About the Report

This report chronicles U.S. efforts to train and equip an 

indigenous constabulary force to control insurgent and militia 

violence in Iraq. The United States does not have constabulary 

forces. In earlier conflicts, the United States called upon the 

United Nations or European allies to provide a gendarmerie. 

In Iraq, the UN police forces that were a feature of peace 

operations in the Balkans were not available, leaving the 

United States with only one option—to develop an Iraqi 

constabulary force under fire. 

About the Author

Robert M. Perito is the director of the Center of Innovation 

for Security Sector Governance at the U.S. Institute of Peace. 

He joined the Institute after a distinguished career as a U.S. 

foreign service officer and service as acting director of the 

international police training program at the Department of 

Justice. He is the author of Where Is the Lone Ranger When We 

Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force and 

other books on the role of police in peace and 

stability operations. 

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 291 October 2011

© 2011 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Robert M. Perito

The Iraq Federal Police

U.S. Police Building under Fire

Summary

•	 In 2004, the U.S.-led coalition and Iraqi security forces faced a growing challenge from 

insurgents and militia groups as the country drifted toward civil war. In street battles with 

heavily armed insurgent and militia groups, Iraq’s fledgling police units mutinied under fire 

and resigned en masse, pointing out shortfalls in the U.S. police training program. 

•	 In response, the U.S. government transferred leadership of the U.S. police assistance program from the State Department to the Defense Department, which created heavy police 

tactical units capable of dealing with armed groups. At the same time, the Iraqi interior 

ministry independently organized police commando units composed of former Iraqi soldiers 

that successfully fought alongside U.S. military forces. 

•	 In 2005, the installation of a new Iraqi government and the escalation of sectarian violence 

brought a change in the composition of the Iraqi police commando units. The new interior 

minister, a senior Shiite party official, enabled members of Shiite militia groups to take over 

the police commando units and engage in the kidnap, torture, and murder of Sunnis. 

•	 To control police death squads, the U.S. military combined all of Iraq’s heavy police and 

police commando units into a new entity, the Iraq National Police (INP). In October 2006, 

the U.S. military began a program to retrain police commando units that were engaged in 

sectarian violence. 

•	 Over the following year, Iraq’s new interior minister, Jawad al-Bolani, undertook a program 

to reform the INP, appointing a new commanding general, purging the officer corps, and 

inviting a training team from the Italian Carabinieri to provide advanced instruction for 

INP units. 

•	 In 2007, INP units successfully partnered with U.S. combat brigade teams that were 

deployed to Baghdad as part of President Bush’s surge of U.S. military force into Iraq. Over 

the next two years, the valor of Iraqi constabulary units and their acceptance in both Sunni 

and Shiite areas brought a new name, the Iraq Federal Police (IFP), and the deployment of 

an IFP unit to every province in the country. 

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Contents

DOD Takes Over Police Training Program 2

Onset of Civil War 4

Crest of Sectarian Violence 5

U.S. Military’s Effort to Control Abuses 6

U.S. Launches a Surge of Forces 8

Future Role of Iraqi National Police 11

Conclusion 12
2

•	 Lessons learned in the development of an indigenous police constabulary in Iraq should be 

applied to current and future stability operations. 

The Iraqi Police (IP) was the only institution in Saddam Hussein’s interlocking network of 

intelligence and security services to remain intact at the end of major combat operations 

in Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) decision to disband the Iraqi army and 

Saddam’s security and intelligence network spared the Iraqi police and the interior ministry. 

Unfortunately, the IP had been at the bottom of Saddam’s bureaucratic hierarchy of security 

agencies and suffered from years of mismanagement, deprivation of resources, and lack of 

professional standards. A U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) assessment team found that 

the IP’s 60,000 members had little understanding of basic police skills. Most of its senior 

officers had graduated from the national police college, but its noncommissioned officers 

and patrolmen had little formal education. Under Saddam the IP had been militarized, and 

its doctrine, procedures, and weapons were completely unsuited to policing in a democratic 

society. Iraqis saw the IP as part of a cruel and repressive regime and described its officers 

as brutal, corrupt, and untrustworthy. Iraqi police officers had remained at their posts until 

U.S. forces entered Baghdad, then took their personal weapons and went home to protect 

their families. In the civil disorder that followed, police infrastructure was heavily damaged 

or completely destroyed by looters and arsonists. Rampaging mobs destroyed police stations, stole police vehicles, and walked away with weapons and equipment. Police returned 

to find their stations gutted or reduced to smoldering ruins.1

In the aftermath of the looting of Baghdad, the U.S. military had to make a public appeal 

for the Iraqi police to return to duty. On April 14, 2003, joint patrols of U.S. soldiers and Iraqi 

police made their first appearance on Baghdad’s streets. Police who returned to duty lacked 

leadership, organization, and logistic support. In May 2003, a DOJ assessment team determined that the Iraqi police could not restore public order and would require substantial U.S. 

assistance. The assessment team’s recommendation was not acted upon, however, until the 

growing Iraq insurgency caused the United States to open police training centers in Amman, 

Jordan, and in Baghdad, in December 2003 and January 2004, respectively. The first graduates of these programs began serving in March 2004, but by that time, the level of insurgent 

and criminal violence had escalated and the situation in Iraq was slipping out of control. 

Department of Defense Takes Over the Police Training Program 

In November 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld requested that Major General 

Karl Eikenberry assess the shortcomings of the Iraq police assistance program. Eikenberry 

reported that the CPA training effort was underresourced, disorganized, and incapable of 

producing a competent Iraqi police force. The report concluded that the U.S. military should 

take over training for police as well as the Iraqi army.2 In the spring of 2004, as the CPA’s 

deadline for returning sovereignty to the Iraqis approached, Washington determined that 

only the U.S. military had the resources required to fast-track the police assistance program. 

In May 2004, President George W. Bush signed National Security Presidential Decision Directive 36, which formally transferred responsibility for the IP train-and-equip program from 

the State Department to the Department of Defense (DOD).3 A month later, the CPA’s work 

ended and formal sovereignty returned to the Iraqi interim government. Ambassador L. Paul 

Bremer departed Baghdad on June 28, 2004, a day in advance of the announced schedule 

for transfer of authority to the Iraqis.

In Iraq, the Civilian Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT) was established under control 

of the Multi-National Force-Iraq—later the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy •

George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor of 

Practice, The George Washington University • Judy Ansley,

Former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser under President George W. Bush • Anne H. Cahn,

Former Scholar in Residence, American University •

Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, 

Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 

Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. 

Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights • Ikram U. 

Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC • Stephen D. 

Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, Stanford University • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive Director of the National Council on Independent Living 

• Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor, George Mason School of Law 

• Judy Van Rest, Executive Vice President, International 

Republican Institute • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy •

Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
3

(MNSTC-I)—and assigned responsibility for training, equipping, and mentoring the Iraqi 

police. CPATT was led by a British brigadier general with a civilian deputy from the U.S. 

Department of Justice and included both military and civilian personnel. CPATT’s initially 

small staff was augmented by the U.S. 89th Military Police Brigade, which provided the 

manpower to oversee the reconstruction of Iraqi police facilities, handle the distribution 

of new equipment and vehicles, and run the central maintenance facilities.4 Transferring 

responsibility for civilian police training to the U.S. military was unprecedented. In all previous peace operations, State and the DOJ had led police assistance programs.5

Unfortunately, the transfer of responsibility from State to DOD and the restoration of 

Iraqi sovereignty were not accompanied by a meeting of the minds among CPATT, State and 

Justice along with their contract advisers, the U.S. military battle space commanders, and 

the Iraqis. Instead there was fundamental disagreement on three critical issues: the mission of the Iraqi police, its relationship to U.S. military forces, and its role in countering the 

insurgency. The State Department and the DOJ’s civilian police advisers wanted to create 

a community police service that would operate under the leadership of provincial police 

chiefs. The U.S. military concluded that the security situation required the creation of a 

militarized counterinsurgency police force, and that community-based policing would have 

to wait. The Iraqis, whose views their American counterparts generally discounted, would 

eventually act on their own to counter the threat from insurgents and sectarian militias. 

The State Department and DOJ police advisers believed the U.S. military did not understand the ethos or the practical requirements for training law enforcement officers and was 

intent on simply putting Iraqi guns on the street to reduce pressure on coalition forces. DOJ 

civilian police advisers changed the name of the organization from the Saddam-era Iraqi 

National Police to the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) to emphasize what they believed should be 

the new police personnel’s community service orientation. DOJ advisers wanted to create 

a lightly armed civilian police organization that used community-policing techniques and 

operated according to Western democratic standards for professional law enforcement. 

DOJ police advisers argued that Iraq’s security problems were best resolved by relying on 

investigations and arrests to incarcerate criminals and terrorists. Since State and the DOJ 

ran the training program in Amman, the police cadets that returned to Iraq were trained 

and equipped for community policing. The security environment in Iraq was not, however, 

conducive to community policing—and sadly, many of the Iraqi police cadets had sought 

training in Jordan because of the opportunity it provided to be safely out of the country, 

if only for a short time. 

The DOJ advisers’ arguments for creating a community-oriented police service failed to 

convince their military counterparts. Once the newly minted community police officers graduated from the Amman training facility or the police academy in Baghdad, they were used as 

combatants in the growing conflict against insurgent and sectarian militia forces. The numbers 

for trained police thus were virtually meaningless, as they related to personnel who were 

prepared for a different mission. Iraqi police were provided with side arms, which were useless 

against insurgents and militia members armed with AK-47s. Use of the police in combat operations pitted poorly led and inappropriately trained and equipped patrolmen against heavily 

armed former military personnel, veteran security operatives, and foreign terrorists. Iraq’s 

civilian police were subjected to repeated attacks from car bombs and fighters equipped with 

rocket-propelled grenades and other military weapons.6 Involvement in the fighting against 

insurgents and militias turned the police into a primary target for terrorist attacks, aimed at 

breaking police resolve and demonstrating the danger of cooperating with the coalition.7 Operating from unprotected facilities, the Iraqi police patrolled in thin-skinned vehicles, lacked 

body armor, and took increasingly grievous casualties. In just two years (2004–06), the Iraqi 

Use of the police in combat 

operations pitted poorly 

led and inappropriately 

trained and equipped patrolmen 

against heavily armed former 

military personnel, veteran 

security operatives, and 

foreign terrorists. 
4

police suffered 12,000 casualties, including 4,000 killed, according to Major General Joseph 

Peterson, the commander of the U.S. Civilian Police Assistance Training Team in Iraq.8

Onset of Civil War

In early 2004, terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda in Iraq on Shiite shrines and pilgrims in Baghdad, 

Karbala, and other cities produced bitter criticism from Shiite leaders of coalition and Iraqi 

security forces and demands for the legalization of sectarian militias to guard neighborhoods 

and places of worship. Militias had been banned under CPA Order Number 91,9 but militia 

groups, such as the Kurdish peshmerga and the Shiite Badr Brigade, were well-established 

and included tens of thousands of fighters. As sectarian attacks continued, militia forces 

openly deployed and challenged Iraq’s fledging security forces. In Mosul and other Iraqi 

cities, Iraqi police mutinied under fire, abandoned their posts, and deserted en masse after 

repeated insurgent and militia attacks. In testimony before Congress on March 5, 2004, Lieutenant General John Abizaid, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) commander, said 

Iraqi security forces had been rapidly recruited in large numbers and still lacked adequate 

training and equipment as well as a clear chain of command. These shortcomings were particularly evident in the Iraqi police, the general said, who were not trained or equipped to 

respond to attacks by organized militia or insurgent groups.10

In April, Sunni insurgents launched a coordinated offensive against coalition forces in 

Fallujah, Baghdad, Ramadi, Samarra, and Tikrit, while the Mahdi Army took control of Najaf 

and Sadr City in Baghdad. Newly trained Iraqi military and police forces refused to fight or 

were quickly overwhelmed. Under pressure from militia groups, Iraqi police units completely 

collapsed in Fallujah, Najaf, Karbala, and Kut, with some 3,000 police deserting in a single 

week. Iraqi police and military failures in battle raised serious concerns about U.S. training 

programs and intentions at the time to rapidly transfer responsibility for internal security 

to Iraqi forces. Of the 200,000 Iraqi security forces that had been rushed into service, only 

5,000 Iraqi army personnel were fully trained and equipped to conduct counterinsurgency 

operations. None of the Iraqi police units were trained or equipped to fight organized enemy 

units armed with military weapons. Clearly, the United States needed to rethink its strategy 

for developing Iraqi security forces.11

Faced with a growing threat from well-organized and heavily armed groups, the U.S. military was determined to create an Iraqi police force that could protect the Iraqi government 

against the insurgency and hostile militias. To confront the insurgent and militia threat, the 

U.S. military created heavily equipped police units composed of former Iraqi soldiers that 

were trained to conduct counterinsurgency operations. These were not true constabulary 

(gendarme) forces, normally defined as police forces with military capabilities; these were 

military forces that received little or no police training, although they were subordinate to 

the Ministry of the Interior. According to Lieutenant General David Petraeus, then in charge 

of training Iraq’s security forces, there was a need for specialized police units that could 

bring combat power to the fight and fill the capability gap between lightly armed Iraqi street 

cops and the Iraqi army.12 The U.S. military thus recruited special 750-man police battalions 

composed mostly of Sunnis who had formerly served in the Iraq army’s special forces. These 

newly created units included emergency response units, based on U.S. special weapons and 

tactics (SWAT) teams and designed to conduct high-risk arrests; a mechanized police unit, 

used for rapid response, fixed-site security, and cordon and search operations; public order 

battalions, intended for crowd control and performing routine police functions in hostile 

environments; and mechanized police units that were heavily armed and specially trained for 

counterinsurgency operations.13 These units were sent to flash points in Samarra, Fallujah, 

and Baghdad, where they were expected to fight alongside U.S. military forces.

The U.S. military was 

determined to create an Iraqi 

police force that could protect 

the Iraqi government against 

the insurgency and 

hostile militias.
5

At the same time, Falah al-Naqib, Iraq’s minister of interior, began recruiting special 

police commando units for counterinsurgency operations independent of U.S. authorities. 

Unlike its position in Iraq’s defense ministry, the United States had few advisers in the 

interior ministry and little control over the recruiting of Iraqi police personnel. When the 

IPS performed poorly in battles against the Mahdi Army, Naqib turned to his uncle, General 

Adnan Thavit, for help. A former Air Force intelligence officer, Thavit was involved in a failed 

attempt to overthrow Saddam and had served time in prison before being released along 

with thousands of other prisoners before the U.S. intervention. Thavit recruited commando 

units composed of unemployed but seasoned officers and men from Saddam’s republican 

guard and special forces. These units began conducting patrols and engaged in skirmishes 

with insurgents and militia fighters.14

The appearance of the Iraqi commandos caught the U.S. military by surprise. Initially 

called pop-up units by U.S. soldiers who stumbled upon them in abandoned buildings and 

bombed-out military bases, the police commandos did not look like a coherent fighting 

force. Composed of ragged and poorly equipped men, the commandos were mostly Sunnis 

with a mix of Shiites and minority groups who were personally loyal to their commanders and 

bound together by tribal and family backgrounds. But numbering as many as 15,000 men, 

with names such as the Defenders of Baghdad and the Amarah Brigade, the units had the 

internal cohesion, experience, and determination that were missing in the U.S.-organized 

Iraqi security forces. 

The problem for U.S. authorities lay in determining the extent of the units’ loyalty to the 

Iraqi government and how they could be used to help coalition forces counter the insurgency.15 Initially U.S. military commanders reacted coolly to what the United States officially 

designated as irregular Iraqi ministry-directed brigades. U.S. commanders were reluctant 

to provide arms and training because they feared the units might turn against the central 

government. In fighting against insurgents and militia, however, these units distinguished 

themselves by their steadiness under fire when regular Iraqi police and army units broke 

and ran. Writing in the Washington Post, columnist David Ignatius described a battle in 

which Iraqi police commandos stayed with their U.S. adviser, Colonel James Coffman, Jr., 

when they were ambushed by insurgents in Mosul. In four hours of intense fighting, the 

commandos suffered four members killed and thirty-eight wounded but drove off the attack. 

Afterward, Coffman, who was wounded in the battle, proudly told Ignatius, “Our guys stood 

and fought!”16

Crest of Sectarian Violence 

Police commando units provided increased firepower, military prowess, and a partial answer 

to the problem of inadequate Iraqi security forces. In January 2005, the Iraqi police and 

army enjoyed temporary success in providing security for national elections so that eight 

million Iraqis could safely vote. The installation of Iraq’s transitional government in May 

2005 resulted in a change of leadership in the interior ministry and the nature of the Iraqi 

police commando units. Before leaving his post as interior minister in April 2005, Minister 

Naqib warned Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld that the Shiite political parties who were taking office would hijack the police commando units and use them for their own purposes.17 

Naqib’s fears were well founded. Bayan Jabr Solagh, a senior official of the Shiite Supreme 

Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), was appointed interior minister. Jabr 

placed leaders of the Badr Brigade, the armed wing of SCIRI, in key positions in the ministry 

and recruited thousands of Shiite militiamen to replace Sunnis in the Special Police Commando units. At the same time, militia loyal to the radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr also 

infiltrated the ministry. Members of the Sadrist Mahdi Army used police uniforms and their 
6

official status to pass through checkpoints and as cover for sectarian violence. During Jabr’s 

one-year tenure, from April 2005 to May 2006, members of the IPS and Special Police Commando units acted as death squads, kidnapping, imprisoning, torturing, and killing Sunnis. 

Iraqis reported that gunmen in police uniforms routinely abducted people from their homes, 

cars, and—in one particularly flagrant case—hospital beds. Bullet-riddled bodies, some 

showing marks of torture, routinely were found in the streets of Baghdad by U.S. troops on 

their morning patrols.18

Over the summer and into the fall of 2005, there was an ever more deafening crescendo 

of sectarian violence involving attacks by uniformed police on Sunnis. On August 25, 

2005, gunmen wearing police uniforms dragged thirty-six Sunni men from their homes in 

the Huriya neighborhood of Baghdad and left their bodies showing signs of torture near 

the Iranian border. After an investigation, a judge ordered the commander of the Volcano 

Brigade commando unit arrested for the murders, but the warrant was never executed. 

The Wolf Brigade, perhaps the most notorious of the Special Police Commando units, was 

discovered to have illegally detained and tortured more than 1,400 prisoners.19 On July 4, 

2004, members of the 759th U.S. Military Police Battalion discovered 170 malnourished and 

badly abused Iraqi prisoners, mostly Sunnis, at a secret prison facility on the grounds of the 

interior ministry. The Americans wanted to free the captives, but U.S. military authorities 

ordered them to withdraw and leave the facility in the hands of the Iraqi police.20 In November 2005, American soldiers discovered a secret prison in Baghdad’s Jadiriya neighborhood 

run by the Wolf Brigade where 173 malnourished and badly abused prisoners, mostly Sunnis, 

were held and tortured.21

U.S. Military’s Effort to Control Abuses by Iraqi Police

In January 2006, the MNSTC–I responded to sectarian police violence by launching an 

effort to reorganize police training and impose discipline, declaring 2006 the Year of the 

Police in Iraq. In April, the MNSTC-I convinced the Ministry of the Interior to combine the 

U.S.-created public order battalions and the Iraqi-organized Special Police Commando units 

into a new organization, the Iraq National Police (INP). The Special Police Commando units 

became the First National Police Division; the public order battalions became the Second 

National Police Division. The new INP was subordinate to the interior ministry along with 

the IPS. National police officers were equipped with small arms, medium machine guns, 

rocket-propelled grenades, and body armor. INP units were given unarmored pickup trucks 

and sport utility vehicles, leaving them vulnerable to roadside bombs and insurgent attacks 

with heavy weapons. Plans called for replacing thin-skinned INP vehicles with armored 

vehicles from various donor countries over time.22

Initially, U.S. advisers conceived of the INP as a bridge between the IPS, which was 

responsible for traffic control, crime prevention, and routine police functions, and the Iraqi 

army. The INP would back up the IPS and take over when the IPS was outgunned and more 

firepower and armor were required. If the INP could not control the situation, the MOI would 

request military assistance. Unfortunately, the sectarian nature of the INP forces and the 

deep distrust in police commando units from Iraqi citizens and other Iraqi police and military units made it impossible for the INP to play that role. The distrust in the INP extended 

to their American advisers. A former U.S. Army adviser to the infamous Wolf Brigade told 

National Public Radio that his charges would conduct proper neighborhood searches when 

U.S. soldiers were present but would go back at night to kidnap and kill Sunnis and burn 

down their houses. The adviser recalled an instance when U.S. advisers were led into an 

ambush by Wolf Brigade members. His advice to Americans training for similar advisery missions was to “never let your guard down ever!”23
7

National elections for a permanent Iraqi government were held on December 15, 2005; at 

that time, sectarian violence was intense enough to border on civil war. After the elections, 

rival political parties negotiated for five months over the choice of a prime minister and 

the appointment of a new government. On May 20, 2006, Nouri al-Maliki was named prime 

minister, but backroom bargaining continued over the choices for key ministries, including 

interior. It was not until June 8, 2006, nearly six months after the election, that Prime 

Minister Maliki appointed a new interior minister, Jawad al-Bolani, a compromise candidate 

chosen because he lacked a political base and did not pose a threat to any faction. Bolani 

was a Shiite and former Air Force engineer with no police experience but a reputation as a 

competent administrator. To ensure that the police would not become the tool of any political faction, Bolani was given strong deputies from the Dawa, Badr, and Kurdish parties. His 

predecessor, Bayan Jabr, was appointed as the new minister of finance, where he retained 

control of the funding for the interior ministry and the direct payment of police salaries.24

Despite the change in leadership at MOI, police involvement in sectarian violence continued unabated. By autumn, the U.S. military could no longer postpone dealing with the 

INP commando units’ role in sectarian violence and death squad activities. In September, 

press reports indicated that U.S. officials had warned Iraqi leaders that, under the Leahy 

Amendment, U.S. law prohibited assistance to foreign security forces that committed “gross 

violations of human rights.” The warnings came after a joint U.S.-Iraqi inspection of a 

detention facility, known as Site 4, found evidence of the Wolf Brigade’s systematic use of 

torture.25 On October 5, 2006, U.S. military forces took their first direct action to deal with 

sectarian violence by INP commando units: U.S. soldiers removed the entire 8th Brigade of 

the 2nd National Police Division from duty and arrested its officers after the brigade was 

implicated in a raid on a Baghdad food factory and the kidnapping of twenty-six Sunni workers, seven of whom were executed.26 Action against the 8th Brigade was the first step in 

CPATT’s National Police transformation program to remove all the INP brigades from service 

for limited vetting and three weeks of police training—in many cases, the first training 

of any kind that INP personnel had received.27 For the remaining eight INP brigades, the 

transition process, called re-bluing, was extended to one month and included training in 

respect for human rights and democratic policing, plus tactical training in patrolling and 

checkpoint operations. To improve the INP’s public image, the names of national police units 

were changed. The Wolf Brigade was renamed the Freedom Brigade. The national police were 

also issued new uniforms with digital patterns that would be difficult to duplicate.

It took more than a year to retrain all nine INP brigades and abuses continued in the 

interim. Iraqi officials had sought to counter allegations of police involvement in sectarian killings by claiming that the perpetrators were wearing counterfeit police uniforms. On 

November 14, 2006, 80 gunmen wearing the new digital police commando uniforms raided 

the Ministry of Higher Education in Baghdad, kidnapping 159 academics and other members 

of its staff. The attackers arrived in a fleet of 20 police vehicles and had lists of names 

of those they intended to abduct. As the education minister was a member of the Iraqi 

Accordance Front, a Sunni political party, observers saw the operation as an act of sectarian 

violence.28 On March 28, 2007, Shiite police went on a rampage in the northwestern town 

of Tal Afar, killing as many as 60 Sunnis after a massive truck bomb shattered the market 

in the majority Shiite community. Police and Shiite militants roamed Sunni neighborhoods 

firing into homes and at people on the street. The shooting ended when Iraqi Army troops 

occupied the town, arrested 18 policemen identified by the families of Sunni victims, and 

imposed a curfew.29 On May 29, 2007, gunmen wearing digital police uniforms cordoned off 

an area in eastern Baghdad and kidnapped 5 British security guards in a well-coordinated 

midday operation. Iraq’s foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari, assigned responsibility for the raid 

to Iraqi interior ministry police.30
8

On July 30, 2007, the Los Angeles Times reported that Iraq’s interior ministry had become 

an “eleven-story powder keg of factions” where hostile militias and criminal organizations 

controlled various floors and settled their differences by assassinations in the parking lot. 

The article described offices guarded by armed men and officials who feared the elevators 

and took the stairs accompanied by heavy security. The article went on to describe the MOI 

as a command center for “militias that kill under the cover of police uniforms and remain 

above the law.” The article noted that the ministry’s third floor was the domain of Prime 

Minister Maliki’s Dawa Party, while the sixth floor housed units controlled by the Badr Organization militia. The intelligence division on the seventh floor directed death squads and 

secret prisons. The ninth floor housed Kurdish units. U.S. military personnel described the 

handful of U.S. police advisers at the ministry as confined to the top floor of the building, 

where they drank tea, drafted policy statements in English, and had no influence with the 

Iraqis. The Los Angeles Times credited Minister Bolani with attempting to rein in the situation but said he was thwarted by a web of political alliances that prevented reform.31

U.S. Launches a Surge of Forces to Reverse the Tide of Battle

U.S. efforts to control the INP commando units coincided with the Bush administration’s 

comprehensive review of the U.S. conduct of the war and implementation of the president’s 

strategy for a New Way Forward in Iraq. In a January 10, 2007 address from the White House 

library, President Bush announced he was sending an additional 20,000 American troops to 

quell the sectarian conflict in Iraq. The president said spiraling violence was “unacceptable” 

to the American people and required a change in strategy. He also reported that the Iraqi 

government had put forth an aggressive plan, which included appointing new commanders 

for Baghdad and deploying eighteen Iraqi army and national police brigades across the nine 

districts of the capital. Iraqi forces would operate from local police stations—conducting 

patrols, manning checkpoints, and going door-to-door to gain the trust of the people. 

U.S. troops would work alongside the Iraqis to help clear and protect neighborhoods from 

insurgents. To implement the new strategy, the president appointed a new American commander in Iraq, Lieutenant General David Petraeus, author of the U.S. Army’s new doctrine 

on counterinsurgency warfare, which stressed the importance of protecting local citizens 

over hunting insurgents.32 Deploying large numbers of U.S. forces into areas previously 

controlled by insurgents and militia groups brought a sharp spike in levels of fighting in 

Baghdad and in Anbar province during the first six months of 2007. 

In September 2007, a report by an independent congressional commission on the security 

forces of Iraq delivered a scathing critique of the interior ministry and the INP. Led by Marine 

General James Jones, former North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) supreme commander, 

the commission’s fourteen members included retired military officers and DOD officials as 

well as several serving police chiefs and former police advisers. The commission made three 

trips to Iraq, visiting Iraqi facilities and interviewing American and Iraqi officials and Iraqi 

citizens. The members concluded that the MOI was crippled by sectarianism and corruption 

and lacked the leadership and administrative capacity to support the forces under its control. They recommended major organizational changes to improve the ministry’s effectiveness. The commission said it also received uniformly negative reports about the INP, which it 

described similarly as riddled with sectarianism and corruption, distrusted by the public, and 

operationally ineffective. Noting the poor quality of INP personnel, low levels of literacy, 

an overwhelming majority of Shiites, and a lack of appropriate leadership, the commission 

strongly recommended that the INP be disbanded and reorganized under the ministry of 

defense with a new name and responsibility for ordnance disposal, search and rescue, and 

other unarmed functions.33
9

Improved conditions in Iraq muted the effect of the Jones Commission report in Washington. By September 6, 2007, when General Jones presented the commission’s report to 

Congress, the combat brigade teams that composed the surge were in place in Baghdad. 

General Petraeus had redeployed U.S. military units into the capital’s neighborhoods to 

protect Iraqi citizens. With the resulting decline in violence, the U.S. military rejected the 

commission’s call to disband the INP and start over. Speaking to the Washington Post by 

telephone, Major General Rick Lynch, the U.S military commander for Baghdad, said the 

situation was “past the point where we could just fire everyone and start over.” He said the 

surge required both U.S. and Iraqi forces, and the INP was holding areas of the city that U.S. 

forces had cleared. Removing the INP, he said, would leave a security gap that the insurgents 

would fill quickly. Lynch admitted that some INP units still engaged in sectarian violence 

and were feared by Sunnis who “saw them as the enemy.” However, Lynch said, “the two 

INP units in his area, which had been through re-bluing, were great and were doing what 

needed to be done.”34

In taking their position, U.S. military officials were encouraged by reforms within Iraq’s 

interior ministry and the prospect that training teams from the Italian Carabinieri would 

soon be involved in retraining the INP. In Baghdad, Interior Minister Bolani had been stung 

by the Jones Commission’s criticism, particularly its call for disbanding the INP. Bolani 

assigned a small group of trusted senior police officers to conduct their own evaluation 

of the INP in light of the report’s findings. The Iraqi evaluation team confirmed the sorry 

state of the INP but recommended accelerating the reform effort rather than disbanding 

the force. Bolani appointed a new INP commander, Lieutenant General Hussein al Awadi, 

a highly regarded military officer who previously commanded the Iraqi Army Staff College. 

Awadi demanded and received assurances that he could fire corrupt commanders and transfer poor performers. He recruited a staff of competent young officers from among the top 

Army Staff College graduates to supervise a four-step program for transforming the INP into 

a reliable security force.35

Awadi’s reform program involved removing the commanding officers at the division, 

brigade, and battalion levels that had been implicated in sectarian violence. In all, the 

commanders of the two INP divisions, seven of the nine brigade commanders, twenty-five 

of the twenty-seven battalion commanders, and eight hundred rank and file personnel were 

removed from the INP, although no one was arrested or disciplined for their actions. Awadi 

continued the program of taking individual brigades offline in succession and providing them 

with their first training in basic police skills. These brigades were then paired with U.S. military units, which were co-located with INP units to conduct joint operations. This enabled 

U.S. troops to monitor INP activity closely and prevent human rights abuses. It also enabled 

U.S. forces to serve as role models and provide on-the-job training in planning, patrolling, and 

other functions. In addition to the partner units, MNSCT-I created forty-one national police 

transition teams (NPTTs) composed of military and contract civilian police advisers that were 

assigned to formally monitor the performance of all thirty-eight INP battalions, all divisions, 

and the INP headquarters. The NPTTs assessed all units to determine equipment levels and 

readiness and provided on-the-spot training and mentoring.36

In the third phase, individual battalions were rotated through a training program in leadership and advanced police skills conducted by training officers from the Italian Carabinieri 

who arrived Iraq in the fall of 2007. In Italy, the Carabinieri are both military police and 

an internal security force. Their duties range from riot control and criminal investigation to 

border patrol. In earlier peacekeeping operations, the Carabinieri had worked in tandem with 

NATO military forces and drew heavily on their extensive experience in Bosnia and Kosovo. 

The Italians’ participation in the INP training process was the key to transforming the INP 

from a rogue force into a competent constabulary. Without the involvement of professional 
10

European gendarmes, U.S. military and contract police personnel would not have had the 

technical skills or the corporate culture required to transform the INP. At a new, U.S.-built 

training facility at Camp Dublin near Baghdad’s airport, the Italians, led by Colonel Fabrizo 

Parrulli, provided training in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and crowd control. More 

important, the Carabinieri discussed the difference between the role of the police and the 

army and served as role models for their Iraqi counterparts.37

Upon arrival at Camp Dublin, Iraqi trainees were deprived of weapons, cameras, and 

recording devices, given a physical examination, and subjected to identification procedures. 

The Carabinieri training program consisted of basic, intermediate, and advanced courses in 

police and military skills, with advanced levels of training reserved for outstanding graduates who were groomed as future instructors. The training included a leadership package for 

commissioned and noncommissioned officers on management-related subjects. The Italians 

also provided training in specialized skills, such as VIP close protection, sharpshooting, and 

self-defense. The objectives of the training were to develop the trainees’ physical and motivational skills, instruct trainees in technical subjects, develop a culture of safety in training 

and operations, and promote respect for human rights and restraint in the use of force. Basic 

training was provided in two month-long courses separated by a one-week break. Trainees 

had to pass a final examination in physical conditioning and police and military skills. High 

performers were invited to stay on and were trained as future instructors. Poor performers 

were dismissed from the training for disciplinary violations and inappropriate behavior, particularly failure to comply with regulations for using firearms or failure to attend class.38

Perhaps the most important aspect of the Carabinieri training was the extensive amount of 

time spent with trainees in discussing the role of police in a democratic society and the moral 

and ethical responsibilities of a police officer in performing his duties. The Italian trainers 

sought to impress upon the Iraqis the importance of behaving appropriately in dealing with 

the public and respecting the rights and personal dignity of their fellow citizens. To introduce 

a spiritual element into the training and build relationships with their students, the Italian 

training teams developed a common prayer that they said every day with the Iraq trainees, 

both to demonstrate their own spirituality and to tap into the religious fervor of many of 

their students. The prayer was designed to capture the moral authority inherent in the police 

officer’s duty to enforce the law, maintain order, serve others, and keep the peace. 

The prayer, entitled The Policeman, was read as follows: 

God is great and merciful. God is the power that moves the universe and lives in all 

things. God is everything but He is above all the personification of the universal good 

and the good is the maximum value of social life. 

In the world we don’t have to distinguish black men and white ones, cultured and 

ignorant, Muslim and Christian, because all men are an expression of God. We all are 

descendants of the Prophet Abraham and we are all God’s creatures. 

In absolute meaning, there are no rich men or poor men because a rich man knows 

all his money cannot buy the thing he needs most. A poor man can feel pleased with 

himself even if he has little. 

There are people, without distinction of race, that have a very high religious spirituality. 

There are people that in their personal space—their family and their work—that have 

great spiritual knowledge.

In the World a supreme division exists between good and evil. We can distinguish two 

kinds of human beings: good men who walk along God’s path, and bad men who take 

Satan’s way.

The policeman represents the good in the World. All criminals are evil. In the 

fight between good and evil, the policeman is a tool of God. 

You are the angels of God and you should believe this every day when on duty. 

A loyal and honest policeman is the angel of God that fights evil because he 

represents the good that defeats evil. 

Only if a policeman is a professional can he achieve success. To become a 

professional, he must train hard and work for the people among the people. 

The most important aspect of 

the Carabinieri training was the 

extensive amount of time spent 

with trainees in discussing the 

role of police in a democratic 

society and the moral and ethical 

responsibilities of a police officer.
11

Unfortunately, the policeman may die in the line of duty. This is a certain sign 

of the will of God. If the policeman fully performed his duty, his sacrifice will 

not be in vain. “Only those who do good will enter Paradise” God says in the 

Holy Text.

The Iraqi National Police will have its heroes, living and dead as it always 

happens. From every drop of blood shed by these unique and true martyrs in 

the line of duty will arise a new generation of brave men who will live in a 

better World, full of serenity and prosperity.

The first class of 430 INP cadets completed the seven-week program in transitional police 

skills in late December 2007. Battalion-sized training rotations of INP cadets continued on 

a routine basis through the fall of 2009. As a fourth stage of the training, units received 

follow-on professional courses over time.39

Future Role of the Iraqi National Police 

Efforts to improve INP performance coincided with a long-running debate in both Washington and Baghdad over whether the INP should become part of the Iraqi army. As early as 

November 2006, the report of the congressionally mandated Iraq Study Group recommended 

that the INP should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, where it would benefit from 

more rigorous U.S. military supervision and could better perform its counterinsurgency 

mission.40 Advocates for transferring the INP to the Iraqi army noted that the INP did not 

have police powers to make arrests, conduct investigations, or collect evidence. Like the 

U.S. military, the INP could detain suspected insurgents that were held in U.S.- and Iraqi-run 

prison camps, often for years. However, the INP had no relationship with the Iraqi judicial 

system, and U.S. authorities, who saw the INP as a fighting force, did not encourage it. As 

conditions began to stabilize in 2008, detractors wondered why Iraq needed a second police 

force in addition to the IPS, which patrolled Iraqi cities and was responsible for directing 

traffic and controlling crime.

 The INP’s commander, General Awadi, argued that his organization had demonstrated 

its value on the battlefield and would develop its ability to deal with organized crime, drug 

trafficking, and civil disturbances—challenges that would exceed the competence of ordinary police. He pointed out the INP’s sacrifices, including the deaths of 1,650 and wounding 

of 3,000 of its officers over the previous four years. Other supporters believed that the INP 

was crucial to eventually establishing civilian police primacy for internal security in Iraq and 

removing the Iraqi army from that role. The INP was the only civilian security force available 

to the interior ministry for confronting insurgents and militia groups that continued to carry 

out attacks, although at significantly reduced levels.41 Improved leadership and professional 

skills were evident in the performance of the INP units that were deployed from late 2007 

through 2008. The INP also continued to demonstrate its mettle on the battlefield, where it 

stood and fought alongside the Iraqi army in Basra, Sadr City, Diyala, and Mosul, in contrast 

to the IPS, which often ran away rather than engage in hostilities. The Iraqi interior ministry 

worked to fill the ranks of the INP to an authorized level of 44,263 by increasing the number 

of Sunnis in the force in order to achieve an ethnic and sectarian balance. Recruitment and 

training of officers lagged, however, as the INP was only able to meet 42 percent of its 

leadership requirements.

To bolster the case for maintaining the INP, on June 8, 2008, General Awadi introduced 

a code of ethics for the INP modeled on the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. At a press conference, Awadi stressed the importance of the code in establishing performance standards for INP officers based on respect 

for human rights and the rule of law.42 By late fall the INP was on track to meet its goal 

of providing a national-level rapid response police capability to deal with large-scale civil 

Supporters believed that the 

INP was crucial to eventually 

establishing civilian police 

primacy for internal security 

in Iraq and removing the Iraqi 

army from that role.
12

disturbance and insurgent and terrorism operations. While still primarily located around 

Baghdad, the INP had begun to deploy to stations outside the city. Prime Minister Maliki 

directed the creation and deployment of a third INP division as the first step toward stationing the INP in all provinces in Iraq.43

By January 2009 the situation in Iraq had changed markedly. The surge of U.S. troops into 

Iraqi neighborhoods to protect the population, the Sunni awakening, the rise of the Sons 

of Iraq, and Moqtada al-Sadr’s decision to stand down his militia brought a 63 percent drop 

in civilian deaths compared with 2007.44 The U.S. combat brigade teams that comprised the 

surge had returned home the previous July. Under the newly completed U.S.-Iraq Strategic 

Framework and Security Agreement (SFA), Iraq assumed responsibility for its own security and 

took formal control of combat operations and detention facilities. On February 27, President 

Barack Obama announced a plan to begin the phased drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq by 

August 31, 2010, and the transition of U.S. forces from combat operations to training and 

support of Iraqi security forces. In July 2009, U.S. troops completed their withdrawal from 

neighborhood combat posts in Iraqi cities and towns and redeployed to military bases, where 

they had little contact with the Iraqi people. During the withdrawal, INP units escorted 

U.S. military units as they redeployed from urban areas to bases in the countryside. The 

security situation continued to improve, with the number of incidents falling to levels not 

experienced since early 2004. Insurgent and militia groups retained the ability to conduct 

high-profile and deadly terrorist attacks, particularly in Diyala and Ninewa provinces and in 

some parts of Baghdad. Where insurgents and militia groups still posed a challenge, the INP 

showed increased ability to plan and execute its own operations with limited technical support from U.S. forces.45

Commensurate with the INP’s improved performance and expanded presence, the name 

of the force was changed on August 1, 2009, to the Iraq Federal Police (IFP). According to a 

spokesman, the new name reflected the objectives of Iraq’s national unity government and 

the plan to establish a brigade headquarters in every province including the Kurdish north 

within two years. The spokesman said the IFP had proven in many areas that it could restore 

peace and order. He noted the IFP had 42,000 personnel serving in four divisions of seventeen brigades, including one dedicated to providing security during the reconstruction of 

the al-Askari mosque in Samarra. In addition to expanding geographically, the IFP assumed 

new security missions that resulted in the creation of three new units: the Embassy Protection Force, the Central Bank of ISF protection force, and the Antiquities/Ruins Security 

Force. These specialized forces resulted from Iraqi police officials visiting Italy and noting 

that the Carabinieri had similar units. The IFP had diversified its forces to achieve a better 

ethnic and sectarian balance, but budget shortfalls were expected to make it difficult for 

the IFP to achieve its newly authorized strength of 60,000 members. 

Conclusion

Mob violence in Iraq demonstrated the need for the U.S. military to be able to call upon the 

assistance of police constabulary forces to control rioting, looting, and general civil disorder. 

Confronted with widespread looting in Baghdad, U.S. military forces were unwilling to use 

their weapons against unarmed civilians and were reduced to standing aside while mayhem 

ensued. Unlike in earlier peace operations in the Balkans, U.S. authorities could not turn 

to the United Nations or other allies to provide police resources. After the destruction of 

the UN headquarters on September 22, 2003, the world organization’s role was limited to 

diplomatic initiatives and assisting with Iraqi national elections. Not until four years after 

the U.S. intervention did a contingent of trainers from the Italian Carabinieri arrive to meaningfully contribute to the police assistance program. In the interim, the U.S. military was 
13

left to rely on its own resources, contract police advisers, plus the efforts of the Iraqis to 

create indigenous paramilitary forces to control the insurgency and militia-inspired violence. 

This effort to create indigenous constabulary forces went awry when Iraqi-created police 

commando units engaged in sectarian violence. Fortunately, this tragic chapter of sectarian 

conflict in Iraq was balanced by the positive story of U.S. and Iraqi efforts to reform the 

police commando units and to create the Iraq Federal Police. 

In creating the IFP, the following lessons emerged that could be applied to future stability operations.

•	 Agreement on the roles and missions of the police at the outset of the operation 

is essential. The inability of the State Department, DOJ, the U.S. military, and Iraqis to 

achieve a common understanding of the roles and missions of the Iraqi police resulted in a 

disconnect between the training provided and the mission the police were required to perform. This resulted in the United States both claiming credit for training indigenous police 

and using them in ways for which they were unprepared, with disastrous consequences. 

That the Iraqi authorities were virtually ignored left them free to create police units independent of the U.S. assistance program and beyond U.S. control. 

•	 Serving professional police officers can be role models, an essential element in successful police training programs. The role of Italian Carabinieri was essential to turning 

the IFP from a rogue force into a national asset. The Italians provided training on police 

skills but spent more time discussing ethical issues and the moral obligation of police to 

protect society. That their Italian mentors were engaged in national service in their own 

country made a lasting impression on the Iraqi trainees. 

•	 Militarization of the police will produce a force that is inconsistent with the country’s 

long-term needs. Assigning responsibility for training Iraq’s police to the U.S. military 

produced a highly militarized force with little ability to enforce the rule of law. Setting 

aside the IFP, which was designed as a paramilitary force, providing military-style training 

to the IPS created a force of some 400,000 personnel that was inconsistent with Iraq’s 

postconflict requirements. As evidence, on October 1, 2011, responsibility for Iraq police 

training will be transferred back to the State Department. The new State Department police 

assistance program will contract civilian police personnel to provide advice and technical 

assistance on training in community policing skills and law enforcement.46
14

Notes

1. Coalition Provisional Authority Interior Ministry, “Iraq Police: An Assessment of their Present and Recommendations 

for the Future,” Baghdad, May 30, 2003, 4–5. 

2. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience (Washington, 

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), 133. 

3. The White House, “United States Government Operations in Iraq,” National Security Presidential Decision Directive 

36, Washington, DC, May 11, 2004.

4. Interview with Brigadier General David Phillips, former commander, Civilian Police Advisery Training Team, Iraq, 

August 21, 2011. 

5. Mark Magnier and Sonni Efron, “Arrested Development on Iraqi Police Force,” New York Times, March 31, 2004.

6. Sabah al-Anbaki, “Police Lack Training, Firepower in Fighting Insurgency,” USA Today, October 25, 2004.

7. Magnier and Efron, “Arrested Development.”

8. CNN World Service, “More than 12,000 Iraqi Police Casualties in 2 Years,” October 6, 2006, http://articles.cnn.

com/2006-10-06/world/iraq.main_1_iraqi-police-police-officers-northern-iraqi-city?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed 

September 12, 2011). 

9. Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 91, “Regulation of Armed Forces and Militias Within Iraq,” CPA/

ORD/02, June 2004/91. 

10. Bradley Graham, “Iraqi Forces Lack Chain of Command; Abizaid Has No Timetable for Baghdad to Assume Control 

of Security,” Washington Post, March 5, 2004, A18. 

11. Special Inspector General, Hard Lessons, 134. 

12. Bradley Graham, “U.S. Says Police in Iraq Need Bolstering: More Arms, Trainers, Backup Units Sought,” Washington 

Post, November 25, 2004, A1. 

13. Special Inspector General, Hard Lessons, 195–96. 

14. Greg Jaffe, “New Factor in Iraq: Irregular Brigades Fill Security Void,” Wall Street Journal, February 16, 2005, A1. 

15. Jaffe, “New Factor in Iraq.”

16. David Ignatius, “Our Guys Stayed and Fought,” Washington Post, February 25, 2005, A21. 

17. Michael Moss, “Law and Disorder: How Iraq Police Reform Became a Casualty of War,” New York Times, May 22, 

2006. 

18. “Iraq’s Mean Streets,” Los Angeles Times, September 10, 2006. 

19. Solomon Moore, “Police Abuses in Iraq Detailed,” Los Angeles Times, July 9, 2006. 

20. Interview with Brigadier General Phillips, August 22, 2011. 

21. Moss, “Law and Disorder.”

22. Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, “Report to Congress,” Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, Washington, DC, September 6, 2007, p. 109.

23. Steve Inskeep, “The Challenge of Policing Iraq,” Morning Edition, National Public Radio, March 28, 2007. 

24. Andrew Rathmell, “Fixing Iraq’s Internal Security Forces: Why Is Reform of the Ministry of Interior So Hard?” PCR 

Project Special Briefing, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, November 9, 2007, 8.

25. Richard A. Oppel, “Iraqi Police Cited in Abuses May Lose Aid,” New York Times, September 30, 2006. 

26. Amit R. Paley, “Attacks in Baghdad Kill 13 U.S. Soldiers in 3 Days,” Washington Post, October 5, 2006.

27. Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” Report to Congress in accordance with the 

Department of Defense Appropriations Act (Section 9010, Public Law 109-289), November 2006, 32–33.

28. James Sturcke, “Up to 150 Kidnapped from Baghdad Institute,” The Guardian, November 14, 2006.

29. Sinan Salaheddin, “Shiite Cops Reportedly Rampage vs. Sunnis,” Associated Press, March 28, 2007. 

30. Mark Tran, “Iraqi Police Cannot Control Crime,” The Guardian Unlimited, May 30, 2007. 

31. Ned Parker, “The Conflict in Iraq: A Ministry of Fiefdoms,” Los Angeles Times, July 30, 2007. 

32. George W. Bush, “The President’s Address to the Nation,” January 10, 2007. 

33. Independent Commission “Report to Congress,” 109–15.

34. Ann Scott Tyson and Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Military Rejects Call to Disband Iraqi Police,” Washington Post, 

September 7, 2007. 

35. Interview with Lieutenant General James Dubik, former commander, Multi National Transition Command-Iraq, 

January 4, 2011. 

36. Independent Commission, “Report to Congress,” 111. 

37. James Dubik, “Building Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity: Iraq as a Primer,” Report no. 1, Best Practices in 

Counterinsurgency, Institute for the Study of War, August 2009, 12–13. 

38. Training Guidelines for the Iraqi Federal Police Personnel Attending Courses at the Gendarmerie Training Unit, NATO 

Training Mission-Iraq, Gendarmerie Training Division, unpublished manual, 2011. 

39. DOD, “Measuring Stability,” 340–41. 

40. James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 78.

41. Lennox Samuels, “The Politics of Policing,” Newsweek, June 3, 2008. 

42. Multi-National Corps-Iraq, “Iraqi National Police Adopts Code of Ethics, ” press release no. 20080614-02, June 14, 

2008. 

43. Department of Defense (DOD), ”Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” Report to Congress in accordance with 

the Department of Defense Appropriations Act (Section 9010, Public Law 109-289), June 2008, 45. 

44. DOD, “Measuring Stability,” iii. 
15

45. Terri Weaver, “As U.S. Troops Scale Back, Iraqi National Police Stepping Up Role as a Viable Security Force,” Stars 

and Stripes, June 22, 2009. 

46. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to Congress, October 30, 2010. 117–18.
Of Related Interest

•	 Lessons from Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq by John K. Naland (Special 

Report, October 2011)

•	 Police Corruption: What Past Scandals Teach about Current Challenges by David Bayley and 

Robert M. Perito (Special Report, November 2011)

•	 Who Controls Pakistan’s Security Forces? by Shuja Nawaz (Special Report, November 2011)

•	 Security Sector Transformation in North Africa and the Middle East: Entry Points and 

Challenges by Mark Sedra (Special Report, November 2011)

•	 Iraq, Its Neighbors, and the United States: Competition, Crisis, and the Reordering of Power 

by Henri Barkey, Scott Lasensky, and Phebe Marr (USIP Press, December 2011) 

•	 The United States in Iraq: Options for 2012 by Sean Kane and William Taylor (Peace Brief, 

May 2011)

•	 Iraq’s Disputed Territories by Sean Kane (Peaceworks, April 2011)

•	 Iraq’s Interior Ministry by Robert Perito and Madeline Kristoff (Peace Brief, August 2009)

•	 The Role of the Ministerial Adviser in Security Sector Reform: Navigating Institutional Terrains 

by Liz Panarelli (Peace Brief, April 2009)

•	 The Private Sector in Security Sector Reform: Essential but Not Yet Optimized by Robert Perito 

(Peace Brief, January 2009)

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