NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

CARL P., Appellant, 

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, C.P., Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-JV 21-0093 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD532688 

The Honorable Connie Contes, Judge (Retired)

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Jamie R. Heller

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Tom Jose

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge David B. Gass and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

FILED 9-9-2021
CARL P. v. DCS, C.P.

Decision of the Court

2 

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Carl P. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order

terminating his parental rights to his child, C.P. For the following reasons, 

we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 Father and Tyler C. (“Mother”)1 are the natural parents of 

C.P., who was born in Colorado in 2019. Before C.P.’s birth, Father was 

arrested and incarcerated for felony charges, including attempted murder. 

As a result, Father has never met his child. 

¶3 After C.P.’s birth, Mother, who was unwilling to parent C.P., 

left the child with maternal grandmother (“Grandmother”). Grandmother 

then took C.P. from Colorado to her home in Arizona, where she filed a 

private dependency petition alleging C.P. was dependent as to both 

parents. The Arizona Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) substituted in as 

petitioner, alleging C.P. was dependent based upon neglect.

¶4 C.P., who has been in Grandmother’s care since his birth,

remained with Grandmother throughout the dependency. The DCS case 

manager reported C.P. was happy and well-bonded to Grandmother, and 

that Grandmother was meeting C.P.’s needs and was willing to adopt. 

¶5 During the dependency, Father sent C.P. gifts and cards, and 

also participated in limited services through the prison, including parenting 

classes. Father also requested video visits with C.P., but despite DCS’s 

attempts to facilitate, they never took place. While the DCS case manager 

recognized Father’s efforts to communicate with C.P., she felt Father had 

not maintained a normal relationship with C.P. and could not meet C.P.’s 

needs. The case manager acknowledged that, even if Father were released 

early on parole, C.P. would remain in care for several more years, thereby 

“disrupting a normal childhood experience.” 

¶6 The juvenile court considered its jurisdiction under the 

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, conferring with 

Judge Billings-Vela from the El Paso County, Colorado District Court. 

Though Colorado was C.P.’s home state, Colorado declined jurisdiction 

based on inconvenient forum and ceded its jurisdiction to Arizona. The

1 The juvenile court also terminated Mother’s parental rights; she is not a 

party to this appeal. 
CARL P. v. DCS, C.P.

Decision of the Court

3 

juvenile court subsequently adjudicated C.P. dependent as to Father and 

set a case plan of family reunification. 

¶7 At some point, Father pled guilty to the felony charge of 

assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to eight years’ 

imprisonment in Colorado. DCS moved to terminate Father’s parental 

rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4), alleging Father’s incarceration would 

deprive C.P. of a normal home for a period of years. Over Father’s objection, 

the juvenile court changed the case plan to severance and adoption. 

¶8 At the severance trial, the DCS case manager testified that

Father has been incarcerated since C.P.’s birth and because of the child’s 

age, it was and would continue to be difficult for C.P. to maintain a normal 

parent-child relationship with Father. She also testified that because C.P. 

would be at least six years old by Father’s mandatory release date, C.P. 

would “miss[] out on a connection with Father during [C.P.’s] formative 

years.” The case manager further testified that C.P. was bonded to 

Grandmother, that severance and adoption offered C.P. a chance at 

permanency and stability, and that C.P. would be negatively impacted if 

the court did not terminate Father’s parental rights because C.P. would lack 

a permanent arrangement. 

¶9 Father testified that though he never met C.P., he greatly 

desired a relationship with C.P., that he attempted to nurture a relationship 

with the child by sending gifts and letters and was working hard while in 

prison to better himself for C.P. Father also testified that he will be released 

no later than 2026, but is eligible to move to a halfway house in August of 

2022 and is eligible for parole in November of 2022. Father further testified 

that his three-year parole term would be served in either Colorado or New 

York. 

¶10 After considering the length of Father’s prison sentence and 

its effect on his relationship with the child, see Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of

Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 251-52, ¶ 29 (2000), the juvenile court found 

termination of Father’s parental rights was warranted on the grounds of his 

length of incarceration, see A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). The court also found 

severance was in C.P.’s best interests and entered an order terminating 

Father’s parental rights. 

¶11 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, 

Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 

12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1), and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the 

Juvenile Court 103(A). 
CARL P. v. DCS, C.P.

Decision of the Court

4 

DISCUSSION

¶12 We review a termination order for an abuse of discretion, 

accepting the court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, Mary Lou C.

v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004), and view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the court’s ruling, Manuel

M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 2 (App. 2008). Because the 

juvenile court “is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the 

parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts,” we 

will affirm an order terminating parental rights if reasonable evidence 

supports the order. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 

(App. 2009) (quoting Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, 

¶ 4 (App. 2004)). 

I. Reasonable Evidence Supports Termination on the Length-of-Sentence

Ground

¶13 “To justify termination of the parent-child relationship, the 

[juvenile] court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, at least one of 

the statutory grounds set out in [A.R.S. §] 8-533,” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249, 

¶ 12, and find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in 

the best interests of the child, Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, 

¶ 22 (2005). 

¶14 Section 8-533(B)(4) provides that a parent’s rights may be 

terminated if “the parent is deprived of civil liberties due to the conviction 

of a felony . . . [and] the sentence of that parent is of such length that the 

child will be deprived of a normal home for a period of years.” Our 

supreme court in Michael J., provided a non-exclusive list of factors for 

courts to consider in determining whether a parent’s prison sentence will 

deprive a child of a “normal home for a period of years”: 

(1) the length and strength of any parent-child relationship 

existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which 

the parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured 

during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the 

relationship between the child’s age and the likelihood that 

incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the 

length of the sentence, (5) the availability of another parent to 

provide a normal home life, and (6) the effect of the 

deprivation of a parental presence on the child at issue. 

196 Ariz. at 251-52, ¶ 29. 
CARL P. v. DCS, C.P.

Decision of the Court

5 

¶15 Father argues that, although the juvenile court’s order 

addressed the Michael J. factors, it erred by failing to consider the possibility 

that he would be released early from prison. Though a court addressing the 

incarceration ground for severance must consider the designated length of 

the sentence, it is not mandatory to consider the possibility of early release.

Jeffrey P. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 212, 214, ¶ 8 (App. 2016) (noting 

that the court “may consider the possibility of early release”). Here, the 

record shows that the court carefully considered the designated length of 

Father’s sentence—eight years—and the impact the sentence would have 

on Father and C.P.’s relationship. And, although the court did not expressly 

consider the possibility of Father’s early release, it was not required to do 

so. See id.

¶16 Father further argues if he were released early, he would have 

been incarcerated for, at most, an additional 20 months, which is too short 

to amount to “a period of years” under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). Father’s 

calculation fails to consider that the “relevant period is the entire period of 

incarceration, not solely the time after entry of the termination order.” 

Jeffrey P., 239 Ariz. at 214, ¶ 9. Thus, even if Father were released early, he 

would have been incarcerated for approximately three years, C.P.’s entire 

life at that point. 

¶17 Father also contends the court erred in finding his 

relationship with C.P. could not be nurtured because of his out-of-state 

incarceration and C.P.’s age. Father argues that because DCS “did not 

provide [him] any visits [with C.P.],” he “was never provided an 

opportunity to demonstrate he could further nurture a relationship through 

non-traditional means while being incarcerated out-of-state, including 

video visits.” 

¶18 The record does not support Father’s contention that the court 

erred. The DCS case manager testified that it is difficult to maintain a 

parent-child relationship between a young child and an incarcerated 

parent, particularly one who is out-of-state, because, “the most important 

relationships [to a child of C.P.’s age] are the ones that are physically 

available . . . and physically present . . . [providing] nurturing behaviors” 

such as “keeping the child safe and secure,” and that Father was unable to 

perform those behaviors while incarcerated. The record also demonstrates 

that DCS attempted to facilitate video visitation and that Father was, at 

times, the reason that visits could not occur.

¶19 Lastly, Father asserts the court failed to consider his efforts to 

better himself. To the contrary, the court expressly considered his efforts 
CARL P. v. DCS, C.P.

Decision of the Court

6 

but determined that the effects of Father’s incarceration, including a “lack 

of presence . . . lack of support, lack of supervision, lack of nurturing, lack 

of safety and protection, inability to meet the needs of the child, and lack of 

permanency,” weighed in favor of termination. 

¶20 Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding 

that Father’s sentence would deprive C.P. of a “normal home for a period 

of years” based on A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4) and all of the factors set forth in 

Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251-52, ¶ 29. 

II. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Best Interests Finding

¶21 The juvenile court must also find, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that terminating the parent-child relationship is in the child’s best 

interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 288, ¶ 41. In conducting the 

best interests inquiry, the juvenile court must find that the child would 

either “benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation of the 

relationship.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990).

¶22 Father contends C.P. would not be harmed by a continuation 

of the parent-child relationship because C.P. “would remain with 

[m]aternal Grandmother and his needs would continue to be met.”

However, when severance of the parent-child relationship will benefit the 

child, the best interests determination may also be satisfied. See id. 

¶23 Here, the juvenile court found that termination was in C.P.’s 

best interests because Grandmother was “meeting all of his needs” and

because termination would “further the plan of adoption, which would 

provide the child with permanency and stability.” See Demetrius L. v. 

Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 12 (2016) (“When a . . . child’s needs [are being 

met] and the child’s prospective adoption is otherwise legally possible and 

likely, a juvenile court may find that termination of parental rights, so as to 

permit adoption, is in the child’s best interests.”); see also Audra T. v. Ariz.

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 5 (App. 1998) (a court “may properly 

consider in favor of severance,” factors that include “the immediate 

availability of an adoptive placement” and “whether an existing placement 

is meeting the needs of the child”).

¶24 Because reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

finding that Grandmother is meeting C.P.’s needs, and that C.P. is 

prospectively adoptable by Grandmother, the court did not err in 

concluding that termination was in C.P.’s best interests.
CARL P. v. DCS, C.P.

Decision of the Court

7 

CONCLUSION

¶25 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s 

termination order.