J-S84026-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

CCOMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JJUAN RIVERA 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1192 MDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order June 30, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-35-CR-0000472-2012, 

CP-35-CR-0000476-2012

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JANUARY 26, 2018

Juan Rivera appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541-9546. 

For the reasons that follow, we quash the appeal.

In July 2012, a jury convicted Rivera of three counts of rape of a child, 

two counts of rape, seven counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, 

one count of aggravated indecent assault of a child, two counts of aggravated 

indecent assault of a child less than 16 years old, three counts of indecent 

assault of a person less than 13 years of age, two counts of unlawful contact 

with a minor, two counts of corruption of minors, and two counts of 

endangering the welfare of a child. The charges were based on Rivera’s sexual 

abuse of his two minor stepdaughters. On December 18, 2012, the court 

determined Rivera to be a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) under this 
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Commonwealth’s version of Megan’s Law,1 and sentenced him to 108-216 

years’ incarceration, plus 10 years of special probation.

Rivera filed a direct appeal; our Court affirmed his judgment of 

sentence. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 140 MDA 2013 (Pa. Super. filed 

March 26, 2014). On January 5, 2015, Rivera filed a pro se PCRA petition 

alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel for the failure to raise issues on 

direct appeal in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and for the failure to argue 

the merits of the issues raised in the Rule 1925(b) statement. PCRA counsel 

was appointed; on February 3, 2016, PCRA counsel filed a petition to withdraw 

pursuant to Turner/Finley2 and furnished Rivera with a copy of his no-merit 

letter. On February 22, 2017, the trial court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice 

of its intent to dismiss Rivera’s petition and advised him of his right to respond 

within 20 days. On March 16, 2017, Rivera filed an untimely response to the 

court’s Rule 907 notice, again referencing trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. On 

June 30, 2017, the court denied Rivera’s petition and granted counsel’s 

petition to withdraw. Rivera filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered 

Rule 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal.

Because of the deficiencies in Rivera’s appellate brief, we are unable to 

discern what issues he wishes to raise or the arguments he wishes to present 

to this Court. To begin, we refer Rivera to the general rule that requires that 

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1 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1.

2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. 

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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briefs conform to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 2101 

states:

Briefs and reproduced records shall conform in all material 

respects with the requirements of these rules as nearly as the 

circumstances of the particular case will admit, otherwise they 

may be suppressed, and, if the defects are in the brief or 

reproduced record of the appellant and are substantial, the appeal 

or other matter may be quashed or dismissed.

Pa.R.A.P. 2101. We also bring Rule 2111 to Rivera’s attention, which 

provides:

Rule 2111. Brief of the Appellant

(a) General rule. The brief of the appellant, except as 

otherwise prescribed by these rules, shall consist of the 

following matter, separately and distinctly entitled and in 

the following order:

(1) Statement of jurisdiction.

(2) Order or other determination in question.

(3) Statement of both the scope of review and the 

standard of review.

(4) Statement of the questions involved.

(5) Statement of the case.

(6) Summary of argument.

(7) Argument for appellant.

(8) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.

(9) The opinions and pleadings specified in Subdivisions 

(b) and (c) of this rule.

(10) In the Superior Court, a copy of the statement of the 

matters complained of on appeal filed with the trial 

court pursuant to Rule 1925(b), or an averment that 

no order requiring a Rule 1925(b) statement was 

entered.

(b) Opinions below. There shall be appended to the brief a 

copy of any opinions delivered by any court or other 

government unit below relating to the order or other 

determination under review, if pertinent to the questions 

involved[.]
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Pa.R.A.P. 2111. Rivera’s brief completely omits all designated portions of Rule 

2111.

Although Rivera lists several issues in his pro se Rule 1925(b) 

statement, none of those issues are presented or argued in his brief. 

Moreover, none of the sections of his brief contain references to the record or 

to case law. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(4) and Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b).

Our review of Rivera’s brief evidences a complete failure to abide by the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 2116, which is entitled 

“Statement of Questions Involved” provides in pertinent part that:

The statement of the questions involved must state the question 

or questions in the briefest and most general terms, without 

names, dates, amounts or particulars of any kind. It should not 

ordinarily exceed 15 lines, must never exceed one page, and must 

always be on a separate page, without any other matter appearing 

thereon. This rule is to be considered in the highest degree 

mandatory, admitting of no exception: ordinarily no point 

will be considered which is not set forth in the statement 

of questions involved or suggested thereby. 

Pa.R.A.P. 2116 (emphasis added).

Recognizing that Rivera has ignored the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, we conclude that we are unable to conduct a meaningful review. 

Moreover, the fact that Rivera is pro se3 on appeal does not entitle him to a 

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3 We note that on November 28, 2017, the trial court granted Rivera in forma 

pauperis (“IFP”) status. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(G) (“When a defendant 

satisfies the judge that the defendant is unable to pay the costs of the postconviction collateral proceedings, the judge shall order that the defendant be 

permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.”). On appeal, verified IFP status will 

relieve the appellant from paying the required filing fees in the appellate court. 
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more lax application of the rules of procedure. In Commonwealth v. Rivera, 

685 A.2d 1011 (Pa. Super. 1996), we stated:

While this court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a 

pro se litigant, we note that appellant is not entitled to any 

particular advantage because she lacks legal training. As our 

supreme court has explained, any layperson choosing to represent 

[herself] in a legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, 

assume the risk that [her] lack of expertise and legal training will 

prove [her] undoing.

Id. at 1013 (quoting O’Neill v. Checker Motors Corp., 567 A.2d 680, 682 

(Pa. Super. 1989)). The Rivera court concluded that “we decline to become 

the appellant’s counsel. When issues are not properly raised and developed 

in briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for 

review[,] a Court will not consider the merits thereof.” Id. (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Sanford, 445 A.2d 149, 150 (Pa. Super. 1982)).

Similarly, we are compelled to quash this appeal due to the numerous 

defects in Rivera’s brief, which we conclude prevent us from conducting a 

meaningful review. 

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See Pa.R.A.P. 2701. Moreover an IFP appellant shall not be required to 

reproduce the record. See Pa.R.A.P. 2151(b). Finally, a party who has been 

permitted to proceed IFP shall file 7 copies of each definitive brief with the 

Superior Court and one copy of each definitive brief on every other party 

separately represented. See Pa.R.A.P. 2187(c)(iii). IFP status, however, 

does not relax the rules regarding the content or form of the appellant’s brief 

on appeal.
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Appeal quashed.4

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/26/2018

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4 We note that to the extent Rivera raises issues in his Reply Brief, we remind 

him that he is not permitted to raise issues on appeal for the first time in a 

reply brief. See Commonwealth v. Otera, 860 A.2d 1052 (Pa. Super. 

2004); see also Filoon v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, 684 A.2d 1339 

(Pa. Commw. 1994) (appellate court refused to address any issue raised by 

petitioner in reply brief that were not already raised in initial brief under 

Pa.R.A.P. 2113).