategic interests and the fundamental international 

and domestic strategic situation.”21

In analyzing the “current international situation” from the perspective 

of Beijing, the news is mixed. Over the past 15 years China’s leaders and diplomats have secured the PRC’s land frontiers by resolving or mitigating territorial 

disputes with Russia, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and India. They have 

also negotiated “strategic partnerships” with most of these countries, and in the 

case of the “stans” and Russia, have knitted them into the fabric of a regional 

security relationship called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).22

As a result, the PRC does not face a credible military threat from its continental neighbors, nor does it have territorial disputes with them that could be the 

pretense for military action. Russia still possesses a substantial strategic nuclear 

force; however, that threat has been modulated by good political relations 

enshrined in the “Sino-Russian Good Neighborly Treaty of Friendship,” which 

went into effect on March 1, 2002.23

While its land frontiers are stable, looking east from Beijing beyond 

its eastern seaboard the situation is more strategically problematic. China’s 

maritime approaches are replete with unresolved sovereignty issues and genuine vulnerabilities. Strategic vulnerability from the sea is not a new issue for 

China. Weakness along its long maritime frontier has been a problem for 

Beijing since at least 1842, when the Treaty of Nanking ended the first Opium 

War and ushered in the so-called “Century of Humiliation.” The repeated military and diplomatic humiliations and defeats that China suffered were inflicted 

by Western powers and Japan, and came mainly from the sea.

24

Today, China has the resources and skills necessary to address the strategic problem that the vast majority of China’s outstanding sovereignty claims 

and unresolved strategic issues are maritime in nature. Consider:

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■  Taiwan is an island. It is the combination of Taiwan’s air defense and 

the threat of intervention by the U.S. military (primarily the U.S. Navy) 

that effectively keeps the Taiwan Strait a moat rather than a highway 

open to the PLA.

■  Perhaps as strategically significant as Taiwan to a PLA planner is the 

geostrategic reality that the PRC’s economic center of gravity is on its 

east coast, which, because it is a “seaboard,” is extremely vulnerable to 

attack from the sea—a military task the United States is uniquely suited to execute.

■  Territorial disputes with Japan over islands and seabed resources in 

the East China Sea have become more contentious, and represent a 

potential flash point between China and Japan, and potentially between China and the United States, because of the U.S. alliance with 

Tokyo. The entire issue is maritime in nature.25

■  Unsettled territorial disputes, and their concomitant resource issues, 

remain with respect to the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea. 

Again, this problem is maritime in nature.

Finally, Beijing’s primary military competitor—the United States—

maintains a significant naval presence on “China’s doorstep.” Should China 

elect to use force to resolve either reunification with Taiwan or outstanding 

maritime claims, the United States is the one country that could militarily deny 

success. Its air and naval presence in the region provides a counterbalance to 

the potential use of the PLA to settle these issues by force majeure. The United 

States is closely allied with China’s “historic” antagonist Japan, which also has 

an excellent navy and a formidable maritime tradition.26

The importance of unresolved maritime issues to China’s leadership 

was highlighted by the December 2004 Chinese Defense White Paper, which 

swept aside assumptions regarding land-force preeminence when it stated that 

the PLA Navy, the PLA Air Force, and the ballistic missile force—the Second 

Artillery—are to receive priority in funding. Further, it explicitly lays out its 

ambitions for the PLA Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery:

While continuing to attach importance to the building of the Army, the 

PLA gives priority to the building of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery force to seek balanced development of the combat force structure, 

in order to strengthen the capabilities for winning both command of the sea 

and command of the air, and conducting strategic counter strikes [emphasis added].27

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Figure 8-1. Soviet Concept for Sea Denial and Sea Control During the Cold War

Source: John B. Hattendorf, Jr., The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper 19 (Newport, RI: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, 

2004), 170.

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Figure 8–2. Chinese Concept for Offshore Defense: “Island Chains”

Source: Based on U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2010.

PLA Approach to Implementing Command of the Sea and Command 

of the Air

It is not a coincidence that the PLA’s concept of offshore defense seems to 

be based on how the Soviets thought about maritime strategy.28 As previously 

discussed, the Soviets developed a defensive maritime strategy with thresholds 

established at various distances from the Soviet Union’s coasts. These thresholds were de facto “lines-in-the-water.” The difference between the Soviets and 

China is that the PLA has elected to define distance-related thresholds in terms 

of “island chains.”29

The Soviet template considered the waters closest to the mainland, out 

to approximately 200 nautical miles (nms), an area that Soviet naval forces and 

land-based air forces must be able to “control.” Beyond this threshold, moving 

farther to sea (to a range of about 1,200 nms), the Soviets strategy was to “deny 

or contest” those waters to the U.S. Navy. In other words, the military requirement is sea control close in and sea denial as the distances from the mainland 

increase. 

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For China the 200-nm sea control zone results in a requirement for the 

PLA Navy to “control” the Yellow Sea, much of the East China Sea, the Taiwan 

Strait, at a minimum the northern portion of the South China Sea, and the 

Tonkin Gulf. Not surprisingly, this sea control area also closely approximates 

the PRC’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and also generally follows the contour of the so-called “first island chain” that stretches southwest from Japan, 

through the Ryukyus, Taiwan, and the Pratas and Paracel Islands in the northern portion of the South China Sea.

If the entire South China Sea is included within the first island chain 

threshold, the “sea control” zone runs beyond 200 nautical miles in that one 

area. While this deviation makes it even harder to actually execute the mission of sea control because of the increase in water space, including the entirety 

of Beijing’s territorial claims in the South China Sea in the sea control zone 

makes sense. Plotting EEZ radius circles of 200 nms around each of the various 

islands and features makes it easy for the PLA to conclude the South China Sea 

belongs within the sea control area. It also creates a “requirement” to improve 

the military potential of disputed islands as bases or outposts in the South 

China Sea. For example, the airfield on Woody Island in the Paracel Group is 

an important contributor to the ability to execute a sea control mission in the 

South China Sea.

Beyond the first island chain threshold, the open ocean expanse extends 

to what the PLA terms the “second island chain.” This second threshold approximates the Soviet 1,200-nm “line in the water.” Except in China’s case, the 

line is probably closer to 2,400 kilometers or 1,300 nautical miles because this 

is the range the Chinese ascribe to Tomahawk cruise missiles.30 This vast area 

between 200 and 1,300 nautical miles essentially encompasses the Philippine 

Sea. This is the area in which use of the seas would be “contested.” The PLA 

ambition is to win the contest for sea control and deny it to U.S. naval forces.

This discussion is not as arcane as it might seem. These thresholds 

establish requirements for specific PLA Navy capabilities and as such are a 

“driver” of what capabilities the PLA will seek in its weapons and platforms. By 

establishing specific distances and areas where certain “military effects” are desired, it becomes simpler to then define precise operational characteristics for 

specific weapons systems, and to determine how many ships, submarines, and 

aircraft are required to accomplish the intended missions. These thresholds 

create what could be termed a layered defense. 

The first and most important requirement of a layered defense of the 

seaward approaches to China is an effective surveillance system that covers 

ocean approaches. Finding ships on the high seas is even today very difficult 

because of the vastness of the oceans. Also, determining the location of a ship 

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only once is not very helpful because ships move. Ships at sea travel around 

the clock, night and day, at relatively modest speeds when compared to land 

travel, but over a 24-hour period they travel a long way. One must keep track of 

moving ships by constantly updating the surveillance “plot.” 

Without effective surveillance, it is impossible to position offensive 

weapons systems to intercept moving naval task forces. As discussed, the 

Soviets built an integrated surveillance system that was composed of radiodirection-finding, electronic “spy ships” that could locate electronic signals, 

and space-based satellites designed to detect either electronic or infrared 

emissions from ships. It is worth noting that surveillance satellites are in 

relatively low orbits around the earth, and therefore pass overhead quickly. 

Thus, to achieve constant, around-the-clock coverage of any geographic area 

requires a large constellation of satellites so that one is always positioned over the 

desired surveillance area. That is why high-altitude drone aircraft have become 

such important new surveillance tools: they can loiter over a specific area for 

a long time.

The second element in the Soviet approach to layered defense was landbased, long-range aircraft that could be employed en masse to fire long-range 

antiship cruise missiles. The Soviet tactic was to send raids composed of two 

regiments (perhaps 45 aircraft) against each carrier battle group, to ensure that 

enough bombers would survive the fighter aircraft’s defensive screens to get 

within range to launch ship-killing cruise missiles. 

The third aspect of the Soviet layered strategy was the use of submarines that were directed to their targets in much the same way that German 

U-boats were sent toward transiting convoys: they were vectored by commands 

from shore, based on surveillance information. The PLA Navy is adapting this 

approach. It has focused on more modern, high-performance, conventionally 

propelled submarines, which, while lacking the time on station and submerged 

speed of nuclear-powered submarines, are much more difficult to detect. But, 

because conventionally powered submarines do not have sustained endurance, 

they are also more dependent on accurate surveillance to help them locate their 

intended targets.

The Soviets recognized the vulnerability of their surface ships to both 

U.S. submarines and U.S. carrier aircraft, both of which could attack the Soviet 

ships before they had closed U.S. ships to within cruise missile firing ranges. 

As a result, the Soviets intended to use surface ships in roles closer to shore, 

either to defend against air raids headed toward the Soviet mainland or as lastditch defenses. 

Today, PLA Navy surface combatants suffer from the same vulnerability. It is likely that the PLA Navy would opt for the same solution as the Soviets: 

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to wit, use surface warships closer to shore. In the PLA Navy’s case, this would 

mean keeping them within the first island chain to serve as last-ditch defenders 

and to search for enemy submarines, or to fight the Taiwan navy if the scenario 

included an attack on Taiwan.31

Offshore Defense (Antiaccess) in a Taiwan Scenario

Anyone who interacts with Chinese from the PRC will almost inevitably, 

at some point, be informed about how important Taiwan is to China, because 

it is a matter of China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity.32 Taiwan is 

the remaining unresolved territorial issue from China’s Century of Humiliation. 

During much of the Cold War, when China’s military potential was focused on a threat from the Soviet Union, or was consumed by the “Cultural 

Revolution,” and remained wedded to a doctrine of “people’s war,” the PLA 

really did not have the means to surmount the barrier that the Taiwan Strait 

presented to the application of PLA power to Taiwan. During this time, when 

the PRC threatened Taiwan with military punishment, its threats were largely 

empty. The PRC was “a paper tiger.”

In retrospect, after the 1950s this did not matter much. Mao could trigger a Cultural Revolution and Deng could focus on the Soviets because there 

was little threat that Taiwan would be permanently lost to China. The political leaders on both sides of the strait sought the same end: eventual reunification of the island and mainland. The argument was over what party would be 

in charge of the “uniting,” not over whether to have one Taiwan and one China. 

For a long time Beijing displayed little urgency in improving its ability to either credibly deter Taiwan’s independence or to field the means to capture it.33

This changed during the early 1990s, when the advent of democracy and 

notions of a de jure independent Taiwanese state began to politically resonate 

in Taiwan. In turn, Beijing made policy pronouncements on the use of force to 

prevent the permanent separation of Taiwan from the mainland. Taiwan became an operational idée fixe for the PLA, which sought to field capabilities 

that would lend credibility to these pronouncements. In this process of fielding 

capabilities that could deter a declaration of independence by Taiwan, the PLA 

Navy has not played a central role.34

The PLA’s single-minded focus on the operational problem of Taiwan has resulted in weapons and military capabilities that allow the PLA to 

“reach out and touch” Taiwan in a way that in earlier decades was not possible. 

The PLA has focused on two areas: putting hundreds of ballistic missiles in 

the hands of the Second Artillery; and purchasing excellent Russian tactical 

aircraft, which have allowed the PLA to credibly begin to match Taiwan’s heretofore qualitatively better aircraft. The two strands of development go hand 

in hand. The missiles will punish Taiwan, destroy its command and control, 

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and ground its air force, and the tactical aircraft will exploit this effort by 

seizing and sustaining air superiority (or “air control”) over the strait and 

perhaps Taiwan itself. Control of the air over the Taiwan Strait is the essential 

prerequisite for an invasion of Taiwan.35

However, if the PRC wants to do more than merely punish Taiwan, if 

it wants to undertake a “regime change” operation, it must “put boots on the 

ground” and invade. This remains a very difficult proposition. In a campaign 

to invade Taiwan, the PLA Navy has two important missions, one offensive 

and one defensive. First, it is responsible for getting the army across the strait 

once air superiority has been achieved. It is also responsible for dealing with 

Taiwan’s small navy, either at sea or by sealing it into its naval bases by mining the entrances closed. The requirement to transport the army to Taiwan is 

a “driver” for one aspect of PLA Navy building, and has resulted in a steady 

growth of small, purpose-built amphibious warships. The PLA Navy also 

has at its disposal the substantial and modern Chinese merchant fleet and a 

mobilized fishing fleet.36

But the PLA Navy can only be assured of fulfilling its mission if air 

superiority is achieved. Everything hinges on the Second Artillery and PLA 

Air Force’s ability to execute their missions. If they can achieve and sustain air 

superiority over the strait, getting the army to Taiwan would be within the 

capability of the PLA Navy.37

Getting soldiers to Taiwan is not the most difficult problem for the PLA 

Navy. The PLAN’s most important and most difficult mission is to stop the U.S. 

Navy from intervening, and thwarting an invasion. The PLA Navy must deter 

or defeat approaching U.S. Navy carrier strike groups to keep them out of the 

fight long enough for the combined forces of the Second Artillery, the PLA Air 

Force, and the army to succeed. “Success” means creating the circumstances 

necessary to cross the strait (establishing air superiority), getting ashore and 

establishing a defensible foothold on Taiwan, and subsequently causing the 

government in Taipei to surrender or flee. Any one of these factors can be 

upset if the United States is able to effectively intervene. In other words, the 

PLA Navy has an important role in a joint “strategic” mission involved with 

keeping the most disruptive element of U.S. power at bay long enough for the 

actual assault to be effective. Doctrinally, this mission is what is envisioned 

under the rubric of “key point strikes.”38

Assessing the PLA Capability to Deny Access

A successful antiaccess campaign rests on effective surveillance of the 

approaches to China. Surveillance is essential to posture submarines, cue and 

vector land-based air, and target antiship missiles. Without surveillance, the 

PLA’s ability to execute its antiaccess mission would be severely handicapped. 

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As the 2009 version of the Defense Department’s annual report on China’s military power says,

China is deploying advanced imagery, reconnaissance, and Earth 

resource systems with military applications. Examples include the 

Yaogan–1, –2, –3, –4, and –5, the Haiyang–1B, the CBERS–2 and –2B 

satellites, and the Huanjing disaster/environmental monitoring satellite 

constellation. China is planning eight satellites in the Huanjing program 

that are capable of visible, infrared, multi-spectral, and synthetic aperture radar imaging. In the next decade, as Beijing fields a more robust 

constellation of reconnaissance satellites, it probably will employ commercial satellite imagery to supplement existing coverage.39

According to open sources, China currently has several satellites in 

orbit that can contribute to ocean surveillance. Significantly, in April 2006 

Beijing launched its first radar satellite. It carries synthetic aperture radar, 

which is excellent for identifying ships and can probably observe a ship as 

small as 20 meters in length.40

The land-based air component of the layered defense consists of both 

PLA Air Force and PLA Naval Air Force aircraft. China does not have anything 

equivalent to the Soviet Backfire bomber carrying long-range AS–4 antiship 

missiles and, as a result, this aspect of its layered defense is not yet especially 

capable. The closest things it has to the Backfire are the FB–7 fighter-bomber 

and the Chinese variant (B6H) of the venerable Soviet Badger bomber. Neither 

of these aircraft has the range of the Backfire or carries especially long-range 

cruise missiles, although according to the 2010 Annual Report to Congress on 

Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 

long-range cruise missiles are under development.41 Based on open-source information, the only PLA Air Force bombers with antiship missiles are a single 

regiment (about 20 aircraft) of the B6H bomber. These aircraft have been practicing over-water missions and antiship attacks since around 2002. The PLA 

Air Force also has one regiment of FB–7 fighter-bombers and two of the new 

Russian-built Su–30MKK multi-role regiments that could be used in antiship 

roles. PLA naval aviation has about 80 JH–7s ( four regiments) capable of carrying the improved, 180-kilometer-range (97 nms) C–803K ASCM, and about 

40 H–6Ds (Badger variant bombers). Most significantly, the PLAN Air Force 

has acquired a regiment of Su–30 MK2s armed with the supersonic Kh–31A 

(AS–17A) air-to-surface missile.42

In sum, the PLA Air Force and Naval Aviation Force can field about 10 

regiments of aircraft with cruise missiles to attack approaching warships—perhaps 200 aircraft. Based on a metric of two regiments per carrier battlegroup, 

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the PLA could muster enough aircraft to attack a three- or four-carrier force. 

But, as mentioned, the PLA has not yet fielded a long-range, air-launched 

cruise missile that would permit these aircraft to launch while remaining 

outside the surface-to-air missile envelope of U.S. warships. As a result, the aircraft would be vulnerable to fleet air defenses.

As the antiaccess concept unfolds today, its submarine force is the most 

important PLAN capability. This makes sense, given the inherent difficulty in 

locating very quiet modern submarines. The PLAN gets a great deal of value 

from submarines in the sense that locating a submarine is perhaps the single most difficult operational task that any military faces, because water is not 

transparent. History has shown that in trying to search for submarines, the 

effort requires a great number of ship and aircraft resources. According to the 

Office of Naval Intelligence:

Chinese submarine procurement has focused on smaller numbers of 

modern, high-capability boats. Now there are fewer submarines in the 

PLA [Navy] inventory than there were at any point in the 1980s. Currently, the submarine force consists of six nuclear-powered attack submarines 

[SSNs], three nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines [SSBNs], and 53 

diesel-electric attack submarines [SSs]. Over the next 10 to 15 years, 

primarily due to the introduction of new diesel-electric and non-nuclearpowered air independent power (AIP) submarines, the force is expected 

to increase incrementally in size to approximately 75 submarines.43

In the 10 years between 1995 and 2007, the PLA Navy commissioned 

38 new submarines. As previously mentioned, because the vast majority of the 

PLA Navy submarine force is conventionally powered, it has one significant 

operational drawback—limited endurance and speed; this is why surveillance 

is so important to the correct positioning of submarines.44 Nonetheless, today 

it is an imposing force, and there is every expectation that it will continue to 

improve and to add more nuclear-powered submarines that will have the speed 

and endurance necessary to overcome positioning errors.

According to a PLA open source assessment, the refueled combat radius 

of an F/A–18 is 1,200 nautical miles. Whether this is accurate is not the point. 

What is germane is that the article gives a hint at what range the PLAN starts 

to worry about an approaching aircraft carrier. It also suggests that this is how 

far from home they might elect to position submarines so they could concentrate and attack carrier forces before aircraft could be involved in an air battle over the Taiwan Strait.45 If the intent is to delay the U.S. Navy, and perhaps 

even deter it from proceeding toward Taiwan, the PLA Navy will have to mass 

submarines in large numbers once carrier forces have been located in order to 

raise the risk to U.S. surface ships to the point where commanders might elect 

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to stay outside the denial area until it is clear of PLAN submarines. This may 

take as many as six or more submarines per approaching carrier strike group. 

Assuming that three to four U.S carriers would respond to an attack 

against Taiwan, the PLA Navy would need at least 18 to 24 submarines on 

station. Its ability to sustain that posture would be a function of how often 

submarines rotated home and how long it would take to transit between 

homeport and patrol station. If one assumes it takes three to keep one on 

station (one on station, one going home, one getting ready to go), somewhere 

between 60 to 75 modern submarines would be required to sustain an anticarrier submarine force. In other words, it is reasonable to expect the PLA Navy 

to continue to grow a modern submarine force if it is to execute an antiaccess 

strategy with confidence.

The Antiship Ballistic Missile Problem

China has taken the Soviet antiaccess strategy one step further. The PLA 

has added a new and very threatening element to the layered defense that comprises antiaccess—one that is uniquely Chinese and uses one of the PLA’s most 

effective capabilities. This new wrinkle is to use ballistic missiles to attack moving surface warships. Traditionally, ballistic missiles were considered a poor 

weapon to use against ships at sea: ships move, and once the missile is fired, the 

aim point of a ballistic trajectory, by definition, cannot be altered to account 

for target motion. 

What the PLA is trying to do is place seekers in high-explosive missile warheads that will activate as the warhead descends into the target area, 

and then steer the warhead to the moving ship. This is a task that depends on 

accurate surveillance plus missile warhead maneuvering technology that can 

slow down the warhead when it reenters the atmosphere so the seekers are not 

burned up by the heat of reentry, and then guide the warhead to its target.46

The Second Artillery is clearly working on this problem. In a paper published by the Second Artillery Engineering College, the authors conclude: 

Providing terminal guidance to ballistic missiles is critical to the successful launch of a precision attack on a slow moving large target at sea. Based 

on the results from simulation, missiles with terminal guidance capability can have a relatively large range of maneuverability, which may be as 

large as 100 kilometers (53nms). . . . Large surface targets at sea, such as 

aircraft carriers, are relatively poor in maneuverability. It cannot effectively escape an attack within a short period of time. Therefore, a ballistic 

missile with terminal guidance capability . . . is fully capable of effectively 

attacking this type of target with high precision.47

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If the PLA can master and field this weapons system, it will be able to 

present as serious a challenge to the U.S. Navy as the one presented by Soviet 

Backfire-launched cruise missiles before the introduction of the Aegis radar 

system. Aside from the technical challenge associated with missile warhead design, the command and control problem of determining an accurate location 

of an aircraft carrier, getting that information to a missile firing unit in a timely 

fashion, and translating positional information into a guidance solution for the 

missile which has to include missile time of flight before the target ship moves 

beyond the terminal seeker’s window—are also issues.48 The central point is, 

however, that these all appear to be solvable problems. In this author’s judgment, this capability, assuming that it is eventually successfully fielded, when 

combined with the PLAN’s robust submarine force, presents the U.S. Navy 

with an operational challenge that is actually more difficult to surmount than 

the antiaccess capabilities it faced during the Cold War from the Soviet Union.

Translating Concept into Reality—Still a Way to Go

The preceding discussion about how the PLA Navy might execute an 

antiaccess operation in support of a Taiwan invasion scenario is not based on 

any special insight on my part into the PLA Navy’s plans. Rather, it is based on 

a good understanding of how the Soviet Union thought through the very same 

operational problem—defense against attacking carrier forces.49 It is also based 

on what the PLA is actually doing in terms of fielding new submarines, aircraft, 

and surveillance systems, and what PLA writers are writing about what they 

would like to be able to do in the future.

Clearly, the Department of Defense believes that the PLA is working to 

field an antiaccess operational concept based on open ocean surveillance, landbased, cruise-missile-firing aircraft, submarines, and maneuverable warhead 

ballistic missiles. In each of these areas, the PLA still has work to do before its antiaccess concept is fully operationally ready. As mentioned, the most dangerous 

future capability is the antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) problem; this is because 

defenses against ballistic missiles are inherently difficult owing to the fact that 

the target is so difficult to shoot down because it is traveling at such great speed.

Trying to “trick” missile seekers—both ballistic and cruise—into attacking 

a false target or simply missing is a tactic all navies have been working on since 

the introduction of the antiship cruise missile era in the 1960s. That obviously 

is something to continue to consider when thinking through operational and 

tactical problems presented by maneuvering warhead ballistic missiles.

While maneuvering ballistic missiles are a future problem, the most 

troublesome problem today is modern conventional-powered submarines because they are the most difficult to detect. During the Cold War, the United 

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States was able to track Soviet submarines because their machinery and propulsion systems made detectable noise.50 Modern quiet submarines, be they 

conventional- or nuclear-powered, have greatly reduced or eliminated this 

tactical liability. As a result, locating them depends on the concept first introduced in World War I of sending a pulse of sound into the water and hoping it 

“bounces off” a submerged submarine to reveal its location. 

If the PLA becomes serious about making major investments in the 

land-based aircraft portion of its antiaccess “weapons triad,” this will also become a matter of some concern. New generations of aircraft-launched cruise 

missiles that fly at very high speeds and incorporate “stealth” technology are 

available on the open market, and could be relatively quickly introduced into 

both the PLA Naval Air Force as well as the PLA Air Force.

Finally, without an effective open ocean surveillance system that can 

locate and then continuously track approaching warships, none of the hardware capabilities just discussed will be of great use. The ocean remains very 

large, and ships, even ones as large as an aircraft carrier, are very, very small 

compared to the vastness of the Pacific. Surveillance is the “brain” needed to 

make antiaccess a reality. It is also the central nervous system of an antiaccess 

warfighting capability, and if it can be disrupted, the entire antiaccess concept 

of operations can be degraded.

The history of 20th and 21st century warfare reveals that countries are 

in a constant competition that revolves around introducing a new capability, 

which is eventually addressed by a countercapability, which is eventually 

trumped once again by counter-countercapability. If the PLA succeeds in fielding a credible antiaccess strategy, it will almost certainly be addressed by the 

United States and its allies, otherwise America would not be a credible guarantor of the security of its friends and allies who find themselves either in or 

on the first island chain. Because a successful PLA antiaccess capability would 

render the United States unable to protect its vital interests in East Asia, it is 

reasonable to expect that the United States will keep a close watch on improving PLA capabilities in this area and not stand idly by. 

The recently released Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is quite clear 

on this point, and highlights a new U.S. conceptual approach that is intended to 

deal with the antiaccess problem. This U.S. countercapability has been named 

Air Sea Battle (ASB). How this concept might take shape is outlined in the 

aforementioned CSBA report called AirSea Battle.

51 The conclusion seems clear: 

Washington will do whatever it takes to make certain its capabilities in East Asia 

match or stay ahead of the PLA’s in this vital area. Therefore, it is likely that the 

future of East Asia will witness a long, drawn-out competition of assured access 

versus antiaccess capabilities between the United States and China.

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Notes

Author’s Note: The paper represents the personal views of the author alone and should not be interpreted as representing the position of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) or the U.S. Navy. CNA is a private not-for-profit research center and does not speak for the U.S. Navy.

1 U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of Defense, September 30, 2001), 25. The report speaks about antiaccess and area denial 

as they relate to one of America’s fundamental strategic concepts—deterring forward. Specifically, it goes on 

to say, “Deterrence in the future will continue to depend heavily upon the capability resident in forward stationed and forward deployed combat and expeditionary forces.” 

2Admiral Robert Willard, USN, Commander U.S. Pacific Command, Statement before the House 

Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, March 23, 2010, 12. 

3 Jan van Tol et al., AirSea Battle: A Point of Departure Operational Concept (Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary Assessments, May 2010), 1, fn 1. Available at <http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/

PubLibrary/R.20100518.Air_Sea_Battle__A_/R.20100518.Air_Sea_Battle__A_.pdf>. 

4 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds., The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science 

Publishing House, Academy of Military Science of the People’s Liberation Army, 2005), 459–461.

5 Jeff Hagen, “Potential Effects of Chinese Aerospace Capabilities on U.S. Air Force Operations,” 

Testimony presented before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 20, 2010, 2–3. 

Available at <www.uscc.gov/hearings/2010hearings/written_testimonies/10_05_20_wrt/10_05_20_hagen_

statement.pdf>. 

6 David A Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, and Barry Wilson, Dire Strait? Military Aspects of ChinaTaiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, National Security Division, 

2000), 7–30.

7 For a fascinating discussion of how the U.S. military responded to this problem during the 19th

century, see Brain McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 

University Press, 2007), 11–39. The lessons of the Revolutionary War when the British captured New York, 

Newport, Charleston, and Philadelphia, and raided at will, and again during the War of 1812 when they 

burned Washington, DC, convinced planners that a chain of forts, a mobile commerce raiding navy, and a 

large militia were the only way to cope with the threat of an invading force that crossed the Atlantic to attack the United States. 

8 See John Keegan, Intelligence in War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 26–65, for a detailed discussion of the difficulties associated with finding ships at sea in the days of sail.

9 The famous (or infamous, depending on your point of view) sinking of surrendered German battleships by Brigadier William “Billy” Mitchell in 1921 was intended to prove that bombers were better at 

finding and defeating approaching hostile naval forces than navies were. For a contemporary take on this 

debate, see for example, William Mitchell, “Air Power vs. Sea Power,” American Review of Reviews 58 (March 

1921), 273–277.

10 There are many fine studies of the Battle of the Atlantic and I have read most of them. In my judgment the best short summary of that campaign is Marc Milner, Battle of the Atlantic (St. Catherines, Ontario, 

Canada: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2003).

11 Jerry Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers: “How the Bomb Saved Naval Aviation” (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, April 2001), passim.

12Author’s personal experiences while on active duty during the Cold War.

13 Notions of sea control and sea denial date back to the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan and his 

near-contemporary Julian Corbett, and stem from notions of “command of the sea.” A search of their writings will yield often-contradictory definitions of these terms. My understanding is that “sea control” means 

having the capability to prevent an enemy from using some segment of maritime geography for as long as 

one wishes. In other words, one party can use the sea at its pleasure while an opponent cannot. This is hard 

to accomplish in practice unless one also controls the air above the water in question. “Sea denial,” on the other 

hand, means temporarily controlling an area of water, with the recognition that control will be contested and 

that neither side has complete freedom to use the sea as it wishes. Many books talk about and around this 

topic. For the best extended discussion, see Colin S. Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage 

of Navies in War (New York: The Free Press, a Division of Macmillan, Inc., 1992), 19, 274.

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 211 11/29/11 12
212 McDEVITT

14 This entire section is based upon the now declassified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-

15-82D, Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs Through the 1990’s, March 1983, which can be found in John B. 

Hattendorf, Jr., The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper 19 (Newport, 

RI: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, 2004).

15 Senior Captain Xu Qi, “Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the 

Early Twenty-First Century,” China Military Science, 2004. Translated and published by Andrew Erickson 

and Lyle Goldstein in Naval War College Review 59, no. 4 (Autumn 2006), 51–63.

16 Peng and Yao, 3–13. These pages contain a very interesting and fulsome discussion of China’s history of strategic thought.

17Chiang Shang-chou, “China’s Naval Development Strategy—Building an Offshore Defensive Naval Armed Force,” Kuang Chiao Ching, December 16, 1998 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service). See 

also Paul H.B. Godwin, “Force Projection and China’s Military Strategy,” paper presented at the Sixth Annual Conference on the PLA at Coolfont, Virginia, June 1995, 4; Nan Li, “Reconceptualizing the PLA Navy in 

Post-Mao China: Functions, Warfare, Arms and Organization,” Working Paper No. 30 (Singapore: Institute 

of Defense and Strategic Studies, August 2002), 6.

18Chen Wanjun and Zhang Chunting, “Shouldering the Task of a Century-Straddling Voyage—Interviewing Newly Appointed Navy Commander Vice Admiral Shi Yunsheng,” Liaowang, cited in David M. 

Finkelstein, “Reform and Modernization of the PLA Navy: From Marginalization to Major Importance” 

(CNA Corporation: April 2000).

19 This entire section is drawn largely from Peng and Yao, 230–234.

20 Ibid., 231.

21 Ibid., 232.

22 This is my interpretation. For the latest official assessment, see China’s National Defense in 2006

(People’s Republic of China White Paper on National Defense), available at <http://www.opensource.ove/

portal/server.ptgateway/PTARGS>. The opening section of the latest PRC Defense White Paper speaks to 

Beijing’s assessment of the security environment.

23 People’s Daily on Line, available at <http://english.peoples.com.cn/200202/28/eng20020229_91188.

html>.

24 Dean Cheng, “Shedding the Century of Humiliation: China’s Place in Asia,” paper prepared for 

the Sino-Japan Strategic Rivalry Workshop, at Center for Naval Analyses headquarters, Alexandria, VA, 

April 2006.

25 The Center for Naval Analyses has partnered with the Institute for Defense Analyses, National 

Defense University, and Pacific Forum/Center for Strategic and International Studies on an 8-month project 

that examines all aspects of the current state of Sino-Japanese relations. The study paid particular attention 

to the disputes in the East China Sea. A final report was completed in December of 2006, and is available 

from this author. See the Japan Times of September 10, 2005, “Chinese Warships Make Show of Force at Protested Gas Rig,” available at <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20050910a1.html>.

26An expression of PRC angst over the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and Japan’s evolution toward becoming a more normal major power is found in the 2006 PRC Defense White Paper in the 

first section of the paper that is dedicated to a discussion of “The Security Environment.”

27 PRC Defense White Paper, December 2004, Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, 

December 2004, Beijing, available at <http://english.people.com.cn/whitepaper/defense2004>.

28 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, 

MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2001), 163–164. Dr. Cole makes the important point that PLAN Commander 

Liu Huaqing in the mid-1980s had been a student at the Voroshilov Naval Academy when Sergei Gorshcov, 

later leader of the Soviet Navy, was an instructor. See also an excellent discussion of Soviet influence in You 

Ji, “The Evolution of China’s Maritime Combat Doctrines and Models: 1949-2001,” Institute of Defense and 

Strategic Studies, Working Paper No. 22, Singapore, May 2002, 2–8.

29 Senior Captain Xu Qi, in Erickson and Goldstein, Naval War College Review, 57.

30 Li Xinqi, Tan Shoulin, and Li Hongxia, “Precaution Model and Simulation Actualization on 

Threat of Maneuver Target Group on the Sea” (The Second Artillery Engineering College, August 1, 2005), 

in author’s possession.

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 ANTIACCESS ROLE IN A TAIWAN CONTINGENCY 213

31 John B. Hattendorf, Jr., The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport 

Paper 19 (Newport, RI: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, 2004). On page 170, a map 

displays Soviet sea denial and sea control areas in the Pacific. This entire section on the Soviet approach to 

layered defense is also informed by the author’s personal experience in the 1980s, when he spent 4 years 

conducting strategic studies and program assessments oriented toward understanding and defeating Soviet 

maritime strategy.

32 PRC White Paper on National Defense 2006, Electronic version in English available at <www.

opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS>. 

33 Harry Harding, “Speech before the Asian Affairs Committee of the Association of the Bar of 

New York on November 1, 2000,” reprinted in the National Committee for U.S.–China Relations newsletter, March 2001.

34While Taiwan is a priority for campaign planning and is the PLA’s most likely contingency, it 

would be a mistake to consider Taiwan as the only reason that the PLA is modernizing. See James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein, eds., China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational 

Art of the PLA, Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) Conference Report (Washington, DC: CNA, December 

2005), 12.

35 U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2009), 3–6, for a discussion of the forces 

postured opposite Taiwan. Available at <www.defense.gov?pubs/pdf’s/China_military_power_report-2009.

pdf >.

36 Ibid., 4 and 30 for a discussion of PLAN amphibious and expeditionary forces.

37 David A. Shlapak, David T. Orlesky, Toy I. Reid, Murray Scott Tanner, and Barry Wilson, A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, National Security Division, 2009), 31–84. This is the most complete unclassified analysis of the issue 

of gaining air superiority over the Taiwan Strait; and it is not encouraging for Taiwan.

38 “Key point strikes” calls for the concentration of the PLA’s most powerful capabilities to destroy 

or degrade the enemy’s best capabilities in order to (1) level the technological playing field at the inception of 

hostilities, and (2) disrupt the enemy’s campaign before it can achieve operational momentum. The PLA’s approach rests upon the correct selection of “enemy vital targets” and “key point application of force” against 

those targets. David Finkelstein, Evolving Operational Concepts of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army: A 

Preliminary Exploration (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, 2001), passim.

39Annual Report to Congress 2009.

40Conversation with Mr. Dean Cheng, Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) China analyst and a leading expert on Chinese space activities. See also his Conference Report, China’s Space Program: Civilian, Commercial and Military Aspects (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, May 2006).

41Antiship cruise missile range is important if the attacker hopes to be successful. The ideal situation for an attacking aircraft is to be able to launch its cruise missiles before it enters the defensive umbrella 

of the surface ships, so the defender is confronted with having to shoot at cruise missiles—a difficult target. It 

is much easier for modern surface-to-air missiles to intercept aircraft. The colloquial characterization of this 

tactical problem is to “shoot the archer before he launches his arrows.” U.S. Department of Defense, Annual 

Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010, available at <www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_final.pdf>, 4.

42Roger Cliff, “The Development of China’s Air Force Capabilities,” RAND Document Testimony 

Before U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 20, 2010. Available at <www.uscc.gov/

hearings/2010hearings/written_testimonies/10_05_20_wrt/10_05_20_cliff_statement.pdf>. 

43Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese 

Characteristics (Suitland, MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, August 2009), 21. 

44Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service Report RL33153: 8, updated December 23, 

2009. This is the single best open-source compilation of information on the PLA Navy available to scholars 

and research specialists.

45 Li Xinqi, Tan Shoulin, Li Hongxia, “Precaution Model and Simulation Actualization on Threat of 

Maneuver Target Group on the Sea” (The Second Artillery Engineering College, August 1, 2005), in author’s 

possession. This assessment is based on the author’s judgment and is not informed by any particular insight 

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 213 11/29/11 12
214 McDEVITT

into PLA Navy plans. The logic is straightforward: if the objective is to deny access, then it is important to 

keep sea-based airpower as far away as possible.

46 DOD Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009, 21. The 

report contains a diagram from a 2006 Second Artillery publication that illustrates this missile concept. Over 

the course of 2009 this issue of antiship ballistic missiles has received considerable attention. See for example, 

Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson, and Christopher Yeaw, “Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force 

Modernization and Its Implications for the United States,” The Journal of Strategic Studies (February 2009), 

67–114; Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang,” On the Verge of a Game-Changer,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (May 2009), 26–32; Andrew Erickson, “Facing A New Missile Threat From China: How The U.S. 

Should Respond To China’s Development Of Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Systems,” CBSNews.com, May 28, 

2009; Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “Using the Land to Control the Sea? Chinese Analysts Consider the Antiship Ballistic Missile,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 4 (Autumn 2009), 53–86. 

47 Tan Shoulin and Zhang Daqiao (Second Artillery Engineering College), “Determination and 

Evaluation of Effective Homing Range for Ballistic Missile Attacking Aircraft Carrier,” Information Command and Control System and Simulation Technology 28, no. 4 (August 2006), 6–9. 

48 This assessment is not based on any specific knowledge of how the PLA will attempt to accomplish this task, keeping in mind that these are the normal steps involved with employing most long-range 

weapons systems. For the best discussion directly related to an antiship ballistic missile, see Eric Hagt and 

Mathew Durwin, “China’s Antiship Ballistic Missile: Developments and Missing Links, Naval War College 

Review 62 (Autumn 2009), 89. See also Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A 

Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, 26–27.

49 In the 1980s, the U.S. Navy developed a maritime strategy, which involved a 600-ship force, in order to defeat the Soviet strategy. See Hattendorf, passim.

50 Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese 

Characteristics, 21–22, provides an interesting diagram that illustrates the relationship between radiated 

noise and relative detectability. See also, Owen Cote, Jr., “The Third Battle: Innovation in the US Navy’s Silent 

Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines,” March 2000, available at <www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/

history/cold-war-asw.html>, passim. For a more sensationalized treatment, see Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage (New York: PublicAffairs, 

a Division of Perseus Books, 1998), passim.

51 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of Defense, February 2010), 32. Available at <www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_

of_12Feb10_1000.pdf>. Jan van Tol et al., AirSea Battle: A Point of Departure Operational Concept (Center for 

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 2010), passim. Available at <www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/

PubLibrary/R.20100518.Air_Sea_Battle__A_/R.20100518.Air_Sea_Battle__A_.pdf >.

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Chapter 9

The PLA Navy as an Instrument of Statecraft1

Eric A. McVadon

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy or PLAN) has, in the span 

of just 60 years, developed from an obscure adjunct to China’s land army to a 

capable, modern force central to Beijing’s national security strategy. In tandem 

with this transformation, China’s political leaders have learned how to employ 

this navy as a potent tool to further China’s increasingly extensive strategic objectives. China has primarily accomplished this in two broad ways: first, as a 

combat-capable navy that sometimes uses or threatens to use force and sometimes favors restraint, as Beijing elects. It has thereby been able to intimidate its 

neighbors or, conversely, to attempt to demonstrate its benign character. Second, 

the PLA Navy has also served as a means to represent China as a growing world 

power and boost Beijing’s image around the globe. The combination of these 

two approaches has given Beijing a versatile means to project China’s growing 

maritime influence and enhance its comprehensive national power.

Balancing Use and Nonuse of Force: A Naval Strategy with Chinese 

Characteristics

The Chinese government is employing its navy as an instrument of 

statecraft with considerable emphasis on the utility of that navy when not

forcefully applied. In this regard, Beijing’s policymakers have pointed to Zheng 

He,2

 the 15th-century Ming dynasty admiral, and his cruises around the Indian 

Ocean basin as the epitome of the peaceful use of a naval force; they have similarly touted their desire to emulate his example as they have modernized the 

PLA Navy. This example is, ironically, even more appropriate than Chinese 

propaganda portrays. Namely, just as the eunuch admiral’s appearances at unexpecting foreign ports with an imposing naval flotilla probably unnerved his 

hosts regardless of his supposedly benign intentions, many of China’s neighbors likewise look uneasily toward the PLA Navy, regardless of how adamantly 

China claims it will be used for peaceful purposes. 

By virtue of building and maintaining a standing navy as ambitiously 

as the Chinese have done in recent years, Beijing has thus acquired not only a 

potent naval combat force but also a valuable tool that can further extend its 

political and economic reach around the world whether or not they use force. As 

was the case with Zheng He, today’s Chinese navy has become an invaluable 

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216 McVADON

instrument of statecraft for the government that owns it. The Chinese have recognized the dual service that their navy can provide, and they have made clear 

their willingness to deviate from their preference for non-forceful use primarily 

in specific, predictable situations, notably Taiwan, offshore energy extraction, and 

intrusive foreign (U.S.) military operations near China—as will be elaborated in 

a subsequent section of this chapter.

Admiral Zheng He: Were His Port Calls Seen as Visits of Love Boats or 

Gun Boats? 

Beijing’s naval policy has emphasized its defensive strategy, even as it has 

developed a capable, modern force. This policy is said to be exemplified, in legend at least, by Zheng He, who eschewed the use of force and promoted trade 

and good relations without overtly posing a threat. The Chinese vice minister 

of communications said in 2004, “During the seven voyages, Zheng He did not 

occupy a single piece of land, establish any fortress, or seize any wealth. . . . He 

was welcomed and lauded by the people of various countries.”3

 Zheng’s cruises 

are cited as a prime example of the non-forceful use of maritime power, and 

the Chinese today proudly hearken back to this golden age of supremacy at 

sea. When this author, in researching and preparing to write this chapter, approached the Chinese naval attaché in Washington for help, he immediately 

launched into the example of Zheng He as representative of today’s use of the 

PLA Navy as an instrument of statecraft.

Recent scholarship, however, reveals that Zheng He’s voyages may not 

have been as innocuous as the Chinese have portrayed. Even a cursory analysis 

of these voyages would lead one to surmise that Zheng’s armada carried a clear 

message of Chinese maritime supremacy regardless of the admiral’s supposed 

mission of goodwill. Hundreds of warships and tens of thousands of soldiers 

could not have been received as sanguinely by China’s neighbors as the 

Chinese have suggested. One recent Western researcher even contends that 

“the ships [of these flotillas] were indeed gunboats, with perhaps 26,000 to 

28,000 military men. . . . These missions were also intended to obtain control 

of ports and shipping lanes.”4

 Zheng’s journeys, therefore, offer a vivid example 

of how China’s neighbors are necessarily wary toward the PLA Navy.

Proclaiming a Policy of Preference for Peaceful Use—Where Considered 

Possible 

As aforementioned, by virtue of building and maintaining a standing 

navy as energetically as the Chinese have done in recent years, Beijing has 

acquired a valuable tool that can further extend its political and economic 

reach around the world—whether or not they forcefully use that tool. The PLA 

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 PLA NAVY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF STATECRAFT 217

Navy has become an invaluable instrument of statecraft for the government 

that owns it, both when used as a military implement and when otherwise 

employed—whether sent on traditional naval missions and as a force in being, or representing the nation, delivering humanitarian aid, and symbolizing 

modern, capable, dynamic China.

China concluded, as have other nations, of course, that its interests 

are generally, but not always, better served by the use of means other than 

force. This preference for the nonuse of force was publicly proclaimed by 

Premier Li Peng and President Jiang Zemin in the mid-1990s (though it did 

not receive the attention it deserved at the time).5

 Specifically, in August 1997, 

Premier Li described five proposals for promoting relations with Association 

of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries: “respecting each other,” “treating each other as equals,” “strengthening dialogue,” “intensifying consultation,” 

and seeking common economic development.6

 These might be seen as euphemisms directed toward those who, instead of snarling at China’s somewhat 

patronizing approach to South China Sea disputes, would shake the extended 

hand of big, smiling China and smile back. These euphemisms stood for 

“we will not sic our navy on you, we will talk rather than shoot, and we will 

pursue common economic endeavors rather than eject you from your footholds, even though we have the capability and the right.” 

Similarly, President Jiang, just months later, in December 1997, proclaimed that “China will never seek hegemony” and “China will forever be a 

good neighbor, a good partner and a good friend with ASEAN countries,”7

 thus 

reinforcing his premier’s commitment to largely eschew gunboat diplomacy 

vis-à-vis its relations with Southeast Asia. Nonuse became a primary element 

of China’s comprehensive national power; Beijing relied substantially upon 

nonmilitary means, including economic and diplomatic, to realize its strategic aims, as this author has argued for the past decade.8

 Beijing clearly did not 

adopt pacifism when it embraced this policy of the nonuse of force, but it has 

shown a mature realization that a less threatening posture, backed with visible 

strong forces, has generally better served its security interests.

If Beijing is beginning to lean now, in 2010, in the opposite direction—

toward a more threatening posture, as appears to many observers to be the 

case, is it because Chinese leaders felt that the less aggressive stance was not 

appreciated and reciprocated by Washington and China’s neighbors? Did the 

emphasis on nonuse not adequately accomplish their objectives, or have they 

concluded that wholly new circumstances demand they establish further 

exceptions or broaden and intensify the current exceptions where the use or 

demonstration of force is considered routinely appropriate? Are these possible 

new or expanded exceptions stemming from the Chinese perceptions that (1) a 

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218 McVADON

somehow shifting South China Sea situation demands that Beijing reassert its 

claims to islands and other minor land features and intensify its rhetoric with 

respect to maritime rights, and (2) new Chinese naval capabilities now make 

it both possible and appropriate to show, even flaunt, that its antiaccess strategy has substance, as seems to have been done in April 2010 by an essentially 

unprecedented major naval exercise skimming Japan, stirring up the Japanese 

Maritime Self-Defense Forces, and reaching into the Western Pacific? These 

questions, raised here rhetorically, will be tackled at the end of this chapter, 

but first it is appropriate to examine more closely what has been the policy for 

more than a decade. That analysis may help determine whether and, if so, how 

Chinese behavior might best be influenced to bring about a return to, and possibly strengthening of, emphasis on the less threatening, more accommodating 

attitude—or some not-yet-contemplated alternative.

Two South China Sea scenarios offer evidence of China’s preference for 

this policy of the nonuse of force. The last significant hostile naval action taken by the PLAN against a neighbor9

 in the South China Sea was the occupation 

and fortification of Mischief Reef (Meiji Jiao, 美济礁) in February 1995—a decade and a half ago. On the one hand, Hanoi and Manila know without question 

that the PLA Navy could readily prevent their retaking of the Paracel Islands 

(Xisha Qundao, 西沙群岛) and Mischief Reef, respectively. On the other hand, 

Beijing knows that the use of force to grab another bit of territory in the Spratly 

Islands, for example, would be counterproductive, raising concerns about 

Chinese intentions in the region and making less effective the use of what Beijing 

calls its comprehensive national power—including “soft power.”10 The cautious 

policy in this instance is intended to minimize the image of China as a bully and 

a hegemon (in the pejorative sense) among countries that are, of course, much 

smaller and, with few exceptions, have navies not even comparable to the PLA 

Navy. This vividly illustrates that China has a strong enough navy to forcefully 

realize its diplomatic objectives; however, it also has for some years restrained 

itself from using that navy forcefully to assert its dominance in the South China 

Sea region, apparently assuming that it could better accomplish its goals when 

not threatening its neighbors.

Consider a more controversial, albeit hypothetical, example: China, 

were it to act even more expansively on its claim to ownership of most of 

the land features in the South China Sea, could have used an overwhelming 

combination of strategic and tactical surprise and its superior navy during 

a period of political or social turmoil in Indonesia to seize the gas fields in 

the vicinity of the Natuna Islands. These very productive wells are over 1,000 

kilometers north of Jakarta—a distance that further diminishes Indonesia’s 

ability to react effectively to a threat. The Natuna gas fields are a proven energy 

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 PLA NAVY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF STATECRAFT 219

resource in the South China Sea.11 But, here again, Beijing has prudently concluded that fostering positive working relations with Southeast Asian nations 

trumps the crude, but available and tempting, alternative of forcefully grabbing 

another energy foothold in distant waters—an action that would, indeed, have 

alarmed ASEAN members; China had already sufficiently overpowered and 

alienated its neighbors when it unilaterally seized in 1974, 1988, and 1995 the 

Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and Mischief Reef, respectively.12

Thus, Beijing has shown that restraint in using the PLA Navy can also 

serve its purposes as much as a show of force. It would have been strange, indeed, had the South Sea Fleet seized another islet so soon after Premier Li and 

President Jiang highlighted their desire to emphasize economic means to further their diplomatic ends, which implicitly but undoubtedly included their 

preference for the nonuse of force. 

The very existence of a modernized PLA Navy significantly influences the thinking and actions of neighboring countries, Taiwan, and the United 

States. To further elaborate this point and pin it down chronologically, China’s 

employment of its navy, in many situations, has arguably been more effective 

when it has not been used to threaten or engage in hostile acts. For the past decade and a half, China has clearly pursued this preference for the use of means 

other than force. Its standing navy has earned its keep as a practical tool that 

can extend China’s influence regionally and even globally—whether or not it 

forcefully uses that tool. Recent (summer 2010) developments alluded to above 

may portend less emphasis on conciliatory practices and more emphasis on 

threatening rhetoric, and this will be examined later in the chapter. For the 

most part, China has generally adhered to its preference for nonuse of force. If 

change is underway—as indicated by breaking news and harsh official rhetoric from Beijing and Washington—we may need to gently and subtly remind 

Beijing of the success of its nonuse practices. Furthermore, we will rely on a full 

understanding of that practice in order to understand better what is occurring 

now, to evaluate whether it is likely to be a temporary aberration or a permanent change of policy and attitude, to determine why it is happening now, and 

to influence the outcome—or cope with the consequences. These issues are 

considered in the concluding section of this chapter.

Case Studies: Deliberate Exceptions to Nonuse or Reversion to Gunboat 

Diplomacy?

Active use of the navy is often called “gunboat diplomacy.” Many have 

accused Beijing of regularly using its navy in an indiscriminate, irresponsible 

manner. But, as this section demonstrates, exceptions to China’s general policy 

of nonuse of force lie in three key areas that Beijing considers of critical 

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220 McVADON

importance to Chinese national security: Taiwan, energy resources, and national sovereignty. These exceptions contrast with a general preference for 

avoiding confrontation and provocation. The recent incidents, which are often 

construed as demonstrating China’s growing belligerence, may instead reflect 

specific and enduring important Chinese concerns. This does not necessarily 

excuse Chinese actions: there have been clear examples where Beijing has used 

gunboat diplomacy (and more) to forcefully acquire what it wants. There is 

also no guarantee that China’s restrained policy will continue; 2010 rumblings 

suggesting that China may be moving to a more aggressive, less constrained 

stance that could be tricky or impossible to reverse are a matter of serious concern. Nevertheless, it would be unfair and unwise to ignore China’s general 

preference for the nonuse of force and fail to understand that the overt use of 

force has been applied only in certain key areas.

For example, there is no question that Beijing has deliberately excluded 

Taiwan from this policy of nonuse—China’s leaders have openly and consistently threatened the use of force across the strait. Taiwan represents one area 

where China feels wholly justified in refusing to renounce the use of force. 

Yet, even with respect to Taiwan, there has been a measure of restraint in the 

overt use of force, for several compelling reasons. Beijing has hesitated to put 

at risk its deep economic interdependence with Taiwan—especially in trade, 

investment, and technological benefits. China has also generally sought to 

avoid an armed confrontation that might disrupt the stability upon which its 

own economic development so heavily depends. Finally, China has feared that 

conflict with Taiwan would besmirch its international reputation, and that 

it could otherwise badly embarrass—or be disastrous for—its untested and 

relatively combat-inexperienced military force if the United States intervenes.

Beijing has also more readily employed force in issues involving regional 

energy resources and defense of its territorial sovereignty as it defines it. The 

following examples illustrate these points.

Sovremenny-Led Task Group to Chunxiao Natural Gas Field (2005). 

China demonstrated its willingness to confront and provoke its neighbors in 

the critical area of energy extraction in 2005. That year, the Japanese Maritime 

Self-Defense Force recorded a confrontation near the oil and natural gas fields 

at Chunxiao (Chun Xiao You Tian, 春曉油田) in the East China Sea,13 as depicted in figure 9–1. China has been a net oil-importing nation since 1993. A 

shortage of oil and other energy resources could retard its economic growth, 

which is critical to the retention of power by the Chinese Communist Party. 

From Beijing’s perspective, there was good reason to send combatant ships and 

then, as Beijing reported doing, form a permanent force in reserve dedicated 

to asserting Chinese rights to these seabed resources. The PLA Navy appears 

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to have thrown down the gauntlet by dispatching a potent naval force to affirm 

its claims to a regional energy source. 

In January 2005, a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) 

P–3C aircraft sighted a PLA Navy Sovremenny-class guided-missile destroyer 

(the top firepower platform in the PLAN) in the Chunxiao gas field area;14 in 

September 2005, China deployed five warships to the gas field.15 The PLAN task 

group, as reported by a Japanese maritime patrol P–3C aircraft, was composed 

of a 7,900-ton Sovremenny-class destroyer, two 1,700-ton Jianghu I-class guided-missile frigates, a 23,000-ton replenishment vessel, and a 6,000-ton missile 

observation support ship, which were maneuvering in the approaches to the gas 

field.16 According to one Japanese report, a PLAN frigate pointed its 100mm gun 

at a Japanese P–3.17 The Chinese thus deployed major surface combatants led 

by a Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyer armed with exceedingly lethal, 

supersonic antiship cruise missiles. If these unannounced deployments did not 

capture Japanese attention immediately, then the “locking-on” of a large caliber 

gun certainly would have. This deployment signaled that the Chinese would no 

longer shrink in the face of what had in earlier years been recognized as technically superior Japanese naval capabilities. Beijing has implicitly confirmed this 

newfound resolve with the establishment of a permanent naval squadron held 

in reserve in the East China Sea—a squadron undoubtedly assigned the task 

of responding specifically to challenges concerning energy extraction rights in 

Chunxiao and elsewhere.18 The message to the JMSDF was that “the PLAN is 

no longer intimidated by you; if you continue to press your unilateral claims to 

these fields in Chunxiao and deny the legitimacy of our claims, we will confront 

you with a combatant task force each time.”

Revealingly, the intensity of Chinese (and Japanese) interest in the 

Chunxiao gas and oil field in the East China Sea has surpassed that concerning the long and intensely disputed Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai Qundao, 釣魚

台群島). Concerns about energy security undoubtedly constituted the overriding rationale for such strong action at Chunxiao from the Chinese—more so, 

it seems, than their long-held animosity toward the Japanese. The PLA Navy 

clearly employed a version of “gunboat diplomacy” to stake out China’s claims 

at Chunxiao, revealing that energy is an area where restraint in China’s use of 

force will not be the dominant consideration.

Han-class Submarine Encounter (1994). China has demonstrated on 

more than one occasion that it is willing to risk serious confrontation to convey 

the point that it does not want the United States and other countries to conduct 

reconnaissance missions so near its coast. This is another area where China has 

shown that it is willing to set aside its general preference for nonuse of force—

in defending its expansive interpretation of sovereign prerogatives and territorial rights. China does not want the United States to conduct intrusive military

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Figure 9–1. Chinese Use of Force—Examples of Gunboat Diplomacy

1994: USS Kitty Hawk

and Han-class Submarine 

Encounter in Yellow Sea

2005: PLAN Deploys 

Naval Task Group to 

Chunxiao Gas Field 

in East China Sea

2001: Chinese 

Fighter and U.S. 

Navy EP–3 Aircraft 

Collide 70 Miles 

off Hainan Island

2009: Harassment of 

USNS Impeccable in 

the South China Sea

Note: Locations are approximate

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 PLA NAVY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF STATECRAFT 223

operations so close to its territory—and, in this early example involving a U.S. 

carrier and a Han-class submarine, threatened to “shoot down” a U.S. military 

plane to demonstrate this desire.

In 1994, the USS Kitty Hawk carrier battle group came upon a Hanclass submarine from China’s North Sea Fleet as the old and noisy Chinese 

nuclear-propelled submarine was returning to port near Qingdao in Shandong 

Province. The Han was discovered close to its homeport, homeward bound, 

and apparently not engaged in shadowing the Kitty Hawk battle group—

possibly even unaware of the significant American presence in the Yellow Sea 

before being detected.19

U.S. forces tracked (prosecuted in Navy parlance) the Han by dispatching antisubmarine aircraft from the carrier Kitty Hawk. Professor and retired 

U.S. Navy Captain Bernard (Bud) Cole, a recognized authority on the PLA 

Navy, writes:

Battle group aircraft began tracking the contact, which turned out to be 

a Chinese Han-class nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) returning 

to its homeport in northern China. Neither the captain of the submarine 

nor, apparently, higher authorities ashore knew how to respond to the 

situation; what would have been an accepted practice between U.S. and 

Soviet naval forces during the Cold War was completely unfamiliar to 

the People’s Liberation Army Navy. 20

Indeed, the Chinese were incensed. They obviously were unaccustomed, 

or wished to take strong exception, to the routine prosecution of submarine 

contacts in international waters (which the author was involved in for three decades in the Cold War). The U.S. naval attaché in Beijing in 1994, Captain Jack 

Reddinger, was even told by a Chinese officer at a dinner party that a repeat 

of such a submarine prosecution would result in the shoot-down of the U.S. 

Navy aircraft involved. This incident foreshadowed continuing Chinese sensitivity concerning surveillance close to China. In retrospect, this incident represents an early instance of how Beijing would overreact to what it considered 

intrusive foreign operations.21 The incident revealed the PLA’s proclivity for 

overreaction (as perceived by the United States): China abhors the conduct 

of intrusive foreign military operations and intelligence collection activities 

close to its territory—and in this case was willing to threaten a shoot-down to 

demonstrate its concern.

F–8 and EP–3 Collision (2001). The most dramatic example of Chinese 

determination to curb what it perceived to be unwarranted, intrusive foreign 

intelligence-gathering operations near its shores (and its willingness to deviate 

from its preference for nonuse of force) occurred in 2001. On the first of April 

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that year, a PLA Navy fighter aircraft from the Lingshui Naval Air Station on 

Hainan Island and a U.S. Navy EP–3 reconnaissance aircraft collided over the 

South China Sea. It had become clear in the months leading up to this incident 

that the Chinese believed that U.S. reconnaissance missions in and over the 

waters off China had become more frequent and intrusive22—sometimes intolerably so, as expressed by many in the PLA.23

PLA officers had conveyed their objections to their U.S. counterparts, 

only to be rebuffed by their American interlocutors. They accused the United 

States of hegemonic behavior, abuse of its superpower status, and arrogance in employing advanced technological spying against poor, developing 

China. “What would the United States do if Chinese aircraft flew just off 

the U.S. coast?” they asked. Appearing on CNN television in Washington to 

discuss the incident, China’s ambassador compared the flights to a car 

obnoxiously passing in front of a private home repeatedly and making 

life miserable for the family in the house—even if the car remained on the 

public street. The United States, for its part, repeated its assertion that such 

intelligence-gathering missions were permissible in China’s exclusive economic zone, regardless of Chinese interpretations to the contrary, and, moreover, 

considered these flights as crucial so long as China continued to threaten 

Taiwan—without using these words. In countering Chinese demands for cessation of the flights, U.S. officials complained about the dangerously aggressive 

intercepts being undertaken by Chinese fighter pilots—a complaint apparently 

dismissed by the Chinese side.24 This was the tense atmosphere as the pilots of 

Lingshui became more aggressive and—as it turned out—dangerous.25

In a spiraling exacerbation of tension, the Chinese became increasingly 

reckless in their responses to American reconnaissance missions. PLA Navy 

Air Force (PLANAF) pilots began harassing American pilots, either as ordered 

from above or on their own volition, often employing alarming closure rates 

during intercepts and sometimes even pulling ahead of the larger aircraft and 

“thumping” it with engine afterburner exhaust.26 Finally, on that fateful April 

Fools’ Day 2001, “hot-dogging” Lieutenant Commander Wang Wei captured 

the world’s attention when he struck a U.S. Navy VQ–1 EP–3E on his botched 

attempt at a third “join-up.” (A join-up is to approach and then fly closely 

alongside another aircraft—to fly in close formation.) The stunningly violent 

collision resulted in the loss of the Chinese pilot and his F-8II airplane, as well 

as in severe damage to the EP–3 (though the 21-member crew of the latter was 

uninjured). The pilot of the EP–3, young U.S. Navy Lieutenant Shane Osborn, 

recovered from a steep 8,000-foot uncontrolled dive and flew toward Lingshui 

on Hainan Island in his badly damaged aircraft.27 Osborn made an engine-out, 

no-flap landing without an airspeed indicator at the PLA Navy airfield, 

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absent both the normal permission required from the PRC government and the 

normally mandatory clearance to land from the control tower (although a 

“May Day” emergency message had been sent on at least one international 

distress frequency).28 The Chinese made an issue of the landing without 

permission—one has to surmise this was a further reflection of objections to 

intrusive activities and violation of sovereignty.

China clearly does not want the United States to conduct reconnaissance missions so near its coast. The EP–3 case demonstrates its willingness to 

risk serious confrontation to convey this point, counter to its general policy of 

nonuse of force. This incident further demonstrates the support for this type 

of activity—harassment and confrontation—possibly at all levels in the PRC, 

from senior policymakers to junior operational officers. It remains unknown 

whether the PLANAF pilots received either orders or encouragement from 

above during the EP–3 crisis. It is also noteworthy that Commander Zhao 

Yu, the flight leader of the two-aircraft flight, reportedly requested permission from his command at Lingshui to shoot down the EP–329—tantamount 

to commencing open hostilities with the United States.30 Beijing prudently 

denied his request,31 but the message came through clearly: the Chinese were 

more than willing to risk a collision to shoo American intelligence-gathering activities from what it considers sovereign territory. The PLA Navy Air 

Force proved in this instance to be a questionable means to exercise statecraft, 

in contrast to the well orchestrated efforts employed by surface combatants 

of the South and East Sea Fleets—even considering the provocative gunpointing. Nevertheless, the Chinese commitment to make its intention to 

confront intruding American missions unmistakably clear was vividly 

demonstrated. Beijing wants Washington to stop collecting intelligence in and 

above the waters near China, and it has gone to great lengths—perhaps even 

overboard—in its reactions to these U.S. missions.

USNS Impeccable (2009). The most recent example of China’s determination to challenge the U.S. right to conduct intelligence operations near 

China is the March 2009 harassment incident of the U.S. acoustic surveillance 

ship USNS Impeccable. This confrontation, scores of miles from the coast, 

occurred well outside of China’s territorial waters (12 miles from the coast) 

but within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ—200 miles from the coast). It involved several Chinese government vessels, including at least one armed PRC 

ship (perhaps a patrol craft) and a PLAN maritime patrol aircraft.

Impeccable is a predominantly civilian-manned ocean surveillance vessel. However, it, along with several other ships, tows the sonar array system 

(SURTASS2) that performs acoustic collection surveillance, producing information used to detect, locate, identify, and, in wartime, attack submarines. 

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While these operations are routine peacetime activities, they would be applied 

to any future antisubmarine warfare (ASW) in times of crisis or conflict.32 The 

Chinese clearly did not feel comfortable with such “spy” ships operating so 

close to its newest nuclear-powered submarine base at Yalong Bay on Hainan 

Island—and in waters that it had begun to treat essentially as its territorial sea.33

The harassment of the Impeccable became particularly intense on March 

8. A Chinese radio call demanded that the American ship leave the area or 

“suffer the consequences”; later, a Chinese vessel impeded Impeccable’s passage by turning across the latter’s bow, stopping, and then placing obstacles 

in the water. Another Chinese ship—this time with guns—approached within 

100 yards of the surveillance ship, and yet another came within 25 feet, even 

though the American crew attempted to repel it by spraying the Chinese crew 

with fire hoses. The latter responded by trying to snag the Impeccable’s cable 

towing its sonar array. There was obviously danger of collision and injury. 

The Chinese government ships blatantly violated the norms of good seamanship and safe maneuvering and the rules of the road—formally known as the 

International Regulations for Avoiding Collisions at Sea.

The issue underlying these incidents was, at least on the surface, the two 

countries’ differing interpretations and applications of international law to U.S. 

military activity in China’s EEZ: China interprets EEZ rules as requiring the 

coastal state’s approval for such activities; the United States disagrees. But, even 

if the EEZ concept did not exist, China would strongly object to what it considers to be intrusive operations so near its coast and so near a sensitive military 

facility. The harassment of the Impeccable transpired because of the Chinese 

desire to interfere with the surveillance ship’s acoustic signature collection operations—and to demand the cessation of all such activities in the future. This 

incident epitomizes Beijing’s willingness to use gunboat diplomacy to confront 

challenges to the “privacy” it seeks in its immediate coastal periphery.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union frequently dispatched intelligence-collecting vessels to distant waters with the explicit purpose of harassing U.S. Navy ships. The Chinese have engaged in similar acts of harassment—

but they have done so almost exclusively near home waters. The Chinese 

may have violated rules of the road as flagrantly as the Soviets did during 

these aforementioned incidents. However, the PLA Navy has predominantly 

harassed U.S. Navy vessels and those of other maritime nations in their littoral when they felt their “privacy” and security were threatened by intrusive 

intelligence-collection efforts. In sum, when the Chinese navy has employed 

gunboat diplomacy or the airborne equivalent thereof in recent years, its 

leaders have done so in an increasingly predictable manner, and have deviated from their declared preference for not using force in three key areas: in 

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confrontations related to Taiwan, energy extraction from the seabed, and what 

they consider intrusive foreign military operations near territorial waters. 

Beijing has repeatedly and openly refused to renounce the use of force 

with respect to the “Taiwan problem,” and it has shown on several occasions 

its readiness to confront formidable Japanese naval forces in order to assert 

its perceived rights to the extraction of regional energy resources. The 1994 

fury surrounding the Han-class submarine prosecuted by U.S. ASW forces also 

appears to have transpired primarily because of a hot-headed overreaction to 

perceived sovereignty issues more than a reversal of Beijing’s naval nonuse of 

force policy. The same can be said of the 2001 incident involving the downed 

USN EP–3 following a collision with a PLAN F–8II and the drama over the 

harassment of USNS Impeccable in 2009. The jury remains out about whether 

China will persist in its self-imposed limits on the overt use of force to further 

its strategic interests. At least until recently, however, the exceptions to China’s 

general preference not to employ force have involved the desire to intimidate 

Taiwan, to protect what it sees as vital offshore energy reserves, or to curb 

foreign military intrusions near its territory.

Beijing and the PLA Navy have been quite adept in this balancing of 

nonuse and use of combatant ships and aircraft and in adhering to this preference not to use force—a policy, of course, that China generally shares with 

many other responsible nations. There have been confrontations of varying intensity over certain issues that the Chinese consider to be “nonnegotiable,” but 

there are also examples of skillful avoidance of confrontation. Particular kudos 

should go to those who, for at least the past decade and a half, replaced an iron 

fist in the South China Sea with what might be termed a heavy hand with a 

gentle touch. Beijing’s refusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan may 

be onerous to the people of Taiwan and to most Americans—but Beijing’s use 

of the PLA in cross-strait relations appears to be carefully calibrated to support 

its policy of intimidation without producing armed confrontations. Even the 

task groups sent to the East China Sea gas field managed generally to emphasize the seriousness of China’s position while avoiding a direct confrontation 

with the JMSDF. Thus, we might term the PLAN operations described above 

as carefully considered and demonstrably effective instruments of statecraft.

Conventional and Traditional Use of the PLAN as an Instrument of 

Statecraft

Beijing has also deployed its navy as an instrument of statecraft in 

traditional ways to represent China as a growing world power and boost 

Beijing’s image around the globe. The PLA Navy, historically, was slow to 

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employ such methods as port visits, combined exercises, operational forays, 

and senior officer exchanges—practices quite common among major navies. 

But it has made great strides in recent years to be more open concerning its 

navy and use its navy as other countries do—to express goodwill, display 

capability, and learn from other navies. And, for the most part, it appears to 

be doing just that—leaving the impression that China is both a capable and 

friendly maritime power.

Port Visits

China’s navy only recently began making port visits to foreign countries. 

The PLAN conducted its first foreign port visit in 1985—almost four decades 

after its establishment—when it sent three ships on a coast-hugging cruise to 

Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Perhaps best illustrating the hesitancy 

and caution involved, PLAN ships did not visit the United States until 1989—a 

decade after the establishment of diplomatic relations, and that was the training ship Zheng He (named after the Ming-dynasty admiral). Subsequently, 

combatant ships visited the United States in 1997, 2000, and 2006. The PLAN 

mustered the courage to sail beyond the Pacific and Indian Oceans, journeying 

to the waters of Europe for the first time in 2001 when it visited France, Italy, 

Germany, and the UK. The following year, in 2002, it completed a round-theworld voyage—nearly one hundred years after the United States accomplished 

a similar feat with its famous Great White Fleet. The PLAN has, however, 

regularly conducted port calls over the past quarter century, to the tune of one 

or two each year since 1989.34 This is far from a robust program, especially 

compared to the U.S. Navy. Nevertheless, it has become an increasingly 

conspicuous part of China’s foreign policy toolkit.

China’s port visits have been a component of larger diplomatic campaigns designed to reinforce China’s stature worldwide and bolster its leverage 

on strategic and economic issues. For example, the PLA Navy undertook three 

voyages to Pakistan and India in an effort to display its “even-handed” disposition toward these South Asia rivals. (Recall that China conducts only one or 

two such cruises each year; expending three of them focused on balancing its 

South Asia coverage over the past dozen years clearly demonstrates Beijing’s 

desire to avoid negative political fallout in the region.) China’s visits to India 

are also noteworthy especially given the two countries’ unresolved territorial 

disputes and historic enmity, evidenced most clearly during their 1962 border 

war in which the PLA humiliated the Indian Army. 

Even more impressive than China’s three visits to South Asia are 

its half-dozen voyages to Southeast Asia. The frequency of these visits to 

ASEAN nations reveals that, despite the long-standing territorial disputes and 

uneasiness in its relations with those countries, China has attempted to engage 

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its southern neighbors more than it has sought to confront them. Similarly, 

Beijing dispatched the destroyer Shenzhen to Europe in 2001 at least in part to 

influence the attitudes of European Union nations toward defense technology 

transfers. China for some time had sought to acquire various items from the 

Europeans in order to fill critical gaps in its military infrastructure, transactions 

to which the Americans strongly objected. Although the United Nations’ postTiananmen sanctions against Beijing remain in place, this voyage was part of 

an effort to keep this issue alive in Europe (and to keep American statesmen on 

the edge of their seats). Finally, the PLA Navy also paid port visits to Japan twice 

in recent years, indicating China’s desire to improve relations with Japan even 

as popular antagonism toward the Japanese reached a peak in the latter half of 

the 2000s.

PRC naval officers consulted by the author describe the purposes of 

PLAN visits to foreign ports as extending a friendly hand, showing goodwill, 

demonstrating an independent foreign policy of peace, showing a desire to 

work together with other countries and navies, and demonstrating the achievements in China’s opening to the outside world and economic development. 

They contend that visits to other countries also show the spirit of the Chinese 

people: active, healthy, and engaged with the outside world. For the most part, 

Beijing appears to have become skilled in wielding its navy in this traditional 

way as an instrument of soft power.

Bilateral and Multilateral Exercises

Considering that China had been reluctant to participate in naval 

exercises with other countries until this past decade (because of a fear of 

embarrassment), the PLA Navy has advanced by leaps and bounds, thus 

providing China’s political leaders with another asset that can be used to 

influence the country’s standing abroad. Notably, in May 2007, a PLA Navy 

frigate participated in a Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)35 exercise for the first time (even though China is a founding member of the twodecade-old U.S.- and Australia-inspired WPNS).36 More than 20 warships from 

12 countries, including the United States, France, and Australia, took part in 

the 6-day exercise. China’s involvement in the exercise essentially equated to an 

imprimatur—a fuller acceptance into the community of Pacific Rim maritime 

powers. The PLAN’s first-ever combined exercises with the Russian Navy in 

2005 also significantly boosted the former’s prestige, as did similar (though 

significantly less complex) exercises with the (vastly superior) U.S. Navy a year 

later.37 The Russian exercises especially provided Beijing with a strategic boost: 

the Russians were now seen as highly likely to be a reliable provider of logistic and other support—almost certainly including specific missiles and spare 

parts for the key Russian weapons systems that China would employ in combat 

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with Taiwan and the United States. The scope and intensity of these exercises 

revealed just how credible the Chinese threat to Taiwan was and, ultimately, 

reinforced Beijing’s stature as a budding global sea power.38

Beijing’s greater confidence in its navy—and in its navy’s ability to engage the international maritime community—has given it an opportunity to 

extend its reach in parts of the world where China felt ignored. For example, in 

March 2007, a Chinese frigate commanded the 4-day sea phase of a combined 

exercise called “Peace-07” in the Arabian Sea—an exercise involving the navies 

of nine different nations—signifying China’s “entrance” in the increasingly important Middle East.39 The PLAN conducted its first combined exercises with 

the Pakistani and Indian navies in 2003; initially, such endeavors were limited 

to occasions tied to port visits, when two navies (Chinese and foreign) performed rudimentary drills together. However, more recently, the Chinese have 

begun to dispatch naval forces explicitly to participate in major international 

exercises. Now, modern Chinese combatant ships are a regular feature of complex multinational naval drills, and this newfound ability has given Beijing a 

seat at the table where serious maritime matters are debated.

China’s International Fleet Review 

In 2009, China received 21 ships from 14 countries in an international fleet review in Qingdao to recognize the 60th anniversary of the People’s 

Liberation Army Navy. The message conveyed here was clear: not only did 

China feel sufficiently confident to send its maritime forces abroad, but it now 

had also acquired the poise to embrace the limelight and host an extravagant 

party in its own waters. U.S. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Gary 

Roughead led the U.S. delegation at the event—one also attended by representatives from 29 other nations, thus signifying that the U.S. Navy and other 

major maritime powers no longer considered the PLA Navy an inconsequential force.40 China wanted the world to accept its navy as a potent and capable 

service that could command international attention and respect—a new 

situation for a fleet that just decades before could not have contemplated measuring up to such standards. This experience reaffirmed China’s global maritime 

aspirations and served, essentially, as a proud “coming-out” party for a navy with 

grand ambitions.

Blue-water Forays

China has not routinely conducted naval operations (as opposed to simple oceanic transits to conduct port visits) far from its own shores. However, it 

has used occasional blue-water forays to demonstrate its intentions to be more 

than a littoral navy. Recent forays have offered us the first glimpses of what may 

become a routine practice of the PLA Navy. Through these cruises, Beijing has 

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essentially shown its willingness to assert its presence in distant waters—implicitly challenging the unspoken dominance of the U.S. Navy in the Western 

Pacific—and thereby furnish its political leaders with another potent means 

of one day securing its growing interests abroad. The following five examples 

illustrate this point:

Incursions of Chinese Survey Ships and Submarine into Japanese EEZ 

(Early 2000s). In 2001, China and Japan agreed to notify each other if either 

one of them planned to conduct maritime survey operations in disputed waters. Yet, according to a contemporary Japanese newspaper report,41 in 2003, 

Chinese survey ships conducted six such operations without notifying the 

Japanese; during just 7 months of 2004, Chinese survey ships made intrusions 

into the Japanese-claimed EEZ 25 times without prior consultations. Why 

did Beijing disregard an international agreement with a longtime antagonist 

so blatantly and send these survey vessels into waters near Japan without the 

latter’s consent? The simplest explanation involves a confusing combination 

of what might be judged politico-military ineptitude and national arrogance, 

as many have been quick to argue. Alternatively—and more likely—Beijing 

used this method to stake out what it sees as its rights.

Both ineptitude in navigation and lapse of judgment seem unlikely 

explanations for such complex oceanographic operations, especially given 

their frequency. Neither reason has been offered as an excuse for these incursions. China sent these ships to locations of interest and ignored Japanese 

complaints to send two messages. First, Beijing signaled to the JMSDF and the 

U.S. Navy that it intends to be a major player in undersea warfare with an increasing area of influence—an area that may have suddenly grown larger with 

the advent of two new classes of Chinese nuclear-powered submarines with 

longer “legs” and greater endurance, the Shang-class SSN (attack submarine) 

and the Jin-class SSBN (ballistic-missile submarine). In other words, Beijing 

may have intended these incursions to serve as a subtle reminder of Beijing’s 

commitment to its antiaccess strategy in the Western Pacific.42 Second, the 

survey ships serve to assert China’s rights in the disputed waters, particularly to 

substantiate its claim that those disputed waters overlie China’s continental 

shelf, which, they argue, is the defining parameter for the outer boundary of 

the EEZ. Such claims would theoretically extend China’s EEZ well beyond 

the currently accepted 200 nautical miles from the domestic coastline or the 

median line between China and Japan—thereby creating a controversy with 

widespread implications.43 Either way, Beijing appears to have used these 

quasi-naval operations to enhance its reach in the region and to demonstrate that it has “stood up” as a maritime equal to Japan—the country that 

60 years before humiliated China and whose Imperial Navy scourged the 

Western Pacific.

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Han-class Submarine Encounter (2004). The PLA Navy conveyed a 

stronger and more far-reaching signal when it deployed a fast-attack nuclear 

submarine—a combatant vessel—to circle Guam in 2004. As aforementioned, 

the Chinese have rarely embarked on such out-of-area sub-surface patrols—

this latest saga was one of only three extended patrols conducted by the entire 

Chinese submarine force in 2004; no such patrols were conducted in 2005.44

This cruise, however, was steeped in significant implications. The Chinese, undoubtedly, were well aware that the United States had been undertaking major military relocations to Guam. These newly deployed U.S. forces on Guam 

were generally known to be located beyond the range of China’s conventionalwarhead missiles—and thus represented a heightened U.S. ability to cope with 

Northeast Asian contingencies. By sending a submarine on a long-distance 

patrol to the vicinity of the island, China dropped the first hint that the 

United States might not be able to act with impunity in the Western Pacific and 

was not entirely invulnerable to Chinese forces, despite the latter’s relative inferiority. China sought to prove to itself and the United States that it was not 

helpless in the face of the American buildup.

Perhaps more significant, however, was what happened toward the end 

of the cruise, when the submarine inexplicably violated Japanese territorial waters and was caught red-handed by JMSDF antisubmarine warfare aircraft and 

surface ships. Beijing may have gotten more diplomatic-message mileage out 

of this Han patrol than it intended. The author, experienced in antisubmarine 

warfare, found in his records the following observations he had made in 2004:

JMSDF destroyers and P–3C aircraft tracked Han-class nuclear attack 

submarine (SSN) number 405 for two or more hours during a surprising 

transit through Japanese territorial waters off Okinawa, followed by an 

unsatisfying apology from Beijing. Japanese observers interpreted this 

as a deliberate act, approved at the highest levels, to test the U.S. and 

Japanese ability to respond to foreign submarine operations near Guam 

and within Japanese waters. The ease of Japanese detection of Han 405, 

some speculated, was because the Chinese intended to be detected, facilitated by U.S.-provided cueing.

Thus, the Chinese could have deliberately used the Han-class submarine 

to demonstrate that it could offer protection to gas exploration activities in 

the East China Sea and that it could threaten U.S. forces en route to intervene 

in a Taiwan contingency. Of course, the detection may have been completely 

unintended—perhaps due to a lapse in seamanship attributable in part to the 

rarity of PLA Navy submarine patrols in distant, unfamiliar waters. In any 

event, this bumbling, inept performance hardly smacks of a professional submarine force. Moreover, the commanding officer of a Han-class SSN in 2004 

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is expected to be an elite submariner. However we explain the saga, it is unmistakably clear that Beijing delivered a strong diplomatic message—the PLA 

Navy showed that it could threaten an important distant U.S. military outpost 

and that it had, whether boldly or mistakenly, intruded in Japanese waters. The 

world awoke to the reality that the United States was not alone in extended 

nuclear submarine surveillance missions. China’s maritime reach, although 

sporadic, now appeared greater than previously thought.

Song-class Submarine Encounter (2006). A Chinese Song-class dieselelectric submarine that had located and apparently been shadowing the USS 

Kitty Hawk surfaced approximately 5 miles away from the carrier, where it was 

spotted by one of the carrier’s aircraft.45 The much-publicized Kitty Hawk-Song

event occurred during one of only two such patrols conducted in 2006. In contrast to the previously described 1994 Kitty Hawk-Han encounter, the Song was 

said to be shadowing the carrier strike group and was near Okinawa, considerably farther from the submarine’s base than was the case with the Han in the 

Yellow Sea.46

That act of surfacing near the U.S. ships (yet at a safe distance) has been 

the subject of considerable speculation.47 It might have been a mistake.48 Or, 

perhaps, as the Song’s surfacing appeared to be prolonged (rather than a brief 

broaching), a casualty may have forced the submarine to surface. The casualty 

scenario makes much more sense considering that Admiral Gary Roughead, 

then commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, had been in Beijing at the time. 

Would Beijing audaciously approve the stalking of Kitty Hawk, much less the 

surfacing, while meeting with a very senior U.S. Navy officer? Or was Beijing 

unaware, forgetful, or insensitive? Might someone have directed that the Song

press on with pursuit of the U.S. strike group, despite Roughead’s visit? Once 

more, questions arise as to the operational savvy and politico-military astuteness of the Chinese leaders involved—as with the previously discussed threat 

to shoot down ASW airplanes, the frigate gun-pointing, and the dangerous 

intercepts of reconnaissance aircraft. But, whether or not such ineptitude or 

questionable judgment was a factor, the Song submarine’s actions ultimately 

became an instrument of statecraft. While these cruises did not represent overt 

rehearsals of naval operations directed against U.S. intervention (and such 

submarine patrols have been few), Beijing demonstrated that the large and 

modernized PLAN submarine force increasingly can threaten the ability of 

U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs) to intervene promptly and effectively in a 

Taiwan crisis.49

International Anti-piracy Operations (2009–Present). China made 

a surprising decision in December 2008 when it sent three PLA Navy ships 

to the Gulf of Aden. Chinese leaders have been careful to justify this deployment based on United Nations Security Council approval—an operation, they 

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have argued, undertaken primarily to protect Chinese shipping from Somali 

pirates.50 This deployment marks the first time since the establishment of the 

PLA Navy that a force has been sent to conduct combat-like operations beyond 

Chinese littoral waters (and in a foreign nation’s EEZ). China may not have followed in the wake of the U.S. Navy and established a standing naval presence 

in distant waters through this deployment—it has no bases abroad to support 

such an endeavor, and its presence in the Gulf of Aden has been moderate, usually consisting of two combatant ships and a replenishment vessel.51 However, 

this deployment marks a strategic turning point in how Beijing has used the 

PLA Navy—it demonstrates that China now appears ready to assume a greater 

role on the high seas, at least in providing sea-lane security in the Middle East. 

It sends a signal to those who might be tempted to disrupt the flow of shipping 

to China that the PLA Navy must be taken seriously.

Surface Action Group in the Western Pacific (2010). In April 2010, 

the PLA Navy put to sea a task group (reportedly composed of eight surface combatants, including destroyers and frigates, and two submarines) that 

proceeded from the East China Sea into the Western Pacific. When accosted 

by JMSDF ships and aircraft as the task group skirted Japanese waters, the 

Chinese launched a helicopter that “buzzed” one of the Japanese warships 

and then circled it twice. The PRC defense ministry defended the deployment 

and asserted that it had posed no threat to Japan or others. Additionally, other 

surface and air units of the PLA Navy conducted missions farther east than is 

routinely done. These deployments and operations represent the first time a 

large Chinese surface action group supported by submarines (as opposed to a 

solitary submarine or a noncombatant survey ship fleet) headed for the blue 

waters where Japan and the United States have long dominated. It might be 

said that April 2010 was the advent of China’s blue-water navy. This surface 

action group might be seen as the initial instance of China truly exercising its 

surface combatant force in a scenario that approximates in location and scale 

part of what the PLA Navy might do if U.S. forces were en route to intervene in 

a cross-strait conflict or other crisis.

These several forays provide good evidence that Beijing allows the 

PLAN to exercise in the waters where it may have to confront the oncoming 

U.S. Navy. This may become a routine practice of the PLA Navy. Through these 

cruises, Beijing has essentially shown its willingness to assert its presence in 

distant waters—implicitly challenging the dominance of the U.S. Navy in the 

Western Pacific.

Senior Officer Exchanges 

The commander of the PLA Navy generally makes one trip abroad 

each year, though he does not strictly adhere to this pattern. Admiral Shi 

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Yunsheng, for example, managed to visit 11 countries in his annual trips from 

1997 to 2002, but no such trips took place from 2003 to 2006.52 Consequently, 

the PLA Navy commander generally interacts with his foreign counterparts 

when they visit Beijing rather than on his own travels abroad. Nevertheless, 

China has been using these visits as an instrument of statecraft, even if only to 

a limited degree.

Maritime Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 

Beijing has given only lip service to cooperative maritime security initiatives like the U.S. Navy’s Global Maritime Partnership (originally dubbed the 

Thousand Ship Navy) and has resisted an active role in support of the Proliferation Security Initiative. Unfortunately, neither Beijing nor Washington has 

taken advantage of the opportunity to undertake humanitarian assistance and 

disaster relief operations as a team. Although PLA soldiers take pride in assistance missions at home and abroad, the PLA Navy has also largely ignored 

engaging in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations—

areas that the Chinese government has not pursued despite the inherent value 

such operations would offer in boosting Beijing’s image abroad.53

China’s less-than-enthusiastic disposition or disinterest toward participation in multinational initiatives has been disappointing—even in initiatives that 

focus on such nonsensitive areas as oceanography, pollution control, fisheries 

enforcement, maritime safety, tsunami detection and warning, antiproliferation, 

and smuggling. The United States has been similarly culpable. China is wary 

of what it might be asked to do and how much it might be asked to contribute—it fears becoming entangled and surprised in operations it might oppose 

in principle. Similarly, the PLA Navy’s longstanding fears of embarrassment also 

appear more than anything else to have stifled Beijing’s zeal for participating 

alongside the U.S. Navy and others in HA/DR. Nevertheless, given China’s latest naval modernization program and its emergence on the global stage, we can 

hope that the PLA Navy becomes more involved in such initiatives as it comes 

to appreciate more fully its own abilities and the value that such operations 

offer for its international reputation. We can also hope that the United States 

will also seek ways to get past the admitted awkwardness that stems from a 

relationship where both sides seek to establish cooperation but also have to be 

ready to undertake combat operations against each other.

Beijing has deployed its navy as an instrument of statecraft by employing 

such methods as port visits, exercises with the navies of other nations, extendedrange operational sorties, and senior officer exchanges. Potential maritime cooperative efforts with other countries, especially the United States, have not been 

exploited. China has made great inroads in the past several years toward establishing its credibility worldwide, demonstrating more openness to share its navy, 

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236 McVADON

and engaging in activities to show that it can use its navy as other countries do—

to express goodwill, display capability, and learn from other navies. Port visits 

have become a prominent part of China’s foreign policy toolkit while simultaneously displaying a friendly face. Similarly, China’s willingness to participate 

more frequently in exercises with other nations also has served to boost its 

navy’s credibility abroad. The PLA Navy’s sporadic blue-water forays have demonstrated Beijing’s growing confidence to challenge other navies distant from 

Chinese shores and furnish China’s political leaders with another potent means 

of one day securing its growing interests abroad. For the most part, these practices, even given relative neglect of such areas as humanitarian assistance and 

disaster relief, have given Beijing greater leverage in its foreign policy, demonstrating the effectiveness of the PLAN as an instrument of statecraft.

The PLA Navy as an Instrument of Statecraft: In Its Own Words 

To paraphrase what Mark Twain said about Richard Wagner’s music, 

Chinese propaganda concerning the use of the PLA Navy as an instrument of 

statecraft is not as bad as it sounds. Propitiously, for the original work on this 

chapter, The People’s Liberation Army Daily newspaper published an article in 

October 2007 entitled “An all-directional, multi-tiered and wide-ranging pattern of military diplomacy created.”54 The first subheading reads: “Enhancing 

trust and dispelling suspicion.” The article is written in the familiar flowery 

propagandistic style. By removing that verbiage, the following pertinent points 

remain:

■  The PLA has established defense and security consultation mechanisms with the United States, Russia, Japan, Australia, UK, France, 

and Germany, and such mechanisms have also gradually been established with surrounding countries, such as Pakistan, Mongolia, and 

Vietnam, and even with South Africa. Through dialogue on defense 

and security affairs, the military channel of mutual trust has been 

established and expanded.

■  The PLA has opened wider to the outside world, as evidenced by its 

constant increase in “going global” and “inviting in.” 

■  Chinese servicemen focus on how to absorb useful management experience and operational and training concepts of foreign troops when 

they “go global.”

■  The PLA has held joint antiterrorism military exercises and exercises 

dealing with nontraditional security menaces with the armed forces of 

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the relevant countries, and explored new methods for cracking down 

on international terrorism.

■  The PLA has participated in 17 UN peacekeeping actions.

■  It has also taken an active part in international disaster rescue and relief operations and helped the peoples of disaster-hit countries to rebuild their homes, faithfully fulfilling the commitment made by the 

Chinese government to the international community.

■  “Mutual respect, consultation on equal footing, mutual benefit and 

win-win cooperation” is the way adopted by China to handle international relations, and it is also the code adopted by the PLA in its military diplomacy. 

To put the use of the PLAN as an instrument of statecraft in a broader 

perspective, the following is helpful. The 2007 U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence 

publication on the PLAN provided an analysis based on the PRC’s five defense 

white papers and PLA writings and arrived at a list of five goals of the PLA’s 

foreign exchange program:55

■  shape the international security environment to support key national 

security objectives

■   improve political and military relations with foreign countries

■  provide military assistance to developing countries

■   enhance China’s military and defense industry modernization by 

acquiring technology and advancing key research and development 

programs through foreign assistance

■  help China’s military leaders, younger officers, and civilian cadre acquire modern military knowledge, especially from the developed 

world, in doctrine, operations, training, military medicine, administration, and a host of noncombat-related areas.

It seems that the PLAN has earned a better-than-passing grade in contributing to these goals through its interaction with other navies.

On balance, it serves the interests of those who want China to live up 

fully to its aspiration to be a constructive member of the community of nations and a “responsible stakeholder” to encourage and reinforce the positive 

aspects of Beijing’s employment of its navy as an instrument of statecraft, just 

as we wish to discourage and weaken the obsessive focus on threatening and 

intimidating Taiwan and the occasional penchant for reckless and irresponsible conduct.

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Conclusion: Whither Chinese (and American) Statecraft?

China employs the PLA Navy as an instrument of statecraft in a wide 

variety of straightforward and complex (sometimes enigmatic) ways to send 

messages, protect claims, assert rights, intimidate, coerce, cajole, convey conciliation, and accomplish other goals. China, of course, also employs the PLAN 

in more conventional ways—port visits, exercises with other navies, operational forays, and senior-level visits—as an instrument of statecraft. Through these 

practices, Beijing has facilitated larger diplomatic efforts to achieve its strategic objectives abroad and largely succeeded in boosting its image around the 

globe. The PLA Navy has become an invaluable instrument to policymakers 

in furthering China’s growing interests and enhancing its international reputation.

A variety of events in 2010 raise questions about whether the fundamental approach to the employment of the PLAN as an instrument of statecraft described in this chapter is now in question, and maybe even in jeopardy. The 

Chinese or at least some of the loudest voices (such as those of retired Rear 

Admiral Yang Yi and Major General Luo Yuan) are more firmly entrenched 

in harsh rhetoric concerning the United States than this author can recall during the last decade or more. Beijing has stridently disrupted PRC-U.S. military 

relations, made disturbing statements about its interests in the South China 

Sea (including senior diplomat Dai Bingguo’s unfortunate assertion that it is a 

Chinese core interest, causing consternation in Washington and Beijing), reiterated its profound concerns about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and reconnaissance missions near China, and reacted strongly to U.S. Navy–Republic of Korea 

Navy exercises in the Yellow Sea—exercises aimed at Pyongyang, not Beijing. 

Washington faces a tremendous challenge as it seeks to understand why Beijing 

has acted with increasing aggressiveness over the past year and to change favorably that trajectory for the relationship. 

Has China become less attached to a preference for the nonuse of force as 

its confidence has expanded—a new confidence reinforced by perceptions of 

a weakened U.S. economy and the conclusion that democracy and capitalism 

are being discredited following the recent global financial crisis? Or has a hardliner faction within the PLA leadership captured the ear of China’s president? 

Is Beijing now determined and resolute in its efforts to stop U.S. arms sales to 

Taiwan, press claims in the South China Sea and possibly even complicate free 

use of those waters, halt U.S. intelligence collection missions near China, keep 

U.S. aircraft carriers out of China’s littoral—and maybe more? Has President 

Hu Jintao proven to be a weak leader, thereby encouraging “cowboys” to ride 

off in different directions? Will a new president more effectively keep the herd 

together and the cowboys reined in?

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The combination of a more aggressive approach and the possession of 

a much more capable navy (and air and missile forces) could affect Beijing’s 

policies on the use of the PLA Navy (and the PLA overall) as an instrument of 

statecraft—as described (or at least alluded to) in this chapter. Nonuse of force, 

for example, loses its “romantic” cachet in the hands of a government that cares 

little about offending its neighbors and expects the equivalent of tributes based 

on its raw economic and military power. China is unlikely to switch horses in 

mid-stream, to pursue the cowboy analogy one more time, and become expansionist, but it can clearly be obnoxious well short of shooting up the town in the 

form of invasion or land-grabs.

Beijing’s actions may eventually reveal whether China has fundamentally changed direction, allowing assessments of whether it is likely to stay the 

new course—if, indeed, change is brewing. It is risky now to speculate on the 

outcome when we do not fully grasp the motivation or cause. This is true even 

when contemplating the less profound aspects of Chinese policy, such as whether Beijing reneges on its “peace agenda” and resorts more frequently to gunboat 

diplomacy or re-dons its white hat and resumes a more conciliatory role.

These developments have caused some to ask if the nationalistic noises 

are signs of internal weakness, a Chinese Communist Party that is seeking 

to bolster its legitimacy and regain support from its populace by pointing to 

the threat of an aggressive United States. The Party retains legitimacy from its 

success in sustaining China’s economic growth, a record some suggest may be 

coming to an end. The odds seem low for a crisis for China’s ruling regime, 

but there is evidence of domestic stress and internal weakness. For example, 

the much-cited figures for incidents of social unrest in China have received 

renewed attention. An August 2010 American Enterprise Institute report 

described the situation and stated:

And these concerns have been mounting. In 1993, there were 8,700 instances of social unrest in China. This number rose to 40,000 in 2000, to 

87,000 in 2005, and to 230,000 in 2009. Social unrest in 2005 may have 

involved as many as 5 million participants; 40 to 50 percent of the incidents in 2005 occurred in the countryside, the spawning ground of the 

last Chinese revolution.56

What if earthshaking change is underway in China, from which we are 

feeling only the first minor tremors? It would indeed be foolhardy to prognosticate about the weightier prospects—an emerged and prosperous China 

that, contrary to what this author thinks serves China’s best interests, becomes 

a more aggressive and dangerous China. If we are witnessing a major national 

development, might it produce fissures stemming from the domestic economic and social problems often cited today as China’s most pressing national 

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concern? Could the Chinese Communist Party be seriously challenged? One 

could offer little more than idle speculation about how the navy and other 

armed services might be employed in a fragmented China. Would the factions 

harden and gaps grow as these factions support or oppose aggressive adventures in economic, social, political, foreign policy, and military areas? However, we will have at least been alerted to the prospects of a chaotic China with 

unpredictable consequences. We can thereby have a better chance to detect 

these developments, understand what is occurring, strive to help if so inclined, 

and look out for U.S. interests. 

The more likely scenario is that, when the lid is lifted on this steaming 

pot, we will find only burbles rather than its being on the brink of boiling over. 

In any case, the U.S. response to these ongoing developments in China—where 

major shifts have not yet occurred—should consist of efforts to encourage the 

use of the PLA Navy and PLA in constructive forms of statecraft and discourage their employment as means to threaten, coerce, and intimidate. We should 

focus on establishing a forward-looking cooperative maritime relationship. 

We should encourage the Chinese to join in cooperative roles in providing 

sea-lane security, in delivering humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and 

ultimately—as habits of cooperation build a foundation of bilateral trust and 

confidence—in becoming partners on the high seas. All this may go nowhere, 

and even be embarrassing if our efforts are rebuffed. Nevertheless, we should 

try. At the same time, we also must keep our powder dry. 

One more thought: as we reflect on China’s statecraft, we should also 

look in the mirror and see how the United States is employing the forces of the 

world’s only superpower as instruments of statecraft—especially in our critical 

relations with a China that may or may not be changing its attitude. We must 

exercise care in the use of U.S. Armed Forces, and especially with respect to 

the force closest to, most respected, and most feared by the Chinese. I mean, 

of course, the U.S. Navy—smaller now, yet daunting even in comparison with 

the mighty fleets of Admiral Zheng He. We already know and have applied 

well the lesson the Chinese associate with Zheng He and that they may now be 

forgetting or ignoring: A powerful Navy is often most effective as an instrument 

of statecraft when it is not used to threaten or to employ force. The U.S. Navy 

has great combat power, but also serves admirably as a force to deter, assist, 

protect, and cooperate. These habits have been nurtured since the Cold War—

using these capabilities inherent in our navy to avoid or make unnecessary the 

use of its combat power. As Sun Tzu came close to writing, the war we will most 

surely win is the one we do not have to fight.

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Notes

1

This chapter has been extensively revised and updated and is based only in part on the paper of 

similar name prepared for the international conference on PLA affairs held by the Chinese Council on Advanced Policy Studies, RAND Corporation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the National Defense University, on “The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles?” in Taipei, Taiwan, November 29–December 1, 2007.

2

“Cheng Ho” under the Wade-Giles system of romanization of Chinese; simplified characters 郑和; 

traditional characters 鄭和.

3

Geoffrey Wade, “The Zheng He Voyages: A Reassessment,” ARI Working Paper 31 (Singapore: Asia 

Research Institute, National University of Singapore, October 2004), 1.

4

Ibid., 18.

5

This author called attention to the first glimmer of what might be a significant change in policy in 

the use of force in the South China Sea. The citations from Li and Jiang are drawn from the author’s paper 

prepared for a PLA conference at Wye Plantation, Maryland, in 1998 that then became a chapter entitled 

“The Chinese Military and the Peripheral States in the 21st Century: A Security Tour d’Horizon” in the book 

The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century, Larry M. Wortzel, ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

U.S. Army War College, 1999). It was not suggested then (nor is it now) that China is altogether benign or 

benevolent, but rather that China concluded that its interests are generally better served by the use of means 

other than force. Regardless of how one views the prospects of China’s adhering to this position, we should 

encourage Beijing to repeat it until it believes its own rhetoric.

6

Reuters, Christina Toh-Pantin, Kuala Lumpur, August 22, 1997.

7

Reuters, “China Will Never Seek Hegemony—Jiang,” Hong Kong Standard, December 16, 1997.

8

Ambassador James Lilley emphasized this point in his introduction to the book The Chinese Armed 

Forces in the 21st Century, where he wrote: “McVadon raises another issue that will echo in the other chapters 

of this book—the centrality of economic factors. . . . He reminds us that for Beijing, economics is the ‘most 

important component of China’s comprehensive national power.’”

9

The harassment of U.S. acoustic intelligence collection ships near Hainan Island in the spring of 

2009 and the collision of a Chinese naval fighter aircraft and a U.S. naval reconnaissance aircraft in 2001 were 

not directed at one of China’s neighbors but rather at the United States, based on Chinese displeasure with 

the American intrusions near China—one of the explicit exceptions to Beijing’s preference for the nonuse of 

force, as this author sees Beijing’s policy.

10Soft power, as used here, is intended to encompass economic means as well as cultural aspects and 

a general ability to influence by attraction rather than coercion. Joseph Nye, father of the term soft power, 

originally excluded economic means. Interestingly, in July 2010, Prof. Nye was on a panel at the Woodrow 

Wilson Center; one of his fellow panelists several times referred to soft power, crediting Nye with coining the 

term, but obviously was including economic power in the concept. Nye did not rise to the bait, and it was 

left to this author, in the audience that day, to mention the matter—at which time Prof. Nye reaffirmed his 

adherence to the original definition.

11Natuna D-Alpha, which is about 1,100 kilometers (680 miles) north of Jakarta and 200 kilometers 

east of the West Natuna fields that feed gas to Singapore, holds 46 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas 

reserves, according to Oilwatch Southeast Asia, September 25, 2007; available at <http://oilwatch-sea.org/

content/view/150/1/>. A January 16, 2009, Reuters report confirmed this earlier estimate. The report read 

in part: “The Natuna D-Alpha block in the South China Sea has around 222 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of gas 

reserves. About 46 tcf of these are thought to be commercially recoverable, accounting for roughly a quarter of Indonesia’s total commercially recoverable gas reserves.” Available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/

idUSJAK37482620090116>.

12James Holmes, “China’s Creeping Expansion in the South China Sea,” American Thinker, June 

7, 2004; available at <http://www.americanthinker.com/2004/06/chinas_creeping_expansion_in_t.html>. 

Holmes wrote: “In recent decades China has acted at opportune moments to acquire strategic outposts. 

. . . In 1974 Chinese forces wrested the Paracel Islands from a teetering South Vietnam. In 1988, taking advantage of united Vietnam’s pariah status, the Chinese navy pummeled a Vietnamese flotilla and occupied 

several of the strategically placed Spratly Islands. In 1995, following the U.S. withdrawal from the Philippine 

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Islands, Beijing capitalized on American inattention and Filipino weakness to seize control of Mischief Reef, 

an islet located within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone of the Philippines.”

13China claims the area as within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), asserting that this area is a natural extension of China’s continental shelf. Japan, taking a different legal slant, claims the disputed territory 

as part of its EEZ, since it is within 200 nautical miles of the adjacent Japanese coastline.

14Richard Fisher, Jr., “Growing Asymmetries in the China-Japan Naval Balance,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, November 22, 2005, at <http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.83/

pub_detail.asp>; Fisher cites the following: “PLA Navy Destroyers Spotted Near Chunxiao Gas Fields in East 

China Sea,” Tokyo Sekai no Kansen, April 5, 2005, 6–7. 

15Arthur S. Ding, “China’s Energy Security Demands and the East China Sea: A Growing Likelihood 

of Conflict in East Asia?” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 3, no. 3 (November 2005), 36, available at 

<http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/CEF_Quarterly_November_2005.pdf>.

16Ibid., 36.

17Fisher. He attributes news of this alarming gun-pointing to a report from a news service, Kyodo, 

October 1, 2005.

18“China Sends Warships to East China Sea,” DefenseNews.com, September 29, 2005.

19Though the Chinese did not say so publicly, every bit of circumstantial evidence indicated that the 

submarine was unaware that it was the subject of U.S. antisubmarine warfare search. If it had indeed been 

aware of the battle group, odds are that it would have been attempting to track it clandestinely, as one might 

expect a submarine near a carrier battle group to have done. But according to reliable contacts it seems clear 

that it was not doing any such shadowing; the Han was proceeding routinely toward its home port, maintaining normal course and speed, when it was detected.

20Bernard D. Cole, “Beijing’s Strategy of Sea Denial,” China Brief 6, issue 23 (November 22, 2006). 

Published on line by Jamestown Foundation, available at <http://www.jamestown.org/china_brief/article.ph

p?articleid=2373240&printthis=1>.

21The United States imparted the following implicit message to the Chinese in response to this saga: 

“Get used to it; if you are to send your submarines on frequent ‘out-of-area’ patrols, you should expect to be 

detected and tracked. You, China, will be imparting the message of an expanding undersea threat to be taken 

into account; we, the West, will be both learning and practicing to ensure that PLA Navy submarines may be 

handled readily in times of crisis or conflict.” This response represents the position that the United States has 

consistently taken with regard to such operations in international waters—a position that the Chinese likely 

will continue to contest and one that ultimately will lead to other such confrontations.

22This author learned of the nature and intensity of Chinese consternation concerning the reconnaissance missions as a result of extensive consultations with various Chinese and Americans behind 

the scenes both before and during the crisis. He participated in dozens of radio and television interviews 

throughout the saga and offered constructive advice and suggestions to both sides. He had been sought out 

by Chinese officials and international media because he was a former defense and naval attaché at the U.S. 

embassy in Beijing, a P–3 (the ASW and patrol version, not EP–3 electronic reconnaissance version) pilot 

from 1960 to 1989 as well as commanding officer of a P–3C squadron, commander of the U.S. and NATO 

maritime operations from Iceland, and a consultant on the PLA and East Asia security affairs.

23One PLAN officer even implied after the collision that PLAN exercises in the past had been disrupted by intruding aircraft; the exercise commanders on the scene felt uncomfortable continuing exercise 

operations in the presence of prying eyes.

24U.S. Pacific Command Commander, Admiral Dennis Blair, described American complaints about 

Chinese aggressiveness: “I must tell you though that the intercepts by Chinese fighters over the past couple months have become more aggressive to the point we felt they were endangering the safety of Chinese 

and American aircraft. And we launched a protest at the working level. This is not a big deal, but we went 

to the Chinese and said, ‘Your aircraft are not intercepting in a professional manner. There is a safety issue here.’” Cooperative Research History Commons, available at <http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/topic.

jsp?topic=topic_weapons_and_equipment>.

25The F–8II squadron assigned to conduct these intercepts belonged to the 8th PLA Naval Air Force 

Wing’s 22d Regiment, by one account, or the 25th Regiment of the 9th Division of the People’s Liberation Army 

Navy Air Force, by another account. During these often risky operations, two-plane flights of PLAN F–8II 

jet fighters were guided by ground radar to intercept and identify the sporadic American flights as they flew 

past Hainan.

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26Apparently, the Chinese also used other angry gestures (such as the “finger”) and abrupt maneuvers to annoy and even frighten the U.S. Navy EP–3 crews.

27For aviators and others interested in the details, the EP–3 suffered from the following damage: #1 

propeller decoupled and windmilling, producing enormous asymmetric drag and a violent initial left yaw; 

port aileron pierced by the F–8’s vertical stabilizer, causing an initial steep left bank (exacerbated by the yaw); 

nose radome and Pitot tube carried away, creating great noise and eliminating both cabin pressurization and 

crucial airspeed indication; and the prospect of unseen and possibly progressive further damage. 

28Two days later, Brigadier General Neal Sealock, the U.S. defense attaché in Beijing, had a 40-minute meeting with the crew of the EP–3 at the facility where they were housed in Haikou, Hainan’s capital—

across the island from Lingshui. The Chinese have since told the author that both the reconnaissance and 

interceptor flights were resumed after a recess and that the Americans are less intrusive and the Chinese less 

aggressive. Americans who know what the situation is now are not at liberty to give their version.

29Commander Zhao may have witnessed the sharp left bank and yaw that resulted from the collision 

and thought the EP–3 had intentionally turned into Wang. This could have led to his feeling justified in asking permission to fire on the unarmed reconnaissance aircraft.

30Author’s conversation around 2004 with a senior PLA Navy officer who said he was present at the 

Navy headquarters in Beijing when the request to fire on the EP–3 was received and denied.

31Zhao, following the rejection, landed his intact aircraft at Lingshui 10 minutes ahead of the crippled EP–3.

32The author has been questioned by other Americans who doubt whether the Chinese knew the 

nature of the acoustic collection and assume the mission was sensitive and highly classified. The following 

surprisingly forthright description of the T-AGOS ships and their mission is taken from the Navy (OPNAV 

80) publication Vision... Presence... Power: A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy—2002 Edition, available at 

<http://www.navy.mil/navydata/policy/vision/vis02/vpp02-ch3j.htm>: “T-AGOS ocean surveillance ships 

are small, civilian-manned surveillance ships that play a prominent role in the Navy’s overall anti-submarine 

warfare and maritime domain awareness capability. T-AGOS ships provide a platform for the Surveillance 

Towed Array Sensor System (AN/UQQ-2 SURTASS). T-AGOS is the Navy’s premier long-range, mobile, 

surface ASW platform capable of detecting modern submarine targets. Although these ships are part of the 

Military Sealift Command’s Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF), they come under the operational control 

of fleet commanders. There are nine ships in four classes: a three-ship monohull Stalwart (T-AGOS-1) class, 

a four-ship twin-hull Victorious (T-AGOS-19) class, (a Small Waterplane Area Twin-Hull [SWATH] design 

that enables the ships to operate in relatively high seas), a single large (5,500-ton) SWATH ship, USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23), designed as a platform for SURTASS towed array and Low Frequency Active (LFA), and 

a single leased vessel, the R/V Cory Chouest.” A U.S. Navy PowerPoint presentation entitled Naval Oceanography R&D Needs Presentation to CEROS Industry Day October 2008—authored by James Rigney, Naval 

Oceanographic Office, Chief Scientist (0TT), and Steve Lingsch, Naval Meteorology and Oceanography 

Command Assistant Chief of Staff Technology Transition and Integration (N9)—is available at <http://www.

ceros.org/documents/CEROS%20NAVMETOC%20Reqts-PPT_Version2.pdf>. It has a slide featuring the 

T-AGOS ships and states colorfully: “• 24/7/365 Acoustic surveillance of threat submarines and other contacts of interest • Positional information to Theater ASW Commanders and tactical forces • Persistent, fixed 

and mobile, long-range active and passive acoustic systems with key node redundancy and reach-back capability WE PUT THE CROSSHAIRS ON THREAT SUBMARINES!”

33Andrew S. Erickson and Michael Chase, “An Undersea Deterrent?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 135 (June 2009), 276, available at <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009-06/undersea-deterrent>, states: “Increasingly aggressive Chinese harassment of U.S. survey vessels came to a head on 8 

March when five Chinese ships surrounded the ocean surveillance ship USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23).... 

The Impeccable was operating in international waters 75 miles south of China’s new Yalong Bay submarine 

base on Hainan Island, prompting speculation that the Chinese actions represented a coordinated effort to 

dissuade the United States from monitoring China’s latest nuclear-powered submarines and their area of 

operations. According to Xiamen University South China Sea expert Li Jinming, ‘It is well known that the 

submarine base was established [at Hainan], so it is unacceptable for China to have the U.S. Navy snooping 

around so close.’ This incident suggests that Beijing may be particularly sensitive about U.S. activities in this 

region, in part because it appears poised to become the home base of China’s second generation of nuclearpowered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), the Type 094, or Jin-class.”

34The following report from the PLA Daily on the PLAN’s visits to foreign ports reflects emphasis 

on the goal of presenting China to Europe in a favorable light. The destroyer Guangzhou and replenishment 

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244 McVADON

ship Weishanhu returned to China in October 2007 from the PLAN’s third European voyage. Here is an exuberant, unedited extract from that homecoming report: “During its 86-day-long voyage, the task force sailed 

across three oceans and five sea areas and through 16 channels and canals, covering a total distance of 22,968 

nautical miles. During the tour, the task force paid friendly visits to Russia, Britain, Spain and France, participated in the activities for the ‘Year of China’ in Russia and successfully conducted joint military exercises 

with the British, Spanish and French naval forces. This is a new voyage of great historical significance, as it is 

the first time for the Chinese naval vessel task force to enter the Baltic Sea, the first time to visit Saint Petersburg Port, Port of Cadiz and Port of Toulon, the first time to take part in the activities for the ‘Year of China’ 

in Russia on behalf of China, the first time to conduct the joint military exercises with the British, Spanish 

and French naval forces in the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, the first time to carry out joint 

military exercise with an aircraft carrier, the first time to stage aerial defense operation map exercise with 

foreign troops and the first time to let multi-type foreign helicopters to take off and land on the Chinese ship. 

Through these seven ‘first times,’ the Chinese Navy has rewritten the history of its naval vessel task force’s 

foreign visit and long-voyage training, and presented a munificent gift to the 17th CPC National Congress.” 

Qian Xiaohu and Zhu Guangyao, “Chinese Naval Vessels Wrap Up European Visit and Long-voyage Training,” PLA Daily, October 19, 2007, available at <www.english.chinamil.com.cn>.

35The Western Pacific Naval Symposium is an undertaking initiated in 1988 for naval professionals 

and aims to increase naval cooperation in the Western Pacific by providing a forum for discussion of professional issues, generating a flow of information and opinion leading to common understanding. 

36Lu Desheng and Li Gencheng, “‘Xiangfan’ Returns in Triumph After Joining Maritime Exercise of 

WPNS,” PLA Daily (in English), May 24, 2007, available at <http://english.pladaily.com.cn/site2/news-channels/2007-05/24/content_825510.htm>.

37The first of two exercises that took place in 2006 coincided with the visit of a PLAN destroyer and 

oiler to Pearl Harbor and San Diego. This initial phase consisted of rudimentary communications and passing exercises off Hawaii, and a search and rescue exercise off Southern California. The second phase took 

place near China during the late 2006 visit there of U.S. Admiral Gary Roughead, who, at the time, commanded the U.S. Pacific Fleet and now heads the U.S. Navy as Chief of Naval Operations. “U.S. Pacific Fleet 

Commander Visits China,” Story Number: NNS061113-20, U.S. Pacific Fleet Public Affairs Navy Newsstand, November 13, 2006. Available at <http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=26570>.

38Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), “China-Russia: PRC Media on Sino-Russian Military Exercises Project Image of Converging Interests in Asia,” FEA20050831007588—FBIS Feature—1304 

GMT 31 Aug 05. FBIS published this analysis of the August 2005 Russian-Chinese exercise. It quotes the 

principal Chinese and Russian generals involved as saying the exercise represented “a major strategic decision of the Russian and Chinese leaders” aimed at deepening “strategic cooperative partnership,” said by the 

FBIS analyst as the phrase normally used to describe bilateral relations.

39This particular exercise included ships from the navies of Bangladesh, China, France, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. “Sea Phase of ‘Peace-07’ Exercises Ends,” 

Xinhuanet, March 12, 2007, available at <http://big5.cctv.com/english/20070312/101407.shtml>.

40U.S. Pacific Command Blog, April 21, 2009, available at <http://us-pacific-command.blogspot.

com/2009/04/us-navy-ship-joins-chinas-international.html>. 

41Toshu Noguchi, “PRC Navy’s Survey Operations Around Okinotori Island Increase by More Than 

Four Fold Over Last Year,” Sankei Shimbun, July 22, 2004. 

42Surveys include such activities as bathymetry, charting bottom features, and measuring the temperature structure of the water. For example, models of the water column in operating areas can aid in forecasting sonar performance and knowing in advance how to achieve detection of other submarines and to 

avoid being detected through positioning one’s own submarine with respect to layers of water of different 

temperatures that cause sound waves to refract. The importance of such data can be appreciated more fully 

when it is realized that the most prominent existing threat to carrier strike groups intervening in an attack 

on Taiwan is the PLAN submarine force. 

43James Boutilier, “Great Nations, Great Navies: Looking for Sea Room in Asia,” paper presented 

at the Conference “NATO-Russia Council: From Vladivostok to Vancouver” in Vladivostok, May 11, 2006, 

14; available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/other/ru/2006/060511/Presentation-by-Mr-Boutilier.pdf>. Dr. 

Boutilier is Special Advisor (Policy) in Canadian Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters. Incidentally, reflecting on the title of the paper on which this chapter is based (a title assigned by the PLA conference organizers), the following sentence was discovered by the author as he was researching the Boutilier paper: 

“Increasingly, the Chinese came to appreciate the value of their navy as a highly flexible and mobile instrument of statecraft.”

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 PLA NAVY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF STATECRAFT 245

44Declassified information obtained by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). “China’s Submarine Fleet Continues Low Patrol Rate,” Strategic Security 

Blog, available at <http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/02/post_2.php>. 

45Cole, “Beijing’s Strategy of Sea Denial.”

46For a submarine with the speed limitations inherent in diesel-electric or other nonnuclear submarine propulsion, the intercept is a challenge. The location of the carrier strike group (CSG) must be ascertained, and the submarine must then cope with the CSG’s course changes and potential to proceed at speeds 

well in excess of that possible for the submarine. And that is even harder to do quietly on battery power, without snorkeling or running on the surface using the noisy diesel engines to go faster. But this type of submarine in all modes is far slower than the roughly 30 knots the carrier may do to provide adequate wind over 

the deck for the launch of aircraft at heavy weights (full ordnance and fuel loads). It could have been luck, 

but the Song intercepted and remained unnoticed before surfacing about 5 miles away. Regardless of whether 

the Song intended to do so, it is a significant development for the PLAN to have a diesel-electric submarine 

make an undetected approach, although the carrier and its accompanying ships were reportedly not employing their submarine detection sensors (sonars on ship and submarine hulls or towed arrays, helicopters with 

dipping sonars, and aircraft dropping sonobuoy fields).

47It is also noteworthy to point out that there were a total of only five significant PLAN submarine 

patrols in the 3-year period between 2004 and 2006, and two of them surfaced. Forty percent of the PLAN 

submarine out-of-area patrols ended with a surfaced submarine and much visibility—not a record to brag 

about.

48For example, in the experience of the author, Soviet submarines often had difficulty with depth 

control and would broach—providing a remarkable photo-op for a P–3 aircrew that may have spent up to 8 

hours tracking the phantom sounds of a propeller, a generator, or a noisy pump through a seemingly empty 

ocean.

49It should also be mentioned that, although several classes of PLAN submarines pose this sort of 

threat, the Song ranks behind only the eight new quiet and capable Kilos obtained around 2005 from the Russians. These Kilos came complete with submerged-launch, supersonic, lethal, and evasive SS–N–27B Sizzler 

antiship cruise missiles with a maximum range of over 100 nautical miles. The message intended by the rapid acquisition of eight such highly capable Kilos seems to the author a muscular statement delivered without 

having to effect a clandestine rendezvous and surprise surfacing with a U.S. Navy carrier strike group. Nevertheless, perhaps some sort of Kilo saga similar to the Song-Kitty Hawk encounter is a chapter later to be 

added to this chronicle of PLAN submarine incidents.

50These ships have yet to join Task Force 151—an international flotilla that includes the United 

States, several European countries, and, later, the Republic of Korea and Japan—as full-fledged participants, 

though they have regularly communicated their actions with the task force. In May of 2011, the PRC naval 

attaché told this author that China disagreed with the Task Force tactic or practice of setting up a corridor 

in which ships would sail and expect not to be accosted by pirates. The PLA force preferred to escort ships 

through the area of danger from pirates. He accepted the author’s suggestion, using a sports analogy, that the 

Task Force employed zone coverage while the PLAN played man-to-man.

51A former PRC naval attaché in Washington once told this author that, despite speculation, there 

will be no foreign bases. They are too costly and do not work to protect the SLOCs (sea lines of communications). China, he said, seeks no long-range capability for its military. He opined that the only way to protect 

the sea lines is “international cooperation.” Additionally, Rear Admiral Yang Yi, formerly director of the PLA 

National Defense University’s Institute of Strategic Studies, told a U.S. Naval War College conference that 

China had “no bases and no places”—borrowing the expression from the U.S. Pacific Command in conveying that, unlike the United States, China did not intend to develop an overseas base structure or even have 

minor support facilities abroad.

52Office of [U.S.] Naval Intelligence, China’s Navy 2007, 112, available at <http://militarytimes.com/

static/projects/pages/20070313dnplanavy.pdf>. 

53This author has opined on numerous occasions that neither Beijing nor Washington has adequately pursued maritime cooperation efforts, even though such undertakings could help overcome bilateral tension and establish trust and confidence. For example, the author delivered a speech to a distinguished Beijing audience as recently as November 2009 advocating U.S.-China maritime cooperation with emphasis on 

combined humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. Given the frequency with which 

the Asia-Pacific region has experienced large-scale natural disasters, this is an opportunity to provide aid to 

victims and build better relations between the two navies—and other regional navies. This author’s speech 

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 245 11/29/11 12
246 McVADON

in Beijing entitled “The Promising Path of China-U.S. Maritime Cooperation: Inherently Valuable, Potentially Invaluable,” was delivered during the opening plenary session at the Eighth International Symposium 

on Sun Tzu’s Art of War. The full text of the speech is available from the author upon request. The speech 

was warmly received by foreigners in the audience but coolly by the Chinese, including senior PLA officers, 

pointing up the lack of trust and confidence in bilateral military relations. The author has also, directly and 

indirectly, urged U.S. Pacific Commanders over the last several years to pursue HA/DR exercises with the 

PLAN so that the Chinese will be comfortable in being part of a team with the U.S. Navy for a real HA/DR 

operation. The goals would be both to aid victims and build trust and confidence between the two navies—

establish habits of cooperation, as Admiral Blair termed it when he was Pacific Commander. With respect 

to U.S.-China naval and maritime cooperation, see Eric A. McVadon, “China and the United States on the 

High Seas,” China Security, Autumn 2007, available at <www.worldsecurityinstitute.org>. On HA/DR, see 

Eric A. McVadon, “Humanitarian Operations and U.S.-China Naval Cooperation: Prospects and Problems,” 

in Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and Nan Li, eds., Defining a Maritime Security Partnership with China

(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010); and also the Nelson Report of August 25, 2010, available from 

the author or from Chris Nelson at <cnelson@samuelsinternational.com>.

54Li Donghan, PLA Daily, October 9, 2007, available at <www.english.chinamil.com.cn>. 

55Office of [U.S.] Naval Intelligence, China’s Navy 2007, 113–117, available at <http://militarytimes.

com/static/projects/pages/20070313dnplanavy.pdf>. This document cites the following sources used in 

analysis: 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 PRC Defense White Papers; and interviews and various PLA Daily articles.

56Michael Mazza, “Chess on the High Seas: Dangerous Times for U.S.-China Relations,” AEI Outlook Series, no. 3 (August 2010), available at <http://www.aei.org/outlook/10098>. Mazza cites several sources on China’s internal stresses and weakness: Albert Keidel, “The Economic Basis for Social Unrest in China” (paper, Third European-American Dialogue on China, George Washington University, May 26, 2005), 

1; Thomas Lum, Social Unrest in China (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 8, 2006), 

1, accessed August 17, 2010, available at <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33416.pdf>; Perry Link, “Waiting for 

Wikileaks: Beijing’s Seven Secrets,” New York Review of Books, August 19, 2010, accessed August 20, 2010, at 

<www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/aug/19/waiting-wikileaks-beijings-seven-secrets>; and Kathy Le 

Mons Walker, “From Covert to Overt: Everyday Peasant Politics in China and the Implications for Transnational Agrarian Movements,” Journal of Agrarian Change 8, nos. 2 and 3 (April and July 2008), 467.

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Chapter 10

Informatization and the Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army Navy

Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase

Introduction

In recent years, the modernization of the PLA Navy (PLAN) has become a very high priority for China. Senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 

leaders and high-ranking military officers have emphasized the importance of 

naval modernization. Most prominently, CCP General Secretary, President, 

and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Hu Jintao in a December 

2006 speech to PLAN officers underscored the need to “endeavor to build a 

powerful People’s navy that can adapt to its historical mission during a new century and a new period.”1

 Similarly, PLAN Commander Wu Shengli and PLAN 

Political Commissar Hu Yanlin promoted the importance of naval modernization in an article that appeared subsequently in the authoritative CCP journal 

Seeking Truth (求事). According to Wu and Hu, “Since the reform and open 

door policy, along with the consistent increase of overall national strength, the 

oceanic awareness and national defense awareness of the Chinese people have 

been raised and the desire to build a powerful navy, strengthen the modern national defense and realize the great revitalization of China has become stronger 

than at any other time.”2

 Moreover, Wu and Hu contend, “To build a powerful 

navy is the practical need for maintaining the safety of the national sovereignty 

and maritime rights.”3

 High-level statements such as these appear intended to 

underscore the importance that China’s civilian and military leaders attach to 

the modernization of the PLAN.

This growing sense of urgency about naval modernization appears to 

be a function of increasing concern about maritime security issues, particularly Taiwan’s status, maritime resources, and energy security, with the most 

rapidly developing, high-intensity capabilities focused on the “Near Seas” (the 

Yellow, East China, and South China Seas), and their immediate approaches. 

Chinese naval modernization is focused partially, but by no means exclusively, on Taiwan. Most of the platforms China is acquiring are multimission platforms, and the PLAN is investing in capabilities like large amphibious ships 

and aircraft carriers, which are clearly much more relevant to other missions. 

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248 ERICKSON AND CHASE

Moreover, the comments of senior PLAN officers underscore the diversity of 

missions the PLAN must be ready to execute. For example, Wu and Hu emphasize that the PLAN must be prepared for a potential conflict over Taiwan.4

At the same time, however, they point out that the PLAN must be prepared for 

a wider range of missions, including the protection of maritime resources and 

energy security issues.5

 This reflects Hu Jintao’s concept of the Chinese military’s “New Historic Missions,” which was introduced at an expanded CMC 

conference on December 24, 2004.6

 In an attempt to transform Hu’s general 

guidance into more specific policy, articles in state and military media have 

argued that to safeguard China’s economic growth, the PLA must go beyond 

its previous mission of safeguarding national “survival interests” (生存利益) to 

protecting national “development interests” (发展利益).7

Hu has also stated specifically that the PLA must prepare for “military 

operations other than war” (MOOTW), such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and noncombatant evacuation operations 

(NEOs). As Hu stated in December 2008, “As we strengthen our ability to 

fight and win limited wars under informatized conditions, we have to pay 

even more attention to improving noncombat military operations capabilities.”8

 The PLAN’s participation in antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden 

since December 2008, its dispatch of a hospital ship to the Indian Ocean 

in summer 2010, and its involvement in the evacuation of Chinese citizens 

from Libya in February 2011 underscore its importance in fulfilling the “New 

Historic Missions.”

Indeed, these expanding combat operations and MOOTW missions 

drive the PLAN’s requirements, not only for the new platforms China is 

putting into service with the PLAN, but also for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 

capabilities to support their use in monitoring and—in a worst case scenario—

targeting foreign platforms on, under, and above the sea.

Within this context, enhancing the PLAN’s information technology (IT) and communications capabilities is seen as critical to the success of 

China’s overall naval modernization program. According to one recent article 

on the future of the PLAN, “The informatization of the shipboard weapons and 

equipment is the core of maritime joint combat . . . the Chinese Navy should 

vigorously build the data links for maritime military actions and fundamentally change the way to carry out tasks in the future.”9

 The ultimate goal is operations carried out by a “networked fleet.”10 Reaching this goal means narrowing 

the gap between the PLA and the world’s most advanced militaries through the 

development, acquisition, and integration of advanced information technology, which is one of the major goals of contemporary Chinese military reforms. 

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Central to this effort is the process of informatization (信息化), which is often 

billed as crucial to the modernization of the Chinese military. This emphasis 

on informatization derives from the expectation that the PLA must strengthen its preparation for local wars under informatized conditions. As part of 

China’s broader strategy of active defense, the PLA is “enhancing in an allround way its capabilities of defensive operations under conditions of informatization” to make sure “that it is well prepared for military struggle” and 

capable of “winning local wars under conditions of informatization.”11 This 

applies with particular force to the navy. According to the authors of the abovementioned article on the future of Chinese maritime power, “Informatized 

warfare is the mainstream trend in the development of future maritime wars.”12

PLA modernization is critical to China’s military competitiveness, and 

“informatization” is central to the PLA’s modernization. An explicit goal of the 

2006 Defense White Paper was to build informatized armed forces capable 

of winning informatized wars. In the view of the PLA, China has yet to fully 

exploit mechanized warfare, while it is now having to transform to the 

follow-on era of informatization. According to Beijing’s 2006 Defense White 

Paper, “China pursues a three-step development strategy in modernizing 

its national defense and armed forces, in accordance with the state’s overall 

plan to realize modernization. The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 

2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is to 

basically reach the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces 

and being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century.”13At the 17th Party Congress in October 2007, Chinese President Hu Jintao 

declared, “To attain the strategic objective of building computerized armed 

forces and winning IT-based warfare, we will accelerate composite development of mechanization and computerization, carry out military training 

under IT-based conditions, modernize every aspect of logistics, intensify our 

efforts to train a new type of high-caliber military personnel in large numbers 

and change the mode of generating combat capabilities.” The PLAN is at the 

center of this effort to achieve the informatization of the Chinese military. It 

“has published an entirely new set of revised guidance documents since the 

end of the 9th Five-Year Plan (1996–2000).”14 Since the beginning of this decade, 

the “Two Transformations” program has sought to implement this guidance 

by using informatization and mechanization to transform the PLAN, along 

with the rest of China’s military, from a posture that is personnel-intensive to 

one that is technology-intensive.15

This chapter explores PLAN informatization and its implications for command and control (C2) and joint operations. Drawing on a variety of Chineselanguage publications, it attempts to address the following key questions: 

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250 ERICKSON AND CHASE

■  How does the PLA define the concept of informatization, what does 

this mean for the PLAN, and how does it relate to the modernization 

of PLAN C2? 

■  How well can the PLAN currently connect sensors, C2, and weapons 

to get a clear picture of the battlefield and execute combat operations? 

■  What is the PLAN’s ability to conduct joint operations with other 

services?

■  What technical improvements is China’s navy likely to make over the 

next decade (e.g., space-based ocean surveillance, use of unmanned 

aerial vehicles, and better communications) and which capabilities 

would make the most difference for combat effectiveness?

■  Where does the PLAN currently fit in the spectrum between the U.S. 

and Russian C2 models?

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The first section surveys how the concept of “informatization” is defined in naval terms 

and how it relates to the modernization of PLAN C2. The second examines 

the PLAN’s current ability to connect sensors, C2, and weapons to get a clear 

picture of the battlefield and execute combat operations, as well as its ability 

to conduct joint operations with other services. The third section addresses 

the technical improvements likely to materialize over the next decade and the 

capabilities that would make the most difference for combat effectiveness. 

The fourth examines the training and education issues that are integral to 

PLAN informatization. The fifth section assesses the PLAN’s position on the 

spectrum between the U.S. and Soviet models of C2. The final section summarizes the key findings and highlights some possible areas for further research on 

naval informatization.

PLAN “Informatization”

The PLAN is modernizing to undertake an expanded set of missions 

in support of China’s national security interests. It is undergoing an impressive transformation from what was essentially a coastal defense force to a more 

offensively oriented force capable of executing a variety of regional missions. 

As part of this impressive modernization program, a number of new surface 

ships and submarines have entered service in recent years. China’s new surface ships include Russian-built Sovremenny guided-missile destroyers (DDGs) 

and indigenously developed Luzhou and Luyang I and II16 DDGs as well as 

Jiangkai I and II guided missile frigates (FFGs), in addition to Houbei-class 

wave-piercing missile catamarans. Among the PLAN’s new submarines are 

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Kilo-class submarines acquired from Russia and the domestically developed 

Shang nuclear-powered and Song and Yuan conventional attack submarines. 

With the addition of these new platforms, the PLAN is improving its surface 

warfare, undersea warfare, and air defense capabilities. The PLAN also appears 

poised to become an increasingly important part of China’s nuclear deterrence 

posture with the addition of several Type–094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which will be armed with JL–2 submarine-launched 

ballistic missiles (SLBMs). According to China’s 2006 Defense White Paper, the 

PLAN “aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive 

operations and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime operations and 

nuclear counterattacks.”17

China’s leaders perceive their nation to be confronting a strategic 

environment in which “Military competition based on informatization is 

intensifying.”18 This view both highlights the growing importance of information technology in military modernization and places a heavy premium on 

striving for information dominance in any future conflict, especially one with 

a technologically advanced adversary. Some Chinese analysts write about the 

role of information in a style reminiscent of U.S. publications that emphasize 

information superiority and extol the virtues of “network-centric warfare.”19 For 

example, according to one recent article by three researchers affiliated with 

the PLAN’s Dalian Ship Academy, “In the information age, information has 

become one of the main sources of combat power.”20 Consequently, as the 

authors of the 2006 version of Science of Campaigns emphasize, informatization 

permeates PLA doctrinal reform: “advancement of military ‘informatization’ 

construction and development of battle theories based on ‘informatization’ are 

currently the primary topics of discussion for national military construction and 

battle preparations.”21

The term “informatization” contains many concepts that are familiar 

both across Chinese writings and to similar Western characterizations:

■   information superiority

■  reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance

■   jamming and antijamming

■  networking and platform integration

■  space operations

■   joint operations and joint integration

■  sensor-to-shooter connectivity

■   electronic attack

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252 ERICKSON AND CHASE

■   autonomous operations

■  notions of speed, accuracy, security, and continuity of communications.

Although many PLA publications emphasize the importance of informatization, the term is not always defined explicitly and Chinese press 

coverage is sometimes vague.22 This complicates efforts to understand exactly 

what PLA authors mean when they use the term, and to determine how it 

applies to the modernization of the PLAN.

Fortunately, some Chinese authors do provide explicit definitions of informatization in their published work. For example, in a recent article, three 

researchers at the Dalian Ship Academy offer the following definition of naval 

informatization: 

The informatization of naval equipment refers to using information 

technology as the impetus, information networks as the foundation, and 

command automation as the core, effectively developing information 

resources, carrying out information transformation of every aspect and 

every link of naval equipment, and continuously promoting the “information ability” and “informatization level” of naval weaponry and 

equipment.23

This definition of naval informatization stresses hardware development and equipment modernization, but PLA writers conceive of naval 

informatization as a larger process that involves training and education as 

well as upgrading C4ISR systems and related military hardware. According to 

one recent article, “The Chinese Navy must establish the guiding principles to 

build digital troops and prepare for informatized combat, which is extremely 

important. In the crucial period of the military reform, what plays an effective role oftentimes is not technologies, but thinking and concepts. He who 

first understands is clear-sighted and he who moves ahead of others is in an 

advantageous position.”24 Nonetheless, from the perspective of many Chinese 

military authors, upgrading C4ISR hardware capabilities is clearly an essential 

component of narrowing the gap that separates the PLA from the world’s most 

technologically advanced militaries. 

PLAN C4ISR Systems

This section provides an overview of the PLAN’s current communications and ISR capabilities and offers some preliminary judgments about its 

ability to connect sensors and weapons. It also discusses some Chinese C4ISR 

and space systems developments that, while not PLAN-specific, have implications for maritime security and naval missions. 

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Given the Chinese military’s C4ISR shortcomings in the 1980s and 

1990s, the PLAN’s informatization drive started from a relatively weak 

position. For many years, the entire PLA, including the PLAN, faced major 

shortcomings in its C4ISR capabilities. As Mulvenon and Bickford observed 

in the late 1990s, the PLA had traditionally relied upon a telecommunications 

infrastructure that was “inadequate” and “outdated.” This weakness “severely 

limited the military’s ability to transmit and process large amounts of information or coordinate activities between the various Military Regions, thereby 

reducing military effectiveness.”25 The PLA also faced challenges when it came 

to modernizing its ISR architecture. Although China was capable of launching photoreconnaissance satellites, Chinese satellite imagery technology was 

“outdated by Western standards.”26 Moreover, the PLA’s situational awareness 

was hindered by China’s lack of a real-time photoreconnaissance capability.27

As of the late 1990s, therefore, C4ISR remained an area of substantial weakness for the PLA. As a U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) report published 

in 2000 pointed out, the PLA’s C2 capabilities were not capable of effectively 

supporting joint service operations.28

Despite these modest beginnings, Chinese C4ISR modernization has 

taken off since the late 1990s, when the PLA embarked on a massive effort to 

modernize, upgrade, and expand its communications infrastructure. This ambitious project was bolstered by the rapid development of the civilian information 

technology and telecommunications industries in China. One of the key results 

of the communications upgrade was the construction of a national fiber-optic 

communications network that provided the PLA with much greater communications capacity, higher reliability, and improved communications security.29

Near–real-time C4ISR is facilitated increasingly by China’s integrated 

Qu Dian military C4ISR system, which enables civilian and military leaders 

to communicate with forces in theater using secure fiber-optic cables, high 

frequency (HF) and very high frequency (VHF) communications and microwave systems, as well as related wireless networks and data links. According to 

China’s 2010 Defense White Paper, “The total length of the national defense 

optical fiber communication network has increased by a large margin, forming a new generation information transmission network with optical fiber 

communication as the mainstay and satellite and short-wave communications 

as assistance.”30 This system is regarded by some as the equivalent of the U.S. 

Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS); China has developed, 

and possibly deployed, a related Triservice Tactical Information Distributed 

Network (三军战术数据分发系统).31

The PLA is likewise making major strides in the development of its 

communications networks more generally. Indeed, the expansion of military 

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communications networks is a particularly noteworthy aspect of Chinese 

military modernization and one that has major implications for the informatization of the PLAN. The PLA reportedly has accelerated the development 

of its nationwide communications capabilities in recent years, devoting particular attention to diversifying the means of communication and enhancing 

security and antijamming capabilities.32 According to one source, “Firstly, in the 

coastal military commands, a gigantic optic-cable communication network has 

been set up, which guarantees the optic-cable communication among the headquarters of each military command. Meanwhile, satellite communication has 

been applied more widely, which ensures smooth communication between the 

top commanding organ and the headquarters at different levels of the military 

commands.”33 Chinese research institutes have also “developed a VSAT [very 

small aperture terminal] communication system consisting of mobile vehicleborne components” as well as new microwave and troposcatter communication 

systems, and China is also upgrading some of its traditional HF, VHF, and ultra 

high frequency (UHF) communication systems.34

Improving military computer networks and making them available to 

more and more units have been a particular priority for the PLA as it expands 

its communications networks, another key “informatization” development 

that has major implications for the PLAN. Indeed, recent reports indicate that 

all PLAN units at the division level and above are now connected to military 

computer networks, and that current plans focus on extending coverage to 

lower-level units.35

This appears to be the case throughout the PLAN. One recent article 

highlights the extent to which various PLAN units in the South Sea Fleet are 

being connected to the military’s computer networks: “. . . 100% of the divisions, brigades, and regiments under the South Sea Fleet aviation corps have 

successfully established their LANs [local area networks], while 92% of its 

companies have been connected to the military network. . . . all of the study 

rooms of units above regiment level have been connected to the comprehensive information network of the People’s Liberation Army [全军综合信息网].”36

In addition, the PLAN is improving the capabilities of its ocean 

survey vessels and reconnaissance ships, which are responsible for a number 

of tasks, such as surveying, gathering meteorological and hydrographic information, laying and repairing undersea cable, and collecting various types 

of intelligence. For example, one article on the South Sea Fleet’s survey and 

reconnaissance ships states that they have “continually raised the level of unit 

informatization building and brought about an historic leap forward in informatized support capabilities including electronic reconnaissance, sea survey, 

and cable laying on the sea floor.”37 More specifics are offered by another article 

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on reconnaissance ships subordinate to the North Sea Fleet, which in recent 

years have “successively introduced advanced equipment such as fathometers, monitoring and scanning sonar, and gravity and magnetic surveying 

devices, transforming traditional manual survey operations . . . enhancing the 

accuracy and effectiveness of surveys, and reducing the cycle of data processing and chart creation.”38

Finally, PLAN researchers believe that refitting older weaponry and 

equipment with modern information technology greatly increases its combat 

effectiveness. Among the benefits of this approach are that it is quick and relatively inexpensive.39 For example, the PLAN apparently views minesweepers 

equipped with “torpedo” mines as a viable ASW platform that illustrates the 

potential for “old equipment + networks + talent” to “thoroughly convince” 

those who believe that “it is not possible to establish a platform for informatized exercises on old equipment.”40 On the other hand, this approach could 

risk a situation in which the PLAN ends up with a hodgepodge of equipment, 

some of which does not suit its requirements.

To improve both its nonterrestrial networks and the data available on 

all networks, Beijing has also intensified its efforts to improve its space-based 

C4ISR capabilities. Indeed, China began an ambitious manned space program, started participating in a variety of international space partnerships, and 

moved forward with several military space programs.41

Space-based ISR and communications capabilities have been at the forefront of this transformation of the PLA’s C4ISR architecture. Chinese military 

strategists view space operations as vital components of joint campaigns in 

informatized local wars.42 For the PLA, as Dean Cheng points out, space is “as 

vital a battlefield as any on earth.”43 According to the authors of The Science of 

Campaigns, 

Future anti–air raid campaigns will be conducted with highly informationized weapons and equipment. The information system, as a main 

body of an integrated C4ISR system and an important information source 

and information channel, plays a decisive role in confrontations in the 

information sphere. Information confrontational activities for seizing information superiority, such as reconnaissance and anti-reconnaissance, 

jamming and anti-jamming, destruction and anti-destruction, will penetrate through the entire process of operations and become important 

contents of anti–air raid campaigns.44

Consequently, according to DOD, “China has accorded building a 

modern ISR architecture a high priority in its comprehensive military modernization, in particular the development of advanced space-based C4ISR 

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and targeting capabilities.”45 China is developing space-based ISR systems 

such as remote-sensing satellites, advanced imagery satellites, and electronic 

intelligence (ELINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) satellites.46 China 

can also purchase commercial imagery products to supplement its current 

reconnaissance capabilities.47

The PLA is leveraging the PRC’s dynamic commercial information 

technology (IT) sector to accelerate the modernization of its C4ISR capabilities. According to a recent RAND study, China’s IT sector is likely “the 

most organizationally innovative and economically dynamic producer of 

equipment for China’s military.”48 Even though Chinese IT companies are 

oriented mainly toward domestic and international commercial IT markets, 

“the PLA has been able to effectively leverage certain IT products to improve 

the military’s command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence 

(C4I) capabilities—a critical element of the PLA’s modernization efforts.”49

Space-based C4ISR developments are particularly crucial for naval informatization, especially given the PLAN’s evolving missions. Indeed, an increase 

in Chinese naval capability from antiaccess/antiarea denial (A2/AD) in the Near 

Seas to regional blue-water operations and power projection in the Far Seas will 

hinge in part on improvements in aerospace capabilities, especially air/spacebased platforms and C4ISR. Despite major imbalances in its development, by 

the end of the Cold War China had become the first developing country to 

achieve comprehensive aerospace capabilities. While China still suffers from 

some challenges, particularly in its aviation sector, it appears to be making rapid, 

comprehensive progress in producing advanced aerospace platforms. This in 

turn affords China an increasing range of military operational possibilities.

China has developed a full range of military, civilian, and dual-use 

satellites of various mission areas and sizes. Remote-sensing satellites include the Fengyun–1D and –3A weather satellites, with their visible, IR, and 

microwave imaging. Advanced imagery satellites include the Yaogan 2–11 

high resolution synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) and electro-optical military 

satellites. The CBERS–2 and –2B near real-time electro-optical satellites, with 

2.7-meter resolution, are also used for military observation. China possesses 

dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites.50 An independent global positioning 

system and data relay satellites are essential components of a robust ISR 

system. According to Chinese media, the PLA is now using such satellites as 

Beidou–4 and Tianlian–1 for, respectively, positioning and data relay (transmission of inputs from sensors beyond line-of-sight from Chinese ground 

stations).51 Other Beidou navigation satellites and space remote-sensing technologies also enhance precision strike capabilities, with the General Armament 

Department’s (GAD’s) Survey and Mapping Bureau given particular credit.52

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The Fenghuo–1 communications satellite and its identically-named follow-on 

may likewise support military operations.53 China’s approximately 15 reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical, multi- and hyper-spectral, 

and radar, especially synthetic-aperture radar.

Navigation and positioning has been a major area of emphasis with implications for military modernization and the informatization of the PLAN. 

Satellite navigation facilitates the monitoring of friendly forces and the targeting 

of enemy forces by offering reliable positioning signals. It supports C2 by 

providing basic communications functions. At present, China uses the U.S. GPS 

and Russia’s GLONASS satellite navigation systems as well as its own indigenous Beidou satellite navigation system.54 Beijing has had only limited access 

to receiver technology and was denied access to the military mode of Europe’s 

nascent Galileo system, apparently intensifying existing Chinese efforts to 

develop Beidou further.55 Unlike those of GPS, Beidou users receive signals from 

broadcasts from a ground station, not directly from the satellites.56

China deployed its own three-satellite Beidou-1 navigation constellation in 2007, but it is limited to providing service from 70 to 140 degrees east 

longitude and from 5 to 55 degrees north latitude and navigation coverage 

accurate to within ~20 meters. This enables Beidou–1 to support operations 

on China’s immediate maritime Near Seas, but not farther afield. To ensure 

reliable independent access in the future, and to support broader operations, 

China is deploying a 35-satellite (5 geostationary, 30 medium earth orbit) constellation—called Beidou-2/Compass (北斗卫星导航定位系统)—that would 

provide much-improved accuracy, with regional navigation and communications coverage anticipated by 2011 and global navigation and communications 

coverage by 2015–2020.57 Eight satellites have been launched thus far; five remain fully operational. 

Maritime observation satellites are another area of particular interest 

from the perspective of naval informatization. China’s first series of dedicated maritime monitoring satellites is administered by the State Oceanic 

Administration (SOA). China launched its first maritime observation satellite, Haiyang-1A, on May 15, 2002. This satellite, which monitored ocean water 

color and temperature, had military applications; an official publication 

states that 12 percent of Haiyang-1A’s 2003 “satellite data distribution” was 

“military.”58 Haiyang (HY)–1B was launched in April 2007 to survey the Near 

Seas. Fully operational versions are scheduled to follow: HY–1C, –1D, and –2A 

in 2011, and HY–3 in 2012.59 A total of 15 further Haiyang ocean monitoring 

satellites are planned in three sets. 

Likewise relevant to maritime surveillance will be China’s Huanjing

disaster/environmental monitoring constellation, envisioned to contain 11 

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satellites capable of visible, IR, multi-spectral, and SAR imaging. Two initial 

satellites in the series, Huanjing–1A and –1B, provide real time multi- and 

hyper-spectral imaging respectively, to a resolution of 30 meters. Huanjing–1C 

and –1D are reportedly scheduled for launch in 2011. 

China uses a variety of other satellites to link these sensors to shooters, and to support related network functions in real time. Its first data 

relay satellite, Tianlian–1, facilitates near-real-time communication between 

satellites and ground control, complementing China’s more than 10 ground 

stations and 4 operating Yuanwang space event support ships. Tianlian–2 

will reportedly be launched in June 2011. 

Satellite surveying and mapping are close to real time in capability. This 

is being exploited by a variety of services, including the PLAN. One South 

Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedly combat-relevant “Stipulated Technical 

Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Mapping.”60

Trends in C4ISR Research and Development

This section addresses technical improvements that are likely over the 

next decade and assesses their potential implications for PLAN operations.

“China has the most active land-based ballistic and cruise missile program in the world,”61 the 2010 DOD report emphasizes. As part of this larger 

missile-centric approach, China has been developing the capability to target 

U.S. ships with ballistic missiles based on the DF–21D medium-range antiship ballistic missile (ASBM). Top U.S. Navy officials state that China’s ASBM 

has reached the equivalent of initial operational capability (IOC). While the 

exact details remain uncertain, both U.S. officials and the director-general of 

Taiwan’s National Security Bureau state that China has already begun to 

deploy the DF–21D.62

If supplied with accurate real-time target data, China’s growing family of 

radar reconnaissance and electro-optical surveillance satellites, terminal radar 

seekers, and maneuvering warheads could enable Chinese ballistic missiles to 

complicate or negate U.S. ballistic missile defense efforts and seriously threaten targets such as airbases and aircraft carriers. If these Chinese systems work 

effectively in practice as a “system of systems,” they would be extraordinarily 

difficult to defend against. 

Chinese researchers emphasize the importance of linking platforms 

together into an integrated whole, suggesting that this will continue to be a 

major focus of defense research and development (R&D) programs. This is 

considered particularly important for the PLAN. According to one recent 

article, “A platform-centric navy cannot bring into full play the potentials of its 

sensors and weapons,” but “effective networks formed with multiple platforms 

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and multiple sensors can enable the resources of military strength to grow 

steadily” and “resource sharing among various platforms and coordinated allocation of the resources of all operational forces can enable the currently available 

resources of military strength to be fully utilized.”63 According to another technical journal article, “In order to effectively fuse all C4ISR system elements and 

achieve a seamless connection from sensors to shooters it is necessary to solve 

the problems of data integration.”64 Publications such as these suggest that networking sensors and data fusion are two topics of particular interest to Chinese 

researchers and are likely to enjoy high priority in the next few years.

Unmanned reconnaissance systems are another area of strong emphasis in Chinese C4ISR-related research and development. Indeed, 

recent technical journal publications indicate that Chinese scientists 

and engineers are conducting research on various types of unmanned 

aerial vehicles (UAVs).65 China is purchasing foreign models, transforming 

former piloted aircraft into unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), and 

developing indigenous variants. This is an area of particular emphasis and 

investment for China; more than 25 UAV prototypes or models were on 

display at Airshow China 2010 in Zhuhai, up from 12 in 2008. Chinese researchers are also working on unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). For example, 

one recent article by PLAN researchers addresses the sonar capabilities of 

remotely operated vehicles (ROVs).66 Such vehicles could have applications in 

ISR and a number of other maritime warfare mission areas.

Digitization of sea charts has also been emphasized.67 The National 

Institute for South China Sea Studies, for instance, has produced China’s first 

“Digital South China Sea” chart. Extensively tested, it reportedly brings the 

PLAN’s charts to international standards and will support its voyages.68

PLAN Training and Education: Preparing for Informatized War at Sea 

Chinese planners realize that rapid improvements in the PLAN’s hardware will not be fully effective without corresponding increases in the ability 

of its personnel to operate it under realistic combat conditions.69 This requires 

the PLAN to make corresponding improvements in training and education.70

In keeping with recent PLA-wide guidance from the General Staff Department that stresses making exercises more realistic and challenging, the PLAN 

has emphasized making sure that training approximates the actual battlefield 

environment as much as possible. Official sources indicate that the PLAN has 

made a considerable amount of progress in making training more rigorous.71

Citing President Hu Jintao’s instructions that military training “must be 

raised to a new level through making innovations,” a recent article in People’s 

Navy (人民海军), the PLAN’s official newspaper, elaborates, “We should more 

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intensively and extensively carry out battle training, and take battle training in 

an authentic environment and in a complicated battlefield situation as a basic 

form of conducting campaign and tactical exercises so as to enhance the naval units’ adaptability in sea battles under the condition of informatization.”72

Similarly, China’s 2006 National Defense White Paper states: “The PLA conducts training in strict accordance with the requirements for winning local 

wars under conditions of informatization” and “takes vigorous steps to accelerate the transition from military training under conditions of mechanization 

to military training under conditions of informatization.”73 Some of these steps 

include training to fight in an electronic warfare (EW) environment, conducting more realistic opposing forces training, increasing the use of modeling and 

simulation, and training for joint operations.

Chinese sources frequently highlight the importance of conducting 

training under “complex electromagnetic conditions” so that Chinese forces will be prepared to conduct operations in an environment characterized 

by jamming and electronic attacks. For example, a January 2007 press report 

states: “Starting this year, units from across the entire Army have brought military training in a complex electromagnetic environment into line with the 

military training outline to ensure that it becomes a part of training and educational practices and making it required training, learning, and testing content 

during the units’ training and in the education of the academies and schools.”74

In September 2007, for example, North Sword 0709 involved 2,000 soldiers 

equipped with electronic devices that beamed real-time battlefield data back to 

headquarters.75 The PLAN is also implementing this guidance, as highlighted 

by recent articles in People’s Navy.

76

Training to conduct operations in a complex electromagnetic environment includes a variety of topics, such as jamming, electronic attacks, reconnaissance, and electronic deception. For example, a June 2007 North Sea Fleet 

(NSF) exercise reportedly incorporated several of these subjects.77 The PLAN 

is also conducting opposing forces training featuring “Blue Force” detachments 

playing the role of enemy units as part of its drive to improve training for future 

informatized conflicts.78 The PLAN is also making extensive use of modeling 

and simulation to enhance training. As one recent article put it, “We should 

use computer networks, simulation, and virtual reality technology extensively 

to develop advanced training means and to promote simulation, base, and network training.”79 Indeed, the PLA’s official newspapers are replete with articles 

that highlight the employment of modeling and simulation in PLAN exercises. 

For example, a recent Liberation Army Daily article highlights the PLAN’s use 

of simulation to improve surface warfare training.80 In addition, the PLAN is 

using simulations to enhance submarine force training.81 The use of simulations reportedly allows units to increase their training efficiency.82

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Another area of emphasis for the PLAN is joint training. This reflects 

the conclusion that the Chinese military will have to fight jointly in future conflicts. According to one recent article in the PLAN’s official newspaper, “As 

profound changes take place in the form of war, future warfare will be integrated joint operations under informatized conditions. Training is the rehearsal 

for war, and what kind of a war we fight determines what kind of training we 

should conduct.”83 Numerous recently published articles highlight the PLAN’s 

joint training activities.84 Some of these joint exercises have focused specifically 

on communications capabilities.85

The PLAN’s participation in joint exercises like these depends on military computer networks that connect all of the services. Another article in 

the PLAN newspaper relates the details of a March 2006 “online joint training” exercise: “Yesterday morning, a group of commanders and staff officers 

gathered at the operation command center of a certain group army of the 

Guangzhou Military Region. Through computers, they synchronized their 

actions with commanders of numerous navy, army, and air force units several 

hundreds of kilometers away. . . .”86

Personnel 

“In the course of promoting the change of the Navy’s military training 

system from a condition of mechanization to a condition of informatization,” a 

major PLAN directive emphasizes, “a critically important factor . . . is the quality of our personnel.”87 In order to make “training more technology-intensive 

and innovative,”88 therefore, the PLAN is making substantial efforts to better 

manage and educate existing personnel and recruit new ones with improved 

skills. This requires the PLAN “to adopt a set of standards and mechanisms 

for selecting, promoting, training, using, appraising, awarding, and punishing 

staff personnel in the light of the informatization requirements. . . .”89 Across 

the PLA, China’s 2010 Defense White Paper maintains,

strategic planning, leadership and management of informatization have 

been strengthened, and relevant laws, regulations, standards, policies and 

systems further improved. A range of measures, such as assembly training and long-distance education, have been taken to disseminate knowledge on information and skills in applying it. Notable achievements have 

been made in the training of commanding officers for joint operations, 

management personnel for informatization, personnel specialized in 

information technology, and personnel for the operation and maintenance of new equipment. The complement of new-mode and high-caliber military personnel who can meet the needs of informatization have 

been steadily enlarged.90

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Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that this remains a difficult challenge.

Major efforts are underway to ensure that PLAN personnel are able to 

operate their increasingly sophisticated equipment effectively. To address 

discrepancies between the technical specialties of its personnel and the new 

demands to which they are subjected operationally, a South Sea Fleet Reconnaissance Ship Group “arranged for concerned specialists to go to scientific 

research organizations for study and development.” Each year, the group “earmarks nearly 100,000 Yuan for ‘major rewards’ to personnel for outstanding 

accomplishments in scientific research and military training. It also allocated 200,000 Yuan to set up an ‘on-the-job personnel development fund’ to pay 

tuition and travel expenses for officers and soldiers engaged in self-study 

and examinations.”91 To facilitate training involving increasingly complex 

missiles, torpedoes, and sea mines, a South Sea Fleet base brought skilled civilians from their factories of origin to help “guide and assist.”92 The PLAN strives 

to improve informatization training even for crews of its older platforms, such 

as East Sea Fleet Jianghu-class frigate Wuxi (Hull 512).93 A new Ship Captain 

Training Center at Lushun Naval Base, which trains captains of minesweepers 

and other smaller vessels, is emphasizing training in “informatization, networking [网路化], and integration....”94

As for recruitment, the PLAN, as “one of the high-tech-intensive military services . . . urgently needs a large number of high-quality non-commissioned officers with modern science and technology backgrounds and with 

the ability to skillfully operate modern weapons and armaments.”95 The PLA’s 

Strategic Project for Talented People, implemented by the Central Military 

Commission in 2003, seeks to prepare future PLA officers and the forces 

under their command for informatized war.96 According to a Taiwanese report, 

since 1999 this program has “given scholarships of 5,000 Yuan per year [$625 

at 2007 exchange rates] to outstanding students in information engineering 

related programs at Qinghua and Beijing Universities.” Following graduation, 

the students reportedly serve at an “All-Army Network Technology Research 

Center” (全军网络技术研究中心). During winter break in 2000, apparently, 

more than 40 scholarship recipients practiced at the Research Center and over 

300 “network assassins” currently work there.97

Education 

As part of a project for establishing key military educational institutions 

during the 11th Five-Year Plan period, the PLAN “continues to focus efforts on 

building a number of institutions and research centers for disciplines and specialties that are important in building an informationized military and winning 

informationized wars.”98 Transformation of teaching materials has reportedly 

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become the “top priority of all priorities” for many of these institutions. In 

this regard, the PLAN Command Academy has “actively made explorations 

and fruitful experiments, continuously updated the contents of the teaching 

materials, improved the teaching material system, and enhanced the level of 

teaching material development.”99 In addition to these high-level initiatives, a 

variety of measures are afoot to ensure that more PLAN personnel are provided with opportunities for further education through everything from special 

classes to libraries and local area networks with educational materials.

Remaining Challenges 

Despite the aforementioned improvements, according to Rear Admiral 

Yang Yi, “The Chinese military has still not completely achieved mechanization, and we are even farther from establishing an informatized force.”100

According to a major PLAN commentary,

At present, the simulation devices used by naval units in their military 

training on the whole cannot satisfy the actual military training needs 

and still lag behind the development of armament. The insufficiency of 

simulation training devices has become a major “bottleneck” that restrains efforts to build fighting capacity in naval units. In practical training, it is hard for us to simulate a strong “blue force,” but things may be 

completely different on the network platforms. The attacks there seem to 

be more authentic.101

The use of local area networks in naval education, for instance, has been 

impeded by lack of familiarity with the demands of informatization, challenges 

of network management and maintenance, concerns regarding information security, and the desire of some higher-ranking officers to monopolize access to 

information.102 According to Ren Xiao, associate dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, “although rapid progress is being made in 

various aspects of the PLA building, because of the comparatively weak foundation and low starting point for modernization and the incomplete condition 

of mechanization, the process of informatization in the PLA remains at an initial stage, and the modernization level still lags substantially behind that of the 

world’s military powers.”103 Articles in People’s Navy also acknowledge that the 

ability of PLAN personnel to implement reforms effectively remains a major 

constraint on informatization efforts.104 It is important to recognize, however, 

that People’s Navy often serves a didactic function to call attention to areas that 

need improvement. This in no way constitutes a self-assessment by the PLAN 

that implies despair at improving the situation. Indeed, there have been great 

improvements in recent years, albeit from a relatively low baseline by Western 

standards.

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Implications for Joint Operations and C2

This section analyzes the implications of PLAN informatization. The first 

part of the section addresses the implications for the PLAN’s ability to conduct 

joint operations. The second focuses on the implications for the C2 system.

Naval Informatization and Joint Operations 

Numerous recent PLA publications emphasize the importance of joint 

campaigns and joint operations.105 In The Science of Campaigns, for example, 

the authors describe joint campaigns as “the primary form of future warfare.”106

PLAN publications also consistently emphasize the growing importance of 

joint operations, which many authors connect to the challenges of informatized operations in a complex battlefield environment. According to one article 

on the modernization of Chinese naval power, “under informatized conditions 

the structure of the equipment for the ships has been changed and the electronic systems have become a main component for the weapons and equipment. ... 

the battlefield environment has changed, and operation assurance is facing the 

challenge of the complex electro-magnetic environment. . . . integrated joint 

operations have become the main operational pattern.”107

Chinese military authors define joint campaigns as campaigns that 

involve the participation of two or more services, and in which all participating forces operate under the direction of a joint campaign command. 

According to The Science of Military Strategy, for instance, “The strategic coordination refers to the coordinated and concerted actions taken according to 

the tasks, space and time by different strategic groups and different services 

and arms carrying out strategic tasks so as to realize the overall strategic aim.” 

Strategic coordination of this type is the responsibility of the strategic command 

authorities.108 The writings on joint campaigns imply the equivalence of all of 

the participating services. This is potentially controversial in a military traditionally dominated by the ground forces. In Dean Cheng’s words, this 

emphasis on the equality of the services in joint campaigns marks a “fundamental and major shift in PLA culture.”109 

Joint operations and informatization are expected to play a prominent 

role in a variety of campaigns in which the PLAN might be called to participate. 

Chapter 12 of The Science of Campaigns, “Joint Blockade Campaign,” for instance, 

emphasizes the need to achieve objectives rapidly in a complex battle environment by jointly implementing an air, maritime, and information blockade.110 The 

last entails “actively destroy[ing] the enemy’s important ground information installations, disrupt[ing] the enemy’s satellite and radio channels, cut[ting] off the 

enemy’s submarine cables and cable channels . . . [and] smashing the enemy’s 

information warfare capability.”111 In an antiair raid campaign, it is also thought 

necessary to “apply all kinds of information attack operational weapons and 

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equipment to jam, suppress, damage, and destroy the enemy air raid information 

system.”112 In “Offensive Campaigns Against Coral Island Reefs,”

It is essential to synthesize the use of the various means of reconnaissance, and establish a perfected intelligence and reconnaissance architecture [情报侦察体系] in order to provide real-time intelligence [实时

情报] for campaign operational activities. Furthermore, it is essential to: 

synthesize the use of multiple signals connectivity measures; establish a 

single organic vessel-, aircraft-, island- and shore signals network body; 

hold in reserve signals troops as well as a specified quantity of spare 

signals materials parts; and safeguard the speed, accuracy, secrecy and 

continuity of campaign communications.113

Joint campaigns require joint campaign command structures, which 

are responsible for coordinating service activities in pursuit of the overall 

campaign objectives. According to Dean Cheng, the chief roles of the joint 

campaign command are “resolving issues of timing, phasing, and various other aspects of coordination.”114 According to the Science of Military Strategy, the 

command and communications systems of troops under the same command 

or participating in coordinated operations must be interoperable.115 Technical 

interoperability of C4ISR assets is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 

the development of joint operational capabilities.

The PLA is clearly striving to develop the capability to plan and conduct 

joint campaigns, but Chinese authors suggest that it is still in the preliminary 

stages of “jointness.” Dean Cheng highlights a 2002 Liberation Army Daily

article in which the author characterizes the achievement of a true joint 

operations capability as a three-stage process. In the first stage, considered 

preliminary joint training, there are three unbroken eggs in a bowl. In the 

second stage, which is characterized as limited joint training, the three eggs are 

broken. It is only in the third stage, however, that the eggs are mixed together and all-around joint training is achieved. The article implies that the PLA is 

still relatively early in this process, though it aspires to move forward so that it 

will ultimately be able to conduct the more sophisticated types of joint training and operations.116 Nonetheless, it is important to highlight that Chinese 

writings on joint campaigns focus on achieving jointness at the operational 

level, rather than jointness at the tactical level as practiced by U.S. forces. 

Furthermore, as ONI noted in its 2009 report on Chinese naval modernization, 

“Emphasis on jointness has been noted in exercises, professional education, 

and logistical planning, yet significant challenges still exist. Progress continues 

to be hampered by a decades-old domination of the Chinese military by the 

army, which remains at many levels.”117

The PLA still faces several potential problems, many of them bureaucratic and institutional. Perhaps the most important of these is a highly 

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centralized and hierarchical command structure and organizational culture 

that is averse to delegating decisionmaking authority to lower levels, much 

less junior officers and NCOs. Another potential roadblock is institutional resistance and bureaucratic opposition resulting from the tendency of joint 

campaigns to emphasize the importance of the PLAN, PLA Air Force (PLAAF), 

and Second Artillery and to downplay the traditional dominance of the army. 

The Chinese military has recognized that organizational reforms and changes 

in command structure are required to support the conduct of joint operations. Achieving these changes will require overcoming institutional resistance. 

Developing a manual (gangyao118) for joint operations, an accomplishment 

almost 10 years in the making, was just the beginning of what will probably be a 

long and difficult process of reorganization and institutional change.

Still another challenge is the PLA’s almost total lack of real experience 

conducting joint operations (the only historical example being the relatively small-scale Yijiangshan campaign in 1955; the rest of the PLA’s warfighting 

experiences were at most combined arms campaigns).119 As the 2006 DOD 

report on Chinese military power points out, “Although the PLA has devoted 

considerable effort to developing joint capabilities, it faces a persistent lack of 

interservice cooperation and a lack of actual experience in joint operations.”120

Finally, the PLA faces the challenges of undertaking so many major changes 

simultaneously.121 In short, the PLA will likely encounter a variety of challenges as it moves forward with the development of joint operations capabilities.122

Nevertheless, the PLA has already made considerable progress and is clearly 

determined to further enhance its ability to conduct joint operations. 

Recent publications suggest that at least some in the PLA believe China 

will eventually need to reach a level of integration comparable to the level of 

“jointness” in the U.S. military. According to one article by a student at the PLA’s 

National Defense University, “All of the ground, air, naval, space, electromagnetic and other forces must be blended together and this system must be organized 

by tasks, not by services or space. The combat forces of the various services and 

branches must be mixed together to a high degree.”123 Such a level of integration 

would require an interoperable communications system that links the ground 

forces, PLAAF, PLAN, Second Artillery,124 and a “continuous command decision-making process” [连续的指挥决策 过程], rather than a “coordinated joint 

operations command process based on running around in circles” [循环往复的

协同性联合作战指挥过程].125

Naval Informatization and the C2 System 

In addition to informatization’s effect on the PLAN’s ability to conduct 

joint operations with the other services, the introduction and integration of advanced information technology is also likely to influence the PLAN’s approach 

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to command and control (C2). The PLA has a tradition of highly centralized 

command. This tradition derives from a variety of sources, including the 

political system, institutional culture, and organizational structure.

Chinese scholars argue that the PLA’s general staff organizational 

structure is conducive to centralized C2. According to Peng Guangqian and 

Yao Youzhi, two major generals with significant ability to shape PLA strategy as advisers to China’s powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) and 

Politburo Standing Committee, “The form of general staff is beneficial to the 

centralized command and control of the troops.”126 Moreover, for the PLA, 

unity of command historically has meant centralization of command. Mao 

emphasized centralizing the decisionmaking responsibility in the hands of a 

small number of senior leaders or even one person.127 This tradition appears 

to have considerable staying power. According to Peng and Yao, for example, 

“All the decision-making power and command authority on issues concerning 

the overall war situation should be centralized to the strategic commander and 

the strategic commanding authorities.”128 Moreover, they write, “No services 

and arms or units shall be allowed to change the operational objectives and 

operational plans specified by the strategic commander and the strategic commanding authorities without authorization.”129

Given the PLA’s long tradition of centralized command, it seems entirely possible that China will choose to use its improved C4ISR capabilities 

to make centralized command function more efficiently and effectively. 

Chinese authors have certainly recognized the potential of enhanced communications capabilities to enable higher-echelon decisionmakers to function 

more effectively. For example, Peng and Yao argue that advances in information 

and communications technology have “significantly enhanced the efficiency of 

strategic command.”130

High-bandwidth secure communications, for instance, allow strategic 

leaders to transmit plans and other operational documents electronically in 

real-time and hold videoconferences with their subordinates instead of traveling to the front for face-to-face meetings. According to Peng and Yao: “Under 

high-tech conditions and with the aid of the strategic command automation 

system, the form of assigning strategic tasks orally, realized only face to face in 

the past, can now be actualized between different places, and assigning strategic tasks in the past by written operations documents can now be completed 

through computer network in real time.”131 Specifically, they add, “Practices 

[have] proved that the very strict system of reports and requests for instructions was a very effective method of the PLA to conduct strategic supervision 

and inspection.”132 “Under modern conditions,” therefore, “special attention 

should be paid to making use of the high-tech strategic command automation 

system to conduct the supervision and inspection.”133

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Supervision and inspection are not supposed to degenerate into meddling for its own sake, however. The purpose of supervision and inspection 

activities is to make sure that the actions of the PLA’s combat units accord with 

the commander’s strategic intent. “It can be said that conducting strict and 

scientific supervision is one of the good traditions of the PLA in its strategic 

command. And this good tradition is still of great significance to the strategic 

command under high-tech conditions.”134

There are also strong incentives to consider decentralizing authority, 

at least to some extent. Indeed, notwithstanding the strong emphasis on the 

role of the strategic commander and the centralized command system, PLA 

writers suggest that strategic decisionmakers should not attempt to micromanage activities at the tactical and operational levels. According to Peng and 

Yao, “The strategic commander has command and control authority over all 

military troops up from the strategic operational groups down to the units and 

elements. However, due to the high level of strategic command, it is neither 

necessary nor possible for the strategic commander to closely command and 

control all the details of all the armed forces’ operations.”135

Having more information at higher echelons is not necessarily better; 

huge amounts of data may simply overwhelm strategic commanders. As Peng 

and Yao write: “Under the high-tech conditions, the glut and overload of strategic information have increased to a large extent the difficulties of strategic 

judgment . . . it’s not an easy job to retrieve and pick out valuable strategic 

information when the total sum of strategic information has greatly increased.” 

Furthermore,

the high-tech means of reconnaissance, intelligence and communication 

can blow away to a certain extent the traditional “fog of war,” but at the 

same time they can change the manifestation of uncertainty in war, thus 

adding a new “fog of war.” Therefore, under the high-tech conditions, 

making sound strategic judgment demands dealing effectively with the 

information overflow, and processing and utilizing the information in a 

scientific way.136

Centralized command does not mean that strategic commanders should 

micromanage operations or that lower-level commanders should never take 

the initiative in response to a rapidly evolving situation on the battlefield. As 

Peng and Yao put it:

Emphasizing the centralized unity of command does not necessarily 

mean that the strategic commander and the commanding authorities 

can interfere in and even run the whole show of his subordinates’ command. In the course of conducting the strategic command, the strategic 

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commander and his commanding authorities should permit and encourage, under the prerequisite of not infringing the overall strategic 

intention, the junior commanders to give full play to their subjective 

initiative and creatively fulfill their operations tasks.137

Moreover, “If flexibility is pursued without due consideration for the 

overall situation or each goes his own way on the pretext of flexibility, the cooperation and coordination of the overall strategic situation shall be affected, and 

the smooth realization of the whole strategic plan shall be affected and even 

undermined. Therefore, to conduct highly efficient strategic command, high 

unity of the initiative, the flexibility and the planning must be persisted in.”138

Wartime emergencies may result in extreme centralization of command, 

or devolution of authority to commanders at lower levels, depending on the 

circumstances.

Certainly, major doctrinal writings stress the importance of the strategic 

commander being able to handle all foreseeable contingencies:

After the commencement of war, the strategic commander regulates 

the operations of his subordinates through his strategic determination 

and strategic plan. In the course of war, many unpredictable things often 

come about with the changes of the battlefield situation, and the strategic commander must make a correct assessment of the situation, make 

timely adjustments to the strategic plan, address different situations flexibly and hold firm the helm of command to lead the war to victory.139

Also, “Under emergencies, the junior commander should be given the 

authority to make prompt decisions and act according to circumstances.”140

But Chinese texts also indicate that decisionmakers at the General Staff 

Department (GSD) or CMC level may directly exercise command over lowerechelon units under emergency circumstances. According to Peng and Yao, in 

wartime emergencies, “the supreme headquarters can bypass the immediate 

leadership to exercise its command.”141

More broadly, PLA writers appear to be engaging in a debate about the 

advantages and disadvantages of centralized and decentralized command 

systems. Some PLA authors argue that conducting complex joint firepower strikes requires centralized command. They contend that there must be 

centralized and unified planning, organization, control, and coordination 

to conduct high-efficiency integrated firepower strikes. They point out that 

participating forces belong to different services and branches, so command 

relationships are complex and carrying out operational tasks will require 

temporary partnerships, which means that organization will be difficult. 

Consequently, there must be centralized control of all of the services’ and 

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branches’ firepower strike forces to assure the timeliness, continuity, and 

coordination of firepower strike operations.142

Other PLA writers appear to favor a C2 system that gives greater autonomy to junior leaders on a more routine basis, not just under emergency 

conditions that impede communications with higher-level commanders.

Chinese analysts recognize that there are inherent trade-offs between 

centralized and decentralized command systems.143 Indeed, PLA officers are 

engaging in debates about command relationships and organizational culture. 

Some parts of this debate have taken place indirectly through the PLA’s analysis of U.S. military operations. For example, the PLA’s official history of the 

Gulf War, produced by the PLA’s Academy of Military Science (AMS), credits “flexible command” with enhancing the combat effectiveness of coalition 

forces.144 According to the Military History Research Department of the AMS, 

which edited the volume, “In the Gulf War ground campaign, in order to bring 

into play the initiative and creativity of lower-ranking commanders the U.S. 

military widely adopted a style of command that placed responsibility in their 

hands.”145 Higher-level planners indicated the tasks that had to be completed, but substantial autonomy and responsibility were delegated to lower-level 

commanders to determine how best to complete the assigned tasks. The editors’ evaluation of this style of command is clearly highly favorable. They 

assess that the “task-oriented style of command” was one of the main reasons 

that U.S. forces won the war so quickly. They also note with approval that “the 

flexibility of this type of command was reflected in the ability of commanders 

to rapidly reach new judgments and change their original decisions in response 

to changes in the battlefield situation.”146

In contrast to the flexible approach of U.S. and coalition forces, Iraq’s 

command arrangements were outdated and further diminished its chances of 

winning the conflict. On the Iraqi side, “command authority was excessively 

centralized, limiting the initiative of lower-level commanders.”147 The overcentralization of authority also meant that when Iraqi forces in the field lost contact with higher-level commanders, they were unable to respond to changing 

situations with any flexibility. Although the authors of the volume do not apply 

this analysis explicitly to command in the Chinese military, their assessment 

seems to convey some implicit criticism of the PLA’s own traditional, highlycentralized style of command, and to suggest that more autonomy should be 

devolved to commanders at lower levels.

The informatization of the PLAN, especially advances in ISR and communications capabilities, may offer China the opportunity to employ a more 

flexible and responsive C2 system that relies on “directive control” and “mission type orders” to meet the challenges of joint operations in high-tech 

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regional wars. The terms “directive control” and “mission type orders” derive 

from the German concept of Auftragstaktik, which calls for general guidance 

rather than highly centralized oversight of operations. This decentralized approach is considered a central element of C2 for modern joint operations.148

It is associated with individual initiative and independent decisionmaking at 

relatively low levels. Senior commanders tell junior commanders what objectives to accomplish, but allow their subordinates to determine how best to 

accomplish the mission. According to Keithly and Ferris, “Skillful commanders, guided by doctrine, should be able to develop and exercise suitable tactical moves in an operation on their own initiative, achieving mission objectives 

in accordance with theater operational and strategic goals. Directive control 

allows commanders to adapt to changing circumstances, exercise flexibility, 

demonstrate initiative, anticipate events, and thereby gain tactical and operational advantage.”149 Although adopting such an approach would appear to 

offer significant operational advantages to the Chinese military and to complement the PLA’s evolving doctrine, a number of obstacles would potentially stand in the way of such a dramatic transformation. The most important 

of these obstacles are the PLA’s tradition of highly centralized C2 and an organizational culture that does not appear to encourage junior officers to take 

the initiative. If these hurdles could be overcome, successful implementation 

of a more flexible C2 system would require providing training and education 

aimed at developing junior leaders capable of taking the initiative and seizing 

fleeting opportunities on the battlefield. 

To be sure, modern military commanders have not always used advances in technology to support the delegation of authority to lower echelons. On 

the contrary, in many cases, they have sought to use technology to improve the 

efficiency and effectiveness of centralized C2. As Keithly and Ferris point out, 

“technology can be a two-edged sword, especially when developments lend 

themselves to ever-greater centralization of execution, and in extreme cases 

to battlefield micromanagement.”150 It is entirely plausible that the PLA will 

pursue this well trodden path instead of exploiting technological advances to 

implement a “directive control” or “mission type orders” system, especially 

given its institutional predispositions. Indeed, it remains to be seen how the 

PLA will adapt its command style to changes in doctrine and improvements 

in information and communications technology. Enhanced IT and C4ISR 

systems capabilities could permit the PLA to give greater decisionmaking 

authority to lower-level commanders. At the same time, however, the modernization of the communications infrastructure could just as easily reinforce 

strong organizational tendencies to favor highly centralized C2 arrangements, 

as seems to have happened in some recent U.S. military operations. 

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These are challenges that the entire PLA must confront, but there are 

also several service-specific issues that PLAN commanders will need to resolve 

in the coming years. First, C2 of PLAN assets is somewhat complicated due to 

the organizational structure of the PLA. The commanders of the PLAN’s three 

fleets answer both to PLAN Headquarters and to regional military commanders. As Peng and Yao point out:

The command departments of the military area commands shall be directly responsible for the command of the joint services and combined 

arms operations within their respective military areas in wartime. The 

PLA has adopted a dual command system for the Navy and Air Force 

troops. When the Navy or Air Force troops carry out operational tasks 

alone or as the main force, the supreme headquarters administers its 

command through the command departments of the Navy or Air Force; 

when the Navy or Air Force carry out operational tasks in cooperation 

with other services, they are under the command of the command department of the corresponding military area command.151

Second, the deployment of SSBNs will present the supreme command 

and the PLAN with special challenges. The supreme headquarters exercises 

direct C2 over China’s strategic missile forces through the Second Artillery 

Corps.152 Presumably, the supreme headquarters would also exercise direct C2 

over deployed SSBNs through the GSD or PLAN Headquarters.

Centralization is essential for SSBN C2, particularly in the highly 

centralized PLA. Insights into C2 are extremely difficult to obtain, but recent research relevant to China’s submarine force offers preliminary suggestions. According to John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s SSBN force, 

like all other nuclear units, is overseen by the Strategic Forces Bureau. This 

is intended to ensure that “Only the [Central Military Commission] Chairman . . . has the authority to launch any nuclear weapons after getting the 

concurrence of the Politburo Standing Committee and the [Central Military 

Commission].”153

The PLAN has been working to achieve secure, reliable SSBN communications for more than two decades.154 However, it remains unclear to what 

extent centralized SSBN command, control, and communication (C3) is 

possible for China across the range of nuclear scenarios. “At present China’s 

communications infrastructure is vulnerable to a first strike,” Garth Hekler, 

Ed Francis, and James Mulvenon contend.155 This points to another critical 

problem for the PLAN: ensuring the ability to communicate with SSBNs in an 

environment in which its C2 system has been degraded.156

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Conclusion

Enhancing China’s naval capabilities is a key component of China’s military transformation, as reflected by several recent leadership statements on the 

importance of naval modernization and the development of several new classes of surface ships and submarines in recent years. Moreover, informatization 

is clearly a central aspect of PLAN modernization, and naval C4ISR modernization will have important implications in areas such as joint operations and 

command and control. Chinese C4ISR modernization has become a top priority, and PLAN informatization appears to have made some impressive progress in recent years.157 “In line with [the PLA’s] strategic objective of building 

informationized armed forces and winning informationized wars,” China’s 

2010 Defense White Paper maintains,

Significant progress has been made in building information systems for 

reconnaissance and intelligence, command and control, and battlefield 

environment awareness. Information systems have been widely applied 

in logistics and equipment support. A preliminary level has been achieved 

in interoperability among command and control systems, combat forces, 

and support systems, making transmission of orders, intelligence distribution, command and guidance more efficient and rapid.158

Indeed, there appears to be tangible evidence of Chinese efforts to 

achieve all of the abstract concepts reflected in Chinese writings:

■  The PLAN appears to be pursuing a full range of sensors across the 

radio frequency (RF) and acoustic spectrums.

■  New PLAN weapons reflect efforts to increase speed (and thus decrease enemy reaction time), reduce signature and thus observability 

(again, decreasing enemy reaction time), and increase the sophistication of seekers.

■  The PLAN is pursuing new communications capabilities across the 

RF spectrum.

■  In C2, the PLAN is seeking increased automation and data links.

■  The PLAN is fielding a broad range of new space systems for navigation, sensing, and communications, as well as antisatellite capabilities.

■  The PLAN is seeking sophisticated capabilities for computer network 

attack and exploitation.

■  The PLAN is pursuing kinetic information warfare and signal jamming capabilities.

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For nearly every operational concept, one can see tangible evidence of 

systems development, and perhaps even more so than China’s military competitors in the area of information denial. Clearly, the PLAN is serious about 

the hardware aspects of naval informatization. At the same time, however, at 

least three broader and no less important questions remain unanswered. 

How Unique Are Chinese Concepts of Informatization?

The first unanswered question is whether there is anything in the 

Chinese concept of informatization that is radically different from Western 

characterizations of the role of information and information and communications technology in modern warfare. It is not evident from the Chinese sources 

that there is anything truly unique about how Chinese strategists view the importance of information and information superiority. Some of the Chinese 

writings are undoubtedly attempts to assimilate and repackage ideas that are very 

familiar to readers of U.S. and Western writings on “network centric warfare,” 

information dominance, and related concepts. It is possible that these similarities are an artifact of a translation process that seeks to fit uniquely Chinese concepts into more familiar U.S. and Western terminology. But it seems more likely that these are more or less universal conceptions of the role of information in 

modern warfare that are quite consistent with U.S. and Western thinking. Open 

source writings offer good insight into Chinese thinking with respect to information in warfare, but Chinese thinking is still evolving and Chinese theorists seem 

to be in roughly the same position as U.S. proponents of network centric warfare 

with respect to connecting abstract concepts to operational practice. Indeed, the 

actual connection between abstract theory and practice remains unclear and the 

question of how long it will take to go from theory to practice remains unanswered. Nevertheless, if the PLAN conception is very different from that of the 

U.S. Navy, the latter might be surprised by how close the PLAN is to making the 

conceptual transition.159 Consequently, it will be important to watch the trends in 

both PLAN writings and practice to see how these developments play out in both 

the short and long term. Of perhaps most critical concern would be any evidence 

of radically different, asymmetric approaches to informatization and the attainment and exploitation of information dominance that could offer China military 

capabilities a relative level of power that is now unforeseen.

How Informatized Does the PLAN Really Need to Be?

The second of these broader questions centers on how close the Chinese 

are to achieving the so-called “informatized force.” The PRC’s 2006 Defense 

White Paper established a goal of being able to fight and win informatized wars 

by the mid-21st century. This reflects a perceived relative and persistent gap 

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between the Chinese armed forces and the world’s most advanced militaries 

that Chinese writers often suggest will take decades to overcome. But it also 

raises the issue of distinguishing between the “ideal” capability the Chinese 

military seeks to establish in the long term and that which might simply prove 

“good enough” in the relatively near term. 

For the most part, Chinese analysts tend to overestimate U.S. and Western capabilities and portray themselves as backward by comparison. Certainly many Western observers continue to denigrate PLA capabilities and note 

that even some of the Chinese military’s recent achievements are relatively 

simplistic by U.S. standards. These limitations certainly merit examination: 

perhaps China’s greatest C4ISR challenge is “bureaucratic data fusion,” as 

different organizations control different elements of sensor architecture yet 

lack joint operational experience, control of some space assets changes from 

peacetime to wartime, and a robust interservice struggle is underway for overall control, the outcome of which remains unclear.

But one should ask how often U.S. forces actually implement such a 

complex “system of systems” in practice themselves. A relatively simple system 

of deconfliction by time or geographic area with disparate platforms might 

actually be “good enough” to allow the PLA to achieve its objectives under 

most circumstances.

The most common criticism of Chinese capabilities is the apparent lack 

of a sophisticated sensor-to-shooter data fusion capability for utilizing longrange, precision-strike weapons. This may be a valid critique, but the need for 

a complex C4ISR system should not be overstated. This is the case for three 

reasons. First, much of the need for sophisticated target data fusion can be 

mitigated by building smarter missile seekers that perform target discrimination that is good enough for a given missile inventory. The United States still 

maintains a man-in-the-loop to prevent collateral damage and fratricide. The 

Chinese might have fewer qualms about such occurrences and thus leave much 

more of the targeting “decision” to the missile itself. Second, the Chinese certainly put a premium on missile speed to rapidly exploit often-fleeting data on 

mobile targets and reduce the need for target tracking. For instance, a typical 

short-range ballistic missile flight time to maximum range is on the order of 

6–7 minutes, that of a medium-range ballistic missile 10–11 minutes. Third, 

numbers matter. The notion of “one weapon, one target” may not be applicable to the Chinese military. At some point, the cost of discriminating targets 

from nontargets exceeds the cost of destroying all possible targets. A low concern for collateral damage and fratricide makes classification by destruction an 

attractive option. China is fielding land attack and antiship missiles in numbers 

that reach well into the thousands.

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In short, the PLAN might have a very different metric for integrated 

C4ISR than that of the U.S. Navy. The U.S. concept emphasizes having “one 

weapon, one target” on the battlefield and minimizing collateral damage. The 

PLAN could mitigate many of the sensor and fusion problems with a large arsenal and classifying “by destruction,” particularly if collateral damage is not 

much of a concern. The Chinese notion of C4SIR requirements might differ 

from that of the U.S. Navy, and the PLAN might achieve an employable capability with surprising rapidity, especially if it pursues one that is relatively crude 

by U.S. standards, but that is nonetheless “good enough” to meet operational 

objectives.160

How Will the PLAN Resolve Two Critical Informatization Debates? 

Perhaps most interesting in the Chinese writings examined are the ongoing debates arising from increased informatization. These will be very 

insightful to watch as the PLA struggles with some of the same basic issues that 

are being debated in the U.S. and Western militaries. Two major debates merit 

elaboration here.

The first concerns the offense-defense balance in information warfare, 

that is, the issue of information assurance versus information denial. The conceptual goal is obviously full information assurance for one’s own forces and 

complete information denial to the enemy’s forces. More likely this is some type 

of balance depending upon capabilities and geography. One could posit that information assurance tends to favor short-range operations close to home (where 

one can rely on land lines and high power line-of-sight communications), i.e., in 

the Near Seas; while information denial might predominate at long range away 

from home, i.e., in the Far Seas (where one becomes reliant on satellite communications and long-range RF signals that might be jammed or geolocated). It will 

be interesting to see how this debate progresses in Chinese writings, especially as 

strides are made in perhaps creating a regional blue-water navy.

A related question that remains unanswered is whether the PLAN will 

develop unrealistic expectations about the potential of informatization. In 

the United States and other countries, some observers have gone so far as to 

suggest that the widespread employment of advanced information technology 

will dramatically reduce or perhaps even eliminate much of the confusion 

and uncertainty of the battlefield. Recent military operations have shown the 

value of advanced information and communications technology, but have 

also demonstrated some of its vulnerabilities and limitations. Advances in 

informatization will dramatically improve the Chinese military’s situational 

awareness and communications capabilities, but these changes will not eliminate the problems of friction and the fog of war for the PLA any more than 

they have for any other modern military. As Keithly and Ferris warn, “A grave 

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contemporary mistake is to regard technological advances in communications 

as a means finally to overcome the fog and friction of war.”161 It remains to be 

seen whether the PLA will heed this warning.

In this vein, a key possibility that Chinese planners must consider is that 

the PLAN’s continuing development of modern C4ISR capabilities will not only 

enhance its ability to operate effectively, but also increase its vulnerability to C2 

warfare. As the PLAN becomes more reliant on high-tech C4ISR systems, it will 

need to be prepared to contend with electronic, computer network, and kinetic 

attacks designed to disrupt or deny its ability to use these new capabilities. 

Indeed, the PLAN—along with the rest of the Chinese military—will likely need 

to devote just as much attention to protecting its own C4ISR capabilities as it will 

to degrading or destroying those of its potential adversaries. Here PLAN writings do not yet seem to offer a definitive conclusion with respect to the offensedefense balance. The Chinese appear to be pursuing both efforts with equal 

vigor, both practically and theoretically. One could conclude that for shortrange C2, where nodes can be connected by land lines, connectivity will generally trump efforts to deny it, but for long range C2, where nodes must be 

connected by RF signals, interruption will generally trump efforts to maintain connectivity. PLAN writings do not yet offer a definitive assessment of 

this problem, but it would seem to be quite important for future Chinese naval 

operations, including the prospects of PLAN power projection beyond areas in 

which China can rely on “using the land to control the sea” (以陆制海).162

The second debate concerns the appropriate balance between centralization and decentralization. The conceptual goal for most militaries is 

centralized planning and decentralized execution—that is, empowering the 

lowest levels with information so that they can leverage superior tactical training and initiative. Certainly the practical experience in the West does not 

always match this conceptual goal. Indeed, many times the reality is that “commanders who can control, do control.” This is certainly an issue that has been 

raised in Chinese writings—with the so-called “10,000 mile screwdriver” as evident to them as it is to us. The issue of decentralized operations will likely be a 

more difficult issue for the PLA, which is not known for valuing and cultivating 

battlefield initiative in the high-technology operations called for in modern war. 

In particular, Chinese writings seem to reflect the opposite view, that informatization should offer the provision of decentralization in emergencies. Indeed, one 

could conclude that some of their key efforts at informatization are intended to 

increase rather than decrease centralized control.

Nonetheless, PLAN “connectivity” theories and efforts do appear 

to have provoked a debate between advocates of centralization and proponents of decentralization. The historical experiences of other navies 

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suggest that centralization tends to win out if connectivity can be maintained 

(e.g., commanders “will command what they can command”). If connectivity 

is denied, however, then forces have tended to fall back on decentralized 

execution, with tactical training generally carrying the day. It is possible 

that China will seek to mitigate relative tactical training deficiencies by 

“taking the man out of the loop” at the tactical level. Depending upon the 

offense-defense balance, the PLAN might become very good at short-range 

operations, but face serious problems at long range where RF sensor-toshooter links might be effectively denied.

On a more concrete level, it remains to be seen whether the PLAN 

will use its enhanced C4ISR capabilities to push information down to lower levels and empower junior commanders to make decisions, or instead attempt to leverage new ISR capabilities and growing communications capacity 

to further strengthen centralized C2 at higher echelons, which would probably be more consistent with the Chinese military’s present approach to C2. 

Although hardware modernization garners much of the attention from outside observers, there is a strong case to be made for devoting more attention to some of the less readily quantifiable factors such as “software” reforms 

and the organizational culture of the PLAN, which will likely prove to be 

equally important determinants of the extent to which naval informatization 

will translate into greater combat effectiveness and an improved ability to 

conduct joint operations. 

The overall implication could be that China is on a path to conduct 

highly effective centralized operations close to China itself. This may be useful 

in an access denial role, but might also be an effective limitation on China’s future power projection in which information assurance decreases with distance. 

Clearly, the evolution of the theory and practice of naval informatization will 

merit careful observation.

Notes

1 For more on Hu’s speech, see David Lague, “China Airs Ambitions to Beef Up Naval Power,” International Herald Tribune, December 28, 2006, available at <http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/28/news/

china.php>. 

2Wu Shengli, Commander of the Navy, and Hu Yanlin, Political Commissar of the Navy; edited by 

Wang Chuanzhi [吴胜利, 胡彦林], “Building a Powerful People’s Navy That Meets the Requirements of the 

Historical Mission for Our Army [锻造适应我军历史使命要求的强大人民海军], Seeking Truth [求事], no. 

14 (July 16, 2007), available at <http://www.qsjournal.com.cn/qs/20070716/GB/qs^459^0^10.htm>.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. According to Wu and Hu, “The Taiwan issue involves our national security and development—the full unification of our nation. It is also the key interest of the Chinese nation and one of the three 

important historical missions for our Party. To ensure the unification of our nation is the holy mission of our 

army. A powerful navy is a key force that can shock the ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists, and defend the 

unification of our nation.”

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 INFORMATIZATION AND THE PLA NAVY 279

5 Ibid. As Wu and Hu elaborate, “In order to protect normal fishing, oceanic resource development, 

oceanic investigation and scientific tests, to maintain the safety of the oceanic transportation and the strategic passageway for energy and resources, to ensure the jurisdiction of our nation to neighboring areas, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zones, and to safeguard our national maritime rights effectively, we 

must build a powerful navy.”

6 The policy defined four missions of the PLA: first, to serve as an “important source of strength” for 

the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to “consolidate its ruling position”; second, to “provide a solid security guarantee for sustaining the important period of strategic opportunity for national development”; third, 

to “provide a strong strategic support for safeguarding national interests”; and fourth, to “play an important 

role in maintaining world peace and promoting common development.” The last two missions truly reflect 

new emphases for the PLA, and the fourth is unprecedented. See “Earnestly Step Up Ability Building within 

CCP Organizations of Armed Forces,” Liberation Army Daily [ 解放军报], December 13, 2004, available at 

<www.chinamil.com.cn>.

7 Maj. Gen. Tian Bingren [田秉仁], “The Scientific Development of the Historical Mission of Our 

Army in the New Phase of the New Century” [新世纪阶段我军历史使命的科学拓展], China Military Science [中国军事科学], October 2007, 21–27. 

8 Shen Jinlong [沈金龙], “Naval Non-combat Military Operations—Challenges Faced and Countermeasures” [海军非战争军事行动—面临的挑战及对策], People’s Navy [人民海军], December 1, 2008, 4.

9 Liu Jiangping and Zhui Yue, “How to Reform the Navy in Order to Execute China’s Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century: Management of the Sea in the 21st Century. Whither the Chinese Navy?” Modern 

Navy [Dangdai Haijun] (June 2007), 6–9.

10 Ibid.

11 See “China’s National Defense in 2006,” Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic 

of China, December 29, 2006, available at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.html>.

12 Liu and Zhui, 6–9.

13 “China’s National Defense in 2006.”

14 Office of Naval Intelligence, Handbook on China’s Navy 2007, 24, 27.

15 Ibid.

16An article that seems to refer to the Luyang II describes this “new generation of ‘flagship’ on the 

sea” as “a model for informatization of the navy.” See Jiang Yi, Zhao Dong, and Wu Chao [姜毅, 赵东, 吴超], 

“Constructing a ‘Flagship’—On-the-Spot Report on Construction of New Type of Guided Missile Destroyer 

Supervised by One of the Naval Equipment Technical Department’s Representative Offices in Shanghai” [铸

就 ‘旗舰’ 啸海疆—海装驻上海某军事代表室监造某新型导弹驱逐舰纪实], People’s Navy [人民海军], November 1, 2006, 1–2.

17 “China’s National Defense in 2006.”

18 Ibid.

19Chinese military researchers have clearly devoted considerable attention to U.S. writings on “network centric warfare” and applied some of these concepts to their own work. See, for example, Wang Lu and 

Zhang Xiaokang, “Analysis of C4ISR System in NCW and Analysis of Its Effectiveness” [网络中心战C4ISR

系统研究及效能应用分析], Command Control & Simulation [指挥控制与仿真] 28, no. 2 (April 2006), 22–

25; and Zhao Liang and Luo Xueshan, “Research on Collaboration and Its Quantifiable Model in Network 

Centric Warfare” [网络中心战中的协作及其量化模型研究], Information Command Control System & Simulation Technology [情报指挥控制系统与仿真技术] 27, no. 6 (December 2005), 35–39.

20 Ji Chengxin, Li Xiangyang, and Wan Yongfeng, “Some Ideas of Naval Service Equipment Information Modification” [对海军现役装备信息化改装的几点思考], Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command and Technology [装备指挥技术学院学报] 17, no. 1 (February 2006), 10. The authors are affiliated 

with the Scientific Research Department at the PLAN Dalian Ship Academy (海军大连舰艇学院) in Dalian, China.

21 Zhanyixue [The Science of Campaigns], 2006, Introduction, 10.

22 Zhang Wenxin [张文新], “PLAN Draws Up ‘Road Map’ for Informatization Development” [海

军设计信息化建设路线图], People’s Navy [人民海军], May 10, 2006, 1. Military press coverage of an April 

26, 2006 PLAN “Forum on the Informatization Development of the Navy,” for instance, has not offered 

the contents of what were undoubtedly instructive speeches by PLAN Chief of Staff Sun Jianguo, Jiang 

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 279 11/29/11 12
280 ERICKSON AND CHASE

Zhijun, director of the Expert Consultation Committee on the Informatization of the Navy and of the PLAN 

Armament Research Institute, and other experts, as well as the forum’s compendium of 107 selected articles 

on the subject.

23 Ji , Li, and Wan, 10.

24 Liu Jiangping and Zhui Yue, “Management of the Sea in the 21st Century: Whither the Chinese 

Navy?” Modern Navy [Dangdai Haijun], (June 2007), 6–9.

25 See James Mulvenon and Thomas J. Bickford, “The PLA and the Telecommunications Industry 

in China,” in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The PLA in the Information Age (Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND, 1999), 245–257.

26 Office of the Secretary of Defense [hereafter, DOD], Annual Report on the Military Power of the 

People’s Republic of China 2000, 12.

27 Ibid., 12–14.

28 Ibid., 21. The report declared that the PLA’s ability to “effectively command and control its forces—particularly in a joint service environment—is practically non-existent.” 

29 Ibid.

30 “China’s National Defense in 2010,” Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, March 31, 2011, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-

03/31/c_13806851_8.htm>.

31Kevin Pollpeter, “Towards an Integrative C4ISR System: Informationalization and Joint Operations in the People’s Liberation Army,” in Roy Kamphausen and David Lai, eds., The PLA at Home and 

Abroad—Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College and 

National Bureau of Asian Research, 2010), 204.

32 See “China Reinforces Construction of National C3I System,” Kanwa Defense Review, April 1, 

2005, 18–19.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35Wang Feng and Yang Yuwen [王锋, 杨玉文], “The Navy’s Comprehensive Military Information 

Network Is Officially Established, Indicating a Significant New Step Forward in the Navy’s Network Building Effort” [海军军事综合信息网正式开通, 标示着海军网络建设迈上新台阶], People’s Navy [人民海军], 

August 28, 2006, 1.

36Kou Yongqiang and Chen Jing [寇永强, 陈静], “Lofty Mountains and Islands Connected by Electronic Networks: 92 Percent of South Sea Fleet’s Companies Are Now Connected to Military Network” [高山

海岛e网通: 南航部队92%的连队接通军网], People’s Navy [人民海军], November 29, 2006, 1.

37 Lu Daoquan, Liang Qingcai, and Li Gencheng [吕道全, 粱庆才, 李根成], “Enhancing Information 

Support Capability at Sea—A Certain South Sea Fleet Vessel Dadui Is Devoted to Building ‘Digitized Battlefields’” [提升海上信息支援能力--南海舰队某舰船大队倾心建造 数字战场], People’s Navy [人民海军], September 1, 2005, 1. According to the article, “In a limited maritime war under high-technology conditions, 

information support is of the utmost importance. Maritime training operations such as ships setting sail, 

submarines remaining concealed, missile launches, and torpedo attacks all require sea survey forces providing accurate information.” 

38Wang Tingjun and Zhang Gang, “Reconnaissance Ship Group Provides Precise Battlefield Information for Warships” [某侦测船大队为战舰提供精确战场信息], People’s Navy [人民海军], December 8, 

2005, 1.

39 Ji, Li, and Wan. 

40 Sun Tao, Qiao Yanfei, and Wu Chao [孙涛, 乔燕飞, 吴超], “Set the Sail Right and You Can Travel for a Thousand Leagues—A Certain Minesweeper Unit’s Experience in Carrying Out Informatization 

Construction/A String of Puzzles: How Did the Minesweeper Capture So Many First Places?/Unraveling 

the Puzzles: They Had the Help of Informatization/Behind the Puzzles: Informatization Makes Its Landing 

On Old Equipment” [帆正自可行千里--某扫雷舰大队推进信息化建设的一段经历/ 谜提一串: 扫雷舰咋拿

了那么多第一?/谜底揭开: 原来他们有信息化帮忙/ 谜的背后: 信息化老装备上‘着陆’], People’s Navy [人民

海军], November 1, 2003, 2.

41 Ibid., 12–14.

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 INFORMATIZATION AND THE PLA NAVY 281

42 Zhang Yuliang, “Chapter 14—Anti Air Raid Campaign,” The Science of Campaigns (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006), 9.

43 Dean Cheng, “Zhanyixue and Joint Campaigns,” 114; Zhang Yuliang, 10–11.

44 Zhang, “Chapter 14: Anti-Air Raid Campaign,” The Science of Campaigns, 10.

45 DOD (2006), 31.

46Richard P. Lawless, “Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on 

East Asian and Pacific Affairs,” April 23, 2004.

47 DOD (2006), 33.

48 Evan S. Medeiros, Roger Cliff, Keith Crane, and James Mulvenon, A New Direction for China’s Defense Industry (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005) , 205–251.

49 Ibid.

50 Lawless. 

51Chen Quanyu and Chen Huijun [陈全育, 陈会君], China Space News [中国航天报], December 4, 

2008, available at <http://www.wforum.com/gbindex.html>. 

52 Liu Jihong and Li Peigong [刘继红, 李沛功], “PLA Employs Beidou and Space Remote Sensing 

Technology to Raise Precision Strike Capability” [解放军利用北斗及航天遥感技术提升精确打击能力], Liberation Army Daily [解放军报], May 9, 2010, available at <http://i.ifeng.com/mil/china/news?aid=3898051>.

53 “FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22/A) Tactical Communications Satellite,” China Defense Today, available 

at <http://www.sinodefence.com/space/spacecraft/fenghuo1.asp>; “China: Military Programs,” available at 

<http://cns.miis.edu/research/space/china/mil.htm>.

54 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010 [hereafter, DOD 

(2010)], Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, August 16, 2010), 

36.

55 Peter B. de Selding, “European Officials Poised to Remove Chinese Payloads from Galileo Sats,” 

March 12, 2010, available at <http://www.spacenews.com/policy/100312-officials-poised-remove-chinesepayloads-galileo.html>.

56 “Strategic Weapon System, China,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—China and Northeast Asia, 

January 17, 2011, available at <www.janes.com>.

57 DOD (2010), 36.

58 Sun Zhihui, ed., China Ocean Yearbook 2004 (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2005), 569. 

59 For all launch schedule predictions, see “Chinese Launch Record,” available at <http://www.

sworld.com.au/steven/space/china-rec.txt; www.forum.nasaspaceflight.com>.

60Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping, “Stipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitalized 

Satellite Surveying and Mapping Passes Experts’ Evaluation” [《海上数字化地形卫星测绘技术规程》通过

专家评审], People’s Navy [人民海军], June 6, 2009, 1.

61 DOD (2010), 1.

62 For details, see Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Reaches Equivalent of ‘Initial Operational Capability’ (IOC)—Where It’s Going and What It Means,” China 

Analysis from Original Sources, June 10, 2011, available at <http://www.andrewerickson.com/2011/06/

china%e2%80%99s-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-asbm-reaches-equivalent-of-%e2%80%9cinitial-operationalcapability%e2%80%9d-ioc%e2%80%94where-it%e2%80%99s-going-and-what-it-means/>.

63Wang Hangyu, Wang Huihua, Hu Fengping, Chi Jian, and Zhou Dexin, “The Exploration of the 

Key-Technique in Sensors Networking” [传感器组网的关键技术], Fire Control and Command Control [火

力与指挥控制] 30, no. 4 (August 2005), 118–121.

64 See, for example, Li Qiang, Zhao Xin-guo, and Li Peng, “Research on Data Integration of C4ISR 

System” [C4ISR系统数据集成研究], Command Control & Simulation [指挥控制与仿真] 28, no. 4 (August 

2006), 29–32.

65 See, for example, Liu Gang, Wang Minle, and Ye Guangqing, “Evaluation Model of UAV Combat 

Effectiveness” [无人侦察机作战效能评估模型], Fire Control and Command Control [火力与指挥控制] 31, 

no. 1 (January 2006), 45–51. The authors of this article are affiliated with the Second Artillery Engineering 

Institute in Xian.

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 281 11/29/11 12
282 ERICKSON AND CHASE

66 See, for example, Guo Weimin and Ma Aimin, “Visualized Simulation of Image Sonar on ROV” 

[灭雷具图像声纳可视化仿真方法], Fire Control and Command Control [火力与指挥控制] 31, no. 2 (February 2006), 66–68.

67 See, for instance, Wang Tingjun and Zhang Gang, “Reconnaissance Ship Group Provides Precise 

Battlefield Information for Warships” [为战舰提供精确战场信息], People’s Navy [人民海军], December 8, 

2005, 1, extra edition.

68Wang Hai and Zhang Xiaoqi, “Digital Sea Chart Ushers in New Era of Navigation,” Liberation 

Army Daily [Jiefangjun Bao], January 23, 2007.

69 Editorial, “Make Great Effort to Promote a Transformation of the Navy’s Military Training in the 

Direction of Informatization” [大力推进海军军事训练向信息化方向转变], People’s Navy [人民海军], July 

21, 2006, 1; PLAN Political Department Director Fan Yinhua, “The Scientific Development Concept Is the 

Guiding Ideology for the Significant Development of Socialist Modernization Construction,” Qiushi, no. 6 

(March 16, 2006), available at <http://www.qsjournal.com.cn/qs/20060316/GB/qs^427^0^5.htm>.

70Xu Sheng, “CMC Vice Chairman Xu Caihou Addressed Second National Defense Work Conference of Qinghua University, Called for Conscientiously Carrying Out Principle of Military-Civilian Integration, Providing Support in Terms of Qualified Personnel, Science, Technology; PLA General Political 

Department Director Li Jinai Also Attended Conference,” Jiefangjun Bao, July 9, 2006, 1; Sun Dongyan and 

Wang Dongming, “Four General Departments under the PLA Issue ‘Opinion’ Standardizing Acceptance and 

Training of Local University Student Cadres,” Xinhua, February 19, 2006.

71Wu and Hu.

72 “Make Changes to the Training Mechanisms, Contents, and Methods—Second on Promoting the 

Innovation and Development of Military Training in the Navy in the New Stage of the New Century,” People’s 

Navy [人民海军], July 28, 2006, 1, OSC# CPP20060906318003.

73 See “China’s National Defense in 2006,” Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic 

of China, December 29, 2006, available at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.html>.

74Xu Zhuangzhi and Guo Jiabao, “People’s Liberation Army Military Training Undergoes Historic 

Transformation—Focus on Informatization,” People’s Daily [Renmin Ribao], March 2, 2007, 15.

75 Peter Harmsen, “China’s Military Tests Sophisticated Real-Time Data System,” Agence France 

Presse, September 19, 2007.

76 Mi Jinguo and Jiang Xiangjie [米晋国, 姜祥杰], “Soul-Stirring Training Carried Out by PLA Naval Forces in Complex Electromagnetic Environments: A North Sea Fleet Destroyer Flotilla, Combat Ready 

and Set in Battle Formation, Seeks Out and Annihilates Powerful Enemy Forces in Complex Electromagnetic Environments” [海军部队复杂电磁环境下训练惊心动魄: 北海舰队某驱逐艇支队--雾里张弓列阵, 磁

场寻歼强敌], People’s Navy [人民海军], July 3, 2007, 1. The article pledges that the newspaper “will devote 

more efforts to covering news in this respect as a means to push forward the in-depth development of training carried out by our naval forces in complex electromagnetic environments.”

77 Ibid., 1.

78Xiao Bai, “Blue Force Detachments: ‘Whetstones’ on the Battleground,” CCTV-7, June 20, 2007. 

79Commentator, “Make Changes to the Training Mechanisms, Contents, and Methods—Second on 

Promoting the Innovation and Development of Military Training in the Navy in the New Stage of the New 

Century” [从体制内容方法上求变革--二谈大力推进新世纪新阶段海军军事训练创新发展], People’s Navy

[人民海军], July 28, 2006, 1.

80 Qin Ruoyun, “Meticulously Cultivate High-quality Commanding Talent,” Jiefangjun Bao, May 1, 

2007, 1.

81 Liu Jian [刘剑], “Submarine Academy Emphasizes Teaching and Training Under Complex and 

Emergency Conditions: Classroom Moves to the Training Ground; Instructors Switch with Warriors” [突出

复杂和应急条件下的教学训练: 课堂训练场靠拢, 教员向战斗员转换], People’s Navy [人民海军], December 

15, 2006, 1. According to the article, “Lined up in front of computers were more than ten submarine captains and department heads fighting a battle of wits and courage, displaying their ability to coordinate all 

the battle stations on a submarine. No sound of gunfire was to be heard, yet the situation was no less tense 

than a unit’s real-war exercise. Lines were linked up into a command net, constituting an extraordinary classroom battlefield. This setup is an important measure by which this academy emphasizes teaching and training under complex and emergency conditions and fosters the development of the corps of submarine unit 

commanders.”

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 INFORMATIZATION AND THE PLA NAVY 283

82 Du Guangrui [杜广瑞], “Informatized Command Node Rises Between Sea and Sky: South Sea 

Fleet Aviation Regiment Actively Explores Patterns of ‘Air-Air Command’ Training and Operations” [海

天间崛起信息化 ‘指挥枢纽’: 南航某飞行团积极探索 ‘空空指挥’ 训练作战模式], People’s Navy [人民海军], 

December 12, 2006, 1.

83 Zhang Jian and Yuan Zhenjun [张剑, 袁珍军], “Data Platform Links to Three-Dimensional Battleground—Scenes of Long-Range Strike Field Exercises of a Destroyer Detachment of the PLA East Sea 

Fleet” [数据平台, 连通立体战场--东海舰队某驱逐舰支队远程奔袭对抗演练见闻], People’s Navy [人民海

军], August 4, 2006, 1.

84Cha Chunming, Li Fuxiang, and Chen Ji [查春明, 李福祥, 陈吉], “Our Special Reporter’s Exclusive: From Scene Where PLA Navy Conducts Informatized Joint Drill” [本刊特约记者独家报道--人民海军

信息化联合演练现场], People’s Navy [人民海军], September 1, 2006, 14–19. 

85 Li Fuxiang and Wu Dengfeng [李福祥, 吴簦峰], “Navy Organizes Multi-service Arm Maritime 

Combat Communications Exercise” [海军组织多兵种海上作战通信演练], People’s Navy [人民海军], August 16, 2006, 1.

86 Peng Zecheng and Zhang Kejin, “A Certain Training Cooperation Zone of the Guangzhou 

Theater [zhan qu] Conducts Synchronized Training at Different Locations Using Computer Network to 

Train the Three Armed Forces,” Liberation Army Daily [Jiefangjun Bao], March 2, 2006, 2. 

87Commentator, “Strive to Enhance the Comprehensive Quality of Officers and Sailors—Fifth on 

Making Great Effort to Promote the Innovation and Development of the Navy’s Military Training in the New 

Stage of the New Century” [着力提高官兵综合素质--五谈大力推进新世纪新阶段海军军事训练创新发展], 

People’s Navy [人民海军], August 4, 2006, 1.

88 See “China’s National Defense in 2006,” Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic 

of China, December 29, 2006, available at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.html>.

89Commentator, “Building Well-functioning, Highly Efficient Command Organs” [建设务实高效

的司令机关], People’s Navy [人民海军], February 7, 2006, 1.

90“China’s National Defense in 2010.”

91 Lu Daoquan, Rao Yanwen, and Li Gencheng [吕道全, 饶燕文, 李根成], “Using Battlefield Requirements to Drive Scientific and Technological Innovation: South Sea Fleet Reconnaissance Ship Flotilla 

Achieves Sustainable Development of Combat Power” [以战场需要牵引科技创新: 南海舰队某侦察船大队

战斗力建设实现可持续发展], People’s Navy [人民海军], October 13, 2006, 1.

92 Qian Xiaohu and Zhou Yawen, “A South Sea Fleet Base’s ‘Senior Blue Collar’ Personnel Become 

‘Whetstones’ for Sailor Training,” Liberation Army Daily [Jiefangjun Bao], January 6, 2007.

93Chen Zhouhai and Yang Xiangchun [陈洲海, 杨向春], “Training Continues While Vessels Go 

Through Repair—Frigate ‘Wuxi’ Receives Outstanding Marks During the First Sea Training After Refit” [出

厂后首次出海训练全优—‘无锡’舰停航不停训], People’s Navy [人民海军], June 12, 2006, 1.

94Chen Wanjun and Zhang Wenxi, “The Chinese Navy Established the First Ship Captain Training 

Center at Lushun Naval Base,” Xinhua, October 24, 2006.

95Commentator, “Make Accomplishments in Promoting Informatization-Oriented Force Transformation of the Navy” [在推进海军建设向信息化转型中有所作为], People’s Navy [人民海军], August 14, 

2006, 1.

96 Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Handbook on China’s Navy 2007, 68.

97 Lin Tsung-ta, “Information Warfare and the ‘Development by Leaps and Bounds’ Strategy of the 

PLA’s Modernization,” Ch’uan-C’iu Fang-Wei Tsa-Chih (May 2005), 90–93.

98 See “China’s National Defense in 2006,” Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic 

of China, December 29, 2006, available at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.html>.

99 Qin Ruoyun [秦若云], “PLA Navy Command Academy Drives Teaching Material Reforms into 

the ‘Fast Lane’ by Adding Informatization Contents to 188 Sets of Teaching Materials, Some Are Selected to 

Be Priority Teaching Materials by the State and All PLA” [指挥学院教材改革驶入‘快车道’: 188部教材融人

信息化作战内容, 多部人选国家军队重点教材], People’s Navy [民海军], June 7, 2006, 3.

100 Tao Shelan, “PLA Navy Admiral: China Is Pursuing a Defensive Strategy, But That Really Does 

Not Mean It Will Not Develop Offensive Military Capabilities,” China News Service [Zhongguo Xinwen She], 

January 9, 2007.

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284 ERICKSON AND CHASE

101Commentator, “Effectively Implement the Training-first Support System—Sixth Talk on Promoting the Innovation and Development of the Navy’s Military Training in the New Stage of the New Century” [切实落实训练优先保障制度--六谈大力推进新世纪阶段海军军事训练创新发展], People’s Navy [人

民海军], August 7, 2006, 1.

102 Zhang Jian et al. [张剑], “Why Was There Not Much ‘Traffic’ on the Broad ‘Road’?”—Education 

Platforms Need Standardized Management—Part Three of the Investigation and Consideration of the Conditions of Ideological and Political Education in Naval Units under the Condition of Informatization” [‘路

宽’ 为何 ‘车马’ 稀?--教育平台需要规范化管理: 对信息化条件下海军部队思想政治教育情况的调查与思考

之三], People’s Navy [人民海军], May 18, 2007, 1–2.

103 Ni Luquan, “Creating an Atmosphere of Mutual Trust and Cooperation, Practicing the Harmonious World Theory—Positive Significance of the Chinese Military’s Stepping Out of the National Gate,” Liberation Daily [Jiefang Ribao] (Shanghai), May 20, 2007.

104Commentator, “Conscientiously Put Military Training in a Strategic Position—First on Promoting the Innovation and Development of Military Training in the Navy in the New Stage of the New Century” 

[切实把军事训练摆到战略地位--谈大力推进新世纪新阶段海军军事训练创新发展], People’s Navy [人民海

军], July 26, 2006, 1.

105Recent Chinese-language publications on joint operations include the following: Ceng Sunan, 

ed., Research on Integrated Joint Operations [一体化联合作战专题研究] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 

2004); Jiang Fangran, ed., Joint Operations Headquarters Work [联合作战司令部工作] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2004); Zhou Dewang, Joint Operations Command Structure Research [联合作战指挥机构研究] 

(Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2002); Gao Yubiao, Joint Campaign Teaching Materials [联合战

役学教程] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2001); Zhang Peigao, Joint Campaign Command Teaching Materials [联合战役指挥教程] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2001); An Weiping, ed., New Theory of Joint Warfare [联合作战新论] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2000); Chen Anran, Political Work in Joint 

Operations [联合作战政治工作] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1999); and Wang Zhiyuan, ed., 

Joint Information Warfare [联合信息作战] (Beijing: Military Arts and Literature Press, 1999).

106 Dean Cheng, “Zhanyixue and Joint Campaigns,” in James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein, eds., 

China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses Corp., 2006), 101.

107 Huang Haipeng, Zhang Li, and Gu Linghua, “On the Informatized Battlefield, What Battle Ships 

Desire and What They Practice,” Liberation Army Daily [Jiefangjun Bao], June 15, 2007, 3. 

108 Peng and Yao, 262.

109 Ibid., 102.

110 The Science of Campaigns [Zhanyixue], 2006, 297–301; Zhang Yulang, chief ed., et al., “Chapter 

XII—The Joint Blockade Campaign,” The Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006), 10.

111 The Science of Campaigns [Zhanyixue], 2006, 300; Zhang Yulang, chief ed., et al., “Chapter XII—

The Joint Blockade Campaign,” The Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Beijing: National Defense University 

Press, 2006), 11.

112 Zhang Yuliang, chief ed., et al., “Chapter XIV—Anti-Air Raid Campaign,” The Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006).

113 Zhang Yuliang, chief ed., et al., “Chapter XXIV—Offensive Campaigns Against Coral Island 

Reefs” [对珊瑚岛礁进攻战役],” in ibid.

114 Ibid., 107.

115 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, ed., The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science 

Publishing House, 2005), 265.

116 Ibid., 115.

117 See ONI, The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, Suitland, MD, April 2009, 34.

118Also translated as “outline,” “compendium,” or “doctrine.”

119 Joint campaigns involve the participation of forces from more than one service, while combined 

arms campaigns involve the participation of multiple branches from a single service. For full definitions of 

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 284 11/29/11 12
 INFORMATIZATION AND THE PLA NAVY 285

these terms, see Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 12, 2001 (as amended through September 17, 2006), 

available at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html>. 

120 DOD (2006), 16.

121Cheng, “Zhanyixue and Joint Campaigns,” 115–117.

122 In joint blockade campaigns [联合封锁战役], for instance, “. . . there is widespread use of highlytechnical weapons; there is a complex electromagnetic environment; offensive operations are intertwined 

with defensive operations; and there are rapid changes in the battlefield situation. All this results in an expansion of the difficulty in commanding and coordinating the campaign, thus requiring that [those who 

provide] campaign guidance be adept at judging the timing and sizing up the situation, adapting themselves 

to changing situations, and making resolute decisions.” Zhang Yulang, et al., “Chapter XII—The Joint Blockade Campaign,” 3.

123 Zhang Shuhui [张书晖], “Revelation to Weapon Equipment Construction Based on Integrative 

Joint Firepower Strike” [一体化联合火力打击对武器装备建设的启示], Journal of the Institute of Command 

and Technology [装备指挥技术学院学报], 2007, 2. Zhang is a graduate student at the National Defense University, where he is conducting research on joint campaigns.

124 Zhang Yuliang et al., “Chapter XIV—Anti-Air Raid Campaign.” 

125 Zhang Shuhui, 2. 

126 Peng and Yao, 253.

127 Ibid., 267–268.

128 Ibid., 268.

129 Ibid.

130 Ibid., 257.

131 Ibid., 262.

132 Ibid., 265.

133 Ibid., 264.

134 Ibid., 265.

135 Ibid., 255.

136 Ibid., 268–269.

137 Ibid., 258–259.

138 Ibid., 272.

139 Ibid., 252.

140 Ibid., 258–259.

141 Ibid., 256.

142 Zhang Shuhui, 2.

143 Zhang Yan, Feng Shuxing, and Lu Hongbing, “Research on the Time Effectiveness of Aerospace 

Command Modes in Future Operations” [浅探未来作战中航天指挥方式的时效性], Journal of the Academy 

of Equipment Command & Technology [装备指挥技术学院学报] 18, no. 2 (April 2007), 55–59. This article 

compares centralized, decentralized, and skip echelon command systems.

144Academy of Military Science, Military History Research Department, Haiwan zhanzheng quanshi [The Complete History of the Gulf War] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press [Jiefangjun chubanshe], 2001), 

413.

145 Ibid.

146 Ibid., 414.

147 Ibid., 417.

148 See David M. Keithly and Stephen P. Ferris, “Auftragstaktik, or Directive Control, in Joint and 

Combined Operations,” Parameters (Autumn 1999), 118–133.

149 Ibid.

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 285 11/29/11 12
286 ERICKSON AND CHASE

150 Ibid.

151 Peng and Yao, 255.

152 Ibid., 255–256. According to Peng and Yao, “The operations of PLA strategic missile force come 

under direct command and control of the supreme headquarters, and the command department of the Second Artillery Corps is responsible for the specific command work.”

153 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War (Stanford, 

CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 120.

154 For a Chinese evaluation of foreign submarine communications systems, see Wang Xiaofei, ed. 

[王小非], Network Warfare at Sea [海上网络战] (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press, 2006), 379–382.

155 Garth Hekler, Ed Francis, and James Mulvenon, “C3 in the Chinese Submarine Fleet,” in Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, William Murray, and Andrew Wilson, eds., China’s Future Nuclear Submarine 

Force (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 198.

156 The authors wish to thank William Murray for raising this point.

157 See, for example, Wu and Hu, “Building a Powerful People’s Navy That Meets the Requirements 

of the Historical Mission for Our Army.” According to Wu and Hu, “along with accelerating the development of informatized equipment, the Navy has been using information technology to integrate and upgrade 

its existing equipment, and to strive to realize the long-range and precision capabilities of the main combat weapons as well as inter-communication, inter-connection and inter-operation capabilities of various 

combat platforms, which has greatly increased the level of the informatization of weapons and armaments.”

158 “China’s National Defense in 2010.”

159 The authors are indebted to Jim Fitzsimonds for the insights contained in this paragraph.

160 The authors are indebted to Jim Fitzsimonds for the ideas contained in this and the previous 

paragraph.

161 See Keithly and Ferris, 118–133.

162 The authors are indebted to Jim Fitzsimonds for the insights contained in this paragraph.

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 286 11/29/11 12
 287

Conclusion

Phillip C. Saunders and Christopher D. Yung

The chapters in this volume highlight the considerable progress made 

by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in developing a more modern 

force capable of operating in waters near China, within the broader Asian 

region, and (for some missions) in extraregional deployments. The hardware 

dimension is the most obvious area of improvement. Purchases of advanced 

Russian submarines, destroyers, and antiship cruise missiles have given the 

PLAN experience in operating modern weapons systems. China’s own defense 

industries have begun to produce much more capable surface combatants, 

submarines, and cruise missiles than in the past, and are developing new systems such as antiship ballistic missiles and aircraft carriers. These hardware 

improvements have the potential to remedy historical PLAN weaknesses such 

as air defense and limited communications capabilities. At the same time, highquality personnel, integrated sensors and command and control systems, and 

military doctrine and training regimes are required to maximize the potential 

capabilities of modern military hardware. The PLAN has devoted significant 

effort to these areas, including a new emphasis on joint operations, but its ability to fight and win in combat against a modern opponent remains unproven.1

One key insight from the Taipei conference upon which this book is 

based is that the PLA Navy is developing forces and training for a range of 

different missions. Preparing for a Taiwan contingency in which the PLAN 

might confront the U.S. Navy is the most urgent and operationally demanding 

mission, but other tasks such as military diplomacy, nontraditional security 

missions like the counterpiracy deployment to the Gulf of Aden, and defense 

of China’s maritime claims and interests require different forces and operating 

concepts and are not merely “lesser-included cases” of a Taiwan contingency. 

This perspective helps explain otherwise puzzling choices such as the PLAN’s 

interest in acquiring an aircraft carrier that would be highly vulnerable to 

attack by more advanced military forces and its relative neglect of underway 

replenishment and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities necessary for 

out-of-area deployments in a combat environment. These vulnerabilities 

are much less salient when performing peacetime missions or operating in a 

permissive or cooperative environment. This observation raises the intriguing possibility that different communities within the PLA Navy and other 

Chinese advocates of naval power are lobbying for different capabilities and 

missions. It also suggests that the PLA Navy may be pursuing a “hedging” strategy 

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288 SAUNDERS AND YUNG

of developing capabilities for multiple potential missions in an uncertain future, 

including hedging against the prospect that the Taiwan contingency may no 

longer serve as a budget justification.2

Another important conclusion is that although China is a factor in regional naval modernization (especially for Japan and possibly for India), 

it is not necessarily the main driver. For many states, other issues such as 

sovereignty enforcement, economic interests, and local security concerns 

are “more crucial.” Richard Bitzinger argues that changes under way in East 

Asia are promoting “arms competitions, not arms races.” To the extent that 

countries are concerned with China’s rise, most regional states count on the 

U.S. Navy to balance the PLAN’s growing power. However, in light of the fact 

that many states see China’s expanding naval capabilities as a factor but not 

the sole cause of their naval modernization efforts, the possibility also exists 

for increased maritime security cooperation between China and other Asian 

states. China has repeatedly proclaimed its interest in expanding cooperation 

on nontraditional security issues, including maritime security issues such as 

counterpiracy missions.

Long-standing Chinese concerns over Taiwan, territorial sovereignty in 

the South and East China Seas, and defense of China’s coast remain “crucially important” missions for the PLA Navy. However, consistent with Hu Jintao’s 

2004 proclamation of “new historic missions” for the PLA as a whole and the 

subsequent emphasis on the PLA’s ability to accomplish “diverse military tasks,” 

the PLAN now sees a broader set of roles and missions where naval power can 

play a useful role.3

 The PLAN routinely conducts important peacetime missions 

such as coastal defense, deterrence, protection of China’s sovereignty claims, 

and military diplomacy activities including port visits and exercises with other 

navies. Rear Admiral (Ret.) Eric McVadon’s chapter highlights how the PLAN’s 

employment as an instrument of statecraft in “military operations other than 

war” has become more important in recent years as part of a Chinese strategy 

that emphasizes achieving security without the use of force (although Beijing 

still uses shows of force or direct threats when necessary). 

As the chapters by M. Taylor Fravel and Alex Liebman and by Frederic Vellucci and Daniel Hartnett demonstrate, the PLAN is also increasingly “casting itself as the protector of China’s economy” in arguing for more 

resources for naval modernization. This accords with the call in the new historic missions for the PLA to “provide a strong security guarantee for safeguarding the important strategic opportunity period in national development” 

and to safeguard national interests. Energy and resource security figure prominently in these arguments, which are not only advanced by PLA Navy officers 

but also by a wider Chinese “naval lobby” that includes the defense industry, 

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 CONCLUSION 289

civilian officials with responsibilities for maritime issues, academics, retired officers, and press commentators. The Gulf of Aden deployments have frequently 

been justified within the Chinese press and by PLA Navy commentators as missions supporting China’s overseas economic interests. The potential utility and 

role of aircraft carriers in securing China’s sea lines of communications (SLOCs) 

and protecting its economic interests are also a prominent part of this discourse.

Despite considerable progress in modernization, the PLAN still faces a number of major problems. These include improving but still inadequate 

C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), lack of integration of the different branches of 

the PLAN and limited joint operations with the other services, personnel and 

leadership deficiencies, limited logistical capabilities, and the uncertain quality 

of indigenous equipment. Despite growing capabilities, the PLAN cannot yet 

reliably perform an antiaccess mission against the U.S. Navy, with limited detection and targeting capabilities being a particular shortcoming. Participants 

at the Taipei conference debated the timeline and circumstances under which 

improved capabilities might allow the PLAN to perform this mission effectively in a Taiwan contingency, concluding that this will depend on the pace of improvements in key PLA capabilities and the success of U.S. countermeasures. 

However, the United States cannot ignore even a rudimentary PLA capability 

to locate and strike U.S. naval forces. As Rear Admiral (Ret.) Michael McDevitt 

notes in chapter 8, the PLAN’s pursuit of antiaccess capabilities clashes with a 

U.S. strategy centered on access to Asia.

Even as the PLA Navy improves its ability to deny access in the Western Pacific, it must also improve its ability to ensure its own access to the 

South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and beyond in order to safeguard Chinese 

overseas economic interests, perform a military diplomacy role, and contribute to maritime security efforts. Such tasks require enhanced capability to 

project and sustain naval power at farther distances from China’s coast. How 

demanding these missions are depends on the specific characteristics of each 

type of out-of-area deployment, combined with the five factors (distance, 

duration, capacity, complexity of coordination, and hostility of environment) 

that have traditionally challenged navies attempting to operate at distances far 

from home ports.4

 How the PLA Navy manages the balancing act between 

antiaccess missions that involve potential combat against the United States and 

power projection missions in a permissive environment or against less capable navies should be a major focus of attention for the U.S. intelligence and 

China-watching communities for decades to come.

Finally, a number of developments have taken place since the Taipei conference. Most have been addressed in the process of updating the conference 

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290 SAUNDERS AND YUNG

papers for publication, but they also deserve attention here. One such item is 

the PLAN’s December 2008 deployment on counterpiracy missions to the Gulf 

of Aden. The initial deployment has been followed by seven additional deployments so far, including the first deployment of a landing platform dock (LPD) 

out of the Pacific area. The counterpiracy deployments have spurred talk and 

articles in the Chinese press of the necessity of access to naval bases and logistics facilities. The most noteworthy of these follow-on articles came from Rear 

Admiral Yin Zhuo, who stated that the difficulties experienced by the initial 

ships deploying to the Gulf of Aden could have been resolved or mitigated had 

China possessed an overseas naval base or facility. Such a facility would have 

facilitated access to medical care, and would have improved communications, 

ability to repair and maintain the ships of the task force, and ability to provide 

fresh fruits, vegetables, and assured access to potable drinking water.5

 The call 

for a PLAN overseas naval facility flies in the face of past Chinese pronouncements about Chinese troops on foreign soil, and past Chinese statements emphasizing that China has no overseas military bases or facilities. Although Rear 

Admiral Yin subsequently retracted his call for overseas bases, the fact that an 

active duty PLA Navy Rear Admiral, in a position to feel out the views of his 

fellow PLA flag and general officers, would publicly advocate such a policy 

shift suggests that the issue is worth watching very closely.

A second major development is the continued expansion and increased 

activity of the PLAN submarine force, including the reported establishment 

of a major new submarine base near Hainan Island. The PLAN has inducted 

new Yuan-class attack submarines (SSs) and Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) into its force, and reportedly plans to build as 

many as five Jin-class submarines as the naval component of China’s nuclear 

deterrent. However, there have been persistent problems in the flight testing of 

the JL–2 sea-launched ballistic missile that the Jin SSBN will carry; the latest 

Department of Defense report states that it is unclear when the Jin and its JL–2 

missiles will be fully operational.6

 The delay highlights the Chinese defense industry’s continuing difficulty in producing a reliable nuclear-powered ballistic 

missile submarine and sea-launched ballistic missiles that would make the 

naval arm of China’s nuclear deterrent effective.

A third development involves Chinese efforts to develop an antiship 

ballistic missile with the capability to target U.S. aircraft carriers.7

 In the past, 

ballistic missiles have not been considered ideal weapons to use against ships 

at sea because once the missile was fired its trajectory could not be altered 

to take into account target movement. As McDevitt notes in chapter 8, the 

PLA is trying to place seekers in high-explosive missile warheads that would 

activate once the warhead descends into the target area, and then steer the 

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 CONCLUSION 291

warhead to the moving ship. As McDevitt points out, such a capability would 

require accurate surveillance, plus missile warhead maneuvering technology 

that can guide the warhead to its target when the missile reenters the atmosphere.8 In a December 2010 interview, U.S. Pacific Command Commander, 

Admiral Robert Willard, suggested that the Chinese antiship ballistic missile 

system may have reached initial operational capability even though the system 

has not been tested over water.9

A fourth development has been increased Chinese activities and efforts 

to defend China’s maritime territorial claims. In early 2009, Japan accused 

China of violating a 2008 agreement permitting joint exploration of oil and gas 

in disputed areas of the East China Sea by unilaterally drilling beneath the demarcation line and extracting natural gas reserves from the Japanese side. In 

2009 China protested claims by Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam in the South 

China Sea and reiterated its sovereignty claims over islands there. A Chinese 

official’s claim (later retracted as a “misunderstanding”) that the South China 

Sea represented a Chinese “core interest” received widespread attention in the 

media and within the region. Chinese actions such as harassment of U.S. naval 

ships operating within China’s exclusive economic zone, the April 2010 sailing of a 10-ship PLAN task force through the Miyako Strait, and China’s use 

of economic intimidation during a 2010 controversy over the Japanese arrest 

of a Chinese fishing vessel captain for fishing in disputed waters reinforced 

regional concerns about how China may use its growing naval power. These 

developments suggest that maritime territorial disputes will remain a key regional security issue, and that many countries will be keeping a closer eye on 

PLAN modernization and activities.

Finally, although rumors of an aircraft carrier have long been in circulation, China will soon deploy a carrier based on the rebuilt Varyag, an exSoviet carrier purchased from Ukraine in 1992.10 It is unclear whether 

the Varyag, which will reportedly be named Shi Lang, will be for training 

purposes or have a fully operational role.11 A number of high-ranking PLA 

officers have publicly discussed rationales for an aircraft carrier, and a 2010 

report by the PRC State Oceanic Administration alluded to a decision to 

construct a carrier.12 General Chen Bingde, Chief of the PLA’s General Staff, 

also recently confirmed that an aircraft carrier is under construction.13 Pictures 

of the J–15, the aircraft that the PLA plans to fly off of the carrier, have been 

appearing on the Internet for over a year now.14 Open talk about a Chinese 

aircraft carrier is probably intended to get the region used to the idea in order to minimize negative reactions once an official announcement is made. 

However, a Chinese carrier capability is likely to have a significant impact on 

the naval programs of some other countries, most notably Japan, the Republic 

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292 SAUNDERS AND YUNG

of Korea, and India. Chinese military officers have discussed a range of 

potential missions for a carrier, but Western analysts disagree about whether 

acquisition of a carrier signals a shift toward building a blue-water PLAN centered on aircraft carriers or a more limited power projection capability.15 An 

operational aircraft carrier would have wide-ranging implications for the kinds 

of missions the Chinese would be able to conduct, including greater ability 

to assert its maritime claims over the Spratlys, the Paracels, and the Diaoyu/

Senkakus. At the same time, any Chinese carrier program would require years 

of development, experimentation, training, and the procurement of hundreds 

of different additional pieces of equipment before it becomes operational, 

especially in a potential combat setting.

As the chapters in this volume indicate, Chinese naval power continues to develop, expand, and mature. Rationales for naval modernization have 

expanded beyond concerns about coastal defense and Taiwan to include 

enhancing China’s ability to pursue its maritime territorial claims, military diplomacy, security cooperation, and protection of its economic interests abroad. 

As Peter Swartz’s review of the history of other rising powers attests, development of advanced naval capabilities is a natural companion to China’s emergence 

as a regional and global power. The PLA Navy still confronts some significant 

obstacles and is faced with serious shortfalls in its operational effectiveness. 

These shortcomings will require a sustained investment in technologies, 

personnel, equipment, and doctrinal development if the PLA Navy hopes to 

become an effective regional and global naval power. Given regional suspicions about China’s long-term ambitions, the ultimate impact of a stronger PLA 

Navy on regional and global stability will depend heavily on whether Chinese 

leaders direct their newfound naval power toward cooperative or coercive ends. 

Notes

1 For another assessment by a knowledgeable observer, see Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: 

China’s Navy in the Twenty-First Century, 2d ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010). 

2 See Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds., Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other 

Than Taiwan (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008); and Michael A. Glosny, 

Getting Beyond Taiwan? Chinese Foreign Policy and PLA Modernization, Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Forum No. 261 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, January 2011), available at <https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/ndupress&CISOPTR=43221&REC=1>.

3 See James Mulvenon, “Chairman Hu and the PLA’s ‘New Historic Missions,’” China Leadership Monitor 27 (Winter 2009), available at <http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM27JM.pdf>; and Cortez A. Cooper, “The PLA Navy’s ‘New Historic Missions’: Expanding Capabilities for 

a Re-emergent Maritime Power,” Testimony presented before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on June 11, 2009, available at <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT332.pdf>.

4Christopher Yung and Ross Rustici with Isaac Kardon and Joshua Wiseman, China’s Out of 

Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles, and Potential Solutions, Institute for National 

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 CONCLUSION 293

Strategic Studies China Strategic Perspectives No. 3 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 

December 2010), 1, available at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/ChinaStrategicPerspectives3.pdf>.

5 “Yin Zhuo: The PLAN should build a long-term supply base in Djibouti” [尹桌:中国海军应在

吉布提建立长期补给基地], accessed at <http://cn.china.cn/article/n494656,fe393f,d2477_12053.html>.

6 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2010), 34.

7Andrew Erickson and David Yang, “On the Verge of a Game-Changer: A Chinese Antiship Ballistic Missile Could Alter the Rules in the Pacific and Place U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Groups in Jeopardy,” U.S. 

Naval Institute Proceedings 135, no. 3 (May 2009), 26–32; and Andrew Erickson and David Yang, “Using the 

Land to Control the Sea? Chinese Analysts Consider the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 4 (Autumn 2009), 53–86.

8 McDevitt’s chapter notes that the obvious U.S. Navy response to this development is to “trick” missile seekers into attacking false targets or simply missing their intended targets. 

9Yoichi Kato, “U.S. Commander Says China Aims to Be a ‘Global Military’ Power,” Asahi Shimbun, 

December 28, 2010, available at <http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201012270241.html>.

10 Nan Li and Chris Weuve, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: An Update,” Naval War College Review 63, no. 1 (Winter 2010). 

11 “China’s First Aircraft Carrier to be Completed Soon: Reports,” China Post, April 7, 2011.

12 Gao Zhiguo et al., eds., China’s Ocean Development Report [Zhongguo haiyang fazhan baogao, 中

国海洋发展报告] (Beijing: Maritime Publishing House, May 2010).

13 “Zhongguo hangmu zaijian buhui shiru taguo” [Chinese aircraft carrier under construction, will 

not drive through other countries], Xianggang Shangbao [Hong Kong Commercial Times], June 7, 2011, available at < http://www.hkcd.com.hk/content/2011-06/07/content_2751772.htm>; Liu Chang, “PLA Chief 

Confirms Vessel Is ‘Under Construction,’” Global Times, June 8, 2011, available at <http://military.globaltimes.cn/china/2011-06/662887.html>.

14 Gabriel Collins and Andrew Erickson, “‘Flying Shark’ Gaining Altitude: How Might New J–15 

Strike Fighter Improve China’s Maritime Warfare Ability?” China SignPost, June 8, 2011. 

15 See Robert S. Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response,” International Security 34, no. 2 (Fall 2009), 46–81; and the response by Michael A. Glosny and Phillip C. Saunders, “Correspondence: Debating China’s Naval Nationalism,” International Security 35, no. 2 (Fall 2010), 

161–169.

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 295

A2/AD (antiaccess/area denial), 191. See also

antiaccess

Academy of Military Science (AMS)

Military History Research Department, 270

War Theories and Strategic Studies Department 

(See War Theories and Strategic Studies 

Department)

active defense. See also near-seas active defense

PLA on, 191–192

Aden, Gulf of. See Africa, Horn of

Admiral Gorshkov (Kiev-class aircraft carrier), 

32–33

advanced trainer aircraft, Malaysia’s acquisition 

of, 35

Aegis combat system, U.S., 27

aerospace platforms, China’s, 256

Africa

exploration and colonization of, 2–3, 4, 5

Horn of, antipiracy operations near, 101–102, 

108n102, 233–234, 245n50, 289

air-cushioned landing craft (LCAC), 24, 30

air warfare destroyers (AWD), for Royal Australian 

Navy, 27

airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), 

Chinese development of, 128

aircraft. See also specific types of aircraft

Australian, short takeoff and vertical landing, 27

for China’s aircraft carriers, 152–153

Chinese acquisition of (2000–2008), 24

Chinese reports of Indian navy’s 

building of, 70

high-altitude drone, for surveillance, 203

India’s Tejas Light Combat, 33

Japanese maritime patrol aircraft (P–X), 29

land-based, long-range, in Soviet 

layered defense, 203

Malaysia’s airborne early warning, 35

maritime patrol, Indonesia’s and Thailand’s, 35

in PLAN’s force structure, 160–162

Soviet, during Cold War, 196

Vietnam’s acquisition of, 36

aircraft carriers

aircraft range from, PLAN’s antiaccess 

campaign and, 207–208, 213–214n45

for China’s far-seas operations, 134–135

China’s military modernization and, 24, 143, 

291–292

for China’s near-seas active defense, 119

China’s Varyag, 149–153, 162, 171n38, 291–292

constraints on Liu Huaqing’s plans for, 126

India’s use of, 32–33

protecting Chinese sea lines of communications 

with, 289

Thailand’s Chakri Nareubet, 35–36

U.S., potential Chinese antiaccess strategies 

against, 167

U.S., Soviet’s defensive strategy during Cold War 

against, 196

vulnerable to attack, China’s acquisition of, 287

AirSea Battle, 210

Airshow China 2010, 259

al Qaeda, PLA Daily reports on ships of, 65

All-Army Network Technology Research Center, 

262

alliances. See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization

British navy’s use of, 6

rising naval powers and, 15–16

American Enterprise Institute, 239

amphibious warships, 28, 30–31, 32, 158–160. See 

also LPD amphibious warfare ships

Andaman Islands, Chinese reports of Indian naval 

base in, 70–71

Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security 

Developments Involving the People’s Republic 

of China (2010), 206

antiaccess (A2)

antiship ballistic missiles for, 208–209

assessing PLA’s capability for, 205–208

China’s potential use of, 166–168, 169–170n5

Chinese offshore defense as, 201–204

Chinese survey ships and submarine in Japan’s 

EEZ and, 231

geostrategic context for, 197–199

PLAN’s limitations against U.S. Navy for, 289

before radar and satellites, 193–195

Soviet maritime defense strategy as, 195–197, 

200 (map)

Soviet vs. Chinese, 142

Taiwan contingency role of, 191–193, 204–205

work left to do for PLA for, 209–210

antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs)

China’s development of, 290–291

China’s DF–21D medium-range, 258

McDevitt on countering attacks by, 293n8

with seekers, in China’s antiaccess strategy, 

208–209, 214n45, 214n48

antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs)

China’s antiaccess campaign and, 206–207, 210, 

213n41

Harpoon-type, for KDX–II ships, 31

for Indonesia, 34

Index

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 295 11/29/11 12
296 INDEX

for Singapore’s frigates, 34

for South Korea’s Dokdo-class vessels, 31

antisubmarine warfare (ASW), China’s, 120, 287

Arabian Sea, Peace-07 exercise in (2007), 230, 

244n39

area denial (AD), 191. See also antiaccess

arms races

factors contributing to, 19

international law and, 58

naval expansion in Asia-Pacific and, 26, 37, 

39n7, 288

rising powers vs. other strong powers and, 14

ASC Shipyards, Adelaide, Australia, 27

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 65

ASEAN states

China’s relations with, 219

India’s relations with, 69, 71

Li Peng’s proposals for promoting relations 

with, 217

navies of, debate on increasing China’s 

cooperation with, 96

navies of, in Chinese coastal waters, 132

PLAN’s port visits to, 228–229

policy of balance in foreign diplomacy by, 67

Taiwan’s independence and Japan’s engagement 

of, 51

Asia. See also Southeast Asia

European colonization of, 3, 5

Asia-Pacific

China’s military leadership in, military 

modernization and, 143

fisheries areas and quotas in, disputes over, 86

implications of expanded maritime combat 

capabilities in, 36–38

maritime combat buildup in, factors for, 24–26

recent naval developments in, 26–36

Association of Southeast Asian Nations. See

ASEAN states

Aster–15 air defense missile, Singapore’s, 34

Atlantic Ocean, 3

Auftragstaktik concept, 271

Australia, 23, 26, 27–28, 186

Australian Defense Force (ADF), 27–28

Aviation Engineering Academy, China, 182

Axis alliance (1940), 10

Backfire bomber, Soviet, 206, 209

ballistic missiles. See also antiship ballistic missiles; nuclear-powered ballistic missile 

submarines

theater-range (TBMs), 142, 169n3

Bangladesh, PLAN’s port visits to, 228

battle groups. See small battle groups

Beidou–2/Compass satellites, China’s, 257

Beidou–4 global positioning satellites, China’s, 

256, 257

Beijing Attaché Corps, foreign naval officer representation within, 186, 189n29

B6H bomber, 206

Bi Yurong, 73

Bickford, Thomas J., 253

bilateral exercises, PLAN’s engagement in, 

229–230, 288

Bismarck, sinking of, 194

Bitzinger, Richard, 288

Black Sea, 7

blockades

in China’s near-seas active defense, 118, 119

joint, 264–265, 285n122

by U.S. of Malacca Strait, Japan and South Korea 

and, 72–73

blue-water navies

France’s, 5

India’s, 26

Japan’s, 9–10, 26

Malaysia’s, 35

Netherlands’, 5

PLAN’s capabilities as, 101, 119–120, 129–135, 

230–234

Portugal’s, 2, 3

South Korea’s, 26, 30–32

Soviet, 122–123

Spain’s, 4

Thailand’s, 35

Bohai, Strait of, 111

Borneo, 116

Boutilier, James, 244n43

Boxer rebellion (1900), 11, 16, 138n54

Brazil, as Portuguese colony, 2

Britain. See also United Kingdom

arms race with Germany of, 14

China on regional defensive and offensive navy 

of, 139n66

Dutch navy and, 4, 5

economic and naval power of, 13

French navy and, 5, 14

geopolitical consequences for naval modernization by, 17

German navy as challenge to, 8, 9

invading forces attacking U.S. by, 211n7

Japan’s alliance with, 10

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 296 11/29/11 12
 INDEX 297

Japan’s navy vs. navy of, 28

as previous rising naval power, 1, 5–7

U.S. Navy and, 11, 12, 16

Brunei, territorial disputes and naval expansion 

by, 25–26

budgets. See funding

Burma, planned Chinese naval base in, 140n87

Canberra-class amphibious power projection 

ships, 27

Cao Gangchuan, 184

catamaran-hull missile fast attack craft, Chinese, 

24, 157–158

Center for Naval Analyses, 212n25

Center for Strategic and Budgetary 

Assessments (CSBA), 191, 210

Central Military Commission (CMC), China, 48, 

177, 262, 269, 272

centralized SSBN command, control, and communication (C3), 272

Century of Humiliation, China’s, 198, 204

Changchun University of Science and Technology, 

180–181

Chen Bingde, 291

Chen Lu, 91

Chen Shui-bian, 45

Chen Xianfeng, 177

Cheng, Dean, 255, 264, 265

Cheng Ho. See Zheng He

China. See also economy, China’s; oil resources; 

People’s Liberation Army Navy; territorial 

disputes

domestic laws on territorial waters, EEZ, and 

continental shelf of, 74

economic center of, as vulnerable to sea attacks, 

199

foreign suppliers for, 169n2

international fleet review, Qingdao (2009), 230

maritime disputes of, 86

merchant fleet of, 131, 139n74

naval expansion by, 23, 25–26

as previous rising naval power, 19–20, 21n2

Soviet’s maritime defensive strategy lessons for, 

196–197

China Daily, 101–102 

China Military Science (Zhongguo Junshi Kexue),

44, 59, 73–74, 197 

China Seas, 2, 132. See also East China Sea; South 

China Sea; Yellow Sea

China Ship Scientific Research Center, 170n19

China Youth Daily, 181

China’s National Defense in 2006. See Defense 

White Paper (2006), Beijing’s

Chinese citizens, sea consciousness of, 82, 88–89, 

91, 124

Chinese Defense White Paper (2004). See Defense 

White Paper (2006), Beijing’s

Chinese Embassy, Washington, DC, naval officers 

serving in, 186

Chunxiao oil and natural gas field, 220–221, 222 

(map), 242n13

C4ISR combat systems

centralized command and control and, 267

Chinese vs. U.S. deconfliction for implementation of, 275–276

directive control or mission type orders and, 271

of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), 

28

PLAN’s current capabilities for, 252–258, 289

PLAN’s development of and vulnerability to C2 

warfare, 277–278

for South Korea’s Dokdo-class vessels, 31

transformation of militaries with, 37

trends in Chinese research and development of, 

258–259

civilian authors, military authors vs., on China and 

international law, 95–96

civilian leadership. See also Communist Party, 

China

changes in naval strategy and, 110

near-seas active defense and, 124

coast guard, China’s, 54, 76

coastal defense. See also antiaccess

before radar and satellites, 194–195

code-breaking, 195

Cole, Bernard (Bud), 223

college students, PLAN commissioned officer 

programs for, 180–181

combat. See also hostilities

active, Liu Huaqing on, 138n47

maritime buildup in Asia-Pacific for, 24–26

rising powers with rising navies in, 13–14

combined arms campaigns, joint campaigns vs.,

284–285n119

Combined Forces Command, Korean Peninsula, 

30

Command Academy, PLAN’s, 263

command and control (C2)

directive control or mission type orders and, 271

naval informatization and, 266–272

PLAN informatization and, 249–250

satellite navigation facilities and, 257

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 297 11/29/11 12
298 INDEX

SSBN deployment and, 272

vulnerability to, PLAN’s development of C4ISR 

capabilities and, 277–278

command of the sea

Chinese on sea power theory and, 83

sea control and sea denial concepts and, 211n13

sea power vs., 105n13

use of term, 104n8

command structure. See also C4ISR combat 

systems; command and control

naval information and joint operations and, 

265–266

communications

China’s centralized C2 and networks for, 

267–268

China’s joint training exercises on, 261

China’s SSBN deployment and, 272

Chinese military networks for, 253–254

for Chinese survey and reconnaissance, 

254–255, 280n37

command in joint operations and, 265

fiber-optic, in 1990s China, 253

Communist Party, China. See also People’s Daily;

PLA Daily; Politburo Standing Committee

economic growth as key element for, 220–221, 

222 (map)

military personnel choices of, 176

on naval modernization, 247

PLAN as instrument of statecraft and challenges 

to, 239–240

PLAN’s personnel and, 183–184

on sea consciousness, 82

complex electromagnetic conditions, 260, 264, 

282n76, 285n122

comprehensive barrier removal, for China’s nearseas active defense, 119

comprehensive maritime security strategy, 82, 92, 

93–94, 103

Contemporary International Relations, 72–73

continental shelf. See also EEZs

China’s maritime rights and interests in, 90

Chinese survey ships in Japan’s EEZ and, 231, 

242n13

Law of China’s EEZ and Continental Shelf 

(1998), 74

PLAN’s operational role to borders of, 57, 59, 

82, 98

UNCLOS on maritime national territory and, 99

Corbett, Julian, 211n13

corvettes

Indonesia’s procurement of, 34

Vietnam’s acquisition of, 36

counter-amphibious-landing operations. See also

antiaccess

in Deng’s people’s war against Soviets, 112–113

cruise missiles. See antiship cruise missiles; landattack cruise missiles

Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), 14

Da Wei, 87, 93

Dai Xu, 101

Dalian Vessel Academy, 100, 182. See also Journal 

of Political Work; Lu Rude

Dangdai Haijun. See Modern Navy

declining powers, previously rising powers as, 16

Defense White Paper (2004), China’s, 186

Defense White Paper (2006), China’s

on funding for PLAN, 199

on informatization, 249

on informatization and interoperability, 272

on informatization and personnel recruitment 

and training, 261–262

on Joint Maritime Exercises with foreign navies, 

186

on national defense optical fiber communication 

network, 253

on strategic depth for offshore defensive operations, 251

three-step development strategy outlined in, 

107–108n95

Deng Xiaoping, 51, 112, 116, 124, 125

destroyers. See also guided-missile destroyers

Indian navy’s procurement of, 33

Japanese, 28, 29

Korean KDX program, 31

deterring forward strategy, of USDOD, 211n2

DF–21D medium-range antiship ballistic missiles, 

258

Diaoyu Islands, 86, 292. See also Senkaku Islands

Ding Yiping, 177, 178

diplomacy. See also gunboat diplomacy; international cooperation; political power; 

statecraft

budgeting for PLAN’s mission and reach of, 76

increased PLAN cooperation with regional 

navies as, 97

potential Chinese antiaccess strategies against 

U.S. using, 168

for protecting China SLOCs, 73–74

vs. force as Chinese naval strategy, 217, 287

directive control, PLAN’s informatization and, 

270–271

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 298 11/29/11 12
 INDEX 299

disaster relief, 37, 168, 235, 236, 245–246n53, 248

Duan Yanzhi, 73, 78n31, 80n73

East China Sea. See also China Seas

China’s near-seas active defense and, 116

China’s offshore defense strategy for, 202

China’s territorial disputes in, 199, 212n25, 288

Chunxiao natural gas field dispute (2005), 

220–221

first and second island chains in, 88 (map)

Senkaku Islands as protective screen for, 54

East Indies, 2, 4–5

East Sea Fleet, PLAN’s, 111, 113

economic power. See also EEZs

force as Chinese naval strategy vs., 217, 241n8

free trade as protection for SLOCs and, 71–73

Japanese arrest of Chinese fishing vessel captain 

and, 291

naval power and, 12–13

Nye on soft power and, 241n10

economy, China’s

Chinese naval development in 1980s and, 125

expanding overseas interests for, increasing 

Chinese sea power and, 87, 131, 140n79

foreign trade growth and, 139n73

growth of, far-seas operations and, 132–133

growth of, increased defense spending 

and, 127

maritime, growth of, 131, 140n77

maritime, territorial disputes and, 85–86

maritime security strategy and, 103

as percentage of world’s total GDP, 140n82

PLAN as instrument of statecraft and, 238

PLAN as protector and contributor to growth of, 

74–77, 288–289

world’s economy and, 131

education and training, PLAN’s

for an informatized military, 259–263

improvement of, military modernization and, 

141

programs for, 180–181

EEZs (exclusive economic zones). See also continental shelf

in Asia-Pacific, 34

China’s, F–8 and EP–3 collision (2001) over, 

223–225

China’s, Impeccable harassed in, 225–227, 

243n32–33, 291

China’s, islands in South China Sea claimed 

for, 50

China’s, potential oil and natural gas deposits 

in, 131

China’s, questioning innocent passage through, 

59–61

China’s, UNCLOS and protection of, 59

China’s offshore defense strategy for, 202

China’s or Japan’s, Chunxiao oil and natural gas 

field in, 242n13

Japan’s, Chinese survey ships and submarine in, 

231, 244n42

PLAN’s case for protection of, 57–58

PLAN’s operational range and control of, 98–99

PLAN’s operational role to borders of, 82

Thailand’s protection of, 35

Vietnam’s protection of, 36

8th Army, U.S., headquarters relocated from Seoul 

to Hawaii for, 30

electronic warfare, training for, 260

energy needs. See also oil resources

budgeting for PLAN’s mission and 

development of, 288–289

China’s increased demand for, 54–57

security for natural resources vs., 60–62

EP–3 and F–8 collision (2001), 60, 223–225, 227, 

241n9, 242–243n22–32

Europe. See also specific countries in

PLAN’s port visits to, 228, 229, 243–244n34

Spanish control in, 3

external security environment, perception of, 

changes in naval strategy and, 110

F–35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), 27, 39n13

Fang Yonggang, 184

far-seas operations, China’s

capabilities for, 289

as China’s goal, 139n66

development of, 134

evolution of, 109–110

factors for change in strategy to, 131–133

lacking concrete objectives, 134

as naval strategy for 21st century, 117 (map), 

129–130, 135n6, 140n85

space-based C4ISR and, 256

fast-attack craft, in PLAN’s force structure, 

157–158

fast-attack craft patrol vessels, Vietnam’s Svetlyakclass, 36

FB–7 fighter-bombers, 206

Feng Liang, 73, 78n31, 80n73, 92, 95

Fenghuo–1 communications satellite, 257

Fengyun–1D and –3A weather satellites, 256

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 299 11/29/11 12
300 INDEX

Ferris, Stephen P., 271, 276–277

fiber-optic communications, in China, 253

fighter-bombers. See also long-range strategic 

bombers

in China’s layered defense, 203, 206–207

Chinese acquisition of (2000–2008), 24

Malaysia’s acquisition of, 35

Mitchell’s sinking of German surrendered 

battleships with, 211n9

in PLAN’s force structure, 161–162

fighting aircraft carrier battle groups. See aircraft 

carriers

finance. See funding

Fisher, Richard, 170n5

fog of war, decentralized command and control 

and, 268

Force (Indian magazine), 159

force structure, PLAN’s

aircraft carriers in, 149–153

amphibious ships in, 158–160

changes to non–force structure vs., 141

destroyers, frigates, and fast attack craft in, 

153–158

fast-attack craft in, 157–158

interservice coordination issues and, 163–164

maritime relevant changes outside the navy and, 

141–142

mine countermeasures (MCM) ships in, 160

naval aircraft in, 160–162

near-term and broader or longer-term goals 

and, 142–144

open-source projections of, 162–163

potential use in antiaccess strategies of, 166–168

potential use in Taiwan contingencies for, 

164–166

potential use supporting broader or longer-term 

goals of, 168–169

submarines in, 144–149

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, U.S., 185

France

British navy and, 6, 14, 194

China on regional defensive and offensive navy 

of, 139n66

Dutch navy and, 4

economic and naval power of, 13

Joint Maritime Search and Rescue exercises with 

China and, 186

military budget in, 26

PLAN’s port visits to, 228

as previous rising naval power, 1, 5

Spanish navy and, 3

Francis, Ed, 272

Fravel, M. Taylor, 288

free trade. See also economic power

as protection for SLOCs, 71–73

frigates. See also guided-missile frigates

Chinese building of, 24

Chinese indigenously-built classes of, 156–157

Indian navy’s procurement of, 33

Japanese, 28

Malaysia’s acquisition of, 35

Singapore navy’s procurement of, 34

Thailand’s acquisition of, 35

Fuchi-class underway replenishment ships, 152

funding

availability of, changes in naval strategy and, 

110, 127

China’s naval expansion in Asia-Pacific and, 26

China’s transformation to far-seas operations 

and, 134

English navy’s techniques for, 6

increased, for PLAN, 74–77

Gao Xinsheng, 91, 95, 96

General Armament Department’s (GAD’s) Survey 

and Mapping Bureau, 256

General Staff Department (GSD), PLA, 269, 272

Germany

arms race with Britain and, 14

British navy and, 6

China on regional defensive and offensive navy 

of, 139n66

economy of, 21n3

geopolitical consequences for naval modernization by, 18

PLAN’s port visits to, 228

as previous rising naval power, 1, 8–9

World War II naval strategy of, 194

global positioning system (GPS)–enabled precision weapons, 192–193

Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao), 101

globalization, post-modern navy and, 38

GlobalSecurity.org, 163

Gorshkov, Sergei, 122–123, 138n45, 212n25

Great Leap Forward, China’s, 115

Great Power System, European-centered, 11

Gu Zuhua, 92–93, 96

Guam, 192, 232–233

Guangxi Normal University, 180–181

guided-missile destroyers (DDGs)

China’s deployment of, 140n86

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 300 11/29/11 12
 INDEX 301

China’s naval modernization and, 24, 153–156, 

250

China’s near-coast defense and, 114–115

China’s near-seas active defense and, 120–122, 

124, 126, 127

displacement of, 136n18, 137n35, 137n37

guided-missile frigates (FFGs)

China’s naval modernization and, 156–157, 250

in China’s near-coast defense strategy, 114–115

in China’s near-seas active defense, 120, 

121–122, 128

displacement of, 137n35, 137n37

Gulf War, PLA on centralized vs.

decentralized command in, 270

gunboat diplomacy

China’s nonuse of force policy and, 219–220

F–8 and EP–3 collision (2001), 223–225

Han-class submarine encounter (1994), 221, 

223, 242n19, 242n21

map of, 222

Sino-Japanese confrontation at Chunxiao natural gas field in (2005), 220–221

USNS Impeccable harassment (2009), 225–227, 

243n32–33

Guofang. See National Defense

Guojia Anquan Zhanlue Lilun (Theory of National 

Security Strategy) (2006), 100

haifang (China’s maritime defense), 42, 43–44, 45

Hainan Island, 111, 225–227, 241n9, 243n32–33

Haiyang ocean monitoring satellites, China’s, 257

haiyang quanyi or haiquan (China’s maritime 

rights and interests). See also People’s Liberation Army Navy

changing definitions of, 41–42

lack of coordinated security strategy for, 102

navy-centric security strategy for protection of, 

92–93

scope of, 90

sources for studying, 43–44

Han-class nuclear-powered attack submarines 

(SSNs), China’s

displacement of, 136n18

Guam patrol by (2004), 232–233

Kitty Hawk carrier battle group and, 221, 222 

(map), 223, 227, 242n19, 242n21

modernization of, 170n15

of 1980s, 124

of 1970s, 114, 115

Shang-class submarines vs., 145

HARPY unmanned combat aerial vehicles, Israeli, 

162

Hartnett, Daniel, 288

H–6D fighter-bombers, 206

Hekler, Garth, 272

helicopter destroyers (DDH), Japanese Hyugaclass, 28–29

helicopters

China’s ASW-type, 120

for China’s Type-071 LPD amphibious warfare 

ship, 24

Indian navy’s procurement of, 33

PLAN’s ship-based, 162

Royal Australian Navy’s, 27

South Korea’s Dokdo-class amphibious assault 

vessels and, 30

Thailand’s, 35

Henry VIII, king of England, 6

Herberg, Mikkal E., 72

Honeywell MK46 Mod.2 antisubmarine 

torpedoes, 185

Hormuz Strait, 70

hostilities. See also combat

free trade as protection for SLOCs and avoidance of, 73

Houbei-class fast-attack craft, China’s, 157–158, 

250

hovercraft transports, Japanese, 28

Hu Jintao

on far-seas operations, 129

on informatization, 249

on the Malacca Dilemma, 63

on military safety, 177

on military training, 259–260

on naval modernization, 247, 288

PLAN as instrument of statecraft and, 238

Hu Yanlin, 247, 248, 278n4, 279n5

Huanjing disaster/environmental monitoring 

constellation satellites, 257–258

Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), 101

humanitarian relief, 168, 235, 236, 245–246n53, 

248. See also disaster relief

Impeccable, USS, 225–227, 243n32–33, 291

India

China on subregional navy of, 139n66

China’s protection of SLOCs and, 67

China’s treaty solving border dispute with, 198

Chinese aircraft carrier and naval program of, 

292

Chinese border dispute with, 125

debate on increasing China’s cooperation with 

navy of, 96

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 301 11/29/11 12
302 INDEX

Indian Ocean control and, 132

Joint Maritime Exercises with China and, 186

military budget in, 26

naval expansion by, 23

naval modernization by, 32–33, 288

as naval threat, Chinese media on, 67–69

PLAN’s engagement in bilateral exercises with, 

230

PLAN’s port visits to, 228

as rising naval power, historical experience and, 

19–20

Indian Ocean

China on India’s capabilities in, 69–70

Dutch naval power in, 4

Indian navy’s constabulary role in, 32

Portuguese competition with Arab and Indian 

dominance of, 2

as SLOC for China, 67, 289

Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC), of Indian navy, 

33

Indonesia, 25–26, 34–35, 218–219, 291

The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 

1660–1783 (Mahan), 89, 123. 

See also Mahan, Alfred Thayer

information technologies (IT). See also technology

China’s commercial sector for, military modernization and, 256

India’s military use of, 32

PLAN’s command structure and, 271

retrofitting older Chinese minesweepers with, 

255

informatization, PLAN’s

C2 system and, 266–272

centralization-decentralization balance and, 

277–278

C4ISR R&D trends, 258–259

C4ISR systems for, 252–258

as critical to modernization, 248–250

ideal vs. good enough capability for, 274–276

as key component of military transformation, 

273–274, 286n157

modernization and, 247–248, 279n16

naval information and joint operations, 264–266

resolving offense-defense balance in, 276–277

training and education for, 259–263

U.S. Navy’s network centric warfare concept 

compared with, 274

use of term, 250–252

infrastructure, for China’s far-seas 

operations, 130

Institute for Defense Analyses, 212n25

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)

China’s far-seas operations and, 130, 134

China’s force structure and, 169

China’s near-seas active defense and, 119–120, 

121

PLAN’s informatization and, 270–271

international cooperation. See also diplomacy; 

political power; statecraft

China’s maritime security strategy and, 82, 94

increasing China’s reliance on, 96–97

international fleet review, Qingdao (2009), 230

international law. See also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

China’s claim in South China Sea under, 51

China’s defense of maritime rights under, 43

China’s increasing reliance on, 94–97

China’s maritime security strategy and, 82, 94

naval blockade of Taiwan and, 119

International Regulations for Avoiding Collisions 

at Sea, 226

interoperability

China’s Defense White Paper (2006) on, 272

naval expansion in Asia-Pacific and, 37–38

of ROK and U.S. military forces, 30

U.S. military and, 25

Iraq during Gulf War, centralized command of, 

270

island chains. See also East China Sea; South China 

Sea; specific islands

China’s far-seas operations and, 129

China’s offshore defense and, 201–202

first and second, 88 (map)

in near-seas active defense, 116, 117 (map), 123

PLAN’s operational role beyond, 82, 99–102

Israeli HARPY unmanned combat aerial vehicles, 

162, 173n70

Italy, 21n2, 21n6, 139n66, 228

J–10 fighter-bombers, PLAN’s, 161

J–15 aircraft, PLA’s, 291

Jane’s Fighting Ships

on China’s air force, 161–162

on China’s aircraft carrier Varyag, 150–151, 

171n38

on China’s incremental shipbuilding, 172n43

on China’s indigenously-built frigate classes, 157

on China’s submarines, 149

on PLAN’s mine countermeasures (MCM) 

ships, 160

on PLAN’s Type 071 amphibious ships, 158–159

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 302 11/29/11 12
 INDEX 303

on PLAN’s Type 081 amphibious ships, 159–160

weapons for, 171n25, 171n26

Japan

blockade of Malacca Strait and, 72

British navy and, 6

China and naval modernization of, 288

China on fisheries areas and quotas of, 86

China on India’s cooperation with, 69

China on internationalizing South China Sea 

disputes by, 51

China on regional defensive and offensive navy 

of, 139n66

China’s aircraft carrier and naval program of, 

291–292

China’s protection of SLOCs and, 67

China’s territorial disputes with, 199, 291

Chinese survey ships and submarine in EEZ of, 

231, 232–233, 244n42

debate on increasing China’s cooperation with 

navy of, 96

economic downturn in, 21n4

geopolitical consequences for naval modernization by, 18

military budget in, 26

Modern Navy on piracy response by, 66

naval expansion by, 23, 28–30

PLAN’s surface action group in Western Pacific 

and, 234

as previous rising naval power, 1, 9–10

Senkaku Islands dispute between China and, 

52–54, 78n17

territorial disputes and naval expansion by, 

25–26

U.S. Navy and, 11–12

World War II naval strategy of, 194

Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), 

220–221, 222 (map)

Japanese Navy, in Chinese coastal waters, 132

JH–7 fighter-bombers, PLAN’s, 162, 206

Jiang Zemin

on far-seas operations, 129, 133

on PLA mechanization, 140n85

preference for nonuse of force by, 217, 219, 

241n4

on sea consciousness, 82, 91

Wang Shouye and, 178

Jiang Zhijun, 48

Jianghu-class guided-missile frigates (FFGs), 

China’s, 114–115, 120, 262

Jiangkai-class guided-missile frigates (FFGs), 

China’s, 121, 137n37, 172n54, 250

Jiangnan Shipyard, 146

Jiangwei I-class and Jiangwei II-class frigates, 

China’s, 157

Jiefangjun Bao. See PLA Daily

Jin Canrong, 101–102

Jin-class submarines, China’s

commissioning of, 148 (table), 170n10, 171n33

description and armaments of, 122, 144–145

displacement of, 137n41

in Japan’s EEZ, 231

naval modernization and, 290

Jin Yinan, 54

JL–2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles 

(SLBMs), 144–145, 170n12, 251, 290

joint campaigns, combined arms campaigns vs.,

284–285n119

Joint Maritime Exercises, with China and various 

countries, 186, 288

joint operations, Chinese

Auftragstaktik on general guidance for, 271

dual command structure and, 272

lack of military integration for, 289

naval information and, 264–266, 285n122

near-seas active defense and, 118

PLAN’s participation in training for, 260

PLA’s command and control in, 253, 280n28

joint operations manual, China’s, 266

Journal of Political Work (Zhenggong Xuekan), 90

Junshi Jingji Yanjiu (Military Economic Research),

87

Junzhong Zhanlue Xue (Science of Service Strategy),

101

Kazakhstan, China’s treaty solving border 

dispute with, 198

KDX (Korean Destroyer Experimental) ships, 31

Keithly, David M., 271, 276–277

key point strikes, 205, 213n38

Kilo-class submarines

China’s, 24, 127, 137n38, 146

China’s naval modernization and, 148 (table), 

171n30, 171n33, 251

Vietnam’s, 36

weapons for, 171n24

Kitty Hawk, USS

Han-class submarine encounter with, 222 

(map), 223, 232–233, 242n19, 242n21

Song-class submarine encounter with, 233, 

245n46–49

Korea. See also North Korea

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 303 11/29/11 12
304 INDEX

Japanese control of, 10

Republic of (See South Korea)

Kuomintang (KMT) forces, 86, 111. See also

Taiwan

Kurile Islands, 116

Kyrgyzstan, China’s treaty solving border dispute 

with, 198

land-attack cruise missiles (LACM), South Korea’s 

Hyunmoo IIIC, 31

landing ships. See also LPD amphibious warfare 

ships

Singapore’s Endurance-class, 34

Law of China’s EEZ and Continental Shelf (1998), 

74

Law of China’s Territorial Waters and Contiguous 

Zone (1992), 74

layered defense. See also near-seas active defense; 

offshore defense

China’s, 202–204, 206–207

Soviet approach to, 203–204, 213n31

Lee Teng-hui, 47–48

Lewis, John Wilson, 272

Li Peng, 217, 219, 241n4

Liaowang (Outlook), 93

Liberation Army Daily, 260, 265

Liebman, Alex, 288

Lijphart, Arend, 110

Liu Huaqing

on active combat, 138n47

on China’s nuclear capabilities (1989), 116

civilian leadership and near-seas active defense 

by, 124

constraints on change in strategy and change in 

capabilities for, 124–126

on far-seas operations, 129

Gorshkov and, 138n45, 212n28

on incremental naval development, 138n63

Mahan and, 138n45

near-seas active defense and, 116, 119, 122–123, 

136n24, 136–137n25

Liu Shuiming, 91, 97

Liu Xinhua, 83, 87, 99–100

Liu Xuxian, 57

Liu Yijian, 87, 99, 100, 107–108n95

Liu Zhenhuan, 57, 58, 59, 92

Liu Zhongmin, 83

Logistics Academy, China, 182

long-range strategic bombers, China’s, 99, 100, 

115, 132, 134. See also fighter-bombers

LPD (landing platform dock) amphibious warfare 

ships

China’s deployment in Gulf of Aden of, 290

Chinese launching of, 24

Indonesia’s procurement of, 34

Lu Rude, 83–84, 85, 93, 95

Luhai-class destroyers, China’s, 120, 126, 154–155

Luhu-class destroyers

China’s, foreign technology and, 126, 138n54

China’s construction of, 154–155

China’s near-seas active defense and, 120, 124

displacement of, 137n35

U.S. restrictions on engines for, 172n43

Luo Xianlin, 57, 91

Luo Yuan, 238

Luo Yuru, 91, 92, 98, 106n54

Lushun Naval Base, Ship Captain Training Center 

at, 262

Luyang I-class and Luyang II-class guided-missile 

frigates (FFGs), China’s

armaments and features of, 154–156

China’s naval modernization and, 152, 250, 

279n16

China’s near-seas active defense and, 121, 122, 

128

displacement of, 137n37

Luzhou-class guided-missile destroyers (DDGs), 

China’s, 121, 137n37, 152, 154, 156, 250

Ma Lixin, 177–178

Ma Yingjeou, 138n59

Macao, 3

Mahan, Alfred Thayer

on battleships and sea power, 19

China’s near-seas active defense and, 123, 

138n45

Chinese on sea power theory of, 83

as product of U.S., 11

on sea consciousness, 89

sea control and sea denial concepts and, 211n13

major strategic direction, of PLA, 198

Malabar Exercises (2007), 69

Malacca Strait

Chinese concerns on Indian control of, 70

Chinese concerns on piracy as excuse for foreign 

naval operations in, 65, 66

Chinese concerns on security in, 63–64, 87

free trade as protection for, 72

U.S. on control of (1986), 67

Malaysia, 25–26, 35, 291

Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency 

(MMEA), 35

Mandab Strait, 70

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 304 11/29/11 12
 INDEX 305

Mao Zedong, 1, 111–112, 115–116, 267

Maritime Patrol Detachment, China, 54

maritime rights and interests. See haiyang quanyi

or haiquan

Maritime Safety Agency, China, 54

maritime security strategy. See also naval strategy

international law and cooperation roles in, 

94–97

lessons learned from Chinese writings on, 

102–104

navy-centric vs. comprehensive, 92–94

PLAN’s operational range and, 97–102

scope of research on, 104n5

sea consciousness and, 88–91

sea power with Chinese characteristics as, 83–88

themes of Chinese writings on, 81–82

Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), Japan, 28, 

29–30, 38

McDevitt, Michael, 289, 290–291

McVadon, Eric, 288

Mediterranean Sea, 3, 7, 8

Melbourne, HMAS, China’s purchase of, 150

Middle East. See also Africa, Horn of; 

Malacca Strait

China’s protection of shipping lanes for oil 

from, 43

PLAN’s role in sea-lane security in, 101–102, 

108n102, 233–234

MiG–29 series fighters, 33

military academies, Chinese, 181

military authors, civilian authors vs., on China and 

international law, 95–96

military communications networks. See communications

Military Economic Research (Junshi Jingji Yanjiu),

87

Military History Research Department, Academy 

of Military Science (AMS), 270

military operations other than war (MOOTW), 

248

minesweepers

China’s naval modernization and, 160

for China’s near-coast defense, 113

for China’s near-coast in 1950s and 1960s, 

114–115

older Chinese versions of, refitting with modern 

information technology, 255

Ming-class submarines, China’s, 120–121, 127, 

137n34, 137n36, 147, 148 (table)

Ming Submarine No. 361 accident (2003), 175, 

176–177

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), China, 53

Mischief Reef, Chinese occupation and fortification of (1995), 218, 219, 241–242n12

missiles. See also surface-to-air missiles

conventional systems for, Chinese building or 

acquisition of, 24

Japan’s national defense system using, 29

Singapore navy’s procurement of, 34

Standard SM–3 Block IA, Japan and U.S. development of, 29

mission type orders, PLAN’s informatization and, 

270–271

Mitchell, William “Billy,” 211n9

Miyako Strait, PLAN task force sailing through 

(2010), 291

modeling, of complex electromagnetic conditions, 

260

Modern Navy (Dangdai Haijun). See also Gu 

Zuhua

on China’s claims to Senkakus, 52

on China’s claims to Spratlys, 48, 50–51

on China’s sea power, 85

on energy security vs. resource security, 60–62

on free trade and protection for SLOCs, 71–73

on Indian naval base in Andaman Islands, 

70–71

on Indian navy, 67–69

on maritime resources, 55–57

on piracy potential in the Malacca Strait, 64–65

on PLAN’s operational range, 98–99

on sea lane security, 63–64

on Senkakus’ strategic value, 53–54

for studying PLAN’s evolving interests and 

potential influence, 44

on Taiwan’s role as China’s gate to the Pacific, 48

on Taiwan’s sovereignty, 45, 47

on UNCLOS effect on China’s maritime interests, 59

Molniya-class fast aircraft, Russian Project 12421, 

China’s acquisition of, 158

Mullen, Mike, 38

multilateral exercises, PLAN’s engagement in, 

229–230, 288

Mulvenon, James, 253, 272

Nanking, Treaty of (1842), 198

Napoleon, 5, 194

National Defense (Guofang)

on energy security vs. resource security, 60–62

on increased naval budget and economic development, 74–75

on Indian navy, 67–68, 70

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 305 11/29/11 12
306 INDEX

on maritime resources, 55, 56

on sea lane security, 63–64

on Senkakus’ strategic value, 53

for studying PLAN’s evolving interests and 

potential influence, 44

National Defense Student Program, China, 180

National Defense University, 212n25

National Defense White Paper (2004), 186

National Defense White Paper (2006). See Defense 

White Paper (2006), China’s

National Institute for South China Sea Studies, 259

Natuna Islands gas fields, 218–219, 241n11

natural resources. See also oil resources

budgeting for PLAN’s mission and 

development of, 75–76, 288–289

importance to Chinese national security of, 220

maritime, PLAN’s case for, 57–58

offshore, China’s increased demand and, 55

PLAN’s focus on China’s increased demand for, 

54–57

security for energy resources vs., 60–62

naval blockade. See blockades

Naval Command Academy, 96. See also Feng 

Liang; Zhang Xiaolin

Naval Engineering University, China, 182

naval information, joint operations and, 264–266

Naval Military Art Research Institute, China’s, 

126, 131

naval objectives, of rising naval powers, 15

naval policy and doctrine, rising naval powers 

and, 15

naval power. See also rising powers

alliances due to, 15–16

arguments and objectives for development of, 17

arms races and, 14

combat and, 13–14

economic wealth and, 13

geopolitical consequences for modernization 

of, 17–19

political, military, and economic powers and, 12

technology and, 14–15

views and uses of by rising powers, 16–17

naval research, naval strategy changes and institutionalization of, 110

naval strategy. See also antiaccess; maritime security strategy

changes in China’s type of, 109–110

for China’s far-seas operations, 129–133

for China’s near-coast defense, 111–116

for China’s near-seas active defense, 116–129

implications for China’s shifts in, 133–135

before radar and satellites, 193–195

variables or factors for changes in, 110

navy-centric security strategy

case for, 92–93

comprehensive maritime security strategy vs.,

82, 103

navy cities, for China’s far-seas operations, 130

NCO School, Bengbu, Anhui Provence, China, 

182

near-coast defense, China’s

accounting for change in capabilities in 1970s 

and, 115–116

battlespace constraints on, 132

evolution of, 109–110

naval capabilities for, 114–115, 136n16, 136n19

as naval strategy, 111–114, 135n6

near-seas active defense, China’s

accounting for change in capabilities to, 122–126

change in naval capabilities for, 120–122

changing strategy effect on changing capabilities 

for, 126–129

evolution of, 109–110

naval modernization and, 134, 247

as naval strategy, 116, 117 (map), 118–120

Nelson, Horatio, 5, 194

Netherlands, 1, 2, 3, 4–5, 6, 13

network centric warfare, U.S. writings on, 251, 

274, 279n19

New Historic Missions, for modernized Chinese 

navy, 248, 279n6

Ni Lexiong, 97

Niu Baocheng, 41

noise issues

for conventional-powered submarines, 209–210

for guided-missile destroyers, 154–155

for guided-missile frigates, 127

for Ming-class submarines, 120

for nuclear-powered attack submarines, 

170–171n19

noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), 

PLA preparation for, 248

noncommissioned officers, PLAN’s, 180–183

North America, European colonialism in, 3, 5, 

211n7

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

British and, 7

Dutch and, 5

French navy and, 5

Portugal and, 3

Spain and, 4

U.S. and, 12

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 306 11/29/11 12
 INDEX 307

West German navy and, 9

North Korea, 86

North Sea Fleet, PLAN’s, 111, 113

North Sword 0709 exercise, 260

nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs)

China’s military modernization and, 143

China’s near-coast defense and, 114, 115

China’s near-seas active defense and, 122, 124

displacement of, 136n18, 137n40

noise reduction for, 170n19

in PLAN’s force structure, 144, 145–146, 148 

(table)

Soviet, during Cold War, 196

nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines 

(SSBNs). See also Jin-class submarines

China’s, 115–116, 120

China’s command structure for deployment of, 

272, 286n152

Type 094, China’s naval modernization and, 251

nuclear submarines, for Indian navy, 33

Nye, Joseph, 241n10

ocean survey vessels, Chinese, 231, 244n42, 254, 

280n37

Oceania, Spanish control of, 3

offshore defense, Chinese policy of, 197–199, 201 

(map)

offshore patrol vessels

Malaysia’s, 35

Thailand’s, 35

oil resources. See also natural resources

China’s increased demand for, 55

confrontation at Chunxiao natural gas field over, 

220–221, 222 (map)

imported, China’s dependence on, 131, 

139–140n75

protecting SLOCs for delivery to China of, 62, 

63, 67, 71–73

Okinawa, 192

operational art and tactics, rising naval powers 

and, 15

Opium War, first, 198

organization culture, PLA’s, 265–266, 271

Osborn, Shane, 223–224

Ottoman Empire, 1, 21n2

Outlook (Liaowang), 93

overseas Chinese, increased sea power for protection of, 87–88, 131

Pacific Forum/Center for Strategic and International Studies, 212n25

Pacific Ocean, 3, 7, 143–144, 210. See also AsiaPacific

Pakistan, 140n87, 186, 228, 230

Palk Strait, 70

Pan Shiying, 51

Paracel Islands

China’s and Vietnam’s claims to, 48

China’s seizure in 1974 of, 136n15, 219, 241n12

Chinese aircraft carrier and claims to, 292

Chinese naval base on, 140n87

disputes over, 25, 86

Filipino and Vietnamese vs. Chinese claims to, 

218

Woody Island airfield in, China’s offshore 

defense strategy and, 202

P–3C long-range maritime patrol aircraft, 33, 221

Peace-07 exercise (2007), 230, 244n39

peacekeeping, 37, 248, 279n5

Peng Guangqian, 267, 268–269, 272. See also The 

Science of Military Strategy

People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao)

on China’s claims to Senkakus, 52–54

on China’s claims to Spratlys, 48–50

on China’s maritime resources, 55, 56

on energy security vs. resource security, 60–62

on Indian navy, 67–68

on piracy potential in the Malacca Strait, 64–65

on sea lane security, 63–64

for studying PLAN’s evolving interests and 

potential influence, 44

Taiwan dispute in, 46, 47–48

People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), 

141–142, 192, 199, 205, 206–207

People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force 

(PLANAF), 152, 206–207, 224–225, 

242–243n22–32

People’s Liberation Army Navy Party 

Committee, 197

People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). See also

far-seas operations; force structure; informatization; near-coast defense; near-seas 

active defense; personnel; statecraft

antiaccess role for, 192

changing definition of haiyang quanyi and 

haifang and, 41–42

Chunxiao natural gas field confrontation with 

Japanese and, 220–221, 222 (map)

comprehensive maritime security strategy vs.

security strategy centered on, 82, 92–94

Deng’s people’s war against Soviets and, 112–113

economic development and, 74–77

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 307 11/29/11 12
308 INDEX

evolving interests and potential influence of, 

41–77

funding for, 26, 199

limited joint operations with other services by, 

289

Mao’s people’s war against Soviets and, 111–112

maritime combat buildup by, 24

on maritime rights and resource security, 54–62

on maritime sovereignty disputes, 44–54

McVadon on maritime cooperation with U.S. 

and, 245–246n53

modernization of, 247–248, 279n5, 287

modernized, nonuse of force by, 219

operational range of, 82, 97–102, 103, 129

overseas bases for, call for, 99, 101–102, 

108n102, 290

overseas bases for, China’s rise as peaceful power 

and, 134–135

overseas bases for, denial of, 245n51

overseas bases for, reports of, 140n87

on protecting sea lines of communications, 

62–74

role of, debate on, 82

scope of research on, 42–43

sea power definition debated for, 81–82

sources for studying policies of, 43–44

SSBN deployment and, 272

People’s Liberation Army (PLA). See also PLA 

Daily

on active defense, 191–192

centralized vs. decentralized command debate 

in, 269–270, 285n143

changing role and responsibility of, 41

downsizing of, 127, 138n49, 138n60

organization culture of, 265–266, 271

sources for studying policies of, 43–44

People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery, 192, 

199, 204, 208

People’s Navy, 259–260, 263, 282n74

Perry, Matthew, 9

personnel, PLAN’s

Communist Party and, 183–184

economic corruption by, 178–179

foreign influence on navy modernization and, 

184–186

improvement of, 141, 187–188

informatization and training and education for, 

259–263

leadership development for, 179–181

operational changes for, 181–183

operational deficiencies of, 176–178

preparation for high-tech war and, 175–176

recruitment and education of, 261–262

transparency issues for foreign military ties of, 

187

Peter the Great, 7, 18

Philippines, 25–26, 86, 116, 218

piracy

budgeting for PLAN’s mission and deterrence 

of, 75–76

China’s economic interests and, 289

China’s energy needs and, 73

China’s surface ships as escorts of merchant 

ships targets for, 168–169

joint exercises (2001 and 2004) for curbing, 69

in the Malacca Strait, 64–67

naval expansion in Asia-Pacific and deterrence 

of, 37

PLAN’s participation in Horn of Africa operations against, 101–102, 108n102, 233–234, 

245n50, 287

Task Force 151 and, 245n50

PLA Daily (Jiefangjun Bao)

on China’s claims to Senkakus, 52–54

on China’s claims to Spratlys, 48–50

on European port visits, 243–244n34

on Indian navy, 67–68, 70

Ma Lixin interview on Ming accident in, 

177–178

on piracy potential in the Malacca Strait, 64–65

PLAN and PLA discussions of Taiwan in, 45–48

on PLAN as an instrument of statecraft, 

236–237

on sea lane security, 63–64

for studying PLAN’s evolving interests and 

potential influence, 44

Politburo Standing Committee, China, SSBN 

deployment and, 272

political power. See also diplomacy; international 

cooperation; statecraft

naval power and, 12–13

potential Chinese antiaccess strategies against 

U.S. using, 168

for protecting China SLOCs, 73–74

port visits, by PLAN ships, 168, 228–229, 

243–244n34, 288

Portugal, 2–3, 6, 13, 16

post-modern navy concept, 38

press, Chinese, on naval informatization, 252, 

279–280n23

Project 12421 Molniya-class fast aircraft, Russian, 

158

Qing Dynasty, 1, 132

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 308 11/29/11 12
 INDEX 309

Qingdao’s 4808 Factory, 170n19

Qiongzhou, Strait of, 111

Qiuxin-class fast-attack craft, China’s, 157–158

Qu Dian military C4ISR system, 253

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 210

radars, high-powered, 194–195

radio signal intercept, 194–195

RAND, 166–168, 193

reconnaissance ships, Chinese, communications 

capabilities of, 254–255, 280n37

Reddinger, Jack, 223

regional economic interests, increasing Chinese 

sea power and protection of, 85–88

Remin University, China, 180–181

remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), China’s, 259

Ren Xiao, 263

Renmin Ribao. See People’s Daily

Republic of Korea. See South Korea

Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN), 30

Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), 34

Research Center for Evaluating Naval 

Equipment, China’s, 126

residual navies, of previously rising powers, 16

revolution in military affairs (RMA), China’s farseas operations and, 133

Revolutionary War, British invasions and, 211n7

Richelieu, Cardinal, 5

rising powers

observations, comparisons, and conclusions on, 

12–16

previous, review of, 1–12

questions regarding, 16–20

Romeo-class submarines, China’s, 114–115, 

136n17, 147

Roughead, Gary, 230, 233, 244n37

Royal Australian Air Force, 27

Royal Australian Navy (RAN), 27

Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN), 35

Royal Thai Navy (RTN), 35–36

Russia. See also Soviet Union

aircraft carrier transferred to India by, 32–33

British navy and, 6

China on regional defensive and offensive navy 

of, 139n66

China’s negotiations on naval fighters from, 160

China’s treaty solving border dispute with, 131, 

198

Chinese military modernization and, 184–185

geopolitical consequences for naval 

modernization by, 18

GLONASS satellite navigation system, China’s 

use of, 257

military budget in, 26

Pacific Fleet of, in Chinese coastal waters, 132

PLAN’s bilateral exercises with, 229–230, 

244n38

as previous rising naval power, 1, 7–8

Ryukyu Islands, 116

Sanjiang University, China, 180–181

satellites

Chinese, 253, 254, 256–258

coastal defense before radar and, 193–195

The Science of Campaigns (Zhanyi Xue)

for studying PLAN’s evolving interests and 

potential influence, 44

piracy deterrence not mentioned in, 65

on attacks against coral islands and reefs, 50, 53

on informatization, 251

on integrated C4ISR systems, 255

on joint blockade campaigns, 264–265

The Science of Military Strategy (Peng Guangqian 

and Yao Youzhi), 191–192, 198, 264, 265

The Science of Service Strategy (Junzhong Zhanlue 

Xue), 101

sea consciousness, 82, 88–89, 90, 124

sea control zone, Soviet, 196, 200 (map), 201–202

sea denial. See antiaccess

sea denial zone, Soviet, 196, 200 (map), 201, 

202–204

sea lane security, media coverage in China on, 63

sea lines of communication (SLOCs)

around Singapore, 34

budgeting for PLAN’s mission and protection 

of, 75–76

China’s near-seas active defense and, 118

China’s protection of, 42, 43

Chinese concerns on Indian control of, 70

disputes over Paracel and Spratly island chains 

and, 25–26

diversity of opinions on protection of, 62–64

foreign bases for China and protection of, 

245n51

free trade as protection for, 71–73

imported oil to China through, 131

Japanese navy’s protection of, 28

politics as protection of, 73–74

protection of, China’s military modernization 

and, 143

Soviet navy’s protection of, 7–8, 15

stronger Chinese navy as protection for, 74

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 309 11/29/11 12
310 INDEX

sea power

command of the sea vs., 105n13

extent of, 84–85

increasing, arguments for, 85–88

range of definitions for, 81–82, 83–84

sealift ships, Japanese high-speed, 28

Sealock, Neal, 243n28

search and annihilation, for China’s near-seas active defense, 119

security and stabilization operations, naval expansion in Asia-Pacific and, 37

security threats, traditional, increasing Chinese sea 

power due to, 86–87

Self-Defense Force (SDF), Japan, 28

senior officer exchanges, PLAN’s, 234–235

Senkaku Islands

China’s focus on sovereignty of, 45

Chinese aircraft carrier and claims to, 292

Chinese fisherman arrested by Japanese Coast 

Guard and, 78n17, 291

disputes over, 86

importance of Chunxiao oil and natural gas field 

vs., 221

PLA media coverage of China’s dispute with 

Japan over, 48, 52–54

Service Arms Command Academy, China, 182

severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic, 176–177

Shandong University of Science and Technology, 

180–181

Shang-class (Type 093) nuclear-power attack 

submarines, China’s

commissioning of, 148 (table), 171n33

displacement of, 137n40

in Japan’s EEZ, 231

naval modernization and, 144, 145–146, 251

near-seas active defense and, 122

noise issues for, 170–171n19

production of, 170n17

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 198

Shenzhen destroyer, European port visits by, 229

Shi Lang. See Varyag aircraft carrier

Shi Yunsheng, 197, 234–235

shipbuilding industry, China, civil-military integration of, 128–129

short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft, 27, 39n13

simulation, of complex electromagnetic conditions, 260

Singapore, 25–26, 34

Sino-Japanese War (1894), 14, 132

Sino-Russian Good Neighborly Treaty of Friendship (2002), 198

slavery, Dutch navy and, 4

SLOCs. See sea lines of communication

small battle groups, China’s far-seas operations 

and, 130, 139n70

SMD (Seabased Midcourse Defense), 27, 29

soft power, China’s use of, 218, 229, 241n10

Song-class submarines

China’s commissioning of, 148 (table), 171n33

China’s naval modernization and, 122, 137n39, 

144, 147, 251

shadowing USS Kitty Hawk (2006), 233, 

245n46–49

Yuan-class submarines and, 146

Soryu-class diesel-electric submarines, Japanese, 29

South America, European colonialism in, 3, 5

South Atlantic Ocean, Portuguese dominance of, 2

South China Sea. See also China Seas

China’s claimed territory in, 89 (map), 288

China’s claims to Spratlys in, 48–51, 199

China’s near-seas active defense and, 116

China’s offshore defense strategy for, 202

as Chinese core interest, 238, 289, 291

digital chart of, 259

F–8 and EP–3 collision (2001) over, 60, 223–225, 

242–243n22–32

first and second island chains in, 88 (map)

as historical Chinese waters, Chinese government on, 76

as historical Chinese waters, UNCLOS and, 51

South Korea

blockade of Malacca Strait effects on, 72

China’s disputes over fisheries areas and quotas 

of, 86

Chinese aircraft carrier and naval program of, 

291–292

military budget in, 26

recent naval developments in, 30–32

territorial disputes and naval expansion by, 

25–26

U.S. Air Force bases in, 192

South Sea Fleet, PLAN’s, 111

Southeast Asia. See also ASEAN states; Asia-Pacific

naval expansion in, 23

recent naval developments in, 34–36

sovereignty disputes. See territorial disputes

Soviet Ocean Surveillance System (SOSS), 196, 203

Soviet Union. See also Russia

Chinese border dispute with, 125

Chinese military modernization and, 185

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 310 11/29/11 12
 INDEX 311

Cold War maritime defensive strategy of, 142, 

195–196, 200 (map), 201

Deng’s people’s war against, 112–113

intelligence-collecting vessels sent to distant 

waters by, 226

Liu Huaqing on incremental naval development 

by, 138n63

Mao’s people’s war against, 111–112

nuclear deterrent forces of, 14

PLAN’s near-coast defense against, 113–114

Victor III-class SSNs, 145

Sovremenny-class guided-missile destroyers 

(DDGs)

China’s naval modernization and, 24, 121–122, 

127, 153, 250

in Chunxiao gas field area (2005), 220–221, 222 

(map)

displacement of, 137n37

space-based C4ISR, Chinese improvement of, 

255–256

Spain, 1, 3–4, 6, 13, 16

Spratly Islands

China’s focus on sovereignty of, 45

China’s seizure in 1988 of, 219, 241n12

Chinese aircraft carrier and claims to, 292

Chinese naval development in 1980s and dispute over, 125

Chinese occupation and fortification of Mischief 

Reef in (1995), 218

disputes over, 25, 86, 199

PLA media coverage of China’s claims to, 48–51

Vietnam and, 36

Sri Lanka, 228

Stalin, Josef, 7

State Oceanic Administration (SOA), China, 257

statecraft

conventional and traditional use of PLAN as 

instrument of, 227–236

future prospects for Chinese and American, 

238–240

gunboat diplomacy in place of, 219–227

PLAN as instrument of, 236–237

proclaiming preference for, 216–219

Zheng He’s nonuse of maritime power force for, 

215, 216

Stipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime 

Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and 

Mapping, 258

Strategic Forces Bureau, China’s SSBN force and, 

272

Strategic Project for Talented People, PLA’s, 262

Su–33 Flanker D naval fighters, 161

Su–30 Flanker naval fighters, Malaysia’s, 26

Su–33 Flanker naval fighters, 149, 171n38

Su–30 MKK 2 Flanker land-based fighters, 

161–162, 206

Submarine Academy, China, 182

submarines. See also nuclear-powered attack submarines; nuclear-powered ballistic missile 

submarines; nuclear submarines; specific 

classes of

China’s, ambush and sabotage by, 135n10

China’s, characteristics of, 144

China’s acquisition and building of, 121–122

China’s antiaccess campaign and, 207–208

China’s commissioning of, 147–148, 148 (table)

China’s nuclear-powered vs. conventional, 

148–149

Chinese simulations for training in, 260, 282n81

conventional-powered, quietness of, 209–210

increases in, for Republic of Korea Navy, 31–32

of Indian navy, 33

Japanese, 28, 29

in layered defense, 203

Malaysia’s acquisition of, 35

of Royal Australian Navy, 28

Singapore navy’s procurement of, 34

Sunda Strait, 70

supervision and inspection, high-bandwidth 

secure communications and, 267–268

suppression of outlaying islands, for China’s nearseas active defense, 118–119

surface action group, PLAN’s, in Western Pacific 

(2010), 234

surface combatants, in layered defense, 203–204

surface-to-air missiles

SM–2 Block IIIA, for KDX–II ships, 31

SM–2 Standard, for Royal Australian Navy, 27

surveillance

for China’s antiaccess campaign, 205–206

China’s conventionally-powered submarines 

and, 207

of ocean approaches to China, 202–203

Swartz, Peter, 292

T-AGOS ocean surveillance ships, U.S., 243n32

Taiwan. See also antiaccess; Taiwan contingency

abandonment of independence efforts by, 

138n59

assertiveness of, PLAN’s budget and, 76

China’s concerns on U.S. arms sales to, 238

China’s far-seas operations and, 131

China’s focus on sovereignty of, 43, 45, 47–48, 

77n3

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 311 11/29/11 12
312 INDEX

China’s naval modernization and, 247–248, 

278n4

China’s near-seas active defense and, 116, 

118–119, 127

China’s offshore defense strategy and independence declaration by, 204–205

China’s potential military options regarding, 

173n76, 173n77

Chinese gunboat diplomacy and, 227

Chinese national security and, 220

Chinese naval development in 1980s and dispute over, 125

dispute over, as reason for increasing Chinese 

sea power, 86

dispute over, China’s military modernization 

and, 143

as disputed island, 199

disputes over and naval expansion by, 25–26

Dutch occupation of, 4

Japanese control of, 10, 14

maritime security strategy and issue of, 103–104

National Security Bureau of, on China’s DF–21D 

ASBMs, 258

PLAN’s bilateral exercises with Russia as threat 

to, 229–230

Portugal and, 2

Taiwan contingency. See also antiaccess

China’s naval modernization and, 287–288

China’s potential military options for, 164–166, 

205, 289

Han-class submarine encounter (2004) and, 

232–233

military conflict potential over, 127, 131

Taiwan Expedition (by Japan, 1874), 9

Taiwan Strait, 111, 118, 141, 202, 204–205

Taiwanese independence forces. See Kuomintang 

(KMT) forces

Taiwanese Navy, 132

Tang Fuquan, 59, 60, 74

Task Force 151, 245n50

task-oriented command style, PLA on, 270

technology. See also information technologies

availability of, changes in naval strategy and, 

110, 127–129, 138n64

centralized command and control and, 267

China’s transformation to far-seas operations 

and, 134

English navy’s investment in, 6

foreign, Liu’s construction and deployment of 

Luhus and, 126, 138n54

mineral resources for, in oceans near China, 

131, 140n76

naval development in 1980s and, 125

naval superiority and flow of, 14–15

neutrality of, 38

for nuclear submarines, Mao on national identity and, 115–116

professional education and training in China on, 

180–181

territorial disputes

China’s borders with various countries as, 86, 125

China’s potential force structure options in, 168

Chinese national security and, 220

Chinese ships in Japan’s EEZ and, 231

islands offshore China including Taiwan and, 43

maritime, China’s military modernization and, 

143, 288, 291

naval expansion in Asia-Pacific and, 25–26, 37

over borders, China’s resolution of, 131, 197, 198

over Taiwan, South China Sea, and East China 

Sea, 44–54

PLA Daily on EP–3 incident (2001) as, 60

war between India and China over (1962), 228

territorial integrity, 86

territorial waters. See also EEZs

definition of, 104n9

innocent passage through, China’s questioning 

of, 59–60

islands in South China Sea as China’s claim for, 50

terrorism, 64, 66–67, 73

Thailand, 35–36, 186

theater-range ballistic missiles (TBMs), 142, 169n3

Theory of National Security Strategy (Guojia Anquan Zhanlue Lilun) (2006), 100

Thousand-Ship Navy, Mullen’s proposal for, 38

threat-based planning, Chinese equivalent of, 198

threats, to rising naval powers, 15

Tiananmen Square incident (1989), 172n43, 180, 

185, 229

Tianlian data relay satellites, China’s, 256, 258

Tibet, China and ethnic unrest in, 135

Till, Geoffrey, 38

TNI (Indonesian armed forces), 34–35

Tonkin Gulf, China’s offshore defense strategy 

for, 202

torpedo, gun, and missile boats, for China’s nearcoast defense, 113, 114–115

Triservice Tactical Information Distributed Network, Chinese, 253

Turkey, 21n2, 21n6

two state theory (liangguo lun), PLA Daily criticism of, 47–48

Two Transformations program, informatization 

and, 249

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 312 11/29/11 12
 INDEX 313

Type 071 amphibious ships, PLAN’s, 158–159

Type 081 amphibious ships, PLAN’s potential, 

159–160

U-boats, German, 194–195

underway replenishment ships, 152, 287

United Kingdom, 26, 186, 228. See also Britain

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

(UNCLOS). See also international law

China’s claim of historical waters in South China 

Sea under, 51

and China’s increased demand for natural 

resources, 58–60

China’s maritime sovereignty rights under, 45

dissatisfaction in China with elements of, 76

on maritime national territory scope, 98, 99

vague areas in, domestic Chinese laws to supplement, 74

United Nations (UN) Command, Korean Peninsula and, 30

United States. See also United States Department 

of Defense; United States Navy

British navy and, 6–7, 16

China on view of South China Sea disputes by, 

50–51

China’s claims to Senkakus and, 54

China’s concern on India’s cooperation with, 69

China’s military modernization and denying 

access to, 142

China’s protection of SLOCs and, 62–63, 67

China’s territorial disputes with Japan and, 199

Chinese military modernization and, 185–186

declaration to control world’s 16 key straits by 

(1986), 67

declining and redefined military role on Korean 

Peninsula of, 30

Dutch navy and, 5

French navy and, 5

geopolitical consequences for naval modernization by, 18

Han-class submarine encounter with Kitty Hawk

of, 221, 223, 242n19, 242n21

Japan’s alliance with, 10

Joint Maritime Search and Rescue exercises with 

China and, 186

Liu Huaqing on incremental naval development 

by, 138n63

military conflict potential over Taiwan and, 127, 

131

military forces used as instrument of statecraft 

by, 240

missile defense coverage for Japan by, 29

Modern Navy on terrorism response by, 66–67

navies of formerly rising powers allied with, 16

as nonsignatory to UNCLOS, 59

nuclear deterrent forces of, 14

potential Chinese antiaccess strategies against, 

166–168

potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan and, 205

as previous rising naval power, 1, 10–12

reduction in Asia-Pacific military interest and 

presence by, 24–25

Statement of Principles signed with Royal Australian Navy, 27–28

task-oriented command style in Gulf War of, 270

technology needs of fueling economic growth 

of, 75

United States Air Force, 195

United States Department of Defense (DOD)

on amphibious operations, 173n76

on antiaccess and area denial, 191

on China’s experience in joint operations, 266

on China’s Jin-class submarines, 145

on China’s JL–2 sea-launched ballistic missile, 

290

on China’s land-based ballistic missile and cruise 

missile program, 258

on China’s move toward maritime antiaccess 

force, 142

on China’s potential military options in 

Taiwan contingencies, 164–166

on China’s Shang-class SSNs, 145

on China’s space-based C4ISR and targeting 

capabilities, 255–256

on PLA’s 1990’s telecommunications infrastructure, 253

United States GPS satellite navigation system, 

China’s use of, 257

United States Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS), 253

United States Navy. See also Impeccable; Kitty 

Hawk; United States Office of Naval Intelligence

China’s offshore defense strategy as challenge 

for, 209

Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) of, 

37–38

debate on increasing China’s cooperation with, 96

EP–3 collision with PLAN fighter aircraft 

(2001), 222 (map), 223–225

far-oceans offensive operations of, China on, 

139n66

Global Maritime Partnership, PLAN and, 235

maritime strategy to defeat Soviet strategy of 

1980s of, 214n49

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 313 11/29/11 12
314 INDEX

McVadon on maritime cooperation with China 

and, 245–246n53

PLAN’s engagement in bilateral exercises with, 

229, 244n37

Proliferation Security Initiative, PLAN and, 235

7th Fleet of, deployed in China Seas, 132

targeting Soviets during Cold War, 195–197

Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry-class 

amphibious ships of, 158

United States Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), 

144, 145, 207, 237, 265

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), PLAN’s, 162, 259

unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), 

PLAN’s, 162, 259

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 193

Varyag aircraft carrier, China’s, 149–153, 162, 

171n38, 291–292

Vellucci, Frederic, 288

Vietnam

China’s territorial disputes with, 291

China’s treaty solving border dispute with, 131, 

198

Chinese border dispute with, 86, 125

Paracels claimed by China and, 48

recent naval developments in, 36

Spratly Islands claimed by China and, 218

territorial disputes and naval expansion by, 

25–26

VMAF21 (Versatile Malaysian Armed Forces of 

the 21st Century), 35

VSAT communications system, Chinese, 254

Wang Shouye, 175, 178–179

Wang Shumei, 74, 76

Wang Wei, 223, 243n29

Wang Zhiyuan, 150, 151, 152

War of 1812, British invasion and, 211n7

War Theories and Strategic Studies Department 

(AMS), 84, 86, 93, 100

Warsaw Pact, 8, 9

Washington Treaty (1922), 10

Wen Yufu, 91

Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), 229, 

244n35

Wilhelm II, emperor of Germany, 8

Willard, Robert, 191, 291

Wochi-class mine countermeasures (MCM) ships, 

PLAN’s, 160

World War II, naval strategy in, 194, 211n10

Wozang-class mine countermeasures (MCM) 

ships, PLAN’s, 160

Wu Shengli, 140n84, 247, 248, 278n4, 279n5

Wuhan Shipbuilding Industry Co., 146

Xia-class submarines, China’s, 120–121, 137n34

Xian Aircraft, 162

Xinjiang region, China, ethnic unrest in, 135

Xiu Bin, 95

Xu Lifan, 88

Xu Qiyu, 85

Xu Xuehou, 59

Xue Litai, 272

Yang Chengjun, 187

Yang Huaiqing, 85

Yang Shangkun, 197

Yang Yi, 238, 245n51, 263

Yao Wenhuai, 74–75, 76, 85

Yao Youzhi, 267, 268–269, 272

Yaogan 2–11 synthetic-aperture radar (SAR), 256

Ye Zicheng, 83, 85, 93, 97

Yellow Sea, 116, 202, 238. See also China Seas

Yi Jianshan Islands, controlled by KMT forces, 

China’s capture of, 135n8

Yin Zhuo, 101, 102, 290

Yuan-class submarines

China’s commissioning of, 148 (table), 171n26

China’s naval modernization and, 24, 121, 122, 

144, 146, 251, 290

as surprise for intelligence community, 171n25

Yubei-class landing craft, PLAN’s (LCUs), 160

Yunshu-class landing ships, PLAN’s (LSMs), 160

Yuting I-class landing ships, PLAN’s (LSTHs), 160

Yuting II-class landing ships, PLAN’s (LSTs), 160

Zhai Kun, 97

Zhang Dengyi, 91, 94–95

Zhang Dingfa, 133, 140n84

Zhang Gang, 65, 67, 70

Zhang Shiping, 58

Zhang Wenmu, 83, 84–85, 87–88

Zhang Xiaolin, 95

Zhang Zhaozhong, 50, 51

Zhao Hongtu, 72–73

Zhao Yu, 225, 243n29, 243n31

Zhejiang University, 180–181

Zheng He, 215, 240

Zheng He training ship visit to U.S., 228

Zhenggong Xuekan (Journal of Political Work), 90

Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, 44. See also China Military 

Science

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 314 11/29/11 12
 315

About the Contributors

The Editors

Phillip C. Saunders is a Distinguished Research Fellow and Director of 

Studies at the Center for Strategic Research, part of National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies. He also serves as Director of the 

Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs. Dr. Saunders previously worked 

at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where he was Director of the 

East Asia Nonproliferation Program from 1999 to 2003, and served as an officer 

in the U.S. Air Force from 1989 to 1994. Dr. Saunders is co-author with David C. 

Gompert of The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Era of 

Vulnerability (NDU Press, 2011), and co-author with Joshua K. Wisemn of Buy, 

Build, or Steal: China’s Quest for Advanced Military Aviation Technologies, China 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 4 (NDU Press, October 2011). He has published 

numerous articles and book chapters on China and Asian security issues. He 

attended Harvard College and received his M.P.A. and Ph.D. in International 

Relations from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University. 

Christopher D. Yung is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for 

Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense 

University. He specializes in Chinese military and national security affairs, as 

well as East Asian security issues. Dr. Yung previously worked at the Center for 

Naval Analyses from 1991 to 2009, serving in assignments at the Pentagon and 

in operational commands with the Navy and the Marine Corps. Dr. Yung is the 

author of China’s Out of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles and Potential Solutions (NDU Press, 2010) as well as numerous articles 

and reports on China and Asia defense issues. He received both his M.A. and 

Ph.D. in International Relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 

International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University.

Michael Swaine is a Senior Associate in the Asia Program of the 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in Chinese security and foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and East Asian international 

relations. He is the author of several monographs on security policy in the 

region. He came to the Carnegie Endowment after 12 years at the RAND 

Corporation, where he was a Senior Political Scientist in international relations 

and Research Director of the RAND Center for Asia-Pacific Policy. He was the 

first recipient of the RAND Center for Asia-Pacific Policy Chair in Northeast 

Asian Security in recognition of his exceptional contributions in his field. 

Prior to RAND, Swaine was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for Chinese 

Studies, University of California at Berkeley, and Research Associate at Harvard 

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 315 11/29/11 12
316 ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

University. He attended the Taipei and Tokyo Inter-University Centers for 

Language Study, administered by Stanford University, for training in Mandarin 

Chinese and Japanese.

Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang has been serving as the Deputy Minister for 

Policy, Special Appointment Rank, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of 

China, since September 2009. He has also been the Assistant Professor at the 

National Sun Yat-sen University in Kaohsiung since 2006. He was the Secretary General of the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS) from 

1991 to September 2009. CAPS primarily focuses on studying and analyzing 

the strategic and security aspects of the PRC’s domestic and international situation, particularly of cross-strait relations. He has published numerous articles 

and book chapters on China and PLA issues.

The Authors

Richard A. Bitzinger is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School 

of International Studies, focusing on Asia-Pacific security and defense, military modernization and force transformation, regional defense industries, 

and proliferation. He has written several monographs and book chapters, and 

his articles have appeared in International Security, Orbis, China Quarterly, 

and Survival. He is the author of Towards a Brave New Arms Industry? 

(Oxford University Press, 2003), “Come the Revolution: Transforming the 

Asia-Pacific’s Militaries,” Naval War College Review (Fall 2005), Transforming 

the U.S. Military: Implications for the Asia-Pacific (ASPI, December 2006), and 

“Military Modernization in the Asia-Pacific,” Asia’s Rising Power (NBR, 

2010). Mr. Bitzinger was an Associate Professor with the Asia-Pacific Center 

for Security Studies in Honolulu, and has worked for RAND, the Center for 

Strategic and Budgetary Affairs, and the U.S. Government. He holds a master’s 

degree from the Monterey Institute of International Affairs. 

Michael S. Chase is an Associate Research Professor in the Warfare 

Analysis and Research Department at the Naval War College. He also serves as 

Director of the Mahan Scholars research group. Dr. Chase previously taught in 

the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College and served as a 

Research Analyst with Defense Group, Inc., and the RAND Corporation. Dr. 

Chase has published numerous articles and book chapters on China and Asian 

security issues. He attended Brandeis University and received his M.A. and 

Ph.D. from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at the 

Johns Hopkins University.

Andrew S. Erickson is an Associate Professor in and founding member of the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), and 

an Associate in Research at Harvard’s Fairbank Center. During the 2010–2011 

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 316 11/29/11 12
 ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS 317

academic year, Dr. Erickson was a  Fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China 

and the World Program. From 2008 to 2011, he was a Fellow in the National 

Committee on U.S.-China Relations’ Public Intellectuals Program. Proficient 

in Chinese and Japanese, Dr. Erickson received his Ph.D. and M.A. from 

Princeton and his B.A. from Amherst College. He is coeditor of and contributor to the Naval Institute Press book series, “Studies in Chinese Maritime 

Development,” comprising, most recently, Chinese Aerospace Power (2011). He 

is also cofounder of China SignPostTM 洞察中国 (www.chinasignpost.com), and 

can be reached via www.andrewerickson.com.

M. Taylor Fravel is Associate Professor of Political Science and member 

of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 

Dr. Fravel is a graduate of Middlebury College and Stanford University, where 

he received his Ph.D. He has been a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Olin Institute for 

Strategic Studies at Harvard University, a Predoctoral Fellow at the Center for 

International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, a Fellow with the 

Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program, and a Visiting Scholar at the 

American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He also has graduate degrees from the 

London School of Economics and Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes 

Scholar. His publications include Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and 

Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton, 2008).

Daniel M. Hartnettis the Senior Policy Analyst for Military and Security Affairs at the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Prior 

to joining the Commission, he worked as a China Analyst at the Center for 

Naval Analyses where he researched issues related to China’s military modernization. Mr. Hartnett is a former U.S. Army linguist, and has worked at the 

Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. He holds 

an M.A. in Asian Studies from the Elliott School of International Affairs at the 

George Washington University and a B.A. in Chinese from the University of 

Massachusetts at Amherst. He is currently studying toward his Ph.D. in political science at George Mason University.

Nan Li is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department of 

the U.S. Naval War College and a member of its China Maritime Studies Institute. He was a John M. Olin Fellow at Harvard University and a senior fellow at 

the U.S. Institute of Peace, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in 

Singapore, and at the East Asia Institute of the National University of Singapore. 

He has published numerous journal articles and book chapters and a few edited 

volumes and monographs on Chinese security and military policy. Dr. Nan Li 

received a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Johns Hopkins University.

At the time this chapter was written, Alexander Liebman was a Ph.D. 

candidate in Political Science at Harvard University, from which he graduated 

990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 317 11/29/11 12
318 ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

in 2009. Prior to his doctorate, Alex earned a B.A in History at Yale University 

and spent two years in Ningbo, China, as a Yale-China Fellow. Dr. Liebman 

currently works in management consulting in East Asia.

Michael McDevitt, a retired Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, is Senior 

Fellow in the Strategic Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses. Rear 

Admiral McDevitt held four at-sea commands, including an aircraft carrier 

battle group. He received a B.A. in U.S. History from the University of Southern California and an M.A. in American Diplomatic History from Georgetown 

University. He was a Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group Fellow at the Naval War College. He is also a graduate of the National War College. He was the Director of the East Asia Policy office for the Secretary of Defense during the George H.W. Bush administration. He also served as the Director for Strategy, War Plans, and Policy (J5) for U.S. Pacific Command. Rear 

Admiral McDevitt concluded 34 years of active duty as Commandant of the 

National War College. He has been an active participant in conferences on 

maritime security issues and U.S. security policy and has had a number of 

papers published in edited volumes on these subjects. His personal expertise is 

East Asia, and his most recent research focus has been the maritime dimension 

of China’s national strategy.

Eric A. McVadon retired from the U.S. Navy as a Rear Admiral. He is a 

consultant on East Asian security affairs and Senior Advisor for the Institute 

for Foreign Policy Analysis on international security in the Asia-Pacific region. In his naval career, he was the Defense and Naval Attaché at U.S. Embassy 

Beijing 1990–1992; Deputy Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy on the Navy 

Staff; Deputy Director of the Defense Mapping Agency; and Commander, 

Iceland Defense Force. A naval aviator with extensive antisubmarine warfare 

experience, he commanded a P–3C squadron and the air station in Iceland, 

and was assistant navigator of an attack aircraft carrier. A graduate of Tulane 

University, Mr. McVadon has a master’s degree in International Affairs from 

George Washington University. A distinguished graduate of the National War 

College, he is also a graduate of the Naval War College and Naval Postgraduate 

School. His writings have been published in Asia as well as the West.

Ronald O’Rourke has worked as a Naval Analyst for the Congressional 

Research Service of the Library of Congress. He has written numerous reports 

for Congress on various issues relating to the Navy. He regularly briefs Members of Congress and Congressional staffers, and has testified before Congressional committees on several occasions. Mr. O’Rourke is the author of several 

journal articles on naval issues, and is a past winner of the U.S. Naval Institute’s 

Arleigh Burke essay contest. Mr. O’Rourke is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the 

Johns Hopkins University, where he received a B.A. in International Studies; and 
 ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS 319

was a valedictorian graduate of the University’s Paul Nitze School of Advanced 

International Studies, where he received his M.A. in the same field.

Susan M. Puska is a Senior Intelligence Analyst at the Center for 

Intelligence Research and Analysis, Defense Group, Inc., focusing on emerging dual-use technologies, military modernization, logistics operations, and 

innovation issues. She retired from the U.S. Army as a Colonel in 2005, where 

she served as an Ordnance Officer and China Foreign Area Officer. She also 

served as the Army Attaché (2001–2003), and Assistant Army Attaché (1992–

1994), Defense Attaché Office, U.S. Embassy, Beijing. She has published on 

various topics of Chinese military modernization, crisis management, training, and logistics. She received a B.A. in Archeology from Michigan State 

University and an M.A. in China Studies from the University of Michigan. 

She is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College and attended the Johns 

Hopkins–Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies. She 

will be awarded a Global Executive M.B.A. in May 2012.

Peter M. Swartz has been a senior analyst at the Center for Naval 

Analyses (CNA) since 1993. Before that he was an officer in the U.S. Navy, 

retiring as a Captain.  At CNA he specializes in studies on naval strategy, 

operations, organization, and history. In the Navy, he served in Vietnam during 

the war; was a principal author of The Maritime Strategy of the 1980s; and was 

Special Assistant to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell during the Gulf War. He holds a B.A. in International Relations from Brown 

University, an M.A. in International Relations from the Paul Nitze School of 

Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and an M.Phil. in Political Science from 

Columbia University. He has taught in military and civilian universities and 

has published numerous chapters and articles.

At the time of writing, Frederic Vellucci was an analyst in the China 

Studies division at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). Mr. Vellucci holds 

an M.A. in Asian Studies from the Elliott School of International Affairs at 

The George Washington University and a B.A. in History and Chinese from 

the University of Buffalo. He has studied Mandarin Chinese at the Beijing 

Polytechnic University, Capital Normal University, and at the HopkinsNanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies in Nanjing, China. At CNA, 

Mr. Vellucci’s research focused on U.S.-China relations, Chinese regional 

engagement strategy, military modernization, and naval strategy.
This timely and superbly edited book contains uniformly informative and wellwritten essays addressing one of the most important issues in the present-day 

international arena and the primary, long-term issue facing U.S. national security: 

the challenges posed by a growing, modernizing China. The Chinese Navy: 

Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles is a work that addresses all aspects of the 

role played by China’s navy in Beijing’s current accomplishments and future intentions. It is that rare collection of essays by different authors that richly deserves 

reading from cover to cover.

—Dr. Bernard D. Cole, Professor of International History, National War College

Author, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-first Century (Naval 

Institute Press, 2010) 

China’s rise and the new international equities it is creating are nowhere more 

apparent than in the expanding capabilities and activities of the People’s Liberation 

Army Navy (PLAN). The contributors and editors of The Chinese Navy: Expanding 

Capabilities, Evolving Roles reach well beyond simply counting hardware to bring 

analytical sunshine into this crowded field. They explore the development of this 

increasingly global force, reaching well beyond military factors, to show the 

dynamic interactions of internal pressures, historic factors, geographic realities, 

technological changes, and doctrinal influences to provide the reader with a framework to organize observations and analysis. The insights here will prove valuable 

not only to maritime strategists, but to every American concerned with the course 

of Asian and world events.

—Lieutenant General Wallace Gregson (USMC, Ret.),

former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs

Free, unfettered access to the maritime domain is an essential element of economic growth and global stability. This timely book does a masterful job of addressing 

the many issues attendant to the PLAN’s potential opportunities and challenges as 

they decide how best to use their naval forces.

—Admiral Timothy J. Keating (USN, Ret.),

former Commander, United States Pacific Command

The Chinese Navy 

Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles

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