About the Report

On January 19, 2011, the National Academy of Sciences 

Committee on International Security and Arms Control, with 

cooperation and financial support from the United States 

Institute of Peace, held a symposium titled “From Reykjavik 

to New START: Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security in the 

21st Century.” Participants were distinguished experts from 

the United States and Russia, including scientists, diplomats, 

and high-level government officials. The meeting identified 

lessons from past science diplomacy, but focused on what 

can be accomplished today and in the future through science 

diplomacy. This report summarizes the main ideas offered 

during the symposium. The opinions expressed here are those 

of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of 

all symposium participants, the National Academy of Sciences 

Committee on International Security and Arms Control, or the 

United States Institute of Peace. Micah Lowenthal is director of 

the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of 

the National Academy of Sciences.

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 288 October 2011

© 2011 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Micah D. Lowenthal

Science Diplomacy for 

Nuclear Security

Summary

•	 The history of science diplomacy for nuclear security is rich and includes, for example, 

establishing confidence in the verifiability of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, paving the 

way to many nonproliferation efforts, and damping potentially drastic responses to actions 

perceived by adversaries as provocative. 

•	 The ingredients for success in science diplomacy may be summarized in terms of seven 

factors: openness to new possibilities, vision and leadership, good science, human connections, communication, time, and self-interest. 

•	 Experts from Russia and the United States have identified topics that would benefit from or 

demand science diplomacy: nuclear energy and nonproliferation, nuclear arms reductions, 

countering nuclear terrorism, cooperation on ballistic missile defense, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Differing perspectives on goals in these areas, however, 

provide new opportunities to work together to promote security. 

•	 A variety of policy measures and physical safeguards have been put in place to prevent 

nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Because of the technical complexities of nearly 

every aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle and its potential for exploitation and terrorism, science diplomacy can continue to make substantial contributions on these topics.

•	 Verification of treaties, including nuclear arms reductions and test bans, is perhaps the topic 

within arms control most susceptible to technical options. Joint exploration and development of technical options to enable proposals for verification of treaties is a valuable topic 

in which science diplomacy has an essential role to play. 

•	 Cooperation on ballistic missile defense (BMD) is an area of tension between the United 

States and Russia today. Such cooperation has technical and political dimensions. So far, 

the political discussions have resurfaced underlying suspicions, suggesting that science 

diplomacy is the stronger option for building confidence and identifying technical options 

that enable BMD cooperation.

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Contents

Introduction 2

Major Lessons for Success in Science Diplomacy 3

Areas for Future U.S.-Russia Science Diplomacy 8

Conclusion 12
2

•	 Although the Cold War is over, the variety of nuclear and other threats has grown, and science diplomacy is needed now more than ever to address those threats.

•	 Science diplomacy practitioners who are daunted by the sensitivity of the topics of the 

day must remember the successes in science diplomacy between the United States and 

the Soviet Union concerning nuclear weapons. The topics are important in part because 

they are so sensitive, and today’s generations owe it to future generations to take on the 

challenge of science diplomacy to address the new and vexing security challenges the world 

faces in the twenty-first century.

Introduction

“In the tragic situation which confronts humanity, we feel that scientists should assemble 

in conference to appraise the perils that have arisen as a result of the development of weapons of mass destruction, and to discuss a resolution in the spirit of the appended draft.” 

So began the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, issued in July 1955. Some of the most prominent 

scientists of the time, seeing a dire threat to humanity, called upon their fellow scientists to 

meet and reach agreement on a course of action to alleviate the threat from nuclear weapons. At times, it seems miraculous that the world survived the Cold War without a nuclear 

attack, either accidental or intentional. Perhaps it was indeed a miracle, but whatever other 

forces were at play, it must be said that science diplomacy played its part in reducing tensions, enhancing mutual understanding, and promoting technical solutions to problems of 

international security.

The global community faces other major nuclear threats today. In the words of former 

secretary of defense William Perry, 

The most dangerous issue facing the world today is a confluence of these two dangerous 

trends: proliferation of nuclear weapons and the rise of catastrophic terrorism. . . . What 

remains to be done is much more difficult than what we have done so far. . . . Time 

is not on our side, and having helped build the nuclear arsenal, we have a special 

responsibility to work to eliminate these threats. 

Secretary Perry spoke these words on January 19, 2011, when the National Academy 

of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), with 

cooperation and financial support from the United States Institute of Peace’s Center of 

Innovation: Science, Technology, and Peacebuilding, called together a distinguished group 

of scientists and policymakers for a one-day symposium titled “From Reykjavik to New 

START: Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security in the 21st Century.” Four weeks after the U.S. 

Senate provided its advice and consent on ratification of the new Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty (New START), nearly twenty-five years after the historic Reykjavik Summit, where U.S. 

and Soviet leaders flirted with the abolition of nuclear weapons, and fifty-six years after 

Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein called on scientists to work for peace, these experts 

from the United States and Russia focused on science diplomacy in support of international 

nuclear security, drawing from the lessons of the past, but focusing on what can be accomplished today and in the future. 

What is science diplomacy? Alan Leshner of the American Association for the Advancement of Science described science diplomacy as international science cooperation to foster 

communication and cooperation among peoples of diverse nations and to promote greater 

global peace, prosperity, and stability.1 This can include science informing diplomacy and 

diplomacy supporting science, but in the context of the work of CISAC and other similar nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), it can also mean providing an alternative channel for 

international communication through the discussion of scientific aspects of international 

issues. Such discussions have the advantage of being fact based, potentially more objective 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy •

George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor of 

Practice, The George Washington University • Judy Ansley,

Former Assistant to the President and Deputy Security 

Adviser under President George W. Bush • Anne H. Cahn,

Former Scholar in Residence, American University 

• Chester A. Crocker, James R. Schlesinger Professor of 

Strategic Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown 

University • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy 

Center for Justice and Human Rights • Ikram U. Khan,

President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC • Stephen D. Krasner,

Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, 

Stanford University • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive 

Director of the National Council on Independent Living 

• Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor, George Mason School of Law 

• Judy Van Rest, Executive Vice President, International 

Republican Institute • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy •

Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
3

than typical diplomatic discussions, and in many cases less susceptible to the vicissitudes 

of standard diplomatic relations.

Many of the symposium participants have engaged in science diplomacy through CISAC, 

which was formed in 1980 as a standing committee of the NAS to “act as a vehicle for discussions with comparable bodies in other countries,” specifically the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Those interactions began in 1981. Richard Garwin, William Perry, Rose Gottemoeller, 

Evgeniy Avrorin, Roald Sagdeev, Raymond Jeanloz, Christopher Chyba, John Ahearne, Norman Neureiter, Stephen P. Cohen, Nikolai Ponomarev-Stepnoi, Viktor Firsov, and Viktor Yesin 

(all current or former CISAC members) spoke at the event, as did William Colglazier, Richard 

Solomon, Thomas Cochran, C. Paul Robinson, Thomas D’Agostino, Sheldon Himelfarb, Cathleen Campbell, and David Albright. Only Gottemoeller, as U.S. assistant secretary of state 

and chief negotiator of New START, and D’Agostino, as U.S. under secretary of energy for 

nuclear security, spoke in an official capacity; the others’ remarks were provided in a personal capacity and may not reflect the views of their home governments or organizations.

This report summarizes the main ideas offered during the symposium. Several major 

themes emerged from the symposium talks and the discussions that followed. This report 

is organized to identify what some participants characterized as essential ingredients for 

successful science diplomacy on nuclear security and promising areas for science diplomacy 

to contribute to nuclear security in the twenty-first century.2

Major Lessons for Success in Science Diplomacy

“We have to remember that science is the foundation for the development of all 

weapons of mass destruction, and scientists also create the basis for monitoring and 

verification technologies for reducing arsenals. International science cooperation can 

create a basis for trust and confidence, and the climate of confidence is the key element 

needed to eliminate nuclear weapons. So we have to deal with nuclear proliferation 

and nuclear disarmament.”

—Evgeniy Avrorin

A sense of responsibility motivates many of the scientists engaged in science diplomacy 

who are working to increase security by building greater mutual confidence. Diplomats, 

military leaders, politicians, religious leaders, NGO experts, and others all have valuable 

capabilities they can bring to bear on these challenges. At their best, scientists acknowledge 

other points of view and evaluate ideas based on the ideas’ merits, not on who proposes 

them. This is fundamental to science. Avrorin said that in experiments “we understand that 

the results are unpredictable, there are various opinions, and the results must be tested.” 

Scientists and science diplomacy have this to offer, an important and valuable perspective 

that can temper the mix of competing positions on such important issues. 

The key ingredients for success in science diplomacy include the following: 

Being Open to New Possibilities 

“I was not convinced that the Cold War really was over. But just one year later, one year 

after Reykjavik, I did become convinced that the Cold War was over. I was attending a 

meeting of American and Russian scientists . . . the fifth in a series of meetings we’ve 

held since 1981. Some of you, in fact, were at that meeting.” 

—William Perry

Secretary Perry described his early 1980s belief that nuclear weapons were a necessary 

danger, required to maintain an uneasy peace in the Cold War. He noted that in years of 

meetings between U.S. and Soviet experts, the Soviets had followed a tight script dictated 

by the Kremlin, and the Kremlin’s position was bellicose and uncompromising. The first 

indication that Secretary Perry got that the Cold War might be coming to an end and that 
4

nuclear weapons might not be necessary in the future occurred during a U.S.-Soviet science 

diplomacy meeting around 1987. For the first time, he witnessed disagreements among 

the Soviet participants, more in fact than between the U.S. and Russian delegations. He 

could see that glasnost was real, meaningful dialogue was possible, and the Cold War was 

winding down. 

Having a Vision and Exercising Leadership

“If you’re constantly mired in what is and you never look at what ought to be, you’re 

never going to really get anywhere.”

—former U.S. secretary of state George Shultz3

A few years after Secretary Perry’s observation of new openness in Russia, that same openness was exhibited in dramatic fashion in an exercise that would have been hard to reconcile 

with the common understanding of the Cold War rivalry, which was beginning to fall apart. 

The Soviet Union arranged for the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Natural Resources 

Defense Council (NRDC), an NGO in the United States, to carry out a set of measurements 

of the radiation from a real warhead on a Soviet Navy ship in 1989. (The experiments are 

described in the next section.) Roald Sagdeev said that the importance of this experiment 

was “displaying that the Gorbachev government was ready to provide such a transparency, 

plus Glasnost extended to gamma rays and neutrons even” from nuclear weapons.

Thomas Cochran of the United States and Evgeny Velikhov, a Soviet Academy member 

and scientific adviser to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, conceived this experiment, 

known as the Black Sea Experiment as a next step after the U.S.-USSR Test Ban Verification 

Project—a joint Soviet Academy-NRDC effort using seismic monitors to measure chemical 

explosions adjacent to U.S. and Soviet test sites. Dr. Cochran credits Dr. Velikhov, a bold 

scientist and a risk taker who had Gorbachev’s ear, and Gorbachev, himself, for having the 

vision and exercising the leadership to make the Black Sea Experiment a reality. Dr. Velikhov 

and Dr. Cochran knew the value of conducting the experiment as a demonstration of what 

Dr. Sagdeev, Frank von Hippel, and others had calculated in studies. The demonstration provided a publicly known technical reference point for political debate over nuclear reductions 

and verification. The fact that this was a joint effort, too, helped illustrate that cooperation 

and joint understanding were possible. 

Secretary Perry publicly talked about his work toward nuclear arms elimination with Secretary Shultz, former senator Sam Nunn, and former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, in an 

op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal in January 2007. “We were amazed at the worldwide 

response to that op-ed. . . . It stimulated the creation of comparable groups in many other 

countries. We came to be called “the gang of four” in the United States, but there were 

gangs of four formed all over the world, in Germany, in England, in France, and even in Russia 

and China.” The vision of these four men to pursue this goal now, even though its realization 

may be many years in the future, constitutes leadership, evidenced in the inspiration it has 

provided to others. 

Pursuing Good Science 

“The [Joint Verification Experiment] was a success because we had a clearly 

defined purpose, preliminary analyses of the working conditions at test sites, 

detailed scenarios—like a phonebook—and thorough preparation of personnel and 

equipment.”

—Evgeniy N. Avrorin

“The [Joint Verification Experiment] was path breaking at its time, and it set the gold 

standard for government-to-government efforts.”

—Rose Gottemoeller 
5

Viktor Firsov extolled the value of joint measurements of nuclear explosions at Semipalatinsk and Nevada (the main Soviet and U.S. test sites, respectively) to understand the 

transmission of seismic signals through the geologic media and formations at the sites. 

Differences in the characteristics at the sites had led some to question whether the Soviet 

Union was complying with its commitments under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), 

which in turn led the U.S. Senate to withhold its consent for ratification of the treaty. The 

relatively soft rock at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) absorbs more of the energy from a nuclear 

explosion than the hard rock at Semipalatinsk, dampening slightly the seismic waves from 

U.S. nuclear explosions. Therefore, an explosion of a given magnitude in Russia produced 

a larger signal, which without proper calibration was misinterpreted by the Americans as a 

larger explosion. 

For the Joint Verification Experiments (JVE), three measurement stations were built in 

each nation. Dr. Firsov carried out seismic background measurements and recorded data from 

the U.S. nuclear test explosion at the Black Hills station. U.S. and Soviet colleagues shared 

data from measurements at the various stations and shared historical data from measurements of explosions at the two test sites. They worked out their own methods for evaluating 

yields at the two sites and reconciled them. These experiments conducted in 1988 made 

possible the technology of mutually agreed seismic monitoring of nuclear explosions. 

The scientists had two months of discussion in Geneva after the JVE. Dr. Avrorin 

described this open discussion of every possible error and explanation of every detail 

as the most important part of the activity. Working through disagreements with sometimes heated discussions to reach high confidence in the results also raised the level of 

trust and confidence between the U.S. and Soviet experts, which built the foundation 

for future dialogue.

The Black Sea Experiment, discussed in the previous section, was actually a set of seven 

experiments to study whether a variety of radiation detectors could detect a nuclear warhead on a ship. The flagship of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet was made available with a nuclear 

armed missile in one of the launch tubes. The measurements were taken on July 5, 1989, 

near Yalta. The question at hand was whether an agreement to limit or ban sea-launched 

cruise missiles (SLCMs) could be verified. A government-to-government agreement to conduct such experiments had not led to action. 

Ironically, part of the impetus for the Black Sea Experiment was a response to bad science. Professor Sagdeev explained that a Soviet institute had claimed that neutrons emitted 

by nuclear weapons containing plutonium would create argon-42 in the air around them and 

that detectors one hundred kilometers away could detect the radioactive argon carried by 

the wind. Although this claim is demonstrably false (the neutron flux is too small, the argon 

concentration is too small, and air transport over even a relatively small distance would 

dilute the argon to levels indistinguishable from background), the idea had captured the 

imagination of some people in leadership positions. The Black Sea Experiment put to test 

several detectors—germanium, sodium iodide, helium-3—positioned in different locations 

relative to the nuclear weapon. Some were handheld and operated on the ship, some were 

in a helicopter, some were on a nearby boat, and some were on the dock farther away. Only 

the nearest detectors (on the ship and in the helicopter) detected the weapon and acquired 

sufficient data to verify the number of weapons on the ship. 

As a one-time experiment with limited measurements and no opportunity to evaluate 

the sensitivity of the results or to follow up with additional experiments, the Black Sea 

Experiment is not a model for scientific research. However, as a model of science diplomacy, 

it was a success. Dr. Avrorin described the Soviet scientists’ concerns that gamma-detector 

measurements could reveal information about the design of the nuclear explosive. The chief 

Working through disagreements 

. . . raised the level of trust and 

confidence between the U.S. and 

Soviet experts, which built the 

foundation for future dialogue.
6

designer of Soviet nuclear weapons personally oversaw the experiment and confirmed that 

the detectors could verify the presence of the weapon but could not show technical details 

or the configuration of the nuclear explosive. As noted, this is important because it opened 

the way to transparent dismantlement of nuclear weapons, demonstrating verification by 

nonintrusive technology.

Making a Human Connection 

“The lesson of the importance of human nature, of people working together on a 

common goal, also is a key takeaway from this. When we started, the tensions of the 

Cold War made everybody nervous about every step of the way. When we finished, we 

not only understood the material and the capabilities of the verification measures, but 

we understood the people who had been working in great secrecy on the other side. 

And that mutual respect that grew, I think, has led to a lot of other areas, such as 

lab-to-lab collaborations, and the initial efforts on safe, secure dismantlement, and I 

believe it can continue on to bolster future efforts as well.”

—C. Paul Robinson

Scientists in the nuclear-weapons establishments of the United States and the Soviet Union 

studied the same topics, grappled with the same problems, and dedicated themselves to 

cloistered careers developing devastating weapons whose destructive capabilities most 

of them hoped would never be used. The secretive work was carried out walled off from 

everyday life, isolating the community of weapons scientists if not the individuals. These 

scientists, from nations that stood as adversaries and deployed vast numbers of nuclear 

weapons to counter each other’s forces, found as they worked together that they had a 

great deal in common. Through joint work, they built respect for each other as peers and 

colleagues and established connections at a personal level. These are the ingredients for 

trust and confidence, which are foundations for peacebuilding.

In the context of the JVE, Dr. Avrorin described the development of antiintrusive equipment to forgo exploiting the opportunity to take measurements of data that were out of 

bounds. This deliberate effort to not acquire unnecessary information and to establish 

equality where neither side felt that the other was gaining advantage illustrated a measure 

of trust and confidence and provided useful technical information. 

Can the trust and confidence associated with science diplomacy be abused? Gerald 

Epstein of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) asked precisely 

this question. The answer was, of course, yes. Examples were given showing that it is a 

particular problem with clandestine programs, but not necessarily a categorical problem for 

science diplomacy itself.

David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), 

has used science to promote progress on the international stage in security matters by using 

scientific analysis to establish a public baseline of facts. His approach, however, relies on 

open-source information. For example, he and his colleagues have used commercially available satellite imagery to examine supposedly clandestine nuclear production facilities and 

to evaluate the operating status and capacity of known facilities. In the case of Iran, he 

and his colleagues figured out that an undeclared nuclear site was actually a gas centrifuge 

plant. Public disclosure of the images pushed Iran to allow the IAEA to visit the site. This 

showed that, at least in this case, Iran could be pressured to open up and that “images 

broadcast with analysis can be a very powerful tool to further diplomacy.”

Unlike the science diplomacy described throughout the rest of the symposium, 

Dr. Albright’s approach is not a cooperative effort between scientists from countries in 

conflict. With Iran, Albright said, “you almost have to have conflict with them to have an 

honest discussion. There have been many, many efforts by the Iranians to draw scientists 

in to take positions that really are aimed at creating division here, particularly with U.S. 

Scientists, from nations that 

stood as adversaries and 

deployed vast numbers of 

nuclear weapons to counter 

each other's forces, found as 

they worked together that they 

had a great deal in common.
7

government positions. You have to be extremely careful in interacting with Iranians on 

nuclear issues.” 

Communicating 

“[A]mong practitioners, science is a global enterprise, scientists have a common 

language; they have common bonds that transcend cultures and transcend political 

differences. And because of that, scientists can be very effective ways to communicate 

between the different countries even when relations between different governments 

might be very difficult.”

—William Colglazier

There are two major barriers to communication, both of which were mentioned during the 

symposium. First, if the parties engaging in science diplomacy have different native languages, high-quality interpretation is critical to success. Dr. Avrorin emphasized this point, 

saying that “the questions were complex, and the discussions were sometimes heated.” The 

interpreters in these cases must be very precise. Second, even if the words are translated 

precisely, their meaning—the subtext and underlying assumptions—might only be communicated implicitly. It is through joint work and indeed arguing over the results and their 

meaning that some of these implicit understandings work their way toward explicit statements whose meanings are understood by both sides.

There is, however, a common starting point. As Colglazier pointed out, the science 

itself has a common language rooted in verifiable facts that should be independent of the 

observer and the practitioner. This is what makes science such a promising basis for building 

understanding and agreement.

Building in the Needed Time

“It is so critical in all of these relationships if you are going to make any progress, you 

have to have trust. There is a process for building it. If you go way back and there is 

no trust, you have to find some way of engaging. That is the secret—to find a way 

and engage it. You cannot jump in and say we are coming to engage on your nuclear 

weapons program. You have got to find some way that the science—in my opinion, 

find some way that you can engage in the science community.”

—Norman Neureiter

In part because of the need to establish a strong scientific basis, a human connection, and 

good communication, effective science diplomacy takes time. Trust and confidence do not 

arise immediately and automatically, especially between ostensible adversaries. Richard 

Garwin noted that the terms of membership in CISAC have necessarily been longer than 

the terms for those serving on other Academy standing committees. This is so that those 

within CISAC could establish trusting relationships and hold effective bilateral discussions. 

Drs. Firsov, Robinson, Ponomarev-Stepnoy, and Avrorin all noted the time and joint efforts 

that were needed under the JVE and the U.S.-Russian lab-to-lab program to establish trust. 

Likewise, Norman Neureiter of the AAAS and Glenn Schweitzer of the NAS have led science engagement efforts in Iran. Of these efforts, which stay away from the controversial 

issues, Dr. Schweitzer said that if the emphasis is on science (“big science and little diplomacy”) then fraud is uncommon. But, “when people try to use the science as the excuse for 

penetrating the security barriers, then I think you have real problems.” Neureiter described 

how to work from a deficit of trust, establishing a process for building trust. Beginning with 

some noncontroversial topic for engagement in the science community, “You really kind 

of start it off with the hope that this will diffuse around the society, have an impact on 

other people, and there may be a time politically when you will talk to the nuclear people. 

Or there may be a time not politically when it will just diffuse. Other people in the other 

country will begin to say, hey, there really is a problem here and maybe we need to take 

Because of the need to establish 

a strong scientific basis, a 

human connection, and good 

communication, effective science 

diplomacy takes time.
8

advantage of this trustworthy dialogue between the science communities to carry it a little 

bit further.” 

Understanding Self-Interest

“The Indians quietly let it be known that they did not want America to be trying to 

pace their relationship with Pakistan.”

—Norman Neureiter

Sovereign nations make their own decisions. They might be pressured, cajoled, or reasoned with, 

but on critical matters of national interest, they make their own decisions based on what they see 

as being in their best self-interest. This self-interest places limits on how much they can be told 

what to do. Commenting on what India and Pakistan can learn from the Cold War experience of 

the United States and the Soviet Union, Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution said, “I think 

that people learn from their own mistakes. They do not learn from the mistakes of others.”

Dr. Avrorin made an argument for using positive incentives to persuade nations not to create nuclear weapons. “Assistance and technical support and economic and financial support in 

the creation of systems of control, and the systems in the creation of the nuclear energy in the 

countries that can guarantee that they are not aiming to create nuclear weapons.” This approach, 

favoring carrots over sticks, was discussed further in the context of Pakistan. Although the 

United States has spent billions of dollars in Pakistan, Pakistan is increasing its nuclear arsenal 

and might conduct further nuclear explosions to modernize its weapons before entering into the 

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Dr. Cohen remarked that “the biggest carrot would 

have been a nuclear deal for Pakistan.” Such an incentive might or might not have been possible, 

but it suggests that diplomacy has an opportunity to give alternative paths when nations conclude that it is not in their overriding self-interest to escalate nuclear competitions. 

Areas for Future U.S.-Russia Science Diplomacy

Recent progress in the U.S.-Russia relationship provides fertile ground for science diplomacy 

between the two nations, as do the areas where there has not been progress. As Assistant 

Secretary Gottemoeller noted, the U.S.-Russian Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, also known as the U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement, came into force on 

January 11, 2011. The agreement normalizes and expands cooperation in nuclear energy and 

enables cooperation on technology development for nuclear nonproliferation programs, nuclear 

forensics, and safeguards and monitoring programs. The 123 Agreement is only a legal framework authorizing such work, so it is now up to the parties to identify the substantive work to be 

done under the agreement and to take the steps necessary to make that joint work successful.

Secretary Perry listed a set of technical issues the world will face as it moves toward a 

follow-on arms control treaty and lower numbers of nuclear weapons, or zero nuclear weapons. They range from cooperation on ballistic missile defense to verification of warheads 

and treaties. Secretary Perry called these technical challenges special challenges to CISAC 

and others in the technical community engaged in science diplomacy. His list, as well as 

issues highlighted by Dr. Garwin and others, are as follows:

Safeguarding Nuclear Power and Contributing to Nonproliferation Regimes

“When we are considering the export of nuclear reactors and fuel to third countries, we need 

to make sure that we arrive at a solution that will not contribute to proliferation.”

—Nikolai N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy

Nuclear power is inextricably linked to a risk of proliferation because of the materials and 

technologies involved. Some nuclear-fuel-cycle technologies and some nuclear materials 
9

are less attractive or less effective for nuclear-weapons applications, but some level of risk 

always remains. For this reason, a variety of policy measures and physical safeguards has 

been put in place, and numerous others are being analyzed and considered. International 

agreements and commitments to physical safeguards, technologies, efforts for detection 

of undeclared facilities, and export controls for sensitive technologies, all contribute to a 

healthy nuclear nonproliferation regime. Because of the technical complexities of nearly 

every aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle and its potential exploitation for proliferation, science 

diplomacy can continue to make substantial contributions on this topic.

Verifying Nuclear Arms Reductions

“These negotiations [over reductions in strategic and nonstrategic arsenals] will only be 

fruitful or productive if the parties are successful in establishing mutually acceptable 

verification mechanisms.”

—Viktor I. Yesin

“Establishing the verification measures in transparency tools . . . will help us ensure 

confidence as we move from step to step. This isn’t going to happen without a 

strong scientific and technology base, because we have to have confidence that we 

collectively, the big we, know what’s going on in this area.”

—Under Secretary of Energy Thomas D’Agostino

In the debate over advice and consent on the ratification of the New START, the U.S. Senate 

made clear that the next step for nuclear arms control must include nonstrategic (tactical) 

nuclear weapons in Russia. Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller noted that the United States 

and Russia are preparing for a dialogue on nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and she highlighted the role of NGOs in providing analysis and ideas for this dialogue, “providing much, very 

welcome food for thought for those of us working these matters inside the government.” 

Under Secretary D’Agostino noted that a prominent challenge among the many associated 

with including tactical nuclear weapons in an arms control or reduction treaty is verification. 

Verification is also perhaps the topic most susceptible to technical options.

General Viktor I. Yesin, former chief of staff of the Strategic Rocket Forces in Russia, 

proposed a course of action for verification of reductions in tactical nuclear weapons: (1) 

declare the number of existing weapons, (2) categorize the weapons into an active stockpile 

(deployable) and an inactive reserve subject to elimination, (3) agree that inactive reserve 

weapons cannot be made active, and (4) separate the storage facilities for the two categories. If these conditions are met, there could be on-site inspections of storage sites of both 

categories of weapons. The goal of each on-site inspection would be to ensure that the 

number of warheads in each storage facility does not exceed what is declared. The number in 

each category sent to elimination is also verifiable based on the amount of nuclear material 

obtained from elimination. 

There are technical details in General Yesin’s ideas that would require further development and refinement, as lingering doubts about possible undeclared sites and shielded 

weapons, among other issues, would need to be addressed. The same is true for nearly any 

such proposal. Secretary Perry said that the verification of warheads, as distinct from missiles and deployments, is a great technological challenge. Joint exploration and development of technical options to enable proposals for verification of declarations and reductions 

is a valuable topic where science diplomacy has an essential role to play. 

Countering Nuclear Terrorism 

“Should we really wait for nuclear terrorism, compared to which 9/11 will appear an 

innocent joke?”

—Evgeniy Avrorin
10

“[T]he stocks [of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium] have grown. Terrorism 

has become a serious problem. But the sense of danger seems to be muted, except 

perhaps for some people here today.”

—John Ahearne

It has been noted that the knowledge of how to build a crude nuclear explosive is within the 

reach of many, and that the difficulty in acquiring the fissile material for the nuclear explosive 

is the main obstacle to nuclear terrorism. Little progress has been made on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), and even this measure would only stop future production of fissile 

material, not address nuclear material already in existence. In discussing disposition of HEU 

and plutonium, Ahearne expressed his view that the sheer quantity of HEU and plutonium in 

storage is a hazard. Some aspects of verification of an FMCT and declarations of existing stocks 

are difficult, but for those who share Dr. Ahearne’s concern about stocks, the challenges cannot 

be avoided. D’Agostino and Gottemoeller both highlighted additional joint activities, such as 

nuclear forensics, which could work to curb nuclear terrorism.

Cooperating on Ballistic Missile Defense

“I can't imagine that at this confidence level we would help each other to intercept 

intercontinental weapons. But as far as intercepting the missiles that we don't have, 

midrange and short range, here we have wide horizons and open opportunity for 

cooperation. That cooperation especially is important because other countries did not 

follow Russia and United States in their INF treaty, despite the fact that this goal was 

approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations.”

—Viktor Yesin

U.S. president Ronald Reagan was willing to pursue significant reductions in strategic weapons and even consider the elimination of nuclear weapons, but he was totally committed 

to developing a U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD). General Secretary Gorbachev and many 

others considered BMD to be a destabilizing factor: few believed it would work effectively, 

but war planners tend to assume the worst. To ensure that sufficient damage could be done 

in a response to a BMD-equipped adversary who has launched a first strike, a war planner 

would tend to require a larger nuclear arsenal. President Reagan offered to share the technology with the Soviet Union but, as Roald Sagdeev noted, this offer rang hollow to the 

Soviets given that under Reagan’s administration, the United States would not even share 

milking machines with the Soviets.

Gorbachev and Reagan’s disagreement on BMD was one of the reasons why agreements 

on nuclear reductions or elimination were not reached at the Reykjavik Summit. START was 

agreed to five years later, and research on BMD, which was permitted under the Anti-Ballistic 

Missile (ABM) Treaty, also continued. But in 2001, President George W. Bush withdrew from 

the ABM Treaty and increased efforts on BMD, which remains a continuing source of tension 

and an irritant within U.S.-Russian relations. Once again, the idea of a cooperative or shared 

system has been broached.

Secretary Perry, Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller, General Yesin, and Dr. Garwin all highlighted BMD cooperation as an area of tension between the United States and Russia today. 

Having both technical and political dimensions, BMD cooperation is a topic that naturally 

calls for science diplomacy.

Secretary Perry noted that there has been movement from both sides on the political 

issues and expressed the hope that joint control and design is possible. If the technical 

people can come up with a reasonable way of cooperating meaningfully and participating 

in design, this could avoid the political problem of joint control. Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller said that her deputy is actively talking with Russian counterparts and that there 

is positive momentum coming out of the Lisbon summit. 
11

General Yesin, however, gave a less positive perspective on the outlook, saying that NATO 

and Russia have not established the necessary mutual trust to create a mutual system, in 

which launch decisions are made mutually. He did suggest a path, beginning with a joint 

surveillance capability providing data to two Early Warning Centers, one in Moscow and one 

in Brussels, as Vladimir Putin suggested in 2007. The missile counter forces, he thought, 

would need to be under separate controls to eliminate the “double key.” By dividing geographic responsibilities, the system would avoid striking the same targets at the same time. 

Such a system could, when the political foundation is there, be turned into a fully joint 

system. An essential first step in such negotiations would be agreement on the types of 

missiles the system is meant to intercept. Implicit in General Yesin’s provisions is the lack of 

trust between the two sides. Fully mutual operation would suggest greater confidence that 

the system would not be used by one partner against the other. A system that targets only 

intermediate-range ballistic missiles is the most likely to be politically acceptable, because 

these were eliminated from the United States and Russia under the INF treaty.

Cooperating on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

“I am just surprised at how the United States was successful in chasing itself up a tree.”

—Viktor Firsov

“The monitoring, transparency, and verification challenges alone are daunting, but we 

have talent available to address these challenges, and that talent is quite formidable. 

We are definitely looking forward to partnership with the scientific community both 

here in the United States, in Russia, and with partners around the world to tackle these 

important challenges.”

—Rose Gottemoeller

Secretary Perry cited technical issues associated with the CTBT, including verifiability, as 

another area for science diplomacy, but he noted that reaching agreement on the CTBT in the 

United States would not be easy. In the 2009 report of the Congressional Commission on the 

Strategic Posture of the United States,4 which Perry co-chaired, the CTBT was the only topic 

on which the commission was unable to reach consensus. This division was apparent in the 

symposium, as Paul Robinson expressed his view that the CTBT is flawed and unverifiable and 

Drs. Firsov, Cochran, and Sagdeev characterized the remaining issues as political and logistical 

rather than technical. According to Dr. Firsov, “The detectors, the devices, and methods can 

be developed to verify the treaty.”

The Russian Federation has already ratified the CTBT. The U.S. Senate denied its consent 

to ratify the CTBT in 1999. President Barack Obama has said that he intends to resubmit 

the CTBT to the Senate, a position that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reaffirmed at the 

NPT Review Conference in 2010. The State Department recently indicated that the process of 

educating senators about CTBT will start soon, and the actual ratification debate and vote 

in the Senate is likely to follow after the general election in 2012. Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller argued that much has changed in the decade since the treaty was last considered 

in 1999, including major improvements in the systems available for monitoring and verifying 

the treaty and in the United States’ ability to ensure the reliability of its nuclear stockpile 

without explosive nuclear testing. The administration has commissioned a new National 

Intelligence Estimate and an NAS study on the technical aspects of the CTBT. The latter will 

allow the administration to engage with Congress and the expert communities on the CTBT, 

its verification regime, and related issues.

Some believe that Russia and other countries could help allay some concerns about the 

CTBT in the United States and other countries through technical cooperation. In making a 

different point, Dr. Robinson pointed out that “by sharing this yield data, it was felt that 

this would set the basis for agreement and resolve the pattern of fifteen years of demarches 
back and forth. On the U.S. side, we used an analogy that . . . the philosophy at the core 

of the JVE is that this was try-before-buy verification.” Dr. Garwin suggested that transparency measures at the existing nuclear test sites and further mapping and enhancement of 

the capabilities of the sensors used in the surveillance regime for the CTBT might also assist 

with ratification in the U.S. Senate.

Conclusion

“If you have an apple and I have an apple and we exchange these apples then you 

and I will still each have one apple. But if you have an idea and I have an idea and we 

exchange these ideas, then each of us will have two ideas.”5

—Evgeniy Avrorin 

Some important lessons were learned from the practice of science diplomacy in difficult 

times between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia over the past twenty-five 

years. Although the issues faced today are more complex, these lessons are still pertinent. 

The Cold War may be over, but the variety of threats has grown. Science diplomacy is needed 

now more than ever to address terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear and other potentially 

dangerous technologies, regional rivalries and conflicts, and a set of other critical matters. 

Some of these topics are quite sensitive and officials and scientists today may wonder how 

the topics can be discussed in bilateral or multilateral settings, but they have to remember what has already been accomplished. Because of nuclear weapons’ terrible destructive 

power, nations consider information about them and their potential use to be highly sensitive. But it is precisely this terrible destructive power that makes discussion including 

sharing of information and analyses—and that makes science diplomacy—so important. 

Indeed, this destructive power is what motivated those practitioners quoted in this report 

to succeed. This inspires practitioners of science diplomacy to continue to work together on 

the critical issues for nuclear security today and to find ways to reduce the threats that the 

world faces. All parties owe that to future generations. Science diplomacy played such a key 

role in helping to bridge important gaps to bring an end to the Cold War; it is time to call 

upon this powerful tool to address the new and vexing security challenges the world faces 

in the twenty-first century.

Notes

1. Alan I. Leshner, written testimony, House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Research and 

Science Education, July 15, 2008.

2. An audio recording of the meeting is at http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/cisac/PGA_060004

3. This quote comes from the documentary movie Nuclear Tipping Point, a clip Secretary Perry shared as part of his 

presentation. Secretary Shultz quotes former adviser Max Kampelman.

4. The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States delivered its report to the U.S. 

Congress on May 6, 2009. The commission was supported by the United States Institute of Peace, which also 

issued the report. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s Strategic 

Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (Washington, 

DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), www.usip.org/programs/initiatives/congressional-commissionthe-strategic-posture-the-united-states.

5. This saying is attributed to George Bernard Shaw, but it has also been described as a Russian proverb.

Science diplomacy is needed 

now more than ever to address 

terrorism, the proliferation of 

nuclear and other potentially 

dangerous technologies, regional 

rivalries and conflicts, and a set 

of other critical matters. 

United States 

Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.