Affirmed and Opinion filed November 8, 2016.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-16-00427-CV

IN THE MATTER OF C.M.M.

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 15JV0434

O P I N I O N

Appellant C.M.M. is a juvenile charged with capital murder of his mother 

and her unborn child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 2016). 

He challenges the order granting the State’s petition for the juvenile court to waive 

jurisdiction and transfer him to criminal district court. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 54.02 (Vernon 2014), § 56.01 (Vernon Supp. 2016).

Appellant challenges the order on grounds that (1) there is no probable cause 

to believe he committed the alleged offense because there is no evidence of the 

unborn child’s cause of death, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in 
2

transferring the case because the trial court did not sufficiently consider the 

required factors. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Appellant’s Activities

Appellant was 14 years old in September 2015 and lived with his mother, 

Nicole.

1 Recorded statements made to police and admitted into evidence without 

objection at the transfer hearing describe the following events occurring between 

Tuesday, September 22 and Sunday, September 27, 2015.

Around 10:00 p.m. on Tuesday, appellant texted his friend, Trace, to see if 

Trace and his sister, Beth, wanted to get together. Beth and Trace agreed, snuck 

out of their house, and met appellant at a nearby store. Appellant was driving a

late-model black Nissan, which he told them his mother’s pimp bought for him. He 

also had a large amount of cash; the bag holding the money had a sticky note with 

“900” written on it. Appellant told them the money was from Nicole’s pimp as 

well. As soon as they got in the car, appellant offered his friends money from a 

“big stack of twenties” in case they wanted to buy anything to eat or drink. 

Appellant then drove his friends to pick up Ella, Trace’s girlfriend. 

Appellant drove Beth, Trace, and Ella to a residence where he paid $40 for 

marijuana while the three passengers stayed in the car. All four teenagers then 

went to a park, where they drank alcohol and smoked marijuana. Beth and 

appellant talked for one to two hours in the park. Beth described appellant as 

“chill” while she was with him. Trace, however, said appellant was acting 

“sketchy” that evening—by which he meant appellant was “always looking 

around, checking his phone, stuff like that.”

 

1 We use fictitious names to refer to the complainant and witnesses in this case.
3

The group left the park and appellant said he wanted to drive by his house to 

see if his mother or the police were there. No one asked appellant why he thought 

the police would be at his house. Neither Beth nor Trace knew what his house 

looked like or where he lived. They knew only that appellant did not stop or slow 

down at a house. He then drove his three friends to a fast food restaurant and paid 

for their food. 

At some point during the evening while the four were in the car, appellant 

said his mother was pregnant and he did not want a baby brother. Appellant also 

said he told his mother he would kill her or the baby. Then he told his friends he 

was just joking and would not do that. Beth took his statement as a joke. Trace 

recalled that a few months earlier appellant told him Nicole was pregnant; he did 

not want a sibling; and he would “beat the [expletive]” out of the baby.

Appellant announced he was driving out of town that night and invited his 

friends to accompany him. They declined. At Beth’s request, appellant drove them 

all home after midnight.

Appellant drove to Seguin, Texas early Wednesday to see his friend, Carlos. 

He arrived before dawn and waited until Carlos was out of school. He then texted 

Carlos and told him he was coming to see him. When Carlos asked why, appellant 

said he did not want to talk about it until they could talk in person.

When Carlos got home, he and appellant talked in the Nissan. Carlos saw 

cuts on appellant’s hands. Appellant told Carlos he found his mother in the living 

room stabbing herself and he “finished her off” by holding a towel over her mouth 

and nose to “put her out of her misery.” Carlos believed Nicole was high on drugs 

at the time. Carlos urged appellant to turn himself in right away, but appellant 

refused. 
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Appellant, Carlos, and Carlos’s mother drove to Houston and stayed at the 

Astro Inn. Appellant drank alcohol and smoked marijuana. Carlos was scared and 

did not tell his mother what appellant had told him. It appears Carlos’s mother did 

not know Nicole was dead because at some point, she instructed the boys to go 

“make things right” with Nicole. 

B. Discovery of the Body

Neighbors noticed on Wednesday that the front door to Nicole’s house was 

slightly ajar. One neighbor entered the house on Saturday, discovered Nicole’s 

body on the kitchen floor, and called the police. It later was estimated Nicole had 

been dead for three or four days when her body was discovered.

Detective Sergeant Spruill, Detective Walton, and Detective Samuelson of 

the La Marque Police Department arrived at the scene, which Spruill described as 

“violent” and “horrific.” The kitchen floor was covered with blood. Spruill said it 

looked like somebody had been “sliding around in the blood, running barefoot 

through the blood.” A pair of slip-on shoes with blood on them sat on the floor

inside the entrance to the kitchen. A blood-covered knife with a bent tip rested on a 

night table in a room determined to be appellant’s bedroom. Pants and a blue jacket 

lay crumpled on the bathroom floor. The clothes were surrounded by bloody 

shoeprints. While at the house, Spruill and Walton learned appellant lived in the 

house but was not there, and a car was missing. At that point, they did not know if 

appellant was a victim, a suspect, or neither. They reported him as a missing 

person. 

C. Appellant’s Statements to Police

Appellant called relatives on Sunday, and an aunt picked him up. Appellant 

left the Nissan at the Astro Inn. The aunt called the police and said appellant was 

with her and his paternal grandparents at their house in Houston. Spruill, Walton, 
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and Lieutenant Waggoner, also of the La Marque Police Department, drove to the 

grandparents’ house, where appellant was sitting on the couch. Either he or a 

relative said the family already knew Nicole was dead. 

As a located missing child, appellant was supposed to be returned to his 

father. Appellant adamantly refused to go with his father. His aunt and 

grandparents also expressed concern about appellant being with his father. The 

police officers asked appellant “if he wanted to talk about it,” and he said yes. 

Appellant rode in Waggoner’s vehicle to go to the police station. On the way, 

appellant directed the officers to the Astro Inn so they could recover the Nissan. 

His grandparents were offered the opportunity to ride with appellant, but they 

elected to follow in their own car. They were at the station while he spoke with the 

officers.

Appellant was not then considered to be a suspect in Nicole’s murder. 

Nevertheless, the officers had him admonished by a magistrate in case he became a 

suspect during the interview.

The interview lasted two hours and twenty minutes. Spruill, Walton, 

Waggoner, and Samuelson each questioned appellant; for most of the time, only 

two officers were in the room. A recording of the interview was admitted into 

evidence over appellant’s objection. Spruill’s written summary of the interview

also was admitted over appellant’s objection.

Appellant’s recounting of events changed over the course of the interview. 

In appellant’s first version of events during his interview, appellant said he and 

Nicole were arguing on Tuesday about his attendance at an alternative high school. 

After the argument, appellant said, Nicole left with a white male whom appellant 

assumed to be her boyfriend. The man and Nicole left in an Escalade, but the 

Nissan remained at the house. On Wednesday around 6:00 p.m., Nicole was still 
6

gone, so appellant left in the Nissan to go pick up Beth and Trace. After spending 

the evening with them, appellant drove to Seguin to see Carlos.

The officers noticed that appellant made inconsistent statements regarding 

which cell phone he used to contact his friends. When asked, appellant said the 

clothes he was wearing during the interview were the same clothes he wore when 

he left his house on Wednesday.

Asked how he felt about his mother’s death, appellant said he felt terrible 

and had been crying all day. He said he did not know how she was killed, and he 

had not been “able to do any research.” The officers told him they believed he 

knew something about the murder. Appellant responded that if he was going to kill 

somebody, he “would have at least cleaned up the body and tried to hide it 

somewhere.” He also said, “[I]f I had murdered my mom, I would have rolled her 

body up in a blanket or something and put it in the car and drove somewhere. 

That’s how I would have done it, but that’s my mom even then, so I wouldn’t do 

that in the first place.” To that point, about 40 minutes into the interview, there had 

been no mention of what the crime scene looked like or the amount of blood at the 

scene.

The officers repeatedly encouraged appellant to tell his side of the story or 

else “the evidence would tell the story.” He said he had been scared to tell, but he 

found Nicole stabbing herself because she was high on methamphetamine. He was 

outside painting a cabinet, then came in and found her on the floor bleeding and 

“pretty much unconscious.” Appellant said he did not know what to do, so he held 

her and pulled the knife from her throat. The tip of the knife was bent. Because “it 

was too late for her,” he told officers he “grabbed a wire” and strangled her with it.

The officers expressed their disbelief that Nicole was stabbing herself.

Appellant insisted he was telling the truth—that she stabbed herself and was 
7

“barely breathing” so he “choked her” because he wanted to “put her out of her 

misery.” He told them her legs were crossed when he found her. Crime scene 

photos admitted into evidence show Nicole’s legs crossed at the ankles, but 

appellant did not see those photos before he mentioned the position of her legs.

Spruill testified at the transfer hearing regarding his reaction to appellant’s 

statement about his mother’s legs:

[H]e said that her legs were crossed, which . . . drew some concern 

just for the fact alone when you walk in and you see your mother

laying on the floor with that amount of blood and you indicate you 

recall her legs being crossed. But that was a corroborating statement 

on his part to the . . . crime scene.

As the officers continued to challenge appellant’s story, appellant again said he 

found Nicole on the kitchen floor near the sink “killing herself” with a knife in her 

throat. When appellant was asked why she would stab herself, he said he believed 

she felt bad about taking methamphetamine while she was pregnant. He also said 

Nicole told him at some point that she could not pay for an abortion because she 

had to take care of appellant. 

Appellant said he was mad she was “doing this” so he “stabbed her a couple 

of times, too.” When asked why, appellant said, “In a way I guess you can say I 

didn’t want her to live. I didn’t feel like she deserved to because she has lost all my 

siblings.” He said he stabbed her in the back of her neck because he thought it 

would be the fastest cause of death. Appellant told the officers he dragged her to 

the middle of the floor but did not stab her any more. He said she was bleeding and 

he did not want her to suffer, so he choked her. 

Then, appellant said, he undressed and took a shower. He said he had been 

wearing a blue jacket and pants, not the clothes he was wearing at the time of the 
8

interview, as he had stated earlier. He then dressed, took money, and left. He came 

back and she was not breathing. He put the dog in the bathroom and left again.

D. The Autopsy

Nobby C. Mambo, M.D. of the Galveston County Medical Examiner’s 

Office conducted an autopsy on Nicole’s body. The autopsy report was admitted 

into evidence on appellant’s proffer.

A two-strand electrical cord nearly a foot long was tightly wrapped around 

Nicole’s neck. The cord was associated with a fracture of her left hyoid bone. 

Nicole had 55 stab wounds on her scalp, temple, forehead, cheek, jaw, neck, 

shoulders, chest, back, arms, hands, and thighs. Some of the wounds were 

superficial; some penetrated muscles or other soft tissue. Blood tests revealed 

positive results for alcohol (specifically ethanol), amphetamine, and 

methamphetamine.

A male fetus estimated to be of 17 weeks’ gestation was in Nicole’s uterus. 

Several loops of the tri-vessel cord were around its neck. 

Dr. Mambo concluded the cause of Nicole’s death was strangulation and the 

manner of death was homicide. The autopsy report does not include findings on the 

cause or manner of the fetus’s death.

TRANSFER HEARING

The State instituted this case in October 2015 by filing a petition in a county 

court at law, sitting as a juvenile court, alleging appellant engaged in delinquent 

conduct. In February 2016, the State filed a petition for waiver of jurisdiction and 

discretionary transfer to district court. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02. 

The trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s transfer petition over the 

course of four days in May 2016. See id. § 54.02(c). The State presented testimony 
9

from Spruill, Walton, and Jenine Collins Boyd, Ph.D., a psychologist who 

evaluated appellant. Appellant presented testimony from Walton; Bryan Sweeney, 

Ph.D., another psychologist who evaluated appellant; a friend of appellant’s 

family; an officer with the Galveston County Juvenile Justice Department; and 

appellant’s grandfather. Nearly 150 exhibits were admitted into evidence, 

including recorded statements by appellant and other witnesses.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court orally announced it would 

waive jurisdiction and transfer the case to district court. The court later signed an 

order specifically stating the reasons for waiver. See id. § 54.02(h). This appeal 

timely followed. Id. § 56.01(c)(1)(A).

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Standards for Waiver of Juvenile Jurisdiction

Texas juvenile courts have exclusive, original jurisdiction over cases 

involving what otherwise would be criminal conduct by children 10 years of age or 

older but younger than 17 years of age. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 51.02(2)(a), 

51.03(a)(1), 51.04(a) (Vernon Supp. 2016). If a juvenile court determines after an 

evidentiary hearing that certain requirements are satisfied, it may waive its 

jurisdiction and transfer a child to the district court for criminal proceedings. Id.

§ 54.02(a), (c).

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has stated as follows:

The transfer of a juvenile offender from juvenile court to criminal 

court for prosecution as an adult should be regarded as the exception, 

not the rule; the operative principle is that, whenever feasible, children 

and adolescents below a certain age should be ‘protected and 

rehabilitated rather than subjected to the harshness of the criminal 

system.’ Because the waiver of juvenile-court jurisdiction means the 

loss of that protected status, in Kent v. United States, the United States 

Supreme Court characterized the statutory transfer proceedings . . . as 
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‘critically important,’ and held that any statutory mechanism for 

waiving juvenile-court jurisdiction must at least ‘measure up to the 

essentials of due process and fair treatment.’

Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (quoting Kent v. United 

States, 383 U.S. 541, 560–62 (1966)).

The statutory requirements for waiver of jurisdiction and transfer are as 

follows:

(1) the child is alleged to have violated a penal law of the grade of 

felony;

(2) the child was:

(A) 14 years of age or older at the time he is alleged to have 

committed the offense, if the offense is a capital felony, 

an aggravated controlled substance felony, or a felony of 

the first degree, and no adjudication hearing has been 

conducted concerning that offense; or

(B) 15 years of age or older at the time he is alleged to have 

committed the offense, if the offense is a felony of the 

second or third degree or a state jail felony, and no 

adjudication hearing has been conducted concerning that 

offense; and

(3) after a full investigation and a hearing, the juvenile court 

determines that there is probable cause to believe that the child 

before the court committed the offense alleged and that because 

of the seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of 

the child the welfare of the community requires criminal 

proceedings. 

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a).

In making the determination required by section 54.02(a)(3), the juvenile 

court shall consider, among other matters, the following:
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(1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, 

with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against 

the person;

(2) the sophistication and maturity of the child;

(3) the record and previous history of the child; and

(4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the 

likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of 

procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the 

juvenile court.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(f). Any combination of these criteria may suffice to 

support a waiver of jurisdiction; not every criterion need weigh in favor of transfer. 

Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 47 & n.78. “The trial court is bound only to consider these . . 

. factors in deciding whether to waive jurisdiction. The court need not find that 

each factor is established by the evidence.” In re D.L.N., 930 S.W.2d 253, 258 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ).

If the juvenile court decides to waive jurisdiction, it must make findings of 

fact and specify its reasons for waiver in a written order. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 54.02(h). The trial court must “show its work.” Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 49. 

B. Appellate Review

Our review of a transfer order is two-pronged. First, we review the juvenile 

court’s specific findings of fact concerning the section 54.02(f) factors under a 

“traditional sufficiency of the evidence review.” Id. at 47. Under a legal sufficiency 

challenge, we credit evidence favorable to the challenged finding and disregard 

contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder could not reject the evidence. 

Moon v. State, 410 S.W.3d 366, 371 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 

451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). If more than a scintilla of evidence 

supports the finding, the no-evidence challenge fails. Moon, 410 S.W.3d at 371. 
12

Under a factual sufficiency challenge, we consider all the evidence presented to 

determine if the court’s findings are against the great weight and preponderance of 

the evidence so as to be clearly wrong or unjust. Id.

Second, we review the juvenile court’s waiver decision for an abuse of 

discretion. Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 47. That is, in reviewing the juvenile court’s 

conclusion that the seriousness of the offense alleged and/or the background of the 

juvenile calls for criminal proceedings for the welfare of the community, we ask, in 

light of our own analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the section 

54.02(f) factors and any other relevant evidence, whether the juvenile court acted 

without reference to guiding rules or principles. Id. A juvenile court abuses its 

discretion when its decision to transfer is essentially arbitrary, given the evidence 

upon which it was based. Id. By contrast, a waiver decision representing “a 

reasonably principled application of the legislative criteria” generally will pass 

muster under this standard of review. Id. at 49. “[A] juvenile court that shows its 

work should rarely be reversed.” Id.

ANALYSIS

I. Probable Cause

In his first issue, appellant contends the record does not support a finding of 

probable cause to believe he committed the alleged offense because there is no 

evidence Nicole’s unborn child died as a result of appellant’s actions. See Tex. 

Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a)(3). 

A. Review of Probable Cause Determination

“Probable cause” is defined as sufficient facts and circumstances to warrant 

a prudent person to believe the suspect committed or was committing the offense. 

D.L.N., 930 S.W.2d at 256. The probable cause standard embraces a practical, 
13

common sense approach rather than the more technical standards applied when 

assessing whether proof rises to standards such as beyond a reasonable doubt or 

preponderance of the evidence. Id.; In re J.G., 495 S.W.3d 354, 373–74 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. filed) (finding probable cause that juvenile

who was a party to the offense committed murder).

Probable cause is based on probabilities; it requires more than mere 

suspicion but less evidence than that needed to support a conviction or support a 

finding by a preponderance of the evidence. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

B. Application

Appellant is charged with capital murder based on the murder of more than 

one person during the same criminal transaction. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. 

§ 19.03(a)(7)(A). “Person” is defined as an individual, corporation, or association. 

Id. § 1.07(38) (Vernon Supp. 2016). “Individual” means “a human being who is 

alive, including an unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until 

birth.” Id. § 1.07(26).

Appellant asserts there is no probable cause to believe he committed capital 

murder because there is no evidence the unborn child did not die of other causes

before Nicole died. He contends the unborn child could have died as a result of the 

tri-vessel cord around its neck or Nicole’s drug abuse.

This contention fails because there is evidence supporting the trial court’s 

determination of probable cause. Appellant told police that Nicole said she could 

not afford an abortion. This statement supports a probable cause finding because 

Nicole’s contemplation of an abortion indicates she had a viable pregnancy that 

would have continued to term if she had not been killed. Proof beyond a reasonable 

doubt is not required to find probable cause. Probable cause is based on “factual 
14

and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent 

[people], not legal technicians, act.” Guzman, 955 S.W.3d at 87. A reasonable, 

prudent person could assume Nicole’s unborn child was alive until Nicole was 

murdered.

In any event, the record supports the trial court’s finding of probable cause 

even without appellant’s statement regarding Nicole’s contemplation of obtaining 

an abortion. There is no dispute that: (1) appellant strangled Nicole by wrapping an 

electrical cord around her neck, and (2) Nicole’s cause of death, according to the 

medical examiner, was strangulation. Lay people understand maternal death can 

cause fetal death. Cf. Eguia v. State, 288 S.W.3d 1, 9–10 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (evidence showed cause of unborn child’s death was 

caused by death of mother). It is reasonable to believe, at this early stage of the 

case, that appellant caused Nicole’s death, which, in turn, caused the unborn 

child’s death. See Guzman, 955 S.W.3d at 87.

After considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the record 

contains information sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe appellant 

caused the death of his mother and his unborn sibling. We overrule appellant’s first 

issue.

II. Section 54.02(f) Factors

Appellant’s second issue concerns the trial court’s findings regarding the 

four factors in section 52.04(f). He contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

waiving its exclusive juvenile jurisdiction and transferring the case to district court

based on those findings. That contention invokes the second part of our review 

under Moon, in which we ask, “in light of [our] own analysis of the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support the Section 54.02(f) factors and any other relevant 

evidence, whether the juvenile court acted without reference to guiding rules or 
15

principles.” Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 47. Accordingly, even though appellant does not 

explicitly challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support any 52.04(f) finding 

by the trial court, we will conduct our own sufficiency analysis as part of our 

determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id.

Appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider 

all of the required factors under section 54.02(f) before finding that, because of the 

seriousness of the offense alleged or appellant’s background, the welfare of the 

community requires criminal proceedings. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a)(3). 

Those factors are as follows: (1) whether the alleged offense was against person or 

property, with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against the 

person; (2) the sophistication and maturity of the child; (3) the record and previous 

history of the child; and (4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and 

the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and 

facilities currently available to the juvenile court. Id. § 54.02(f).

A. Evidence Addressing the 54.02(f) factors

Evidence addressing the section 54.02(f) factors came from two 

psychologists who evaluated appellant: Jenine Collins Boyd, Ph.D., appointed by 

the trial court, and Bryan Sweeney, Ph.D., retained by appellant. Neither party 

challenges the qualifications of Dr. Boyd or Dr. Sweeney.

1. Dr. Boyd

Dr. Boyd met with appellant twice while appellant was detained in a juvenile 

facility. Appellant was 15 years old by that time. Dr. Boyd administered three 

tests—one each for intelligence, achievement, and personality—and interviewed

appellant. Appellant’s lawyer was present when Dr. Boyd interviewed appellant 

and appellant’s father. Her written report regarding her evaluation was admitted 
16

into evidence at the transfer hearing without objection. She also testified at the 

transfer hearing.

Dr. Boyd described appellant as respectful and cooperative during their 

visits. He exhibited no unusual mood changes. She observed no overt signs of 

delusion, auditory or visual hallucinations, or a thought disorder, and appellant 

denied a history of delusions or hallucinations. His father described him as 

intelligent, kind, calm, and polite.

Appellant recounted his unstable childhood for Dr. Boyd. He lived with his 

mother until he was four years old, but then the Department of Family and 

Protective Services (“the Department”) removed him from her care and placed him 

in foster care. Dr. Boyd did not know but assumed the removal was due to Nicole’s 

alleged abuse or neglect of appellant. Appellant believed his father reported his 

mother to the Department, which made appellant angry with his father. 

Appellant lived with his maternal grandparents from age six to eight. He told 

Dr. Boyd they left him in a camper during a fire while they called 911, which made 

him feel abandoned, and he did not want to see them again. He was returned to

Nicole briefly, but the Department removed him again when he was nine years old. 

Dr. Boyd had no Department records to review.

Appellant lived with his father and his two paternal half-sisters beginning in 

March 2010. Appellant’s half-sisters moved out in June 2013, and appellant was 

left alone with his father. A year later his father went to jail; the reason for his 

father’s incarceration is not clear from the record.

Appellant lived with his paternal grandparents for six months after his father 

went to jail. During that time, appellant said, he repeatedly called his mother and 
17

asked to live with her. His grandparents did not agree, but they finally allowed him 

to move in with Nicole in December 2014. 

Nicole was hospitalized due to seizures in February 2015, so appellant 

stayed with Nicole’s friend, Opal. While at Opal’s house, appellant mutilated his 

arms. His mother was out of the hospital by this time but apparently was 

“unavailable,” so Opal called the police. The police were set to return appellant to 

his father’s care, but appellant wanted nothing to do with his father, so he ran away 

and lived with friends. The police eventually located appellant and returned him to 

his mother’s home. Appellant told Dr. Boyd he did not want to be around Nicole’s 

boyfriend, so he moved into a motel for two weeks. He experienced suicidal 

ideation at the motel. He felt “down and depressed,” and he put a gun to his head 

but “couldn’t pull the trigger.”

Appellant first drank alcohol at age 12 at a party with his mother. He first 

smoked marijuana when he was 12 years old as well, this time with his father. He 

smoked marijuana daily during the three years he lived with his father. Appellant 

occasionally participated in Native American sweat lodges with his aunt. Peyote 

was present in the sweat lodges, but Dr. Boyd did not know if appellant ingested it. 

Appellant knew his mother was a dancer at a strip club and that she 

continually abused drugs. She had financial difficulties throughout appellant’s life; 

at times there was little to no food in the house, and they were evicted at least once. 

Dr. Boyd did not have access to all of appellant’s school records, but no 

significant deficits were noted on the records she did review. Appellant told her he

had been suspended from school more than once for drug use and fighting. Two 

weeks before Nicole’s death, appellant was suspended for five days for smoking 

marijuana in a school bathroom. He was referred to an alternative high school as a 

result.
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Dr. Boyd found appellant to possess average intellectual potential and 

excellent computational math skills. He read and spelled at an eighth- and ninthgrade level, respectively. His math-computation ability was higher than a twelfthgrade level.

Appellant’s responses on the personality test were inconsistent and therefore 

considered invalid. His father’s responses on the parent version of that test were 

considered valid and showed “an elevation” on a scale measuring conduct 

problems. Conduct noted by appellant’s father included using foul language, 

stealing, sneaking around, smoking or chewing tobacco, lying, using illegal drugs, 

deceiving others, and breaking rules to see what will happen. Dr. Boyd said some

of that behavior is typical of teenagers and some is considered delinquent.

After completing her evaluation, Dr. Boyd concluded appellant is similar to 

other 15-year-old children in his sophistication and maturity and does not possess 

any intellectual deficits or naiveté compared to his peers. He can make good 

decisions when he so desires. Her diagnostic impressions were conduct disorder, 

cannabis abuse, neglect of a child (victim), and physical abuse of a child (victim).

Dr. Boyd recommended that appellant receive rehabilitative services in a 

secure facility where his educational and counseling needs can be met. She said he 

needs behavior modification, resocialization, substance abuse services, and 

empathy training. Additionally, appellant’s mental status should be monitored due 

to the seriousness of the charge against him, his previous self-mutilation, and his 

previous thoughts of suicide. In her opinion, because appellant was already 15 

years old, the juvenile system would not have time to provide him sufficient 

services before he aged out of the system. She found no contraindications to 

appellant’s being in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice if he 

is certified as an adult. On cross-examination at the transfer hearing, Dr. Boyd 
19

agreed there were no contraindications to appellant’s being retained in the juvenile 

system and sentenced under the determinate sentencing statute, which permits 

sentences up to 40 years in certain situations. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 53.045

(Vernon Supp. 2016), § 54.04011 (Vernon 2014).

2. Dr. Sweeney

Dr. Sweeney spent seven to eight hours interviewing and administering 

psychological tests to appellant. Dr. Sweeney has treated juveniles who have been 

convicted, but he has not worked for the juvenile justice system. His knowledge of 

the juvenile system comes from governmental reports, articles, and conversations 

with people. Before he met with appellant, he never performed a psychological 

evaluation on a juvenile as part of a certification proceeding. 

Dr. Sweeney reviewed the raw data underlying Dr. Boyd’s evaluation. He 

did not prepare a report, but he testified at the transfer hearing. He conducted his 

own evaluation “just to be safe” because he had the benefit of information Dr. 

Boyd did not have: appellant’s Department records. He also added three tests. Dr. 

Sweeney had “no major disagreement” with Dr. Boyd’s conclusions, but he had 

reservations about her diagnosis of conduct disorder:

I don’t know that I disagree with it, but I’m not sure that [appellant] 

meets the criteria for conduct disorder. He hasn’t had a history of 

problematic behavior. He hasn’t — he hasn’t had run-ins with 

authority throughout his life. He wasn’t a fire starter. He’s not 

somebody that abused animals.

Dr. Sweeney characterized appellant’s childhood as “incredibly unstable.” He 

spoke of the “volatile” relationship between Nicole and appellant, explaining, 

“[H]e didn’t want anything more than for her to love him. So, he kind of put her on 

a pedestal, but had major resentments of her at the same time.”
20

Appellant is of average intelligence, in Dr. Sweeney’s opinion, and has no 

intellectual deficits. He may be more mature than other 15-year-old children in that 

early on he had to fend for himself, find money to feed himself, and take care of 

his mother, who was frequently incoherent. However, he is emotionally less 

mature than his peers because “he didn’t have the same sense of security and the 

same bonding” growing up.

Dr. Sweeney found no contraindications to appellant’s remaining in the 

juvenile system. He believed the juvenile services available would meet appellant’s 

needs. 

B. Review

In reviewing a trial court’s transfer and waiver of jurisdiction for an abuse of 

discretion, we must decide whether the trial court acted without reference to 

guiding rules or principles. We assess whether the decision was “essentially 

arbitrary,” given the evidence upon which it was based, or whether it “represented 

a reasonably principled application of the legislative criteria.” Moon, 451 S.W.3d 

at 47.

We begin by reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial 

court’s findings on the section 54.02(f) factors. Id. A legal sufficiency analysis 

requires us to credit only that evidence favorable to the finding and disregard 

contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder could not reject the evidence. 

Moon, 410 S.W.3d at 371. If more than a scintilla of evidence favors the finding, 

the evidence is legally sufficient to support that finding. Id. A factual sufficiency 

analysis is based on all the evidence. Id. A finding is supported by factually 

sufficient evidence unless the finding is against the great weight and 

preponderance of the evidence so as to be clearly wrong or unjust. Id.
21

Not every factor in section 54.02(f) need weigh in favor of transfer. Any 

combination of the criteria may suffice to support the juvenile court’s waiver of 

jurisdiction. Id. at 47 & n.78; accord D.L.N., 930 S.W.2d at 258 (“The court need 

not find that each factor is established by the evidence.”).

The trial court concluded that all of the section 52.04(f) factors weigh in 

favor of transfer. The court’s order includes the following determinations:

 “[B]ecause of the seriousness of the offense or the background of the 

child, the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings.”

 “[T]he penal laws alleged to have [been] violated by the [appellant] . . 

. were laws of the grade of Captial Felony and were offenses against a 

person.”

 “[B]ased on the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing the 

Court finds . . . the alleged offense particularly egregious and 

aggravating . . . .”

 Appellant “is of sufficient sophistication and maturity to have 

intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily waived all constitutional and 

statutory rights heretofore waived . . . and is of sufficient 

sophistication and maturity to intelligently and knowingly understand 

and have a rational as well as a factual understanding of the 

proceedings in this Court and to rationally assist in his own defense . . 

. .”

 Appellant “has sufficient sophistication and . . . sufficient present 

ability to aid and assist his attorney.”

 “[T]here is little, if any, likelihood that the facilities and services 

available to this Court could reasonably be expected to rehabilitate the 

[appellant] . . . and . . . there is from the nature of the offense, the 

likelihood that the public is not adequately protected from future such 

conduct . . . .”

Based upon these findings, the trial court determined that “the jurisdiction of this 

Court is waived in this cause.”
22

1. Sufficiency of the evidence

a. Offense against person or property

Appellant is accused of an offense against the person. By statute, offenses 

against the person are afforded greater weight in favor of transfer. Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. § 54.02(f)(1).

The trial court’s order details the nature and circumstances of Nicole’s 

death. It noted the electrical cord around her neck, the large number of stab 

wounds on her body, and the significant amount of blood near the body. Those 

findings are supported by the autopsy report, crime scene photographs, and police 

officers’ testimony. The court also cited evidence from Beth’s and Trace’s 

recorded statements to police that appellant threatened, at least twice, to kill his 

mother and the baby.

The trial court’s findings concerning the first factor are amply supported by 

the record, and there is no evidence in the record to the contrary. Accordingly, the 

findings are supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence.

b. Sophistication and maturity of appellant

The trial court’s order expressly relies on Dr. Boyd’s written report in 

making a finding about appellant’s sophistication and maturity. Specifically, the 

court focused on Dr. Boyd’s findings that appellant has no intellectual deficits or 

naiveté compared to children his age, shows no signs of a thought disorder, and has 

no history of inpatient or outpatient psychiatric services. The trial court noted that 

Dr. Sweeney had no major disagreements with Dr. Boyd’s opinions other than the 

diagnosis of conduct disorder.

Appellant admits he has no history of psychiatric services but contends Dr. 

Boyd’s statement to that effect is misleading because she knew appellant thought 
23

of and took steps toward suicide a few months before the offense. The focus on 

appeal is whether the trial court’s decision was arbitrary and unprincipled. Moon, 

451 S.W.3d at 47. We cannot say the trial court acted without reference to guiding 

rules or principles by relying on an admitted fact. See In re B.R.H., 426 S.W.3d 

163, 168 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (“[W]e defer to the trial 

court’s findings unless the record contains no evidence to support them.”).

The trial court also recounted appellant’s difficult upbringing, highlighting 

“his mother’s alleged abuse of him as a child that led to him being placed in 

[Department] custody and the general instability of his home life which included 

drug use by both parents.” The trial court then referred to Dr. Boyd’s opinion that 

appellant’s home situation did not affect his cognitive abilities.

Appellant’s real challenge appears to be his assertion that Dr. Boyd’s 

opinion is unreliable because she did not review appellant’s Department records. 

Appellant suggests on appeal that Dr. Boyd’s opinion would have been different 

had she reviewed these records.

This contention fails because Dr. Boyd assumed, even without the records, 

that Nicole abused and neglected appellant. She diagnosed him as the victim of 

both physical abuse and neglect. There is no indication that the Department records 

would have materially changed Dr. Boyd’s opinions given that Dr. Boyd assumed 

the facts appellant says the records show. 

In any event, appellant’s retained expert, Dr. Sweeney, did review the 

Department records. Dr. Sweeney expressed no disagreement with respect to Dr. 

Boyd’s discussion of appellant’s background or Dr. Boyd’s opinion that 

appellant’s troubled upbringing did not affect his cognitive abilities. Rather, Dr. 

Sweeney said even after he reviewed the Department records, “the findings were 

not different” than those of Dr. Boyd. 
24

The trial court quoted Dr. Boyd’s testimony that appellant is able to make 

good decisions when he so chooses. Her statement “[led] the Court to believe that 

[appellant] knows right from wrong but has in the past chosen not to make good 

decisions, and specifically in this case, made decisions that led to the violent death 

of his mother and unborn sibling.” Dr. Boyd’s testimony is more than a scintilla of 

evidence, and therefore legally sufficient, to support the trial court’s findings on 

the second factor. Moon, 410 S.W.3d at 371.

Appellant contends on appeal that Dr. Sweeney said appellant “does not 

have the present emotional ability to make good decisions” due to his background.

No such testimony appears in the record. Even if it did, that testimony would 

reflect a second expert’s opinion; the trial court would be free to believe or 

disbelieve such testimony. See id. at 375 (“[A]s the sole judge of credibility, the 

juvenile court was entitled to disbelieve [expert] testimony . . . .”). Dr. Sweeney’s 

hypothetical testimony would not render the trial court’s finding to the contrary 

“against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence so as to be clearly 

wrong or unjust.” Id. at 371. The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to 

support the trial court’s findings regarding the second factor. 

c. Appellant’s record and history

Appellant asserts the trial court failed to consider appellant’s record and 

history. We disagree. The trial court expressly considered Dr. Boyd’s recitation 

and opinions about the facts of appellant’s childhood, including information 

provided to Dr. Boyd by appellant’s father indicating appellant has a history of 

deceitfulness, stealing, and disruptive behavior. 

Dr. Boyd’s report discusses appellant’s self-proclaimed membership in a 

gang. Appellant told Dr. Boyd he has been “blessed in” to a gang because his older 

cousin is a member. He reported he was “jumped in” to a gang in January 2015. 
25

Dr. Boyd also detailed appellant’s school disciplinary history based on her review 

of school records and appellant’s statements to her. Appellant was suspended for 

five days shortly before Nicole died because he smoked marijuana in a school 

restroom. Appellant reported a history of suspension due to fighting. 

Beth told police that appellant said he was in two gangs and had killed a 

person. She did not believe him. Beth also stated appellant frequently spoke of 

killing his father because he hated him. 

The trial court’s findings regarding appellant’s background are supported by 

Dr. Boyd’s report and Beth’s recorded statement. Accordingly, the findings are 

supported by legally sufficient evidence. Further, because there is no evidence to 

the contrary, the findings are supported by factually sufficient evidence as well. 

d. Protection of public and likelihood of rehabilitation

Both Dr. Boyd and Dr. Sweeney testified about the availability of 

rehabilitative services in the juvenile system. Dr. Boyd opined that appellant 

needed more than the juvenile system could offer in the relatively short period 

appellant would be in that system. Dr. Sweeney testified that the juvenile system 

could adequately meet appellant’s needs. As the sole judge of credibility, the trial 

court was free to decide which opinion to adopt or reject. See Moon, 410 S.W.3d at 

375.

Dr. Boyd’s testimony is more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the trial 

court’s findings that “the public is not adequately protected from future conduct” 

by appellant and there is “little, if any, likelihood that the facilities and services 

available to this Court could reasonably be expected to rehabilitate [appellant].” 

Those findings, accordingly, are supported by legally sufficient evidence.
26

Even if Dr. Sweeney’s contrary testimony would support a decision not to 

waive jurisdiction, we cannot say his testimony is enough to render the trial court’s 

finding against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence so as to be 

clearly wrong or unjust. Therefore, the trial court’s findings on the fourth factor are 

supported by factually sufficient evidence.

Appellant further contends the State failed to prove that the determinatesentencing option for juvenile proceedings, codified in section 54.04 of the Family 

Code, would be inadequate to ensure the welfare of the community. That statute 

permits a judge or jury in certain cases to sentence a juvenile to a term of 

confinement that exceeds the length of time the individual is eligible to spend in 

the juvenile justice department. Such a sentence is served in the juvenile justice 

department or other authorized facility with a possible transfer to the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.04(d)(3) (Vernon 

Supp. 2016). Assuming other requirements are met, a juvenile who committed 

capital murder may be sentenced to up to 40 years. Id. §§ 53.045(a)(2), 

54.04(d)(3)(A).

Section 54.02(f)(4) refers to “the prospects of adequate protection of the 

public and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, 

services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court.” Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. § 54.02(f)(4). Dr. Boyd opined there would not be enough time for the 

juvenile system to provide appellant with sufficient services before appellant aged 

out of the system at 19. Dr. Sweeney disagreed; he believed the juvenile system 

could adequately meet appellant’s needs by the time appellant turned 19. As the 

sole judge of credibility, the trial court was free to credit Dr. Boyd’s opinion over 

Dr. Sweeney’s. See Moon, 410 S.W.3d at 375.
27

The conclusion does not change even if we presume the determinate 

sentencing option may be considered as part of “the prospects of adequate 

protection of the public.” Dr. Boyd testified that adult sentencing was “not 

contraindicated” and determinate sentencing also was “not contraindicated.” Dr. 

Sweeney did not assert a conclusion on this point with respect to either adult 

sentencing or determinate sentencing. The trial court was entitled to rely on Dr. 

Boyd’s conclusion that sentencing appellant as an adult if he is found guilty was 

not contraindicated. See id.

2. Decision to transfer

We have concluded that each of the trial court’s findings is supported by 

legally and factually sufficient evidence. In light of that conclusion, we now 

consider whether the trial court’s decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer the 

case was “essentially arbitrary” and “without reference to guiding rules or 

principles.” Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 47.

The record reflects the trial court carefully considered this matter. The 

evidentiary hearing spanned four days. Crime scene photographs, police officers’ 

testimony, and the autopsy report all revealed that Nicole suffered a violent death. 

Two psychologists testified, offering their opinions based on the same facts. The 

trial court received evidence regarding appellant’s unstable childhood and heard 

argument from appellant’s counsel. The transfer order includes the findings 

specified under section 54.02, and each of those findings is sufficiently supported 

by the evidence. All of the trial court’s findings support a decision to transfer 

jurisdiction.

On this record and in light of these findings, we cannot say the trial court’s 

decision was arbitrary or made without reference to guiding rules. Rather, the trial 

court’s decision resulted from a principled application of legislative criteria. Id.
28

Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to waive 

jurisdiction and transfer appellant to district court. We overrule appellant’s second 

issue.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s order waiving juvenile jurisdiction and 

transferring appellant to criminal district court.

/s/ William J. Boyce

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and Christopher.