20036 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 69 / Monday, April 11, 2011 / Notices 

6 In his Exceptions, Respondent cites two cases 

which he contends the ALJ ‘‘failed to consider’’ as 

cases where physicians had lost their state licenses 

and yet ‘‘no revocation of [the] physician’s DEA 

license occurred. Exceptions at 8 (citing Barry H. 

Brooks, M.D., 66 FR 18305 (2001); Vincent J. 

Scolaro, 67 FR 42060 (2002)). Neither of these case 

support Respondent because in both of them, the 

physician’s state authority had been restored at the 

time of the proceeding. See Brooks, 66 FR at 18308; 

Scolaro, 67 FR at 42065. 

7 In the event the State Board restores 

Respondent’s medical license at some point in the 

future, he can then apply for a new registration. 

1The correct citation is Va. Code Ann. § 54.1– 

111.A(4). 

‘‘knowingly and intelligently’’ waive his 

right to a hearing before the Mississippi 

Board, id. at 12; his ‘‘waiver [was] 

obtained through misrepresentation and 

under extreme duress,’’ id. at 8; and he 

is currently challenging the validity of 

his waiver in the Mississippi State 

Courts. Id. at 12. 

This argument, however, takes 

Respondent nowhere because ‘‘DEA has 

repeatedly held ‘that a registrant cannot 

collaterally attack the results of a state 

criminal or administrative proceeding in 

a proceeding under section 304 [21 

U.S.C. § 824] of the CSA.’ ’’ Hicham K. 

Riba, 73 FR 75773, 75774 (2008) 

(quoting Brenton D. Glisson, 72 FR 

54296, 54297 (2007) (other citation 

omitted)). See also Shahid Musud 

Siddiqui, 61 FR 14818 (1996); Robert A. 

Leslie, 60 FR 14004 (1995). 

Respondent’s various contentions 

regarding the validity of the Consent 

Order are therefore not material to this 

Agency’s resolution of whether he is 

entitled to maintain his DEA 

registration. 

Because 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) authorizes 

the revocation of a registration ‘‘upon a 

finding that the registrant * * * has had 

his State license suspended [or] revoked 

* * * and is no longer authorized by 

State law to engage in the * * * 

distribution [or] dispensing of 

controlled substance,’’ the only fact 

material to resolving this dispute is 

whether Respondent holds a State 

license. There being no dispute that 

Respondent lacks the requisite state 

authority, there was no need for an 

evidentiary hearing, as summary 

judgment has been used for more than 

100 years to resolve legal ‘‘actions in 

which there is no genuine issue as to 

any material fact’’ and has never been 

deemed to violate Due Process. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56 (Advisory Committee 

Notes—1937 Adoption). Cf. Codd v. 

Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977). 

Nor was Respondent entitled to an inperson hearing to challenge the sanction 

which the ALJ recommended. Cf. 

Anderson v. Recore, 446 F.3d 324, 330– 

31 (2d Cir. 2006). Under DEA’s 

longstanding interpretation of the CSA, 

revocation is warranted whenever a 

practitioner’s state authority has been 

revoked because, under the plain terms 

of the statute, possessing such authority 

is an essential condition for holding a 

DEA registration. See 21 U.S.C. 802(21) 

(‘‘[t]he term ‘practitioner’ means a 

physician * * * licensed, registered, or 

otherwise permitted, by * * * the 

jurisdiction in which he practices * * * 

to distribute, dispense, [or] administer 

* * * a controlled substance in the 

course of professional practice’’). See 

also id. § 823(f) (‘‘The Attorney General 

shall register practitioners * * * if the 

applicant is authorized to dispense 

* * * controlled substances under the 

laws of the State in which he 

practices.’’). 

Accordingly, DEA has repeatedly held 

that the CSA requires the revocation of 

a registration issued to a practitioner 

whose state license has been suspended 

or revoked. David W. Wang, 72 FR 

54297, 54298 (2007); Sheran Arden 

Yeates, 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); 

Dominick A. Ricci, 58 FR 51104, 51105 

(1993); Bobby Watts, 53 FR 11919, 

11920 (1988).6 This is so even where a 

state board has suspended (as opposed 

to revoked) a practitioner’s authority 

with the possibility that the authority 

may be restored at some point in the 

future, Rodriguez, 70 FR at 33207, as 

well as where, as here, a practitioner has 

sought judicial review of the state board 

proceeding. Dolin, 65 FR at 5662. 

Because Respondent currently lacks 

authority to dispense controlled 

substances in Mississippi, the State in 

which he holds his DEA registration, his 

registration will be revoked and any 

pending applications will be denied.7

Order 

Pursuant to the authority vested in me 

by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) & 824(a), as well as 

28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.104, I order that 

DEA Certificate of Registration, 

AR7086689, issued to Calvin Ramsey, 

M.D., be, and it hereby is, revoked. I 

further order that any pending 

application of Calvin Ramsey, M.D., to 

renew or modify his registration, be, and 

it hereby is, denied. This Order is 

effective May 11, 2011. 

Dated: April 1, 2011. 

Michele M. Leonhart, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2011–8533 Filed 4–8–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Clifton D. Burt, M.D.; Revocation of 

Registration 

On April 6, 2010, the Deputy 

Assistant Administrator, Office of 

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement 

Administration, issued an Order to 

Show Cause to Clifton D. Burt 

(Registrant) of Richmond, Virginia and 

Union, New Jersey. The Show Cause 

Order proposed the revocation of 

Registrant’s DEA Certificates of 

Registration, FB0575499 and 

FB1499587, on the ground that his 

‘‘continued registrations are inconsistent 

with the public interest as that term is 

defined in 21 U.S.C. 823(f).’’ Show 

Cause Order, at 1. 

The Show Cause Order alleged that 

from ‘‘May 2008 to October 2008,’’ 

Registrant ‘‘prescribed controlled 

substances to individuals via the 

Internet based on online questionnaires, 

submissions of unverifiable medical 

records, and telephone consultations’’ 

such that the prescriptions ‘‘were for 

other than a legitimate medical purpose 

or outside the usual course of 

professional practice in contravention of 

21 CFR 1306.04(a).’’ Id. at 2. The Order 

further alleged that Registrant ‘‘failed to 

establish a valid physician-patient 

relationship as required by the laws of 

Virginia.’’ Id. (citing, inter alia, Va. Code 

Ann. §§ 54.1–2915.A(3), (13), (16) & 

(17)). The Order next alleged that 

‘‘[f]rom October 2008 to March 2009,’’ 

Registrant ‘‘directly dispensed control 

substances to patients in Schedules IV 

and V without possessing a controlled 

substance certificate in violation of the 

laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia.’’ 

Id. (citing, inter alia, Va. Code Ann. 

§§ 54.1–2914.A., 54.1–2915.A(17) & 

(18), 54–1–111.A(4),1 and 54.1– 

3303(A)). The Order also informed 

Registrant of his right to request a 

hearing or to submit a written statement 

in lieu of a hearing, the applicable 

procedures for doing so, and the 

consequence if he failed to do either. Id. 

at 2–3. 

On April 9, 2010, the Show Cause 

Order was served on Registrant by 

registered mail addressed to him at both 

of his registered locations. Since that 

time, thirty days have now passed, and 

neither Registrant, nor anyone 

purporting to representing him, has 

either requested a hearing or submitted 

a written statement. I therefore find that 

Registrant has waived his rights under 

21 CFR 1301.43(b) and (c) and therefore 


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2Ambien is the name brand of generic zolpidem. 

3Under Virginia law, the Board may discipline a 

physician, suspend his license or revoke his license 

for the ‘‘unprofessional conduct’’ of ‘‘[i]ntentional or 

negligent conduct in the practice of any branch of 

the healing arts that causes or is likely to cause 

injury to a patient or patients.’’ Va. Code Ann. 

§ 54.1–2915.A(3). 

4This paragraph makes it unprofessional conduct 

for a physician to ‘‘[c]onduct[] his practice in a 

manner as to be a danger to the health and welfare 

of his patients or to the public.’’ Va. Code Ann. 

§ 54.1–2915.A(13). 

5This paragraph makes it unprofessional conduct 

for a physician to ‘‘[p]erform[] any act likely to 

deceive, defraud, or harm the public.’’ Va. Code 

Ann. § 54.1–2915.A(16). 

6This paragraph makes it unprofessional conduct 

for a physician to ‘‘[v]iolat[e] any provision of 

statute or regulation, state or federal, relating to the 

manufacture, distribution, dispensing, or 

administration of drugs.’’ Va. Code Ann. § 54.1– 

2915.A(17). 

issue this Decision and Final Order 

based on relevant evidence contained in 

the record submitted by the 

Government. 21 CFR 1301.43(e). 

Findings 

Registrant is the holder of two DEA 

registrations, both of which authorize 

him to dispense controlled substances 

in schedules II through V as a 

practitioner: (1) Certificate of 

Registration FB1499587, issued for the 

registered location of 1505 Stuyvesant 

Avenue, Union, New Jersey, and which 

expires on July 31, 2012; and (2) 

Certificate of Registration FB0575499, 

issued for the registered location of 9211 

Burge Avenue, Richmond, Virginia, 

which expires on July 31, 2010. The 

record, however, contains no evidence 

as to whether Respondent has filed an 

application to renew the latter 

registration. 

On September 17, 2008 a DEA 

Diversion Investigator (DI) and a DEA 

Special Agent (SA) interviewed patient 

T.M. at the Richmond District Office. 

T.M. indicated that since 2006, he had 

obtained hydrocodone through the Web 

site Fortune Telemed on ten to fifteen 

occasions. T.M. stated that he acquired 

the drugs by visiting the Web site, filling 

out an online questionnaire, and 

requesting the drug; T.M. also faxed his 

medical records to the Web site. 

Thereafter, T.M. spoke on the phone 

with individuals who identified 

themselves as physicians and who, after 

a brief consultation, wrote prescriptions 

for him for hydrocodone/ 

acetaminophen(apap) (10/325 mgs.), the 

drug he had requested. T.M. was never 

physically examined by, let alone met, 

any of the physicians who issued the 

prescriptions he obtained through 

Fortune Telemed. 

During his interview, T.M. did not 

recall the names of the Fortune Telemed 

physicians. However, the record 

contains copies of two controlled 

substance prescriptions (dated June 7 

and July 20, 2008) issued by Registrant 

for T.M., both of which were for 45 

tablets of hydrocodone/apap (10/325 

mgs.), a schedule III controlled 

substance. See 21 CFR 1308.13(e). 

On September 18, 2008, two DIs 

interviewed patient N.N. N.N. stated 

that he had received hydrocodone/apap 

(10/325 mgs.) ten to fifteen times in the 

last year and a half from the Web site 

Topline.com. N.N. stated that to acquire 

the drugs, he had completed an online 

questionnaire, requested the drug and 

faxed his medical records to Topline; 

thereafter, N.N. was called by 

individuals who identified themselves 

as physicians and who wrote the 

prescriptions after consultations which 

typically lasted less than five minutes. 

N.N. was never physically examined by, 

nor saw, any of these physicians. 

N.N. did not remember the names of 

any of the Topline physicians. The 

record, however, contains a copy of a 

prescription written by Registrant for 

N.N. on June 10, 2008 for 90 tablets of 

hydrocodone/apap (10/325 mgs.). 

On September 24, 2008, a DI and SA 

interviewed patient R.D. in Alexandria, 

Virginia. R.D. stated that during the 

previous two and a half to three years, 

he had obtained hydrocodone/apap (10/ 

500 mgs.) approximately 30 times from 

the Web site Telemed. R.D. stated that 

he had filled out an online 

questionnaire, requested the drug, and 

faxed his medical records to Telemed. 

Thereafter, R.D. was called by 

individuals who identified themselves 

as doctors from Telemed, who then did 

a two to three minute-long consultation 

with him. R.D. stated that he never was 

physically examined by the Telemed 

doctors and never saw them. 

Although R.D. stated that he had 

obtained hydrocodone 10 mg. from 

Telemed, the only prescriptions written 

by Registrant for him which are in the 

record were for 30 tablets of Ambien 

(zolpidem), a schedule IV controlled 

substance.2 See 21 CFR 1308.14(c). The 

prescriptions were dated July 1, October 

14, November 26, and December 26, 

2008. 

On September 26, 2008, a DI and an 

SA interviewed patient K.H. at his 

residence in Manassas, Virginia. K.H. 

indicated that he first visited the 

Topline Web site to obtain drugs in 

‘‘[e]arly 2008.’’ He completed an online 

questionnaire and faxed his medical 

records to the site. He was then 

contacted by individuals identifying 

themselves as physicians who, after 

‘‘[n]o more than five (5) minutes’’ of 

conversation, wrote prescriptions for 

hydrocodone/apap (10/500 mgs.). The 

Topline doctors issued the prescriptions 

without ever physically examining or 

meeting him. 

The investigative file contains three 

controlled substance prescriptions 

written by Registrant for K.H. All were 

for 90 tablets of hydrocodone/apap (10/ 

500 mgs.) and are dated October 30, 

November 28, and December 23, 2008. 

On Wednesday, March 4, 2009, an 

Intelligence Research Specialist (IRS), a 

DI, and an Investigator from the Virginia 

Department of Health Professionals 

interviewed Registrant at his place of 

employment, Concentra Medical Center 

(‘‘Concentra’’) in Richmond, Virginia. 

Registrant stated that he first learned 

about Telemed Ventures, L.L.C. 

(‘‘Telemed’’) through advertising in May 

2008 and that he contacted the company 

on his own initiative. After speaking 

with a woman named Ana Goris and 

providing his curriculum vitae and 

licensing information, he then spoke 

with the Medical Director, Dr. John 

Maye. 

During the interview, Registrant 

stated that he was still working for 

Telemed. In the interview, he indicated 

that he would review any medical 

records submitted by the customer and 

talk with him, discuss the side effects of 

the drug being sought, and then 

authorize the prescription, which he 

would fax to Telemed Ventures, L.L.C. 

He further claimed that he could deny 

the prescription if he chose to. 

According to Registrant, customers 

were required to submit updated 

records approximately every four to six 

months, but he did not state what 

records were required. Registrant stated 

that he never ordered any medical tests 

for any of Telemed’s customers and that 

he never independently verified 

customer records. He further asserted 

that he would speak with approximately 

three to nine customers per week and 

admitted that he never saw the 

customers in person or evaluated them 

face-to-face. He also stated that he was 

paid $25.00 for new patients and $20.00 

for returning patients and that he 

received a check every Friday in 

payment for the consultations he had 

done the previous week. Finally, he 

stated that the majority of the Telemed 

customers requested hydrocodone. 

On November 7, 2009, Registrant 

entered into a Consent Order with the 

Virginia Board of Medicine (‘‘the 

Board’’). In its Findings of Fact, the 

Board determined that Registrant 

‘‘violated Sections 54.1–2915.A(3),3

(13),4 (16) 5 and (17),6 and Section 54.1– 


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7Similar to the CSA, Virginia law provides that 

a ‘‘prescription for a controlled substance may be 

issued only by a practitioner of medicine * * * 

who is authorized to prescribe controlled 

substances’’ and that the ‘‘prescription shall be 

issued for a medicinal or therapeutic purpose and 

may be issued only to persons * * * with whom 

the practitioner has a bona fide practitioner-patient 

relationship.’’ Va. Code Ann. § 54.1–3303.A. The 

section also provides, in pertinent part, that ‘‘a bona 

fide practitioner-patient relationship means that the 

practitioner shall * * * (iii) perform or have 

performed an appropriate examination of the 

patient, either physically or by means of 

instrumentation and diagnostic equipment through 

which images and medical records may be 

transmitted electronically.’’ Id. 

8This paragraph makes it unprofessional conduct 

to ‘‘[v]iolat[e] or cooperat[e] with others in violating 

any of the provisions of Chapters 1, 24, and this 

chapter or regulations of the Board.’’ Va. Code Ann. 

§ 54.1–2915.A(18). 

9This section makes illegal ‘‘[p]erforming any act 

of function which is restricted by statute or 

regulation to persons holding a professional or 

occupational license or certification, without being 

duly certified or licensed.’’ Va. Code Ann. § 54.1– 

111.A(4). 

10 In the Consent Order, Registrant ‘‘neither 

admit[ted] nor den[ied] the truth of the * * * 

Findings of Fact, but agree[d] not to contest them 

in any future proceedings before’’ the Board. Id. at 

3. This, however, does not foreclose the Agency 

from giving weight to these findings. 

3303.A 7 of the Code, in that from May 

2008 to October 2008, he prescribed 

controlled substances, including 

hydrocodone * * * and zolpidem 

* * * to individuals outside of a bona 

fide practitioner-patient relationship.’’ 

Consent Order, at 1. According to the 

Consent Order, ‘‘during that time period 

[Registrant] was employed by Secure 

Telemedicine, LLC (‘‘Telemed’’), a 

company offering medical services and 

prescriptions to patients via its Web 

site, TopLineRx.com.’’ Id. The Consent 

Order further indicated that Registrant 

‘‘stated that he would review medical 

records and speak with patients by 

phone prior to issuing a prescription’’ 

and that he ‘‘prescribed controlled 

substances to these individuals without 

seeing these patients in person and 

without performing any physical 

examinations on these patients.’’ Id. at 

1–2. 

In its findings, the Board also 

determined that Registrant ‘‘violated 

Sections 54.1–2915.A(17) and (18),8 and 

Section 54.1–111.A(4) 9 of the Code, in 

that, from approximately October 2008 

to March 4, 2009, he dispensed 

controlled substances in Schedules IV, 

V, and VI to patients without being 

licensed by the Board of Pharmacy, as 

required by Section 54.1–3302 of the 

Code.’’ Id. at 2. The Board further found 

that ‘‘since October 1, 2008, [Registrant] 

has been employed by Concentra 

Medical Center * * * in Richmond, 

Virginia, providing medical care to 

workers’ compensation patients,’’ that 

he ‘‘admits that he has dispensed 

controlled substances during the course 

of his employment with Concentra, and 

states that he was unaware that he was 

required to have an additional license to 

do so.’’ 10 Id. By the terms of the Consent 

Order, Registrant received a reprimand, 

was fined fifteen hundred dollars 

($1,500.00), and was required to 

complete ‘‘at least twelve (12) hours of 

continuing medical education * * * in 

the subject of proper prescribing.’’ Id. 

Discussion 

Section 304(a) of the Controlled 

Substances Act (‘‘CSA’’) provides that a 

‘‘registration pursuant to section 823 of 

this title to * * * dispense a controlled 

substance * * * may be suspended or 

revoked by the Attorney General upon 

a finding that the registrant * * * has 

committed such acts as would make his 

registration under section 823 of this 

title inconsistent with the public 

interest as determined under such 

section.’’ 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). In the case 

of a practitioner, Congress directed that 

the following factors be considered in 

making the public interest 

determination: 

(1) The recommendation of the appropriate 

State licensing board or professional 

disciplinary authority. 

(2) The applicant’s experience in 

dispensing * * * controlled substances. 

(3) The applicant’s conviction record under 

Federal or State laws relating to the 

manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of 

controlled substances. 

(4) Compliance with applicable State, 

Federal, or local laws relating to controlled 

substances. 

(5) Such other conduct which may threaten 

the public health and safety. 21 U.S.C. 823(f). 

‘‘[T]hese factors are * * * considered 

in the disjunctive.’’ Robert A. Leslie, 68 

FR 15227, 15230 (2003). I may rely on 

any one or a combination of factors and 

may give each factor the weight I deem 

appropriate in determining whether to 

revoke an existing registration or to 

deny an application. Id. Moreover, I am 

‘‘not required to make findings as to all 

of the factors.’’ Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 

477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Morall 

v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 173–74 (DC Cir. 

2005). 

While I have considered all five 

factors, I conclude that it is not 

necessary to make findings as to factors 

one, three, and five. As explained 

below, I conclude that the evidence 

relevant to Registrant’s experience in 

dispensing controlled substances (factor 

two) and his compliance with 

applicable laws related to controlled 

substance (factor four) establishes that 

he has committed acts which render his 

registration ‘‘inconsistent with the 

public interest.’’ 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). I 

will therefore order that his registration 

be revoked and that any pending 

application be denied. 

Factors Two and Four: Registrant’s 

Experience in Dispensing Controlled 

Substances and Record of Compliance 

With Applicable Controlled Substance 

Laws 

Under a longstanding DEA regulation, 

a prescription for a controlled substance 

is not effective unless it is issued for a 

legitimate medical purpose by an 

individual practitioner acting in the 

usual course of his professional 

practice. 21 CFR 1306.04(a). This 

regulation further provides that an 

‘‘order purporting to be a prescription 

issued not in the usual course of 

professional treatment * * * is not a 

prescription within the meaning and 

intent of * * * 21 U.S.C. 829 * * * and 

* * * the person issuing it, shall be 

subject to the penalties provided for 

violations of the provisions of law 

relating to controlled substances.’’ Id. 

See also 21 U.S.C. 802(10) (Defining the 

term ‘‘dispense’’ as meaning ‘‘to deliver 

a controlled substance to an ultimate 

user * * * by, or pursuant to the lawful 

order of, a practitioner, including the 

prescribing and administering of a 

controlled substance.’’) 

As the Supreme Court recently 

explained, ‘‘the prescription 

requirement * * * ensures patients use 

controlled substances under the 

supervision of a doctor so as to prevent 

addiction and recreational abuse. As a 

corollary, [it] also bars doctors from 

peddling to patients who crave the 

drugs for those prohibited uses.’’ 

Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274 

(2006) (citing United States v. Moore, 

423 U.S. 122, 135, 143 (1975)). 

Under the CSA it is fundamental that 

a practitioner must establish and 

maintain a bona fide doctor-patient 

relationship in order to act ‘‘in the usual 

course of * * * professional practice’’ 

and to issue a prescription for a 

‘‘legitimate medical purpose.’’ Laurence 

T. McKinney, 73 FR 43260, 43265 n.22 

(2008); see also Moore, 423 U.S. at 142– 

43 (noting that evidence established that 

physician exceeded the bounds of 

professional practice ‘‘when he gave 

inadequate physical examinations or 

none at all,’’ ‘‘ignored the results of the 

tests he did make,’’ and ‘‘took no 

precautions against * * * misuse and 

diversion.’’). At the time of the events at 

issue here, the CSA generally looked to 

state law to determine whether a doctor 

and patient have established a bona fide 

doctor-patient relationship. See 

Christopher Henry Lister, 75 FR 28068, 


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11Under Federal law, because Respondent did 

not hold a Virginia license to dispense controlled 

substances, he was not even entitled to hold a DEA 

registration in the State because he did not meet a 

statutory prerequisite for obtaining a registration. 

See 21 U.S.C. 802(21) (defining ‘‘[t]he term 

‘practitioner’ [as] a physician * * * licensed, 

registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United 

States or the jurisdiction in which he practices 

* * * to dispense * * * a controlled substance in 

the course of professional practice’’); id.§ 823(f) 

(‘‘The Attorney General shall register practitioners 

* * * to dispense * * * controlled substances 

* * * if the applicant is authorized to dispense 

* * * controlled substances under the laws of the 

State in which he practices.’’). See also Jovencio L. 

Raneses, 75 FR 11563, 11564 (2010); Nasim F. 

Khan, 73 FR 4630, 4632 (2008). 

28069 (2010); Kamir Garces-Mejia, 72 

FR 54931, 54935 (2007); United 

Prescription Services, Inc., 72 FR 50397, 

50407 (2007). 

Under Virginia law, a controlled 

substance prescription ‘‘shall be issued 

for a medicinal or therapeutic purpose 

and may be issued only to persons 

* * * with whom the practitioner has a 

bona fide practitioner-patient 

relationship.’’ Va. Code Ann. § 54.1– 

3303.A. Furthermore, under the statute, 

‘‘a bona fide practitioner-patient 

relationship means that the practitioner 

shall * * * (iii) perform or have 

performed an appropriate examination 

of the patient, either physically or by 

the use of instrumentation and 

diagnostic equipment through which 

images and medical records may be 

transmitted electronically.’’ Id. 

As found above, Registrant admitted 

in an interview with agency 

Investigators that he prescribed 

controlled substances for Telemed 

without conducting physical 

examinations of its customers. 

Moreover, the record shows that each of 

the four persons who were interviewed 

by DEA Investigators, obtained 

controlled substances from Telemed 

through prescriptions issued by him, 

without being physically examined by 

him, let alone seeing him. The Virginia 

Board’s findings corroborate the various 

admissions Registrant made in his 

interview as well as the statements 

made by T.M., N.N., R.D., and K.H. in 

their respective interviews. I therefore 

find that Registrant issued controlled 

substances to internet patients without 

physically examining them and that he 

failed to establish a bona fide doctorpatient relationship with the Telemed 

customers. I further hold that in 

prescribing controlled substances to 

these persons, Respondent lacked a 

legitimate medical purpose and acted 

outside of the usual course of 

professional practice. 21 CFR 

1306.04(a). Respondent thus violated 

both the CSA and Virginia law. 

I further find—as did the Virginia 

Board—that Registrant violated Virginia 

Code §§ 54.1–2915.A(17) & (18) in that 

between October 2008 and March 2009, 

he prescribed controlled substances in 

Virginia’s schedules IV through VI in 

the State of Virginia without possessing 

the required license. Consent Order, at 

2; see also Christopher Henry Lister, 75 

FR 28068, 28069 (2010) (citing 

University of Tennessee v. Elliot, 478 

U.S. 788, 797–98 (1986)). This conduct 

also violated a DEA regulation. See 21 

CFR 1306.03(a)(1). I therefore find that 

Registrant violated both DEA regulation 

and Virginia law in this regard as well.11

In sum, the evidence shows that 

Registrant has repeatedly violated both 

Federal and State laws related to the 

dispensing of controlled substances and 

has therefore committed acts which 

render his registration ‘‘inconsistent 

with the public interest.’’ 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(4). Accordingly, Respondent’s 

registrations will be revoked and any 

pending application to renew or modify 

either registration will be denied. 

Order 

Pursuant to the authority vested in me 

by 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(f) & 824(a)(4), as 

well as 28 CFR 0.100(b) & 0.104, I order 

that DEA Certificate of Registration 

FB1499587, issued to Clifton D. Burt, 

M.D., be, and it hereby is, revoked. I 

also order the Office of Diversion 

Control to determine whether Clifton D. 

Burt, M.D., filed a timely renewal 

application for DEA Certificate of 

Registration FB0575499, and if so, order 

that this registration be, and it hereby is, 

revoked. I further order that any 

pending application of Clifton D. Burt, 

M.D., to renew or modify his 

registrations, be, and it hereby is, 

denied. This Order is effective May 11, 

2011. 

Dated: April 1, 2011. 

Michele M. Leonhart, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2011–8545 Filed 4–8–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

The Medicine Dropper; Revocation of 

Registration 

On January 29, 2010, I, the then 

Deputy Administrator of the Drug 

Enforcement Administration, issued an 

Order to Show Cause and Immediate 

Suspension of Registration (Order) to 

The Medicine Dropper (Respondent), of 

Greenwood, South Carolina. The Order 

proposed the revocation of 

Respondent’s DEA Certificate of 

Registration, BT2981214, as a retail 

pharmacy, and the denial of any 

pending applications to renew or 

modify its registration, on the ground 

that its ‘‘continued registration is 

inconsistent with the public interest.’’ 

Order, at 1. 

More specifically, the Order alleged 

that, on March 18, 2009, Respondent’s 

owner had entered into a Settlement 

Agreement with the United States 

Attorney for the District of South 

Carolina under which he agreed to a 

policy ‘‘to prevent the use of [his] 

pharmacy for ‘doctor shopping’ and [to] 

provide quarterly reports of all Schedule 

II controlled substances [it] dispensed.’’ 

Id. at 1–2. The Order also alleged that 

in the settlement, Respondent’s owner 

‘‘agreed to ‘fill prescriptions using the 

correct DEA number for the physician 

and [to] ensure that all required 

elements of the prescriptions are present 

prior to dispensing,’ ’’ as well as to 

comply with Federal and State laws 

related to the dispensing of controlled 

substances. Id. 

The Order alleged that, after executing 

the Settlement Agreement, Respondent’s 

owner continued to dispense 

prescriptions for schedule III controlled 

substances containing hydrocodone to 

L.P, even though she submitted similar 

prescriptions from three different 

physicians between June and November 

of 2009. Id. With respect to L.P., the 

Order further alleged that Respondent 

had ‘‘dispensed an excessive amount of 

hydrocodone,’’ and that ‘‘[b]ased on 

Respondent’s own calculations for what 

constitutes a ‘day’s supply’ of 

hydrocodone for L.P., Respondent 

dispensed the equivalent of 709 ‘day’s 

supplies’ during the period between 

September 22, 2008 and September 1, 

2009,’’ and that ‘‘[t]his resulted in 

dispensing more than twice the 

recommended amount of hydrocodone 

that L.P. should have received.’’ Id. 

Next, the Order alleged that in 

January and February 2009, Respondent 

distributed Lyrica, a schedule V 

controlled substance, ‘‘to T.M. without a 

valid prescription in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a),’’ and that it ‘‘also 

furnished false or fraudulent material 

information regarding T.M.’s Lyrica 

prescriptions in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 843(a)(4)(A) and mislabeled T.M.’s 

Lyrica prescription in violation of 21 

CFR 1306.24(a).’’ Id. The Order further 

alleged that on September 14, 2009, 

Respondent completed filling a 

prescription for Dilaudid 

(hydromorphone), a schedule II 

controlled substance, which T.M. had 

presented to it in August 2009, thereby 


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