cle . . . on the highways of the Commonwealth while the revocation of the person's driving privilege remains in effect." Va. Code S 46.2-357(A). This language shows that the legislaturecontemplated and provided for the continued regulation of individuals who

3had received habitual offender status before implementation of the Act.
Perhaps most significant for purposes of this appeal is the fact that the penalty provision for an adjudicated habitual offender's second offense (driving on a suspended or revoked license, see Va. Code S 46.2-357(B)(2)) has not been altered in the least. It states that such an offender shall be "guilty of a felony punishable by confinement in a state correctional facility for not less than one year nor more than five years." Va. Code S 46.2-357(B)(2)&(3). Dawson was sentenced within those parameters; his presentencing report set the statutory minimum and maximum sentences as one and five years respectively.
Based on the foregoing, we find that the Virginia General Assembly evinced its intent to enact a new, stiffer law dealing with those who commit serious traffic violations, and that it drafted thelegislation in such a way as to provide saving provisions for the penalties to be imposed on those it previously chose to designate habitual offenders for having accumulated such violations. Because thelegislature continues to recognize a class of persons who have already been designated habitual offenders, Dawson's contention that his
conviction has been deprived of its "statutory underpinnings" is without merit.
We likewise find Dawson's equal protection argument to be unavailing. Dawson argues that the Act creates a class of habitual offenders who are treated differently under the traffic laws than
are those who now commit the same types of infractions. While this is undoubtedly correct, we find the Act's classification scheme to be rationally related to a legislative goal. See FCC v. Beach Communica-tions, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993) (stating that statutoryclassifications that neither affect members of a suspect class nor infringe upon fundamental constitutional rights are subject to a rational basis standard of review). There can be no doubt that retaining theclassification of habitual offender that existed prior to July 1, 1999 isrationally related to the Virginia General Assembly's goal of regulating traffic safety. Furthermore, the legislature could hardly be expected to reclassify past offenders under the new scheme, as ex post facto problems would then arise.

AFFIRMED

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 _?        Ç  NK   _?  ! !  UNPUBLISHED  §     § )UNITEDÇSTATESÇCOURTÇOFÇAPPEALS )) FORÇTHEÇFOURTHÇCIRCUIT ))UNITEDÇSTATESÇOFÇAMERICA,  §   Φ 8  §    Plaintiff-Appellee,  §   £   !  § )  v. α !αα `αα  αα αα hαα $αα §αα pα No.Ç99-7006  §   T   § )WILLIAMÇBLOHM, )    Defendant-Appellant.  §   p  § )  AppealÇfromÇtheÇUnitedÇStatesÇDistrictÇCourt  §   ê    § forÇtheÇEasternÇDistrictÇofÇNorthÇCarolina,ÇatÇRaleigh. )W.ÇEarl ÇBritt,ÇSeniorÇDistrictÇJudge. ) (CA-86-1184) )) Submitted:ÇAprilÇ28, Ç2000 )) Decided:ÇMayÇ19,Ç2000 )) BeforeÇWILLIAMSÇandÇMICHAEL,ÇCircui tÇJudges,Çand ) BUTZNER,ÇSeniorÇCircuitÇJudge. ))

___________________

______________________________________________ )) AffirmedÇbyÇunpub lishedÇperÇcuriamÇopinion. ))

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____________________________ ))  COUNSEL  §   0  Ç   § )EdwinÇC.ÇWalker,ÇActingÇFederalÇPublicÇDefender,ÇG.ÇAlanÇDuBois,  §   ÿ  Φ "  § AssistantÇFederalÇPublicÇDefender,ÇRaleigh,ÇNorthÇCarolina,Çfor )

Appellant.ÇJaniceÇMcKenzieÇCole,ÇUnitedÇStatesÇAttorney,ÇAnneÇM. )Hayes,ÇAssistantÇUnitedÇStatesÇAttorney,ÇBarbaraÇD.ÇKocher,ÇAssi
s- ) tantÇUnitedÇStatesÇAttorney,ÇMichaelÇD.ÇBredenberg,ÇSpecialÇAs sis- ) tantÇUnitedÇStatesÇAttorney,ÇRaleigh,ÇNorthÇCarolina,ÇforÇAp pellee. ))

________________________________________________________

_________ ))) §   á# ,  § UnpublishedÇopinionsÇareÇnotÇbindingÇprecedentÇinÇthisÇcircuit. ÇSee ) LocalÇRuleÇ36(c). ))

_________________________________________

________________________ ))  OPINION ))PERÇCURIAM: ))WilliamÇJ.ÇBlohmÇappealsÇfromÇtheÇdistrictÇcourt'sÇorderÇdecl actÇon ) them). ))Moreover,ÇbothÇBlohm'sÇtreatingÇphysiciansÇatÇFCIButnerÇ