UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

CHRISTOPHER SCOTT SMITH, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 21-5057 

(D.C. No. 4:20-CR-00298-GKF-1) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before MATHESON, BACHARACH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

A federal grand jury in the Northern District of Oklahoma indicted Christopher 

Smith on a single count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. 

See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C). Smith entered a conditional plea of 

guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Exercising 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

July 1, 2022

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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BACKGROUND1

Smith was riding his bicycle near 58th Street and Peoria Avenue in Tulsa, 

Oklahoma when Officer Kenneth Stewart of the Tulsa Police Department stopped 

him. Smith was travelling northbound on Peoria on the right side of the street. 

Because there were obstructions in his path, he moved from the right-hand side of the 

street to the left-hand side of the street, crossing four traffic lanes. He did not signal 

before this maneuver. 

After stopping Smith, Officer Stewart ran a records check showing an active 

arrest warrant from the Muscogee (Creek) Nation. Officer Stewart asked Smith if he 

had anything illegal on him. Smith responded: “Yes, I have a pipe in my pocket.” 

R. vol. 2 at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). After asking Smith to step off the 

bicycle, Officer Stewart removed a pipe with a white crystalline substance inside it. 

He then removed some backpacks Smith was carrying and gave them to Sergeant 

Joshua Goldstein, who had arrived on the scene. Officer Goldstein searched the 

backpacks and found a container with 26.77 grams of a substance that tested 

presumptive positive for methamphetamine, a set of digital scales, and several empty 

plastic baggies. The officers arrested Smith, leading to his federal indictment. 

Smith filed a motion “to suppress all evidence seized, whether tangible or 

intangible, which were the fruits of the seizure and search.” R. vol. 1 at 26. In his 

1

 This factual summary comes from the findings of the district court, none of 

which Smith challenges as clearly erroneous. See United States v. Loera, 923 F.3d 

907, 914 (10th Cir. 2019). 

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motion, Smith challenged the legality of the initial stop and the subsequent search of 

his backpacks. The government filed a response, and the court held a hearing at 

which Smith, Officer Stewart, and Sergeant Goldstein testified. The court also 

considered Officer Stewart’s bodycam video, the outstanding bench warrant, the 

Tulsa Police Department’s written “personal searches” policy, and the arrest report. 

The court denied Smith’s motion, concluding that Officer Stewart had reasonable 

suspicion for the stop and that the search of the backpacks was valid as incident to 

Smith’s arrest. 

Alternatively, the court concluded the inevitable discovery doctrine precluded 

suppression—even if the roadside search was illegal, the police would have found the 

items when conducting an inventory of Smith’s property after they arrested him. See 

United States v. Cunningham, 413 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2005) (“The inevitable 

discovery doctrine provides an exception to the exclusionary rule[] and permits 

evidence to be admitted if an independent, lawful police investigation inevitably 

would have discovered it.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). This 

appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION 

When reviewing a “denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the government and accept the district court’s factual findings 

unless they are clearly erroneous, but the ultimate question of reasonableness under 

the Fourth Amendment is a legal conclusion that we review de novo.” United States 

v. Loera, 923 F.3d 907, 914 (10th Cir. 2019) (brackets, citation, and internal 

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quotation marks omitted). The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people 

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 

searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A traffic stop is a seizure within 

the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even though the purpose of the stop is limited 

and the resulting detention quite brief.” United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 

786 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because “[a]n ordinary 

traffic stop is . . . more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial 

arrest,” however, “[w]e . . . analyze such stops under the principles pertaining to 

investigative detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).” Id. (parallel 

citations omitted). “To determine the reasonableness of an investigative detention, 

we make a dual inquiry, asking first whether the officer’s action was justified at its 

inception, and second whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 

which justified the interference in the first place.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

We agree with the district court that the stop was justified at its inception 

because Officer Stewart observed Smith change lanes without signaling his intent to 

do so. This action constitutes a potential violation of Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 11-604(A) 

and chapter 10, § 640(B) of the Tulsa Revised Traffic Code. Both the Oklahoma 

Highway Safety Code and the Tulsa Traffic Code apply to bicyclists on public 

roadways. See Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 11-1202; Tulsa Revised Traffic Code ch. 10, 

§ 1000. Smith argues that Officer Stewart made no mention of the failure to signal in 

his police report, did not mention the failure to signal during the stop, and did not 

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issue a citation for failure to signal.2

 But “[w]hether reasonable suspicion exists is an 

objective inquiry determined by the totality of the circumstances, and an officer’s 

subjective motivation for the stop plays no role in ordinary reasonable suspicion 

Fourth Amendment analysis.” United States v. Salas, 756 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 

2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Smith also argues the records check was inconsistent with the purpose for the 

stop, but “[t]his court has routinely permitted officers to conduct criminal-history 

checks during traffic stops in the interest of officer safety.” United States v. 

Mayville, 955 F.3d 825, 830 (10th Cir. 2020). Relatedly, Smith asserts Officer 

Stewart unreasonably prolonged the stop by asking Smith if he was carrying anything 

illegal. In support of this argument, he cites United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 

498, 509–13 (4th Cir. 2011), in which the Fourth Circuit held an officer 

impermissibly extended the scope of a traffic stop by engaging in a lengthy 

investigation of potential drug trafficking unsupported by reasonable suspicion. 

Unlike in Digiovanni, however, by the time Officer Stewart asked Smith 

whether he was carrying anything illegal on him, he had already discovered the 

outstanding arrest warrant. The record thus belies Smith’s assertion that, at that 

point, the mission of the traffic stop was still limited to issuing a citation for failure 

2

 Although Officer Stewart’s arrest report refers to the penalty section of the 

Oklahoma Highway Safety Code for bicycle violations, see R. vol. 1 at 22, and 

explains that Officer Stewart observed Smith “ride a bicycle across four lanes of 

traffic” and that he then “conducted a pedestrian stop on the subject for the bicycle 

violations,” id. at 23, the report does not specify what traffic laws Smith allegedly 

violated on his bicycle. 

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to signal. And Smith offers no basis to conclude that this single question—which 

elicited an affirmative answer and the discovery of drug paraphernalia—meaningfully 

extended the scope or duration of the stop. 

Finally, Smith challenges the district court’s application of the searchincident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement to the search of his 

backpacks. But we need not consider this challenge because the district court also 

denied the suppression motion on the basis of inevitable discovery. “If the district 

court states multiple alternative grounds for its ruling and the appellant does not 

challenge all those grounds in the opening brief, then we may affirm the ruling.” 

Rivero v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M., 950 F.3d 754, 763 (10th Cir. 2020). Smith 

does not challenge the inevitable-discovery ground for the district court’s ruling, so 

we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress on this ground. 

CONCLUSION 

We affirm the denial of the motion to suppress. 

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge 

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