UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4367

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LONNIE HAMES, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., 

District Judge. (3:95-cr-00178-MOC-8)

Submitted: March 29, 2016 Decided: March 31, 2016

Before GREGORY and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Roderick G. Davis, LAW OFFICE OF RODERICK G. DAVIS, PLLC, 

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jill Westmoreland Rose, 

United States Attorney, Anthony J. Enright, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Lonnie Hames, Jr., appeals from the 22-month sentence imposed 

upon revocation of his supervised release. On appeal, Hames 

contends that the sentence imposed is procedurally and 

substantively unreasonable and that the district court erred by 

imposing an upward departure sentence without having given prior 

notice of the intent to depart. Finding no error, plain or 

otherwise, we affirm.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a 

sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States v. 

Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We will affirm a 

revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and not 

plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-

40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first consider whether the sentence is 

procedurally or substantively unreasonable, employing the same 

general considerations applied during review of original 

sentences. Id. at 438. In this initial inquiry, we “take[ ] a 

more deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and 

the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review for 

[G]uidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 

656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). If we 

find the sentence unreasonable, we must then determine whether it 

is “plainly” so. Id. at 657.
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A supervised release revocation sentence is procedurally 

reasonable if the district court considered the Chapter 7 policy 

statements in the Sentencing Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2012) factors applicable in the supervised release revocation 

context, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439, 

and provided sufficient explanation for the sentence imposed, see

United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). The 

district court’s explanation “need not be as detailed or specific 

when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a 

post-conviction sentence.” Id.

Hames contends that the district court failed to adequately 

consider and apply the sentencing factors in determining his 

sentence and failed to provide a sufficient explanation for the 

upward variant sentence it imposed. We reject both of these 

contentions. 

First, our review of the record leads us to conclude that the 

district court sufficiently considered the applicable policy 

statements as well as the sentencing factors. The court noted the 

policy statement recommendation of an 8-to 14-month sentence and, 

addressing the relevant factors, the court emphasized two factors 

in particular: the need to “protect the public from further crimes 

of the defendant” and the need to “afford adequate deterrence.” 

18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C); 3583(a)(1). Additionally, the 

court noted that this was Hames’ third violation of supervised 
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release and concluded that an upward variant sentence was necessary 

to protect the public and to provide deterrence, in light of Hames’ 

repeated violations.

Nor do we find any procedural error in the district court’s 

justification for the upward variance imposed. The court’s 

statements prior to sentencing Hames reflect its view that a 

sentence within the calculated policy statement range would be 

insufficient given the facts and circumstances of this case, which 

established Hames’ repeated failures to comply with the 

requirements of his supervision. We further conclude that the 

court’s explanation for the selected sentence is sufficient. 

Although Hames contends that the court failed to give required 

notice that it would impose a sentence above the policy statement 

range, such notice is not required, United States v. Ryans, 237 F. 

App’x 791, 794 (4th Cir. 2007); see Irizarry v. United States, 553 

U.S. 708, 716 (2008) (holding that notice requirement of Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 32(h) is not applicable to variances above advisory 

Guidelines ranges). Additionally, although not required, the 

court had provided Hames with notice when, during a prior 

revocation proceeding, it warned him that an upward departure would 

be imposed if he committed another Class C violation of the terms 

of his supervision. 

We have reviewed the record and conclude that Hames’ sentence 

is within the statutory maximum and that the district court 
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adequately explained the reasons for the upward departure 

sentence. We therefore conclude that the sentence imposed was not 

plainly unreasonable. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439-40. 

Accordingly, we affirm the revocation judgment. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED