### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on

Briefs J une 24, 2003 STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JESSE TUGGLE Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Williamson County No. II-1001-320 Timothy L. Easter, Judge

No. M2002-02426-CCA-R3-CD - F iled December 30, 2003

The appella

nt, Jesse Tuggle, was convicted by a jury in the Williamson County Circuit Court of

one count of forge ry, one cou nt of theft of property valued under $500, and one count of criminal impersonation. The trial court sentenc ed the ap

pellant to one and o ne-half

years of imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the forgery

conviction, elevenmo nt hs an d t we nt ynine day s imprisonm

ent for th e theft c onviction , and six mont hs imprison

ment for t

he crim ina l impersonation conviction. The trial court further ordered the sentenc es to be se rv ed co nc ur re nt ly. On appeal, the appellant contests the sufficiency of the evidencesupporting his forgery conviction and argues that the trial court erre d in denying alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. Tenn. R. App.P. 3 Appe al as of Right ; Judgme nts of the Ci rcuit Court are A ffirmed.
N ORMA M C G EE O GLE , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in whi ch G ARY R. W ADE , P.J., and D AVID H. W ELLES , J., joined. Trudy L. Bloodworth (at trial) a nd Douglas P. Nanney

(on appeal and at trial), Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jesse Tuggle.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter; Thomas E. Williams, II I, Assistant Attorney Genera l; Ronald L . Davis, D istrict At torney Genera l; and L ee Dry er, Assis ta nt Dist

rict Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Te nnessee. OPINION
I. Fact ual Backgro

und
The appellant was indicted by the Williamson County GrandJu ry o n o ne co un t o f for ge ry, one count of theft of property valued under $500, one count of criminal impersonation, and one count of possession of

burgla ry tools. The

trial on th

esecharg es beg an in the Williamson Cou nty Circuit Court on May 8, 2002.-2-

Corp oral Melissa We stbrook with the Br entwood Po lice Dep artment t estified that, due to numerous reports of bur gl ary, she w as patrolling Andrews Cadillac and L and Rover Nashville at 2:45 a.m. on Ma

y 17 , 2001. She

explained

that the p arking

lot of the A

ndrews Ca

dillac de alership “flows into” the

parking lot of the L

and Rover

Nashville

dealer ship. Corp oral Westb rook wa s driving in the parking lot of the Cadillac dealership with her patrol ca r “blacked out,” i.e., the ligh ts on the vehicle were turned off. Fr om her va nt age point, she observed the appellant cr ouched suspiciou sly

between two vehicles in the La nd Rover parking lot. Corporal Westbrook stated that part of the L and Rover

dealer ship is loca

ted in Davidson County and part is locate d in Williamson County

. Base d upon her familiarity with the bounda ry of the two c ounties, Corporal Westbrook knew tha t the appe llant wascrouched in the Willia mson County

portion of

the park ing lot. Corporal Westbrook turned on the lights of her patrol car and “sped towards” the appe llant. The appellant raised from his crouched position, then crouched again, and finally

stood and placed his hand in the right front pocket of his pants. Corporal Westbrook parked and exited her vehicle. She called for

backup, approached

the appellant, and asked for his name. The appellant r eplied that his name was “Jesse Ramsey,”then he immediately stated that his name was “Ramsey Spenc er.” Corporal Westbrook

asked the appella nt for ide ntificat ion. The a

ppellant removed a bifold busi ness card holder from his pocket. The appellant opene d the makeshift wallet and handed t h e officer a check cashing ca

rd. While the appellant was removing the check c ashing card, he att empted to shield from Corporal Westbrook’s view an item in the wallet that appe ared to be a driver’s license. After the appellant presented the check cashing card, Corpora l Westbrook advised the appellant that she needed to see the picture ide ntificat ion th at she had seen in the wallet. The appellant replied, “What?” The appellant thenmaintained that his d river’slicense

was in his v ehicle and that h is vehicle was located behind the L and Rover office building. At that point, Corpor a l Westbrook and the appellant were joined by Detective Adrian

Breedlove of the Brentwood Police Departm ent. At trial, Detective Breedlove testified that the ev en ts to ok pl ac e i n W il li am so n C ou nt y. Corporal Westbro ok asked the appellant why he was at the dealership and the appellant repliedthat

he worked there. Corporal Westbrook noted that throughout the e ncounter the appellant “kept inching further away from th e patrol veh icles.” The officer opined that the appellant wa s attempting to separate the police from their vehicles. Accord ingl y, Corporal Westbrook believed that the appellant was try ing to flee.
The appellant repeatedly

maintained that his driver’s license was in his vehicle. According ly, the officers decided to driv e to the appellant’s vehicle to obtain his driver’s license. Because of safety c oncerns, the officers determined that Detective Breedlove would transport the appellant to his vehicle . Also for

safety reasons , Detec tive Breedlove pe rformed a pat-do wn of the

appella nt in conformancewith police department policy. T he appellant became beligerent with the of ficers and had to be “physica

lly subdue[d]” by

Detective Breedlove.
Af ter conducting the search, Detective Breedlove discovered a Phillips head screwdriver wit h a red plastic handle in the right front po cket of t h e appellant’s pants. Additionally, De tective1 See Te nn. Co de A nn. §§ 39-1 4-70 1 and 39-1 6-60 2 (1 997 ). -3- Breedlovediscovered the bifold wallet the appellant had produced e arlier. Inside the wa llet was an identification card bearing the appellant’s name and photograph. The card ind icated th at it was to be used for identification purposes only . However, the identification card had been altered to make it appear to be a valid Tennessee driver’ s license.
Detective Breedlove placed the appellant und er ar rest for resisting stop, frisk, or halt and possession of burg lary

tools. 1 The offi cers the

n proceeded to the appe llant’s vehicle, which was locatedbehind the Land Rover office building, to conduct an inventory search. Both officers asserted that the appellant’s vehicle was located in Williamson County. The vehic le, which was a dark green Infiniti Q-45, was running whe n the officers arrived. Additionally , the parking lights of the vehicle were on, the stereo was play ing, and the doors of the vehicle w ere unlocked. Upon a search of the vehicle, Detective Breedlove discover ed a Ten nessee d river’slicense

bearing the name “Ramsey Spencer.” The appellant’s photogra ph was on the license. The purporte d driver ’s licens e was discovered in the center console of the vehicle. Additionally , a dealer’s license plate wa s loosely affixed to the rear of

appellant’s vehicle where a reg ular license plate would normally be placed. The license plate could only

be affi xed to the ve

hicle by use of Phillips head

screws. Another

license plate was discovered in the trunk.
Detective Breedlove asserted that the driver’ s license bearing the name “Ramsey Spencer” was “prese

nted to me

de fact o. It w as there .” While the appella nt did not hand th e lic ense to the officers, he stated prior to his arrest that he nee ded to obtain his driver’s license from his vehicle. During the booking proc ess, the appellant was uncooperative, refusing to let polic e take hi s picture or obtain his finger

prints. Th e appell ant also r

efused t o answer questionsregar

ding his n ame or social se curity

number. C orporal

Westbrook

and Detective Br

eedlove stated tha

t the appe lla n t never told them that he was having trouble with his vehicle on the nig ht of his arrest.
Ronnie Reed, the general manag er for Land Rover Nashville, stated that the appellant did not work for Land Rover, nor ha

d he ever worked

for that business. Moreover, Reed confirmed that the license plate found on the appellant’s car bel onged t o the L and Rover

dealer ship and was used when the vehicles were being “demonstra ted.” Reed asserted that the license plates for the business were usually kept in the

office building , but occa sionally the plate s were le

ft on a ve hicle tha t had just been driven. He opined that the dealer’s lice nse plates cost approximately $125 per ta g. Reed stated that

he never gave the appe

llant permission to enter the dealership’s parking lot or to take the dealer’s license plate. Reed ac knowledged that the parking lot of the dea lership was not enclosed by fe

ncing. Reed further conceded that customers occa sionally shopped for vehic les when the business was closed. Finally , Reed confirmed that the portion of the parking lot where

the appel lant was discovered and where the appe llant’s car was located were both in Williamson Cou nty

.-4-

Kenneth Wade Birdwell, the manager of the Financial Responsibility section of t h e Tennessee Department of Safety testifie d that he w as the cu stodian of driver’ s license

record s. He presented the photograph on record for Ramsey Spenc er and compared the photograph to the picture th at was on the driver’s license found in the appellant’s ca r. Birdwell determined that th e photograph

on the lic ense

in the appellant’s car did not match the photograph on recor d for Ramsey Spencer.
The appellant’s wife, Tina Tuggle, t estified that she had been married to the appellant for four and one-half y ears, and the two had a four-y ear-old son. Tuggle worked as the Coodinator of Player Development and Playe

r Personnel for

the Tennessee Titans football team. She testified that the appella

nt worke d as an ind

epende nt contra ctor with several businesses and

often kept odd hours to accommodate his clients. Tuggl e stated that she had been talking with Chuck Hay nes, an employee

of Andre ws Cadillac, regarding her inter est in purchasing a L and Rover vehicl e. Howeve r, Tuggle ultimate ly purchased a different vehicle. Tuggl e explained

that the a ppellant ’s In

finiti had been involved in a car accident prior to Ma y 17, 2001. After the vehicle was rep aired, s he and the appella nt discove

red that the lug n uts of the automobile

were da maged a nd had to b e tighte

ned peri odically

or the ve hicle would begin to shake. The appellant routinely

kept tools with him to tighten the lug nuts. Tuggl e admitted t

h at she was the primary

supporter of the family . The appellant had not made much money

fr om hi s r ec en t j ob s. Ad di ti on al ly, she revealed that she and the appellant had been experiencing financial difficulties for approximately two ye ars prio

r to trial , which difficulties resulted in bankruptcy

proceedings after the off ense occurred.
The trial court granted the appellant a judgment of acquittal on the charge of possession of burglary tools but submitted the remaining charges to the jury. After

deliberation, the jury r

eturned guilty verdicts on the charges of forg ery, thef t, and criminal impersonation.
At the sente ncing hearing , Wanda Sull ivan, a c ourt cle

rk, testif ied that th e appell ant had pa

id only $600 toward payme

nt of his court ordered fees. Sullivan noted that the first $100 pay ment was made shortly after the

trial court thr

eatene d to revok

e his bond, and the remaining $500 pay ment was made following the State’s filing of a motion to revoke the appellant’s bond. After reviewing the appellant’s affidavit of indigency , Sullivan opi ned that the appellant appeared to be capable of paying his fees.
David Pratt, who prepared the appellant’s presentenc e report, testified that he spoke with the appellant and Tug gle sev eral time s by telephone in orde

r to prep are the

report. Pratt

stated that he had some diff

iculty contacting the appellant, but the appellant was coop erative

once Pra tt was abl e to speak with him. Pratt verified that the appellant was employ ed, but he was unable to verify the appellant’s income.-5-

Pratt revealed that according to “Metro records,” the appellant had

previous ly u sed the na

me “Ramsey Spencer ” inconnection with other arrests. Pratt stated that the appellant failed to mention some pri or convictions during their conversations, but the appellant was for the most part forth comin g. Pratt discovered that the appe llant had previous ly

served t wo proba tionary sentenc es.

Pratt reveal ed that the appell ant did not have a history of fe

lony convictions. Pratt utilized the Nation al Crime I

nformati on Center

(NCI C) databa se as par

t of his inve stigatio n of the a ppellant ’ s prior criminal history. Pratt explained that he discovered convictions for the appellant in Davidson County that were not listed on NCIC. Pratt noted that NCI C listed “Ramsey Spencer” as an alias for the appellant; however, the appe llant had no convic tions unde

r the nam e “Ramsey

Spencer .” Pratt acknowledged that NCI

C is sometimes incomplete and is not always 100% ac curate. Tina Tuggl e testifi ed that she filed individually for bank ruptcy after th e offen se but pri or to the appella

nt’s tria l. She main

t ained that their family w as “definitely a two income family.” However, in the foregoing two y ears, the appellant had mostly “sales and commission” jobs beca use his “area of expert ise” wassales. Th

e appell ant did

not earn much and thefamily had to function mainly from Tug gle’s salary , leading to financial problems. Tuggl e explained

that medica

l difficulties exper

ienced b y th

eir son a ccounte d for par

t of their financial difficul

ties. Tug gle ass erted th at she and the appe llant wer e not bein g lax in pa

yin g his court fees, bu t they had to cho ose betw een cou rt fees a nd their s on’s medi cal expen ses. Tug gle explained that she had chos en to pay the costs associa

ted with her son’ s health. Regar

dless, Tug gle testified that s he would make a $2 00 pay ment towa

rds the a ppellant ’s court

fees imme diately following the sentencing hearing

. T uggle main tained th at she and the appe llant shar ed pare nting re sponsibilit

ies. She a

lso maintained that the appellant cared for their son while she was on business related trips. As traveling was a large part of her job, the appe llant’s c aretak

ing wasnecessa

ry . Moreove

r, Tuggle noted that neither she nor the appellant were originally from the area and th erefore had no nearby family or friends who could care for their son while she tra veled. Tug gle explained that Ramsey Spencer is the a ppellant’s young er brother. However, sh e testified that she did notknow that the appellant had ever identified himself by the name “Ramsey Spencer.” She was also unaware of the appellant possessing any falsified identification.
At the conclusion of the sent encing hearing , the tria

l court se ntenced the appe llant as a standar d Range I off

ender to one and one-half y ears of incarceration for the f orgery convict ion , eleven months and twenty-nine day s for the theft conviction, and to six months for the criminal impersonation conviction. The court ordered that the sentences be s er ve d c on cu rr en tl y. Additionally, the trial court denied a lternative sentencing. The appellant timely appealed. II. Analysis-6-

On ap pe al , a ju ry c onviction removes the presumption of the appellant’s innocence and replac es it

with one of guilt, so that the appellant carries the burden of demonstrating to this court wh y the evidence will not support the jury ’s findings. See State v. Tu ggle , 639 S.W.2d 91 3, 91 4 (Tenn. 1982). The appellant must establish that no “reasonable trier of fa ct” could have found the essential elementsof the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. V irginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e).
Ac co rd in gl y, on appeal, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the e vidence and all reasonable inferenceswhich may be dr awn therefrom. See State v. Williams , 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). In o ther words, questions concerning the credibility of witnesses and the weight and value

to be giv en the ev

idence, as well a s all fac tual issue s r ai sed by the evidenc e, are resolvedby the trier of f

act, and not

the appellate courts. See State v. Pr uett , 788 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990). We also note that a guilty ve

rdict can be based upon direct evidence , circumstantial evidence, or a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence. See State v. Knight , 969 S.W.2d 941, 959 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
On appeal, the appellant

contests only the sufficiency of the evidenc e supporting his forgery conviction. Therefore, we will not address any concerns with the sufficien cy underly ing his theft or criminal im persona

ti on convictions. Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-114(a) (1997) provides that “[a] pe

rson comm

its an off ense who forge s a writin g with int

ent to defraud or harm another .” Tenne ssee Code Annotate d section

39-14-11 4 furthe

r provide s: (b)(1) “Forge”means to: (A) Alter, make, complete, execut e or authe nticate a ny w riting so that it purports to: (i) Be t he act of another who did not

authorize that act; (ii) Have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case; or (iii) Be a copy

of an original when no such original e xisted; (B) Mak e false entries in books or

record s; (C) Issue, transfer, r

egister the transfer

of, pass, publish, or other wise utter a writing that is forged within the meaning of su bdivision (1)(A); or (D) Possess a w

riting th at is forg ed within t he meanin g o f subdivision (1)(A) with inten t t o utte r it in a ma

nner spe cified in subdivision (1)(C); and-7- ( 2) “Writing” includes printing or any other method of recordin g information, mo ne y, coins, tok ens, stam ps, seals , credit

cards, b adges , trademarks, and sy

mbols of value, right, privilege or identification.
Possession of an object can be eithe r actu al or constructive. See State v. Transou , 928 S.W.2d 949, 955 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). To find constructive possession, the State must show that the pers on accu sed had th e power and inten tion at a g iven time to exercise dominion and control over the object directly or

through others. See State v. Cooper , 736 S.W.2d 12 5, 129 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1987) . In other words, “‘c onstructive possession is the ability to reduce an objectto actual possession.’” Id. (quot ing State v. Will iams , 623 S.W.2d 121, 125 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981)).
In the instant case, the State elected to proce ed based upon the appellant’s possession of a driver’s license bearing the name “Ramsey Spencer.” The record

reflects that the appellant, upon questioning by police, stated that his name w as “Ramsey Spenc er.” He repeatedly maintained that his identific ation wasin his vehicle . In f act, the appella nt offer ed to obta in his driver’s license from his vehicle for the officers’ inspection. To ensure the safety of

the officers, D etective Br eedlove informedthe appellant that he would drive the appellant to his ve hicle, but he wo uld need to patdown the appellant prior

to allowing him into the patrol car. Subsequent to the pat-down, Detective Breedlovearrested the appe llant for resisting stop, fris k, or halt

and posse ssion of bu

rglar y to ols. After the arrest, the officers perfor med an inventory sear

ch of the appellant’s vehicle and discovered a driver’s license bearing the appellant’s photograph and the name “Ramsey Spencer.”
Ad di ti on al ly, the Department of Safety driving records r evealed that the photograph on record for Ramsey Spenc er did n ot match the photograph on the driver’s license f ound in the appellant vehicle. Instead, the photog raph on the drive

r’s lice nse found in the app ellant’svehicle was that of the appellant. The proof demonstrated that the appella

nt possess ed the fo

rged li cense withthe intent to utter it to Detective Breedlove, as evidenced by the appellant’s r epeated offers to obta in his identification from his vehicle. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-114 (b)(1)(D). The onl y license found in the vehicle was fraudulent. The evidence s u pports the jury’s deter mination that appellant acted with the intent to defraud the police concerning his identity. Accordingly , we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the appellant’s for gery conviction.
We note also that the appellant raised questions concerning the proof of venue. This court has explained: The state has the burden to prove that the offense w as committed in

the co un ty o f t he in di ct me nt . V en ue ma y be sh ow n b y a preponderance

of the ev

idence, which may

be eithe

r direc t, circumst antial, or a combination of both. Ven

ue is not an element of the offense. . . . Rule 18(b) of the Tennessee R ules of Cr

im inal Procedure provides that “if one or more elements of an offe nse are-8- committed in one county and one or mor e eleme nts in another, the offense may

be prosecuted in either county .”
Statev. Smith , 926 S. W.2d 267, 269 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (citations omitted). In the instant case, the State provided ample proof t hat the appel lant posse ssed the f orged driver’ s license

in Williamson County. Thus, the State established venue by a preponderance of the evidenc e. B. Sentencing
The appellant does not contest the length of his sentences. His sole complaint regarding sentencing is that the trial court denied alternative sentencing. Appe llate review of the length, range or manner of service of a sentence is de novo. See Te nn. Code A nn. § 40 -35 -40 1(d ) (1 997 ). In conducting i ts de no vo re vi ew , t hi s c ou rt co ns id er s t he fo ll ow in g f ac to rs : ( 1) th e e vi de nc e, if an y, received at the tri al and the

sentenc ing hea

ring; ( 2) th e pres entence report; (3) the principles of sentencing and arg

uments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and chara cteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offer ed by the parties on enhancement and mitigating fac to rs ; ( 6) an y s tatement by the def endant in his own behalf; and (7) the potential for rehabilitation or treatment. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103, -210 (1997 an d 2003); see also State v. Ashby , 823 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991). Moreover, if the record reve als that the trial court adequa tely consider ed sente ncing p rinciple s and all r

elevant f act s and circumstances, this court will accord the trial court’s determinations a presumption of cor rec tness. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401 (d); Ashby , 823 S.W.2d a t 169. Reg ardless , the burde n is on the a

ppellant to demonst

rate the impropriety of his sentence s. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 401, Senten cing Commission Comments.
We note that an appellant is eligible for alternative sentencing if the sen tence a ctually imposed is eight yea

rs or less. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(a) (1997). Moreover, an appellant who is an especi al ly m itigate d or stand ard off ender c onvicted

of a ClassC, D, or E f elony is presumedto be a favorable candidate for a lternative sentencing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 102(6). The appellant was sentenced a s a standard Range I

offender for his Class E felony conviction for forgery

and the sentence imposed was less than eight y ears; accordingly , he i s presu med to be a fav orabl e candi date fo r alte rnati ve sen tenci ng. The appella

nt was als o convicted of theft o f proper ty v alued und

er $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and crim

inal imper sonation, a Class B misdemeanor. We note that the trial court has the authority to place a

misdemeanant on probation either after service of a portion of the sentence in confine ment or imm

ediately after sentencing. SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-302(e)(1)(2) (1997 and 2 003). However, we note that, while certain Class C, D, or E of fenders are entitled to a presumption in favor of probation, the appellant is ent it led to no su ch presu

mption reg arding

his misdemeanor

sentenc es. See State v. Will iams , 914 S.W.2d 940, 949 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Our supreme court has observed

that “[i]n addition to the statutory considera tions for issuing sentences of confinement, the misdemeanor sentencing statute mer ely re quire s a trial judge to consider-9-

enhancement

and mitigating factors when calculating the percentag e of a misdemeanor sentenc e to be served in confinement.” State v. Troutman , 979 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Tenn. 1998).
The presumption in favor of alternative sentencing may be rebutted by “ evidence to the contrary .” State v. Z

eolia , 928 S.W.2d 457, 461 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). The following sentencing consider ations, set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103(1), ma y cons titut e “evidence to the contrary ”: (A) Confi nemen t is n ecessa ry to prot ect so ciety by rest raini ng a defenda nt who hasa long h

istory of crimin al conduct; (B) Confinement

is necessary

to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense or confinement is part icul arly suited to provide an effective deterrence

to others likely to commit similar offenses; or (C) Measures les s restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant.
Zeolia , 928 S.W.2d at 461

. In the instant case, the trial court initially state d that it would consider the circumstances of the offense and the principles of sentencing . Next, the trial court observed that the appellant qualified for the presumption in favor of alternative sentencing . However, the trialcourt determined that alternative sentencing was not appropria te be cause of the appellant’s long history of criminal conduct. The court acknowledged that the a ppellant had no felony c onvictions but ne verth eless determinedthat the appellant’s misdemeanor history was sufficient

to deny alter nativ e sent encin g. The appellant’s presentence report re flects that the appellant has six prior misdemeanor convicti ons, including convictions for assau lt, driving while impaired, disorderly conduct, and resisting stop, frisk, or halt. When arrested for three of these of fe nses, th e appellant represented himself to be “Ramsey Spenc er.” We conclude that this is sufficie

nt crimina

l history to overc ome the presumption in favor of alternative sentencing.
Ad di ti on al ly, the appe

llant has p

reviousl y se rved pro batio nary sentenc es and ha s failed t o reform. Therefore, the record re veals tha t “[m]ea sures less restrictive than confinement have freque ntly or recently

been applied unsuccessfully to the [appellant.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40 -35- 103(1)(C). Accord ingl y , we conclude that the trial court did not err in deny ing alternative sentencing.-10- III. Conclusion We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEE OGLE, JUDGE