About the Report

This report draws on a series of workshops entitled “Anticipating 

a Political Process in Afghanistan: How Should the International 

Community Respond?” These workshops brought together some 

thirty analysts, both Afghans and foreigners, who have spent 

many years in Kabul, Kandahar, and other parts of Afghanistan. 

Participants considered a range of possible scenarios for 

Afghanistan over the next five years and the drivers of events 

in Afghanistan, then developed scenarios based on a five-year 

perspective and constructed along two main axes: the degree of 

political inclusion and the degree of state capacity and control. 

The workshops were held in Kabul, London, and Washington, 

D.C. in June 2010, supported by the Royal Norwegian Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs and the United States Institute of Peace 

(USIP) and facilitated by the European Council on Foreign 

Relations (ECFR). This report also incorporates comments to 

an earlier version that was circulated as a nonpaper to senior 

policymakers ahead of the July Kabul conference. The report 

focuses on examining the role of the international community 

and the key challenges to a sustainable peace process, creating 

an inclusive peace process, gauging the interests of parties, 

identifying actual participants in peace talks, and structuring an 

agenda for sustainable stability.

About the Author

Minna Jarvenpaa is a policy analyst who has worked in 

Afghanistan since late 2005. She has held senior roles in 

the United Nations, most recently as the head of analysis 

and planning at the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 

(UNAMA), and as senior adviser to Nobel Prize winner Martti 

Ahtisaari. In addition to Afghanistan, she has worked in conflict 

and postconflict settings in Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia, 

Northern Ireland, and Iraq. She is a founding member of two 

think tanks, the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) and the 

European Stability Initiative, and an associate of the Centre 

for International Studies at Oxford. She studied international 

relations at the London School of Economics and Slavic 

languages at Harvard University.

202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 267 February 2011

Minna Jarvenpaa

Making Peace in 

Afghanistan 

The Missing Political Strategy

Summary

•	 The proposition that a political settlement is needed to end the war in Afghanistan has 

gained increasing attention in recent months. Channels for preliminary talks with Taliban 

leaders have been sought and a High Peace Council created. 

•	 However, despite upbeat military assessments, the insurgency has expanded its reach across 

the country and continues to enjoy sanctuary in Pakistan. Afghans increasingly resent the 

presence of foreign troops, and the Taliban draw strength from grievances by ordinary Afghans 

against their government. External money to supply military bases and pay for development 

projects often ends up fueling conflict rather than creating stability. 

•	 For their part, President Karzai and many Afghan political elites lack genuine commitment 

to reform, calling into question the viability of a state-building international strategy and 

transition by 2014. 

•	 Missing is a political strategy to end the conflict that goes beyond dealing with the 

Taliban; it must define the kind of state that Afghans are willing to live in and that regional 

neighbors can endorse. Knowing that such a settlement could take years to conclude does 

not diminish the urgency of initiating the process. 

•	 Given doubts about Karzai’s ability to manage the situation effectively, the international 

community needs to facilitate a peace process more pro-actively than it has. To be sustainable, the process will need to be inclusive; women’s rights, human rights, and media 

freedoms cannot become casualties of negotiations.

•	 Afghanistan’s international partners should commit to a peace process and lay the groundwork 

to appoint a mediator. This includes gauging the interests of parties, identifying actual participants in talks, and structuring an agenda. In the meantime, international military efforts must 

be realigned to avoid action that contradicts the ultimate aim of a peace settlement.

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Contents

A Reality Check 2

Toward a Sustainable Political Settlement 4

Conclusion 10
2 

Every year since 2001, Western leaders have announced a last push or critical event that will 

turn around the situation in Afghanistan. Each time the underlying assumption is that, with 

increased resources and the right plan, the weaknesses of the Afghan state can be tackled 

and stability achieved. Yet despite the latest—and massive—military surge and accompanying “civilian uplift,”1 the political and security situation has continued to deteriorate. The 

Taliban have expanded their reach across the country from their strongholds in the south and 

southeast2 while the Afghan public increasingly views the government of President Hamid 

Karzai as corrupt.3 Even under a reform-minded leadership, a self-sufficient central state that 

could provide security and justice for the people of Afghanistan would take decades to build 

up. Within the 2014 Lisbon transition timeline, without basic political stability and in an 

environment dominated by an increasingly self-serving elite, it is practically out of reach. 

In the current Afghan context, reports of preliminary contacts between the Afghan government and the Taliban have become a cause for optimism. A political settlement is needed, but 

at the same time, an exclusive deal between Karzai and the Taliban would be divisive, alienating civil society, minority groups, and other constituencies. If the international community 

wants to reduce its role by 2014 without further destabilizing Afghanistan, it will need to work 

out a political strategy to ensure that it does not become the guarantor of a deal that splits 

the country—or that sets the stage for renewed civil war.

A Reality Check

The inteqal or transition process endorsed at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

Lisbon summit in November 2010 consists of a familiar menu of counterinsurgency and 

state-building strategies,4 and the year-end review of the Obama strategy recommended no 

major adjustments.5 International forces in Afghanistan will continue to rely on a mix of 

military operations to capture and kill insurgents, training and mentoring programs to hand 

control of security to Afghan forces by the end of 2014, and an assortment of governance 

and development efforts aimed at generating popular trust in the Afghan government, particularly in the south and east. Meanwhile, the government itself is increasingly unpopular.6 

The Taliban have a safe haven in Pakistan and a growing base of fighters7 disgruntled with 

the Karzai government and resentful of the presence of foreign troops.8

Missing is a feasible political strategy. Developing one will require a reevaluation of 

current assumptions, including consideration of the following three propositions: first, that 

the insurgency shows no signs of subsiding; second, that external resources are fueling 

conflict through a war and aid economy; and third, that Karzai and Afghan political elites 

lack genuine commitment to reform, calling into question the international community’s 

state-building and counterinsurgency approach.

Proposition 1: The Insurgency Shows No Signs of Subsiding 

The assumption that escalating coalition military operations will force the insurgents to 

the negotiating table should be treated with caution. So far, the evidence from the field 

suggests that the military surge has not only intensified the conflict, but also expanded 

it geographically.9 The insurgency continues to enjoy access to safe havens and support in 

Pakistan despite stepped-up drone strikes across the border. 

According to NATO estimates, insurgent numbers have swelled in the five years since 2005, 

from a few thousand fighters to as many as 35,000. The outrage that many Afghans feel over 

the actions of foreign troops—including night raids, civilian casualties, and detention—and 

the predatory nature of their own government continue to swell Taliban ranks.10 For their 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor 

of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, 

D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American 

University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, James R. 

Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. • Kerry 

Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and 

Human Rights • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care 

Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, Nev. • Stephen D. Krasner, 

Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George 

Mason University, Fairfax, Va. • Judy Van Rest, Executive 

Vice President, International Republican Institute, Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C. 

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy •

Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 

© 2011 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.
 3

part, the Taliban target government officials, policemen, aid workers, development contractors, and tribal elders in assassinations and assaults; Taliban fighters also lay roadside bombs 

that kill Afghan civilians. Despite such brutality, the insurgency is gaining momentum far 

beyond the south and southeast, and beginning to enlist non-Pashtun fighters.11 The map 

of Afghan government access to districts across the country is steadily diminishing. Many 

previously stable areas in the north (including Badghis and Faryab provinces), northeast 

(Kunduz, Baghlan, and Takhar), and central Afghanistan (Kapisa) have become key infiltration routes. The Taliban have delivered night letters—threatening notes left on doorsteps 

under cover of darkness—even in the central highland region of Hazarajat, until now one of 

the most stable parts of the country. 

On the government side, even the best Afghan army and police units are barely capable 

of operating on their own and often lack the will to challenge the insurgency.12 Tribes that 

have been enlisted to provide security against the Taliban have ended up fighting internally, 

as in the case of the Shinwari tribe in Nangarhar.13 Local power brokers use their links to 

the international military to settle personal scores by branding their competitors as Taliban, 

turning potential allies into insurgents.

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) casualties are at their highest ever, up 

20 percent since 2009 and fourfold since 2005.14 The NATO-led coalition has captured or 

killed hundreds of mid-level insurgent commanders in raids over the last year, but this has 

not reduced violence; it appears only to have fragmented the Taliban and made local units 

more autonomous. Experienced analysts have suggested that new commanders tend to be 

more radical, less prone to compromise, and more committed to jihad against the foreign 

occupation. They may also be less responsive to direction from Mullah Omar.15 The ongoing 

intergenerational transfer of power within the Haqqani network, from Jalaluddin Haqqani to 

his son Sirajuddin, could have a similar effect in southeastern Afghanistan, as Sirajuddin is 

involved in a more violent strand of the network, with less respect for traditional authority.16

At a strategic level such fragmentation could undermine the ability of the insurgent leadership 

to deliver on a political deal. 

Proposition 2: External Resources Are Fueling Conflict 

Allocating additional money for development programs—with pressure to spend it fast in 

pursuit of security objectives—and supplying international military bases across Afghanistan 

has unintentionally produced a war and aid economy. Donor programs delivered in an environment of state weakness, warlordism, racketeering, and rent seeking create conflict and popular 

disappointment, rather than winning hearts and minds.17

Among contractors, client networks, villages, and tribes, competition for development 

projects is intense; for Afghan political elites, the conflict has become a lucrative enterprise, 

and with hundreds of millions of dollars hanging in the balance, there is little economic 

incentive for political power brokers to end it. Those in power control the mechanisms of 

government for their personal gain, and instead of promoting stability and good governance, 

they reap rewards from the development and military contracts that follow the fighting. 

The construction, trucking, and private security contracts that come with the presence of 

international military forces thus are plagued by extortion and clientelism. Often a single 

network or actor becomes dominant. Matiullah Khan controls all the highway security 

contracts in Uruzgan, while the president’s brother Ahmed Wali Karzai towers over private 

security, real estate, and contracting in Kandahar.18 A U.S. Senate inquiry links U.S.-paid 

private security contractors to murder, kidnapping, and bribery, as well as to the Taliban.19

Even the best Afghan army and 

police units are barely capable 

of operating on their own and 

often lack the will to challenge 

the insurgency.
4 

Proposition 3: Karzai and Afghan Political Elites Lack Genuine Commitment 

to Reform

A lack of real commitment to reform among Afghan leadership calls into question the 

international community’s entire state-building approach. Technical and financial support 

to institutions cannot substitute for political will. 

Karzai has not held to his expressed commitments to cleaner government. Instead, the 

state has been captured and manipulated by various factions and powerful business and 

political figures, with a confusion of institutions with private interests. Less than a month 

after anticorruption undertakings made at the Kabul Conference, Karzai intervened personally 

to release an aide who had been arrested in connection with an investigation into a hawala

money transfer business, through which billions of dollars were leaving Afghanistan. He also 

dismissed the deputy attorney general, Fazel Ahmed Faqiryar, who had authorized the arrest, 

and took more direct control of the task force that was carrying out the investigation.20 The 

government has rejected offers for a transparent audit of Kabul Bank after a bailout of several 

hundred million dollars.21 Shareholders include another of the president’s brothers, Mahmood 

Karzai, and a brother of the vice president, Haseen Fahim.22 Chief executive Khalilullah Fruzi 

was senior financial advisor to Hamid Karzai’s 2009 reelection campaign.23

Most reforms remain at the level of empty policy debates and government appointments 

are bought, sold, and distributed to family and close allies to ensure the loyalty of critical 

appointees.24 This includes senior police and customs officer posts, as well as local government offices. While important freedoms and progress have been achieved since the end 

of Taliban rule, abuses by police and other local government officials have eroded public 

trust. The social breakdown and lawlessness that preceded the Taliban takeover is being 

repeated in many parts of Afghanistan, enabling a comeback in some provinces. In Wardak, 

the Taliban have set up a parallel administration across the province and people look to the 

shadow governor, district chiefs, and judges for administration and justice. Unlike official 

government courts, Taliban courts are known for swift decisions, harsh punishments, and 

not soliciting bribes.25

For its part, the international community has become hostage to its own rhetoric of 

Afghanization and an Afghan lead, and is unwilling or unable—despite a massive financial 

and military commitment to Afghanistan—to pressure the government to deliver what it has 

promised. Although few believe Karzai to be a reliable partner,26 placating him has become 

a central plank of the international strategy. Karzai still feels betrayed over the 2009 elections, in which foreigners supported the exclusion of more than one million fraudulent 

votes, denying him a first-round victory. He has delayed inauguration of the newly-elected 

Parliament, bringing the country to the brink of constitutional crisis. Karzai also has become 

a vocal critic of the NATO-led military effort.27 This leaves the international community 

in a conundrum. Karzai is the elected leader, with a mandate until 2014, and no obvious 

political alternative. Yet with Karzai as a partner, a counterinsurgency approach, which 

relies on the government winning the trust of the Afghan people, is unlikely to succeed. 

The only option for a responsible withdrawal of foreign troops—one that does not leave 

behind the poisoned seeds of renewed civil war—is a negotiated peace settlement that has 

broad-based support. 

Toward a Sustainable Political Settlement

Based on the above propositions, the international community’s main investment should 

be in facilitating a sustainable political settlement. A peace deal will take time to conclude—perhaps several years. That talks will not be a quick fix, however, should not take 

The only option for a responsible 

withdrawal of foreign troops . . . 

is a negotiated peace settlement 

that has broad-based support. 
 5

away from the urgency of laying out a framework for a political process. There are at least 

three levels at which solutions need to be sought: internally, among Afghans; with the 

Taliban; and with regional stakeholders to undergird any deal that emerges. The following 

sections consider the elements that can contribute to a sustainable settlement and a role 

for the international community. 

Opening Up the Political Space

A sustainable political settlement for Afghanistan is not only about doing a deal with the 

Taliban or with Pakistan. It is about defining a state that Afghans are willing to support. 

While the actual negotiations should be kept quiet, there needs to be a broad-based consultation of Afghans to establish the parameters of an acceptable settlement.

Grievances that are fuelling the insurgency—such as corruption, injustice, warlordism, 

and marginalization of various tribal and ethnic groups, political actors, economic and business elites, and civil society—are costing the government support. Women’s groups, human 

rights advocates, and ethnic minorities are concerned that the discrimination and abuse 

that Afghans experienced under the Taliban regime of the 1990s will return.28 A number 

of prominent ethnic leaders and senior army commanders are also staunch opponents of 

negotiating with the insurgents and of giving Pakistan a role in Afghanistan’s security.29 All 

these groups need to be sufficiently involved in the process to be able to seek and receive 

guarantees. Given research findings that a quarter of all civil war settlements collapse within 

five years,30 it is important to reach a political settlement that is widely accepted across 

all segments of society. 

Rather than diplomats determining red lines for negotiations on human rights and 

women’s rights issues, the Afghan public should have a voice in establishing the parameters 

of an acceptable settlement ahead of any negotiations with the Taliban. A broad-based 

consultation that engages Afghans across the country in a debate over the future of their 

state could, in itself, create political pressure for upholding core principles. The peace jirga

was an exercise for Karzai to seek a mandate from his own base, and had merit as such, but 

it was not the nationwide consultation it was sold as. Karzai-appointed governors carefully 

orchestrated the list of invitees, and major Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek leaders stayed away, as 

did those affiliated with the Taliban.31

Ideally, a carefully balanced and representative government-appointed group would carry 

out the consultation, along the model of the selection committee for the 2003 constitutional 

loya jirga. In the absence of such an initiative by the government, donors could support 

alternative methods of bringing Afghans from all thirty-four provinces into the debate. One 

possibility would be funding televised debates and radio call-in programs. This would give 

Afghans a voice and begin building up a constituency for a peace settlement. 

Talks with the Taliban

President Karzai has been preparing the ground for talks with the “upset brothers,” as he 

calls the insurgency, activating backchannels at various levels, mainly through family connections.32 Enticements to come over to the government side include a reintegration decree 

that offers amnesty to Taliban fighters who want to leave the battlefield, on condition that 

they accept the Afghan constitution and break ties with al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. 

The peace jirga in June 2010 resulted in proposals for the release of Taliban prisoners and 

for the lifting of UN sanctions on blacklisted individuals. In September, Karzai announced 

the creation of a seventy-member High Peace Council as the formal interface for talks with 

the Taliban. Other political signals have been the replacement of the Tajik intelligence chief 

Rather than diplomats 

determining red lines for 

negotiations . . . the Afghan 

public should have a voice in 

establishing the parameters 

of an acceptable settlement 

ahead of any negotiations 

with the Taliban.
6 

Amrullah Saleh with Rahmatullah Nabil, who is Pashtun, as well as the promotion of two 

Pashtun generals to the crucial posts of chief and deputy chief of staff of the army, both 

replacing Tajiks. 

The political intention to reintegrate Taliban fighters and persuade them to swap allegiances has been translated into the complex and costly Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program, launched at the Kabul conference in July 2010. The program, underwritten by 

$250 million in international pledges, is built on the assumption that lower-ranking fighters 

join the Taliban to earn an income and can be persuaded to switch sides with promises of 

work and development projects for their communities. So far there have been few takers, 

perhaps because the program fails to respond to the political grievances that fuel the insurgency and does not offer credible security guarantees to Taliban who choose to reintegrate. 

Those who have joined the reintegration program—a few hundred to date—are predominantly former Jamiat fighters and bandits from Herat, Badghis, and the northeast, rather 

than actual Taliban.33 In the absence of a broader peace process, the program is likely to 

continue to lack appeal.34

None of the above activity means that a peace deal between Karzai and the Taliban is 

imminent. There are three main flaws in the preparations undertaken so far. The first is the 

perception that Karzai is giving in too easily to demands by the Taliban and Pakistan; this 

is alienating to much of the rest of Afghanistan, especially to non-Pashtuns in northern and 

central Afghanistan. At worst, an exclusively negotiated Karzai-Taliban deal could lead to collapse of the government, with non-Pashtun ministers and much of the army walking out. 

The second concern is that, despite a flurry of press reports about contacts between the 

government and the insurgency, the Taliban may not be ready to talk just yet. It is likely 

that some elements of the movement are tired and looking for an exit. It is also possible 

that a part of the Quetta Shura is interested in power sharing. However, it is not clear that 

the contacts that have been reported since September 2010 amount to substantial preliminaries for negotiations. Presumed high-level discussions with Mullah Akhtar Muhammad 

Mansour, the Taliban second-in-command, facilitated by NATO, turned out to be a sham.35 

Channels have always existed between the insurgents and government to discuss prisoner 

releases and other deals, but it does not appear that the Quetta Shura has authorized 

broader political discussions. 

The third concern is that much of the activity from Karzai’s side is symbolic and appears 

aimed at fragmenting the insurgency and making a closed deal that allows him to stay in 

power. The High Peace Council includes many unlikely peace negotiators, and it remains to 

be seen whether the former Taliban represented on the council can provide a meaningful 

conduit for talks. Its membership is heavily weighted toward the same factional leaders who 

have been fighting the wars of the past thirty years and whose lawless rule paved the way 

for the Taliban to come to power in the 1990s.36 They are where the armed power, increasingly coupled with economic and political power, of Afghanistan lies, and the leaders have 

little incentive to share that power. The Taliban have publicly responded by characterizing 

the High Peace Council as impractical and doomed to fail.37

The more Karzai moves toward a genuine national peace settlement, the more power he 

would have to give, both to the Taliban and to the political opposition, Pashtun and nonPashtun. At the moment, Western support is shielding Karzai’s government and personal 

networks from having to share power and propping up a false political equilibrium. This has 

prevented Karzai from having to reach for deals that he would otherwise be compelled to 

strike. However, as ISAF contributing nations are increasingly looking for the exit, the pressure to satisfy various constituencies will grow. 

Exploratory dialogue about a peace settlement has also started between Karzai and 

Pakistan’s army and intelligence chiefs as Pakistan seeks to secure its interests and the 

Western support is shielding 

Karzai’s government and 

personal networks from having 

to share power and propping up 

a false political equilibrium.

An exclusively negotiated KarzaiTaliban deal could lead to collapse 

of the government, with nonPashtun ministers and much of the 

army walking out. 
 7

loyalty of a future Afghan state.38 Pakistan has an undeniable role in any future negotiations. Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s intelligence agency, has deep links into 

the insurgency, including both the Taliban and Haqqani networks, and may even participate 

in meetings of the Quetta Shura, the Taliban leadership council.39 Yet this influence should 

not be exaggerated; the Afghan Taliban are increasingly driven by indigenous factors and it 

seems unlikely that Pakistan would have sufficient control to shut down the insurgency even 

if it wanted to. Together with the problem of Taliban leadership fragmentation due to the 

killing and capturing of mid-level commanders by international military forces, it is hard to 

envisage an early or smooth negotiating process. Still, enlisting the unambiguous and firm 

support of Pakistan is critical to any sustainable political settlement. 

Agenda for Talks

Despite the challenges, talks are needed to end the insurgency. Even if, at present, prospects for a settlement are still remote, groundwork to prepare a political process should 

begin in earnest. The Afghan government has yet to develop its negotiating position 

beyond calling on the insurgency to respect the constitution and lay down arms. For the 

international community, the key requirement will be for the Taliban to sever all links to 

al-Qaeda. As for the insurgency, an eventual negotiation would need to address a wide 

range of motivations, among them the presence and actions of foreign forces, including 

night raids, civilian casualties, and detentions; the desire for a more rigorous application 

of sharia law by the state; the predatory nature of the government, especially the bribetaking prevalent in the police and justice institutions; perceived ethnic or tribal bias in the 

distribution of gains from reconstruction activities; and economic vulnerability, which may 

motivate lower-level fighters.40

Both the Afghan government and the Taliban have yet to develop a positive vision of 

their long-term aspirations for Afghanistan. The Taliban platform does not go much beyond 

the slogan of forcing out foreign troops along with what they consider to be the puppet 

government of Karzai, while the Afghan government is inclined to see the root causes of the 

conflict as exogenous to itself, blaming Pakistan, the United States, and other international 

players. The government’s mindset needs to shift. In reality it is the significant deficit in 

governance that continues to undermine the emergence of a credible Afghan state and, 

in turn, loyalty of Afghans to it. Without addressing the grievances that have enabled the 

insurgency to step up its recruitment, it will be insufficient to entice low-level Taliban from 

their leadership through the reintegration program. 

Some of the issues that the Taliban would look for on the agenda would include foreign 

troop withdrawals; an expanded role of Islam in national life; power sharing at the provincial and local levels; the release of detainees; and a say in civil service, police, and justice 

appointments.41 For the time being, the option of altering the Afghan constitution has been 

taken off the table; casualties of a more conservatively drafted constitution might include 

the rights enshrined for women, the role of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, and the freedom of the press. That said, it may be possible to give sharia a more 

prominent role in law making without bargaining away fundamental freedoms. Similarly, 

the powers of governors and provincial councils could be enhanced without altering the 

constitution. Beyond severing ties to al-Qaeda, the principal red lines for any negotiated 

solution should come not from foreigners but from Afghan constituencies, including civil 

society actors, that are informed of and included in the process.

It is the significant deficit in 

governance that continues to 

undermine the emergence of a 

credible Afghan state and . . . 

loyalty of Afghans to it.
8 

Capacity to Negotiate

Groundwork to prepare a political process will need to address key questions about who 

specifically would be negotiating and the preparedness of the various parties to engage in 

a long and complex political negotiation. Setting up the High Peace Council does not seem 

like the real answer from the Karzai administration’s side. It is too unwieldy to be more 

than a formality. The insurgency also lacks the capacity and political structure needed for 

peace talks. There is a role for diplomats to advocate for a realistic negotiating team that 

includes legitimate representatives of Afghanistan’s various ethnic, social, and political 

groups, including women, as well as to build up the capacity of such a team to engage in 

talks. There may also be a role for a regional actor to support the development of insurgent 

capacity for talks. Karzai has suggested a possible role for Turkey in providing an office that 

Taliban negotiators can use.42

The next stage of preparations should focus on the issues of capacity to engage in peace 

talks, as well as identifying the interests of the main players.43 All the main insurgent 

groups will need to be accepted as interlocutors, along with all key political groupings. The 

challenge is to ensure that all Afghans who need to be included are included and that underlying principles are adhered to. Genuine political debate about acceptable compromises is 

needed. Otherwise there is a real danger that women, human rights, and media freedoms 

become victims of botched negotiations, and that a just peace remains elusive. Other core 

principles that need safeguarding include a commitment to a functioning Afghan state that 

fulfills its constitutional obligations toward its citizens as well as its international obligations, maintains normalized relations with regional neighbors and globally, and undertakes 

not to harbor terrorists. Many of these issues can best be explored through informal contacts, so that all parties can prepare their constituencies ahead of formal negotiations.

Regional Talks

A peace settlement among Afghans would need to be underpinned by a carefully designed 

regional framework for stabilizing Afghanistan. Neighboring countries could pull Afghanistan apart in a proxy war, such as that seen in the 1990s, or contribute to its stability. 

The key question is whether it is possible to overcome the mutual distrust among regional 

actors in favor of even minimally coordinated regional engagement. A stable Afghanistan is 

ultimately in the interests of all of its neighbors, although each may have its own view of 

what stability means and may be tempted to fall back on cultivating old client relationships. 

The thorniest issue in designing a regional strategy is finding a way to move Pakistan and 

India away from their confrontational positions over Afghanistan.44

China has a clear strategic and economic interest in an Afghanistan that is safe for 

natural-resource extraction and able to tackle Islamist extremism. It may be able to exert 

constructive pressure based on its close ties with Pakistan. Russia and the Central Asian 

countries on Afghanistan’s northern border are concerned about spillover effects, with a 

particular concern for links to the latent conflicts in the Ferghana Valley. At the same time, 

while Russia does not want the Taliban in power in Kabul or elsewhere, it cannot help but 

savor the prospect of the United States also failing in Afghanistan. It may find it difficult to 

resist cultivating local allies based on former Northern Alliance and Communist commander 

networks, which could make a national-level political settlement harder to achieve.

Iran has ambitions to be a regional heavyweight and views Afghanistan largely through 

the lens of its relations with the United States. Despite a relatively small investment, it 

wants to maximize its influence over a future Afghanistan and minimize the influence of 

its enemies, particularly the United States and Saudi Arabia. In line with the former, it is 

supporting all sides: providing financial support to Karzai’s and Abdullah Abdullah’s election 

While Russia does not want 

the Taliban in power in Kabul 

or elsewhere, it cannot help 

but savor the prospect of the 

United States also failing in 

Afghanistan.
 9

campaigns and maintaining links to the Northern Alliance and small groups of the insurgency 

that have been trained in Iran. Iran would not want to see a Taliban government in Kabul, 

but it wants to keep the United States embroiled in the south; it may be positioning itself 

to be a spoiler to a peace process. Gaining Iran’s support for a political settlement might 

require assurances that there would not be permanent U.S. military bases in Afghanistan. Yet 

in the short term Iran may have rather mixed feelings about the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. Hasty troop withdrawal would likely result in an internal shakeout in Afghanistan and, 

thus, increased instability in Iran’s neighborhood. Iran would also lose the leverage it has in 

being able to hurt U.S. troops, and therefore view itself as more vulnerable to U.S. attacks 

against its nuclear assets.45

While Iran’s interest in Afghanistan is limited to ensuring that it is not Taliban dominated 

or a Western satellite, India and Pakistan are using Afghanistan as a battleground in their 

broader conflict. India is increasingly assertive in its diplomacy and wants to reduce Pakistan’s ability to determine events in Afghanistan. Its financial investment in infrastructure 

and development and its large diplomatic presence, including four consulates in addition to 

an embassy, signals its intention to stay a long time. India has also been keen to accelerate 

the development of Iran’s Chabahar port, which will give it access to Afghanistan and Central 

Asia without needing to go through Pakistan. It has already built the Zaranj-Delaram road 

through Afghanistan’s Nimruz province to connect to Chabahar.46 The July 2011 date for 

the beginning of U.S. withdrawal has led to hard-line debate in the Indian strategic community over a backup security plan, with some suggesting the reestablishment of links with 

Northern Alliance commanders.

Pakistan has been positioning itself as a main broker in talks with the Taliban. Diplomacy 

between Karzai and Islamabad intensified in 2010, with multiple visits to Kabul by General 

Kayani and intelligence chief Shuja Pasha. Pakistan envisions an Afghanistan without an 

Indian presence and with an Afghan government that is not pro-Indian, and will seek to use 

the insurgency to pressure the government into a deal that offers it a pivotal role in shaping 

Afghan politics in exchange for closing down sanctuaries. However, Pakistan’s ability to control the insurgency is often overstated, and the Taliban’s dislike for the ISI is understated. 

Also, Pakistan recognizes that it is interested in a stable and therefore ethnically balanced 

government structure in Kabul, and the context for Taliban rule no longer exists.47

Given the distrust among the states in the region, it is difficult to conceive of a formal 

multilateral negotiating process that could deliver a regional consensus, at least not without 

a preparatory round of bilateral dialogues and deals. To start with, basic principles should 

be agreed upon to raise the level of confidence between Afghanistan and its neighbors. At 

their simplest, these principles should include respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, commitment to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of neighbors, and 

prevention of the use of Afghanistan’s territory for hostile activities against its neighbors. 

Some observers have called for unblocking progress on Kashmir to allow for a solution on 

Afghanistan to be developed. This would substitute one Gordian knot for another, but even 

some incremental movement or confidence building measures between India and Pakistan 

would clearly help. 

International Role in Talks

So far, the international community has distanced itself from the anticipated political 

process by stressing that talks with the insurgency will be conducted under an Afghan government lead. This is partly due to incomplete policy formulation within the United States, 

where there continues to be nervousness about talking to the Taliban. However, ultimately 

the countries with troops on the ground will need to engage in peace talks. Neither Karzai 

Pakistan’s ability to control the 

insurgency is often overstated, 

and the Taliban’s dislike for the 

ISI is understated. 
10 

nor the newly established High Peace Council has control over many of the issues at stake. 

With U.S. troops leading the anti-Taliban fight, there are guarantees that only the United 

States can offer. Similarly, the Afghan government can request the United Nations to review 

the Resolution 1267 terrorist sanctions list, but will have little control over action that is 

taken. Negotiations can only be successful if all major players take part. 

For talks to be meaningful, the international community will need to facilitate them—

not to determine the specific shape of a political settlement, but to help structure the 

process so that what emerges is sustainable. Despite the recent hype, as mentioned above, 

a political settlement could take years to conclude and there should be no rush to begin formal negotiations. This does not detract from the urgency of undertaking informal preparations. A mediator or team of mediators and analysts, with at least a minimal mandate, could 

begin to identify the various stakeholders and analyze their interests, through engaging 

regional actors and the range of Afghan constituencies, with a view to proposing a structure 

and format for multilevel negotiations. Such a mediator could also explore ideas for a range 

of incremental and reciprocal confidence-building measures. 

Further down the line a more formal process will be required. Given the Afghan government’s testiness about foreign involvement, it will eventually take the United States, as the 

most powerful actor, to broker agreement over a mediator. The United States itself cannot 

play this role for lack of impartiality, but whoever is appointed must have U.S. support at the 

highest level. Successful negotiations will require an exceptionally knowledgeable mediator 

with a clear plan and the ability to maintain support and coherence among the international 

actors, as well as sufficient authority to conduct regional diplomacy and bring the parties to 

a peace conference. This could be a role for a UN mandated envoy, although not for the UN 

Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; its reputation for impartiality has been weakened among 

Afghans due to its mandate requiring a close relationship with the Afghan government and 

its handling of the 2009 elections. 

If the end to the conflict in Afghanistan requires a peace settlement, it also follows that 

the international military forces should orient their strategy to support agreed-upon political ends, rather than vice versa. Within U.S. military and political circles, some argue that 

intensified capturing and killing of insurgents is driving the Taliban to the negotiating table. 

Most analysts who have spent longer periods of time in Afghanistan tend to disagree.48 A 

less combat-oriented international military posture across the country, covering not only 

the planned transition of security responsibilities from NATO to Afghan security forces in 

more benign districts, could create the political space for genuine negotiations. A first step 

toward talks could be agreeing to a reciprocal and incremental set of confidence-building 

measures. These might include deescalating hostilities or localized cease-fires, prisoner 

releases, and delisting insurgents from target lists and the UN sanctions list.

Talks will not result in peace overnight. Crafting a political deal that parties to the conflict 

accept and regional neighbors endorse will take time and a sustained commitment of foreign 

troops to back it up. This has consequences for the speed of troop withdrawals. Even Afghans 

living in Kandahar who have no fondness for foreign troops worry that an ill-considered rush to 

the exits would make matters even worse.49 At best, skillful and patient diplomacy leading to 

a political settlement might result in a tenuous peace that can be consolidated over time. The 

requirement of maintaining a military presence to underwrite a peace deal should be considered 

early on to maintain confidence in the process. 

Conclusion

The politics of a potential grand bargain between Karzai and the Taliban, underwritten by 

Pakistan, are divisive. Leaders of the Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek communities are opposed, 

A less combat-oriented 

international military posture 

across the country . . . could 

create the political space for 

genuine negotiations.
 11

as are many Pashtuns—at least without further clarification of what the end goals and 

their roles in the process are. To be sustainable, a political settlement must be acceptable 

to a broad range of Afghan constituencies. It must also be supported by regional actors, 

including those who are backing various factions within Afghanistan. Such a settlement may 

be years away, but the way ahead needs to be prepared urgently. This means designing a 

negotiation with a genuine consultation process to give Afghans a say in the kind of state 

they are willing to support, facilitated by an international mediator to keep talks on track 

and ensure a decent outcome. 

The international community must not become the guarantor of a deal that results in 

deeper internal conflicts and greater regional instability, under the slogan of Afghanization 

and an Afghan lead. There are significant security interests at stake, as well as a moral 

obligation not to leave behind a country that is worse off now than it was before the 

international intervention began. An exit of NATO combat troops by 2014 is only feasible 

if the NATO-led military effort falls firmly behind a peace process; before that can happen, 

however, a political strategy for the country, missing up to now, must be developed. 

Notes

1. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan,” March 27, 2009.

2. Antonio Giustozzi, Negotiating with the Taliban: Issues and Prospects (New York: The Century Foundation, 2010). 

3. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as Reported by the Victims

(New York: UNODC, 2010); The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2010: A Survey of the Afghan People (San 

Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 2010). 

4. Afghan Government and NATO/ISAF, “Inteqal: Strengthening Afghan Sovereignty through International 

Partnership,” joint paper presented to the Kabul Conference, July 20, 2010.

5. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review,” 

December 16, 2010.

6. Julie Ray and Rajesh Srinivasan, “Afghans’ Approval of Their Leadership Falls to 33 Percent: Majority Disapprove 

of Karzai for the First Time,” Gallup, July 23, 2010.

7. Matt Waldman, Dangerous Liaisons with the Afghan Taliban: The Feasibility and Risks of Negotiations (Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2010); Giustozzi, Negotiating with the Taliban.

8. The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS), Afghanistan: The Relationship Gap (London: ICOS, 

2010); Sarah Ladbury with Cooperation for Peace and Unity in Kabul, “Testing Hypotheses on Radicalisation in 

Afghanistan: Why Do Men Join the Taliban and Hizb-i Islami? How Much Do Local Communities Support Them?” 

Independent report for the Department for International Development, London, August 2009.

9. Ernesto Londono, “Red Cross Offers Bleak Assessment of Afghan War,” The Washington Post, December 15, 

2010. 

10. Erica Gaston and Jonathan Horowitz, The Trust Deficit: The Impact of Local Perceptions on Policy in Afghanistan 

(New York: Open Society Foundations, October 2010); Thomas Ruttig, “The Other Side—Dimensions of the Afghan 

Insurgency: Causes, Actors, and Approaches to ‘Talks,’” Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 2009.

11. Antonio Giustozzi and Christoph Reuter, “The Northern Front: The Afghan Insurgency Spreading Beyond the 

Pashtuns,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, March 2010. 

12. Department of Defense (DOD), Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, DOD Report to 

Congress, November 2010.

13. Josh Partlow, “U.S. Military Runs into Afghan Tribal Politics after Deal with Pashtuns,” The Washington Post, May 

10, 2010.

14. iCasualties.org, “Coalition Military Fatalities by Year and Month,” December 2010, available at iCasualties.org 

(accessed January 17, 2011).

15. Felix Kuehn and Alex Strick van Linschoten, “Who Are the Taliban?” Presented at workshop, “Anticipating 

a Political Process in Afghanistan: How Should the International Community Respond?,” Washington, D.C., 

June 24–25, 2010; Thomas Ruttig, “A Back Somersault in the U.S. Strategy: Lower Aims, Higher Risks,” (blog), 

Afghanistan Analysts Network, October 16, 2010, http://aan-afghanistan.com/ (accessed January 17, 2011).

16. Tom Gregg, “Talk to the Haqqanis, Before It’s Too Late,” AfPak Channel, September 22, 2010; Thomas Ruttig, 

“Splitting the Haqqanis with NATO Reconciliation Air?” Blog, Afghanistan Analysts Network, November 1, 2010. 

17. “Winning ‘Hearts and Minds’ in Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in COIN 

Operations,” report on Wilton Park Conference 1022, March 11–14, 2010; Andrew Wilder, Hearing on U.S. Aid to 

Pakistan: Planning and Accountability, Testimony to House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, December 9, 2009. 

18. Rep. John F. Tierney, Chair, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, “Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the 

U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan,” June 2010; Bette Dam, “The Story of ‘M’: U.S.-Dutch Shouting Matches in 

Uruzgan,” (guest blog), Afghanistan Analysts Network, June 10, 2010, aan-afghanistan.com (accessed January 

17, 2011); Carl Forsberg, “Politics and Power in Kandahar,” Afghanistan Report 5, Institute for the Study of War, 

To be sustainable, a political 

settlement must be 

acceptable to a broad range 

of Afghan constituencies.
Washington, D.C., April 2010; Kate Clark, “WikiLeaks and the Paktia Governor,” (blog) Afghanistan Analysts 

Network, December 6, 2010.

19. U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into the Role and Oversight of Private Security Contractors in 

Afghanistan, September 28, 2010. 

20. Rod Nordland, “Antigraft Units, Backed by U.S., Draw Karzai’s Ire,” The New York Times, August 6, 2010; Adam 

Entous, “American Concerns over Karzai Deepen,” Wall Street Journal, August 30, 2010. 

21. Matthew Rosenberg, “Afghanistan Rejects U.S. Aid for Bank Audits,” Wall Street Journal, November 27, 2010.

22. Dexter Filkins, “Depositors Panic Over Bank Crisis in Afghanistan,” The New York Times, September 2, 2010.

23. Andrew Higgins, “Banker Feeds Crony Capitalism in Afghanistan,” The Financial Times, February 22, 2010.

24. For a discussion of patronage in appointments, see Martine van Bijlert, “Between Discipline and Discretion: 

Policies Surrounding Senior Subnational Appointments,” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, May 2009. 

25. Qayum Babak, “Taleban Justice ‘Fairer’ than State Courts,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, no. 369, 

August 17, 2010; Julius Cavendish, “‘If You Have a Problem, the Taliban Solves It. In the Government Offices 

There Is Only Corruption and Bribery’,” The Herald, January 3, 2009. 

26. Cables leaked from the U.S. State Department have depicted Karzai variously as “not an adequate strategic 

partner,” “erratic,” “indecisive and unprepared,” and “a paranoid and weak individual unfamiliar with the basics 

of nation-building.” See Peter Baker, “Obama in Unannounced Afghan Visit,” New York Times, December 3, 

2010; Karen DeYoung, “Leaked Afghan Cables Show U.S. Frustration with Leader,” Washington Post, December 3, 

2010. 

27. Ahmed Rashid, “Karzai Turns Against Western Allies,” BBC Viewpoint, November 20, 2010.

28. Coordination Group on Transitional Justice in Afghanistan to participants at the London Conference, “Do 

Not Sacrifice the Victims: Justice, a Prerequisite for Lasting Peace,” Afghanistan Watch, January 23, 2010, 

www.watchafghanistan.org (accessed January 17, 2011); Human Rights Watch, The ‘Ten-Dollar Talib’ and Women’s 

Rights: Afghan Women and the Risks of Reintegration and Reconciliation (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010). 

29. International Crisis Group, “A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army,” Asia Report no. 190, 

May 12, 2010.

30. Astri Suhrke and Ingrid Samset, “What’s in a Figure? Estimating Recurrence of Civil War,” International 

Peacekeeping, vol. 14, no. 2 (May 2007), 195–203.

31. Kate Clark, “The Afghan Jungle’s Big Beasts and ‘Lively Debate,’” (blog), Afghanistan Analysts Network, June 

4, 2010, aan-afghanistan.com (accessed January 17, 2011); Clark, “Who’s Come to Town ... and Who’s Staying 

Away,” (blog), Afghanistan Analysts Network, June 2, 2010.

32. On Qayum Karzai’s role, see Abubakar Siddique and Ron Synovitz, “Pursuit of Elusive Peace Could Drive Afghan 

Government, Taliban to the Table,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, October 10, 2008; Talatbek Masadykov, 

Antonio Giustozzi, and James Page, “Negotiating with the Taliban: Toward a Solution for the Afghan Conflict,” 

Working Paper no. 66, series 2, Crisis States Research Centre, January 2010. 

33. Antonio Giustozzi, personal communication, December 6, 2010.

34. Christian Aid, Open Society Foundations, and Oxford Research Group, “Piecemeal or Peace Deal? NATO, Peace 

Talks, and a Political Settlement in Afghanistan,” presented at NATO Heads of Government Summit, Lisbon, 

November 19–20, 2010. 

35. Dexter Filkins and Carlotta Gall, “Taliban Leader in Secret Talks Was an Impostor,” New York Times, November 22, 

2010.

36. Martine van Bijlert, “Warlords’ Peace Council,” (blog), Afghanistan Analysts Network, September 28, 2010, aanafghanistan.com (accessed January 17, 2011). 

37. “Reaction of the Islamic Emirate to the Announcement of High Peace Council by Karzai,” Afghan Islamic Press, 

September 29, 2010. 

38. Declan Walsh and Jon Boone, “Afghanistan in Turmoil after Peace Talk Rumours,” The Guardian, June 28, 2010.

39. Matt Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents,” Crisis States 

Research Centre, Discussion Paper no. 18, June 2010.

40. Ruttig, “The Other Side”; Waldman, Dangerous Liaisons.

41. Michael Semple, “We Need to Offer the Taliban More Than Just Money,” Financial Times, February 5, 2010.

42. Simon Cameron-Moore, “Karzai Warms to Idea of Talking to Taliban in Turkey,” Reuters, December 24, 2010. 

43. Some informal work to this end is already ongoing under the auspices of the U.S. Institute for Peace and the 

Peace Research Institute Oslo; other informal processes have been initiated on a regional basis.

44. This section draws on findings from the workshop “Anticipating a Political Process in Afghanistan: How Should 

the International Community Respond?” hosted by USIP in Washington D.C., June 24–25, 2010. The author is 

grateful to the participating experts for their insights. 

45. Karim Sadjadpour, “Iran” in Is a Regional Strategy Viable in Afghanistan? Ashley Tellis and Aroop Mukharji, ed. 

(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010).

46. Gautam Mukhopadyaya, “India” in Is a Regional Strategy Viable? Tellis and Mukharji, eds.

47. Frédéric Grare, “Pakistan” in Is a Regional Strategy Viable? Tellis and Mukharji, eds.; Rajan Menon, “Pakistan’s Dual 

Policy on Taliban,” Los Angeles Times, June 30, 2010.

48. “An Open Letter to President Obama,” www.afghanistancalltoreason.com.

49. Kuehn and Strick van Linschoten, “Who Are the Taliban?”

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