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AFRICA’S NEWEST NATION: THE REPUBLIC OF

SOUTHERN SUDAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 16, 2011

Serial No. 112–90

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

KAREN BASS, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Eduardo Hiiboro Kussala, bishop, Diocese of Tambura-Yambio .................. 14

Mr. John Eibner, chief executive officer, Christian Solidarity International—

USA ....................................................................................................................... 23

Ms. Dana Lyons Wilkins, campaigner, Global Witness ........................................ 29

The Honorable Roger Winter (former Special Representative on Sudan, U.S. 

Department of State) ........................................................................................... 36

The Honorable Princeton Lyman, Special Envoy for Sudan, U.S. Department 

of State .................................................................................................................. 45

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Frank Wolf, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Virgnia: Letter to President Obama submitted for the record ........ 11

Mr. Eduardo Hiiboro Kussala: Prepared statement ............................................. 17

Mr. John Eibner: Prepared statement ................................................................... 25

Ms. Dana Lyons Wilkins: Prepared statement ..................................................... 31

The Honorable Roger Winter: Prepared statement .............................................. 39

The Honorable Princeton Lyman: Prepared statement ........................................ 49

Ms. Rajakumari Jandhyala, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development: Prepared statement ............. 70

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 90

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 91

(1)

AFRICA’S NEWEST NATION: THE REPUBLIC 

OF SOUTHERN SUDAN 

THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will come to order. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. We are holding today’s hearing for the 

purpose of focusing on the creation and showing our solidarity with 

the creation of the new nation on the African continent, but also 

of assessing its myriad of challenges in transitioning successfully to 

independence. 

Recent brutal attacks by the Khartoum government on disputed 

areas in the North-South border area have raised alarms about renewed violence in this country that already has suffered far too 

much. For decades, the Government of Sudan in Khartoum has 

waged war, genocide against the people of Southern Sudan and facilitated the enslavement of its people. Even as we meet today, the 

regime of President Omar al-Bashir is seizing territory, causing the 

displacement of more than 100,000 people and killing countless 

other Black Sudanese. 

Sudan, geographically the largest country in Africa, has been 

ravaged by civil war intermittently for 4 decades. The first Sudanese civil war occurred during the period of 1955 to 1972 and the 

second ran from 1983 to 2005. More than 2 million people have 

died in Southern Sudan over the past 2 decades alone due to war 

related causes and famine, and millions have been displaced from 

their homes. 

Since 1989, the United States has maintained multiple sanctions 

against the Government of Sudan because of human rights concerns in Southern Sudan, as well as the western region of Darfur 

and Sudan’s support for international terrorism. 

I have had face-to-face meetings with General Bashir in Khartoum pushing for lasting peace and an end to the abuses of his government. Unfortunately in that meeting he was far more interested 

in discussing the end of U.S. sanctions than he was in discussing 

how to end the suffering that his government and the rebel groups 

it sponsors have inflicted on countless innocent lives. 

2

Beginning in 1995, human rights organizations have raised the 

issue of kidnapping of African Southerners by Arab elements from 

the North in conjunction with the second civil war between the 

North and the South. 

I would note parenthetically that right here in this room, in 

1996, I actually held the first hearing on chattel slavery in Sudan, 

with the focus also on Mauritania, but we did focus primarily on 

Sudan. And we heard from men and women and mothers who had 

had their children kidnapped and sold into slavery. It is now estimated that between 11,000 and 35,000 Sudanese are being held 

against their will and subjected to vicious exploitation and violent 

abuse in the North. 

The Khartoum government claims that slavery is the product of 

intertribal warfare, which is not under its control. However, credible sources indicate that the Government of Sudan was involved 

in arming and otherwise backing numerous militia groups involved 

in kidnapping and enslaving these Southerners. Regardless of who 

initiated their enslavement, their freedom must be secured as part 

of the South’s declaration of independence. 

One Sudanese slave, Simon Deng, escaped and is now living in 

freedom in the United States. Deng said that every night while he 

was in captivity he would go to sleep thinking maybe tomorrow 

someone will come to my rescue. He now goes to sleep thinking of 

those fellow slaves left behind, knowing that they are thinking and 

dreaming the same thought, living on that same hope that tomorrow someone will come to rescue them. 

These people enslaved in the North must not be forgotten in the 

celebration and the inauguration of a new country. The United 

States and the rest of the international community must not let 

their suffering continue. 

On January 9th, South Sudan, as we all know, held a peaceful 

and transparent referendum on Southern secession as called for in 

the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. According to the South 

Sudan Referendum Commission, 98.8 percent voted for secession. 

In early February, Sudanese President Bashir officially accepted 

the result of the referendum. The United States, the African Union, 

the European Union, the U.N., and others endorsed the result as 

well. On July 9, 2011, the Republic of South Sudan will officially 

declare its independence. 

Unfortunately, a mutual military buildup, occasional clashes and 

unresolved issues from the CPA led to a tense atmosphere in the 

Abyei region. On May 19th, according to the U.N. report, a Sudanese Armed Forces Joint Integrated Unit convoys, accompanied by 

U.N. peacekeeping forces, was attacked by the SPLA outside of 

Abyei. The Northern military unit was being moved to a newly 

agreed upon position. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army denied 

deliberately attacking the Northern military unit as retaliation for 

an earlier SAF attack on an SPLA Joint Integrated Unit, but that 

May 19th attack took place in an area controlled by the Southern 

Sudan police force. 

As usual, the Khartoum government has vastly overreacted. 

Northern military forces invaded Abyei, displacing as many as 

100,000 people and began moving Arabs into the area. This ethic 

cleansing of the Abyei area will have a far reaching impact on the 

3

resolution of this dispute. The indiscriminate bombings in Southern 

Kordofan, attacks in the Nuba Mountain area and reported doorto-door murders of non-Arab Africans is creating a scene as horrific 

as any during the civil wars. 

We are nearly on the eve of independence for South Sudan, yet 

many issues remain unresolved. There is the undefined border, citizenship questions regarding Southerners living in the North, governance issues for the post-independence nation, equitable sharing 

of oil revenues, the question of liberation and repatriation of Sudanese still held in bondage and, of course, the continuing Northern 

military attacks. 

The United States, one of the guarantors of the CPA, has a great 

deal at stake in South Sudan’s successful transition to independence. Since 2004, the U.S. has spent $9.8 billion in humanitarian 

and other assistance. But that monetary investment is far outweighed by the moral commitment to see this transition through to 

a successful conclusion. Now we must do all that we can to help 

this new nation come into being in peace and help its government 

to safeguard the life, liberty and fundamental human rights of its 

people. 

I would like to now yield to my friend and colleague, Mr. Payne, 

for his opening comments. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

holding this important hearing. This is a very critical moment in 

the history of Sudan. Many of us have been dealing with Sudan for 

many, many years. And I see my colleague, Mr. Wolf, who has been 

on the battlefield for this issue for so many years. And I want to 

also express my deep appreciation to the witnesses who certainly 

are among the most knowledgeable people on Sudan. Ambassador 

Lyman, the Honorable Roger Winter, former Special Representative on Sudan, USAID Deputy Assistant Administrator, Ms. 

Rajakumari Jandhyala, have all been deeply engaged in the intense international struggle to bring justice and peace to the people 

of Sudan. I would also like to thank the private panel witnesses 

whose engagement is vital in bringing peace and development to 

the people of Sudan and the individuals who for many, many years 

NGOs have made a tremendous goal in working toward a solution 

to the problems in Sudan. And we appreciate all the work that they 

have done over the years. I would like to thank all of you for your 

commitment and selfless determination to make peace in Sudan a 

reality. 

I spoke to President Salva Kiir yesterday. He told me that he is 

committed to a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Later, I will mention some other issues we discussed. But he is determined to withhold any retaliation because he wants to see a peaceful transition 

and the new independent state go into being without disruption. 

Today Sudan is at a crossroads. In less than 23 days, on July 9, 

2011, the world will witness the birth of a new nation, the Republic 

of South Sudan. With independence day rapidly approaching, a 

myriad of issues remain unresolved. Yet, let us not forget that the 

referendum that facilitated this secession is a sign of tremendous 

progress, the peaceful nature of the referendum in which a stunning 98.8 percent of South Sudanese voted for independence was 

4

a testament of the great hope and excitement that lies in the 

hearts of the people of South Sudan. 

Unfortunately, recent violence in Abyei and Southern Kordofan 

also remind us of the important work that remains to be done to 

ensure a peaceful transition to statehood. 

My first visit to Sudan was in 1993, when the SPLA controlled 

a town near the Ugandan border. That was the frontline at that 

time. I saw the suffering of citizens firsthand. Since then, I have 

visited liberated areas over a dozen times, but never to Khartoum. 

I refuse to go to Khartoum because I refuse to recognize an illegitimate government and I will never step my foot into that city. 

With deep sadness, though, I remember visiting Abyei in May 

2008 just after the town had been attacked and burned to the 

ground by Bashir’s forces and pro-government militia. And we have 

some photos that we took. And this was 3 years ago. And the same 

thing happened several days ago. The people of Abyei have suffered 

and suffered. And the suffering should end. It is wrong. It is absolutely wrong. These pictures from that sad day depict the physical 

and human devastation caused by the bombing. The atrocity displaced more than 40,000 people. And upon return, I introduced a 

resolution to highlight this heinous act of violence. We must remember the human cost of such acts of aggression. 

The people of Abyei have suffered severely after prolonged civil 

war. For many of the displaced, the right to return home is increasingly becoming more and more difficult. We do not want to see 

Abyei turn into another longstanding dispute like Kashmir. 

Compounding this is the recent fighting in Southern Kordofan, 

the latest flash point in this conflict. Humanitarian organizations 

on the ground have reported that just 2 days ago, northern forces 

detonated as many as 52 bombs, leaving as many as 7,000 people 

without access to food, water and shelter. There are disturbing reports of Northern forces going door to door to find and kill SPLM 

supporters, as well as denying and manipulating humanitarian assistance and aid. 

The new violence is by no means an isolated or localized incident. 

Bashir has done this before; many, many times. Remember Darfur. 

The people of Darfur are still suffering and many remain in displaced camps on the border of Darfur in Chad. 

South Sudan’s President, Salva Kiir, has shown considerable restraint thus far because he does not want to go to war and seeks 

a peaceful resolution to the crisis. As I mentioned, I spoke to President Salva Kiir yesterday. He confirmed the level of violence and 

aggression by the Bashir regime in Southern Kordofan and Abyei. 

The U.S. must support the people of Southern Sudan by providing support in the security sector so that they can better defend 

themselves. In 2008, President Bush approved a request by the 

South for an air defense system. To this day, this pledge has not 

been fulfilled. The South purchased tanks, but the Obama administration has not allowed the tanks to be delivered from Kenya to 

South Sudan. 

We cannot stand by idly as Bashir continues his aggression, 

brings in his weapons, brings in his planes, brings in his tanks, 

and the U.S. Government said that the South Sudanese cannot 

have a few tanks to try to protect themselves. It is wrong. 

5

Ambassador Lyman, I look forward to hearing the latest update 

on Abyei and Southern Kordofan. The outstanding issues seriously 

endanger the viability of peaceful relations between the North and 

the South. We must use all available diplomatic and political tools, 

including possible sanctions and other accountability measures, to 

ensure progress in the remaining CPA negotiations. 

Despite recent fighting, the U.N. has continued to provide vital 

aid in the region. In order to ensure an effective peacekeeping mission after July 9th, the new UNMIS mission must include a Chapter 7 mandate to adequately protect civilians. Looking past July 

9th, the governor of South Sudan will need our support in order to 

meet the demands of the people. 

South Sudan continues to have some of the worst human development indicators in the world. In a country ravaged by decades 

of war, the challenges are daunting. The U.S. and international 

community must help the Government of South Sudan provide its 

people with health care, education and prosperity in order to ensure peace. South Sudan will need to build infrastructure and to 

provide employment opportunities. 

In an emerging country where oil deposits account for roughly 98 

percent of the region’s revenues, we must also work to ensure the 

new developing economy will be diversified and include sustainable 

land use, agricultural development and conservation, thus ensuring 

stability and shared benefits for the South Sudanese people. Let us 

not forget that peace will depend not only on troops, but on development. 

The United States Government, backed by the steadfast support 

of the American people, have long been a critical partner in the 

Sudan peace process. We must reinforce our past investments in diplomacy and development to ensure that the current progress 

evolves into stability and continued growth. 

In less than 23 days, South Sudan will become the newest nation 

in the world. Like any newborn, the country will be fragile and 

weak and they will need our continued support for decades to come. 

We must remain engaged and commit our support to democracy, 

rule of law, justice, and peace for the people of South Sudan. 

Thank you very much, And I look forward to hearing from the 

witnesses. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Payne. I would like to now yield to 

Mr. Fortenberry. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this 

hearing. Mr. Chairman, my home State of Nebraska has the largest number of Southern Sudanese refugees in the United States. 

And the independence of Southern Sudan was closely followed back 

home and it is a true testament to the character of Nebraskans 

that they supported their neighbors before, during, and after that 

referendum. I have been particularly impressed by the civic engagement of local youth in particular as I hear frequently from students wanting to better understand Sudanese history and circumstances and how they could actually help themselves. 

I met recently with a young Nebraskan, 24 years old, who returned to Southern Sudan to bring needed access to clean water to 

his former community. I learned of a local Omaha church’s work 

to bring portable hospital equipment and medical supplies to unVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:29 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\061611\66903 HFA PsN: SHIRL
6

derserved areas of Southern Sudan as well. The Southern Sudan 

diaspora is strong in Nebraska and refugees, as well as their neighbors and new friends, want to help ensure a stable and successful 

independent state in whatever capacity they can. 

I wish, Mr. Chairman, the story of Southern Sudan’s independence could all be good news as well, neighbor helping neighbor, the 

great humanitarian capacity of the human spirit, the extraordinary 

event of people realizing their highest democratic ideals. But sadly, 

it is not that easy. 

The grave conflict in Abyei and the resulting refugee spillover 

will finally receive much needed attention in this hearing. Knowing 

that Abyei would be the hotspot of any conflict, we have been 

watching this area very closely. And I know Ambassador Lyman 

has been working with painstaking care to broker peace. 

I look forward to learning more about a new temporary DA, Demilitarization Agreement, between the North and the South as the 

Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, according to media reports, 

just said hours ago that it was readying for more fighting. Furthermore, in the last several days my office has received numerous 

alarmed reports from advocacy groups of imminent chemical warfare bombing, executions and ethnic attacks in the Nuba Mountains. Southern Sudan’s Vice President has reported to the U.N. 

Security Council that ethnic cleansing was underway in the South 

Kordofan state, especially against Southern sympathizers in the 

Nuba Mountains. 

While this area is just north of what will be the North-South border, I am intensely concerned that the scope of violent oppressive 

action against those with ties to the South is very real. While the 

extent to which these attacks have been perpetrated by the Sudanese Armed Forces or militia groups does remain unclear, the violence is a violation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and 

warrants immediate investigation. 

I am also concerned about the potential areas of conflict that are 

outside the current scope of international attention in the Upper 

Nile. Concerns have been expressed that certain breakaway groups, 

including the Nuer, haven’t fully been absorbed into the emerging 

southern culture. Nascent conflicts in other lesser known areas 

could also threaten potential stability. The potential sources of ethnic conflict, including any imbalance of government power in 

Southern Sudan’s dozens of ethnic groups, does loom. 

Sudan, of course, has many sad experiences with this. A major 

source of North-South conflict stems from colonial time when 

Northern groups were given preference in government positions 

over Southerners. 

I am keenly interested in hearing from our witnesses, in particular Ambassador Lyman, about the steps that the Government 

of South Sudan is taking to create a government inclusive of ethnic 

minorities, also women, to mitigate the risk of conflict that has historically marred too many post colonial independent African states. 

And importantly as we discuss the future of a healthy and vibrant Southern Sudanese state, we must also be clear that we 

want a future, stable and viable North. However, China’s relationship with Northern Sudan is of particular concern. Just today 

China announced it would be welcoming President Omar al-Bashir 

7

with an official state visit later this month to deepen ‘‘their deep 

and profound friendship,’’ according to China’s foreign ministry 

spokesman. 

Sudan is China’s third largest trading partner in Africa, and 

China has been its largest arms supplier, as well as a major oil investor. Will China’s unrestrained, mercantilistic agenda deepen 

this geopolitical conflict? It is an important question. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing that 

is of personal importance to many of my constituents, many of 

whom have suffered and sacrificed so much to have their chance 

to realize their democratic hopes manifested in an independent 

Southern state. I look forward to relaying the proceedings of this 

hearing to them. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Fortenberry. The chair recognizes 

Mr. Carnahan. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Payne. Thank you for holding this hearing on the situation in 

Sudan. As the anticipated July 9 date of the South Sudan independence quickly approaches, I hope that we work toward a meaningful way forward in an important and conflict torn region. 

I have watched with growing concern as the deteriorating security situation has come to a head with recent violence in oil producing border regions. Where there have been reports of aggression 

attributed to both sides, it is clear that the North’s Sudanese 

Armed Forces invasion of Abyei violated the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and has inflamed further security and 

humanitarian crises and warrants measured reevaluation of our 

policy toward Khartoum. 

The Sudanese people have endured many years of ethno-religious 

violence, state-sponsored oppression and genocide that has resulted 

in the loss of as many as 2.5 million lives with millions of others 

displaced. With recent crises in Abyei and South Kordofan, these 

numbers continue to rise. 

It must remain a U.S. priority to support viable security agreements that advance implementation of the CPA. We look forward 

to hearing from our witnesses today on the status of our diplomatic 

and development efforts to these ends. We also hope to hear more 

about the work of the international community to complement our 

interests in Sudan. 

With the mandate for the U.N. mission in Sudan set to expire 

next month and the Sudanese Government maintaining that it will 

not allow an extension, I am particularly interested in hearing 

what role you think a U.N. mission could and should play in either 

the North or the South. I am also interested in hearing what role 

you think the African Union should have in any negotiations and 

peacekeeping. 

While improvements are certainly needed, UNMIS and other 

peacekeeping missions address some of our most challenging security situations and directly impact U.S. national interests. 

In closing, I would like to thank the panelists for their testimonies and presence here today. I hope that your answers and 

opinions will help us realize avenues toward stability and peace between the North and the South. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

8

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. The chair recognizes the 

gentlelady from New York, Ms. Buerkle. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for all 

you do on behalf of human rights throughout the world. 

The future of South Sudan is of great importance to me because 

of the Sudanese presence in the Syracuse area. Syracuse has been 

home to over 500 of the Lost Boys of Sudan. In fact, my district 

office has a graduate student interning with us by the name of 

Pierre Anthony, who is one of those Lost Boys. 

I am also pleased and very honored to have with us today in the 

hearing room a very prominent member of the Sudanese diaspora 

and a constituent of mine, Father Darius Makuja. Father is a professor of medieval theology at Le Moyne College in Syracuse. He 

holds master’s and doctoral degrees in historical theology from St. 

Louis University. He has published work on the situation in Sudan, 

including an article in the journal Encounter entitled, ‘‘Religious 

Fundamentalism and Political Hegemony: A Case of Islamic Fundamentalism and Conflict in Sudan.’’

Father Makuja is originally from Torit, near the Ugandan border. He is an important advocate for the South Sudanese in America, not only in assisting them but also in helping call attention to 

the challenges the South Sudan faces and will continue to face in 

the aftermath of obtaining its independence. 

In a referendum in January 2011, the Southern Sudanese people 

overwhelmingly voted in favor of independence from the North. 

South Sudan is due to gain its independence on July 9th. Tragically, bloodshed along the ill-defined border between the North 

and the South Sudan over the last 3 weeks has raised fears that 

the two longstanding rivals will return to open conflict. A number 

of sensitive issues between the North and the South remain unsettled, how to share oil revenues, where to draw the common border, 

and how to split the national debt. 

Moreover, Khartoum government forces seized the disputed region of Abyei, tanks and troops, on May 21st, causing tens of thousands of people to flee and drawing an international outcry. Despite the United States, the United Nations and Southern Sudanese officials calling on the North to withdraw, the North seems to 

be further entrenching itself. And it remains to be seen whether an 

agreement cannot only be reached, but also be abided by. 

The security situation remains grave with intense fighting, sporadic artillery fire, and a continuing military buildup along the contested border between the North and the South. 

For several years, the United States has engaged in humanitarian development and peacekeeping work in Sudan and has participated in efforts to resolve the civil war between the North and 

the South. The United States of America has a stake in seeing that 

the Republic of South Sudan becomes a successful, a stable, and a 

secure state. 

I thank our witnesses for being here today, and I look forward 

to hearing their testimony. I yield back my time. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Ms. Buerkle. The chair recognizes Congresswoman Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you once again, Chairman Smith. 

9

For the past several years, the world has watched as conditions 

in Sudan have continued to deteriorate. Despite the hopeful passing of the peace referendum decision in January, the road to independence for South Sudan has not been easy. Recent government 

assaults on innocent civilians have increased the humanitarian and 

refugee crisis throughout Sudan and the region and destabilized 

the delicate balance of peace. My deepest condolences go out to the 

people of Sudan that have been affected by the recent violence. To 

those who were displaced, have lost family members or were 

wounded during the attack, my thoughts are with you. 

In addition to the violence of the Sudanese Armed Forces, the 

Sudanese Government continues to delay the implementation of aspects of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and has taken steps 

to impede its progress. We must do all we can to ensure the peaceful transition of governments and the equitable division of resources to guarantee the safety and well-being of all Sudanese people. 

A good demonstration of democracy is a willingness to embrace 

change for the overall betterment of a country and the human 

rights of its citizens. I believe we must assist in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by urging both sides 

to end the violence and cease all military actions. We must continue providing U.S. assistance to promote stable governance in 

South Sudan, strengthening multilateral international engagement, 

and preventing terrorists from having a safe haven in Sudan. 

I support President Obama’s statement yesterday insisting that 

both sides must be held accountable to their international obligations and agreements. The United States must remain active and 

expand our diplomatic engagement in Sudan, along with our 

United Nations partners. We must have the opportunity to play a 

key role in advancing a healthy democracy, economic growth, and 

a peaceful and prosperous future for the Sudanese people in the region. 

I look forward to hearing from all of the witnesses today and 

learning more about the current conditions in Sudan, as well as 

how the U.S. can promote the peaceful independence of the Republic of South Sudan. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Ms. Bass. I would like to now 

recognize Congressman Frank Wolf, who is chair of the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies on 

the Appropriations Committee. Mr. Wolf. 

Mr. WOLF. Thank you, Chairman Smith. I want to thank you for 

your actions on this issue and so many others, but being the first 

out of the box to deal with this. And I also want to publicly thank 

Congressman Payne for his faithfulness over the years on this 

issue in good times as well as bad times. 

I remember reading Samantha Power’s book, ‘‘A Problem from 

Hell: America and the Age of Genocide.’’ Her frustration at the lack 

of U.S. action in the face of human suffering was palpable and understandable. She examined cable traffic and State Department 

press guidance, which eliminated any doubts that the horrors taking place in countries like Rwanda were not unknown to policymakers like U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, who knew what 

was taking place in Rwanda, and former Secretary of State Warren 

10

Christopher, who also knew what was taking place. Bill Clinton 

had the good sense of going to Rwanda and apologizing for the lack 

of action by his administration. 

Have we learned nothing yet? Are we ready to see another Rwanda? Today in Sudan we see unfolding before us what can only be 

described as a recurring nightmare in that country, a genocidal 

government hell-bent on maintaining its grip on power, treating civilian populations as mere collateral damage. And in the face of 

these murderous policies in Abyei and Southern Kordofan and the 

Nuba Mountains, the White House can hardly muster more than 

a Friday night 7:45 press statement by the Press Secretary and not 

by the President of the United States to come out and in the Rose 

Garden and say what should be said. Press statements released at 

7:35 Friday in this town communicate to me volumes about the priority, or the lack thereof, of the matter at hand. 

Last week, with news reports of a rapidly deteriorating situation 

in Sudan, I wrote President Obama urging him to act swiftly to 

dispatch former Secretary of State Colin Powell to Sudan to attempt to secure a peaceful resolution of the crisis and salvage the 

Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the weeks remaining before 

South Sudan can become an independent nation. 

Don Payne was there at the signing. Secretary Powell was there 

at the signing. Roger Winter was there at the signing. Secretary 

Powell, given the opportunity and given the sticks, may very well 

be able to deal with this, and yet the response from the White 

House is zero, zero, zero. 

I submit a copy of that letter for the record. 

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. WOLF. Not only is engagement at the highest levels needed, 

but the engagement must include sticks. We have seen time and 

time again that dangling carrots before an indicted war criminal, 

Bashir, will never yield the desired results. 

My sense of urgency is even greater today. This week, I had the 

opportunity to meet a young man who was an intern in my office. 

He has been living in Sudan for the last 2 years engaged in humanitarian and development work. He is back in the States briefly 

but remains in close contact with folks in Sudan, including in areas 

that are presently cut off from the rest of the world. What I heard 

from these sources is bone chilling. Door to door targeted killings 

of the SPLM supporters, mass graves, Antonov bombers indiscriminately shelling civilian populations; in short, an unfolding tragedy 

of the highest order right before our eyes, and the administration 

knows it. 

And when we look at this and Samantha writes her next book, 

the cables will show what we now know and what no one is doing 

anything about. 

The committee has before it today several distinguished witnesses, including my friend Roger Winter. These panelists will undoubtedly urge the administration to consider a variety of policy 

options to stem the killing and avert a mass humanitarian crisis. 

I pray they will be given every consideration. 

And the thought that China is welcoming Bashir—I did not know 

it until Congressman Fortenberry said it—is incredible. What more 

do you need to know? China has been aiding them with regard to 

the Antonov, with regard to the Soviet Hind helicopters, with the 

AK–47s, and supporting the genocide in Darfur, the number one 

supporter of the genocide in Darfur that many people are so concerned about, the Chinese Government. And keep in mind, Hu 

Jintao, the President of China, was the architect of the policies to 

really bring about the destruction of Tibet. And you had the 2009 

Nobel Prize winner, President Obama, holding a steak dinner for 

Hu Jintao when the 2010 Nobel Prize winner was in jail and his 

wife was under house arrest, and now we find that they are welcoming Bashir. What more do we need to know? Lives hang in the 

balance. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you having these hearings. 

Mr. SMITH. Chairman Wolf, thank you very much for your statement and for your leadership on human rights. Let me just note 

that originally Special Envoy Princeton Lyman was scheduled to 

testify first. He was called to the White House. So we have reversed the order and we will invite what was Panel 2 to become 

Panel 1. I would like to—if they could make their way to the witness table—just recognize Bishop Andudu Adam Elnail, whose diocese actually represents the Nuba Mountains, among other areas, 

and Bishop Abraham Nhial Yel, whose—these are both Episcopal 

bishops whose diocese includes Abyei. If they wouldn’t mind standing. I know they are here. And thank you for your tremendous 

leadership. 

I would like to now introduce our very distinguished and knowledgeable panel, beginning with Bishop Eduardo Hiiboro Kussala, 

who is originally from Southern Sudan. When he was just 9 years 

old, his mother was killed in a Northern government military raid 

14

on his village. His family fled Sudan and eventually settled in 

neighboring DRC. Bishop Hiiboro’s family eventually returned to 

Sudan and he became a priest in 1994. After serving refugees in 

the Central African Republic, he returned to Sudan where he has 

been an outspoken and totally courageous advocate in demanding 

protection for his people. We welcome the bishop to our panel, and 

thank him for being here. 

We will then hear from Dr. John Eibner, Christian Solidarity 

International. He is the CEO for CSI in the United States. He has 

traveled to Sudan over 100 times since 1992, often working in 

frontline situations to document slavery and other gross human 

rights abuses. Dr. Eibner played a leading role during the last civil 

war to raise awareness of these human rights issues among the 

public and policymakers. Dr. Eibner also served as CSI’s main representative at the United Nations in Geneva and has written extensively on human rights issues for a range of well-known publications. I would note parenthetically that both Chairman Wolf and 

I have traveled to many human rights abusing countries around 

the world with CSI, including China in the past. So we welcome 

you, Dr. Eibner. 

Then we have Ms. Dana Wilkins, who is a campaigner for Global 

Witness, an NGO that works to prevent natural resources from 

fueling conflict and corruption. Ms. Wilkins recently returned from 

Southern Sudan where she did extensive advocacy and information 

exchange with government officials, local civil society, and members of the donor community. Ms. Wilkins has been working to ensure that there is transparency and accountability in Southern Sudan’s oil sector after independence to help prevent a return to war 

and also to provide equity and fairness to the people from those reserves. 

Then we will hear from Ambassador Roger Winter, who first 

went to Sudan in 1981 to do humanitarian work for a nonprofit 

group, which we all know and respect on this committee, the U.S. 

Committee for Refugees. Ambassador Winter continued his work 

until early 2001, when he became Director of the U.S. Office for 

Foreign Disaster Assistance at USAID. While at the office in that 

role and subsequently as Assistant Administrator at USAID, Ambassador Winter participated on the U.S. team—led the team—to 

what then became the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Ambassador Winter has served as the U.S. Special Representative on 

Sudan from 2005 to 2006, when he retired. 

I would just note that all of our witnesses have very extensive 

biographies, which will be made a part of the record. But to allow 

maximum time for your testimony and questions, they will be made 

a part of the record. So, Bishop, if you could begin. 

STATEMENT OF MR. EDUARDO HIIBORO KUSSALA, BISHOP, 

DIOCESE OF TAMBURA-YAMBIO 

Bishop HIIBORO. Thank you, Chairman Smith, for calling this important and timely hearing concerning the Sudan and for giving me 

the opportunity to testify before this committee on behalf of the 

people of South Sudan. I also would like to thank the ranking 

member, Mr. Payne, and all the members of the subcommittee for 

their longstanding commitment to the welfare of my people. 

15

With the committee’s permission, I would like to enter my full 

written testimony for the record, and I will summarize it. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, so ordered. And that goes for all 

of our distinguished witnesses. 

Bishop HIIBORO. My name is Bishop Eduardo Hiiboro Kussala. I 

am the bishop of the Catholic Diocese Tambura-Yambio in southwestern Sudan. And I am very grateful to have come from my native Sudan to share with you the gratitude, the hopes and the concerns of the new nation. The Sudanese church in her prophetic role 

has accompanied the Sudanese people in times of peace and war. 

The church has been building peace, providing basic services and 

serving millions of Sudanese people across the generations. 

As international aid actors come and go, it is an indigenous 

church sharing the hopes, the suffering of the people, giving voice 

to those often who are not heard. I have come here definitely to 

thank you, the American people, and express to you the hopes of 

the people of South Sudan. We thank you for the efforts you did 

in order to get for us, with our own collaboration and yours, the 

referendum successfully done. 

Our hope in South Sudan is that we are going to have a nation 

of our own since time immemorial, a country that would hope to 

be a country of dignity, peace, freedom and human prosperity. The 

achievement of the referendum was a collective effort for which we 

thank you and ask you then that the homework is not finished. We 

are seeing the responsibilities that come to us as people of South 

Sudan to be accountable, transparent and consistent in building a 

nation of dignity and peace. And we can all do this very well with 

your collaboration. 

And my visit here, definitely, is to invite you, the American people, the American Government to be consistent, to persevere, and 

to remain focused on the cause of the people of Sudan. You all have 

very well expressed and discussed the problems that we have gone 

through. I want to recommend an immediate stop to the violence 

that is going on within Sudan at the moment. I would like to recall 

what we have gone through and to ask you that it is time to stop 

it. If we do not stop this war, it is quite clear that it will spread 

and go beyond control. There is a possibility that there is this intolerance within South Sudan. Let us seize this opportunity and stop 

this war and give Sudan what it has lacked for decades. 

And I would like to express what has been missing on the accord 

that was signed in 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 

Many of the things that have not been implemented remain a 

stumbling block. If we can remain focused and have those things 

realized, we can save South Sudan the possibility of enjoying its future. And we can also guarantee a stable Northern Sudan that can 

protect the regional members from going into conflict. 

I want to underline the importance for the support of the displaced and refugees. The humanitarian support has to continue. 

And as much as we know, under the name for peace and development, the hope for the people of South Sudan is that July 9th will 

be the end of the decades of suffering and pains of our people and 

is a moment in which we can say the past is gone and now we can 

have a new life. 

16

The fear that grows around us can be stopped if this House, if 

the Congress, if the American people can be consistent, I repeat. 

I want to conclude with a special appeal that July 9th should be 

an opportunity for the Government of the United States and our 

friends to guarantee peace in that part of Africa and that the peace 

will serve as a balance rod for the rest of the countries in the region. 

Having ended Africa’s longest war, Africa’s largest country is at 

a crossroads. The road after the violence and suffering of our past 

has been a long one. But with the continued support and ongoing 

commitment of the Congress, we can all help bring millions of 

South Sudanese a chance to enjoy the hope and the freedom of justice and peace it sorely deserves and has long awaited. 

I was born into this war. I lost my mom in the war and I have 

grown as much as I am in the refugee camps in the most difficult 

areas. And I represent millions of orphans in my country who have 

gone through the same history. My story is a story of the people 

of South Sudan and the people of the Sudan. Sudan must not return to war again so they will not lose many mothers and children 

due to this war. And that is my interest. And I pray that this 

House will continue consistently to extend and to get Sudan stable 

and into freedom. 

Thank you and God bless you. 

[The prepared statement of Bishop Kussala follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Bishop Hiiboro, thank you so much for your eloquent 

testimony and thank you for the blessing. We know that South 

Sudan is in all of our prayers. And there is a lot that divides the 

House and the Senate and Congress these days, but we are—we 

will be praying very hard for peace and reconciliation and that has 

been led by the church. So I thank you so much. 

Dr. Eibner. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN EIBNER, CHIEF EXECUTIVE 

OFFICER, CHRISTIAN SOLIDARITY INTERNATIONAL—USA 

Mr. EIBNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for affording me the opportunity to testify about slavery. I am particularly pleased that 

my anti-slavery colleagues, Diane Gooch and Joe Madison, are with 

us today. 

Slavery, an internationally recognized crime against humanity, 

continues to blight the lives of tens of thousands of Southern Sudanese. It furthermore darkens the prospect of a genuinely comprehensive and sustained peace and threatens the security of Africa’s newest nation. 

May I begin by introducing Achol Deng, a liberated slave? For 

about 15 years, Achol served a master in Northern Sudan. She was 

threatened with death. She was gang raped, genitally mutilated, 

forced to convert to Islam, renamed Mariam and was racially and 

religiously insulted. She lost the sight in one eye when her master 

thrashed her face with a camel whip for failing to perform correctly 

Islamic rituals. This mother of four said she saw two of her children beaten to death for minor misdemeanors. She lost the use of 

one of her arms when her master took a machete to it because she 

failed to grind grain properly. 

As Sudan enters a new era of crisis on the eve of Southern independence with fresh waves of violence, it is timely to revisit the 

slavery aspect of what Francis Deng calls Sudan’s war of visions, 

a cultural conflict that transcends the late North-South civil war, 

a battle that continues today. 

Senator Danforth, a Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan, understood the true significance of slavery. In his report to the President, 

he rightly identified progress on the eradication of slavery as one 

of his four tests of the willingness of the belligerents to embark on 

a course of peace. 

In accordance with the Danforth recommendations, the U.S. Government sponsored an investigation by the International Eminent 

Persons Group on slavery. Their findings largely corroborates 

CSI’s. They observed that slave raiding in Sudan was government 

sponsored and ‘‘commonplace.’’ Slavery, they also noted, included a 

disturbing pattern of abuse very much like that endured by Achol 

Deng. 

The Eminent Persons proposed a comprehensive policy for eradicating slavery and stated,

‘‘Eliminating the abuses described in this report will require 

major political initiatives on the part of both the Government 

[of Sudan] and of the SPLM/A. The initiatives we propose can 

only succeed with assistance from the international community. This assistance must be substantial, long term, carefully 

conceived and above all rigorously monitored.’’

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Regrettably, Mr. Chairman, neither have major political initiatives nor significant long-term carefully conceived assistance been 

forthcoming. While the CPA created the historic opportunity for 

ending the civil war, it failed to include a mechanism for the liberation and repatriation of slaves. 

Some bold efforts were made following the signing of the CPA to 

restore slavery to the peace agenda of Khartoum, Juba and the 

international community. I have mentioned several of them in my 

written submission, including H.R. 3844 of 2007, sponsored by Mr. 

Smith and co-sponsored by Ms. Watson. But these constructive initiatives failed as a result of lack of political will in Congress and 

in Washington generally. 

The signing of the CPA did, however, have a beneficial anti-slavery byproduct. It produced an end to slave raids in Southern 

Sudan. But those already enslaved during the war and their offspring remained in bondage. According to Southern members of the 

Sudanese Government’s former showcase anti-slavery organ, the 

now dissolved Committee for the Eradication of the Abduction of 

Women and Children, over 35,000 slaves from Northern Bahr ElGhazal alone remain in bondage. In addition, slavery is used as a 

weapon of war against black Africans in Darfur. The enslavement 

and horrific abuse of Sudanese tactics of the Lord’s Resistance 

Army in Equatoria, which I am sure the Bishop can speak a very 

long time about, is another appalling and neglected facet of Sudan’s 

slavery problem. 

I would encourage members to search for ways to implement the 

constructive proposals set forth in the report of the Eminent Persons, in particular the need for a financially transparent and functional Sudanese national institution for locating and liberating 

slaves, a program of research on all aspects of Sudanese slavery, 

an institution with international and indigenous components to 

monitor slavery and its eradication, and finally an American or 

international mechanism to follow up the Eminent Persons’ recommendations. 

Twelve years ago, Ambassador Susan Rice came face to face with 

liberated slaves in Marial Bai, Southern Sudan. She pledged then 

that the United States would work tirelessly to stamp out slavery 

in Sudan. Let us strive to achieve the goal established by Ambassador Rice. Failure to eradicate slavery with all its overtones of 

racism and religious bigotry will leave in Sudan a deadly cancer 

destroying possibilities of reconciliation and undermining chances 

of sustainable peace and stability for the new state in Southern 

Sudan. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to testify and also for all you and your colleagues do to achieve the eradication of slavery in Sudan and elsewhere. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Eibner follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Dr. Eibner, thank you very much for your testimony 

and your leadership and for ensuring that we try to stay focused 

on this horrific issue of slavery. Thank you so very much. 

Ms. Wilkins. 

STATEMENT OF MS. DANA LYONS WILKINS, CAMPAIGNER, 

GLOBAL WITNESS 

Ms. WILKINS. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am 

honored to appear before you today to discuss the importance of the 

responsible management of natural resources in what will soon be 

the world’s newest and most oil dependent state. 

In order to support stability and development in South Sudan, 

the U.S. must ensure that explicit transparency and accountability 

requirements are included in both the new legal framework governing the country’s oil sector and the new North-South oil deal. 

South Sudan is currently crafting its new petroleum law with a 

hope to complete it before July 9th. The development of this new 

legal framework is a critical opportunity for the country to demonstrate its commitment to democratic principles and to the responsible governance of its most important sector. 

With more than 98 percent of its budget derived from oil, as Congressman Payne pointed out earlier, South Sudan will be the most 

oil dependent country in the world. Many analysts are suggesting 

that for this reason and because of limited capacity, weak institutions, and alleged widespread corruption, the country will be born 

a failed state. 

Global Witness has repeatedly documented how this state failure 

occurs elsewhere—in countries where natural resource wealth is 

not managed in a transparent and accountable way, the results can 

be not only entrenched poverty and failed development efforts, but 

political instability and even large-scale conflict. 

However, this does not have to be the case in South Sudan. If 

the legal framework developed now is robust and comprehensive, 

South Sudan has the potential to become a best practice example 

of a post-conflict country where oil revenues are governed responsibly and transparently. 

During my most recent trip to Juba at the start of this month, 

I had an opportunity to speak with many of the central figures involved in the development of this framework, and I believe the political will to institutionalize transparency is there. However, given 

so many competing priorities and distractions, and a limited drafting timeframe, the detailed legislative language necessary to guarantee the publication and verification of data may be overlooked. 

In order to support good governance in South Sudan’s oil sector, 

the United States must prioritize technical and institutional capacity building through its foreign assistance and push hard for transparency and independent verification in the management of the 

sector through its diplomatic efforts. 

Transparency is not an end in itself. Its purpose is to allow ordinary citizens to see exactly how their natural resources are being 

managed, which in the case of South Sudan will be paramount in 

helping build public confidence in the new state. 

30

The publication of oil sector information also helps to prevent 

corruption and avoid the resource curse, thus driving development 

through a country’s own natural resource wealth. 

The new law must explicitly require that detailed production, 

revenue and cost data, as well as the fiscal terms of contracts be 

published. But publication alone is not enough. For the oil sector 

to be sufficiently accountable, it must be independently monitored. 

For this to happen in South Sudan, there must be an office created 

independently from the Ministry of Energy and Mining whose sole 

responsibility is to monitor and verify the petroleum sector. While 

I was in Juba last, the Auditor General expressed his intention to 

establish a Petroleum Directorate which will do exactly that, and 

the United States must support him in this effort. This support 

should include funding if needed, technical assistance and training 

and, importantly, political backing for the new directorate to be 

guaranteed independence and access to information. 

So what else can the United States do? The U.S. could also have 

a significant impact on the ground by supporting local civil society 

groups. The establishment of a strong civil society watchdog will be 

critical for the accountable management of oil revenues and for 

combating corruption. The U.S. should also support South Sudan 

in signing up to and implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which would put many of the reforms I have 

spoken about on stronger institutional footing. 

Before I close, I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize 

the importance of transparency in the new North-South oil deal. 

The current deal, a 50/50 split of southern oil revenues has been 

managed almost entirely by the government in Khartoum and does 

not contain any transparency mechanism enabling either the government in the South or the public to verify that the revenues are 

being shared fairly. This lack of transparency and accountability 

has led to much mistrust and tension between the North and 

South, repeatedly threatening the fragile peace of the CPA. Given 

the North and South’s shared reliance on oil revenues and the fact 

that more than three-quarters of the oil is in the South but the 

major pipelines and ports of export are in the North, a fair and 

transparent oil arrangement which supports the economic viability 

of both parties would be a powerful incentive for sustained peace. 

As a member of the Troika and one of the main guarantors of 

the CPA, the USA should be putting pressure on the negotiating 

parties to ensure that transparency and independent verification 

are included in the new deal. We strongly recommend that the U.S. 

take a more active role in pushing publicly and privately for these 

crucial provisions. 

South Sudan faces a huge struggle in the months and years 

ahead. But with the help of the U.S. and other donors, that struggle can lead to peace and prosperity for all citizens. Responsible oil 

management and transparency in the new North-South oil deal 

will very much be at the center of this success. 

Thank you again for this opportunity. I look forward to answering any questions you have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Wilkins follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you so very much and for the work that your 

organization has done so well over the years. 

I would now like to welcome Ambassador Roger Winter and ask 

him to proceed. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROGER WINTER (FORMER 

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON SUDAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF STATE) 

Mr. WINTER. Thank you. What I want to do is to give just a brief 

summary of my analysis and recommendations that are in the 

written testimony. It will be very controversial, and I urge you to 

try to take a look at the entire document. 

I am rather disturbed that what I hear so often these days is a 

comment like we need to make sure that ‘‘both sides’’ do thus and 

so. And I think if we look at the record, we will find there is no 

moral equivalence between the two sides here. None whatsoever. I 

think that kind of commentary that has been picked up by our 

media and others is a very damaging thing. 

There is Khartoum and there is Juba. They both have problems, 

but the consequences of their problems are light years away from 

each other. And one, that is Khartoum, has the potential for affecting all that happens from here on out, whether there is a contentious, bloody relationship between the two countries after July 9, 

or something that approaches cooperation. So let me try to dispel 

a little bit that what I think is misguided ‘‘moral equivalence.’’

We know from consistent experience with Khartoum that 

Khartoum’s commitments, its formal or informal agreements, are 

not reliable. They regularly use agreements as a tactic to buy time 

or to get people to get off their back; but, in fact, they ultimately 

do what they want to do. It doesn’t make any difference what the 

agreement said. And we have seen that over and over again, because it is a very rich record of prevarication, of lying, and deception. And we see it in so many ways. Signing a piece of paper 

doesn’t ever seem to actually result in them doing what they said 

they would do. 

So, in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, many, many of the 

really key provisions of the CPA were never pursued to implementation by Khartoum. That is also true of the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration regarding the boundaries for Abyei. They 

have been entirely disregarded, and Khartoum has obviously, by 

their current actions, no interest whatsoever in going by that 

court’s decision; but rather, they will do what they choose to do. 

It is also the case, for example, that the things that foster violence right now are things that Khartoum chose not to do. 

The issue of demarcation of borders, which is a factor in the current bloodshed that is going on, the failure to demarcate borders 

that is required by the CPA, it has over and over again been raised 

as an issue. And nothing—there has never been a consequence to 

penalize Khartoum for the things they don’t do that they promised 

they would do. 

Also, I would like to say it is very clear, my second point, that 

Khartoum does not at all hesitate to kill its own nationals and destroy their property and livelihoods. That is obvious if you have followed what has happened with respect to the South and the soVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:29 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\061611\66903 HFA PsN: SHIRL
37

called ‘‘three areas.’’ Over and over again, we see the kind of bloodletting that we are seeing right now in Kadugli and Kauda and in 

Dilling and other locations. This is a pattern that we have seen 

over and over again: 3 million dead civilians. 

If you add up what is documented on the South, if you add what 

is from Darfur, from Nuba Mountains, from all of these, 3 million 

bodies is not something that we can just write off. And almost all 

of them were civilians; and, frankly, almost all of them were children. This is not the moral equivalent of the SPLM and the SPLA. 

The SPLM and the SPLA have huge problems, absolutely, but they 

don’t rise to this level. Khartoum is used to getting away with murder, in Darfur, in the South, in Abyei, and in Southern Kordofan 

and elsewhere. And I must tell you, with the way they are behaving right now, I fear a great liquidation of population in Southern 

Kordofan, in Abyei, and potentially in Southern Blue Nile after the 

separation of the South. I think we are seeing the beginning of that 

right now. 

I think it is terribly important to not—I love the South, I spend 

all of my time working to support the South, but the people of 

Southern Kordofan, the people of Abyei, and the people of Southern 

Blue Nile are the same people, basically; they just happen to be on 

the Northern side of the border between North and South and, 

therefore, will not become part of the independent country. What 

does that mean? That means that they are locked in there for the 

long haul, at least right now, and it is not a pretty thing to think 

about. 

Thirdly, I would say there is no reason to believe that what I am 

talking about right now will change. The track record of an unrepentant National Congress Party in power is, I think, clear and 

scary. 

I would like to say, there is no moral equivalency between these 

two parties. And I recommend, and I have never done this in my 

life, okay, I have never recommended something like this before, I 

think the possibility of massive liquidation of populations north of 

South Sudan that are basically the same people as in the South, 

I think they are at risk and I think our talking has not paid off 

and we are almost out of time. I suggest that it is time, as radical 

as this may sound to you, it is time to take, I would argue, a military action. I am not talking about going to war; I am talking 

about a military action against a military installation of the Khartoum government, and do that now as a warning to them that the 

end of the playing around with this peace agreement is over and 

they must improve their behavior toward the people not just of 

Darfur, but most particularly now I am talking about Southern 

Kordofan, Southern Blue Nile, and of Abyei. 

I would like to suggest that this is important because it seems—

there are at least reports about the potential for using what I will 

call illegal weaponry against the civilians in those locations that I 

just mentioned. So that is one thought. 

The second is that the U.S. take steps to strengthen the Sudan 

People’s Liberation Army in meaningful ways and to escalate our 

efforts to prepare them to at least defend their new homeland. This 

is, I would suggest, something that is important to deter violence 

against civilians and the potential for war. 

38

Why? Why am I saying this? I am saying this because the postindependence timeframe, because the borders have never been defined adequately in the controversial areas, because they have 

never been defined, there are going to be continuing issues between 

the North and the South until they are sorted out. I think it is very 

important to have a capable Southern capacity. 

I would say thirdly—and this is on the issue of the casualties of 

civilians and what has happened in the last few weeks—it should 

tell us something about what is immediately in the future. Almost 

all of the substantive humanitarian assistance that goes to assist 

the people in Southern Khartoum and in Abyei and in parts of 

Southern Blue Nile are delivered through the South. They are delivered from South Sudan and the issue is that starting on the 9th 

of July, that border is not an internal border of a single state, it 

is going to be a hard border between two separate countries. And 

you can bet your boots that Khartoum is not going to allow humanitarian assistance into Abyei, into Southern Kordofan and into 

Southern Blue Nile. So all of these people who have been damaged 

and affected by the most recent violence, there needs to be a recognition that Khartoum will not allow humanitarian assistance in 

the same way the government in the South does for those people 

who are currently affected. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Professor Winter, thank thank you very much for 

that very sobering assessment. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Winter follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you—you mentioned illegal weapons—are 

you talking about chemical weapons and those reports? 

Mr. WINTER. Not that I know anything, but a lot of where this 

comes from is what has appeared over Kadugli and other locations 

that have been being bombed and so forth, was an unusual, very 

large plane that some people suggested was a Hercules that was 

escorted by MiGs, the MiGs that are usually attacking and doing 

other things, and the Antonovs are bombing and so forth. What 

people saw and reported was this large, different kind of plane that 

was being escorted by MiGs, and that has triggered some of this 

speculation is my understanding. 

Mr. SMITH. If I can ask, obviously to the lead-up to the full declaration of independence, every day is a day in which all of us are 

holding our breath. What is your sense as to what happens after 

July 9th, assuming that these terrible incidents that we have seen, 

the bloodletting that has occurred, do abate and hopefully there 

will be an ability to get resources to those who are suffering? 

And your point, I think, Ambassador Winter, is very well taken. 

But when the lights go out, so to speak, and the international community takes some of its focus off on July 10th and beyond, what 

huge risks then portend for South Sudan in terms of what Khartoum and Bashir might be hatching? 

Mr. WINTER. I would suggest that Bishop Hiiboro may know 

something about this from his own country. 

Let me say this. Take, for example, the Nuba people, people of 

the Nuba Mountains which are an important piece of Southern 

Kordofan. We are talking about an area that in the early 1990s 

was under a fatwa. The population there of Nuba are visually determinable pretty much from other aspects of the population. The 

Nuba are Christian, Muslim, and traditional kinds of religion. The 

fatwa applied to all of those. It was in fact, by professionals, determined to be genocide. 

Now, it is the Nuba in particular that are being attacked now in 

Southern Kordofan. They have suffered really tremendously over 

time, and it is they where you hear most of the difficult stories 

right now about people who are being pulled out of their hovel and 

shot, or even having that done in the presence of people from 

UNMIS, soldiers and that kind of thing. 

Why I am suggesting some of these actions that I am suggesting 

now, you can’t just let it happen. Something has to happen before 

independence to try to—you know, try to provide some deterrence 

for that kind of action. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask a process question with regards to 

your time. 

Special Envoy Princeton Lyman was at the White House, and I 

know he has to be out of this room by 4:30. I am wondering if our 

distinguished witnesses have flexibility in their time so that he can 

come and present, some questions will be asked of him, and then 

we would bring you back. I hate to do that to you, but when the 

President calls, the Special Envoy had to respond to the White 

House. Would that be okay? 

Mr. WINTER. Within limits, yes. 

Mr. SMITH. Within limits, okay. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. WINTER. I have another commitment, too. 

45

Mr. SMITH. I am sorry. 

I would then ask Ambassador Princeton Lyman, U.S. Special 

Envoy to Sudan, who has served in that position since March 31st 

of this year to come forward. Immediately prior to that, he served 

as U.S. Senior Advisor on North-South negotiations where he led 

the U.S. team focused on supporting ongoing negotiations between 

the parties to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 

Ambassador Lyman has held a number of positions in the NGO 

sector and academia, in addition to a multitude of diplomatic assignments throughout Africa, spanning a decade. Mr. Ambassador, 

welcome. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PRINCETON LYMAN, 

SPECIAL ENVOY FOR SUDAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador LYMAN. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Payne, 

and other members of the committee, thank you so much for holding this hearing and for the great interest I know you have for this 

situation. 

As you well know, and you know it from the testimony so far, 

we face a very serious situation right now. I would ask that my full 

testimony be put in the record because it has a great deal of information on the background to these events that I hope will be helpful to the committee. But I want to focus in this presentation on 

where we are. 

We were relatively optimistic after the referendum of January 9; 

but in fact in recent months there has been more tension between 

the parties and we could see that coming in a number of ways. 

In Abyei, there was a growing frustration by the population. 

There was a blocking of the migration. There were forces introduced contrary to the agreement, forces from both sides. And tension was building up there. 

We have been working nonstop on these issues all through this 

period and that includes the more recent events in Southern 

Kordofan. From the time that the Sudanese forces moved into 

Abyei, we have been working around the clock to mobilize international opinion in support of the withdrawal of those forces. And 

from the President, from the Secretary of State, from others in the 

administration, we have urged people—you know that we don’t 

have direct contact with President Bashir, but we urged many, 

many leaders from around the world who do, to call him and to say 

that they are risking a great deal by doing this. 

I came just this morning, I had just this morning a meeting with 

President Obama where we discussed this situation. He is deeply 

concerned. He follows Sudan events daily; and of course is very 

concerned not only about the situation in Abyei, but about what 

has happened in Southern Kordofan. 

The Secretary, as you know, was in Addis Ababa just this week 

in meetings with the parties. And let me say where we are and 

what has happened in response to this crisis. 

On Abyei, we recognized that the situation was growing very 

dangerous at the beginning of May. And I and former President of 

Burundi, Pierre Buyoya, and the Secretary General’s Representative, Haile Menkerios, immediately flew to Juba and we worked 

with both parties to resurrect an agreement for the withdrawal of 

46

forces from both sides that both had signed but had not been implemented. 

We were moving that process forward when a second incident of 

attacks from the SPLA on a Joint Integrated Unit triggered what 

we feel is an extraordinarily disproportionate response by the government to move its forces into Abyei. 

Our efforts on Abyei have been to get an agreement as quickly 

as possible on the withdrawal of forces from Abyei. To do that, we 

needed to strengthen the U.N. force in Abyei, which had been ineffective in both monitoring fully the introduction of forces that violated the agreement and in preventing the events that took place 

when the Sudanese forces came into the territory. To do that, we 

have asked Ethiopia to bring their troops in to the U.N. force because they are willing to enforce the mandate that that U.N. operation has. 

There has been long and sometimes painstaking negotiations on 

that. But I can tell you, particularly thanks to the Secretary’s 

intervention earlier this week, we are fairly close to an agreement 

that would have the Sudanese forces withdraw from Abyei, reinforcement of the U.N. voice, and a new administration in Abyei. It 

is not sealed yet, but it is close and we are hoping it will be signed. 

Now, on Southern Kordofan, you have heard a great deal of testimony on that, and you know we face an extraordinarily serious 

problem there. The fighting has broken out. There are reports of 

very serious human rights abuses, which you have heard about, 

and there is a serious humanitarian situation where anywhere 

from 40,000 to 60,000 people are displaced as a result of the fighting. 

I have been to Southern Kordofan several times in recent months 

in the lead-up to the election there, and have been in regular contact by phone with Abdul Aziz, who is the former deputy governor 

and the leader of the SPLM in South Kordofan, trying to avert the 

kind of situation that broke out. 

Under the auspices of the African Union High Level Panel, negotiations to resolve this immediate crisis have been going on also in 

Ethiopia, and an agreement is being put together but yet it is not 

as close as the one on Abyei. 

A delegation just flew by helicopter into Southern Kordofan, in 

spite of the fighting, a U.N. helicopter carrying members of the 

SPLM and a member of my staff and the AU panel to meet with 

Abdul Aziz and to work further on the agreement; and, in particular, to get an agreement that covers several things. 

First and foremost, we want a cessation of hostilities and full access for humanitarian assistance to those who have been displaced. 

Second, and this has been worked on, an agreement that the political grievances which are at the source of the conflict there get 

fully aired and negotiated between the NCP and the SPLM in an 

organized way in the future. 

And, third, an issue which in part touched off this conflict in 

Southern Kordofan, a committee to look at how you eventually integrate the SPLA forces inside Southern Kordofan, which as Roger 

Winter noted, and others, are people who come from Southern 

Kordofan. They are not Southerners, and they are looking for their 

place in that state. 

47

Abdul Aziz, as a result of this mission, has agreed to a 30-day 

cease-fire on certain conditions, and now we and others have to 

work to see if we can get that done. 

These are the efforts we have been making throughout the administration over the last several weeks to arrest what has been 

a deterioration in the whole process of the Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement. And there are outstanding issues that need to be resolved by July 9. 

First, of course, is Abyei, the future of Abyei, a most contentious 

issue, and I know members are very familiar with that. 

There is the second question of how the proceeds of oil from the 

South will be apportioned during a transition period and the conditions under which that would take place. There are issues of citizenship that have to be resolved, issues of disputed border areas, 

and a few others. 

There have been lots of discussions on these issues, a lot of technical work has been done; but what we haven’t gotten to are the 

political decisions that will resolve many of these issues. Those negotiations were supposed to start this week, but of course all of us 

have been diverted to dealing with the crises in Abyei and Southern Kordofan. 

Let me take a moment also to deal with Darfur, because as consumed as we are with these current crises and the CPA in general, 

we are also deeply engaged on the problems of Darfur. 

We decided in the administration to put a very intensive diplomatic effort in the peace talks going on in Doha in the country of 

Qatar. Those talks have been going on for 21⁄2 years without results. My colleague, Dane Smith, Ambassador Dane Smith, who 

works full-time on Darfur, practically camped out in Doha for several weeks with his staff to try to improve that agreement. We 

worked very hard to get a second armed movement, the JEM, into 

those talks with the Government of Sudan, and they did engage in 

talks. The result of Doha is a draft agreement which is better than 

the one that came out of Abuja, but it is not signed yet by the government or any of the armed movements. 

The question is where we go next from there. We have to do two 

things. We have to try to work more with the armed movements 

on getting them into the peace process. It is not that they don’t 

have grievances, but many of them have said what they want to 

negotiate is the whole constitutional restructuring of Sudan. They 

don’t want to start with Darfur, and that makes for a very complicated process when you are talking about Darfur. 

On the government side, we have constantly worked on questions 

of access and respect for human rights. There is a desire, and a legitimate one, for a peace process that engages many more of the 

people inside Darfur. But to do that, you have to have conditions 

in which you don’t have a state of emergency, in which people are 

free to talk, not worry about harassment afterwards. You need security, et cetera. 

So what we have said to the U.N. and the African Union that 

want to lead this process, ‘‘Not until these conditions are present, 

you can’t have a process that would be legitimate or credible.’’ So 

we continue to work on all of these aspects of the Darfur problem. 

48

It is complicated, also, I might just say in passing, by what is 

happening in Libya. I think you are aware that Libya had been assisting at least one of movements—the head of that movement, 

JEM, is still in Tripoli—and what happens in Libya could have an 

impact on the situation in Darfur, something we are watching very 

closely. 

Let me stop there, Mr. Chairman. There is much, much more to 

go into. But I just wanted to give you a quick view of the efforts 

that we have been making for the last several weeks throughout 

the administration, with the President, the Secretary, the National 

Security Council, myself and others, our Embassy in Khartoum, 

our consulate in Juba, to get at these issues. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Lyman follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask you, what do you think might be the 

next flash point after Southern Kordofan, Abyei, and the Nuba 

Mountains? Have we identified something that is building, some 

pressure that is building? 

Ambassador LYMAN. I think the other flash point is the five disputed areas of the border, some more significant than others. One 

on the Darfur-Abyei side. The two sides have not yet agreed on 

how to resolve those border disputes. 

There has been a good deal of technical analysis by the British 

and the African Union on those five areas which could be the basis 

for a settlement. But again, we don’t have the political leaders having come to an agreement. So there is a potential flash point if either side tries to occupy those areas and assert a military control. 

Mr. SMITH. With regards to the U.N. peacekeepers, both you and 

Ambassador Winter, Ambassador Winter was very strong on how 

while the U.N. humanitarian efforts have been extraordinarily 

helpful, the other efforts by the U.N. peacekeepers fall far short, 

particularly with regard, I would suggest, to their rules of engagement, which you might want to speak to. 

My understanding is that after July 9, some 7,000 additional 

U.N. peacekeepers are envisioned. This is a time when financial restraint cannot be held up—we would do more if only we had it—

this could mean the difference between an all-out new genocide and 

fighting a war, or not. It seems to me that if there is not a sufficiently robust deployment, there could be serious, serious problems. 

What are your thoughts on that? 

Ambassador LYMAN. There is work, very advanced, going on with 

the Security Council and with the parties to set up by July 9 a new 

U.N. mission in South Sudan. It would be a mission devoted to 

building state capacity, conflict prevention, protection in emergency 

situations of civilians, a very broad mandate that I think will be 

approved soon in the Security Council. I don’t have in front of me 

the exact number of troops involved; I think it is 7,000. That would 

be just strictly in the South. 

Now, what the Government of Sudan and Khartoum have said 

to the U.N., we don’t want the U.N. in the North after July 9. But 

there are several areas in which this is now coming back to discussion. One, of course, is the peacekeeping force that we are talking 

about in Abyei which right now is above the 1956 line, and both 

sides recognize that they must continue a peacekeeping operation 

in Abyei. 

Then there is the question of a role for a third party in assisting 

in border monitoring after July 9, and in these two very important 

areas of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The discussions so far 

on those, the borders and the two areas, have not reached conclusion, whether a third party should be the U.N., whether it should 

be AU, or whether it should be someone else. And that will shape 

the response of the U.N. to what is needed north of the line between the two countries. So it is much more advanced on the force 

going and the broad civilian mission going into the South than it 

is in the North. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask you, Bishop Hiiboro made a very important appeal that the church and civil society be included, and 

he noted that the latest establishment of the structures—and this 

59

is post-referendum—and the absence of church, civil society and 

other actors’ participation in them could lead to a lack of transparency and inclusiveness. What assurances can you give that the 

U.S. is pushing very hard that the church and civil society are 

truly partners and are not left out, particularly in the provision of 

humanitarian assistance? 

Ambassador LYMAN. It is a very important objective. I have been 

disappointed, as have others, that the negotiating process itself has 

not been more open to women, to civil society, to religious groups. 

It has been two parties, really, negotiating between themselves. 

There has been some effort to reach out to civil society, but it has 

not been satisfactory. 

The work on a transitional constitution has largely in the South 

been kind of an in-house operation. It is among the politicians more 

than it is civil society. Right now the religious institutions play a 

major role in the delivery of services. Without them, many people 

wouldn’t be receiving health care and other things. We have urged 

the Government of South Sudan to—as it develops its permanent 

constitution—to make it a very broad process of consultation and 

participation throughout the country. We think that it is extremely 

important. They have committed themselves to that in principle, 

and we will be working with them through NDI, IRI, and other organizations that we have, to make sure that that happens. Because 

it hasn’t happened sufficiently now, and that is doubly important, 

Mr. Chairman, because in the South there is a lot of considerable 

unrest, some of it sparked by militias, but some of it inherent in 

the communities themselves. And you can’t get at that simply by 

government or military means, you have to get the churches and 

you have to get civil society involved. 

Mr. SMITH. One last question. I have many questions, but because of your time constraints, I will just ask one more. 

Dana Wilkins has testified that the U.S. should be more involved 

with the oil transparency issue, and she makes a very strong appeal that we do so, and notes that we are not. Since wars are 

fought over oil, land, demarcation of boundaries, obviously these 

are inextricably linked, are we going to be more involved in that? 

Ambassador LYMAN. We have been heavily engaged in discussions with the Government of South Sudan about this. We recently 

had a Troika mission—that is the U.S., U.K. and Norway—headed 

by our USAID Administrator, that raised this issue very seriously 

with the South. The IMF has been there to talk about this. We are 

now with the Norwegians, putting 10 or 12 people into the Oil Ministry of South Sudan to help develop their capacity, and we are 

working with their finance department to ensure that there is 

transparency in this area. The Norwegians are also being very 

helpful in this regard. 

It is an extremely important issue, as you have heard from the 

other witnesses, and we have said over and over again that for the 

Government of South Sudan, this is going to be one of the major 

tests of their ability as a new state to manage their resources well 

and to earn the support and credibility of the international community. 

Mr. SMITH. Ambassador Winter it would appear, if we were to 

sum up his view on this, is very much concerned about the duplicVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:29 Feb 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\061611\66903 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ity on the part of Bashir, which we have all seen, but he has lived 

it. He saw how we would think something was going to happen and 

it wouldn’t. It reminds of what Slobodan Milosevic always did in 

Serbia. He would sign a peace agreement or a cease-fire, and 2 

days later he would break it. We would have that false sense of 

hope over and over again. 

Is there something dramatic that the U.S. and our partners need 

to be doing to ensure that this man who has committed genocide 

is not perhaps looking to develop another crisis where he will use 

force and use it with impunity? 

Ambassador LYMAN. What we have to do in a case like this, Mr. 

Chairman, at least to the best of my ability and others, is to get 

the people in Khartoum to recognize that it is in their own interests to have a successful peace process with the South; not preaching to them about being good guys, but telling them that there are 

big consequences to their not doing so. 

Mr. SMITH. And what are those consequences? 

Ambassador LYMAN. Well, the North, after July 9, will lose about 

60 percent of their revenue. They will be shouldering a $38 billion 

debt. They will have very serious economic problems. They already 

are experiencing some of those. The only way to resolve these or 

deal with them is to come back into the good graces of the international community. That means dealing effectively and properly 

with the CPA and with Darfur. 

It is not just our condition, it is the condition of all of our Western allies and others who are major creditors to Sudan. They risk 

all of that if, for whatever reasons, they take a military solution 

or otherwise violate the CPA. And we have made that crystal clear. 

They have lots to gain if they do it right. They have lots to lose 

for the people of Sudan if they don’t. 

I think, to be perfectly honest, you have to look at what they see 

as their own interest. And what we have said to them is, being isolated in the world, facing all of those economic consequences, having an unfriendly relationship with the South, all of those things 

are bad for Sudan. It is to see it in their interest not because they 

are good guys or bad guys, but that this is the only way that they 

can produce a viable, stable society in Sudan. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Ambassador, I commend you for your many years of distinguished service. I do feel, though, that we got off to a late start 

with the Obama administration and the Special Envoy. I think that 

the focus might have been misdirected and I think, unfortunately, 

time was lost and we find that you have an impossible—almost impossible situation you have inherited. 

Having said that, though, it does seem that the Bashir regime 

would recognize that time is running out, that they really have serious problems after July 9th. But the fact that they continue to 

behave the way that they do, it is almost incomprehensible about 

the thought process, their tendency to overreact in Darfur. It was 

some soldiers or civilians that went into a barrack and the next 

thing you know, thousands of villages are bombed in retaliation. I 

61

mean, you talk about moral equivalency, you couldn’t even use the 

word. 

The alleged attack by SPLM on a U.N. convoy, once we finally 

got down to the common denominator, it was perhaps a gunshot 

really, not intentionally or did much damage or whatever, but then 

the overwhelming response by once again the Government of 

Sudan, using their overwhelming power, no kind of moral equivalency. And so I just wonder whether this regime in Khartoum can 

ever be reformed. It just makes no sense. 

And then the arrogance of President Bashir that he is going to 

go to China, and Amnesty International has requested that China 

arrest him since they are a permanent member of the Security 

Council and not a member of the Rome Statute. Or at some point 

if he is an indicted criminal—and it is a long way from Sudan to 

China or other places—that he does. I think at some point in time, 

we need to empower some kind of international special forces to intercede and to arrest him or to have some serious kind of intervention to bring him to justice, because this is never going to work 

with the manner of impunity that he goes around the world and 

does what he wants to do. 

However, let me just ask, the situation in Abyei, is there the possibility, or even in South Kordofan, the SPLM want to have a transition from that into the police or military or something, and others 

being deployed out of military. There has to be some time to do 

this. 

In your opinion, do you think that the plan that has been laid 

out before, what they laid out as a plan, do you think that there 

is time for that to work; where, like I said, the SPLM, because they 

are not going anywhere, could demobilized, but there has to be 

someone in between to try to be there to enable it to happen? What 

are the prospects of that happening? 

Ambassador LYMAN. Thank you very much, Congressman. And 

again, let me thank you for all that you do on behalf of Africa. 

Let me distinguish three aspects of that. In Abyei, the understanding in the CPA, which we need to go back to, is that there 

should be no militarized forces in Abyei, only a U.N. peacekeeping 

force and local police. That was the objective that we were working 

on so desperately at the beginning of May, called the Kadugli 

agreement, but it fell apart in the matters that we discussed. But 

that is the essense of the agreements being worked on. You have 

a local administration and you have a local police force, but security is with the U.N. peacekeeping force; and, as I said, an enhanced one with the support of Ethiopia. 

When it comes to South Sudan, I think South Sudan faces an extraordinarily difficult set of circumstances with regard to the 

SPLA. Part of their strategy of achieving unity, of coming to terms 

with various militia that have fought in the past against the SPLM 

in the South, has been to bring them in, and their soldiers, into the 

government and into the Army. The result is a force that is really 

much too large. And as they face some of these other militias, those 

deals might continue to be necessary, but you get the force even 

larger. 

On the other hand, many of these people are not trained for civilian life. They don’t have the skills. There is a high illiteracy rate. 

62

So what the chief of staff, General Holt, has said and what we have 

agreed and what I think the U.N. has agreed, you don’t start immediately a demobilization program. What you do is take several 

years to build this force more into a professional lineup, provide a 

lot of skills training for people, doing things for the society, whether it is agriculture or construction or other things, and then go into 

a demobilization process where you are putting skilled people back 

into society. 

If you do it too soon, if you send people back with no skills, they 

are easily recruited by militia. So it has got to be not a quick demobilization, but a process where you get bigger first and then down. 

I think we all now understand this is how it is going to have to 

be. 

Inside Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, you have a situation 

where you have both in those states and in the South but from 

those states, tens of thousands of soldiers who fought in the civil 

war. Eventually they should be either integrated into a single army 

in the North or demobilized. But the point is that they are not prepared to do that unless they know that the political rights for 

which they fought are going to be protected. That has been the 

issue behind the current conflict in Southern Kordofan. 

So what we are hoping will come out of these negotiations is an 

agreement that these political grievances and concerns have to be 

addressed, and that any plans for integrating or demobilizing those 

forces have to be related to an assurance that the political issues 

are being resolved. 

It is a touchy kind of issue for both sides to work on, but that 

is what is going to be necessary before you can get to a demobilization in those areas. I hope this is okay, Congressman. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. My time has expired. But I 

would ask very quickly, if the chairman would indulge me, about 

the tanks, the tanks that the South Sudanese have paid for that 

are on tracks still in Kenya. 

Is there any possibility that those assets that belong to the Government of South Sudan can be released by the U.S.? 

Ambassador LYMAN. I have to ask you if we can deal with that 

in classified session. I am happy to come up and do that. 

Mr. PAYNE. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Buerkle. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Ambassador, for being here today. My first question 

has to do with North Sudan and the fact that currently their behavior—they are violating the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 

protocol. Now, in your testimony you talked to us about the fact 

that written agreements are being put in place for Abyei and also 

for Kordofan. We heard from Mr. Winters that apparently the 

North Sudan doesn’t adhere to these agreements, that there is concern that even if you have the best agreement on paper, if they 

don’t pay attention to it and they don’t adhere to it, it doesn’t do 

any good. 

My question to you is: Is there a contingency plan? Is there an 

understanding by the administration that we are going through 

this step here, but more than likely it may not work? 

Ambassador LYMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

63

You know, to go back to now the very familiar phrase of President Reagan, ‘‘trust but verify,’’ in the Abyei agreement, you have 

to have a U.N. force capable and willing of enforcing the mandate. 

If you don’t have that, either side could break it, and the North included, of course. What we have been working at is to make sure 

that we have a U.N. force that is not only mandated but willing 

to go to every part of Abyei. 

I don’t want to get into the argument of moral equivalency because I understand that. But the fact is in Abyei, both sides 

blocked the U.N. from fully inspecting the amount of forces that 

they had brought into the area. It only works if the U.N. not only 

has the mandate but is willing to enforce it. That has been at the 

heart of this discussion, to bring in a better force into Abyei. 

Now, when it comes to Southern Kordofan, what I think has 

been demonstrated at terrible cost is that the Government of 

Sudan can’t come in and militarily just disarm those SPLA soldiers. That you get into a terrible fight at great human cost, but 

it is not a walk-over. And hopefully out of that comes—again this 

is mutual interest, not anything else; the only way to deal with 

that problem is to negotiate with parties that have some wherewithal. 

I am hoping that in the discussions that are coming out now on 

Southern Kordofan, there is a recognition you can’t do it militarily. 

You might want to, you might have people who say we ought to, 

but you can’t. And if you can’t, then you need to find another way. 

So that is what I think is going to happen in Southern Kordofan, 

or at least I hope so; that people realize that the military solution 

is not going to work. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Just as a follow-up couple of questions, and I 

would like your opinion as to whether or not you think what is 

going on in Abyei is really tantamount to ethnic cleansing. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Well, what has happened in Abyei is that 

when the Sudanese forces moved in, the population, remembering 

what happened in 2008, left. And understandably so. And what we 

have said is, until those people are allowed to go back and as soon 

as possible, you have what could be called ethnic cleansing because 

you can’t just remove people from where they are and then not 

allow them to come back. 

But for the government to say they are free to come back any 

time, of course they are not going to come back while it is occupied 

by Sudanese armed forces. 

So the reason, one of the reasons that we have pushed so hard 

to get an agreement on withdrawal as fast as possible is so over 

now 100,000 people can come back to their homes, and we get away 

from any thought that you could change the ethnic composition of 

Abyei through military means. And that is clearly part of the objective. It has to be. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Lastly, what leverage do you think the United 

States has to contain the events you are talking about prior to July 

9? 

Ambassador LYMAN. I smile because we debate that all of the 

time in the administration. 

Look, I think there are a number of things that give us an important role. One is that Sudan—and it is not just us, but we are a 

64

major player—Sudan, and by that I mean North Sudan, cannot 

come out of its economic isolation without the agreement of the 

United States. They can’t get the debt relief, they can’t get to the 

World Bank, they can’t get to the IMF, they can’t get off the list 

of State Sponsors of Terrorism. The relationship between Sudan 

and the United States is critical to all of that. It is a point that 

we make, and sometimes they recognize it and sometimes they are 

angry about it, but it is a reality. 

The second thing is in the negotiations that are overseen overall 

by the African Union High Level Panel, it is important that the 

United States be participating and be able to talk to both sides 

about the substance of those agreements, and we have been able 

to play a very significant role in that regard. 

It is that, and it is working very closely with a number of our 

allies so that we speak with one voice. I mentioned that I traveled 

recently with my colleagues from Britain and Norway, the Troika, 

but we also traveled with the European Union Special Envoy, as 

well, and we try to mobilize as much united as we can. 

And the Africans. Look, Prime Minister Meles has played an extraordinarily important role. And we work closely with him so that 

we multiply, if you will, the leverage by bringing more parties to 

the table. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. A couple of questions. You mentioned people returning, that people should be able to go back. But what 

would they actually be returning to? Are there villages intact, was 

the housing destroyed? 

Ambassador LYMAN. What happened in Abyei and we are seeing 

in Southern Kordofan is a great deal of looting and destruction of 

property. I saw one estimate that something like 20 percent of 

homes or building in Abyei towns were destroyed. I don’t have 

verification on it, but it wouldn’t surprise me. A tremendous 

amount of looting. So when people go back home, obviously there 

is going to have to be a lot of help in rebuilding. Now, we haven’t 

worked out the details and the financing of that. But we have a 

coalition of humanitarian agencies that are working with them 

now, with displaced people that will go back into Abyei and work 

with them on reconstruction. But you put your finger on one of the 

terribly devastating costs of this conflict. Many have lost everything and they have to have their lives reconstituted when they go 

home. I think we are going to find that in Southern Kordofan as 

well. 

Ms. BASS. And one of the previous witnesses had mentioned that 

he believes that if things don’t go well after the 9th, that we really 

could be looking at a virtual genocide. And I wanted to know your 

thoughts on that. And I have a question following that that was 

asked actually by one of my constituents who e-mailed it to me: 

What is the administration doing to stop the atrocity in Khartoum 

and how will the administration work to stop the violence toward 

civilians? Distinguishing that from what could potentially be a 

genocide. 

Ambassador LYMAN. It depends a lot on why or where such 

would happen. Obviously, as Roger Winter pointed out, that danger 

65

in many people’s minds could happen in Southern Kordofan or Blue 

Nile if there isn’t the kind of recognition of rights, et cetera, that 

I talked about earlier. In the South, it is a different story. You are 

not talking about, I don’t think, genocide as much as you are talking about ethnic differences, cattle rustling, militias, et cetera, a lot 

of fighting and a lot of dislocation. But I don’t think that borders 

on genocide. 

So I am not clear that that is immediately the problem as it is 

in this continued level—you know, many people say if we don’t get 

these things settled, the two sides will go back to war. What I fear, 

because I don’t think either side really wants to go back to fullscale war, is that you get a relationship that is not even a cold 

peace. It is a very unfriendly relationship between two countries 

that try and spoil each other. ‘‘I will help Darfurians because you 

are helping the rebels and so and so,’’ and each side is trying to 

upset the other with great loss of life for people caught in the middle. I worry about that. 

Now, it could get worse than that. But that disrupts the lives of 

everybody because a very large portion of the people in the North 

and South live very close to the border. Their lives depend on an 

open border. They trade. They migrate with their cattle up and 

down, et cetera. If you get into what I call not even a cold peace 

but an unfriendly hostile relationship, those people are going to 

suffer a great deal on both sides. That in my mind is the bigger 

threat. 

I hope a bigger war is not on the horizon, but I see that as a pattern that would be very destructive if they don’t come to the kind 

of understanding between the two countries, as I often say to them, 

you don’t have to kiss on the cheeks but you have got to shake 

hands, you have got to recognize that your lives are intertwined. 

You don’t have to like each other, you do have to recognize that you 

have mutual relationships that you have got to develop. 

Mr. SMITH. Chairman Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have a leaked United 

Nations report that says that the Sudanese Armed Forces’ invasion 

of Abyei was, in the words of the U.N., tantamount to ethnic 

cleansing. So I was going to ask you what is the administration’s 

response to that report and what consequences are being considered? And then the other aspect of this is the new report, the June 

1st attack by the LRA. It has been 25 years now that we have dealt 

with Joseph Kony, and he has been abducting children and brutalizing them in such a horrific way that he turns them into killing 

machines. But the last report cites that escaped child soldiers have 

reported Sudanese Armed Forces trucks during their time in activity delivering munitions, delivering weaponry, also bringing uniforms to LRA commanders. This is pretty problematic, especially 

when you consider that the latest attack on June the 1st had to 

repeat the modus operandi that Kony often uses where he gathered 

a lot of children, had some of the people massacred in front of their 

very eyes and had some of them identify and kill their parents and 

then have them boiled, dismembered them and boiled them in 

water. The fact that we have not been able to get across to the 

Khartoum government that this kind of support, this kind of using 

the LRA to destabilize South Sudan—and this was on the South 

66

Sudan-Ugandan border where this occurred—the fact that we 

haven’t been able to drive that home means that just explaining 

this to them may not be working. So what is the administration 

prepared to do in light of this in order to get some results? And 

we have given the authorization, myself and Congressman McGovern on that legislation, you have got the green light on taking Kony 

out. What is being done to take Kony out? 

Ambassador LYMAN. Thank you, Congressman. I couldn’t agree 

more about the horrific character of the LRA. There was a meeting 

just in Addis while I was there of the countries of the region and 

the United States and others on how to implement exactly what 

you are talking about, to eliminate the LRA. We have a task force 

in Washington following up on the legislation. Very good legislation 

has come out of the Congress actually. Actually a member of my 

staff is taking over the lead of that in July. So I think the plans 

are being formulated by a coalition of countries in that area along 

those borders to go after the remnants of the LRA. We have made 

it very clear to Khartoum that any support of the LRA is a threat 

to any kind of normal relations. 

I haven’t seen the report that you mentioned. I would like to get 

it, please, because I do raise this issue often. But we do have—and 

I would ask my colleagues in the Department who work on this to 

give you an up to date on what happened in Addis and the plans 

that are underway. 

Mr. ROYCE. Very good. And I am going to follow up with another 

point, and that is the new mission that the U.N. is working on regionally. My concern is what is being done to give them the wherewithal to protect civilians, to make certain that they have as part 

of their mandate a definition that gives them the ability adequately 

in situations where we have already seen happening in Darfur happens, again we make sure that there is a credible deterrence there. 

Ambassador LYMAN. The problem for U.N. peacekeeping forces 

is, of course, how much they get out in front and start engaging 

in conflict with one party or another. It is a longstanding issue. 

Mr. ROYCE. Get out in front is your way of looking at it. I was 

in Darfur. I have seen—it is not a matter of getting out in front. 

It is a question of when civilians are overrun and slaughtered and 

run to the U.N.—or to take the situation, for example, in the 

former Yugoslavia. 

Ambassador LYMAN. I take your point completely because it is 

important that the U.N. be proactive in those situations and it goes 

to the question I was asked earlier about the South. We want a capability in the new U.N. mission there to move very quickly in situations like that, in fact to have a good sense of where that kind 

of problem would break out. UNAMID in Darfur, we have gotten 

the U.N. forces to be much more proactive in asserting its rights 

to move into areas and get to them. And those cases that you described where they haven’t been doing so have been a source was 

not only great consternation on our part but very frank discussions 

with the U.N. So I take your point. 

Mr. ROYCE. One last point if I could get this in. The Chad-Cameroon pipeline project. I went out there and took a look at that. 

And we put a lot of pressure on that government to try to make 

sure that that money went not to line politician’s pockets, right, 

67

but for roads and for schools. The question here is going to be in 

South Sudan what you will be able to do, as difficult a challenge 

as this is going to prove to be, to make sure that our Government 

is supporting the ability to put in place the transparency necessary, 

because otherwise this is going to have a sad ending. Whereas if 

we get out in front of this and really leverage what influence we 

have for full transparency in terms of the oil revenue, I think it 

could have a very beneficial outcome in building society there and 

maybe teach a lesson to the North as well. So I just ask you on 

that front. 

Ambassador LYMAN. No, Congressman—and I mentioned this 

earlier—I don’t think I have had a conversation with officials in the 

South that this issue has not been raised. But more specifically, we 

and the Norwegians are putting 10 people into the Ministry of Petroleum to help them develop the right systems. We are working 

with the Ministry of Finance to get transparency there. Our friends 

from Britain and Norway have joined us to say this is going to be 

a critical factor in how the world comes to support the government 

of the South Sudan. So it is a big issue. And we have emphasized 

it a great deal. 

Mr. ROYCE. Ambassador, I appreciate your good work in the past 

and working with you in the past, and thank you very much. I 

yield back. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have been monopolizing 

this a little bit. We have Raja here and she knows a great deal 

about the plans of USAID for South Sudan and for some of the humanitarian activities. So I hope if you are interested in those 

things——

Mr. SMITH. We are interested. And, in fact, we would like to invite her back for an additional hearing. Let me just ask a couple 

of questions if I could very quickly and then Mr. Payne—as a matter fact, I will ask the questions, Mr. Payne will then ask you because I know you have to leave immediately.

Ambassador Winter made a very, very strong statement in his 

written testimony. He talks about how in Abyei and elsewhere obviously, Khartoum attacks and expects only a neutered international reaction. And he said something that I would appreciate—

because past is often prologue, and you had to, coming on line as 

Special Envoy, deal with whatever good or ill had been done by 

previous Special Envoys—and I would appreciate knowing your reaction to the statement by Ambassador Winter. ‘‘I believe’’—this is 

him speaking—‘‘that more than 2 years of the Obama administration’s approach to Sudan made matters worse, emboldening Khartoum and setting the stage for Abyei’s and South Kordofan’s current horrors. Perhaps the eccentricities of General Gration’s approach to being a Special Envoy for Sudan are related to the administration’s commitment to a reach out to the Arab and Islamic 

world.’’ And he also points out his greatest issue was General 

Gration’s highly biased approach to Abyei. And I am not sure if we 

are reaping a bitter fruit from that or if he has that wrong, but I 

appreciate your reaction to that. 

And secondly, Dr. Eibner in his testimony reminded us that 

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trieval of Southern Sudanese women and children abducted and 

enslaved in Northern Sudan. 

Back in 1996, I chaired a hearing right here, Slavery in Mauritania and Sudan, and Secretary William Twaddell, Deputy Assistant Secretary, you remember him, from African Affairs, said, and 

I quote, ‘‘The Government of Sudan has denied that slavery exists 

and refused to investigate such reports or to cooperate with others 

seeking to do so.’’ He did point out that the State Department’s 

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices included a section 

concerning the persistence of slavery and the alarming increase in 

reports of the seizing of civilian captives, particularly in the war 

zones. 

An unfinished bit of huge business and I am wondering—obviously you are dealing with a whole lot of highly important issues—

but are we pushing for a full accountability and hopefully repatriation of those slaves? 

Ambassador LYMAN. On your first question, look, I think that—

and I worked with General Gration for several months before he 

was nominated for Kenya and we worked very closely together. 

And quite frankly, he worked his heart out and his soul for peace 

in Sudan. People may have quarreled with his style or things, but 

I found him just overwhelmingly dedicated to the peace process. 

Now, if you look at the record, getting up to and through the referendum, when I started in August working with him, people said 

we couldn’t possibly have the referendum on January 9th and if we 

had it, it would be a disaster. We did—and I don’t want to say we 

get all the credit because we don’t, but we certainly did an awful 

lot to make that happen. And it is as much General Gration as myself and others who worked on that to make sure that the Referendum Commission was stood up, supported, capable and that 

we weighed in politically heavily to make it happen. 

We worked hard on the Darfur crisis. We tried very hard to get 

an agreement on the referendum. And we just ran into an impossible situation where each side was not prepared to accept a voting 

situation in which the other side would have a clear advantage. 

The Ngok Dinka did not feel the Misseriya should have the right 

to vote and the North argued that the Misseriya not only had the 

right to vote but to vote in very large numbers. And 9 days of dayand-night work led us to the conclusion—and not only us, but the 

two parties—this isn’t going anywhere, maybe we need a political 

solution. And we have been working on that ever since. 

So I think quite frankly that a lot of work was done over those 

2 years. Of course I came on last August, but I found people very 

dedicated, very committed, working literally night and day on behalf of peace. 

When it comes to the slavery issue, this is a very sore point—

a very sore point. It is a bitter, bitter memory for many people. I 

don’t know of plans for full accountability, I don’t. And I can look 

into that. But I know for many people, this is a bitter, bitter part 

of the history that they carry with them. And sometimes when you 

are dealing in the negotiations, that bitterness jumps up and you 

realize sometimes how deep these feelings go. 

So I take what you are saying very seriously and I will look into 

whether there are any plans on it. 

69

Mr. PAYNE. Very quickly. I think two things I want to mention 

quickly. I believe that the Government of South Sudan would want 

to see a transparent and a well working oil system. I think they 

need the help. I think in Chad there might have been resistance 

and needed to be convinced this is what you have do and if you 

don’t do it, we are not going to get the money. I think in South 

Sudan, that is not the problem. The problem is going to be the capacity to manage it properly. And I am glad to hear that the Norwegians and the U.S. have 10 people there. 

Secondly—and I do know that I agree that General Gration was 

a very hard worker. I just think that we tried to get hearings. We 

were able to get him to come before the committee I chaired for 2 

years one time. We felt that if there could be more discussion we 

might have been able to get our points across, our ideas, and we 

could have worked together, but he would not come before the 

House committee. He did go over to the Senate on some occasions. 

Just one line of questioning. I don’t know whether it is classified 

or not, but we have reports that over a dozen trucks filled with 

chemicals are heading for Kordofan. Chemical weapons are a violation of world human rights and things dealing with war, and so 

forth and so on, and I would hope that there could be some 

verification. It is even alleged that Mr. Saleh Gasch, who is a leader in the Government of Sudan, set up a company called G–A–I–

D, GAID, for the purchase of chemical weapons. 

Now, this is alleged. However, I would hope that we would really 

take a serious look into whether chemical weapons are being transported to Kordofan. And if so, I think that this raises to a new level 

and that there will have to be some kind of an action with—we just 

can’t allow this to occur. 

Ambassador LYMAN. No, Congressman. I just heard about this 

today before I came here and will look into it. I don’t have any information on it or evidence one way or another. But I saw the reports as I was coming here and I will look into it, and I will get 

back to you with whatever we have. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. We tried to stay within your 

time limit. And I would say to Ms. Jandhyala, thank you for being 

here. Without objection, your full statement will be a part of the 

record. And we would like to invite you back for a specific hearing 

on Sudan on just humanitarian issues if you would be amenable to 

that. Thank you so much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jandhyala follows:]

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Ambassador LYMAN. She is worth it. 

Mr. SMITH. I know. I would like to now welcome——

Ambassador LYMAN. And thank you for all the interest. I really 

appreciate it. 

Mr. SMITH. I would like to now welcome our first, second, panel 

back to the witness table. And I would also ask that Ms. Buerkle, 

if she could assume the chair for a few moments. 

Ms. BUERKLE [presiding]. We are going to get started again with 

our first panel. Thank you and we apologize for the length of your 

wait here. I am going to begin the line of questioning and then will 

turn it over to Mr. Payne. 

Bishop Hiiboro, I would like to start with you if I could. In your 

opening comments, you talked to us about the United States being 

consistent and being focused on the South Sudan. Can you elaborate for me? What do you need from the United States? 

Bishop HIIBORO. Well, what I mean is that in the report that we 

have gone through with the support of the United States, we have 

concerns about how much efforts that we could keep on the momentum, the kind of system we have in our country. An example—

that is one of the few that I can highlight. With the peace agreement in 2005, there was a little bit of silence not only from the 

United States but also from the international community. Until 

2008, when we were close now to the election, a lot of efforts came 

out for which I appreciate. But I think—the issue of Sudan has 

been on the agenda for so many years. So I would think that with 

the birth of the new country that is coming, efforts could be done 

both from the Sudanese side and from our friends, from the United 

States, to get this issue finished on the world agenda is what I 

meant. 

Thank you. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you. To all four of our panelists, I would 

like for you to comment. I think you all heard me ask the Ambassador what he felt our leverage was as a country to get the North 

Sudan to cooperate. If you could comment on that and if you feel 

there is other things that we could leverage as well. 

Ambassador Winter, if you would like to start. I know you have 

a time constraint. 

Mr. WINTER. I have never fully understood Khartoum’s way of 

thinking. So I may be off base. But obviously they were looking for 

at the very beginning of this process—you are talking a decade ago 

where we had a relationship on intelligence and those kinds of 

things with them, still do to some degree, I guess. But I think—

this is my personal view—that they were looking for a relationship 

and they were willing at least to enter a process of negotiation that 

would produce something, an agreement which would benefit them. 

I personally think that that changed and changed seriously in the 

summer of 2005. In the summer of 2005, several things happened 

that were key to, I think, how they shifted. 

First of all was that on the 8th or so of July of that year, Dr. 

John Garang went to Khartoum for the first time in several decades of the war. When he went there, a group of the lowest number 

that I have heard, it is like 5 or 6 million people, showed up to 

greet him. They were not just Southerners. They were Southerners, 

they were Northerners, they were from Darfur, they were from 

80

Beja in the east and all over Sudan because there was a hunger 

on all kinds of people in Sudan for a new governance arrangement. 

I think that kind of turnout, which was not all Southerners, his 

perceived constituency, because of his arguments for a new Sudan, 

the fact that so many people of so many different kinds showed up, 

I think put the fear of God in them about what the possibilities 

were under an arrangement that the CPA required and he was 

going to be Vice President of the entire country. 

Then, less than 4 weeks later, he was dead. He died. And I think 

his death divided—having seen the scare of all these people coming 

out and supporting basically his policies, the fact that he died in 

the helicopter crash opened up the possibility of actually eventually 

backing off of all of the key commitments that they had in signing 

the CPA, and that is why it has been such a rough road and continues to be right now. 

That is my view. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you. Ms. Wilkins. 

Ms. WILKINS. Well, I have to respectfully disagree with the Ambassador’s opinion of agreements because I do think that agreements, getting commitments down on paper, can be very important 

and can be a useful point of leverage. Now of course the agreement 

that jumps out to me is this new oil deal in particular, which has 

additional points of leverage. The North is very reliant on the oil 

revenues and it would be a massive blow—they would collapse 

without some share of these revenues. And that is one place to 

start in saying, great, well, if we are going to come together in this 

agreement, which they have to, you need to be transparent in how 

we are managing this. And that is one way to exercise leverage. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you. Dr. Eibner. 

Mr. EIBNER. Thank you. The Special Envoy outlined a number of 

areas where we have great leverage and that is a fact. We do have 

leverage, but it is not obviously enough to make Khartoum fall into 

line with what the United States wants to do. And I see little—that 

there is little space between actually regime change and negotiating or having discussions with Khartoum on the basis of their interests, which is what the Special Envoy emphasized, the American 

strategy is to not like them but simply try to identify their interests. And if there are interests that are compatible with ours, then 

we try to reach some agreement. This obviously happened in the 

case of the CPA, according to President Salva Kiir of Southern 

Sudan, over 90 percent of the CPA has been respected all of these 

years and we would not have the prospect of an independent 

Southern Sudan were it not for the possibility of many agreements 

being respected. But it is not for me to say whether there should 

be regime change and whether the United States is in a position 

to exercise that and to do it effectively and then do it in the right 

way that doesn’t create more killing, displacement, and enslavement or whether we have to proceed on the basis of the strategy 

outlined by the Special Envoy and one that its predecessors have 

followed. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you. Bishop Hiiboro. 

Bishop HIIBORO. My reading of the situation, I would think that 

if you really have a stable North, then that would also hold the 

peace for the South. So decisions that we can take regarding the 

81

government in the North Sudan have to be also very much weighed 

again in South Sudan. And so the regime change definitely I think 

I can speak about, but that has to come from within. And also the 

level of discussions going on with the government and the Special 

Envoy to Sudan should also a little bit get down to the grassroots. 

And so—get the people involved. To my thinking, maybe the—the 

discussion is a little bit very high. So getting the people on the 

ground involved I think would be able to provide a possibility for 

understanding the situation and finding out a solution to the problem in the Sudan. 

And finally on the same and looking at the issue of the implementation of the CPA, we had already foreseen these things. People are already aware that if some of those elements were not implemented, we are going to have a conflict even before the referendum. And that was sort of like, no, we pay attention to the referendum to succeed, then we shall come to talk about Abyei. But 

I think the time has come and past and now we are already in violence. So therefore the moment I would think that more groundwork needs to be done involving the stakeholders and the current 

leaders and to see the best way they can be able to resolve the 

issue. I don’t think the people in the North need violence. They 

need peace, too. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you very much. I yield now to the ranking 

member, Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Ms. Wilkins, what is your—

in a nutshell, how do you see the plan for South Sudan’s oil sector 

going—you had some points that you had made before. What were 

they again real quickly that you would like to see? 

Ms. WILKINS. Of course. Of what the United States can do, action 

points for example? 

Mr. PAYNE. Right. 

Ms. WILKINS. Wonderful. Back to what the Special Envoy was 

saying about how the U.S. and Norway are now beginning to do 

some capacity building in the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry 

of Energy. That is a great step. What I would really—I would very 

much like to add to that, though, is the other aspect of accountability and the real technical support and capacity building for the 

Legislative Assembly to be able to monitor how the ministries are 

functioning and how the ministries are actually managing the sector. 

And in addition, I had mentioned it earlier in my testimony, but 

capacity building and technical support for the petroleum directorate which the Auditor General intends to create. And of course 

capacity building for civil society. That is going to be huge. And as 

of yet, no donors appear to be stepping forward and saying we are 

going to take a real lead on building the capacity of local civil society groups to take an active role in the management of the petroleum sector. I believe that is a real oversight. 

Mr. PAYNE. Let me just ask a question. You were saying that you 

felt the government of—the Khartoum government showed, I guess, 

good faith. You said the CPA went through and that you, I guess, 

had faith in them. Do you have any way to know that the—even 

their accounting of the oil accounts? I mean, you have talked about 

the South. They say they pumped 10,000 gallons last hour. Have 

82

you looked to Khartoum, have you questioned them about is there 

a real meter that you can see and that it is going—have you taken 

any kind of a look—because you seem to have a lot of confidence 

that they are going to do the right thing, although they have just 

broken every sort of agreement that they have made? 

Ms. WILKINS. No, I wouldn’t say I have a lot of confidence that 

they will do the right thing here. No, no. I disagree with the importance of agreements. I think that getting commitments down on 

paper is very important even if the——

Mr. PAYNE. But they have been broken as much as they have 

been written. And it is great to have it written because at least 

there is something to work from. 

Ms. WILKINS. Yeah. Something to hold people to. And I think 

that that is where it is really important. 

Mr. PAYNE. I mean, Darfur, they have broken every single agreement they made. 

Ms. WILKINS. No. Certainly. But I think that is why we have to 

chase them on things like the audit of the current oil sharing 

agreement which they agreed to do last year, or in 2009 rather. 

And progress is actually moving ahead on that audit happening. 

They are waiting now to choose a company, an international, credible auditing firm to conduct the audit. And that is where you step 

in on verifying. Because I agree that both parties, the North and 

the South, can agree to implement this, any new agreement, effectively and transparently, but it is about independent verification. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Bishop, the LRA continues to exist. And 

once again in Sudan, the government has continued to support 

them as they move along. This group should have been eliminated 

20 years ago. They still roam around. Do you feel that with the 

new Government of South Sudan that that should be a priority for 

them or do you think that the Bashir government will continue to 

support the LRA, and would that be some conflict between the 

North and the South as they try to deal with the LRA? 

Bishop HIIBORO. Thank you. The issue of the LRA definitely is 

a very serious issue for Sudan and especially the region where I 

come from, he—that is where he operates, within the area where 

I live. And so we are only amazed too at the situation of the LRA 

that has continued for so many years without any proper solution. 

We wonder about how they get their support, how they are sustained and how—they also carry out their activities with a very 

high degree of military hardware. No one knows definitely. I cannot say. I only maybe want to speculate. We don’t know where they 

get their supplies from. But all we know and I know that every day 

as I speak in my area there are continual raids on the population 

and attacks on the population, abducting, looting, killing. And this 

is causing a lot of displacement. And so I hate to think that it has 

even gone beyond an international issue. It is a regional issue that 

involves Uganda, Congo, Central African Republic, and the Sudan 

and also the international community. And my worry is that the 

continued presence of the LRA in the forest, with that kind of maximum support of them from a source I don’t know, there could be 

a time bomb for the destabilization of South Sudan or anybody. 

Anybody with the terrorist oriented activities can buy them and 

can use them for anything that they would wish. 

83

So I am hoping and so many others are hoping that with the 

birth of the new country, probably an initiative will be taken by the 

Government of South Sudan to involve the other countries because 

they have gone across the border, and to control them and in these 

collective efforts, a regional approach and also international. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Thank you very much. Dr. Eibner, we listened to your testimony and I certainly have to commend the CSI 

in the early days when they exposed the whole question of abductions and other advocates who played an important role in exposing 

the extension, the existence of slavery and people being enslaved. 

There then became a debate, you may recall, with UNICEF that 

had some question about the fact that what had gone on initially 

to a smaller degree tended then to be amplified because when the 

redemption program came in, it kind of created—it created an industry actually. Some alleged that because there was money now 

to buy back abducted people, that it heightened the abductions because millions of dollars came in as a new industry. And then actually even some reports got into the fact that the money—there was 

corruption on the part of some people involved in it. And I know 

that there were restrictions imposed by the SPLM on the CSI. 

And I just wonder—I think we do need to take account of people 

in the North; it is going to be very difficult to track abducted people who are in the North. I think that in the South, the Government of South Sudan, if there are still remnants of that, I am sure 

that would probably still be a part of the social services. 

So, you know, there are so many gigantic problems going forward, it seems as though that you are saying that this is one—I 

assume a looming overwhelming problem in the scheme of things 

in Sudan. I just kind of wonder to the extent to which the situation 

still exists. 

Mr. EIBNER. Thank you very much for the opportunity to respond. First of all, there has been no evidence of any credible sort 

from any—from UNICEF or anyone else about fueling the slave 

trade that it has made, that more people have been taken into slavery than otherwise would be the case. In fact, all of the evidence 

that I am aware of points to the contrary, that slavery has actually 

decreased to the point where they are not happening today. And I 

am sad to say that those who failed to address the slavery problem, 

those who knew about it back in the 1980s and failed to address 

it come up with these kinds of things as a cover for their own inadequacies and failure to address crime against humanity. 

And in terms of corruption and such allegations, you quite rightly say there are allegations and I would be delighted to have really 

hard evidence about really anything that we do in Sudan that is 

not helpful. And I can assure you that if I had hard evidence, I 

would look into it very thoroughly and we would make sure that 

all of our operations are either conducted in a way that is helpful 

to the victims and the victimized communities or stopped if we 

were to feel that they are in some way harmful. 

And I must say I am not aware of any restrictions that the SPLA 

has put on CSI in terms of its operations. If you are aware of any 

restrictions, please let me know and we will try to abide by whatever regulations Juba has. But CSI operates fully in conformity 

with the law in Southern Sudan and the wishes of the authorities. 

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And it would be very unfortunate if people were to think that that 

were not the case because it is. I believe that the slavery issue is 

extremely important today both because of people that are still apparently enslaved. They are human beings, human beings like the 

lady Achol Deng that I mentioned, and today there may be somebody whose genitals are removed, somebody who is executed because they displeased a master. This is important and we want to 

find ways to get them back. 

That is important just on humanitarian grounds. Slavery is a 

crime against humanity, and it cannot be just marginalized in the 

political debate in Sudan. But there is another reason and that is 

why I mentioned Francis Deng and the ‘‘War of Visions’’ because 

there is something that fuels this cruelty, this slavery, and it is related to the different visions and the competing visions. And one 

vision is based on racism and religious bigotry that will justify this 

kind of appalling behavior in the minds of perpetrators, and this 

needs to be addressed as a part of the political debate on Sudan. 

Already there has been some mention of regime change, and this 

is not something I wish to get into but I think everybody has to 

understand that slavery wasn’t invented by Omar Bashir. The 

slave raids got underway in earnest in a very serious way when 

there was what people call a democratic government in Khartoum 

that was a coalition government. All of the so-called democratic 

parties were involved and they were the ones who were really responsible for setting this in motion. This problem goes much deeper 

than a particular leader, a particular party in Sudan. And if we are 

really serious about bringing sustained peace to Sudan and enabling peoples, whether they are in two separate states or three 

states or whether they are united, to be able to live together in 

peace and harmony, then we have to address these issues. And 

slavery symbolizes that. 

I believe that you were probably in Juba at the time of the referendum, and I am sure that you saw all of the campaign posters 

for the independence of Southern Sudan. And it was to prevent 

slavery and to enable us to develop—vote for independence. Slavery 

is an important issue in the hearts and minds of Southern Sudanese, and it is something that we address and we err if we just 

sweep it to the margins of political life. 

Mr. PAYNE. Well, I am not saying we should sweep anything anywhere. All I am simply saying is that we have oppression throughout the world. I mean, we could almost call slavery here in the 

United States if you want to use that term. I just think the term 

is used a little loosely because it is used in some places and not 

used in other places. We ought to have a definition of the way that 

exploitation—you can go to India, you can go to Brazil, you can go 

to Alabama with the chain gangs where people wear chains and 

they work on farms and they get no pay and they work 10 hours 

a day and they are given poor meals. And so all I am saying is that 

we have inequities and abuses that are worldwide, China, Brazil, 

the Caribbean, Indonesia, where you have sex trading that goes on 

in abundance, even the border of Burma. I went to Burma while 

going to China. You would be surprised, you wouldn’t think that 

prostitution and gambling occurs right up there. But they use other 

terms. 

85

And I would like to follow up with you because I do have some 

information that I would like to get to you since you said you are 

unaware it of and I think we could perhaps set up a meeting at 

another time. 

Just one last question since my time is really over, Mr. Winter, 

if there could be some immediate things that our Government could 

do to try to get this situation—and let me also recognition Mr. Joe 

Madison, who had gone to Sudan many times, went on a fast and 

really did much and is a radio personality and has done a tremendous amount to get on the airwaves way back when not many people were talking about Sudan. So thank you for being here, Mr. 

Madison. 

What would you do immediately if you were a Special Envoy? 

What would you suggest to Mr. Obama that should be done now 

because I am really concerned about what is going on? 

Mr. WINTER. First of all, I wouldn’t want to be said person. There 

is at this point no clear simple answer to that, a quick answer. We 

have been talking for 11 years. Everything has been said. I mean, 

the CPA process started in 2001. This is 2011. Everything that can 

be said pretty much was said. The question is, what do we do? And 

that I think is the weak link in the thing. So if you want to go 

back—you can go back, for example, in the case of—we have been 

doing a lot of talk about Abyei and I always stand corrected to the 

other people—to be corrected by other folks on the panel. 

But just to raise the issue of the mobilization by Khartoum of the 

Misseriya people, not for the Misseriya people’s benefit, but for 

Khartoum’s benefit. If you have a government that deals with—for 

their good that actually divides populations against each other, 

something is dramatically wrong now. When we were talking about 

slaves in the 1980s, it was the so-called Murahaleen that were 

doing most of that slave raiding with the complicity of people in the 

government. 

Now, the Murahaleen consisted of two primary groups. One of 

them was the Misseriya. The Misseriya are the same people who 

under the auspices of Khartoum burned down Abyei in 2008, and 

that have been consistently harassing. The 31st Brigade of the 

Sudan Armed Forces is one of those military units that does the 

attacking and the violence in the Abyei area. The whole discussion 

about the kind of thing I referred to earlier about Special Envoy 

Gration in my written testimony about what he was trying to do 

to benefit the Misseriya was this same population that was one of 

the primary enslaving populations. 

Now, the truth of the matter is that the Misseriya people definitely need a lot of help, but the way it has been handled by Khartoum doesn’t ultimately help the Misseriya people. For example, 

the Misseriya people, by the way, have their own homeland. It is 

a large one. It is headquartered by Mugled, the town of Mugled. 

They bring their cattle down into Abyei, historically with agreements with the Ngok Dinka, for water and pasture and a lot of 

them pass through Abyei further into the south. Giving them a little more chunk of Abyei doesn’t really solve most of their problem 

because they need to go further south. So it is not—what Mr. 

Gration was doing was not solving a problem, but he was moving 

the goal line further south, which was problematic. And what I 

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would say is that the issue of the entitlement that the Special 

Envoy was trying to do to create by saying they should have part, 

equal responsibility for the northern part of Abyei, really that is 

not at all the kind of thing that the whole CPA was about. 

The Abyei Protocol is focused on the issue of residence. People 

can get to vote in the referendum on Abyei’s status if they were 

residents. They had to include the Ngok Dinka community because 

that was their traditional homeland. But beyond that, any other 

residents—and there actually are Misseriya who are residents in 

Abyei. And nobody, including the Ngok Dinka, have any problem 

with those people voting in an Abyei referendum. But what Khartoum has been trying to do is get the whole large part of the 

Misseriya population to move in and claim residence. 

Now, keep in mind, they have a homeland area in which they 

spend most of their time, normally around 8 months out of the 

year. So up to 4 months of the year they may pass through Abyei. 

Well, to say they should be able to keep their own homeland and 

then have parts of somebody else’s homeland seems something is 

wrong with that formulation. 

So this whole process is a process that is being, in my view, manipulated by Khartoum for Khartoum’s benefit but isn’t really solving the situation. And they are justifying it by saying—as I say in 

my written testimony, it would be like—since I live in Maryland, 

and I am a resident of Maryland and I can vote in Maryland because I am a resident, it would be like saying, well, the Misseriya, 

since they live north of Abyei, the area headed by the sort of capital town called Mugled, they are residents there for at least 8 

months of the year and they can vote there. But because they go 

for up to 4 months and pass through Abyei, well, they should be 

able to vote there also in the referendum. And it is like me, I live 

in Maryland, but if I go and spend summer months on the ocean 

beaches in Delaware should I be able to say I am a resident of 

Maryland and a resident of Delaware and therefore I can vote in 

Maryland and I can also vote in Delaware? 

That is the kind of thing that is really underpinning the conflict 

and the way it is being handled by the Khartoum government now. 

It doesn’t hold any water. 

Mr. SMITH [presiding]. Thank you. In your testimonies, which 

you have really laid out I think very clear and concise and compelling recommendations, you have really anticipated many of our 

questions, although members may have additional questions they 

would like to ask. I would like to ask one final question and just—

is there anything you heard from Special Envoy Princeton Lyman 

on which you might want to comment on, having sat through his 

testimony a few moments ago? For instance, Dr. Eibner, he did 

agree that he would more robustly look into the issue of slavery, 

and when I talked to him on the way out, he reiterated that commitment. If there is anything anyone would like—yes, Ms. Wilkins. 

Ms. WILKINS. Yes, I would just add that, I said it before. It is 

wonderful that they are putting in advisers in the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Energy, but it is very important that the 

donors, led by the U.S., also focus on building the technical knowledge and capacity of the Legislative Assembly and of the Auditor 

General’s office. To only focus on the ministries which are actually 

87

doing the management would risk undermining accountability in 

the government. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. PAYNE. Let me comment on that there. There is a group 

called the House Democracy Assistance Commission here headed 

by Mr. David Dreier, and that is exactly what they do, they select 

new or re-emerging Parliaments. And they just came back from 

Mongolia and Georgia, countries that have had a transition. We 

have already discussed the possibility of the commission expanding 

to one other country in South Sudan. So I do believe—and they 

have focused strictly on the legislative branch, which in many 

countries are very weak. I mean, the executive has the power to 

have the staff, the budgetary. And so that is what we had discussions already about. 

So that is a good point. Thank you. 

Mr. WINTER. I said before that we have been talking for 11 years 

on this agreement and its implementation. I suggested in my written statement that it is time to take an action. And I never foresaw 

myself ever suggesting such a thing. But my concern is that this 

situation can become a train wreck, a train wreck that influences 

the lives of millions of people in southern North Sudan and in 

South Sudan. And we are the prime entity in the whole process. 

And if anybody is going to take an action, it would have to be us; 

it is not going to be Norway. It is not going to be Holland, you 

know. Somebody else. And I think if you look at the calendar and 

the state of affairs, we are at a significant risk of failure. Not a 

failure on having a separate South, but having a separation that 

becomes even after separation a train wreck for many, many, many 

people of South Sudan and Northern—the south part of Northern 

Sudan. 

Thank you. 

Mr. PAYNE. Yes, Bishop. 

Bishop HIIBORO. One of the points from the Special Envoy which 

I felt he should highlight is the post-referendum arrangement committee that has been set. So I think it will be necessary at this 

point because the time is already close. We are already getting to 

July 9th and the negotiation will be new. It will be between the 

two countries discussing issues that have led to peace. But the 

post-referendum committee that has been put in place, it should 

have been much earlier. I would suggest that the Congress should 

put its energy very much behind this because it is going to resolve 

those issues that can pull the country into serious danger, that can 

pull the country into war. With that, we would be able to halt, to 

halt issues that could lead to war. 

Additionally, Mr. Payne said he was able to speak with the President yesterday, Salva Kiir, and he said he is exercising maximum 

calm, not to turn to violence. I think it is an opportunity that can 

be used at this very moment to address the many issues. But after 

July 9th, from the 10th onward, then I think the language could 

easily change. So I think the highest time is for the U.S. Government to throw its authority behind the committee and those things 

that are left should be well resolved before that time. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

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If there are no further comments, I want to thank our witnesses 

not only for your insights and counsel and for the work you do, but 

for being so courteous for allowing Princeton Lyman to present his 

testimony because of his schedule because I know you all have 

schedules as well. I deeply appreciate that courtesy extended to 

him and to us. 

Thank you, and the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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