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i 

68–158 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–50] 

HOW DOES THE NAVY GET READY, AND 

WHERE ARE WE TODAY? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 12, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

BILL OWENS, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JAMIE LYNCH, Professional Staff Member 

VICKIE PLUNKETT, Professional Staff Member 

CHRISTINE WAGNER, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, July 12, 2011, How Does the Navy Get Ready, and Where Are 

We Today? ............................................................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, July 12, 2011 ............................................................................................ 35 

TUESDAY, JULY 12, 2011 

HOW DOES THE NAVY GET READY, AND WHERE ARE WE TODAY? 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 2 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Burke, VADM William, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Readiness and Logistics (N4) ........................................................................................ 4 

McCoy, VADM Kevin, USN, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command ......... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z. ............................................................................ 41 

Burke, VADM William, joint with VADM Kevin McCoy .............................. 43 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 39 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Department of the Navy, May 11, 2011, Memorandum for the Record, 

Subject: Fleet Readiness Review Panel Report (One Year Later) ............ 57 

OPNAV 43, February 2011, unclassified Report to Congress on Impact 

of Training and Crew Size on Surface Force Material Readiness ............ 65 

Two slides submitted by Admiral Burke ........................................................ 80 

Three charts submitted by Mr. Forbes ........................................................... 82 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 87 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 87 

Dr. Heck ............................................................................................................ 88 

Mr. Kissell ......................................................................................................... 88 

Mr. Palazzo ....................................................................................................... 89 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 93 

Mr. Kissell ......................................................................................................... 95 

(1) 

HOW DOES THE NAVY GET READY, AND WHERE 

ARE WE TODAY? 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 12, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:12 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON READINESS 

Mr. FORBES. The hearing will come to order. 

I want to welcome all of our members and our distinguished 

panel of experts to today’s hearing that will focus on how the Navy 

gets ready and the current state of Navy readiness. 

I want to apologize to both our admirals for being a few minutes 

late. We just had a long series of votes, as you know, and our members will be coming in, I am sure, on a sporadic basis. 

No one will dispute that we have the most capable Navy in the 

world. However, a dichotomy exists when you contrast the decline 

in our Navy readiness posture due to decreased funding, with the 

increase in military capabilities of many emerging powers. 

In January of this year, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 

admitted that Beijing’s military modernization caught the U.S. intelligence community off-guard. This committee and the China 

Caucus have been trying to alert them to that fact for years, but 

to no avail. 

I juxtapose that against a backdrop of looming defense cuts in 

the United States that are expected to be submitted by the Administration in the very near future. Our Navy already has insufficient 

resources to preserve its current fleet, let alone reverse the negative trends of years of underfunding, deferred maintenance, and 

gaping holes in Navy readiness. 

According to the Pentagon’s quarterly readiness report to Congress, in many areas the Navy has not met their goals and is not 

prepared even with the current level of funding. For example, currently only 45 percent of our deployed Navy aircraft are fully combat ready for the hours that they are sailing. 

Everyone can do the math, but I am startled by the fact that 

fewer than 5 aircraft out of every 10 in combat are prepared for 

their mission. We continue to see shortfalls throughout the fleet, 

including an ominous 16 percent backlog for aircraft and engines, 
2 

fewer spares available, and more than $850 million of unfunded 

maintenance requirements, to cite a few examples. 

During inspections in the last 2 years, more than one in five 

Navy vessels were deemed less than satisfactory or unfit for combat. Coupled with manpower shortfalls, an increased number of 

commanding officers being relieved, greater cannibalization of 

parts from other vessels, and insufficient training, all of these statistics add up to glaring deficiencies that are nothing short of 

alarming. 

Earlier this year before this very subcommittee, Vice Admiral 

Bruce Clingan admitted that in his opinion the Department of Defense, and certainly the Navy budget, is carrying a level of risk this 

year, fiscal year 2012 and in the out-years, that would cause me 

to suggest that one of the solutions to the deficit spending that I 

would not advise is to diminish DOD [Department of Defense] and 

certainly the Navy’s budget. 

Admiral Clingan went on further to suggest that to decrease the 

funding at a time when we are trying to reset and reconstitute the 

force and meet an evolving security environment, would invite multiple concurrent diverse crises and would in fact increase risk. 

Fundamentally, I am very disturbed because over the horizon I 

see our adversaries continuing to expand their military might, 

while a masthead of a $400 billion cut to national defense is looming. 

In the last few years, the press reported that after meeting with 

Admiral Mullen, China’s top general recommended that the U.S. 

should reduce its military spending, which is consistent with what 

we anticipate from the Administration in the very near future. 

And while some in Congress may agree, this is not a position 

that I am prepared to accept. Unfortunately, this is exactly the direction we are headed if we do not take strides to preserve the 

budget and our critical investments. 

It is incumbent upon this subcommittee to focus on today, and 

it is our obligation to preserve and defend strategic investments for 

the future. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today not 

only how the Navy gets ready, but delving into detailed discussions 

regarding the current state of Navy readiness. 

Joining us today to discuss these issues are two very distinguished individuals: Vice Admiral William Burke, who is the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Readiness and Logistics; and 

Vice Admiral Kevin McCoy, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. 

Gentlemen, as we mentioned earlier, we thank you both for being 

here. We are looking forward to your testimony. 

And now I would like to recognize the ranking member, my 

friend Ms. Bordallo, for any remarks she may have. 

Madeleine. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE 

FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 
3 

To both our witnesses, Vice Admiral Burke and Vice Admiral 

McCoy, I look forward to your testimony this afternoon. 

Today, we are going to take a more comprehensive look at the 

United States Navy’s fleet readiness posture. The readiness of our 

Navy’s surface fleet has been a topic addressed in detail by this 

subcommittee over the past 2 years under former chairman Solomon Ortiz. 

The Navy has slowly come to realize that it has accepted too 

much risk in the maintenance of our non-nuclear surface fleet over 

the past decade. These significant risks are due in part to organizational decisions made by the Navy regarding ship manning, ship 

maintenance capability, and crew training as the Navy responded 

to institutional pressures to reduce spending. 

While the subcommittee appreciates the Navy’s recognition that 

its past decisions contributed to the current high risk in maintenance of the non-nuclear surface fleet, we hope that the testimony 

provided by our witnesses today will address when we can expect 

to see tangible progress and improvement in the overall readiness 

of our Navy fleet. 

This subcommittee takes very seriously the material readiness of 

our surface fleet. As a result, we increased funding for the Navy’s 

operation and maintenance account by $440 million in our fiscal 

year 2012 authorization bill. 

Now, this funding will make whole both the ship depot maintenance and aviation depot maintenance accounts. I hope that our 

witnesses can outline how this additional funding will reduce risks 

and what specific benefits this funding would have on maintenance 

activities in fiscal year 2012. 

Finally, given the results of the Balisle Report, significant challenges remain for improving Navy readiness. I have seen the May 

11, 2011, memorandum from Fleet Forces Commander Admiral 

Harvey regarding changes to address the issues outlined in the 

Balisle Report. And I hope our witnesses today can discuss how 

these recommended changes will be institutionalized in the Navy 

and over the coming years. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 57.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Further, what is the cost of implementing and 

sustaining these recommendations? Will these recommended 

changes be reflected in the budgets for Navy operations and maintenance over the Future Years Defense Program? What challenges 

will possible reductions in the Defense and the Navy budgets 

present to implementing these changes? 

We do not have a fleet of 313 ships yet, so it is critically important that we maintain our current fleet of 288 ships for the next 

near-term. Even though the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are beginning to ramp down, our Navy’s role in projecting force across 

the globe will not decrease. 

In fact, in many instances, I see the role of our Navy increasing, 

particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. So maintaining our fleet is 

of utmost importance. 

And again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to our 

witnesses’ testimony today. 
4 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bordallo can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you for those remarks, Madeleine. 

And as we discussed prior to the hearing, I ask unanimous consent that we dispense with the 5-minute rule for this hearing and 

depart from regular order so that members may ask questions during the course of the discussion. I think this will provide a roundtable-type forum and will enhance the dialogue on these very important issues. 

Without objection, that is so ordered. 

As I mentioned earlier, we have got two very distinguished individuals who have served their country very well, bring to this committee a great deal of expertise. 

And gentlemen, we are both very proud of the service you have 

done to your country and grateful that you would take time to 

come here and be with us today. 

Vice Admiral William Burke, as I mentioned, is the Deputy Chief 

of Naval Operations, Fleet Readiness and Logistics, and Vice Admiral Kevin McCoy is the Commander of Naval Sea Systems Command. 

So with that, we look forward to hearing your initial statements. 

And Admiral Burke, I am assuming we will start with you. And 

please feel free to address the committee. 

STATEMENT OF VADM WILLIAM BURKE, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF 

OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, FLEET READINESS AND LOGISTICS 

(N4) 

Admiral BURKE. Chairman Forbes, Congresswoman Bordallo, 

and distinguished members of the Readiness Subcommittee, it is 

my honor to participate in today’s hearing representing the Navy 

men and women—Active Duty, Reserve and civilian—who work to 

ensure our Navy is ready to deliver the full range of capabilities 

we possess to defend the Nation. 

On their behalf, I also want to express our great appreciation for 

the work of this committee in support of their service, and in particular I appreciate what you just said, Madam, about the plus-ups 

in 2012 in the readiness account. Certainly, we appreciate those 

and I am happy to address how those will help us. 

I was asked to begin today by discussing briefly how we generate 

ready Navy forces to meet the requirements of the combatant commanders for named operations, presence, or major combat operations. 

Back in 2003, then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern 

Clark directed the fleets to develop a new approach to preparation 

and deployment of Navy forces. The idea was to figure out how to 

get more of them out there at any given time. 

So what came out of that was what we called the Fleet Response 

Plan. And what it replaced was the IDTC or the Inter-Deployment 

Training Cycle. 

I would like to begin with a simple slide that explains the elements of the plan. 

Do you have those slides? You do. Okay, good. 
5 

So as you look at that first slide, you can see that the Fleet Response Plan consists of four phases, each designed to produce or 

sustain a certain readiness output. 

[The slide referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 80.] 

Admiral BURKE. On the left, it starts with basic training, and 

that provides unit-level training to a single ship or aviation squadron, with training in—focused on being safe and basic warfare 

skills. 

At the completion of this phase, a ship or squadron is qualified 

for certain limited operations, like humanitarian assistance or 

counternarcotic. 

The next phase is the integrated training phase, and that provides additional training for Navy forces to be ready for major combat operations. It is focused on training at the task group level, 

with units working together to accomplish combat objectives. 

It culminates with a task force exercise which trains group commanders in command and control. 

At the completion of the integrated phase, the task force and its 

associate elements are what we consider a 30-day surge asset, and 

they are qualified for the full range of maritime operations. 

Next comes the sustainment phase. That is where the task force 

will conduct virtual and live training as necessary to maintain a 

high state of readiness, and will normally be scheduled for one or 

more rotational deployments, depending on the length of the 

sustainment phase and the Global Force Management requirements. 

And I am happy to discuss the Global Force Management requirements later if that is desired. 

Now, after they come back from deployment, ships and squadrons and the task force in general will maintain themselves at a 

readiness level to be a 30-day surge asset for the length of that 

sustainment phase. 

Then the maintenance phase is set aside to accomplish maintenance. But from a ship perspective that is when many of the individual members go off to schools and get individual training to 

allow them to contribute to the unit training later on. 

Okay, so the IDTC was focused on building readiness in the minimum time required—that is the old system—prior to a single 

scheduled deployment. The new system is designed to build readiness over a period of time and sustain readiness for a significant 

period of time. 

So if you will move to the second slide, you can see two different 

schedules on there, the top one being the IDTC. And what you see 

there is—in yellow is a maintenance period, a notional maintenance period of several months, and then a kind of an open period. 

And in that area, we didn’t have the direction we had in the current system. 

[The slide referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 81.] 

Admiral BURKE. So ships would do a bunch of things. They might 

be a bunch of exercises or operations, but they weren’t focused on 

getting to a certain level of training. 

Then you would go into this work-up phase, which was dedicated 

to getting the ship ready to deploy, and then the single deployment. 
6 

And so you can see there is a couple opportunities in there, circled in red, where those are lost opportunities for operations. 

In the FRP [Fleet Response Plan], on the other hand, you have 

the same sort of maintenance period, followed by a basic phase, 

where you go through exactly what I just explained. You build 

basic skills in the unit level, then go to the intermediate where 

you—or the integrated where you build skills for the task force. 

Finally, to the sustainment period in which you can see that is 

a significant period of time. It is more than a year in length. And 

so there is an opportunity for one deployment, or two deployments, 

or a long deployment. 

So, we think that that FRP scheme is the right way to go because it generates the opportunity for greater forward presence. 

Now, the readiness challenge that we have today is that the continuing demand for forces exceeds that which we have, which we 

can provide. So, we have the combatant commanders in a situation 

where they drive demand, and their demand is relatively unconstrained except by the Global Force Management process. And we 

have a limited supply of forces. 

So, the Global Force Management process addresses that, but 

then there is a request for forces that is outside that process that 

we have to deal with, and I would be happy to talk about that as 

well. 

But when you have these additional deployments, you sometimes 

impact the maintenance or you impact the training, which will impact the maintenance. So, what we have is one event cascading 

into another and so we don’t get either of them quite right. 

And on the family side, an average of 50 ships a year since 2005 

have violated one or more of the OSD [Office of the Secretary of 

Defense] or Navy standards such as deployment length, dwell time, 

or time in home port, compared with an average of 5 in years prior 

to that. 

Now, my responsibility is the sustainment of our current force, 

including Navy shore infrastructure. We must deliver the expected 

service life of our current platforms to provide future capacity to 

meet the Navy and Nation’s needs. And our shore infrastructure 

must support our warfighting platforms and our sailors. 

For fiscal year 2012, we focus first on supporting our deployed 

forces, and then on achieving expected service life of all our platforms. 

The President’s budget for fiscal year 2012 balances risk across 

the entire Navy program to achieve the strongest current and future readiness outcomes. 

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you and look 

forward to discussing the Navy’s sustainment programs with you. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Burke and Admiral 

McCoy can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral Burke. 

Admiral McCoy. 
7 

STATEMENT OF VADM KEVIN MCCOY, USN, COMMANDER, 

NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND 

Admiral MCCOY. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, 

distinguished members, it is a pleasure to be here with you this 

afternoon with Admiral Burke to discuss this topic. 

When I came into my command 3 years ago, the readiness and 

sustainment of our surface forces was my number one priority. I 

had just come from 3 previous years as the Navy’s chief engineer, 

and I saw what the increased OPTEMPO [operating tempo] was 

doing to our ships. 

Where today, for example, on any given day 50 percent of our 

surface ships are underway, our ships are reaching midlife in 

terms of our major combatant ships, and so therefore they are 

going to get more maintenance intensive. 

As well as, we build a lot of robustness and redundancy into our 

ships early on, and you can underfund and underdo maintenance 

early on in the ship’s life and you may not necessarily see it and 

then it catches up to you, and then realization that we simply can’t 

build our way to 313 ships. 

And in fact, the cheapest way to afford our Navy with the force 

structure that we need is to maintain the ships that we already 

have. 

In fact, over 70 percent of the 313-ship Navy out in the 2020 

timeframe we own today. It is out there, it is underway, it is deployed, it is sitting pierside. 

So we brought all of our attention on solving this problem. And 

the last piece was a recognition that we have a disparity between 

how we were maintaining and sustaining our surface, non-nuclear 

surface forces, compared to our submarines and our aircraft carriers. 

So, we implemented three initial series of actions. The first was 

to make sure that, just like we do for submarines and aircraft carriers, we build rigorous, class maintenance plans, engineeringbased, with the fundamentals. 

They are required to get each one of our ships to their full expected service life. And every one of our ships has a defined service 

life when we go ahead and build the ship. 

For example, a DDG 51 Flight IIA ship we are expecting to get 

to 40 years, and LCS [Littoral Combat Ship] is 25 years, a cruiser 

is 35 years. And each one of our ships has a defined—and we base 

our future force structure plans and our shipbuilding plan on getting those ships to their expected service life. 

We have no problem doing that with submarines and aircraft 

carriers. Matter of fact, I am proud to say that today USS Enterprise is 49 years and 8 months old, and it is underway on deployment. Its first deployment was associated with the Cuban missile 

crisis. And submarines routinely reach their end of service life. 

And so how do we build that engineering rigor? And we have 

stood up an organization, it is today in Norfolk. We have 120 people that build the engineered class maintenance plants and keep 

track of the requirement maintenance on our surface ships every 

day. And we have funding laid in now to go ahead and do that. 

The second piece was, we had to build a comprehensive assessment and sustainment plan for our surface ships. Quite frankly, we 
8 

stopped looking in an organized manner through the late 1990s 

and the early part of the 2000s. We start looking with outside eyes 

and detail at our ships. 

And so one of the first things we did was we partnered with the 

American Bureau of Shipping and said we want to use what they 

use to keep about 10,000 ships in class around the world every 

year. And we didn’t want to reinvent the wheel, and we built a 

very efficient process. And so far we have put about 20 ships 

through that process. 

Actually when the ship goes in dry dock, we do about 5,000 to 

6,000 ultrasonic tests on key structure and tanks, and we inspect 

distributed systems. The things you need to make sure a ship will 

last 30 or 40 years, we go do that now. 

And we have a plan through the end of 2017 to just about get 

every one of our surface ships through that process. 

We also built rigorous assessment and sustainment plans around 

the deployment cycle that Admiral Burke just talked through. So 

for example, before a ship comes into major availability, we now 

send people down to do hand-over-hand inspections to make sure 

we thoroughly understand the work package and pick up any last 

minute things. Prior to deployment we do grooms and things like 

that. 

And so the last piece of it, the third leg of the stool, if you will, 

was to rebuild capacity and capability at the regional maintenance 

centers, and that was for twofold. One was to oversee contractor 

cost performance and quality performance, and the second was to 

reestablish the intermediate level capability that we had let atrophy. 

And that is so important for ships right next to where they tie 

up, to have repair capability so that we don’t build this backlog of 

little things that become bigger things. And so sailors can come off 

the ships and see their equipment tore down and have a better capability to repair their stuff underway and be more self-sufficient 

when they get underway. 

And I am happy to say just 2 weeks ago, with Admiral Harvey, 

the Atlantic Fleet Forces Commander, we went down to Mayport 

and we re-stood up the eye-level capability, and reopened the shops 

that we had closed a number of years ago to service the 19 surface 

ships that are in that area. 

So, I would tell you, for 3 years now we have been working this. 

I worked very closely with Admiral Balisle when he was working 

on the Balisle Report. And he did a great job of tying these issues 

together with other things in terms of manning and training to 

build a comprehensive story. 

And then, the last piece is we have been working very closely, 

have received great support from the two surface type commanders, 

the two fleet commanders, the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] 

staff and the CNO himself to build the resources necessary to fund 

the programs that I just talked about. 

So, I am very happy to answer any questions you may have. And 

thank you for your interest in this subject. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral McCoy and Admiral 

Burke can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral McCoy. 
9 

And to both you gentlemen, I just want to tell you a little bit of 

the logistics. 

Our members ask their questions a little bit different than some 

of the committees that have a more formal structure, where one 

member will ask something for 5 minutes and then they alternate. 

If they have anything related to that subject matter, they may 

chime in, so we can have kind of a dialogue and discussion. 

And I want you guys to have all the time you need to respond. 

So it is not a gotcha thing. You get a chance to look at your answers and bring them back. 

We want to begin by reiterating what I said at the beginning, 

and that is how much we appreciate all you have done for the service to our country. We recognize that. We thank you. Both of you 

bring an enormous amount of expertise to this hearing. 

Admiral Burke, as I understand, in your role, you are basically 

in charge of all of the maintenance operations for our carriers, all 

of our ships, our aircraft, all of our naval facilities. All of it is kind 

of under your auspices. 

Is that pretty much accurate? 

Admiral BURKE. My job, sir, is to get the resources for those 

areas, such that Admiral McCoy, his counterparts in the aviation, 

can execute the maintenance and execute the readiness. 

Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And, Admiral McCoy has that with everything other 

than the carriers. But you have the surface ships and the subs. Is 

that correct? 

Admiral MCCOY. I am responsible for all of the engineering and 

maintenance on the aircraft carriers, submarines and surface 

ships. I don’t have airplanes. My compadre, Vice Admiral Architzel, 

who is Commander of Air—runs the airplanes. 

Mr. FORBES. One of the concerns that this committee has is that 

oftentimes we are trying to make sure we are answering one key 

question, and that is, are we ready? 

We see where—I mentioned in my opening statement, in January 

the Secretary of Defense said that Beijing’s military modernization 

caught the U.S. intelligence community off-guard. Whether he 

meant that or not, we can only go by his words. 

But one of the things that is so frustrating to us is for years, we 

sat in hearings just like this and said this is happening, and we 

saw guys sitting where you are sitting saying, ‘‘No, no, no, it is all 

under control and we don’t see it happening that much.’’ 

Today, it is important for us, because every time we see somebody come over here with a uniform on, we just assume that they 

are coming over to give us their best military expertise and the experience that they bring to bear with all the great stuff that they 

have done. 

But I need to ask you how you perceive your role as witnesses 

today, so begin, so our committee understands that. 

And the reason that I have to ask that question is just a few 

weeks ago, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral 

Mullen, was over here. And we were a little surprised, because we 

asked the chairman, we said, ‘‘We know that your role to the President is being a military adviser and bringing the collective informa-
10 

tion that you are getting from all of the Joint Chiefs to him. Is that 

the same role you have when you come testify to Congress?’’ 

And he quickly said no. And we tried to find out what his role 

was. And he couldn’t tell us. It was kind of like obscenity—you 

know it when you see it. 

But what we didn’t understand was he could come over here and 

tell us on Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. Before anybody even asked him the 

question, he wanted to say what his personal opinion was. 

But when we asked him about troops in Afghanistan, where he 

had mentioned that some of the policies that were taken posed a 

greater risk than he was willing to accept, a risk to our men and 

women in uniform and our mission, he said he didn’t want to answer those questions, to give us that expertise. 

So, I guess my first question for you guys today, so the committee knows just in how to phrase our questions, today as witnesses, are you coming supporting the President’s budget? Are you 

coming as support of the Pentagon’s position? Or are you coming 

with an independent military assessment? 

And we don’t put a right or wrong on that. We just need to know 

which hat we are wearing when we listen to your testimony. 

Admiral Burke, maybe you could start off with that, and then, 

Admiral McCoy. 

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir. I come as a member of the U.S. Navy 

to tell you what the President’s budget says. And I will give you 

my personal opinion if I think that is warranted. 

In some cases my personal opinion is probably not warranted, because I made my personal opinion known in the deliberations, and 

it was either not accepted or my view wasn’t broad enough. Because, you know, I have my area of expertise and there are other 

people that have a different area, and there is only so much money 

to go around. 

And so you end up with kind of a mix. 

Mr. FORBES. And Admiral, we would still like to hear your opinion, because we put a great deal of respect on that opinion. 

And one of the concerns that you know, in our oversight role— 

we know what our role is. Our role is, first of all, to represent our 

constituents, but secondly to do an oversight role on the Navy. And 

for that, we need that kind of expertise and those opinions. 

Admiral McCoy, any difference on how you view your role? 

Admiral MCCOY. Mr. Chairman, I am here, first as a naval officer. I am also an engineer and probably a lifelong maintainer of 

ships. 

I intend to give you a straight story on what we need. I will also 

tell you what I think the impacts if we don’t get what we need. 

But I also—as Admiral Burke said, I also understand that in the 

higher roll-up of the budget, that the priorities may not exactly 

have come out the way I would have selected it. But I think I can 

give you an honest assessment of what the shortfall will translate 

into. 

Mr. FORBES. And that is what we are asking for—thank you, 

both, for that. 

Oftentimes, I have found that our services speak a language that 

sometimes they don’t even, each other, understand, you know, and 

we speak a language that the American people don’t understand. 
11 

So we try to bring it down to a language that, perhaps, unifies 

us all. 

When we talk about readiness, the average person listening to 

that doesn’t really know what we are talking about, because we 

sometimes talk around them. 

But as I look at readiness, it seems to be our ability to supply 

the resources our combatant commanders need to meet their current and future missions. 

Is that a fair assessment, Admiral Burke, or how would you 

change that? 

Admiral BURKE. I am sorry. I think that is probably a fair assessment. 

I do think, though, that the combatant commanders live in a different world than we do, in that they are not constrained by resources and we are. 

And I don’t mean to make that sound like we don’t have, but I 

think we only have so many ships today. They can’t be in all the 

places they are asked for. 

And I think the services, in particular the Navy in this case, has 

to be stewards of that resource for the future. So using it up today 

puts a future combatant commander at risk if we don’t husband 

that resource in the near term. 

Mr. FORBES. And Admiral Burke, and I don’t want to belabor 

this but, but these are important issues for us. That is why I am 

taking a few more minutes than I normally would. 

But when we are looking from this committee at making sure we 

are ready, that we have the readiness we need as a nation, we 

have got to not only look at today’s missions, but our future missions as well. 

But our goal for readiness is to make sure those combatant commanders have what they need to be able to fulfill their missions. 

Now, we may be restrained by budgets and have to say how do 

we deal with that. 

But isn’t that the essence of readiness, to make sure that those 

combatant commanders have what they need to fulfill their missions, whatever those missions might be? 

Admiral BURKE. Sir, I would agree that in general that is true. 

I am just simply making the point that there is a combatant commander today and there is a combatant commander tomorrow. 

If the combatant commander today uses it all up, then it won’t 

be there for the combatant commander tomorrow. 

So it is—I know it sounds like I am hedging, but I am trying to 

say that there is a future readiness piece to this as well. 

Mr. FORBES. And I don’t disagree. What I have a hard time with 

is when our combatant commanders are on the field, trying to fulfill the missions that we have tasked them to fulfill, we want to 

make sure they have the resources to do those missions. 

That is what this committee should be about, I would think, as 

a Readiness Subcommittee. 

And do you disagree with that? 

Admiral BURKE. I don’t disagree with it. I am just saying there 

is a caveat to it that I think the committee ought to recognize. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral McCoy. 
12 

Admiral MCCOY. I think the piece that I would probably elaborate on a little further is, for example, if a combatant commander 

decides he needs the force structure such that we don’t do maintenance availabilities for 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 years. There is a cost to 

that, such that that ship is no longer a 35- or a 40-year ship. 

And that has to be accounted for in the shipbuilding plan and in 

our ship inventory for future years. That is the piece. 

And it may be to the point where we technologically, you know, 

we have to be on a cycle, a maintenance and sustainment cycle, 

that with our inventory of ships that doesn’t allow us to provide 

the readiness at very high levels for sustained periods of time. 

Mr. FORBES. When are you going to look at our combatant commanders and say, ‘‘You shouldn’t have the resources you need to 

fulfill your mission?’’ 

I don’t understand that. 

I understand that you may differ with them on what those resources may be. But I just don’t understand, when we have a combatant commander anywhere in the world that we are going to look 

at him and say, ‘‘We are not going to give you the resources you 

need to fulfill your mission.’’ 

That is different than saying, ‘‘We are going to give you everything you want.’’ 

But shouldn’t we be about saying we are going to give them all 

the resources they need to fulfill their mission? 

Or are we saying that we are making budgetary decisions here 

today and we are making them over at the Pentagon that are not 

giving them the resources they need to fulfill their mission? 

I guess that is my question. And that is where I am having a 

hard time getting a yes or no answer. 

Admiral Burke. 

Admiral BURKE. They should have the resources to do their mission. The process in the Pentagon is such that there is a Global 

Force Management process that adjudicates the requests from the 

combatant commanders. 

And so, that is a way of taking the resources and allocating them 

to the level of what we have. So trying to take what we have, divvy 

it up in an appropriate fashion, you get X, you get Y, you get Z, 

et cetera. 

But then there is a piece outside the process, where there are requests for forces that we try to address. But they come in outside 

of the process, and so in doing some of that, we end up with what 

Admiral McCoy is talking about with potentially using up our fleet. 

It is not so obvious with ships, but it is very obvious with aircraft. Aircraft only have a certain amount of life in them. They can 

only fly so many hours. When you use those up today, you don’t 

have them tomorrow. 

Mr. FORBES. And, Admiral, I don’t disagree with that at all. I 

mean, that is kind of the given. We understand that. 

What I am saying is it looks like to me, this committee and the 

full committee should be asking ourselves this question when we 

are looking at readiness. Do our combatant commanders have the 

resources they need to fulfill the missions we task them with? 

If we don’t have those resources, we shouldn’t be tasking them 

with the missions. But if we task them with the missions, don’t we 
13 

have an obligation to make sure they have the resources necessary 

to fulfill those missions? 

That seems to me to be a pretty straightforward question for us. 

And we shouldn’t be back over here in the Pentagon or over here 

saying, ‘‘No, we are just going to give you a portion of what you 

need to fulfill your mission, because we don’t want to spend the 

money to do it.’’ 

So my question to you is at what time do we look at any combatant commander and say, ‘‘We are giving you a mission, but we are 

not going to give you the resources to fulfill your mission?’’ 

That is different than a wish list. That is when do we look and 

say, ‘‘We are not going to give you the resources you need to fulfill 

your mission?’’ 

Admiral BURKE. I don’t think we do. I think if they don’t have 

the resources, then we would change the mission or—— 

Mr. FORBES. So then, it would be fair to say that from our perspective as the committee, we should be looking to determine readiness based on whether or not we are able to give the resources that 

our combatant commanders need to fulfill their missions, both 

today and the future missions they have. 

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Is that fair? 

Admiral McCoy, would you disagree with that? 

Admiral MCCOY. No, that is fair. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Now in making that assessment, do we have 

any objective bars, thresholds, or standards we use to make it, or 

is all this just kind of subjective, that we kind of know it when we 

see it? 

Admiral BURKE. We have a—it is not ‘‘we will know it when we 

see it.’’ We have, as I described in my opening, a process by which 

we generate maintenance—or generate readiness. 

That process has specific requirements that the units complete, 

that the task group or task force completes before it is certified by 

the Second or Third Fleet Commander to go forward and do its deployed business. 

Mr. FORBES. In determining our readiness, do we rely on the 

QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] at all? 

Admiral BURKE. No, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. So you don’t look at the QDR at all to determine— 

how do you know what the missions are going to be for our combatant commanders, both today and in the future? What do you use 

as your touchstone to measure those missions against? 

Admiral BURKE. Let me make sure—the Quadrennial Defense 

Review? 

Mr. FORBES. Yes. 

Admiral BURKE. No, sir. When the COCOM [combatant commander] requests forces, he has some idea what he wants those 

forces to be able to do, and that allows us to tailor the training 

package, if necessary. 

But what we endeavor to do is train the deploying force to a wide 

variety of missions, because what we think is going to happen isn’t 

always what happens, so we want them to be ready for—— 
14 

Mr. FORBES. So, what role does the QDR play? In other words 

if we are looking at this laydown of what we believe our risk assessment is, what role does that play? 

Does that play no role at all in determining our readiness posture? 

Admiral BURKE. I think the QDR, sir, is designed to look at what 

the future might be and what the force is necessary to deal with 

the QDR would be. So I believe it is more a force planning document than a force readiness document or force readiness generating document. 

Mr. FORBES. So, do you not use the QDR to know the forces that 

you are going to need to be able to do your planning with? 

Admiral BURKE. I think we are talking past one another, sir, and 

I will try to remedy that. 

The QDR helps us decide what forces we procure. The COCOM 

demand signal helps us determine how we prepare those forces to 

deploy. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. I am going to hold off now and come back, 

because I have got a series of questions I would like to follow up 

with you on that and some of the reports that we have from that. 

But I would like to recognize the ranking member now, Ms. 

Bordallo, for any questions that she has. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

My first question is for either of the admirals. 

I do know the Navy has been operating at a very high operational level for the past 10 years. And in order for the Navy to 

meet the ongoing, intense operational requirements, are we increasing our fleet deployment schedule too much? 

Or are we investing sufficient time into preventative maintenance, training our sailors, and building an adequate, managed 

structure to maximize our fleet readiness in the future? 

I guess I will hear from both of you. 

Admiral BURKE. I will take it. 

That is one of my concerns, madam. And it gets back to a conversation I was just having with the chairman. 

It is the potential overuse of our platforms. And so, that overuse 

makes them last less time or precludes the opportunity to do the 

necessary maintenance, and what the ground forces will call reset, 

and we call ‘‘reset in stride.’’ 

That is, they need to get a certain amount of maintenance every 

so often at the engineered required level. And if we don’t do that, 

we are not going to achieve service life. That is the ships side. 

On the air side, we are going to fly the wings off them. They only 

have about 6,000 or 8,000 hours in those planes, if we don’t get 

them—if we use that up in 10 years or 12 years. But we plan on 

them lasting 20, 25 years. 

The other thing that happens with some of the deployments we 

had is those deployments optimize for the combatant commanders’ 

requirements. 

That is what we have done, and so now what happens is you run 

into a maintenance issue gets shortchanged or a subsequent [inaudible]. So one cascades into another, which cascades into another, which cascades into another, and you end up with a less 

ready ship or less ready [inaudible] because of that. 
15 

Ms. BORDALLO. Admiral. 

Admiral MCCOY. No, it is—I think this is an issue, something 

that we are working closely with surface maintenance, particularly 

now that we are putting the resources and the focus on it. 

One area where you have a series of smaller compressed availabilities is you can’t efficiently do the deep maintenance that you 

need to do. 

Looking at a cycle similar to what we do with aircraft carriers, 

where we have, say, a certain cycle that allows us a 6-month period 

in there to do deep maintenance. What is the right mix in there 

for surface ships? This is one issue that we are tackling right now 

inside of Navy. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

My next question also is for both of you. I am not familiar with 

the technical nuances of combat operations of the ship, but I have 

heard repeatedly about the tactical data link coordination and 

standard protocol on board our surface combatants. 

I think the network is called [inaudible] 16, and I am wondering 

if you plan any improvements to establishing a high fidelity, common operational picture to ensure a more stable, dependable depiction of the domain operations at any point in time. 

And I would like to hear from both of you. 

Admiral BURKE. Madam, there are technologies in that area. You 

have it absolutely right. 

We are working on that one. I don’t know specifically what the 

progress is that we have made. And I would be happy to get back 

to you on that. 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. 

Admiral. 

Admiral MCCOY. It is an area that we are working on, madam. 

It has to do with interoperability between sea and air assets. And 

we would like to take that one for the record and get you and upto-date response. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 87.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Mississippi is recognized. 

Mr. Palazzo. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to thank our witnesses for being here today. For 

your service to our country, thank you very much. 

Our U.S. Navy is the world’s greatest power projection force, and 

despite being at the lowest ship levels in decades, the fleet remains 

one of our greatest national assets. This is an asset that we should 

be nurturing and ensuring. And we must continue to grow this 

asset to meet all of our current requirements and ensure that future capability needs are met. 

In my opinion this means continuing to grow our fleet, supporting a robust shipbuilding plan, and ensuring that our current 

ships meet their projected service lives without major problems. 

One thing I am curious about is the use of composite materials 

in our Navy as both replacement parts and original parts. 
16 

So, Admiral McCoy or Admiral Burke, whoever is the most 

knowledgeable on the subject, while much of the discussion has 

been focused on the Navy’s past performance with respect to the 

operation and maintenance of the surface fleet, I would like to shift 

the topic slightly to talk about, you know, composites. 

So, I have a number of material manufacturers in my district, 

composite materials, and I am aware that composite materials 

have been introduced in several Navy ship programs. 

What is the Navy’s experience to date with composites? 

Admiral MCCOY. Yes, sir. We are trying to use composite replacement parts everywhere we can. Great examples are, for example, 

topside electrical boxes, telephone boxes, electrical plug-ins all over 

the ship. 

Great success stories—composite deck gratings. Every place we 

can, we are trying to use composite. So particularly on, for example, LCS–1, we see in the waterborne mission zone that use of composites really improved corrosion performance. 

Corrosion is one of our biggest cost drivers in the Navy, and so 

we are trying to use composites everywhere we can, sir. 

Mr. PALAZZO. I understand that these composites offer some valuable advantages as far as strength and weight efficiency. And 

some studies have concluded that composites are able to meet Navy 

service life requirements on several ship classes. 

Do you anticipate the Navy will rely on these types of materials 

even more in the future? 

Admiral MCCOY. I do. And in fact, you know, we are building a 

ship right now, the DDG 1000, with an all-composite deck house 

that we will get valuable experience on. 

But at the component level, it is the way to go, particularly for 

replacement of steel enclosures and things, and topside structure. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Are you satisfied with the amount of composite materials going into the future ship plans, or could we do more? 

Admiral MCCOY. I think we could always do more. And I think 

that is the partnership that we have to continue to have with the 

shipbuilders, who are really, kind of, the deck plate experts, and 

they are giving us ideas and opportunities on how to further expand the composite use. 

Mr. PALAZZO. All right. Is there anything I can do or our colleagues on this committee can do to help the Navy use more composite materials? 

Admiral MCCOY. No, I will get back to you. If I see the opportunity, I will tell you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 89.] 

Admiral MCCOY. You know, for example, I just spent a day— 

twice a year, there is a big group of Navy and industry folks that 

get together. It is called Mega Rust. And I go at least once a year. 

It doesn’t sound very exciting, but there is hundreds of people. 

Some people estimate 20 percent of, you know, all DOD budget 

goes to fighting corrosion. 

But I regularly have people coming into my office showing me 

their products, and we try and fast-track it. It is not just composites. It is things, different metal treatments for corrosion-resistant. 

This is one of those things that gets an open door to my office. 
17 

Mr. PALAZZO. Let us know how we can help. 

Admiral MCCOY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, gentlemen. Appreciate it. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

And the chair recognizes now the gentleman from Connecticut, 

Mr. Courtney, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding 

this hearing. And thank you to both witnesses. 

At the outset, first of all, I just want to state that I have had 

an opportunity to work, over the last 2 years, with Admiral 

McCoy’s office, dealing with issues regarding repair and maintenance work up at the Groton Shipyard at Electric Boat. 

And I just want to say I think we are blessed to have your service. 

And again, I just think your balancing act that you perform constantly is really impressive. And on behalf of the people in southeastern Connecticut, I just want to publicly thank you for your 

great work. 

You know, one of the things that I did, sort of, get a peek at during that whole process of, you know, trying to figure out availabilities that some of the workers could, you know, fit into was when 

we went through the CR [continuing resolution] process last spring. 

You know, when we talk about, you know, readiness and making 

sure that, you know, the maintenance requirements that your testimony describes is really going to be part of the effort to get to 313 

ships. 

I mean, when there is these sort of uncertainties regarding funding, that obviously has got to be a factor. And I just wonder if you 

could talk about that for a little bit, in terms of, you know, what 

was going on last spring when the CR was up in the air and what 

that meant in terms of availabilities, and how that would affect 

readiness, if Congress really doesn’t operate in regular order as far 

as getting budgets passed? 

Admiral MCCOY. Yes, first of all, thank you very much for your 

kind remarks, Congressman. 

As you know, I think it is a waste to have any qualified mechanic, particularly a submarine mechanic, not doing his trade. 

And we have been very successful at using the folks at EB [Electric 

Boat] to really help our tremendous needs on the Navy side. 

The CR process was incredibly disruptive. I think, luckily, we 

will be able to come out of it with the majority of the availabilities 

that we wanted to accomplish, most of that maintenance done. But 

it is incredibly disruptive. 

For example, Peleliu was supposed to be done in the early spring 

at NASSCO [National Steel and Shipbuilding Company] in San 

Diego, and it is getting done at the end of the year. 

We were not able to let contracts. We had to defer maintenance, 

and we had to change ship schedules around. We were not able— 

for example, we needed help in our public shipyards to do some 

work and we were not able to write the contracts to the Electric 

Boat workers to have them come down and help us. 
18 

And so, to the extent we can have a budget on time, boy, you 

really help us out with the maintenance and sustainment piece and 

keeping the fleet schedules on track. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And—go ahead, Admiral. 

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir, Mr. Courtney. 

It also impacts ship operations as well. So there are some deployments that are lesser deployments than others. And so we are 

forced to decide whether to do those or not and try to, you know, 

kind of, bet on the come there will be a budget or not. 

Ship visits, you know, a number of those are canceled to various 

wonderful ports around the east and west coasts that—you know, 

not too many as it turns out, but it also creates churn. 

You know, what are we going to do with the schedule? What is 

the ship going to do? And so that, the combination of maintenance 

and operations are—they are both impacted by a continuing resolution. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

And Admiral McCoy, I was wondering if you could just, sort of, 

describe for the committee again the process that you use with 

that, sort of, you know, industry working group, in terms of looking 

at, maybe, shortfalls of workers in one yard versus another and 

how that operates. 

Because, frankly, I think that is helpful for us to understand how 

you are trying to balance the maintenance needs. 

Admiral MCCOY. Yes, sir. 

We have inside NAVSEA [Naval Sea Systems Command] is 

about 60,000 civilians. About half of them turn a wrench every day 

for a living. About a little less than 30,000 turn a wrench for a living, and work on our nuclear ships or submarines and our aircraft 

carriers. 

We experience peaks and valleys through the year. And we rely 

heavily on augmentation of our organic workforce at the four nuclear shipyards. We rely on Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls 

down in Newport News. 

The folks that work on nuclear ships are highly skilled. They 

have a significant amount of experience. And it is not somebody 

that you can just hire off the street. 

As a matter of fact, we tell people it takes longer to train a nuclear welder in this country than it does a surgeon, because of the 

level of experience that they have. 

And so, we meet every single month with the four naval shipyards, Electric Boat, and Huntington Ingalls, and we go through 

not only at the trade, you know, Shop 38 mechanic, an outside machinist mechanic, but also the individual trade skills below that, an 

air conditioning and refrigeration mechanic, a hydraulics mechanic, 

all within that Shop 38. 

And we project out for the year how many people we need at 

each place and how many people we have. And we are constantly 

moving workers around. 

On any given day, there are about 200 workers in the six nuclear 

yards, the four public yards, and the two private yards. There is 

about 200 or so workers. Some months, it is more. 
19 

For example for the next couple of months, 170 Electric Boat 

workers will be required to augment the public shipyards to get the 

Nation’s nuclear work done. 

And so, we treat the workforce of the six nuclear yards as a very 

precious commodity and are constantly balancing the pluses and 

minuses and sending folks here and sending folks there. And we 

have been very successful at doing that, and we continue on. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

I yield back now. I will save a question for later. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 

Now, the chair recognizes Dr. Heck from Nevada. 

Dr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, 

for being here today. 

And interested to see the Navy go into the Fleet Response Plan, 

I think you will find it very successful, as the Army has found the 

ARFORGEN [Army Force Generation] model to be very successful 

in a similar pattern. And that will be my only gratuitous Army 

comment for today. Hooah. 

You know, we have talked a lot about hardware ships. But I tend 

to concentrate more on the personnel readiness side, considering 

that we can have the best hardware in the world, but if we have 

got nobody to man it or staff it, it really doesn’t do us any good. 

In the final report of the Fleet Review Panel of Surface Force 

Readiness from last February, some of the corrective actions that 

were to be taken for manning were to increase billets, primarily— 

I think it was, what, 1,120 personnel billets for optimally manned 

ships in order to perform preventive and corrective maintenance, 

and then an additional 285 shore billets. 

Where are those billets coming from? Is that within the current 

manning caps? Is that a movement of billets from one location to 

another? 

But where are you going to find those available billets? 

Admiral BURKE. Sir, those are within the current caps. So, they 

will come from things that we consider less important. 

Dr. HECK. So the risk analysis has been done to identify which 

billets can be given up without incurring any risk in those other 

areas where you are going to shift over to shore up these areas? 

Admiral BURKE. I wouldn’t say that there is no risk. I would say 

that—— 

Dr. HECK. But the risk-benefit analysis says that the risk is acceptable to move those billets? 

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir. 

Dr. HECK. The other thing I found interesting was that there was 

only a 61 percent fit classification on board ships. Why such a low 

percentage? 

And the goal was to get it up to 85 percent. What eats away that 

only has you at a 61 percent fit classification? 

Admiral BURKE. This is not my area of expertise, but I will take 

it for the record. But let me tell you roughly what I think on this 

one. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 88.] 

Admiral BURKE. For years, we operated on a fill model. So that 

was essentially, you have a billet, we will put a person in it. Fit 
20 

says that not only will we put a person in it, but we will put the 

right person in it, and that will be both rate, Fire Controlman, and 

NEC [Navy Enlisted Classification], which is specific schools or 

specific capability within that. 

And so in many cases, we now have the right person at the right 

grade, but we don’t have the specific school. So that person may 

need to go to another level of fire control school. And so that is the 

challenge we have right now, and so we are trying to remedy that. 

Dr. HECK. And I know, if it is anything like the issues that we 

have in the Army, getting enough school slots is always a problem. 

Are you finding that a big—and maybe you don’t know, but you 

can find out. Is part of the issue having enough available school 

slots to get these individuals in to be trained, or what is the issue 

with them not attaining the level necessary to be classified as fit? 

Admiral BURKE. I will definitely take that one for the record, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 88.] 

Dr. HECK. Thank you. And I appreciate it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. 

Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being with us today. 

Admiral Burke, you said a couple times, ‘‘a limited supply of 

forces.’’ What were you referring to in the big picture there, and 

what does that affect? 

Admiral BURKE. What I am referring to when I say we have a 

limited supply is we only have 285 ships. And I as a submariner, 

I am most familiar with the submarine model, where COCOM demand is for about 16 or 18 sub SSNs at any one time. 

We deliver about 10 SSNs at any one time. And why do we only 

deliver 10? Because that is all we can afford to deliver, so—— 

Mr. KISSELL. When you were talking about limited supply of 

forces, you were talking about specifically ships, and not personnel, 

not aircraft, not missiles, or equipment for the ships? You were 

talking specifically for ships? 

Admiral BURKE. I am talking about ships as a representative of 

the entire Navy. So the same sort of thing happens with aircraft. 

But the aircraft in the Navy are typically on ships. So they are 

part of that process. So in other words, we frequently get asked to 

deliver more carrier presence with the carrier and the aircraft than 

we can deliver. 

Mr. KISSELL. So for every ship that we are short, then you are 

saying there is just a multiplied shortness there of everything that 

you could want or imagine or need with that ship, and that is what 

kind of—I was just curious more about, when you say, limited supply of forces, just, you know. So that is kind of a—for every ship, 

then, what comes with that ship, we are missing? 

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KISSELL. Okay. 

And Admiral McCoy, you mentioned a percentage of ships being 

deployed. And I know we had some charts here, and I probably— 

it is on there somewhere and I just missed it. 
21 

But is there an optimum level that we operate against in saying 

this is the percentage that we would like to have deployed at any 

one time, in order to have the rest and retrofitting and everything 

else that we need going on at one time? 

Is there a percentage that we shoot for, or is it just kind of vary 

to tempo levels, or—— 

Admiral BURKE. Let me take that one. 

Mr. KISSELL. Okay. 

Admiral BURKE. First of all, there are about 12 percent of our 

forces forward deployed. In other words, it is homeported in 

Sasebo, Yokosuka, Japan or in Bahrain. So those forces are always 

forward, if you will. 

That number has essentially doubled over the last 10 years, effectively doubled, given the increase in forces forward and the decrease in overall forces. So the 40 percent includes that. 

What we have done over the last several years is, by increasing 

those that are forward deployed, we have taken those that are 

rotationally deployed—those that deploy from Norfolk and Groton 

and San Diego and Hawaii to go other places. 

We have taken that number and kept it the same, even though 

the force is dropping, the force size is dropping. So where we are 

today is we are not at a sustainable level. Forty percent is not sustainable in the long term. 

Mr. KISSELL. Is there a percentage that would be, you know, all 

things being equal, more sustainable? 

Admiral BURKE. Well, in the submarine force that number is 

about 22 percent. 

Mr. KISSELL. Okay. 

Admiral BURKE. So 22 percent are forward at any one time. 

Mr. KISSELL. And one other question, Admiral Burke. 

You talked about that with aircraft, that there is a certain number of hours you get to fly them. And with the delayed delivering 

of the F–35 and the more hours that we are flying on the wings 

we have now, where are we heading to? 

Are we heading towards to the point we don’t have the aircraft 

that we need? And how soon might we be there or the consequences—what do you foresee there? 

Admiral BURKE. The delay in the arrival of the F–35 is a challenge for us. It will add hours on those other aircraft that we call 

legacy aircraft. It will add hours to them. And those hours are costly, particularly at the end of the aircraft’s life. 

Mr. KISSELL. And how many more hours do you think we have 

there? When are we going to reach the point where those lines 

start coming too close to each other? 

Admiral BURKE. Well, we are addressing that now. We have a 

surface life assessment program and a surface life extension—excuse me, a service life extension program for our F–18s. 

And we are in the middle of actually assessing and extending 

some of those aircraft. So they are built as a 6,000-hour aircraft. 

And we are doing the engineering analysis. 

And we think we can get them to 8,000. And then there is additional analysis that is going on, to try to get longer life out of them. 

But there is only so far you can go. 
22 

The other thing we are trying to do in that regard is to add simulation time. So, if we can—a simulator hour is one, cheap—if we 

can make if effective, we can reduce the hours on the actual airplane. 

Mr. KISSELL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the admiral to 

get some more information on that and to kind of project where 

these lines may be going. Because if we don’t get the F–35 in and 

we can’t get the hours there, you know, how soon is that crisis 

point coming? 

Admiral BURKE. I would be happy to do that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 88.] 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Larry. 

Admiral, I want to come back to the questions we were asking, 

because—and I want to just be honest with you. 

I do not understand—and these aren’t just to you two individuals 

as much as they are to the Pentagon and to the questions—when 

we are grappling with trying to make sure we have the right readiness posture, it would seem to me that it would be without question that we would determine readiness to be our ability to supply 

the resources our combatant commanders need to meet their current and future missions. 

It baffles me that we can’t even answer that question first and 

agree on that question. 

Now, we might say we just don’t have the budget to be able to 

do it. We don’t have the dollars, and we need more dollars to do 

it. 

We might even say that our combatant commanders ask for too 

much. Maybe they don’t need all that they are asking for. 

But to suggest that readiness is not our ability to supply the resources our combatant commanders need to meet their current and 

future missions baffles me, you know. So, I just want to say at the 

outset, I don’t understand that. 

The second thing is I don’t know why we have the QDR if the 

QDR isn’t going to help us make some assessments on our readiness. We have been asking for, for the longest time, in the full committee, to get a true threat assessment of what we have got out 

there and the risks that we may have for future missions, as well 

as current, so we know if we are ready, because we can’t turn these 

things on a dime in 2 years or 3 years. Sometimes it is a longer 

period of time. 

We are constantly told, when the Navy wants something or the 

Pentagon wants something, well, look at the QDR. So, I would 

think we would need to look at the QDR for our readiness. 

But I want to cite you this, which is disturbing to me. This comes 

from the independent panel, bipartisan. Everybody agrees that 

they had a consensus that said this: ‘‘The natural tendency of bureaucracy is to plan short-term, operate from the top-down, think 

within existing parameters and affirm the correctness of existing 

plans and programs of record.’’ 

That is exactly what happened to the QDR process. ‘‘Instead of 

unconstrained, long-term analysis by planners who were encouraged to challenge preexisting thinking, the QDRs became expla-
23 

nations and justifications, often with marginal changes of established decisions and plans.’’ 

I think that is what happens sometimes when we are talking 

about readiness. 

Admiral Burke, yesterday, you and Admiral McCoy were kind 

enough to come meet with me prior to this meeting. Putting it in 

a simple language, I asked you on readiness were we good to go. 

And you said yes. 

I want to put up a chart, if you don’t mind now on our INSURV 

[Board of Inspection and Survey] inspections, which I asked you 

about yesterday, and ask you guys to respond to this. 

Assuming that we are not going to just rely on our combatant 

commanders to tell us what they need, I would think we would 

have some kind of objective criteria. 

If you look at this chart—and I think the members have it in 

their materials, that they can look at if they can’t see up there— 

if you go back to 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, on our INSURV inspections, of the ones that came back either unsatisfactory or unfit 

for combat, it was 8 percent in 2007, 12 percent in 2008, 18 percent 

in 2009, 24 percent in 2010 and 22 percent so far this year. 

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 82.] 

Mr. FORBES. Is there any objective goal that we look for, for 

those failures? Any percentage, Admiral McCoy, that you would 

say—that you would be looking for us to say we are good to go 

when it comes to our INSURV inspections? 

Admiral MCCOY. Yes. Let me first say, referring back to our conversation yesterday, I told you I thought we had a good plan, that 

we had built, over the last 3 years, that we were started off on it 

and that the key is to sustain the funding and to sustain that effort. And I believe that. 

We are not good to go today. And I will you that, in the near 

term, I suspect that some of these indicators will actually, in the 

near term, turn a little bit harsher. 

And the reason I say that is, for a long time, we were not doing 

the deep, deep looks. And we are doing the deep, deep looks right 

now. And so that, you know, we are going to see a backlog of 

CASREPS [casualty reports] actually go up. 

We are going to see a backlog of 2-kilos [repair work requests] 

that need to be completed go up, because we are doing hand-overhand inspections. We are doing the grooms with the ships in the 

middle of the period, getting ready for deployment. 

And so, I would tell you, one of the things we are trying to answer right now with the two fleet commanders is so what are the 

key metrics that show we are making progress? 

And what do we think that our trajectory is going to be? 

That is something that we are working on right now, Congressman Forbes. I think we have the right elements in place. We have 

laid in the right engineering rigor. We have laid in the right inspections. We have laid in the right staffing at our maintenance facilities. 

The type commanders have laid in the additional people that 

they need shipboard to keep up with the maintenance period. The 

top-down involvement, from the fleet, in terms of the standards 
24 

and hands-on work with the ships, not only to get ready for 

INSURVs, but to get ready for deployment. 

All of that is in the right direction. And, right now, we are trying 

to figure out exactly what those key measures of success are going 

to be, and how long it is going to take us to get there. But I will 

tell you it is going to take us another couple of years. 

And we are going to see some of this kind of data for the next 

year or two, I think, as we get the deep looks, get the inspections 

done. I will give you a great example, and I think it is kind of the 

poster child for why we need to continue doing what we have laid 

in place. 

I was on a ship a couple of weeks ago, USS Chosin, a cruiser out 

in Hawaii. And the availability started out at about $35 million. It 

was supposed to finish in July. The availability is now about $70 million, mostly because of deep 

structure, tanks, hull that once we put the ship in dry dock that 

needed to be addressed and it is going to extend the availability 

about 3 months and add about $35 million—almost 100 percent 

growth to the ship. 

That is the kind of thing that we are going to see for the near 

term as we do these inspections, but it will ensure that our ships 

get to their full service life. I am convinced, because we have put 

in place for surface ships the same model that we use for submarines and aircraft carriers that we know works. 

And now, I think we have to stay the course. We are not where 

we want to be. We are on the right path. We are moving in the 

right direction, but we have to stay the course, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And Admiral, I want to repeat what I said earlier. 

I have the utmost respect for both of you guys. I am not pointing 

fingers at either one of you. I also have the utmost respect for your 

opinions. 

Here is what concerns us as a committee. We have to look at objective criteria. And when I look at this kind of chart, it worries 

me that I see this trajectory that I have got up here, and I think 

you would agree when we look at 24 percent and 22 percent, that 

is concerning. 

The second thing that worries me is exactly what you said with 

the Chosin. We look at a situation where we see folks from the 

Pentagon sitting on the other side of those tables telling us, ‘‘We 

have got a plan. We are turning it around.’’ 

We watched as time after time they come over here when they 

have a statutory requirement to audit their financial statements 

and they said the exact thing. ‘‘We have a plan.’’ 

In fact, the Secretary said that in 2007, had it up on his Web 

site that he was going to have them all audited by 2010—got a 

plan, taking care of it, it is a high priority. He missed it by 100 

percent. 

They didn’t audit any of them in 2010 and they said they would 

do 100 percent. 

Chosin, you are right. We had people telling us it was going to 

be $35 million, you know. It is coming out $70 million. 

In Guam, when they came in and sat right where you are and 

told us it is going to cost $10 billion, the last report we got it is 

going to be $18 billion, you know, not $10 billion. And so, we are 
25 

sitting here saying how do we have confidence in the fidelity of 

these models if we don’t see objective criteria turning them. 

Now, I would like to put up another—actually, I think it is on 

the bottom of that. Look at the maintenance that we have a shortfall on. 

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 82.] 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral Burke, this is one I would like to ask you 

on. I raised it last night, and for the members, it is at the bottom 

of the chart, I think, that you just had. We had this year in the President’s budget a $367 million shortfall in our ship maintenance. 

Admiral Burke, I am coming back to what you told me at the beginning of today’s hearing that if we don’t do the maintenance, we 

are going to have shorter life cycles, and we are going to have 

greater costs down the road. 

Ultimately, this is something that came over. Your office had to look at it. How do we justify having a $367 million shortfall for 

ship maintenance if I am looking at INSURVs that are continually 

growing in terms of failures, and I am looking at your statement 

that we are going to have shorter life cycles and greater costs? 

Admiral BURKE. I am not happy about the $367 million. However, it was a decision that was made based on a bunch of other 

priorities. And ship maintenance came out short a few hundred 

million dollars. 

The impact of that is significant. The impact is that we will go 

without approximately 40 availabilities. 

Mr. FORBES. And Admiral, my concern about, first of all, again, 

you know, I am not pointing at you. Because I know you needed 

that money and had it in there. 

I am just saying when the Pentagon comes over and tells us ev- erything is good to go, it is okay, we are $367 million short, that 

is a problem for us, especially when I am looking every day at 

China growing in the terms of ships they have got. And I know 

that that is having an impact on us. 

Can I put up another chart on our Navy aircraft? Now, these are 

deployed aircraft. 

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 83.] 

Mr. FORBES. If you would look at that, it is less than 5 out of 

10 of our aircraft are fully mission capable. Our goal is 60 percent 

and we are not reaching 45 percent. And yet I see shortfalls of 

$72.7 million for our aircraft depot maintenance and our aviation 

logistics of $27 million. 

How do we justify those proposed shortfalls in the budget that 

came over here if we are only at less than 5 out of 10 of our aircraft—these are deployed aircraft. These aren’t ones that are sitting back somewhere. They are deployed. 

How do we justify those kinds of shortfalls? 

Admiral BURKE. There is not a good justification for those shortfalls. I will say that they are within the realm of what we have 

been doing for years, but it is a problem. We are short on spares 

and that is part of the issue here is having the parts that are available to fix these aircraft. 

Mr. FORBES. So, it would be fair to say that we are not good to 

go on those? 
26 

Admiral BURKE. We are meeting the COCOM demand, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Be careful. You are telling me, are we meeting the 

demands of our combatant commanders? 

Admiral BURKE. We are meeting the missions of the combatant 

commanders. We are not missing missions today, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. All right. 

Admiral BURKE. But I will say that—— 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, I want to ask you this. Have you read this 

quarterly readiness report from our combatant commanders? 

Admiral BURKE. I would have to look at it to tell you if I have 

read it. 

Mr. FORBES. It is—and let me just say this. I can’t talk about all 

this. This is the unclassified version. We have got the classified 

version. 

I want you just to look at that classified version. I am tempted 

to go into a classified setting, but I encourage our members to look 

at it and then come back and let me ask you that question about 

whether or not you want to say that our combatant commanders 

feel they are ready to meet those missions. 

But let us look at these objective facts, which is not classified. 

I think you would agree with me we are not reaching the goals we 

have set for ourselves, which are low goals. They are only 60 percent. But we are just at 45 percent. So that is a concern, isn’t it? 

Admiral BURKE. It is definitely a concern. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Now, the next thing I would like to put up 

is on our Naval facilities. I think we have a chart. 

We don’t have a chart on that, but let me just say this. I come 

back to what you said, which I agree with you, if we don’t do our 

maintenance we have shorter life cycles and greater costs. 

This year, the budget that came over from the Pentagon required 

that we only do 20 percent of the required maintenance on all of 

our facilities. All the facilities—I am sorry, 80 percent, that we 

didn’t do 20 percent of it. We only did 80 percent. 

We had a shortfall of $349 million. How do we justify that kind 

of shortfall and not doing the maintenance on those facilities? 

Admiral BURKE. The model that we used for that is a resourcing 

model that doesn’t necessarily relate directly to the way in which 

we do the maintenance. But I will agree with you that in the long 

term if we don’t pay for the maintenance today, we will pay more 

for the maintenance in the future. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, let us come back. You don’t disagree that we 

have a $349 million shortfall on the facility maintenance, do you? 

Admiral BURKE. Well, I think in the past, I think there is—you 

won’t find that anybody is funded to 100 percent because there is 

some concern about the miles. So, I would say—— 

Mr. FORBES. That is not my question, though, as you know. My 

question is, we had—I am taking your numbers. These aren’t our 

numbers. I am taking your numbers of $349 million shortfall. 

Tell me what the numbers are. If this is a hearing on readiness 

and we need to know whether our facilities are being maintained 

or we are going to have shorter lives and greater costs down the 

road, what is the number if it is not $349 million? 

Is it $300 million? Is it $280 million? What is the figure? 
27 

Admiral BURKE. If you were to fund fully to the readiness model, 

it would be—I am sure the number you are using is right. It is 

roughly $350 million and it is about $175 million delta between 80 

and 90 percent. 

Yes, sir. 

Yes, that is all I have to say. 

Mr. FORBES. And the reason I ask this is not to push on you, but 

these are the numbers we put in our bill because we want to be 

good to go. We don’t want to be coming in telling our combatant 

commanders they don’t have the resources to meet those missions. 

Now, just a couple of other questions—last week, we had a bill, 

DOD authorization—I mean, not DOD authorization, but a DOD 

appropriations bill cut $8.9 billion out of the defense budget that 

the President submitted. 

What impact is that going to have on readiness? 

Admiral BURKE. Sir, I am sure it will have some impact, but I 

don’t know what the—I have not seen that, so—— 

Mr. FORBES. When you get a chance, would you look at that and 

give us those figures? I am concerned when we start cutting almost 

$9 billion. 

Because I am assuming you guys had already cut to the bone be- fore you got here, and then to cut $9 billion, just concerns me. And 

I would just like to hear it from you as to the impact it is going 

to have on you. 

If it is not going to have an impact, my question would be why didn’t we cut the $9 billion out before the budget came to us? If 

it is going to have an impact, we need to know what that impact 

is and we would love to hear you guys just submit that to us for 

the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 87.] 

Mr. FORBES. The other thing I think you need to be looking at, 

and we would love to have some insight on, we are just talking 

about the $9 billion because we have got shortfalls right now that 

we have just pointed out. And I am looking over the horizon at all 

these reports of $400 billion to $1 trillion of cuts coming down. 

I am really worried about what that does to our readiness posture. And I know you guys have to be concerned about that a little 

bit. 

The last two questions I have for you are these. I have heard rumors. We had one report in a media outlet that said the Navy was 

thinking about deferring for 2 years, the aircraft carrier that we 

currently have underway in construction. 

Is there any truth to those rumors that you can share with us 

today? 

Admiral MCCOY. I would have to take that one for the record and 

let ASN–RDA [Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development & Acquisition] response formally on that, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Would you mind getting us a response on that? 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. And also, we heard that they were talking about 

taking the future carrier off the shipbuilding plan altogether, and 
28 

Admiral, if you could just get us a response on that to the extent 

that you can do it. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 87.] 

Mr. FORBES. Final thing I want to just close my part with, and 

then I think Mr. Courtney had an additional—oh, I am sorry, Madeleine has a question. 

As I mentioned earlier, also we had a Chinese general recommending that—to the Administration, that we cut military spending in the United States. Since you guys told me that we can have 

your expertise and your experience, I am going to ask you—do you 

feel we should be cutting military spending in the United States? 

Admiral BURKE. I would prefer not to cut military spending in 

the United States. I would even more prefer not to cut spending 

on the Navy in the United States. 

Mr. FORBES. And will it impact readiness if we do that, Admiral? 

Admiral BURKE. So, sir, the answer to this question and the answer to a previous question about cutting $9 billion or $8.9 billion, 

whatever the number was, out of the budget is I don’t know whether it will impact readiness per se. It will certainly impact capability 

and capacity. 

I look at readiness as what it takes to get the right platforms out 

the door with the right training and the right equipment. I suspect 

we will continue to do the best we can there. The question is, if 

you cut too much you may not have as many platforms. 

Mr. FORBES. And, Admiral, I just want to finish my part up with 

saying, I thank you for all the balancing act you did, just like Mr. 

Courtney has said. But our job is not to do just the balancing act. 

Our job is to say, if those combatant commanders have a mission 

that we have tasked them to do, we want to make sure they have 

the resources so that they will not fail in that mission. And that 

is what our committee is just trying to do, and we are trying make 

sure they have those resources. 

Ms. Bordallo, I recognize you for whatever time you may need. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

There are a few miscellaneous questions for the admirals. 

Admiral Burke, it is my understanding that the DOD rates for 

fuel increased on June 1st from $126 a barrel to $165 a barrel. Can 

you please explain the total cost and the impact to the ship operations and flying hour program accounts? 

And if the fuel rates remain high in fiscal year 2012, how will 

you pay for that deficit? 

Admiral BURKE. Madam, you are absolutely right. It is roughly 

$39 a barrel. In the last 4 months of 2011, if that price holds, it 

will cost us an additional $140 million in the ship operating account, an additional $204 million in the flying hour account, for a 

total of $344 million through the rest of the fiscal year. 

The likely source of payment for that will be supplemental funding. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Supplemental, okay. 

The next one I have is—the Fleet Review Panel had much to say 

about the inadequacy of the Aegis ship SPY radar readiness. Since 
29 

this radar is the backbone of the Navy’s air and missile defense capability, what steps has the Navy taken to address this deficiency? 

Admiral MCCOY. Yes, madam. About 2 years ago, we undertook 

a comprehensive look at the SPY radar. That look was finished 

about a year ago this summer. 

Following on that, we took an even more comprehensive look, not 

only at the radar, but the entire Aegis weapon system, to include 

what we call wholeness—manning, training, shore infrastructure, 

spare parts, fit and fill, the adequacy of the coding, the coding 

standards, interoperability, all of those. 

We implemented in the near term, starting in fiscal year 2011, 

the results of the SPY task force, to include plused-up manning, increased spares, rooms on ships, plus some coding software fixes. 

In addition, we have just come through with the two fleet commanders and the resource sponsors and the Chief of Naval Operations, a comprehensive plan for total Aegis wholeness, to include 

those key elements. We are using some end-of-year funding this 

year to start that, and we will plan on continuing that through fiscal year 2012 and through the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program]. 

So we have looked at it from a holistic standpoint. We were not 

happy with where we were. And we have got a comprehensive plan 

in place to address those issues. 

Ms. BORDALLO. And the funding has been requested? 

Admiral MCCOY. The funding has been requested, yes, madam. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Another question is, given the issues with the 

current computer-based training raised by GAO [Government Accountability Office], the Naval Inspector General and the Balisle 

Report, how has the Navy improved off-ship training for Navy personnel to ensure that sailors arrive at the ship with the necessary 

skills? 

Admiral BURKE. Madam, we probably went a little too far on 

computer-based training a few years ago. We have since shifted the 

pendulum back some, so we have a mix of computer-based training 

as well as instructor-based training. And we have a very good instructor-to-student ratio in that instructor-based training. 

And we see benefits in both kinds of training, because there are 

some people that learn better one way than the other and there are 

some things that are better taught one way than the other. 

But the key point is it is much better to take apart a valve and 

put it back together in something, you know, where you actually 

put your hands on a physical valve or physical work on something. 

So like I said, we shifted too far. We have come back. And we 

think we have got the mix about right now. But we have heard 

from the sailors and heard from the Congress on this one, and we 

have moved. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Good. 

My last question, Mr. Chairman, is based on the findings of the 

Balisle Report, the Navy plans to take a number of actions in many 

interrelated areas such as training, maintenance, command and 

control, manning, et cetera. 

What is not clear, however, is who will be responsible for making 

sure that the actions are coordinated and implemented to avoid the 

problems of the past where the Navy wasn’t looking at things holis-
30 

tically to see whether the changes it was making were compatible 

and did not have unintended consequences. 

The Navy will need to take accountability clear and have some 

kind of integration mechanism across the areas, whether it be one 

senior-level official who is the focal point supported by an interdisciplinary group or another approach. 

So, how does the Navy intend to proceed from here in taking corrective actions, including establishing leadership and organizational accountability? 

Admiral BURKE. Last summer, last July, I think it was, in front 

of this committee, Admiral McCoy and I were here—in between us 

was Admiral Harvey. 

And Admiral Harvey was and is the Commander at Fleet Forces 

down in Norfolk. Admiral Harvey said he was the responsible person to do exactly what you talked about. 

Now, he can’t do that without Admiral McCoy and Admiral 

Architzel and me doing our jobs to support him. So in military parlance, we see him as the supported commander and we are the supporting commanders. And as long as we do our jobs to give him the 

resources to do it, he will deliver. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So, he is the focal point. 

Admiral BURKE. Yes, madam. 

Admiral MCCOY. And if I could chime in, I am on a regular every 

60- to 90-day drumbeat with Admiral Harvey. I also report to Admiral Walsh, the Pacific Fleet Commander. 

I am responsible to deliver the engineering and maintenance associated with the actions in the Balisle Report. 

I can also tell you that the two surface type commanders are also 

held accountable by the fleet, Admiral Harvey and Admiral Walsh, 

for their pieces of manning, training and standards and things like 

that that were in the Balisle Report. 

So, we are on a regular drumbeat. And so, I think that is often 

moving and being well cared for. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. And I thank you both for 

service to our country. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Madeleine. 

Mr. Courtney is recognized for a question. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. Actually, I wanted to ask two questions, if that is okay. 

One is, you know, we talk about spending in the top line of the 

defense budget, which, again, I share a lot of Mr. Forbes’ concern. 

Obviously, that doesn’t mean there is a blanket approval for any 

kind of spending. I mean, the fact of the matter is, any system can 

always be more efficient. 

And, you know, the SSBN reconfiguration that brought the price 

tag down by almost $2 billion a copy that was worked through over 

the last year or so, you know, is an example of where, you know, 

I think that is a healthy thing, to make sure that we are really 

spending the money as efficiently and smartly as possible. 

Another question that came up over the last year was the JSF 

[Joint Strike Fighter] alternate engine, you know, never-ending, 

perpetual debate in this building. 
31 

But one of the arguments that Secretary Gates and Admiral 

Roughead talked about was the impact, not just on production 

costs, which was about $3 billion in additional spending for the alternate engine, but also the repair and maintenance impact of having two separate engine systems, particularly in places like aircraft 

carriers, where, I mean, you are really creating—Admiral 

Roughead argued pretty passionately was a pretty inefficient arrangement that was going to cost money. 

So, I guess, you know, again, I share many of Mr. Forbes’ concerns, but on the other hand I think that, you know, I think—let 

me ask you. Do you agree that it still behooves us to look at spending issues, you know, thinking through, again, the way these sort 

of play out over the life cycle in terms of impact of cost down the 

road, because we don’t want to waste money under almost any scenario over the next few years or so. 

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir. I fully agree with you. 

And I spend much of my time and my team spends much of its 

time scrubbing those things that come to us from Admiral McCoy, 

Admiral Architzel and others as requirements. So, we dig into 

them to try to figure out if there is a different way to skin the cat. 

Once it goes past me, the same thing happens with some of our 

budgeteers who have much experience in particular accounts and 

look for ways to either save money that might be spent in a duplicative fashion or to look at efficiencies like you are talking about, 

Congressman. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Because I think, you know, we want, you know, 

testimony that is very upfront about whether we are unnecessarily 

cutting spending, but we also, I think, would encourage input about 

ways that we could do things better and maybe save money as 

well. 

Admiral MCCOY. Can I chime in there for a second? 

Mr. FORBES. Yes. 

Admiral MCCOY. We see it as our obligation, particularly given 

all that we deal with maintaining this and procuring this fleet, to 

cut what we call total ownership costs. And it is everything to do 

from using composites on ships to single-coat paints instead of 

three-coat paints. 

Sounds like a small, small thing, but it is huge when you multiply it over 288 ships. For example, we recently saved $600 million by one study of 

whether we could take a class of ships from 4-year maintenance intervals to 6-year maintenance intervals. And that was $600 million 

over the FYDP. 

And on any given day across NAVSEA, we have 200 to 300 of 

those efforts ongoing. Some of them don’t pan out. Some of them 

are almost a no-brainer, because the return on investment is so 

big. And we are constantly feeding those out. 

Matter of fact for the first time starting in the fiscal year 2012 

budget, we actually across the Navy went and invested heavily to 

put seed money to a number of initiatives that will actually reduce 

spending in the long run. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Good, last point, Admiral McCoy. 

You testified earlier again that you have this monthly meeting 

process. I hope that will continue. Again, a few notices go out this 
32 

week, and as you know, my office will be calling in just to check 

in with you. 

And again, I want to thank you for your great efforts to try and 

make sure that talented people get used and not wasted. And I 

hope that will continue. 

Admiral MCCOY. Yes, sir. And we are heavily relying on the excess labor, if you will, at Electric Boat for the next 6 to 12 months 

to help us with the public shipyards. 

Mr. FORBES. And let me finish up by saying that what Mr. 

Courtney said is really apples and oranges. There is no one who 

says that we shouldn’t look at the most efficient means possible. 

Here is what I will stand on, and I think it is very difficult to 

argue with this. We hear the Secretary come in and talk about efficiencies. It is not an efficiency when you cut your maintenance 

down to doing only 80 percent of the maintenance that you need. 

That is just kicking the can down the road. And as you have admitted, it is going to be greater cost and shorter life expectancies when 

we do it. 

This committee needs to be on top of that. That is not good to 

go. 

It is not cutting costs when we say that we are going to cut the 

cost on aircraft maintenance, and we see that we have the problems that we have with only 45 percent of our naval aircraft in a 

mission-capable ready to fly. That is not a cost efficiency. 

It is not a cost efficiency when we look at our cannibalization 

rates, which have been above the maximum accepted level for the 

fourth consecutive quarter. That means we are taking parts off of 

one ship to put on another ship so we can meet the inspections. 

The other thing that I am really concerned about, and I don’t 

think it is a cost efficiency—I want to put this last chart up so we 

can get it in the record and let you comment on this—but our casualty reports, which indicate—if it is a C–3 or C–4, indicates a primary mission degradation with mission-essential systems or equipment have failed. 

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 84.] 

Mr. FORBES. We have had on the average 40 percent of the time 

that our ships have been deployed, they have had at least one 

major equipment or systems failure. That is not a cost-cutting 

measure. 

And I know yesterday when we were talking, you said, ‘‘Well, 

that is not necessarily a failure for that particular mission that 

they are doing.’’ But that would be like saying, ‘‘I am going down 

the road, and the windshield wipers on my car aren’t working, but 

it is not raining right now.’’ 

The reason we put that equipment on is so they are ready for 

those missions when they come up. 

And that is the kind of thing, Mr. Courtney, I think this committee needs to be on top of, because when we come in here and 

say we are good to go for readiness, we are not good to go for readiness. We have got some big shortfalls that we need to fill, if we are 

going to make sure that our combatant commanders have the resources they need to meet the missions that they need. 

And the final question I want to do is just one follow-up. Ms. 

Bordallo raised a very good question on the fuel, and you talked 
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about the supplemental. But what are you going to do to address 

the fiscal year 2012 costs that you are going to be having? 

How are we going to pay for those shortfalls due to the increased 

prices that you know you have already got? 

I am sorry, Larry—okay. 

The supplemental won’t come for that, but. 

Admiral BURKE. Is that a question? 

Mr. FORBES. Yes, sir, please. 

Admiral BURKE. I don’t know yet how we will pay for it. I suspect 

we will—because much of that fuel use will be in the CENTCOM 

[Central Command] area supporting operations in Afghanistan and 

in the Gulf, that we will pay for that with OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] funding. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Kissell, one final question, and then we are 

done. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just a couple of follow-ups and the information we talked about 

on our aircraft and kind of like the convergence, you know, where 

does the eventual demise of the legacy aircraft and the lack of the 

F–35, you know, where are we going with that? 

But especially in terms of safety for our airmen and, you know, 

how far are we going to be pushing that envelope in terms of safety. I would like to have, you know, consideration for that. 

And the last thought is when you look at these readiness numbers and recognizing that we are operating in what I would call a 

harsh environment, but we are not operating in a hostile environment, you know. And I hope we don’t. 

I hope we don’t have active warfare involving our ships, other 

than what we are doing in terms of launching attacks. 

But it does concern me. If we did get into a hostile situation, and 

we have these maintenance situations, you know, without being 

fired upon, then, you know, where might we go? 

And the idea that switching from computer-based training to 

more realistic training—I applaud that. And I remember when Admiral Harvey said that last year, that it falls on him, and we do 

need these numbers getting better. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Kissell. 

I thank all the members of the committee. 

And I want to also, before we adjourn, once again thank our witnesses again for their service to the country and also for appearing 

before the subcommittee today. 

I want to also take a moment to highlight for our membership 

an opportunity to continue this dialogue by joining me in a visit to 

some of our key shipyards that we are going to be trying to arrange 

in the near future. And I think this will facilitate a first-hand assessment of our capabilities. And I welcome your participation. 

Thank the Navy in advance for organizing those visits for us. 

And with that, if there is nothing else, we are adjourned. 

Thank you all very much. 

[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JULY 12, 2011 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Admiral BURKE and Admiral MCCOY. Of the $8.9B reduction in the House version 

of the DoD Appropriation Act for 2012 (H.R.2219), Navy’s budget request is decreased by a total of $1,982M. These reductions would impact future readiness, with 

$1,795M taken against Navy procurement accounts (APN, OPN, WPN, SCN, and 

PANMC), and smaller reductions taken against R&D ($157M), National Defense 

Sealift Forces ($26M), and personnel ($25M). Current readiness accounts (OMN and 

OMNR) actually increase by a net total of $21M. Congress’ support for our current operational forces and the $365M increase for 

ship maintenance funding are greatly appreciated. However, the Navy remains concerned about two readiness items that were marked in H.R. 2219: 

1. Public Shipyards were marked $215M for excessive overhead funding. As Navy 

ship construction workload is increasing across the FYDP, this OMN reduction 

detrimentally impacts the execution of all Navy shipbuilding contracts, by forcing reductions in manpower oversight that will degrade mission execution for 

onsite management of these critical programs at all major shipbuilding private 

yards. This loss of funding will reverse gains made by the Supervisors of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIPS) over the last five years, and will result in the loss of critical skills. The SUPSHIPs provide contract administration and government 

oversight to ALL Navy shipbuilding programs and private sector nuclear repair. In FY12, this includes oversight of construction and/or design of SSN 774 

Class, CVN 78 & 79, DDG 1000 Class, LCS Variants, DDG 51 Class, LPD 17 

Class, LHA 6 Class, JHSV Class, MLP, T–AGM, T–AGS and T–AKE, as well 

as nuclear repair of submarines and Refueling Complex Overhauls for CVNs. 

These programs are critical to the Navy’s ability to deliver quality ships, control cost, meet schedules, and successfully recapitalize to 313 ships. 

2. Deployed steaming days were marked $25M. Deployed ship underway steaming days directly support Combatant Commander missions, including Joint exercises with allied nations, maritime interdiction operations, and anti-piracy 

operations. Reduced funding for deployed steaming days will increase costs in 

other accounts, given deployed ships that are not underway typically must 

moor/anchor, run generators, and incur additional shore support expenses, 

nearly equal to the costs of remaining underway. The net effect of this mark 

would be a 4% reduction in the number of underway days available for Combatant Commander missions (from 45 per ship/quarter to 43 per ship/quarter). 

[See page 27.] 

Admiral MCCOY. Fiscal Year 2013 budget discussions on the shipbuilding plan are 

ongoing. As always, these discussions focus on balancing the overall shipbuilding 

plan, considering warfighting needs and industrial base considerations. Deliberations of Navy’s force structure alignment are subject to a complete review by the 

Secretary of the Navy and OSD; results are pre-decisional until submitted in the 

President’s Fiscal Year 2013 budget request. It would be inappropriate to discuss 

internal budget deliberations until officially released in President’s Budget 2013. 

[See page 27.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Admiral BURKE and Admiral MCCOY. The Navy is taking a three phased approach 

to address Interoperability issues within its Carrier Strike Groups. Phase I is a 

‘‘Near Term’’ solution providing immediate corrections to Aegis platforms and Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC only). This effort is already fielding and will 

first deploy with the John C Stennis Carrier Strike Group. 

Phase II is a ‘‘Mid Term’’ solution to correct ‘‘root cause’’ Interoperability issues 

across the majority of Navy ships, to include Aegis, Ships Self Defense System 

(SSDS), and E–2 aircraft. The main goal of this Mid Term effort is to improve the 

integration of our CEC sensor netting capability with the Link 16 track data management process to deliver a consistent common operational picture. The Navy plans 

to demonstrate these interoperability improvements in FY 12 during a Fleet exer-
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cise titled Trident Warrior. This fleet exercise is representative of a real world joint 

operational environment and involves a wide range of Navy and Joint operational 

platforms (ships and aircraft). Based on successful testing and completion of Trident 

Warrior 12, the Navy will commence fielding of this improved common operational 

picture capability starting in FY 13. 

Phase III (Far Term) will be a follow on effort to address Interoperability in future Navy platforms that will include implementing design changes learned from 

the Mid Term development and integrating those changes into future system and 

platform baselines. [See page 15.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KISSELL 

Admiral BURKE. The Department of the Navy (DoN) is challenged with a strikefighter shortfall due to F/A–18A–D aircraft reaching the end of their service life before the replacement aircraft (the F–35B/C) can be delivered into service. 

In December 2010, the Secretary of Defense made changes to the Programs of 

Record for both the F–35B/C and F/A–18E/F programs. The DoN’s procurement of 

F–35B/C aircraft was decreased by 60 in the FYDP, creating a requirement for 50 

additional F/A–18 E/F to negate the resulting increase in the projected strike fighter 

shortfall. To address this shortfall, 150 F/A–18A–D service life extensions (SLEP) 

and 41 additional F/A–18E/F aircraft were added to the Fiscal Year 2012 Navy 

budget request, and Congress added nine F/A–18E/F aircraft to the program of 

record of 556 aircraft in the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Resolution Appropriations Act 2011. These nine aircraft, combined with the 41 additional 

aircraft, satisfied the requirement for 50 that resulted from the changes to the F– 

35B/C Program of Record. With the new F/A–18E/F procurement total of 565 aircraft, the predicted peak shortfall was reduced to 52 aircraft in 2018. 

The DoN has determined that a 52 aircraft shortfall in 2018 is manageable with 

the mitigations in place. Along with other mitigation efforts, if the JSF delivery profile remains unchanged, and the service life of 150 F/A–18A–D is extended to 10,000 

flight hours, DoN will continue to assess the most recent shortfall projection as 

manageable. However, any further delay in the JSF delivery profile will have a negative effect on the projected strike fighter shortfall in both magnitude and duration, 

depending on the magnitude, duration, and timing of the delay. [See page 22.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. HECK 

Admiral BURKE. In recent years, to enhance operational readiness at sea, we 

shifted from a supply-driven system, focused on getting the right number of Sailors 

aboard ships, to a demand-driven system, focused on getting the right number of 

Sailors in the correct pay grades and with the requisite formal schoolhouse training 

aboard ships. Establishing new schoolhouse courses of instruction for certain Navy 

Enlisted Classification (NEC) codes, the timing of which are properly aligned with 

distribution and assignment practices that deliver a fully trained Sailor to the Fleet 

on time, are essential to getting us to the overall goal of 85% Fit. The Chief of Naval 

Personnel has established a Business Improvement Team, which is using proven 

business models to properly align our supply chain and eliminate inefficiencies in 

processes for delivering fully trained personnel to the Fleet on time. We are initially 

focusing on improving Fit in our most critical NEC requirements (i.e., those in 

which the mission cannot be performed unless the NEC is properly manned), and 

have increased Critical NEC Fit from 70% to 75% in fiscal year 2011, ensuring that 

assigned combat missions are properly manned. [See page 19.] 

Admiral BURKE. The issue is less about sufficient numbers of school slots than 

it is about timing of available school slots with the rotation of Sailors. Fit is not 

currently where it should be as a result of friction in Navy’s distributable inventory 

at pay grades E5–E9, in part due to assignment policies and sea/shore flow imbalance. We are working diligently to optimize use of available resources to improve 

all Fit measures, and minimize the amount of time Sailors must wait for seat availability. Navy Personnel Command’s Quarterly Demand Planning Working Group 

has been working to synchronize rotation of Sailors with available school quotas to 

time the arrival of trained Sailors as they are required in the Fleet. In the past 

year, through numerous distribution and administrative enhancements, we have improved Fit, from just above 60%, to approximately 70%. [See page 20.] 
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO 

Admiral MCCOY. The Naval Sea Systems Command continues efforts in coordination with industry to identify additional uses of composites in shipboard applications. Additional composite applications currently include gratings, louvers, screens, 

stanchions, masts, bow domes, cover plates, electrical boxes, shaft covers, and boat 

deck enclosures. The President’s budget directly supports the further development 

and integration of composite technology in a number of ship acquisition programs. 

For example, the Navy is currently pursuing several composite applications through 

the OHIO Replacement program. Evaluation of these applications is based on a 

business case assessment that includes projected life cycle cost savings. The OHIO 

Replacement program is also planning to invest in development of new manufacturing techniques for the bow dome and bow dome boot. These manufacturing techniques have the potential to be leveraged for future applications. [See page 16.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 12, 2011 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. There are many aspects to material readiness; training and manning 

are only two of them. What are the others? 

Admiral BURKE and Admiral MCCOY. Navy reports Fleet readiness in five pillars. 

In addition to Training and Personnel (manning), the remaining pillars are Equipment, Supply, and Ordnance. From a material readiness perspective, depot, intermediate, and unit-level maintenance programs are all important factors under the 

Equipment pillar. A key element in the Supply pillar is the availability of spare 

parts. Ordnance readiness is a product of both acquisition of new weapons and 

maintenance of existing stockpiles. An additional element, not directly addressed by 

the Navy readiness pillars, is ‘‘time.’’ To get material readiness right, we must allow 

sufficient time for: 

• Individual sailors’ training and professional growth 

• Unit level training 

• Execution of maintenance availabilities and unit-level maintenance 

When time is compressed, each of these may suffer. The pace of operations over 

the last ten years is in excess of what Navy can ultimately support within our existing force structure. This has compressed the time available for readiness activities 

and is reflected in negative readiness trends in several areas, as reported in the 

Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress. 

Mr. FORBES. For the last two years you have discussed the degraded military 

readiness of the surface ships and the steps you are taking to achieve expected service life on your ships. Given the $367 million shortfall in ship depot maintenance 

that defers 44 availabilities in fiscal year 2012, how do you plan on maintaining a 

ready surface fleet that meets its estimated service life? What is the threshold for 

risk on surface ship maintenance? 

Admiral BURKE and Admiral MCCOY. The cumulative amount of surface ship 

maintenance that can be deferred, without impacting operations or the expected 

service life of our platforms, varies from year to year based upon the individual age 

and materiel condition of our ships, current operations, and the next available opportunity to complete the maintenance. With the recent establishment of the Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program, Navy has an improved ability to 

assess the risk of individual ship maintenance deferrals, track deferred work to completion, and optimize deferral decisions in a budget constrained environment, allowing us to more effectively mitigate shortfalls that do occur. 

The Navy remains committed to sustaining the force structure required to implement the Maritime Strategy and to funding the full surface ship maintenance requirement, as evidenced by the increase in the baseline maintenance budget request 

from $4.3B in FY 2010 to $5.0B in FY 2012. The Navy’s total FY 2012 budget submission reflects the best balance of risk and available resources across the Navy 

portfolio. 

Mr. FORBES. How will the stand-up of SURFMEPP help improve the maintenance 

tracking and planning for surface ships? What are the Navy’s plans for re-establishing further intermediate maintenance activities? 

Admiral BURKE and Admiral MCCOY. In 2009, NAVSEA established the Surface 

Ship Life Cycle Maintenance (SSLCM) Activity, which in 2010 evolved into the Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program (SURFMEPP)—a shore command 

to centrally manage surface ship maintenance assessments and planning. 

SURFMEPP will improve maintenance tracking and planning for surface ships 

by: 

– Providing centralized surface ship life cycle management, and discipline of 

maintenance and modernization requirements. 

– Creating individual ship life cycle maintenance plans that are based on the 

Class Maintenance Plan (CMP) and actual ship condition. 

– Using the CMP and individual ship life cycle maintenance plans to build a 

Baseline Availability Work Package (BAWP) for each scheduled availability 

that will include a list of non-deviational life cycle work that must be accomplished. 
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– Tracking the completion of all required maintenance actions to meet ship expected service life. 

– Ensuring adjudication of all BAWP deferral requests by the appropriate Technical Warrant Holder (TWH), and if approved, automatically scheduling the deferred work for the follow-on availability or window of opportunity, as directed 

by the TWH. 

– Integrating, tracking, and monitoring organizational level maintenance requirements as part of the surface ship maintenance end-to-end process. 

To increase intermediate maintenance capacity, the Navy is adding manning to 

the Regional Maintenance Centers (RMCs), whose dual mission is to train returning 

Fleet Sailors in shipboard repairs, and perform intermediate level maintenance and 

repairs. This training will prepare them to return to sea with enhanced maintenance and repair skills resulting in improved ship readiness. 

Increased civilian and military manning allowed the re-opening of selected repair 

shops at the Southeast RMC in Mayport, Florida in June, 2011. The requested FY12 

budget provides a manning increase of 200 military and 385 civilians across all 

RMCs. Additional civilian and military personnel increases are being considered as 

part of POM–13. 

Mr. FORBES. How will the projected backlog of airframe and engine maintenance 

events impact aviation readiness and training? 

Admiral BURKE and Admiral MCCOY. The projected backlog of airframe and engine maintenance in FY12 is not of sufficient size to cause an impact to the readiness of deployed Naval aviation units. 

Mr. FORBES. How are the LPD 17 and other ship construction lessons learned 

being formally captured and incorporated into the institutional memory and training for all new program managers and key Supervisor of Shipbuilding personnel? 

Admiral BURKE and Admiral MCCOY. Government oversight by the Navy’s Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Gulf Coast (SSGC) has been revamped with an increase in 

overall SSGC manning by 21 percent from 2005 through the end of 2010, including 

an intensive focus on critical waterfront Quality Assurance (QA) billets. All Government QA weld inspectors were required to undergo re-training and re-certification 

in critical process areas, and QA oversight was increased across all phases of production. Within the last 18 months, the QA organization has been restructured to 

include more surveillance of in process work and compliance with formal ship construction procedures. A revamped training program has been implemented, providing an ‘‘apprentice to subject matter expert’’ career roadmap for QA specialists. 

SSGC has implemented a process of ‘‘critical process pulse audits’’ to ensure HII 

maintains production quality across the critical shipbuilding areas of structure, 

pipe, electrical, and coatings. Navy critical process metrics have been aligned with 

the shipbuilder to better assess performance trends leading to earlier identification 

of issues when they arise. 

In addition, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) sent teams of 

QA experts to assess SSGC ability to provide QA oversight and HII’s production 

quality in Spring 2009, July 2010 and January 2011. The NAVSEA audits confirmed 

initial improvement by both SSGC and HII. The focus going forward, and a key element of the critical process pulse audits, is ensuring sustainment of that performance. 

The LPD 17 Strike Team and INSURV Trial Card databases are two tools that 

are monitored on a consistent basis and have been made readily available to the 

other NAVSEA shipbuilding programs. Lessons learned from these two databases 

are being leveraged across all ship construction efforts to increase focus on pre-outfitting and completion levels at launch, facilitate more efficient production cycles, 

and further enhance quality assurance processes resulting in improved operational 

effectiveness, reliability, and sustainability. 

Additionally, the program office has recently initiated preliminary discussions 

with the Defense Acquisition University to ascertain the possibility and value of 

adding the recent LPD 17 class issues and lessons learned as a case study for inclusion in the program managers’ curriculum. 

Mr. FORBES. In light of the most recent issues with the LPD 17 maintenance contract, what is being done to ensure that the correct repairs were performed on the 

ship? What steps are being taken at Norfolk Ship Support Activity to ensure that 

future availabilities do not face the same setbacks as LPD 17? 

Admiral BURKE and Admiral MCCOY. A Navy engineering team from NAVSEA 

and Norfolk Ship Support Activity certified that all work had been performed correctly by completing a review of all work and objective quality evidence. 

More stringent oversight has been put into place to oversee quality of work. For 

example, all Main Propulsion Diesel Engine work for LPD 17 Class and LSD 41/ 
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49 Class ships is now being conducted under controlled work packages for increased 

oversight. 

Mr. FORBES. As we know, in the recent past, the Navy severely reduced its Intermediate Maintenance Activities (IMAs) by closing some locations and reducing personnel in others resulting in a loss of critical capability and trained personnel. The 

Navy is currently reversing that trend. How many IMAs does the Navy intend to 

reestablish and what is the overall manpower increase anticipated? 

Admiral BURKE and Admiral MCCOY. The Navy is reconstituting some intermediate maintenance capabilities at existing Regional Maintenance Centers 

(RMCs). All RMCs are scheduled to receive additional manning to increase intermediate maintenance capacity as well as provide Fleet Sailors the opportunity for 

training in engineering ratings so they return to sea duty with journeyman-level capabilities. 

The FY12 RMC manning increase totals 200 military and 385 civilians. Additional 

civilian and military personnel increases are being considered as part of POM–13. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KISSELL 

Mr. KISSELL. What is the Navy’s projection reflected annually for the next 10 

years of potential increased operational maintenance costs on current air platforms 

that the F–35 is expected to replace? 

Admiral BURKE. Navy has reliable projections of maintenance costs across the 

FYDP. Requirements in the Navy FY12 budget submission are based on assumed 

aircraft utilization rates and inventory, and they include funding for the Service Life 

Extension of 150 legacy F/A–18 aircraft. This funding is adequate for maintenance 

and sustainment of the projected Navy strike-fighter inventory at the time of submission. The costs are also consistent with those reported in the Secretary of Navy 

SLEP report to Congress, Appendix 3, as required by Public Law 111–383 of May 

13, 2011. Maintenance for the nine additional F/A–18E/F aircraft, provided by Congress in the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Resolution Appropriations Act of 2011, will be included in the FY13 Navy budget submission. 

Mr. KISSELL. How will this projected maintenance cost be impacted as current air 

platforms are utilized well past their normal amount of flight hours? 

Admiral BURKE. Maintenance costs increase with additional flight hours above 

planned service life, due to required inspections and modifications. Projected maintenance and sustainment requirements for all strike-fighter aircraft currently in inventory are included in the Navy FY12 budget submission. In addition to all regularly scheduled maintenance for these aircraft, the budget submission requirements 

include the F/A–18 Service Life Extension Program to extend 150 legacy F/A–18 aircraft to 10,000 hours, with all remaining legacy F/A–18 aircraft extended through 

high flight hour inspections to 8,600 flight hours. 

Mr. KISSELL. At what date does the Navy identify emerging readiness shortfalls 

due to operational or maintenance requirements as well as critical readiness shortfalls for air platforms that are being utilized for an extensive amount of time beyond 

their projected use? Please provide a response for aircraft expected to be replaced 

by the F–35. 

Admiral BURKE. The process to identify emerging aircraft readiness shortfalls, as 

well as critical readiness shortfalls, is continuous across all Naval aviation platforms. Service life, operational utilization, and cost are continuously monitored by 

Type/Model/Series. As issues are identified, they are prioritized in conjunction with 

the annual POM process. The FY12 Navy budget supports the operational and 

maintenance requirements through the FYDP for all aircraft in the Navy inventory. 

The Navy is challenged with a strike-fighter shortfall, due primarily to F/A–18A– 

D aircraft reaching the end of their planned service life before the replacement aircraft (F–35B/C) can be delivered into service. Based on a Program of Record to procure 556 F/A–18E/F aircraft and the FY12 President’s Budget Request, the current 

projected peak strike fighter shortfall is 52 aircraft in 2018. The DoN assesses that 

the shortfall, as currently forecasted, is manageable with acceptable risk for a limited duration. An increase above the current projected shortfall will have a negative 

impact on operational readiness. 

Mr. KISSELL. Specifically, if the F–35 does not reach fully mission capable status 

as planned, when does the Navy reach a crisis point in short and long term readiness as well as day to day operations as we push our current air platforms well beyond their planned service time line? 

Admiral BURKE. The Department of the Navy (DoN) does not currently assess 

there to be a forseeable ‘‘crisis point’’, in either short or long term readiness. The 

DoN has traditionally managed its entire aircraft inventory in a purposeful and re-
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sponsible manner, balancing operational requirements with ‘‘best practices’’ for maximum utilization of aircraft service life. The established process of ensuring required 

preparedness levels are maintained is iterative, and constantly under review as new 

data and assumptions are evaluated. 

Mr. KISSELL. How soon will we see the consequences of overextending our current 

air platforms? At what date will the Navy reach the point where we do not have 

the necessary aircraft to fulfill mission requirements? 

Admiral BURKE. The DoN continues to meticulously manage the flight hours and 

fatigue life of our tactical aircraft. Since 2004, we have provided Fleet users guidance and actions to optimize aircraft utilization rates, while maximizing training 

and operational opportunities. The F/A–18A–D Service Life Extension Program 

(SLEP) initial request is included in PB–12. The program is designed to extend the 

airframe life of approximately 150 aircraft from 8,600 to 10,000 flight hours, with 

all remaining legacy F/A–18 aircraft extended through high flight hour inspections 

to 8,600 flight hours. Through extensive engineering analysis, the DoN continues to 

refine its SLEP plan to ensure that those aircraft, whose service lives are extended, 

satisfy all safety of flight and operational requirements. If the Joint Strike Fighter 

(JSF) delivery profile remains unchanged, and the service life of 150 F/A–18A–D is 

extended to 10,000 flight hours (along with success in other mitigation efforts), DoN 

will continue to assess the most recent shortfall projection of 52 as manageable, allowing the DoN to meet all mission requirements. However, any further delay in 

the JSF delivery profile will have a negative effect on existing strategies, and the 

projected strike fighter shortfall in both magnitude and duration. 

Mr. KISSELL. Is there or what is the projection for taking current air platforms 

off line as the F–35 begins to integrate into service? If so, how is that projection 

adapting to continued delays in the procurement of the F–35? 

Admiral BURKE. Both the Navy and the Marine Corps develop separate F–35 

transition plans that account for each Service’s assumptions. These transition plans 

go through periodic reviews that will address any changes, including any delays in 

F–35 procurement. The Naval Aviation Master Aircraft Plan (MAP) document, and 

its associated processes, identifies the transition schedule to F–35. The current document, MAP 11–01, reflects all of the Navy’s Type/Model/Series aircraft transitions. 

This document is reviewed and updated twice a year to account for any changes, 

including any delay in F–35 procurement. 

As current strike-fighter platforms reach the end of their service life, the Department of the Navy (DoN) plans to replace them with the F–35. Planned delivery 

rates for the F–35 will not keep up with current projected retirements, resulting in 

the shortfall in the overall number of strike-fighters within DoN. The latest Fiscal 

Year 2012 President’s Budget DoN inventory shortfall is 52 aircraft, projected to 

occur toward the end of the decade. The DoN has testified that this shortfall is manageable. 

Mr. KISSELL. Is the Navy sustaining its training capability of new pilots on many 

of these legacy aircraft? If the Navy is transitioning its future needs toward the F– 

35 how are we mitigating the potential need for a much larger pool of pilots capable 

of flying our legacy aircraft as the need for continued service of older aircraft remains? 

Admiral BURKE. Yes, Navy is sustaining training capability for new pilots on its 

legacy strike-fighter aircraft. It is not expected that legacy pilot training capacity 

will be reduced until F–35 transitions have stabilized. Since aircraft are being replaced on a one to one basis in most cases, the number of pilots necessary does not 

vary much between the present and the future. Our Master Aviation Plan process 

allows us to forecast the demand for aircrew to support new and legacy platforms. 

This results in adjustments to Pilot Training Rates at the appropriate Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) as a matter of normal execution. 

Mr. KISSELL. How is the Navy adapting its training, if at all, to these older aircraft to better ensure the safety of our pilots? What is the risk associated with utilizing our aircraft for thousands of hours beyond what they were originally intended? 

Admiral BURKE. The Navy adapts its training for older aircraft as necessary to 

ensure the safety of our pilots. Safety and mission readiness are not compromised 

in the service life management of the Fleet’s F/A–18 aircraft. In fact, coincident with 

the Navy and Marine Corp’s service life management program, aircrew training 

readiness has been enhanced with improved tactical standardization, a refined 

training syllabus, and improvements to measurable training objectives on each 

training sortie flown. There is a recognized and appreciated correlation between aircrew flight hours, flight safety, and combat effectiveness. There has been no decrease in aircrew flight hour requirements or lowering of training standards simply 

to preserve aircraft life. 
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Any extension of service life beyond the initial design life is the result of rigorous 

engineering analysis by NAVAIR, in concert with the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). Any extension that results will include the necessary inspections and 

modifications to ensure the full operating envelope of the aircraft remains available 

in support of its mission. 

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