## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Suprem e Court

In re Parentage of J.W. , 2013 IL 114817

Caption in S upreme Court: In re PARENTAGE OF J .W., a Minor (Steve Taylor, Appellee
, v. Amy Wil ls-Merrill (J ason Will s, Appellant))

.

Docke t No. 114817

Filed May 23, 2013

Held ( Note : This syl l abus

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo r t er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) The Parenta g e Act provides that, afte r a finding of biologica l fathe rhood,

a visitation reque st is evaluated in acc ordanc e with the Marriag e Act; and the Proper provision there of to apply is section 602, which lists fac tors to consider in deter

mining the best interests of the child, rathe r than section 607(a)
, which g ives a noncustodial pare nt a rebuttable pres umption of

rea sonable visitation absent a showing that this would endang er the child.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Appellate Court for the Four th Di s t ri ct ; hear d in that

cour t on appea l from the Circuit Court of Ver milion County
, the Hon. Kar en E. Wall, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Appellate c ourt judg ment reve rsed. Circuit court judg ment aff irmed.Counsel on

Appea l David Sotomayor, of Orland Park, for appellant.

J ames A. Martinkus, of Erwin, Martinkus & Cole, Ltd., of C hampaign, for a ppellee.

Robert F. Har

ris, Kass A. Plain a

nd Christopher Wil liams, of the Offic e of the Cook County Public Guar dian, of Chicag o, for amicus curiae Cook County Public Guardian.

L isa Madig an, Attorney Gene ral, of Springf ield (Michae l A. Scodro, Solicitor Gene ral, and Diane Potts
, Deputy Attorney Gene ral, of Chicag o, of counsel), for amicus cur i a e I llinois Depa rtment of Hea lthcare and Family Service s.

Camilla B. Taylor, of Chicag o, for amicus curiae L ambda L eg al Def ense and Educ ation Fund, Inc.

J ustices J USTI CE THEI S delivered the judgme nt of the cour t, with opinion.
Ch ie f Ju s ti c e Kilb rid e and J ustices Fr eema n, Thomas, Gar

man, Kar meie r , and B urke c oncurr ed in the judgment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 The issue in this appea l conce rns the proper standard to be applied wh en a b i o logic al fathe r seeks visitation privileg es afte r a deter mination of pare ntag e under section 14(a) (1) of the I llinois Parenta g e Act of 1984 (the Parenta g e Act) (750 I L CS 45/14(a)( 1) (West 2010)). The circ uit court of Ver

milion County applied the best interests of the child standard set forth in section 602 of the I llinois Marriag e and D issoluti on of Marriag e Act (the Marriag e Ac t) (750 I L CS 5/602 (West 2010)), and found that it wa s not in the minor child’s best interests
to have contac t with her biologica l fathe r at t h i s t i m e. The appellate court reve rsed, concluding that section 607(a) of the Marriag e Act (750 I L CS 5/607(a) (West 2010) ) is the rele vant standard to be considere d, entitling a noncustodial p ar ent to a rebuttable presumption of rea sonable visitation unless it c an be shown that visitation would seriously endang er the child’s phy sical, mental, mora l or emotional hea lth. ¶ 2 For the rea sons that follow, we hold that in a p ro ce ed i n g t o d et er m i n e v i s i tation privileg es under section 14(a) (1) of the Parenta g e Act, the initial b u rd en is on the noncustodial pare nt to show that visitation will be in the best interests of the child pursuant to section 602 of the Marr iag e Act. We there fore reve rse the judgme nt of the appellate court.

-2-¶ 3 BA CKGROUND

¶ 4 In the sum m er o f 2 0 0 1
, Am y W i l l s -M erri l l an d J ason Wil ls beg an an intimate relationship. During that same summer, unbeknownst to J ason, Amy had a one-time sexual
encounte r with Steve Taylor. Amy subsequently beca me pregnant and had a child, J .W., who

was b o rn on April 15, 2002. Amy assumed that the child’s fathe r was J ason. J ason si g ned

a voluntary acknow ledgmen t of pater nity and was listed as the fathe r on J .W.’s birth

cer tificate. ¶ 5 Amy and J ason m arried i n Marc h 2003, when J .W. was almost a y ea r o l d

. T h e couple later divorced i n 2006. They enter ed into a marital settlement agree ment, which was incorpora ted into the dissoluti on judgme nt. Pursuant to the terms of their agree ment, which identified J ason as J .W.’s fathe r, Amy had sole custody of J .W.
, and J ason had visitation rights and child support obligations. ¶ 6 After

the divorce , J .W. ex perie nced a lot of chaos in her life. In September 2008, Amy marrie d J oe Mer

rill, who had three children from a previous relationship. Meanwhile, that summer, Steve viewed a picture of J .W. on Amy ’s social media site, while seeking out old
acqua intances. H e sawa re semblance in J .W. and contacte d Amy reg ardingthe possibilit y that he was J .W.’s biologica l fathe r. There afte r, Steve, Amy
, and J .W. sub m i t t ed t o DNA testing. About one we ek p ri or to Thanksg iving 2008, DNA results indicated Steve was J .W.’s biological f

ather

. ¶ 7 After rec eiving the DNA results, Amy temporarily separ ated from J oe, moved with J.W

. from Catlin, I llinois
, to Potomac, I llinois
, wh er e S t ev e resided, and place d J .W. in school there

. Amy informed J ason t hat he was not the bi ologic al father. Over the h o l i d ay s eason, J .W. was introduced to Steve and hi s ex tended family and spent time with them betwee n Thanksg iving 2008 and J anuar y 2009. J .W. was initially introduced to Steve and his family as fr iends, but was subseque ntly told by Amy at t he end of Decembe r 2008 that Steve was h er “re al dad.” Amy never discussed with J .W. her understanding of her relationsh i p t o Steve. ¶ 8 In J anuar

y 2009, J ason soug ht a temporar y modification of custody or, alternatively , an order prohibiting Amy from c o h ab i t i ng with any male not her lawful s pouse whil e having phy sical custody of J .W. Amy and J ason agree d to modify the judgme nt of dissoluti on. Under the modified order
, Amy was prohibited fr o m residing or cohabiting with Steve, prohibited from allowing J

. W. to have any contac t with Steve, and prohibited from
p r o mo ting the exis tence of any pare nt-child relationship betwee n Steve and J .W. until further order of the court. Neither Steve nor his counsel was prese nt or a party to that hearing in the 1 dissoluti on proce eding

. There afte r, on Fe bruar y 4, 2009, Steve filed a verifie d pet i t i o n to deter mine the exis tence of a pare n t -c h i l d rela tionship under the Parenta g e Act (750 I L CS 45/1 et seq. (West 2008)). In addition to establishing his pater nity
, Steve soug ht joint custody

T he ord er is ent it le d “or der on J anu ary 9, 2009
, hea ri ng.” Acco rdi ng to the re cor d, the ord er 1

was ent er ed and fi le d on Apri l 17, 2009

. A tr ans cr ipt of the J anu ary 9 hea ri ng has not bee n m ade par t of the re cor d onapp eal

.
-3-and visitation privileg es pursuant to section 14(a) (1) of the Act. 750 I L CS 45/14(a)( 1) (West 2 2008). J ason did not contest Steve’s peti t ion to establish pare ntag e, but soug ht a bestinterests hearing on the issue of Steve’s right to visitation with J .W. At that time, J .W. wa s almost seven year s old. ¶ 9 On April 17, 2009, the trial court grante d Steve’s motion to consolidate the dissolution
proce eding betwee n Amy and J ason with his pare ntag e action. The recor d ref lects that t he
no-conta ct order was enter ed at that time. Steve’s motion to appoint a guardia n ad litem (GAL ) for J .W. was also g rante d. Steve then filed a motion to vacate, modify
, or rec onsider the no-conta ct order

. He argued that the order eff ectively barr ed him from any contac t with J .W. in contravention of the rele vant standards in deter mining his visitation rights under the Parenta g e Ac t. The trial cour t denied his motion. Meanwhile, a month af ter Steve filed his petition to deter

mine pater

nity
, Amy reunited with J oe and his three children. Amy and J oe later move d to Danville and ha d a child tog ether

. ¶ 10 On September 9, 2009, afte r additional DNA testing, the trial court enter ed a judgment decla ring Steve to b e the biologica l fathe r of J .W. After an unsucce ssful attempt at mediation, the court held a hearing on Steve’s right to visitation with J .W. Dr. Marily n Fr ey , a clinical psycholog ist, was appointed by the trial court to conduct an evaluation to deter mine whether visitation betwee n Steve and J .W. was in J .W.’s best interests. Dr. Fr ey testified that in August and September of 2010, she interviewe d Steve, Amy
, and J ason and observe d J .W. interac t with J ason and Amy

. Dr. Fr ey testified at the hearing consistently with her evaluation
repor t. She stated that J.W . was bonde d with both Amy and Jason, and that J .W. indicated that she enjoyed spendingtime with J ason and his son from a subsequent r elationship. ¶ 11 Dr. Fr ey acknow ledg ed that Steve and J .W. had some sort of a relationship at one time, but rec ommended that it would not be in J.W .’s best interests to have contac t with Steve at this time. It was Dr. Fr ey ’s opinion that J .W. did not have the abstrac t rea soning skills at her
ag e to under stand Steve’s re lationship to her or how J ason was not he r “biolog ical” fathe r, and that the i nformation could seriously impact her relationship with her mother. Dr. Frey also believed that introducing another fathe r figure into J .W.’s life could put J .W. at risk emotionally
, socially and aca demically
, af fe ct her sense of adequa cy with her peer s, and

cre ate a fea

r of abandonme nt. She was con ce rn ed about J .W. being exposed at eight y ear s old to information reg arding her relationship to Steve i n such a small rural co m m u n i ty

. In forming the basis of her opinions, Dr. Fr ey used dolls and teddy bear s and had J .W. identify them with a person from her family

. During these exercises, J .W. identified numerous extended family

members, but did not mention Steve as par t of her f amily

. ¶ 12 Dr. Fr ey testified that the basi s o f her predic tions of risk wer e based, in part, upon the developmenta l theories of Erikson and Piage t, and 44 years o f clinical experience

. She acknow ledg ed that she did not have “har dcore evidenc e” or rese arc h that involvement with Steve would have a neg ative impact on J .W. Dr. Fr ey also acknow ledg ed that at the time she interviewe d J .W., J .W. had alre ady been i n t ro duced to another fathe r figure, her new

T he re cor d re fl ect s tha t af te r m ent ion ing it in his pet it ion
, Ste ve never pur sue d j oin t cus tody 2 of J .W.

-4-stepfathe r, J oe, and that she did not exhi bit any of the potential risks Dr. Fr ey expressed as

conce rns. Howeve r, Dr. Fr ey stated that the situation with a stepfathe r was not compar able. She acknow ledg ed that it was possible that J .W. could have a g ood relationship with Steve and could rec eive the benef its of spending time with Steve’s extended family

. Dr. Fr ey also left open the pos sibili ty that at s ome t ime in the future it may be in J .W.’s best interests t o be advised about Steve. In her repor t, Dr. Fr ey stated that “[o] nly with time and observation of and interac tions with [J .W.] will it be possible to deter mine at what ag e she should be told about Steve.” ¶ 13 Steve prese nted the testi m o n y of Dr. Judy Osg ood, a clinical psycholog ist reta ined by him to revie w Dr. Fr ey ’s report. Dr. Osgo o d re viewed the repor t and int ervie wed St eve in May 2011. Dr. Osg ood testified that she believed that J .W. and Steve had spent a signific ant amount of time toge ther and that it would be detrimental for J .W. to miss out on contac t with Steve and his extended family
, who s howed J .W. love and aff ection. Dr. Osg ood believed it was in J .W.’s best interests to resume contac t with her biologica l fathe r. In her opinion, Steve did not present a

ny risk fac tors which would cr eate any dang er to J.W

. ¶ 14 Dr. Osg ood stated that, based upon the fac t that J .W. was told Steve was her biolog ical fathe r, she believed that J .W. would question why he had no w d i s appeare d out of her life. It was her opinion that if J .W. could at least maintain a stable relationship with her biologica l fathe r, t hat could be a constant i n her life, wh ere there had been a lot of i nconsistency and instabilit y

. Dr. Osg ood rec ommended that both J .W. and Stev e m ee t with a counselor to assist J .W. in understanding that she was not g oing to lose her relationship with J ason, and believed that there c ould be a gradua l progression of c ontact with Steve. ¶ 15 Dr. Osgood was critica l of Dr. Fr ey for faili n g t o o b s er ve J .W. and S teve togethe r and believed that this interac tion was a signific ant m issin g p i ece of Dr. Frey ’s evaluation. She did not agree that mere ly beca use J .W. did not m en t i o n Steve i n the s ession with Dr. Frey that there was no bond betwee n them. It was Dr. Osg ood’s opinion that the testing ref lected the people that wer e curr ently in J .W.’s life, g iven the no-conta ct order
, but did not mean that there was not a bond betwee n them at one time, or that J .W. did no t kn o w her biologica l fathe r. She believed it would be shortsighte d to conclude that there was no bond. She found it signific ant that, althoug h Steve was not allowed to continue contac t with his daughter due
to the court order
, Steve’s si ster continued to pr ovide child ca re to J.W . until March 2010, when J .W. moved to Danville. Dr. Osg ood acknow ledg ed that she did not know what J .W.

curr ently understood about he r re lationship to S teve. ¶ 16 Dr. Os g ood explained that she was not reta ined to eng ag e in a best-intere sts visi tation evaluation. Rathe r, she char acte rized her r ole as providinga psycholog ical report on Steve and providing an opinion as to his “position and cre dibilit y” in reque sting visitation wi t h J .W. She was not provided with th e GA L ’s repor t and did not have an opportunity to interview or evaluate J .W. She would have liked to have observe d J .W. interac t with Steve, b u t b elieved that the no-conta ct order prohibited her from observing them toge ther. S h e further stated that she wa s not requeste d by counsel to eva luate them tog ether

. ¶ 17 Steve testified that he was employed with the railroa d and resided in Potomac, I llinois
, with his fathe r. He has no other children and is not marrie d. He has three sisters, who are all

-5-marrie d with children. Upon finding out that J

. W

. was his biologica l child, he and his

extended family wer e introduced to J .W. and eng ag ed in many activities with her during the period from Thanksg iving of 2008 until J anuar y o f 2009, when the court prohibited Amy from promoting a relationship betwee n him and J .W. He introduced sever al photogr aphs of their time toge ther. Steve stated that he rec ognized that J .W. had many people in her life that loved her. He did not want to take awa y J ason’s right to visitation or disturb the rela tionship J .W. had developed with J ason and with her curre nt stepfathe r, J oe. S teve testified that he wanted to be a part of J .W.’s life, to g et to know her, to watch her grow up, to teac h her how
to do cer tain things, and be there to support her. He fu rt h er t es t i fi ed that he had provided financ ial support for J.W .’s ca re. ¶ 18 Stephanie Bishop, Steve’s s is ter , te s ti f ie d th at she started baby sitti ng for J .W. afte r school in Dec ember 2008, when J .W. moved to Potomac and continued to provide child car e until Marc h 2010, when J .W. moved to Danville. Bishop and her sisters’ families wer e orig inally introduced to J .W. as Amy ’s frie nds, and then, a fter Christmas 2008, they wer e re fer

red to by J .W. as aunts and cousins and eng ag ed in sever al activities toge ther. Stephanie hear d J .W. ref er to Steve a s “daddy” on many occa sions. ¶ 19 C l ar en d i n McCarty was J .W.’s first-grade teac her while she lived in Po t o m ac fr o m Dec ember 2008 until May 2009. McCarty knew Steve from high school and was friends with

one of Steve’s sisters. McCarty testified that J .W. was very enthusiastic, aca demically a g ood student, and g ood with transitions. McCarty did not observe a

ny ang er or

depre ssion. J .W. spoke about two dads, “daddy Steve” and “daddy J ason,” and ref err ed to Steve as her “re al dad.” In Fe bruar

y 2009, Steve came to a Valentine’ s Day party at the scho ol. Steve’s two nephew s were also in the same c lass as J.W . at the school. ¶ 20 After hearing the evidenc e, the trial court allowed the GAL an opportunity to c omment

on whether the evi d en ce p resented at the hearing had chang ed his rec ommendations previously set forth in his report filed in J une 2009. The repor t w as admitted into e vidence
at the hearing. There in, the GAL indicated that he met with J .W. in June 2009. At that time, he expressed conce rn with r eg ard to all of the chang es in J .W.’s life, including the divorce
, her mother’s rema

rriag e to J oe, being

taken a bruptly out of her sc hool, and being remove d from her home and plac ed with a ne w set of c hildren in a new school. The GAL noted that during the meeting with J .W. in June 2009, J .W. did not include Steve as s o m eo n e i n h er family
, when g iven an opportunity to tell him about her family

. When asked about what was new in her

life or if there wer e any

surprises, J.W . did not mention S teve in her life. When asked about her b ab y s itter, if the baby sitter had any brothers, and if Steve was the baby sitter’s brother, J .W. responde d that Steve was the baby sitter’s friend and her mother’s friend. ¶ 21 The GA Lfurther found that J .W. had a ve ry strongbond with J ason. The GAL did not believe that Steve posed any serious endang erme nt to J .W., bu t was conce rned that introducing him into J .W.’s life could detrimentally impact her stability

. He rec ommended that it was not in J .W.’s best interests to be introduced to S t eve at this stag e in her life. Ho we v er , if the court wer e to order visitation, he believed it should be gradua l and with

ex t en s i v e counseling. At the hearing
, he acknowledg ed that his opinions wer e based upon his perspe ctive, withou t h aving a degree in psychology

. He essentially defe rre d to the

-6-opinions and rec o m mendations made by Dr. Fr ey , but felt even strong er about his

rec ommendation afte r hea ringDr. F rey ’s testimony

. ¶ 22 Amy

did not testify

at the hea

ring

. ¶ 23 The trial court deter mined that based upon this court’s prec edent, Steve had the burden of proving that visitation would be in J .W.’s best i n t ere sts by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. The court applied the “best interests” fa ct o rs as set forth in section 602 of the Marr iag e Act (750 I L CS 5/602 (W es t 2 010)). Specifica lly
, the court found the following fac tors applicable to the circ umstances : t h e wi s h es of the child’s pare nt or pare nts as to custody ; the interac tion and interre lationship of the child with the pare nt or pare nts, siblings, and any other person who may signif i cantly aff

ect the child’s best interests; the child’s adjustment to home, school, and the community ; and t h e m en tal and phy sical health of

ever yone involved. ¶ 24 The trial court consi d er ed t h at Steve sincere ly soug ht to establish a close pa rent-c hild rel a ti o n s h ip and desired visitation. The court indicated that Amy ’s desire was unclea r, having taken conflicting positions. At the time of the GAL repor t, she seeme d desirous of visitation, but at the time of trial, she did not support Steve’s eff orts to obtain visitation. The court also noted J ason’s opposition to St eve’ s visitation wit h J .W. ¶ 25 Wit h respe ct to the experts, the court fo un d Dr

. Fr ey ’s opinions more persua sive than those of Dr. Osg ood. The court noted t hat Dr. Fr ey ’s obs ervations of J .W. d i d n o t s upport

an exis ting close rela

tionship betwee n Steve and J .W. and that Dr. Fr ey ’s explanations
reg arding J .W.’s inability to proce ss Steve’s re l at ionship to her and the incre ased risk it posed wer e cre dible. The court further found Dr. Osg ood’s opinions not persua sive beca use she did not perf

orm any independe nt testing of J .W. and relied instead upon her impressions related by Steve of a

close a nd loving r elationship. ¶ 26 The court indicated that the m o s t weight was given to what J .W. perc eived at the time of her evaluation. The court found that based upon Dr. Fr ey ’s testing and the GAL interview, J .W. did not understand Steve to be her fathe r. She identified J ason as her fathe r beca use of their long- standing loving relationshi p

. The court noted that Steve had no reg ular contac t with J .W. since J anuar

y 2009 and his involvement was limit ed to a five- or six -we ek period of time, wh ere much of that time he was thought to be a family friend. The court was

conce rned about the incre ased ri sk of harm if the court disreg arde d J .W.’s curr ent lack of understanding of the situation. Ba sed on these finding s, the co u rt h el d t hat it was not in J .W.’s best interests for Steve to be introduced or reintroduc ed into her lifeat this tim e. ¶ 27 In ruling
, the court al s o consi dere d Steve’s argument that under section 602(c) of the Marr iag e Act there is a presumption that “the maxi mum involvement and cooperation of both pa rents reg arding the phy sical, mental, moral, and emotional well-be ing of their child is in the best interest of the child.” 750 I L CS 5/602(c) (West 2010). The court found that the presumption was not rele vant t o the facts and circum stance s prese nted here, and that even if the presumption applied, it was rebutted by Dr. Fr ey ’s testimony that Steve’s involvement was not in J .W.’s best interests at this tim e. ¶ 28 The court denied Steve’s petition for v i s i t at i on, and order ed that all parties and their families not promote the exis tence of a pare ntal relationship betwee n Steve and J .W. The

-7-court additionally order ed that J .W. be evaluated annually “to deter mine [her] understanding of the identification of her fathe r.” The order provided that if during the annual evaluation, J .W. demonstrates “an understanding that [S teve] is her fathe r,” all parties shall be notified within 10 day s. I ssues with reg ard to c hild support were rese rved. ¶ 29 There afte r, the trial court enter ed an agree d order on Amy ’s petition to set child support. The parties agree d that Steve would pay Amy child support for J .W. in the amount of $300
per m o nth in addition to an arr ear ag e in child support of $4,500. The order noted that althoug h the amount deviated from the guidelines, it was rea sonable and appropriate under the unique circ umstances of this case beca use J ason also pay s child support to Amy for J .W. ¶ 30 On appe al, Steve argued that the t rial court err ed in holding that the burden of proof is

on the noncustodial pare nt seeking vis i t at i o n u nder the Parenta g e Act to establish that visitation is in the best interests of the minor child. He maintained that as a biologica l pare nt h e en joy ed a presumption, entitling him to visitation under section 607(a) of the Marriage Act absent evidenc e of serious endang erme nt to the child. 2012 I L App (4th) 120212, ¶¶ 35- 36. The appellate court considere d the conflicting appellate court case law on the appropriate standard, including its own prior Four th District case of Departme nt of Public Aid ex r el

. Gagnon-Dix v. Gagnon
, 288 I ll. App. 3d 424, 428 (1997), which reje cted the application of section 607(a) as the rele vant standard under the Parenta g e Act. Id. ¶ 34. The appellate court then noted that other appellate court decisions had disagree d with Gagnon

. Relying on those

case s, the court conclude d, without eng ag ing in any statutory co n s tru ct i on of i ts own, t hat section 607(a) of the Marr iag e Act is the rele vant standard to be considere d when deter mining visitation rights in case s brought under the Parenta g e Act or the Marriag e Act. Id. ¶¶ 35- 39. ¶ 31 Ho we v er , i n re ac h i n g i t s co n cl u sion, the appellate court emphasized the fa ctual circ umstances of this case , highlighting that t h er e wa s “no delay on Steve’s part in attempting to establish a healthy
, meaning ful relationship with J .W.” Id. ¶ 4 1

. T h e co urt stated, “[w]e are co n fi d ent trial courts can sort out those case s such as Gagnon
, wher e a biologica l fathe r soug ht visitation afte r no co n t ac t for eight year s, and [cases] wher e a presumed fathe r eag erly soug ht continued visitation and contac t with the son born during his marria g e to the child’s mother.” Id

. ¶ 39. Thus, the court seeme d to sug g est that whether the presumption in section 607(a) i s rele vant under the P are ntag e Act is not a qu es t i o n o f l aw but, rather , depends upon the fac ts and circ umstances of the ca se. ¶ 32 The appellate court held that Steve was entitled to rea sonabl e v i s i t at ion rights unless visitation would seriously endang er J .W.’s phy sical, mental, moral, or emotional health. Id

. ¶ 40. The court found that the evidenc e did not support a findingof serious endang erme nt. Acc ording ly
, it reve rsed and rema nded with direc tions for the trial court to cr ea t e and implement a re asonable visitation pl an. Id. ¶ 52. ¶ 33 We subsequently allowed J ason’s petition for leave to appea l. I ll. S. Ct. R. 315 (ef f. F eb. 26, 2 0 10). Additionally
, we allowed the amicus curiae briefs of the Cook County public
guardia n, the L ambda L eg al Def

ense and Education Fund, Inc., and the I llinois Depa rtment of He althcar e and F amily Service s. I ll. S. C t. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010)

.

-8-¶ 34 ANALYSI S

¶ 35 I ¶ 36 The question prese nted by this appea l is a narr ow one: What is the proper standard to be applied when a biologica l fathe r seeks visitation privileg es afte r a deter mination of pare ntag e under section 1 4 (a )( 1 ) of the Parenta g e Act (750 I L CS 45/14(a)( 1) (West 2010)). This
qu estion require s us to construe section 14(a) (1) and its interre lationship to the provisi ons in the Marr iag e Act ref

erring to a noncustodial pare nt’s entitlement to rea sonable visitation under se ction 607(a) (750 I L CS 5/ 607(a) (West 2010)). 3 ¶ 37 Familiar principles o f statutory construction guide our analy sis. Our primary objective is to g ive eff

ect to the leg islature’s intent. In re C.C.
, 2011 I L 111795, ¶ 30. In deter mining that intent, we may properly consider the statutory languag e, the rea son and nece ssity for the law, the evils to be reme died and the statute’s ultimate purpose and objective. Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co.
, 2012 I L 113204, ¶ 37. When construing the languag e of the statute, we must view the statute as a whole, construing words and phrase s in light of other rele v ant statutory p ro visions and not in isolation. Id

. Our revie w is de novo

. Mashal v. City of Chicago , 2012 I L112341, ¶ 21. ¶ 38 The Parenta g e Act establishes a compre hensive scheme for deter mining pater

nity and for establishing custody
, visitation, and child support obligations in connec tion with a judgme nt of pater nity

. Under the Act, once pater nity is established, section 14(a) (1) provides in pertinent part that the ju d g ment “ may contain provisions conce rning *** visitation privileg es with the child.” (Emphasis added.) 750 I L CS 45/14(a)( 1) (West 2010). Dec isions reg arding visitation “shall [be] deter

mine[d] in acc ordanc e with the rele vant fa ct o rs s et forth in the I llinois Marr iag e and Dissolution of Marriag e Act [750 I L CS 5/101 et seq. ] and any other applicable law of I llinois
, to guide the court in a finding in the best interests of the child. In deter

mining custody
, joint custody
, remova l, or visitation, the court shall apply the rele vant standards of the I llinois Marriag e and Dissolution of Marriag e Act, including Sec tion 609.” 750 I L CS 45/ 14(a) (1) ( West 2010). Thus, section 14(a) (1) expressly provides that an awa rd of visitation is discretionar y , direc ts the trial court to make a “finding in the best interests of the child,” and to apply the “re levant standards” of the Mar

riag e Ac t. ¶ 39 We have previously held that under the express terms of the Parenta g e Act, a judgme nt of pater nity does not automatically entitle a b i o l o g ical fathe r to visitation. Rather, the “privileg e” of visitation is subordinate to the best interests of the child. J.S.A. v. M.H.
, 224 I ll. 2d 182, 211 (2007) (“[T]he right of a biologica l fathe r to establish pater nity to a child

At the out set , we not e tha t J aso n h a s never cha ll enged Ste ve’s st and ing to est abl is h the 3 exi st enc e of a par ent

- chi ld re la ti ons hip
, and no at te m pt has bee n m ade or ord er ent er ed dis avowing J aso n’s par ent al ri ghts ei the r unde r the Par ent age Act or unde r the j udgm ent of d i s sol uti on. Acco rdi ngly, f

o r p u rp o s es of thi s app eal
, we m ake no det erm ina ti on wit h re gard to ei the r par ty’s
st and ing, or as to J aso n’s con ti nue d le gal st atus as a p ar ent

. T hos e is sue s ar e not pre sen tl y be for e thi s c our t.

-9-born to a marria g e does not also mean that the leg al rights flowing from the pare nt and child

relationship are automatically confe rre d.”); In re Parentage of John M.
, 212 I ll. 2d 253, 264- 65 (2004). ¶ 40 In J.S.A.
, this court reiter ated that “the Parenta ge Ac t s pecif ically provides in section 14(a) (1) that decisions reg arding the i nvolv em en t o f t h e biol og ical father in the l ife of the child are to be g overne d solely by what is in the child’s best interests.” J.S.A.
, 224 I ll. 2d at 211. We explained that “ ‘eve n though pater nity may be establish ed upon the filing of a petition pursuant to section 7(a)
, any pare ntal rights of the biologica l fathe r, such as the right
to have custody of, or visitation with, the child, shall not be grante d unless it is in the child’s best interest.’ ” Id. at 212 (quoting Parentage of J ohn M.
, 212 I ll. 2d at 265). Ac cording ly
, under the statutory scheme
, afte r a decla ration of pater

nity
, the court is “re quired to conduct

a best-intere sts hearing to deter mine whether
, and to what extent, t h e n atural fathe r may exercise any rights with respe ct to the child.” Id

. We further h el d t h at “b o t h parties may introduce evidenc e either in support of, or in opposition to, the natura l fathe r being grante d
pare ntal rights to his bi ologic al child.” Id

. ¶ 41 As this court has long emphasized, the best interests of the child is the “guiding star” by which all matter s aff

ectingchildren must be decided. Nye v . Nye , 411 I ll. 408, 415 (1952). Neve rtheless, we have not specific ally been called upon to consider which provisions of the Marr iag e Ac t are “re levant” to guide the cour t in a finding in the best intere sts of the child in the context of a pater

nity action whe re visitation is at issue. ¶ 42 Initially
, we observe that our appellate court has previously ruled inconsistently on this iss u e. Some case s have applied t he best-interests provisions set forth in section 602 of t he Marr iag e Act, which lists sever al nonexclusive fac tors the court is to consider and weigh in makin g an y cu stody deter mination. 750 I L CS 5/602(a) (West 2010). Other case s have applied the visitation provisi ons of sec tion 607(a), whic h presumes visitation is in the best interests of the child abs en t ev idence of serious endang erme nt. Compare W ittendorf v. W orthington
, 2012 I L App (4th) 120525; Departme nt of Publi c Aid ex rel. Gagnon-Dix v. Gagnon
, 288 I ll. App. 3d 424, 428 (4th Dist. 1 9 9 7 ) (f i nding that the ref

ere nce in section 14(a) (1) of the Parenta g e Act to the Marriag e Act was a ref ere nce to section 602 and did not incorpora te section 607(a) ), with Jines v. Jurich
, 335 I ll. App. 3d 1156, 1162 (5th Dist. 2002) (the plain languag e of the Parenta g e Act require s cour t s to use the standards for visitation outlined in section 607(a) of the Marriag e Act); In re Parentage of Melton
, 314 I ll. App. 3d 476, 480 (1st Dist. 2000) (“the fac tors for deter mining visitation privileg es in section 607(a) *** guide visitation determinations unde r the Parenta g e Act”) ; W enzelman v. Benne tt , 322 I ll. App. 3d 262, 265 (2001) (whe re a prior pare nt-child relationship exis ted, a presumption exis ted in favor

of the biologica l pa

rent for visitation and parent wa s not require d to prove visitation was in the child’s best interests). ¶ 43 Steve maintains that the app el l at e co u rt co rr ec t l y conclude d that section 14(a )(1) incorpora tes the visitation provisions of section 607(a) of the Marriag e Act as the “re levant” standard in considering visitation privileg es arising out of a pater nity action. Section 607(a) of the Mar

riag e Ac t provides: “[a] pare nt not g rante d custody of the child is entitled to rea sonable visitation rights

-10-unless the court finds, af t er a hearing, that visitation would endang er seriously the

c h il d ’ s p hys ic al, mental, moral or emotional health.” 750 I L CS 5/607(a) (West 200 8 )

. Thus, u n d er s ection 607(a) of the Marriag e Act, the Gene ral Assembly has established a p re s u mp tion that it is in the best interests of the child to have rea sonable visitation with a noncustodial pare nt, and the burden is on the custodial pare nt to prove that visitation would seriously endang er the child. In re Marriage of Fields
, 283 I ll. App. 3d 894, 905 (1996). The “serious endang erme nt” standard h as b ee n described as a high burden that is “oner ous, stringe nt, and rig orous.” In re Marriage of Diehl
, 221 I ll. App. 3d 410, 429 (1991); see, e.g. , In re Marriage of

Pleasant
, 256 I ll. App. 3d 742, 751 (1993) (finding that the standard is “an extraordinary” one and “is more stringe nt than the best interests standard” ); In re Marriage of Lombaer
, 200 I ll. App. 3d 712, 724 (1990) (evide nce of mother’s hospitaliz ation for mental condit i o n an d failure to take psychiatric medication was insufficient to meet the onerous standa

rd of se rious endang erme nt to the children). ¶ 44 Although section 607(a) speaks to visitation, the Parenta g e Act does not expressly ref er to section 607. Thus, to understand whether this presumption an d the “serious endang erme nt” standard are “re levant” to a best-intere sts hearing on visitation under section 14(a) (1) of the Parenta g e Act, we consider the leg islative purpose for the presumption as well as the high burden e stablished to overc ome it. ¶ 45 When the Gene ral Assembly enac ted the Marriag e Act in 1977, it substantially adopted the Uni fo rm M arriag e and Divorce Act (Unifor m Marriag e Act). See Unif. Marriag e and Divorce Act § 101, 9A U.L .A. 171 (1998); I ll. Ann. Stat., ch. 40, ¶ 101, Historical & Practice Notes, at 6-7 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (re fer encing the Uniform Marriag e Act). Section 607(a) of the M arriag e Act is derive d from sec tion 407 of the Uniform Mar riag e Ac t. I ll. Ann. Stat., ch. 40, ¶ 607, Historical Note, at 70 (Smith-Hurd 1980). The comment to this section in the Uniform Mar

riag e Ac t expl ains why

the “se rious endang erme nt” languag e wa s chosen: “Although the standa

rd is n e c e s s arily somewhat vague, it was deliberately chosen
to indicate its stringe ncy when compar ed to the ‘best interest’ standard traditionally applied to this problem. The specia l standard was chosen to preve nt the d en i al of visitation to the noncustodial pare nt on the basis of moral judgme nts about pare ntal behavior which have no rele vance to the pare nt’s interest in or capa city to ma intain

a close and benign relationship to the child. The same onerous standard is applicable when the custodial pare nt tries to have the noncustodial pare nt’s visitation privileg es restric ted or eliminated.” Unif. Marriag e and Divorce Act § 407, 9A U.L .A. 398-99, cmt. (1998).
T h u s, the onerous standard derives from the gene ral principle that in matters of visitat i o n , as in custody
, the primary conce rn is the welfa re of the child. In a postdissol ution setting, the leg islature has presumed it to be in the child’s best interests t o m aintain a continued, meaning ful relationship with both pare nts afte r the dissoluti on. See also 750 I L CS 5/102(2) (West 2010) (stating that one of the underly ing purposes of the Act is to saf eguar d family relationships); In re Marriage of Seitzinger
, 333 I ll. App. 3d 103, 112 (2002) (noting that the best interests of the child is normally fostere d by continuing a healthy and close rela tionship with the noncustodial pare nt); Pleasant , 256 I ll. App. 3d at 751 (“[t] here is a strong public

-11-policy to preser ve the r elationship betwee n a par ent and c hild”). ¶ 46 This g ener al policy is also ref lected in section 607(c) of the Marriag e Act by limit ing the court’s pow er to re strict visitation rights in those circ umstances. 750 I L CS 5/ 607(c) (West 2010); see also I ll. Ann. Stat., ch. 40, ¶ 607, Historical & Practice Notes, at 70 (Smith-Hurd 1 980) (“The public policy of I llinois maintains that it is benef icial for a child to have a healthy an d clos e relationship with both pare nts even afte r divorce [citations] and that visitation privileg es should not be awa rded or withheld as a punishment or rew ard to either
pare nt.”). ¶ 47 As a result, the presumptive right to visitation in section 607(a) of the Marriag e Act
, draf ted over 30 year s ag o, is in k ee p i n g wi th the traditional model of a family para digm, wher e eac h pare nt has presumably exercised custody over the child and one pare nt will now be g rante d custody and the other rea sonable visita t i o n

. S uch a presumption ref lects a l egi s lative rec ognition of the need to protec t the pree x isting pare nt-child bond th at presumably develope d prior to the divorce or separ ation of two pare nts. Thus, to overc ome the presumption that visitation is in the best interests of the child in custody proce eding s filed by a par ent under

the Marriag e Ac t, the Gene ral Asse mbly soug ht a higher, more stringe nt burden on the custodial pare nt than mere ly the traditional best-inter ests fac tors. ¶ 48 I n contra st, in actions under the Parenta g e Act, pater nity is at issue and mu s t fi rs t b e proved. At the time visitation is soug ht, a relationship with the child may not have ever been forg ed, espec ially wher e pater nity is established long afte r birth. See 750 I L CS 45/8 (a )( 1 ) (West 2010) (re cognizi ng that the statute of limit ations for raising pater nity is two year s afte r the minor rea ches the ag e of majority). Additionally
, the para digm of prese rv i n g or continuing the pare nt-child relationship of a traditional intact family unit does not acc urate ly ref lect many family situations. See, e.g. , Siobhan Morrissey
, The New Neighbors: Domestic Relations Law Struggles to Catch Up W ith Changes in Family Life
, 88 AB A J

. 37, 38 (Mar ch 2002) (“The domestic unit in early 21st centur y Americ a [has become ] a crazy quilt of onepare nt households, blended families, sing le s , u nma r rie d p a r tn e r s h ip s a

n d s a me -sex unions.”). Thus, in pare ntag e actions, i s s u es of visitation may arise under situations wher e the court may be aske d to balancesever al competinginterests re lated to the child. ¶ 49 As this case illustrate s, there are many fac tors that may be rele vant to whether visitation is in a child’s best interests in the context of a pater nity action. An alleg ed fathe r seeking to deter mine his pater

nity and subsequent entitle ment to v is itation privileg es may be confr onted with an alre ady exis ting meaning ful rela tionship betwee n a presumed fath er and a child, wher e th e b iologica l fathe r has had no previous contac t with the child. Alternatively
, the alleg ed father may have been livi ng with the child prior to a determination of paternity , or the m arriag e between the child’s m other and a presumed father may have disint egr at ed so that there is not necessa

rily an “intac t family .” Additionally , there may be sce narios whe re a biol og ical father may be the only person in the child’s life who can effect u ate the s trong public policy of providing for the phy sical, mental, emotional, and monetary support of the child. 750 I L CS 45/ 1.1 (West 2010). ¶ 50 Given the my

riad relationships that may evolve outside the pa rame ters of a dissoluti on proce eding
, the Gene ral Assembly could not have prede termined with suc h b r o a d s tro k e s th at

-12-the presumptive entitlement to rea sonable visitation absent “se rious endang erme nt” is in a

child’s best interests in ever y pare ntag e action, without g iving the court the flexibi lity to consider the fac ts and circ umstances of eac h case

. Rather, the plain lan guag e of section 14(a) (1), g iving the court discretion in awa rding visitation and requiring “a finding in the best interests of the child,” contemplates a hearing wher e the court has the flexibi lity to consider whether
, and to what exte n t , the biologica l fathe r may now exercise visitation rights with
respe ct t o the child. (Emphasis added.) 750 I L CS 45/1 4 (a)(1) (West 2010); J.S.A.
, 224 I ll. 2d at 212. Acc o rd i n gl y , the “serious endang erme nt” standard under section 607(a) would underc ut the court’s statutory authority under section 14(a) (1) of the Parenta g e Act to deliberate and weigh fac tors rele vant to making a “finding in the best interests of the child.” ¶ 51 The provisions of section 602 of the Marriag e Act are broade r and allow the court to take into acc ount the fac ts and circ umstances of each case

. Section 602(a) sets forth a nonexclu s i v e l i s t of best-intere sts fac tors that the trial court shall consider in making deter minations related to custody

. 750 I L CS 5 / 6 0 2 (a) (West 2010). We have previously described visitation as a form of custody

. In re M.M

. , 156 I ll. 2d 53, 62 (1993). Those rele vant fa ctors include: ( 1) the wishes of the child’s par ent(s); (2) the wishes of the c hild; (3) the interac tion and interre lationship of the child with the pare nt(s), siblings, and any other person who ma

y signific antly

aff ect the c hild’s best interests; (4) the child’s adjust ment to his or her home, school, and community ; (5) the mental and phy sical health of the involved individuals; (6) the potential for violence or threat of violence; (7) the occur renc e of ong oing

or re peate d abuse; (8) the willingness and ability of eac h pare nt to facilitate a nd encourag e

a close and continuing relationship betwe en the other pare nt and the child; (9) whether one of the pare nts is a sex offe nder; and (10) milit ary obligations. 750 I L CS 5/60 2 (a) (West 2010). These fac tors best promote the leg islative intent under the Parenta g e Act g iven the
nature of the proc eeding s. ¶ 52 W e re cognize, as Steve points out, that section 602(c) incorporates the polic y o f t h e Marr iag e Act that “the maxi mum involvement and cooperation of both pare nts reg arding the phy sical, mental, moral, and emotional well-be ing of their child is in the best interest of the child.” 750 I L CS 5/602(c) (West 2010). In that reg ard, we not e that the t rial court err ed in stating that this presumption was not rele vant to the best-intere sts hearing. Ra t h er, the presumption is indeed rele vant, but unlike the onerous “serious endang erme nt” standard in section 607(a)
, it may be overc ome if, afte r considering the rele vant fac tors, the court finds it is notin the child’s best intere sts to gra nt visit ation privileg es. ¶ 53 Acc ording ly , for the f oreg oing r easons, it was e rror for the appellate court to apply the “serious endang ermen t ” standard of section 607(a)

. We hold that in a proce eding to deter mine visitation privileg es under section 14(a) (1) of the Parenta g e Act, the initial burden is on the petitioner to show that visitation will be in the best intere sts of the child pursuant
to the provisions set forth in section 602 of the Marriag e Act. To the extent that W enzelman
, Jines and In re Parentage of Melton contra dict our conclusion, they are expressly overr uled.

¶ 54 I I ¶ 55 We next consider whether t h e t ri al co u rt err ed in deter mining that it was not in J .W.’s

-13-best interests to have visitation with Steve at this time. A trial court’s deter mination as to the best interests of the child will not be reve rsed on appea l unless it is clea rl y ag ainst the manifest weight of

the evidenc e and it appe ars that a manifest injustice has oc curr ed. In re Marriage ofEck

ert , 119 I ll. 2d 316, 328 (1988). A judgme nt is ag ainst the manifest weight

o f t h e evidenc e only when the opposite conclusion i s clea rly appar ent. In re A.P.
, 2012 I L 113875, ¶ 17. ¶ 56 Dr. Fr ey , the court-a ppointed expert, and Dr. Osg ood, Steve’s reta ined expert, disputed J .W.’s cognitive understanding of her relationship to Steve and its implications for her best interests. They disagree d about the risks that introducing or reintroduc ing Steve into J .W.’s life would have on her emotional well-be ing and stability and the risk to her bond with J ason, whom she has known a s her f ather for he r entire life. ¶ 57 The testimony of Dr. Fr ey and the GAL supports t h e t ri al co u rt ’s conclusion that visitation was not in the best interests of J .W. at this stag e in her life. Ba sed upon various testing proce dures, and the evaluation and interviews with J .W., it was their opin i o n that, despite the fac t that Steve and J .W. had spent some time toge ther, at this stag e in her
cognitive developmen t , J

. W. did not understand Steve to be her fathe r and was unable to proce ss a relationsh i p with him. Dr. Fr ey believed that disrupting her life by introducing Steve as her fathe r at this stag e, given her curr ent chaotic life circ umstances, would potentially incre ase her risk of instability , disrupt her emotional well-be ing, and cou ld be detrimental to her

long- standingrelationship with J ason and he r mother. ¶ 58 Dr. Osg ood disagree d with Dr. Fr ey ’s premise and believed that Steve and his family had develope d a close and meaning ful bond with J .W. and believed that it would be detrimental
to now disrupt that rela

tionshi p

. Dr

. Osg ood was critica l of Dr. Fr ey ’s failure to observe Steve with J .W. Neve rtheless, t h e t ri al court found that Dr. Osg ood’s opinions wer e not persua sive wher e she did not interview J .W. to understand her perc eption of her rela tionship with Steve, did not perf

orm any independe nt testing, and instead relied solely on her revie w of Dr. Fr ey ’s repor

t and an interview with Steve. Dr. Osg ood did not ref ute any of Dr. Fr ey ’s testing me thods. ¶ 59 The court considere d that Steve was g enuinely interested in having a re lationship with J .W., and considere d the experience s Steve had with J .W. in late 2008 and early 2009, which

wer e supported by his sister’s testimony and other evidenc e. Neve rtheless, afte r weighing the rele vant best-intere sts fac tors, the co u rt ultimately found any presumption that it was in J .W.’s best interests to promote a pare nt-child rela tionship was rebutted by the evidenc e. In making its findings, the court relied upon the actions and behavior of J .W. as rec ounted by Dr. Fr ey and the GAL
, and their conce rn for incre ased risk of harm to her at this stag e in her

concr ete cognitive development. We cannot say that the trial court’s ruling was clea rly
ag ainst the manifest we ight of the evidenc e. ¶ 60 We note, and as J as o n ’s co u nsel points out, the trial court’s order and the statutory framework do not fore close the possibili ty that in the future it may be in J .W.’s best interests
to have a meaning ful relationship with her biologica l fathe r and to reintroduc e him into her life. Steve has shown a co m m itted interest in developing a relationship with J .W. and has adher ed to his pare ntal responsibilities of support. The no-c ontact orde r in no way ref lects

-14-a lack of desi re o n S teve’ s part to be a part of J .W.’s life. Nor should the no-contact order

prohibit Steve in any future proce eding from having his own expert evaluate J .W. Rather, as ref lected by the court’s annual evaluation r equire ment, the denial of visitation was focuse d

on J .W. and her circ umstances at her stage of development at t he ti me of the hea ri n g. The
p ar t i es and the court acknow ledg ed that J .W. is a very resilient, strong , adapta ble chil d
, despite all of the chaos in her life. As she grows and develops, as Dr. Fr ey indicated, future evaluation of J .W. may

sug g est a diff

ere nt outcome.

¶ 61 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 62 For

all of the for eg oing r easons, we hold that the trial court corre ctly conclude d that in

a p roceeding to enter

tain a petition for visitation privileg es under section 14(a) (1) o f t h e Parenta g e Act, the initial burden is on the petitioner to show that visitation will be in the best interests of the child pursuant to the provisions set forth in section 602 of the Marriag e Act. Additionally
, we conclude that the trial court’s ruling
, that it was not in J .W.’s best interests
to awa rd visitation privileg es at this stag e, was not ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidence. Acc ording ly
, we reve rse the judgme nt of the appellate court and af fi rm t h e judgme nt of the circ uit court.

¶ 63 Appellate c ourt judg ment reve rsed. ¶ 64 Circuit court judg ment aff irmed.

-15-