Hon. Lynn S. Adelman, of the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-1867

CHICAGO REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

VILLAGE OF SCHAUMBURG, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 09 C 5425—George W. Lindberg, Judge.

ARGUED OCTOBER 18, 2010—DECIDED MAY 2, 2011

Before POSNER and WOOD, Circuit Judges, and ADELMAN,

District Judge.



WOOD, Circuit Judge. Chicago Regional Council of

Carpenters (“the Union”) filed an action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against the Village of Schaumburg, the owner of
2 No. 10-1867

the Schaumburg Renaissance Hotel, asserting that the

Village had violated its First Amendment rights. The

Union chiefly complained that, in August 2009, the

Village denied its request to stage a protest on the

Hotel’s property. In November 2009, while the lawsuit

was pending, the Village denied a second request from

the Union to allow two of its members to distribute

pamphlets at the entrance of the Hotel. In response to

the Village’s motion for summary judgment with respect

to the August 2009 incident, the Union discussed only

the Village’s refusal in November 2009 to permit the

leafletting; it said nothing about the August incident.

The district court entered summary judgment for the

Village, noting that the Union’s complaint had been

filed before the November 2009 action and hence did

not address any events that occurred after its filing.

The Union appeals, asserting essentially that the two

incidents were part of a single wrong by the Village. We

conclude that the district court properly understood

the complaint, and we therefore affirm.

I

In the summer of 2009, the Union began representing

the housekeeping staff of the Schaumburg Renaissance

Hotel in collective bargaining negotiations. Having hit

a roadblock in the discussions, it decided to stage some

demonstrations. On August 18, 2009, the Union staged

a mock funeral procession on the Hotel premises.

During this procession, the Schaumburg police directed

the Union to keep the noise level down and to follow a
No. 10-1867 3

specified route. After a short discussion between the

attorneys representing both sides, these terms were

agreed to and the mock funeral proceeded without a

hitch. Relying on the assumption that the same terms

would apply in the future, the Union informed the

police that it intended to undertake a similar demonstration on August 31, 2009. But things did not go as the

Union had expected. As its members approached the

Hotel on August 31, the police refused to permit them

to enter the premises. The Union promptly filed this

case on September 2, 2009; it alleged that the Village

had violated the Union’s First Amendment rights by

restricting the demonstrators’ access to public property—specifically, the area occupied by the Hotel.

As the case was underway, the Union continued discussions with the Village about how it might demonstrate

at the Hotel. On November 6, 2009, the Union sent the

Village a letter requesting that two of its volunteers be

allowed to distribute pamphlets at the entry of the Hotel.

The Village denied this request on November 19, 2009.

Both parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Abandoning its claims relating to the

August 31 demonstration, the Union focused its motion

for summary judgment on the Village’s refusal to permit

its members to distribute pamphlets in November 2009.

At oral argument before this court, the Union explained

that it had dropped its complaint about the August 31

incident because it was persuaded that the First Amendment jurisprudence on non-public forums would bar

relief. 
4 No. 10-1867

Reasoning that once the Union forfeited its claims

relating to the August 31 incident there was nothing

redressable left in the complaint (which the Union

never properly moved to supplement pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d)), the district court

granted summary judgment for the Village on March 24,

2010. Only then did the Union file a motion under

Rules 15(a)(2) and 59(e) for leave to file a second

amended complaint; the court denied that motion on

March 30.

II

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, examining the record in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Ellis v. DHL Express

Inc. (USA), 633 F.3d 522, 525 (7th Cir. 2011).

The Union’s primary argument is that the district court

erred when it construed the Union’s summary judgment

motion as abandoning any theory relating to the

August 31 incident. What it was really doing, the Union

now says, was merely abandoning claims that depended

on its right to demonstrate on public property. But, it

now urges, there was another aspect to the planned

demonstration: Union volunteers were going to hand out

leaflets. When the Village denied the Union access to the

Hotel, it simultaneously denied the Union the opportunity to pass out its literature. The Union concludes

by asserting that it intended to preserve the leafleting

claims in its summary judgment motion.
No. 10-1867 5

Unfortunately for the Union, this account is impossible

to square with the record. To the contrary, the Union

made it clear that it was forfeiting all arguments

relating to the August 31 demonstration and, instead,

was limiting itself to the denial of the right to leaflet in

November. This is what it wrote in its summary judgment motion: “The Plaintiff now focuses, not upon its

request to demonstrate on public property, but instead

upon its right to conduct leafleting on public property in

a peaceful and non-coercive manner.” In presenting the

facts pertinent to its motion, the Union discusses only

the November incident; it uttered not a peep about any

denial of the right to pass out leaflets during the

August 31 demonstration. It thus forfeited the latter

theory and must stand or fall on the November denial.

Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.

1983) (“It is a well-settled rule that a party opposing a

summary judgment motion must inform the trial judge

of the reasons, legal or factual, why summary judgment

should not be entered. If it does not do so, and loses the

motion, it cannot raise such reasons on appeal.”).

In light of this, the district court correctly granted

summary judgment. Normally, a complaint can seek

relief only for events that have already occurred. Grain

Traders, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 160 F.3d 97, 105 (2d Cir.

1998). (A person seeking injunctive relief must show a

likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable

injury and the inadequacy of a remedy at law. See City

of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983) (citing

O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)). But the

plaintiff must still ground its right to relief on events
6 No. 10-1867

described in the complaint, not on matters that arise

later.) Before the complaint may be broadened to encompass subsequent events, the plaintiff must move to supplement it. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d)

provides a mechanism for doing just that: “[o]n motion

and reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms,

permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting

out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened

after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 15(d). It is worth underscoring, however, that

there is no absolute right to expand the case in this way;

the district court has substantial discretion either to

permit or to deny such a motion. In this case, the Union

filed its complaint on September 2, 2009, but the

only event that it now is complaining about occurred in

November 2009, two months later. It did not ask the

district court to accept a supplemental pleading until

after the court had denied its motion for summary judgment. The court was well within its rights to conclude

that this was too little, too late.

That is all we have to say about this lawsuit. We note,

however, that all may not be not lost for the Union. It

can follow the district court’s advice and file a new suit

for the November 2009 incident. It apparently has been

reluctant to do so because it is concerned that it may

be faced immediately with a defense of claim or issue

preclusion. We think it best not to comment on that

possibility, because at the moment it is purely hypothetical. We note only that the Village, having insisted

loudly that the November events were entirely separate

from the August events, may have to live with that char-
No. 10-1867 7

acterization should there be a new case. See Smith v.

Potter, 513 F.3d 781, 783 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that

claim preclusion “does not bar a suit based on claims

that accrue after a previous suit was filed”).

* * *

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

5-2-11