About the Report

An effective police force is critical to countering insurgency. 

In Pakistan, an understaffed and underequipped police force is 

increasingly called on to manage rising insecurity and militant 

violence. This report evaluates the obstacles to upgrading 

the existing police system and recommends traditional and 

innovative reform options, including major restructuring of the 

total civilian law enforcement infrastructure, without which the 

police force cannot be effectively improved. Because Pakistan’s 

police capacity has direct implications for the country’s ability 

to tackle terrorism, the United States and its allies would 

realize counterterrorism dividends by helping law enforcement 

efforts through modern training and technical assistance.

Professor Hassan Abbas holds the Quaid-i-Azam Chair at 

the South Asia Institute of Columbia University and is a 

senior adviser at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. 

His previous papers on the subject of police reforms in 

Pakistan were published by the Institute for Social Policy 

and Understanding and the Brookings Institution (both in 

Washington, D.C.) in 2009. He is also a Bernard Schwartz 

Fellow at the Asia Society, New York, where he is director of 

the Pakistan Study Group, which is developing “Pakistan 2020: 

A Vision for a Better Future and a Roadmap for Getting There.”

202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 266 February 2011

© 2011 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Hassan Abbas

Reforming Pakistan‘s 

Police and Law 

Enforcement 

Infrastructure 

Is It Too Flawed to Fix?

Summary

•	 An efficient, well-functioning police service is critical to counterinsurgency as well as counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan, now and in the future. At the same time, the police force 

must also address rising crime rates and a deteriorating law-and-order situation, among 

many other tasks.

•	 The capacity of the Pakistan Police Service to deliver on all these fronts is severely diminished by political manipulation, the lack of forensic services, inadequate training and 

equipment, corruption, and weaknesses in the judicial sphere. Disconnect and lack of 

coordination between numerous kinds of policing and intelligence organizations are major 

hurdles on the path leading to collective strategizing.

•	 Upgrading the existing police system as the central law enforcement institution in the 

country cannot occur in isolation, however. Instead, it must be part of an overarching 

restructuring of the total law enforcement infrastructure, including a reform of the criminal 

justice system and the stripping of politically motivated amendments from the Police Act 

of 2002. Both traditional and innovative reforms would be expected to bear fruit in this 

arena. With a high degree of public consensus on the need for far-reaching law enforcement reforms in Pakistan, there is political space to make tough, reform-oriented choices. 

Pro-reform circles within police are also gaining strength.

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Contents

Current Challenges 2

An Opportunity 3

Law Enforcement Organizations in Pakistan 4

Reasons for Weakness of Law Enforcement

Infrastructure 5

Counterterrorism Capacity and Interinstitutional

Complexities 10

Recommendations for Reform 12
2 

•	 The United States and its allies, especially the EU countries, would reap major dividends 

from an upgraded police service that has as one of its mandates the interdiction of 

militants’ efforts to disrupt U.S. interests and security. However, donor aid in the form of 

financial and technical support should be coordinated and targeted toward improved police 

services, rather than earmarked only for counterinsurgency efforts.

Current Challenges

For many years, Pakistan has been engaged in battling a hydra-headed insurgency in the 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province 

(KPP, formerly known as North-West Frontier Province). An expanding terrorist campaign 

targeting Pakistan’s major cities is inextricably linked to this insurgency. The growing number of suicide attacks across Pakistan underscores the dangerous nature of the crisis.1 From 

2002 to 2005, the total number of suicide attacks in Pakistan was fifteen, while over the 

next four years (i.e., the 2006–09 period), the number rose to around two hundred. The statistics on the numbers killed or injured are astounding if all terrorist attacks and consequent 

casualties are included (table 1). 

Pakistan has suffered more than 30,000 casualties in the war on terror so far.2 This 

trend continues: around 2,250 civilians and security personnel lost their lives in 2010 alone 

at the hands of terrorists.3 While those under fire are chiefly religious leaders challenging 

extremists, politicians associated with progressive political parties, and innocent civilians, 

the police are increasingly being targeted as a symbol of the state. Terrorists understand 

well that the military and the police are their most important enemies.

The changing tactics and targets of the various terrorist groups operating in the country 

pose a formidable challenge to a police force with limited resources, poor training, and 

inadequate equipment. Pakistan’s civilian law enforcement structure has failed to develop 

any systematic and advanced counterterrorism strategy owing to the lack of modern investigative tools, requisite skills, and incentives. For the same reasons, it is no surprise that the 

rate of crimes not associated with terrorism has also jumped in recent years. Law-and-order 

duties and VIP protection responsibilities consume a significant chunk of police resources.4

The lack of forensic support further diminishes police effectiveness and capacity to deliver. 

Corruption, nepotism, and political manipulation are rampant; they damage police integrity, 

credibility, and public image. An additional impediment to criminal law enforcement is the 

ineptitude of Pakistan’s judicial sector.

Police capacity is critical for tackling terrorism and controlling insurgency-infested areas. 

A growing body of empirical research has established that law enforcement, not military 

force, is the most effective tool for this task.5 As Christine Fair of Georgetown University’s 

Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service aptly observes, “A police-led effort would be better than one led by the army, as the history of successful insurgency movements in disparate 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor 

of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, 

D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American 

University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, James R. 

Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. • Kerry 

Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and 

Human Rights • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care 

Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, Nev. • Stephen D. Krasner, 

Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George 

Mason University, Fairfax, Va. • Judy Van Rest, Executive 

Vice President, International Republican Institute, Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C. 

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy •

Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 

Table 1. Total Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan, 2006–09

Year 

Total 

attacks

Annual 

increase (%)

No. 

killed

No. 

injured

2006 675 159 907 1,543

2007 1,503 129 3,448 5,353

2008 2,577 43 7,997 9,670

2009 3,816 48 12,632 12,815

Source: Pakistan Security Report 2009 (Islamabad: Pak Institute of Peace Studies, 2010).
 3

theatres across the globe shows.”6 A RAND Corporation study titled How Terrorist Groups End

also provides evidence that effective police and intelligence work, rather than the use of 

military force, delivers better counterterrorism results.7 Douglas P. Lackey in a counterterrorism article goes a step further when he argues, “The killing of civilians by terrorists is not 

war, but murder, so the social genre of terrorism is crime, and terrorists should be classified 

as criminals,” and from this premise he rightly deduces, “If terrorists are criminals, their 

natural antagonists are the police.”8 As he points out, most of the activities considered vital 

for any counterterrorism effort fall within the scope of standard police activity, including 

the forensic analysis of terrorist attack sites, gleaning information from abandoned terrorist 

camps, searching suspected terrorist locations, the penetration of terrorist organizations by 

undercover agents, surveillance of suspicious sites, monitoring suspects, and maintaining 

databases of suspects. Hence, whether it is to combat insurgency or terrorism, a good police 

force is any state’s best bet. 

Military operations can substitute for police action in certain circumstances, but that 

creates a new set of issues, ranging from high civilian casualties to human rights violations. A disproportionate use of force is almost always counterproductive. Most militaries, 

including that of Pakistan, are not trained or equipped to deal with internal law-and-order 

crises. Ideally, the military should act as a backup force that is ready to move in if needed 

in support of police action.

This report evaluates the capacity and performance of Pakistan’s civilian law enforcement 

structure in relation to counterterrorism efforts, with a special focus on police forces. The 

attention to law enforcement as a whole is warranted as the law enforcement infrastructure 

includes all police departments (provincial and federal), various investigative organizations, 

specialized forces (including paramilitary units that support police work), and intelligence 

outfits that share information with police. The police force is the central institution in the 

law enforcement structure of any state, but it is not the only one, and therefore it cannot be 

treated in a vacuum. After a brief explanation of why police reforms in Pakistan are essential 

and possible, the report examines the current state of the Pakistan police force in terms of 

infrastructure and manpower. It then evaluates obstacles to reform and considers (1) traditional reform options that, if implemented, could upgrade and improve the existing police 

system to effectively support counterinsurgency and counterterrorism measures and the goal 

of mitigating extremism in society, and (2) innovative reform options, including a major 

restructuring of existing police organizations or the creation of new police organizations to 

circumvent and reach beyond traditional problems. Effective remedies for the shortcomings of 

the police service likely depend on equally far-reaching reforms of the criminal justice system 

and political administrative changes. The counterterrorism operations led by Pakistan’s armed 

forces (especially the army and air force) in FATA are beyond the scope of this report.

An Opportunity

With the increasing insecurity and instability in the country, the government of Pakistan 

must consider making major changes to the police and other law enforcement structures and 

the coordination mechanisms these various entities use in their counterterrorism efforts. 

Some initiatives have been launched in this direction since 2009. For instance, additional 

recruiting from a pool of retired army soldiers is being considered to raise specialized counterterrorism units in each province.9 Yet the expert consensus is that Pakistan lacks the 

local expertise and capacity to achieve a turnaround in law enforcement performance on its 

own. The time is ripe for U.S. and international support to Pakistan in this sphere. Helping 

the police and civilian intelligence agencies with modern training and technical assistance 

would pay counterterrorism dividends for the United States and the EU.

Whether it is to combat 

insurgency or terrorism, a 

good police force is any state’s 

best bet.
4 

Admittedly, the task is not easy; the obstacles on the path of police reform in Pakistan 

are potent and entrenched. Moreover, for Pakistan to attract international assistance it 

needs to introduce concrete and well-thought-out organizational reforms in the law enforcement sector as well as in the related intelligence infrastructure. Such reforms have not 

been forthcoming thus far. Moreover, building the capacity of only one segment of the law 

enforcement infrastructure is impractical, as overarching reform is needed. In other words, 

the counterterrorism capacity of the police service cannot be improved in isolation; a comprehensive approach is necessary. Rule of law, a critical prerequisite for democracy, is also 

closely linked to effective law enforcement. Nevertheless, the stakes are simply too high 

for international partners to walk away from the challenge. It is undeniable that successful 

police reforms that enhance Pakistan’s counterterrorism performance and strengthen the 

rule of law will stabilize Pakistan and improve the prospects of peace in the region.

The Obama administration’s revitalized engagement with Islamabad provides a unique 

opportunity to usher in significant law enforcement reform on an urgent timetable to 

improve Pakistan’s counterterrorism capacity. This addresses one of the most vital U.S. 

interests in the country and the region—preventing the sanctuary of global terrorists with 

the aim and capacity to strike the United States and its allies. The episode involving Faisal 

Shahzad, a Pakistani American who tried to explode a bomb in Times Square in New York 

in May 2010, is a case in point. The United States has signaled its willingness to assist in 

this area under the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, but the issue deserves 

priority treatment.

Law Enforcement Organizations in Pakistan

Before reform measures can be considered, a clear understanding of the present status of 

the law enforcement structure is essential. There are two sets of law enforcement organizations in Pakistan: those that operate under the federal government, and the provincial police 

organizations. Nineteen major organizations operate directly under the federal government 

dealing with a variety of law enforcement responsibilities (including intelligence gathering, 

border and coast surveillance, and policing) and answering to different authorities. The total 

strength of all law enforcement and intelligence services’ officials at the disposal of the 

federal government (with cross-provincial jurisdiction) is approximately 210,000.10 Rarely do 

these organizations coordinate their plans and activities or strategize together. The chain of 

command of the organizations varies, which further complicates coordination and collective 

policy planning. As a result, decisions are often poorly implemented. 

The eighteen federal law enforcement organizations (figure 1) can be grouped into four 

broad categories: 

•	 Forces under the Ministry of the Interior. These forces include five paramilitary organizations, 

namely, the Pakistan Rangers (Sindh and Punjab), the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency, 

the Frontier Corps (KPP and Balochistan), and the Frontier Constabulary and Northern Areas 

Scouts (Gilgit-Baltistan), in addition to the Islamabad Police and the Federal Investigation 

Agency (FIA).

•	 Police planning and management organizations under the Ministry of the Interior. These 

include the National Police Bureau, the National Police Management Board, the National 

Police Foundation, and the National Public Safety Commission. The National CounterTerrorism Authority (NACTA) is the latest organization to be included in this category. 

•	 Other federal organizations. In this category are those organizations that are not under the 

direct control of the Ministry of the Interior. They include the National Highways and Motorway Police (under the Ministry of Communications), the Pakistan Railways Police (under the 
 5

Ministry of Railways), the Airport Security Force (under the Ministry of Defense), and the 

Anti-Narcotics Force (under the Ministry of Narcotics Control). 

•	 Intelligence organizations. The Intelligence Bureau (IB), a civilian agency, and InterServices Intelligence (ISI), led by a serving army lieutenant general, are the two major 

intelligence outfits. They have regional and provincial offices throughout Pakistan. 

A brief description of responsibilities, jurisdiction, and chain of command of these organizations is given in the appendix.11

The second category of law enforcement infrastructure comprises the four provincial police 

organizations, as well as those operational in Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir 

(AJK). These provincial and regional police organizations are all organized along similar lines 

and abide by the same set of laws and rules. For instance, the procedural criminal laws (i.e., 

the Pakistan Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order) are 

uniformly applicable to all parts of the country (except FATA). The Police Service of Pakistan 

(PSP), a federal service recruited through the Federal Public Service Commission, provides more 

than 80 percent of senior supervisory officers (with the rank of assistant superintendent of 

police and above, who act as subdivisional police chiefs) to the provincial police departments. 

Its recruitment, training, and career management (including transfers to provinces and federal 

law enforcement agencies) are managed by the Establishment Division (federal government), 

though PSP officers report to provincial governments and draw their salaries from provincial 

budgetary provisions. These PSP officers can be assigned to any province, but lower ranks of 

police are permanent employees of provincial police organizations and cannot be transferred 

outside their respective provinces. Since the British era, this complicated service structure has 

created an elitist PSP that is a source of frustration for junior ranks. The statistics in table 2 

indicate police strength and resources in the four provinces, AJK, and Gilgit-Baltistan.

Federal Government

Gilgit-Baltistan Police Azad Kashmir Police

Police

Four Provincial Governments

Punjab

Police

Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa Police

Sindh

Police

Balochistan

Police

Ministry of 

Narcotics Control

Ministry of 

Communications

Ministry of 

Defense

Ministry of 

Railways

Anti -

Narcotics

Force

National Highways

and Motorway Police

Airport

Security Force

Railway

Police

Inter-Services

Intelligence

Counter-Terrorism Centre

Intelligence Bureau

Ministry of 

Interior

Pakistan Rangers

Punjab Rangers

Sindh Rangers

Pakistan Maritime

Security Agency

Capital Territory Police

(Islamabad)

National

Counterterrorism

Authority

FATA: Levies and Khasadars

Frontier Corps

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa FC

Balochistan FC

Frontier Constabulary

Gilgit-Baltistan Scouts

Federal Investigation Agency

National Police

Bureau

National Public

Safety

Commission

National Police

Management

Board

Gilgit-Baltistan Government Azad Kashmir Government

Figure 1. Police Organization in Pakistan
6 

Reasons for the Weakness of the Law Enforcement Infrastructure

There is a broad consensus in Pakistan that after decades of abuse and neglect, its police 

force is failing to combat crime effectively, uphold the law, provide basic security to 

citizens, and fight growing militancy. Since its inception in 1947, despite frequent ethnic 

confrontations, sectarian battles, and sharp rises in criminal or insurgent activity, policymakers have never put the law enforcement and police sector at the top of their priority list 

for investment and reform. As a result, the overall police infrastructure is poorly organized. 

Many reports were commissioned to improve policing standards, but either their recommendations were too general or the governments of the day lacked the will to implement 

the recommended changes. Some of the major reasons relevant to police engagement in 

counterterrorism activities are insufficient numbers and scant resources, institutional disconnect, political challenges, corruption, and lack of modernization.

Insufficient Numbers and Scant Resources

Pakistan’s total population is estimated to be around 180 million, and the combined 

federal and provincial law enforcement forces (including paramilitary and related wings 

of the intelligence organizations) have a total strength of close to 575,000 personnel.12

Thus, the police–population ratio is one police official for every 304 persons. On paper, 

Pakistan is in better shape than, say, India, where there is on average one policeman 

for every 794 people. Pakistan also fares well vis-à-vis the UN standard for peacetime 

policing, which recommends one police officer for every 400 persons.13 However, given 

the nature of the crisis in Pakistan, especially the heightened terrorist activity and 

insurgency situations in FATA and parts of Balochistan Province, coupled with rising 

crime figures nationwide, the numbers are not as good as they appear. Moreover, the UN 

standards assume an efficient, well-resourced, honest police force, which is not the case 

in Pakistan. And the ratio worsens if only forces directly involved in routine police work 

are counted and the paramilitary forces with a specific focus (such as maritime and airport 

security) and administrative personnel in various ministries and intelligence organizations 

are excluded.14

Table 2. Police Organizations in the Provinces, AJK, and Gilgit-Baltistan

Province

Population 

(millions) Police stations Police strength

Budget 2009 

(millions of 

rupees)

Punjaba 93 637 170,031 43,000 

KPPb 21 250 55,000 9,677 

Sindh 36 440 70,133 24,900 

Balochistanc 8 84 46,022 3,500 

Gilgit-Baltistand 2 26 4,662 450 

(approx.)

AJKe 5 42 8,373

Total 165 1,479 354,221 82,513

a. Abida Ellahi, “Overview of Police in Pakistan,” scribd.com, December 13, 2010, www.scribd.com/doc/24031499/

Pakistan-Police.

b. For the latest data, see Government of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, “White Paper 2010–11,” Finance Department, 

June 12, 2010.

c. Balochistan Police, “Annual Policing Plan 2007–08,” 2007, www.balochistanpolice.gov.pk.

d. Since the promulgation of the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order of 2009, the police in 

that region now fall under the direct supervision of the government of Gilgit-Baltistan. Also, a new force named the 

Karakoram Security Force is being raised (by recruiting 1,500 employees) to manage the highways in the area. 

e. “More ASIs, Constables to Enroll in AJK,” Pakistan Observer, June 13, 2010, pakobserver.net/detailnews.

asp?id=26876. 

There is a broad consensus in 

Pakistan that . . . its police 

force is failing to combat 

crime effectively, uphold the 

law, provide basic security to 

citizens, and fight growing 

militancy. 
 7

In the domain of counterterrorism, despite the sharp rise in terrorist attacks across the 

country, no significant investment has been made in specialized expertise. For instance, 

the FIA’s Special Investigation Group, which is responsible for investigating major terrorist 

attacks in the country, has a very limited number of terrorism specialists. Its number of 

investigators has only recently risen from a mere thirty-seven to eighty-seven (plus thirteen 

additional specialists in explosives, banking, and law).15

Provincial Police Forces, Islamabad Police, and Others

While substantial financial commitments have been made to increase the police capacity 

in KPP, the KPP administration has serious concerns about the availability of funds. For 

example, recruitment has increased substantially, shooting up to 78,320 in 2010–11 after 

attaining levels of 55,450 in 2009–10 and 50,892 in 2008–09, according to the KPP government, and the financial budget for police has more than doubled over the past five years.16

However, unexpectedly large increases in salaries, health care costs, and compensation for 

police officials killed in the line of duty have depleted the funds needed for expansion. 

Fortunately, the belated but critical U.S. support for the provincial police force has 

helped the institution through increased resources and enhanced professional expertise 

to tackle terrorism. The support included specialized training for officers, the upgrading of 

police stations in sensitive areas, funds for the establishment of the first police academy for 

women, and the provision of protective gear, modern communications systems, and vehicles 

to KPP police.17 The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs deserves credit for some of these initiatives. However, this new partnership has not proceeded without hitches: more than 3,000 bulletproof jackets given by the 

United States to KPP police and the Frontier Corps languished at the Islamabad airport for 

months in 2010, apparently because of poor coordination between various departments, 

including the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Commerce, and Pakistan International 

Airlines, which operates under the Ministry of Defense.18

Punjab Province has also made a significant contribution to increasing police capacity 

in the 2009–10 budget.19 A sharp rise in terrorist attacks in Punjab, especially in Lahore, 

targeting religious institutions and police infrastructure convinced the provincial government of the need to increase resources for police. However, so far the only effect has been 

an increase in salaries for police officials, which is a positive change but far from what 

is needed to transform the institution. The chief of police in Lahore, Mohammad Aslam 

Tareen, aptly argues, “We are in transformation period where we badly need huge reforms in 

the police department,” while emphasizing the need for “adopting a joint strategy among 

security agencies, police, and public.”20 For example, while there are around 170,000 police 

officials in Punjab, there are only 82,000 weapons and 5,000 bulletproof vests for the 

officers.21 After a major terrorist attack against two religious centers of the Ahmiddiya 

community in Lahore in May 2010, senior police officials admitted that the department 

faces a serious shortage of equipment and lacks training.22 In Sindh Province, while a lobby 

within the Sindh police in support of change has been gaining strength, no reforms of substance have been implemented. An analysis conducted by some pro-reform police officers 

concluded that nothing short of a “cultural transformation” in the police institutions would 

bear any fruit.23 The analysis revealed the following: junior officers, who manage police 

stations, are unqualified for the job; ordinary police officials work between sixteen and 

eighteen hours a day; and an insufficient number of police in urban centers has compromised law enforcement efficiency.24 Unprecedented levels of street crime and a consistent 

pattern of ethnic and sectarian-motivated target killings in Karachi are just one indication 

of the nature of the challenge.

Pro-reform police officers 

concluded that nothing short 

of a “cultural transformation” 

in the police institutions would 

bear any fruit.

In . . . counterterrorism, despite 

the sharp rise in terrorist 

attacks across the country, no 

significant investment has been 

made in specialized expertise.
8 

The situation in Balochistan is even more desperate. In January 2010 in Quetta city, 

hundreds of police officials surrounded the governor’s and chief minister’s residences to 

protest low salaries. The protesting officers used official weapons for aerial firing, blocked 

various roads, damaged vehicles, and beat up civilians.25 Though stern action was taken 

against senior officials, the only improvement made after the crisis ended was an increase 

in the compensation for police personnel killed by terrorists while on duty. 

Islamabad police also suffer from inadequate force numbers. It is especially surprising in 

light of the nature of the threat to the capital city. As the Pakistani writer Ayesha Siddiqa 

points out, how can 11,000 cops effectively guard (and in some cases monitor) 81 embassies, 76 ambassadors’ residences, 22 UN offices, 14 hospitals, 20 universities, 1,044 schools 

and colleges, 77 markets, and 305 madrassas?26 In addition, they have to protect the head 

of state, government, and other dignitaries who visit the capital. It is an impossible task.

The resource capacity of law enforcement organizations, other than the provincial police 

forces, is inconsistent. The National Highways and Motorway Police, established in 1997, is 

one of the most efficient organizations in the country and an almost corruption-free institution as a result of higher salaries, good training facilities, recruitment on merit, and the 

availability of modern equipment.27 However, other federal law enforcement organizations, 

such as the Pakistan Railways Police and the Airport Security Force, have not been that fortunate. In recent months the Pakistan Railways Police could not install donated scanners at 

two important and vulnerable stations because of a lack of funds, and its request for closedcircuit cameras in twenty-three large railway stations has not been fulfilled.28 Similarly, 

the Airport Security Force continues to use a type of bomb detector at one of the largest 

airports whose export from the UK was banned after it led to the deaths of 275 people.29

Institutional Disconnect

In accordance with the constitution of Pakistan, which provides for a federal system of 

government, the four provincial governments are directly responsible for law-and-order 

functions. Consequently, the police are supervised at a provincial level. Police and paramilitary forces in the capital city of Islamabad and Levies and Khasadars in FATA, however, 

are under the direct jurisdiction of the federal government. The police of AJK and GilgitBaltistan are managed by their respective governments (somewhat similar to the situation 

in the provinces), although the federal government has more direct leverage because of the 

special legal status of these regions. PSP officers who serve in senior supervisory positions 

all across Pakistan are deemed employees of the federal government even when they serve 

in provincial police institutions. In case of a center–province tussle, the central government 

can recall any PSP officer or refuse to send any requisitioned officer to a province. The 

federal government’s discretionary authority has sometimes been misused for political ends, 

making the work environment for police officials very hard and strenuous. 

The police forces in each of the provinces act independently of each other, and there is no 

nationwide integration in terms of training standards and coordination. The federal interior 

ministry exercises overall supervision, but provincial inspector generals of the police service 

report directly to their respective chief ministers and are funded from the provincial government. In addition, there is no standardized system of hiring, transferring, and promotion 

in the four provincial police departments, which creates employment disparities. Lack of 

coordination among provincial police services often leads to poor information sharing and 

ineffective monitoring of criminal and terrorist networks.

The police forces in each of the 

provinces act independently of 

each other, and there 

is no nationwide integration 

in terms of training standards 

and coordination. 
 9

Political Challenges

The police in Pakistan have traditionally been used by the state to suppress dissent and tame 

opposition.30 Many senior police officers became politicized in recent decades in an attempt 

to be in the good books of one political party or the other, and prized field appointments are 

often made based on political connections. Ironically, the Police Act of 1861 (along with the 

Police Rules of 1934), a colonial legacy that was meant to control people rather than serve 

them, remained applicable in Pakistan as a central law (with very minor modifications) until 

2002, when a reform-oriented Police Order replaced it. The autocratic and oppressive nature 

of the old law negatively affected police culture and the professionalism of the force.

Improvements to correct years of oversight of the police were attempted during the 

Musharraf era. For instance, the Police Act of 2002 emulated the Japanese National Safety 

Commission system in institutionalizing oversight of the police by public representatives at 

various levels, and independence of the prosecution service was encouraged to keep police 

high-handedness in check. Additionally, mechanisms for registering complaints against 

police were streamlined. However, these adjustments were deemed contrary to the political 

interests of the legislators (mostly feudal and partisan) aligned with Musharraf at the time, 

and thus were diluted through amendments. 

In rural areas (almost 60 percent of the country), local police officers can influence the 

fate of politicians in elections by allowing or curbing rigging. Moreover, feudal and tribal 

elements in remote areas often use police for torturing or “teaching a lesson” to their 

opponents, who are mostly peasants. Hence, they need influence with the police. Therefore, while Musharraf’s new law was very good on the books, few of the changes were ever 

implemented, and various amendments inspired by political expediencies were incorporated 

into the law in 2004, thus nullifying the intent and purpose of the original 2002 act. This 

is a clear indication of the level of politicization in decision making pertaining to the police 

force; even well-thought-out plans are virtually impossible to implement without strong 

political will.

Lack of Modernization and Corruption

The police in Pakistan have a terrible reputation, and ordinary people often avoid approaching police to report crime or communicate grievances.31 There is a general perception that 

the institution of the police is corrupt, institutionally incompetent, and brutal. Consequently, justice is elusive, insecurity is rampant, and ordinary citizens are the victims of this 

system. Even internal police assessments acknowledge the police force’s lack of credibility in 

the public eye.32 However, in the overall scenario and in comparative terms, police performance is not much different from the functioning of customs officials, bureaucrats running 

the provincial and federal secretariats, and the intelligence services. The police officers get 

the most blame because they are visible to everyone and are expected to do everything 

in Pakistan, from crisis management to resolving political and legal disputes, in addition 

to facing the wrath of people venting their frustrations over blunders committed by the 

country’s leadership, both political and military. Still, the police force cannot be defended 

for its routine excesses, violations of human rights, and inefficiency. 

The police regularly use torture to elicit confessions because they lack other, more 

sophisticated means of investigation. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s forensics capabilities are 

rudimentary at best. Until the late 1990s the country had only one major laboratory (located 

in Rawalpindi), staffed by a handful of experts, and only under “special circumstances” (i.e., 

in high-profile cases) could a police officer get access to this resource. In the 2002–07 

period four additional laboratories were sanctioned, one in each provincial capital. Even 

though the increased capacity is a significant improvement, the forensic services still canThe police in Pakistan have a 

terrible reputation, and ordinary 

people often avoid approaching 

police to report crime or 

communicate grievances.
10 

not meet the demand. In fact, the Sindh laboratory is not even fully functional. Therefore, 

cases for evaluation are sent to Islamabad, as happened with the evidence collected from 

the crime scenes of the major terrorist attacks in Karachi in recent months.33 Despite a $40 

million grant from the Asian Development Bank to the Sindh police to upgrade the existing 

Sindh Forensic Science Laboratory in Karachi and set up two new facilities in the interior 

of the province, in Hyderabad and Larkana, almost no progress has been made.34 Because 

of budgetary constraints, the government has also discontinued funding for the envisioned 

National Forensic Science Agency headquarters and its main laboratory in Islamabad.35 As 

a result, only a DNA laboratory is operating.

A lack of attention to developing modern investigation and interrogation techniques is 

another serious issue. Most police officers vie for command positions in investigative work 

because the primary work of any police force is not even considered a field job,36 which is a 

mandatory requirement for promotion to a senior supervisory role.37 Only very recently has 

the government considered a proposal to declare service in the Investigation Wing a field 

posting, to encourage prime officers to work in this area. This development will remove the 

anomaly, which has so far deterred many professionally competent officers from serving in 

the Investigation Wing; officers will now be able to count their service with the Investigation Wing as a two-year field posting.

Most police training schools are in a deplorable state due to a paucity of funds. The 

instructors are often officials who were removed from field duties for political reasons, and 

it is hardly surprising that the performance of a demoralized and sidelined faculty leaves 

much to be desired. Fortunately, there is some international interest in revitalizing this area. 

The U.S. government is supporting the KPP government in building an additional police 

academy, which is a positive investment.38 France is sending experts to conduct training at police academies in Pakistan, and funds from the EU are likely to be geared toward 

enhancing police training standards.39 British assistance to Pakistan’s FIA is especially 

noteworthy here.40 However, based on interviews with government officials in the United 

States, France, and the UK, it appears that much more coordination is needed among international donors involved in supporting Pakistan’s law enforcement capacity, as the support 

currently shows some level of duplication. Perhaps Pakistan can facilitate synchronization 

in this sector.

Counterterrorism Capacity and Interinstitutional Complexities

The Pakistani police force was traditionally not trained for counterterrorism. Indeed, for 

reasons of lack of training and insufficient capacity already mentioned, it is barely able 

to operate as an entity in checking crime and carrying out basic law-and-order functions. 

However, current circumstances have upended the traditional model and thrust the police 

into the forefront of the counterterrorism effort. Lack of police expertise in countering the 

growing extremist menace is undermining the stability of the Pakistani state and claiming 

thousands of lives in terrorist attacks. This shortcoming is catastrophic, as counterterrorism 

will be part of the portfolio of the Pakistani police for years to come.

In the counterterrorism segment of the larger law enforcement sphere, a number of overarching problems are obvious impediments to reform efforts. Four warrant special attention, 

for without remedial measures to treat these major inadequacies, reform of the law enforcement sector, especially in the counterterrorism domain, cannot succeed.

Lack of police expertise 

in countering the growing 

extremist menace is 

undermining the stability of the 

Pakistani state and claiming 

thousands of lives in terrorist 

attacks.
 11

Dysfunctional Relationship between Police and Intelligence Organizations

Lack of trust and coordination between the police force and intelligence outfits have been 

a long-standing concern for Pakistani law enforcers, and this concern is amplified by the 

sometimes close relationship between certain armed groups and elements of the intelligence services. For example, according to a well-informed Pakistani journalist, throughout 

the 1990s one or two intelligence officers in each district of Pakistan were tasked to help 

out members of the state-supported militant groups if police “creat[ed] any problems for 

them.”41 In private discussions police officers routinely mention apprehending militants and 

criminals but quickly receiving “requests” from intelligence agencies (civilian or military) to 

let them go. Although the intensity of such practices has decreased in the post-9/11 environment, even today police hesitate to pursue militants and activists associated with groups 

generally known for their close relationship with the intelligence services.

Poor data collection with regard to crimes and criminals is another major lacuna in the 

system. Many criminals who join militant religious groups are not traced and tracked efficiently. Even banned militant organizations are not well profiled.42 According to a senior 

official of NACTA, many militants currently incarcerated have not been interviewed by 

experts, which is critical to understanding their networks.43 In many instances, militant 

organizations continue their publications, and wanted criminals and terrorists may simply 

change their affiliations to a group that is not under government scrutiny. All the while, the 

police remain clueless. 

A discernible lack of coordination among the police force, the civilian-run IB, and the 

military-run intelligence agencies lies at the heart of the problem. For instance, to get data 

from telephone companies (to trace calls made by criminals and terrorists), the police and 

the FIA must send a request to intelligence agencies, and the time delay can be crucial 

to the investigation. Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao, a renowned Pakistani politician who 

remained interior minister during the Musharraf years, publicly acknowledged that coordination between and among the ISI, IB, police, and the Special Branch of the police is far 

from satisfactory and that intelligence agencies often have information but do not share 

it with law enforcement agencies.44 Admittedly, since 2008, the army has been proactive 

in providing training to a select group of police officers. Such collaboration in KPP has 

been highly praised by the inspector general of police in the province, Malik Naveed. In a 

television interview he mentioned that around 5,000 police officials in KPP had undergone 

counterterrorism and combat training by army instructors.45 Apparently in lieu of special 

training, retired army soldiers were recruited by police institutions, especially in the Swat 

and Peshawar districts, over the past year. And subsequent to the government of Punjab’s 

request that the army help train the provincial police force, the military operations directorate in Rawalpindi has asked the 10th Division headquarters in Lahore to devise a training 

plan.46 Thus, in principle, the army welcomes improvement in police capacity building. 

Perhaps this will ultimately lead to better coordination between police and intelligence 

services in practical terms.47

Poor Analytical Capacity

Effective police work is hugely dependent on the analytical competence of the law enforcement infrastructure. Without access to relevant crime or terror data and professional expertise to interpret the underlying trends, no effective strategy can be formulated. According 

to FIA investigations, five major suicide bombing attacks in Islamabad in October and 

November 2009 were planned and conducted by former students of the Lal Masjid (Red 

Mosque), indicating that police utterly failed to profile these students in the immediate 

aftermath of the Red Mosque crisis of July 2007.48 All those who surrendered (around 
12 

1,300 persons) were initially kept in police custody for a few weeks. Similarly, the main 

culprit (known as Dr. Usman) in the October 2009 attack on Pakistan army headquarters 

in Rawalpindi, Aqeel, was reportedly arrested by police earlier and even interrogated in the 

presence of officials from an intelligence organization before being cleared. Both police and 

intelligence specialists failed to gauge his mind-set accurately. Worse still, the attack on 

the army headquarters was predicted by Punjab police based on information gleaned from 

a computer memory stick found on a militant in Dera Ghazi Khan, but to no benefit, either 

because of mistrust between the army and police or because of poor coordination.49 An 

overload of intelligence information streaming in from multiple directions also plays a role 

in such warnings not being heeded.

Ineffective Strategy

The rising tide of suicide attacks all across Pakistan since 2006 has created widespread fear 

and insecurity. Though police officials have faced this challenge bravely, sustaining a high 

number of casualties in such attacks, the law enforcement agencies have not been able to 

disrupt the cycle in any systematic way. Complacency about the strength and operational 

capability of some militant groups also hinders formulation of an efficient strategy. For 

instance, Punjab police as well as intelligence agencies remained in denial for some time 

about the threat posed by militant groups based in south Punjab, which allowed the militants’ 

networks not only to survive but to grow.50 Ayesha Siddiqa maintains there is widespread 

reluctance in the security sector as well as on the part of the present Punjab government 

“to focus on the four main Punjab-based jihadi groups: Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkare-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Lashkar-e-Taiba. . . . These jihadi groups could actually 

be thwarted by a concerted, integrated police and intelligence operation.”51 Even though 

the situation has somewhat improved, because attacks in Punjab convinced the provincial 

government of the source of these troubles, critical time has been lost in the process. 

Ineffective Criminal Justice System

Inadequate and defective criminal justice systems are another critical problem. The witness protection system in Pakistan is almost nonexistent. Consequently, those who testify 

against powerful criminals and militants in courts receive no security. In dozens of cases, 

police officers investigating militants have been gunned down. The best-known case is that 

of Sipah-e-Sahaba terrorist Malik Ishaq, whose police charge sheet includes at least seventy 

murders but who has never had a conviction that has stuck,52 and those who testified in 

court as witnesses against him now live in fear of reprisal.53 Judges face similar security 

threats, and in many instances lower court decisions in terrorism cases are supposedly pending owing to such fears. In recent months, alleged terrorists arrested for involvement in the 

Islamabad Marriott bombing and some major attacks in Punjab Province were released by 

the courts for lack of evidence. The police had to put the individuals under “house arrest” 

afterward to buy time before challenging the verdicts in higher courts.54

Recommendations for Reform: Traditional versus Innovative Policing

Pakistan desperately needs reform of its law enforcement infrastructure. This need is now 

increasingly recognized in the policy circles within Pakistan and among donor countries, 

especially the United States and the EU.55 Over the years, the government of Pakistan has 

attempted to introduce various reforms to control rising crime and violence, but all such 

attempts—made half-heartedly and reluctantly—have had only marginal impact. Additionally, a change of government in Pakistan often leads to abandonment of initiatives of the 
 13

previous government. Reform efforts in different provinces are also uncoordinated. For 

instance, the Punjab government has been working on formulating special legislation to 

govern police functioning in the province called the Punjab Police Act 2010; commendable 

as it is, no similar changes are in the offing in the other provinces.56

The scale and extent of the problem are such that the limited and disjointed reform 

efforts such as those described can have little impact on the overall situation. Lack of 

resources is a big obstacle, but merely throwing money at the problem is unlikely to bear 

dividends. Technical issues and the need for modernization in police investigations are 

only one aspect of the challenge. Remedies for police shortcomings depend on equally farreaching reforms of the judicial and court systems. All this requires extreme political will. As 

Frederic Grare, a leading French expert on Pakistan, points out, “Capacity building and the 

political will to fight terrorism cannot be separated. Should political will or real determination to fight terrorism be missing, capacity building will inevitably end in failure, regardless 

of the amount of foreign assistance invested.”57

There may be no better moment to press ahead with far-reaching law enforcement 

reforms in Pakistan, given the public consensus against militancy and extremism since 2008, 

which has provided the political space to make tough, reform-oriented choices.

The recommendations for police reform can be divided into two broad categories, traditional and innovative reforms. Traditional police reforms generally include providing better 

salaries and basic facilities, professional training, modern equipment, and readily available 

forensic support, in conjunction with strengthening the prosecution sector. Community 

policing and refinement of the legal framework governing police organizations also fall in 

this category. There are no two views about the necessity of these measures in Pakistan, and 

the country has embarked on this path lately, though without much coordination between 

provinces and with meager resources. In this domain, financial as well as technical support 

from the United States and the EU can make a difference.

Recommendations for Traditional Reforms

The following recommendations can help the traditional reform aspects.

•	 Implement the original 2002 Police Act nationwide. All of the 2004 amendments to the 

2002 Police Act, which reintroduced tools of political manipulation, should be discarded 

and the new ideas introduced in the Punjab Police Act of 2010, which makes police more 

accountable and encourages a community policing model, should be incorporated into 

the original 2002 Police Act. All four provinces, FATA, the Azad Kashmir region, and GilgitBaltistan should be governed by a common police act. 

•	 Increase public awareness. The level of public awareness about the changes introduced 

with the 2002 reforms was very low. As a result, the new mechanisms for ensuring police 

independence and opportunities for redress of grievances against police high-handedness 

remained largely unimplemented. A public information campaign focusing on citizens’ 

rights and police accountability can help this cause. Lately, the independent broadcast 

media in Pakistan have started exposing police brutality and are making an impact nationwide. The government of Pakistan needs to understand that an effective and independent 

police service will add to the legitimacy of democratic governance. 

•	 Focus on junior officers. Investigative field work is primarily done by junior ranks, whereas 

most of the international training facilities are currently offered to senior supervisory 

officers. This pattern needs to be reversed so that junior officers have significant training 

opportunities.

•	 Provide training support and equipment. Pakistan has a poor track record in utilizing 

international aid, especially when it comes in the form of financial handouts. Corrupt officials 

There may be no better moment 

to press ahead with far-reaching 

. . . reforms, given the public 

consensus against militancy 

and extremism since 2008, 

which has provided the political 

space to make tough, reformoriented choices.
14 

in Pakistan and foreign private contractors from donor countries often benefit most from 

such aid. Support for investigative training and help in the acquisition of modern equipment 

(e.g., small weapons, scanners, bulletproof jackets, armored vehicles) will be more effective. 

Moreover, police training academies are often overlooked by international donors, an oversight that needs correction.58 Finally, foreign donors should avoid framing everything in the 

context of counterterrorism, as Pakistani public opinion is likely to be more appreciative of 

international help in this arena if it is focused on enhancing the crime-fighting capacity of 

police. Donors should also involve their own police organizations in the process rather than 

depending overwhelmingly on the private sector.

•	 Help NACTA in analytical and research work. This fledging organization needs both 

internal and external help in attracting experienced experts and analysts who can focus on 

scientific and statistical studies dealing with crime patterns and develop databases useful 

for counterterrorism. For effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, the law 

enforcement model also needs nonpolicing corrective measures, such as developing public 

awareness about the nature of the threat through the media and incorporating counterextremist discourse into the public schools curriculum. Decommissioning the brigades 

of militants and terrorists will require well-resourced and well-devised deradicalization 

programs. NACTA can spearhead such initiatives if given requisite funds and independence 

from bureaucratic channels. Unfortunately, NACTA has already been the victim of political 

turf battles; its first director general and a leading counterterrorism expert, Tariq Pervez, 

resigned in July 2010 because of the opposition in some quarters to placing NACTA directly 

under the prime minister (as opposed to the Ministry of the Interior).59

Recommendations for Innovative Reforms

As is evident from the half-hearted implementation of the 2002 reforms and predictable 

governmental dithering out of short-term political expediency, traditional reforms by themselves are rarely enough. They need to be coupled with innovative reforms. Two critical ones 

are described below.

•	 Restructuring of law enforcement organizations. Though Pakistan must resist the 

temptation to create new specialized antiterrorism structures that marginalize the country’s already existing institutions, establishment of a central organization similar to the 

Department of Homeland Security in the United States will go a long way toward improving coordination between various law enforcement agencies in the country. As explained 

earlier, the chain of command for various organizations is complicated and dispersed. A 

restructuring of the overall command setup that brings all the federal institutions under 

one umbrella can help system effectiveness considerably. Provincial police chiefs, operating 

under the executive control of chief ministers, can be increasingly involved in policy planning at the central level through this new organization. Staunch proponents of provincial 

autonomy will likely be the strongest opponents of such a reorganization. One way to 

alleviate their concerns is to involve all stakeholders in the decision-making process and 

ensure that the new institution focuses on coordination rather than on controlling. The 

fact that such experienced hands as retired Lieutenant General Moeen-ud-din Haider, who 

remained minister of interior under General Musharraf, support the creation of such an 

institution indicates that many well-informed voices can be counted on to support such a 

major overhaul of the system.60

•	 Reform of the criminal justice system. The credibility of Pakistan’s higher judiciary has 

increased in recent years with the judiciary’s defiant response to former president Musharraf’s arbitrary removal of the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Mr. Iftikhar 

Chaudhry, and in the aftermath of the popular lawyers’ movement. Consequently, at the 

Foreign donors should avoid 

framing everything in the 

context of counterterrorism, as 

Pakistani public opinion is likely 

to be more appreciative 

of international help in this 

arena if it is focused on 

enhancing the crime-fighting 

capacity of police. 
 15

level of the Supreme Court and the provincial High Courts, the judiciary is increasingly 

independent. However, police performance faces its first test in the lower courts, which 

are in poor shape, largely for reasons similar to those that plague police work—limited 

resources, lack of professionalism, and incompetence. Through a new National Judicial 

Policy, the higher judiciary has already begun introducing major reforms to the lower courts, 

but considerable financial support will be needed from the government to bring this initiative to fruition. According to one of Pakistan’s widely respected and most competent senior 

police officials, Tariq Khosa, who is currently federal secretary in the Ministry of Narcotics 

in Islamabad, police accountability through an independent judiciary is one of the most 

effective ways to ensure improvement in police performance.61

Conclusion

Pakistan’s law enforcement and police system is by no means too flawed to fix. Moreover, 

at least within the police service, there is a discernible desire to improve performance. In 

comparative terms, better performance by the National Motorway Police (Highways Police) 

and a few effective counterterrorism operations in the late 1990s show that improvement 

and reform are indeed possible. The laudable performance of Pakistani police officers and 

junior officials while serving in various UN peacekeeping operations also show promise. 

Lately, many police officials across Pakistan have shown bravery in facing suicide bombing 

attacks. Courageous police officers like Malik Saad and Safwat Ghayur who sacrificed their 

lives while leading from the front have inspired many young police officers in Pakistan.62

For reform to take root along the lines suggested in the recommendations, however, 

Pakistan must first overcome internal lacunae: political appointments must end; postings, 

recruitment, and promotions must be made on merit alone; and corrupt officers must be 

punished publicly. No financial resources are required to accomplish these goals. Second, 

Pakistan has to start investing its own funds in enhancing overall law enforcement capacity. 

International donors must understand that supporting the larger police and law enforcement reforms is the only effective way to enhance Pakistan’s capacity to fight terrorism. 

Such support, besides strengthening the rule of law and democracy in the country, will 

improve interagency coordination for intelligence sharing and joint investigations with 

donor countries, which have acquired increased importance in recent times. 

In December 2009 I had the opportunity to ask U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton if 

the U.S. government would be supporting the police and law enforcement reform agenda in 

Pakistan. Her enthusiastic response should be of interest to U.S. and Pakistani policymakers 

alike:

We would be honored to do so, because I agree with you that the police truly are on 

the front lines. They often have to deal with the rush of violence that comes in cities or 

towns and they don’t have the support they need, they don’t often have the equipment 

that they need. . . . I met a number of police officers, both in Lahore and in Islamabad, 

who are very committed, but underresourced. And I am more than happy to consider 

any request from the Pakistani government to help the police force.63
Appendix: Federal Law Enforcement and Intelligence Organizations

Organization Mandate and jurisdiction Command and strength

1. Frontier Corps 

(a) FC Khyber Pakhtunkhwaa 

(b) FC Balochistan

The Frontier Corps supports local law enforcement 

in maintaining law and order when requested by the 

federal government. The corps’s primary task is to 

monitor and obstruct smuggling along Pakistan’s 

borders with Afghanistan and Iran. Increasingly, 

these forces are involved in counterterrorism and 

counterinsurgency operations; FC KPP is playing an 

especially important role in FATA.

2. Rangersb

(a) Rangers, Punjabc

(b) Rangers, Sindhd

This organization secures Pakistan’s border with 

India and assists when called in by respective 

provincial governments to maintain law and order. 

Sindh Rangers also provide security to VIPs visiting 

Sindh and are especially active in Karachi. Both 

organizations regularly assist police in border regions 

and focus on intelligence gathering. An antiterrorist 

wing, trained by the army’s Special Services Group, 

was incorporated in 2004 in both organizations.

The director general, an army officer with the rank 

of major general, leads both forces. Commanders 

of these forces closely coordinate with local military 

commanders in Karachi and Lahore. Deputy director 

generals are appointed by provincial governments. 

The Rangers’ strength in Punjab is 19,475, and in 

Sindh, 24,630. 

3. Northern Areas Scouts 

(Gilgit-Baltistan)

This paramilitary force secures areas that border 

Gilgit-Baltistan and provides assistance to local police 

forces for law-and-order duties.

It is led by a serving army brigadier, and the 

organization coordinates closely with military 

deployed in the area. Its total employees number 

3,679. 

4. Frontier Constabularye This paramilitary force (formed after the merger of 

Samana Rifles and Border Military Police in British 

India), though largely drawn from KPP, can be 

deployed anywhere in Pakistan by the Ministry of the 

Interior. The majority of its units operate in KPP, FATA, 

and Islamabad. 

It is led by a senior police officer designated as 

commandant. The inspector general of police can 

request support from this force during any crisis. Its 

current strength is 22,817. 

5. Pakistan Maritime Security 

Agency (Pakistan Coast 

Guards)

It is responsible for enforcing maritime law, 

maintenance of seamarks, border control, and 

antismuggling operations. It is deployed in the coastal 

areas of Sindh and Balochistan Provinces.

Formerly part of the Pakistan Army, it now operates 

under the Ministry of the Interior and is led by a 

serving army officer (rank of major general), and its 

various battalions are led by army officers (lieutenant 

colonel rank) seconded from the army. Its present 

strength is 4,067. 

6. Capital Territory Police 

(Islamabad)f It performs standard police duties in Islamabad (divided into thirteen police station areas) and 

operates directly under the control of the Ministry of 

the Interior. The total population of Islamabad is close 

to two million. 

Led by an inspector general of police, its current 

strength is 10,995. The Police Act of 2002 has not 

been fully enforced in Islamabad.g

7. Federal Investigation Agency 

(FIA)h The FIA investigates offenses committed in connection with matters that concern the federal 

government, are of interprovincial scope, or involve 

transnational organized crime. Its jurisdiction 

encompasses economic crimes, terrorism, cyber 

crimes, banking offenses, and enforcement of 

immigration laws and exit control lists. It also 

maintains a Redbook of high-profile criminals and 

terrorists.

It is led by a senior police officer (rank of inspector 

general) designated as director general. The agency 

has offices in all four provincial headquarters, plus 

headquarters in Islamabad. Its total strength is around 

3,500. 

8. Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF)i It is primarily tasked with eliminating the trafficking 

and distribution of narcotics in Pakistan, enhancing 

international cooperation against drugs, and liaising 

with international organizations on the subject.

It is led by a serving army officer of the rank of 

a major general with the designation as director 

general. It operates under the Ministry of Narcotics 

Control. Its strength is around 3,100. 

9. National Highways and 

Motorway Police (NHMP)j Established in 1997, it is specifically assigned traffic control functions and policing on national highways. 

The organization is reputed for its efficiency, integrity, 

and discipline.

Led by an inspector general of police, its officials 

are drawn from the police service as well as through 

direct recruitment. It operates under the Ministry of 

Communications, and its total strength is estimated to 

be around 5,000. 

10. Airport Security Force 

(ASF)k It is responsible for protecting all the airports in the country. Besides safeguarding the civil aviation 

industry, it is responsible for maintaining law and 

order within the limits of airports. In recent years it 

has been trained for counterterrorism measures at 

airports.

A serving army brigadier is appointed by the Ministry 

of Defense as director general of the ASF. The ASF’s 

total strength is estimated to be around 4,500.

16 
 17

Organization Mandate and jurisdiction Command and strength

11. Pakistan Railways Police 

(PRP)

The PRP is responsible for law-and-order duties on 

trains and at train stations across the country. Since 

2008, the PRP has assumed police duties in 1,500 

railway employees colonies (covering a 2,000 square 

kilometer area) and in other areas owned by the 

Railways Department.l

It is led by a senior police officer designated 

as inspector general. The total number of PRP 

employees is around 7,000 (according to 2007 

records).m The PRP also has a 600-strong 

commando unit for counterterrorism tasks. 

12. National Police Bureau 

(NPB)

It acts as a national focal point for all police-related 

research and development matters. It functions as a 

permanent secretariat for the National Public Safety 

Commission (NPSC), which oversees the functioning 

of federal law enforcement agencies, and the National 

Police Management Board (NPMB), which advises 

the federal and provincial governments about criminal 

justice reform, public safety, and police information 

technology.

Operating under the Ministry of the Interior, it is 

headed by a director general, an officer from the 

police service. NPSC has twelve members who meet 

periodically. NPMB, which comprises all the heads 

of the police and law enforcement agencies (except 

the FC), meets very rarely. Total NPB employees are 

fewer than 100. 

13. National Counter-Terrorism 

Authority (NACTA)

This newly established institution will focus on 

preparing national threat assessment reports on 

extremism, terrorism, and insurgency and will help 

the government formulate a National Action Plan for 

counterterrorism. It will primarily focus on research, 

data collection, and analysis of terrorism-related 

issues, in addition to serving as a liaison with 

international organizations focusing on the subject. 

It is led by an inspector general of police and 

operates under the Ministry of the Interior. The 

organization has three wings: Counter Extremism, 

Counter Terrorism, and the Research, Analysis, 

Training Wing. It is currently recruiting employees for 

all sectors of the organization. The total strength of 

the organization is 203.n 

14. Intelligence Bureau (IB) Its responsibilities include gathering intelligence 

(including for counterterrorism purposes) within the 

country and disseminating it through the Ministry 

of Interior to political leadership and various police 

organizations. 

It is led by a director general who is either a serving 

police officer (typically the case during periods 

of civilian rule), or a serving major general from 

the army (often the case during military rule). Its 

employees supporting police work total around 2,000.

15. Inter-Services Intelligence 

(ISI)o Pakistan’s premier intelligence organization, only part of its responsibilities deal with law enforcement work. 

ISI’s internal wing, the Counter Terrorism Centre, 

focuses on intelligence gathering and analysis and 

provides intelligence assessments to the government. 

The ISI is responsible for sharing relevant information 

with police organizations in the country through the 

federal government.

Led by a serving lieutenant general from the Pakistan 

Army (designated as director general), the ISI reports 

directly to the prime minister of Pakistan. However, its 

head also sits in army corps commanders’ meetings 

and reports to the Chief of Army Staff. Approximately, 

3,500 ISI employees are involved in work that is 

linked to police work and counterterrorism.

Total number of employees of 

all federal organizations

209,790

a. Source for FC (KP) strength: Eric Schmitt and Jane Perlez, “Distrust Slows U.S. Training of Pakistanis,” New York Times, July 11, 2010.

b. See The Pakistan Rangers Ordinance, 1959, www.pap.gov.pk/uploads/acts/106.html.

c. For details, see www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=139.

d. For details, see www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=141.

e. Historically, the Frontier Constabulary’s basic job was to man the border between the tribal areas of FATA and the settled districts of the North-West Frontier Province.

f. For details, see www.islamabadpolice.gov.pk.

g. The Police Act of 2002 significantly improved the laws and rules that govern the police organizations of Pakistan. It emulated the Japanese National Safety Commission 

system to ensure oversight of police by both elected and nominated members at local (district), provincial, and national levels. It also provided for an independent 

prosecution service to place additional checks on the police. It provided police with operational autonomy in administrative as well as investigative spheres, while the 

various responsibilities of the police service (ranging from investigations and intelligence to watch-and-ward and guard duties) were divided among separate police 

departments to improve the efficiency of the system. Its various provisions were further amended in 2004.

h. For more details about FIA’s mandate, see the Federal Investigation Agency Act of 1974, http://www.fia.gov.pk/abt_background.htm.

i. For details, see Ministry of Narcotics Control, Government of Pakistan, About Ministry—Overview, www.narcon.gov.pk/about.htm.

j. For details about the National Highways and Motorway Police, see its official website, www.nhmp.gov.pk/; see also Muhammad Faisal Ali, “Motorway Police Facing 

Shortage of Personnel,” Dawn, October 29, 2007.

k. For details about the Airport Security Force’s responsibilities, see “ASF Gets New Head,” Dawn, April 2, 2010.

l. Asif Chaudhry, “Govt Extends Railways Police Jurisdiction,” Nation, October 7, 2008. 

m. See www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/fbs/publications/yearbook2008/Transport%20&%20Comm/20-17.pdf.

n An official of the Ministry of Interior in discussion with the author, June 2, 2010.

o. For details about the ISI’s role, see Frederic Grare, “Reforming the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan’s Transitional Democracy” (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace, 2009).
18 

Notes

1. For year-over-year data, see www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Fidayeenattack.htm.

2. Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Pakistan Loses $400m to ‘Enhanced Oversight,’” Dawn, March 3, 2010.

3. For details, see http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm; Amir Mir, “2010: 

Suicides Drop by 35 pc, Deaths Up by 1 pc,” News, December 24, 2010. 

4. The budget for VIP protection varies in urban and rural areas but on average consumes around 30 percent of the 

total police budget. It is estimated to be around 50 percent in major urban centers of the country. 

5. For instance, see How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corp., August 

2008), www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf. See also Kelev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in 

Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, May–June 2005: 8–12, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/sepp.pdf.

6. Christine Fair, “Policing Pakistan,” Wall Street Journal Asia, June 30, 2009.

7. How Terrorist Groups End.

8. Douglas P. Lackey, “The Good Soldier versus the Good Cop: Counterterrorism as Police Work,” Jerusalem 

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (January 2006): 66–82.

9. This is especially the case in NWFP’s troubled Swat district. For details, see Amanda Hodge, “Elite Force to Police 

Swat Valley,” Australian, July 18, 2009.

10. A few estimates are used here as updated information about the total number of employees of various 

organizations is not available publicly. It should also be noted that intelligence agencies perform a range of 

standard functions, some of which are unrelated to law enforcement work, and the figures provided here are 

an approximation, especially with regard to the number of intelligence officials who are directly involved in 

counterterrorism work (see the appendix to this report for details).

11. For a useful and informative source on the subject, see Asad Jamal and Sanjay Patil, eds., Police Organizations 

in Pakistan (Lahore: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative), 2010, 

www.hrcp-web.org/pdf/Police_Organisations_in_Pakistan%5B1%5D.pdf.

12. This final figure also includes an estimate of total employees of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, four provincial 

Home Ministries (which oversee law enforcement organizations), and relevant administrative offices in Azad 

Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan—around 10,000 employees altogether.

13. Madhur Singh, “Can India Reform Its Wayward Police Force?,” Time, August 10, 2009; “City Has Lowest PolicePublic Ratio,” Hindu, March 27, 2010.

14. For instance, see statistics in Imran Ayub, “KARACHI: City’s Police-Population Ratio Abysmally Low,” Dawn, 

November 24, 2008.

15. For details, see Hassan Abbas, Police & Law Enforcement Reform in Pakistan: Crucial for Counterinsurgency and 

Counterterrorism Success, report for the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (Washington, D.C.: Institute 

for Social Policy and Understanding, April 2009). For the latest figures, see the FIA website, www.fia.gov.pk/

prj_sig.htm. 

16. For the latest recruitment figures, see http://www.khyberpakhtunkhwa.gov.pk/Gov/White_paper_%202010-11.

pdf; for previous trends, see Ismail Khan, “Govt’s Writ Weakening in NWFP, Tribal Areas,” Dawn, March 29, 2007.

17. Police officials in telephone or e-mail discussion with the author, Islamabad and Peshawar, January–February 

2010. See also “Bomb-proof Police Station Set Up in Peshawar,” Dawn, March 3, 2010.

18. For details, see “Bulletproof Jackets Not to Be Handed Over,” Dawn, March 10, 2010.

19. Shabbir Sarwar, “Punjab Gears up for Rs585 Billion Budget,” Daily Times, June 13, 2010.

20. Jam Sajjad Hussain, “Social Crime Ratio in Punjab More Than Balochistan, Sindh: CCPO,” Nation, June 10, 2010. 

21. Figure quoted on Geo TV’s prime-time talk show Jirga, hosted by journalist Saleem Safi on June 7, 2010.

22. Shahnawaz Khan, “Attacks Expose Shortcomings of Police Department,” Daily Times, June 7, 2010. See also 

Sebastian Abott, “Ill-Equipped Police Lack Funds, Intel to Combat Rising Militancy in Pakistan’s Heartland,” 

Associated Press, July 5, 2010.

23. Imtiaz Ali, “Overhaul of Sindh Police,” News, January 18, 2010.

24. Ibid.

25. “Quetta Handed Over to FC as Police Strike Continues,” Daily Times, January 27, 2010.

26. Ayesha Siddiqa, “Perils of Policing,” Dawn, November 20, 2009.

27. For instance, see “ADB Declares Motorway Police a ‘Miracle,’” Daily Times, July 12, 2008.

28. “Pakistan Railway: Lack of Security Measures,” Eastern Tribune, December 22, 2009. For other issues faced by 

Railway Police, see “Steel Mills Purchase Stolen Property of Railways,” Dawn, July 12, 2009.

29. Hasan Abdullah, “Lives at Airport Threatened by Bogus Bomb Detectors,” Dawn, January 26, 2010; “Man Bypasses 

Airport Security, Sneaks in Weapon,” Daily Times, March 15, 2010. See also Kim Sengupta, “Inquiry into Sale of 

Fake Bomb Detectors Expanded,” The Independent (UK), June 8, 2010.

30. See “Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform in Pakistan,” International Crisis Group Asia Reports, no. 102, 

September 28, 2005.

31. For instance, see “Crime Report,” Geo TV, November 26, 2010.

32. Jam Sajjad Hussain, “Police Plan Steps to Restore Public Confidence,” Nation, November 2, 2010. 

33. S. Raza Hassan, “No Progress on Rs40m Forensic Lab Projects,” Dawn, April 26, 2010.

34. Ibid. 

35. Tahir Niaz, “Govt Stops Funding to Forensic Agency,” Daily Times, February 15, 2009.

36. A field job in the Pakistan police service means direct policing responsibilities, separate from administrative tasks. 

37. “Proposal for Improving Police Investigation System,” Daily Times, August 10, 2009.

38. Interview with a U.S. official, New York, October 2010.

39. “France Provides Pakistan Advanced Security Equipment,” China View, July 25, 2009. 
 19

40. See http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/UKGOV_UKPolicy_Afghanistan_Pakistan_TheWayForward.pdf 

(pp. 25–26).

41. Khaled Ahmed, in discussion with the author, Washington, D.C., May 2006.

42. Telephone interview with an official of the Federal Investigation Agency, March 2007.

43. Interview with a senior NACTA official, Islamabad, July 2010.

44. Comments of Aftab Sherpao made in a talk show, Jirga, on GEO TV on June 7, 2010. The Report of the United 

Nations Commission of Inquiry into the Facts and Circumstances of the Assassination of former Pakistan Prime 

Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto also raises critical questions about the interference of intelligence organizations 

in police work.

45. Malik Naveed, NWFP inspector general, Dawn TV, December 2, 2009.

46. “Punjab Police Seeks Army’s Help in Anti-terror Training,” Daily Times, November 22, 2009.

47. For details, see “Police Need Immense Support from Intelligence Services,” The News on Sunday, May 10, 2009.

48. The Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) in Islamabad was stormed by Pakistan’s military in July 2007 after its leaders 

and students led a monthslong “antivice campaign” that included the kidnapping of police officials and forced 

takeover of government property. Hundreds, including civilians, died in the gun battles between security forces 

and extremists operating from the mosque complex.

49. For details, see “Punjab Police Predicted GHQ Attack on July 15,” News, October 10, 2009. See also Sabrina 

Travernise and Waqar Gillani, “Frustrated Strivers in Pakistan Turn to Jihad,” New York Times, February 27, 2010.

50. For details, see Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel 2, no. 4 (April 2009): 1–4.

51. Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan’s Second Front,” Newsweek, October 21, 2009. 

52. For details, see Sabrina Tavernise and Waqar Gilani, “70 Murders, Yet Close to Going Free in Pakistan,” New York 

Times, August 5, 2009.

53. For details, see Asad Kharal, “First the Sorrow, Now the Fear,” Daily Times, April 22, 2010.

54. “Four Marriott Bombing Accused Put under House Arrest,” Daily Times, May 7, 2010.

55. U.S. and French officials in discussion with the author, Paris and Washington, D.C., October–November 2009. 

For details, see U.S. State Department, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “Law 

Enforcement and Criminal Justice Program: Pakistan,” May 3, 2010, www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/141578.htm.

56. See the draft Punjab Police Act of 2010 www.nipsa.in/resources/punjab_police_act_2010_draft.pdf.

57. Frederic Grare, “Political Dimensions of Police Reform in Pakistan,” Policy Outlook (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, July 14, 2010). 

58. For an estimate of the financial support needed to upgrade one academy, see Imran Asghar, “Rs102m Projects 

for Sihala Police College Modernization,” Daily Times, August 10, 2009.

59. “NACTA Chairman Tariq Pervez Resigns,” Daily Times, July 21, 2010.

60. Lieutenant General Moeen-ud-din Haider, GEO TV, July 11, 2010. Former home secretary of Sindh Province, retired 

Brigadier General Ghulam Mohammad Mohtarram, also supported this idea in the same program.

61. Tariq Khosa, in discussion with the author, Islamabad, July 2009. See also his comments on the subject at 

www.mohtasib.gov.pk/site/Projects/spgrminterface/exhibition/exhibition/PDF%20Conference%20Report%20

SPGRM%20UNDP.pdf (pp. 21–22).

62. Malik Saad, the Peshawar police chief, widely respected for his competence, died in a suicide attack in Peshawar 

on January 27, 2007. Safwat Ghayur, commandant of the Frontier Constabulary and another senior police officer 

highly regarded for his integrity and counterterrorism efforts, was killed by a suicide bomber in Peshawar in a 

targeted attack on August 4, 2010. 

63. Hassan Abbas, “Tete à Tete with Hillary Clinton,” the AfPak Channel, Foreign Policy, December 14, 2009, http://

afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/12/14/tete_a_tete_with_hillary_clinton. 
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Of Related Interest

•	 How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster (2011) by Howard B. 

Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer

•	 Afghanistan‘s Police by Robert M. Perito (Special Report, August 2009)

•	 The Interior Ministry’s Role in Security Sector Reform by Robert M. Perito (Special Report, 

May 2009)

•	 Hydropolitics in Pakistan’s Indus Basin by Daanish Mustafa (Special Report, November 2010) 

•	 Humanitarian Space Shrinking for Health Program Delivery in Afghanistan and Pakistan by 

Leonard S. Rubenstein (Peace Brief, October 2010)