Present: Lemons, C.J, Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, McClanahan, and 

Powell, JJ., and Koontz, S.J. 

CVAS 2, LLC 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 140505 JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR.

 January 8, 2015 

CITY OF FREDERICKSBURG 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF FREDERICKSBURG 

Gordon F. Willis, Judge 

In this appeal we consider whether a circuit court had 

authority to enter a decree of sale of real estate pursuant to 

a locality's suit to collect delinquent real estate taxes and 

delinquent special assessments. 

I. Facts And Proceedings 

The City of Fredericksburg (the "City") created the 

Celebrate Virginia South Community Development Authority (the 

"CDA") in 2000 by resolution, and ratified and amended that 

resolution in 2005. CVAS 2, LLC owns real estate located 

within the City's geographic area. The City has levied that 

real estate with taxes, and the local governing body has levied 

that real estate with special assessments for the CDA's 

benefit. CVAS 2 has not paid all these taxes and special 

assessments. CVAS 2 has outstanding real estate taxes dating 

back to the 2012 fiscal year, and has outstanding special 

assessments dating back to the 2009 fiscal year. 
2

On June 13, 2013, the City brought suit against CVAS 2. 

The City sought to have CVAS 2's real estate sold in order to 

collect CVAS 2's outstanding payments for the delinquent real 

estate taxes and special assessments. The City's complaint and 

the City's motion for decree of sale cited Article 4 of Chapter 

39 of Title 58.1 as the basis for its complaint and the 

authority for the decree of sale.1

CVAS 2 filed a motion to dismiss along with its amended 

answer. The motion to dismiss asserted in relevant part that 

the City failed to comply with Code § 58.1-3965, and therefore 

its complaint could not result in a decree of sale to recover 

the delinquent real estate taxes and special assessments. 

After a hearing on the matter, the circuit court granted the 

City's motion for the sale of CVAS 2's real estate. The court 

subsequently entered a decree of sale, in which the court 

(1) denied CVAS 2's motion to dismiss, (2) ordered that 

CVAS 2's real estate be sold in gross to pay "the taxes, 

penalties, interest, special assessments, fees, costs, and any 

 1

 In its complaint, the City alleged that the action was 

"brought pursuant to Virginia Code §§ 58.1-3965 and 58.1-

3965.2, et seq." In its motion for decree of sale, the City 

asserted that the case "was initiated upon the filing of that 

certain Complaint among the records of this Court citing all 

notices required by Virginia Code § 58.1-3965, et seq., having 

been complied with in this matter." Later in that motion, the 

City specifically cited Code §§ 58.1-3965, 58.1-3965.2, and 

58.1-3969. 
3

liens whatever thereon" pursuant to Code §§ 15.2-5158, 58.1-

3965, and 58.1-3969, and (3) appointed a special commissioner 

to oversee the sale of CVAS 2's real estate and to disburse the 

funds from that sale. 

CVAS 2 timely filed a petition for appeal with this Court. 

We granted CVAS 2's single assignment of error: 

1. The trial court erred in its construction of 

Virginia Code §§ 15.2-5158 and 58.1-3965(A) by 

ordering the sale of CVAS 2's [real estate] when taxes 

are less than two (2) years delinquent. 

II. Discussion 

A. Standard Of Review 

Whether this Court has jurisdiction of an appeal is a 

question of law we review de novo. See Henderson v. Ayres & 

Hartnett, P.C., 285 Va. 556, 563, 740 S.E.2d 518, 521 (2013). 

Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law we 

review de novo. Commonwealth v. Herring, 288 Va. 59, 66, 758 

S.E.2d 225, 229 (2014). 

B. The City's Motion To Dismiss CVAS 2's Appeal To This Court 

Pursuant to Rule 5:4, the City filed a motion to dismiss 

CVAS 2's appeal to this Court on the basis that the circuit 

court's entry of the decree of sale was not a final order 

giving rise to this Court's jurisdiction under Code § 8.01-

670(A). It is a familiar principle that a "court always has 

jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction." Rutter v. 
4

Oakwood Living Ctrs. of Va., Inc., 282 Va. 4, 13, 710 S.E.2d 

460, 464 (2011) (collecting cases) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Final orders, as envisioned by Code § 8.01-670(A), are not 

the only types of orders giving rise to this Court's 

jurisdiction. "[F]or [this] Court to have jurisdiction of [an] 

appeal, the order from which [a petitioner] appealed must be 

either a final order or an interlocutory order from which an 

appeal is statutorily authorized." Comcast of Chesterfield 

Cnty., Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 277 Va. 293, 300, 672 

S.E.2d 870, 873 (2009). Title 8.01 of the Code of Virginia 

establishes civil remedies and procedures. The General 

Assembly has provided that, except in cases involving an 

administrative agency, the Virginia Workers' Compensation 

Commission, or domestic relations, which would vest 

jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals, this Court has 

jurisdiction of an appeal from an interlocutory decree or order 

"in any case on an equitable claim" in three enumerated 

situations, one of which applies here. Code § 8.01-670(B)(2); 

see also Code § 17.1-405. 

The decree of sale from which CVAS 2 appeals is an 

interlocutory decree in a case on an equitable claim, even 

though that claim is statutory in nature. The General Assembly 

has the power to define the statutory rights it creates to be 
5

of a legal or equitable nature.2 See, e.g., Campbell v. Harmon, 

271 Va. 590, 597, 628 S.E.2d 308, 311 (2006) (Code § 8.01-31 

permits the beneficiary of a trust to file an "accounting in 

equity" against the trustee); City of Portsmouth v. City of 

Chesapeake, 232 Va. 158, 164, 349 S.E.2d 351, 354 (1986) 

(former Code § 15.1-1026 et seq., now Code § 15.2-3100 et seq., 

allowing cities to file suit to determine the boundary lines 

between them, conferred "only legal, not equitable, rights"). 

The City filed suit against CVAS 2 to sell CVAS 2's real estate 

for delinquent real estate taxes and special assessments. The 

statutory scheme upon which the City filed suit, and the 

authority relied upon by the circuit court to enter the decree 

of sale, was Article 4 of Chapter 39 of Title 58.1. The 

General Assembly explained that "[p]roceedings under this 

article for . . . the sale of real estate on which county, 

city, or town taxes are delinquent shall be by bill in equity." 

Code § 58.1-3967 (emphasis added). 

 2

 "There shall be one form of civil case, known as a civil 

action." Rule 3:1. This Rule "effectively abolish[es] the 

division of trial court dockets into legal and equity 

proceedings." Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Norfolk S. Railway 

Co., 278 Va. 444, 454 n.3, 683 S.E.2d 517, 522 n.3 (2009). 

Despite this change to how pleadings are labeled and filed, 

this Rule does not abolish the existence of, and distinction 

between, legal and equitable claims. Rule 3:1; VEPCO, 278 Va. 

at 454 n.3, 683 S.E.2d at 522 n.3. 
6

As the City's case is a "case on an equitable claim" and 

does not involve an administrative agency, the Virginia 

Workers' Compensation Commission, or domestic relations, this 

Court has jurisdiction to resolve this appeal from the 

interlocutory order "[r]equiring . . . title of property to be 

changed." Code § 8.01-670(B)(2). We therefore deny the City's 

motion to dismiss CVAS 2's appeal. 

C. Localities, Community Development Authorities, And The 

Imposition Of Taxes And Assessments On Real Estate 

This appeal requires us to address how different 

governmental entities may levy and collect certain taxes and 

assessments on real estate. In particular, five statutory 

provisions allowing for such action are implicated in this 

dispute. "Because we do not read statutes in isolation, and 

because statutes dealing with a specific subject must be 

construed together in order to arrive at the object sought to 

be accomplished," we first review these relevant statutes so 

that we can more readily resolve the issues on appeal. Bailey 

v. Loudoun Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 288 Va. 159, 169-70, 762 

S.E.2d 763, 765 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

1. How A Locality May Levy And Collect Taxes On Real Estate 

In compliance with the Constitution of Virginia, the 

General Assembly directs that certain real estate "shall be 

assessed for local taxation in accordance with the provisions 
7

of [Chapter 32 of Title 58.1, Code § 58.1-3200 et seq.,] and 

other provisions of law." Code § 58.1-3200; see also Va. 

Const. art. X, § 4. In Code § 58.1-3965, the General Assembly 

established the method for a locality to collect delinquent 

taxes by selling the subject real estate.3 In relevant part, 

the "officer charged with the duty of collecting taxes for the 

locality" must abide by the following: 

When any taxes on any real estate in a locality are 

delinquent on December 31 following the second 

anniversary of the date on which such taxes have 

become due . . . such real estate may be sold for the 

purpose of collecting all delinquent taxes on such 

property. 

Code § 58.1-3965(A). This provision contains two aspects 

important to this appeal. First, the locality may not bring 

suit to collect delinquent taxes on real estate until the 

December 31 two years after the real estate taxes became due. 

Second, the suit to collect such delinquent taxes may be 

enforced through the sale of the real estate upon which the 

delinquent taxes were levied. 

Also, the General Assembly allows a city to reduce the two 

year delay in Code § 58.1-3965(A) to a single year. That is, a 

city – but not a county or town - may pass an ordinance 

allowing it to file suit, for the purposes of having real 

 3

 A "[l]ocality" may be either a county, city, or town. 

Code § 15.2-102. 
8

estate sold to collect delinquent taxes on such property, on 

the December 31 one year after such outstanding taxes become 

due. Code § 58.1-3965.1. 

2. How A Locality May Levy And Collect Special Taxes On 

Behalf Of A Community Development Authority 

Localities may, "by ordinance or resolution[,] create a 

community development authority." Code § 15.2-5155(A). The 

General Assembly has provided numerous powers to any community 

development authority created by a locality. See Code §§ 15.2-

5114; 15.2-5158. In order "to finance the services and 

facilities provided by the authority," one such power is the 

ability to "[r]equest annually that the locality levy and 

collect a special tax on taxable real property within the 

development authority's jurisdiction." Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3). 

Thus, the community development authority may not levy and 

collect the special tax itself, but may request that the 

locality do so on its behalf. Then, once the locality receives 

the revenues from the special tax, those revenues are directed 

to "be paid over to the development authority for its use 

pursuant to this chapter." Id. 

The General Assembly has established the following method 

for a locality to collect such special taxes: 
9

The special taxes shall be collected at the same time 

and in the same manner as the locality's taxes are 

collected, and the proceeds shall be kept in a 

separate account and be used only for the purposes 

provided in this chapter. 

Id. The parties dispute how the statutory phrase "at the same 

time and in the same manner" operates. "As this statutory 

language is neither ambiguous nor absurd, we conclude that it 

means exactly what it says." Bailey, 288 Va. at 173, 762 

S.E.2d at 768; see also Sheppard v. Junes, 287 Va. 397, 403, 

756 S.E.2d 409, 411 (2014). 

"[I]n the same manner" means that a special tax must be 

collected in accordance with the procedural provisions that 

govern the collection of "the locality's taxes." That is, how

a special tax is collected is determined by the manner in which 

"the locality's taxes" are collected. Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3). 

"[A]t the same time" must mean something different than 

"in the same manner." To reason otherwise contravenes our 

repeated admonition of making any portion of a statute 

meaningless or surplusage. See, e.g., Idoux v. Helou, 279 Va. 

548, 554, 691 S.E.2d 773, 776 (2010). The preposition "at" in 

this phrase is "used as a function word to indicate [a] 

position in time." Webster's Third New International 

Dictionary 136 (1993). The position in time to which this 

phrase relates is when the locality collects "the locality's 

taxes." That is, when a special tax is collected is determined 
10

by the time when "the locality's taxes" are collected. Code 

§ 15.2-5158(A)(3). 

The General Assembly coupled the collection of special 

taxes under Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) to the collection of "the 

locality's taxes." This general phrase – "locality's taxes" – 

does not specify what type of tax the locality must use as a 

prerequisite to collect special taxes, and therefore the 

locality may choose to what tax it wishes to attach the 

collection of special taxes. Then, whatever tax the locality 

chooses to be the prerequisite for collecting special taxes in 

any given situation will govern the "at the same time and in 

the same manner" analysis. 

This case is illustrative. The City sought to collect 

delinquent real estate taxes as the type of "locality's taxes" 

serving as the prerequisite necessary to collect delinquent 

special taxes. Delinquent real estate taxes are collected 

pursuant to Code § 58.1-3965. Thus, our analysis of the 

statutory phrase "at the same time and in the same manner" in 

Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) is necessarily related to Code § 58.1-

3965 for purposes of the City's appeal. Consequently, when a 

Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) special tax is collected ("at the same 

time") is dictated by Code § 58.1-3965, so that the City can 

collect delinquent special taxes only at the time when the City 

properly seeks to collect delinquent real estate taxes under 
11

Code § 58.1-3965. Further, how a Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) 

special tax is collected ("in the same manner") is governed by 

Code § 58.1-3965, thereby allowing, in pertinent part, the City 

to sell the subject real estate to recover delinquent special 

taxes. See Code § 58.1-3965(A). 

3. How A Local Governing Body May Levy And Collect A Special 

Assessment On Behalf Of A Community Development Authority 

As part of the powers the General Assembly afforded to all 

community development authorities, a development authority has 

the ability to have a "special assessment . . . imposed by the 

local governing body" in order to "[f]inance the services and 

facilities [the development authority] provides to abutting 

property within the district." Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5). As 

with special taxes, the community development authority does 

not have the power to levy and collect the special assessment 

itself. Instead, the local governing body must levy and 

collect such a special assessment on the development 

authority's behalf.4

 Then, once the locality receives the 

revenues from the special assessments "which the locality 

elects to impose upon [a development authority's] request," 

those revenues are directed to "be paid over to the development 

authority for its use under this chapter." Id. 

 4

 The "[g]overning body" of the locality may be either "the 

board of supervisors of a county, council of a city, or council 

of a town." Code § 15.2-102. 
12

The General Assembly has established the following method 

for a local governing body to collect such special assessments: 

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any 

assessments made pursuant to this section may be made 

effective as a lien upon a specified date, by 

ordinance, but such assessments may not thereafter be 

modified in a manner inconsistent with the terms of 

the debt instruments financing the improvements. 

Id. Unlike a special tax for the benefit of a community 

development authority under Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3), this 

provision provides that a special assessment for the benefit of 

a community development authority must be collected as a lien. 

Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5). 

Moreover, the method in which a delinquent special 

assessment is collected differs significantly from the method 

in which a delinquent special tax is collected. Unlike Code 

§ 15.2-5158(A)(3), which relates to special taxes, Code § 15.2-

5158(A)(5), which relates to special assessments, contains no 

reference to being collected at the same time and in the same 

manner as the locality's taxes are collected. Thus, unlike a 

special tax, a special assessment "may be made effective as a 

lien upon a specified date, by ordinance." Code § 15.2-

5158(A)(5). There is no requirement that the special 

assessment must be collected when the locality's taxes are 

collected, or that it be collected under the procedures 

governing the locality's collection of taxes. Consequently, a 
13

special assessment need not be collected "at the same time and 

in the same manner" as another type of locality's taxes, 

including, for example, real estate taxes under Code § 58.1-

3965. Simultaneously, however, a suit to collect delinquent 

special assessments under Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5) lacks the 

authority set forth in Code § 58.1-3965(A) to sell the real 

estate in order to collect the delinquent special assessment. 

4. Additional Methods To Collect Special Taxes And Special 

Assessments 

Finally, the General Assembly has provided additional 

methods to expedite the collection of special taxes or special 

assessments: 

In addition to the authority provided by 

subsection A of § 58.1-3965, a locality may provide, 

as part of any ordinance[:] 

(ii) to levy special taxes or special assessments on 

real property within any district covered by the 

community development authority or on abutting 

property within the district, that proceedings be 

instituted to sell any such real property when any 

special tax or special assessment described under 

subdivision A 3 or A 5 of [Code] § 15.2-5158 imposed 

on the property is delinquent on the first anniversary 

of the date on which the tax or assessment became due. 

Code § 58.1-3965.2 (paragraph break added). This provision 

permits localities to expedite the collection of delinquent 

obligations by shortening the period of delinquency required 

before selling the subject real estate from two years to one 

year. Thus, the locality may provide "as part of any 
14

ordinance" that a suit to collect delinquent special taxes or 

special assessments may result in real estate being sold so 

long as the suit is filed on or after one year from when the 

special tax or special assessment became due. Code § 58.1-

3965.2(ii) (emphasis added). 

Such an ordinance, as pertaining to special taxes, would 

separate the collection of special taxes from the default 

requirement under Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) that the locality's 

collection of special taxes must be "at the same time" when the 

locality collects another type of "locality's taxes." Code 

§ 58.1-3965.2(ii). 

Additionally, such an ordinance, as pertaining to special 

assessments, would bring the locality's collection of special 

assessments under the umbrella of Article 4 of Chapter 39 of 

Title 58.1. Such an ordinance would authorize the sale of the 

subject real estate to collect a special assessment under Code 

§ 58.1-3965, which, as addressed, is not permitted by the plain 

language of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5). Code § 58.1-3965.2(ii). 

D. The City's Suit Against CVAS 2: Collection Of Delinquent 

Real Estate Taxes 

Having laid out the statutory framework relevant to the 

City's suit, we now turn to whether the circuit court erred in 

entering the decree of sale. 
15

The City's suit against CVAS 2 sought, in part, collection 

of delinquent real estate taxes. As discussed, the sale of 

real estate for the collection of delinquent real estate taxes 

by the City is governed by Code § 58.1-3965. The earliest a 

suit can be brought to collect outstanding real estate taxes is 

the December 31 two years following the anniversary of when the 

taxes became due. Code § 58.1-3965(A). The City has not 

passed an ordinance under Code § 58.1-3965.1 reducing this time 

requirement to the December 31 one year following the 

anniversary of when the taxes became due. 

CVAS 2's delinquent real estate taxes date back to the 

2012 fiscal year. The City's local ordinances provide that its 

fiscal year ends on June 30, and that all real estate taxes for 

any given fiscal year are due in two installment payments, the 

first on November 15 and the second on May 15. Fredericksburg 

City Code §§ 2-491; 70-93. The City has further explained to 

this Court that its fiscal year ends prior to the end of the 

calendar year, so that the 2012 fiscal year began on July 1, 

2011 and ended on June 30, 2012. Thus, CVAS 2's first 

delinquent installment payment on its 2012 taxes occurred on 

November 15, 2011. 

The December 31 two years following the anniversary of 

November 15, 2011 is December 31, 2013. Thus, the City's suit, 

filed on June 13, 2013, to collect those delinquent real estate 
16

taxes was premature and requires dismissal of the City's 

complaint as to the delinquent real estate taxes. See Code 

§ 58.1-3965(A). 

A suit to sell real estate to collect delinquent taxes on 

that property is purely a creature of statute. See Lester 

Group, Inc. v. Little, 238 Va. 54, 57, 381 S.E.2d 3, 5 (1989) 

("The power of a governmental entity to sell land for nonpayment of taxes is not a common law power, but arises entirely 

from statute." (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted)). A party's ability to "enforce" such a statutory 

right "rest[s] upon compliance with the statute." Isle of 

Wight Materials Co. v. Cowling Bros., 246 Va. 103, 105, 431 

S.E.2d 42, 43 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Because the City did not strictly comply with the 

time period in Code § 58.1-3965(A) allowing for such a suit to 

be brought, the City had no authority under that statute to 

bring suit to sell CVAS 2's real estate as a means to collect 

delinquent real estate taxes dating back to November 15, 2011. 

See Lester Group, 238 Va. at 57, 381 S.E.2d at 5. 

E. The City's Suit Against CVAS 2: Collection Of Delinquent 

"Special Assessments" 

The City's suit against CVAS 2 also sought, in part, 

collection of delinquent "special assessments." 
17

1. Special Taxes Are Different From Special Assessments 

Despite the City and CVAS 2 repeatedly acknowledging that 

the City was seeking to collect special assessments, both 

parties argued before the circuit court whether CVAS 2's real 

estate could be sold under Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3), which 

governs collection of delinquent special taxes, as opposed to 

Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5), which governs collection of delinquent 

special assessments. And the circuit court, citing Code 

§ 15.2-5158 in support of its authority to enter the decree of 

sale, necessarily relied upon Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) because, 

as previously addressed, Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5) does not 

provide authority to sell real estate. 

This confusion between special taxes and special 

assessments, and what statutory provisions are applicable to 

each type of obligation, persists on appeal. In briefs 

submitted to this Court, the City now refers to the delinquent 

special assessments as "special tax assessments," and argues 

that Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) remains the governing statute. For 

its part, CVAS 2 has resisted this change in nomenclature and 

continues to assert in briefs submitted to this Court that the 

special assessments were indeed special assessments and not 
18

special taxes, but has corrected its error and now argues that 

special assessments are governed by Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5).5

During oral argument, the City assured this Court that no 

practical difference exists between special taxes and special 

assessments. We disagree. The General Assembly gave these 

words particular and fixed meanings in the statutory scheme 

pertaining to community development authorities, and we must 

give different effect to these different statutory provisions. 

PKO Ventures, LLC v. Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 286 

Va. 174, 183, 747 S.E.2d 826, 831 (2013). 

Longstanding jurisprudence has distinguished between 

special taxes and special assessments. See 1 William Herbert 

Page & Paul Jones, A Treatise on the Law of Taxation by Local 

and Special Assessments § 4, at 4 (1909) (defining a special 

assessment, when used in this context, as "a charge upon 

 5

 Of course, judicial estoppel prohibits a party "from 

taking inconsistent positions within a single action." Lofton 

Ridge, LLC v. Norfolk S. Railway, 268 Va. 377, 381-82, 601 

S.E.2d 648, 650-51 (2004). However, a party cannot concede the 

law. Cofield v. Nuckles, 239 Va. 186, 194, 387 S.E.2d 493, 498 

(1990). Further, a party's mistaken belief as to what statutes 

govern a particular set of facts does not bind this Court on 

appeal, nor does such an error prohibit this Court from 

establishing how a statutory scheme correctly operates or from 

applying the correct statutes to the set of facts before it. 

See Virginia Marine Res. Comm'n v. Chincoteague Inn, 287 Va. 

371, 388-89, 757 S.E.2d 1, 10 (2014); Wright v. Commonwealth, 

278 Va. 754, 760 n.3, 685 S.E.2d 655, 658 n.3 (2009); see also, 

e.g., PS Business Parks, L.P. v. Deutsch & Gilden, Inc., 287 

Va. 410, 420-22, 758 S.E.2d 508, 513-14 (2014). 
19

property, imposed by proper authority, usually in return for 

special benefits conferred upon such property by an improvement 

of a public character for the expense of making which the 

assessment is levied"); id. § 7, at 11-13 (further defining 

what constitutes a special assessment); id. § 35, at 59-62 

(distinguishing a tax, which is a "recurring charge" that "is 

levied for the purpose of raising revenue for paying the 

expenses of the government," from a special assessment, which 

is only levied "occasionally" and for purposes of paying for 

the "special benefits conferred upon" the property owner); id.

§ 50, at 86 (noting that one definition of "special tax" is 

"that of a tax analogous to the general tax, but devoted to a 

specific purpose and not to be used for the general expenses of 

the public corporation which levies it"). 

In the context of community development authorities, the 

General Assembly has acted in accordance with this longstanding 

law by distinguishing between a special tax and a special 

assessment. On the one hand, a special tax must come as an 

"annual[]" "[r]equest" by the community development authority 

for the locality to "levy and collect" that tax so as to 

"finance the services and facilities provided by" the 

development authority. Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3). On the other 

hand, a special assessment arises from "improvements" to "the 

services and facilities" provided "to abutting property within 
20

the district" under the development authority's oversight, and 

must comply with "the laws pertaining to assessments under 

Article 2 ([Code §] 15.2-2404 et seq.)" as well as other 

expressly detailed requirements. Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5).6

 6

 Justice McClanahan correctly observes that Code § 15.2-

5158(A)(5) mentions both "assessments" and "taxes." However, a 

close reading of this statutory provision reveals that the 

reference to "taxes" is inadvertent and does not alter our 

conclusion that special assessments under Code § 15.2-

5158(A)(5) are treated differently from special taxes under 

Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) and real estate taxes under Code § 58.1-

3965. 

 Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5) contains five sentences. The 

first, third, fourth, and fifth sentences are all substantive 

provisions and provide, respectively: that every community 

development authority has the power to request imposition of 

special assessments; how special assessments shall be made 

effective; how special assessments shall be implemented; and 

how revenues collected from special assessments shall be 

disposed. In each of these sentences, the General Assembly 

uses only the terms "special assessment" or "assessments." 

 The second sentence of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5) is not 

substantive, but establishes certain requirements for "[a]ll 

assessments [imposed] pursuant to this section." (Emphasis 

added.) As part of those requirements, the second sentence 

first references "the laws pertaining to assessments under 

Article 2 ([Code] § 15.2-2404 et seq.) of Chapter 24," and then 

provides three additional requirements. In setting forth these 

three additional requirements, Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5) refers to 

"taxes or assessments." 

 This passing reference to "taxes" in the second sentence 

does not alter the scope of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5). The second 

sentence provides requirements only for "[a]ll assessments," 

not taxes, and does not modify the fact that the other four 

sentences apply only to assessments. Further, the reference to 

"taxes" is inadvertent. The first phrase of the second 

sentence invokes Article 2 of Chapter 24, Code § 15.2-2404 et 

seq. In turn, Article 2 of Chapter 24 pertains to taxes and 

assessments for local improvements as imposed by localities, 

unrelated to community development associations. In 

incorporating the requirements of Article 2 of Chapter 24 to 
21

2. Determining Whether An Obligation Is A Special Tax Or 

Special Assessment Is A Mixed Question Of Law And Fact 

Determining whether a particular obligation levied against 

real estate is a special tax or a special assessment under the 

Code requires evaluating the specific obligation imposed 

relative to the different statutory definitions. Recognizing 

this as the correct analysis, we respectfully but necessarily 

disagree with our colleagues in concurrence and dissent who 

contend that the City's resolution governing the CDA answers 

 

apply only to special assessments imposed under Code § 15.2-

5158(A)(5), the General Assembly inadvertently included the 

"tax" term from Article 2 of Chapter 24 when setting forth the 

three additional requirements that special assessments must 

satisfy when imposed pursuant to Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5). 

 Thus, Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5) only governs special 

assessments requested by a community development authority. 

Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) only governs special taxes requested by 

a community development authority. Code § 58.1-3965 only 

governs taxes on real estate. These three provisions govern 

three different types of obligations. Although the dividing 

line between these types of obligations is not always clear or 

defined with the most precise language, the General Assembly 

has enacted a scheme whereby different obligations are governed 

by different procedures. This is an exceptional situation in 

which we must recognize that the word "tax," as used in a 

portion of a single sentence of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5), appears 

to be a legislative scrivener's error. Our holding is 

necessary to avoid the absurd result of dismantling the General 

Assembly's carefully crafted statutory scheme distinguishing 

between these different obligations. Idoux, 279 Va. at 554, 

691 S.E.2d at 776 ("[N]o part [of a statute] will be treated as 

meaningless unless absolutely necessary." (emphasis added)); 

Covel v. Town of Vienna, 280 Va. 151, 158, 694 S.E.2d 609, 614 

(2010) (construing a statute so that the law is "incapable of 

operation" is an absurd result (internal quotation marks 

omitted)); see also Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 

723-24 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
22

the question. To the extent a locality's resolution or 

ordinance purports to limit a community development authority's 

powers, such a fact only addresses whether the relevant 

governmental authority acted within its scope of authority when 

levying a particular obligation. It does not answer the wholly 

separate question of what that obligation is under the Code. 

As such, whether an obligation is a special tax or a 

special assessment for purposes of the Code is a mixed question 

of law and fact. See Smyth County Cmty. Hosp. v. Town of 

Marion, 259 Va. 328, 336, 527 S.E.2d 401, 405 (2000). The 

factual predicate for such a determination in this case is 

poorly developed. The circuit court – understandably, in light 

of the parties' confusion of the issue – failed to make factual 

findings germane to whether the obligation in question is a 

special tax or a special assessment. Moreover, the parties did 

not brief the issue before the circuit court, and provided only 

a cursory discussion of the issue before this Court. 

Considering the insufficiency of the record in this 

regard, and the parties' continuing disagreement about this 

fundamental aspect of the case, we decline to make a factual 

finding ourselves. See Bailey, 288 Va. at 181, 762 S.E.2d at 

773 ("[W]e are a court of review, not of first view." (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted)). However, we need not 

decide the issue, nor must we remand the case to develop such 
23

factual findings, because the circuit court erred as a matter 

of law in entering the decree of sale regardless of whether the 

delinquent special assessments are categorized as special taxes 

or special assessments under the Code. See D.R. Horton, Inc. 

v. Board of Supervisors, 285 Va. 467, 471-75, 737 S.E.2d 886, 

888-90 (2013) (addressing each of the appellant's alternative 

legal arguments as applied to the same set of facts). 

3. Analysis Of The "Special Assessments" As Special Taxes 

The collection of a delinquent "special tax" on behalf of 

a community development authority is governed by Code § 15.2-

5158(A)(3). A suit to collect outstanding special taxes must 

be brought "at the same time" as when "the locality's taxes are 

collected." Id. 

The City chose delinquent real estate taxes to be the type 

of "locality's taxes" to which the collection of these 

particular delinquent special taxes was coupled by operation of 

Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3). Consequently, when those special taxes 

may be collected is dictated by when the City could collect 

such delinquent real estate taxes. And as established, the 

City could not bring suit under Code § 58.1-3965(A) to sell 

CVAS 2's real estate in order to collect the delinquent real 

estate taxes, which dated back to November 15, 2011, until 

December 31, 2013. Further, the City has not adopted an 

ordinance pursuant to Code § 58.1-3965.2(ii) allowing for it to 
24

expedite and collect delinquent special taxes independent from 

its collection of another type of delinquent "locality's 

taxes." Thus, the City could not bring suit on June 13, 2013 

to collect the delinquent special assessments dating back to 

the 2009 fiscal year, even if they are in fact special taxes 

under the Code.7

A suit to sell real estate to collect special taxes on 

that property is purely a creature of statute. See Lester 

Group, 238 Va. at 57, 381 S.E.2d at 5. A party's ability to 

"enforce" such a statutory right "rest[s] upon compliance with 

the statute." Isle of Wight Materials, 246 Va. at 105, 431 

S.E.2d at 43 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Thus, because the City did not strictly comply with the time 

period in Code §§ 15.2-5158(A)(3) and 58.1-3965(A) allowing for 

 7

 Justice Powell contends that the delinquent special taxes 

could have been collected under Code § 58.1-3965, which is a 

general provision governing "any taxes on any real estate," as 

a matter of course. This reading unnecessarily renders 

meaningless the "at the same time and in the same manner" 

language of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3), which is a specific 

provision governing the collection of special taxes. 

 Absent an ordinance adopted pursuant to Code § 58.1-

3965.2(ii), a special tax can only be collected "at the same 

time" when another type of "locality's tax[]" is collected. 

Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3). A special tax cannot be collected 

independent of collecting another "locality's tax[]" simply by 

invoking Code § 58.1-3965. See Idoux, 279 Va. at 554, 691 

S.E.2d at 776 ("[N]o part [of a statute] will be treated as 

meaningless unless absolutely necessary."); Peerless Ins. Co. 

v. County of Fairfax, 274 Va. 236, 244, 645 S.E.2d 478, 483 

(2007) (holding that specific statutes prevail over general 

statutes). 
25

such a suit to be brought, the City had no authority under 

those statutes to bring suit to sell CVAS 2's real estate as a 

means to collect delinquent special taxes. See Lester Group, 

238 Va. at 57, 381 S.E.2d at 5. 

4. Analysis Of The "Special Assessments" As Special 

Assessments 

The collection of a delinquent "special assessment" on 

behalf of a community development authority is governed by Code 

§ 15.2-5158(A)(5). Delinquent special assessments may be 

collected as a lien upon the property if the locality has 

passed an ordinance allowing for special assessments to be made 

effective in such a manner. Id. As discussed, however, the 

plain language of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5) does not invoke the 

authority under Code § 58.1-3965(A) to sell real estate subject 

to a special assessment. And the City has not adopted an 

ordinance pursuant to Code § 58.1-3965.2(ii) allowing for it to 

file suit to have CVAS 2's real estate sold to collect 

delinquent special assessments pursuant to Article 4 of Chapter 

39 of Title 58.1, Code § 58.1-3965 et seq. 

A suit to collect delinquent special assessments is purely 

a creature of statute. See Lester Group, 238 Va. at 57, 381 

S.E.2d at 5. A party's ability to "enforce" such a statutory 

right "rest[s] upon compliance with the statute." Isle of 

Wight Materials, 246 Va. at 105, 431 S.E.2d at 43 (internal 
26

quotation marks and citation omitted). The City, being the 

party asserting the statutory right which has been challenged, 

has the burden of proving compliance with the statutory scheme. 

See Moore v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1, 15, 155 S.E. 635, 639 

(1930); see also, e.g., Glasser & Glasser, PLC v. Jack Bays, 

Inc., 285 Va. 358, 369-71, 741 S.E.2d 599, 605 (2013) (party 

asserting the statutory right to enforce a mechanic's lien has 

the burden of naming all necessary parties so as to comply with 

the statutory scheme). 

CVAS 2 challenged the City's ability to file suit to 

collect the delinquent special assessments, and the City failed 

to establish that it complied with the statutes actually 

pertaining to the collection of special assessments. Because 

the City has not shown that it has strictly complied with Code 

§§ 15.2-5158(A)(5) or 58.1-3965.2 allowing for it to bring suit 

to collect delinquent special assessments, the City has not 

established authority under those statutes to bring suit to 

sell CVAS 2's real estate as a means to collect the delinquent 

special assessments. See Lester Group, 238 Va. at 57, 381 

S.E.2d at 5. 

III. Conclusion 

The General Assembly has established a comprehensive 

statutory scheme affording localities, local governing bodies, 

and community development associations the ability to levy and 
27

collect real estate taxes, special taxes, and special 

assessments owed to a governmental entity by a property owner, 

including the right to sell the subject real estate. However, 

the governmental authority must act pursuant to, and in 

compliance with, that statutory scheme in order to bring suit 

to collect such delinquent obligations. 

We reverse the circuit court's judgment because the City 

failed to act in compliance with the relevant statutory 

provisions. With the City having no basis for relief under 

those statutes, the circuit court lacked authority to order the 

sale of CVAS 2's real estate. We will vacate the decree of 

sale and dismiss the City's suit against CVAS 2. 

Reversed, vacated, and dismissed. 

JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

 While I agree with the majority opinion on the initial 

jurisdictional issue, I disagree with it on the merits and 

would affirm the circuit court. First, as addressed in the 

concurring opinion, it is undisputed that the subject 

delinquent obligation on CVAS 2's real property is a "special 

assessment" under Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5). Second, the special 

assessment is a form of taxation on real estate, based on both 

the express language of subsection (A)(5) of the statute 

(describing the obligation alternatively as a levy of "taxes or 
28

assessments") and the treatment of the subject by this Court. 

Third, because the special assessment on CVAS 2's property is a 

real estate tax, and it is more than two years past due, the 

property can be sold for the delinquent taxes pursuant to Code 

§ 58.1-3965, as the circuit court held. 

 CVAS 2 admitted in its answer to the City's complaint that 

the levy was a special assessment, which is exclusively 

controlled by subsection (A)(5) of Code § 15.2-5158 (not 

subsection (A)(3) of the statute). Moreover, the City's 

September 13, 2005 resolution governing the Celebrate Virginia 

South Community Development Authority ("CDA") expressly 

authorized the imposition of special assessments pursuant to 

Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5), not a "special tax" under subsection 

(A)(3) of the statute. The resolution then sets forth the 

methodology to be used in levying the special assessment on 

"the parcels [of land] in the CDA so that there is a rational 

relationship between the assessments and the benefit received 

from public improvements by each parcel." This provision is in 

keeping with the express requirement under Code § 15.2-

5158(A)(5) that such "taxes or assessments may be imposed upon 

abutting land which is later subdivided in accordance with the 

terms of the ordinance forming the district, in amounts which 

do not exceed the peculiar benefits of the improvements to the 

abutting land as subdivided." In this case, the "taxes or 
29

assessments" levied pursuant to subsection (A)(5) were for the 

purpose of financing the debt on bonds issued by the CDA to 

fund its improvements in the district. Id. 

 As indicated above, the "special assessment," which is the 

sole subject of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5), is described therein as 

the levy of "taxes or assessments."1

 In so describing the 

 1

 Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5)states as follows: 

 A. Each community development authority created under this 

article, in addition to the powers provided in Article 3 (§ 

15.2-5110 et seq.) of Chapter 51 of this title, may: 

. . . . 

 5. Finance the services and facilities it provides to 

abutting property within the district by special assessment 

thereon imposed by the local governing body. All assessments 

pursuant to this section shall be subject to the laws 

pertaining to assessments under Article 2 (§ 15.2-2404 et seq.) 

of Chapter 24; provided that any other provision of law 

notwithstanding, (i) the taxes or assessments shall not exceed 

the full cost of the improvements, including without limitation 

the legal, financial and other directly attributable costs of 

creating the district and the planning, designing, operating 

and financing of the improvements which include administration 

of the collection and payment of the assessments and reserve 

funds permitted by applicable law; (ii) the taxes or 

assessments may be imposed upon abutting land which is later 

subdivided in accordance with the terms of the ordinance 

forming the district, in amounts which do not exceed the 

peculiar benefits of the improvements to the abutting land as 

subdivided; and (iii) the taxes or assessments may be made 

subject to installment payments for up to 40 years in an amount 

calculated to cover principal, interest and administrative 

costs in connection with any financing by the authority, 

without a penalty for prepayment. Notwithstanding any other 

provision of law, any assessments made pursuant to this section 

may be made effective as a lien upon a specified date, by 

ordinance, but such assessments may not thereafter be modified 
30

special assessment, the legislature did not establish two 

different schemes under subsection (A)(5) for imposing a local 

levy on properties located within a particular district in 

order to fund the improvements undertaken by a community 

development authority. Rather, subsection (A)(5) makes 

provision for financing such improvements only through one type 

of levy specifically tied to the costs of the improvements and 

the "peculiar" benefits conferred upon the properties by those 

improvements - whether the levy is called a tax or an 

assessment.2

 Id.; see also Code § 15.2-2404 (establishing 

 

in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the debt instruments 

financing the improvements. All assessments pursuant to this 

section may also be made subject to installment payments and 

other provisions allowed for local assessments under this 

section or under Article 2 of Chapter 24. All revenues received 

by the locality pursuant to any such special assessments which 

the locality elects to impose upon request of the development 

authority shall be paid over to the development authority for 

its use under this chapter, subject to annual appropriation, 

and may be used for no other purposes. 

(Emphasis added.) 

2

 By contrast, the local levy authorized under subsection 

(A)(3) of Code § 15.2-5158 as a "special tax" to finance the 

services and facilities provided by the community development 

authority contains no limit based on the benefit of the 

authority's improvements. Rather, it sets a limit that is tied 

to the assessed fair market value of the taxable real estate in 

the district ($.25 per $100 of assessed fair market value of 

each parcel). 

 Subsection (A)(3) is not controlling in this case, in 

light of the provisions and application of subsection (A)(5). 

I note my agreement, however, with the concurring opinion's 

interpretation of the phrase "at the same time and in the same 
31

similar authority for local governments to impose "taxes or 

assessments" on properties located in a particular area in 

order to fund a variety of permitted improvements that would 

specifically benefit those properties). 

 The description of the special assessment authorized under 

Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5) as the levy of "taxes or assessments" is 

consistent with the general definition of the term "special 

assessment": "[t]he assessment of a tax on property that 

benefits in some important way from a public improvement." 

Black's Law Dictionary 140 (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). 

 In City of Richmond v. Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike 

Authority, 204 Va. 596, 600, 132 S.E.2d 733, 736 (1963), this 

Court recognized that a special assessment like the one at 

issue here is most assuredly a tax on real estate. There, the 

Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike Authority contended that, as a 

political subdivision of the Commonwealth, it was exempt from 

special assessments made against it by the City of Richmond for 

 

manner" in subsection (A)(3), which is the linchpin of the 

majority's analysis. More specifically, I agree that this 

phrase is not in reference to Code § 58.1-3965, which sets 

forth the authority and outlines the procedure for a locality 

to effect a foreclose sale for delinquent real estate taxes. 

When the phrase is read in a proper context, it is apparent 

that the phrase only addresses the time and manner in which the 

"special tax" is to be collected "annually" by the locality as 

part of its routine procedure of billing and receiving payment 

of taxes - not the procedure governing a foreclosure sale when 

the taxes are delinquent. Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3). 
32

the construction of sidewalks abutting the Authority's 

properties. The City countered that the Authority was only 

exempt from taxes, whereas the assessments at issue were not 

taxes. Id. at 597, 132 S.E.2d at 733-34. In holding for the 

Authority, the Court explained that "[c]ourts and text writers, 

generally, make a distinction between special assessments, or 

special taxes to pay for local improvements, and general tax 

levies for purposes of carrying on the government." Id. at 

598, 132 S.E.2d at 734. In that sense, "[t]he word 'taxes,'" 

in reference to general taxes, "is not synonymous with 

'assessments.'" Id. The Court nonetheless concluded that 

"[t]he levies here, whether they be called taxes or 

assessments, were taxes - maybe a special kind of taxes - that 

is, local taxes assessed and imposed as liens upon real estate 

of a political subdivision of the Commonwealth of Virginia."3 

 3

 This distinction between special assessments and general 

taxes, as relates to the improvements for which they are 

levied, has been well summarized as follows: 

 There is a distinction between public improvements, which 

benefit the entire community, and local improvements, which 

benefit particular real estate or limited areas of land. The 

latter improvements are usually financed by means of special, 

or local, assessments. These assessments are, in a certain 

sense, taxes. But an assessment differs from a general tax in 

that an assessment is levied only on property in the immediate 

vicinity of some local municipal improvement and is valid only 

where the property assessed receives some special benefit 

differing from the benefit that the general public enjoys. 

Robert Kratovil, Real Estate Law § 690, at 465 (6th ed. 1974). 
33

Id. at 600, 132 S.E.2d at 736 (emphasis added). See City of 

Roanoke v. Fisher, 193 Va. 651, 654, 70 S.E.2d 274, 277 (1952) 

(identifying a "special assessment" to finance the cost of 

local improvements as "in reality a tax"); see also Illinois 

Central R.R. Co. v. Decatur, 147 U.S. 190, 197 (1893) 

(explaining distinction between "general taxes" as one form of 

levy on property and "special taxes or special assessments" as 

another, "both of [which] are properly called taxes"); City of 

Beckley v. Wolford, 140 S.E. 344, 345 (W. Va. 1927) (noting 

that it is "thoroughly established" that "special assessments 

are a species of taxation, and the authority to enforce them is 

a branch of the taxing power") (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). Accord: French v. Barber Asphalt Paving 

Co., 181 U.S. 324, 343-44 (1901)(adopting Judge Dillon's 

synthesis that the levy of "special assessments" is "a branch 

of the taxing power, or included within it"); Parsons v. 

District of Columbia, 170 U.S. 45, 55-56 (1898)(same).4

 4

 In light of such authority, it is understandable why the 

legislature chose to describe the "special assessment" under 

Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5) as a levy of "taxes or assessments." 

See also Code § 15.2-2404. Completely ignoring this line of 

case law, however, the majority merely asserts that the 

legislature's description is "inadvertent." Moreover, in doing 

so, the majority overlooks the salient point recognized by 

these cases that a special assessment like the one here is one 

form of a real estate tax - even if the legislature had not 

included the word "taxes" in describing it. 
34

 Finally, because the special assessment under Code § 15.2-

5158(A)(5) is a tax on real estate, it falls squarely within 

the purview of Code § 58.1-3965 for its collection by 

foreclosure sale when delinquent. Code § 58.1-3965(A) states, 

in relevant part, that "[w]hen any taxes on any real estate in 

a locality are delinquent on December 31 following the second 

anniversary of the date on which such taxes have become due . . 

. such real estate may be sold for the purpose of collecting 

all delinquent taxes on such property." (Emphasis added.) In 

this case, it is undisputed that CVAS 2's special assessment 

was more than two years past due. Accordingly, CVAS 2's 

property, on which the City levied the special assessment, was 

subject to a foreclosure sale for the delinquent taxes under 

Code § 58.1-3965. 

 For these reasons, I would affirm the circuit court in 

ordering the sale of CVAS 2's property pursuant to Code § 58.1-

3965, and remand the case to the court for further proceedings. 

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE GOODWYN joins, concurring. 

 Although I agree with the outcome of this case, I write 

separately because I disagree with the majority with regard to 

its analysis of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) and Code § 58.2-3965. 

 As an initial matter, in my opinion the majority applies 

an incorrect standard of review in its analysis of the 
35

ordinance at issue in this case. The majority relies on Smyth 

County Community Hospital v. Town of Marion, 259 Va. 328, 336, 

527 S.E.2d 401, 405 (2000), where this Court held that 

“application of the requirements of [a statute] is a mixed 

question of fact and law.” The issue in Smyth County Community 

Hospital was whether a property was used in a manner that 

“immediately and directly promote[d] the charitable purposes of 

the hospital,” thereby exempting that property from taxation. 

Id. In other words, it was necessary for us to examine the 

facts before we could determine whether the law applied. The 

question in the present case, however, is not whether the 

ordinance applies to CVAS 2’s property; rather, the question is 

what type of obligation is created by the ordinance. 

 In support of its holding, the majority explains that 

“[d]etermining whether a particular obligation levied against 

real estate is a special tax or a special assessment under the 

Code requires evaluating the specific obligation imposed 

relative to the different statutory definitions.” It is 

unclear, however, how such a determination requires any form of 

factual predicate. Indeed, the majority fails to explain what 

factual findings, if any, a trial court could make that would 

be germane to the issue of whether the ordinance created a 

special tax or a special assessment. 
36

 In my opinion, determining the meaning of a statute or 

ordinance relative to other statutory definitions is the very 

definition of statutory interpretation. Accordingly, the 

determination of what type of obligation this ordinance creates 

is clearly an issue of statutory interpretation subject to de 

novo review by this Court. See Renkey v. County Bd., 272 Va. 

369, 373, 634 S.E.2d 352, 355 (2006) (recognizing that 

interpretation of an ordinance “is a pure question of law 

subject to de novo review by this Court”). 

 Here, the plain language of the relevant ordinance 

unequivocally establishes that the obligation levied on the 

property is a special assessment. The ordinance consistently 

refers to the obligation as a special assessment and never once 

refers to it as a tax of any sort. Further, the ordinance 

specifically provides that the debt incurred by the CDA will be 

“covered by . . . special assessments pursuant to Virginia Code 

§ 15.2-5158(A)(5).” The ordinance goes on to explain that the 

special assessments will levy a lien upon the property. See

City of Fredericksburg Resolution No. 05-87 (“[A]ll real 

property in the District may be subject to the lien of a 

special assessment to be established and levied by this 

Resolution”) (emphasis added). Notably, under Code § 15.2-

5158(A)(5), only special assessments may be made effective as a 

lien upon property to be paid in installments. 
37

 Thus, it is readily apparent that the ordinance at issue 

in the present case created a special assessment. Accordingly, 

the majority should have limited its analysis in this case to 

the application of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5). Indeed, I agree 

with the majority’s application of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5). 

However, I believe that the majority’s analysis of Code § 15.2-

5158(A)(3), which only applies to special taxes, is unnecessary 

and is, therefore, obiter dicta. See Harmon v. Peery, 145 Va. 

578, 583, 134 S.E. 701, 702 (1926) (“Obiter dicta are such 

opinions uttered by the way, not upon the point or question 

pending, . . . as if turning aside . . . from the main topic of 

the case to collateral subjects.” (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted)). 

 Notwithstanding the fact that I believe the majority’s 

analysis of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) is unnecessary, I feel 

compelled to address the majority’s application of the statute. 

As an initial matter, I agree with the majority’s basic premise 

that, as used in this statute, “at the same time” establishes 

when a special tax is collected and “in the same manner” 

establishes how a special tax is collected. I further agree 

with the majority that “when a special tax is collected is 

determined by the time when ‘the locality's taxes’ are 

collected” and “how a special tax is collected is determined by 

the manner in which ‘the locality's taxes’ are collected.” 
38

Thus, under this logic, Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) allows a 

locality to collect special taxes when (i.e., “at the same 

time”) and how (i.e., “in the same manner”) that locality’s 

other taxes are collected. 

 However, I believe the majority’s analysis goes awry when 

it creates a “prerequisite for collecting special taxes.” 

Nothing in the statute indicates any such prerequisite. 

Indeed, such an interpretation adds an additional procedural 

requirement to the collection of special taxes, thus running 

counter to the previously established definitions of “at the 

same time” and “in the same manner.” Rather, the statute 

merely states that the locality must use the same procedural 

and temporal provisions that govern the collection of its other 

taxes.1

 Furthermore, the majority fails to give proper weight to 

the plain language of Code § 58.1-3965(A). Special taxes under 

Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) are levied on “taxable real property 

within the development authority's jurisdiction to finance the 

services and facilities provided by the authority.” Code 

§ 58.1-3965(A) applies “[w]hen any taxes on any real estate in 

 1

 I do, however, agree with the majority that a locality is 

allowed to choose which of its taxes will provide the necessary 

procedural and temporal provisions for the collection of 

special taxes. 
39

a locality are delinquent on December 31 following the second 

anniversary of the date on which such taxes have become due.” 

(Emphasis added.) As the special taxes described in Code 

§ 15.2-5158(A)(3) are clearly taxes on real estate, Code 

§ 58.1-3965(A) may be utilized to collect any sufficiently 

delinquent special taxes owed on the property, independent of 

whether there are any other delinquent real estate taxes due.2

 2

 Contrary to what the majority states, my interpretation 

of Code § 58.1-3965(A) does not render meaningless the “at the 

same time and in the same manner” language of Code § 15.2-

5158(A)(3). Code § 58.1-3965(A) does not apply to the general 

collection of taxes on real estate; it only applies when 

certain conditions are met, i.e., when the taxes on real estate 

are sufficiently delinquent. Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3), on the 

other hand, only applies to the general collection of special 

taxes; it makes no reference to the collection of delinquent 

special taxes. Thus, the two statutes can be read 

harmoniously: Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) applies to the normal 

collection of special taxes and Code § 58.1-3965(A) applies 

when those special taxes become delinquent. See, e.g., L.F. v. 

Breit, 285 Va. 163, 178, 736 S.E.2d 711, 719 (2013)(“[T]wo 

statutes must be read ‘as a consistent and harmonious whole to 

give effect to the overall statutory scheme.’")(quoting Bowman 

v. Concepcion, 283 Va. 552, 563, 722 S.E.2d 260, 266 (2012)). 

See also City of Lynchburg v. English Constr. Co., 277 Va. 574, 

580, 675 S.E.2d 197, 200 (2009)(applying this doctrine to 

multiple statutes governing collection of taxes by localities). 

 Furthermore, I note that nowhere does Code § 15.2-

5158(A)(3) state that “a special tax can only be collected ‘at 

the same time’ when another type of ‘locality's tax[]’ is 

collected,” as the majority insists. (Emphasis added.) 

Indeed, such an approach necessarily renders the introductory 

clause of Code § 58.1-3965.2 meaningless. Code § 58.1-3965.2 

specifically references Code § 58.1-3965 as providing the 

authority to initiate proceedings to sell property to collect 

delinquent special taxes. Code § 58.1-3965.2 does not require 

that the authority provided by Code § 58.1-3965 be exercised in 

conjunction with Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3). Thus, it is readily 
40

 The majority’s holding with regard to special taxes 

results in a curious taxing scheme. It makes no sense to allow 

a property owner to disregard special taxes with impunity, so 

long as he continues to pay the requisite “locality’s taxes” on 

time. Indeed, it is unclear how a locality could ever collect 

delinquent special taxes, absent the existence of the necessary 

“prerequisite” delinquent “locality’s taxes.”3

 In my opinion, the ordinance unequivocally created a 

special assessment under Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5). As I agree 

with the majority’s analysis with regard to special 

assessments, I concur in the judgment reversing the decision of 

the trial court. I disagree with the majority’s further 

analysis of the case under Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3). If, 

however, the obligations levied on the property had actually 

 

apparent that the General Assembly did not intend for Code 

§ 15.2-5158(A)(3) to be the sole method by which a locality 

could collect special taxes. 

3

 Under the majority’s interpretation of Code § 15.2-

5158(A)(3), not even the eventual sale of the property would 

necessarily allow a locality to collect the delinquent special 

taxes unless the locality was also able to collect the 

prerequisite “locality’s taxes” at the same time. A 

particularly crafty property owner could time the sale of the 

property such that none of the prerequisite “locality’s taxes” 

were due at the time of sale. As there is nothing in Code 

§ 15.2-5158(A)(3) that allows the locality to treat the 

delinquent special taxes as a lien upon the property, the 

locality is left with no way to collect the delinquent special 

taxes. 
41

been special taxes under Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3), then, I would 

have affirmed the decision of the trial court.