cle . . . on the highways of the Commonwealth while

the revocation of the person's driving privilege remains in

effect." Va.

Code S 46.2-357(A). This language shows that the legislature

contemplated and provided for the continued regulation of individuals

who

3
had received habitual offender status before implementation of

the

Act.

Perhaps most significant for purposes of this appeal is the fact

that

the penalty provision for an adjudicated habitual offender's

second

offense (driving on a suspended or revoked license, see Va. Code

S 46.2-357(B)(2)) has not been altered in the least. It states

that such

an offender shall be "guilty of a felony punishable by

confinement in

a state correctional facility for not less than one year nor more

than

five years." Va. Code S 46.2-357(B)(2)&(3). Dawson was sentenced

within those parameters; his presentencing report set the

statutory

minimum and maximum sentences as one and five years respectively.

Based on the foregoing, we find that the Virginia General Assembly evinced its intent to enact a new, stiffer law dealing with

those

who commit serious traffic violations, and that it drafted the

legislation in such a way as to provide saving provisions for the

penalties

to be imposed on those it previously chose to designate habitual

offenders for having accumulated such violations. Because the

legislature continues to recognize a class of persons who have already

been designated habitual offenders, Dawson's contention that his

conviction has been deprived of its "statutory underpinnings" is

without

merit.

We likewise find Dawson's equal protection argument to be

unavailing. Dawson argues that the Act creates a class of

habitual

offenders who are treated differently under the traffic laws than

are

those who now commit the same types of infractions. While this is

undoubtedly correct, we find the Act's classification scheme to

be

rationally related to a legislative goal. See FCC v. Beach

Communica-
tions, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993) (stating that statutory

classifications that neither affect members of a suspect class nor

infringe

upon fundamental constitutional rights are subject to a rational

basis

standard of review). There can be no doubt that retaining the

classification of habitual offender that existed prior to July 1, 1999 is

rationally related to the Virginia General Assembly's goal of

regulating

traffic safety. Furthermore, the legislature could hardly be

expected

to reclassify past offenders under the new scheme, as ex post

facto

problems would then arise.

AFFIRMED

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UNPUBLISHED	§ 

§	)UNITEDÇSTATESÇCOURTÇOFÇAPPEALS))FORÇTHEÇFOURTHÇCIRCUIT))
UNITEDÇSTATESÇOFÇAMERICA,	§ Φ8

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αNo.Ç99-7006	§ T 

§	)WILLIAMÇBLOHM,)Defendant-Appellant.	§ 

p §	)AppealÇfromÇtheÇUnitedÇStatesÇDistrictÇCourt	§ ê



§	forÇtheÇEasternÇDistrictÇofÇNorthÇCarolina,ÇatÇRaleigh.)W.ÇEarl

ÇBritt,ÇSeniorÇDistrictÇJudge.)(CA-86-1184)))Submitted:ÇAprilÇ28,

Ç2000))Decided:ÇMayÇ19,Ç2000))BeforeÇWILLIAMSÇandÇMICHAEL,ÇCircui

tÇJudges,Çand)BUTZNER,ÇSeniorÇCircuitÇJudge.))___________________

______________________________________________))AffirmedÇbyÇunpub

lishedÇperÇcuriamÇopinion.))_____________________________________

____________________________))
COUNSEL	§ 0Ç  §	)
EdwinÇC.ÇWalker,ÇActingÇFederalÇPublicÇDefender,ÇG.ÇAlanÇDuBois,

	§ ÿΦ
"

§	AssistantÇFederalÇPublicÇDefender,ÇRaleigh,ÇNorthÇCarolina,Çfor

)Appellant.ÇJaniceÇMcKenzieÇCole,ÇUnitedÇStatesÇAttorney,ÇAnneÇM.

)Hayes,ÇAssistantÇUnitedÇStatesÇAttorney,ÇBarbaraÇD.ÇKocher,ÇAssi

s-)tantÇUnitedÇStatesÇAttorney,ÇMichaelÇD.ÇBredenberg,ÇSpecialÇAs

sis-)tantÇUnitedÇStatesÇAttorney,ÇRaleigh,ÇNorthÇCarolina,ÇforÇAp

pellee.))________________________________________________________

_________)))	 § á#,

§	UnpublishedÇopinionsÇareÇnotÇbindingÇprecedentÇinÇthisÇcircuit.

ÇSee)LocalÇRuleÇ36(c).))_________________________________________

________________________))
OPINION))
PERÇCURIAM:))WilliamÇJ.ÇBlohmÇappealsÇfromÇtheÇdistrictÇcourt'sÇorderÇdecl

actÇon)them).))Moreover,ÇbothÇBlohm'sÇtreatingÇphysiciansÇatÇFCIButnerÇ