About the Report

In postconflict countries and emerging democracies, reform of 

security sector institutions is vital for a successful transition 

to political stability and economic prosperity. The EU has 

unique experience in strengthening security sector governance 

and can serve as a partner for the United States. This report 

examines the EU’s experience in supporting the transformation 

of ministries of interior to draw lessons for assistance programs 

and make recommendations for future cooperation. The report 

was prepared as part of the research program of the Initiative 

on Security Sector Governance of the United States Institute of 

Peace and discussed at a public forum, “The Role of the EU in 

SSR,” held at the Institute on December 16, 2010. 

Louis-Alexandre Berg is a former Jennings Randolph Peace 

Scholar at the United States Institute of Peace and a PhD 

candidate at Georgetown University, where he is conducting 

research on the politics of security sector governance in 

postconflict states. He has served as a rule of law adviser 

in the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of 

Democracy and Governance. 

202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 265 January 2011

Louis-Alexandre Berg

The EU’s Experience 

with Security Sector 

Governance

Summary

•	 Civilian oversight ministries are essential to broader efforts to strengthen the performance 

and responsiveness of security and law enforcement forces. Ministries facilitate coordination among agencies, hold personnel accountable to law and policy, perform administrative 

functions, shield forces from political interference, and enable civilian oversight through 

the legislature, civil society, and other mechanisms. Failure to support these roles can 

undermine efforts to strengthen law enforcement and improve citizen safety in countries 

affected by conflict or instability. 

•	 The European Union has extensive experience supporting oversight ministries, having 

prepared twenty-one ministries of interior to join the EU. The European Commission has 

assisted ministries in developing countries around the world, while the European Council has 

deployed civilian missions to crisis environments to establish security and the rule of law.

•	 Efforts to develop the laws, procedures, and organizational structures needed for effective oversight ministries face numerous challenges, from limited human capacity to political and organizational resistance, especially in countries transitioning from conflict or authoritarian rule.

•	 EU enlargement provided a unique incentive for countries to overcome obstacles to 

transforming their ministries and improving security sector governance. EU institutions 

helped translate this incentive into organizational changes by helping candidate countries 

define a clear structure and vision, deploying experienced experts from EU member states, 

and managing resistance through coordinated political engagement in support of clearly 

defined benchmarks. 

•	 In crisis and stabilization countries, the EU has faced greater challenges. Without a strong 

external incentive, weak capacity and severe political tensions have undermined assistance 

efforts. The EU has been enhancing its capabilities for deploying skilled personnel to these 

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Contents

Introduction 2

Role of Oversight Ministry 3

EU Capabilities and Experience 5

Overcoming Challenges to Strengthening

Ministerial Oversight 9

Recommendations for Enhancing

Transatlantic Cooperation 15
2

environments and for leveraging member states’ relationships with countries affected by 

conflict, to help them overcome political obstacles. Yet the EU has often struggled to 

achieve the coherence among member states and institutions necessary to support locally 

driven reforms.

•	 The United States can learn from the EU’s successes and challenges by paying attention to 

the role of oversight ministries in the development of security and law enforcement forces 

overseas. To build its capacity to strengthen oversight ministries and other components of 

security sector governance, the United States should recruit personnel with broader sets 

of skills, improve coherence among agencies providing assistance, and deepen cooperation 

with the EU and other donor countries. Through collaboration in headquarters and in the 

field, the EU and the United States could complement each other’s strengths and pursue 

common approaches to fostering institutional change in the security sector. 

Introduction

As the U.S. government has expanded its efforts to strengthen security and law enforcement forces in countries affected by conflict and instability, it has confronted the challenges of operating in one of the most contentious and politically charged sectors. Efforts 

to support the development of professional, responsive forces inevitably run into political 

and organizational resistance as competing factions vie for control of security forces to 

maintain power and security. At the center of these struggles lie the ministries of interior, 

justice, home affairs, and defense, which manage and oversee security forces. Weak and 

politicized ministries can facilitate divisions and factional conflict among forces, constrain 

their effectiveness, and undermine broader assistance efforts. Well-managed ministries, 

on the other hand, can improve the responsiveness of security and law enforcement forces 

to citizens through policymaking, coordination, and accountability functions governed by 

clearly defined and transparent procedures. Effective oversight ministries, along with civilian oversight through legislatures, civil society, local governments, and other institutions, 

are crucial building blocks in broader efforts to fashion professional, responsive security 

forces. As a focal point for governance and politics, efforts to strengthen ministries also 

highlight some of the core challenges of providing support to the security sector. 

Efforts by the U.S. government to strengthen security and law enforcement forces overseas are increasingly pursued within the framework of security sector reform (SSR). These 

efforts approach the security sector as an integrated whole to ensure that security forces 

are professional, accountable, and responsive to the publics they are intended to serve.1 This 

integrated approach underpins a wide range of objectives, from confronting transnational 

security threats to establishing the rule of law, safety, and security in countries affected by 

instability or conflict. Central to this concept is attention to strengthening oversight institutions, including ministries, legislatures, and judiciaries, while fostering citizen participation 

in holding security forces accountable and addressing the linkages across the entire range 

of security forces in a given country. Despite growing acceptance of an integrated approach, 

however, the U.S. government has devoted little attention in practice to supporting oversight ministries for law enforcement forces. With its own police forces largely decentralized, 

the United States lacks a national-level agency to oversee the various levels of law enforcement. Assistance programs tend to focus on building operational skills and capacity for 

security and law enforcement forces, with less emphasis on the institutions that manage, 

coordinate, and hold these forces accountable.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the EU has accumulated extensive experience strengthening oversight ministries. The European Commission assisted ministries in twenty-one 

countries in meeting the requirements for joining the EU and has strengthened ministries 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor 

of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, 

D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American 

University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, James R. 

Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. • Kerry 

Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and 

Human Rights • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care 

Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, Nev. • Stephen D. Krasner, 

Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George 

Mason University, Fairfax, Va. • Judy Van Rest, Executive 

Vice President, International Republican Institute, Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C. 

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy •

Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
3

in developing countries around the world. The European Council has fielded twenty-two 

crisis response missions with an emphasis on civilian law enforcement through its Common 

Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). This report explores the EU’s successes and challenges 

to draw out lessons for supporting the development of oversight ministries as a component 

of broader efforts to strengthen security and law enforcement forces. Based on a review of 

policies, capabilities, and experience in a number of countries, the report identifies common 

requirements for developing ministry capacity, along with the challenges of pursuing these 

efforts in countries transitioning from authoritarian rule, conflict, or instability. Attempts to 

shift the responsibilities, orientation, and capabilities of oversight ministries in such countries directly confront the entrenched political and organizational resistance that impedes 

broader efforts to strengthen the security sector. The experience of EU enlargement yields 

insights into how external assistance can contribute to overcoming these challenges; some 

strategies include building consensus on the structure and role of the ministry early on, 

deploying the most skilled and appropriate personnel, and confronting political and organizational resistance through establishing a clear framework and effective coordination. The 

EU’s experience in stabilization and postconflict environments sheds light on approaches 

to overcoming the additional challenges in these environments. The report concludes by 

outlining steps the U.S. government should take to improve its capacity and enhance 

cooperation with the EU and other donors toward more effective support of security 

sector governance.

The Essential Role of the Oversight Ministry

Oversight ministries play an essential role in the functioning of police, border guards, emergency response agencies, and other internal security and law enforcement forces. Their functions include setting policy and budgets, coordinating policy and strategies across agencies, 

appointing personnel, inspecting and auditing operations, and managing administrative 

processes. A ministry cannot alone ensure the effectiveness or responsiveness of security 

forces without other forms of legislative, judicial, and civilian oversight. Because of its position at the center of the linkages among security forces and institutions, however, an effective oversight ministry can be crucial to broader efforts to strengthen the security sector. 

Although ministries vary in terms of their responsibilities and structures, most countries have 

a national-level ministry with policymaking and oversight functions for internal security and 

law enforcement forces. The term “ministry of interior” is used in this report to refer to any 

ministry that serves these functions. Failure to devote sufficient attention to strengthening 

these functions can undermine broader assistance efforts aimed at a wide range of objectives, 

from confronting transnational crime and terrorism to establishing security and the rule of law 

after conflict and creating the conditions for economic development. 

The importance of effective ministries is most visible when addressing high-profile 

security threats such as terrorism, organized crime, trafficking, and migration, which require 

cooperation among numerous actors within and across states. By setting policy, defining 

strategies, and allocating resources across agencies and forces, a well-functioning ministry 

of interior can help ensure a coordinated response to these complex threats and facilitate 

cooperation with other states. Ministries of interior often manage criminal databases, border management systems, civil registries, and other systems that facilitate investigation 

and law enforcement across a range of agencies. In the absence of an effective ministry or 

other coordinating body, divisions and factionalism among agencies can heighten a country’s vulnerability to transnational threats. In postconflict Liberia, for instance, a legacy 

of factionalized forces with ill-defined and overlapping roles has limited the state’s ability 

to confront the growing threat of illicit drug trafficking across Liberia’s borders.2 Building 
4

capacity to manage such threats requires attention beyond operational capacity and toward 

strengthening the ministry or agency tasked with interagency coordination. 

Oversight ministries also enhance the responsiveness and accountability of security 

forces to citizens while playing a crucial role in deterring human rights abuses. For national 

law enforcement forces, the ministry is an important means through which elected officials 

advance their policy goals, by defining priorities, developing strategies, aligning budgets, 

and appointing senior personnel. Through dissemination and communication of policies, 

strategies, and budgets, ministries can facilitate citizen input through the legislature or 

civil society. Ministries also deter abuse and hold officials accountable through inspectorates that conduct audits and investigate cases of grave misconduct. Well-specified roles 

and clearly defined procedures within a ministry prevent political interference by specifying 

the limits of politicians’ involvement in operations and guaranteeing some level of operational independence for the forces. Where these roles and procedures are not enforced or 

are nonexistent, security forces may remain factionalized and politicized despite external 

assistance. In some countries of the former Yugoslavia, for example, security units reported 

directly to the minister of interior rather than following procedures, allowing the minister to 

employ them for personal or political interests.3 The weakness of Iraq’s Ministry of Interior 

after 2003 enabled certain factions to build up rival militias through their control of sections of the ministry.4 In both cases, the absence of clear and transparent procedures and 

accountability mechanisms within the ministry of interior facilitated political influence and 

fueled conflict.

Some ministries fulfill even more basic roles in relation to security and law enforcement 

forces by performing core administrative functions. Ministries may manage procurement, 

finance, and logistics, as well as the selection, assignment, and promotion of security 

personnel. Since these functions are often weak or disrupted in postconflict and stabilization contexts, insufficient attention to strengthening them can exacerbate the logistical 

constraints that prevent forces from responding to citizens. In East Timor, for example, 

failure to develop capacities within the ministry to govern personnel, procurement, budgets, and policy enabled leaders to politicize these forces while leaving them hampered by 

a chronic shortage of equipment and logistical capability.5 Even where these functions are 

managed by the forces themselves, ministries often retain some oversight to minimize the 

risk of corruption, politicization, and abuse. Strengthening these functions can be critical 

to enhancing the capability of security and law enforcement forces.

The roles and structure of oversight ministries vary considerably. For instance, some countries house oversight functions in a ministry of justice or home affairs rather than a ministry 

of interior. Ministries of interior may be called on to fulfill roles outside the security and law 

enforcement arenas, from managing elections to supervising local governments. Some ministries may directly manage national-level police organizations, while others are restricted to 

setting policy or coordinating decentralized forces. In general, ministries are typically responsible for the following core oversight tasks for security and law enforcement forces: 

•	 Policy and budget planning, including formulating, drafting, and monitoring policy; strategic planning; and allocating resources, setting budgets in line with policy. 

•	 Accountability mechanisms, such as inspectorates, auditors, codes of conduct, and citizen 

complaint offices, along with procedures for personnel appointment, assignment, and 

discipline. 

•	 Interagency coordination, by developing policies, strategies, and action plans, establishing specialized directorates or procedures, and monitoring agencies and forces to manage 

complex, multidimensional issues that require coordination among agencies.

The weakness of Iraq’s Ministry 

of Interior after 2003 enabled 

certain factions to build up rival 

militias through their control of 

sections of the ministry.
5

•	 Public affairs and communication to enable citizen monitoring and input, and to build 

public trust regarding law enforcement operations and reforms. This element is especially 

important where citizens are accustomed to regarding security forces with suspicion. 

•	 Administrative functions for the ministry itself and sometimes for the security forces, such 

as managing procurement, logistics, finances, and human resources. 

Given these critical roles, external assistance to ministries may be catalytic in strengthening security and law enforcement, especially when it is part of broader efforts to build 

capacity and expand civilian oversight. In postconflict and stabilization contexts, skilled 

personnel may have fled or departed, bureaucracies may be politicized or divided, and the 

ministry may have facilitated repression or failed to function at all. The government may 

have little experience in or capability for policy planning, interagency coordination, and 

administration. Efforts to restructure security forces may challenge the power of individuals 

and political parties by reallocating control over these forces, insulating them from discretionary control and eliminating opportunities to manipulate funds or authority. These obstacles may block progress on strengthening security and law enforcement forces. By targeting 

assistance to oversight ministries, external actors can help leaders overcome obstacles and 

allow assistance to other parts of the security and justice sectors to bear fruit.

EU Capabilities and Experience

Limitations of U.S. Government Support to Ministries of Interior

Despite their central importance in strengthening security and law enforcement, these core 

functions are often neglected in externally funded assistance programs, especially those 

supported by the U.S. government. With its police forces highly decentralized, the U.S. 

government lacks a national-level department or agency with responsibility for oversight 

of law enforcement forces. The federal departments, including the Departments of Justice, 

Homeland Security, and Interior, that oversee law enforcement agencies have narrow and 

specialized mandates rather than broad internal security or law enforcement ones.6 Oversight of most U.S. law enforcement forces resides in mayoral and gubernatorial offices, city 

councils, state assemblies, and other local government bodies. This structure complicates 

efforts by federal agencies to recruit personnel to assist ministries overseas. The agencies 

that manage this type of assistance, including the Department of State, the U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID), the Department of Justice, and the Department of 

Defense, have relied on a variety of mechanisms, ranging from contracts with private firms 

to deploying their own personnel, for the design and implementation of programs. Although 

many of the individuals involved come from local or federal law enforcement backgrounds, 

they rarely bring the combination of policy and legislative and administrative skills that is 

core to ministerial oversight. With a few exceptions, programs tend to focus on strengthening operational skills rather than on oversight functions.7

The EU Experience

The EU’s experience in strengthening ministries’ role in oversight of security and law enforcement can yield valuable lessons. In preparing countries for accession to the EU and by intervening in crisis contexts, the EU has sought to transform and strengthen ministries to improve 

oversight and management of law enforcement forces. The variety of governance structures, 

legal traditions, bureaucratic systems, organizational cultures, and languages among the EU’s 

twenty-seven member states serves as a rich resource for countries seeking models to improve 

their own systems. The recent experience of countries that transformed their own ministries 

to join the EU can be especially instructive for other countries attempting reform. Yet the 

External assistance to 

ministries may be catalytic in 

strengthening security and law 

enforcement, especially when 

it is part of broader efforts 

to build capacity and expand 

civilian oversight.
6

EU has also faced challenges in applying these resources to postconflict and stabilization 

environments. 

Two European bodies have been primarily responsible for assistance to the security 

sector—the European Commission, which manages development assistance, and the European Council Secretariat, which manages the CSDP missions to crisis contexts. The Treaty of 

Lisbon, which entered into force in December 2009, includes measures aimed at enhancing 

the coherence and effectiveness of these institutions. The EU thus continues to evolve in its 

efforts to address the challenges of strengthening security sector institutions in a variety 

of contexts. 

EU Enlargement: Incentives for Reform

The most extensive transformation of ministries of interior occurred through the EU enlargement process. The expansion from its original six to its current twenty-seven members 

involved significant reforms across the political and economic system of each new member 

state to comply with EU standards. After gradual expansion in the 1980s and early 1990s, 

the biggest wave came in 2004 and 2007 with the accession of twelve countries in Eastern 

and Central Europe. In these countries, EU member states placed particular emphasis on 

justice and home affairs, including law enforcement and border management, to ensure that 

the new members could control the newly expanded borders into Europe and cooperate in 

confronting transnational crime and terrorism. Strengthening cooperation among customs, 

border, immigration, and police forces and improving human rights standards and the treatment of minorities necessitated extensive restructuring, reorganizing, and capacity building 

within ministries of interior. 

The powerful incentive of EU membership motivated candidate countries to implement 

these reforms. Prospective members were required to conform to the EU’s acquis communautaire, the set of rules and regulations for all member states. They also had to meet a set of 

basic principles known as the Copenhagen Criteria before negotiations for membership could 

start; the criteria include a requirement for “stable institutions that guarantee democracy, 

the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.”8 These principles 

were translated into specific benchmarks through National Progress Reports. Compiled and 

monitored by the European Commission with input from the candidate country governments, 

the reports identified specific areas where improvements were required for negotiations to 

advance, ranging from reforming legal frameworks and reorganizing ministries to enforcing 

new laws and regulations. The National Progress Reports also facilitated monitoring by the 

Commission by clearly specifying the criteria according to which progress would be judged. 

In keeping with the interests of EU member states, the reports emphasized the countries’ 

capacity to manage their borders and cooperate with member states on interdicting transnational crime. The process thus translated countries’ desire to join the EU into pressure for 

specific reforms of ministries of interior. 

While the European Commission monitored progress and negotiated each phase of the 

process, the candidate country governments led the design and implementation of reforms. 

The acquis did not include detailed rules for institutional structure or organization. Although 

many of the requirements were driven by the interests of member states, candidate countries were left with some space for making their own decisions on the structure of their 

forces, the organization of their administrations, and the sequence of steps to be taken. The 

process thus put the onus on the countries themselves—and individual leaders within the 

countries—to design and lead the reforms necessary to meet the criteria. 

The EU also provided assistance to enable these changes.9 Assistance was managed 

primarily by the European Commission, which transferred funds to candidate countries for 
7

specific reforms, procured technical assistance through direct contracts with consulting 

firms, or paired candidate country institutions with counterpart institutions in EU member 

states through “twinning” contracts. These mechanisms enabled candidate countries to 

select the institutional models they saw as most appropriate. For the twinning contracts, 

the candidate country could specify the assistance to be provided and select among a set of 

proposals by member state institutions. The selected member state institution deployed a 

long-term expert along with a package of shorter-term advisers, often establishing a longerterm relationship between the institutions and individuals.10 Between 1998 and 2002, 

around 700 “twinners” and 20,000 experts from EU member states were sent to candidate 

countries, at a cost of nearly €500 million.11 While the candidate countries took the lead on 

the nature, model, and sequencing of reforms, the European Commission ensured that its 

priority concerns were addressed by directing the lion’s share of its resources to its priority 

sectors, including justice and home affairs. 

Changes within particular sectors were reinforced through broader reforms of the countries’ 

bureaucracies. The Copenhagen Criteria required countries to develop the administrative 

capacity necessary to implement the rules and regulations of the acquis, and to coordinate and 

manage the complex negotiation process. The resulting efforts to build more professional and 

apolitical civil service systems paid off in the quality and professionalism of personnel in the 

ministries of interior. Reforms within the ministries were grounded in broader improvements 

in procurement, financial management, budgeting, and personnel management, which served 

as the building blocks for effective oversight of law enforcement forces. 

This combination of a strong political incentive, country-level leadership and commitment, clear requirements and monitoring, customized technical assistance, and broader 

administrative reform enabled significant transformations of the law enforcement and 

security forces and their oversight ministries. The process did confront numerous obstacles, 

and was criticized for being driven too much by EU member state interests and for failing 

to incorporate the concerns of civil society within candidate countries. Even after joining 

the EU, some countries continue to struggle with weak administrative and legal systems 

in trying to meet the requirements of the acquis. Nonetheless, the process resulted in 

notable changes in the capacity and structure of ministries and in the professionalism and 

performance of law enforcement forces. The transformation of these institutions is matched 

perhaps only by the success of NATO accession in transforming countries’ defense sectors, 

which took place in parallel in many of the same countries. 

The European Commission’s Development Approach

The European Commission has supported ministerial oversight of the security sector as part 

of its portfolio of development activities around the world.12 The Commission manages 

assistance programs aimed at improving governance and building institutional capacity in 

a variety of sectors. In the security and justice sectors, it has supported programs ranging 

from criminal investigation training to strengthening the strategic planning and oversight 

capacity of ministries of justice and interior. In 2006, the European Commission adopted 

a policy on SSR that emphasized its attention to “the governance aspects of SSR,” including “support for state institutions dealing with management and oversight of the security 

system . . . [and] for civilian control and democratic governance of the public sector in 

general.”13 Commission funding in this area has focused on crisis prevention activities, 

consolidation of democratic governance and the rule of law, and support for human rights. 

Funds managed by the European Commission are expended through a variety of mechanisms, including direct budget support to host governments, technical assistance contracts 

with private firms, grants to NGOs, and, in the EU enlargement context, twinning contracts. 

Even after joining the EU, some 

countries continue to struggle 

with weak administrative and 

legal systems in trying to meet 

the requirements of the acquis.
8

The Commission has in some cases contracted directly with security forces, training centers, 

and other relevant institutions in member states through a restricted competition and 

contracting process.14 These mechanisms have been used to access specialized expertise in 

EU member states, including that necessary for the core functions of oversight ministries. 

The majority of European Commission programs are planned and implemented in multiyear 

frameworks. This structure enables the slow, long-term work involved in strengthening institutions, yet it also limits the Commission’s flexibility to respond to crises. The Commission 

also manages small pools of funding aimed at crisis environments, including the budget for 

CSDP operations managed by the European Council Secretariat and the Instrument for Stability (IfS). The IfS allows rapid expenditure of funds in support of conflict prevention, early 

recovery following natural disasters, and postconflict stabilization.15 Although these funds 

are limited, they have been used to kick-start SSR activities in programs of up to eighteen 

months’ duration, such as rapid assessments and the provision of short-term advice, often 

in conjunction with a CSDP mission in the same country.16

Common Security and Defense Policy Crisis Interventions

Another mechanism for addressing security and law enforcement issues in crisis contexts is 

the Common Security and Defense Policy.17 The CSDP was launched by the European Council 

in 1999 as part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy to strengthen the EU’s “capacity 

for autonomous action . . . to respond to international crises.”18 Since the first mission to 

Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2003, the CSDP has fielded twenty-two missions aimed at establishing security and strengthening local institutions through the deployment of military and 

civilian personnel.19 The majority of these missions have focused on deploying civilian 

capacity to address rule of law and civilian security. The European Council has adopted SSR 

as a core activity for CSDP missions, to include “oversight/budget control, administration, 

transparency and accountability, as well as political control” and “co-locating experts to the 

national ministry of home affairs to monitor, mentor and advise local authorities in issues 

related to home affairs policy and SSR.”20 Although only three recent missions have made 

explicit reference to SSR in their mandates, many of the missions, from Kosovo to Afghanistan, to have sent personnel to advise ministries of interior as part of efforts to strengthen 

the rule of law.21

The core of CSDP missions is the deployment of personnel seconded from member 

states. The European Council Secretariat has been building its capability to deploy civilian 

police, border management, and justice sector personnel, including judges, prosecutors, 

and corrections officials. Although sometimes deployed with an executive mandate, 

these personnel are more often tasked with “monitoring, mentoring and advising” host 

country personnel and institutions.22 Through a methodology that has evolved over successive missions, advisers identify weaknesses in organization, capability, or performance, 

suggest projects aimed at overcoming these challenges, and advise counterparts on the 

implementation of the projects. In many missions with a rule-of-law or policing mandate, 

advisers have worked in the ministry of interior on policy, legislation, and administration 

to complement the more operational support provided to law enforcement forces. The 

advisers are supposed to help develop policy and procedures while building the capacity of 

individuals, often with a focus on strategic-level decision makers to maximize impact. As 

these missions have evolved, they have become increasingly adept at mobilizing personnel 

with specialized skills. Yet, as described below, they have at times struggled to find sufficient personnel and resources to fill these roles or leverage their short-term deployments 

to foster longer-term institutional change. 
9

Complementary Support by Bilateral European Donors

Several EU member states manage their own bilateral assistance programs. In addition to 

seconding personnel to CSDP missions, member states fund technical assistance, training, 

and equipment through their own contracts and budget support. Some of these agencies 

have contributed significantly to strengthening ministries of interior and other oversight 

mechanisms for the security sector. For instance, the UK’s Department for International 

Development and the Netherlands government have supported strategic planning processes 

and provided training and technical assistance directed to ministries of interior and justice on policy, administration, and other aspects of oversight. Development agencies in 

France, Germany, and other EU states have deployed advisers or brought developing country 

officials to training institutions in their countries. This type of targeted assistance can 

complement CSDP missions by funding longer-term support for priorities identified by CSDP 

advisers. While bilateral efforts play important roles in strengthening ministries of interior, 

the remainder of this report focuses on assistance provided through EU institutions rather 

than through bilateral programs.

Overcoming Challenges to Strengthening Ministerial Oversight

The EU’s experience in strengthening ministries of interior highlights a number of challenges. 

Especially in the security sector, limited capacity, political tension, and organizational resistance can stymie attempts to reform or strengthen a ministry, even where there is strong 

commitment. The EU’s experience in the enlargement process yields four broad principles 

for organizing external assistance to overcome these challenges: defining a clear structure 

early on, mobilizing personnel with specialized skills, strengthening internal leadership and 

external support to manage resistance, and ensuring a coherent approach among donors. In 

postconflict and stabilization environments the challenges are often deeper. Human capacity is more limited, resistance is more entrenched, and tensions can explode into violence. In 

the absence of the carrot of EU membership, the EU has often struggled to foster effective 

oversight and responsive security forces. Nonetheless, its successes and challenges yield 

insights into how these principles can be adapted to other contexts. 

Defining a Structure, Mandate, and Roles

A crucial step in developing a ministry’s oversight role is defining a structure, mandate, 

and roles for the ministry and the various forces under its authority. Key elements to be 

decided include the allocation of roles and functions across ministries and forces, the level 

of autonomy of security forces vis-à-vis the ministry, the basic mission and orientation of 

the forces, and the relationship of the ministry to other parts of the security and justice 

sectors. Each of these decisions affects the appropriate organization and functions of the 

oversight ministry and implies different priorities for external assistance. Although no universal models exist, and countries must decide these issues according to their own contexts, 

a decision is crucial to enable efforts to strengthen both the ministry and the security and 

law enforcement forces.

During the recent wave of EU enlargement, these decisions constituted a crucial basis for 

assistance. The European Commission devoted considerable attention to reorienting security 

forces away from protecting the state and political interests and toward serving the public 

and enhancing safety and security. This shift required the development of new oversight and 

accountability functions within the ministry while shifting operational control out of the 

ministry to increase the autonomy of law enforcement forces. Commission-funded experts 

helped draft the appropriate laws and regulations and develop the capacity to implement 

Especially in the security sector, 

limited capacity, political 

tension, and organizational 

resistance can stymie attempts 

to reform or strengthen a 

ministry, even where there is 

strong commitment. 
10

them. Given its interests in secure borders and in confronting transnational crime, the EU 

focused especially on reorganizing border forces and placing them under a single oversight 

ministry to enhance coordination with other law enforcement agencies. Within these 

parameters, however, candidate countries had to choose the most appropriate structure and 

organization. The European Commission sometimes supported the process of defining the 

model and structure. In general, however, Commission assistance was most effective after 

basic decisions had been made by the candidate country itself.23

In postconflict and stabilization environments, weak capacity and political tension 

can create obstacles to arriving at such decisions. Individuals who benefit from control of 

resources or authority may resist change. Lack of experience among officials in policymaking, planning, and budgeting can prevent clear decisions from being reached on how to 

allocate these functions. Yet failure to commit to a clear direction can severely undermine 

the impact of assistance efforts. In Afghanistan, for example, fundamental disagreements 

over whether to emphasize counterinsurgency efforts or more community-oriented policing, 

fueled in part by differences among donors, delayed the development of the ministry and 

the police forces.24 Even minor disagreements over where to house specific functions can 

delay progress. Once a clear framework for the ministry of internal affairs was established—

after some delay—in Kosovo, disagreements among donors over specific procedures and 

systems delayed progress, and the government was reluctant to alienate donors by choosing one side or another. Lack of consensus on structure and roles can also undermine the 

impact of individual advisers. In the absence of clear guidelines, advisers tend to fall back 

on their experience in their home countries, leading to conflicting advice that fuels confusion and lack of confidence in the advisers.25 The absence of consensus within the country 

also increases the risk that assistance programs reflect the priorities of donors rather than 

local priorities.

Given these complexities, achieving a consensus on the structure, mandate, and roles of 

the ministry and security forces has posed a significant challenge for the EU in crisis environments. The EU often provides assistance in the absence of a clear institutional structure 

or direction for the security forces. Consistent with its development approach, the European 

Commission tends to identify specific weaknesses and focus technical assistance on them. 

Without an overall framework, European Commission–funded technical advisers have been 

stymied by political resistance or unclear commitment. For CSDP missions, objectives are 

defined prior to deployment in a Crisis Management Concept and elaborated in a Concept 

of Operations and an Operational Plan, all developed by the European Council Secretariat 

and approved by the Council. These documents lay out the broad goals of the mission and 

the modalities for operation in the field, but they do not specify goals or approaches for 

achieving consensus on the structure of institutions within the host country. The CSDP has 

developed concepts for strengthening the police and justice systems that include detail on 

approaches, specific structures, and means for achieving them.26 These concepts do not, 

however, include guidance for oversight ministries. In the absence of clear standards for the 

EU in this area, advisers often promote varying and sometimes conflicting approaches based 

on their own experiences.

CSDP and European Commission planning teams have sought to overcome these challenges by more clearly defining institutional reform objectives prior to deployment. Since 

most CSDP missions are deployed at the request of a state, negotiations with the state can 

provide an opportunity to specify a structure—or at least a process for achieving a decision. 

Recent CSDP missions have deployed on the basis of strategic plans for the security sector 

that were approved by the government and laid out specific legislation and procedures to 

be reformed.27 In more urgent stabilization missions, achieving such a consensus may not 

be possible prior to deployment. In such cases, CSDP personnel have supported strategic 

In the absence of clear 

guidelines, advisers tend to 

fall back on their experience in 

their home countries, leading 

to conflicting advice that fuels 

confusion and lack of confidence 

in the advisers.
11

planning processes to help achieve this consensus. In Afghanistan, a strategic plan and 

accompanying action plans for the ministry of interior, which were endorsed by the government of Afghanistan, have helped focus capacity-building efforts by various donors within 

agreed-upon areas.28 Although often difficult and time-consuming, these processes can lay 

the basis for longer-term institution-building programs supported by the European Commission or bilateral donors. Defining a structure and direction early on can be crucial to the 

success of assistance efforts in later phases of engagement.

Deploying the Right Personnel

Even with a clear structure, effective assistance requires personnel with the right skills and 

experience. Strengthening ministries of interior requires individuals skilled in such areas as 

setting up organizations and procedures, assessing organizational weaknesses, designing 

strategies and policies, planning and monitoring budgets, drafting laws and regulations, coordinating actors and agencies, and training and mentoring officials. Many of these skills can be 

found outside law enforcement, in other areas of public administration. Yet it is also important 

to deploy personnel with experience applying these skills to law enforcement issues, preferably 

in similar contexts, to ensure their familiarity with the relevant issues, and to enhance confidence and comfort among officials in the host country. During the EU enlargement process, 

the European Commission tapped the diversity of experience and models through technical 

assistance and twinning contracts. Although their impact varied, these programs were found 

to be most effective when the personnel selected had the right skills and experience, when 

they were deployed for more than a year, and when the program enabled the development of 

longer-term relationships among counterpart institutions and personnel.29

The European Commission recruits personnel for crisis environments in much the same 

way as it does for its development programs in other contexts. It generally recruits on the 

open market, through private firms, to find and deploy individuals with the specialized skills 

and experience needed to tackle specific issues. This approach facilitates the recruitment 

of personnel with specific skills and is capable of providing a broad range of assistance 

over the multiyear period typically needed for institutional development. The quality of the 

individuals varies, however, since skilled private consultants are in high demand or difficult 

to mobilize, especially to work in insecure environments. Nor does contracting with private 

firms foster relationships among counterpart officials or institutions. With the exception of 

the limited funds available in the IfS, European Commission programs are generally unable 

to respond to rapidly changing crisis contexts.

 The CSDP relies on officials seconded from member states. Starting in 2001, a series of 

successive targets was set for voluntary contributions of personnel from EU member states 

through the Civilian Headline Goals.30 Careful analysis involving illustrative deployment 

scenarios was used to generate a breakdown of all the functions and skills that might be 

required, along with detailed job descriptions that could be matched to the requirements 

of specific missions. This approach has enabled CSDP missions to recruit individuals with 

skills and expertise appropriate to the particular missions. The use of seconded personnel 

rather than individuals hired through contracts leads to an enhanced level of comfort for 

counterpart officials while fostering longer-term institutional relationships as seconded 

officials draw from their home institutions for expertise and support. 

The primary challenge for CSDP planners has been their reliance on member states to 

identify and second personnel. The responsiveness of member states to requests is inconsistent, ranging from the Finnish model, which includes a national strategy and an interministerial coordination mechanism for recruiting personnel, to more fragmented systems 

that recruit personnel from different levels of government on an ad hoc basis.31 Among 
12

even the most committed member states, the number of skilled personnel made available 

for these missions is limited. Individuals with specialized expertise are too highly valued in 

their home institutions to be released for sufficient periods to operate as effective mentors 

in other countries. The limited budget available to the CSDP pays only for the travel costs 

of personnel, leaving member states to shoulder the burden of salaries while their personnel are deployed.32 Missions sometimes supplement seconded staff with personnel hired 

through direct contracts, yet tight budgets limit this option. In insecure environments such 

as Afghanistan, missions face the additional challenge of finding willing volunteers. With 

nearly 2,000 civilians already deployed, the CSDP has had trouble finding sufficient personnel, leaving some missions chronically understaffed. 

The European Council has sought to address these shortfalls through a new Civilian 

Headline Goal adopted in 2010. The secretariat is working with member states to streamline 

their recruitment procedures and offer additional incentives for deployment. As the number, 

scale, and complexity of missions have increased, the secretariat has undertaken new analysis to revise the requirements, position descriptions, and mix of personnel, based on the 

experience of CSDP missions.33 It has begun to streamline recruitment through the Civilian 

Capabilities Management Tool, which includes a number of software applications aimed at 

matching personnel to missions through permanently updated catalogues of mission tasks, 

job descriptions, equipment, and contexts.34 The Council has also created Civilian Response 

Teams and a new SSR pool to rapidly mobilize experts from member states for short-term 

missions and to assist the secretariat in developing concepts, tools, or approaches.35 The 

SSR pool will include individuals with skills related to policy, strategy, and organizational 

development. These efforts should help the EU tap the depth of expertise in member states 

to deploy the most qualified and appropriate staff. Yet the limited time frame of their 

deployments means staff will continue to rely on the more enduring assistance provided by 

the European Commission and other donors for institutional development.

An additional challenge is ensuring that individuals have the necessary skills and preparation for their deployment. The most capable technical experts often lack skills necessary 

to mentor and advise counterparts, familiarity with the local context, or knowledge of the 

objectives of the mission. Especially for seconded personnel without experience overseas, 

training and preparation can be essential in enabling them to use their skills effectively. 

For CSDP missions, member states are responsible for training their own personnel, leading 

to inconsistencies in the availability, content, and quality of training. The European Council 

Secretariat has begun to make training courses available in partnership with the European 

Group on Training and the European Security and Defence College, a network of institutions 

and academies throughout Europe. The availability of training remains limited compared to 

what is required, however, and many of the training programs are either ad hoc or designed 

for high-level officials rather than personnel to be deployed.36 The secretariat has also been 

developing curricula in specialized areas, including SSR. Despite these efforts, much more 

work is required to improve capacity to quickly recruit and deploy specialized personnel and 

to ensure consistent preparation for deployment. 

Managing Organizational Change

Even with a clearly defined structure and appropriate human and material resources, 

assistance efforts inevitably confront obstacles generated by political, organizational, or 

individual resistance. Managing these obstacles requires strong leadership and sufficient 

resources applied for an extended period of time. External actors can support this process by 

contributing resources, bolstering skills, and, perhaps most important, backing the leaders 

who must make risky decisions through sustained political engagement. 

Individuals with specialized 

expertise are too highly valued 

in their home institutions to be 

released for sufficient periods to 

operate as effective mentors in 

other countries.
13

In the context of EU enlargement, a uniquely powerful incentive—entry into the EU, 

with its economic and political benefits—generated considerable momentum. By helping to 

build consensus on a strategic direction, specifying benchmarks, and monitoring progress, 

the European Commission helped translate this incentive into specific changes.37 The Commission also helped sustain momentum by raising key issues through diplomatic channels, 

publishing lack of compliance and deficits to garner public attention, sometimes withholding aid in cases of delay by the host government, and rewarding progress with discrete 

steps along the road to accession.38 The process was most successful when support was 

provided to leaders and officials within candidate countries to enhance their skills, provide 

needed equipment, connect them to networks of counterparts in other countries, and back 

them up politically to help them overcome obstacles in their countries. The European Commission played a key role in this process by raising technical issues to the political level at 

the European Council, thereby helping maintain pressure on both sides to resolve difficult 

issues. Since accession was a priority for the European Council and for member states, they 

continually raised issues in their relations with the candidate countries to maintain a focus 

on reforms. 

The European Commission devoted less attention in the EU enlargement context to 

involving the broader constituencies needed to back difficult reforms. Changes in EU 

candidate countries were often driven by governments, without sufficient support from 

key segments of their populations. In postconflict and stabilization environments, where 

incentives as powerful as EU membership are rarely present, such support can be critical 

to the success of reforms. Although CSDP missions engage primarily with state agencies, 

Commission-funded programs often support civil society, political parties, parliaments, 

judiciaries, and other actors. Where they are sufficiently linked, these programs can complement institutional reform efforts by providing political leaders and officials with critical 

domestic support and facilitating the passage and implementation of new laws, procedures, 

and mandates. Engagement with civil society and other constituencies can also contribute 

to longer-term political support for reforms to ensure they are sustained after external 

assistance decreases. Yet both European Commission and CSDP missions have often failed 

to coordinate these broader assistance efforts with more technical assistance efforts to 

ministries and law enforcement forces 

Difficulties in achieving coherence among EU member states in postconflict and stabilization environments have further limited the EU’s potential to leverage its relationships 

and overcome resistance. Even where candidacy for the EU has been on the agenda, as 

in the western Balkans, disagreements among EU member states and trade-offs between 

short- and long-term objectives have prevented the EU from leveraging its relationships to 

overcome obstacles to reform. In the absence of consensus over the direction of reforms or 

a framework that enables donors to back up technical assistance with political engagement, 

assistance efforts depend largely on individual relationships, with limited potential for 

politically or organizationally difficult changes. European Commission–funded institutionbuilding programs can provide crucial assistance for the protracted technical work of 

developing regulations, procedures, and capacity. Without a political framework such as 

that afforded by EU accession, however, Commission consultants rarely have access to the 

political clout needed to support leaders in difficult positions. In CSDP missions, frequent 

rotations, language barriers, and security restrictions limit the potential for international 

staff to develop productive relationships. Weak or corrupt civil service systems in many 

crisis-affected countries compound these challenges and limit the benefit of mentoring and 

training. Faced with entrenched resistance and the difficulty of achieving changes, CSDP 

personnel have tended to take on functions themselves rather than try to strengthen their 

counterparts, thus limiting their impact on organizational changes.
14

The EU has succeeded in some postconflict and stabilization environments in leveraging 

the relationships of the European Council and member states with host countries. A constitution, peace accord, strategic plan, or other document that embodies a clear direction for 

reforms can serve as the framework for dialogue in a similar way to EU accession. With their 

presence on the ground, CSDP missions can monitor progress to identify and raise issues 

to the political or diplomatic level. An effective head of mission (HoM) of the CSDP can 

play a critical role in this process, particularly for ministries of interior. The HoM can liaise 

directly with counterparts at the minister level to develop relationships, facilitate cooperation among counterparts, and bring obstacles to the attention of the European Council. In 

Kosovo, a team of advisers to the Ministry of Internal Affairs was placed under the HoM to 

facilitate engagement. Once issues are raised, EU member states can use their collective or 

individual influence to engage host country governments diplomatically. The CSDP mission 

in Georgia was able to leverage the influence of a unified European Council to maintain 

momentum on rule-of-law reforms, at one point using the visit of Georgian officials to Brussels to raise the level of attention to these issues. In other cases, however, achieving the 

level of coherence needed to back up host country officials and overcome political obstacles 

has been a major challenge.

Enhancing Donor Coordination

Leveraging assistance to manage political and organizational obstacles and support internal 

leaders requires close coordination among donors. For the EU enlargement process, the 

convergence of interests among EU member states and the role of the European Commission 

in negotiating and monitoring on their behalf helped overcome these challenges. Using the 

National Progress Reports to build consensus among EU member states, the European Commission set the agenda for the European Council regarding reforms that required political 

attention. The Commission served as the focal point for raising issues to the political level 

when necessary, while ensuring the space needed for technical work. 

In crisis contexts, coordination has been more challenging. In the absence of a clear 

framework or focal point, the lack of consensus and insufficient coordination on the direction of reforms have undermined the ability to leverage relationships while leading to duplication, manipulation, and wasted resources. Lack of coordination is especially damaging in 

the security sector, as different donors’ support of different forces can complicate efforts by 

the ministry of interior to coordinate among them or to establish linkages among security 

and justice actors. Disagreements among the EU’s twenty-seven member states have directly 

undermined efforts to strengthen institutions and leverage relationships. Differences over 

the sovereign status of Kosovo, for instance, have limited the impact of the CSDP mission 

and prevented it from engaging on key issues. 

Additional obstacles arise from the separate structures and lines of authority between 

the European Commission and the European Council–led CSDP missions, resulting in separate 

planning and implementation processes in the same country. CSDP missions are limited by 

their budgets and short-term mandates from supporting integrated or long-term projects, 

and must instead rely on the European Commission or other donors. As a result of its multiyear planning framework, however, European Commission assistance is rarely coordinated 

to fill the gaps or address the reforms prioritized by crisis-oriented CSDP personnel. When 

they have been linked, these efforts have result in useful synergies. In Kosovo, input by the 

CSDP into the National Progress Report, compiled by the European Commission as part of the 

pre-accession process, resulted in targeted Commission assistance to the Ministry of Internal 

Affairs. This type of coordination has been ad hoc and inconsistent, however, especially in 

countries outside the EU accession framework. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the 
15

European Commission and CSDP missions were following two separate and disconnected 

strategies for the security sector.39

The Lisbon Treaty addresses many of these shortfalls in order to improve the EU’s capacity 

to coordinate and leverage its influence. Changes include the establishment of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who oversees the new European External 

Action Service comprising personnel from the European Commission and European Council 

Secretariat. In Brussels, Commission programs and CSDP missions will benefit from a more 

integrated planning process to ensure that Commission and CSDP interventions complement 

each other in contributing toward a common set of objectives. In the field, new political 

officers deployed to the EU delegations will help link technical and political issues when 

appropriate. EU ambassadors with more direct ties to member states should help enlist 

member states’ support to overcome political obstacles. These changes are for the most part 

untested, however. Since the CSDP mission and the European Commission maintain separate 

institutional structures, coordination at the level of implementation will continue to rely on 

individual efforts. Nonetheless, these changes may contribute to improved coherence and 

better ability to support technical assistance through diplomatic engagement. 

Even where EU assistance achieves greater coherence, competing priorities and programming approaches with other donors undermine momentum and complicate efforts. To 

address these challenges, planners in the EU and elsewhere have proposed the use of joint 

planning and implementation mechanisms, by pooling donor funds, by defining joint objectives and programs, or by sharing information on a regular basis. The CSDP has established 

agreements with a number of countries, including the United States, to enable them to 

contribute their personnel to EU missions. U.S. personnel have served in the CSDP mission to 

Kosovo, for instance, leading to greater cooperation between the EU and the United States. 

Common benchmarks, indicators, and evaluation tools could focus attention on shared 

goals and measures of success to promote coherent approaches and overcome coordination 

challenges. Yet these approaches have been difficult to achieve among donors, experts, and 

host government officials wedded to their perspectives or unable to manage these conflicts. 

Improved planning between headquarters would be required to lay the groundwork for 

coordination in the field. 

Recommendations for Enhancing Transatlantic Cooperation in the Security Sector

A capable oversight ministry is critical to the effectiveness and responsiveness of security 

and law enforcement forces. Oversight ministries can improve coordination, strengthen 

accountability, enable core administrative functions, and facilitate other means of civilian 

oversight. Ministries are also at the center of political and organizational struggles involved 

in transforming security and law enforcement forces. Support to oversight ministries can 

be essential to strengthening governance of the security sector and to enabling other components of assistance to succeed. The EU has built its capacity to mobilize experts from 

among member states with diverse governance structures, legal cultures, organizational 

models, languages, and experiences in transforming ministries of interior. It has also gained 

experience in building consensus on the structure of oversight institutions, and in leveraging the relationships of member states to help overcome political obstacles to change. Yet 

the EU has struggled to achieve the necessary coherence among its twenty-seven member 

states and between the European Council–led CSDP missions and the European Commission. In some crisis contexts the EU has failed to mobilize sufficient skilled personnel or 

to link crisis-oriented assistance provided by the CSDP missions with the European Commission’s longer-term support to institutions and civil society. Although changes adopted 
16

in the Lisbon Treaty may improve coherence, these challenges have so far limited the EU’s 

unique potential to help overcome obstacles and catalyze improved governance in crisis and 

stabilization environments.

These challenges are not unique to the EU. Institutional change in the security sector is 

a long-term, complex endeavor that requires coherent, targeted, and sustained engagement 

on a variety of fronts. The U.S. government faces its own impediments to such integrated 

support. On the one hand, its political influence and the ability to adopt a coherent diplomatic position have facilitated political and organizational change when that influence is 

mobilized effectively over time. Yet the United States has also struggled to mobilize qualified personnel and to achieve coordinated and sustained political and technical engagement 

among agencies with varying short- and long-term perspectives. The experience of the 

EU suggests a number of ways in which the U.S. government could enhance its efforts to 

strengthen security and law enforcement forces.

Recommendations for Washington Agencies

The U.S. government should broaden and deepen the pool of personnel available for deployment overseas and should enhance coordination among agencies providing assistance. 

Looking beyond police organizations, U.S. government agencies should seek experts with 

management and oversight experience in law enforcement at the state and local levels to 

plan, manage, and implement assistance programs. Required skills and job descriptions 

should be identified through scenario-based planning, drawing on the previous missions 

and experiences of the United States, the EU, and the UN. Methods of securing expertise 

should move beyond reliance on contracts and explore agreements with state and local 

governments and the use of the Civilian Response Corps to identify and deploy government 

officials with policy, legal, financial, and administrative backgrounds in law enforcement.40

To apply this expertise effectively to institutional development, individuals deployed for 

short-term assistance should coordinate more consistently with longer-term, integrated 

development programming, as well as with diplomats who manage political relationships. 

Achieving greater coherence within the U.S. government will require more clearly defined 

policy, roles, relationships, and coordination mechanisms for the agencies involved.

Recommendations for Transatlantic Cooperation

The U.S. government should pursue cooperation with the European Commission and the 

European Council Secretariat. Efforts should focus on developing common concepts and 

methods for providing assistance to security sector governance institutions, including oversight ministries. The European Council has begun this process through its focus on strengthening police forces and the justice sector, but more work is needed for oversight institutions. 

U.S. government agencies should work with their European counterparts to learn from their 

experience, achieve consensus on the most appropriate models, structures, and approaches, 

and determine the most appropriate role and contribution of each donor for strengthening 

oversight ministries and security forces in different contexts. The United States should also 

seek cooperation on predeployment training by collaborating on curricula and organizing 

joint training programs, building on existing curricula and training courses.

Recommendations for Actions in Postconflict Contexts

In postconflict and stabilization countries, the United States and the EU should define common objectives and joint frameworks for providing assistance. Collaborative efforts should 

begin in the assessment and planning stage and should include cooperation on strategic 

Achieving greater coherence 

within the U.S. government will 

require more clearly defined 

policy, roles, relationships, and 

coordination mechanisms for the 

agencies involved.
17

planning processes, joint steering committees, common assessments, and shared indicators 

and measurement tools. Shared objectives and approaches can enable the United States 

and the EU to jointly leverage their relationships with host countries and officials more 

effectively. The United States should seek more opportunities to deploy its personnel in 

EU missions, especially where the EU has deeper relationships or capacity; invite seconded 

European experts into its own missions; and find ways to fund priorities identified by EU 

experts. Although bilateral assistance is necessary, sharing personnel can enhance coherence for institutional development. Such cooperation would be a crucial building block 

in fostering effective security and law enforcement while serving as a model for broader 

cooperation in crisis and stabilization contexts.
18

Notes

1. U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of Defense, and U.S. Department of State, Security 

Sector Reform, February 2009, http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/

SSR_JS_Mar2009.pdf.

2. See Thomas Jaye, An Assessment Report on Security Sector Reform in Liberia (Monrovia: Governance Reform 

Commission, 2006). 

3. This politicization through the ministry was a driver of tension and conflict in Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 

and elsewhere. See, for example, International Crisis Group, No Room for Complacency, Europe Report no. 149 

(Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003). Similar dynamics have fueled conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, 

and Kosovo. 

4. See Robert Perito, “The Interior Ministry’s Role in Security Sector Reform,” USIP Special Report 223 (Washington, 

DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009).

5. See Ludovic Hood, “Security Sector Reform in East Timor, 1999–2004,” International Peacekeeping 13, no. 1 

(2006): 60–77. See also United Nations, Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry 

for Timor-Leste (New York: United Nations, 2006).

6. Law enforcement agencies under the Department of Justice include the U.S. Marshals Service, Federal Bureau 

of Investigation, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and the Drug 

Enforcement Administration. Agencies under the Department of Homeland Security include the U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Coast 

Guard, and U.S. Secret Service. The U.S. Department of Interior oversees the U.S. Park Police.

7. The U.S. State Department, Department of Justice, and Department of Defense have deployed advisers to 

ministries of interior in a few cases, for example in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. USAID has broader experience 

strengthening ministries in other sectors but has been constrained by legal and policy restrictions from 

supporting oversight of security and law enforcement.

8. The Copenhagen Criteria are (1) stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and 

respect for and protection of minorities; (2) a functioning market economy, as well as the ability to cope with the 

pressure of competition and the market forces at work inside the EU; and (3) the ability to assume the obligations 

of membership, in particular adherence to the objectives of political, economic, and monetary union. In addition, 

candidate countries must be able to put the EU rules and procedures into effect and must have adapted their 

administrative systems to meet EU standards.

9. The Phare program for 2000–2006 was the primary mechanism to support EU candidate countries in Eastern and 

Central Europe.

10. Court of Auditors, “Special Report No 6/2003 Concerning Twinning as the Main Instrument to Support InstitutionBuilding in Candidate Countries together with the Commission’s Replies,” Official Journal of the European Union 

46 (2003) 1–24, doc. 2003/C 167/02. See also Chris Cooper and Mikael Johansen, “An Evaluation of Completed 

Twinning Projects: A Report Presented to the National Contact Points Meeting,” Brussels, January 30, 2003. 

11. Barbara Lippert and Gaby Umbach, The Pressure of Europeanisation (Nomos, 2005), 101. See also Court of 

Auditors, “Special Report No. 6/2003 Concerning Twinning,” doc. 2003/C 167/25.

12. For an overview of EU funding mechanisms and their application to SSR, see Maria Derks and Sylvie More, 

“The European Union and Internal Challenges for Effectively Supporting Security Sector Reform” (The Hague: 

Clingendael Institute, 2009). 

13. European Commission, A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform, report of the 

Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels (Brussels: European Union, May 24, 2006), 

COM (2006) 253 final.

14. These efforts have been tried in only a few places (European Commission official, interview, Brussels, September 

25, 2010). 

15. The IfS contains €2.062 billion for 2007–11, including €1.487 billion for short-term and €484 million for 

long-term conflict prevention, early recovery following natural disasters, and postconflict stabilization. Up to 

€20million can be disbursed without approval of member states. See Derks and More, “The European Union and 

Internal Challenges.”

16. European Commission, Annual Report from the European Commission on the Instrument for Stability in 2008 

(European Commission: Brussels, July 9, 2009), COM (2009) 341. 

17. The CSDP was formerly known as the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) until changes brought about 

by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. 

18. Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defense, “St Malo Declaration,” St. Malo, December 4, 

1998. 

19. See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id=268&lang=EN.

20. European Council, EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 

2005), revised October 13, 2006, doc. 12566/4/05 REV 4. 

21. The three SSR missions are EUSEC Democratic Republic of Congo, EUPOL Democratic Republic of Congo, and EU 

SSR Guinea-Bissau.

22. European Council, EU Comprehensive Concept for Strengthening of Local Police Missions (Brussels: European 

Council, May 31, 2002), doc. 9535/02. See in particular Annex C. 

23. Court of Auditors 2003.

24. See Eva Gross, “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The EU’s Contribution,” Occasional Paper no. 78 (Paris: EU 

Institute for Security Studies, April 2009).

25. This critique was especially salient in the early days of the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo missions. See, for 

example, Michal Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, “ESDP Police Missions: Meaning, Context and Operational 

Challenges,” European Foreign Affairs Review 10, no. 2 (2005): 215–35. 

26. European Council, EU Comprehensive Concept for Strengthening of Local Police Missions (Brussels: European 

Council, May 31, 2002), doc. 9535/02. The Justice Concept is in draft (European Council Secretariat official, 

interview, Brussels, October 29, 2010).
19

27. The CSDP mission in Guinea-Bisseau, for instance, deployed on the basis of a strategic plan and a request by 

the government to implement the plan. When the mission failed to achieve substantial progress, the existence 

of this plan also helped justify a decision to end the mission when it became clear after a change in political 

conditions that there was insufficient commitment within the government. See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/

uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/100930%20FACTSHEET%20EU%20SSR%20Guinea-Bissau%20-%20

version%2012_EN.pdf.

28. U.S. adviser to Afghanistan Ministry of Interior, telephone interview, Kabul, September 28, 2010.

29. Cooper and Johansen, “An Evaluation of Completed Twinning Projects.”

30. The first goal was set in 2001 at 200 rule-of-law officials and 2,000 members of civil protection teams. In 2004 

these targets were raised to 5,761 police officers, 631 rule-of-law personnel (including judges, prosecutors, and 

corrections officers), 562 civilian administration experts, and 4,988 members of civil protection teams. See the 

Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference, Ministerial Declaration, Brussels, November 22, 2004, 102. For an 

overall assessment of the output of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, see Council Document 14807/07, “Final 

Report on the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, 9 November 2007,” approved by the Ministerial Civilian Capabilities 

Improvement Conference and noted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (Brussels: European 

Council, November 19, 2007).

31. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane, European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years 

(1999–2009). (Paris: European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009). 

32. The Common Foreign and Security Policy budget for roughly 2,000 civilians was only €245million in 2009, limited 

to travel costs. See Derks and More, “The European Union and Internal Challenges.”

33. Contrary to expectations, the majority of missions have been civilian rather than military, and have focused more 

on strengthening local institutions than on executive functions. European Council Secretariat official, interview, 

Brussels, October 28, 2010. 

34. See Grevi, Helly, and Keohane, European Security and Defence Policy, 111.

35. European Council Secretariat official, interview, Brussels, October 28, 2010.

36. European Council, “EU Training Programme in the Field of ESDP 2008 to 2010” (Brussels: European Council, 

December 10, 2007), doc. 16266/1/07.

37. On how the accession process resulted in incentives for organizational change in EU candidate countries, see 

Frank Schimmelfenning and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and 

Eastern Europe,” in The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Frank Schimmelfenning and Ulrich 

Sedelmeier (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 71–90. 

38. Lippert and Umbach, The Pressure of Europeanization, 45.

39. See Derks and More, “The European Union and Internal Challenges,” on the challenges of coordinating between 

the European Commission and the European Court. 

40. The Civilian Response Corps is a capacity managed by the U.S. Department of State to quickly mobilize civilians 

with specialized skills to deploy to crisis and stabilization environments.
Of Related Interest

•	 Realism and Pragmatism in Security Sector Development by Eric Scheye (Special Report, 

October 2010) 

•	 Institutionalizing Security Sector Reform by Gregory A. Hermsmeyer (Special Report, 

September 2010)

•	 The Link Between DDR and SSR in Conflict-Affected Countries by Sean McFate (Special Report, 

May 2010)

•	 Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform by Liz Panarelli (Peace Brief, February 2010)

•	 Congress and Parliaments in Security Sector Reform by Robert M. Perito (Peace Brief, 

January 2010)

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www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

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