T he H o no rable R o nal d S.W

. Le w, U ni t ed Stat es D i st ri ct Jud ge f o r t he * C ent ral D i st ri ct of C al i f o rni a, s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n. F OR P UB LIC AT ION



### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA ,

Plaintif f-Appellee ,

v.
O SCAR G AL L EG OS -G AL I NDO , AKA Osca r A. Ga lleg os-Galindo, AKA Osca r Alsonso Galleg os-Galindo,

Defendant-

Appellant

. No. 12-10000

D.C. No. 4:11-cr- 00953- DCB- HCE-1

OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court for the D istrict of Arizona Ronald S.W . L ew, Senior District J udg e, Presiding *
Argued and Submitted No ve mbe r 5 , 2 01 2— San F ra nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia Filed January

17, 2013U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AL L EG OS -G AL I NDO 2

T he H o no r abl e Ro bert D

. Sack , Seni or Ci r cui t Ju dge f or t he U ni t ed ** Stat es Co urt of A p p eal s f o r t he Se co nd C i rcui t , s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n.

T hi s s ummary co ns t i t ut es no p ar t of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s *** b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. Be fore : Robert D. Sack, Ronald M Gould, **

and Mil an D . Sm ith , Jr. , Ci rc uit Judg e s. Opinion by

J udg e Sack

SUMMAR

Y ***

Crim inal L aw
Th e pa ne l a ff ir me d a se nte nc e fo r ille g a l r e e ntr y in a c a se in wh i ch the dist rict cour t concluded that the defe ndant’s 2008 conviction for third- deg ree rape under Revised Code of Washington § 9A.44.060(1) (a) qualified a s a “f orci b l e sex offe nse” supporting a 16-level cr i m e- o f-violenc e enhanc ement under

U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(a) (1)( A). Applying the mod ified categ orica l approa ch, the pa nel held th at be c a

us e the Gu ide lin e s w e re ame nd e d in 20 08 to include as a for cible sex offense any sex offense involving the absenc e of the victim’s consent, and be cause the def endant stated in his signe d 2008 g uilty plea that the victim did not consent, the district c ourt did not err – pla inly or otherw ise – in c o n c lu d in g th at th e p r io r c o n v ic ti o n w a s a c r ime of violence.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AL L EG OS -G AL I NDO 3

CO UN SEL

Dan W. M o ntgome ry

(ar g ued), Tuc son, Arizona, for De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt.

Erica L . Seg er ( argued), Tuc son, Arizona, for PlaintiffAppellee

.

OP IN ION
SACK, Circuit J udg e: The que stion be fore us on this appeal is whethe r the district court, when sentenc ing the defe ndant-a ppellant Osca

r Galleg os-Galindo, prope rly included a crime of violenc e enhanc ement based on the court’s conclusion that the defe ndant’s prior Washington State third-degree rape conviction qualified a s a for cible sex offense under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”)

. See U.S. SentencingGuidelines Manual § 2L 1.2 cmt. n.1(B )(iii). Be cause the Guidelines were amended in 2008 to include as a forcible sex offe nse any sex offe nse involving the absenc e of the vic tim ’s c on se nt, we c on c lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt did
no t e rr in e nte ri ng the c ri me of

vio le nc e e nh anc e me nt i n th e se c ir c ums tanc e s and

the re fo re a ff

ir m.

F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND

On Febr ua ry 15 , 2 01 1, U. S. B or de r P a tr ol a g e nts ob se rv e d a

g ro up of pe rs on s w a lki ngin t

he Ar izon a

de se rt

. Suspecting t h at they

had illeg ally

enter ed the c ountry , the ag ents arr es t ed the members of the group, includingthe defe ndant-a

ppellant Osca

r Ga lleg os-Galindo.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AL L EG OS -G AL I NDO 4

T he p re- sent ence rep o rt al so i ncl ud ed i nfo rm at i o n regardi ng   G al l egos
- G al i ndo’ s 200 2 f eder al i l l ega l e n t r y conv i ct i on, f or w hi ch he was
s ent enc ed t o 30 day s ’ i nca r cer at i on. T he r eport i ndi cat ed t hat he ha d p end i ng agai nst hi m charges f o r dri vi ng unde r t he i nf l uence i n 2 0 0 7 and h a d b e e n a rr e ste d fo r t h e p o sse ssio n o f a c o n tro lled na rc o tic su b sta n c e in 2002, dr i v i n g u n der t h e i n f l u en ce i n 2002, a n d t h ef t i n 2004. On Marc h 16, 2011 , a Tuc son g rand jury returne d an ind ic tme nt c ha

rg ingGa lle g os -G a lin do wi th r e e ntr y a s a remove d alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, enhanc ed by 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)( 2). On J uly 15, 2011, he pled guilty to the
c ha rg e s in the ind ic tme nt w ith out a

ple a a g re e me nt.

In prepa ring Galleg os-Galindo’s pr e-se ntence repor t, the probation depa

rt m ent consider ed his prior c onvictions. The depar tmen t concluded that his 2008 W ashing ton conviction for r ape in the third de g ree was a “for cible sex offense ” that qu a lif ie d a s a “cri me of v iol e nc e ” un de r t he Gu ide lin e s, U.S.S

. G

. § 2 L 1

. 2 (b)( 1)(A) . Acc ording ly , Galleg os-Galindo’s
rec ommended offense level was increase d by 16 levels to 24. The probation depar

tment then rec ommended a de duction of two poi n ts for ac cepta

nce of responsibility , resulting in an of fe ns e le ve l of

22 . B a se d o n th at of

fe ns e le ve l and

his criminal history

cate g ory

of I I , Galleg o s -G alindo’s Gu ide lin e s rang e wa s c a lc ulate d to be 46 –5 7 mo nth s’ imp ri so nme nt. ** **

In 2008, Galleg os-Galindo wa s convicted in Washing ton of Rape in the Third Degree , a fe lony , in violation of Revised Code of Washing ton § 9 A. 44.060(1)( a). A ccor ding to a n aff idavit in support of the Motion for Warr ant in that case , the juvenile victim r eporte d that she had been se x ually assaulted afte r, at Ga lleg os-Galindo’s de mand, she enter ed his car f rom the roa d alongwhich she ha d been w alking . Sh e said thatU NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AL L EG OS -G AL I NDO 5

af t er stopping for coff

ee, Galleg os-Galindo drove her to a seclude d d ir t r o a d

. H e th e na s s a

u lt e d h e r b y “ k is s in g her mouth, biti ngher lips leaving a v i s ible injury , suckingon [her] breasts, and pene tratingher ‘ butt’ with his penis . . . .” Th e vic tim“ bo th t old him ‘n o’ and to sto p, and tr ie d to pu sh him away but was unable to do so.” The victim later use d the cell phone of

a passingmotorist to contact police. Galleg os-Galindo pled g uilty to Ra pe in the Third Degree

. In his F ebrua

ry 28, 2008 statement ac company ing his plea

of g uilty to the offe nse (the “ Statement”), he said: “On January 23, 2007, in Skagit County , Washington, I eng ag ed in sexual i n terc ourse with K.A.T ., to whom Iwasn’t mar ried a nd K. A. T. did

no t con se nt t o th e se xua l in te rc ours e and c le arl y expressed that wit h her words and conduct.” The state cour t found that there was a

fac tual basis for Ga lleg os-Ga l indo’s plea a nd convicted him under

Rev i s ed C ode of Washing ton § 9 A. 44 .0 60 (1 )( a ). On

May 8, 20 08 , he was se nte nc e d to t we l v e months in prison. After se rvingthe sentenc e, Galleg os-Galindo wa s o rder ed re moved from the United States by the Depa rtment of Just ice, a

nd was re moved.

At his feder al sentenc ing f or the 2011 re entry

now bef ore us, the eff

ect of the 2008 t hird-degree rape conviction was discussed. De fense counsel c oncede d that Galleg os-Galindo was “ cate g orica lly

lev el 24,” implicitly

acknow ledg ing that the 16-leve l “cr ime of violence ” enha nceme nt under § 2L 1.2(b)( 1)(A) of the Guidelines was corr ectly applied. But c ounsel argued that fa ctor s u n d er 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including de terre nce a

nd fami l y

history , oug ht to be considere d. Counsel reques t ed a sentence below the applicable Guidelines ra

ng e. The g overnme nt argued for a sentenc e at the hi gh end of the rang e, in par t beca use of theU NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AL L EG OS -G AL I NDO 6

seri o u s n es s o f t h e c i rc u m s t an ce s s urr o un d i n g th e t h i rd -d egre e rape conviction.

F oll ow ing argume nt, the dis tr ic t c ourt de c lin e d G a lle g os
Galindo’s re quest for a

downwar d depar

ture a nd sentenc ed him to 52 mont hs’ impris o n m en t, in the middle of the Gu id eli ne s r ang e . T he c ourt a c kn ow le dg e d th a t G a lle g os
Ga lin do ’s c ri min a l hi sto ry cat ego ry wa s I I , b ut n ote d h is many criminal conv i cti ons and other c ontacts with law enfor ceme nt office rs over the previous dec ade. I n arr iving at its sentence, the court stated that it had considere d the fa ctors it was requir ed to consider under 18 U .S.C. § 3 5 5 3 (a ), the entire rec ord, including judicially noticeable documents, the defe ndant’s sente ncingmemorandum, a nd the pre -sentenc e repor t.

JU RI SDI CT ION AN D ST AN DA RD OF RE VI EW

Or din ari ly , th is C ourt

re vie ws d

e n o v o a district cour

t’s deter mination that a defe ndant’s prior conviction qualifies as
a “ c ri me of vio le nc e ” fo r a 16- le ve l e nh anc e me nt p ur su a nt t o Guidelines § 2L 1.2(b)( 1)(A)

. United States v. Grajeda , 581 F.3d 1186, 1188 ( 9th Cir. 2009), cert. de nied , 1 31 S. Ct

. 58 3 ( 20 10 ); Un ite d Sta te s v . E sparz a-He rre ra , 557 F.3d 1019, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Where a de fe nd ant f

ail s to r a ise an is su e be fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt , howeve r, we revie w for pla in error , so long a s it has been forf eited rather t h an deliberately waived, in whic h case we will decline to re view it at all. Se e Un ite d Sta te s v . R os s , 51 1 F .3 d 12 33 , 12 35 (9 th C ir . 2 00 8) ; United States v. Pe rez , 116 F.3d 840, 845 ( 9th Cir. 1997) (en ba nc).

Her e, defe nse counsel ag ree d with the district c ourt that Ga lle g os -G a lin do wa s “ c ate go ri c a lly le ve l 24 ,” e sse nti a llyU NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AL L EG OS -G AL I NDO 7

a dmi tti ngto the 16 -l e ve l e nh anc e me nt. Th e re is n o r e a so n to think that t h e d ef

endant considered obje cting but did not do so for tac tical re asons. The de fenda nt thus did not deliberately

waive the objection. He may there fore raise the issue on appea l, albeit s u b j ect to plain error r eview. See United States v. J

imenez , 258 F.3d 1120, 1124 ( 9th Cir. 2001).

Pl a in e r r o r is “ ( 1 ) e r

r o r , ( 2 ) th at is p la in , an d (3) that aff ects subst antial rig hts.” United States v. Cotton , 5 35 U. S. 6 2 5 , 6 3 1 ( 2 0 0 2 ) ( c i t at i o nan d qu o t at i o nm ar

k s o m i t t e d )

. If these thre e conditions are met, we may exercise our

discretion to n oti c e a

fo rf e ite d e rr or that “ se ri ou sly a ff e c ts t he fa ir ne ss, integ rity , or public re putation of judicial pro ce edings.” Id. (citation omitted).

DI SCU SSIO N The princ ipal issue on appea l is thus whether the district
c ourt pla inl y e rr e d in imp os ingup on

Ga lleg os -Gali nd o in 2011 a cr ime of violence enhanc ement pursua nt to Guidelines § 2L 1.2(b)( 1)(A) for his 2008 Washington State third-de g ree rape conviction. The district court arr ived at its conclusion that the enha

nceme nt was jus t i fi ed by ref ere nce to the Guidelines, as amended in 2008. B efor e then, Application Note 1(B )(iii) to Guidelines § 2L 1.2 had cha rac terized a “cr ime of violence ” as inc luding thre e ty pes of se x ual offe nses: forc ible sex offenses, statutory rape , and sexual
a bu se of a min or

. We ha d inte rp re te d “ fo rc ibl e se x off e ns e s” in case s such as this one as r equiringthe use of some phy sical forc e above and beyond that re q u i red f or pene tration. See United States v. Bolanos-He rnandez , 4 9 2 F

. 3 d 1 1 4 0 , 1144 (9th Cir. 2007).U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AL L EG OS -G AL I NDO 8

In 2008, howev er , the SentencingCommi ssion promulg ate d Amendment 722 (the “2008 Amendme nt”), wh ic h mo dif

ie d th e de fi nit ion

of Ap pli c atio n N ote 1( B )( iii ) to i nc lud e wi thi n th e de fi nit ion of “ fo rc ibl e se x off

e ns e s” those offe nses “whe re c onsent to the conduc t is not given or is n ot l e g a lly

va lid , such as whe re c on se nt t o th e c on du c t is involuntary , incompetent, or c oerc ed.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manua l § 2L 1.2, cmt. n.1(B )(iii). Thus, under the 2008 Amendment, indicia of additional forc e or violenc e wer e no long er r equire d for the e nhancem ent so long as co n s en tt o th e s ex o ff

en s e w as s h o wn t o b e l ac k i n g. Despite these chang es, t here linge red some uncer tainty as to whether fo rce above and beyond that require d for penetr ation was still n ec es s ary for a sex offense to be forc ible. Indeed, that is the argument th at the def endant
make s h e re . H e argue s th at in United S t a tes v. EspinozaMorales , 6 2 1 F. 3 d

1 1 4 1 (9 thC i r. 2 0 1 0 ), a c a s e i n v o l v i n g a sex offense f

or which the defe ndant was sen t ence d afte r the
e ff e c tiv e date of the 20 08 Am e ndme nt, we did no t e xplic itl y abrog ate United States v. Lopez-Montane z , 4 21 F .3 d 9 26 (9 th Cir. 2005), a case in which the sex off ense sentenc e occ urre d prior to the 2008 Amen d m ent and where , unlike here , we decide d that t h e pre -2008 additional for ce sta ndard w as require d to be applied.

The re sult in Espinoza-Morales , howeve r, wa s driven by the fa ct that the defe ndant had committed the fede ral re -entry of fe ns e imm e d i a

t e ly be fo re c ha

ng e s to the Gu ide lin e s b e c ame eff ective, but wa s sentence d afte r they beca me effec tive, arguably subjecting him to a highe r sentenc e . EspinozaMorales , 621 F.3d at 1146. Al tho ug h a dis tr ic t c ourt

us ua lly applies the ve rsion of the Sentenc ing Guidelines in eff ect on the date of

a def endant’ s sentencing , U.S. SentencingU NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AL L EG OS -G AL I NDO 9

Guidelines Manua l § 1B1.11, the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United Sta

tes Constit ution requires that if the Guidelines have underg one substantive cha ng es that would disadvanta g e the defe n d an t, th e n th e d e f

e n d an t is to b e s e n te n c e d un d e r the Guidelines in eff

ect at the time of the o ff

ense, rather

then at sentenc ing. Se e Un ited St ate s v . A lfa ro , 336 F.3d 876, 882 (9 th C ir . 2 00 3) . It w a s f

or jus t that r e a so n th a t w e de c lin e d to apply the 2008 Guidelin es i n Espinoza-Morales. We
rea soned that “if the 2008 amendment to § 2L 1.2’s cr ime of violence de finit i o n abrog ated Lopez-Montanez , it was substantive and ther ef

o re cannot be applied to [the defen d ant].” Espinoza-Morales , 621 F.3d at 1146. I n light of this chang e, we followed Lopez-Montanez be c a us e it offe red a n analy sis of how to treat the i ssues prior to the 2008 Amendment to the Guidelines. Id.

Th e c a se at ba

r is c ri tic a lly dif

fe re nt. Th e Ex Pos t F a c to Clause would re quire Ga lleg os-Galindo to be s e nte n c e d u nder the Guidelines in ef

fec t at the t ime of hi s “cur rent off ense” – the offe nse of r e-e ntry , not the state sex offense – rathe r than at the time of sente ncingonly if in t h e interve ning pe riod th ere was a

n amendment that substantively disadvantag ed him. Id. The c urre nt offense took place o n Februar y 15, 2 0 1 1 , lo n ga f

te r th e 2 0 0 8 A me n dme n t t o th e G u idelines beca me eff ective. There was no intervening chang e betwe en the of fe ns e and se nte nc ingthat w ou ld d isa dv anta g e Ga lle g os
Galindo, and, unlike in Espinoza-Morales , we wo uld not be require d to use the pre -2008 def inition of a forcible sex of fe ns e and e ng a g e in a

de te rmin atio n o f whe the r t he c ri me involved the use or attempted use of a dditional force

. We can the re fo re re ly

up on the fu rt he r e nume ratio n o f whic h f or c ibl e sex off enses constitute crimes of violence under th e 2 0 08 Am e ndme nt.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AL L EG OS -G AL I NDO 10

In light of this fact, for those like G alleg os-Galindo who
are proper ly

sentenc ed pursua

nt to t h e Guidelines af

ter the 2008 Amendment, Lopez-Montanez is s imp ly ina pp lic a ble to th e ex tent that it required, f or a c rime of violenc e enh an c e me n t, f

o r c e b e y o n d p e n e tr ati o n in th e c a s e o f sex offe nses wher e “c onsent to the conduc t is not g iven or is not leg ally valid.” U.S. Sente ncing Guidelines Manual § 2L 1.2, cmt n.1(B )(iii).

To dec ide whether Galleg os-Galindo’s se x offe nse wa s pr op e rl y c ha ra c te ri zed a s a crime of

vio le nc e , w e or din ari ly follow the categ orica l and modified categ orica l approa ches outlined in Taylor v . United States , 495 U. S. 5 75 (1 99 0) ; see als o Grajeda , 581 F.3d at 1189.

Under the cate g orica l a

pproac h, we f

irst consider whe ther a prior of

fense “is categ orica lly a cr i m e of violenc e by assessingwhether

the full rang e of c ondu ct covered by the statute falls within the meaningof th at t er m.” Grajeda, 581 F.3d at 1189 (quotation marks, alter ati ons, and citation omi tte d) . “ I f t

he statut e of

c onvic tio n is ov e rb ro a d – that is , if it punishes some conduct that qualifie s as a c ri m e of violence a

nd some conduc t that does n o t – it does not cate g orica lly c o n s ti tu te a c r im e o f v io le n c e.” Espinoza-Morales , 621 F.3d at 1144. The Washing ton statute un der which Galleg os-Galindo
wa s c onvic te d s tate s in

re le va nt p art : (1) A pe rson is g uilty

of ra pe in the thi rd deg r e e w h e n , un d e r

c ir c u ms ta

n c e s n ot
con s t ituting ra

pe in the first or se cond deg ree s, such per son eng ag es in sexualU NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AL L EG OS -G AL I NDO 11

intercour se with another person, not mar ried to the perpe trator: (a) Where the vic tim did not consent a s d efined in RC W 9A.44.010(7), to sexual intercour se with the perpetrator and such la ck of conse nt was cle arly ex p resse d by the victim’s words or c onduct, or (b) Where there is threat of substantial unlawful ha

rm t o p roperty

rig hts of the vic tim

. Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.060.

We n e e d n ot d e c ide wh e the r G a lle g os-Ga lin do ’s c ri me wa s c ate g or ic a lly

a c ri me of vio le nc e un de r t

he se pr ov isi on s. The g overnme nt does not argue that it wa s

. Al though w e have the technica l power to re ach a cate g orica l analy sis issue embedde d in the fac ts, we ar e not re quired t o re ach a n issue that is not briefed a

nd not nece ssary fo r o u r decision. See Lop e z v . S mi th , 203 F.3d 1122, 1125 n.5 ( 9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) . The g overnme nt argues to us only t h at t h e R evised Code of Washington § 9A.44.060( 1) wa s a cr ime of violence under the “modified c ateg orica l approa ch.” B eca use we ag ree that it was a c rime of violenc e under the modified cate g orica l analy sis, we need not and do not decide the issue not raised b y t h e g overnme nt as to whether it was cate g orica lly

a cr ime of violence

. Pur su ant t o th e mod if

ie d c ate g or ic a l a

pp ro a c h, Ga lle g os
Galindo’s re cord of

convi ct i o n ref

lects the fa ct that he “ was convicted of

the eleme nts of the g ener i ca lly define d crime.” Un i ted States v. Vidal , 5 0 4 F

. 3 d 1 0 7 2 , 1 0 7 7 ( 9 th

Ci r

. 2 007)U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AL L EG OS -G AL I NDO 12 (en ba nc). We have explained that th e m o d i fi ed categ orica l approa ch “re quires us to de termine – if we c an – whe ther the conduct f or which the defe ndant was c onvicted fits w ithin the fede ral de finition of t h e offense [detailed he re in the Guidelines note].” United St ates v. Sne llenberger , 548 F.3d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per curiam), abrogated on oth er g r o u n ds by Y

oung v. Holder , 697 F.3d 976 ( 9th Cir. 2012) (e n banc)

. T h at is, we ar e re quired to find that the conviction is indeed a “pre dicate conviction for e nhance ment purposes.” United States v. Bonat , 1 06 F .3 d 1 47 2, 14 76 (9 th C i r. 1 9 9 7 ) (qu o t i n g United States v. Swee ten , 933 F.2d 765, 769-7 0 (9th Cir. 1991)), cert. de nied , 522 U.S. 874 (1997). We can c onclude that a

conviction q u alified a s a cr ime of violence unde r the modi fied categ orica l approa ch “only if the
rec ord of conviction s hows the j ury [or dist rict cour t, if there is n o ju ry tr ia l] ‘ ne c e ssa

ri ly ’ foun d a ll o f t

he g e ne ri c ele me n ts , o r th e d e f

e n d an t ‘ n e c e s s ar il y ’ a dmi tt e d a ll o f the g ener ic eleme nts in a plea.” Sandoval-L ua v. Gonzales , 4 9 9 F. 3 d 1 1 2 1 , 1 1 3 1 (9 th C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Taylor , 4 95 U. S. at 599–602 and Shepard v. U nited States , 544 U.S. 13, 19–21 (2005)) , overruled on othe r grounds by Y oung , 697 F.3d at 980.

Under th e m o dified categ orica l approa ch, we may appropr iately

consider c erta in kinds of docum entation and judicially noticeable fac ts when dete rmini n g whether a conviction is a pre dicate c onviction for enha nceme nt purposes, including“the indictment, the judgment of conviction, j u ry

instructions, a signe d g uilty plea, or the transcr ipt from t h e plea proce eding s.” United States v. Rivera- Sanchez , 247 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 2001) (en ba nc) (qu o t i n g United States v. Casarez-Brav o , 1 8 1 F

. 3 d 1 074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999)).U NI TED S T A T ES V

. G AL L EG OS -G AL I NDO 13 The g overnme nt of

fer s Galleg os-Galindo’s Statement a s ev id e n c e th at t

h e s e xu a l a s s a

u lt w a s c o mm itte d

w it h o u t the consent of the vi ct i m

. The Statement is containe d in a judicially noticeable documen t

– a si g ned guilty plea – a nd indeed state s that the victim d i d not consent to the off ense. Ga lle g os -G a lin do ’s c onvic tio n c an th us be sa id to fa ll w ith in the Guidelines’ de finition of “forc ible sex off en s es,” which includes off

enses “ wher e conse nt to the conduct is not g iven

. . . .” U.S. Sente ncing Guidelines Manual § 2L 1.1, cmt. n.1(B)( i ii). Under the modified categ orica l approa ch, the dis tr ic t c ourt

the re fo re did

no t err – pla inl y or oth e rw ise – when it conc luded that Galleg os-Galindo’s c o n v iction for rape in the third deg ree was a crime of violence. The c onduct for whic h he wa s co n v icted does “ fit[] within the . . . definition” of a

crime of violence, Snellenberge r , 548 F.3d at 701, and he indeed did “‘ nece ssarily ’ admit[] all of the g ener ic eleme nts in [ his] plea,” Sandoval-Lua , 4 9 9 F.3d at 1131.

AF F IRMED.