20490 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 71 / Wednesday, April 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 

AIR IMMERSION DAC—Continued 

Radionuclide Half-life (μCi/mL) (Bq/m3) 

Xe-120 ..... 40.0 min 1E–05 4E+05 

Xe-121 ..... 40.1 min 2E–06 8E+04 

Xe-122 ..... 20.1 h ..... 8E–05 3E+06 

Xe-123 ..... 2.14 h ..... 6E–06 2E+05 

Xe-125 ..... 16.8 h ..... 1E–05 6E+05 

Xe-127 ..... 36.406 d 1E–05 6E+05 

Xe-129m .. 8.89 d ..... 2E–04 7E+06 

Xe-131m .. 11.84 d ... 5E–04 1E+07 

Xe-133 ..... 5.245 d ... 1E–04 5E+06 

Xe-133m .. 2.19 d ..... 1E–04 5E+06 

Xe-135 ..... 9.11 h ..... 1E–05 6E+05 

Xe-135m .. 15.36 min 1E–05 3E+05 

Xe-138 ..... 14.13 min 3E–06 1E+05 

* * * * * 

[FR Doc. 2011–8836 Filed 4–12–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 

Office of Thrift Supervision 

12 CFR Part 563e 

Community Reinvestment 

CFR Correction 

In Title 12 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations, Parts 500 to 599, revised as 

of January 1, 2011, on page 278, in 

§ 563e.12, the heading of paragraph (u) 

and paragraph (u)(1) are corrected to 

read as follows: 

§ 563e.12 Definitions. 

* * * * * 

(u) Small savings association—(1) 

Definition. Small savings association 

means a savings association that, as of 

December 31 of either of the prior two 

calendar years, had assets of less than 

$1.122 billion. Intermediate small 

savings association means a small 

savings association with assets of at 

least $280 million as of December 31 of 

both of the prior two calendar years and 

less than $1.122 billion as of December 

31 of either of the prior two calendar 

years. 

* * * * * 

[FR Doc. 2011–8795 Filed 4–12–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 1505–01–D 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 27 

[Docket No. SW026; Special Conditions No. 

27–026–SC] 

Special Conditions: Eurocopter France 

Model AS350B Series, AS350D, and 

EC130 Helicopters, Installation of a 

Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. Autopilot/ 

Stabilization Augmentation System 

(AP/SAS) 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions; request 

for comments. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the modification of the 

Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) model 

AS350B series, AS350D, and EC130 

helicopters. These model helicopters 

will have novel or unusual design 

features when modified by installing the 

Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. (Hoh) complex 

autopilot/stabilization augmentation 

system (AP/SAS) that has potential 

failure conditions with more severe 

adverse consequences than those 

envisioned by the existing applicable 

airworthiness regulations. These special 

conditions contain the added safety 

standards the Administrator considers 

necessary to ensure the failures and 

their effects are sufficiently analyzed 

and contained. 

DATES: The effective date of these 

special conditions is March 31, 2011. 

We must receive your comments by 

June 13, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: You may send your 

comments by e-mail to: 

john.vanhoudt@faa.gov; by mail to: 

Federal Aviation Administration, 

Rotorcraft Directorate, Attn: John 

VanHoudt (ASW–111), Special 

Conditions Docket No. SW026, 2601 

Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 

76137; or by delivering your comments 

to the Rotorcraft Directorate at the 

indicated address. You must mark your 

comments: Docket No. SW026. You can 

inspect comments in the special 

conditions docket on weekdays, except 

Federal holidays, between 8:30 a.m. and 

4 p.m., in the Rotorcraft Directorate. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John 

VanHoudt, Aviation Safety Engineer, 

FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations 

and Policy Group (ASW–111), 2601 

Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 

76137; telephone (817) 222–5167; 

facsimile (817) 222–5961; or e-mail to 

john.vanhoudt@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Reason for No Prior Notice and 

Comment Before Adoption 

The substance of these special 

conditions has been subjected to the 

notice and comment period previously 

and has been derived without 

substantive change from those 

previously issued. It is unlikely that 

prior public comment would result in a 

significant change from the substance 

contained herein. Further, a delay in the 

effective date of these special conditions 

would significantly delay issuance of 

the design approval and thus delivery of 

the helicopter, which is imminent. 

Therefore, the FAA has determined that 

prior public notice and comment are 

unnecessary, impracticable, and 

contrary to the public interest, and finds 

good cause exists for adopting these 

special conditions upon issuance. The 

FAA is requesting comments to allow 

interested persons to submit views that 

may not have been submitted in 

response to the prior opportunities for 

comment. 

Comments Invited 

While we did not precede this with a 

notice of proposed special conditions, 

we invite interested people to take part 

in this action by sending written 

comments, data, or views. The most 

helpful comments reference a specific 

portion of the special conditions, 

explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. 

We will file in the special conditions 

docket all comments we receive, as well 

as a report summarizing each 

substantive public contact with FAA 

personnel about these special 

conditions. You can inspect the docket 

before and after the comment closing 

date. If you wish to review the docket 

in person, go to the address in the 

ADDRESSES section of this document 

between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive by the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments 

filed late if it is possible to do so 

without incurring expense or delay. We 

may change these special conditions 

based on the comments we receive. 

If you want us to let you know we 

received your mailed comments on 

these special conditions, send us a preaddressed, stamped postcard on which 

the docket number appears. We will 

stamp the date on the postcard and mail 

it back to you. 

Background 

On February 5, 2010, Hoh submitted 

an application to the FAA’s Los Angeles 


emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 71 / Wednesday, April 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 20491 

Aircraft Certification Office (LA ACO) 

for a supplemental type certificate (STC) 

to install an AP/SAS on the Eurocopter 

model AS350B, AS350BA, AS350B1, 

AS350B2, AS350B3 (AS350B series), 

AS350D, and EC130 helicopters. The 

Eurocopter model AS350B series, 

AS350D, and EC130 helicopters are 14 

CFR part 27 Normal category, single 

turbine engine, conventional helicopters 

designed for civil operation. These 

helicopter models are capable of 

carrying up to six passengers with one 

pilot, and have a maximum gross weight 

of approximately 5,290 pounds, 

depending on the model configuration. 

The major design features include a 3- 

blade, fully articulated main rotor, an 

anti-torque tail rotor system, a skid 

landing gear, and a visual flight rule 

(VFR) basic avionics configuration. Hoh 

proposes to modify these model 

helicopters by installing a two-axis 

AP/SAS. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under 14 CFR 21.115, Hoh must show 

that the Eurocopter model AS350B 

series, AS350D, and EC130 helicopters, 

as modified by the installed AP/SAS, 

continue to meet the 14 CFR 21.101 

standards. The baseline of the 

certification basis for the unmodified 

Eurocopter model AS350B series, 

AS350D, and EC130 helicopters is listed 

in Type Certificate Number H9EU. 

Additionally, compliance must be 

shown to any applicable equivalent 

level of safety findings, exemptions, and 

special conditions, prescribed by the 

Administrator as part of the certification 

basis. 

If the Administrator finds the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(that is, 14 CFR part 27), as they pertain 

to this STC, do not contain adequate or 

appropriate safety standards for the 

Eurocopter model AS350B series, 

AS350D, and EC130 helicopters because 

of a novel or unusual design feature, 

special conditions are prescribed under 

§ 21.101(d). 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, Hoh must show compliance 

of the AP/SAS STC-altered Eurocopter 

model AS350B series, AS350D, and 

EC130 helicopters with the noise 

certification requirements of 14 CFR 

part 36. 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in § 11.19, under § 11.38 and 

they become part of the type 

certification basis under § 21.101. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The Hoh AP/SAS incorporates novel 

or unusual design features, for 

installation in a Eurocopter model 

AS350B series, AS350D, and EC130 

helicopter, Type Certificate Number 

H9EU. This AP/SAS performs noncritical control functions, since this 

model helicopter has been certificated 

to meet the applicable requirements 

independent of this system. However, 

the possible failure conditions for this 

system, and their effect on the 

continued safe flight and landing of the 

helicopters, are more severe than those 

envisioned by the present rules. 

Discussion 

The effect on safety is not adequately 

covered under § 27.1309 for the 

application of new technology and new 

application of standard technology. 

Specifically, the present provisions of 

§ 27.1309(c) do not adequately address 

the safety requirements for systems 

whose failures could result in 

catastrophic or hazardous/severe-major 

failure conditions, or for complex 

systems whose failures could result in 

major failure conditions. 

To comply with the provisions of the 

special conditions, we require that Hoh 

provide the FAA with a systems safety 

assessment (SSA) for the final AP/SAS 

installation configuration that will 

adequately address the safety objectives 

established by a functional hazard 

assessment (FHA) and a preliminary 

system safety assessment (PSSA), 

including the fault tree analysis (FTA). 

This will ensure that all failure 

conditions and their resulting effects are 

adequately addressed for the installed 

AP/SAS. The SSA process, FHA, PSSA, 

and FTA are all parts of the overall 

safety assessment (SA) process 

discussed in FAA Advisory Circular 

(AC) 27–1B (Certification of Normal 

Category Rotorcraft) and Society of 

Automotive Engineers (SAE) document 

Aerospace Recommended Practice 

(ARP) 4761 (Guidelines and Methods for 

Conducting the Safety Assessment 

Process on civil airborne Systems and 

Equipment). 

These special conditions require that 

the AP/SAS installed on a Eurocopter 

model AS350B series, AS350D, or 

EC130 helicopter meet the requirements 

to adequately address the failure effects 

identified by the FHA, and subsequently 

verified by the SSA, within the defined 

design integrity requirements. 

Applicability 

These special conditions are 

applicable to the Hoh AP/SAS installed 

as an STC approval, in Eurocopter 

model AS350B, AS350BA, AS350B1, 

AS350B2, AS350B3, AS350D, and 

EC130 helicopters, Type Certificate 

Number H9EU. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features for a Hoh 

AP/SAS STC installed on the specified 

model series of helicopters. It is not a 

rule of general applicability and affects 

only the applicant who applied to the 

FAA for approval of these features on 

the model helicopters listed in the 

‘‘Applicability’’ section. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27 

Aircraft, Aviation safety. 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572, 49 U.S.C. 

106(g), 40105, 40113, 44701–44702, 44704, 

44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the Hoh 

Aeronautics, Inc. (Hoh) supplemental 

type certificate basis for the installation 

of an autopilot/stabilization 

augmentation system (AP/SAS) on the 

Eurocopter model AS350B, AS350BA, 

AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3 (AS350B 

series), AS350D, and EC130 helicopters, 

Type Certificate Number H9EU. 

The AP/SAS must be designed and 

installed so that the failure conditions 

identified in the functional hazard 

assessment (FHA) and verified by the 

system safety assessment (SSA), after 

design completion, are adequately 

addressed in accordance with the 

‘‘failure condition categories’’ and 

‘‘requirements’’ sections (including the 

system design integrity, system design 

environmental, and test and analysis 

requirements) of these special 

conditions. 

I. Failure Condition Categories 

Failure conditions are classified, 

according to the severity of their effects 

on the rotorcraft, into one of the 

following categories: 

1. No Effect—Failure conditions that 

would have no effect on safety; for 

example, failure conditions that would 

not affect the operational capability of 

the rotorcraft or increase crew workload; 

however, could result in an 

inconvenience to the occupants, 

excluding the flight crew. 

2. Minor—Failure conditions which 

would not significantly reduce rotorcraft 

safety, and which would involve crew 

actions that are well within their 

capabilities. Minor failure conditions 

would include, for example, a slight 

reduction in safety margins or 

functional capabilities, a slight increase 

in crew workload, such as, routine flight 


emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES
20492 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 71 / Wednesday, April 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 

plan changes, or result in some physical 

discomfort to occupants. 

3. Major—Failure conditions which 

would reduce the capability of the 

rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to 

cope with adverse operating conditions 

to the extent that there would be, for 

example, a significant reduction in 

safety margins or functional capabilities, 

a significant increase in crew workload 

or result in impairing crew efficiency, 

physical distress to occupants, 

including injuries, or physical 

discomfort to the flight crew. 

4. Hazardous/Severe-Major—Failure 

conditions which would reduce the 

capability of the rotorcraft or the ability 

of the crew to cope with adverse 

operating conditions to the extent that 

there would be: 

• A large reduction in safety margins 

or functional capabilities; 

• Physical distress or excessive 

workload that would impair the flight 

crew’s ability to the extent that they 

could not be relied on to perform their 

tasks accurately or completely; or 

• Possible serious or fatal injury to a 

passenger or a cabin crewmember, 

excluding the flight crew. 

Note 1: ‘‘Hazardous/severe-major’’ failure 

conditions can include events that are 

manageable by the crew by the use of proper 

procedures, which, if not implemented 

correctly or in a timely manner, may result 

in a catastrophic event. 

5. Catastrophic—Failure conditions 

which would result in multiple fatalities 

to occupants, fatalities or incapacitation 

to the flight crew, or result in loss of the 

rotorcraft. 

The present §§ 27.1309 (b) and (c) 

regulations do not adequately address 

the safety requirements for systems 

whose failures could result in 

‘‘catastrophic’’ or ‘‘hazardous/severemajor’’ failure conditions, or for 

complex systems whose failures could 

result in ‘‘major’’ failure conditions. The 

current regulations are inadequate 

because when §§ 27.1309(b) and (c) 

were promulgated, it was not 

envisioned that this type of rotorcraft 

would use systems that are complex or 

whose failure could result in 

‘‘catastrophic’’ or ‘‘hazardous/severemajor’’ effects on the rotorcraft. This is 

particularly true with the application of 

new technology, new application of 

standard technology, or other 

applications not envisioned by the rule 

that affect safety. 

Hoh must provide the FAA with a 

SSA for the final AP/SAS installation 

configuration that will adequately 

address the safety objectives established 

by the FHA and the preliminary system 

safety assessment (PSSA), including the 

fault tree analysis (FTA). This will show 

that all failure conditions and their 

resulting effects are adequately 

addressed for the installed AP/SAS. 

Note 2: The SSA process, FHA, PSSA, and 

FTA are all parts of the overall safety 

assessment (SA) process discussed in FAA 

Advisory Circular (AC) 27–1B (Certification 

of Normal Category Rotorcraft) and Society of 

Automotive Engineers (SAE) document 

Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 

4761 (Guidelines and Methods for 

Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on 

civil airborne Systems and Equipment). 

II. Requirements 

Hoh must comply with the existing 

requirements of § 27.1309 for all 

applicable design and operational 

aspects of the AP/SAS with the failure 

condition categories of ‘‘no effect,’’ and 

‘‘minor,’’ and for non-complex systems 

whose failure condition category is 

classified as ‘‘major.’’ Hoh must comply 

with the requirements of these special 

conditions for all applicable design and 

operational aspects of the AP/SAS with 

the failure condition categories of 

‘‘catastrophic’’ and ‘‘hazardous severe/ 

major,’’ and for complex systems whose 

failure condition category is classified 

as ‘‘major.’’ A complex system is a 

system whose operations, failure 

conditions, or failure effects are difficult 

to comprehend without the aid of 

analytical methods (for example, FTA, 

Failure Modes and Effect Analysis, 

FHA). 

System Design Integrity Requirements 

Each of the failure condition 

categories defined in these special 

conditions relate to the corresponding 

aircraft system integrity requirements. 

The system design integrity 

requirements, for the Hoh AP/SAS, as 

they relate to the allowed probability of 

occurrence for each failure condition 

category, and the proposed software 

design assurance level, are as follows: 

• ‘‘Major’’—For systems with ‘‘major’’ 

failure conditions, failures resulting in 

these major effects must be shown to be 

remote, a probability of occurrence on 

the order of between 1 × 10¥5 to 1 × 

10¥7 failures/hour, and associated 

software must be developed to the 

RTCA/DO–178B (Software 

Considerations in Airborne Systems 

And Equipment Certification) Level C 

software design assurance level. 

• ‘‘Hazardous/Severe-Major’’—For 

systems with ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ 

failure conditions, failures resulting in 

these hazardous/severe-major effects 

must be shown to be extremely remote, 

a probability of occurrence on the order 

of between 1 × 10¥7 to 1 × 10¥9

failures/hour, and associated software 

must be developed to the RTCA/DO– 

178B (Software Considerations in 

Airborne Systems And Equipment 

Certification) Level B software 

assurance level. 

• ‘‘Catastrophic’’—For systems with 

‘‘catastrophic’’ failure conditions, 

failures resulting in these catastrophic 

effects must be shown to be extremely 

improbable, a probability of occurrence 

on the order of 1 × 10¥9 failures/hour 

or less, and associated software must be 

developed to the RTCA/DO–178B 

(Software Considerations in Airborne 

Systems And Equipment Certification) 

Level A design assurance level. 

System Design Environmental 

Requirements 

The AP/SAS system equipment must 

be qualified to the appropriate 

environmental level per RTCA 

document DO–160F (Environmental 

Conditions and Test Procedures for 

Airborne Equipment), for all relevant 

aspects. This is to show that the AP/ 

SAS system performs its intended 

function under any foreseeable 

operating condition, which includes the 

expected environment in which the AP/ 

SAS is intended to operate. Some of the 

main considerations for environmental 

concerns are installation locations and 

the resulting exposure to environmental 

conditions for the AP/SAS system 

equipment, including considerations for 

other equipment that may be affected 

environmentally by the AP/SAS 

equipment installation. The level of 

environmental qualification must be 

related to the severity of the considered 

failure conditions and effects on the 

rotorcraft. 

Test and Analysis Requirements 

Compliance with the requirements of 

these special conditions may be shown 

by a variety of methods, which typically 

consist of analysis, flight tests, ground 

tests, and simulation, as a minimum. 

Compliance methodology is related to 

the associated failure condition 

category. If the AP/SAS is a complex 

system, compliance with the 

requirements for failure conditions 

classified as ‘‘major’’ may be shown by 

analysis, in combination with 

appropriate testing to validate the 

analysis. Compliance with the 

requirements for failure conditions 

classified as ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ 

may be shown by flight-testing in 

combination with analysis and 

simulation, and the appropriate testing 

to validate the analysis. Flight tests may 

be limited for ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ 

failure conditions and effects due to 

safety considerations. Compliance with 

the requirements for failure conditions 


emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 71 / Wednesday, April 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 20493 

classified as ‘‘catastrophic’’ may be 

shown by analysis, and appropriate 

testing in combination with simulation 

to validate the analysis. Very limited 

flight tests in combination with 

simulation are used as a part of a 

showing of compliance for 

‘‘catastrophic’’ failure conditions. Flight 

tests are performed only in 

circumstances that use operational 

variations, or extrapolations from other 

flight performance aspects to address 

flight safety. 

These special conditions require that 

the Hoh AP/SAS system installed on a 

Eurocopter model AS350B, AS350BA, 

AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3, AS350D, 

and EC130 helicopter, Type Certificate 

Number H9EU, meet these requirements 

to adequately address the failure effects 

identified by the FHA, and subsequently 

verified by the SSA, within the defined 

design system integrity requirements. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on March 31, 

2011. 

Scott A. Horn, 

Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2011–8294 Filed 4–12–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2011–0262; Directorate 

Identifier 2010–NM–215–AD; Amendment 

39–16649; AD 2011–07–12] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Fokker 

Services B.V. Model F.27 Mark 050 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD results 

from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

* * * [T]he Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) has published Special 

Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and 

the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has 

published Interim Policy INT/POL/25/12. 

The review conducted by Fokker Services on 

the Fokker 50 and Fokker 60 type design, in 

response to these regulations, revealed that 

the clearance between parts of the main 

landing gear (MLG) and the fuel pipes may 

be insufficient. 

This condition, if not detected and 

corrected, could lead to chafing, possibly 

resulting in fuel leakage and, in combination 

with other factors, a fuel fire. 

This AD requires actions that are 

intended to address the unsafe 

condition described in the MCAI. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective April 

28, 2011. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in the AD 

as of April 28, 2011. 

We must receive comments on this 

AD by May 31, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–40, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The street address for 

the Docket Operations office (phone: 

800–647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES

section. Comments will be available in 

the AD docket shortly after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tom 

Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; phone: 425– 

227–1137; fax: 425–227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

The European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Community, has issued EASA 

Airworthiness Directive 2010–0197, 

dated October 1, 2010 (referred to after 

this as ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct an unsafe 

condition for the specified products. 

The MCAI states: 

* * * [T]he Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) has published Special 

Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and 

the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has 

published Interim Policy INT/POL/25/12. 

The review conducted by Fokker Services on 

the Fokker 50 and Fokker 60 type design, in 

response to these regulations, revealed that 

the clearance between parts of the main 

landing gear (MLG) and the fuel pipes may 

be insufficient. 

This condition, if not detected and 

corrected, could lead to chafing, possibly 

resulting in fuel leakage and, in combination 

with other factors, a fuel fire. 

EASA issued AD 2010–0182 to require 

actions to ensure that a minimum clearance 

is maintained between the parts of the MLG 

and the fuel pipes in both nacelles. 

Since that AD was issued, it was 

discovered that aeroplane serial numbers 

20133 through 20142 were erroneously 

omitted in the original Fokker Service 

Bulletins (SB) and consequently the AD did 

not apply to those aeroplanes. The two SB’s 

(some typographical errors in part numbers 

were also found) have now been revised to 

correct this omission. 

For the reasons described above, this new 

AD retains the requirements of AD 2010– 

0182, which is superseded, and expands the 

Applicability to add the 10 missing serial 

numbers. 

The required actions include an 

inspection to determine fuel pipe part 

numbers, a general visual inspection to 

determine the clearance between certain 

fuel pipes and parts of the main landing 

gear, and replacement of certain pipes 

with insufficient main landing gear 

clearance. The required actions also 

include revising the maintenance 

program to incorporate a fuel limitation 

and a critical design configuration 

control limitation (CDCCL). You may 

obtain further information by examining 

the MCAI in the AD docket. 

The FAA has examined the 

underlying safety issues involved in fuel 

tank explosions on several large 

transport airplanes, including the 

adequacy of existing regulations, the 

service history of airplanes subject to 

those regulations, and existing 

maintenance practices for fuel tank 

systems. As a result of those findings, 

we issued a regulation titled ‘‘Transport 

Airplane Fuel Tank System Design 

Review, Flammability Reduction and 

Maintenance and Inspection 

Requirements’’ (66 FR 23086, May 7, 

2001). In addition to new airworthiness 

standards for transport airplanes and 

new maintenance requirements, this 

rule included Special Federal Aviation 

Regulation No. 88 (‘‘SFAR 88,’’ 

Amendment 21–78, and subsequent 

Amendments 21–82 and 21–83). 


emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES