UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4799

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

ANGELA M. BLYTHE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District 

Judge. (1:14-cr-00591-WDQ-1)

Submitted: June 2, 2016 Decided: July 13, 2016

Before NIEMEYER, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Philip Urofsky, Richard Vigil, Jon Weingart, Robert McCabe, 

SHEARMAN & STERLING, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. 

Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Joyce K. McDonald, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

A federal jury convicted Angela M. Blythe of conspiracy to 

commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1349 

(2012); bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344; and two 

counts of knowingly making false statements to banks, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2012). The district court 

sentenced Blythe to 12 months and 1 day of imprisonment on each 

count to run concurrently, and she now appeals. Finding no 

error, we affirm. 

Blythe first challenges the admission of documents from a 

prior trial for civil fraud in which she represented as an 

attorney one of her coconspirators. A district court should 

exclude relevant evidence when “its probative value is 

‘substantially outweighed’ by the potential for undue prejudice, 

confusion, delay or redundancy.” United States v. Queen, 132 

F.3d 991, 994 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403). 

“Prejudice, as used in Rule 403, refers to evidence that has an 

undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, 

commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

“We apply a highly deferential standard of review to such 

an issue, and a trial court’s decision to admit evidence over a 

Rule 403 objection will not be overturned except under the most 

extraordinary circumstances, where that discretion has been 
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plainly abused.” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 132 

(4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, 

“we look at the evidence in the light most favorable to its 

proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its 

prejudicial effect.” United States v. Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 153 

(4th Cir. 2011). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and 

conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 

this evidence.

Blythe next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support her convictions. We review a district court’s decision 

to deny a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal 

de novo. United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 

2006). A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 

faces a heavy burden. United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 

1067 (4th Cir. 1997). In determining whether the evidence is 

sufficient to support a conviction, we determine “whether there 

is substantial evidence in the record, when viewed in the light 

most favorable to the government, to support the conviction.” 

United States v. Palacios, 677 F.3d 234, 248 (4th Cir. 2012) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence is 

“evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as 

adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Furthermore, “[d]eterminations of credibility are 
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within the sole province of the jury and are not susceptible to 

judicial review.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

For the conspiracy count, the Government had to demonstrate 

that Blythe conspired to execute a scheme to defraud a financial 

institution. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1349. The elements of a bank 

fraud conviction under § 1344 include (1) the defendant 

knowingly executing or attempting a scheme or artifice to 

defraud a financial institution, (2) with the intent to defraud, 

and (3) the institution is federally insured or chartered. 

United States v. Adepoju, 756 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2014). In 

addition, “[a] person violates § 1014 by knowingly making any 

false statement for the purpose of influencing in any way the 

action of any FDIC-insured financial institution upon any 

application, advance, discount, purchase, commitment or loan.” 

Elliott v. United States, 332 F.3d 753, 759 (4th Cir. 2003). 

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that there was a 

considerable amount of substantial evidence presented at trial 

supporting the jury’s verdict of guilt on all the counts. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED