Ballot accountability is the capacity to demon-
strate how many ballots are involved in an elec-
tion, and what happens to all of them.

To do so, and to make a complete, rational record
of the process, requires division of the ballots into
categories and keeping count of them in catego-
ries until they are destroyed. The first division
of ballots is into those used and unused, after
which the used ballots — the bulk of the total —
are divided by purpose or disposition. Subtotals
are produced for all categories, by precinct and
ballot style, and possibly other groupings; for a
primary election, subtotals are produced by party.
Finally, the counts for the separate categories are
added to produce a grand total report.

Needless to say, the task of ballot accounting is
exacting and, for a large electorate, massive. Re-
sponsible election authorities take account peri-
odically throughout the life of the ballots, so as
to be able to demonstrate, when the election is
over, what happened to the thousands (up to mil-
lions) of pieces of paper that were created to bear
the record of voter choices.

Requirements in the States

The fact that all States require and perform some
measure of ballot accounting is evidence that it
is generally considered an important element in
establishing electoral integrity. A requirement for
keeping track of the ballots often appears in stat-

Ballot
Accountability

ute law, but usually not in detail. Devising the
method for ballot accounting, as well as its inclu-
siveness, may be the responsibility of the State
election authority, by regulation or directive, or
may be left to the left to the discretion and inge-
nuity of local election boards.

Methods

Whatever the method used, ballot accountabil-
ity depends on dividing the whole quantity pro-
duced into portions identified for particular uses,
accounting for them within those groups, and
aggregating the end totals from the various cat-
egories to arrive at a grand total which balances
with the original quantity received. An example
of such categorization is shown on the next page.

A format such as this could be modified and elabo-
rated to conform to the requirements and practices
of the State, as well as the kind of election. For
instance, in a primary election there would be a
separate accounting for the ballots of each party;
there might be a subtotal accounting for each bal-
lot style; some of the above-listed categories will be
inapplicable to certain elections and locations, and
other situations may require additional categories:
provisional ballots; challenged ballots; ballots un-
acceptable to the precinct tabulator, often called
“diverted ballots” when a scanner is used; and if
there is a central count, there will be a category for
damaged ballots.

17


Ballot Production

State of California

Code of Regulations,

Title 2, Division 7, Chapter 4

Table of Contents,

Regulations governing production of punchcard
ballots

Elections Division

Office of the Secretary of State
Sacramento CA

Melissa Warren

916-657-2189

Commonwealth of Virginia

Oath of Printer

State Board of Elections, Richmond VA
Audrey Piatt, Deputy Director
804-786-6551

34



same outer crate protected the ballot box during
warehousing between elections. Such boxes now
show up in antique shops, brass frames polished
and glass sides gleaming, commanding a price of
$500 or more. It is also not impossible that some
of them are still serving the purpose for which
they were created, perhaps in an idyllic New
England town that harried urban dwellers fan-
tasize about when they are running for the sub-
way or stalled in rush hour traffic.

Jurisdictions that use central count electronic
voting systems (principally punchcards, but also
some mark sense ballots) often use disposable
ballot boxes made of heavy corrugated packag-
ing material. If the box has a removable top, it
can be used to send ballots and other election
materials to the polls. When those are removed,
the ballot box is demonstrated to be empty, the
lid replaced and sealed on. At the end of the day
the voting slot is sealed over, and pollworkers
sometimes sign across the seal. The box will not
be opened until it reaches the central office where
the voted ballots are removed and prepared for
counting. The box is then flattened and discarded.
Washington, D. C., uses a box of this type, but it
does not have a removable lid. To demonstrate
that the box is empty before voting begins, the
pollworkers shake it.

The disposable box offers certain advantages over
the permanent box. It provides an ideal milieu,
clean and dry, into which ballots are inserted, an
important consideration for punchcards that
must be cardreader-acceptable. Moreover, there
is no need for between-elections storage space.
Conversely, however, some traditionalists don’t
consider it appropriate to deposit documents as
valuable as ballots in cardboard boxes. And envi-
ronmentalists sometimes raise concerns about
excessive use of paper. Reusable metal ballot
boxes obviate those objections. However, assur-
ing that they provide appropriate conditions for
deposit of computer source documents is a con-
siderable task in election preparation. After long
storage in the warehouse, the metal boxes can
require intensive cleaning and removal of spider

webs and other debris, depending on the particu-
lar flora and fauna of the region and the atmo-
spheric humidity in the storage facility.

At poll closing, the ballots in the ballot box may
be secured therein for return to the election of-
fice, or they may be removed from the box and
placed in a transfer container. If they are left in
the box, the lid will be locked, sealed, or both
locked and sealed. Often a seal is placed over the
slot. Pollworkers sometimes are required to sign
across the seal and onto the edge of the ballot
box. These precautions assure that no ballots will
come out of the box and no additional ones will
be inserted, and any tampering with the box will
be apparent.

The voted ballots sometimes are removed from
the ballot box, or from the inside container of the
scanner or precinct tabulator, and packed into a
transfer case, which is sealed and/or locked much
as ballot boxes are secured.

At the Polls—Spoiled Ballots,
and Others

Ballots which are neither cast nor unvoted also
need to be kept secure, in order that the final
accounting will be complete. Principally these are
the “spoiled ballots” — ones on which the voted
either makes a mistake, or decides he wants to
make a change in the vote(s) he has cast.

Again, the pollworkers have the responsibility for
security, and for documenting the transaction of
the replacement of the spoiled ballot by a new
unvoted ballot which is then issued to the voter.
Some States destroy the spoiled ballot at the poll-
ing place, after first removing its stub (usually
numbered) and marking it “spoiled”; then saving
it for accounting. Other States save the entire
ballot, marking it “spoiled”. Pollworkers some-
times are instructed also to deface or tear spoiled
ballots; Dade County, Florida, reports that
“Spoiled ballots are torn part way through so that
they cannot be mistaken, substituted, or added
to voted ballots.”

11


®

ballot reconciliation for ALL ballots and for ALL
polling sites is impossible. Fortunately, this is not
a widespread problem and usually only repre-
sents one or two ballots in a count of thousands.”
Asensible assessment. But that is not to say that
a careful, comprehensive ballot accounting will
not reveal gross errors which could indicate mis-
feasance or malfeasance, and therefore trigger
further investigation.

In the Central Office

Once the ballots and other election documentation
come in from the polling places, the task of produc-
ing a post-election aggregate accounting of ballots
begins. The extent of this process varies from State
to State, and even among communities within a
State. It can involve any or all of the following steps,
and if done comprehensively can require days, or
even several weeks, to complete.

@ Review and verify the precinct ballot account-
ing reports.

@ Compare precinct accounting with machine
count of ballots.

m@ Produce and assemble final ballot accounting
information for ballots other than those sent
to the polls — absentee, testing, unused, etc.

@ Produce and assemble final ballot accounting
information for any ballots not included in
above categories — damaged, disallowed, etc.

m Incorporate all data into a jurisdiction-wide
report, a reconciliation, that accounts for all
ballots ordered, printed and received.

For many States, ballot accounting extends no
further than the precinct reports; in most in-
stances, they are at least reviewed when they
come to the central office.

In other locations, the process of accounting for all
the ballots is complete and jurisdiction-wide before
results are certified; total ballot accounting is
deemed to be an integral part of the canvass. In
other instances it is completed after results are
made official.

Sacramento County, California, utilizes all the
time available so as to produce comprehensive
ballot accounting; the county registrar describes
their process as “very deliberate”. Deadline for
certification is 29 days after election, and all dur-
ing that official canvass period ballot accounting
is proceeding. In another large California county
the practice has been only to review and recon-
cile the precinct reports. However, because there
was so much scrutiny of their process during the
last Senatorial election when the result was con-
tested, they are now expanding their ballot ac-
counting so as to be able to produce a countywide
reconciliation

Dade County, Florida, conducts a post-election
evaluation of polling place operations. The
pollworker trainers, assisted by appropriate cen-
tral office staff, carefully examine and assess all
the records that document activity related to the
polling places. There are dozens of such for each
of the 504 precincts, including checklists from
supply pick-up, seals and receipts from ballot
transfer cases, ballot accountability forms, oaths
and certificates, and records made on the condi-
tion of materials when they are returned from
the polling place. The results of the assessment
for each precinct are recorded on a Precinct Au-
dit form. In each category, and for total perfor-
mance, the precinct team is rated “Outstanding”,
“Very Good”, “Average”, or “Needs Improvement”,
and specific deficiencies are indicated. All pre-
cinct clerks (chief pollworkers) receive the report
for their precinct; those rated “Outstanding” also
receive a “Certificate of Appreciation”. Where
ratings are lower, the trainers offer to assist the
clerks in upgrading their work. Dade’s Supervi-
sor of Elections finds that the evaluation process
is as useful to management as to the pollworkers,
because it enables them to re-focus their train-
ing curriculum on the areas where deficiencies
are shown to be frequent and persistent.

21


Pollworkers - Official staff who conduct the elec-
tion in the polling places. Does not include cam-
paign workers, watchers, challengers, etc., who
represent entities other than the election author-
ity. Also called “inspectors”, “officers of election”,
“clerks”, “election judges”, “precinct board”, “com-
missioners”, “warden”, “moderator”, “poll manager”
Precinct tabulator - An electronic device used to
read and tabulate ballots at the polling place. In-

cludes Precinct Ballot Counter (PBC) and optical
scanner.


Ballot Accountability

Ballot Accounting form for use by pollworkers.

Washington DC
Emmett Fremaux, Executive Director
202-727-2525

Ballot Accounting report by pollworkers and
Precinct audit /reconciliation in central office.

Montgomery County MD
Carol Evans, Elections Administrator
301-217-6451

Ballot Accounting form for use by pollworkers
in precinct using multiple ballot styles.

King County WA
Robert W. Bruce
206-296-1540

Ballot receipt form, for use by pollworkers,
Ballot Statement form, for use by pollworkers,
and Certificate of Packaging and Sealing form,
for use by pollworkers.

Sacramento County CA
Ernest Hawkins, Registrar
916-366-2051

32

State of Illinois

Official Ballot Record, specimen filled out,
included in Manual of Instructions for Illinois
Election Judges 1995, produced by State Board
of Elections, Springfield IL.

Dr. Ronald D. Michaelson, Executive Director
217-782-4141

State of lowa

Ballot Record and Receipt, combination form to
be used for accounting at opening of polls and
at poll closing, and instructions for use of the
form. Prescribed by the Secretary of State,
Towa City IA

Sandy Steinbach, Director of Elections
515-281-5823

~%



BALLOT ACCOUNTING, JURISDICTION-WIDE SUMMARY

A. Number received from printer
1. Allocated to polling places, individually and total
2. At each polling place
a. Received from central office
b. Issued to voters
(1) Number voted and counted (or sent for counting)
(2) Number voted but disallowed (if applicable)
(3) Number spoiled
c. Unused
3. Allocated for absentee voting
a. Issued to voters
(1) Returned and counted
(2) Spoiled and replaced
(3) Returned but disallowed
(a) Late receipt
(b) Oath/affidavit not signed
(c) Other reason (specify)
(4) Not returned
b. Unused :
4. Used in testing
5. Unused
B. Post-election reconciliation
1. Allocated to polling places
a. Issued to voters
(1) Voted and counted
(2) Voted but not counted
(3) Spoiled
b. Unused
2. Allocated for absentee voting
a. Issued to voters
(1) Returned and counted
(2) Returned but disallowed
(a) Late receipt
(b) Oath/affidavit not signed
(c) Other reason
b. Unused
3. Used in testing
4. Unused (never allocated)
5. Other dispositions
C. Total used
D. Total unused
E. Grand Total (E, the sum of C and D, should equal A) @

18


Election Administration, Innovations in Election
Administration 9: Early Voting.

The author reports that ballot security was a
major fear and concern when the concept of early
voting was proposed. Based on the experience so
far, most of those fears have been assuaged, but
even the boosters of early voting emphasize that
management of the process is exacting and de-
tailed documentation must be maintained in or-
der to engender public confidence. Ballots have
to be tracked as they travel to and from the sat-
ellite sites where voting goes on for a number of
days in the pre-election period, and logs kept to
record each transfer of custody.

The root of the security concerns in early voting is
simply stated in the report (though not necessarily
simply resolved):

“Security procedures at satellite early vot-
ing sites are very much the same as those
followed on election day, but they must be
followed every day of the early voting pe-
riod. All ballots and materials must either
be returned to the election office at the end
of each day and delivered to the early vot-
ing sites at the beginning of the next day,
or they must be locked in a secure room at
the early voting location every night.”

Logistics of the system are complex; numerous
ballots styles must be provided at each site, be-
cause it is impossible to predict the residence of
the voters who choose to vote at a site. Accord-
ingly, ballot accounting must involve sorting of
early voted ballots by precinct and ultimately
incorporating those ballots with ballots voted on
election day.

Besides the techniques used for election day vot-
ing — locked containers; numbered seals; bipar-
tisan staffing and teams, tracking logs, etc. —
the early voting pioneers use some additional
techniques to ensure security: double locks, so
that no one single person can access ballots;
chaining a ballot box to an immobile or heavy
object (when the site is in a retail facility, for in-

24

stance); using a new ballot box each day, and bal-
ancing the ballot records at the end of each day;
and heavy emphasis on security in the training
of satellite “pollworkers”.

In Texas, where early voting is widely used, the
Elections Division of the Office of the Secretary
of State has developed a series of report forms
on which early voting activity is documented to
provide effective security and accountability.

All-Mail Ballot Elections

Elections in which all ballots are issued and re-
turned by mail, thus eliminating polling places,
is the subject of another Innovations in Election
Administration study, the report for which is soon
to be published by the National Clearinghouse
on Election Administration.

All-mail elections are now conducted in sixteen
States, usually at the option of the local election
authority and almost always in elections where
the contests are solely ballot issues. The juris-
dictions are apt to be small, and the contests non-
partisan. This method of ascertaining the will of
the electorate involves substantial concern for
ballot security and accountability. To respond, the
study recommends that election administrators
keep detailed, complete records on an ongoing
basis, from the time the ballots are printed until
the results are certified.

A number of the practices employed to secure
and keep track of ballots in traditional absen-
tee voting are appropriate also for all-mail bal-
lot elections. Among them are locked cabinets
and rooms in which to store ballots, both un-
used and after return; a building alarm sys-
tem; restricted access to the area where bal-
lots are handled; logging all activity. But early
voting also differs from absentee voting and
therefore requires new thinking in devising
security and accountability precautions. The
volume of ballots produced is large, because one
is sent to every qualified voter in the jurisdic-
tion, not just to those who can’t get to the polls


training sessions to focus on that task, and found
their reports were done correctly the next time.

The appendix to this report includes reproduc-
tions of ballot accounting report forms that are
clear and have been found to contribute to full
and accurate reporting.

Another problem in designing ballot accountabil-
ity programs is what to do when the numbers
don’t add up, when the number of ballots cast is
lesser or greater than the number of people
checked off on the list of voters. Thoughtful elec-
tion officials agree that is not only a possibility,
but that it does happen. They offer a number of
possible explanations, most of which are rooted
in human error:

m The voter signs in, but leaves the polls before
getting a ballot.

@ The voter is issued a ballot but leaves without
casting it.

@ The pollworker mistakenly tears two
punchcard ballots off the pad; the voter mis-
takenly punches and casts both.

mg Arithmetic errors in making out the ballot ac-
counting form, or simply failure to understand
how to complete the form.

@ Missing numbers on the ballot stubs. Certainly
a theoretical possibility, but most unlikely to
occur. One election director reports that after
verifying the numbering on more than a mil-
lion Datavote ballot cards and finding eight
missing numbers among them; she decided
that such verification before each election was
not warranted.

A number of States require that any discrepan-
cies in precinct ballot accounting be explained by
the pollworkers. The requirement can be a statu-
tory mandate, an administrative rule, or an in-
struction in the pollworkers manual. Where there
are discrepancies, the remedy varies.

If the accounting shows an “excess” of ballots —
i. e., the number of voted ballots is greater than

20

the number of people recorded as voting — the
remedy can be harsh. For instance, Michigan elec-
tion law (168.802) provides:

“When the board is ready to proceed with
the counting of any kind of ballots, the box
containing such ballots shall be opened and
the whole number of ballots counted. If the
ballots shall be in excess of the number of
the electors voting according to the poll lists,
the ballots shall be replaced in the box and
one of the inspectors shall publicly draw out
and destroy so many ballots therefrom un-
opened as shall be equal to such excess.”

The same requirement appears in the Michigan
regulations governing punchcard and optical scan
ballots. Several other States have a similar provi-
sion, among them Utah and Wisconsin. Probably
such laws were designed to be antidotes to ballot
box stuffing, though certainly the rectification is
imprecisely targeted.

The Ohio approach in dealing with ballot ac-
counting discrepancies in the precinct is more
typical: Pollworkers are instructed to recheck
their work, recounting the number of voters on
the signature list, the number listed on the poll
list, and the number whose registration cards
have been checked off as voting in that election.
If the accounting still does not balance, the
pollworkers should explain what they think ac-
counts for the difference and all pollworkers ini-
tial the explanation. In the central office there is
a machine count of ballots as they are tabulated;
if balance is not reached, the matter is referred
to the county Board of Elections who make the
decision on whether to accept the precinct count
and the pollworker explanation despite the dis-
crepancy in ballot accounting, and go ahead with
certification.

One local election director, whose operation is
known for its efficiency and professionalism, com-
ments that “... there is always the frustration
created by human errors in the ballot account-
ing documentation that precludes achieving a
perfect accounting balance. Absolute precision in

e


Appendix 3

Ballot Production

33


The Ballot Count/Security Department of
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Board of Elections has
developed a comprehensive Procedures Manual,
the purpose of which is to enable it to meet its
responsibilities broadly defined in State law, one
of which is to “ensure the security of all ballots
and related materials”. Sections in the manual
include Pre-Election Procedures, Election Day
Procedures, and Post-Election Procedures, and
there are exhibits of forms used and reports pro-
duced. The Board also produces procedures for
the Absentee Voting Department, among which
are precautions to assure security of those bal-
lots.

Post-Election Storage

Storage of ballots after election is both like and
different from pre-election storage.

It is still a huge job; for elections in which there
is a federal office, ballots must be retained for 22
months. Since there are four such elections in a
two-year period, there will be at least four elec-
tions’ ballots extant at all times — those from
the last three previous federal elections and those
being produced and readied for use in the next
election. Each time an election’s ballots reach the
age at which they can be discarded, it is time to
order ballots for the upcoming election.

After the election, the voted ballots are packed,
sealed, and left untouched. They must be kept in
their precinct batches, each one divided into sepa-
rate categories — valid voted and counted bal-
lots; spoiled, disallowed, etc. Labeling and orderly
arrangement is essential to enable retrieval if
need occurs. Access to the ballots still should be
restricted, and where it occurs should be docu-
mented, Packaging should be such that if there
is tampering it is apparent. Ambiance require-
ments for the storage facility are less demand-
ing, since the moisture controls required for ma-
chine-read documents is no longer necessary.

Most commonly, storage for ballots after the
election is in similar, or the same, facility as

used before election — sealed containers in a
locked room or vault. Sometimes a sheriff holds
the key; sometimes there are two locks, with
keys held by a bipartisan pair of custodians.
Typically access is restricted, although not
many authorities report that they record
access when it does occur.

Texas provides in law for post-election storage:
Ballots must be packed in locked or sealed boxes
which are stored in a locked room. A General
Custodian of Election Records has responsibility
for their security, and it is a Class A misdemeanor
for the custodian to make or permit an unautho-
rized entry into a ballot box.

San Francisco has a well-defined plan: All used
ballots (voted and counted; voted but disallowed;
spoiled) are batched by precinct, boxed and
sealed. Stubs of used ballots, along with all un-
used ballots, are also batched, boxed and sealed.
Everything then is shrink-wrapped on pallets and
stored in a locked area of their warehouse. King
County, Washington, seals the ballots in contain-
ers which are placed in locked cabinets located
in a special locked storage room. Access to the
storage facility is limited. Sealing of the ballots,
and opening, if ordered, is witnessed by political
party representatives.

In Oklahoma, all ballots are locked in the sheriff’s
vault for three days after election (the deadline
for contesting the result), at which time they are
transferred to the county election board for stor-
age. If a recount is requested in the three-day
period, State law provides that the judge of the
county trial court must first “. . . hear evidence
as to whether the ballots have been preserved in
the manner and by the officers prescribed by law,
and as to whether they are the identical ballots
cast by voters, and that they have not been ex-
posed to the reach of unauthorized persons, as to
afford a reasonable opportunity of their having
been changed and tampered with. . ... Ifthe judg-
ment of the court is that the ballots have been
properly preserved, then the recount of the bal-
lots shall be conducted . . . “

15


vendor during production; disposition of all stock
manufactured and ballots printed, including that
which is scrapped; storing, packaging and ship-
ment of ballots; transportation methods; reports
of shipment and warehouse security, including
authorization for access and access log.

Transferring Ballots from the
Printer to the Election Authority

State and local election authorities also make pro-
visions for security and accountability in the
transfer of the finished ballots from the printer
to the local election authority, specifying condi-
tions in State law or regulations and/or in direc-
tives of the customer which usually are included
in the contract for the work. Such specifications
may include requirements that ballots be pro-
duced and prepared for delivery

mTM with an inventory of contents of the order;

@ sequentially numbered, with the number on a
removable stub, or on each part of a double
stub;

@ batched and wrapped, usually by precinct but
sometimes by ballot style;

lm securely wrapped, sealed, and marked to iden-
tify the contents of the batch; wrapping to be of
material that will protect the ballots from mois-
ture and detect tampering — shrink-wrap;
vacuum seal, poly-wrap; tamper-proof or
filament tape.

In many instances the printer delivers the bal-
lots in the company truck; in some small juris-
dictions, election office personnel pick them up.
In larger jurisdictions there is a range of meth-
ods, usually a bonded carrier: Federal Express
or United Parcel Service; U. S. Postal Service;
air freight; or commercial trucker. In a few States,
law enforcement officials -—— usually the sheriff
or his deputies — assist in ballot delivery.

It is common for an inventory of the order to ac-
company it and be delivered with it; for a signed
receipt to be given by the customer; and for the

contents of the shipment to be verified with the
inventory and the original order. Some jurisdic-
tions track and monitor the transfer and deliv-
ery, once they are notified by the vendor that it is
ready for shipment.

Ifa messenger or courier is entrusted with ballot
delivery in Illinois, that person must subscribe
to an oath which is specified in State law. Maine
election law requires that both the Secretary of
State (which office originates the ballot order for
all local election offices) and the municipal clerks
retain for one year the receipts relating to ballot
shipment. In Oklahoma, where the State Elec-
tion Board places the order for ballots, the county
election office calls the State Board to confirm
that ballots have been delivered, and forwards a
copy of the receipted packing slip that comes with
the order.

San Francisco’s Registrar of Voters describes the
meticulous care taken in ballot transfer from the
printer:

“The printer shrink wraps the pallets of
boxed ballots, makes arrangements for a
trucking company to pick up and deliver the
ballots, and informs us about the pick up
time as well as the estimated delivery date
and time.

If the ballots do not arrive in a timely fash-
ion, we call the printer, and if necessary the
trucking company, and we track the deliv-
ery until it arrives.

Upon arrival, the staff immediately con-
ducts an inventory to verify the quantity
and ballot types, serial numbers, etc. on the
ballots. Any discrepancies are immediately
resolved with the printer.”

Ballots in Storage Prior to Use

For the period between delivery by the printer
and use by the voter, ballots are in custody of the
local election authority. During that time they
must be prepared for use, and are stored for long


Ballot Security

Diagrams

Ballot Control & Security, and

Counting Center Activity Flow

District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics
Emmett Fremaux, Executive Director
202-727-2525

Other References

The following are too large to be reproduced in
this report. They are listed because they are
excellent models for a jurisdiction seeking
guidance in developing a ballot security/ac-
countability system. The chief election official
for each jurisdiction is listed in the event a
reader wants to pursue this subject.

Procedures Manual

Ballot Count/Security Department
Cuyahoga County Board of Elections
Cleveland OH

Thomas J. Hayes, Director
216-443-3200

Includes also specimen copies of forms, reports,
directives and other reference materials.

Election Counting Center Procedures

D. C. Board of Elections and Ethics
Washington DC

Emmett Fremaux, Executive Director
202-727-2525

Includes also specimen copies of checklists
and logs

30

Ballot Security and
Accountability Procedures

Dade County, Florida

Miami FL

David Leahy, Supervisor of Elections
805-375-5553

Very complete and detailed, covering all aspects
of ballot security and accountability, as well as
specimen copies of ballot accounting forms, logs,
and receipts. Serves a very large electorate.

The following States are among those which have
adopted rules or regulations that include provi-
sions for ballot security and accountability.

Alaska
Sandra Stout, Director of Elections
Juneau AK 907-465-4611

Maryland

Gene Raynor

Elections Administrator
Annapolis MD
410-974-3711

Oklahoma

Lance Ward, Secretary, State Election Board
Oklahoma City OK

405-521-2391

Washington

Gary McIntosh, Election Director
Olympia WA

360-753-2336


Drawing from work of the fifty States and from
various local election authorities, one can iden-
tify the characteristics of effective ballot security
and accountability, and the techniques useful in
achieving those goals.

There should be a clear written process for bal-
lot security and accountability, preferably in a
three-tier structure: State law; State rules
or regulations; and step-by-step procedures.
At each level of the process it should be explicit
that security and accountability are to be main-
tained for the life of the ballots, from production
to destruction.

All aspects of the process should be docu-
mented. At any point in the life of ballots, from
production through destruction, and for all types
of ballots however they are used or if not used, it
should be possible to ascertain where they were or
are, how many of them in each use or location, who
had or has custody, when transfer of custody oc-
curred, and whether (when in storage) they were
accessed by someone other than the official custo-
dian, who had such access, and the time and pur-
pose of occurrence. Documentation may be main-
tained on paper or electronic medium.

Training of all staff, and particularly poll-work-
ers, should emphasize the importance of
securing and accounting for ballots.

In most States, bipartisanship is a factor in
ensuring ballot safety, as it is in all aspects of
election administration.

Making Ballot
Security and
Accountability
Effective

Ballots should be constantly and continuously
attended by election officials, except when
they are in secure storage.

Access to ballots, or areas where ballots are
being handled, should be restricted to those
whose access is authorized by law, regulation, or
written procedure. When ballots are in storage,
a record of all access should be maintained.

Ballot accountability should be comprehen-
sive, including a grand total to demonstrate that
the number of ballots at the end of the election
equals the number produced for that election.
Jurisdiction-wide reconciliation should be com-
pleted before results are certified. The work of
the pollworkers should be audited, and deficien-
cies identified and rectified. Materials supplied
to pollworkers should be evaluated to ensure that
they are comprehensible and that they enable
effective accountability.

The processes and documentation reflecting func-
tioning of the ballot security and accountability
program should be evaluated following the
election and modified if necessary to improve the
program.

The State, legislators and chief election of-
ficials, should assume their responsibility
for effective ballot security and accountability.
Preferably, policy should be broadly stated in law,
and rules or regulations should flesh out the re-
quirements implicit in the policy. Detailed writ-
ten procedures probably are best developed at the

27


were common. To cope with the growing elector-
ate and the new political morality, American in-
ventiveness responded with a new method of vot-
ing which would eliminate the separate document
ballot for each voter and count the vote automati-
cally — the mechanical lever machine. The large
urban jurisdictions switched to the new device
and no longer was the paper ballot a means by
which elections could be corrupted. By 1920 -
1940, it came to be the method of choice, deemed
the only feasible method for voting in most of
urbanized America. In a number of States, legis-
lators rewrote their laws to mandate use of the
lever machine.

Immediately after World War II, with the intro-
duction of the computer, another sea change oc-
curred in American voting. Many large popula-
tion centers switched to the new electronic vot-
ing systems because they counted votes quickly
and accurately and were cheaper than lever ma-
chines. Most of the computer-based systems uti-
lize a machine-readable document ballot for each
voter. In the 1992 Presidential election, two-thirds
of the electorate in the country were assigned to
polling places which use a document ballot, al-
most all of them electronically read and counted.

Concurrent with the introduction of new com-
puter systems came growth in absentee voting,
impelled by changes in federal law which required
the States to make absentee voting available to
all citizens who could not come to the polls. The
movement started with the Servicemen’s Voting
Act of 1942 and culminated with the Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1970.

Other federal laws enacted since then have fur-
ther enlarged the absentee franchise and some
States have gone beyond federal mandates to
make absentee voting available for any and all
who opt for it. In a few States voting in certain
elections is entirely by mail. Only the individual
voter document ballot serves these purposes.

Vote-counting by computer — a device few people
understand and many mistrust — brought
demands for auditing and verifying of election

results, and one element of validation would be
demonstration of ballot security and accountabil-
ity. Because there are tens of millions of document.
ballots cast nationwide each year, and tens of mil-
lions more printed but not cast and/or counted, the
job of ensuring their safety and keeping track of
them has become a vast undertaking.


The rationale for ballot security and accountabil-
ity programs is simply stated: ballots are the criti-
cal element in determining and confirming the
result of an election, and election officials need
to protect them and keep track of them, secure
them and account for them. A comprehensive and
proved program of ballot security and account-
ability makes it possible to

TM reconstruct and replay the election should the
result be uncertain;

g establish responsibility should wrongdoing be
indicated;

m deter fraud and other irregularities simply
because such a program is in place;

@ evaluate performance of election personnel and
effectiveness of election procedures;

@ reassure candidates, campaigns and the elec-
torate that votes cast are counted, and even
avoid election contests when losing candidates
are shown that security and accountability are
an integral part of the conduct of elections.

In short, ballot security and accountability main-
tain the integrity of the election process and those
who administer it.

Although it is easy to define the reason for ballot
security and accountability, it does not follow that
ensuring these conditions is easy. The job is com-
plicated and can be massive. In a large jurisdiction
where the voting system used involves a separate
ballot for each voter, it is a major responsibility in

Why Worry
About Ballots?

effective election administration. The work is te-
dious, costly, and demanding in its requirement for
detail. But considered in the framework of the pur-
poses it serves, its essentiality is beyond doubt.

In jurisdictions using lever or direct electronic
voting machines in their polling places, and the
ballot posted on the machine serves all those who
cast votes on that device, ballot accountability is
not entirely obviated. Absentee voting is avail-
able to all who cannot (or sometimes choose not
to) come to the polls and most absentees indicate
their choices on document ballots. Moreover, in-
dividual ballots are used at the polls when the
machine is out of service and by citizens whose
qualification for voting is uncertain (provisional
ballots).

In the early years of the Republic, ballot security
and accountability were not the problem they now
are. The franchise was limited; only five per cent
of the adult population qualified for voting in the
first Presidential election and not until 1965 did
the universal franchise become a legal reality. The
country was predominantly rural and the popu-
lation not mobile; everyone in a community knew,
and trusted, everyone else.

With industrialization and immigration in the
second half of the 19th Century, cities grew rap-
idly and the franchise steadily enlarged. These
demographic changes first occurred in the North-
eastern United States, and they impacted poli-
tics and the administration of elections. Such
schemes as ballot box stuffing and chain voting

3


16


@ Making it unlawful for a printer to permit bal-
lots to be given to or taken by anyone other
than the election authority for which they are
printed, or even for a printer to divulge the
content of ballot copy to anyone other than the
election authority which placed the order;

m@ Making it unlawful to print a ballot with
names, candidates, and arrangement other
than what is authorized and directed by the
election authority;

@ Directing that ballots printed with errors be
destroyed, and how ballots printed in excess
of the quantity ordered are to be disposed of;

@ Directing how type is to be distributed when
the print job is finished;

m Permitting access to the production facilities
by State and/or local election authorities at any
time ballots are in production.

Texas law requires that companies which expect
to print ballots for an election for State and county
offices must register with the Secretary of State
at least 60 days before each such election. The
registration statement lists all the clients for
which ballots are to be printed, and essential data
about the company including names of its sales
representatives who will be the contacts with the
clients.

Companies which print ballots in Ohio are required
to have a night time alarm which is connected to
the Sheriff's office.

Hawaii law makes the vendor responsible for se-
curity of ballots until they are delivered to the
election authority. The printing contract contains
a clause that the vendor is required to “exercise
proper security” and that “ballot information and
materials” be provided only to the Lieutenant
Governor, who is the chief election official for the
State.

In Maine, the election law requires that the print-
ing contract specify that the contractor take rea-
sonable precautions to maintain the security of
all ballots printed until they are delivered to the

municipalities; promptly destroy all ballots de-
termined to be unusable due to error; and store
any leftover, usable, undelivered ballots in a se-
cure location. Immediately after the election —
before any recount — the printer requests per-
mission of the Secretary of State to destroy all
ballots still held by the contractor, with the man-
ner of destruction to be agreed upon. The con-
tractor then attests, in writing, that destruction
is complete.

Nebraska law makes it a felony for a printer to
negligently lose, permit to be taken away, fail to
deliver, or destroy a ballot or package of ballots.
Moreover, a printer is forbidden to print anything
on a ballot other than what is authorized by the
election authority; to print false or fraudulent bal-
lots; to appropriate any ballots or permit some-
one else to do so, or to deliver fewer ballots than
the number purported to be in the job order.

California has the most comprehensive require-
ments for ballot security during production. They
are given definition in regulations adopted by the
Secretary of State and are binding on the county
officials who contract for printing and on the ven-
dors who manufacture ballot stock and print bal-
lots for use in California elections. The State
closely monitors and controls ballot security start-
ing with the stock on which the ballots are
printed; buys the stock and specifies the color and
watermark to be used for each election; and stock
is stored until allocated for printing in ware-
houses owned by the vendor but over which the
State exercises controls. A vendor involved in
ballot production — stock manufacture or print-
ing — and his agents must be certified by the
State. Materials used must be kept in locked stor-
age at all times when they are not actually in
use — stock, ink, plates. State or county election
officials may (and do) inspect the printing opera-
tion at any time, unannounced; a vendor which
does not maintain adequate security may be de-
certified by the Secretary of State. The regula-
tions also include provisions governing the order-
ing and purchase of ballots by the local authori-
ties; record keeping and inventory control by the


22


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changed every 24 hours. The election office
thereby has a visual record of every entry into
the room. Sacramento’s Registrar of Voters re-
ports that in the last federal election, when the
race for the U. S. Senate was contested by the
losing candidate’s organization, the first question
asked by the challenger was “Do you have cam-
era surveillance of the ballot storage area?”

Transfer from Local Election
Authority to Polling Places

Starting at some time in the immediate pre-elec-
tion period, and until the polls close on election
day and materials are returned to the election
office, the election system relies on pollworkers
to ensure ballot security. The responsibility is
enormous, as indicated in a provision of Texas
election law which states that “The presiding
judge [chief pollworker] shall take the precau-
tions necessary to prevent access to the ballots
and ballot boxes in a manner not authorized by
law . ..”, from the time he receives the ballots
until the precinct returns have been certified. An
offense under this section of law is a Class A mis-
demeanor. Other States expect the same of their
pollworkers as Texas does, though they may not
be as specific in their charge and admonition.
South Carolina, for instance, says only that “It is
the responsibility of poll managers, who are un-
der oath, to keep ballots secure. . .”

Clearly this responsibility and liability should be
made explicit to pollworkers — staff who come to
work only one or two days a year, who receive only
brief training, and who are provided written in-
structions for reference that sometimes are not as
comprehensive and lucid as they should be.

The transfer of custody most often takes place
when the pollworker picks up the election mate-
rials before election day — sometimes at the cen-
tral election office; sometimes at a satellite dis-
tribution center set up by that office; and some-
times at the polling place itself. In the last in-
stance, a schedule is set up for delivery at the
various polling sites, and the pollworkers meet

the delivery at the appointed time and take cus-
tody of the materials which include the ballots.

The pollworker signs a receipt for the materials he
receives, including the ballots; he is given one copy
and another copy is retained by the election office,
part of their paper trail which tracks custody of
the ballots. The pollworker is instructed to verify
the contents of the ballot package he received,
checking it against a listing supplied by the elec-
tion office. Verification is sometimes done at time
of pre-election pick-up, but more often at the polls
on election day before voting begins.

Pollworker custody usually starts one to three
days before election — or Saturday through Mon-
day, for a Tuesday election. Typically, packages
of ballots are securely wrapped and sealed and
pollworkers are instructed not to break the seal
or unwrap the packages until election morning,
in the polling place, with other pollworkers and
possibly observers on hand to witness the open-
ing. During the time between assuming custody
and poll-opening, the securely packaged ballots
often are kept in the locked trunk of one
pollworker’s car. Illinois requires that a biparti-
san team pick up the ballots, which are in a
locked box, and store them in one pollworker’s
car trunk. The other team member has the key
to the locked ballot container. Key and container
come together at the polls on election morning.
Oklahoma is less specific but still imposes the
burden of secure storage on the chief pollworker,
who is directed to take custody of the ballots for
his precinct and to “maintain them in a secure
manner until election day.”

In other transfer systems, the ballots, along with
other election materials, are delivered directly to
the polling sites and left in secure storage where
they will be available for use by the pollworkers
when they arrive on election morning. Voting
systems which utilize an optical scanner, or other
kind of precinct tabulator, often deliver ballots
locked in the inner compartment of the device.
The key(s) to open it are held by the chief
pollworker.


hours when the election office is closed and the
responsible staff are not on site. Ballot security
during that period depends on three factors: the
place they are stored; the ambiance of the stor-
age site; and the people who have access to the
site.

Most election officials keep their ballots in what
they describe as “secure storage”, a “secure room”,
or a “secure area”. Further questioning reveals a
variety of methods by which storage sites are se-
cured. Some election offices have a vault, or ac-
cess to a vault, which provides the high level of
containment security a bank uses to store its cash.
Where a small county has only its absentee bal-
lots to be secured, they can be stored in a safe.
Others use a locked room. One small county re-
ported that they keep their ballots in a“... fire-
proof filing cabinet which is locked in a closet.”
Often a locked storage area has two keys, each of
which is held by an election official of a different
political party. Where a warehouse is used,
whether it serves only election office storage
needs or the space is shared with other local gov-
ernment agencies, security sometimes is height-
ened by a 24-hour guard and/or a burglar alarm
system.

Whatever the conditions of the area where bal-
lots are stored, their security is further enhanced
by careful packaging. Most ballots now are ma-
chine-read, and for that process they must be in
condition acceptable to the reading or scanning
device. They are usually delivered from the
printer in batches, and the customer requires
wrapping materials which deter unauthorized
access and also provide humidity control: shrink-
wrap; tamper-proof tape, and sealed packages are
most often specified. The batches are kept in such
wrapping at all times; when the packages are
opened to allocate them to polling places, most
jurisdictions promptly re-wrap and re-seal them.
Others pack the precinct’s ballots into a metal
transfer case with a hasp fastener, into which a
padlock is inserted; the key or keys for the lock
will be part of the supplies which the pollworkers
bring to the polls.

To maximize security and ensure integrity of the
election, access to ballots has to be restricted, and
those who are granted that access should be held
responsible for their security. These needs are
recognized, with varying degrees of specificity, in
all the States, — by law, regulation, or written
directive.

The Maine code requires that “.. . the [munici-
pal] clerk take appropriate security measures.”,
and goes on to specify that the ballot order must
be inspected and verified on receipt, after which
a bipartisan team must wrap and reseal the
batches with tamper-proof tape.

Minnesota law mandates that ballots not yet is-
sued to polling places, or assigned to absentee
voting, be secured and accounted for by the local
election official. Dade County, Florida, has its
own Election Department warehouse, equipped
with a monitored security system. In Broward
County, Florida, ballots are stored in the secured
Voting Equipment Center, access to which is re-
stricted to those authorized by the chief election
official of the county. Wisconsin, does not leave
the interpretation of such terms as “secure” or
“sealed” to the judgment of its local election offi-
cials. By regulation of the State Elections Board,
various general terms used in the statute which
relate to ballot security are defined, so that local
officials understand what constitutes “secure”
batches of ballots, “sealed” containers in which
ballots are placed, and a “locked” or “secured”
storage room or facility, as well as the need to
document any authorized access to stored bal-
lots which occurs incident to a recount, contest,
or public information request.

Sacramento County, California, stores ballots in
“secured rooms’ in their own building, which area
has redundant protection. Access to the room is
restricted to the election officials who need to be
there; the room is locked; each door is equipped
with an alarm which will sound if an unautho-
rized person attempts entry; video cameras, moni-
tored by the county Communications Center, con-
stantly film the entrances, and the video tape is


Appendix 1

Ballot Security

29


local level, although the State could provide an
outline or a suggested draft which local boards
could adapt. State personnel should supervise,
monitor, evaluate and — above all — support the
local election offices in their efforts to maintain
ballot security and accountability and to guar-
antee electoral integrity in this area.

28

@


The means by which ballots are kept secure vary,
as do most American election practices, by State
and even within a single State. To identify and
describe these methods, we follow the ballots
chronologically from production to destruction.
Note that throughout the life of the ballots a pa-
per trail is created, including documentation of
each transfer of custody and providing a receipt
for the party that surrenders custody. It is thereby
possible to ascertain at all times where ballots
are and who is responsible for them.

Ballot Production

Ballot production starts with design, usually done
by election officials. They specify the content of the
ballot, the various configurations that result in
ballot styles appropriate for all segments of the elec-
torate, the sequence of listing of contests and can-
didates, any other copy to be printed, kind and color
of stock to be used, typefaces, etc. In addition, they
calculate the appropriate quantities for each party
(in a primary election), each ballot style, and each
precinct or precinct segment. After printing, the
election office will receive the full order, verify it,
take custody of the ballots and secure them.

Until that transfer, a vendor — usually a printer
— (and possibly his subcontractors) provides
whatever security of the ballots there is. If secu-
rity is not maintained, ballots could, through
misfeasance or malfeasance, pass into custody of
unauthorized persons and the integrity of the
election could be breached.

Ballot Security

In many States this production stage in the life of
the ballot is not part of the security plan. Their
election administrators make no demands on, or
issue no official directives to, ballot printers regard-
ing ballot security. A question to them about en-
suring ballot security during production will elicit
a response that “We leave it to the printer.”, “We
trust the integrity of our printers.” or “Those who
print ballots understand the need for security.”

Other States recognize that production is a sen-
sitive time in the ballot life cycle. Ballot security
measures start when the order for production is
placed. Methods and approaches used reflect a
keen awareness of the need to ensure ballot se-
curity starting with the creation of the ballot. The
requirements and precautions are documented
in State law, in regulations or rules adopted by
the State election authority, in provisions incor-
porated into the contract for ballot printing, or
in an official declaration (an oath, affidavit, or
certificate) the vendor signs at the time of con-
tracting. Statements signed and statutory provi-
sions usually specify the penalty for violation of
the law or agreement.

Requirements imposed on contractors in these
States include one or more of the following:

gw An obligation to maintain security of the bal-
lots at all times;

mw Examination and approval of a vendor by the
State election authority before he can print
ballots for any election in the State;


Principal source documents for creating the sum-
mary are the ballot accounting reports from the
polling places, records of absentee voting, and
various other records of the central office.

At the Polls

It goes without saying that in a State or locality
which uses lever or direct recording electronic
(DRE) voting machines, a major part of the task
of ballot accounting is obviated. Mainly, the bal-
lot accountability task is limited to absentee bal-
lots. The work associated with management of
that subsystem, and documenting thereof, usu-
ally is done in the central office by permanent or
long-term temporary employees, where supervi-
sion and monitoring can be close and results con-
trolled. (It should be noted that in some machine-
using jurisdictions, there will still be some ballot
accounting at the polls: for provisional ballots,
for emergency ballots used with the machine is
out of service, and for absentee ballots if they are
sent to the polling places for counting.)

Typically, the batch of ballots sent to each pre-
cinct is accompanied by a statement from the
central office as to its contents, the number of
ballots sent and usually the serial number range.
Polling place staff is instructed first to verify that
the shipment includes what is stated, and at the
end of the day, after polls close, to account for all
of the ballots sent to them.

End-of-the-day accounting is done on a form that
is uniform throughout the local jurisdiction, some-
times throughout the State. These ballot account-
ing reports, filled out by the pollworkers, consti-
tute the major source of data for the jurisdiction-
wide post-election summary accounting of ballots.
The important feature of the polling place report
is to show that the number of voted ballots equals
the number of persons recorded as having voted.
Election authorities have prescribed a variety of
ways to compare numbers compiled during the
day and to incorporate them to produce the bal-
lot accounting report. If ballots are read and pre-
cinct totals produced by an electronic precinct

tabulator, it is possible to obtain a machine count
of voted ballots as a further check on the
pollworkers’ count.

Usually ballots are serially numbered on a stub
which is perforated and removed before the bal-
lot is cast. The stubs of the remaining ballots indi-
cate the number of ballots not issued; add their
number to the number of the spoiled ballots, and
subtract that sum from the number of ballots re-
ceived at poll-opening to determine the number to
be counted or the number cast.

Almost without exception, State and local au-
thorities report that one of the weakest points in
ballot accountability is deficiencies in precinct
ballot accounting reports. No wonder. They are
made up by a huge decentralized staff of one-day
employees, who have been working twelve or fif-
teen hours when they begin their accounting, who
probably have no adding machine to work with,
and who either have never done this particular task
before or have not done so for a year or more. Not
the kind of working conditions which engender
mental acuity and arithmetic accuracy.

Recognizing both the difficulty in producing the
precinct reports and their importance to demon-
strating integrity of the vote, the conscientious
election manager seeks to assure that (1) the poll-
ing place staff is well- trained in the importance
and methods of accounting for ballots, (2) that
the written instructions provided for their refer-
ence on election day are clear, and (3) that the
form on which the information is recorded is user-
friendly.

The Manual of Instructions for Illinois Election
Judges, 1995, prepared by the State Board of
Elections, includes careful step-by-step directions
for ballot accounting, as well as a replica of the
“Official Ballot Record” form with the requisite
data filled in.

Wicomico County, Maryland, reports that when first
they replaced lever voting machines with optically
scanned ballots, the ballot accounting forms were
not correctly filled out by the pollworkers; before
the succeeding general election they held additional

19


and who take the initiative to apply for a bal-
lot. All ballots are mailed at the same time;
participation is high, and ballots come back in
huge volume in a short span of time. Account-
ing for the ballots, tracking them through pro-
cessing, and assuring their security is a task
of much greater dimension than for absentee
ballots. Indeed, it might be called a difference
in degree so great as to be a difference in kind.

In addition, methods must be devised to pro-
vide “replacement” ballots to those who do not
receive the mailing or who spoil their ballots,
and to service out-of-town voters with tradi-
tional absentee ballots sent to an address other
than that on the registry. This activity
demands careful documentation.

Fail-Safe Voting

Provisions of The National Voter Registration Act
(NVRA) known as the “fail-safe voting provisions”
require that election officials permit an individual
to vote even though his name is not found on the
active voter list when he comes to the polls. This
requirement serves to give meaning to the prin-
ciple that “once registered, a voter should remain
on the list of voters so long as the individual re-
mains eligible to vote in that jurisdiction”, (House
Report. Section 8, page 18)

In certain instances, implementation of fail-safe
voting may require a jurisdiction to have special
individual ballots in the polling places where,
absent such a requirement, votes would be cast
on mechanical or DRE voting machines or on
ballots that are deposited into and recorded by a
precinct tabulator. Sometimes, and depending on
the State, fail-safe ballots may be treated as pro-
visional ballots, and safeguards must be put in
place to assure that they are secured and ac-
counted for throughout their life, including the
time in the polling place. Jurisdictions which al-
ready use provisional ballots at the polls will find
this method of fail-safe voting easier to accom-
modate than those which have not.

For complete information on fail-safe voting, see
Implementing the National Voter Registration Act
of 1993: Requirements, Issues, Approaches, and
Examples, prepared by the National Clearing-
house on Election Administration of the Federal
Election Commission. Chapter 6 details options
for compliance with fail-safe voting requirements
and includes specimen forms for administering
the process.

25



Definitions

All-mail ballot election - One in which ballots
are mailed to all eligible voters and returned, usu-
ally by mail, by voters to the election authority.

Ballot - A piece of paper stock upon which a voter
may indicate a choice or preference amongst can-
didates or issues. Also called “document ballot”.

a Challenged ballot - Ballot that is set aside
and not counted because the voter’s eligibil-
ity to vote in the election has been challenged
in accordance with State law. After the chal-
lenge is resolved, the ballot will either be
counted or disallowed.

0 Damaged ballot - Ballot that has been
damaged in mailing, handling or machine
processing and rendered unacceptable for
machine tabulation.

C Disallowed ballot - Ballot which has been
voted and cast but is excluded from the vote
count, usually because the voter was found to
be unqualified or because the ballot has been
improperly marked. Also called “rejected
ballot”.

C Disputed ballot - Voted ballot which has
been questioned during the canvass process.
After the question is resolved, the ballot will
either be counted or disallowed.

0 Duplicated ballot - Exact copy of damaged
ballot that can be substituted for it in the
machine tabulation.

Ballot Security
and Accountability

0 Machine-read ballot - Ballot that is
marked by the voter and counted by com-
puter. Includes punchcard and mark sense
ballots.

0 Paper ballot - Ballot that is manually
marked by the voter and manually counted
by election officials.

0 Provisional ballot - Ballot used by a per-
son whose qualification for voting is uncer-
tain and must be confirmed in the central
office before it can be included in the vote
count. Also called “special ballot” , “ques-
tioned ballot”, “escrow ballot”, or “affidavit
ballot”.

0 Spoiled ballot - Ballot on which the voter
either makes a mistake, or decides he wants
to make a change in the vote(s) he has
marked.

Early voting - Unrestricted in-person voting, both
at central election office and at satellite sites, dur-
ing some designated period before election day. Does
not include in-person voting before election by ab-
sentee voters.

Local election authority - Agency or other en-
tity charged by law with responsibility for con-
duct of elections in a local jurisdiction. Also called
“Board of Elections”, “Electoral Board”, “County
Auditor”, “County, City or Town Clerk”, “Election

Commissioners”, “Supervisors of Elections”, “Reg-
istrar of Voters”, “Elections Administrator”.


States which provide the provisional ballot es-
tablish some procedure for documenting the rea-
son why the voter could not be qualified. The bal-
lot is usually placed in its own sealed envelope, of-
ten of distinct color so as to distinguish it from the
voted ballots of those about whose qualifications
there is no question.

If ballots are counted at the polls, there may also
be disputed or disallowed ballots which must be
identified and secured, in order that their valid-
ity can be judged in the central office and, if es-
tablished, the votes cast on them added to the
count.

Finally, with a scanner or other device that reads,
records and accumulates individual votes, there
can also be rejected ballots, sometimes called di-
verted ballots — those found not to be machine-
acceptable. The device automatically identifies
them in some way, usually by striping them or
depositing them in a compartment separate from
that where the machine-acceptable ballot are
stacked. The rejected ballots will be tallied and
added to the count in the canvass conducted in
the central office.

Special, marked containers (most often enve-
lopes) are provided for spoiled ballots and also
for provisional, disputed, disallowed and rejected
ballots. These marked containers are usually
packed up with the regular voted ballots, either
in the ballot box or the transfer case. The alter-
native method is to place such ballots in some
other sealed and/or locked container for the re-
turn trip to the election office.

Transferring Ballots from the
Polls to the Election Authority

Most State and local jurisdictions depend on
pollworkers — typically a team of two, and usu-
ally bipartisan — to get ballots, and other vital
election materials, from the polling place to the
central office where votes will be counted and the
canvass conducted. Large jurisdictions sometimes
have satellite distribution/drop-off sites; the

12

pollworkers bring the precinct materials that far,
and another authority, often the sheriff’s deputies,
brings them to the counting center and delivers
them to election office personnel.

The transfer of responsibility is documented; a
receipt is given to those who made the delivery,
and a record is made of the precinct number, time,
number of containers, etc.

Washington, D. C., does not depend on its
pollworkers for the end-of-the-day delivery. An
Election Transport Team, made up of a driver,
helper and police officer, goes to the polling place
and picks up the ballots; a receipt is given to the
pollworkers. After making the assigned number
of stops, the truck delivers the ballots from the
several precincts to the counting center, where
again the transfer is documented by log record
and receipt. To ensure security of the system and
to prevent interference with the transport teams,
the assignment of drivers and officers is random,
and routes and polling places are “close hold”
information.

Some States permit a jurisdiction which tallies
votes centrally to have a midday pick-up of bal-
lots in order that the time-consuming task of bal-
lot assembly and cardreading is not all left until
after the polls close. By splitting the cardreading
into two parts, one batch read in the afternoon
and the other as boxes come in after the polls
close, the need for cardreading equipment is
halved and the election results can be reported
earlier in the evening. Montgomery County,
Maryland, uses this technique successfully, and
provides for a secure transfer of responsibility for
the ballots cast in the first half of election day.
Two ballot boxes are delivered to each precinct,
one slightly smaller and fitted inside the other.
The morning box is used from 7 A. M. until noon,
when its slot is sealed and the afternoon box re-
places it. A Midday Pick-up Team, traveling in a
school bus and made up of a police officer, a bi-
partisan team of Transport Judges, and a bus
driver, comes for the box between noon and 1:30
P. M. The police officer comes into the polling


The rule also sets minimum standards in certain
areas to be covered by the procedures:

® ballot distribution, including security and
accountability;

@ transport of ballots, including method and
equipment;

@ receiving and preparing ballots for tabulation;

m absentee ballot handling, including storage
prior to election;

@ tabulation of the vote, including consolidation
of precinct and absentee ballot results; and

@ public viewing of the tabulation process.

In addition the county must submit copies of all
forms, schedules, logs, checklists, etc., as well as
an election schedule which includes a list of tasks,
deadline for completion of each, and assignment
of responsibility.

Implementation of the rule by most Florida coun-
ties is admirable, resulting in full effectuation of
the State’s purposes. In Dade County, which
serves one of the largest electorates in the coun-
try, procedures are comprehensive, detailed, and
clear. The process is well-organized; tasks are
broken down to manageable size; for each, there
are step-by-step instructions and a listing of re-
quired supplies; responsibility for each task is
recorded. Batches of ballots are tracked and bal-
lot security is given priority throughout the op-
eration. Specimens of forms, logs and receipts are
included. Broward County’s procedures and in-
structions are another very good model. All ac-
tivity is documented; the person or authority with
responsibility for security is specified through-
out the procedures; clear forms have been devel-
oped for accounting, certifications, etc.; ballot
security — from procurement to destruction —
is highlighted throughout the plan.

Florida is one of the fastest-growing States and
the electorate will enlarge correspondingly in the
coming years. The security systems established
as a result of the State’s initiative bode well for

14

the ability of the State and county election au-
thorities to cope with rapid expansion of what
are already very large systems.

Washington, D. C.’s Board of Elections and Eth-
ics, also has developed procedures which reflect
the importance placed on ballot security:

“Board rules, administrative directives such
as ‘Election Counting Center Procedures’,
and instructions to pollworkers, all address
to one degree or another the importance of,
and the formal procedures for, ballot secu-
rity and accountability; this philosophy
stretches all the way from the development
of specifications for the ballot printing con-
tract to post-election activity. Security is
paramount throughout the full process and
as prescribed in the Board’s rules, there is ‘
... full accounting of official ballots... prior
to certification of the official election

on

results’,

Washington’s Counting Center procedures, which
have evolved over more than a decade, break the
operation down into “stations” representing the
receipt, inspection, and computer tabulation of
each precinct’s ballots, and the release of elec-
tion results throughout election night following
the close of the polls. A station can be divided
into substations. For example, Station 1, Box
Reception includes substations 1A, Box Pick-up
Truck Reception Area; 1B, Counting Center Bal-
lot Box Reception Area. Each task is detailed,
location identified, and materials needed are de-
fined. Specimen forms and logs are included.
Ballots are never left unattended. A complete
record is produced for polling place ballots cast
in the boxes (both A. M. and P. M. boxes), and for
spoiled, and provisional ballots, as well as those
damaged in processing and absentee ballots. Ac-
cess to the Counting Center is controlled; secu-
rity officers are on duty. Watchers include repre-
sentatives of candidates, campaigns, civic groups,
and media; they are required to log in, are issued
identifying badges, and are escorted by Board
staffers.


This report is another in the series on Innova-
tions in Election Administration being published
by the FEC’s National Clearinghouse on Election
Administration.

The purpose of this series is to acquaint State
and local election officials with innovative elec-
tion procedures and technologies that have been
successfully implemented by their colleagues
around the country.

Our reports on these innovations do not
necessarily constitute an endorsement by
the Federal Election Commission either of
any specific procedures described or of any
vendors or suppliers that might be listed
within the report. Moreover, the views and
opinions expressed in these reports are
those of the authors and are not necessar-
ily shared by the Federal Election Commis-
sion or any division thereof.

ii

Introduction by the
Clearinghouse

We welcome your comments on these reports
as well as any suggestions you may have for addi-
tional topics. You may mail these to us at:

The National Clearinghouse on
Election Administration
Federal Election Commission
999 E. Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20463

or else contact us

Toll free 800/424-9530
Direct on 202/219-3670
By FAX on 202/219-8500.



Where ballots are used other than at the polls on
election day, these special circumstances require
special provisions to ensure that those ballots are
safe and accounted for. Absentee voting is one
such special circumstance; others are the inno-
vative methods of voting that have been intro-
duced in recent years with the goal of enhancing
voter turnout and convenience.

Absentee Voting

The mainstream program for ballot security and
accountability must be modified to reach those
same goals for ballots used in absentee voting:

m Absentee ballot handling by election officials
is all in the central office, by full-time staff who
can be monitored and supervised directly un-
like election day at the polls which takes place
in dozens or hundreds of distant sites staffed
by temporary employees.

m Absentee ballots are handled in the central of-
fice for an extended period, from receipt from
the printer until the canvass, while the bulk
of the used ballots are in storage much of this
time. Accordingly, absentee ballots must be
tracked continuously — from time of issuance
through return and canvass. The same level
of secure storage, with restricted access, should
be provided as for other ballots; supplies of
ballots withdrawn for processing during work-
ing hours should be logged out; ballot account-
ing should be done at the end of each day;

Special
Circumstances;
Special
Provisions

returned voted ballots should be time-stamped
and their receipt recorded, and batched (prob-
ably by precinct) before placing in secure stor-
age until time for removal and preparation for
vote-tallying and canvass. Computerized elec-
tion management systems often have an ab-
sentee voting module which facilitates the
careful record-keeping essential to this aspect,
of election administration.

uw The work area where absentee ballots are pro-
cessed should be treated with the same care and
caution as a polling place on election day. Only
those who have need to be there should be in the
area; other staff and the public should be ex-
cluded. Ballots should never be left unlocked and
unattended.

In some respects, securing and accounting for ab-
sentee ballots is easier than for polling place bal-
lots, but in other ways more demanding. It is well
for election managers to remember that when an
election is very close and the result is questioned,
the absentee ballots often become the focus of at-
tention and their validity can be challenged if it
cannot be demonstrated that appropriate care was
taken to ensure their integrity.

Early Voting

The experience with early voting to date, which
is of short duration but considerable dimension,
has been examined and assessed in a recent pub-
lication of the National Clearinghouse on

23


Ballot Security
and Accountability

Author:

Marie Garber

Consultant in Election Administration
10201 Grosvenor Place #310
Rockville, Maryland 20852-4606

Managed and Edited by:
William C. Kimberling
National Clearinghouse on Election Administration

Published by:

National Clearinghouse on Election Administration
Federal Election Commission
Washington, D.C. 20463

September 1995


Appendix 2

Ballot Accountability

31


26


At the Polls—Unvoted Ballots

The precinct’s supply of ballots must be secured
from the time the polls open, throughout the day,
until closing and after-election accounting, and
return to the election office. Again, pollworkers
have responsibility. Usually ballots are kept in
their wrapping or container until they are needed,
at which time they are distributed to the issuing
officials. Constant attendance of the supply of
ballots is essential; some States require custody
by at least two pollworkers at all times, often a
bipartisan pair.

Disposition of unvoted ballots at the end of the
voting period, after they have been counted for
the ballot accounting report, varies. They may
be rendered unusable, by defacing or tearing in
half, and then returned to the election office; they
may be returned intact, often still in their batches
of fifty, still shrink-wrapped; or they may be ac-
counted for, the stubs retained and returned, and
the ballots themselves destroyed and discarded
immediately.

At the Polls—Voted Ballots

Once voted, ballots are deposited in some kind of
secure container: a traditional ballot box which is
locked or sealed, or a precinct tabulator which both
reads the ballot to electronic medium and also
stores the ballot — usually an optical scanner.

During the voting hours, the ballot box is at-
tended constantly by pollworkers, sometimes a
bipartisan team. Some States also specify that it
be so placed that voters and observers in the poll-
ing place can see it easily.

Maryland regulations are specific with regard to
security of the ballot box and its contents during
the voting hours. They are binding for jurisdic-
tions that use voting systems with a document
ballot for the individual voter in the polling place:

Constant Attendance of Ballot Box. The bal-
lot box shall be placed so that the voter of-
fering a ballot, the judges, and all persons

10

entitled to be present [in the polling place]
may conveniently observe the process of
each ballot being deposited. During the time
from the opening of the polls until the bal-
lots are returned to the counting center, the
ballot box shall be attended by a bipartisan
pair of judges of election. From the time
voting starts until voting ends after the polls
close, the judges attending the ballot box
shall make certain that:

(1) Only valid voted ballots are deposited
in the ballot box;

(2) The ballot box is never opened and noth-
ing is removed from the ballot box; and

(3) The secrecy of each voter’s ballot is
preserved.

COMAR, 14.02.06.07 G

A ballot box often is made of metal, with a hinged
top that fastens with a hasp, through which a
padlock is inserted. Some States’ election codes
specify that the box be metal, and include detail
of how it is to be lidded, hinged, and locked or
sealed. Part of the polls-opening procedure is the
unlocking of the box, and removing from it pack-
ages of ballots or other materials which were
transported in it from the election office. The box
is then demonstrated to all present to be empty;
it is locked again and will remain so for the rest
of the day. The cover of the ballot box has a slot
through which voted ballots will be inserted. For
all ballot boxes, it is standard practice to place a
seal over the voting slot when the polls close;
sometimes pollworkers are required to sign across
the seal.

Old time ballot boxes had a metal frame, clear
glass sides, and wooden top and bottom; the bal-
lot slot was cut into the wooden top. The glass
sides made it possible for voters and others to
see that the box was empty when voting started.
Such boxes were transported to and from the polls
in heavy wooden storage crates, which had hinged
tops and a hasp fastened with a padlock. The


place and accompanies the Ballot Box Judges as
they take the morning ballot box to the bus. A re-
ceipt is given to the Ballot Box Judges, and they
return to their station where they were temporarily
replaced by other pollworkers. The bus goes on to
another polling place and when all stops on its as-
signed route have been visited, the bus proceeds to
the counting center.

Post-Election Processing

Once the polls close and election materials are
brought to the central election office, the task of
assuring ballot security is transferred to one
place, one entity. Starting at that time, security
must be maintained through a complex myriad
of steps which include

@ receipt of dozens of different items from each
of the many polling places;

@ preparing the bulk of the voted ballots for vote-
counting;

E separating out other ballots and processing
them appropriately (provisional, disputed,
spoiled, etc.);

@ tallying the absentee vote;

@ bringing together all the ballots and votes
deemed valid and arriving at final results for
each precinct;

@ ageregating votes of various constituencies to
produce subtotals and grand totals;

TM producing the final canvass and the various
reports derived therefrom;

TM packaging, labeling, and storing ballots for the
required post-election period; and

@ destruction of those things that need not be
retained.

Not all of the above is done election night. None-
theless, that which must be done immediately —
producing the “quick count” or unofficial returns,
and assuring that all materials have been re-
turned and are safe — is a massive job. It must

be done under pressure for results — from can-
didates, from media representatives, and from
observers entitled to be present.

To observe a well-planned counting center and
canvass is a joy and a marvel; everyone knows
what he has to do and how his task relates to the
rest of the operation. The.whole thing hums like
a Rolls Royce engine, and one senses it is a se-
cure process. Conversely, observing the canvass
operation which is neither well-defined nor effi-
ciently carried out is like visiting chaos, and it
does not inspire confidence. An effective ballot
security plan for a counting center is character-
ized by documentation of process exemplified by
labeled batches, frequently verified; by logs or
other record-keeping which tracks activity step
by step; by transparency to enable scrutiny, but
with access to the premises controlled and re-
corded; and by maintenance of order, often using
law enforcement officials.

A plan for post-election processing is but part
of planning for the entire election, and for en-
suring ballot security throughout. A few State
election authorities have taken the lead in this
area, notably Florida where security is well-
developed and conscientiously practiced. Rule
IS-2.015, “Minimum Security Procedures for
Voting Systems”, was adopted by the Division
of Elections in the Office of the Secretary of
State in 1998, pursuant to a statutory man-
date to do so. The rule requires that each
county develop and file with the Division writ-
ten security procedures for conduct of an elec-
tion, which procedures must be approved by
the Division. With respect to the overall goal
for ballot security, the rule states that

“The security procedures shall describe bal-
lot accountability and security beginning
with their receipt from a printer or manu-
facturer until such time as they are de-
stroyed. The procedures for each location
shall describe physical security, identify who
is authorized access, and identify who has
the authority to permit access.”

13