UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-4323

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

COURTNEY ROSS, a/k/a Ace,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, Senior District Judge. (3:02-cr-00347-HEH-1)

Submitted: October 31, 2018 Decided: November 15, 2018

Before NIEMEYER and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. Pratt, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, Joseph S. Camden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. 

G. Zachary Terwilliger, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, Michael C. Moore, 

Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Courtney Ross appeals his 36-month sentence imposed upon the revocation of his 

supervised release. Ross contends that his revocation sentence is unreasonable because, 

when explaining the sentence, the district court stated that Ross’ breach of the court’s 

trust was the most important consideration. We affirm.

District courts have “broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation 

of supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). As 

such, “ [w]e will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is 

not plainly unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “We first must

determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.” United 

States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017). In doing so, we generally apply “the 

procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our review of original 

sentences, with some necessary modifications to take into account the unique nature of 

supervised release revocation sentences.” Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Only when we conclude that the revocation sentence is procedurally or 

substantively unreasonable must we consider whether it is plainly so. Id. at 208.

“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately 

explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding 

Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) [(2012)]

factors.” Id. at 207 (footnote omitted). “[A] revocation sentence is substantively 

reasonable if the court sufficiently state[s] a proper basis for its conclusion that the 

defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012), the § 3553(a) factors relevant to 

revocation sentences are all those apart from “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to 

reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 

punishment for the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). We have recognized, however, 

that “the factors listed in § 3553(a)(2)(A) are intertwined with the factors courts are 

expressly authorized to consider under § 3583(e).” Webb, 738 F.3d at 641. 

One factor the district court must consider is any applicable policy statement. 18 

U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(4)(B), 3583(e). The introduction to the Chapter Seven policy 

statement instructs that, when imposing a revocation sentence, “the court should sanction 

primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree, 

the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.” U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b), p.s. “[T]he nature of the conduct 

leading to the revocation [is] considered in measuring the extent of the breach of trust.” 

USSG ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b), p.s. We have also observed that “the very purpose of a 

supervised release revocation hearing is to determine the gravity of the breach of trust 

committed by the defendant.” United States v. Wynn, 786 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir. 2015); 

see United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that breaches of 

trust are “the type of breaches that are explicitly contemplated as the reasons for 

imposing a revocation sentence”).

Here, the district court explained that, when choosing an appropriate sentence, it 

considered the need for deterrence, the need to protect the community, the properly 

calculated policy statement range, and Ross’ breach of the court’s trust. Ross argues that 
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the district court should not have considered his breach of trust or treated it with such 

significance. We conclude, however, that in light of the clear instructions in the Chapter 

Seven policy statement and our precedent, the district court permissibly considered Ross’ 

breach of the court’s trust in fashioning his revocation sentence.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s revocation judgment. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in 

the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED