Filed 5/20/14 Jovaag v. Champion Mobile Notary CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JORY A. JOVAAG, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. CHAMPION MOBILE NOTARY et al., Defendants and Respondents. H039269 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct . No. 1-12-CV215896)

This appeal is one in a series of appeals brought by Jory A. J ovaag related to the termination of her 29-year purported co mmon-law marriage to Donald Ott, and Ms. Jovaag’s action against Mr. Ott over the division of the coup le’s jointly held property. 1 The present appeal is of the trial court’ s order granting Mr. Ott’s attorney, Daniel Jensen’s motion for attorney fees and co sts pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c) 2 following his successful special motion to strike (“antiSLAPP” motion) against Ms. Jovaag.

1 Jovaag v. Ott (1-08-CV-119884)

2 All further statutory references ar e to the Code of Civil Procedure.2 S TATEMENT OF THE C ASE The following statement of the case wa s taken from this court’s opinion in Jovaag
v. Ott , et al ., (Jul. 22, 2013, H038468) [nonpub. opn.].) “The underlying action for division of Ms. Jovaag an d Mr. Ott’s jointly held property was tried in May 2011. The court ruled in favor of Mr. Ott, and issued an injunction freezing all of Ms. Jovaag’s accoun ts. Ms. Jovaag and Mr. Ott appeared for further hearing on the matter on May 16, 2011, a nd entered into a glob al settlement of all
issues. “On July 20, 2011, a judgment was entered in favo r of Mr. Ott. Part of the judgment required Ms. Jovaag to execute an interspousal tran sfer deed of trust to real property. “In January 2012, Ms. Jovaag filed a comp laint against Mr. Ott and Mr. Jensen, as well as Champion Mobile Notary, who notarize d the interspousal transfer deed. The complaint alleged fraud, real estate fraud, deceit and undue influence. The basis of Ms. Jovaag’s allegations is her belief that Mr . Ott and Mr. Jensen willfully deceived her, threatened her with criminal charges, and exerted undue infl uence over her so that she would execute the interspousal transfer deed. “On March 16, 2012, Mr. Ott filed an anti-SLAPP motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Mr. Jensen also filed an anti-SL APP motion, which the court granted on May 24, 2012, dism issing Ms. Jovaag’s complaint.” ( Jovaag v. Ott , et al., supra, H038468.) Ms. Jovaag appealed the trial court’s gr ant of the anti-SLAPP motion. This court
affirmed the decision of the trial court in Jovaag v. Ott , et al., supra, H038468.) Following the grant of the anti-SLAPP motion, Mr. Jensen brought a motion for attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 426.16, subdivision (c) requesting a total of $12,667.85. The court awarded Mr. Jensen the reduced amount of $7,715 in attorney3 fees and costs as the prevailing party in the anti-SLAPP motion. Ms. Jovaag filed a notice of appeal of this order.
D ISCUSSION Ms. Jovaag asserts on appeal that the tr ial court abused its discretion in awarding Mr. Jensen $7,715 in fees and costs a ssociated with the anti-SLAPP motion. We review the trial court’s award of fees in this case for an abuse of discretion. ( Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1134, 1138 ( Ketchum ).) Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c), provides for mandatory fee-shifting that entitles a prevailing defendant in an anti-SLAPP motion to an award of attorney fees and costs. ( Ketchum , supra , 24 Cal.4th at p. 1131.) The stat ute is interpreted to allow awards
of fees in an amount the court deems reas onable, the determination of which normally begins with the “lodestar” approach (i .e. number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate preva iling in the community for similar work). ( Id . at p. 1136.) The reasonableness of the fees to be awarded is within the sound discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of factors such as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel, and the amount of time involved. ( Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) Here, Ms. Jovaag fails to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in the award. As the prevailing party in the un derlying anti-SLAPP motion, Mr. Jensen was entitled to fees under the statute. (§ 425.16, subd. (c).) The trial court was in the best position to evaluate the work product of Mr. Jensen’s attorneys, a nd awarded the $7,715, which was 40 percent less than the total reque st of $12,667.85. The record shows the attorneys who prepared the motion were experienced in pr ofessional liability defense, and spent a cumulative 30.3 hours in its preparation. Moreover, the attorney s’ hourly rates of $395 and $300 are reasonable and reflective of the prices charged by similar attorneys in4 the San Francisco Bay Area. Th e total award of $7,715 is reasonable for the preparation of the anti-SLAPP motion, and was not an abuse of discretion. ( Robertson v. Rodriguez (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 347, 362 [court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $15,000 in attorney’s fees and costs to a preva iling defendant in an anti-SLAPP matter]; Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777 , 785 [court did not abuse its discretion in awarding an anti-SLAPP prev ailing defendant $27,00 0 in attorney fees and costs].)5 D ISPOSITION The order is affirmed.

__________ _______________ _____________ RUSHING, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

___________________ _________________ PREMO, J.

___________________ _________________ ELIA, J.