United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 16, 2009

Decided April 17, 2009

Before

       JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

       ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 07‐3332

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

STEVEN ROBINSON,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 06 CR 697‐1

Robert W. Gettleman,

Judge.

O R D E R

Steven Robinson pleaded guilty to five counts of robbing, and attempting to rob, a

bank, see 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), for which he received concurrent sentences totaling 84 months’

imprisonment.  Robinson filed a timely notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyer asks to

withdraw for lack of a non‐frivolous argument.  See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

Robinson has not commented on counsel’s motion (though we invited a response, see CIR. R.

51(b)), so we confine our review to the potential issues identified in counsel’s facially

adequate supporting brief.  See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973‐74 (7th Cir. 2002).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 07‐3332 Page 2

Robinson stands by his guilty plea, and for that reason counsel does not examine the

adequacy of the plea colloquy or the voluntariness of the plea.  See United States v. Knox, 287

F.3d 667, 670‐72 (7th Cir. 2002).

Instead counsel considers whether Robinson might challenge his sentence as

substantively unreasonable.  See Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 586, 596‐97 (2007).  Robinson

asked the district court for a sentence below the advisory guidelines range of 84 to 105

months because, he insisted, his criminal history was driven in large part by drug addiction

and unresolved mental‐health issues.  The court was sympathetic, noting the likelihood of

rehabilitation, Robinson’s “promise,” and the magnitude of his addiction and post‐

traumatic stress disorder.  But, the court continued, “Bank robbery is a really serious crime. .

. . . And this wasn’t just one bank robbery. . . . Five times, I mean, you had a lot of time to

think about it.”  In light of the need to protect the community, promote respect for the law,

and acknowledge the seriousness of Robinson’s past, the court settled on 84 months, the

bottom of the guidelines range.  That makes for a presumptively reasonable sentence on

appeal.  See Rita v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2462‐64 (2007); United States v. Shannon, 518

F.3d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 2008).  And we agree with counsel: attacking that presumption here

would be frivolous.

Counsel also considers whether Robinson could challenge the district court’s failure

to specify a maximum number of drug tests when it imposed participation in a drug

treatment and testing program as a condition of supervised release.  Yet Robinson never

objected at sentencing, which would limit our review to plain error.  See United States v.

Tejeda, 476 F.3d 471, 473‐74 (7th Cir. 2007).  And a court’s failure to specify a maximum

number of drug tests is not plain error under our precedent, see id., so raising this error on

appeal would be fruitless.

Counselʹs motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.