UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

GENE AUTREY BURRIS, SR., individually, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. BOB MOORE AUTO GROUP, INC., LLC; BOB MOORE IMPORTS BOB MOORE KIA LLC; BOB MOORE BUICK PONTIAC GMC LLC, and all 7 officers; MARK MOORE, President and CEO of Bob Moore Auto Group, Inc., LLC; CHARLES GRIFFIN, VP Variable Operations BMAG; SAVANNAH EMERY, HR Generalist II BMAG; CATHY TURNER, Payroll BMAG; JEFF POWELL, General Manager BMAG; JOHN GULLETT, Sales Manager of Bob Moore Imports Bob Moore Kia LLC; RALPH ASHLEY, General Sales Manager of Bob Moore Buick Pontiac GMC LLC, Defendants-Appellees. No. 13-6067 (D.C. No. 5:12-CV-00440-HE) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this pane l has determined unanimously that oral argument would not mate rially assist the de termination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 a nd 10th Cir. R. 32.1.. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### July 10, 2013

Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - Before TYMKOVICH , ANDERSON , and MATHESON , Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff Gene Autrey Burris, Sr., br ought this action claiming he had been discriminated and retaliated against in c onnection with his employment. Following the entry of judgment for defendants, he time ly filed this appeal . He challenges only one ruling by the district court: the denial of his motion for default judgment based

on the asserted untimeliness of defendants’ answer to his third amended complaint. A brief summary of the few pertinent procedur al facts will suffice to demonstrate that this appeal lacks merit. Defendants successfully moved to dism iss Mr. Burris’ orig inal complaint. Granted leave to amend following the di smissal, Mr. Burris filed an amended complaint and then a second amended comp laint in quick succession. Defendants again moved to dismiss. This time, the di strict court noted Mr . Burris still had not corrected a number of previously cited pl eading deficiencies, but expressly deferred ruling on the motion to dismiss to give Mr . Burris one last opportunity to fix his complaint. R. Vol. 1, Pt. 1 at 366. Mr . Burris filed a thir d amended complaint on August 22, 2012, which put the pending mo tion to dismiss back at issue. On September 12, 2012, the distri ct court granted the motion in part, dismissing claims involving individual defendant s, who are not subject to lia bility under the applicable employment discrimination laws, see Butler v. City of Prairie Village, Kan. , 172 F.3d- 3 - 736, 744 (10th Cir. 1999) (collecting case s); and denied it in part, holding that, liberally construed, the allegations agains t the corporate defendants “barely alleged”

claims for discrimination and reta liation. R. Vol. 1, Pt. 2 at 90. The defendants filed

their answer to these clai ms on September 26, 2012. Mr. Burris then moved for default judgment, arguing that defendants’ answer was un timely because it was not submitted within twenty-one days of hi s third amended complaint, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). The district court denied the motion, notin g that in light of its order reserving disposition of the pending motion to dismiss while Mr. Burris tried one last time to shore up his complaint, the answer was time ly under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A). When a complaint has been challenged by a motion to dismiss, Rule 12(a)(4)(A) supplants the filing deadlines in Rule 12(a )(1)(A), tolling the time for an answer until fourteen days after notice that the motion ha s been denied (or, irrelevant here, after

notice that resolution of th e motion has been postponed until trial). This allowed defendants to answer the third amended comp laint up to fourteen days after notice of the September 12 order denying (in part) their motion to dismiss—which they did on September 26. On appeal, Mr. Burris persists in his misplaced reliance on Rule 12(a)(1)(A) and presents no cogent argument to challe nge the district cour t’s straightforward adherence to Rule 12(a)(4)(A ). Nor is his cause a dvanced by his conclusory

assertion that “time after time” the cour t “has shown nothing but Prejudice against- 4 - the Plaintiff for Not having a[n] attorney.” Aplt. Br. at 4. That is not proper appellate argument, whether the pa rty is counseled or pro se. See Garrett v. Selby

Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 840-41 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding conclusory objection, lacking citations to authority a nd parts of the record supporting claim of error, inadequate to entitle pro se appellant to appellate review). The judgment of the dist rict court is affirmed.

Entered for the Court

Timothy M. Tymkovich Circuit Judge