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341, 184 P.3d 369, 377 (2008). We have held that "[a] writ of mandamus is 

an appropriate remedy for inadequate notice of a grand jury hearing." 

Lisle v. State, 113 Nev. 540, 551, 937 P.2d 473, 480 (1997), as clarified on 

reh'g, 114 Nev. 221, 223-24, 954 P.2d 744, 746 (1998); Solis-Ramirez v. 

Dist. Court, 112 Nev. 344, 347, 913 P.2d 1293, 1295 (1996). 

Estes is awaiting trial on charges related to alleged domesticrelated altercations with his wife. On October 25, 2012, the State served 

Estes and counsel with a notice of intent to seek an indictment. That day, 

counsel responded, requesting the date of the grand jury hearing and 

indicating that the defense may request the State to present exculpatory 

evidence to the grand jury. According to the district court's findings, 

counsel later advised the State that Estes would not testify at the grand 

jury hearing. The grand jury convened on November 1, 2012, and an 

indictment issued the next day. Subsequently, Estes filed a motion to 

dismiss the indictment arguing, among other things, that (1) the grand 

jury notice was defective because it failed to state the time, place, and date 

of the grand jury hearing and (2) the grand jury convened four days after 

the notice was served in violation of NRS 172.241(2)(a). The district court 

denied the motion to dismiss, and this original writ petition followed. 

Estes' claim that the grand jury notice was defective because 

the State did not provide the time, place, and date of the grand jury 

hearing lacks merit because the State is not required to provide that 

information unless the grand jury target submits a written request 

expressing his intent to testify. NRS 172.241(2)(b). Here, Estes did not 

express his intent to testify in his initial communication with the State 

but only requested to be notified of the date of the grand jury hearing. 

The district court found that counsel later emailed the State indicating 

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that Estes would not testify. Estes argues that because new counsel was 

appointed after he was served the grand jury notice and he did not 

communicate with counsel before the grand jury hearing convened, he 

never affirmatively waived his right to testify. However, we conclude that 

the State met its statutory obligation to provide reasonable notice in this 

instance. Estes' circumstances with counsel do not render the grand jury 

notice defective. 

Estes also argues that the grand jury notice was defective 

because it was served less than 5 judicial days before the grand jury 

convened in violation of NRS 172.241(2)(a) (providing that a grand jury 

notice is adequate if it "gives the person not less than 5 judicial days to 

submit a request to testify to the district attorney"). The grand jury notice 

was served 4 judicial days before the 1-day grand jury hearing. The 

district court determined that once Estes affirmatively notified the State 

that he would not testify, the State was not required to wait the five days 

provided in NRS 172.241(2)(a) to accommodate Estes' opportunity to 

exercise his right to testify. Although Estes denies having waived his 

right to testify, he does not appear to dispute that counsel advised the 

State by email that he would not testify at the grand jury. 

Considering Estes' argument and the record before us, we 

conclude that Estes has failed to demonstrate that the district court 

manifestly abused its discretion or exercised its discretion in an arbitrary 

or capricious manner, see State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Armstrong), 

127 Nev. „ 267 P.3d 777, 780 (2011) (defining manifest abuse of 

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discretion as dearly erroneous interpretation or application of a law or 

rule). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 1 

,J. 

cc: Hon. Jerome T. Tao, District Judge 

Carl E. G. Arnold 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

'We note that the district court also denied the motion to dismiss on 

jurisdictional grounds but considered the merits of the motion in 

anticipation of a challenge to its decision. Estes does not challenge the 

district court's jurisdictional basis for denying the motion. 

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