[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 13-15483

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-02735-MHS

TONY W. STRICKLAND, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

RICHARD T. ALEXANDER, 

Clerk of Court of the State Court of 

Gwinnett County, Georgia, 

GREENE & COOPER, LLP, 

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NA, 

 Defendants - Appellees,

DISCOVER BANK,

 Defendant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(November 20, 2014)

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Before WILSON and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER,

*

District Judge.

ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge: 

Plaintiff-Appellant Tony W. Strickland’s limited funds include those that he 

obtained from a workers’ compensation settlement after suffering a permanent 

disability on the job and those that he receives from his Social Security disability 

payments. He keeps these funds in two bank accounts that he shares with his wife, 

who, like Strickland, is entirely dependent on the funds in the accounts to live. 

Luckily for Strickland, the law protects workers’ compensation funds and Social 

Security disability payments from garnishment.

But that did not stop one of Strickland’s creditors from having the clerk of 

court for the State Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia, issue a garnishment 

summons that resulted in the freezing of Strickland’s workers’ compensation funds

for almost four months before Strickland’s creditor finally conceded that 

Strickland’s funds were exempt from garnishment and agreed to the dissolution of 

the hold on his funds. Now Strickland seeks declaratory and injunctive relief 

against the Georgia post-judgment garnishment statute to prevent that same thing 

from happening again to him and his wife, who remain judgment debtors. Because 

it is substantially likely that Strickland and his wife’s exempt funds soon will again 

 * Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger, United States District Judge for the Middle District of 

Florida, sitting by designation.

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be the subject of a garnishment summons, we reverse the district court's dismissal 

of Strickland’s lawsuit for lack of standing and remand for consideration of 

whether Georgia’s post-judgment garnishment statute is constitutionally sound.

I.

In 2004, Strickland beat nasal cavity cancer. Because of his condition, 

however, he was unable to work as many hours as he could before he fell ill. He

soon found himself unable to pay all of his bills, and in 2005, he defaulted on his 

Discover Bank (“Discover”) credit-card balance. In 2009, to recover the balance 

owed, Discover, represented by Greene & Cooper, LLP (“G&C”), filed suit against 

Strickland in State Court for Fulton County, Georgia. (Civil Action No. 

09VS171247). 

Also in 2009, Strickland injured his back at work, leaving him permanently 

disabled. In February 2011, he received a $30,000 workers’ compensation 

settlement to compensate him for his injury. He deposited these funds into a newly

formed JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) savings account and listed his wife 

as a joint accountholder so that she would be able to access the funds should his 

health further deteriorate. The Stricklands periodically drew upon these funds to 

help pay for living and healthcare expenses. In the fall of 2011, Strickland also 

began receiving Social Security Disability benefits. 

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On April 4, 2012, Discover obtained a default judgment against Strickland 

for the monies he owed in the principal amount of $13,849.93, plus interest of 

$2,138.64, attorney’s fees of $1,613.61, and court costs of $147.50.

1

 

Approximately three months later, on July 6, 2012, Discover, again represented by

G&C, filed a garnishment action against Strickland’s Chase funds to enforce its 

default judgment in the State Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia. 

At that time and to this day, Defendant-Appellee Richard T. Alexander was 

and is the Gwinnett County clerk of court. Accordingly, Alexander’s office 

generated the garnishment summons to be served upon Chase (the garnishee) in 

accordance with Georgia’s statutory requirements. The summons, served on July 

11, 2012, advised Chase to “hold all [of Strickland’s] property, money and wages, 

except what is exempt,” but did not provide an explanation as to what types of 

property are exempt from garnishment (such as unemployment benefits, Social 

Security Disability benefits, and workers’ compensation benefits). Georgia does 

not require garnishment summonses to include such information. Pursuant to the 

summons, Chase promptly put a hold on Strickland’s account. 

Strickland learned of the garnishment on July 16, 2012, when he received a 

certified letter from G&C and a first-class letter from Chase. G&C’s letter notified 

 1 These amounts add up to $17,749.68, although the record refers to the total amount that 

Discover sought to garnish as $18,096.65, and $18,302.65. We need not concern ourselves with 

the actual sum sought by Discover in the garnishment proceeding because it does not bear on the 

issues in this appeal, and, in any case, Discover filed a satisfaction of judgment on November 27, 

2012.

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Strickland that a garnishment proceeding had been instituted against his property 

and provided the case caption and amount sought, but it did not mention that 

Strickland’s funds might be exempt from garnishment. 

For its part, Chase’s letter explained that the bank had recently received the 

garnishment summons, and that, as a result, it was required by federal law to place 

a hold on Strickland’s account. It further advised Strickland that he would be 

unable to access the funds in his account and informed him of potential bank fees 

that he might become liable for, the need to consult with an attorney, and the way 

in which the funds could be released. Unlike the G&C letter, however, the Chase 

letter also disclosed to Strickland that certain forms of property might be exempt 

from garnishment, such as unemployment benefits, disability benefits, and 

workers’ compensation benefits. Therefore, the Chase letter recommended that

Strickland “immediately contact the judgment creditor’s attorney” if he believed

that his funds might be exempt. 

Upon receipt of these letters, Strickland went to the nearest Chase branch,

where he was told that the remainder of his workers’ compensation settlement

funds, totaling $15,652.67, had in fact been frozen. Following the suggestion 

contained within Chase’s letter, Strickland contacted G&C to try to persuade it to 

release the garnishment, but to no avail. Strickland then became “upset, felt 

nauseous, and began to cry and shake,” because, according to Strickland, the

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frozen funds were vital to the Stricklands’ ability to pay for living and healthcare 

expenses. 

On August 20, 2012, Chase answered the garnishment summons by paying 

into court $15,652.67, which constituted the entire remainder of Strickland’s 

workers’ compensation funds. These funds were retained by the clerk’s office 

throughout the pendency of the garnishment action. 

Acting through counsel, Strickland first tried to resolve the matter without 

resorting to the formal claims process. When he was unsuccessful, Strickland then

filed a statutory claim to the funds on September 4, 2012, on the grounds that the 

funds were exempt from garnishment under Georgia law.

2

 Discover opposed the

claim, and a hearing was scheduled for October 24, 2012. The day before the 

hearing, however, Discover voluntarily dismissed the action. 

An order to release the funds was entered on October 24, 2012. On October 

29, 2012, the court clerk’s office issued a check for the return of Strickland’s 

workers’ compensation funds, which Strickland’s counsel received on November 

2, 2012. Discover filed a satisfaction of judgment on November 27, 2012.

 2 See O.C.G.A. § 34-9-84 (“No claim for [workers’] compensation under this chapter 

shall be assignable, and all compensation and claims therefor shall be exempt from all claims of 

creditors.”).

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II.

Strickland filed the present action on August 8, 2012, while Discover’s statecourt garnishment action was still pending and when his funds were therefore still 

frozen. At that time, Chase had not yet filed its answer in the state-court 

garnishment action, so Strickland was unable to assert any direct claim for the 

funds. 

Strickland also set forth the following pertinent allegations in his complaint:

27. Mr. Strickland is still a judgment debtor to 

[Discover] . . . .

28. This judgment is likely to remain unsatisfied for 

some time because Mr. Strickland and his wife 

currently subsist on a modest income, consisting 

only of Mr. Strickland’s monthly check for Social 

Security Disability, in the amount of $1,300.00.

29. This account is likely to be the subject of a future 

garnishment because Ms. Strickland, the joint 

account holder, has judgments against her, as well 

as other debts that are likely to be reduced to 

judgment. Furthermore Mr. Strickland has another 

bank account, which contains only his Social 

Security Disability income, which may be subject 

to garnishment by Discover. Neither Mr.

Strickland nor his wife is likely to satisfy any of 

their debts in the near future.

Compl. ¶¶ 27–29. In light of these facts, Strickland brought two claims against 

Discover, Chase, G&C, and Alexander: one under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acting 

under color of state law and unconstitutionally depriving Strickland of his property 

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in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution, and one under the Georgia Bill of Rights for depriving 

Strickland of his property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Georgia 

Constitution. In short, he alleged that Georgia’s post-judgment garnishment 

statute, O.C.G.A. § 18-4-60, et seq., failed to provide him with sufficient notice of 

the garnishment and exemptions, and it failed to establish procedures complying 

with due-process requirements that would allow him to challenge the garnishment 

by claiming an exemption and having his funds returned. 

Strickland sought various forms of relief, including the following: (1) a 

declaration that the specified portions of the garnishment statute are 

unconstitutional; (2) injunctive relief against Alexander, Discover, G&C, and 

Chase to restrain them from using the allegedly unconstitutional garnishment 

process against Strickland’s property and from freezing any exempt funds in the 

future; and (3) monetary damages against Discover, G&C, and Chase for the 

injuries that Strickland alleged that he incurred as a result of his Chase funds 

having been frozen.3

 

 3 Strickland alleged that he “suffered great hardship” due to his inability to draw upon his 

workers’ compensation funds for nearly four months. For instance, Strickland has a heart 

condition for which he takes medication. Failure to take the medication every day puts him at 

greater risk for a stroke. By the end of July 2012, Strickland’s funds had run out, and because he 

could not access his workers’ compensation funds, he could not purchase his medicine for three 

days. Although he did not suffer a stroke or other cardiac episode during this three-day hiatus,

Strickland alleged that the increased health risk that he faced while not taking his medicine 

caused him and his family great emotional distress. Additionally, in October 2012, Strickland 

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After Discover dissolved the underlying debt and dismissed its garnishment 

claim, it was dismissed from this action with prejudice, by consent. The trial court 

then turned its attention to the outstanding motions to dismiss filed by Chase and 

G&C, respectively. On April 11, 2013, the trial court granted Chase’s Rule

12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., motion, concluding that Chase had not acted “under the 

color of state law” for purposes of Strickland’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. In the 

same order, the court determined that Strickland lacked standing to continue 

pursuing injunctive and declaratory relief against G&C and similarly sua sponte

dismissed without prejudice Strickland’s claims for injunctive and declaratory 

relief against Alexander. 

The dismissal order, however, preserved Strickland’s claims for damages 

against G&C, holding that Strickland had stated a claim for violation of his dueprocess rights. The parties then presented a record upon cross motions for 

summary judgment stipulating that Strickland had suffered damages in the amount 

of $10,000 for his inability to access his workers’ compensation funds for nearly 

four months as a result of the garnishment action initiated by G&C. Concluding 

that G&C was protected by a “good faith” defense and that Strickland had failed to 

 

developed a blood clot in his hand that required surgery. He delayed surgery to address the 

problem, however, because he could not afford the hundreds of dollars that the procedure would 

cost since he could not access his workers’ compensation funds. Eventually, because his hand 

became so swollen that he could not use it, and because his forearm had turned black, his family 

decided that Strickland must schedule the surgery, anyway, and worry about payment later. 

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satisfy its burden of proof to affirmatively show G&C’s bad faith, the court granted 

G&C’s motion for summary judgment on October 29, 2013. Strickland then lodged 

this timely appeal against Defendant Alexander only. 

III.

We review de novo an order granting a motion to dismiss. Amnesty Int’l v. 

Battle, 559 F.3d 1170, 1176 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In conducting our 

review, we “accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe the 

facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). We also consider de novo whether a plaintiff has 

standing. Id. (citation omitted).

IV.

In this appeal, we must decide three questions: (1) whether Strickland had

standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendant-Appellee

Alexander; (2) assuming that Strickland had standing, whether the release of 

Strickland’s funds and the satisfaction of the judgment creditor’s claim mooted

Strickland’s claim against Defendant-Appellee Alexander; and (3) assuming that 

Strickland had standing and that his claim has not been mooted, whether various 

provisions of Georgia’s post-judgment garnishment statute satisfy Fourteenth 

Amendment and Georgia state constitutional due-process requirements. We 

address each question in turn.

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A. Justiciability

Article III of the Constitution extends the jurisdiction of federal courts to 

only “Cases” and “Controversies.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 

559, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). The case-or-controversy restriction imposes 

what are generally referred to as “justiciability” limitations. Socialist Workers 

Party v. Leahy, 145 F.3d 1240, 1244 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Fla.

Azalea Specialists, 19 F.3d 620, 621-22 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 

392 U.S. 83, 94-95, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 1949-50 (1968))). Justiciability doctrine serves 

two purposes: (1) it aims to prevent the judiciary from infringing on the powers of 

the executive and legislative branches, and (2) it seeks to ensure that the judiciary 

considers only those matters presented in an adversarial context. Id. (citing Fla.

Azalea Specialists, 19 F.3d at 621-22).

Justiciability doctrine is composed of “three strands”: standing, ripeness, 

and mootness. See Leahy, 145 F.3d at 1244. The failure of any one of these 

strands can deprive a federal court of jurisdiction. This case involves both 

standing and mootness issues.

1. Standing

At an “irreducible constitutional minimum,” standing imposes upon a 

plaintiff the requirement to make the following three showings:

(1) the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in 

fact”—an invasion of a legally protected interest 

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which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) 

“actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or 

‘hypothetical[;]’”

(2) there must be a causal connection between the 

injury and the conduct complained of—the injury 

has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged 

action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] 

the independent action of some third party not 

before the court[;]” and

(3) it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely 

“speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by 

a favorable decision.”

Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S. Ct. at 2136 (citation omitted)).

a. Injury in Fact

Where the plaintiff seeks declaratory or injunctive relief, as opposed to 

damages for injuries already suffered, for example, the injury-in-fact requirement 

insists that a plaintiff “allege facts from which it appears there is a substantial 

likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future.” Malowney v. Fed. Collection 

Deposit Grp., 193 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). This is 

because injunctions regulate future conduct only; they do not provide relief for past 

injuries already incurred and over with. See Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 

1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1994). So a plaintiff seeking declaratory or injunctive relief 

must allege and ultimately prove “a real and immediate—as opposed to a merely 

hypothetical or conjectural—threat of future injury.” Id. (citation omitted). 

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In considering whether Strickland had satisfied this requirement, the district 

court concluded that Strickland did not because it found that the risk that 

Strickland would suffer future injury was too remote. The court reached this 

conclusion based in large part on Malowney, 193 F.3d 1342, a case where the 

plaintiffs challenged Florida’s post-judgment garnishment statute. While we can 

understand how the district court reached this conclusion, in Malowney, we 

expressly chose not to consider whether facts as they exist in Strickland’s case 

would satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. Id., 193 F.3d at 1347 n.6. Now that 

we are faced with these facts, we conclude that Malowney and its brief discussion 

of Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1980), warrant the conclusion that

Strickland has alleged sufficient facts in this case to demonstrate a substantial 

likelihood that he will suffer garnishment proceedings in the future under 

Georgia’s post-judgment garnishment statute.

In Malowney, a bank froze the plaintiffs’ checking-account funds in 

accordance with a writ of garnishment. 193 F.3d at 1344. At the time of 

garnishment, the only funds in the account were Social Security Disability benefits 

and United States Army retirement benefits, both of which are exempt from 

garnishment under federal law. Id. at 1345. The plaintiffs sued the clerk of a 

circuit court that issued the writ, seeking only declaratory relief pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Id. 

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Specifically, they sought a judgment declaring notice provisions of Florida’s postjudgment garnishment statute unconstitutional in part because those provisions 

failed to afford the plaintiffs adequate due process. Id.

When we reviewed the district court’s order granting the motion to dismiss,4

we concluded that “the amended complaint [did] not contain any allegations which 

could reasonably support a finding that the Malowneys are likely to be subject to 

future injury from the application of the statute they challenge.” Id. at 1347. The 

absence of several facts underpinned this determination. 

First, we noted that the complaint did not allege that the Malowneys had

checking-account funds likely to be subject to garnishment in the future, or even 

that they were still judgment debtors. Id. For these reasons, we declined to 

speculate that the Malowneys were, or soon would become, indebted to a different 

judgment creditor and, as a result, would have a garnishment issued against them 

under the challenged statute. Id. 

Second, we emphasized that both the creditor that obtained the garnishment 

summons against the Malowneys’ bank account and the bank that froze the 

Malowneys’ account were both on notice of the exempt status of the Malowneys’ 

funds as a result of the Malowneys’ case. Id. at 1347-48. We doubted that they 

 4 The district court in Malowney concluded that Florida’s post-judgment garnishment 

statute satisfies due process and is constitutional because it provides sufficient notice and an 

adequate opportunity to be heard. Malowney, 193 F.3d at 1346. We did not reach this issue on 

appeal because we held that the claim should have been dismissed since the plaintiffs lacked 

standing. Id.

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would risk liability over wrongful garnishment again in the future. Id. These facts 

made the likelihood of a recurrence of the attempted garnishment of the 

Malowneys’ exempt funds weak and deprived the Malowneys of standing to seek 

declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 1348.

In reaching this conclusion in Malowney, we were careful to distinguish the 

Third Circuit’s decision in Finberg, 634 F.2d 50. Malowney, 193 F.3d at 1347 n.6. 

In Finberg, a widow whose sole source of income was Social Security retirement 

benefits, sought to have the application of Pennsylvania’s post-judgment 

garnishment statute declared unconstitutional after the statute was used to initiate 

garnishment proceedings on Finberg’s bank accounts that held her Social Security 

benefits. 634 F.2d at 51-52. The Third Circuit determined that Finberg’s claim 

had not been mooted as a result of Finberg’s recovery of all of the funds that had 

been attached through the garnishment proceedings because Finberg had 

demonstrated “a ‘reasonable expectation’ that [she would] be subject to a 

recurrence of the activity that [she] challenge[d].” Id. at 55 (citation omitted). 

When we discussed Finberg in Malowney, we explained,

Finberg . . . involved different facts, because in that case 

the plaintiff remained a judgment debtor, and she was an 

elderly widow on a modest income, from which the court 

inferred that the judgment was likely to remain 

unsatisfied for some time. . . .

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193 F.3d at 1347 n.6. Although we noted that the Third Circuit had considered 

Finberg under a mootness analysis, as opposed to a standing analysis, see id., the 

fact that the Finberg Court found, under the facts that Finberg alleged, a 

“reasonable expectation” that Finberg would be subjected again to garnishment 

proceedings on her exempt funds certainly suggests that the Third Circuit would 

have found these same facts to have been sufficient to establish standing by 

demonstrating a “substantial likelihood” that Finberg would suffer injury in the 

form of garnishment proceedings on her exempt funds in the future.

Taking Strickland’s allegations as true and liberally construing the complaint 

in his favor (as we must when we review a motion to dismiss), we note that none 

of the disqualifying facts that existed in Malowney are present in Strickland’s case, 

yet all of the facts, plus more, that allowed Finberg to escape mootness exist in 

Strickland’s case. Unlike the Malowneys but similar to Finberg, Strickland alleged 

in his complaint that he and his joint-accountholder wife were both judgment 

debtors and that his wife had “judgments against her, as well as other debts that are 

likely to be reduced to judgment.” Because of this situation, as Strickland points 

out in his brief, he is “essentially a sitting duck.” Also unlike the Malowneys but 

again similar to Finberg’s situation as construed by the court, Strickland averred 

that he and his wife subsist on a very modest income consisting only of 

Strickland’s disability benefits, so they were very unlikely to satisfy their 

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outstanding debts “for some time.” In addition, and once again in contrast to the 

Malowneys, Strickland asserted that, at a bank other than Chase, he had a second 

account containing only his Social Security disability income.

All of these facts point strongly to one conclusion: it is substantially likely 

that it is simply a matter of time before another judgment creditor seeks to garnish 

the monies that the Stricklands have in at least one of their bank accounts. And, 

unlike in Malowney, we cannot count on the creditor and the bank to have learned 

their lessons that the Stricklands’ funds are exempt. This is so because the 

Stricklands have judgments against them from creditors other than Discover, the 

creditor involved in this case. And they have a second bank account containing 

exempt funds at a bank other than Chase, the bank involved in this case. These 

circumstances create a “real and immediate” likelihood of future injury and satisfy 

the injury-in-fact requirement for seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

b. Causation

We also find that Strickland has met the second standing requirement: that 

the injury suffered is fairly traceable to the defendant. This “causal connection” 

must “link the injury to the complained-of conduct” of the defendant and is not 

satisfied if the injury results instead from “the independent action of some third 

party not before the court.” Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of 

Ga., 691 F.3d 1250, 1257 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 

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154, 167, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1163 (1997) (quotation marks omitted)). In making this 

inquiry, we note that “even harms that flow indirectly from the action in question 

can be said to be ‘fairly traceable’ to that action for standing purposes.” Focus on 

the Family, 344 F.3d at 1273 (citation omitted).

Here, Defendant Alexander is the court clerk with the responsibility to 

process garnishments by docketing the garnishment affidavit, issuing the summons 

of garnishment, depositing the garnished property into the court registry, and 

holding the property. At the time that Strickland filed his complaint, Defendant 

Alexander had docketed the garnishment and issued the summons of garnishment. 

He was awaiting receipt of the garnished property from Chase and planned to hold 

the property until the garnishment action was resolved. Similarly, the next time 

that Strickland’s property is the subject of a garnishment action, Alexander will be 

required to follow these exact same procedures. So Strickland’s inability to access 

his exempt funds will be “fairly traceable” to Alexander’s actions, not to “the 

independent action of some third party not before the court.”

Nor, as Alexander suggests, does the fact that “his duties are ministerial in 

nature” somehow render Strickland’s injury not fairly traceable to Alexander.

Alexander provides no authority for the proposition that conduct must be 

“unlawful” for a resulting constitutional deprivation to be “fairly traceable” to that 

conduct, and he similarly identifies no support for the notion that an injury cannot

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be deemed “fairly traceable” to ministerial conduct. We decline to reach such a 

conclusion.

In Finberg, the Third Circuit considered whether the prothonotary and 

sheriff who issued the writ of execution and served it on the garnishee were proper 

defendants in the action. In conducting this analysis, the Third Circuit noted that it 

had to determine whether the prothonotary and sheriff “[met] the prerequisites to 

adjudication in a federal court.” 634 F.2d at 53. In other words, the court 

evaluated whether a causal connection between Finberg’s injury and the 

prothonotary and sheriff’s actions existed under standing doctrine. 

The Third Circuit concluded that the prothonotary and sheriff’s actions 

constituted the “immediate causes of the attachment and freezing of [the 

plaintiff’s] bank accounts.” Id. at 54. As the court further explained, “If the rules 

that they were executing are unconstitutional, their actions caused an injury to [the 

plaintiff’s] legal rights.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit 

expressly rejected the proposition that the requisite causation did not exist because 

the prothonotary and the sheriff executed only ministerial duties in issuing and 

serving the garnishment. Id. The court reasoned that “the inquiry is not into the 

nature of an official’s duties but into the effect of the official’s performance of his 

duties on the plaintiff’s rights.” Id. 

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This case is exactly the same: Alexander’s docketing of the garnishment 

affidavit and issuance of the summons of garnishment were the immediate cause of 

the attachment and freezing of Strickland’s account, and the requirement that he 

execute these ministerial duties in the future when presented with the appropriate 

documents means that Alexander will again be a cause of any garnishment that 

befalls Strickland. As a result, Strickland’s injury is fairly traceable to Alexander’s 

conduct.

c. Redressability

Finally, turning to the third prong of the standing inquiry, it is likely that 

Strickland’s injury would be redressed by a favorable decision. A federal court 

could declare the Georgia garnishment process unconstitutional or enjoin any 

future similar actions that lacked adequate due process protections. Because 

Strickland has demonstrated injury in fact, causation, and redressability with 

respect to the declaratory and injunctive relief he seeks, Strickland enjoys Article 

III standing.

2. Mootness

Having established that a justiciable controversy existed between Strickland 

and Alexander at the time that Strickland filed his complaint, we must now decide 

whether the controversy became moot when Strickland received his previously 

garnished funds from the State Court of Gwinnett County. 

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The Supreme Court has often remarked that “the doctrine of mootness can 

be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal 

interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must 

continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 

189, 120 S. Ct. at 709 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But

mootness and standing “are distinct doctrines that must not be confused.” Sheely v. 

MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505 F.3d 1173, 1189 n.16 (11th Cir. 2007). The 

principle difference is that exceptions to the mootness doctrine exist, while they do 

not for standing. Id. 

As relevant here, the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception

to mootness is at issue. Id. This exception applies when “(1) the challenged action 

was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, 

and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would 

be subjected to the same action again.” Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1308 

(11th Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We find that 

Strickland has satisfied both of these requirements.

First, garnishment proceedings against exempt funds are generally too short 

to be fully litigated before the challenged conduct is ceased. As the Third Circuit 

explained in Finberg, 

Any lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the 

attachment would require, at the very least, one year to 

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proceed from the filing of a complaint in the district court 

to the entry of judgment in this court. The attachment 

probably would end within that time with the occurrence 

of either of two events: the release of the accounts from 

attachment pursuant to claims of exemption, as occurred 

here, or the entry of a final judgment in the state court 

garnishment action. . . . Neither event should take as 

long as one year to occur because the issues and 

procedures in a garnishment are relatively simple. . . .

Finberg, 634 F.2d at 56 (citations omitted). In Finberg, the proceedings lasted for 

six months. Id. 

Under Georgia law, garnishment proceedings similarly require less than a 

year to complete. Georgia’s post-judgment garnishment statute generally provides 

a garnishee with forty-five days to answer a garnishment summons. O.C.G.A. § 

18-4-62(a). The judgment debtor may then file a claim for funds within fifteen 

days of the garnishee’s answer. O.C.G.A. § 18-4-85. Therefore, although a court 

typically will not rule on any exemptions within sixty days of the commencement 

of a garnishment action, it is unlikely that a garnishment action will last longer 

than a few months. In this case, less than four months went by between Discover’s 

filing of the garnishment action against Strickland and Discover’s dismissal of that 

very same action. 

While state-court garnishment proceedings are relatively short in duration, 

constitutional challenges to statutes in federal court, in contrast, can easily require 

more than a year to resolve. The state attorney general may wish to become 

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involved in the proceedings, discovery may be appropriate, and the issues raised 

may be complex. Additional time, of course, would be required for appellate, and, 

if appropriate, Supreme Court review of any district-court decision.

For these reasons, we have held that activities spanning less than one year 

are likely to evade review. Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1309 (“[W]e conclude that one 

year is an insufficient amount of time . . . to adjudicate the typical case. 

Consequently, if this issue arises again . . . it is likely to evade review because the 

[challenged conduct] will occur before the parties have a final ruling on the merits 

from a court of last resort.”). See also Turner v. Rogers, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 

2507, 2515 (2011) (because periods of incarceration of less than twelve months are 

not long enough for a person to challenge the constitutionality of the procedures 

used to subject the person to incarceration, where a person can show that he is 

likely to suffer future imprisonment of less than twelve months for the same 

reason, the case does not become moot upon the prisoner’s release from 

incarceration).

Other courts tend to agree with this proposition, particularly in the context of 

challenges to garnishment statutes. For example, besides the Third Circuit’s 

decision in Finberg, the First Circuit in Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1349 (1st 

Cir. 1985), concluded that a challenge to Rhode Island’s garnishment statute was 

not moot even if the funds sought to be garnished had been released because “[b]y 

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the time a case can be heard and decided in the federal court, the attached funds 

will usually have been obtained by the creditor or else released.” Similarly, in 

Harris v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 614, 616 (4th Cir. 1982), the Fourth Circuit determined 

that a challenge to West Virginia’s garnishment statute was not moot, though the 

plaintiff’s funds had been returned to her, because the state’s “brief procedure” was 

capable of evading review. Strickland’s challenge to Georgia’s garnishment 

statute suffers from the same durational problem: the garnishment proceeding 

itself is highly unlikely to outlive the length of time that it takes to resolve the 

constitutionality of the statute used to execute the garnishment proceeding. As a 

result, Strickland’s challenge to Georgia’s post-judgment garnishment statute 

satisfies the first prong of the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” test.

It also satisfies the second prong. We have already concluded in our 

analysis of the injury-in-fact requirement under the standing inquiry that a 

substantial likelihood exists that Strickland’s funds will again be garnished to 

attempt to satisfy a debt against him or his wife that has already been reduced to a 

judgment. Certainly, where a substantial likelihood of an event exists, a 

“reasonable expectation” does as well. In summary, Strickland’s available funds 

consist solely of his exempt workers’ compensation monies and his exempt Social 

Security disability payments. His meager income cannot currently or in the near 

term satisfy his and his wife’s outstanding debts, some of which have already been 

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reduced to judgments. And, because Strickland’s wife is a joint accountholder of 

both bank accounts, Strickland’s funds within those accounts are at significant risk

of garnishment. So garnishment proceedings against Strickland are “capable of 

repetition.” See also Finberg, 634 F.2d at 55-56 (finding a “reasonable 

expectation” that garnishment proceedings against an indebted widow on a modest 

income would again occur). 

For these reasons, we hold that the release of Strickland’s funds and the 

satisfaction of his debt to Discover did not moot Strickland’s claim against 

Defendant Alexander and that Strickland’s claim for declaratory and injunctive

relief still presents a live controversy.

B. Constitutionality of Georgia’s Post-Judgment Garnishment Statute

Because Strickland has established that he has standing and his claim is not 

moot, we now turn to the constitutionality of Georgia’s post-judgment garnishment 

statute. Although the Supreme Court has remarked that the courts of appeals enjoy 

discretion to determine what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first 

time on appeal, “[i]t is the general rule . . . that a federal appellate court does not 

consider an issue not passed upon below.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 119-

21, 96 S. Ct. 2868, 2876-77 (1976) (citation omitted). The reason for this is to 

ensure that all parties have had an opportunity to offer all evidence they believe 

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relevant to the issues so that they will not be surprised when the issues are decided 

by final decision on appeal without first having had an opportunity to be heard. Id. 

In Singleton, for example, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Circuit’s 

resolution on the merits of a challenge to the constitutionality of a Missouri statute 

was improper and “an unacceptable exercise of [the Eighth Circuit’s] appellate 

jurisdiction.” Id. at 119-20, 96 S. Ct. at 2877. In that case, the defendant had filed 

only a pre-answer motion to dismiss for lack of standing and had filed no answer 

or other pleading addressing the merits, had stipulated to no facts, had given no 

intimation of what defenses, if any, he might have other than that the plaintiffs’ 

alleged lack of standing, and had limited himself on appeal entirely to the standing 

determination. Id. 

The development of the constitutional issue in this case suffers similarly. 

Here, although Defendant-Appellee Alexander filed an answer to Strickland’s 

complaint, like the Singleton defendant, Alexander did not substantively address 

the constitutionality of the challenged portions of the statute in the district court. 

And, while Alexander has briefed the constitutional issue on appeal for the first 

time, he is not charged with defending the constitutionality of Georgia’s statutes; 

that is the job of the Attorney General of the State of Georgia. Nor, unlike 

Georgia’s Attorney General, does Alexander have a real interest in the 

constitutionality of the statute at issue here. 

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Moreover, based on the record below, it appears that Georgia’s Attorney 

General may indeed wish to participate in proceedings relating to the 

constitutionality of Georgia’s post-judgment garnishment statute. Although 

Georgia’s Attorney originally declined to intervene in this action after being

provided notice that the matter involved a challenge to the constitutionality of

O.C.G.A. § 18-4-60, he indicated that he intended to monitor the case and that he

might file an amicus brief addressing the constitutionality of the statute. Once the 

district court dismissed this action sua sponte for lack of standing, however, the 

Attorney General likely believed that no need existed to file an amicus brief 

addressing the constitutionality of the statute with our Court. We think that 

development of the constitutional issue would benefit from Georgia’s Attorney 

General’s involvement, should he elect to participate in the proceedings. We 

therefore remand this case to the district court for further proceedings to evaluate 

the constitutionality of the challenged portions of Georgia’s post-judgment 

garnishment statute, O.C.G.A. § 18-4-60, et seq.

V.

In sum, we hold that Strickland enjoys Article III standing. We further 

conclude that Strickland’s claim is not moot but rather presents a live controversy

that is ready for adjudication. Finally, we decline to pass on the constitutionality 

of Georgia’s post-judgment garnishment statute before ensuring that all interested 

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parties have had notice and, if desired, a chance to present all evidence and 

argument, and the district court has had an opportunity to examine and consider 

that evidence and argument when ruling on the merits. For these reasons, we 

reverse the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of Strickland’s claims against 

Alexander and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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