TIMELY ACTIONS NEEDED 

TO ADVANCE THE NEXT GENERATION AIR 

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 

Federal Aviation Administration

Report Number: AV-2010-068

Date Issued: June 16, 2010
U.S. Department of

Memorandum

Transportation

Office of the Secretary

of Transportation

Office of Inspector General

Subject: ACTION: Timely Actions Needed To Advance 

the Next Generation Air Transportation System 

Federal Aviation Administration

Date: June 16, 2010

Report Number AV-2010-068

From: Lou E. Dixon

Principal Assistant Inspector General 

 for Auditing and Evaluation

Reply to 

Attn. of: JA-10

To: Federal Aviation Administrator

The National Airspace System handles almost 50,000 flights per day and more 

than 700 million passengers per year. Historically, steadily increasing levels of air 

traffic have resulted in increasing delays. While the current demand for air travel 

is down, it is expected to return, which will require better air traffic management

to reduce congestion and decrease delays. To meet this anticipated demand, the 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is developing the Next Generation Air 

Transportation System (NextGen) to replace the current ground-based air traffic 

control system with a satellite-based system. FAA’s goal for NextGen—to create 

a system that will handle up to three times more air traffic and reduce FAA 

operating costs—is ambitious and involves multibillion-dollar investments from 

both the Government and the airline industry. Since the effort began in 2005, we 

have repeatedly reported on the cost and schedule risks and operational and 

management challenges NextGen faces. These concerns prompted us to identify 

NextGen as one of the Department’s top management challenges.1

The Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House Committee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure and Subcommittee on Aviation requested that we examine 

FAA’s progress in transitioning to NextGen. This report provides the results of 

our review. Specifically, it addresses (1) key actions needed to successfully 

implement NextGen, (2) FAA and partner agencies’ progress in leveraging 

resources and budgets, and (3) FAA’s efforts to engage the private sector in 

shaping NextGen policy issues. In addition, we were asked to report on FAA’s 

 1 OIG Report Number PT-2010-008, “DOT Top Management Challenges for FY 2010,” November 16, 2009. 

OIG reports and testimonies are available on our website: www.oig.dot.gov.
2

progress in implementing our past NextGen-related recommendations, which is

detailed at exhibit A. We conducted this performance audit from May 2008 to 

March 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

See exhibit B for a more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology. 

RESULTS IN BRIEF

A number of critical actions are still needed to move NextGen from planning to 

implementation. FAA has yet to establish firm requirements to help guide cost 

and schedule estimates for adjustments to existing projects or new acquisitions. In 

addition, FAA has not modified its Acquisition Management System (AMS) so 

that it can gauge the impact of a single NextGen investment on multiple initiatives

or manage efforts in an integrated way. FAA’s tendency to focus on individual 

programs has also limited its ability to assess how it will concurrently implement 

multiple, interdependent programs and mitigate any associated risks. Finally, 

although FAA considers NextGen to be one of the most complex systems ever 

developed by the U.S. Government, FAA has not yet acquired the necessary skill 

sets and expertise to successfully implement NextGen. Not taking timely action 

on these issues now could delay FAA’s plans to transition to NextGen. 

FAA also faces challenges in developing an integrated budget to help ensure it 

leverages the right resources, pursues realistic goals, and secures adequate funding 

for projects. A multi-agency approach that allows for coordinating diverse 

research and aligning other agencies’ resources to develop NextGen is not only 

required by law, but also important since FAA conducts very little long-term air 

traffic management research. However, with the exception of the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), partner agencies have not 

adjusted their research and development plans, existing budgets, or program 

requirements specifically to accommodate NextGen efforts. Additionally, FAA is 

missing opportunities to leverage other partner agencies’ research and 

development efforts that could significantly enhance NextGen development and 

reduce costs. For example, FAA has yet to inventory the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) vast research base for NextGen or fully leverage ongoing work for an 

accurate satellite-based precision landing system and net centric operations. 

While FAA has made some progress in engaging the private sector to develop 

NextGen and shape NextGen policy issues, several challenges remain. For 

example, FAA is working with a Government/industry task force to gain

consensus on NextGen operational improvements that can be achieved in the 

midterm (2012 to 2018), but significant policy issues remain unresolved. Other 

FAA efforts also face challenges, such as better defining the role of the NextGen 

Institute. FAA established the Institute to ensure access to private sector expertise, 

but it has not lived up to expectations due to a lack of focus and clear priorities for 

its working groups. Further, while FAA has involved industry in NextGen 
3

demonstration projects to validate concepts and procedures, stakeholders are 

concerned that these projects are not well coordinated or outcome-focused. 

As part of this report, we are making recommendations to FAA to reduce

implementation risks, strengthen the multi-agency approach, and improve

coordination with the private sector in NextGen policy matters. 

BACKGROUND 

In 2003, Congress mandated2

We have testified on several occasions that FAA must make several critical 

decisions over the next several years to keep NextGen on track.

that FAA establish the Joint Planning and 

Development Office (JPDO) and that it create and carry out plans for 

implementing NextGen by 2025. Congress also mandated that the JPDO 

coordinate diverse research efforts of other Federal agencies to reduce the cost and 

risks of implementing NextGen by leveraging ongoing development efforts by 

partner agencies. These include DOD, the Department of Commerce, the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as well as NASA. In developing and 

carrying out its plans, the JPDO was also tasked to consult with the public and 

ensure the participation of experts from the private sector, including 

representatives of commercial aviation, labor groups, and air traffic controllers. 

3 Specifically, we 

have noted that the cost of NextGen remains uncertain and much work remains to 

refine requirements and costs; align diverse agency budgets; and set realistic 

expectations for airspace users with respect to milestones, equipage, and 

anticipated benefits. In October 2009, we testified that FAA’s transition from 

NextGen planning to implementation poses a number of operational and 

management challenges that must be addressed in the near and midterm. 

Additionally, our past audit reports have highlighted several areas of risk, such as 

complex software and development and systems integration issues, that FAA 

needs to address, and we recommended several actions to reduce cost and 

schedule risks.4

CRITICAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENT 

NEXTGEN 

 

FAA has made some progress in developing and shaping a vision for NextGen in 

the midterm and is working with stakeholders to develop priorities for the next 

 2 Vision 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-176 (2003). 3 OIG Testimony Number CC-2006-065, “Perspectives on the Progress and Actions Needed To Address the Next 

Generation Air Transportation System,” July 25, 2006. OIG Testimony Number CC-2009-044, “Federal Aviation 

Administration: Actions Needed To Achieve Mid-Term NextGen Goals,” March 18, 2009. 4 OIG Report Number AV-2005-031, “Joint Planning and Development Office: Actions Needed To Reduce Risks 

With the Next Generation Air Transportation System,” February 12, 2007. 
4

2 to 3 years. However, FAA has yet to take timely action in a number of critical 

areas needed to move NextGen from planning to implementation. Specifically, 

FAA has yet to (1) establish firm requirements or reliable costs and schedules for 

adjustments to existing projects or new NextGen acquisitions, (2) modify its 

Acquisition Management System so it can manage initiatives as portfolios, (3) 

address key safety concerns related to increased throughput at congested airports 

and mixed equipage, (4) assess the ability to implement multiple capabilities 

concurrently, or (5) establish a viable plan to secure the expertise needed to 

manage a NextGen-driven workforce. 

FAA Has Yet To Establish Firm NextGen Requirements for New and 

Existing Systems

FAA has updated its enterprise architecture for the National Airspace System that 

includes “road maps” for automation, communications, navigation, aircraft, and 

surveillance planned with NextGen. However, FAA has not established firm 

requirements that can be used to develop the cost and schedule estimates for 

modifications to existing programs or new acquisitions, such as performance 

attributes for systems that controllers will rely on to manage traffic at high 

altitudes and in the vicinity of airports. 

The current architecture identifies more than 340 key decisions that FAA must 

make to reach envisioned mid-term capabilities. The Agency’s most recent 

roadmap identifies a total of 51 decision points for fiscal year (FY) 2009. 

However, FAA only made a total of 11 decisions. One key decision that FAA 

failed to make was the Investment Analysis (projected program cost) for the 

NextGen Weather Processor, which is part of the Agency’s efforts to significantly 

improve how weather information is used to reduce delays. FAA scheduled this 

decision for the fourth quarter of 2008 but failed to meet the milestone. FAA

officials acknowledged that this could impact scheduling for other investment 

decisions for the program and delay NextGen weather systems. 

According to FAA, pending decisions on several key design issues will determine 

NextGen capabilities, timing, and costs. These include:

• Air/Ground Division of Responsibility: FAA needs to decide how much 

responsibility will be delegated to pilots in the cockpit and what duties will 

remain with controllers and FAA ground systems for tracking aircraft. 

• Level of Automation: The decision on the degree of human involvement in 

traffic management and separating aircraft is linked to the outcome of the 

division of responsibility between aircrew and controllers (and related ground 

systems). Possible options range from today’s largely manual flight 
5

management to a largely automated system centered on machine-to-machine 

exchanges with little controller involvement.

• Facilities Consolidation: A major determination of both capital and operating 

costs for NextGen is the degree to which the Agency eliminates or consolidates 

FAA facilities. FAA must make critical decisions on facility requirements that

will significantly impact the type and number of systems needed to support 

NextGen.

In addition, FAA must still make several critical decisions for other core 

capabilities that will ultimately affect the budget and pace of NextGen in the 

midterm (see table 1). 

Table 1. Examples of Critical Decisions Still Needed for Core Capabilities

Area Critical Decisions Needed

Terminal Modernization FAA recently approved dividing the Terminal Automation

Modernization Replacement (TAMR) Phase 3 program into two 

segments. Segment 1 addresses modernization of existing 

terminal automation systems for the 2010 to 2013 timeframe to 

enable near-term NextGen capabilities at selected sites. 

Segment 2 will address all terminal systems for the mid-term 

beyond 2013. FAA plans Final Investment Decisions for 

Segments 1 and 2 for September 2010 and FY 2012,

respectively. Delays in terminal automation modernization 

decisions could increase risk to implementation of NextGen 

capabilities. 

En Route Automation FAA expects to decide on capabilities for the remaining two 

software releases planned for the En Route Automation 

Modernization (ERAM) program. Delays could impact the 

schedule for incorporating future capabilities, such as the Data 

Communications and the System Wide Information 

Management efforts. 

Data Communications FAA plans to make the Final Investment Decision for the first 

segment of Data Communications in FY 2011. Costs are 

uncertain, but the Segment 1 investment decision is expected to 

include $400 million specifically for upgrades to ERAM.

Source: OIG analysis of FAA National Airspace System enterprise architecture roadmaps

Note: Cost projections for FAA projects have not been baselined.

In April 2008,5

 5 OIG Report Number AV-2008-049, “Air Traffic Control Modernization: FAA Faces Challenges in Managing 

Ongoing Projects, Sustaining Existing Facilities, and Introducing New Capabilities,” April 14, 2008.

we recommended that FAA conduct a “gap analysis” of the 

National Airspace System to determine what would be required to transition from 

the existing architecture to NextGen in the midterm (2012 through 2018). FAA’s 

work thus far shows that major gaps exist with respect to automation, such as new 

capabilities that will allow controllers to better manage traffic. According to FAA, 
6

it may take 1 to 2 years to develop requirements for new automation systems for 

the mid-term timeframe.

Continued delays, however, in developing requirements and in making key 

program decisions will slow NextGen’s progress. A recent NextGen portfolio

analysis,6

FAA’s Acquisition Management System Is Not Structured To Manage 

NextGen Mid-Term Initiatives as Portfolios

commissioned by the JPDO, already shows that some NextGen 

automated air and ground capabilities originally planned for 2025 may not be 

implemented until 2035 or later and could cost the Government and airspace users 

significantly more than the projected cost estimate of $40 billion. 

FAA will need to synchronize the development and implementation of multiple

NextGen initiatives. NextGen will require greater integration of functions, 

interfaces, and capabilities of systems that are funded through multiple accounts to 

achieve expected benefits. Our work and an FAA study7

The FAA study also points out that although a benefit analysis is required for each 

acquisition program under the AMS, this analysis does not consider benefits 

involving integration between multiple programs. This creates a significant 

concern for NextGen programs because overall benefits and capabilities are 

cumulative and depend on multiple programs to achieve a new capability. For 

example, integration of NextGen programs, such as Data Communications

show that FAA’s current 

AMS—which establishes policy and guidance for lifecycle acquisition 

management—was not designed for managing NextGen investments as portfolios. 

Rather, FAA’s acquisition system focuses on individual programs in line with the 

Office of Management and Budget guidance for program-specific budgets and 

baselines. Focusing on individual programs rather than the portfolio creates the 

risk that key strategic alternatives may not be considered or funded. 

8 and 

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B),9 depends on the timely 

implementation of the En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM)10

 6 The analysis is referred to as the NextGen portfolio or “trade space” analysis. FAA is continuing to update and 

revise the analysis. The study sought to examine the costs, risks, and benefits of the JPDO Integrated Work Plan 

targeted for 2025. 

program. 

ERAM is critical to both programs due to, among other things, integration 

requirements for data sharing. FAA recently began adjusting the AMS by 

7 “Independent Assessment of FAA Acquisition Management System,” April 22, 2008. 8 Data Communications will provide comprehensive data connectivity—including ground automation message 

generation and receipt, message routing and transmission, and aircraft avionics requirements—and will automate 

repetitive tasks and supplement voice communications with less workload-intensive data communications. 9 ADS-B is a surveillance system that uses information from satellite-based systems to identify and track aircraft 

positions. 10 ERAM is a $2.1 billion automation program that will replace the current HOST computer systems in 20 of FAA’s 

En Route Centers that control high-altitude traffic in the National Airspace System. The system processes flight

radar data, provides communications and generates display data to air traffic controllers.
7

establishing the Acquisition Executive Board, which the Agency believes will

better address portfolio decision making within the AMS. Given the complexity 

of NextGen and the interdependencies of efforts, FAA recognizes that additional 

adjustments to the AMS will be required to manage the mid-term initiatives as 

portfolios. FAA has begun and is planning modifications to transition AMS to 

portfolio management.

FAA Has Not Fully Addressed Key Safety Concerns That Impact New 

Systems and Procedures

Before FAA can move from the current air traffic control system to NextGen, it 

must address key safety concerns. First, FAA must determine whether throughput 

at already congested airports can be increased. This is particularly important for 

airports with complex runway configurations, including closely spaced parallel or 

converging/intersecting runways (e.g., John F. Kennedy, Las Vegas, and Newark). 

Updated safety assessments, some of which are decades old, are also needed to 

ensure unanticipated hazards are not introduced, particularly during periods of low 

visibility. FAA points out that safety assessments are underway.

Second, FAA must develop plans to mitigate differences with aircraft equipage. 

Mixed equipage presents significant safety concerns for NextGen, as controllers 

will be expected to concurrently manage aircraft with different capabilities and 

procedures. FAA has acknowledged that until clearly defined procedures and 

support tools are in place, safety concerns could limit the value of new equipment 

on aircraft in a mixed-equipage environment. FAA points out that increased 

reliance on automation that supports the use of new avionics could degrade 

controllers’ skill levels, which may in turn impact safety if the new automation 

fails.

As we testified in July 2009,

11 a prolonged mixed-equipage environment will 

likely increase—not decrease—controller workload. Experts believe that between 

80 and 100 percent of aircraft at any given location will need to be equipped with 

new NextGen systems to realize benefits and limit the potential for introducing 

new hazards. Assessing and addressing the impacts of mixed equipage are 

important for several mid-term efforts, including performance-based navigation,12

 11 OIG Testimony Number CC-2009-086, “

Data Communications for controllers and pilots, and ADS-B. To help ensure 

mixed equipage does not introduce safety risks, FAA will need to adjust existing 

air traffic control systems and develop training for controllers and pilots. FAA 

Challenges in Implementing Performance-Based Navigation in the U.S. Air 

Transportation System,” July 29, 2009. 12 FAA defines performance-based navigation (PBN) as a framework for defining navigation requirements that can be 

applied to air traffic route, instrument procedure, or defined airspace. PBN comprises both Area Navigation (RNAV) 

and Required Navigation Performance (RNP) and provides a basis for the design and implementation of flight paths 

that can enhance capacity. 
8

may also have to segregate specific airspace for aircraft with the required avionics 

to take advantage of the new capabilities. 

FAA Lacks an Understanding of Risks Associated with Concurrently 

Implementing Multiple Capabilities 

FAA has yet to determine what risks are associated with implementing multiple 

NextGen capabilities concurrently. To do so, FAA must examine critical 

interdependencies between systems, procedures, and training programs needed to 

deliver NextGen capabilities. FAA acknowledges that implementation decisions 

in the past were made on individual programs and that those decisions were not 

necessarily optimal from an operational change perspective. Therefore, FAA has 

staggered the implementation of key NextGen capabilities, such as data link 

communications, to wait for the completion of ERAM in 2012. 

Conducting the risk assessment is time-critical because FAA plans to hire and 

train nearly 15,000 new controllers over the next decade to replace those who are 

now retiring. This new controller workforce will not only have to work with 

existing systems and procedures but will also be required at some point to 

transition to new roles and responsibilities—from controlling to managing air 

traffic—as envisioned for NextGen. Currently, about one-third of the controller 

workforce is composed of controllers in training. 

Since 2004, we have issued a series of reports focusing on FAA’s programs for 

developing the next generation air traffic controller workforce. FAA is taking 

steps to address our concerns, such as appointing a national director for training; 

however, our current work shows that continued management attention is still 

needed. Given the current state of the controller workforce and interdependencies 

between systems and procedures, FAA and airspace users need to establish 

realistic transition benchmarks that point to when new controller and pilot training, 

aircraft avionics and ground systems, and procedures must be in place at specific 

locations.

FAA Does Not Have the Necessary Skill Sets and Expertise To 

Manage and Execute NextGen

According to FAA, NextGen is one of the most complex systems ever developed 

by the U.S. Government. In response to a recommendation we made in 

February 2007, FAA commissioned the National Academy of Public 

Administration (NAPA) to assess the skill sets needed for NextGen 

implementation. In its September 2008 report, NAPA identified 26 competencies 

where FAA lacks the skill sets to successfully transition to NextGen.13

 13 Report by a panel of the National Academy of Public Administration, “Identifying the Workforce to Respond to a 

National Imperative - The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen),” September 2008. 

These 
9

include program management, software development, contract administration, and 

systems engineering with an understanding of human factors considerations. 

FAA recently completed an initial acquisition workforce plan to address 

workforce recommendations in the NAPA study—an important first step. 

However, the plan requires more development and clarification to be useful. For 

example, the plan is not specific with respect to how or when FAA will actually 

secure the necessary skill sets and expertise. FAA has estimated that it will 

require approximately 350 new hires through fiscal year 2011. We have work 

underway to examine FAA’s plans for determining its acquisition workforce needs 

and FAA’s progress in addressing them.

FAA HAS MADE LIMITED PROGRESS IN LEVERAGING 

PARTNER AGENCIES’ RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE NEXTGEN 

GOALS

With the exception of NASA, partner agencies have not adjusted their budgets and 

ongoing research and development programs to demonstrate a relationship to 

NextGen efforts. The law that created the JPDO mandated a multi-agency 

approach to develop and implement NextGen and tasked the JPDO with 

coordinating research and development efforts among Federal partner agencies. 

However, FAA has yet to take full advantage of partner agencies’ research base—

particularly DOD’s—which could reduce risks and costs of NextGen 

development. 

Most Partner Agencies Have Not Adjusted Budgets or Made Program 

Changes To Support NextGen

FAA and the JPDO have been working on a NextGen integrated budget document 

(similar to the Office of Management and Budget Exhibit 300)14

 14 The Office of Management and Budget Exhibit 300 is designed to ensure that the business case for investments are 

made and tied to agency mission statements and long-term goals. 

for more than

4 years with little to show for the effort. The JPDO, however, does not have the 

authority to adjust or redirect the research budgets or actions of other agencies. 

While partner agencies are generally supportive of NextGen, most have not 

adjusted their research and development budgets and programs or changed 

requirements specifically to accommodate NextGen efforts. Without a completed 

integrated budget document, it will be difficult for FAA and Congress to track 

involvement of partner agencies in NextGen and determine if JPDO is leveraging 

the right research, whether funding is adequate for specific efforts, or how projects 

will improve the air transportation system and at what cost. 
10

We analyzed the JPDO’s most recent efforts to develop a NextGen integrated 

budget. While the budget identifies NextGen-specific funding from FAA, NASA, 

and a token amount from Commerce, it does not yet quantify investments at DOD 

or DHS or the value of any research or capabilities that FAA and the JPDO could 

ultimately leverage for NextGen (see table 2).

Table 2. Partner Agency Combined NextGen Capital and Research and 

Development Budgets, Fiscal Years 2008 – 2013 (Dollars in Millions)

NextGen Investments by Agency

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total

Federal Aviation 

Administration $212 $688 $1059 $1131 $1301 $1566 $5957

Department of 

Commerce $3 $5 $5 $5 $5 $5 $28

National Aeronautics 

and Space 

Administration $284 $285 $284 $287 $290 $297 $1727

Department of 

Homeland Security To be determined

Department of Defense To be determined

Source: OIG Analysis of Exhibit 300 - Next Generation Air Transportation System, September 10, 2007, submission

The lack of progress with the integrated budget document is traceable to a number 

of factors, which include complexity, the lack of a common method to identify 

NextGen-related budget items, and FAA’s focus on running and maintaining the 

existing system. FAA officials recently stated that this responsibility has been 

elevated to the Department of Transportation’s NextGen Senior Advisor for action 

by the Office of the Secretary. The Secretary’s office has involved the Senior 

Policy Committee to solicit the partner agencies for data and to review all data 

submitted.

Significant Research and Development Issues Remain Unresolved

Ensuring partner agency initiatives are aligned with the operational improvements 

identified in the Integrated Work Plan is key to NextGen’s success. A multiagency approach for developing NextGen is critical because FAA conducts very 

little developmental air traffic research and historically has relied on NASA for its 

long-term air traffic management research needs. NASA is the lead agency for 

43 out of 203 research and development activities identified in the NextGen 

Integrated Work Plan.15

 15 The NextGen Integrated Work Plan (IWP) is intended to be a master planning document that depicts the 

collaborative efforts of the stakeholders responsible for implementing the NextGen vision.

 Initially, NASA planned to limit its NextGen work solely 
11

to fundamental research,

16

Coordination between FAA and its other partner agencies, however, has been 

lacking in several areas. A JPDO assessment also found similar research and 

development gaps that could materially affect the cost and schedule for NextGen.

requiring FAA to assume a larger than expected role to 

complete research and development for use in NextGen initiatives. However, 

NASA recently revisited this policy and, according to officials, is now tailoring its 

efforts on a case-by-case basis and is going beyond fundamental research to 

development and even to the prototype stage if warranted. 

• Synchronizing Weather-Related Applications. The Department of 

Commerce’s 4D Weather Cube is expected to provide a common picture of 

weather for the entire country that airspace users may view and apply directly 

in flight route planning and automated decision aides for traffic flow 

management.17

We also found that Commerce’s work on its 4D Weather Cube focuses 

exclusively on its own requirements. According to officials from Commerce’s 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), NextGen-specific 

requirements are considered to be “extras,” and NOAA expects FAA to fund or 

reimburse its costs related to NextGen development. Recognizing the need for 

better communication and coordination on implementing NextGen weather

systems, the JPDO Board

However, according to the JPDO, FAA and Commerce 

disagree on how to synchronize national weather-related applications of 

observed, forecast, and disseminated data, which could delay the Weather 

Cube’s planned 2013 implementation. 

18

 16 NASA officials define “fundamental research” as continued long-term, scientific study in areas such as physics, 

chemistry, materials, experimental techniques, and computational techniques that lead to a furthering of 

understanding of underlying principles that form the foundation of the core aeronautics disciplines as well as 

research that integrates the knowledge gained in these core areas to significantly enhance capabilities, tools, and 

technologies at the disciplinary (e.g., aerodynamics, combustion, and trajectory prediction uncertainty) and 

multidisciplinary (e.g., airframe design, engine design, and airspace modeling and simulation) levels.

has designated the NextGen Executive Weather 

Panel, chaired by the FAA Senior Vice President for NextGen and Operations 

Planning and the NOAA Assistant Administrator for Weather Services, to act 

as primary policy- and decision-makers. While this is an important first step, 

FAA has not defined requirements for the 4D Weather Cube or established a 

formal agreement between the agencies on NextGen weather systems. 

17 The Department of Commerce has the lead role in developing the single authoritative source of legally required 

weather information for National Airspace System operations. The 4D Weather Cube is to be a distributed, national 

database of gridded and interpolated weather observations and automated analyses, scaled consistently over time for 

any location above the continental United States. It is expected to provide observations with respect to latitude, 

longitude, altitude, and time. 18 An adjunct to the Senior Policy Committee, the JPDO Board consists of senior representatives from participating 

Federal agencies.
12

• Coordinating Joint Surveillance Requirements with DOD and DHS. A 

key concern of DOD and DHS is the continuing need to track aircraft—a 

capability currently provided by FAA—to maintain security coverage for the 

United States, such as tracking aircraft designated as non-cooperative targets.

With the implementation of ADS-B, FAA has plans to decommission an 

undetermined number of radar19

• Researching NextGen’s Human Factors Impact on Controllers and Pilots. 

The NextGen concept of operations calls for significant changes to the roles of 

controllers and pilots. A focused “human factors” research effort on the 

impact of such changes, such as how highly automated systems will affect 

controllers, will ensure that new concepts and technologies can be safely 

implemented. However, FAA continues to lack a cross-agency research plan 

that (1) establishes an agreed-upon set of initial focus areas for research, 

(2) inventories existing facilities for research, and (3) capitalizes on past and 

current research. FAA’s inadequate attention to such research when 

implementing the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System 

(STARS) resulted in significant cost increases and schedule slips.

that it will no longer need to conduct National 

Airspace System operations. If DOD or DHS determine that some of these 

secondary radar must remain in service to ensure security, they may need to 

assume maintenance and replacement costs. However, DOD and DHS have 

not established budgets or programs specifically identified for NextGen. 

Failure to coordinate and agree on surveillance requirements increases the 

potential for duplicative efforts or gaps in NextGen surveillance and security 

capabilities.

• Introducing Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace 

System and NextGen. Increased use of unmanned aircraft to perform 

missions not considered for manned aircraft has a number of safety 

implications for domestic airspace operations and NextGen. Current UAS are 

unable to sense and avoid traffic, creating significant risk of collisions in 

populated areas or busy airspace. While there are no established cross-agency 

requirements for UAS operations in the National Airspace System, the 

evolving use of this technology has become an important issue for FAA, DOD, 

DHS, and other agencies. Accordingly, it will be important to include UASrelated issues as part of NextGen development. FAA currently authorizes 

Government UAS operations on a limited basis after conducting a case-by-case 

safety review. However, the JPDO’s annual cross-agency gap analyses have 

repeatedly stated the need for agencies to work toward developing UAS 

requirements, standards, procedures, and avionics. NASA has included an 

additional $30 million a year in its fiscal 2011 budget request to develop 

 19 We are referring to secondary radar that operate on the coded reply sent from the airborne radio beacon transponder 

to an aircraft in response to an interrogation sent from the ground station.
13

technologies that will allow unmanned aircraft routine access to the National 

Airspace System. This effort will focus initially on Government-owned and 

-operated UAS aircraft, followed by private-sector UAS.

Missed Opportunities Could Further Impact the Multi-Agency 

Approach for NextGen 

FAA is missing several opportunities to coordinate with partner agencies and 

strengthen its ability to reduce NextGen cost and schedule risks. Of key concern 

is FAA’s failure to coordinate with DOD to fully leverage its vast research and 

development base. Not only is a multi-agency approach for NextGen required by 

law, better coordination with DOD and other partner agencies could also facilitate 

technology transfer and capability verification and validation. 

DOD is the lead agency in developing NextGen’s network-centric operations20

and is working with FAA and the JPDO on surveillance issues. DOD also 

contributes to NextGen as a member on various committees, boards, and working 

groups. However, neither FAA nor the JPDO have fully assessed DOD’s vast 

research and development portfolio and existing capabilities to determine their 

applicability to NextGen. DOD’s experience with enterprise architecture 

development, large-scale systems integration, net centric operations, and overall 

management of high-risk efforts could prove useful. For example, leveraging 

DOD’s work on a satellite-based Joint Precision Landing System (JPALS)21

Ensuring adequate mechanisms and funding to facilitate the transfer of 

technologies among NextGen partners may also be inadequate, according to an 

FAA/JPDO assessment. FAA has established research transition teams to address

technology transfer issues with NASA and review plans for NextGen. Thus far 

these teams have reviewed plans and, on a limited basis, begun transferring

technology between the two agencies. For example, NASA’s research into 

improved arrival routes and an initial set of software algorithms for enhancing the 

could 

inform FAA’s development of capabilities to meet NextGen requirements and 

potentially reduce costs. Other DOD research and development areas that could 

help FAA improve NextGen outcomes include surveillance and security of 

aircraft, communications, and navigation. While DOD officials have stated that 

the Department is willing to provide access to its existing capabilities and ongoing 

research and development, FAA has yet to conduct a meaningful inventory of 

DOD’s research base. According to FAA officials, the Agency’s failure to 

leverage these resources is due in part to a culture that is reluctant to embrace 

technologies not developed in-house. 

 20 DOD’s Network-Centric Operations is a robust network of information for geographically dispersed forces. 21 The Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS) is a precision satellite-based landing system that will 

allow aircraft to land on any suitable land or sea-based surface worldwide, while minimizing the impact to airfield 

operations because of a low ceiling or poor visibility.
14

flow of air traffic is being transitioned to FAA for further testing. However, FAA 

has not formed similar teams or methods for other agencies, such as the 

Department of Commerce and DOD to accomplish technology transfer. We have 

found that “entrance and exit” criteria, with clearly defined hand-off points for 

research projects being developed by other agencies, will aid in determining what 

it will take to transition new concepts and technologies into daily operations. 

Additionally, JPDO officials have stated that while research transition teams make 

sense for the FAA/NASA relationship, this approach may not be ideal for 

transitioning research and development and technology from other partner 

agencies. We agree, but FAA must develop appropriate approaches to effectively

obtain technologies or research from other partner agencies to support NextGen.

Finally, FAA has not coordinated with partner agencies to develop a framework 

for verifying and validating NextGen capabilities. Because concept and system 

validation could take more than 3 years after development is completed and before 

the acquisition cycle begins, coordination is needed to better ensure systems can 

fulfill their intended use in the National Airspace System. An FAA task force has 

developed some initial guidelines that will require agreement among JPDO partner 

agencies. 

FAA FACES CHALLENGES IN ENGAGING THE PRIVATE 

SECTOR TO DEVELOP NEXTGEN AND RELATED POLICIES

FAA and industry have faced long-standing challenges in coordinating their 

NextGen efforts. FAA and the JPDO have worked to involve industry participants 

and representatives in key planning efforts, including the NextGen Institute, to 

gain access to private sector expertise. However, the Institute has not lived up to 

original expectations due to a lack of clear focus and priorities. While the large 

number of industry stakeholders and evolution of NextGen have made it difficult 

to reach consensus in NextGen planning and demonstration, successful 

implementation of NextGen depends on stakeholders’ involvement in the 

development of NextGen policies, procedures, and decisions. 

FAA Has Not Clearly Defined the Role of the NextGen Institute

In March 2005, FAA established the NextGen Institute to provide the JPDO with 

access to private sector expertise, tools, and facilities in developing NextGen. The 

Institute was also expected to be used as a contracting mechanism to accelerate the 

development of NextGen technologies outside of the traditional Government 

acquisition process. However, FAA has failed to clearly articulate the Institute’s 

responsibilities, creating the potential for duplicative efforts between the Institute 
15

and other private sector organizations, such as RTCA22 and the MITRE 

Corporation.23

FAA Is Engaging the Private Sector Through RTCA, but Significant 

Policy Issues Remain Unresolved

FAA’s reorganization of the JPDO, which placed it within FAA’s 

Air Traffic Organization, has complicated FAA’s attempts to better define the 

Institute’s role. To date, FAA has not reassessed the Institute’s role to, at a 

minimum, determine whether it is still needed or what role it should play in light 

of other private sector organizations’ contributions. 

In an effort to gain stakeholder acceptance and solidify commitments from both 

Government and industry, FAA asked RTCA to undertake a new task force, the 

NextGen Mid-Term Implementation Task Force. The group was tasked with 

forging a consensus on the NextGen operational improvements planned for the 

2012 to 2018 timeframe and to develop business cases to support and implement 

mid-term capabilities. RTCA delivered its final report to FAA on 

September 9, 2009.24

In addition to making 28 specific recommendations, the Task Force report noted 

the following key messages regarding its view of NextGen:

 

• Users are willing to support FAA Communication Navigation Surveillance 

infrastructure programs that require user investment only if those programs 

provide a clear and unambiguous path to immediate and tangible benefits to the 

users. 

• FAA should primarily focus on delivering near-term operational benefits, 

rather than the delivery of infrastructure, as the best way for stakeholders to 

gain confidence in FAA plans and to encourage users to invest in NextGen 

equipage. Industry and FAA must agree on common metrics to measure 

achievement of benefits. 

• FAA should be delivering benefits and assign responsibility, accountability,

authority, and funding within the Agency to accomplish all the associated and 

necessary non-infrastructure tasks (i.e., development of procedures and policy) 

critical to achieving those benefits. 

• FAA must continue to support the efforts of the Task Force and keep 

stakeholders as active participants in the planning, implementation, and 

measurement of the report recommendations. 

 22 The RTCA is a private, not-for-profit corporation that develops consensus-based recommendations regarding 

communications, navigation, surveillance, and air traffic management system issues. 23 MITRE Corporation functions as FAA’s federally funded research and development center. 24 RTCA – “NextGen Mid-Term Implementation Task Force Report,” September 9, 2009.
16

The task force findings and recommendations are consistent with our work and 

identify several new areas that will require FAA’s attention, including adjustments 

to current Agency plans and budgets. Airspace users generally view the task force 

recommendations as a stepping stone for NextGen that will help FAA reduce risk 

and build confidence with stakeholders. FAA supports the task force 

recommendations and is developing an implementation plan. 

NextGen Demonstration Projects Offer Potential To Reduce Risk, but 

Lack Coordination and Are Not Outcome-Based

The private sector is participating with FAA in several NextGen demonstration 

projects to validate NextGen concepts from research and development to 

implementation. While our work found that these projects have merit and can help 

reduce risk with NextGen, stakeholders have concerns that the demonstrations are 

not coordinated or outcome-focused, may not provide a clear path to 

implementation or fail to leave new capabilities behind.

For fiscal years 2008 through 2010, Congress provided a total of $112 million to 

fund demonstration projects. FAA is pursuing more than 10 demonstrations, 

excluding projects within other major efforts like ADS-B. These demonstrations 

are managed by FAA’s Office for Research and Technology Development. FAA

demonstrations include developing improvements for surface management 

through leveraging existing systems like FAA’s Airport Surface Detection 

Equipment – Model X (ASDE-X). This demonstration relies on a system that 

was originally envisioned to help prevent accidents on runways. FAA is now 

relying on ASDE-X to help boost airport capacity by improving surface situational 

awareness and better managing the movement of aircraft on the ground. Some

airlines are participating with FAA at John F. Kennedy International Airport and 

Memphis International Airport on this effort. However, while this project offers 

potential to improve surface operations, the key is ensuring research translates into 

meaningful information that can be shared with stakeholders and used to improve 

efficiency and reduce delays.

As we recommended in February 2007, with respect to NextGen demonstration 

projects, FAA needs to develop sufficient data to establish a path for certifying 

new systems and identify the full range of adjustments to policies and procedures 

to get benefits for airspace users. As FAA works to develop these data, it must 

also clearly define the expected outcomes from the demonstration projects for 

industry participants. Our analysis and discussions with FAA officials found that 

the Agency could gain valuable knowledge and concept validation from the 

demonstrations, but it remains unclear how these identified benefits will be 

transitioned from research and development to an operational capability that 

airspace users can benefit from at specific locations. 
17

CONCLUSION

NextGen is the most complex effort FAA has embarked upon, and its success is 

vital to revolutionizing our aviation system. While FAA is making progress in 

addressing NextGen’s challenges, a number of critical actions are still needed for 

successful implementation. Among them, and perhaps most important in the near 

term, is setting realistic expectations for what can be achieved in the midterm and 

assessing the associated risks. In addition, maximizing a multi-agency approach 

that leverages other agencies’ research and aligns resources will pay dividends and 

help reduce costs. Until then, NextGen may not deliver the expected long-term 

benefits and ultimately puts billions of taxpayer dollars at risk. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

We have made a number of recommendations over the years to reduce risk with 

FAA’s major acquisitions in the areas of defining requirements, managing 

NextGen investments as portfolios, and determining the skill sets required to 

execute NextGen. We strongly encourage FAA to follow through on actions 

underway to address those recommendations. In this report, to further reduce risk, 

strengthen the multi-agency approach to systems development, and enhance 

collaboration with the private sector in policy matters, we recommend that FAA

take the following actions to advance NextGen. 

1. Conduct an assessment of risks associated with implementing multiple 

NextGen capabilities concurrently in the midterm and what can reasonably 

be accomplished. This assessment and risk mitigation plan should:

a. Document interdependencies between systems, procedures, and training

and include strategies to address them.

b. Identify critical path issues or decisions in terms of airspace changes and 

changes in roles and responsibilities for controllers and pilots that directly 

affect achieving NextGen benefits.

c. Set realistic benchmarks that establish when training for controllers and

pilots on new aircraft avionics, ground systems, and procedures will be 

required and where they need to be provided.

2. Assess safety and implementation risks of mixed-equipage operations and 

develop corresponding mitigation strategies and policies.

3. Develop a plan to effectively review and identify research and technologies 

from DOD’s research and development portfolio that can be used for 

NextGen efforts and establish a mechanism to coordinate and transfer this 
18

information to the appropriate FAA program or development offices for 

consideration. 

4. Expand the NextGen Research Transition Team concept that has been 

developed for NASA and FAA into mechanisms that perform the same

function with other partner agencies. 

5. Reassess the current role and continued need for the NextGen Institute. If it 

is determined as a needed resource, redefine the roles and responsibilities of 

the Institute to avoid duplication with other private sector organizations, such 

as RTCA. 

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

RESPONSE 

We discussed the results of our review with the Air Traffic Organization’s Senior 

Vice President for NextGen and Operations Planning and the Director of the 

JPDO, and they agreed with our findings and recommendations. We provided 

FAA with our draft report on April 14, 2010, and received its formal response on 

May 26, 2010. FAA concurred with all five of our recommendations and 

proposed appropriate action plans but did not provide target completion dates for 

recommendations 1 and 4. FAA’s response is included in its entirety as an 

appendix to this report.

With regard to recommendation 1, FAA stated that a number of actions are 

underway. These include developing and refining NextGen segment 

implementation plans in response to the recent RTCA Task Force report on 

NextGen operational improvements for the near and midterm. These plans will 

address interdependencies among programs, critical path issues, and transition 

segment benchmarks. FAA also stated that it is developing an enhanced crossagency approach with a strong emphasis on systems engineering for allocating 

NextGen capabilities to various systems. We believe this approach—if properly 

implemented—has merit because it will help align NextGen plans, architecture 

development efforts, and various program offices that will be responsible for 

establishing new NextGen capabilities. However, to measure progress with these 

actions, FAA needs to provide our office with target action dates for finalizing and 

implementing this new approach and clarify which NextGen planning documents 

will identify critical path issues and transition benchmarks.

In response to recommendation 4, FAA states that the JPDO is applying the 

concept of research transition teams to other partner agencies beyond NASA, 

including the Department of Commerce for weather-related initiatives. Further, 

FAA stated that the JPDO will annually assess where research transition teams or 
19

other mechanisms can be used. FAA believes this recommendation should be 

closed. While we agree that positive steps are being taken, FAA needs to provide 

specific dates for when it expects to establish mechanisms to successfully 

transition technologies from partner agencies. This is particularly important since 

FAA has not yet done a full inventory of DOD’s vast research and development 

base. As noted in our report, technology transfer is critical to NextGen for 

reducing costs, limiting risk, and preventing duplicative efforts. 

ACTIONS REQUIRED 

FAA’s planned actions for all five recommendations are responsive, and its target 

action dates for recommendations 2, 3, and 5 are appropriate. However, in 

accordance with DOT Order 8000.1C, we request that FAA provide our office, 

within 30 days of this report, with target action dates for recommendations 1 and 

4. All five recommendations will remain open pending receipt of documentary 

evidence that appropriate corrective actions are complete. 

We appreciate the courtesies and cooperation of FAA representatives during this 

audit. If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 

366-1427, or Matthew E. Hampton, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for 

Aviation and Special Program Audits, at (202) 366-0500. 

#

cc: FAA Assistant Administrator for Financial Services/CFO

FAA Deputy Administrator

FAA Chief of Staff

Anthony Williams, ABU-100

Martin Gertel, M-100
20

Exhibit A. NextGen Prior Audit Recommendation Status

EXHIBIT A. NEXTGEN PRIOR AUDIT RECOMMENDATION STATUS

JPDO: Actions Needed To Reduce Risks with the Next Generation Air 

Transportation System – February 12, 2007

Report Recommendations

Status

1. Report NextGen cost data along three vectors developmental efforts, adjustments to 

existing programs, and NextGen implementation—when reporting NextGen financial 

requirements to Congress and stakeholders.

AV-2007-31 

Costs to develop and implement NextGen remain uncertain. A recent 

analysis suggests that the cost of NextGen could be several times the 

projected estimate of $40 billion and some advanced capabilities would not 

be implemented until the 2035 timeframe. An integrated NextGen budget 

document that captures NextGen expenditures across all partner agencies is 

still under development. FAA has referred this action to the DOT NextGen 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary in coordination with the JPDO for 

development of the integrated budget with the partner agencies. 

2. Determine the level of technical maturity of NASA’s research projects developed for 

NextGen initiatives. If NASA will be unable to provide research projects at a level that 

FAA can quickly move to prototype development, then FAA will need to develop 

contingency plans for how this research and development will be conducted, managed, 

and paid for. 

AV-2007-31

FAA has worked with NASA and established Research Transition Teams to 

address the successful transfer of research and development work from 

NASA to FAA. NASA has changed its position of doing only fundamental 

research since our February 2007 report and has stated it will deliver 

projects at a more mature level on a case-by-case basis. While progress in 

developing the teams has advanced, the teams have yet to actually transfer 

research between the two agencies for further development or use in a major 

acquisition. 

3. Review existing ongoing modernization programs to determine if they are still 

needed and, if so, what adjustments in cost, schedule, and performance parameters will 

be needed.

AV-2007-31

FAA is still assessing NextGen impact on existing programs and efforts to 

identify initial requirements for future automation systems is still 1 to 

2 years away. Further, FAA pointed out that after requirements are 

established, it will take at least an additional year to establish cost and 

schedule baselines before approval for acquisition of these new programs 

could begin. 

4. Include information in the annual JPDO progress report on specific research projects 

with budget data for FAA developmental efforts as well as budget data of other 

agencies that are being leveraged and specify how the ongoing research is supporting 

the JPDO.

AV-2007-31

FAA has not published a congressionally directed document since the FY

2006 Progress Report. The NextGen Integration and Implementation Office 

is currently producing an annual NextGen Integration Plan (formerly known 

as the Operational Evolution Plan), which the Agency maintains is a 

substitute for the progress report. FAA does not publish detailed budget 

data on partner agency contributions to NextGen. 

5. Determine what skill sets and expertise, with respect to software development and 

system integration, will be required by the ATO and JPDO and how they will be 

obtained to manage and execute NextGen initiatives. 

AV-2007-31

FAA commissioned the National Academy of Public Administration 

(NAPA) to conduct a study to determine what skills would be required to 

implement NextGen. NAPA issued its final report in September 2008. The 

report identified the skills needed to design, develop, test/evaluate, integrate 

and implement NextGen programs. Some of these include, program/project 

management, systems engineering management, integration and verification, 

and contract administration. 
21

Exhibit A. NextGen Prior Audit Recommendation Status

JPDO: Actions Needed To Reduce Risks with the Next Generation Air 

Transportation System – February 12, 2007

Report Recommendations

Status

6. In planned NextGen demonstration projects, develop sufficient data to establish a 

path for certifying new systems and identify the full range of adjustments to policies 

and procedures needed to get benefits.

AV-2007-31

FAA received $28 million in FY 2009 and $34 million for FY 2010 

specifically for NextGen demonstration projects. However, stakeholders are 

concerned that the demonstrations are not coordinated or outcome-focused, 

may not provide a clear path to implementation, and do not leave 

capabilities behind. FAA needs to clearly define the expected outcomes 

from the demonstration projects and develop data to establish a path for 

certification of new systems. 

7. Continue to develop and refine procedures that address conflict of interest issues 

with JPDO initiatives and conduct annual reviews of the matter as the role of the JPDO 

evolves from planning to implementation.

AV-2007-031

FAA and the JPDO continue to assess conflict of interest issues. FAA is 

providing annual refresher training to private sector participants. The 

placement of the JPDO within the ATO underscores the need to assess 

conflict of interest issues. 

8. Use technology readiness levels in assessing the maturity of research conducted at 

other agencies to help speed technology transfer and the introduction of new capabilities 

into the National Airspace System.

AV-2007-031

In addition to the RTT work described in recommendation 2 above, the 

JPDO expected to complete work with NASA and the Department of 

Commerce to define “exit criteria” for all supporting research activities by 

September 2009, to ensure appropriate level of maturity of research for 

transition from research to possible application development. In FY 2010,

FAA will work on ensuring that “receiving criteria” (org. receiving 

completed research) is matched to research agency “exit criteria.”

9. Fund targeted human factors research to ensure that the changing roles of controllers 

and pilots envisioned by the JPDO can safely be accommodated. This will require a reprioritization of ongoing efforts at FAA and close cooperation with NASA, which also 

conducts human factors research.

AV-2007-031

This was identified as a gap in 2008. FAA and NASA continue to pursue 

the work. However, efforts still need to be prioritized and aligned across 

partner agencies. Important questions about the role of automation for 

controllers and pilots remain unresolved. FAA cannot advance NextGen 

without an effective human factors effort.
22

Exhibit A. NextGen Prior Audit Recommendation Status

Traffic Control Modernization: FAA Faces Challenges in Managing Ongoing 

Projects, Sustaining Existing Facilities, and Introducing 

New Capabilities – April 14, 2008

Report Recommendations

Status

1. Develop written criteria for the selection of milestone metrics that are used for 

tracking progress with major acquisitions and reported in Agency plans and reports.

AV-2008-049

FAA has developed standard operating procedures and documented the 

process and criteria for selecting programs for inclusion in the Flight Plan.

2. Develop and report on a new set of metrics for measuring progress with NextGen 

initiatives that focus on the delivery of a new capability with respect to enhancing 

capacity, boosting productivity, or reducing Agency operating costs.

AV-2008-049

FAA has recognized the need for improved measures, but this remains a 

work in progress. FAA and the JPDO are working to develop a suite of 

performance measures for the safety, capacity, and productivity impacts of 

NextGen. FAA anticipates that the full suite of measures will be complete 

later in 2010.

3. Complete a gap analysis of the NAS enterprise architecture that closely examines 

current systems (the “as is”) and the planned NextGen enterprise architecture (the “to 

be”) and develop and establish priorities.

AV-2008-049

FAA efforts to complete a gap analysis are underway. According to FAA, it 

may be another 2 years to establish firm requirements for NextGen 

automation efforts. FAA’s analysis thus far shows that there are major gaps 

with respect for automation. We will continue to monitor FAA progress on 

the gap analysis and the development of the mid-term architecture.

4. Once the gap analysis is completed, develop an interim architecture that details what 

can be accomplished in the 2012 timeframe that will allow FAA to more accurately 

determine costs and other factors required for NextGen.

AV-2008-049

FAA has developed a mid-term Enterprise Architecture for the 2018 

timeframe, but cost and schedule for key efforts remain uncertain. 

5. Use the interim architecture as the basis for an integrated program plan that 

establishes an executable program for the NextGen capabilities. This effort should 

include detailed cost, schedule, requirements, acquisition strategies, risk management, 

and the supporting organizational structures to execute the integrated program.

AV-2008-049

FAA’s mid-term Enterprise Architecture is being used to shape the Agency 

NextGen Implementation Plan. Plans thus far do not provide detail for cost, 

schedule, requirements, acquisition strategies, risk management, and the 

supporting organizational structures to execute the integrated program.
23

Exhibit B. Scope and Methodology

EXHIBIT B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 

At the request of the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House Transportation 

and Infrastructure Committee and the House Aviation Subcommittee, we initiated 

a review on FAA’s progress in transitioning to NextGen. Specifically, we focused 

on (1) key actions needed to successfully implement NextGen, (2) FAA and 

partner agencies’ progress in leveraging resources and budgets, and (3) FAA’s 

progress in engaging the private sector in shaping policy issues. We were also 

asked to report on FAA’s progress in implementing our past NextGen-related 

recommendations.

To review key actions needed to successfully implement NextGen, we reviewed 

documents related to NextGen implementation, such as the National Airspace 

System Enterprise Architecture, the NextGen Implementation Plan, and the 

NextGen Integrated Work Plan. We also reviewed pertinent NextGen legislation 

such as FAA Reauthorization Act of FY 2004 (Vision 100) and current proposed 

reauthorization legislation. We reviewed independent studies on NextGen issues 

commissioned by FAA from the National Academy of Public Administration and 

Price Waterhouse/Coopers. We also interviewed officials from FAA Air Traffic 

Organization (ATO)’s NextGen and Operations Planning service unit responsible 

for NextGen implementation. The service unit offices include the JPDO, the 

NextGen Integration and Implementation Office, and the Research and 

Technology Development Office. 

To determine FAA and partner agencies’ progress in leveraging resources and 

budgets, we reviewed FAA budget documentation pertaining to NextGen, such as 

recent budget submissions, capital investment plans, and research and 

development plans. We also interviewed ATO Finance officials to gain insight on 

FAA budget formulation and NextGen partner agencies to gain insights into their 

NextGen research and capital activities. The partner agencies were the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Commerce’s National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, 

and the Department of Defense. 

To determine FAA’s efforts to engage the private sector in shaping NextGen 

policy issues, we interviewed a cross-section of key organizations based on their 

participation in JPDO NextGen working groups. These organizations included 

airline industry associations, aircraft manufacturers associations, and aircraft trade 

unions. We also interviewed officials from the JPDO’s NextGen Institute and 

coordinated with major FAA advisory bodies such as RTCA Inc, and the ADS-B 

Aviation Rulemaking Committee.
24

Exhibit B. Scope and Methodology

To assess FAA’s progress towards our earlier recommendations on NextGen 

implementation, we conducted interviews with JPDO officials to obtain status 

information on their progress in addressing nine recommendations from a DOT 

OIG report on the JPDO issued on February 2007 and similar recommendations 

from a DOT OIG report on air traffic control modernization issued April 2008. 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2008 through March 2010. We 

performed our work in accordance with Government Auditing Standards as 

prescribed by the Comptroller General of the United States and included such tests 

as we considered necessary to provide reasonable assurance of detecting abuse or 

illegal acts.
25

Exhibit C. Activities Visited or Contacted

EXHIBIT C. ACTIVITIES VISITED OR CONTACTED 

DOT/OST

NextGen Senior DOT Advisor to the Secretary

FAA

Air Traffic Organization Offices

Chief Operating Officer

Data Communications

En Route Automation Modernization Program Office

FAA Chief Architect

Investment and Planning Analysis

NAS Chief Scientist

NextGen Integration and Implementation Office

NextGen Research & 

Development/Demonstrations

NextGen Portfolio Management

Senior Vice President, NextGen 

Operations and Planning

Terminal Automation Modernization and 

Replacement

Wide Area Augmentation System

Joint Planning and Development Offices

Director, JPDO

JPDO Chief Architect

Modeling and Analysis Team

NextGen Institute

Research Transition Teams

Other FAA/Unions

National Air Traffic Controllers Association

Professional Airways System Specialists

FAA Contractors/JPDO Partners

CAASD/MITRE

Department of Homeland Security
26

Exhibit C. Activities Visited or Contacted

Department of Defense

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 

Administration

National Weather Service

RTCA

Industry Groups

Industry Associations

Aerospace Industries Association

Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association

Air Line Pilots Association

Air Transport Association

Aviation Electronics Association

Aviation Management Associates

Helicopter Association International

Companies

Garmin

Lockheed Martin

Raytheon

Other Stakeholders

Colorado Division of Aeronautics

Office of Management and Budget
27

Exhibit D. Major Contributors to This Report

EXHIBIT D. MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT 

Matthew E. Hampton Deputy Assistant Inspector General

for Aviation and Special Program Audits

Name Title

Barry DeWeese Program Director

Kevin Dorsey Program Director

Joseph J. Hance Project Manager

Arnett Sanders Senior Auditor (Lead Auditor)

Victoria J. Smith Analyst

Ryan Sanders Analyst

Arthur Shantz Technical Advisor for Aviation Research 

and Acquisitions

Andrea Nossaman Writer/Editor
28

Appendix. Agency Comments

APPENDIX. AGENCY COMMENTS 

Federal Aviation 

Administration 

Memorandum

Date: May 26, 2010

To: Lou Dixon, Assistant Inspector General for Aviation and Special Program 

Audits

From: Ramesh K. Punwani, Assistant Administrator for Financial Services/CFO

Prepared by Anthony Williams, x79000

Subject: OIG Draft Report: Timely Actions Needed To Advance the Next Generation 

Air Transportation System

NextGen is a comprehensive overhaul of our national airspace system to make air travel more 

convenient and dependable, while ensuring flights are safe and secure. It will make air travel more 

predictable, with fewer delays, less time waiting on the ground and holding in the air, as well as 

provide more flexibility to get around weather problems.

FAA recognizes the complexities of NextGen design and implementation, and from the very 

beginning has been working to identify system risks and to develop strategic plans to address 

those risks. The FAA released the annual update to its NextGen Implementation Plan in March 

2010. The plan provides an overview of the FAA’s ongoing transition to NextGen, laying out the 

agency’s vision now and into the mid-term, which is defined as 2012-2018. It further identifies 

the FAA’s goals for technology and program deployment and the commitments FAA has made in 

support of that vision.

The FAA remains confident it will achieve the vision set out in the NextGen plan, and is prepared 

to face the challenges that will come with making NextGen a reality. Undertaking NextGen is 

extremely complex, in part because systems in various stages of development and maturity are 

interdependent and will be implemented in a variety of time frames. NextGen’s increasing 

dependence on aircraft-centric capabilities means that we must rely on operators’ willingness to 

equip. We believe there is a solid business case for air carriers to equip their aircraft but we 

continue to investigate possible ways to incentivize equipage. The true benefits of NextGen will 

not be realized until a sufficient percentage of aircraft have the necessary equipment.

The following is FAA’s response to each of the recommendations.
29

Appendix. Agency Comments

OIG Recommendation 1: Conduct an assessment of the risks associated with implementing

multiple NextGen capabilities concurrently in the mid-term and what can reasonably be

accomplished. This assessment and risk mitigation plan should:

a. Document interdependencies between systems, procedures, and training and include strategies 

to address them.

FAA response: Concur. In response to the complexity of the NextGen implementation, the FAA 

improved its ability to analyze and manage interdependencies from a strategic, enterprise level to 

the programmatic level. The mid-term enterprise architecture contains the interdependences 

between systems, procedures, training and pacing issues that are used to develop the NextGen and 

individual program plans. The FAA continues to refine detailed programmatic plans. The 

planning for the midterm is divided into sequential segments for implementation. These mid-term 

implementation plans address the recommendations from RTCA NextGen Implementation Task 

Force. These plans include the associated costs and benefits. The plans also document the policy, 

training, and procedural implications as they are known at the time.

In addition, the FAA has identified the need to put additional system engineering focus on the

inter-program, inter-domain issues. The FAA is developing an enhanced cross-FAA approach to

refining the identification, analysis, and recommended resolution of the allocation of NextGen

capabilities to systems. This updated approach will support the NextGen Integration and

Implementation Office, the Enterprise Architecture, and the program offices in the planning and

the execution of the cross-system or cross-domain engineering.

The FAA has developed the detailed programmatic planning for the initial segment and will

continue to refine it as we move forward. This initial segment will address programmatic,

training, and procedural dependencies as they are now. The programmatic, training and

procedural development will be refined as individual programs complete investment analysis and

enter solution implementation. The development of the second sequential segment is underway.

b. Identify critical path issues or decisions in terms of airspace changes and changes in roles and

responsibilities for controllers and pilots that directly affect achieving NextGen benefits.

FAA response: Concur. While there are no foreseen changes in roles and responsibilities for

controllers and pilots such as self-separation airspace or fully automated air traffic control now

through the mid-term, there are major changes to the methods and support mechanisms by which

pilots and controllers will operate. These changes include the use of data communications for

trajectory operations, the increased use of the flight management system (FMS) and flight deck

systems in executing merging and spacing, the delivery of conflict resolution advisories to the

controller by the automation, and the use of 3D RNAV/RNP. As part of the NextGen portfolio,

there are ongoing activities in the NextGen R&D and the NextGen Pre-Implementation Solution

Set Activities to address for example the human factors, display, certification, and training issues

related to these new methods and tools. The NAS Enterprise Architecture “green lanes”- the

support and mission activity portions of the roadmaps- are used to link these activities to NAS

investment decisions and the integration tables of the architecture are used to identify key linkages 

and requirements.

These critical path items and decisions are being further refined in the more detailed NextGen

segment implementation plans discussed above.
30

Appendix. Agency Comments

c. Set realistic benchmarks that establish when training for controllers and pilots on new aircraft

avionics and ground systems, and procedures will be required and where they need to be

provided.

FAA Response: Concur. The NextGen operational requirements describing NextGen capabilities 

in the mid-term are documented in the NextGen segment implementation plans. The plans 

incorporate timelines for systems acquisition and implementation, procedure and airspace

development, certification and training. Also, recently a representative from the National Air

Traffic Controllers Association was added to the NextGen Integration & Implementation Office to 

provide technical expertise and assist in identifying areas where increased controller involvement 

is warranted.

Schedule information for benchmarks and training are documented as part of the NextGen

segment implementation plans. The plan for the first five years has been developed and will

continue to be refined. Benchmarks, procedures and training locations are part of the acquisition

process and will be addressed by each program.

OIG Recommendation 2: Assess safety and implementation risk of mixed-equipage operations

and develop corresponding mitigation strategies and policies.

FAA Response: Concur. The FAA operates under a Safety Management System (SMS) which

requires the assessment of all changes before they become operational. The Associate

Administrator for Aviation Safety and the Chief Operating Officer chair an SMS implementation

Steering Committee to ensure the proper application of the SMS process.

FAA is further supplementing this process with regard to NextGen implementation with an 

integrated safety assessment process to further mitigate potential implementation risks. A crossagency team, led by an individual assigned to the NextGen Integration and Implementation

Office, is responsible for coordinating a consistent approach, as well as the timely integration and 

execution of safety assessments.

The FAA will develop a mixed performance/equipage strategy to define aircraft performance

requirements, parameters, risks and sensitivities that need to be addressed when controllers and

pilots are asked to perform in a mixed performance/equipage environment. The document will be

available by January 2011.

OIG Recommendation 3: Develop a plan to effectively review and identify research and

technologies from DOD’s research and development portfolio that can be used for NextGen

efforts and establish a mechanism to coordinate and transfer this information to the appropriate

FAA program or development offices for consideration.

FAA Response: Concur. The Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) has existing

mechanisms in place to facilitate the exchange of research related information relating to NextGen 

through the Air Force Lead Service Organization (LSO), which is responsible for Department of 

Defense (DoD) NextGen activities. As such, the Air Force LSO has the responsibility for 

interactions between DoD and NextGen, including those with regard to technology transfer. The 

DoD also has designated a Chief Architect who participates in JPDO Interagency Architecture 

Engineering and Net-Centric Operations planning. These contacts are intended in part, to enable 

NextGen to benefit from research activities at DoD.
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Appendix. Agency Comments

The JPDO, together with the FAA and the Air Force LSO, will enhance its efforts to ensure that

NextGen benefits from related research at DoD. Specifically, JPDO will outline its plan by

September 2010 to collaborate with DoD to capitalize on its research portfolio and determine

which technologies may be relevant to NextGen. This plan will include a process to identify key

DoD research, development and acquisition activities such as capabilities for tracking of noncooperative aircraft and information data sharing.

OIG Recommendation 4: Expand the NextGen Research Transition Team concept that has been 

developed for NASA and FAA into mechanisms that perform the same function with other partner 

agencies.

FAA Response: Concur. The JPDO is already applying the Research Transition Team (RTT)

concept to other partner agencies in an effort to expedite the implementation of Next Gen.

The current NASA research program responds to the NextGen Concept of Operations and the

research needs identified by the JPDO. Four NASA RTT’s were established to facilitate the

transition of NASA research to the FAA in a way that would expedite NextGen implementation. 

The RTT documents the FAA’s plan for integrating the research results to be delivered into its

NextGen implementation program. This documentation includes identifying any additional

research or pre-operational work that is envisioned beyond the NASA research, so that the FAA

can plan and budget for it in a timely manner.

The JPDO is expanding the use of this concept now, working with the Department of Commerce

through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, FAA and DoD on developing a

vision for aviation weather management that is focused on the aviation user. The JPDO facilitates 

the NextGen Executive Weather Panel, which oversaw the development of a joint program plan. 

FAA and NOAA will work out the specific technical requirements and handoff under this joint 

plan. The JPDO will annually assess where RTT’s or other types of transition mechanisms can be 

utilized to transition research. While these actions will be conducted on a continuous basis, we 

maintain that actions to date demonstrate FAA’s commitment to this process, and believe this 

recommendation can be closed.

OIG Recommendation 5: Reassess the current role and continued need for the NextGen Institute. 

If it is determined as a needed resource, redefine the roles and responsibilities of the Institute to 

avoid duplication with other private sector organizations, such as RTCA.

FAA Response: Concur. The NextGen Institute was developed to provide a streamlined

mechanism for private sector collaboration with the JPDO in NextGen planning. The primary

mechanism for collaboration is through pro-bono participation of subject matter experts in domain 

specific working groups (for example - safety, security, aircraft, airports, etc.). This mechanism 

provided substantial and unique value in the development of the NextGen Concept of Operations 

and the integrated plan. While private sector engagement is a key element in the development of 

NextGen, the FAA is in full agreement with the need to revisit the roles and responsibilities of the 

NextGen Institute.

NextGen is entering the program implementation phase. Therefore, our model for private sector

collaboration will also change. Subject matter experts will now be needed in cross-functional

studies, which blend expertise from airports, aircraft and operations, in order to identify the full

range of possibilities within NextGen concepts or policies. The JPDO has briefed this transition to 
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Appendix. Agency Comments

the Institute Management Council that oversees the NextGen Institute and plans to work with the 

Council to evaluate the best approach to private sector collaboration on interagency research,

concept and policy development. The JPDO is also working with the FAA to fully assess a range 

of stakeholder engagement forums, including the RTCA, to ensure that appropriate means of 

engagement are available for both near- and long-term NextGen activities. The JPDO assessment 

will be conducted this summer so that changes can be implemented in fiscal year 2011.

- - - -

We appreciate this opportunity to review and comment on the OIG draft report. Separately, we

provided the OIG with specific and technical comments on the draft report.