If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

March 5, 2019

v No. 340829

Oakland Circuit Court

ANTHONY QUINN LAVALLIS, LC No. 2017-160175-AR

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: TUKEL, P.J., and SHAPIRO and GADOLA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The prosecution appeals by leave granted the circuit court’s order denying the 

prosecution’s delayed application for leave to appeal to that court the district court’s orders 

dismissing defendant’s charges of resisting and obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1), 

and operating a motor vehicle without a valid license, MCL 257.301(1). We reverse.

I. FACTS

This case arises from a traffic stop. On March 22, 2017, Oakland County Sheriff’s 

Deputy Brandon DeVita was on routine patrol in the city of Pontiac when he followed a vehicle 

and ran the vehicle’s license plate number in the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN)

system as a matter of routine. He received a response indicating that the registered owner of the 

vehicle had a suspended driver’s license and that the vehicle was uninsured.

Defendant was driving the vehicle.1 According to DeVita’s dashcam video and DeVita’s

testimony at the preliminary examination, DeVita followed the vehicle for a short distance until 

the vehicle turned into a driveway without using a turn signal. DeVita activated his overhead 

lights and parked directly behind the vehicle, then approached the driver’s door of the vehicle. 

DeVita testified that upon approaching the vehicle, defendant immediately began to argue with 

 1 Defendant apparently is not the owner of the vehicle.
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him regarding why DeVita had stopped him, and would not listen when the officer attempted to 

explain the reason for the stop. DeVita explained that the LEIN records had indicated that the 

vehicle was not insured. He then asked defendant for his driver’s license and for the vehicle’s 

proof of insurance, to which defendant responded that he did not have a driver’s license, nor did

he have other proof of identification.

Devita asked defendant to step out of the vehicle because he was under arrest for driving 

without a license. In response, defendant rolled up the windows, locked the car doors, and 

started the engine. Deputy Kyle Lindsey had been traveling behind DeVita in a police car and 

stopped to assist DeVita. DeVita and Lindsey pointed tasers at defendant and ordered him out of 

the vehicle. At that point, defendant reached behind the passenger seat, and DeVita unholstered 

his gun and pointed it at defendant. DeVita warned defendant to keep his hands where they 

could be seen. Defendant refused to get out of the vehicle, moved around the vehicle without 

keeping his hands in sight, began recording DeVita with his cell phone, began beeping the horn, 

put the car in gear, and began “revving” the engine.

After defendant continued to disobey commands to get out of the vehicle, the officers 

broke the car window with a baton, at which point defendant said “okay, okay” and unlocked the 

door, but continued to refuse to get out of the car. Defendant struggled with the officers as they 

pulled him out of the car and onto the ground. Another deputy arrived, and after a struggle, the 

three deputies were able to handcuff defendant. Defendant then refused to get inside the police 

car. After the officers physically placed defendant in the police car, defendant apologized, 

provided his name, and stated that he had an outstanding Friend of the Court warrant. DeVita 

then verified that defendant did not have a valid driver’s license and that there was an 

outstanding Friend of the Court warrant for defendant’s arrest.

Defendant was charged with resisting and obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1), 

and operating a motor vehicle without a valid license, MCL 257.301(1). During the preliminary 

examination, the district court asked the officer during his testimony what induced him to run a 

LEIN check of the license plate of the vehicle defendant was driving. DeVita responded that he 

frequently runs license plate numbers while on patrol, and nothing specifically had caused him to 

run the license plate number of defendant’s vehicle. At the conclusion of the preliminary 

examination, the district court declined to bind defendant over on the charges. Although the 

district court’s reasoning is not entirely clear, the district court apparently determined that the 

basis of the stop was unlawful because the officer did not have probable cause to believe that 

defendant had violated the law before he ran the LEIN check. The district court entered orders 

dismissing the charges on May 2, 2017.

On August 4, 2017, the prosecutor filed a delayed application for leave to appeal with the 

circuit court, explaining that the reason for the delay in seeking the appeal was that the 

prosecutor’s case file mistakenly had been returned to the office’s records division before 

appropriate personnel could consider the matter for appeal. The circuit court denied the 

prosecution’s delayed application for leave to appeal to that court, finding that the delay in 

seeking leave to appeal had been unreasonable under MCR 7.105(G)(1).

The prosecution sought leave to appeal to this Court, arguing that the district court’s 

determination directly contravenes People v Jones, 260 Mich App 424; 678 NW2d 627 (2004). 
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This Court granted the prosecution leave to appeal. People v Lavallis, unpublished order of the 

Court of Appeals, entered March 28, 2018 (Docket No. 340829).

II. DISCUSSION

The prosecution contends that the district court abused its discretion in failing to bind 

over defendant to the circuit court on the charges, arguing that the district court erroneously 

determined that the officer conducted an unreasonable search by checking the vehicle’s license 

plate number on LEIN without probable cause. We agree.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We note initially that the circuit court declined to grant the prosecution’s delayed 

application for leave to appeal under MCR 7.105(G), concluding that an unreasonable period of 

time had passed. We review the decision of a circuit court to grant or deny a delayed application 

for leave to appeal for an abuse of discretion. Teddy 23, LLC v Michigan Film Office, 313 Mich 

App 557, 564; 884 NW2d 799 (2015); People v Flowers, 191 Mich App 169, 172; 477 NW2d 

473 (1991). Here, the district court entered its orders dismissing the charges on May 2, 2017. 

On August 4, 2017, the prosecution sought delayed leave to appeal, resulting in a delay of 

approximately two months after the initial appeal period had expired. There is no indication that 

this delay in seeking review of the district court’s decision prejudiced defendant, nor that the 

delay was for any improper purpose. Further, our review of the record indicates that the district 

court erred as a matter of law in declining to bind over defendant to the circuit court on the basis 

that the LEIN check was an unreasonable search, necessitating review to correct the error. We 

therefore conclude that under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court abused its 

discretion by declining to grant the prosecution’s delayed application for leave to appeal.

With regard to the underlying decision of the district court, this Court reviews a district 

court’s decision regarding whether to bind over a defendant for an abuse of discretion. People v 

Shami, 501 Mich 243, 251; 912 NW2d 526 (2018). The district court abuses its discretion when 

its decision “falls outside the range of principled outcomes.” People v Seewald, 499 Mich 111, 

116; 879 NW2d 237 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). When a trial court makes an 

error of law, it necessarily abuses its discretion. People v Duncan, 494 Mich 713, 723; 835 

NW2d 399 (2013).

B. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION

A preliminary examination is conducted to determine whether probable cause exists to 

believe that the defendant committed a crime. People v Bennett, 290 Mich App 465, 480; 802 

NW2d 627 (2010). To find probable cause requires sufficient evidence of each element of the 

crimes charged, or evidence from which each element may be inferred, sufficient to “cause a 

person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the 

defendant’s guilt.” Shami, 501 Mich at 251 (quotation marks and citations omitted). The 

elements may be established sufficiently by circumstantial evidence, and reasonable inferences 

arising from the evidence, to justify binding over a defendant. People v Woods, 200 Mich App 

283, 288; 504 NW2d 24 (1993). When the prosecution has presented competent evidence 

sufficient to support probable cause that the felony was committed and that the defendant 
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committed it, the district court is required to bind the defendant over to the circuit court for trial. 

People v Cervi, 270 Mich App 603, 616; 717 NW2d 356 (2006).

In this case, defendant was charged with resisting and obstructing a police officer, MCL 

750.81d(1), which requires the prosecution to demonstrate that (1) the defendant assaulted, 

battered, wounded, resisted, obstructed, opposed, or endangered a police officer, (2) the 

defendant knew or had reason to know that the person was a police officer performing his or her 

duties, and (3) the officer’s actions were lawful. People v Quinn, 305 Mich App 484, 491-492; 

853 NW2d 383 (2014). Defendant was also charged with operating a motor vehicle without a 

valid license, MCL 257.301(1). Despite the evidence presented that defendant did, in fact, 

commit these offenses, the district court in this case declined to bind over defendant to the circuit 

court, apparently concluding that the officer had conducted an unreasonable search by checking 

the license plate number of the vehicle defendant was driving without probable cause to believe 

that defendant had committed a crime.

The United States and Michigan Constitutions protect individuals from unreasonable 

searches and seizures. US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11; People v Henry (After 

Remand), 305 Mich App 127, 137; 854 NW2d 114 (2014). This Court has held that stopping a 

vehicle and detaining the occupants is considered a seizure. People v Simmons, 316 Mich App 

322, 326; 894 NW2d 86 (2016). However, the protection against unreasonable searches is 

implicated only when government action infringes upon a person’s reasonable expectation of 

privacy. People v Jones, 260 Mich App 424, 428-429; 678 NW2d 627 (2004). This Court has 

specifically held that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a license 

plate openly displayed on a vehicle. Id. at 429. Thus, “[a] police officer may properly run a 

computer check of a license plate number in plain view even if no traffic violation is observed 

and there is no other information to suggest that a crime has been or is being committed.” Id. at 

427-428. The district court in this case therefore erred in determining that the officer conducted 

an unreasonable search when he ran a computer check of the license plate number of the car 

defendant was driving without probable cause to believe defendant had committed a crime.

Once the officer in this case determined from LEIN that the vehicle was uninsured and 

that the owner of the vehicle did not have a valid driver’s license, the officer was justified in 

stopping defendant. Police are only required to have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 

when conducting a valid traffic stop, People v Maggit, 319 Mich App 675, 692; 903 NW2d 868 

(2017), and the criminal activity suspected may include violation of a traffic law, Simmons, 316 

Mich App at 326. When, as here, a LIEN check reveals that a car is uninsured and that the 

registered owner does not have a valid driver’s license, the officer has reasonable suspicion 

sufficient to justify stopping the vehicle. See People v Mazzie, __ Mich App ___, ___; ___ 

NW2d ___ (2018) (Docket No. 343380), slip op at 7.

Defendant argues that the officer did not have adequate time to run the vehicle’s license 

plate number through LEIN, suggesting that the officer did not conduct the LEIN check before 

stopping defendant. However, DeVita testified that he can run a license plate number through 

LEIN “in about 10 seconds.” The officer’s in-car video recording shows him following behind 
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defendant’s vehicle for roughly 30 seconds, and for approximately 15 to 20 seconds of this time 

he arguably was close enough to read the license plate on defendant’s vehicle,2 before defendant 

turned into the driveway, supporting the argument that the officer had sufficient time to check 

the license plate number through LEIN. Further, a review of the officer’s in-car recording shows 

that immediately upon walking up to the driver’s side of defendant’s vehicle, the officer 

explained to defendant that his check of the license plate number indicated that the vehicle was 

uninsured, suggesting that the officer had, in fact, checked the license plate number on LEIN 

before stopping defendant. 3 In any event, when evidence at a preliminary examination conflicts, 

the defendant should be bound over for resolution of such issues by the trier of fact. See People 

v Henderson, 282 Mich App 307, 312; 765 NW2d 619 (2009).

Because the officer obtained the information that the vehicle was uninsured and the 

vehicle’s owner did not have a valid license, the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that 

defendant was committing traffic violations, justifying the officer’s stop of defendant’s vehicle. 

Maggit, 319 Mich App at 692. The district court’s determination that there was no basis for the 

officer’s stop of defendant’s vehicle was erroneous as a matter of law, Duncan, 494 Mich at 723, 

and the district court therefore abused its discretion by dismissing the charges on that basis.

Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain 

jurisdiction.

/s/ Jonathan Tukel

/s/ Michael F. Gadola

 2 The quality of the dashcam video does not permit a more precise determination.

3 We also note that DeVita stopped defendant after observing a traffic violation, being the 

unsignaled turn, which gave him an objective and reasonable ground to stop the vehicle. Any 

subjective intent by the officer was irrelevant in this case, see Whren v United States, 517 US 

806, 813; 116 S Ct 1769; 135 L Ed 2d 89 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, 

probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”), and his observation of the unlawful turn provided 

probable cause to stop defendant, see id. at 810 (“As a general matter, the decision to stop an 

automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation 

has occurred”).