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S. HRG. 112–198 

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 15, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

DAVID M. MORRISS, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

MARCH 15, 2011

Page 

Flournoy, Hon. Miche`le A., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy ..................... 7 

Petraeus, GEN David H., USA, Commander, International Security Assistance Force, and Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan .................................... 16 

(III) 

(1) 

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN 

TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room SD– 

G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

Nelson, Webb, McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Manchin, 

Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, 

Chambliss, Wicker, Brown, Portman, Ayotte, Collins, Graham and 

Cornyn. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; 

William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional 

staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member 

Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority staff 

director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Christian D. 

Brose, professional staff member; Michael J. Sistak, research assistant; and Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, Hannah I. 

Lloyd, and Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator 

Reed; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon Peterson, 

assistant to Senator Webb; Tressa Guenov, assistant to Senator 

McCaskill; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay 

Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Elana Broitman, assistant to Senator 

Gillibrand; Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator 

Wicker; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Ryan Kaldahl, 

assistant to Senator Collins; and Grace Smitham and Russ 

Thomasson, assistants to Senator Cornyn. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. 

Before we begin our hearing, we have a quorum, so I’m going to 

ask the committee to consider two civilian nominations and a list 

of 252 pending military nominations. First I would ask the comVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:43 Jan 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\72295.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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mittee to consider the nominations of Michael Vickers to be Under 

Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and Jo Ann Rooney to be 

Principle Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. 

These nominations have been before the committee for the required 

length of time. 

Is there a motion to favorable report? 

Senator MCCAIN. So moved. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is there a second? 

Senator NELSON. Second. 

Chairman LEVIN. All in favor, say aye. [Chorus of ayes.] 

Opposed, nay. [No response.] 

The motion carries. 

Second, I would ask the committee to consider a list of 252 pending military nominations. Included in this list is the nomination of 

General Martin Dempsey to be Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. All 

the nominations have been before the committee for the required 

length of time. 

Is there a motion to favorably report? 

Senator MCCAIN. So moved. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is there a second? 

Senator REED. Second. 

Chairman LEVIN. All in favor, say aye. [Chorus of ayes.] 

Opposed, nay. [No response.] 

The motion carries. 

[The list of nominations considered and approved by the committee follows:] 

MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE’S CONSIDERATION ON MARCH 15, 2011. 

1. RADM James P. Wisecup, USN to be vice admiral and Inspector General, Department of the Navy (Reference No. 170). 

2. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Daniel 

A. Sierra) (Reference No. 177). 

3. In the Marine Corps there is 1one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Jeffrey S. Forbes) (Reference No. 196). 

4. LTG Purl K. Keen, USA, to be lieutenant general and Chief, Office of the Defense Representative-Pakistan, U.S. Central Command (Reference No. 213). 

5. GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, to be general and Chief of Staff, U.S. Army 

(Reference No. 247). 

6. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(list begins with Garry W. Lambert) (Reference No. 258). 

7. In the Navy, there are 23 appointments to the grade of commander and below 

(list begins with Karin E. Thomas) (Reference No. 259). 

8. MG Joseph L. Votel, USA, to be lieutenant general and Commander, Joint Special Operations Command/Commander, Joint Special Operations Command Forward, U.S. Special Operations Command (Reference No. 262). 

9. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Stacy J. Taylor) 

(Reference No. 264). 

10. In the Army, there are 90 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with 

Temidayo L. Anderson) (Reference No. 265). 

11. Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Conant, USMC, to be lieutenant general and Deputy 

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (Reference No. 276). 

12. In the Air Force, there are 14 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(list begins with David Lewis Buttrick) (Reference No. 278). 

13. In the Air Force, there are 20 appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Martin D. Adamson) (Reference No. 279). 

14. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Paul L. Robson) 

(Reference No. 280). 

15. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Brian M. Boyce) 

(Reference No. 281). 

3 

16. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Jan 

I. Maby) (Reference No. 282). 

17. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Jason K. Burgman) (Reference No. 283). 

18. In the Army, there are four appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

and below (list begins with Lee A. Burnett) (Reference No. 284). 

19. In the Army Reserve, there are six appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Kenneth P. Donnelly) (Reference No. 285). 

20. In the Army, there are 12 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel and 

below (list begins with Kevin J. McCann) (Reference No. 286). 

21. In the Army, there are 15 appointments to the grade of colonel and below (list 

begins with John S. Kuttas) (Reference No. 287). 

22. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of captain (Daniel A. 

Freilich) (Reference No. 289). 

23. BG Donald L. Rutherford, USA, to be major general (Reference No. 310). 

24. In the Air Force, there are 13 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

and below (list begins with Christian R. Schlicht) (Reference No. 311). 

25. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Nicole K. Avci) 

(Reference No. 312). 

26. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Edmond K. 

Safarian) (Reference No. 313). 

27. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

and below (list begins with Charles L. Clark) (Reference No. 314). 

28. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Richard T. Grossart) (Reference No. 315). 

29. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of commander and 

below (list begins with John A. Salvato) (Reference No. 316). 

30. MG Donald M. Campbell, Jr., USA, to be lieutenant general and Commanding 

General, III Corps and Fort Hood (Reference No. 323). 

31. Lt. Gen. John F. Kelly, USMC, to be lieutenant general and Senior Military 

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Reference No. 324). 

32. VADM Joseph D. Kernan, USN, to be vice admiral and Deputy Commander, 

US Southern Command (Reference No. 325). 

33. In the Army, there are six appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Erik M. Benda) (Reference No. 327). 

34. In the Army Reserve, there are seven appointments to the grade of colonel 

(list begins with Kevin B. Dennehy) (Reference No. 328). 

35. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(Brandon M. Oberling) (Reference No. 331). 

36. In the Navy, there are three appointments to the grade of commander and 

below (list begins with William A. Brown, Jr.) (Reference No. 332). 

Total: 252 

Chairman LEVIN. Today the committee receives testimony from 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Miche`le Flournoy, and General David Petraeus, Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and 

Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan. 

We thank you both for your years of service to the Nation and 

the sacrifice made by both you and your families. 

We also cannot express enough our gratitude and admiration for 

the men and women in uniform deployed in Afghanistan and elsewhere. They are doing a phenomenal job. Their morale is high. Our 

troops are truly awe-inspiring. Please pass along our heartfelt 

thanks to them. 

It has now been a little over a year since President Obama’s 

speech at West Point announcing his strategy for Afghanistan. 

That strategy included two key elements: a surge of 30,000 U.S. 

troops to help reverse the Taliban’s momentum and seize the initiative; and the setting of a date 18 months from then, or July 2011, 

for when U.S. troops would begin to come home. The setting of that 

July date also laid down a marker for when the Government of AfVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:43 Jan 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\72295.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ghanistan would assume more and more responsibility for that 

country’s security. 

During his visit to Afghanistan last week, Secretary Gates determined that ‘‘we will be well-positioned for transitioning increasing 

security responsibility to Afghanistan and beginning to draw down 

some U.S. forces in July of this year’’. President Karzai is expected 

to announce next week the first phase of provinces and districts 

throughout Afghanistan that will transition lead for providing security to the Afghan people. 

We’ve heard two messages in recent months relative to the July 

2011 date when U.S. troop numbers in Afghanistan will begin to 

be reduced. Message number 1: Secretary Gates before this committee recently said that the July date was needed as a way of telling the Afghan leadership ‘‘to take ownership of the war’’ and as 

a way to ‘‘grab the attention of the Afghan leadership and bring a 

sense of urgency to them.’’ 

Message number 2: Secretary Gates, speaking at the NATO 

Defence Ministers meeting last week, said, ‘‘There is too much talk 

about leaving and not enough talk about getting the job done 

right.’’ 

Now, some may dismiss those messages as inconsistent, or say 

that Secretary Gates is speaking to two different audiences, but I 

disagree. Secretary Gates well knows that with modern global, instantaneous communications the world is the audience for every utterance. The unifying thread in the two messages is that both are 

needed for success of the mission. Success requires Afghan buy-in, 

Afghans taking the lead and Afghan ownership of the mission, all 

of which in turn depend upon their confidence in our continuing 

support. Both messages, and the thread that unifies them, are part 

and parcel, I believe, of General Petraeus’ counterinsurgency 

(COIN) strategy which is so instrumental in turning the tide in Afghanistan. The success of the mission depends on Afghan security 

forces holding the ground which they are helping to clear of 

Taliban, and that, to use General Mattis’s words before this committee recently, is what ‘‘undercuts the enemy’s narrative when 

they say that we’re there to occupy Afghanistan.’’ 

The growth in the size and capability of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and control of territory by those forces is robbing the Taliban of their propaganda target and bringing us closer 

to the success of the mission. That’s why I have pushed so hard to 

grow the size of the Afghan security forces and to keep metrics on 

how many Afghan units are partnered with us and being mentored 

by us, and how often Afghan units are in the lead in joint operations. That’s why a number of us are pushing so hard, including 

with the President himself, for approval of the pending proposal of 

up to 70,000 additional Afghan troops and police. 

The NATO training command in Afghanistan has done an extraordinary job not only building the numbers of the ANSF, but improving their quality as well, focusing on marksmanship, training, 

leadership and literacy. This success in recruiting and training Afghan troops reflects the desire of the Afghan people to provide for 

their own security. That success is why Taliban suicide bombers attack recruiting centers. The young men signing up represent the 

Taliban’s worst nightmare. 

5 

During our visit to Afghanistan in January Senator Jack Reed, 

Senator Jon Tester, and I saw how the Afghan people have growing 

confidence in the ability of Afghan and coalition forces to provide 

security in former Taliban strongholds in Helmand and Kandahar 

Provinces. The Afghan people are returning to villages and communities and starting to rebuild their lives. Joint operations are increasingly Afghan-led in their planning and execution. 

As the Afghan people see their own forces providing ongoing protection after the Taliban are cleared out, Afghan confidence in the 

Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) 

grows. In the Arghandab district, the number of tips from locals increased significantly, enabling Afghanistan and coalition forces to 

find and clear a much greater percentage of improvised explosive 

devices (IED). The increasing support of the Afghan people across 

Helmand and Kandahar has also allowed partnered coalition special operations forces and Afghan commandos to target large numbers of insurgent leaders in the last few months, with the vast majority of them being captured without a shot being fired. The growing support of the Afghan people for their security forces will make 

the transition to an Afghan security lead more achievable in the 

short-term and sustainable over time. 

Certainly, challenges lie ahead. General Petraeus has said there 

will be a Taliban spring offensive, and Secretary Gates has warned 

that this spring’s fighting season will be ‘‘the acid test,’’ in his 

words, as the Taliban tries to take back the terrain it has lost and 

engages in a campaign of assassination and intimidation. Afghan 

leaders need to bring a sense of urgency to improving governance, 

delivering services, and fighting corruption and other practices that 

prey upon the Afghan people if they’re to earn the support of the 

people for the Afghan Government, and additional steps must be 

taken to end the safe havens that insurgents use in Pakistan which 

impact on Afghanistan’s security. 

Finally, General Petraeus briefed NATO defense ministers at the 

meeting in Brussels last week, and I hope that he will address the 

outcomes from that meeting, including whether any further commitments by our NATO partners were forthcoming to address the 

continuing shortfall in trainers of Afghan troops. Also of interest 

would be the status of any discussions on a longer-term relationship between the United States, NATO, and Afghanistan beyond 

2014. 

Again, our thanks to our witnesses for their work on behalf of 

our Nation, and for their devotion to the men and women who defend us. 

Senator McCain. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to welcome our distinguished witnesses and thank them 

for their service to our Nation. 

I want to say a special note of thanks to General Petraeus. The 

truest test of a commander is whether he is worthy of the sacrifice 

made by those he leads, whether the young men and women whom 

we call upon day-in and day-out to risk their lives for us feel that 

6 

their commander offers the same degree of devotion as they do. We 

are fortunate that General Petraeus is such a commander. 

It is Congress’ highest priority to be just as worthy of the sacrifices made by the men and women of our Armed Forces and to 

provide them with everything they need to succeed in their mission 

of defending our Nation. 

So, let me take this opportunity again to say that we urgently 

need to pass a full year appropriations bill on defense for the remainder of fiscal year 2011, as the Secretary of Defense has repeatedly called for. It is irresponsible to continue funding our fellow 

Americans fighting two wars through piecemeal continuing resolutions that do not meet their full needs. 

Perhaps the greatest need of all right now is winning the war in 

Afghanistan, which is the subject of this hearing. The cost of our 

commitment to this conflict remains substantial, especially the precious lives we have lost. According to one new poll reported on in 

today’s Washington Post, a majority of Americans no longer support the war. The next several months will therefore be decisive as 

winter turns to spring, and the traditional fighting season begins 

in Afghanistan. 

NATO forces will surely face a renewed Taliban offensive this 

spring to retake the territory and momentum they have lost on the 

battlefield, and those losses have been considerable. U.S., NATO, 

and Afghan Special Forces have dealt a crushing blow to the midlevel leadership of the Taliban and its al Qaeda allies. Afghan and 

coalition surge forces are recapturing the momentum in key terrain 

areas such as Kandahar and Helmand. 

Afghan security forces are growing in quantity and improving in 

quality even faster than planned, and the Afghan local police (ALP) 

initiative is empowering communities across the country to provide 

their own security from the bottom up, while Kabul does so from 

the top down. 

The cumulative effect of these security operations is that we are 

turning around the war in Afghanistan. But, as General Petraeus 

says and will emphasize, this progress remains fragile and reversible, and the sustainability of our gains will be tested during the 

fighting season ahead. We should all be very clear about the fact 

that violence will go up in the months ahead, and we will surely 

encounter setbacks in some places. As a result, we need to be exceedingly cautious about withdrawal of the U.S. forces this July, as 

the President has called for. 

Now, we should be mindful that perhaps the wisest course of action in July may be to reinvest troops from more secured to less 

secured parts of Afghanistan, where additional forces could have a 

decisive impact. In short, we should not rush to failure, and we 

should cultivate strategic patience. 

This patience will be all the more essential as we wrestle with 

two other key challenges, which our military operations are necessary but not sufficient to meet. The first is governance and corruption. American taxpayers want to know that the vast resources 

they are committing to this war effort are not being wasted, stolen, 

or misused by Afghan officials, but we must not allow this legitimate and critical demand to feed a sense of fatalism about our objectives. Some are alarmed that the Afghan Government is at times 

7 

a weak partner, but that’s the norm in any counterinsurgency. 

After all, if our local partners provided good governance already, 

there would not be an insurgency in the first place. 

The goal of any counterinsurgency is to create the conditions that 

enable our local partners to provide better, more effective, and 

more just governance for their people. That does not mean that we 

are trying to make Afghanistan like us, but rather more like Afghanistan used to be prior to the past three decades of civil war, 

when the country enjoyed half a century of relative peace and rising standards of living. 

A second key challenge stems from Pakistan—the growing instability of the country, the insurgent safe havens that remain there, 

the ties to terrorists that still exist among elements of Pakistan’s 

military and intelligence services, and the seeming deterioration of 

our relationship amid the continued detention of U.S. Embassy official Raymond Davis. But here, too, a measure of patience is needed. We have sought every means to compel Pakistan to reorient its 

strategic calculus short of cutting off U.S. assistance, which we did 

before to no positive effect. To be sure, Pakistan deserves praise for 

some steps it has taken to fight al Qaeda and Taliban groups on 

the Pakistani side of the border. But what we must increasingly 

recognize is that perhaps the most effective way to end Pakistan’s 

support for terrorist groups that target our partners and our personnel in the region is to succeed in Afghanistan. Ultimately, it is 

only when an Afghan Government and security force is capable of 

neutralizing the terrorist groups backed by some in Pakistan that 

those Pakistani leaders could come to see that a strategy of hedging their bets in this conflict will only leave them less secure and 

more isolated. 

We have made a great deal of progress in Afghanistan since the 

last hearing of this committee on the subject just over half a year 

ago. Whereas the momentum was then still with the insurgency, 

our forces have now blunted it in many places and reversed it in 

key areas of the fight. It is now possible to envision a process of 

transition to Afghan responsibility for security based on conditions 

on the ground, with 2014 being a reachable target date. But for 

that transition to be truly irreversible, and for it to lead to an enduring strategic partnership between the United States and Afghanistan, our country, and especially this Congress, must remain 

committed to this fight and those Americans waging it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. 

Secretary Flournoy. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHE` LE A. FLOURNOY, UNDER 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

McCain, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you 

very much for inviting us here today to update you on our efforts 

in Afghanistan. 

Nearly 10 years ago, al Qaeda operatives carried out terrorist attacks that killed thousands of Americans and citizens from other 

countries. As we all know, these attacks emanated from a safe 

haven in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. In response to the SepVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:43 Jan 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\72295.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
8 

tember 11th attacks, the United States, supported by vital international partners, entered Afghanistan by force in order to remove 

the Taliban regime and to prevent further attacks by al Qaeda and 

its associates. Our mission was just, it was fully supported by the 

international community, and initially, it was quite successful. 

In the years that followed, however, we lost focus on Afghanistan. While our attention was turned away, al Qaeda, the Taliban, 

and associated extremist groups reconstituted their safe havens 

along the borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a result of this inattention, we risked the return of a Taliban-led Afghanistan that would likely once again provide a safe haven for 

terrorists who could plan and execute attacks against the United 

States. 

When President Obama took office, he immediately undertook a 

thorough review of our strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and 

reaffirmed our core goal, to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda, and to prevent its return to Afghanistan. In the 

course of that review we found that the situation in Afghanistan 

was even worse than we thought and that the Taliban had seized 

the momentum on the ground. 

In response, over the course of 2009 and 2010 the President committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. forces to reverse that 

momentum. Last December we conducted a follow-on review of the 

strategy’s implementation. In the course of that review we reaffirmed our core goal and the strategy’s key elements, a military 

campaign to degrade the Taliban-led insurgency, a civilian campaign to build Afghan capacity to secure and govern the country, 

and an increased diplomatic effort designed to bring a favorable 

and endurable outcome to the conflict. 

Over the last year we have made significant progress. With the 

troop surge, the U.S. and our ISAF partners now have over 150,000 

troops in Afghanistan putting relentless pressure on the insurgents 

and securing more and more of the Afghan population. That surge 

has been matched by a surge in the numbers, quality and capability of the ANSF. During the past year, the ANSF have increased 

by more than 70,000 and we have been able to improve their quality substantially by developing Afghan non-commissioned officers 

and trainers, expanding the training curriculum, adding literacy 

programs, increasing retention rates, and partnering Afghan units 

with ISAF forces in the field. 

As General Petraeus will describe in detail, U.S. and ISAF forces 

fighting side-by-side with increasingly capable Afghan units 

throughout the country have wrested the initiative from the insurgents, even in the strongholds of central Helmand and Kandahar 

Provinces, and we’ve turned up the pressure on al Qaeda and its 

affiliates in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, significantly degrading, though not yet defeating, their ability to plan and 

conduct operations. 

One contributor to this positive momentum is the ALP initiative, 

a village-focused security program that has already significantly 

disrupted insurgent activity, denied insurgent influence in key 

areas, and generated serious concern among the Taliban leadership. 

9 

At the same time, we’ve ramped up our civilian efforts to improve Afghan governance and development. Today, thanks to the 

civilian surge, there are more than 1,000 civilian experts from nine 

different U.S. agencies helping to build Afghan governance and economic capacity, work that is absolutely vital to the ultimate success 

of our overall mission in Afghanistan. 

Nevertheless, the significant gains we’ve made in the last year 

are still reversible. There is tough fighting ahead, and major challenges remain. Most notably, we must continue our efforts with 

Pakistan to eliminate terrorist and insurgent safe havens. We seek 

to build an effective partnership that advances both U.S. and Pakistani interests, including the denial of safe havens to all violent extremist organizations. To do so, we must demonstrate to our Pakistani partners that we will remain a strong supporter of their security and prosperity, both now and in the years to come, even as we 

ask them to do even more to defeat terrorism. 

In addition, we must work with the Afghan Government to tackle 

corruption, especially predatory corruption that erodes public trust 

and fuels the insurgency, and we must help create the conditions 

necessary to enable a political settlement among the Afghan people. This includes reconciling those insurgents who are willing to 

renounce al Qaeda, forsake violence, and adhere to the Afghan constitution. 

This July we will begin a responsible conditions-based drawdown 

of our surge forces in Afghanistan. We will also begin the process 

of transitioning provinces to Afghan lead for security, and by the 

end of 2014, we expect that Afghans will be in the lead for security 

nation-wide. This transition is a process, not an event. The process 

will unfold village by village, district by district, province by province. The determination of when the transition will occur and 

where it will occur is going to be based on bottom-up assessments 

of local conditions. This process is beginning now and, in fact, we 

do expect President Karzai to announce the first round of districts 

and provinces for transition on March 21st. 

As this transition process gets underway, and as ANSF capabilities continue to develop, we and our ISAF partners will thin out 

our forces as conditions allow, and gradually shift to more and 

more of a mentoring role with the ANSF. 

Some of the ISAF forces that are moved out of a given area will 

be reinvested in other geographic areas or in the training effort, in 

order to further advance the transition process. The objective here 

is to ensure that the transition is irreversible. 

We have no intention of declaring premature transitions, only to 

have to come back and finish the job later. We would much rather 

stick to a gradual approach, making sure that an area is truly 

ready for transition before thinning out the ISAF forces there. This 

is the surest path to lasting success. But let me be clear. The transition that will take place between now and December 2014 in no 

way signals our abandonment of Afghanistan. President Obama 

and President Karzai have agreed that the United States and Afghanistan will have an enduring strategic partnership beyond 

2014, and we are currently working with the details of that partnership. 

10 

Finally, I’d like to acknowledge the very real costs of this war. 

Many of you have expressed concern about these costs, and especially in light of our battlefield casualties and our fiscal pressures 

here at home. But the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands have served as 

a crucible for the most catastrophic terrorist actions of the past 

decade. The outcome we seek is the defeat of al Qaeda and the denial of the region as a sanctuary for terrorists. This objective is the 

reason why our brave men and women in service have sacrificed 

so very much, and we are determined to bring this war to a successful conclusion, for the sake of our own security, but also for the 

sake of the security of the people of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the 

region who have suffered so much and who have so much to gain 

from a secure and lasting peace. 

Members of this committee, I want to thank you for providing us 

with this opportunity today. I also look forward to your continued 

and invaluable support for the policies and programs that are critical to our success in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Flournoy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. MICHE`LE A. FLOURNOY

Mr. Chairman, ranking member, and distinguished members of the committee: 

thank you for inviting us here to update you on our efforts in Afghanistan. 

Ten years ago, al Qaeda operatives organized a deadly attack from a safe-haven 

in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan that killed thousands of Americans and citizens 

of other countries. In response, the United States, supported by valued international 

partners, entered Afghanistan by force in order to remove the Taliban regime and 

to prevent further attacks by al Qaeda and other extremist groups operating in the 

region. Our mission was just, fully supported by the international community, and 

initially successful. 

In the years that followed, however, we lost focus on Afghanistan. The war in Iraq 

drained resources from Afghanistan and, while our attention was turned away, al 

Qaeda, the Taliban and associated extremist groups reconstituted their safe-havens 

straddling the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan from which they have 

launched attacks and sustained a resilient insurgency. At the time, we did not appreciate their resiliency, their determination to regain what they had lost, and their 

continuing capacity to grievously harm the United States and our allies. The return 

of the Taliban in Afghanistan put at risk all that we had accomplished during the 

first years of the war and reminded people throughout the region of previous episodes when the U.S. misunderstood the region’s challenges and underestimated the 

commitment required to achieve our objectives. As I discussed with this committee 

last year, through our inattention, we risked the return of a Taliban-led Afghanistan that would likely provide a safe-haven for terrorists who could again plan and 

execute attacks against the United States and our allies. 

President Obama, immediately upon taking office, led a thorough review of our 

strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan and reaffirmed our core goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, to deny it safe haven in the region, and to prevent 

it from again threatening the United States and our allies. In the course of that 

review, we found that the situation was worse than we had thought and that the 

Taliban had seized the momentum in Afghanistan. In response, the President committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. forces to degrade the Taliban insurgency, thereby providing time and space to build sufficient Afghan capacity. Similarly, our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies and other partner nations surged additional forces of their own. Perhaps most importantly, we began an 

intensified effort to increase the size, skills, and effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). 

In December 2009, the President directed the deployment of an additional 30,000 

surge forces to Afghanistan to increase security, reverse the Taliban’s momentum 

and set the conditions for a transition to Afghan security lead. He also directed that 

we would begin a reduction of those surge forces in July 2011, saying, ‘‘We will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground.’’ 

11 

Last December, we conducted a follow-on review of our strategy’s implementation 

in which we reaffirmed our core goal and the strategy’s key elements: a military 

campaign to degrade al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists and Taliban insurgents; a civilian 

campaign to build Afghan governmental capacity; and an increased diplomatic effort 

designed to bring a favorable and durable outcome to the armed conflict and provide 

a more secure future for the United States, our allies and partners, and the region. 

The review found that our strategy was on track, that our forces and civilians were 

making real progress on the ground, and that we were making great strides in 

growing an ANSF capable of ultimately providing security in Afghanistan. The review also validated the Lisbon Summit Declaration that called for Afghan forces to 

assume full responsibility for security across the whole of Afghanistan by the end 

of 2014, and confirmed that we will be ready to begin a responsible drawdown of 

our surge forces in July 2011. 

The review also identified several important challenges we must address. We 

must continue our efforts with Pakistan to eliminate the safe havens from which 

al Qaeda senior leaders continue to operate and from which insurgents are able to 

launch attacks against Afghanistan, Pakistan, and our own forces. We must work 

with the Afghan Government to tackle corruption, particularly predatory corruption 

that affects individual Afghan citizens in their daily lives and fuels the insurgency, 

as well as high level corruption that can undermine the trust of the Afghan people 

in their own government. In addition, we must work to reduce intra-regional sources 

of tension that affect Afghanistan’s stability, spur economic development, and create 

the conditions necessary to enable a political settlement among Afghans and reconcile those insurgents who are willing to renounce al Qaeda, forsake violence, and 

adhere to the Afghan constitution. 

Since the review, we have continued to make progress. Our strategy is working. 

With the surge, the United States and our International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) partners have over 140,000 forces in Afghanistan placing relentless pressure 

on the insurgents and regaining more and more critical territory. That surge has 

been matched by a surge in the numbers, quality and capability of the ANSF. During the past year, the ANSF have increased by more than 70,000 personnel, and 

we have been able to improve quality by developing noncommissioned officers and 

Afghan trainers, expanding the training curriculum, adding literacy programs, and 

increasing retention rates. As General Petraeus will describe in detail, U.S., NATO, 

and other ISAF forces, partnered and fighting side-by-side with increasingly capable 

ANSF units throughout Afghanistan, have wrested the initiative from the insurgents and have successfully cleared the Taliban from much of the country, including 

strongholds in and around Kandahar and Helmand Provinces. We have turned up 

the pressure on al Qaeda and their affiliated groups in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan and have significantly degraded their ability to plan and conduct 

operations throughout the theater. 

Complementing our joint military operations are important, bottom-up security 

initiatives, led by our special forces, that provide basic assistance to Afghan communities that desire to resist Taliban influence and connect with their district and provincial government. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) program is a temporary, villagefocused security program that aims to deny Taliban territory and freedom of movement in selected areas that have a limited ANSF presence. Today we have 26 validated ALP sites with a total strength of approximately 4,000 Afghans. ALP programs have already significantly disrupted insurgent activity, denied insurgent influence in key areas, and generated serious concern among the Taliban leadership. 

These programs complement counterinsurgency operations, ANSF development, and 

civilian development programs to enhance stability. 

Along with our military successes, we have also ramped up our civilian efforts to 

improve Afghan governance and increase economic opportunity for the Afghan people. Today, thanks to the ‘‘civilian surge,’’ there are more than 1,100 civilian experts 

from 9 U.S. departments and agencies working with the Afghan Government and 

civil society in an effort to increase capacity and improve services delivered at the 

district, province and national level—with more and more of the effort directed at 

the local level. This is no small task in one of the poorest nations in the world with 

a vast and varied geography and a population of some 30 million people who have 

been traumatized by over 30 years of nearly continuous war. 

Reintegration is now a viable alternative for those insurgents willing to break 

their ties to al Qaeda, renounce violence, and agree to abide by the Afghan Constitution. I want to thank Congress for recognizing this strategic requirement and providing us important authorities and funding to support reintegration. Likewise, in 

London last year, the international community pledged financial support for the Afghan Government’s comprehensive program designed to draw insurgents off the battlefield and help communities reintegrate them back into Afghan society. This past 

12 

winter, we observed many favorable examples of both formal and informal reintegration. Formal reintegration is carried out through the three phases of the Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Process: outreach, demobilization, and community recovery. To date, nearly 20 provinces have created reintegration councils, and several 

hundred militants have left the battlefield through this process. Informal reintegration, which is more common, but less easily measured, refers to those insurgents 

who simply stop fighting and become productive members of their community. 

While reintegration reduces the manpower available to the insurgency, reconciliation focuses on the development of a political solution that ends armed opposition 

to the Afghan Government by major insurgent groups. This past June, President 

Karzai convened the Afghan Consultative Peace Jirga that established a framework 

for national reconciliation. He also formed the High Peace Council that includes representation from each of Afghanistan’s major ethnic and political stakeholders, including women. The High Peace Council has had substantive discussions with representatives from a variety of insurgent groups and recently met with key leaders 

in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey to help build consensus towards a political 

resolution of the conflict. The United States strongly supports these Afghan-led efforts, though we recognize that this will not be a quick or easy process. 

We have always recognized that we cannot succeed in Afghanistan through military operations alone. We welcome and encourage peaceful political participation by 

those Taliban leaders who are willing to reject al Qaeda, foreswear violence, and accept the Afghan Constitution in order to reconcile with their fellow Afghans. As Secretary Clinton recently said, ‘‘Taliban militants will have to decide that they are better off working within the Afghan political system rather than fighting a losing 

struggle alongside al Qaeda . . . ’’ 

As we consider a political process in Afghanistan, we must understand the broad 

regional dynamics at play. Afghanistan is a proud and sovereign nation that fears 

and resents meddling or interference in its affairs by its neighbors. Nevertheless, 

Iran and Pakistan still hold the potential to support or spoil progress in Afghanistan. India and the Central Asian States also seek to have their deep concerns about 

the security and stability of the region addressed. We will endeavor to work together 

with these nations to support our core goal in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the 

long-term stability of the region. 

Let me turn now to some of the key milestones and challenges that lie ahead. 

Transition—or Inteqal in Dari—is a process by which the ANSF will progressively 

take lead responsibility for the security of Afghan provinces and municipalities from 

ISAF. 

Transition is built upon the following principles: 

• Transition is a process, not an event and will be based upon an assessment of conditions on the ground. 

• Transition is a bottom-up process that will be informed by local assessments. 

• Transition is a process by which ISAF will ‘‘thin out’’ and progressively 

shift, as conditions allow, from a partnering role, to a mentoring role. 

• Headquarters elements will be retained, even as combat elements thin 

out to facilitate and enable ANSF operations. 

• As ISAF thins out, some of the ‘‘transition dividend’’ will likely be reinvested in other geographic or functional areas such as training. 

• The transition process goes beyond terrain and also applies to key Afghan 

governmental institutions. 

• We must ensure that get transition right the first time, so this process 

is irreversible. 

The Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) met in February to determine 

which areas were ready for transition. This assessment was based on the readiness 

of the ANSF to take the lead for security responsibilities and the readiness of local 

government structures to provide necessary services to the people. The results of the 

JANIB were reviewed at last week’s NATO Defense Ministerial meeting and we expect President Karzai to announce his decision on the first tranche of municipalities 

and provinces for transition on March 21. 

We should expect the implementation of the transition process to reflect the diverse circumstances and varied requirements of districts and provinces across Afghanistan. That said, our objective in each case is for transition to be an irreversible 

process that will unfold during the months and years ahead city by city, district by 

district, and province by province, as the security situation improves and Afghan capacity grows. During the transition, Coalition forces will ‘‘thin out’’ and move from 

a position of being in the lead for security to one where Afghan forces are in the 

lead with an ISAF partner: first in tactical overwatch, then in strategic overwatch. 

13 

In addition to transition in the field, we are also building capacity in the Ministries 

of Defense and Interior to enable the transition of key functions at the national 

level. Even by the end of 2014 when Afghans will have the lead for security nationwide, I anticipate that some U.S. forces will remain in Afghanistan in order to train 

and assist the ANSF and conduct combined counterterrorism operations. 

As the President directed, the surge forces that we deployed to Afghanistan last 

year will conduct a responsible, conditions-based force reduction beginning in July 

2011. I know that General Petraeus will expand upon this issue, but let me just 

say that it is too early to put a number on the size of the initial withdrawal. The 

pace and scope of this withdrawal will be based upon conditions on the ground. At 

the same time, as the transition process continues, and as ISAF forces thin out in 

a given district or province, we anticipate that some forces will be reinvested in 

other geographic areas or missions, such as training the ANSF. 

The transition that will take place between now and December 2014 in no way 

signals our abandonment of Afghanistan. Our nation has made that mistake before, 

and we are determined not to repeat it. President Obama and President Karzai 

have agreed that the United States and Afghanistan will have an enduring strategic 

partnership beyond 2014, and we are currently working with the Afghans on the 

details of that partnership. Afghans must stand in the lead, but they will not stand 

alone. 

This strategic partnership, along with the enduring partnership declaration 

NATO signed with President Karzai at the Lisbon Summit, sends an important 

message to the government and people of Afghanistan, to our friends and allies, to 

al Qaeda and the Taliban, and to others in the region: we remain committed to Afghanistan. As we responsibly reduce our combat forces, and as Afghan forces take 

the lead, we will continue to work with the Afghan people to assist them in the development of their key institutions. Although the scope of our commitment will 

evolve, our core goal will remain unchanged. 

Meanwhile, logistical support also remains a challenge in Afghanistan. We are 

working, along with the Department of State, to secure the additional approvals 

that we need from countries participating in the Northern Distribution Network 

(NDN) that will allow us to further reduce the load we place on Pakistan’s infrastructure and provide additional routes for our personnel and cargo transiting into 

Afghanistan. We have already secured necessary approvals from Russia and we are 

negotiating with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to conclude further agreements and 

arrangements regarding NDN routes that they control. We likewise appreciate the 

cooperation we have had with Kyrgyzstan’s democratically elected government to 

support our use of the Transit Center at Manas and have recently concluded an 

agreement with Kyrgyzstan that will permit us to contract with a new state-owned 

enterprise to help meet our fuel needs. Together, these efforts demonstrate the 

broader and shared interest in regional cooperation to bring an end to extremism 

and to support a stable and secure Afghanistan. 

Pakistan, too, is inextricably linked to a successful outcome in the region, in both 

the near and long term. Pakistan has a pivotal role to play in our efforts to disrupt, 

dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates; to help bring about a durable political solution in Afghanistan; and to promote and sustain long-term regional stability. A lasting political solution in Afghanistan will require Pakistan to be part 

of the process. However, Pakistan will have to respect Afghan sovereignty and work 

with Afghanistan to improve regional stability. Additionally, Pakistan must take decisive steps to ensure that the Afghan Taliban cannot continue to conduct the insurgency from Pakistani territory. Continued pressure from the Pakistani side is essential to help push the Taliban toward reconciliation. 

Pursuing a strategic partnership with Pakistan based on a foundation of mutual 

interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust guides our civilian-military efforts. Over 

the long term, this partnership could lead to enduring linkages between our two 

peoples; stronger trade and investment ties; greater regional and internal stability; 

and a secure Pakistan whose regionally-integrated economy is growing and benefiting all of its people and its neighbors. 

There is no question that there are significant hurdles to overcome to realize this 

vision. The history of U.S.-Pakistan relations is fraught with disappointments, leading many in both countries to see our relationship as driven by transitory interests. 

In Pakistan, this is manifested in the expectation that we may abandon the region 

once again as soon as we have achieved our immediate objectives in Afghanistan. 

Our efforts to date have yielded progress in changing this mindset. However, overcoming years of mistrust will take patience, as well as sustained effort and resources. 

Our approach with Pakistan is to build an effective partnership that advances 

both U.S. and Pakistani interests, while also demonstrating to our Pakistani partVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:43 Jan 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\72295.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
14 

ners that we will remain a strong supporter of their security and prosperity over 

the long-term. Central to our efforts is aligning U.S. and Pakistani interests with 

respect to denying safe haven to all violent extremist organizations. 

Pakistan’s people have suffered greatly at the hands of extremists, with approximately 20,000–30,000 civilian casualties resulting from attacks on mosques, 

schools—particularly girls’ schools—and even a World Food Program food distribution site. Pakistan’s military has incurred nearly 3,000 personnel killed in action 

and over 8,000 wounded as a result of extremist attacks and kinetic operations 

against militants. In addition to the human toll, the financial burden of nearly a 

decade of conflict inside of and adjacent to Pakistan has been significant, both in 

opportunity costs of economic growth and in sustaining more than 140,000 troops 

in combat along on their border with Afghanistan. Still, Pakistan has continued the 

fight. 

Pakistan’s will to confront extremist organizations, particularly those that it does 

not view as a direct threat to the Pakistani state, remains a key challenge. However, its deficiencies in capacity are even more daunting. Pakistan faces a determined, complex, and resilient set of insurgent enemies. Pakistan’s military has historically focused on a major conventional land war with India and they still view 

India as their existential threat. The capabilities needed for a counterinsurgency 

campaign are different and require appropriate training and equipment. We are 

helping Pakistan to build this much needed capacity through train and equip programs funded by the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) and the Pakistan 

Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF), for which Congress has provided significant support. However, enhancing Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities to 

the level needed for successful operations to clear areas then ‘‘hold’’ and ‘‘build’’ in 

them will require our sustained civilian and military assistance. 

Before addressing some of Pakistan’s key deficiencies, it is important to remark 

on the progress Pakistan’s military has achieved to date. 

First, Pakistani operations since 2009 in Swat, South Waziristan, and a number 

of other agencies and areas in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Khyber 

Pakhtunkhwa Province (formerly known as the Northwest Frontier Province), are 

unprecedented. 

Second, Pakistan’s movement of six divisions, or one-third of their Army, from the 

Indian border to the border with Afghanistan demonstrates their recognition of the 

significant threat emanating from certain extremist groups. 

Third, Pakistan’s military leadership has increased cross-border coordination with 

ISAF and Afghan security forces. Part of this increased coordination resulted from 

a tragic accident that occurred last September when ISAF forces accidentally killed 

three Pakistani border soldiers who were mistaken for insurgents. This incident not 

only led to enhanced procedures being put in place to avoid future such tragedies, 

but also a greater measure of operational coordination designed to ensure that kinetic operations on one side of the border do not allow insurgents to escape with 

impunity to the other. Such coordination would have been impossible just 2 years 

ago. 

However, despite this progress, Pakistan’s military forces have not yet established 

effective control over important areas where extremists and insurgents operate. In 

many cases where the military has undertaken operations to clear insurgents and 

hold territory, Pakistan’s inadequate civilian and military capacities for the ‘‘build’’ 

phase have prevented ultimate transfer of those areas to civilian control. This deficiency forces the Pakistan military to leave large numbers of forces in cleared areas 

to ‘‘hold’’ them for indefinite periods of time rather than redeploying them to undertake new operations. In several cases, such as Mohmand Agency, military forces 

have been required to repeat clearing operations as insurgents have reinfiltrated. 

Addressing these issues will not only require sustained military and security assistance, but the financial assistance provided through the Enhanced Partnership 

with Pakistan Act of 2009, also known as Kerry-Lugar-Berman. The efforts the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are undertaking through the Strategic Dialogue to reach all segments of Pakistan’s population with civilian capacity training and new infrastructure are essential elements 

for Pakistan’s ability to ‘‘hold’’ and ‘‘build’’ areas to make them resistant to militant 

return. 

In many ways, we are still in the early stages of seeing our renewed civilian-military partnership with Pakistan gain traction. Our team in the Office of the Defense 

Representative—Pakistan has been able to build and nurture partnerships with 

Pakistan’s security forces on every level, including during the historic flooding and 

subsequent recovery efforts in the summer of 2010. These relationships have been 

critical to working through challenges that might once have broken the relationship, 

such as the late September 2010 incident on the Pakistani border post. Instead, the 

15 

ability to continue communicating through crises has led to greater coordination 

that advances our mutual interest in a stable and secure Pakistan. 

We have also made significant progress by supporting Pakistan’s efforts to define 

their near and long-term requirements as they restructure their forces to take on 

this counterinsurgency fight. Through the Exchanges in Defense Planning (EDP) 

process, we worked with the Pakistani military leadership to develop a shared 5- 

year vision for training and procurement. That shared vision formed the basis for 

the administration’s fiscal year 2012 request for $350 million in Foreign Military 

Financing (FMF), $5 million in International Military Education and Training 

(IMET), and $1.1 billion in PCCF for the first year of the Multi-Year Security Assistance Commitment for Pakistan that Secretary Clinton announced in October 

2010. That commitment includes $2.029 billion of FMF and IMET over 5 years, with 

PCCF levels set annually according to conditions on the ground. 

‘‘Train-advise-and-equip’’ programs with Pakistan’s military and paramilitary 

forces are central to pursuing our near-term objectives of eliminating terrorist sanctuaries and disrupting and defeating the al Qaeda network. Through congressional 

support for programs like the PCF and PCCF, we are increasing Pakistan’s capacity 

to take on militant networks. This effort will take time, and we are working to reform our security assistance system to make it more responsive to the wartime 

train-and-equip needs of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other partners. 

Let me conclude my remarks on Pakistan with a comment concerning the detention of U.S. diplomat Raymond Davis. The U.S. Government remains extremely concerned about the continued detention of Mr. Davis and views this as a violation of 

Pakistan’s international commitments under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 

Relations. The State Department remains actively engaged in a dialogue with the 

Government of Pakistan about releasing Mr. Davis as quickly as possible. It is critical, however, that we work to resolve this issue, so that it does not derail the important progress we have made in the last 2 years in building a stronger and deeper 

relationship between our countries. 

Finally, I would like to turn to the human and financial costs of this war. Many 

of you have expressed concern with these costs, especially in light of our battlefield 

casualties and our fiscal pressures here at home. You face these costs each time you 

sign a letter to a constituent who has lost a loved one and each time you vote on 

war funding. This concern has been expressed by our ISAF allies and partners as 

well. 

But, let me be absolutely clear. As the President said, the threat to our national 

security and the security of our friends and allies that emanates from the borderland of Afghanistan and Pakistan is not hypothetical. There is simply no other place 

in the world that contains such a concentration of al Qaeda senior leaders and operational commanders. Al Qaeda and the other terrorist organizations that operate in 

this region have a proven ability to infiltrate across borders to conduct attacks. 

These dangerous groups have established safe-havens inside of a nuclear-armed 

state and they are allied with the Taliban, a movement that seeks to overthrow the 

Government of Afghanistan and contributes to the destabilization of Pakistan. To 

allow these hostile organizations to flourish in this region is to put the security of 

the United States and our friends and allies at grave risk. 

In conclusion, I want to reiterate the basic principle that is at the heart of our 

efforts in Afghanistan. The outcome we seek is the defeat of al Qaeda and the denial 

of the region as a sanctuary for al Qaeda and its affiliates. This objective is the reason why our brave servicemen and servicewomen have sacrificed so much. It is why 

we have invested so much treasure. 

This remote region has served as a crucible for the most catastrophic terrorist actions of the past decade. As we learned at great cost after abandoning the region 

in 1989, staying engaged over the long term is critical to achieving lasting peace 

and stability in this region and to securing our national interests. We are determined to bring this war to a successful conclusion, for the sake of our own security, 

but also for the security of the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who have suffered so much, and who have so much to gain from a secure, lasting peace. 

Members of the committee, I want to thank you for providing the opportunity to 

appear before you today. I look forward to your continued and invaluable support 

for the policies and programs that are critical to our success in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Secretary Flournoy. 

General Petraeus. 

16 

STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER, 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE, AND COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES AFGHANISTAN 

General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman and Senator McCain, it’s a 

privilege to be here today with Under Secretary Flournoy to report 

on the situation in Afghanistan. 

Before I proceed, however, I’d like to offer my sincere condolences 

to the people of Japan as they work to recover from one of the 

worst natural disasters in their history. 

For many years now, Japan has been a stalwart partner in Afghanistan, and an important contributor to the mission there. Now 

our thoughts and our prayers are with our long-term allies and all 

those in Japan affected by the earthquake and the tsunami. 

Chairman LEVIN. If I could just interrupt you for a minute, in 

expressing those sentiments you’re speaking for every member of 

this committee and, I believe, every American. Thank you for doing 

that. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As a bottom line upfront, it is ISAF’s assessment that the momentum achieved by the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2005 has 

been arrested in much of the country, and reversed in a number 

of important areas. However, while the security progress achieved 

over the past year is significant, it is also fragile and reversible. 

Moreover, it is clear that much difficult work lies ahead with our 

Afghan partners to solidify and expand our gains in the face of the 

expected Taliban spring offensive. 

Nonetheless, the hard-fought achievements in 2010 and early 

2011 have enabled the Joint Afghan-NATO Transition Board to 

recommend initiation this spring of transition to Afghan lead in 

several provinces. 

The achievements of the past year are also very important as I 

prepare to provide options and a recommendation to President 

Obama for commencement of the drawdown of the U.S. surge forces 

in July. Of note, as well, the progress achieved has put us on the 

right azimuth to accomplish the objective agreed upon at last November’s Lisbon Summit, that of Afghan forces in the lead throughout the country by the end of 2014. 

The achievements of 2010 and early 2011 have been enabled by 

a determined effort to get the inputs right in Afghanistan. With the 

strong support of the United States and the 47 other troop-contributing countries, ISAF has focused enormous attention and resources over the past 2 years on building the organizations needed 

to conduct a comprehensive, civil-military counterinsurgency campaign, on staffing those organizations properly, on developing—in 

close coordination with our Afghan partners—the requisite concepts and plans, and, above all, on deploying the additional forces, 

civilians, and funding needed. Indeed, more than 87,000 additional 

NATO–ISAF troopers and 1,000 additional civilians have been 

added to the effort in Afghanistan since the beginning of 2009, and 

Afghanistan’s security forces have grown by over 122,000 in that 

time, as well. 

Getting the inputs right has enabled our forces, together with Afghan forces, to conduct the comprehensive campaign necessary to 

achieve our goals in Afghanistan. Our core objective is, of course, 

17 

ensuring that Afghanistan does not once again become a sanctuary 

for al Qaeda. Achieving that objective requires that we help Afghanistan develop sufficient capabilities to secure and govern itself, 

and that effort requires the execution of the comprehensive civilmilitary effort on which we are now embarked. 

Over the past year, in particular, ISAF elements, together with 

our Afghan and international partners, have increased all the activities of our comprehensive campaign substantially. We have, for 

example, stepped up the tempo of precise intelligence-driven operations to capture or kill insurgent leaders. In a typical 90-day period, in fact, precision operations by U.S. special mission units and 

their Afghan partners alone kill or capture some 360 targeted insurgent leaders. Moreover, intelligence-driven operations are now 

coordinated with senior officers of the relevant Afghan ministries, 

and virtually all include highly trained Afghan soldiers or police, 

with some Afghan elements now in the lead on these operations. 

We have also expanded considerably joint ISAF-Afghan operations to clear the Taliban from important, long-held safe havens, 

and then to hold and build in them. ISAF and Afghan troopers 

have, for example, cleared such critical areas as the districts west 

of Kandahar City that were the birthplace of the Taliban movement, as well as important districts of Helmand Province, areas 

that expand the Kabul security bubble, and select locations in the 

north where the Taliban expanded its presence in recent years. 

One result of such operations has been a four-fold increase in recent months in the number of weapons and explosive caches turned 

in and found. Another has been the gradual development of local 

governance and economic revival in the growing security bubbles. 

In fact, Marjah, the one-time hub of the Taliban and the illegal 

narcotics industry in central Helmand Province, held an election 

for a community council on March 1 during which 75 percent of 

registered voters cast a ballot. As a result of improvements in the 

security situation there, the markets, which once sold weapons, explosives, and illegal narcotics, now feature over 1,500 shops selling 

food, clothes, and household goods. 

We have positioned more forces, as well, to interdict the flow of 

fighters and explosives from insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan, and 

we will do further work with our Afghan partners to establish as 

much of a defense in depth as is possible to disrupt infiltration of 

Taliban and Haqqani Network members. Meanwhile, we are coordinating more closely than ever with the Pakistani army to conduct 

ISAF operations that will provide the ‘‘anvil’’ on the Afghan side 

of the Durand Line, against which Pakistani Taliban elements can 

be driven by Pakistani operations in the border areas. 

With your support, we have also devoted substantial additional 

resources to the development of the ANSF. This effort is, of course, 

another very important component of our comprehensive approach. 

Indeed, it is arguably the most critical element in our effort to help 

Afghanistan develop the capability to secure itself. 

We have seen significant progress in this arena over the past 

year, though we have had to contend with innumerable challenges, 

and our Afghan partners are the first to note that the quality of 

some elements is still uneven. The train and equip mission is, in 

fact, a huge undertaking, and there is nothing easy about it. HowVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:43 Jan 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\72295.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ever, the past year alone has seen ANSF grow by over one third, 

adding some 70,000 soldiers and police. Notably, those forces have 

grown in quality, not just in quantity. 

Investments in leader development, literacy, marksmanship, and 

institutions have yielded significant dividends. In fact, in the hard 

fighting west of Kandahar in late 2010, Afghan forces comprised 

some 60 percent of the overall force, and they fought with skill and 

courage. 

President Karzai’s ALP initiative has also been an important addition to the overall campaign. It is, in essence, a community watch 

with AK–47s, under the local District Chief of Police, with members nominated by a representative Shura Council, vetted by the 

Afghan intelligence service, and trained by and partnered with Afghan Police and U.S. Special Forces elements. 

This initiative does more than just allow the arming of local 

forces and the conduct of limited defensive missions. Through the 

way each unit is established, this program mobilizes communities 

in self-defense against those who would undermine security in 

their areas. For that reason, the growth of these elements is of particular concern to the Taliban, whose ability to intimidate the population is limited considerably by it. 

There are currently 70 districts identified for ALP elements, with 

each district’s authorization averaging some 300 ALP members. 

Twenty-seven of the district ALP elements have been validated for 

full operations, while the other 43 are in various stages of being 

established. This program has emerged as so important that I have 

put a conventional U.S. infantry battalion under the operational 

control of our Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in Afghanistan to augment our Special Forces and increase our ability to support the program’s expansion. 

We have increased, as well, our efforts to enable the Afghan Government’s work and that of international community civilians to 

improve governance, economic development, and the provision of 

basic services. These are essential elements of the effort to shift delivery of basic services from Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) 

and international organizations to Afghan governmental elements, 

thereby addressing President Karzai’s understandable concerns 

about parallel institutions. 

We have provided assistance for new Afghan Government-led initiatives in reintegration, supporting the recently established Afghan High Peace Council and Provincial Peace and Reintegration 

Councils. Indeed, we recognize that we and our Afghan partners 

cannot just kill or capture our way out of the insurgency in Afghanistan. Afghan-led reintegration of reconcilable insurgents must also 

be an important element of the strategy—and it now is. In fact, 

some 700 former Taliban have now officially reintegrated with Afghan authorities just in recent months, and some 2,000 more are 

in various stages of the reintegration process. 

All of these efforts are part of our comprehensive approach, and 

we have worked hard to coordinate ISAF activities with the international organizations and diplomatic missions in Afghanistan, as 

well as with our Afghan partners. We have also sought to ensure 

that we minimize loss of innocent civilian life in the course of our 

operations, even as we also ensure protection of our forces and our 

19 

Afghan partners. Of note, a recently released United Nations 

(U.N.) study observed that civilian casualties due to ISAF and Afghan force operations decreased by just over 20 percent in 2010, 

even as our total forces increased by over 100,000 and significant 

offensive operations were launched. 

Our progress in this area notwithstanding, however, in view of 

several tragic incidents in recent weeks, I ordered a review of our 

Tactical Directive on the use of force by all levels of our chain of 

command and with the air crews of our attack helicopters. I have 

reemphasized instructions on reducing damage to infrastructure 

and property to an absolute minimum. Counterinsurgents cannot 

succeed if they harm the people they are striving to protect. 

As I noted at the outset, the Joint NATO-Afghan Inteqal, or 

Transition, Board has recommended to President Karzai and 

NATO leaders commencement of transition in select provinces in 

the next few months. President Karzai will announce these locations in a speech on March 22. 

In keeping with the principles adopted by the North Atlantic 

Council to guide transition, the shifting of responsibility from ISAF 

to Afghan forces will be conducted at a pace determined by conditions on the ground, with assessments provided from the bottom up 

so that those at operational command level in Afghanistan can plan 

the resulting battlefield geometry adjustments with our Afghan 

partners. 

According to the NATO principles, transition will see our forces 

thinning out, not just handing off, with reinvestment of some of the 

forces freed up by transition in contiguous areas, or in training 

missions where more work is needed. Similar processes are also 

taking place as we commence transition of certain training and institutional functions from ISAF trainers to their Afghan counterparts. 

As we embark on the process of transition, we should keep in 

mind the imperative of ensuring that the transition actions we take 

will be irreversible. As the ambassadors of several ISAF countries 

emphasized at one recent NATO meeting, we’ll get one shot at 

transition, and we need to get it right. 

As a number of ISAF national leaders have noted in recent 

months, especially since the Lisbon Summit, we need to focus not 

just on the year ahead, but increasingly on the goal agreed at Lisbon of having Afghan forces in the lead throughout Afghanistan by 

the end of 2014. Indeed, we need to ensure that we take a sufficiently long view, to ensure that our actions in the months ahead 

enable long-term achievement in the years ahead. We have refined 

our campaign plan to do just that—and we are also now beginning 

to look beyond 2014, as Under Secretary Flournoy noted, as the 

United States and Afghanistan—and NATO and Afghanistan—discuss possible strategic partnerships. 

All of this is enormously reassuring to our Afghan partners, and 

of considerable concern to the Taliban. With respect to the Taliban, 

appreciation that there will be an enduring commitment of some 

form by the international community to Afghanistan is important 

to the insurgents’ recognition that reconciliation, rather than continued fighting, should be their goal. 

20 

Before concluding, there are four additional issues I would like 

to highlight to the committee. First, I am concerned that levels of 

funding for our State Department and USAID partners will not 

sufficiently enable them to build on the hard-fought security 

achievements of our men and women in uniform. Inadequate 

resourcing of our civilian partners could, in fact, jeopardize accomplishment of the overall mission. I offer that assessment, noting 

that we have just completed a joint civil-military campaign plan between U.S. Forces Afghanistan and the U.S. Embassy Kabul which 

emphasizes the critical integration of civilian and military efforts 

in an endeavor such as that in Afghanistan. 

Second, I want to express my deep appreciation for your support 

of vital additional capabilities for our troopers. The funding you 

have provided has, for example, enabled the rapid deployment of a 

substantial increase in the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets supporting our forces. To take one example, we 

have increased the number of various types of persistent surveillance systems—essentially blimps and towers with optics—from 

114 this past August to 184 at the present, with plans for continued increases throughout this year. 

Your support has also enabled the rapid procurement and deployment of the all-terrain vehicle version of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) family of vehicles, with 6,700 fielded since 

I took command some 81⁄2 months ago. Your support has continued 

to provide our commanders with another critical element of our 

strategy, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) 

funding that has once again proven absolutely invaluable as a way 

of capitalizing rapidly on hard-won gains on the ground. Indeed, 

CERP funding, the establishment of the Afghan Infrastructure 

Fund, and the specific authorization for the reintegration program 

have been instrumental in enabling key components of our overall 

effort. 

Third, I should at this point also highlight the critical work of 

the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. These institutions are the largest donors to Afghanistan after the United States, 

and they have been critical to the success of important projects, 

such as the Ring Road and the Uzbek-Afghan railroad. We need 

these critical enabling institutions, and further U.S. support for 

them will ensure that they are able to continue to contribute as significantly as they have in the past. 

Fourth, I also want to thank you for the substantial funding for 

the development of the ANSF. The continued growth of Afghan 

forces in quantity, quality, and capability is, needless to say, essential to the process of transition of security tasks from ISAF forces 

to Afghan forces. The resources you have provided for this component of our effort have been the critical enabler of it. 

In closing, the past 8 months have seen important, but hardfought, progress in Afghanistan. Key insurgent safe havens have 

been taken away from the Taliban. Numerous insurgent leaders 

have been killed or captured. Hundreds of reconcilable mid-level 

leaders and fighters have been reintegrated into Afghan society. 

Meanwhile, Afghan forces have grown in number and capability. 

Local security solutions have been instituted. Security improvements in key areas like Kabul, Kandahar, and Helmand Provinces 

21 

have, in turn, enabled progress in the areas of governance and development. 

None of this has been easy. The progress achieved has entailed 

hard fighting and considerable sacrifice. There have been tough 

losses along the way. There have been setbacks as well as successes. Indeed, the experience has been akin to that of a roller 

coaster ride. The trajectory has generally been upward since last 

summer, but there certainly have been significant bumps and difficult reverses at various points. 

Nonetheless, although the insurgents are already striving to regain lost momentum and lost safe havens as we enter the spring 

fighting season, we believe that we will be able to build on the momentum achieved in 2010, though that clearly will entail additional 

tough fighting. 

As many of you have noted in the past, our objectives in Afghanistan and in the region are of vital importance, and we must do all 

that we can to achieve those objectives. Those of us on the ground 

believe that the strategy on which we are now embarked provides 

the best approach for doing just that, noting, as dialogue with 

President Karzai has reminded us at various junctures, that we 

must constantly refine our activities in response to changes in the 

circumstances on the ground. Needless to say, we will continue to 

make such adjustments in close consultation with our Afghan and 

international counterparts as the situation evolves. 

Finally, I want to thank each of you for your continued support 

for our country’s men and women in Afghanistan and their families. As I have noted to you before, nothing means more to them 

than knowing that what they’re doing is important, and knowing 

that their sacrifices are appreciated by their leaders and their fellow citizens back home. Each of you has sought to convey that 

sense to them, and we are grateful to you for doing so. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General Petraeus follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA 

Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, it’s a privilege to be here today with Under Secretary Flournoy to report on the situation in Afghanistan. However, before I proceed, I would like to offer my sincere condolences to the people of Japan as they 

recover from one of the worst natural disasters in their history. For many years 

now, Japan has been a stalwart partner in Afghanistan and has made many vital 

contributions to the mission. Our thoughts and prayers are with all those affected 

by the earthquake and the tsunami. 

BOTTOM LINE UPFRONT

As a bottom line upfront, it is the International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) 

assessment that the momentum achieved by the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2005 

has been arrested in much of the country and reversed in a number of important 

areas. However, while the security progress achieved over the past year is significant, it is also fragile and reversible. Moreover, it is clear that much difficult work 

lies ahead with our Afghan partners to solidify and expand our gains in the face 

of the expected Taliban spring offensive. Nonetheless, the hard-fought achievements 

in 2010 and early 2011 have enabled the Joint Afghan-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Transition Board to recommend initiation this spring of transition 

to Afghan lead in several provinces. The achievements of the past year are also very 

important as I prepare to provide options and a recommendation to President 

Obama for commencement of the drawdown of the U.S. surge forces in July. Of note, 

as well, the progress achieved has put us on the right azimuth to accomplish the 

22 

objective agreed upon at last November’s Lisbon Summit, that of Afghan forces in 

the lead throughout the country by the end of 2014. 

GETTING THE INPUTS RIGHT

The achievements of 2010 and early 2011 have been enabled by a determined effort to get the inputs right in Afghanistan. With the strong support of the United 

States and the 47 other troop-contributing countries, ISAF has focused enormous attention and resources over the past 2 years on building the organizations needed 

to conduct a comprehensive, civil-military counterinsurgency campaign, on staffing 

those organizations properly, on developing—in close coordination with our Afghan 

partners—the requisite concepts and plans, and, above all, on deploying the additional forces, civilians, and funding needed. Indeed, more than 87,000 additional 

ISAF troopers and 1,000 additional civilians have been added to the effort in Afghanistan since the beginning of 2009. Afghanistan’s Security Forces have grown by 

over 122,000 in that time, as well. 

THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Getting the inputs right has enabled our forces, together with Afghan forces, to 

conduct the comprehensive campaign necessary to achieve our goals in Afghanistan. 

Our core objective is, of course, ensuring that Afghanistan does not once again become a sanctuary for al Qaeda. Achieving that objective requires that we help Afghanistan develop sufficient capabilities to secure and govern itself. That effort requires the execution of the comprehensive civil-military effort on which we are now 

embarked. 

Over the past year, in particular, ISAF elements, together with our Afghan and 

international partners, have increased all the activities of our comprehensive campaign substantially. We have, for example, stepped up the tempo of precise, intelligence-driven operations to capture or kill insurgent leaders. In a typical 90-day period, in fact, precision operations by U.S. special mission units and their Afghan 

partners alone kill or capture some 360 targeted insurgent leaders. Moreover, intelligence-driven operations are now coordinated with senior officers of the relevant Afghan ministries and virtually all include highly-trained Afghan soldiers or police, 

with some Afghan elements now in the lead on these operations. 

With your support, we have also expanded considerably joint ISAF-Afghan operations to clear the Taliban from important, long-held safe havens and then to hold 

and build in them. ISAF and Afghan troopers have, for example, cleared such critical areas as the districts west of Kandahar City that were the birthplace of the 

Taliban movement, as well as important districts of Helmand Province, areas that 

expand the Kabul security bubble, and select locations in the north where the 

Taliban expanded its presence in recent years. One result of such operations has 

been a four-fold increase in recent months in the number of weapons and explosives 

caches turned in and found. Another has been the gradual development of local governance and economic revival in the growing security bubbles. In fact, Marjah, the 

one-time hub of the Taliban and the illegal narcotics industry in central Helmand 

Province, held an election for a community council on March 1 during which 75 percent of registered voters cast a ballot. As a result of improvements in the security 

situation there, the markets, which once sold weapons, explosives, and illegal narcotics, now feature over 1,500 shops selling food, clothes, and household goods. 

We have positioned more forces, as well, to interdict the flow of fighters and explosives from insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan. We will do further work with our Afghan partners to establish as much of a defense in depth as is possible to disrupt 

infiltration of Taliban and Haqqani Network members. Meanwhile, we are coordinating closely with the Pakistani Army to conduct ISAF operations that will provide 

the ‘‘anvil’’ on the Afghan side of the Durand Line against which Pakistani Taliban 

elements can be driven by Pakistani operations in the border areas. 

AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCE DEVELOPMENT

With your support, we have also devoted substantial additional resources to the 

development of Afghanistan’s security forces. This effort is, of course, another important component of our comprehensive approach; indeed, it is arguably the most critical element in our effort to help Afghanistan develop the capability to secure itself. 

We have seen significant progress in this arena over the past year, though we have 

had to contend with innumerable challenges and our Afghan partners are the first 

to note that the quality of some elements is still uneven. The train and equip mission is, in fact, a huge undertaking, and there is nothing easy about it; however, 

the past year alone has seen Afghan forces grow by over one-third, adding some 

70,000 soldiers and police. Those forces have grown in quality, not just in quantity. 

23 

Investments in leader development, literacy, and institutions have yielded significant dividends. In fact, in the hard fighting west of Kandahar in late 2010, Afghan 

forces comprised some 60 percent of the overall force, and they fought with skill and 

courage. 

THE AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE INITIATIVE

President Karzai’s Afghan Local Police (ALP) initiative has also been an important addition to the overall campaign. It is, in essence, a community watch with 

AK–47s, under the local District Chief of Police, with members nominated by a representative Shura Council, vetted by the Afghan intel service, and trained by and 

partnered with Afghan Police and U.S. Special Forces elements. The initiative does 

more than just allow the arming of local forces and the conduct of limited defensive 

missions; through the way each unit is established, this program mobilizes communities in self-defense against those who would undermine security in their areas. 

For that reason, the growth of these elements is of particular concern to the 

Taliban, whose ability to intimidate the population is limited considerably by it. 

There are currently 70 districts identified for ALP elements, with each district’s 

authorization averaging 300 ALP members. Twenty-seven of the district ALP elements have been validated for full operations, while the other 43 are in various 

stages of being established. This program has emerged as so important that I have 

put a conventional U.S. infantry battalion under the operational control of our Special Operations Command in Afghanistan to increase our ability to support the program’s expansion. 

We have increased as well our efforts to enable the Afghan Government’s work 

and that of international community civilians to improve governance, economic development, and the provision of basic services. They are essential elements of the 

effort to shift delivery of basic services from PRTs and international organizations 

to Afghan Government elements, thereby addressing President Karzai’s understandable concerns about ‘‘parallel institutions.’’ 

We have provided assistance for new Afghan Government-led initiatives in reintegration, supporting the recently established Afghan High Peace Council and 

Provincial Peace and Reintegration Councils. Indeed, we recognize that we and our 

Afghan partners cannot just kill or capture our way out of the insurgency in Afghanistan; Afghan-led reintegration of reconcilable insurgents must also be an important element of the strategy—and it now is. In fact, some 700 former Taliban 

have now officially reintegrated with Afghan authorities and some 2,000 more are 

in various stages of the reintegration process. 

All of these efforts are part of our comprehensive approach. We have worked hard 

to coordinate ISAF activities with the international organizations and diplomatic 

missions in Afghanistan, as well as with our Afghan partners. We have also sought 

to ensure that we minimize loss of innocent civilian life in the course of our operations, even as we also ensure protection of our forces and our Afghan partners. Of 

note, a recently released United Nations study observed that civilian casualties due 

to ISAF and Afghan force operations decreased by just over 20 percent in 2010, even 

as our total forces increased by over 100,000 and significant offensive operations 

were launched. Our progress in this area notwithstanding, however, in view of several tragic incidents in recent weeks, I ordered a review of our Tactical Directive 

on the use of force by all levels of our chain of command and with the air crews 

of our attack helicopters. I have also issued instructions on reducing damage to infrastructure and property to an absolute minimum. Counterinsurgents cannot succeed if they harm the people they are striving to protect. 

TRANSITION

As I noted at the outset, the Joint NATO-Afghan Transition Board has recommended to President Karzai and NATO leaders commencement of transition in 

select provinces in the next few months. President Karzai will announce these locations in his Nowruz speech on March 21st. In keeping with the principles adopted 

by the North Atlantic Council to guide transition, the shifting of responsibility from 

ISAF to Afghan forces will be conducted at a pace determined by conditions on the 

ground with assessments provided from the bottom up so that those at operational 

command level in Afghanistan can plan the resulting ‘‘battlefield geometry’’ adjustments with our Afghan partners. According to the NATO principles, transition will 

see our forces thinning out, not just handing off, with reinvestment of some of the 

forces freed up by transition in contiguous areas or in training missions where more 

work is needed. Similar processes are also taking place as we commence transition 

of certain training and institutional functions from ISAF trainers to their Afghan 

counterparts. As we embark on the process of transition, we should keep in mind 

24 

the imperative of ensuring that the transition actions we take will be irreversible. 

As the ambassadors of several ISAF countries emphasized at one recent NATO 

meeting, we’ll get one shot at transition, and we need to get it right. 

2014

As a number of ISAF national leaders have noted in recent months, we need to 

focus not just on the year ahead, but increasingly on the goal agreed at Lisbon of 

having Afghan forces in the lead throughout Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Indeed, we need to ensure that we take a sufficiently long view to ensure that our 

actions in the months ahead enable long-term achievement in the years ahead. We 

have refined our campaign plan to do just that—and we are also now beginning to 

look beyond 2014, as well, as the United States and Afghanistan—and NATO and 

Afghanistan—discuss possible strategic partnerships. All of this is enormously reassuring to our Afghan partners—and of considerable concern to the Taliban. With respect to the Taliban, appreciation that there will be an enduring commitment of 

some form by the international community to Afghanistan is important to the insurgents’ recognition that reconciliation, rather than continued fighting, should be their 

goal. 

ADDITIONAL ISSUES

Before concluding, there are four additional issues I would like to highlight. 

First, I am concerned that levels of funding for our State Department and USAID 

partners will not sufficiently enable them to build on the hard-fought security 

achievements of our men and women in uniform. Inadequate resourcing of our civilian partners could, in fact, jeopardize accomplishment of the overall mission. I offer 

that assessment, noting that we have just completed a joint civil-military campaign 

plan between U.S. Forces Afghanistan and the U.S. Embassy which emphasizes the 

critical integration of civilian and military efforts in an endeavor such as that in 

Afghanistan. 

Second, I want to express my deep appreciation for your support of vital additional capabilities for our troopers. The funding you have provided has, for example, 

enabled the rapid deployment of a substantial increase in the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets supporting our forces. To take one example, we 

have increased the number of various types of persistent surveillance systems—essentially blimps and towers with optics—from 114 this past August to 184 at the 

present, with plans for continued increases throughout this year. Your support has 

also enabled the rapid procurement and deployment of the all terrain vehicle 

version of the mine resistant ambush protected family of vehicles, with 6,700 fielded 

since I took command. Your support has continued to provide our commanders with 

another critical element of our strategy, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding that has once again proven absolutely invaluable as a way 

of capitalizing rapidly on hard-won gains on the ground. Indeed, CERP funding, the 

establishment of the Afghan Infrastructure Fund, and the specific authorization for 

the reintegration program have been instrumental in enabling key components of 

our overall effort. 

Third, I should at this point also highlight the critical work of the World Bank 

and the Asian Development Bank. These institutions are the largest donors to Afghanistan after the United States, and they have been critical to the success of such 

projects as the Ring Road and the Uzbek-Afghan railroad. We need these critical 

enabling institutions, and further U.S. support for them will ensure that they are 

able to continue to contribute as significantly as they have in the past. 

Fourth, I also want to thank you for the substantial funding for the development 

of the Afghan National Security Forces. The continued growth of Afghan forces in 

quantity, quality, and capability is, needless to say, essential to the process of transition of security tasks from ISAF forces to Afghan forces. The resources you have 

provided for this component of our effort have been the critical enabler of it. 

CONCLUSION

In closing, the past 8 months have seen important, but hard-fought, progress in 

Afghanistan. Key insurgent safe havens have been taken away from the Taliban, 

numerous insurgent leaders have been killed or captured, and hundreds of reconcilable mid-level leaders and fighters have been reintegrated into Afghan society. 

Meanwhile, Afghan forces have grown in number and capability, local security solutions have been instituted, and security improvements in key areas like Kabul, 

Kandahar, and Helmand Provinces have, in turn, enabled progress in the areas of 

governance and development. 

25 

None of this has been easy. The progress achieved has entailed hard fighting and 

considerable sacrifice. There have been tough losses along the way. There have been 

setbacks as well as successes. Indeed, the experience has been akin to that of a roller coaster ride. The trajectory, however, has generally been upward since last summer—though there certainly have been significant bumps and difficult reverses at 

various points. Nonetheless, although the insurgents are already striving to regain 

lost momentum and lost safe havens as we enter the spring fighting season, we believe that we will be able to build on the momentum achieved in 2010—though that 

clearly will entail additional tough fighting. 

As many of you have noted in the past, our objectives in Afghanistan and in the 

region are of vital importance, and we must do all that we can to achieve those objectives. Those of us on the ground believe that the strategy on which we are embarked provides the best approach for doing just that, noting, as dialogue with 

President Karzai has reminded us at various junctures, that we must constantly refine our activities in response to changes in the circumstances on the ground. Needless to say, we will continue to make adjustments, in close consultation with our 

Afghan and international counterparts in Afghanistan, as the situation evolves. 

Finally, I want to thank each of you for your continued support for our country’s 

men and women in Afghanistan and their families. As I have noted to you before, 

nothing means more to them than knowing that what they’re doing is important 

and knowing that their sacrifices are appreciated by their leaders and their fellow 

citizens back home. Each of you has sought to convey that sense to them, and we 

are grateful to you for doing so. Thank you very much. 


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35 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General. 

Thank you both for your testimony. 

[Audience disturbance interrupts proceeding.] 

Please leave if you’re going to make any comments in public like 

that. Just please leave. 

General, let me start by asking you about the July 2011 date, 

which you’ve made reference to in your statement as a date about 

which you’re going to recommend to President Obama the commencement of the drawdown of some of our forces. Have you decided on the level of the reductions that you’re going to be recommending yet? 

General PETRAEUS. I have not, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you continue to support the beginning of reductions of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in July? 

General PETRAEUS. I do, Mr. Chairman, and I will provide options to the chain of command and the President to do that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Why do you support the beginning of reductions this July? 

General PETRAEUS. If I could come back, perhaps, to your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, I think it is logical to talk both 

about getting the job done, as Secretary Gates did with his NATO 

counterparts, and to begin transition and responsible, to use President Obama’s term, reductions in forces at a pace determined by 

conditions on the ground. As my good friend and shipmate, General 

Jim Mattis, noted, it undercuts the narrative of the Taliban that 

we will be there forever, that we will maintain a presence. It does, 

indeed, as I have told this committee before, send that message of 

urgency that President Obama sought to transmit on the 1st of December at West Point, 2009, when he also transmitted a message 


315ful21.eps
36 

of enormous additional commitment in the form of 30,000 additional U.S. forces, more funding for Afghan forces, and additional 

civilians. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Now, relative to the pending request to increase the size of ANSF 

by up to an additional 70,000 personnel, I believe that you have 

made that request, is that correct? 

General PETRAEUS. I have, Mr. Chairman. My understanding is 

that the Secretary of Defense has forwarded that. This was made 

in consultation, needless to say, with the Ministers of Interior and 

Defense in Afghanistan, who also gained President Karzai’s support for it. Keeping in mind that it recommends a floor of 352,000, 

and then, if there are certain reforms carried through, which are 

all very much in train by our ministry counterparts in Afghanistan 

in terms of additional commitment to leader development, recruiting, retention, and attrition issues, that the growth would be to 

378,000 total. 

Chairman LEVIN. That floor of 352,000 is approximately 45,000 

more than the goal for October 2011, as I understand it. 

General PETRAEUS. That’s correct, Mr. Chairman. The Afghan 

forces are on track, it appears, to reach that goal probably even 

early, as was the case this past year. 

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary Flournoy, are you recommending 

that increase? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. The Secretary has forwarded the increase over to 

the White House for the President’s consideration. We do expect a 

decision on that soon. 

Chairman LEVIN. Are you able to say that you support it, or the 

Secretary supports it? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes, I think the secretary does support the range 

that General Petraeus suggested, between 352,000 and 378,000. 

Chairman LEVIN. You both have made reference to Pakistan and 

the safe havens which exist there, with the Pakistan Government 

basically looking the other way in two key areas, and that’s North 

Waziristan and down in Quetta, where they know where those people are who are crossing the border and terrorizing Afghan citizens, 

attacking us, attacking Afghan forces, coalition forces. Now, Pakistan may be looking the other way in that regard, but I don’t think 

we can look the other way about what they are not doing in those 

areas. So I would ask you both what, if anything, more can we do 

to persuade the Pakistanis to be the hammer, which I think you 

made indirect reference to, General Petraeus, so that when those 

forces cross the border, we can be the anvil? 

General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, first, if I could, I think it’s always important to note what Pakistan has done over the course of 

the last 2 years, and that is very impressive and very challenging 

counterinsurgency operations to clear Swat Valley and a number of 

the agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 

the rugged border regions. To note the enormous sacrifices they 

have made, their military as well as their civilian populace, which 

has also suffered terrible losses at the hands of internal extremists. 

There is indeed, as a result of a number of recent visits and coordination efforts in recent months, unprecedented cooperation, coordination, between Pakistani, Afghan, and ISAF forces to coordiVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:43 Jan 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\72295.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
37 

nate on operations that will complement the others’ activities on either side of the border, and, indeed, where, say, for example, the 

Pakistanis push the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistani and they go across 

the border, and we are poised, indeed, to be the anvil on which 

they are driven. 

The fact is that the Pakistanis are the first to note that more 

needs to be done. There is, I think, a growing recognition that you 

cannot allow poisonous snakes to have a nest in your backyard 

even if they just bite the neighbor’s kids, because sooner or later 

they’re going to turn around and cause problems in your backyard. 

I think that, sadly, has proven to be the case. 

Having said that, there is, of course, considerable pressure on al 

Qaeda and on the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan. The campaign there has disrupted significantly the activities of those 

groups. Then, of course, on the Afghan side of the border there has, 

as I noted in my opening statement, been an enormous effort to establish a defense in depth to make it very difficult for infiltration. 

Again, we have conducted a great deal of coordination with our 

Afghan partners. Ultimately, I think, as Senator McCain noted, 

that the way to influence Pakistan is to show that there can be a 

certain outcome in Afghanistan that means that there should be 

every effort to help their Afghan neighbors and, indeed, to ensure 

that they do that on their side of the border as well. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add, at the strategic level, I think what’s needed is continued investment in the 

strategic partnership that we’ve been developing with Pakistan, 

and very candid engagement with them on these issues to influence 

their will to go after the full range of groups that threaten both of 

us. It means continued efforts to build their capacity, things like 

the Pakistani counterinsurgency fund. But not only efforts to build 

their military capacity, but also their capacity for governance and 

development in areas like the FATA and other parts of northwest 

Pakistan to meet the basic needs of their people. 

We can’t walk away from this problem, and we believe that a 

strategy of engagement and investing in the partnership is the best 

way forward. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think that’s all well and good, but it’s also 

factually true, I’m afraid, that just simply investing in their capacity is not what we need at the moment in North Waziristan and 

down in Quetta with the Taliban. Those folks using those areas are 

attacking our people, and the Pakistanis have basically resisted 

going after them in those areas. They’ve done that for their own 

internal reasons. On the other hand, we have to continue to find 

ways to impress upon them that their backyard is a backyard 

where snakes are permitted to continue to exist, and those snakes 

are crossing the border. You say just simply increase their capacity. 

I’m not willing to simply increase their capacity without some kind 

of an understanding that that capacity is going to be used to end 

these safe havens, which are deadly to our people. So I’ll simply 

say that. If you want to comment, you can. 

I should have announced at the outset that we’ll have a 7-minute 

round for questions. I probably have used mine already. But in any 

event, I will end my round there unless you want to add a comment. 

38 

Ms. FLOURNOY. If I could just add, Senator, we are having extremely candid conversations about our expectations of what we 

would like to see our Pakistani partners do in areas like North 

Waziristan and elsewhere. We are also continuing to apply as 

much pressure as we can both from the Afghan side of the border, 

and also in terms of pressure on al Qaeda’s senior leadership in the 

border regions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the 

witnesses again. 

General Petraeus, I have been a member of this committee for 

a long time, and I’ve sat through hundreds of hearings. One that 

stands out in my memory was in September 2007, when you and 

Ambassador Crocker came and testified when the majority of 

Americans, the majority of members of this committee, and the majority of the Senate, wanted to have an immediate pullout from 

Iraq, and that the surge could not succeed and would fail. Obviously, that turned out not to be true. The surge did succeed. 

I have a bit of a feeling of deja vu here because this morning I’m 

sure you may have seen, the Washington Post’s March 13 headline 

is, on the front page, ‘‘Most in U.S. Say Afghan War Isn’t Worth 

Fighting.’’ The story says, ‘‘nearly two-thirds of Americans now say 

the war in Afghanistan is no longer worth fighting, the highest proportion yet opposed to the conflict, according to a new Washington 

Post-ABC News poll.’’ 

Could you respond to that poll and maybe have a few words for 

the American people about this conflict? You might mention the 

consequences of failure. 

General PETRAEUS. Thanks, Senator. 

Upfront, I can understand the frustration. We have been at this 

for 10 years. We have spent an enormous amount of money. We 

have sustained very tough losses and difficult, life-changing 

wounds. I was at Walter Reed yesterday seeing some of our troopers whose lives have been changed forever by their service in our 

country’s uniform in a tough fight. 

But I think it is important to remember why we are there at 

such a time. It’s important to remember that that is where September 11 began. That’s where the plan was made. That’s where 

the initial training of the attackers took place before they went on 

to Germany and then to U.S. flight schools. That is where al Qaeda 

had its most important sanctuary in the world, and it had it under 

the Taliban. At that time, of course, the Taliban controlled Kabul 

and the vast majority of the country. Indeed, we do see al Qaeda 

looking for sanctuaries all the time, frankly. They are, as I mentioned earlier, under considerable pressure in their North 

Waziristan sanctuary. There is a search for other locations. Afghanistan, I think, would be an attractive location were the 

Taliban to control large swaths of it once again. Indeed, there is 

a small presence of al Qaeda in Afghanistan, some, probably less 

than 100, in fact, we killed the number three leader of al Qaeda 

in Afghanistan several months ago and have detained another very 

important individual there as well. We do see the exploration, if 

you will, of certain possible sanctuaries. 

39 

Now, the other point I think it’s important to recall is the one 

that I made in my opening statement, and that is that it is only 

recently that we have gotten the inputs right in Afghanistan. As 

Under Secretary Flournoy explained, there were a number of years 

where our focus was elsewhere, where Afghanistan was an economy of force effort, to use the military terminology. And it is only 

since late 2008, early 2009 that we have focused back on Afghanistan and have deployed the military, civilian, and financial resources necessary, adjusted our campaign plans and concepts, 

staffed the organizations properly, and so forth, so that we could, 

indeed, say that we actually had the inputs right. We judge that 

that was roughly last fall. That is what has enabled us to make 

the progress that we have made. 

I do believe that we can build on that progress, as difficult as 

that will be, and I believe it’s imperative that we do so because, 

again, I think this is, as President Obama has said, a vital national 

security interest that, again, al Qaeda not be allowed to reestablish 

sanctuaries in Afghanistan. 

Senator MCCAIN. Let me, then, ask you to respond to a Los Angeles Times story this morning which says, ‘‘National Intelligence 

Director James R. Clapper told Congress last week, ‘I think the 

issue, the concern that the Intelligence Community has is, after 

that, in the ability of the Afghan Government to pick up their responsibility for governance.’ At the same hearing, General Ronald 

Burgess, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, offered a sobering view, one that is shared by the Central Intelligence Agency, 

U.S. officials say, that contrasted sharply with the optimism expressed in recent days by Petraeus,’’ from General Burgess, ‘‘ ‘The 

Taliban in the south has shown resilience and still influences much 

of the population, particularly outside urban areas,’ Burgess said. 

‘The U.S.-led coalition has been killing Taliban militants by the 

hundreds,’ he said, ‘‘but there have been no apparent degradation 

in their capacity to fight.’’ 

Would you respond to General Clapper and General Burgess’s 

statements? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, with respect, I have tried to avoid 

what might be labeled optimism or pessimism, and have tried to 

provide realism. I think that the opening statement speaks for 

itself in terms of expressing what we believe is reality on the 

ground within very significant note of the challenges that lie 

ahead. 

There is no question that governmental capacity is an area of 

strategic risk, as we identify it. In fact, I think in the slides that 

we provided along with the statement, you’ll see the so-called 

‘‘cloud slide,’’ and I think there’s a double thunderbolt coming out 

of that particular cloud. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

40 

General PETRAEUS. The reason is that, indeed, it is very difficult 

to transition tasks that are currently performed by international 

organizations or ISAF PRTs to Afghan institutions if that capacity 

is not present. In fact, I had a long conversation with Minister of 

Finance Dr. Hazrak Omar Zakhilwal in Kabul, and then President 

Karzai the day before leaving, and discussed the imperative of increased efforts to expand this governmental capacity, particularly 

in the arena of budget execution. Now, that may sound like an odd 

item for a military commander to be engaged in. But with our civilian partners, we absolutely have to help our Afghan partners increase their ability to spend the money they’re provided to spend 

on the very bureaucratic processes that they have instituted, to enable them to take money that’s provided in through the top and get 

it down to the province and district to replace, again, service provision by international organizations and PRTs. 

They are seized with that. They realize that the trend that is 

currently in Afghanistan has to be changed and that, indeed, budget execution has to increase substantially, again, to enable President Karzai’s goal of doing away with parallel institutions. 

Senator MCCAIN. Could I just finally ask very briefly, do you see 

evidence of increasing Iranian involvement in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. We did interdict, as you saw, I think, in press 

reports, Senator McCain, a shipment from the Quds Force, without 

question the Revolutionary Guard’s core Quds Force, through a 

known Taliban facilitator. This was interdicted. Three of the individuals were killed. Forty-eight 122-millimeter rockets were intercepted with their various components. This is a significant increase 

in, more than double in range over the 107-millimeter rockets that 


315ful21.eps
41 

we have typically seen, more than double in terms of the bursting 

radius, and also the warhead. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you see other evidence of Iranian involvement? 

General PETRAEUS. We do see, certainly, Iranian activity to use 

both soft power in the way that they shut off the fuel going into 

Afghanistan a couple of months ago, and also, certainly, to influence the political process there as well, in ways similar to what we 

saw in Iraq. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks, Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus for your service and your testimony. 

General Petraeus, I don’t think we can ever thank you enough 

for the service and leadership you’ve given our country. Particularly in this case, you’d gone from, really, a remarkable leadership 

in Iraq, with a lot of help from the State Department and our 

troops, turning that situation around, then to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Suddenly with General McChrystal’s departure 

from Afghanistan, you’re called to the Oval Office, the president 

asks you to go to Afghanistan. You could have found a lot of reasons not to. You just didn’t hesitate. You said, yes, sir. You’ve been 

there with a lot of support from the administration and others. 

We’re turning it around now in Afghanistan without any illusions 

about the difficulties we face. I just think the country owes you a 

tremendous expression of gratitude. You set, by your example, the 

standard for everyone who serves under you in Afghanistan, and 

frankly, for any of us who have the privilege of serving our country 

in whatever capacity. I thank you for that. 

The public opinion polls are on our minds today. I think we all 

know from experience, you can’t make decisions about war and 

peace based on public opinion. Once you commit, as we did after 

September 11, to the cause of a different, new Afghanistan, and 

you commit troops to it, you can’t be affected by waves of public 

opinion. We know from recent history that when wars seem to be 

failing, public opinion is negative. When wars seem to be succeeding, public opinion turns more positive. 

In this case, we are succeeding in Afghanistan today. Therefore, 

I think the downward turn in the public opinion here in the United 

States has more to do with the understandable preoccupation of the 

American people with the economy, with jobs, and with the deficit. 

In that sense, I think we have to come back and remind the American people of why we are in Afghanistan, why it is worth it, and 

that we are now succeeding. I think, Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, you have done that most effectively in your testimony. 

Secretary Flournoy, I want to quote from you because you said, 

just, direct to the point, ‘‘The threat to our national security and 

the security of our friends and allies that emanates from the borderland of Afghanistan and Pakistan is not hypothetical. There is 

simply no other place in the world that contains such a concentration of al Qaeda senior leaders and operational commanders. This 

42 

remote region has served as a crucible for the most catastrophic 

terrorist actions of the past decade. As we learned at great cost 

after abandoning the region in 1989, staying engaged over the long 

term is critical to achieving lasting peace and stability in this region, and securing our national interests.’’ I don’t think we could 

say it better, and have to keep saying it, about why we’re there. 

Second, General Petraeus, I think your presentation today tells 

us, again, nobody’s under any illusions here that this is turning 

around. I can tell you that I’ve been going to Afghanistan since 

January or February 2002, after our initial victory there, overthrowing the Taliban, going back at least once a year, usually twice 

a year. For a period of years, just to validate what you’ve said 

about us turning our attention away, every time we went, if we 

looked at the map every year, the Taliban was in control of more 

of the territory of Afghanistan until the last year, until 2010. I 

don’t think this is an accident because, as you both said, in some 

sense we’ve only fully engaged in Afghanistan for the last year. 

President Obama made the decision to commit the surge troops. In 

fact, since the president has been our commander in chief, we have 

increased our troop presence not just 30,000, but 87,000, when one 

considers the previous commitment made. 

So we’re there for a reason. We’re making progress. I can’t thank 

you both enough for all of that. 

I want to just get to a couple of questions briefly. We’ve talked 

about the safe havens in Pakistan. But what strikes me as really 

significant and, I think, under-appreciated, is that as of 2 years ago 

there were large Taliban safe havens inside Afghanistan such as 

Marja, and that, one of the things that’s happened over the past 

2 years is that our coalition has taken those safe havens away from 

the enemy and shut them down. I wonder, General, if you’d comment on that. 

General PETRAEUS. Indeed, that has been one of our most important objectives and, indeed, one of our troopers’ most important accomplishments. These were significant safe havens, in the case of 

Kandahar City, with Zharay, Panjwa’i, and Arghandab, again, the 

very wellspring of the Taliban movement and right on the doorstep 

of the second largest city in Afghanistan. Indeed, there was a period in early 2009, I remember the intelligence analysts came in 

and told me that they thought that Kabul was being encircled once 

again in the same way that it was during the civil war. So these 

are very important accomplishments. 

The increase of ANSF and the advent of the ALP program now 

also enable us to prevent other safe havens in much less populated 

areas from springing up as well. That is certainly one of our objectives. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that answer. 

Let me go to another important matter which we both, you both 

talked about. We’re on a path now to transition control of security 

to the ANSF by the end of 2014. But both of you have testified 

today about the importance of signaling an enduring commitment 

to the security of Afghanistan, and I couldn’t agree more. 

I wonder if both of you would describe, I know there are some 

discussions going on now seriously between the U.S. and the Afghan Government, what kinds of long-term commitment you might 

43 

contemplate. I wondered if you’d comment on the possibility of 

some continuing base presence, perhaps a jointly operated system 

of bases in Afghanistan, between us and the Afghans. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, thank you. When the President first announced the strategy at West Point, he was very clear that we were 

making an enduring, long-term commitment to Afghanistan and 

the region, having made the mistake historically of walking away 

and then paid a very dear price for that. That has been clear from 

the beginning. It’s an important message to emphasize as we begin 

this transition process. 

We just had a team in Kabul this week starting to discuss the 

outlines of a strategic partnership with our Afghan partners, being 

clear about our expectations of that partnership, and also the kinds 

of commitments we would be willing to make. 

The President has also been very clear from the beginning that 

we do not seek any permanent bases in Afghanistan, that we don’t 

seek to be a type of presence that any other country in the region 

would see as a threat. That said, we are committed to the success 

of the Afghans, to continuing to build their capacity. So we do envision, if the Afghans invite us to stay, the use of joint facilities to 

continue training, advising, assisting the ANSF, conducting joint 

counterterrorism operations, and so forth. So, we are in the process 

of discussing what kind of parameters should outline that partnership. 

I should also add, it goes far beyond the military domain to look 

at how we can support further development of government, governance, economic development, and so forth. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. General, do you want to add anything to 

that? 

General PETRAEUS. Again, I think it’s very important to stay engaged in a region in which we have such vital interests. I think the 

concept of joint basing, the concept of providing enablers for Afghan operations and so forth, frankly, similar to what we have 

done in Iraq since the mission change there, would also be appropriate in Afghanistan, again, depending on how the circumstances 

evolve, noting that we have nearly 4 years to go until that time. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well, I thank you both. I think the important points you made, obviously, we will only stay in Afghanistan 

after 2014 to the extent we’re invited to do so by the Afghan Government and we determine we’re able and want to do so. But I 

think, General, you point out very correctly that we have, that we 

would do this not just for the Afghans, but we also have security 

interests in the stability of Afghanistan and in the region more 

generally. 

I thank you both very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, let me identify with the remarks of Senator 

Lieberman about your service, General Petraeus. I might also add 

that in the 17 years I’ve been on this committee, I don’t recall a 

better, more comprehensive, opening statement and I appreciate 

that very much. 

44 

One thing that hasn’t been talked about, and I thought you 

might comment about is what’s happening right now with the 

budget and the CRs and how that is affecting the military. 

General PETRAEUS. Thanks, Senator. 

The fact is that the Services will do everything in their power to 

make sure that those on the front lines are provided everything 

that is required. They will do that even as they start to inflict pain 

on themselves. We’ve been through this before. I think I remember 

this from when I was a commander in Iraq. The Services did some 

very serious belt-tightening, but they continued to provide the support to us out there. 

Now, there does come a point, however, at which some of that 

pain has to be passed on where you just can’t continue. Our assessment is, again, this is strictly from an Afghan perspective, not from 

the perspective of those here in the Pentagon, but we sense that 

somewhere in the June timeframe, probably, with the ANSF funding, that they would start to be a limiting factor. That, obviously, 

would cause us enormous concern, because the last thing that we 

want to have to do is to halt our progress in an area that is so important to the ultimate transition of tasks. 

If I could add a comment on that while we’re on this topic, 

though, Senator, and that does have to do with the growth of the 

ANSF, again, making very clear, my job, of course, is to state requirements. I’m a battlefield commander. Every level above me has 

a broader purview and broader considerations. 

Of course, the challenge with the growth of the ANSF, the concern, is the issue of sustainability. So, while it’s clearly desirable 

from the perspective of the Ministry of Interior, Defense, ISAF and 

Afghan leaders, there is an understandable concern about the sustainability of that over time, and you all had quite a bit of dialogue 

with Secretary Gates on that. I think that’s the discussion that is 

taking place here in Washington with respect to that growth decision. 

Senator INHOFE. All right. I appreciate that very much. 

General, I noticed you made a request for an additional $150 million in the CERP, and that’s been one of my favorite programs. 

You’ve spoken very favorably about it. I noticed, though, that the 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction had a report 

where they were somewhat critical of CERP, and I’d like to have 

your response to that. 

General PETRAEUS. Again, there were, in some areas, grounds to 

be critical about it, and we’ve taken quite considerable steps to improve our oversight of this and a number of other programs, frankly. We have increased significantly personnel who are in the business of tracking our contracting, overseeing the implementation of 

the various construction efforts and so on, and also monitoring 

CERP. I reissued the CERP letter, for example, and clarified it, 

and established new procedures. We’ve done more training for the 

CERP individuals. We have, indeed, structured the program so that 

now the average of these is entirely what I think the committee’s 

intent was all along, and that is that there are roughly $17,000 on 

average this particular year. 

We have already done more projects this year than we did in last 

fiscal year because, of course, of the increase of our troopers that 

45 

are now on the ground, deployed, and they have gains that they 

want to solidify and build on with the help of this program. So, 

that additional $150 million that we requested over the $400 million in regular CERP is very important to us, and that would be 

something that would cause a significant halt in some of the programs that we seek to capitalize in the very hard-fought and costly 

gains of our troopers on the ground. 

Senator INHOFE. We talked about this as it relates to Iraq. We 

went through the same thing. I look at this, that perhaps there 

aren’t the same safeguards in there, but there’s, so much more can 

come by those immediate decisions to carry them through. Then 

those figures still stand. 

General PETRAEUS. Yes. 

Senator INHOFE. Let me just mention on a much larger scale, 

when talking about train and equip, our figures have gone up, from 

fiscal year 2010 to 2012, $9 billion, $11.8 billion and $12.8 billion. 

I would say that both of you had been very complimentary about 

the training and the changes that had been taking place with the 

Afghans. I was over there, spent New Year’s Eve with the kids 

there, and took a long time out at the Kabul military training center. I was just really in shock at the attitude, well, first of all, being 

on New Year’s Eve, the attitude of our kids over there, just, their 

spirits are high. They know what their mission is. They’re excited 

about it, and they’re dedicated. 

But in terms of watching the military train, it isn’t all that different from the training that takes place here. We have done a 

great job over there. Would you make some comments about the 

successes that we’ve had in the training of the Afghans? 

General PETRAEUS. This is another area, Senator, in which, 

again, it is only recently that we got the inputs right. Key input 

in this regard was Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell, former commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, commander out at Fort 

Leavenworth before taking this command, and he has guided this 

effort very impressively. The fact is that we have increased very 

substantially in every single area of the so-called ‘‘train and equip’’ 

mission. The funding has, indeed, gone up because we’re in the 

stages of building the infrastructure to accommodate the additional 

forces, and buying the equipment for them. We still do have fairly 

substantial numbers of contract trainers, although we’re starting to 

bring those down as we replace them both with NATO, ISAF trainers and with increasingly Afghan trainers, because we have an Afghan ‘‘train-the-trainer’’ program among all the other efforts. 

One of the most significant steps forward in this regard is in the 

literacy arena. We have actually already had some 50,000 to 60,000 

Afghans go through literacy training, and we have even more than 

that number in literacy training now. Now, you may say that’s a 

strange pursuit for a train and equip mission. But the fact is that 

one of the major challenges in Afghanistan is human capacity because of the more than 80 percent illiteracy rate. If a soldier can’t 

read a serial number off a weapon, a policeman can’t read a license 

plate on a car, needless to say, that is mission-limiting. So, we bit 

the bullet and decided that, as part of basic training for the Army 

and for the police, that we would introduce basic literacy training 

46 

along with it, without having to extend the course. It’s a night program. 

Interestingly, the Afghans have really taken to this. Not surprisingly, many of them were quietly ashamed of not being able to read 

and write. They now get themselves to a first-grade level, it’s a 

functional level, and then we build on that in the subsequent noncommissioned officer training courses for the soldiers and police, as 

well. This is a huge investment in Afghanistan writ large, and a 

major investment in the ANSF. 

But the same is true of a number of different areas. There are 

now 11 branch schools. So, the institutional side of this is also 

building. The leader development side is beginning to take off. 

Senator INHOFE. Oh. 

General PETRAEUS. We’re starting now to build the so-called ‘‘enabler’’ forces. For a long time we were basically training and equipping infantry battalions. But of course, a force, an infantry battalion is only as good as the military intelligence, the logistics support, the transportation, the maintenance, and all these other, 

again, enablers. So that has been a key area of focus in the past 

year as well. 

Senator INHOFE. That’s going great. My time has expired. But I 

would only say that we were able to randomly talk, select some 

people out, Afghans, and get their take on this thing, and I understand that literacy issue. The training is going very well there. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Reed is next, and after his round, we will then have a 

5-minute break. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Madame Secretary, General Petraeus, thank you very much, not 

only for your appearance today, but your extraordinary service to 

the Nation. 

General Petraeus, we are contemplating a serious issue in terms 

of the Department of Defense (DOD) budget. Many have suggested 

that we have to move forward regardless of other aspects. But, integrated within your plans is a strong State Department presence 

in Afghanistan. And the State Department request for OCO funding is $2.2 billion, civilian personnel, economic activities, aid work, 

et cetera. How central and critical is this funding to your overall 

strategy and your assessment of ultimate success in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. Thanks, Senator, because it is critical. It is 

absolutely central to what we do. This is a comprehensive civilmilitary COIN campaign. It is not a military-only campaign. As I 

noted in my opening statement, we’ve recently revamped the U.S. 

civil-military campaign plan. Essential to that is the ability of 

State, USAID, and other implementing partners to capitalize on 

the hard-fought gains of our troopers on the ground and those of 

our Afghan partners in joint operations. Again, it’s not enough just 

to clear and hold. You do have to build. The build includes local 

governance, local economic revival, if you will, improvements in 

basic services, and so forth, so that the Afghan people see that 

there’s a better future by supporting the Afghan Government, the 

legitimate government, and it has to be seen as legitimate, rather 

than a return to the repressive days of the Taliban. There are varVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:43 Jan 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\72295.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
47 

ious areas in which the Taliban can actually compete. Conflict resolution is one of them, by the way. 

Again, if the Afghan Government can’t or doesn’t provide those 

basic services, then there will be a reversion to the Taliban, however little the people have regard for them, and they remember 

what it was like under the brutal rule of the Taliban. So this is 

very, very central to what it is that we’re trying to do. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

I’ll ask both of you to comment on this. We hear various comments emanating from Kabul, the civilian leadership of the 

Afghani government, from our NATO allies, about the strategy, the 

long-term commitments, et cetera. But what struck me along with 

Senator Levin, and I’ll speak for myself now—was, at the local 

level there seems to be much more traction with respect to local 

Afghani leadership. Also, there seems to be continuous improvement in the ANSF that gives a different perspective than listening 

to the pronouncements of the President or of some of our allies. I 

wonder if both of you might comment on that, and, just, to what 

extent is one overwhelmed by the other? To what extent one is a 

better sign of the reality on the ground than the other? 

General Petraeus, and then Secretary Flournoy. 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, Senator, local governance has indeed been growing and developing, as has, again, the development 

in other areas of basic service delivery. But as I noted earlier, 

there’s no question, and President Karzai and his Minister of Finance are the first to recognize it, that at the national level budget 

execution does have to be improved. They are determined to do 

that, and they have plans to do that, so that more money can be 

put on budget, rather than being injected through what President 

Karzai understandably is concerned with, this term of ‘‘parallel institutions.’’ 

Certainly some things are said in Kabul at times for domestic political reasons. I know that that never takes place in Washington. 

Senator REED. Never. 

General PETRAEUS. But occasionally in Kabul that does take 

place. Beyond that, though, I think Secretary Gates made a good 

point the other day, I think before this committee, that sometimes 

we don’t listen well enough to President Karzai. He was understandably concerned for years about private security contractors, 

which he sees as the ultimate parallel institution under the control, 

in some cases, of former warlords or members of what he, and we, 

by the way, have agreed to call ‘‘criminal patronage networks,’’ 

which he is very concerned about. We had a long conversation just, 

again, the day before I left, with Brigadier General H.R. McMaster, 

who is the one who’s spearheading the effort with Afghan partners 

to focus the right attention on this very, very challenging element 

that can erode the very institutions to which we need to transition 

if, again, these are criminals. They’re breaking the law. They have 

political protection in some respects. They’re not just acting as individuals. They are part of networks. President Karzai sees these, 

and he wants to deal with them. When he heard the evidence on 

his Surgeon General, for example, he fired him on the spot in a 

subsequent, or, previous briefing between an Afghan partner and 

Brigadier General McMaster. He did the same with the ANA MiliVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:43 Jan 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\72295.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
48 

tary Hospital when he heard what they were doing, and how derelict in their duty and, frankly, immoral, and failing their moral obligation to their soldiers. 

So, again, I think at times we have to listen better. What he says 

is understandable about civilian casualties. We cannot harm the 

people that we are there to help protect. We have to protect them 

from all civilian casualties, not just those at our hands, or those 

of our Afghan partners, but those of the insurgents as well. 

So I think that’s how you do have to look at this. I do think that 

periodically we have to think about walking a mile in his shoes and 

understanding the dynamics with which he has to deal, the political foundation that he has to maintain, because it is not, although 

the executive has enormous power in that system, there are also 

significant checks and balances on it that may not be as apparent 

to individuals who haven’t lived this the way some of us have there 

in Kabul. 

Senator REED. Madame Secretary. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, I would just add, Secretary Gates has 

also said this is a case where the closer you are to what’s happening on the ground in Afghanistan, the more positive you are 

about the ultimate outcome. Because when you go to, at the district 

level, very small changes can have huge impact. If you combine 

some basic security with a decent district police chief, a decent district governor, a shura that is representative of the local population, you start to see the basis of transformation at the local 

level. That is what we are seeing in many, many villages and districts across, particularly, the south. 

I think I would totally agree with General Petraeus’ comments 

about President Karzai. But I’d also expand to say, look, we work 

with many, many Afghan partners and many extremely competent 

ministers who are committed to fighting corruption, who are committed to Afghanistan’s success. I’ll just cite for you the new Minister of Interior, Bismillah Khan, or, Minister Mohammadi. He has 

personally gone district by district. He’s removed 66 corrupt police 

leaders, 2,000 officers, personally rooting out corruption where he 

finds it, holding leadership accountable. Those, each of those 

changes can have a profound effect on the population in that locality. So, as we see our Afghan partners stepping up to take on that 

accountability, the anticorruption, the transparency, we are starting to get real traction at the local level. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

We’ll take a 5-minute break. [In recess.] 

We are now back on the record and we’ll come back to order. 

Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, I want to welcome 

both of you and thank you for your distinguished service to our 

country. 

I also want to associate myself with the remarks of Senator 

Lieberman. You truly are a role model about what it means to be 

a public servant, and we are deeply grateful and honored to have 

you serving us in Afghanistan and what you have done for our 

49 

country. I also want to thank you for the sacrifices that the troops 

that serve underneath you are making on our behalf. 

I had the privilege of meeting you in January when we went to 

Afghanistan. I was very encouraged to see the progress that has 

been made there. I think sometimes the press focuses often on the 

bad things that happen, and the progress that is being made there 

is not reported about enough. In particular, I was very impressed 

with the military training center, as Senator Inhofe mentioned, 

particularly the work done by General Caldwell in standing up the 

effort Afghan troops to allow them to carry forward with this conflict and work with you, and then, of course, when we transition, 

to allow them to protect their own country. 

I also had the opportunity to meet with so many of our brave soldiers who are working along with their Afghan counterparts, and 

I was very impressed with, for example, walking through the village in Nawa, where months before I would have never been able 

to do that. 

Now, more than ever, I think it’s important for us to follow 

through on our commitment in Afghanistan, to make sure that Afghanistan does not become a haven for terrorists again and that we 

disrupt the terrorist networks there and in Pakistan to make sure 

that our country and our allies are protected. 

I would like to ask you today about the amount of money that 

we’re spending on contracting in Afghanistan. In 2009, the U.S. 

and NATO common funding expenditures for contracting in Afghanistan amounted to roughly $14 billion. This is, obviously, a 

very significant amount of money. One of the issues that I know 

that you are concerned about, both of you, is the issue of contracting funds ending up in the hands of power brokers and those 

that are working with our enemies and working to undermine us. 

I want to commend you, General Petraeus, as well as Secretary 

Flournoy, for the efforts that are being undertaken right now to 

make sure that U.S. dollars are not getting in the hands of the 

wrong people. For example, I know, General Petraeus, that you 

have put together contracting guidance that was issued in September 2010, that is very important to make sure that we are getting the hands, the money where it is supposed to go. 

I believe that more work must be done, however, to fully implement the guidance that you have brought forward. I believe that 

the law must be reformed to allow you to more quickly terminate 

contracts that directly or indirectly benefit our enemies, and to ensure that no additional funds go to those who undermine our interests or attack our troops. 

For this reason, Senator Brown and I recently introduced legislation to quickly allow us to terminate the flow of money that goes 

to the wrong people. General Petraeus, I thank you for the feedback that you gave Senator Brown and I on that legislation. We 

will be incorporating your comments. I just wanted to ask you, 

General, what your view is on this type of legislation and the need 

for it. 

General PETRAEUS. My view is very simple, Senator, the sooner, 

the better. As my comments back to you indicated, that would be 

very helpful to us. Indeed, the fact is that we were not spending 

50 

anywhere near enough time, energy or sheer man-hours in focusing 

on where our money was going. 

Now, don’t misinterpret that, please. We knew who, with whom 

we were contracting. We knew who the subcontractors were. But 

literally down there in the subs to the subs, occasionally we found 

out that money is actually going to the insurgents, or there is bribery, corruption or some other activity that’s going on. 

The counterinsurgency contracting guidance, in the past, I’ve always issued counterinsurgency guidance. In that guidance we have 

this phrase, ‘‘money is ammunition at a certain point in the fight.’’ 

In this case, I said, if money is ammunition, we need to make sure 

it gets into the right hands, and that was part of the 

counterinsurgency contracting guidance. 

We subsequently developed Task Force (TF) Shafafiyat, transparency, Brigadier General H.R. McMaster is in charge of that, to 

come to grips with our Afghan partners with the whole issue of, 

again, criminal patronage networks and how they undermine the 

very institutions to which we need to transition tasks in the 

months and years ahead. 

We also formed two subordinate TFs, TF 2010 and TF Spotlight, 

one to look at all contracts and review every single contract to the 

best of our ability with much greater intelligence focus on them, 

and the other to focus specifically on the issue of private security 

contracts, again, a subset which, we believe we have reached an 

agreement with the Afghan Government, again, one that was of 

understandable concern, an issue of understandable concern to 

President Karzai, that you cannot have armed groups being funded 

through our contracts running around the country. We call them 

road warriors in some cases, and they actually were becoming part 

of the security problem, rather than necessarily a solution to it. 

These groups have enabled us now, in the past year or so alone, 

to debar some nine contractors, to suspend several dozen others 

that are pending debarment, and to terminate a number of contracts as well, although, again, it’s a difficult and laborious process 

without the legislation that you have proposed, which is why we 

strongly support it. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you very much, General. 

I also wanted to follow up to, I believe, a request that has been 

made from CENTCOM Contracting Command, and perhaps the 

secretary could comment on this as well. 

As I understand it, we haven’t had enough contracting officers to 

be able to police the contracts. I know that CENTCOM has asked 

for, I believe, an additional 60 officers to make sure that, as we go 

forward with the legislation and your guidance, that we have the 

people scrutinizing these to make sure that money goes in the right 

place. 

If you could comment on what the status is of getting those additional officers in place to be able to move forward with this initiative. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Secretary Gates has already signed deployment 

orders to increase the number of military personnel and, in some 

cases, civilian personnel to provide additional contracting oversight 

and to support General Petraeus’s efforts, and there may be more 

of that coming. 

51 

The other thing we’ve done is started a dialogue with our interagency partners, the USAID, State Department, who also have 

substantial contracts on the ground, to share, to make sure that 

we’re all doing this together, that they share some of the best practices and lessons learned from the efforts that General Petraeus 

started, and that we as a government are better monitoring and 

overseeing our contracts. 

Senator AYOTTE. My time is up. 

I want to thank you both for your efforts you’re making in this 

regard and for everything that you’re doing on behalf of our country. I look forward to working with you both to make sure that you 

have the tools that you need to be able to make sure that this 

money goes to our efforts in advancing the cause in Afghanistan. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. 

Senator Nelson. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me add my appreciation for your service and that of the men 

and women who serve under you so ably. 

General Petraeus, I’ve been an advocate for benchmarks, metrics 

of evaluating progress and giving, as something that is more objective than a subjective explanation of whether we’re winning, losing 

or whether we’re doing better. I noticed that in your evaluation of 

the benchmarks from the November report to Congress regarding 

the progress in Afghanistan, that the focus on the assessment of 

governance from March 2010 to November 2010 was flat, at 38 percent. In other words, there was 38 percent in March and roughly 

38 percent in November, no appreciable change. In your opinion, 

since that November report, has anything changed? Are we moving 

forward? Or could we be losing some ground? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, Senator, of course, one reason I 

provided the packet of slides for you, indeed, is to provide some of 

the measurements that we do focus on in terms of terrain gained, 

in terms of ANSF progress, not just growth in numbers but also 

in capability and in quantity, the damage done to the midlevel and 

below Taliban fighters, and so forth. 

With respect to governance, I think since the fall, there’s no 

question that there has been—as, actually, one of your colleagues 

noted already—improvement in local governance, especially in 

these districts that were cleared during the course of the fall. So, 

you see the establishment of district sub-governors and, now, line 

ministry representatives, the revival of schools, and a variety of 

other areas of improvement in some of these very important districts, Marjah among them, Zharay, Panjwa’i, Arghandab and so 

forth. You see the gradual reestablishment of ANSF presence in 

those locations as well. 

With respect to national governance, there has been progress in 

these areas as well. But there clearly, as I mentioned earlier, is 

recognition by the key individuals, President Karzai and the Minister of Finance foremost among them, that there has to be more 

done in the sense of governmental capacity building, and particularly with respect to budget execution. 

52 

Again, we all want that day to arrive where we can achieve the 

Kabul conference of last year’s goal of putting 50 percent of the 

donor money on budget, rather than injecting it directly through a 

variety of implementing partners or international organizations. 

It’s very important to the development of Afghan capacity. But they 

have to then execute that budget. Although there has been good 

performance with respect to the operations side of the budget, 

which is salaries, predominately, they have done well, with respect 

to the so-called development budget or capital investment, there 

clearly is substantial work that needs to be done. Again, President 

Karzai is personally seized with this, as is his lead for this, the 

Minister of Finance. That’s an area that the embassy and, indeed, 

ISAF and other international partners, will be working together to 

support the growth in this particular area. 

Senator NELSON. In terms of evaluating a percentage, is it fair 

to ask how this compares to the 38 percent in November overall for 

governance, local as well as national? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, that’s probably one that we should 

take for the record and consult with our civilian partners on, as I 

think that’s the embassy and USAID that put that together, certainly with U.S. Forces-Afghanistan input. 

Senator NELSON. Okay. That would be great, to get it for the 

record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The governance rating in 124 focus districts remained about even between March 

2010 and September 2010 at 38 percent (as reported in the Section 1230 report, 

‘‘Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan’’). In March 2011, 53 percent of the population living in the 124 focus districts rated governance as ‘‘emerging’’ or ‘‘full authority,’’ an increase of 15 percent. See attached slide. 


315ful22.eps
53 

Senator NELSON. On the effectiveness and capability of the ANA 

and ANP, you have indicated that it’s challenging. There is some 

improvement in certain areas, and not necessarily in other areas. 

Is it possible to begin to look at that in terms of metrics as well? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, in fact, if you look at slide 16, ANSF 

Capability in the Field, you’ll see the development in these forces, 

not just in terms of the growth of additional army battalions and 

so forth and in police districts and precincts, but, in absolute terms, 

also the growth in terms of capability. This is an assessment not 

just based on math, if you will. It’s not just numbers of vehicles 

and do they work and some other functions. It’s an assessment by 

their partners who are actually in the fight alongside them. 

[The slide referred to follows:] 

Senator NELSON. I guess it would be the orange and the yellow 

that would measure what kind of effectiveness they have—— 

General PETRAEUS. That’s correct, Senator. That shows the 

growth in their capability, again, as assessed by those actually in 

the field with them. 

Senator NELSON. You’re comfortable that this is a fair appraisal 

of that capacity and capability? 

General PETRAEUS. I am. In fact, we’ve worked a number of 

months on these metrics. Candidly, this is a process that you’ll recall we went through in Iraq. I think it took me 6 months as the 

commander in Iraq before we finally unveiled it to all the press and 

everybody else. We spent 2 full days explaining how the metrics 

were evaluated and assessed. So, this is the maiden voyage for 

some of these, with your committee. 


315ful17.eps
54 

Senator NELSON. We appreciate your efforts toward that. Obviously, it’s better to be able to establish it in terms that are more 

objective than those that are usually subjective. So, I appreciate 

your continuing to do that. 

Now, in terms of ISR, I know the department has put forth a 

spending proposal of about $4.8 billion in procuring additional ISR 

assets. I think there are three Global Hawks, 84 Predators, and 

over 1,300 various small remotely piloted aircraft systems. That 

also sets a goal of achieving 65 Predator orbits by the end of 2013. 

Do you have all the ISR assets that you can use at the present 

time, recognizing that their increased use will require, most likely, 

additional assets? But, are you somewhat close to what you need 

now? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, we are much better off, as I stated in my 

opening statement than we’ve ever been in Afghanistan. I did request additional ISR assets, and I think that this is becoming an 

area, frankly, where there’s probably not a U.S. commander in the 

world who has really worked closely with what these assets do for 

us, who would say that he is satisfied with the number that he has. 

But we are vastly better off than we were when I took command 

81⁄2 months ago. It makes a huge difference for our troopers. It is 

becoming increasingly difficult for a Taliban member to plant an 

IED on a road that’s covered by a tower or a blimp with an optic, 

and to do that successfully, just to give one example. 

These is also a reason for the very high success rate of operations 

by our special mission unit elements. The fact is that, the reason 

that they are so good is not just because they’re the best assaulters 

in the world and extraordinarily fit and great shots and everything 

else, it’s all of the enablers behind them. It’s the linguists, the interrogators. It’s the documentation exploiters. It’s the ISR platforms that get them to the right place, then other systems that get 

them the final 5 or 10 meters. It’s all of this together that inserts 

these individuals and provides them real-time information on their 

targets. ISR platforms of a variety of different types, manned as 

well as unmanned, I might add, are critical ingredients in this. 

Senator NELSON. My time has expired, but I’m getting, gathering 

from what you’re saying that it’s a joint effort between our forces 

and the other ANA, or, the other forces that are there, using this 

intelligence that, gathering all together. 

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, Senator. Indeed, other troopcontributing nations are providing a variety of systems as well. But 

clearly, the United States provides the vast majority of them and 

has the most effective command and control, and pipes as well. Because remember that all of this requires massive communication 

pipes, and again, that is unique to the United States. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

But just your comment about the maiden voyage for these 

metrics, double-check with your staff on that, because these metrics 

have been reviewed by us, presented to us for many, many months 

in a different form. But it’s been a long battle. Senator Nelson’s 

been in the lead in terms of metrics. But we on this committee 

55 

have seen these numbers, and, indeed, have battled over some of 

these numbers for the last year or so. 

General PETRAEUS. We have the Chairman Levin metrics, as 

well, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.] 

Chairman LEVIN. These, yes. 

General PETRAEUS. These are a little bit different. 

Chairman LEVIN. They’re in a much better, more readable form. 

I will say that. 

General PETRAEUS. Point well taken, sir. [Laughter.] 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me echo my colleagues in thanking you both for your service. 

General Petraeus, you’ve answered the call to duty over and over 

again, and we are extraordinarily grateful for that. Nevertheless, 

I do have some difficult questions that I want to ask you today. 

Madame Secretary, in your testimony you spoke of our goal as 

achieving a ‘‘durable outcome.’’ 

Admiral Mullen has testified that one of the necessary conditions 

to succeed in achieving sustainable security in Afghanistan requires neutralizing the insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan. Indeed, 

in the strategic risk chart that the General’s given, it talks about 

the external sanctuaries as well as actions by our neighbors. How 

can we have a durable outcome, when insurgent sanctuaries exist 

in neighboring Pakistan, and when the Iranians are continuing to 

supply the insurgents with weapons, money, and by some reports, 

even training at camps on the Iranian side of the border? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, I think that we have to continue to halt 

the flow of arms into Afghanistan wherever it comes from, whether 

it’s coming across the Iranian border or the Pakistani border. I 

think we are, have a number of forces focused on that. 

On the particular question of the sanctuaries in Pakistan, I think 

there’s a multi-pronged strategy of applying, with the Pakistanis, 

additional military pressure on those areas, and having very candid 

conversations with the Pakistanis, and very clearly stating our expectations of where we would like them, where we need them to 

do more. But, in addition, I think it also involves a long-term strategy that tries to shift their calculus to get them to buy into our success in Afghanistan. A friendly, stable Afghanistan is in Pakistan’s 

interest as well. 

As we pursue some of the political dimensions of our strategy, 

enabling the reintegration of foot soldiers to give up the fight and 

renounce al Qaeda and agree to come back into their communities 

in Afghanistan and abide by the constitution, as we begin to create 

the conditions where we might see some reconciliation of reconcilable elements more senior, those are the kinds of things that will 

begin to fracture the insurgency and degrade it to a level that can 

be managed and ultimately defeated, even as we build up Afghan 

capacity. 

So there are many parts of this problem that have to be worked 

together. But make no mistake, we continue to apply as much pressure as possible on those sanctuaries and in working with our partners and allies to try to deny them. 

56 

Senator COLLINS. Pakistan may well have an interest in a stable 

Afghanistan, as you and the general have said. I would suggest to 

you that I do not think that the Iranians have an interest in a stable Afghanistan. I recognize the difference between the Shiites and 

the Sunni groups here, but the Iranians certainly view as making 

life more difficult for us if Afghanistan is unstable. We don’t have 

that kind of relationship with the Iranians. That’s why I am particularly troubled by the interception of weapons coming from Iran. 

But we know that it’s more than weapons, it’s money, it’s also, according to some reports, training at Iranian camps as well. 

General PETRAEUS. I would, Senator, because it’s interesting in 

this sense, that the Iranians seem almost conflicted, frankly. On 

the one hand, they don’t want the Taliban to come back. This is 

obviously an ultra, ultra conservative, some elements extreme, extremist Sunni movement. They are, of course, a Shia state with a 

Sunni minority. So they’re really not happy to see that happen. Beyond that, though, they also don’t want us to succeed too easily, 

and they certainly want to have influence in whatever state does 

evolve in their neighbor to the east. That’s why you see different 

activities ongoing. 

There is a significant amount of trade and economic activity between the two countries. Afghanistan does import a great deal of 

various goods and services from Iran, and it’s an important economic outlet for them. Iran knows that if Afghanistan is, over time, 

able to develop the infrastructure, human capital, value chains, 

and so forth, to extract and to export the trillions of dollars of minerals in its soil, that it wants to have a good relationship with Afghanistan for that time, and, indeed, to have some of those exported through Afghanistan’s neighbor to the west and not be shut 

out of what President Karzai terms the ‘‘Asian roundabout’’ as his 

vision for the Afghanistan of the future, the new Silk Road running 

through Afghanistan from the energy-rich Central Asian states to 

the north, to the very populated subcontinent to the southeast. 

So again, we see these different impulses. Of course we see, in 

fact, in truth, different elements of the Iranian Government. There 

is the part of the Iranian Government that responds to President 

Ahmadinejad, and then there is the part that is the security services, which have achieved much greater power and influence as a 

result of the supreme leader having to turn to them to put down 

the unrest in the wake of the hijacked election some year and a 

half ago. So there are some very, very interesting currents that run 

within Iran, and you see them playing out in these different fashions inside Afghanistan, in a number of cases, of course, in a very 

unhelpful manner, as you noted. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

I know my time has expired. 

Let me just very quickly say that I’m also concerned about 

whether we’re sending mixed messages to both the American people and to the Afghans. On the one hand we hear the President, 

and General Petraeus has repeated it today, that we’re going to 

start withdrawing our troops this summer in order to underscore 

the urgency and undermine the Taliban narrative that we’re going 

to be there forever. On the other hand, both of you have said how 

important it is that we not repeat the mistakes of the past where 

57 

we turned our back on Afghanistan, and that we do need a longterm relationship. I would just suggest that I think that’s part of 

the confusion that we see reflected in the polls is about exactly 

what is our long-term strategy. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, as I mentioned earlier, I don’t really 

see those as mutually exclusive strands of logic, if you will. I think, 

again, as Secretary Gates has laid out, it’s appropriate to talk 

about getting the job done, as he emphasized with his NATO counterparts in Brussels. I think it’s also appropriate, as he did when 

he spoke before this committee, to talk about the commencement 

of transition and the commencement of, again, the responsible 

drawdown at a conditions-based pace of the surge forces, while, 

even beyond that, discussing the initiation of discussions on a strategic partnership with our Afghan partner. So I think all of that 

actually can be seen as a coherent whole. But, I certainly understand the challenges that you have described about that. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

Senator Hagan. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My compliments to both of you, too, for your outstanding service 

to our country. Thank you. 

I am the new chairman of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities 

Subcommittee, which has under its purview the continued threat 

of IEDs. Roadside bombs are by far the leading cause of death and 

injury to our U.S. troops in Afghanistan. One of my highest priorities is to improve our capacity to counter the IED threat. Just this 

past week, I had the honor to talk to a wounded warrior from Fort 

Bragg who is currently recuperating at Walter Reed. He was involved in February with an IED, has lost both of his legs below his 

knees, and he’s getting great treatment at Walter Reed. I was truly 

inspired by this incredible young man’s service, honor, and his attitude. 

Last year the Obama administration started a worldwide effort 

to stop the flow of ammonium nitrate into Afghanistan. The campaign, as I understand it, is running up against stubborn hurdles 

in neighboring Pakistan, where police routinely wave tons of ammonium nitrate shipments across the border into Afghanistan despite Afghanistan’s ban on the import of chemicals. It’s unclear 

whether the border guards are being fooled by clever attempts to 

disguise the shipments or whether they’re being paid to turn a 

blind eye or both. I think the problem’s also exacerbated by the lax 

enforcement in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Government has 

passed a law banning the chemical, but Pakistan has not yet done 

so. We know that ammonium nitrate is commonly used in agriculture as a fertilizer, but currently in Pakistan most of the farmers use urea, which is an organic chemical, to fertilize their crops, 

and right now there’s only one factory in Pakistan that actually 

manufacturers ammonium nitrate. 

Can you give me your assessment of the IED threats, and can 

you provide us with the detection rate? Is there, do you think, 

progress in working with the Pakistani government to stop this 

58 

flow of ammonium nitrate into Pakistan, into Afghanistan, which 

is, I think, the basis of so many of these IEDs? 

General PETRAEUS. Thanks very much, Senator. By the way, I 

spoke to that great 7th Special Forces Group noncommissioned officer myself yesterday, and he is, indeed, a very inspirational American. I actually think it is very realistic that he will be back in the 

fight by the next time that his unit deploys. 

With respect to the detection of IEDs, obviously, the number goes 

up and down, but we are somewhere in the neighborhood of 60 percent, I think, in recent weeks and months in terms of detection of 

the IEDs. I think that that is probably a bit higher than it was in 

the past because we are getting more tips from local citizens in the 

same way that we’ve been able to detect, or to find, four times the 

numbers of weapons caches and explosives caches in the last probably 4 months over previous time. In fact, I think there’s a slide 

on that in your packet as well. 

Clearly, there is an enormous effort that has gone into the protection of our troopers from IED blasts. As I mentioned, the all-terrain vehicle version of the MRAP, nearly 7,000 of those deployed 

since I took command, the increase in ISR platforms of various 

types, and also various sensors and optics and so forth that are 

helping us to detect this, some, of course, that help us detect ammonium nitrate, which, of course, is used in the production of 

homemade explosives that do, indeed, form the base for a number 

of the IEDs. 

You are correct that there are no ammonium nitrate factories in 

Afghanistan. I think there are actually two functioning in Pakistan. I have spoken about this. I have written formally, as well, 

about it to General Kayani, with whom I meet at least once a 

month and have done so since, I saw him twice in the last 3 weeks 

alone. He has pledged support for this. He has gone to the Ministry 

of Interior, which has purview for it. Having said that, we have not 

yet detected any appreciable reduction in the production, or, importation, infiltration into Afghanistan of ammonium nitrate. There 

have been enormous seizures, colossal. I think there was one the 

other day of 10,000 pounds found of ammonium nitrate. But again, 

there’s still a substantial amount getting through. 

This, then, comes to the whole issue of, obviously, improving detection at the borders, and then also this so-called defense in-depth 

concept, because a fair amount of it is infiltrated through some of 

the borders as well. 

We very much appreciate your focus on this and the whole gamut 

of this, every piece of the chain from someone even training an individual, then constructing it, financing it, doing the reconnaissance, planting it and so forth, the whole, there’s no silver bullet, 

as we say, that can take out IEDs. There is a silver pathway, 

though, and you have to attack the entire pathway. Your support 

for a whole variety of initiatives for attacking that pathway has 

been very important. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, because I want to do everything possible to be sure we can detect as many and, obviously, prevent this 

ammonium nitrate as the base. I think it would go a long way. 

59 

General PETRAEUS. Again, Senator, that was a major reason for 

the request for the additional funding for the ISR that Secretary 

Gates conveyed to the committee when he testified. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

The demand for a sizable ANSF continues to increase, and at 

some point down the road this demand may drop when the Afghan 

security and governance capacity becomes more mature and security gains are not easily reversed, and there would not be a significant breeding ground for the Afghans to join extremists. In the 

President’s fiscal year 2012 request, it includes $12.8 billion to 

grow, train, and equip the ANA and ANSF. On February 17, Secretary Gates indicated that it’s unsustainable to fund the ANSF at 

these levels for the long term. He suggested that perhaps the U.S. 

could temporarily fund the ANSF as a sort of surge in security assistance, and then reduce that as conditions in Afghanistan improve and as the ANSF becomes more capable. 

Would you, both of you if you so desire, describe your thoughts 

on this issue, and should any increase beyond the ANSF’s current 

manning levels be temporary? How can we ensure that our NATO 

partners significantly contribute in this regard? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, to answer to the last one first, 

Secretary Gates was quite clear in his request to our NATO and 

other troop-contributing nation partners for ISAF when he addressed them in Brussels and asked not only that they maintain 

forces at appropriate levels and so forth, but also that they provide 

funding for the ANSF trust fund and their other mechanisms as 

well. Japan, as an example, funds the salaries of the ANP, a very 

significant contribution. So continuing that and increasing that is 

hugely important. 

The very high levels of ANSF funding right now are, of course, 

necessary because we’re building them. It requires the infrastructure, equipment and, in some cases, still various contract trainers 

and other contract assistants. These are the big cost drivers, actually, not salaries per se. So once the infrastructure is built and 

then it is in the sustainment mode rather then the construction 

mode, costs will come down. Obviously as equipment is procured, 

that element of the cost will come down. As Afghan trainers take 

over increasingly from ISAF and contract trainers, that cost will 

come down. It will still be considerable, and Secretary Gates talked 

about that. Certainly over time Afghanistan itself, as it becomes 

able again to exploit its extraordinary mineral blessings, which 

measure in the trillions, with an ‘‘S’’ on the end of it, of dollars of 

minerals, as they are able to extract and get those to markets, that 

will help them sustain it as well. 

But certainly there could be a point at which this would be an 

Afghan surge that could come down as well, and would need to 

come down as well, because of the cost and because of the 

sustainment. Again, that is the issue with respect to the decision 

on the growth of the ANSF in the future, what is ultimately determined. As I said earlier, I fully recognize that situation. Again, I’m 

someone who’s supposed to forthrightly state requirements. Other 

people are supposed to determine how to resource those. Those of 

us who state requirements understand that you can’t always get 

full resourcing for everything it is that you’ve requested. 

60 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, if I could just add, I do believe that as 

the insurgency is degraded, there may be possibilities to sort of resize, right-size the force over time. 

I also think this is a very important area for potential reinvestment by our NATO and ISAF partners. As we go through the transition process, as some forces are pulled out or some countries 

change the nature of their mission, reinvesting by contributing 

more to support the ANSF as an important, could be an important 

part of that. 

We’re also hearing from our counterparts in the Ministry of Defense and Interior that they want to take on this issue of how to 

make the costs more sustainable for them by finding efficiencies, 

different ways of doing things that are sustainable in an Afghan 

context. 

Finally, revenue generation. General Petraeus mentioned the 

strategic minerals extraction, but also, Afghanistan is in the process of putting in place a whole system for customs collection, taxation, et cetera. So as their economy begins to grow, we expect 

them to be able to pay for more of these costs as well. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hagan. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you both for coming. 

General Petraeus, how long have you been deployed since September 11? Do you even know? 

General PETRAEUS. It’s more than 6 years, because there was a 

year in Bosnia, nearly 4 years in Iraq and then 81⁄2 months here, 

and then it depends on your accounting rules for CENTCOM, I 

guess, where we spent, I think, 300 days of the first 365 on the 

road. 

Senator GRAHAM. What keeps you going? 

General PETRAEUS. Obviously, it is the greatest of privileges to 

serve with our young men and women in uniform. When the President turns to you in the Oval Office and asks you to do something 

that’s important to our country, there can only be one answer, 

frankly. I strongly believe that our young men and women in uniform in places like Afghanistan and Iraq and elsewhere around the 

world have more than earned the title as the ‘‘new greatest generation.’’ 

Senator GRAHAM. I totally agree with you. 

What percentage of the people in Afghanistan have probably 

served at least one tour in Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. There’s a substantial number. Although, Senator, as Colonel Graham, having served, I have been privileged to 

serve as your commander in two different—— 

Senator GRAHAM. We’re doing well in spite of me. Yes, sir. 

[Laughter.] 

General PETRAEUS. —two different combat theaters. It was quite 

a burden, but—— 

Senator GRAHAM. I know it must have been. 

General PETRAEUS. Each cohort, each brigade combat team, probably deploys with about as much as 40 percent who are going to 

combat for their first time. So, certainly the commissioned, warrant, and noncommissioned officers, almost all have served at least 

61 

one tour downrange in Afghanistan or Iraq. Now, of course, there 

are increasingly individuals with several 1-year tours, and in some 

cases even more than that. 

Senator GRAHAM. One of the things I hear a lot, General, when 

I’m over there, is what makes you do this? So, the most common 

answer is, I want to do it so my children will not have to. 

General PETRAEUS. I think I talked to you one time, Senator, 

about the reenlistment ceremony we had on the 4th of July in 2008 

in Baghdad. It was going to be a big ceremony, a couple hundred 

people, but we never envisioned that it would be 1,215. To see that 

many great young Americans raising their right hands in the air, 

reciting the oath of enlistment after you, is a pretty inspirational 

thing. We all sort of asked ourselves out loud, why are they doing 

this? The economy at that time was still booming. It wasn’t for the 

stock options. We think it was because they believed that they 

were engaged in something that was hugely important to our country, that they felt that their fellow citizens recognized it, and that 

they felt very privileged to have those individuals on their right 

and left who had also raised their right hands and were willing to 

serve in such circumstances. 

What’s particularly remarkable about that ceremony, of course, 

is that by raising their right hands at that time in Iraq, they knew 

that they were volunteering for another tour in combat. Again, our 

country can never thank them or their families enough. 

Senator GRAHAM. Madame Secretary, I would like to acknowledge the civilian component of this war. Some of the best people 

I’ve met in Iraq and Afghanistan have come from the Department 

of State and other agencies, as well as civilian contractors. 

General Petraeus, you wrote me a letter about the essential need 

for a civilian surge and that the holding, building and transition 

cannot possibly succeed unless we have enough investment on the 

civilian side. 

Mr. Chairman, I’d like to introduce this letter into the record. 

Chairman LEVIN. It will be made part of the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

62 

Senator GRAHAM. Could you very briefly elaborate, can we succeed if we do not get the civilian piece right? 

General PETRAEUS. We cannot, Senator. Again, this is not just a 

military campaign. This is not a campaign where we take the hill, 

plant the flag, and come home to a victory parade. This is a civilmilitary comprehensive endeavor that requires building on what 

our troopers in uniform have fought to achieve. 

Senator GRAHAM. I hate to interrupt my commander, but we only 

have 7 minutes. [Laughter.] 


315ful1.eps
63 

At the end of the day, should the foreign operations accounts for 

Afghanistan be considered overseas contingency operations? The 

same category? 

General PETRAEUS. It’s certainly as important. Again, I don’t 

know how to classify categories. As I wrote in that letter, this is 

a national security issue. It’s not just a foreign aid issue. 

Senator GRAHAM. From your point of view, it would be a national 

security expenditure. 

General PETRAEUS. Correct. 

Senator GRAHAM. Private contractors. We have thousands of contractors throughout Afghanistan doing good work. Sometimes they 

make mistakes. I received a letter from Mr. Zoellick, the head of 

the World Bank, who is about ready to withdraw his presence from 

Afghanistan because of some changes the Karzai government were 

contemplating regarding private contractors. Do we have some good 

news on that front? Could you share it with us? 

General PETRAEUS. I think we do, Senator. My deputy commander emailed me this morning right before this, and said there 

had been an agreement on the ability to continue the use of private 

security contractors for a specified period as a bridge to achieving 

what I think President Karzai understandably wants to do, which 

is to bring these kinds of forces underneath the oversight of the Afghan public protection force, an element of the Ministry of Interior, 

so that they are not, in a sense, armed elements that may be working for a former warlord or another. 

Senator GRAHAM. I totally understand that. But the position that 

Mr. Zoellick was about to take is, I think, shared by many. They’re 

very reluctant to keep their people in Afghanistan unless they can 

make sure they’re secure. Do you believe this bridge is going to accommodate their needs? 

General PETRAEUS. I do. Again, President Karzai was instrumental in getting this done. Dr. Ashraf Ghani was the point man. 

But clearly it was, again, President Karzai and the Minister of Interior who enabled this to be achieved. 

Senator GRAHAM. Let’s talk a little about leaving and staying. 

Senator Collins and I had a pretty interesting conversation. We 

were talking about leaving and staying all at the same time, and 

that can be confusing. 

I understand the poll. I know this is a war-weary nation, and the 

only reason I ask you about the commitment of our troops and 

yourself is that the people who are doing the fighting really do believe they can win. I certainly believe you can win, and winning is 

probably a hard concept to define, but not for me. I think I know 

it when I see it. I certainly will know losing when I see it. 

Can you tell us why it is important to announce this summer 

that America will have an enduring relationship with the Afghan 

people, if they request it? Part of that enduring relationship would 

have a military component. It is my belief, General and Madame 

Secretary, if the Taliban believed that the American military 

forces, at the request of the Afghan people, would be around for 

awhile providing American air power and support, it would be a demoralizing event and it would encourage the people we’re trying to 

help. What is your view of how this would play out in the region? 

Starting with the Taliban, and go around the region. 

64 

General PETRAEUS. Again, that was also in my statement, perhaps not quite as eloquently put as that. [Laughter.] 

But it was in there, indeed, that if the Taliban recognizes that 

there is an enduring international commitment, that they perhaps 

should consider some other alternatives than fighting for a longer 

period of time and, indeed, that they should consider the conditions 

for reconciliation that have been established by President Karzai. 

The fact is that, again, already, just in the few months since the 

peace and reintegration process has formally begun, there are some 

700 members of the Taliban, mid and lower level, who have decided 

to reconcile. There are 2,000 more that are in various stages of it. 

We think there are perhaps a couple thousand more who have informally reconciled, if you will, they’re just going home to their village and laying down their weapons. A lot of this, again, because 

of the progress that our troopers have achieved on the ground; because of a sense that Afghan forces are growing evermore rapidly; 

and that even if there is again a staying in smaller numbers, if you 

will, there is going to be an enduring commitment, a sustained substantial commitment, that should give them confidence that this 

Afghan Government can, over time, develop the capabilities to secure and to govern itself. 

That’s a critical message for the neighbors as well. Again, as I 

think, one of the lead members of the committee mentioned earlier, 

the best way perhaps to influence Pakistan is through Afghanistan. 

By seeing that there can be an enduring solution in Afghanistan, 

Pakistan can then recognize how to achieve its understandable national security aims over time as well, and that would not include 

allowing elements on its soil who create problems for their neighbors. 

Central Asian states very much want to see a stable and secure 

Afghanistan. They are very concerned about the illegal extremism 

problem, and also about the illegal narcotics industry. 

Senator GRAHAM. One last thought. 

I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman. 

There’s some discussion in this country about detainee operations. What would we do if we caught someone tomorrow in 

Yemen or Somalia, a high-value target? Where would we jail that 

person? Would you recommend that we take future captures to Afghanistan or outside the country? 

General PETRAEUS. I would not, Senator. Again, that’s from the 

perspective of the commander. 

Senator GRAHAM. It would do enormous damage to the Afghan 

Government potentially, is that correct? 

General PETRAEUS. It potentially would. Again, it’s something I 

think we probably would not want. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you have people in American military custody in Afghanistan, third-country nationals, that we need a home 

for outside of Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. We do. I might let the Under Secretary answer. Because what we have is a process where we identify these 

individuals to DOD, which then has to determine in an interagency 

process, with consultation with Capitol Hill, I believe, can they be 

returned to their country of origin, or are they going to be retained 

there as we sort out literally what to do with them? 

65 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I would also add, we are, detainee operations is 

one of the functional areas that we are in the process of 

transitioning to Afghan lead. So, that will obviously also affect the 

nature of what can and can’t be done. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you both for your extraordinary service 

to our country. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you both, to General Petraeus and Secretary Flournoy, for your service. I just returned a couple weeks 

ago from Afghanistan and Pakistan and had a great discussion 

with you. I appreciate it very much. I, like Senator Graham and 

everyone who’s ever visited, have never been more impressed with 

the quality of the men and women that we have serving over there. 

With that being said, I know that everything relies a lot on the 

training of the security forces and also of their police force. I know 

we’re spending about $1 billion a month in that effort. With that, 

sir, I would simply ask General Petraeus what skill sets will they 

have, knowing that we have about 80 percent plus illiteracy when 

they enter into it, and when they finish the program they’re at a, 

maybe no more than a third grade level as far as reading or writing? What do we expect them to do, and what can they do? Does 

that give you concern? 

General PETRAEUS. Again, the reason that we’re investing in 

them and their basic training with basic literacy, as well as basic 

combat skills or what have you, is because it’s vitally important 

that they be able to read a serial number or basic instructions, orders, and so forth. The idea is to get them to a first grade reading 

level by the end of their basic training, and then with each additional rung of their professional development, that there is additional investment in them. We’re well over a hundred thousand 

that have now completed that, or who have, or are in training right 

now. We think it’s a very important investment in the security 

forces of Afghanistan. 

Senator MANCHIN. The thing that I’m having a problem with, 

being the former Governor of the State of West Virginia, I know 

we train our State police, 26-week paramilitary training, to go into 

all aspects of the police force. For $1 billion, we could do 100,000 

State policemen in my State. The cost is so enormous. By the end 

of 2011 we will have spent close, they tell me, to $40 billion. This 

has to be the largest undertaking of a literacy program ever in the 

history that we, as a country or a military—have taken on. 

General PETRAEUS. We’re doing a lot more than literacy, I can 

assure you, Senator. We are building infrastructure for them. We 

are buying equipment for them. We are conducting, needless to say, 

all kinds of combat training, and not just basic infantryman training, but everything all the way up to and including pilot training 

for them. This is, again, the development of institutions, not just 

infantry battalions, not just, with all due respect, paramilitaries. 

Of course, it’s being conducted in the midst of an insurgency, which 

creates all kind of special challenges not to be found in West Virginia, the last I checked. With respect. [Laughter.] 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you. I take it as respectful. 

66 

If I may ask you this, I know everything depends in 2014 if we’re 

asked to stay. If we’re not asked to stay, and they are not at the 

level, and the investments that we have made at that point in 

time, what do we do? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, I would hate to speculate because, first 

of all, I think that’s an unlikely set of conditions. 

Senator MANCHIN. So you assume that they’re going to ask us to 

stay? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think everything that we have heard, they have 

asked us to stay, it’s, they are, this is a region, after decades of 

war, where people and states have survived by hedging their bets. 

They don’t want to hedge their bets. They want to be able to have 

a reliable strategic partner in the United States. NATO has already signed a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan. 

They want our continued engagement and support over time. 

Obviously, closer to the time, we will be able to evaluate that. 

But sir, what I would, on the ANSF, if I could just make the 

point—our investment in this force is our part of the pathway to 

diminish the burden on the United States and our Armed Forces. 

It is by standing them up that we will eventually be able to withdraw, providing continued support to enable their success. It is 

much less expensive to build the ANSF than it is to support our 

own continued involvement at these levels. 

Senator MANCHIN. If I may, it’ll depend an awful lot on the determination and commitment by their own government and their 

own leaders to continue this or it’ll be a catastrophic failure at the 

greatest proportions, and money committed to the, by the U.S. citizen. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. 

Senator MANCHIN. If I could go into a question real quick to you, 

Secretary Flournoy. Can you explain to me that, basically, with the 

U.S. and the ISAF forces, we’ve secured the areas of the Logar 

Province, and we have also determined there are quite valuable resources in Afghanistan, coal being one of them, which I have a little familiarity with, and copper being the other. Why is it that 

China is the only country that’s able to go in there and extract 

these resources? They’re making an investment of $3.5 billion. It 

looks like there will be a return of $88 billion, and we’re paying for 

the security. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. This is an area where we would like to expand 

the opportunity for foreign investment and assistance to develop 

the strategic mineral resources of Afghanistan. The United States, 

through something called the Task Force for Business and Stability 

Operations, a very important function that we have—that, they actually were the ones that brought in the U.S. Geological Survey to 

survey everything that’s there, and now give the Government of Afghanistan a map, if you will, for this long-term development of 

their resources. We are trying to bring in other western companies 

now to see if they are willing to invest and develop resources. 

Senator MANCHIN. How is that China is the only country that is 

willing to go in there? How can China do it successfully? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, they’re not the only country. In 

fact, there is now open for bid some other mineral resources, and 

there are, indeed, other countries than China that are contemVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:43 Jan 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\72295.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
67 

plating serious bids for it. With respect, the security for that particular location is paid for by China, I might add, as well. 

Senator MANCHIN. My time is up, but there will be a time when 

I’d like to go into that further because I have talked to an awful 

lot of the companies that aren’t willing to go there right now, but 

China was willing to make a $3.5 billion investment. It’s because 

of the security, what we have given there for them to be able to 

do that. I don’t know why they believe they can, and no one else 

has ventured in, a tremendous, rich deposit. 

General PETRAEUS. There are actually other contracts that have 

been let recently. There is a contract for small oil, actual extraction. Again, it is minuscule by, say, Iraq standards, but it is providing feed money. It’s not certainly China that has that. There is 

a gold mine that has actually been bid on in, just in recent months, 

again, facilitated to some degree by Task Force for Business and 

Stability Operations. It is, I believe, a joint venture between a U.S. 

company and an Afghan company. 

So, I mean, the fact is Senator, China has bid on mineral extraction around the world because it’s trying to build its growing basic 

industries, and that’s why its been so aggressive in that area. But 

India has been equally aggressive in various locations as well. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, if I could add that the authority for this 

task force to operate and do this economic development work that’s 

so crucial to Afghanistan’s long-term sustainability, that authority 

is basically going away. So we, this is a place where you could help 

enormously by providing the authority for that work to continue in 

Afghanistan. 

General PETRAEUS. If I could second that, because in Iraq, which 

was vastly more violent, I mean, we’re talking about 220 plus attacks per day in Iraq and we will have somewhere in the neighborhood, anywhere from 20 on up to 60, depending on the season in 

Afghanistan, and there were vastly more easily extractable elements in Iraq, of course, with the oil, with natural gas, with sulfur 

and with some other resources, not to mention fresh water. It was 

very difficult to attract industry back to Iraq. Some had literally 

given up completely and gone home. 

Deputy Under Secretary Paul Brinkley and the Task Force for 

Business and Stability Operation came in. They would guide investors back in. They would help them. We would help secure them. 

This is part of a comprehensive approach. Ultimately, for example 

I think Boeing, by the way, got a $5.5 billion deal. GE came back 

after a personal call to Jeff Immelt. Many large energy companies 

came back in and did, indeed, bid. It wasn’t just for the United 

States, this was for the success of a mission. That’s what he sought 

to do, and had quite considerable success in it. I think that Prime 

Minister Maliki in Iraq, and indeed, certainly, President Karzai in 

Afghanistan, would personally attest to the important role that 

Paul Brinkley and his team have played in each of those missions. 

Senator MANCHIN. Again, thank you for your distinguished service. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Manchin. 

Senator Brown. 

68 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good to see both of you. 

I actually share the concerns of Senator Manchin. I’ve also spoken to many companies. They say it’s very difficult to get in there 

and establish a base. It seems like we’ve done all the work, and 

now everyone’s coming in, reaping the benefits. You have a potential couple of trillion dollars of natural elements under the ground 

that need to be, obviously, retrieved and then secured, and make 

sure that that money from those sales actually stays in Afghanistan and it’s obviously distributed to the people the right way so 

we don’t have to keep supplementing what’s going on over there, 

I mean, because there is obviously a point where we have to draw 

the line. 

I’m wondering a couple of things. When I was there, I have to 

admit, I wasn’t too impressed with some of the training that was 

going on. I know there was a big concern about the trainers that 

other countries were supposed to provide, and to get the police up 

and running. Has that gotten any better at all? 

General PETRAEUS. There has been an absolute increase in the 

number of trainers provided by the ISAF troop-contributing nations, quite substantial. But the requirement has grown as well because of the course, of course of the need to train greater and 

greater numbers for the increased end strength. So, we see right 

now a shortage of about 750 or so trainers, after one takes out the 

pledges, noting that there are a couple of countries, Canada and 

The Netherlands, who have not yet worked out their final contribution. Those could be significant in helping us reduce that number, 

but again, premature to announce that. But even after that, there 

will still be a shortage of trainers, and we’re looking at how to compensate for that. 

Senator BROWN. Secretary Flournoy, has there been any effort? 

What can you tell us about those efforts with Canada and Netherlands with regard to, kind of, adhering to the terms of their agreements? 

General PETRAEUS. I think I probably should address that because I talked to the defense ministers of both countries recently. 

Senator BROWN. Okay. Right. 

General PETRAEUS. They’re both intent on it. We’re in very substantial negotiations. But again, it’s premature for us to announce 

what they’re going to do. 

Senator BROWN. Okay. That’s fine. Is there a concern that we 

may be doing it alone? Are countries pulling out to the point like 

they did ultimately in other conflicts? Are we ultimately going to 

be the last country standing? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Secretary Gates just came back from the NATO 

Defence Ministers meeting and he had a very clear message that 

we need to stay focused on the fight, we need to stay in this together. 

But honestly, what’s impressed us since Lisbon is the level of resolve and the level of unity within ISAF. Countries are committed. 

They’ve signed up to the 2014 goal. They are staying in the fight, 

by and large, and they understand the concept of reinvestment, 

that even as they may start to change the composition of their 

force, the expectation is reinvestment to continue to support, 

69 

whether it’s through training or through funding in other ways. So 

at this point, we feel that the resolve is there going forward. 

Senator BROWN. I know when Senator Graham was speaking, he 

said that he knows what losing is, but he didn’t really say what 

winning is in Afghanistan. Sir, what is your opinion as to, what’s 

a win? When do we say, ‘‘Hey, we’re there, we won, it’s time to 

really go on.’’ 

General PETRAEUS. A win would be an Afghanistan that, again, 

can secure itself against the level of insurgency at that time, and 

that can govern itself, see to the needs of its people, presumably 

still with some level of international assistance, but with vastly reduced levels of assistance and a very different character to whatever security assistance is provided. Ultimately, of course, winning 

is really ensuring that there is not an al Qaeda sanctuary again 

in Afghanistan. Of course, what’s necessary for that is, again, an 

ability to secure and govern itself. 

Senator BROWN. That being said, would it also have to include 

Pakistan and Iran basically saying that they’re going to stay out 

and let Afghanistan self-govern and do their own thing? 

General PETRAEUS. Needless to say, the more that all the neighbors of Afghanistan, not just Pakistan and Iran, but the more that 

all the neighbors help Afghanistan, obviously, the higher the prospects are for an enduring win, as you put it. 

Senator BROWN. Are you seeing that type of help? Because I 

know when I was there, it didn’t seem like there’s a whole heck of 

a lot of help. 

General PETRAEUS. We are seeing considerable help by Afghanistan’s neighbors to the north who provide electricity, who are allowing the northern distribution network, as we call it now, to 

transit their soil, and who are providing a variety of different forms 

of assistance, everything from humanitarian assistance, again, to 

goods and services. 

As I mentioned earlier, Iran has indeed, without question, provided weapons, training, funding, and so forth for the Taliban, but 

still in measured amounts. It’s certainly not an all-out escalation 

or something like that. We think, again, that’s because they are 

conflicted. It’s a very cynical approach, if you think about it. They 

want to provide enough assistance to the Taliban so that they 

make life difficult for us and others, but not so much that they 

might actually succeed. 

Then of course with respect to Pakistan, as I mentioned, they 

have taken very considerable actions against the Tehrik-e Taliban 

Pakistani, Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), and 

some of the others that have threatened the very existence of their 

country as they know it. We are coordinating more closely with 

them in that particular fight than we ever have before. There is 

significant pressure on al Qaeda and on the Haqqani Network in 

North Waziristan, without question. But clearly, again, I think the 

Pakistanis are the first to recognize that there are big challenges 

there that have to be dealt with if they are to help their neighbors 

to the west. 

Senator BROWN. I was thankful that Senator Ayotte signed on to 

my bill regarding the corruption and accountability aspects of, 

where’s the money? I mean, I was shocked, as many of us were, 

70 

that some of our taxpayer money is going to be going to the 

Taliban, potentially, through, really, not legal or appropriate 

means. I was listening obviously as I was doing another matter, 

and I appreciate your endorsement on that. 

Mr. Chairman, you would really throw a lot of weight behind this 

if you could join in, not figuratively, but—— 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes, well, it sounds very, very good to me, and 

we’ve been very actively involved in that contracting issue. It fits 

very, very well with the kind of effort that we’ve made to look at 

the way in which contractors have actually assisted our enemy at 

times. So we are grateful for your initiative. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. 

Finally, with everything that’s happening over in Egypt, in that 

area, have you noticed any similar types of activities in the region 

that you’re really focusing on? 

General PETRAEUS. We have not, Senator. There have been, and 

always have been, small demonstrations on this issue or that issue. 

I think it’s actually a strength of Afghanistan that there are peaceful demonstrations periodically in the capital or in some of the 

provinces for the citizens to voice pleasure or displeasure at some 

action that has taken place. But there has certainly been nothing 

on the scale or the order of what we’ve seen in Egypt or some other 

countries in the Mideast. 

Senator BROWN. Sir, thank you. I’m looking forward to coming 

over in that capacity we spoke about. We’re working on that. So, 

thank you. 

General PETRAEUS. That would be great. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Brown. 

Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to join the chairman and others on the committee who 

have expressed their appreciation for your extraordinarily distinguished and courageous service. Both of you are certainly owed a 

debt by this country—as are your spouses. In particular, I want to 

express my appreciation to Holly Petraeus for the work that she’s 

doing on behalf of our veterans when they are threatened with 

scams and frauds and other kinds of abuses. This leads me to my 

first question. 

Both of you have spoken very powerfully and eloquently about 

this ‘‘greatest generation.’’ At the same time, we know that many 

of them are threatened by wounds that may not have been visible 

or diagnosed—traumatic brain injury or post-traumatic stress. I 

wonder if you could describe the hopefully enhanced efforts that 

are being made on the battlefield and at home given that the suicide rate, I think I saw in the CNAS report, is estimated to be at 

an annual rate of one every 36 hours, and 35 percent of all troops 

are estimated to be afflicted by post-traumatic stress or traumatic 

brain injury. Sadly, and unacceptably, 7,000 veterans of Iraq or Afghanistan are homeless every night in this country. 

So if you could respond. Thank you. 

General PETRAEUS. Thanks very much, Senator. 

First of all, there has been an extraordinary effort, I think, to improve every aspect of battlefield medicine, all the way from the 

71 

training of those and the equipping of those at the point of injury, 

the medical evacuation. We have devoted—especially with Secretary Gates’ leadership, frankly, when I was at CENTCOM—considerable additional resources that are very much keeping us within the ‘‘golden hour’’ it’s called, of Medevac from, again, point of injury to the field hospital. The average for last month, I think, was 

44 minutes, as an example. That’s despite, of course, a vastly increased number of troopers on the battlefield, and much more 

spread out across Afghanistan. 

The advances at the field hospitals are extraordinary as well. 

They really now approach those of the major medical systems in 

the United States—of course, through Landstuhl in Germany, and 

then to the various hospitals appropriate for the injury, and then 

even into the VA system. As one who during the command at 

CENTCOM, in particular, had an opportunity to visit our wounded 

warriors, not just in places like Walter Reed or Bethesda, but also 

in various VA system hospitals, my impression was that our country has devoted significant additional resources to those that we 

used to provide to this in years past. 

Having said that, as you noted, there are first of all, in a sense, 

signature wounds of this conflict. They are, of course, the very visible losses of limbs, and then the unseen wounds—again, the 

posttraumatic stress syndrome and so forth. These, I think, clearly 

deserve the resources that have been devoted to them. My sense is 

that we continue to be on the very cutting edge of medicine in our 

medical system, in our military medical system, when it comes to 

addressing these. I have been personally very heartened by it, as 

one who was privileged to command these individuals when, indeed, they sustained these injuries. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. If I could just add, Senator, that this is an area 

where, I think, Secretary Gates has made it a real priority. He sees 

this as part of his stewardship, to focus on caring for our wounded 

warriors. 

But for our people more broadly, one of the things that several 

people have remarked on is that we actually talked about people 

and preserving the force as an element of our strategy for the first 

time ever in this last Quadrennial Defense Review. 

But it’s not only investing in these programs. It is, as General 

Petraeus says, really, pushing the boundaries of the science to get 

towards more innovative approaches. As the wife of the deputy secretary at VA, I can also attest, there’s a whole-of-government approach here. There’s unprecedented cooperation between DOD and 

VA to give a sort of cradle-to-grave type of care for not only active 

duty members but veterans, but also to ensure that once people 

leave active duty, we don’t lose sight of them—we continue to invest in the care they’re going to need to deal with some of these 

injuries that may last a lifetime. 

General PETRAEUS. If I could also add, Senator, this goes way beyond, of course, just appropriated funds as well. I think it would 

be appropriate to thank the millions of American citizens who have 

supported a variety of different foundations and nonprofits and others that have also devoted enormous effort, again, to taking care 

of our wounded warriors, to looking after the children of the fallen, 

and indeed, to ensure that those who have served and have been 

72 

injured in that service, or the families left behind, are, indeed, 

looked after by more than just government, but by fellow citizens 

as well. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I would agree with you, having worked 

with and supported some of those groups, and they do wonderful 

work. But we heard in response to similar kinds of questions from 

General Mattis at a recent hearing about the effort that he is making to really implement the kind of preventive measures on the 

battlefield to reach out to the gunny who says to the corporal, 

‘‘You’re not going out tomorrow. You were just in a concussive incident.’’ I think it is because you have such great young men and 

women who are so eager to return to the battlefield, I think it may 

be more than just medical science or the golden hour. It’s part of 

a culture that—— 

General PETRAEUS. It is—with traumatic brain injury in particular. I mean, this is, again, essentially an accumulation of concussions in some cases and, again, can be unseen. A trooper wants 

to suit up. No one wants to leave his or her fellow members of the 

brotherhood of the close fight behind when they’re going outside 

the wire. Yet we have had to institute procedures to allow them a 

break, a recuperative period, just as, frankly, we are finding, I 

guess, in football and other violent, or very, contact sports, is needed as well, to allow, again, recovery before exposing an individual 

to the chance of further such injury. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I want to thank you for your testimony. 

My time has expired. I know others will follow on this issue and 

others. But I am particularly interested in the detainee question, 

and I believe others on the panel may follow with questions on that 

issue, as Senator Graham has mentioned. Maybe we can follow up 

on those questions. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madame Secretary, General Petraeus, it’s good to see both of you. 

Thank you for your service. 

My questions really relate to concerns reflected in polling in 

America. The Washington Post said this week in a poll that twothirds of Americans now say that the war in Afghanistan is not 

worth fighting. I think part of the problem is not that it isn’t worth 

fighting—because I do believe that it is—but I’d like to give you an 

opportunity, General, in particular, to state the reasons why you 

believe it’s worth fighting, because frankly, above your pay grade, 

there have been mixed messages about timetables or drawing down 

troops, and about what our objectives in Afghanistan should be. 

So General, we all know that public opinion is very important. 

The American people have to remain behind our military, and 

we’ve seen the consequences, unfortunately, in our Nation’s history 

when that doesn’t happen. But would you please articulate the reasons why fighting in Afghanistan and the service of our men and 

women in uniform is worth fighting? 

General PETRAEUS. Again, I think you come back to two words, 

and those are ‘‘nine eleven.’’ Those attacks on September 11 were 

73 

planned in Afghanistan by al Qaeda when it enjoyed a major sanctuary there, when it had training camps there. That’s where the 

initial training of the attackers took place before they moved on to 

Hamburg and the U.S. flight schools. 

Beyond that, of course, there are other attacks that emanated 

from that region. As the President has said, we have a vital national security interest in ensuring that al Qaeda and other 

transnational extremist elements that might attack our country or 

our allies cannot establish robust sanctuaries there from which 

they can plan and then launch attacks. 

The fact is that we have gotten frustrated with this region before. As the Under Secretary mentioned earlier, we did leave the 

region in the past. In the wake of Charlie Wilson’s war, we headed 

home and we cut off funding, and we cut off professional military 

education for our Pakistani partners and so forth. The fact is that 

we have paid for that in the long run. I think it would be a mistake, a big mistake, to go down that road again. 

Senator CORNYN. General, would you explain, in your opinion, 

what would be the perception of al Qaeda and their like-minded 

people in the region if the United States were to simply draw down 

its troops and leave before finishing the job in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. I think there would be a propaganda as well 

as a physical victory, in a sense. This would be a sign of having 

prevailed. Indeed, it’s very hard to calculate what would happen in 

Afghanistan itself, but there is a prospect of a renewed civil war, 

as we saw in the wake of the Soviet departure and again in the 

wake of, as I said, Charlie Wilson’s war, and again, leaving that, 

as this situation unfolded in the wake of the Soviet removal. I 

think this, again, would be very, very damaging to the world—not 

just to Afghanistan, the Afghan people, and, indeed, the immediate 

region. I think it would pose a grave danger for the entire world. 

We have seen again on numerous different dates beyond September 

11 attacks, again, that emanated from this region. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, if I may, since you and Senator Collins 

both mentioned mixed messages, if I could just clarify. I think, as 

General Petraeus has said, we have vital interests at stake—— 

Senator CORNYN. Well, Madame Secretary, I wasn’t saying that 

you were delivering mixed messages. 

I was saying, those above your pay grade at different times talking about drawing down troops in 2011. Then I was pleased to see 

some modification of those views expressed through 2014, and then 

a reference to status of forces agreements beyond that. So that’s 

just to be clear. I was not talking about you delivering mixed messages. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Okay. I understand. But what I wanted to say 

is that I don’t think there’s any inconsistency between the beginning of a transition process that allows Afghans to step up and 

take the lead in areas like security and so forth—I don’t see a tension between that transition process that begins a drawdown and 

the commitment of, the statement of an enduring commitment to 

Afghanistan and to partnership with Afghanistan. 

Senator CORNYN. As long as it’s conditions-based, I agree with 

you. 

74 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes, it is conditions-based, as the President has 

noted. 

Senator CORNYN. General, let me ask you about Pakistan. I know 

that subject has come up numerous times. No matter what we do 

in Afghanistan, it seems to me that unless we’re able to build, to 

help Pakistan become a more reliable partner and deal with that 

porous border the terrorists exploit on a regular basis, that we’re 

not going to be successful in our ultimate goal. 

But I want to ask specifically, as our attempts to degrade al 

Qaeda in Afghanistan are successful, as long as the Taliban remain 

a powerful force, what are their aspirations in terms of getting 

their hands on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and a regime change in 

Pakistan? Is that a concern that we ought to have? 

General PETRAEUS. With respect to the Afghan Taliban, Senator, 

I think that their aspirations truly are within Afghanistan. In particular, it would be to reestablish the kind of state that they had 

established there, again, in the wake of the Afghan civil war that 

came in the wake of the Soviet departure from Afghanistan. 

There is quite considerable security for the Pakistani nuclear 

weapons. There are certainly other elements in Pakistan—the Pakistani Taliban and several other varieties of elements who generally have symbiotic relationships, and the most extreme of which 

might, indeed, value access to nuclear weapons or other weapons 

that could cause enormous loss of life. Again, I mean, they killed 

several thousand in one destructive act, and some have shown a 

willingness to carry out similar destructive acts if they had the 

means of their survival. 

Senator CORNYN. My time is up, but let me just say in conclusion 

that I think, again, in terms of garnering public support for what 

I believe it’s important that we do in the region, I think the extent 

to which someone—and I think that someone may end up being 

you, General—ought to be able to articulate our objectives in a way 

that the American people can see the importance to our national 

security here at home. Because I worry that if there are mixed 

messages in terms of when we’re leaving and how long we’re staying, or what our objective actually is, and people are a little confused about that, that I think you’re going to continue to see some 

erosion of public support of our mission. 

Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Cornyn. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for being here. 

General, I’ve had a number of conversations with you over the 

years about CERP. I want to make sure I’m clear about something. 

It appears to me that we have taken some of the CERP funds and 

put them in a category called Afghan Infrastructure Fund, and the 

other category, Task Force for Business. So we’ve taken the, 

around about amount of a billion a year, and we’ve now broken it 

up into three parts. I was worried enough when it was one part, 

in terms of the oversight and whether or not there was clear communication from the State Department. This is what, where we 

have kind of morphed this into—and it’s a little bit like who’s in 

75 

charge of security at, security contracting, how this has gone back 

and forth from State to DOD, State, DOD. Now we have an acknowledgement for the first time that DOD, that the Army, that 

our military is going to be doing major infrastructure projects, as 

opposed to the traditional place that we have done that kind of 

work, which has always been at State. 

So I’m really worried about the oversight of this. What I’m also 

worried about, if you would address, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noting that it doesn’t appear even that we’re 

sharing Excel spreadsheets maybe about the various projects that 

are ongoing. We do not have a database that is real-time that 

USAID and DOD can look at on a real-time basis. I’m worried 

about the duplication. Then you layer over that all the corruption, 

then I really get worried. We know what kind of money walked 

away from infrastructure projects in Iraq, and once again, my concern has really been heightened about money walking away from 

infrastructure projects in Afghanistan. 

General PETRAEUS. Let me just state upfront, and, as we have 

discussed it in the past, I absolutely share every one of those concerns. That’s why we requested, as an example, between 60 and 80 

quite well-trained and specifically experienced individuals to help 

us with oversight of our contracts. As I mentioned earlier, this is 

a big reason why we established the two different task forces led 

by general officers—one to look at all contracts, the other to look 

at the specific issue of private security contractors—in addition to 

the task force led by Brigadier General H.R. McMaster, which is 

looking, with our Afghan partners, at the issue of corruption. 

First of all, the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations 

is not funded through CERP. That was not approved, and that is 

not being done. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. 

General PETRAEUS. The traditional category of CERP, if you will, 

I think is very much meeting what the intent of it was in the beginning. As I mentioned earlier, projects are averaging somewhere 

around $17,000 to $17,400, and very much solidifying and building 

on the gains that our troopers have fought so hard and sacrificed 

so much to achieve. 

The Afghan Infrastructure Fund component of CERP, if you will, 

was created—and in fact, this was an initiative when I was the 

CENTCOM commander—so that we could support—with our State 

and USAID partners—in a very carefully coordinated way. It’s so 

carefully coordinated that the projects nominated for this—these 

are larger projects that, again, are central to the conduct of a 

counterinsurgency campaign. So these are not economic development, and they’re not economic assistance or something. These are 

projects that directly enable the success of our troopers on the 

ground. The first tranche of these, for example, is almost all energy-related, infrastructure-related and so forth, to enable the revival of the areas in Kandahar and the greater south, and then 

tying in a power grid to that as well. 

The Ambassador and I both approve the projects that are sent 

forward. Ultimately, they have to be approved by the Secretaries 

of Defense and the Secretaries of State. Obviously, USAID is inVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:43 Jan 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\72295.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
76 

strumental in all of this, and so there is, again, absolutely full coordination on this particular program. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. If I could just add, it’s also jointly funded. So, 

State Department and USAID contribute funding via reprogramming from their resources, and DOD uses the $400 million from, 

that was formerly in CERP to contribute. So there’s joint funding, 

joint decisionmaking and validation of the projects, and joint oversight. So you’re actually probably getting double the oversight, 

rather than less. 

General PETRAEUS. If I could add, Senator, you also authorized us to spend a portion of CERP, $50 million, to support Afghan-led 

reintegration of reconcilable elements of the insurgency. We think 

this is a very, very wise investment as well. As I mentioned earlier, 

you don’t kill or capture your way out of an insurgency the size of 

the one in Afghanistan. You have to try to get as many as possible 

to reintegrate back into society. This is a bridge fund, if you will, 

until the larger funding that’s been provided by the international 

community to the High Peace Council can make its way through 

their bureaucracy and out into the provinces. That now is in the 

process of happening. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So your sense is, the GAO criticism about 

a data system is, just because of their penchant for data systems 

and not because there really isn’t a real-time sharing of information and coordination of projects? 

General PETRAEUS. We are very carefully sharing it. In fact, we 

actually want to go to a Joint Total Asset Visibility—I forget the 

exact term. I’d like to provide the term to you, because Brigadier 

General McMaster, again, has been pioneering this—but where we 

have a, literally a joint procurement oversight effort between all of 

the U.S. elements not just the military, but State Department elements as well, so that, again, everybody knows where the money 

is going from all U.S. programs. 

Senator MCCASKILL. There is a concern on this money that we’re 

using to fight the insurgency through the small projects and even 

the big project—There’s the issue of, are we doing these projects 

where we can, or are we doing these projects where we should, in 

terms of the security issues? Do you have available to you, General, 

the information that allows your folks to make decisions based on 

where in fact we should be making these investments based on the 

insurgency? Or are, is it just natural that these things are happening where there’s the least security danger? Because obviously 

when you’re doing these kind of things, if you’re out there and exposed, especially when you have the civilian component, it worries 

me that we may be doing it where we can, instead of where we 

should. 

General PETRAEUS. I mean, there is this, the joke about the 

drunk who looks for the keys underneath the light post because 

that’s where the light is, not necessarily where he dropped them. 

So, we certainly try to build the projects where they are needed 

and not just, again, where we can. 

But there are cases in which there are projects that are needed 

that we know are needed, but where the security conditions do not 

allow that. In some cases, we are literally fighting to create the security environment to enable very important economic projects, 

77 

such as hydropower plants in particular, that are crucial to the 

sustainable energy sources for Afghanistan, but where we cannot 

at this point in time yet carry out those projects. 

Senator MCCASKILL. If you have an overlay available of where 

attacks are occurring and where the CERP monies are being spent, 

I would love that information. I would assume that you would probably have that somewhere, and I would love to look at the overlay 

between population, attacks and CERP expenditures. 

General PETRAEUS. We’d be happy to provide that. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The majority of Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) projects are 

initiated to complement and to solidify security gains. The first attached slide shows 

that, in the south, CERP projects are concentrated around the population centers 

of the Central Helmand River Valley and Kandahar City—our main operational effort. These projects are intended to improve freedom of movement, to connect population centers, to support local governance initiatives, and to create opportunities for 

economic growth. 

CERP projects are also most prevalent in areas where we have established or are 

expanding security ‘‘bubbles,’’ as shown by the slide with CERP projects overlayed 

on security influence. In these areas, we have pushed the enemy away from the population so that attacks tend to occur most often on the periphery in contested areas. 

The security ‘‘bubble’’ provides a baseline level of security necessary for many CERP 

projects to begin. These projects both reinforce the security gains as well as set conditions to expand them. 


315ful23.eps
78 

Senator MCCASKILL. I know my time is up, and I didn’t have a 

chance to get to LeT, but I’m very concerned about LeT. 

General PETRAEUS. So are we. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I’m very concerned about this organization’s 

designs on a global presence. 

General PETRAEUS. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I’m very worried that we’ve gone beyond a 

proxy for ISI and beyond a proxy in terms of just an issue as it 

relates to India and Kashmir. I am anxious to get some kind of 

briefing from you for the record on LeT, especially in light of the 

instability of the Pakistani Government right now and some of the 

issues we’re having with incidents that have occurred in Pakistan, 

and how the Pakistan Government is responding to those. But I 

worry that we’re honing in and doing what we need to do with al 

Qaeda, and we’re honing in and doing what we need to do with the 

Taliban, and, as Senator Cornyn mentioned, Pakistan has nuclear 

weapons, and LeT obviously has a great deal of power, it appears, 

with certain people in the Pakistani government. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. That will have to be for the record, if that 

would be okay. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[Deleted.] 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


315ful24.eps
79 

Thank you, Secretary Flournoy, for your leadership and commitment to our country. 

General Petraeus, thank you again for what you’ve done. We just 

value so much your commitment and effort. 

To follow up on—a very important point that Senator McCaskill 

raised is something that’s concerned me a bit. We know that the 

provisional reconstruction teams in Iraq, for example, were really 

to be under the leadership of the State Department a year or 2 ago. 

In essence, most of the personnel that dominated those areas were 

DOD, mostly military. Now we have a plan to remove our soldiers 

from there. I understand the State Department is planning to go 

to 17,000 personnel from maybe 7,000, now, in Iraq. 

They do not have the kind of force-protection capability that we 

have with the military. I guess I’m just concerned that this rapid 

withdrawal—and there seems to be an expectation that State Department personnel who didn’t sign up to go into harm’s way, as 

the military have, and for the most part are unarmed—do you see 

a danger there? Is there something that we need to be thinking 

about, that we do not place our State Department people in a position that they can’t accomplish what we expect them to accomplish? 

General PETRAEUS. I’ll hand off to the Under Secretary in a second, but I’m obviously not the commander in Iraq anymore, but I 

obviously keep an eye on an area in which we invested an enormous amount. My concern with Iraq is actually similar to the concern that I voiced about Afghanistan. That is funding for our State 

and USAID partners. 

The idea was—and it was back when I was the CENTCOM commander, even, indeed, when we were developing concepts when I 

was still the commander in Iraq in late 2008—that as military 

forces came down, the State and USAID presence would actually 

take on more tasks than they did in the past, as they were handed 

off, again, from some of our military elements to them. Then subsequent to that, the funding for those particular endeavors has not 

been forthcoming, and so you have a situation in which military 

forces are drawing down or transitioning tasks to elements that are 

not sufficiently resourced to carry them out. 

Senator SESSIONS. Just to make the point, though, that State Department personnel have the right to reject deployment in areas 

where security cannot be guaranteed. Isn’t that a complicating factor, Secretary Flournoy? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, we have developed the Iraq transition 

plan with very realistic expectations about what the security environment is going to be, and looking at the DOD and State Department pieces of that as an integrated whole in terms of the footprint 

of the presence, what the activities are, continued security cooperation for the Iraqis, continued training for the police, continued engagement on the intelligence side, and so forth. The challenge is 

keeping the coherence of that plan, as it comes up to be considered 

by multiple different committees who will take a look at the different funding streams that are stovepiped by agency. 

So we would appeal to you all to help us as you look at that plan 

to look across agencies, to look at how we maintain an integrated, 

coherent plan to support, really, finishing out the job in Iraq and 

ensuring that we protect our interests there. 

80 

Senator SESSIONS. Okay. I would just say count me as someone 

who’s concerned about the viability of the plan if it’s funded. 

Second, you’re exactly right, we do have a problem here—how we 

move funds to make sure State Department has the sufficient numbers. I’m on the Budget Committee. That’s where I was earlier this 

morning. The Education Department in the President’s budget 

projects an 11 percent increase in their spending, Energy, 9.5 percent increase next year, Transportation, 62 percent increase, and 

State Department, 10.5 percent, most of which I think is overseas 

contingency. 

We’re not going to have these increases. We don’t have the 

money. Congress is not going to give these kind of increases. We 

don’t have the money. It presents us all with a real challenge, and 

I’m concerned about it. 

General Petraeus, you spent virtually a year in Iraq leading the 

whole effort to train the Iraqi forces. Now, training of forces in Afghanistan is such a critical part of it. We’re thankful that you’re 

there and you’ve had the experience that you’ve had. We’re thankful that you’ve written the defense manual on how to conduct a 

counterinsurgency operation. 

Tell us, are we obtaining sufficient support from our NATO allies? I think the answer is really no. But second, that which they 

have taken over often has not been as effectively managed as the 

U.S. military’s training programs. We’re moving the numbers in Afghanistan up, both military and police. 

Can you summarize it for us, how well that’s going? Are we going 

to be in a position to rely on them in the near future to provide 

the security that’s necessary for an independent Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. Thanks, Senator. In fact, we often get the 

question, when, General, are the Afghans going to step forward and 

start leading security? I say, well, they’re in Kabul right now, in 

the lead, and in Kabul, which is one quarter to one fifth the population of the entire country, it is ANSF who are very much in the 

lead. It is the ANP who are the face of security on the streets. It 

is the ANA a bit further out that has security responsibilities. 

Every given night in that city there are a couple of operations that 

are conducted by Afghan special operations forces, either from the 

police, their intelligence services, or from the army. 

So, indeed, they are already very much stepping up to the plate. 

They are taking losses at a higher level than our losses—a considerably higher level. So they are very much fighting and dying for 

their country. 

Our NATO and non-NATO ISAF contributing nations are very 

much providing superb individuals in the train and equip mission. 

Yes, there is a need for more of them. As I mentioned earlier, 

there’s a shortage of some 750 or so—although, again, 2 nations 

that have announced an intention are still working out what it is 

that they will provide. But while there is that shortage, the troopcontributing nations have very much stepped up to the plate and 

provided substantial numbers of additional trainers, and that does 

continue. There were a few more pledges, in fact, in recent months 

that will be significant as well. 

In fact, the challenge now is what we call specialized training. 

We don’t have these. We don’t have MI–17 pilots, or, at least not 

81 

large numbers in our inventory. We don’t have pilots of some of the 

other aircraft, again, that are being used for the Afghan air forces. 

Some of the speciality skills—again, it’s very helpful to have some 

former Warsaw Pact nations that are actually familiar with the artillery, for example, that is going to be used, is being used by the 

Afghan forces, and some of the mortars and some of their other 

weapons systems as well. 

So, I think, actually, that they have done a superb job, and that 

the creation of NTM–A from the formerly U.S.-led multinational, 

the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC– 

A) has been a very important step forward. The fact is that during 

my time in Iraq, where I led, again, the U.S.-led Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC–I)—I was also dualhatted as the NATO Training Mission-Iraq. But those were not 

merged. Those were two separate organizations, and the NATO one 

was quite modest in its size, certainly in comparison to MNSTC– 

I. 

In this case, CSTC–A and NTM–A have been merged, and it’s 

been done in a very effective way, again, in large measure I attribute to Lieutenant General Caldwell’s leadership, because he’s 

the one who’s been in command of both organizations and he’s the 

one that actually oversaw the concept for, and then the actual establishment, of NTM–A. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To clarify my concern—the State Department has fabulous people. They’re willing to take risks and they are taking risks. But 

they’re not trained and committed, as military people are, to be in 

dangerous spots. And you’ve done such a good job, I believe, in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, that, to transition so rapidly from the military, 

who’s out there, who’s now learning to manage money, CERP funds 

and so forth, to the State Department will be a dicey handoff, I 

think. I wish you every success in that. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, if I could just a moment, about our 

foreign service officer comrades and the members of USAID? 

Chairman LEVIN. If you would, make it very brief, General. 

General PETRAEUS. Okay. They’re awesome. They are putting it 

on the line every day, as well. They’re going outside the wire. I’m 

not aware of any member of the foreign service who’s declined one 

of these assignments. In fact, I think they have serviced all of them 

by volunteers. Again, certainly this presents some challenges as we 

try to transition, but I think the challenge is more one of funding 

than of any other. 

For what it’s worth, we also have established, as what we’ll do 

in Afghanistan, where we have military-led PRTs, is we will not try 

to transition them wholesale to State Department over time. Rather, what we’ll do is just reduce the size of them as we do the transition. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you very much, Senator 

Sessions. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good—I was going to say good morning, but good afternoon. 

82 

I know, General, you’re a marathon runner, and we’re about to 

break the magic 3-hour mark—although I know you aimed your 

goal at breaking three, reducing the time that you would run till 

under 3 hours. But thank you for your persistence and your endurance. 

If I might, I’d like to turn to the COIN doctrine, which you authored. It’s been successfully implemented in a number of places. 

I think that the core of that set of concepts is defeating an insurgency is about 30 percent military and 70 percent political. Yet it 

seems that our exit strategy is focused primarily on the transition 

of security responsibilities in selected districts from the ISAF to Afghan forces. If I could, I’d like to just direct a few questions at you 

and you can pick and choose in your responses. 

Are you concerned about the Taliban’s ability to exploit this plan 

by attacking specific targets of choice during the transition? In 

other words, does this handoff strategy telegraph our next play and 

put a bull’s-eye on the districts while they’re in vulnerable transition process? 

Then, more broadly, how closely is this military transition strategy being coordinated with the political endgame, in terms of ensuring the delivery of the basic government services in these districts and then reintegrating Taliban fighters who’ve had enough? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, upfront, transition really has 

three big components to it, Senator, and security is just one of 

them. The other two actually are governance and development. So 

there is, I think, an understandable focus on security. That’s the 

foundation, if you will, for all progress, after all. 

But at the end of the day, security is not enough. Military action 

is necessary but not sufficient. You must build on that foundation, 

again, with the establishment of local governance that can earn legitimacy in the eyes of the people. It does that by serving the people, by being transparent, representing integrity, and, indeed, providing a better future for the people than they would have by going 

with the insurgents. 

Then, of course, the development is obvious as well. This also encompasses basic rule of law, basic development. Again, there’s 

measured aspirations. There’s no objective to try to turn Afghanistan into Switzerland in 10 years or less, or something like that. 

Now with respect to a concern that transition might put a bull’seye on a province or municipality—absolutely. There is concern 

about that, and indeed, we will try to take mitigating measures so 

that as locations are identified for transition, that as they become 

targeted, that we do all that is humanly possible to prevent the 

enemy from causing major disruption, while recognizing that there 

will be attacks. Again, Kabul has enjoyed a period of, touch wood, 

the best security we think it has—I think it’s for a 9-month period 

now—but even during that period, there have been periodic sensational attacks. Again, it is inevitable that there will be some continuation of that. The objective is, needless to say, to ensure that 

all security challenges have been reduced below the threshold that 

is necessary for continued growth, again, in the governance and development arenas. 

Because of that recognition that there are three components, not 

just security, there has been very close coordination, especially 

83 

with the JANIB, the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal, or Transition, 

Board, which is chaired by Dr. Ashraf Ghani, working directly for 

President Karzai, and co-chaired by the NATO senior civilian representative, the ambassador from the U.K., and then by myself, 

with a committee that includes heads of the relevant ministries 

and the major troop-contributing nation ambassadors as well. 

So there is, again, a keen awareness that transition requires 

much more than just the security foundation, although that is, indeed, the most important element without which you can’t transition. But you cannot succeed with transition if you haven’t built on 

that foundation adequately in the governance and development 

arenas. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, General, for that. 

I’d like to turn to Secretary Flournoy. But before I do that, I 

wanted to acknowledge, as you both have, the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations. I don’t like who crafts the acronym, 

but I know the important work they’ve done. I believe Paul 

Brinkley has been the leader in that effort, and I look forward to 

working with you all as we do make that important transition. 

If I could, I’d like to turn to Pakistan and India. We’ve been 

hearing for quite a while that the Pakistani leadership is unwilling 

to abandon support for the Taliban because they view it as a hedge 

against possible future Indian influence in Kabul. India, of course, 

denies any such ambitions. 

In the context of our new strategic partnership with India, do 

you think that there are new openings to engage New Delhi in a 

more positive political solution that might reassure Pakistan? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think we’ve actually been very heartened by the 

fact that India and Pakistan are resuming their own dialogue on 

a number of disputed issues, from Kashmir to counterterrorism, 

humanitarian issues, trade, and so forth. So we think that dialogue 

is extremely important. I think Pakistan in particular views so 

much of, so many issues in the region through the prism of its relationship with India. So, I think, getting at some of those root problems between the two of them is one of the most important initiatives that can happen in the region. So, we are being as supportive 

of that as possible. 

But I want to come back to something that was said before, and 

that is, I do think that our success in Afghanistan will be a calculus-changing event for many actors in the region who’ve spent 

many years hedging. The fact of that stability and that success will 

force a recalculation by a whole number of parties that will have 

to reckon with that, and may choose to approach that reality differently than what, and change some behavior that we’ve seen in 

the past. 

Senator UDALL. Not to get ahead of ourselves, but that sounds 

like one of the prizes when we are successful in the long run. 

I know that I spoke recently to a keen observer of the India-Pakistan relationship, and the case that this gentleman made to me 

was if India and Pakistan could liberalize their economic relationship, they would result in enormous gains and positive developments. General, would you care to comment? 

General PETRAEUS. This ties in again to what I think is a very 

reasonable ambition of President Karzai, an aspiration, and that is 

84 

the idea, again, of Afghanistan as the Central Asian roundabout, 

again, the transit location for the new Silk Road. If you can tie in 

the extraordinary energy resources of the Central Asian states with 

the very rapidly growing economy of the subcontinent, you have to 

go through Afghanistan to do that and then tie into Pakistan and 

India. That’s obviously beneficial for all of the countries in the region, but it obviously requires a degree of economic cooperation to 

take place between India and Pakistan, in particular, that has been 

elusive so far because of the context in which they have been seeking to do this. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. One step in that direction has been the conclusion of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement, which 

we very much helped to encourage. Now we need to actually see 

them implement it as a step in that direction. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you for that image of the roundabout. I’m 

going to freely borrow it, having spent time in roundabouts, particularly in that part of the world in another life. Thank you both 

for your extraordinary service. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

Senator Chambliss. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome back to both of you. 

General Petraeus, I feel like I’ve welcomed you back so many 

times that when you finally do retire 15 or 20 years from now we’re 

going to have to get you back just to report on something. But it’s 

just an indication of the great leadership that you’ve provided, and 

thanks to you. As you get back, express to all the troops serving 

under you how much we appreciate their great service. 

General PETRAEUS. I’ll do it, Senator. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. You’ve already talked extensively about the 

training situation, and I’m not going to ask you to repeat anything 

there. I heard your comments earlier about the progress you’re 

making on the literacy program within those training programs, 

both the police and the military, and that’s such a great step in the 

right direction. When we ultimately do turn the total security force 

over to the Afghans to take care of themselves, without being somewhat more literate than what they are today, we all know that it’s 

simply not going to be possible on their end. So, I’m encouraged 

about what I hear, and I’m glad to hear my friend General 

Caldwell continues to do the great job that I know he has been 

doing under your leadership. 

This war is not very popular among the American people. It’s no 

different from any other war. No war is popular. But it has been 

absolutely necessary from the standpoint of ridding the world of 

terrorists and bringing Afghanistan to a point to where it cannot 

be used as a safe haven for terrorists. But as we look back today, 

after spending almost a decade in that part of the world, we see 

a government that is rampant with corruption. The stability of the 

leadership is questionable. There’s arguing back and forth among 

the parliaments there now, and they’re not even able to elect a 

speaker of their parliament. 

There, the economy in Afghanistan does not have the luxury of 

the economy in Iraq, because there basically was no economy, 

85 

whereas Iraq did, does have an oil-based system. The education 

system in Iraq, excuse me, in Afghanistan is, continues to be very 

weak, even though we are seeing improvements. 

I say that to ask both of you just to comment on the fact that, 

what kind of shining light or hope can we give the American people 

about the future of Afghanistan, when we are gone completely in 

some period of time, which is likely to be not far down the road 

from a military standpoint? 

Secretary Flournoy, we’re particularly going to have a lot of civilians, DOD civilians as well as State Department civilians, in Afghanistan for a long time to come. The safety and security of those 

individuals is of great concern to us. So, having given that glowing 

outlook on what I see happening in Afghanistan right now, I’d ask 

for both of you to come in as to where we go in the future. 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, Senator, if I could, I’d like to go 

back to September 2005, when I was coming home from a second 

tour in Iraq. It was 151⁄2 months standing up the train and equip 

program. Secretary Rumsfeld asked me to detour and come home 

through Afghanistan to look at the train and equip mission there, 

and really at the situation more broadly. At that time, levels of violence in Afghanistan were very, very low. It was described as the, 

‘‘war that we were winning’’ and so forth. 

The truth is that I came back after looking at it, because of the 

various challenges you could just feel how difficult various aspects 

of this were, and you could also sense that the Taliban was beginning its comeback. I went back and reported, in addition to various 

observations on the train and equip program, that I thought that 

this would be the longest campaign in the long war. Now, that 

didn’t elicit wild applause in the third floor of the Pentagon, as you 

might imagine. It’s a pretty sobering assessment. But it is something that I stand by. The reason is because of these various challenges that accrued over 30 years of war in a country that was, 

when those wars began, among the three poorest in the world. 

There’s no question about the difficulty of this endeavor. I think 

it is understandable, again, that the American people could be frustrated that we’ve been at this for 10 years and we haven’t won yet. 

On the other hand, as both the Under Secretary and I mentioned, 

we hadn’t gotten the inputs right until, really, just in the last 6 

months or so. Last fall is when we assessed that we finally had the 

organizations necessary for the conduct of a comprehensive civilmilitary counterinsurgency campaign—all the concepts, plans, directives, ideas, the staffing of those organizations, and then, above 

all, the levels of troops, civilians, and funding, together with the 

gradual growth of the ANSF, that turned into much more rapid 

growth. 

There’s no question about the challenges, again, whether it is in 

illiteracy, lack of human capital, human capacity, governance capacity, and the rest. But I would submit that there’s no question 

about the progress in these areas. Let me give you just one really 

important metric. Under the Taliban, there were less than 1 million Afghan children in school. This coming academic year, the 

Minister of Education projects that there will be 8.2 million in 

school, and the growth from last year to this year will be the largest of any year since liberation from Taliban rule in late 2001. 

86 

The fact is that there’s been progress in every component of the 

comprehensive campaign. But the fact is also, every component has 

been very, very challenging and very difficult. 

By the way, they have elected a speaker, I’m happy to report. 

They’re actually now selecting committee members, and they’re 

reasonably along in that process with their parliament. Certainly, 

democracy in Afghanistan at times can be noisy, if you will—but 

I think that’s probably true of some other countries on occasion as 

well. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I would just add to that that as we start to think 

about the future and how this partnership will go forward, I think 

there’s tremendous strength derived from the fact that we really do 

share the same goals fundamentally. The core goals are very 

strongly held by both the United States and Afghanistan. 

I take heart from the tremendous resiliency and patriotism and 

dedication of many of our interlocutors, many of the ministers, 

many of their deputies, people who have suffered 30 years of war 

and who are just absolutely committed to reclaiming their country, 

to rebuilding capacity and reasserting their sovereignty. 

Then, really, if you really want to get a boost, go talk to the next 

generation. Meet with the students who are now back at school, 

coming out of Kabul University, coming out of other universities, 

who are not leaving, even though they could, but who want to 

make a future in Afghanistan and change Afghanistan, and create 

the kind of country that they think is possible with our help and 

the help of the international community. 

So, I think we tend to focus on the challenges—and they are significant. But the more you get out and talk to the people who have 

chosen to stay, and why they’re staying, and what they’re committed to doing in their country, it gives you great hope. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. General, just quickly, those numbers on the 

children in school are pretty impressive. That 1 million that were 

in school under the Taliban rule, how many of those were female 

versus how many were male? What percent are female of the 8.2? 

General PETRAEUS. Thanks for pointing that out. It was a very, 

very small percentage that was female under the Taliban, needless 

to say. Now it is a very considerable number. We’ll get you the 

exact number, but I think it’s in the neighborhood of 30 to 40 percent. So it’s that significant. I might add as well, by the way, that 

the percentage of females in the Afghan parliament is something 

like 10 percent higher than the percentage of females in the U.S. 

Congress as well. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thanks again for your leadership. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Since 2001, total primary and secondary education enrollment increased from 1.2 

million in 2001 (with virtually no females) to approximately 8.2 million today (over 

37 percent females). 

Chairman LEVIN. Except for that last note, thank you so much. 

I wish that everybody had heard all of your testimony this morning, particularly these last comments in response to Senator 

Chambliss’ question. It is really quite uplifting. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

87 

Thank you both for being here, and for your stamina to still be 

here. I think some of us think that if we could design our democracy again, we could probably put in a required percentage for 

women’s participation. That would make some of us happier. 

General PETRAEUS. As they did in Afghanistan. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Yes. 

General PETRAEUS. Of course, that’s one reason that they have 

that percentage but it is an interesting innovation. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Absolutely. You’ve both talked about the need 

for a comprehensive approach in Afghanistan, so, both the military 

commitment and the civilian commitment. I applauded the creation 

of the Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) back in January 2010. 

I know NATO has recently appointed a new SCR, Ambassador 

Simon Gass. 

But I’m concerned that that coordinator has the sufficient authority to do what the position was envisioned doing on the ground 

in Afghanistan. So I wonder if you could speak to that, and to also 

the coordination that’s involved between, General Petraeus, your 

command as the NATO head on the ground there, and the coordination with the civilian coordinator. 

General PETRAEUS. It’s a very, very close relationship actually. In 

fact, he and I are located in the same headquarters. He starts each 

morning the same way I do after the initial intel updates and so 

forth. But at our morning, what’s called stand-up briefing, we sit 

together during that, often as long as an hour or so. Then we meet 

many times a day and periodically, on quite a frequent basis, we’ll 

brief the members of the diplomatic community of the NATO–ISAF 

troop-contributing nations, meet with the U.N. Assistance MissionAfghanistan Special Representative of the Secretary General 

(SRSG) together at least once a week—that also includes the U.S. 

Ambassador—in which together we take actions. But, he also has 

an independent series of actions that he oversees, that he pursues 

through the regional SCRs, the regional command SCRs, who are 

seeking to coordinate the various civilian activities that take place 

within those regional commands. 

This is a different situation than the one in Iraq, as an example, 

where Iraq was a very U.S.-centric, Multi-National Force-Iraq, it 

had a single chain of command. I reported only to the CENTCOM 

commander operationally, as well as chain of command. In this 

case, my operational chain of command runs through a NATO 

chain of command, Joint Forces Command in Brunssum to Supreme Allied Commander-Europe to NATO Headquarters, with the 

U.S. chain running through CENTCOM and, of course, on to the 

Pentagon. A very close relationship with our U.S. Ambassador, 

Karl Eikenberry, a friend of over 30 years. But, a different relationship because of the operational command being NATO and the U.S. 

command being more of an administrative, if you will, troop provision and so forth and resource provision command. 

It’s the NATO SCR, Ambassador Mark Sedwell, soon to be Simon 

Gass, Ambassador Eikenberry, but also very much the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan SRSG, the EU special representative, Vygaudas Usackas, and actually a number of other 

senior members of the diplomatic community of the major troopcontributing nations—the U.K. Ambassador probably foremost 

88 

among them, with others. So this is a lot more complicated, frankly, than it was in Iraq in that particular regard. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Let me, let me try and refine this a little bit, 

and perhaps you could speak to that, Secretary Flournoy. My understanding is that one of the roles or responsibilities that we 

hoped for the civilian coordinator was that person could help address waste and corruption and abuse in civilian assistance. I know 

several people have raised concerns about how the assistance is actually being used on the ground in Afghanistan, so perhaps you 

could speak to that. 

General PETRAEUS. The truth is that, because funding is provided nationally, not through NATO writ large, there is a limited 

ability of the NATO SCR to, in a sense, oversee the contracting aspects of this. That’s where this all ends up, or, procurement aspects. 

On the U.S. side, and of course the United States is far and away 

the largest donor nation, what we have done is that’s why we’ve 

brought in Brigadier General McMaster and a very talented civil 

and military team. He has a Federal Bureau of Investigations official as his co-director, so this is a civil-military element, again, 

with the U.S. Embassy. There is a board of directors that is, again, 

civil-military, and then ultimately Ambassador Eikenberry and I 

oversee the efforts of this new task force. 

But this is what was necessary. This is why, as I mentioned earlier, we also want to go to an oversight system of all U.S. procurement in coordination of that with this organization, as well, as we 

have now focused increasing intelligence assets on determining 

what is this corporation? Who runs it? Are there any silent partners in it? Where is the money, again, ending up through subs to 

subs and that kind of thing, and this is a very complex endeavor. 

As I mentioned, it was only with the establishment of this task 

force and then the other subordinate ones that we’ve been able to 

focus the kind of attention and resources on the contracting aspect 

of this to the point that we have then de-barred, as I said, I think 

it’s nine total right now. I think it’s 30 something that are actually 

suspended and in the process of either being debarred or proving 

that they didn’t do what we believe they did. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Did you want to speak to that also, Secretary Flournoy? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. It was really to the broader point of the importance of properly resourcing and gaining greater coherence on the 

civilian side, not just in general, because that’s what COIN involves, but at this particular point in the campaign. At the point 

at which you finally gain military traction and you’re creating momentum on the ground, and you’re creating the security and the 

space for other things to happen—that’s the point at which it becomes that much more important that the diplomatic and political 

and economic development and other elements of the civilian elements of the strategy are fully resourced and properly led, and in 

place. I think we’re struggling to get those resources, and to fully 

achieve the coherence that we think is necessary to consolidate the 

gains. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. My time has expired. 

89 

But, General Petraeus, I hope that at some point when you do 

retire, that you will plan to come and spend some of your time in 

New Hampshire, where I have been told you own a home. 

General PETRAEUS. ‘‘Live free or die.’’ [Laughter.] 

Senator SHAHEEN. Good. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. We thank you both for your great work for this 

country. Just two comments. 

First, in terms of the size of the military in Afghanistan, I would 

just point out that even if the size of the security forces were increased to 378,000, which is what the top limit is, I believe, that 

that would still be about 300,000 fewer than are in the Iraqi security forces, even though Afghanistan has a larger population than 

Iraq. 

Second, that the cost of even a 400,000 Afghan security force is 

a tiny, tiny fraction of what the cost is of having our forces in Afghanistan. I think the total payroll of a 400,000 Afghan security 

force would be about a billion and a quarter, something like that. 

Our expenditures in Afghanistan this year, I believe, are something 

like $80 billion, if I’m not mistaken. So, it’s a tiny fraction of what 

our costs are. 

Finally, General, I noticed in your charts—which are really very 

helpful, and I want to thank you for them, you didn’t make too 

many references to them, but I hope all of us will have a chance 

to take a look at them because there’s a lot in here—there’s a slight 

omission on page three when they talk about the inputs and the 

people. Your name is left off. I know that’s one of two things—either undue modesty on your part, or someone’s trying to give you 

a message on your staff. I’m not sure what, which it would be. But 

I do point out that it belongs there, right with Ambassador 

Eikenberry at the top. 

We thank you both. You have great staying power. 

We’ll stand adjourned. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

1. Senator MCCASKILL. General Petraeus, as of January 2011 there were 1,671 

registered Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO), including both foreign and domestic, within Afghanistan according to the Ministry of Economy. Some of these are 

large international organizations with a long history in Afghanistan while others 

have only been working in the country in the last decade since the fall of the 

Taliban Government. As the conflict there intensified in recent years, it has become 

more and more difficult and dangerous for NGOs to operate in Afghanistan. According to some prominent NGOs, the U.S. strategy has not made life easier or safer 

for them or for their Afghan partners. Government and military leaders often assert 

that NGOs in Afghanistan depend on the military for protection, but I have been 

told by at least one very prominent and successful NGO that this assertion is ‘‘chiefly false’’. NGOs cling to their neutrality and autonomy as their best means of safety 

so when U.S. strategy or operational concerns deprive NGOs of these they in fact 

put them at greater risk for violence. While some organizations may have questionable motives or suspect finances, a majority of them are altruistic and invaluable. 

How does the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) balance its strategic 

and operational imperatives with those of the NGO community to ensure that their 

concerns are taken into consideration and that coalition efforts do not negate years 

of relationship-building or compromise NGO safety? Please cite specific examples. 

General PETRAEUS. ISAF balances its strategic and operational imperatives with 

those of the NGO community through coordination and cooperation to help ensure 

90 

that we do not unintentionally compromise the efforts and safety of our NGO partners. In particular, we are increasingly sensitive to NGOs that want to distance 

themselves from ISAF security operations, since their safety is sometimes dependent on the population’s perception of the neutrality of their activities. During predeployment training, we now explain this dynamic to our troopers through educational programs. Also, the ISAF Deputy Commander meets monthly with major 

international and Afghan NGO country directors to share information and to assure 

NGOs that our policies, plans, and programs respect NGO neutrality and autonomy. 

Even so, the objectives of ISAF and NGOs are largely complementary, and we benefit from maintaining close working relationships with NGOs at all levels. For example, at the strategic level, ISAF and the international community sponsor multiple conferences and meetings each year to generate discussion and to collaborate 

on strategies and projects. On the operational and tactical level, NGOs have contributed valuable experience and insight in discussions with our battlefield commanders. 

2. Senator MCCASKILL. General Petraeus, I understand that school establishment 

is happening all over the country, through direct government action, NGO action, 

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) action, and military action. The NGO perspective is that in volatile regions where there exists hostility towards either girls’ 

education or state-building, the establishment of community-based schools in preexisting mosques, other public buildings, or in people’s private homes is the preferred method. I have been told that these schools are for the most part left alone 

by insurgent groups. I have also been told that the PRT perspective to education 

is quite different. PRTs often use school construction (different from school establishment, which requires teachers and curriculum and community support and furniture and text-books, et cetera, and may not include any construction at all) as a 

state-building activity, and these schools are often quite visible, prominent, and 

empty. As ISAF continues to work with the Government of the Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan to expand educational opportunities for Afghan children, how do you 

balance the need to incorporate visible good governance programs (i.e. school construction) without endangering the very people the state-building initiatives are trying to help? 

General PETRAEUS. Security and good governance are interdependent; without security, governance cannot take hold, and without good governance, security gains 

are not enduring. ISAF works to balance its governance and security efforts by understanding the specific needs of the communities in which it operates and then tailoring resources and projects towards those needs. With education, as with all development efforts, we do not use a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ approach. Actively involving Afghans and the international community, we work to promote acceptance for education and to increase support for girls’ education in particular. 

As a result of this close coordination, we are seeing progress in some of the most 

challenging areas of Afghanistan. Since 2009, nearly 50 schools have been reopened 

in Helmand Province with the support of the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction 

Team and ISAF. In Marjah District, Helmand Province, a high school and five other 

primary schools were able to open for the first time in 6 years after ISAF/ANSF 

combined security operations cleared the area. Since security operations began in 

late 2001, total primary and secondary education enrollment across the country has 

increased seven-fold, from 1.2 million students (virtually none of whom were female) 

to approximately 8.2 million students in 2011 (37 percent of whom were female). In 

2010 alone, total nationwide primary and secondary education enrollment increased 

by 14 percent. 

3. Senator MCCASKILL. General Petraeus, what is the greatest need with respect 

to increasing educational access for Afghans? 

General PETRAEUS. Our effort to increase Afghan access to education should focus 

on three main areas: enhancing security so that children can safely attend school, 

increasing the Ministry of Education’s budget execution capacity to improve and expand Afghan-led education programs, and continuing to support building and staffing of schools. (On this last point, authorization of the additional $150 million in 

CERP for fiscal year 2011 is a critical component of this effort.) Together, these efforts address both immediate and long-term educational needs. 

Along with our international development partners, we are simultaneously implementing education programs and increasing the capacity of the Afghan Government 

to sustain these programs after transition. And, there are now over 70,000 Afghan 

Security Force members in literacy training. 

91 

LAKSHAR-E-TAIBA AND EXTREMIST FACTIONS

4. Senator MCCASKILL. General Petraeus, I have long felt that Lakshar-e-Taiba 

(LeT) has broader terrorist designs than its traditional role as proxy force for the 

Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to attack targets and enemies in India and 

in the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir. I raised this concern with you about a year 

ago as well. What is LeT’s current role in Afghanistan and what is your assessment 

as to whether the organization is potentially endangering the lives of our troops 

there? 

General PETRAEUS. [Deleted.] 

5. Senator MCCASKILL. General Petraeus, should we be concerned about any extreme factions within the Pakistani military? 

General PETRAEUS. [Deleted.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

6. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Flournoy, Director of the National 

Counterterrorism Center, Michael Leiter, recently said that Yemen’s Al Qaeda in 

the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has surpassed Osama bin Laden as being the most 

likely to conduct attacks inside the United States. Al Qaeda’s threat is increasingly 

one of motivation and influence, not direct attack. How does that change America’s 

national security strategy from 10 years ago? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. For the first time since September 11, the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) integrates homeland security and national security and seeks 

to represent and reflect all aspects of U.S. power. In a refinement over the previous 

administration’s strategies, President Obama has sought to speak with more precision about the threats we face. 

Today, our preeminent security threat is from al Qaeda and its terrorist adherents—those individuals or groups that have formed collaborative relationships inspired to take action in furtherance of both al Qaeda’s operational and ideological 

goals. The al Qaeda core, primarily based in Pakistan, has been joined by affiliates 

that retain their own distinct organizational structure, including facilitators, financiers, and training sites. The al Qaeda core not only provides the strategic vision 

for affiliates such as AQAP, but is also itself involved in plotting attacks against 

the interests of the United States and our allies and partners. 

The rise of these affiliate organizations in the Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere 

is of great concern, and highlights the importance of not only disrupting al Qaeda’s 

attacks against the United States and our allies and partners, but also countering 

al Qaeda’s ideology, messaging, and resonance as well. As such, both are administration priorities. AQAP is intensely focused on conducting a near-term attack 

against the United States, and poses an immediate terrorist threat to U.S. interests 

and the Homeland. 

The NSS, and the forthcoming derivative National Counterterrorism Strategy, 

will advance U.S. interests in security, prosperity, and universal values, and will 

help shape an international order that can meet the tests of the century. 

7. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Flournoy, how does a large-scale ground war, 

such as the one in Afghanistan, make sense against a distributed enemy? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. To disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its extremist 

affiliates operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and prevent their return, the 

United States and our allies are waging a civil-military counterinsurgency campaign. Although large in scale, this population-centric counterinsurgency is fundamentally different from conventional ground warfare. It is tailored to the actual 

conditions in the operating environment where, in addition to protecting the local 

population against a distributed enemy, our forces and civilian officials work closely 

with Afghan partners to build Afghan capacities to secure and govern the country 

more effectively. A major thrust of the overall effort is to build the capacity of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), who are steadily increasing their roles and 

their capability to take the lead responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan 

by the end of 2014. The development of these Afghan capacities is essential to 

achieving enduring results that will prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a 

safe haven for violent extremists. 

92 

WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN

8. Senator GILLIBRAND. General Petraeus, I was pleased to hear you say that giving Afghan forces the lead by 2014 is achievable. In 2008 under your command, the 

United States and Iraq negotiated a Strategic Framework Agreement and a Withdrawal of U.S. Forces Agreement, setting up the end of 2011 as the withdrawal date 

for U.S. troops. Is this a good model for Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, to a degree, but ultimately, this is a political decision and 

I would defer to those negotiating the agreement between our two governments. I 

can tell you that, militarily, there will likely still be a need for some assistance, 

mentorship, and support after 2014, when the Afghans are in the lead for security 

across the country. The Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement may contain some 

useful concepts that we can adapt for the Afghanistan agreement, but Iraq and Afghanistan are two very different countries. We should be wary of trying to cut and 

paste solutions from one country to the other. 

COUNTERING THE TALIBAN

9. Senator GILLIBRAND. General Petraeus, in last Tuesday’s New York Times you 

were quoted as saying: ‘‘The Taliban have never been under the pressure that they 

were put under over the course of the last 8 to 10 months.’’ What contribution is 

being made by the Afghan security forces in bringing this pressure to bear? 

General PETRAEUS. The ‘‘Afghan surge’’—the growth of the National Security 

Forces by more than 85,000 since November 2009—has directly contributed to our 

combined forces’ ability to put enormous pressure on the Taliban in the last 8 to 

10 months. During this time period, the Afghan National Army (ANA) has led nearly 25 percent of operations nationwide. Of the ANA’s approximately 160,000 soldiers, some 100,000 are deployed (with the remainder in the training pipeline or in 

institutional positions). The ANA has also fielded a formidable Special Operations 

component with 9 Commando kandaks, 14 Special Forces A-Teams, all of which are 

increasingly capable of performing independent operations. Simultaneously, the Afghan National Police (ANP) has more than 90,000 policemen deployed out of 

122,000 total. Moreover, various other Afghan special operations elements (police 

provincial response companies, counter-terrorist teams, narcotics interdiction units, 

and other units) all contribute significantly to the mission. Although Afghan Local 

Police (ALP) personnel are not part of the ANSF, the 5,200 members of this force 

are making important contributions to security, especially in rural areas. Afghan security forces are a critical and irreplaceable component of our security efforts across 

the country, and, as they continue to increase in size and capability, they will be 

able to make even greater contributions. 

10. Senator GILLIBRAND. General Petraeus, what are we doing to train them to 

continue to maintain a credible defense against the Taliban as the Afghan troops 

take leadership for the fight? 

General PETRAEUS. The long-term sustainability and credibility of a professional 

ANSF will provide a credible defense against the Taliban. To achieve this goal, 

NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM–A) currently leads the effort of 33 troopcontributing nations to train, develop, and sustain the ANSF with a particular emphasis on the need to enable self-reliance. NTM–A is doing this through a variety 

of means, to include leadership development through numerous courses for officers 

and noncommissioned officers; branch schools to build critical skills and enabler capabilities (11 of 12 planned branch schools are open); and literacy training (with 

more than 70,000 ANSF currently enrolled). Additionally, we are focused on mentoring and partnering the ANSF in the field. This helps ANSF troopers learn tactics, 

techniques, procedures, and processes, and it also provides them with the opportunity to observe and receive mentoring on professional values and military ethics. 

These efforts are intended to improve the professionalization and capabilities of the 

ANSF, which will, in turn, enhance their credibility with the people and increase 

their ability to provide a credible defense against the insurgency. 

11. Senator GILLIBRAND. General Petraeus, the Taliban reportedly use tunnels to 

store weapons, house sleeping quarters, and hide fighting positions. How much of 

a factor are these underground facilities to the Taliban’s ability to continue the 

fight? 

General PETRAEUS. Insurgents continue to use tunnels, including irrigation tunnels, to conceal their movement and to store weapons and supplies throughout Afghanistan. Currently, however, these have little impact on the insurgency’s ability 

to sustain itself, and we are having increasing success in finding and removing inVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:43 Jan 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\72295.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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surgent weapons caches. (Of note, over the past three months, the number of weapons and supply caches found in tunnels and buried underground and seized by coalition forces has increased by over 250 percent compared to the same time period last 

year.) Of greater value than the tunnels is the direct and indirect help the intimidated and coerced portions of the Afghan population provide to the insurgency. As 

ISAF and Afghan forces continue to apply pressure against the insurgency, and as 

popular support wanes, we anticipate an increased use of tunnels, as the insurgents 

will have fewer places in which they can operate in the open. 

12. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Flournoy, I often hear that the reason to continue to be in Afghanistan is the threat that al Qaeda and the Taliban will exploit 

the weak state to mount attacks on our Homeland. Yet despite our presence, the 

Pakistani Taliban apparently planned and executed an attempted bombing in Times 

Square last year. The year before, al Qaeda-influenced AQAP similarly planned and 

executed an attempted airplane bomb from Yemen. Can you explain how the presence of 100,000 troops in Afghanistan is helping to address these ongoing threats? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The attacks that al Qaeda operatives carried out on September 11, 2001 emanated from a safe haven in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. 

These attacks were made possible by the virtually complete freedom of action al 

Qaeda enjoyed in Afghanistan. Our strategy is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al 

Qaeda and its extremist affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan and prevent their 

capacity to reestablish a safe haven in the region that would pose a threat to the 

United States, to our allies and partners, and to our interests abroad. Over the past 

two years, through our civilian and military surges and our counterinsurgency strategy, we have made important gains, including driving the Taliban out of areas in 

their heartland that they have controlled for years. However, these gains remain 

fragile and reversible, and success requires that we sustain our efforts, including 

the successful development of the ANSFs. We have also worked closely with Pakistan in support of their military’s efforts to combat violent extremists in the border 

areas near Afghanistan. These efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan have reduced, 

but not eliminated the threat from al Qaeda, and we must sustain them to achieve 

success. At the same time, we must also recognize that the problems of violent extremism and safe havens are not limited to just this region, and it is likewise necessary to address them, through a variety of means, in other areas of the world as 

well. 

13. Senator GILLIBRAND. General Petraeus, once we redeploy, will we conceivably 

continue to be able to use counterterrorism methods, unmanned aerial vehicles 

(UAV) and other tactics to address the threat? 

General PETRAEUS. We are still very much in the fight in Afghanistan and we 

have not yet commenced redeployment. One could foresee a situation where ISAF 

forces would redeploy from Afghanistan according to a phased plan, yet would still 

maintain the ability to execute conventional force and counterterrorism operations 

in support of ISAF and Afghan Government objectives. While this would likely include UAVs, it would not be limited to them, as UAVs require a wide range of 

networked ISR capabilities and support enablers, including some ground forces, to 

ensure tactical success, limit collateral damage, and achieve intended operational effects. Counterterrorist force operations would also require special forces units on the 

ground, which require their own enablers and support personnel. 

ROLE OF PAKISTAN

14. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Flournoy, you said that Pakistan is key to success, but its will and ability to take on insurgency remains a challenge. What do 

you think we are able to do to enhance Pakistan’s efforts against the insurgency, 

particularly during this very tense time between our Nations? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. First, it is important to note that Pakistan has undertaken 

impressive and challenging counterinsurgency operations to clear the Swat Valley 

and a number of agencies in the federally Administered Tribal Areas. We are seeing 

an unprecedented level of coordination and cooperation along the border between 

Pakistani, Afghan, and ISAF forces, including ‘hammer and anvil’ operations. Pakistan continues to make incredible sacrifices-the Pakistan military has already taken 

several thousand casualties, and Pakistan has lost tens of thousands of civilians to 

terrorism. Violent extremism and the counterinsurgency campaign have also taken 

a toll on Pakistan’s economy. As Secretary Gates has said, Pakistan has its foot on 

the accelerator. We stand by to support. 

94 

We are already working with Pakistan to build counterinsurgency and 

counterterrorism capabilities of its security forces, particularly the Frontier Scouts 

and Special Services Group. The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund is 

a key part of this effort. Going forward, the Multi-Year Security Assistance commitment will enable this work to continue and demonstrate our long-term commitment 

to Pakistan. This is truly a whole-of-government effort. The work of the Department 

of State and U.S. Agency for International Development to enhance Pakistan’s governance and policing capacity will be critical for allowing areas cleared by the military to return to civilian control-and to rendering them resistant to militant return. 

Full funding for the authorized assistance under Kerry-Lugar-Berman will be a key 

part of this effort. 

We continue to have candid discussions with Pakistan even during periods of tension. We seek a whole-of-government strategic partnership that can weather crisesone that advances the interests of both our Nations. This includes the denial of safe 

haven to all violent extremist organizations. Pakistan’s sustained counterinsurgency 

operations are an indication of this growing recognition of the threat of militancy. 

Ultimately, one the most effective ways to influence Pakistan’s approach to safe 

havens will be to continue to demonstrate a long-term commitment to Afghanistan 

and to Pakistan. 

15. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Flournoy, how is the large ISAF presence in 

Afghanistan impacting our image in Pakistan, and Pakistan’s internal stability? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The source of instability in both Afghanistan and Pakistan 

is violent extremism. Afghanistan and Pakistan are closely linked, and extremismdriven instability in Afghanistan, particularly that in the border regions, threatens 

Pakistan—but the converse is also true. Our core goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and 

defeat al Qaeda and its extremist affiliates and prevent them from using safe havens in the region. Indeed, that is the reason for the ISAF presence in Afghanistan. 

The historical relationships among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States 

are complex. Pakistan clearly remembers instances of perceived U.S. abandonment 

in the past. Pakistan seeks a stable, friendly Afghanistan, and elements within 

Pakistan question our staying power in Afghanistan, as well as the prospects for 

success. Pakistan is concerned about a U.S. abandonment of Afghanistan, which 

could result in a damaging power vacuum. 

We will continue endeavors to build trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Increasing operational coordination among Pakistani, Afghan, and ISAF forces is a 

key example of progress in this arena. However, the most important task is to continue to demonstrate clearly our long-term commitment to both Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

16. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, some have raised the concern that the Afghan Government will not be able to sustain the costs of the large security force 

that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is helping to build, absent continued large-scale international assistance. How do you respond to this concern? 

General PETRAEUS. There is no doubt that the Afghan state will need to rely on 

international donations to support and sustain their security forces in the near 

term. It is important to remember that while costly, sustaining the Afghan security 

forces over the next few years will be substantially less expensive than maintaining 

a large coalition presence in Afghanistan. At some future date, Afghanistan should 

be able to use the profits from its considerable natural resources to provide for its 

own security, but the current security situation and the nascent state of the Afghan 

economy make it difficult to predict when that date will be. Despite this uncertainty, the way forward is clear: we must help build capable and professional Afghan security forces and create the conditions for sustained economic growth. Failing to do so risks the return of the Taliban and Al Qaeda to safe havens inside the 

country. 

17. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, could Afghanistan’s natural resources, together with better governance, help the Afghan Government to pay for its own security? 

General PETRAEUS. Over time, Afghanistan’s natural resources, together with better government oversight and increased security, could allow the Afghan Government to increasingly pay for its own security. It will take a minimum of five to ten 

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years to begin exploiting these resources in earnest, but Afghanistan’s extractive industries are estimated to be worth at least $1–3 trillion (with only 30 percent surveyed and explored). In the next 5 to 10 years, the Afghan mining sector has the 

potential to produce up to $5–6 billion annually, which would increase domestic revenue by around 20 percent and add more than 1 percent to the annual GDP, if properly managed. The efforts of the Task Force for Business Stability Operations (TF– 

BSO) have been critical in leading efforts to catalyze private-sector economic development and in generating interest in foreign direct investment, particularly in the 

mining industry. In order to help the Afghan Government increase its internallygenerated revenue and become more self-sufficient over time, we will need to continue to fund TF–BSO, to support ongoing security operations, and to encourage 

anti-corruption initiatives. Still, even as Afghanistan develops its natural resources, 

we should expect to support the ANSFs for some time to come. 

18. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, what would be the impact on the ANSF 

if Congress were to reduce or cut funding for our training mission, just as Congress 

reduced our commitment to the Iraqi Security Forces last year? 

General PETRAEUS. Insufficient funding for the ANSF would result in a smaller 

and less capable Afghan force at the exact moment in the campaign when we are 

expecting our Afghan partners to assume more responsibilities across the country. 

We would likely have to cancel the fielding of critical units, to include ANA infantry 

kandaks, ANA Quick Response Force kandaks, ANA Engineer kandaks, an Afghan 

National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) brigade (ANCOP forces are some of the most 

capable police forces), an Afghan Border Police kandak, and ANP heavy weapons 

companies. Coalition forces would potentially have to fill some of the resulting battlefield and logistical requirement shortfalls. Additionally, funding reductions would 

negatively affect our plans to build ANSF infrastructure to enable long-term Afghan 

self-sufficiency. 

Unlike in Iraq, the Afghan Government does not have an alternative source of 

revenue since its vast mineral resources will take years to develop. Further, in the 

event of funding cuts, it is likely that the Afghan Government would question our 

long-term commitment to the mission and to them, which could have serious repercussions on many fronts. Overall, fund reductions at this point could undermine the 

hard-earned progress our troopers and our Afghan partners have achieved. 

19. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, how are you preventing the ALP program 

from turning into privately armed militias, as some have feared they will become? 

General PETRAEUS. The ALP is subject to extensive oversight by the Government 

of Afghanistan and the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command, 

Afghanistan (CFSOCC–A). Districts are only nominated for an ALP site after extensive vetting by our Special Forces, the Afghan Ministry of Interior, and the National 

Directorate of Security-Afghanistan’s intelligence service. Once nominated, prospective ALP members are first vetted and endorsed by local community leaders, who 

vouch for each individual patrolman. The entire site is then vetted and validated 

by the District Chief of Police, Provincial Chief of Police and the Afghan Ministry 

of Interior (MOI). Once validated, the proposed force falls under the overall control 

of the MOI and under the operational control of the District Chief of Police. All personnel are biometrically enrolled into the MoI personnel and payroll system, which 

encodes their identifying information into a database and prevents known insurgents from infiltrating the ALP. Pay controls ensure that only the MOI pays the 

ALP members’ salaries. Furthermore, ALP units may not be deployed outside their 

home district, which prevents misuse. Finally, at each district where ALP is 

present, the district police chief receives additional supervisory personnel and the 

National Directorate of Security provides additional intelligence assets to monitor 

the site and members. 

20. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, what evidence can you offer that the ALP 

program is contributing to greater security in areas where it is active in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. There are currently 4,878 ALP patrolmen deployed across 34 

districts in Afghanistan. While a wealth of reporting indicates that they have had 

some success in repelling attacks, discovering weapons caches, and conducting effective security patrols, the best evidence of their security contribution comes from the 

residents of the districts in which they operate. Polls taken from November 2010 

to March 2011 reveal that residents of ALP district are growing more confident in 

the ALP, are feeling safer, and are seeing lower levels of violence in their districts 

compared to those where ALP is not operating. Local residents also report being exposed to fewer violent acts, (e.g., car bombs, improvised explosive devices, sniper atVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:43 Jan 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00099 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\72295.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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tacks, and kidnappings). These improvements in residents’ perceptions of security 

are the best evidence that the ALP program is improving the lives of everyday Afghans and creating the conditions for long-term stability in Afghanistan. 

INSURGENT CAPABILITIES AND SAFE HAVEN IN PAKISTAN

21. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, what is your current assessment of the 

Haqqani Network’s capabilities and the extent of its sanctuary in Pakistan? 

General PETRAEUS. [Deleted.] 

22. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, what is the relationship between the 

Haqqani Network and other national and transnational terrorists in the Pakistani 

tribal regions? 

General PETRAEUS. [Deleted.] 

23. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, recent press reports have noted a growing 

synergy between the various terrorist and insurgent networks in South and Central 

Asia that once seemed to be more separate and distinct from one and another. To 

what extent do you see this synergy between groups and how does this affect U.S. 

strategy in the region? 

General PETRAEUS. [Deleted.] 

24. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, one of the deadliest of these groups is 

LeT. How would you describe the threat posed by LeT against our troops and civilians in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. [Deleted.] 

25. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, how have our Special Forces missions to 

kill and capture midlevel Taliban leaders affected the senior leadership’s command 

and control of the insurgency? 

General PETRAEUS. [Deleted.] 

26. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, can ISAF be successful in Afghanistan 

without defeating insurgent sanctuary in Pakistan? 

General PETRAEUS. [Deleted.] 

TRANSITION

27. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, in your prepared testimony, you note that 

on March 21, 2011, President Karzai will announce the areas and districts of Afghanistan where transition can begin. Will President Karzai’s announcement be consistent with your recommendation as ISAF commander? 

General PETRAEUS. President Karzai’s announcement on the 22nd of March was 

consistent with my recommendation as ISAF commander. More importantly, this 

announcement was the result of the Joint Afghan NATO Inteqal (Transition) Board, 

which governs the transition process and ensures that ISAF’s and the Afghan Government’s concerns are heard and addressed by all parties involved. I expect the 

Inteqal process will continue to evolve and improve as we advance through the various tranches of provinces undergoing transition. 

28. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, how many U.S. forces will be affected? 

General PETRAEUS. President Karzai’s announcement of the provinces and municipalities to begin the transition process gives us an interim goal to move towards, 

and I am factoring this into my ongoing work to provide options and a recommendation to mo my chain of command to implement U.S. policy this summer. 

29. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, last week at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels, Secretary Gates urged our NATO allies not to ‘‘rush for the exits’’ 

after July 2011. What kind of withdrawals of NATO forces can we expect this year? 

General PETRAEUS. Secretary Gates’ remarks were reaffirming the political consensus achieved at the Lisbon Conference for maintaining the coalition through 

2014 when the Afghans will assume the lead for security throughout their country. 

Engagement and support to the Afghans will, in all likelihood, be necessary beyond 

2014 in order to ensure the durability of our gains. 

We have received indications that several countries plan to begin shifting or drawing down their forces in 2011, but most have not offered specific numbers or 

timelines yet. We expect Canada to withdraw their combat troops in 2011, but this 

97 

will be accompanied by a substantial increase to their commitment to the training 

mission. A handful of other partners have also indicated that they will make modest 

adjustments to their force contributions this year. All of these force adjustments will 

be coordinated with ISAF and the Afghan Government to avoid security setbacks 

that might endanger our achievements. We will know more after the NATO Force 

Generation Conference in early May. 

30. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, how will those withdrawals impact our 

operations? 

General PETRAEUS. The loss of any team member will affect the team. Canada’s 

withdrawal from a combat role will have only a minimal impact, however, as they 

are simultaneously increasing their commitment to the training mission, which 

should free up additional U.S. forces to fight. Additionally, during the Lisbon Summit and subsequent international conferences, partner nations agreed on key principles as we move forward with plans to transition to Afghan security lead by the 

end of 2014. These principles included an affirmation that any drawdown would be 

conditions-based and would also entail ‘‘reinvesting’’ troops in contiguous areas or 

in the training mission. Therefore, we are hopeful that other nations beginning to 

plan to draw down forces will follow Canada’s example and increase their training 

contribution or reinvest forces in other ways. 

31. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, how do you expect the insurgency to react 

to President Karzai’s decision to transition areas of Afghanistan to Afghan-control 

beginning this summer? 

General PETRAEUS. We expect the insurgency to test the Afghan security forces 

in the provinces that are transitioning and to challenge the Afghan Government’s 

legitimacy around the country. The insurgents see the announcement as an opportunity to reaffirm their claim that ISAF forces are retreating, and they will seek 

to increase violence around the country in order to provide evidence for this narrative. As their ability to confront ISAF forces directly is limited, they will most 

likely rely on IED attacks and spectacular attacks against representatives of the Afghan Government. As the Afghan security forces become increasingly professional 

and numerous, they will increasingly be able to counter these threats and prevent 

such attacks from occurring. We already see this in Kabul, home to some 20 percent 

of the Afghan population, and one of the areas in the first tranche of transition. 

OPERATIONS IN HELMAND, KANDAHAR, AND EASTERN AFGHANISTAN

32. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, if ISAF succeeds in Helmand and 

Kandahar, what effect will that have on the insurgency and the broader war effort? 

General PETRAEUS. Durable gains in the provinces would have several effects on 

the insurgency and the broader war effort, since the insurgency has deep roots in 

the south. Kandahar Province was the spiritual and physical center of the Taliban 

movement, with Mullah Omar himself hailing from Kandahar. Additionally, 

Helmand’s fields offer an important source of poppy production and revenue generation for the insurgents. 

Since early 2010, operations in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces have reversed 

insurgent momentum and greatly reduced the enemy’s ability to control the population. Meanwhile, a tangible improvement in security has enabled increased cooperation among ANSFs, ordinary Afghans, and local government officials. Expanding these gains and making them durable would deny the enemy freedom of action 

and logistical support in its traditional strongholds. This would undermine the 

Taliban’s narrative and further deprive insurgents of popular support, which could 

potentially encourage fighters there and elsewhere to lay down their arms. Additionally, lasting gains in the south would allow combined forces to reinvest troops in 

other areas of the country to address resilient insurgent pockets there. 

33. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, what is the current status of counternarcotics efforts in Helmand? 

General PETRAEUS. Since the illegal narcotics industry is the largest source of Afghanistan-derived income for the Taliban—with other revenue streams from outside 

the country—we are working to deprive the enemy of this important source of funding, especially in the major poppy-growing areas in the south. As we have made 

progress on the security front in Helmand, we have further pressured illegal narcotics networks by significantly increasing the amount of drugs interdicted and by 

reducing enemy freedom of movement. Beyond security-force efforts, Helmand Province accounts for around 70 percent of Afghanistan’s eradication efforts. ApproxiVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:43 Jan 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00101 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\72295.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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mately 1,600 hectares were eradicated in Helmand in 2010, and, as of early April, 

more than 1,200 hectares had already been eradicated in 2011. Additionally, the 

provincial governor is a strong advocate of crop-replacement programs to encourage 

farmers to switch to licit crops. 

Nationwide drug interdictions have increased significantly from last year, with 

interdictions in the south representing a significant portion of the finds. In the first 

quarter of 2011, we interdicted nearly 350 percent more illegal drugs than in the 

same time period in 2010 (with a 700 percent increase between March 2010 and 

March 2011). Simultaneously, there was a nearly 50 percent decrease in nationwide 

opium production between 2009 and 2010, although a poppy blight last year is surely responsible for much of that. 

34. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, are narcotics still a major source of funding for the insurgency? 

General PETRAEUS. Yes. The insurgents profit from narcotics in a number of ways, 

including taxing the harvests and receiving funding for refining and shipping of narcotics outside the country. Local insurgent tax collectors tax poppy farmers, who 

generally provide payment in the form of raw opium, not in cash. Raw opium is also 

often used as a commodity for bartering in rural communities throughout the south, 

southwest, and west, and opium is also used for weapons purchases and payments 

for fighters. Criminal networks groups connected to the insurgency also continue to 

profit from the narcotics trade, and some of that money makes its way to insurgent 

groups. 

35. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, are military gains against the insurgency 

across the south capable of forcing them to the negotiating table? 

General PETRAEUS. Military operations are pushing some insurgents in the south 

and other areas to reintegrate. Recently in Uruzgan Province, up to forty insurgents 

decided to enroll in the Afghan Government’s Peace and Reintegration Program 

(APRP) and another one hundred insurgents in Kandahar are in now negotiations 

to reintegrate. Other southern provinces are also experiencing ‘‘informal reintegration’’—instances where insurgents lay down arms and cease opposing the Afghan 

Government without entering the APRP—in encouraging numbers. Relentless pressure by Afghan and coalition troopers is one of the reasons insurgents are choosing 

to lay down their arms and reintegrate into Afghan society, though there are also 

other reasons. 

36. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, how far does ISAF need to go in order 

to get insurgents to the negotiating table? 

General PETRAEUS. There is no way to know precisely when insurgents will give 

up fighting and reintegrate into Afghan society. ISAF and its Afghan partners are 

pursuing a number of tasks to hasten that process, and, together, they are starting 

to depress insurgent morale and fracture their networks and cohesion. First, we are 

using military operations to convince Taliban leaders that they can neither regain 

the territory they used to control nor intimidate the population in the ways they 

previously did. Second, we are using development projects, cash-for-work programs, 

and support for the Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Program to convince communities that they are better off supporting the Afghan Government instead of passively or actively supporting the insurgency. Third, we are improving governance at 

the local level in order to remove some of the basic grievances against the Afghan 

state that drove people towards the insurgency in the first place. We are also targeting the insurgency’s financing and their narcotics trafficking in order to reduce 

their means to pay their fighters and keep them united in opposition to the Afghan 

Government. Finally, ISAF is mentoring Afghan Government ministries to help 

them build basic infrastructure for economic development, so that the Afghan State 

can provide for the basic needs of its people in the long term and prevent the 

insurgency’s return. 

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

37. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, you note that a recent United Nations report shows that civilian casualties caused by ISAF have fallen by about 20 percent 

in 2010, even as the force increased in size by 100,000. You also note that ISAF’s 

intelligence-directed raids on Taliban leadership are highly effective, yet these raids 

are often what President Karzai expresses concern about when they result in unintended civilian casualties. How are you reconciling President Karzai’s concerns 

about civilian casualties with the need to effectively target Taliban leaders? 

99 

General PETRAEUS. We cannot succeed in a counterinsurgency campaign if we 

harm the people whom we are supposed to protect. For that reason, I have issued 

a tactical directive on the employment of various ‘‘enabler’’ elements, as well as a 

tactical driving directive, to ensure we are doing everything possible to avoid harming civilians while conducting military operations in Afghanistan. To address President Karzai’s concerns, we have established the Palace Intelligence Coordination 

Cell (PICC), which ensures that there is an open channel between ISAF and the 

Afghan Government. When allegations of civilian casualties occur, we deploy a Joint 

Incident Assessment Team (JIAT) to investigate, which includes both Afghan and 

ISAF representatives. When allegations prove true, we admit our mistake forthrightly. We also have recently created a CIVCAS Mitigation Working Group to continually review and improve our tactics and procedures for preventing civilian casualties and responding to allegations when they arise. Even as we work to reduce 

civilian casualties, we are mindful of the dangers of overly-restrictive rules of engagement and we will do nothing that hampers our soldiers’ rights to defend themselves in the line of duty. 

38. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, your testimony indicates that in a typical 

90-day period, U.S. special mission units and their Afghan partners kill or capture 

roughly 360 insurgent leaders. Interrogating captured insurgents facilitates further 

raids and additional captures. The U.S. detention facility at Parwan (near Bagram 

Air Base) is routinely full. Where are these captured insurgents being detained and 

how are they being prevented from returning to the fight? 

General PETRAEUS. As a result of recent efforts to increase capacity, the Detention 

Facility at Parwan (DFIP) is now configured to hold up to 2,600 detainees. The 

United States currently holds around 1,700 detainees there, and our Afghans partners are holding an additional 250 at the DFIP (most of those 250 face prosecution 

under Afghan law for terrorism-related crimes). We expect additional construction 

projects to increase U.S. and Afghan holding capacity at the DFIP by 320 this summer. Further, if circumstances require, we can build modular housing units capable 

of holding additional detainees. In addition to the DFIP, there are 9 Field Detention 

Sites (FDSs) and 19 Temporary Holding Facilities (THFs) in Afghanistan. We are 

currently in the process of assessing several of the THFs for upgrade and certification to FDS standards. In general, detainees can be held at FDSs for up to 14 

days before being transferred to the DFIP. Overall, we are confident that we have 

sufficient detention capacity to get us through this fighting season. 

Although the DFIP is a maximum security facility designed to hold detainees 

until the end of hostilities, detainees have opportunities to challenge their detention 

and to present evidence in their defense through the Detainee Review Board process. When a detainee is found to no longer meet detention criteria or is recommended for reintegration, we contact the local provincial governor and the National High Peace Council and arrange for the release to occur under the auspices 

of the provincial governor at ‘‘release shuras.’’ At these ceremonies, a village elder 

or other local official signs a guarantor statement certifying that the releasee will 

not return to the fight. As of early April 2011, nearly 400 former DFIP detainees 

had been released and reintegrated into Afghan society through 75 release shuras 

in 13 provinces. 

The DFIP, FDSs, and THFs all operate within the standards for humane treatment under U.S. law and policy and obey the applicable laws of armed conflict. All 

facilities are routinely visited by the International Committee of the Red Cross and 

various Afghan officials. 

MEDICAL AIR EVACUATION

39. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, in 2009 Secretary Gates directed additional medical evacuation helicopters and personnel to Afghanistan to ensure that 

all wounded American troops receive definitive medical treatment within the American standard of the golden hour. Are you confident that this standard is being met 

now and will be met in the spring and summer as conflict intensifies? 

General PETRAEUS. We are confident that we are meeting the ‘‘golden hour’’ 

standard and that we will be able to do so throughout the fighting season. We first 

achieved the ‘‘golden hour’’ standard in June 2009, and we have continued to improve since then (with the average medical evacuation mission time dropping more 

than 30 percent between 2009 and 2010). With the additional assets Secretary 

Gates ordered to theater—quadrupling our air medical assets in the last 2 years— 

98 percent of Category A urgent evacuees reach a surgical facility within 60 minutes. (Each mission outside the 60-minute standard is reported and evaluated; these 

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delays are usually the result of weather, terrain, or hot landing zones.) Beyond the 

additional deployments of air assets, we have also used other resources to shorten 

and improve medical evacuation missions. In 2010, we expanded medical support in 

theater by adding 500 additional medical personnel, another combat hospital, and 

critical-care nurses to accompany medical evacuation patients. Additionally, Air 

Force helicopters previously Reserved for search and rescue missions have also been 

assigned to medical evacuations. 

Care of our wounded is among our highest priorities, and we will continue to seek 

out ways to improve our care for injured troopers. 

40. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, are there sufficient aeromedical evacuation helicopters, crews, and long distance evacuation in the southern region of Afghanistan where fighting is most intense? 

General PETRAEUS. There are sufficient air medical assets in the south to meet 

the 60-minute standard for urgent evacuees. We first achieved the ‘‘golden hour’’ 

standard for the theater in June 2009, and we have continued to reduce the time 

required since then, with the average medical evacuation mission time dropping 

more than 30 percent between 2009 and 2010. The average time for medical evacuations in the south has likewise fallen approximately 30 percent in the same time 

period. Beyond the quadrupling of air medical assets in theater over the last 2 

years—with many of them added in the south—in 2010 we also added a combat support hospital in central Helmand Province to augment the existing hospital in northern Helmand Province. 

We are currently conducting a theater-wide review of medical evacuation utilization rates to assess if we need to shift any further assets to serve high-risk areas. 

CORRUPTION IN CONTRACTING

41. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, since last fall, you have focused on the 

perception by the Afghan people and the Government of Afghanistan that money 

being spent there by the international community on construction, goods, and services is not having the desired, positive effect on the Afghan population and is sometimes even supporting power brokers or malign actors there. In response, you stood 

up several task forces to help you identify and address—in real time—those problems. I know a few changes have been made since you first stood up those task 

forces. Can you describe what you are currently doing to ensure that your contracting activities actually support, rather than undermine (as they have in the 

past), your counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. Contracting and development funds can be a powerful weapon 

in the counterinsurgency fight by helping to build capacity, to reinforce good governance, and to promote economic opportunity. However, as our Counterinsurgency 

Contracting Guidance says, if we spend large amounts of money quickly with insufficient oversight, it is likely that some of those funds will unintentionally fuel corruption, finance insurgent organizations, strengthen criminal patronage networks, 

and undermine our efforts in Afghanistan. 

To ensure our contracting dollars are used correctly, we are pursuing numerous 

initiatives. For example, we are quickly moving toward our goal of vetting all contracts over $100,000 prior to award by using the Central Command (CENTCOM) 

Vendor Vetting Cell and by ensuring effective integration of intelligence and contracting actions. Simultaneously, we are working with Afghan partners to improve 

the transparency of the ISAF contracting process while also working to improve 

post-award oversight through a common and easily accessible database of projects 

underway. We are also increasing efforts to create smaller contracts, to identify subcontractors in advance, and to hold prime contractors responsible for their sub-contractors. All of this has been supported by our deepening understanding of specific 

networks and business relationships as a result of focused investigations by Task 

Force 2010, Task Force Spotlight, and CJIATF-Shafafiyat, as well as the Afghan 

Threat Finance Cell. Additionally, we continue to promote the development of sustainable Afghan private sector growth through the aggressive implementation of the 

Afghan First initiative, which helps to build indigenous Afghan industries. Finally, 

and perhaps most importantly, our Counterinsurgency Contracting Guidance has 

made procurement and acquisition a command priority. At all levels, our commanders understand that their contracting decisions can have strategic effects and, 

as such, these activities require their personal attention. 

42. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, what progress, if any, have you made 

since you first started to focus on those problems? 

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General PETRAEUS. We have made significant progress in numerous areas related 

to our contracting practices since we began focusing on the problem set. We have 

substantially increased the pace of contract actions when contractors are assessed 

to potentially be associated with the insurgency or with criminal patronage networks. Since last summer, we have vetted approximately 450 companies, debarred 

44 companies, and suspended 42 companies. Almost 60 other companies have been 

notified of pending debarments, and the International Contract Corruption Task 

Force presently has more than 120 open cases of contract fraud. These actions not 

only cut off money from contractors we assess to be high risk, they also send a 

strong signal to all contractors about our commitment to improving the effectiveness, transparency, and accountability of our contracting process. We have also 

sought to stem other forms of diversion of international funds, such as pilferage of 

goods in transit. In the last 3 months, 90,000 items valued at over $100 million have 

been recovered—items that might otherwise have benefited criminal or insurgent 

networks. 

Additionally, through aggressive implementation of the Afghan First initiative, 

ISAF has provided critical support to the development of a sustainable and diverse 

Afghan private sector. This program has facilitated the establishment of joint ventures in, among other industries, construction, textiles, and pharmaceuticals manufacturing. These efforts have advanced counterinsurgency development goals and 

also resulted in estimated coalition savings of around $320 million. 

Our priorities going forward include increasing vendor vetting, expanding the vetting effort to partner nations, integrating law enforcement and military efforts, and 

working together with our Afghan partners to make further progress on these critical issues. 

43. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, what additional changes in law or regulations, if any, do you need to further address the problem of corruption-in-contracting 

in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. We are now working with OSD to implement two key reforms 

to improve U.S. Government contracting in Afghanistan, which together should 

strengthen our anti-corruption controls and prevent U.S. taxpayer dollars from flowing to the insurgency. First, we are seeking the authority to restrict or void contracts and subcontracts with firms that directly or indirectly support the enemy, so 

that if a link to the enemy is discovered, we can quickly and completely stop payment. Second, we are seeking authority to have access to contractor and subcontractor records in order to trace the flow of U.S. Government money after a contract 

has been awarded. We are receiving strong support from the Senate in these endeavors. In February 2011, Senators Brown and Ayotte introduced and co-sponsored 

the ‘‘No Contracting with the Enemy Act of 2011,’’ which captures the key aspects 

of these two legislative proposals. While the legislation does not address all issues 

related to contracting in a warzone, it is a step forward for preventing American 

taxpayer dollars from flowing to the enemy under U.S. Government contracts. 

PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

44. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, last year, President Karzai issued a decree that, if enforced, would disband most private security contractors operating in 

Afghanistan and transfer some of their responsibilities to the Ministry of Interior. 

That was done in reaction to perceived abuses with the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) use of private security contractors in that theater. What progress, if any, has 

DOD had in ensuring that U.S. contract funds are not inadvertently flowing to 

Taliban, anti-coalition, or insurgent groups in Afghanistan, and in communicating 

that progress to President Karzai? 

General PETRAEUS. We have taken a number of steps to ensure that U.S. contract 

funds are not flowing to the Taliban. On 8 September, 2010, I issued my COIN contracting guidance, which provides clear guidelines for how U.S. forces will contract 

for services without empowering the insurgency. In cooperation with the CENTCOM 

Contracting Command, we are now vetting all non-U.S. contracts valued in excess 

of $100,000, and our ISAF Joint Command has stood up an additional contract vetting cell. Together, these 2 offices have vetted over 240 companies, 17 of which have 

been rejected as potential contractors. We have also begun debarring companies and 

cancelling contracts when we find that our contractors are defrauding the U.S. Government or supporting the insurgency. Finally, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan’s Task 

Force 2010, which is specifically charged with overseeing contracting, continues to 

use intelligence and forensic accounting techniques to determine if criminal networks or insurgents are profiting from U.S. contracts in Afghanistan. 

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45. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, to what extent is DOD working with the 

Government of Afghanistan to develop a realistic plan to replace private security 

contractors with the ANSF? 

General PETRAEUS. We have been working closely with the Afghan Government 

to develop a realistic plan to replace private security contractors. The primary 

means of doing so will be through the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), whose 

growth and development we are supporting through several initiatives. NATO 

Training Mission-Afghanistan is increasing the number of trainers devoted to this 

force, and we have secured funding and other resources through the international 

Law and Order Trust Fund-Afghanistan. Additionally, we are committed to helping 

build the infrastructure to support this force, and are working to open an APPF 

Training Center this summer with the capacity to train 1,000 guards per month. 

The exact timeframe of the transition from Private Security Companies (PSCs) to 

the APPF has, obviously, been a source of friction between ISAF and the Afghan 

Government over the past 6 months. However, we have worked closely with our Afghan partners and agreed to a joint bridging strategy that will transition security 

responsibilities to the APPF over the course of two years, which should be sufficient 

time for the growth and development of the APPF. Of note, the bridging strategy 

will leverage PSCs to assist in increasing the size and capabilities of the APPF more 

rapidly by employing former PSC personnel. 

FACILITIES FOR THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

46. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, the Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) recently published a report questioning the 

U.S. plan to invest $11.4 billion through 2012 to construct at least 900 facilities for 

over 300,000 ANSF. Specifically, SIGAR has very serious concerns about both contract delays and the sustainability of many of the construction projects. What is 

your opinion of the report’s findings? 

General PETRAEUS. The report’s findings were largely based on the incorrect assumption that we were planning to construct all $11.4 billion of facilities by 2012. 

In reality, we are planning to complete construction of these facilities by 2014, with 

our timelines tied to the generation of ANSF. Moreover, we are constantly re-assessing and adjusting our plans based on developments in Afghanistan, and we are also 

examining a variety of options for the future that include the possible phased consolidation or even transfer of coalition facilities to Afghans in some places. 

Sustainability is obviously a crucial element of infrastructure development. This 

past year, we created the Infrastructure Training and Advisory Group under the 

NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan to further develop the capacity of the ANSF 

to maintain facilities over the longer term. Currently, members of this group are 

located at six locations, with plans to add personnel over the next year in order to 

expand its reach and to strengthen long-term ANSF self-sustainability. 

47. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, can you provide this committee with a 

long-range construction plan to meet the facility requirements for Afghan forces 

with the funds that Congress has provided? 

General PETRAEUS. Our construction program for the ANA, the ANP, and the Afghan Air Force (AAF) is expected to address infrastructure requirements by 2014. 

And, if requested funds are received by this fall, we anticipate that almost all the 

planned facilities would be completed in accordance with our 2014 timeline. 

For the ANA, we are building garrisons to house a force of 25 brigades—consisting of more than 250 battalion-sized units—as well as 25 schools. The plan calls 

for about 150 separate locations dispersed across the country. We have completed 

approximately 30 percent of these facilities, about 15 percent are in progress, and 

an additional 55 percent remain to be built between now and 2014. 

Our ANP infrastructure requirements include headquarters for the district police, 

border police, and civil order police. Together, our plan is for more than 800 facilities, with most of these being small and dispersed. We have completed around 20 

percent, 40 percent are in progress, and approximately 40 percent remain to be built 

between now and 2014. 

We are currently building facilities for two of the three planned wings of the AAF. 

Two of the remaining twelve AAF detachments/units are funded and pending award. 

The other ten units/detachments are planned but not yet funded. 

48. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, can the plan accommodate up to 365,000 

ANSF? 

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General PETRAEUS. Yes, the President’s budget request for 2012 includes adequate 

funding to meet facility requirements for up to 365,000 ANSF. 

49. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, what impact will the timely completion 

of the facilities and transfer to Afghan control have on our projected withdrawal 

dates? 

General PETRAEUS. In order to assume the lead for security across the country 

by the end of 2014, the Afghans must have the necessary infrastructure to field and 

sustain an appropriately-sized military. Although completing and transferring facilities to the ANSF is a necessary component of our transition planning, it is by no 

means sufficient. The ANSF will have to continue to increase in size and capability 

in the years to come, with the completion of necessary facilities being an important 

element of this ongoing development. We will continue to work with our Afghan 

partners to determine their long-term infrastructure requirements and also to determine areas where we can further facilitate the growth and professionalization of the 

ANSF. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

CIVILIAN POLICE ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM

50. Senator WICKER. General Petraeus, I am familiar with the Nationwide police 

candidate screening program that the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team 

(CPATT) implemented in Iraq during the period of your command in Iraq. General 

Joseph Fil, who headed CPATT, has stated that the screening program prevented 

substantial waste in the training program and helped ensure that only the candidates showing the best potential to serve were selected for the training academies. 

Similar to our efforts in Iraq, we must ensure that valuable training dollars are 

spent effectively in Afghanistan and not wasted on futile attempts to train unsuitable candidates. What are your thoughts on a similar screening program in Afghanistan now that we have committed to a multi-billion dollar training contract with 

DynCorp International? 

General PETRAEUS. Candidates for the ANSF undergo a rigorous vetting process 

to ensure that soldiers and policemen meet minimum acceptable standards. Applicants must have a valid Afghan identity card, and they also must obtain two letters 

of endorsement from village guarantors, who are generally elders or mullahs. Recruits are then further screened with criminal background checks, identity 

verifications, medical exams, drug tests, and interviews with the recruiting commander. Recruits who pass these tests are then biometrically enrolled and checked 

against a biometric watch list prior to the start of training. 

Although not identical to the CPATT program, this process was developed based 

on lessons learned in Iraq as well as factors unique to Afghanistan. As the ANSF 

approaches steady state, the candidate pool may be larger than the positions that 

need to be filled, in which case recruiters will be able to increase their selectivity. 

Similarly, the ANSF may further refine their minimum standards over time, resulting in recruits who are screened by even more factors. 

POSSIBILITY OF EXTENDED TROOP PRESENCE IN IRAQ

51. Senator WICKER. Secretary Flournoy, it seems to me that the Iraqi Government is extremely fragile. Iraqi leaders privately concede the need for an extended 

U.S. troop presence in Iraq but we all know this may be a politically difficult—if 

not impossible—request for the Iraqis to make. What is your assessment of the security situation on the ground in Iraq? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The underlying security situation in Iraq remains strong. 

Although insurgent and extremist groups remain capable of conducting attacks, 

overall levels of attacks and Iraqi civilian casualties have remained relatively constant for more than two years at the lowest levels of the post-2003 period. This consistently low level is even more remarkable in that it has been maintained as the 

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have assumed primary responsibility for security, and 

the number of U.S. forces has declined from approximately 144,000 in January 2009 

to approximately 47,000 today. 

Although the ISF are currently functioning well as a counter-insurgency force and 

demonstrating the capability to maintain internal security, U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF– 

I) assesses that gaps, particularly in the capability to defend against external 

threats, will exist in December 2011. USF–I assesses that the broad categories of 

projected gaps are cross-ministerial intelligence sharing; combined arms capability; 

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integrated air defense and air sovereignty enforcement; and sustainment and logistics. USF–I will focus its efforts on these areas between now and the end of the mission. 

52. Senator WICKER. Secretary Flournoy, I believe Iraq 2011 is definitely a testcase for Afghanistan 2014. What do you think will happen at the end of 2011? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. By the end of 2011, we will transition to a civilian-led mission in Iraq, having completed the responsible drawdown of U.S. forces in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. We will also have established an Office 

of Security Cooperation-Iraq to conduct security assistance and security cooperation 

activities, and to serve as the cornerstone of the U.S.-Iraq military-to-military relationship. 

53. Senator WICKER. Secretary Flournoy, it appears on a practical level to me that 

the Iraqis would prefer the presence of U.S. combat troops to the presence of poorlyregulated contractors roaming the country. At the end of 2011 will the Iraqis ask 

us to stay? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. It is unclear whether the Government of Iraq will request 

a U.S. military presence post-2011. Secretary Gates has indicated that the United 

States would be willing to consider a continued military presence should the Iraqis 

request one. However, to date no request has been made. We are committed and 

confident about completing the drawdown in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Security 

Agreement and transitioning to a civilian-led mission in Iraq. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN CORNYN

DRAWDOWN OF FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN

54. Senator CORNYN. General Petraeus, Secretary Gates recently gave a speech 

to NATO defense ministers where he warned them against threatening progress in 

Afghanistan through ‘‘ill-timed, precipitous, or uncoordinated’’ drawdowns of their 

troops from Afghanistan. Reports indicate Germany plans to begin withdrawing its 

4,900 soldiers by the end of this year, Great Britain is also considering a possible 

withdrawal of its 9,000 troops, and Poland and Canada have also announced plans 

to withdraw. In your opinion, what impact would the withdrawal of these NATO 

forces have on the security situation in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. During the Lisbon Summit and subsequent international conferences, partner nations agreed on key principles as we move forward with plans 

to transition to Afghan security lead by the end of 2014. These principles included 

affirmation that any drawdowns would be conditions-based and would also entail 

‘‘reinvesting’’ troops elsewhere in the country or in the training mission, as Canada 

is in the process of doing. Further, members of the Alliance have reaffirmed their 

commitment to Afghanistan through the end of 2014 and even beyond. Given all 

this, I believe that the actions of partner nations will be coordinated and based on 

conditions. We will continue to work closely with our partners to ensure that decisions on troop drawdowns do not adversely affect the hard-fought gains that we 

have made. 

55. Senator CORNYN. General Petraeus, what impact would such a withdrawal 

have on the administration’s plans to begin a drawdown of U.S. forces in July 2011? 

General PETRAEUS. As Secretary Gates said during the March Defense Ministerial 

in Brussels, our goal is for members of the Alliance to abide by the principle of ‘‘in 

together, out together.’’ In the coming months, I will provide options and a recommendation to my chain of command for implementing the U.S. policy that includes initiation of the responsible drawdown of U.S. surge forces at a pace determined by conditions on the ground. In the meantime, we will continue to coordinate 

closely with all the troop-contributing nations to ensure that drawdown plans by 

any nation, including our own, support our campaign plan and our goal of achieving 

conditions that enable transitioning security lead to the Afghans by the end of 2014. 

SHORTAGE OF TRAINERS FOR AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES

56. Senator CORNYN. Secretary Flournoy, India has welcomed the international 

community’s commitment to remain in Afghanistan and has made it clear that a 

stable, friendly Afghanistan is crucial to its own security. Although India has no 

fighting forces in Afghanistan, on the civilian side, it has committed some $1.3 billion and 3,500 Indian personnel to relief and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan 

105 

to date. Reports indicate that NATO still faces a shortage of 750 trainers needed 

by this summer in order for the ANSF to be ready to take the lead by 2014. Secretary Gates has called trainers the ‘‘ticket to transition’’ in Afghanistan. Given the 

clear and immediate demand for more trainers and training options in Afghanistan, 

as well as India’s willingness to provide substantial support to stability and security 

efforts in the region, should we encourage and invite India to expand its role and 

help train the Afghan security forces, perhaps at its own installations in India? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. India provides scholarships for ANSF personnel to study in 

India, and the Indian Government is currently exploring options to train Afghan 

women police in India. We welcome these efforts and have encouraged India to coordinate its efforts with the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM–A). The 

shortfall of 740 trainers identified by NTM–A for filling NATO’s Combined Joint 

Statement of Requirements includes a number of specific capabilities. We are working to identify these specific capabilities and match them with NTM–A requirements. 

We also encourage India to consider further assistance in Afghanistan through 

priority infrastructure projects and additional training and education assistance and 

technical assistance to the agriculture sector. As Prime Minister Singh’s recent visit 

to Afghanistan illustrated, India continues to work bilaterally with the Afghan Government to identify additional areas of cooperation. 

During President Obama’s visit to India in November 2010, he and Prime Minister Singh committed to intensify consultation, cooperation, and coordination to 

promote a stable, prosperous, and independent Afghanistan. They agreed to collaborate closely to assist the people of Afghanistan by identifying opportunities to leverage our relative strengths, experience, and resources, including joint projects on agriculture and women’s economic development. Eighty-five percent of Afghans derive 

their income from agriculture, and Afghan women continue to lack economic, social, 

and political opportunities. 

ROLE OF U.S. GROUND FORCES IN FUTURE CONFLICTS

57. Senator CORNYN. General Petraeus, on February 25, 2011, Secretary Gates 

made the following comment regarding the force structure that will be needed in 

the years ahead: ‘‘The Army also must confront the reality that the most plausible, 

high-end scenarios for the U.S. military are primarily naval and air engagements— 

whether in Asia, the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere . . . but in my opinion, any future 

defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army 

into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined.’ ’’ You 

have played lead roles in both Operation Iraqi Freedom and now Operation Enduring Freedom, both of which have been large ground campaigns. In your opinion, is 

this type of military operation truly a thing of the past? 

General PETRAEUS. Based on subsequent comments by Secretary Gates and his 

spokesman, it appears that his comments have been misinterpreted, as the Secretary has clarified that he was not suggesting that the days of ground campaigns 

are over. While the United States may well face maritime and air threats in the 

future, no one can say for sure where those conflicts will take place or if they will 

not require ground campaigns. It is my opinion that ground forces will always remain an essential element of national power, no matter how advanced our technology becomes. And, since it is the Armed Forces’ job to plan for the worst, even 

while hoping for the best, I don’t think it is wise to rule out any type of future conflict. Secretary Gates’ clarifications suggest the same. 

58. Senator CORNYN. General Petraeus, would it be possible to make the gains 

that we have in Iraq and Afghanistan through primarily naval and air engagements? 

General PETRAEUS. No. We are conducting a comprehensive civil-military 

counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan and that type of military operation requires much more than just air or naval power. While the separate armed services 

have all done extraordinary work here over the last 10 years, and have done the 

same in Iraq as well, none of the services could have made the gains we’ve seen 

by operating independently, and ground forces have been absolutely critical. Moreover, our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have required a fully joint, interagency effort that not only combines our many tools of military power, but also leverages the 

expertise and experience of our partners from the Departments of State, Treasury, 

Homeland Security, Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigations, the Intelligence Community, Agriculture, Commerce, and the many coalition partners from our friends 

and allies around the world. 

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B–1 BOMBERS

59. Senator CORNYN. General Petraeus, the B–1 bombers, many of which are 

based in Texas at Dyess Air Force Base, have been operating over Afghanistan in 

support of our troops on the ground and have proven themselves a critical component of our long-range strike operations overseas. Senior U.S. military leaders have 

consistently acknowledged that the B–1 fleet is doing an outstanding job. As I understand it, the B–1 has been called upon to maintain a constant presence in the 

skies over Afghanistan. In your most recent Senate confirmation hearing, you stated 

that the B–1 is a ‘‘great platform’’ and a ‘‘very capable bomber.’’ In your view, what 

are the most critical roles that the B–1 fleet has played in Afghanistan, and what 

unique capabilities has it brought to the table, as compared to other platforms, especially other bombers? 

General PETRAEUS. The B–1 has been an enduring presence in the skies over Afghanistan since the first night of combat operations in October 2001. Versatility and 

flexibility are the key qualities that distinguish the B–1 from other platforms. Indeed, the B–1 has the speed to quickly respond to troops-in-contact (TIC) situations 

anywhere in Afghanistan, the persistence to remain overhead in support of the TIC 

for hours at a time, and the precision to deliver weapons exactly where they are 

needed, while minimizing collateral damage and the risk to civilians. Additionally, 

the B–1 has the flexibility to deliver different weapons as required by the tactical 

situation and weather conditions, as well as the sensors to provide nontraditional 

ISR and armed overwatch day or night. 

[Whereupon, at 1:28 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

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