IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-30173

ROYNELL J. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL W. WYNNE, Secretary of the United States Air Force,

Defendant - Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Louisiana

Before GARZA, STEWART, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-appellant Roynell Williams occupied a dual status position with

the United States Air Force, working both as an Aircraft Electrician, in a civilian

capacity, and serving as a member of the Air Force Reserves. After testing

positive for cocaine use while on active reserve status, the appellant was

discharged from the reserves and then removed from his civilian position. In

this action, the appellant challenges his removal from his civilian position and

discharge from his military status. He also asserts a claim for employment

discrimination under Title VII. The district court dismissed the Title VII claim

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and granted summary judgment for the

defendant-appellee Michael W. Wynne, Secretary ofthe United States Air Force

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 30, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-30173

1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c), Secretary Wynne was

automatically substituted for former Secretary of the Air Force F. Whitten Peters, who

originally was the named party.

2

(“Air Force”),1on the remaining claims. Williams appeals. For the reasons that

follow, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I

The appellant held a dual status position with the Air Force for many

years. In his civilian capacity, he was an Aircraft Electrician; in his military

capacity, he was an Air Reserve Technician (“ART”). In January 1997, while the

appellant was on active status with the reserves, the appellant provided a urine

sample that tested positive for cocaine. In separate proceedings, the plaintiff

was discharged from both his civilian position and his military position for drug

use.

The appellant challenged his removal from his civilian position and his

discharge from his military position. He appealed his discharge from the

Reserves to the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records

(“AFBCMR”). He appealed his removal from his civilian position to the Merits

System Protection Board (“MSPB”). Before the MSPB, the appellant also

asserted that he was terminated in retaliation for filing a prior Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) complaint. The MSPB denied

the appellant’s retaliation claim, as well as his challenge to the merits of the

removal decision, and the EEOC affirmed. The AFBCMR likewise rejected the

appellant’s objections to his removal from the Reserves and affirmed his

discharge. 

The appellant then brought this action challenging the removal decisions

of the AFBCMR and the MSPB and further alleging that his removal from his
No. 07-30173

2 The district court applied the standard of Rule 12(b)(1) to the appellant’s Title VII

claim, which while similar to the standard of Rule 12(b)(6), permits the court to consider a

broader range of materials in resolving the motion. See Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736,

741 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that a court may dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

based on either “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts

in the record; or (3)the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution

of disputed facts.”). A recent decision of our court pondered, but did not resolve, whether the

standard for Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) applies on a motion to dismiss Title VII claims brought

by dual status military personnel. See Walch v. Adjutant Gen.’s Dep’t of Tex., __ F.3d __, 2008

WL 2512956, at *__ (5th Cir. June 24, 2008). Because the parties do not raise any issue with

respect to the standard the district court used in this case, we do not resolve this issue.

3

civilian position was discriminatory and in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5. 

In December 2002, the Air Force filed an administrative record with the

district court. That record contained a previously undisclosed letter. The letter

explained that an expert witness in the appellant’s administrative discharge

hearing, who provided evidence regarding the laboratory procedures used in the

case, had been removed prior to the hearing from his position as chief of the

forensic sciences branch at the Air Force base’s drug laboratory. Based on this

new evidence, and its potential value for impeachment, the appellant filed a

request for reconsideration with the AFBCMR. The AFBCMR denied the

request. The appellant challenges this decision as well. 

The district court dismissed the appellant’s Title VII claim for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction and granted summary judgment to the Air Force on

the remaining claims. This appeal followed.

II

We review dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) de novo. Dawson Farms, LLC v. Farm Serv.

Agency, 504 F.3d 592, 601 (5th Cir. 2007).2

We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo

as well. Stotter v. Univ. of Tex. at San Antonio, 508 F.3d 812, 820 (5th Cir.
No. 07-30173

4

2007). Summary judgment is proper where “the pleadings, the discovery and

disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). On a motion for summary judgment, we

view the facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party. Stotter, 508 F.3d at 820.

III

Relying on this court’s decision in Brown v. United States, 227 F.3d 295

(5th Cir. 2000),the district court concluded that because the appellant’s Title VII

claim arose from the appellant’s military status, it was not cognizable; the

district courttherefore dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The appellant argues that (a)

Brown is distinguishable and, (b) in any event, the claim did not arise from his

military status. The Air Force disagrees and further contends that the appellant

waived his Title VII claim by failing to include that claim in the amended

complaint that was filed after the Title VII claim was dismissed.

We first reject the Air Force’s contention that the appellant waived his

Title VII claim by failing to include it in his amended complaint after that claim

was dismissed by the district court. “[A] plaintiff, by filing an amended

complaint after a dismissal with leave to amend, [is] not barred from raising on

appeal the correctness of the dismissal order.” Wilson v. First Houston Inv.

Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1238 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 44 U.S. 959

(1979). Applying this rule, the appellant did not waive his Title VII claim by

filing an amended complaint that failed to replead the claim already rejected by

the district court.

The next question is whether the district court correctly concluded that it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Brown to consider the appellant’s Title
No. 07-30173

5

VII claim. In Brown, this court considered whether a dual status Air Force

Reserve Technician could bring a claim against the Air Force for employment

discrimination under Title VII. 227 F.3d at 297. Title VII waives federal

sovereign immunity as to the Air Force and all other “military departments,” see

29 C.F.R. § 1614.103(d)(1), but in Brown the court explained that “this waiver

has been understood to apply only to suits by civilian employees of the military

departments, and not members of the armed forces.” 227 F.3d at 298.

Addressing the problem of the dual status employee, the court stated that

“employment discrimination claims by ARTs must be categorized as either

arising from their position as a civilian employee of a military department, or

their position as a uniformed service member.” Id. at 299. “[C]laims arising

purely from an ARTs civilian position are provided for under Title VII; claims

that originate from an ARTs military status, however, are not cognizable” under

Title VII. Id. The district court concluded that the appellant’s claim arose from

his military status and thus was not cognizable.

The appellant argues that the district court’s reliance on Brown was

misplaced. The appellant attempts to distinguish Brown, relying on a case from

the Federal Circuit, Jentoft v. United States, 450 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

Jentoft addressed the problem of the dual status employee in the context of the

Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206. Id. at 1343. There, the court rejected the

distinction between non-military and military status to determine the right of

dual status employees to bring Equal Pay Act claims. Id. at 1349. The court’s

decision rested in part on 10 U.S.C. § 10216(a), a statute not cited in Brown.

The current version of § 10216(a) provides that “[f]or purposes of this

section and any other provision of law, a military technician (dual status) is a

Federal civilian employee . . . .” (emphasis added). Id. at 1348–49. Because the

court found “no language in § 10216(a) limiting the circumstances in which a

dual status technician can be considered a federal civilian employee,” the
No. 07-30173

3 The original definition of “military technicians” in § 10216(a), enacted in 1996,

provided: 

IN GENERAL.–Military technicians are Federal civilian employees hiredunder

title 5 and title 32 who are required to maintain dual-status as drilling reserve

component members as a condition of their Federal civilian employment. Such

employees shall be authorized and accounted for as a separate category of

dual-status civilian employees, exempt as specified in subsection (b)(3) from any

general or regulatory requirement for adjustments in Department of Defense

civilian personnel.

The specific language relied on by the Federal Circuit in Jentoft, stating that “[f]or purposes

of this section and any other provision of law, a military technician (dual status) is a Federal

civilian employee,” was not added until November 18, 1997. See National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 522(a), 111 Stat. 1629, 1734

(1997). That specific, relevant language has remained unchanged since 1997, although

surrounding language of the statute has been amended.

The appellant has directed us to both versions of § 10216(a). The appellant does not

argue that a particular version of the statute is applicable. The appellant does argue that the

1997 version of the statute, relied on by Jentoft, clarified the intent of the statute. In light of

this argument and the fact that the current version of the statute is in relevant respects

identical to the 1997 version of the statute, we assume arguendo that the language in the

current version of the statute applies. 

6

Federal Circuit concluded that a dual status employee, as defined in § 10216(a),

could bring a claim under the Equal Pay Act. Id. at 1348. Jentoft distinguished

Brown by noting that Brown did not cite § 10216(a). Id. at 1349. 

Relying on Jentoft, the plaintiff argues that Brown should be limited to

cases involving employment actions taken against dual status employees that

occurred prior to the 1996 enactment of § 10216(a) as part of the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-201,

§ 1214(1)–(2), 110 Stat. 2422, 2695 (1996).3 The Government responds that

Jentoft is distinguishable because it dealt with the Equal Pay Act and not Title

VII. The Government points out that Brown relied on the definition of “military

departments,” not at issue in the Equal Pay Act context, to determine the scope

of Title VII’s coverage and to conclude that Title VII did not extend to uniformed

members of the military.
No. 07-30173

7

The rule articulated in Brown applies, notwithstanding the statement in

§ 10216(a) that “a military technician (dual status) is a Federal civilian

employee.” That provision also provides that a military technician “is required

as a condition of that employment [( i.e., the civilian employment)] to maintain

membership in the Selected Reserve . . . .” § 10216(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).

Consistent with this provision, Brown recognized that “ARTs, such as Brown, are

civilian employees whose positions require that they also serve in the military

reserves.” 227 F.3d at 297 (emphasis added). The court concluded that these

civilian employees could not bring Title VII claims arising from events related

to their military reserve status, a necessary condition of their civilian

employment. 

As we explained in Brown, Title VII claims arising from an ARTs military

status constitute an impermissible “intrusion into military personnel decisions.”

227 F.3d at 299. Nothing in the legislative history of § 10216(a)(1)(B) suggests

that Congress intended to intrude on such military personnel decisions.

Adopting the rule implied by appellant’s distinction would create an absolute

right of ARTs, as dual status employees, to assert Title VII claims against the

Air Force, even for claims arising from events falling wholly within “the military

sphere.” Section 10216(a) does not countenance this result, and based on Brown

we reject it.

One of our recent decisions confirms this result. In Walch v. Adjutant

Gen.’s Dep’t ofTex., we considered whether the appellant, a dual status employee

who split his time as a full-time National Guard civilian employee and a member

of the Texas Air National Guard could bring a Title VII claim against the State

of Texas, Texas’s military departments, or the Air Force. __ F.3d __, 2008 WL

2512956, at *__ (5th Cir. June 24, 2008). Relying primarily on Brown and the
No. 07-30173

4 Feres held that the United States “is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for

injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident

to service.” 340 U.S. at 146. However, Feres has been understood more broadly as generally

disfavoring judicial review of military decisions. See Walch, 2008 WL 2512956, at *__ (“The

Feres doctrine was premised on the disruptive nature of judicial second-guessing of military

decisions.”).

8

Supreme Court’s decision in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950),4 we

affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the appellant’s Title VII claims as nonjusticiable. Walch, 2008 WL 2512956, at *__. According to Walch,

a court may not reconsider what a claimant’s superiors did in the

name of personnel management—demotions, determining

performance level, reassignments to different jobs—because such

decisions are integral to the military structure. Some of those

decisions might on occasion be infected with the kinds of

discrimination that Title VII generally seeks to correct, but in the

military contextthe disruption of judicially examining each claim in

each case has been held to undermine other important concerns.

Id. at *__ (emphasis added). Walch confirms that the rule from Brown remains

applicable. See id. at *__ (distinguishing Jentoft and reaffirming the rule of

Brown). The district court was correct to apply Brown in this case.

The appellantfurther argues that even if Brown does apply, his claim does

not arise from his military status. The appellant argues that he brings this

claim in his civilian capacity. He argues that there was no “military nexus”

shown because there was no evidence that he ingested the drugs while on

military status. The Government argues that the claim arises from his military

status because the drug test was administered while the appellant was on active

reserve status. 

The district court adopted the Government’s position, adding that the

military discharge proceedings were initiated prior to the civilian employment

removal proceedings; the court further correctly noted that for the appellant to

maintain his civilian position, he had to maintain his military position. For
No. 07-30173

9

these reasons, the district court concluded that the claim arose from the

appellant’s military status. 

The district court committed no error in finding that the appellant’s claim

arose from his military status. As we stated in Brown,“[w]hile these actions had

a civilian component, in that his discharge made him ineligible for his civilian

position, they nonetheless were actions taken within the military sphere.” 227

F.3d at 299. Regardless of whether the appellant ingested the drugs while on

military status, he tested positive for cocaine use while on military status and

the decision to discharge him as a result was therefore a military personnel

management decision, which was integral to the military structure and which

we will not second guess. See, e.g., Walch, 2008 WL 2512956, at *__ (considering

various Title VII claims by a dual status employee and rejecting those claims as

integrally related to military personnel management decisions). 

Based on the facts of this case, we hold that the district court did not err

in applying Brown to dismiss the appellant’s Title VII claim. 

IV

The appellant next argues that the decision of the AFBCMR was arbitrary,

capricious, or not supported by substantial evidence and therefore violated the

Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706.

Final decisions made by boards for the correction of military records, such

as the AFBCMR, are subject to judicial review under the APA and can be set

aside if they are arbitrary, capricious, or not supported by substantial evidence.

See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 303 (1983). Under 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1),

the Secretary of the Air Force, acting through the AFBCMR, “may correct any

military record . . . when the Secretary considers it necessary to correct an error

or remove an injustice.” (emphasis added). In light of this language, the review

of military board judgments is “exceptionally deferential.” Viles v. Ball, 872F.2d
No. 07-30173

5 The AFBCMR agreed with and adopted the advisory opinion prepared by Lt. Col. P.

Christopher Clark of the Air Force, which we thus review as the AFBCMR’s decision in this

case.

6 The appellant claims a right to the appointment of qualified counsel in his

administrative discharge hearing under Article 27(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

See Strickland v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 684, 691 n.6 (Fed. Cl. 2006). This right, however,

is not clear; the appellant relies on a case from the Court of Federal Claims for this proposition,

but that case—Strickland—cited to a statute regarding the appointment of counsel for a court

marital (not an administrative discharge hearing), 10 U.S.C. § 827(b), and a regulation issued

by the Secretary of the Navy (not the Air Force). However, the Notification of Initiation of

Separation Action issued to the appellant suggests that the Air Force also provides qualified

10

491, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also Kreis v. Secretary of Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508,

1514 (D.C. Cir. 1989). “All that is required is that the Board’s decision

minimally contain a rational connection between the facts found and the choice

made.” Frizelle v. Slater, 111 F.3d 172, 176–77 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quotation marks

omitted). “The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing by ‘cogent and clearly

convincing evidence’ that the decision of the board was the result of a material

legal error or injustice.” Calloway v. Brownlee, 366 F. Supp. 2d 43, 54 (D.D.C.

2005) (quoting Muse v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 592, 602 (Cl. Ct. 1990)).

A

The appellant argues, as he did to the AFBCMR and the district court,

that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his hearing before the

administrative discharge board. The AFBCMR rejected this claim for two

reasons.5 First, the AFBCMR noted that the Sixth Amendment right to effective

assistance of counsel is a criminal concept with no relevance to administrative

or civil proceedings. This observation was correct; the Sixth Amendment right

to effective assistance of counsel did not apply to the appellant’s non-criminal,

administrative discharge hearing. See Mantell v. Dept. of Justice, I.N.S., 798

F.2d 124, 127 (5th Cir. 1986); Sanchez v. United States Postal Service, 785 F.2d

1236, 1237 (5th Cir. 1986).6
No. 07-30173

counsel in discharge proceedings. This court has distinguished in other contexts between the

right to competent (or qualified) counsel and the right to effective assistance of counsel under

the Sixth Amendment. See Elizalde v. Dretke, 362 F.3d 323, 330 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting this

distinction in the state habeas context). The right to have qualified counsel appointed does not

necessarily created a coordinate right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth

Amendment. 

11

Second, the AFBCMR concluded that even assuming the Sixth

Amendment did apply, the appellant failed to establish ineffective assistance.

Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–96 (1984), cited by the

AFBCMR, the appellant had the burden of demonstrating that (1) counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that (2) but

for counsel’s deficient performance,the result ofthe proceeding would have been

different. The AFBCMR concluded that the appellant failed to meet the first

prong of the test for each of his ineffective assistance claims. The appellant

points to no evidence establishing an objective standard of reasonableness that

applies in this case. Further, the appellant offers only conclusory allegations of

prejudice. After a careful review of the record, we find that all the AFBCMR’s

reasons for rejecting the appellant’s individual ineffective assistance claims at

least minimally contain a rational connection between the facts found and the

choice made. See Frizelle, 111 F.3d at 176–77. Therefore, the AFBCMR’s

determination that the appellant did not receive ineffective assistance was not

arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to substantial evidence. 

B

The appellant argues that a gap in the chain of custody of the urine

sample used for his drug test rendered that evidence inadmissible. See United

States v. Nault, 4 M.J. 318, 320 (C.M.A. 1978) (holding that the United States

Army Court of Military Review erred in admitting a pill and a lab report

identifying the pill as LSD where an “essential link” of the “custodial chain” was
No. 07-30173

12

missing). The AFBCMR rejected this claim for two reasons. First, the AFBCMR

rejected the appellant’s reliance on court-martial cases to establish the

applicable evidentiary rule. According to the AFBCMR, all matters relevant to

an issue are admissible at a discharge board hearing, and the rules governing

court-martial cases do not necessarily apply. Second, the AFBCMR concluded

that a break in the chain of custody would not necessarily render that evidence

inadmissible; instead the nature of the break in the chain of custody would

impact the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.

The AFBCMR’s decision that the urine sample was admissible was not

arbitrary or capricious. As the Court of Military Appeals explained in United

States v. Pollard:

We hold that deviating from a regulation or instruction which sets

out procedures for collecting,transmitting, or testing urine samples

does not render a sample inadmissible as a matter of law; however,

such deviation may be considered along with all other factors in

determining if the evidence lacks sufficient reliability to be

considered by the finders of fact.

27 M.J. 376, 377 (C.M.A. 1989); see also United States v. Maxwell, 38 M.J. 148,

152 (C.M.A. 1993) (“Any deficiencies in [the] chain [of custody] ‘go to the weight

of the evidence rather than its admissibility.’”). The ultimate test for admitting

a urine sample into evidence is “whether a urine sample originated from [the

plaintiff] and was tested without adulteration by any intervening agent or

cause.” Petway v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 711, 715 (Fed. Cl. 1993) (quoting

Pollard, 27 M.J. at 377). 

Here, the appellant complains of a short break in custody between the

time the sample was delivered to the post office and the time the laboratory

received the sample. Acknowledging that the chain of custody is not broken

while the sample moves through the postal system,the appellant complains that

there was no log entry for the post office’s receipt of the sample. However,

balanced against this minor custody gap was the fact that the sample arrived at
No. 07-30173

7 This regulation no longer appears in the Code of Federal Regulations. See Enlisted

Administrative Separations, 63 Fed. R. 56,081-01 (Oct. 21, 1998) (“[32 C.F.R. Part 41] has

served the purpose for which it was intended in the C.F.R. and is no longer necessary.”).

8 For this reason, the AFBCMR distinguished the case of Poole v. Rourke, 779 F. Supp.

1546, 1564–65 (E.D. Cal. 1991), on which the appellant relies. In Poole, the court concluded

that the Air Force administrative discharge board erred by failing to take into account a onetime marijuana user’s potential for rehabilitation. However, the AFBCMR claims that the

regulation at issue in that case, AFR 39-10, authorized P&R for persons discharged for drug

abuse, in contrast to this case. The appellant replies simply that Poole v. Rourke “remains

good law.” The appellant’s conclusory reply is not persuasive. 

13

the lab with the seal unbroken. Under these circumstances, the AFBCMR’s

determination that the evidence was admissible was not arbitrary, capricious,

or contrary to substantial evidence. 

C

The appellant next argues thatthe administrative board failed to consider

his potential for rehabilitation as required by 32 C.F.R. Part 41, App. A, Part 2

§ (A)(2)(b). That provision, which was then applicable, provided that “unless

separation is mandatory, the potential for rehabilitation and further useful

service shall be considered by the Separation Authority.”7 The AFBCMR

rejected the appellant’s contention that the board failed to consider

rehabilitation for two reasons. 

First,the AFBCMR concluded that separation in this case was mandatory

under Air Force Instruction (“AFI”) 36-3209, which states at paragraph 3.25.1

that members discharged for drug abuse are not eligible for Probation and

Rehabilitation (P&R) consideration.8 The appellant contends that this provision

applies only in a post-discharge scenario and only to the “discharge authority,”

an entity he contends—without further elaboration—is distinct from the

discharge board. Because this paragraph applies only after a discharge decision

has been made, the appellant argues that this provision is irrelevant in

determining the threshold question of whether discharge is appropriate, a
No. 07-30173

9 These six retention criteria are:

(1) The seriousness of the circumstances forming the basis for initiation of

separation proceedings, and the effect of the member’s continued retention on

military discipline, good order, and morale. 

(2) The likelihood of continuation or recurrence ofthe circumstances forming the

basis for initiation of separation proceedings.

(3) The likelihood that the member will be a disruptive or undesirable influence

in present or future duty assignments.

(4) The ability of the member to perform duties effectively in the present and in

the future, including potential for advancement or leadership.

14

question that requires the consideration of rehabilitation under 32 C.F.R. Part

41, App. A, “unless separation is mandatory.”

We decline to resolve whether the AFBCMR was correct in concluding that

separation was mandatory in this case because we conclude that the AFBCMR’s

second reason for rejecting appellant’s argument was not arbitrary, capricious,

or contrary to substantial evidence. The AFBCMR reasoned that the board did

consider specific retention factors, which necessarily incorporated the potential

for rehabilitation and further useful service. We discuss the AFBCMR’s

consideration of the retention issue below. However, the AFBCMR’s

determination thatthe board sufficiently considered the appellant’s potential for

rehabilitation was reasonable. The appellant thus cannot sustain his burden of

showing by cogent and clearly convincing evidence that any failure to expressly

consider specific rehabilitation factors resulted in material legal error or

injustice.

D

The appellant next argues thatthe administrative board failed to consider

the requisite “retention” factors then promulgated by the Secretary of Defense

under 32 C.F.R. § 41, App. A, Part 2 § (A)(2)(d). Under this regulation, the board

must consider six criteria for determining whether a member should be retained

despite the events or conduct forming the basis for the separation proceeding.9
No. 07-30173

(5) The member’s rehabilitative potential. 

(6) The member’s entire military record. 

10 AFI 36-3209, paragraph 4.14.4 states that a member found to have abused drugs will

be discharged unless all of the following criteria are met: 

(1) Drug abuse is a departure from the member’s usual and customary behavior;

and

(2) Drug abuse occurred as a result of drug experimentation; and 

(3) Drug abuse does not involve recurring incidents, other than drug

experimentation; and

(4) The member does not desire to engage in or intend to engage in drug abuse

in the future; and 

(5) Drug abuse under all circumstances is not likely to recur; and 

(6) Under the particular circumstances of the case, the member’s continued

presence in the Air Force Reserve is consistent with the interest ofthe Air Force

in maintaining proper discipline, good order, leadership, and morale; and 

(7) Drug abuse did not involve drug distribution.

11 Several of the Air Force’s criteria focus on the likelihood of recurrence of the drug

abuse. The potential for rehabilitation rationally could be considered along with the likelihood

of recurrence. 

15

As the AFBCMR noted,the board did consider specific retention factors, outlined

in Air Force Instruction 36-3209, paragraph 4.14.4, specifically to be applied in

drug cases.10

These two sets of criteria are similar. The appellant argues that the

criteria are inconsistent and that the Secretary of Defense’s criteria should

control. However, the Air Force’s criteria can be viewed rationally as a specific

implementation ofthe Secretary of Defense’s more general criteria. Because the

board sufficiently considered retention using the Air Force’s criteria, the

AFBCMR’s affirmance of the board’s use of the retention criteria articulated in

AFI 36-3209 was not arbitrary or capricious.11

E
No. 07-30173

16

Finally, the appellant asserts a due process violation under the Fifth

Amendment. This due process violation contains two parts. The first part is

based on the appellant’s allegations of deficiencies in the administrative

discharge hearing, which already have been considered and rejected above. The

second alleged due process violation is based on the non-disclosure of a letter

memorandum revealing that the Air Force’s expert witness on laboratory

procedures, Dr.Papa, had been removed from his post as a laboratory supervisor

because of poor forensic practices in the lab, which resulted in a false positive

drug test in an unrelated case. That lab was the same lab that tested the

appellant’s urine sample.

This letter predated the appellant’s discharge proceedings. Nonetheless,

the appellant did not discover this letter until after the Air Force produced the

administrative record to the district court for the purposes of this action. After

learning of the letter, the appellant asked the AFBCMR to reconsider its prior

decision in light of the new evidence. He argued that the letter constituted

critical impeachment evidence as to the expert witness and a potential avenue

for exploring the accuracy of the lab results; thus, the letter should have been

disclosed to him. The appellant argued that the failure to disclose the letter

constituted a due process violation, relying on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,

87 (1963) and Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959), among other cases.

The AFBCMR reasonably concluded that the discovery requirements of

Brady did not apply to the appellant’s non-criminal, administrative discharge

hearing. See, e.g., Weaver v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 69, 78 (Fed. Cl. 2000)

(“[A]dministrative discharge hearings are not criminal procedures and,

therefore, do not give rise to the Brady rule requirements of disclosure.”).

Nonetheless, the AFBCMR acknowledged that discovery must be granted if the

failure to provide discovery is so prejudicial that it constitutes a denial of due

process. 
No. 07-30173

17

For several reasons, the AFBCMR concluded that the failure to disclose

the letter was not sufficiently prejudicial to constitute a due process violation

and thatthere was no material legal error or injustice warranting reversal ofthe

administrative board’s decision. First, the AFBCMR—adopting the rationale of

the chief of the administrative law division of the Air Force Judge Advocate

General—noted that a thorough review of the lab’s testing procedures was

conducted in the wake of the unrelated false positive report, and the findings of

the investigation concluded that the false positive was an isolated event.

Second, the AFBCMR reasoned that while the letter may have impugned Dr.

Papa’s credentials as a lab supervisor, it did not impugn his forensic toxicology

expertise. Third, the AFBCMR noted that the appellant’s primary defense was

a “good soldier” defense, for which the letter would have served no useful

purpose. Moreover, the value of the letter to other potential defenses was

questionable. The letter involved lab procedures and thus was not relevant to

the chain of custody issue that the appellant raised. Also, the appellant

produced no evidence to refute the conclusion that the single, unrelated false

positive was an isolated event and produced no evidence that his own test results

were incorrect. 

Applying the heightened deferential review that applies to military boards,

the AFBCMR’s reason for concluding that no due process violation occurred

cannot be deemed arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to substantial evidence.

V

Finally, the appellant challenges the decision of the Merits Systems

Protection Board, which affirmed his removal from his civilian position as an

ART. 

This court reviews non-discrimination claims presented to the MSPB

based on the administrative record “and will uphold the Merits Systems
No. 07-30173

12 Typically, appeals of MSPB decisions are heard by the Federal Circuit. See 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1). However, if the MSPB addressed claims of discrimination, the challenge to the

MSPB decision may—after following the correct procedures and exhausting the claims—be

filed in federal district court. See § 7703(b)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. The district court had

jurisdiction to review allthe MSPB’s decision as a “mixed case,” because the claim to the MSPB

was based both on discrimination allegations and other grounds. See Aldrup v. Caldera, 274

F.3d 282, 285 (5th Cir. 2001). In the district court, the appellant argued that the MSPB erred

in failing to find that he was removed in retaliation for filing prior EEOC complaints. The

appellant does not, however, pursue his retaliation claim on appeal and has therefore waived

the issue. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993). 

18

Protection Board’s determinations unless they are clearly arbitrary and

capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence or otherwise not in accordance

with law.” Aldrup v. Caldera, 274 F.3d 282, 287 (5th Cir. 2001); see also 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(c)(1)–(3).12

First, the appellant claims that the MSPB’s determination that he

ingested cocaine was not supported by substantial evidence. The MSPB decided

the issue on collateral estoppel grounds, looking to the finding of drug use by the

administrative discharge board in the military proceeding. The appellant

contests the MSPB’s reliance on the finding of the administrative discharge

board on this issue, arguing that because of errors in that proceeding, collateral

estoppel should not apply. For all of the reasons already discussed, the

appellant’s claim that the military discharge proceedings were unfair and thus

should not be relied upon is without merit. The MSPB’s determination that

collateral estoppel applied to this issue was not arbitrary or capricious.

Second, the appellant argues that the MSPB failed to consider his claim

of innocent ingestion. However, the appellant has not offered any reason why

the MSPB was required to consider this defense. The appellant’s supervisor

recommended his removal from his civilian position for the illegal use of drugs.

The appellant has established no legal requirement that removal for drug use

from his civilian position requires that the drug be knowing or intentional; as

the district court noted, the appellant’s reliance on military cases in making this
No. 07-30173

19

argument confuses the issue before the MSPB with the issue before the

AFBCMR, the latter of which involved different requirements. The MSPB’s

resolution of this issue was not arbitrary or capricious. 

Third, the appellant contends that the penalty of removal was

unreasonable under the circumstances of his case and that the MSPB failed to

consider the relevant factors articulated in Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5

M.S.P.B. 313, 331–34 (MSPB 1981) for weighing the reasonableness of the

agency’s actions. The MSPB concluded that the agency considered the relevant

factors. The MSPB also noted that the penalty of removal for a single use of

cocaine had been approved in other cases. We defer to the MSPB’s

determination that removal was reasonable in this case. See Parker v. U.S.

Postal Service, 819 F.2d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“It is well established that

the determination of the proper disciplinary action to be taken to promote the

efficiency of the service is a matter peculiarly and necessarily within the

discretion of the agency.”).

Fourth and finally, the appellant argues that the removing official

improperly raised a basis for the appellant’s removal for the firsttime before the

administrative board, a basis that had not been included in the Notice of

Proposed Action. The removing official in the civilian action stated that his

decision was based primarily on the decision of the discharge authority in the

appellant’s military discharge. The new basis was the fact that his discharge

decision was based on the appellant’s military discharge. However, because the

basis underlying the military discharge was drug use, and the stated basis for

the removal from his civilian position was also drug use, this argument is

without merit. 

The MSPB’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious.

VI
No. 07-30173

20

For the reasons stated above, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED

in all respects.