DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

LORRAINE CAMPBELL and CHARLES LAMM,

Petitioners,

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

Respondent.

No. 4D16-1728

[July 6, 2016]

Petition for writ of mandamus to the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth 

Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Joel T. Lazarus, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

10-47953 CACE 11.

Peter J. Snyder of Peter J. Snyder, P.A., Boca Raton, for petitioners.

John D. Cusick of Phelan Hallinan Diamond & Jones, PLLC, Fort 

Lauderdale, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioners Lorraine Campbell and Charles Lamm, the defendants in a

pending residential mortgage foreclosure action, petition for a writ of 

mandamus, seeking review of the denial of their motion to dismiss. 

Petitioners contend that the Verified Second Amended Complaint of 

respondent, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., does not comply with the certification 

requirements of section 702.015(4), Florida Statutes (2015), and Florida 

Rule of Civil Procedure 1.115(c). We deny the petition and conclude that 

a plaintiff’s failure to meet the certification requirements is not a 

mandatory prerequisite to the filing of suit which can be enforced by 

mandamus.

The statute and rule at issue provide as follows:

(4) If the plaintiff is in possession of the original promissory 

note, the plaintiff must file under penalty of perjury a 

certification with the court, contemporaneously with the filing 

of the complaint for foreclosure, that the plaintiff is in 

possession of the original promissory note. The certification 
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must set forth the location of the note, the name and title of 

the individual giving the certification, the name of the person 

who personally verified such possession, and the time and 

date on which the possession was verified. Correct copies of 

the note and all allonges to the note must be attached to the 

certification. The original note and the allonges must be filed 

with the court before the entry of any judgment of foreclosure 

or judgment on the note.

§ 702.015(4), Fla. Stat. (2015).

(c) Possession of Original Promissory Note. If the claimant 

is in possession of the original promissory note, the claimant 

must file under penalty of perjury a certification 

contemporaneously with the filing of the claim for relief for 

foreclosure that the claimant is in possession of the original 

promissory note. The certification must set forth the location 

of the note, the name and title of the individual giving the 

certification, the name of the person who personally verified 

such possession, and the time and date on which the 

possession was verified. Correct copies of the note and all 

allonges to the note must be attached to the certification. The 

original note and the allonges must be filed with the court 

before the entry of any judgment of foreclosure or judgment 

on the note.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.115(c).

The Verified Amended Complaint in this case was filed in November 

2014, after the 2013 legislation enacting section 702.015(4), Florida 

Statutes. Ch. 2013-137, § 8, Laws of Fla. (“In addition, the Legislature 

finds that s. 702.015, Florida Statutes, as created by this act, applies to 

cases filed on or after July 1, 2013. . . .”). The Florida Supreme Court’s 

adoption of rule 1.115 followed. See In re Amendments to Florida Rules of 

Civil Procedure, 153 So. 3d 258, 259 (Fla. December 11, 2014) (creating 

rule 1.115, “effective as to cases filed on or after July 1, 2013,” that is, 

immediately upon the release of the court’s opinion).

In closed case number 4D15-2601, petitioners previously sought a writ 

of certiorari to quash, on the same grounds, the denial of their prior motion 

to dismiss the Verified First Amended Complaint. By unpublished order, 

this Court dismissed that petition for failure to establish material harm 

that could not be adequately remedied on appeal. See, e.g., Donado v. 

PennyMac Corp., 174 So. 3d 1041, 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (reversing a 
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final foreclosure judgment where the trial court erred in denying a motion 

to dismiss the initial complaint which did not comply with the verification 

requirement of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.110(b), a predecessor to 

rule 1.115).

In 2015, respondent filed the Verified Second Amended Complaint, and 

petitioners again moved to dismiss, alleging respondent had failed to 

certify its possession of the original promissory note and provide the 

information required by the statute and rule. The trial court denied the 

motion to dismiss, and petitioners have returned to this Court, now 

seeking a writ of mandamus.

Petitioners contend that mandamus “may be issued to enforce 

compliance with a mandatory rule.” Genuine Parts Co. v. Parsons, 917 So. 

2d 419, 421 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (granting mandamus to enforce Florida 

Rule of Civil Procedure 1.440(c), which prohibits the setting of a trial less 

than thirty days after service of a notice for trial); see also Gawker Media, 

LLC v. Bollea, 170 So. 3d 125, 129-30 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (granting 

mandamus to enforce rule 1.440 and holding that an appeal after final 

judgment would be insufficient to remedy the rule’s provisions requiring a 

fifty-day hiatus between trial and service of the last pleading).

“Mandamus is a narrow, extraordinary writ used to coerce an official to 

perform a clear legal duty.” Sica v. Singletary, 714 So. 2d 1111, 1112 (Fla. 

2d DCA 1998). It “is a discretionary writ that is awarded, not as a matter 

of right, but in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion and upon 

equitable principles.” Haft v. Adams, 238 So. 2d 843, 844 (Fla. 1970).

This Court in Genuine Parts, 917 So. 2d at 421, and our sister court in 

Gawker Media, 170 So. 3d at 130, recognized mandamus as a proper 

vehicle to enforce the time restrictions for the setting of a trial under rule 

1.440. However, as explained in Bollea, “a trial court’s obligation to hew 

strictly to the rule’s terms is so well established that it may be enforced by 

a writ of mandamus compelling the court to strike a noncompliant notice 

for trial or to remove a case from the trial docket.” 170 So. 3d at 130. In 

that context, the appellate remedy was deemed insufficient to remedy the 

right to not be subjected to trial in violation of the timing requirements of 

rule 1.440. Id.

Petitioners argue that mandamus has been used to enforce other 

mandatory procedural rules. See Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Carnoto, 798

So. 2d 22 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (granting mandamus to enforce compliance 

with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.490, which precludes reference of a 

matter to a magistrate without the consent of the parties); Hicks v.
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Chamberlin, 710 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (granting mandamus to 

compel the trial court to hold a hearing as required by Florida Rule of Civil 

Procedure 1.610(d)).

However, these decisions do not support expanding this Court’s 

extraordinary writ jurisdiction to review any non-final order where a party 

alleges failure to comply with a procedural rule. In Novartis, established 

precedent had recognized mandamus as a means to compel a trial court 

to exercise its clear ministerial duty to hear a matter that was not subject 

to referral to a magistrate. 798 So. 2d at 23 (citing Hanor v. Hinckley, 584

So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)) (additional citations omitted). Likewise, 

in Hicks, the petition sought mandamus to compel the trial court to 

exercise its clear ministerial duty to hold a hearing required by law. 710 

So. 2d at 993. As we have explained, “[c]entral to mandamus relief is the 

ministerial character of the compelled action[.]” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs 

Broward Cty. Fla. v. Parrish, 154 So. 3d 412, 417 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). “A 

duty or act is defined as ministerial when there is no room for the exercise 

of discretion, and the performance being required is directed by law.” 

Town of Manalapan v. Rechler, 674 So. 2d 789, 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).

Section 702.015(4) and rule 1.115(c) do not create a mandatory presuit requirement such that a trial court has only a ministerial duty to 

dismiss the complaint if a certification is not included. Compare 

§ 702.015(4), and rule 1.115(c), with § 766.206, Fla. Stat. (2015) 

(incorporating mandatory language in “[p]resuit investigation of medical 

negligence claims and defenses by court”), and § 768.72, Fla. Stat. (2015) 

(“In any civil action, no claim for punitive damages shall be permitted 

unless there is a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered 

by the claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of 

such damages.”). The certification requirement of the statute was not 

intended to be a prerequisite to suit but was instead intended to expedite 

the foreclosure process. § 702.015(1), Fla. Stat. (2015) (“The Legislature 

intends that this section expedite the foreclosure process by ensuring 

initial disclosure of a plaintiff’s status and the facts supporting that status, 

thereby ensuring the availability of documents necessary to the 

prosecution of the case.”). In fact, section 702.015(6) states that the court 

may sanction a plaintiff for failure to comply, which contradicts any 

argument that these are mandatory conditions precedent to suit or that 

the complaint must be dismissed for failure to comply, thus creating a 

mandatory, non-discretionary duty.

We deny the petition filed in this case, as the record does not reflect 

the trial court’s refusal to perform a strictly ministerial duty. We adhere 

to our prior ruling that certiorari is also not appropriate.
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Petition denied.

WARNER, DAMOORGIAN and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur. 

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.