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ON THE BORDER AND IN THE LINE OF FIRE: 

U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT, HOMELAND SECURITY, AND DRUG CARTEL VIOLENCE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, 

INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 11, 2011 

Serial No. 112–24 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

VACANCY

VACANCY

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

BILLY LONG, Missouri, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

DR. R. NICK PALARINO, Staff Director 

DIANA BERGWIN, Subcommittee Clerk 

TAMLA SCOTT, Minority Subcommittee Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, 

and Management: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Massachusetts, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight, 

Investigations, and Management ........................................................................ 5 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 7 

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Mr. Grayling G. Williams, Director, Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11 

Mr. Amy E. Pope, Deputy Chief of Staff and Counselor, Office of Assistant 

Attorney General, Department of Justice: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15 

PANEL II 

Mr. Steven C. McCraw, Director, Texas Department of Public Safety: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 40 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 42 

Mr. Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General, State of Arizona: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 45 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 47 

Mr. Sigifredo Gonzalez, Jr., Sheriff, Zapata County, Texas: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 59 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 62 

Mr. Victor Rodriguez, McAllen Police Department, McAllen, Texas: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 75 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 78 

(1) 

ON THE BORDER AND IN THE LINE OF FIRE: 

U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT, HOMELAND SECURITY, AND DRUG CARTEL VIOLENCE 

Wednesday, May 11, 2011 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND

MANAGEMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:12 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael McCaul [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives McCaul, Long, Duncan, Keating, 

Clarke, Davis, and Thompson. 

Also present: Cuellar, Green, Canseco, and Jackson Lee. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Good morning. The committee will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony from our 

witnesses in order to examine the validity of the assertion that the 

border is better now than it has ever been. 

Before I begin my opening statement, there are several Members 

that have asked to join our hearing today. I ask unanimous consent 

that Mr. Cuellar, a Member of the full committee, Mr. Canseco of 

Texas, Mr. Green of Texas, also be allowed to sit on the dais for 

the hearing today. 

Hearing no objection, it is so ordered. 

I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

I would like to welcome everyone here to the hearing today. The 

hearing is titled, ‘‘On the Border and in the Line of Fire: U.S. Law 

Enforcement, Homeland Security, and Drug Cartel Violence.’’ It is 

the second of two hearings to raise awareness of the dangers we 

face along our southern border with Mexico, to determine what we 

are doing to confront this growing National security threat to both 

countries. 

Our first hearing examined the U.S. strategy, assisting Mexico to 

win the war against the drug cartels. Testimony revealed drug cartels are taking huge amounts of territory, and the violence in Mexico is escalating at an alarming rate. 

We concluded there is no comprehensive U.S. strategy, and recommended they use lessons learned from Plan Colombia as our 

framework. 

Additionally, Federal law defines terrorism as activity that is intended to intimidate a civilian population or to influence the policy 
2 

of a government by intimidation, or to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. 

In my judgment, the drug cartels fall squarely within this definition. That is why Chairman King and I introduced H.R. 1270 designating the Mexican drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations 

to provide us more authority to go after them and those who provide them with assistance. 

We communicated all these findings to Secretary Clinton, Attorney General Holder, and Assistant to the President for National 

Security Affairs, Mr. Donilon. 

I would first like to take this moment to commend President 

Caldero ́n for taking on these drug cartels and the political courage 

he has demonstrated. But in my view, Mexico is losing this war, 

and so are we. It is my intention that through these hearings we 

can help Mexico win it. 

Today, we examine the U.S. side of the border. It is necessary 

to provide a realistic security assessment as determined by local 

and State law enforcement, and accurately measure the level of 

crime in our border communities related to cartel activities. 

In March, our Secretary of Homeland Security said that the border is better now than it has ever been. Many officials who are directly in the line of fire, such as Captain Bob Bullock of the Texas 

Rangers, disagree with the Secretary. We heard last week from 

Sheriff Dever in Arizona, stating he disagreed. 

Of course there is violence along the border. There is a spillover 

of crime and intimidation. 

Since January 2010, the Texas Department of Public Safety has 

identified at least 22 murders, 24 assaults, 15 shootings, five 

kidnappings directly related to this spillover. This past Sunday, 

there was a gun battle between Mexican marines and drug smugglers on Falcon Lake, which straddles the border, killing 13 people. 

We have in our presence today Ms. Tiffany Hartley. This is the 

same lake where Tiffany Hartley of Colorado watched the cartels 

murder her husband in cold blood while they were riding jet skis 

together last year. 

Thank you for being here. 

Arizona sheriffs said that Mexican drug gangs literally do control 

parts of Arizona, noting that gang members are armed with radio, 

optics, and night vision goggles. Texas’ Zapata County Sheriff Sigi 

Gonzalez, who is here today, as well, said that ‘‘The feds say our 

side of the border is safe, but we have bullet holes in our schools 

and businesses that say otherwise.’’ 

The cartels do not fear U.S. law enforcement. In February we 

saw evidence of that as the Los Zetas gangs ambushed and killed 

U.S. ICE Agent Jaime Zapata and wounded his partner, Agent 

Avila, in broad daylight on a Mexican highway. They commonly 

threaten law enforcement on American soil, most recently threatening to shoot at State police or Federal agents from across the 

river in Mexico. 

Make no mistake. The drug cartels are here inside the United 

States. The Department of Homeland Security reports that Mexican drug cartels have infiltrated 276 U.S. cities. After Agent Zapata was killed, more than 450 cartel members were arrested 

across this country. 
3 

The greatest impact on the U.S. side of the border is not well 

publicized. The Mexican drug cartels continue to threaten and intimidate. They offer their victims ‘‘plato o plumo,’’ silver or lead, 

meaning the bribe or the bullet. 

This is exactly how these cartels operate. For example, in the 

border town of Reynosa, Mexico, across the Rio Grande from 

McAllen, body parts were found this past December, which were no 

longer recognizable. A blood-stained poster board had a message of 

intimidation written on it. ‘‘See, hear, shut up, if you want to stay 

alive.’’ 

It has been reported by the FBI, which issued a bulletin as early 

as 2008, warning drug gangs stockpiling weapons in safe houses in 

the United States in response to crackdowns against drug traffickers. The bulletin also said a drug kingpin ordered gang members to ‘‘regain control and engage law enforcement officers if confronted.’’ Gang members were armed with ‘‘assault rifles, bulletproof vests, and hand grenades.’’ 

Late that same year, the Mexican federal police and Mexican 

army discovered what was then the largest weapons seizure in 

Mexico’s history just a few miles from our border—540 rifles including 288 assault rifles, .50-caliber sniper rifles, 287 hand grenades, anti-tank weapons, 500,000 rounds of ammunition, ballistic 

vests, and 14 sticks of dynamite. 

While we know that spillover violence occurs, the Congressional 

Research Service recently found that no one set of data exists that 

can definitively answer whether there has been significant spillover 

violence. The Federal definition of spillover violence is based on the 

Uniform Crime Report. Significantly, this report does not include 

key data such as kidnappings, extortions, home invasions, smuggling, and cartel-on-cartel violence. 

In contrast, the Texas Department of Public Safety’s definition of 

spillover violence includes aggravated assault, extortion, kidnapping, torture, rape, and murder. The director of the Texas DPS, 

Colonel Steve McCraw, who is here today, says, ‘‘There is no question spillover violence is growing in Texas.’’ 

I have urged the President to visit the border, but to do more 

than to deliver a political speech. While I am pleased that we have 

added more resources to the border, it is not secure. 

It has never been more violent or dangerous than it is today. 

Anybody who lives down there will tell you that. 

There is a disagreement about the definition of spillover violence 

and the extent of that violence. But there should be no disagreement about the threat we face and what will happen if this administration continues to downplay the threat. 

So, what should we do? 

For starters, I think we should get out of our foxholes and lean 

forward against this growing threat. If we do not take the cartels, 

they will eventually take over our cities. 

We need to extend the use of the National Guard troops on the 

border and increase their numbers until we have a sufficient number of Border Patrol agents. 

We need to incorporate DOD surveillance technology along the 

border. 
4 

We need to add at least two more unmanned aerial vehicles to 

the Texas-Mexico border. 

We need to increase southbound checkpoints or our best teams 

to confiscate weapons and cash, and then use the cash to help pay 

for border security operations. 

Finally, we need to increase funding to State and local law enforcement along the border through increased funding of operations 

like Operation Stonegarden. 

[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:] 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL MCCAUL

MAY 11, 2011 

Welcome to this Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management 

hearing titled ‘‘On the Border and in the Line of Fire: U.S. Law Enforcement, Homeland Security, and Drug Cartel Violence.’’ 

It is the second of two hearings to raise awareness of the danger we face along 

our Southern border with Mexico to determine what we are doing to confront this 

growing National security threat to both countries. 

Our first hearing examined the U.S. strategy assisting Mexico to win its war 

against the drug cartels. Testimony revealed drug cartels are taking huge amounts 

of territory and the violence in Mexico is escalating at an alarming rate. 

We concluded there is no comprehensive U.S. strategy and recommended they use 

lessons learned from Plan Colombia as our framework. 

Additionally, Federal law defines ‘‘terrorism’’ as activity that is ‘‘intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by 

intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by assassination 

or kidnapping.’’ 

That is why I, along with Chairman King, introduced H.R. 1270, designating the 

Mexican drug cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations to provide us more authority to go after them and those who provide them assistance. 

We communicated all these findings to Secretary Clinton, Attorney General Holder, and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Mr. Donilon. 

I would like to commend President Caldero ́n for taking on the drug cartels that 

are overtaking his country. Mexico is losing this war. It is my intention through 

these hearings to help Mexico win it. 

Today we examine the U.S. side of the border. It is necessary to provide a realistic 

security assessment as determined by local and State law enforcement and accurately measure the level of crime in our border communities related to cartel activities. 

In March our Secretary of Homeland Security said, ‘‘The border is better now 

than it ever has been.’’ Many officials who are directly in the line of fire, such as 

Captain Bob Bullock of the Texas Rangers, disagree with the Secretary. Of course 

there is violence along the border—spillover of criminal organizations and spillover 

crime and intimidation. 

Since January 2010, the Texas Department of Public Safety has identified at least 

22 murders, 24 assaults, 15 shootings, and 5 kidnappings directly related to spillover violence. 

This past Sunday there was a gun battle between Mexican Marines and drug 

smugglers on Falcon Lake, which straddles the border, killing 13 people. This is the 

same lake where Tiffany Hartley of Colorado watched the cartels murder her husband when they were riding jetskis together last year. 

Arizona Pinal County Sheriff Paul Babeu said Mexican drug gangs ‘‘literally do 

control parts of Arizona,’’ noting that gang members are armed with radios, optics, 

and night-vision goggles. 

Texas Zapata County Sheriff Sigifredo Gonzalez said, ‘‘The feds say our side of 

the border is safe, but we have bullet holes in our schools and businesses that say 

otherwise.’’ 

The cartels do not fear U.S. law enforcement. In February members of Los Zetas 

ambushed and killed U.S. ICE Agent Jaime Zapata and wounded his partner, Agent 

Avila in broad daylight on a Mexican highway. 

They commonly threaten law enforcement on American soil—most recently threatening to shoot at State police or Federal agents from across the river in Mexico. 

Make no mistake: The drug cartels are here inside the United States. The Department of Homeland Security reports that Mexican drug cartels have infiltrated 276 
5 

U.S. cities. After Agent Zapata was killed more than 450 cartel members were arrested across this country. 

The greatest impact on the U.S. side of the border is not well publicized. The 

Mexican drug cartels threaten and intimidate. They offer their victims ‘‘plata o 

plumo,’’ silver or lead, meaning the bribe or the bullet. 

This is exactly how these cartels operate. For example, in the border town of 

Reynosa, Mexico, across the Rio Grande River from McAllen, Texas, body parts were 

found this past December which were no longer recognizable. A blood-stained poster 

board had a message of intimidation written on it; ‘‘See. Hear. Shut up, if you want 

to stay alive.’’ 

It has been reported the FBI issued a bulletin, as early as 2008, warning drug 

gangs stockpiled weapons in safe houses in the United States in response to crackdowns against drug traffickers. The bulletin also said a drug gang kingpin ordered 

gang members to ‘‘regain control and engage law enforcement officers if confronted.’’ 

Gang members were armed with ‘‘assault rifles, bullet-proof vests, and grenades.’’ 

Late that same year Mexican Federal Police and the Mexican Army discovered 

what was then the largest weapon seizure in Mexico’s history just a few miles from 

our border—540 rifles including 288 assault rifles and .50-caliber sniper rifles, 287 

hand grenades, 2 M–72 anti-tank weapons, 500,000 rounds of ammunition, 67 ballistic vests, and 14 sticks of dynamite. 

While we know that spillover violence occurs, the Congressional Research Service 

recently found that no one set of data exists that can definitively answer whether 

there has been significant spillover violence. 

The Federal definition of spillover violence is based on the Uniform Crime Report. 

Significantly, this report does not include key data such as kidnappings, extortions, 

home invasions, and smuggling that are directly related to cartel violence. 

In contrast, the Texas Department of Public Safety’s definition of spillover violence includes aggravated assault, extortion, kidnapping, torture, rape, and murder. 

The Director of Texas DPS, Colonel Steven McCraw, says there is ‘‘no question spillover violence is growing in Texas.’’ 

I have urged the President to visit the border—but to do more than deliver a 

speech. 

While I am pleased that we have added more resources, the border is not secure 

and it has never been more violent or dangerous. Anyone who lives down there will 

tell you that. 

There is a disagreement about the definition of spillover violence and the extent 

of such violence. But there should be no disagreement about the threat we face and 

what will happen if this administration continues to downplay the threat. 

So what should we do? For starters we should: 

• Get out of our foxholes and lean forward against this growing threat. If we don’t 

the cartels will eventually attempt to take over our cities. 

• Extend the use of National Guard troops on the border, and increase their numbers, until we have a sufficient number of Border Patrol Agents. 

• Incorporate DOD surveillance technology. 

• Add at least two more Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to the Texas-Mexico border. 

• Increase southbound checkpoints to confiscate weapons and cash then use the 

cash to help pay for border security operations; 

• Increase funding to State and local law enforcement along the border through 

increased funding of Operation Stonegarden. 

We look forward to hearing the testimony from our witnesses. 

Mr. MCCAUL. So, with that, let me say I look forward to the testimony here today. I want to thank the witnesses for being here. 

Now, the Chairman recognizes the Ranking Member of the full 

committee, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I will defer to the Ranking Member first, if that is all right. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I will now recognize the Ranking Member of the 

subcommittee, Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is great to have our 

ranks all defined. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. KEATING. If only this issue could be dealt with as easily as 

that, but thank you. 
6 

I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for conducting the 

hearing and for providing the subcommittee with the opportunity 

to hear first-hand accounts in terms of what the occurrences are in 

our southwest border. 

I would like to thank Ranking Member Thompson for being here 

and joining us, as well, and lending his experience to this morning’s hearing. 

I look forward to receiving an update on the strategy utilized by 

the Federal Government to secure our border, and to the extent to 

which the State and local enforcement agencies are incorporated in 

this effort. 

We are obviously all here, because we are troubled with drug-related violence that occurs in the Mexican border and in Mexico. To 

that end, I am particularly interested in hearing from witnesses regarding the measures that are being deployed on the Federal, 

State, and local levels to prevent this violence from spilling over 

into the United States. 

I believe that we are fully able to continue the valuable assistance we can partner with in the Government of Mexico in their 

fight against daily acts of violence in their country, and to take actions to keep our border secure from this threat, and to face headon domestic challenges that we have here at home. 

Any suggestion that we are not capable of doing these things simultaneously, I think discredits the admirable job performed by 

the Customs and Border Protection, Immigration, Customs Enforcement and the myriad of Federal, State, and local partners that 

really have worked tirelessly to keep our border secure and to implement immigration strategies. 

President Obama and Secretary Napolitano’s visit to El Paso and 

Austin, Texas, yesterday, to discuss both border security and comprehensive immigration reform, show a commitment to both of 

these concepts. 

As we move forward in our discussion on the best way to address 

drug-related violence in Mexico, I am fully open to new ideas and 

concepts with the ultimate goal of ensuring that our homeland security is not threatened by the actions occurring in our neighboring 

country. 

Our Government has successfully used the Foreign Narcotics 

Kingpin Designation Act to sanction Mexican drug trafficking organizations. I am assured that this act provides the United States 

with one of the best available tools from posing economic sanctions 

against Mexican DTOs. 

It is my hope that moving forward we can work toward initiatives that provide bilateral efforts with Mexico, one of our closest 

allies, and maintain needed humanitarian aid provided to Mexicans by the United States Government. 

Finally, we cannot have a full discussion on a Southwest border 

counternarcotics strategy and how best to protect our border security personnel without also having a discussion on the demand for 

drugs in the United States and the use of U.S. firearms in the violence occurring in Mexico. 

As a member of the Addiction Treatment and Recovery Caucus, 

I am supportive of efforts here to reduce demand on drugs. I look 
7 

forward to working with colleagues on both sides of the aisle to address this aspect of the issue. 

As I have stated before, as long as the demand exists here, the 

violence will continue there. 

I look forward to hearing from our Federal witnesses on how demand reduction factors factor into our overall strategy. 

Moreover, I am greatly concerned that so many of the guns 

seized in Mexico, including the firearms allegedly used in the recent killings and wounding of two immigration officials come from 

the United States. 

As the President noted yesterday at the border, for the first time, 

we are now screening 100 percent of the southbound rail cargo to 

reduce the threat of gun trafficking into Mexico. 

With that said, once again, to my disappointment here this 

morning, we do not have witnesses from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives on the panel despite two requests 

in our last two hearings to have them included. 

I would encourage the Department of Justice witness, to the extent that she is able to do, to address the interplay of guns from 

the United States and Mexico, and how that interplays with the violence that is occurring in Mexico. 

So, I look forward to today’s testimony and thank everyone for 

participating. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full 

committee, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding today’s hearing. 

I would also like to thank our witnesses for their presence, and 

I look forward to their testimony. 

The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether the United 

States has a substantive strategy to control the Southwestern border, and whether that strategy is producing results. 

I would first like to express my concern about a recent statement 

made by House Speaker John Boehner regarding immigration reform. I understand that he plans to oppose any effort to reform the 

Nation’s immigration laws before the violence at the border declines. As the committee’s hearings have established, the violence 

is centered in Mexico. 

I am troubled by this violence in our backyard. That is why I 

support the Me ́rida and other Federal initiatives to help our neighbors to the south address the violence. 

However, I do not see any legitimate reason for the United 

States to let comprehensive immigration reform fall by the wayside, because Mexico is experiencing drug-related violence. The two 

should not represent a zero-sum equation. 

As I previously stated, a comprehensive border security strategy 

must create an appropriate mix of personnel, technology, and infrastructure. In recent weeks, U.S. efforts along the Southwestern border have received a great deal of attention. 

In fact, just yesterday, both President Obama and Secretary 

Napolitano visited El Paso, Texas, to discuss the unprecedented resources that have been dedicated to the Southwestern border over 

the past 2 years. 
8 

The United States has deployed more resources, personnel, technology, and infrastructure to secure the Southwestern border than 

ever before. There are more than 17,500 Border Patrol agents on 

the border. Authority to place up to 1,200 National Guardsmen has 

also been granted. 

More than 250 Customs Immigration special agent investigators 

and intelligence analysts are working around the clock to secure 

our border and to keep illegal goods, narcotics, and dangerous individuals from entering the United States. Their presence deters violent actors from crossing over our border communities, which are 

among the safest places to live in the United States. 

Legitimate travel and commerce occur between the United States 

and Mexico and within our border communities on a daily basis. 

Including services, we trade more than $1 billion a day with Mexico. 

To put this in perspective, we do as much business in goods and 

services with Mexico in just over a month as Mexico does with all 

27 countries of the European Union combined in a year. 

As we seek to define a solution to increasing violence in Mexico, 

we must remain mindful that Mexico is our third-largest trading 

partner, which the United States ranks first among Mexico’s trading partners. 

The source for much of the violence in Mexico has been Mexican 

drug trafficking organizations, called DTOs. The facts indicate that 

the violence occurring in Mexico is highly concentrated and, in 

many instances, limited to drug trafficking corridors, some of which 

are hundreds of miles away from the United States border. 

The facts also indicate that the bulk of this violence occurs between rival DTOs seeking to conquer new turfs or DTOs as lowerlevel drug dealers seek to rise up within their organizations. 

Moreover, the facts show that DTOs are motivated by one thing 

and one thing only—money. They are not ideologically based. They 

do not seek an effectual political change. They do not organize orchestrated attacks against the government. 

They only seek to make a profit by any means necessary. 

Fortunately, statistics and concrete evidence show that the violence does not spill over substantially into the United States. The 

combined efforts of our Federal Government working along with 

our State and local law enforcement have produced real results. 

In fiscal year 2010, ICE-led efforts along the Southwestern border resulted in 1,616 criminal arrests, 907 administrative arrests, 

868 indictments, 697 convictions, the discovery of two tunnels and 

the seizure of tons of marijuana, cocaine, and methamphetamines. 

In the past 2 years, Customs and Border Protection seized $147 

million in currency and between ports of entry along the Southwestern border, in addition to 4.1 million pounds of narcotics. 

These results do not negate the violence that is occurring in Mexico. However, they do indicate that current U.S. strategies are improving the safety and security of the United States. 

I would be remiss if I did not mention the significant budget cuts 

proposed by the Republican majority in this current budget proposal. In this Congress, the majority passed H.R. 1, which cut $350 

million from the Department of Homeland Security budget for border security, fencing, and technology. If enacted, these cuts will 
9 

also reduce the number of Border Patrol agents on the Southwestern border. 

I would encourage my Republican colleagues to show a real concern for border security by fully funding border security efforts. 

Moving us backwards by slashing funds and decreasing our human 

and financial resources will certainly result in less secure borders. 

Again, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and having 

an honest discussion about the future of our border security efforts. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Thompson. 

Let me also say in response to the resource issue, it is my commitment and my sincere hope we can work together in a bipartisan 

fashion. It is a tough budgetary time, but this is the one area we 

cannot afford to cut back. We need to add additional resources 

down to the border. 

Thank you for bringing that point up. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. With that, other Members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

We are pleased to have two panels here today. The first panel, 

we have a witness from the Department of Homeland Security and 

Department of Justice, and the second panel more State and local 

witnesses. 

I encourage the members of the press and those in attendance 

at this hearing to stick around for both. I think you will find the 

opinions may vary. I would just encourage you to stay and hear 

both testimonies from both panels. 

First we have Mr. Grayling Williams, who has served as the director of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement since 2009, coordinating policy and strategy to stop the entry of illegal drugs into 

the United States. Prior to his appointment, Director Williams 

served as a special agent with the DEA for almost 23 years where 

he taught undercover operations, surveillance techniques, and informant management to law enforcement officers in the United 

States and overseas. 

Mr. Williams, thank you for being here, and thank you for your 

service in the field. 

Ms. Amy Pope currently serves as deputy chief of staff and counselor to the assistant attorney general for the Criminal Division at 

my old alma mater, the Department of Justice. Prior to this position, Ms. Pope served on detail as senior counsel to the AAG. Ms. 

Pope has previously served as counsel to Senate Majority Leader 

Harry Reid and as the liaison between the Senate leadership and 

the Senate Judiciary Committee. 

With that, Mr. Williams, if you would give us your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF GRAYLING G. WILLIAMS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE 

OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes. Good morning, and thank you. 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished 

Members of the subcommittee, I am honored to appear before you 

today to discuss the efforts of the Department of Homeland Security in securing the Southwest border. 
10 

DHS is committed to protecting our Nation’s borders from the illegal entry of people, weapons, drugs, and contraband, and is continuing to work with our Mexican counterparts to address the violence and criminal activities occurring in Mexico, and guard 

against spillover effects into the United States. 

We are in the midst of National Police Week. Before beginning 

my formal remarks, I would like to recognize the law enforcement 

officers serving the department, other Federal agencies, State, 

local, and Tribal governments, who put their lives on the line each 

day to protect our communities and our Nation. 

I particularly want to honor the service and recognize the sacrifice of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Special Agent 

Jaime Zapata, and Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry, who were recently killed in service to their country. 

As director of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, I serve 

as the primary advisor to Secretary Napolitano on counterdrug 

issues. I work closely with the Department’s components and the 

interagency to ensure that our counterdrug efforts are well-coordinated and support the Secretary’s priorities. 

CNE works with components to identify and resolve issues impacting the DHS counternarcotics mission and the President’s National Drug Control Strategy. 

I also serve as an executive agent for the development and implementation of the administration’s National Southwest Border 

Counternarcotics Strategy. The strategy is a comprehensive plan 

that provides the resources and tools necessary to combat 

transnational crime. 

Over the past 2 years, DHS has deployed historic levels of personnel, technology, resources to the Southwest border. The Border 

Patrol more than doubled the number of agents to over 20,700. 

Under the Southwest Border Initiative, launched in March 2009, 

DHS has doubled the number of personnel assigned to border enforcement security task forces under ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations Office. 

With the aid of $600 million from the border security supplemental requested by the administration and passed by Congress in 

2010, we have continued to add more technology, manpower, and 

infrastructure to the border. Further, President Obama authorized 

the temporary deployments of up to 1,200 National Guard personnel to contribute additional capabilities and capacities to assist 

law enforcement agencies. 

Additionally, to support State and local law enforcement jurisdictions along the border, we directed more than $123 million in Operation Stonegarden funds in 2009 and 2010, to Southwest border 

States to pay for overtime and other border security-related expenses. 

In partnership with the Drug Enforcement Administration and 

the Department of Justice, and the Department of Defense, we 

have also achieved initial operational capability for the new Border 

Intelligence Fusion Section within the El Paso Intelligence Center. 

This new section will provide a comprehensive Southwest border 

common intelligence picture as well as real-time operational intelligence to our law enforcement partners in the region. 
11 

Taken as a whole, the additional manpower, technology and resources directed at securing the region represent the most serious 

and sustained effort to secure our border in our Nation’s history. 

Every key metric shows that these border security efforts are producing significant results. 

Seizures of drugs, weapons, and currency have increased across 

the board, and violent crime in border communities has remained 

at a common level, or has fallen. At the same time, challenges do 

remain. 

We remain deeply concerned about the drug cartel violence taking place in Mexico. We know that these drug organizations are 

seeking to undermine the rule of law in Mexico, and we must continue to vigorously guard against potential spillover effects into the 

United States. 

Our partnership with Mexico has been critical to or efforts to secure the Southwest border, and we will continue to expand this collaboration. 

Mexico’s president, Felipe Caldero ́n, has demonstrated a tremendous level of commitment and resolve to breaking the power structure of the transnational criminal organizations operating in his 

country. 

I have visited Mexico and have met with officials from the government to discuss how DHS can further support them. Our 

progress in securing the Southwest border against illicit drug trafficking is unprecedented. 

Even with the current budget restraints, I am committed to continuing to work efficiently and effectively with DHS’s components 

and the interagency to ensure that counternarcotics policies and 

operations are well coordinated, and that DHS commits the resources necessary to respond to the evolving threats posed by 

transnational criminal organizations. 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of 

the subcommittee, thank you again for this great opportunity to 

testify. I am happy to respond to your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Grayling follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GRAYLING G. WILLIAMS

MAY 11, 2011 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, I am honored to appear before you today to discuss the efforts of the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in securing the Southwest border. DHS is 

committed to protecting our Nation’s borders from the illegal entry of people, weapons, drugs, and contraband, and is continuing to work with our Mexican counterparts to address the violence and criminal activities occurring in Mexico and guard 

against spillover effects into the United States. 

As Director of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement (CNE), I serve as the 

primary advisor to the Secretary on counterdrug issues, working closely with the 

Department’s components and the interagency to ensure that our counterdrug efforts are well coordinated and support the Secretary’s priorities. CNE works with 

components to identify and resolve issues impacting the DHS counternarcotics mission, while also supporting the goals identified in the President’s National Drug 

Control Strategy. 

On behalf of the Secretary, I also serve as an executive agent for the development 

and implementation of the administration’s National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, which is produced by the White House Office of National Drug 

Control Policy. This strategy is a comprehensive plan that identifies concrete joint 

actions to improve intelligence and information sharing, enhances interdiction at 
12 

and between U.S. ports of entry, and provides investigators and prosecutors with 

the resources and tools necessary to combat transnational criminal organizations. 

Over the past 2 years, DHS has deployed historic levels of personnel, technology, 

and resources to the Southwest border. Today, the Border Patrol is better staffed 

than at any time in its 87-year history, having more than doubled the number of 

agents from approximately 10,000 in 2004 to more than 20,700 today. Under the 

Southwest Border Initiative launched in March 2009, DHS has doubled the number 

of personnel assigned to Border Enforcement Security Task Forces; increased the 

number of intelligence analysts focused on cartel violence; quintupled deployments 

of Border Liaison Officers to work with their Mexican counterparts; begun screening 

100 percent of southbound rail shipments for illegal weapons, drugs, and cash; and 

expanded unmanned aircraft system coverage to the entire Southwest border. 

With the aid of $600 million from the border security supplemental requested by 

the administration and passed by Congress in 2010, we have continued to add more 

technology, manpower, and infrastructure to the border. These resources include 

1,000 additional Border Patrol Agents; 250 new U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) officers at our ports of entry; 250 new U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents focused on transnational crime; improving our tactical communications systems; adding two new forward operating bases to improve coordination of border security activities; and additional CBP unmanned aircraft systems. 

Further, President Obama authorized the temporary deployment of up to 1,200 

National Guard personnel to contribute additional capabilities and capacity to assist 

law enforcement agencies as a bridge to longer-term enhancements in the efforts to 

target illicit networks’ smuggling of people, drugs, illegal weapons, money, and the 

violence associated with these illegal activities. That support has allowed us to 

bridge an operational gap and hire additional agents to support the Southwest border, as well as field additional technology and communications capabilities that Congress so generously provided. The Departments of Defense and Homeland Security 

agreed to equally fund this support; however, Congress did not approve DHS’ reprogramming requests. Consequently, the Department of Defense has been funding 

the full cost of this National Guard support. 

Additionally, to support State and local law enforcement jurisdictions along the 

border, we directed more than $123 million in Operation Stonegarden funds in 2009 

and 2010 to Southwest border States to pay for overtime and other border-related 

expenses. 

In partnership with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Department of Defense, we also have achieved initial operational capability for the new 

Border Intelligence Fusion Section integrated into the DEA-led El Paso Intelligence 

Center (EPIC). This new section will provide a comprehensive Southwest Border 

Common Intelligence picture, as well as real-time operational intelligence, to our 

law enforcement partners in the region—further streamlining and enhancing our operations. And we are continuing to work with Mexico to develop an interoperable, 

cross-border communications network that will improve our ability to coordinate law 

enforcement and public safety issues. 

Taken as a whole, the additional manpower, technology, and resources directed 

at securing the region represent the most serious and sustained effort to secure our 

border in our Nation’s history. Such efforts were undertaken with the support of 

Congress and were well coordinated within the interagency. While our work is not 

done, every key metric shows that these border security efforts are producing significant results. Border Patrol apprehensions—a key indicator of illegal immigration—have decreased 36 percent in the past 2 years, and are less than one-third of 

what they were at their peak. Seizures of drugs, weapons, and currency have increased across the board. And violent crime in border communities has remained 

flat or fallen in the past decade—in fact, studies and statistics have shown that 

some of the safest cities and communities in America are along the border. 

At the same time, challenges remain, and we must continue to build upon the 

progress we have made. We remain deeply concerned about the drug cartel violence 

taking place in Mexico. We know that these drug organizations are seeking to undermine the rule of law in Northern Mexico, and we must vigorously guard against 

potential spillover effects into the United States. 

Our men and women in uniform encounter danger every day, and they put their 

lives on the line for our country. The murder of a U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement special agent in Mexico in February 2011 and of a Border Patrol agent 

in December 2010 underscore the risks our men and women on the frontlines face 

as they work to protect our borders and our country. As the Director of CNE, I take 

very seriously my position and responsibility to ensure our law enforcement officers 

have the resources necessary to carry out their duties in protecting America’s bor-
13 

ders. We owe them every tool and every resource in our arsenal so that they can 

safely and successfully do their jobs. 

Our partnership with Mexico has been critical to our efforts to secure the Southwest border, and we will continue to expand this collaboration. Mexico’s President, 

Felipe Caldero ́n, has demonstrated a tremendous level of commitment and resolve 

to breaking the power structure of the transnational criminal organizations operating in his country. Through our attache ́s in Mexico, the Me ́rida Initiative and direct, operational cooperation and information sharing, DHS is working to support 

the Government of Mexico’s continuing counternarcotics efforts. As part of a broader 

bilateral effort, the Department has increased joint training programs with Mexican 

law enforcement agencies and, for the first time in history, Border Patrol agents are 

coordinating joint operations along the Southwest border with their colleagues in 

the Mexican Federal Police to combat human trafficking and smuggling in our respective nations. 

I have visited Mexico and have worked with the Government of Mexico to develop 

the CNE sponsored U.S.-Mexico Bi-National Criminal Proceeds Study. The success 

of this study is the result of the collaborative efforts of CNE, ICE, other Federal 

agencies and the Government of Mexico. This study reveals the means by which 

criminal networks, particularly drug cartels, move criminal proceeds from the 

United States into Mexico and beyond. The study includes critical assessments of 

money collection sites, transportation routes, and chokepoints. It also enables the 

United States and Mexico to strategically target our law enforcement operations and 

resources. Its findings are being addressed and implemented by several bi-national 

planning and strategic working groups. These groups provide a forum for U.S. and 

Mexican law enforcement to coordinate, de-conflict, and enhance significant criminal 

investigations. I am encouraged that as our governments expand collaborative efforts, the level of cooperation and information sharing continues to improve. 

Our progress in securing the Southwest border against illicit drug trafficking over 

the past 2 years is unprecedented and our efforts greatly contributed to protecting 

the safety and security of individuals and communities along the Southwest border. 

I am committed to continuing to work with DHS’ components and the interagency 

to ensure that counternarcotics policies and operations are well coordinated and 

that DHS commits the resources necessary to respond to the evolving threats posed 

by transnational criminal organizations. 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the subcommittee, 

thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I am happy to respond to your questions. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Williams. 

The Chairman now recognizes Ms. Pope to testify. 

STATEMENT OF AMY E. POPE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF AND 

COUNSELOR, OFFICE OF ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Ms. POPE. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Keating and distinguished Members of this subcommittee. Thank you for the invitation to address the subcommittee about the Department of Justice’s 

strategy to combat the violence on the Southwest border. 

Your commitment to this issue and these hearings come at a critical time for the United States and for Mexico. In a nutshell, the 

Department of Justice’s strategy to eliminate the threat posed by 

the Mexican drug cartels is two-pronged. 

First, to intensify our investigative and prosecutorial efforts 

through coordinated, intelligence-driven operations here in the 

United States. 

Second, to strengthen the Mexican government’s own capacity to 

dismantle the cartels. 

Both aspects of this strategy are essential to defeating the organized criminal groups operating in both countries. 

The first prong of the Department of Justice’s strategy is to increase and intensify our own investigative and prosecutorial efforts 

here in the United States. 
14 

We are investing unprecedented agent and prosecutorial resources in fighting the Mexican drug cartels. With these resources 

and with our partners at DHS and other agencies of the Federal 

Government, we are using intelligence to coordinate long-term investigations that identify all of the tentacles of a particular organization. 

Through the Special Operations Division, we are able to connect 

the dots between jurisdictions, arresting and prosecuting as many 

high-level members of the organization as possible, disrupting and 

dismantling the domestic transportation and distribution networks 

of the cartels and seizing as many of the organization’s assets as 

we can identify. 

This comprehensive approach has led to a number of remarkable 

successes. Five of the most recent SOD-coordinated investigations 

combined resulted in more than 5,500 arrests and the seizure of 

more than $300 million in U.S. currency, 260,000 pounds of marijuana, 36,000 kilos of cocaine, 1,400 pounds of heroin, 6,500 pounds 

of methamphetamines, and 1,500 weapons. 

We have also realized that the key to the vitality of the drug 

trafficking and other criminal organizations is their continued access to enormous sums of money. Thus, we are aggressively using 

our asset forfeiture and anti-money laundering laws to deprive the 

cartels of their illicit proceeds. 

The Criminal Division has created a new Money Laundering and 

Bank Integrity Unit and a Mexican drug cartel team within our 

Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, which is devoted 

exclusively to investigating and prosecuting complex criminal cases 

involving the financial institutions and the individual criminal 

facilitators who hide the money that fuel the cartels. 

Similarly, the Department is aggressively seeking the extradition 

of high-level traffickers to the United States to face criminal prosecution here. In the past 2 years, we have secured the extradition 

of more than 200 high-level drug traffickers and violent criminals— 

more than in any other 2-year period. 

Just last month, Mexico extradited Benjamin Arellano-Felix, the 

former head of the Tijuana cartel, to face racketeering and drug 

conspiracy charges resulting from a long-running OCDETF investigation in San Diego. We hope to build and expand upon these 

successes in the coming year as we work more closely than ever 

with the Mexican government in this critical area of cooperation. 

The second piece of our strategy is to increase Mexico’s own ability to investigate and prosecute the cartels—in Mexico. With funding from the State Department and USAID, our Federal prosecutors stationed in Mexico do work that runs the gamut from highlevel advice on criminal code reform to practical training on investigations and prosecutions. 

Since July 2009, working with our U.S. Federal agency partners, 

the Department of Justice has trained more than 10,600 different 

individuals at all levels and in the executive and judicial branches 

of the Mexican government. 

We are partnering with law enforcement agencies in Colombia. 

We are sending Mexican members of Congress, of the judiciary and 

of the Executive branch to train in tandem with our U.S.-trained 

Colombian counterparts. 
15 

But our training and our mentoring extends beyond the classroom. We are partnering on investigations and prosecutions. 

Assistant U.S. attorneys and Criminal Division prosecutors are 

mentoring and partnering with their Mexican counterparts in the 

attorney general’s office in Mexico, the PGR, who are in turn collaborating with the Mexican federal police, the SSP, and the DEA 

as never seen before. 

We are identifying cases to work on both sides of the border, and 

our Southwest border U.S. attorneys are forging relationships with 

their regional counterparts. 

Before I conclude, I am compelled to add that we cannot achieve 

success without the support and input from Members of Congress. 

Through the investment in our efforts along the Southwest border, 

as in last summer’s emergency supplemental, the collaboration on 

legislation and a recognition that this is a sustained, long-term investment, Congress has already and can in the future play a meaningful role in this fight. 

I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

[The statement of Ms. Pope follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMY E. POPE

MAY 11, 2011 

INTRODUCTION

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Keating, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee. Thank you for your invitation to address the subcommittee and for 

the opportunity to discuss the Department of Justice’s work in the United States 

and in Mexico to combat drug cartel violence. Mr. Chairman, I followed with interest your last hearing on the Mexican war against the drug cartels. Your commitment to these issues—and these hearings—comes at a critical time for both Mexico 

and the United States. Just last month, Attorney General Holder participated in a 

U.S./Mexico High Level Meeting, hosted by Secretary Clinton at the State Department, where leaders from Mexico’s Law Enforcement, Security, and Diplomatic 

agencies met with their U.S. counterparts to discuss the progress achieved under 

the Me ́rida Initiative and to set out next steps and commitments for the joint work 

that lies ahead. The stakes are high for both countries. The safety and well-being 

of the public in Mexico and the United States depend on our joint work on investigations and prosecutions and advancing the rule of law. These efforts will help defeat 

the drug trafficking organizations that threaten the safety of all our citizens. 

I. Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations Remain a Critical Threat to U.S. and 

Mexican Security 

This committee needs no reminding of the critical importance of Mexico to the security of the United States. The National Drug Intelligence Center’s 2010 National 

Drug Threat Assessment indicates that Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations 

(DTOs) ‘‘continue to represent the single greatest drug trafficking threat to the 

United States.’’ The influence of the Mexican DTOs is felt in every region of the 

United States and in at least 230 U.S. cities, up from about 50 cities in 2006. Although historically the Colombian cartels posed the more significant threat, there 

is increasing evidence that as the United States and Colombian governments successfully dismantle the Colombian cartels, the Mexican cartels have become more 

powerful and active. 

In Mexico, in recent years, there has been a marked increase in violent crime, 

particularly as a result of desperate drug cartels battling for turf. Murder rates 

have risen significantly in some major cities located on or near the border. Kidnapping remains a serious threat in that country. Moreover, DTOs have engaged in increasingly brazen behavior within Mexico including: (a) The creation of unauthorized checkpoints where they have killed motorists who have not stopped; (b) the use 

of automatic weapons and grenades in confrontations with the Mexican army and 

police; and (c) the use of full or partial police or military uniforms and vehicles. The 

violence in Ciudad Juarez, just across the border from El Paso, Texas, makes it one 

of the most dangerous cities in the world, outside of a war zone. Large firefights 
16 

have taken place in towns and cities in many parts of Mexico, often in broad daylight on streets and in public. 

The violence in Mexico has impacted U.S. citizens and U.S. Government employees who live, work, and travel in Mexico. Indeed, U.S. citizens and U.S. law enforcement officers have been the victims of violent crime in Mexico, including kidnapping 

and murder. In the wake of the deteriorating security situation in Mexico, the 

United States Government has curtailed the movement of U.S. Government personnel; prohibiting U.S. personnel from driving from the U.S.-Mexico border to the 

interior of Mexico or Central America; advising U.S. Embassy employees to defer 

travel to parts of the State of San Luis Potosi, including the entire stretch of Highway 57D; and prohibiting Embassy personnel from hailing taxis off the street in 

Mexico City because of frequent kidnappings and robberies. In September 2010, the 

U.S. Consulate in Monterrey became a partially unaccompanied post, with no minor 

dependents of U.S. Government employees permitted in response to changes in the 

security situation. The current State Department Travel Warning urges U.S. citizens to defer unnecessary travel to Michoaca ́n and Tamaulipas, and to parts of Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Durango, and Coahuila, and advises U.S. citizens residing or traveling in those areas to exercise extreme caution. 

Of course, the impact on U.S. citizens and U.S. Government personnel is dwarfed 

by the tremendous and tragic violence experienced by Mexican civilians, law enforcement, journalists, and politicians who have suffered at the hands of the cartels. 

Although the vast majority of the victims of the violence are believed to be affiliated 

with the cartels, there are far too many innocent bystanders who are often tragically 

caught in the cross-fire. We have not seen a significant spike in crime on the U.S. 

side of the Southwest border, but the fact remains that the instability and violence 

in certain cities along the border such as Ciudad Juarez raise concerns about the 

safety and security of communities along both sides of the border as the cartels become more desperate to secure distribution routes into the United States. 

II. The Department of Justice’s Two-Pronged Strategy for Addressing Drugs and Violence on the Southwest Border 

The dismantling and disabling of the Mexican DTOs is a priority for this administration. To target these DTOs, members of the Executive Branch are coordinating 

their efforts as never before. The prosecutors of the Criminal Division and the U.S. 

Attorneys’ Offices work with all of the law enforcement agencies of the United 

States, including the Department of Justice’s Drug Enforcement Administration, 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Marshals Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, and the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection. 

Our strategy is two-pronged: First, to intensify our investigative and prosecutorial 

efforts through coordinated, intelligence-driven operations; and second, to strengthen the Mexican government’s own capacity to dismantle the DTOs. Both aspects of 

this strategy are essential. Transnational organized crime knows no borders—and 

without strong, stable, and trustworthy foreign law enforcement partners, we cannot 

hope to defeat organized criminal groups. 

A. Prong One: Increasing and Intensifying Our Law Enforcement Efforts in 

the United States 

The first prong of the Department of Justice’s strategy for addressing drugs and 

violence on the Southwest border is through our own investigative and prosecutorial 

efforts as detailed in our Strategy for Combating the Mexican Cartels, promulgated 

by the Attorney General on January 5, 2010. The Strategy uses intelligence to coordinate long-term, extensive investigations to identify all the tentacles of a particular organization. Through the Special Operations Division (SOD), we are able to 

execute multi-jurisdictional enforcement actions, arresting as many high-level members of the organization as possible, disrupting and dismantling the domestic transportation and distribution cells of the organization, and seizing as many of the organization’s assets as possible, whether those assets be in the form of bank accounts, 

real property, cash, drugs, or weapons. Finally, we prosecute the leaders of the cartels and their principal facilitators, locating, arresting, and extraditing them from 

abroad as necessary. In this effort, we coordinate closely with our Mexican counterparts to achieve the goal: Destruction or weakening of the drug cartels to the point 

that they no longer pose a viable threat to U.S. interests and can be dealt with by 

Mexican law enforcement in conjunction with a strengthened judicial system and an 

improved legal framework for fighting organized crime. 

This ‘‘whole-of-government’’ approach has led to a number of remarkable successes. Some recent examples of such SOD-coordinated investigations involving mul-
17 

tiple Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) and other task 

forces include: 

• Operation Bombardier.—Announced in 2011, this disruption operation was a 

multi-agency coordinated response to the murder of one U.S. agent and wounding of another by members of Los Zetas Cartel. Operation Bombardier was a 

rapid response strike targeting all Mexico DTOs including cartel members, associates, infrastructure, and activity operating in the United States regardless of 

specific cartel affiliation and resulted in 676 arrests; 

• Project Deliverance.—Announced in 2010, this 22-month multi-agency investigation targeted all Mexican DTO transportation and distribution infrastructure 

along the Southwest border and elsewhere in the United States, resulting in 

more than 2,200 arrests; 

• Project Coronado.—Announced in 2009, this 44-month multi-agency operation 

targeted the La Familia Michoacana Cartel’s distribution networks within the 

United States. It was the largest ever undertaken against a Mexican drug cartel 

and resulted in 1,186 arrests; 

• Operation Xcellerator.—Announced in 2009, this 21-month multi-agency operation targeted the Sinaloa cartel and resulted in the arrest of more than 750 

individuals; and 

• Project Reckoning.—Announced in 2008, this 18-month multi-agency operation 

targeted the then-combined Gulf and Los Zetas Cartels and resulted in 621 arrests. 

Combined, these five Department of Justice-led SOD and OCDETF investigations 

over the past 3 years resulted in more than 5,500 arrests and the seizure of more 

than $300,000,000 in U.S. Currency; 260,000 pounds of marijuana; 36,000 kilograms 

of cocaine; 1,450 pounds of heroin; 6,500 pounds of methamphetamine; and 1,500 

weapons. 

The Department is also committed to combating violent and organized crime 

through aggressive use of our asset forfeiture and anti-money laundering laws. The 

key to the vitality of drug trafficking and other criminal organizations is their continued access to enormous sums of money. Disrupting that flow of money is a top 

priority for the Department. Wherever possible and particularly in our multi-jurisdictional investigations, U.S. Attorney’s Offices and the Criminal Division are adding forfeiture counts to indictments, not as an afterthought, but as part of a deliberate and targeted strategy. 

As a measure of how seriously the Department takes this responsibility, the Asset 

Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section (AFMLS) of the Criminal Division has 

created a new Money Laundering and Bank Integrity Unit and a Mexican Drug 

Cartel Team devoted to investigating and prosecuting complex criminal cases involving financial institutions and the individual criminal facilitators who hide and obfuscate the financial flows that enable the cartels to operate. The Team will aggressively use all of the tools at their disposal to develop domestic and international forfeiture cases targeting the criminal proceeds and operating assets of the Mexican 

drug cartels, and all those who support their operations. To achieve this objective, 

the team is partnering with countries throughout the Central American region. 

Similarly, the Department is aggressively seeking the extradition of high-level 

traffickers to the United States. The Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs, working with the full collaboration of the Mexican government, and our embassies and foreign counterparts, has sought and secured the extradition of major 

Mexican traffickers to face criminal prosecution in the United States. In the past 

2 years, we have secured the extradition from Mexico of over 200 drug traffickers 

and violent criminals, more than in any other 2-year period. Just last month, Mexico extradited Benjamin Arellano Felix, the former head of the Tijuana Cartel, to 

face racketeering and drug conspiracy charges resulting from a long-running 

OCDETF investigation in San Diego. And our work in Mexico has led to the apprehension and extradition of other high-value targets, such as Mario Villanueva Madrid, the former governor of the Mexican state of Quintana Roo charged with money 

laundering conspiracy, bribery, and narcotics conspiracy offenses for his support of 

the Juarez cartel; Vicente Zambada Niebla, son of Ismael Zambada Garcia, one of 

two Sinaloa cartel leaders; Oscar Arriola Marquez, designated as a Foreign Narcotics Kingpin under the Kingpin Designation Act, and CPOT (Consolidated Priority 

Organization Target) Oscar Nava Valencia, charged with drug conspiracy offenses 

in the Southern District of Texas. We hope to build and expand upon these successes in the coming year as we work more closely than ever with the Mexican Attorney General’s Office and the Foreign Ministry in this critical area of cooperation. 

However, while extraditions are an important tool in our joint efforts against the 

cartels and the violence, we are also determined to assist our counterparts with 
18 

long-term measures to reform and strengthen institutions that the public can trust 

and in which they can have confidence. 

B. Prong Two: Increasing the Capacity of the Government of Mexico to Investigate and Prosecute Cases in Mexico 

We and our Mexican counterparts recognize that we cannot rely on criminal investigations and prosecutions in the United States alone if we are to defeat the 

DTOs. Instead, we must ensure that Mexico has the capacity to investigate and 

prosecute these and other criminals in legal systems that are transparent and efficient, and that are seen to be so by their populations. Mexico has committed itself 

to significant legal reforms to accomplish this goal, and we are strongly supporting 

the Mexican efforts. 

The Department of Justice’s primary rule of law work is undertaken pursuant to 

the Me ́rida Initiative, a multi-year program that aims to improve law enforcement 

capabilities to identify, disrupt, and dismantle transnational DTOs and organized 

criminal enterprises. With funding from the State Department and U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID), we currently have three senior Federal prosecutors stationed in Mexico City under the auspices of the Criminal Division’s Office 

of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training to work on rule of 

law issues with their Mexican counterparts. Our rule of law work in Mexico runs 

the gamut from high-level advice on criminal code reform—as Mexico moves forward 

on its own decision to create a more adversarial system—to practical training on investigations and prosecutions. To assist the Mexican transition to the accusatory 

system, expert-to-expert exchanges, seminars, and workshops and training programs 

are underway. To date, working with U.S. Federal law enforcement agencies and 

the Department of State, the Justice Department has trained over 10,657 individuals at all levels and in the Executive and Judicial branches. 

We are also partnering with law enforcement agencies and prosecutors in Colombia, and have sent Mexican members of congress, prosecutors, and law enforcement 

officers to train in tandem with their U.S.-trained Colombian counterparts on code 

reform, strengthening internal affairs and corruption investigations, and creating effective witness protection programs. 

But our training and mentoring extends beyond the classroom to partnering on 

investigations and prosecutions. First, the DEA has provided counsel to several vetted units of highly trained investigators from the SSP, the Mexican Federal Police. 

These vetted units have achieved tremendous success, including the apprehension 

of significant leaders of the drug cartels such as Antonio Arcos-Martinez. This past 

year, the Criminal Division, working jointly with DEA, began training prosecutors 

of the PGR, the Mexican Attorney General’s Office, to join the SSP investigators to 

work as part of a task force. As part of this project, Assistant U.S. Attorneys and 

Criminal Division prosecutors are mentoring and partnering with their Mexican 

counterparts as they begin to use the task force model. For the first time, we are 

seeing PGR prosecutors and SSP investigators truly sharing their expertise and intelligence. 

Additionally, as of December 2010, prosecutors and investigators from the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Treasury are collaborating with our counterparts in the Mexican government to work on several money laundering cases together. 

Finally, our Southwest border U.S. Attorneys are forging relationships with their 

counterparts in the PGR so that they can more effectively share leads on cases and 

fight crime on both sides of the border. These essential relationships have resulted 

in the coordination of prosecutorial efforts and strategies to fight crimes along and 

on both sides of the border and better protect our own citizens. 

III. A Meaningful and Robust Partnership With Congress is Crucial to Our Success 

While we have made great strides against the Mexican drug cartels in recent 

years, we cannot achieve success without the support and input from Members of 

our Congress. There are several ways Congress has already, and can in the future, 

play a meaningful role in this fight. 

A. Investing in the Southwest Border 

First and foremost, we are grateful to Congress for its investment in our efforts 

along the Southwest border. The supplemental funding from last summer’s Southwest Border Initiative, of which the Department received $196 million, has been 

crucial to our strategy along the border and in Mexico. Much of that money went 

to our law enforcement agencies to expand their successful investigative efforts, but 

we also invested a significant amount in shoring up our ability to prosecute the cartel members whose drug trade is the root cause of violence in that region. We hired 

more prosecutors, bolstered Mexican fugitive apprehension, enhanced capacity at 
19 

the multi-agency SOD and OCDETF Fusion Center, and provided additional funding for OCDETF Strike Forces along the Southwest border. As a result, our five 

Southwest border districts have increased the overall number of felony prosecutions, 

particularly prosecutions of narcotics, firearms, and public corruption offenses. 

Within the Department’s Criminal Division, we have explicitly dedicated a number of our resources to Mexico and the Southwest border. The supplemental funding 

allowed the Criminal Division to deploy another attache ́ to Mexico City to work with 

AUSAs around the country to build cases against the cartels. In addition to 

AFMLS’s new Mexican Drug Cartel Team discussed above, we created a new Mexico 

cartel unit in the Criminal Division’s Narcotics and Dangerous Drug Section that 

is dedicated to the prosecution of these Mexican drug cartels. We also have added 

prosecutors in the Division’s Organized Crime and Gang Sections to investigate and 

prosecute the gangs that do the bidding of the drug cartels, using statutes such as 

RICO. The recently announced indictment against 35 members of the Barrio Azteca 

international gang for violations of RICO, including the murders of a U.S. Consulate 

employee and two family members, is a direct result of Congress’ investment. The 

Department is working through the administration to identify areas where additional tools and resources will strengthen our anti-money-laundering and forfeiture 

efforts. We would welcome the opportunity to work with Congress should we identify any such areas. 

B. A Sustained Commitment is Crucial 

Finally, we appreciate Congress’ recognition that our efforts in Mexico must be 

consistent and sustained. It was over a period of 10 years that Plan Colombia 

achieved the success we now see today. Plan Colombia was preceded by years of 

work by the U.S. Government. Our experience teaches us that we will not see quick 

fixes to a problem as complex as the Mexican drug cartels. But we are in this struggle for the long haul. And through a long-term, cooperative partnership with our 

neighbors in Mexico, we will weaken the influence of organized crime on Mexican 

society, thereby better protecting our citizens. 

CONCLUSION

In sum, working with Mexico to fight the drug cartels and the violence associated 

with them both in our country and in Mexico is a top priority of the Department 

of Justice. I thank you for the opportunity to discuss our efforts, which make the 

citizens of both our countries safer, and we look forward to partnering with you to 

ensure that we are doing all we can to curtail the reach of these organized crime 

rings. 

I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Ms. Pope. 

The Chairman now recognizes himself for questions. 

My first question is, I realize—first of all, let me commend both 

of you for a job well done in what you do every day. I realize there 

have been more resources put down on the border than probably 

ever before. Yet, the violence and the danger, in my view, it has 

never been more violent or dangerous. 

So, when the Secretary of Homeland Security says that the border has never been more secure, and the President just the other 

day in El Paso said that we strengthened border security beyond 

what many believe possible, do you agree with that assessment? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. I guess I will take a stab at that. 

Yes, I do agree with that assessment, Congressman. I believe the 

Secretary and the President are speaking to the violence that we 

see on this side of the border. 

While some of it can be attributed to drug dealing in our communities and drug trafficking, we are not seeing the level and the 

overall viciousness of violence that you see in Mexico—the beheadings, the, you know, constant shooting of police officers and military personnel. We are not seeing that on this side of the border. 
20 

Mr. MCCAUL. In terms of spillover crime, though, you know, I 

demonstrated in the opening statement, you know they are here. 

The drug cartels are present in the United States. 

At what point do we have cartel-on-cartel violence in the United 

States like we are seeing in Mexico? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. That, I do not have exact stats or information on, 

you know, the violence that we are seeing between actual, identified cartel members versus other cartel members. 

There is—you know, with drug trafficking and drug dealing— 

there is violence as far as New York City, you know, dating back 

to the 1980s, dating back to when I was a DEA agent working undercover, working drug cases. So, drug trafficking has an inherent 

violent streak to it, because people are in competition against each 

other. 

But again, the level of violence that we see in Mexico is not being 

seen—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. Let me follow up with Ms. Pope on that point, because, you know, the FBI Uniform Crime Report has been used to 

say that that violence is not here in the United States. Yet, that 

definition and the definitions used by the Southwest Border Task 

Force in September, in testimony from DEA, both these definitions 

they use exclude crimes such as home invasions, kidnappings, extortions, and trafficker-on-trafficker violence. 

So, if you are excluding all these crimes, how can this be an accurate assessment of the violence present in the United States? 

Ms. POPE. It is true, Mr. Chairman, that the FBI UCR does exclude those particular crimes. But that does not mean that we are 

not very concerned about any amount of crime. One kidnapping is 

too many. One murder is too many. 

To the extent that there is drug trafficker-on-trafficker violence, 

we are investigating it and prosecuting it. 

I will tell you—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. But does it not count if a cartel member kills another cartel member in the United States? That does not count as 

a violent crime? 

Ms. POPE. It does count as violent crime. 

Mr. MCCAUL. But it is excluded under the definition. 

Ms. POPE. I can tell you there is no Executive branch definition 

of spillover violence. 

Mr. MCCAUL. But the UCR—the FBI Uniform Crime Report—excludes that. That is my point. 

I am just trying to get to the truth here. That is the purpose of 

this hearing. 

People are going to spin this thing politically both ways. But it 

seems to me, if you are going to record crime statistics, you ought 

to be recording the things that they do best. 

They kill each other. They kidnap, they extort. Yet, all that is removed from the definition of spillover violence. 

So, I do not think we are getting an accurate—just my opinion— 

I do not think we are getting an accurate assessment here. 

Ms. POPE. What I can tell you is that there are problems with 

the reporting of trafficker-on-trafficker violence, for the sole reason 

that if a person is already involved in drug trafficking violence, 
21 

they are far less likely to go to the police. Or if it is an undocumented person, they are far less likely to report the crime. 

So, there may be kidnappings. There may be violent crime as a 

result of drug traffickers targeting someone who has upset them in 

some way. That information is not getting reported. 

But to the extent that—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. Why shouldn’t it? I mean, Ms. Hartley’s husband 

was killed and murdered, and she is here today. That is not counted. That does not count under the FBI’s definition. 

Ms. POPE. The FBI has multiple definitions of crime. For example, I know that the FBI tracks the amount of crime along the 

Southwest border through the HIDTA task forces. Those numbers 

are consistent that the crime is—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. You know, all I am saying is, Congress, we have 

an oversight role. That is probably what we do best. I just want 

an accurate assessment of what is the level of crime. 

When you have a definition that excludes all these things that 

the cartel members do, I do not think that the American people are 

getting a clear picture of what the rate of violence really is. 

I would be very interested to get that kind of data, if that is possible. I am sure DOJ has that kind of data. I would be very much 

willing to work with you on that. 

On that, just a last point, and my time has expired, but you 

talked a lot about asset forfeiture. 

Ms. POPE. Yes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I think that is great news. 

I think Mr. Cuellar and I have talked about enhancing the best 

team operations to confiscate the southbound flow to interdict that 

cash and guns going south. It is going to be one of the best ways 

to choke their lifeblood and to disarm them. I hope we can ramp 

up those efforts, as well. 

Finally, I do not know how much of this asset forfeiture money 

is actually going back into border security operations, but I would 

certainly like to see a large percentage—and the Ranking Member 

of the full committee, I think we could work together to make sure 

that as much of that money as possible goes back into, to pay for 

these border security operations. 

Ms. POPE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that is an important point that you are making. 

What I can tell you is, what we have learned about the illicit finances of the cartels is that it is not just that it is going across 

the border. They are concentrating large amounts of money 

through cities throughout the United States in places like Atlanta 

and Chicago. 

So, our goal is to find where that money is being collected and 

to target the people who handle the money long before it gets to 

the border and it is disbursed into smaller amounts and secreted 

into compartments. 

Once it gets to that point, our job is much harder—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. Of course, if they are categorized as a foreign terrorist organization, you can seize their bank assets in the United 

States, as we did with the FARC in the 1990s, with that designation. 

Ms. POPE. We are also able to do that through the Kingpin Act. 
22 

Mr. MCCAUL. That goes to the kingpin, the head, but not the 

body of the drug cartel. 

My time has expired, though, and I appreciate everybody’s patience. 

With that, I yield to the Ranking Member, Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

By all accounts Mexico is our largest supplier of drugs. While the 

United States is the largest supplier of weapons in Mexico. 

Mr. Williams, in particular, it has been reported that the guns 

that are seized and that guns that were used, that 90 percent of 

them come from the United States. What steps are being taken on 

the outward supply of U.S. guns used to facilitate drug-related violence in Mexico? 

I mean, given your experience in New York City, Boston, I noticed, I am curious as to what steps and how successful we are in 

trying to deal away with the really greatest supplier of drugs—I 

mean, of guns, rather—for Mexico? What are we doing in particular? No one from ATF is here, but I am just curious from your 

experience. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, that is a very good question. I know that 

Customs and Border Protection, they have changed their focus. 

They still, obviously, focus on people coming into the country. But 

in light of money and weapons going out of the country and south 

into Mexico, there is greater emphasis placed on outbound or 

southbound flow. 

So, as I believe you mentioned in your opening statement, we are 

doing 100 percent rail inspections, utilizing special equipment to do 

that. Customs and Border Protection officers at the ports of entry 

now have outbound entry exit areas where they are doing more 

work. 

They do what we call ‘‘pulse and surge.’’ So, they will take an 

area and they will, in essence, check the pulse of that area for a 

couple of hours, maybe a couple of days, to see what their efforts 

are as far as outbound flow. 

If they get a lot of contraband going out, then they will do a 

surge to that area. If they do not see that kind of activity, then 

they will move to another area and do a pulse there to see what 

the outbound flow is like. 

I know that both Immigration and Customs Enforcement and 

ATF are working cooperatively together to take a look at the weapons flow from the United States into Mexico. But also, in concert 

with the Mexican government, they are also going to work closely 

with them to look at weapons flow into Mexico from their other 

border areas, from Central America, you know, north. 

Mr. KEATING. I am curious, too. How successful are we, Ms. 

Pope, in terms of domestic prosecution for gun trafficking in the 

area? What is your experience for that? 

Ms. POPE. What I can tell you is that this Department of Justice 

has been more aggressive than ever before at targeting the flow of 

guns into Mexico. We are using every resource at our disposal. We 

are using wiretaps, we are using surveillance, we are using confidential informants to build a case. 
23 

Our goal is not just to get the straw purchasers, the people who 

buy the guns legally. But our goal is to get to the heads of the organizations. 

So, we are building cases against the organization itself. That is 

our goal. That is what we are doing every day. 

I can also tell you that, in line with our strategy, we have our 

investigative efforts here in the United States. We also have what 

we are doing in Mexico. We are partnering with our Mexican counterparts as never before. 

Recently, Mexico has gotten access to something called Spanish 

e-Trace, which allows them to trace firearms that are originating 

in the United States, and share that information with law enforcement in the United States. 

Mexico just announced within the past 2 weeks that they are 

going to expand access of Spanish e-Trace to other law enforcement 

in Mexico, which is key to our ability to target where those guns 

are coming from. 

Mr. KEATING. I just had one question, too. You mentioned that 

we are able to track gun purchasing—often legal gun purchasing— 

in the United States. That has been helpful to do, because we had 

a vote in the House earlier in this session that did away with the 

reporting of multiple gun purchasing. 

Now, that kind of change, should it be implemented, wouldn’t 

that hurt our ability to go and track the guns, see where the legal 

purchases come from? 

I was concerned, particularly on border issues, that if there is 

that change in the law, so we are not doing—contacting Justice, 

telling them about these multiple purchasing effort—and if that is 

done away with, wouldn’t that hurt? 

Ms. POPE. From a law enforcement point of view, it is important 

for us to know where the guns are coming from. I can tell you, in 

past investigations, that we have seen certain dealers with very, 

very high numbers of guns that end up later in Mexico. That is a 

tip to law enforcement to look at what is happening in—— 

Mr. KEATING. So, you would be hurt if that change occurred 

where multiple gun purchases were not reported to Justice. 

Ms. POPE. We prefer to have more access to information wherever possible. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. 

Long. 

Mr. LONG. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Williams, in January of this year, Secretary Napolitano stated that any incursion of drug war violence in the United States 

would face overwhelming response. Is DHS and its components prepared to assist in providing such a response? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes, we are. We have a few operational plans 

with Customs and Border Protection in the event something like 

that was to happen. 

But quite frankly, I would rather, you know, talk off-line with 

you about the actual plans, or get personnel from CBP. But we do 

have plans that we have set up. 
24 

Mr. LONG. Okay. That probably takes out my second part of that 

question, then. I will talk to you after this. 

Ms. Pope, how have you been able to overcome any pre-existing 

turf battles to coordinate our efforts? 

Ms. POPE. I can tell you that the agencies of the Federal Government are working together as never before. We are working together through interagency groups here in Washington. 

We are working together through EPIC at the border. We are coordinating our law enforcement efforts. We are aware of what DHS 

is doing in terms of strategy. We are, on our side of the issue, trying to engage in complementary efforts. 

For example, DHS plays an important role at intercepting drugs, 

guns, money. But you have to have prosecutors on the other side 

to bring those cases and to prosecute the defendants. We are working together to make sure that we are all walking in lockstep to 

focus on drug cartel violence. 

Mr. LONG. Okay. What was that tracing program? What did you 

call that? 

Ms. POPE. It is called e-Trace. It is called Spanish—— 

Mr. LONG. Called what? 

Ms. POPE [continuing]. E-Trace. 

Mr. LONG. I thought you said Spanish something. 

Ms. POPE. Spanish e-Trace. So, we have made e-Trace available 

in Spanish to the Mexican government, so that they, too, as they 

find firearms, can trace them back to their source. 

Mr. LONG. But that is strictly from the United States. 

Ms. POPE. Right. 

Mr. LONG. Okay. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full 

committee, Mr. Thompson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. I would like to associate 

myself to the line of questioning the Ranking Member of the subcommittee raised with respect to guns. 

I am an avid outdoorsman. I hunt all the time. Fact about it, I 

helped defeat the Republican Members of the House yesterday in 

the Sportsman Caucus. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. THOMPSON. But I think the point I am trying to make is, all 

the guns I own are legal. I buy them through the normal channels 

prescribed by law. 

Now, as I understand it, owning a gun in Mexico is illegal. Am 

I correct? 

This is to Ms. Pope. I am sorry. 

Ms. POPE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So, if 90 percent of those guns that we have 

identified with some aspect of violence in Mexico, we have traced 

back to their point of origin in the United States, I think it would 

be a reasonable assumption that we need to close that loophole. 

Has Justice looked at how we close that loophole? 

Ms. POPE. What the Department of Justice has done is focus on 

the illegal transfer of guns. That is where we have made real efforts. 
25 

So, for example, increasing the sentences for straw purchasers, 

who may legally buy a gun, but then illegally transfer it with the 

intention for it to go down into Mexico—that is where our efforts 

are focused. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So, how successful are you with that? 

Ms. POPE. Frankly, we need to have tough penalties to focus on 

people who are illegally reselling guns, because our goal is not ultimately just get the person sells illegally. We want to get to the 

head of the trafficking organization. That is where—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. So, what other legislation or penalties do you 

need? 

Ms. POPE. I would be happy to get back to you and as we work 

through it within the Department of Justice to figure out ways that 

we can partner to stop the illegal transfer of guns into Mexico. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So, do we need to talk to somebody else? Are you 

the person? I am just—are you the person? 

Ms. POPE. The Department of Justice does not have any particular, clear legislative proposals on how to stop the trafficking— 

legislative proposals on arms trafficking. But we would certainly be 

interested in talking to you about how to do that. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Williams, according to your testimony, $600 million that the 

Department received in supplemental monies allowed the Department to add technology, manpower, and infrastructure. If under 

H.R. 1, if that money is not available to the Department, what impact would it have on border security efforts? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. I believe it would have a great impact. I believe 

that the plans that we have in place to utilize more technology, to 

utilize the 1,200 National Guardsmen that we have on post today, 

would be affected by that. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So, your testimony is, rather than having less resources to fight crime and violence along the border, we should 

have more resources. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. It would be my testimony that the resources given 

to us should be utilized to fight that crime and violence, that, you 

know, a reduction would affect us. Of course, you know, in law enforcement we always have a history of doing more with less, and 

we would continue the fight no matter what. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Ms. Pope, explain to the committee how DOJ 

fights the drug trafficking organizations with respect to their financial operations. What do you do? 

Ms. POPE. There are a number of ways. First, wherever possible, 

we are bringing forfeiture counts so that we could forfeit the assets 

of the drug cartel operations. 

At one point, forfeiture was seen more as an afterthought to a 

drug conspiracy charge. Now we are leading with forfeiture charges 

wherever possible. 

Second, the Criminal Division, with the money that Congress invested in the Southwest border, has now set up a Mexico cartel 

team in our Asset Forfeiture Section. The sole purpose of that team 

is to target the finances of the cartels through our investigative efforts here, through bringing cases here against individuals and 

against banks, and through working with our partners in Mexico, 

so that they can get the information, share the information, bring 
26 

the cases in Mexico and with our other partners in Central America. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. Can you provide the committee with 

the statistics on the asset forfeiture program so far? 

Ms. POPE. Yes, absolutely. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

Let me just clarify. If, say, a gun dealer provides a weapon to a— 

provides material support to a terrorist, that would have an enhancement on top of the underlying offense, correct, a 15-year enhancement? 

Ms. POPE. The material support provision, yes, if a gun dealer 

were convicted of providing material support. 

Mr. MCCAUL. So, if they were designated as foreign terrorist organizations, that would have a 15-year enhancement on top of the 

underlying weapons trafficking offense. 

Ms. POPE. The problem in these cases, as I am sure you are 

aware, is that we need to prove that the gun dealer was providing 

support. That is the problem with our law now. 

But, yes, if we can make that connection, if we can prove that 

the gun dealer knew that he was providing material support, the 

answer is yes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. We could seize their bank assets, and we could deport them, even if they are here illegally. 

With that, I recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. 

Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to commend the Chairman—the gentleman from Mississippi—for shooting well yesterday. I enjoyed shooting with you. 

Like you, I am an avid shooter. I own a number of firearms. I 

saw you bust a lot of clays yesterday, but I would almost be willing 

to guarantee that none of his guns and none of my guns have ever, 

ever killed another person. 

So, I think that we need to be cognizant that it is not the firearm 

that kills. It is the person behind the firearm. 

Gun purchases in the United States that make their way into 

Mexico point clearly that we do have a porous southern border, 

that humans and weapons travel both ways, back and forth. I 

think we have got to get back to focus on our border. 

I notice in the Chairman’s opening remarks he talked about the 

gun cache that was found in Mexico, and the number of weapons 

that were there. I remember hearing anti-tank weapons and antiaircraft weapons and grenades, and a number of other things, as 

well as fully automatic AK–47s, that you cannot buy legally in the 

United States. 

Those weapons are coming from somewhere. It is doubtful they 

are coming from Texas. It is doubtful they are coming from Arizona. It is doubtful they are coming from South Carolina, because 

they are illegal to purchase in this country. 

They are coming from somewhere. I think we need to know that. 

On March 31, this committee held a hearing on the U.S. Homeland Security role in the Mexican war against drug cartels, and I 
27 

listed a plethora of examples that cited evidence of the terrorist organization Hezbollah’s influence on the Southern border. 

I asked the panelists then if a possible relationship between 

Hezbollah and the Mexican drug cartels merited any further investigation. I received no response, no acknowledgment of the problem, no plan to investigate the situation further and no strategy to 

protect the safety and security of our country. 

Since that time, the ‘‘San Diego News’’ reported on May 4 that 

Hezbollah is blending into Shia Muslim communities in Mexico, including Tijuana, and cited testimony from a former U.S. intelligence agent that Hezbollah is partnering with drug organizations. 

The article stated that Hezbollah has been setting up shop in 

Mexico for 15 to 20 years. On May 9, Reuters reported the U.S. 

Border Patrol agents found a sophisticated tunnel fitted with 

lights, water pumps, ventilation systems running 250 feet from an 

abandoned building in Nogales, Mexico, to Nogales, Arizona, at a 

depth of 15 feet. 

One of my staffers went and looked at one in the San Diego area 

that was 25 feet deep, very sophisticated. 

We know that Hezbollah is a master of tunneling, and the Washington Times reported on March 31 that the Israeli military has released a map of nearly 1,000 underground bunkers, weapons storage facilities, and monitoring sites built by Hezbollah. 

So, it is very clear that we do have a terrorist organization, a 

known terrorist organization, Mr. Chairman, not one that we would 

like to identify as a terrorist organization with the drug cartels operating in Mexico. 

It concerns me. It concerns the folks back home. 

So, Mr. Williams and Ms. Pope, are you aware of this problem? 

Ms. POPE. Mr. Duncan, I cannot say that I am aware of the influence of Hezbollah in particular. What I can say is that we are very 

cognizant of the need to protect our Southwest border, because of 

the kinds of threats that you are identifying. 

It is for that reason that we have so many agents who are working on the border. It is for that reason that the FBI has now stood 

up eight hybrid task forces on the Southwest border and why they 

are so focused on border corruption. 

We must secure our border, for all of the reasons that you have 

put forward. That is a top priority for this administration. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Williams. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes, Mr. Duncan. The links between drug trafficking and terrorism is something that I have been talking about 

for several years, you know, since I was with DEA, and now at 

Homeland Security. We keep our eyes and ears open for that. 

I know that through the investigator side of the house—i.e., ICE, 

DEA, the FBI—they look at that. There is a counternarcotics terrorism center, or section, at SOD, that has been stood up to take 

a look at when investigations identify these links between a drug 

trafficking organization and a terrorist organization. 

So, through investigations, they look to exploit that and develop 

evidence to bring that to prosecution. 

Mr. DUNCAN. With those links that you talked about, would you 

support the Chairman’s efforts to name the drug cartel, add them 

to the list of terrorist organizations in this country? 
28 

Mr. WILLIAMS. I think that there are enough laws in place to 

deal with drug trafficking. I mean, I can tell you right now, as I 

sit here today, there is an individual who I bought a kilo of cocaine 

from back in 1989. He is still in jail under a 40-year sentence for 

a continuing criminal enterprise. 

So, from my perspective as a former Federal agent, I believe that 

we have enough laws in place to deal with these organizations. 

They are different from your regular terrorist organizations such as 

the FARC. The FARC—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. I am out of time. I would like to get Ms. Pope on 

the record whether you support the Chairman’s definition of naming the cartel as a terrorist. 

Ms. POPE. Frankly, Mr. Duncan, I am not sure that we need it. 

Because, as Mr. Williams has said, we have very, very powerful 

penalties here in the United States. 

The problem is extradition. If cartel members can flee across the 

border into Mexico and escape U.S. prosecution, then having another crime won’t make a difference. 

We need to be able to extradite those people here to the United 

States, so that they can face justice, and they can face the tough 

penalties that we now have here. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I am sure if we extradite the killers of Agent Jaime 

Zapata here in the United States. 

But with that, I recognize the gentlelady from New York, Ms. 

Clarke. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to ask my questions of Mr. Williams. 

Mr. Williams, currently, the Department of Defense is funding 

the full cost of the National Guard deployment on the border. 

Is the Department expected to reimburse the Department of Defense for its portion of the expenses? Is the Department able to do 

so? If not, what actions must Congress take so that the Department can pay its share? 

Then, can you just discuss briefly, Operation Stonegarden—its 

costs, benefits and any results achieved as a result of this program? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, I would have to get back to you on the questions about reimbursement to the Department of Defense for use 

of National Guard personnel. I did not actually take part in setting 

that up. So, I would be glad to get back—— 

Ms. CLARKE. Fair enough. Fair enough. 

Mr. WILLIAMS [continuing]. To your office on that. 

As far as Operation Stonegarden, that is a grant program handled by FEMA for, on behalf of the Department of Homeland Security. It is for, obviously, you know, for equipment purchases by 

State and local law enforcement along the Southwest border. 

I believe, from everything I am hearing, that it is moving along 

appropriately. The funding is adequate. 

Ms. CLARKE. You find it beneficial. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Absolutely. 

Ms. CLARKE. Okay. 

The National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy of 

2011 report to Congress is due next month. What is the status of 

the report? Should the committee expect it to be submitted on 

time? 
29 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes. I believe the committee should expect it to 

be submitted on time. That is under the purview of the White 

House Office of National Drug Control Policy. I believe all the edits 

are in, and they are just going through the clearance process right 

now. 

Ms. CLARKE. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Pope, in 2009, President Obama named several different 

Mexican DTOs as suitable for prosecution under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. 

Has DOJ been successful with prosecuting Mexican DTOs under 

this framework? Does this act provide the necessary resources to 

successfully prosecute Mexican DTOs? 

Then, secondly, a significant pillar of the Me ́rida Initiative is to 

support judicial reform in Mexico. 

How does the Department of Justice work with its Mexican counterparts to improve Mexico’s judiciary and system of justice? 

Ms. POPE. Let me take your second question first. With respect 

to the judicial reform work that we are doing in Mexico, it is tremendous. We have AUSAs from all around the country, we have 

agents from all around the country, who are going down to Mexico, 

who are working, not just training, but building relationships with 

our Mexican counterparts. 

The goal is that we have relationships so that, when there is information, information is being shared, so that we can naturally 

end up working together. 

As I said, we have trained over 10,000 members of the Mexican 

government to-date. We are partnering with them. We have AUSAs 

who are mentoring members of the PGR. 

We just had a group of Mexican legislators go to meet their legislative counterparts in Colombia, to talk about what Colombia has 

done to overcome drug cartel violence. We are facilitating that relationship in particular, because we think that there are a lot of commonalities between those countries, and they can learn from one 

another. 

So, I would say that the work we are doing there is really unprecedented. The members of our Department who are down there 

are working tirelessly around the clock, so that Mexico can tackle 

this problem in Mexico. 

With respect to the Kingpin Act, I will tell you about that act. 

There have been fairly few prosecutions under the act itself. The 

major reason is that we have other tools that we have been able 

to use to bring the cases that get to the same penalties. 

There are no separate sentencing guidelines for the Kingpin Act. 

So, because of that, a court is most likely to apply the same sentences as someone who was convicted of money laundering. So, 

tough sentences under the Kingpin Act would make the difference. 

Ms. CLARKE. Then, just finally, you know, I come from an urban 

environment in Brooklyn, New York. As I hear this discussion 

about at what point we sort of designate the gun trafficking, the 

drug trafficking as a part of a terrorist organization, I can see how 

it becomes a bit challenging. Because once it hits major urban cities, and you have local domestic type of gang activities that end up 

taking lives and distributing drugs, where do you draw that distinction? 
30 

I’m wondering if you could just share a bit about that, because 

the same guns are manufactured in the United States that end up 

illegally in the hands of domestic gangs. Where do you draw the 

distinction? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, coming from Harlem, and having attended 

Brooklyn Technical High School in Brooklyn, I understand the 

urban environment. I think, if I hear what you are saying, it would 

be—you know, do we call gangs on the streets of BedfordStuyvesant terrorists, because they engage in rival gun battles? I 

think that is what you are talking about. 

So, again, my feeling is that the laws that are on the books, the 

Federal laws—and we have taken street gangs Federally, and they 

have gotten significant jail time. Again, I—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. I hate to interrupt, but we have a second panel of 

witnesses that we need to hear from, came all the way from the 

border States that deal with this kind of thing every day. I want 

to hear from them pretty soon. 

But we have a lot of Members that want to ask questions. I am 

going to keep everybody to the 5-minute rule, as much as I can. 

With that, I recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Canseco. 

Mr. CANSECO. Mr. Chairman, Mr. McCaul, and Ranking Member 

Keating, I appreciate very much the opportunity to come before 

this panel and ask questions of your panel. So, thank you very 

much. 

Ms. Pope and Mr. Williams, I am from a district in Texas that 

represents 780 miles of Texas-Mexico border. We have problems 

along that border. 

I am hearing it from my constituents, from ranches, from ranch 

owners, from schools, school districts, where, for a number of years 

now, there has been an infiltration by drug gangs into the school 

district, by home invasions, automobile thefts. The list goes on and 

on, and bullets flying over the river in El Paso, into El Paso, and 

threatening people there. 

There is a very serious concern about this spillover violence. 

When I hear Ms. Napolitano say that the border is better now 

than it ever has been, I really wonder where that is coming from, 

because many of my constituents are not. 

Now, let me start out by telling you that, first of all, I am in the 

process of finalizing a piece of legislation that will define cross-border spillover violence. It will instruct the Department of Homeland 

Security to measure and track the level of spillover violence and require the Department of Homeland Security to regularly report to 

Congress on the levels of spillover violence occurring along our border. 

Because I believe that accurately defining and measuring crossover violence will allow our local and Federal law enforcement officials to better execute their mission of keeping the United States 

and its citizens, especially along the border and into the interior of 

the United States, more secure. 

So, help me out a bit, please. 

Mr. Williams, what is your definition of—and your Department’s 

definition—of spillover violence? 
31 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, I know that we look at the deliberate plan 

of a cartel to attack U.S. assets or innocent civilians, or military 

and law enforcement personnel, public or private buildings. 

I know that there is violence in all of our communities throughout the United States. 

The question is: How do we find out or attribute that to specific 

drug cartels or to the drug cartels in Mexico? How do we link that 

violence? 

I would submit to you that there are gangs and, you know, thugs 

at work in our communities every day. There are thugs in Brooklyn, New York, just like there are thugs down on the Southwest 

border. 

Mr. CANSECO. Well, let me interrupt a bit here. Let me ask you 

specifically, would you consider it being spillover violence if we had 

drug cartels whose family, friends and immediate family, and even 

themselves, have residences here in the United States? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. If now you are saying they live here as—— 

Mr. CANSECO. If that were to be the case. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, I do not have any information regarding 

that. I do not know if I would consider it spillover violence. It depends upon what type of violence you are talking about. I 

mean—— 

Mr. CANSECO. What if they intimidated neighbors? What if they 

have violence among themselves? Would that be spillover violence? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, let me just say this. It has been my experience that, if you had such, you know, family members of cartel 

members living here in the United States, they would like to probably stay under the radar screen, because if there is one thing that 

I know that these cartels, when they come to America, they like to 

stay under the radar screen, because they are afraid of U.S. law 

enforcement. 

Mr. CANSECO. Would it be advisable for the Department to find 

out how many of those cartel people have families and themselves 

in this country? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. I can tell you categorically that my Department 

and the Department of Justice are trying to find that out through 

all the joint investigations that they do. 

Mr. CANSECO. Thank you. 

With the limitation of time, and I am a guest here, I go to Ms. 

Pope. Would you please answer that same question? 

Ms. POPE. The Department of Justice does not have one definition of spillover violence. But the bottom line is that any violence 

is something that we are taking seriously. Any violence is too 

much. One kidnapping is too much. One home invasion is too 

much. 

So, we are putting unprecedented resources on the border, because we believe that we must stem any violence, and particularly 

as it relates to the Mexican drug cartels. 

Mr. CANSECO. Would you think that it is prudent for your Department or Homeland Security or that the Government find out 

who is residing in the United States that is a member of that cartel, and who is related to that cartel in one way or the other? 

Ms. POPE. Absolutely. I can tell you that one of our priorities is 

to identify not just family members of cartels, but the facilitators. 
32 

Who is helping to launder the money? Who is helping to get the 

guns and the drugs? Those are all investigative priorities. 

Mr. CANSECO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

for your hospitality in having me. 

Mr. MCCAUL. It is good to have you here. It is almost 11:30. We 

have a second panel that has traveled very far to testify here 

today. I hope the Members will take that into consideration. 

With that, I recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Davis. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank both of you, Mr. Williams and Ms. Pope. 

It seems to me that the cartels are seriously coordinated on both 

sides of the border. Their operations appear to be pretty seamless. 

That is, they just kind of connect up, so there is a tremendous 

amount of communication, interaction, and cooperative work between them. 

How much interaction or coordination is there between law enforcement on both sides of the border? Meaning, how do we work 

with the authorities in Mexico, and they work with the authorities 

on our side? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, I will take a stab at that. 

I have been to Mexico City twice and spoken with representatives of the PGR and the SSP. They are extremely complimentary 

of the assistance and the help that they received from the United 

States Government—not just specifically DHS or DOJ, but every 

facet of the U.S. Government, you know, State Department and everything. 

We work very, very closely with our Mexican partners. As a matter of fact, I believe there are two border enforcement security 

teams that actually have Mexican law enforcement officials on 

them. There are Mexican law enforcement officials at the El Paso 

intelligence center working with us. 

So, we coordinate all these operations and work with our partners in Mexico. If there is information we can pass to them for 

them to take action on, we do it. If there is information they can 

pass to us to take action on, they do that with us. 

Mr. DAVIS. Ms. Pope. 

Ms. POPE. Mr. Davis, there is an incredible amount of cooperation going on between U.S. law enforcement and Mexican law enforcement. 

Much of this is due to the tremendous leadership of President 

Caldero ́n. He has recently appointed a—the new attorney general 

has recently been confirmed, her name is Marisela Morales—has 

been an incredible partner with the United States. 

Just one example to share with you, DEA has a series of vetted 

units where they vetted members of the Mexican federal police and 

members of the Mexican attorney general’s office. Those vetted 

units are working hand-in-hand. 

We have mentors from our U.S. attorneys’ offices working. They 

have, you know, telephone connections on a daily basis, weekly 

basis, communicating information, sharing strategies, helping and 

working with our partners there. 

Mr. DAVIS. You do not have to answer this question, but it would 

just appear to me that the trust levels are so important, and that 

unless the trust levels are such between both entities that it be-
33 

comes a bit difficult to have the same level of security and assurance as perhaps the cartels have in terms of their trust levels with 

each other. 

You do not have to answer or respond to that. But it just seems 

to me that that is part of the problem. 

I do not have any other questions, Mr. Chairman, so I yield back. 

Mr. MCCAUL. The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Cuellar from 

Texas. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to the Ranking Member. 

Mr. Chairman, I ask for unanimous consent from you to distribute graphs to the Members dealing with the crime rate in border and other areas. I think we are going to have that in the charts 

also. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I want to thank both Mr. Williams and Ms. Pope for 

the work that they do, and all the men and women that work with 

you. We really appreciate it. 

Also, my good friend, Steve McCraw, thank you for everything 

you do at DPS. As you know, my brother is a sheriff, a border sheriff, and he got trained with DPS. Thank you for all the great work 

that you have provided. Thank the Governor also. 

Sigi Gonzalez, one of my constituents, also is a sheriff. Thank 

you very, very much for being here. Chief Victor Rodriguez, another constituent of mine from McAllen. 

Thank you for allowing all my constituents to be here today. 

Of course, to the attorney general also, thank you very much for 

being here with us. 

Mr. Chairman, first of all, the only thing I would ask is, you 

know, I am with you, I have worked with you on many issues before. The only thing I ask, that we do not confuse what happens 

in Mexico and what is happening in the United States. 

In fact, I just got an e-mail from my Laredo folks, border business people, who are worried about this type of hearing. We have 

got to be measured on how we provide border security without creating hysteria about the work that, you know, there, because it 

does affect our border businesses down there. 

The only thing I do ask, for example, I met with the Zapata family, the mom, the dad, the brothers. Today they send me the best. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. They asked me to personally thank you 

for all the work. 

Agent Zapata was killed in Mexico. Tiffany Hartley, who is also 

present here, also—we have got to also keep in mind that her husband got killed, I believe it was 21⁄2 miles inside Mexican territory, 

and not in the United States. So, we have got to be careful that 

we do not use that to say this happened on the U.S. side. 

Let me give you a couple of rankings a little bit, and ask you to 

just take a look at it. Murders, this is 2010 crime ranking. I would 

ask you to look at El Paso. This is, again, murders per 100,000 population. 

El Paso has the lowest, 1.9 murders per 100,000. Brownsville has 

2.2; Yuma has 2.2 per 100,000; McAllen, three per 100,000; San 

Diego, 3.1; Laredo, 7.1. Chicago has 16.1 per 100,000; Philadelphia, 
34 

19.5; Memphis, 19.8; Washington, DC, has 23.8. Baltimore has 37.3 

per 100,000. Detroit has 40.2 murders per 100,000. 

So, again, the figures show that we are looking at the border 

areas, at least the murder rates are lower there, regardless of how 

we come up with a definition. 

I would ask you also to look at the next chart also, Mr. Chairman, Members. These are cities, 400 cities ranked per rates of 

crime. This includes murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, 

other ones. 

You see the lowest, Brownsville, at 97, ranked out of 497; 

McAllen, 110; El Paso, 126; San Diego, 180; Yuma, 197; your home 

town, 198, which means it is higher. Then you have Houston, 

which is also part of the area that is represented by some of the 

Members. 

Again, it shows that the lowest rankings are on the border area 

itself, also. 

I have got other rankings also, Mr. Chairman. I do not have time 

to go into this. 

The only thing I ask as we approach that, that we do this in a 

measured way. I am with you. I support what we are doing with 

Plan Me ́rida as part of what Homeland, the Department of Justice 

are doing. We have just got to do it in a measured way, because 

it does affect us. 

My family lives in Laredo. I represent Laredo. Just like Mr. 

Canseco, who is originally from Laredo and now represents San 

Antonio also, our families are there. 

Right now, I think the border folks—State, Federal, local—are 

doing a great job. I am just asking that we do this in a measured 

way without crying that, you know, the sky is falling. I would just 

ask that we just work on this. I really want to thank our State, 

Federal, and local folks. 

I would ask only the Federal folks, because I have about 27 seconds left, I would only ask that you work with DPS, work with the 

local sheriffs and the police, because they are a great source. I 

know you are doing that. But I would ask you to just continue 

working with them. 

Mr. Chairman, I have no questions. I just wanted to do a commentary today. Again, I look forward to continue working with you. 

Heading off to Mexico very soon to talk to the president. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Let me say, I appreciate your concerns on that 

issue. All I want is the truth, because if we are excluding extortions, kidnappings, and cartel-on-cartel violence, or trafficking-ontrafficking violence, I do not think we are getting, you know, an accurate picture here. The stats are not being honest. 

I am not doing this for any other reason than to try to get to the 

truth as to what is really happening. 

Who is to say, in Austin or in Houston, the numbers you showed? 

I do not know how much of that, what the cartel-on-cartel violence 

is. I would have to say, it is probably pretty big. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Mr. Chairman, if I could—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. Defining the definition. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes, and I am not—you noted, but I consider you 

my best friend here in Congress. 

Mr. MCCAUL. You are on record saying that. 
35 

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes, I am on record, a Democrat saying that to a 

Republican, my best friend here. 

The only thing is, I am just trying to put a little caution, that 

we put a little measured—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. Sure. 

Mr. CUELLAR [continuing]. On how we do it, because we can go 

to the extreme left and right. I am just saying—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. Yes. 

Mr. CUELLAR [continuing]. Let us do it measured. I am not questioning your motives, Mr. Chairman. You are my best buddy. But 

I just want to just put that out for the committee. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thanks for saying that twice. 

But in my—— 

Mr. CUELLAR. Make it three times. Best buddy. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MCCAUL. You know, my intent is to help Mexico. As I said 

in my opening statement, that is the intent I have behind this. 

But I do think we have to have an accurate picture of what is 

happening on both sides. So, with that, I yield to my good friend, 

Mr. Green, from Texas. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Please note, Mr. Chairman, that he said best friend in Congress. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the Ranking 

Member for the privilege to be a part of this august body. I am 

honored that you would allow me to be an interloper, and to also 

have the opportunity to pose some questions. 

It has been my experience that persons who work with the Department of Justice and Homeland Security, generally speaking, 

are persons who do not work based upon a political philosophy. You 

do not get too caught up into some of the things that we, on this 

side, get caught up in. 

Usually, your career people. As such, you tend to pass through 

various administrations. 

But, Mr. Williams, how long have you been in law enforcement? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. I did 7 years with the Yale University Police Department, and then I did 23 years with the Drug Enforcement Administration as a special agent. 

Mr. GREEN. Do you consider yourself a person who is trying to 

make a career of this? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. GREEN. Ms. Pope, how long, please? 

Ms. POPE. Oh, I have been with the Department of Justice in 

some capacity for 9 years. 

Mr. GREEN. Are you a person who seeks to make this a career? 

Ms. POPE. This has been my career. I have worked only in the 

public service. 

Mr. GREEN. Let me commend both of you, and all of the persons 

who support you, because too often, I think the appearance is given 

that you may have a political bias. It has been my experience that 

the people who work in these departments really do their best to 

try to enforce the law and make sure that the American people are 

protected. 
36 

I thank you for what you do. 

Let us talk very briefly about two things. One, the empirical evidence—the empirical evidence associated with how the guns actually leave the United States and get to Mexico. 

What does the empirical evidence reveal in terms of how it occurs? We use esoteric terms like gun shows, and we talk about how 

they are legally purchased, and somehow they get to Mexico. But 

we do not actually trace it and give the chain of events. 

Can you start with the lawful sale of a weapon, and then give 

us the empirical evidence that you have gathered that shows how 

it actually gets into the hands of some cartel member in Mexico? 

Ms. POPE. The evidence that we have seen today—and before I 

answer the question, I want to thank you for your acknowledgment, not just of our service, but of all of the men and women who 

are working within the Government, State, and local. I know there 

are many people who work tirelessly on an issue that really is bipartisan. I am grateful for your support. 

On the question of how guns get into Mexico, what we have seen 

so far is that a person who is legally qualified to purchase a gun 

will do so. That—— 

Mr. GREEN. But where would that purchase take place, usually? 

Ms. POPE. It frankly takes place at a number of different places. 

It can take place from a licensed firearms dealer. It can take place 

at gun shows. There are a number of ways that a person can legally purchase the guns. 

What happens next, though, is where the criminal conduct starts, 

is when a person who has legally purchased a gun then gives it or 

sells it to someone who is prohibited under Federal law from having that gun, whatever, and that person taking the gun across the 

border into—— 

Mr. GREEN. What is the crime at that point, when the person 

who has lawfully purchased sells to a person unlawfully to take it 

to Mexico? What is the offense at—what is the punishment? 

Ms. POPE. The crime is the crime of straw purchasing. The punishment is low. 

I will tell you, one of our priorities within the Department has 

been to advocate for tougher penalties for folks who sell guns with 

the intent that they travel across the border. 

Mr. GREEN. I do not mean to interrupt you, but can you—you 

said ‘‘low.’’ Do you have any—perhaps I caught you—— 

Ms. POPE. Often less than a year. 

Mr. GREEN. Of incarceration? 

Ms. POPE. Right. 

Mr. GREEN. Do most persons receive time in terms of incarceration? Or do they get probation? What specifically happens with 

these first offenders? 

Ms. POPE. I would want to get more information so that I could 

speak more accurately to you. But I can tell you that these folks 

are not facing tough penalties. That has been one of the struggles 

we have had in terms of building the cases. 

If someone is not facing a stiff penalty, that person is less likely 

to give up the information that we are seeking. That person is less 

likely to cooperate with law enforcement. So, that makes our job 
37 

even tougher. So, we have to use far more—we need to be very aggressive in our approach to this—— 

Mr. GREEN. One more question quickly. 

Do you have what I call fast-track authority when you have a 

person that has been identified as promoting this kind of activity? 

Do we still have the same rules that apply to a typical enforcement 

action in terms of speedy trial, in terms of discovery? Or is there 

a means by which these cases can be fast-tracked, and not violate 

the Constitution, of course? 

Ms. POPE. I am not aware of fast-tracking any straw purchasing 

cases. But I will go back, and I will confirm that. If I am wrong 

about that, I will let you know. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

We have yet another Member who wants to ask questions. Let 

me caution you, though, that we have flights to catch. They have 

flown a long ways at their own expense to testify before this committee. I want that to happen soon. 

With that, I yield to Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your 

courtesy. I was looking for my nameplate to be placed here for the 

appropriate protocol. 

Mr. Chairman, let me thank you very much for your kindness. 

We are in a hearing in Judiciary on the PATRIOT Act, which somewhat overlaps. I will be pointed in my questions. 

But I do want to acknowledge Steve McCraw from the State of 

Texas, and to thank him for the leadership that he has given and 

the many times that we have worked together on any number of 

disaster issues and, of course, the work that we have done together, even on finding missing senior citizens. 

So, I am grateful for your men and women who serve not only 

the State, but the Nation. Thank you very much. 

To the witnesses on the second panel, as well, Sheriff Gonzalez 

and Chief Rodriguez, welcome. 

Of course, let me indicate that Mr. Horne, the attorney general, 

is certainly welcome. 

But I have to make a statement of my absolute opposition to the 

line of legislation that has been passed in Arizona. I find it detrimental and undermining the Federal system of immigration and 

security. 

But I do want to just a pose question to Mr. Williams and Ms. 

Pope. It will be to both of you, so if you would. I am cognizant that, 

if your answers could be pointed. 

I was with the president yesterday, and also went to the border 

and Paso del Norte, saw the great work that is being done, the new 

technology and new construction, the biometric cards that are used 

by Mexican nationals getting them, allowing them a 10-year visitation. 

They looked like they were very much in charge. We are talking 

now about terrorism. I can tell you, I have no comfort or love of 

drug cartels and violence. 
38 

But give us what you are doing, both of you, under your responsibilities, and how well you can do it under the present laws, and 

what you are missing. Those are succinct, one, two. 

The last one is: Does a terrorist indication—or designation, excuse me—enhance your ability to fight drug and gun violence? 

You will have to be succinct, I know, because I do want to finish. 

That is my last question. Thank you. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, very quickly, at the Department of Homeland Security, we are putting all our uniformed assets, air, our 

CBP officers at the ports of entry, our Border Patrol agents between the ports of entry, out there with the assistance of the National Guard, as eyes and ears to vector Border Patrol agents and 

to look at suspicious activity between the ports of entry. 

With our investigative components, Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, we are working with our State and local counterparts, as well as the Mexican government—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But you could take more resources in that 

area. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. True. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. All right. Anything dealing with the designation, would that help you? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. The designation I do not think would help us. I 

think we have laws on the books that we need to apply and have 

worked with us, you know, for several years during my career. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

Ms. Pope, I am very well aware of the task forces that you have 

put in certain cities, one in Houston on the gun-running and otherwise. The same thing. Do you need more resources? Or how are you 

working to protect the American people? Would the designation 

help you? 

Ms. POPE. We are working to protect the American people, as I 

said, a number of different ways through these coordinated, acrossjurisdictional boundaries, investigations, and prosecutions. We are 

very grateful to Congress’ investment in the Southwest border 

strategy from last summer. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you need more resources? 

Ms. POPE. That is critical. I mean, frankly, we have hired up as 

never before. We want to make sure those people can continue to 

do their jobs, and so that we can all continue—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Can we close the gun show loopholes that 

seem to allow drugs to pass back and forth? That would be helpful 

to you as well. 

Ms. POPE. I think the administration does not have a position on 

that in particular. But we look forward to working with you on—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. What about the designation? 

Ms. POPE. Frankly, as Mr. Williams said, we have very tough 

laws here already in the United States. 

I am not sure it gets us more, unless we can get defendants extradited back to the United States, so that they are facing the very 

tough penalties that we now have in our U.S. courts. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, I want to work with my Chairman. I 

think he has good intentions, and there may be some compromising 

opportunities to go through this. 
39 

Mr. Chairman, I would just say publicly to the administration, 

to the committee, we need to have a position on gun show loopholes. 

This is a gun-running country, unfortunately. A lot of it passes 

through my own city of Houston, and that is fueling the fire of drug 

cartels and violence with guns. 

So, there are a lot of ways that we can work together to protect 

the American people. 

I thank both of you for your public service. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you for your courtesy. 

Mr. MCCAUL. All right. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee. 

This panel is dismissed. Thank you so much for being here and 

testifying. Given the time, let us move very rapidly to our next 

panel. Again, thanks for being here. 

Ms. POPE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Let me thank this panel for your patience. I had 

attempted to have one panel, and the Department of Justice objected to doing that, because they did not feel it was appropriate 

for them to appear with State and locals. 

I just want to state that on the record. 

With that, let me thank you all for being here. Let me introduce 

the panel. 

Mr. Tom Horne was elected Arizona attorney general in 2010. 

Prior to being attorney general, he was a litigation attorney in private practice for more than 30 years, during which time he served 

on the school board of Arizona’s third-largest school district for 24 

years, and 10 as its president. He also served in the Arizona legislature, was a member of the judiciary committee and chairman of 

academic accountability committee. 

Next, my good friend, Mr. Steve McCraw, who I worked with 

when I was at the Justice Department. He worked for the FBI. He 

is the director of the Texas Department of Public Safety. Previously, Mr. McCraw was the director of Texas Homeland Security 

in the Governor’s Office. Before that, Mr. McCraw had a 21-year 

career with the FBI. 

He worked as the director of the Foreign Terrorism Tracking 

Task Force after 9/11, assistant director of the Office of Intelligence, and Inspector Division here in Washington. 

Next we have Sheriff Sigifredo Gonzalez, or better known as 

what? We just call you Sigi? 

He has been the sheriff of Zapata County since 1994. Sheriff 

Gonzalez has twice been named as director of the Sheriffs’ Association of Texas, and has been a member of the Legislative Committee 

since 1996. Recently, he was appointed to the Governor’s Office of 

Homeland Security, Texas Intelligence Council. He has been in law 

enforcement for 34 years. 

Chief Victor Rodriguez has held the position of chief of police for 

the City of McAllen, Texas, since 2001. He has previously been the 

chief of police for the Cities of Brownsville and Harlingen, both in 

Texas. He has also served as the director of the Parole Division for 

the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. 
40 

I see we are a little bit out of order with my format, but I am 

going to go ahead and, going left to right, first recognize Director 

Steve McCraw for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN C. MCCRAW, DIRECTOR, TEXAS 

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 

Mr. MCCRAW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members. I apologize to the Department of Justice for not being worthy to sit at the 

same table, but I will get over it. 

I will say, though, I do want to commend our Federal partners. 

In fact, we work seamlessly with the great men and women of the 

Border Patrol, the Office of Field Operations, ICE, FBI, ATF. We 

love our Federal partners. They work with us every day. 

I will say that border unsecurity is not something recent. It is 

a 30-year under-investment by the Federal Government. There are 

consequences when you do not secure a border. 

In fact, some of the consequences, for example, is you have proliferation of organized crime cartels. I say organized crime, because 

they are no longer involved in drugs. They are involved in 

kidnappings, extortions, murders. They have butchered 36,000 

Mexican nationals and some American citizens on the other side of 

the border. 

So, I think that there is no question of the depravity, there is no 

question of the impact. They threaten domestic security of the Government of Mexico. 

As noted by this distinguished committee, is that they are our 

third-leading trading partner, our third-leading exporter of oil to 

our Nation. Culturally, we have always been very close to Mexico, 

and they are very important to us. So, their security is our security. 

Yet, when we have an unsecure border, we enable the cartels to 

expand, become powerful and with this—and use the billions of dollars to undermine the government of Mexico. 

Not only has an unsecured border impacted Mexico, but, clearly, 

you can talk about spillover violence and spillover this, spillover 

that, or pour-over crime or flow of a crime. 

The bottom line is that, without question, as a result of an unsecure border, there has been a proliferation of organized crime in 

Texas. Not just Texas, but I think you will find from talking to the 

attorney general of the other border States, as well. 

That does not just affect the border region of Texas or Texas 

itself, but it affects the entire Nation. There are consequences, because when I talk about organized crime activity, it does not show 

up on a UCR report. It does not show up as an index crime. 

It does not count kidnappings, extortions. It does not count the 

recruitment of our children in high school and schools to conduct 

operations to support cartel members—not just counter-surveillance, but to conduct, you know, murders, assassinations, hits on 

both sides of the border. It does not count that. 

Clearly, the numbers I submitted in my written testimony are 

accurate—18.9 percent referral rate for drug felonies, and we have 

9.4 percent of the population in our border region. 
41 

It does not count the corruption of our U.S. law enforcement officials. Today, that is the business model for the Mexican cartels. 

Corruption is king. 

They did not stop at the Rio Grande River. They are utilizing our 

ports of entry and between the ports of entry. 

We had two sheriffs go down. We have had 80 Border Patrol 

agents knocked off for corruption, as a result of Federal corruption 

investigations, and hundreds more under investigation, because 

they have got billions of dollars. 

So, there is an insidious aspect of it that is not reflected on index 

crimes that go back to 2009. 

You have got to be careful. I was just talking to the chief over 

here about index crimes. They are always, you know, 2 years late, 

a year-and-a-half late. You know, in talking with our latest update 

from El Paso, there is a 1,200 percent increase in murders in El 

Paso. 

Now, does that mean something dramatically happened? No, it 

just means that some things have happened, and that it shows up 

dramatically on that report. 

But make no mistake about it. We are not happy with the fact 

that our border is not secure, because we know it can be secure, 

if the Federal Government commits sufficient resources to do it. 

This is not rocket science. 

If you put sufficient men, equipment, and apply training, boats, 

aircraft, aviation—Congressman, you talked about technology—you 

can do it. This is doable. 

There is no question the Federal Government can do this. When 

it is not done, there are consequences. 

I have not talked to a counterterrorism expert—and, Mr. Chairman, you have dealt in this before—who is not mortified every time 

they look at the numbers of foreign nationals from countries with 

a known al-Qaeda presence, or Hezbollah or Hamas, that crossed 

the border, the Texas-Mexico border, that are detected and arrested. 

We talk about performance measures, and how do you view success? Hey, it is great to have indictments, convictions, arrests. Seizures goes up. Hey, you know, our seizures are up 124 percent, and 

marijuana 168 percent, and cash. 

All that proves is that the border is not secure. At the end of the 

day, the only performance measure that matters is that the border 

is secure, plain and simple. 

That is not difficult to define. It means that, you know, from the 

Texas standpoint, or a lowly State standpoint—and I will try to 

throw something together here. 

But, you know, it means, when an individual or individuals and 

contraband cross the border—either direction—and illegally, and 

are not, first, detected and, secondly, interdicted—plain and simple. 

It is not hard to do. 

Because as one of the Congressmen had mentioned earlier, is 

that they do not do it for ideological reasons. They do it for profit. 

Though I will say to your point, you know, Mr. Chairman, I was 

thinking about it when you were talking about the international 

terrorists and using a designation, is that it is interesting to observe that, you know, international terrorists engage in organized 
42 

crime to support their terrorist activities. Whereas the Mexican 

cartels are now engaging in terrorist activities to support their 

criminal enterprises and organized crime activities. 

The barbarism? Al-Qaeda has nothing on these Mexican cartels. 

We see, you know, four of our gangs that are operating directly 

with the cartels and supporting their hit squads. And oh, by the 

way, there are hit squad members of the cartels living in Texas. 

When we see that, we are obviously concerned. 

When they expand in the past year from 4 to 18, when they grow 

three-fold, it is a dramatic increase, and we are very concerned. 

The last thing I will say about, for example, last night. I did say 

Texas is a law-and-order State. Did I not make that clear? All 

right. We do not like people trespassing and vandalizing and breaking into homes on our farms, just because they happen to be on the 

border. We take offense to that. 

We take enough offense to it, like last night, 11:50 p.m., Central 

time, which is the time that matters, we had two Border Patrol 

agents fired upon when all they tried to do—they are on the river, 

they are marine Border Patrol agents trying to interdict drug traffickers coming on boats. When they did, we had an individual. 

Three shots were fired. They looked up. Someone pointing a gun 

at them, and they returned fire. 

On September 10 and 11—and we ought to be concerned—Border 

Patrol agents were fired upon. Same scenario on the river, Rio 

Grande River. This would be in Hidalgo County. 

So, to say that there is not violence or concern, or that we have 

not had 58 high-speed chases, and, oh, by the way, the cartels are 

throwing out spikes, using chase vehicles and blocking vehicles to 

thwart law enforcement operations, to get these splash-downs. 

Then we have got retrieval teams of cartels on our side of the river 

to take the dope and the subject back over, and confront us. 

That is unacceptable by Texas standards. I think that is unacceptable by American standards, as well. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. McCraw follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVEN C. MCCRAW

MAY 11, 2011 

Chairman McCaul and committee Members, on behalf of the men and women of 

the Texas Department of Public Safety, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss a vitally important public safety and 

National security issue, our unsecure border with Mexico. 

Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations have exploited weaknesses in our border 

defenses for many years in an effort to exert their dominance over the highly lucrative U.S. drug and human smuggling market and they have evolved into powerful 

and vicious organized crime cartels that now threaten the domestic security of Mexico. They battle each other and the Government of Mexico to maintain and/or increase their share of the multi-billions of dollars derived from the smuggling of 

drugs and humans into the United States, and bulk cash, high-value merchandise, 

stolen vehicles, and weapons into Mexico. 

They use military and terrorist tactics and weaponry killing over 36,000 people 

since 2006 and there is no limit to their depravity. They employ horrific tactics to 

intimidate their adversaries and the public such as decapitations, acid baths, skinning people alive, torture, and Improvised Explosive Devices and they have expanded their criminal operations to profit from kidnappings, robberies, human trafficking, extortions, and theft. During the past several months we have seen reports 

of mass graves and self-censorship of the Mexican press. The Mexican Cartels work 
43 

closely with Texas-based and transnational gangs to support their criminal operations on both sides of the border. We continually see multi-ton drug loads seized 

throughout Texas. 

The Mexican Cartels use a mature decision-making process that incorporates reconnaissance networks, techniques, and capabilities normally associated with military organizations such as communication intercepts, interrogations, trend analysis, 

secure communications, coordinated military-style tactical operations, GPS, thermal 

imagery, and military armaments including fully automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, and hand grenades. They are very adept at corrupting government 

officials and entire institutions to support their criminal operations undermining the 

ability of Mexico to address this threat. Recent reports reveal that Mexico has only 

a 2% criminal conviction rate. 

The 2011 GAO Report confirmed what we already knew in Texas, there are insufficient Federal resources to secure the Texas/Mexico border with as much as 70% 

to 90% of the 1,250 miles of border in Texas is only being monitored as opposed to 

managed or operationally controlled. It is important to note that the men and 

women of the Customs and Border Protection Service are dedicated professionals 

and do an exceptional job with the limited resources they possess. However, there 

has been a substantial underinvestment in border security for several decades to the 

benefit of the Mexican Cartels and the detriment of public safety and homeland security. 

Texas is a law-and-order State and there is a high expectation by our citizens that 

Sheriffs, Chiefs of Police, and the Texas Department of Public Safety will work 

closely together with our Federal partners to proactively protect Texas from all 

criminal and terrorist threats regardless of their origin. When Texas landowners are 

overwhelmed by drug and human smugglers trespassing and vandalizing their property, they expect a timely law enforcement response and do not want to hear from 

Sheriffs and the State of Texas that it is not their job. The State of Texas has already invested over $250 million to enhance border security efforts recognizing long 

ago its importance to the safety of all Texans. 

The State adopted a unified command structure to centralize local, State, and 

Federal border-related intelligence across 53 Texas border counties and over a hundred local, State, and Federal agencies to support unified patrol operations on the 

ground, in the air, and on the water. Combining efforts is a force multiplier and 

provides a more accurate understanding of the current and future border-related 

threats. 

It has also been necessary to increase the State’s tactical capability on the border. 

The Cartels have become increasing confrontational using blocking and chase cars, 

caltrops to disable patrol cars during high speed pursuits and Cartel boat teams 

that confront U.S. law enforcement on the U.S. side of the Rio Grande River while 

they retrieve the drugs from vehicles that have been driven into the Rio Grande 

River to avoid capture. In ONE instance, Cartel members threw a Molotov cocktail 

at Texas Rangers in an attempt to avoid capture and on at least two occasions, Border Patrol Agents were fired upon from Mexico while patrolling the Rio Grande 

River. The State of Texas established Texas Ranger Recon Teams augmented with 

DPS SWAT resources, Texas Military Forces personnel, DPS Aviation and Trooper 

Strike Teams who work closely with local law enforcement and the Border Patrol 

to confront the Cartels in high-threat areas. 

The committee requested that I provide an assessment of the impact of Cartelrelated crime in the Texas border region. To accurately assess the overall criminal 

impact of an unsecure border on Texas requires the syntheses of several different 

variables within and outside the border region. For example, if we were to use only 

Index Crimes as reported through the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system, it would not include essential variables such as extortions, kidnappings, smuggling incidents, corruption, smuggling-related trespassing and vandalism, arrests of 

aliens from countries with strong terrorist networks, seizures of Cartel drugs, weapons, and bulk cash on the 10 major smuggling corridors throughout Texas, Cartel 

command and control networks operating in Texas, increases in Cartel-related gang 

activity, death squad members living in Texas, Cartel-related killings of U.S. citizens in Mexico, Cartel-related violence along the border directed at U.S. law enforcement and the recruitment of Texas children in our border region to support Cartel 

operations on both sides of the border. These indicators reflect what the Texas Department of Public Safety refers to as ‘‘spillover crime’’ and are discussed below: 

• Over the last 18 months, six of the seven Mexican Cartels have established 

command-and-control networks in Texas cities. This is a three-fold increase. 

• Within the last year the number of Texas prison gangs who work directly with 

the Mexican Cartels have increased from four to twelve. This is significant because 62% of prison gang members are incarcerated for violent crimes in Texas 
44 

and as much as 60% of the criminal activity in some Texas communities is carried out by gangs. 

• Since January 2010, DPS has identified in Texas 22 murders, 24 assaults, 15 

shootings and five kidnappings directly related to the Mexican Cartels. 

• The Mexican Cartels are recruiting Texas school age children to support Cartel 

operations. The border region constitutes 9.4% of the State’s population and 

now has over 18.9% of the juvenile felony drug and gang referrals. 

• The Mexican Cartels are actively recruiting U.S. law enforcement officers to 

support their smuggling operations. Two South Texas Sheriffs were convicted 

for Cartel-related corruption and over 70 CBP Agents have been arrested for 

corruption along the southwest border. 

• The Mexican Cartels and Texas gangs who support them smuggle and traffic 

in humans. There have been 480 human trafficking victims over the last 4 

years, 77% were children. Approximately 10% of the calls to the National 

Human Trafficking Hotline come from Texas, more than any other State. 

• The FBI in San Antonio reported that there have been 266 kidnappings since 

2004, 14 reported in 2004, and 58 in 2009. Kidnappings include Americans kidnapped in Mexico, victims abducted in Texas and taken to Mexico and victims 

kidnapped in Texas by subjects from Mexico. 

• Virtual kidnappings and extortions are increasing in Texas. There were 23 reports of attempted extortion in El Paso between August 2009 and September 

2010. 

• The amount of drug and human smuggling and trafficking that occurs in Texas 

is an essential indicator of the crime impact on the State. A senior DHS official 

has reported that only 6.5% of the drugs and humans smuggled into the United 

States from Mexico are interdicted. The Department of Public Safety is not in 

a position to confirm the percentage cited but it does track interdictions within 

the border region and seizures beyond the check points. 

• The 2009 UCR data for the El Paso Police Department shows a reduction in 

murders; however, the 2011 data from the El Paso Police Department currently 

shows a 1,200% increase in murders from 2010 to 2011. The Department of 

Public Safety considers UCR data as only one indicator because of the delay in 

reporting and the limited incidents it captures. 

• CBP Agents and Officers continue to arrest illegal aliens along the U.S./Mexico 

border from countries with a known terrorism presence and 74% of those arrests have occurred in Texas. 

• A recent Federal investigation in Texas underscores the seriousness of this 

homeland security threat. Between 2006–2008, Dhakane smuggled 300 Somali 

illegal aliens, moving them through Brazil-Guatemala-Mexico-Texas and California. Dhakane eventually admitted that not only had he worked for many 

years for the designated terrorist groups AL-ITTIHAD-AL-ISLAMI (AIAI, or Islamic Union Courts/closely affiliated with al-Shabaab) and the AL-BARRAKAT, 

he moved at least seven committed Jihadists, most of them over the U.S. Southwestern border. 

• Total amount of Operation Border Star seizures from 2006 to present have an 

estimated street value of $7,939,824,739.23 (see Exhibit 1). 

• The Texas Department of Public Safety has seen an increase in Cartel-related 

seizures occurring beyond the check points and along the ten major corridors 

in Texas. 

• Cocaine—28% increase; 

• Marijuana—124% increase; 

• Heroin—2,493% increase; 

• Methamphetamine—135% increase; 

• Bulk Cash—168% increase; 

• Weapons—155% increase. 

When the U.S./Mexico border is finally secured the Mexican Cartels will no longer 

have access to the billions of dollars they use to undermine the domestic security 

of Mexico and the safety and security of the citizens of Texas and the Nation. Border security can be accomplished with the sufficient will and resources of the Federal Government working as a team with local and State law enforcement agencies. 
45 

EXHIBIT 1 

TOTAL OB FROM 2006–PRESENT 

Seizures Street Value 

Marijuana (lbs) ...... 5,957,250 Marijuana .............. $5,242,380,403.39 

Methamphetamine 

(lbs).

4,813 Methamphetamine $191,673,350.06 

Cocaine (lbs) ........... 66,858 Cocaine .................. $2,238,596,134.72 

Heroin (lbs) ............ 1,485 Heroin .................... $119,703,650.54 

Cash ($) .................. 147,471,201 Cash ($) .................. $147,471,200.52 

Value of Seizures .. $7,939,824,739.23 

Value of Drugs 

Only, no cash.

$7,792,353,538.71 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. McCraw. Let me say, as a fellow 

Texan, thank you for your service to our State and the country. 

It is refreshing to hear—the reason for calling the second panel 

is to get people who are on the ground, down on the border, who 

understand it and have seen it up close and personal. I think you 

have got a different story than political appointees in Washington 

perhaps have. 

So, thank you for that. 

Mr. Horne. 

Mr. HORNE. [Off mic.] 

Mr. MCCAUL. You want to turn the mic on? 

Yes. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS C. HORNE, ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

STATE OF ARIZONA 

Mr. HORNE. It is on. Do I need to get closer? 

It is not made for us tall guys, I am afraid. 

Can I be heard now? 

Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members. I certainly do agree 

with the Chairman’s bill to designate cartels as terrorist organizations. 

Mr. Chairman and Members, I have sued the Obama administration for negligence on the border with Mexico. The Obama administration had previously sued Arizona to prevent Arizona from helping to fight illegal immigration through Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070. 

I filed a counter-claim, asking for a court declaration that, among 

other things, the administration has failed to achieve and maintain 

operational control for the Arizona-Mexican border as required by 

Congress in the Secure Fence Act of 2006, and the Appropriations 

Act of 2008. 

Some may question whether it is possible to get operational control. I argue that it is for the following reasons. 

The Arizona border is divided into the Yuma Sector and the Tucson Sector. In 2006, the Bush administration put substantial resources into the Yuma Sector, which had been one of the most difficult sectors. As a result, apprehensions decreased 96 percent—96 

percent—from 134,000 in 2005, to 7,200 last year. 

Substantial operational control was obtained in the Yuma Sector. 

But in the Tucson Sector, last year, well over 400,000 people 

crossed illegally into the United States in this sector. That is the 
46 

equivalent of an invasion from various countries of 20 divisions, 

400,000 people. 

The criminal element increased from 8 percent in 2005 to 17 percent, more than doubling. Criminal enterprises based in Mexico are 

bringing a degree of brutality to crime in the United States that 

we have never experienced before. 

They are bringing techniques they have used in Mexico, where 

attacks on police headquarters, assassinations of high government 

officials, murders of journalists, mass jail breaks and ultimatums, 

stating that the criminal enterprise will unleash terrorist acts unless the government gives its members amnesty for their crimes. 

All signify assertion of power unchecked by the rule of law. 

The Drug Enforcement Administration has confirmed Mexican 

drug organization presence in 230 U.S. cities and towns. They are 

expanding from drug smuggling to all kinds of criminal activity. 

This presence in 230 U.S. towns and cities comes mostly through 

the Tucson sector. 

The United States and Mexico’s mutual economic future faces catastrophe, because Mexican drug cartels, fueled by the American 

appetite for drugs, are becoming entrenched as criminal enterprises 

that affect Mexican commerce, and whose method of intimidation 

is ruthless violence. 

Mexico is the United States’ second-largest trading partner, and 

the two countries must work together to be sure their commerce is 

not destroyed by criminal enterprises. 

In October, the Phoenix area experienced its first beheading, 

where someone walked into a Chandler apartment and found a 

head in one part of the room and a body in the other. 

Two months ago in Casa Grande, midway between Phoenix and 

Tucson, 15 cartel members had a firefight with bandits in an attempt to steal their drugs. Just a few weeks ago, one of my special 

agents in the attorney general’s office was shot by a suspected cartel operative in the Phoenix area. 

In the United States it is widely understood that marijuana, cocaine, and methamphetamine come largely from or through Mexico. 

It is also common knowledge that Mexican drug organizations are 

engaging in atrocities, murders, and widespread corruption. 

In Pinal County, as an example, the number of pounds of marijuana seized has more than doubled in the last 2 years, from 

20,000 pounds to 45,000 pounds. 

The extent to which these criminal enterprises have expanded 

beyond smuggling to other kinds of crimes is not widely known. In 

addition to the massive invasion of illegal aliens and the extremely 

serious problem of criminal enterprises invading through the Tucson Sector, there is the problem of terrorism from the Middle East. 

A terrorist seeking to enter the United States to do mass destruction could get through Mexico and blend in among the 400,000 

people crossing illegally every year through the Tucson Sector. 

The Border Patrol has caught over 600 people from Middle Eastern countries to-date. We can only imagine how many have gotten 

through in addition to that 600. 

The Obama administration could do in the Tucson Sector what 

the Bush administration did in the Yuma Sector, but it has chosen 

not to do so. 
47 

In the beginning of World War II, the French discovered that a 

chain is no stronger than its weakest link. When German troops 

poured through an unguarded section of the Maginot Line, and the 

whole Maginot Line proved to be useless. 

All of the work the United States has done to control illegal immigration in California, Texas, New Mexico and in the Yuma Sector are useless, if it simply increases the number of illegal aliens 

pouring in through the Tucson Sector. 

The best plan that I know of to achieve control over the Tucson 

Sector is the 18-point plan prepared by the Arizona Cattle Growers 

Association. It includes additional technology and infrastructure, 

an additional 3,000 patrol field agents in Arizona, and forward operating bases immediately adjacent to the U.S. border with Mexico, 

approximately 1 every 12 miles. 

Some of the Arizona Cattle Growers Association provisions are 

included in the McCain-Kyl bill currently before Congress. 

Most immediately, the National Guard should be increased. 

There are 560 in Arizona now. There were 2,400 in Arizona in 

2006, when the Bush administration obtained control over the 

Yuma Sector. 

Mr. Chairman and Members, there are people in the United 

States and Mexico living in fear. They are victims of our Nation’s 

appetite for drugs, victims of the Mexican cartels’ thirst for power 

fueled by innocent blood, and they are victims of negligence by the 

Federal Government at the border. 

This must end. I am doing my best in the courts. But sometimes 

courts decline to enter into what they view as political issues that 

need to be dealt with by Congress. 

I ask you to please deal with this issue that is so crucial to our 

country. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Horne follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS C. HORNE

MAY 11, 2011 

INTRODUCTION

I have sued the Obama administration for negligence on the border with Mexico. 

The Obama administration had previously sued Arizona to prevent Arizona from 

helping to fight illegal immigration through Arizona Senate Bill 1070. I filed a counterclaim asking for a court declaration that, among other things, the administration 

has failed to achieve and maintain operational control for the Arizona-Mexican border, as required by the Congress in the Secure Fence Act of 2006 and the Appropriations Act of 2008. Some may question whether it is possible to do so. I argue that 

it is for the following reasons: 

The Arizona border is divided into the Yuma Sector and the Tucson Sector. In 

2006, the Bush administration put substantial resources into the Yuma Sector, 

which had been one of the difficult sectors. As a result, apprehensions decreased 96 

percent from 134,000 in 2005 to 7,200 last year. Substantial operational control was 

obtained in the Yuma Sector. But in the Tucson Sector, since 2009, well over 

400,000 people have crossed illegally into the United States in this sector. That is 

the equivalent of an invasion, from various countries, of 20 divisions. 

BACKGROUND OF THE CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES

The criminal element increased from 8 percent in 2005 to 17 percent. Criminal 

enterprises based in Mexico are bringing a degree of brutality to crime in the United 

States that we have never experienced before. They are bringing techniques they 

have used in Mexico, where attacks on police headquarters, assassinations of high 

governmental anti-organized crime law enforcement officials, murders of journalists, 
48 

mass jail breaks, and ultimatums stating that a criminal enterprise will unleash 

terrorists acts unless the government gives its members amnesty for their crimes, 

all signify assertion of power unchecked by the rule of law. The Drug Enforcement 

Administration has confirmed Mexican drug organization presence in 230 U.S. cities 

and towns. They are expanding from drug smuggling to all kinds of criminal activity. The United States and Mexico’s mutual economic future faces catastrophe because Mexican drug cartels, fueled by the American appetite for drugs, are becoming 

entrenched as criminal enterprises that affect Mexican commerce from petroleum to 

groceries, and whose method of intimidation is ruthless violence. Mexico is the 

United States’ second-largest trading partner and the two countries must work together to be sure their commerce is not destroyed by the criminal enterprises. 

In October, the Phoenix area experienced its first beheading, where someone 

walked into a Chandler apartment and found a head in one part of the room and 

the body in another. Two months ago, in Casa Grande, midway between Phoenix 

and Tucson, 15 cartel members had a fire fight with bandits in an attempt to steal 

their drugs. Just a few weeks ago, one of my Special Agents in the Attorney General’s Office was shot by a suspected cartel operative in the Phoenix area. In the 

United States, it is widely understood that marijuana, cocaine, and methamphetamine come largely from or through Mexico. It is also common knowledge that Mexican drug organizations are engaging in atrocities, murders, and wide-spread corruption. 

In Pinal County, as an example, the number of pounds of marijuana seized has 

more than doubled in the last 2 years from 20,000 pounds to 45,000 pounds. 

The extent to which these criminal enterprises have expanded beyond smuggling 

to other kinds of crimes is not as widely known. 

While familial drug smuggling organizations have thrived near the border for generations, their present successor Mexican criminal enterprises now present a new 

and different threat to North American well-being. Although they are sometimes 

called drug cartels, they are not primarily cooperative price-setting entities and they 

are not just about drugs—they are primarily opportunistic, generally—and sometimes fiercely—competitive multi-crime criminal enterprises. This discussion uses 

the term ‘‘criminal enterprises’’ (‘‘CEs’’) because this term is used in Federal and 

State racketeering statutes. 

There are many sources of the CEs’ increased power. A few of them include: 

(1) Immigration into the United States brought Mexican criminals to U.S. cities 

in large numbers in the 1990s. DEA has confirmed Mexican drug organization 

presence in 230 U.S. cities and towns. Larger Mexican criminal populations 

allow Mexican drug organizations to rely on extended affinity to vertically integrate their distribution networks. Simultaneous law enforcement pressure on 

rival groups, such as the Colombians and their air smuggling methods, further 

permitted Mexican CEs to vertically integrate the drug distribution chain. 

(2) The Mexican CEs have incorporated influences from the ‘‘Zetas,’’ former 

members of an elite military unit originally recruited by a drug organization as 

mercenaries in inter-enterprise warfare. The Zetas brought with them greater 

eagerness to diversify into criminal opportunities other than drug smuggling. 

The Zetas also brought a culture of ruthlessness and intimidation, with huge 

economic power implications. 

(3) Expendable mercenaries are more available to the CEs. Maquiladoras, and 

other opportunities such as preparing to illegally cross the border into the 

United States, brought many unemployed young men to northern Mexico. The 

sharp decline of the economies of the United States and Mexico in 2008 swelled 

this available pool of mercenaries. With many young strangers available as gunmen, CE leaders are not as constrained about violent confrontations with rival 

gangs or with government authorities as they had been. When the casualties 

will be replaceable strangers, aggression and brutality become more acceptable. 

(4) The availability of high-powered weapons has armed the gunmen as never 

before. While the exact amounts and percentages of U.S.-sourced weapons that 

are being used by the CEs are the subject of some debate, it is beyond dispute 

that the CE gunmen have no shortage of weaponry and that U.S. sources account for some portion of these arms. Any weapons in this context are too many. 

(5) In the United States, it is widely understood that marijuana, cocaine, and 

methamphetamine come largely from or through Mexico. It is also common 

knowledge that Mexican drug organizations are engaging in atrocities, murders, 

and wide-spread corruption. Nevertheless, it does not appear to be widely understood that continued consumption of Mexico-sourced drugs is the direct root 

cause of the erosion of the free democracy in Mexico and ultimately of the economy of North America. Our young people are acutely aware of the indirect consequences of their consumer decisions. Yet they continue to buy Mexico-sourced 
49 

drugs as if there were no consequences for these decisions. This can only be explained by a lack of knowledge of the linkage between these particular consumer choices and the long term effects of those choices. 

In Mexico, popular support for the representative government’s desperate efforts 

to control the growing power of the CEs appears to be flagging as the death toll 

and violence mounts. The misunderstanding that these are simply drug or human 

smuggling organizations persists despite the general knowledge that the CEs are 

also engaged in many non-drug, non-human smuggling criminal activities. As in the 

United States, it appears that the populace in Mexico is not aware that the uncontrolled rise in the power of the CEs foreshadows the potential failure of the Mexican 

economy. 

THE DANGER TO COMMERCE PRESENTED BY CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE DIVERSIFICATION

The CEs are increasingly engaging in diversified organized criminal activity, such 

as diverting petroleum products, agricultural crop theft, hijacking truck and train 

cargo, extorting major businesses, import/export fraud, intellectual property theft, 

and targeted intelligence-driven kidnappings of business and societal leaders. They 

are uniquely situated for attacks on trade because most of them grew out of smuggling organizations, so they can exploit their deep roots on the key trade routes between the United States and Mexico. Apart from the direct injury to the immediate 

victims, these diversified criminal activities are strategically significant in two ways. 

Most obviously, they are sources of income and therefore sources of power to the 

CEs. Most important, these crimes allow the CEs to infiltrate, burden, and ultimately destroy trade-related activity and investment. 

The diversified CEs are fundamentally different from their predecessor smuggling-based organizations. The former passive bribery-for-amnesty stance of the 

smuggling organizations is now largely a thing of the past. The CEs are shifting 

to an aggressive stance, actively asserting primacy over the elected representative 

government in their respective geographic areas. Attacks on police headquarters, assassinations of high governmental anti-organized crime law enforcement officials, 

murders of journalists, mass jail breaks, and ultimatums stating that a CE will unleash terrorist acts unless the government gives its members amnesty for their 

crimes, all signify assertion of power unchecked by the rule of law. 

Taking advantage of non-smuggling criminal opportunities requires immunity of 

a fundamentally different kind than that accorded to smuggling organizations in the 

past. Past impunity was for smuggling, which is regarded as mostly victimless from 

the Mexican point of view. Present crimes are far from victimless. So immunity cannot be bought, and therefore must be coerced. Diversification necessarily requires 

and encourages intimidation. Because the crimes are not victimless, law enforcement and the populace at large must be discouraged from taking action by means 

other than mere bribery. In this context, open and notorious cruelty and inhuman 

atrocities serve an economic purpose. They terrorize the general public with two 

complementary messages: (1) The CE will show horrible cruelty to any who stand 

against them (such as by having the wife who thought she was bringing ransom 

money to rescue her husband forced to watch as his head is cut off); and (2) the 

representative government is powerless to do anything effective about it. This is one 

explanation for the apparent escalation in the level of atrocity. Murders escalated 

to beheadings and mutilation. Beheadings became commonplace, so killers are now 

skinning the victim and ripping the heart from the chest, leaving the corpse so grotesque that responders can barely stand to look at the remains. The diversification 

of the criminal activity and the decline of representative government authority are 

complementary—one escalates as the other declines. As organized criminal activity 

succeeds—success defined as being accomplished at a profit without countervailing 

consequences for the perpetrators—it is repeated and expanded. The diversification 

means that all economic activity in the particular area is increasingly at risk of victimization. 

The societal impact of the CEs’ campaign of terror is well encapsulated in the 

presence of .50 caliber machine guns mounted in CE SUVs patrolling the streets of 

Mexican border cities. This weapon, in the hands of a CE, is a brazen assassination 

about to happen. 

The mere existence of such CE war wagons speaks volumes. Most significant for 

strategic purposes, such weapons signify the vulnerability of legitimate business because no business can stand against extortion and victimization when the perpetrators are this cruel, have this kind of firepower, and have the impunity to display 

it. The war wagon is a rolling advertisement that business must capitulate—or 

else—and that investment in Mexico includes the associated risks. 
50 

SEARCHING FOR ALTERNATIVES TO ECONOMIC CRISIS

Internal Limiters Within CEs 

If the Mexican CEs could be relied upon to recognize the economic consequences 

of their depredations and desist before it is too late, then the potential strangulation 

of commerce would not be an inevitable consequence of the growth and evolution 

of diversified CEs. 

Organized crime leaders operate in a treacherous high-risk environment in their 

daily lives. They stay in charge by inspiring, fostering, and demanding the loyalty 

of an immediate inner circle. Keeping a loyal inner circle involves several strategies, 

the most important of which is making financial opportunities available to the most 

loyal. If the dominant figure turns away apparent economic opportunities for his 

CE, and therefore for his inner circle, he invites that inner circle to look to another 

contender for leadership. There is always another contender waiting in the wings 

for a shot at the top spots. When traditional U.S. Mafia dons balked at trafficking 

in narcotics, they were replaced by leaders who would condone it because the profits 

were high. Whenever criminal opportunities are identified and prove successful, 

leaders must exploit them or risk being replaced (which often involves their death). 

This analysis applies to the potential for strangulation of U.S./Mexico commerce. 

The CEs continue to exploit and expand their ability to engage in criminal opportunities because there is no internal limiter. The CEs may not intend to strangle commerce. Indeed, they may have no thought that this could happen and no desire for 

this result. But a pack of wolves may decimate a deer population without a thought 

about what that may mean to future wolves years hence. They act like wolves because that is their nature. CEs act like CEs because that is their nature. They will 

continue to escalate their parasitic criminal conduct without regard to whether their 

crimes will ultimately kill the host. They will continue unless and until they are 

stopped. So the diversification of the Mexican CEs’ criminal conduct will continue 

as long as the economic opportunities are there and will take whatever advantage 

of those opportunities that they can get away with. 

Governmental Retreat 

If the capitulation of the Mexican government would end the bloodshed, perhaps 

the threat to commerce would abate. Some observers of the present violence have 

written that President Caldero ́n’s decision to call in the military was the initial 

cause of the present violence. This is worth mentioning only because if that was the 

cause, then reversal of the decision could be seen as a possible way to end the violence. However, the rise of the newly aggressive and power-acquiring CEs was not 

caused by Caldero ́n’s administration, and in any event, to the extent that increased 

law enforcement has some violent repercussions, the Mexican government cannot reverse that course of action. 

The Zetas arrived on the scene in the late 1990s, bringing their military tactics 

and new ruthlessness and opportunism. For example, drug violence in Nuevo Laredo 

increased dramatically in 2004 and over 100 people died in Nuevo Laredo alone in 

January–August 2005. This was long before Caldero ́n’s inauguration. 

The frequent references to the number of murders in Mexico since the start of the 

Caldero ́n administration in late 2006 create the unfounded and unfair impression 

that the violence began with his administration. This is not true. They also create 

the incorrect impression that his policies are a cause of the violence. Since the violence began before his administration, this is patently false. 

The CEs’ tactics are rooted in the CEs’ diversification and their need to avoid 

prosecution for crimes beyond drug and human smuggling. The violent tactics have 

the effect of undermining representative government by instilling lack of confidence 

and fear in the Mexican people. These outrages to civil life include murders of reporters, murders of mayors and a gubernatorial candidate, postings of murder 

threats and actual videos of murders (including beheadings) on the internet, ads for 

criminal gang recruitment in the newspapers, murders of and death threats to clergy, ‘‘taxation’’ (extortion) of city residents, car bombings, and horrific mutilations. 

While torture has always been a part of criminals’ intelligence gathering, torture for 

the purpose of getting information is different than wanton mutilation of the already-dead bodies and the public desecration of their remains, such as by hanging 

mutilated bodies in public, skinning corpses, or delivering severed heads with messages. These are not responses to law enforcement. If they were responses to law 

enforcement, they would be done in the United States by the representatives of 

these same CEs in U.S. cities in response to even more effective law enforcement. 

They are not done in the United States for the simple reasons that the CEs are not 

presently contending for control of cities or areas of the United States, as they are 

in Mexico, and they do not believe they could avoid prosecution for such crimes in 
51 

the United States, as they do in Mexico. Erroneous attribution of the violence to the 

law enforcement efforts to control the CEs and the resulting erroneous understanding of the reasons for the CEs’ tactics leads to the erroneous idea that law enforcement accommodation would end the escalation of CEs’ criminal power. 

In any event, in the present circumstances, it is not really possible for the Mexican government to back down. Mexican smugglers have operated with relative amnesty, but that was in the context of the crimes of drug and human smuggling. The 

crimes have changed. They now include diversion of petroleum (owned by the government and therefore by the people), hijacking cargo, kidnapping business people, 

extorting insurance companies, extorting whole cities, and atrocious murders, including of clergy, journalists, and political leaders. No government can look the 

other way in connection with such conduct, no matter what bribe is offered, so there 

is no ‘‘back down’’ solution. 

Nor would the CEs accept a return to the former order, even if could be offered. 

The scenario suggested by some is that with a new president and new administration, the CEs could return to the prior order, agree to limit criminal activities to 

drug and human smuggling, perhaps consolidate to a more manageable smaller set 

of CEs with agreed territories, and pay bribes for peace with the government. This 

scenario rests on three unsupported foundations. 

First, as explained above, once the CE has enjoyed the criminal benefits of operating with impunity in a governmentally-challenged area by exploiting new criminal 

opportunities, and parceled out those additional income streams to the inner circle, 

its nature does not permit unforced retreat. A leader who proposed to his inner circle that the group henceforth limit itself to drug and human smuggling and abandon 

the other criminal opportunities would not remain the leader for long. The evolution 

of the drug smuggling organizations into diversified organized criminal enterprises 

was an evolution, not a simple temporary switch of one set of tactics for another. 

Second, there is no reason that the present CEs would accept the limited role suggested by this scenario. Mexican law enforcement and military efforts have so far 

proven inadequate to slow the diversified criminal conduct. They have had some 

success at lopping off top participants and at making some activities more difficult, 

particularly drug activities, and a great many gunmen have been eliminated by the 

authorities or by each other, but there is no evidence that the CEs’ combined net 

income has declined. Because there is no existing credible threat of appropriate consequences, the hypothetical government suggestion of peace terms would offer nothing to the CEs that the CEs don’t already have. 

Third, this scenario supposes tight control throughout the ranks of the CEs, such 

that an order from top CE leadership to forego income from non-drug, non-human 

smuggling activities would be effective. The CEs have recruited many young guns, 

and many of those recruits are now forever changed by having adopted the macho 

high-risk, high-spending values of their peers. They are unlikely to accept any such 

order. Faced with their own gunmen’s desire to continue to engage in profitable 

crimes, a cartel leader who had given such an order would have no incentive to 

spend the lives and resources necessary to enforce the order, even if the leader had 

the power to do so. 

Legalization of Drugs 

Some argue that the legalization of drugs may be a panacea by which the violence 

could be stopped and the strength of Mexico’s representative government restored, 

deflecting the threat to the economy. This is simply not possible. The fulcrum is economics, not politics. Please consider the economics of, say, a hypothetical ‘‘National 

Cocaine Corp.’’ (‘‘NCC’’), a new business formed to sell hypothetically recently legalized cocaine in the United States. As the first order of business, NCC must undertake the expense of getting an FDA permit after showing the purity of the product 

and the conditions of its manufacture in a clean plant under closely monitored conditions, under the watchful eyes of various doctors, chemists, and quality control experts. Next, NCC must pay for insurance against the inevitable lawsuits a la the 

massive suits against Big Tobacco. Next, NCC must set its prices based on its payment of enormous taxes, like alcohol and tobacco, but undoubtedly much higher. But 

the Mexican CEs won’t have any of these expenses. In addition, legalization will no 

doubt deem some young people; say those under 21, too young to use the drugs legally, again like alcohol and tobacco. This market would not be available to NCC, 

but the CEs would keep selling to this market. Bottom line: There is no legal product that can match the price of smuggled drugs. So the Mexican CEs would stay 

in business and would continue smuggling the same products, but for a larger market because the products are approved by the government as ‘‘legal [sic.] 
52 

Sealing the Border 

Taking this suggestion at even its most perfect vision, sealing the border cannot 

resolve the threat to commerce. Assuming for the sake of this discussion that the 

United States could somehow erect a perfect, miraculous wall through which no illegal drugs, aliens, guns, or money could flow, this would not stop the CEs in Mexico 

from operating. They would continue to develop diversified criminal activities, in addition to selling more drugs in Mexico. They would complete the escalation of their 

dominance over the representative government, strangling U.S./Mexico trade from 

the south side of the perfect wall. They would still cause economic collapse. The collapsed Mexican representative government would then have little control of the 

growth of the CEs. The CEs would turn their attention to penetrating the United 

States with diversified criminal activities, using the collapsed northern Mexican 

areas as staging grounds. After economic ruin, Mexico would become a staging area 

for CE diversified criminal attacks on the United States. 

Abandonment of Mexico 

It is also tempting to some to suggest that the United States hide behind Mexico’s 

sovereignty to continue our role. But this is not an option. Certainly sovereignty is 

an issue that the United States must deal with in true partnership against our common enemy, but abandonment of our neighbor and trading partner is not a proper 

way to recognize and honor its sovereignty. Nor would it be effective to avert economic catastrophe. 

The Hard Reality 

In addition to the massive invasion of illegal aliens, and the extremely serious 

problem of criminal enterprises invading through the Tucson Sector and the rest of 

the border and spreading throughout the United States, there is the problem of terrorism from the Middle East. A terrorist seeking to enter the United States to do 

mass destruction could get to Mexico and blend in among the 400,000 people crossing illegally every year through the Tucson Sector. 

The Obama administration could do in the Tucson Sector what the Bush administration did in the Yuma Sector, but it has chosen not to do so. 

In the beginning of World War II, the French discovered that a chain is no stronger than its weakest link, when German troops poured through an unguarded section 

of the Maginot Line, and the whole Maginot Line proved to be useless. All of the 

work the United States has done to control illegal immigration in California, Texas, 

and New Mexico, and in the Yuma Sector, are useless, if it simply increases the 

number of illegal aliens pouring through the Tucson Sector. 

The best plan that I know of to achieve control over the Tucson Sector is the 18- 

point plan prepared by the Arizona Cattle Growers Association. It includes additional technology and infrastructure, an additional 3,000 Border Patrol Field Agents 

in Arizona, and forward operating bases immediately adjacent to the U.S. border 

with Mexico, approximately one every 12 miles. Some of the Arizona Cattle Growers 

Association provisions are included in the McCain Kyl Bill currently before Congress. 

Most immediately, the National Guard should be increased, not removed, as currently planned by the administration. There are 500 there now, and there were 

6,000 there in 2006 when the Bush administration obtained control over the Yuma 

Sector. Removing the Guard from its role on the border is the exact wrong thing 

to do. It will leave a gaping hole in law enforcement efforts, put more innocent lives 

at risk, and it sends a message—whether intentionally or not—that the administration is not serious about border security. 

The sober truth is that the United States faces a substantial and immediate risk 

that the Mexican criminal enterprises will drive the United States’ neighbor and 

second-largest trading partner into economic ruin in the next few years. There is 

no easy ‘‘back down’’ solution, no ‘‘legalize drugs’’ solution, and no ‘‘seal the border’’ 

solution. Mexican CEs pose a serious threat to U.S./Mexico commerce, which in turn 

poses a serious threat to the economic health of Mexico and therefore of North 

America. 

It is going to be a very difficult and costly road. It will require careful assessment 

of the options, none of which are easy or attractive, in an atmosphere unclouded 

by simplistic rhetoric relating to such things as hoping that organized criminals will 

give up lucrative criminal lines of business to get impunity from prosecution that 

they already have, hoping that they will show selfless patriotism, legalizing drugs, 

or sealing the border. It is time to put these impossible, ineffective, or irrelevant 

agendas aside and consider what must be done for the survival of North America’s 

economic health. There is no easy way around it. 
53 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman and Members, there are people in the United States and Mexico 

living in fear. They are victims of our Nation’s appetite for drugs; victims of the 

Mexican cartels’ thirst for power fueled by innocent blood; and they are victims of 

negligence by the Federal Government at the border. This must end. I am doing my 

best in the courts, but sometimes courts decline to enter into what they view as political issues that need to be dealt with by Congress. I ask you to please deal with 

this issue that is so crucial to our country. 

APPENDIX 

COUNTERMEASURES EXHIBIT: THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE ESSENTIAL GOAL

REQUIRES FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGY SHIFTS

The escalating power of the CEs in Mexico and the resulting threat to North 

America’s economic stability are the core concern. This is because without adequate 

defense of commerce all sub-agendas fail—judicial and government corruption reforms, social and labor programs, suppressing violence, drug and weapon interdiction, illegal immigration—all require viable representative government. 

Containment No Longer Central 

Recognizing that the keystone of all other agendas is defense of legitimate commerce requires fundamental reconsideration of how we evaluate potential strategies. 

U.S. strategy relating to smuggling organizations has long been evaluated by measuring its effectiveness in terms of interdiction of drugs arriving in the United 

States. Policy considerations have been fundamentally a balance of the amount of 

resources required to get an acceptable interdiction result. Adjustments relating to 

domestic activities have been made in the relative share of resources devoted to 

interdiction, preventive education, and treatment, but the worst-case scenario has 

been marginally more drug use. That has changed. That containment model no 

longer applies because containment cannot avoid the emerging threat. The present 

core threat—the potential for economic collapse—can occur if drug interdiction remains constant or even if drug interdiction improves. The diversification of the CEs’ 

criminal activities means that there could be a collapse that is not solely caused by 

drug smuggling. The most essential goal is no longer preventing prohibited imports—it is finding ways to preserve legitimate commerce. We simply cannot prevail 

by playing goalie—keeping the other side from getting smuggled drugs or humans 

past our border defense—so no matter how good we may get at playing goalie, it 

will not be good enough. 

U.S. No Longer the Key Theater 

In the past, the U.S. efforts to control drug and human smuggling have been 

staged almost entirely in the United States with some relatively minor activities in 

Mexico. The present threat to commerce will be won or lost in Mexico. As discussed 

above, even sealing the border, if it were possible, would not save the North American economy from the CEs and it would not prevent the CEs from becoming entrenched in a collapsed Mexican state immediately south of our border. 

U.S. Success No Longer Possible Without Mexican Success 

As a corollary of the above, the United States is no longer solely in control of the 

outcome. It must depend on Mexican action because if the Mexican government 

loses the battle for control of the trade routes, the United States and Mexican economies will be devastated without regard to U.S. efforts that take place exclusively 

in the United States. Quite simply, the United States cannot prevail in this struggle 

unless the Mexicans prevail. Geography is not optional—so we must succeed with 

the neighbor we have. 

Much Strategic Thinking No Longer Appropriate 

Strategists in this field generally have drug-fighting backgrounds. They have observed and understand the devastating effect drug use has on the quality of life. 

They tend to focus on the flow of illegal drugs. Of course the flow of illegal drugs 

is a major concern, and the anti-drug efforts must continue. However, relegating the 

deeper and more significant threat to the general North American economy to the 

margins of strategic analysis leads to an allocation of resources that marginalizes 

the commercial threat. The threat to commerce is the key because economic collapse 

forecloses all other government efforts, including drug interdiction. 

Other strategists have international intelligence backgrounds. They tend to focus 

on the intramural ebb and flow of the fortunes of the various CEs. This focus has 

some positive effects, such as illuminating the fact that the CEs are not a mono-
54 

lith—an important circumstance that is generally absent in media accounts. CEs 

are quite different and behave differently in important ways. As examples, the Zetas 

are not derived from smuggling family roots, La Familia Michoacana fronts a social 

and pseudo-political agenda, asserting in effect a divine mission to murder and torture its drug-dealing rivals, the Gulf Cartel has substantially older leadership than 

others, and fragmentation of CEs presents significant law enforcement opportunities 

in addition to increasing CE casualties through inter-CE violence. While all of these 

differences are important because they indicate different tactical approaches against 

the respective enterprises, all of the CEs are arrayed against the rule of law and 

all of them together present the threat of economic strangulation, so focusing on the 

ebb and flow of their internal power struggles and shifting alliances as though they 

were competing soccer franchises distracts from addressing their collective threat to 

the economy. It also has the effect of placing too much emphasis on the importance 

of individual leaders, the removal of which is indeed important but is not the key 

to ultimate success. 

Consideration of just the raw total numbers in connection with the murder rate 

may also misdirect resources. The level of organized crime-related murders in Mexico is staggering—now set by State Department sources at some 36,000 since the 

end of 2006, and rising sharply year after year, with over 15,000 in 2010 alone. 

However, identification of the reduction of this entire figure as a primary goal would 

not serve the preservation of U.S./Mexico commerce. Much less than half of these 

casualties involve police, military, and other non-drug-related members of society, 

such as kidnapping victims, journalists, clergy, and bystanders. It is this minority 

of murders that is directly related to economic concerns because it is these murders 

that undermine popular trust in government institutions and investment in Mexico. 

Investigation and prosecution of these crimes directly supports stability, investment 

in resources, and commerce. In contrast, the remainder of the death toll represents 

the fall-out from turf battles and internal strife among CEs. This part of the death 

rate rises when inter- and intra-CE competition rises, which often happens after the 

arrest or removal of a dominant CE figure, whether by government action or by internal action. So this portion of the death figure actually serves as a rough barometer of the government’s success in stirring the CEs up by taking successful action 

against them and breaking them into warring fragments. Therefore, the fact that 

this part of the total figure was very high in 2010 and is climbing in 2011 is bad 

news primarily for the deceased, but not bad news for the survival of the economy. 

Drug Consumption Decisions No Longer Just Personal 

Americans generally see drug involvement as an individual choice between avoiding illegal drug use and suffering jail, treatment, or marginal/stunted lives. Americans often view the actors as choosing their own course but not so much choosing 

consequences to others outside their immediate family and social circle—like choosing a career or a level of commitment to a healthy lifestyle. The stakes are now 

vastly different for those not directly involved in these decisions. Americans who 

choose involvement with Mexico-sourced drugs are choosing economic devastation 

for the rest of North America and political disenfranchisement for Mexican citizens. 

Mexicans who choose allegiance to the CEs in Mexico are making a similar choice. 

So success depends on elevating social consciousness to a degree that has not been 

necessary at any previous time on the drug issue. The level of collective social commitment to avoid Mexico-sourced drugs must be very high to overcome the reluctance of drug users to give up some of their sources or choices. No national cause 

has required this level of joint commitment of Americans on any issue since World 

War II. 

COUNTERMEASURES

We—the United States and Mexico acting together—must act decisively now. It 

will require a close partnership with, and often following the leadership of, the 

Mexican government. The alternative is the catastrophic consequences of a destabilized Mexico. 

Strategic Considerations Today 

Strategically, we first acknowledge that the most pressing threat is strangulation 

of U.S.-Mexico trade. This differs from the conventional wisdom of some strategists 

described above. Importation of illegal drugs and illegal aliens are of course enormous and multi-faceted concerns. In addition to the harm these activities do to the 

United States, they also fuel the CEs. But the significance of these harms is overshadowed by the fact that if the Mexican economy fails, all efforts to control these 

CE activities will also fail because Mexican government resistance will disintegrate. 

The CEs will then have ready access to multiple alternative sources of income from 
55 

the diversified criminal activities within Mexico and will have protected bases in 

northern Mexico from which to extend criminal operations into the United States. 

Our two countries have labored under high levels of drug and alien smuggling for 

many years. Therefore, we can continue to do so at least until the CEs are broken. 

But we cannot afford a failed Mexico. Defending U.S.-Mexico commerce and investment is therefore our most pressing focus. 

Strategic allocation of resources and priorities generally involves identifying the 

essential components of a criminal group or industry, focusing on those components 

that are most essential to the criminal activity and most vulnerable to governmental 

action, and attempting to bring specific remedies to bear on those pressure points 

on the criminal organism. As an example, movement of money from undocumented 

immigrants’ sponsors to coyote organizations through an immediate payment mechanism such as Western Union is an essential element of the coyote business model 

in the Southwest. The coyote money arriving in Phoenix was a root cause of substantial violence—home invasions, kidnappings (i.e., theft of human cargo by rival 

coyotes), and inter-coyote assaults and murders. The wire transfers are subject to 

law enforcement interference. So focusing on those transactions was a very effective 

strategy to combat coyote violence in Arizona in the 2001–2009 time frame. 

Applying this strategic process to Mexican CEs points to focusing on their interaction with legitimate businesses, such as interaction to accomplish money laundering and interaction with business suppliers of necessary services and materiel, 

such as money movement, communication equipment, weapons, or vehicles. This 

presents challenges when applied to the Mexican CEs’ diversified criminal activities. 

The expanded list of Mexican criminal enterprises’ criminal activities includes petroleum theft, agricultural crop theft, product counterfeiting, cargo hijacking, business 

kidnapping, business extortion, and import/export fraud. These all require substantial business-directed infiltration, subversion, and corruption in the target industries. But U.S. law enforcement is generally ill-prepared and woefully understaffed 

to counter such attacks. Moreover, these activities are much more centered in Mexico than drug and human smuggling. U.S. law enforcement is particularly ill-prepared to conduct business-directed financial investigations in connection with businesses operating in Mexico. 

Ultimately, success or failure will pivot on two key fulcrums: The U.S. public’s 

recognition that use of Mexico-sourced drugs is killing North America economically 

and the Mexican people’s continuing support of their government’s efforts to maintain the rule of law. If either of these fails, Mexico will likely descend into economic 

ruin and political instability, and large parts of the U.S. economy, particularly in 

the Southwest, will sink with it. 

IMMEDIATE TERM COUNTERMEASURES

In the immediate term, focusing on preserving U.S.-Mexico commerce points to 

several parallel goals: 

(1) Focusing U.S. and Mexican investigation and prosecution on the CEs’ incursions into commercial activities, with the investigations centered in Mexico and 

the prosecutions in the United States; 

(2) Cutting off CEs from sources of income, services, and materiel that the 

United States has direct influence over, specifically money laundering, including 

the payments for illegal drugs and aliens, and the weapons flowing south from 

the United States; and 

(3) Recasting and vastly expanding efforts to prevent and treat U.S. use of Mexico-sourced drugs. 

Investigations and Prosecutions 

The first of these focal points will require significant new approaches and resources: 

Business Outreach 

a. U.S. Government outreach to all U.S.-Mexico international businesses. Enlist 

as allies those that are in some way facilitating the CEs, wittingly or unwittingly. 

As examples, money transmitters and stored value program operators are used by 

CEs to transfer value from the United States to Mexico without the risk and expense of smuggling bulk cash. Hundreds of millions of illicit dollars pass through 

these systems annually. Review anti-money laundering programs and industry contribution of data relating to these transactions and gather industry insights into 

how the illicit money flows and how industry members could prevent or report it. 

ICE began similar efforts with its Trade Transparency Unit in 2009. 
56 

Industry Teams and Strategies 

b. Recruit and train Federal and State investigators and prosecutors in the United 

States and Mexico to address specific criminal industries, to include petroleum theft, 

cargo hijacking, import-export fraud, kidnapping/extortion, and intellectual property 

theft (i.e., product counterfeiting) aimed at international businesses. Enlist victim 

businesses to educate law enforcement and to partner with law enforcement in focused attacks on these diversified criminal activities. Expand existing Federal and 

State racketeering efforts to support bringing trade-based civil and criminal racketeering cases in U.S. courts. 

The strategic analysis applied by these teams, as elsewhere, would start by identifying the components that permit the CEs to continue and prosper and thereby 

threaten U.S.-Mexico trade. It would proceed to identify those components that are 

most essential to the CEs’ endangerment of the U.S.-Mexico economy, and then 

those components among them that are most vulnerable to Government attack. 

An effective strategy calls for objectively quantifiable, meaningful goals and objectives. The amounts of drugs seized and the number of arrests of CE participants 

have served this purpose badly. They measure the wrong metrics, and do so ambiguously. We need to focus on Mexican business measures, particularly businesses involving the border area, and on the effective net profit of the CEs. Certainly this 

second figure is particularly difficult to estimate and will require some incisive research, but this is a war of attrition, and we need to aim at the center of the target, 

so we need do the work necessary to estimate this figure and keep it ever in front 

of us as our ultimate measure of success. A goalie measures success by the number 

of saves. A warrior measures success by the eradication of the enemy. 

Coordinated and Data-Sharing Organization 

c. Collect these investigators and prosecutors in multi-agency collocated task 

forces modeled on the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) or Border Enforcement Security Taskforce (BEST) task forces. HIDTAs and BESTs presently dot 

the Southwest Border in strategic locations on the U.S. side. One BEST team already exists in Mexico City. These investigative operations would involve Mexican 

and U.S. investigators and focus on some specific areas of organized criminal conduct that directly attack commerce. The leaders on this list include petroleum 

thefts, truck and train cargo hijackings, extortion, kidnapping, and import-export 

fraud, but the list also includes financial industry segment. These particularly include the money transmitter and prepaid industries, which have both indicated willingness to work constructively with law enforcement. 

This kind of operation is not new to law enforcement. As an organizational model, 

the HIDTA example of multi-agency cooperation effectively crosses jurisdictional 

boundaries and cuts across different levels of government, and it can also be applied 

to multi-national cooperation and industry partners operating in an appropriate capacity. 

These groups would solicit industry participants’ knowledge of their industry’s 

vulnerabilities to penetration and victimization and acquire detailed understanding 

of the particular circumstances of CE attacks on that industry. Law enforcement 

would in turn pass on knowledge about the criminal organizations’ activities and 

trends to industry to enable industry to assess threats and harden defenses. These 

groups would jointly encourage industries’ coordination within and among themselves to alter practices to make victimization more difficult. They could also serve 

as bridges between industry and law enforcement and non-governmental organizations engaged in social programs, such as programs addressing the roots of gang recruitment, for example Todos Somos Juarez, created a year ago in the wake of the 

massacre of 15 non-gang-affiliated young people in Juarez by drug gunmen. 

These task forces would be located in both the United States and Mexico, particularly in commercial centers such as Monterrey, Hermosillo, Tijuana, Juarez, and 

Saltillo. They would be administered to accommodate Mexican leadership of these 

operations in Mexico and still allow them to bring the resulting criminal prosecutions and civil RICO cases in U.S. courts using U.S. statutes. Like the U.S. HIDTAs, 

they would depend heavily on non-Federal officers and prosecutors. Because the conviction rate in Mexico is under 5%, the United States and Mexico must rely on continued extradition support from Mexico, which is now extraditing record numbers 

of defendants, until the Mexican statutes and judicial system are prepared to assume full partnership in the prosecutions. 

One major impediment to the development of such coordinated trade preservation 

expertise is the lack of data connectivity among the law enforcement agencies most 

available to develop such cases. In particular, while each HIDTA is now independent, has its own way of doing business, and its own unique mix of law enforcement initiatives, they lack effective data connectivity in the Southwest, and of 
57 

course in Mexico. Although the information stored at one HIDTA could be necessary 

to further an investigation in another region, existing intelligence-sharing mechanisms are not set up to provide smooth access to the data in near real time. Enhanced data connectivity would move the HIDTAs into position to serve as the foundation for the proposed new groups. 

d. Expand U.S. judicial and related support resources in the economic centers 

with most direct trade and business headquarter connections with Mexico, such as 

San Diego, Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Antonio, Dallas, Houston, New Orleans, 

Miami, and New York. Substantial new prosecutions require substantial new resources. 

The second of the focal points is money laundering, including bulk cash flow into 

Mexico. The strategic analysis described above identifies money laundering as an essential CE activity, one that directly leverages the CEs’ infiltration of commerce and 

threat to trade, and one that is vulnerable to government action. Anti-money laundering enforcement has the triple advantages of attacking the economic incentive to 

engage in crime, making conducting a CE harder by interfering with the flow of 

money that CEs need to maintain their operations, and pointing investigations and 

prosecutions to dominant or corrupt participants and to specific CE operations by 

following the money trail back to them. Investments of CE proceeds in the United 

States are vulnerable to forfeiture and prosecution. The existing substantial efforts 

to locate and seize illicit money in transit should be expanded and better unified 

through intelligence sharing and resource coordination. Technologies such as tracking devices and license plate readers should be fully integrated into this intelligence 

coordination. Additional research into alternative means of value movement should 

cover black market peso exchange money laundering, other trade-based money laundering, and stored value devices. 

Regarding the flow of weapons, cross-border multi-jurisdictional task forces similar to those described above must focus on the reduction of the flow of weapons into 

Mexico. These prosecutions would include racketeering actions against U.S. gun sellers who are aware that their sales are facilitating Mexican CEs. Racketeering prosecutions could also be used to vindicate civil liability for providing substantial assistance to CEs in connection with the shooting deaths of Mexican police officers 

with weapons traced to those selected complicit U.S. sellers. 

These efforts should be supported by National legislation controlling movement of 

weapons into Mexico, such as requiring reporting of multiple sales of high-risk long 

guns (e.g., AK–47-style assault rifles) and large ammunition sales, and banning certain assault rifles and high-caliber weapons (e.g. .50 cal. weapons). 

The money and gun interdiction efforts will take place largely in the United 

States. Law enforcement resources for these efforts are now made possible in part 

by the presence of the National Guard, which contributes directly to these efforts 

and also makes resources available that would otherwise be required to do things 

that the Guard does. Keeping the National Guard on the border is therefore an important objective. 

The third of the focal points, preventing and treating use of Mexico-sourced drugs, 

will require, above all else, broad recognition of the consequences of funding the 

Mexican CEs by using Mexican-sourced drugs. A massive public education effort 

would get the truth to potential consumers, who, once aware of the consequences, 

will do the right thing. U.S. consumers have dramatically changed attitudes toward 

drunken driving and smoking once made aware of the consequences. They will also 

do so with regard to the threat to the economic survival of Mexico, the extreme violence, and the erosion of the quality of life in Mexico that are the consequences of 

Mexico-sourced drug use in the United States. U.S. consumers have not done so because they do not know the facts. The Me ́rida Initiative contained an explicit commitment to invest more resources in demand reduction. The administration has not 

adequately funded such efforts, although it has acknowledged the role of U.S. consumers in the CEs’ rise. We can’t continue to make empty promises. Nor can we 

fail to inform the public of the threat when informing the public is the best way 

to reduce that threat. 

THE TIME FACTOR

The above immediate term goals would have been timely if begun 4 years ago 

when President Caldero ́n began his initiative. Experience with new or rapidly expanding government operations counsels that these operations will take significant 

time to get into effective motion, but time is now very short. This time factor calls 

for some action that could buy breathing space to allow these initiatives to gain momentum. 
58 

This is a war of attrition in which the enemy is receiving vast amounts of income. 

At the same time, the enemy is not frugal, and is not saving its income. On the 

contrary, the gunmen who are responsible for the violence are living life day-to-day, 

spending freely in the shadow of a consciously or subconsciously held (and wellfounded) belief that they will probably die an early death. A sudden and substantial 

loss of criminal income would create a cash flow crisis and massive disruption of 

operations, disloyalty, and internal strife, particularly among the young guns for 

whom the allure of sudden wealth makes their high-risk, high-adrenalin life glorious 

in their eyes. 

The United States and Mexico, working together, probably have the capacity to 

create a short-term (6 to 18 months) cash flow crisis by moving decisively to cut off 

southbound cash and guns and, incidentally, northbound smuggled goods—drugs 

and humans. This would be a fully bi-national program, as with all of these proposals, involving Mexican support in the form of extraditions and access to defectors, in addition to mirroring U.S. efforts on the south side of the border. The particulars of such an operation are beyond the scope of this discussion. The obstacles 

are daunting. Moving investigators or officers to the border or to off-border theaters 

with direct effect on the border is complex and can be prohibitively costly in short 

terms. Identifying precise efforts that could be ramped up in a short time and that 

will have surgical effects on CE income is obviously difficult. Nevertheless, a concerted and coordinated effort to create a cash-flow crisis has not been done before. 

If successful, it would buy time to effectuate other longer-term countermeasures. It 

is worth the effort for the appropriate U.S. and Mexican representatives to attempt 

to work out the particulars of such an effort and assess its potential. 

LONG-TERM GOALS

Focusing on preserving U.S.-Mexico commerce points to other long-term goals, including: 

1. Expand support of Mexico’s on-going reforms of its judicial system to make 

it more transparent, more resistant to corruption, and therefore more credible 

in its results; 

2. Support of freedom of the Mexican press by assisting with investigations of 

intimidation and assassination of journalists and other media representatives; 

3. Form joint anti-corruption initiatives partnering with U.S./Mexico international businesses to address corruption that affects U.S./Mexico trade; 

4. Support of on-going Mexican reforms of the Federal and State police by offering training and technical support of Mexican law enforcement agencies and the 

Mexican military; 

5. Promote more effective Mexican statutes adapting concepts from U.S. forfeiture, racketeering, and terrorism statutes to the Mexican legal framework; 

6. Reduce the availability of young gunmen in northern Mexico by restructuring 

manufacturing opportunities, perhaps by encouraging plants to move from population centers, improving working conditions, and matching job supply and 

local demand for jobs more effectively to minimize excess labor supply. 

7. The joint investigation and prosecution efforts described as immediate-term 

objectives and the training, statutory, and labor-related objectives described 

above imply a final set of objectives aimed at cross-border communication and 

cooperation. In addition to training, the United States and Mexico must fund 

and revitalize joint legislative and executive groups such as trade groups, border governors, border attorneys general, judicial conferences, and other similar 

non-governmental groups that serve to break down barriers to joint law enforcement and judicial cooperation. 

CONCLUSION

Although the situation is dire, it is not hopeless. Mexico has indicated its will to 

survive by enacting sweeping judicial and anti-money laundering reforms. It is in 

the process of effecting fundamental anti-corruption measures. It is using military 

and newly created law enforcement capabilities and it is working with U.S. law enforcement more closely than at any time in memory. By acting now and working 

together we can still defeat this common enemy. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Horne. I would go on to say that 

it is a Constitutional obligation, not a political obligation, to protect 

the border. We have failed the States, the Federal Government has. 

Mr. HORNE. That is correct. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Sheriff Gonzalez. 
59 

STATEMENT OF SIGIFREDO GONZALEZ, JR., ZAPATA COUNTY, 

TEXAS 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, good 

morning and thank you for the invitation to appear before you. 

Ranking Member Keating, also thank you, sir, and, of course, my 

Congressman, Dr. Cuellar. 

Mr. Chairman, we formed in 2005 a coalition of sheriffs, because 

we were frustrated with our Government’s inability to preserve and 

protect the border. We were seeing many, many things that were 

happening, especially the criminal element coming into the country, that we were very, very concerned about the murderers, people 

that have tried to kill police officers, child rapists who were coming 

back into our country. We were, of course, very, very much concerned with that. 

We formed a coalition in 2005 and 2006. The sheriffs in Arizona, 

New Mexico, and California joined us in our efforts to speak with 

one voice to see if maybe then our Government, our Federal Government, would listen to us and provide some type of assistance to 

us. 

Mr. Chairman, I define domestic terrorism based on the Federal 

Government’s definition under 28 CFR, Section 0.85. That being, 

sir, and for the last seven words of this definition, citizens living 

along the Southwest border, would very much apply under the terrorism statutes. 

That is, sir, ‘‘the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian 

population, or any segment thereof’’—for the exception of this last 

seven words—‘‘in furtherance of political or social objectives,’’ we 

would have definitely domestic terrorism along the border, if not 

for the political and social objectives. 

Again, many people in our jurisdictions are very much afraid of 

what is happening in Mexico, yes. However, there is a very, very, 

as far as I am concerned, spillover violence towards our country. 

People perhaps claim that, if you are not involved in narcotics 

trafficking, you have nothing to worry about. Well, I differ with 

that, because there are many people that have gotten caught at the 

wrong place at the wrong time. 

We have seen, Mr. Chairman—and I have attached to my written testimony some photographs as attachments—we have seen 

armed individuals coming into our country. We no longer see individuals, or we still see some, but we now see also individuals coming into our country that are being escorted by armed individuals— 

individuals with machine guns on them, individuals that have been 

given instructions by the drug trafficking cartels in Mexico to shoot 

it out with law enforcement officers. Otherwise, they are going to 

have to pay, or they lose their load. 

In my situation, I have had deputy sheriffs in two different locations being shot at by smugglers of narcotics. I have also seen 

‘‘wannabes’’—but fortunately, my deputy sheriff who got injured seriously—where these individuals are transporting narcotics from 

Mexico that are being smuggled through our very porous border, 

are ramming our vehicles, causing our deputy sheriffs to roll over 

in their vehicles. 
60 

April last year we saw a kidnapping attempt, one of several that 

we have had in Zapata County. Fortunately, we were able to obtain 

some information and were able to stop the kidnapping from taking 

place. This did not stop the cartels in Mexico from trying again. 

Fortunately, again, we were able to spoil—or rather, foil—the second one also. 

Questioned, they were looking for a 34-year-old in Zapata County 

who has been missing now for almost a year. He was abducted in 

Zapata County in the United States by Mexican drug trafficking organizations, or ‘‘wannabes.’’ 

Again, we have seen the very ruthless, brazen, and open behavior of these cartels. When it comes to things like that, we are very 

much outgunned, and we are very much, you know, out—or overpowered, rather. 

On different occasions, again, we have tried to stop these individuals. We have been shot at. We have also seized, in our jurisdiction, weapons and ammunition going to Mexico. 

Yes, I admit that they were going to Mexico. However, information we received from them also was that part of this ammunition 

would remain in the United States, so whenever the cartels would 

come into the United States to continue their operations, they 

would be ready on the U.S. side of the border with ammunition and 

weapons to defend themselves. 

Now, I am talking here about ammunition such as .50-caliber 

machine guns, which we, of course, do not have. I really do not care 

to have them, but these are what the cartels are using. 

In my attachments, I also have attached a photograph of some 

hand grenades that were also caught in Zapata County, Texas— 

also, perhaps, destined for Mexico. Information again is that they 

were going to be—part of them were going to be left in Zapata 

County, or in the United States, for whenever this individual would 

come into the country. 

Again, we have seen on an almost daily basis what I define as 

spillover violence. We have defined it this way. We have defined 

spillover violence as, if there is a reaction by U.S. law enforcement 

for an action that occurs in Mexico or in the United States. That 

is the definition of our coalitions. 

We see it on an almost-daily basis along the border. The 

carjackings, the kidnappings, home invasions, the extortions, the 

shooting at officers from Mexico into the United States, or the individuals escorting loads. We see members of drug trafficking organizations going to police officers’ homes in the United States to 

threaten the families. 

We have, of course, seen the prison gangs and street gangs working with Mexican drug trafficking organizations, for all of this, 

again. 

Some of them are politicians. When I say politicians, I consider 

myself a public servant. But politicians will disagree with me about 

spillover violence. We do have spillover violence. 

Yes, like Mr. Cuellar mentioned, Congressman Cuellar, it is relatively safe on the U.S. side of the border. It is. However, we still 

have those worries about things that do happen. 

We see, of course, individuals such as a single mother in Starr 

County, Texas, that every time there is gunfire in Mexico, right 
61 

across the border, she has to jump under her bed along with her 

three daughters, because bullets hit her home in Starr County, 

Texas. 

We see that in El Paso. We have seen it in Brownsville, Texas, 

where colleges have had to be, you know, they have had to be 

awoken and evacuated, because of shootings. Ranchers in our jurisdictions are getting tired of people going through their property. 

We are seeing also, of course, what we saw last year, a rancher, 

Robert Krentz in Cochise County, Arizona, get murdered. Right before that we saw two Border Patrol agents in California get murdered, repeatedly run over by cartels—on the U.S. side of the border—shot 10 times, once between the eyes as a message to law enforcement. 

We all saw the shooting of another Border Patrol agent in Arizona not even a year ago. 

We have seen also what happens, for example, in Falcon Lake, 

the best bass-fishing lake in the Nation. That is in Zapata County, 

Texas. 

Mr. Chairman, you mentioned Ms. Hartley is present, and she 

has had an opportunity, of course, and I have had opportunity to 

talk to her on many occasions. 

Yes, her husband was killed in Mexico. However, the cartels in 

Mexico were warned that they were going over there, by spies that 

they have on the United States side of the border. 

We saw just what happened this last weekend, 13 individuals 

killed by drug trafficking organizations. 

Now, our problem there, Mr. Chairman, is that we were never 

warned by the Mexican government or our own Government about 

what is happening in Mexico, and for us to be cautioned—have cautioned us what happened. 

Some of these cartels stole boats in Mexico and came over to the 

United States side of the border. We were not aware of it. 

There has been many other things that have happened, Mr. 

Chairman, and I know that I am running out of time. However, 

Mr. Chairman, the National Drug Intelligence Center has given 

those figures of 286 cities in the country in 2008 that have had a 

presence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations. 

The same agency, the National Drug Intelligence Center, from 

the Department of Justice, also mentioned that in just 1 year’s difference, there was a difference of 286 cities being invaded by drug 

trafficking organizations. 

Mr. Chairman, the video I guess is showing right there, that is 

the video of cameras that we have with a grant from the Governor’s Office. I do not know if it can be replayed from the beginning again. 

But very briefly, Mr. Chairman, before I conclude my statement 

to you, this is videotape taken from the United States side of the 

border with cameras that the Governor’s Office has given us, a 

grant that is given us. 

We have been able to do in Texas in 3 years what SBI has not 

been able to do in billions of dollars in several years. This is proven 

technology. 

These are individuals crossing the border. Ninety-five percent of 

these cases—this is just six different clips—have been stopped by 
62 

us, by Border Patrol, by local law enforcement—95 percent success 

rate. 

What you see there, Mr. Chairman, those are neighborhoods 

right by the riverbank, individuals running through neighborhoods 

with bales of marijuana. 

What you see in a little bit, you will see in thermal imaging a 

bridge. That is an international bridge. You will notice that the 

cartels were right under the bridge, right under our noses, are 

transporting their narcotics and humans into the United States. 

You will also notice, sir, that is a bridge right there that you see. 

You will also notice a home next to it and just a little bit on thermal imaging. That is an official United States port of entry that 

these individuals are going across—feet away from the port of 

entry. 

So, Mr. Chairman, again, border sheriffs, we are very much concerned with what is happening and the very unique problems along 

the border. In almost 10 years, we have seen nothing but broken 

promises in protecting our Nation. 

September 11, 2001 was a very dark day in American history 

and the protection of a great Nation. What has changed in my 

backyard since then is very, very little. 

In Texas, Mr. Chairman, we have no choice. We have had to pick 

up the fight to save our counties. 

We did not ask for the battle of the border. However, we refuse 

to lose to criminals, Mr. Chairman. Border security is not a red 

issue. It is not a blue issue. It is a red, white, and blue issue. It 

concerns us. 

We have been fortunate to receive some funding for Operation 

Border Star, an operation from the State of Texas; Operation 

Stonegarden from our Federal Government. We wish that maybe 

our Federal Government would consider a BASI, a border area security initiative, such as what you have now in urban area security 

initiative, but this time include just the border area. 

We do have problems with information sharing. It is so unfortunate that our Federal partners did not want to appear in public 

with us, because that is one of the problems we have sometimes 

about sharing information. 

Again in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity. As I have always stated, sir, there cannot be homeland security without border security. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for what you do for our country. I appreciate everything you do, sir, and I would be more than glad to 

answer any questions that you may have. 

[The statement of Mr. Gonzalez follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SIGIFREDO GONZALEZ, JR. 

MAY 11, 2011 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, Members of the committee, it is an 

honor and a privilege to be invited to appear before your committee to discuss Border Security and Homeland Security issues from the view of local law enforcement. 

INTRODUCTION

Because of frustration in knowing that our Government was doing little to nothing in protecting our international border, Texas sheriffs along the Texas-Mexico 

border formed the Texas Border Sheriff’s Coalition in May 2005. Subsequently, in 
63 

1 28 C.F.R. Section 0.85. 

2Texas House of Representatives joint meeting of the Border & Intergovernmental Affairs 

Committee and the Public Safety Committee, April 29, 2010. 

March 2006, and for the same reason, border sheriffs from New Mexico, Arizona, 

and California joined our efforts and we formed the Southwestern Border Sheriff’s 

Coalition. We felt then, and still do, that the 2,000-mile border with the Republic 

of Mexico is very much unprotected, wide-open, and extremely porous. 

The first and foremost priority of our coalitions is protecting all residents of this 

country against a terrorist act without regard to race, sex, color, or ethnic origin. 

We continue to believe that many persons have entered our country with intentions 

of harming us. We continue to believe that terrorists have expressed an interest and 

a desire to exploit the existing vulnerabilities in our border security to enter or attack the United States of America. 

BORDER VULNERABILITIES

Domestic Terrorism—Defined—Code of Federal Regulations: ‘‘... the unlawful 

use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political 

or social objectives.’’1 For the exception of the last seven words of this definition, 

people living along the Southwest border, as well as other areas of our Nation, have 

experienced and/or are presently experiencing some form of ‘‘domestic terrorism’’. 

There have been many instances where individuals coming into the United States, 

some armed with firearms, have been reported by landowners. Some of these landowners set up game cameras on their land. Some of these cameras have photographed armed individuals crossing their land. These individuals were probably 

drug or human smugglers that were armed while escorting, or ‘‘protecting’’, whatever it was that they were tasked to protect. Figure 1 on the attachments shows 

these individuals. These smugglers will not hesitate to engage law enforcement in 

the United States. 

In many counties along the border, police receive reports from informants of 

kidnappings in their respective counties. Individuals are kidnapped and taken to 

Mexico for ransom. Family members seldom file official reports due to fear of retaliation. In Zapata County, as well as in other counties along the border, we receive 

reports from informants of kidnappings in our counties. 

On April 2, 2010, a kidnapping was thwarted in Zapata County, Texas. Enforcers 

of the Zeta Cartel were sent to Zapata County to kidnap and take to Mexico an individual who they thought had provided information to the Zapata County Sheriff’s 

Office regarding a marijuana transaction. They were to kidnap the Zapata resident 

and take him to Mexico where they were to kill him, videotaping the killing. Four 

of the six involved are from the Mexican state of Durango, another from Zapata, 

and yet another from Roma, Texas. Information was obtained about the kidnapping, 

surveillance was conducted, and arrests were subsequently made. The cartel kept 

trying. Another attempt was recently foiled by law enforcement. 

The FBI’s Assistant Agent-in-Charge of the McAllen, Texas, office, John Johnson, 

now retired, testified before a joint hearing of the Border and Intergovernmental Affairs Committee and the Public Safety Committee of the Texas House of Representatives that kidnappings had almost doubled between October 2008 and September 

2009. He stated that most were connected to the drug trade. He was quoted as saying that ‘‘Fiscal Year 2009 was off the charts.’’2

Abductions are also very common along the United States side of the border of 

South Texas. I am still searching for a missing 34-year-old Zapata resident. This 

resident was tricked and subsequently abducted in Zapata County by Mexican cartel 

wannabes. It is believed that he was killed somewhere either in Zapata County or 

Mexico. This case is still under investigation. 

BORDER THREATS

Through intelligence information we have learned that several murders along the 

Texas-Mexico border, have been orchestrated by members of drug cartels operating 

on both sides of the Rio Grande River. These drug cartel enforcers cross the Rio 

Grande River, some illegally in areas other than a designated port of entry, commit 

their murders, or other crimes in the United States, then go back to Mexico, again, 

via the Rio Grande River. They are very well-armed and are determined to accomplish their goal. 

Prison and street gangs in the United States have formed partnerships with Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) and are their enforcers in the United 

States. 
64 

3 National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Department Of Justice, Drug Market Analysis, 

South Texas High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, 2008. 4 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, Situation Report, April 11, 

2008. 5 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, Situation Report, April 2010. 

More and more, law enforcement is seeing, and citizens are reporting, armed individuals entering the country via the Southwest border through areas other than a 

port of entry. It is a matter of time before a shootout will occur between law enforcement and armed drug/human smugglers. In the unfortunate event of a shootout, 

Federal, State, and local officers along the Southwest border, seeing the weapons 

used by the cartels (Attachments Figures 2 and 3), are not adequately armed. Compared to the ruthless, brazen, and open behavior of these cartels, law enforcement 

is certainly outmanned and outgunned. 

On two different occasions within the last year, deputy sheriffs were shot at while 

they were trying to apprehend individuals who had absconded when they were 

stopped for a traffic violation. Drug smugglers are also ramming law enforcement 

vehicles during pursuits. I recently lost one brand new vehicle when a drug smuggler rammed our vehicle while trying to elude us. As a result of the ramming, the 

vehicle rolled over and was a total loss. Luckily, the deputy sheriff driving it was 

not seriously injured. 

In Zapata County, Texas, during one operation, deputy sheriffs seized several 

rounds of .50 caliber cartridges during a traffic stop. The ammunition was seized 

from individuals that were working for the Zeta Cartel. The ammunition, along with 

camouflage netting and night vision equipment, was believed to be headed towards 

Mexico (Figure 4 in the Attachment Section). Speculation was that if the ammunition was not to be taken to Mexico, it was going to be stockpiled along the border 

in the event the war in Mexico would end up in Texas. More of these types of seizures have occurred in many areas of the Texas-Mexico border. On December 16, 

2010, a reported gang member was arrested in Zapata County after 30 hand grenades were discovered hidden under the spare tire of the vehicle he was driving (Attachment Section Figure 5). 

In confirming the above, the National Drug Intelligence Center has stated that 

‘‘drug traffickers in the South Texas High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) 

region use sophisticated surveillance, counter-surveillance, and communication techniques to aid their trafficking operations. Mexican DTOs maintain cells that monitor 

law enforcement activities and the smuggling operations of rival traffickers.’’3

According to a 2008 report of the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), U.S. 

Department of Justice, drug traffickers and gang members involved in drug smuggling frequently commit assault, automobile theft, burglary, extortion, and murder 

throughout the United States, specifically the South Texas border area to facilitate 

smuggling activities and to protect their operations from rival trafficking organizations and gangs. 

This same agency, in a Situation Report published on April 11, 2008, illustrate 

that Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations are the most pervasive organizational 

threat to the United States. The DTOs are active in every region of the country and 

dominate the illicit drug trade in every area of our Nation. Federal, State, and local 

law enforcement reporting reveals that Mexican DTOs operate in at least 195 cities 

throughout the United States.4

A similar report published by the NDIC in April 2010, revealed that in 2009, 

Mexican DTOs operated in 1,286 cities. The report indicates that the NDIC assessed 

this information with high confidence. It should also be noted that in the same report there is a caveat that the increase does not necessarily represent an increase 

in Mexican DTO activity but the difference could simply reflect a significant change 

in the information collection methodology.5 I tend to disagree with the explanation 

of the NDIC. From speaking to law enforcement officers from other parts of the Nation, Mexican DTOs are in fact very active in cities all across the United States. 

Information has been received by law enforcement that there have been times 

that rogue members or ‘‘wannabes’’ of Mexican DTOs have contemplated killing a 

police officer on the U.S. side of the border. It is believed that Mexican DTO higherups have never approved of such killing as this would draw many law enforcement 

officers and military personnel to the border area, thus, halting their smuggling operations. Two Federal agents (Border Patrol) have been killed at the California/Mexico border, and one at the Arizona/Mexico border. Our U.S. Government basically 

continues to fail to acknowledge these senseless killings by young punks. 
65 

6 Recording of 9–1–1 call to Laredo Police Department requesting assistance after a gun battle 

in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico www.pro8news.com/news/local/87295207.html (last visited May 7, 

2011). 

SPILLOVER VIOLENCE

Although many persons would disagree with me on the definition of spillover violence, there is a constant threat to counties along the Southwest border of our country of spillover violence from Mexico. Some of the threats law enforcement and residents along the border deal with on an almost-daily basis include, but are not limited to, the following: • kidnappings, • carjackings, • home invasions, • extortions, • shooting from Mexico at U.S. law enforcement officers, local, State, and Federal, • armed individuals escorting drug and human loads into the United States, • members of Mexican DTO’s visiting the homes of U.S. officers to threaten them 

and their families, • drug/prison/gang members working for Mexican DTO’s, • undocumented/deported criminals re-entering the United States, including murderers and child sex molesters, and, • auto theft (vehicles are used for smuggling of humans and drugs). 

Even though some of our politicians will negate the existence of spillover violence 

from Mexico, the above criminal violations are spillover violence as far as I am concerned. When people in the United States fear the cartels in Mexico, even if they 

are not involved in drug trafficking, but are afraid to be at the wrong place at the 

wrong time in their own country, this is terrorism which to me is the fear of spillover violence. 

Shootings in Mexico along the U.S.-Mexico border are very common across the 

border in the South Texas and the El Paso areas. On many occasions bullets from 

gun battles in Mexico have landed or hit structures on the U.S. side of the border. 

A police chief in South Texas who lives alongside the Rio Grande River hears the 

gunshots and sees the plumes of smoke and the flashes of grenades going off just 

yards from his residence. He wonders if his home will have any bullet holes when 

he awakens the next day. This happens often. Federal agents have documented 

these same incidents. 

A single mother living in Starr County, Texas, has to hide under her bed, along 

with her young daughters, every time she hears gunshots in Mexico. Bullets from 

gun battles in Mexico have struck her home. Figure 7 on the attachment shows the 

bullet indentations to her home. 

It is also known that bullets from gun fights in Mexico have also struck colleges/ 

universities in El Paso and Brownsville, Texas. The City Hall in El Paso was also 

struck. The college dorms in Brownsville, Texas, have been evacuated in the middle 

of the night due to gun battles in Matamoros, Tamaulipas, Mexico. 

An elementary school in San Ygnacio, Texas, in Zapata County, was placed on 

‘‘lockdown’’ last year due to someone hearing a gunshot across the river in that 

small community. San Ygnacio sits on the banks of the Rio Grande River. Children, 

ages 4 to 12, had to lie on the floor at their school for several hours until the threat 

was over. Parents frantically went looking for their children at the school only to 

be told they could not release any of the children because of the lockdown. 

Often, residents in our communities call upon local law enforcement every time 

there is a gunfight in Mexico. Residents of the United States are afraid that bullets 

from .50 caliber guns, or cartel members, will end up in their bedrooms. Most of 

America does not realize that these gunfights are just yards away from homes along 

the riverbank in the United States. The last incident regarding threats of bullets 

hitting a home in Zapata County was on April 13, 2011. Across the river in Starr 

County, Texas, gunfights happen on an almost daily basis. 

Federal officials at one of the international bridges in Laredo had to call the local 

police department for assistance after the threat of gunfire on the streets of Nuevo 

Laredo, Mexico, by the international bridge. Emergency calls are often made by 

bridge Federal officers to the Laredo Police Department requesting assistance.6

Hired escorts of illegal aliens and narcotics, known as coyotes of years ago, are 

very different today. Due to the openness and brazen behavior of these new coyotes, 

or cartels, these individuals are now armed and make demands of residents living 

along the riverbank. Many landowners constantly complain about their fences being 

cut by human and drug smugglers. The repairing of landowners’ fences becomes 

very expensive. Some of these landowners decide not to repair their fences since it 
66 

7San Antonio Express-News, posted on the web on 10/13/2006. Article written by Jesse Bogan, 

Rio Grande Valley Bureau. 8Texas DPS, BIA, Awareness Bulletin, 11/05/08. 

9Texas DPS, Media Relations Office, News Release, May 17, 2010. 

is very costly for them. They complain to local officers about the trash left on their 

properties. Some of the trash is eaten by their livestock, causing their livestock to 

die. 

In other counties along the border, residents are now scared with the big influx 

of immigrants coming across their property. These immigrants are not the same as 

what we saw 2–3 years ago. Many of the immigrants have tattoos across their chest 

or back advertising what gang they belong to and demand from the residents living 

along the border to use their phone or other necessities. They no longer ask for 

things but rather they demand. These landowners, who have lived on their farms 

for decades, choose to move away from their properties. Farmers along the border 

have reported to sheriffs that they have fear when working their fields. They report 

having their homes surrounded by drug or human smugglers until they are forced 

to leave. They report, with a lot of fear, when their homes get invaded by persons 

coming across the border and hide in their garages. Many residents living along the 

river live in fear. 

In a newspaper article appearing in the San Antonio (Texas) Express-News newspaper, the former county judge of Kleberg County, Texas, Judge Pete de la Garza, 

was quoted as saying, ‘‘I do not go to the back of my ranch after dark,’’ after discussing the different types of individuals coming across his ranch. The article mentions that Judge de la Garza runs cattle on about 500 acres and that undocumented 

immigrants in the area used to be harmless and poor Mexicans looking for work, 

whom his family would help with food and water as they passed through, but that 

now he and his family are personally taunted on his own property in recent years.7

Like Judge de la Garza, many landowners from San Diego, CA, to Brownsville, 

TX, have complained to county sheriffs that they fear living on their farms or 

ranches, or of going to their property after dusk. Some have chosen to sell their land 

or to move to towns and cities instead of living the comfortable and quiet lives on 

their own property. Farmers along the border have reported to sheriffs that they 

have fear when working their fields. 

On March 27, 2010, Cochise County, Arizona, rancher Robert Krentz was killed 

while on his ranch. It was very well known that Mr. Krentz, just like Judge de la 

Garza and his family would always help illegal immigrants coming through his 

property. He would do this in order to prevent these illegal aliens from destroying 

things on his property. It is believed that Mr. Krentz was killed by a drug smuggler 

who was discovered in the act of smuggling narcotics. 

In the small community of Kinney County, in April 2010, four suspects forced 

entry into a residence, beat the homeowner, and stole cell phones, a vehicle and 

cash. The homeowner stated that the invaders carried backpacks and appeared to 

be illegal immigrants. 

There are many areas within the 2,000-mile Southwest border that are used for 

recreational purposes, some private and some public. Falcon Lake, located in Zapata 

County, Texas, is an international lake and is considered by many to be the best 

wide-mouth bass fishing lake in the Nation. Falcon Lake and the Rio Grande River 

are used by Mexican fishermen for commercial fishing. 

Mexican DTOs issued a warning to commercial fishermen that anyone caught on 

Falcon Lake after dusk would be treated as a threat. They did this to ensure that 

if anyone was doing any smuggling without paying the tax they would be shot out 

of the water. Unfortunately, this also applied to law enforcement conducting operations on the lake or river. It was also reported that the drug traffickers would defend their loads at all costs against law enforcement.8 The Zeta Cartel currently 

controls the corridor along Falcon Lake, the ‘‘plaza’’ or turf, in Mexico that borders 

Falcon Lake. This cartel is well known for their use of extreme violence. 

On May 17, 2010, the Texas Department of Public Safety, in coordination with 

the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department and my office, put out a joint news release warning boaters on Falcon Lake to stay on the U.S. side of the lake and not 

to venture into Mexico. There had been at least three reported incidents of individuals getting robbed on the lake when in Mexican waters.9

It had been discovered several months before that, that tons of marijuana were 

being stored by the Zeta Cartel in an area across from Zapata, Texas, on the Mexican side of Falcon Lake, known as Arroyo Salado. When U.S. fishermen ventured 

into Arroyo Salado as they would always do to fish for their prized bass, they were 

accosted by cartel enforcers demanding to know who they were in order to rule out 

the possibility that these fishermen were not spies for their rival Gulf Drug Cartel. 
67 

10 National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Market Analysis, 

South Texas High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, 2008. 11 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, Situation Report, June 2009 

and U.S. Department of Justice, NDIC, Situation Report, June 2009. 

On September 30, 2010, Colorado residents David and Tiffany Hartley ventured 

into Arroyo Salado on their jet skis. They wanted to go into Old Guerrero (Mexico) 

in Arroyo Salado to take pictures of a now submerged church in the old town. This 

submerged church is a popular tourist attraction. David and Tiffany took their pictures and were on their way back to the United States when they were chased by 

commercial fishing boats while they tried to outrun them. The fishing boats were 

occupied by enforcers of the Zeta Cartel. These enforcers were shooting at them and 

a bullet hit David in the back of the head. He fell into the water. Tiffany headed 

back to the U.S. side of the lake to summon help after not being able to load her 

husband’s 250-pound body on her jet ski. Other than contacting Mexican authorities, there was very little U.S. law enforcement could do to help. 

As of today’s date, the body of David Hartley has not been found and it is believed 

that the body will never be recovered. 

During the Hartley investigation, it was learned that DTO’s in Mexico were forewarned that two jet skis were headed to the Arroyo Salado area, the stronghold of 

the Zeta Cartel. The DTO’s were warned by some of their own spies doing surveillance at the public boat ramp in Zapata, Texas. These DTO’s have spies on the U.S. 

side of the border at every border crossing in Texas. 

I have caused to be placed two 4′×8′ signs, one each in English and Spanish, at 

each of the boat ramps in Zapata County warning U.S. fishermen to stay away from 

Mexican waters. A photograph of one of the signs can be found in Figure 8 of the 

Attachments Section of my testimony. 

The National Drug Intelligence Center reported that increased operations in the 

United States and Mexico may be causing slight disruptions to some drug smuggling 

operations along the U.S.-Mexico border in South Texas.10 This, I believe, is attributed to increased patrol by local sheriff’s offices. 

In Laredo, Texas, a U.S. Border Patrol agent had to shoot and kill a suspect when 

he was attacked by the suspect while a marijuana load was being smuggled. More 

assaults against Federal and local agents have been documented. 

On February 2 of this year, two individuals believed to be Zeta cartel members 

were chased into the United States in Zapata County, Texas, by Mexican military 

forces. These individuals were taken into custody by U.S. Federal officials. The chasing of cartel members into the United States is somewhat common. Recently, a body 

was recovered from the Rio Grande River in Starr County, Texas. The body was clad 

in a military uniform. Under the uniform the body revealed street clothing. This individual was either killed by cartel members or the Mexican military thinking he 

was a Mexican soldier and then dumped in the river or in the process of escaping 

death in Mexico he tried to flee into the United States and drowned. A picture of 

the body has been included in the Attachment Section as has been marked as Figure 9. U.S. law enforcement has to respond to incidents such as this—known to me 

to be ‘‘spillover violence’’. 

The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) issued a report in response to 

heightened interagency concern over the mounting threat posed to U.S. National security from increased violent activity associated with drug trafficking along the 

U.S.-Mexico border. The key findings of the report found that: • Mexican drug traffickers engage in violent offenses—including kidnappings— 

within U.S. communities along the Southwest border. 

• Mexican drug cartels train enforcement groups and cell members to perpetrate 

kidnappings in the United States and Mexico. Cartel-run training camps are 

typically located in Mexico; however, in 2008, law enforcement authorities discovered a training camp in South Texas that was operated by members of the 

Gulf Cartel’s enforcement arm, Los Zetas. 

• Mexican DTOs also use U.S.-based prison and street gangs to carry out enforcement-related activities, including kidnappings in the Southwest Region. 

• Drug-related kidnappings are increasing in some U.S. cities near the Mexico 

border. The actual number of kidnapping incidents is most likely higher, since 

many drug-related kidnappings are not reported because the victims are involved in drug trafficking or are fearful of deportation.11

Another matter that I feel threatens the security of Texas and the Nation is the 

constant incursion of Mexican military helicopters into Texas land. These incursions 

are more common now and more frequent. I have personally reported these incursions and have been told by my own Federal Government that these incursions did 

not exist and that there was no record of any such flyovers. I have attached a copy 
68 

of a letter received from a new media outlet indicating no such incident after a request for information was sent to the FAA. It is included in the Attachment Section 

as Figure 11. The photographs of the Mexican military helicopters are marked as 

Figure 10. This goes to show that the radar system utilized by our Federal Government is not working. These aircrafts fly into our country at what witnesses describe 

‘‘treetop’’ level. 

Lately, we have received information that Mexican DTOs are planning on fighting 

for what they call the Medina Addition plaza (plaza means turf in Spanish) in Zapata County, Texas. Medina Addition is a subdivision of the town of Zapata, Texas, 

and is known for harboring cartel members from Mexico. This has caused many 

problems for my office. The majority of our calls for service come from this subdivision because people are afraid. The fighting for this plaza is between the Gulf Cartel 

and the Zeta DTO. 

I mention this plaza, or turf, fight because Mexican DTOs apparently do not care 

about law enforcement in the United States and it further proves that these Mexican DTOs are attempting to take over more cities and towns in the United States. 

The same applies to juvenile gangs in our country forming to start working for 

Mexican DTOs. Prison/jail gangs are also doing the same thing. 

What has been reported to my office now more and more is individuals that invade homes, or are seen getting out of vehicles and going into areas covered with 

brush, wearing hoods on their heads to hide their identity and carrying firearms. 

They are supposedly gang members in the United States that are hired by the Mexican DTOs to act as their enforcement arm in the United States. They have at times 

approached individuals that have been mistaken for the ones they are supposed to 

target. 

SUMMARY

Border sheriffs are very concerned with the very unique problems along our border. In 9 years we have seen broken promises of protecting our great Nation. September 11, 2001, was a dark day in American history and the protection of a great 

Nation. What has changed since that day along the border and in my backyard? 

Very little. 

In Texas, our legislature, with State monies, has funded a border security initiative that has literally shut down criminal enterprises in several Texas counties. 

We did this with State funds and working with other partners on an initiative 

that puts law enforcement in the driver’s seat instead of the cartels, smugglers, and 

border crossing criminal entrepreneurs. This should have been done on September 

12, 2001, by our Federal Government. The lack of Federal funding for local law enforcement to provide border security hasn’t just failed me and my law enforcement 

comrades . . . it has failed Americans. Almost 10 years from that day and the border remains open to smuggling operatives, criminal organizations, and people aimed 

at destroying this Nation. 

In Texas we have no choice; we have had to pick up the fight to save our counties 

and our country. We didn’t ask for this battle on the border... but we refuse to 

lose to criminals! Border Security is not a red issue or a blue issue . . . it is a red, 

white, and blue issue. 

SOLUTION

Fortunately for our constituents in Texas, the Texas Legislature during the 80th 

(2007) and 81st (2009) Legislative Sessions granted the request of Governor Rick 

Perry and appropriated several million dollars for border security. I honestly believe 

that sheriffs along the Texas-Mexico border have used the share awarded them very 

prudently. 

On the Federal side, funding appropriated thru Operation Stonegarden has 

helped. It is the desire of local law enforcement agencies located along the Southwest border that more of this funding be available for purposes of hiring personnel, 

such as is done with the COPS grants. 

An initiative similar to an Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) managed by 

DHS should be initiated and focused on making money available for border agencies. Said initiative could be designated as a Border Area Security Initiative, a 

BASI, where local law enforcement agencies within 25 miles from the Southwest 

border would be funded to perform ‘‘border security’’ operations. Sheriff’s offices 

along the border with Mexico are in need of additional funding for overtime for employees but at the same time they are in need of augmenting their manpower to 

enhance patrolling along the border. Criminal entrepreneurs must stop the illegal 

activities and their threats against a free society. 
69 

Sheriffs are the ones that respond to emergencies called in by their constituents. 

Sheriffs work in places other than paved roads. Local law enforcement works not 

only paved roads and highways, but also unpaved county roads, the riverbank, and 

other areas known to harbor and facilitate contraband entering illegally into the 

United States. Local officers know the area and the terrain they work at. They know 

the residents. They know the ranchers and farmers that traverse the various county 

roads. Local officers have a vested interest in their communities. 

Information sharing amongst Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies 

is extremely important. Sharing of information among the agencies needs to be improved, especially when it is expected from Federal agencies. 

The Texas Border Sheriff’s Coalition was awarded a grant by Texas Governor 

Rick Perry’s Office to install cameras along the border. This project, known as Blue 

Servo, has been very successful. We have been able to do in Texas in 4 years and 

with $4 million what Secure Border Initiative (SBI) could not do in years with billions of dollars. The cameras can be viewed on the internet by any persons that logs 

in to www.blueservo.net. They can then become virtual deputies and assist Texas 

sheriffs in monitoring drug smuggling activity. This program has proven to be very 

successful with virtual deputies from through the world. It is my understanding 

that DHS-Border Patrol has now copied our system and is installing cameras next 

to the ones that have been put up by TBSC. 

CONCLUSION

Committee Members, unfortunately the border with Mexico is still not secure and 

as far as local law enforcement is concerned, it has not changed much for the positive. There cannot be homeland security without border security. Our Southwest 

border needs immediate attention. Local officers answer emergency calls for assistance made by our constituents. We are in fact the first responders. 

I want to express my most sincere appreciation for allowing me the opportunity 

to appear before you today and thank you for the work you do for our Nation. 

Chairman McCaul, this concludes my statement. I will be pleased to answer any 

questions that you or Members of the committee may have. 
70 

ATTACHMENTS
71 
72 
73 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Sheriff. Let me say thank you for your 

service to the State and the country, and for the State of Texas 

standing up. The Federal Government needs to stand up with you. 

With that, I am going to go out of order. I apologize, Chief. We 

have a Member who has to leave in just a few minutes. Mr. Duncan wanted to ask the panel a question. 

I yield to the gentleman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thought it was interesting, Mr. Horne, that you mentioned 

400,000 folks. You used the word ‘‘invasion.’’ We have been invaded 

numerous times. 
74 

I study the Constitution. Article IV, Section 4, guarantees every 

State that joins the union or a republican form of government 

would also guarantee protection against invasion. That is a role of 

the Federal Government. Invasion is a word that does not just 

mean a military invasion. So, I think that was spot-on. 

I am a Member of a number of committees here in Congress, and 

I am a Member of the Natural Resources Committee and interested 

in on-going environmental battles that go on, especially on the 

Southern border, environmental regulations that prevent Border 

Patrol from accessing the border. 

So, really, I want to address this to Mr. McCraw, I guess. In addition to serving on this committee, I mentioned I serve on Natural 

Resources. I notice in your written testimony you state that the 

State of Texas has had to devote a lot of its own funds and resources to border security. 

So, have you found instances where the Federal environmental 

regulations have impeded the State’s ability to secure the border 

and apprehend illegal aliens? 

Mr. MCCRAW. Well, yes, sir. If you will talk to Border Patrol, 

they will tell you one of their—a serious threat to their agents, and 

also it diminishes their ability to locate individuals, drug traffickers as well as illegal aliens, is the Carrizo cane and the salt 

cedar. It is not a natural—in fact, it is a drought weed. 

It is growing up along the river banks, and the cartels use it to 

their advantage. You cannot see on both sides. You know, if someone is shooting from them, you do not know where they are at. 

Clearly, there is no reason to have it. 

So, I know Border Patrol has been working with the Federal 

Government, the EPA. I know we from the Department of Public 

Safety, you know, we have worked at the bequest of our sheriffs 

and chiefs of police to work with—and farmers and ranchers—work 

with Todd Staples, who is our commissioner of agriculture. There 

is a biological that will take care of that. 

It was just that—but yet, and here we are, 3 years after we have 

identified the biological. If you go down there and take a look, salt 

cedar and the Carrizo cane is still there. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Sheriff Gonzalez, I noticed on the video you showed 

either with infrared vision, some of that natural cover is truly 

cover, even for heat sensors and what not. So, I think that is interesting. 

I found out recently that there is a lizard that is preventing a 

lot of the fencing being put up. That lizard can be identified by 

being flipped over and dissected, basically to find out if it is the endangered one, versus—just, you know, to identify. 

I put a lizard in here to crawl up that wall right there. I know 

it will crawl over a fence. I see it every day in South Carolina with 

different lizards. 

Have you seen anything, Sheriff, along those lines? 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. We do have a problem with the growth, especially in a community called San Ignacio, where this growth is all 

the way up, you know, all the way down to the riverbank. We are 

not able to see anything or anybody coming across. 
75 

You get into this growth, Mr. Duncan, you will notice that there 

is what we call, like, tunnels under all this growth where smugglers went through there all the time. We cannot see them, though. 

But, yes, we definitely, like Mr. McCraw stated, we need to get 

rid of some things like that. In that area, as far as I know, there 

is nothing that would prevent a lizard, like what you are talking 

about, that would prevent them from being—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back, and thank you for your ability. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Now the Chairman recognizes Chief Rodriguez for 

his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF VICTOR RODRIGUEZ, MC ALLEN POLICE 

DEPARTMENT, MC ALLEN, TEXAS 

Cheif RODRIGUEZ. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating 

and all the Members, it is an honor to be before you today. On behalf of the city of McAllen and the McAllen Police Department, I 

extend our thanks for the opportunity to provide this testimony. 

The subject of the violence in Mexico brings us together today. 

There is some, maybe a great degree, of impression that the violence in Mexico is limited to the U.S.-Mexico border, and that U.S. 

cities in that border area are experiencing the same lawlessness. 

It is true. Violence in Mexico continues unabated. Horrific acts 

of violence, gruesome killings, mass murder, and countless atrocities typify the violence in Mexico today. 

Whereas we tend to believe that this lawlessness occurs only in 

the border region of Mexico, there appears to be no part of Mexico 

that has been spared by such violence. Whereas we tend to believe 

that the reach of drug trafficking activities, whether such be drug 

trafficking or drug-related violence, is limited to our border communities, there is no corner of our country that has been immune from 

the effects of that reach. 

We know that people in Mexico live in constant fear, not just for 

their safety, but for their lives, the lives of their children, and for 

their personal property. Their stories are pure horror. 

We often listen to them. We listen to them, because they escape 

to the United States and to our communities. They come to our 

communities, because they feel safe here. 

All of them get here as fast as they can. They envy our ability 

to simply call 9–1–1 and get a police response, and trust the system. 

Citizens in Mexico do not have a 9–1–1 that they trust. 

Their safety, and often their lives, are at the mercy of what they 

encounter on any given day. 

All of this, however, is in Mexico. My city is a border city. It is, 

as any other U.S. city, and in many cases a better, safer, less 

crime-ridden city. I would say that such is the case for all of Texas’ 

border cities. 

We are thriving communities. We are growing communities. All 

of our border cities are part of the economic engine of Texas. 

We get up every day. We send our kids to school, and we go to 

work every day, just like other Americans throughout our country. 

Nonetheless, there are important questions to explore. It is important to see clearly through the fog of all of this. 
76 

There is no question that drug trafficking at the hands of Mexican drug trafficking organizations poses a concern for all of us in 

the United States. There is no question that the violence in Mexico 

at the hands of Mexican drug trafficking organizations poses a concern for all of us in the United States. There is no question that 

the apparent unreliability of the criminal justice system in Mexico 

poses a concern to all of us as well. 

So, the questions are: Is the violence in Mexico unprecedented? 

Does the violence in Mexico threaten the American criminal justice system? 

Does the violence in Mexico represent a public safety concern to 

us? 

I respectfully suggest that the answers are yes, no, and yes. 

For some time now, Mexico has suffered from an image that portrays corruption, drug trafficking, and drug-related crime and violence. The violence in Mexico today, however, is unprecedented. 

It is a war between drug trafficking organizations, and it has 

taken the form of direct challenges and firefights with the authorities in Mexico. If they, drug trafficking organizations, were forces 

from another country, Mexico could be seen as at war and not winning. 

Whereas these drug trafficking organizations exercise their will 

in Mexico, they cannot threaten our communities, our criminal justice system and our form of government in the same manner. This 

is because we have local, State, and Federal police officers that rise 

to the challenge every day. 

They are in the hunt every day. They identify, arrest, and prosecute bad guys every day. They seize contraband every day. 

More importantly, we have a criminal justice system behind 

these officers that is reliable, trustworthy, and it is not subject to 

be trampled on, ignored, or made irrelevant. 

These officers and this system are untiring. They never rest. 

I recognize, though, that we have victims of crime every day. 

However, the system they entrust for help is not threatened by 

criminals. 

Should we simply disregard all of this as something not occurring 

in our country? No. We seize thousands and thousands of tons of 

drugs that we know were trafficked by these drug trafficking organizations. 

Drug trafficking through Mexico spans decades. Every ounce of 

those drugs was unlawfully introduced into our country. In every 

case, drug trafficking organizations trampled on our borders. 

Today, multi-ton seizures are not uncommon. 

There are landowners today that fear working their lands, because of these constant incursions. 

To this end, we have built walls, fences, and added thousands of 

boots on the ground. It is obvious that doing less on this front is 

not acceptable. 

The violence in Mexico does not affect us—I am sorry, the violence in Mexico does affect us. There are acts of crime that reach 

beyond Mexico. 

Although we do not fear this violence as if it were an invading 

force at our doorstep, our watch is constant, and our concern is 
77 

ever-present. The threat is not a visible army of criminals. That 

threat is invisible. 

That threat is drug trafficking money that creeps, infiltrates, and 

corrupts our communities. That threat is the crime that drug trafficking money causes. That threat is the criminals that drug trafficking organizations and their money buys. 

I would submit that it is prudent to be cognizant of the instabilities of our southern neighbor. It is prudent to contemplate worstcase scenarios. It is prudent to plan contingencies, and it is prudent to take measured steps. 

As we approach those steps, it is also prudent to consider that 

we are not a lawless frontier, and spillover does not mean an invasion. 

I suggest that the violence in Mexico is a concern that has 

brought us together. That very violence, the violence we decry 

today, occurs at the hands of U.S. weapons and ammunition unlawfully sold and exported to Mexico. 

Sadly, today we believe that we have lost one of our very own 

ICE agents to U.S. weapons and ammunition. 

I respectfully suggest that we study, propose, and pass legislation that more tightly controls the sale, resale, purchase, multiple 

purchases, possession, and transportation of weapons and ammunition. There is nothing right now that talks about ammunition in 

terms of laws against it. 

I respectfully suggest that we propose and pass legislation that 

more tightly controls, more severely criminalizes the unlawful sale, 

resale, purchase, multiple purchase, possession, transportation, and 

exportation of weapons and ammunition. 

I realize that these suggestions put our right to bear arms front 

and center. I do not wish to trample on that. However, I believe 

that our right to bear arms is not a right to arm a war in a foreign 

country. 

Approximately 70 percent of murders in Texas are committed by 

firearms. Few will contest that over 90 percent of the weapons and 

ammunitions in Mexico are U.S.-made. 

I believe that in addressing weapons and ammunition in this 

manner, we will make our communities safer. 

I suggest that we control our borders outbound through steadystate port of exit inspections similar to port of entry inspections. 

Please study, propose, and pass legislation that creates a steadystate law enforcement presence at our ports of exit. We need effective, efficient, southbound inspections designed to encourage compliance with U.S. laws and to deter exportation of guns, ammunition, stolen property, and fugitives. 

We have built human fences, real fences. We have built virtual 

fences. Those fences have great big holes in them—the ports of 

exit. They serve as express lanes to Mexico. 

Those ports of exit are our last defense. Whereas criminal activity in Mexico sometimes extends beyond Mexico and into our 

streets, it does so, because they can simply escape to their safe havens in Mexico. 

We must deter that mentality. If we do not, and escape to Mexico 

is merely an exercise, then the violence in Mexico will be ours to 

confront. 
78 

Let us deter and stop the unlawful exportation of guns and ammunition. Let us stop the daily southbound, unimpeded flow of our 

citizens’ stolen vehicles and stolen property. Let us stop the daily 

southbound, unimpeded flow of murderers, rapists, sex offenders, 

violent offenders. Steady-state southbound inspections will do that. 

Finally, I suggest that the underlying bases of these threats is 

illicit money. Money corrupts people and systems. Illicit money is 

the real threat. It is that invisible threat. 

Immediately following the attacks on us on September 11, we 

moved to identify and freeze financial assets. We moved in the direction of human intelligence and investigations. I suggest that the 

violence in Mexico and the threat it poses to Mexico and to our 

communities require a September 11-type of response for our country. 

Please study, propose, and pass legislation that creates a border 

financial crimes task force. Not only is this proposition an effective 

tool, but it will serve as a direct counter to the problem. It will 

serve as that line in the sand. 

We must answer this concern. We need coordinated, regionalized, 

investigative law enforcement to help identify and act against violent offenders and criminal organizations. 

In this context, Mr. Chairman, if you gave me a choice between 

500 boots on the ground or 25 investigators, I would say 25 investigators. Let us investigate the money. 

We should move against illicit funds associated with criminal organizations. We owe our communities a comprehensive and responsible action. 

I thank you for this opportunity and hope that we have contributed to a better America. 

[The statement of Mr. Rodriguez follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VICTOR RODRIGUEZ

MAY 11, 2011 

Mr. Chairman, Honorable Members of the committee, it is an honor to be before 

you today. 

On behalf of the city of McAllen and the McAllen Police Department, I extend our 

thanks for the opportunity to provide this testimony. 

The subject of the violence in Mexico bring us together today. 

There is some, maybe a great degree, of impression that the violence in Mexico 

is limited to the U.S.-Mexico border and that U.S. cities in that border area are experiencing the same lawlessness. 

It is true, violence in Mexico continues unabated. 

Horrific acts of violence, gruesome killings, mass murder, and countless atrocities 

typify the violence in Mexico today. 

Whereas we tend to believe that this lawlessness occurs only in the border region 

of Mexico, there appears to be no part of Mexico that has been spared by such violence. 

And, 

Whereas we tend to believe that the reach of the drug trafficking cartel’s activities, whether such be drug trafficking or drug-related violence, is limited to our border communities, there is no corner of our country that has been immune from the 

effects of that reach. 

We know that people in Mexico live in constant fear, not just for their safety, but 

for their lives, the lives of their children and for their personal property. 

Their stories are pure HORROR. 

We often listen to them. We listen to them, because they escape to the United 

States and to our communities. They come to our communities because they feel 

safe here. All of them get here as fast they can. 
79 

They envy our ability to simply call 9–1–1, get a police response and TRUST the 

system. Citizens in Mexico, do not have a 9–1–1 system that they trust. 

Their safety and often their lives are at the MERCY of what they encounter on 

any given day. 

ALL of this however IS Mexico. 

My city is a border city. It is as any other U.S. City and in many cases, a better, 

safer, and less crime-ridden city. I would say that such is the case for all of Texas’ 

border cities. 

We are thriving communities. We are growing communities. All of our border cities are part of the economic engine of Texas. 

We get up everyday. 

We send our kids to school and we go to work everyday just like other Americans 

throughout our country. 

Nonetheless, there are important questions to explore. It is important to see clearly through the FOG of all of this. 

There is no question that drug trafficking at the hands of Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations poses a concern for all of us in the United States. 

There is no question that the violence in Mexico at the hands of Mexican Drug 

Trafficking Organizations poses a concern for all of us in the United States; and 

There is no question that the apparent unreliability of the criminal justice system 

in Mexico poses a concern to all of as well. 

So the questions are: 

Is the violence in Mexico unprecedented? 

Does the violence in Mexico threaten the American criminal justice system? 

Does the violence in Mexico represent a public safety concern to us? 

I respectfully suggest that the answers are YES, NO, and YES. 

VIOLENCE IN MEXICO IS UNPRECEDENTED

For some time now, Mexico has suffered from an image that portrays corruption, 

drug trafficking, and drug-related crime and violence. 

The violence in Mexico today, however, is unprecedented. It is a war between 

drug-trafficking organizations. It has taken the form of direct challenges and firefights with authorities in Mexico. 

If they, the drug trafficking organizations, were forces from another country, Mexico could be seen as being at war and NOT winning. 

THE VIOLENCE IN MEXICO DOES NOT THREATEN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

SYSTEM

Whereas these drug trafficking organizations exercise their will in Mexico, they 

cannot threaten our communities, our criminal justice system, and our form of government in the same manner. 

This is because we have local, State, and Federal police officers that rise to the 

challenge every day. They are in the hunt everyday. They identify, arrest, and prosecute bad guys everyday. They seize contraband every day. 

Most importantly, we have a criminal justice system behind these officers, that 

is reliable, trustworthy, and it is not subject to be trampled on, ignored, or made 

irrelevant. 

These officers and this system are untiring. They never rest. 

I recognize that we have victims of crime every day. However the system they entrust for help, is not threatened by criminals. 

THE VIOLENCE IN MEXICO IS A PUBLIC SAFETY CONCERN TO US

Should we simply disregard all this as something not occurring in our country? 

No. 

We seize thousands and thousands of tons of drugs that we know were trafficked 

by these Drug Trafficking Organizations. Drug trafficking through Mexico spans 

decades. Every ounce of those drugs was unlawfully introduced into our country. In 

every case, Drug Trafficking Organizations trampled on our borders. 

Today, multi-ton seizures are not uncommon. 

There are landowners today that fear working their lands because of these constant incursions. 

To this end, we have built walls, virtual fences, and added thousands of boots on 

the ground. It is obvious that doing less on this front is not acceptable. 

The violence in Mexico does affect us. There are acts of crime that reach beyond 

Mexico. 

Although we do not fear this violence as if it were an INVADING FORCE at our 

doorstep, our watch is constant and our concern ever-present. 
80 

The threat is not a visible army of criminals, the threat is invisible. 

The threat is drug trafficking money that creeps, infiltrates, and corrupts our 

communities. The threat is the crime that drug trafficking money causes. The threat 

is the criminals that drug trafficking money buys. 

I would submit that it is prudent to be cognizant of the instabilities in our southern neighbor, it is prudent to contemplate worst-case scenarios, it is prudent to plan 

contingencies, and it is prudent to take measured steps. 

As we approach those steps, it is also prudent to consider that we are not a lawless frontier and spillover does not mean an invasion. 

WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION

The violence in Mexico is the concern that has brought us together today. That 

very violence, the violence we decry today occurs at the hands of U.S. weapons and 

ammunition unlawfully sold and exported to Mexico. 

Sadly, today we believe that we may have lost one of our very own ICE agents 

to U.S. weapons and ammunition. 

I respectfully suggest that we study, propose, and pass legislation that more tightly controls the sale, resale, purchase, multiple purchases, possession, and transportation of weapons and ammunitions. 

I respectfully suggest that we study, propose, and pass legislation that more tightly controls and more severely criminalizes the unlawful sale, resale, purchase, multiple purchases, possession, transportation, and exportation of weapons and ammunition. 

I realize that these suggestions place our right to bear arms front and center. I 

do not wish to trample on that. However, I believe that our right to bear arms is 

not a right to arm a WAR in a foreign country. 

Approximately 70% of Murders in Texas are committed by firearms. Few contest 

that over 90% of the weapons and ammunition in Mexico are U.S.-made. 

I believe that in addressing weapons and ammunition in this manner, we will 

make our communities safer. 

SOUTHBOUND STEADY-STATE INSPECTIONS

I respectfully suggest that we control our borders OUTBOUND through steadystate port of exit inspections, similar to port of entry inspections. 

Please study, propose, and pass legislation that creates a steady-state law enforcement presence at our ports of exit. 

We need effective and efficient southbound inspections designed to encourage compliance with U.S. laws and to deter exportation of guns and ammunition, stolen 

property, and fugitives. 

We have built human fences, real fences, and we have built virtual fences. Those 

fences have great big holes in them: The ports of exit. They serve as express lanes 

to Mexico. 

Those ports of exit are our last line of defense. Whereas criminal activity in Mexico sometimes extends beyond Mexico and into our streets, it does so because they 

can simply escape to their safe havens in Mexico. 

We must deter that mentality. If we don’t, and escape to Mexico is merely an exercise, then the violence in Mexico will be ours to confront. 

Let’s deter and stop the unlawful exportation of guns and ammunition. 

Let’s stop the daily southbound unimpeded flow of OUR citizen’s stolen vehicles 

and stolen property. 

Let’s stop the daily southbound unimpeded flow of murderers, rapists, sex offenders, and violent offenders. 

Steady-state south bound inspections will do that. 

BORDER FINANCIAL CRIMES TASK FORCE

Finally, I suggest that the underlying basis for of these threats is illicit money. 

Money corrupts people and systems. 

Illicit money is the real threat. It is that invisible threat. 

Immediately following the attacks on us on September 11, we moved to identify 

and freeze financial assets. We moved in the direction of human intelligence and 

investigations. 

I suggest that the violence in Mexico and the threat it poses to Mexico and to our 

communities, requires a September 11 type of response from our country. 

Please study, propose, and pass legislation that creates a BORDER FINANCIAL 

CRIMES TASK FORCE. 

Not only is this proposition an effective tool, it will serve as a direct counter to 

the problem. It will serve as that ‘‘line in the sand’’. We must ANSWER the concern. 
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We need coordinated, regionalized investigative law enforcement to help identify 

and to act against violent offenders and criminal organizations. 

In this context, if you gave me a choice between 500 boots on the ground or 25 

investigators, I would say 25 investigators. Let’s investigate the MONEY. 

We should move against illicit funds and assets associated with criminal organizations. 

We owe our communities comprehensive and responsible action. 

I respectfully thank you for this opportunity and hope that we have contributed 

to a better America. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Chief. Let me say that I agree with 

you. I know Congressman Cuellar does, as well. The interdiction of 

that southbound cash, how important that is. 

I think you are right. We need a bold effort here. 

I recognize myself. 

Let me just say how—I just want to say thank you for showing 

up. I know you had to travel a long ways on an airplane at your 

own expense. Again, I apologize for the duration of the prior panel. 

We got the Washington response to this in the prior panel, and 

now I believe we are getting the State and local response, the people on the ground, where this is happening, you know, where the 

threat really is. 

It is interesting how different those points of view are. Many 

times it is different between Washington and the rest of the United 

States. 

When Secretary Napolitano, though, stated that border security 

is better now than it has ever been, and the President agreed with 

her, just recently in El Paso, I want to go one by one and ask 

whether you agree with that statement or not. 

Mr. McCraw. 

Mr. MCCRAW. I did not hear the statement, but I will say this, 

that we are concerned, the fear is the increasing threat, that the 

border is not secure more than it ever was. 

There has been some successes. We would love to see all the Federal resources. But the bottom line is, it is not secured. Until it is, 

we are not going to be happy. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Horne. 

Mr. HORNE. I disagree with the statement. I think if she would 

meet with some ranchers on the border, as I have, she would get 

an earful as to the extent to which things are much worse than 

they were. 

She has some statistics that show some improvement. But if I 

could give an analogy, if we were to reduce her salary to $5,000 a 

year, and then the next—this is just an analogy, it is not a proposal—but then the next year, double it to $10,000, that would be 

a 100 percent increase. But it would still be inadequate in absolute 

terms. 

I think the same thing applies here. Even if there has been some 

improvement in numbers, the absolute situation is totally unacceptable. I mentioned 400,000 people a year crossing in the Tucson 

region alone. Even if that were a decrease from the prior year in 

absolute terms, it is utterly unacceptable. 

Things are going to be getting, possibly getting much worse, because the support for President Caldero ́n politically for his heroic 

actions is waning. So, things could get much worse. 
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So, to promote complacency at this time, I think is very dangerous and scary. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I agree with the President Caldero ́n comment. I 

think the window is shutting. His time is coming to a close, and 

he is really an effective partner that we need to be helping more 

in a post-Me ́rida operation. 

Sheriff, the same question. 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. Mr. Chairman, with all due respect to Secretary Napolitano, I know that she has been somewhat responsive 

to our needs. We communicate often through somebody in her office. 

But there has not been too much change in the border, sir. It is 

not more secure than it has ever been. We still have problems. 

I really have not seen any change since, like my statement read, 

since September 11, 2001. It is getting more violent. The smugglers 

are getting more brazen. They are given orders to confront us. 

So, it is not as if it is more secure. 

Think, for example, of not taking sometimes our cases regarding 

illegal immigrants. That brings your totals down. But we cannot 

just release them back into our communities, a lot of times, because they are criminals. Some of them are criminals. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I wanted to follow up on a point you made, the 

Border Area Security Initiative Grants. We have UASI grants, 

which are urban area. But we do not have the border area grant 

funding. Would that be helpful to the border sheriffs? 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. It most certainly would, Mr. Chairman. As I 

have discussed before, we are doing sometimes, unfortunately, the 

jobs of the Federal Government. 

We have to be the ones who—we are the first responders. We are 

the ones who have to respond to what happens on Falcon Lake and 

everywhere else. The Federal Government does not respond. 

So, yes, we do need the funding. 

With all due respect also, sir, there have been a lot of Federal 

agencies, specifically like, for example, Border Patrol. I am not 

speaking bad, but they now have 22,500 agents. 

How many of those agents are really going to the border, and 

how many are going to task force? How many are going to programs and schools? How many are going to programs at shopping 

malls? 

In other words, if you give me 10 deputy sheriffs, I am going to 

have 10 deputy sheriffs on the border, and that is what they are 

going to do, and not doing other stuff. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Chief Rodriguez, the question about is the border— 

more secure now than it has ever been? 

Cheif RODRIGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, we should not rely on one, two, 

or three variables to make that call. 

I am afraid that the basis for those statements are less Border 

Patrol apprehensions and less detections of drugs through the Border Patrol. They have interpreted that to mean we are bringing 

this under control. That is just not reliable enough to make that 

statement, in my opinion. 

We have incursions every day. We have people that are afraid to 

go out on their property. They are afraid to go out on their property. That is un-American. 
83 

So, if we rely on a set of numbers to simply make one point of 

view or the other, that will create a false picture of all of this. That 

is one of the problems that we are facing on a constant basis. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I could not agree with you more. 

I wanted to focus on the basis for this assumption. It is—and Mr. 

McCraw, you worked in the FBI for many years—it is based on the 

Uniform Crime Report. 

When I heard the description of what the violence that they are 

perpetrating, it is extortions, kidnappings, cartel-on-cartel violence. 

Yet, those very crimes are not part of the measurement under the 

FBI’s Uniform Crime Report. 

What is your opinion in terms of that not being an accurate assessment when we talk about spillover violence? 

Mr. MCCRAW. Well, you saw our data was established with the 

process back in 1930. Over the years, it is no longer applicable. We 

are talking about index crimes. It does not reflect what is going on 

on the ground in near-real time. 

For example, smuggling, trespassing, vandalism is, one, the increase of organized criminal activity, corruption. As you noted, the 

non-index crimes—kidnappings, extortions, and recruitment of our 

kids, child prostitution—where is that a good thing? 

You know, if you cannot reflect all those factors, if you cannot reflect the manifestation of violence that is not just at the border, but 

ends up in our cities, reflected by the Texas syndicate, Mexican 

mafia, Hermanos Pistoleros Latinos, and other gangs that are 

working directly for these cartels, then you have a false understanding of what that threat is. 

You are kidding yourself, because you are not going to secure the 

border through definitions. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I think that is an excellent answer. I do not think 

we are getting an inaccurate picture by this report that the administration is relying upon. In fact, you did quote a statistic about El 

Paso, which is always touted as the safest city in the United 

States, but an increase of 1,200 percent in the murder rate this 

year. 

Mr. MCCRAW. Yes, sir, as reported by the El Paso Police Department. That is the problem when you start using the Uniform Crime 

Report statistics that are dated to try to reflect what is actually 

going on. 

Another thing is that, the activities that we talked about, what 

you heard the chief talk about, are not happening in the cities, because we take a very proactive law enforcement presence. We are 

not going to allow cartels and gangs to move up and down into our 

cities. 

But where the smuggling activity is occurring is between the 

ports of entry. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Right. 

Mr. MCCRAW. The latest look at the Uniform Crime Reports, and 

I think that the Secretary will find, is that, if you segregate what 

the sheriffs are having to deal with, there is an increase in everything except stolen vehicles. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, I would like to work with your office, and all 

offices along the border and DOJ, to get a more accurate assess-
84 

ment for what is the level of violence, because I do not think we 

are getting the right, accurate picture. 

Special interest, they do not even know that number went up 37 

percent. That is a pretty frightening number when you are talking 

about people coming from countries of interest that could have terrorist ties, as well. 

I think, you know, even though the numbers of apprehensions 

have gone down, that number seems to be going up. That is a disturbing trend. 

Mr. MCCRAW. Well, and Texas has 74 percent of those special interest aliens across Texas that are apprehended. 

You hear us talk about, well, name one case, name one case. Obviously, the San Antonio Federal case of the Somalian is a significant concern, and underscores that this is not make-believe, that 

you cannot secure your borders from foreign nationals penetrating 

them undetected and uninterdicted. It constitutes a threat. We will 

always have to be mindful of that. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I know that is a concern you and I have had, starting with 9/11. 

One last question, and I will yield to the Ranking Member. 

Mr. Horne, you started out unsolicited by saying you support the 

designation of a foreign terrorist organization for the drug cartels. 

You are obviously a lawyer by training, attorney general for a border State. 

Can you explain why you support that? 

Mr. HORNE. Well, among other things, it makes it an enhanced 

crime to supply aid to those organizations. That obviously would be 

a very powerful tool in fighting them. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Yes. My view is, we ought to call them what they 

are. Their tactics are certainly like terrorists. 

With that I yield to the Ranking Member. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would just like to ask all of you, do you feel that a $350 million 

cut in Federal appropriations will hinder border security right 

now? 

Mr. MCCRAW. You need to increase funding in border security, 

not cut it. 

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Horne. 

Mr. HORNE. I agree. 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. If you are talking $250 million reduction in 

border security, sir, I most certainly agree. You need to increase 

that way, way up. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. 

Chief Rodriguez. 

Cheif RODRIGUEZ. I agree with my panel members. 

Mr. KEATING. My point is that that is what the House majority 

budget is doing. So, you should be well aware of that. 

Mr. HORNE. I am a Republican elected official, and I am happy 

to be bipartisan, and agree with you that it should be increased. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I agree with the Ranking Member, as well. 

Mr. KEATING. Hey, we are all agreeing. 

Just, you know, we could be here a long time, but I am just curious. I am just going to poke a few specifics, just to try and get a 

little more information, you know, so I can learn more specifically. 
85 

But, you know, we are talking about coordination between countries. In my experience, it is pretty tough to have coordination 

among different law enforcement entities, even in your own country. 

Can you share any specifics as to how we can be better coordinated with Federal, State, county, local? Because there is just, I 

know, just from over a decade, that that is not what it always 

should be. Maybe we can look at some areas here in our own country that we have some control over, how we can better coordinate. 

Any suggestions, specifically? 

Mr. MCCRAW. Well, I have to actually commend our Federal 

partners and their leadership, certainly. I started with Operation 

Linebacker in the Texas border sheriffs. 

Right now we are conducting continuous operations between 59— 

the local law enforcement, police departments, and 53 sheriffs 

across from Brownsville all the way to El Paso, and using, you 

know, Texas Rangers, our State troopers and State trooper strike 

teams, aviation assets, and adopting a unified command structure 

to conduct information-driven patrol operations. 

No one has failed to share information or be a part of that. As 

a result, it is a force multiplier. 

Mr. KEATING. Is that the experience of everyone, in general? 

Mr. HORNE. I recently did a border tour with the border guard 

in their helicopters. I was very, very impressed. You know, I have 

disagreements at the top, but among the people who are actually 

doing the work, you cannot help but be impressed with how hard 

they are working and how brave they are. 

Mr. KEATING. Sheriff. 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. Mr. Keating, I was at one time the team leader for the DEA task force. Federal agencies sometimes, or most of 

them do not speak to each other. 

In a case with us right now, we would like to share as much information as we can. Unfortunately, sir, it does not always come 

back. 

I see there is some jealousy among some agencies sometimes. 

Federal agencies like to do long-term investigations. We are a reactionary agency. But we need to have more sharing of information, 

sir. 

Mr. KEATING. Chief. 

Cheif RODRIGUEZ. Mr. Keating, this problem needs an answer. 

That is what I have suggested along the ideas of creating a border 

financial crimes task force. That would be the means and manner 

by which a lot of us will work together while answering the threat 

that we perceive these organizations cause us. 

Mr. KEATING. Yes, I made a note of that. I thought that was an 

excellent suggestion. 

Also, it is encouraging to hear that the level of information sharing is better than maybe the norm in this instance. So, that is encouraging. 

The issue of asset forfeiture, how do those funds get split up in 

terms of some of the border issues? Do some of those funds get 

back to helping the enforcement itself? 

Anyone. 
86 

Mr. MCCRAW. From the Department of Public Safety, yes. We 

have seized $60 million in 2010, our troopers did and CID agents. 

Working with our Federal partners and using asset forfeiture procedures under the Federal guidelines, we are able to get as much 

as 80 percent of that back. 

Mr. KEATING. Yes, Chief. 

Cheif RODRIGUEZ. The answer for us, as well, from a local level, 

the answer is yes. It is of great help to us. 

The way that happens is depending on your participation, depending on your case. If you are active or involved in a case and 

the size of the seizure, then the result is what you end up basically 

getting. 

Mr. KEATING. Then, a lot of those assets are going right back into 

enhancing our border security. 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. Well, we have—— 

Cheif RODRIGUEZ. The uniformed operations, yes, sir. 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. But we have not, since I cannot afford, Mr. 

Keating, to have anybody assigned to Federal task forces, you are 

talking asset sharing at the Federal level, sir. I have gotten zero 

in the last maybe 8 years. 

So, I cannot afford to assign anybody to a task force. I do not 

have the personnel to do it with. 

Maybe I have assigned one person through a grant, and we have 

done some, the applications. But to-date, sir, I have zero funding 

from asset sharing. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, I want to thank all of you for your service. 

I want to thank you also for your suggestions. You were specific in 

instances and certainly issues worth pursuing, strengthening our 

statutes, trying to make sure definitions, like ammunition, are 

clear. 

So, I really thank you for—you traveled a long distance, but, you 

know, I would certainly—I think I could speak for the whole committee, too, that these kind of specific recommendations are very 

helpful to us. 

So, I want to thank you. It was a trip well worth making, at least 

from my vantage point. Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Let me in closing just say that I am sorry that the 

witnesses who were here for the first panel were not here for this 

panel. 

I thought this was excellent testimony that tells the story like it 

really is. I plan to submit that testimony to them, so they can read 

it. You certainly deserve that after traveling all the way up here. 

I want to just touch on one last thing. 

Mr. McCraw, the joint operations center effort that you have in 

the State of Texas is probably, I think, one of the most advanced 

of any border State, doing tremendous work down there. If you 

could just briefly describe those operations. 

What more do you need from the Federal Government to help 

fund these operations that have been successful? 

Mr. MCCRAW. Well, first, you know, working with our local and 

State and Federal law enforcement partners. The State legislature 

did fund joint operations intelligence center. We do have it in Austin. 
87 

It is with the support of the unified command, which is out in 

the field, not in Austin. We have six joint operations intelligence 

centers in each of the border security sectors, one in Victoria. 

Again, unified command is what it is about, centralizing the information, report it. Based upon what the cartels are doing, as they 

move we adjust patrol operations. 

One of the Congressmen asked about contingency plans for violence. We have developed with our partners, you know, con plans 

for contingency for spillover violence in each of the border security 

sectors. 

So, if you are going to address it from a border security standpoint, it is a team sport. There is no question that, when you work 

together, then we are able to do more and with less. 

That said, you know, the border is not secure. Additional resources are needed, not just for the Department, but for local law 

enforcement. 

One thing I would like to point out. There is one thing that DHS 

can do right now, is Operation Stonegarden funds, which came up. 

Sheriffs are not allowed to use that money for personnel. They are 

allowed it for overtime and equipment. 

If you would allow them to use that money—same amount of 

money—and use it for augmentees, they could increase their capacity, because you can only use so much of that time in overtime. 

Someone cannot work 24 and 7. 

To do that would provide them, I think, an immediate capability. 

When you arm local law enforcement along the border, you are enhancing and amplifying border security. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Again, thank you for coming up here, and thank 

you for your service. Thanks for your testimony. 

Unless the Ranking Member has anything in addition, this committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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