GAO-12-9R Honduran Political Crisis 2009 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

October 20, 2011 

Congressional Requesters 

Subject: Review of U.S. Response to the Honduran Political Crisis of 2009

On June 28, 2009, Honduran President Manuel Zelaya was detained by his 

country’s military and flown to Costa Rica. Zelaya’s removal from Honduras 

followed several months of political polarization within Honduras in response to a 

number of controversial actions taken by Zelaya, including efforts to hold a national 

poll on June 28, 2009. Zelaya’s stated purpose for the poll was to ask Hondurans if 

there should be a referendum on whether the country should convoke a national 

constituent assembly to approve a new constitution. However, Honduran officials 

from other government institutions stated that they believed Zelaya would use the 

results of the poll to suspend the Honduran constitution. Immediately following the 

removal of Zelaya, the Honduran National Congress voted in Roberto Micheletti, 

President of the National Congress at the time, to replace Zelaya as President of 

Honduras. 

U.S. policy toward Honduras in the months preceding Zelaya’s removal was to 

support the rule of law and the Honduran constitution, and to encourage Honduras’ 

political actors to resolve their differences consensually and within Honduran law. In 

response to Zelaya’s removal, U.S. officials characterized the events of June 28, 

2009, as a coup. On the day of Zelaya’s removal, President Barack Obama and 

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton released statements calling on Hondurans to 

respect democratic norms and the constitutional order, and to resolve their political 

disputes peacefully and through dialogue. The U.S. Ambassador to Honduras 

characterized Zelaya’s removal as a breakdown of the constitutional order and noted 

that President Obama would only recognize Zelaya as the legitimate president of 

Honduras. U.S. policy after Zelaya’s removal was to assist Honduras in reaching a 

legal, constitutional, and negotiated resolution to the political crisis, which would 

include allowing for Zelaya’s return to the Honduran presidency. As the crisis 

persisted, U.S policy also sought to ensure that the already scheduled November 

2009 presidential election would be conducted in such a way that the international 

community could accept the results and recognize the winner as the legitimate 

president of Honduras. 

In response to your request, this report provides unclassified information we 

obtained to describe U.S. actions in response to President Zelaya’s removal, 
Page 2 GAO-12-9R Honduran Political Crisis 2009

including efforts to help Honduras resolve the political crisis. We are issuing a 

separate classified report that provides further details on U.S. actions in response to 

the Honduran political crisis and describes U.S. actions in response to events 

leading up to President Zelaya’s removal from office. To conduct this review, we 

obtained documents from the Department of State (State), Department of Defense 

(DOD), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Millennium 

Challenge Corporation (MCC). We interviewed officials from these agencies; 

Honduran officials in Zelaya’s government, the Micheletti-led government, and the 

current government; and other influential Hondurans who played a role during the 

political crisis. For further information on our scope and methodology, see 

enclosure I. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2010 through October 2011 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis 

for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Summary 

In response to Zelaya’s removal from office, the United States took diplomatic and 

economic measures against the Micheletti-led government and played an influential 

role in negotiations to resolve the crisis between Zelaya and Micheletti. These 

measures included instituting a no-contact policy with Micheletti-led government 

officials; terminating several U.S. security, economic, and development assistance 

programs in Honduras totaling almost $36 million of $51 million of fiscal year 2009 

and prior year U.S. funds; and imposing diplomatic measures, including revoking 

U.S. visas for selected Hondurans. At the same time, U.S. officials encouraged 

Zelaya and the Micheletti-led government to enter into negotiations to resolve the 

crisis and return to what the administration considered to be constitutional order in 

Honduras. When negotiations stalled, senior administration officials traveled to 

Honduras to urge Zelaya and Micheletti to reach agreement. After an accord was 

signed in October 2009, U.S. officials encouraged its implementation so the 

international community could accept the legitimacy of the Honduran presidential 

election taking place in November 2009. The United States then recognized the 

results of the presidential election as generally free and fair. Following the elections, 

State continued to urge Honduran officials to implement the remaining provisions of 

the accord. In addition, State revoked visas held by selected Hondurans in January 

2010 to push the Micheletti-led government to accelerate the accord’s 

implementation. In March 2010, Secretary Clinton determined that U.S. conditions 

for resuming aid to Honduras had been met and allowed U.S. assistance programs 

to resume.
Page 3 GAO-12-9R Honduran Political Crisis 2009

Background 

Honduras has been led by a civilian government under its current constitution since 

1982. The Honduran government is composed of an executive (led by the 

President), a unicameral legislature (the National Congress), and a judiciary. The 

President of Honduras serves a 4-year term and is constitutionally prohibited from 

re-election. Members of the National Assembly also serve a 4-year term, but may 

stand for re-election. The highest judicial authority in Honduras is the Supreme 

Court, which the National Assembly elects every 7 years. 

Broad U.S. policy goals in Honduras include a strengthened democracy with an 

effective justice system that protects human rights and promotes the rule of law, and 

the promotion of sustainable economic growth with a more open economy and 

improved living conditions. In addition to military and economic ties, the United 

States cooperates with Honduras on transnational issues such as immigration, 

crime, narcotics trafficking, trafficking in persons, and port security. For fiscal year 

2010, the United States provided Honduras with approximately $51 million in foreign 

assistance. 

In November 2005, Manuel Zelaya of the Liberal Party was elected president of 

Honduras and inaugurated the following January.1

 The months leading up to his 

removal were a period of increasing political polarization within Honduras (see fig. 

1). First, Zelaya proposed postponing the presidential primary elections scheduled 

for November 16, 2008, ostensibly due to the logistical challenges created by 

torrential rains and flooding. Second, in January 2009, Zelaya proposed that two 

sitting members of the Honduran Supreme Court be considered for the new court.2

Both proposals were strongly opposed by the Honduran National Congress. 

 

1

Honduras has two dominant political parties—the Liberal Party and the National Party. There are 

four additional parties that field presidential candidates—the Innovation and National Unity Party, the 

Christian Democratic Party, the Democratic Unification Party, and the Popular Bloc. 2

Under the Honduran constitution, the National Congress elects the Supreme Court every 7 years. A 

nominating board reviews applications and submits a list of 45 candidates to the National Congress. 

In 2009, the board did not include any of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court on its nominating 

list. The National Congress had a deadline of January 25 to select the15-member court. 
Page 4 GAO-12-9R Honduran Political Crisis 2009

Figure 1: Timeline of Key Events Leading up to Zelaya’s Removal 

A third event was in March 2009 when Zelaya issued an executive decree instructing 

the executive branch of government to hold a referendum on June 28. Zelaya 

proposed that the referendum would ask Honduran voters whether there should be a 

subsequent referendum—a 4th Urn in the November 29, 2009, national election—on 

whether a constituent assembly should be convened to consider changes to the 

constitution.3 Zelaya subsequently rescinded the decree and issued a new decree, 

ordering a nonbinding poll to ask Hondurans whether they wanted the 4th Urn 

referendum on the November ballot. Honduran officials in the National Congress 

and the Supreme Court interpreted this initiative as Zelaya’s attempt to suspend the 

Honduran constitution and remain in office beyond his 4-year term. These officials 

were particularly opposed to including the term “constituent assembly” in the wording 

of the poll’s question. 

The situation culminated with the Honduran military taking Zelaya into custody and 

removing him from Honduras on June 28, 2009 (see fig. 2). The Honduran Supreme 

Court asserted that an arrest warrant had been issued for Zelaya as a result of his 

noncompliance with judicial decisions that had declared the nonbinding poll 

unconstitutional. However, the military’s actions halted the judicial process before a 

trial could be held. The Honduran National Congress quickly adopted a resolution to 

 

3

Honduran national elections have three ballots, or “urns”: the first ballot is for the presidential 

election, the second is for the National Congress election, and the third is for local leaders. A 

referendum on whether to open a constituent assembly would have represented a fourth ballot during 

the November election, and therefore is referred to as a “4th Urn.” 
Page 5 GAO-12-9R Honduran Political Crisis 2009

replace Zelaya with Roberto Micheletti, President of National Congress and a fellow 

Liberal Party member. 

Figure 2: Timeline of Key Events Following Zelaya’s Removal 

The Obama administration characterized the removal of Zelaya as a coup and called 

for Hondurans to respect democratic norms and the constitutional order. The 

administration also recognized Zelaya as the only legitimate president of Honduras 

and took actions against the Micheletti-led government. Similarly, the international 

community quickly condemned Zelaya’s removal. On July 1, 2009, the United 

Nations General Assembly passed a resolution condemning Zelaya’s removal, 

demanding his immediate restoration as President of Honduras, and calling on 

member states to recognize no other Honduran government. On July 1, the 

Organization of American States passed a similar resolution and suspended 

Honduras’ participation on July 4. Most nations with diplomatic representation in 

Honduras recalled their ambassadors and refused contact with the Micheletti-led 
Page 6 GAO-12-9R Honduran Political Crisis 2009

government. However, the United States kept its ambassador in Honduras as part 

of its efforts to help find a resolution to the political crisis. 

U.S. Actions in Response to Zelaya’s Removal 

In response to news of Zelaya’s removal, the United States responded with 

diplomatic and economic measures and played an influential role in negotiations to 

resolve the crisis between Zelaya and Micheletti. According to State, the 

Ambassador exercised his Chief of Mission authority and instructed all Embassy 

officials to cease contact with their counterparts in the Honduran government on 

June 28, 2009. Officials at the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa maintained the nocontact policy with the Micheletti-led government leadership until Porfirio Lobo, who 

had won the November 2009 presidential election, was inaugurated as the new 

President in January 2010. As a matter of policy, other U.S. agencies followed 

State’s lead and ceased contact with counterparts in the Honduran government. 

In addition, State and other U.S. agencies terminated almost $36 million of $51 

million from fiscal year 2009 and prior year funds for assistance programs to 

Honduras4

 (see table 1). U.S. agencies suspended certain U.S. assistance efforts to 

Honduras in July 2009 and then terminated them in September 2009 to influence the 

Micheletti-led government to negotiate in good-faith a resolution to the crisis. 

According to State officials, the Secretary of State made these decisions as a matter 

of policy. State officials asserted the need for strong measures in light of the 

administration’s assessment that the Micheletti-led government was resisting 

adoption of the San José Accord5 and therefore failing to restore democratic, 

constitutional rule to Honduras. Consistent with State’s policy, other U.S. agencies 

also suspended and then terminated their assistance programs. According to State 

officials, these programs had been funded from annual Department of State, Foreign 

Operations, and Related Programs appropriations acts. 

 

4

The terminated funds had not been expended. 

5

The San José Accord was a 12 point plan for reconciliation that President Arias of Costa Rica 

proposed in July 2009 during the course of negotiations between Zelaya and the Micheletti-led 

government. 
Page 7 GAO-12-9R Honduran Political Crisis 2009

Table 1: U.S. Assistance Programs to Honduras Terminated in September 2009 

Implementing 

agency 

Program description Terminated 

September 

2009

State Foreign Military 

Financing 

$6,521,000

State Military education and 

training 

361,000

State Global Peace 

Operations Initiative 

1,722,000

DOD Security programs 1,713,000

Security 

assistance 

Subtotal $10,317,000

State CAFTA-DR 

Environment 

$364,000

USAID Education 8,188,000

USAID Private sector 

competitiveness 

200,000

USAID Environment 1,067,000

USAID Family planning 3,645,000

Department of 

Labor 

Strengthening labor 

inspectorates 

273,000

Department of 

Labor 

Labor law compliance 700,000

Department of 

Labor 

Labor law 

compliance/agriculture 

68,000

Department of 

Labor 

Worker’s rights centers 698,000

MCC Transportation and 

rural development 

10,000,000

Economic and 

development 

assistance 

Subtotal $25,203,000

Total $35,520,000

Source: State and MCC data. 

Note: All figures estimated by State and include estimates for fiscal year 2009.

The criterion used to determine whether an assistance program would be 

suspended, and then terminated, was whether Section 7008, which appears in the 

Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 as well as prior year appropriation acts, would 

have applied, if the Department of State had determined that a military coup had 

occurred.6

 The MCC Board of Directors terminated assistance after determining that 

the manner of Zelaya’s removal and the failure to re-establish the democratic order 

in Honduras were contrary to the criteria used to determine eligibility for assistance. 

 

6

Although State officials referred to the events of June 28, 2009, as a coup, State did not make an 

official determination of whether a military coup had occurred. The Omnibus Appropriation Act of 

2009 states: “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available” under headings in the Act, 

including bilateral economic assistance, and international security assistance “shall be obligated or 

expended to finance directly any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected 

head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.” (Pub.L. No.111-8, DIV. H, §7008, Mar. 

11, 2009). 
Page 8 GAO-12-9R Honduran Political Crisis 2009

Foreign Military Financing, Department of Defense security programs, USAID 

projects to improve education, and MCC transportation projects were among the 

affected assistance programs. Assistance programs that did not directly benefit the 

government of Honduras were not suspended. Some programs funded under 

“notwithstanding authority,” which allows for funds to be provided despite other legal 

restrictions that may exist, also were not suspended. Other programs funded under 

“notwithstanding authority,” such as counter-narcotics assistance, were nevertheless 

suspended as part of the no-contact policy. According to State officials, State did 

not make a determination of whether the events of June 28, 2009, were a military 

coup because having already terminated the potentially-affected assistance 

programs as a matter of policy, the issue was moot. 

To apply further diplomatic pressure to the Micheletti-led government to reach a 

resolution and communicate that the United States did not recognize it as the 

legitimate government of Honduras, State revoked visas of selected Hondurans on 

four different occasions during the political crisis. The first set of visa revocations, in 

July 2009, included diplomatic visas of Honduran officials who had received the 

visas because of their position in the Zelaya government but had chosen to serve in 

the Micheletti-led government. The subsequent visa revocations occurred in 

September 2009, October 2009, and January 2010. During these sets of visa 

revocations, the tourist and business visas of several members of the Micheletti-led 

government and its supporters were revoked. In addition, Embassy Tegucigalpa 

closed its Consular Section in August 2009 to Hondurans seeking visas for business 

or tourist travel to the United States. Honduran citizens and third country nationals 

residing in Honduras could continue to apply for such visas to the United States, but 

they had to do so through a U.S. embassy in another country. 

U.S. officials also played an influential role in efforts to negotiate a resolution to the 

political crisis and implement the resulting agreement. During deliberations to find a 

negotiated solution to the political crisis, U.S. officials sought to encourage a return 

to what administration officials considered to be constitutional order in Honduras, 

including a mechanism for Zelaya’s return to the presidency. For example, U.S. 

officials took steps to support President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica and his efforts to 

facilitate negotiations between Zelaya and the Micheletti-led government in July and 

August 2009. 

Similarly, when negotiations in Tegucigalpa stalled in October 2009, senior State 

and White House officials traveled to Honduras to urge Zelaya and Micheletti to 

reach an agreement. The Tegucigalpa-San José Accord was signed on October 30, 

2009, and U.S. officials encouraged its implementation to ensure that the 

international community could accept the results of the presidential election. Among 

the accord’s provisions were that a unity government would be established, the 

national Congress would vote on whether Zelaya was to be restored to the 

presidency, and a verification commission would be created to ensure the accord’s 

implementation, and a truth commission would be formed. In November 2009, the 

United States recognized the results of the general presidential election as generally 

free and fair and called it an important step to resolving to the Honduran crisis. 

Following the elections, State continued to urge Hondurans officials to implement the 
Page 9 GAO-12-9R Honduran Political Crisis 2009

remaining provisions of the accord, including the vote on Zelaya’s return to office to 

complete his term, the creation of a national unity government, and the formation of 

a truth commission.7 According to some Honduran officials, the United States 

pressured Micheletti to step down prior to Porfirio Lobo’s January 2010 inauguration. 

Six days prior to the inauguration, Micheletti announced that he was taking a leave 

of absence, allowing greater recognition of the new administration by the 

international community. 

On March 1, 2010, Secretary Clinton wrote to Congress certifying that a 

democratically elected government had taken office and that democratic 

constitutional governance had been restored to Honduras. These conditions, 

together with President Lobo’s actions after taking office, such as establishing a 

unity government and signing an amnesty decree for political crimes committed 

during the crisis, met U.S. requirements for restoring terminated foreign assistance 

to Honduras. The Secretary publicly stated on March 4 that U.S. conditions for 

resuming aid to Honduras had been met, and that the United States would therefore 

resume its assistance. 

 

7

On December 2, 2009, 111 of the 128 deputies in the Honduran National Congress voted against 

restoring Zelaya to the Honduran presidency. 
Page 10 GAO-12-9R Honduran Political Crisis 2009

Agency Comments 

We provided the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, 

Department of Defense, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation a draft of this 

report for their review and comment. The Department of State provided technical 

comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. 

------------------------------------ 

As arranged with your offices, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 

days after the issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to 

appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, 

Administrator of USAID, and relevant agency heads. The report will also be 

available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 

512-3101 or williamsbridgersj@gao.gov. Contact points for our offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 

report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in enclosure 

II.

Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers 

Managing Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

Enclosures – 2 
Page 11 GAO-12-9R Honduran Political Crisis 2009

List of Requesters 

The Honorable John Boehner 

Speaker 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Eric Cantor 

Majority Leader 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

Chairman 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Darrell Issa 

Chairman 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Michele Bachmann 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Brian Bilbray 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Paul Broun 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Dan Burton 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Ken Calvert 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Mario Diaz-Balart 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Elton Gallegly 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Doug Lamborn 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Connie Mack 

House of Representatives 
Page 12 GAO-12-9R Honduran Political Crisis 2009

The Honorable Donald Manzullo 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Michael McCaul 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Thaddeus McCotter 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Mike Pence 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Ted Poe 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Peter Roskam 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Jean Schmidt 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Aaron Schock 

House of Representatives 
Page 13 GAO-12-9R Honduran Political Crisis 2009

Enclosure I: Scope and Methodology 

This report describes the U.S. response to events surrounding the Honduran political 

crisis that culminated with the arrest and removal from office of Honduran President 

Manuel Zelaya. It covers a time frame of November 2008 through March 2010. To 

describe U.S. actions in response to Zelaya’s removal, including efforts to help 

Honduras resolve the crisis, we reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed 

cognizant officials from the Department of State (State), the Department of Defense 

(DOD), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Millennium 

Challenge Corporation (MCC). We also obtained publicly available documents from 

the Organization of American States, the United Nations, and la Comisión de la 

Verdad y la Reconciliación (the Honduran Truth and Reconciliation Commission) 

established under the Tegucigalpa-San José Accord. We are issuing a separate 

classified report that provides further details on U.S. actions in response to the 

Honduran political crisis, and describes U.S. actions in response to events leading 

up to President Zelaya’s removal from office. 

 We reviewed more than 240 State official cables describing U.S. diplomatic 

efforts related to the 2008 Honduran presidential primary, the Supreme Court 

election, President Zelaya’s 4th Urn initiative, and efforts to resolve the 

political crisis that ensued after Zelaya’s removal up to the inauguration of 

President Porfirio Lobo. State officials provided the cables based on our 

request for cable traffic from January 2009 through January 2010 that 

discussed the U.S. response to events in Honduras during this time period. 

State officials identified cables that were relevant to our reporting objectives 

and time frames and were transmitted among Embassy Tegucigalpa officials; 

State management; and senior leadership in Washington, D.C., the U.S. 

Mission to the United Nations, and the U.S. Mission to the Organization for 

American States. State officials redacted information in the cables that they 

determined to describe internal State deliberations or relate to matters that 

were irrelevant to the scope of this review. Because we do not have access 

to State’s cabling system, we were not able to independently verify that the 

set of cables we obtained included all State cables that were relevant to our 

reporting objectives and timeframes. However, to the extent possible, we 

corroborated information in the cables that we received with the accounts of 

U.S and Honduran officials that we interviewed who had first-hand knowledge 

of the events that occurred and U.S. actions taken during our reporting 

timeframe. In the few instances where contradictory information was 

provided, we have noted this. Many of the cables that State provided were 

classified. Our analysis of the information in these cables is presented in our 

classified report. This report includes information from cables that were 

unclassified. State also provided unclassified data on the amount of 

assistance terminated as a response to the removal of Zelaya. 

 We reviewed documents from the DOD, USAID, and MCC. We reviewed 

DOD guidance that U.S. Southern Command sent to U.S. forces stationed in 

Honduras after Zelaya’s removal. We also reviewed documents that showed 

communication between DOD officials concerning key U.S. policy decisions. 
Page 14 GAO-12-9R Honduran Political Crisis 2009

We reviewed USAID and MCC documentation that outlined both agencies 

actions in response to the removal of Zelaya, such as, agency guidance on 

termination of assistance. 

 We interviewed officials from State, DOD, USAID, and MCC in Washington, 

D.C. and Honduras. Among the U.S. officials we interviewed were individuals 

who held the following positions at some point between November 2008 

through January 2010: the U.S. Ambassador to Honduras, the Assistant 

Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, the Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, the Deputy Commander for the 

Military Assistance Group in Honduras, the USAID Mission Director for 

Honduras, the Country Director for MCC Honduras, and other key Embassy 

Tegucigalpa officials. In addition, we interviewed Honduran officials directly 

involved in the key political events that transpired from November 2008 

through January 2010. These include high level officials from the Zelaya 

government, the Micheletti-led government, and the current Honduran 

government; negotiators who represented Zelaya and the Micheletti-led 

government during the San José and the Tegucigalpa negotiations; the 

Honduran Supreme Court; and the Honduran Chief of Defense. We also 

interviewed officials from the Organization of American States. 

 To obtain information on State’s revocation of visas held by Micheletti-led 

government officials and supporters, we reviewed State documents and 

interviewed officials in the Bureau of Consular Affairs. These officials 

provided us with information on the number and types of visas that were 

revoked. Due to laws that prohibit State from sharing documentation on 

individual visa applications (except under certain circumstances), we were 

unable to independently verify the reliability of these data. Nevertheless, we 

interviewed some Honduran officials who asserted that their visas had been 

revoked. We are not presenting the number of visas revoked in this report 

due to the sensitive nature of that information. 

 We did not attempt to analyze or interpret Honduran laws. All statements in 

this report concerning Honduran law, including its constitution, are based on 

other sources. 

 We traveled to Tegucigalpa, Honduras in April 2011 to meet with the U.S. 

officials at Embassy Tegucigalpa and with Honduran officials previously 

mentioned. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2010 through October 2011 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis 

for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
Page 15 GAO-12-9R Honduran Political Crisis 2009

Enclosure II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers, (202) 512-3101 or williamsbridgersj@gao.gov

Staff Acknowledgments 

In addition to the contact named above, Michael Courts, Assistant Director; Ashley 

Alley; Lynn Cothern; Etana Finkler; Jess Ford; Valérie Nowak; Marisela Perez; Jena 

Y. Sinkfield; Ellery Scott; and Adam Vogt made key contributions to this report. 

(320861) 
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