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LAYING THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE TASK AHEAD: 

AN EXAMINATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY’S QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, 

INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 29, 2010 

Serial No. 111–65 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

BEN RAY LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

EMMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

AL GREEN, Texas 

JAMES A. HIMES, U.S. Virgin Islands 

MARY JO KILROY, Ohio 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

DANA TITUS, Nevada 

VACANCY

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio 

I. LANIER AVANT, Staff Director 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

AL GREEN, Texas 

MARY JO KILROY, Ohio 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

PETER T. KING, NEW YORK (Ex Officio) 

TAMLA T. SCOTT, Director & Counsel 

NIKKI HADDER, Clerk 

MICHAEL RUSSELL, Senior Counsel 

KERRY KINIRONS, Minority Subcommittee Lead 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Christopher P. Carney, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Management, 

Investigations, and Oversight ............................................................................. 1 

The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Management, 

Investigations, and Oversight ............................................................................. 2 

WITNESSES

Ms. Jane Holl Lute, Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

Dr. James Carafano, Deputy Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis 

Institute for International Studies and Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison 

Center for Foreign Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14 

FOR THE RECORD

The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Management, 

Investigations, and Oversight: 

DHS Jurisdictional Chart .................................................................................... 4 

(1) 

LAYING THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE TASK 

AHEAD: AN EXAMINATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW 

Thursday, April 29, 2010 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND

OVERSIGHT, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:11 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Christopher P. Carney 

[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Carney, Pascrell, Green, and Bilirakis. 

Mr. CARNEY [presiding]. The Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on ‘‘Laying the Framework for the Task Ahead: An Examination of the Department of Homeland Security’s Quadrennial Homeland Security 

Review.’’ 

Good morning. I would like to welcome everyone here today. I 

would especially like to thank Deputy Secretary Lute for participating in today’s hearing. I am sure this will be a much more constructive hearing because of her testimony. 

The purpose of this hearing is to examine the Department of 

Homeland Security’s completion of its first Quadrennial Homeland 

Security Review, or QHSR. This subcommittee has held a hearing 

and multiple briefings on the topic in both the 110th and 111th 

Congresses. 

I know that myself, the Ranking Member, and all Members of 

this subcommittee took a particular interest in the QHSR because 

we recognize how instrumental it is in shaping homeland security 

policy and guiding the Department toward a better protection of 

our country. 

We will examine the Department’s process for completing the 

QHSR, its plans for implementing the new policies contained within the document, and whether the final product meets legislative 

requirements. 

The QHSR is a comprehensive assessment outlining the longterm strategy and priorities for homeland security and guidance on 

the Department’s programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, 

and authorities. 
2 

According to statute, the first QHSR was required to be submitted to Congress by December 31, 2009. However, it wasn’t until 

February 1, 2010—over a month after the required date—that the 

Committee on Homeland Security received the QHSR. 

The most frustrating thing about that missed deadline was that, 

for a year-and-a-half prior to the deadline, this subcommittee had 

repeatedly asked the Department if it was going to be on time and 

if it needed more personnel or more funding. We were consistently 

told the Department had everything it needed to produce an ontime, quality product. We now know that was not the case. 

The 9/11 Act specifically delineates the information that is required to be included in the QHSR, yet some of the statutorily 

mandated items were not included in the QHSR. Missing was a description of the interagency cooperation, preparedness of Federal 

response assets, infrastructure, a budget plan, and other elements 

of the homeland security program. 

An assessment of the organizational alignment of the Department with the applicable National homeland security strategy was 

also not included. Missing, too, was a discussion of the status of cooperation among Federal agencies in the effort to promote National 

homeland security. 

There was no discussion of the status of cooperation between the 

Federal Government and State, local, and Tribal governments in 

preventing terrorist attacks and preparing for emergency response 

to threats to National homeland security. 

This is wholly unacceptable. These items were statutorily mandated to be included in the QHSR. They were not suggestions, and 

they were not optional. The lack of guidance on these items undercuts our National security. 

I am anxiously awaiting the release of the Bottom Up Review. 

I was first told by the Department that the BUR, the B–U–R, 

would be released in late March. Then I was told early April, and 

then late April. I will be very interested in hearing today whether 

the Department has set a date for the release of the BUR. 

Much of the information that was included in the BUR was supposed to have been delivered in the QHSR almost 5 months ago. 

The BUR is not a statutorily mandated report; the QHSR was. It 

is my sincere hope that the next QHSR will be a complete product 

that doesn’t require a follow-on review to complement it and excuses as to why it was not released on time. 

I would like to thank the witnesses for their participation, and 

I do look forward to their testimony. 

I now recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, the 

gentleman from Florida, my friend, Mr. Bilirakis, for an opening 

statement. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it very 

much. 

Good morning. I am pleased that the subcommittee is meeting 

today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security’s first 

Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. 

I must start by expressing my disappointment with the Department’s delay in transmitting the QHSR to Congress. Despite repeated bipartisan inquiries into whether the Department had sufficient time and resources to complete the review and assurances 
3 

from the Department that it would be completed on time, the 

QHSR was over a month late and certainly fell short of the statutory requirements of the Implementing Recommendations of the 

9/11 Commission Act. 

Secretary Lute, it is for this reason that I am interested in hearing more about the Department’s progress in completing its Bottom 

Up Review, which will contain the programmatic and budgetary information that I believe should have been included in the QHSR, 

in accordance with the 9/11 Act. 

I would also like to discuss the QHSR in the context of the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request for the Department of Homeland Security. In a February 8 CQ Homeland Security article, Assistant Secretary for Policy David Heyman stated, ‘‘We certainly 

had this strategic framework in mind when we constructed the [fiscal 2011] budget.’’ Yet in many instances, the QHSR contains statements contradictory to the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request. 

The QHSR states that we must achieve effective control of the 

physical borders and approaches to the United States, a point on 

which we agree, Madam Secretary. Why, then, doesn’t the budget 

request include the funding for CBP to add any additional miles of 

effective control in fiscal year 2011, and why does it cut $225 million for fencing and technology along the border? 

I can give you more examples of ways in which the QHSR and 

budget request conflict, but I will address them during my questioning. In addition, I am interested in hearing about the lessons 

learned from this QHSR process that can be applied as the next 

QHSR is drafted. 

Last, but certainly not least, while we are looking at the task 

ahead, as suggested by the hearing’s title, I strongly agree with Dr. 

Carafano’s comments in his written statement about the immediate 

need for Congress to consolidate jurisdiction over the Department 

of Homeland Security. The Department is currently reporting to 

more than 100 Congressional committees and subcommittees, as 

you can see from this chart on the monitors. 

We have heard this recommendation time and time again from 

many notable sources, including the 9/11 Commission and the 

WMD Commission. I know this is an issue on which we agree, Mr. 

Chairman, and I hope Members of this committee will work together to take this very important step. 

After all, the Department won’t truly be able to accomplish the 

goals set forth in the QHSR if it is continuously distracted from its 

mission by the current broken oversight system. 

With that, I would like to welcome our witnesses, and I look forward to your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield 

back the balance of my time. 

[The information follows:] 
4 

Mr. CARNEY. I thank the gentleman from Florida. 

Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that, under 

committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the 

record. 

I welcome both of our witnesses. Our first witness is the deputy 

secretary for homeland security, Ms. Jane Holl Lute. Deputy Secretary Lute has over 30 years of military and senior executive experience in the United States Government and is at the heart of 

efforts to prevent and resolve international crises. 

Ms. Lute served as assistant secretary general of the United Nations, responsible for support to peacekeeping operations. In this 

capacity, she managed operational support for the second-largest 

deployed military presence in the world. 

At the United Nations, Ms. Lute led rapid response support to 

a variety of operations and crises in some of the most remote, austere, and dangerous environments in the world. She also effectively 

directed the growth of United Nations peacekeeping support from 

$1.8 billion to nearly $8 billion of operations annually. 

Most recently, Ms. Lute led the United Nations initiative designed to coordinate efforts and build sustainable peace in countries emerging from violent conflict. Prior to joining the United Nations, Ms. Lute served on the National Security Council staff under 

both President George H.W. Bush and President William Jefferson 

Clinton. 

Ms. Lute has a distinguished career in the United Nations Army, 

including serving in the gulf during Operation Desert Storm. Ms. 
5 

Lute has a Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University and 

a J.D. from Georgetown University. 

Our second witness is Dr. James Carafano. Dr. Carafano, one of 

the Nation’s leading experts in defense National homeland security, directs Heritage’s Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies. 

In August 2009, Dr. Carafano was promoted to director of the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, as well as to deputy director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies. 

Dr. Carafano, a 25-year veteran of the Army, manages day-to-day 

research and program activities of the Allison Center, in addition 

to overseeing the centers and projects at the Davis Institute. 

Before joining Heritage, he served 25 years in the U.S. Army, rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel, and was head speechwriter 

for the Army chief of staff, the service’s highest-ranking officer. Dr. 

Carafano has also served as an assistant professor at the U.S. military academy in West Point and is currently a visiting professor at 

the National Defense University and Georgetown University. 

He is the author or co-author of numerous books, including ‘‘Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom,’’ and the textbook ‘‘Homeland Security,’’ which was designed as a practical introduction to everyday 

life in the era of terrorism. 

Dr. Carafano is a graduate of West Point. He holds a master’s 

degree and doctorate from Georgetown University, as well as a 

master’s in strategy from the U.S. Army War College. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted 

into the record. I now ask each witness to summarize a statement 

for 5 minutes, beginning with Deputy Secretary Lute. 

STATEMENT OF JANE HOLL LUTE, DEPUTY SECRETARY, 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. LUTE. Chairman Carney, Ranking Member Bilirakis, Members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to appear 

before you today. 

I am pleased to discuss the administration and our Nation’s firstever Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, the QHSR, that the 

Department of Homeland Security submitted to Congress on February 1 of this year. 

Even nearly 8 years since 9/11 and 6 years since the creation of 

the Department, questions regarding homeland security—what is 

it, how is the homeland best secured, and what does it mean to be 

prepared—still echo widely among homeland security stakeholders. 

The QHSR is a major step for our Department. It sets forth a vision and framework to help answer these central questions and 

shape the strategic direction of the Department and of homeland 

security for the next 4 years. 

As we have briefed Congress—as we have briefed stakeholders in 

the homeland security enterprise, we see the completion of the 

QHSR and the submission of the report as step No. 1 of a threestep process. Step No. 2 is, Mr. Chairman, as you noted, the Bottom Up Review, an exercise designed to examine the Department 

from the activity level up to align our programmatic activities and 
6 

* The QHSR is available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsrlreport.pdf and has 

been retained in committee files. 

organizational structure with the missions and goals that were 

identified in the QHSR. 

Once completed and our work in the Department is completed, 

the BUR will inform step No. 3, which is our budget building process for fiscal year 2012 and for the 2012–2016 future years FYHSP. 

Let me mention just a few key concepts that we articulate in the 

QHSR. First, the QHSR lays out a positive, forward-looking vision 

for homeland security. What does it mean to have a secure homeland? It means that we are trying to create a safe, secure, resilient 

place where the American way of life can thrive. We also discuss 

the concept of homeland security as an enterprise, and we do this 

in order to capture the collective efforts and shared responsibilities 

of Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, non-Governmental, and 

private-sector partners. 

Mr. Chairman, I have spent my entire career in National security, and there is a big difference between National security and 

homeland security, and this—the QHSR recognizes that difference, 

but also recognizes the essential connection between the two. 

In the QHSR, we identify what we see as the three pillars for 

the foundation of homeland security: Security itself, protecting the 

United States and its people, vital interests, and way of life; resilience, fostering individual, community and system robustness, 

adaptability, and capacity for rapid recovery; and customs and exchange, that is, expediting and enforcing lawful trades, travel, and 

immigration. 

Finally, the QHSR grounds homeland security in five mission 

sets, and we believe these mission sets are essential to achieving 

the vision of a safe and secure and resilient homeland protected 

from terrorism and other hazards where the American way of life 

can thrive. Those missions are preventing terrorism and enhancing 

security, securing and managing our borders, enforcing and administering our immigration laws, and safeguarding security in—safeguarding and securing cyberspace, and, finally, ensuring resilience 

to disasters. 

The QHSR was produced with lessons in mind from the past 7 

years with the lessons learned from the QDR process, which has 

a much longer history than the QHSR, and with the very broad 

input of literally thousands of individuals from across this country, 

from Government, private, and nonprofit sectors, and communities 

Nation-wide. We are proud of that accomplishment, and we can be 

confident that the homeland security enterprise will strengthen 

and mature over the next 4 years with a clear sense of purpose and 

common understanding of the mission at hand. 

As you have noted, Mr. Chairman, I have submitted my full 

statement for the record, and as well as a copy of the QHSR.* I 

look forward to addressing the committee—the questions that you 

and the committee may have. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Ms. Lute follows:] 
7 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JANE HOLL LUTE

APRIL 29, 2010 

Chairman Carney, Ranking Member Bilirakis, and Members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the recently completed Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). 

The QHSR represents the most comprehensive strategic assessment of homeland 

security to date, and it has set forth a vision and framework that will shape the 

strategic direction of homeland security for the next 4 years and guide all homeland 

security stakeholders toward common goals and objectives. Today, I’d like to describe the major findings and results of the QHSR, outline the approach we took 

in executing the review, and articulate some of the lessons learned along the way 

that we hope will inform the next QHSR. 

Secretary Napolitano and I are particularly proud of the substantive and consistent engagement with our Federal, State, local, Tribal, and non-Governmental 

partners that produced this first QHSR. This robust collaboration added immeasurable value to the analysis and reinforced a foundational theme of the review that 

I will address shortly—that homeland security is a vast enterprise which extends 

well beyond just the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), leveraging capabilities and capacities that reside across all levels of government, the private and nonGovernmental sectors, and among the communities and citizens of this country. 

INTRODUCTION

As the subcommittee is aware, Section 2401 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 amends Title VII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to require the Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct a QHSR 

every 4 years beginning in 2009. Congress was clear that the QHSR should delineate a homeland security strategy, including an outline of priority mission areas. 

The QHSR legislation also sought to better understand the resource and organizational implications of a new strategic view of homeland security. What we quickly 

discovered, however, was that any articulation of strategy or analysis of specific programmatic or resource tradeoffs—either within DHS or across the broader homeland 

security enterprise—had to be firmly rooted within a comprehensive understanding 

of homeland security. This understanding remained somewhat elusive, as questions 

like: ‘‘What is homeland security?’’; ‘‘How is the homeland best secured?’’; and, 

‘‘What does it mean to be prepared?’’ still echoed widely among homeland security 

stakeholders 8 years after 9/11. 

To that end, the submission of the QHSR Report to Congress on Feb. 1, 2010 

marked an important first step in a multi-step process to examine and address fundamental issues that concern homeland security. The QHSR describes the Nation’s 

homeland security interests, identifies the critical homeland security enterprise missions, and ultimately defines a strategic approach to those missions by laying out 

the principal goals, essential objectives, and key strategic outcomes necessary for 

that strategic approach to succeed. A bottom-up review (BUR) of the Department 

of Homeland Security was initiated in November 2009 as an immediate follow on 

and complement to the Congressionally mandated QHSR, with the aim of aligning 

DHS’ programmatic activities and organizational structure with the broader mission 

sets and goals identified in the QHSR. The BUR represents an intermediate substantive follow-on step to the QHSR and the results will be reflected in the President’s 2012 budget submission and the DHS fiscal year 2012–2016 Future Years 

Homeland Security Program. These documents will propose specific programmatic 

and resource adjustments. 

It is also important to note that the QHSR is not an assessment of the strategy, 

policy, or resource allocations of the Department of Homeland Security. By no 

means was this an internal review of DHS or a resource prioritization document. 

Rather, the QHSR was a strategic analysis that is already serving as a basis for 

a deeper review of the full range of homeland security enterprise missions. 

QHSR RESULTS

The QHSR has resulted in a new strategic framework and a positive, forwardlooking vision for homeland security: A homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient 

against terrorism and other hazards where American interests, aspirations, and way 

of life can thrive. The QHSR acknowledges existing relationships, roles, and responsibilities, and seeks to set forth a shared vision of homeland security in order to 

achieve unity of purpose going forward. 
8 

As referenced in my introduction, the QHSR introduces the concept of the homeland security enterprise to capture the collective efforts and shared responsibilities 

of Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, non-Governmental, and private-sector 

partners—as well as individuals, families, and communities—to maintain critical 

homeland security capabilities. The term ‘‘enterprise’’ connotes a broad-based community with a common interest in the public safety and well-being of America and 

American society that is composed of multiple actors and stakeholders whose roles 

and responsibilities are distributed and shared. 

Second, in conceptualizing a new strategic framework for the homeland security 

enterprise, several conclusions or principles provided necessary context. The QHSR 

takes a more comprehensive approach to homeland security threats by expanding 

the focus of homeland security to specifically address high-consequence weapons of 

mass destruction; al-Qaeda and global violent extremism; mass cyber attacks, intrusions, and disruptions; pandemics and natural disasters; and illegal trafficking and 

related transnational crime. 

Third, the QHSR identifies three key concepts essential to the foundation of 

homeland security and relevant to all homeland security activities: 

• Security: Protecting the United States and its people, vital interests, and way 

of life; 

• Resilience: Fostering individual, community, and system robustness, adaptability, and capacity for rapid recovery; 

• Customs and Exchange: Expediting and enforcing lawful trade, travel, and immigration. 

All homeland security activities must be built upon a foundation of ensuring security and resilience in the normal, daily activities of society and interchange with the 

world. 

Informed by these principles, the QHSR Strategic Framework grounds homeland 

security in five missions and their associated goals and objectives that more completely capture the universe of activities required to achieve homeland security. 
9 

This framework recognizes that all-hazards emergency management is part of 

homeland security, and restores ‘‘mitigating hazards’’ as a strategic aim for Ensuring Resilience to Disasters. In addition, the framework acknowledges the vital importance of Enforcing and Administering Immigration Laws and Safeguarding and 

Securing Cyberspace by elevating these efforts to core homeland security missions. 

The QHSR also emphasizes the importance of maturing and strengthening the 

homeland security enterprise in recognition of the critically important functional capabilities that support the mission priorities outlined above. The goals in this area 

include: 

• Enhance Shared Awareness of Risks and Threats; 

• Build Capable Communities; 

• Foster Unity of Effort; 

• Foster Innovative Approaches and Solutions Through Leading-Edge Science and 

Technology. 

QHSR STRUCTURE AND APPROACH

As I indicated previously, the QHSR benefited from the constructive engagement 

of thousands of dedicated individuals from across the country and, indeed, around 

the globe, including the key officials of DHS, the heads of other Federal agencies, 

and other relevant governmental and nongovernmental entities, including State, 

local, Tribal, and territorial governments, as well as the broader public at large. Although numbers alone cannot capture the depth and vibrancy of the debates and 

discussions that occurred throughout the process of preparing the QHSR, the process engaged more than 100 stakeholder associations and several hundred experts 

from government at all levels, as well as academia and the private sector. Our on- 
10 

1The Executive Committee consisted of the leaders of the following organizations: The National Governors Association, the Council of State Governments, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, 

the National League of Cities, the National Association of Counties, the National Council of 

State Legislatures, the National Congress of American Indians, the International City/County 

Management Association, the National Emergency Management Association, and the International Association of Emergency Managers. 

line National Dialogues had over 20,000 visits, with over 3,000 comments submitted. 

The core of the QHSR approach was the formation of seven study groups that consisted of over 200 participants from 42 DHS directorates, components, and offices. 

The study groups were each led by a DHS official and facilitated by an independent 

subject-matter expert, both of whom ensured that all viewpoints were aired and that 

divergent opinions were brought forward. The study groups conducted their analyses 

over a 5-month period, and consistently shared work products with the other stakeholder groups via multiple collaboration processes. 

A Steering Committee, chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy (Strategic Plans) and consisting of the leads and facilitators of each study group, ensured 

consistency and integration across the review and raised issues for leadership consideration. At the conclusion of the study group deliberation period, I convened more 

than a dozen senior leadership meetings to review and reach concurrence on study 

group recommendations. Final decisions on the recommendations reflected Departmental acknowledgement of the major themes around which the QHSR report was 

written. 

DHS also worked closely and consistently with the White House, National Security Staff and other Federal departments and agencies to refine the QHSR and ensure consistency with National strategy and other major security reviews, including 

the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 

Review. Key mechanisms for interagency coordination included six special sub-Interagency Policy Committees established by the National Security Staff to provide a 

forum for interagency input on study group work products, and a Strategy Coordination Group which provided strategy and policy planners from across the Government 

an opportunity to share perspectives and provide feedback throughout the process. 

Congress was kept apprised of QHSR status and process through testimony by the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy (Strategic Plans) at the outset of the review, 

and through 17 briefings to Congressional staff, including multiple briefings to staff 

of the House Homeland Security Committee, the Senate Homeland Security and 

Government Affairs Committee, and the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security, as well as briefings to staff of the House Energy 

and Commerce Committee, the House Judiciary Committee, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, the Senate Commerce Committee, and the 

Senate Judiciary Committee. 

To ensure the broadest possible outreach to critical State, local, and Tribal partners as well as the general public, the Secretary of Homeland Security invited 118 

homeland security stakeholder organizations representing State, local, Tribal, territorial, non-Governmental, and private-sector interests, to submit papers and other 

materials relating to the QHSR study areas at the outset of the review. Over 40 

position papers were received and disseminated to study groups, and these papers 

helped to frame and inform their deliberations. This early engagement of homeland 

security stakeholders at the beginning of the review process was a critical element 

of the QHSR. 

Second, in a groundbreaking initiative, DHS held three on-line, collaborative ‘‘National Dialogue on the QHSR’’ sessions to capture the direct input and perspectives 

of a wide array of participants across the homeland security enterprise. The National dialogues were open to anyone who wanted to provide input on QHSR content, although DHS engaged in deliberate outreach to several hundred organizations 

with interests in homeland security. As I stated earlier, over the course of three dialogues, more than 20,000 visits were logged, resulting in over 3,000 comments on 

study group material. National dialogue comments and content ratings were provided to the study groups who used the information to inform their iterative deliberations throughout the analytic period of the review. Revised study group materials 

were posted on each subsequent dialogue, demonstrating how materials evolved over 

the course of the review and showing participants how their comments informed 

study group work. 

Last, the Secretary convened the leadership of ten key stakeholder associations 

that are broadly representative of State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments 

to form a ‘‘virtual’’ QHSR Executive Committee.1 DHS held monthly teleconferences 

with the Executive Committee throughout the analytic phase of the review to keep 
11 

these organizations appraised of review progress. These organizations also participated in the collaborative events DHS held throughout the review, such as Secretary Napolitano’s call for comment at the beginning of the review and the three 

National Dialogue sessions. Finally, on Nov. 19, 2009, Secretary Napolitano met in 

person with leadership representatives of the Executive Committee organizations to 

share key findings and recommendations of the QHSR. This in-person meeting provided key stakeholder organizations the opportunity to comment on QHSR findings 

and recommendations in a similar manner to, and at a similar time as, Federal department and agency leadership. 

LESSONS LEARNED AND NEXT STEPS

As we look toward the next QHSR, I would like to share with you a few lessons 

learned. First, future Quadrennial Reviews should not be conducted in transition 

years. Senior leadership engagement and support is critical to any planning process 

of this scale, and the timeline of the transition process creates significant challenges 

in the critically important conceptualization and launch phases of a review. Based 

on the foundation set by the 2009 QHSR, the next QHSR will involve significant 

analytics during both the preparatory and early phases of the review, which must 

be conducted with full buy-in and awareness of senior leadership. 

In addition, the other major quadrennial reviews, including the Quadrennial Defense Review and Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, among others, 

must be synchronized. Today’s security environment demands whole of Government 

solutions and flexible and adaptable policy responses to difficult challenges. Quadrennial reviews offer an important opportunity to pause and ensure the strategy is 

right and the organization is aligned. We must find ways to do this in a way that 

meaningfully leverages the knowledge of each relevant department and agency, as 

well as stakeholders beyond the Federal Government. 

Last, though the QHSR succeeded in breaking down bureaucratic and other barriers to large-scale engagement with the public, there is still more we can do. The 

technology and the tools are there for Government to significantly enhance representative policymaking and we must facilitate the use of such tools across the 

Government. 

CONCLUSION

The QHSR has been an incredibly valuable endeavor, both for the results I’ve outlined here today, as well as the path we took in getting here. It has already generated significant follow-on analysis and examination within DHS, including the results of the BUR that will be reflected in the 2012 President’s budget submission, 

and other important efforts to improve DHS strategic management and analysis. We 

can be confident that the homeland security enterprise will proceed over the next 

4 years with a clear sense of purpose and a common understanding of the mission 

at hand. 

I look forward to addressing any questions that you may have. Thank you. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Ms. Lute. 

Dr. Carafano for 5 minutes, please. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES CARAFANO, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, THE 

KATHRYN AND SHELBY CULLOM DAVIS INSTITUTE FOR 

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AND DIRECTOR, DOUGLAS AND 

SARAH ALLISON CENTER FOR FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, 

THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. CARAFANO. Thank you, sir. 

I am deeply honored to be here, and I am very excited. I think 

that this is a real opportunity. I think the Department has produced a document that lays the foundation for a positive and constructive—and maybe contentious—but a healthy and useful dialogue between the Congress and the Department. 

I mentioned three areas of observations and comments in my 

statement. The first of those was analytics, and analytics is basically, how do you decide what is really important to look at, what 

is a big issue, and then how do you decide what is the right way 

to analyze that issue and then use that data? 
12 

My observation there is, I think we can simply go a lot farther. 

I commend the Secretary and the deputy secretary for taking this 

process very seriously. I watched this as a member of the HSAC. 

They did give it the attention and leadership it deserved, and I did 

see improvements over the course of the year. 

But I think there is an awful long way to go. There is actually 

a fair amount of capacity already existent that the Department can 

harness in both the FFRDCs and the University of Excellence program, but you have got to organize it and harness it and be forward-looking in terms of thinking your problems and then build additional capabilities. 

I think QHSRs, to really be a strong, powerful document, have 

to have powerful analytics behind them. You know, I think we are 

just not there yet. 

The second area that I focused on in my comments is on enhancing the cooperation and the dialogue. How can we get the most out 

of this QHSR process for the Congress and Department to move 

forward together? That is two areas in there that I want to particularly highlight. 

One is Congressional oversight, which I think that this is the 

most significant issue. The 9/11 Commission report stated that this 

is a critical, vital issue, that you cannot have dysfunctional and diffuse oversight of the Department and expect to have it go forward 

in a strategic direction, and I think that is an incredibly significant 

challenge. 

When you look at the QHSR and you have tried to look forward 

about how you can work on these things, it is just very, very difficult to me to foresee with the current oversight of the Congress 

and the—how we are going to be able to move forward in an integrated and systematized matter. 

The other point I noted in there was the position of under secretary for policy and planning. I think there is a good parallel here 

in DOD. There is a reason why DOD, whether you like their QDR 

or not, whether they have a very demonstrably effective QDR process, and why policy and strategy really do drive the Department, 

and why there is a powerful link in that Department between policy planning and budgeting, and a lot of it has to do with the fact 

that the person that has the hot button in terms of policy and planning process is that at the appropriate level of leadership in the 

Department, and I think that is simply important for the Department of Homeland Security, as well. 

The third area which I really think is what we really should put 

the focus of our discussion is, there is a long laundry list of here 

in the Department of things that need to get done, and the Department I think rightly pointed in the QHSR that the single-most important obligation or duty or thing to go forward is to really build 

a National homeland security enterprise. 

It doesn’t mean that Department of Homeland Security is running everything, but it does mean that there is a community of people that are looking after American citizens that bridges Federal, 

State, local, Tribal, private sector, non-Governmental, and even 

international partners. Building that enterprise is an enormous 

challenge, and I listed some areas that I would propose or the—you 

know, the things that have to go to the top of the to-do list. 
13 

I will just run through those very quickly. The first one of those, 

it was a response and resiliency, which I think are very important 

topics, and what I would like to highlight for the committee there 

is the administration is in the middle of writing HSPD–7, HSPD– 

8. I think these are critical documents. I think it is vitally important that the Department’s leadership role in the interagency process be appropriately recognized in these documents, and if it is not, 

I think we are in real trouble, particularly disturbed that—on the 

planning side. 

The Department develops something called an integrated planning system, never really got off the ground, and it is a huge deficit. The fact that we don’t have a way to have coherent planning 

at all level—integrated at all levels of governments is a serious 

problem. Quite frankly, I think we have not made anywhere near 

the progress we need to do that. 

I also talk a bit about international cooperation, which I think, 

you know, we all think Department of Homeland Security and we 

think internally, but, really, it is what the Department does as a 

global leader that makes a difference. You are only as strong as the 

weakest link, and virtually every aspect of homeland security has 

an international dimension to it. 

This is an area that we just haven’t given appropriate attention. 

At the end of the day, I think the Department needs a toolset that 

looks a lot more like the Department of Defense. We think of individual education and training, IMET program, or other types of 

lend-lease programs and training programs. I think the Department ought to look a lot more like that. 

Counterterrorism, I think, is something also this committee 

ought to take a serious look at. I don’t think the Intelligence Reorganization Act I don’t think well served the Department. I don’t 

think its leadership role in counterterrorism and intelligence was 

properly recognized. 

I think there is an enormous amount of counterterrorism capability within the Department that can be harnessed and integrated 

with other Federal agencies. So I think that—and stopping terrorist attacks, of course, should be our top priority. 

The last one is cyber. I commend the Department for putting 

that one on the list. It is a tough one. My observation there is, you 

know, we all—when we talk about cyber, we tend to talk a lot 

about kind of foot soldiers, you know, more analysts, you know, 

more of this, more of that. 

You know, cyber has simply become something that has transcended every element in our society. The problem with it is we all 

haven’t caught up. 

In virtually every organization today, when somebody uses the 

word ‘‘computer’’ or ‘‘Internet,’’ the COO says—turns to the CIO 

and says, ‘‘Take care of that.’’ We are long past the age when this 

is CIO business. This is leadership business. Leaders at every level 

need to be cyber competent. 

I think we tend not to put enough emphasis on human capital, 

and particularly not enough evidence on training leadership. I 

think that is where the party really needs to go. 

We could debate whether these should be the top of the to-do list, 

but I definitely think we would be ill-served if that wasn’t a very 
14 

1L. Paul Bremer III and Edwin Meese III, Defending the American Homeland: A Report of 

the Heritage Foundation Homeland Security Task Force (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2002). 2 James Jay Carafano and David Heyman, ‘‘DHS 2.0 Rethinking the Department of Homeland 

Security,’’ Heritage Foundation Special Report, SR–02, December 13, 2004, at http:// 

www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2004/12/DHS-20-Rethinking-the-Department-of-Homeland-Security. 3 James Jay Carafano, testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Government Affairs, January 25, 2005 at www.heritage.org/Research/Testimony/Before-theSenate-Committee-on-Homeland-Security-and-Government-Affairs. 4 Jena Baker McNeill, ‘‘The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: A Vital Tool for the 

Obama Administration,’’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2215, December 12, 2008, at 

http://s3.amazonaws.com/thflmedia/2008/pdf/bg2215.pdf. 

important part of our discussion. But thank you again for having 

me, and I look very forward to hearing your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Carafano follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES CARAFANO

APRIL 29, 2010 

My name is Dr. James Jay Carafano. I am the Deputy Director of the Kathryn 

and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and the Director of 

Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today and address 

this vital subject. In my testimony today I would like to address what I see as the 

key lessons from the process of conducting the first-ever Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and what can be done to enhance the oversight role of Congress and 

the dialogue between the Legislative branch and the Department of Homeland Security. I will focus my comments on: (1) Improving methods of analysis, (2) enhancing 

cooperation with the Congress, and (3) establishing priorities for implementation. 

My responsibilities at The Heritage Foundation comprise supervising all the foundation’s research on public policy concerning foreign policy and National security. 

Homeland security has been a particular Heritage research priority. The foundation 

produced the first major assessment of domestic security after 9/11.1 Over the past 

9 years we have assembled a robust, talented, and dedicated research team. I have 

had the honor and privilege of leading them for over 8 years. Heritage analysts have 

studied and written authoritatively on virtually every aspect of homeland security 

and homeland defense. The results of all our research are publicly available on the 

Heritage Web site at www.heritage.org. We collaborate frequently with the homeland security research community, including: The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Aspen Institute, the Center for National Policy, the 

Hudson Institute, the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, and the Strategic Studies Institute and Center for Strategic Leadership at 

the Army War College. Heritage analysts also serve on a variety of Government advisory efforts, including task forces under the Homeland Security Advisory Council 

and Advisory Panel on Department of Defense Capabilities for Support of Civil Authorities. Our research programs are non-partisan, dedicated to developing policy 

proposals that will keep the Nation safe, free, and prosperous. 

CALL TO ACTION

In 2004 David Heyman, who headed the Homeland Security program at CSIS 

(and who now is assistant secretary for policy at the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security), and I led a research project that produced ‘‘DHS 2.0: Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security,’’ the first comprehensive review of the newly established Department of Homeland Security.2 One of the key steps we proposed for implementing the recommendations in the report was that ‘‘Congress should establish 

a requirement for DHS to conduct quadrennial reviews . . .’’ 3 The Implementing 

the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 established the requirement for this review.4

I had an opportunity to observe the process of conducting the review as a member 

of the Department’s Quadrennial Review Advisory Committee. The committee met 

periodically with the management team overseeing the review and the leadership 

of the Department through each step of the process of determining the structure of 
15 

5While DHS should be commended for its outreach effort, the process for prioritizing, gathering, assessing, and integrating stakeholders was immature, inefficient, and of doubtful value. 

I commend the recommendations of the report by a panel of the National Academy of Public 

Administration which analyzed the outreach effort. See, Franklin, S. Reader, et al. ‘‘The National Dialogue on the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review,’’ National Academy of Public 

Administration, April 2010, at www.napawash.org/pclmanagementlstudies/DHS/QHSR/ 

QHSRFinalReport.pdf (April 25, 2010). 6For more on this issue see James Jay Carafano, ‘‘Thinking the Future,’’ The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations (Summer/Fall 2009), pp. 27–38, at 

www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=112018 (April 25, 2010). 7David Heyman and James Jay Carafano, ‘‘Homeland Security 3.0: Building a National Enterprise to Keep America Safe, Free, and Prosperous,’’ The Heritage Foundation and the Center 

for International and Strategic Studies, 8 Richard L. Kugler, Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods for a New Era 

(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2006), p. 218. 9L.A.N. Amaral and J.M. Ottino, ‘‘Complex Networks: Augmenting the Framework for the 

Study of Complex Systems,’’ The European Physical Journal, May 14, 2004, at 

amaral.northwestern.edu/Publications/Papers/Amaral-2004-Eur.Phys.J.B-38-147.pdf (April 13, 

2009). 10 Yaneer Bar-Yam, ‘‘Multiscale Representation Phase I,’’ New England Complex Systems Institute, August 1, 2001, at www.necsi.edu/projects/yaneer/SSGlNECSIl1lCROP.pdf (April 

13, 2009); James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, ‘‘Complex Systems Analysis: A Necessary 

Tool for Homeland Security,’’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2261, April 16, 2009, at 

www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/bg2261.cfm. 

the review, through data collection and outreach, the assessment phase, and the 

production of the final report. 

The Department should be commended for the seriousness with which it undertook the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) process. When the Department of Defense undertook its first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in 1996, it 

had the advantage of being a standing department with an almost 50-year history, 

a large support staff and a well-developed set of analytical tools, strategies, and 

policies on which to draw. DHS had none of these. Furthermore, it had undertaken 

the review during the Department’s first-ever transition in Presidential leadership. 

Given all these conditions, completing a thoughtful and relevant assessment that 

met statutory guidelines was a real achievement. In addition, DHS should be commended in the transparency that it allowed during the review, as well as its effort 

to reach out to stakeholders.5

As a result of the Department’s effort Congress has a document that can serve 

as a basis for dialogue on our National homeland security enterprise. To me the report suggests a clear ‘‘to-do list’’ for both the administration and the Congress. 

Three items should top the agenda. 

NO. 1 IMPROVE METHODS OF ANALYSIS

One clear limitation of the QHSR was that the Department lacks a methodology 

to identify issues and appropriate methods of analysis to address them as well as 

sufficient analytical tools to undertake the analysis.6

Homeland security presents a uniquely challenging set of public policy issues. The 

National homeland security enterprise is a vast, complex system that includes a 

vast array of Federal, State, local, Tribal, private sector, community, non-governmental, and international entities.7 A system is ‘‘any set of regularly interacting factors and activities that has definable boundaries and that produces measurable outputs.’’8 The complexity of a system is determined by the number and diversity of 

interacting components. When systems become overly complex, their behavior cannot be easily predicted by traditional methods of analysis (breaking a system into 

its component parts and analyzing elements in detail).9 These systems are described 

as complex ‘‘non-linear.’’ Non-linear environments make it extremely difficult to map 

the cause and effect between variables. Indeed, in such environments isolating independent variables (a single factor that can be manipulated that will drive the behavior of the whole system) may be impossible. In a complex system, elements are so 

interconnected and their relationship so multifaceted that their properties cannot be 

properly understood without assessing their interrelationship with each other as 

well as their relationship with the wider system and its environment. Many homeland security challenges require mastering an understanding of complex, non-linear 

systems.10

QHSR findings would have greatly benefited from robust analytical complex systems analysis. There are several areas where the lack of analytical capacity is clearly apparent. 
16 

11 Jena Baker McNeill, ‘‘Quadrennial Defense Review’s Homeland Defense Realignment 

Leaves U.S. Less Prepared,’’ Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 2865, April 15, 2010, at 

www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/04/Quadrennial-Defense-Reviews-Homeland-DefenseRealignment-Leaves-US-Less-Prepared (April 25, 2010); James Jay Carafano, ‘‘Obama is Unprepared for Disaster,’’ Washington Examiner, March 29, 2010 at www.washingtonexaminer.com/ 

opinion/columns/Obamals-UlSl-is-unprepared-for-disaster-89360027.html (April 25, 2010). 12David B. Muhlhausen, Ph.D., ‘‘Building a Better Border: What the Experts Say,’’ Heritage 

Foundation Backgrounder No. 1952, July 17, 2006, at www.heritage.org/static/reportimages/ 

61B2F37CAC2EEC388C2444D8BF5E892D.pdf. James Jay Carafano, ‘‘Border Security and State 

Safety and Security: Addressing Common Agendas’’ in Simon Hakim and Erwin A. Blackstone, 

eds., Safeguarding Homeland Security: Governors and Mayors Speak Out (New York: Springer, 

2009); James Jay Carafano, ‘‘Safeguarding America’s Sovereignty: A ‘System of Systems’ Approach to Border Security,’’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1898, November 28, 2005, 

at www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2005/11/Safeguarding-Americas-Sovereignty-A-Systemof-Systems-Approach-to-Border-Security. 13 Edwin Meese III, James Jay Carafano, Matthew Spalding, and Paul Rosenzweig, ‘‘Alternatives to Amnesty: Proposals for Fair and Effective Immigration Reform,’’ Heritage Foundation 

Backgrounder No. 1858, June 5, 2005, at www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2005/06/ 

Alternatives-to-Amnesty-Proposals-for-Fair-and-Effective-Immigration-Reform. 14For an assessment of risk management see, James Jay Carafano, testimony before the SubCommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, Committee on Homeland 

Security United States House of Representatives June 24, 2008, at homeland.house.gov/ 

SiteDocuments/20080625151302-26534.pdf (April 25, 2010). 

• Defense Support to Civil Authorities.—Military support to civil authorities for 

homeland security missions is vital. Yet, DHS still lacks the capacity to develop 

requirements for this support. As a result, an opportunity was lost to link the 

analysis done in the Defense Department’s QDR with the QHSR. This had immediate and detrimental impact. The QDR cut the number of specially trained 

and equipped forces prepared to respond to chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, and high explosive attacks by almost 20 percent. The Pentagon, however, is pushing forward with realignment plans by decreasing the number of 

Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF) from three to one and 

moving personnel from two CCMRFs to 10 smaller Homeland Response Forces 

in each of the FEMA districts. The Pentagon claims this is a slight structural 

realignment, but such an organizational change and personnel decrease would 

have a major impact on the ability of the United States to respond to a largescale disaster by reducing the sheer number of specially prepared, dedicated 

forces to such a response.11 Meanwhile, the QHSR remained virtually silent on 

military support requirements. 

• Immigration and Border Security.—The QHSR identifies ‘‘Securing and Managing Our Borders’’ and ‘‘Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws’’ 

as priority Departmental missions. Together the border and commerce, 

transnational criminal, and migration flows constitute a complex system.12 Yet, 

DHS lacks the capacity to analyze the border and migration flows as an integrated system. The administration supports legislation that would grant amnesty to the millions unlawfully present in the United States, arguing this 

would enhance Government’s capacity to control the border, improve public 

safety, grow the economy, and enforce immigration laws. When this strategy 

was attempted in 1986, however, it utterly failed. The QHSR provides no analytical basis for suggesting why the system would not fail again in the same 

way. Nor did it assess alternative strategies that might better address the problem.13

• National Preparedness and National Risk.—The legislation establishing the 

QHSR required DHS to assess National preparedness. In addition, the QHSR 

established as a priority ‘‘national-level homeland security risk assessments’’ (p. 

65). These requirements seem intuitively valuable. In practice, they would likely 

amount to little more than ‘‘shelfware,’’ studies that have no meaningful application. There is no analytical basis to determine if these assessments are 

achievable and meaningful. Understanding risk and preparedness requires context. There are so many variables in each kind and type assessment, and they 

are so complex and different, that is difficult to imagine how aggregating them 

would provide useful insights into mitigating risks.14

RECOMMENDATIONS

Congress and DHS should work together to address the shortfalls in the Department’s analytical capabilities. 
17 

15 James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, ‘‘Complex Systems Analysis: A Necessary Tool for 

Homeland Security,’’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2261, April 16, 2009, at 

www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/04/Complex-Systems-Analysis-A-Necessary-Tool-forHomeland-Security. 16 James Jay Carafano, Frank J. Cilluffo, Richard Weitz, and Jan Lane, ‘‘Stopping Surprise 

Attacks: Thinking Smarter About Homeland Security,’’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 

2026, April 23, 2007, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg2026.cfm (April 13, 

2009). 17 James Jay Carafano, ‘‘Missing Pieces in Homeland Security: Interagency Education, Assignments, and Professional Accreditation,’’ Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 1013, 

October 16, 2006, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/em1013.cfm (April 25, 

2010). 

• Congress should demand an action plan.—DHS must have a program to institutionalize multidisciplinary analysis, including expertise in complex systems 

analysis in the National homeland security enterprise.15

• DHS should integrate complex systems analysis into a net assessment office.— Net assessment, a widely used tool within the intelligence community, complements and contributes to complex systems analysis. Net assessment is based 

on the understanding that all National security challenges are a series of actions and counteractions between competitors. The purpose of examining these 

actions and counteractions is to assess how these competitions could develop in 

the future. The Department of Homeland Security has considered establishing 

an Office of Net Assessment within its policy and planning directorate. This office should include developing expertise in employing complex systems analysis 

to develop policy recommendations.16

• DHS should add complex systems analysis to the Homeland Security Professional Development Program.—Homeland security needs the foundation of a 

professional development system that will provide the cadre of leaders required 

to meet the demands of the 21st Century. This foundation must include education, training assignments, and accreditation tools that can help develop professionals for homeland security and other critical interagency National security 

activities. Developing expertise in critical systems and multidisciplinary analysis should be a core component of any professional development curriculum. 

The government should have a ‘‘brick and mortar’’ homeland security university 

dedicated to teaching these and other essential National security management, 

leadership, and decision-making skills.17

NO. 2 ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH CONGRESS

One clear advantage of conducting the QHSR in the first year of the administration is that it allows the Secretary to undertake a through strategic assessment and 

use the review to help establish long-term goals as well as engage the Congress on 

the most critical homeland security priorities. In order for this effort to be as efficient and effective as possible, a permanent QHSR office must be established and 

maintained to undertake preparatory efforts, including working with the Congress 

on determining the statutory requirements for the report; conducting long-term analytical studies to support QHSR analysis; and coordinating with the interagency 

community and State, local, Tribal, private sector, and international partners. Having this office in place and conducting the long-term preparations for the QHSR 

would significantly reduce the time and effort required for a new administration to 

undertake a review during its first year. 

The QHSR should also be seen as an on-going process that includes not only developing statutory reporting requirements, but also consultation during the review 

process and after the report is delivered. The review can and should be the premier 

instrument for strategic dialogue with the Congress, but established procedures for 

systematic consultation should be implemented and maintained during the years before and after the submission of the report. A permanent QHSR office could best 

facilitate this activity. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Congress can also take additional actions to ensure that the dialogue between the 

DHS and other Federal agencies and the Legislative branch is improved. Congress 

should: 

• Consolidate jurisdiction over DHS into single committees in each chamber.— 

Congress cannot serve as effective partner in assessing and implementing the 

QHSR as long as oversight of DHS remains fractured and diffuse. The final report of the 9/11 Commission reaffirmed the importance of fixing Congressional 

oversight. The commission held that ‘‘Congress should create a single, principal 
18 

18 Carafano and Heyman, ‘‘DHS 2.0,’’ p. 19. 19 James Jay Carafano, Richard Weitz, and Alane Kochems, ‘‘Department of Homeland Security Needs Under Secretary for Policy,’’ Heritage Backgrounder No. 1788, August 17, 2004, at 

www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2004/08/Department-of-Homeland-Security-Needs-UnderSecretary-for-Policy. 20 Heyman and Carafano, ‘‘Homeland Security 3.0,’’ p. 5. 21 Cindy Williams, ‘‘Strengthening Homeland Security: Reforming Planning and Resource Allocation,’’ Report for the 2008 Presidential Transition Series of the IBM Center for the Business 

of Government (Washington, DC: IBM, 2008), p. 6. 22 James Jay Carafano, ‘‘Preparations Means Planning Ahead of Time,’’ Washington Examiner, 

December 14, 2009, at www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columns/Preparation-meansplanning-ahead-of-time-8655242-79171502.html (April 25, 2010); Matt A. Mayer and James Jay 

Carafano, ‘‘National Disaster Planning Slowed by Inadequate Interagency Process,’’ Heritage 

Foundation Backgrounder No. 2079, October 24, 2007, at www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/ 

bitstreams/13040.pdf; Jena Baker McNeill and Richard Weitz, ‘‘Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) 

Attack: A Preventable Homeland Security Catastrophe,’’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 

2199, October 8, 2008, at www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/10/Electromagnetic-PulseEMP-Attack-A-Preventable-Homeland-Security-Catastrophe; James Jay Carafano, ‘‘Lessons from 

Mumbai: Assessing Armed Assault Threats to the United States,’’ Heritage Foundation 

point of oversight and review for homeland security. Congressional leaders are 

best able to judge what committee should have jurisdiction over this department 

[DHS] and its duties. But we believe Congress has the obligation to choose one 

in the House and one in the Senate, and that this committee should be a permanent standing committee with a nonpartisan staff.’’ As the report also noted, 

one expert witness appearing before the commission testified that the lack of 

effective Congressional oversight is perhaps the single greatest obstacle impeding the successful development of DHS.18

• Create an Under Secretary for Policy and Planning.—The Under Secretary 

should serve as the Secretary’s chief policy official within the Department. The 

responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Policy should include: (1) Coordinating DHS policy, (2) establishing and directing a formal policymaking process 

for the Department and oversee a policymaking board, (3) conducting long-range 

policy planning, (4) preparing critical strategic documents, (5) conducting program analysis, and (6) preparing net assessments.19

• Establish a bipartisan caucus that meets regularly to consider issues affecting 

the National homeland security enterprise.—Congress currently lacks a forum to 

inform members on these issues in a holistic manner. A caucus could help fulfill 

this role.20

NO. 3 ESTABLISH PRIORITIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

The greatest virtue of the QHSR is that it provides a framework to organize the 

roles and missions of the Department in terms of strategic ends, ways, and means. 

As Professor Cindy Williams at MIT pointed out in an authoritative study in 2008, 

‘‘[f]ive years later, the nation’s homeland security effort is anything but unified. 

Core legacy organizations that migrated into DHS still generally set their own agendas, often with strong backing from supporters in Congress.’’21 The QHSR offers a 

mechanism to more thoroughly integrate and prioritize the operations of the Department. 

The QHSR rightly recognizes that the Department must serve as the steward of 

a National homeland security enterprise. The Department and the Congress should 

give highest priority to the initiatives that will strengthen the leadership role of 

DHS over the National enterprise. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

In particular, Congress and the administration should strengthen the Department’s role in: 

• Resiliency and Response.—The administration is currently rewriting HSPD–7 

and HSPD–8, two key Presidential directives that govern the protection of critical infrastructure and disaster preparedness. The administration should 

strengthen the Department’s leadership role in both policy directives. In particular, the Federal Government should develop and implement a National 

planning capability for preparedness and response to guide resource allocation 

and investment across the Federal Government and to State and local communities. In particular, the Integrated Planning System needs to be revitalized and 

implemented and renewed emphasis must be given to disaster scenarios including updating them to address emergent threats such Electromagnetic Pulse and 

armed assaults on the U.S. homeland.22
19 

Backgrounder No. 2219, December 10, 2008, at www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/12/ 

Lessons-from-Mumbai-Assessing-Armed-Assault-Threats-to-the-United-States. 23 James Jay Carafano and Henry Brands, ‘‘Building a Global Freedom Coalition with a New 

Security for Freedom Fund,’’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2236, February 4, 2009, 

at www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/02/Building-a-Global-Freedom-Coalition-with-aNew-Security-for-Freedom-Fund. 24 James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, ‘‘Enhancing International Collaboration for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,’’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2078, October 18, 

2007, at s3.amazonaws.com/thflmedia/2007/pdf/bg2078.pdf. 25 James Jay Carafano, ‘‘Fighting Terrorism, Addressing Liability: A Global Proposal,’’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2138, May 21, 2008, at http://safetyactconsultants.com/ 

yahoolsiteladmin/assets/docs/HeritagelFoundationlSAFETYlActl5-21- 

2008.32823618.pdf. 26 Heyman and Carafano, ‘‘Homeland Security 3.0,’’ pp. 14–17. 

• International Leadership.—The Department has substantial international responsibilities yet lacks technical and statutory authority to engage overseas 

partners. In particular, the Department should have expanded authority in providing international assistance and development. The United States should establish security assistance sales, lease, and grant programs that allow DHS to 

assist countries in obtaining equipment, support, and financing for homeland 

security functions. One option, for example, would be to establish a ‘‘security for 

freedom fund’’ to provide the Department a Congressional authorized program 

for assisting other nations in developing their homeland security systems.23 The 

Department should also establish a formal, integrated education and training 

program similar to IMET. This would include training in the United States, mobile training teams that would deploy overseas, and support for international 

programs.24 Research and development is another area of international cooperation. The Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies (SAFETY) 

Act lowered the liability risks of manufacturers that provide products and services used in combating terrorism. The act, passed in 2002, protects the incentive 

to produce products that the Secretary of Homeland Security designates as 

‘‘Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technologies.’’ DHS should work to engage other nations in a serious dialogue on expanding the umbrella of liability protection for 

developing effective anti-terrorism technologies by encouraging cooperative and 

reciprocal liability protection programs.25

• Counterterrorism Operations.—The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 neglected DHS’s role in counterterrorism operations. Congress 

and the administration should consider whether the Department should play a 

more prominent leadership role in the Terrorist Screening Center and the National Counterterrorism Center. In addition, Congress and the administration 

should consider how to better integrate the myriad of counterterrorism capabilities, operations, and activities in the command, possibly through a ‘‘joint’’ structure similar to that employed by the U.S. military Combatant Commands or by 

emulating operations such as those conducted by Joint Interagency Task Force 

South in Key West. The President should issue an Executive Order establishing 

a National domestic counterterrorism and intelligence framework that clearly 

articulates how intelligence operations at all levels should function to combat 

terrorism, while keeping citizens safe, free, and prosperous.26

• Cyber Leadership.—The QHSR emphasizes the important role the Department 

should play in promoting cybersecurity knowledge and innovation (pp. 56–57). 

The top priority of this effort should be in promoting cutting-edge research and 

developing the ‘‘human capital’’ for National cybersecurity leadership. The 

United States needs leaders who understand the need for strategies of resiliency—methods for ensuring that basic structures of global, National, and local 

economies remain strong after a cyber attack, other malicious acts, or disasters. 

A cyber-strategic leadership program is necessary for constructing a resiliency 

strategy for the 21st Century. Cyber-strategic leadership is a set of knowledge, 

skills, and attributes essential to all leaders at all levels of government and the 

private sector. The Obama administration should build on the National Security 

Professional Development process to educate, certify, and track National security professionals. This program should be modified based on the experience of 

the past 2 years in attempting to implement the program and be used to develop leaders skilled in cyber-strategic leadership and other critical National security missions. Research is also vital. A 2007 Computer Science and Telecommunications Board research report rightly concluded that Government’s research agenda is deeply flawed. The report goes on to lay out an appropriate 

research agenda, including such issues as deterring would-be attackers and 
20 

27 Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, Toward A Safer and More Secure Cyberspace (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2007); The White House, ‘‘Executive Order: 

National Security Professional Development,’’ May 2007, at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 

2007/05/20070517-6.html (December 2, 2008); James Jay Carafano, ‘‘Missing Pieces in Homeland Security: Interagency Education, Assignments, and Professional Accreditation,’’ Heritage 

Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 1013, October 16, 2006, at www.heritage.org/Research/ 

HomelandSecurity/em1013.cfm. 

managing the degradation and reconstitution of systems in the face of concerted 

attacks.27

Thank you for the opportunity to address the QHSR and the next steps that the 

Department and the Congress should take together to keep the Nation safe, free, 

and prosperous. I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Dr. Carafano. 

I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony. I will remind 

each Member that he will—and there is no she right here—will 

have 5 minutes to question the panel. I now recognize myself for 

5 minutes. 

Deputy Secretary Lute, according to numerous GAO and Office 

of Inspector General reports, in addition to the Department’s own 

budget request process, the Department lacks a sufficient acquisition workforce. We will start with that. Fortunately, the budget 

seeks to expand this workforce. However, as it currently stands, 

there are shortages in every aspect of the acquisition workforce. 

Notwithstanding this fact, the 9/11 Act specifically requires the 

Department to review and assess the Department’s mechanisms for 

turning the requirements developed in the QHSR into an acquisition strategy. How are we going to do that? 

Ms. LUTE. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, for that question. 

The way—strategy is the connection of end, ways and means, 

and what are you trying to do? At the end of the day, what does 

success look like? The QHSR document lays that out. It is the vision of a safe, secure, resilient place where we can thrive. It also 

lays out all the elements of the homeland security enterprise that 

needs doing. 

Connected to that will be the results of the Bottom Up Review 

that looks specifically at the Department of Homeland Security. 

Mr. CARNEY. Is an acquisition strategy going to be part of the 

BUR? 

Ms. LUTE. The third part of our effort here is the 2012 submission and the 2012 to 2016 FYHSP. Taken together, all three of 

those will lay out the ends we are trying to achieve, the ways in 

which we are trying to do that, with a focus on three specific 

things. 

How do we execute our mission sets? How do we do it programmatically? What are the activities involved in those programs? 

Then what are the budgetary resources in 2012 and in the outyears over the quadrennial that will feed that process? 

How will we execute those mission sets? How will we run ourselves? How will we account for the resources that are entrusted 

to us? 

Mr. CARNEY. You will be satisfied that that will meet the statutorily mandated requirement for the 9/11 Act, right? 

Ms. LUTE. In the provision of acquisitions—— 

Mr. CARNEY. Yes, that is what I meant. 

Ms. LUTE [continuing]. I am satisfied that it will articulate to 

Congress our vision of how to address that question. 
21 

Mr. CARNEY. As long as we are on the line of financial issues, 

the Department has yet to produce a clean audit. The QHSR and 

the BUR hopefully will reveal what financial management structures is going to be in place. 

How far along are you in aligning the financial structure with 

the Department’s missions, goals, strategies, et cetera? 

Ms. LUTE. Part of the—part of the BUR process, Mr. Chairman, 

has been to look at exactly this set of issues. We have developed 

in the Department over the past several years a playbook on internal controls which are precisely to get to the heart of careful and 

competent stewardship of resources, leading to clean audits across 

the board for all of our operating components in the headquarters, 

as well. We are looking at that. 

We have a problem in the Department, Mr. Chairman. We don’t 

have budget comparability currently. We cannot compare how 

much we spend on personnel across our components in any consistent way. We don’t in consequence have very good costing models. We know what we are spending, but we don’t have very good 

visibility into how the cost actually of a service or a commodity relates to what we are spending. 

We have been working on that as part of the Bottom Up Review 

process and going forward into the 2012 build and the 2012–2016 

FYHSP. We are addressing exactly all of these issues in order to 

position the Department and profile the Department correctly moving forward. 

Mr. CARNEY. So we will see the Department’s plan—I am getting 

a handle on that—in the BUR, in the Bottom Up Review? 

Ms. LUTE. You will see the resource implications in the 2012 submission—— 

Mr. CARNEY. We understand the resource implications. We want 

to know how you are going to fix it. 

Ms. LUTE. That is part of that, as well, because the other thing 

we have to do, Mr. Chairman, which I know you appreciate especially, is we need to fundamentally retool our performance measures. So budgetary alignment, account alignment, resource 

prioritization, performance measure, re-profiling, that will all come 

in the 2012 submission based on the activity review in the BUR 

and the findings in programmatic areas of emphasis in the BUR, 

which reflect the strategic imperatives laid out in the QHSR. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. Let’s talk about the BUR just for a moment 

here to start. The BUR infers that you are doing a deep dive, if I 

can characterize it that way, into the Department and each of the 

components to determine the programming needs. 

Ms. LUTE. Yes. 

Mr. CARNEY. How many times did the staff working on the BUR 

meet specifically with representatives from each component? 

Ms. LUTE. What I can tell you is we have spent hundreds of 

hours on the activities review in the Department with the components together. I have held numerous meetings with the component 

leadership. We can go back and see if we can compile a list of the 

actual meetings. 

Mr. CARNEY. Yes, please do. What was the nature of those meetings? What happened? What was the—— 
22 

Ms. LUTE. What we said was, look, we have just come out in the 

QHSR with a strategic vision and a sense of mission priorities. 

Within those mission priorities, we lay out goals. What will it take 

to prevent another terrorist attack? What will it take to secure our 

borders, enforce our immigration laws, ensure cybersecurity and resilience in the face of disasters? How do we know success when we 

see it? What do we need to be doing? 

We then looked at what we were currently doing, because the 

QHSR looks at more than the Department. So we said it takes an 

enterprise. The Department can’t do all that needs doing. But what 

is the Department doing in each of these mission areas? How is 

what we are doing every single day matching up to those requirements? Where are the gaps? What needs strengthening? What are 

we doing pretty well and how can we leverage those successes? 

Where do we need to innovate? Again, we took a 4-year forwardlooking view of the kinds of things that we would want to strengthen from an activities level. That was the nature of the conversation. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. I am way over time. I yield 5 minutes to the 

gentleman from Florida. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you—okay, didn’t work. 

I would like to return to an issue that I raised during my opening statements about conflicts I believe exist between the QHSR 

and the Department’s fiscal year 2011 budget request. The QHSR 

recognizes the border security missions of the Department and 

states that the first priority is achieving effective control of the 

physical borders and approaches to the United States. 

However, the fiscal year 2011 budget submission fails to include 

funds or plans to increase control over the border. We have 936 

miles under control now and no expectation that we will secure 

more of the border over the next 2 years. How can there be such 

a wide disparity between the budget request and the QHSR? Does 

the Department have a time frame for when we will have more 

miles of the border under control? How long will it take to have 

even half of the border under effective control? 

Ms. LUTE. Congressman Bilirakis, what I can say to you is that 

the QHSR, the BUR, and the 2012 budget process is the three-part 

framework that we have used for that. But we were working on the 

QHSR when we did the 2011 submission. In a number of areas, 

that submission reflects the five-part mission priorities that I outlined. 

As the Secretary has said, the southwest border, the border of 

the United States and the northern border have never been more 

secure. The budget reflects a commitment in that regard with respect to CBP agents, the presence of ICE, and other assets at the 

border, the improvement of border ports of entry, for the first time 

ever, 100 percent scanning of southbound rail traffic, for example, 

and other initiatives. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Dr. Carafano, would you like to comment? 

Mr. CARAFANO. Well, my observation is—and this goes back to 

my comment on analytics, which is, where is the assessment of the 

complex system that suggests that these investments are right or 

that the administration in looking forward to looking at how it is 

going to deal with immigration reform, that that is right? 
23 

You know, we know for a fact that people vote with their feet, 

right? We have seen, actually, as we increase border security over 

the years, we actually saw an increase in unlawful population in 

the United States because people just stayed. We also saw a decrease because people left because the economy turned down. 

So we know that we can kind of affect people’s behavior. In 1986, 

we did a broad amnesty, and the result of that was we had an 

enormous increase in the unlawful population in the United States. 

Now we are talking about doing a broad amnesty again, which 

would seem to me would overwhelm all security efforts. 

You know, looking at things—that we are inspecting 100 percent 

of southbound rail, okay, but I am not really sure—relevant to 

that. 

Now, you know, we could debate all these points as a matter of 

strategy—and I think that is fine—but the point is, is what the 

QHSR certainly did not do is it—and I don’t believe the Department still has—is really kind of an analytical foundation to really 

justify their assessments in the context of all the issues that they 

are dealing with, commerce, trade, transnational crime, and immigration. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

Madam Secretary, continuing along the line, the QHSR advocates for the enhancement of community disaster response programs. It advocates for that. Certainly as a member from an area 

that frequently experiences hurricanes, I believe in the need for individual and families to be well informed and prepared in the event 

of disasters, which is why I am pleased with the QHSR’s emphasis 

of this issue. 

However, while on the one hand the QHSR advocates for enhanced community preparedness efforts and mentions the Citizens 

Corps program by name, on the other hand, the budget, the 2011 

budget request proposed to eliminate the Citizens Corps program. 

Can you explain that? 

Ms. LUTE. Again, Congressman, the QHSR is directly going to inform the 2012 budget build and the coming quadrennial and the 

2012–2016 FYHSP. On the whole question of resilience and preparedness in the face of disaster, frankly, the Nation has learned 

a lot of lessons from Florida. The Department of Homeland Security benefits from Craig Fugate, who is now the head of FEMA. 

What do we base our resilience argument on? A three-part structure that you yourself identified. Empowered individuals, individuals who have the information they need and the tools they need 

to be able to withstand disaster, respond, and aid their neighbors 

when necessary. 

Capable communities, precisely as you identify, communities that 

have the training, equipment, knowledge, of the understanding of 

their vulnerabilities, as well as their strengths, to be able to respond to their needs and assist others, again, in a mutual aid fashion. 

Then, finally, we highlight the need for a responsive Federal system who understands its place and knows its opportunities for leverage and comparative advantage to assist when disaster strikes. 

It is all three of these pieces that we are working towards, both 

programmatically within the Department, from a resource perspec-
24 

tive, and then as we importantly engage not only with Congress, 

but with State and local, municipal leaders, as well, to get this balance right. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay, Secretary Heyman, as I said before, said 

that the administration had a QHSR in mind while crafting the fiscal year 2011 budget. Was he wrong? 

Ms. LUTE. No, also, Congressman, as I have said, we looked at 

2011 as a partial down payment on the direction we were headed 

with the QHSR, but we were explicitly pointing to the 2012 build 

and the 2012–2016 FYHSP to reflect the priorities that we outlined 

through the QHSR–BUR process. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. Thank you. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes my good friend from Texas, Mr. Green, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the witnesses for appearing, as well. 

I am concerned about a statement that was made. I am confident 

that there will be others who will want to have some additional 

evidence presented, so I will simply allow the deputy secretary to 

elaborate. 

You said the border is as secure now as it has ever been—perhaps I am paraphrasing, and I am not quoting you exactly, but if 

you would like to elaborate on that, I would give you the opportunity to at this time. 

Ms. LUTE. Congressman, I was reflecting what the Secretary herself has said recently, drawing on her deep experience as a former 

Governor of Arizona and deep experience with the southwest border and the understanding that we have in the Department of 

Homeland Security the border is more secure than it has ever been. 

Mr. GREEN. All right, let me just—as a follow-up to border security—ask about something that has been promoted as of late, and 

that is having the National Guard move to the border. In assessing 

this type of circumstance, how would what we are proposing address having the National Guard on the border? 

Ms. LUTE. The potential deployment of the National Guard reflects, frankly, its ability potentially to contribute additional capabilities to law enforcement agencies in their border security mission. It is just one of a number of options that are being considered. 

Mr. GREEN. In considering this, I am confident that it will be 

done this way, but I will ask just for clarity purposes, would you 

also talk to the various military persons who would be in the loop? 

You are obviously a part of the Executive. Because we have two 

wars, one in Iraq, one in Afghanistan, and we have troops deployed. Do you—in making this decision, you would not just simply 

make that as an internal decision. There is a lot more to it than 

simply deciding to deploy troops, I am sure you agree, deploy the 

Guard. 

Ms. LUTE. Congressman, forgive me for smiling. The Lutes are 

very familiar with the requirements that you outlined. In the interest of full disclosure, my husband works at the White House for the 

President on Afghanistan and Pakistan and previously served on 

the issues relating to Iraq, as well. 
25 

We are very mindful of the requirements. I am both personally— 

we are institutionally, and we are in a very robust dialogue with 

Department of Defense. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. I mention it because I am not sure that 

every person who says, ‘‘Send the Guard,’’ has thought through all 

of what that entails. I want border security. I think that we should 

have proper personnel there. I assume that we will review the adequacy of personnel and make the proper adjustments. True or 

false? 

Ms. LUTE. We will. 

Mr. GREEN. Now, with reference to the Bottom Up Review, can 

you kindly for me in your mind give me what bottom—where is the 

bottom in the Bottom Up? Where is that starting point? 

Ms. LUTE. That is a very fair question, Congressman. The bottom 

actually begins with an activity review. It is not a zero-based budgeting or a zero-based review, as if we were starting with a clean 

state and only mission requirements. 

This looks at our mission activities that are undertaken by the 

operating components and compares them against the mission sets 

that we say are essential in the QHSR for achieving that vision of 

a secure homeland. 

Mr. GREEN. What is the anticipated—you may have given the answer—but what is the anticipated completion date of the BUR? 

Ms. LUTE. The analytic work of the BUR is completed, and we 

are looking to finish the interagency review of our work shortly. 

Mr. GREEN. Could you define shortly please? 

Ms. LUTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would expect that before 

the end of May. 

Mr. GREEN. From time to time, it has been my experience, is that 

we don’t always meet the goals that we set for ourselves. If you 

find that you are running long as opposed to short, meaning short, 

completing it early, long, you are going to go past the goal, the anticipated completion date, how would we receive notice of that? 

Ms. LUTE. Unfortunately, Congressman, there is no more early 

for us here. But I would, as I have in the past, be in touch with 

the Chairman on the prospects for delivery. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Green. 

Mr. Pascrell, do you have questions? 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Deputy Secretary Lute, thank you for your service, extending beyond homeland security. I have questions about the bureaucracy of 

the Department which you represent. I looked through the chronology since August 2007 to the present time about reviewing that 

bureaucracy and the Department. 

If I have stressed one thing as a Member of this committee—and 

you and I have talked about this—it is that the bureaucracy itself 

is as great a threat to our National security as anything else. That 

is my opinion. I have tried to point out how I think that plays out 

within the Department itself. 

I think it had something to do with the confusion on December 

25 last year, which is not the total responsibility of Homeland Security. I understand that. You are a collector. You are not making 

decisions on the intelligence level, your Department, that is. 
26 

When we created the Department in the wake of September 11, 

it was the largest United States Government reorganization in over 

50 years, since the Department of Defense was created in 1947. We 

consolidated 22 separate agencies into one Department. It is the 

third-largest in the Government behind only the Department of Defense and Veterans Administration. 

So this is a big deal we are talking about here. When you have 

that realization in mind, it is not hard to understand that why we 

desperately need to re-evaluate everything within DHS to find all 

the missing links and efficiencies and why the committee on both 

sides of the aisle is very impatient and has a lot of anxiety about 

waiting beyond the scheduled time, because we are talking about 

the defense of this country and protecting our neighborhoods, so we 

cannot be late with any reports, no excuses accepted. 

Madam Secretary, can you talk about what steps you have taken 

in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and within your 

long-term plan to help cut down on the layers of bureaucracy and 

get the Department to work more effectively? Can you tell us, for 

the record? 

Ms. LUTE. Thanks, Congressman. We have talked. We are both 

from New Jersey. There are no excuses for what is not done, but 

I will explain to you what we have done and what we will do. 

I will also say to you that I am personally answerable to the Secretary for the progress or lack of it that we have made on the 

QHSR and the BUR, in the 2012 build process, and the 2012–2016 

FYHSP, and the totality of this comprehensive examination of the 

Department that you are talking about. 

You talk also about bureaucracy. Congressman, I am an operator. I spent 30 years operating in large, far-flung, unwieldy bureaucracies. I began my career in the Army in the 1970s. I spent 

a lot of time in the United Nations. Now I am in homeland security. 

So I would respectfully say to you, bureaucracy and homeland security, compared to what? This is a Department of 210,000 fulltime civil servants approximately, Coast Guardsmen and others, 

207,000 of which are in operating agencies. It is a headquarters bureaucracy of 3,000 people for this Department. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Very small administration. 

Ms. LUTE. Very small. So when you speak bureaucracy, what I 

see are men and women every single day who come into work supporting the operational activities that we have at the borders, at 

the airports, on the water, in defense of security of this homeland. 

So I take very seriously everything you say, particularly defense 

of the homeland and the responsibilities we have. It resonates with 

me personally, having begun my professional career as a soldier. 

What we are doing is taking a look at our activities against the 

QHSR. In the QHSR, we said, this is what we are aiming for, a 

safe, secure, resilient place where the American way of life can 

thrive, protect ourselves against terrorism and other hazards. What 

does that mean we need to do? It means we need to do the five mission sets that we have laid out in the QHSR. 

How do we do that? We need to look ourselves in the Department, and we have done this through the BUR process comprehensively, including an examination—the unglamorous knuckle drill of 
27 

examining the plumbing and wiring of the budget processes of the 

Department, the acquisition processes, our account structures, our 

organizational fidelity and coherence, as well. 

There are a number of areas that we can streamline. When you 

are standing up a Department, when you are starting up an activity—and I have done it several times in my career—I can tell you, 

nobody is lining the streets tuning up the band because you are 

getting ready to march down the aisle. Everybody is waiting to see 

how you can fall. 

Congress has been remarkably supportive of this Department 

and this enterprise, and we appreciate that. We have a long way 

to go. We know that, as well. We are going to—we are going to look 

at how we can consolidate our operational activities against the 

mission sets that are articulated in the QHSR. We are going to 

look at the value proposition of the headquarters. How can headquarters add value to the frontline operators, to the men and 

women who are opening trunks, inspecting suitcases, manning the 

waterways, ensuring maritime safety and security, as well? 

But we are beginning, Congressman, with a very lean bureaucracy to begin with. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I think that I have confidence in Under Secretary 

Lute to follow through on what you have talked about many times, 

Members of this committee, the Ranking Member, Mr. Green. 

There are many impediments that we create ourselves or allow to 

exist. 

I hope that this committee and the administration will be strong 

enough and courageous enough not only to see reports and make 

reports, but to follow through on recommendations, because we are 

heading towards consolidation. Otherwise, what are we doing here? 

Now, are we going to have the courage to support your efforts 

and maybe instead of having 22, we have 8, instead of having X 

amount of people, should all of those people—207,000, 210,000—be 

in one Department? Should parts of the Department be other 

places? Has the intelligence breakdowns we have had indicate that 

there should be not only a collection—Homeland Security should 

not only be a collection agency for intelligence, but should be part 

of the very apparatus which seeks to find out who is trying to harm 

us? 

These are going to be—you know, we have got to make those decisions, too. We have personal responsibility. I remember when the 

select committee went to a full committee, this Homeland Security, 

and it was stacked with Chairmen from other subcommittees. Well, 

you know what the heck happened. They all wanted to fight for 

turf, and then one person wouldn’t show up because he was insulted that his committee wasn’t even—I mean, it was a zoo. You 

would never know that you were protecting the United States of 

America and our neighborhoods. It was insane. 

I hope we will have the courage to go to the next step. That is 

all I hope. Thank you. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell. 

I guess I would like to echo some of his sentiments, Mr. 

Pascrell’s sentiments, that, you know, despite appearances, we are 

pretty smart here, and we have—truly, I know. We have talked 
28 

about organization of Homeland Security many times, privately, 

you know, over beers at the club or on the floor or whatever. 

That is a question I have. You know, and we don’t get a sense 

of that from the QHSR, the QHSR—or I hope maybe we will from 

the BUR—is reorganization considered in either one of the documents really? 

Ms. LUTE. So, Chairman, reorganization is a radioactive word. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay, let’s say moving assets. 

Ms. LUTE. Well, there has been a lot of moving assets and there 

has been a lot of churn masquerading as reorganization. It covers 

a multitude of sins. Churn is debilitating to an organization. It is 

debilitating to a workforce. 

People want some very fundamental things when they show up 

for work every single day. They want to have the training, the 

tools, and the leadership, and the frontline supervision competent 

to help them get a job done. They want to have an organizational 

structure that is built to purpose. What are we trying to do? Are 

we organized well to do it? What pieces of the effort that it takes 

to achieve that purpose are we missing? Or else who has got it? Do 

I have replicable models of success for getting it when I need it? 

Or do we encounter every problem as if for the first time? 

Mr. CARNEY. I agree. We really want to help you with that, but 

we can’t if we have a QHSR that doesn’t answer the questions required statutorily, and we can’t do it if we don’t see the BUR. 

Madam Secretary, I have to tell you, from what we have talked 

about over the last roughly hour or so, everything that wasn’t in 

the QHSR is supposed to be in the BUR. What is not going to be 

in the BUR is going to be in the 2012 budget report? Am I getting 

that right? Not even the 2011, but the 2012 budget report? 

Ms. LUTE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CARNEY. Can I ask, when exactly—within a month or 2—will 

the first QHSR actually be completed, given all the components 

that you have mentioned? The goal posts seem to be going further—this is the bad dream where I can’t quite get to the end of 

the hall as fast as I run. 

Ms. LUTE. I am living the dream, Mr. Chairman. I guess what 

I would tell you is, beginning last year, we set ourselves out an 18- 

month process to execute these three pieces of the puzzle. Congress 

originally gave the Department of Homeland Security 2 years to do 

the QHSR as its outlined statutorily. 

I think that is about the right amount of time that you need to 

fully conduct an analytic examination of the mission sets that need 

doing, the strategy. What are we trying to do? How are we going 

to do it? What does it take to do that? 

I think that we learned some lessons. This shouldn’t straddle a 

transition of an administration. It essentially means you are at a 

standing start, not a sitting start, not lying down, but a standing 

start when a new administration comes in. 

There is an enormous requirement for stakeholder outreach that 

we have. We had no precedent. We had no experience in the Department. This was the first ever that we have done. What we are 

building towards is this three-part submission. 

I think the specific answer to your question, Mr. Chairman, is 

when the budget is presented to Congress for 2012, all of the pieces 
29 

of the puzzle will be in place. However, you can also say that we 

are required by the statute governing the QHSR—and I believe 

that we have been faithful to this—to engage in comprehensive 

consultations with a number of stakeholders, including Congress, 

and we will certainly continue that process. 

Mr. CARNEY. Well, I appreciate the consultation, but now I know 

how my dissertation committee felt when I didn’t get my chapters 

in on time. But, you know, that is what we are looking at. 

Dr. Carafano, you sat on the QHSR advisory board. Great job. I 

really want to hear your opinion of the process, the pros, the cons, 

et cetera. Just hold forth, please. 

Mr. CARAFANO. Yes, well, I would actually just like to address 

this very specific issue. You know, it is important for Congress to 

ask tough questions, but it is also important for Congress to ask 

questions the Department can actually answer. 

I think one of the lessons learned was perhaps the first QHSR 

was a bit overambitious in the expectations of what the Department could actually do. I think there are two parts to solving that 

on both sides. 

You know, on the Congressional side, if you think of—in terms 

of asking questions, you are not terribly well-armed. You have 

GAO, which is great if you have a process question, but GAO can’t 

ask—help you really kind of think through kind of deeply strategic 

analytical questions, and you have CRS, Congressional Research 

Service, which is great at kind of telling you what people are thinking, but they are not an analytic organization, either. 

So there is kind of a whole in terms of the Congressional support 

to the committee in terms of thinking, what are the right questions 

to ask? We know what we want, but what can the system actually 

produce for us? 

On the Department side—and here is where I might disagree 

with the Secretary—I do think you have to do this in the first year 

of the administration. You have to. I mean, I have been on this 

QDR thing forever, right, about first-year, second-year, third— 

whatever. You have got to do it in the first year, because you have 

got to set your priorities, because otherwise you run out of time to 

implement it. 

You have got to do it from a standing start. If you are lucky, you 

get two shots at the apple, right, you get re-elected, you get—you 

know, and the same team is on board. 

But so what is that? I think you really have to have a permanent 

structure within the Department that is going to do this day in and 

day out for the 4 years running up to it. 

Now, you get two things out of that. One you get is when the 

standing team comes in, they may want to shift a focus, they may 

want to look at questions differently, but at least there is an analytical foundation and an infrastructure there that can support 

that. That is going to make all the difference in the world. 

To me, that was the big learning lesson. Alan and Dave and the 

Secretary, you know, they really had to build—you know, they really had to build the house. So that was a double tough thing for 

them. 

But the other thing to me, which is actually much, much more 

important, is if you have, in a sense, a permanent sell, then you 
30 

have a partner to dialogue with. Then what you can be mulling 

over is both the questions of—what are the—you can have a backand-forth between what are the tough questions we need to ask 

next time and what are the Department’s capabilities to actually 

address and answer those questions? 

So I think that, you know, if we walk away from this and we 

don’t figure out how we are going to have the dialogue for the next 

QHSR, so when we write the statutory requirements, not only do 

they get to the issues which are important to you and which are 

tough, but the Department can actually give me meaningful answers. 

Mr. CARNEY. Are you suggesting the answers we are getting 

today are not meaningful? 

Mr. CARAFANO. You know, again, I thought the Department—you 

know, that the Department did a great job trying to address all the 

issues in the report and to deliver the report on time. I can’t speak 

for the Department or the administration, but my feeling was, is 

that if the Department could have delivered a report in December 

to meet the statutory requirement, and they didn’t have to run 

through all the interagency stuff you have to run through, that 

that would have happened. 

But, again, you know, I will just offer an example. One of the requirements in the report was National preparedness. That is a 

really interesting question. This is one of the questions we have to 

ask completely. Is that kind of the right question? I mean, you 

have prepared for what? 

I mean, at the end of the day, I can give you a metric and a 

measurement, but what can you really do with it? Is it meaningful? 

The Department came back and said, ‘‘We need to do a National 

risk assessment.’’ Well, I really questioned as a member of the 

HSAC kind of the—where that is coming from and how that makes 

sense. 

I mean, we live in a country of infinite vulnerabilities. Okay, a 

risk assessment is a combination of criticality, vulnerability, and 

threat. Okay, so when one of your variables is infinite, you know, 

how are you going to come up with something like that? 

So I kind of question what the analytical foundation in that is, 

as well. But I thought the—you know, I will say, from the HSAC 

perspective, we thought we got great feedback, great transparency, 

great interaction. I really applauded the Department’s effort to do 

outreach. I think there are some real issues there and some real 

lessons learned there, as well. 

You know, you always get 80/20 on anything, which is 20 percent 

of the people do 80 percent of the work. So when you try to do 

broad, strategic outreach, you get a lot of feedback from the 20 percent of the people that want to give you feedback, but then the 

question is, are those the right people? Is that feedback really 

meaningful? Can you actually do anything with it? 

That I think was a great learning lesson for the Department, as 

well. But I do think both sides here have to build the structure for 

dialogue if you want a better outcome next time. 

Mr. CARNEY. Are we asking the right people the questions from 

this subcommittee? 

Mr. CARAFANO. I am sorry. I don’t understand the question. 
31 

Mr. CARNEY. You just said we have to—you know, are you part 

of the 20 percent that—— 

Mr. CARAFANO. No, but, you know, it all goes back to kind of, 

what do you really want to know? Then who do you really outreach 

to? I mean, you can’t say we need to outreach to all of the stakeholders, because the stakeholders are infinite. 

Mr. CARNEY. We will re-engage on this. 

Mr. Bilirakis. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Carafano, with regard to consolidating—the Congress consolidating their oversight over the Department of Homeland Security, 

it is long overdue, I think we will all agree on that. What would 

be your best model for oversight of the House committee? 

Mr. CARAFANO. One. Actually—— 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. That is good, sounds good. 

Mr. CARAFANO. But, no, well, you know, obviously, you know, 

here is the simple answer, right? Here is the standard. If you can’t 

do at least as good as the Department of Defense, that is fundamentally wrong, right? The Department of Defense is a key National security instrument, right? I mean, it doesn’t have a committee of one. It does have to answer to multiple committees. 

But it is much more like something that is reasonable than what 

we have now. So if you can’t make it look at least like that, then 

you have failed. Just to put a point on this, I mean, I have always 

felt that one of the problems in terms of consolidation is you have 

a chief operating officer with too many operating agencies. 

It was a problem that we pointed out in Homeland Security—Department of Homeland Security 2.0, and at some point, you have 

got to get your business model right, and the business units have 

to equal the span of control that their chief operating officers can 

actually handle it. It is just that simple. 

Then the instruments that they have to manage that have to be 

right, which is why I raise the issue of the under secretary. I mean, 

let’s be honest. We are never, ever, ever going to get to a consolidation of the Department of Homeland Security with a chart that 

looks like that. It is never going to happen unless a lot of people 

die, and that is when the Congress will be shamed into doing the 

right thing, and I think that that is the greatest tragedy that you 

could possibly imagine. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

Madam Secretary, Dr. Carafano’s testimony offers interesting 

criticism of the lack of analytical support included in the QHSR 

and other DHS proposals to advocate the need for amnesty legislation. Has the Department reviewed the—I know you touched on 

this—has the Department reviewed the 1986 laws and why they 

failed in order to justify advocating for a repeat legislative performance in legalizing millions of people? 

I think you brought it up, Dr. Carafano. 

Could you answer that question, please, Madam Secretary? 

Ms. LUTE. Congressman, with respect to the 1986 law on immigration, you know, the Department reviewed an extensive amount 

of its history relevant to the key mission areas that identified—one 

which was enforcing and ensuring effective enforcement of our immigration laws. Why? Because we believe fundamentally that a 
32 

basic right of a country is to know who lives and works within your 

borders. 

The Department, as the administration, supports comprehensive 

immigration reform. As you know, that has a number of elements, 

including enforcement. 

Mr. Carafano lays out a set of arguments, particularly related to 

the analytics of the QHSR. Analytics are not sufficient for an organization like the Department of Homeland Security. I am an operator. Maybe what you are hearing is the difference between an academic and an operator’s approach to this. It is not just what we 

know; it is what we do about what we know and how we organize 

to do it and how we prioritize the activities that those organizations undertake to execute the mission sets that we say are important. 

That is what we tried to do beginning with the QHSR through 

the BUR and the 2012 build. I think there are a number of things 

on which reasonable people can disagree. You know, should there 

be a permanent capacity for the QHSR? Absolutely not, in my view. 

Absolutely not. 

The American people have a right to expect that the leadership 

of the Department of Homeland Security can come together from 

time to time, whether it is quadrennial or not—and I actually agree 

that the timing of the QHSR ought to coincide with the first year 

of an administration. It ought just not to straddle administrations. 

That essentially reduces your effective time to conduct the review 

that you want to do comprehensively. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Well, when did the review take place, if it did 

take place, when and where, of the 1986 laws? 

Ms. LUTE. We will have to get back to you on that, Congressman. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. Has this information, this review been 

shared with Congress? 

Ms. LUTE. I will have to get back to you, Congressman. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. Please do. 

Okay, Dr. Carafano, just last week, the full committee received 

testimony from Senators Graham and Talent on the WMD Commission who discussed the likelihood of a WMD attack on the 

United States in the coming years. Your testimony details your 

concern with the lack of coordination between QHSR and QDR, especially as it relates to military support to civil authorities. 

What impact would the Pentagon’s proposal to downsize the 

number of military forces prepare to respond to a WMD attack 

have on the domestic response capabilities? 

Mr. CARAFANO. Well, it would depend on the scale of the response. On a very, very large response, basically, the Department 

of Defense answer is, we will backfill that with kind of general purpose forces. 

The problem is, on a very, very large response, the crisis is more 

immediate, you have to get there faster, and you kind of don’t have 

time to kind of learn as you go. So the fact is, is that, on that situation, you want the first team to get in to be trained and equipped 

and prepared for it. 

The Department of Defense has actually moved in the opposite 

direction. They went from 16,000 troops to 13,000 troops. 
33 

Their argument is, well, we did an assessment, we did analysis. 

Then when you ask them, well, how does that compare with the 

Department of Homeland Security’s analysis? There is no Department of Homeland Security analysis. I think this is just an example of where requirements are lacking. 

I mean, DHS still really doesn’t have the capacity to really in a 

meaningful way articulate to DOD what are requirements. Therefore, I think the DOD is just going in its own direction. I honestly 

believe that the DOD decision, it was driven by personnel. It was 

just—they needed to cut 3,000 people, so they did, and then they 

made it sound like they were doing more with less, which I don’t 

think is true. That is just my honest opinion. 

It is hard for the Department to have a meaningful dialogue, so 

I think that is an example of where an opportunity was missed, because I think DHS just has a lack of capacity to really engage in 

a meaningful dialogue. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. One last question, if I can—okay. Dr. Carafano, 

shortly after the release of both the QHSR and the QDR, you expressed your concern about references to climate change on both 

documents and the link they made—the link made to National security. Would you please discuss your concerns? 

Mr. CARAFANO. Well, of course, one concern is drift, right? If everything is National security, then nothing is National security. 

Again, I would like to compliment the QHSR and the effort of the 

Department to really focus on identifying what the key missions of 

the Department are. 

So that is one concern, is that, as you broaden National security, 

then everything becomes National security. Then, of course, when 

things are National security, that is the responsibility of the Federal Government, and then we tend to be more centralized and 

more focused, you know, at the center. We tend to increase the 

Federal investments in things. 

Then many times, that is not the best answer and, of course, particularly in homeland security, where it is a diverse, complex, lots 

of partners. Over-centralization, over-authority is actually a bad 

idea. 

So I am not sure, you know, that that is meaningful and helpful 

to have the departments looking at this. Then I have also written 

on this before, is that, you know, the climate change—you know, 

there is this kind of magic thing. It is, well, the world is going to 

get warmer and everything is going to get worse and we are going 

to need a lot more National security and, therefore, we have to 

keep the world from getting warmer. 

Well, that is a very simplistic and unrealistic way to look at how 

things really work in the world. The world is a very, very complex 

system. When the climate changes—which it always has, and 

sometimes things get worse, sometimes things get better—but, you 

know, making simple predictive outcomes that, you know, we are 

going to need a lot more National security or we are going to have 

to change the way the economy works, and those are our only two 

options, that is not—those are judgments. They are not based on 

any kind of real science. 

I am not questioning or talking about the science about what— 

question the science about people looking at the predictions on cli-
34 

mate and then for that inferring about what governments can or 

should need to do over the long term. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. 

Mr. Green, please. 

Mr. GREEN. Yes, thank you. 

Let me ask the Secretary, assistant secretary, to respond. I believe the contention was put forth that DHS does not have the capacity to respond to DOD. Would you like to respond to that, 

please, Madam? 

Ms. LUTE. What I would say, Congressman, is that—of course we 

do. What we can’t do is match DOD pound for pound in terms of 

its ability and the deliberate planning process, or nor do we model 

in the same way its demand functions. 

But every single day, we generate requirements for ourselves as 

an operating agency for our operators, and a lot of these processes 

parallel. What is true is that we have a long way to go in our dialogue with DOD on the support to civilian authorities and the 

kinds of contingencies that are represented across the whole front 

of homeland security challenges. 

Mr. GREEN. There was also the proposition—and you may have 

responded to it, but I would like to go back. Mr. Carafano indicated 

that we need some sort of on-going analysis taking place. Is that 

correct, Mr. Carafano? 

Mr. CARAFANO. Yes, sir, I think that is right, particularly when 

you look at the kinds of questions that are asked in the QDR. 

Many of those questions actually take months and years to answer, 

so if you ask them—the statutory requirement is in place and a 

new administration starts to ask them at the beginning, they will 

never get the answers in that year. 

So many of those questions actually have to be asked years before you actually do the QHSR, which is if you have in any sense 

an on-going brain in the Department that is being forward-looking 

in anticipating the QHSR questions, you can ask them in time to 

actually do the deep analytical dive. 

I must say, I have never—of all the criticisms I have had in my 

life, being an academic was never one of them, but I guess that is 

a good thing. 

Mr. GREEN. Well, before I move to the assistant secretary, would 

you explain how you would have this on-going activity work? 

Would it be housed in a given area? Would you give it a name? 

How would you have this perfected? 

Mr. CARAFANO. Yes, sir. I mean, the QDR is actually a very good 

model for that. There is a permanent QDR office. It is under the 

under secretary for policy. Basically what it does is it does all the 

preparatory work. It makes sure—— 

Mr. GREEN. If we have this in place, do you assume that they 

don’t do this type of analytical work? 

Mr. CARAFANO. That QDR office won’t actually do analytical 

work, right? It is basically a coordinating body. So what it has to 

do is it has to reach out to the analytics that are available to the 

Department in the FFRDCs, in the universities, and kind of give 

them guidance, along with the Secretary for Science and Tech-
35 

nology and Policy, to make sure that the preparatory research is 

done, so when the new administration needs those deep dives, that 

they are available for them. 

Mr. GREEN. Madam Deputy Secretary, would you care to respond? 

Ms. LUTE. It is just my view, Congressman, that one of the lessons we have learned in doing the QHSR is that there is no substitute for leadership engagement and that this is not something 

that we can hand off to an analytic capability, although that is essential for doing careful work and ensuring that there is some perspective on the work that you are doing. 

I do believe that we need to be thinking about the next QHSR 

beginning now, and we have been. We need to have this dynamic 

impetus to renew ourselves organizationally every 4 years, because 

an organization structure in the public sector, in my experience— 

which is a long one—is that organizations really only serve you 

well for about 5 to 7 years. You need an opportunity to refresh. The 

QHSR gives us that process. 

But more than that, it gives us the opportunity for dialogue with 

stakeholders, for an intensive dialogue with Congress about the 

kinds of larger strategic issues that really ought to be guiding the 

security of this homeland. That is important to do. I just don’t 

know that we need a large permanent office to do it. 

Mr. GREEN. Well, let me thank both of you for your testimony. 

Clearly, you have given us much to consider, and I greatly appreciate the way you have approached it. I think you have been frank 

with us, and I think that is very important, to get that kind of candor, so thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Green. 

Secretary Lute, I think I agree with Dr. Carafano on the need 

for some sort of a permanent office. I don’t know how large it needs 

to be, but I think that probably the QDR model is the right way. 

Dr. Carafano, when the first QDR was done, how much satisfaction was there with that report? Did it raise the kind of consternation and questions that we are raising today? 

Mr. CARAFANO. Well, you know, I am a historian, so I feel—— 

Mr. CARNEY. That is why I asked you. 

Mr. CARAFANO. You know, it is really not comparable, because if 

you think about it, the Department of Defense had—you know, 

when they formed the National Military Establishment, which was 

really the precursor to the Department of Defense, I mean, that 

was by the law in 1947. 

So the Department already had a large staff. It had an under 

secretary for policy. It did massive analytical analysis. It had an 

established doctrine. I mean, it knew who it was. So even though 

the few first—— 

Mr. CARNEY. But let me stop you with that. You know, as a sailor, we have a different culture than the Army that has a different 

culture than the Army Air Corps that had a different culture than 

the Marines. So what we are trying to—22 separate agencies with 

different cultures are trying to come together here. 

So I don’t know that it is that distinct, in terms of the historical 

precedent here. 
36 

Mr. CARAFANO. Well, again, even then, you know, by the time 

you got to the first QDR, I mean, you already had the—I mean, you 

already had the—— 

Mr. CARNEY. Yes. 

Mr. CARAFANO [continuing]. You already had the 1986 Reform 

Act and you already had the beginnings of jointness. You know, 

DOD had a long time to beat the guys over the head to try to get 

them all in line. 

So, I mean, in fairness to the Department—and, you know, I am 

an independent. I am nonpartisan. I am just going to judge them 

here. I am a guy that has followed this from day 1. When you look 

at the magnitude of the report card that you ask for them and 

what the Secretary had to do when they came on-board and the capacity that they had to do that, this is not a bad job. 

Actually, I think, if the Department of Defense had to do a QDR 

in 1950, I am not sure it would have looked any different. 

Mr. CARNEY. I guess that is good-ish. 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. LUTE. All things-ish. Actually, I thought historians were academics. 

But, Mr. Chairman, I guess just inviting myself to the dance at 

this moment, you know, I would say something—— 

Mr. CARNEY. You are always welcome. 

Ms. LUTE. Thank you. I went into the Army in 1976, basic training. The first QDR was in the 1990s—1993, 1994? What had happened in the intervening time, in my view, importantly informed 

DOD’s ability to do a QDR. 

The evolution of the Army after Vietnam was an extraordinary 

thing to see. The leadership said we are going to master the doctrine of how to fight. We are going to train to that doctrine, and 

we are going to buy the proper equipment for our forces. 

So they began to rebuild the institutionalized Army around those 

three things, training, doctrine and equipment. Over the course of 

the decade that followed, they added to that logistical support and 

sustainability, an emphasis on leadership and integrity. 

So much so, by the time Desert Storm came around, the Army 

no longer deployed soldiers, deployed forces. It deployed military 

solutions. DOD had itself evolved to a state of thinking about what 

it did and how to do it that permitted the kind of comprehensive 

cross-service analysis that the QDR now reflects. 

Homeland Security needs to evolve to that point where we can 

look across our capabilities and see how they blend together at our 

borders, in the interior, abroad, to achieve that vision that I talked 

about, and that is a path we are on with your help. 

Mr. CARNEY. Well, we will provide the help, certainly, but, you 

know, we have got to hit those benchmarks, you know? I was concerned when I started to hear things are going to be pushed to the 

2012 budget, that that is unacceptable. You know, we have got to 

do better than that. 

But you need to understand the historic nature of the first report. I mean, it sets the tone going forward. From this, it has to 

have the evolutionary nature to it, but you can’t just start over out 

of whole cloth, I don’t think, every 4 years. I don’t think that that 

makes much sense, that if you are going to have a culture of home-
37 

land security, if you are going to have folks in place who have a 

history of the institution, as institutional memory is vital no matter 

what we are talking about, if it is Department of Ag or Department 

of Transportation or Homeland Security. 

I think you probably ought to have something in the QHSR 

realm that is permanent within the Department. You get to determine how many folks that might entail. 

But, you know, we are frustrated and concerned at the subcommittee and the full committee that we don’t have the things 

that we asked for. Dr. Carafano said we may be asking questions 

that are unanswerable. We never got that kind of response. 

Let’s make sure we have a relationship with you so we completely understand what it is we are trying to both understand 

about homeland security, the development of the Department, and 

the relationship that you have with us. This is a partnership; it is 

not an adversarial relationship. It may sound like it occasionally, 

but this in the end is a partnership. 

You know, I get frustrated, too, every time we see this. You 

know, I would love each of you some evening on the back of a napkin to sketch out how you think this ought to look, how we can 

streamline it, how we can make this a more reasonable relationship with Congress and the Department. 

I will work my rear end off to get that to happen. I will go to 

the mat with the other committee Chairs and subcommittee 

Chairs. You know, this is ours. It should be, because this is a committee that if something happened on the Congressional side we 

can look at first. They are not going to look at transportation. They 

are not going to—they are going to look at the Homeland Security 

Committee. 

So I think it is important—so working with both of you, whomever wants to jump in, and lends an idea on the relationship that 

does better than this, I welcome it. 

All right. Mr. Green, any further questions? 

All right. I thank you both for your testimony, and I promise we 

will have further questions in writing. Please answer them quickly. 

The subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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