[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Xenia v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3423.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -3423
T HE S TATE EX REL
. THE C ITY OF X ENIA , A PPELLEE , v . G REENE C OUNTY
B OARD OF C OMMISSIONERS ET AL ., A PPELLANTS
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Xenia v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3423.] Annexation—Mandamus is a proper vehicle to compel county board of commissioners to grant city’s annexation petition—Board failed to show that city’s petition does not satisfy R.C. 709.023(E)(1), (4), (5), or (7)— Court of appeals’ judgment granting writ of mandamus ordering board to approve city’s petition affirmed. (No. 2019-1791—Submitted May 12, 2020—Decided June 25, 2020.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Greene County, No. 2018CA0021, 2019-Ohio-4805.

_________________ Per Curiam. {¶ 1} This is an annexation case concerning roughly 45 acres of land located between the city of Xenia and Central State University. The Se cond District CourtS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 of Appeals granted the city’s re quest for a writ of mandamus or dering the Greene County Board of Commissioners (“the county”) to approve the cit y’s annexation petition. The county has appealed, arguing that a writ of mand amus cannot compel it to grant the city’s petition because, it says, it relied on its discretion in denying the petition and performed all its statutorily required duties. The county also argues that the city’s petition falls short of the statutory requireme nts for approval. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND {¶ 2} In Ohio, “annexation is strictly a statutory process.” In re Petition to
Annex 320 Acres to S. Lebanon , 64 Ohio St.3d 585, 591, 597 N.E.2d 463 (1992). The General Assembly comprehensi vely reformed Ohio’s annexation processes in
2001 with the enactment of Am .Sub.S.B. No. 5, 149 Ohio Laws, Pa rt I, 621 (“S.B. 5”). See State ex rel. Butler Twp. Bd. of Trus tees v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of
Commrs. , 112 Ohio St.3d 262, 2006-Ohio-6411, 858 N.E.2d 1193, ¶ 3 (dis cussing the legislation). S.B. 5 estab lished three procedures “allow[i ng] for expedited annexations when all the propert y owners within a parcel to be annexed sign an annexation petition.” Id. The three procedures are referred to as expedited type-1, type-2, and type-3 annexations. Id. at ¶ 5. {¶ 3} This appeal involves a type-2 annexation, which is governed by R.C. 709.023. In a type-2 annexation, “the residents of the territo ry become residents of both the township and the municipality, subject to the taxes of both, and potentially
able to receive services from either.” Butler Twp. Bd. of Trustees at ¶ 7 (citing R.C. 709.023(H)). A type-2 annexation petition must be filed with t he clerk of the board of county commissioners. R.C. 709.023(B). After the petition is filed, the municipal corporation to which annexation is proposed must adop t an ordinance or resolution specifying what services it will provide to the terr itory proposed for annexation and when it will pr ovide them. R.C. 709.023(C). A township or municipal corporation that oppos es the proposed annexation may file objectionsJanuary Term, 2020

3 with the board. R.C. 709.023(D). If objections are filed, the board must “review [the petition] to deter mine if each of the following conditions ” are satisfied:

(1) The petition meets all the requirements set forth in,
and was filed in the manner provided in, section 709.021 of the
Revised Code. (2) The persons who signed the petition are owners of
the real estate located in the territory proposed for annexatio n and constitute all of the owners of real estate in that territory. (3) The territory proposed for annexation does not
exceed five hundred acres. (4) The territory proposed for annexation shares a contiguous boundary with the municipal corporation to which annexation is proposed for a continuous length of at least five per cent of the perimeter of the t erritory proposed for annexation. (5) The annexation will not create an unincorporated area of the township that is completely surrounded by the terri tory proposed for annexation. (6) The municipal corporation to which annexation is proposed has agreed to provide to the territory proposed for annexation the services specified in the relevant ordinance or resolution adopted under divi sion (C) of this section. (7) If a street or highway will be divided or segmented by the boundary line between the township and the municipal corporation as to create a road maintenance problem, the munici pal corporation to which annexation is proposed has agreed as a
condition of the annexation to assu me the maintenance of that s treet or highway or to otherwise correct the problem.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 R.C. 709.023(E). {¶ 4} A board of county commissioners must grant a petition that sati sfies all the conditions and must deny a petition that does not. R.C . 709.023(F). Although “[t]here is no appeal in law or equity from the board’ s entry of any resolution under this section,” a pa rty may request “a writ of mandamus to compel the board * * * to perform its duties * * *.” R.C. 709.023(G).
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND {¶ 5} In September 2017, the city file d a type-2 annexation petition with the county seeking approval to annex roughly 45.6 acres of territor y located in Xenia Township. The city owns approx imately 41.1 acres of the territ ory proposed for annexation, and its ownership int erest consists of a narrow str ip of land used for a bicycle path. The path runs outward from the city in a northea sterly direction, where it ends adjacent to the remaining roughly 4.5 acres of th e territory proposed for annexation—a triangular-shape d parcel owned by Central Stat e University. A report prepared by the city’s staff explained that the city wou ld benefit from the annexation by receiving income-ta x revenue from Central State U niversity’s employees and contractors and that Central State University, in turn, would benefit by becoming a recipient of the city’s services. Central State University consented to the city’s proposal to annex the 4.5-acre parcel. {¶ 6} The township trustees urged the county to deny the petition, wh ich the county did after determining th at the city’s petition did not s atisfy R.C. 709.023(E)(1), (4), (5), or (7). T he city then f iled an origin al action in the court of appeals requesting a writ of ma ndamus ordering the county to ap prove the petition. The court denied the county’s motion for summary judgment, gran ted the city’s motion for summary judgment, and issued the writ. The county h as appealed. The Ohio Township Association has filed an amicus br ief in support of the county, and the Ohio Municipal League has filed an amicus brief in support of the city.January Term, 2020

5 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW {¶ 7} For a writ of mandamus to issue in a type-2 setting, the relato r must establish that it has a clear legal right to the requested reli ef by showing that it satisfies the conditions necessary for annexation. State ex rel. Natl. Lime & Stone Co. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , 152 Ohio St.3d 393, 2017-Ohio-8348, 97 N.E.3d 404, ¶ 26. If the relator ca n show that it satisfies th e conditions, a board of county commissioners has a clear legal duty to approve the anne xation. Id. Because R.C. 709.023(G) authorizes an action in mandamus, a cou rt need not
consider whether the relator l acks an adequate remedy at law. Id. {¶ 8} This court exercises de novo review in an appeal from a grant o f summary judgment. Transtar Elec., Inc. v. A.E.M. Elec. Servs. Corp. , 140 Ohio St.3d 193, 2014-Ohio-3095, 16 N.E.3d 645, ¶ 8. Summary judgmen t may be granted only when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fac t, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law, and (3) upon viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach only a conclusion adverse to the nonmoving party. Id.
IV. ANALYSIS {¶ 9} Our analysis proceeds in two parts. We first address the count y’s claim that a writ of mandamus is an improper vehicle to compel it to grant the city’s petition. We then address the count y’s claim that the city’s p etition fails to satisfy the conditions specified in R.C. 709.023(E). A. Whether a writ of mandamus is a proper vehicle to compel the county to grant the city’s petition {¶ 10} A writ of mandamus is a command directing the “performance of a n act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station.” R.C. 2731.01. A writ ca nnot compel the exercise of a permissive act. State ex rel. Hodges v. Taft , 64 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 591 N.E.2d 1186 (1992). Nor canS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 it “issue to control an officer’s exercise of discretion, but i t can be issued to compel
him to exercise it when he ha s a clear legal duty to do so.” Id. {¶ 11} The county claims that mandamus does not lie because it applied its discretion under R.C. 709.023(E) i n denying the city’s petition . Because a board of county commissioners is a statutory creation, with only “suc h power and jurisdiction as are conferred expressly by statutory enactment, ” State ex rel. Shriver v. Belmont Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , 148 Ohio St. 277, 74 N.E.2d 248 (1947), paragraphs one and two of the s yllabus, the county must locate its claimed discretionary powers in the text of division (E)’s seven condit ions. We discern no such powers here. Division (E)’s seven conditions are tightly written legal rules requiring straightforward application, see, e.g. , R.C. 709.023(E)(3) (“The territory proposed for annexation [must] not exceed five hundred acres”), not open-ended standards permitting a “power of free decision or choice within certain legal bounds” or a “latitude of decision [to] decide[] questions * * * not expressly controlled by fixed rules of law,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 647 (1993) (defining “discretion” ). Tellingly, the county does not develop an argument centered on division (E)’s seven conditions that shows otherwise. 1 {¶ 12} Had the General Assembly inten ded to confer discretion on a boa rd of county commissioners in a type-2 setting, it would not have been difficult to use wording to that effect. Under what we have termed the “traditi onal” method of annexation, Sugarcreek Twp. v. Centerville , 133 Ohio St.3d 467, 2012-Ohio-4649, 979 N.E.2d 261, ¶ 3, a board must consider whether “the general good of the

1. The county argues for the first time in its reply brief that it performed a ministerial act when it reviewed the petition, determined that it did not satisfy all o f R.C. 709.023(E)’s conditions, and denied it. That argument is not only in tension with the count y’s claim in its merit brief that it exercised discretion in reviewing the petition, applying divisi on (E), and denying the petition, see Maloney v. Rhodes , 45 Ohio St.2d 319, 322, 345 N.E.2d 407 (1976) (distinguishing a discretionary act from a ministerial act)—the argument is also tardy, see Corrigan v. Illum. Co. , 151 Ohio St.3d 85, 2017-Ohio-7555, 86 N.E.3d 287, ¶ 11, fn. 1 (disregarding an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief).January Term, 2020

7 territory proposed to be annexed will be served” by the annexat ion, R.C. 709.033(A)(5). Interpreting virtually identical language found in R.C. 709.033’s predecessor, we observed that suc h language presents a “questio n of fact within the
discretion of the board.” In re Annexation of 118.7 Acres in Miami Twp. to
Moraine , 52 Ohio St.3d 124, 132, 556 N.E.2d 1140 (1990). Division (E) ’s seven conditions do not contain this ty pe of open-ended language. {¶ 13} Turning from the statutory text to our caselaw, we observed in Butler Twp. Bd. of Trustees that S.B. 5 put “in place firm standards to govern the consideration of annexation pe titions * * *.” 112 Ohio St.3d 2 62, 2006-Ohio-6411, 858 N.E.2d 1193, at ¶ 8. And in Natl. Lime & Stone , we explained that when a type-2 annexation petition satisfies all seven of division (E)’ s conditions, a board “has no discretion to deny the petition” and a writ of mandamus will issue. 152 Ohio St.3d 393, 2017-Ohio-8348, 97 N.E.3d 404, at ¶ 2. The boa rds in those two cases did not raise precisely the same argument that the county is raising here, but we see no reason why the logic of those two decisions does not apply here. {¶ 14} The county next contends that ma ndamus does not lie because it performed all its statutorily imposed duties. It points to div ision (G), which provides that a party may pursue relief in mandamus to “compel the board of county commissioners to perform its du ties under this section,” R.C. 7 09.023(G). In the county’s view, it performed its statutory duties when it review ed the petition, determined that it does not comply with the statutory condition s, and adopted a resolution denying it. See R.C. 709.023(E) and (F). {¶ 15} The county’s argument fails under Natl. Lime & Stone . There, a board of county commissioners denied a mining company’s type-2 annexation petition. The company t hen filed a complaint for a writ of man damus in the court of appeals to compel the board to grant the petition, which the court of appeals dismissed. We reversed and granted the writ, determining that the company had satisfied division (E)’s conditions. As we explained, when a r elator satisfies all theS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 statutory conditions, it establishes a “clear legal right to th e requested relief and a clear legal duty on the part of the commissioners to provide it ,” meaning that a board “must grant the annexation.” Id. at ¶ 32 (citing R.C. 709.023(F) and (G)). It
follows from Natl. Lime & Stone that the county’s performance of its three statutorily imposed duties does not, on its own, foreclose the possibility that the county could be compelled to gra nt the city’s petition in a man damus action. Indeed, if the county were correct here, we would not have reve rsed the court of appeals’ judgment and granted the writ in Natl. Lime & Stone

. B. Whether the city’s petition satisfies the conditions of R.C. 709.023(E) {¶ 16} The county claims that the city ’s petition fails to satisfy fou r of the seven conditions specified i n R.C. 709.023(E). We address the conditions in turn.
1. Whether the c ity’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)(1) {¶ 17} Under R.C. 709.023(E)(1), a petition must “meet[] all the requirements set forth in” and be “filed in the manner” prescri bed by R.C. 709.021. R.C. 709.021(A) provides:

When a petition signed by all of the owners of real estate in the unincorporated territory of a township proposed for annexat ion requests the annexation of that territory to a municipal corpor ation contiguous to that territory under one of the special procedures provided for annexation in sections 709.022, 709.023, and 709.0 24 of the Revised Code, the anne xation proceedings shall be conduc ted
under those sections to the exc lusion of any other provisions o f this chapter unless otherwise provided in this section or the specia l procedure section chosen.

(Emphasis added.)January Term, 2020

9 {¶ 18} The word “contiguous” in R.C. 709.021(A) is undefined by statut e, leading the county to argue that the word should be understood according to the contiguity principles we announced in Middletown v. McGee , 39 Ohio St.3d 284, 530 N.E.2d 902 (1988), a pre-S.B. 5 decision that addressed whe ther a territory proposed for annexation was c ontiguous with the annexing munici pality. We
observed in McGee that although “the law is unsettled as to what degree of touch ing is needed to fulfill the contiguity requirement,” there “is gen eral[] agree[ment] that some touching of the municipalit y and the territory to be annex ed is required.” Id. at 287. We explained that Ohio courts had looked with disfavor on the “use of connecting strips of land to meet the contiguity requirement wh en annexing outlying territory not otherwise connected to the municipality. Such annexations are usually referred to as ‘strip, shoestring, subterfuge, corr idor, and gerrymander
annexations.’ ” Id. , quoting Watson v. Doolittle , 10 Ohio App.2d 143, 148-149, 226 N.E.2d 771 (6th Dist.1967). Applying these principles, we concluded that a section of the territory propose d for annexation, w hich include d a strip of roadway that extended outward from the annexing municipality for severa l miles, could not lawfully be annexed, because it was “not sufficiently contiguou s” to the municipality. Id. at 288. {¶ 19} The county asserts that because R.C. 709.023(E)(1) incorporates R.C. 709.021, a type-2 annexation petition must conform to McGee ’s contiguity principles. The c ity responds that the sole contiguity requirement in a type-2 s etting lies in R.C. 709.023(E)(4), which r equires that the territory p roposed for annexation have a boundary contiguous with the municipal corporation of “a t least five per cent” of the territory’s per imeter. We conclude that McGee does not apply here. {¶ 20} As McGee itself makes clear, the General Assembly had not, at the time we decided that case, defined the word “contiguous” for th e purpose of applying Ohio’s annexation statutes. That statutory silence le d us to draw from theS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 caselaw in determining the minimum degree of touching necessary for a territory and an annexing munici pality to be contiguous. See id. at 287. {¶ 21} Here, in contrast, the General Assembly has defined the minimum degree of touching necessary in a type-2 setting. As set forth in R.C. 709.023(E)(4), the territory proposed for annexation must have a boundary cont iguous to the annexing municipality for a “continuous length of at least five per cent” of the territory’s perimeter. See also Lawrence Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Canal Fulton , 185 Ohio App.3d 267, 2009-Ohio-6822, 923 N.E.2d 1180, ¶ 38-40 (5th Dist.) (rejecting the view that a type-2 annexation petition must satisfy contigu ity requirements in addition to those prescribed by R.C. 709.023(E)(4)); 1 Gotherma n, Babbitt & Lang, Baldwin’s Ohio Practice: Local Government Law—Municipal , Section 2.19, at 3 (Sept. 2019) (“territory that is a ‘balloon on a string’ may ne vertheless be annexed using the expedited type-2 annexa tion process provided that the territory shares a contiguous boundary with the munici pal corporation for a contin uous length of at least 5% of the perimeter of the territory”). It follows that applying McGee ’s contiguity principles in a type-2 case would render meaningless the specific contiguity limitations embodied in R.C. 709.023(E)(4). See In re Adoption of M.B. , 131 Ohio St.3d 186, 2012-Ohio-236, 963 N.E.2d 142, ¶ 19 (disfav oring an interpretation that renders a s tatute meaningless); R.C. 1.47(B ) (“The entire statute is intended to be effective”). {¶ 22} Another problem with the county’s argument is that it is in ten sion
with our decision in Natl. Lime & Stone , 152 Ohio St.3d 393, 2017-Ohio-8348, 97 N.E.3d 404. There, we considered whether each of the seven con ditions applicable in a type-2 setting were satisfied. Not once did we refer to McGee ’s contiguity principles in determining whethe r the territory proposed for an nexation was contiguous with the annexing municipality. Instead, we simply performed the analysis prescribed by R.C. 709.023(E)(4), determining that the territory proposed for annexation was sufficiently contiguous because it “share[d] a contiguousJanuary Term, 2020

11 boundary of at least 5 percent of the territory’s perimeter.” Natl Lime & Stone at ¶ 30. To be sure, Natl. Lime & Stone does not squarely resolve the argument that the county raises here. But even so, it would be hard to chara cterize the above language of Natl. Lime & Stone as dicta because its contiguity analysis was essential to the judgment. 2 {¶ 23} The county urges this court to apply State ex rel. Overholser Builders, L.L.C. v. Clark Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 2007 CA 36, 2008-Ohio-6338, ¶ 37-39, a decision holding that McGee ’s contiguity principles apply to type-1 annexation petitions filed under R.C . 709.022. But
Overholser Builders does not apply here, because the c ity filed its annexation petition under R.C. 709.023, not R.C. 709.022. {¶ 24} In summary, we hold that R.C. 709.023(E)(4) establishes the sol e contiguity requirement in a typ e-2 setting. Because the county does not otherwise
contend that the c ity’s petition departs from R.C. 709.023(E)(1), we conclude tha t the petition satisfies the re quirements of that provision.
2. Whether the c ity’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)(4) {¶ 25} Under R.C. 709.023(E)(4), the te rritory proposed for annexation must have a boundary contiguous with the municipal corporation of at least 5 percent of the territory’s perimeter. The c ity attested to the court of appeals that the territory proposed for anne xation has a perimeter of 36,302 .11 feet and has a boundary contiguous with the c ity of 1,929.14 feet, equatin g to a shared boundary of roughly 5.31 percent of the t erritory’s perimeter. For its part, the county attested that the territory proposed for annexation has a perimeter of 3 8,317.34 feet and has a boundary contiguous with the c ity of 1,929.14 feet, equating to a shared boundary of roughly 5.03 percent of the territory’s perimeter. The cour t of appeals

2. Our decision in Butler Twp. Bd. of Trustees does not require a different result. There, we observed that “balloon-on-a-string annexations can be a significant prob lem.” 112 Ohio St.3d 262, 2006- Ohio-6411, 858 N.E.3d 1193, at ¶ 40. But we did not hold in th at case that they are unlawful under R.C. 709.023.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 determined that there is no ge nuine issue of material fact abou t the petition’s compliance with R.C. 709.023(E)(4) because, although the partie s’ numbers slightly diverge, they nevertheless establish that the shared b oundary exceeds the 5 percent threshold. {¶ 26} The county now points to a different category of evidence, urgi ng us to consider the c ity’s future plans for annexing additional territory. Specific ally, the county cites a c ity report describing the c ity’s future plan to annex roughly 159 acres of territory, at least some of which Central State Univer sity has an interest in. According to the county, if one were to account for the c ity’s future annexation plans, the shared boundary would fall to 4.29 percent. {¶ 27} The problem with the county’s argument is twofold. First, Ohio law directs a board of county commi ssioners to review a petition to determine whether it satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)’s seven conditions, not a municipa l corporation’s intent
to annex additional te rritory at some indeterminate point in th e future. We decline the county’s invitation to rewrite the statute by considering t he c ity’s future plans.
See State v. Hughes , 86 Ohio St.3d 424, 427, 715 N.E.2d 540 (1999) (“In construing a statute, we may not add or delete words”). Second, the count y’s argument
conflicts with the statement of facts that it and the c ity jointly filed below, which states, among other things, that the c ity’s petition seeks to “annex 45.637 acres of territory, more or le ss, in Xenia Township to the City of Xenia .” {¶ 28} We conclude that the c ity’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)(4)’s requirements.
3. Whether the c ity’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)(5) {¶ 29} Under R.C. 709.023(E)(5), the p etition must show that the “annexation will not create an unincorporated area of the towns hip that is completely surrounded by the te rritory proposed for annexation. ” The county
claims that the c ity’s petition does not satisfy this condition because the prop osed annexation of the bicycle path would create two township island s. The first area,January Term, 2020

13 known as the Green Parcel, is a triangular-shaped parcel that i s bounded by the c ity on two sides, with the bicycle p ath running along the third sid e. The second, the Douglas Street area, is a quadr ilateral-shaped group of parcels that are bounded by
the c ity on three sides, with the bicy cle path running along the fou rth side. {¶ 30} The c ity does not dispute that the pr oposed annexation would create two township islands. But it correctly points out that R.C. 70 9.023(E)(5) forbids only township islands that are “co mpletely surrounded by the te rritory proposed for annexation,” not islands that are created by the coupling of pr e- and post-annexation boundaries. Here, “the territory proposed for annexation” woul d form merely one side of the triangular-shaped is land and one side of the quadri lateral-shaped island. {¶ 31} We conclude that the c ity’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)(5)’s requirements.
4. Whether the c ity’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)(7) {¶ 32} R.C. 709.023(E)(7) provides that “[i]f a street or highway will be divided or segmented by the boundary line between the township and the municipal corporation as to create a road maintenance problem, the munici pal corporation” must have “agreed as a condition of the annexation to assume th e maintenance of that street or highway or to othe rwise correct the problem.” {¶ 33} Although the c ity essentially replicated this language in its petition, during deliberations on the pe tition, one of the county commiss ioners inquired about the scope of the c ity’s agreement. The c ity’s attorney initially responded that
the c ity would maintain portions of a ffected roads that crossed over the bicycle path but would not maintain any other portions of the roads, because the c ity would not have jurisdiction over the latte r portions. The attorney later clarified this response, saying that the c ity would comply with “whatever legal requirements” regarding road maintenance would apply. {¶ 34} The county claims that the attorn ey’s statements invalidate the c ity’s agreement to assume road-maintenance duties. But as the court of appealsS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 observed, R.C. 709.023(E)(7) provides that a municipal corporat ion must agree either to “assume the maintenance of th[e] street or highway or to otherwise correct the problem.” (Emphasis added.) In light of the clause’s disj unctive phrasing, it does not matter whether the attorney’s statement undermined the c ity’s promise to assume street-maintenance duties, because the c ity had agreed “to otherwise correct the problem,” id. {¶ 35} The county next argues that the c ity failed to present to the township or any agency an agreement concerning road-maintenance issues; however, the county cites no law that require s a municipal corporation to do this. {¶ 36} Last, the county claims that the c ity had failed to correct roadmaintenance problems arising fro m prior annexations. Thus, the argument runs, the c ity will fail to correct problems arising from the proposed ann exation. This argument is speculative, and even if true, it fails to establis h a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the c ity in fact agreed in its petition to correct road-maintenance-related problems. {¶ 37} We conclude that the city’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)( 7)’s requirements.
V. CONCLUSION {¶ 38} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court appeals. Judgment affirmed.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F RENCH , F ISCHER , D E W INE , D ONNELLY , and S TEWART , JJ., concur.

_________________ Donnette A. Fisher, Directo r of Law, for appellee. Stephen K. Haller, Greene Count y Prosecuting Attorney, and Eliz abeth A. Ellis, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellants.January Term, 2020

15 Frost, Brown, Todd, L.L.C., Philip K. Hartmann, Yazan S. Ashra wi, and Christopher D. Thomas; and Gar ry E. Hunter, General Counsel, ur ging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Municipal League. Brosius, Johnson & Griggs, L.L.C., Peter N. Griggs, Julia E. D onnan, and Jennifer L. Huber, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Towns hip Association.

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