_______________________________ 

 

Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

Chief Justice:	 Justices: 

Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver Opinion Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED JULY 30, 2004 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v No. 124083 

LATASHA GENISE MORSON, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 

WEAVER, J. 

Defendant Latasha Morson waited in a car while her 

friend, Iesha Northington, robbed Deborah Sevakis of her 

purse at gunpoint, using a gun obtained from defendant. As 

Northington fled the scene, she shot James Bish, who tried 

to stop her and recover Sevakis’s purse. Following a bench 

trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery,1

 conspiracy 

1

 MCL 750.529. 
 

to commit armed robbery,2 and two counts of possession of a 

firearm during the commission of a felony.3 She was 

sentenced to concurrent terms of eight to thirty years for 

the armed robbery and conspiracy convictions,4 to be served 

consecutively to the mandatory two-year sentence for 

felony-firearm. 

The first issue to be addressed is how many points 

defendant could be properly assessed at sentencing under 

offense variables (OV) 1 and 3. OV 1, which considers 

aggravated use of a weapon, and OV 3, which considers 

physical injury to the victim, require both that the 

highest number of points be assessed and that multiple 

offenders be assessed the same number of points for these 

variables. When Iesha Northington’s armed robbery 

conviction was scored on May 10, 2000, she was assessed 

fifteen points for OV 1 and zero points for OV 3. But when 

defendant’s armed robbery conviction was scored on December 

10, 2001, the sentencing court assessed defendant twentyfive points for OV 1 and twenty-five points for OV 3. The 

2

 MCL 750.157(a). 

3

 MCL 750.227b. 

4

 The Court of Appeals opinion incorrectly states the

sentence as eight to twenty years. The sentencing

transcript, sentencing information report, and judgment of

sentence all state the term as eight to thirty years. 

2
 
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the sentencing 

court on this issue, concluding that the multiple offender 

provision required that defendant’s scores on OV 1 and OV 3 

be the same as those previously assessed to Iesha 

Northington for OV 1 and OV 3. 

The second issue that must be decided is how many 

points defendant could be properly assessed under OV 9, 

which considers the number of victims. The sentencing 

court assessed ten points under this variable, concluding 

that there were two victims. The Court of Appeals reversed 

and concluded that defendant should be assessed zero points 

because there was one victim. 

We affirm in part and reverse in part. The Court of 

Appeals correctly concluded that pursuant to the sentencing 

guidelines, defendant should have been assessed the same 

scores for OV 1 and OV 3 that Iesha Northington was 

assessed. But the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that 

under OV 9, defendant should have been assessed zero points 

because there was only one victim. Pursuant to the 

language of the guidelines, two people were placed in 

danger. Consequently, the sentencing court properly 

assessed defendant ten points under OV 9. We remand this 

case to the circuit court for resentencing consistent with 

this opinion. 

3
 
 Facts 

Deborah Sevakis was robbed of her purse at gunpoint by 

Iesha Northington as Sevakis was walking down Nine Mile 

Road in Ferndale at about 10:00 p.m. on May 29, 1999. 

Sevakis testified that someone tapped her on the shoulder 

and demanded her purse. When Sevakis initially refused to 

give up her purse, Northington pointed a gun at her. As 

Northington ran off with the purse, Sevakis yelled, “Call 

9-1—1. I’ve been robbed.” Immediately, James Bish, who 

was standing nearby and had witnessed the robbery, ran 

after Northington. When Bish told Northington to drop the 

purse, Northington shot him. 

In her written statement to the police, defendant 

stated that as she and Northington were driving down Nine 

Mile Road, they observed a lady walking with her purse and 

discussed robbing her. Northington got out of the car 

while defendant drove to a gas station. Defendant next 

observed Northington running toward the car, carrying a 

black purse. She also saw a man running and holding his 

chest; Northington told her that she thought she had shot 

the man. Defendant admitted that she had given Northington 

the gun that Jermaine Calloway had given her. Defendant 

stated that she and Northington stopped to get gas, then 

4
 

went to a Kmart store, where they tried unsuccessfully to 

use Sevakis’s credit card. 

Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of 

armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and two 

counts of felony-firearm.5 Before defendant’s sentencing, 

Northington, who was sentenced on May 10, 2000, was 

assessed fifteen points on OV 1 and zero points on OV 3. 

At defendant’s sentencing on December 10, 2001, she 

asserted that she should be assessed the same number of 

points as Ms. Northington on OV 1 and OV 3 when defendant’s 

armed robbery conviction was scored. But the court 

assessed defendant twenty-five points on OV 1 and twentyfive points on OV 3 when scoring defendant’s armed robbery 

conviction. The trial court also assessed defendant ten 

points on OV 9. 

Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed 

and remanded for resentencing.6 The Court of Appeals 

concluded that defendant should have been assessed the same 

scores as Northington on OV 1 and OV 3 for the armed 

5

 Defendant and Northington were tried separately.

Though Northington was also charged with and convicted of

assault with intent to commit murder, defendant was not. 

6

 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued May 29, 2003

(Docket No. 238750). 

5
 
 

robbery conviction. Additionally, the Court of Appeals 

concluded that defendant should have been assessed zero 

points on OV 9 because there was only one victim, not two. 

This Court granted the prosecution’s application for 

leave to appeal. 7 

7

 469 Mich 966 (2003). The Court’s grant order

instructed the parties to include among the issues briefed: 

(1) how subsection 1 of MCL 777.31 (offense

variable one [OV 1]), requiring that the "highest

number of points" be assigned, should be applied

in light of subsection 2(b), requiring that "all

offenders" in multiple offender cases be assessed

the same number of points; (2) similarly, how

subsection 1 of MCL 777.33 (OV 3), requiring that

the "highest number of points" be assigned,

should be applied in light of subsection 2(a), 

requiring that ‘all offenders’ in multiple

offender cases be assessed the same number of 

points; (3) whether MCL 777.31(2)(b) and 

777.33(2)(a) apply where all "offenders" have not

been charged with identical crimes; (4) whether

under MCL 777.31(2)(b) and 777.33(2)(a) the trial

court is bound by a previously imposed sentence

upon a codefendant where that sentence is based

upon an erroneous offense variable score; (5)

whether under MCL 777.39 (OV 9) the number of

persons placed in danger includes only those 

persons who are placed in danger during the 

particular crime for which defendant is being

scored (here, armed robbery), or whether that

number includes all persons placed in danger at

any point during the criminal episode; and (6) 

whether the due process clauses of the state and

federal constitutions require that the 

prosecution prove the elements of a crime that

someone else committed before a court can base a 

defendant's sentence on the actions of the other 

person. See Harris v United States, 536 US 545

(2002), Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466 . . .

(continued...) 

6
 
 

 Standard of Review 

The issues in this case concern the proper 

interpretation and application of the legislative 

sentencing guidelines, MCL 777.11 et seq., which are legal 

questions that this Court reviews de novo. People v 

Perkins, 468 Mich 448, 452; 662 NW2d 727 (2003). When 

construing a statute, this Court’s primary goal is to give 

effect to the intent of the Legislature. We begin by 

construing the language of the statute itself. Where the 

language is unambiguous, we give the words their plain 

meaning and apply the statute as written. People v Morey, 

461 Mich 325, 330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999). 

Analysis 

Generally, to determine a minimum sentence range under 

the legislative sentencing guidelines, the sentencing court 

must first determine the offense category. MCL 

777.21(1)(a). The sentencing court must then determine 

which offense variables (OV) are applicable, score those 

variables, and total the points to determine the offender’s 

(...continued)

(2000), and Washington v Blakely, 111 Wash App

851 (2002), cert gtd sub nom Blakely v 

Washington, [124 S Ct 429 (2003)]. 

7
offense variable level. Id. The sentencing court also 

scores all prior record variables. MCL 777.21(1)(b). The 

offender’s offense variables score and prior record 

variables score are then used with the sentencing grids to 

determine the recommended minimum sentence range under the 

guidelines. MCL 777.21(1)(c). 

In this case, the sentencing issues presented arise 

out of defendant’s armed robbery conviction, MCL 750.529. 

Under the guidelines, armed robbery is categorized as a 

crime against a person. MCL 777.16y. MCL 777.22(1), as 

amended by 2002 PA 143, provided: 

For all crimes against a person, score 

offense variables 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,

12, 13, 14, 19, and 20. Score offense variables 

5 and 6 for homicide, attempted homicide,

conspiracy or solicitation to commit a homicide,

or assault with intent to commit murder. Score 

offense variable 16 under this subsection for a 

violation or attempted violation of . . . MCL

750.110a. Score offense variables 17 and 18 if 

an element of the offense or attempted offense 

involves the operation of a vehicle, vessel, ORV,

snowmobile, aircraft, or locomotive. 

At issue are defendant’s scores for OV 1, OV 3, and OV 9. 

 OV 1 and OV 3 

OV 1 assesses points for the aggravated use of a 

weapon, MCL 777.31, and OV 3 assesses points for physical 

injury to a victim, MCL 777.33. This case concerns how 

8
 
these two variables are to be scored in cases involving 

multiple offenders. MCL 777.31 provides in part: 

(1) Offense variable 1 is aggravated use of

a weapon. Score offense variable 1 by determining

which of the following apply and by assigning the 

number of points attributable to the one that has

the highest number of points: 

(a) A firearm was discharged at or toward a

human being or a victim was cut or stabbed with a

knife or other cutting or stabbing weapon......25

points 

* * * 

(c) A firearm was pointed at or toward a

victim or the victim had a reasonable 

apprehension of an immediate battery when 

threatened with a knife or other cutting or 

stabbing weapon................15 points 

(d) The victim was touched by any other type

of weapon...................10 points 

(e) A weapon was displayed or 

implied.......5 points 

(f) No aggravated use of a weapon

occurred.........0 points 

(2) All of the following apply to scoring 

offense variable 1: 

(a) Count each person who was placed in

danger of injury or loss of life as a victim. 

(b) In multiple offender cases, if 1 

offender is assessed points for the presence or

use of a weapon, all offenders shall be assessed

the same number of points. 

(c) Score 5 points if an offender used an

object to suggest the presence of a weapon. 

(d) Score 5 points if an offender used a

chemical irritant, chemical irritant device, 

9
 
 

smoke device, or imitation harmful substance or

device. 

(e) Do not score 5 points if the conviction

offense is a violation of . . . MCL 750.82 and 

750.529. [Emphasis added.][8] 

MCL 777.33 provides in part: 

(1) Offense variable 3 is physical injury to

a victim. Score offense variable 3 by determining

which of the following apply and by assigning the 

number of points attributable to the one that has

the highest number of points: 

(a) A victim was killed...........100 points 

(b) A victim was killed...........50 points 

(c) Life threatening or permanent

incapacitating injury occurred to a 

victim........25 points 

(d) Bodily injury requiring medical 

treatment occurred to a victim........10 points 

(e) Bodily injury not requiring medical 

treatment occurred to victim...........5 points 

(f) No physical injury occurred to a 

victim.............5 points 

(2) All of the following apply to scoring 

offense variable 3: 

(a) In multiple offender cases, if 1 

offender is assessed points for death or physical

injury, all offenders shall be assessed the same

number of points. 

8

 Some amendments were made to the statute after the 

crime in the present case occurred. Subsection 1(d) was

added in 2001. In 2002, amendments added subsection 1(b),

which scores twenty points for exposure to harmful 

substances or incendiary devices, and subsection 3, which

defines harmful substances and incendiary devices. 

10
 
 

* * * 

(d) Do not score 5 points if bodily injury

is an element of the sentencing offense. 

(3) As used in this section, “requiring 

medical treatment” refers to the necessity for

treatment and not the victim's success in 

obtaining treatment. [Emphasis added.][9] 

When the sentencing court scored defendant’s armed 

robbery conviction, it assessed defendant twenty-five 

points on OV 1 for the shooting of Bish. But when Iesha 

Northington had previously been sentenced for the armed 

robbery before defendant, she was assessed only fifteen 

points under OV 1. Similarly, on OV 3, defendant was 

assessed twenty-five points for the shooting of Bish, while 

Iesha Northington had been assessed zero points. 

Focusing on subsection 1 of each statute, the 

prosecution contends that defendant may be assessed twentyfive points for OV 1 and OV 3 when scoring the armed 

robbery conviction because subsection 1 requires the 

sentencing court to assess the “highest number of points” 

and because the sentencing court should not be bound to 

apply “inaccurate” scores. Defendant, on the other hand, 

9

 This statute was revised in 2003, after the crime in

this case was committed. The amendments, which increased

the score imposed under 1(b) from thirty-five points to

fifty points and made corresponding revisions to 2(c), do

not affect the present case. 

11
 
 

 

asserts that subsection 2 of each statute requires that 

defendant, for her armed robbery conviction, be assessed 

the same scores for OV 1 and OV 3 that Iesha Northington 

was assessed when scored for armed robbery. On the facts 

before us, we agree with defendant that the plain language 

of subsection 2 requires that defendant, when scored on the 

armed robbery conviction, be assessed the same scores on OV 

1 and OV 3 that Iesha Northington was previously assessed 

on those variables when she was scored for armed robbery.10 

Each multiple offender provision states that if one 

offender is assessed points under the variable, “all 

offenders shall be assessed the same number of points.” 

MCL 777.31(2)(b), MCL 777.33(2)(a)(emphasis added).11 While 

10 Because the scoring issues in this case can be

resolved under the plain language of the statute, it is

unnecessary to address, as do the concurring and 

concurring/dissenting opinions, whether armed robbery is a

transactional offense. See concurring opinion of Corrigan,

C.J., at 1-5, 10-11 and partially concurring and partially

dissenting opinion of Markman, J., at 7 n 1. Additionally,

it is unnecessary to draw the sharp lines that Justice

Markman attempts to draw between “offenses” stemming from

this event. See infra at 3-6. 

11 We note that there is no language in either statute

to suggest that the multiple offender provision applies

only when “offenders” are charged with identical crimes. 

Thus, the fact that Northington was charged with additional

crimes—namely, assault with intent to murder—does not mean

that the multiple offender provisions do not apply to the

armed robbery convictions arising from the incident. 

12
 
 

 

 

we agree that the sentencing court should not be bound to 

apply an erroneous score in the multiple offender context, 

we note that the prosecution does not characterize Iesha 

Northington’s scores on OV 1 and OV 3 of her armed robbery 

conviction as inaccurate or erroneous. In fact, the 

prosecution acknowledged in its brief that Northington’s 

scores were not disputed by the prosecution at sentencing.12 

Rather, the prosecution’s argument seems to be that 

whenever it appears possible that a higher score could be 

argued for under the variables, a subsequent sentencing 

court is not bound by the prior score because the 

sentencing court is required to assess the “highest number 

of points.” We find such analysis contrary to the plain 

language of the statute, which requires the sentencing 

court to assess the same number of points to multiple 

offenders.13 

12 Compare People v Libbett, 251 Mich App 353, 366; 650

NW2d 407 (2002), in which it was “undisputed” that the

first offender sentenced had been scored improperly on OV

1. 

13 Justice Young opines in his partially concurring and

partially dissenting opinion that the multiple offender

provision does not require a comparison of the OV scores

for identical crimes (i.e., comparing Northington’s armed

robbery OV 1 score with defendant’s armed robbery OV 1

score) but that the provision contemplates simply the 

comparison of OV scores. Post at 4-5. Not only is this

inconsistent with MCL 777.21(2), which requires the 

(continued...) 

13
 
 

Further, we reject the argument that our conclusion 

would read the “highest number of points” requirement out 

of the statute. When the sentencing court assesses points 

for the first offender, it must assess the “highest number 

of points” that can be assessed under the statute. If 

Iesha Northington’s scores were inaccurate or erroneous 

because the sentencing court failed to assess the highest 

number of points, the prosecution should have challenged 

the scores at Northington’s sentencing. But the 

prosecution acknowledges that Northington’s scores were not 

disputed and it does not argue to this Court that the 

scores Northington received under OV 1 and OV 3 were 

(...continued)

sentencing court to score each offense, but such a reading

may lead to illogical results. Suppose that defendant,

like Northington, had also been convicted of assault with

intent to commit murder. Under Justice Young’s theory,

since the sentencing court would only compare the OV 1

scores, and not the OV scores received for a specific

offense, presumably defendant could receive twenty-five

points under OV 1 for both her assault with intent to 

murder conviction and her armed robbery conviction because

the sentencing court, looking at only the OV 1 scores,

could simply give defendant the highest OV 1 score—25

points—that Northington received under OV 1 when her 

offenses were scored. Or suppose that defendant was 

convicted of an additional crime that Northington was not.

Under Justice Young’s theory, Northington’s scores for an

offense variable would be considered when defendant is 

subsequently scored and sentenced for the additional 

offense. This would be another illogical result of Justice

Young’s theory. 

14
 
 

erroneous. Consequently, in the absence of any clear 

argument that the scores assessed to Northington under OV 1 

and OV 3 were incorrect, the sentencing court should have 

assessed defendant the same number of points that were 

assessed to Northington for OV 1 and OV 3 when her armed 

robbery conviction was scored: fifteen points and zero 

points. 

For these reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals 

conclusion concerning defendant’s scores for OV 1 and OV 3. 

 OV 9 

Offense variable 9 assesses points on the basis of the 

number of victims. MCL 777.39 provides: 

(1) Offense variable 9 is number of victims. 

Score offense variable 9 by determining which of

the following apply and by assigning the number

of points attributable to the one that has the

highest number of points: 

(a) Multiple deaths occurred......100 points 

(b) There were 10 or more victims.......25 

points 

(c) There were 2 to 9 victims..........10 

points 

(d) There were fewer than 2 victims.......0 

points 

(2) All of the following apply to scoring 

offense variable 9: 

(a) Count each person who was placed in

danger of injury or loss of life as a victim. 

15
 
 

(b) Score 100 points only in homicide cases.

[Emphasis added.] 

Defendant was assessed ten points by the sentencing 

court for two victims: Deborah Sevakis and James Bish. 

The Court of Appeals reversed that determination by the 

sentencing court, concluding that Sevakis was the only 

victim of the armed robbery. We disagree with the Court of 

Appeals and therefore reverse its conclusion regarding OV 

9. 

Pursuant to the plain language of the statute, the 

sentencing court is to count “each person who was placed in 

danger of injury or loss of life” as a victim. Though 

Sevakis was the only person actually robbed, Bish, who was 

standing nearby and responded to Sevakis’s call for help, 

was also “placed in danger of injury or loss of life” by 

the armed robbery of Sevakis.14 Consequently, the 

sentencing court properly counted Bish as a victim and 

properly scored defendant under OV 9. 

14 Justice Markman, in his concurring/dissenting

opinion, fails to apply the plain language of the statute,

which, as explained, requires the sentencing court to count

“each person who was placed in danger of injury or loss of

life” as a victim. MCL 777.39(2)(a). 

16
 
 Conclusion 

We conclude that pursuant to the language of the 

sentencing guidelines, defendant should have been assessed 

the same number of points on OV 1 and OV 3 that Iesha 

Northington was assessed when scored on the armed robbery 

conviction. Unless the prosecution can demonstrate that 

the number of points assessed to the prior offender was 

erroneous or inaccurate, the sentencing court is required 

to follow the plain language of the statute, which requires 

the court to assess the same number of points on OV 1 and 

OV 3 to multiple offenders. The prosecution has not 

alleged that Northington’s score on these variables was in 

error. Consequently, we affirm the Court of Appeals 

conclusion that defendant should have been assessed the 

same number of points as Northington on OV 1 and OV 3. 

Additionally, we conclude that defendant was properly 

assessed ten points by the sentencing court for OV 9 

because there were two people placed in danger of injury or 

loss of life: Sevakis, who was robbed, and Bish, a 

bystander who responded to Sevakis’s call for help. 

17
 

Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is 

reversed on this point.15 

We remand the case to the circuit court for 

resentencing consistent with this opinion. 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Maura D. Corrigan

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly 

15 Given our resolution of the sentencing issues in this

case, it is unnecessary to address whether due process

requires that the prosecution prove the elements of a crime

that someone else committed before a court can base a 

defendant’s sentence on the actions of the other person. 

18
 
_______________________________ 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

No. 124083 

LATASHA GENISE MORSON, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

CORRIGAN, C.J. (concurring). 

I concur in the majority’s result for the sake of 

reaching a clear rule regarding the legislative sentencing 

guidelines and providing direction to trial courts in 

implementing the guidelines. I believe that offense 

variables 1 (OV 1) and 3 (OV 3), however, contain language 

that may be contradictory in some cases, such as the 

instant case. I further believe that armed robbery is a 

transactional offense and thus concur with the majority’s 

conclusion that the trial court properly assessed defendant 

ten points under OV 9. 
 

I. ARMED ROBBERY IS A TRANSACTIONAL OFFENSE 

At the time that defendant and Northington committed 

the armed robbery in this case, the armed robbery statute, 

MCL 750.529, provided, in part:1 

Any person who shall assault another, and

shall feloniously rob, steal and take from his 

person, or in his presence, any money or other

property, which may be the subject of larceny,

such robber being armed with a dangerous weapon,

or any article used or fashioned in a manner to

lead the person so assaulted to reasonably

believe it to be a dangerous weapon, shall be

guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in

the state prison for life or for any term of

years. 

In People v Randolph, 466 Mich 532, 551; 648 NW2d 164 

(2002), a majority of this Court rejected the 

“transactional approach” to unarmed robbery. Under the 

transactional approach, “a defendant has not completed a 

robbery until he has escaped with stolen merchandise. 

Thus, a completed larceny may be elevated to a robbery if 

the defendant uses force after the taking and before 

reaching temporary safety.” Id. at 535 (citations 

omitted). A majority of this Court determined, on the 

basis of the language of the unarmed robbery statute in 

existence at that time and on the common-law history of 

1

 The Legislature amended MCL 750.529 after the armed

robbery in this case. This amendment is discussed in note 

2, infra. 

2
 
unarmed robbery, that the force used to accomplish the 

taking must be contemporaneous with the taking. Id. at 

536. In so holding, the majority overruled four Court of 

Appeals cases, including three involving armed robbery, 

People v Tinsley, 176 Mich App 119; 439 NW2d 313 (1989); 

People v Turner, 120 Mich App 23; 328 NW2d 5 (1982); and 

People v Sanders, 28 Mich App 274; 184 NW2d 269 (1970). 

Randolph, supra at 546. 

The portion of the Randolph opinion overruling the 

above cases involving armed robbery is dicta because 

Randolph did not involve armed robbery. Further, the 

unarmed robbery statute at issue in Randolph, MCL 750.530, 

was significantly different than the armed robbery statute 

at issue in the instant case. The statute at issue in 

Randolph stated: 

Any person who shall, by force or violence,

or by assault or putting in fear, feloniously

rob, steal and take from the person of another,

or in his presence, any money or other property

which may be the subject of larceny, such robber

not being armed with a dangerous weapon, shall be

guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in

the state prison not more than 15 years.

[Emphasis added.] 

The armed robbery statute at issue in this case, however, 

does not contain the above emphasized language that the 

Randolph majority found required a taking contemporaneous 

with the use of force, violence, or putting in fear. 

3
 
 

Rather, MCL 750.529 merely required an assault “and” a 

taking. Thus, the majority opinion in Randolph did not 

implicate armed robbery, and the armed robbery statute at 

issue in this case followed a transactional approach 

because nothing in the statute required that the use of 

force be contemporaneous with the taking.2 

2

 The Legislature effectively overruled Randolph after 

this Court released its decision in that case. MCL 750.530 

now provides: 

(1) A person who, in the course of 

committing a larceny of any money or other 

property that may be the subject of larceny, uses

force or violence against any person who is 

present, or who assaults or puts the person in

fear, is guilty of a felony punishable by 

imprisonment for not more than 15 years. 

(2) As used in this section, “in the course

of committing a larceny” includes acts that occur

in an attempt to commit the larceny, or during

commission of the larceny, or in flight or 

attempted flight after the commission of the 

larceny, or in an attempt to retain possession of

the property. 

Thus, effective July 1, 2004, the Legislature has

explicitly stated that unarmed robbery is a transactional

offense. 

The Legislature also amended the armed robbery

statute, MCL 750.529, which now provides: 

A person who engages in conduct proscribed

under section 530 and who in the course of 

engaging in that conduct, possesses a dangerous

weapon or an article used or fashioned in a

manner to lead any person present to reasonably

believe the article is a dangerous weapon, or who

represents orally or otherwise that he or she is

(continued...) 

4
 
 

 

II. OV 1 and OV 3 

Because armed robbery is a transactional offense, and 

Northington shot Bish immediately after she stole Sevakis’ 

purse and before she reached a place of temporary safety, 

the trial court’s consideration of the shooting when 

determining defendant’s score under OV 1 and OV 3 was 

arguably proper.3 OV 1, MCL 777.31, involves the aggravated 

(...continued)

in possession of a dangerous weapon, is guilty of

a felony punishable by imprisonment for life or

for any term of years. If an aggravated assault

or serious injury is inflicted by any person

while violating this section, the person shall be

sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of

not less than 2 years. 

This case involves the version of MCL 750.529 in existence 

before the amendment effective July 1, 2004. 

3

 I disagree with Justice Markman that once all the 

elements of the armed robbery were completed, no subsequent

use of force to help Northington retain possession of

Sevakis’ purse could be considered a continuation of the

armed robbery. See post note 1. Northington shot Bish in

an attempt to retain possession of the purse. Thus, the

shooting occurred in furtherance of the armed robbery and

is properly considered a continuation of the robbery under

the transactional approach. If, as recognized in Justice

Markman’s Randolph dissent, “a defendant has not completed

a robbery until he has escaped with stolen merchandise” and

reached a place of temporary safety, Randolph, supra at 

535, then, contrary to Justice MARKMAN’s contention in note 

1, post, the armed robbery in this case was not complete

immediately after Northington acquired Sevakis’ purse

because Northington had not yet reached a place of 

temporary safety. Accordingly, the use of force subsequent

to the actual taking itself committed in an attempt to

retain possession of the purse was a part of the armed

(continued...) 

5
 
 

use of a weapon. At the time that defendant committed the 

armed robbery in this case, that section provided, in 

relevant part:4 

(1) Offense variable 1 is aggravated use of

a weapon. Score offense variable 1 by

determining which of the following apply and by

assigning the number of points attributable to 

the one that has the highest number of points: 

(a) A firearm was discharged at or toward a

human being or a victim was cut or stabbed with a

knife or other cutting or stabbing weapon.....25

points 

(b) A firearm was pointed at or toward a

victim or the victim had a reasonable 

apprehension of an immediate battery when 

threatened with a knife or other cutting or 

stabbing weapon........15 points 

* * * 

(...continued)

robbery. See People v Velasquez, 189 Mich App 14, 17; 472

NW2d 289 (1991) (use of force after taking in an attempt to

retain possession of property constitutes force or coercion

for armed robbery); People v Tinsley, 176 Mich App 119,

121; 439 NW2d 313 (1989) (because robbery is a continuous

offense, the use of force after a taking in order to retain

stolen property constitutes force for purposes of armed

robbery statute). In any event, the views expressed by

Justice MARKMAN could not have survived the amendments of MCL 

750.529 and MCL 750.530. Under those amendments, effective

July 1, 2004, acts of force or violence during flight or

attempted flight after acquiring the stolen property or in

an attempt to retain possession of the stolen property

occur during “the course of committing” the robbery. See 

note 2, supra. 

4

 The Legislature amended MCL 777.31 after the crime in

this case, but the amendments are not relevant to this

appeal. See ante note 8. 

6
 
 

(2) All of the following apply to scoring 

offense variable 1: 

(a) Count each person who was placed in

danger of injury or loss of life as a victim. 

(b) In multiple offender cases, if 1 

offender is assessed points for the presence or

use of a weapon, all offenders shall be assessed 

the same number of points. [Emphasis added.] 

The trial court also assessed twenty-five points under 

OV 3. OV 3, MCL 777.33, involves physical injury to a 

victim. At the time that defendant committed the armed 

robbery in this case, MCL 777.33 provided, in relevant 

part:5 

(1) Offense variable 3 is physical injury to

a victim. Score offense variable 3 by 

determining which of the following apply and by

assigning the number of points attributable to

the one that has the highest number of points: 

* * * 

(c) Life threatening or permanent

incapacitating injury occurred to a 

victim.............25 points 

(d) Bodily injury requiring medical 

treatment occurred to a 

victim....................10 points 

5

 Like OV 1, the Legislature amended MCL 777.33 after

the armed robbery in this case. The amendments do not 

affect the result of this case. See Justice WEAVER’s 

opinion, note 9. 

7
 
(e) Bodily injury not requiring medical 

treatment occurred to a 

victim.....................5 points 

(f) No physical injury occurred to a 

victim...................................0 points 

(2) All of the following apply to scoring 

offense variable 3: 

(a) In multiple offender cases, if 1 

offender is assessed points for death or physical

injury, all offenders shall be assessed the same

number of points. [Emphasis added.] 

Subsection 1 of both OV 1 and OV 3 required the trial 

court to assess the highest number of points that it could 

assess for each variable. Following the transactional 

approach to armed robbery, the trial court did so by 

assessing defendant twenty-five points under OV 1 because 

Northington discharged a firearm toward Bish. The court 

also assessed defendant twenty-five points under OV 3 

because Bish’s gunshot wound to the chest was lifethreatening. Thus, the trial court properly complied with 

subsection 1 of both variables and assessed the highest 

number of points possible under each variable. 

Notwithstanding the above language of OV 1 and OV 3, 

subsection 2(b) in OV 1 and subsection 2(a) in OV 3 

required the trial court to assess the same number of 

points under those variables as were assessed for 

Northington. The trial court assessed Northington fifteen 

8
 
points under OV 1 and zero points under OV 3. Thus, the 

trial court did not assess Northington the highest number 

of points as subsection 1 of OV 1 and OV 3 directs. The 

question then is whether the trial court was obligated to 

assess defendant the same number of points as were assessed 

for Northington notwithstanding the fact that Northington 

was not assessed the highest number of points. The answer 

to this question is unclear. In these circumstances, the 

language of subsection 1 of OV 1 and OV 3 conflicts with 

the language of subsection 2(b) in OV 1 and subsection 2(a) 

in OV 3. The trial court could not have followed one 

provision without rendering the other nugatory. 

Because it is the duty of the judiciary to interpret, 

not to write, our laws, we, as judges, are unable to 

correct the conflicting language of OV 1 and OV 3. Rather, 

that task is left to the Legislature. A practical approach 

to this problem would require trial courts to assess 

offenders in multiple offender cases the same number of 

accurately scored points. In that event, trial courts 

would be required to assess multiple offenders the same 

number of points only if the first offender’s assessment of 

points was accurate. Otherwise, trial courts would be 

required to assess subsequently sentenced offenders “the 

highest number of points.” Because the “highest number of 

9
 
 

points” provision of OV 1 and OV 3 conflicts with the 

“multiple offender” provision of those variables, and 

nothing directs which provision prevails, I concur with the 

majority that defendant was required to be assessed the 

same number of points as were scored for Northington.6

 III. OV 9 

I also concur with the majority that the trial court 

properly assessed defendant ten points under OV 9. OV 9, 

MCL 777.39, provides, in part: 

(1) Offense variable 9 is number of victims. 

Score offense variable 9 by determining which of

the following apply and by assigning the number

of points attributable to the one that has the

highest number of points: 

(a) Multiple deaths occurred...........100 

points 

(b) There were 10 or more victims.......25 

points 

(c) There were 2 to 9 victims...........10 

points 

6

 In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice

Young opines that the trial court properly scored 

defendant’s OV 1 and OV 3 variables in the instant case 

because those scores coincided with Northington’s OV 1 and

OV 3 scores for her assault conviction. Even accepting

Justice YOUNG’s argument as correct, however, a conflict may

still exist between the “highest number of points”

provision and the “multiple offender” provision in some

cases. Although under Justice YOUNG’s theory, defendant was

properly scored in this case, the above provisions would

still conflict in other cases if the first offender to be 

sentenced is not assessed the highest number of points. 

10
 
 

 

(d) There were fewer than 2 victims......0 

points 

(2) All of the following apply to scoring 

offense variable 9: 

(a) Count each person who was placed in

danger of injury or loss of life as a victim. 

Because armed robbery is a transactional offense and Bish 

was placed in danger of injury or loss of life while the 

robbery was ongoing, the trial court properly considered 

him a victim of the armed robbery under subsection 2(a).7 

Accordingly, the trial court’s assessment of ten points 

under this variable was correct. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The “multiple offender” provision of OV 1 and OV 3 

conflicts with the “highest number of points” provision of 

those variables. Accordingly, it is unclear whether the 

trial court assessed the proper number of points under each 

variable. Nevertheless, I concur with the majority for the 

sake of reaching a clear rule and offering guidance to 

sentencing courts in implementing the legislative 

7

 As discussed in note 3, supra, because Northington

shot Bish in an attempt to retain possession of Sevakis’

purse and before she reached a place of temporary safety,

the shooting was a continuation of the robbery under the

transactional approach to that offense. Thus, the trial

court properly considered the shooting in scoring OV 9. 

11
 
sentencing guidelines. I urge the Legislature to amend 

those sentencing variables containing the above conflicting 

provisions. Further, I concur with the majority’s 

conclusion regarding OV 9. Because armed robbery is a 

transactional offense, the trial court properly assessed 

defendant ten points under OV 9. 

Maura D. Corrigan 

12
 
_______________________________ 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

No. 124083 

LATASHA GENISE MORSON, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

MARKMAN, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

I concur in the conclusion of the majority opinion 

that the trial court improperly scored OV 1 and OV 3, 

although I reach this conclusion by a different analysis. 

I respectfully dissent from the conclusion of the majority 

opinion that the trial court properly scored OV 9. 

Defendant and Iesha Northington robbed an elderly 

woman, Deborah Sevakis. Northington stole Sevakis’s purse. 

James Bish, a bystander who witnessed the robbery, chased 

after Northington and Northington shot Bish. Defendant was 

the getaway driver. Northington pleaded guilty to armed 

robbery and assault with intent to murder, and defendant 

was convicted of armed robbery, but never charged with the 

assault. 
OV 1 is to be scored at fifteen points for pointing a 

firearm at a person and twenty-five points for discharging 

a firearm at a person. MCL 777.31(1)(a) and (c). Although 

defendant’s accomplice, Iesha Northington, was assessed 

twenty-five points for the assault conviction, she was 

assessed only fifteen points for the armed robbery 

conviction. Defendant was assessed twenty-five points for 

the armed robbery conviction. Defendant was never charged 

with an assault. The Court of Appeals concluded that the 

trial court erred in assessing defendant twenty-five points 

for the armed robbery conviction because MCL 777.31(2)(b) 

provides that “[i]n multiple offender cases, if 1 offender 

is assessed points for the presence or use of a weapon, all 

offenders shall be assessed the same number of points.” 

The majority opinion agrees. 

OV 3 is to be scored at twenty-five points if a victim 

suffered a life-threatening injury. MCL 777.33(1)(c). 

Clearly, James Bish suffered a life-threatening injury when 

he was shot in the chest and his lung was punctured. 

Although Northington was assessed twenty-five points for 

the assault conviction, she was assessed zero points for 

the armed robbery conviction. Defendant was assessed 

twenty-five points for the armed robbery conviction. 

Again, the Court of Appeals concluded that this was an 

2
 
 

 

error because MCL 777.33(2)(a) provides that “[i]n multiple 

offender cases, if 1 offender is assessed points for death 

or physical injury, all offenders shall be assessed the 

same number of points.” The majority opinion again agrees. 

MCL 769.31(d) provides: 

“Offense characteristics” means the elements 

of the crime and the aggravating and mitigating

factors relating to the offense that the 

legislature determines are appropriate. For 

purpose of this subdivision, an offense described

in section 33b of 1953 PA 232, MCL 791.233b, that

resulted in a conviction and that arose out of 

the same transaction as the offense for which the 

sentencing guidelines are being scored shall be

considered as an aggravating factor. [Emphasis

added.] 

Therefore, in general, when scoring offense variables, the 

trial court can only consider the offense for which the 

sentencing guidelines are being scored and those enumerated 

offenses that arose out of the same transaction as that 

offense and that resulted in convictions.1 

In this case, the discharging of the firearm and the 

resulting injury to Bish are not factors that relate to the 

robbery offense—the offense for which the sentencing 

guidelines are being scored—but are, instead, factors that 

1

 Although the majority opinion believes that it is

“unnecessary to draw . . . sharp lines . . . between

‘offenses’ stemming from [the same] event,” ante at 12 n 

10, the Legislature, as evidenced by the express language

of MCL 769.31(d), believes otherwise. 

3
 
relate to the assault offense—an offense of which defendant 

was never convicted. Therefore, the trial court erred when 

it considered these factors in scoring defendant’s robbery 

conviction. 

MCL 777.31(1) and MCL 777.33(1) provide that OV 1 and 

OV 3 are to be scored “by determining which of the 

following apply and by assigning the number of points 

attributable to the one that has the highest number of 

points.” With regard to OV 1, defendant argues that 

fifteen points was the highest score attributable to either 

offender for the robbery because a weapon was pointed, but 

not discharged during the robbery. Northington did not 

discharge the weapon until after the robbery. Similarly, 

with regard to OV 3, defendant argues that zero points was 

the highest score attributable to either offender for the 

robbery because nobody was injured during the robbery. 

Northington did not shoot Bish until after the robbery. 

MCL 769.31(d) explicitly states that “an offense 

described in section 33b of 1953 PA 232, MCL 791.233b, that 

resulted in a conviction and that arose out of the same 

transaction as the offense for which the sentencing 

guidelines are being scored shall be considered as an 

aggravating factor.” This is clearly an exception to the 

general rule—the general rule being that the relevant 

4
 
factors are those that relate to the offense being scored, 

and the exception being that, if the defendant is convicted 

of certain enumerated offenses that arose out of the same 

transaction as the offense being scored, these offenses can 

be taken into consideration in scoring. Although assault 

with intent to murder is one of the enumerated offenses and 

the assault arguably arose out of the same transaction as 

the armed robbery, defendant was not convicted of assault 

with intent to murder. Therefore, the fact that 

Northington shot Bish cannot be considered in scoring 

defendant’s robbery conviction. The trial court took this 

shooting into consideration when it scored OV 1 and OV 3, 

and, thus, improperly scored OV 1 and OV 3. 

That the general rule is that the relevant factors are 

those that relate to the offense being scored is further 

supported by the fact that some offense variables 

specifically provide otherwise. For instance, MCL 

777.44(2)(a) provides that in scoring OV 14 (whether the 

offender was a leader in a multiple offender situation), 

“[t]he entire criminal transaction should be considered.” 

In other offense variables, the Legislature unambiguously 

made it known when behavior outside of the scored offense 

is to be taken into account. OV 12, for example, applies 

to acts that occurred within twenty-four hours of the 

5
 
sentencing offense and have not resulted in separate 

convictions. MCL 777.42(2)(a). OV 13 explicitly permits 

scoring for “all crimes within a 5-year period, including 

the sentencing offense” regardless of whether they resulted 

in conviction. MCL 777.43(2)(a). OV 16 provides that 

“[i]n multiple offender or victim cases, the appropriate 

points may be determined by adding together the aggregate 

value of the property involved, including property involved 

in uncharged offenses or charges dismissed under a plea 

agreement.” MCL 777.46(2)(a). Finally, OV 8 (scoring for 

victim asportation or captivity) specifically focuses on 

conduct “beyond the time necessary to commit the offense.” 

MCL 777.38. That the Legislature has explicitly stated in 

some offense variables that conduct not related to the 

offense being scored can be considered strengthens the 

conclusion that, unless stated otherwise, only conduct that 

relates to the offense being scored may be considered. 

OV 9 is to be scored at ten points if two to nine 

victims were involved. MCL 777.39(1)(c). “[E]ach person 

who was placed in danger of injury or loss of life” is to 

be counted as a victim. MCL 777.39(2)(a). OV 9 does not 

require multiple offenders to receive the same score. Both 

defendant and Northington were assessed ten points. The 

Court of Appeals concluded that this was error because only 

6
 
 

Deborah Sevakis was placed in danger during the robbery. I 

agree. The robbery was complete by the time Bish 

intervened. Bish was not the victim of the robbery; he was 

the victim of the assault.2 Defendant was not charged with 

the assault.3 For the same reason that the assault cannot 

2

 The majority opinion accuses me of “fail[ing] to

apply the plain language of the statute.” Ante at 16 n 14. 

However, with all due respect, I believe it is the majority

opinion that fails to apply the clear language of the

statute. MCL 769.31(d) specifically states that “the 

offense” and any enumerated offenses “that resulted in a

conviction and that arose out of the same transaction as 

the offense for which the sentencing guidelines are being

scored shall be considered . . . .” In this case, “the

offense for which the sentencing guidelines are being

scored” is armed robbery. Defendant was not convicted of 

assault, or any other offense. Under the express language

of the statute, only the robbery, not the assault, can be

considered. 

3

 MCL 769.31(d) states that “‘[o]ffense

characteristics’ means the elements of the crime and the 

aggravating and mitigating factors relating to the offense

that the legislature determines are appropriate.”

Therefore, I agree with Justice Young that the trial court

can “consider not only the actual elements constituting the

offense, but also any aggravating or mitigating factors

associated with the offense . . . .” Post at 2 (emphasis

in original). However, in this case, the disputed factors

relate not to the offense—armed robbery—but to another

offense—assault—that occurred after the offense [of armed

robbery] was already completed and that defendant was never 

even charged with, let alone convicted of. As explained

above, MCL 769.31(d) specifically states that only offenses

that have resulted in convictions can be considered. 

Because defendant was not convicted of an assault, the

assault cannot be considered in scoring the armed robbery

offense. To allow the assault to be considered, even

though it was not even charged, would be to circumvent the

guidelines by scoring a defendant on the basis of 

(continued...) 

7
 
 

 

be considered when scoring OV 1 and OV 3, it cannot be 

considered when scoring OV 9.4 

(...continued)

circumstances constituting an offense that was never even

charged. However, I do agree with Justice Young that the

assault may be considered by the court in imposing an

upward departure as long as the standards articulated in

People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247; 666 NW2d 231 (2003), have

been adhered to. 

4

 Chief Justice Corrigan concludes that “[b]ecause

armed robbery is a transactional offense, and Northington

shot Bish immediately after she stole Sevakis’ purse and

before she reached a place of temporary safety, the trial

court properly considered the shooting when determining

defendant’s score under OV 1[,] OV 3” and OV 9. Post at 5,

10. Assuming arguendo that armed robbery is a 

transactional offense, I still cannot agree that the trial

court properly scored OV 1, OV 3, and OV 9. Under a 

transactional view, a person can be found guilty of armed

robbery if, before reaching a place of temporary safety,

all of the elements of armed robbery are completed.

However, that does not mean that an armed robbery can never 

be completed until a person has reached a place of 

temporary safety. In other words, although it is possible

that an armed robbery will not be completed until defendant

has reached a place of temporary safety, it is also 

possible that the crime will be completed before then.

Here, all the elements of the armed robbery were completed

before defendant reached a place of temporary safety. 

There cannot be two endings to a crime. In other words, it

cannot be that the crime of armed robbery was completed

once defendant stole the purse and it was also completed

once she reached a place of temporary safety. The crime 

had to have been completed at either the latter or the

former time. If all the elements had not been completed,

we could look, under a transactional view, to defendant’s

conduct until she reached a place of temporary safety to

establish all of the elements of the armed robbery. Here,

however, that is not necessary because all the elements

were, in fact, completed before she reached a place of

temporary safety. Because the assault occurred after the 

armed robbery and because defendant was never convicted of

(continued...) 

8
 
 

 

OV 1 should only have been scored at fifteen points 

because Northington only pointed a firearm during the 

robbery; she did not discharge a firearm during the 

robbery. OV 3 should have been scored at zero points 

because the robbery victim did not suffer from a lifethreatening injury; only the assault victim suffered from a 

life-threatening injury. Finally, OV 9 should have been 

scored at zero points because there was only one robbery 

victim; Bish was an assault victim, but not a robbery 

victim. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the 

Court of Appeals, which concluded that the trial court 

erred in scoring OV 1, OV 3, and OV 9, albeit on different 

grounds. 

Stephen J. Markman

Clifford W. Taylor 

(...continued)

the assault, it cannot be considered when scoring OV 1, OV

3, and OV 9. 

Contrary to the majority opinion’s contention, I do

not determine here whether armed robbery is a transactional

offense. I simply note that, even if armed robbery is a

transactional offense, the trial court erred in scoring OV

1, OV 3, and OV 9. 

9
 
_______________________________ 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

No. 124083 

LATASHA GENISE MORSON, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

YOUNG, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part) 

I agree with the majority that the trial court did not 

err when it assessed ten points for offense variable (OV) 9. 

The language of MCL 777.39(2)(a) clearly states that each 

person “placed in danger of injury or loss of life” is to 

be counted as a victim. Because a gun was fired at him, 

James Bish was placed in danger even if he had not 

intervened or been injured. 

However, I dissent from that portion of the majority 

opinion holding that the trial court erred in assessing 

twenty-five points each for OV 1 and OV 3. Because I believe 

that the guidelines were scored correctly, I would affirm 

the trial court’s scoring of those guidelines. 
 

 

I disagree with the majority's conclusion that 

defendant was entitled to have her armed robbery scores 

match Northington's armed robbery scores. I believe the 

majority's position is based on a flawed assumption 

regarding the "multiple offender" provision of OV 1 and OV 

3. 

When scoring the guidelines, the court is instructed 

by MCL 769.31(e)1 to consider not only the actual elements 

added.][2] 

constituting the offense, but also any aggravating or 

mitigating factors associated with the offense as 

designated in the guidelines: 

"Offense characteristics" means the elements 

of the crime and the aggravating and mitigating

factors relating to the offense that the 

commission determines are appropriate and 

consistent with the criteria described in section 

33(1)(e) of this chapter. For the purposes of

this subdivision, an offense described in section

33b of 1953 PA 232, MCL 791.233b, that resulted

in a conviction and that arose out of the same 

transaction as the offense for which the 

sentencing guidelines are being scored shall be 

considered as an aggravating factor. [Emphasis 

1

 Redesignated as subsection d in a 2002 amendment.

2002 PA 31. The amendment also designated responsibility

to the "legislature" instead of the "commission." 

2

 The second sentence of MCL 769.31(e), which is not at

issue in this case, mandates the trial court to consider 

certain convictions as aggravating factors when they result

in a conviction and they arose out of the “same 

transaction” as the offense being scored. In instructing

the sentencing court to view the entire "transaction," I do

(continued...) 

2 
 

Therefore, an “offense characteristic” clearly encompasses 

more than merely the offense itself–it contemplates both 

positive and negative factors “related to,” but not 

constituting, the charged offense. 

When scoring OV 1, which takes into account the 

aggravated use of a weapon, MCL 777.31(2) specifically 

requires a trial court to: 

(a) Count each person who was placed in

danger of injury or loss of life as a victim. 

(b) In multiple offender cases, if 1 

offender is assessed points for the presence or

use of a weapon, all offenders shall be assessed

the same number of points. 

 Likewise, when scoring OV 3, which assesses physical 

injury to a victim, MCL 777.33(2)(a) requires that: 

(...continued)

not believe that this phrase describes the transactional 

approach to robbery as recognized by this Court in People v

Randolph, 466 Mich 532; 648 NW2d 164 (2002). Rather, I

believe that the plain meaning of the phrase "same 

transaction" refers to the entire criminal episode or 

event, not the term "transactional test," which is unique

to robbery cases and has never received legislative

recognition. In fact, when the Legislature recently amended

the unarmed robbery statute in response to this Court’s

opinion in Randolph, the Legislature did not use the terms

“transaction” or “transactional” in its amendment. See MCL 

750.530 as amended by 2004 PA 128. In any event, the

“transactional” analysis offered by Justices CORRIGAN AND 

MARKMAN is irrelevant to the first sentence that applies in

this case. 

3 
In multiple offender cases, if 1 offender is

assessed points for death or physical injury, all

offenders shall be assessed the same number of 

points. 

The majority opinion rests upon the analytical 

assumption that the requirement of equal scores for 

"multiple offenders" means that identical crimes must be 

compared to identical crimes. However, as illustrated 

above, the plain language of the MCL 777.31(2)(b) and MCL 

777.33(2)(a) clearly do not require that the convicted 

offenses must be identical. Rather, the statutes 

contemplate the comparison of identical offense variable 

scores. I believe that the correct reading of the statutes 

requires that, to the degree that both defendants are 

convicted of crimes requiring the scoring of OV 1 and OV 3, 

the second defendant would get the same OV 1 and OV 3 scores 

as the first defendant. 

Here, defendant was scored twenty-five points for her 

armed robbery OV 1 score. This score is supported by the 

evidence because a firearm was discharged at or toward 

James Bish, and the discharge of the firearm was an 

aggravating factor related to the armed robbery. 

Defendant's OV 1 score for use of a weapon coincides with 

Northington's OV 1 score for use of a weapon, as shown in 

the table below. 

4 
Additionally, defendant was scored twenty-five points 

for her OV 3 score. This score is supported by the evidence 

because of the life-threatening gunshot injury suffered by 

James Bish, which was an aggravating factor related to the 

armed robbery. Defendant’s OV 3 score of twenty-five points 

for physical injury to a victim is identical to 

Northington’s OV 3 score for physical injury to a victim, as 

shown in the table below: 

DEFENDANT & 

OFFENSE 

OV 1 

Aggravated use of

weapon 

OV 3 

Physical injury

to victim 

Northington

Assault with intent 

to murder 

25 points 25 points 

Northington

Armed robbery 

15 points 0 points 

Morson 

Armed robbery 

25 points 25 points 

The majority errs in simply comparing identical 

convictions. However, as noted above, the directives 

contained in OV 1 and OV 3 do not require equality of 

criminal convictions—they merely necessitate that the 

offense variables be scored identically. Because defendant 

received the same OV 1 and OV 3 scores as her cohort, I do 

5 
 

 

 

not believe that defendant is entitled to resentencing.3 

As Chief Justice Corrigan notes in her concurring 

opinion, there is an arguable tension between the 

sentencing instructions requiring assessment of the highest 

number of points shown by the evidence and the instruction 

included in some offense variables directing the court to 

assess equal OV points in multiple offender situations. 

However, I believe that enforcing the statute as written, 

which instructs a sentencing court to compare offense 

3 Contrary to the majority's conclusion, the 

analysis I advocate is not inconsistent with MCL 777.21(2).

The trial court is still required to score each convicted

offense, but is permitted, under the clear language of the

statute, to consider aggravating factors “related to” the

convicted charge. In addition, the Legislature specifically

contemplated different defendants being convicted of 

different offenses, as evidenced by the instruction that 

offense variables be scored the same for "multiple

offenders," rather than limiting its instruction to 

offenders convicted of identical offenses. 

While my approach is considered “illogical” by the

majority, I believe that it best adheres to the plain

language of the statute. When the language is clear, it is

my responsibility to simply apply the facts to the law. The

genesis of the error in this case is the trial court's

decision to disregard the law when it sentenced Iesha

Northington. The trial court failed to consider the facts 

of both convictions under the second sentence of MCL 

769.31(e) when sentencing Northington, and failed to assess

the highest number of points for OV 1 and OV 3 that the 

evidence supported. See MCL 777.31(1) (OV 1); MCL 777.33(1)

(OV 3). When the trial court failed to follow the law, it

injected an error that defendant now seeks to perpetuate. 

6 
 

 

variable to like offense variable, promotes both accuracy 

and equality in the scoring of the guidelines.4 

For the reasons stated herein, I dissent from that 

portion of the majority opinion holding that the trial 

court erred in scoring offense variables 1 and 3. Because I 

believe that the guidelines were scored correctly, I would 

reverse the Court of Appeals judgment and reinstate the 

sentence imposed by the circuit court. 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

4 While my interpretation and application of the

statute does not prevail in this case, I note that, if

factors arising before or after the offense cannot be

calculated in the guidelines, they are certainly relevant

sentencing factors not adequately contemplated by the 

guidelines. If these factors are substantial and 

compelling, a sentencing court may utilize those factors in

imposing an upwardly departing sentence. People v Babcock,

469 Mich 247; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). 

7