United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 13-2095

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Roscoe Chambers

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Davenport

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 Submitted: May 7, 2014

Filed: May 21, 2014

[Unpublished]

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Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

A jury found Roscoe Chambers guilty of two counts of distributing cocaine

base and one count of possessing with intent to distribute at least 28 grams of cocaine

base. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1). At trial, Chambers elected to proceed pro se

with standby counsel. The verdict was based on evidence that Chambers made two

drug sales to a confidential informant (CI) while police officers conducted
surveillance, as well as evidence that additional drugs and the buy money were

recovered from a search of his apartment and car. The district court sentenced 1

Chambers as a career offender to 360 months in prison and 8 years of supervised

release. Chambers challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and a host of pretrial,

trial, and sentencing rulings. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court

affirms.

The district court did not err in denying, without a hearing, Chambers’s

motions to suppress. Probable cause for the search warrant was established by a

Davenport police officer’s statements describing the investigation, the CI’s recent

purchase of crack cocaine from Chambers, and the officer’s statement that a check

through the energy company confirmed Chambers was the utility holder at the

apartment he approached after the transaction. See United States v. Allen, 705 F.3d

367, 369 (8th Cir. 2013) (review of factual findings is for clear error and ultimate

question of whether Fourth Amendment was violated is de novo); United States v.

Lucca, 377 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2004) (setting out when hearing is required).

The district court’s adverse pretrial rulings did not deprive Chambers of due

process or establish judicial bias. See United States v. Oaks, 606 F.3d 530, 537 (8th

Cir. 2010) (legally sound adverse rulings do no establish judicial bias). The district

court did not err in denying Chambers’s motions to dismiss the indictment and for a

change of venue, or in denying his challenge to the racial composition of the jury

panel. See United States v. Rodriguez, 414 F.3d 837, 842 (8th Cir. 2005) (conclusory

allegations of falsehood are insufficient for dismissal of indictment based on false

testimony presented to grand jury); United States v. Stanko, 528 F.3d 581, 584 (8th

Cir. 2008) (absent prejudice to defense, denial of motion for change of venue cannot

be considered abuse of discretion); United States v. Jefferson, 725 F.3d 829, 835 (8th

The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, United States District Judge for the

1

Southern District of Iowa.

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Cir. 2013) (Constitution does not guarantee proportionate number of defendant’s

racial group on jury pool or jury which tries him), cert. denied, 2014 WL 1659957

(2014).

This court finds no abuse of discretion in any challenged rulings involving

witnesses or evidence. See United States v. Valenzuel-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867

(1982); United States v. Garcia-Hernandez, 682 F.3d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 2012), cert.

denied, 133 S. Ct. 1608 (2013). There is no merit to Chambers’s assertion that the

jury was not provided an instruction about the credibility of a CI. Chambers did not

object to the replacement of a sick juror with an alternate, and he agreed to keep a

juror who expressed concern about her safety but confirmed her ability to continue

when she was questioned. There is no indication in the record that Chambers

suffered prejudice as a result of the district court’s security measures requiring

everyone to remain seated, and he did not object to the presence ofsecurity personnel. 

Chambers has not supported a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on his

conclusory assertions that he was convicted based on false witness testimony, false

lab reports, and planted evidence. See United States v. Boone, 437 F.3d 829, 840 (8th

Cir. 2006). To the extent his claims of false testimony involve witness credibility,

such matters are for the jury. See United States v. Kirkie, 261 F.3d 761, 768 (8th Cir.

2001). Overwhelming evidence supported the verdicts. See United States v. Samuels,

611 F.3d 914, 917-18 (8th Cir. 2010) (standard of review). 

As to his sentence, the government provided Chambers with timely notice that

he was subject to an increased prison term under 21 U.S.C. § 851 based on his prior

felony drug conviction. There was no violation of Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.

Ct. 2151 (2013). The district court left no unresolved sentencing objections. The

district court did not err in finding Chambers’s prior Illinois burglary conviction

involving a vacant dwelling, coupled with his armed robbery conviction, supported

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career-offender sentencing. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a ); United States v. Maxwell, 363

F.3d 815, 820-21 (8th Cir. 2004). 

The judgment is affirmed.

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