About the Report

To be effective, policymaking and programming in conflict 

situations must start with an accurate understanding of local 

context, conflict actors, causes, and the dynamic relationships 

among them. The report argues that complex conflict 

situations can be better understood by tapping the potential 

synergy between two distinct approaches to analyzing 

conflicts—conflict assessment and intelligence analysis. This 

report originates from the United States Institute of Peace’s 

Center for Conflict Management, which conducts research, 

identifies best practices, and develops new tools for conflict 

prevention, management, and resolution.

About the Author

Lawrence Woocher is a senior program officer at the United 

States Institute of Peace. The author benefited from many 

discussions with practitioners of conflict assessment and 

intelligence analysis, especially at an Institute roundtable 

meeting on November 10, 2010, and wishes to thank 

Jennifer Sims and Abiodun Williams for their helpful 

comments on an earlier draft.

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 275 June 2011

© 2011 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Lawrence Woocher

Conflict Assessment and 

Intelligence Analysis

Commonality, Convergence, and Complementarity

Summary

•	 A wide consensus has emerged in recent years that successful policymaking and programming in conflict situations must start with an accurate understanding of local context, 

conflict actors, causes, and the dynamic relationships among them.

•	 This recognition has led to a plethora of new analytic initiatives, but little evident effort 

to exploit potential synergies between conflict assessment and national security intelligence analysis.

•	 Conflict assessment and intelligence analysis have different origins, aims, and methods but 

also a number of important elements of commonality. They both aim to enhance understanding of complicated sociopolitical situations to support better decision making and 

face many common challenges, including accuracy, precision, timeliness, and relevance.

•	 Conflict assessment is marked by its action orientation, its flexibility, and its emphasis on collaborative methods to elicit views on the conflict from diverse perspectives. These attributes 

may lead conflict assessment processes to be especially able to pick up “weak signals” and to 

promote cooperation and enhance understanding of the “other side’s” perspectives.

•	 These strengths of conflict assessment may at times come at the cost of analytic rigor, 

precision, and sensitivity to the possibility that some stakeholders could provide misleading information.

•	 Intelligence analysis is designed to produce objective assessments for government national 

security decision makers through rigorous evaluation of “all source” data (including classified information) in a competitive environment. Intelligence analysts’ independence from 

policymakers and their adherence to explicit standards of analytic tradecraft should help 

lead to high-quality analytic products.

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Contents

Introduction 2

The Two Analytic Approaches 3

Strengths and Pitfalls of the Two Approaches 6

Forces Promoting Convergence of the Approaches 7

Recommendations for Promoting Complementarity 

of the Approaches 9

Appendix: Pairing Analytic Tools 10
2

•	 Potential pitfalls of intelligence analysis include being too reliant on data from clandestine and highly technical sources, being subject to political pressure, and being insufficiently collaborative.

•	 Three important global trends tend to push conflict assessment and intelligence analysis 

toward convergence: the changing nature of national security, the increasing salience of 

“open source” information, and the growing recognition of the limitations of lone analysts.

•	 Deliberate efforts to draw on the methods of both conflict assessment and intelligence 

analysis will yield fuller and more useful analysis, which should in turn improve the formulation of conflict management, peacebuilding, and national security strategies. Using tools 

of conflict assessment and intelligence analysis in tandem is one specific step toward fully 

realizing the complementarity of these two analytic approaches.

Introduction

One of the axioms of international conflict management and peacebuilding is the importance of developing a deep understanding of a situation before acting. Conflicts emerge 

and escalate based on an incredible diversity of local contexts and conditions. Without 

understanding the actors, root causes, and conflict dynamics of the specific case, outside 

actors risk exacerbating conflicts, even when acting with good intentions. Multilateral 

organizations, individual governments (including the United States), and nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs) all appear to have absorbed this message and, accordingly, have begun 

to commit themselves to conducting systematic conflict assessments more regularly.

The broad consensus about the need to develop an understanding of a conflict situation 

before seeking to influence it is perhaps best illustrated by the Development Assistance 

Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC), a 

forum including two dozen of the world’s largest aid donors. A decade ago, OECD DAC issued 

a report titled The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict, which concluded, “To 

create a ‘culture of prevention’ in development co-operation and foreign policy action, the 

international community needs to better analyse the causes and dynamics of conflict and 

peace in order to understand how their actions will affect the ‘structural stability’ of a society or country.”1 Subsequently, in 2007, the OECD DAC issued Principles for Good International 

Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, a touchstone guide for donors. “Take context as 

the starting point” is the first of these ten principles. “It is essential,” the report elaborates, 

“for international actors to understand the specific context in each country, and develop a 

shared view of the strategic response that is required.”2

Several individual governments—including Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the 

United Kingdom—have developed frameworks for assessing conflict situations to inform 

their policy and programming.3 The U.S. government adopted an Interagency Conflict 

Assessment Framework (ICAF) in 2008, building on the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Conflict Assessment Framework.4 The government’s Principles of the Interagency 

Conflict Assessment Framework summarized the rationale for conducting systematic conflict 

assessments: “A first step toward a more effective and coordinated response to help states 

prevent, mitigate and recover from violent conflict is the development of shared understanding among USG agencies about the sources of violent conflict or civil strife.”5

Likewise, NGOs and civil society organizations working in conflict situations have recognized the central role that good analysis should play in designing effective programs. 

“Conflict analysis is the foundation of conflict sensitivity,” summarized one resource for 

NGOs. “Without a good understanding of the context in which interventions are situated, 

organizations that support or directly implement them may unintentionally help to fuel 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor 

of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, 

D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American 

University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, James R. 

Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. • Kerry 

Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and 

Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Ikram U. Khan, President, 

Quality Care Consultants, LLC, Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. 

Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of 

Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA • Judy Van Rest, 

Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute, 

Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, 

Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C. 

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy •

Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
3

violent conflict or to exacerbate existing tensions.”6 NGOs working in conflict areas now hardly 

question the need to engage in conflict analysis, but they continue to grapple with how they 

can most effectively go about this task and integrate the results into their programming.

The groundswell of support for more rigorous and regular conflict assessments represents 

important progress from the period when rigid templates and “essential task” lists held 

more sway. Yet conflict assessment efforts are but one of multiple approaches that governments and other organizations use to enhance understanding of and to inform their actions 

relating to conflict situations. Just as these organizations strive to streamline and coordinate their activities in conflict-affected and at-risk states—whether termed a “whole-ofgovernment,” “joined-up,” or “comprehensive” approach—they would benefit from bringing 

together disparate analytic approaches. Nudging the analytic activities of sprawling institutions toward greater synergy has its own challenges. Maximizing the benefits of different 

analytic approaches requires going beyond mere coordination to understand the strengths 

and weaknesses of various approaches, and crafting ways they can complement each other.

In addition to conflict assessment, one analytical approach that is important when considering conflict situations is that typified by national security intelligence organizations. 

For a variety of reasons, intelligence analysis and conflict assessment have proceeded for 

the most part on separate tracks. However, as this report will argue, despite their different 

origins, aims, and methods, they share important commonalities, and global trends tend 

to push them toward greater convergence. Furthermore, deliberate efforts to draw on both 

conflict assessment and intelligence methods will yield fuller and more useful analysis, 

which should in turn improve the formulation of conflict management, peacebuilding, and 

national security strategies.

The Two Analytic Approaches

For two concepts that are so frequently discussed, it is surprising how little consensus there 

is on exactly how to define conflict assessment or intelligence analysis. This poses a challenge in assessing their respective strengths and weaknesses and the relationship between 

them. Nevertheless, various discussions of the concepts by experts and institutions tend to 

agree on certain essential aspects.

Conflict Assessment and Analysis

“Conflict assessment” and “conflict analysis” tend to be used synonymously. One finds many 

definitions of conflict assessment and analysis in the scholarly literature and in practitioner 

guidebooks.7 These definitions differ in their details, but they agree on several defining 

characteristics of conflict assessment:

•	 It is action oriented. Conflict assessment is distinguished from academic analysis of a 

conflict by its supposition that assessment is an activity that precedes and informs work 

in or on a conflict.8

•	 It aims to describe actors, causes, and conflict dynamics. While the numerous conflict 

assessment frameworks promulgated by governments, multilateral organizations, and others differ in their details and exact terms used, there is broad agreement around the key 

components for any conflict assessment. These include understanding the main actors in 

the conflict, including groups as well as individuals; the underlying causes and mitigating 

factors of the conflict; and the dynamics of the conflict—the interaction of the factors that 

drive the situation toward conflict or promote peace and stability. While conflict assessments often seek to describe trends and identify “windows of vulnerability” or “windows of 

Maximizing the benefits of 

different analytic approaches 

requires going beyond mere 

coordination to understand the 

strengths and weaknesses of 

various approaches.
4

opportunity,” in the words of the ICAF, for the most part they do not try to serve a warning 

function; their analysis is typically more descriptive and explanatory than predictive.

•	 It generally does not prescribe particular analytic methods or tools. Most frameworks 

for conflict assessment call on practitioners to engage in a process that can gather insights 

about the conflict from diverse perspectives—for example, government officials, religious 

leaders, youth, trade unions, human rights groups, etc. But by and large, conflict assessment frameworks encourage practitioners to choose the most suitable analytic tools from 

the wide range available and to adapt these tools for use in local contexts. In other words, 

beyond the emphasis on incorporating multiple perspectives, the specific means of analysis 

are not a defining feature of conflict assessment.

•	 It aims to enhance understanding of inevitable disputes among groups so that these 

disputes can be managed peacefully. Rarely if ever are conflict assessment processes 

totally norm-free. They typically presuppose—implicitly or explicitly—that conflicts can be 

managed peacefully and that this is preferable to any use of violence.

Intelligence Analysis 

Intelligence analysis suffers less from an abundance of different definitions than from a paucity of definitions at all.9 Even highly relevant and insightful publications like The Future of 

Intelligence Analysis, Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis, and Analyzing Intelligence 

struggle to articulate concise definitions of their subject.10 This may reflect that intelligence 

is a field dominated by practitioners, for whom sharply articulated conceptual distinctions 

are less important than shared, implicit understanding.

Nevertheless, certain key points should be emphasized from definitions and related 

discussions of intelligence analysis:

•	 It seeks to produce objective assessments through rigorous evaluation of data.

Experts debate whether intelligence analysis is distinguished by its use of secret data, by 

its use of unstructured “all source” data, or by the assumption that some data may be 

intentionally misleading because of other parties’ desire to deceive. It is agreed, however, 

that intelligence analysis is designed to ensure that conclusions flow from unbiased 

evaluation of data. Standards of analytic tradecraft—for example, explicit assumptions, 

precision in confidence of conclusions, use of “alternative analysis,” and structured 

analytic tools—have been developed as a means to reinforce these central features of 

intelligence analysis.

•	 It is undertaken to support decision making in a competitive context. Like conflict 

assessment, the raison d’être of intelligence analysis is to help people make better decisions. In fact, intelligence organizations in governments are given a unique mandate to 

respond to the analytic needs of national security decision makers—frequently referred to 

as “customers” or “consumers.” The type of decision support provided by intelligence analysis is further distinguished by the competitive context, in which information advantages 

or insights into an adversary’s motivations can prove instrumental in achieving decision 

makers’ objectives.

•	 It concerns any issue that affects national security, including but not limited to 

conflict situations. The concept of intelligence analysis can apply to other domains, such 

as business and law enforcement, but this discussion focuses on national security intelligence. Even with this limitation, the specific issues with which intelligence analysis may 

be concerned range widely and include international conflicts.11

Intelligence analysis suffers less 

from an abundance of different 

definitions than from a paucity 

of definitions at all.
5

Elements of Commonality and Divergence 

There are important commonalities between conflict assessment and intelligence analysis:

•	 At their core, they both aim to enhance understanding of complicated sociopolitical 

situations to support better decision making. Intelligence analysis and conflict assessment 

are both “sense-making” activities concerning phenomena that transcend individual domains 

or disciplines.12 Both approaches ask questions about the deep roots of crises, the interests 

and capabilities of individual leaders, the pathway of current trends, and plausible future scenarios, among other things. In essence, they try to make ill-defined and complex situations 

more understandable to enable leaders to make wiser choices about policy or programs.

•	 They face many common challenges—for example, accuracy, precision, timeliness, 

relevance—and require similar skills from analysts. Despite differences in data and 

methodology, the attributes of good conflict assessment and intelligence analysis largely 

overlap. Conflict analysts tend to talk about ensuring that their conclusions are not “prejudiced,” whereas intelligence analysts tend to worry about “bias,” but these are very similar 

concerns. James Bruce and Roger George articulate four skills that distinguish intelligence 

analysts from other specialists and experts. Leaving the skill of understanding intelligence 

collection methods aside, the other three skills could equally describe the skills of good 

conflict analysts: “Self-awareness of cognitive biases and other cognitive influences on 

analysis, Open-mindedness to contrary views or alternative models that fit the data, and 

Self-confidence to admit and learn from analytic errors.”13

Despite these similarities, there are also significant differences between these two 

concepts (table 1). These can be summarized as falling into two broad categories: (1) the 

subject, process, and outcome of analysis, and (2) organizational issues.

The two concepts diverge first in the focus of their analysis. In short, intelligence analysis 

focuses on threats and opportunities related to a state’s national security, whereas conflict 

assessment seeks to understand the conflict and its effects on all parties without applying a national security prism. Intelligence analysis, furthermore, relies to varying degrees 

on classified information, whereas conflict assessment is nearly always based exclusively 

on open sources. The difference in data sources extends also to what might be called the 

Table 1. Summary of Differences between National Security Intelligence 

Analysis and Conflict Assessment

National security intelligence analysis Conflict assessment and analysis

Subject, process, and 

outcome of analysis

Threats to national security Threats to human security

Clandestine and open sources Open sources

Typically distinct from data collection Typically not distinct from data collection

No policy recommendations Frequently includes policy 

recommendations

Secretive, private, classified Collaborative, consultative, public

Value in product Value in both product and (participatory) 

process

Organizational issues Governments’ intelligence organizations International organizations, NGOs, aid 

agencies, foreign ministries

Analyst set off from decision maker Analyst and decision maker are often one 

and the same

Analysis is core function Analysis is rarely core function

Relatively significant resources for analysis Relatively minimal resources for analysis

Intelligence analysis focuses 

on threats and opportunities 

related to a state’s national 

security, whereas conflict 

assessment seeks to understand 

the conflict and its effects on 

all parties without applying a 

national security prism.
6

culture of the analytic process, which tends to be secretive and private for intelligence 

analysis versus open and collaborative for conflict assessment. The collaborative nature of 

conflict assessment has led peacebuilding specialists to use the assessment process itself, 

when conducted with a group that represents diverse parties to a conflict, as a tool of 

conflict transformation. According to Peter Woodrow of the Reflecting on Peace Practice 

project, “The [analysis] exercise itself helps to build relationships and understanding among 

those trying to make a difference in the peace process.”14 In contrast, the value of intelligence analysis is overwhelmingly found in the product—that is, the analytic insights 

generated by the process.15

The way in which conflict assessment and intelligence analysis are organized also tends 

to be quite different. Large national security intelligence organizations exist for the purpose 

of collecting and analyzing threats to a state’s national security. (For example, in 2009 the 

U.S. director of national intelligence described the intelligence community as a “200,000-

person, $75 billion national enterprise.”) Intelligence organizations have a unique place in 

governments’ bureaucracies, set off from policymakers in an advisory role with analysis as a 

core function and significant resources (at least relatively) dedicated to the analytic enterprise. Conflict assessment is rarely associated with any dedicated institutions; rather, it is 

undertaken as is seen fit by development agencies, international organizations such as the 

United Nations, foreign ministries, and NGOs. The assessment process is accordingly seen as 

one piece—and typically a small piece—of these organizations’ core functions of engaging 

in diplomacy, development, and peacebuilding. Rarely do organizations dedicate substantial 

staff and resources to conflict assessment. This means that it is common for the individuals 

or groups conducting the assessment to be also those developing the policy or programming 

ideas, a stark contrast to intelligence analysts, who in most settings are proscribed from 

even offering policy recommendations.

The extent to which the commonalities or the differences between these two approaches 

predominate depends largely on the specific context or subject of analysis. When the subject 

of analysis is a highly militarized state-to-state conflict, a highly centralized authority, or highly 

technical/scientific issues (e.g., nuclear weapons development), the differences will tend to 

dominate. Likewise, conflict assessment and intelligence analysis tend to diverge in manner and 

content when there is a lack of open source information or major “denial and deception” issues—

that is, parties to the conflict have strong incentive and ability to hide or mislead their true 

capabilities and intentions. Examples of subjects of analysis in this domain might include conflict 

on the Korean Peninsula, between the United States and Iran, and between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 

Nevertheless, to say that the differences between conflict assessment and intelligence analysis 

are marked in these situations is not to say that they cannot complement one another.

Strengths and Pitfalls of the Two Approaches

The differences in archetypal conflict assessment and intelligence analysis approaches lead 

them to have distinct strengths and weaknesses. The strengths of conflict assessments, in 

general, include their being based on loose frameworks that can be adapted to the specifics 

of a unique context, their openness to different perspectives, their emphasis on dynamic 

communication with diverse stakeholders, and their action orientation. The flexibility and 

openness of conflict assessment processes may lead assessors to be especially able to pick 

up “weak signals” about emerging changes in complex environments and quickly refine 

the questions being asked. In addition, as noted, beyond the analytic value per se, collaborative conflict assessment processes have the ability to bring people together around a 

common endeavor, promoting cooperation and enhancing understanding of the “other 

side’s” perspectives.
7

These strengths—particularly the emphasis on eliciting information from parties to conflict and building a shared understanding—may at times come at a cost of lack of analytic 

rigor, precision, or sensitivity to the possibility that some stakeholders could provide misleading information, deliberately or not. For example, conflict assessment processes often 

rely on inviting groups of people living in the situation of interest to identify conflict causes 

or drivers. If all voices are affirmed equally, this type of process can lead to long lists of 

factors with little sense of priority or interaction among them, or a collection of individual 

perceptions that fails to add up to a coherent picture. If, however, there is a strong preference for consensus, there is a risk that the “most popular” ideas will emerge rather than the 

ones best supported by all available evidence.

The strengths of intelligence analysis include its independence, adherence to standards 

of analytic tradecraft, and provision for evaluation and oversight. For example, the U.S. 

director of national intelligence has promulgated a set of analytic standards to which all 

analytic products should follow. Dedicated units exist to audit analytic reports on their 

adherence to these agreed standards. The unique role of intelligence analysts—set off from 

policymakers and free of responsibility from decisions about policy or programming—has 

distinct advantages. Most commonly cited is the freedom to explore hypotheses about 

trends and effects unencumbered by pressure from political bosses or from the biases that 

plague the evaluation of ideas in which one is already invested. In addition, the interplay 

with “customers” and congressional oversight, when they work well, push intelligence analysts toward deeper, sharper, and more policy-relevant analysis.

Reviews of recent intelligence failures have underscored some of the corresponding pitfalls.16 For example, intelligence analysis is often too reliant on data from clandestine and 

highly technical sources. Since these data are so difficult and costly to acquire and are the 

most tangible feature that distinguishes intelligence from other kinds of analysis, it can be 

tempting to assign them undue influence in the analytic process. One notorious example is 

the weight that was reportedly given to testimony of a single Iraqi defector—code-named 

Curveball—about alleged Iraqi weapons programs. A similar bias can exist regarding analysis 

based on highly technical means or methods, including various visualization techniques, 

whose vividness tends to make people see these results as more likely than may be merited. In addition, when analyst-policymaker relations go awry, intelligence analysis can be 

subject to severe political pressures—ironically, precisely because intelligence organizations 

are designed to operate outside the political fray. Because of reliance on classified data, 

the analytic culture in intelligence organizations tends toward individual experts working 

independently or in small groups of analysts with similar sets of expertise and background. 

This risks producing overly insular or insufficiently collaborative analysis, especially when 

important knowledge exists outside the intelligence community. All of these issues are 

being tackled by intelligence organizations, but they remain thorny challenges.

Forces Promoting Convergence of the Approaches

This review of the strengths and potential pitfalls of conflict assessment and intelligence 

analysis alone is sufficient to recommend greater interaction between these approaches. 

Three important global trends combine to make this task all the more critical.

Increasing Primacy of Open Source Information

Whereas intelligence analysis has traditionally been based largely on classified information, 

it is now widely recognized that changes in both information and security environments 

make open source information central to virtually any analytic enterprise. “The need for 

Changes in both information 

and security environments 

make open source information 

central to virtually any 

analytic enterprise.
8

exploiting open source material is greater now than ever before,” concluded the 2005 WMD 

commission report, adding that “the Intelligence Community’s open source programs have 

not expanded commensurate with either the increase in available information or with the 

growing importance of open source data to today’s problems.”17 As the Internet and social 

media platforms continue their explosive growth, one can expect that the future information environment will place open source information more and more at the heart of any 

analytic enterprise. This means, in turn, that differences in the data being analyzed by 

conflict assessment and intelligence analysis processes will shrink considerably.

Changing Nature of National Security Threats

In past decades, the most significant threats to national security originated in powerful 

hierarchically organized states. This is less true today. As former senior U.S. intelligence 

official John C. Gannon summarized, “Threats are becoming more complicated and more distributed at home and across the globe.”18 In this more complicated security environment, 

many of the most significant threats—for example, violent extremism, pandemics, and 

nuclear proliferation—emanate from societies at risk of or currently experiencing violent 

conflict, even outside zones of obvious geopolitical concern. This has led many observers 

to identify instability and conflict themselves, wherever they occur, as major threats to U.S. 

national security. This is evidenced in the attention to several ongoing and potential violent 

conflicts in recent public threat assessments presented by the U.S. intelligence community.19 In addition, the ascendance of nonstate actors means that national security threats 

are more frequently associated with networked organizations like al Qaeda, which draw 

strength from popular grievances and ideological appeal as much as material capacities. As 

governments like the United States increasingly find that violent conflict itself threatens its 

security, with networks more than hierarchical bureaucracies being key actors, the type of 

assessment required to support national security action will become less and less distinct 

from that needed to support peacebuilding.

Growing Insufficiency of the “Lone Analyst” 

Knowledge about matters relevant to conflict situations is increasingly dispersed across 

individuals and organizations, meaning analysts must tap into pockets of outside expertise to generate accurate findings. When topics of interest range from missile technology 

to infectious disease vectors—let alone tomorrow’s emerging issues—it is impossible to 

house all relevant subject matter expertise in a single organization. Moreover, current 

analytic challenges are less highly structured than in the past, frequently spanning multiple disciplines or topic areas, and less amenable to being broken down into individual 

components. For example, understanding the drug war in Mexico requires not only experts 

in political, economic, security, and organizational analysis but also methods designed to 

develop an appreciation for how these various dynamics together form an adaptive system, 

where no separate component can be understood fully without recognizing its many linkages. In addition, collaborative analytic techniques (e.g., prediction markets, wikis) have 

proved useful in aggregating knowledge as well as picking up “weak signals.” In sum, as 

Carmen A. Medina, a senior U.S. intelligence official, wrote, “The ‘lone expert’ model will 

suffice for fewer analytic problems.”20 This means that intelligence analysis should increasingly engage outside expertise and embrace collaborative methods, thereby bringing it 

closer to practices associated with conflict assessment.

Collaborative analytic techniques 

have proved useful in aggregating 

knowledge as well as picking up 

“weak signals.”
9

Recommendations for Promoting Complementarity of 

the Approaches

These forces promoting convergence highlight the increasing importance of and potential for 

synergy between conflict assessment and intelligence analysis. But they by no means guarantee that this potential will be realized, particularly when the connections across the respective 

professional communities remain quite weak. The foregoing analysis leads to recommendations 

about how to draw on the strengths of conflict assessment and intelligence analysis in ways 

that can benefit both peacebuilding and national security decision making: 

•	 Recognize that there are no one-size-fits-all analytic approaches.21 The methodologies 

chosen to address any issue should be driven by the contours of the analytic challenge, not 

by the traditions and practices of any organization or professional community. For most 

conflict situations, multiple analytic perspectives will be necessary.

•	 Remember that the analytic value of information is only loosely associated with the 

method by which it was obtained. This is an admonition both to intelligence analysts, 

who tend to overvalue clandestine reporting, and to conflict assessment specialists, who 

tend to overvalue the outcomes of inclusive group processes. The source of information 

should, of course, affect one’s assessment of the information’s credibility. Yet, particularly 

in complex conflict situations, even highly credible information—for example, satellite 

imagery of artillery movements or the shared perception of civil society leaders about 

the root causes of a conflict—may not help much in choosing among multiple plausible 

explanations. The ultimate question is the extent to which information provides purchase 

on a relevant analytic question, and this is not necessarily a product of the method used 

to obtain the information.

•	 Embrace collaborative methods, but beware of lowest-common-denominator analysis. 

While intelligence organizations have begun to take strides toward fostering collaborative 

analysis, there remains a long way to go. To reap the rewards of collaboration, all assessment 

processes need to safeguard against the possibility that critical points of differing judgment 

or uncertainties may be papered over by an emphasis on what can be agreed on by all.

•	 Be explicit about the precision and degree of confidence in analytic conclusions. This 

hallmark of analytic tradecraft is too commonly absent in the results of conflict assessment 

processes, leading to overconfidence and different understandings of a single analytic conclusion. Moreover, as analytic problems become increasingly complex, it will be important 

for all analysts to be equally open and direct about what they do not know as about what 

they do know.

•	 Be open to counterintuitive, nonlinear, nonrational explanations. Conflict situations 

frequently surprise and even confuse the methodical analyst. Analysts should adopt explanations wherever the evidence points them, even if they fail to match implicit assumptions 

of linear relationships or even minimally rational behavior. Matching systematic and rigorous analysis with this kind of openness can be a major challenge.

•	 Try using tools of conflict analysis and intelligence analysis in tandem. This is the most 

specific implication of this report’s conclusions. Selecting analytic tools from both traditions 

that can work well together can help operationalize the more general recommendations 

above. The appendix presents an illustration of how the “onion model” of positions, interests, 

and needs—a classic from conflict resolution theory that is used in many conflict assessment 

exercises—could be used in combination with the analysis of competing hypotheses, a technique developed for intelligence analysts. Further discussion among analysts should uncover 

additional pairs or groups of analytic tools that are well suited to complementary use.
10

Figure 1. The onion model: an example from Chiapas, Mexico

Needs

Interests

Positions

Indigenous Peasant 

Organizations

Against militarization: 

demand for a free press, 

equal opportunities, and the 

investigation of assassinations and punishments

Land redistribution, respect 

for human rights, alliances 

with other social forces, and 

democracy

Land, well-being, and justice

Bosses, Stockmen, and 

Landowners

Against subversion: 

protection by the security 

forces and a denial of the 

rights of indigenous people

Political and economic 

control, access to cheap 

manual labor, building 

alliances with municipal and 

state government

Land as well as money

Source: Simon Fisher, ed. Working with Conflict (London: Zed Books, 2000), 28

Appendix: Pairing Analytic Tools

Conflict analysts frequently use the “onion model” described by Simon Fisher and colleagues, 

as a tool for eliciting from parties to a conflict not only their stated positions but also their 

underlying interests and needs (figure 1). This is a critical step toward understanding the 

roots of a conflict and whether there is a “win-win” solution that meets both parties’ interests and needs. What is sometimes overlooked is that ideas generated by using the onion 

model are just hypotheses that should be subject to subsequent analysis and testing.

Analysis of competing hypotheses (ACH) is a technique developed by Richards Heuer for 

intelligence analysts to avoid cognitive traps and to ensure that hypotheses are accepted 

only when the evidence merits.22 ACH guides analysts by having them array multiple 

hypotheses in columns against evidence in rows. Each cell is coded based on how consistent 

the hypothesis is with the piece of evidence. The analyst can then reject hypotheses by 

looking across the matrix at the degree of correspondence between data and hypotheses 

(tables A.1 and A.2).

It is important to recognize that the ACH method itself relies on starting with an appropriate range of plausible hypotheses. Using the onion model and ACH in tandem, thus, could 

help ensure that an appropriate set of hypotheses are generated and that these are evaluated systematically based on available evidence (table A.2).
11

Table A.2. Illustration of an ACH matrix based on hypotheses generated using 

the onion model

Landowners’ interest in 

cheap labor drives their 

treatment of indigenous 

people

Landowners’ ideology 

and prejudice drive their 

treatment of indigenous 

people

Landowners’ desire for 

political control drives their 

treatment of indigenous 

people

Evidence 1 Very consistent Neutral Neutral

Evidence 2 Inconsistent Consistent Neutral

Evidence 3 Consistent Neutral Inconsistent

Evidence 4 Consistent Very consistent Inconsistent

Evidence 5 Neutral N/A Consistent

Table A.1. Analysis of competing hypotheses: an example from the 

Wen Ho Lee case

Classic spy 

who passed 

classified info

6

Archived data 

for LANL as 

instructed

3

Stashed 

intellectual 

property for his 

next job

1

Talked to 

Chinese but 

passed no 

classified info

1

WHL’s wife was FBI/CIA informant Inconsistent N/A N/A Neutral

WHL had a record of cooperating 

with the FBI and CIA

Inconsistent Consistent N/A Consistent

Massive amounts of material were 

transferred to UNCLAS disc drives

Very Consistent Consistent Very Consistent Very Consistent

WHL admitted he had disclosed 

sensitive info to a foreign govt

Inconsistent N/A Consistent Consistent

WHL did not report all his 

meetings 

Very Consistent N/A N/A Consistent

PRC’s W-88 sketch had revisions 

made after WHL lost access

Inconsistent N/A N/A Consistent

99% of W-88 info on the Internet Neutral Consistent Inconsistent Consistent

No proof any classified documents 

were passed to the PRC

Inconsistent Neutral Neutral Consistent

WHL was in regular contact with 

senior Chinese nuclear scientists

Consistent Consistent Consistent Consistent

Entered lab at 0330 Christmas Eve Very Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent

Did not download user manuals Inconsistent Inconsistent Consistent Neutral

Took computer files home Very Consistent Inconsistent Very Consistent Very Consistent

Moved files to UNCLAS computer Very Consistent Very Consistent Very Consistent Very Consistent

Source: Adapted from http://competinghypotheses.org/docs/Sample_Projects
United States 

Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

Endnotes

1. OECD, The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (Paris: OECD, 2001), 31, www.oecd.org/

dataoecd/15/54/1886146.pdf.

2. OECD DAC, Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (Paris: OECD, 2007), www.

oecd.org/dataoecd/28/5/43463433.pdf.

3. Frameworks documents developed or sponsored by individual governments include Deutsche Gesellschaft für 

Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Management (Bonn: GTZ, 2001), 

http://tinyurl.com/62mj8f; Stability Assessment Framework (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International 

Relations, 2005), http://tinyurl.com/lwtua; Manual for Conflict Analysis (Stockholm: Swedish International 

Development Cooperation Agency, 2006), http://tinyurl.com/4s7er8c; Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance 

Notes (London: Department for International Development, 2002), http://tinyurl.com/4zwcelv.

4. Conducting a Conflict Assessment: A Framework for Strategy and Program Development (Washington, DC: United 

States Agency for International Development, 2005), www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/

publications/docs/CMM_ConflAssessFrmwrk_May_05.pdf.

5. Principles of the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (Washington, DC: United States Department of State, 

2008), 1, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB943.pdf.

6. “Chapter 2: Conflict Analysis,” in Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and 

Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack (London: APFO, CECORE, CHA, FEWER, International Alert, and Saferworld, 2004), 

1, www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/chapter_2__266.pdf.

7. For representative definitions of conflict assessment or analysis, see GTZ, Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and 

Management, 8; Conducting a Conflict Assessment, 8; Simon Fisher, ed., Working with Conflict (London: Zed Books, 

2000), 17; “Chapter 2: Conflict Analysis,” in Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, 1.

8. For example, International Alert, a leading NGO in the peacebuilding arena, describes the role of analysis in 

its Programming Framework as follows: “The purpose of the analysis is to determine what actions Alert can 

take—if any—to improve the prospects for peace, with respect to a specific conflict context or a specific issue 

or theme which is relevant to peace and conflict—often one of the peace factors.” Programming Framework 

for International Alert: Design, Monitoring and Evaluation (London: International Alert, January 2010), www.

international-alert.org/sites/default/files/library/012010ProgrammingFrameworkForAlert.pdf.

9. Notable exceptions include definitions of intelligence analysis in Rob Johnston, Analytic Culture in the U.S. 

Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2005), 4; and Bruce 

D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for American National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 1989), 85. 

10. William J. Lahneman, The Future of Intelligence Analysis: Volume 1, Final Report (College Park, MD: University of 

Maryland, 2006), www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/future_intel_analysis_final_report1.pdf; Gregory F. Treverton 

and C. Bryan Gabbard, Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), www.rand.

org/pubs/technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR293.pdf; and Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, eds., Analyzing 

Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008).

11. See, for example, Randolph H. Pherson, Rethinking National Security in a Globalizing World: A New Ecology (Reston, 

VA: Pherson Associates, 2009); Thomas Fingar, “Analysis in the U.S. Intelligence Community: Missions, Masters, 

and Methods,” in Intelligence Analysis: Behavioral and Social Scientific Foundations, ed. B. Fischhoff and C. Chauvin 

(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2011).

12. Gary Klein, Brian Moon, and Robert R. Hoffman, “Making Sense of Sensemaking 1: Alternative Perspectives,” IEEE 

Intelligent Systems 21, no. 4 (2006): 70–73.

13. George and Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence, 3.

14. Peter Woodrow, Advancing Practice in Conflict Analysis and Strategy Development: Interim Progress Report 

(Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2006), 18, www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/article/RPP%20

Article%20Conflict%20Analysis%2020060101.pdf.

15. “Intelligence liaison” activities may be an exception. These collaborative efforts between different parts of a 

single government or among multiple governments can themselves help build relationships and trust, which can 

prove useful beyond the particular analytic endeavor.

16. See, for example, The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 

Destruction: Report to the President of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 

31, 2005) and The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 22, 2004).

17. The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, 378.

18. John C. Gannon, “Managing Analysis in the Information Age,” in George and Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence, 215.

19. See, for example, James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. 

Intelligence Community for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,” Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence, February 10, 2011; Dennis C. Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence 

Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 

February 2,2010.

20. Carmen A. Medina, “The New Analysis,” in George and Burce, Analyzing Intelligence, 242.

21. National Research Council, Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow: Advances from the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2011), 33.

22. Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), 

95–100.