2013 IL 115473



### IN TH E
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF IL LI NOI S

(Doc ket No. 115473)
THE BO ARD OF EDUCATI ON OF ROXANA COMMUN I TY SCHOOL DI STRI CT No. 1, Appellant, v. THE POL L UTI ON

CONTROLBO ARD et al., Appellee s.

Opinion filed November 21, 2013.

J USTI CE KARMEI ER delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
Chief J ustice Gar

man and J ustices Fr eem an , Thomas, Kilbride, and The is concurr ed in the judg ment and opinion.
J ustice B urke took no pa

rt in the dec ision.

OP INION

¶ 1 The issue in this case is whether the appellate court ruled c orre ctly

when it conclude d that it lacke d jurisdiction to enter tain an appea l by the Boa rd of Education of Rox ana Communi ty School District No. 1 (the Boa rd of Education) from decisions of the P o llution Control Boa rd which denied the Boa

rd of Educ ation’s petitions to int erve ne in 28 separ ate proce eding s for cer tification of cer t ain fac iliti es as “pollution con t ro l fac iliti es” and g rante d the subject cer tifications. The ba sis f

or the appe llate cour

t’s rulingwas that judicial re view of

a Pollut ion Control Boa

rd decision to issue, ref

use to issue, deny
, revoke
, modify or restrict a poll ution control certificate i s g overne d by section 11-60 of the Property Tax Code (35 I L CS 200/11-60 (West 2 0 10)). Under that provision, appea ls must be filed in circ uit court, not the appellate court, a

nd can only

be broug ht by applicants for orholders of the cer tificates, classifications into which the Boa rd of Education did not fall. 2012 I LApp (4th) 120174- U. ¶ 2 One justice dissented. He believed the Boa rd of Education should have been permitted to prosec ute this appea l pursuant to section 41 of t he Environmental P ro t ec t i on Act (415 I L CS 5/41 (West 2010)), which permits appea ls direc tly to the appellate cour t by
, inter alios
, “any party adver sely aff

ecte d by a final order or deter mination of the Boa rd.” ¶ 3 Follow i n g entry of the appellate court’s judgme nt, the Boa rd of Education petitioned this court for leave to appea l. I ll. S. C t. R. 315 (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010). We g rante d the peti tion. For the rea sons that follow, we nowaff

irm.

¶ 4 BA CKGROUND ¶ 5 T h e fa ct s n ec es s ar y fo r re s o l u t i o n o f t h i s ap p e a l a r e

st ra i ghtforwa

rd and undisputed. A company known as WR B R efining
, L P (WRB), owns the Wood River Petroleum Refinery i n Madison County

. Following major renova tions to the ref

inery
, WR B submitt ed separ ate applications to the I llinois Environmental Protection Ag ency (I EPA) pursuant to se ction 11-25 of the Property Tax Code (35 I L CS 200/ 1 1 -2 5 (West 2010)) to have 28 of the ref in ery ’s sy stems, methods, device s, and fac iliti es cer tified as “pollution c ontrol fac iliti es” within the me aning of sec tion 11-10 of the Code (35 I L CS 200/11-10 (W es t 2010)). WR B soug ht those

cer tifications beca

use, if approve d, they would result in a pref ere ntial
tax assessment of the subject sy stems, methods, device s and fac il it ies. See 35 I L CS 200/ 11-5, 11-15, 11- 20 (West 2010). ¶ 6 WR B filed its 28 applications in October of 2010. The following

Aug ust, the I EPA rec ommended to the Pollut ion Control Boa rd that it a pprove two of WR B’ s cer tification reque sts. The Boa rd acc epted the I EPA’s rec ommendations and cer tified the two entities at issue as pollution control facilities. ¶ 7 Shortly there afte r, the Boa rd of Education filed separ ate petitions for leave to intervene in the two proce eding s wher e cer tification had been g rante d. The Boa

rd of Education argued that the particula r applications submitt ed by WR B fail ed t o satisfy statutory require ments under the Property Tax C o d e an d that it had a leg ally
cog nizable interest in challeng ing the sufficie ncy of the applications

-2-beca use issuance of the c ertifications would ultimately deprive it of
tax revenue. ¶ 8 The Pollut ion Control Boa rd considere d and denied the Boa rd of Education’s petitions to intervene
, rea s o n ing that beca use the

cer tificati o ns in the two matters had alre ady been issued, the Boa rd of Education’s petitions were n o w moot. The Boa rd of Education asked the Pollut ion Control Boa rd to rec onsider that decision. Whil e the reque sts to rec onsider wer e pending
, the I EPA rec ommended that the Pollut i o n C ontrol Boa rd also approve WR B’ s applications to

cer tify the rema ining 26 sy stems, me thods, de vices, a nd fac iliti es as “pollution control fac iliti es.” ¶ 9 Be for e the Pollut ion Control Boa rd took action in these re maining 26 case s, the Boa

rd of Education filed petitions for leave to intervene in eac h of them. Those petition s , fi led in Dec ember of 2011, wer e premised on the same arguments asser ted by the Boa

rd of Education in the initial two cases. ¶ 10 Bot h t h e I E P A an d W R B o b j ec t ed, arguing that under the statutory and reg ulatory scheme g overningcer

tification of pollution control fac iliti es, t h e Bo ard of Education had no rig ht to intervene

. The Boar d of Education responde d by filing a join t re p l y addre ssed
to all 28 proce eding s. I n that reply
, the Boa rd of Education challeng ed the Pollut ion Control Boa rd’ s v i ew that its petitions to intervene in the i n i t i al two case s wer e moot. I t also argued that it possessed a leg ally cog nizable basis for intervening and that the Pollut ion Control Boa rd had au t h ority under the law to permit it to intervene

. I n addition, it took issue wi t h the substance of the Pollut ion Control B o a r d ’ s decision to issue pollution control fac ility cer tifications in the initial two procee dings. ¶ 11 I n a deta iled and unanimous order enter ed J anuar y 19, 2012, the Pollut ion Control Boa

rd denied rec onsideration. Wit hin t h e time permitted by law, the Boa rd of Education soug ht administrative revie w of the Pollut ion Control Boa rd’s decision in the appellate
court pursuant to section 41 of the I llinois Environmental Protection Act (415 I L CS 5/41 (West 2010)). I n the interim, the Po l l u t ion Control Boa

rd enter ed a separ ate order
, also detai l ed and also unanimous, denying the Boa rd of Educ ation’s petitions to interve ne in the rema ining 26 proce eding s and g ranting WR B’ s applications for pollution control fac ility cer t i fi ca t ion in eac h of those case s. The Boa rd of Education soug ht administrative revie w of that decision as

-3-well, and, on the Boa rd of Education’s motion, t h e appellate court consolidated both appe als. ¶ 12 As noted at the outset of this opinion, t h e ap p el l ate court, with

one justic e d i s senting
, dismiss ed the Boa rd of Education’s consolidated appea l on the g rounds that it lacke d j u ri sdiction to consider it. The appellate court opined that sec tion 41 of the I llinois Environmental Protection Act, the provision invoked by the Boa rd of Education in seeking direc t a dminist rative revie w by that court, was inapplicable here

. Section 41 is the g ener al prov i s i o n for judicial revie w of final decisions of the Pol l u t ion Control Boa rd, and it provides that such appea ls may be broug ht by
, inter alios
, “any party adversely aff

ecte d by a final order or deter mination of the Boa

rd.” The appellate court noted, howeve r, that the leg islature has promulgat ed a separ ate and more specific provision for appea ls in
proce eding s involving the Pollut ion Control Boa rd’s “issuance
, ref usal to issue, denial, revoc ation, modificati o n o r restric tion of a p o l l ution control cer

tificate,” which is the ty

pe of proce eding fro m which this appea l emanated. Th at p rovision is section 11-60 of the Property Tax Code (35 I L CS 200/ 11-60 (West 2010)). B y its terms, section 11-60 authori z es appea ls from such decisions only by applicants for or holders of pollution control fac ility cer tificates who

are ag g rieve d by the Boa rd’s decision. The Bo ard of Education is neither an applicant for o r h o l d er of a pollution control fac ility

cer tificate. Moreove r, such appea ls are subj ec t to the regular provisions of the Administrative Review L aw ( 735 I L CS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2010)). Unlike section 41 of the I llino i s E n vironmental Protectio n Act, there is no mecha nism for bring ing such appea ls direc tly to the appellate court. They must be initiated, instea d, in the circ uit court. 735 I L CS 5/ 3-104 (West 2010). ¶ 13 I n the appellate court’s view, sec t i o n 11-60 of the Property Tax Code rathe r than section 41 of the I llinois Environmental Protection Act must take prec edenc e in case s such as this for two basic rea sons. First, to hold oth er wi s e would mean that the court “would be essentially disreg arding the specific an d n a r row g uidance provided by section 11-60,” a course that would not only run afoul of t h e “l o ng held principle that t h e ap p ellate court must construe a statute as a whole so that no part is rende red meaning less or sup er fl u o u s,” but could also “produc e absurd results in that it could conce ivably allow,
at a minimum
, applicants seeking a pollution-control-fac iliti es

cer tification to eng ag e in forum shopping any potential appea l in

-4-either t h e circuit court or appellate court.” 2012 I L App (4th) 120174-U, ¶ 25. Second, applying section 11-60 of the Property Tax Code rathe r than section 41 of the I llinois Environmental Protection Act to proce edings s u ch as these, which wer e broug ht under the Property Tax Code, is compelled by the “we ll-sett l ed ax iom of statutory interpre tation that the g ener al must y ield to the specific .” Id

. ¶ 26. ¶ 14 One justice dissented. Contrary to his colleagues in the majority
,

he believed that the Boa

rd of Education should be permitted to appea l pursuant to section 41 of t he I llinois Environmental P rotec tion Act. He would have allowed the appeal, reve rsed the Pollut ion Control Boa rd’s decisions, and reve rsed and rema nded to the Pollut ion Control Boa

rd with direc tions to g rant the Boa rd of Educat i o n’s petitions for leave to intervene and to conduct further hear ings on the merits. 2012 I L App (4th) 120174-U, ¶ 45 (Appleton, J
., dissenting)

.

¶ 15 ANALYSI S ¶ 16 I n its a

ppeal to our court, the Boa rd of Education arg ues that the appellate court’s jurisdictional analy sis was incorrec t as a matter of law and that section 41 of the I llinois Environmental Protec tion Act provides a proper basis for challeng ing the Pollut ion Control Boa rd’s deci s i o ns throug h direc t appea l to the appellate court, as the dissenting justice had rea son ed

. I t then g oes on to asser t that the Pollut ion Control Boa

rd err ed when it denied the Boa rd of Education permission to intervene in the pollution control facility cer tification
proce eding s, that the Pollut ion Control Board err ed when it conclude d that the Boa

rd of Educa

tion’s petitions to intervene in the first two proce eding s wer e moot, and that the Pollut ion Control Boa rd

err ed in cer

tifying the subject fac iliti es as pollution control fac iliti es. ¶ 17 We beg in with the question of the appellate court’s jurisdiction.

Whether t h e appellate court has jurisdiction to consider an appea l
prese nts a question of law wh i ch we review de novo

. Gardner v. Mullins
, 234 I ll. 2d 503, 508 (2009); In re A.H.
, 207 I ll. 2d 590, 593 (2003). I n this case , we ag ree with the appellate court’s co n cl u sion that it l ac k ed jurisdiction to consider the Boa rd of Education’s
appea ls. W e do so, howe ver, ba sed on diffe rent re asoning

. ¶ 18 I t is undisputed that under the statutory scheme implemented by
t h e Gene ral Assembly
, the Board of Education’s only direc t path t o the appellate court for administrative revie w of the Pollut ion Control Boa rd’s decisions in these 28 case s is throug h s ection 41 of the

-5-I llinois Environmental Protection Act (415 I L CS 5/41 (West 2010)). Unless the Boa

rd of Education can avail itself of that statute, its
appea l is doomed, for t h e appellate court has jurisdiction to revie w administrative decisions only as provi d ed by law (I ll. Const. 1970,
art. VI
, § 6; Town & Country Utiliti es, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board
, 225 I ll. 2d 103, 121 (2007); People e x rel. Madigan

v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n
, 394 I ll. App. 3d 382, 386 (2009))
, and the only other mecha

nism for obtaining judicial revie w of de cisions by the Pollut ion Co n t ro l Boa rd in administrative proce eding s involving cer

tification of pollution control fac iliti es is section 11-60 of the Property

Tax Code (35 I L CS 200/11-60 (West 2010) ). As the appellate court here noted and as we have j u s t p o inted out, the
express terms of that statut e authorize appea ls in such proce eding s only by applicants for or holders of pollution control fac ility

c e r tif icates who are ag g rieve d by the Boa rd’s decision, cate g ories in to which the Boa

rd of Education does n o t fa l l, and, in any case , such
appe als must be broug ht in circ uit court. There is no statutory authorization for litigants to skip ahea d and g o direc tly to t he appellate court. ¶ 19 W h i l e t he appellate court majority in this case was of the view

that section 11-60 of the Property Tax Code leave s no room for resor t to section 41 of the I llinois Environmenta l P rotec tion Act in case s involving cer

tification of pollution control fac iliti es, we need not g o that far i n re solving the particula r case befor e us today

. That is so beca use even if section 41 wer e not completely supplanted by section 11-60 with reg ard to appea ls in such case s, it still would be of no aid to the Rox ana B oard of

Education here. ¶ 20 S ec t i o n 4 1 p ro v i d es for appea ls by “[a]ny party to a B o ar d

hear ing, any person who filed a complaint on which a hear ing was denied, any person who has been den i ed a variance or permit under this Act, any party adver sely aff ecte d by a final order or deter mination of the Boa

rd, and any person who participated in the public comment proce ss under subsec tion (8) of Sec tion 39.5 of this Ac t.” 415 I L CS 5/41 (West 2010)). I n its argu m en ts befor e our court, the Boa rd of Education contends that it f alls within the fourth of these cate g ories

an d q u ali fies as “any party adver sely aff ecte d by a final order or det ermination of the Boa rd.” I t does not. Our court has specific ally held that to be a “par

ty ” within the meaning of the fourth cate g ory of

s ection 41, one must have been an actua l party of rec ord in the underlying proce eding s befor e the B oard. Lake County Contractors

-6-Ass’n v. Pollution Control Board
, 54 I ll. 2d 16, 21 (1973); People v. Pollution Control Board
, 113 I ll. App. 3d 282, 291 (1983), rev’d on other grounds sub n om. Pioneer Processing, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agenc

y , 102 I ll. 2d 119 (1984). This is consistent with the
g ener al rule that administrative revie w is limit ed to parties of rec ord befor e t h e admi nistrative ag encie s and then only when their rig hts, duties or privileg es ar e adve rsely aff ecte d by the dec ision. S ee, e.g ., W illiams v. Departme nt of

Labor
, 76 I ll. 2d 72, 78 (1979); Robinson

v. Regional Board of School T rustees , 130 I ll. App. 3d 509, 512-13 (1985). Be cause the Boa

rd of Educ a

ti o n was denied leave to intervene in these proce eding s, it is not and cannot be deeme d to have ever been

a party to the litigation. In re Veatch
, 93 I ll. App. 3d 413, 415 (1981). Acc ording ly
, the fourth clause of section 41 could not aff ord it any basis for se eking administrative re view in the appe llate cour t. 1 ¶ 21 I n u rgi n g t h e exercise of jurisdiction, the dissenting a ppel l at e court justice argu ed t hat this matter might actua lly fall within the third clause of section 41, which permits appea ls by “any person who filed a complaint on which a hear ing was denied,” but that contention is without merit. The Boa

rd of Education did not file a “complaint on which a hear ing was denied.” I t did not file a complaint at all. I n civil matters, a “complaint” is g ener ally understood to mean t h e initial pleading that starts an action, states the basis for the plaintiff’s claim, and sets forth the demand for relief

. Bla ck’s L aw Dictionary 323 (9th ed. 2009). The proce eding s at issue here wer e init i at ed by applications for pollution control fac ility cer tificates. T h o se wer e filed by WR B, not the B oard of

Education. The Boa

rd of Educ ation simply reque sted leave to intervene

. There is no meaning ful sense in which a petition to intervene can be considere d a co m p l aint

. The
contra ry v i ew t aken by the appellate court in Citi zens Against the

I n Ree d-Cu st er Communi ty U nit Sch ool Dis tr ic t No. 255- U v. 1 Pol lut ion Cont rol B o a r d
, 232 I ll

. App. 3d 571 (19 92)
, a pan el of the
app el la te c o u r t re li ed on the fou rt h cl aus e of sec ti on 41 to ass er t j uri sdi ct ion over a sch ool dis tr ic t’ s app eal of the Pol lut ion Cont rol Boar d’s den ia l of it s at te m

pt to re vok e a company’s pol lut ion con tr ol fa ci li ty

cer ti fi cat ion

. Signif

ic ant ly, the app el la te cou rt did not con si der whet her the la w per m it te d thi r d par ti es to see k re vocati on of a cer ti fi cat e, and no cha ll enge was ra is ed to it s j uri sdi ct ion unde r sec ti on 41. I t is the re for e sca nt aut hor it y f

or the Boar d of Educ at ion ’s pos it ion in thi s cas e. I n any event, to the ext ent th at it is inc ons is te nt wit h our hol din g t oda y, i t is overr ule d.

-7-Randolph Landfil l ( CARL) v. Pollution Control Board
, 178 I ll. App. 3d 686, 692 (1988), is untena ble, and we reje ct it. ¶ 22 The dissenting appellate court just ice’ s interpre tation of the law

m u st be reje cted for another rea son as well. Although he conten d s that appea ls in cer

tification proce eding s are proper ly broug ht direc tly
to the appellate court when they are prosec uted by third part i es , he does n o t dispute that when the appea l is broug ht by an actua l applicant for or holder of a cer tificate, it must be pursued in circ uit court. 2012 I L App (4th) 120174-U, ¶ 40 (Appleton, J., dis senting ). The dissen t i n g justice’s approa ch would thus cre ate a situation in which the particula

r court to which an appea l must be broug ht would differ depending

on the par

ticular litiga

nt who broug ht it. ¶ 23 We are unawa re of any other sit uation in I l linois law where this

occur s, and we can c onceive of no sound re ason why the leg islature would possibly

have w anted to c reate such a dual-tra ck sy stem with
respe ct to appea ls in pollution control fac ility cer ti fi cation
proce eding s. We there fore ag ree with the appellate c o u rt majority that such a construction of the law would y ield absurd results and must be reje cted. ¶ 24 Finally
, and in any case , a court’s ref usal to entert ai n an appea l from the denial of petitions to intervene in administrative proce e d ings
cannot be err or if the entity seek i n g t o ap peal had no rig ht to intervene to beg in with. I n this case , the Boa rd of Education failed to show that it had any such rig ht. Under the law, the question of whether a s y stem, method, construction, device
, building, etc. , qualifies as a pollution control fac ility within the meaning of section 11-10 of the Property Tax Code (35 I L CS 200/11-10 (West 2010)) is

a technica l one betwee n the entity seeking cer tification and state regulatory officia ls. See 35 I L CS 200/11 -2 0
, 1 1-25, 11-30 (West 2010). The Gene ral Assembly made no provision for involvement of
any other parties in the cer tification proce ss. Nor has t he Pollut ion Control Boa

rd. There is nothing in the applicable admin i s t rative
regulations authorizing participation by third parties in the pollution control fac ility cer

tification proce ss. See 35 I ll. Adm. Code 125.200 to 125.216 (2005). ¶ 25 We rec og nize, of course , that leg itimate conce rns may arise when

the only parties permitted to participate in the regulatory proce ss are regulators and the companies they reg ulate. That, howeve r, is a matter for the Gene ral Assembly

. T he responsibility for the wisdom of leg islation rests with the leg islature, and courts may no t re wr ite

-8-statutes to make them consistent with the court’s idea of order liness and public policy

. People v. Carpenter
, 228 I ll. 2d 250, 270 -71 (2008). ¶ 26 We must also point out that under this state’s proper ty tax s y stem, taxi ng bodies such as the Boa rd of Education have been g iven some voice in how cer

tified pollution control fac iliti es within their border s

are u l t i m ately taxed. I t is simply not at the cer tification stag e. I t comes later, w h en t he Department of Revenue actua lly assesses the value of those fac iliti es. At that p oint, any person ag g rieve d by the
assessment may apply for revie w and co rr ection of the assessment and ask for a hear ing on the matter. 35 I L CS 200/8-35(a) (West 2010); 86 I ll. Adm. Code 110.110 (1996). That stag e had not y et been

rea ched in this case

. Even if it had, revie w in such proce eding s lies in the circ uit court. T h e l aw d oes not authorize direc t revie w by the appellate court, as the Boa rd of Educa

tion s o u gh t here

. 35 I L CS 200/8-40 (West 2010).

¶ 27 CONCL USI ON ¶ 28 For the fore g oing rea sons, we hold that the appellate court did not

err whe n i t d i s missed the Boa rd of Education’s appea l for lack of jurisdiction. I n light of this conclusion, there is no need to addre ss the Boa rd of Educat i o n’s rema ining arguments. The judgme nt of the appellate court is af

firmed.

¶ 29 Affir

med.

-9-