2003 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-10-2003

Longenette v. Krusing

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket 00-3690

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"Longenette v. Krusing" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 693.

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PRECEDENTIAL

Filed March 7, 2003

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 00-3690

WILLIAM LONGENETTE,

Appellant

v.

PETER KRUSING;

WILLIAM E. PERRY, SPECIAL AGENT FBI;

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

D.C. Civil Action No. 92-cv-00312E

(Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.)

Argued September 17, 2002

Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, SCIRICA

and McKEE, Circuit Judges

(Filed: March 7, 2003)

KEITH NOREIKA, ESQUIRE

(ARGUED)

Covington & Burling

1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

Attorney for Appellant
BONNIE R. SCHLUETER, ESQUIRE

PAUL E. SKIRTICH, ESQUIRE

(ARGUED)

Office of United States Attorney

633 United States Post Office &

Courthouse

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

Attorney for Appellees

OPINION OF THE COURT

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge: 

This case involves an administrative forfeiture proceeding

of a motor vehicle allegedly used in certain drug

transactions. The pro se prisoner’s claim of ownership was

dismissed as untimely. At issue is whether to apply the

prison mailbox rule. 

I.

On August 30, 1990, federal authorities arrested William

Longenette on drug-related charges. One day later, special

agents of the FBI seized his 1985 Dodge B250 Custom Van,

under § 881 of the Controlled Substances Act. 21 U.S.C.

§ 881. The government initiated administrative forfeiture

proceedings against Longenette’s van on March 27, 1992,

advising him to “file a claim of ownership and a bond . . .

by May 12, 1992” to contest the forfeiture.1 Longenette did

not receive the initial notice immediately since it was

mailed to an incorrect prison location. On April 16,

Longenette claimed ownership of the van in a letter to the

FBI. Longenette also asserted an inability to post the

mandatory bond and requested an in forma pauperis

declaration to provide in lieu of the bond. 

The FBI mailed Longenette an in forma pauperis form on

1. In compliance with 19 U.S.C. § 1608, the government also published

notice of the impending forfeiture in a local newspaper on April 13, 20,

and 27. 

2
April 17, responding to a separate request from

Longenette’s former attorney, who had received a copy of

the initial notice. The FBI’s letter accompanying the form

provided a deadline extension and directed Longenette to

“return” the form to the FBI by May 29. The record does not

indicate when Longenette received the IFP form. On May

27, he handed the completed form to prison authorities for

mailing to the FBI, but wrote the date of May 9 next to his

signature. The FBI did not receive the form until June 2,

four days after the May 29 deadline. On July 6, the FBI

sent a letter to Longenette advising him that his bond was

untimely and that the administrative forfeiture proceedings

would continue.

On September 15, 1992, Longenette filed suit to contest

the administrative forfeiture. On June 6, 1994, the District

Court dismissed Longenette’s claim based on lack of

jurisdiction and insufficient service of process. On

November 9, 1995, we reversed, finding jurisdiction on due

process grounds, and remanded for further consideration.

Longenette v. Krusing et al, No. 94-3321 (3d Cir. filed Aug.

25, 1995) (table). On September 26, 2000, after several

delays in securing counsel for Longenette, the District

Court granted the government’s motion for summary

judgment.2 Longenette filed a timely appeal.3

2. Longenette claims government authorities in West Virginia stole up to

$13,000 from him when seizing and judicially forfeiting his cash assets.

Since the United States District Court for the District of West Virginia

presided over those forfeiture proceedings, the District Court here

correctly held this issue was not properly before it. 

3. We have jurisdiction to review administrative forfeitures for

constitutional infringements or procedural errors. United States v.

McGlory, 202 F.3d 664, 670 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“The federal courts

have universally upheld jurisdiction to review whether an administrative

forfeiture satisfied statutory and due process requirements.”); see also In

re One Jeep 1987 Wrangler Auto., 972 F.2d 472, 480 (2d Cir. 1992). We

have jurisdiction to consider the grant of summary judgment under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. 

3
II.

A.

The Controlled Substances Act permits seizures and

subsequent forfeitures of motor vehicles used to facilitate

the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or

concealment of illegal drugs. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a). For seized

property valued less than $500,000, the Act and

accompanying regulations authorize civil forfeiture through

an administrative action rather than through a judicial

proceeding. Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 1316.77(b). 

An administrative forfeiture proceeding requires the FBI

or DEA, whichever is relevant, to notify any person with an

interest in the property. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.77. The

government accomplishes notification by sending a letter

via certified mail to the person’s last known address and by

advertising a notice of forfeiture in a local publication on

three separate occasions. See 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a); 21

C.F.R. § 1316.75(a). Any person claiming ownership has

twenty days in which to file a claim stating his interest

“with the appropriate customs officer.” 19 U.S.C. § 1608.

The individual also must provide a bond “to the United

States” to cover the costs and expenses of judicial

proceedings. Id. Individuals who cannot afford to post a

bond may file an in forma pauperis declaration. 19 C.F.R.

§ 162.47(e). Once an individual properly contests the

administrative forfeiture, the matter automatically is

forwarded to the courts for judicial proceedings.4 19 U.S.C.

§§ 1608, 1610; 21 C.F.R. §§ 1316.76(b), 1316.78. 

Here, the government initiated administrative forfeiture

proceedings against Longenette’s van on March 27, 1992.

Longenette filed his ownership claim on April 16 and

requested IFP status. By letter of April 17, the FBI

4. If an individual fails to contest an administrative forfeiture, he loses all

recourse for judicial review of the administrative proceeding’s merits. See

21 C.F.R. § 1316.77(b). His only opportunity to regain his property

interest rests on a due process or procedural claim or on filing a petition

for remission (pardon) with the administrative agency. 21 C.F.R.

§ 1316.80(a). 

4
forwarded an IFP form to Longenette and provided a

“return” deadline of May 29, 1992. Longenette submitted

his completed IFP form to federal prison authorities on May

27, but the FBI did not receive the form until June 2. The

timeliness of Longenette’s submission, therefore, depends

on the application of the prison mailbox rule. 

B.

Nearly fifteen years ago, the Supreme Court promulgated

the prison mailbox rule. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266

(1988). Houston involved a pro se prisoner’s appeal of a

district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. The prisoner gave a notice of appeal to prison

authorities on the twenty-seventh day following the district

court’s judgment. But the district court did not receive the

filing until the thirty-first day, one day beyond the

permitted period. The United States Court of Appeals for

the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal because the prisoner

had filed it outside of the permitted thirty days. 

The Supreme Court reversed, crafting a prison mailbox

rule whereby the date on which a prisoner transmitted

documents to prison authorities would be considered the

actual filing date. The Court designed the rule specifically

for pro se prisoners. Id. at 275 (“[A] pro se prisoner has no

choice but to hand his notice over to prison authorities for

forwarding to the court clerk.”). The Court cited several

policy considerations for its decision: a pro se prisoner may

only communicate with the district court through prison

authorities; a tardy prisoner is not free to “walk” papers to

the district court; and the prevention of an intentional delay

in transmission by prison authorities. Id. at 274. The Court

also noted the “well-developed procedures” at federal

prisons that record the date and time of prisoner

submissions, making reference to prison mail logs a

“straightforward inquiry.” Id. at 275. 

The dissenting justices in Houston remarked that the

“decision obliterates the line between textual construction

and textual enactment.” Id. at 277 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

The dissent also noted that “the Court’s rule makes a good

deal of sense [but] it is not the rule that we have

5
promulgated through congressionally prescribed

procedures.” Id. 

C.

Five years after Houston, the Supreme Court returned to

the prison mailbox rule in Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43

(1993). The State of Michigan sought to try a prisoner

detained by the State of Indiana. Under the Interstate

Agreement on Detainers, a prisoner may file a request for

final disposition in the prosecuting state.5 The Agreement

provides for dismissal with prejudice if the prosecuting

state does not bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days of

receiving such a request. Here, Michigan brought the

prisoner to trial 196 days after he delivered his request to

prison authorities, but only 177 days after the Michigan

prosecutor received the request. 

The Court held the prison mailbox rule did not protect

the detainee, focusing on the Agreement’s specific language:

“[the detainee] shall be brought to trial within one hundred

and eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered

to the prosecuting officer . . . written notice of the place of

his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition

. . . .” Id. at 45 n.1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, Art. III(a)

(emphasis added)). The Court concluded this language

meant the 180-day period could not begin to run until the

prosecuting officer received the request for final disposition.

Because, under the statute, the time period specifically

commenced after delivery to the prosecuting officer, the

prison mailbox rule did not apply.

The line between Houston and Fex is a narrow one. The

distinguishing factor appears to be the specificity of the

“service” language in the statute at issue. Before we

examine the statutory language of civil forfeitures, it is

instructive to look at three recent appellate decisions. 

5. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers permits a prisoner to request

final disposition of any untried “indictment, information, or complaint.”

18 U.S.C. app. § 2. 

6
D.

In Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999),

a prisoner filed an administrative claim of excessive force

under the Federal Tort Claims Act. He delivered the claim

to prison authorities within the Drug Enforcement

Administration’s two-year regulatory period, but the DEA

did not receive the claim until one day beyond the

permitted time. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

found no difference between the filing of a court action and

the filing of an administrative claim, so it applied the prison

mailbox rule to make the plaintiff ’s filing timely. Id. But the

court did explain that “Houston does not apply, of course,

when there is a specific statutory regime to the contrary.”

Id. at 152 n.1. 

The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits

have rejected the prison mailbox rule’s application to

administrative proceedings when precluded by a specific

statutory or regulatory regime. Smith v. Conner, 250 F.3d

277 (5th Cir. 2001); Nigro v. Sullivan, 40 F.3d 990 (9th Cir.

1994). Nigro involved a pretrial detainee who tested positive

for illegal drug use. Following the Bureau of Prisons’

prescribed administrative remedies, the detainee filed his

appeal with the General Counsel’s Office. But that office did

not receive his appeal until thirty-one days after the initial

report, one day beyond the permitted period. 

The Ninth Circuit rejected Nigro’s appeal, finding the

prison mailbox rule did not apply where administrative

regulations defined the word “filed.” Id. at 994 (“An appeal

is ‘considered filed when the receipt is issued.’ ”) (quoting

28 C.F.R. § 542.14 (1993)). As the court expressed, “[w]e

cannot in the name of sympathy rewrite a clear procedural

rule.” Id. at 995. 

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit similarly

declined to apply Houston where the administrative

regulation was precisely written. In Smith, a pro se prisoner

failed to file a timely appeal of his deportation with the

Board of Immigration Appeals. 250 F.3d at 277. The

prisoner had submitted his appeal to prison authorities on

the final day of the permitted period, but the BIA did not

receive the appeal until three days later. The court focused

7
on the relevant INS regulation, which provided that the date

of filing is the date the BIA receives the appeal. Id. at 279.

Based on this regulation, the court rejected application of

the prison mailbox rule. Id. 

All three appellate courts found no reason to apply the

prison mailbox rule in the face of a specific statutory or

regulatory regime. Houston’s narrow holding, therefore,

apparently was designed to protect pro se prisoners in the

absence of a clear statutory or regulatory scheme.6

E.

Our decision here turns on the proper construction of the

statute and regulations for administrative forfeitures. In

order to contest an administrative forfeiture, a person

claiming ownership must file a claim and give a bond to the

United States. The government acknowledges Longenette

properly filed his claim of ownership in his April 16 letter.

The only question is whether Longenette timely “gave” a

bond to the United States. 

We examine the statutory language for civil forfeitures to

determine whether there is a clear statutory scheme.7 The

government contends the statutory regime makes it

“indisputable that Longenette had to perform his two acts

[of filing a claim and posting bond] by May 29, 1992.”

Longenette did not meet his deadline, the government

argues, because he failed to give a bond to the United

States within the time period required by the civil forfeiture

statute. Longenette responds that the statutory scheme

does not clearly define the operative words “filing” a claim

and “giving” a bond to require actual receipt of those items.

6. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Fex, we have recognized the

prison mailbox rule in other contexts. E.g., In re Flanagan, 999 F.2d

753, 758-59 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying the prison mailbox rule to the

bankruptcy litigation process). 

7. The District Court found “the regulation at issue specifies that the

challenge to the forfeiture must be received by a date certain.” Longenette

v. Krusing et al, No. 92-312, at *12 (W.D. Pa. filed Sept. 26, 2000). But

the court did not cite the specific regulatory language upon which it

relied, nor did it focus on the “giving of the bond.” 

8
Accordingly, we review the relevant federal law. Section

1608 of the Tariff Act of 1930 requires that: 

Any person claiming such vessel, vehicle, aircraft,

merchandise, or baggage may at any time within

twenty days from the date of the first publication of the

notice of seizure file with the appropriate customs

officer a claim stating his interest therein. Upon the

filing of such claim, and the giving of a bond to the

United States in the penal sum of $ 5,000 or 10

percent of the value of the claimed property, whichever

is lower, but not less than $ 250, with sureties to be

approved by such customs officer, conditioned that in

case of condemnation of the articles so claimed the

obligor shall pay all the costs and expenses of the

proceedings to obtain such condemnation, such

customs officer shall transmit such claim and bond,

with a duplicate list and description of the articles

seized, to the United States attorney for the district in

which seizure was made, who shall proceed to a

condemnation of the merchandise or other property in

the manner prescribed by law.

19 U.S.C. § 1608.

Section 1609 provides:

If no such claim is filed or bond given within the

twenty days hereinbefore specified, the appropriate

customs officer shall declare the vessel, vehicle,

aircraft, merchandise, or baggage forfeited, and shall

sell the same at public auction in the same manner as

merchandise abandoned to the United States is sold or

otherwise dispose of the same according to law, and

shall deposit the proceeds of sale, after deducting the

expenses described in section 613 [19 USCS § 1613],

into the Customs Forfeiture Fund. 

19 U.S.C. § 1609.8

8. See also 21 C.F.R. § 1316.77(b) (“For property seized by officers of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, if the appraised value does not exceed

the jurisdictional limits in § 1316.75(a), and a claim and bond are not

filed within the 20 days hereinbefore mentioned, the FBI Property

Management Officer shall declare the property forfeited.”) 

9
Read together, §§ 1608 and 1609 require an individual to

file a claim and give a bond within twenty days of the

publication of notice. Notwithstanding this requirement, the

FBI extended the twenty day period here in its April 17

letter, providing Longenette a deadline of May 29. At issue

is whether Longenette met this revised deadline. 

The District Court found “the [prison mailbox] rule has

never been applied outside of court filings; that is, the

courts have never imposed the rule on the executive branch

as Plaintiff is suggesting that we do here.” Longenette, No.

92-312, at *12. But Houston and Fex direct us to look at

the statutory and regulatory regimes, not the branch of

government in which they originate, in deciding whether to

apply the rule. In Houston, the relevant statute provided

that “no appeal shall bring any judgment . . . before a court

of appeals for review unless notice of appeal is filed, within

thirty days after the entry of such judgment.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2107. The statute in Houston did not define whether

“filed” meant actual receipt by the court. Because of this

ambiguity, the Supreme Court crafted the prison mailbox

rule.

The cases that have eschewed application of the prison

mailbox rule involved statutory or regulatory schemes that

clearly required actual receipt by a specific date. In Fex, the

Interstate Agreement on Detainers incorporated language

that specifically started the relevant 180-day period after

the prosecuting officer received a prisoner’s request for final

disposition. 507 U.S. at 45. In Smith, the INS regulation

provided that the date of filing was the date the Board of

Immigration Appeals received the appeal. 250 F.3d at 278.

And in Nigro, the regulation provided that “an appeal is

considered filed when the receipt is issued.” 40 F.3d at 994.

Here, there is no such conclusive language. Section 1608

provides that an administrative forfeiture proceeding

terminates, and is referred to the local United States

attorney for judicial forfeiture proceedings, “[u]pon the filing

of [a] claim, and the giving of a bond to the United States.”

19 U.S.C. § 1608. Section 1609 provides a clear deadline

that the claim be “filed” and the bond be “given” within

twenty days. As in Houston, neither the statutory nor

regulatory schemes define “filed” and “given” as requiring

10
actual receipt.9

 The circumstances of his situation required

Longenette to give his “bond” to prison authorities for

forwarding to the FBI customs officer. He gave the in forma

pauperis declaration to prison authorities on May 27, two

days in advance of the FBI’s deadline. Because neither the

statute nor the regulations require “actual receipt,” Houston

mandates the prison mailbox rule’s applicability. Therefore,

Longenette timely contested the administrative forfeiture.

III.

The question remains as to disposition of the forfeited

van, or the proceeds from its sale.10 The answer is not

immediately apparent. At issue is whether the

administrative forfeiture is void or voidable and whether the

statute of limitations bars a new proceeding. 

A.

All of the appellate courts that have addressed similar

issues were faced with defective notices of forfeiture. Four

appellate courts — the Courts of Appeals for the Second,

Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits — have held that a

forfeiture conducted without adequate notice is void. AlliBalogun v. United States, 281 F.3d 362, 370-71 (2d Cir.

2002); Kadonsky v. United States, 216 F.3d 499, 506-07

(5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213,

1218-20 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Clymore, 164 F.3d

569, 574 (10th Cir. 1999). As the Fifth Circuit explained in

Kadonsky, “[t]he remedy for constitutionally insufficient

notice in forfeiture proceedings is to void and vacate the

9. Nor was this clear in the FBI’s correspondence to Longenette. The

FBI’s March 27 letter directed that Longenette “file a claim of ownership

and a bond . . . with the FBI” by May 12. On April 17, the FBI

acknowledged Longenette’s claim of ownership and forwarded him an IFP

declaration to complete. The letter directed Longenette to “[r]eturn this

declaration and [claim] of ownership to the FBI by May 29, 1992.” The

FBI seemed to use the words “give,” “file,” and “return” interchangeably.

10. At oral argument, we asked counsel what had become of the van.

Given the elapsed time, government counsel presumed the van had been

sold. For purposes of this opinion, we will continue to refer to the van

rather than the proceeds from its sale. 

11
original proceeding, and [the statute of] limitations may bar

consideration of the government’s forfeiture claim on the

merits unless the government provides a rationale to

equitably toll or otherwise not apply the statute.” 216 F.3d

at 506-07. 

One appellate court — the Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit — has interpreted insufficient notice as making

forfeiture proceedings voidable, not void. United States v.

Dusenbery, 201 F.3d 763, 768 (6th Cir. 2000), aff ’d on

other grounds, 534 U.S. 161 (2002). In a 2-1 decision, the

Sixth Circuit declared that “inadequate notices should be

treated as voidable, not void, and that the proper remedy is

simply to restore the right . . . to judicially contest the

forfeiture . . . . Thus, the Government is not required to

institute ‘new’ forfeiture proceedings and the applicable

statute of limitations, § 1621, therefore has no bearing.” Id.

We have adopted the majority view when there has been

inadequate notice. In Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co.,

756 F.2d 14, 19 (3d Cir. 1985), we declared that “[a] default

judgment entered when there has been no proper service of

complaint is, a fortiori, void, and should be set aside.” We

applied Gold Kist to civil forfeitures in United States v. One

Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 2000)

(en banc), holding that a prior forfeiture judgment issued

without proper notice to a potential claimant is void.

Because the administrative forfeiture lacked legal

foundation, the judgment was incurable. Id.; see also

Kadonsky, 216 F.3d at 506 (“[C]onstitutionally ineffective

notice renders forfeiture orders void because the court

lacked jurisdiction to enter them.”). Thus, we held that

where notice is improper, the administrative forfeiture is, a

fortiori, void, and should be set aside. 

Here, the government provided proper notice to

Longenette. The proceedings, therefore, were valid from

their inception. This distinction makes the administrative

forfeiture proceeding here voidable, rather than void. Once

notice was properly given to Longenette, the FBI validly

could proceed with the administrative proceeding.

Furthermore, the District Court subsequently had

jurisdiction to enter the judgment of forfeiture. The only

defect in this proceeding was the failure to apply the prison

12
mailbox rule. Because jurisdiction was proper, the court’s

judgment is voidable, not void. 

If the administrative forfeiture is voidable, the proper

remedy is to vacate the forfeiture and restore the prior

situation. Once restored, the FBI would accept Longenette’s

IFP declaration in lieu of a bond, and the matter would be

referred to the local United States attorney for judicial

forfeiture. 19 U.S.C. § 1608; see Dusenbery, 201 F.3d at

766 (“A properly filed claim stops the administrative

forfeiture process and requires the seizing agency to refer

the matter to the United States Attorney to institute judicial

forfeiture proceedings.”); 21 C.F.R. §§ 1316.76(b), 1316.78.11

Nevertheless, at issue is whether the statute of

limitations in 19 U.S.C. § 1621 bars the United States

Attorney from instituting judicial forfeiture proceedings. The

administrative forfeiture here occurred more than ten years

ago, and under the applicable statute of limitations, “[n]o

suit or action to recover any . . . forfeiture of property

accruing under the customs laws shall be instituted unless

such suit or action is commenced within five years after the

time when the alleged offense was discovered.” 19 U.S.C.

§ 1621. We have determined that administrative forfeitures

are “separate proceedings” from judicial forfeitures. United

States v. $184,505.51 in U.S. Currency, 72 F.3d 1160, 1164

(3d Cir. 1995). Because a judicial forfeiture would qualify

as a new proceeding, it would appear that the statute of

limitations, unless tolled, bars consideration of the

government’s forfeiture claim on the merits.12

11. In judicial forfeiture proceedings, the government must show

probable cause for the forfeiture, which shifts the burden to the claimant

to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is

his and not the proceeds of drug transactions. 19 U.S.C. § 1615. “The

claimant may meet his burden by showing that the property was not the

proceeds of illegal drug activities or that the claimant is an ‘innocent

owner’ and was unaware of the proceeds’ criminal connection.”

Dusenbery, 201 F.3d at 766. 

12. Congress recently passed the Civil Administrative Forfeiture Reform

Act, P.L. 106-185, which applies to forfeitures commencing on or after

120 days from April 25, 2000. 18 U.S.C. § 983. Where a forfeiture is set

aside due to inadequate notice, the government may commence a new

forfeiture proceeding within a specified period of time. 18 U.S.C.

§ 983(e)(2). This statute does not operate retroactively so it is not directly

relevant here. United States v. One “Piper” Aztec, No. 02-1925 (3d Cir.

filed Mar. 5, 2003). 

13
B.

The relevant statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1621, requires the

government to institute forfeiture proceedings within five

years after discovery of the alleged offense. Since

administrative and judicial actions are “separate

proceedings,” that can no longer happen here. The statute

does provide for express tolling of the limitations period

during “the time of the absence from the United States of

the person subject to the penalty or forfeiture, or of any

concealment or absence of the property.” 19 U.S.C.

§ 1621(2). There is no statutory exception to the statute of

limitations for the type of situation presented here. But

even so, under limited and specific circumstances, the

statute of limitations may be tolled based on equitable

principles. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397

(1946). 

The Supreme Court has held that limitations periods are

subject to equitable tolling where tolling is not inconsistent

with the statute. United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48

(1998). We recognize that we have “exercised caution in

using the equitable tolling doctrine.” Seitzinger v. Reading

Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). But

it is appropriate to apply the doctrine “where consistent

with congressional intent and called for by the facts of the

case.” Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 479

(1986); cf. Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 810 (5th Cir.

1998) (“The doctrine of equitable tolling preserves a

plaintiff ’s claims when strict application of the statute of

limitations would be inequitable.”). 

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits

both allowed for the possibility of equitable tolling in civil

forfeiture cases, with the Fifth Circuit stating the

government may have had “a strong argument for equitable

tolling” if the court had reached that question. United

States v. Clymore, 245 F.3d 1195, 1199 (10th Cir. 2001);

Kadonsky, 216 F.3d at 507 & n.8; see also United States v.

$57,960.00 in U.S. Currency, 58 F. Supp.2d 660, 664

(D.S.C. 1999) (invoking the doctrine of equitable tolling

where the administrative forfeiture proceeding was voided).

The Kadonsky court noted the government’s good faith

efforts to give notice and the inequity inherent in the strict

14
application of a statute of limitations where the seized

funds “were clearly the product of drug transactions.” 216

F.3d at 507 & n.8. 

Several similar factors weigh in favor of granting the

government equitable relief here. First, the government

acted in good faith. It did not seek to hide the van from

Longenette, nor did it try to withhold notice from him.

Furthermore, the government gave proper notice and even

extended Longenette’s response time to accommodate him.

The long delay in litigation was not the government’s fault;

if anything, Longenette’s erroneous framing of the facts in

his previous appearance before this court contributed to

the delay.13 The FBI’s only error here was failing to

recognize the prison mailbox rule’s applicability, certainly a

reasonable error in this matter of first impression. 

Second, the record includes evidence that the van

qualifies as § 881(a) property used in facilitating illicit drug

transactions. Third, the relevant statute of limitations

provision, 19 U.S.C. § 1621, provides for express tolling in

some circumstances but does not preclude equitable tolling.

In specific circumstances, congressional intent to permit

equitable tolling may be inferred where a statute provides

for express tolling in some instances and does not

otherwise preclude it. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 480 (“[Where

Congress] express[es] its clear intention to allow tolling in

some cases . . . , we conclude that application of a

traditional equitable tolling principle . . . is fully consistent

with the overall congressional purpose and is nowhere

eschewed by Congress.”) (internal quotations omitted). 

Finally, it bears noting that all of the forfeiture cases

addressed by our sister circuits involved due process claims

of constitutionally inadequate notice. But Houston’s prison

mailbox rule was not based on due process considerations,

and other courts specifically have found that the rule is not

13. In his original complaint, Longenette stated: “I was given only two

days notice that my Van [sic] and personal property were being subjected

to forfeitur[ ]e proceedings in May, 1992. . . . I contend that there was

never enough time to respond or prepare any pleadings to defend my

interests in the property.” The record reveals this is a clearly inaccurate

statement. 

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based on constitutional requirements. E.g., Jenkins v.

Burtzloff, 69 F.3d 460, 461 (10th Cir. 1995) (“The rationale

of Houston was not constitutional or equitable in nature;

rather, it was based on an interpretation of the word ‘filed’

in the rule and statute governing the timeliness of notices

of appeal.”); Nigro, 40 F.3d at 995 & n.1 (finding that

Houston contains no “explicit reference” to due process).

Thus, Longenette’s due process rights will not be infringed

upon by equitably tolling the statute of limitations.14

The government did not ask for equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations. Nonetheless, we may exercise

equitable relief at our discretion where the interests of

justice are served. United States v. Midgley, 142 F.3d 174,

179 (3d Cir. 1999). In Midgley, we held “a statute of

limitations should be tolled only in the rare situation where

equitable tolling is demanded by sound legal principles as

well as the interests of justice.” 142 F.3d at 179 (internal

quotations and citations omitted). We believe the facts here

present one of those rare situations. 

The administrative forfeiture proceeding is set aside

without prejudice to the government. The statute of

limitations under 19 U.S.C. § 1621 is equitably tolled. The

government has six months from this date in which to file

judicial forfeiture proceedings. 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the judgment of

the District Court and remand for proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

14. As noted, Congress recently passed CAFRA, which included a

provision that alters the statute of limitations where a court later voids

the administrative forfeiture. 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(2). 

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