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A DHS INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE: STILL JUST 

A VISION OR REALITY? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

INFORMATION 

SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK 

ASSESSMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 12, 2010 

Serial No. 111–66 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

AL GREEN, Texas 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

MARY JO KILROY, Ohio 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

VACANCY

VACANCY

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio 

I. LANIER AVANT, Staff Director 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND 

TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT 

JANE HARMAN, California, Chair 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

AL GREEN, Texas 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

THOMAS M. FINAN, Staff Director 

BRANDON DECLET, Counsel 

NATALIE NIXON, Deputy Chief Clerk 

MEGHANN PETERLIN, Minority Subcommittee Lead 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment ............................................. 3 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

WITNESSES

Ms. Caryn A. Wagner, Under Secretary, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 9 

Mr. Bart R. Johnson, Principal Deputy Under Secretary, Office of Intelligence 

and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 13 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 9 

(1) 

A DHS INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE: STILL 

JUST A VISION OR REALITY? 

Wednesday, May 12, 2010 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jane Harman [Chair of 

the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Harman, Thompson, Clarke, Richardson, Green, Himes, McCaul, Dent, and Broun. 

Ms. HARMAN [presiding]. Good morning. The subcommittee will 

come to order. We are meeting today to receive testimony on the 

state of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise and the continuing efforts 

to improve intelligence and information sharing at the Department. 

Today’s hearing is entitled, ‘‘A DHS Intelligence Enterprise: Just 

a Vision or a Reality?’’ I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

Nearly 8 years ago this—excuse me. Nearly 8 months ago—time 

flies—this subcommittee received testimony from then-acting 

Under Secretary Bart Johnson, a career law enforcement officer, 

about his vision for the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis. 

The Chairman, who has just joined this hearing, and I were very 

impressed. In fact, I recall him saying, ‘‘Wow,’’ as Mr. Johnson completed his oral testimony. 

Mr. Johnson’s testimony set a new tone for information and intelligence sharing at I&A—one that embraced the key role that 

State and local police and sheriffs can play in encouraging an alert 

public to ‘‘See Something and Say Something,’’ or ‘‘iwatch,’’ as the 

LAPD campaign in my own Congressional district suggests. 

Mr. Johnson said, ‘‘Every day across the country State, local, 

Tribal, and territorial law enforcement and other officials gather 

information in the course of their work of providing emergency and 

nonemergency services to their communities. This information may 

serve as the first indicator of a potential threat to our National security.’’ Obviously these words became crystal clear last week with 

the apprehension of Faisal Shahzad, the would-be Times Square 

bomber. 

Mr. Johnson suggested that a number—a number of practical 

ideas for intelligence sharing, including a comprehensive outreach 

effort to make sure that intelligence products provide State, local, 

territorial, Tribal, and private sectors with the information they 
2 

want, at the time they want it, and in the form they need it. He 

suggested creating a Single Point of Service program that handles 

information requests by State, local, and Tribal partners and developing an analytic capability and methodology for assessing suspicious activity reporting data. 

Mr. Johnson suggested that I&A should create baseline capabilities and help improve analytic capacity at State and major urban 

area fusion centers in order to support information-driven decision 

making by State, local, Tribal, territorial, and Federal homeland 

security and law enforcement officials. He nailed it, and this subcommittee has been waiting to see his vision become reality. 

Now that an under secretary has been named and confirmed— 

and I am glad that Caryn Wagner is joining us today—we are 

meeting to evaluate I&A’s progress. As I am sure is now clear, we 

believe I&A’s core mission is to ensure not just horizontal sharing 

among intelligence agencies, but vertical information sharing up 

and down between the Federal and local government and law enforcement. This is our vision; I think this was Mr. Johnson’s vision 

8 months ago. 

Yet, the testimony today, in my view, seems more focused once 

again on I&A’s horizontal relationships with other Federal intelligence agencies. I confess I am a bit disappointed, and I wonder 

whether we are pedaling backwards. 

We have recent and excellent real-life examples of how information shared with and by law enforcement can make all the difference. It was a beauty supply shop owner who provided key information that led to the unraveling of Najibulla Zazi’s plot to blow 

up the New York subways. As we all know, two alert veterans 

alerted law enforcement to Shahzad’s smoking vehicle planted in 

Times Square. 

An alert public and proactive police force will continue to make 

the critical difference, especially as terror tactics evolve. After all, 

they are the ones who know their communities best and will notice 

first when something odd is occurring. 

It should be clear that many terrorist groups and, alas, some 

homegrown terrorists want nothing more than to strike us, to 

cause physical and economic damage, and to make us fear them. 

They are not giving up. 

We will never be able to achieve 100 percent security, but we can 

certainly improve the odds. That is why we are here today. When 

Americans are prepared, not scared, they too can play a key role 

in keeping us safe. 

So, my question for both witnesses today is, are we going to implement the inspired vision we heard 8 months ago from Mr. Johnson? How are you both leveraging the eyes and ears of the public 

and local law enforcement to keep our communities and our country safe in an ever dangerous world? 

I welcome you both and look forward to your testimony. 

[The statement of Chair Harman follows:] 
3 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIR JANE HARMAN

MAY 12, 2010 

Nearly 8 months ago, this subcommittee received testimony from then-acting 

Under Secretary Bart Johnson—a career law enforcement officer—about his vision 

for the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis. 

The Chairman of the full committee and I were very impressed. 

Mr. Johnson’s testimony set a new tone for information and intelligence sharing 

at I&A—one that embraced the key role that State and local police and sheriffs can 

play in encouraging an alert public to ‘‘see something and say something’’ or 

‘‘iwatch’’ as the LAPD campaign in my own Congressional district suggests. 

He said: ‘‘Every day across the country, state, local, tribal and territorial law enforcement and other officials gather information in the course of their work of providing emergency and non-emergency services to their communities. This information may serve as the first indicator of a potential threat to our national security.’’ 

This became crystal clear last week with the apprehension of Faisal Shahzad, the 

would-be Times Square bomber. 

Mr. Johnson suggested a number of practical ideas for intelligence sharing, including a comprehensive outreach effort to make sure that intelligence products provide State, local, territorial, Tribal and private sectors with the information they 

‘‘want, at the time they want it, and in the form they need it.’’ 

He suggested creating a ‘‘Single Point of Service’’ program that handles information requests by State, local, and Tribal partners and developing an analytic capability and methodology for assessing Suspicious Activity Reporting data. 

And Mr. Johnson suggested that I&A should create baseline capabilities and help 

improve analytic capacity at State and major urban area fusion centers in order to 

support information-driven decision making by State, local, Tribal, territorial, and 

Federal homeland security and law enforcement officials. 

He nailed it—and this subcommittee has been wanting to see his vision become 

reality. 

Now that an Under Secretary has been named and confirmed—I’m glad Caryn 

Wagner is joining us today—we are meeting to evaluate I&A’s progress. 

As I’m sure is now clear, we believe I&A’s core mission is to ensure not just horizontal sharing between intelligence agencies, but vertical: Up and down between the 

Federal and local government and law enforcement. 

Yet the testimony today seems more focused on I&A’s horizontal relationships 

with other Federal intelligence agencies. I confess I am disappointed and wonder 

whether we are peddling backwards. 

We have recent and excellent real-life examples of how information shared with 

and by law enforcement can make all the difference. 

It was a beauty supply shop owner who provided key information that led to the 

unraveling of Najibullah Zazi’s plot to blow up New York subways. And two alert 

veterans alerted law enforcement to Shahzad’s smoking vehicle planted in Times 

Square. 

An alert public and proactive police force will continue to make the critical difference, especially as terror tactics evolve. After all, they are the ones who know 

their communities best and will notice first when something odd occurs. 

Terrorists want nothing more than to strike us, to cause physical and economic 

damage, and to make us fear them. They will not give up. 

We’ll never be able to achieve 100% security, but we can certainly improve the 

odds. That is why we are here today. 

When Americans are prepared, not scared, they can play a key role in keeping 

us safe. 

My question for the witnesses today is: Are we going to implement the inspired 

vision we heard from Mr. Johnson? How are you leveraging the eyes and ears of 

the public and local law enforcement to keep our communities and our country safe? 

I welcome you both and look forward to your testimony. 

Ms. HARMAN. Now I yield 5 minutes to the Ranking Member for 

his opening comments. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I would like to welcome the witnesses, Under Secretary Wagner 

and Principal Deputy Under Secretary Johnson. We are delighted 

to see you here today. I hope you are equally as delighted to see 

me and Jane. 
4 

I also want to praise—the communication between your office 

and with us on the committee has greatly improved, and I appreciate that. I hope you see this, as I do, as an opportunity for us 

to discuss some of the challenges faced by I&A and the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, and as an opportunity to work together to find 

solutions. 

Nidal Hasan is an American citizen who had contact with alQaeda’s Anwar al-Awlaki over the internet, and Federal authorities 

knew it at that time. But Hasan went on to brutally murder 13 innocent people at Fort Hood, just outside of my district, on November 5. No one ever told the base commander or Hasan’s immediate 

superiors that they had a potential problem on their hands. That 

attack demonstrated a devastating information-sharing failure between the FBI and the Department of Defense, and in my questions I would like to expand upon the National fusion center and 

how this could potentially prevent any future Hasans from occurring. 

We had Abdulmutallab, the terrorist who trained with al-Qaeda, 

whose violent radicalization was brought to the attention of the 

State Department by his own father. In addition, the NCTC had 

threat information coming in. 

Nevertheless, he attacked us—or attempted to—on Christmas 

day with a bomb that he brought onto an airplane. This wasn’t just 

a failure to connect the dots and identify terrorist targeting the 

homeland; it has also shown a weakness in our ability to detect terrorists boarding airplanes with explosives. 

Mr. Shahzad, also an American citizen, tried to blow up Times 

Square in a terrorist attack just 11 days ago, and while law enforcement did an outstanding job identifying and apprehending him 

quickly, Shahzad showed us difficulties in updating watch list information to the airlines, as well as our vulnerability to individuals 

who simply are not on anyone’s radar screen. 

The list goes on—15 terror plots within the past year. We are 

still under attack today as much as we were on the morning of September 11 and the subsequent creation of the Department of Homeland Security. 

We have been lucky. We have been very lucky. But that cannot 

be the basis of our homeland security policy. Next time, we may 

not be so lucky. 

A robust system of homeland security intelligence and information sharing must work, and I think we all agree that failure is not 

an option. We have come a long way over the past few years, particularly in the creation of a network of State and local fusion centers around the country, which has transformed information sharing between all levels of government. 

I know that the men and women at DHS are wholly committed 

and patriotic to their mission to do their very best to protect this 

Nation. But the Department of Homeland Security continues to be 

so burdened with internal troubles that it cannot fully execute its 

mission to keep the American people safe from terrorists, drug violence along the southwest border, threats of weapons of mass destruction, or to prepare for National disasters. 

Do we set ourselves up for failure by trying to fix all of the external problems DHS faces without DHS fixing itself first? In my 
5 

view, I think we need to get the house in order first before we look 

to the external. 

Since its inception, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis has 

been plagued by a confused mission, low employee morale, hiring 

and retention problems, and an evolving organizational structure. 

To no one’s surprise, this has resulted in poor analytical intelligence products. 

It is that reason, Madam Chair, I am grateful to you for holding 

this important hearing. We have an obligation to make intelligence 

and information sharing within DHS as robust as we want it to be 

between DHS and other Federal agencies and State and local partners. We have an obligation to look at what may be wrong within 

the Department itself that prevents it from being the best it can 

be. 

Recently—I think we need to give credit to the two witnesses— 

we have seen signs of improvement and are hearing good things. 

But we are still a long way from where we need to be. 

Just recently, Under Secretary Wagner, we had a very good 

meeting, I think, in my office, and I have high hopes that under 

your leadership that the DHS Intelligence Enterprise can realize 

the level of greatness that is required. 

With that, Madam Chair, I yield back. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. McCaul. 

The Chair now yields 5 minutes to the Chairman of the full committee, Mr. Thompson, of Mississippi, for opening remarks. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Welcome, Ms. Wagner. I understand that this is your first appearance before the committee since your confirmation, as we had 

a chat one Sunday afternoon, but we didn’t get a chance to see 

each other, so I am happy to have you. 

Mr. Johnson, it is always good to see you. 

As I am sure you have discovered, you have a particularly challenging position. As the under secretary for intelligence and analysis you must continue to build that organization, as you have said, 

to be trusted leader in meeting our Nation’s homeland security intelligence needs. 

Simultaneously, as chief intelligence officer you must craft a 

strategic approach to support and leverage the unique intelligence 

capability of each of the Department’s components. As you know, 

we created I&A 6 years ago in part to break down traditional 

stovepipes, set mission-based agendas, and develop an integrated 

Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise. As I said in September 

and unfortunately must say again, we are still not there. 

Unfortunately, your I&A has never established a specific set of 

effective strategic plans that both describes and delivers results, 

measures those results, and helps course correct if or when those 

results are insufficient. Without such a plan I fear that I&A risks 

failing its unique opportunity as an intelligence coordinator for 

State and local consumers within DHS or for the intelligence community. 

Consider, if you will, the recent Times Square attack. We have 

all heard the successful contributions made by CBP to capturing 

Faisal Shahzad. They rightly are to be congratulated. However, absent from Congressional briefings has been what, if anything, I&A 
6 

or DHS Intelligence Enterprise brought to the table, and we will 

talk a little bit about that. 

Further, the recent designation of Rand Beers as under secretary 

for the national protection and programs directorate as DHS’s lead 

for counterterrorism raises questions about where you fit in the 

Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise. 

Simply put, Ms. Wagner, I&A is at a crossroads. It has the potential to become the premier provider of information to homeland 

security intelligence consumers, but will only succeed if organizational ambiguity that I identified is addressed, a strategic vision in 

place, and a dedicated people who work for you can: No. 1, demonstrate specific results; No. 2, proactively embody the position— 

both inside and out of DHS—of a trusted leader in meeting our Nation’s homeland security intelligence needs. 

I look forward to your testimony. Perhaps you can help clear the 

air on some of these issues. 

I yield back, Madam Chair. 

[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON

MAY 12, 2010 

Welcome, Ms. Wagner. I understand that this is your first appearance before the 

committee since your confirmation. As I am sure you have discovered, you have a 

particularly challenging position. As the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, you must continue to build that organization to, as you have said, ‘‘be the 

trusted leader in meeting our nation’s homeland security intelligence needs.’’ 

Simultaneously, as the Chief Intelligence Officer, you must craft a strategic approach to support and leverage the unique intelligence capabilities of each of the 

Department’s components. 

As you know, I&A was created 6 years ago, in part, to break down traditional 

stovepipes, set mission-based agendas, and develop an integrated Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise. As I said in September and, unfortunately, must say 

again, we are still not there. 

Unfortunately, your I&A has still never established a specific and effective strategic plan that both describes and delivers results, measures those results, and 

helps course correct if or when those results are insufficient. 

Without such a plan, I fear that I&A risks failing in its unique opportunity as 

an intelligence coordinator for State and local consumers, within DHS, or for the 

intelligence community. 

Consider, if you will, the recent Times Square attack. We have all heard of the 

successful contributions made by CBP to capturing Faisal Shahzad, rightly, are to 

be congratulated. However, absent from Congressional briefings has been what, if 

anything I&A or DHS’s Intelligence Enterprise brought to the table. 

Further, the recent designation of Rand Beers, Under Secretary for the National 

Protection and Programs Directorate, as DHS’ lead for counterterrorism raises questions about where you fit into the Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise. 

Simply put, Ms. Wagner, I&A is at a crossroads. It has the potential to become 

the premier provider of information to homeland security intelligence consumers but 

will only succeed if the organizational ambiguity that I identified is addressed, a 

strategic vision is in place, and the dedicated people who work for you can: Demonstrate specific results and proactively embody the position—both inside and outside of DHS—of ‘‘the trusted leader in meeting our nation’s homeland security intelligence needs.’’ 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that under 

the committee rules opening statements may be submitted for the 

record. 

I now welcome our witnesses this morning. Ms. Caryn Wagner 

was confirmed on February 11, 2010, as the under secretary for in-
7 

telligence and analysis at the Department of Homeland Security. 

In this role she serves as the head of the Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis and as the chief intelligence officer for the Department. 

In her career she has served as the budget director for the House 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, HPSCI, where I first 

met her, and she has also served in the office of the director of national intelligence as the assistant deputy director of national intelligence for management and for the first chief financial officer for 

the national intelligence program. Ms. Wagner spent many years 

with the Defense Intelligence Agency, most recently as the director 

of DIA’s liaison to the United States European Command and 

NATO. 

Bart Johnson is the principal deputy under secretary for intelligence and analysis, and he was the acting under secretary for a 

period. Appointed on May 18, 2009 to the Department, he also 

served—well, I just mentioned that—as the acting under secretary. 

Prior to his appointment, Mr. Johnson served as the director of 

homeland security and law enforcement at the office of the director 

of national intelligence. His work focused on bridging the intelligence community with State, local, and Tribal customers. 

Before this, Mr. Johnson served as a colonel with the New York 

State Police and possesses over 30 years of law enforcement experience. I should add that the committee, I think, on a bipartisan 

basis, feels that the experience he brings to this position is enormously helpful, especially because our view is that the primary 

mission of I&A is information sharing on a vertical basis with 

State, local, and Tribal agencies. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted 

in the record. I now ask Secretary Wagner to summarize her statement for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF CARYN A. WAGNER, UNDER SECRETARY, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. WAGNER. Thank you very much, Chair Harman, Ranking 

Member McCaul, Chairman Thompson, other Members of the committee. I am very pleased to be here before you today for the first 

time. This is the 3-month anniversary of my first day on the job 

at I&A, and I am very happy to be here with Bart Johnson, who 

is my partner at I&A. As the Chair has already mentioned, Mr. 

Johnson’s distinguished career and credibility with National and 

local law enforcement has made him an indispensible asset to the 

Department and to achieving the Department’s goals. 

As has been mentioned, Mr. Johnson did an outstanding job as 

acting under secretary for 10 months, and he and I are now in the 

process of building on the foundation that he laid to hopefully take 

I&A to a new level and address some of the issues that you all 

have raised. 

I find the subject of this hearing—‘‘DHS Intelligence Enterprise: 

A Vision or Reality?’’—actually very appropriate since the major 

focus of both of our efforts has been on building a true homeland 

security enterprise. In fact, I think we see this as being two interlocking enterprising—one that is within the Department and one 
8 

that is between the Department and all of its State, local, Tribal, 

territorial, and private sector partners. 

As the chief intelligence officer I am primarily focused on leading 

the effort to create that internal DHS enterprise, while Mr. Johnson is leading the effort to create the distributed homeland security 

enterprise, made up of the State and local fusion centers, who then 

all have their own enterprises at their—at the State and local level. 

So we are trying to create a fabric across the Nation. 

After 3 months on the job, I can say I have never been in an organization that has the broad range of customers and requirements 

that I&A does. We are responsible for supporting the Secretary and 

senior Departmental leadership, the diverse set of DHS operational 

components, the State, local, Tribal, territorial, and private sector 

partners, other Federal partners, and also the intelligence community. 

In order to provide the best intelligence support to that wide 

range of customers it is important that the intelligence activities of 

the components of the Department be synchronized. That is the job 

of the chief intelligence officer, or CINT, and it is accomplished 

largely through the Homeland Security Intelligence Council, or 

HSIC. 

The HSIC is made up of the intelligence chiefs of the components 

and other key elements of the Department, such as infrastructure 

protection and ops coordination. It meets regularly; it is supported 

by a staff to follow up on its actions; and it has undertaken and 

overseen many important tasks over the past year. 

It has overseen the production of the first ever Department-wide 

production plan to coordinate and deconflict analysis. It has overseen the process of developing and validating standing information 

requirements to be used to leverage the intelligence community on 

behalf of the components and the State and local fusion centers. 

It has also been used to charter, recently, a working group to 

standardize and streamline our process of homeland intelligence reporting across the entire Department, which requires standardization and improvement to make it more timely and useful, again, to 

our customers in the State and local fusion centers and in the intelligence community. We have also recently chartered a working 

group to improve—accelerate classified connectivity to the components along the border. 

So I believe that the HSIC is operating in a collegial and effective manner to improve the coordination of the Department’s intelligence efforts, and I would like to point out that we actually have 

several key members of the HSIC present here today to support us, 

and they are sitting behind me, and I would like to call out Admiral Cindy Cougan, from the U.S. Coast Guard; Mr. Jim Woosley, 

from ICE; Mr. Don Crusetti, from Citizenship and Immigration 

Services; and Ms. Cindy Farkas, from TSA. I appreciate their willingness to be here in solidarity with us. 

As the CINT, I am responsible not only for coordinating current 

intelligence activities but also advising the Secretary on the overall 

intelligence posture of the Department to meet our future needs as 

defined in the recently completed Quadrennial Homeland Security 

Review. I recently received briefings from all of the components on 

their programs, and I will be advising the Secretary on my rec-
9 

ommendations for the 2010 budget bill process, and I am also 

working with the components to refine and justify their intelligence 

initiatives. 

A recent example, I think, of how the DHS enterprise operates 

is the new Silent Partner aviation security screening program that 

I know you are familiar with. While the details of the program are 

classified, it is an intelligence-driven program that significantly improves our aviation screening efforts. 

The program itself is the result of an outstanding collaboration 

between CBP and TSA, for which I&A takes absolutely no credit. 

But our role in this is to work with them and the intelligence community to brief the intelligence community on what is needed to 

support this program and to make sure that we have the processes 

and procedures in place to get that information to them on a timely 

basis. That partnership, I think, is emblematic of the enterprise 

and the way that it should operate. 

Another good example of where the enterprise is at work is along 

the southwest border, where we are working hard to improve the 

coordinated efforts of I&A, CBP, ICE, Coast Guard, and also the 

other elements, such as DEA, DOJ, and the Department of Defense, that are down there. 

So, two other quick things to highlight: We now are having a 

weekly intelligence VTC at the senior level with the components to 

make sure that we are on top of these very concerning threat 

streams and we are sharing our information, and I think that has 

been very helpful. We have also increased manning levels for the 

DHS Threat Task Force, which I believe you are familiar with, 

which is made up of elements from the components and I&A and 

is focused on keeping on top of those threats. 

So overall, I believe while we have still room for improvement, 

I think it is fair to say that the DHS internal enterprise is reality, 

and we are focusing our efforts to provide better products and support to the other part of our enterprise, which is the State and local 

part, which Mr. Johnson is now going to address, so I will turn it 

over to him. 

[The joint statement of Ms. Wagner and Mr. Johnson follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF CARYN A. WAGNER AND BART R. JOHNSON

MAY 12, 2010 

INTRODUCTION

Chair Harman, Ranking Member McCaul, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the 

vision and goals for the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). This is my first testimony before the Subcommittee on 

Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment since my confirmation on February 11, 2010. I am honored to serve as the Under Secretary for 

Intelligence and Analysis and Chief Intelligence Officer for DHS. I look forward to 

working closely with this subcommittee and the Congress to lead and strengthen the 

critical intelligence mission of the Department. 

THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS STRATEGIC VISION

I&A’s overarching vision is to be the trusted leader in meeting our Nation’s homeland security intelligence needs. This vision drives our core focus of strengthening 

the Department’s and our partners’ ability to protect the homeland by accessing, integrating, analyzing, and sharing timely and relevant intelligence and information, 

while protecting the privacy and civil rights and civil liberties of all Americans. 
10 

I&A’s programs and activities align with the core DHS missions designated in our 

recently completed Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). Intelligence 

and information sharing are identified as key activities for the Department in the 

QHSR. To that end, I&A plays a critical role to DHS’ success in all of its core mission areas: Preventing terrorism and enhancing security; securing and managing 

our borders; enforcing and administering our immigration laws; safeguarding and 

securing cyberspace; ensuring resilience to disasters; and strengthening and maturing the Department. 

I have spent considerable time reviewing the roles, missions, functions and alignment of I&A since my confirmation in February. Much of my review has focused 

on what I&A must do to enhance its support to core customers at the Department 

and to its non-Federal partners at the State, local, Tribal, and territorial levels. I 

have also evaluated how I&A can improve upon the services that it already provides 

to the Intelligence Community (IC) and its interaction with Congress. I am focusing 

now on four main areas: 

• Creating a true homeland security information-sharing enterprise through 

greater focus on the State, local, and major urban area fusion centers; 

• Unifying and sustaining a DHS intelligence enterprise as the Chief Intelligence 

Officer of the Department; 

• Producing first-rate analytic products tailored to the needs of core customers, 

including to those not often served by traditional members of the IC; and 

• Establishing the program management processes necessary to improve the morale, efficiency, and professionalism of I&A as an organization. 

In the last few months, we have made substantial progress in defining priorities, 

improving management processes, and determining the best structure for I&A to 

meet the goals that I have set forth. I would be remiss if I did not express my appreciation for the outstanding work and leadership of Principal Deputy Under Secretary Bart Johnson during his tenure as Acting Under Secretary; much of what I 

propose today builds on his foundational efforts. The following specific steps, already 

under way, will translate I&A’s goals into an organizational and program-execution 

reality. 

EXECUTING THE STRATEGIC VISION

Two basic themes drive I&A’s need for realignment: (1) The need for I&A to maximize support to core customers and; (2) the need for I&A to take better advantage 

of its collective resources. 

I have also identified areas in which we can improve I&A’s organizational structure. I&A’s proposed realignment consolidates similar activities, invests more resources in areas of required core competencies, and frees up existing resources for 

new endeavors. 

I&A’s proposed realignment establishes four core offices, three of which are supervised by a Deputy Under Secretary: Analysis; Enterprise and Mission Support; and 

Plans, Policy and Performance Management; and the fourth by a Director of the Department’s new Joint Fusion Center Program Management Office (JFC–PMO). The 

I&A Principal Deputy Under Secretary will have direct responsibility for overseeing 

the overall fusion center effort. We plan to forward a reprogramming action to consolidate the resources of the legacy State and Local Program Office (SLPO) into the 

JFC–PMO. We are also determining the relationship the JFC–PMO will have with 

the emergent National Fusion Center Program Management Office (NFC–PMO) directed by the White House. 

I will now describe in further detail some of the key initiatives underway that 

support the four focus areas previously described: (1) Supporting State and local fusion centers; (2) strengthening the DHS intelligence enterprise; (3) providing firstrate analytic information to core customers; and (4) improving I&A management 

and processes. These focus areas are the guiding principles under which I&A’s goals 

have been established. 

1. Supporting State and Local Fusion Centers 

A primary role of I&A is to share intelligence and information with our partners 

at the State, local, Tribal, territorial, and private sector levels. The State, local, 

Tribal, and territorial first responders and first preventers are the leading edge of 

the homeland security enterprise. The linchpin of our interaction with our non-Federal partners is through stronger partnerships with State and local fusion centers. 

Fusion centers are a vital tool for strengthening homeland security, and it is I&A’s 

job to work closely with State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners on some of the 

Nation’s most pressing homeland security issues. Further strengthening this capability is a top priority. 
11 

We are continuing to expand the level of cooperation and information sharing 

with our State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners via a robust network of intelligence and law enforcement agencies participating in State and local fusion centers. 

Secretary Napolitano approved the plan to implement the Joint Fusion Center Program Management Office (JFC–PMO) on March 15, 2010. The JFC–PMO will bring 

to bear all the Department’s resources—not just I&A’s—to support information 

sharing among State, local, Tribal, territorial, and Federal law enforcement partners, as well as to coordinate relevant support from all DHS elements, not just from 

I&A. The Department is now considering how the JFC–PMO will align with the 

White House’s direction that DHS be the lead agency in establishing the National 

Fusion Center Program Management Office (NFC–PMO). I&A developed an implementation plan for the NFC–PMO with the assistance of State and local representatives and more than 15 Federal agencies. The implementation plan was widely coordinated throughout the Federal Government and will soon be sent to Secretary 

Napolitano for her review. 

To leverage the capabilities of our non-Federal partners, I&A has deployed 55 intelligence officers to fusion centers Nation-wide and plans to deploy a total of 70 officers by the end of fiscal year 2010, with the ultimate goal to deploy personnel to 

all 72 designated fusion centers and assign 10 regional coordinators to the field. I&A 

has installed the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN), which allows the Federal 

Government to share Secret-level intelligence and information with State, local, and 

Tribal partners, at 33 fusion centers. Additional centers are undergoing facilities 

certification to be accredited to house HSDN. This burgeoning network greatly expands two-way information sharing flows between Federal and non-Federal homeland security partners. We are also partnering with the DHS Office for Civil Rights 

and Civil Liberties and the DHS Privacy Office to provide training to Federal, State, 

and local fusion center personnel, to ensure privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties 

are appropriately addressed in fusion center activities and products. 

2. Strengthening the DHS Intelligence Enterprise 

I&A is continuing to take concrete steps to promote a unified, collaborative DHS 

intelligence enterprise. Our goal is to make intelligence activities at DHS more integrated, efficient, and effective, and to allow DHS, both headquarters and components, to give and receive better intelligence support. A critical tool in this effort 

is the Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC), which I chair in my role as 

Chief Intelligence Officer. The HSIC is comprised of component intelligence leaders 

and other key officials representing a broad range of DHS activities that require intelligence support. The HSIC is focused on governance-level, DHS intelligence enterprise-wide objectives, such as overseeing the completion of the first coordinated, enterprise-wide analytic production plan, playing a leading role in reviewing DHSwide protocols for disseminating Homeland Security Intelligence Reports and preparing a fiscal year 2012 consolidated intelligence budget recommendation to the 

Secretary. 

Another successful example of the power of the DHS intelligence enterprise is the 

DHS Threat Task Force (DTTF). The DTTF was established in the summer of 2009 

to support the Zazi and Headley investigations. The DTTF is composed of I&A analysts and representatives from the DHS operational components and ensures that 

all the Department’s information and expertise is brought to bear on an issue or 

investigation. Last summer, the DTTF provided information to the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI) on hundreds of additional individuals who were determined 

to be potentially relevant to specific, high-profile cases. DHS reactivated the DTTF 

on Christmas day, after the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253. 

We institutionalized this task force to focus and unify the efforts of the whole Department on mitigating terrorist threats to the homeland. These efforts have directly contributed to the effective use of watch lists and have supported Department 

programs for passenger travel analysis and airport screening procedures. 

I&A recently completed a comprehensive set of Standing Information Needs 

(SINs) that uniformly document on-going intelligence and information needs of the 

entire Department. These SINs improve DHS’ ability to participate in the IC’s collection management processes and the quality and quantity of information received 

in support of those needs, as well as the information I&A produces. In addition, 

since October 2009, our Collection and Requirements Division assisted more than 

20 fusion centers in developing their own SINs, with the goal of improving the level 

of support they can receive from the Department and the rest of the IC. We are putting in place tools to ensure our analytic products adhere to information needs of 

both Departmental and non-Federal partners. These same SINs also provide the 

starting point for I&A’s planning and performance measurement activities. 
12 

3. Providing First-Rate Analytic Information to Core Customers 

I&A’s analytic programs now better align with the Secretary’s priorities and the 

Department’s SINs, and encompass those analytic topics that are most meaningful 

for homeland security. Our analysts—in partnership with National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the FBI—address threats to the homeland from both 

international and domestic terrorist groups and actors and also analyze terrorist 

tactics, techniques, and procedures to inform the development of protective measures at home. As a result of recent trends, I&A is working closely with its IC partners to develop a framework for analysis of homegrown violent extremism that is 

consistent with protecting privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. 

I&A has primary responsibility within the IC to analyze, evaluate, and disseminate analysis on threats to homeland critical infrastructure. Through our robust relationship with the private sector and partnership with DHS’ Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), we routinely assess the impact of threats to industry and, with 

our IP partners, identify specific vulnerabilities and consequences that could result 

from terrorist attacks or other hazards. We are working with IP to improve the 

partnership and the utility of the products produced in this area. 

Our border and immigration security analysts focus not only on terrorist threats 

to the United States on or at our land and maritime borders, but also address 

trends regarding travel, asylum, and refugee issues and the rising violence on the 

Mexican side of the southwest border. I&A, in fact, uniquely supports the U.S. Government’s efforts to identify, track, deter, and prevent terrorists from traveling to 

the homeland. I&A’s role in preventing terrorist travel focuses on providing targeted 

intelligence analysis that leverages unique DHS databases and expertise, and on 

sharing information broadly within DHS and also with the U.S. Government and 

foreign partners. I&A plays a key role in monitoring changes to and effects of global 

immigration and travel security policies, provides direct support to DHS asylum and 

refugee programs, informs Customs and Border Protection targeting rules and 

Transportation Security Administration screening measures, and produces unique 

assessments on alien smuggling and illicit travel patterns in support of the IC and 

other customers. 

I&A also possesses a cyber intelligence analytic program. This team provides a 

National intelligence analytical framework in support of key cybersecurity customers, such as the DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 

Center (NCCIC), the DHS United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team 

(US–CERT), and the Industrial Control Systems CERT. We are working with partners in the community to collaborate on strategic cyber analysis, and we continue 

to determine the amount of analytic support necessary to the Department’s cybersecurity mission. 

I&A also maintains expertise in the fields of health intelligence and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) issues to serve its Departmental, Federal, 

State, local, Tribal, territorial, and private sector partners. DHS is a co-founder, 

with the Defense Intelligence Agency, of the National Center for Medical Intelligence at Fort Detrick, Maryland, which focuses on a broad range of foreign medical 

risks that could threaten the United States. We use our combined research and analytic talents to produce all-source threat analyses on human health, agriculture, and 

food security to support DHS components—a recent example being the health intelligence we provided to support first responders’ relief efforts in Haiti—as well as 

Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial government agencies and the private 

sector. Our analysis goes beyond just the science of health threats to address relevant foreign policy and socio-economic issues that could adversely affect homeland 

security operations and critical infrastructure and key resources. 

On CBRN issues, our experts collaborate with their IC partners on broad-ranging 

assessments and National-level exercises; provide the threat basis for risk assessments that drive DHS policy formulation and detection and response programs; and 

provide practical insights to State, local, Tribal, and private sector partners on 

CBRN indicators they might encounter in the course of their operational and law 

enforcement roles. 

4. Improving Management and Processes 

To ensure that I&A is able to meet the broad range of its responsibilities, I am 

placing great emphasis on strengthening its planning, management, and performance oversight functions. I&A is making considerable progress developing fair and 

transparent policies and decision-making processes, aligning resources to priority 

missions, and assessing the efficacy of investments. I&A has established leadershiplevel policy, personnel, and resource requirements boards to improve the management of I&A’s workforce, programs, and budget. As part of my commitment to improving management, policy development, and business processes, I&A’s realign-
13 

ment proposal establishes a Deputy Under Secretary for Plans, Policy, and Performance Management (PPPM), as discussed earlier in this testimony. This new element 

will enable more streamlined and integrated strategic planning, programming and 

performance measurement, and budgeting life cycle processes. PPPM will further 

the Department’s intelligence mission by providing DHS intelligence enterprise and 

Departmental information sharing management guidance by overseeing the Executive Directors of both the Homeland Security Intelligence Council and the Information Sharing Governance Board. For example, PPPM will be the focal point for our 

partnership with the DHS Chief Information Officer to improve Departmental information-sharing governance and establish enterprise-wide best practices. 

The new Deputy Under Secretary’s responsibilities will include developing and 

unifying applicable strategies, plans, and policies for the entire intelligence mission 

cycle, leading to integrated DHS intelligence and information-sharing enterprises focused on mission and customers. PPPM will also develop a detailed I&A strategic 

action plan that will include a mapping of all organizational activities and performance management metrics to measure program execution and effectiveness. This, in 

turn, will institute valid metrics to measure success and create a systemic cycle that 

facilitates organizational improvement. Finally, it will serve as I&A’s primary focal 

point for intelligence policy planning and representation of the intelligence mission 

to the rest of DHS, the larger IC, and the National security policy community. 

I&A’s proposed Office of Enterprise and Mission Support is intended to centralize 

intelligence mission support functions for I&A, as well as the larger DHS intelligence enterprise. It is designed to maximize the effectiveness of our information 

technology knowledge management, counterintelligence, training, collection requirements, and external operations programs. 

Intelligence training is a critical capability that will enable fulfillment of I&A’s 

strategic goals, and the proposed Office of Enterprise and Mission Support will build 

on existing I&A training successes. This program, which will be staffed by additional intelligence trainers, is intended to support the establishment of a culture of 

disciplined intelligence work in I&A. 

IMMEDIATE WAY FORWARD

These steps are a beginning, and I&A will undergo further refinement over time. 

I&A must—and will—continue to mature its management and business standards; 

move towards more proactive, collaborative and prioritized process planning and; 

ensure that all of its activities align with DHS missions and goals. 

CONCLUSION

Members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you 

today to discuss the strategic vision for I&A. I&A has made significant strides, and 

we continue to adapt ourselves to the continuing emerging needs of the Department. 

I&A has a vital and unique mission, and we will continue to improve our strategic 

posture to more effectively support core customers. 

I&A’s efforts to gather, assess, analyze, and share intelligence and information 

will continue to be guided by the dual imperatives of protecting the country from 

those who wish to do it harm, and protecting our privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. With your support, the leadership of Secretary Napolitano, and the fine men 

and women of I&A, I believe we can accomplish our goals and fulfill these imperatives. I look forward to keeping the subcommittee apprised of I&A’s continued 

progress. 

Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your questions. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Johnson. 

STATEMENT OF BART R. JOHNSON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

UNDER SECRETARY, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. JOHNSON. Chair Harman, Ranking Member McCaul, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, good morning, and thank 

you for this opportunity to appear before you today to hopefully discuss some very concrete and positive steps and activities that have 

occurred since my last appearance before you. 
14 

When I appeared before you last September, I had 4 months 

under my belt, and you advised me that you wanted to see real 

progress made as it relates to interacting with our State, local, and 

Tribal partners. I took that direction very seriously, and I would 

now like to walk through with you some of those concrete examples. 

First and foremost, I am very gratified and happy, quite frankly, 

that after 10 months of being the acting under secretary there is 

now a Senate-confirmed under secretary seated to my right, Ms. 

Caryn Wagner. Ms. Wagner brings to bear a considerable amount 

of experience and credibility from the intelligence community. 

I have worked side-by-side with Ms. Wagner for the past 3 

months and have watched her embrace this role in both her capacity as the under secretary and also the CINT, and I can say with 

a great deal of confidence that we are partners in this effort to 

make this a reality. 

Ms. Wagner has empowered me and given me the leadership role 

within I&A regarding matters related to State, local, and Tribal 

law enforcement and which will, in turn, allow me to provide even 

more focus to this very important part of our National security enterprise. 

Over nearly, now, the past year I have come to appreciate the 

role of I&A, and in particular I would like to compliment all the 

employees who are working very hard within I&A, who have been 

so supportive to me personally and to the Department in all they 

have contributed. I, too, would also like to acknowledge the Members seated behind me from the component agencies who have really developed that kindred spirit of teamwork. 

So what have we done to implement, in a concrete example, some 

of the things that we spoke about back in September? We have 

taken very seriously the need to provide more timely and useful information to fusion centers, and I believe, based on the feedback 

that we are getting on a regular basis, we are making progress. 

We have made our bulletins reports more actionable and have 

developed, at your encouragement, new products that have been 

well received by the field. We have worked very closely with the 

Department of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to provide training 

to fusion centers and make certain that we respect the rule of law. 

We have reinstituted the I&A fellowships program, and right 

now have a member from the NYSIC, the New York State Intelligence Center, assigned to I&A. We are also in partnership with 

the ODNI hosting our first ever fusion center directors course to be 

held in Monterey, California, in June 2010. 

We have accelerated our deployment of analytical training to 

build those analytical centers of excellence. We have accelerated 

our deployment of HSDN secret connectivity, and also the deployment of I&A reps to the field. We are working in lockstep with the 

components, once again represented behind me, along the southwest border as it relates to integrating the HIDAs and the fusion 

centers into an information sharing environment and enterprise 

that could better protect the homeland. 

Obviously, to institutionalize these efforts we would need to ensure that not only these are words, but these are built in a very 

institutionalized and sustained way. So to that end, we have not 
15 

only developed a Joint Fusion Center Program Management Office 

that is bringing together the Department-wide efforts, we are also 

building the National Fusion Center Program Management Office, 

which is going to be a nimble, lean group of individuals to bring 

the wealth of experience of the Federal Government. 

As evidenced by the terrorist activity of 2009 and thus far in 

2010, the threat to the Nation is persistent, particularly as illustrated by Zazi, Hasan, Abdulmutallab, and now Shahzad. These incidents clearly illustrate that there are individuals overseas, and 

yes, now living within our borders, who have and do want to do us 

harm. Building the capabilities at the National Network of Fusion 

Centers and working with our Federal counterparts, it is now more 

important than ever to continue to build this enterprise. 

Based on my previous law enforcement interactions it is obvious 

to me that an alert law enforcement officer, firefighter, or other 

public safety personnel, or, as evidenced by the Times Square incident, the public will be the first to potentially identify a threat or 

suspicious activity, thereby making established relationships and 

institutionalized and practiced information sharing vital to our National security. It is our responsibility to provide these first preventers of the homeland the information they need, and I believe 

I&A is working very hard to do that, and that is our role and mission within the Federal Government. 

In conclusion, we have made some concrete steps to accomplish 

these goals. However, I know there is much more that needs to be 

done. With your support and the support of others, we within I&A 

will continue to work with our Federal partners to support State 

and local fusion centers along with the first responders to ensure 

that they are empowered to be a key defense and an integral part 

of our National security. Once again, I look forward to doing that 

in partnership with Under Secretary Wagner. 

Thank you, ma’am. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much, both of you. Thank you. 

We will now turn to questions. I will recognize myself first, followed by the Ranking Member, and then recognize Members for 

questions in the order that they arrived at the hearing. Mr. 

Thompson assures me that he will be back to ask questions. 

First, let me congratulate each of you for introducing the other 

as a partner. I think that is critically important. 

Ms. Wagner, you didn’t miss it—certainly the noise emanating 

from me—that I thought it was critical that someone with law enforcement background occupy the position as head of I&A. I said 

that because people with that background instinctively and on the 

basis of experience understand how important vertical information 

sharing is. So now that you are in this position—and we welcome 

you—I am very happy that you embraced Mr. Johnson as a partner 

and that he embraces you as a partner. Good start. 

I am also happy, as you mentioned, that you are working hard 

on aviation screening. That clearly is a place where we may need 

to improve, based on the Christmas bomber experience, although, 

as you point out, CBP was a hero in making it work in the latest 

New York City bomber case. 

So congratulations on that. I will be at my home airport, a twiceintended al-Qaeda target, LAX, this weekend, and I plan to walk 
16 

through with TSA and others, exactly what has changed. So I think 

that is hopefully an improving story. 

My question is based on my opening comments. I believe strongly—and I think my view is shared by others here—that vertical information sharing is the primary responsibility of I&A. Organizing 

better in the Department and having a chair at the table—the intelligence table—across the Federal Government are also tasks 

that have some urgency, but your primary mission is to get accurate, actionable, and timely information to local law enforcement, 

to a public consistent with helping them be prepared, and to the 

private sector, because many of the things that we fear could happen in private firms or by leveraging private sector assets. 

So my question to you specifically, Ms. Wagner, is: Do you agree 

that vertical information sharing is your primary responsibility? 

Ms. WAGNER. Yes, ma’am, I do agree, understanding that information sharing goes both ways. I wholeheartedly agree with that, 

and I think that is one of the major authorities and responsibilities 

of this office. 

We need to make sure that the information flows down to allow 

those first responders and first preventers to do what we need 

them to do. But at the same time, we are expecting that valuable 

information that they are privy to to flow back up, because the 

point of the whole two-way flow is making the country safer, and 

the two-way flow is required in order for us to accomplish that. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you for that comment. 

Mr. Johnson, do you agree? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, ma’am, very much so. In fact, as evidenced 

by Abdulmutallab and the fast-pacedness of that investigation and 

the concern about follow-on attacks, that information flow did 

occur. It is encouraging, also, to know that even some of the material that we were receiving had ready built into them tear lines, 

so we were much more readily available and able to pass to our 

partners to include the airlines. 

Conversely, the information flow up—that is why, through the 

PMO, the program manager’s office, we need to continue to partner 

with the Bureau of Justice Assistance, who has the lead on the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, which was led in 

part by the LAPD with Mike Downing and Joanie McNamara. That 

is being continued to roll out, and we are going to partner with 

them, because as Ms. Wagner referred to, there is a lot of information out there, and it is the first responders who are going to touch 

it, and we need to have access to it legally and lawfully and then 

pass it up. 

Ms. HARMAN. I enthusiastically agree that information sharing— 

vertical information—is in two directions and just thought I would 

impart a bit of good news to all of our Members, and I hope to you 

too. This subcommittee was responsible for legislation on over-classification. Over-classification is a problem because, as Cathy Lanier, who is the chief of the Washington Police, will tell you, sometimes they are afraid to share information up because they are 

afraid it will get classified—this is declassified information—and 

then their folks won’t get access to it later. 

We passed, I thought, pretty responsible legislation out of the 

House, and that legislation has been taking a long time to get 
17 

through the Senate. My understanding is yesterday or today the 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security finished its report on the 

legislation, and it will be hopefully on the Senate consent calendars 

soon in a form that it will pass here again. So soon we will be able 

to deal with this problem, and a subcommittee initiative that was 

bipartisan and unanimous, I hope, will become law. 

My time has expired. I now yield to Mr. McCaul for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I agree that vertical information sharing is very important. I also 

think horizontal sharing is important. When we looked at particularly the Hasan case and the Christmas bomber—and this is where 

I want to lead toward the National fusion center; I think this is a 

monumental task for you to pull this thing off, and who are the 

partners, and who will be sharing the information? 

We know that Hasan, as I mentioned in my opening statement— 

that the Joint Terrorism Task Force had information that he had 

been in touch with the cleric in Yemen, and yet none of that information was shared with the commander at Fort Hood, General 

Cohen, who I spoke with at the memorial service. ‘‘Wouldn’t you 

have liked to have had that information?’’ 

‘‘Absolutely.’’ 

How many more Hasans are out there? We don’t know. 

That is horizontal. How will this—and let’s talk about the Christmas bomber. 

You have threat information coming in from the State Department that this father—his father came in to the embassy, warned 

them that his son was in contact with extremists in Yemen. At the 

same time, NCTC is getting threat information. In fairness to 

them, they are getting a lot of threat information every day, but 

that is, again, a horizontal issue. 

So how do you envision this National Fusion Center to work? 

Who will be the partners? Specifically, will DOD be a partner to 

that? How will this work to prevent—in those two cases, prevent 

something like that from happening again? 

Ms. WAGNER. I think I will defer to Bart to answer the question 

on the National Fusion Center since he has been the person personally responsible for working to establish the plans with the 

White House, so I will turn that question—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. As it relates to the National Fusion Center enterprise, we are meeting with the—I actually met with Assistant Secretary Paul Stockton, DOD, and he shared a lot of your 

concerns as it relates to force protection. In fact, we are stepping 

out an opportunity to assist them, you know, with the special activity, to assist them with a force protection. 

Additionally, we are interacting with the high-intensity drugtrafficking areas to ensure that that horizontal information sharing 

is occurring; and also, obviously, building the capabilities and capacities of the fusion centers. 

As it relates to the information flow within the Federal Government, from FBI to DOD, I would really like to defer, you know, answering that, but suffice to say that the fusion centers need to be 

considered part of this fabric, part of this enterprise. They need to 

be trusted colleagues. 
18 

They are secure space; they are secure connectivity; they have 

Federally-recognized clearances. So the Federal Government needs 

to look at them as partners and leverage them to share the information and make them better informed as to what to look out for 

and certainly what to report back into the system. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Johnson, as I understand it DHS has been 

tasked with the lead responsibility for the Nation in terms of the 

National Fusion Center. That is where I am concerned when you 

say, ‘‘Well, I can’t—this is DOD and FBI, Joint Terrorism Task 

Force,’’ all that. How can we help you make sure that there is a 

proper level of information sharing between the Joint Terrorism 

Task Forces out there, the HIDAs, the Department of Defense, and 

DHS? 

Mr. JOHNSON. As it relates to deferring, I meant just the particular case facts. But to your point, yes, we have been given the 

lead based on Mr. Brennan’s memorandum of 17 December putting 

the Secretary as the Executive agent for this National Fusion Center PMO. 

So the help that we could, you know, get from you, obviously, 

and we are already getting it, quite frankly, is, you know, to build 

that enterprise and once again illustrate the effectiveness of it, the 

supportedness of it, the need for sharing the information. We are 

partnering very well with the FBI. Deputy Assistant Director Eric 

Velez is a true partner in this. 

In fact, he came from the JRIC, the Joint Regional Intelligence 

Center, so he gets it; he is understanding it. I was in Florida. I am 

going out to California with him to really effectively show the SACs 

and partnerships with the fusion center directors about what could 

become of this once the full support of the Federal Government is 

put behind it. 

I am confident as this matures you are going to see more information percolating to the surface as relates to the observations 

being made in the field. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I know that I think the Chair agrees with me. We 

do want to work with you and help you in this effort because you 

have been tasked as a lead agency, and it is a monumental task. 

I think to give you the authority where you can go to the Department of Defense, or the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, or even, you 

know, the intelligence community, and say, ‘‘Look, we are—I have 

the lead responsibility to protect the Nation and the homeland and 

you need to work with us.’’ 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thanks for that. 

Ms. HARMAN. I appreciate that last comment by Mr. McCaul. We 

have said often that we are your partners, we are not your adversaries, and we share exactly your goal. We actually represent the 

communities in which some future terror attack could occur, and 

we depend on you to work with us to make certain that, to the 

maximum extent, those in—people in those communities know 

what to look for and what to do and hopefully can prevent or disrupt a future plot, not just respond to it. 

I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. Broun. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Under Secretary Wagner, Mr. Johnson, thank you so much for 

taking your time to be with us here today. In light of the recent 
19 

bombing attempt at Times Square, I believe that this hearing is as 

timely as ever, and I thank you for your testimonies. 

There are media reports that the would-be Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, appear at Government travel lookout lists, 

Travel Enforcement Compliance Systems, or TECS, between 1999 

and 2008 because he brought approximately $80,000 cash or cash 

instruments into the United States. 

TECS is a major law enforcement computer system that allows 

its approximately 120,000 users from 20 Federal agencies to share 

information. The database is designed to identify individuals suspected of or involved in violation of Federal law. 

My questions are for both of you. First, can you confirm the presence of Shahzad on the TECS lookout list? 

Ms. WAGNER. Yes. 

Mr. BROUN. Is TECS an effective way for DHS to be communicating the travel of suspicious people into the country? 

Ms. WAGNER. I think I would answer that by saying that we 

have a very—we have a layered system to prevent travel into the 

country, of which that is one aspect. I think CBP’s data, TSA’s data 

and authorities interact very effectively on the aviation side—of 

land crossings at the border. So I believe it is an effective tool, but 

it is not effective by itself. It is effective when used in conjunction 

with a range of other—training of the CBP and TSA people who 

are protecting our borders. 

Mr. BROUN. What changes need to be made in order to ensure 

that DHS is identifying, tracking, and preventing terrorists from 

entering the United States? 

Ms. WAGNER. I think we already have several efforts under way 

in response to recent events. In fact, I have already mentioned the 

Silent Partner program, which is already in effect. TSA is also 

working on putting in place a system called Secure Flight, which 

will improve our ability to quickly notify airlines of no-flies. I believe we are going to be attempting to accelerate the completion of 

that program in light of Faisal Shahzad’s ability to get on the 

flight. 

So there are a lot of activities that are already under way to improve this, and we have, as we demonstrated, however, already a 

layered system of redundant efforts so that even though the airline 

had not updated its no-fly list we were still able to identify the fact 

that he was on the plane in time to get him off. So we will continue 

to ensure that we have that layered defense. 

I don’t know if Bart has anything he would like to add. 

Mr. JOHNSON. The only thing I would like to add is the effectiveness of what Ms. Wagner referred to before, was the DHS Threat 

Task Force, which really was very much supported by the Homeland Security Intelligence Council seated behind us, as it relates to 

CBP, and ICE, and CIS, and Coast Guard, and TSA, and others, 

situating some of their best and brightest at the table with us within I&A. They provided a significant role and reached back not only 

to the components but keeping the Secretary very much informed 

to implement many of these things that Ms. Wagner just referred 

to as it relates to the concentric circles of intervention and support 

as we moved out. 
20 

It was so successful, in fact, that it has been institutionalized by 

Ms. Wagner and made a permanent part of I&A, and we continue 

to look forward to working with the National Counterterrorism 

Center in support of what they are doing on a regular basis in 

partnership with the Department. 

Mr. BROUN. Okay. Additionally, if Mr. Shahzad had brought 

those funds by way of a prepaid or a stored value card, which could 

be purchased in any convenience store, would he have been placed 

on the TECS list? 

Ms. WAGNER. To be honest, I don’t know the answer to that question, so I would like to get you a response for the record, if I could, 

unless Bart knows. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All I know is, you know, regarding that, we actually produced a product about the stored value cards in partnership 

with Immigration Customs Enforcement, so yes, we are aware of 

that new type of way to transmit. But I concur with Ms. Wagner 

that I won’t have a specific answer to the question, but we will get 

back to you, sir. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I will 

yield back. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Broun. 

I would like an answer for the record. If this is possibly a loophole I think we would be very interested in working with you to 

fix it. 

Mr. Green is now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you so much for 

the hearing and the opportunity to speak. You are a part of the 

avant-garde when it comes to these issues, and I am eternally 

grateful that I have the opportunity to serve with you. 

I also thank the Ranking Member, who is a friend from Texas. 

Thank you for your efforts and for things that you do to help us 

as well. Nice to have two friends sitting so close to each other. 

I would like to start by complimenting the many persons that 

you work with. It is important for them to know that we have some 

great amount of appreciation for the difficult work that they do 

under unusual circumstances. Very difficult—very difficult. 

You do great work under adverse circumstances. If there is one 

thing that the New York circumstance called to our attention it is 

the importance of the vendor on the street working closely with the 

officer on the beat. That marriage, that integration of information, 

was crucial. It was critical, of paramount importance. For the two 

to work together to the extent that they did at a critical time made 

all the difference in the world. So we have to compliment them. 

I also want to compliment the people of New York, because unfortunately and unfairly, New Yorkers are sometimes depicted as 

persons who would just walk on by. I am appreciative that the vendor didn’t just walk on by. I am appreciative that the officer had 

received proper training so that that information was passed on appropriately. 

With these things said, and complimenting the Chair for mentioning the vertical integration, Ranking Member for the horizontal 

integration, what are the chief obstacles to vertical integration of 

information and horizontal dissemination of information—the chief 
21 

obstacles that you can call to our attention? I would like for each 

witness to answer, and I will defer to the lady first. 

Ms. WAGNER. Thank you for that question, because we give that 

a lot of thought, especially in the wake of things that don’t go exactly as we would have preferred them to go. 

I think the chief obstacle to horizontal integration tends to be, 

in the intelligence community side at least, what we call sort of signal to noise, which is not so much connecting the dots, but the fact 

that there is so much fragmentary information that it is very difficult to know at the time, until something happens to give you sort 

of hindsight, which of those pieces of information are significant 

enough to follow up on. 

That is just a continuing challenge that the community and the 

homeland security community will face, and we are working on 

putting in place. You know, the automation helps to a certain extent, but some of this is also, you know, people and training and 

mindset. 

One of the main improvements, I think, that is being made in 

the intelligence community is the idea of these pursuit groups, 

where we are charging people to take hold of a specific piece of information and follow it all the way through, to pull that string to 

find everything else, and to institutionalize that approach so that 

we don’t have compartmentalization, you know, like, ‘‘I am assuming that this guy here did something on this so I am not going to 

check to make sure it got done.’’ We can’t afford to do that. I don’t 

know that that happens very often, but we can’t afford to have it 

really happen at all. So the idea of pursuit groups, I think, is one 

way to get at that signal to noise problem horizontally. 

I think vertically—and I look forward to actually hearing what 

Bart is going to say on this—I think one of the challenges is one 

that the Chair has already mentioned, is classification and sort of 

ownership of data. We are working through those issues, but there 

is a lot of information that we have to push down and we have to 

figure out how to get it sanitized to move to lower classification levels and yet still make it useful enough for the State and locals that 

if we give it to them they can do something with it. 

So I would tend to say that those are at least two of the challenges, and then I will turn it over to Bart for his views. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thanks for your comments about New York State. 

Having retired from the New York State Police a little while ago, 

and I have been involved in this since September 11, since 2001, 

and ‘‘See Something, Say Something’’ actually originated in New 

York State, NTA Chief Bill Morange, and it is great to have a 

street vendor make that type of observation and report it. 

But what if, you know, it was during the planning stages and the 

acquisition stages and the storage stages? We need to make certain 

that that same citizen or police officer or first responder made that 

same report. So we need to institutionalize the processes associated 

with that, and I think that goes to the National Suspicious Activity 

Reporting Initiative and have a fusion center have the capacity and 

capability to receive it, analyze it, share it, and in the process, to 

pass it up to the intelligence community. 

I applaud Director Blair as it relates to his responsibility to provide as opposed to a need to know, so we always need to work from 
22 

the premise of ‘‘let’s share it unless you could tell me otherwise’’ 

as opposed to ‘‘let’s not share it and show me why we need to share 

it.’’ I believe that we are stepping out in that regard. 

Some of the obstacles, obviously, you know, include a leadership, 

you know, or lack thereof, accountability—holding people accountable to the statutes and the premises and policies that are being 

built—connectivity, trust, and things associated with that. That is 

something, you know, in partnership with Ms. Wagner, we are earnestly trying to do, and certainly with the support of the Secretary 

of the Department of Homeland Security. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Green. 

Chair now yields 5 minutes to Mr. Dent, of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. DENT. Thanks, Madam Chair. 

Under Secretary Wagner, in your prepared testimony before the 

Homeland Security Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee 

on March 4 you stated that as a result of recent trends I&A is 

working closely with its IFC partners to develop a framework for 

analysis of homegrown extremism that is consistent with protecting 

civil rights and civil liberties. Could you elaborate on that collaboration? 

Ms. WAGNER. Yes, I can. As a result of the Christmas Day bombing there were a number of actions that were taken to address 

issues that were identified then, and one of them was the DNI 

tasked I&A Homeland Security to lead an interagency effort to, you 

know, develop a plan to improve our analysis on homegrown violent extremism. 

So DHS has taken the lead on that project, working very closely 

with the FBI and NCTC, to put together a plan to improve our understanding of the motivations of some of these homegrown violent 

extremists and also to lay out a plan of action for interacting more 

with State and locals to get a better understanding of their views 

of their communities and the factors at play there. 

So we are doing this hand-in-glove with our civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy officers from the beginning to ensure that whatever we put in place is consistent with the—civil liberties. 

Mr. DENT. What are the other agencies that you are partnering 

with here? 

Ms. WAGNER. FBI and NCTC, primarily. 

Mr. DENT. Okay. 

Ms. WAGNER. Looking at the international terrorism and the domestic terrorism—— 

Mr. DENT. What metrics are you using to develop this framework? 

Ms. WAGNER. I think we are in the process of defining what 

those metrics are now, again, making sure that whatever we are 

going to measure ourselves on is consistent with privacy, civil 

rights, and civil liberties. But I would be happy to come up and 

talk to you about that in the future when those things are finalized. 

Mr. DENT. Is the Homeland Security Advisory Council part of 

this framework? 

Ms. WAGNER. I don’t believe that we have discussed this with 

them yet, no. 
23 

Mr. DENT. I understand that Secretary Napolitano, in February 

2010, asked the Department’s Homeland Security Advisory Council 

to develop recommendations on how DHS can develop communitybased law enforcement to tackle homegrown terrorism. Would you 

elaborate on the status of that review and its recommendations, either one of you? Ms. Wagner. 

Ms. WAGNER. I think I will defer to Mr. Johnson on that. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, the Secretary has asked the Homeland Security Advisory Council to look at countering violent extremism as it 

relates to community-orientated policing, the buy-in of the community, the understanding of the community in very proactive and 

trusting ways. 

So about a month ago I was fortunate enough to be able to interact with major city chiefs, the intel commanders, that was started 

up by Chief Mike Downing and Chief Mike Grossman and really 

elicited a lot of best practices on how they do it, because obviously 

we are not going to solve that within the beltway; we need to get 

back to the boots on the ground, the patrol officer, the trooper, the 

deputy, to understand and have the trust and relationship with the 

public. 

So as it relates to the recommendations, the recommendations 

are nearly complete. I actually had an opportunity to review a draft 

of them the other day. They haven’t been presented to the Secretary yet so if it is okay I would prefer not to illuminate on any 

of them, but suffice to say it covers a number of topics and goes 

to, I believe, what this committee would—— 

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Dent, would you yield to me for 1 second? 

Mr. DENT. I would. 

Ms. HARMAN. I would like to request, Mr. Johnson and Ms. Wagner, that we be briefed as soon as possible on this material. 

Thank you. 

Mr. DENT. Just finally, what is I&A doing, really, to help improve our Government’s understanding on this whole notion of domestic radicalization and extremism? 

Ms. WAGNER. I think what we are doing is being done in the context of the interagency effort that I just mentioned. We are going 

to be taking a variety of approaches, including looking for best 

practices potentially overseas with our partners, reaching out to 

academia, open source, and leveraging expertise wherever we can 

find it. Again, be happy to talk to you in more detail on the details 

of the plan that we have laid out. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Dent. I just want to commend you 

for raising the privacy and civil liberties issue, and just to use the 

airwaves afforded by this hearing to call on the administration, 

again, to appoint the privacy and civil liberties oversight board, 

which is mandated by the 2004 intelligence reform law, and which 

has not been filled—the positions for which have not been filled by 

this administration. 

I think that would go a long way to making—toward making 

sure that all the practices we are talking about by fusion centers 

and new regulations and proposed legal remedies comply fully with 

our Constitution. That is something we are all concerned with, and 

so—and I know that you are, too. I would just point out also, for 

the record, that we have had hearings in the past with the privacy 
24 

and civil liberties officers at DHS to talk about the need to make 

sure that on the front end policies take account of privacy and civil 

liberties of law-abiding citizens. 

In introducing Ms. Clarke, I want to give a shout out to the 

NYPD and the New York State Police. First of all, they did a heroic 

job in connection with the Times Square bomber apprehension. But 

also, they get my attention always since all four of my children and 

all three of my perfect grandchildren live in New York City, and 

I am very glad that they are well-protected. 

I now yield to Ms. Clarke, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, Ranking 

Member McCaul. It is a very timely hearing, and I know that there 

was quite a bit of conversation around the New York City Times 

Square event, but I would like to raise a concern that I have. 

I want to add to your equation, Madam Chair, the observation 

and quick thinking of the civilians in this whole equation, and I 

don’t think we can underestimate how important it is to have the 

type of campaign we have had going on in New York City for quite 

some time, which is the ‘‘See Something, Say Something.’’ But having said that, I want to address, you know, our thinking around the 

whole lone actor scenario. 

Following the recent attempted car bombing in New York City’s 

Times Square Federal authorities swiftly investigated the incident, 

proving the post-incident counterterrorism cooperating across Government is improving. Roughly 53 hours after the incident the FBI, 

New York City Department—Police Department and its intelligence officials quickly identified and arrested the suspect. 

However, the goal should be to detect and thwart these plots— 

even small-scale plots such as Mr. Shahzad—as early as possible. 

Of course, small-scale attacks would and should be handled differently than large-scale attacks. A large-scale attack is generally 

easier to detect because it will involve many people and there are 

more opportunities for someone to leak information. 

Clearly, local law enforcement is at the front lines with regard 

to detecting small-scale attacks in our communities. However, I 

want to know, how can we use our National intelligence infrastructure—namely the Intelligence Enterprise and the newly institutionalized DHS Threat Task Force—to better detect the lone actor 

who may appear normal to his neighbors but has been radicalized 

either in person or by the internet? 

Ms. WAGNER. I will take this, and then I will see if Mr. Johnson 

has anything to add. I think one of our primary missions in terms 

of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise is to take all of the intelligence 

information on a specific event and put that out to State and locals 

in a way that would be useful for them in terms of understanding 

what were the actions that the perpetrator took leading up to the 

event that could potentially be recognized and reported on so that 

we are in a position where, as you point out, we could prevent or 

disrupt instead of respond. 

We have put out numerous products on what we call the tactics, 

techniques, and procedures of how the bombs were built, how they 

were delivered, and any kind of suspicious behaviors or activities 

that could be used by local law enforcement to potentially disrupt 

these attacks. You know, in—we have also identified in the past 
25 

the kinds of things that would be bought; I think someone already 

mentioned the example of the hair care products. Fertilizer is obviously a key issue that we also alert people on. 

So that is how we approach this problem. I think we do a pretty 

good job of doing that, but we have a training and education issue 

as well, as you point out, not just at the local law enforcement, but 

then within their areas with the actual civilians who might see 

something along the lines of the ‘‘See Something, Say Something’’ 

campaign. 

I will let Mr. Johnson add his comments. 

Mr. JOHNSON. As Ms. Wagner referred to, it is important to get 

from the intelligence community those indicators and warnings 

that can be applied to every day practice and law enforcement. As 

I mentioned before and I agree with you—‘‘See Something, Say 

Something’’—the importance of that, and to articulate to the law 

enforcement and first responders really what to look for. 

So, for example, in New York State, you know, we knew where 

the storage facilities were; we knew who the ammonia nitrate distributors were; we knew who was renting large vans and things 

like that; we had the ability to, you know, work with law enforcement, the NYPD. In the words of Commissioner Kelly, Mr. 

Shahzad was unremarkable. So that goes to your point, ma’am, 

about how can you detect it before it becomes remarkable, and 

those little indicators and warnings that he may very well display. 

To build upon what Ms. Wagner said, also, the criticality and the 

importance of CBP and TSA and ICE and the information holdings 

that they also have, and how do you leverage them to really try to 

identify a person who may be doing other type of criminal activity 

but may also be involved in a terrorist activity, and the linkages 

to the JTTFs. I think they do that quite well. A lot of the components do have assets apply to the JTTFs and they played a critical 

role in this, you know, this investigation. 

So it is really, you know, right across the board with everything 

that we are doing and everything that you support. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much, Ms. Clarke. 

As everyone knows, this line of questions and this information is 

central to what this subcommittee cares about. New York City and 

New York State are very sophisticated and very well-resourced in 

terms of their law enforcement and public awareness effort. Our 

hope is that other States—all other States—will get up to speed, 

too. Obviously California is doing pretty well—especially Southern 

California—but terror attacks could occur anywhere, anytime, and 

the whole country needs to be protected, not just parts of the country. 

Now I yield 5 minutes to Ms. Richardson for questions. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Johnson, I understand that the I&A analysts receive the opportunity to attend training offered to and by other members of the 

intelligence community. To what extent does the I&A facilitate 

DHS component intelligence analysts to participate in these types 

of training? 

Mr. JOHNSON. First and foremost, you know, Dawn Scalise—she 

has been assigned from the Central Intelligence Agency. She has 

been on, I think, since September. She brings to bear a consider-
26 

able amount of experience as it relates to analytical capabilities, 

and she is in the process and has implemented a number of programs, to include mentoring a lot of the young analysts, training 

a lot of the young analysts. Before Mr. Mike Morell became the 

deputy director she had been interacting with him on a regular 

basis to do exactly what you just described about the cross-fertilization of analysts and training and experiences and exposures. 

But also, equally important is the relationship with the field and 

the analysts from the field, and the first week of June we are going 

to be bringing in some analysts from the field—from the fusion centers—to share with us their experiences and also have them share 

with us, you know, a lot of the best practices and some of the information that they need. 

Under the leadership of Ms. Wagner, she is also exacting training as it relates to sourcing and citing and all the elements that 

make up what the ODNI has been doing with Dr. Peter Lavoy and 

a lot of the expertise resident within there. 

I would also defer to Ms. Wagner as it relates to, you know, some 

of the efforts that she is undertaking and directing within I&A. 

Ms. WAGNER. I would just add that we do work hard to provide— 

make training available to the components so that the analysts in 

the different Department operational elements have access to 

training that helps them understand how to leverage the intelligence community and how to interact with the rest of the intelligence elements of the Department. We are working with them as 

part of the Homeland Security Intelligence Council to understand 

what other training requirements they might have that I&A then 

could meet as part of our service to the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Would it be accurate to say that the analysts 

have a list of all the training that is available? 

Ms. WAGNER. I believe they do. I think it is posted and they have 

access to it. We are able to take advantage of any courses that are 

offered by the intelligence community, so there is a very full roster 

of possibilities. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Would you verify to this committee that, in 

fact, the analysts are aware and have received information of what 

is available to them? 

Ms. WAGNER. I will certainly go back and confirm that all of the 

courses are posted where they can have access to it and that they 

know that. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. That they are aware that that is where it is. 

Ms. WAGNER. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. Thank you. 

For this next question—I apologize, I came in a few minutes late; 

I was presenting in the Jobs Task Force, so if it was asked I apologize—what is the progress in getting the next generation systems, 

such as the HSIN 2.0 and the HTSN on-line? That seemed to be 

a big bulk of—— 

Ms. WAGNER. Flip a coin on this—— 

One of the areas that I am trying to focus on now working very 

closely with Mr. Johnson is trying to solidify the information architecture to serve the enterprise, both at the SCI level, which is the 

HTSN, at the secret level, and at the unclassified level. I think we 
27 

are making progress in understanding where we want to go, but 

there is still room for improvement in terms of the speed with 

which we are implementing some of these solutions. In terms of 

any more details, I probably have to defer to Bart. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Ms. Wagner has been meeting with Richard 

Spiers, the chief information officer, over the past couple months, 

and that is certainly a partnership that is developing as it relates 

to his expertise along with our responsibilities for those classified 

systems. We are working, also, with Ms. Sue Reingold, at the program manager’s office, for the information-sharing environment at 

the secret level to make sure that those systems are sustainable 

and they contain within them the information that is required. 

If you recall, back in September I gave a little bit of an overview 

about our efforts to get more information that is resident on 

sippernet as it relates to helpful tactics and techniques and plans 

for not only the components but for the fusion centers regarding 

VBIEDs, TATP, and really some of the materials that go into making them. To your point about HISN, we are currently working 

with HSSLIC, the Homeland Security State and Local Information 

Committee, and right now we are working with Ops, Operations, 

and NOC, the National Operations Center, to transition it to Next 

Gen. We are—— 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Excuse me. I apologize. My time has expired. 

But what I wanted to make sure you answer the question was, 

when do you expect it to be on-line? 

Mr. JOHNSON. HISN Next Gen? That is going to be over the next 

year or so, and we are taking it very carefully because we don’t 

want to diminish any of the services that are available on HSSLIC 

right now. However, other organizations have already been transferred over to Next Gen and we are just monitoring and watching 

it for the partners and the components. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Ms. Richardson. 

We have discussed whether to go to a brief second round of questions, and we are planning to do that. I will start with me, and if 

you are both interested in doing that, please stay. 

First of all, on Ms.—to follow up on Ms. Richardson’s question, 

I would strongly urge that you consult the users of these on-line 

services. We learned when we did a number of field visits to fusion 

centers around the country that they were not using some of the 

homeland products because they found other products to be much 

more effective. 

The goal is not just to consult horizontally in Washington, DC. 

The goal is to make sure that information sharing vertically works. 

Therefore, I would urge you—and I know this is something you 

would instinctively do, Mr. Johnson—but to consult carefully to 

make sure that your new products will be well received. Thank 

you. 

Let me ask you two questions that Mr. Thompson had planned 

to ask if he had been able to stay for the rest of this session. First 

of all, he mentioned in his opening remarks that Rand Beers has 

now been named the top counterterrorism official for the Depart-
28 

ment. He, Rand Beers, was part of the panel that briefed us last 

week on the New York City bombing. 

The question is, Ms. Wagner, what is his relationship with you 

with respect to—how does his appointment as chief counterterrorism official to the Department affect your duties as the chief intelligence officer? Do you now report to him, or do you work on parallel tracks? You know, why aren’t you the counterterrorism official 

for the Department? 

Ms. WAGNER. Well, I would characterize my relationship with 

Rand as being, we are partners. He is, you know, as we all know, 

a distinguished public servant. We discussed as a Department in 

the recent bottom-up review process that we are doing in the wake 

of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review how many of us 

have terrorism as a key element of our mission, and it ends up 

being almost every component and departmental element of the 

Department. 

So the Secretary wanted to ensure that we had an effective 

mechanism for pulling all those pieces together and she appointed 

Rand to be the CT coordinator. So no, I don’t report to him, but 

I work very closely with him. In fact, we do function as partners. 

When the Secretary goes to the White House for the terrorism 

briefing, if he doesn’t go I go, and he actually took the briefing yesterday because I was testifying in front of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on my budget at the time. 

So I think we have a very constructive relationship and what we 

are both trying to do is to serve the Secretary as best we can to 

make sure that all of the elements that are focused on counterterrorism are rowing in the same direction. 

Ms. HARMAN. Your answer makes me smile, since we have that 

problem up here. We have counterterrorism subcommittees of every 

committee, and this is the only committee called ‘‘The Homeland 

Security Committee.’’ I think we are somewhat jurisdiction-starved, 

so I get it, that there is a need to coordinate, and I understand better. I have known Rand Beers personally for years and think he is 

a very capable fellow. 

But the bottom line here is, we don’t want big org charts and 

people doing duplicative functions; we want straight, fast info sharing, right? Okay. 

The second question that the Chairman would have asked is 

about the use of outside Federal contractors. I remember being appalled to learn that the ratio was 60/40, outside to inside, or maybe 

even worse. Mr. Johnson, you pledged 8 months ago to help fix 

that. I think the goal was to get to 40/60, which is still not terrific. 

Where are we? 

Ms. WAGNER. Well, I think Mr. Johnson had already made considerable progress when I came on board. We are moving in the 

right direction but we are only down to about 55 percent, now. It 

has dropped 15 percent since the beginning of the fiscal year. I am 

working—— 

Ms. HARMAN. Excuse me, 55 percent what? 

Ms. WAGNER. Fifty-five percent contractors. 

Ms. HARMAN. So it is 55/45? 
29 

Ms. WAGNER. Down from 60 percent to 55 percent, a 15 percent 

reduction since the beginning of the fiscal year. We are looking 

very hard—— 

Ms. HARMAN. Excuse me, maybe I can’t add. How is 60 to 55 a 

15 percent reduction? 

Ms. WAGNER. It was 60 percent; it is now 55 percent. So it was 

a 15 percent reduction in total contractors on the—— 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. WAGNER [continuing]. From the beginning of the fiscal year. 

We are looking very hard at seeing where we can make further reductions, but I must be honest that with the amount of work to be 

done, unless I can figure out a way to dramatically increase my 

level—my rate of hiring of Government employees, it will be difficult to draw down too much too quickly. 

We are working very hard to remedy this ratio. Bart and I are 

doing everything we can to micromanage the hiring process, and 

we are working with our Department to try to advocate for direct 

hire authority from OPM to allow us to make some headway on 

these billets, because we all know there are too many vacant billets 

and we are trying to address that problem. 

Ms. HARMAN. Right. Well, I think my time has expired, but this 

is an administration-wide problem, and it has huge implications for 

I&A, which you know, and again, for your—for successfully achieving your mission. 

I now yield to Mr. McCaul. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have a couple of organizational questions to add on the last questions I asked, but I do 

want to just focus on the specific cases. 

Hasan, we had threat information prior to the incident and intelligence coming in. In the Christmas bomber case we did. Is it your 

testimony that in the Times Square bomber there was really nothing we could have done to have prevented that? 

Ms. WAGNER. He was not watch-listed, and I think that he is an 

example of a new paradigm—a difficult paradigm—that we are 

having to deal with of individuals who are mounting very smallscale, unsophisticated attacks without having a great deal of communication or support from others, necessarily, although obviously 

this investigation is still on-going and—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. I agree that that is a challenge. They have indicated they are going to smaller-scale attacks and it is very difficult 

to detect this prior to prevent it. I know he went to Pakistan, and 

perhaps that was looked at, but there was nothing further to indicate that he would be a threat in any way? 

Ms. WAGNER. There are many, many tens—I don’t even know 

how large the number is—of people that go to Pakistan regularly, 

so there—no, we need a little bit more than that. 

Mr. MCCAUL. This may be a little bit out of I&A’s jurisdiction, 

but the no-fly list, UAE did not have him down. It wasn’t refreshed 

every 12 hours; now it is down to 2 hours they will refresh that, 

is that correct? 

Was there an alert that was sent out, though? It seems to me 

in this type of case that an alert should have been sent out to all 

the airlines saying, ‘‘Don’t let this guy get on a plane.’’ 
30 

Ms. WAGNER. He was, as you point out, expedited onto the nofly list, and unfortunately the airlines under the previous rules 

were only required to update that information I believe it was 

every 12 hours. So the new rule that TSA is putting in place will 

require them to update those expedited no-flys every 2 hours—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. Every 2 hours, but can’t you send out an alert separately just saying, ‘‘Special alert,’’ you know? 

Ms. WAGNER. I believe that those are the special alert. But 

again, if we had—— 

Mr. MCCAUL [continuing]. Refresh—— 

Ms. WAGNER. But when the Secure Flight system is completely 

implemented, we will not have this problem any longer. It will be 

automatic. 

Mr. MCCAUL. That is the good news here. 

Two quick issues, and they are big: One, tripling the intelligence 

agents representatives down on the southwest border, that was— 

the Secretary said that that was going to be done. Can you update 

me on that? 

Then the second one on cybersecurity. This is one of those issues 

that a lot of people—it is not on their radar screen, but I consider 

it to be one of the biggest threats that we have to our National security. Can you tell me what you are doing in that regard, too? 

Ms. WAGNER. Yes. Cybersecurity, and it was tripling of the—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. We were told that—basically that there would be 

a tripling of the intelligence analysts down on the southwest border. Has that occurred yet, and what is happening down there? 

Ms. WAGNER. I think its—whether it is officially tripling I do not 

know, but we have substantially increased the level of intelligence 

support that we have located within the El Paso Intelligence Center. We now have, I believe, 12 people on our homeland intelligence 

support team down there doing analytic support to the operational 

elements on the border. 

We have also added a collection manager, with another en route 

to assist in working with the intelligence community to leverage 

their capabilities in support of the operation. We have got a network of State and local fusion centers, HIDAs, elements of DOJ, 

DOD, everybody working together, and we are trying now to formalize sort of the new interagency intelligence coordination body at 

IPIC, which is being worked at the highest level with CBP, ICE, 

DEA, and us. 

Mr. MCCAUL. That is good. Because as you know, it is getting 

very dangerous down there. 

Ms. WAGNER. Yes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Cybersecurity? I only have about 35 seconds. 

Ms. WAGNER. Cybersecurity is—we have created that as a major 

mission area within the Department as part of the Quadrennial 

Homeland Security Review, and we work very closely with NPPD, 

with Rand Beers and Phil Reidinger, specifically, to figure out what 

intelligence support to bring to bear for their responsibilities to secure the dot-gov network. 

We are attempting to increase the level of cybersecurity analysis 

we are doing to look at this unique source of data that we have 

within the Department—the CERT data—and try to see if we can 

improve our ability to do predictive analysis and attribution. 
31 

Mr. MCCAUL. That is good. That is very good. 

Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. McCaul. 

Ms. Clarke. 

Ms. CLARKE. Ms. Wagner, I just wanted to bring to your attention that for quite some time we have been hearing about the deployment of Secure Flight—at least since I have been in Congress, 

and I was elected and started here—elected in 2006 and started 

here in 2007. During that time we have had a number of events 

that we keep referring back to when we have Secure Flight up and 

running. 

Do you have a sense at all of when Secure Flight will actually 

be deployed in its full glory with the capability of doing everything 

that we expect it will do? 

Ms. WAGNER. Ma’am, I actually would prefer to defer that question to TSA—— 

Ms. CLARKE. Okay. 

Ms. WAGNER [continuing]. To come and speak to you, because it 

is not really an intelligence issue; it is more of a Departmental 

issue—— 

Ms. CLARKE. Yes. 

Ms. WAGNER [continuing]. And I don’t have the exact date. 

Ms. CLARKE. But it would seem to me that it would be a major 

tool for the intelligence community. 

Ms. WAGNER. It will be a major tool for the homeland security 

and law enforcement communities, and it will certainly assist us in 

ensuring that the no-fly information is acted on immediately. 

Ms. CLARKE. So it just seems to me that there should be some 

urgency in everyone’s mind around the Secure Flight program. I 

will share that with you because, you know, you raised this with 

Mr. McCaul, which is the issue of the fact that we have thousands 

of people that fly to Pakistan every year, if not tens of thousands. 

Many of the folks who fly to Pakistan every year come from my 

district. If we are going to get really solid intelligence it is like finding a needle in a haystack when you have a system that doesn’t 

weed out the bad actors from the misidentifications from folks who 

we really know are out there to do our Nation harm. 

So I just raise that because I think there needs to be a clarion 

call coming from every part of the homeland security community 

that is relying on clear intelligence that this program be expedited. 

But having said that, that is just my own pet peeve. 

I want to ask about the costs associated with building secure 

spaces that are needed for the installation of information sharing 

technology systems. Many fusion centers do not have connectivity 

to secret—excuse me, connectivity to secret-level DHS networks. 

However, TSA uses storable, secure laptops and devices, allowing 

the TSOs to access classified networks from remote locations. 

To what extent has I&A looked into this option or a similar way 

of providing access to secure networks for fusion centers? 

Ms. WAGNER. Thank you for that question. If I could go back to 

your previous question just for a moment, because my TSA colleague has just given me some information to pass on, which is 

that there is going to be a briefing for Members tomorrow on this 

topic, that they are expecting the Secure Flight to be implemented 
32 

domestically in early summer and internationally by the end of the 

calendar year. 

On to your question about secure coms, we—as I think Mr. Johnson mentioned earlier, and I will let him add his remarks to this— 

we are looking at an overall secret-level architecture to support not 

just the components but also the State and local fusion centers. 

We know that TSA has had some success with their Trace architecture, which uses the talon card, and we are looking at whether 

or not there are circumstances where it would make sense for us 

to employ that. 

We don’t necessarily view it as a substitute for getting our HSDN 

secret connectivity because it doesn’t have all the same 

functionality, and it does have some disadvantages associated with 

its use in terms of it has to be locked—you know, the card has to 

be locked in a safe, and there are some, you know, security issues 

that you have to weigh in the balance. But we do believe that it 

is possible that for some of our folks it would be a good interim solution, and we are reviewing that. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Additionally, we have accelerated the deployment 

of HSDN to the field, and you are exactly right about the need to 

build out secure space, secure coms. So we are pretty optimistic by 

the end of the year we will have 64 HSDN terminals deployed to 

those fusion centers capable of receiving it. 

Another critical thing is the components and their ability to have 

HSDN and give them the connectivity that they need. I recall using 

Trace back in 2004 during the RNC in New York City, and it is 

effective, but yes, it is a stop-gap, and we are not going to rely on 

that to be the final solution. We want to roll out HSDN as effectively as we can. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Ms. Clarke. 

Thank you, Mr. McCaul. 

Again, I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony, and 

the Members for their brilliant questions. 

This partnership has been going on a long while and we expect 

it to continue. We need this partnership to work. Our country will 

not be safe if it doesn’t work. Our country still may face future attacks, but the chances of that are somewhat reduced if this partnership is robust and successful. 

So I thank you, Ms. Wagner, for agreeing to submit some additional information for the record. That was requested, and I strongly support it, and if there is a loophole—we were exploring this— 

we obviously want to work with you to close it. 

Having no further business, this subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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