About the Report

This report reflects the views expressed during a conference 

entitled “Who Controls Pakistan’s Security Forces?” hosted by 

the U.S. Institute of Peace’s Security Sector Governance Center 

on April 19, 2011. Speakers at the event included the author, 

Professor Hassan Abbas of Columbia University, and Moeed 

Yusuf of the U.S. Institute of Peace. The report discusses 

the complex political landscape in which Pakistan’s civilian 

and military authorities operate, often vying for power and 

supremacy; identifies the challenges facing Pakistan’s civilian 

government in the face of the military’s expanding role; and 

suggests a realignment of roles, increased expertise 

for civilian officials in security matters, and better 

civilian-military coordination.

About the Author

Shuja Nawaz is the director of the South Asia Center at The 

Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. He is the author of Crossed 

Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within. He is the 

principal author of FATA: A Most Dangerous Place, Pakistan in 

the Danger Zone: A Tenuous U.S.-Pakistan Relationship, and 

Learning by Doing: The Pakistan Army’s Experience 

with Counterinsurgency. 

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 297 December 2011

© 2011 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Threats to Physical Security and

Political Stability 2

A Case Study of Incompetence 4

The National Counter Terrorism Authority:

Another Opportunity Missed 5

Constitutional Relationship 5

What Does the Future Hold? 6

Conclusion 7 

Shuja Nawaz

Who Controls Pakistan’s 

Security Forces?

Summary

•	 Internal militancy and insurgency are the immediate threats to Pakistan’s security.

•	 Pakistan’s polity is fractured and dysfunctional, allowing the military to assert greater control over Pakistan’s response to this growing internal threat. 

•	 Civilian authorities have missed numerous opportunities to assert control over security 

matters. Miscalculation by the current civilian government in its attempt in 2008 to exert 

control over the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate soured civil-military relations 

at a time when the new army chief favored keeping the army out of politics. 

•	 The military’s interests are expanding to newer sectors, including economic policymaking, 

since a shrinking economy could hurt military interests and lifestyles. 

•	 An opportunity to improve security sector governance exists in the proposed National 

Counter Terrorism Authority, which the government has unduly delayed. 

The emerging danger to Pakistan today emanates not from its traditional external adversary 

to the East—India—but from homegrown insurgency and militancy. No less than the incoming head of Inter-Services Intelligence, Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, told Der 

Spiegel in a 2009 interview that “we are distancing ourselves from conflict with India, both 

now and in general,” adding concisely for emphasis, “We may be crazy in Pakistan, but not 

completely out of our minds. We know full well that terror is our enemy, not India.”1

The danger should shift the focus of internal security from the military to the ministries 

of interior and defense, the institutions that should be the backbone of security sector governance in Pakistan. This shift highlights the new, more complex environment that Pakistan’s 

security forces face: what a thoughtful senior military officer described to the author as “no 

war, no peace” with India, alongside a continuing war inside Pakistan. The author’s analysis 

of the situation inside Pakistan yields the strong view that its security sector is not as well 

equipped and coordinated as it could be to fight the wars within the country, and that the 

forces of militancy and terror have owned the agenda. This lack of coordination leaves the 

government scrambling to catch up with new threats, many of which it has created itself, 

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT
2 

both by its actions and inaction. More often than not, civilian authorities have outsourced 

internal security and policymaking on external security to the military, losing both control and legitimacy. The fault behind this does not lie with the security forces per se, but 

with the lack of political direction and will that is evident in Pakistan’s governance today. 

Meanwhile, absent a serious attempt to normalize relations with India, Pakistan’s security 

concerns remain largely focused on India, though India has not showed great interest in 

addressing Pakistan’s fears of its hegemonic power, thus adding to Pakistan’s paranoia.

Pakistan has a very dysfunctional body politic. An accumulation of decades of military 

or quasimilitary rule, along with the civilian sector’s gradual ceding of ground to the military, have led to a very sharp division between civilians and the military, with the military 

capturing more bureaucratic turf than is the norm in democracies. This division has created 

a system that gives the military the upper hand in all matters dealing with national security 

policy. The civil and military hierarchies rarely work together, lacking the systems and the 

structures that would allow for frequent consultation and professional collaboration. Ad hoc 

actions rule the day. As a result, the civilian and military authorities operate on parallel 

tracks on many issues.

Threats to Pakistan’s Physical Security and Political Stability 

Historically, Pakistan has had three major military autocracies and several civilian autocratic 

rulers. At the country’s birth in 1947, adventurist elements in the military tried to make 

foreign policy, forcing the fledgling country into an unwanted war with India over Kashmir, 

for which Pakistan was unprepared. When that war fizzled into a less than satisfactory 

cease-fire, the military blamed civilians for lack of nerve to see the conflict through. In 

turn, the civilian system sputtered and bickered internally for years and failed to coalesce 

around democratic principles, relying on the military to give it heft and support. The civilian 

system opened the door for Pakistan’s first martial law in 1958—the first of many military 

interventions—by bringing the serving army chief, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, into the 

cabinet as defense minister. The civilian authorities thus failed to establish a political base 

to sustain civilian governance. Most governments were enmeshed in short-term tactical 

politics rather than building a political superstructure to hold up civilian rule, which ended 

up becoming, more often than not, an interregnum between military regimes.

The latest such military venture was the 1999 illegal overthrow of the civilian prime minister, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, by his army commanders acting on behalf of General 

Pervez Musharraf, the army chief of staff whom Sharif had wanted to replace in October of 

that year. Under the 1973 constitution, amended by subsequent governments, the illegal 

overthrow was treasonous. The complicity of pliant judges enabled Musharraf—like the previous military ruler, General Muhammad Zia ul Haq—to invoke the Doctrine of Necessity to 

give his overthrow of Sharif legal cover and guarantee an extended stint as army chief and 

head of state. In 2009, Musharraf was forced to depart under threat of impeachment by the 

civilian government of Asif Ali Zardari, who had come to power through a deal with former 

prime minister Benazir Bhutto that involved parliament passing legislation clearing Zardari 

and most other accused politicians of all charges of past misconduct.

Since 2007, the new army chief appointed by Musharraf, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, 

has said he wants the military to stay out of politics. Former army chiefs have said the same 

thing until there was a popular clamor for order and military rule was reinstated. Kayani has 

been true to his word, for the time being, though he continues to influence political decisions from behind the scenes, using suasion and the subtle threat of military intervention to 

force politicians to stay within the lines of the political coloring book. Although the results 

have not been pretty, Kayani is playing on a new and complex field of Pakistan politics.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy •

George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor of 

Practice, The George Washington University • Judy Ansley,

Former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser under President George W. Bush • Eric Edelman,

Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins 

School of Advanced International Studies • Kerry Kennedy, 

President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human 

Rights • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, 

LLC • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor 

of International Relations, Stanford University • John A. 

Lancaster, Former Executive Director of the National Council 

on Independent Living • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor, 

George Mason School of Law • Judy Van Rest, Executive Vice 

President, International Republican Institute • Nancy Zirkin,

Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy •

Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
 3

On a more positive note, the political system is slouching toward an equilibrium arising 

from the emergence of countervailing sources of power. In the 1990s, Pakistan was governed by the famed troika: the president, the army chief, and the prime minister, with the 

first two often ganging up on the third. Under Musharraf, a single person ran the army, the 

presidency, and government with a compliant cabinet and parliament. This situation was 

inherently unstable and demanded a balancing skill that Musharraf lost over time. Today 

there seems to be less a troika than an unstable stool, even though it has four legs: the 

elected government, represented by the Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) duo of the president 

and the prime minister; the ubiquitous and powerful army chief; the chief justice; and the 

noisy and attention-grabbing media. Pakistan has a burgeoning civil society, which played 

a major role in persuading the army chief to force the president to reinstate the dismissed 

chief justice of the Supreme Court, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, on March 16, 2009.

With Pakistan’s changing political landscape, the rules of the game for security management inside the country must be examined today. Since 1947, the military has maintained 

its traditional role of defending the borders against external enemies. It also inherited the 

Military Intelligence (MI) directorate at army headquarters from the British Indian Army. MI 

focused primarily on external military threats and to some extent monitored the activities 

of the army officers and soldiers to prevent unrest, espionage, or sabotage. The ISI was 

started by then-brigadier Syed Shahid Hamid with the help of friends and relatives immediately after independence, but is often mislabeled in popular history as the brainchild of 

British major general William Cawthorn.2 The ISI’s primary aim has been counterintelligence 

and espionage, especially aimed at India, where it has been fairly successful. However, over 

time, military rulers and then Pakistan’s first civilian martial law administrator, Zulfikar Ali 

Bhutto, gave it a domestic political mandate, displacing the civilian Intelligence Bureau 

(IB) that provided domestic intelligence to successive civil and military governments up to 

that time. 

The ISI has not looked back, using U.S. assistance during the Afghan war against the 

Soviets to acquire independent wealth and enlarge its footprint inside Pakistan and neighboring countries. The civilian prime minister is its titular head, but since its officer corps 

comes from the military, primarily the army, it reports in most cases and effectively to the 

army chief. When the military and civil authorities are at loggerheads, the MI directorate 

takes on a domestic role as a counterweight to the ISI. This has led to permanent overlaps 

in their operations. Today, in addition to four provincial ISI chieftains at the rank of brigadier, there are MI units in the provincial capitals; in Balochistan, the units often step on 

the ISI’s toes and add to the confusion of who is running operations where and why. As the 

commander-in-chief of the armed forces and president of Pakistan, Zardari has not stepped 

in to halt this rampant behavior that has supplanted, over time, the nineteen civilian agencies involved with internal security functions. Confusion reigns.3 As Hassan Abbas states,

There are two sets of law enforcement organizations in Pakistan: those that operate 

under the federal government, and the provincial police organizations. Nineteen major 

organizations operate directly under the federal government dealing with a variety of 

law enforcement responsibilities (including intelligence gathering, border and coast 

surveillance, and policing) and answering to different authorities. The total strength 

of all law enforcement and intelligence services’ officials at the disposal of the federal 

government (with cross-provincial jurisdiction) is approximately 210,000. Rarely do 

these organizations coordinate their plans and activities or strategize together. The 

chain of command of the organizations varies, which further complicates coordination 

and collective policy planning. As a result, decisions are often poorly implemented.4

The nineteen agencies report to the ministries of interior, defense, railways, communications (a separate entity), and narcotics control, among others (see chart in appendix). Even 

if they wanted to collaborate—and they do not—coordination would be a nightmarish exercise. There has been no movement to remove redundancies or to improve the setup, which 

With Pakistan’s changing 

political landscape, the rules 

of the game for security 

management inside the country 

must be examined today.
4 

grew unplanned over time, acting more as a job-creation machine than as a mechanism to 

meet the country’s urgent security needs. As a result, there is no professional challenge to 

the military in internal security functions.

A Case Study of Incompetence

Soon after the civilian government established itself in 2008, it took a sudden action on 

Saturday, July 26, to put the ISI and IB under the Ministry of Interior. As columnist Nasim 

Zehra described it:

The matter was not discussed in any Cabinet meeting, it was not put before the 

Parliament or any Parliamentary or Senate Committee and none of the coalition 

partners were consulted. Similarly, the justification to alter the reporting line was not 

discussed with the Ministry of Defence or the three services chiefs or the Chairman 

Joints Chief of Staff Committee who are directly involved in the operations and the 

output of the ISI.5

The decision came a couple days after a meeting on security issues and coordination 

of intelligence inside the government. Near the end of that meeting, the interior minister 

commented that better coordination was needed and asked the army chief, General Kayani, 

if he agreed. Kayani assented to the idea in principle. But no specific plans were discussed, 

nor was the subsequent action presented to or confirmed by the army chief.6 Then, as 

the prime minister headed to London, a notification was issued late in the evening in 

his name, effecting the change of reporting responsibility for both the ISI and IB. It was 

unclear if the prime minister had been informed of the notification in advance. Members 

of his entourage learned of the decision from the minister of interior, who announced the 

change to a small group on the plane to London, including the national security adviser, 

Major General (retired) Mahmud Ali Durrani, who reacted with alarm to this idea and asked 

if General Kayani was aware of the change. It was suggested that Durrani call Kayani to 

gauge his reaction.

Kayani and other senior military officers meanwhile were gathering at an army officers’ 

mess to celebrate the wedding of the daughter of one of their senior colleagues at army 

headquarters. Unbeknownst to the minister of interior, an impromptu meeting of the 

army high command ensued at this wedding. Kayani’s first reaction was to wait for the 

prime minister to return, but his military colleagues advised him that the matter would 

become a fait accompli and harder to overturn. Subsequently, Kayani huddled with a few 

confidants and decided to oppose the decision. This was conveyed among others to Durrani.7 Within hours, the civilian government issued a fresh notification putting the earlier 

orders in “abeyance.”

The incident illustrated the civilian government’s lack of understanding of the nature 

and role of security organizations, especially those under the military’s jurisdiction. Only 

one of the ISI’s six wings actually deals with domestic political issues. Most of the rest of 

its operations deal with military matters at home and abroad. In addition to the threestar-general head of the ISI, there are six two-star major generals responsible for each of 

the wings of the agency, more than even in a corps headquarters of the regular army. The 

overwhelming majority of the staff at senior levels is from the army. The idea that such 

an organization would report to a civilian entity with a narrow remit of law and order 

inside Pakistan was never examined or tested in debate or discussion, even if it had merit 

in the context of strengthening the civilian role in an emerging democracy. But for that 

to happen, the civilian establishment would need to prepare itself with knowledge and 

experience to handle high-level decision making related to the military and especially to 

intelligence—as in India and the United States, among others, and as intended in Pakistan’s 1973 constitution.
 5

The National Counter Terrorism Authority: Another Opportunity Missed

As the battle against domestic terrorism grew in size and intensity, it became obvious 

that the government needed to create a structure to handle the competing demands for 

resources and to come up with a practicable strategy for fighting the mounting threat. To 

that end, the idea of the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) was born in 2008. 

Tariq Parvez, a seasoned police officer, was brought in to help launch this entity, which was 

to be the focal point for decisions at the national level (see appendix for draft NACTA bill). 

Comprising senior members of the government, provincial leaders, and the military, NACTA 

was to effectively fill the gap in the national system of security governance left by the 

abolition of the National Security Council. 

But the plan foundered on a bureaucratic shoal. Disagreements between the interior 

minister and Parvez, about whom NACTA would report to and where it would be located, 

created a stalemate. Parvez favored NACTA under the prime minister. The interior minister 

favored its location under his own ministry. Parvez resigned. The draft law for NACTA was 

amended to make the prime minister NACTA’s titular chair with the interior minister as 

deputy chair but designated to chair the meetings in the prime minister’s absence. This provision was a nonstarter for the provincial chief minister and military leadership. As a result, 

the draft lies dormant.8 An opportunity for civilian governance of this important security 

sector mechanism was missed, leaving provincial governments to come up with their own 

approaches, or in some cases, to do nothing at all. 

Constitutional Relationship

Article 245 of the 1973 constitution deals with the relationship between the civilian 

authority and the armed forces (see appendix for text of Article 245 and related articles). 

It says the government has the right to call in the military in times of crisis. It also crossreferences Article 199, which states that nothing the military does can be challenged in the 

high courts.9 This amounts to blanket immunity for the entire military. Periodically there is 

debate within Pakistan on this issue. In the 1990s, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto requested 

the army chief to mount an offensive in Sindh, and he said he would not do it without 

express allowance under Article 245. This refusal delayed the action.

In October 2008, during the early days of the current government, there was an attempt 

to get a joint resolution in parliament to fight terrorism within Pakistan. After much arm 

twisting and cajoling, members of parliament across the political spectrum consented to 

create the resolution, even if they disagreed politically with the government. The joint 

resolution they produced essentially ceded all powers to the army chief, even though martial 

law had not been declared in the Northwest Province or the Federally Administered Tribal 

Areas (FATA). More recently, in June 2011, the president signed a new law that provided 

judicial and executive authority as well as immunity to the military for operating in FATA. 

The military also reserves the right to detain persons until it finds civil authority capable of 

taking detainees over. In effect, a quasimartial law exists.

Thus the civilian government has ceded control to the military. It retains some semblance of involvement with administration in the insurgency-prone areas: Recently the Apex 

Group brought together civilians and military personnel at the highest levels in the province 

of KP. However, the military has more or less determined and approved the group’s agenda. 

The military has a wider national stance than during earlier civilian regimes. Beyond the 

traditional areas of India and Kashmir, the military has exerted control over national policy 

concerning Afghanistan, nuclear weapons, and U.S. relations. 

The military has a wider 

national stance than during 

earlier civilian regimes. 

Beyond the traditional areas 

of India and Kashmir, the 

military has exerted control 

over national policy concerning 

Afghanistan, nuclear weapons, 

and U.S. relations. 
6 

As civilian governance deteriorates in Pakistan, the military is being drawn into new 

areas of influence. Increasingly, the military has become interested in economic policy as 

the civilian government has failed to undertake the necessary economic reforms to ensure 

sustainable growth. With the current government’s failure to muster support for reforms—

even within the governing party, let alone the political opposition—Pakistan could be 

on the path to economic failure if things do not change in the near future. The enormous 

spending on defense is a major burden on the exchequer, in addition to debt servicing, but 

the military budget is not subject to the detailed scrutiny or cutbacks that could give the 

government some breathing room. 

In addition to the civilian leadership’s failure to execute economic reforms, the army’s 

worries about the economy include the following:

•	 The army suffering if the economic pie shrinks. The army cannot rely entirely on foreign 

assistance, and given the budget debates in the United States, free-flowing aid will not 

continue forever, especially once U.S. military operations cease in Afghanistan. The U.S. 

Congress will have little desire to continue to finance Pakistan military operations under 

the coalition support funds.

•	 The military having to look after its own retirees. Its salary and pension costs are mounting, 

and to finance some of these activities off-budget, it has become involved in real estate, 

banking, and import substitution in defense production on a fairly large scale. Pakistan is 

worried it will lose its ability to produce defense materials, so protective tariffs are levied 

on foreign suppliers.

•	 Pakistan perceiving its history through a prism of bad experiences with foreign aid. The 

famous case of France pulling the plug on the transfer of nuclear technology is the kind 

of narrative that haunts Pakistan’s military. Another example is the F-16s that the United 

States first sold to Pakistan, withheld under sanctions laws, then would not sell to Pakistan. “The Pakistanis have never forgotten that betrayal,” wrote Bruce Riedel in Newsweek 

Pakistan.10 The recent U.S. withholding of $800 million of military assistance has added to 

the negative Pakistani narrative of this relationship.

Adopting an import substitution policy to retain autarky in military equipment has its 

price. Pakistan is producing washers for the army’s standard G3 rifle at five times the cost of 

readily available imports from Malaysia, according to a former head of the Pakistan Ordnance 

Factories. There are no effective controls or public scrutiny over military budgets or financial 

operations. The military controls the security-related agencies of the civilian government 

through surrogates. The Ministry of Defence, the titular superior institution in the defense 

establishment, is controlled by retired military officers. The defense secretary is a retired 

general, as are most of the other senior officials. The once-powerful finance adviser at the 

ministry, who decided military budgets and financial operations, has been reduced to a 

rubber stamp. 

What Does the Future Hold? 

In the next three to five years, the military’s influence over Pakistan’s polity will likely 

increase. The economy will not improve quickly. Politics are in a stalemate. The election in 

2013 is not likely to produce a powerful civilian government with a strong mandate, so the 

military will remain the strongest institution. One countervailing factor to the military’s 

growing pervasiveness, however, is the personal predilection of General Kayani—if, and only 

if, he maintains his current behind-the-curtain stance. Kayani and his team want to focus 

on military operations, but if civilians do not take charge, the military will take a larger role 

in civil affairs. Perhaps in the long term, civilians could take back some of their proper roles 

The election in 2013 is not 

likely to produce a powerful 

civilian government with a 

strong mandate, so the 

military will remain the 

strongest institution.
 7

and functions. Civil-military relations are more nuanced than many believe. It behooves 

leaders of both establishments to recognize those nuances and the importance of creating 

a knowledge base among civilians to better understand and manage the military under the 

rubric of the constitution.

What are current trends? There is much more debate on the role and size of the military 

within Pakistan than there has been in the past. Opposition politicians appear to have 

decided that they are not going to ask the army chief for political help, which is a positive 

development. Sharif has of late been the army’s major critic and, for that reason, some 

question whether he would be allowed to return to power. But in a divided coalition, that 

position may change, and if it does, the old politics of the 1990s may reemerge. Another 

major change is the military’s realization that it has an interest in a strong economy; it is 

also aware of the negative effects of excessive military spending. A newly vibrant judiciary 

and judicial activism are serving as brakes on the unfettered power of the government and 

the military. Suo moto actions by the judiciary are becoming frequent and civil society has 

become more vocal against governmental highhandedness.

On the other hand, there are reasons for pause. Since 2008, the actions of the military 

have not indicated that it is trying to restrain its sphere of influence. Adding to this are the 

government’s actions that betray the abdication of security sector control to the military. 

Rising violence inside Pakistan may portend a greater military role, even if political decisions 

more than military actions may be needed to restore calm to the country’s fractured polity. 

Conclusion

In Pakistan’s current political stalemate, one cannot be too optimistic about democratic 

outcomes. The military is not going away, nor can it because of its crucial role in protecting 

the borders of Pakistan and braking civilian excess. The civilian government, however, needs 

to take back the space the military now controls in determining policy toward extremism 

and militancy, and policing the FATA and troubled areas of Balochistan and KP. Such actions 

mean that civilian authorities need to gather more expertise in defense matters, refrain 

from asking the military to intervene, and strengthen civilian institutions to perform democratic duties. If these basic initiatives are taken, the public will likely become more vested 

in maintaining a democracy.

Lastly, there needs to be more public and parliamentary discussion on the National 

Security Council and other mechanisms for bringing civilians and military officials together. 

Lessons from other countries, such as Turkey, indicate that the military usually steps back 

when regional conflict subsides and the absence of external threat reduces its importance. 

In Turkey, there is a constitutional mechanism for the military to have its say. A similar 

mechanism needs to be formalized in Pakistan. Anything that the United States and other 

friends of Pakistan can do on that front would be beneficial. 

An increase in civilian authority over the military would also result from the following 

institutional reforms:

•	 Civilian authorities expanding their knowledge and experience in the security sector.

•	 The military better coordinating its antimilitancy and antiinsurgency activities with the 

civil administration.

•	 The military studiously reducing its footprint in the government and the economy.

•	 Government enacting and implementing the NACTA under the prime minister’s direct control and bringing the military units dealing with terrorism under its umbrella.

•	 Improving transparency in governance to garner public support for better management of 

the security sector. 

A newly vibrant judiciary 

and judicial activism are 

serving as brakes on the 

unfettered power of the 

government and the military.
8 

The path to democracy and greater civilian control of the security sector in Pakistan is 

not going to be easy, but it is worth the effort—for the civilian government to better inform 

itself about security issues and lead in decision making, and for the military to give civilians space, even to make mistakes. Friends of Pakistan and neighbors in this highly volatile 

region may be able to help by reducing tensions and assisting in Pakistan’s economic stability and expansion. In this regard, normalization of Pakistan’s relations with India would be 

a key foundation for stability in the region.
 9

Appendix

Excerpts from Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution:11, 12, 13

243. Command of Armed Forces.

(1) The Federal Government shall have control and command of the Armed Forces.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the Supreme 

Command of the Armed Forces shall vest in the President.

(3) The President shall subject to law, have power—

 (a) to raise and maintain the Military, Naval, and Air Forces of Pakistan; and the 

Reserves of such Forces; and

 (b) to grant Commissions in such Forces.

[258G] The President shall, on advice of the Prime Minister, appoint—

 (a) the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee

 (b) the Chief of the Army Staff;

 (c) the Chief of the Naval Staff; and

 (d) the Chief of the Air Staff,

and shall also determine their salaries and allowances.

244. Oath of Armed Forces.

Every member of the Armed Forces shall make oath in the form set out in the Third 

Schedule.

245. Functions of Armed Forces.

[259] (1) The Armed Forces shall, under the direction of the Federal Government, defend 

Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war, and, subject to law, act in aid of civil 

power when called upon to do so.

[259A] (2) The validity of any direction issued by the Federal Government under clause (1) 

shall not be called in question in any court.

(3) A High Court shall not exercise any jurisdiction under Article 199 in relation to 

any area in which the Armed Forces of Pakistan are, for the time being, acting in aid of civil 

power in pursuance of Article 245:

Provided that this clause shall not be deemed to affect the jurisdiction of the High Court 

in respect of any proceeding pending immediately before the day on which the Armed Forces 

start acting in aid of civil power.

(4) Any proceeding in relation to an area referred to in clause (3) instituted on or 

after the day the Armed Forces start acting in aid of civil power and pending in any High 

Court shall remain suspended for the period during which the Armed Forces are so acting.

18th Amendment Pertaining to the Military:14

90. Substitution of Article 243 in the Constitution.-

In the Constitution, for Article 243, the following shall be substituted, namely:—

“243. Command of Armed Forces.

(1) The Federal Government shall have control and command of the Armed Forces.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the Supreme 

Command of the Armed Forces shall vest in the President.

(3) The President shall subject to law, have power-

 (a) to raise and maintain the Military, Naval, and Air Forces of Pakistan; and the 

Reserves of such Forces; and
10 

 (b) to grant Commissions in such Forces.

(3) The President shall, on advice of the Prime Minister, appoint-

 (a) the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee;

 (b) the Chief of the Army Staff;

 (c) the Chief of the Naval Staff; and

 (d) the Chief of the Air Staff,

and shall also determine their salaries and allowances.”

Military Oath of Office: Members Of The Armed Forces

Article 244

(In the name of Allah, the most Beneficent, the most Merciful.) 

I, ____________, do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to Pakistan and uphold the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which embodies the 

will of the people, that I will not engage myself in any political activities whatsoever and 

that I will honestly and faithfully serve Pakistan in the Pakistan Army (or Navy or Air Force) 

as required by and under the law.

May Allah Almighty help and guide me (A’meen).

Oath for Chief Justice or a Judge of the Federal Shariat Court substituted by 

the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010:15

Article 203 C (7)

(In the name of Allah, the most Beneficent, the most Merciful.)

I, ____________, do solemnly swear that, as the Chief Justice (or a Judge of the Federal Shariat Court, I will discharge my duties, and perform my functions, honestly, to the 

best of my ability and faithfully in accordance with law;

And that I will not allow my personal interest to influence my official conduct or my 

official decisions.

May Allah Almighty help and guide me (A’meen).

Excerpts from The Draft: National Counter Terrorism Authority Pakistan Ordinance 

2010: 16

An Ordinance

WHEREAS, the menace of terrorism and extremism is becoming an existential threat to 

the state and needs to be responded to and addressed comprehensively;

AND WHEREAS, in order to eliminate this menace, a focal institution to unify state 

response by planning, combining, coordinating, and implementing the Federal Government’s Policy through an exhaustive strategic planning and necessary ancillary mechanism 

is needed;

AND WHEREAS, the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary to take immediate action to set up such an institution in the country;

NOW, THEREFORE, in pursuance of Article 89 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic 

of Pakistan, the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is pleased to make and promulgate the following Ordinance, namely:

3. Establishment of the Authority.

(1) As soon as may be, but not later than 30 days after the promulgation of this Ordinance, the Federal Government shall, by notification in the official gazette, establish an 

Authority to be known as the National Counter Terrorism Authority Pakistan for carrying out 

the purposes of this Ordinance.
 11

(2) The Authority shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common 

seal with powers, subject to the provision of this Ordinance, to acquire and hold property, 

movable and immovable, and to sue and be sued by its name. 

(3) The headquarters of the Authority shall be at Islamabad, and it may set up offices at 

such place or places in Pakistan, with the approval of the Federal Government.

4. Functions of the Authority.

The Authority shall have the following functions, namely:

 (a) to receive and collate information/intelligence and coordinate between all relevant stakeholders to formulate threat assessment with periodical reviews to be 

presented to the Federal Government for making adequate and timely efforts to 

counter terrorism and extremism;

 (b) to coordinate and prepare comprehensive National Counter Terrorism and National 

Counter Extremism Strategies, and review them on a periodical basis;

 (c) to develop Action Plans against terrorism and extremism and report to the Federal 

Government about implementation of these plans, on a periodical basis;

 (d) to carry out research on topics relevant to terrorism and extremism, and to prepare and circulate documents;

 (e) to carry out liaison with international entities for facilitating cooperation in areas 

relating to terrorism and extremism; and 

 (f) the Authority shall have administrative and financial powers as approved by the 

Federal Government.

5. Board of Governors.

(1) The Authority shall have a Board of Governors comprising the following, namely:

 (a) Prime Minister—Chairman

 (b) Minister for Interior—Deputy Chairman

 (c) Chief Ministers of 4 Provinces and Gilgit/Baltistan—Members

 (d) Prime Minister of AJK—Member

 (e) Minister for Finance—Member

 (f) Minister for Foreign Affairs—Member

 (g) Minister for Education—Member

 (h) Minister for Information—Member

 (i) Minister for Defence—Member

 (j) One Senator (recommended by Chairman Senate)—Member

 (k) One MNA (recommended by Speaker National Assembly)—Member

 (l) Secretary, Ministry of Interior—Member

 (m) DG ISI—Member

 (n) DG IB—Member

 (o) DIG Special Branch (4 Provinces, AJK and Gilgit/Baltistan)—Members

 (p) DG FIA—Member

 (q) National Coordinator—Member

 (r) Any person can be invited by special invitation.

(2) The National Coordinator shall act as the Secretary to the Board.

6. Procedures of the meeting of the Board.

(1) The members of the Board shall participate in the meeting, and 50 percent of the 

members would form a quorum to hold a meeting.

(2) The Board may meet as and when required, but it shall meet at least twice 

a year.

(3)In the absence of the Chairman of the Board, the Deputy Chairman shall preside over 

the meeting.
12 

(4) No act or proceedings of the Commission shall be invalid by reason only of the existence of a vacancy in, or defect in the constitution of, the Board.

7. Powers and functions of the Board.

(1) The Board’s powers and functions shall include, but would not be limited to, the following, namely:

 (a) The Board shall exercise all the power and functions of the Authority;

 (b) To provide strategic vision and oversee activities of the Authority;

 (c) To make rules and regulations and approve policies and manuals in order to carry 

out the purposes of this Ordinance;

 (d) To approve the annual budget of the Authority.

(2) The Board may, through a majority decision of its Members and subject to such conditions as it deems necessary, delegate any of its functions and powers to the Chairman and 

National Coordinator. All actions taken in the exercise of all such delegated functions and 

powers shall be submitted to the Board for information in the subsequent Board meeting.

8. National Coordinator.

(1) There shall be a National Coordinator of the Authority to be appointed by the Federal 

Government, on the recommendation of the Ministry of Interior.

(2) The National Coordinator shall have the following powers, as delegated by the Board, 

and instructions issued by the Federal Government from time to time:

 (a) To execute the policies and plans approved by the Board and instructions issued 

by the Federal Government;

 (b) To determine terms and conditions of the employees and to grant additional 

allowances or any other incentives to them by making rules and regulations to 

that effect in accordance with the Federal Government policies;

 (c) To take appropriate measures for effective administration of the Authority;

 (d) To engage any person or entity on a contract basis with the approval of Ministry 

of Interior to carry out assignments, or for the consultancy in accordance with 

the acclaimed best practices;

 (e) To establish administrative structures at the field level for the efficient implementation and accessibility of the Authority.

Source: Shuja Nawaz, Learning by Doing: The Pakistan Army’s Experience with Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2011).
 13

Security Agencies in Pakistan:17

Federal Government

Gilgit-Baltistan Police Azad Kashmir Police

Police

Four Provincial Governments

Punjab

Police

Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa Police

Sindh

Police

Balochistan

Police

Ministry of 

Narcotics Control

Ministry of 

Communications

Ministry of 

Defense

Ministry of 

Railways

Anti -

Narcotics

Force

National Highways

and Motorway Police

Airport

Security Force

Railway

Police

Inter-Services

Intelligence

Counter-Terrorism Centre

Intelligence Bureau

Ministry of 

Interior

Pakistan Rangers

Punjab Rangers

Sindh Rangers

Pakistan Maritime

Security Agency

Capital Territory Police

(Islamabad)

National

Counterterrorism

Authority

FATA: Levies and Khasadars

Frontier Corps

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa FC

Balochistan FC

Frontier Constabulary

Gilgit-Baltistan Scouts

Federal Investigation Agency

National Police

Bureau

National Public

Safety

Commission

National Police

Management

Board

Gilgit-Baltistan Government Azad Kashmir Government

 15

Notes

1. Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, interviewed by Susanne Koelbl, “Terror is Our Enemy, Not India,” Der 

Spiegel, January 6, 2009.

2. Author’s numerous conversations with Major General (Ret.) Syed Shahid Hamid.

3. See the excellent survey of this civilian security agency landscape in Hassan Abbas, “Reforming Pakistan’s 

Police and Law Enforcement,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report no. 266, Washington, DC, 2011, 

http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr266.pdf.

4. Abbas, “Reforming Pakistan’s Police.”

5. Nasim Zehra, “ISI Flip Flop: Anatomy of Defective Decision Making,” The Khaleej Times, August 2, 2008.

6. Kayani’s recollection, as shared with a retired senior army officer.

7. Conversations with Major General (Ret.) Mahmud Ali Durrani and other senior military officers.

8. Shuja Nawaz, Learning by Doing: The Pakistan Army’s Experience with Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Atlantic 

Council, 2011), 20, 29–31.

9 “An order shall not be made under clause (1) on application made by or in relation to a person who is a member 

of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, or who is for the time being subject to any law relating to any of those Forces, 

in respect of his terms and conditions of service, in respect of any matter arising out of his service, or in respect 

of any action taken in relation to him as a member of the Armed Forces of Pakistan or as a person subject to 

such law.”

10 Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan Plays Hardball,” Newsweek Pakistan, April 18, 2011.

11. Zartash Uzmi and Shehzaad Nakhoda, “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,” http://www.

pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/.

12. “5” substituted for “3” by the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010 (Article 100(i)), effective April 

19, 2010, http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/amendments/18amendment.html.

13. “130(5)” substituted for “131(4)” the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010 (Article 100(ii)), effective 

April 19, 2010.

14. Substituted by the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010 (Article 100(iii)), effective April 19, 2010, 

for the words “I will discharge.”

15. Oath for Chief Justice or a Judge of the Federal Shariat Court substituted by the Constitution (Eighteenth 

Amendment) Act, 2010 (Article 100(iv)), effective April 19, 2010.

16. Selected excerpts from the draft National Counter Terrorism Authority Pakistan Ordinance 2010.

17. Hassan Abbas, “Reforming Pakistan’s Police and Law Enforcement,” United States Institute of Peace Special 

Report no. 266, Washington, DC, 2011, 5. 
Of Related Interest

•	 Reforming Pakistan’s Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure: Is It Too Flawed to Fix? by 

Hassan Abbas (Special Report, February 2011)

•	 How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster by Howard B. 

Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer (USIP Press 2011)

•	 Police Corruption: What Past Scandals Teach about Current Challenges by David Bayley and 

Robert M. Perito (Special Report, November 2011)

•	 Lessons from Embedded Reconstruction Teams in Iraq by John K. Naland (Special Report, 

October 2011)

•	 The Iraq Federal Police: U.S. Police Building under Fire by Robert M. Perito (Special Report, 

October 2011)

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Washington, DC 20037

www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.