About the Report

This report evaluates the eighth Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Treaty (NPT) review conference, which was held May 3–28, 

2010, in New York, and examines the core issues debated at 

the conference: nuclear proliferation, nuclear disarmament, 

access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the creation of 

a weapons of mass destruction–free zone in the Middle East. 

Although it finds that the conference was a qualified success, 

it warns that states parties must fulfill the commitments made 

there to ensure the future of the treaty. The report is informed 

by the author’s experiences as an active participant in and 

observer of the nonproliferation debates that have taken place 

over the past three decades.

Jayantha Dhanapala was a Jennings Randolph Senior Visiting 

Scholar at the United States Institute of Peace from March to 

June 2010. He formerly served as ambassador of Sri Lanka to 

the United States, as president of the 1995 NPT Review and 

Extension Conference, and as UN under-secretary-general for 

disarmament affairs from 1998 to 2003. 

This report represents the author’s personal views. He wishes 

to thank the president and staff of the United States Institute 

of Peace for the experience of working there.

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 258 October 2010

© 2010 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Jayantha Dhanapala

Evaluating the 2010 

NPT Review Conference

Summary

•	 The 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons (NPT) concluded on May 28, with the states parties agreeing to a final document 

that reiterated their commitment to nuclear disarmament. This expression of solidarity was 

important for reaffirming the treaty’s legitimacy in the wake of the seventh review conference in 2005, which failed to yield a final document.

•	 The 2010 final document was also important in the face of long-standing tensions between 

the five nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the 185 non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) that 

are party to the treaty and nuclear weapon–related developments that had raised serious 

questions about the treaty’s efficacy as a nonproliferation instrument.

•	 With all that weighed against it, the 2010 Review Conference benefited from a number of 

trends and developments, including an international atmosphere conducive to multilateralism in general and nuclear disarmament in particular.

•	 Despite more propitious circumstances than in the past, the 2010 Review Conference 

opened amid great uncertainty and proceeded in three distinct phases—the plenary 

debate, the negotiations in the main committees, and the return to the plenary for a tense 

seesaw before the final denouement between pessimistic prospects of failure and optimistic 

expectations of success. 

•	 Much of the discussion centered on debates between NWS and NNWS on the four main 

pillars of the NPT: nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, access to peaceful uses 

of nuclear energy, and the creation of a weapons of mass destruction–free zone (WMDFZ) 

in the Middle East.

•	 Although the ultimate adoption of a final document was an important and welcome 

development for the future of the NPT, the central bargain of the NPT (disarmament, nonproliferation, and access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy) remains unfulfilled. Further, 

the conflict in the Middle East presents an increasingly significant obstacle to the treaty’s 

future effectiveness.

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Contents

Introduction 2

The Context 2

The Conference 4

The Debates 7

The Future of the NPT 12

Recommendations 13
2

•	 Good-faith implementation of the document’s action plan will be crucial for keeping the 

nonproliferation regime from fraying, as will progress on the new Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by the United States.

•	 The future course of the Six-Nation Talks on North Korea, the resolution of the questions 

about Iran’s nuclear program, and the outcomes of the 2012 conference on a WMDFZ in 

the Middle East will also determine the future of the NPT. 

Introduction

The 2010 Review Conference on the NPT concluded on May 28, with the states parties 

agreeing to a final document that reiterated their commitment to nuclear disarmament. This 

unexpected expression of solidarity was important for reaffirming the treaty’s legitimacy in 

the wake of the 2005 Review Conference, which failed to yield a final document, in the face 

of long-standing tensions between the five nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the 185 nonnuclear weapon states (NNWS) that are party to the treaty, and in the context of nuclear 

weapon related developments that raised serious questions about the treaty’s efficacy as a 

nonproliferation instrument.

The NPT, which was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, is the world’s most 

widely subscribed to disarmament treaty, with 190 states party to it at present.1 NWS are 

obliged, as parties to the treaty, to negotiate the reduction and elimination of their weapons and to ensure that NNWS, especially developing countries, have full access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as an “inalienable right.”2 NNWS are prohibited from acquiring 

nuclear weapons, but they may run peaceful nuclear energy programs as long as they make 

safeguard arrangements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that ensure 

the programs are not employed for nonpeaceful purposes.3

After providing a brief survey of the challenges that the NPT has faced in the recent 

past and of key developments in the nuclear nonproliferation arena, this report offers a 

high-level review of the 2010 Review Conference and then examines the issues and debates 

surrounding the four main pillars of the NPT: nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, the accessibility of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the creation of a weapons of 

mass destruction–free zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East. It concludes with reflections on 

the future of the NPT and offers recommendations to ensure that the treaty remains the 

cornerstone of the international nonproliferation regime. 

The Context

The NPT has long been strained by allegations from the NNWS that the NWS have not 

reduced their nuclear arsenals sufficiently per the terms of Article 6 of the treaty, have not 

provided treaty-based guarantees that NNWS will not be attacked with nuclear weapons, and 

in general have enjoyed a monopoly of nuclear weapon possession without moving toward a 

nuclear weapon–free world. The treaty has been further weakened by the discovery of Iraq’s 

clandestine nuclear weapon program in the early 1990s, the withdrawal of the Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from the NPT and its subsequent nuclear weapon tests, 

the acknowledgment and rectification of Libya’s noncompliance, the persisting questions 

about a reported Syrian nuclear reactor destroyed by Israel, and the continuing tensions 

over Iran’s nuclear program.

In addition to the long-entrenched tensions over persistent proliferation questions about 

the DPRK, Iran, and Syria and the demand for new proliferation barriers (“gold standards”), 

such as the universalization of the IAEA additional protocol and the “multilateralization” of 

the fuel cycle, the review conference faced the potential for a repeat of 2005 for a number of 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor 

of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, 

D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American 

University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, James R. 

Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. • Ikram U. 

Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, 

Nev. • Kerry Kennedy, Human Rights Activist • Stephen D. 

Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor 

of Law, George Mason University, Arlington, Va. • Judy Van 

Rest, Executive Vice President, International Republican 

Institute, Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy •

Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
3

key reasons. The domestic U.S. debate over Iran, which included partisan posturing between 

the Republican right wing and the Obama administration, rumors about an imminent preemptive strike on Iran by Israel, and the threat of additional sanctions on Iran all promised 

another conference breakdown, as did the precedent created by the Nuclear Suppliers Group 

(NSG) on September 6, 2008, which, at the urging of the United States, granted India privileges hitherto reserved for NPT non-nuclearweapon states, causing fears that Israel would 

be the next country to be so favored. The problem of deciding how to implement the 1995 

NPT resolution that called for a WMDFZ in the Middle East also suggested that the states 

parties would fail to adopt a final document by consensus. 

The preparatory committee meeting in May 2009—the final meeting before the 2010 

Review Conference—succeeded in clearing the underbrush of procedural problems that had 

bedeviled the failed 2005 Review Conference. That said, the more important adoption of 

recommendations to be conveyed by the preparatory committee to the review conference 

ran aground on the tensions that had plagued the NWS and NNWS since the NPT was signed 

and suggested a retread of the past. This difficulty was a reminder that more political repairs 

were needed in advance of and during the conference and that proclaimed policy changes 

had to be translated into practice.

With all that weighed against it, the 2010 Review Conference did benefit from a number 

of trends and developments. To begin, an international atmosphere conducive to multilateralism in general and nuclear disarmament in particular had undoubtedly been created prior 

to the conference: First, by the groundbreaking op-eds in the Wall Street Journal by four U.S. 

elder statesmen—George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, and William Perry—that possessed a rare display of bipartisan apostasy over the Cold War sacred cows of nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons; and second, by the elevation of this opinion to public policy by 

President Barack Obama in his April 2009 speech in Prague, which was both dramatically 

bold and pragmatically circumscribed. 

While public opinion and civil society organizations applauded Obama’s vision, atmosphere is a limited driver of global decision making and thus governments around the world 

reacted cautiously to it. Even though Obama’s speech had failed to cast a spell over the 

international community, the nonproliferation regime made undeniable progress over the 

following year for a number of reasons. First, the two major NWS—the United States and 

Russia—which together own 95 percent of the nuclear weapons in the world, negotiated a 

new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in a welcome return to seriously negotiated, 

verifiable, and irreversible disarmament treaties. Second, a new U.S. Nuclear Posture Review 

was announced, greatly reducing the likelihood of the actual use of nuclear weapons and 

providing security assurances for the majority of NNWS. Third, UN Security Council Resolution 1887, which resulted from the September 2009 G-20 summit presided over by President 

Obama, signaled a new emphasis on nuclear nonproliferation (though the resolution’s disarmament component was considered by the NNWS to be slight, with the French accused 

as the main NWS responsible for the weak language). Fourth, the United States Institute 

of Peace and Elliott School of The George Washington University’s conference on nuclear 

weapon–free zones (NWFZs) before the second conference of NWFZ countries in April 2010 

led to greater focus by the international community on this less-publicized aspect of the 

NPT, a focus that was greatly appreciated by the countries concerned and that may have 

contributed to the United States’ decision to submit the protocols of two of the NWFZs 

(Africa and the South Pacific) for ratification to the U.S. Senate. And fifth, a Nuclear Security Summit had locked in forty-seven leaders in a commitment to secure nuclear materials 

and facilities. Although the small print of the reported achievements led to the charge by 

some that the glass was half empty, even the strongest critics among the NNWS had to 

concede that progress on nuclear disarmament was being made.
4

Despite more propitious circumstances than in the past, the 2010 Review Conference 

opened on May 3, in New York amid great uncertainty, with 172 states parties (Palestine 

participated as a nonstate party observer) and 121 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 

in attendance. Indeed, based on the conviction that the NPT was in crisis mode and that 

another failed conference would be a serious blow to this centerpiece of the global nonproliferation regime, NGOs and think tanks organized numerous international meetings and a 

rash of official consultations among governments in advance of the conference. 

Although the ultimate adoption of a final document was an important and welcome 

development for the future of the NPT, the central bargain of the NPT (disarmament for nonproliferation and access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy) remains unfulfilled. Further, the 

conflict in the Middle East presents an increasingly significant obstacle to the treaty’s future 

effectiveness. Indeed, the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 became possible only 

with the adoption of a resolution on the Middle East. In short, without further progress on 

the Middle East peace process, the nonproliferation regime may still falter in the years ahead 

due to unresolved concerns about the slow pace of nuclear disarmament and the problems 

over the implementation of Article 4 of the NPT (which provides for access to peaceful uses 

of nuclear energy) and the policies of the NSG—which even before the ink was dry on the 

2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document deviated from agreed upon policy by continuing with the India nuclear cooperation deal and creating special conditions for the Republic 

of Korea (ROK)—this, while China supplies reactors to Pakistan. 

The Conference

The 2010 Review Conference seems, in retrospect, to have had three phases—the plenary 

debate, the negotiations in the main committees, and the return to the plenary for a tense 

seesaw before the final denouement between pessimistic prospects of failure and optimistic 

expectations of success. 

Plenary

U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s opening remarks set a positive tone for the conference. Quoting from President Obama’s message to the conference, she emphasized that 

the United States would do its part in seeking the peace and security of a world without 

nuclear weapons, that there were rights and responsibilities under the NPT, that while 

the majority of states observed its norms there were a “few outliers,” and that it was 

important to “think outside the blocs.” She also made references to the DPRK and Iran. 

Recapitulating the achievements of the Obama administration, she announced that the 

United States would henceforth become more transparent by declaring the exact number 

of nuclear weapons it possesses (the Pentagon announced that same day that the figure 

was 5,113),4 that protocols for the NWFZs in Africa and the South Pacific were being sent 

to the Senate for ratification and that discussions would be held regarding the Central 

Asian and Southeast Asian NWFZs, and that $50 million would be given to a new IAEA 

Peaceful Uses Initiative for the use of nonpower related nuclear energy in developing 

countries, with other states contributing another $50 million. She warned that while the 

United States did not seek amendments to the treaty, there should be penalties for violations of it. Her announcements were received well by the NNWS, especially those in the 

Nonaligned Movement (NAM).

On the eve of the conference, the NGOs at the conference had conducted a well-attended 

rally and were buoyed by the event’s success, and their afternoon session on the first Friday 

was well organized and featured many statements in support of a Nuclear Weapons ConvenAlthough the ultimate adoption 

of a final document was 

an important and welcome 

development for the future of 

the NPT, the central bargain of 

the NPT . . . remains unfulfilled. 
5

tion (NWC)—a rallying point that is likely to be increasingly popular in the post–review 

conference phase.

Overall, this first two-week phase of the conference was smooth sailing, with mostly 

routine statements in the plenary debate and a general feel-good atmosphere. Not even 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s fierce critique of the NWS could disrupt this mood.

Main Committees

Although the conference had broken into the three main committees and negotiations had 

begun over the final document in the conference’s second week, the second phase lasted in 

fact from May 17 to 21, when the chairpersons of the committees submitted draft reports 

as a basis for discussion. For the first time, subsidiary bodies had been set up in each of 

the committees to deal with nuclear disarmament, regional issues and nuclear weapon–free 

zones, and other issues, including Article 10 (the treaty withdrawal issue). The withdrawal of 

Iranian objections to the establishment of a subsidiary body dealing with larger institutional 

and treaty withdrawal issues was the first sign of Iranian cooperation during the conference. 

On May 17, news broke that the Brazilian-Turkish mediation over the swap of Iranian uranium 

for uranium enriched abroad had succeeded, adding to the buoyancy of the mood. However, 

the United States soon announced that it would lodge sanctions against Iran in the Security 

Council and a temporary gloom descended upon the delegates as they feared the impact 

of the news on the conference. But the fears proved unfounded, both because the actual 

voting in the Security Council was held off until after the review conference had ended and 

because the Iranian delegation showed no adverse change in its conduct.

However, the redlines that key delegations, such as the NWS, did not want crossed were 

clearly demarcated as delegations began to spell out their positions. By the end of the second phase (that is, the end of the third week), in accordance with the plan of the president 

of the conference, Libran Cabatculan, the three main committees‘ chairmen produced revised 

drafts of their reports. The first draft of the first main committee chairman was regarded as 

too ambitious (although the NAM states were encouraged by it). Some tensions were evident 

in this committee over the decision to move the action from the main committees to the 

plenary in the fourth week since no consensus had yet been reached. A few delegations 

wanted the work of the main committees to continue so that differences could be resolved 

there. Cabatculan compromised by allowing the main committees one more day.

Plenary Redux

On Tuesday, May 25, Cabatculan produced a draft final declaration that was based on what 

the main committees’ chairmen had prepared but that reflected his perceptions of where 

consensus could be found. Prior to that, on Monday, May 24, when the plenary reconvened 

as scheduled in the program of work, the NWS had moved in a seemingly orchestrated manner to declare firm positions. This led to speculation among the NNWS that the NWS had 

met over the weekend and had decided on a “get-tough” policy. The policies of the NWS, 

if accepted, would have inevitably resulted in a dilution of the final conference document 

into a weaker document than that produced in 2000. The NAM states were clear that this 

would be unacceptable. At this stage the trajectory of the conference appeared to be heading toward collapse. Rumors of a possible vote were afloat despite the fact that such an 

action had no precedent. Decision making in NPT review conferences had been undertaken, 

by convention, on the basis of consensus, although Rule 28 of the rules of procedure did 

provide for voting if all efforts to reach consensus broke down. The pros and cons of a failed 

conference were pondered.
6

The conference saw fluctuating fortunes in the final week. The main flow of the conference proceeded in the plenary on the basis of the president’s draft, but components of it, 

especially those relating to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, were negotiated elsewhere, with Arab-U.S. discussions reportedly going on in Washington and a seventeen-state 

delegation (the five NWS and key NNWS from the NAM and Europe) huddle at the Egyptian 

mission in New York deciding on the final compromises. All this came to a head when Cabatculan presented another revised draft on Thursday, May 27, informing delegations that it 

was, in his judgment, the best possible outcome. Although the draft generally accepted the 

redlines laid down by the NWS, Cabatculan adopted a drafting technique of referring to some 

views as belonging to “numerous parties”; in one instance, he stated a “majority of states” 

held a particular view. This obviated the need to reach consensus and followed a practice 

used in the 1985 NPT Review Conference Final Document in relation to conflicting views on 

the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) issue. (The CTBT issue remained controversial in 1990 and caused the collapse of that conference.) No attempt was made to qualify 

or quantify “numerous” or “a majority,” and the conference appeared ready to accept this.

There was no time for further negotiations and despite the text falling short of the optimum expectations of individual delegations, there was a growing realization that this was 

the last chance for an agreement. The NGO blogs were guardedly optimistic and had reconciled themselves to a weak final document. With the rumor that it was only Iran who had not 

signified its consent, the meeting of the plenary was postponed first from 11 a.m. on Friday, 

May 28, to 12 p.m., and then to 3 p.m. in the main General Assembly Hall. Despite the tension, the declaration was finally presented, with Cabatculan making a distinction between 

the first review part (which carried a footnote saying this part was the responsibility of the 

president) and the future-oriented action part. Finally, to the relief of all delegations, the 

conference came to a close, with varying levels of satisfaction. In an effort to prove that a 

balanced consideration of all three pillars of the NPT had taken place, the final document’s 

action plan had twenty-four actions on nonproliferation, twenty-two on disarmament, and 

eighteen on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Unlike the 2000 conference, the bridge-building transcontinental group known as the 

New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden) was not a driving force and yielded to the NAM states, which were led by the Egyptian 

permanent representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Maged Abdel Aziz. Cabatculan 

had wanted to avoid appointing a “friends of the chair” group, fearing that the exclusion 

of some states could prove controversial. However, he did decide, ahead of the beginning 

of the conference, on coordinators to conduct negotiations in the subsidiary groups. He 

also had Norway convene a focus group, which included key radical members of the NAM, 

to preempt any adverse repercussions in the final plenary session when the draft declaration came up for adoption. This proved to be a wise strategy. The conference was mainly 

a negotiation between the NAM states and the NWS, with the timely intervention by the 

focus group that had convened in the Egyptian mission and the work of coordinators such 

as Irish ambassador Alison Kelly.

The Debates

Nuclear Proliferation

Throughout the conference, the principle of nonproliferation, the first pillar of the NPT, and 

its vital link to peace and security was strongly upheld and reflected in the final declaration. There was no agreement on enforcing compliance or recourse to the Security Council. 

The record of proliferation among the NPT NNWS in the period being reviewed included the 

Throughout the conference, the 

principle of nonproliferation, 

the first pillar of the NPT, 

and its vital link to peace 

and security was strongly 

upheld and reflected in the 

final declaration. There was 

no agreement on enforcing 

compliance or recourse to the 

Security Council. 
7

case of DPRK and questions regarding Iran and Syria. The NNWS raised the NSG’s decision on 

India following the Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation deal, calling it a violation of Article 1 and 

repeating their argument that the placement of U.S. nuclear weapons on the territories of 

five NATO parties in Europe represented a form of proliferation. The specific issues debated 

were the following:

•	 Compliance. After a healthy debate at the conference, the review part of the final declaration 

emphasized that “concern over compliance . . . should be pursued by diplomatic means in 

accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations.” The 

reference to the UN Charter was added in the final draft to reflect the views of the West. This 

formulation effectively rules out the use of force, even though Article 42 in Chapter VII of 

the UN Charter provides for the collective use of force by the United Nations if the Security 

Council so decides.

•	 DPRK. The document “condemned with the strongest possible terms the nuclear test explosions” carried out by the DPRK, recalled the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and 

concluded that the DPRK “cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon-state.” This same 

wording was used in the 2000 Review Conference document to refer to India and Pakistan. 

China attempted to soften this language on the DPRK, which was probably one reason why 

this part of the document was “noted” and not adopted. In discussing Article 10 and withdrawal from the NPT—applicable both to DPRK and Iran—the final document affirmed the 

right to withdraw at paragraph 120, noting the “divergent views regarding its interpretation 

with respect to other relevant international law.” A description of a view held “by many 

states” was that a withdrawing party remains responsible for any violations of the NPT committed prior to withdrawal. Two following paragraphs identify “numerous states” as having 

specific views regarding the consequences that would follow withdrawal by such a party.

In the “action” section that was adopted, the conference “strongly” urged DPRK to fulfill 

its commitments under the Six-Party Talks and to return to the NPT and adhere to IAEA 

safeguards. Support for the Six-Party Talks and a resolution of the DPRK problem via diplomatic means was also mentioned.

•	 Iran. The final declaration did not name Iran lest this gave Iran an excuse for disrupting 

the conference. The emphasis on diplomatic solutions to noncompliance also helped. 

Paragraph 10 of the final declaration’s review section upheld the authority of the IAEA 

for verification of nonproliferation, via safeguards asking that concerns should be referred 

to that body with evidence and information for investigation. Paragraph 11 reaffirmed 

the importance of access to the Security Council (the NAM states added the UN General 

Assembly to this) by the IAEA in ensuring compliance with safeguards agreements. A 

general reference, aimed at Iran, in paragraph 23, spoke of “concerns expressed by numerous parties” with regard to matters of noncompliance. “Numerous parties” here no doubt 

referred to Western states and others critical of Iran. Paragraph 76 refers to the dangers 

of attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities “devoted to peaceful purposes” and 

states, as an opinion of the conference, that these threats and/or attacks raise “serious 

concerns on the application of international law on the use of force in such cases.” It 

was added that “a majority of states parties” (a reference presumably to the NAM states) 

suggested “a legally binding instrument be considered in this regard.”

•	 Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation. The Indo-U.S. deal featured lightly in the discussions, and 

while states parties acknowledged that the deal could not be undone, they were quite firm 

that no more exceptions should be made. Thus, paragraph 13 recalled paragraph 12 of 

Decision II in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference whereby new supply arrangements had to align with nonproliferation obligations and comprehensive IAEA safeguards. 

This statement is unlikely to deter China from providing reactors to Pakistan. In the action 
8

part of the declaration (paragraph 35), all parties are urged “to ensure that their nuclearrelated exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or 

other nuclear explosive devices” and that such exports comply with the NPT and the 1995 

NPT Review and Extension Conference decisions. This exhortation was intended as a warning against deals with Pakistan and Israel, but given the ease with which past conference 

documents were disregarded, NNWS cannot rest assured on this issue.

•	 Additional protocol. The application of the IAEA additional protocol—as a mandatory 

requirement for benefiting from peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the “multilateralization” of the fuel cycle—was sought by some NWS and Western states in order to place 

additional safeguards against proliferation and to discourage national enrichment of uranium. Many NNWS, such as Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, and Argentina, resisted this move 

on the grounds that it infringed on their sovereignty and represented an additional obligation heaped on NNWS in an already asymmetrical division of obligations under which the 

NWS were barely touched. In fact, 133 states have had their additional protocols approved 

by the IAEA Board of Governors, and 102 of those states are currently implementing 

them. This illustrates that as a voluntary measure the additional protocol has served as a 

confidence-building measure.

The disagreement within the conference on this was reflected in paragraph 18, where 

the conference notes “that numerous states were of the view” that the additional protocol 

was an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system and in paragraph 19, which states that 

“many states recognize that comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols are among the integral elements of the IAEA safeguards system.” At the same time, the 

entire conference “notes that the additional protocol represents a significant confidencebuilding measure” and “encourages all states parties” to “conclude and bring into force 

an additional protocol.” The same disagreement is reflected elsewhere too. However, in 

the action plan section (Action 28) adopted by the conference, the hortatory consensual 

language is as follows: “The Conference encourages all states parties which have not yet 

done so to conclude and bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to 

implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.”

Nuclear Disarmament

The 2000 Review Conference Final Document was regarded by NAM states and supporters of 

nuclear disarmament, the second pillar of the NPT, as the highest benchmark so far achieved 

in the NPT review process by virtue of the “unequivocal undertaking” by the NWS to the 

total elimination of nuclear weapons through thirteen steps. This benchmark was rejected at 

the 2005 Review Conference, however, so the NAM states were especially wary at the start 

of the 2010 conference, despite the Obama administration’s commitment to the vision of a 

nuclear weapon–free world and the achievements registered in the months preceding the 

conference. The NAM working paper contained a NAM wish list, and the NGOs increasingly 

mobilized around a demand for an NWC, which was among the points mentioned by the UN 

secretary-general in his five-point plan of October 2008. The United States had accepted 

the goal of a nuclear weapon–free world but excluded an NWC as a means of achieving this 

and hedged on a time frame. 

The plenary debate and the NGO session in the first week set out the battle lines. The 

increasing conservatism of France and Russia relative to the United States was of particular interest. The United Kingdom, which formed a new government after the conference 

opened, moved to the right and abandoned the prodisarmament policies of the Labor 

government, even opposing a Swiss–International Committee of the Red Cross inspired reference to international humanitarian law in the use of nuclear weapons. That reference was 
9

finally included as a principle and objective in the context of the “catastrophic humanitarian 

consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.” China, except for a ritualistic reference to its 

no-first-use declaratory policy and some sympathy for NAM positions, maintained solidarity 

with the NWS.

Faced with this solid NWS phalanx, the NNWS and NAM in particular wanted to ensure 

that they did not retreat behind the 2000 achievement. The first draft that emerged from 

the main committee was too optimistic and provoked an aggressive response from the NWS. 

The next draft came back diluted and was watered down further in the hands of the president. What was achieved, however, was seen by most delegations as marginally better than 

the 2000 achievement, though the subjective nature of the text promised future battles. 

Specific issues addressed included the following:

•	 The “unequivocal undertaking.” In the review section of the declaration, paragraph 80 reaffirms the commitment made by the NWS in 2000 to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals. 

•	 The NWC. An NWC was not mentioned directly in the action plan but was made note of in 

paragraph 82 as part of the UN secretary-general’s five-point proposal “to inter alia consider 

negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or agreement on a framework of separate 

mutually reinforcing instruments.” This marked the achievement of another NNWS objective. 

•	 Timelines. The insistence by the NAM on a time-bound framework for achieving a world free 

of nuclear weapons was met with stubborn resistance by the NWS. In paragraph 83, it was 

affirmed that the final phase of nuclear disarmament should be within a legal framework, 

which only a “majority of states parties believe should include specified timelines.”

•	 The CTBT, new START, etc. Other features of the review section of the document included 

calls to bring the CTBT into force; to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security 

policies (e.g., in nuclear posture reviews); to welcome the new START between the United 

States and Russia; to “de-alert” and “de-target” nuclear weapons; to increase the transparency of some NWS (i.e., the United States and United Kingdom) with regard to the number 

of nuclear weapons they have; and to recognize “the legitimate interest” of the NNWS in 

constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons.

•	 Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions. In this section a total of twentytwo actions were adopted. The “unequivocal undertaking” of the NWS to achieve the 

total elimination of nuclear weapons was reaffirmed, but unlike in earlier drafts, the word 

“accountability” was dropped in the final document, meaning the NWS could refuse to be 

held responsible for their failure to undertake meaningful “good faith” nuclear-disarmament 

measures. The practical steps mentioned in 2000 were reaffirmed as valid. In the face of 

strong Russian resistance to any mention of “tactical nuclear weapons,” the NNWS and others had to content themselves with references to “all types of nuclear weapons,” especially 

in Action 3. The United States and Russia committed themselves to entry into force of the 

new START and to continue discussions thereafter on further reductions. Action 5, over 

which there was considerable controversy, emerged as a weak compromise, with the NWS 

being called upon “to promptly engage” on a series of specific actions, such as reducing 

their stockpiles, dealing with all types of nuclear weapons irrespective of their location, and 

reporting on further disarmament measures by 2014 so that the 2015 Review Conference 

could take appropriate stock and consider future steps. The NNWS had wanted a firmer 

commitment from the NWS to these specific actions, because they knew that the weaker 

formulation that finally emerged could cause future problems. The exclusion of specific 

timelines and language that had been included in earlier drafts and that made reference to 

“no first use” and the “de-alerting” of nuclear weapons was a blow to the NNWS.

•	 Other aspects. The final document passed the “security assurances” issue on to the Genevabased Conference on Disarmament (CD); strongly endorsed the CTBT with all committing 

The declaration . . . reaffirms the 

commitment made by the NWS 

in 2000 to totally eliminate their 

nuclear arsenals. 

It was affirmed that the final 

phase of nuclear disarmament 

should be within a legal 

framework, which only a 

“majority of states parties 

believe should include specified 

timelines.”
10

to ratify it; called a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) a desirable objective within the 

CD (although, because of China, no agreement was reached on a moratorium on further 

production of fissile material pending a FMCT); welcomed the entry into force of the 

NWFZs in Africa and Central Asia and asked NWS to implement their security assurances 

to states within NWFZs; accepted regular reporting by all (as a compromise to naming 

the NWS alone) parties on nuclear-disarmament obligations (although a weak formulation 

was inserted for NWS so that the NWS “are encouraged to agree” to a standard reporting 

form and predetermined intervals for the voluntary provision of information to be made 

available in a UN repository); and made reference to the importance of disarmament and 

nonproliferation education.

•	 India, Israel, Pakistan. The universality of the NPT was addressed with a call to India, Israel, 

and Pakistan to join unconditionally the NPT as NNWS. 

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

The debate over access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the third pillar of the NPT, 

was closely linked to the debate on nuclear nonproliferation. It was agreed that each state 

party had the right to define its national energy policy. Most of this discussion came within 

the ambit of the IAEA, for which support was expressed, and underlined the principles of 

Article 4. Preferential treatment to the NNWS and the special needs of developing countries 

were duly recognized.

The IAEA guidelines for nuclear safety and security that had been endorsed at the Washington Security Summit were highlighted without any controversy. All relevant conventions 

were mentioned and adherence to them encouraged. Spent fuel and radioactive waste management issues, attacks on nuclear facilities, safe nuclear-fuel transport, and development of 

a new generation of proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors were also subjects agreed upon.

On the use of uranium, the conference welcomed the voluntary efforts to minimize the 

use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian sector and through Action 61 encouraged states to further “minimize highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use where 

technically and economically feasible.” The conference also noted, in its “review” section, 

Russia’s establishment of a low-enriched-uranium (LEU) reserve for use by IAEA member 

states and made a modest reference to the importance of discussing, under the IAEA’s 

aegis, the possibilities of creating nondiscriminatory “voluntary multilateral mechanisms 

for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the end of 

the back-end of the fuel cycle.” This mention represented a limp end to the plethora of 

proposals that had been made in the recent past over the so-called nuclear renaissance and 

the consequent concern that this would facilitate nuclear weapon proliferation. The former 

head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, had been at the forefront of such proposals, but 

the lukewarm response of major NNWS such as Brazil, South Africa, and Egypt that wanted 

national enrichment of uranium had deflated this move. In addition, the February 2010 

research report by the Canadian Nuclear Energy Futures Project cited economic security and 

fuel waste problems to prove that the claims for a nuclear renaissance were overblown.5

Following the generous offer made by the United States in the plenary debate, Action 55 

welcomed the extrabudgetary contributions pledged to the IAEA’s Peaceful Uses Initiative 

and encouraged others to help raise the $100 million required over the next five years.

The Middle East

The fourth major issue at stake in the conference was how to move forward with the resolution adopted in 1995 on the establishment of a WMDFZ in the Middle East. The success 

The fourth major issue at stake 

in the conference was how 

to move forward . . . on the 

establishment of a WMDFZ 

in the Middle East. The success 

achieved in resolving this 

issue . . . was without doubt 

the main success of 

this conference. 
11

achieved in resolving this issue brought credit to Egypt and to the United States and was 

without doubt the main success of this conference. However, it did not compensate for the 

disappointment of the NNWS over the disarmament section of the final declaration.

Before the 2010 conference, it was recognized that the conference could break down if 

no progress was achieved in implementing the 1995 resolution. Diplomatic messages were 

no doubt exchanged between Cairo, Washington, and other capitals. NGOs such as Pugwash 

also intervened to ensure progress on this issue and held a side event for this purpose.

The subsidiary body appointed for the consideration of this issue was fortunate to have 

Ambassador Kelly nominated as its chair. Her assiduous consulting and deft drafting helped 

to achieve a consensus. Using the various proposals that had been made at previous NPT 

meetings and at the review conference, Ambassador Kelly built a credible proposal.

Because of the sensitivity of the subject, much of the negotiations were kept confidential. One requirement of the United States was that Israel should not be named in the final 

text, but the Arabs maintained that the naming of Israel as a country outside the NPT had 

been accepted in the 2000 document and that they could not retreat from that precedent. 

The United States’ alleged stance was that if Israel were to be named, then so too should 

Iran, a stance at which the Arabs balked. The United States also maintained that it could 

not guarantee Israel’s attendance at a WMDFZ in the Middle East conference that had been 

requested by Egypt.

Despite this, the first draft proposal presented by Ambassador Kelly on May 25 contained 

an agreement on a WMDFZ in the Middle East conference to be held in 2012, with the UN 

secretary-general appointing a special coordinator to consult and prepare for it and follow 

up on its results. Other complementary action called for in the draft included the hosting 

of a seminar by the European Union and background documentation from the IAEA and the 

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The draft also referenced links to the 

Middle East peace process and to processes related to WMD elimination.

However, because of dissatisfaction with the first draft (presumably from the United 

States), Ambassador Kelly went back to consulting her subsidiary body. Her final draft was 

included in the president’s final declaration draft presented on May 27. The main differences 

between the earlier draft and this newer draft were (1) that the 2012 conference would be 

co-convened by the UN secretary-general and the cosponsors of the 1995 resolution (the 

United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia) in consultation with states of the region 

and that it would be attended by “all states of the Middle East”; and (2) that a “facilitator” 

(it was reported that Israel did not like the “special coordinator” title) would be appointed 

by the UN secretary-general and that the cosponsors of the 1995 resolution would consult 

with the states in the region and prepare the conference, implement its follow-on steps, 

and report on those steps to the NPT 2015 Review Conference and to preparatory committee meetings.

A host government would be designated by the UN secretary-general and the cosponsors 

of the 1995 resolution for the 2012 conference. This compromise seemed acceptable to the 

Arabs. The role secured for the cosponsors of the 1995 resolution ensured that the United 

States would be able to influence the choice of the facilitator, since ascribing this responsibility to the UN secretary-general alone was unacceptable to Israel. No mention was made 

as to how the conference and the facilitator would be financed.

However, the success of an agreement on the convening of a conference seemed to be 

spoiled when the U.S. delegation, in its concluding statement, reiterated its support for the 

1995 resolution and the WMDFZ in the Middle East but regretted that its ability to ensure 

a WMDFZ was jeopardized by the “singling out of Israel.” Many observers saw this statement as a disingenuous one, because all the document did was recall the 2000 language, 

which stated that Israel’s accession to the NPT was important. Further, elsewhere the 2010 
12

document called upon India, Israel, and Pakistan to join the NPT, to which the United 

States made no objection.

The U.S. delegation’s statement was followed the same day by one from President Obama, 

who, after applauding the results of the conference, said that he deplored the mentioning of 

Israel by name and identified Iran as the main threat to the NPT in the region. U.S. national 

security adviser James Jones went further and cast doubt on whether the conference would 

ever take place unless all countries in the region attended. This postconference resiling by 

the United States seemed to spoil the prospects for the future conference, but Arab reactions have been muted, presumably because this was an expected scenario. 

The Future of the NPT

Most observers felt that the 2010 Review Conference was a huge success. On the institutional and procedural level, the conference reinforced and strengthened the review process. 

States parties agreed on the importance of having an informal and voluntary group of past 

and incumbent chairs available to pass on the lessons learned to future chairs. In addition, states parties committed to making funding available for one staff officer in the UN 

Office of Disarmament to monitor and follow nonproliferation matters on a permanent and 

continuous basis. 

That said, an objective assessment of the conference involves honest answers to the more 

political questions related to the future of the regime. In this regard, the divided views attributed in the final declaration to “a majority of states parties” and to “numerous parties” cannot 

be sustained. While the formulation was largely neutral and referred to different groups at 

various points in the declaration, these divisions have to be resolved within the NPT.

Two representative opinions that spoke to the success of the conference came from the 

U.S. and Egyptian delegations. As the U.S. delegation’s Ellen Tauscher stated, “The Final 

Document this Conference adopted today advances President Obama’s vision. It reflects 

our collective commitment to uphold and strengthen this cornerstone of the international 

nonproliferation regime. It also demonstrates our unified resolve to strengthen the Treaty’s 

three pillars—disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy—with 

the inclusion of recommendations for follow-on actions. This forward-looking and balanced 

action plan establishes benchmarks for future progress and concrete actions.” 

Egyptian ambassador Maged Abdel Aziz, speaking on behalf of the NAM, conceded that 

while the NAM did not achieve all that it wanted, it had decided to “take advantage of the 

emerging goodwill.” Was this a message of thanks by the NNWS in general and the NAM in 

particular to President Obama for what he had achieved for nuclear disarmament? The final 

document of the conference is regarded by Egypt as a basis for a future “deal,” and the 

ambassador promised to pursue NAM priorities in the run-up to the 2015 Review Conference. 

They include the elimination of all nuclear weapons by 2025 and the beginning of negotiations for an NWC and a Negative Security Assurances treaty. 

Although the relief of the NWS over the adoption of the final declaration’s conclusions 

and recommendations and the lukewarm reaction by the NAM states and the prodisarmament NGOs has bought the NPT another five years, the tensions endemic in the central 

bargain remain. Good-faith implementation of the document’s action plan will be crucial, 

as will progress on the new START, and ratification of the CTBT by the United States. The 

future course of the Six-Nation Talks on DPRK, the resolution of the questions over Iran’s 

nuclear program, and the outcomes of the 2012 Middle East conference will also determine 

the future of the NPT. The NPT has survived another challenge, but without further action 

by the NWS, the nonproliferation regime may well fray. 

On the institutional and 

procedural level, the conference 

reinforced and strengthened 

the review process.

Although the relief of the NWS 

over the adoption of the final 

declaration’s conclusions and 

recommendations . . . has 

bought the NPT another five 

years, the tensions endemic in 

the central bargain remain. 
13

Recommendations

The states parties to the NPT clearly cannot rest on the laurels of this qualified success and 

have equal responsibility not only to fulfill the commitments made at the 2010 Review Conference but also to reinforce the NPT as the world’s most important nuclear nonproliferation 

and disarmament treaty. To this end, the following specific actions are needed:

•	 The new START must be ratified by the U.S. Senate and the Russian Duma by the end of 2010 

so that the next phase in U.S.-Russian nuclear disarmament negotiations can begin.

•	 The process of bringing the CTBT into force must begin with urgency. This includes the 

initiation of the ratification process in the U.S. Senate by 2011, as well as in countries that 

have yet to sign or ratify the treaty.

•	 The Conference on Disarmament must begin negotiations on an FMCT, or the international 

community must find an alternative forum for doing so.

•	 The Six-Party Talks on DPRK must begin and reach a conclusion before the transition in 

that country’s leadership.

•	 Talks with Iran should begin as soon as possible with mutual assurances.

•	 Agreement on steps to begin negotiations on a WMDFZ in the Middle East must begin in 

2011. These steps include the appointment of a facilitator and credible preparations for 

the 2012 conference. 

•	 The IAEA funding situation must improve, and assistance to developing countries for peaceful non-power-related uses of nuclear energy should be extended from the new fund.

•	 A campaign for greater adherence to the additional protocol should be aggressively led, 

and attention to nuclear-security requirements must increase.

•	 The use of HEU must be phased out and more encouragement should be given through tax 

incentives and other means for the use of LEU in nuclear power.

•	 The already agreed-upon steps to strengthen the institutional aspects of the NPT must be 

implemented.

15

Notes

1. The treaty stipulates the convening of a review conference every five years. In 1995, at the fifth review 

conference, the treaty was extended indefinitely.

2. As far as arms control is concerned, that is, control of the level of arsenals, NWS are permitted to retain their 

weapons with the restraints that apply through other bilateral and multilateral treaties.

3. IAEA director general Yukiya Amano, in his statement to the Eighth NPT Review Conference, mentioned that sixty 

countries were considering acquiring nuclear power and that ten to twenty-five of them would have their first 

nuclear power plant by 2030. In this regard, he stressed the importance of having the additional protocol in force 

as a confidence-building exercise and stated that ninety-eight countries had already become signatories to it. The 

additional protocol was adopted in 1997 after the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons program. 

4. The opening statements of the other NWS—Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China—followed predictable 

lines, with calls for undiminished security for all and a commitment to the NPT and the success of the conference. 

However, none of them followed the good example of the United States by announcing the details of their nuclear 

arsenals. The United Kingdom eventually did so toward the end of the conference, declaring from London that it 

had 225 nuclear warheads.

5. See Louise Frechette and Trevor Findlay, The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030: Final Report of the Nuclear Energy 

Futures Project (Waterloo, Canada: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2010).
Other Titles in WMD, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control

•	 America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic 

Posture of the United States (2009) by William J. Perry and James R. Schlesinger

•	 In the Eyes of the Experts: Analysis and Comments on America’s Strategic Posture (2009) by 

Taylor A. Bolz

•	 The Quest for Nuclear Disarmament in South Asia: A Reality Check by Moeed Yusuf and Ashley 

Pandya (Peace Brief, August 2010)

•	 Nuclear Weapon–Free Zones as a New Deterrent by Janene Sawers (Peace Brief, April 2010)

•	 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program: A Practicable, Verifiable Plan of Action by 

David Albright and Corey Hinderstein (Peaceworks, January 2006)

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