[Cite as State v. Irvin, 2023-Ohio-3274.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee

v. 

LANCE A. IRVIN

 Appellant

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Appeal No. 28495

Trial Court Case No. 17-CR-3623

(Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas 

Court)

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O P I N I O N

Rendered on September 15, 2023

. . . . . . . . . . . 

STEPHEN P. HARDWICK, Attorney for Appellant

 

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ANDREW T. FRENCH, Attorney for Appellee

 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TUCKER, J.

{¶ 1} On remand from the Ohio Supreme Court, we must conduct a harmless-error 

analysis to determine whether the trial court’s misallocation of the self-defense burden of 

proof requires reversal of defendant-appellant Lance A. Irvin’s convictions for murder and 

felonious assault. 

{¶ 2} We conclude that Irvin was entitled to a self-defense jury instruction and that
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the trial court’s erroneous instruction placing the burden of proof on him was not harmless. 

Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment will be reversed as to his murder and feloniousassault convictions, and the case will be remanded for a new trial on those charges. 

Because Irvin’s conviction for tampering with evidence was unaffected by erroneous 

instruction, we will affirm the trial court’s judgment as to that offense. 

I. Background

{¶ 3} A grand jury indicted Irvin on two counts of murder, two counts of felonious 

assault, and evidence tampering in connection with the shooting death of Jesse 

Redavide. The case proceeded to a 2019 jury trial during which Irvin admitted the

shooting but claimed he had acted in self-defense. The trial court instructed the jury that 

self-defense was an affirmative defense on which Irvin bore the burden of proof. 

{¶ 4} The jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges. After merging allied offenses, 

the trial court imposed a sentence of 15 years to life in prison for murder with additional 

consecutive sentences for an accompanying firearm specification and evidence 

tampering. Irvin appealed, raising four assignments of error. One of them challenged the 

trial court’s allocation of the burden of proof to Irvin on the self-defense issue. Irvin argued 

that an amendment to the self-defense statute, R.C. 2901.05, had shifted the burden of 

proof to the prosecution, obligating the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he 

had not acted in self-defense. 

{¶ 5} Upon review, we held that the amendment to R.C. 2901.05 did not apply to 

Irvin because it took effect on March 28, 2019, which was after he shot and killed 

Redavide. We rejected an argument that the amendment applied prospectively to trials 
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held after the amendment’s effective date regardless of when the underlying offenses 

occurred. We overruled each of Irvin’s assignments of error and affirmed the trial court’s 

judgment. We also certified a conflict to the Ohio Supreme Court, recognizing that other 

Ohio appellate districts had reached a contrary conclusion regarding the applicability of 

R.C. 2901.05’s amendment. The Ohio Supreme Court later agreed that a conflict existed. 

{¶ 6} While Irvin’s appeal was pending, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. 

Brooks, 170 Ohio St.3d 1, 2022-Ohio-2478, 208 N.E.3d 751, holding that the amended 

version of the self-defense statute applied to trials held on or after the amendment’s 

effective date even if the offenses at issue occurred prior to that date. In October 2022, 

the Ohio Supreme Court vacated our judgment on the authority of Brooks and remanded 

Irvin’s case to us to “conduct a harmless error analysis.” State v. Irvin, 169 Ohio St.3d 

276, 2022-Ohio-3587, 203 N.E.3d 709. 

II. Analysis

{¶ 7} The harmless-error rule, Crim.R. 52(A), provides that “any error, defect, 

irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” 

Under this standard, the State must demonstrate that an error did not affect the 

defendant’s substantial rights. State v. Gillilan, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29182, 2023-

Ohio-325, ¶ 11, citing State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 

643, ¶ 15. If the State fails to satisfy this burden, we cannot ignore the error and must 

reverse the conviction. Id. 

{¶ 8} Here the State first asserts harmless error on the basis that Irvin was not 

entitled to a self-defense instruction at all. The State argues that his own testimony 
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negated a self-defense claim and, therefore, the trial court’s misallocation of the burden 

of proof was harmless. In State v. Cunningham, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29122, 2023-

Ohio-157, we addressed such a situation, finding harmless error in the trial court’s 

allocation of the burden of proof where the defendant’s own testimony established that 

the trial court should not have given a self-defense instruction. See also Brooks at ¶ 24

(recognizing that error in allocating the self-defense burden of proof is harmless if a 

defendant was not entitled to a self-defense claim). 

{¶ 9} In the present case, however, Irvin was entitled to a self-defense jury 

instruction. “After arguments are completed, a trial court must fully and completely give 

the jury all instructions which are relevant and necessary for the jury to weigh the evidence 

and discharge its duty as the fact finder.” State v. Comen, 50 Ohio St.3d 206, 553 N.E.2d 

640 (1990), paragraph two of the syllabus. When considering a self-defense instruction, 

a trial court must determine whether the evidence presented, if believed, reasonably 

would support a self-defense claim. State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2021-CA-68, 2022-

Ohio-3763, ¶ 40. 

{¶ 10} A claim of self-defense involving deadly force requires the existence of 

evidence that “the defendant had a bona fide belief that he or she was in danger of death 

or great bodily harm[.]” State v. Barker, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29227, 2022-Ohio-3756, 

¶ 22. It also “requires evidence that the defendant had both an objectively reasonable 

belief and a subjective belief that force was necessary to protect himself or herself.” Id. at 

¶ 27. In addition, a self-defense claim requires consideration of the force used relative to 

the danger. “If the force used was so disproportionate that it shows a purpose to injure, 
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self-defense is unavailable.” Id. Finally, under the law applicable to Irvin, he could not kill 

in self-defense if he had a reasonable means of retreat from the confrontation.1Id. at 

¶ 23.

{¶ 11} In our prior opinion affirming Irvin’s convictions, we summarized his trial 

testimony as follows:

Testifying on his own behalf, Irvin testified he knew Joseph 

[Redavide] as the “neighborhood dealer, weed dealer.” Tr. p. 856. He further 

testified that, for the year prior to the shooting, he had gone to Joseph’s 

home “every other day,” and they used marijuana and liquid THC. Tr. p. 

858. According to Irvin, he got off work around 12:30 a.m. on the morning 

of the shooting. He testified he was driving from work when another friend, 

Tenia Lane-Calhoun, called him seeking a ride from work. Irvin picked up 

Lane-Calhoun, they made some stops, and then they drove to Joseph’s 

home. Irvin testified that Lane-Calhoun waited in the car while Irvin went 

into the home to get some food and drugs. Irvin testified that Jesse met him 

just inside the front door, and Irvin could smell alcohol on Jesse’s breath. 

Irvin testified that Jesse yelled, “Joey, your n****r friend is at the door.” Tr. 

p. 866. Irvin testified he asked Jesse why he would say that and Jesse 

replied, “I don't care about n*****s.” Id. Irvin claimed Jesse then attacked 

1

In April 2021, S.B. 175 took effect, amending R.C. 2901.09 and substantially modifying 

the duty to retreat in cases involving a self-defense claim. The amendment has no 

applicability in Irvin’s case. It does not apply retroactively to offenses committed before 

its effective date. State v. Degahson, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2021-CA-35, 2022-Ohio-2972, 

¶ 23.
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and “monkey dunked” him. After Irvin fell to the floor, Jesse grabbed a rifle 

and hit Irvin in the head. Irvin testified that he feared for his life and thought 

Jesse would kill him, so he pulled out his own gun, shot Jesse, and then 

fled the premises. He testified that his gun only had two bullets, and he 

discharged the second bullet into the floorboard of his Durango SUV. Irvin 

testified that, as he drove from the scene, he threw the gun into bushes 

located on Linden Avenue. Irvin testified he thought he parked the vehicle 

at a relative’s home, but he was actually at the wrong home; when he 

realized his mistake, he had to leave the Durango at the home because the 

vehicle was out of gas. Irvin testified he and Lane-Calhoun then walked to 

his stepmother’s home, where Irvin spent the night. Irvin was arrested later 

in the day.

(Footnote omitted.) State v. Irvin, 2020-Ohio-4847, 160 N.E.3d 388, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.), 

vacated, 169 Ohio St. 3d 276, 2022-Ohio-3587, 203 N.E.3d 709.

{¶ 12} The State argues that Irvin’s testimony did not demonstrate a bona fide 

belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, did not establish an 

objectively reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to protect himself, and did

not establish his inability to retreat and avoid the danger. 

{¶ 13} Although Irvin claimed Redavide had “monkey dunked” or slammed him to 

the ground and then hit him in the head with a rifle while he was down, the State notes 

Irvin’s additional testimony that he then got to his feet and was standing beside an open 

door when he pulled a gun and shot Redavide. See Tr. p. 870-971. The State also notes 
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the absence of testimony from Irvin that Redavide was pointing the rifle at him, overtly 

threatening to shoot him, or even threatening to strike him with it a second time when Irvin 

shot and killed Redavide. Under these circumstances, the State asserts that Irvin lacked 

a bona fide belief of imminent danger of serious injury, that it was unreasonable for him 

to believe deadly force was necessary, and that he could have escaped by simply exiting

the open door. 

{¶ 14} Notwithstanding the State’s arguments, we believe the trial court correctly

found Irvin entitled to a self-defense instruction. Accepting Irvin’s testimony as true, a 

potentially-intoxicated Redavide had made racial slurs against him and slammed him to 

the ground without provocation before proceeding to strike him in the head with a rifle. 

Irvin responded by regaining his footing, pulling a gun from his pocket, and firing a shot 

at Redavide, who remained no more than two feet away. Although Irvin did not specify 

whether Redavide was pointing the rifle at him, he did testify that Redavide was still 

holding it. Tr. p. 883. 

{¶ 15} Irvin’s testimony supported a bona fide belief that he remained in imminent 

danger of death or great bodily harm. His testimony also supported an objectively 

reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to protect himself. According to Irvin, 

Redavide, who smelled of alcohol, was acting irrationally by displaying unprovoked 

aggression and already had struck him in the head with a rifle, which Redavide continued 

to hold. Under these circumstances, a trier of fact could conclude that deadly force was 

necessary to protect Irvin. As for a duty to retreat, the threat posed by Redavide’s rifle at 

least arguably would not have been negated by Irvin’s turning his back and attempting to 
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flee. A trier of fact could find that such a response by Irvin would not have been a 

reasonable means of retreat from the confrontation. Therefore, Irvin was entitled to a selfdefense instruction.

{¶ 16} Although the instruction was warranted, the State next argues that the trial 

court’s misallocation of the burden of proof was harmless because it did not affect the 

outcome. The State suggests that the totality of the evidence presented at trial strongly

contradicted Irvin’s self-defense claim, making it implausible that any reasonable jury 

would have found self-defense regardless of which party bore the burden of proof. The 

State notes the existence of evidence controverting Irvin’s testimony about the 

circumstances surrounding the shooting, including eyewitnesses who testified that 

Redavide’s hands were in the air when he was shot. The State also notes other 

inconsistencies and argues the implausibility of some of Irvin’s claims. In essence, the 

State asks us to conduct a manifest-weight review to determine whether the trial court’s 

misallocation of the self-defense burden of proof constituted harmless error. 

{¶ 17} We recently rejected the same argument in Gillilan, declining to conduct 

what would have been in effect a manifest-weight analysis. As in the present case, the 

defendant in Gillilan had been entitled to a self-defense instruction. While giving the 

instruction, the trial court erroneously had placed the burden of proof on the defendant. 

On review, we applied the harmless-error standard and reasoned:

“In examining errors in a jury instruction, a reviewing court must 

consider the jury charge as a whole and ‘must determine whether the jury 

charge probably misled the jury in a matter materially affecting the 
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complaining party’s substantial rights.’ ” Becker v. Lake Cty. Mem. Hosp. 

W., 53 Ohio St.3d 202, 208, 560 N.E.2d 165 (1990). “A substantial right is, 

in effect, a legal right that is enforced and protected by law.” Cleveland v. 

Trzebuckowski, 85 Ohio St.3d 524, 526, 709 N.E.2d 1148 (1999).

As conceded by the State, Gillilan presented evidence at trial which 

entitled him to an instruction on self-defense. And, as discussed, the trial 

court provided an incorrect instruction which allocated the burden of proof 

on self-defense to Gillilan and omitted the State’s burden to disprove, 

beyond a reasonable doubt, Gillilan’s claimed use of self-defense. When, 

as here, the defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction, the failure to 

correctly instruct the jury regarding the burden of proof on self-defense 

affects a substantial right. Given this, the error is not harmless.

(Emphasis added.) Gillilan, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29182, 2023-Ohio-325, at ¶ 12-13.

{¶ 18} Based on our opinion in Gillilan, we do not find harmless error here. As in 

that case, Irvin was entitled to a self-defense instruction, and the trial court’s failure to 

instruct the jury correctly regarding the self-defense burden of proof affected a substantial 

right. As a result, the error was not harmless. 

{¶ 19} Part of the problem with conducting the State’s suggested manifest-weight 

review involves quantifying the impact the faulty instruction had on Irvin’s jury. The trial 

court instructed the jury that Irvin bore the burden of proving self-defense by a 

preponderance of the evidence. In reality, the State bore the burden of proving beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Irvin did not act in self-defense. This improper allocation of the 
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burden of proof was particularly significant in Irvin’s case. Because he admitted shooting 

and killing Redavide, disproving that he acted in self-defense was more than just “an 

element” of the State’s case. With respect to the murder and felonious-assault 

convictions, disproving self-defense was the case. Thus, the trial court’s erroneous 

instruction obligated Irvin to prove his own innocence on the only issue that mattered. 

{¶ 20} In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 

(1993), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that constitutional due process compels the 

prosecution to prove all elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt and that the 

Sixth Amendment requires a jury to make the requisite finding of guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. The Sullivan Court then explained: 

“It is self-evident, we think, that the Fifth Amendment requirement of 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of 

a jury verdict are interrelated. It would not satisfy the Sixth Amendment to 

have a jury determine that the defendant is probably guilty, and then leave 

it up to the judge to determine * * * whether he is guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. * * *

Id. at 278.

{¶ 21} In Irvin’s case, the absence of self-defense in effect became an element of 

the State’s case on which it bore the burden of proof. See United States v. Duran, 133 

F.3d 1324, 1331 (10th Cir.1998) (recognizing that “when a defendant has presented 

sufficient evidence to raise the issue of entrapment for the jury, proof that the defendant 

was not entrapped effectively becomes an element of the crime”). But because the jury 
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was instructed that Irvin bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, 

the most we confidently can infer from its verdict is that it found the evidence in equipoise 

on self-defense or could not determine which party possessed the preponderance of the 

evidence, meaning that Irvin may have been guilty of murder and felonious assault. By 

urging us to find harmless error, the State asks us to make the first and only determination 

that Irvin is guilty of murder and felonious assault beyond a reasonable doubt (because 

he did not act in self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt). 

{¶ 22} In Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a jury instruction 

relieves the prosecution of its burden to prove the elements of an offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt, harmless error cannot exist:

* * * There being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, 

the question whether the same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 

would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly 

meaningless. There is no object, so to speak, upon which harmless-error 

scrutiny can operate. The most an appellate court can conclude is that a 

jury would surely have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—

not that the jury’s actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would 

surely not have been different absent the constitutional error. That is not 

enough. * * * The Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate 

speculation about a hypothetical jury’s action, or else directed verdicts for 

the State would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual jury finding 

of guilty.
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(Citations omitted.) Sullivan at 280.

{¶ 23} The error in Sullivan involved providing the jury with an erroneous 

reasonable-doubt definition. That defect necessarily permeated the jury’s beyond-areasonable-doubt findings on all elements of the defendant’s murder charge and 

precluded a finding of harmless error. Id. at 280-281.

{¶ 24} In a subsequent case, Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 

144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999), the U.S. Supreme Court distinguished Sullivan and held that the 

trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on just one element of fraud charges against the 

defendant was harmless error. The Neder majority reasoned in part:

It would not be illogical to extend the reasoning of Sullivan from a 

defective “reasonable doubt” instruction to a failure to instruct on an element 

of the crime. But, as indicated in the foregoing discussion, the matter is not 

res nova under our case law. And if the life of the law has not been logic but 

experience, see O. Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1881), we are entitled to 

stand back and see what would be accomplished by such an extension in 

this case. The omitted element was materiality. Petitioner underreported $5 

million on his tax returns, and did not contest the element of materiality at 

trial. Petitioner does not suggest that he would introduce any evidence 

bearing upon the issue of materiality if so allowed. Reversal without any 

consideration of the effect of the error upon the verdict would send the case 

back for retrial—a retrial not focused at all on the issue of materiality, but on 

contested issues on which the jury was properly instructed. We do not think 

the Sixth Amendment requires us to veer away from settled precedent to 
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reach such a result.

Id. at 15.

{¶ 25} In a partial dissent, three justices opined that depriving a defendant of a jury 

verdict beyond a reasonable doubt on one element of an offense was just as

unsusceptible to harmless-error review as the error in Sullivan. Writing for the dissent, 

Justice Antonin Scalia reasoned:

The Court's decision today is the only instance I know of (or could 

conceive of) in which the remedy for a constitutional violation by a trial judge 

(making the determination of criminal guilt reserved to the jury) is a 

repetition of the same constitutional violation by the appellate court (making 

the determination of criminal guilt reserved to the jury).

* * * 

The Court’s decision would be wrong even if we ignored the 

distinctive character of this constitutional violation. The Court reaffirms the 

rule that it would be structural error (not susceptible of “harmless-error” 

analysis) to “ ‘vitiat[e] all the jury’s findings.’ ” * * * A court cannot, no matter 

how clear the defendant’s culpability, direct a guilty verdict. * * * The 

question that this raises is why, if denying the right to conviction by jury is 

structural error, taking one of the elements of the crime away from the jury 

should be treated differently from taking all of them away—since failure to 

prove one, no less than failure to prove all, utterly prevents conviction.

The Court never asks, much less answers, this question. Indeed, we 
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do not know, when the Court’s opinion is done, how many elements can be 

taken away from the jury with impunity, so long as appellate judges are 

persuaded that the defendant is surely guilty. * * * 

(Citations omitted.) Id. at 32-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

{¶ 26} Even accepting the Neder majority’s holding that it may be harmless error 

to fail to instruct a jury on a single element of a charge (meaning that there is no jury 

finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the missing element), Irvin’s case bears 

more similarity to Sullivan than Neder. 

{¶ 27} Again, the only real dispute with Irvin’s murder and felonious-assault

charges was whether he acted in self-defense. On that issue, the trial court obligated him 

to prove his own innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. Irvin improperly was 

required to establish each element of his self-defense claim by the greater weight of the 

evidence rather than the State’s proving that he did not act in self-defense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Much like the error in Sullivan, this error by the trial court “vitiate[d] all 

the jury’s findings” as to self-defense. We note too that the omitted element in Neder was 

materiality, which the defendant had not even contested at trial. Unlike Neder, the affected 

issue in Irvin’s case was self-defense, which was critical to the murder and feloniousassault charges and was fully litigated by him.

{¶ 28} Similarly to Neder, the Ohio Supreme Court has considered a trial court’s 

failure to instruct a jury on an element of an offense. In State v. Wamsley, 117 Ohio St.3d 

388, 2008-Ohio-1195, 884 N.E.2d 45, the court examined a trial court’s omission of an 

instruction on the culpable mental state for trespass as an element of aggravated 

burglary. Id. at ¶ 1, 14. The Wamsley court opined that failure to instruct on an element 
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of an offense is not structural error and is not always reversible as plain error. In finding 

no structural error, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that the instructions “did not 

necessarily render the trial so fundamentally unfair that it could not be a reliable vehicle 

for the determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” Id. at ¶ 24.

{¶ 29} In State v. Wilks, 154 Ohio St.3d 359, 2018-Ohio-1562, 114 N.E.3d 1092, 

the Ohio Supreme Court discussed Sullivan, Neder, and Wamsley in the course of 

considering an instruction that told jurors they must find the defendant not guilty if the 

State “failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the essential elements of aggravated 

murder.” Id. at ¶ 121. The defendant argued that the instruction was defective because it 

should have used the word “any” instead of “all.” According to the defendant, the given 

instruction suggested that he should be acquitted only if the State proved none of the 

elements. Finding no plain error, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that other portions of the 

instructions correctly articulated the State’s burden of proof as to each element and made 

clear that acquittal was proper if the State failed to prove any element. Id. at ¶ 126-128.

{¶ 30} In Wilks, the Ohio Supreme Court also distinguished Sullivan and found 

structural-error analysis to be inappropriate, reasoning: 

The nature of the error here is also different from that in Sullivan. The 

instructions here did not misrepresent “reasonable doubt,” and the failure to 

present more precise instructions did not vitiate all the jury’s findings. We 

conclude that the present case is more analogous to improperly instructing 

the jury on an element of an offense as in Wamsley than to failing to give a 

proper reasonable-doubt instruction altogether.
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Id. at ¶ 138.

{¶ 31} The error in Irvin’s case exceeds the magnitude of the error in Wamsley and

Wilks. As the Ohio Supreme Court noted in Wilks, neither of those cases involved failure 

to give a proper reasonable-doubt instruction. In Irvin’s case, however, the trial court’s 

error was much worse than giving an erroneous reasonable-doubt instruction. It entirely 

removed the State’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the only real issue, 

self-defense, and obligated Irvin to prove his innocence. This error was even more

egregious than the error in Sullivan, which involved incorrectly defining the prosecution’s 

burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. At a minimum, instructing the jury that Irvin 

bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence was an overt misstatement 

of the prosecution’s burden of proof just as in Sullivan. Removing the State’s obligation 

to disprove that Irvin acted in self-defense and placing the burden of proof on him did 

“vitiate all of the jury’s findings” as to self-defense, the linchpin of his murder and 

felonious-assault convictions. 

{¶ 32} In our view, the error at issue necessarily rendered Irvin’s trial an unreliable 

vehicle for the determination of his guilt or innocence. In fact, there still has been no real 

determination of guilt or innocence beyond a reasonable doubt on the murder and 

felonious-assault charges. As explained above, because Irvin’s jury was instructed that 

he bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the most its verdict 

conveyed was that the evidence was equally balanced on self-defense or that the jury 

could not determine which party possessed the preponderance of the evidence, leaving 

open the possibility that he may have been guilty of murder and felonious assault. We 

decline to uphold a conviction under this standard, which is objectively worse than 
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misstating the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt definition as in Sullivan. 

{¶ 33} Based on this court’s prior precedent in Gillilan and the reasoning set forth 

above, we conclude that the trial court’s erroneous allocation of the burden of proof on

self-defense was not harmless error. Finally, even if we were not to characterize the trial 

court’s error as “structural error” per se, it still fundamentally impacted how the jury made 

its decision, and we cannot say with any confidence that it did not affect the outcome with 

respect to the murder and felonious-assault offenses. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 34} The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The 

judgment is affirmed with respect to Irvin’s conviction for evidence tampering. That 

conviction was unrelated to the self-defense instruction, which was relevant only to the 

murder and felonious-assault charges. 

{¶ 35} The trial court’s judgment is reversed with respect to Irvin’s convictions for 

murder, felonious assault, and the accompanying firearm specification, and the case is 

remanded for a new trial on those charges.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

EPLEY, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.