About the Report

This report, commissioned by the United States Institute 

of Peace, examines the Indus Waters Treaty and its role 

in contemporary international hydropolitics in the Indus 

basin, paying particular attention to the most recent river 

development projects on the Indian side of the Indus’s three 

western tributaries. Conflicts around contemporary large-scale 

water development projects in the Indian and Pakistani 

parts of the Indus basin are also reviewed. Arguing against 

assumptions about the inevitability of conflict over water 

because of its future absolute scarcity, this report finds that, 

on the international level, the lack of transparency in data 

sharing between India and Pakistan and the trust deficit 

between them have real potential for accentuating tensions in 

the aubcontinent. It also finds that, on the subnational level, 

focus on the supply side of water management and pervasive 

inequities and inefficiencies in water distribution in 

both India and Pakistan have the potential to drive 

interprovincial conflict in Pakistan. 

Daanish Mustafa is a senior lecturer in Environment, 

Politics, and Development at the Department of Geography, 

King’s College, London. His research interests include the 

intersection of water resources, environmental hazards, and 

development, primarily in Pakistan.

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 261 November 2010

© 2010 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Daanish Mustafa

Hydropolitics in 

Pakistan’s Indus Basin

Summary

•	 Water problems in Pakistan result largely from poor management, but the consequences of 

management failures are accentuated, both materially and politically, by international and 

subnational hydropolitics.

•	 There is enough water in the Indus basin to provide for the livelihoods of its residents for a 

long time, provided that the water is managed efficiently and equitably and that additional 

water is made available not just through storage but, more importantly, through higher 

efficiency and intersectoral transfers.

•	 The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) seems to moderate the worst impulses of India and Pakistan 

toward each other, and perhaps therein lies IWT’s greatest strength.

•	 Pakistani engineers typically interpret the IWT’s extensive technical annexures very literally, 

whereas the Indian engineers tend to emphasize the treaty’s criteria for techno-economically sound project design.

•	 No single completed or proposed Indian project on the three western rivers of the Indus 

basin alone has the potential to significantly limit flows of water to Pakistan. But the long 

list of proposed Indian projects on the those rivers will in the future give India the cumulative storage capacity to reduce substantively water flows to Pakistan during the low-flow 

winter months.

•	 The IWT, by performing an amputation surgery on the basin, made matters simple and 

allowed India and Pakistan to pursue their nationalist agendas without much need for more 

sophisticated and involved cooperation in the water field. This lack of cooperative sharing 

of water leaves the ecological and social consequences of the treaty to be negotiated and 

contested at the subnational scale.

•	 The interprovincial conflict over water distribution in Pakistan has potential—albeit entirely 

avoidable—repercussions for stability, at both the subnational and international levels.

•	 Instead of constructing very expensive, environmentally damaging, and economically dubious water-storage megaprojects in Pakistan, enhancement of the existing infrastructure’s 

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SPECIAL REPORT

Contents

Introduction 2

International Hydropolitics 4

Subnational Hydropolitics 8

Moving Ahead: Prospects for Cooperative Hydropolitics 12
2

efficiency, coupled with better on-farm water management and more appropriate irrigation 

and farming techniques, would perhaps more than make up for any additional water that 

might be gained from megaprojects.

•	 Since the drought in southern Pakistan in the latter half of the 1990s, the single-minded 

focus of the Pakistani water bureaucracy on water development has made the issue of the 

construction of the Kalabagh Dam project a surrogate for a litany of Sindhi grievances 

against the Punjabi-dominated political, military, and bureaucratic system in Pakistan.

•	 The emphasis on maximizing water withdrawals and on greater regulation of the Indus 

river system contributed to accentuating the very high flood peaks in 2010. Although the 

floods are being used by the pro-dams lobby to call for construction of more storage on 

the Indus, the tragedy ought to inspire a more nuanced and comprehensive reevaluation of 

the water-management system in the basin. 

•	 The IWT is a product of its time and could be fruitfully modified and renegotiated to 

bring it more in line with contemporary international watercourse law, the Helsinki rules, 

and emerging concerns with water quality, environmental sustainability, climate change, 

and principles of equitable sharing. But that renegotiation, if it ever happens, is going 

to be contingent upon significant improvement in bilateral relations between India and 

Pakistan.

•	 India could be more forthcoming with flow data and be more prompt and open in communicating its planned projects on the Indus basin to Pakistan, particularly in the western 

basin. 

•	 Pakistan can engage with India within the context of the IWT more positively than defensively, and also educate its media and politicians so as not to sensationalize essentially 

technical arguments by presenting them as existential threats.

Introduction

The semiarid environment of the Indus basin is home to more than a quarter of a billion 

people, with some of the lowest human-development indicators in the world. As if the marginal environment and the pervasive poverty were not enough, deep political fissures across 

international, subnational, and local boundaries characterize the political geography of the 

basin. Just as Egypt has been described as a gift of the Nile, the bustling ancient cultures of 

northwestern South Asia and present-day Pakistan and northwestern India can be described 

as the gift of the Indus. There were, of course, bustling communities of agropastoralists 

and inundation-irrigation-based agriculture in the basin prior to the construction of the 

present-day system in the nineteenth century.1 The present-day agricultural productivity 

and population densities, however, would not have been possible without the contemporary 

irrigation system. Given the stakes involved, in terms of the livelihoods of millions of people, 

the Indus River basin has been a veritable laboratory for international and national research 

on various problems associated with water distribution, development, and management, 

especially those problems that pertain to issues of water efficiency, equity, hazards, and 

environmental quality.2 More recently, though, what had been a laboratory for devising 

water management solutions has become an arena of conflict over water both between India 

and Pakistan and between ethnic groups and provinces in Pakistan. 

Nowhere is the need for a focus on the political, economic, and discursive factors driving 

resource use and distribution more urgent than in the field of water resources. The sterile 

per capita fresh-water-availability numbers may seem alarming to many observers,3 but 

such alarm serves only to divert attention from water’s problematic social geography, its 

extremely skewed distribution across sectors and social groups, and its conceptualization by 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

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About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor 

of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, 

D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American 

University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, James R. 

Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. • Ikram U. 

Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, 

Nev. • Kerry Kennedy, Human Rights Activist • Stephen D. 

Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor 

of Law, George Mason University, Arlington, Va. • Judy Van 

Rest, Executive Vice President, International Republican 

Institute, Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy •

Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
3

the power elites as a resource to be deployed toward modernist economic development, in 

isolation from its ecological and social roles.4 Surprisingly, even though scholars continue 

to talk about per capita water-availability numbers, ordinary water users at the local level 

tend to know that water scarcity is really mediated by social power relations.5

The following analyses of water and security in the Indus basin reject the argument 

that absolute population growth is responsible for absolute resource scarcity. This report 

argues instead that environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and resource security are 

all socially constructed—normative and collective understandings that have consequences 

for physical and social worlds.6 Furthermore, the epistemic (knowledge-based experts) 

and political communities that are most influential in the social construction of environment and security are found at the subnational level, but they have important linkages 

to international epistemic communities (e.g., the engineering profession). The following 

survey of the Indus basin concentrates on the geopolitical context that renders Indus basin 

hydropolitics so riven with conflict and on the perceived limited range of choices of South 

Asian water managers, which accentuates deeply held sensitivities about water by both the 

general public and the politicians. The key insight offered by this report is that water problems in Pakistan result largely from poor water management, but that the consequences of 

management failures are accentuated, both materially and politically, by international and 

subnational hydropolitics. There is enough water in the basin to provide for the livelihoods 

of its residents for a long time, provided that the water is managed efficiently and equitably 

and that additional water is made available not just through storage but, more importantly, 

also through higher efficiency and intersectoral transfers.

The report builds a narrative of contemporary hydropolitics in the basin at the international level, paying particular attention to the dispute resolution mechanism between India 

and Pakistan under the rubric of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT). The report then discusses 

subnational-scale hydropolitics with reference to the Kalabagh Dam controversy in Pakistan 

and the water dispute between Punjab and Haryana states in India. The report concludes 

will identify possible avenues for the international community’s intervention to facilitate 

cooperation rather than conflict over water in the Indus basin. 

There is enough water in 

the basin to provide for the 

livelihoods of its residents for 

a long time, provided that the 

water is managed efficiently 

and equitably.

Figure 1. Indus Basin and Its Major Infrastructure

Even though scholars continue 

to talk about per capita 

water-availability numbers, 

ordinary water users at the local 

level tend to know that water 

scarcity is really mediated by 

social power relations.
4

International Hydropolitics

In the immediate aftermath of the partition of the subcontinent between the two independent states of Pakistan and India, the issue of water distribution in the Indus basin—now 

divided—was to gain immediate urgency for the Pakistani government and the populace 

at large. As a result of the partition on August 15, 1947, the headworks of two important 

canal systems were left in Indian territory, and the command areas in Pakistani territory. In 

the absence of any arrangement for the sharing of water in those canal commands, the two 

countries concluded a “standstill agreement,” which provided for the maintenance of existing flows until March 31, 1948, to allow time to reach a longer-term settlement. However, 

the agreement lapsed without settlement, and the very next day the provincial government 

of Indian Punjab suspended supplies to Pakistan. This suspension of water was seared into 

the Pakistani consciousness as evidence of Indian desire to undermine the fragile new 

dominion of Pakistan.7 The supplies were restored eighteen days later, and soon after the 

two countries concluded what came to be known as the Inter-Dominion Agreement, which 

called for continued negotiations for a final settlement of the water issue. This brief episode 

of the suspension of water supplies alarmed the Pakistani water bureaucracy into initiating 

the Bombanwala-Ravi-Bedian-Dipalpur (BRBD) link canal project, which would allow flows 

from the Ravi River to be diverted to the Sutluj. Significantly, this project demonstrated to 

Pakistani engineers the viability of compensatory interriver water transfers—a lesson that 

was to be at the core of Pakistan’s postion during the IWT negotiations.8

Indus Waters Treaty

Thanks to the active mediation and financial support of the World Bank and the Western 

powers, led by the United States, India and Pakistan signed the IWT in 1960, allocating the 

entire flow of the three eastern tributaries of the Indus River—Ravi, Sutluj, and Beas—to 

India and the three western tributaries—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab—to Pakistan. The 

World Bank rewarded both Pakistan and India with massive aid inflows to build storage and 

conveyance facilities to provide remedial water supplies for the flows that were supposedly 

lost to the other country.9

The resources for water storage and diversion facilities in both countries were made 

available in the geopolitical context of the Cold War. Pakistan had relatively early on aligned 

itself with the U.S.-led Western military alliances, such as the Central Treaty Organization 

(CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). India, on the other hand, was 

one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement, which sought to chart an 

independent course between the two superpowers. But despite the trappings of apparent 

nonalignment, the United States at the time looked upon the Non-Aligned Movement with 

considerable hostility as a front for pro-Soviet postcolonial states from the global South. 

Furthermore, the government of India at the time did maintain friendly relations with the 

Soviet Union and did draw upon the Soviets for military hardware. In that context, then, the 

Western allies led by the United States were willing to make much more resources available 

to both India and Pakistan to spread their influence in South Asia than would probably have 

been forthcoming otherwise.

The IWT was a trilateral treaty between, India, Pakistan, and the World Bank. It was 

concluded in an atmosphere of considerable mutual suspicion, particularly in the context 

of Pakistan’s paranoia about the upper riparian—India’s—ability and intentions to deprive 

Pakistan of water. Nationalist engineers negotiated the IWT, and the treaty did not concern 

The headworks of two important 

canal systems were left 

in Indian territory, and 

the command areas in 

Pakistani territory. 
5

itself with more contemporary principles of equitable sharing of water between riparians.10 

Rather, the treaty mirrored the political landscape of the time by simply dividing the basin 

between the two countries instead of providing for meaningful cooperative management or 

sharing. As mentioned, India was given rights to the three eastern rivers of the Indus basin 

and Pakistan was given full rights to the three western rivers. Pakistan’s rights on the three 

western rivers, however, acknowledged customary use of water in the Indian territory and 

allowed for limited diversion for agricultural purposes and for run-of-the-river electricitygeneration projects. It is the IWT provisions allowing India limited use of the three western 

rivers that has caused the most conflict. The IWT provides for specific coordination mechanisms through the Indus Commission, with dispute resolution to pass in a stepwise fashion 

from the Indus Commission, which is composed of Indian and Pakistani representatives and 

administers the IWT,11 to the governments of India and Pakistan, to a neutral expert, and 

then to a Court of Arbitration. 

The key feature of the IWT was its extensive technical annexures, which are typically 

interpreted very literally by Pakistani engineers, whereas Indian engineers tend to emphasize the treaty’s criteria for techno-economically sound project design.12 For example, as 

will be illustrated later, the IWT’s technical annexures do not allow for substantial storage 

on projects on the three western rivers upstream of Pakistan. The treaty also puts strong 

limitations on structures with movable gates that could manipulate the storage upstream of 

Pakistan in any project on the three western rivers of the basin. But, given the high seasonal 

flow variability of the Indus basin rivers, which also carry some of the highest silt loads 

in the world, projects often simply cannot be technically or economically viable without 

a liberal interpretation of the limitations on those regulating structures, such as movable 

spillway gates. This issue is further elucidated later in this report, in the context of the first 

episode of resorting to the neutral expert by India and Pakistan.

The massive water development carried out in both India and Pakistan as part of the 

Indus Basin Water Development Project in the aftermath of the IWT provided a temporary 

boon to agricultural water supplies in the basin.13 But one of the more obvious hydropolitical implications of the IWT was the capacity of the two governments to build infrastructure 

with more overt security implications. The efficacy of canals as defensive infrastructure 

that could serve as tank ditches and hinder enemy movement was not lost on the military 

planners of the two countries. General J. N. Chaudhury, chief of army staff of the Indian 

Army from 1962 to 1966, commenting on the prospect of an Indian assault on Lahore on 

the eve of the 1965 India-Pakistan war, proclaimed, “All my experience teaches me never to 

start an operation with the crossing of an opposed water obstacle; as far as I am concerned 

I have ruled out Lahore or a crossing at Dera Baba Nanak.”14 But he was made to go against 

his better judgment when he was ordered by his civilian bosses to mount precisely such an 

assault on Lahore. The quote, however, illustrates the recognition of the defensive importance of canals and other water bodies in Indian and Pakistani military thinking. The alignment of the BRBD canal was very much influenced by military considerations, and it served 

its defensive purpose quite well during the 1965 war. On the Indian side, the importance of 

defensive considerations cannot be discounted in the alignment and operations of canals—

for example, the Indira Gandhi Canal. The 649-kilometer canal serves the dual purpose of 

irrigation canal and tank ditch. Some have pointed to the ecological and economic pitfalls 

of the canal, but measures such as encouraging settlement only on its left bank seem to 

indicate a strong defensive bias in its conception, alignment, and operation.15 The military 

functionality of canals is well known on the Pakistani side as well, where canals are often 

operated to simulate flooding during military exercises to the detriment of their supposed 

function as irrigation water suppliers.

One of the more obvious 

hydropolitical implications of 

the IWT was the capacity of 

the two governments to build 

infrastructure with more overt 

security implications.
6

Dispute Resolution under the IWT Rubric

The IWT has been relatively successful, at the very least by virtue of surviving two and a half 

wars and frequent military mobilizations by India and Pakistan. But some of the disputes 

that arose in the context of the treaty are also indicative of the nature of the treaty and the 

nationalist-driven hydropolitics of the basin, which are further inflected by the supply-side 

engineering bias of the water managers of the two countries. In this case, supply side means 

a simplistic equation whereby growing populations must be provided additional water supplies by enhancing the supply of water through storage or more water control structures and 

not through gains in use efficiency or intersectoral water transfers.

Relatively early on, for example, there was disagreement over Indian plans to build the 

Salal hydroelectric project on the Chenab River. After negotiations at the governmental 

level, the Pakistanis accepted the project in the 1970s. Subsequently, the Tulbul/Wullar 

project on the Jhelum River from the early 1980s and the Baglihar hydroelectric project on 

the Chenab River from the late 1990s became prolonged sources of disagreement. Because 

of Pakistani objections, work on the Tulbul/Wullar project was stopped in the 1980s, and 

the project is still a subject of negotiations between the two governments. On the Baglihar 

project, however, the government of Pakistan invoked the arbitration clause for the first 

time in the treaty’s history in 2005.16

Pakistani objections to the Baglihar regarded primarily the technical specifications of 

the run-of-the-river project—that is, a river project without dams or storage. Although the 

project was initiated in 1992, the Pakistanis did not object to it until 1999, when they complained about changes in the design of the project on which they had not been consulted. 

The Indians protested that the changes were necessary for the techno-economic viability 

of the project. The public view in Pakistan, however, was that India was somehow trying to 

dam the Chenab River, which was Pakistan’s by virtue of the IWT, whereas Indians viewed 

Pakistani objections as yet another example of Pakistanis’ negativism about any legitimate 

Indian project on the three western tributaries.17 The dispute was a manifestation of the 

different interpretations the two countries’ engineers had of the treaty. In the words of a 

former Indian secretary for water resources, Ramaswamy Iyer,

Pakistan regards the western rivers as its rivers under the treaty, and tends to look with 

jaundiced eyes at any attempts by India to build structures on those rivers. Structures 

give control, and Pakistan is reluctant to agree to India acquiring a measure of control 

over those rivers, that stand allocated to Pakistan. The treaty gives Pakistan virtually a 

veto power over Indian projects on the Western rivers, which Pakistan tends to exercise 

in a stringent rather than accommodating fashion.18

Pakistani possessiveness about the western rivers notwithstanding, it is also a fact that 

much of Pakistan’s technical objections to projects such as Baglihar are informed by security 

concerns, such as India’s potential ability to impound water during low-flow winter months 

and/or to release excess water during high-flow months to cause flooding in downstream 

Pakistan. India of course protests (1) that it cannot flood Pakistan without flooding itself 

first, (2) that the water projects are necessary for the development of the disputed state 

of Jammu and Kashmir, and (3) that the design elements of the Baglihar are necessary for 

the safety and techno-economic viability of the project. The neutral expert appointed by 

the World Bank to resolve the dispute gave his binding decision on the Baglihar dispute in 

2007, essentially accepting some of the Pakistani concerns by asking India to respond to 

them but rejecting other concerns. This allowed the project to go forward with some design 

changes.19 Both the countries claimed the neutral expert’s decision as a victory, though 

the Indians had more of a cause for such a claim, because the neutral expert conceded the 

fundamental design issues of the impounding of water and the location of the movable 

spillway gates for the project.

Much of Pakistan’s technical 

objections to projects such 

as Baglihar are informed by 

security concerns, such as India’s 

potential ability to impound 

water during low-flow winter 

months and/or to release excess 

water during high-flow months.
7

Overall, Pakistan’s perceived negativism might be vexing for India but has not been unreasonable. The Salal Dam was agreed to by Pakistan once Pakistan’s concerns were satisfied, and 

there was no official protest on Baglihar until the design changes that, in Pakistan’s view, 

went against IWT provisions. Pakistan has never opposed an Indian project on the western 

tributaries in principle. Its objections have always been technical and based upon a literal

reading of the IWT. That literal reading is intentional. Indeed, at the time of the treaty signing, extensive technical annexures were added to the treaty and agreed to precisely because 

such future disputes were anticipated. It should, however, be noted that the Indus Commission is a rather secretive organization and with good reason. News of any Indian projects on 

the western rivers, once leaked to the Pakistani press, becomes highly emotive and inflames 

public opinion. In that environment, it becomes virtually impossible for Pakistani engineers 

to evaluate a project on its technical merits alone and concede Indian projects on the three 

western rivers without taking public opinion into account. This problem will likely become 

more pronounced because Pakistan and India have highly diverse and vocal electronic media. 

The truth is that no single completed or proposed Indian project on the three western rivers 

of the Indus basin alone has the potential to significantly limit flows of water to Pakistan. But 

given the long list of proposed Indian projects on the three western rivers, India will in the 

future have the cumulative storage capacity to substantively reduce water flows to Pakistan 

during the low-flow winter months. It is this potential capacity that Pakistan is ultimately 

afraid of, but this is a fear that India does not recognize as legitimate.20

Besides the Baglihar challenge to the IWT, there was some talk in India in 2002 of 

rescinding the treaty altogether because of “cross-border terrorism,” particularly the attack 

on the Indian parliament in December 2001, and the ensuing mobilization of the two countries’ armed forces. Notwithstanding this talk, the expert view held that the treaty was 

serving both countries’ interests and that rescinding it would open a Pandora’s box of bilateral water-sharing issues between India and Pakistan and other South Asian countries—a 

situation India could ill afford.21

More recently, the political temperature in Pakistan again began to rise on account 

of India’s Kishenganga–Jhelum run-of-the-river hydroelectric project. The project, on a 

tributary of the Jhelum River, proposes to divert water from the Kishenganga River (also 

called the Neelum River in downstream Pakistan) a few kilometers upstream from where it 

enters Pakistan across the Line of Control in Kashmir and channel it through a tunnel to a 

tributary of the Jhelum River to generate electricity. The diverted water does theoretically 

reenter Pakistan via the Jhelum River. The Pakistani water establishment is irked, because it 

has a similar planned run-of-the-river project on the Kishenganga River soon after it enters 

Pakistani-administered Kashmir. Pakistani project’s design specifications and economic viability are contingent on the specifications of the Indian project and evaluation of river-flow 

data supplied by India. According to Pakistani sources, the Indians, when asked for design 

specifications and flow data, have not been forthcoming.22 For example, when the upstream 

low-flow data was requested, the numbers received were much higher than what Pakistan 

had historically experienced downstream. Pakistanis’ suspicions about Indian intentions are 

further accentuated by the fact that India in general holds stream-flow data as a state secret 

and that there is very little possibility to independently verify the data. In this context, 

then, data quality and accessibility are at the heart of the brewing conflict between the two 

countries. The Indus Commission agreed in principle in late July 2010 to install a telemetry 

system on the Indus River system.23 One hopes that the installation and judicious use of 

the system will be an important confidence-building measure between the two countries in 

the water sector, though the fate of a similar system in Pakistan for interprovincial water 

distribution—discussed later—is not very encouraging.
8

To reiterate, the international hydropolitics of surface water between India and Pakistan 

are delimited within the bounds of the IWT. The treaty is a product of its time and would 

probably not have been negotiated the same way today. Pakistan’s perceived negativism 

toward Indian projects on the three western tributaries do rankle Indian nationalist elements, just the same as Indian river development arouses Pakistanis’ worst fears about India’s 

intentions. Ironically, Pakistan’s negativism most rankles the Indian-administered Kashmiri 

population, which considers such obstructionism as evidence of Pakistan’s relative indifference to its well being. The trust deficit between the two countries is played out through 

the technical negotiations between the two governments and rhetorical posturing in their 

respective media. All told, though, the IWT does seem to moderate the worst impulses of the 

two countries vis-à-vis each other, and perhaps therein lies IWT’s greatest strength.

The IWT, by performing an amputation surgery on the basin that was much the same 

as the political bifurcation of the subcontinent, made matters simple and allowed the two 

countries to pursue their nationalist agendas without much need for more sophisticated 

and involved cooperation in the water field. This lack of cooperative sharing of water leaves 

the ecological and social consequences of the treaty to be negotiated and contested at 

the subnational level, which has considerable negative consequences for the ecology and 

societies of the Indus basin. 

Subnational Hydropolitics 

In both India and Pakistan, subnational hydropolitics have been political lightning rods in 

terms of interprovincial relations. In the case of India, the issue of interstate water distribution between Punjab, Haryana, and Rajastan became one (among many others) of the 

catalysts for a very destructive separatist insurgency. In the case of Pakistan, however, the 

conflict over water distribution between the dominant Punjab province and remaining smaller provinces in the federation, particularly Sindh province, has remained peaceful and limited to the political arena, though its wholesale appropriation by Sindhi nationalist elements 

in their rhetoric bodes ill for the future. The fratricidal insurgency in the Indian Punjab in 

the 1980s claimed thousands of lives and almost spun into an international conflict between 

India and Pakistan when the Indian Armed Forces were mobilized in 1987 on the pretext of 

stopping Pakistan’s alleged support to militancy in the Indian Punjab. The insurgency had 

a number of causes, including water conflict between Punjab and Haryana. Similarly, the 

ongoing interprovincial argument over water distribution in Pakistan has potential—though 

entirely avoidable—repercussions for stability, both at the subnational and international 

levels. It is with the worst-case scenario of the Indian Punjab–style insurgency in mind that 

this report turns to an analysis of subnational-scale hydropolitics in Pakistan. 

Historical Overview of Interprovincial Water Conflict in Pakistan

In Pakistan, the interprovincial conflict over the allocation of the Indus Rivers’ water 

dates to the beginning of the massive canal construction by the British in the Punjab 

from the mid-nineteenth century onward. The first substantial interprovincial water 

allocation treaty between the Punjab and the downstream riparian Sindh province dates 

to 1945. The treaty allocated 75 percent of the waters of the main-stem Indus River to 

Sindh province, and 25 percent going to Punjab province. The treaty further allocated 

94 percent of the water from the five eastern tributaries of the Indus River to Punjab, 

and 6 percent to Sindh.24 The partition of the Subcontinent and the subsequent signing 

of the IWT by India and Pakistan allocated most of what was Punjab’s share of the Indus 

basin waters—according to the 1945 Sindh-Punjab Agreement—to India, and provided for 

This lack of cooperative 

sharing of water leaves 

the ecological and social 

consequences of the treaty 

to be negotiated and contested 

at the subnational level. . .
9

construction of storage and link canals from the western half of the Indus basin to the 

eastern half to compensate for the water lost to India. The Sindhis widely perceived the 

compensatory water and the storage on the Indus and Jhelum Rivers to be compensation to 

Punjab province at the expense of Sindh.25 The Kalabagh Dam controversy—an argument 

between the dominant Punjab province and the remaining smaller provinces in Pakistan, 

especially Sindh, over a proposed storage dam on the main-stem Indus River in Punjab—is 

perceived by the Sindhis as yet another insult that has been directed at them by the Punjabis 

in the form of further appropriation of Sindh’s rightful share of water.26

Although the focus of subnational hydropolitics in Pakistan has been surface water, it 

would be useful here to point to the significance of groundwater in the basin and related 

problems of water logging and salinity, which are likely to have much greater impact on 

water use, agricultural productivity, and hence hydropolitics in the long run. The estimated 

0.8 million water pumps in Pakistan supply almost 50 percent of the crop-water requirements in the country.27 One of the consequences of this major groundwater development 

has been the secondary salination of 4.5 million hectares of land, half of which affects the 

Indus basin’s irrigated lands. An additional 1 million hectares of the 16 million hectares of 

irrigated land in the Indus are affected by waterlogging from canal seepage and inappropriate irrigation practices. The problem of salinity is acutest downstream in Sindh province, 

where 70 to 80 percent of the soils are classified as moderately to severely salinized. This 

land degradation is severely hurting agricultural productivity, and most remedies have 

largely been unsuccessful.28 The simmering ongoing conflict between Sindh and Punjab 

on surface-water supplies should be viewed in this context, where land degradation and 

groundwater salinity in the downstream province make its thirst for surface-water supplies 

much more pronounced. This is apart from the province’s pervasive problems of poverty, 

lost productivity, and consequent social instability, which have not attracted the resources 

or attention from the country’s water managers that they deserve.

The seemingly perpetual water conflict between Sindh and Punjab had a tentative 

settlement in the form of the interprovincial water accord of 1991, when four provincial 

governments, all governed by the same political party for the first time in Pakistan’s history, agreed to set allocations among the four provinces. The accord, which was based on 

the assumed average flow of 114.35 million acre-feet (MAF) of water in the Indus system, 

allocated 55.94 MAF of water to Punjab and 48.76 MAF to Sindh province, the remaining 

9.65 MAF divided between Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces.29 Although it 

has been argued that the actual apportionment came closest to what a reasonable apportionment could be, the accord nevertheless suffered a crisis of legitimacy. The legitimacy 

was in question primarily because the negotiating process leading up to the accord was 

not transparent and did not include all the stakeholders, particularly from the smaller 

provinces, and because of the suspect legitimacy of the political setup in Sindh province 

at the time.30

The Dam Controversy

The official figures for average annual flows for the Indus basin used in the interprovincial 

water accord and subsequent justifications for additional storage on the Indus River, particularly for Kalabagh Dam, on the main-stem Indus River in Punjab province, are suspect. Many 

have convincingly argued against the official methodology of using the higher number for 

flows in the Indus system, particularly because it is based on a shorter time frame—that is, 

since 1977—and because the higher number works to the disadvantage of the downstream 

riparian.31 The official argument in favor of the construction of the Kalabagh Dam on the 

Indus River paints the picture of a scarce water resource, which is being wasted by being 

The accord [of 1991] 

nevertheless suffered a crisis 

of legitimacy. . . because the 

negotiating process leading 

up to the accord was not 

transparent and did not include 

all the stakeholders.
10

allowed to flow out to sea, and outlines a doomsday scenario should additional storage not 

be built on the Indus River.32

On the internal security front, the water scarcity in Sindh, especially in the aftermath of 

the drought in southern Pakistan in the latter half of the 1990s, coupled with the singleminded focus of the Pakistani water bureaucracy on water development, has made the 

issue of the construction of the Kalabagh Dam project a surrogate for a litany of Sindhi 

grievances against the Punjabi-dominated political, military, and bureaucratic system in 

Pakistan.33 The controversy is beginning to polarize public opinion in Pakistan, particularly 

in Sindh province, where more than 80 percent of the groundwater is saline, making the 

province’s farmers exceptionally dependent on surface-water supplies, which itself may be 

compromised by the upstream dam. Furthermore, the ecology of the Indus Delta and the 

livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of Sindhi fishermen are also in jeopardy because of 

reduced fresh water flows to the delta, which are likely to be reduced further if the dam is 

built. On the other hand, for the Pakistani water managers, Kalabagh Dam has become a 

metaphor for the persistent meddling of the “untrained” and “nonexpert” politicians in what 

they perceive to be, or wish to be, a purely engineering issue. All types of appeals to patriotism, science, economics, and neo-Malthusian scenarios are being pressed into service by 

the Pakistani government and the engineering establishment to make the case for not only 

Kalabagh Dam but also other storage projects on the Indus. The dam project at the moment 

is in cold storage, particularly on account of the combined opposition of not just Sindh but 

also of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.34 Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa is concerned about 

the potential flooding of rich farmland and Pashtun cultural heartland by the lake that will 

be created behind the dam. The province is also reluctant to lend its support to the project 

because of suspicions based on the poor record of the Pakistani government in providing for 

the rehabilitation of those affected by earlier large-dam projects.

The objections to additional storage on the Indus are not limited to the nationalist politics of smaller provinces. Other convincing arguments have also been made by environmental and citizen groups in Pakistan, pointing out that Pakistan’s irrigation sector has some of 

the lowest conveyance efficiencies in the world. The detractors argue that instead of going 

for very expensive, environmentally damaging, and economically dubious storage and megaproject solutions to the water issue in Pakistan, enhancement of the existing infrastructure’s 

efficiency, coupled with better on-farm water management and more appropriate irrigation 

and farming techniques, would perhaps more than make up for any additional water that 

might be gained from megaprojects.35 In addition, the lack of sufficient flows in the Indus 

Delta adversely affects the ecology of the delta, which has a direct effect on the livelihoods 

of thousands of fishermen and farmers in the lower basin. The interprovincial water debate 

is a vigorous one and is frequently waged at expert forums in Pakistan. But as far as the 

Pakistani press and public are concerned, the parameters of the debate are limited to how 

to build more megaprojects and increase water supplies. A more sensitized and informed 

media coverage of the debate could go a long way toward lowering the temperature on the 

issue among politicians and the public.

Recent Developments in the Subnational Water Debate

In 2004, the Indus River System Authority (IRSA), which is the main interprovincial watermanagement body in Pakistan, installed a satellite-based telemetry system on the Indus 

basin rivers to provide real-time flow data to all the provincial water managers and thereby 

diffuse the atmosphere of mistrust between the provinces. The system unfortunately has 

not worked—largely to the disadvantage of Sindh. Some in the government have blamed the 

faulty design parameters of the system for this, but others have convincingly argued that 

For the Pakistani water 

managers, Kalabagh Dam has 

become a metaphor for the 

persistent meddling of the 

“untrained” and “nonexpert” 

politicians in what they perceive 

to be, or wish to be, a purely 

engineering issue. 
11

the faults with the system are not unfixable and that field engineers and their leadership 

were so disposed the system could be made functional.36 In addition, there are perpetual 

tensions between Sindh and Punjab on the opening or closure of link canals in Punjab and 

on the whole issue of Sindh’s allocated water share not getting to the province because 

of thefts in Punjab. Again, there could have been a substantive basis for arbitrating those 

conflicts if the data from the telemetry system were available. This issue is beginning to 

get considerable attention from the Pakistani press, and there are legitimate concerns that 

an expensive technology (it cost US$5.4 million in 2004) that is already in place and has 

the potential to make water flows between the provinces more transparent, is not working 

because of incompetence or worse (malice on the part of vested interests).

The Indus waters distribution controversy, at the moment, is limited to sloganeering and 

street protests by part of the populace of Sindh and to a lesser extent of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, as well as heated debates among the water managers and provincial governments of the 

Pakistani federation. Incidentally, in the Punjab, the province that stands to benefit the most 

from the potential construction of the Kalabagh Dam and other water development projects 

(e.g., the Greater Thal Canal project, which is to supply additional water from the Indus to 

the arid Thal area of the Punjab),37 public opinion at the grassroots level is uninterested at 

best, unlike in the case of Sindh. This is one controversy where the dissonance between the 

engineers’ conceptions of how to manage and develop water seems to be driving the conflict 

more than any popular demand for additional water projects on the part of the residents of 

Punjab province. For example, both factions of the ruling Punjabi-dominated Pakistan Muslim 

Leagues (PML-N and Q) have been at great pains to try to mobilize grassroots public support 

for the dam, with little evidence of success.38 This is in stark contrast to the Indian Punjab 

situation, where public opinion was quite inflamed in support of keeping Punjab’s waters 

from Haryana. Whereas in Sindh there may have been a fusion of hydropolitics with identity 

politics of Sindhi nationalists, in the Pakistani Punjab, there do not seem to be any popular 

passions regarding hydropolitics. Consequently, given the shallowness of popular support 

for additional water development on the Indus River, there is an opportunity for a more 

enlightened and multidimensional policy dialogue to resolve the controversy. The specter of 

an Indian Punjab–style insurgency with hydropolitics as one of the key issues is a nightmarish 

scenario for Pakistan but is an entirely avoidable one, provided the parameters of the discourse are widened from purely engineering concerns to wider social, cultural, environmental, 

and equity- and justice-related concerns on water resources.

The subnational water issue in Pakistan took a new twist in 2010 with the worst floods 

in the country’s history. The floods were a consequence of the anomalous intense rains in 

the western Indus basin, something that was once observed every few decades but that 

has been experienced more than three times in the past decade alone. The enormity of the 

disaster and the role played by the highly regulated river channels and the irrigation-system 

management procedures have drawn renewed scrutiny from the public and the media. There 

is concern that the single-minded focus on maximizing water withdrawals and on greater 

regulation of the river system may have contributed to accentuating the already high flood 

peaks.39 Furthermore, the issue of deliberate breaching of side levees to protect irrigation 

infrastructure—something that is routine operating procedure for flood management—

drew media attention and accusations of favoritism when it came to protecting some parts 

of the flood plains at the expense of others. The floods are being used by the pro-dams 

lobby to call for construction of more storage on the Indus, but the tragedy also ought to 

inspire a more nuanced and comprehensive reevaluation of the water-management system 

in the basin. Such a reevaluation would likely lead to a new balance between the benefits 

and hazards associated with the river system and more equitable distribution of the same, 

both spatially and socially.

The floods are being used by 

the pro-dams lobby to call for 

construction of more storage on 

the Indus, but the tragedy also 

ought to inspire a more nuanced 

and comprehensive reevaluation 

of the water-management 

system. . . Such a reevaluation 

would likely lead to a new 

balance between the benefits 

and hazards associated with the 

river system.
12

Moving Ahead: Prospects for Cooperative Hydropolitics

At the bilateral level, the IWT has served an important moderating function in the hydropolitics between India and Pakistan. The treaty is a product of its time and could be fruitfully 

modified and renegotiated to bring it more in line with contemporary international watercourse law, the Helsinki rules,40 and emerging concerns with water quality, environmental 

sustainability, climate change, and principles of equitable sharing. But that renegotiation, if 

it ever happens, is going to be contingent on significant improvement in bilateral relations 

between India and Pakistan. As long as the two countries continue to be hostile and mutually suspicious, the imperfect IWT will have to be the medium for the conduct of hydropolitics between the two countries. In the meantime, however, India could be more forthcoming 

with flow data and be more prompt and open in communicating its planned projects on the 

Indus basin to Pakistan, particularly in the western basin. Pakistan, on the other hand, could 

engage with India within the context of the IWT more positively than defensively, and also 

educate its media and politicians so as not to sensationalize essentially technical arguments 

by representing them as existential threats. India too will have to be mindful of the fact that 

although no single Indian project presents a substantial threat to Pakistan’s water security, 

India’s planned water development projects on the Indus will have the cumulative capacity 

to substantially reduce water flows to Pakistan during low-flow months. Pakistan’s anxieties 

about that future capacity are understandable and reasonable, and India must acknowledge 

and address those anxieties. Claiming compliance with the letter of the IWT will only add to 

the mistrust between the two countries. 

Within Pakistan, considerably greater research needs to be undertaken to establish the 

relative weight of violence vs. cooperation as a means of conflict resolution over water. 

The fact that more than 95 percent of water withdrawals in the Indus basin are dedicated 

to agriculture, where its efficiency does not exceed 36 percent, is a clear indicator that 

the scarcity of water is institutional rather than absolute.41 Increased irrigation-water-use 

efficiency through engineering as well as institutional reforms, coupled with intersectoral 

water transfers, has the potential to more than make up for any water scarcity. Consequently, the question of whether water shortages and inequities in its distribution will lead 

to violence or threats to human security also becomes contingent on how water-related 

institutions behave. This point also relates to the international dimension, whereby a recognition of Pakistan’s problems as fundamentally internally driven will provide the necessary 

perspective to the Pakistani public and media in evaluating the potential threat of Indian 

projects in the Indus basin. In other words, allowing the experts in the room to negotiate the details of proposed Indian projects in the context of the IWT is the best course of 

action for Pakistan—short of a future renegotiation of the treaty along the lines mentioned 

earlier.

The following recommendations to the international community are given with the 

intent of promoting more cooperative international and interprovincial hydropolitics in 

Pakistan’s Indus basin:

•	 Provide technical assistance to both India and Pakistan to enable more accurate and timely 

stream-flow data that is readily accessible to decision makers and the public. This will 

prevent ignorance, rumors, and emotion from taking hold in the absence of hard data. The 

provision of more accurate and timely data can be a very important confidence-building 

measure.

•	 Encourage the Indian government to take Pakistan’s concerns—for example, with regard to 

data availability or storage capacity in individual projects—more seriously and to address 

those concerns on merit. Often, with regard to the water sector, the issue is not what the 

Indian government is doing, it is how it is doing it.

As long as the two countries 

continue to be hostile 

and mutually suspicious, 

the imperfect IWT will have 

to be the medium for the 

conduct of hydropolitics.
13

•	 Utilize World Bank levers to facilitate greater openness of communication and data sharing 

within the IWT’s Indus Commission and between the commission and the public.

•	 Facilitate a debate on how a more cooperative tenor, such as through a renegotiated IWT 

treaty that is in line with the principles of equitable apportionment and other contemporary international legal doctrines, could be beneficial to all relevant parties. A large portion 

of the subnational problems in Pakistan are partially a function of the treaty, because the 

Sindhis perceive, with some truth, that Sindh compensates Punjab for water that Pakistan 

negotiated away to India. The principle of allocating entire rivers may have appeared to be 

an elegant solution when the IWT was negotiated, but the IWT could be fruitfully renegotiated in the future provided there is sufficient trust between India and Pakistan.

•	 Provide technical assistance to Pakistan to improve its irrigation-system efficiency. Much 

more water can be realized from a more efficient distribution system than from any dam.

•	 Train and sensitize Pakistani water managers to the issue of equity in water distribution. 

The engineers dominating Pakistan’s water bureaucracy do not have the skills to deal with 

the all-important social-equity aspects of water, which often lie at the heart of water 

conflict.

•	 Provide technical assistance to Pakistan so that it can bring its surface and groundwater 

laws more in line with contemporary developments in water law.

•	 Provide training and technical assistance that could address the long-term legitimate 

storage needs of the country. Groundwater storage capacity and knowledge is extremely 

underdeveloped in Pakistan. 
14

Notes

1. Indu Agnihotri, “Ecology, Land Use and Colonisation: The Canal Colonies of Punjab,” Indian Economic and Social 

History Review 33, no. 1 (1996): 37–58; Imran Ali, The Punjab under Imperialism, 1885–1947 (Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 1988).

2. James L. Wescoat Jr., Sarah J. Halvorson, and Daanish Mustafa, “Water Management in the Indus Basin of 

Pakistan: A Half-Century Perspective,” International Journal of Water Resources Development 16, no. 3 (2000): 

391–406.

3. See, for example, Peter Gleick, The World’s Water 2000–2001 (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2000).

4. See, for example, Chris Sneddon and Coleen Fox, “Rethinking Transboundary Waters: A Critical Hydropolitics of the 

Mekong Basin,” Political Geography 25, no. 2 (2006): 181–202.

5. Daanish Mustafa, “To Each according to His Power? Access to Irrigation Water and Vulnerability to Flood Hazard 

in Pakistan,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 20, no. 6 (2002): 737–52.

6. Shlomi Dinar, “Water, Security, Conflict, and Cooperation,” SAIS Review 22, no. 2002: 229–53.

7. Haris Gazdar, “Baglihar and Politics of Water: A Historical Perspective from Pakistan,” Economic and Political 

Weekly, February 26, 2005, 813–17.

8. Ibid.

9. For details of the treaty negotiation process, see Asit K. Biswas, “Indus Water Treaty—the Negotiating Process,” 

Water International 17 (1992): 201–09; Aloys Arthur Michel, The Indus Rivers: A Study of the Effects of Partition

(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967).

10. Muhammed Siyad, “Indus Water Treaty and Baglihar Project: Relevance of International Watercourse Law,” 

Economic and Political Weekly, July 16, 2005, 3145–54.

11. Article VIII of the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 provides for the formation of the permanent Indus Commission. The 

commission is responsible for facilitating exchange of information and routine treaty-related matters between the 

two countries.

12. Ramaswamy R. Iyer, “Indus Treaty: A Different View,” Economic and Political Weekly, July 16, 2005, 3140–44.

13. The Indus Basin Water Development Project comprised World Bank–financed storage, link-canal, and regulatorystructure projects to facilitate realization of the water demand in the two signatory countries in order to 

compensate for the water the two countries had negotiated away to each other in the treaty. 

14. Nawaz Sharif, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), 209.

15. R. Rao, “Pitfalls of the Indira Gandhi Canal,” Ambio 21, no. 6 (1992): 439.

16. Annexure F of the IWT allows for the appointment of a neutral expert for arbitration in case the dispute between 

the two countries cannot be resolved at the Indus Commission level. 

17. Rajesh Sinha, “Two Neighbors and a Treaty: Baglihar Project in Hot Waters,” Economic and Political Weekly, 

February 18, 2006, 606–08.

18. Iyer, “Indus Treaty,” 3143.

19. Mary Miner, Gauri Patankar, Shama Gamkhar, and David Eaton, “Water Sharing between India and Pakistan: A 

Critical Evaluation of the Indus Water Treaty,” Water International 34, no. 2 (2009): 204–16.

20. John Briscoe, “War and Peace on the Indus?” News (Pakistan), April 5, 2010, www.countercurrents.org/

briscoe050410.htm.

21. Ramaswamy R. Iyer, “Was the Indus Waters Treaty in Trouble?” Economic and Political Weekly, June 22, 2002, 

2401–02.

22. Employee of Pakistan’s Water and Power Development Authority, personal communication with the author, March 

28, 2010.

23. M. S. Shafique, “Telemetry System and Confidence Building,” Daily Dawn, August 9, 2010, www.dawn.com/wps/

wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/in-paper-magazine/economic-and-business/telemetry-system-andconfidence-building-980.

24. Michel, The Indus Rivers.

25. Mir Atta Muhammad Talpur, “Water Shortage in Sindh: Causes and Consequences,” March 2001, www.scribd.com/

doc/529124/Water-shortage-in-Sindh. 

26. See, for example, www.sindh.ws/indusfarming.

27. A. S. Qureshi, P. G. McCornick, M. Qadir, and Z. Aslam, “Managing Salinity and Waterlogging in the Indus Basin 

of Pakistan,” Agricultural Water Management 95, no. 1 (2008): 1–10.

28. Ibid.

29. Simi Kamal, “Pakistan’s Water Challenges: Entitlement, Access, Efficiency, and Equity,” in Running on Empty: 

Pakistan’s Water Crisis, eds. Michael Kugelman and Robert M. Hathaway (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars, Asia Program, 2009).

30. H. L. Afzal, “Settling Disputes between Ethno-Regional Groups in Young Democracies: Distributing the Indus 

Waters of Pakistan” (PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 1995).

31. See, for example, Abdul Majid Kazi and A. N. G. Abbasi, “Kalabagh Dam: Look before Your Leap,” 2003, www.

angelfire.com/az/Sindh/indus4.html; Shaheen Rafi Khan, “The Kalabagh Controversy,” 2003, www.sanalist.org/

kalabagh/a-14.htm.

32. Government of Pakistan, “Report of the Technical Committee on Water Resources,” August 2005, www.dawn.com/

events/tcr_on_wr/text1.htm.

33. Erik Eckholm, “A Province Is Dying of Thirst, and Cries Robbery,” New York Times, March 17, 2003, www.nytimes.

com/2003/03/17/world/gharo-journal-a-province-is-dying-of-thirst-and-cries-robbery.html.

34. Balochistan’s own water projects, such as the Pat Feeder canal, are vulnerable to potential water stoppages from 

the proposed dam.

35. See Daanish Mustafa, “The Dam Dilemma,” Newsline Magazine, October 2005, 68–70; Khan, “The Kalabagh 

Controversy.”
15

36. Khaleeq Kiani, “Faulty Telemetry System Leads to Dispute over Water,” Daily Dawn, July 9, 2010, www.dawn.

com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/national/19-faulty-telemetry-system-leadsto-dispute-over-water-970-hh-06.

37. See Actionaid, “Greater Thal Canal: A Misadventure,” 2009, www.scribd.com/doc/9707184/Greater-Thal-Canal.

38. See “PML-QA to Form KBD Committee,” Daily Times (Pakistan), September 4, 2003, www.dailytimes.com.pk/

default.asp?page=story_4-9-2003_pg7_31. In addition, no political party of any significance in Pakistan in 

general and in the Punjab in particular has ever passed a resolution in support of Kalabagh Dam, nor is there 

any evidence of a public rally held in support of the dam in Punjab. The Punjab Assembly in the aftermath of 

Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998 did pass a resolution congratulating then prime minister Nawaz Sharif for the 

nuclear tests and for his announcement on the construction of Kalabagh Dam. There is, however, no resolution 

of the assembly specifically supporting the construction of the dam. 

39. Robert Mackey, “Attempts to Tame Indus River Contributed to Disaster in Pakistan, Expert Says,” Lede Blog, August 

18, 2010, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/18/attempts-to-tame-indus-river-contributed-to-disasterin-pakistan-expert-says/; Daanish Mustafa, “Pakistan Floods: Living with the Mighty Indus,” New Atlanticist Policy 

and Analysis Blog, August 23, 2010, www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/pakistan-floods-living-mighty-indus.

40. The Helsinki rules, established in 1966, address the principles governing use of international surface waters 

and aquifers connected to those surface waters. The rules’ key overarching principle is of equitable use and 

apportionment between upstream and downstream riparians in international watercourses. The IWT, however, 

rather than designating equitable apportionment, designates entire flows of rivers to one or the other riparian.

41. M. A. Kahlown and Abdul Majeed, “Water Resources and Management in Pakistan,” in Water and New Technologies, 

ed. Ishfaq Ahmed, 19–60 (Islamabad: Global Change Studies Center, 2002).
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