FOURTH DIVISION January 31, 2008

No. 1-06- 2905

COMPAS S ENVIR

ONM ENTA

L, INC ., ) A ppe al f rom the Ci rcu i t Cou rt of a De lawar e co rp or at ion, ) Co o k C o un t y, I llino is ) Plai ntif f-A ppel le e, ) No. 06 L 5526

) v. ) Honorabl e Pad dy McN am ara, ) Jud ge P re siding POLU KA

I SERVICES, L.L.C., a Vi rgin ia ) limit ed
- liab ilit y co mp an y, ) ) De f en da n t-A pp el l an t. )

)

JU STI CEMU

RP HY de l i v er ed th e op i n i on of th e c our t: Plai ntif f, Com pass Env ironm ental Services, Inc., a Delaware corpor ation wi th its pri nci pal pla ce o f bu sine ss in Ch ica go , filed su it ag ain st de fen da nt , Po lu K ai S er vic es , L. L. C. , a V irg inia l i m i ted-l i ab i l i ty com pa n y . A f ter th e tr i al cou rt d en i ed de f en da n t’s moti on to quash pu rs ua n t to
sec t ion 2 -3 01( a) of t he Co de o f Civil Pr oc edu re (7 35 I LCS 5/ 2- 301 (a ) ( West 200 4) ), defend ant petitioned for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(3) ( 210 Ill. 2d R. 30 6( a) ( 3) )
. Fo rt he fo llo win g r ea so ns, we affir m. I. BACKG

ROUND Shaw En vi ron men tal , In c., en tere d i nto a con tract wi th th e A rm y Corp s of Engi ne ers f or t he inst allatio n of g ove rnment -su pplied s heet ing and t empo ra ry ro ofing o n re sidenc es in Lo uisiana1-06-2905

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dam aged by Hurri can e K atri na . Pl ai ntif f agree d to be Sh

aw’ s su bc ontractor on th

i s roof i ng work. Plai ntif f perf ormed a portion of the serv ic es i n the contract and subcontracted a portion of the work to def

endan t. In Ma y 20 06 , pl ai n ti f f f i l ed a f our -c oun t com pl ai n t i n th e c i rc ui t cou rt of Coo k C oun

ty al l eg i n g th at def en da n t b re ach ed

i ts s ub con tra ct a n d tw o se ttl em en t ag re em en ts. A ttach ed to pla in tif f’ s compl ai nt was an un

signed purchase order, numb ered 1002680002 and dated October 12, 2005. The to p of the purchas e order showed plai ntif f at a Ch ic ago address; i

n the b ox bel

ow, it sai d “sh ip to: Compass En

vi ronmen tal, Inc.,” i

n Sul pher, Louis ia

na. The b ot to m of

both pages of the purchas e order pro vi ded, “SEE TERMS AND CONDITIONS ON REVERSE SIDE. *** Plea se si gn thi s purchase

orde r an d return to pur ch as i ng depa rtm en t at the a bov e addr es s. F or
an y questions of

conc ern s pl

eas e ca l l (312) 4 32-39 13.” The thi rd page of the exh

ibit was a l

is t o f terms and condi

tions, i ncl udin g paragraph 21, whi ch prov i des as fol l ows:

“ JU RIS DIC TION A

ND A TTO RNEY’ S F EES- -Ve nu e f or an y l i ti ga ti on ari si ng out of thi s O rde r, i nc l udi ng sui ts f or pa y men t, sh al l be i n th e Sta te of I llino is. T he pr ev ailing pa r t y in su ch lit iga t io n sh all be en t it led t o r ea so na ble attorney ’sf

ees . An y di spute r egard i ng th e term s an d condi tions of thi s Order, including su its fo r p ayments , sha ll be det er mined in acco rd ance wit h t he r ules a nd l awsof the State of

Il l i noi s wi thout rega

rd to its conf l i ct of l aw prov i sion.” Plai nti f f also s ubm i tted a n i nv oi ceof de f en da nt’ s date d J an

ua ry 1, 2 006 , wh

i ch sh owe d a “bi l l to”
an d “ sh i p to”addre ss

f or pl ai nti f f i n C hi cago.1-06-2905

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Defend ant fil

ed a mot ion t o d ismi ss t he co mplaint fo r lack of p er so nal jurisdict ion alleging (1) t he trial court lacked perso nal juri sdiction over defendan t and (2) the forum-selection cl ause did no t ap ply b ec au se t he r ev er se sid e o f t he pu r ch as e o r de r , wh ich co nt ain ed ad dit io na l t er ms and c ond itio ns, w as no t included in the ve rsio n t hat plaint iff e- mailed to defend ant . S ean J ense n, defen dant’s presi

dent, averred i

n an aff ida vi t t hat defe

ndan t ini tiated work o n the sub contract be f ore rec ei vi ng the pur ch as e ord er, wh i ch pl ai nti f f sent v i a e -m ai l . The e -m

ai l ed cop y di d n ot cont ain the additional ter ms and conditions t hat we re included in the exhi bit to plain

tiff ’s compl ai nt. Defen dant did n ot recei ve a copy of the purchas e order via Un ited States mai

l. Jen sen
ca l l s th e ex h i b i t to pl ai n ti f f ’s com pl ai n t a “ f org er y ” a n d al l eg es th at “Com

pa ss di d n ot pres en t to
me, nor di d I si

gn or a gree to the

term s or condi

tions con tai ne d” on the a ttache d purcha se orde

r. Furtherm ore, no o ne on b ehal

f of ei ther plai ntif f or def endan t executed the purchase order attached to the c omp l ai

nt. Jense n furt her aver re d t hat defend ant do es no t t ra nsac t business in Illi nois a nd has no pr operty or e m pl oy ee s i n Il l i n oi s. Non

e of de f en da n t’s em pl oy ee s h ad ev er v i si ted Il l i n oi s to
n eg oti ate wi th pl ai n ti f f re ga rdi n g th e pur ch as e order, a

n d i t perf orm ed al l of i ts o b l i ga ti on s wi th respec t t o t he purchase or der o ut side Ill inois. Defendant only comm unicated wit h plai

ntiff ’s Tex as of f i ce re gardi

ng th e ev en ts des cri be d i n the com pl ai nt. In r esp ons e, plaint iff

fil ed a n affidavit by Mar t in Bat t isto ni, plaint iff ’s chief o per at ing officer . H e ave rr ed t hat plaint iff maintains s at ellite o ffi

ces t hro ugho ut t he co unt ry, includ ing Te xas. All of plaintiff’s pu rc hase or der s ar e pr inted in Chicago wit h its C hicago add re ss and ph on e n um b er . Al l of pl ai n ti f f ’s ch ecksar e p ri

n ted wi th i ts C h i ca go add re ss an d al l pa y men ts to1-06-2905

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i ts sub contractors are m

ade th rough i ts Ch i cago h eadq uarters . The

Com pas s person

ne l who were pri mari l y i nv ol ve d w i th d ef en da nt a re l oca ted thr ough out the c oun

try , i nc l udi ng Ch i cago, I nd ian ap o lis, an d T ex as , an d t r av el f r eq ue nt ly. Ba tti sto n i also s tate d th at i t i s p l ai n ti f f ’s pol i cy th at a l l pu rc h as e ordersar e p ri

n ted wi th terms an d condi tions on the b ack side and m ai le d to ven

dors. The copy of purchase order 100 268 000 2 that he m

ai nta i ne d i n h i s f i l esi s a “ cop y of what I woul

d have m ai l ed to the ve nd or and it includes t he st anda rd ‘Te rms and Co ndit ions’ o n t he r ever se side .” In a ddit ion, he sa id, “I be l i ev e” that plai

ntif f mail ed de f

endan t a copy of the purc

ha se orde r that con tai ne d the stan dard t er ms and c ond itio ns o n t he r ever se side . A let t er dat ed M ay 5, 200 6, fro m Bat t isto ni to Jense n, whi ch i s al so in

cl uded i n the record, was written on plai ntif f’ s Texas l

etter head. John Mark off , pl ai ntif f ’sprocuremen

t ma na ger, av erred that he pri

nts a l l purch ase orders and m ai ls them to the ven

dor. Whi le

he h ad no specifi

c recoll ection of m

ai li ng purchas e order 1002680002, he had n

o reason to bel

ie ve that he di

d not foll ow standard procedure for t hat purchase or der. T he copy of purchase order 1 002680002 that he main tained i n his fi les i s a “co py of w hat I w ou ld have mailed t o t he vend or and it includes t he st anda rd ‘Te rms and Condi tions’ on the rev

erse si de.” In addi

tion, he sa

id, “I bel ie ve that I mai

le d” defe ndan t a copy of the purchas e order t hat contain ed the standard terms an

d condi tions on the reverse side. A l etter in the record dat ed May

9, 2006, from def

endan t’s atto rney

to pla in tif f states t hat Jens en recei

ved a tel ephone cal

l f rom John W

eber requesti

ng that defen

dant “depl

oy to Sulf ur Louisi ana to comm

ence work, further represen ting the c ontract would m eet hi m there.” It further provides , “On or about Octo ber 14, 2005, Mr. Jensen recei ved a F edEx package contai ni ng a1-06-2905

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pur chas e o rd er dat ed O ct obe r 1 2, 200 5 ** *. Po lu Kai had a lread y been wo rk ing, in go od faith, f or 4 da y s. ” T h e p ar

ti es do n ot ackn owl ed ge th i s l ette r i n th ei r brief s. A t oral argu men t, defend ant admit t ed t hat it r ece ived a ha rd co py of t he ent ire p ur chas e o rd er via FedE x. On S ept ember 1 5, 200 6, t he t rial co ur t denied defend ant ’s mot ion t o q uas h ser vice and di sm i ss th e com pl ai nt wi thout an evi den tia ry he ari ng. Th i s ap peal f oll owed. II. AN AL YSIS A. Forum-Selection Clause The pur chas e o rd er at t ache d t o t he co mplaint had a pa ge o f add itio nal te rms and
co nd it io ns, wh ich inc lud ed an I llino is fo rum- se lec t io n c lau se . De fen da nt co nt en ds t ha t t he fo rumselection cl

ause was n

ot part o f the contract and, al ternativel y, that the clause i s unen

forceabl e. Defend ant co nt ends t hat it has offer ed “leg itimat e evide nce t hat it d id no t re ceive t he versi on of the purchas e order t hat Compass now proffe

rs as the genui

ne articl e.” It is undi

sputed t hat t he elec t ro nic vers ion o f the pur chas e o rd er t hat defend ant re ceived did no t include t he
r ev er se sid e. De fe nd an t als o po int s t o t he af fid av it s o f p lain t iff’ s e xe cu t ive s t ha t t he y “ think t he
r ev er se sid e o f t he pu r ch as e o r de rwa s” se nt t o de fen da nt us ing Un it ed St at es mail ( emp ha sis added). In addi

tion, i n hi s af fi davi t Jensen states that defendan

t did not receiv

e the purchase order vi a Un i ted States m

ail
. During or al argument, t his court drew t he part ies’ att ention t o a let ter from defendant’s at t o rne y, w hic h ne it he rpa r t y ac kn o wle dg ed in it s br iefs , ev en t ho ug h it wa s inc lud ed in de f en da nt’ s a ppe nd i x a nd the sh ort su ppor ti ng rec ord th at i t pre pa red i n s upp ort of i ts p eti ti on f or le ave to appeal. The l

etter provides

that on Octo ber 10, 2005, the parties orall y a greed that1-06-2905

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defen dant would b egi

n work in Louisi ana an d that on Octo ber 14, 2005, Jense n “ recei ved a Fed Ex pa ckag e con tai ni ng a purch ase order da ted Octob er 12, 2 005.”

Def endan t theref ore admit t ed a t or al arg ument befo re t his co ur t t hat it r ece ived t he pu rc hase or der , c omp lete wit h t he terms an d condi tions on the reverse si

de, via FedEx. It then sh

if ted its argum

ent, clai mi ng that when it recei ved the h ard copy vi

a FedEx, i

t had no reason to beli

eve that it superseded the email ed co py. We disag re e. We find t hat , by its co ur se o f co nduc t , d efenda nt asse nt ed t o t he “t er ms and condi tions” on the rev

erse si de of the purchas e order, incl udin g the forum

-sel ection cl

ause. See Landmark Proper

ties, Inc. v. Architects International-Chicago , 172 Ill . App. 3d 379, 383 (1988) (a party can i

ndicate assent to t he terms of a contract t hrough i

ts acts or conduct even wh en i t has not signed it) ; Amelco Electric Co. v. Arcole Midwe st Corp. , 40 I ll. A pp . 3d 11 8 ( 19 76 )
. I t is undis puted that d efendan

t began wor k pursuant t o t he contract bef ore r eceiv in g the purchase order v i a e-m ail . Wh en i t recei ve d the electroni c v ersi on of the purch

ase order, i t di d not i nqu i re as t o t he “t er ms and c ond itio ns o n re ver se side ” but , r at her , c ont inued w or king. Defend ant argues that it was reasonab le to concl ude that the “reverse s ide ” of the purchas e order was actuall y pa ge two o f the purch

ase order. We reje ct defen dant’s argum

ent. If that were the case, bot h sides o f the pur chas e o rd er wo uld be in t he sa me for mat a nd no t hing wo uld p ro vide fo r t he “term s an d condi tions.” Fi n al l y , w h en de f en da n t re ce i v ed a c opy of th e pur ch

as e order v

i a F ed Ex , i t con ti n ue d to
wo rk . Alt hou gh “[ f]o r c ou rse of c ond uct t o a ct as c ons ent t o a co nt ra ct , it must be clea r t hat t he conduct relates to t he speci fi c contract in question” (

Landmark Proper

ties , 172 Ill . App. 3d at1-06-2905

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38 3) , t he r e is no ind ica t io n in t he r ec o r d t ha t de fen da nt , up o n r ec eip t o f t he pu r ch as e o r de rvia FedE x, inqu ired abo ut t he t er ms and c ond itio ns o n t he r ever se side , no r d id it st op per for ming und er the contrac t or attemp t to resci

nd. De fen da nt ar gu es t ha t it wa s e nt it led t o an ev ide nt iar y hea r ing o n t he iss ue o f wh et he rit received the reverse si de of the purchase o rder. Defendan t cites TCA Int

ern ation al, Inc . v. B&

B Custom Auto, Inc. , 2 99 I ll. App. 3d 5 22 ( 199 8) , fo r t he idea t hat when t her e is co nfli ct ing
evi den ce a s to j uri sdi

cti onal matters, a tri

al court errswh en

i t rul es wi thout an evi den tia ry he ari ng. It also contends, however, that the evi dence was

not confl icting b ecause pl

ai ntif f’ s evi dence does not squarely

refute def

endan t’s evi dence that i

t did not receiv

e i t. In addition, i

t conceded at o ral
ar gu men t t ha t it r ec eiv ed a h ar d c o py c o nt ain ing t he t er ms a nd co nd it io ns s ev er al d ays aft er it
re ce i v ed th e e -m ai l ed copy . We th

er ef orere j ec t de f en da n t’s argu men t. Se con d, d ef en da n t con ten dsth at ev en

i f th e f oru m-s el ec ti on cl au se i s p ar t of th e c on tra ct, it is unenf orceable because i

t is unreasonable. A forum-sel ection clause i n a contract is prima facie valid and s hou ld be enfo rc ed u nless t he o ppo sing pa rt y show s t hat enfo rc ement wo uld be
unr eas onab l e un

der the ci rcum stan ces . Calanca v. D&

S Manufacturing Co. , 157 Ill . App. 3d 85, 87 ( 198 7) . T he pa rt y opp os ing t he enfo rc ement of t he clau se must sho w t hat “tr ial in the contractual forum

wil l b e so gravel

y di ff ic ult and i nconveni ent that he will

for all practical purposes be depri

ved of h is day in court .” Calanca , 1 57 I ll. App. 3d a t 87- 88. To det er mine the
re aso nableness of a for um-se lect ion clau se, t he co ur t sho uld co nsider : ( 1) t he law t hat go ver ns t he f orm ati on a nd con stru cti on of the con tract, (2)the

res i de nc y of the pa rti es , (3 ) th e p l ac e of execution and/or per formance of the contract , (4) the location of the part ies an d their witnesses,1-06-2905

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(5) the conveni

ence to the parties of an

y pa rticular location, an

d (6) whether the clause was equa l l y ba rgai ne d f or. Calanca , 15 7 Ill. App. 3d at 88; Yamada Corp v. Y asuda Fire &

Marine Insurance Co. , 305 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 36 2, 368 ( 1999)
. The f irst f actor favors plai

ntif f, as the s am

e forum -sel ection provi si on al so provides that any dispu t es r ega rd ing t he co ndit ions o f the pur chas e o rd er wo uld be g ove rne d by t he law o f the state o f Il li nois . The second f

actor is a draw: pl ai

ntif f is a Delaware corpor ation wi th its pri nci pal pl ace of b usi ne ss i n Il l i noi s, wh i l e def endan t is a Vi rgi ni a l i m i ted-l i ab i l i ty c omp an

y . The thi rd factor fav ors defen dant, sin ce the subc ontract was perf ormed i n Loui si ana, en

tirel y outsi de Ill in ois. Em ploye es of

pl ai ntif f ’sthat we re i nv olv ed i n the su bc ontract ap

pear to b e f

rom T ex as. In addi tion , as the work was perf orme d i n L oui siana, pres

um ab l y wi tnes ses are a l so located there. Plai ntif f’s ex ecutives that were involv

ed in the sett lem

ent negot iations are l

ocat ed in Ill in ois. Defend ant ar gue s t hat t he fifth fact or is a dr aw be cau se “I lli nois is no do ubt as c onve nient to Ch i cago-b as ed

Com pa ss asi t i s to V i rgi ni a-b as ed Pol u K ai .” H owe ve

r, the re cord

doe s n ot
re flect any evidenc e as t o t he r elat ive co nvenience of t he pa rt ies. E ven as suming t hat defend ant wil l s uff er some i nconveni ence b y l itigating thi

s case i n Il li nois , “relative

in conven ie nce h as been rout in el y rej ected as a basi

s f or voidi ng f orum sel ection cl auses.” Dace International, Inc. v. Apple Computer, Inc. , 275 Ill . App. 3d 234, 239 (1995). Defendan t has not establis

hed that l i tig ati ng i n Il l i noi s woul d be so seri ous a h

ardshi p tha t it woul d ha ve to aban don i ts def en se. De fen da nt ar gu es t ha t t he sixt h fa ct o r“w eig hs s t r o ng ly ag ain st en fo r cin g t he fo rumselection cl

ause” be cause i

t was boil erplate l anguage an

d there is no evi dence that the clause was1-06-2905

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eq ua lly bar ga ine d fo r . T he cla us e w as pa r t o f a p r ep r int ed ag r ee men t an d t he r e is no ind ica t io n in the rec ord th at the p arti

es ne gotiate d over th

ose term s. “ Ne ve rthel es s, th e f ac t tha t [i t] di d n ot object to or at tempt t o negot iate the clause i s no reason t o inval idate it. They were busi

ness entities as opposed to ordinary consum ers, and thi s court is not persuaded that they were i n ne ed of protect ion wh

en contractin

g for busi ness servi ces.” IFC Credit Cor

p. v. Rieker Shoe Corp. , No. 1-05-1 310, slip op. at 1 3 (December 27, 2007) . As IFC Cr edit noted, t he Fi

rst District has
cons i sten tly en f orced f orum-sel ection ag reem en ts be tween ex peri enced b usi ne ss p eople. IFC Credit Corp. , sli

p op. at 18-19, citin

g Aon Co rp. v. Utle

y, 371 Il l . Ap p. 3d 56 2, 570 ( 2006) ; Dace , 27 5 Ill. App. 3d at 241 ; Calanca , 1 57 I ll. App. 3d a t 88. Fur t her mor e, when d efenda nt
re ce i v ed th e f ul l pu rc h as e order vi a F ed

Ex , i t di d n ot ob j ec t or a ttem pt n eg oti ati on wi th re ga rd to the forum -sel ection cl

ause. See Aon Corp. , 371 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 570. Defend ant re lies on Mellon First United Leasing v. Hansen , 301 Il l . Ap p. 3d 10 41 (19 98), wh i ch , i n a ddi ti on to f i nd i ng a l ac k of pe rs ona l j urisd i cti on, also f oun d that the f

orum -s el ec ti on claus e include d in t he co nt ra ct was unenfo rc eable. In Mellon , i t wa s n ot un ti l af ter th e terms of the a greem en t, such as the ty pe of equi pm en t, terms of the leas e, an

d am ount of pay men ts, were set that t he pl

ai ntif f wen t t o t he def

endan t company ’s Cal

if ornia of fi ce to sign the docum

ent. No
men tion was made of the Ill

in ois forum-sel

ection clause, and she was n ot giv en a copy of the leas e unti l years l ater. The cl

aus e was l ocated on

the b ack p age of

a prep ri nted f orm i n smal l typ ef ace . Th e Se con

d D i stri ct re f us ed to enf orce the cl au se . The c ourt n

oted tha t “ i t [di d] n ot appear that the claus e was reach ed through arm’ s-le

ngth ne got ia

tion between

experienced busi ness persons of the sa

me stature. ” Mellon , 30 1 Il

l . A pp. 3d a t 104 6. “ Ra the r, i t wa s p art of1-06-2905

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boil erplate language i

n sm all print on the back of a prepr in ted for m used by

the plai ntif f i n i ts lease agreem ents.” Mellon , 301 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 1046. Th

e pl ai ntif f wasmore aki

n to an ordi na ry
con su mer i n v ol v ed i n a smal l tra n sa cti on th an a s oph i sti ca ted b us i n es s p er son

of sta tur e e qu al to the l eas i ng c omp an

y . Mellon , 3 01 I ll. App. 3d a t 104 6. Fur t her mor e, t he plaint iff had no re aso n, until the last mom

ent, to bel ie ve that she woul

d be deal in g with a n Il li nois corpo ration i f a l

egal di spute oc curre d. Mellon , 3 01 I ll. App. 3d a t 104 6. “We believe it wo uld be u nfair and unreasonab le

to require def

endan t t o li tigate this sm all c la im in Ill in ois.” Mellon , 301 Ill . App. 3d at 1047. Unlike t he de fendant in Mellon , de f en da n t i s n ot an i n ex perien ce d b us i n es s ow n er “ ak i n to
an o rd inary co nsumer .” Acco rd ing t o t he co mplaint, defend ant is an enviro nmenta l-ser vices and site -e ngineer ing co mpany tha t pr ovid ed s er vices in t he wa ke o f Hur ricane Kat rina. While the
ex tent of the p arti es’ ne gotia

tions on th

e i ni tia l sub contrac

t is not des cri

be d i n the rec ord, defend ant was an ac t ive nego t iato r w hen it c ame t o t he se t t lement a gr eement s, a s evide nced by the e-mai ls in the record. Furt herm

ore, t he Mellon cou

rt w as h es i tan t to re qui reth e def en da n t to l i ti ga te th e “ sm al l cl ai m ” s eeki n g l es s th an $4 ,00 0 i n Il l i n oi s. Th i s is n ot a s mal l cl ai m ; cou n t I alone a l l eges dam ages ran gi ng f rom $ 168,00 0 to $184,80 0 f or brea ch of c ontract. Fi na l l y , IFC Credit

has cal le d the Mellon holdi

ng i nto q uestion: “the reaso ni ng of that case is not persuasiv

e and the distin

ctions i t sought t o draw are amb iguous.” IFC Credit Cor p. , slip
o p. at 20 . I nst ea d o f Mellon , IFC Cr edit fol lowed Dace , “w hic h he ld b us ine ss en t it ies t o t he ir
con tractua l ba rga i ns , but c l ari

f i ed tha t Ill i noi s c ourts ha ve not a cc ep ted the f ed era l l aw tren d of
en fo r cin g fo rum s ele ct io n c lau se s in c o nt r ac t s inv o lving un so ph ist ica t ed co nsu mer s in s mall1-06-2905

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t ra nsa ct io ns in t he ma rk et pla ce wit ho ut any r ea l o pp o rt unit y t o co nsid er t he a cc ep t anc e o f a forum selection cl

ause.” IFC Credit Cor

p. , sli p op. at 20-21, citin

g Dace , 275 Ill . App. 3d at 241. We c o nclu de t hat t he fo ru m-s ele ct io n cla us e w as pa rt o f t he a gr ee ment bet we en p laint iff and def endan t and that it was enf

orceabl e. B. P ers ona

l Ju ri sd i cti on De f en da n t f ur th er argu es th at i t di d n ot h av e s uf f i ci en t m i n i m um con tacts w i th Il l i n oi s to sup po rt per so nal jurisdict ion. For pur pos esof de term i ni ng pe rs ona l j urisd i cti on, a p l ai nti f f ca rri esthe bu rde n of establ is hi ng a prima facie

ba si s upon

whi ch j uri sdi cti on ove r the d ef endan t can be ex ercised
. Palen v. Daew

oo Motor Co. , 358 I ll . App. 3d 64 9, 659 ( 2005). A plain tiff ’s prima facie

case
may be overc ome

by a def endan t’s un controv erted evi

den ce that def

eats j uri sdi

cti on. Palen , 358 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 659. W hen a tria l court determ

i ne s j uri sdi

cti on sol el y on the ba si s of docum en tary evidenc e and hear s no co ur t ro om t est imony, an a ppe llate c ou rt re views t he issue of jur isdict ion de
novo . Palen , 358 Ill . App. 3d at 659. Sec ti on 2 -20 9(c ) of

the l ong -ar m sta tute a l l owsan Il l i noi s c ourt to “ exerc i se

j urisd i cti on
on a ny othe r b as i s n ow or h ere af ter p erm i tted b y the Il l i noi s C ons ti tution a nd the Consti tution of the United St at es. ” 735 ILCS 5/2 -20 9(c ) ( West 200 4); Kostal v. Pinkus Der matopathology Laboratory, P.C. , 35 7 I l l . A pp . 3d 38 1, 3 83 (2 00 5) . Th

us , the l on g- ar m sta tute h as b een h el d to be coex tens i ve wi th the due process

requi rem en ts of th e Il l i noi s an d Un i ted States C onsti

tution s. Kostal , 357 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 383. To sat isfy f

ede ra l due p ro ces s re quir ement s, a nonr eside nt defend ant must have s ufficient1-06-2905

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mini mum cont act s wit h t he fo ru m sta t e so t hat t he exe rc ise o f jurisdict ion d oe s no t offend “traditional

notions of f

ai r play and sub stantial

jus tice. [Ci tation.]” International Shoe Co. v. Washington , 3 26 U .S . 3 10, 316 , 9 0 L. Ed . 9 5, 102 , 6 6 S . C t . 1 54, 158 (1 945 ). In a ddit ion, federal due process requires

that t he acti on aris e out o f the def endan t’s contacts with the f

orum state an d tha t it b e rea sona

bl e to requi re the def endan t to li tig ate i n the f orum state. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzew

icz , 471 U.S. 462, 472-77, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 540-44, 105 S. Ct . 2174, 2181-85 (1 985 ). Unde r t he I lli

nois C ons t itu t ion’s g uar ant ee o f due pr oc ess, “[j]u risdict ion is t o be asserted only

when it i s f ai r, just, and reasonab le

to require a n

onresi dent defe

ndan t t o defend a

n
ac t io n in I llino is, co nsid er ing t he qu alit y and na t ur e o f t he de fen da nt ’s ac t s” t ha t o cc ur in I llino is or that af f ect i ntere sts l ocated i n Il l i noi s. Rollins v. Ellwood

, 141 Il l . 2d 244 , 275 (1 990). 1. General jurisdiction “G en er al ju r isd ict io n c an be fo un d w he n a de fen da nt ha s c o nt inu o us an d s yst ema t ic general busi ness contacts with the f

orum.” Bolger v. Nautica International, Inc. , 369 Ill . App. 3d 947 , 9 51 ( 200 7) . “I lli

nois limits ge ner al jurisdict ion o ver nonr eside nt s t o inst ance s in which t he nonresi dent was presen

t and doing b

usi ness in the forum .” Bolger , 369 Ill . App. 3d at 951. That sta nd ard req ui res the de f en da nt to tran sact i

ts b us i ne ss wi thi n th e s tate“ not oc ca si

ona l l y or casual ly , but with a f

ai r meas ure of perm

anen ce and conti

nui ty.” Haubner v. Abercrombie & Kent International, Inc
. , 35 1 I ll. A pp . 3d 11 2, 11 9 ( 20 04 )
. T he “d o ing bu sine ss ” s t an da r d is “qui te high .” Haubner , 351 Ill . App. 3d at 119. It me ans that, “ ‘[i ]n ef fect, the f oreign
cor porati on h as tak en up re si den ce i n Il l i n oi s a n d, t h er ef ore , m ay b e s ue d on ca us es of ac ti on b oth related an d unrelated to its acti

vi ties i n Il li nois .’ [Citation.]” Roiser v. Cascade Mountain, Inc. ,1-06-2905

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367 Il l . Ap p. 3d 55 9, 563 ( 2006)
. De fen da nt do es no t t r an sa ct bu sine ss in I llino is a nd ha s no pr o pe r t y o remp lo yee s in Illino is. No ne o f de fend ant ’s e mplo yee s ha d e ver visit ed Illino is t o neg o t iat e w it h pla int iff regarding the purchase or der, and it perfor med al l of i ts o bl igations wi

th respect to the purchase
or der ou t side I lli

nois. Bec aus e de fendant do es no t car ry o n business act ivities in Illinois wit h any de gr ee o f pe r man en ce o rco nt inu it y, I llino is c o ur t s c an no t ex er cis e p er so na l jur isd ict io n o ve rit und er a ge neral-j uri sdi

cti on the ory . 2. Specific jurisdiction Def endan t argues that i t di d not hav e suf

f i ci en t mi ni m um contacts wi

th Il l i noi s to supp ort specifi c j urisdi ction. The af

fi davi ts and documen

tary evi dence i n the record establis

h that defen dant had the f

oll owing c ontacts with Il li

nois : (1) entering i

nto a contr act with the Texas offi ce of plai ntif f, a Delaware company

that is headquart ered in Il li nois; (2) receiv

in g a purchase order t hat ide

ntif ie s pl ai ntif f’ s Chi cago offi ce as wel l a s a “s hi p to ” address i

n Loui si ana; (3) sending an i

nvoice to plain

tiff ’s Chicago o ff

ice; (4) re ceivi

ng subcont ract or checks fro m plaintif f’s Ch i cago of f i ce; and (5) h

avi ng s ettle men t di scu ssi ons w i th Ba ttis toni , who is

l ocated i n Chi cago. Defend ant ar gue s t hat it co mmunicate d almos t ent irely with p laintiff’s Texa s o ffi ce, not t he Il l i noi s one , and i

ts m i ni mal contact wi

th the Il l i noi s of f i ce was i ns uf f i ci en t. Commerce Trust Co. v. Air 1st Avi ation Cos. , 36 6 I ll. A pp . 3d 13 5 ( 20 06 ) , he ld t ha t in de ter m i n i n g w h eth er a def en da n t pu rp ose l y estab l i sh ed m i n i m um con tacts w i th th e f oru m sta te when a contract exists, a court focuses on “pri or negot ia

tions an d future consequen

ces, as wel

l a s on the terms of the c ontract and the course of deal in g between the parti es.” Commerce Trust ,1-06-2905

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366 Ill . A pp. 3d a t 143 -44 . Se e al so Viktron Ltd. Partnership v. Program Data Inc. , 32 6 I ll. App. 3d 1 11, 118 (2 001 ). Lo ok ing t o p rio r ne go t iatio ns and t he co ur se o f co nduc t bet wee n t he part ies, we not e that most o f the communicat ion regar ding the subco ntra ct o riginated in plai ntiff ’s Te xas o ffi ce. Ho weve r, defend ant did neg ot iate wit h Chicag o- base d Ba t t isto ni reg ar ding t he settlem ent, and i t also sen t an in voic e to Chicago and rece iv ed at least two checks f

rom that off i ce. Th e work occ

urred i n L oui siana, but the s ettle men t agreemen

ts i nc l uded i n the rec ord
an ti ci pa ted f utu rede al i n gsb etw een

th e tw o com

pa n i es , i n cl udi n g p ay men t. Defend ant re lies on Riemer v. KSL Recreation Corp. , 348 Ill . App. 3d 26 (2004), whic h hel d that a defen

dant was not “doin

g busi ness ” i n Il li nois through its sub si dia

ry, wh ic h ha d an off i ce i n Il l i noi s, wh en the p aren t di d not con

trol the su

bs i di ary ’sacti

vi tie s i n Il l i noi s. Riemer in volv ed general

in stead of specifi

c j urisdi ction. Furtherm

ore, defendan

t mi sunderstands pla in tif f’ s corporat e structure; even though def endan t is i ncorporat ed i

n Del aware and h

as off ic es in a num ber of states, in

cl udin g Texas an

d Ill in ois, def endan t contends that it dealt wi th a “Texas entity ” and “ a subs idi

ary of a corpor ation ch

artered in Del

aware and h

eadquartered in

Ill in ois.” Unl ike Riemer , a

n d c on tra ry to de f en da n t’s argu men t, the T ex as of f i ce wa s a sa tel l i te of f i ce , not a subs idiary o f the plaint iff

co rp or at ion. Defendan t also co ntends that mail

in g an i nvoice to Chicago was in suff ici ent to establi sh j urisd i cti on. It com

pa res i ts m ai l i ng of an i nv oi ceto Ch

i cago to Mellon and Commer cial Coin Laundry System s v. Loon Inv

estme nts, LLC , 375 Il l . Ap p. 3d 26 (2007 ). In Mellon , t he defen

dant, a Calif

ornia residen

t, entered into a mail

in g equipm ent lease ag r ee men t wit h a n I llino is c o mpa ny bu t st o pp ed mak ing pa yment s. T he ne go t iat io ns t o o k p lac e in1-06-2905

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Calif ornia an d her onl y c ontacts with Il li

nois were that the lease

documen ts were sent to an Ill i noi s of f i cef or ap prov al an d the d ef en da nt s en t the pa y men ts to Il l i noi s. The cre di t ap pl i ca ti on
an d o t he rdo cu men t at io n p r o vid ed be fo r e s he sig ne d t he ag r ee men t did no t co nt ain an I llino is addre ss or area cod e. On a

ppe al , th e c ourt h

el d that w he n a “ non res i de nt m

ere l y en ters i nto a
co nt ra ct wit h a r eside nt of t he fo ru m sta t e, t his fact is not sufficient by itself t o s ubject t he nonresi dent to t he in personam jurisdi ction of the f orum state.” Mellon , 301 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 1048. “D ef endan t nev er se t foot i n Il l i noi s. He r onl y conn ection wi th Il l i noi s i nc l uded corres ponde nc e-- for war ding t he do cument s, p re sumably thr ou gh t he Ca lif or nia vendo r, for app ro val in Illi nois a nd sendi ng pay me nts to an Ill

in ois off ic e.” Mellon , 301 I ll . App. 3d at 1049. T he court found these actions to b e i

ns uf f i ci en t to satis f y the “ m i ni m um contacts” due

proces s stan

dard. Mellon , 30 1 I ll. App. 3d at 1049. The Mellon co ur t st r es se d t ha t “ ‘if t he no nr es ide nt bu yer is a pa ss ive pa r t y wh o mer ely pl ace s an order by mail *** or to a sa

l esp erson and acc epts the se l l er’s

price’ through

som e f orm of s oli ci tation ,” the

court of th

e se l l er state c an

not exercise p erson

al j uri sdi cti on ove r the b uy er. Mellon , 301 Ill . App. 3d at 1048, quo ting Chalek v. Klein , 193 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 76 7, 773 ( 1990) . If t he buyer dep ar t s fro m a pas sive ro le by dicta t ing o r vigo ro usly nego t iating co nt ra ct t er ms the buy er m ay be cons i dered

an acti ve buy er su bj ect to person

al j uri sdi cti on i n th i s state . Mellon , 301 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 1048-49 . The

typ e of cond uct tha t cha racteri zes an acti ve purch ase r “ ‘ i s f ar m ore typical in dealin gs between m

aj or busin ess organi zations than

in transactions i

n wh ic h a consum

er
or even a sm

al l s hopkeeper i s the purchase r.’ ” Mellon , 301 Ill . App. 3d at 1049, quo ting Chalek , 193 Ill . App. 3d at 773. The court compared the def endan t t o a “passi

ve, sm al l s hopkeeper1-06-2905

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purch ase r” i nstead of an acti ve purch ase r. Mellon , 301 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 1049. De f

endan t here
ca nn ot be con si de red a “ pa ss i ve , sm al l sh opke ep er p

urchaser”;i

t f al l s s qua rel y i nto th e “ maj or business or ganiza t ion” t hat t he co ur t ident ifi ed a s an a ct ive pur chas er . E ven t hou gh t her e ar e no fact s in the re co rd re gar ding t he neg ot iatio n ove r t he su bco nt ra ct , it st ra ins cre dulit y to believe that de f endan t woul d not n

egoti ate the

term s of the s ubc ontract. In Commer

cial Coin , th e Il

l i noi s- base d pl ai nti f f en tere d i nto a con tract wi th th e ow ne r of
an apartm en t bui l di ng to leas e the

l aun dry area s of the b uil di ng, l ocated i n W i scon si n. Y ears l ater, the defe ndan t, a Wis consi

n l im ited-l ia bi li ty compa ny, acquired the b

uil din g, and the plai

ntif f f il ed sui t al l egi ng, inter al

ia , b rea ch of con tract. On appe al , th e c ourt f

oun d that the d ef

en da nt d i d n ot ha ve the re qui si

te m i ni m um contac ts wi th the state. Commer

cial Coin , 375 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 34. Altho ugh t he de fendant assu med t he co nt ra ct bet wee n t he plaint iff and t he o riginal building
ow ner , t he co ur t fou nd significant t he fact t hat t he de fendant pas sively accep t ed t he t er ms of t he
assu med co nt ra ct inste ad o f ta king an “a ct ive ro le suc h as d icta t ing o r vigo ro usly nego t iating t he contract t erms

or inspe cting e quipm

ent in faci li ties i n Il li nois .” Commer

cial Coin , 375 Ill . App. 3d at 3 3. I n addi ti on , the s i

m pl e m ai l i n g of re n t pa y men ts to or f rom Il l i n oi s w as n ot en oug h to conf er j uri sdi cti on on I l l i

noi s. Commer

cial Coin , 375 I ll . App. 3d at 33. The defendant also po sses sed and c ont ro lled Illinois machines, but t he co ur t had p re viou sly held tha t po sses sion a nd contro l b y a nonresi dent of Illi

nois equi pme nt for use i

n a f oreign j urisdi

ction does not confer j uri sdi cti on i n Il l i noi s. Commer

cial Coin , 37 5 I ll. A pp . 3d at 33
. Fina lly, a lt ho ug h t he I llino is choi ce-of-l aw cl ause i

n the ass ume d contract was a “rele van t considerati on,” a choic e-of-la w claus e does

not, by i tself , conf er per sona

l j uri sdi cti on. Commer

cial Coin , 375 Ill . App. 3d at 33-1-06-2905

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34. Here, de f

en da nt m ai l ed an i nv oi ceto Ch

i cago a nd rec ei ve d a n u ns pe cif i ed nu m be r of ch ec ks fr o m t he Ch ica go o ffice
. T he r e a r e n o fac t s in t he r ec o r d r eg ar din g d efe nd an t ’s r o le in
acc ept ing t he su bco nt ra ct , bu t even if defend ant nego t iate d, it ap par ent ly negot iate d wit h t he Te x as of f i ce . Th e r ec ord demon strate s th

at def en da n t v i gorous l

y n eg oti ate d th

e s ettl em en t, in cl udin g with C hicago-based Battistoni . Most relevan t, however, is n

ot only the Ill in ois choiceof-l aw cl aus e, but the Il

l i noi s f orum-sel ection cl aus e. Commer

cial Coinfou nd significant t hat t he
co nt ra ct co nt ained a cho ice-o f-law c lause , “o ne mor e ar ro w in [p laintiff’s] q uiver ,” inste ad o f “a stronger and enf

orceabl e forum

-sel ection cl

ause.” Commer

cial Coin , 375 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 34. Furth erm ore, plai ntif f ’scaus es of

action ari

se out of def endan t’s m i ni m um contacts. Regardi ng the cl ai m f or breach of the s

ubcontract, defendan

t sent an i nvoice to and receiv

ed ch ecks f rom p l ai ntif f ’sCh i cago of f i ce, a nd th e purc ha se orde r i nc l uded the f orum-sel ection cl aus e. A s f or th e c l ai m re ga rdi n g th e b re ach of th e s ettl em en t ag re em en ts, de f en da n t n eg oti ate d w i

th Bat t isto ni, who was loca t ed in Chica go , a nd t he se t t lement a gr eement s ass umed c ont inuing ob l i ga ti on s on de f en da n t’s pa rt. To e sta b l i sh pers on al j uri sd i cti on , a cou rt m us t also d ete rm i n e w h eth er i t i s rea son

ab l e to require a n

onresi dent defe

ndan t t o li tigate in the forum

state. Five f

actors guide our inqui

ry: “ (1) the burden on t he defen

dant t o defend the action in the f oru m state; (2) t he f

oru m state’s interest i n ad j udi ca ti n g th e d i spute ; (3 ) the p l ai

n ti f f ’s i n terest i n ob tai n i n g e f f ec ti v e r el i ef ; (4 ) the i n ter sta te judi ci al system’ s i

nterest in obtaini ng the m ost effi ci ent resoluti on of the action;and (5) the sha red in terests o f the s everal

states in a

dvan ci ng f undam ental [state] po li

ci es.” Commerce Trust , 3661-06-2905

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I ll. A pp . 3d at 14 6. “O nc e a pla int iff ha s e st ab lishe d t ha t t he de fen da nt pu r po se ly dir ec t ed his act ivities at t he fo ru m sta t e, t he de fendant must pr ese nt a co mpelling case t hat litigat ing t he dis pute there would be un

reasonabl e.” Commerce Trust , 366 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 146. Fi rst, def endan t has not stated th

at i t woul d be

und ul y bur den som e to def end i n Il l i noi s. Sec ond , p laintiff’s par t of t he se t t lement ne go t iatio ns o ccu rr ed in I lli nois, and t he wo rk unde r t he
su b con tra ct oc cu rre d i n Lou i si an a. How ev

er , Il l i n oi s “ h as a stron g i n terest i n pr ov i di n g i ts ci tizen s wi th a conven

ie nt forum to li tigate.” Commerce Trust , 366 Ill . App. 3d at 146. Third, pla int iff is inc o r

po r at ed in D ela wa r e a nd he ad qu ar t er ed in Ch ica go . T he fac t t ha t it filed su it in Ill in ois dem onstrates t hat it ha s an i

nterest in li tigatin g in Ill in ois. See Viktron , 326 Ill . App. 3d at 124. D ef endan t adv ances

no arg um en t as to the l

ast two rea sona

bl eness f actors. I n su mmar y, w e c o nc lud e t ha t de fen da nt ha d s uffic ien t minimum c o nt ac t s w it h I llino is such that it is reasonabl e to require it to defend thi s action in Ill in ois. III. CONCLUSION Fo r the f ore goi n g r ea son s, we af f i rm th e dec i si

on of th e tr i al cou rt. Af fi rmed. NEVILLE, P.J ., and O’ BRIEN , J., con cur.