LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

AND FRIGATE

Congress Faced with 

Critical Acquisition 

Decisions

Statement of Paul L. Francis, Managing Director, 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management

Testimony 

Before the Committee on Armed 

Services, U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9:30 a.m. ET

Thursday, December 1, 2016

GAO-17-262T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-262T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Armed Services, 

U.S. Senate

December 1, 2016

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP AND FRIGATE

Congress Faced with Critical Acquisition Decisions

What GAO Found

The Navy’s vision for Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has evolved 

significantly over the last 15 years, reflecting degradations of the underlying 

business case. Initial plans to experiment with two different prototype ships 

adapted from commercial designs were abandoned early in favor of an 

acquisition approach that committed to numerous ships before proving their 

capabilities. Ships were not delivered quickly to the fleet at low cost. Rather cost,

schedule, and capability expectations degraded over time. In contrast, a sound 

business case would have balanced needed resources—time, money, and 

technical knowledge—to transform a concept into the desired product.

Evolution of Expectations for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program

Early program Updated program

Quantity and 

cost

55 seaframes @ $220 million each 40 seaframes @ $478 million each 

Schedule Ship initial operational capability 

(IOC) in 2007

Ship IOC with partial capability in 2013

Design Leverage existing designs for

reduced cost, rapid fielding

Considerable design changes, under 

revision throughout early construction

Seaframe Sprint speed: 40-50 knots; range: 

1,000 nautical miles @ 40 knots

Neither seaframe meets combined 

original speed and range expectations

Mission 

Packages

IOC for three mission packages by 

2010

Revised IOC – one package in 2015; two 

more planned by 2020

Source: GAO analysis of prior GAO reports and Navy documentation. | GAO-17-262T

Concerned about the LCS’s survivability and lethality, in 2014 the Secretary of 

Defense directed the Navy to evaluate alternatives. After rejecting more capable 

ships based partly on cost, schedule, and industrial base considerations, the 

Navy chose the existing LCS designs with minor modifications and re-designated 

the ship as a frigate. Much of the LCS’s capabilities are yet to be demonstrated 

and the frigate’s design, cost, and capabilities are not well-defined. The Navy 

proposes to commit quickly to the frigate in what it calls a block buy of 12 ships.

Congress has key decisions for fiscal years 2017 and 2018 that have significant 

funding and oversight implications. First, the Navy has already requested funding

to buy two more baseline LCS ships in fiscal year 2017. Second, early next year, 

the Navy plans to request authorization for a block buy of all 12 frigates and 

funding in the fiscal year 2018 budget request for the lead frigate. Making these 

commitments now could make it more difficult to make decisions in the future to 

reduce or delay the program should that be warranted. A more basic oversight 

question today is whether a ship that costs twice as much yet delivers less 

capability than planned warrants an additional investment of nearly $14 billion. 

GAO has advised Congress to consider not funding the two LCS requested in 

2017 given its now obsolete design and existing construction backlogs. 

Authorizing the block buy strategy for the frigate appears premature. The 

decisions Congress makes could have implications for what aspiring programs 

view as acceptable strategies.

View GAO-17-262T. For more information, 

contact Paul Francis at (202) 512-4841 or 

francisp@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

The Navy envisioned a revolutionary 

approach for the LCS program: dual

ship designs with interchangeable 

mission packages intended to provide 

mission flexibility at a lower cost. This 

approach has fallen short, with 

significant cost increases and reduced 

expectations about mission flexibility 

and performance. The Navy has 

changed acquisition approaches 

several times. The latest change 

involves minor upgrades to an LCS 

design—referred to now as a frigate. 

Yet, questions persist about both the 

LCS and the frigate.

GAO has reported on the acquisition 

struggles facing LCS and now the 

frigate, particularly in GAO-13-530 and 

GAO-16-356. This statement 

discusses: (1) the evolution of the LCS 

acquisition strategy and business case; 

(2) key risks in the Navy’s plans for the 

frigate based on the LCS program; and 

(3) remaining oversight opportunities 

for the LCS and small surface 

combatant programs. This statement is 

largely based on GAO’s prior reports 

and larger work on shipbuilding and 

acquisition best practices. It

incorporates limited updated audit work 

where appropriate.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making any new 

recommendations in this statement but 

has made numerous recommendations 

to the Department of Defense (DOD) in 

the past on LCS and frigate

acquisition, including strengthening the 

program’s business case before 

proceeding with acquisition decisions. 

While DOD has, at times, agreed with 

GAO’s recommendations, it has taken 

limited action to implement them.
Letter

Page 1 GAO-17-262T 

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the 

Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of the Navy’s 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and frigate programs. The Navy envisioned a 

revolutionary approach to the LCS program. Unlike other surface 

combatant programs, LCS consists of two different ship design variants 

(called seaframes) with interchangeable mission packages carrying 

equipment for three mission areas—surface and anti-submarine warfare, 

and mine countermeasures—intended to give the Navy flexibility to 

rapidly deploy equipment and incorporate new systems. Coupled with this 

approach, the LCS would have a smaller crew that would rely on shorebased support for its maintenance needs in an effort to reduce life-cycle 

costs. To execute the program, the Navy deviated from traditional 

shipbuilding acquisition in hopes of rapidly delivering ships to the fleet. 

The consequences of this approach are well known today—costs to 

construct the ships have more than doubled from initial expectations, with 

promised levels of capability unfulfilled and deliveries significantly 

delayed. Acknowledging capability and affordability concerns, the 

Department of Defense (DOD)—in conjunction with the Navy—changed 

course in February 2014 to pursue a more capable frigate based on the 

LCS concept.1

Today, with 26 ships delivered or under contract, the LCS program again 

stands at a crossroads, as Congress will decide on funding the last two 

planned LCS and will be asked early next year to authorize the Navy’s 

plans to procure the remaining 12 ships, including funding the lead 

frigate. With that context in mind, I will discuss today: (1) the evolution of 

the LCS acquisition strategy and business case; (2) key risks in the 

Navy’s plans for the frigate based on the LCS program; and (3) remaining 

oversight opportunities for the LCS and small surface combatant 

programs.

 1

The term “frigate” can be applied to ships of different sizes and capability. The nowretired Oliver Hazzard Perry-class frigate (FFG 7) was the last U.S. Navy frigate. 

Frigates—including the FFG 7—have been identified as typically being open-ocean, multirole ships capable of performing surface, anti-submarine, and anti-air warfare.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-262T 

This testimony largely leverages our past reports on the LCS program 

from 2005 to 2016.2 We also draw on some conclusions from our broader 

work on Navy shipbuilding and acquisition reform initiatives. More 

detailed information on our objectives, scope, and methodology for that 

work can be found in the issued reports. We conducted the work on which 

this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. This 

statement also includes updates to information, as appropriate, based on 

program documentation and discussion with DOD officials—work that 

also was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards.

When first conceived, the LCS program represented an innovative 

approach for conducting naval operations, matched with a unique 

acquisition strategy that included two nontraditional shipbuilders and two 

different ships based on commercial designs—Lockheed Martin’s 

Freedom variant and Austal USA’s Independence variant, respectively.

3

The Navy planned to experiment with these ships to determine its 

preferred design variant. However, in relatively short order, this 

experimentation strategy was abandoned in favor of a more traditional 

acquisition of over 50 ships. More recently, the Secretary of Defense has 

questioned the appropriate capability and quantity of the LCS. The 

purpose of the program has evolved from concept experimentation, to 

LCS, and more recently, to an LCS that will be upgraded to a frigate. The 

strategy for contracting and competing for ship construction has also 

changed. This evolution is captured in figure 1.

 2

GAO, Littoral Combat Ship: Need to Address Fundamental Weaknesses in LCS and 

Frigate Acquisition Strategies, GAO-16-356, (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2016); Navy 

Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship Continue Amid 

Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost, GAO-13-530, (Washington, 

D.C.: July 22, 2013); and Defense Acquisitions: Plans Need to Allow Enough Time to 

Demonstrate Capability of First Littoral Combat Ships, GAO-05-255, (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 1, 2005).

3

Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for LCS 1 and the odd numbered seaframes. For 

LCS 2 and LCS 4, General Dynamics was the prime contractor for the Austal USA built 

ships. General Dynamics and Austal USA ended their teaming arrangement in 2010. 

Austal USA is the prime contractor for the remaining even-numbered seaframes.

The Course of the 

LCS Program Has 

Changed Significantly 

over Time
Page 3 GAO-17-262T 

Figure 1: A Persistent Pattern of Change to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Acquisition Strategy

While one could argue that a new concept should be expected to evolve 

over time, the LCS evolution has been complicated by the fact that major 

commitments have been made to build large numbers of ships before 
Page 4 GAO-17-262T 

proving their capabilities. Whereas acquisition best practices embrace a 

“fly before you buy” approach, the Navy has subscribed to a buy before 

you fly approach for LCS. Consequently, the business imperatives of 

budgeting, contracting, and ship construction have outweighed the need 

to demonstrate knowledge, such as technology maturation, design, and 

testing, resulting in a program that has delivered 8 ships and has 14 more 

in some stage of the construction process (includes LCS 21, with a 

planned December 2016 construction start) despite an unclear 

understanding of the capability the ships will ultimately be able to provide 

and with notable performance issues discovered among the few ships 

that have already been delivered.

The Navy’s vision for the LCS has evolved significantly over time, with 

questions remaining today about the program’s underlying business case. 

In its simplest form, a business case requires a balance between the 

concept selected to satisfy warfighter needs and the resources—

technologies, design knowledge, funding, and time—needed to transform 

the concept into a product, in this case a ship. In a number of reports and 

assessments since 2005, we have raised concerns about the Navy’s 

business case for LCS, noting risks related to cost, schedule, and 

technical problems, as well as the overall capability of the ships. Business 

case aside, the LCS program deviated from initial expectations, while 

continuing to commit to ship and mission package purchases.

The LCS acquisition was challenging from the outset. The Navy hoped to 

deliver large numbers of ships to the fleet quickly at a low cost. In an 

effort to achieve its goals, the Navy deviated from sound business 

practices by concurrently designing and constructing the two lead ship 

variants while still determining the ship’s requirements. The Navy 

believed it could manage this approach because it considered LCS to be 

an adaptation of existing commercial ship designs. However, transforming 

a commercial ship into a capable, survivable warship was an inherently 

complex undertaking. Elements of the business case further eroded—

including initial cost and schedule expectations. Table 1 compares the 

Navy’s initial expectations of the LCS business case with the present 

version of the program.

LCS Business Case 

Has Eroded as Cost,

Schedule, and 

Performance 

Expectations Have 

Not Been Met
Page 5 GAO-17-262T 

Table 1: Evolution of Expectations for the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program

Early program Updated program

Quantity and

cost

• 55 seaframes

• $220 million per seaframe

• 40 seaframes (includes 12 frigates)

• $478 million per seaframe

Schedule • Ships rapidly fielded, with initial 

operational capability (IOC) in 2007, 3 

years after program initiation

• IOC achieved with partial capability in 2013, 9 years after 

program initiation

Design • Leverage existing designs to enable a 

low-cost, rapidly fielded platform

• Designs required considerable change and were under 

revision throughout the first several ships built

Seaframe

Capability

• Sprint speed: 40-50 knots

• Range: 4,300-nautical-mile range when 

operated at a speed of 16 knots and 

1,000-nautical miles at 40 knots

• Speed: Freedom variant (odd-numbered ships, e.g., LCS 1) 

can meet speed requirements, but Independence variant 

(even-numbered ships, e.g., LCS 2) did not meet speed 

requirements; frigate will have reduced speed

• Range: In 2009, endurance requirement reduced to 3,500-

nautical-mile range at a speed of 14 knots. Freedom variant 

cannot meet these reduced requirements—with a 2,138-

nautical miles range at a speed of 14 knots and 855 nautical 

miles at 43.6 knots; Independence variant can meet range 

requirements

Mission 

Packages 

Capability 

• New capabilities would be rapidly fielded 

as the Navy would integrate existing 

technologies on to the three types of 

mission packages—mine 

countermeasures, surface warfare, and 

anti-submarine warfare

• Some technologies were ultimately less mature than 

envisioned, leading to significant difficulty developing mission 

capabilities

• Only one of three packages (surface warfare) has 

demonstrated required performance. However, initial 

operational capability was achieved at a temporarily reduced 

minimum capability requirement

Crewing and 

Logistics 

Constructs

• LCS would be minimally manned (55-60 

crew), with many support functions 

transferred to shore facilities

• LCS was initially intended to have a 3-2-1 

crewing construct, where 3 crews would 

support 2 LCS, and 1 LCS would remain 

forward deployed

• Crew size has increased over time to 70

• The Navy is transitioning to a blue/gold crew concept for LCS, 

where two crews will rotate on and off the same hull 

Source: GAO analysis of prior GAO reports and Navy documentation. | GAO-17-262T

Note: Costs are in fiscal year 2005 dollars.

Our recent work has shown that the LCS business case continues to 

weaken. LCS ships under construction have exceeded contract cost 

targets, with the government responsible for paying for a portion of the 

cost growth. This growth has prompted the Navy to request $246 million 

in additional funding for fiscal years 2015-2017 largely to address cost 

overruns on 12 LCS seaframes. Similarly, deliveries of almost all LCS 

under contract (LCS 5-26) have been delayed by several months, and, in 

some cases, closer to a year or longer. Navy officials recently reported 

that, despite having had 5 years of LCS construction to help stabilize ship 

delivery expectations, the program would not deliver four LCS in fiscal 

year 2016 as planned. Whereas the program expected to deliver all 55 
Page 6 GAO-17-262T 

ships in the class by fiscal year 2018, today that expectation has been 

reduced to 17 ships.

LCS mission packages, in particular, lag behind expectations. The Navy 

has fallen short of demonstrating that the LCS with its mission packages 

can meet the minimum level of capability defined at the beginning of the 

program. As figure 2 shows, 24 LCS seaframes will be delivered by the 

time all three mission packages achieve a minimum capability.

Figure 2: Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Operational Capability Delays Since 2007
Page 7 GAO-17-262T 

Since 2007, delivery of the total initial mission package operational 

capability has been delayed by about 9 years (from 2011 to 2020) and the 

Navy has lowered the level of performance needed to achieve the initial 

capability for two packages—surface warfare and mine countermeasures. 

In addition to mission package failures, the Navy has not met several 

seaframe objectives, including speed and range. For example, Navy 

testers estimate that the range of one LCS variant is about half of the 

minimum level identified at the beginning of the program. As the Navy 

continues to concurrently deliver seaframes and develop mission 

packages, it has become clear that the seaframes and mission package 

technologies were not mature and remain largely unproven. In response, 

the Navy recently designated the first four LCS as test ships to support an 

aggressive testing schedule between fiscal years 2017 and 2022. 

Additional deficiencies discovered during these tests could further delay 

capability and require expensive changes to the seaframes and mission 

packages that have already been delivered.

As the cost and schedule side of the business case for LCS has grown, 

performance and capabilities have declined. Changes in the LCS concept 

of operations are largely the consequence of less than expected lethality 

and survivability, which remain mostly unproven 7 years after delivery of 

the lead ships. LCS was designed with reduced requirements as 

compared to other surface combatants, and over time the Navy has 

lowered several survivability and lethality requirements further and 

removed some design features—making the ships less survivable in their 

expected threat environments and less lethal than initially planned. This 

has forced the Navy to redefine how it plans to operate the ships. Our 

previous work highlighted the changes in the LCS’s expected capability, 

as shown in table 2.

Table 2: Evolution of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Capability

Concept Initial Current

LCS’s capability

against

adversaries

LCS was primarily planned to be used in 

major combat operations, enter contested 

spaces, and be employable and 

sustainable throughout the battlespace

regardless of anti-access or area denial 

environments.

The Navy acknowledges current LCS weapon systems are underperforming and offer little chance of survival in a combat scenario.

LCS lacks the ability to operate independently in combat and should 

not be employed outside a benign, low-threat environment unless 

escorted by a multi-mission combatant providing credible anti-air, 

anti-surface, and anti-submarine protection.

How LCS will

deploy

LCS will be a self-sufficient combatant 

designed to fight and win in shallow water 

and near-land environments without risking 

larger combatants in constricted areas.

LCS’s dependencies in combat require it to be well-protected by 

multi-mission combatants. Multiple LCS will likely have to operate in 

a coordinated strike attack group fashion for mutual support.
Page 8 GAO-17-262T 

Concept Initial Current

How mission

packages swaps

will be utilized

Mission packages will be quickly swapped 

out in an expeditionary theater in a matter 

of days.

Mission packages can be swapped within 72 hours only if all the 

equipment and personnel are in theater. An LCS executing a 

package swap could be unavailable for between 12-29 days. The 

Navy now expects mission package swaps will be more infrequent 

than initially envisioned.

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. | GAO-17-262T

Further capability changes may be necessary as the Navy continues to 

test the seaframes and mission packages, as well as gain greater 

operational experience. For example, the Navy has not yet demonstrated 

that LCS will achieve its survivability requirements and does not plan to 

complete survivability assessments until 2018—after more than 24 ships 

are either in the fleet or under construction. The Navy has identified 

unknowns related to the Independence variant’s aluminum hull, and 

conducted underwater explosion testing in 2016 but the Navy has yet to 

compile and report the results. Both variants also sustained some 

damage in trials in rough sea conditions, but the Navy has not completed 

its analytical report of these events. Results from air defense and 

cybersecurity testing also indicate capability concerns.

The Navy elected to pursue a frigate concept based on a minor modified 

LCS. The frigate, as planned, will provide multi-mission capability that is 

an improvement over LCS and offers modest improvements to some 

other capabilities, such as the air search radar. Still, many questions 

remain to be settled about the frigate’s design, cost, schedule, and 

capabilities—all while the Navy continues to purchase additional LCS. 

Despite the uncertainties, the Navy’s acquisition strategy involves 

effectively demonstrating a commitment to buy all of the planned 

frigates—12 in total—before establishing realistic cost, schedule, and 

technical parameters—because the Navy will ask Congress to authorize

the contracting approach for the 12 frigates (what the Navy calls a block 

buy contract) in 2017.

4 Further, the frigate will inherit many of the 

 4

The Navy plans to request authorization in 2017 to use what it calls a block buy contract 

to purchase the frigate—the same contracting approach used for LCS—and funding in the 

fiscal year 2018 budget request for the lead frigate. Our past analysis of the LCS contracts 

found that a block buy approach could affect Congress’s funding flexibility. For example, 

the LCS block buy contracts provide that a failure to fully fund a purchase in a given year 

would make the contract subject to renegotiation, which could result in the government 

paying more for ships. If similar terms are included in the frigate contract, the same 

potential effect may apply.

Business Case for 

Frigate Program 

Remains Uncertain
Page 9 GAO-17-262T 

shortcomings or uncertainties of the LCS, and does not address all the 

priorities that the Navy had identified for its future frigate.

The costs for the frigate are still uncertain. Navy officials have stated that 

the frigate is expected to cost no more than 20 percent—approximately 

$100 million—more per ship than the average LCS seaframes. However, 

the Navy will not establish its cost estimate until May 2017— presumably 

after the Navy requests authorization from Congress in its fiscal year 

2018 budget request for the block buy contracting approach for 12 

frigates—raising the likelihood that the budget request will not reflect the 

most current costs for the program moving forward.

In addition to the continued cost uncertainty, the schedule and approach 

for the frigate acquisition have undergone substantial changes in the last 

year, as shown in table 3.

Table 3: Changes in Frigate Acquisition Plan

Previous plan (December 2015) Current plan (October 2016)

Dual contract award in fiscal year 2019 Downselect award to one shipbuilder in summer 2018

20 frigates (10 per shipbuilder) 12 frigates 

Government-led, prescribed design Contractor-driven design process based on build specifications; increased 

government furnished equipment

Multiple frigate upgrade packages, with a fiscal year 2019 

bid to mature frigate design

Single frigate upgrade package expected from each contractor in fiscal 

year 2018

Detail design in fiscal year 2018 to increase design 

knowledge prior to contract award

Detail design begins after downselect award in 2018

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. | GAO-17-262T

According to frigate program officials, under the current acquisition 

approach the Navy will award contracts in fiscal year 2017 to each of the 

current LCS contractors to construct one LCS with a block buy option for 

12 additional LCS—not frigates. Then, the Navy plans to obtain proposals 

from both LCS contractors in late 2017 that would upgrade the block buy 

option of LCS to frigates using frigate-specific design changes and 

modifications. The Navy will evaluate the frigate upgrade packages and 

then exercise the option—now for frigates—on the contract that provides 

the best value based on tradeoffs between price and technical factors. 

This downselect will occur in summer 2018. Figure 3 illustrates how the 

Navy plans to modify the fiscal year 2017 LCS contract to convert the 

ships in the block buy options to frigates.

Frigate Cost Uncertainty 

and a Compressed 

Schedule Contribute to 

Gaps in Program 

Knowledge
Page 10 GAO-17-262T 

Figure 3: Navy Block Buy Option Contract Modification Process for Frigate Procurement

The Navy’s current plan, which moves the frigate award forward from 

fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year 2018, is an acceleration that continues a 

pattern of committing to buy ships in advance of adequate knowledge. 

Specifically, the Navy has planned for its downselect award of the frigate 

to occur before detail design of the ship begins. As we previously 

reported, awarding a contract before detail design is completed—though 

common in Navy ship acquisitions—has resulted in increased ship 

prices.5

 Further, in the absence of a year of frigate detail design, the 

 5 GAO-16-356 and GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Improved Management Practices Could 

Help Minimize Cost Growth in Navy Shipbuilding Programs, GAO-05-183 (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 28, 2005).
Page 11 GAO-17-262T 

Navy plans to rely on a contractor-driven design process that is less 

prescriptive. This approach is similar to that espoused by the original LCS 

program, whereby the shipyards were given performance specifications 

and requirements, selecting the design and systems that they determined

were best suited to fit their designs in a producible manner. Program 

officials told us that this new approach should yield efficiencies; however, 

history from LCS raises concern that this approach for the frigate similarly 

could lead to the ships having non-standard equipment, with less 

commonality with the other design and the rest of the Navy.

As LCS costs grew and capabilities diluted, the Secretary of Defense 

directed the Navy to explore alternatives to the LCS to address key 

deficiencies. In response, the Navy created the Small Surface Combatant 

Task Force and directed it to consider new and existing frigate design 

options, including different types of modified LCS designs. The task force 

concluded that the Navy’s desired capability requirements could not be 

met without major modifications to an LCS design or utilizing other nonLCS designs. When presented with this conclusion, senior Navy 

leadership directed the task force to explore what capabilities might be 

more feasible on a minor modified LCS. This led the task force to develop 

options with diminished capabilities, such as reduced speed or range, 

resulting in some capabilities becoming equal to or below expected 

capabilities of the current LCS. Ultimately, the department chose a frigate 

concept based on a minor modified LCS in lieu of more capable small 

surface combatant options because of LCS’s relatively lower cost and 

quicker ability to field, as well as the ability to upgrade remaining LCS.

Table 4 presents an analysis from our past work, which found that the 

Navy’s proposed frigate will offer some improvements over LCS. For 

example, the Navy plans to equip the frigates with the mission systems 

from both the surface and anti-submarine mission packages 

simultaneously instead of just one at a time like LCS. However, the 

Navy’s planned frigate upgrades will not result in significant 

improvements in survivability areas related to vulnerability—the ability to 

withstand initial damage effects from threat weapons—or recoverability—

the ability of the crew to take emergency action to contain and control 

damage.

Frigate Does Not Address 

All Navy Priorities and Will 

Likely Carry Forward 

Some of the Limitations of 

the LCS Designs
Page 12 GAO-17-262T 

Table 4: Proposed Frigate Capability Changes

Proposed change Description Significance

Switch from single to multimission capabilityFrigate will be able to embark surface and 

anti-submarine warfare mission packages 

at one time instead of just a single 

mission package, like LCS.

A multi-mission capability was recognized in Navy analysis 

as a key characteristic of a frigate. A frigate will be able to 

engage different types of threats at all times, unlike LCS 

which depends on the mission package embarked. 

Improve air warfare systems Frigate will be equipped with an improved

air search radar and defensive 

countermeasures. 

This reduces susceptibility to attacks from air-based 

threats (e.g. aircraft or missiles). The Navy also is 

considering these improvements for LCS. 

Add armor to vital spaces and 

magazines. Improve shock 

hardening in anti-air missile 

system

Armor reduces vulnerability; intended to 

lessen risk of magazine detonation. 

Shock hardening reduces vulnerability of 

missile system.

LCS already has some armor in these areas; shock 

hardening is limited to anti-air missile system. The Navy 

believes adjusting the concept of operations for the frigate 

is more cost-effective and feasible than a further increase 

in armor and shock hardening.

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. | GAO-17-262T

Further, the Navy sacrificed capabilities that were prioritized by fleet 

operators. For example, fleet operators consistently prioritized a range of 

4,000 nautical miles, but the selected frigate concept is as much as 30 

percent short of achieving such a range.

The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation has noted that the Navy’s 

proposed frigate design is not substantially different from LCS and does 

not add much more redundancy or greater separation of critical 

equipment or additional compartmentation, making the frigate likely to be 

less survivable than the Navy’s previous frigate class. Further, the Navy 

plans to make some similar capability improvements to existing and future 

LCS, narrowing the difference between LCS and the frigate. We found 

that the proposed frigate does not add any new offensive anti-submarine 

or surface warfare capabilities that are not already part of one of the LCS 

mission packages, so while the frigate will be able to carry what equates 

to two mission packages at once, the capabilities in each mission area 

will be the same as LCS. While specific details are classified, there are 

only a few areas where there are differences in frigate warfighting 

capability compared to the LCS.

Since it will be based on the LCS designs, the frigate will likely carry 

forward some of the limitations of the LCS designs. For example, LCS 

was designed to carry a minimally-sized crew of approximately 50. The 

Navy has found in various studies that the crew is undersized and made 

some modest increases in crew size. A frigate design based on LCS may 

not be able to support a significant increase in crew size due to limited 

space for berthing and other facilities. Additionally, barring Navy-directed 

changes to key mechanical systems, the frigate will carry some of the 
Page 13 GAO-17-262T 

more failure-prone LCS equipment, such as some propulsion equipment, 

and will likely carry some of the non-fleet-standard, LCS-unique 

equipment that has challenged the Navy’s support and logistics chain. 

Uncertainties or needs that remain with the surface and anti-submarine 

warfare mission packages, such as demonstrating operational 

performance of the surface-to-surface missile and the anti-submarine

warfare package, also pose risk for the frigate.

The Navy’s plans for fiscal years 2017 and 2018 involve significant

decisions for the LCS and the frigate programs, including potential future 

commitments of approximately $14 billion for seaframes and mission 

packages. First, the Navy plans to buy the last two LCS in fiscal year 

2017, even though DOD and the Navy recognize that the LCS does not 

meet needs. Second, the Navy is planning to seek congressional 

authorization for a block buy of all planned frigates and funding for the 

lead frigate as soon as next year—2017—despite significant unknowns 

about the cost, schedule, and capability of the vessel. The Navy’s 

acquisition approach for the frigate raises concerns about overcommitting 

to the future acquisition of ships for which significant cost, schedule, and 

technical uncertainty remains. Similar to what we previously have advised 

about LCS block buy contracting, a frigate block buy approach could 

reduce funding flexibility. For example, the LCS contracts provide that a 

failure to fully fund the purchase of a ship in a given year would make the 

contract subject to renegotiation. Following this reasoning, such a failure 

to fund a ship in a given year could result in the government paying more 

for remaining ships under the contract, which provides a notable 

disincentive to take any action that might delay procurement, even when 

a program is underperforming.

The Navy requested funding for two LCS in its fiscal year 2017 budget 

request. We previously suggested that Congress consider not funding 

any requested LCS in fiscal year 2017 because of unresolved concerns 

with lethality and survivability of the LCS design, the Navy’s ability to 

make needed improvements, and the lagging construction schedule of 

the shipyards. As figure 4 depicts, even if no ships were funded in fiscal 

year 2017, delays that have occurred for previously funded ships have 

resulted in a construction workload that extends into fiscal year 2020.

Limited Opportunities 

Remain to Shape 

LCS and Frigate 

Programs
Page 14 GAO-17-262T 

Figure 4: Construction Demands for Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Shipyards

a

The delivery dates for LCS 25 and 26—awarded in March 2016—have not been modified.

b

The Navy has not awarded contracts for construction of LCS 27 or 28.

In all, 8 ships have been delivered (LCS 1-8) and 14 are in various 

phases of construction (LCS 9-22), with 3 more (LCS 23, 24, and 26) set 

to begin construction later in fiscal year 2017. Although the Navy has 

argued that pausing LCS production would result in loss of production 

work and start-up delays to the frigate program, the schedule suggests 
Page 15 GAO-17-262T 

that the shipyards in Marinette, Wisconsin, and Mobile, Alabama, will 

have sufficient workload remaining from prior LCS contract awards that 

offsets the need to award additional LCS in fiscal year 2017. The Navy’s 

concern also does not account for any other work that the shipyards may 

have from other Navy or commercial contracts and the possibility of 

continued delays in the delivery of LCS.

On the heels of the decision to fund fiscal year 2017 LCS will be the 

decision on whether to authorize the frigate contracting approach and

fund the lead frigate. As I noted above, the current acquisition plans for 

the frigate have been accelerated during the past year. If these plans 

hold, Congress will be asked in a few months to consider authorizing a 

block buy of 12 frigates and funding the lead frigate when the fiscal year 

2018 budget is proposed—before detail design has begun and the scope 

and cost of the design changes needed to turn an LCS into a frigate are 

well understood. The frigate acquisition strategy also reflects a proclivity 

by the Navy to use contracting approaches such as block buys and

multiyear procurement for acquisition programs, which may have the 

cumulative effect of inuring the programs against changes—such as in 

quantities bought.

To the extent that both the LCS and the frigate successfully demonstrate 

their ability to conduct their intended missions, it is reasonable to assume 

they will provide useful capability to the Navy. By the same token, the 

LCS’s weakened business case raises a basic oversight question: does a 

program that costs twice as much but delivers less capability than 

planned still warrant an additional investment of nearly $14 billion?

Congress has two key decisions remaining for LCS and the frigate that, 

once made, will put a set of commitments in place that will make it difficult 

for Congress to alter in the future. The first decision is whether to fund 

additional LCS in fiscal year 2017, in light of the backlog of work already 

in the shipyards and the fact that these ships are baseline LCS, not the 

frigate. Second—and more importantly—is the decision on whether to 

authorize a block buy of 12 frigates, which would conclude the entire buy 

of 40 LCS and frigates. If Congress were to authorize the block buy, 

those ships would still require annual appropriations. While Congress 

could still thus conduct oversight of the program through the 

appropriations process, it could be more difficult to make decisions to 

reduce or delay the program should that become warranted, as the Navy 

may point to losses in favorable block buy prices, like it has done 

previously with LCS. At a minimum, holding the Navy to the plan it set 

Summary
Page 16 GAO-17-262T 

forth in the fiscal year 2017 budget submission, which provided for detail 

design activities in advance of a contract award in fiscal year 2019, 

affords more time to reduce LCS uncertainties that directly affect the 

frigate and to build design knowledge to reduce technical and cost risks. 

Additionally, forgoing a frigate award in fiscal year 2018 offers the Navy 

an opportunity to better demonstrate to Congress whether the frigate’s 

estimated cost and expected capabilities warrant the additional 

investment.

GAO has reported extensively about what we refer to as the defense 

acquisition culture, a prevailing set of incentives that encourages 

decisions to go forward with programs before they are ready and a 

willingness to accept cost growth and schedule delays as the likely 

byproduct of such decisions. This Committee has been particularly 

concerned with repeated acquisition problems and has actively advocated 

for legislative solutions. As I testified last year on the Ford-class Aircraft 

Carrier, Congress has a very important role to play in shaping the 

acquisition culture, particularly in what it sanctions via funding approvals. 

If programs that propose optimistic or rushed acquisition strategies win 

funding approval, those strategies are, in effect, sanctioned. The 

upcoming decisions on the LCS and the frigate represent opportunities for 

Congress to take a stand on what it is willing to fund and what that means 

for maintaining—or changing—the defense acquisition culture.

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the 

Committee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to 

respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

If you or your staff has any questions about this statement, please contact 

Paul L. Francis at (202) 512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 

found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key 

contributions to this testimony are Michele Mackin (Director), Diana 

Moldafsky (Assistant Director), Pete Anderson, Jacob Leon Beier, Laurier 

Fish, Kristine Hassinger, C. James Madar, Sean Merrill, LeAnna Parkey, 

and Robin Wilson.

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 17 GAO-17-262T 

Littoral Combat Ship: Need to Address Fundamental Weaknesses in LCS 

and Frigate Acquisition Strategies. GAO-16-356. Washington, D.C.: June 

9, 2016.

Littoral Combat Ship: Knowledge of Survivability and Lethality Capabilities 

Needed Prior to Making Major Funding Decisions. GAO-16-201. 

Washington, D.C.: December 18, 2015.

Littoral Combat Ship: Additional Testing and Improved Weight 

Management Needed Prior to Further Investments. GAO-14-827. 

Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2014.

Littoral Combat Ship: Navy Complied with Regulations in Accepting Two 

Lead Ships, but Quality Problems Persisted after Delivery. GAO-14-749. 

Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2014.

Littoral Combat Ship: Deployment of USS Freedom Revealed Risks in 

Implementing Operational Concepts and Uncertain Costs. GAO-14-447. 

Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2014.

Navy Shipbuilding: Opportunities Exist to Improve Practices Affecting 

Quality. GAO-14-122. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2013.

Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship 

Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost.

GAO-13-738T. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2013.

Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship 

Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost.

GAO-13-530. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2013.

Defense Acquisitions: Realizing Savings under Different Littoral Combat 

Ship Acquisition Strategies Depends on Successful Management of 

Risks. GAO-11-277T. Washington, D.C.: December 14, 2010.

National Defense: Navy’s Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for 

the Littoral Combat Ship Program. GAO-11-249R. Washington, D.C.: 

December 8, 2010.

Defense Acquisitions: Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the 

Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities. GAO-10-523. 

Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2010.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 18 GAO-17-262T 

Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost 

Estimates and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts. 

GAO-10-257. Washington, D.C.: February 2, 2010.

Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate 

Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding. GAO-09-322. 

Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2009.

Defense Acquisitions: Overcoming Challenges Key to Capitalizing on 

Mine Countermeasures Capabilities. GAO-08-13. Washington, D.C.: 

October 12, 2007.

Defense Acquisitions: Plans Need to Allow Enough Time to Demonstrate 

Capability of First Littoral Combat Ships. GAO-05-255. Washington, D.C.: 

March 1, 2005.

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