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i 

68–163 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–55] 

TOTAL FORCE READINESS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 26, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

BILL OWENS, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

RYAN CRUMPLER, Professional Staff Member 

VICKIE PLUNKETT, Professional Staff Member 

CHRISTINE WAGNER, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, July 26, 2011, Total Force Readiness .................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, July 26, 2011 ............................................................................................ 33 

TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2011 

TOTAL FORCE READINESS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 3 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 1 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 2 

WITNESSES 

Breedlove, Gen. Philip M., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force ................ 9 

Chiarelli, GEN Peter W., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ........................... 5 

Dunford, Gen. Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine 

Corps ..................................................................................................................... 8 

Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. 

Navy ...................................................................................................................... 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Breedlove, Gen. Philip M. ................................................................................ 80 

Chiarelli, GEN Peter W. .................................................................................. 39 

Dunford, Gen. Joseph F., Jr. ........................................................................... 67 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 37 

Greenert, ADM Jonathan W. ........................................................................... 54 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Palazzo ....................................................................................................... 93 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 97 

Mr. LoBiondo .................................................................................................... 107 

Mr. Loebsack ..................................................................................................... 109 

Mr. Owens ......................................................................................................... 110 

(1) 

TOTAL FORCE READINESS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 26, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:02 p.m. in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON READINESS 

Mr. FORBES. I want to welcome all of our members and our very 

distinguished panel of experts to today’s hearing focused on total 

force readiness and how we resource, train, and equip our military 

for the challenges that they face. 

No one will dispute that we have the most capable and professional military in the world. However, I worry about our state of 

readiness, not for mastheads on the horizon or columns of tanks 

rolling towards us, but for the looming defense budget cuts many 

in this Congress seem willing to inflict on our military. 

Two weeks ago, this subcommittee heard about the challenges 

the Navy has faced in preserving and enhancing its readiness and 

current capabilities. I suspect we will hear today how our other 

military services face many of the same challenges and how they 

all would be negatively impacted by hundreds of billions of dollars 

in budget cuts. 

As we consider our deficit, Federal spending, and the impact on 

our defense budget, I believe we should be asking four questions: 

First, what are the threats we face? Second, what resources do our 

combatant commanders need to protect us against those threats? 

Third, what do these resources cost and how can we obtain them 

as efficiently as possible? And fourth, what can we afford and what 

are the risks to our Nation if we do not supply those resources? 

I believe many in Congress and the White House have been asking only the portion of question four that asks how much they want 

to spend, and have been ignoring the other questions almost entirely. 

However, in January, Chairman Mullen was quoted as saying 

that any additional budget cuts can almost only be met through 

substantial reductions in force structure, which goes against the 

national security requirements which we see in the world we are 

living in. 

Similarly, just before his departure in June, Secretary Gates 

warned that no further reductions should be considered without an 
2 

honest and thorough assessment of the risk involved, to include the 

missions we may need to shed in the future. 

I realize that our witnesses today are in a difficult position. I 

would simply ask: Help us help you. I hope our frank discussion 

during this hearing can help us all better understand the seriousness of the challenges we face and those still ahead. We must not 

let our legacy be one of overseeing the slow dismantlement of the 

greatest military on the Earth. 

We all have a responsibility to ensure our men and women in 

uniform are given all the tools necessary for the job we have asked 

them to do, and I look forward to hearing from our very distinguished witnesses. 

Today, we have with us General Peter W. Chiarelli, the Vice 

Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. We are proud of his service to our 

country and we are delighted to have him with us today. 

We also have Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, the Vice Chief of 

Naval Operations for the U.S. Navy. Admiral, we are proud of your 

service, and we are also proud of the work we know you will do 

as the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] of the Navy. And we know 

they made a good selection there. 

Equally important today is the presence of General Joseph F. 

Dunford, Jr., the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps for 

the U.S. Marine Corps. General, we know you have been at the tip 

of the spear in all the fights, and we just are honored to have you 

with your expertise and experience coming before our committee 

today. 

And finally, General Philip M. Breedlove, the Vice Chief of Staff 

of the U.S. Air Force. General, you have done a great job, and we 

are just honored to have your presence with us today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

Mr. FORBES. I now turn to my dear friend and chairman of the 

full committee, Buck McKeon, for any comments he would like to 

make. Mr. Chairman, we are delighted to have you join us for a 

portion of this hearing and would love to hear any comments that 

you might have. 

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE 

ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I am just happy to be here. I just got to shake hands with the 

chiefs down there and said I feel like I am in—maybe I won’t repeat it. I am honored to be in your presence is what I said, and 

I am really looking forward to this hearing. I am looking forward 

to your testimonies. 

This is something that we have really been focused on. I think 

the four questions that the chairman outlined are really important. 

I had a chance over the weekend to talk to each of the chiefs because I am concerned with the cuts that have been escalating so 

rapidly over the last year. It is hard to keep up with where we are, 

and I just wanted to know from them how far—how much further 

they can go, because I was expecting to hear some requests from 

our leadership. Fortunately, they didn’t ask for any more cuts in 
3 

the solution that they are working on to solve our problem right 

now. 

But thank you. I am glad to be with you and look forward to your 

testimony. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Chairman McKeon. 

I would now like to turn to my fellow co-chair of the China Caucus and also the ranking member of this committee, Madeleine 

Bordallo from Guam—and she just got back from Guam—for any 

remarks she may have. Ms. Bordallo. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE 

FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Today we continue our discussion on the overall readiness of our 

military forces, and we will hear from all of the Vice Chiefs of our 

military services. We thank them for their service to our Nation 

and for appearing before our subcommittee today. 

Over the past decade, we have asked our All-Volunteer Force to 

sustain continuous combat operations, and they have done so remarkably well. Our men and women who deploy in support of operations worldwide are some of the best trained and the best 

equipped service members that this Nation has ever seen. 

I think many of us on this subcommittee can remember back several years ago when service members frequently deployed without 

proper training or necessary equipment. Those were the days when 

readiness was at its lowest state, but this committee took appropriate steps to correct that problem, and now the readiness rates 

for our deploying units are consistently high. 

Some today are inclined to believe that readiness continues to decline across the services, but to me that is a false assumption. 

Reset efforts and a decrease in operations tempo and incrementally 

improved the services’ readiness to support not only ongoing contingency operations but also to prepare for future challenges. In 

fact, this year was the first year that the Army was able to conduct 

full-spectrum operations training since the beginning of the war in 

Iraq, because operational tempo has decreased and dwell time has 

increased. Given this positive development, I hope that our witnesses will address what we need to do to stay on that track. 

It should come as no surprise, however, that we have readiness 

challenges, especially among our non-deployed forces. For one, Congress has not made things easy by passing defense authorization 

bills at the 11th hour and providing months and months of continuing resolutions. But the greater issue causing readiness challenges is being engaged in two wars for more than a decade. As 

long as we remain engaged in ground combat in both Iraq and Afghanistan, our ability to respond to another event or contingency, 

should they arise, will be negatively affected. 

This fact concerns me greatly as the elected Representative of 

Guam, which sits in the strategically important region of the Western Pacific, where threats from North Korea and China remain a 

constant threat. Case in point: How would we have responded in 

Korea if the Cheonan incident had been followed by further provocations from North Korea? 
4 

Finally, like our subcommittee chairman, I am concerned about 

possible further cuts to the defense budget. These cuts will place 

additional pressures on each service’s budget at a time when combat operations continue to stress and stretch our forces. I hope that 

our witnesses today can discuss the potential impacts that further 

budget cuts would have on their ability to perform their missions 

and meet theater commanders’ validated requirements, as well as 

their ability to posture for the future. 

The only way to restore readiness across the board is to decrease 

the demand for forces, but we should not make the mistake of not 

making necessary investments to better posture our forces to respond to emerging threats. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. And again, I feel that this hearing is 

very, very important and continues this committee’s long history of 

oversight of the readiness of our military. Having the right mix of 

manpower, a total force ready to be employed and engaged as an 

instrument of national security, is essential to preserving our way 

of life. And I look forward to the testimony from our witnesses this 

afternoon and their responses to our questions. 

And I thank you and yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Madeleine. 

As we discussed prior to the hearing, I would like to dispense 

with the 5-minute rule for this hearing and depart from regular 

order so that members may ask questions during the course of the 

discussion. I think this will provide a roundtable-type forum and 

will enhance the dialogue of these very important issues. We would 

like to proceed with standard order for members to address the witnesses; however, if any member has a question pertinent to the 

matter being discussed at the time, please seek acknowledgment 

and wait to be recognized by the chair. 

We plan to keep questioning to the standard 5 minutes; however, 

I don’t want to curtail productive dialogue. So I believe we can do 

this and still ensure each member has the opportunity to get his 

or her questions asked. As we have explained to each of our witnesses, that helps us to have a better dialogue. 

I think you will find that the expertise of the members of this 

committee is quite vast, and we just want to get that where they 

have that ability to ask those questions and make sure that we are 

getting them answered, if we can. 

If we get bogged down, the chair will ask members to hold further discussion until the first round of questioning is complete. Do 

any members have any questions about how we propose to conduct 

the questioning? 

If not, I ask unanimous consent that for the purposes of this 

hearing we dispense with the 5-minute rule and proceed as described. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

Now, we look forward to our statements from our witnesses. Gentlemen, I know that you have submitted prepared remarks that we 

will be introducing for the record. We would love for each of you 

to take a few minutes and tell us whatever you would like to say. 

This is your opportunity to get before this committee the importance of the readiness issues that you see. 

General Chiarelli, since you happen to be sitting in that seat, I 

take it you are going to be the first one up on deck with your state-
5 

ment, and then we will proceed right on down the line from there. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF GEN PETER W. CHIARELLI, USA, VICE CHIEF 

OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY 

General CHIARELLI. Chairman McKeon, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, distinguished members of the committee, I 

want to thank you for allowing me to appear in front of you today. 

As the chairman said, you have my written statement and I look 

forward to questions and answers after my opening comments. 

These are challenging times. We have been at war for almost a 

decade, both in Iraq and Afghanistan. I am very, very proud of the 

job our soldiers, their families, and our Department of the Army civilians have done during that almost decade of conflict. To all this 

is added a serious fiscal crisis that our country is going through. 

Looking ahead, I think there are three main things that we— 

from an Army standpoint, we must ensure. First is that we must 

maintain into the future a force that is capable and as ready as it 

is today. There is no going back. We must maintain the edge we 

have gained over 10 years of conflict. We must modernize that force 

so it is relevant for tomorrow, and the Army has a very, very good 

modernization plan. And we must design a force that is affordable, 

and that is my promise to you. 

Since World War II, we have been 100 percent correct in one 

thing, and that is a failure to forecast the fights of the future. We 

are in an era of persistent conflict, and I would argue if we get out 

of that conflict we will go into an era of persistent engagement in 

order to avert conflict. Whatever reductions are made carry risk, 

and with reductions we will not be able to do as much tomorrow 

as we are able to do today. Everything we do should be aimed at 

reducing that risk. 

And for the Army there are four points that I would like to 

make: 

The first is it is absolutely critical that the Army get itself to a 

baseline BOG:DWELL [Boots on the Ground:Dwell] of 1 to 2. That 

means for the active component force, when deployed for 12 

months, we must get them to a baseline of 24 months at home, 

going to an optimal BOG:DWELL 1 to 3. For the Reserve components it should be 1 year mobilized, 5 years at home, before we request them to go on a second mobilization. That is absolutely essential for the work that I have been doing in health promotion, 

risk reduction, and suicide prevention. That BOG:DWELL ratio is 

absolutely critical. 

As you well know, the Army has a requirement for 22,000 soldiers that we call the temporary end strength account. Temporary 

end strength was created to allow us to get off of stop-loss and also 

to help us make up for the medically non-deployable soldiers that 

we had in our units. 

In addition to that, we have been asked to give up 27,000 soldiers in force structure in 2015 and 2016 based on some assumptions. We have done the analysis of that drawdown to 520, and our 

strong recommendation is that that be a gradual drawdown, a 

drawdown of both force structure and the TESI account, Temporary 

End Strength Increase, if required to do so. That is absolutely es-
6 

sential if we are going to take care of our soldiers and our families. 

And we would also argue that we need to maintain a portion of 

that Temporary End Strength Increase because of the fact we have 

over 13,000 soldiers in the disability evaluation system after 10 

years of conflict. 

I promise you we will continue to do our part to find cost savings, 

eliminate redundancies, and improve business practices, and the 

capability portfolio review process that we have embarked upon 

and the network integration exercises that we are running at Fort 

Bliss are examples that I would be happy to expand on during 

questions and answers. 

The bottom line: While the current fiscal environment may require changes or reductions to force structure, we must act responsibly. We must ensure for the United States Army that whatever 

we have is a balanced force. We have a tendency to protect force 

structure because we are a people-oriented and -focused force, not 

platform-oriented. But we have three dials we have to turn here. 

We have to make sure that we have the required dollars to train. 

We have to be able to equip our force and the proper force structure. All those dials must be moved at the same time so whatever 

force we have is a balanced force, able to do the missions the country asks it to do. 

I want to thank you for your continued and generous support and 

demonstrated commitment to what I think we all believe is the 

greatest Army in the world. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Chiarelli can be found in the 

Appendix on page 39.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF ADM JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN, VICE 

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral GREENERT. Chairman Forbes, Congresswoman Bordallo, 

and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Readiness, 

thank you for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing 

alongside the Assistant Commandant and my fellow service chiefs. 

I am honored to represent the men and women in Active Duty, 

Reserve, and civilian who work each day to ensure that our Navy 

is ready to perform the full range of capabilities necessary to ensure the security of the Nation. On their behalf, I want to express 

my appreciation and our appreciation for the work of this committee in support of the sailors’ service and the committee’s work 

to ensure that their welfare, the sailors’ welfare, and the welfare 

of their family is taken care of. 

I also want to say that we in the Navy are pleased and encouraged by the progress that Representative Giffords has made. As the 

CNO mentioned when he addressed the full committee in March, 

Representative Giffords is a Navy spouse and a member of our 

family, the Navy family, and has been a friend of the Navy and 

Marine Corps throughout her career. So our thoughts and prayers 

and wishes for her speedy recovery remain with her as she continues her journey to return, and we look forward to her return to 

this committee. 

Mr. Chairman, I would ask my written testimony be accepted for 

the record. 
7 

Our Navy remains globally deployed. Fifty to 60 percent of our 

ships are underway on any given day; 27,000 Navy people are at 

sea or on the ground or engaged in directly supporting combat operations in Central Command. We have naval forces providing deterrence against North Korea; providing maritime security and executing global maritime partnership initiatives in Europe, South 

America, Africa, the Mideast and the Pacific; providing humanitarian assistance disaster relief, as we have in Haiti, Pakistan, and 

Japan over the last year. 

The Sixth Fleet is supporting NATO power projection operations 

in Libya, and our ballistic missile defense capable surface ships 

provide theater ballistic missile defense in Europe, the Middle 

East, and the Western Pacific. Also, the Navy ballistic missile submarines provide the most survivable element of our strategic deterrent triad. Now, all these activities are directly aligned with our 

maritime strategy and our six core capabilities that that strategy 

articulates. 

Our sailors, your sailors, are doing a superb job in a myriad of 

tasks, and the combatant commander positive feedback that we get 

testifies to their performance. Our sailors represent the foundation 

of our readiness. 

Overall, Navy’s readiness is acceptable, but as you have seen in 

the quarterly readiness report we provided to the Congress, there 

are indicators of a declining trend. I view these indicators and the 

trend with concern. It is clear to me that the Navy is under stress. 

This is reflected in a host of indicators and resource areas. 

Like our partner services, we have been engaged in combat operations for 10 years while continuing to support other theater and 

area of responsibility requirements. For example, to best meet combatant commander needs for deployed Navy forces and to simultaneously respond to emerging requirements, we have increased deployments and we have increased deployed time. This has resulted 

in reduced training time, a narrowing of pre-deployment training 

for certain units for tailored and mission-specific tasks. We had to 

reschedule or descope depot maintenance periods, and we have had 

limited opportunities for unit level training and maintenance, and 

it has dramatically compelled us to more routinely exceed personnel op tempo [Operations Tempo] guidelines. 

Your Navy has been a rotational force for decades and consequently we are used to what we call ‘‘resetting in stride’’ between 

deployments. This principle has kept core Navy readiness measures 

above minimum requirements, but the stress on the force is real 

and it has been relentless. 

I can’t tell you for sure, Mr. Chairman, if we are at an inflection 

point or a tipping point, but I don’t see how we can sustain this 

pace of operations indefinitely and meet the readiness standards. 

If we try to do so, I think it will consume the expected service life 

of our force structure earlier than designed and planned and will 

face a cascading increase in the cost to achieve the expected service 

life of those ships. And reaching that expected service life is a 

foundational element of our future ship inventory and, accordingly, 

our shipbuilding plan. 
8 

Therefore, it is important for us to reestablish, in my view, a sustainable level of operations consistent with force structure and supportable by our fleet response plan. 

Our responsibility is to provide a Navy ready today to do today’s 

mission. It is also our responsibility to be ready to meet tomorrow’s 

challenges. So, accordingly, the CNO strives to carefully balance 

modernization and procurement with current readiness requirements in developing our budget submission. 

For example, we have taken steps in the 2012 budget request to 

reduce our reliance on overseas contingency operation funding, particularly in the operating accounts. However, we remain dependent 

upon some level of OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] to fully 

meet today’s baseline readiness requirements. Our readiness would 

be dramatically impacted if OCO’s funding is further reduced or 

terminated without a corresponding reduction in those operating 

requirements. 

So, Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Bordallo, and members of the 

committee, you can be proud of the work of the men and women 

serving your Navy. They get it done on behalf of the combatant 

commanders around the world, and I appreciate the opportunity to 

be with you today, and I look forward to the discussion. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Greenert can be found in the 

Appendix on page 54.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral. General Dunford. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, 

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS 

General DUNFORD. Chairman McKeon, Chairman Forbes, Congresswoman Bordallo, distinguished members of the committee, 

thanks for the opportunity to join you here today. It is an honor 

to represent your Marines. 

I would like to begin by offering a few key observations regarding 

our current and our future readiness. Today, of the 202,000 marines on Active Duty and the 39,000 in the selected Marine Corps 

Reserve, 30,000 are forward deployed; 20,000 are actually in Afghanistan. Due to the support of the Congress, those forward-deployed forces are well-manned, trained, and equipped in keeping 

with our Commandant’s number one priority, but our forward-deployed units have personnel and equipment requirements that exceed standard allowances. The additional equipment is due to the 

nature of the fight and the very distributed of operations in Afghanistan. The additional personnel are required to support staffs 

and trainers for Afghan security forces. 

We meet those additional requirements by pulling equipment 

and personnel from home station. As a result, units at home station continue to experience significant personnel and equipment 

shortfalls. In fact, approximately two-thirds of our units at home 

station are in a degraded readiness state. 

Home station readiness is a particular concern for the Nation’s 

expeditionary force and readiness. The forces at home station represent our capability to respond to unexpected crises and contingencies. Last year, units at home station responded to several unplanned requirements, including those in Afghanistan, Libya, and 

Japan. Marines were also called to reinforce embassies in Egypt, 
9 

Bahrain, Guinea, and Kyrgyzstan. In these cases, Marines had 

days, in some cases hours, to respond. 

We are reminded that crisis response is come as you are. If the 

Marine Corps is asked to support another major contingency at this 

time, we would respond, but home station shortfalls would affect 

our ability to meet the timelines established by the combatant commanders. Also, we are not currently meeting the combatant commanders’ demand for forward-deployed marines. 

Even as we work to meet current requirements, we are looking 

ahead. We have conducted an assessment of the future security environment and of force structure review. Based on our analysis, we 

plan for a force with the right capabilities and capacities to provide 

the Nation with an expeditionary force and readiness that meets 

the vision of the 82nd Congress. 

Our intent is to reset our forces coming out of Afghanistan and 

reconstitute an Active Force of 186,800 marines with 39,500 in the 

selected Marine Corps Reserve. That force will be manned and 

equipped as a force in readiness and will be designed to be forward 

deployed and engaged, and it will be prepared for a wide range of 

crises and contingencies. 

With your continued support, tomorrow’s Marine Corps will remain a force that is ready to respond to today’s crisis, with today’s 

forces, today. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Dunford can be found in the 

Appendix on page 67.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. General Breedlove. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, USAF, VICE 

CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General BREEDLOVE. Chairman McKeon, Chairman Forbes, 

Ranking member Bordallo, and distinguished members of the committee, it is my pleasure to be here today representing the more 

than 690,000 Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen. 

Thank you for providing me the opportunity to update you on the 

readiness of your United States Air Force. My intent today is to address a few Air Force readiness trends and highlight some of the 

challenges we are facing. 

I am pleased to report that America’s Air Force continues to provide the Nation with unmatched global vigilance, reach, and power 

as a part of this joint and coalition team. The Air Force remains 

a mission-focused and prepared force, an increasingly difficult task 

given 20 years of constant deployed combat operations dating all 

the way back to Operation Desert Storm. 

Notably since 2003, we have seen a slow but steady decline in 

reported unit readiness indicators. This makes our ability to be 

ready for the full spectrum of operations at an acceptable risk quite 

challenging, especially for the combat Air Forces and for our limited supply of high-demand units. 

Our enduring commitment to readiness in the joint fight is evidenced by the 40,000 American airmen deployed to 285 locations 

around the globe. Of this group, nearly 28,000 are on a continually 

rotating basis to directly contribute to operations in U.S. 

CENTCOM [United States Central Command], including 10,000 
10 

airmen in Afghanistan providing close air support to U.S. and coalition ground forces, airlift, air refueling, personnel rescue, air medical evacuation, and training to develop our partner Air Force 

there. 

An additional 57,000 total force airmen, or 11 percent of our 

force, are forward stationed overseas, providing capabilities in direct support of our COCOMs [United States Combatant Commands]. And from their home stations in the United States, 

220,000 total force airmen, 43 percent of the Air Force, provide 

daily support to worldwide operations, standing nuclear alert, commanding and controlling our satellites, analyzing intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance data for the forward troops, and 

much, much more. 

This high operations tempo continues to stress 16 of our enlisted 

specialties and 6 of our officer specialities, well below the 1 to 1 acceptable minimum. 

Aircraft readiness: Through the dedicated work of our airmen, 

the Air Force’s aircraft inventory remains ready despite extensive 

use in contingency operations and increases in fleet average age. 

The mobility Air Forces are in good shape. Our modernization and 

recapitalization efforts, most notably the KC–46, remain on track. 

The combat Air Force’s readiness is adequate despite the challenge 

of rapidly accumulating hours and the fleet faster aging than we 

originally planned, as well as delayed modernization and recapitalization efforts. 

To keep our legacy platforms viable well into the future, the Air 

Force intends to use funds saved through our efficiency efforts to 

subsidize modernization. A good example is our plan to retire six 

B–1 bombers to fund B–1 fleet upgrades. 

In addition to air power, Air Force continues to reliably provide 

the Nation with required space and cyber capability, precision navigation and timing through GPS [Global Positioning System] and secure satellite COM [communications], missile warning and network 

defense against a barrage of cyberspace attacks. We have achieved 

a record 80 consecutive, successful, national security space 

launches since 1999, and our space readiness meets the requirement. 

Likewise, as a critical component of our Nation’s strategic deterrence, the Air Force has maintained our 450 ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] on continuous alert at greater than 99 percent readiness rate. This is a mission we cannot fail in. 

Mr. Chairman, committee members, the Air Force remains steadfastly committed to providing global vigilance, reach, and power for 

America and the joint team. Despite fiscal challenges and high ops 

tempo, Air Force personnel, weapons systems, and organizations 

prepare and are prepared for today’s fight. Thank you for your continued support of your United States Air Force, for our airmen and 

for their families. 

I look forward to your questions, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General Breedlove can be found in 

the Appendix on page 80.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. And to each of our panelists 

we thank you for being here. As Chairman McKeon indicated at 

the beginning, we view each and every one of you as true American 
11 

heroes. We don’t say that lightly; we believe that. And equally important, we believe that the men and women who serve under you 

are true heroes for this Nation, defending freedom. 

As I look out upon the world that we face, my biggest concern 

is not an enemy masthead that I see coming over the horizon. It 

is not a new missile that we don’t know about, and it is not even 

a group of planes that could be flying over there. One of the biggest 

fears that I have is these enormous budget cuts that we see coming 

down the pike. We have heard tunes of anywhere from $400 billion 

to $1 trillion. 

As I look at it, the questions we need to ask for national security 

are pretty straightforward. They are commonsense questions. 

The first question that we have to ask is this: What is the true 

risk? What are the threats that America faces, both today and in 

the near and far future? In doing that, we have a number of different tools. We use the Quadrennial Defense Review that each of 

you are very familiar with, the National Security Strategy. Many 

of these are unclassified. We know that you have a number of documents that you use to bring together to assess that risk and to 

make sure we know what it is. But at some point in time we have 

to ask the question: What is the risk that America is facing? 

The second question that we have to ask is: What resources do 

our combatant commanders need to fulfill the missions necessary 

to defend America from those risks? 

The third question is: How much are we paying for those resources and how can we do it as efficiently as possible? 

And then the fourth question is: How much can we afford, and 

what is the risk to America if we don’t provide those resources? 

I can tell you that I believe with every ounce of strength that I 

have that the debate that we have had in the United States over 

the last several months has been around only one portion of one 

of those questions. And it is: What do we want to spend and how 

much can we afford? But we are not looking at the risks that we 

are assuming by not expending those moneys. 

I know the tremendous pressure each of you are under as you 

come here today, and I also know this: If we don’t ask those questions, we may all be presiding over the dismantling of the greatest 

military the world has ever known. That will not be our legacy. 

The chairman has given me this gavel, and he has done it because he knows that I will ask those tough questions, and we will 

do that today. And he also knows that we are prepared if we need 

to, and you think we need to, we are all set up, we will gavel this 

session and we will go into a classified setting if that is necessary. 

But we won’t leave the men and women who serve under you without the resources they need to do the missions necessary to defend 

this country. 

General Dunford, your marines have been at the front of almost 

everything we have done over the last several decades. They have 

risked their arms, their legs, their quality of life, their life itself, 

in doing that fight. So I think we should come to you first. 

And the question that I want to ask you which is at the heart 

of it, if we believe that readiness is the ability of the military services to provide the combatant commanders with the resources necessary to meet the operational requirements necessary to defend us 
12 

from the threats we face, the question I would ask you is this: In 

your best professional military judgment, given the tremendous demands on your service, are you currently able to provide the combatant commanders with the resources—all the resources they need 

to meet their operational requirement? 

General DUNFORD. Chairman Forbes, thank you for that question. First, as I mentioned in the opening statement, I am absolutely confident that in the case of the United States Central Command, we are providing that combatant commander with all the 

Marine forces that he needs. And those forces, as is the Commandant’s number one priority, those forces are the best trained, 

best equipped, and best manned units that we can provide. 

The requirement to meet the Central Command demand has 

caused us to accept risks in other areas of operations. So currently 

we are not able to meet all the forward presence requirements of 

the other combatant commanders in the Pacific Command, in the 

Southern Command, European Command, and Africa Command. 

Also, in the case of another major contingency operation, the 

United States Marine Corps would not right now be able to meet 

the timelines of the combatant commanders in response to another 

major contingency operation, should it occur simultaneously with 

current operations in Afghanistan. 

Mr. FORBES. General, you have heard the same statements that we have heard about potential cuts from different sources, $400 billion to a trillion dollars. Assuming that we divided this equally and 

the Marine Corps had to take as much as $200 billion of cuts over 

the next 10 years, could you absorb those, and what would the impact be on the readiness state of the Marine Corps if that were to 

come your way? 

General DUNFORD. Chairman, we have taken a look at the figure of $400 billion, and we have taken a look at what our fair share 

would be it if would come down to the Department of the Navy and 

we would take a pro-share cut of those reductions inside the Department of the Navy. 

I think within $400 billion, we would have some challenges in 

taking those cuts. I think if they were to exceed $400 billion we 

would start to have to make some fundamental changes in the capability of the Marine Corps. 

Mr. FORBES. Would your reductions come in the nature of personnel and force structure? 

General DUNFORD. Chairman, as a result of the way that we are 

organized, 60 percent of our total obligation authority actually goes 

to people. So if we were forced to take cuts, they would absolutely 

come in the form of capacity. 

Mr. FORBES. General Breedlove, I know you have talked about 

the aging of your fleet, and so my first question to you is the same 

one to General Dunford. Given the demands on the service right 

now and the Air Force and your best professional military judgment, are you currently able to meet all the demands from our 

combatant commanders with the resources they need to meet their 

operational requirements? 

General BREEDLOVE. Mr. Chairman, my answer starts very similar to General Dunford’s. In the case of CENTCOM, I believe we 

can meet all of those requirements. I will tell you that some of our 
13 

low-density, high-demand requirements—personnel recovery, ISR 

[Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance], and a few—are 

right at the ragged edge, and as we continue to be challenged by 

new tasks around North Africa and other places, we are right at 

the limit of supporting CENTCOM in those low-density, high-demand assets. 

Similarly, once you get outside of CENTCOM, we would have 

some risk, and those risks fall in these familiar areas: personnel 

recovery, ISR, some of our intel assets’ limited demand, are being 

pretty much consumed by the CENTCOM fight. And therefore, we 

would accept risk as we would approach other COCOM requirements around the world that we have. 

Mr. FORBES. And some of those would include PACOM [United 

States Pacific Command], for example? 

General BREEDLOVE. Yes, sir, exactly. 

Mr. FORBES. In addition to that, General Dunford addressed the 

impact that cuts would make on the Air Force. I am looking right 

now at the average age of some of your fleet, and it could be a few 

years either way, but as I look at it, your strategic bombers are 

about 34 years old; tanker aircraft, 47; your airlift aircraft, 19. 

What impact would those cuts have on the readiness for the Air 

Force? 

General BREEDLOVE. We have also looked at the conversation 

which is happening about our fair share of 400, and it would cause 

us quite some concern in the recapitalization of just what you talk 

about, Mr. Chairman. We do have an attack air fleet and a bomber 

fleet that is in bad need of recapitalization, and our plans throughout this period would be challenged by those cuts. 

Similarly to General Dunford, what we have looked at is that in a $400 billion cut, our capacity would have to come down. We have 

determined that we will not go hollow. When I came into the flying 

business in the seventies, I looked at what hollow was on Air Force 

bases. As I walked down the line and saw holes in aircraft where 

there were no engines and we had maintained a certain amount of 

infrastructure and iron, but it was unflyable. And we can’t afford 

to go there with the requirements of our COCOMs today. 

So a $400 billion cut would force us to constrict our force in order 

to maintain a ready and fit force to fight, and we come to almost 

the same conclusion that General Dunford did. Beyond $400 billion, we would have to go into a fundamental restructure of what 

it is our Nation expects from our Air Force. 

Mr. FORBES. General, you and I have also had some discussions 

regarding the importance of technology and advanced technology 

for the Air Force. We see as one of the forces around the world, obviously, the Chinese and what they are doing with a huge modernization. In your best professional military judgment from assessing what the Chinese have been doing in the last several years, 

when they make commitments or promises that they are going to 

have various numbers of aircraft online within certain years, do 

they deliver on those promises? 

General BREEDLOVE. They do, sir, and that is probably the most 

scary thing about what they are doing. Clearly, we are some number of decades ahead of the Chinese in stealth and in the capability 

to employ stealth and to do these high technically pieces of work 
14 

in the military. You don’t catch up that 3 or 4 decades overnight. 

Normally, it would take you 3 or 4 decades to do it, but quite 

frankly, the way that they are intruding into the nets of our manufacturers and our government, they are catching up in an increased 

rate because of what they learn in those cyber intrusions. 

So, yes, sir, it does scare me. When they say they are going to 

build 300 J–21s in the next 5 years, they will build 300 J–21s in 

the next 5 years. They will put the money to whatever they decide 

to do, and that scares me because of the determination and the fact 

that they will deliver. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

General Chiarelli, again thank you for being here. No surprise 

question to you. You have heard the questions that I have asked 

to General Dunford and also to General Breedlove. I would like to 

ask you the same thing. 

In your best professional military judgment, given the demands 

of the Army currently, are you currently able to provide the combatant commanders—all of our combatant commanders—with the 

resources they need to meet the operational requirements of the 

missions that they currently face? 

General CHIARELLI. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you for that 

question, and I would add that we have been shoulder-to-shoulder 

with our Marine brethren throughout both conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan from the beginning. 

Mr. FORBES. And we know you have. 

General CHIARELLI. And I would tell you, yes, in CENTCOM we 

are, but not without a cost. I think you know that our aviation assets are on the 1 to 1 BOG:DWELL today. I recently visited an 

aviation brigade in Fort Hood, Texas, that had just returned from 

the theater, and 12 months to the day after they returned they 

were back for another 12-month deployment, and currently at 1 to 

1, and a majority of our forces we have over there are below 1 to 

2. That is 12 months at home—12 months deployed, 24 months at 

home. 

No, we cannot meet all the other COCOM commanders’ validated 

demands. Those are prioritized through the global force management process. We work hard to meet them. We are not able to meet 

them all, and we help them manage that risk. 

We are looking very, very hard at a $400 billion cut. We don’t 

totally understand the total impact that is going to have on the 

force, but when you double that to $800 million or more—or $800 

billion or more, that is—you are reaching an area there that I 

think would definitely—we would have to look very, very hard at 

our strategy, what we can and cannot do. 

Mr. FORBES. General, if you can’t meet the combatant commanders’ need for the resources for their operational requirements 

today, and you were to have these cuts coming down, how are you 

right now in terms of your equipment needs, and would these cuts 

come out of equipment or would they come out of personnel? 

General CHIARELLI. We are absolutely focused on whatever force 

we have is a balanced force. And there is three big dials that we 

have to turn. We have a tendency to hold on to force structure 

longer than we should because, as I indicated in my opening comments, we are people-focused. We are not platform-focused, but we 
15 

have made a commitment, both the Secretary of the Army and the 

Chief of Staff of the Army, that whatever force we have, if cut, 

whatever force is left will be a balanced force. We will have the 

necessary funds to train that force to do the missions we ask it to 

do. We will equip and we will ensure that force is a modernized 

force going into the future, and we will have the force structure 

that allows us to man that equipment, but we will not in any way 

favor one account or the other. 

Mr. FORBES. Would it be fair to say that if you have those budget 

cuts you would have to further reduce the resources that you could 

supply to our combatant commanders? 

General CHIARELLI. That is fair to say. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, again, we thank you for your presence 

here, look forward to your service as CNO. You know that there 

have been some somewhat substantiated rumors floating around 

Congress that I mentioned to you the other day regarding our aircraft carriers, and particularly the possibility of delaying the construction of current aircraft carrier underway from 5 years to 7 

years, and also doing away perhaps altogether with the next carrier that is on deck. 

In your best professional military judgment, if that proposal was 

presented to this committee, should we embrace it and support it, 

or should we fight against it? 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, first, Mr. Chairman, I would have to 

say that in the deliberations of our fiscal year 2013 budget there 

are a whole host of items on the table, but the best—we have found 

that the best center for aircraft procurement and construction, and 

that is, if you will, interval between construction, I think we are 

talking about, is 5 years. And that is our program of record right 

now for CVN–79. That is the carrier in question. 

We find that when you go beyond that you have an overhead 

cost, you have a labor cost increase, and you lose the skill, the proficiency of the workers. So that is kind of about in the sweet spot. 

So we would prefer not to do that. That is not the best way to build 

an aircraft carrier if you have that option. 

The CVN–79 is the intended relief for the Nimitz, which as retired, if I am not mistaken, in 2025. So anyway, what I tell you, 

any rumor to that extent is definitely predecisional. There are a lot 

of things under deliberations right now, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, we recognize that. Let me ask you this: In 

your best professional military judgment, given all the demands on 

the Navy now, are you currently able to provide the combatant 

commanders with the resources they need to meet their operational 

requirements? 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our validated 

signal, if you will, for providing the combatant commanders what 

they need is the global force management allocation plan. That is 

the result of deliberations in the joint staff with the combatant 

commanders, with the services, and the Secretary of Defense’s 

staff. The combatant commanders unconstrained, if you will, what 

they believe they need is the input to this process. That is reviewed 

for validity, if you will, for policy, for strategy. The outcome of that 

is the global force—— 
16 

Mr. FORBES. And Admiral, I want to make sure I phrased my 

question to you correctly, so I am sorry to interrupt you, but I 

didn’t say what they wanted; I said what they needed. 

Admiral GREENERT. What they—my signal to me, what they 

need, is the global force management allocation plan. We meet that 

plan right now, with the caveats I gave you in my oral statement. 

We are on the edge right now. There are some aspects of my fleet 

response plan, my covenant to provide rotational forces forward 

that I find that I am concerned about some of those trends, and I 

described those to you. 

So to answer your question, yes, we meet those. An unconstrained combatant commanders’ demand, I would need, doing 

some analysis, about some 400 ships. I have 285 ships today. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, last question I am going to ask this. When 

Admiral Burke was here little over a week ago he said that the 

COCOM demand was for about 16 or 18 subs at any one time. He 

said we could only deliver about 10 subs at any one time, not because they didn’t need them, but because that is all we could afford 

to deliver. Big difference. 

I am looking at the shipbuilding plan that has been submitted 

by the Navy, and looking out. We had Admiral Willard testify before one of our subcommittees a little over a year ago, that the Chinese now for the first time in their lifetime had more ships in their 

Navy than we did in ours. And I know we can argue about capability, but at some point in time numbers become capability. 

The second thing we looked at is the Navy has said we needed 

a floor of 313 ships. Then they came back and somewhat tweaked 

that and said 328. You know, and we have chatted about this before, in the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] independent panel 

that did an analysis on that number, they came up and felt we 

needed 346 ships. Regardless of whether it is 313, 328, or 346, in 

CBO’s [Congressional Budget Office] review of the shipbuilding 

plan that has been brought forward, they asked the question how 

the numbers work out, because based on their numbers and the 

cost of the ships they feel instead of going to 313, we could be going 

down to 270, 250, even 170 depending upon the cost of the ships. 

Here is the question I have for you. This year this committee put 

$14.9 billion in shipbuilding. The average over the last 3 decades, 

as you know, has been $15 billion that Congress has put in for 

shipbuilding. We know we can’t supply enough subs right now for 

our combatant commanders’ request. We know, as you mentioned 

and also as CRS [Congressional Research Service] has come out 

and told us, if we were to delay a carrier, that carrier cost for either not building one or delaying them would increase not just our 

carrier costs, but the cost of our subs and the cost of doing the 

maintenance on our ships. We also know that last year the Navy 

had a $367 million shortfall in their ship repair accounts. 

Admiral Burke, Admiral McCoy testified about a week or so ago, 

that when we don’t do the maintenance on the ships, we reduce the 

lifecycle for those ships and we increase the cost of the maintenance. The number differentiation on that shipbuilding plan is this: 

If we had the $15 billion, we can’t reach even a 313-ship goal. 

You heard General Breedlove say when the Chinese say they are 

going to do something, they normally do it. And they are talking 
17 

about building a lot of ships over the next few years. My concern 

to you is, if we are short already—and I think the numbers are between that we need 17- to $19 billion, so we could be short $21⁄2

billion to $19 billion. What in the world would the Navy do on its 

shipbuilding plan if you had to take further reductions coming 

down from some of these budget hits? 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, Mr. Chairman, you have really eloquently described the conundrum. 

Mr. FORBES. I tried. 

Admiral GREENERT. The balance—and it is really all about that 

balance. 

If we had a reduction of a kind that was passed around here, 

$400 billion, $886 billion, without a comprehensive strategic review, a fundamental look at what we are asking our forces to do, 

without a change in activity as I described, we won’t be able to 

meet the global force management plan today. I am pretty sure of 

that. It will exacerbate our readiness trends which you are familiar 

with, and if we have to go to force structure, reduction of force 

structure, which you mentioned, I am concerned about the industrial base. You are familiar with it, and you know that it is a fragile item. 

Mr. FORBES. And Admiral, of that comprehensive strategic review, the one part of that we cannot change is what the threats 

are; would that be fair to say? We can change our analysis and the 

missions we are going to do to fight this, but we can can’t change 

the threats as such. 

Admiral GREENERT. I would only add a caveat. You can’t change 

a threat. You can determine what you view to be in your vital interests, your national interests. Threats are certainly a part of that 

equation. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. Thank you. Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a 

couple of questions for each of the witnesses, and I guess in the interest of time, if you can be brief in your response, I know we have 

votes later on. 

How long will it take to return your service’s forces to their pre2001 readiness posture? How much will it cost to achieve that level 

of readiness? And will we ever again attain that level of readiness? 

And is that even the correct standard of measurement? I guess we 

will start with General Chiarelli. 

General CHIARELLI. Ma’am, we never want to go back to 2001. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, I am talking about prewar. 

General CHIARELLI. Even prewar. Our level of readiness today is 

much better than it was in the prewar period, much better than 

it was in the prewar period, but that does not—you still have to 

understand we have got a force that has been fighting for 10 years, 

and from a strained standpoint is a force that has been strained 

over time. We have equipment that has to be reset and when that 

equipment returns from theater, we will need the funds to reset 

that equipment. But we have never had a force that is more combat-tested than the United States Army of today. Ten years of 

fighting with an All-Volunteer Force, soldiers who have been on 

three, four, five, and six deployments, gives you a level of readiness 
18 

when it comes to their ability as soldiers that I don’t believe has 

ever been as high as it is today. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So even cost, the whole package, is much better 

today? 

General CHIARELLI. Level of readiness is greater. We never want 

to go back. 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. 

General CHIARELLI. But that doesn’t mean there aren’t things we 

need to fix. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Admiral. 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, ma’am. I think I need to characterize our force in 9/11 first, and then I will answer your question. 

We had 316 ships on 9/11. We have 285 today. On 9/11 we had 385 

[385,000] sailors in the Navy. Today we have 325 [325,000]. So we 

are a different Navy. We are a smaller Navy. 

Our readiness posture today, the foundation of it, is the process, 

the fleet response plan. We owe and have a covenant with the combatant commanders to meet a global force management plan. To 

meet that, I think our unfunded requirement probably best describes where we want to be in maintenance, and that is $367 million in ship depot maintenance and $317 million in aviation spares. 

That would give you my best estimate of where I would like to 

be to meet a readiness standard cost-wise, to quantify it for you, 

ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So you take a different view, then. In other 

words, you are a smaller Navy today than you were back then. 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. And our next one is General Dunford. 

General DUNFORD. Thank you, Congresswoman Bordallo. 

Let me answer the question about the pre-9/11 benchmark first. 

When we looked at the future and we developed what we believe 

to be the Marine Corps that the Nation will need tomorrow, we 

didn’t look at 9/11, we looked at the threats in the future. So we 

don’t benchmark our readiness for tomorrow based on where we 

were yesterday. 

I agree with General Chiarelli with regard to the quality of the 

force. We have never had a force that is more capable than the one 

that we have today. 

Having said that, we have seen significant degradation, particularly in the category of equipment readiness, over the past 10 

years. So when we look at the cost of resetting—that is, replacing 

or fixing the equipment that will come out of Afghanistan—as well 

as the cost of modernizing, our initial figures are on the order of 

$12 billion. That $12 billion, again, is to reset the equipment that 

will come out of Afghanistan as well as modernize to the degree 

that we have done the analysis right now. 

I would qualify that figure somewhat by saying that there are 

many lessons learned from Afghanistan and from Iraq right now 

that we haven’t yet institutionalized. We are in the process right 

now of examining our equipment standards, how much equipment 

a unit rates. And I suspect that we will find that particularly in 

the case of communications gear and, in some cases, mobility capability that we will need additional equipment. 
19 

But $12 billion is about the number right now that we have, and 

that is a combination of reset and reconstitution. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General. 

General Breedlove. 

General BREEDLOVE. Thank you, ma’am. 

I will echo just a couple of comments of my Navy colleague. The 

Air Force is smaller now than it was in 2001 by some 250 fighters 

and some other forces. So I don’t think that it is likely that we will 

return to the size and the capacity that we once had in the fiscal 

environment we face. We will be a smaller force. 

I will also echo the remarks of my fellow vices, in that, while we 

were ready in 2001, we are a combat-tested and incredibly ready 

force now as we deploy. That sometimes comes at the expense of 

the non-deployed forces, as we make sure that those forces that are 

forward get the supplies and the abilities that they have. 

Our small capabilities, limited-number but high-demand capabilities, have been rode hard for the last 10 years. To get back to the 

material readiness that the vice commandant speaks about is a 

tough road to hoe in what we see to be the next fiscal environment. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Uh-huh. So in a few of your cases, then, you are 

a smaller organization, but you are far more ready and qualified 

today. Is that the message? 

General BREEDLOVE. When it comes to the capability—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. That is correct. 

General BREEDLOVE [continuing]. Of our airmen as they fight on 

the ground and in the air, we are a battle-tested and proven force 

and ready there. It is our material readiness that is strained, in 

our aircraft and our high-demand, limited-density assets. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, I thank you very—— 

General CHIARELLI. May I add something, ma’am? I am sorry. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes. 

General CHIARELLI. I was wondering if I could add something. 

We are a larger force today, but we didn’t get large quick enough. 

I don’t know if everyone remembers, but there was a period in 

time, because we could not grow the force as fast as demand was 

requiring, that we had to go to 15-month deployments. When I say 

we never want to go back to that again, we never want to go back 

to that again. What that did to soldiers and to families was nothing 

any of us want to see again. 

So when I say we don’t want to go back, it is much easier to take 

down this force, and quicker, than it would be to build it up, should 

something that we don’t foresee happen in the future. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General. 

I have another question. This will be my last. I would like to ask 

about training opportunities in the Pacific. Now, I know that some 

of you are more apt to answer that than the others. But it appears 

that training opportunities in the Pacific are trending in the wrong 

direction, particularly in Okinawa. 

What steps is the Department of Defense and each of the services taking to address broader training issues in the Pacific? And 

to what extent is each of the services participating in environmental impact statements funded by the Pacific Command but led 

by the Marines to look at Pacific training? And how do we get 

training right in the Pacific? 
20 

I guess I will start with you, General. 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman Bordallo, as you know, we 

are actively involved in implementation of the DPRI [Defense Policy Review Initiative] agreement. And as you pointed out, one of 

the biggest challenges we have as we look at the proper laydown 

of Marine forces after we come out of the war is ensuring that they 

have training opportunities for the entire Marine Air-Ground Task 

Force. Those opportunities right now are limited and don’t fully 

meet all of our requirements. 

As we become more desegregated in conjunction with the DPRI, 

those training requirements will actually increase. We will need to 

find other opportunities to increase training opportunities. 

We have identified our training requirements; we have done a 

detailed analysis. We provided that analysis to the U.S. Pacific 

Command. We provided that analysis to the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense. And we are actively involved both in the environmental 

impact studies as well as the negotiations that OSD [Office of the 

Secretary of Defense] is leading with a number of countries in the 

Pacific to ensure that our training requirements in the future are 

met. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much, General. 

General Breedlove. 

General BREEDLOVE. Yes, ma’am. As you well know, with your 

familiarity of the Pacific, as Korea and Japan become much more 

dense with people and their use of airspace becomes much more 

constricted for our aircraft, and as our aircraft get more and more 

sophisticated and need more room in which to practice, we are severely challenged in Japan and in Korea to meet our training 

needs. 

And so we are forced now to seek our training actually in the 

continental United States, in Alaska, or maybe back at Nellis. So 

we have to move the forces from the forward area back to the rear 

area to get them training, which, of course, is expensive and takes 

time out of their training. So we, too, are looking for opportunities 

to increase our training capability. 

As far as the issue of the Marines, we are working and 

partnering with our Marine brothers and sisters to best meet the 

demands should we have to do joint basing and look at those opportunities around. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General. 

Admiral Greenert, you were once stationed in Guam, so I am 

sure you are quite familiar with the region. 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, ma’am. Thank you for the question. 

First of all, we are quite pleased with the support we get in 

Guam for training. We have been training there for years. Our explosive ordnance disposal, our SEALs [Sea, Air, and Land], our 

maritime expeditionary support forces, our RIVRONs [Riverine 

Squadrons] all train there. And so I would say, for expeditionary 

warfare, it is hard to find a better site than the islands in and 

around Guam and the government of Guam’s support. 

Other training opportunities we have to continue to develop: missile defense. And, in this case, it is the Pacific Missile Range in 

Kauai. We have to continue to upgrade that and make sure that 
21 

it stays technologically in synchronization with the development of 

missile defense technologies that we have to test out. 

Acoustic training. Antisubmarine warfare is a skill set unique to 

us, and we have to dominate the undersea domain. And so, finding 

those ranges, whether it be ad hoc where we use our own, if you 

will, organic equipment or, if you will, instrumented range, those 

are our challenges, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral. 

And General Chiarelli. 

General CHIARELLI. Well, ma’am, as we all know, a majority of 

our training is in Korea and Hawaii. We were able to train at both 

locations. I recently toured Hawaii and the training facilities there. 

We work both environmental and cultural issues there. But have 

absolutely outstanding training facilities for the 25th and other visiting units. 

In addition to that, we have elements in Kwajalein that are able 

to do excellent missile defense training in that area. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, thank you very much, gentlemen. It is encouraging news. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Madeleine. 

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Breedlove, as you know, Robbins Air Force Base is the 

heart of my district, and Fort Benning is just to my west, Kings 

Bay to my east. The Marine Corps Logistics Base in Albany is also 

in Georgia. And I want to thank all of you for what you mean to 

my State. And I, for one, want to do anything and everything that 

I can to help you be successful in your job. 

With that said, I would like to just ask a simple question. And 

as I listen and watch the news, the thing that we keep coming back 

to with regard to inefficiencies, if you will, seems to be driven by 

uncertainty, not knowing what your budget number is going to be, 

whether it is going to be a flat line or a 3 percent up or a 3 percent 

down. 

Would you be better served if the difference was split and you 

knew exactly what it was going to be, than the inefficiencies of not 

knowing? Would you be better off if you knew you were going to 

have 1 percent less if you absolutely knew that you were going to 

have it? Could you accomplish more? 

General. 

General CHIARELLI. It is very, very difficult to do the work necessary to prepare a budget the size of the Army’s budget in the 

amount of time I fear we are going to have to be able to do that. 

It creates all kinds of inefficiencies that we worry about because so 

many of our programs are interrelated. 

I ran into a particular program while doing capability portfolio 

reviews where I had over 200 launchers but only 100 missiles, 

which made absolutely no sense. There was no one who planned to 

do that. And I am sure that something like that happens when you 

are forced at the last minute to put together all the documentation 

required to submit a budget without the appropriate time to do 

that in a very, very focused and correct way. 
22 

So it does make it more difficult, and I believe it generates inefficiencies. 

Admiral GREENERT. I would echo what General Chiarelli said. 

The mechanics of putting together a budget is extraordinary in the 

Navy and the Army, Marine Corps, Air Force. 

I would add that we need a strategy, you know, given a dollar 

value, even if it is a percentage, in my opinion, a strategy and guidance to deal with that change, be it up or be it down, I think is 

important, because that enables us to have a deliberate process 

that can be collaborative, and then we can pursue a joint or interagency solution, which tends to be more efficient than a rapid service-only kind of solution, which can be the manifestation of a short 

timeframe. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I would echo Admiral 

Greenert’s comments. I think if we had a clear strategy, with predictability with resources that would be available, we would be 

more efficient. 

General BREEDLOVE. I will pile on that remark. If we understood 

the strategy and the demand, that makes it easier for us to determine how to meet that demand. 

To your first point, Mr. Congressman, if we have a certain 

amount of budget cut, we can go to our force and constrict that 

force and maybe retain all of the different capabilities of that force. 

If the cut becomes so deep that you cannot find those efficiencies 

by taking portions of several capabilities, you may have to take an 

entire capability out in order to get to the deep savings that you 

need in depots, in modernization, in force structure and people and 

basing when you take an entire slice out. 

So understanding the depth of the problem up front allows us to 

make good decisions about how we would go after force structure 

as we are going to constrict. 

Mr. SCOTT. So if we did the budget on a 2-year basis, how much 

would that help, if you had a 24-month planning and execution 

timeline on the budget? 

General Breedlove. 

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, I will step up to that first. 

Any stability in these kind of budgets are helpful. In fact, when 

we look at how we buy in space and other large procurement programs, the ability to put stability into a purchasing program allows 

the subcontractors and others to predict and count on and then 

produce in good quantities. So stability in budget is always helpful 

as we plan for these types of things. 

Mr. SCOTT. Gentlemen, my time has expired, but thank you for 

being here, and thank you for what you do for our country. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Austin. 

The distinguished gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling 

this hearing. 

And, gentlemen, thanks for being here, and thanks for your service. 

Discussing this issue is always, I think, from my perspective, 

tenuous, because you don’t want to give too much information to 

those that are wanting to know exactly what our status is, but I 
23 

think it is very useful to us to be able to be in a position to see 

how we can best help, in terms of making each of the services 

ready and prepared for whatever challenge we have. 

My question is for General Chiarelli. And, you know, we have 

talked from time to time about the Army’s plans to ensure that our 

soldiers in the field have that communications network that they 

need and that they have come to rely on here in carrying out the 

fight in the 21st century. 

So perhaps I will start by asking you to tell us a little bit more 

about the Army’s network modernization strategy. And, most importantly, I think most of us are interested in, how is the Army 

prepared to stay ahead of the changes that technology makes literally every 6 months? 

General CHIARELLI. Well, sir, thank you for that question. 

We are very, very pleased in something I indicated in my opening statement, the network integration exercise that we just conducted out of Fort Bliss, Texas. For the very first time here in the 

United States, we had the entire network deployed across Fort 

Bliss and White Sands. And it was an amazing, amazing exercise 

where we were able to see for the first time how the network integrates and, in fact, do many of the integration challenges that commanders are going to have downrange. We will have that next exercise in October. 

We published a sources-sought document—and this is what I find 

very, very exciting—out to the industry where we and TRADOC 

[United States Army Training and Doctrine Command] had seen 

gaps in network capabilities. Within 30 days, we had 71 white papers come in, where industry had spent their own dime to put together products that fill those gaps. Many of them will be tested 

in October for the first time. This is noteworthy because, rather 

than using our R&D [Research and Development] money, industry 

has used theirs to bring to us products that they believe will fit the 

needs of the Army. 

We are pushing the network down to the tactical edge. And the 

network integration exercises to be conducted every 6 months at 

Fort Bliss are going to prove to be valuable—valuable to the 

COCOM commanders, to the warfighters, and, I believe, to the 

American taxpayers. 

Mr. REYES. In terms of this first test that occurred—and I say 

that because, you know, we have gone from the introduction of the 

iPhone to now the iPhone 4. And that is an example of how that 

technology evolves and changes so quickly. So how is the Army— 

I want to get back to the question of, how is the Army preparing 

itself to stay ahead of that curve? 

Because I don’t want to—the only thing I can relate this to is the 

B–52 bombers that were old when I was in Vietnam, and today we 

are still using them. Nothing against the B–52s, but in today’s 

world technology changes so fast that I think we are in the position 

to make sure that we at least keep up with it. 

General CHIARELLI. Well, we have done a couple of things. The 

first is to publish the first-ever operating environment, where we 

have set the left limits and the right limits of the Army’s network 

and asked industry to build within that left and right limit. If they 

don’t, we are not going to buy. 
24 

We have changed our acquisition strategy. We are going to only 

buy as many as we need. The tendency has always been in the 

Army to find something and buy one for everyone. That is not what 

we are going to do. In capabilities packages that go over 2-year periods, we are going to buy what we need and then look for changes 

in technology to provide to follow-on forces in successive capabilities packages. 

All this is possible because of the network integration exercises 

that we are doing at Fort Bliss. And I really think it is going to 

change the way the Army acquires, in so many different ways. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I would invite and the ranking member 

come out and see, perhaps in October, the test, the second test on 

that. It is really remarkable, the way that it has been integrated, 

and I think it is the way of the future. 

Mr. FORBES. We would like to do that. And we are planning right 

now some trips to our various yards to look at them, and maybe 

we can put that on the list. 

The distinguished gentleman from Mississippi is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Mr. Chairman, thank you for hosting this hearing 

today. 

And thank you to our witnesses for being here and for the service 

to our country. I appreciate it. 

Ensuring the readiness of our Nation and our ability to respond 

to global threats is one of my number-one priorities here in Congress. We are, no doubt, in a time of serious uncertainty when it 

comes to the national debt limit and the path forward. Some in 

Congress have suggested that cutting defense spending is an acceptable way to meet the goals of deficit reduction. I couldn’t disagree more with some of my colleagues that think of that. 

I have a few questions regarding our current issues of readiness. 

And if we have a little extra time, I would like to hear your 

thoughts about defense spending cuts. 

Admiral Greenert, I know the Navy has chosen to reduce the Marine Corps prepositioning stock in EUCOM [United States European Command]. Can you talk a little more about the decision to 

move two maritime prepositioning squadrons in the reserve status 

back to Jacksonville, Florida? 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, actually, Congressman, what I am familiar with is moving the maritime preposition squadron readiness 

to what we call the ROS–5 [Reduced Operating Status–5] status. 

I can speak to that. We did that in deliberation with the Marine 

Corps within the Department. 

There are three squadrons. The first two squadrons, which are 

very committed to a timeline to meet an operational plan requirement, that is on track. And the ROS–5, as we say, ready in 5 days, 

we view as an acceptable risk, again, in consultation with the Marine Corps. We have found that the Maritime Sealift Command has 

been very reliable in delivering in that ROS, be it ROS–5, –15, –30. 

And, again, after consultation and deliberations, we believe it is an 

acceptable risk. 
25 

The movement of squadrons back to Jacksonville, I will research 

that, and I will have to get back to you on the detail of those particular individual squadrons. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 93.] 

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay. Thank you. 

And I guess for General Dunford, with a smaller footprint, are 

we able to meet COCOM requirements? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, the primary purpose of maritime prepositioning is to meet the combatant commander’s operational plan requirements. Two squadrons would meet the old plan 

requirements. 

What is more important than the numbers of squadrons is the 

actual composition of the squadrons. And as long as the two remaining fully operational squadrons can carry about 80 percent of 

a Marine Expeditionary Brigade’s equipment, then I am comfortable that we can meet the combatant commander’s requirements with two squadrons. 

What you lose with the loss of a third squadron actually is the 

day-to-day support for theater security cooperation and phase-zero 

shaping operations in the other combatant commanders’ areas of 

operation. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Do you believe the current mix of equipment is correct? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, the equipment that we have 

aboard those ships right now are legacy construct. We are in the 

process, as I mentioned, of doing a detailed force structure review. 

Part of that detailed force structure review will take a look at what 

the organizational construct will be for the Marine Corps, and that 

will drive some changes in our equipment. 

So the current legacy squadrons are correct for today. We are 

going to make some changes to our tables of equipment, and that 

will incur some changes, as well, in the organizational construct of 

the squadrons. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Do you have any idea of what kind of financial 

commitment we would be looking at, to go from legacy to the new— 

what you envision the force going to? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I don’t have that available 

right now. We are in the process—this is a complicated issue. We 

are working with United States Transportation Command on some 

of the platforms that might be available, working very close with 

the Navy on the ships that would be available. And, of course, we 

are doing our own internal analysis on the actual equipment that 

we will require aboard those ships. 

So all that analysis will go on over the next several months. And 

I think, certainly, by the spring of next year, we will be prepared 

to come back and articulate the future of maritime prepositioning. 

Mr. PALAZZO. That is all I have. Thank you, gentlemen. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to all the witnesses for your testimony today. 
26 

Admiral Greenert, great to see you. Congratulations on the news 

that pretty soon—— 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. COURTNEY [continuing]. It will be ‘‘CNO’’ only in front of 

your name. 

And I wanted to ask you a couple questions. Mr. Forbes talked 

a little bit earlier about some of the speculation regarding aircraft 

carriers. One of the other sort of topics that has been out there, in 

terms of the budget pressures—in fact, I think it was General Cartwright gave a speech recently where he talked about the SSBN replacement program and possibly looking at alternatives, such as a 

stretch Virginia, which, superficially, seems to have some attraction. In fact, this committee looked at that concept last Congress. 

And, I mean, given the fact that it would require a smaller missile, ICBM, that is not built right now, and I think there are lots 

of other questions that the design of that vessel would generate in 

terms of complications and certainly potential costs, I was wondering if you had any comment regarding that speculation that, 

again, is in the press about that as an alternative, a cheaper alternative to the Ohio replacement. 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir. I know a little bit more about it 

than what you have read—you and I have read in the press. 

General Cartwright, I have a lot of respect for him and his vision, and so it is probably worthy to look into. But what we know 

about it, we looked at a Virginia, if you will, module as one of the 

alternatives. That was reviewed by the Defense Science Board. And 

the SSBN–X concept that we are preparing for today was the ultimate outcome of that. 

I think we have to look at the survivability of such a vessel, a 

Virginia, with that missile compartment, the range of a missile. A 

smaller missile might limit options. And those are all part and parcel for the key performance parameters of the overall system that, 

again, we would have to look into. 

And redesigning the missile will obviously add cost, rather than 

just using the D–5 missile, and that could change the balance. 

So all of those items would have to be looked at again, because 

I think they would play into bear on the affordability. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And, again, this is really a mission that really is 

a core strategic goal which the Nuclear Posture Review and Quadrennial Defense—I mean, really, it has just been across the board 

that this is something that we have to build into risk assessment 

in terms of having a sea-based deterrence. 

So, again, I think the Navy did a terrific job, in terms of bringing 

down the cost per vessel with that process that you just described. 

And I am sure there are going to be additional efforts to try and 

see if there are other ways to find savings. But that concept just 

seems like fraught with delay and costs that, again, I think could 

really just boomerang in terms of what, you know, people are trying to achieve. 

The other question I wanted to ask you was, when myself and 

Mr. Forbes and others were pushing to boost the shipbuilding program for Virginia a few years back, I mean, we were certainly looking at numbers at the time that mission requests from combatant 

commanders for submarine deployments was roughly about 50 per-
27 

cent, in terms of what was actually being met. And I think those 

were, like, 2009 figures. 

I was wondering, again, just sort of put it in context, in terms 

of where—your testimony today, in terms of where we are. Are we 

going up, down, in terms of that? Or is that percentage pretty 

much the same today? 

Admiral GREENERT. The percentage is, I would say, a little down. 

In other words, a number of years ago, the request by COCOM was 

19, and we were able to provide 11 based on force structure—or, 

earlier mentioned, 16 versus 10. And these are, as you know, SSN 

days, SSNs out there deployed. So that is the context of that. 

Now, as you well know, if you look at our ship inventory, when 

it comes to submarines, 48 is the number that we testified a need 

to. That is the requirement. And we won’t be able to meet that requirement through the years, which is why we are very focused on 

two Virginia-class submarines, a year to construction, to help meet 

that COCOM demand. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Great. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 

General Dunford, Mr. Rogers had a question. He had to leave to 

go to another hearing, but he wanted me to ask this question. If 

you were required to reduce your forces by 10,000 or more within 

the next 18 to 24 months, how would that impact the Marine 

Corps? 

General DUNFORD. Chairman, first of all, we are at 202,000 right 

now, and we still have many units that are well below the one-totwo deployment-to-dwell that General Chiarelli referred to earlier. 

So, until we draw down from Afghanistan, we can’t significantly reduce our overall end strength. 

And we would have to, when we do reduce our end strength, do 

so in a measured way, so as not to break faith with the Marines 

that have done so much over the past 10 years. And the numbers 

of Marines that we can draw down in any given year is directly related to the numbers of Marines we enlisted 4 years prior. 

So our number for planning, for example, is somewhere in the vicinity of 4,000 a year is the maximum number of Marines that can 

be drawn down in a given year. Some years, it is a little bit less. 

But, on average, our planning figure is we can draw down about 

4,000 Marines a year without breaking faith with Marines or their 

families. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. 

Admiral Greenert, I had another question for you regarding in 

the Air-Sea Battle concept. You know, we know that has been requested by Secretary Gates for, I think, over a year now. Any idea 

when we might be seeing that and how close we are to getting that 

out? 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The study, if you will, is in Mr. Panetta’s office—Secretary Panetta. We anticipate he will look at it soon, give his comments. And 

we look forward to being able to release appropriate aspects of it 

in unclassified and classified form as appropriate. We look forward 

to that. 

Mr. FORBES. So we think that is pretty close? 
28 

Admiral GREENERT. I hope so, sir. You know, we are focused on 

it. 

Mr. FORBES. And just a couple more questions. 

General Dunford and General Chiarelli, you both talked about 

the reset portion and how important that was to you. I think, General, you talked about $10 billion for the Army if—or how much 

was that for the Army? 

General CHIARELLI. We are looking at $25 billion to $20 billion. 

Mr. FORBES. Twenty-five-point—— 

General CHIARELLI. Twenty to $25 billion is going to be the total 

cost for reset—— 

Mr. FORBES. Twenty to $25 billion. 

General Dunford, I think you said 12. 

General DUNFORD. Chairman, that figure combined our reconstitution and our modernization, as well. We have requested in the 

2012 budget approximately $3 billion of reset. We have estimated 

that we will require an additional $5 billion of reset at the conclusion of hostilities, and need OCO funding for approximately 2 to 3 

years after coming out. And then what I added in to that $12 billion was actually our initial estimate of modernization of $5 billion. 

So that is how I got to approximately $12 billion. 

We did have some other resources that we requested in 2011. We 

have received those resources, and now we are currently analyzing 

our request for 2013. 

Mr. FORBES. For both of you, if budget cuts came down and impacted your ability on that reset, the dollars that you had, how 

would that impact your timeline capability of doing the reset that 

you need? 

General CHIARELLI. There are a number of answers to that question, sir. 

First of all, the bill doesn’t go away. And we have been counting 

on 2 to 3 years after the end of hostilities being able to get OCO 

money, because that is a true cost of war, to do that reset. 

One might look at this year’s reset budget and say, ‘‘Army, you 

have $775 million that you are not going to be able to execute.’’ 

That is correct, but that is because 41,000 pieces of equipment 

went into Afghanistan when we thought it was going to be coming 

back home to take care of the surge in Afghanistan. And, as you 

know, we make the estimates for reset 2 years before the money 

actually gets to us. So, when changes occur, we have to have the 

equipment back in the States to do the reset; if the equipment 

doesn’t come back, we can’t do the reset. That is why we have that 

additional money this year. 

But that don’t make the bill go away. That equipment is going 

to come back at some point in time, and when it does, it is going 

to have to be reset. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

General Dunford. 

General DUNFORD. Chairman, our total procurement account in 

the Marine Corps, it runs about $2 billion. It has been steady for 

about 20 years. During this FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], we are projected to be at a high of about $2.7 billion during 

the FYDP. 
29 

So you can see what a $5 billion reset would do to our modernization account. It would have a significantly adverse effect if 

we were forced to pay the reset bill out of our baseline budget. 

Quite frankly, we wouldn’t be able to get to where we need to get 

to along the timeline that we believe is critical. 

Mr. FORBES. And, Admiral Greenert, the last question I have for 

you. Going back to the numbers we were chatting about earlier on 

our shipbuilding plan, I think it would be fair to say that the Congress has been averaging about $15 billion over last three decades. 

This year, we put in $14.9 billion. 

As you know, CBO has come out with their report suggesting that, to follow your plan, you would need about $19 billion per 

year. I think some of your own figures—but I don’t want to throw 

these at you—show that we would need about $17.3 billion. But 

let’s just take the CBO figures. 

How realistic do you think it is, with the budgets that we are 

seeing and proposed cuts, that we are going to have those kind of 

increases going into the shipbuilding plan over the next several 

years? And if we can’t come up with a realistic scenario of getting 

those dollars, does that mean our shipbuilding plan is not a realistic plan? 

Admiral GREENERT. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I looked at the CBO 

report, and, as we know, the differences vary by year, if you will, 

by tranche of years. First 10 years, we are pretty close. It is about 

inflation indices, labor differences, cost differences, and, really, the 

foundation, if you will, or the assumptions put into the design of 

the ships. We vary slightly on what the future ship might look like. 

But, nonetheless, to get to your question at hand, if we receive a reduction of the ilk we were talking about, $886 billion, and we 

have to reduce force structure and we can’t build ships to the level 

that we need to, then our shipbuilding plan—it gets back to strategy. I would have to change the strategy. So, as stated by all our 

leadership, we need a change in strategy. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. 

Now, for any of our four witnesses, anything that we have left 

out that you want to get on the record? Anything you would like 

to change that you have stated? We want to make sure you have 

the time to do that. 

General Chiarelli, any last comments that you have for us? 

General CHIARELLI. Mr. Chairman, I can’t think of any. I think 

you have done a very, very good job of covering the waterfront, so 

to speak. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. Well, thank you, General. 

Admiral, anything? 

Admiral GREENERT. You covered our waterfront, as well, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Good, good. 

General Dunford. 

General DUNFORD. Chairman, I would just probably echo something that General Breedlove said earlier. I think all the witnesses 

today joined the military in the 1970s, and probably what we found 

when we joined was certainly what looked to me like a hollow force 

with regard to equipment readiness and training and so forth. And 

we very much appreciate your efforts to ensure that, when we do 

draw down a force and we do take a look at where reductions 
30 

might be taken in the budget, we do so in a measured way so that 

we don’t end up, at the end of the day, with a force that is hollow 

in the future. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. 

And General Breedlove. 

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, we just thank you for your stewardship 

of our military services. And if we do have to face the kind of budget cuts that we are hearing about, we look forward to being a partner with you to make sure that we get our forces right for the future. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

And I think, if you could just be patient, I think Ms. Bordallo has 

one last question. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I thought we might end on a positive note. And 

I would like to ask all of the witnesses, how do we build on the 

progress that each of you discussed in terms of retaining the very 

capable force that we have now? 

We will start with you, General. 

General CHIARELLI. Well, we can’t lose their trust. And that is 

absolutely critical. 

The Chief of Staff of the Army has a great picture where it shows 

a soldier who is talking into a microphone, a lieutenant out in the 

field. And we really don’t know what he is saying, but, as the chief 

often says, we are the only army in the world where, if he is asking 

for something, anything, he knows he is going to get it. 

And that is a level of trust we have with the soldiers of the 

United States Army. And we just need to make sure that, whatever 

we do, we never take away his ability and his belief that, if in combat he asks for it, he is going to get it, or she is going to get it. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Admiral. 

Admiral GREENERT. Very eloquently done by General Chiarelli. 

And I think he has hit a key part of it. Our sailors want to be challenged, and they want to feel that what they are doing is relevant. 

And they want to be—they need to be motivated, remain motivated. 

But the old saying in the Navy, I think, applies: You enlist the 

sailor; you reenlist the family. We have to be sure that our sailors 

believe that we will also take care of their families while they are 

away, deployed. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral. 

General. 

General DUNFORD. One of our commandant’s top priorities he describes is keeping faith with our Marines and their families. 

And I think there are two parts of that. The first is ensuring that 

if we are going to send them in harm’s way, they have the wherewithal to accomplish the mission with a minimal loss of life or 

equipment. 

And the other part is that when they are focused on the mission, 

they don’t have to look over their shoulder to see if they are wellsupported back home. They know, as General Chiarelli said, that 

they can trust that the United States Marine Corps is taking care 

of their family and their loved ones when they are forward deployed. 
31 

And I think those are the two key elements of maintaining a 

quality force in the future. 

Ms. BORDALLO. General. 

General BREEDLOVE. Thank you, ma’am. And I would echo a couple of the things my compatriots have already said. 

First of all, trust. And part of that trust is we don’t send American soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines to the battle with the second-best equipment or the second-best training. We have to continue to equip and train our force so that they can overcome anybody that gets in front of them. 

Second, again, is to challenge them. How do you train troops who 

are the most battle-tested we have ever had in our service? We 

have to continue to invest and to put our efforts toward giving 

them quality training that will not only prepare them for today’s 

fight but the future fight that may be very different than today’s. 

And then, finally, recognize their sacrifice and the sacrifices of 

their families as we go forward. 

Thank you, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I thank all of you gentlemen for the service that 

you have donated to our country. You have placed your entire life, 

your careers. And I think I join the—I am sure I join the Chairman 

in saying that we are tremendously proud of our men and women 

in the military service. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. We echo that. 

And, General Chiarelli, we will just tell to all four of you, it is 

the commitment of this subcommittee and this full committee that 

we are going to make sure that when those men and women are 

on that line and that microphone, that we are over here listening 

and making sure they get those resources. And thank you all for 

helping us do that. 

I now ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members 

be allowed to submit questions for the record for today’s hearing. 

Is there any objection? 

And, without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. FORBES. With that, thank you all so much. 

And we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JULY 26, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 26, 2011 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JULY 26, 2011 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO 

Admiral GREENERT. The Mediterranean-based Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 

(MPSRON 1) will be relocated to the U.S. East Coast. Bids for layberths have yet 

to be sought, but the Blount Island Command in Jacksonville, FL, is one of many 

potential layberths on the East Coast being considered. The vessels do not have to 

be consolidated in a single homeport. 

The two other MPSRONs, based in the Pacific Ocean, meet all OPLAN and 

CONPLAN time requirements. [See page 25.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 26, 2011 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. The QDR Independent Review Panel supported an increased force 

structure in both the NORTHCOM and PACOM areas of responsibility. We seem 

to be headed in a different direction. So, how do we balance a future smaller force 

to meet the increased needs in these and other areas? 

General CHIARELLI. Anticipated reductions of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan will 

enable us to restore our strategic depth and allow us to meet other security obligations by reapportioning available forces to meet the current strategic guidance. Reducing the numbers of deployed forces will result in increased presence and activity 

at CONUS and OCONUS basing locations. This more stable force will be able to 

return to predictable training programs to prepare for full spectrum operations 

thereby placing increased requirements on our current facilities but resulting in better prepared forces to meet Combatant Commander (COCOM) requirements. These 

theaters do retain important capabilities and enablers. More effective force structure 

can be realized from the continued transformation of Headquarters (HQs) when appropriate and reallocation of selected enablers to the global force pool. The end state 

is increased capability the Army can provide to the COCOMs in support of full spectrum operations. Total Army Analysis for Fiscal Years 2014–2018 is currently ongoing and will enable the Army to provide the correct mix of organizations required 

to maintain a balanced and affordable force that is able to meet COCOM requirements. 

Mr. FORBES. The budget cited numerous ‘‘efficiencies’’ found in reductions to personnel through defunding civilian positions associated with insourcing initiatives 

and instituting a hiring freeze. Similarly, the Committee has received reprogramming requests that cite further savings in the reduction of contracted work. Where 

are we accepting risk by reducing contractors and civilian workers while undertaking large reductions in force structure? 

General CHIARELLI. At this time, the Army is confident it is taking the necessary 

steps to mitigate the potential risks associated with reductions in the contractor and 

civilian workforce. Through a deliberate process, the Army works with commanders 

to right-size the civilian and contractor workforce and ensure there is no reduction 

in the level of services provided for soldiers and families. As force structure is reduced, we will make appropriate adjustments so that the workload and the work 

force remain balanced. 

Mr. FORBES. Please update the subcommittee on your Service’s efforts to reset the 

force. What are the impacts of a delayed and/or scaled-down reset and reconstitution 

(R2) effort? How would such a reduction affect your mission capability? Are current 

OMB guidelines on modernization through reset too restrictive? 

General CHIARELLI. Since the Reset Program began in 2002, we have Reset over 

2.5 million pieces of equipment and, on average, 25 brigade sets of equipment annually. As a result of these efforts, our operational readiness rates of equipment in theater has generally met or exceeded 90 percent ground equipment and 75 percent 

aviation equipment. To date in Fiscal Year 2011, the Army has Reset over 80,000 

pieces of equipment at the depot level and over 500,000 pieces of equipment (e.g., 

small arms, Night Vision Devices, and chemical and biological protective items) 

through our Special Repair Teams. A scaled down Reset effort would cause the 

Army to experience a decline in the aggregate number of trained and ready combat 

capable formations to respond to any unforeseen contingency operations. Additionally, it would disrupt the current pace of equipment Reset at our national maintenance facilities. 

There is no degradation in equipment readiness attributable to current Office of 

Management and Budget Reset guidelines. 

Mr. FORBES. What are the long-term strategic implications to the force of providing ready deployed and deploying forces at the expense of non-deployed units? 

General CHIARELLI. The high demand for forces over the course of the last decade 

has created a situation where the Army has to shift resources from the generating 

force to the operating force in order to maintain our required levels of manning for 

deploying units. From FY08–FY11, non-deployable Soldier rates have increased approximately two percent each year, with the current non-deployable rate just over 
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16% of the active force. Of that percentage, 11,000 Soldiers are in the Disability 

Evaluation System (DES) with approximately 7,000 in the operating force and 1,900 

currently assigned to units with a Latest Arrival Date (LAD). To ensure deploying 

units meet the deployment criteria at 90 percent available strength at departure for 

deployment, Human Resources Command (HRC) must over-man deploying units to 

ensure the deployment manning criteria is met. Non-deploying formations have reduced levels to provide the needed Soldiers. This impacts the ability of the Army 

to generate enough manpower to fill a deploying unit prior to participation in critical Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MREs) which usually occurs within 90 days prior 

to deployment. Consequently units are not as highly trained on collective tasks because all unit members did not participate in the MRE. Additionally, meeting administrative requirements and making up individual training for late arriving Soldiers places an additional burden on small unit leaders during a time when their 

focus should be on preparing the unit for deployment. 

The Army has also decremented the generating force to ensure our war fighting 

units are manned at an acceptable level for deployment in support of the full range 

of operations. If projected demand reduces in parallel with the reduction in Army 

force size and structure, the long-term strategic implications are more manageable. 

However, if the future demand exceeds future supply, the Army will continue to 

have difficulty maintaining those institutions that facilitate unit deployments and 

provide for the professional development and training of our force. 

Mr. FORBES. To the extent possible in open session, please describe the impacts 

that any equipment shortages have had on full spectrum training? 

General CHIARELLI. Equipment shortages do adversely impact full spectrum training. We know that 55% of units in the Army have less than 80% fill across their 

authorized equipment sets. It has been a number of years since our Brigade Combat 

Teams have had enough dwell between deployments that they could focus on anything other than the counter-insurgency training necessary for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result we have not had the benefit of unit commander’s 

feedback to fully understand the second order impacts to full spectrum training. 

In the aggregate, the Army can provide most major systems (combat vehicles such 

as tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, tactical wheeled vehicles, howitzers, weapons, etc); however, we continue to work through modernization issues (most notably 

C4ISR/network-related shortfalls) and selected shortages of low density but nonetheless important equipment like specific types of tool sets and test equipment, armored ambulances, etc. These shortfalls continue to adversely impact full spectrum 

training, and the Army expects that these impacts will become more apparent as 

more and more units are able to conduct full spectrum training. At the same time, 

the Army is now delivering much of what the Army invested in during the past five 

years; this, coupled with the reduction in numbers of Army units deployed in the 

CENTCOM area, should enable the Army to continue to make steady progress in 

improving our equipment on hand posture across the Army to support full spectrum 

training. 

Mr. FORBES. How are you adapting to budgetary reduction in FY 2011? What 

challenges would you experience should additional cuts be levied against you? 

General CHIARELLI. With the Army still heavily engaged in operations in Afghanistan and to a lesser degree in Iraq, the $5.7 billion reduction to our FY 2011 budget 

request required us to take a hard look at balancing what is required for meeting 

our current national security obligations while reducing risk to support future contingencies. The Army was able to adapt to some of the FY2011 budgetary reductions 

by leveraging previous efficiency efforts such as reducing reliance on service support 

contractors and reducing civilian personnel to FY10 levels. However, the majority 

of the FY 2011 reductions occurred in the Research, Development and Acquisition 

appropriations. The Army was able to work closely with congressional committees 

to identify areas with the lowest risk and greatest flexibility to absorb reductions 

and deferrals but these changes will still affect the delivery of capabilities in the 

future years. 

Additional reductions to the FY 2012 and 2013 budgets will require the Army to 

bring down manpower, readiness and procurement accounts in a balanced way to 

avoid creating hollowness in this force. Significant reductions would be extraordinarily difficult and impact nearly every Army equity, program and community. We 

must maintain faith with our Soldiers, Families and Civilians while meeting our 

critical modernization needs, resetting the force through our depot maintenance and 

sustainment operations and taking care of the behavioral health needs of our force. 

Mr. FORBES. The Army recently alerted this committee to roughly $751 million 

in excess reset funding due to improved condition of returning equipment, retention 

of equipment in Iraq for risk mitigation, and to accommodate growth of theater provided equipment (TPE) sets. How confident are you about your FY12 reset forecast? 
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When does the ‘‘bow wave’’ of TPE reset hit? How are we leveling workload to ensure capacity across this trough for the coming wave? What happens if we stay in 

Iraq at their request beyond December 2011? 

General CHIARELLI. The $751M excess in FY11 was a result of the late return of 

equipment from Iraq due to combatant commander risk mitigation. TPE in Iraq was 

retained beyond unit redeployment dates in order to ensure immediate equipment 

availability if a temporary troop increase was required to react to a crisis. 

Based on current National Strategy, the Army is confident that we have requested 

adequate funding for our FY12 Reset requirements. The Army estimates that the 

‘‘bow wave’’ of TPE Reset for Operation New Dawn will occur between FY12 and 

FY14. Another ‘‘bow wave’’ will occur upon conclusion of operations in Afghanistan. 

We have the capacity and flexibility within our Industrial Base, both organic and 

private industry, to adjust to equipment Reset requirements as the operational system dictates. Additionally, a portion of our equipment Reset is completed by our 

units and our installations. 

Any delay in return of equipment from Iraq beyond December of 2011 will result 

in an adjustment for future year Reset funding as our Reset requirements and liability is delayed further into the out years for execution. 

Mr. FORBES. LTG Stevenson testified earlier this year that the Army’s reset liability is around $10 billion and will take about 2–3 years to complete after major operations in CENTCOM end. What impact would significant reductions in budget authority such as the Senate’s ‘‘Gang of Six’’ $866 billion proposed cut have on Army 

reset and its readiness assuming ‘‘persistent engagement’’ bendy OEF/OND? How 

would it impact depots, arsenals, and ammo plants? 

General CHIARELLI. Loss of Reset buffer of 2–3 years beyond the end of operations 

will result in difficult choices for the Army. The Army will likely be forced to decrement funding of essential equipment repair, training, Soldier services, and similar 

Army programs. 

The impact to arsenals, depots, and ammunition plants is equally significant. Adverse impacts could include civilian workforce reductions, dormant repair and production lines, reduced throughput, and decreasing equipment readiness. 

Mr. FORBES. The QDR Independent Review Panel supported an increased force 

structure in both the NORTHCOM and PACOM areas of responsibility. We seem 

to be headed in a different direction. So, how do we balance a future smaller force 

to meet the increased needs in these and other areas? 

Admiral GREENERT. Navy must address several competing demands with the current force, which we adjudicate through the Global Force Management (GFM) Process. This process, led by the Office of SECDEF and Joint Staff, decides how to allocate operating ships and aircraft among the six regional Combatant Commanders 

based on the Guidance of Employment of the Force (GEF). 

Today, Navy is meeting the JCS-directed (via GFM) Combatant Commander 

needs. We don’t have the capacity, though, to meet all unrestrained Combatant 

Commander requests for forces. 

Looking forward, our current shipbuilding and aviation plans balance the anticipated future demand for naval forces with expected resources. With anticipated 

funding being flat or declining in the future, we focus our investments to ensure 

the battle force has the capability for Navy’s core missions with the capacity to be 

present forward in the most critical regions. At the same time, our plans take into 

account the importance of maintaining an adequate national shipbuilding design 

and industrial base. 

Assuming Navy forces will continue to be allocated by the GFM process to Combatant Commanders, the investment choices we make today will either enable or 

constrain what will be available. Given the potential for dramatic fiscal reduction, 

we need a comprehensive strategic review that takes a fundamental look at what 

we are asking our forces to do in an era of constrained resources. If Navy force 

structure is significantly reduced, a review is recommended in order to meet the 

global force management plan today and balance the needs of tomorrow. 

Mr. FORBES. The budget cited numerous ‘‘efficiencies’’ found in reductions to personnel through defunding civilian positions associated with insourcing initiatives 

and instituting a hiring freeze. Similarly, the Committee has received reprogramming requests that cite further savings in the reduction of contracted work. Where 

are we accepting risk by reducing contractors and civilian workers while undertaking large reductions in force structure? 

Admiral GREENERT. In-sourcing is one of the tools the DoN and DoD will use to 

establish the appropriate mix of military, civilian, and contractor employees in our 

workforce to affordably accomplish its roles and missions. In addition to having the 

right skill set, our workforce must also be appropriately sized with the appropriate 
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skill set. We are eliminating some civilian positions and reducing new hires to gain 

efficiencies and reduction in overhead. This reduces the number of overall positions 

we will in-source but balances the skill set, alleviating redundancy. The Department 

of the Navy is currently monitoring the impact of these reductions from FY11 and 

will continue doing so in FY12. 

Mr. FORBES. Please update the subcommittee on your Service’s efforts to reset the 

force. What are the impacts of a delayed and/or scaled-down reset and reconstitution 

(R2) effort? How would such a reduction affect your mission capability? Are current 

OMB guidelines on modernization through reset too restrictive? 

Admiral GREENERT. Navy is different in some respects from other Services in that 

we ‘‘reset in stride’’; that is, we rely upon regular, rotationally scheduled maintenance of our ships and aircraft, and training and certification of our crews between 

deployments, to sustain the long-term material condition of our force. Our Navy’s 

reset in stride, when executed properly, translates into decades of assured service 

for each ship and aircraft, a good return on investment. This reset is intended to 

be funded every year, as opposed to only during a reset and reconstitution effort 

after contingency operations. As such, it should eventually be part of our baseline 

funding. Navy platforms will not reach Expected Service Life if OCO funding is not 

aligned with contingency operations, enabling ‘‘reset in stride.’’ 

For expeditionary equipment used in operations ashore in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

it is estimated to take approximately two years to complete depot maintenance 

reset; the equipment will be reset after contingency operations are complete. Most 

expeditionary equipment is used for contingency operations, so maintenance is funded with OCO appropriations. If contingency operations cease without OCO funding 

for reset, expeditionary equipment readiness will be severely impacted. 

Navy does not deem current OMB guidelines on modernization through reset to 

be overly restrictive. 

Mr. FORBES. What are the long-term strategic implications to the force of providing ready deployed and deploying forces at the expense of non-deployed units? 

Admiral GREENERT. To pay for ‘‘ready deployed’’ readiness expenses that are 

emergent or unplanned, we sometimes are compelled to reduce operating funding 

for non-deployed units to assure readiness of deployed forces. From a strategic perspective, this affects Navy’s ability to support surge requirements. From a force provider perspective, this tends to reduces non-deployed maintenance and training 

funding as forces prepare to re-deploy to meet emergent requirements (deployed). 

This makes it difficult to maintain (long-term) the material readiness of the force, 

and in some cases requires us to tailor training and certification of deploying units 

to ‘‘mission-specific’’ qualifications, instead of the full spectrum of naval operations. 

In addition, reduced time non-deployed is a stress on our Sailors and Families. 

Mr. FORBES. To the extent possible in open session, please describe the impacts 

that any equipment shortages have had on full spectrum training? 

Admiral GREENERT. With one exception, Navy training has not been impacted by 

equipment shortages. The exception is in Navy P–3 squadrons, where wing fatigue 

life required the grounding of approximately one-third of the aircraft fleet. This has 

required mission-tailored training for deploying aircrews due to training aircraft 

availability. The corrective action is well underway and currently ahead of schedule. 

Mr. FORBES. How are you adapting to budgetary reduction in FY 2011? What 

challenges would you experience should additional cuts be levied against you? 

Admiral GREENERT. In FY11, budget constraints inherent in the ongoing Continuing Resolution required the Navy to freeze new civilian hiring, limit some support functions, and adjust the schedules of some procurement contracts. We also 

identified efficiencies to reduce overhead costs—the impact of which we are still assessing. 

In FY12 and beyond, there are no obvious programs or activities in which to make 

further efficiency reductions, pending additional analysis and internal policy change. 

In the FY12 budget Navy proposes to cut overhead to reinvest in our ability to provide forces. It would be imprudent to make further overhead reductions without first 

evaluating the impact of these cuts. 

Mr. FORBES. At one time we relied heavily upon the Navy and Air Force to provide individual augmentees to meet ground force requirements in CENTCOM. What 

is that level of dependence now and how has the long-term use of sailors and airmen 

to meet ground force requirements impacted the readiness of the Navy and Air 

Force? 

Admiral GREENERT. The Joint force still depends on Individual Augmentee (IA) 

Sailors to meet evolving ground force requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan as these 

conflicts have progressed through various phases. The Navy provides over half of 

its IA support in core Navy skill areas, such as cargo handling, airlift support, and 

Seabees. As of 01 September approximately 4,800 Sailors were serving in these 
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‘‘core’’ missions. Navy also provides approximately 4,100 Sailors for a range of ‘‘noncore’’ missions, such as provincial reconstruction, detainee operations, civil affairs, 

and customs inspection. The Joint sourcing process to meet both ‘‘core’’ and ‘‘noncore’’ requirements is deliberate and currently focused on reducing IA requirements 

without unduly increasing the risk to mission success. 

Navy’s FY12 end strength anticipates a phased reduction in IA demand for Iraq 

and Afghanistan. Should IA demand remain at current levels or increase, we will 

be challenged to meet manning requirements for the Fleet. 

Mr. FORBES. The QDR Independent Review Panel supported an increased force 

structure in both the NORTHCOM and PACOM areas of responsibility. We seem 

to be headed in a different direction. So, how do we balance a future smaller force 

to meet the increased needs in these and other areas? 

General DUNFORD. Tomorrow’s Marine Corps, though smaller than the force conducting current overseas contingency operations, is not simply a reduced version of 

today’s Marine Corps nor is it a reversion to the pre-9/11 posture. The imperative 

for the Marine Corps is to preserve capabilities developed since 9/11, expand our engagement efforts, respond to crisis, and still be able to project power for the most 

dangerous threat scenarios. To that end, we accept a degree of risk by reducing our 

active component capacity for conducting multiple, major sustained operations 

ashore, relying on an ‘‘operationalized’’ reserve component to mitigate that risk. Of 

necessity, our force structure represents many judiciously considered factors and 

makes pragmatic trade-offs in capabilities and capacities to achieve a posture that 

creates opportunity and provides an operational stance that enables flexibility and 

rapid response. The resulting force structure provides a force optimized for forwardpresence, which facilitates both ongoing engagement activities and rapid crisis response; provides readiness for immediate deployment and employment; re-shapes organizations, capabilities, and capacities to increase aggregate utility and flexibility 

across the range of military operations; properly balances critical capabilities and 

enablers; creates an operationalized reserve; and creates opportunity for more closely integrated operations with our Navy, Special Operations, and inter-agency partners. 

We will use a conditions based approach to enable tomorrow’s Marine Corps. As 

our forces draw down in Afghanistan, we will reorganize over time to the 186.8K 

structure. Although we will be smaller than today’s force, we will ensure a robust 

forward presence in PACOM through a mix of forward deployed forces and a restart 

of the unit deployment program. 

Mr. FORBES. The budget cited numerous ‘‘efficiencies’’ found in reductions to personnel through defunding civilian positions associated with insourcing initiatives 

and instituting a hiring freeze. Similarly, the Committee has received reprogramming requests that cite further savings in the reduction of contracted work. Where 

are we accepting risk by reducing contractors and civilian workers while undertaking large reductions in force structure? 

General DUNFORD. In meeting the Secretary’s (SECDEF) efficiency initiatives the 

Marine Corps is heavily engaged in many efforts aimed at improving our 

warfighting business operations. A thorough assessment of civilian labor across the 

Marine Corps, to include contractors, is one of the major actions the Commandant 

of the Marine Corps has undertaken to achieve efficiencies throughout the Marine 

Corps. To support this effort the Marine Corps implemented an enterprise wide 

freeze on all internal and external hiring actions for all appropriated fund positions 

back in December 2010. This action was designed to assist Headquarters Marines 

Corp activities and commands across the Corps in reconciling their current civilian 

workforce against manpower requirements and budgetary constraints. While hiring 

has resumed for some activities and commands, hiring actions will continue to be 

closely scrutinized to ensure requirement are balanced against fiscal constraints. To 

complement these efforts the Marine Corps has reduced personnel associated with 

infrastructure and headquarters support activities, with particular emphasis on duplicative functions across the enterprise. This reduction in ‘‘tail’’ functions and activities will allow rebalancing towards ‘‘tooth’’ functions and activities, thus sustaining the Marines Corps war fighting priorities. Additionally, the Marine Corps 

reduced civilian billets programmed for the future as a result of insourcing initiatives in order to meet reduced funding levels. While the Marine Corps is accepting 

risk in some of its management and oversight functions, the on-going strategic review of civilian and contractor requirements will allow the Marine Corps to mitigate 

that risk by rebalancing its civilian workforce based on validated requirements at 

all levels and functions across from an enterprise perspective. 

Mr. FORBES. Please update the subcommittee on your Service’s efforts to reset the 

force. What are the impacts of a delayed and/or scaled-down reset and reconstitution 
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(R2) effort? How would such a reduction affect your mission capability? Are current 

OMB guidelines on modernization through reset too restrictive? 

General DUNFORD. The Marine Corps has been planning a methodical reset of 

equipment from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) while simultaneously 

executing Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) reset actions. This month marks the 

end of successfully resetting equipment that returned from OIF. Planning efforts for 

resetting equipment returning from OEF began early this year with a symposium 

to capture lessons learned from the draw dawn and reset of equipment deployed to 

OIF. The Commandant of the Marine Corps completed a Force Structure Review to 

realign personnel, and equipment structure to meet the requirements of the modern 

post-OEF Middleweight Force. A series of planning conferences have been conducted 

to refine our plans for redeployment and retrograde out of Afghanistan to leverage 

resources to enable an in-stride reset and reconstitute the force. The planning actions over the past year have enabled the Marine Corps to draft a strategic-level 

OEF Ground Equipment Reset Strategy scheduled for release in October, 2011. As 

an enabler to Reset and Reconstitution, the Marine Corps will publish an OEF 

Reset Playbook that will synthesize our reset actions across the tactical, operational, 

and strategic levels in order to reconstitute to the Middleweight Force. 

A delayed and/or scaled down reset and reconstitution effort will result in persistent equipment and training shortfalls for a significant part of the Marine Corps. 

These shortfalls would require the Marine Corps to emphasize readiness for deployed and next-to-deploy units at the expense of the non-deployed force. The inability to properly resource non-deployed combat units to high levels of readiness would 

compel the Marine Corps to further adopt a form of ‘‘cyclical readiness’’ rather than 

steady force-wide readiness. 

A scaled down reset and reconstitution effort would negatively impact the Marine 

Corps’ capacity to respond to unexpected crises or contingencies with non-deployed 

forces. Since a degraded non-deployed force would likely respond to an emergent crisis or contingency operation, the employing Combatant Commander loses depth, 

flexibility, and responsiveness for the unexpected. The strategic implication is increased time to respond to unexpected crises or large-scale contingencies. 

OMB has been supportive of the Marine Corps buying the latest versions of equipment to replace equipment losses from OEF. However, based on the current restrictions for spending reset funding, the Marine Corps is restricted from resetting aging 

equipment used for training our forces at home station. Thus, operational units preparing for deployment using equipment sets (e.g. Mojave Viper) for training do not 

meet the OMB criteria. We believe these equipment sets should be included in reset 

funding requests. 

Mr. FORBES. What are the long-term strategic implications to the force of providing ready deployed and deploying forces at the expense of non-deployed units? 

General DUNFORD. The non-deployed force provides the Nation depth and responsiveness for the unexpected. The long-term strategic implications of underfunding 

non-deployed units are: 

• Increased risk in the timely execution of unexpected crises or large-scale contingencies 

• Increased risk in the successful execution of a military response to unexpected crises or large-scale contingencies at tolerable cost in American lives 

and materiel 

• Increased risk in achieving a successful strategic outcome to the crisis or contingency; the larger the crisis or contingency, the greater the risk 

This question infers the long-term strategic implications of tiered readiness. 

Tiered readiness is the deliberate attrition of the non-deployed force’s combat capability and deployability in favor of sourcing planned rotational requirements; readiness is optimized for a known deployment. 

The major shortcoming with tiered readiness is meeting known, planned requirements is only one facet of readiness; the ability to respond to crises and contingencies with the non-deployed force is also important—something tiered readiness 

fails to properly take into account. Congress requires the Marine Corps to be most 

ready when the Nation is generally least ready. Tiered readiness is at odds with 

this mandate. The Marine Corps will leverage its non-deployed forces and task organize to meet crises and contingencies. 

Mr. FORBES. To the extent possible in open session, please describe the impacts 

that any equipment shortages have had on full spectrum training? 

General DUNFORD. The Marine Corps’ training is focused on preparing forces for 

counterinsurgency operations (COIN) in Afghanistan. In pre-deployment training, 

we strive to provide the same equipment that our Marines will use in theater. While 

there have been equipment shortages in both home station and at Service level 
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training locations, these deficiencies have not significantly impacted our ability to 

meet pre-deployment training requirements. Our equipment shortages reside in the 

following areas: 1) Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C–IED) equipment; 2) 

Command and Control (C2) equipment; and 3) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 

and other sensor systems. 

CIED Equipment: Effective C–IED operations require unique skill sets that are 

first developed through a progressively-challenging training program that encompasses individual and collective skill development at all levels of leadership. Examples of this highly specialized equipment include IED detection kits, metal detectors, 

counter-radio controlled IED electronic warfare systems (CREW) and C–IED training lanes. The majority of these systems are fielded to support operational requirements in theater. To mitigate the finite amount of systems available for training, 

we provide support for standardized, home station training to the operating forces 

on all bases including equipment and technical expertise, as well as support for institutional pre-deployment exercises such as Enhanced Mojave Viper. Once deployed, Marines continue to train in order sustain their CIED skill-sets and integrate any newly fielded systems—often incorporating immediate lessons learned. 

Training and Education Command currently has personnel forward deployed to ensure this in-theater sustainment training and the lessons learned are institutionalized. Additionally, our Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory is working with the 

Joint IED Defeat Office to further update equipment and mitigate any shortfalls. 

C2 Equipment: Units deploying to Afghanistan are directed to maintain specific 

C2 systems while in theater and to incorporate these systems into pre-deployment 

training. Due to technological advances, many of these systems are fielded rapidly 

to support operational requirements and most of the equipment resides in country. 

To mitigate the finite amount of systems available for training, we maintain 

MAGTF Integrated Systems Training Centers (MISTCs) at all major Marine Corps 

Bases. The MISTCs provide standardized, home station training to the operating 

forces on multiple C2 systems. Additionally, many of the C2 system program initiatives allocate funding for Field Service Representatives (FSRs) from respective companies to both train Marines and provide on-site technical support. 

UAV/Sensor Systems: Much like C3 equipment, UAV and other sensor systems 

have been fielded rapidly, resulting in shortages of systems available at home-station. We alleviate our shortages through collaborative training with other Services 

and use of simulators. Units are also augmented with appropriate contracted field 

support from FSRs in Afghanistan. 

Mr. FORBES. How are you adapting to budgetary reduction in FY 2011? What 

challenges would you experience should additional cuts be levied against you? 

General DUNFORD. The Marine Corps maintains a long-standing reputation in the 

Department of Defense as being a frugal, lean Service that delivers the best value 

for the defense dollar. As such, the Marine Corps has adapted to budgetary reductions by continuing our tradition of pursuing ways to streamline operations, identifying efficiencies, and reinvesting savings in order to get the most out of every dollar. It is this mentality that has allowed us to continue to provide the best trained 

and equipped Marine units to Afghanistan, even in this era of constrained resources. 

The Marine Corps recognizes the fiscal realities that currently confront the 

United States, and we are already making hard choices inside the Service and ensuring that we ask only for what we need as opposed to what we may want. The 

Marine Corps is currently taking steps to rebalance the force while simultaneously 

posturing it for the future; additionally, we are continuing to maintain our forward 

presence and provide Marine combat forces to Afghanistan. We understand that the 

nation will face difficult resource decisions in the future, and additional cuts will 

impact the manner in which we address the challenges presented by an uncertain 

and ever-changing world. As such, the Marine Corps will resource the appropriate 

capabilities to remain the nation’s expeditionary middleweight force and has a well 

analyzed plan for the reset and reconstitution of equipment which has been severely 

used during the last decade of war. Commensurate with our responsibility to maintain warfighting readiness, we must ensure that we keep faith with our Marines 

and their families. Additional budgetary reductions will influence our ability to accomplish all of these objectives while simultaneously continuing to conduct combat 

operations in Afghanistan. Accordingly, such budget reductions will result in increased risk, requiring careful consideration to ensure we maintain an effective and 

efficient force capable of providing operational reach and agility during times of 

crisis. 
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Mr. FORBES. The QDR Independent Review Panel supported an increased force 

structure in both the NORTHCOM and PACOM areas of responsibility. We seem 

to be headed in a different direction. So, how do we balance a future smaller force 

to meet the increased needs in these and other areas? 

General BREEDLOVE. The Air Force will carefully enhance and modernize the capabilities of our legacy and fifth generation aircraft so as to balance our ability to 

meet the increased needs and Combatant Commander (COCOM) requirements within NORTHCOM and PACOM. The Air Force will continue to participate in the Department’s Global Defense Posture discussions and will support the integrated process through which the Department validates and prioritizes defense posture initiatives and implementation. We will continue to work closely with the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, other Services, and the COCOMSs as part of 

the ongoing Department of Defense Comprehensive Review to ensure our force 

structure is consistent with and fully advances U.S. National Security Strategy and 

National Defense Strategy objectives. In the face of an increasingly austere defense 

funding environment, the Comprehensive Review will guide future force structure 

decisions based upon sound strategy development. You can be assured the Air Force 

will endeavor to field the most capable force available, within size and funding constraints, to meet the requirements of the Joint warfighter, while balancing risk 

across the spectrum of operations. 

Mr. FORBES. The budget cited numerous ‘‘efficiencies’’ found in reductions to personnel through defunding civilian positions associated with insourcing initiatives 

and instituting a hiring freeze. Similarly, the Committee has received reprogramming requests that cite further savings in the reduction of contracted work. Where 

are we accepting risk by reducing contractors and civilian workers while undertaking large reductions in force structure? 

General BREEDLOVE. We accepted risk in overhead and support services to ensure 

risks are reduced across mission capabilities and readiness, i.e. moving resources 

from tail to tooth. The contract efficiencies are aimed at reducing the Department’s 

reliance on contract services. These reductions include service support contracts, 

knowledge based services, acquisition program overhead, and contractor supported 

studies. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense efficiency objectives limits Air Force civilian 

growth above fiscal year 2010 levels. The Air Force is minimizing potential risk by 

conducting a highly-focused, strategic review of our entire workforce. We are reviewing all core functions and assessing trade-offs, to include reevaluating in-sourcing 

plans and implementing hiring controls to rebalance the workforce within existing 

resources. This review is also focused on reducing manpower in overhead and support functions to realign dollars and manpower to the most critical force structure 

and mission needs. Specific adjustments will be programmed as we work through 

our FY13 President’s Budget. The Air Force will continue to reassess the need for 

additional steps to achieve necessary civilian workforce levels while minimizing the 

impact on current personnel. 

Mr. FORBES. Please update the subcommittee on your Service’s efforts to reset the 

force. What are the impacts of a delayed and/or scaled-down reset and reconstitution 

(R2) effort? How would such a reduction affect your mission capability? Are current 

OMB guidelines on modernization through reset too restrictive? 

General BREEDLOVE. There are no immediate impacts of a delayed and/or scaled 

down reset and reconstitution effort to the Air Force. The Air Force R2 is structured 

and calendar driven. Aircraft and engines are continuously returned to meet regularly scheduled depot maintenance. For vehicles and support equipment, when the 

mission is complete a majority of these assets will remain in theater, with the exception of special purpose vehicles and generators which return to depot as needed. 

A reduction in overseas contingency operations funding will impact the Air Force’s 

ability to meet future requirements. 

Current Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidelines on modernization 

reset are not too restrictive. There are no immediate operational aircraft or equipment shortfalls due to current OMB guidelines; however, stressed fleets due to high 

operations tempo are accelerating service life, and mitigation strategies require 

longer-term investments. 

Mr. FORBES. What are the long-term strategic implications to the force of providing ready deployed and deploying forces at the expense of non-deployed units? 

General BREEDLOVE. The Air Force established a predictable, standardized battle 

rhythm to ensure rotational forces are organized, trained, equipped, and ready to 

respond to combatant commanders’ requests for forces. Using a rotational construct, 

each unit undergoes a period of reconstitution before entering another deployment 

vulnerability period. When combatant commander requirements exceed the forces 

available in the vulnerability period, the Air Force either reduces the reconstitution 
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period of ‘‘non-deployed’’ units or selects individuals from organizations with no designated combat capability (e.g., those who fulfill Air Force-level organize, train, and 

equip Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E) responsibilities). 

Continued periods of reduced reconstitution have long-term effects on unit readiness and affect the health and welfare of Airmen and their families. Additionally, 

sustained deployment of over 20 percent of our individual Airmen from organizations with Service-level OT&E responsibilities will reduce our ability to sustain operations and provide ready, trained, and equipped Airmen for future engagements. 

Mr. FORBES. To the extent possible in open session, please describe the impacts 

that any equipment shortages have had on full spectrum training? 

General BREEDLOVE. Ongoing operations continue to pose a challenge to Air Force 

equipment and supplies. Overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding has been 

instrumental in avoiding shortfalls and maintaining critical capabilities for our 

Joint force commanders. 

The Air Force is currently experiencing a shortage of advanced targeting pods 

(ATP) that are used during operational deployments on Combat Air Forces aircraft. 

Because the quantity of ATPs available is below the requirement, the Air Force can 

only support pre-deployment training and deployed operations, leaving a limited 

number of pods to support day-to-day training. 

ATPs are not permanently assigned to a particular aircraft or unit; rather they 

are moved between units to support the priorities set by Air Combat Command as 

follows: current combat/contingency operations; Air Expeditionary Force spin-up 

training for units within the four-month prior to deployment window; test requirements; continuation training for operational/combat-coded units; and lastly, flying 

training units (FTU). 

Mr. FORBES. How are you adapting to budgetary reduction in FY 2011? What 

challenges would you experience should additional cuts be levied against you? 

General BREEDLOVE. The budgetary reductions presented execution challenges 

and impacted areas requiring mitigation strategies that drove risk and tradeoffs. 

Congressionally-mandated operations and maintenance (O&M) reductions were absorbed in areas such as civilian pay, base support, and facilities, sustainment, restoration, and modernization (FSRM). The reductions delayed new mission beddowns, 

airfield, runway, dorms, and utility infrastructure projects. They drove operational 

workarounds and inefficiencies and increased sustainment costs. Reductions also 

slowed the civilian hiring process. The Air Force is committed to achieving efficiencies across the force and will continue to make tradeoffs to preserve our most 

important capabilities while supporting current operations and taking care of our 

men and women in uniform. This late in the execution year, we do not expect any 

additional budgetary reductions. 

Mr. FORBES. The Air Force has reduced its flying hour training program and reexamining its mix of live and virtual training including opportunities to rely more on 

the use of simulators. How will the Air Force measure the impact of changing the 

mix of live and virtual training on the quality of training as well as individual and 

unit readiness? 

General BREEDLOVE. The Air Force leverages critical live fly training with increasingly capable virtual training devices and simulators. In a continual process, 

the Air Force reassesses the mix between live fly and virtual training to strike the 

right balance. As simulator technology and fidelity improve, training methods and 

simulator capabilities are assessed to ensure requirements are met as efficiently and 

effectively as possible. The Air Force has already shifted a significant amount of live 

fly training into our simulators. Reductions in flying hours require investments in 

infrastructure and training system upgrades and procurement. 

Unit commanders assess unit readiness on a monthly basis via the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) and the Defense Readiness Reporting System 

(DRRS). Individual readiness is tracked with unit training programs. Any negative 

training impact to Air Force operational readiness would be reported and tracked 

through those reporting systems. 

Mr. FORBES. Each Air Force unit is designed to perform a specific mission requiring a particular skill set. However, Air Force personnel may be assigned to support 

current operations by deploying to perform a related mission that does not necessarily require their full skill set. When individuals are engaged in operations that 

require only a subset of their full skill set, their competence in some other skills 

may erode because the individual is unable to complete the full extent of their training requirements to remain qualified in their core mission. To what extent has the 

Air Force identified unit types or career specialties in which assigned personnel are 

not receiving comprehensive training for their core missions and what steps, if any, 

have been taken to mitigate any identified gaps in training? 
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General BREEDLOVE. The Air Force approved specialized procedures for maintaining specialty skills to include comprehensive training management processes. Air 

Force Instruction (AFI) 36–2201, Air Force Training Program, requires supervisors 

to review the training records of enlisted Airmen prior to their deployment to ensure 

the training continuum is not broken. In turn, the supervisors document any remaining upgrade training requirements and training remarks as appropriate on the 

On-the-Job Record Continuation Sheet, or automated version. If Airmen are out of 

their career specialties long enough to diminish the proficiency in their particular 

specialty skills set, Airmen will increase their proficiency in lost competencies 

through force development programs that include any combination of education, 

training, and experience (i.e., Career Development Courses, on-the-job training, and/ 

or specific placement in development positions). 

Additionally, the Air Force trains rated personnel in accordance with 11-series 

Mission Design Series (MDS)-Specific Volume 1 AFIs, which identify events that 

must be accomplished for aircrew personnel to maintain mission qualification and 

currency. Depending on real-world mission requirements, some skill sets may experience a loss in training in order to accommodate immediate mission requirements, 

which reinforce other skill sets. When personnel return to their unit, individuals receive the necessary training to regain proficiency in unit mission tasks and accomplish training events as necessary to comply with Volume 1 requirements. This is 

a recognized issue associated with the Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF) cycle, and it 

is provided for in the cycle dynamic. The Air Force is standardizing deployment 

lengths to 179 days and increasing dwell to afford more time for reset and training 

opportunities. The Air Force restructured the AEF to include tempo banding for 

high-stressed capabilities in response to the long-term surge. 

Mr. FORBES. The Air Force has been flying CENTCOM sorties since Operation 

Desert Storm. General Breedlove, do you anticipate a similar operational tempo 

post-Operations New Dawn and Enduring Freedom? What is the impact to the Air 

Force’s aging fleet of aircraft? How important, then, do reset and modernization become? How would deep cuts impact your ability to modernize/recapitalize? 

General BREEDLOVE. Yes, we anticipate a similar operational tempo post-Operations New Dawn and Enduring Freedom. The readiness of Combat Air Forces aircraft is adequate despite challenges from accumulating hours on our fleet due to 

continuing combat operations in multiple theaters of operation. 

Delays in the F–35 program increase our reliance on an aging legacy fighter fleet, 

driving the need to extend legacy fighters’ service life and modernize their combat 

capability. Air Force actions to extend and modernize the legacy fleet are a bridge 

to 5th generation capability and are not considered replacement actions. The F–16 

Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) is one example of the effort to mitigate the 

fighter force capacity shortfall. Additionally, development of a Long Range Strike 

family of systems, including a new Long Range Strike (LRS) bomber and next generation, extended-range standoff missiles, allows the Air Force to address anticipated threats. 

To keep our legacy platforms viable, the Air Force intends to use funds saved 

through efficiencies to subsidize modernization. One such example is our plan to retire six B–1 bombers and use the savings to fund modernization and sustainment 

upgrades for the B–1 fleet. Restrictions on the proposed B–1 retirements would reduce our overall savings by a minimum of $290 million (an 80 percent reduction in 

savings), limiting our ability to maintain a viable B–1 fleet. 

The readiness of the Mobility Air Forces remains high while meeting robust and 

dynamic operational requirements. Our airlift fleet continues to provide strategic 

airlift as well as theater and direct support airlift missions moving personnel and 

a wide variety of equipment and supplies. The awarding of the KC–46A contract 

starts the timeline for recapitalizing our aerial refueling aircraft. Delays or reductions in KC–46A production will have impacts on Air Force readiness and ability 

to meet operational requirements. Reset and modernization are essential to ensure 

continued readiness of our fleet inventory. 

Mr. FORBES. The Air Force just released figures to the HASC that they have spent 

$433M of O&M on Libya. Where in O&M did that money come from? What is the 

impact? Does this indicate significant financial commitments we should consider beyond OEF/OND when making budgetary decisions? 

General BREEDLOVE. Approximately three-quarters of the Libya costs are attributed to flying hours, which are being paid for within the flying hour program. The 

Air Force flying hour program has not been reduced, nor have air operations training been deferred, to support the U.S. participation in Libya operations. However, 

unused/available flying hours from the F–22, C–130, and C–17 platforms have been 

realigned to KC–135, KC–10, operational support aircraft (OSA), and F–16 plat-
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forms to support emerging and high priority flying/training requirements, one of 

them being the Libya operation. 

The accrual of unused/available flying hours can be attributed to a variety of rea- sons: Mobility Air Force (MAF) hours were available from the following weapons systems: C–130s: Aircraft are being used to support increased US Transportation Command operations and are not available for programmed training hours; PACAF C– 

17s: Hours available due to execution slightly below programmed hours. 

Unused/available MAF flying hours were moved to the KC–135, KC–10 and OSA 

flying hour programs. In the Combat Air Forces (CAF), F–16 execution rates are 

much higher in support of Libya operation than at home station. CAF was able to 

cover approximately 70 percent of the increased flying hour requirement with F–22 

hours available due to the stand down of that platform. The remaining Libya costs 

represent, in part, airlift bills sourced from unused Airlift Readiness Account funding available because Transportation Working Capital Fund cash balances are sufficient. Additionally, other costs (e.g. travel, command, control, communications, and 

computers, and global lift & sustain) were cash-flowed by major commands and are 

being offset by deferred facilities sustainment and restoration expenses and reductions in contractor support. 

The Air Force will continue to support the Department of Defense contingency operations as high-priority requirements, and there will likely be significant financial 

commitments required to support those operations in future years. However, in a 

fiscal environment with declining toplines, identifying, budgeting, and justifying dollars for unforeseen contingencies will be increasingly important to maintaining critical Air Force warfighter capability. 

Mr. FORBES. At one time we relied heavily upon the Navy and Air Force to provide individual augmentees to meet ground force requirements in CENTCOM. What 

is that level of dependence now and how has the long-term use of sailors and airmen 

to meet ground force requirements impacted the readiness of the Navy and Air 

Force? 

General BREEDLOVE. The Air Force currently has 4,893 personnel deployed to support Joint Expeditionary taskings (ground forces) and 2,541 supporting Individual 

Augmentee (headquarters staff) taskings—a total of 7,434. This is a decrease from 

12,896 in 2009. 

Although certain career fields are experiencing high opstempo which presents 

challenges regarding dwell times and individual training, the Air Force will continue to use innovative approaches to mitigate operational impacts. Current unit reporting via the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) and the Defense 

Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) indicates no adverse impact to overall Air 

Force operational readiness from supporting joint fight requirements. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO 

Mr. LOBIONDO. What are some examples of the negative impact of O&M funding 

reductions to training? 

General CHIARELLI. Given the current fiscal environment, the Army is examining 

possible negative impacts of potential operations and maintenance (O&M) funding 

reductions to training by assessing adjustments through the three dials I spoke of 

in my opening statement. Potential reductions carry different risks, and our analysis continues to be aimed at reducing the impacts of that risk while maintaining 

a versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations, operating on a rotational 

cycle to provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for full spectrum operations and to hedge against unexpected contingencies—all at a tempo that is predictable and sustainable for our all-volunteer force. Potential reductions to the 

Ground OPTEMPO and Flying Hour Programs may impact on the Army’s ability 

to provide units trained for Full Spectrum Operations by reducing the funded miles 

and crew hours thereby curtailing the number and intensity of training events at 

Company, Battalion and Brigade levels at home stations and at the Combat Training Centers. As a consequence, the Army could be challenged to prepare for contingencies across the spectrum of conflict and may require more time to prepare larger 

formations for deployment after notification of a requirement to deploy. Potential reductions could also impact the Army’s ability to execute home station individual and 

collective gunnery training by limiting the availability of ranges and deferring replacement of damaged targets. Range modernization efforts may be impacted as the 

construction footprint of several MILCON projects will not have Unexploded Ordnance clearance completed. Reductions to Mission Training Complex capabilities 

could limit Battalion and Brigade staff proficiency on their mission command sys-
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tems in a realistic training environment due to facility availability and exercise design limitations. The Training Support Centers may not be able to provide Instructor/Operator support for numerous complex virtual trainers, including for flight simulators and support for Medical Simulation Training and other training devices. The 

Army may have to curtail units scheduled to train at the Combat Training Centers 

or send only portions of those units limiting the training value derived from training 

with a world class Opposing Force (OPFOR), detailed and impartial After Action Review from the Observer Controllers, and a robust Contemporary Operating Environment enabling concurrent and simultaneous training in multiple environments 

against hybrid threats. Potential reductions may impact on the Army’s Institutional 

Training capability to conduct Initial Military Training and critical functional skills. 

This could result in a potential back log of recruits awaiting training at the institutional training base. Soldiers may not receive duty specific skill training required 

by the Soldier’s unit thus contributing to degradation in unit readiness. Additionally, funding reductions may impact the Army’s ability to develop agile and adaptive 

leaders at all levels by reducing the Army’s capacity to conduct Professional Military 

Education. We are looking to Congress to help the Army maintain balance. As the 

committees consider their reductions the Army is ready to assist by providing our 

assessment of any and all specified reductions. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. What are some examples of the negative impact of O&M funding 

reductions to training? 

Admiral GREENERT. Navy O&M funding in support of training is adequate in the 

current execution year (FY11), and as proposed in the Navy budget submission for 

FY12. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. What are some examples of the negative impact of O&M funding 

reductions to training? 

General DUNFORD. The Marine Corps remains committed to continued success in 

Afghanistan by providing the best trained and equipped forces. The Fiscal Year 

2013 budget submission continues to fund core skills required for continued success 

in Afghanistan while also investing in irregular warfare capabilities like MARSOC, 

MARFORCYBER, and five new Marine Expeditionary Command Elements. Impact 

of funding reductions will be in the form of reduced capacity in the following areas: 

• The Marine Corps’ force structure must provide a strategically mobile, middleweight force optimized for rapid crisis response and forward-presence. 

Æ Budget cuts have a disproportionate impact on the Marine Corps. For 8.5 percent of the annual Defense budget, the Marine Corps provides approximately 

31 percent of the ground operating forces, 12 percent of the fixed wing tactical aircraft, and 19 percent of the attack helicopters in the Joint Force. 

Æ A reduction in training will further challenge the Marine Corps to respond 

to 2 large scale regional contingency operations. 

• A reduction in Operations and Maintenance funding will impact training across 

a wide spectrum of activities. 

Æ Capacity to support Geographic Combatant Commanders requirement for forward deployed presence. Demand to support Theater Security Cooperation requirements outpaces the Marine Corps capacity to satisfy the demand. 

Æ Enhanced small unit training (squad and below) would be at risk. Small unit 

training is essential for success in distributed operations such as in our most 

recent campaigns in (OIF and OEF). 

Æ Large scale training would be impacted at the Marine Air Ground Task Force 

(MAGTF) level. Immersion of Marines into large scale decentralized training 

environments has been a vital part of pre-deployment training programs and 

has improved leadership decision making at all levels. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. What are some examples of the negative impact of O&M funding 

reductions to training? 

General BREEDLOVE. The high tempo of Air Force operations and the use of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)/Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF) 

hours in support of Combatant Commander taskings has masked our true training 

flying hour requirements. The Air Force base budget for the operations and maintenance (O&M) flying hour program has declined 29 percent in the last seven years. 

Failure to smoothly transition the appropriate number of hours from OCO/TWCF 

to normal O&M flying hour programs as overseas contingency operations wind down 

will result in readiness challenges for the Air Force. 

Additional reductions could have cumulative impacts on future years, such as reducing the number of aircrew members who gain ‘‘experienced’’ status in their first 
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operational assignment. This, in turn, could create deficits in filling critical flight 

instructor and rated staff positions. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. What do you believe is the recapitalization solution for the ASA 

units that sit alert for NORAD while also training for and supporting other combatant commanders through overseas deployments, especially given some of the findings of the ASA report issued to Congress a couple of months ago? 

General BREEDLOVE. Defending the homeland remains a priority for the Air Force 

as we organize train and equip forces for the joint warfighter. Recapitalization of 

the Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) force, previously known as Air Sovereignty Alert 

(ASA), is one part of the much broader perspective of having the right mix of capabilities in the right components (active, Guard, Reserve) performing the right missions. We will find the right balance between anti-access capabilities (5th generation 

stealth) across all components balanced with an alert aircraft fleet that is capable 

of performing the air sovereignty mission of defending the homeland. 

As the Air Force completes the final moves of the Combat Air Force (CAF) Redux 

plan (FY 08–12) this coming year, all Air National Guard (ANG) units, including 

those who sit ACA duty, will have the necessary platforms to perform their assigned 

missions. In support of this plan, Burlington Air Guard Station, Vermont has been 

identified as the Preferred Alternative for the first F–35A ANG unit, with the final 

basing decision expected to be made in the summer of 2012. As the various models 

of F–15s and F–16s approach the end of their forecasted service lives, the Air Force 

will continue to use the principles of Total Force Integration to balance the proper 

capabilities across all components. 

As such, NORAD’s recent report to Congress on the ACA mission, in the Air 

Force’s view, did not warrant any immediate recapitalization solutions. Overall, the 

Air Force assesses current capabilities across the joint community are well-matched 

to the estimated threat level. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. The Air Force has been challenged in recent years to keep backlogged aircraft maintenance low and mission capable rates up, even as optempo remains high and aircraft continue to age. What is the Air Force doing to keep platforms going beyond their expected service life? Do you expect that optempo will remain steady? If so, how vital then is adequate funding for aircraft operation and 

maintenance? 

General BREEDLOVE. The Air Force remains focused on maximizing aircraft service life through a number of formalized fleet health sustainment programs. Most 

platforms leverage proactive integrity programs, such as the Aircraft Structural Integrity Program, in which areas such as airframe strength, durability, damage tolerance, corrosion control, and material defects are closely managed. Additionally, avionics modernization programs focus on continuous avionics and software systems 

upgrades to capitalize on emerging technology to address diminishing manufacturing sources and retain capability in dynamic threat environments. Furthermore, 

many platforms undergo formal Service Life Extension Programs, in which structural, propulsion, avionics, and mechanical subsystems upgrades are combined into 

one modernization effort. The Air Force also utilizes the Fleet Viability Board process to provide an independent source for operational health, associated availability, 

and cost of continued ownership to assist with sustainment and recapitalization investment decisions. Lastly, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board promotes the exchange of the latest scientific and technical information to enhance the accomplishment of the Air Force mission. These proven programs are critical to ensuring continued airworthiness for service life extensions. 

We expect the tempo for Air Force operations to remain the same. The required 

capability areas will shift with mission requirements but the overall Air Force support will be largely unchanged. Adequate funding will ensure supply chains, maintenance operations, and flying operations are not further stressed, which could negatively impact war readiness engine levels, aircraft availability, and mission readiness. As such, adequate funding to support these programs is vital to mission capability across the entire fleet. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK 

Mr. LOEBSACK. One of the concerns I have regarding our readiness as we draw 

down in Iraq and Afghanistan and as we review future budgets and our future readiness posture is that we don’t repeat the mistakes of the past when we lost critical 

organic manufacturing capabilities. 

It makes little sense to lose the workforce that has built the equipment for our 

troops in combat over the past ten years and to shutter the manufacturing base that 

has produced that equipment. That is why I’ve been working with Congressman 
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Schilling to expand the authority for the Army’s industrial facilities to enter into 

public-private partnerships to maintain the critical skills and workforce that are essential to Army readiness. But I am concerned that the Army does not have a longterm plan in place for workloading the facilities. 

Can you outline what plans the Army is pursuing to ensure that the Army’s organic manufacturing base has the workload necessary to maintain its critically 

needed capabilities? 

General CHIARELLI. The Army continues to employ a multi-pronged approach to 

maintain sufficient workloads at the Army’s manufacturing Arsenals in order to ensure their workforce strengths and skill sets are sustained to meet future contingency operations. 

The Army has taken the following steps to mitigate projected workload reductions 

in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funded workloads at the Army manufacturing Arsenals: The Army has drafted an Organic Industrial Base Strategic Plan 

(OIBSP) that provides the framework for ensuring that the Army’s Arsenals and Depots remain viable and relevant in a post-OCO funded environment. The four pillars 

of the Army OIBSP are: 

(1) Modernization, which requires investment in new technology, training and 

plant equipment at the same rate that the Army modernizes its weapon 

systems; 

(2) Capacity, which identifies and aligns core competencies and workloads to 

support current and future surge requirements while maintaining effectiveness and efficiencies at each facility; 

(3) Capital Investment, which requires the investment in our facilities to maintain ‘‘state-of-the-art’’ capabilities and quality of work environment (QWE) 

standards; and 

(4) Resource Alignment, which requires the Army to prioritize funding in support of these four pillars to achieve the desired end state—viable and relevant OIB facilities. 

• Foreign Military Sales (FMS)—The Army is exploring opportunities for Army 

Arsenals to manufacture replacement gun tubes and other components for nations that purchase Excess Defense Article (EDA) howitzers and other equipment. A Security Assistance option with increasing potential is the EDA program that allows countries to acquire excess defense items or equipment at either reduced or no cost to eligible foreign recipients on an ‘‘as is, where is’’ 

basis. 

• The Army Materiel Command’s (AMC’s) TACOM Life Cycle Management Command, the Army’s parent organization for Army Arsenals, recently hosted a 3- 

day summit for its commercial partners, Army Program Executive Offices 

(PEOs), Program Management Offices (PMOs), and the Army’s OIB activities. 

The objective of the 3-day summit was to highlight the Army’s OIB capabilities 

and identify opportunities for the Arsenals to partner with commercial firms in 

order to meet future PEO/PMO requirements. 

• We continue to invest in the manufacturing Arsenal infrastructure to ensure 

that the facilities are modernized with advanced technological capabilities. Capital investment improvements total close to $25 million in FY11 and are expected to remain at this level through the Five Year Defense Plan. 

The Army also supports current HASC and SASC legislative language in the National Defense Authorization Act which authorizes the Secretary of the Army to designate Army Arsenals as Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITEs) in 

the recognized core manufacturing competencies and also enhances the Arsenals’ 

ability to establish workshare agreements with private industry through Public Private Partnerships. CITE designation will recognize and preserve Army Arsenal core 

manufacturing competencies, enhancing their ability to better compete for work and 

gain greater PEO/PM recognition. 

The bottom line is that the Army OIBSP recognizes the critical role of the manufacturing Arsenals within the integrated industrial base and is aggressively pursuing opportunities to increase Arsenal workloads at a sustained level over time. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS 

Mr. OWENS. As the Representative for Fort Drum I’m sure you understand that 

I have paid particular attention to the proposed end strength put forward by the 

Army. To that end, you note in your testimony that the Army is working towards 

‘‘achieving the authorized end strength of 547.4K by the end of FY13’’ and ‘‘520.4K 

by the end of FY16’’. Further, you noted that this will be accomplished through re-
111 

ducing recruitment goals, lowering retention requirements and natural attrition. It 

seems to me that these built-in, environmental measures for reducing end-strength 

may limit sudden disruption to Army units, but they also reduce the amount of control the Army will have over how they occur. What measures can the Army take 

to ensure that any force reduction occur in a manner that allows installations and 

commanders, as well as military communities, to fully prepare for any future end 

strength reductions? 

General CHIARELLI. The Army Staff is actively engaged with supporting the development of OSD plans to help ensure that installations, commanders, and military 

communities can adequately prepare for any future end strength reductions. Planning includes a full range of options under varying timelines to ensure any DoD reductions are completed in accordance with OSD directives taking into consideration 

operational readiness and the impact on the Army’s most valuable resource, Soldiers 

and Families. 

The Army is seeking reinstatement or creation of separation authorities to enable 

voluntary and involuntary force shaping actions between now and 2017. The Army 

will likely need to exercise the full extent of voluntary and involuntary force shaping 

measures to maximize flexibility and minimize the impact on Soldiers and Families 

as we size and shape our force to achieve a balanced end-strength. We are currently 

working within DoD to scope the measures that will be necessary, and, where appropriate, the Department will seek legislative authority to help us shape the force. 

Mr. OWENS. It is no secret that the U.S. Army has a difficult history in the procurement of major weapons programs. As reported in the Washington Post earlier 

this year, a recent study commissioned by the Army shows that between 1995 and 

2009, the Pentagon spent more than $32 billion on weapons programs that were 

eventually cancelled. These include the Crusader Cannon, the Comanche Helicopter 

and others. While the scope of this hearing does not include specific systems, I remain concerned about the potential to spend funds on assets that will never help 

our men and women in the field, while installations like Fort Drum in my Congressional District continue to make sacrifices to meet new budget realities. Do you believe the Army is taking sufficient steps to prevent a reoccurrence of these weapons 

cancellations, and is there potential to use even a portion of those savings to meet 

budget shortfalls at installations here at home? 

General CHIARELLI. In order to address the challenges with the development of 

major weapons systems, the Army undertook an unprecedented review of the Army 

Acquisition process. The Decker-Wagner panel, commissioned by the Secretary of 

the Army, examined weapons system procurements from ‘‘cradle to grave’’ with a 

key focus on properly defining requirements. The panel discovered that many of the 

Army’s development and procurement problems stemmed from pursuing requirements that ultimately did not match the needs of the Soldier, were cost prohibitive 

or were technologically infeasible. The Army has been working to rapidly review and 

implement many of the innovative recommendations. 

These efforts will not only support a stable modernization strategy, but will also 

result in producing systems that are timely, within budget parameters, and meet 

the needs of the Soldier. As the Army implements sweeping changes to its acquisition system, lessons learned from its efforts will be infused into other procurements 

across the Services and the Department. 

As part of his comprehensive efforts to reform Army acquisition, in February 

2010, Secretary McHugh ordered Army-wide ‘‘capability portfolio reviews’’ (CPR) to 

revalidate requirements through a wide range of criteria, including Combatant Commander requests, wartime lessons learned, the leveraging of emerging technologies, 

elimination of redundancy, and system affordability. Each review examines systems 

across a certain spectrum to make recommendations for modernization improvements or, if appropriate, project terminations. The Army is already realizing significant savings through terminations and avoidance of unnecessary program costs. 

CPRs are designed to get the right system, with the best technology to the 

warfighter at the right time. 

The Army’s top modernization priorities—the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) and 

the Network, provide opportunities to leverage proven technology, as well as use lessons learned from other programs. The Army must have a combat vehicle fleet and 

information technology infrastructure that allows our primary ground forces to handle full spectrum missions from regional conflicts, hybrid threats, hostile state actors to natural disasters and humanitarian relief efforts. Regarding the GCV, our 

Soldiers need a single, modern armored vehicle to take them to the fight. The 

Army’s Network modernization will enable the rapid flow of large amounts of critical data on the battlefield, down to the individual Soldier. Both programs are seeking to leverage harvested technologies, as well as state-of-the-art developments, to 
112 

ensure the systems are affordable and ready for adaptation to accommodate needed 

future capabilities. 

Æ