Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 69 / Monday, April 11, 2011 / Notices 20039 

11Under Federal law, because Respondent did 

not hold a Virginia license to dispense controlled 

substances, he was not even entitled to hold a DEA 

registration in the State because he did not meet a 

statutory prerequisite for obtaining a registration. 

See 21 U.S.C. 802(21) (defining ‘‘[t]he term 

‘practitioner’ [as] a physician * * * licensed, 

registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United 

States or the jurisdiction in which he practices 

* * * to dispense * * * a controlled substance in 

the course of professional practice’’); id.§ 823(f) 

(‘‘The Attorney General shall register practitioners 

* * * to dispense * * * controlled substances 

* * * if the applicant is authorized to dispense 

* * * controlled substances under the laws of the 

State in which he practices.’’). See also Jovencio L. 

Raneses, 75 FR 11563, 11564 (2010); Nasim F. 

Khan, 73 FR 4630, 4632 (2008). 

28069 (2010); Kamir Garces-Mejia, 72 

FR 54931, 54935 (2007); United 

Prescription Services, Inc., 72 FR 50397, 

50407 (2007). 

Under Virginia law, a controlled 

substance prescription ‘‘shall be issued 

for a medicinal or therapeutic purpose 

and may be issued only to persons 

* * * with whom the practitioner has a 

bona fide practitioner-patient 

relationship.’’ Va. Code Ann. § 54.1– 

3303.A. Furthermore, under the statute, 

‘‘a bona fide practitioner-patient 

relationship means that the practitioner 

shall * * * (iii) perform or have 

performed an appropriate examination 

of the patient, either physically or by 

the use of instrumentation and 

diagnostic equipment through which 

images and medical records may be 

transmitted electronically.’’ Id. 

As found above, Registrant admitted 

in an interview with agency 

Investigators that he prescribed 

controlled substances for Telemed 

without conducting physical 

examinations of its customers. 

Moreover, the record shows that each of 

the four persons who were interviewed 

by DEA Investigators, obtained 

controlled substances from Telemed 

through prescriptions issued by him, 

without being physically examined by 

him, let alone seeing him. The Virginia 

Board’s findings corroborate the various 

admissions Registrant made in his 

interview as well as the statements 

made by T.M., N.N., R.D., and K.H. in 

their respective interviews. I therefore 

find that Registrant issued controlled 

substances to internet patients without 

physically examining them and that he 

failed to establish a bona fide doctorpatient relationship with the Telemed 

customers. I further hold that in 

prescribing controlled substances to 

these persons, Respondent lacked a 

legitimate medical purpose and acted 

outside of the usual course of 

professional practice. 21 CFR 

1306.04(a). Respondent thus violated 

both the CSA and Virginia law. 

I further find—as did the Virginia 

Board—that Registrant violated Virginia 

Code §§ 54.1–2915.A(17) & (18) in that 

between October 2008 and March 2009, 

he prescribed controlled substances in 

Virginia’s schedules IV through VI in 

the State of Virginia without possessing 

the required license. Consent Order, at 

2; see also Christopher Henry Lister, 75 

FR 28068, 28069 (2010) (citing 

University of Tennessee v. Elliot, 478 

U.S. 788, 797–98 (1986)). This conduct 

also violated a DEA regulation. See 21 

CFR 1306.03(a)(1). I therefore find that 

Registrant violated both DEA regulation 

and Virginia law in this regard as well.11

In sum, the evidence shows that 

Registrant has repeatedly violated both 

Federal and State laws related to the 

dispensing of controlled substances and 

has therefore committed acts which 

render his registration ‘‘inconsistent 

with the public interest.’’ 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(4). Accordingly, Respondent’s 

registrations will be revoked and any 

pending application to renew or modify 

either registration will be denied. 

Order 

Pursuant to the authority vested in me 

by 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(f) & 824(a)(4), as 

well as 28 CFR 0.100(b) & 0.104, I order 

that DEA Certificate of Registration 

FB1499587, issued to Clifton D. Burt, 

M.D., be, and it hereby is, revoked. I 

also order the Office of Diversion 

Control to determine whether Clifton D. 

Burt, M.D., filed a timely renewal 

application for DEA Certificate of 

Registration FB0575499, and if so, order 

that this registration be, and it hereby is, 

revoked. I further order that any 

pending application of Clifton D. Burt, 

M.D., to renew or modify his 

registrations, be, and it hereby is, 

denied. This Order is effective May 11, 

2011. 

Dated: April 1, 2011. 

Michele M. Leonhart, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2011–8545 Filed 4–8–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

The Medicine Dropper; Revocation of 

Registration 

On January 29, 2010, I, the then 

Deputy Administrator of the Drug 

Enforcement Administration, issued an 

Order to Show Cause and Immediate 

Suspension of Registration (Order) to 

The Medicine Dropper (Respondent), of 

Greenwood, South Carolina. The Order 

proposed the revocation of 

Respondent’s DEA Certificate of 

Registration, BT2981214, as a retail 

pharmacy, and the denial of any 

pending applications to renew or 

modify its registration, on the ground 

that its ‘‘continued registration is 

inconsistent with the public interest.’’ 

Order, at 1. 

More specifically, the Order alleged 

that, on March 18, 2009, Respondent’s 

owner had entered into a Settlement 

Agreement with the United States 

Attorney for the District of South 

Carolina under which he agreed to a 

policy ‘‘to prevent the use of [his] 

pharmacy for ‘doctor shopping’ and [to] 

provide quarterly reports of all Schedule 

II controlled substances [it] dispensed.’’ 

Id. at 1–2. The Order also alleged that 

in the settlement, Respondent’s owner 

‘‘agreed to ‘fill prescriptions using the 

correct DEA number for the physician 

and [to] ensure that all required 

elements of the prescriptions are present 

prior to dispensing,’ ’’ as well as to 

comply with Federal and State laws 

related to the dispensing of controlled 

substances. Id. 

The Order alleged that, after executing 

the Settlement Agreement, Respondent’s 

owner continued to dispense 

prescriptions for schedule III controlled 

substances containing hydrocodone to 

L.P, even though she submitted similar 

prescriptions from three different 

physicians between June and November 

of 2009. Id. With respect to L.P., the 

Order further alleged that Respondent 

had ‘‘dispensed an excessive amount of 

hydrocodone,’’ and that ‘‘[b]ased on 

Respondent’s own calculations for what 

constitutes a ‘day’s supply’ of 

hydrocodone for L.P., Respondent 

dispensed the equivalent of 709 ‘day’s 

supplies’ during the period between 

September 22, 2008 and September 1, 

2009,’’ and that ‘‘[t]his resulted in 

dispensing more than twice the 

recommended amount of hydrocodone 

that L.P. should have received.’’ Id. 

Next, the Order alleged that in 

January and February 2009, Respondent 

distributed Lyrica, a schedule V 

controlled substance, ‘‘to T.M. without a 

valid prescription in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a),’’ and that it ‘‘also 

furnished false or fraudulent material 

information regarding T.M.’s Lyrica 

prescriptions in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 843(a)(4)(A) and mislabeled T.M.’s 

Lyrica prescription in violation of 21 

CFR 1306.24(a).’’ Id. The Order further 

alleged that on September 14, 2009, 

Respondent completed filling a 

prescription for Dilaudid 

(hydromorphone), a schedule II 

controlled substance, which T.M. had 

presented to it in August 2009, thereby 


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1The Agreement was also intended to resolve the 

Government’s contentions that Respondent had 

submitted various false claims to the South Carolina 

Medicaid Program. 

violating 21 CFR 1306.13(a), which 

requires that a partially-filled 

prescription for a schedule II controlled 

substance be completely filled within 72 

hours of the partial filling. Id. With 

respect to T.M., the Order also alleged 

that in September 2009, Respondent 

provided false information regarding his 

prescriptions to an inspector from the 

South Carolina Department of Health 

and Environmental Control. Id. 

The Order further alleged that in 

September 2009, Respondent violated 

21 CFR 1306.11(d)(4), when it ‘‘filled an 

‘emergency’ oral call-in prescription for’’ 

MS Contin, a schedule II controlled 

substance, ‘‘for patient D.S. without 

notifying DEA that no written order was 

ever received.’’ Id. The Order also 

alleged that Respondent violated South 

Carolina law by filling two prescriptions 

for schedule II controlled substances 

‘‘that were more than 90 days old.’’ Id. 

at 3. 

Finally, the Order alleged that ‘‘[s]ince 

March 2009, Respondent has repeatedly 

violated the terms of the Settlement 

Agreement’’ by ‘‘permitt[ing] doctor 

shopping, fill[ing] prescriptions for 

controlled substances without a 

legitimate medical purpose,’’ and 

violating other Federal and State laws in 

filling various prescriptions. Id. The 

Order further alleged that Respondent 

had violated the Settlement Agreement 

because it had ‘‘failed to provide DEA 

with quarterly reports of all schedule II 

controlled substances [it] dispensed.’’ Id. 

Based on the above, I concluded that 

Respondent’s continued registration 

during the pendency of the proceeding 

‘‘constitutes an imminent danger to the 

public health and safety.’’ Id. Pursuant 

to my authority under 21 U.S.C. 824(d), 

I therefore immediately suspended 

Respondent’s registration and ordered 

that the suspension ‘‘remain in effect 

until a final determination is reached in 

these proceedings.’’ Id. 

On February 3, 2010, the Order, 

which also notified Respondent of its 

right to a hearing to contest the 

allegations (as well as its right to submit 

a written statement in lieu of a hearing), 

the procedure for requesting a hearing, 

and the consequence if it failed to do so, 

was served on Respondent. See id. at 3 

(citing 21 CFR 1301.43(a), (c), (d) & (e)). 

Since the date of service of the Order, 

neither Respondent, nor anyone 

purporting to represent it, has requested 

a hearing or submitted a written 

statement in lieu of a hearing. Thirty 

days now having passed since the Order 

was served on Respondent, I find that it 

has waived its right to a hearing. See 21 

CFR 1301.43(b) & (d). I therefore issue 

this Decision and Final Order based on 

the evidence contained in the 

investigative record submitted by the 

Government. Id. 1301.43(e). I make the 

following findings. 

Findings 

Respondent is a corporation organized 

under the laws of South Carolina, which 

is owned by John Frank Weeks and 

Derrelyn B. Weeks. Respondent operates 

a retail pharmacy located at 420 Epting 

Avenue, Greenwood, South Carolina, 

and is the holder of DEA Certificate of 

Registration, BT2981214, which 

authorizes it to dispense controlled 

substances in schedules II through V as 

a retail pharmacy. Respondent’s 

registration was to expire on November 

30, 2009; however, on October 16, 2009, 

Respondent submitted a renewal 

application. Accordingly, Respondent’s 

registration remains in effect (albeit in 

suspended status) pending the issuance 

of this Final Order. See 5 U.S.C. 558(c). 

On March 23, 2009, Respondent and 

its owners entered into a Settlement 

Agreement with the United States of 

America, which was intended to resolve 

the latter’s civil and administrative 

claims based on its contentions that, 

between June 14, 2002 and January 16, 

2008, Respondent violated the 

Controlled Substances Act and DEA 

regulations ‘‘by filling prescriptions for 

other than legitimate medical purposes; 

ignoring evidence of diversion; and 

dispensing excessive doses of controlled 

substances.’’ 1 Settlement Agreement at 

2. As part of the Settlement Agreement, 

Respondent and its owners agreed that 

‘‘as a registrant with the DEA, they have 

a duty to comply with all federal 

regulations governing the dispensing 

and distribution of controlled 

substances.’’ Id. at 8. 

Respondent and its owners further 

agreed that ‘‘[t]hey will adopt a 

reasonable and customary policy 

suitable to the DEA to prevent the use 

of their pharmacy for ‘doctor shopping’ 

and will provide quarterly reports of all 

schedule II controlled substances 

dispensed in such a form as reasonably 

required by the DEA.’’ Id. at 9. In 

addition, Respondent and its owners 

agreed that ‘‘[t]hey will fill prescriptions 

using the correct DEA number for the 

physician and ensure that all required 

elements of the prescription are present 

prior to dispensing’’ and that ‘‘[t]hey will 

comply with State and Federal law 

pertaining to the dispensing of 

controlled substances.’’ Id. 

According to the affidavit of a DEA 

Diversion Investigator, notwithstanding 

Respondent’s (and its owner’s) promise 

to adopt a policy to prevent doctor 

shopping, between June 2009 and 

November 2009, Respondent dispensed 

ten prescriptions for schedule III 

controlled substances containing 

hydrocodone to L.P., which were issued 

by three different doctors. Affidavit at 

3–4. Moreover, according to 

Respondent’s records, in most instances, 

the quantity dispensed was intended to 

be a thirty-day supply, yet in several 

instances Respondent dispensed an 

additional thirty-day supply well before 

the prescription it had previously 

dispensed would have run out and 

frequently did so weeks early, and in 

one instance, nearly four weeks early. 

More specifically, Respondent’s records 

show that, based on prescriptions issued 

by a Dr. B., Respondent dispensed a 

thirty-day supply to L.P. on April 9 and 

24, May 2, 5, and 22, June 1 and 20, and 

July 1, 2009. 

In his affidavit, the DI further stated 

that Respondent had dispensed 

prescriptions for Lyrica, a schedule V 

controlled substance to T.M., which 

were purportedly called in by a Dr. M. 

Affidavit at 5–6. However, in a letter, 

Dr. M. stated that he had discharged 

T.M. from his clinic on October 29, 

2008, and that the last prescription he 

had authorized was on October 22, 

2008. Included in the record are five 

‘‘TELEPHONE PRESCRIPTION’’ forms, 

attached to which are the stickers 

indicating the actual dispensing of 90 

tablets of Lyrica 150 mg. and listing Dr. 

M. as the prescriber. According to these 

documents, Respondent dispensed 

Lyrica to T.M. on November 28, 2008, 

January 6, May 1, June 2 and July 8, 

2009, well after Dr. M. had discharged 

her. 

Subsequently, Mr. Weeks 

(Respondent’s owner) wrote a letter to 

Lauren Patton, an Inspector with the 

South Carolina Department of Health 

and Environmental Control. Affidavit at 

5. Therein, Mr. Weeks asserted that he 

had reviewed the actual prescription-fill 

information, and that subsequent to 

November 28, 2008, Respondent did not 

dispense any more Lyrica to T.M. 

because she was placed on hold while 

the pharmacy waited for her to bring in 

an actual prescription. Id. However, 

other records of Respondent show that 

it billed T.M.’s insurance company for 

Lyrica prescriptions attributed to Dr. M. 

which were dispensed on January 6, 

February 6, March 5, April 3, May 1, 

June 2, July 8, and August 7, 2009. In 

addition, the record includes a 

photograph of a drug vial; the vial bears 

the label of Respondent’s pharmacy and 

indicates that on May 1, 2009, it 

dispensed 60 tablets of Lyrica to T.M., 


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2The Government also alleged that Respondent 

violated 21 CFR 1306.13(a) because it did not fill 

the remainder of a prescription for Dilaudid 

(hydromorphone, a schedule II drug) until well after 

72 hours of its having partially filled the 

prescriptions. The Government’s evidence does not, 

however, establish this violation. 

3As the Supreme Court recently explained, ‘‘the 

prescription requirement * * * ensures patients 

use controlled substances under the supervision of 

a doctor so as to prevent addiction and recreational 

abuse. As a corollary, [it] also bars doctors from 

peddling to patients who crave the drugs for those 

prohibited uses.’’ Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 

274 (2006) (citing United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 

122, 135 (1975)). 

that T.M. was owed 30 tablets of the 

authorized quantity and lists Dr. M. as 

the prescriber. According to the DI’s 

affidavit, during an interview, T.M. 

showed them two vials for Lyrica which 

listed Dr. M. as the prescriber and 

which were dispensed to her by 

Respondent on January 6 and May 1, 

2009.2

Other evidence shows that while 

Respondent repeatedly dispensed 

prescriptions for hydromorphone (a 

schedule II controlled substance), which 

were purportedly authorized by Dr. M., 

a pain management specialist, and did 

so through May 1, 2009, on multiple 

occasions during this period it also 

dispensed hydrocodone to T.M. based 

on prescriptions issued by other 

practitioners. Indeed, on May 1, 2009, 

Respondent dispensed to T.M. 240 

tablets of hydromorphone purportedly 

authorized by Dr. M. and 90 tablets of 

hydrocodone authorized by J.B., a 

Family Nurse Practitioner. Moreover, 

other documents establish that Dr. M. 

and J.B. did not work in the same 

practice. 

The record also includes a copy of a 

‘‘Telephoned Prescription’’ dated ‘‘09/ 

03/09’’ for 28 tablets of ‘‘MSCOTIN [sic] 

30 mg.’’ for patient D.S. According to the 

DI’s affidavit, ‘‘no subsequent written 

order was ever received and Respondent 

did not notify DEA’’ as required under 

21 CFR 1306.11(d)(4). Affidavit at 6. 

However, there is no evidence such as 

prescription labels or a dispensing log 

establishing that the prescription was 

ever actually dispensed. 

The record also contains two 

prescriptions which were issued on 

March 6, 2009, by Dr. S. to J.W. for 60 

tablets of MS Contin (morphine sulfate) 

100 mg. and 180 tablets Roxicodone 

(oxycodone) 30 mg., both of which are 

schedule II controlled substances under 

the CSA and South Carolina law. The 

record further establishes that the 

prescriptions were dispensed on August 

7, 2009, approximately five months after 

they were issued. 

Finally, while the Settlement 

Agreement requires that Respondent 

submit to DEA each quarter a report of 

the schedule II controlled substances it 

dispensed, according to the DI, it has 

never done so. Id. at 7. 

Discussion 

Section 304(a) of the Controlled 

Substance Act provides that ‘‘[a] 

registration * * * to * * * dispense a 

controlled substance * * * may be 

suspended or revoked by the Attorney 

General upon a finding that the 

registrant * * * has committed such 

acts as would render his registration 

under section 823 of this title 

inconsistent with the public interest as 

determined under such section.’’ 21 

U.S.C. 824(a). In determining the public 

interest, the Act directs that the 

Attorney General consider the following 

factors: 

(1) The recommendation of the appropriate 

State licensing board or professional 

disciplinary authority. 

(2) The applicant’s experience in 

dispensing * * * controlled substances. 

(3) The applicant’s conviction record under 

Federal or State laws relating to the 

manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of 

controlled substances. 

(4) Compliance with applicable State, 

Federal, or local laws relating to controlled 

substances. 

(5) Such other conduct which may threaten 

the public health and safety. 

Id. § 823(f). 

‘‘[T]hese factors are * * * considered 

in the disjunctive.’’ Robert A. Leslie, 

M.D., 68 FR 15227, 15230 (2003). I may 

rely on any one or a combination of 

factors, and may give each factor the 

weight I deem appropriate in 

determining whether a registration 

should be revoked and/or an application 

should be denied. Id. Moreover, it is 

well settled that I am ‘‘not required to 

make findings as to all of the factors.’’ 

Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th 

Cir. 2005); see also Morall v. DEA, 412 

F.3d 165, 173–74 (DC Cir. 2005). 

However, the Government has the 

burden of proof. 21 CFR 1301.44(d) & 

(e). 

Having considered all of the factors, I 

conclude that the evidence pertinent to 

factors two and four makes out a prima 

facie showing that Respondent ‘‘has 

committed such acts as would render 

[its] registration * * * inconsistent with 

the public interest.’’ 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). 

Accordingly, Respondent’s registration 

will be revoked and its pending 

application to renew its registration will 

be denied. 

Factors Two and Four—Respondent’s 

Experience in Dispensing Controlled 

Substances and Compliance With 

Applicable Laws Relating to Controlled 

Substances 

Under a longstanding DEA regulation, 

a prescription for a controlled substance 

is unlawful unless it has been ‘‘issued 

for a legitimate medical purpose by an 

individual practitioner acting in the 

usual course of his professional 

practice.’’ 21 CFR 1306.04(a). The 

regulation further provides that while 

‘‘[t]he responsibility for the proper 

prescribing and dispensing of controlled 

substances is upon the prescribing 

practitioner, * * * a corresponding 

responsibility rests with the pharmacist 

who fills the prescription.’’ Id. (emphasis 

added). Continuing, the regulation states 

that ‘‘the person knowingly filling such 

a purported prescription, as well as the 

person issuing it, [is] subject to the 

penalties provided for violations of the 

provisions of law relating to controlled 

substances.’’ Id. 

DEA has consistently interpreted this 

provision as prohibiting a pharmacist 

from filling a prescription for a 

controlled substance when he either 

‘‘knows or has reason to know that the 

prescription was not written for a 

legitimate medical purpose.’’ Medic-Aid 

Pharmacy, 55 FR 30043, 30044 (1990); 

see also Frank’s Corner Pharmacy, 60 

FR 17574, 17576 (1995); Ralph J. 

Bertolino, 55 FR 4729, 4730 (1990); 

United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207, 

213 (6th Cir. 1980). This Agency has 

further held that ‘‘[w]hen prescriptions 

are clearly not issued for legitimate 

medical purposes, a pharmacist may not 

intentionally close his eyes and thereby 

avoid [actual] knowledge of the real 

purpose of the prescription.’’ Bertolino, 

55 FR at 4730 (citations omitted).3

As the evidence shows, Respondent 

violated this regulation on multiple 

occasions when it dispensed 

prescriptions for schedule III controlled 

substances containing hydrocodone to 

L.P., notwithstanding that L.P. was 

filling the prescriptions weeks before a 

previously filled prescription would 

have run out. More specifically, 

pursuant to prescriptions issued by a Dr. 

B., Respondent dispensed 90 tablets of 

hydrocodone to L.P. on April 9 and 24, 

May 2, 5, and 22, June 1 and 20, and 

July 1, 2009. According to Respondent’s 

records, each of these prescriptions 

provided a thirty-day supply to L.P. Yet 

Respondent repeatedly filled 

subsequent prescriptions weeks early. 

Indeed, even ignoring the April 

prescriptions, the May 5 prescription, 

which followed a prescription filled 

three days earlier, was filled nearly four 

weeks early. Given the dates on when 

L.P. presented the prescriptions, I 

conclude that Respondent and its 

employees clearly had reason to know 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
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that the prescriptions were unlawful. I 

thus hold that Respondent violated its 

corresponding responsibility under 

Federal law and DEA’s regulation by 

filling prescriptions which it had reason 

to know were not legitimate. 21 CFR 

1306.04(a); Bertolino, 55 FR at 4730. It 

is also clear that Respondent has 

breached the Settlement Agreement by 

failing to comply with Federal law and 

DEA regulations and by failing to 

institute a policy to prevent the filling 

of unlawful prescriptions. 

The evidence also supports the 

conclusion that Respondent violated 

Federal law when it dispensed 

numerous prescriptions for Lyrica to 

T.M. which were purportedly 

authorized by Dr. M. by telephone. The 

evidence shows that the prescriptions 

were fraudulent because Dr. M. had 

previously discharged T.M. from his 

practice and ceased writing 

prescriptions for her. The evidence also 

shows that Mr. Weeks falsely 

represented to a State inspector that 

Respondent had not dispensed Lyrica 

after November 28, 2008, when, in fact, 

it had dispensed the drug multiple 

times to her. At a minimum, Mr. Weeks’ 

willingness to lie about this issue 

(coupled with his failure to submit any 

evidence rebutting the allegation) 

supports the inference that he and 

Respondent had reason to know that the 

prescriptions were fraudulent and yet 

dispensed them anyway. See 21 U.S.C. 

841(a)(1) and 843(a)(3); 21 CFR 

1306.04(a). 

In addition, the evidence shows that 

Respondent repeatedly dispensed 

narcotic drugs such as hydromorphone 

(also purportedly authorized by Dr. M) 

to T.M. for more than six months after 

she had been discharged by him, and 

that during this time period, it also 

repeatedly dispensed hydrocodone 

based on prescriptions which were 

issued by J.B. (a nurse practitioner). Dr. 

M. and J.B. did not, however, practice 

together. Yet Respondent repeatedly 

dispensed both drugs to T.M. and even 

dispensed both drugs to her on the same 

day (May 1, 2009). Once again, it is clear 

that Respondent violated its 

corresponding responsibility under 21 

CFR 1306.04(a) and the Settlement 

Agreement on numerous occasions. 

The record further establishes that 

Respondent violated South Carolina law 

when, on August 7, 2009, it dispensed 

180 tablets of Roxicodone (oxycodone) 

30 mg. and 60 tablets of MS Contin 

(morphine sulfate) 100 mg. to J.W. based 

on prescriptions which were dated 

March 6, 2009. Both drugs are schedule 

II controlled substances under South 

Carolina law (as they are under the 

CSA). See S.C. Code § 44–53–210(a). 

Under South Carolina law, 

‘‘[p]rescriptions for Schedule II 

substances must be dispensed within 

ninety days of the date of issue, after 

which time they are void.’’ Id. § 44–53– 

360(e). However, on the date 

Respondent dispensed these two 

prescriptions, they were more than five 

months old and were void. I thus 

conclude that Respondent violated 

South Carolina law by dispensing these 

prescriptions. 

Finally, the Settlement Agreement 

clearly required that Respondent submit 

‘‘quarterly reports of all schedule II 

controlled substances [it] dispensed.’’ As 

found above, the DI’s affidavit 

establishes that Respondent has never 

submitted such a report. Respondent is 

therefore in violation of the Settlement 

Agreement for this reason as well. 

I therefore find that Respondent has 

committed acts which render its 

registration ‘‘inconsistent with the 

public interest.’’ 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). 

Accordingly, Respondent’s registration 

will be revoked and its pending 

application to renew its registration will 

be denied. For the same reasons which 

led me to order the immediate 

suspension of Respondent’s registration, 

I conclude that this Order shall be 

effective immediately. 

Order 

Pursuant to the authority vested in me 

by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a), as well 

as 28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.104, I hereby 

order that DEA Certificate of 

Registration, BT2981214, issued to The 

Medicine Dropper, be, and it hereby is, 

revoked. I further order that any 

pending application of The Medicine 

Dropper for renewal or modification of 

its registration be, and it hereby is, 

denied. This Order is effective 

immediately. 

Dated: April 1, 2011. 

Michele M. Leonhart, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2011–8542 Filed 4–8–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

[Docket No. 08–16] 

Four Seasons Distributors, Inc.; Order 

Accepting Settlement Agreement and 

Terminating Proceeding 

On October 31, 2007, the Deputy 

Assistant Administrator, Office of 

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement 

Administration, issued an Order to 

Show Cause to Four Seasons 

Distributors, Inc. (Respondent), of 

Belleville, Illinois. The Show Cause 

Order proposed the revocation of 

Respondent’s Certificate of Registration, 

which authorizes it to distribute listed 

chemicals, and the denial of any 

pending applications to renew or 

modify the registration, on the ground 

that Respondent’s registration is 

‘‘inconsistent with the public interest.’’ 

ALJ Ex. 1 (citing 21 U.S.C. 823(h) & 

824(d)). 

Respondent, through its counsel, 

requested a hearing on the allegations 

and the matter was assigned to an 

agency Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), 

who conducted a hearing on April 21, 

2008. Thereafter, on October 30, 2009, 

the ALJ issued her recommended 

decision. Therein, the ALJ found that 

the Government ‘‘ha[d] not met its 

burden of proof in showing that the 

Respondent’s continued registration 

would be against the public interest’’ 

and recommended that its registration 

be continued. ALJ at 37. The 

Government apparently agreed as it did 

not file exceptions to the ALJ’s decision. 

The ALJ then forwarded the record to 

me for final agency action. 

Thereafter, the parties ‘‘reached a 

settlement of all administrative matters 

pending before’’ me and filed a joint 

motion which requests that I terminate 

the proceedings. Motion to Terminate 

Administrative Proceedings. The parties 

also included a copy of the 

Memorandum of Agreement, setting 

forth the terms of their settlement. 

Having reviewed the ALJ’s decision 

and the terms of the settlement 

agreement, I find that the settlement is 

appropriate and consistent with the 

public interest. Accordingly, the parties’ 

motion to terminate the proceeding is 

hereby granted and the Order to Show 

Cause is dismissed. 

It is so ordered. 

Dated: April 1, 2011. 

Michele M. Leonhart, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2011–8537 Filed 4–8–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

[OMB Number 1110–0002] 

Agency Information Collection 

Activities: Proposed Collection, 

Comments Requested 

ACTION: 30-day Notice of Information 

Collection Under Review: Revision of a 

currently approved collection; 

Supplementary Homicide Report. 


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