In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06-11-00040-CR

______________________________

IN RE: DOUGLAS ALAN DANZER

 

 

Original Mandamus Proceeding

 

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Douglas Alan Danzer has filed a petition for writ of mandamus requesting this Court to 

order the Honorable Robert Newsome, presiding judge of the 8th Judicial District Court of 

Hopkins County, Texas, to issue an order vacating Danzer’s conviction for aggravated sexual 

assault of a child. The facts, as stated by Danzer in his petition, are as follows. In 1998, Danzer 

pled guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child and was placed on deferred adjudication 

community supervision for ten years.1 The trial court entered an order on August 20, 2008, 

extending the deferred community supervision for an additional ten years.2 On February 4, 2009, 

the State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt, Danzer pled true to the allegations, and the trial court 

sentenced Danzer to sixty years’ imprisonment on May 1, 2009. This Court affirmed Danzer’s 

conviction on appeal. Danzer v. State, No. 06-09-00113-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 2810 (Tex. 

App.—Texarkana Apr. 16, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.). 

To be entitled to mandamus relief, a relator must show that he or she has no adequate 

remedy at law to redress the alleged harm and that he or she seeks to compel a ministerial act, not 

 

1The order attached to Danzer’s petition specifies Danzer’s ten-year community supervision period was “to begin and 

be effective as of the 13th day of August, A.D., 1998 . . . .” The date of the order, pursuant to a handwritten 

correction, was August 27, 1998. 

2The order attached to Danzer’s petition states community supervision was extended “PURSUANT TO TEXAS 

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 42.12, SECTION 12A.” The order finds Danzer “has not sufficiently 

demonstrated a commitment to avoid future criminal behavior” and finds “the release of the defendant from 

supervision would endanger the public.” We note that Section 22A of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure permits 

community supervision for certain enumerated offenses to be extended for an additional ten years at “any time during 

the period of community supervision” upon finding “the defendant has not sufficiently demonstrated a commitment to 

avoid future criminal behavior and that the release of the defendant from supervision would endanger the public.” 

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 22A (Vernon Supp. 2010). 
3

involving a discretionary or judicial decision. State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of 

Appeals at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (orig. proceeding). An act is 

ministerial if it constitutes a duty clearly fixed and required by law. State ex rel. Curry v. Gray, 

726 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (orig. proceeding).

Danzer argues his conviction is void and he is entitled to mandamus relief. Danzer 

contends, because his community supervision period had expired, the trial court lacked authority 

to extend his deferred adjudication community supervision an additional ten years. It is not 

necessary for this Court to consider the merits of Danzer’s complaints; this Court lacks jurisdiction 

to grant mandamus relief.3 The Texas courts have recognized that “the exclusive post-conviction 

remedy in final felony convictions in Texas courts is through a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07.” Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 525 n.8 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1996); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (Vernon Supp. 2010). The Texas 

Court of Criminal Appeals has held a writ of habeas corpus is the exclusive post-conviction 

remedy even when it is alleged that the conviction is void. Ater v. Eighth Court of Appeals, 802 

S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (orig. proceeding) (concluding court of appeals lacked 

jurisdiction to grant mandamus relief for void conviction); In re Snow, No. 12-10-00132-CR, 2010 

Tex. App. LEXIS 6247 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 4, 2010, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). To the 

extent Danzer’s complaints could be considered an application for a writ of habeas corpus, this 

 

3Danzer cites numerous civil cases for the proposition that “[m]andamus may be used to set aside a lower court[’]s 

order that is void . . . .” 
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Court has no original habeas corpus jurisdiction in post-conviction criminal matters. See TEX.

GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.221 (Vernon 2004); Ater, 802 S.W.2d at 243. We lack jurisdiction to 

grant mandamus relief.

For the reasons stated, we deny Danzer’s petition for writ of mandamus.

Jack Carter

Justice

Date Submitted: March 16, 2011

Date Decided: March 17, 2011

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