Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 68 / Friday, April 8, 2011 / Notices 19795 

NUREG–1496, July 1997 

(ML042310492, ML042320379, and 

ML042330385). 

2. Martinson, Tracey A., University of 

Alaska-Fairbanks, Licensee letter 

requesting release of incinerator, 

July 30, 2008 (ML082420967). 

3. NRC, Request for additional 

information, June 4, 2009 

(ML091560189). 

4. Martinson, Tracey A., University of 

Alaska-Fairbanks, Proposed 

decommissioning plan, July 12, 

2009 (ML110310647). 

5. NRC, License amendment, August 12, 

2009 (ML092240357). 

6. Martinson, Tracey A., University of 

Alaska-Fairbanks, Final status 

survey report, November 16, 2009 

(ML093641107). 

If you do not have access to ADAMS 

or if there are problems in accessing the 

documents located in ADAMS, contact 

the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) 

Reference staff at 1–800–397–4209 or 

301–415–4737 or by e-mail to 

pdr.resource@nrc.gov. 

These documents may also be viewed 

electronically on the public computers 

located at the NRC’s Public Document 

Room (PDR), O–1F21, One White Flint 

North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 

MD 20852. The PDR reproduction 

contractor will copy documents for a 

fee. 

Dated at Arlington, Texas this 31st day of 

March 2011. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Jack E. Whitten, 

Chief, Nuclear Materials Safety Branch B, 

Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, Region 

IV. 

[FR Doc. 2011–8419 Filed 4–7–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket No. 50–219; NRC–2010–0320] 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC; 

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating 

Station; Exemption 

1.0 Background 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC 

(Exelon or the licensee) is the holder of 

Facility Operating License No. DPR–16 

that authorizes operation of the Oyster 

Creek Nuclear Generating Station 

(Oyster Creek). The license provides, 

among other things, that the facility is 

subject to all rules, regulations, and 

orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC or the Commission) 

now or hereafter in effect. 

The facility consists of a boiling-water 

reactor located in Ocean County, New 

Jersey. 

2.0 Request/Action 

Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR), part 50, Section 

50.48 requires that nuclear power plants 

that were licensed before January 1, 

1979, must satisfy the requirements of 

10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section 

III.G, ‘‘Fire protection of safe shutdown 

capability.’’ Oyster Creek was licensed 

to operate prior to January 1, 1979. As 

such, the licensee’s Fire Protection 

Program (FPP) must provide the 

established level of protection as 

intended by Section III.G of 10 CFR part 

50, Appendix R. 

By letter dated March 3, 2009, 

‘‘Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 50, 

Appendix R, Section III.G, ‘Fire 

Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability 

(Phase 1)’ ’’ available at Agencywide 

Documents Access and Management 

System (ADAMS), Accession No. 

ML090630132, and supplemented by 

letter dated April 2, 2010, ‘‘Response to 

Request for Additional Information 

Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 50, 

Appendix R, Section III.G, ‘Fire 

Protection of Safe Shutdown 

Capability’ ’’ (ML100920370), the 

licensee requested an exemption for 

Oyster Creek from certain technical 

requirements of 10 CFR part 50, 

Appendix R, Section III.G.2 (III.G.2) for 

the use of operator manual actions 

(OMAs) in lieu of meeting the circuit 

separation and protection requirements 

contained in III.G.2 for the following 21 

plant Fire Areas: CW–FA–14, OB–FA–9, 

OB–FZ–6A, OB–FZ–6B, OB–FZ–8A, 

OB–FZ–8B, OB–FZ–8C, OB–FZ–10A, 

RB–FZ–1D, RB–FZ–1E, RB–FZ–1F3, 

RB–FZ–1F5, RB–FZ–1G, TB–FA–3A, 

TB–FA–26, TB–FZ–11B, TB–FZ–11C, 

TB–FZ–11D, TB–FZ–11E, TB–FZ–11F, 

and TB–FZ–11H. These 21 plant areas 

are the subject of this exemption. 

3.0 Discussion 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the 

Commission may, upon application by 

any interested person or upon its own 

initiative, grant exemptions from the 

requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when: 

(1) The exemptions are authorized by 

law, will not present an undue risk to 

public health or safety, and are 

consistent with the common defense 

and security; and (2) when special 

circumstances are present. The licensee 

has stated that special circumstances are 

present in that the application of the 

regulation in this particular 

circumstance is not necessary to achieve 

the underlying purpose of the rule, 

which is consistent with the language 

included in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii). 

In their March 3, 2009, and April 2, 

2010, letters, the licensee discussed 

financial implications associated with 

plant modifications that may be 

necessary to comply with the regulation. 

10 CFR 50.12(a)2(iii) states that if such 

costs have been shown to be 

significantly in excess of those 

contemplated at the time the regulation 

was adopted, or are significantly in 

excess of those incurred by others 

similarly situated, this may be 

considered a basis for considering an 

exemption request. However, financial 

implications were not considered in the 

regulatory review of their request since 

no substantiation was provided 

regarding such financial implications. 

Even though no financial substantiation 

was provided, the licensee did submit 

sufficient regulatory basis to support a 

technical review of their exemption 

request in that the application of the 

regulation in this particular 

circumstance is not necessary to achieve 

the underlying purpose of the rule. 

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(b), 

nuclear power plants licensed before 

January 1, 1979, are required to meet 

Section III.G of 10 CFR part 50, 

Appendix R. The underlying purpose of 

Section III.G of 10 CFR part 50, 

Appendix R, is to ensure that the ability 

to achieve and maintain safe shutdown 

is preserved following a fire event. The 

regulation intends for licensees to 

accomplish this by extending the 

concept of defense-in-depth to: 

(1) Prevent fires from starting; 

(2) Rapidly detect, control, and 

extinguish promptly those fires that do 

occur; 

(3) Provide protection for structures, 

systems, and components important to 

safety so that a fire that is not promptly 

extinguished by the fire suppression 

activities will not prevent the safe 

shutdown of the plant. 

The stated purpose of 10 CFR part 50, 

Appendix R, Section III.G.2 (III.G.2) is to 

ensure that one of the redundant trains 

necessary to achieve and maintain hot 

shutdown conditions remains free of 

fire damage in the event of a fire. III.G.2 

requires one of the following means to 

ensure that a redundant train of safe 

shutdown cables and equipment is free 

of fire damage, where redundant trains 

are located in the same fire area outside 

of primary containment: 

a. Separation of cables and equipment 

by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating; 

b. Separation of cables and equipment 

by a horizontal distance of more than 20 

feet with no intervening combustibles or 

fire hazards and with fire detectors and 


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an automatic fire suppression system 

installed in the fire area; or 

c. Enclosure of cables and equipment 

of one redundant train in a fire barrier 

having a 1-hour rating and with fire 

detectors and an automatic fire 

suppression system installed in the fire 

area. 

Exelon has requested an exemption 

from the requirements of III.G.2 for 

Oyster Creek to the extent that 

redundant trains of systems necessary to 

achieve and maintain hot shutdown are 

not maintained free of fire damage in 

accordance with one of the required 

means prescribed in III.G.2. 

Each OMA included in this review 

consists of a sequence of tasks that 

occur in various fire areas. The OMAs 

are initiated upon confirmation of a fire 

in a particular fire area. Table 1 lists, in 

the order of the fire area of fire origin, 

the OMAs included in this review. 

TABLE 1 

Area of fire origin Area name Actions OMA 

No. 

1 CW–FA–14 ...... Circulatory Water Intake ................................................. Manually open valve (V) V–9–2099 and V–11–49 and 

close V–11–63 and V–11–41.

7 

Manually open V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 using local 

flow indicator (FI–225–2) and close V–15–52.

12 

2 OB–FA–9 ........ Office Building (Bldg.) Elev. 23′-6′′, 35′-0′′, 46′-6′′ ......... Locally read Condensate Storage Tank level at level indicator (LI) LI–424–993 due to damage to control circuits.2 

Manually open V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 using local 

flow indicator (FI–225–2) and close V–15–52.

12 

3 OB–FZ–6A ...... Office Bldg. ‘‘A’’ 480V Switchgear (SWGR) Room Elev. 

23′-6′′.

Locally read condensate storage tank (CST) level at 

LI–424–993 due to damage to control circuits.

2 

Use Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP) to control equipment: RSP, Control Rod Drive (CRD) Hydraulic 

Pump NC08B and 480V USS 1B2 Incoming breaker 

(Operate USS 1B2/CRD Transfer Switch (Partial initiation) to ‘‘Alternate’’ and operate Control Switches for 

USS–1B2 Main Breaker and B CRD Pump).

9 

Manually open V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 using local 

flow indicator (FI–225–2) and close V–15–52.

12 

4 OB–FZ–6B ...... Office Bldg. ‘‘B’’ 480V SWGR Room Elev. 23′-6′′ .......... Manually open V–9–2099 and V–11–49 and close V– 

11–63 and V–11–41.

7 

Manually open V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 using local 

flow indicator (FI) FI–225–2 and close V–15–52.

12 

5 OB–FZ–8A ...... Office Bldg. Reactor Recirculation Motor Generator 

(MG) Set Room Elev. 23′-6′′.

Manually open V–9–2099 and V–11–49 and close V– 

11–63 and V–11–41.

7 

Manually open V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 using local 

flow indicator (FI–225–2) and close V–15–52.

12 

6 OB–FZ–8B ...... Office Bldg. Mechanical Equipment Room Elev. 35′-0′′ Manually open V–9–2099 and V–11–49 and close V– 

11–63 and V–11–41.

7 

Manually open V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 using local 

flow indicator (FI–225–2) and close V–15–52.

12 

7 OB–FZ–8C ...... Office Bldg. A/B Battery Room, Tunnel and Electrical 

Tray Room Elev. 35′-0′′.

Locally read Condensate Storage Tank level at LI– 

424–993 due to damage to control circuits.

2 

Manually open V–9–2099 and V–11–49 and close V– 

11–63 and V–11–41.

7 

Use Local Shutdown Panels to control equipment as 

follows: LSP–1A2, CRD Hydraulic PP NC08A and 

480V USS 1A2 Incoming breaker (Operate transfer 

switch ‘‘Alternate’’ and operate Control Switch for 

USS–1A2 Main Breaker 1A2M and A CRD Pump).

8 

Manually open V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 using local 

flow indicator (FI–225–2) and close V–15–52.

12 

Trip all five Reactor Recirculation Pumps (NG01–A, 

NG01–B, NG01–C, NG01D and NG01E). Also, lockout the 4160V breakers using local switch.

16 

8 OB–FZ–10A .... Office Bldg. Monitor and Change Room Area and Operations Support Area Elev. 35′-0′′ & 46′-6′′.Manually open V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 using local 

flow indicator (FI–225–2) and close V–15–52.

12 

9 RB–FZ–1D ...... Reactor Bldg. Elev. 51′-3′′ .............................................. Manually open V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 using local 

flow indicator (FI–225–2) and close V–15–52;.

12 

10 RB–FZ–1E .... Reactor Building Elev. 23′-6′′ .......................................... Read CRD local flow gauge FI–225–998 ....................... 11 

Manually open V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 using local 

flow indicator (FI–225–2) and close V–15–52.

12 


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TABLE 1—Continued 

Area of fire origin Area name Actions OMA 

No. 

11 RB–FZ–1F3 ... Reactor Bldg. Northwest Corner Elev.-19′-6′′ ................. Open Core Spray System II manual valves V–20–1 

and V–20–2 and close V–20–4.

13 

12 RB–FZ–1F5 ... Reactor Bldg. Torus Room Elev. -19′-6′′ ........................ Manually open V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 using local 

flow indicator (FI–225–2) and close V–15–52.

12 

13 RB–FZ–1G .... Reactor Bldg. Shutdown Cooling Room Elev. 38′-0′′ & 

51′-3′′.

Read CRD local flow gauge FI–225–998 ....................... 11 

Manually open V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 using local 

flow indicator (FI–225–2) and close V–15–52.

12 

14 TB–FA–3A ..... Turbine Bldg. 4160V Emergency SWGR Vault 1C Elev. 

23′-6′′.

Manually open V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 using local 

flow indicator (FI–225–2) and close V–15–52.

12 

15 TB–FA–26 ..... Turbine Bldg. 125V DC Battery Room C Elev. 23′-6′′ ... Manually trip 4160V 1D Breakers and control USS 1B2 

and 1B3 480V Breakers locally at LSP–1D.

1 

Manually control 1B3M Breaker from LSP–1B3 ............. 3 

Manually re-close motor control center (MCC) 1B32 

Feeder Breaker at USS 1B3.

6 

Manually open V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 using local 

flow indicator (FI–225–2) and close V–15–52.

12 

16 TB–FZ–11B ... Turbine Bldg. Lube Oil Storage, Purification and Pumping Area Elev. 0′-0′′, 27′-0′′, and 36′-0′′.Manually trip 4160V 1D Breakers and control USS 1B2 

and 1B3 480V Breakers locally at LSP–1D.

1 

Locally read Condensate Storage Tank level at LI– 

424–993.

2 

Manually control 1B3M Breaker from LSP–1B3 ............. 3 

Local Shutdown Panels used to control equipment as 

follows: LSP–1B32 Condensate Transfer Pump 1–2 

(Operate transfer switch to ‘‘Alternate’’ and operate 

Control Switch for Condensate Transfer Pump 1–2).

4 

Manually re-close MCC 1B32 Feeder Breaker at USS 

1B3.

6 

Manually open V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 using local 

flow indicator (FI–225–2) and close V–15–52.

12 

Trip all five Reactor Recirculation Pumps (NG01–A, 

NG01–B, NG01–C, NG01D and NG01E). Also, lockout the 4160V breakers using local switch.

16 

17 TB–FZ–11C ... Turbine Bldg. SWGR Room 1A and 1B Elev. 23′-6′′ ..... Manually trip 4160V 1D Breakers and control USS 1B2 

and 1B3 480V Breakers locally at LSP–1D.

1 

Manually control 1B3M Breaker from LSP–1B3 ............. 3 

Manually re-close MCC 1B32 Feeder Breaker at USS 

1B3.

6 

Manually open V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 using local 

flow indicator (FI–225–2) and close V–15–52.

12 

18 TB–FZ–11D ... Turbine Bldg. Basement Floor South End Elev. 3′-6′′ .... Manually trip 4160V 1D Breakers and control USS 1B2 

and 1B3 480V Breakers locally at LSP–1D.

1 

Manually control 1B3M Breaker from LSP–1B3 ............. 3 

Local Shutdown Panels are used to control equipment 

as follows: LSP–DG2, EDG2 and its Switchgear (Operate transfer Switches (3 total) to ‘‘Alternate’’ and 

operate Control Switch on Diesel Panel to start diesel).

5 

Manually re-close MCC 1B32 Feeder Breaker at USS 

1B3.

6 

Manually open V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 using local 

flow indicator (FI–225–2) and close V–15–52.

12 

19 TB–FZ–11E ... Turbine Bldg. Condenser Bay Area Elev. 0′-0′′ .............. Manually trip 4160V 1D Breakers and control USS 1B2 

and 1B3 480V Breakers locally at LSP–1D.

1 

Locally read Condensate Storage Tank level at LI– 

424–993.

2 

Manually control 1B3M Breaker from LSP–1B3 ............. 3 

Local Shutdown Panels used to control equipment as 

follows: LSP–1B32 Condensate Transfer Pump 1–2 

(Operate transfer switch to ‘‘Alternate’’ and operate 

Control Switch for Condensate Transfer Pump 1–2).

4 


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TABLE 1—Continued 

Area of fire origin Area name Actions OMA 

No. 

Local Shutdown Panels are used to control equipment 

as follows: LSP–DG2, EDG2 and its Switchgear (Operate transfer Switches (3 total) to ‘‘Alternate’’ and 

operate Control Switch on Diesel Panel to start diesel).

5 

Manually re-close MCC 1B32 Feeder Breaker at USS 

1B3.

6 

Manually open V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 using local 

flow indicator (FI–225–2) and close V–15–52.

12 

Trip all five Reactor Recirculation Pumps (NG01–A, 

NG01–B, NG01–C, NG01D and NG01E) Also, lockout the 4160V breakers using the 69 Switch.

16 

20 TB–FZ–11F ... Turbine Bldg. Feedwater Pump Room Elev. 0′-0′′ & 3′- 

6′′.

Manually open V–9–2099 and V–11–49 and close V– 

11–63 and V–11–41.

7 

Manually open V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 using local 

flow indicator (FI–225–2) and close V–15–52.

12 

21 TB–FZ–11H ... Turbine Bldg. Demineralizer Tank and Steam Jet Air 

Ejector Area Elev. 3′-6′′ & 23′-6′′.

Manually open V–9–2099 and V–11–49 and close V– 

11–63 and V–11–41.

7 

Manually open V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 using local 

flow indicator (FI–225–2) and close V–15–52.

12 

In their submittals, the licensee 

described elements of their fire 

protection program that provide their 

justification that the concept of defensein-depth that is in place in the above fire 

areas is consistent with that intended by 

the regulation. To accomplish this, the 

licensee utilizes various protective 

measures to accomplish the concept of 

defense-in-depth. Specifically, the 

licensee stated that the purpose of their 

request was to credit the use of OMAs, 

in conjunction with other defense-indepth features, in lieu of the separation 

and protective measures required by 

III.G.2 for a fire in the fire areas stated 

above. 

In their April 2, 2010, letter the 

licensee provided an analysis that 

described how fire prevention is 

addressed for each of the fire areas for 

which the OMAs may be required. The 

licensee developed a Fire Hazards 

Analysis (FHA) for each fire area or 

zone identified in its exemption request. 

For each fire area or zone, the FHA 

describes the physical location and 

arrangement of equipment, combustible 

loading, ignition sources, fire protection 

features, and proximity of redundant 

safe shutdown equipment to in situ 

hazards and identifies deviations from 

fire protection codes and previously 

approved exemptions. In addition, for 

each fire area or zone the licensee’s 

response includes a tabulation of 

potential ignition sources as well as the 

equipment that may exhibit high energy 

arcing faults. For each fire area or zone, 

the FHA states that the fire protection 

configuration achieves a level of 

protection commensurate with that 

intended by III.G.2. 

The 21 areas or zones identified in the 

request have administratively limited 

combustible fuel loading with fuel 

sources consisting primarily of cable 

insulation and limited floor based 

combustibles except areas OB–FZ–6A, 

OB–FZ–6B, and TB–FZ–11B, which 

contain quantities of transformer liquid 

or lubricating oil. Combustible fuel 

loading in most areas is classified as low 

by the licensee while Fire Areas OB– 

FZ–6A, OB–FZ–6B, and TB–FA–26 

have been classified as having moderate 

combustible fuel loading and TB–FZ– 

11B has been classified as having a high 

combustible fuel loading. In addition, 

the licensee has stated that they 

maintain a robust administrative 

program (e.g., hot work permits, fire 

watches for hot work, and supervisory 

controls) to limit and control transient 

combustible materials and ignition 

sources in the areas. The fire areas 

included in the exemption are not shop 

areas so hot work activities are 

infrequent and the administrative 

control programs are in place if hot 

work activities do occur. 

The licensee also stated that 98% of 

the Oyster Creek cables are jacketed 

with Vulkene, which passes the 

horizontal flame test of the 

Underwriter’s Laboratory (UL), therefore 

reducing the likelihood of the cables 

themselves contributing to a fire hazard. 

Furthermore, the areas or zones are of 

noncombustible construction with 

typical utilities installed, lighting, 

ventilation, etc. and 3-hour fire 

resistance-rated barriers normally used 

to provide fire resistive separation 

between adjacent fire areas. In some 

cases, barriers with a fire resistance 

rating of less than 3 hours are credited 

but exemptions have been approved or 

the licensee has stated they have 

performed engineering evaluations in 

accordance with Generic Letter 86–10, 

‘‘Implementation of Fire Protection 

Requirements,’’ to demonstrate that the 

barriers are sufficient for the hazard. 

Walls separating rooms and zones 

within fire areas are typically 

constructed of heavy concrete. This 

compartmentalization of the areas 

reduces the likelihood for fire events in 

a particular area to spread to or impact 

other adjacent areas. 

Many fire areas included in this 

exemption have automatic detection 

systems installed, although the licensee 

indicated that not all systems are 

installed in accordance with a 

recognized standard with regard to 

spacing in all areas. In such cases, the 

licensee has stated that the detectors are 

located near equipment such that they 

are likely to detect a fire. Upon 

detecting smoke, the detectors initiate 

an alarm in the constantly staffed 

control room. In addition to the 

automatic suppression systems noted 

below, equipment operators are trained 

fire brigade members and may identify 

and manually suppress or extinguish a 

fire using the portable fire extinguishers 

and manual hose stations located 

throughout the fire areas if a fire is 

identified in its early stages of growth. 

The licensee stated that the postulated 

fire events that may require the use of 

the OMAs would include multiple 


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failures of various components or 

equipment. In most cases, it is 

considered unlikely that the sequence of 

events required to necessitate the OMAs 

would fully evolve because of the fire 

prevention, fire protection, and physical 

separation features in place. However, 

in the event that the sequence does 

evolve, the OMAs are available to 

provide assurance that safe shutdown 

can be achieved. For each of the fire 

areas included in this exemption, the 

postulated fire scenarios and pertinent 

details are summarized in the table 

below. 

Each of the fire areas or zones 

included in this exemption is analyzed 

below with regard to how the concept 

of defense-in-depth is achieved for each 

area or zone and the role of the OMAs 

in the overall level of safety provided 

for each area or zone. 

3.1 Fire Area CW–FA–14—Circulatory 

Water Intake 

3.1.1 Fire Prevention 

The licensee stated that combustible 

loading is not tracked in this area since 

it is an outside area. The licensee also 

stated that the primary combustible 

materials in the area are transformer 

liquid and electrical motors; although 

the amount is not quantified since the 

area is open to the atmosphere with no 

walls or ceiling to contain the heat or 

smoke that may be produced during a 

fire event. Additionally, the main 

combustible in this area that could 

result in the need for the OMAs is Dow 

Corning 561 Silicon transformer liquid, 

which the licensee states has 

characteristics that minimize the 

likelihood of a fire involving the 

insulating liquid itself. 

3.1.2 Detection, Control, and 

Extinguishment 

CW–FA–14 is not equipped with 

automatic fire detection or suppression 

systems but since it is an outdoor area 

with no walls or ceiling, it is not 

expected that such systems would 

enhance this element of defense-indepth in this area since the area is open 

to the atmosphere with no walls or 

ceiling to contain the heat or smoke that 

may be produced during a fire event. 

However, the licensee stated that a 

security tower monitors this area 

continuously; therefore, any fire of 

significance would be detected and 

responded to appropriately by the 

station fire brigade. Manual suppression 

is also provided by a fire hydrant and 

fire hose house located approximately 

75 feet from the principal fire hazards. 

3.1.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown 

Capability 

Since Fire Area CW–FA–14 is an 

outdoor space with no walls or ceiling, 

smoke and heat would not accumulate 

within the fire area to cause damage to 

components remote to the initiating fire 

or obstruct operator actions. 

3.1.4 OMAs Credited for a Fire in This 

Area 

3.1.4.1 OMA #7—Align the Fire Water 

System to the Isolation Condenser 

In order for OMA #7 to be necessary, 

the loss of the ‘‘B’’ Train of power would 

have to occur due to fire damage. Unit 

Substation Transformer (USS) 1B3 is 

located in the outside area on the west 

side of the power block on a raised 

concrete foundation that sits 

approximately 5 feet above grade. USS 

1B3 is considered as a potential ignition 

source as well as its associated adjacent 

transformer, USS 1A3, which is located 

approximately 15 feet west of USS 1B3. 

Both of these unit substations are 

located approximately 20 feet from any 

plant operating equipment (e.g., 

circulating water pump motor, etc.). 

Additionally, the need to perform this 

OMA would likely be apparent in the 

control room based on the loads that are 

lost (e.g., control room ventilation, 

service water pump, etc.) and a fire at 

USS 1B3 would be visible from the 

security tower monitoring the area. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the loss of USS 1B3 or 

its associated cables, OMA #7 is 

available to manually open V–9–2099 

and V–11–49 and close V–11–63 and V– 

11–41 to align the fire water system for 

make-up water to Isolation Condenser 

‘‘B’’ since there is no power (‘‘B’’ Train) 

available to the Condensate Transfer 

System. The licensee also stated that 

they have assumed a 10-minute 

diagnosis period and that the required 

time to perform the action is 13 minutes 

while the time available is 45 minutes, 

which provides a 22-minute margin. 

3.1.4.2 OMA #12—Establish CRD Flow 

to Reactor 

In order for OMA #12 to be necessary, 

a loss of instrument air to the CRD flow 

control valve would have to occur due 

to fire damage. The licensee stated that 

they conservatively assume that 

instrument air is lost for all Appendix 

R fires based on the fact that instrument 

air lines run throughout many areas of 

the plant. The licensee’s analysis 

assumes that the air line could 

potentially fail in approximately 45 

minutes when exposed to the postulated 

fire. 

The licensee also stated that the 

normal CRD flow control valve is a 

single component without a redundant 

counterpart. Because of this, a manual 

bypass is provided to maintain flow 

around the CRD flow control valves that 

fail closed upon loss of instrument air 

or control cable damage. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the normal flow 

control valve to be unavailable due to a 

loss of instrument air or cable damage, 

OMA #12 is available to manually open 

V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 while 

monitoring flow at FI–225–2, and close 

V–15–52 to establish CRD flow to the 

reactor. Furthermore, OMA #12 would 

only be necessary if the Isolation 

Condenser/CRD systems are utilized for 

hot shutdown. If OMA #12 becomes 

necessary, the licensee stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 15 minutes, while 

the time available is 204 minutes, which 

provides a 159-minute margin. 

The licensee stated that OMA #12 

essentially duplicates the Emergency 

Operating Procedure (EOP) actions for 

reactor pressure vessel (RPV) level 

control. Therefore, if a fire did occur 

and was not immediately discovered, 

any delay in the entry into the 

appropriate Fire Support Procedure 

(FSP) or delay in suppression of the fire 

would not significantly affect the 

performance of this OMA, since the 

EOPs would direct the same action to be 

performed if required. 

3.1.5 Conclusion 

Given the combustion resistant 

properties of the most probable 

combustible materials, limited ignition 

sources, and open nature of the area, it 

is unlikely that a fire would occur, go 

undetected or unsuppressed by station 

personnel, and damage the safe 

shutdown equipment. The low 

likelihood of damage to safe shutdown 

equipment due to a fire in this area, 

combined with the ability of OMAs #7 

and #12 to manipulate the plant in the 

event of a fire that damages safe 

shutdown equipment, provides 

adequate assurance that safe shutdown 

capability is maintained. 

3.2 Fire Area OB–FA–9—Office Bldg. 

Elev. 23′-6′′, 35′-0′′, 46′-6′′ 

3.2.1 Fire Prevention 

The licensee has classified the fire 

loading in this fire area as low. The 

licensee also stated that OB–FA–9 has 

an administrative fire loading limit of 

less than 1.5 hours as determined by the 

time-temperature curve contained in 

American Society of Testing and 


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Materials standard E119, ‘‘Standard Test 

Methods for Fire Tests of Building 

Construction and Materials’’ (ASTM 

E119), and that the major combustibles 

in the multiplexer (MUX) corridor, 

which is within OC–FA–9, are cable 

insulation and a wood ceiling on top of 

the MUX enclosure, which is within the 

MUX corridor. 

3.2.2 Detection, Control, and 

Extinguishment 

The licensee stated that OB–FA–9 has 

a partial area coverage wet pipe 

sprinkler system installed. The licensee 

further stated that the area is not 

provided with an area-wide detection 

system but that there is an installed 

detection system in the main hallways 

and inside of the MUX corridor and that 

it is a high traffic area so a fire would 

likely be detected by personnel. The wet 

pipe sprinkler system, when actuated, 

will alarm in the control room to notify 

operators of a potential fire event. 

Extinguishment of a fire in the majority 

of this area will be accomplished by the 

plant fire brigade. 

3.2.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown 

Capability 

The licensee stated that the MUX 

corridor within OB–FA–9 has a ceiling 

height of approximately 10′–6′′ and an 

approximate floor area of 513 square 

feet in the MUX corridor where the safe 

shutdown equipment is located so it is 

unlikely that smoke and heat would 

accumulate at the height of the safe 

shutdown equipment and cause a 

failure due to fire damage. 

3.2.4 OMAs Credited for a Fire in This 

Area 

3.2.4.1 OMA #2—Read Condensate 

Storage Tank (CST) Local Level 

Indicator LI–424–993 

In order for OMA #2 to be necessary, 

the primary CST level indicator (5F–27) 

would have to fail as a result of the fire. 

Should this occur, indication can only 

be obtained by reading the local 

indicator (LI–424–993) located at the 

CST. The licensee stated that the safe 

shutdown success path structure, 

system, or component (SSC) cable for 

the level indicator is routed in a cable 

tray located approximately 12 feet above 

the floor in this area (MUX corridor). 

The cable enters the room in the 

northwest corner and is routed in a 

cable tray for approximately 15 feet. It 

then air drops vertically down into the 

MUX enclosure. The credited cable is 

routed in a cable tray with other cables 

and is routed through the wooden 

ceiling, which also has some rubber 

piping insulation on top of the ceiling, 

thus putting the cable in close proximity 

to in situ combustibles. However, there 

are no ignition sources in this area. 

Therefore, due to the lack of ignition 

sources, it is not expected that a fire 

would occur in this area and it is 

unlikely that the OMA would be 

required. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the loss of the primary 

CST level indicator, OMA #2 is 

available to locally read CST level at the 

local level indicator, LI–424–993. The 

licensee also stated that they have 

assumed a 30-minute diagnosis period 

and that the required time to perform 

the action is 7 minutes while the time 

available is 73 minutes, which provides 

a 36-minute margin. 

3.2.4.2 OMA #12—Establish Control 

Rod Drive (CRD) Flow to Reactor 

In order for OMA #12 to be necessary, 

a loss of instrument air to the CRD flow 

control valve would have to occur due 

to fire damage. The licensee stated that 

the normal CRD flow control valve is a 

single component without a redundant 

counterpart. Because of this, a manual 

bypass is provided to maintain flow 

around the CRD flow control valves that 

fail closed upon loss of instrument air 

or control cable damage. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the normal flow 

control valve to be unavailable due to a 

loss of instrument air or cable damage, 

OMA #12 is available to manually open 

V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 while 

monitoring flow at FI–225–2, and close 

V–15–52 to establish CRD flow to the 

reactor. Furthermore, OMA #12 would 

only be necessary if the Isolation 

Condenser/CRD systems are utilized for 

hot shutdown. If OMA #12 becomes 

necessary, the licensee stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 15 minutes, while 

the time available is 204 minutes, which 

provides a 159-minute margin. 

3.2.5 Conclusion 

Given the limited amount of 

combustible materials, ignition sources, 

and sufficient volume of the space, it is 

unlikely that a fire would occur and go 

undetected or unsuppressed by the 

sprinkler system noted above, or 

personnel, and damage the safe 

shutdown equipment. The low 

likelihood of damage to safe shutdown 

equipment due to a fire in this area, 

combined with the ability of OMAs #2 

and #12 to manipulate the plant in the 

event of a fire that damages safe 

shutdown equipment, provides 

adequate assurance that safe shutdown 

capability is maintained. 

3.3 OB–FZ–6A Office Bldg. ‘‘A’’ 480V 

Switchgear (SWGR) Room Elev. 23′–6′′ 

3.3.1 Fire Prevention 

The licensee has classified the fire 

loading in this fire zone as moderate. 

The licensee also stated that this area 

has an administrative fire loading limit 

of less than 3 hours as determined by 

the ASTM E119 time-temperature curve. 

The main combustibles in this area are 

cable insulation (approximately 81% of 

loading) and Dow Corning 561 Silicon 

transformer liquid (approximately 15% 

of loading). Additionally, the 

transformer liquid has characteristics 

that minimize the likelihood of a fire 

involving the insulating liquid itself. 

3.3.2 Detection, Control, and 

Extinguishment 

The licensee stated that OB–FZ–6A 

has an automatic smoke detection 

system, a total flooding automatic Halon 

1301 System, and manual fire fighting 

capabilities (portable extinguishers and 

hose stations). 

3.3.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown 

Capability 

The licensee stated that OB–FA–6A 

has a ceiling height of approximately 

10′–8′′ and an approximate floor area of 

1157 square feet so it is unlikely that 

smoke and heat would accumulate at 

the height of the safe shutdown 

equipment and cause a failure due to 

fire damage. 

3.3.4 OMAs Credited for a Fire in This 

Zone 

3.3.4.1 OMA #2—Read Condensate 

Storage Tank Local Level Indicator LI– 

424–993 

In order for OMA #2 to be necessary, 

the primary CST level indicator (5F–27) 

would have to fail as a result of the fire. 

Should this occur, indication can only 

be obtained by reading the local 

indicator (LI–424–993) located at the 

CST. The licensee stated that the safe 

shutdown success path cable for the 

level indicator is routed in a conduit 

that leaves a 120 VAC distribution panel 

and travels approximately 5 feet 

vertically to a cable tray that is 

approximately 9 feet above the floor. 

The cable is routed with other cables in 

the cable tray for approximately 15 feet 

at which point the cable tray travels up 

through the ceiling. The liquid filled 

transformer is located approximately 10 

feet north of the cable. However, there 

is a partial non-rated concrete block 

wall between the transformer and cable 

tray that would provide some protection 

of direct flame impingement or radiant 

heat transfer on the cable tray. The 

ignition sources in this fire zone consist 


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of enclosed metal electrical cabinets 

(120 VAC and 125 VDC circuits) and the 

liquid filled transformer (4160 VAC to 

480 VAC). 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the primary CST 

level indicator, OMA #2 is available to 

locally read CST level at local indicator 

LI–424–993. The licensee also stated 

that they have assumed a 30-minute 

diagnosis period and that the required 

time to perform the action is 7 minutes 

while the time available is 73 minutes, 

which provides a 36-minute margin. 

3.3.4.2 OMA #9—Manually Control 

480V Breakers From Remote Shutdown 

Panel 

In order for OMA #9 to be necessary, 

damage to the credited and redundant 

cables would have to occur due to a fire. 

The licensee stated that the credited and 

redundant cables are located in the 

same cable tray with additional cables 

and that the tray is located 

approximately 7 feet above the floor. 

Other than the cables themselves, the 

primary combustible in this area is a 

liquid filled transformer, which is 

located approximately 7 feet from the 

cable tray. The licensee also stated that 

the ignition sources in this fire zone 

consist of electrical cabinets (120 VAC 

and 125 VDC circuits) and the liquid 

filled transformer (4160 VAC to 480 

VAC). The electrical cabinets are 

enclosed metal cabinets, which are 

located approximately 2 feet from the 

credited and redundant cables in some 

locations. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #9 is available 

to manually control the 480V USS 1B2 

breakers for CRD Pump NC08B and 

1B2M from the Remote Shutdown 

Panel. The licensee also stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 13 minutes while 

the time available is 180 minutes, which 

provides a 137-minute margin. 

3.3.4.3 OMA #12—Establish CRD Flow 

to Reactor 

In order for OMA #12 to be necessary, 

a loss of instrument air to the CRD flow 

control valve would have to occur due 

to fire damage. The licensee stated that 

the normal CRD flow control valve is a 

single component without a redundant 

counterpart. Because of this, a manual 

bypass is provided to maintain flow 

around the CRD flow control valves that 

fail closed upon loss of instrument air 

or control cable damage. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the normal flow 

control valve to be unavailable due to a 

loss of instrument air or cable damage, 

OMA #12 is available to manually open 

V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 while 

monitoring flow at FI–225–2, and close 

V–15–52 to establish CRD flow to the 

reactor. Furthermore, OMA #12 would 

only be necessary if the Isolation 

Condenser/CRD systems are utilized for 

hot shutdown. If OMA #12 becomes 

necessary, the licensee stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 15 minutes, while 

the time available is 204 minutes, which 

provides a 159-minute margin. 

3.3.5 Conclusion 

Given the limited amount of 

combustible materials, ignition sources, 

and the volume of the space, it is 

unlikely that a fire would occur and go 

undetected or unsuppressed by the 

smoke detection or Halon system noted 

above, or personnel, and damage the 

safe shutdown equipment. The low 

likelihood of damage to safe shutdown 

equipment due to a fire in this zone, 

combined with the ability of OMAs #2, 

#9, and #12 to manipulate the plant in 

the event of a fire that damages safe 

shutdown equipment, provide adequate 

assurance that safe shutdown capability 

is maintained. 

3.4 OB–FZ–6B Office Building ‘‘B’’ 

480V SWGR Room Elev. 23′–6′′ 

3.4.1 Fire Prevention 

The licensee has classified the fire 

loading in this fire zone as moderate. 

The licensee also stated that this area 

has an administrative fire loading limit 

of less than 2 hours as determined by 

the ASTM E119 time-temperature curve. 

The main combustibles in this area are 

cable insulation (approximately 28% of 

loading), Thermo-Lag (approximately 

29% of loading) and Dow Corning 561 

Silicon transformer liquid 

(approximately 31% of loading). Also, 

the transformer liquid has 

characteristics that minimize the 

likelihood of a fire involving the 

insulating liquid itself. 

3.4.2 Detection, Control, and 

Extinguishment 

The licensee stated that OB–FZ–6B 

has an automatic smoke detection 

system, a total flooding Halon 1301 

System, and manual fire fighting 

capabilities (portable extinguishers and 

hose stations). 

3.4.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown 

Capability 

The licensee stated that OB–FA–6B 

has a ceiling height of approximately 

10′–8′′ and an approximate floor area of 

679 square feet so it is unlikely that 

smoke and heat would accumulate at 

the height of the safe shutdown 

equipment and cause a failure due to 

fire damage. 

3.4.4 OMAs Credited for a Fire in This 

Zone 

3.4.4.1 OMA #7—Align the Fire Water 

System to the Isolation Condenser 

In order for OMA #7 to be necessary, 

the loss of the ‘‘B’’ Train of power would 

have to occur due to fire damage. Motor 

control center (MCC) 1B21 is located 

approximately 5 feet from USS 1B2. The 

licensee indicated that a credited power 

cable for the static charger enters the fire 

zone through the ceiling of the corridor 

and then enters the main portion of the 

room through the north wall 

approximately 9 feet above the floor. It 

then runs east and down into MCC 

1B21. The cable is located 

approximately 2 feet above the potential 

ignition source, USS 1B2, and runs 

directly into ignition source MCC 1B21. 

The credited power cable for MCC 1B21 

is routed from USS 1B2 to MCC 1B21 

in a cable tray. This cable tray runs 

approximately 10 feet above the floor 

and approximately 2 feet above the 

potential ignition sources, USS 1B2 and 

MCC 1B21, but it also enters into both 

as indicated above. However, both of 

these ignition sources are contained in 

enclosed metal cabinets and are not 

high voltage. The cable tray is also 

located approximately 10 feet from the 

ignition source of the USS 1B2 

transformer, which is located near the 

west end of the room. 

The licensee also indicated that the 

‘‘A’’ train of power is credited and 

available for this fire zone and that the 

redundant cable is associated with the 

‘‘C’’ battery charger, which is fire 

wrapped with a 1-hour barrier in this 

fire zone. It is unlikely that a fire would 

develop and cause damage to multiple 

redundant pieces of equipment given 

the spatial relationship between the 

credited equipment and ignition 

sources, the presence of the automatic 

Halon system, and the protected ‘‘C’’ 

battery charger cable. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #7 is available 

to manually open V–9–2099 and V–11– 

49 and close V–11–63 and V–11–41 to 

align the fire water system for make-up 

water to Isolation Condenser ‘‘B’’ since 

there is no power (‘‘B’’ Train) available 

to the Condensate Transfer System. The 

licensee also stated that they have 

assumed a 10-minute diagnosis period 

and that the required time to perform 

the action is 13 minutes while the time 


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available is 45 minutes, which provides 

a 22-minute margin. 

3.4.4.2 OMA #12—Establish CRD Flow 

to Reactor 

In order for OMA #12 to be necessary, 

a loss of instrument air to the CRD flow 

control valve would have to occur due 

to fire damage. The licensee stated that 

the normal CRD flow control valve is a 

single component without a redundant 

counterpart. Because of this, a manual 

bypass is provided to maintain flow 

around the CRD flow control valves that 

fail closed upon loss of instrument air 

or control cable damage. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the normal flow 

control valve to be unavailable due to a 

loss of instrument air or cable damage, 

OMA #12 is available to manually open 

V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 while 

monitoring flow at FI–225–2, and close 

V–15–52 to establish CRD flow to the 

reactor. Furthermore, OMA #12 would 

only be necessary if the Isolation 

Condenser/CRD systems are utilized for 

hot shutdown. If OMA #12 becomes 

necessary, the licensee stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 15 minutes, while 

the time available is 204 minutes, which 

provides a 159-minute margin. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages multiple redundant 

trains, OMAs #7 and #12 are available 

to align the fire water system to the 

isolation condenser and establish CRD 

flow. The locations of these OMAs are 

in separate fire areas from Fire Area 

OB–FZ–6B so a fire in Fire Area OB– 

FZ–6B would not impact the locations 

of the actions. 

3.4.5 Conclusion 

Given the limited amount of 

combustible materials, ignition sources, 

and the volume of the space, it is 

unlikely that a fire would occur and go 

undetected or unsuppressed by the 

smoke detection or Halon system noted 

above, or personnel, and damage the 

safe shutdown equipment. The low 

likelihood of damage to safe shutdown 

equipment due to a fire in this zone, 

combined with the ability of OMAs #7 

and #12 to manipulate the plant in the 

event of a fire that damages safe 

shutdown equipment, provides 

adequate assurance that safe shutdown 

capability is maintained. 

3.5 OB–FZ–8A Office Bldg. Reactor 

Recirculation MG Set Room & OB–FZ– 

8B Mechanical Equipment Room Elev. 

23′–6′′ & 35′–0′′ 

3.5.1 Fire Prevention 

Fire Zones OB–FZ–8A and 8B are 

evaluated together for the combustible 

loading and fire safe shutdown (FSSD) 

analysis due to the lack of rated fire 

barriers between the zones. The licensee 

has classified the fire loading in these 

fire zones as low. The licensee also 

stated that these fire zones have an 

administrative fire loading limit of less 

than 45 minutes as determined by the 

ASTM E119 time-temperature curve. 

There are minimal combustibles in Fire 

Zone OB–FZ–8B. The major 

combustibles in Fire Zone OB–FZ–8A 

are lubricating oil (approximately 83% 

of loading) and cable insulation 

(approximately 13% of loading). 

3.5.2 Detection, Control, and 

Extinguishment 

The licensee stated that OB–FZ–8A 

has a partial wet-pipe sprinkler system 

with a flow alarm that notifies the 

control room and that the area does not 

have a smoke detection system, 

however, a duct smoke detector is 

located in the exhaust duct of fan EF– 

1–20. Since operation of the sprinkler 

system will alarm in the control room, 

prompt notification of and response by, 

the fire brigade for any required manual 

fire fighting activities is expected. 

3.5.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown 

Capability 

The licensee stated that OB–FZ–8A 

has a ceiling height of approximately 

10′–10′′ and an approximate floor area of 

2128 square feet and OB–FZ–8B has a 

ceiling height of approximately 11′–0′′ 

and an approximate floor area of 479 

square feet so it is unlikely that smoke 

and heat would accumulate at the 

height of the safe shutdown equipment 

and cause a failure due to fire damage. 

3.5.4 OMAs Credited for a Fire in 

these Zones 

3.5.4.1 OMA #7—Align the Fire Water 

System to the Isolation Condenser 

In order for OMA #7 to be necessary, 

the loss of the ‘‘B’’ Train of power would 

have to occur due to fire damage. The 

licensee indicated that the cable for the 

125 VDC control power is in conduit 

that enters this zone through the ceiling 

in the northwest corner and then travels 

south along the ceiling near the west 

wall approximately 9 feet above the 

floor and approximately 7 feet from the 

primary ignition sources in the area, the 

motor-generator (MG) Sets, and then 

leaves through the floor, where it runs 

within 2 feet of the ‘‘E’’ MG–Set. The 

licensee also indicated that the ‘‘A’’ train 

of power is credited and available for 

this fire zone and that the redundant 

cable is associated with the ‘‘C’’ battery 

and this cable is not located in this fire 

zone. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #7 is available 

to manually open V–9–2099 and V–11– 

49 and close V–11–63 and V–11–41 to 

align the fire water system for make-up 

water to Isolation Condenser ‘‘B’’ since 

there is no power (‘‘B’’ Train) available 

to the Condensate Transfer System. The 

licensee also stated that they have 

assumed a 10-minute diagnosis period 

and that the required time to perform 

the action is 13 minutes while the time 

available is 45 minutes, which provides 

a 22-minute margin. 

3.5.4.2 OMA #12—Establish CRD Flow 

to Reactor 

In order for OMA #12 to be necessary, 

a loss of instrument air to the CRD flow 

control valve would have to occur due 

to fire damage. The licensee stated that 

the normal CRD flow control valve is a 

single component without a redundant 

counterpart. Because of this, a manual 

bypass is provided to maintain flow 

around the CRD flow control valves that 

fail closed upon loss of instrument air 

or control cable damage. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the normal flow 

control valve to be unavailable due to a 

loss of instrument air or cable damage, 

OMA #12 is available to manually open 

V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 while 

monitoring flow at FI–225–2, and close 

V–15–52 to establish CRD flow to the 

reactor. Furthermore, OMA #12 would 

only be necessary if the Isolation 

Condenser/CRD systems are utilized for 

hot shutdown. If OMA #12 becomes 

necessary, the licensee stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 15 minutes, while 

the time available is 204 minutes, which 

provides a 159-minute margin. 

3.5.5 Conclusion 

Given the limited amount of 

combustible materials, ignition sources, 

and the large volume of the space, it is 

unlikely that a fire would occur and go 

undetected or unsuppressed by the 

smoke detection or sprinkler systems 

noted above, or personnel, and damage 

the safe shutdown equipment. The low 

likelihood of damage to safe shutdown 

equipment due to a fire in this zone, 

combined with the ability of OMAs #7 

and #12 to manipulate the plant in the 

event of a fire that damages safe 


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shutdown equipment, provides 

adequate assurance that safe shutdown 

capability is maintained. 

3.6 OB–FZ–8C Office Bldg. A/B Battery 

Room, Tunnel and Electrical Tray Room 

Elev. 35′–0′′ 

3.6.1 Fire Prevention 

The licensee has classified the fire 

loading in this fire zone as low. The 

licensee also stated that this fire zone 

has an administrative fire loading limit 

of less than 1.5 hours as determined by 

the ASTM E119 time-temperature curve. 

The major combustibles in Fire Zone 

OB–FZ–8C are electrolyte-filled plastic 

battery cases and racks (approximately 

56% of loading) and cable insulation 

(approximately 39% of loading). 

3.6.2 Detection, Control, and 

Extinguishment 

The licensee stated that OB–FZ–8C 

has a fixed, total-flooding, Halon 1301 

extinguishing system, area-wide smoke 

detection that is installed at the ceiling 

level and cross-zoned to sound a local 

alarm, and an alarm in the control room 

upon actuation of one detector. 

Actuation of a second detector will 

sound a local alarm, discharge the 

Halon system, trip supply and exhaust 

fans, and close dampers. 

3.6.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown 

Capability 

The licensee stated that OB–FZ–8C 

has a ceiling height of approximately 

11′–0′′ and an approximate floor area of 

1292 square feet so it is unlikely that 

smoke and heat would accumulate at 

the height of the safe shutdown 

equipment and cause a failure due to 

fire damage. 

3.6.4 OMAs Credited for a Fire in This 

Zone 

3.6.4.1 OMA #2—Read Condensate 

Storage Tank Local Level Indicator LI– 

424–993 

In order for OMA #2 to be necessary, 

damage to the primary CST level 

indicator (5F–27) cable would have to 

occur due to a fire. Should this occur, 

indication can only be obtained by 

reading the local indicator (LI–424–993) 

located at the CST. Although there is no 

redundant train of equipment for the 

credited source of obtaining CST level 

Indication, the licensee stated that the 

tray containing the credited train is 

located in the Electric Tray Room 

portion of the zone, which is separated 

from the main battery room by a cable 

tunnel that is approximately 25 feet 

long. The licensee also stated that the 

credited cable runs in a cable tray with 

other cables, thus putting it in close 

proximity to in-situ hazards, however, 

due to the size and use of the room, 

there are no other credible hazards 

including transient combustibles. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the loss of the primary 

CST level indicator, OMA #2 is 

available to locally read CST level at the 

local level indicator, LI–424–993. The 

licensee also stated that they have 

assumed a 30-minute diagnosis period 

and that the required time to perform 

the action is 7 minutes while the time 

available is 73 minutes, which provides 

a 36-minute margin. 

3.6.4.2 OMA #7—Align Fire Water to 

Isolation Condenser 

In order for OMA #7 to be necessary, 

the loss of the ‘‘B’’ Train of power would 

have to occur due to fire damage. The 

licensee indicated that the credited 

cable is located in the A/B Battery Room 

portion (main portion) of this fire zone 

and that the credited cable runs in a 

conduit that begins at 125V DC 

Distribution Panel B. The cable is routed 

in a conduit that runs approximately 1 

foot above a series of vertical cable 

trays, approximately 8 feet above the ‘‘B’’ 

MG Set, and approximately 3 feet over 

the top of the 125V DC ‘‘B’’ Distribution 

Center. However, the ‘‘B’’ MG Set is not 

normally energized since the static 

charger is utilized normally for charging 

the ‘‘B’’ Battery. The licensee also 

indicated that the battery banks are 

another potential ignition source in the 

room but that they are located greater 

than 15 feet from the particular conduit 

in question but that the failure of the 

battery itself may also require the OMA. 

The ‘‘A’’ train of power is credited and 

available for this fire zone. The 

redundant cable, ‘‘C’’ battery, ‘‘C’’ 

Distribution center, etc. are not located 

in this fire zone. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #7 is available 

to manually open V–9–2099 and V–11– 

49 and close V–11–63 and V–11–41 to 

align the fire water system for make-up 

water to Isolation Condenser ‘‘B’’ since 

there is no power (‘‘B’’ Train) available 

to the Condensate Transfer System. The 

licensee also stated that they have 

assumed a 10-minute diagnosis period 

and that the required time to perform 

the action is 13 minutes while the time 

available is 45 minutes, which provides 

a 22-minute margin. 

3.6.4.3 OMA #8—Manually Control 

USS 1A2 ‘‘A’’ CRD Pump & 1A2M From 

LSP–1A2 

In order for OMA #8 to be necessary, 

damage to the credited control cables, 

1A2M & A CRD Pump, and the 

redundant control cables, 1B2M and B 

CRD Pump, would have to occur due to 

a fire. The licensee stated that the 

credited and redundant cables are run 

in the same cable tray with additional 

cables in the Electric Tray Room portion 

of this fire area and are separated from 

the main battery room by a cable tunnel 

that is approximately 25-feet long. With 

the exception of the cables themselves, 

there are no other combustibles or 

ignition sources and the storage of 

transient combustibles in this portion of 

the fire zone is remote since it is a small 

room with only one door for access or 

egress. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #8 is available 

to manually control the 480V USS 1A2 

breakers for ‘‘A’’ CRD Pump and 1A2M 

from LSP–1A2. The licensee also stated 

that they have assumed a 30-minute 

diagnosis period and that the required 

time to perform the action is 8 minutes 

while the time available is 60 minutes, 

which provides a 22-minute margin. 

3.6.4.4 OMA #12—Establish CRD Flow 

to Reactor 

In order for OMA #12 to be necessary, 

a loss of instrument air to the CRD flow 

control valve would have to occur due 

to fire damage. The licensee stated that 

the normal CRD flow control valve is a 

single component without a redundant 

counterpart. Because of this, a manual 

bypass is provided to maintain flow 

around the CRD flow control valves that 

fail closed upon loss of instrument air 

or control cable damage. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the normal flow 

control valve to be unavailable due to a 

loss of instrument air or cable damage, 

OMA #12 is available to manually open 

V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 while 

monitoring flow at FI–225–2, and close 

V–15–52 to establish CRD flow to the 

reactor. Furthermore, OMA #12 would 

only be necessary if the Isolation 

Condenser/CRD systems are utilized for 

hot shutdown. If OMA #12 becomes 

necessary, the licensee stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 15 minutes, while 

the time available is 204 minutes, which 

provides a 159-minute margin. 

3.6.4.5 OMA #16—Manually Trip Rx 

Recirculation Pumps at 4160V 

Switchgear 

In order for OMA #16 to be necessary, 

damage to the credited cables for 

tripping the recirculation pumps or the 

loss of the 125 VDC ‘‘B’’ Battery and ‘‘B’’ 

Distribution Center would have to occur 

due to a fire. The licensee stated that the 


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cable tray configuration in the A/B 

Battery Room is a series of vertical trays 

closely stacked together and that the 

trays containing the required equipment 

are located approximately 4 feet from 

the ‘‘B’’ MG Set. However, the ‘‘B’’ MG 

Set is not normally energized since the 

static charger is utilized normally for 

charging the ‘‘B’’ Battery. The licensee 

also stated that other than the cables 

themselves, there are no other 

combustibles or ignition sources in the 

area and that the placement of transient 

combustibles is remote since access is 

limited and the rooms are small in size. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #16 is available 

to manually trip Reactor Recirculation 

Pumps (‘‘A,’’ ‘‘C,’’ and ‘‘E’’) 4160V 

Switchgear 1A and 1B. The licensee also 

stated that they have assumed a 10- 

minute diagnosis period and that the 

required time to perform the action is 13 

minutes while the time available is 30 

minutes, which provides a 7-minute 

margin. 

3.6.5 Conclusion 

Given the limited amount of 

combustible materials, ignition sources, 

and the large volume of the space, it is 

unlikely that a fire would occur and go 

undetected or unsuppressed by the 

smoke detection or Halon systems noted 

above, or personnel, and damage the 

safe shutdown equipment. The low 

likelihood of damage to safe shutdown 

equipment due to a fire in this zone, 

combined with the ability of OMAs #2, 

#7, #8, #12, and #16 to manipulate the 

plant in the event of a fire that damages 

safe shutdown equipment, provides 

adequate assurance that safe shutdown 

capability is maintained. 

3.7 OB–FZ–10A Office Bldg. Monitor 

and Change Room and Operations 

Support Area Elev. 35′-0′′ & 46′-6′′ 

3.7.1 Fire Prevention 

The licensee has classified the fire 

loading in this fire zone as low. The 

licensee also stated that this area has an 

administrative fire loading limit of less 

than 30 minutes as determined by the 

ASTM E119 time-temperature curve. 

The major combustibles in this area are 

cable insulation (approximately 27% of 

loading), rubber flooring (approximately 

31% of loading), miscellaneous plastics 

(approximately 15% of loading) and 

protective clothing supplies 

(approximately 20% of loading). 

However, since the protective clothing 

supplies have been placed in metal cans 

with self-closing lids they are no longer 

considered a contribution to the 

combustibles in this area. 

3.7.2 Detection, Control, and 

Extinguishment 

The licensee stated that OB–FZ–10A 

has an area-wide smoke detection 

system and a wet-pipe automatic 

sprinkler system installed throughout 

the area. In addition, a hose station 

located nearby, outside the control 

room, provides manual suppression 

capability. 

3.7.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown 

Capability 

The licensee stated that OB–FZ–10A 

has a ceiling height of approximately 

13′-0′′ and an approximate floor area of 

2019 square feet so it is unlikely that 

smoke and heat would accumulate at 

the height of the safe shutdown 

equipment and cause a failure due to 

fire damage. 

3.7.4 OMAs Credited for a Fire in This 

Zone 

3.7.4.1 OMA #12—Establish CRD Flow 

to Reactor 

In order for OMA #12 to be necessary, 

a loss of instrument air to the CRD flow 

control valve would have to occur due 

to fire damage. The licensee stated that 

the normal CRD flow control valve is a 

single component without a redundant 

counterpart. Because of this, a manual 

bypass is provided to maintain flow 

around the CRD flow control valves that 

fail closed upon loss of instrument air 

or control cable damage. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the normal flow 

control valve to be unavailable due to a 

loss of instrument air or cable damage, 

OMA #12 is available to manually open 

V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 while 

monitoring flow at FI–225–2, and close 

V–15–52 to establish CRD flow to the 

reactor. Furthermore, OMA #12 would 

only be necessary if the Isolation 

Condenser/CRD systems are utilized for 

hot shutdown. If OMA #12 becomes 

necessary, the licensee stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 18 minutes, while 

the time available is 204 minutes, which 

provides a 156-minute margin. 

3.7.5 Conclusion 

Given the limited amount of 

combustible materials, ignition sources, 

and the large volume of the space, it is 

unlikely that a fire would occur and go 

undetected or unsuppressed by the 

smoke detection or sprinkler systems 

noted above, or personnel, and damage 

the safe shutdown equipment. The low 

likelihood of damage to safe shutdown 

equipment due to a fire in this zone, 

combined with the ability of OMA #12 

to manipulate the plant in the event of 

a fire that damages safe shutdown 

equipment, provides adequate assurance 

that safe shutdown capability is 

maintained. 

3.8 RB–FZ–1D Reactor Bldg. Elev. 51′– 

3′′ 

3.8.1 Fire Prevention 

The licensee has classified the fire 

loading in this fire zone as low. The 

licensee also stated that this area has an 

administrative fire loading limit of less 

than 30 minutes as determined by the 

ASTM E119 time-temperature curve. 

The main combustible in this area is 

attributed to cable insulation 

(approximately 84% of loading). 

3.8.2 Detection, Control, and 

Extinguishment 

The licensee stated that RB–FZ–1D 

has an area-wide smoke detection 

system and an automatic fixed deluge 

water spray system installed over cable 

trays and open hatches. The deluge 

suppression system protecting safetyrelated cable trays is automatically 

activated by a cross-zoned detection 

system consisting of linear heat 

detection wire located on top of the 

cables in each original safety-related 

cable trays and smoke detectors are 

located in each beam pocket at the 

ceiling. 

3.8.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown 

Capability 

The licensee stated that RB–FZ–1D 

has a ceiling height of approximately 

21′-0′ and an approximate floor area of 

9,100 square feet so it is unlikely that 

smoke and heat would accumulate at 

the height of the safe shutdown 

equipment and cause a failure due to 

fire damage. 

3.8.4 OMAs Credited for a Fire in This 

Zone 

3.8.4.1 OMA #12—Establish CRD Flow 

to Reactor 

In order for OMA #12 to be necessary, 

a loss of instrument air to the CRD flow 

control valve would have to occur due 

to fire damage. The licensee stated that 

the normal CRD flow control valve is a 

single component without a redundant 

counterpart. Because of this, a manual 

bypass is provided to maintain flow 

around the CRD flow control valves that 

fail closed upon loss of instrument air 

or control cable damage. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the normal flow 

control valve to be unavailable due to a 

loss of instrument air or cable damage, 

OMA #12 is available to manually open 

V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 while 


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monitoring flow at FI–225–2, and close 

V–15–52 to establish CRD flow to the 

reactor. Furthermore, OMA #12 would 

only be necessary if the Isolation 

Condenser/CRD systems are utilized for 

hot shutdown. If OMA #12 becomes 

necessary, the licensee stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 15 minutes, while 

the time available is 204 minutes, which 

provides a 159-minute margin. 

3.8.5 Conclusion 

Given the limited amount of 

combustible materials, ignition sources, 

and the large volume of the space, it is 

unlikely that a fire would occur and go 

undetected or unsuppressed by the 

smoke detection or localized water 

deluge systems noted above, or 

personnel, and damage the safe 

shutdown equipment. The low 

likelihood of damage to safe shutdown 

equipment due to a fire in this zone, 

combined with the ability of OMA #12 

to manipulate the plant in the event of 

a fire that damages safe shutdown 

equipment, provides adequate assurance 

that safe shutdown capability is 

maintained. 

3.9 RB–FZ–1E Reactor Bldg. Elev. 

51′-3′′ 

3.9.1 Fire Prevention 

The licensee has classified the fire 

loading in this fire zone as low. The 

licensee also stated that this area has an 

administrative fire loading limit of less 

than 30 minutes as determined by the 

ASTM E119 time-temperature curve. 

The main combustible in this area is 

attributed to cable insulation 

(approximately 84% of loading). 

3.9.2 Detection, Control, and 

Extinguishment 

The licensee stated that RB–FZ–1E 

has an area-wide smoke detection 

system and an automatic fixed deluge 

water spray system installed over cable 

trays and open hatches. The deluge 

suppression system protecting safetyrelated cable trays is automatically 

activated by a cross-zoned detection 

system consisting of linear heat 

detection wire located on top of the 

cables in each original safety-related 

cable trays and smoke detectors are 

located in each beam pocket at the 

ceiling. 

3.9.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown 

Capability 

The licensee stated that RB–FZ–1E 

has a ceiling height of approximately 

26′-9′′ and an approximate floor area of 

12,140 square feet so it is unlikely that 

smoke and heat would accumulate at 

the height of the safe shutdown 

equipment and cause a failure due to 

fire damage. 

3.9.4 OMAs Credited for a Fire in This 

Zone 

3.9.4.1 OMA #11—Locally Read CRD 

Flow Gauge FI–225–998 

In order for OMA #11 to be necessary, 

the normal local gauge for CRD flow, FI– 

225–2, would have to be damaged by 

fire. The licensee stated that there are no 

in-situ combustibles present in the 

immediate area surrounding the gauge 

and that the placement of transient 

combustibles is remote since the gauge 

is surrounded by piping and tubing. The 

licensee also stated that the nearest 

ignition source is MCC 1A21B, which is 

located approximately 8 feet from the 

flow gauge. However, the solid steel rear 

of the MCC faces the flow gauge making 

it highly unlikely that this potential 

ignition source would adversely impact 

the flow gauge. 

OMA #11 would require re-entry into 

Fire Zone RB–FZ–1E to manually 

control CRD System valves V–15–237, 

V–15–30, and V–15–52 located in this 

fire zone while monitoring flow at FI– 

225–998 to establish CRD flow to the 

reactor due to the loss of instrument air 

to the CRD flow control valve. Fusing of 

the unprotected CRD valves by heat 

from a fire resulting in the valves 

becoming inoperable is not considered 

credible because of the low fire loading, 

the provision of automatic fire detection 

and suppression capability and the heat 

sink capability of the water filled piping 

connected to the valve. Operation of one 

of the valves that is in close proximity 

to these valves was previously approved 

in the exemption discussed above. 

In the unlikely event that a fire occurs 

and this flow gauge becomes 

unreadable, OMA #11 is available to 

locally read flow gauge FI–225–998, 

which is the redundant instrument that 

provides the same data and is mounted 

on an instrument rack located in Fire 

Zone RB–FZ–1D. The licensee also 

stated that they have assumed a 30- 

minute diagnosis period and that the 

required time to perform the action is 

100 minutes, including a 90-minute 

allowance before re-entry, while the 

time available is 204 minutes, which 

provides a 74-minute margin. 

3.9.4.2 OMA #12—Establish CRD Flow 

to Reactor 

In order for OMA #12 to be necessary, 

a loss of instrument air to the CRD flow 

control valve would have to occur due 

to fire damage. The licensee stated that 

the normal CRD flow control valve is a 

single component without a redundant 

counterpart. Because of this, a manual 

bypass is provided to maintain flow 

around the CRD flow control valves that 

fail closed upon loss of instrument air 

or control cable damage. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the normal flow 

control valve to be unavailable due to a 

loss of instrument air or cable damage, 

OMA #12 is available to reenter RB–FZ– 

1E and manually open V–15–237, 

throttle V–15–30 while monitoring flow 

at FI–225–2, and close V–15–52 to 

establish CRD flow to the reactor. 

Furthermore, OMA #12 would only be 

necessary if the Isolation Condenser/ 

CRD systems are utilized for hot 

shutdown. If OMA #12 becomes 

necessary, the licensee stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 100 minutes, 

including a 90-minute allowance before 

re-entry, while the time available is 204 

minutes, which provides a 74-minute 

margin. 

3.9.5 Conclusion 

Given the limited amount of 

combustible materials, ignition sources, 

and the large volume of the space, it is 

unlikely that a fire would occur and go 

undetected or unsuppressed by the 

smoke detection or localized water 

deluge systems noted above, or 

personnel, and damage the safe 

shutdown equipment. The low 

likelihood of damage to safe shutdown 

equipment due to a fire in this zone, 

combined with the ability of OMAs #11 

and #12 to manipulate the plant in the 

event of a fire that damages safe 

shutdown equipment, provides 

adequate assurance that safe shutdown 

capability is maintained. 

3.10 RB–FZ–1F3 Reactor Bldg. 

Northwest Corner Elev. -19′-6′′ 

3.10.1 Fire Prevention 

The licensee has classified the fire 

loading in this fire zone as low. The 

licensee also stated that this area has an 

administrative fire loading limit of less 

than 30 minutes as determined by the 

ASTM E119 time-temperature curve. 

The major combustibles in this area are 

cable insulation (approximately 58% of 

loading), ladders (approximately 16% of 

loading) and lubricating oil in pumps 

(approximately 16% of loading). 

3.10.2 Detection, Control, and 

Extinguishment 

The licensee stated that RB–FZ–1F3 

has smoke detectors which alarm locally 

and in the control room installed over 

hazards rather than mounted at the 

ceiling. Fire extinguishers are also 


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provided for manual fire fighting 

backup. Hose lines are available from 

outside hydrants and hose houses. 

3.10.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown 

Capability 

The licensee stated that RB–FZ–1F3 

has a ceiling height of approximately 

41′-6′′ and an approximate floor area of 

560 square feet so it is unlikely that 

smoke and heat would accumulate at 

the height of the safe shutdown 

equipment and cause a failure due to 

fire damage. 

3.10.4 OMAs Credited for a Fire in 

This Zone 

3.10.4.1 OMA #13—Manually Align 

Core Spray to CST To Provide Reactor 

Coolant Makeup 

In order for OMA #13 to be necessary, 

both CRD pumps located in this area 

would have to become damaged due to 

a fire. The licensee stated that the 

pumps are separated by a horizontal 

distance of approximately 6 feet and 

that the associated cables and conduits 

are in close proximity to each other. The 

licensee also stated that the primary 

ignition sources in the area, aside from 

the pumps themselves, are located 

approximately 18 feet from the CRD 

pumps. 

In the unlikely event that a fire occurs 

and causes damage to both pumps, 

OMA #13 is available to re-enter this 

fire zone and manually open Core Spray 

valves V–20–1 and V–20–2 and close V– 

20–4 (V–20–2 and V–20–4 are located in 

Fire Zone RB–FZ–1F2) to provide 

Reactor Coolant Makeup from the CST 

for Fire Zone RB–FZ–1F3. The licensee 

also stated that they have assumed a 30- 

minute diagnosis period and that the 

required time to perform the action is 35 

minutes while the time available is 204 

minutes, which provides a 139-minute 

margin. 

3.10.5 Conclusion 

Given the limited amount of 

combustible materials, ignition sources, 

and large volume of the space it is 

unlikely that a fire would occur and go 

undetected or unsuppressed by the 

smoke detection system or personnel 

and damage the safe shutdown 

equipment. The low likelihood of 

damage to safe shutdown equipment 

due to a fire in this zone, combined with 

the ability of OMA #13 to manipulate 

the plant in the event of a fire that 

damages safe shutdown equipment, 

provides adequate assurance that safe 

shutdown capability is maintained. 

3.11 RB–FZ–1F5 Reactor Bldg. Torus 

Room Elev. -19′-6′′ 

3.11.1 Fire Prevention 

The licensee has classified the fire 

loading in this fire zone as low. The 

licensee also stated that this area has an 

administrative fire loading limit of less 

than 30 minutes as determined by the 

ASTM E119 time-temperature curve. 

The major combustibles in this area are 

cable insulation (approximately 19% of 

loading) and gratings (approximately 

76% of loading). The grating, which is 

the largest plastic material in this area, 

has a low flame spread rating (less than 

25). 

3.11.2 Detection, Control, and 

Extinguishment 

The licensee stated that RB–FZ–1F5 

does not have a detection or 

suppression systems. The NRC staff 

finds that the, because of the low 

amount of combustible material in the 

area and low flame spread rating of the 

majority of this material, a fire in this 

zone is not expected to be of significant 

size or duration. 

3.11.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown 

Capability 

The licensee stated that RB–FZ–1F5 is 

a voluminous area with an approximate 

floor area of 11450 square feet and a 

ceiling height of approximately 41′-6′′, 

therefore, it is unlikely that smoke and 

heat from a fire in the area would 

accumulate at the location of the 

instrument air line and cause a loss of 

instrument air. 

3.11.4 OMAs Credited for a Fire in 

This Zone 

3.11.4.1 OMA #12—Establish CRD 

Flow to Reactor 

In order for OMA #12 to be necessary, 

a loss of instrument air to the CRD flow 

control valve would have to occur due 

to fire damage. The licensee stated that 

the normal CRD flow control valve is a 

single component without a redundant 

counterpart. Because of this, a manual 

bypass is provided to maintain flow 

around the CRD flow control valves that 

fail closed upon loss of instrument air 

or control cable damage. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the normal flow 

control valve to be unavailable due to a 

loss of instrument air or cable damage, 

OMA #12 is available to manually open 

V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 while 

monitoring flow at FI–225–2, and close 

V–15–52 to establish CRD flow to the 

reactor. Furthermore, OMA #12 would 

only be necessary if the Isolation 

Condenser/CRD systems are utilized for 

hot shutdown. If OMA #12 becomes 

necessary, the licensee stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 15 minutes, while 

the time available is 204 minutes, which 

provides a 159-minute margin. 

3.11.5 Conclusion 

Given the limited amount of 

combustible materials, ignition sources, 

and the large volume of the area, it is 

unlikely that a fire would occur and go 

undetected or unsuppressed by 

personnel, and damage the safe 

shutdown equipment. The low 

likelihood of damage to safe shutdown 

equipment due to a fire in this zone, 

combined with the ability of OMA #12 

to manipulate the plant in the event of 

a fire that damages safe shutdown 

equipment, provides adequate assurance 

that safe shutdown capability is 

maintained. 

3.12 RB–FZ–1G Reactor Bldg. 

Shutdown Cooling Room Elev. 38′-0′′ & 

51′-3′′ 

3.12.1 Fire Prevention 

The licensee has classified the fire 

loading in this fire zone as low. The 

licensee also stated that this area has an 

administrative fire loading limit of less 

than 30 minutes as determined by the 

ASTM E119 time-temperature curve. 

The main combustibles in this area are 

cable insulation (approximately 12% of 

loading), plastic (approximately 57% of 

loading) and Class A combustibles 

(approximately 14% of loading). The 

grating, which is the majority of the 

plastic material in this area, has a low 

flame spread rating (less than 25). 

3.12.2 Detection, Control, and 

Extinguishment 

The licensee stated that RB–FZ–1G is 

provided with a smoke detection system 

that alarms locally and in the control 

room to provide prompt notification of 

a potential fire event. 

3.12.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown 

Capability 

The licensee stated that RB–FZ–1G 

has a ceiling height of approximately 

21′, measured from the 51′-3′′ elevation, 

and an approximate floor area of 1609 

square feet so it is unlikely that smoke 

and heat would accumulate at the 

height of the safe shutdown equipment 

and cause a failure due to fire damage. 

3.12.4 OMAs Credited for a Fire in 

This Zone 

3.12.4.1 OMA #11—Locally Read CRD 

Flow Gauge FI–225–998 

In order for OMA #11 to be necessary, 

the normal local gauge for CRD flow, FI– 


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225–2, located in Fire Zone RB–FZ–1E 

or its associated cables, would have to 

be damaged by fire. The licensee stated 

that there are no in-situ combustibles 

present in the immediate area 

surrounding the gauge and that the 

placement or storage of transient 

combustibles is remote since the gauge 

is surrounded by piping and tubing. The 

licensee also stated that the nearest 

ignition source is MCC 1A21B, which is 

located approximately 8 feet from the 

flow gauge. However, the solid steel rear 

of the MCC faces the flow gauge making 

it highly unlikely that this potential 

ignition source would adversely impact 

the flow gauge. 

In the unlikely event that a fire occurs 

and this flow gauge becomes 

unreadable, OMA #11 is available to 

locally read flow gauge FI–225–998, 

which is the redundant instrument that 

provides the same data and is mounted 

on an instrument rack located in Fire 

Zone RB–FZ–1D. The licensee also 

stated that they have assumed a 30- 

minute diagnosis period and that the 

required time to perform the action is 

100 minutes, including a 90-minute 

allowance before re-entry, while the 

time available is 204 minutes, which 

provides a 74-minute margin. 

3.12.4.2 OMA #12—Establish CRD 

Flow to Reactor 

In order for OMA #12 to be necessary, 

a loss of instrument air to the CRD flow 

control valve would have to occur due 

to fire damage. The licensee stated that 

the normal CRD flow control valve is a 

single component without a redundant 

counterpart. Because of this, a manual 

bypass is provided to maintain flow 

around the CRD flow control valves that 

fail closed upon loss of instrument air 

or control cable damage. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the normal flow 

control valve to be unavailable due to a 

loss of instrument air or cable damage, 

OMA #12 is available to manually open 

V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 while 

monitoring flow at FI–225–2, and close 

V–15–52 to establish CRD flow to the 

reactor. Furthermore, OMA #12 would 

only be necessary if the Isolation 

Condenser/CRD systems are utilized for 

hot shutdown. If OMA #12 becomes 

necessary, the licensee stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 100 minutes, 

including a 90-minute allowance before 

re-entry, while the time available is 204 

minutes, which provides a 74-minute 

margin. 

3.12.5 Conclusion 

Given the limited amount of 

combustible materials, ignition sources, 

and large volume of the space, it is 

unlikely that a fire would occur and go 

undetected or unsuppressed by the 

smoke detection system or personnel 

and damage the safe shutdown 

equipment. The low likelihood of 

damage to safe shutdown equipment 

due to a fire in this zone, combined with 

the ability of OMAs #11 and #12 to 

manipulate the plant in the event of a 

fire that damages safe shutdown 

equipment, provides adequate assurance 

that safe shutdown capability is 

maintained. 

3.13 TB–FA–3A Turbine Bldg. 4160V 

Emergency Switchgear Vault 1C Elev. 

23′-6′′ 

3.13.1 Fire Prevention 

The licensee has classified the fire 

loading in this fire area as low. The 

licensee also stated that this area has an 

administrative fire loading limit of less 

than 30 minutes as determined by the 

ASTM E119 time-temperature curve. 

There are minimal amounts of cable 

insulation (approximately 5% of 

loading) miscellaneous plastic 

(approximately 73% of loading) and 

class A combustibles such as paper for 

procedures (approximately 20% of 

loading) in this area. 

3.13.2 Detection, Control, and 

Extinguishment 

The licensee stated that TB–FA–3A is 

provided with an area-wide smoke 

detection system and a total-flooding, 

manually actuated CO2 system. 

3.13.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown 

Capability 

The licensee stated that TB–FA–3A 

has a ceiling height of approximately 21′ 

and an approximate floor area of 336 

square feet so it is unlikely that smoke 

and heat would accumulate at the 

height of the safe shutdown equipment 

and cause a failure due to fire damage. 

3.13.4 OMAs Credited for a Fire in 

This Area 

3.13.4.1 OMA #12—Establish CRD 

Flow to Reactor 

In order for OMA #12 to be necessary, 

a loss of instrument air to the CRD flow 

control valve would have to occur due 

to fire damage. The licensee stated that 

the normal CRD flow control valve is a 

single component without a redundant 

counterpart. Because of this, a manual 

bypass is provided to maintain flow 

around the CRD flow control valves that 

fail closed upon loss of instrument air 

or control cable damage. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the normal flow 

control valve to be unavailable due to a 

loss of instrument air or cable damage, 

OMA #12 is available to manually open 

V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 while 

monitoring flow at FI–225–2, and close 

V–15–52 to establish CRD flow to the 

reactor. Furthermore, OMA #12 would 

only be necessary if the Isolation 

Condenser/CRD systems are utilized for 

hot shutdown. If OMA #12 becomes 

necessary, the licensee stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 15 minutes, while 

the time available is 204 minutes, which 

provides a 159-minute margin. 

3.13.5 Conclusion 

Given the limited amount of 

combustible materials, ignition sources, 

and large volume of the space, it is 

unlikely that a fire would occur and go 

undetected or unsuppressed by the 

smoke detection or CO2 systems, or 

personnel, and damage the safe 

shutdown equipment. The low 

likelihood of damage to safe shutdown 

equipment due to a fire in this area, 

combined with the ability of OMA #12 

to manipulate the plant in the event of 

a fire that damages safe shutdown 

equipment, provides adequate assurance 

that safe shutdown capability is 

maintained. 

3.14 TB–FA–26 Turbine Bldg. 125V DC 

Battery Room C Elev. 23′-6′′ 

3.14.1 Fire Prevention 

The licensee has classified the fire 

loading in this fire area as moderate. 

The licensee also stated that this area 

has an administrative fire loading limit 

of less than 90 minutes as determined 

by the ASTM E119 time-temperature 

curve. The major combustibles in this 

area are plastic, which is contributed by 

the battery cases (approximately 92% of 

loading) and cable insulation 

(approximately 6% of loading). 

3.14.2 Detection, Control, and 

Extinguishment 

The licensee stated that TB–FA–26 

has an area-wide automatic pre-action 

sprinkler system and an area-wide 

smoke detection system installed. 

Additionally, the licensee identified 

that the battery cases are filled with 

water which would provide some 

resistance to combustion of the cases. 

3.14.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown 

Capability 

The licensee stated that there are no 

specific cables in this fire area 

associated with the OMAs identified for 

Fire Area TB–FA–26 and that the only 


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FSSD component and cable located in 

this fire area is associated with the ‘‘C’’ 

battery. Additionally, per the Oyster 

Creek Updated Final Safety Analysis 

Report, Section 8.3.2.4, the ‘‘B’’ 125V DC 

distribution system is redundant to the 

‘‘C’’ system and the two systems are 

physically independent. 

3.14.4 OMAs Credited for a Fire in 

This Area 

The licensee stated that this fire area 

is wholly contained within Fire Zone 

TB–FZ–11C (A and B 4160V Room) and 

that all cables to TB–FA–26 must 

traverse TB–FZ–11C. Therefore, TB– 

FA–26 and TB–FZ–11C were analyzed 

together for safe shutdown purposes and 

the OMAs are duplicated for these two 

plant areas. Refer to Section 3.16 below 

for NRC staff’s evaluation of the 

feasibility of OMAs #1, #3, #6, and #12, 

which are common to both areas. 

3.14.5 Conclusion 

Given the limited amount of 

combustible materials, ignition sources, 

and lack of multiple safe shutdown 

trains in this area, it is unlikely that a 

fire would occur and go undetected or 

unsuppressed by the smoke detection or 

sprinkler systems, or personnel, and 

damage the safe shutdown equipment. 

The low likelihood of damage to safe 

shutdown equipment due to a fire in 

this area, combined with the ability of 

OMAs #1, #3, #6, and #12 to manipulate 

the plant in the event of a fire that 

damages safe shutdown equipment, 

provides adequate assurance that safe 

shutdown capability is maintained. 

3.15 TB–FZ–11B Turbine Bldg. Lube 

Oil Storage, Purification and Pumping 

Area Elev. 0′-0′′, 27′-0′′, and 36′-0′′ 

3.15.1 Fire Prevention 

The licensee has classified the fire 

loading in this fire zone as high. The 

licensee also stated that this fire zone 

has administrative controls such that 

additional combustible materials are not 

introduced into this zone and defensein-depth features to control a potential 

oil fire in this zone. The major 

combustibles in this area are lubricating 

oil (approximately 99% of loading) and 

cable insulation (approximately 0.3% of 

loading). The amount of oil contained in 

the lube oil storage tanks in this fire 

zone results in a combustible loading of 

approximately 14 hours. 

3.15.2 Detection, Control, and 

Extinguishment 

The licensee stated that TB–FZ–11B 

has automatic suppression systems 

installed over principal combustibles 

and a rate of rise/fixed temperature fire 

detection system installed at the lube oil 

tank. A closed head automatic sprinkler 

system protects cable trays and open 

head water spray deluge system protects 

oil handling equipment and the oil 

storage tank. Thermal detectors are 

located in close proximity to the lube oil 

tank so that a lube oil fire would be 

quickly detected, which in turn would 

activate the deluge system for 

extinguishment. Additionally, the 

licensee stated that there are fire 

extinguishers provided throughout the 

zone and that aqueous film-forming 

foam (AFFF) is staged in the Fire 

Brigade van for use if necessary. 

3.15.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown 

Capability 

The licensee stated that the ceiling 

heights in the area are approximately 9′- 

0′′ in the basement hallway, 

approximately 19′-0′′ in the basement 

stairs, approximately 26′-0′′ on the first 

floor of the area, and approximately 42′- 

0′′ on the second floor of the area. 

Additionally, the licensee stated that the 

floor area, measured at the 0′-0′′ 

elevation is approximately 3,175 square 

feet. 

3.15.4 OMAs Credited for a Fire in 

This Zone 

3.15.4.1 OMA #1—Manually Trip 

4160V 1D Breakers and Control USS 

1B2 & 1B3 Breakers Locally at LSP–1D 

In order for OMA #1 to be necessary, 

damage to the credited and redundant 

cables would have to occur due to a fire. 

The licensee stated that these cables are 

located in the same tray with additional 

cables and are generally located 

approximately 14 feet above the floor. 

The licensee also stated that the cables 

pass over the top of potential ignition 

sources MCC 1A12 and MCC 1B12 and 

that the cables are located 

approximately 6 feet above these 

ignition sources. Additionally, the lube 

oil tanks are located below the cables, 

although not directly below, with a 

distance of approximately 26 feet 

separating the cables and the tanks. The 

cables are also located approximately 20 

feet from ignition sources MCC 1A12A 

and 1B12A. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #1 is available 

to manually trip the 4160V 1D breakers 

and control USS 1B2 and the 1B3 480V 

breakers locally at LSP–1D. The licensee 

also stated that they have assumed a 10- 

minute diagnosis period and that the 

required time to perform the action is 19 

minutes while the time available is 45 

minutes, which provides a 16-minute 

margin. 

3.15.4.2 OMA #2—Read Condensate 

Storage Tank Local Level Indicator LI– 

424–993 

In order for OMA #2 to be necessary, 

damage to the primary CST level 

indicator (5F–27) cable would have to 

occur due to a fire. The licensee stated 

that this cable is located approximately 

20 feet above the floor and that the 

nearest primary ignition source in the 

area, the lube oil tank, is located 

approximately 7 feet below the cable. 

With the exception of the cables 

themselves, there are no other ignition 

sources or combustibles located near the 

cables. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the primary CST 

level indicator, OMA #2 is available to 

locally read CST level at the local 

indicator, LI–424–993, located at the 

CST. The licensee also stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 7 minutes while 

the time available is 73 minutes, which 

provides a 36-minute margin. 

3.15.4.3 OMA #3—Manually Control 

1B3M Breaker at LSP–1B3 

In order for OMA #3 to be necessary, 

the credited and redundant cables 

would have to be damaged due to a fire. 

The licensee stated that these cables are 

located in the same tray with additional 

cables and are generally located 

approximately 14 feet above the floor. 

The licensee also stated that the cables 

pass over the top of potential ignition 

sources MCC 1A12 and MCC 1B12 and 

that the cables are located 

approximately 6 feet above these 

ignition sources. Additionally, the lube 

oil tanks are located below the cables, 

although not directly below, with a 

distance of approximately 26 feet 

separating the cables and the tanks. The 

cables are also located approximately 20 

feet from ignition sources MCC 1A12A 

and 1B12A. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #3 is available 

to manually control the 1B3M breaker 

locally from LSP–1B3. The licensee also 

stated that they have assumed a 10- 

minute diagnosis period and that the 

required time to perform the action is 10 

minutes while the time available is 45 

minutes, which provides a 25-minute 

margin. 

3.15.4.4 OMA #4—Manually Control 

Condensate Transfer Pump 1–2 from 

LSP–1B32 

In order for OMA #4 to be necessary, 

damage to the credited and redundant 

cables for the Condensate Transfer 


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Pump 1–2 would have to be damaged 

due to a fire. The licensee stated that 

these cables are located in the same tray 

with additional cables and are generally 

located approximately 20 feet above the 

floor and approximately 7 feet above the 

lube oil tank. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #4 is available 

to manually control Condensate 

Transfer Pump 1–2 locally from LSP– 

1B32. The licensee also stated that they 

have assumed a 10-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 10 minutes while 

the time available is 45 minutes, which 

provides a 25-minute margin. 

3.15.4.5 OMA #6—Manually Reclose 

Feeder Breaker MCC 1B32 at USS 1B3 

In order for OMA #6 to be necessary, 

power to USS 1B3 or the 1B 4160V 

switchgear would have to be lost due to 

a fire. The licensee stated that these 

cables are located in the same tray with 

additional cables and are generally 

located approximately 14 feet above the 

floor. The licensee also stated that the 

cables pass over the top of potential 

ignition sources MCC 1A12 and MCC 

1B12 and that the cables are located 

approximately 6 feet above these 

ignition sources. Additionally, the lube 

oil tanks are located below the cables, 

although not directly below, with a 

distance of approximately 26 feet 

separating the cables and the tanks. The 

cables are also located approximately 20 

feet from ignition sources MCC 1A12A 

and 1B12A. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes a loss of power to USS 

1B3 or a loss of the 1B 4160V 

switchgear, OMA #6 is available to 

manually re-close Feeder Breaker MCC 

1B32 at USS 1B3 due to an under 

voltage trip. The licensee also stated 

that they have assumed a 10-minute 

diagnosis period and that the required 

time to perform the action is 6 minutes 

while the time available is 45 minutes, 

which provides a 29-minute margin. 

3.15.4.6 OMA #12—Establish CRD 

Flow to Reactor 

In order for OMA #12 to be necessary, 

a loss of instrument air to the CRD flow 

control valve would have to occur due 

to fire damage. The licensee stated that 

the normal CRD flow control valve is a 

single component without a redundant 

counterpart. Because of this, a manual 

bypass is provided to maintain flow 

around the CRD flow control valves that 

fail closed upon loss of instrument air 

or control cable damage. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the normal flow 

control valve to be unavailable due to a 

loss of instrument air or cable damage, 

OMA #12 is available to manually open 

V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 while 

monitoring flow at FI–225–2, and close 

V–15–52 to establish CRD flow to the 

reactor. Furthermore, OMA #12 would 

only be necessary if the Isolation 

Condenser/CRD systems are utilized for 

hot shutdown. If OMA #12 becomes 

necessary, the licensee stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 15 minutes, while 

the time available is 204 minutes, which 

provides a 159-minute margin. 

3.15.4.7 OMA #16—Manually Trip Rx 

Recirculation Pumps at 4160V 

Switchgear 

In order for OMA #16 to be necessary, 

the credited and redundant cables 

would have to be damaged due to a fire. 

The licensee stated that these cables are 

located in the same tray with additional 

cables and are generally located 

approximately 14 feet above the floor. 

The licensee also stated that the cables 

pass over the top of potential ignition 

sources MCC 1A12 and MCC 1B12 and 

that the cables are located 

approximately 6 feet above these 

ignition sources. Additionally, the lube 

oil tanks are located below the cables, 

although not directly below, with a 

distance of approximately 26 feet 

separating the cables and the tanks. The 

cables are also located approximately 20 

feet from ignition sources MCC 1A12A 

and 1B12A. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #16 is available 

to manually trip Reactor Recirculation 

Pumps (‘‘A,’’ ‘‘B,’’ ‘‘C,’’ ‘‘D’’ and ‘‘E’’) 

4160V Switchgear 1A and 1B. The 

licensee also stated that they have 

assumed a 10-minute diagnosis period 

and that the required time to perform 

the action is 13 minutes while the time 

available is 30 minutes, which provides 

a 7-minute margin. 

3.15.5 Conclusion 

Although the fire loading for this zone 

is high, the limited ignition sources, 

large volume of the space, and the 

detection and suppression system make 

it unlikely that a fire would occur and 

go undetected or unsuppressed and 

damage the safe shutdown equipment. 

Additionally, the availability of fire 

extinguishers and AFFF, which is 

effective against oil based fires, provides 

an augmented ability to suppress a fire 

prior to damaging safe shutdown 

equipment. The low likelihood of 

damage to safe shutdown equipment 

due to a fire in this zone, combined with 

the ability of OMAs #1, #2, #3, #4, #6, 

#12, and #16 to manipulate the plant in 

the event of a fire that damages safe 

shutdown equipment, provides 

adequate assurance that safe shutdown 

capability is maintained. 

3.16 TB–FZ–11C Turbine Bldg. 4160V 

SWGR Room 1A and 1B Elev. 23′-6′′ 

3.16.1 Fire Prevention 

The licensee has classified the fire 

loading in this fire zone as low. The 

licensee also stated that this area has an 

administrative fire loading limit of less 

than 30 minutes as determined by the 

ASTM E119 time-temperature curve. 

The main combustible loading is 

attributed to cable insulation 

(approximately 73% of loading) and 

plastic (approximately 17% of loading). 

3.16.2 Detection, Control, and 

Extinguishment 

The licensee stated that TB–FZ–11C 

has an area-wide smoke detection 

system and an area-wide automatic 

fixed pre-action sprinkler system 

installed (except in the small caged area 

located to the east of Fire Area TB–FA– 

3A). 

3.16.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown 

Capability 

The licensee stated that TB–FZ–11C 

has a ceiling height of approximately 

21′-8′′ and an approximate floor area of 

2666 square feet so it is unlikely that 

smoke and heat would accumulate at 

the height of the safe shutdown 

equipment and cause a failure due to 

fire damage. 

3.16.4 OMAs Credited for a Fire in 

This Zone 

3.16.4.1 OMA #1—Manually Trip 

4160V 1D Breakers and Control USS 

1B2 & 1B3 Breakers Locally at LSP–1D 

In order for OMA #1 to be necessary, 

the credited cables for USS 1B2 and 1B3 

4160V breakers and the redundant 

cables for USS 1A2 and 1A3 breakers 

would have to be damaged due to a fire. 

The licensee stated that these cables are 

located in the same tray with additional 

cables and are generally located at least 

17 feet above the floor. The licensee also 

stated that the tray passes over the top 

of potential ignition source ‘‘B’’ 4160V 

switchgear and that the cables are 

located approximately 9 feet above this 

ignition source and 3 feet above the isophase bus duct at their closest point. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #1 is available 

to manually trip the 4160V 1D breakers 

and control USS 1B2 and the 1B3 480V 

breakers locally at LSP–1D. The licensee 


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also stated that they have assumed a 10- 

minute diagnosis period and that the 

required time to perform the action is 24 

minutes while the time available is 45 

minutes, which provides an 11-minute 

margin. 

3.16.4.3 OMA #3—Manually Control 

1B3M Breaker at LSP–1B3 

In order for OMA #3 to be necessary, 

the credited and redundant cables 

would have to be damaged due to a fire. 

The licensee stated that these cables are 

located in the same tray with additional 

cables and are generally located at least 

17 feet above the floor. The licensee also 

stated that the tray passes over the top 

of potential ignition source ‘‘B’’ 4160V 

switchgear and that the cables are 

located approximately 9 feet above this 

ignition source and 3 feet above the isophase bus duct at their closest point. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #3 is available 

to manually control the 1B3M breaker 

locally from LSP–1B3. The licensee also 

stated that they have assumed a 10- 

minute diagnosis period and that the 

required time to perform the action is 10 

minutes while the time available is 45 

minutes, which provides a 25-minute 

margin. 

3.16.4.5 OMA #6—Manually Reclose 

Feeder Breaker MCC 1B32 at USS 1B3 

In order for OMA #6 to be necessary, 

power to USS 1B3 or the 1B 4160V 

switchgear would have to be lost due to 

a fire. The licensee stated that these 

cables are located in the same tray with 

additional cables and are generally 

located at least 17 feet above the floor. 

The licensee also stated that the tray 

passes over the top of potential ignition 

source ‘‘B’’ 4160V switchgear and that 

the cables are located approximately 9 

feet above this ignition source and 3 feet 

above the iso-phase bus duct at their 

closest point. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes a loss of power to USS 

1B3 or a loss of the 1B 4160V 

switchgear, OMA #6 is available to 

manually re-close Feeder Breaker MCC 

1B32 at USS 1B3 due to an under 

voltage trip. The licensee also stated 

that they have assumed a 10-minute 

diagnosis period and that the required 

time to perform the action is 6 minutes 

while the time available is 45 minutes, 

which provides a 29-minute margin. 

3.16.4.6 OMA #12—Establish CRD 

Flow to Reactor 

In order for OMA #12 to be necessary, 

a loss of instrument air to the CRD flow 

control valve would have to occur due 

to fire damage. The licensee stated that 

the normal CRD flow control valve is a 

single component without a redundant 

counterpart. Because of this, a manual 

bypass is provided to maintain flow 

around the CRD flow control valves that 

fail closed upon loss of instrument air 

or control cable damage. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the normal flow 

control valve to be unavailable due to a 

loss of instrument air or cable damage, 

OMA #12 is available to manually open 

V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 while 

monitoring flow at FI–225–2, and close 

V–15–52 to establish CRD flow to the 

reactor. Furthermore, OMA #12 would 

only be necessary if the Isolation 

Condenser/CRD systems are utilized for 

hot shutdown. If OMA #12 becomes 

necessary, the licensee stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 15 minutes, while 

the time available is 204 minutes, which 

provides a 159-minute margin. 

3.16.5 Conclusion 

Given the limited amount of 

combustible materials, ignition sources, 

and large volume of the space, it is 

unlikely that a fire would occur and go 

undetected or unsuppressed by the 

smoke detection or sprinkler systems 

noted above, or personnel, and damage 

the safe shutdown equipment. The low 

likelihood of damage to safe shutdown 

equipment due to a fire in this zone, 

combined with the ability of OMAs #1, 

#3, #6, and #12 to manipulate the plant 

in the event of a fire that damages safe 

shutdown equipment, provides 

adequate assurance that safe shutdown 

capability is maintained. 

3.17 TB–FZ–11D Turbine Bldg. 

Basement Floor South End Elev. 3′-6′′ 

3.17.1 Fire Prevention 

The licensee has classified the fire 

loading in this fire zone as low. The 

licensee also stated that this area has an 

administrative fire loading limit of less 

than 30 minutes as determined by the 

ASTM E119 time-temperature curve. 

The major combustibles in this area are 

cable insulation (approximately 29% of 

loading), Dow Corning 561 Silicon 

transformer liquid (approximately 15% 

of loading) and lubricating oil 

(approximately 40% of loading). 

3.17.2 Detection, Control, and 

Extinguishment 

The licensee stated that an automatic 

wet-pipe sprinkler system and an 

automatic water spray system located at 

the hydrogen seal oil unit are installed 

in the area. 

3.17.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown 

Capability 

The licensee stated that TB–FZ–11D 

has a ceiling height of approximately 19′ 

and an approximate floor area of 9668 

square feet so it is unlikely that smoke 

and heat would accumulate at the 

height of the safe shutdown equipment 

and cause a failure due to fire damage. 

3.17.4 OMAs Credited for a Fire in 

This Zone 

3.17.4.1 OMA #1—Manually Trip 

4160V 1D Breakers and Control USS 

1B2 & 1B3 Breakers Locally at LSP–1D 

In order for OMA #1 to be necessary, 

the credited cables for USS 1B2 and 1B3 

4160V breakers and the redundant 

cables for USS 1A2 and 1A3 breakers 

would have to be damaged due to a fire. 

The licensee stated that these cables are 

located in the same tray with additional 

cables and are generally located at least 

15 feet above the floor. The primary 

combustible fuel load in the area is the 

cables themselves and storage of 

transient combustibles is limited due to 

a sump and abandoned acid/caustic 

tanks located in the area. 

The licensee also stated that the 

primary ignition sources in the area near 

the cable trays are the Turbine Building 

Closed Cooling Water Pumps and USS 

1A1 and its associated transformer 

(4160V to 480V transformer). However, 

the Turbine Building Closed Cooling 

Water Pumps contain less than 5 gallons 

of oil and are enclosed in metal casings 

and the cable tray containing the cables 

is approximately 13 feet from the top of 

the pumps/motors. The top of USS 1A1 

and its associated transformer are 

located approximately 30 feet 

diagonally from the credited cables and 

approximately 15 feet diagonally from 

the redundant cables. Additionally, 

there is a concrete ceiling beam, with a 

water curtain sprinkler system attached, 

which would provide some shielding 

for the cables from potential products of 

combustion generated by this ignition 

source. Sprinkler heads are also located 

in a ceiling pocket between the concrete 

ceiling beam and the USS 1A1 and 

transformer. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #1 is available 

to manually trip the 4160V 1D breakers 

and control USS 1B2 and the 1B3 480V 

breakers locally at LSP–1D. The licensee 

also stated that they have assumed a 10- 

minute diagnosis period and that the 

required time to perform the action is 24 

minutes while the time available is 45 

minutes, which provides an 11-minute 

margin. 


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3.17.4.2 OMA #3—Manually Control 

1B3M Breaker at LSP–1B3 

In order for OMA #3 to be necessary, 

the credited and redundant cables 

would have to be damaged due to a fire. 

The licensee stated that these cables are 

located in the same tray with additional 

cables and are generally located at least 

15 feet above the floor. The primary 

combustible fuel load in the area is the 

cables themselves and storage of 

transient combustibles is limited due to 

a sump and abandoned acid/caustic 

tanks located in the area. 

The licensee also stated that the 

primary ignition sources in the area near 

the cable trays are the Turbine Building 

Closed Cooling Water Pumps and USS 

1A1 and its associated transformer 

(4160V to 480V transformer). However, 

the Turbine Building Closed Cooling 

Water Pumps contain less than 5 gallons 

of oil and are enclosed in metal casings 

and the cable tray containing the cables 

is approximately 13 feet from the top of 

the pumps/motors. The top of USS 1A1 

and its associated transformer are 

located approximately 30 feet 

diagonally from the credited cables and 

approximately 15 feet diagonally from 

the redundant cables. Additionally, 

there is a concrete ceiling beam, with a 

water curtain sprinkler system attached, 

which would provide some shielding 

for the cables from potential products of 

combustion generated by this ignition 

source. Sprinkler heads are also located 

in a ceiling pocket between the concrete 

ceiling beam and the USS 1A1 and 

transformer. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #3 is available 

to manually control the 1B3M breaker 

locally from LSP–1B3. The licensee also 

stated that they have assumed a 10- 

minute diagnosis period and that the 

required time to perform the action is 10 

minutes while the time available is 45 

minutes, which provides a 25-minute 

margin. 

3.17.4.3 OMA #5—Manually Control 

Diesel Generator #2 from LSP–DG2 

In order for OMA #5 to be necessary, 

damage to the credited and redundant 

cables for Diesel Generator #1 and #2 

would have to occur due to a fire. The 

licensee stated that the credited and 

redundant cables are located in the 

same cable trays, in some areas, with 

additional cables and that the cable 

trays are approximately 17 feet above 

the floor. The primary combustible fuel 

load in the area is the cables themselves 

and storage of transient combustibles is 

limited due to a sump and abandoned 

acid/caustic tanks located in the area. 

The licensee also stated that the 

primary ignition sources in the area are 

the Turbine Building Closed Cooling 

Water Pumps and USS 1A1 and its 

associated transformer. The licensee 

stated that the Turbine Building Closed 

Cooling Water Pumps contain less than 

5 gallons of oil, are enclosed in metal 

casings, and are located approximately 

13 feet from the cable tray containing 

the credited and redundant cables. 

Additionally, USS 1A1 and its 

associated transformer are located 

approximately 8 feet directly below 

some of the credited cables for Diesel 

Generator #2, however, the redundant 

cables are approximately 25 feet from 

this portion of the credited cables. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #5 is available 

to manually control Emergency Diesel 

Generator #2 from LSP–DG2. The 

licensee also stated that they have 

assumed a 10-minute diagnosis period 

and that the required time to perform 

the action is 14 minutes while the time 

available is 45 minutes, which provides 

a 21-minute margin. 

3.17.4.4 OMA #6—Manually Reclose 

Feeder Breaker MCC 1B32 at USS 1B3 

In order for OMA #6 to be necessary, 

power to USS 1B3 or the 1B 4160V 

switchgear would have to be lost due to 

a fire. The licensee stated that these 

cables are located in the same tray with 

additional cables and are generally 

located at least 15 feet above the floor. 

The primary combustible fuel load in 

the area is the cables themselves and 

storage of transient combustibles is 

limited due to a sump and abandoned 

acid/caustic tanks located in the area. 

The licensee also stated that the 

primary ignition sources in the area near 

the cable trays are the Turbine Building 

Closed Cooling Water Pumps and USS 

1A1 and its associated transformer 

(4160V to 480V transformer). However, 

the Turbine Building Closed Cooling 

Water Pumps contain less than 5 gallons 

of oil and are enclosed in metal casings 

and the cable tray containing the cables 

is approximately 13 feet from the top of 

the pumps/motors. The top of USS 1A1 

and its associated transformer are 

located approximately 30 feet 

diagonally from the credited cables and 

approximately 15 feet diagonally from 

the redundant cables. Additionally, 

there is a concrete ceiling beam, with a 

water curtain sprinkler system attached, 

which would provide some shielding 

for the cables from potential products of 

combustion generated by this ignition 

source. Sprinkler heads are also located 

in a ceiling pocket between the concrete 

ceiling beam and the USS 1A1 and 

transformer. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes a loss of power to USS 

1B3 or loss of the 1B 4160V switchgear, 

OMA #6 is available to manually reclose Feeder Breaker MCC1B32 at USS 

1B3 due to an under voltage trip. The 

licensee also stated that they have 

assumed a 10-minute diagnosis period 

and that the required time to perform 

the action is 6 minutes while the time 

available is 45 minutes, which provides 

a 29-minute margin. 

3.17.4.5 OMA #12—Establish CRD 

Flow to Reactor 

In order for OMA #12 to be necessary, 

a loss of instrument air to the CRD flow 

control valve would have to occur due 

to fire damage. The licensee stated that 

although the USSs powering the air 

compressors are located 35 feet apart 

from each other, the power cables are 

located in the same cable trays for at 

least 45 feet and that the normal CRD 

flow control valve is a single component 

without a redundant counterpart. 

Because of this, a manual bypass is 

provided to maintain flow around the 

CRD flow control valves that fail closed 

upon loss of instrument air or control 

cable damage. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the normal flow 

control valve to be unavailable due to a 

loss of instrument air or cable damage, 

OMA #12 is available to manually open 

V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 while 

monitoring flow at FI–225–2, and close 

V–15–52 to establish CRD flow to the 

reactor. Furthermore, OMA #12 would 

only be necessary if the Isolation 

Condenser/CRD systems are utilized for 

hot shutdown. If OMA #12 becomes 

necessary, the licensee stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 15 minutes, while 

the time available is 204 minutes, which 

provides a 159-minute margin. 

3.17.5 Conclusion 

Given the limited amount of 

combustible materials, ignition sources 

and the volume of the space, it is 

unlikely that a fire would occur and go 

undetected or unsuppressed by the 

suppression systems noted above, or 

personnel, and damage the safe 

shutdown equipment. The low 

likelihood of damage to safe shutdown 

equipment due to a fire in this zone, 

combined with the ability of OMAs #1, 

#3, #5, #6, and #12 to manipulate the 

plant in the event of a fire that damages 

safe shutdown equipment, provides 

adequate assurance that safe shutdown 

capability is maintained. 


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19812 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 68 / Friday, April 8, 2011 / Notices 

3.18 TB–FZ–11E Turbine Bldg. 

Condenser Bay Area Elev. 0′-0′′ 

3.18.1 Fire Prevention 

The licensee has classified the fire 

loading in this fire zone as low. The 

licensee also stated that this Fire Zone 

is procedurally controlled as a transient 

combustible free area while the plant is 

operating. This area is a high radiation 

area during plant operation and is not 

normally accessed. The zone has an 

administrative fire loading limit of less 

than 30 minutes as determined by the 

ASTM E119 time-temperature curve. 

The major combustibles in this area are 

cable insulation (approximately 40% of 

loading) and plastic (approximately 

59% of loading). Plastic grating, which 

is the largest plastic material in this 

zone, is dispersed throughout this fire 

zone (not concentrated) and has a low 

flame spread (less than 25). 

3.18.2 Detection, Control, and 

Extinguishment 

The licensee stated that a closed head 

automatic sprinkler and spray systems 

protect the south end basement area and 

the hydrogen seal oil unit. An 

exemption was granted from the 

requirements of Appendix R Section 

III.G.2 in Safety Evaluations (SEs) dated 

March 24, 1986, and June 25, 1990, for 

not having fixed fire detection in this 

area. The primary basis for this 

exemption is the presence of the 

automatic wet pipe sprinkler system, 

low fire loading and the 1-hour barrier 

protection for safe shutdown circuits. 

Also, the flow alarm will notify the 

control room of any sprinkler system 

activation. Since the Condenser Bay is 

procedurally controlled as a transient 

combustible free area in procedure OP– 

AA–201–009 while the plant is 

operating. Extinguishment of a fire will 

be accomplished by the automatic fixed 

suppression system and the plant fire 

brigade. A closed head automatic 

sprinkler system was recently expanded 

to provide fire suppression over the 

cables in cable trays in the northeast 

side of the condenser bay. 

3.18.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown 

Capability 

The licensee stated that TB–FZ–11E 

has a ceiling height of at least 40′ and 

an approximate floor area of 26427 

square feet so it is unlikely that smoke 

and heat would accumulate at the 

height of the safe shutdown equipment 

and cause a failure due to fire damage. 

3.18.4 OMAs Credited for a Fire in 

This Zone 

3.18.4.1 OMA #1—Manually Trip 

4160V 1D Breakers and Control USS 

1B2 & 1B3 Breakers Locally at LSP–1D 

In order for OMA #1 to be necessary, 

the credited and redundant cables 

would have to be damaged due to a fire. 

The licensee stated that these cables are 

located in the same tray with additional 

cables and are generally located 

approximately 40 feet above the floor. 

With the exception of the cables 

themselves, there are no other ignition 

sources or combustibles located near the 

cables. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #1 is available 

to manually trip the 4160V 1D breakers 

and control USS 1B2 and the 1B3 480V 

breakers locally at LSP–1D. The licensee 

also stated that they have assumed a 10- 

minute diagnosis period and that the 

required time to perform the action is 19 

minutes while the time available is 45 

minutes, which provides a 16-minute 

margin. 

3.18.4.2 OMA #2—Read Condensate 

Storage Tank Local Level Indicator LI– 

424–993 

In order for OMA #2 to be necessary, 

damage to the primary CST level 

indicator (5F–27) cable would have to 

occur due to a fire. The licensee stated 

that this cable is located approximately 

16 feet above the floor. With the 

exception of the cables themselves, 

there are no other ignition sources or 

combustibles located near the cables. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the primary CST 

level indicator, OMA #2 is available to 

locally read CST level at the local 

indicator, LI–424–993, located at the 

CST. The licensee also stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 7 minutes while 

the time available is 73 minutes, which 

provides a 36-minute margin. 

3.18.4.3 OMA #3—Manually Control 

1B3M Breaker at LSP–1B3 

In order for OMA #3 to be necessary, 

the credited and redundant cables 

would have to be damaged due to a fire. 

The licensee stated that these cables are 

located in the same tray with additional 

cables and are generally located 

approximately 40 feet above the floor. 

With the exception of the cables 

themselves, there are no other ignition 

sources or combustibles located near the 

cables. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #3 is available 

to manually control the 1B3M breaker 

locally from LSP–1B3. The licensee also 

stated that they have assumed a 10- 

minute diagnosis period and that the 

required time to perform the action is 10 

minutes while the time available is 45 

minutes, which provides a 25-minute 

margin. 

3.18.4.4 OMA #4—Manually Control 

Condensate Transfer Pump 1–2 From 

LSP–1B32 

In order for OMA #4 to be necessary, 

damage to the credited and redundant 

cables for the Condensate Transfer 

Pump 1–2 would have to be damaged 

due to a fire. The licensee stated that 

these cables are located in the same tray 

with additional cables and are generally 

located approximately 18 feet above the 

floor. With the exception of the cables 

themselves, there are no other ignition 

sources or combustibles located near the 

cables. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #4 is available 

to manually control Condensate 

Transfer Pump 1–2 locally from LSP– 

1B32. The licensee also stated that they 

have assumed a 10-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 10 minutes while 

the time available is 45 minutes, which 

provides a 25-minute margin. 

3.18.4.5 OMA #5—Manually Control 

Diesel Generator #2 from LSP–DG2 

In order for OMA #5 to be necessary, 

damage to the credited and redundant 

cables would have to occur due to a fire. 

The licensee stated that the credited and 

redundant cables are located in separate 

cable trays separated by a horizontal 

distance of at least 90 feet. The licensee 

also stated that there are no ignition 

sources near the redundant cables and 

that the primary ignition sources that 

could affect the credited cables are the 

moisture separator drain pumps and 

area sump pumps, which are located on 

the floor approximately 20 feet 

horizontally and 17 feet vertically from 

the credited cables. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #5 is available 

to manually control Emergency Diesel 

Generator #2 from LSP–DG2. The 

licensee also stated that they have 

assumed a 10-minute diagnosis period 

and that the required time to perform 

the action is 14 minutes while the time 

available is 45 minutes, which provides 

a 21-minute margin. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 68 / Friday, April 8, 2011 / Notices 19813 

3.18.4.6 OMA #6—Manually Reclose 

Feeder Breaker MCC 1B32 at USS 1B3 

In order for OMA #6 to be necessary, 

power to USS 1B3 or the 1B 4160V 

switchgear would have to be lost due to 

a fire. The licensee stated that the cables 

that could cause the loss of USS 1B3 are 

located in the same tray with additional 

cables and are generally located 

approximately 40 feet above the floor. 

With the exception of the cables 

themselves, there are no other ignition 

sources or combustibles located near the 

cables. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes a loss of power to USS 

1B3 or loss of the 1B 4160V switchgear, 

OMA #6 is available to manually reclose Feeder Breaker MCC 1B32 at USS 

1B3 due to an under voltage trip. The 

licensee also stated that they have 

assumed a 10-minute diagnosis period 

and that the required time to perform 

the action is 6 minutes while the time 

available is 45 minutes, which provides 

a 29-minute margin. 

3.18.4.7 OMA #12—Establish CRD 

Flow to Reactor 

In order for OMA #12 to be necessary, 

a loss of instrument air to the CRD flow 

control valve would have to occur due 

to fire damage. The licensee stated that 

although the USSs powering the air 

compressors are located 35 feet apart 

from each other, the power cables are 

located in the same cable trays for at 

least 45 feet and that the normal CRD 

flow control valve is a single component 

without a redundant counterpart. 

Because of this, a manual bypass is 

provided to maintain flow around the 

CRD flow control valves that fail closed 

upon loss of instrument air or control 

cable damage. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the normal flow 

control valve to be unavailable due to a 

loss of instrument air or cable damage, 

OMA #12 is available to manually open 

V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 while 

monitoring flow at FI–225–2, and close 

V–15–52 to establish CRD flow to the 

reactor. Furthermore, OMA #12 would 

only be necessary if the Isolation 

Condenser/CRD systems are utilized for 

hot shutdown. If OMA #12 becomes 

necessary, the licensee stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 15 minutes, while 

the time available is 204 minutes, which 

provides a 159-minute margin. 

3.18.4.8 OMA #16—Manually Trip Rx 

Recirculation Pumps at 4160V 

Switchgear 

In order for OMA #16 to be necessary, 

the credited and redundant cables 

would have to be damaged due to a fire. 

The licensee stated that the credited 

cables for tripping the recirculation 

pumps are located in the same tray, or 

adjacent tray, with additional cables and 

are generally located approximately 40 

feet above the floor. With the exception 

of the cables themselves, there are no 

other ignition sources or combustibles 

located near the cables. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #16 is available 

to manually trip Reactor Recirculation 

Pumps (‘‘A,’’ ‘‘B,’’ ‘‘C,’’ ‘‘D’’ and ‘‘E’’) 

4160V Switchgear 1A and 1B. The 

licensee also stated that they have 

assumed a 10-minute diagnosis period 

and that the required time to perform 

the action is 13 minutes while the time 

available is 30 minutes, which provides 

a 7-minute margin. 

3.18.5 Conclusion 

Given the limited amount of 

combustible materials, ignition sources, 

and large volume of the space, it is 

unlikely that a fire would occur and go 

undetected or unsuppressed by the 

suppression system noted above or 

personnel, and damage the safe 

shutdown equipment. The low 

likelihood of damage to safe shutdown 

equipment due to a fire in this zone, 

combined with the ability of OMAs #1, 

#2, #3, #4, #5, #6, #12, and #16 to 

manipulate the plant in the event of a 

fire that damages safe shutdown 

equipment, provides adequate assurance 

that safe shutdown capability is 

maintained. 

3.19 TB–FZ–11F Turbine Bldg. 

Feedwater Pump Room Elev. 0′-0′′ & 3′- 

6′′ 

3.19.1 Fire Prevention 

The licensee has classified the fire 

loading in this fire zone as low. The 

licensee also stated that this area has an 

administrative fire loading limit of less 

than 30 minutes as determined by the 

ASTM E119 time-temperature curve. 

The major combustible load consists of 

cable insulation (approximately 15% of 

loading), lubricating oil (approximately 

39% of loading), rubber (approximately 

21% of loading) and plastics 

(approximately 17% of loading). The 

licensee states that the majority of the 

combustible loading attributed to rubber 

and plastic was due to the storage of 

hoses which are now no longer in the 

area. 

3.19.2 Detection, Control, and 

Extinguishment 

The licensee stated that TB–FZ–11F 

has an area-wide thermal fire detection 

system. Extinguishment of the fire will 

be accomplished by the plant fire 

brigade. 

3.19.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown 

Capability 

The licensee stated that TB–FZ–11F 

has a ceiling height of approximately 16′ 

in approximately 70% of the area and 

approximately 19′-6′′ in the remainder 

of the area. With an approximate floor 

area of 5,650 square feet, it is unlikely 

that smoke and heat would accumulate 

at the height of the safe shutdown 

equipment and cause a failure due to 

fire damage. 

3.19.4 OMAs Credited for a Fire in 

This Area 

3.19.4.1 OMA #7—Align Fire Water to 

Isolation Condenser 

In order for OMA #7 to be necessary, 

the loss of the ‘‘B’’ Train of power would 

have to occur due to fire damage. The 

loss of the ‘‘B’’ Train of power is 

attributed to the fact that the 125 VDC 

control power could be lost to the 1D 

4160V Switchgear or the 1D 4160V main 

breaker could trip due to cables that 

traverse through this fire zone. The 

licensee stated that the cables for the 

125 VDC control power and the control 

circuit for the 1D main breaker are 

contained in separate conduits but are 

routed within approximately 6 inches of 

each other in a portion of this zone and 

that the conduits are located 

approximately 5 to 18 feet above the 

floor. Additionally, the licensee stated 

that the 125 VDC control cable leaves 

the zone through the east wall into Fire 

Zone RB–FZ–1F2 while the 1D main 

breaker control cable continues along 

the east wall near the floor through the 

remaining portion of this zone and rises 

up to approximately 6 feet from the 

floor where it exits the zone. 

The licensee also stated that the 

primary ignition sources in the area are 

the feedwater pumps and motors, which 

are located approximately 10 feet from 

the conduits. Transient combustibles are 

controlled by administrative procedures 

and although the accumulation of 

transient combustibles along the east 

wall of the area could potentially impact 

the cables, the majority of the conduits 

are routed such that it would be 

unlikely that a fire in this area would 

adversely impact the cables in the 

conduit. The ‘‘A’’ train of power is 

credited and available for this fire zone. 

The redundant cable, ‘‘C’’ battery, ‘‘C’’ 

Distribution center, etc. are not located 

in this fire zone. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #7 is available 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
19814 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 68 / Friday, April 8, 2011 / Notices 

to manually open V–9–2099 and V–11– 

49 and close V–11–63 and V–11–41 to 

align the fire water system for make-up 

water to Isolation Condenser ‘‘B’’ since 

there is no power (‘‘B’’ Train) available 

to the Condensate Transfer System. The 

licensee also stated that they have 

assumed a 10-minute diagnosis period 

and that the required time to perform 

the action is 13 minutes while the time 

available is 45 minutes, which provides 

a 22-minute margin. 

3.19.4.2 OMA #12—Establish CRD 

Flow to Reactor 

In order for OMA #12 to be necessary, 

a loss of instrument air to the CRD flow 

control valve would have to occur due 

to fire damage. The licensee stated that 

although the USSs powering the air 

compressors are located 35 feet apart 

from each other, the power cables are 

located in the same cable trays for at 

least 45 feet and that the normal CRD 

flow control valve is a single component 

without a redundant counterpart. 

Because of this, a manual bypass is 

provided to maintain flow around the 

CRD flow control valves that fail closed 

upon loss of instrument air or control 

cable damage. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the normal flow 

control valve to be unavailable due to a 

loss of instrument air or cable damage, 

OMA #12 is available to manually open 

V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 while 

monitoring flow at FI–225–2, and close 

V–15–52 to establish CRD flow to the 

reactor. Furthermore, OMA #12 would 

only be necessary if the Isolation 

Condenser/CRD systems are utilized for 

hot shutdown. If OMA #12 becomes 

necessary, the licensee stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 15 minutes, while 

the time available is 204 minutes, which 

provides a 159-minute margin. 

3.19.5 Conclusion 

Given the limited amount of 

combustible materials, ignition sources, 

and large volume of the space, it is 

unlikely that a fire would occur and go 

undetected or unsuppressed by the 

thermal detection system noted above or 

personnel, and damage the safe 

shutdown equipment. The low 

likelihood of damage to safe shutdown 

equipment due to a fire in this zone, 

combined with the ability of OMAs #7 

and #12 to manipulate the plant in the 

event of a fire that damages safe 

shutdown equipment, provides 

adequate assurance that safe shutdown 

capability is maintained. 

3.20 TB–FZ–11H Turbine Bldg. 

Demineralizer Tank and Steam Jet Air 

Ejector Area Elev. 3′-6′′ & 23′-6′′ 

3.20.1 Fire Prevention 

The licensee has classified the fire 

loading in this fire zone as low. The 

licensee also stated that this area has an 

administrative fire loading limit of less 

than 30 minutes as determined by the 

ASTM E119 time-temperature curve. 

The major combustibles are cable 

insulation (approximately 23% of 

loading), ladders and other 

miscellaneous plastics (approximately 

55% of loading) and miscellaneous 

ordinary combustibles. 

3.20.2 Detection, Control, and 

Extinguishment 

The licensee stated that TB–FZ–11H 

has a partial area thermal fire detector 

system. The system alarms locally and 

in the control room. Manual 

extinguishment of fire will be 

accomplished by the plant fire brigade. 

3.20.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown 

Capability 

The licensee stated that TB–FZ–11H 

has a ceiling height of approximately 7′- 

0′′, measured at the 3′-6′′ elevation, and 

approximately 19′-0′′, measured at the 

23′-6′′ elevation with an approximate 

floor area of 3,944 square feet and 4,366 

square feet, respectively, so it is 

unlikely that smoke and heat would 

accumulate at the height of the safe 

shutdown equipment and cause a 

failure due to fire damage. 

3.20.4 OMAs Credited for a Fire in 

This Area 

3.20.4.1 OMA #7—Align Fire Water to 

Isolation Condenser 

In order for OMA #7 to be necessary, 

the loss of the ‘‘B’’ Train of power would 

have to occur due to fire damage. The 

loss of the ‘‘B’’ Train of power is 

attributed to the fact that the 125 VDC 

control power could be lost to the 1D 

4160V Switchgear or the 1D 4160V main 

breaker could trip due to cables that 

traverse through this fire zone. The 

licensee stated that the cables for the 

125 VDC control power and the control 

circuit for the 1D main breaker are 

contained in separate conduits but are 

routed within approximately 6 inches of 

each other in a portion of this zone and 

that the conduits are located 

approximately 5 to 6 feet above the 

floor. Additionally, the licensee stated 

that the total length of the conduits in 

this area is approximately 20 feet. 

The licensee also stated that there are 

no ignition sources in the area and that 

combustible loading is limited since the 

area is a stairway area. Transient 

combustibles are controlled by 

administrative procedures and although 

the accumulation of transient 

combustibles below the conduits could 

potentially impact the cables, it is 

unlikely because the area is a stairway 

and part of the floor is blocked by a 

large ventilation duct. The ‘‘A’’ train of 

power is credited and available for this 

fire zone. The redundant cable, ‘‘C’’ 

battery, ‘‘C’’ Distribution center, etc. are 

not located in this fire zone. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and damages the credited and 

redundant cables, OMA #7 is available 

to manually open V–9–2099 and V–11– 

49 and close V–11–63 and V–11–41 to 

align the fire water system for make-up 

water to Isolation Condenser ‘‘B’’ since 

there is no power (‘‘B’’ Train) available 

to the Condensate Transfer System. The 

licensee also stated that they have 

assumed a 10-minute diagnosis period 

and that the required time to perform 

the action is 13 minutes while the time 

available is 45 minutes, which provides 

a 22-minute margin. 

3.20.4.2 OMA #12—Establish CRD 

Flow to Reactor 

In order for OMA #12 to be necessary, 

a loss of instrument air to the CRD flow 

control valve would have to occur due 

to fire damage. The licensee stated that 

although the USSs powering the air 

compressors are located 35 feet apart 

from each other, the power cables are 

located in the same cable trays for at 

least 45 feet and that the normal CRD 

flow control valve is a single component 

without a redundant counterpart. 

Because of this, a manual bypass is 

provided to maintain flow around the 

CRD flow control valves that fail closed 

upon loss of instrument air or control 

cable damage. 

In the unlikely event that a fire does 

occur and causes the normal flow 

control valve to be unavailable due to a 

loss of instrument air or cable damage, 

OMA #12 is available to manually open 

V–15–237, throttle V–15–30 while 

monitoring flow at FI–225–2, and close 

V–15–52 to establish CRD flow to the 

reactor. Furthermore, OMA #12 would 

only be necessary if the Isolation 

Condenser/CRD systems are utilized for 

hot shutdown. If OMA #12 becomes 

necessary, the licensee stated that they 

have assumed a 30-minute diagnosis 

period and that the required time to 

perform the action is 15 minutes, while 

the time available is 204 minutes, which 

provides a 159-minute margin. 

3.20.5 Conclusion 

Given the limited amount of 

combustible materials, ignition sources, 

and large volume of the space, it is 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 68 / Friday, April 8, 2011 / Notices 19815 

unlikely that a fire would occur and go 

undetected or unsuppressed by the 

thermal detection system noted above or 

personnel, and damage the safe 

shutdown equipment. The low 

likelihood of damage to safe shutdown 

equipment due to a fire in this zone, 

combined with the ability of OMAs #7 

and #12 to manipulate the plant in the 

event of a fire that damages safe 

shutdown equipment, provides 

adequate assurance that safe shutdown 

capability is maintained. 

3.21 Feasibility of the Operator 

Manual Actions 

This analysis postulates that OMAs 

may, in some scenarios, be needed to 

assure safe shutdown capability in 

addition to the traditional fire 

protection features described above. 

NUREG–1852, ‘‘Demonstrating the 

Feasibility and Reliability of Operator 

Manual Actions in Response to Fire,’’ 

provides criteria and associated 

technical bases for evaluating the 

feasibility and reliability of post-fire 

OMAs in nuclear power plants. 

However, Exelon states that the OMAs 

identified in its Phase 1 request were 

previously found acceptable in fire 

protection SEs dated March 24, 1986 

and June 25, 1990, and, therefore, do not 

need to meet the reliability criteria 

specified in NUREG–1852, 

‘‘Demonstrating the Feasibility and 

Reliability of Operator Manual Actions 

in Response to Fire,’’ dated October 

2007. The NRC staff finds that the SEs 

referenced by the licensee, in addition 

to the feasibility review contained in 

this SE, provide the necessary 

information to determine the feasibility 

and reliability of the OMAs. 

3.21.1 Bases for Establishing 

Feasibility 

Using NUREG–1852, the NRC staff 

has evaluated the feasibility review 

provided by the licensee in the April 2, 

2010, Response to Request for 

Additional Information. For an OMA to 

be considered feasible, the required 

actions must be proceduralized, any 

equipment that is needed to implement 

the OMA is available, the environments 

in which the OMA is to be performed 

must permit the action, and the time 

taken to diagnose the need for the OMA 

and implement it (time required) must 

be less than the time in which the OMA 

must be completed (time available). 

3.21.2 Feasibility 

The feasibility review provided by the 

licensee documents that procedures are 

in place, in the form of fire response 

procedures, to ensure that clear and 

accessible instructions on how to 

perform the manual actions are 

available to the operators. All of the 

requested OMAs are directed by plant 

procedures, and the operators are 

trained in the use of the procedures. 

Specifically, the licensee stated that 

abnormal operating procedure ABN–29, 

‘‘Plant Fires,’’ is entered whenever a fire 

or indication of a fire occurs on the 

main fire alarm panel in the control 

room or at any local fire alarm panel. In 

addition to dispatching a radioequipped operator to the alarming 

location, ABN–29 also directs that the 

fire brigade be dispatched whenever a 

fire suppression system has actuated 

(sprinkler, deluge, Halon, CO2) or a fire 

is confirmed. In addition, the licensee 

stated that ABN–29 directs immediate 

entry into the FSP for the affected fire 

area as soon as the existence of a fire is 

confirmed. The licensee states that the 

following indications or symptoms are 

considered examples of a confirmed 

fire: 

• Fire detection alarm and equipment 

malfunction indication or alarms within 

the same area; 

• Fire pump start and either sprinkler 

flow alarm or deluge flow alarm; 

• Gaseous suppression system 

actuation; 

• Report from the field of an actual 

smoke condition or actual fire 

condition; or 

• Fire detection alarm with follow up 

confirmation by field operator. 

Entering the FSP means that the 

operator will review the FSP, identify 

equipment that could be affected, 

identify equipment that will be 

available, monitor plant equipment from 

the control room and communicate with 

the fire brigade leader. Based on the 

symptoms received in the control room 

and the feedback from the fire brigade 

leader, the operator will decide using 

the procedure what mitigating actions 

are necessary. In the event that a plant 

shutdown has occurred before the FSP 

is entered, the operator will still enter 

the FSP based on the fire and initiate 

the OMAs as appropriate. OMAs that 

are considered ‘‘prompt’’ (i.e., those that 

must be done within 45 minutes or less) 

are identified in both ABN–29 and in 

the applicable FSPs as an item requiring 

immediate attention. The operators are 

trained to perform prompt actions first 

and prioritize them based upon existing 

plant conditions. The FSPs are based on 

the worst-case loss considerations by 

assuming all fire damage occurs 

instantaneously and thus all operator 

manual actions will be required. The 

use of the EOPs in conjunction with the 

applicable FSPs will permit the use of 

any mitigating system available first, 

and if a desired system is not available, 

the FSP provides a contingency action 

to restore the system or provide another 

means to perform the function. Operator 

training, including simulator 

demonstrations and plant walk downs, 

has been performed to ensure 

consistency in operator and team 

response for each OMA. 

The licensee evaluated several 

potential environmental concerns, such 

as radiation levels, temperature/ 

humidity conditions and the ventilation 

configuration and fire effects that the 

operators may encounter during certain 

emergency scenarios. The licensee’s 

feasibility review concluded that the 

operators performing the manual actions 

would not be exposed to adverse or 

untenable conditions during any 

particular operator manual action 

procedure or during the time to perform 

the procedure. The licensee states that 

OMAs required for achieving and 

maintaining hot shutdown conditions 

are not impacted by environmental 

conditions associated with fires in the 

fire area identified in the request. Each 

of the safe shutdown calculations that 

provide the technical basis for the FSPs 

contains a timeline for operator actions 

for the specific fire area. In addition, the 

licensee stated that the equipment 

needed to implement OMAs remains 

available and the fire areas remain 

accessible during or following the event. 

In one instance, OMA 12, the licensee 

identified that an operator may need to 

re-enter Fire Zone RB–FZ–1E (i.e., 

perform part of an OMA in the affected 

fire zone) to manually manipulate three 

2-inch CRD System valves V–15–237, 

V–15–30, and V–15–52 that are 

physically located within 4 feet of each 

other within the spray area of the 

automatic localized fixed water spray 

deluge system installed in this fire zone. 

An exemption was granted in SE dated 

June 25, 1990, for not providing either 

additional separation from in-situ 

combustibles or protection for CRD 

System valve V–15–30. This exemption 

was granted on the basis that: (1) There 

are 204 minutes following a scram 

before this action would need to be 

completed and this action and only 

requires 15 minutes to complete; (2) any 

fires in that area are unlikely to render 

the valve inoperable; (3) the valves are 

within the spray area of an automatic 

fixed water spray deluge system. Since 

valves V–15–237, V–15–52, and V–15– 

30 are physically within 4 feet of each 

other the NRC staff considers the 

technical basis of the exemption to be 

equally valid for these two additional 

valves. 

The licensee’s analysis demonstrates 

that, for the expected scenarios, the 

OMAs can be diagnosed and executed 


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19816 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 68 / Friday, April 8, 2011 / Notices 

within the amount of time available to 

complete them. The licensee’s analysis 

also demonstrates that various factors, 

as discussed above, have been 

considered to address uncertainties in 

estimating the time available. Therefore, 

the OMAs included in this review are 

feasible because there is adequate time 

available for the operator to perform the 

required OMAs to achieve and maintain 

hot shutdown following a postulated 

fire event. Table 2 summarizes the 

‘‘required’’ versus ‘‘available’’ times for 

each OMA. The licensee has included 

any diagnosis time as part of the 

required time for performing a 

particular action. Where an action has 

multiple times or contingencies 

associated with the ‘‘available’’ 

completion time, the lesser time is used. 

This approach is considered to 

represent a conservative approach to 

analyzing the timelines associated with 

each of the OMAs with regard to the 

feasibility and reliability of the actions 

included in this exemption. The 

licensee provided a discussion of the 

times and circumstances associated 

with each of the actions in their March 

3, 2009, and April 2, 2010, 

correspondence. 

TABLE 2 

OMA Fire area/zone of fire origin OMA location 

Required 

time 

(min) 

Available 

time 

(min) 

Margin 

(min) 

1 ........ TB–FA–26, TB–FZ–11B, TB–FZ–11E ................................. TB–FA–3B ............................. 29 45 16 

TB–FZ–11C, TB–FZ–11D .................................................... 34 45 11 

2 ........ OB–FA–9, OB–FZ–6A, OB–FZ–8C, TB–FZ–11B, TB–FZ– 

11E.

Yard ....................................... 37 73 36 

3 ........ TB–FA–26, TB–FZ–11B, TB–FZ–11C, TB–FZ–11D, TB– 

FZ–11E.

CW–FA–14 ............................ 20 45 25 

4 ........ TB–FZ–11B, TB–FZ–11E ..................................................... MT–FA–12 ............................ 20 45 25 

5 ........ TB–FZ–11D, TB–FZ–11E ..................................................... DG–FA–17 ............................ 24 45 21 

6 ........ TB–FA–26, TB–FZ–11B, TB–FZ–11C, TB–FZ–11D, TB– 

FZ–11E.

CW–FA–14 ............................ 16 45 29 

7 ........ OB–FZ–6B, OB–FZ–8A, OB–FZ–8B, OB–FZ–8C, TB–FZ– 

11F, TB–FZ–11H, CW–FA–14.

RB–FZ–1E ............................ 23 45 22 

8 ........ OB–FZ–8C ............................................................................ OB–FZ–6A ............................ 38 60 22 

9 ........ OB–FZ–6A ............................................................................ OB–FZ–6B ............................ 43 180 137 

11 ...... RB–FZ–1E, RB–FZ–1G ........................................................ RB–FZ–1D ............................ 130 204 74 

12 ...... RB–FZ–1D, RB–FZ–1F5, TB–FA–3A, OB–FZ–6A, OB–FZ– 

6B, OB–FZ–8A, OB–FZ–8B, OB–FZ–8C, OB–FA–9, TB– 

FA–26, TB–FZ–11B, TB–FZ–11C, TB–FZ–11D, TB–FZ– 

11E, TB–FZ–11F, TB–FZ–11H, CW–FA–14.

RB–FZ–1E ............................ 45 204 159 

OB–FZ–10A .......................................................................... 48 204 156 

RB–FZ–1E, RB–FZ–1G ........................................................ 130 204 74 

13 ...... RB–FZ–1F3 .......................................................................... RB–FZ–1F2 ........................... 65 204 139 

16 ...... TB–FZ–11B, TB–FZ–11E, OB–FZ–8C ................................ TB–FZ–11C ........................... 23 30 7 

The NRC staff reviewed the required 

OMA completion time limits versus the 

time before the action becomes critical 

to safely shutting down the unit as 

presented in the feasibility analyses. 

The NRC staff recognizes that, in some 

cases, the time required neared the time 

available for an OMA. The NRC staff, 

however, also recognizes that there are 

conservatisms built in to these time 

estimates such as adding in the entire 

time assumed to diagnose the need for 

an OMA where in reality, the actual 

time take would likely be less. 

The NRC staff notes that, in one case, 

an OMA must be completed within 30 

minutes (i.e., it is considered a prompt 

action). This action is identified as 

OMA #16 and requires an operator to 

manually trip the Reactor Recirculation 

Pumps ‘‘A,’’ ‘‘B,’’ ‘‘C,’’ ‘‘D’’ and ‘‘E’’ at the 

4160V Switchgear 1A and 1B. The 

action may be required as a result of fire 

in OB–FZ–8C, TB–FZ–11B, or TB–FZ– 

11E. The symptom for this action is the 

inability to trip the Recirculation Pumps 

from the control room and this is 

detected using the associated pump 

breaker indicating lights, alarms and 

flow indications. The Fire Support 

Procedures direct the operator to trip 

the pumps using the pump control 

switches or the Recirculation Pump Trip 

circuitry (two trip coils for pumps). If 

both of these methods fail on one or 

more pumps, the guidance is given to 

trip the pumps from the 4160V 

Switchgear 1A and 1B located outside 

the control room in Fire Area TB–FZ– 

11C. Only one operator would be 

required and it would take 

approximately 13 minutes for access to 

the area and to perform the action of 

tripping the breakers. Given the low 

complexity of this action, the NRC staff 

finds that there is a sufficient amount of 

time available to complete the proposed 

OMAs. 

3.22 Summary of Defense-in-Depth 

and Operator Manual Actions 

In summary, the defense-in-depth 

concept for a fire in the fire areas 

discussed above provides a level of 

safety that limits the occurrence of fires 

and results in rapid detection, control 

and extinguishment of fires that do 

occur and the protection of structures, 

systems, and components important to 

safety. It should be understood that the 

OMAs are a fall back in the unlikely 

event that the fire protection defense-indepth features are insufficient. In most 

cases, there is no credible fire scenario 

that would necessitate the performance 

of these OMAs. As discussed above, the 

licensee has provided preventative and 

protective measures in addition to 

feasible and reliable OMAs that together 

demonstrate the licensee’s ability to 

preserve or maintain safe shutdown 

capability in the event of a fire in the 

analyzed fire areas. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 68 / Friday, April 8, 2011 / Notices 19817 

3.23 Authorized by Law 

This exemption would allow Oyster 

Creek to rely on OMAs, in conjunction 

with the other installed fire protection 

features, to ensure that at least one 

means of achieving and maintaining hot 

shutdown remains available during and 

following a postulated fire event, as part 

of its FPP, in lieu of meeting the 

requirements specified in III.G.2 for a 

fire in the analyzed fire areas. As stated 

above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the NRC to 

grant exemptions from the requirements 

of 10 CFR part 50. The NRC staff has 

determined that granting of this 

exemption will not result in a violation 

of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended, or the Commission’s 

regulations. Therefore, the exemption is 

authorized by law. 

3.24 No Undue Risk to Public Health 

and Safety 

The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 

part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G is to 

ensure that at least one means of 

achieving and maintaining hot 

shutdown remains available during and 

following a postulated fire event. Based 

on the above evaluation, the NRC staff 

finds that the plant features, as 

described in the March 3, 2009, 

submittal, as supplemented by letter 

dated April 2, 2010, should limit the 

occurrence and impacts of any fire that 

may occur. This, combined with the 

ability of the OMAs to place and 

maintain the plant in a safe condition in 

the event of a fire that does damage safe 

shutdown equipment, provides 

adequate protection of public health and 

safety. Therefore, there is no undue risk 

to public health and safety. 

3.25 Consistent With Common Defense 

and Security 

This exemption would allow Oyster 

Creek to credit the use of the specific 

OMAs, in conjunction with the other 

installed fire protection features, in 

response to a fire in the analyzed fire 

areas, discussed above, in lieu of 

meeting the requirements specified in 

III.G.2. This change, to the operation of 

the plant, has no relation to security 

issues nor does it diminish the level of 

safety from what was intended by the 

requirements of III.G.2. Therefore, the 

common defense and security is not 

diminished by this exemption. 

3.26 Special Circumstances 

One of the special circumstances 

described in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) is 

that the application of the regulation is 

not necessary to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule. The underlying 

purpose of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, 

Section III.G is to ensure that at least 

one means of achieving and maintaining 

hot shutdown remains available during 

and following a postulated fire event. 

While the licensee does not comply 

with the explicit requirements of III.G.2, 

specifically, they do meet the 

underlying purpose of 10 CFR part 50, 

Appendix R, and Section III.G as a 

whole. Therefore, special circumstances 

exist that warrant the issuance of this 

exemption as required by 10 CFR 

50.12(a)(2)(ii). 

4.0 Conclusion 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by 

law, will not present an undue risk to 

the public health and safety, is 

consistent with the common defense 

and security and that special 

circumstances are present to warrant 

issuance of the exemption. Therefore, 

the Commission hereby grants Exelon 

an exemption from the requirements of 

Section III.G.2 of Appendix R of 10 CFR 

part 50, to utilize the OMAs discussed 

above at Oyster Creek. 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the 

Commission has determined that the 

granting of this exemption will not have 

a significant effect on the quality of the 

human environment (74 FR 36274). 

This exemption is effective upon 

issuance. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day 

of March 2011. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Joseph G. Giitter, 

Director, Division of Operating Reactor 

Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. 2011–8405 Filed 4–7–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[NRC–2009–0345] 

Final Regulatory Guide: Issuance, 

Availability 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice of issuance and 

availability of Regulatory Guide (RG) 

5.79, ‘‘Protection of Safeguards 

Information.’’ 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Robert Norman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 

0001, telephone: 301–415–2278 or email: Robert.Norman@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Introduction 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC or Commission) is 

issuing a new guide in the agency’s 

‘‘Regulatory Guide’’ series. This series 

was developed to describe and make 

available to the public information such 

as methods that are acceptable to the 

NRC staff for implementing specific 

parts of the agency’s regulations, 

techniques that the staff uses in 

evaluating specific problems or 

postulated accidents, and data that the 

staff needs in its review of applications 

for permits and licenses. 

Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.79 

‘‘Protection of Safeguards Information,’’ 

was issued August 6, 2009 as a Draft 

Regulatory Guide (DG) for public 

comment under the temporary 

identification number DG–5034. RG 

5.79 is a new regulatory guide which 

describes methods the staff of the NRC 

consider acceptable to implement the 

general performance requirements 

specified in Title 10, Section 73.21(a)(i) 

and (ii), of the Code of Federal 

Regulations, ‘‘Protection of Safeguards 

Information: Performance 

Requirements,’’ (10 CFR 73.21) that 

establish, implement, and maintain an 

information protection system that 

includes the applicable measures for 

safeguards information (SGI) specified 

in 10 CFR 73.22, ‘‘Protection of 

Safeguards Information: Specific 

Requirements,’’ or 10 CFR 73.23, 

‘‘Protection of Safeguards Information— 

Modified Handling: Specific 

Requirements.’’ This guide applies to all 

licensees, certificate holders, applicants, 

or other persons who produce, receive, 

or acquire SGI (including SGI with the 

designation or marking: ‘‘Safeguards 

Information—Modified Handling’’ (SGI– 

M)). 

The guidance and criteria contained 

in this document pertain to the 

protection of SGI as defined in 10 CFR 

part 73, ‘‘Physical Protection of Plants 

and Materials.’’ It is intended to assist 

licensees and other persons who 

produce, receive, or acquire SGI to 

establish an information protection 

system that addresses (1) information to 

be protected, (2) conditions for access, 

(3) protection while in use or storage, (4) 

preparing and marking documents or 

other matter, (5) reproduction of matter 

containing SGI, (6) external 

transmission of documents and 

material, (7) processing SGI on 

electronic systems, (8) removal from the 

SGI category, and (9) destruction of 

matter containing SGI. 

10 CFR 73.21 ‘‘Protection of 

Safeguards Information: Performance 

Requirements,’’ requires, in part, that 


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