UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 98-4115

MICHAEL TERRENCE REEVES,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.

Malcolm J. Howard, District Judge.

(CR-97-94-H)

Submitted: February 26, 1999

Decided: March 19, 1999

Before WIDENER, HAMILTON, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Charles Christopher Henderson, Trenton, North Carolina, for Appellant. Janice McKenzie Cole, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes,

Assistant United States Attorney, John Howarth Bennett, Assistant

United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Michael Terrence Reeves appeals his conviction for conspiracy to

possess cocaine, cocaine base, heroin, and marijuana with the intent

to distribute, and conspiracy to distribute the same in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 846 (1994), and use and carry of a firearm under 18

U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). Reeves raises two

issues on appeal: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to support

his conviction; and (2) that there was a variance between the indictment and the evidence adduced at trial. We affirm, and deny Reeves'

pending motion to file a pro se supplemental brief.

A conviction should be sustained if, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, there is substantial evidence to support it. See

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). In conducting a

review for substantial evidence, circumstantial as well as direct evidence is considered, and the government is given the benefit of all

reasonable inferences from the facts proven to the facts sought to be

established. See United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th

Cir. 1982). To prove a § 846 conspiracy, the government must show

that there was an agreement between two or more persons to violate

the federal drug laws, that the defendant knew of the agreement, and

that he voluntarily joined it. See United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849,

857 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

In reviewing the record under this standard, we find our opinion in

United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044 (4th Cir. 1993), to be controlling. In Banks, we explained that:

[i]t is of course elementary that one may be a member of a

conspiracy without knowing its full scope, or all its members, and without taking part in the full range of its activities

or over the whole period of its existence. Critically, it is not

necessary to proof of a conspiracy that it have a discrete,

identifiable organizational structure; the requisite agreement

to act in concert need not result in any such formal structure,

indeed frequently, in contemporary drug conspiracies, contemplates and results in only a loosely-knit association of

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members linked only by their mutual interest in sustaining

the overall enterprise of catering to the ultimate demands of

a particular drug consumption market (and, undoubtedly on

the part of some, by fear of the consequences of abandoning

or subverting the enterprise). Furthermore, the fact that parallel suppliers, or middlemen, or street dealers serving such

a market may sometimes, or even always, compete for supplies or customers in serving that market does not on that

account alone disprove either the existence of a single conspiracy to achieve the overall results of their several efforts,

or the participation of particular ones of them in that conspiracy.

Banks, 10 F.3d at 1054.

The evidence presented at Reeves' trial describes precisely such a

"loose-knit" conspiracy. Reeves sold drugs within Campbell Terrace,

a public housing project in Fayetteville, North Carolina. According to

the Government's witnesses, many of them drug dealers themselves,

Campbell Terrace was the site of extensive drug dealing. These witnesses explained that, although some dealers worked in groups, and

others alone, the project was essentially a "big family" that worked

together and looked out for each other in the drug business. If one

dealer needed something, he could obtain it from other sellers or

groups thereof. The dealers were also protective of the area, and outsiders attempting to sell within the project would be "beat down or

shot." Reeves admitted to selling drugs within this atmosphere, and

to engaging in drug transactions with a large number of dealers within

the project. Given our holding in Banks, we find this evidence sufficient to sustain Reeves' conviction.

Reeves next contends that there was a variance between his indictment, which alleged a single conspiracy, and the evidence adduced at

trial, which demonstrated the existence of multiple conspiracies. In a

conspiracy prosecution, the Defendant may establish a material variance by demonstrating that the indictment charges a single conspiracy

but the evidence adduced at trial proved multiple and separate conspiracies. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 755-56

(1946). The Government bears the burden of proving a single conspiracy charged in an indictment. See United States v. Hines, 717 F.2d

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1481, 1489 (4th Cir. 1983). "Whether there is a single conspiracy or

multiple conspiracies, as well as an agreement to participate in the

conspiracy, is a question of fact for the jury and we must affirm its

finding of a single conspiracy `unless the evidence, taken in the light

most favorable to the government, would not allow a reasonable jury

so to find.'" United States v. Harris, 39 F.3d 1262, 1267 (4th Cir.

1994) (quoting United States v. Urbanik, 801 F.2d 692, 695 (4th Cir.

1986)).

A reversal is only proper on variance grounds if the variance

infringed the appellant's substantial rights and resulted in actual prejudice. See United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 883 (4th Cir. 1994).

To demonstrate actual prejudice from a multiple conspiracy variance,

the appellant must show that there were so many defendants and conspiracies before the jury as to make it likely that the jury would transfer evidence from one conspiracy to a defendant who was not

involved therein. See id.

Following a review of the trial testimony, we conclude that even

if Reeves can demonstrate a variance, he cannot demonstrate prejudice. Although the witnesses testified as to the existence of smaller

groups within the Campbell Terrace project, these witnesses unequivocally stated that Reeves was not a part of these groups, but was only

a part of the larger unit encompassing the entire project. Further, the

evidence presented included only transactions in which Reeves was

a participant. Accordingly, we find that even assuming a variance,

there was no prejudice to Reeves. We therefore affirm his conviction.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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