About the Report

Most of the research for this report was conducted in June 

and July 2011. Susanne Tarkowski Tempelhof was based 

in Benghazi, Libya, from March 2011 to September 2011, 

conducting observational research, focus group discussions, and 

in-depth interviews with civilians, National Transitional Council 

(NTC) members, militia leaders, youth and civil society groups, 

tribal leaders, and Islamists. From June 2011 Manal Omar 

has been conducting regular visits to Libya to make strategic 

assessments and implement U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) 

programs, during which she has engaged with civil society 

organizations and activists, NTC members, and international 

organizations and players. 

About the Authors

Susanne Tarkowski Tempelhof is the founder and president 

of Shabakat Corporation, an international research and 

communications firm. In the past, she has carried out research 

and communications work in Sweden, France, China, Brazil, 

United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Manal 

Omar is the director of Iraq, Iran, and North Africa Programs 

under USIP’s Center for Conflict Management. Previously, 

she was regional program manager for the Middle East for 

Oxfam–Great Britain, where she responded to humanitarian 

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 300 January 2012

© 2012 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Cultural, Historical, and Contemporary Narrative 2

Competing Group Narratives, Identities,

and Ownership 3

National Transitional Council, Executive Board,

and Local Councils 3

The February 17 Youth Movement 5

Armed Forces, Rebel Fighters, and Militias 6

Civil Society, Volunteers, Women, and the

Libyan Diaspora 6

 Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists, and Jihadists 7

Tribal and Ethnic Divides 8

The Monarchists 10

Grievances and Frictions during Transition 11

Recommendations 12

Susanne Tarkowski Tempelhof and Manal Omar 

Stakeholders of Libya’s 

February 17 Revolution 

Summary

•	 Who the rebels are in Libya has been a common question surrounding the revolution that 

overthrew Muammar Gadhafi. This report maps out the factions in Libya’s east, centering 

on Benghazi. It identifies the various groups, their narratives, their part in the revolution, 

and emergent grievances that could translate into instability or future conflicts.

•	 Libyans share a strong sense of historical narrative and ownership of the recent revolution, 

but complexities lie within that ownership. There are tensions between the youth movement and the National Transitional Council; between local Libyans and returning members 

of the Libyan diaspora; between secular groups and religious ones, particularly the Muslim 

Brotherhood; within militia groups that did the fighting; and among Libya’s tribes and 

ethnic groups.

•	 The widespread sense of ownership of the revolution, which kept morale high during the 

fighting, has translated to expectations of quick improvements, both overall and in people’s 

day-to-day lives. Managing expectations will be key to ensuring that tensions within Libyan 

society do not overcome the sense of unity that the revolution fostered. 

•	 International actors should ensure that local ownership of the political process remains at the 

fore and is not undermined. In addition, research is needed to understand the situation in 

Libya more clearly, in order to identify ways that the international community can support, 

aid, and advise local efforts in forming a stable and secure environment in Libya.

The question of who the Libyan rebels are has animated the analytical discourse surrounding the revolution against and overthrow of Muammar Gadhafi. The question has spurred 

polarized debate, yet scant research has actually been carried out on the composition of 

the opposition. With recent developments within the opposition to Gadhafi—beginning 

with the U.S. recognition of the National Transitional Council (NTC) as part of a larger move 

to help release Libyan frozen assets and continuing through the emergence of increasingly 

violent internal factionalism, the death of the rebel leader Abdel Fatah Younis, the reshuffling of the cabinet, and internal tribal disputes—the question of how to define the rebels 

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Continued on page 2
2 

accurately moves away from abstract political rhetoric to concrete political urgency. The 

opposition is not a unified and homogenous group; there is little ability to predict how the 

factions will cooperate now that Gadhafi is gone and little understanding of how the groups 

composing the opposition will interact with the many factions in southern and western 

Libya in a post-Gadhafi setting. This heterogeneity has dire implications for Libya’s people 

and for policymaking in the international arena.

Multiple reintegration and reconciliation problems in a post-Gadhafi Libya are a given, 

as the depth and nuances of the conflicts to come are unforeseeable. In Benghazi, which 

was a rebel-controlled territory before the fall of Gadhafi, a pro-regime insurgency arose, 

as have interopposition conflicts that remain significant to this day. Molotov cocktails, gun 

battles, and assassinations have become the daily norm in Libya. Developments such as 

these threaten the unity urgently needed to create a stable post-Gadhafi society.

This report broadly maps out the factions in the east, identifying the various groups, 

their narratives, their sense of ownership of the revolution, and emergent grievances that 

could translate into instability or future conflicts in a post-Gadhafi setting. Such an exercise 

can help foster dialogue and continue to facilitate engagement in the political processes to 

come, while identifying indicators and dynamics of potential conflicts before they grow to 

a point of no return.

Overarching Cultural, Historical, and Contemporary Narrative

To an expatriate visiting Libya during the revolution in spring 2011, the visual landscape of 

Benghazi was striking: The strong presence of a vibrant revolutionary spirit was omnipresent. Revolutionary flags, graffiti, billboards, posters, pins, and hats were found on every 

car, wall, and person, signaling that the revolution was indeed a people’s revolution. All 

these inspiring sights indicate the strong sense of popular ownership that the international 

community would like to have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, beneath the surface 

of Benghazi’s revolutionary spirit lurk complexities in the sentiment of political ownership. 

Various groups have different narratives and perceptions of their roles in the revolution. This 

diversity translates to different expectations for power sharing in political and social life. 

The narratives are not only different but often compete.

The common narrative found in the rebel-held territories and projected to foreign 

diplomats and media is that of a consolidated Libya with few religious, ethnic, and tribal 

divisions. Mottos and phrases found on posters and across various media are “Tripoli is in 

our heart” and “Tripoli is our capital.” Unexpectedly, very little Benghazi-ism can be found. 

When asked in spring 2011 how much of the population in the west may be pro-Gadhafi, 

many east Libyans responded: Nobody. It’s Gadhafi and his mercenaries against the people; 

all of the Libyan people. Events however, clearly defied the common rhetoric that western 

Libya did not support Gadhafi. The east, from Tobruk to Benghazi, fell in six days, whereas it 

took more than six months for the west to fall in a protracted conflict. Military capabilities 

alone do not bolster a region; popular support of Gadhafi’s regime must have been present 

in the west for it to resist the revolution as it did. That said, it is impossible to estimate 

what proportion of the populace actually supported Gadhafi or to predict what implications 

that loyalty may have. Loyalties may disappear now that the paymaster is dead or reappear 

as an ideological insurgency. More likely, loyalty to Gadhafi may manifest itself as the source 

of tribal and ethnic conflicts. 

The notion of Libyan nationalism emerged only in 1949, when Libya became the first African state to achieve independence from European rule and the first and only state created 

by the General Assembly of the United Nations.1 The monarchy and the Senussi movement—

created by the al-Senussi royal family—united the tribes after the Italian presence in North 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy •

George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor of 

Practice, The George Washington University • Judy Ansley,

Former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser under President George W. Bush • Eric Edelman,

Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins 

School of Advanced International Studies • Kerry Kennedy, 

President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human 

Rights • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, 

LLC • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor 

of International Relations, Stanford University • John A. 

Lancaster, Former Executive Director of the National Council 

on Independent Living • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor, 

George Mason School of Law • Judy Van Rest, Executive Vice 

President, International Republican Institute • Nancy Zirkin,

Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy •

Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 

crises in Palestine and Lebanon. She also has worked in 

Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, Bahrain, and Kenya 

for several international organizations. 

Continued from page 1
 3

Africa dissipated. The king delegated administrative authority to locally powerful families. 

Many older eastern Libyans identify the old al-Senussi monarch, King Idris, as the one who 

led the resistance against the Italians and subsequently united the nation. However, the 

more commonly used symbol for the resistance is Omar Mukhtar, the lead fighter against 

Italian colonization, who was captured and executed in 1921.2

Gadhafi formulated and introduced a greater Libyan and pan-Arab nationalism to the 

Libyan Jamahiriyya; he “skillfully blended the threads of nationalism, anti-imperialism, and 

pan-Islamic loyalties . . . with contemporary movements for Arab nationalism, Arab socialism, and Arab unity.”3 Libya was to become the greater dominant state in the region, the 

ultimate symbol of pan-Arab socialism and pride. When Gadhafi led his coup against the 

al-Senussi monarchy in 1969, he also used and transformed the image of Omar Mukhtar into 

a symbol of national freedom fighting. 

Again reincarnated, Omar Mukhtar is very much part of the Libyan narrative today. His 

portrait can be seen everywhere, on most posters and billboards, and has become a symbol 

for Libya’s February 17 revolution against Colonel Gadhafi. The pre-Gadhafi flag and national 

anthem have been revived. All this indicates a strong sense of a commonly held cultural and 

historical narrative in the east.

Competing Group Narratives, Identities, and Ownership of the Revolution 

Despite a strong sense of a common cultural and historical narrative, many groups have 

expressed different views regarding how the revolution was carried out, how different 

groups contributed, and how those actions should or should not translate into future powersharing arrangements. Most people say they watched the revolutions develop in Egypt and 

in Tunisia but never believed it could happen in Libya. Once the revolution began in Libya, 

however, everybody claimed to be the first one there. Some women have stated that “we 

started it on February 15 in Benghazi, when we demonstrated against the political prisoners.” Others say the revolution was started, as the name indicates, on February 17, 2011, by 

the youth—though some youth claim that the revolution actually started on February 17, 

2006, in Benghazi, referencing the demonstration against the Italian embassy due to the 

Mohammed drawings. Events are always experienced subjectively, but in this very loaded 

context the statements above indicate different levels of ownership of them, based on personal experiences and sacrifices, which ultimately translates into expectations of the future. 

As seen throughout history, after major political transformations, inflated expectations can 

turn quickly into failed expectations, leading to apathy or radicalization.

Having looked into the principal groups and factions currently present in eastern Libya—

some formal, some less formal—we have found that these groups are fluid and allegiances 

change quite rapidly. That said, the outline below identifies some broad groupings and the 

key competing narratives.

The National Transitional Council, the Executive Board, and the 

Local Councils

According to the NTC’s website, the council was officially established on March 5, 2011, as 

the sole legislative body of the interim government.4 Eastern Libyans have often described 

the council as “a group of friends, lawyers, who got together and said, ‘Hey, let’s create a 

government.’” The NTC, however, has been working to include various factions within Libyan 

society in its structure. These include, but are not limited to, religious representatives, a 

member of the former al-Senussi royal family, Gadhafi government defectors, and members 

Once the revolution began in 

Libya . . . everybody claimed to 

be the first one there.
4 

from cities outside of Benghazi, including western cities. Despite this, the NTC suffers from 

a reputation of being noninclusive and dominated by a few powerful families. Voices in 

Benghazi quietly criticize the NTC selection method. As one professor expressed in a private 

conversation in a hotel lobby in Benghazi in June 2011, “The selection is not based on 

merit. It’s based on who suffered most under Gadhafi [e.g., former war prisoners]—but we 

all suffered under Gadhafi, and it’s not fair. It should be based on merit.” Others observed 

that the NTC seemed to be dominated by two key families, the Bogaigis and the Garianis—

people who are part of the Benghazi elite and largely considered to not have suffered under 

the Gadhafi regime. 

In addition, the council has been accused of being heavily influenced by the Muslim 

Brotherhood (MB), as several members of the council are said to be high-level MB officials. 

This accusation is typically heard from younger Libyans throughout the east, who are presumably less supportive of the MB; they are prone to state in private that “they [the NTC] stole 

the revolution from us.” Another common accusation is that the NTC are “all foreigners”—

that is, made up primarily of Libyans with dual citizenship, who have spent a lot of their 

time abroad. What the population sees as a greater threat, however, is what they deem to 

be the ultimately pro-Gadhafi makeup of the council. Many of the members defected from 

the Gadhafi government after the revolution began and were suspected of having links and 

loyalties to the Gadhafi administration, to keep “all doors open.” General Younis, the highestprofile government figure to defect, was accused of having maintained Gadhafi links. He 

was arrested and later executed in mysterious circumstances.5 There have been rumors of 

assassination attempts against other members of the council as well, not only because of 

possible links to the Gadhafi regime, but also based on accusations of corruption, particularly 

of members trying to carve deals out of foreign direct investment contracts. 

The NTC members themselves have expressed very different opinions, stating that the 

council was created before the no-fly zone went into effect and thus can lay claim to legitimate ownership of the revolution. The members also point out that, fearing for their lives 

and taking significant risks, they created the council when there were no funds, no end in 

sight, and when the outcomes in Benghazi and east Libya were uncertain. 

The constitution drafted by the NTC provides for an executive board, which is to serve 

as the main governing body with the council as the legislative arm of the government. The 

executive board is also referred to as the crisis management committee or simply “the government.” This body acted as a government in exile, focusing primarily on diplomacy. As with 

the NTC, according to local perceptions, the board is composed of “foreigners,” such as those 

in the Libyan diaspora, formerly led by Dr. Mahmoud Jibril. The board and the NTC have at 

times been perceived as “competing entities.” Though the constitution delineated their mandates, this grievance was more apparent with the dissolution of the entire board after the fall 

of Tripoli, excepting Jibril, its chairman, who resigned in October 2011. Some have speculated 

that the cabinet was reshuffled to accommodate General Younis’s tribe, the Obeidis. 

Local councils emerged throughout the east with great speed after February 17. The rapidity of the emergence can be explained by Gadhafi’s former structure of local councils: In the 

1970s, Gadhafi established people’s committees to run almost every facet of the country.6 His 

motivation was to undermine the idea of a political party, as a “party allows a minority to 

seize the power that belongs to the People.”7 In principle, all citizens were already members 

of the Basic People’s Congress of their electoral district and could express themselves politically through it. Each Basic People’s Congress delegated to a committee the responsibility of 

organizing their congress.8 This infrastructure remained and was adopted during the revolution, remolded to adapt to local councils. The population outside of Benghazi seems unclear 

as to whether the councils are coordinating with the NTC or not. Council representatives in 

Benghazi claim to be doing so actively. Recent research indicates, however, that the councils 

The NTC suffers from a 

reputation of being noninclusive 

and dominated by a few 

powerful families.
 5

are perceived as more efficient in delivering governance than the NTC itself. It is unknown the 

extent to which preexisting tribal structures have determined the formation of the local councils, but it can be assumed that the tribes influence the selection process of likely candidates 

for local council positions. Even though people have expressed that the NTC is “good for now” 

in focus group discussions conducted in Libya in April 2011, and Chairman Abdul Jalil seems to 

be genuinely popular, grievances have emerged rapidly.

The February 17 Youth Movement

In many people’s perceptions, the February 17 youth movement created, and was created 

by, the February 17 revolution: Very early on, it became the key group uniting the revolutionaries. Several members of the youth movement were targeted by Gadhafi’s snipers. A 

young cartoonist and the charismatic media leader Mouhammed Nabous were assassinated 

in the early months of the conflict. Those in the movement largely perceived themselves as 

initiating the revolution and are primarily centered in the Benghazi Media Center, a former 

courthouse turned into a makeshift media production headquarters and recreational youth 

haven, hosting everything from newspapers to rock bands. As the status quo was emerging 

in Benghazi, however, the youth volunteer presence became less relevant. 

The February 17 movement has a strong sense of ownership of the revolution, even as 

political grievances have emerged within the movement. Divisions have also already emerged 

between the movement and the NTC, with youth who prefer to remain anonymous opining 

that “the revolution was hijacked by the lawyers,” a critique aimed at the NTC. Though the 

February 17 youth claim that there is no divide, it has become clear to a majority of observers 

that the youth movement constitutes a key political constituency that may eventually form a 

distinct party able to challenge any post-Gadhafi government. The youth movement itself is 

largely composed of young, urban, middle-class citizens, most of whom have obtained a higher 

degree. This trend is also found among revolution leaders in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt, 

with whom the leaders of the February 17 movement coordinate and cooperate. 

The youth movement claims to have about one hundred civil society organizations 

under its umbrella, in addition to considerable student backing. Their power is thus already 

tangible in the east. At the same time, competition appears to be emerging for civil society organizations between the movement and the NTC, which may further foretell future 

political rivalry. The youth movement has already begun to claim that the NTC is corrupt, 

infiltrated by former Gadhafi officials, and dependent on Italian money. The concern over 

pro-Gadhafi allegiances is especially sharp; youth movement leader Abdul Salam Mismary 

stated in June that “we are getting advice from our Egyptian brothers. They say don’t make 

the same mistake as us. Both Gadhafi and his sons and his loyalists must go.”

In contrast, the movement has taken a largely populist stance, claiming that its platform 

revolves around eliminating corruption and bringing the voice of the people into government. The February 17 movement has attempted to convey in various meetings that it has 

already pressed a key checks-and-balances function upon the NTC. It has also expressed a 

fear that a small group of people could take control of what began as a broader movement 

for revolutionary change, as the military has been seen to do in Egypt. In Libya, this could 

be the case with key families at the center of the NTC. The movement also clearly resents 

the MB influence in the NTC; it perceives the MB and the NTC as highly linked—potentially 

in a conspiracy involving the media, specifically al-Jazeera, and the Qatari backing of the 

council as well—which ultimately could undercut the democratic aims of the revolution. 

When Gadhafi was still alive, the movement viewed the MB as potentially open to cutting 

a deal with him or his sons, whereas members of the youth movement, as the revolution’s 

authentic leaders, have resisted the involvement of those closely associated with the 

The youth movement constitutes a 

key political constituency that may 

eventually form a distinct party 

able to challenge any post-Gadhafi 

government.
6 

regime. Now that Gadhafi is gone, there is tension between the February 17 youth and the 

emerging government, which may not fully realize all of the movement’s revolutionary goals 

and may very well be accommodating remnants of the previous government. 

The Armed Forces, the Rebel Fighters, and the Militias

According to the NTC, the armed forces comprise approximately a thousand people, accounting for the actual trained armed forces that defected from the Gadhafi military. There currently are no reliable data on the number of rebel fighters. Early popular impressions of the 

rebels indicated that the fighters were drawn from a broad cross-section of society, from 

the bread baker to the jihadist to the urban law student. Those who decided to become 

involved managed to obtain a firearm, often paying for it themselves, and then literally 

jumped into their cars, drove to the front lines, and started shooting—more often in the 

air, hurting themselves, than at Gadhafi’s forces. Two trends have emerged in the structure 

of the militias: large and organized units that coordinate with the NTC, and smaller, looser 

groups that perform various activities. The latter tends to be comprised of friends who took 

up weapons to fight at the front lines, guard neighborhoods, or conduct the now infamous 

rat hunts that have involved targeted executions of Gadhafi loyalists.

Many local Libyans, as well as diplomats and the foreign media, have expressed concerns 

over the numerous and disparate armed groups across the country. The common desire is to 

bring them all under the NTC umbrella, although concrete suggestions as to how to do this 

have yet to be heard. On paper, the various militias fall under the umbrella of the Union of 

Revolutionary Forces, which answers to the rebels’ minister for defense.9 Colonel Ahmad al 

Qutrany, the leader of the 3,000-fighter strong Saraya al Shohada—meaning Battalion of 

Martyrs—stated in June that “all my fighters have signed a contract with the council to hand 

over our weapons when the fight has ended.” Whether this is true and actionable remains to 

be seen. Recent news coverage indicates that there is fighting among factions, which seems 

to be largely regionally based. The western militias are still lingering in Tripoli despite orders 

to depart, the rebels from Misrata are executing former loyalists, and conflict among these 

groups—Misrata, the western militias, and the Benghazi forces—seems to occur regularly. 

In summer 2011 the rebels further divided. After the mysterious death of General Younis, 

clashes broke out in Benghazi between rebel factions. Those loyal to Gadhafi, such as the 

Nida Brigade, helped three hundred loyalists break free from jail on July 29.10 Rebels fought 

against the escapees and the brigade, but the escapees remain at large. The Benghazi-based 

brigade was rumored to have been allied with Gadhafi but had been operating under the 

prorevolutionary banner until Younis’s death. 

From the perspective of future stability, it may be difficult for bread bakers turned rebel 

fighters who have experienced the adrenaline rush of the front lines to simply hand over their 

weapons and return to being bakers once the conflict is over. Further, the swinging nature of 

rebel groups’ allegiances will prove problematic in any attempt to reestablish normalcy.

Civil Society, Volunteers, Women, and the Libyan Diaspora

The first wave of volunteerism was led primarily by the February 17 youth movement, as 

well as the Muslim Brotherhood, in addition to individuals who at that point did not have 

any particular loyalties. The volunteers performed all societal functions: picking up garbage, 

establishing neighborhood watches, distributing food to the poor, and regulating vehicle 

traffic. In one well-known instance of volunteerism, boy scouts acted as traffic policemen. 

In our focus groups, many expressed gratitude about the role the volunteers performed 

directly after the revolution, primarily thanking the youth movement.

The swinging nature of rebel 

groups’ allegiances will prove 

problematic in any attempt to 

reestablish normalcy.
 7

Despite a general waning optimism, there remain an inspiring number of volunteers in the 

streets. Many of them have become nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and have registered with the council. Others are under the February 17 umbrella, or are independent entities. This is an encouraging development for a strong and inclusive civil society. Inside the 

council there is even a Ministry of Civil Society Organizations, without any trace of irony.

Although eastern Libya is a culturally and religiously conservative society, most women 

are well educated. In 2002, adult female illiteracy had fallen to 29 percent, 6 percentage 

points less than in 1998. In Morocco, female adult illiteracy stands at 64 percent.11 According to Gadhafi’s statistics, more women than men have obtained a higher education. Despite 

this trend, however, before the revolution, many women stayed at home without working 

once they were married. During the revolution, this changed: Many women demonstrated 

and took to the streets, especially on February 15 in Benghazi in a protest against the Abu 

Salim massacre. During the uprising, women provided food and clothes to the fighters on 

the front lines, gave charity to the poor, produced media, organized in civil society, and 

otherwise contributed to the rebel cause.

One revolutionary Libyan woman, Ferjal al Shari, formed an NGO she calls Lighthouse, 

through which she recruited 150 volunteers in Benghazi to clean the streets. Lighthouse 

also produced movies that encouraged women to “send their men to the front lines.” 

al Shari says that the NTC has placed significant numbers of women in important positions 

and that it has become much easier to participate in the political sphere. While this may 

bode well for the future role of women under a new government, there also was not much of 

a political sphere for anyone to operate in under Gadhafi. Like most women we spoke with, 

al Shari wished for better health care, education, environmental protections, and child care 

and expressed a mild worry over the number of arms in the streets of Benghazi. She also 

appeared to be less vindictive against pro-Gadhafi elements than most men, though she did 

state that “we will not forgive [them for] our lost relatives. And we will not forgive the rapes 

that happened before the revolution, by the Gentorya.” As in many wars, women tended 

to play a strong role in society while the men were fighting at the front lines. They then 

became accustomed to new forms of empowerment, and they expect to maintain their new 

positions. Although both men and women are equal under Libyan law, women only comprise 

25 percent of the work force.12 The desire to remain integrated in the political arena may 

clash with cultural expectations now that the fighting is over. 

A large number of Libyans from the diaspora communities in Europe, North America, and 

the Gulf countries have come to Benghazi. Some assisted the council through advice. Others focused on creating media outlets and fighting on the front lines. Many in the Libyan 

diaspora remain engaged from outside the borders of Libya, with both sides of the conflict 

benefiting from this external source of financial and operational support. Recently, public 

grievances against the involvement of diaspora communities and the desire to have more 

local Libyans in the council led to extensive reshuffling of council positions. Comments such 

as “they weren’t here during Gadhafi, they didn’t suffer like we do, and now they’re taking all 

the power” were commonly heard around Benghazi during spring and summer 2011.

As in many conflict and postconflict situations, diaspora members are often well educated and able to provide technical expertise during a transition phase. The ruling authorities 

cannot all be from the diaspora, however, as this would leave them open to accusations of 

“not having suffered” or “not understanding or having any connection with the people.”

The Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafists, and the Jihadists

It appears that Libyans consider themselves religious but not extremist. In interviews 

and focus groups, many people responded that “we’re not extreme like the people in Iran 

Women tended to play a strong 

role in society while the men 

were fighting at the front 

lines. . . . The desire to remain 

integrated in the political 

arena may clash with cultural 

expectations now that the 

fighting is over.
8 

or Saudi Arabia. We are a moderate population.” The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Libya, 

however, is very strong and, as in Egypt, well funded and organized. Eastern Libya has 

historically been particularly receptive to the ideology of political Islam. From the Libyan 

branch of the MB to the militant cells that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, these groups 

have been located primarily in and around the cities of Benghazi, Derna, and Ajdabia.13 The 

MB is commonly perceived as having organized an underground resistance to Gadhafi for 

years, with its members suffering numerous arrests and terms of imprisonment. In the last 

few years, the MB had been willing to open channels with the regime in Tripoli, hoping to 

be allowed official presence in the country. With the revolution, however, the Brotherhood 

returned to the eastern parts of the country. 

The MB claims that its members participated in the revolution from the beginning, 

providing aid to the wounded and food to the hungry, among other benevolent activities. 

In stark contrast to other groups who play down their future political ambitions, the MB is 

refreshingly honest about it. “Of course we are a political party. We will run in the future 

elections, and we will win. Otherwise I would never have joined!” said Mohamed Alkouafi, 

the chief financial officer of an MB civil society organization. Their political aspirations are 

also obvious in their public relations, as they market themselves as moderates by organizing events where women are invited to attend and speak. A number of civil society organizations are under their umbrella, along with media outlets such as Sabil Rahid, Shabab 

Libya, and Libya Lion. Brotherhood officials have also expressed resentment against the 

February 17 movement because of their frictions with the NTC and fear of tribal involvement in politics, probably sensing these two groups as competitors. “If there is an election, 

people will vote for their tribes. We need to educate people to vote for political beliefs, 

not tribes,” stated Alkouafi. MB officials seem to generally support the council but have 

voiced concerns about the NTC’s technical expertise and suggested that the NTC use more 

consultants. Others in Libyan society say the MB is too involved in the council, especially 

as the minister of economics and the minister of media are said to be MB members. 

Salafists appear to be a large part of eastern society. However, unlike the Wahhabists, 

the Salafists claim that they have renounced violence. Some claim that they did not even 

participate in the revolution on either side because of their nonviolent approach. They seem 

to be popular with most Libyans and are perceived as “honest and clean-living Muslims” 

without any particular political objectives.

Most journalists and experts have found the fear of the jihadi Libyan Islamic Fighting 

Group (LIFG) in Darna to be overstated. Many can testify that radical elements are found 

within the rebel groups, but there are too few of them to be considered a true threat. That 

said, if prolonged instability plagues the country or when the inevitable postrevolution 

disillusionment hits the youth—especially those who have become fighters—radical Islam 

may become a catalyst for those deceptions and grievances. 

Recent reports suggest that the jihadi movement is growing significantly, with several 

prominent LIFG members rising to power. The LIFG claims to have renounced links to alQaeda, but it remains unclear whether this is true or not.

Tribal and Ethnic Divides

Tribal and ethnic dynamics in Libya are very complex. More than 90 percent of Libyans 

consider themselves to be an ethnic mix of Arab and Berber, but other ethnicities in Libya 

include the previously nomadic Touareg and Tebu tribes in the southwest (important from 

a border control perspective), sub-Saharan Africans (often subject to discrimination), and 

Berbers (Amazighs). There are an estimated 2,000 tribes in Libya, divided into 140 main 

tribes, and of those about 50 seem to be key, playing large socioeconomic and political 

If prolonged instability plagues 

the country or when the 

inevitable postrevolution 

disillusionment hits the youth 

. . . radical Islam may become a 

catalyst for those deceptions 

and grievances.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Libya 

is very strong and, as in Egypt, 

well funded and organized.
 9

roles within the country. Both the opposition and the pro-Gadhafi forces have been actively 

pursuing the allegiance of these key tribes by organizing meetings and conferences with 

the respective tribal leaders. 

Most citizens in Benghazi claim that tribes are important culturally but not politically. 

Research conducted in other cities suggests otherwise, however, and the role of tribes in 

governance is a subject of debate. Different reports suggest that Gadhafi both undermined 

and empowered tribes at various times. An opposition leader expressed that the tribes were 

widely disliked because Gadhafi had previously used them to overpower the traditional 

legal system of courts and police officials, creating a corrupt alternative power structure. 

Historically, under Gadhafi, tribal leaders resolved local conflicts, liaised with the People’s 

Congresses and committees, and implemented socioeconomic development plans. Under the 

Popular Social Leadership, established in 1993, tribal leaders were meant to be communities’ 

natural leaders, serving on a three-year rotational basis.14

Arabic graffiti against tribalism appeared around the courthouse turned youth headquarters in Benghazi, even as some reports suggest that the revolution was essentially a tribal 

uprising, with the eastern tribes pitting themselves against the western tribes (as well as the 

Berbers). Gadhafi had integrated a large part of his own tribe, the Ghaddafa, as well as the 

Warfalla tribe (Libya’s largest tribe with an estimated two million people) and the Maghara 

(the tribe Gadhafi married into) into top positions within the government and the military. 

Gadhafi had to leverage the Maghara and Warfalla tribes during his rule, as historically, the 

Warfalla tribe not only outweighed the Ghaddafa tribe in prominence and resources, but also 

maintained power relations of domination; the Warfalla historically employed the Ghaddafa 

to look over resources and cattle.15 After 1969, Gadhafi continued to forge alliances with 

the powerful tribesman of the Warfalla, employing them in higher ranks. Guards and chiefs 

of the revolutionary committees, as well as the armed forces, belonged to the Warfalla 

tribe. Gadhafi’s clear favoritism of tribes, despite historical tradition, has become a cause 

for grievance among the eastern tribes.

It is difficult to draw the line between the political and social realms. In the east, tribal 

law systems overrule national laws, which is not unexpected given Libya’s traditionally 

weak governing institutions. Each Libyan must pay a tax between LD1 and LD15, depending 

on the size of the tribe, to his tribal leader. If murder or rape occurs between members of 

different tribes, compensation is owed to the tribe of the victim. Tribal leaders maintain 

their claim that their role is strictly social and do not overtly express any interest in being 

involved in post-Gadhafi governance, even as their continuing hold over local law and order 

is the essence of political order in the east; their claim to political neutrality may be more 

accurate in the realms of national governance and foreign affairs. Once the national discussion of common pool resources, such as oil and natural gas wealth, begins at the end of 

Gadhafi’s rule, the claims to political neutrality may very well change quickly. Land rights 

will be another major legal issue that the tribes will want to have a say in. 

The southern ethnicities—the Touareg and the Tebu—are different from the northern tribes in lifestyle and in culture. Originally nomadic, they have been impoverished 

since the demise of the camel trade due to droughts and political conflicts. The Touareg, 

originally caravan traders linking the Mediterranean coast and south Saharan Africa, lived in 

a “stratified society based on tribe-entities and pastoral activities.”16 The south of Libya is 

underdeveloped and discriminated against; the black population of the Tebu has struggled 

significantly to obtain Libyan citizenship. The Tebu and the Touareg have resented the Gadhafi regime because local rulers in the south were commonly Arab, and during the Gadhafi 

regime neither tribe had the right to speak their own language or express their culture. 

However, many Tebu and Touareg managed to obtain citizenship and become integrated 

into the military through links with the Gadhafi regime. The Tebu became a leverage point 

Tribal leaders maintain their 

claim that their role is strictly 

social . . . even as their 

continuing hold over local law 

and order is the essence of 

political order in the east. 
10 

for the regime, as Gadhafi helped them conduct proxy wars in neighboring countries in 

exchange for loyalty towards his regime. In the early 1990s Gadhafi had enrolled young 

Touareg men in the Libyan Army and his Islamic Legion, established solely to fight for Libya 

in Chad.17 Both the Tebu and the Touareg expressed strong grievances towards the NTC, 

claiming that they did not receive enough weapons, food, and medicine from it to support 

the revolution in the south. They also feel that they have too little representation within 

the council. This type of aspirational deprivation is common in postconflict societies and 

must be addressed, as it is a prime motivator for continuing internal instability. 

There has been much talk about Gadhafi’s infamous African mercenaries. The government 

certainly used some mercenaries, but many were Tebu from the south that had held Libyan 

citizenship for up to thirty years. Some fighters were also Touareg from Mali and Chad. Gadhafi’s forces trained the Touraeg and Tebus in Obari, as Ahmed Mohammed Atargi, a tribal 

Touareg leader from Obari, has reported. Atargi also asserts that there will be conflict unless 

the tribes from the south have more rights in a post-Gadhafi regime. He estimates that 

roughly 50 percent of Touareg and 68 percent of Tebu still do not have formal Libyan citizenship, because Law 18 forbids non-Arabs from obtaining Libyan citizenship. Despite this, the 

Touareg and Tebu call themselves “the real citizens of Libya” because historically the tribes 

came to the desert before the Arabs. “We hate the Arabs and Islam because of what Gadhafi 

did,” said a Touareg refugee, “but since the revolution we feel that Arabs are our brothers, 

and Islam our religion.” “We are looking for the new Libya, not the new Arabic Libya,” said 

Ali Agari, a Tebu leader. There seem to be specific grievances toward the Ghaddafa and 

Stemanza tribe, as they were enforcing the law of the Gadhafi regime in the south. Gadhafi 

once told the Tebu “that they were not Libyans. All of them.” For the Tebu, there is a clear 

and strong identity conflict between being Arabic, African, Libyan, and Islamic. The inability 

to reconcile these dissonant elements likely will eventually lead to further rebellion, as the 

tribes dissociate from the dominant national identity and seek enough autonomy to express 

the social, cultural, and economic elements of their own group.

The Berber—more commonly referred to as the Amazigh—are found in the west and have 

suffered a similar fate as the Touareg, with whom they share a common language. The Libyan 

government has always struggled with the Berber and its attitude toward the tribe has been 

consistently ambiguous and contradicting; the government recently attempted to promote 

Berber folklore, while simultaneously denying the people’s existence.18 Like tribes in the 

west, the Amazigh have historically been impoverished, were denied the right to speak their 

own language, and denied other cultural rights. Recent reports from humanitarian workers 

in the Nafusa Mountains not only confirm underlying tensions between the Berber and the 

Arabs, but also inter-Berber tribal rivalries and conflicts. The Amazigh cooperated with the 

eastern tribes, uniting against a common enemy, but in the post-Gadhafi setting, historical 

grievances are likely to reemerge.

The Monarchists

Eastern Libyans tend to romanticize the former government of King Idris, whose power 

derived from the religious legitimacy of the al-Senussi order, presumably because Gadhafi 

deposed King Idris in 1969.19 The popular claim is that King Idris united the Libyans and 

brought infrastructure and wealth to the country, though the gross national product was 

significantly lower during the king’s rule than Gadhafi’s. Ultimately, the monarchy’s mismanagement of resources undermined its authority, and by 1969, the Idris monarchy “collapsed 

under the weight of its own stagnation.”20 The newfound nostalgia for the former monarchy 

within the Libyan diaspora could translate into a desire to return the self-proclaimed crown 

prince, Mohamed al-Senussi, to power from his current base in London. However, there 

The Amazigh cooperated with 

the eastern tribes, uniting 

against a common enemy, but 

in the post-Gadhafi setting, 

historical grievances are likely 

to reemerge.
 11

seems to be little or no appetite among local eastern Libyans to have Libya return to any 

sort of monarchy. They have expressed a genuine wish for a democratic system.

Grievances and Frictions during Transition

Postrevolution Aspirational Deprivation

The lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that when the dust settles after Gadhafi’s 

demise, people will begin to realize that improvements will not come to Libya quickly. The 

resulting feelings of aspirational deprivation will start the inevitable blame games over the 

slow progress, with power grabs, corruption, and failures of security and governance possibly 

to follow. At best, deception can lead to apathy; at worst, to armed conflict and radicalization. A prolonged state of aspirational deprivation can fuel an insurgency.21 Because of the 

country’s small population and vast oil wealth, the risk for frustration of tribal and national 

aspirations is greater in Libya than it was in Afghanistan or Iraq. Many Libyans speak about 

the post-Gadhafi future optimistically, stating that “every Libyan will have lots of money to 

travel and won’t have to work” and “we’ll be like Qatar.” The vision of a Qatar-like Libya is 

not founded in economic reality, as Libyan oil per capita is significantly lower. The sense of 

ownership of the revolution thus becomes a double-edged sword: It kept the population’s 

morale high during difficult times but can lead to unmet expectations that translate into 

deeper grievances as people feel more personally vested in the outcomes.

February 17 Movement Resentment toward the NTC and Muslim Brotherhood

A strong sense of postrevolution disillusionment seems to have hit the February 17 youth 

already and is likely to grow. The youth population in Libya is large and although the movement does not represent the entire age cohort—even in the east—it remains a large and 

influential group. If aspirational deprivation and resentment of the NTC and MB escalates, it 

may become a source of armed conflict. The NTC should work more closely with the February 

17 youth instead of alienating them. The NTC also needs to check other factions to make 

sure that one is not dominating the others. This monitoring will prevent accusations that the 

February 17 youth have already made against the MB from growing into larger problems. 

Tribes and Islamic Organizations

In the West, there is a tendency to fear tribalism and Islamic organizations. Instead of 

fear, these existing structures should be leveraged to create stability in the current power 

vacuum. The tribes should be engaged with caution, as it is in nobody’s interest to empower 

a parallel structure that could undermine the future governing body. However, supporting 

a well-defined and limited social mandate can benefit all parties and create a more stable 

environment. The same goes for Islamic organizations; from individual imams to organized 

parties such as the MB, there needs to be engagement and support. Islamic organizations 

are integral to the east Libyan social construct and are often trusted and respected sources 

of information and advice. These factions should be engaged in the debate instead of 

pushed to the side. 

Potential tribal conflicts can be mitigated through dialogue rather than through violence. During Gadhafi’s half-century in power, a process of meta-contrast kept the tribes in a 

state of stasis with respect to their support of—or oppression by—his military regime. Now 

that the oppressive structure is removed, the natural divisions and competitions between 

cultural identities will surface, requiring mediation. The successes and failures of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Balkans should be kept in mind.

The sense of ownership of 

the revolution . . . kept the 

population’s morale high during 

difficult times but can lead 

to unmet expectations that 

translate into deeper grievances.
12 

A serious intelligence effort should be conducted to learn more about the radical 

elements—the jihadists—as their growth could potentially undermine a stable transition, 

not only in Libya, but within the entire region.

The South

The south tends to be dismissed as “the desert,” implying that the population is so small 

that it is irrelevant to stability. This is a dangerous assumption. While they may be few in 

numbers, the southern population has access to and controls many of the borders, water 

resources, and some of the energy resources. As mentioned before, southerners feel alienated by the NTC. Some kept allegiances to the Gadhafi government throughout the conflict. 

Unless current and past grievances between the Arab ruling elite and the Amazigh, Touareg, 

and Tebu are addressed, conflict is almost a certainty. Another scenario that could lead to 

conflict involves Arabs accusing Touareg and Tebu of not having fought on the side of the 

revolution and of having allowed mercenaries and supplies to enter Libya. In addition to 

the racism that already exists—specifically concerning the Tebu, who are black Africans—

this could lead to more discrimination and violence. There will most certainly be conflicts 

between and within the tribes in the south and west as well, potentially undermining not 

only Libya’s internal peace and reconciliation process, but also creating wider instability in 

neighboring countries.

Recommendations 

•	 Researchers should engage in further mapping of stakeholders as well as talking to community 

and other key leaders. Gadhafi authorized very little research on his country and kept Libya 

closed to journalists and researchers for many years. It is difficult to understand and obtain 

access to data, whether those data exist or not. Very little is understood about Libyan social 

constructs, tribal and intertribal dynamics, and the more recent groups that have emerged. 

Most accounts are solely qualitative, such as this one, and none is a serious quantitative 

approach for a deeper understanding.

•	 Once a thorough understanding has been achieved, an engagement plan should be outlined.

Ideally, local Libyans would implement such a plan. But should the situation be too tense, 

international assistance could help monitor and provide advice in the process. The international community should also remain the neutral outside element.

•	 Local ownership of the political process should not be undermined. In the West, there is a 

tendency to rapidly claim the ownership of other nations’ successes and failures. While this 

generally stems from a genuine desire to help, the good-natured helping hand can undermine the local sense of ownership of the process. This outside direction in Iraq and Afghanistan led to political apathy locally. By claiming others’ ownership processes, the West 

provides excuses for failure: in taking responsibility for locals’ failures, the local movement 

never attempts to stand on its own and address its own issues. Western help will be needed 

in the form of advice and possibly funding, but international actors should be careful to 

keep a genuinely local face on everything. Any political change must be locally driven, just 

like the revolution itself. The strong sense of ownership of the revolution present in Libya 

must be maintained and enhanced. This sense of ownership can only be enhanced through 

an inclusive and open political process and further empowerment of civil society. Foreigners 

must avoid being highly visible and coming across as patronizing—something that has 

already happened as various foreign diplomats hold forth to the opposition on how they 

should handle internal conflicts. However well meaning those comments are intended to 
 13

be, they would be more beneficial stated over a cup of tea in Tripoli than in a White House 

press briefing broadcasted on television.

•	 Post-Gadhafi expectations need to be managed. The postrevolutionary disillusionment phase 

will pose huge challenges to security and political progress. This challenge needs to be 

addressed immediately. Facts and examples about democratization, different governance 

systems, the importance of a strong private sector, foreign direct investment, the structure 

of an economy that is not dependent on energy exports, the time it takes to rebuild a 

society and repair physical and psychological damage caused by conflict, and the time it 

takes to rebuild basic functions such as security and elections need to be disseminated 

soon. Now is the time to create realistic expectations, avoid a situation like Afghanistan, 

and help bring security and stability to Libya.

 15

Acknowledgements

Alixe Turner, operations coordinator, Shabakat Corporation, contributed with editing and background research, and Osama Ibrahim Mustafa, East Libya research manager, facilitated access to 

the various interview subjects.

Notes

1. Emanuela Paoletti, “Libya: Roots of a Civil Conflict,” Mediterranean Politics 16, no. 2 (July 2011), 313–19.

2. Paoletti, “Libya.”

3. Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife (Philadelphia, PA: University of 

Pennsylvania Press, 2002). 

4. See website of the National Transitional Council, www.ntclibya.com.

5. Evan Hill, “General’s Death Puts Libyan Rebels in Turmoil,” Al-Jazeera, July 28, 2011. 

6. David S. Sorenson, “Civil-Military Relations in North Africa,” Middle East Policy 14, no. 4 (2007), 99–114. 

7. Muammar Gadhafi, The Green Book (Tripoli: Jerusalem International Publishers on behalf of the Green Book World 

Center for Research and Study, Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 1984).

8. Luis Martinez, “Libya: The Conversion of a ‘Terrorist State,’” Mediterranean Politics 11, no. 2 (July 2006), 151–65. 

9. Graeme Smith, “Libyan Rebels Crack Down on Rogue Militias,” The Globe and Mail, July 31, 2007, http://www.

theglobeandmail.com/news/world/africa-mideast/libyan-rebels-crack-down-on-rogue-militias/article2115805/.

10. Chris Stephen, “Misrata Rebel Forces Seize Arms after Routing Pro-Qaddafi Troops,” The Guardian, July 31 2011, 

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/31/misrata-rebels-seize-Qaddafi-arms.

11. Louisa Dris-Ait-Hamadouche, “Women in the Maghreb: Civil Society’s Actors or Political Instruments?” Middle East 

Policy 14, no. 4 (2007), 115–33. 

12. UNDP Programme of Governance in the Arab Region, http://www.pogar.org/countries/theme.aspx?cid=10&t=4.

13. Alison Pargeter, “Localism and Radicalization in North Africa: Local Factors and the Development of Political Islam 

in Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya,” International Affairs 85, no. 5 (2009), 1031–1044. 

14. Paoletti, “Libya.”

15. Larbi Sadiki, “Wither Arab ‘Republicanism?’ The Rise of Family Rule and the ‘End of Democratization’ in Egypt, 

Libya, and Yemen,” Mediterranean Politics 15, no. 1 (2010), 99–107. 

16. Claudio Ottoni, Maarten H.D. Larmuseau, Nancy Vanderheyden, Cristina Martínez-Labarga, Giuseppina Primativo, 

Gianfranco Biondi, Ronny Decorte, and Olga Rickards, “Deep into the Roots of the Libyan Tuareg: A Genetic Survey 

of their Paternal Heritage,” American Journal of Physical Anthropology 145, no. 1 (May 2011), 118–24. 

17. “Tuareg Return,” The Economist, October 13, 1990.

18. Aisha Al-Rumi, “Libyan Berbers Struggle to Assert Their Identity Online,” Arab Media and Society, Spring 2009. 

19. Ray Takeyh, “Qadhafi’s Libya and the Prospect of Islamic Succession,” Middle East Policy 7, no. 2 (February 2000), 

154–64. 

20. Takeyh, “Qadhafi’s Libya.” 

21. See Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969).
Of Related Interest

•	 Security Sector Transformation in North Africa and the Middle East by Mark Sedra (Special 

Report, November 2011)

•	 Extending Libya’s Transitional Period: Capitalizing on the Constitutional Moment by Jason 

Gluck (Peace Brief, September 2011)

United States 

Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.