IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION 

OF D.J.V. 

APPEAI, FROM: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Pondera, 

The Honorable McPhillips, Judge presiding. 

COUI\TSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Chris Christensen, Keil & Christensen, Kalispell, 

Montana 

For Respondent: 

Scott 0. Swansoll, Pendroy, Montana 

submitted: May 5, 1990 

Decided: August 20, 1990 

Filed: 
Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

This appeal involves an adoption proceedings held in the Ninth 

Judicial District, Pondera County. Appellant, Kent Keil, the 

natural father and respondent below, appeals the July 5, 1989 order 

and decree terminating his parental rights and granting the 

adoption of his son, D.J.V., by D.J.V. Is stepfather, Albert 

Blockeel, Jr. The District Court ruled that the natural father's 

consent was not required for the adoption because he failed to 

provide support for his son for a period of one year before the 

filing of the petition for adoption. We affirm the District 

Court's order and decree. 

The natural father raises the following issue on appeal: 

Did the District Court err in finding that the natural 

father's consent to the adoption of D. J.V. was not required because 

the natural father did not contribute to the support of D.J.V. 

during a period of one year before the filing of the petition for 

adoption? 

D. J.V. was born on September 2, 1987, in Choteau, Montana. 

In 1986, Carolyn Vandenbos (Carolyn), a 17 year-old junior in high 

school, began dating Kent Keil (Kent), a college student at Montana 

State University. In January of 1987, Carolyn discovered that she 

was pregnant with Kent's child; at that time, Kent broke off their 

relationship. 

Upon discovering Carolyn's pregnancy, Kent's parents, Dale and 

Sheri Keil, took an active interest in Carolyn's welfare. They 
arranged for her to receive counseling. Kent attended one of these 

sessions, and apparently drove Carolyn home from another, but 

otherwise did not take part in the counseling sessions. 

After D.J.V. was born, Dale and Sheri visited several times 

with the baby in their home. Kent did not see his son until two 

months after the birth, when Carolyn's cousin arranged a half hour 

visit. According to Carolyn, Kent held the baby, but did not 

appear to take a great deal of interest in him. 

On another occasion, Kent happened to arrive at his parent's 

home when Carolyn and D. J.V. were visiting, and two photographs 

were taken of Kent and the child. The parties disagree on how many 

more times Kent visited with his son. Carolyn remembers only two 

occasions in which Kent saw D.J.V., whereas Kent testified that he 

saw his son at least five or six times. Testimony from the parties 

also differs whether Kent attempted to pay any of Carolyn's medical 

expenses. Carolyn claims Kent never offered or paid any of her 

medical expenses during the pregnancy. In contrast, Kent claims 

that he specifically requested Carolyn to supply him with the 

medical bills so that he could pay them. Despite this offer by 

Kent, the record reveals that Kent failed to pay any of Carolyn's 

and D.J.V.'s medical expenses. 

Kent appears from the record to be a rather prosperous young 

man. He estimates his net worth as being $200,000 and he also 

expects a substantial inheritance. Despite his wealth, Kent has 

not paid anything toward the support of his child. He has given 

no clothes or gifts of any kind to the boy. 
In January of 1988, the petitioner, Albert Blockeel, Jr. 

(Albert), began dating Carolyn. By August, they had decided to 

marry. As part of their marriage plans, they wished to have D. J .V. 

adopted by Albert. At the suggestion of their lawyer, Jim Obie, 

and Dale Keil, who was acting as his son's lawyer, Carolyn and 

Albert met with Kent and his new wife, Lisa, to discuss the 

possibility of Kent giving his consent to the adoption. Kent 

refused to consent to the adoption, and inquired whether Carolyn 

and Albert wanted child support. The subject of visitation also 

surfaced. Albert invited Kent and his wife to come to their house 

at anytime; Kent, however, chose not to take advantage of Albert's 

invitation to see D.J.V. 

Later, Carolyn and Albert were married on October 28, 1988, 

and on February 21, 1989, Albert filed a petition for adoption. 

After a hearing on April 17, 1989, the District Court ruled that 

Kent's consent was not required, under 9 40-8-111 (1) (a) (v) , MCA, 

since Kent failed to contribute to his son's support for a period 

of one year prior to the filing of the petition for adoption. 

The central issue in this appeal involves the District Court's 

application of the adoption statute, 9 40-8-111, MCA. Section 40- 

8-111 (1) , MCA, generally requires the filing of written consents 

in an adoption proceeding. However, consent for the adoption is 

not required from a father or mother: 

(v) if it is proven to the satisfaction of the court 

that the father or mother, if able, has not contributed 

to the support of the child during a period of 1 year 

before the filing of a petition for adoption . . .. 
Section 40-8-111(1) (a) (v) , MCA. 

Accordingly, a father's rights may be terminated, and an 

adoption decreed without that parent's consent upon a showing of 

nonsupport under 5 40-8-111(1)(a)(v), MCA. In re the Adoption of 

R.M. (Mont. 1990), 785 P.2d 709, 711, 47 St.Rep. 124, 127. 

As we have previously held, "Parental rights involve a 

fundamental liberty interest, and a judicial decree terminating 

such rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.'' 

.I 

R M 785 P.2d 711; In re the Adoption of C.R.D. (Mont. 1989), 782 

P.2d 1280, 1282; Matter of R.B. (1985), 217 Mont. 99, 102-103, 703 

P.2d 846, 848, citing Santosky v. Krommer (1982), 455 U.S. 745, 

753-54, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394-1395, 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 606. It is a 

fundamental principle of law, however, that parental rights do not 

exist without concomitant obligations. As the District Court 

properly noted, "It is the public policy of the State of Montana 

that the statutes concerning the termination of parental rights 

should not be interpreted in favor of those who shun the burden of 

parental obligations." In re Burton's Adoption, 147 Cal.App.2d 

125, 305 P.2d 185, 191; In re the Adoption of S.L.R. (1982), 196 

Mont. 411, 415, 640 P.2d 886, 888; In re the Adoption of B.L.P. 

(1986), 224 Mont. 182, 186, 728 P.2d 803, 805; In re the Adoption 

of R.G.C. (1987), 228 Mont. 345, 349, 742 P.2d 471, 474. 

As the District Court notes, the central issue in this case 

is whether Kent has contributed to the support of D.J.V. during a 

period of one year before the filing of the petition. The District 
Court found Kent had failed to pay any support, and therefore his 

consent was not needed under 5 40-8-411(1)(a)(v), MCA. 

Kent argues that because there was no court order requiring 

him to pay child support, the District Court cannot terminate his 

parental rights pursuant to 5 40-8-111 (1) (a) (v) , MCA. Furthermore, 

Kent contends that virtually all of the Montana cases decided under 

5 4-8-lll(l)(a)(v), MCA, involve court-ordered child support. 

Kent is correct; most of the adoption cases under the statute 

involve court-ordered support; however, a parent's obligation to 

his child is not dependent on an order of the court. Section 40- 

6-211, MCA. There is no requirement under 5 40-8-111 (1) (a) (v) , 

MCA, that the child support be court-ordered. If the father has 

provided no support during the one year period prior to the filing 

of the petition for adoption and the father is able to provide 

support, then consent is not required. The absence of a child 

support order does not absolve Kent of his legal duty to support 

his child. 

Next, Kent argues that his parental rights should not be 

terminated because he made an offer concerning support at a meeting 

in the Keg Restaurant in Conrad, Montana. At the meeting, Carolyn 

and Albert met with Kent and his new wife, Lisa, to discuss Albert 

adopting D.J.V. At the meeting, Kent asked Carolyn if she needed 

support, and she refused. According to Kent, this offer showed his 

willingness to pay the support, and thus his rights should not be 

terminated under 5 40-8-411 (1) (a) (v) , MCA. We disagree, and adopt 

the District Court's reasoning set forth in its memorandum: 
This Court agrees with the Petitioner that, at most, the 

discussion which occurred during July or August of 1988 

was a mere inquiry concerning support which was 

insufficient to exempt the father from the requirements 

of 5 40-8-111, MCA. The discussion took place one year 

subsequent to the birth of the child. There was no 

promise or offer to pay any child support for the 

preceding year. There was not a promise or offer to pay 

any of the expenses of the pregnancy or delivery. There 

was no specific dollar amount of future child support. 

No checks were written. No trust account was set up for 

the child. No health insurance policy was provided for 

the child. The father merely inquired of the Petitioner 

whether or not she wanted any support to be paid. The 

Petitioner, who was not yet married to the child's 

mother, answered "no. 'I The father has not ever actually 

contributed any money whatsoever to this child's support 

or ever made a specific offer of child support. 

In the past, this Court has strictly upheld the child support 

requirements under 5 40-8-111, MCA. In in re the Adoption of 

R.A.S. (1984), 208 Mont. 438, 679 P.2d 220, the father had paid the 

sum of $450.00 child support during the one year period immediately 

preceding the filing of the petition for adoption. However, this 

payment was properly attributable to a child support obligation 

which had accrued prior to the one year period preceding the filing 

of the petition for adoption. Therefore, the requirement of 

support during the one year period before the filing of the 

adoption petition was not met and the father's consent to the 

adoption was not required. R.A.S., 679 P.2d at 223, 224. If 

actual payment of some child support, under R.A.S., does not toll 

the running of 5 40-8-111(l) (a) (v), MCA, then Kent's mere inquiry 

regarding child support is surely insufficient to toll the statute. 

It is uncontroverted that Kent has not contributed financial 

support to D.J.V., in the preceding one year or at any time. By 
Kent's own admission, he has not paid any expenses of Carolyn's 

pregnancy or hospitalization, or any child support since the birth 

of D.J.V. This is not a case where the father is suffering 

financial hardship. Thus, there is ample "clear and convincing 

evidence1' to support the District Court1 s termination of Kent s 

parental rights. 

Finally, Kent argues the doctrine of equitable estoppel should 

preclude petitioner (Albert) from asserting that Kent failed to pay 

child support. According to Kent, both Albert and Carolyn cleverly 

refused his "offer" of child support at the Keg Restaurant, in 

order to later assert at the adoption proceeding that Kent's 

consent was not necessary. Kent claims that Albert and Carolyn 

should not be allowed to induce him to forego making child support 

payments, and then utilize 5 40-8-411 (1) (a) (v) , MCA, which deprives 

Kent of his parental rights for his failure to pay child support. 

Equitable estoppel is a principle of equity, Cremer v. Cremer 

Rodeo Lands and Livestock Co. (1979) , 181 Mont. 87, 93, 592 P. 2d 

485, 489, used to promote justice, honesty, fairdealing and to 

prevent injustice. Keneco v. Cantrell (1977), 174 Mont. 130, 135, 

568 P.2d 1225, 1228. Furthermore, the object of equitable estoppel 

is to prevent a party from taking advantage of his own wrong while 

asserting his strict legal right. Matter of Shaw (1990), 189 Mont. 

310, 316, 615 P.2d 910, 915. We cannot adopt Kent's argument of 

equitable estoppel. Carolyn has done no wrong giving rise to 

estoppel. Since the birth of D.J.V., Kent has not performed his 

legal responsibility as a parent. Equitable estoppel is 
unavailable to Kent in this case. We affirm the District Court 

order. 

1 

/+ d, g-3 Justice 

We Concur: / 

Chief Justice