U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

22–439 PDF 2016

AN UPDATE ON THE TAKATA AIRBAG RUPTURES 

AND RECALLS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, MANUFACTURING, 

AND TRADE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 2, 2015 

Serial No. 114–49 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

energycommerce.house.gov 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

Chairman 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

Chairman Emeritus 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

Vice Chairman 

STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

DAVID B. MCKINLEY, West Virginia 

MIKE POMPEO, Kansas 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

RENEE L. ELLMERS, North Carolina 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILL FLORES, Texas 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

CHRIS COLLINS, New York 

KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

Ranking Member 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

BEN RAY LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

KURT SCHRADER, Oregon 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, III, Massachusetts 

TONY CA ́ RDENAS, California 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, MANUFACTURING, AND TRADE

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

Chairman 

LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey 

Vice Chairman 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

MIKE POMPEO, Kansas 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma 

FRED UPTON, Michigan (ex officio) 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

Ranking Member 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, III, Massachusetts 

TONY CA ́ RDENAS, California 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey (ex 

officio) 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. Michael C. Burgess, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas, opening statement .................................................................................... 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3 

Hon. Janice D. Schakowsky, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Illinois, opening statement .............................................................................. 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of 

New Jersey, opening statement .......................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10 

WITNESSES

Mark R. Rosekind, Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ................................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 14 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 108 

Kevin M. Kennedy, Executive Vice President, North America, Takata .............. 42 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 44 

Answers to submitted questions 1 ................................................................... 121 

David Kelly, Project Director, Independent Testing Coalition ............................. 52 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 53 

Answers to submitted questions 2 ................................................................... 122 

Mitch Bainwol, President and Chief Executive Officer, Alliance of Automobile 

Manufacturers ...................................................................................................... 54 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 56 

Answers to submitted questions 2 ................................................................... 123 

John Bozzella, President and Chief Executive Officer, Association of Global 

Automakers ........................................................................................................... 62 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 64 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 124 

SUBMITTED MATERIAL

Letter of June 2, 2015, from Jacqueline Gillan, President, Advocates for 

Highway and Auto Safety, et al., to Mr. Pallone and Ms. Schakowsky, 

submitted by Ms. Schakowsky ............................................................................ 94 

Statement of American Car Rental Association and Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety, June 2, 2015, submitted by Ms. Clarke ............................. 96 

‘‘Takata Airbag Inflator Ruptures: Timeline of Events,’’ submitted by Mr. 

Burgess ................................................................................................................. 100 

1Mr. Kennedy’s answers to submitted questions have been retained in committee files and 

also are available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20150602/103546/HHRG-114- 

IF17-Wstate-KennedyK-20150602-SD005.pdf. 2Mr. Kelly and Mr. Bainwol did not answer submitted questions for the record by the 

time of printing. 

(1) 

AN UPDATE ON THE TAKATA AIRBAG 

RUPTURES AND RECALLS 

TUESDAY, JUNE 2, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, MANUFACTURING, AND

TRADE, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:09 p.m., in room 

2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael C. Burgess (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Burgess, Lance, Blackburn, 

Harper, Guthrie, Olson, Kinzinger, Bilirakis, Brooks, Mullin, Upton 

(ex officio), Schakowsky, Clarke, Kennedy, Ca ́ rdenas, Butterfield, 

Welch, and Pallone (ex officio). 

Staff present: Leighton Brown, Press Assistant; James Decker, 

Policy Coordinator, Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade; Andy 

Duberstein, Deputy Press Secretary; Graham Dufault, Counsel, 

Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade; Melissa Froelich, Counsel, 

Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade; Kirby Howard, Legislative 

Clerk; Paul Nagle, Chief Counsel, Commerce, Manufacturing, and 

Trade; John Ohly, Professional Staff Member, Oversight and Investigations; Olivia Trusty, Professional Staff Member, Commerce, 

Manufacturing, and Trade; Michelle Ash, Democratic Chief Counsel, Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade; Christine Brennan, 

Democratic Press Secretary; Jeff Carroll, Democratic Staff Director; 

Elisa Goldman, Democratic Counsel; Meredith Jones, Democratic 

Director of Communications, Member Services, and Outreach; 

Adam Lowenstein, Democratic Policy Analyst; and Timothy Robinson, Democratic Chief Counsel. 

Mr. BURGESS. I want to welcome Dr. Rosekind to our committee 

hearing today. The Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, 

and Trade will now come to order. The Chair recognizes himself for 

5 minutes for the purposes of an opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL C. BURGESS, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

So, again, I want to extend my welcome to everyone as we revisit 

a very serious motor vehicle deficit. Six months ago this subcommittee held a hearing looking at the same issue, and members 

of the subcommittee were assured that everything was being done, 

and that testing and expertise were being brought to bear, but 

there were still a lot of unanswered questions. I was not chairman 

at that time, but I did sit in on the subcommittee hearing, and I 

2 

remember raising the concern that safer does not mean the same 

thing as safe. Here we are 6 months later, and I was hoping we 

were getting down the road of safer, but it is still unclear to me 

how far away we are from safe. 

A few weeks ago the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration launched the largest motor vehicle safety recall in our Nation’s history due to defective Takata airbags. This recall may impact 13 percent of the country’s driving stock, affecting an unknown number of vehicles, and spanning 11 vehicle manufacturers. 

Since our last hearing, tragically, there has been an additional 

death attributed to an exploding Takata airbag in my home State 

of Texas. Every morning I fear I am playing headline roulette waiting for another rupture, another injury, another death. While it has 

now been confirmed that there is a defect affecting at least six 

Takata airbag inflators, we don’t have any great clarity as to the 

root cause, and how we will know when we get to that point where 

we are safe. Clarity and transparency are indeed needed. 

One thing that certainly isn’t clear is why we are launching this 

national recall now, instead of almost a year ago, when basically 

the same information was before us. The American people deserve 

much better. They deserve to know, when a national recall is announced, if their car part is of the recall. I am repeatedly visited 

by vehicle manufacturers who lament the challenges of getting 

drivers to respond to recall notices, especially following a year of 

record recalls, and an overwhelming sense of recall fatigue. Yet, 

when we do have the attention of consumers, how is it helpful to 

tell them that there is a recall, but to check back later to see if you 

need to do something? NHTSA serves a fundamental and critical 

role in ensuring vehicle safety. It is critically important that it be 

part of the solution in every step of the recall process in removing 

defective vehicles from the road. 

The supply of replacement parts is also of concern. I am glad 

that the agency has—acknowledging that it has a role to play. 

United States drivers are competing against a global supply chain, 

and recalls in many parts of the world. I also acknowledge that Dr. 

Rosekind is still fairly new to NHTSA, and was not yet the administrator at our last hearing. I hope that we will see more action 

going forward, as this is now direct and timely. 

I have serious concerns about where we are in the process. It is 

inconceivable to me that none of the tests conducted by Takata 

over the past year on over 30,000 inflators has given us a clearer 

picture and dictated more direct action. And why is it that we still 

don’t have any deployment testing being done by anyone besides 

Takata? At what point do we accept that we need to completely 

eliminate defective inflators and implement a new design, and a 

new manufacturing process? Are all the driver’s side airbag replacements now using different inflator compounds? What is different about the passenger side inflators? 

We do have many questions today. The most important question 

of all, however, does not involve compounds, desiccate O-rings, or 

moisture. It is simply this, when will we have a plan that can be 

presented to the public, identifies who is affected, and when they 

will have a safe, not a safer, but a safe replacement part available? 

Nothing is more important, and nothing else is acceptable. In the 

3 

meantime, the driving public should continue checking their Vehicle Identification Numbers against the NHTSA database to see if 

their vehicle is affected, and this includes vehicles that have previously been recalled. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burgess follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL C. BURGESS

Good morning. I want to welcome everyone to our hearing today as we revisit a 

very serious motor vehicle defect. Six months ago, this subcommittee held a hearing 

looking at this same issue and the Members were assured that everything was being 

done and that testing and expertise were being brought to bear. But there were still 

a lot of unanswered questions. I sat in on that hearing and raised the concern that 

Safer is not the same thing as Safe. 

Six months later, I hope we are getting down the road of safer, but it is still unclear to me how far away we are from Safe. A few weeks ago, the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration launched the largest motor vehicle safety recall in our 

Nation’s history due to defective Takata airbags. This recall may impact up to 13% 

of the country’s driving population, affecting an unknown number of vehicles and 

spanning 11 vehicle manufacturers. 

Since our last hearing, tragically, there has been an additional death attributed 

to an exploding Takata airbag in my home State of Texas. Every morning I fear 

I am playing headline roulette waiting for another rupture. While it has now been 

confirmed that there is a defect affecting at least six Takata airbag inflators, we 

still don’t have any great clarity about what was the root cause and how we know 

that we are safe going forward. Clarity and transparency are needed. 

One thing that isn’t clear is why we are launching this national recall now instead 

of almost a year ago when we had almost the same information before us. The 

American people deserve much more. They deserve to know when a national recall 

is announced if their car is part of the recall. I am repeatedly visited by vehicle 

manufacturers who lament the challenges of getting drivers to respond to recall notices, especially following a year of record recalls and an overwhelming sense of recall fatigue. Yet, when we do have the attention of consumers, how is it helpful to 

tell them there is a recall but check back later to see if you need to do something. 

NHTSA serves a fundamental and critical role in ensuring vehicle safety. It is important that it be a part of the solution in every step of the recall process in removing defective vehicles from the road. 

The supply of replacement parts is also a concern. I am glad that NHTSA is acknowledging that it has a role to play. U.S. drivers are competing against a global 

supply chain and recalls in many parts of the world. I also acknowledge that Dr. 

Rosekind is still fairly new to NHTSA, and was not yet the Administrator at our 

last hearing. I hope we will see more action from them going forward that is direct 

and timely. 

In that vein, I have serious concerns about where we are in the process. It is inconceivable to me that none of the tests conducted by Takata over the past year on 

over 30,000 inflators has given us a clearer picture and dictated more direct action. 

And why is it that we still don’t have any deployment testing being done by anyone 

besides Takata? At what point do we accept that we need to completely eliminate 

the defective inflators and implement a new design and manufacturing process? Are 

all the driver side airbag replacements now using different inflator compounds? 

What is different about the passenger side inflators? 

We have many questions today. The most important question of all, however, does 

not involve compounds, desiccant, o-rings or moisture. It is simply: 

When will we have a plan that can be presented to the public that identifies who 

is affected, and when they will have a SAFE, not safer, but SAFE, replacement part 

available? 

Nothing is more important, and nothing else is acceptable. 

In the meantime, the driving public should continue checking their VIN numbers 

against NHTSA’s database to see if their vehicle is affected. This includes those vehicles that have previously been recalled. 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair now recognizes—I will be happy to yield to 

Mrs. Blackburn the balance of the time. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to 

thank the witnesses for both panels for being here. As Chairman 

4 

Burgess has said, this is an issue that we have followed, are continuing to work on, and you are going to see us stay with this 

issue. The fact that we have these airbag ruptures, that they have 

caused serious injury and death, is of concern to us. I questioned 

Takata at the last hearing about a November 19, 2014, New York 

Times article which noted that engineers at Takata’s Moses Lake, 

Washington, facility had raised serious concern about the use of 

ammonium nitrate as an airbag propellant. They had done that as 

far back as 1999, yet they persist with this. Questions persist, and 

I thank you all for being here for our hearing. I yield back. 

Mr. BURGESS. Gentlelady yields back. The Chair thanks the 

gentlelady. The Chair recognizes Subcommittee Ranking Member 

Ms. Schakowsky, 5 minutes for an opening statement, please. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today’s 

hearing on the Takata airbag recall. The American people deserve 

to know what went wrong with Takata’s airbags, and why it took 

so long to discover, and how the committee and this Congress will 

respond to ensure that it never happens again. 

Chairman Upton recently remarked about his airbag deploying 

after hitting a deer and said, ‘‘Maybe I am lucky it wasn’t a 

Takata’’. But at least 34 million Americans aren’t so lucky. We 

have a guest here today, Angelina Zujarta, who was a victim—raise 

your hand—who was a victim of a Takata air rupture. At least six 

people have been killed by their airbag. In Angelina’s case, it was 

3 years ago, she was in a car accident at only 25 miles an hour. 

Shrapnel from a defective airbag ripped her chest, and we are just 

very thankful to have her here today. Here is an example of such 

an airbag that has these holes in it, where the—am I on the wrong 

side? Here we go. That shows where the shrapnel came out. This 

is an example—these are examples of these sharp pieces that landed in her chest in two places. These are not the exact ones, but 

shrapnel like this, and it is very, very dangerous. We need to stop 

it. 

My big concern about this recall is that the root cause really has 

not been yet determined. We have been told that a combination of 

factors, including humidity and age, contribute to airbag ruptures, 

but we don’t know whether the flaws in the design, manufacture, 

installation, or some other aspect of the airbag, which means that 

we still can’t be sure that replacement airbags being installed right 

now are any safer. Well, this is really dangerous, and we need to 

know what caused this failure to make sure that it doesn’t happen 

again. 

But as we wait for those questions to be answered, there are 

steps we can take right now to improve vehicle safety. Many of 

those are included in H.R. 1181, the Vehicle Safety Improvement 

Act, legislation that I introduced earlier this year, along with my 

colleague, and several others, Frank Pallone, the ranking Democrat 

on the full committee. And I am hopeful that my colleagues on both 

sides of the aisle will join me in this bill. 2014 was the year of the 

recall. Almost half of all cars on our roads were recalled. GM, 

5 

Honda, and other major auto companies failed their customers, and 

lives were lost as a result. The Vehicle Safety Improvement Act 

takes valuable lessons from those recalls, and addresses existing 

weaknesses and information sharing, oversight, and accountability 

regarding auto safety. 

The legislation includes several provisions that would have benefitted consumers whose cars have those faulty airbags. One, the bill 

would double NHTSA’s funding for vehicle safety programs, a priority that has been severely underfunded by this Congress. Two, 

H.R. 1181 would increase the quantity and quality of information 

shared by auto manufacturers not only with NHTSA, but with the 

public, and with Congress. Had more information about Takata airbag ruptures been cataloged and diagnosed earlier, I believe lives 

could have been saved. Three, the bill would require manufacturers 

to fix all recalled vehicles free of charge, rather than just those 

that were purchased within the past 10 years. And Takata has indicated that age of airbags is a contributing factor to ruptures, and 

many of the vehicles with defective Takata airbags are more than 

10 years old. They should clearly be subject to mandatory fixes. 

Under the legislation, NHTSA would also have new imminent 

hazard authority to expedite recalls related to dangers defects. It 

would eliminate the regional recall program, ensuring that all cars 

subject to a recall are repaired, regardless of their location. Both 

of those changes would have improved the speed, scope, and efficacy of the Takata recall. 

The ongoing investigation into Takata airbag ruptures may identify additional policies that would limit the risk of similar recall 

during—in the future. If it does, we should enact them as soon as 

possible. In the meantime, we can’t afford to wait to act on legislation that we know would save lives. It is not just committee Democrats who want action. A who’s who of leading consumer and auto 

safety organizations support H.R. 1181, and I really implore my 

Republican colleagues to join me in this legislation. I ask unanimous consent that this advocates letter be added to the record. 

Mr. BURGESS. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.] 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. And I am eager to hear answers from our witnesses about what led to this massive failure, how to prevent another one in the future. And in the meantime, we can’t delay common sense safety improvements that will save lives. I urge the 

committee to advance the Vehicle Safety Improvement Act without 

delay, and I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Schakowsky follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today’s hearing on the Takata airbag recall. The American people deserve to know what went wrong with Takata airbags, 

why it took so long to discover, and how this committee and this Congress will respond to ensure that it never happens again. 

Chairman Upton recently remarked about his airbag that deployed after hitting 

a deer, ‘‘maybe I’m lucky it wasn’t a Takata.’’ 

At least 34 million Americans aren’t so lucky. We have a guest here today, 

Angelina Sujata, who is a victim of a Takata airbag rupture. At least six people 

have been killed by their airbag—a supposed safety feature. 

My biggest concern about this recall is that the root cause has not been determined. We’ve been told that a combination of factors—including humidity and age— 

6 

contribute to airbag ruptures, but we don’t know whether the flaw is in the design, 

manufacture, installation, or some other aspect of the airbag. That means we still 

can’t be sure that the replacement airbags being installed right now are any safer. 

That isn’t just dumb—it’s dangerous. We need to know what caused this failure to 

make sure it doesn’t happen again. 

But as we wait for those questions to be answered, there are steps we can take 

right now to improve vehicle safety. Many of those are included in H.R. 1181, the 

Vehicle Safety Improvement Act—legislation I introduced earlier this year. 

2014 was the year of the recall. Almost half of all cars on our roads were recalled. 

GM, Honda, and other major auto companies failed their customers—and lives were 

lost as a result. The Vehicle Safety Improvement Act takes valuable lessons from 

those recalls and addresses existing weaknesses in information sharing, oversight, 

and accountability regarding auto safety. 

The Vehicle Safety Improvement Act includes several provisions that would have 

benefitted consumers whose cars have those faulty airbags: 

• The bill would more than double NHTSA’s funding for vehicle safety programs— 

a priority that has been severely underfunded by this Congress. 

• H.R. 1181 would increase the quantity and quality of information shared by 

auto manufacturers with NHTSA, the public, and Congress. Had more information 

about the Takata airbag ruptures been catalogued and diagnosed earlier, lives could 

have been saved. 

• The bill would require manufacturers to fix all recalled vehicles free of charge— 

rather than just those that were purchased within the past 10 years. Takata has 

indicated that age of airbags is a contributing factor to ruptures, and many of the 

vehicles with defective Takata airbags are more than 10 years old. They should 

clearly be subject to mandatory fixes. 

• Under the legislation, NHTSA would also have new Imminent Hazard Authority 

to expedite recalls related to dangerous defects. It would eliminate the regional recall program, ensuring that all cars subject to a recall are repaired, regardless of 

their location. Both of those changes would have improved the speed, scope, and efficacy of the Takata recall. 

The ongoing investigation into the Takata airbag ruptures may identify additional 

policies that would limit the risk of a similar recall occurring in the future. If it 

does, we should enact them as soon as possible. In the meantime, we can’t afford 

to wait to act on legislation that we know would save lives. 

It’s not just committee Democrats who want action. A who’s who of leading consumer and auto safety organizations support H.R. 1181 and urge this committee to 

move it forward without delay. I ask unanimous consent that their letter be added 

to the record. 

I am eager to hear answers from our witnesses about what led to this massive 

failure, and how to prevent another one in the future. In the meantime, we cannot 

delay commonsense auto safety improvements that will save lives. I urge the committee to advance the Vehicle Safety Improvement Act without delay, and I yield 

back. 

Mr. BURGESS. Gentlelady yields back. The Chair thanks the 

gentlelady. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, 5 

minutes for an opening statement, please. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 

Mr. UPTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. An airbag is a safety 

measure that you hope that you never have to use. And if you do 

need it, you need to have it work exactly right. And yes, I had my 

own incident, going back for the Memorial Day break in Michigan 

less than 2 weeks ago. It was dark, it was at night, there wasn’t 

much of a moon, and I was driving at 70 miles an hour when I hit 

not one deer, but two. I was lucky. The seat belt worked, airbag 

deployed, just as they were designed. It was a scary moment for 

anyone, and I remember thinking, you know, I am lucky I didn’t 

have a defective Takata airbag at the time. And then I thought, the 

safety of your airbag can’t be just a game of luck. Being from the 

auto State, which includes Takata’s headquarters in Auburn Hills, 

7 

Michiganders understand better than most just how complicated 

cars are, and how much goes into each and every part. Cars are 

certainly safer today than ever before. As miles driven, and as the 

age of the car goes up, deaths and injuries have gone down. 

What concerns me today, though, are the multiyear safety investigations where we can identify a problem, but a solution is nowhere in sight, where the preferred approaches are Band-Aids, instead of an effective cure. In these Takata airbags, we have a problem. It has persisted for years. And again we have NHTSA opening 

up an initial investigation, and closing it, before revisiting it years 

later. The technology truly is rocket science, but you don’t need to 

be a rocket scientist to see that more needs to be done, and it 

should have been done a lot quicker. When lives are put in jeopardy, delay is deadly. There wasn’t much doubt at our December 

hearing last year that the airbags were defective, but it still took 

6 months to say so. 

Dr. Rosekind was not the administrator when we held our last 

hearing in December, and there has been some—certainly some 

positive movement of late. Now Takata is changing its formulation 

of propellant in the replacement on the driver’s side, either because 

someone else is making it, or because they were using improved 

formulations of their own. But this isn’t the case on the passenger 

side. Instead, they continue to try to perfect an innumerable set of 

manufacturing variables which, for 10 years or more, have resisted 

perfection. So we trust that this time the moisture won’t get in, 

and everything else will be just perfect. 

Once we have safe replacements, we need people to actually be 

able to replace them. Recall rates of 15 to 30 percent are unacceptable. We have to understand what the plan is from NHTSA and 

the automakers. NHTSA will be—for the first time act as a central 

coordinator. Such a move seems warranted, if not overdue, but we 

need to clearly understand the plan so that it can be relayed to the 

public. The messaging around these airbag recalls has been tortured, at best. We need more information, clear information from 

consumers. I am concerned that NHTSA and Takata decided to release head turning, headline grabbing recall numbers at a time 

when the information is not yet actionable for consumers. Drivers 

read about the recall, biggest one in history, but could not look up 

if their own car was part of the recall, including mine, a week or 

two after my incident. How does that help safety? Surely a better 

way exists. 

At a time when this committee should be focusing on how to update NHTSA, how to incentivize the rollout of better safety technologies, and how to improve recall take rates, we are instead 

forced to understand why safety, our very highest priority, seems 

relegated to the back lot. Testing is overdue. Change is overdue. 

Safe replacement parts are overdue. Six months ago I asked the 

question, what should I say to the mom in Michigan who asked me 

if she and her family are safe behind the wheel? Six months later 

I, unfortunately, have to ask the same question. We will have as 

many hearings as needed, and require as much reporting to this 

committee as needed, to ensure that this problem is finally resolved, restoring the safety of our Nation’s roadways and trust of 

the American people. 

8 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Upton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON

An airbag is a safety measure you hope you never need—if you do need it, you 

need it to work exactly right. I had my own incident with an airbag while back in 

Michigan just two weeks ago. It was in the evening, pitch black, while driving on 

the interstate at 70 mph when I struck two deer. I was lucky that my seat belt 

worked and my air bag deployed—just as they were designed. It’s a scary moment 

for anyone and I remember thinking, ‘‘I’m very lucky I didn’t have a defective 

Takata airbag.’’ And then I thought, ‘‘the safety of your airbag can’t be a game of 

luck.’’ 

Being from the auto State, which includes Takata’s headquarters in Auburn Hills, 

Michiganders understand better than most just how complicated cars are and how 

much goes into each and every part. Cars are safer today than ever before. As miles 

driven and the age of the car go up, deaths and injuries have gone down. 

What concerns me today, though, are multiyear safety investigations where we 

can identify a problem but a solution is nowhere in sight; where the preferred approaches are band-aids instead of an effective cure. In these Takata airbags we have 

a problem that has persisted for years. And again we have NHTSA opening an initial investigation and closing it before revisiting it years later. 

This technology is truly rocket science. But you don’t need to be a rocket scientist 

to see that more needs to be done and that it should have been done sooner. When 

lives are put in jeopardy, delay is deadly. There wasn’t much doubt at our December 

hearing that the airbags were defective, but it still took six months to say so. 

Dr. Rosekind was not the administrator when we held our last hearing in December and there has been some positive movement of late. Now, Takata is changing 

its formulation of propellant in the replacements on the driver’s side—either because someone else is making it or because they are using improved formulations 

of their own. But this is not the case on the passenger’s side. Instead they continue 

to try to perfect an innumerable set of manufacturing variables, which for 10-plus 

years have resisted perfection. Do we trust that this time the moisture won’t get 

in and everything else will be perfect? 

Once we have safe replacements, we need people to actually replace them. Recall 

rates of 15––30 percent are unacceptable. We must understand what the plan is 

from NHTSA and the automakers. NHTSA will for the first time act as a central 

coordinator. Such a move seems warranted, if not overdue, but we need to clearly 

understand the plan so that it can be relayed to the public. 

The messaging around these airbag recalls has been tortured at best. We need 

more information, and clearer information for consumers. I am concerned that 

NHTSA and Takata decided to release head turning, headline grabbing recall numbers at a time when the information is not yet actionable for consumers. Drivers 

read about the biggest recall in history, but could not look-up if their car was part 

of the recall. How does that help safety? Surely a better way exists. 

At a time when this committee should be focusing more on how to update 

NHTSA, how to incentivize the rollout of better safety technologies, and how to improve recall take rates we are instead forced to understand why safety, our very 

highest priority, seems relegated to the back lot. Testing is overdue. Change is overdue. Safe replacement parts are overdue. Six months ago I asked the question, 

‘‘What should I say to the mom in Michigan who asks me if she and her family are 

safe behind the wheel?’’ Six months later I unfortunately have to ask the same question. We will have as many hearing as needed and require as much reporting to 

this committee as needed to ensure that this problem is finally resolved—restoring 

the safety of our Nation’s roadways and the trust of the American people. 

Mr. UPTON. And I yield back the balance of my time to Mr. 

Lance. 

Mr. LANCE. Thank you, Chairman Upton, and distinguished 

members of the committee. I telephoned my car dealer last week. 

I have a 2004 Honda Accord. I did not indicate my title. I just telephoned as a regular and ordinary citizen, and I was told that I will 

need a new airbag. It seems to me that one of the main purposes 

of this hearing is to make sure that Mr. and Mrs. John Q. Public 

are aware of the recall, are able to be informed quickly as to 

9 

whether their automobile is affected, one of 34 million inflators recalled, and be confident that the replacement is safe. 

During the subcommittee’s hearing 6 months ago, Takata’s witness indicated extreme reluctance to cooperate with NHTSA’s requests for an expanded recall, and I characterized the testimony at 

that time as tendentious. I am extremely dissatisfied with the company’s obstinate attitude during a majority of this process, and I 

hope that its recent change of heart will be sincere. It occurs, of 

course, after being fined $14,000 a day. I look forward to discussing 

this with the distinguished person now in charge, Mr. Rosekind. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I hope that this will be a hearing of great substance for the American people. 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentleman, gentleman yields 

back. Chair recognizes the ranking member of the full committee, 

Mr. Pallone, 5 minutes for an opening statement, please. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

Mr. PALLONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Though it has taken 

months, I am glad that Takata finally admitted that its airbags are 

defective, and finally moved forward with national recalls. Getting 

dangerous cars off the road is crucial. Airbags are supposed to save 

lives, and not take lives. 

But these national recalls came after a full year in which we 

have seen a rather sloppy rollout of recalls of these exploding airbags. Each automaker seems to have handled the recalls differently. Some automakers conducted regional safety improvement 

campaigns in high absolute—areas. At the same time, others conducted regional recalls in the same areas. Some automakers expanded their recalls to more States. Some eventually conducted national recalls of certain cars. One automaker advised against passengers using front seats until the airbags are fixed, even offering 

to disable passenger airbags as a precaution. 

All of this has led to considerable confusion for the public. Drivers are unsure if their cars are part of the recall. Those who have 

already had their airbag replaced do not know if they need to have 

it replaced again. But most importantly, people do not know if their 

cars are safe to drive. This is the second hearing this subcommittee 

has held on the Takata airbag recalls, and our first hearing was 

6 months ago, and yet in that time we are still left with many of 

the same questions. We still do not know the root cause of the 

Takata airbag defects. We certainly know enough to take action, 

however. And while I appreciate and share the majority’s concerns 

about this Takata crisis, I am disappointed by its lack of action. 

Auto safety is not a partisan issue. However, even after the GM ignition switch issues, the Takata airbag ruptures, and even going 

back to the Toyota sudden acceleration problems, this committee 

has failed to take appropriate legislative action. 

Earlier this year, Subcommittee Ranking Member Schakowsky 

and I, and of course she mentioned it, with a number of other 

members of the subcommittee introduced the Vehicle Safety Improvement Act of 2015. Many provisions in our bill would address 

problems that occurred in the Takata airbag and the GM ignition 

10 

switch recalls. I mentioned to Congresswoman Schakowsky that my 

car—I had a Chevy Impala, I think it was a 2008, I still have it— 

was, you know, subject to the ignition switch issue. And, you know, 

I received a notice in the mail, but there was still some confusion, 

even on my part, as to what this was all about. I was told that 

until I actually had the opportunity to go to the Chevy dealer that 

I should separate the two parts of the key from the keychain, or 

whatever this thing is called. And, you know, I continued to do 

that, even after the—even after they soldered and fixed the key. 

And, of course, I had to look up and see if my VIN number was 

one of the Impalas that had to be recalled. But even in my mind, 

there is a lot of confusion about, you know, what was being accomplished. 

And I think that is why we need legislation. The National Highway Transportation Safety Administration, or NHTSA, has received much of the blame in both the GM recall and this Takata 

recall, but it is clear that NHTSA simply does not have the resources and authorities it needs to protect drivers and passengers, 

and to hold automakers and automobile parts suppliers accountable for safety defects. Our bill provides more resources and tools 

to NHTSA, increasing fines for manufacturers that violate vehicle 

safety laws. Also, in both cases, automakers and parts suppliers 

failed to timely produce critical information that may have helped 

NHTSA identify problems earlier. The bill improves the early 

warning reporting system by making more reported information 

public, and requiring manufacturers provide significantly more information about any fatal accident involving a safety defect. 

So, Chairman Burgess and Chairman Upton, I appreciate your 

interest and, you know, what you have said today, in terms of continued oversight of these recalls, but I think that we need to begin 

our legislative work, and not just talk about more investigations. 

I hope that we can work together to move forward with a bill to 

keep our citizens safe on the roads. I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, JR. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Though it has taken months, I am glad that Takata 

finally admitted that its airbags are defective and finally moved forward with national recalls. Getting dangerous cars off the road is crucial. Airbags are supposed 

to save lives, not take lives. 

But these national recalls came after a full year in which we have seen a rather 

sloppy roll-out of recalls of these exploding airbags. Each automaker seems to have 

handled the recalls differently. 

Some automakers conducted regional ‘‘safety improvement campaigns’’ in high absolute humidity areas. At the same time, others conducted ‘‘regional recalls’’ in the 

same areas. Some automakers expanded their recalls to more States. Some eventually conducted national recalls of certain cars. One automaker advised against passengers using front seats until the airbags are fixed, even offering to disable passenger airbags as a precaution. 

All of this has led to considerable confusion for the public. Drivers are unsure if 

their cars are part of the recall. Those who have already had their airbag replaced 

do not know if they need to have them replaced again. 

But most importantly, people do not know if their cars are safe to drive. 

This is the second hearing this subcommittee has held on the Takata airbag recalls. Our first hearing was six months ago. And yet, in that time, we are still left 

with many of the same questions. 

11 

We may still not know the root cause of the Takata airbag defects, we certainly 

know enough to take action. And while I appreciate and share the majority’s concerns about this Takata crisis, I am disappointed by its lack of action. 

Auto safety is not a partisan issue. However, even after the GM ignition switch 

issues; the Takata airbag ruptures; and even going back to the Toyota sudden acceleration problems, this committee has failed to take appropriate legislative action. 

Earlier this year, Subcommittee Ranking Member Schakowsky and I, with a number of other members of this subcommittee, introduced the Vehicle Safety Improvement Act of 2015. Many provisions in our bill would address problems that occurred 

in the Takata airbag and the GM ignition switch recalls. 

The National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) has received much of the blame in both the GM recall and this Takata recall. But it is 

clear that NHTSA simply does not have the resources and authorities it needs to 

protect drivers and passengers and to hold automakers and automobile parts suppliers accountable for safety defects. Our bill provides more resources and tools to 

NHTSA, increasing fines for manufacturers that violate vehicle safety laws. 

Also in both cases, automakers and parts suppliers failed to timely produce critical information that may have helped NHTSA identify problems earlier. Our bill 

improves the Early Warning Reporting System by making more reported information public and requiring manufacturers provide significantly more information 

about any fatal incident involving a safety defect. 

Chairman Burgess, I appreciate your interest in continuing oversight of these recalls. But we don’t need any more investigation to begin our legislative work. 

I hope that we can work together to move forward with our bill to keep our citizens safe on the roads. 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentleman, gentleman yields 

back. That concludes member opening statements. Chair would remind members that, pursuant to committee rules, all members’ 

opening statements will be made part of the record. 

We do want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today, 

taking the time to testify before the subcommittee. Today’s hearing 

will consist of two panels. Each panel of witnesses will have an opportunity to give an opening statement, followed by a round of 

questions from members. Once we conclude with the questions on 

the first panel, we will take a very brief recess to set up for the 

second panel. 

Our first panel today will consist of a single witness, Administrator Mark Rosekind of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Dr. Rosekind, we appreciate you being here today, 

and you are now recognized for 5 minutes to summarize your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF MARK R. ROSEKIND, ADMINISTRATOR, 

NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Chairman Burgess, Ranking Member Schakowsky, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide an update on NHTSA’s efforts to address defective Takata airbags. There is a more detailed explanation of our 

efforts in my prepared statement, but let me summarize what 

NHTSA has done, and what we are doing. All of NHTSA’s actions 

are focused on achieving one main goal, the only acceptable goal, 

a safe airbag in every American vehicle. 

On May 19 Secretary Fox of NHTSA announced that Takata had 

filed four defect information reports with the agency, covering an 

estimated 33.8 million defective airbag inflators that Takata had 

shipped to automakers. Takata, as an original equipment supplier, 

does not know into which vehicles those inflators were installed. 

Prior to the filing, automakers had recalled a total of 18.5 million 

12 

vehicles. All of the May 19 filed defect reports involved recalls that 

are national in scope. 

Since May 19, 11 auto manufacturers have been scouring their 

own records to determine which vehicles are affected. To date, 

automakers have filed additional recalls, bringing the total to an 

estimated 30.4 million vehicles. During that May 19 announcement, NHTSA made clear the consumers might have to wait to determine if their vehicles were covered by the expanded recall while 

automakers made their own recall filings. As you know, Takata’s 

defect filings were a necessary first step before the automakers 

would initiation their own filings. The automakers’ filings contained the detailed make and model information and Vehicle Identification Number, or VIN numbers, that allow individual vehicle 

owners to determine if they are affected by this recall. Obviously 

this delay is frustrating, and if there is any way to avoid that anxiety, it would have been done. 

In NHTSA’s public communications philosophy, and like all of 

our other interactions, we followed a very simple philosophy, to 

make information available to consumers as quickly as possible. To 

that end, NHTSA has established a microsite called Recalls Spotlight. It is located at safercar.gov, and includes key consumer information on recall issues of high public interest. It includes continuously updated information on the Takata recalls. On May 19 and 

20, after the DOT NHTSA announcement, more than 1.5 million 

people conducted VIN lookup searches on safercar.gov, including 

nearly one million on May 20. On May 19, Secretary Fox also announced a Consent Order with Takata that gives NHTSA oversight 

into the company’s testing, requires its full cooperation with our investigation, and, importantly, gives us the ability to fully evaluate 

the adequacy of proposed remedies. 

It was also announced that NHTSA has launched an administrative process, a coordinated remedy program, to prioritize and coordinate the actions of Takata and the manufacturers. NHTSA is 

using this authority provided under the Safety Act, and by Congress in the Tread Act, for the very first time. We need to acknowledge Congressman Upton for driving that vision, and working with 

others to provide a mechanism to address the challenges and circumstances that are now faced in this recall. 

Many Americans have asked whether we can trust remedy inflators any more than the defective inflators. NHTSA’s Consent Order 

with Takata, the coordinated remedy program, and NHTSA’s own 

testing, are all essential actions designed to provide full and final 

answers to that critical question. NHTSA will continue pursuing 

answers until the American people can have a safe airbag in every 

vehicle. 

There continues to be great interest in establishing the root 

cause of these defects. While some factors appear to have a role, 

such as time and absolute humidity, the full story is not yet 

known, and a definitive root cause has not been identified. In my 

recent experience as an NTSB Board member, and a veteran of 

many major transportation investigations, it may be that there is 

no single root cause, or the root cause may never be known. Secretary Fox addressed this directly on May 19, clearly stating that 

uncertainty cannot stop NHTSA from acting to protect safety. In 

13 

areas of uncertainty, NHTSA must act, focused firmly on our safety 

mission. 

Lastly, whatever the final numbers turn out to be, this may be 

the largest, most complicated consumer safety recall in our Nation’s history. Fixing this problem is a monumental task. It will require tremendous effort from the auto industry. It will also require 

tremendous effort from NHTSA. And yet the agency must manage 

this enormous and necessary task with too few people, and insufficient funding. The same people managing the Takata recall must 

also continue to analyze thousands of consumer complaints, investigate scores of other potential defects, and oversee more than 

1,200 other recall campaigns that automakers and equipment manufacturers now have underway. NHTSA must accomplish this task 

with a defects investigation budget that, when adjusted for inflation, is actually 23 percent lower than its budget 10 years ago. 

NHTSA needs your help to protect the safety of Americans on 

our country’s roads. The President has submitted a budget request 

that would fund significant improvements in NHTSA’s defect investigation efforts, providing the people and technology needed to keep 

Americans safe. The Administration has proposed the Grow America Act, which would provide stable, increased funding for our 

agency, and important safety authorities to help us in our mission. 

As proposed, the Grow America Act, and in a recently introduced 

bill, if imminent hazard authority had been available to NHTSA, 

this hearing would have a very different focus. At NHTSA we address safety risks every day. 

I urge the members of the subcommittee and your colleagues in 

Congress to help NHTSA address these safety risks and keep the 

traveling public safe on America’s roadways. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rosekind follows:] 

14 


Statement of National Highway Traffic Safety Administrator Mark R. Rosekind, Ph.D. before 

the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade 

June 2, 2015 

Chairman Burgess, Ranking Member Schakowsky, and members of the Subcommittee, thank 

you for the opportunity to provide an update on NHTSA's efforts to address defective Takata 

airbags. The recall of defective Takata airbags may represent the largest national consumer 

recall in history and it is also one of the most complicated. 

First and foremost, airbags save lives. 2,388 lives were saved by frontal airbags in 2013 alone 

and 39, 866 lives were saved by frontal airbags since 1987. We need to make sure that people 

trust their airbags. All of our actions are targeted at achieving our goal, the only acceptable goal: 

a safe airbag in every American vehicle. 

On May 19, Secretary Foxx and NHTSA took a significant step toward ensuring that airbags in 

all vehicles are safe. As part ofNHTSA's ongoing investigation, NHTSA announced that 

Takata, at the agency's insistence, had filed four Defect Information Reports ("DIRs") covering 

an estimated 33.8 million defective airbag inflators. This action launched national recalls for all 

of the named airbag inflators and significantly expanded the universe of vehicles with Takata 

airbag inflators that were subject to recall. 

The 11 affected auto manufacturers are currently scouring their records and state registrations to 

determine exactly which vehicles are affected, and will be providing NHTSA with specific make 

and model information. As soon as possible, NHTSA will make this information available so 

vehicle owners will know if they have a vehicle that is under recall. This may take some time, 

but NHTSA's VlN lookup tool located at Safercar.gov is being updated in real time as this 

information becomes available. Consumers are strongly encouraged to check their VlN numbers 

weekly on Safercar.gov to see if their vehicle is included in the expansion. Automakers are 

legally responsible for informing consumers, via a mailed notice, that their vehicle is subject to a 

recall. In addition, under the consent order announced on May 19 Takata must within 60 days 

provide NHTSA with plans for how it, alone and in concert with automakers, will use traditional 

media, new media and individual contacts to inform consumers and boost completion rates. 

On May 19 and 20, after the Department ofTransportation/NHTSA announcement, more than 

1.5 million people conducted VIN lookup searches on Safercar.gov, including nearly 1 million 

on May 20 alone. At one point, Safercar.gov was the most visited website in the Federal 

Government 

Understandably, consumers will want to know what this expanded recall means for them and 

what actions they should take. 

If a vehicle has an open recall, consumers should call their dealer to arrange for a replacement 

airbag as soon as one is available. Because of the size and scope of the recall, a replacement 
15 


may not be immediately available. In order to mitigate and control the risk, and to organize and 

prioritize the availability of replacement airbags, NHTSA is taking steps to coordinate the 

remedy process among Takata, the auto manufacturers, and other airbag suppliers- something 

NHTSA has never done before in its history. In the meantime, consumers whose airbags are 

under recall may continue to drive their vehicles and should stay in contact with their dealers in 

order to replace their airbag as soon as replacements are available. Consumers may also check 

with the dealer for a free loaner or rental vehicle, as offered by some auto manufacturers, while 

they wait for a replacement airbag. 

The four defective airbag inflator models and affected automakers included in these recalls are as 

follows: 

Expanded Recalls 

The first DIR Takata filed declares a defect in all PSDI, PSDI-4, and PSDI-4K model driver 

inflators. Five automakers are affected (Honda, BMW, Chrysler, Ford, and Mazda). Takata 

estimates that this recall covers 17.6 million inflators, 9.7 million of which are already subject to 

prior recalls and safety campaigns. 

The second DIR declares a defect in all SPI model passenger inflators made between 2000 and 

2008. Eight automakers are affected (Chrysler, Ford, GM, Daimler Trucks, Mitsubishi, Nissan, 

Subaru, and Toyota). Takata estimates the recall covers 7.7 million inflators, 2.8 million of 

which are already under recall. 

The third DIR covers PSPI-L model passenger inflators in cars manufactured by Honda and 

Toyota. Model years vary by automaker. GM is also affected because it sold the Toyota-made 

Pontiac Vibe. Takata estimates 5.2 million inflators are covered, 1.1 million of which are 

already under recall. 

The fourth DIR covers PSPI model passenger inflators in Honda Accord (Model Year 2003) and 

Honda Civic (Model Years 200 1-2006). Takata estimates this covers 3.3 million inflators, 2.1 

million of which are already subject to prior recall. 

Coordinated Remedy 

To deal with the extraordinary complexity of the Takata recall, NHTSA is using all of the tools 

at its disposal to prioritize and organize these national recalls, and to ensure the adequacy of the 

remedy. In addition to the defect notifications, NHTSA has issued a Consent Order to Takata. 

This Consent Order, among other things, gives NHTSA oversight into the company's testing, 

requires the company's full cooperation with NHTSA's investigation, and, importantly, gives 

NHTSA the ability to ensure the adequacy of the remedy so that there will be a safe airbag in 

every vehicle. Additionally, NHTSA has begun its own testing for oversight and to verifY if the 

remedy is effective. 
16 


Fifteen years ago, Congress provided authority in the TREAD Act that gives NHTSA the 

groundwork to address the challenges and circumstances now faced in this recall. For the first 

time ever, NHTSA is using this authority, in conjunction with other authority under the Safety 

Act, to open a coordinated remedy proceeding to prioritize and organize vehicle manufacturers' 

recall and remedy programs related to the defective Takata airbag inflators. On Friday, May 22, 

2015, the Federal Register published NHTSA's notice of intent to open this proceeding. NHTSA 

will shortly issue a second Federal Register notice and open a docket for public comment on a 

variety of issues related to the replacement of the airbag inflators. NHTSA will obtain relevant 

information from any and all sources regarding the availability and implementation of remedy 

parts and programs in a process that will be public and transparent. NHTSA also plans to hold a 

series of meetings to collect additional information from Takata, auto manufacturers, and airbag 

suppliers. It is NHTSA's expectation that this process will provide the necessary data on which 

to develop a plan to prioritize and organize replacement inflators. 

Root Cause 

By now, everyone had hoped to have a more clear understanding of the root cause of these airbag 

inflator failures. There are several factors that, based on incidents in the field and from lab test 

data, are known to lead to an increased risk of an inflator rupture. Prolonged exposure to 

persistent levels of high absolute humidity outside the inflator, combined with the effects of 

thermal cycling, may lead to moisture intrusion in some inflators over time. As a result of 

moisture intrusion, the propellant wafers in some of the subject inflators may experience an 

alteration over time, which could lead to over-aggressive combustion in the event of an airbag 

deployment. Takata is also aware of a potential issue with internal tape seal leaks in some 

inflators that could also be a source of moisture intrusion. Takata's test results and investigation 

indicate that the potential for rupturing may also depend on other factors, including vehicle 

design factors and manufacturing variability. 

So while NHTSA's analysis of the data shows that prolonged exposure to hot, humid climates is 

associated with greater risk, the full story is not yet known and a definitive root cause has not 

been identified. In my recent experience as a Member of the National Transportation Safety 

Board, I know there may not be a single root cause, and we may in fact never know the root 

cause. But Boeing did not wait to find a remedy for the lithium battery in its 787 Dreamliner 

despite not knowing the root cause of the fire and smoke incidents that grounded the fleet. 

NHTSA must act to protect the driving public and ensure their airbags are safe. 

That is why NHTSA is taking aggressive action to keep people safe on the road now, rather than 

waiting, perhaps indefinitely, to determine the root cause. 

Fixing this problem is a monumental task. It will require much effort from the auto industry and 

demands extensive effort from NHTSA. Yet the agency must manage this enormous and 

necessary task with its existing people, technology, and authorities. NHTSA must accomplish 
17 


this task with a defects investigation budget of$10.6 million, a figure that, when adjusted for 

inflation, is actually 23 percent lower than its budget I 0 years ago. 

We need your support to help us protect the safety of the American traveling public. The 

President has submitted a budget request that would fund significant improvements in NHTSA's 

defect investigation efforts, providing the people and technology needed to keep Americans safe. 

Secretary Foxx has proposed the GROW AMERICA Act, which would provide stable, increased 

funding for our agency and important safety authorities to help us in our mission, such as raising 

the maximum civil penalty to $300 million. At NHTSA, we address safety risks every day. In 

my judgment as a safety professional, NHTSA's lack of resources is a known risk. I urge the 

members of the Subcommittee and your colleagues in Congress to help us address that risk and 

keep the traveling public safe on America's roadways. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testifY and I look forward to your questions. 
18 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentleman. We will move into 

the question-and-answer portion of the hearing. I start by recognizing myself 5 minutes for questions. 

And, Mr. Administrator, again, thank you very much for being 

here. Thank you for making yourself available to me both in person, on the telephone, as you have worked your way through this 

process. Just so that people are clear, the VIN number that we 

keep talking about, the Vehicle Identification Number, people could 

access that number at the lower left hand of their windshield or 

inside the driver’s door? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. I hope they are paying attention to you. They can 

find that VIN in that location, and go to safercar.gov to see if their 

vehicle is in the recall. 

Mr. BURGESS. And that is the Web site, safercar.gov. Now, if 

someone checked their VIN number and got the all clear on May 

1, do they need to do anything further, or are they good to go? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. We suggest people check that on a weekly basis. 

Mr. BURGESS. You issued the initial recall in the middle part of 

May. How quickly can people assume that you are getting the 

uploaded information into your Web site so that, if they check the 

Web site, they can be confident that the information they get is 

current? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. So—thank you for that question, because clarity 

for consumers is critical here, and Takata had to file their defect 

reports before the auto manufacturers could put together their information. And what is clear is we can’t just get numbers. They 

have to be accurate. So they have to do their due diligence, and 

then we have to do ours. At this point, we have—seven out of the 

11 manufacturers have provided the information, which are now 

covering up to 30.4 million vehicles, but weekly people should be 

checking. 

Mr. BURGESS. So, let me just ask you this, is there anything else 

that you can do, or we can do, to make certain that this process 

is clearly and effectively communicated to the driving public? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. I think you just did part of it, and we are trying 

to do the same thing, which is give people safercar.gov, and helping 

them on a weekly basis go. I do have to acknowledge the auto manufacturers have stepped up and really provided an accelerated production of those numbers, which we are checking, so they are getting up there very quickly. 

Mr. BURGESS. OK, but then that brings up the other point, the— 

their ability to access the remedy inflators. Where do we stand 

with that, the production and distribution of those remedy inflators? Where are you? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Again, very important for people to understand 

the whole process. And I won’t give the whole list now, but part 

of what we are—this whole hearing is really addressing is, before 

May 19, there was denial of a defect. There was mostly a focus on 

root cause. There was concern about the supply chain, whether the 

remedy even worked or not. So that all changed on May 19. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, let me stop you there. We are no longer concerned if the remedy works? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. I am sorry? 

Mr. BURGESS. We are no longer concerned if the remedy works? 

19 

Mr. ROSEKIND. We absolutely are, and that is what I am saying. 

On May 19 the focus changed. There has been acknowledgement by 

Takata that there is a recall, and they are all national. The second 

is a Consent Order with NHTSA, which allows us to be directly involved in oversight for testing to make sure that the remedy is 

going to be adequate or not. And then the third part of that is a 

coordinated remedy program, which goes to your question, and that 

is now NHTSA is in the driver’s seat, and we will coordinate and 

prioritize to make sure that the supplies are available, and that 

they get out there as quickly as possible. 

Mr. BURGESS. But just so people are clear, to cut through any of 

the talk surrounding this, are the replacement devices safe? Not 

safer, but safe, unequivocally safe. 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And thank you, because, again, that is a very important, confusing point. People need to look up their VIN number 

now, and if they have a recall to go get a replacement inflator, they 

need to do that. And we have got to point out, there are millions 

of airbags that are out there every day protecting people, including 

millions by Takata, that are functioning properly. We are trying to 

get the defective ones off. 

And so, yes, they need to go get it fixed. What we will do is identify if there is an interim remedy, because you are correct, some 

of these may not have the longevity that is needed to make sure 

that it is a lifelong, for the entire life of the vehicle, fix. 

Mr. BURGESS. So, you know, what am I supposed to do? One of 

my kids calls me and says, hey, I got a bad VIN number, but good 

news, they have got a replacement, and I am going to get it fixed. 

Am I OK with that? Am I OK letting my child drive that car? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And your dealer should be able to tell you whether they have a fix that is long term, or they have an interim remedy. And the bad news is, if there is an interim remedy, you should 

get a call back from the dealer when it is time to get that fixed 

for the long term. 

Mr. BURGESS. OK. So even someone who gets it fixed may not 

really have it fixed? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And the dealer better make that clear. 

Mr. BURGESS. I just want to ask you one thing quickly. I was 

being interviewed on a national business show the other—or last 

week, and they pointed out to me that in New York, I guess is 

where the show originated, that they called dealers around the 

town, and they said they were laughed at when they said, can we 

bring our vehicle in to get our airbag changed, that they did not 

have a supply. 

So I did the next logical thing, and called my local guy who does 

all things cars back in the district, and he actually provided me 

some—what I think is some—this was recent information. Number 

one, no one is reporting any panicked or irate customers as a result 

of the recall. I do remember a few months ago some dealers were 

complaining about mad customers. I am going to assume this was 

when there was no process in place. And only one dealer had a real 

volume for replacements. Another one had maybe 1,000 that needed to be replaced, but no one was bringing their vehicles in. And 

that is, and will continue to be, a problem, that people aren’t recognizing that their vehicle needs to be fixed. 

20 

My time is expired. I will recognize the gentlelady from Illinois, 

5 minutes for your questions, please. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I think it is really important, what you said 

earlier, not all of the VIN numbers are up yet, is that true, so that 

people need to be checking. They may be driving a—with a Takata 

airbag that will, and their vehicle may be recalled, but it is not up 

online right now, right? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. That is correct. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. OK. So—— 

Mr. ROSEKIND. We have seven out of the 11 manufacturers—— 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. OK. So people should not necessarily feel secure, but they should just keep checking. I wanted to talk about 

one of the authorities that would be in the Vehicle Safety Improvement Act, and that would be to give NHTSA more authority itself 

for recalls. The first known Takata airbag inflator rupture occurred 

in 2004, May 2004. That was 11 years ago. And months after 

NHTSA called for national recalls, which was last November, 

Takata has finally relented, because it is still within their authority to do that. NHTSA currently has no authority to take emergency action, even in cases where defects are known, and there is 

strong and immediate risk of serious injury or death. 

So, Dr. Rosekind, in November of last year NHTSA called for this 

national recall of certain vehicles with defective driver’s side airbags. Takata had refused to conduct the national recall. I know you 

weren’t there at the time, but if NHTSA had had the authority to 

mandate emergency recalls, do you think the agency—or let me put 

it this way. Would you have used it, with regard to Takata? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And thank you for the rephrasing. Starting at my 

confirmation hearing, I made it clear NHTSA will use every tool 

available. If imminent hazard authority had been available, we 

would have used it. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you. The—as I said, the—this legislation does allow for imminent hazard authority to recall, and 

NHTSA has testified before the subcommittee in the past, asking 

for that authority, so I guess you have already stated, you agree 

with the need for that authority? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Absolutely. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. And would it have been beneficial to NHTSA 

in carrying out its mission to reduce deaths, injuries, and economic 

losses resulting from motor vehicle crashes? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Absolutely. And just to highlight, what you are focused on, as an imminent hazard, would have allowed us to get 

these airbags off the road. And there are still procedures to make 

sure everything is done transparently, officially, but we wouldn’t 

have been waiting. There could have been lives saved, and people— 

injuries prevented with imminent hazard authority. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. There are a number of other provisions in the 

Vehicle Safety Improvement Act. It would double the funding for 

NHTSA. So, first, let me have you comment on that, in terms of 

the resources that you have to do the job that needs to be done, 

and—but I think Americans all expect is being done. 

Mr. ROSEKIND. At my confirmation hearing in December I highlighted people, technology, and authorities, that we needed to look 

at those. I got to NHTSA and found out it was more underVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:50 Nov 09, 2016 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\114THCONGRESS\114X49TAKATAAIRBAGSPETEROKPRINT\114X49TAKATAAIRBAGS
21 

resourced than I had ever imagined from the outside. And since I 

have been there, we have done everything we are—we can, and will 

be doing with what we have available to us. 

I could give you a list of 29 different things that have already 

gone on, process improvements, et cetera. At some point you need 

people and authority to get the job done, and that is a concern. I 

highlighted, even in December, there are eight people looking at 

80,000 complaints coming in, and there are now eight people in the 

recall group that have to do with this recall, 34 million vehicles, 

and the other 1,200 campaigns that are going on at the same time. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I think it actually would be helpful to this 

committee that, if you had additional resources, to tell us exactly 

how that would be used, and how then it would impact consumer 

safety. So I would appreciate seeing that. 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And I would be happy to do that, because, in fact, 

in the President’s 2016 proposal, we have identified what—our request for enhanced funding. So we could actually talk about a 

trend analysis division, a special investigation division for defects. 

We can provide that to you. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I would appreciate it. The legislation that 

some of us are co-sponsoring, it would increase civil penalties, it 

would limit—eliminate most statutory maximum penalties to make 

sure that bad actors have every incentive to get unsafe vehicles off 

the road. It would also make sure that—it would eliminate what 

I think is really the farce of regional recalls. Wonder if you could 

comment on those provisions. 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Sure. Just as far as the cap goes, Grow America 

goes to 300 million, yours has no cap. Clearly the message there 

is that $35 million is not enough to really get an effect, so anything 

that gets us to 300 million or beyond would be great. And I think, 

as far as regional recalls, my perspective is that everything is national. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Good. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. BURGESS. Gentlelady yields back. Gentlelady’s time is expired. Chair recognizes the chairman of the full committee, Mr. 

Upton, 5 minutes for questions, please. 

Mr. UPTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, again, we welcome 

your appearance before us, and wish you all the best. I want you 

to know that I have made an inquiry—I don’t know what the Appropriation Committee did with regard to the NHTSA budget, but 

I am—I will find out soon. 

Prior to the May 19 announcement, what efforts did you do to 

coordinate with the auto manufacturers so that they could identify 

the VIN numbers impacted by the recall? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And before I go specifically to that, let me just 

say there were a lot of actions and inactions before May 19, so it 

has already been raised here that Takata was pressured to go for 

a national recall, denied any defect. We do have to acknowledge—— 

Mr. UPTON. We saw that in December back here too, before you 

were on board. 

Mr. ROSEKIND. That is exactly—and the auto manufacturers 

stepped up to actually take on those recall service campaigns and 

22 

other things, even though Takata was denying. So there was some 

action before that. 

Mr. UPTON. So just to use my own little personal experience, I 

don’t do this very often, but with my incident coming back for the— 

to Michigan for the Memorial Day break, so I did plug in to 

safercars.com with my VIN number, and I am not sure that we still 

can determine today it was a Ford Explorer, ’06, and I can’t really 

tell today even if it was a Takata airbag, or TRW, or whoever it 

was. The information was not readily available when I got online 

last week. 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And that is why the information that is coming 

back at safercar.gov is really just called to get recalled or not. It 

won’t give you the specific—— 

Mr. UPTON. Yes, it didn’t have it on the recall list. 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Yes, which means you would be clear if it wasn’t 

there as a recall. 

Mr. UPTON. Although I am supposed to be checking every week, 

is what you are saying? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. On a weekly basis. Which, by the way, is a good 

thing to do anyway because of the number of recalls that are coming out, is just to check that on a regular basis. Airbags aside, that 

is a good source to have bookmarked for you to go back. 

Mr. UPTON. So the auto manufacturers really did step up, then, 

is what you are saying? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And—— 

Mr. UPTON. All of them? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And that was to—again, previously, when Takata 

denied, the manufacturers stepped up to look at recalls and what 

they could do. To your question specifically, we had contact with 

them the day before to let them know something was coming related to the defect so they would have a heads up, and since then 

have been in contact with them about the coordination that is coming forward. 

Mr. UPTON. So you and I talked in advance of the announcement. 

And what is the timetable—what is the goal, the timetable, for 

completely resolving the issue? Being able to identify which vehicles have these defective airbags, getting them replaced, making 

sure that the owners are there. What is your hopeful timeframe for 

this to be resolved, and we can move to the next issue? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. At this point, I believe if anybody gave you a 

number, they don’t know what they are talking about. Here is our 

plan to get there, and that is—we have already initiated contact 

and had meetings with both the auto manufacturers and suppliers, 

other meetings bringing all of them together. That will create a 

plan that will look at the effectiveness of the remedy, the supply, 

and try—and basically getting to 100 percent recall. We hope to 

have a public hearing by the fall that will lay all of that out, all 

three of those elements. 

Mr. UPTON. What steps have you taken to, you know, has 

NHTSA taken to ensure that the propellant safety and evaluation 

for the integrity of the studies and testing being submitted to 

NHTSA by various parties? That seems to be a real element here. 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Yes. And, again, thank you for highlighting that, 

because part of the Consent Order actually allows NHTSA to diVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:50 Nov 09, 2016 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\114THCONGRESS\114X49TAKATAAIRBAGSPETEROKPRINT\114X49TAKATAAIRBAGS
23 

rectly focus the testing, so we can make sure that goes to both the 

adequacy of the remedy, as well as for root cause. So now we have 

some direct oversight and involvement with that. Before we were 

just on the receiving end. Now we can actually direct. And, as you 

know, everybody was focused on root cause, which is still not determined, nobody focusing on the remedy. 

Mr. UPTON. So when someone has one of these defective airbags, 

they have to replace the whole thing? They can’t replace just the 

propellant, is that right? They have got to take the whole thing out, 

and put a whole new device in with a different propellant, is that 

right? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. That is correct. 

Mr. UPTON. OK. Thank you. Thank you very much for being 

here. Yield back. 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentleman. Chair recognizes the 

ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Pallone, 5 minutes for 

questions, please. 

Mr. PALLONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On February 20 of this 

year NHTSA sent a letter to Takata, informing the company that 

its failure to cooperate with NHTSA’s investigation of the airbag 

defect, as well as Takata’s prior knowledge of the defect, would result in fines of $14,000 per day for each day Takata failed to cooperate. By the time those fines were suspended under the Consent 

Order last month, Takata had been fined about $1.2 million. So, 

Doctor, how much of the 1.2 million that Takata owes in fines has 

the company paid to NHTSA? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Basically, with the Consent Order, we made sure 

that the investigation continues, as well as the potential for future 

penalties. And so, at this point, nothing has been collected because 

we are looking at an open investigation with potentially future penalties to be collected. 

Mr. PALLONE. So when do you expect that the penalties will actually be paid to the agency? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. That could be at any time. And part of that I 

think will come as the investigation continues. We are focused 

right now on the safety element of it. As it unfolds there may be 

need for, again, further penalties, and I am sure that would be part 

of the package that would be—— 

Mr. PALLONE. I was going to ask you about further penalties, but 

you obviously think you do—there is a possibility of additional civil 

penalties against Takata? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Yes. 

Mr. PALLONE. OK. A Reuters article last week cited a source 

within Takata, explaining that the daily fine was a factor motivating Takata to agree to a national recall, but it still took 3 

months of daily fines to get Takata to agree. Are financial incentives an effective means of ensuring compliance amongst manufacturers, in your opinion? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. No question. And I think from the earlier question, going from 35 to 300 or no cap is critical. If I can take just 

a moment, I would highlight that there was the penalty, there was 

a preservation order, and, frankly, NHTSA was working on a unilateral program to go after this that we made sure was communicated to Takata as well. 

24 

Mr. PALLONE. Do you believe that increasing the size of the statutory penalties would have allowed NHTSA to put more pressure 

on Takata and other automakers and, in turn, to reach an agreement to conduct a national recall sooner? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. No question. 

Mr. PALLONE. OK. Last year GM was fined the statutory max- imum of $35 million for its failed handling of the ignition switch 

recall. Many regulators and advocates, including Transportation 

Secretary Anthony Fox, asked Congress to raise or eliminate those 

statutory maximums in order to send a stronger message to bad actors. I mean, it is impossible to put a price on the cost of a serious 

injury of a loss of life. No financial penalty or compensation can 

bring back a family member, but stronger financial incentives can 

go a long way in deterring manufacturers from hiding defects and 

not cooperating with Federal investigations. 

So, you know, as I mentioned, Congresswoman Schakowsky and 

others on the committee have introduced the Vehicle Safety Improvement Act, which would not only raise per violation civil penalties, but also eliminate most statutory maximum penalties. So do 

you believe strong financial penalties would discourage automakers 

and parts suppliers from hiding possible defects, or incentivize 

quicker action from manufacturers? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Absolutely. 

Mr. PALLONE. All right. And, lastly, I wanted to ask you, would 

increased fines make automakers more likely to cooperate with 

NHTSA investigations? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Yes. 

Mr. PALLONE. All right. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentleman, gentleman yields 

back. Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Tennessee, 5 minutes 

for questions, please. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Rosekind, 

I thank you so much for taking your time and being here. Let us 

go back to your November 18 second special order to Takata, where 

they were to come to you with information—further information 

about their propellant mix. And what we would like to know is 

what you have been given, what you know about that mix, what 

is the specific use of that mix in the replacement parts, or the remedy parts, as you call them, and in new vehicles? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And I can provide as much technical information 

as you would like. What you have identified is one of the special 

orders that actually triggered the daily penalties that started, because we basically had 2.4 million documents dumped on us with 

all of that information, and tried to understand where the meaningful pieces were. So we have some of the meaningful pieces now 

identified, and we can certainly bring you as much technical information that was provided. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Are you satisfied with the information that 

Takata has provided to you on their propellant mix? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. We are still—we are working our way through 

that information. They have been open about—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. OK. 

Mr. ROSEKIND [continuing]. Providing us testing data—— 

25 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. OK. 

Mr. ROSEKIND [continuing]. But the information that you are 

asking about was millions and millions of pages that have grown 

to about 2.4, so we are still making our way through that. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. OK. Are they being forthcoming in bringing 

clarity to that? We want to know what the mix is, the propellant 

mix is. So are they satisfying the questions that will—that consumers will have when they want to know—this component that is 

in their vehicle that is to make the vehicle safe now explodes, it 

causes injury, and the question is, have they arrived at something 

that is going to make certain that indeed it is safe? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And I would say they will now. That us part of 

the consent—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. OK. 

Mr. ROSEKIND [continuing]. Order, that they are required to provide that information. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. So you are satisfied? I think if you could just 

have someone from your team provide a summary so that we will 

have that for the record, that would be helpful to us for future 

hearings and for legislation. 

Also, let me go to the point that was made—back to that December hearing we had, that ammonium nitrate was used as a propellant in the 1990s. And—so what we would like to know, have you 

all found any evidence of ruptures from the—that occurred in the 

’90s? And, if not, does NHTSA have any insight into why not? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And that is a good question. Again, I will go back 

and make sure that that is part of the information that we provide 

you. What is really important about the Consent Order is we now 

get to be in the driver’s seat to direct this kind of testing. We will 

be looking at it both historically, and see how that informs what 

we need to do now. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. OK. We would love to have that as a follow on, 

if you will, as to what occurred in the ’90s, and as you go back and 

do a revisit of the information that you have, that would be helpful. 

One last thing, you mentioned that the auto manufacturers—and 

Chairman Upton mentioned that they had been doing their part in 

meeting this. I want to know if you are satisfied with how the dealers are being compensated for this, if they are being made whole. 

Because if everyone is taking their car in for the replacement, that 

is a lot of loaner cars, that is a lot of man hours. So would you 

speak to that? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Actually, I would suggest you ask that of the individuals on the next panel, because we would be focused on that 

only if it interfered with the recall. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. OK. We are going to ask the next panel that, 

but I wanted your insight also. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I 

yield back. 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentlelady, gentlelady yields 

back. Chair recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, 5 minutes for questions, please. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Thank you very much, Administrator. Great for—of you to be here, and I appreciate your service 

to the country, and your—willing to testify today. I want to touch 

base with you a little bit. You have heard some of my colleagues 

26 

already mention the Vehicle Safety Improvement Act, and I want 

to touch on that, and particularly the need for safety upgrades for 

used cars. 

Used car sales in March and April of this year reached more 

than three million cars sold for each month, but purchasers of used 

cars now face major loopholes when it comes to auto safety. Most 

do not know it. The Vehicle Safety Improvement Act would take 

two concrete steps toward making our used car market safer. First, 

the bill would require the buyer’s guide window form to include information about a vehicle’s history of damage and recall or repair 

history. Second, the bill would also prohibit dealers from selling or 

leasing used vehicles subject to a recall until the dealer has repaired the defects. 

So, Dr. Rosekind, I—concerned that consumers have an implicit 

perception that used cars are safe and free of defect, and that dealers have made all necessary repairs. Is that true, or what light can 

you shine on that problem? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. This is part of the Grow America proposal. It is 

part of what you are describing, and I guess I just—I can’t imagine 

that you would sell a new car, used, leased, et cetera, if you knew 

there was a defect involved, not to have it fixed before you put it 

in somebody’s hands. Just seems like we don’t have the system 

working properly. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. I would agree. So, Doctor, a 

purchaser of a used car can find some vehicle history information 

through the National Motor Vehicle Title Information System, but 

that information is available only if the purchaser knows where to 

find it, and pays a fee. So do you agree that purchasers of used cars 

can benefit from knowing that a used car they intend to purchase 

has been previously junked, salvaged, or marked as a total loss? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Any information that is going to help them determine the safety of that vehicle is going to be useful to that consumer, no question. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. So the Vehicle Safety Improvement Act requires information from vehicle history report to 

be made available through the National Motor Vehicle Title Information System to be included in a buyer guide window form. Do 

you think that is a smart provision to go for? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Every piece of safety information is going to be 

helpful. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Finally, sir, current dealers 

are prohibited from selling or leasing new vehicles subject to recall 

unless a dealer makes the necessary repairs, but the same regulation does not apply to used cars, which means that used cars may 

be sold or leased to consumers with unrepaired defects. The average recall completion rate for vehicles is about 75 percent, meaning 

that a full 25 percent of all recalled cars are not being repaired. 

For that Takata airbag recall, the completion rate so far has been 

much, much lower. 

In many of these cases the cars are not being repaired because 

the current owner of the vehicle doesn’t know anything about the 

recall. So what efforts does—has NHTSA undertaken to increase 

the awareness of used car buyers and lessees about the potential 

27 

safety defects, and what does NHTSA—or what obstacles does 

NHTSA face in getting this information out to consumers? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. I don’t think there is any question this is a huge 

part of the whole system, and we have—Secretary Fox and I have 

really emphasized finding defects is great, but if you don’t get them 

fixed, doesn’t really matter. So we actually held, at the end of 

April, an event called Retooling Recalls, asking the industry for 

new ideas, and have set the standard as 100 percent target to get 

recalls done. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. So do you agree, then, that 

the provision of the Vehicle Safety Improvement Act that prohibits 

the sale or lease of used cars until any defect has been remedied 

would help increase recall completion rates? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Absolutely. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. And would it make drivers of 

used cars safer? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Absolutely. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Are there other tools that 

would help improve the safety of those cars? What would they be? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And I would say, from our even in April, there 

was a great list of possible things that could be done, and we are 

looking at all of them. But we had manufacturers come in and talk 

about some of their new strategies, and there were some new 

things that only one manufacturer is doing. We need to figure out 

what NHTSA could do to get those basically across the entire industry. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. And, Doctor, how can this 

committee be of any service to you as you try to get that information out? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Frankly, I think the bill that has been introduced 

and Grow America Act are two of the most critical things right 

now, as far as our authorities and budget. And then directly there 

is the budget, which allows us not just people, but the authorities, 

and other kinds of opportunities. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. And, briefly, I only have a 

short period of time left, but if—did I hear you say earlier in your 

testimony, Doctor, that there were—you had eight staff that were 

working on this recall of 34 million vehicles, and that same staff 

of eight people working on 1,200 other recalls? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. There are 51 in the Office of Defect Investigations. Eight of them look at the 80,000 complaints that come in. A 

different eight are handling this recall. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. But—so eight people—— 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Correct. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. OK. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentleman, the gentleman yields 

back. Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Lance, 

5 minutes for questions, please. 

Mr. LANCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Rosekind, I went online regarding my own situation, and the Web site is safecar.gov? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Safercar.gov. 

Mr. LANCE. Spell that out for the public, please. 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Thank you. S-a-f-e-r-c-a-r-dot-g-o-v. Safercar.gov. 

Mr. LANCE. And it has on it how many millions of VIN numbers? 

28 

Mr. ROSEKIND. The total number of VINs I can’t tell you specifically. For the Takata right now, we are up to 30.4 million vehicles, 

seven manufacturers. 

Mr. LANCE. And I know you are working as quickly as you can, 

but at the moment, not all of the VIN numbers are on that site, 

and I was just lucky that my VIN number had already come up. 

But you are informing the American people, through this committee hearing, which is being televised across this country, that 

the American people should go on that Web site frequently? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Weekly. 

Mr. LANCE. Weekly? Now, can you estimate, Dr. Rosekind, as to 

when you might have all of the numbers up on the site? And I 

know that is a difficult question, and I am just asking, is there a 

timeframe that you think you might be able to have? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. We have seven out of 11, and the manufacturers 

are working quickly. I would hope within the next 2 weeks we 

should have that complete data set. 

Mr. LANCE. So within the next 2 weeks you—— 

Mr. ROSEKIND. That is the plan. 

Mr. LANCE. Very good. Now, I didn’t ask this, because then I 

called the dealer, and the dealer was very, very cooperative, and 

said that he thought he would have a new airbag within 1 week 

to 4 weeks, and did I need a loaner car? But I didn’t think to ask, 

should the American people ask, is this for the driver or for the 

passenger? And I have no idea at the moment, and perhaps I 

should, as to whether in my personal situation it is the driver or 

the passenger. And, as I understand it, in some situations, it is 

both. Could you enlighten the committee, and through the committee the American people, on that aspect of all of this? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Safercar.gov will tell you what the recall is for 

specifically. Driver, passenger, both, it will give you that information so you will know what to ask the dealer, don’t have to rely— 

you don’t have to rely on the dealer to tell you what needs to be 

fixed. 

Mr. LANCE. And are there situations where there will be the 

need for a new airbag for both the driver and the passenger in the 

same automobile? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. That could be. 

Mr. LANCE. Do the auto manufacturers themselves have the responsibility, I trust, to inform those who have purchased their 

automobiles of these potential defects? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And they make that information both through 

safercar.gov, they are the ones who provide us the make and model 

and VIN numbers, as well as—most of them provide that on their 

own Web sites as well. 

Mr. LANCE. And are they mailing letters to those who own the 

vehicles? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Yes. There are recall letters that are officially labeled for people to know specifically what is being recalled. 

Mr. LANCE. And do you know, Dr. Rosekind, how many of those 

letters have gone out so far? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. That I would have to look into and get back to 

you. 

29 

Mr. LANCE. Thank you. The Wall Street Journal says today, 

based upon a German study, that there may be at least four factors 

that could lead to all of this, and the factors include damaged or 

problematic inflator components, the positioning of the inflator and 

airbag system in vehicles, prolonged exposure to heat and humidity, and manufacturing variability. Are you now analyzing the new 

study from the Germans as to whether—what they suggest may be 

true? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. So we are looking—we are both aware of that report, and looking at that, plus there are multiple folks doing testing. You are going to hear from an independent testing coalition of 

the auto manufacturers. Takata is doing its own. Automakers are 

doing their own. The Consent Order is going to give us access to 

all of that data. 

And you have just highlighted, last quick comment, why this is 

so difficult. There are over 10 different configurations of the inflator across all the different makes and models. That is part of the 

problem with trying to figure out what the root cause has been. 

Mr. LANCE. As I understand it, part of this is using batwing 

shaped wafers inside airbags. Would you, through the committee, 

explain to the American people what that means? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And that has to do with the shape or design, basically, of the propellant container. And that is a perfect example of 

the different design configurations that are in over 10 different of 

these inflators. And that is part of the problem. In fact, there are 

some Takata airbags in certain manufacturers that have ruptured 

in some manufacturers’, but not other manufacturers’, cars. 

Mr. LANCE. Thank you, you have been very helpful, and let me 

say I look forward to the testimony of the second panel. And, Mr. 

Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. BURGESS. Gentleman yields back. Chair thanks the gentleman. Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Ca ́ rdenas, 5 minutes for questions, please. 

Mr. CA ́ RDENAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Dr. 

Rosekind, for all of your service, and for answering our questions 

today. Not only for us, but for the people we represent throughout 

the country. I am going to start off by talking about the—your administration, to get an understanding of how well we are or are not 

doing, to make sure you have the resources to protect the American 

public—or to help protect the American public. 

One estimate puts the number of vehicles on U.S. roads in 2014 

at about 253 million, which is nearly four million more than the 

estimate of 2013. Meanwhile, in spite of the growing volume of vehicles, and the increasing complexity of newer vehicles, NHTSA’s 

budget has remained relatively flat over the past few years. The 

fiscal year 2016 budget appropriation of 837 million continues this 

trend, coming in more than 70 million short of NHTSA’s request. 

Dr. Rosekind, do you believe that the stagnant funding for 

NHTSA, as part of the do more with less culture that has resulted 

from sequestration, has made it harder for the administration to do 

its job of keeping unsafe vehicles off the roads? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. There is no question, where NHTSA is addressing 

safety risks every day, that the budget and personnel and authority 

issues are helping create more risk for us. From my confirmation 

30 

hearing, I have identified—we have done, and will continue to do 

everything internally, process-wise, procedurally that we can to be 

more effective, but at some point, eight people to look at 80,000 

complaints, up from 45,000 the year before, now you are just talking, you know, people that can get the job done. 

Mr. CA ́ RDENAS. Um-hum. Well, I constantly hear—I have been 

elected to office 18 years at various levels, and I constantly hear 

some of my colleagues talk about fiscal conservativeness, and talking about how Government needs to operate more like a business. 

I don’t know of too many businesses that responsibly act with eight 

human beings trying to handle 80,000, you know, moving parts of 

issues and constituents. That is not efficiency. I think that is—well, 

it is delinquency, to be honest with. And not delinquent on you, but 

delinquent on us, the appropriators. I think we need do—to do a 

better job of protecting the American public, or helping you do your 

job of helping to protect the American public. 

The Office of Defect Investigation, which is responsible for 

screening and reviewing 40,000 consumer complaints per year, and 

conducting investigations of possible defects, had 51 full time staff 

in March of 2014, down from 64 in 2002. NHTSA’s fiscal year 2016 

budget request includes a request for funds to do—to more than 

double the number of ODI personnel. Dr. Rosekind, is the 837 million that the House Appropriations Committee approved for the 

2016 fiscal year, is it sufficient for increasing the number of ODI 

personnel? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. No. That basically flatlines where we are today. 

And—— 

Mr. CA ́ RDENAS. OK. 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And just to inflate that for you appropriately, 

that 40,000 number was last year. Because of all the attention last 

year, that number is now 80,000 complaints coming in. 

Mr. CA ́ RDENAS. So that is where we—— 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Doubled. 

Mr. CA ́ RDENAS. So that is where you get to the 80,000? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CA ́ RDENAS. Thank you. It is clear that additional funding 

sources for NHTSA will be critical to ensure the—ensuring the administration can keep drivers and passengers safe. That is why, in 

addition to new appropriations specifically for NHTSA’s vehicle 

safety programs, H.R. 1181 would authorize a new vehicle safety 

user fee. This fee would be paid by vehicle manufacturers for each 

U.S. vehicle certified to be Federal—to meet Federal safety standards, beginning at $3 per vehicle, and increasing annually to $9 per 

vehicle. But this could potentially generate tens of millions of dollars for NHTSA to spend specifically on safety. Dr. Rosekind, do 

you think NHTSA would be able to find efficient and effective ways 

to channel the money raised by such a fee into consumer safety? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. No question. And I think, if anything, it is all 

about the safety mission, I think for the agency, and for me, so you 

give us more resources, and we will give you more safety. 

Mr. CA ́ RDENAS. OK. And, once again, looking at the numbers, the 

number of vehicles on American roads is growing, correct? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Yes. 

31 

Mr. CA ́ RDENAS. And, fortunately and unfortunately, when we 

have better systems of identifying when there is a defect, that 

means that we are much more aware quicker of how many more, 

in this case millions, of people need to be notified and coordinated 

with, et cetera, so that we can actually get them in a safer place, 

with a product that has been identified as being defective, correct? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. No question. We want to move the whole industry 

to a more proactive safety culture. Early identification means early 

intervention. Small numbers, we wouldn’t be where we are today. 

Mr. CA ́ RDENAS. Um-hum. Well, I think that Americans take it for 

granted that we do have these systems. Unfortunately, I think that 

too many Americans ignore the idea that Congress is not doing its 

job of properly appropriating so that they are safe. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentleman, gentleman yields 

back. The Chair recognizes gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Guthrie, 

5 minutes for questions, please. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for recognition. Thank 

you for being here today, real—appreciate it. I have a question. 

You mentioned—talking about going to the site and putting in your 

VIN number, that you have the information from seven of 11 manufacturers. Is there a timeline you think you will have the other 

four? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. That was asked earlier, and our plan is to have 

that within 2 weeks, if not sooner. The manufacturers are working 

very quickly. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. Uh-huh. 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Not just about getting the numbers. It is checking 

the accuracy, which both they and NTHSA have to do. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. So that is the process that is taking—OK. Takata 

suggested that the particular make and model of a vehicle may be 

contributing to the inflator defects. Has NHTSA reviewed that 

analysis and come to some conclusion with that? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And that is part of the problem with the root 

cause right now. There are not just 10 plus different designs of the 

inflators, but we are looking at different makes and models, so that 

is exactly what the difficulty is. There are some Takata inflators 

in a make and model that has not ruptured. The same Takata inflator in a different make and model might rupture. So when you 

think about all the different variations you have to look for, that 

is why it is a challenge right now trying to come to a root cause. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. Yes, but earlier in my life I was a certified quality 

engineer, and so it seems like it is difficult to recreate the problem. 

I mean, you—it is just—you can’t figure out exactly the root cause, 

I am sort of getting at. 

And I was, you know, vehicles last a lot longer than they used 

to, and people have them for quite a while. And they tell you to 

change your oil every 3,000 miles, your tires every so many thousand, rotate them. Is there any manufacturer or vehicle out there 

that has routine maintenance at all on airbags that you know of? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. That is a very good question. I don’t believe so, 

but I will get a specific answer for you. And right now the average 

vehicle is in service for 11.4 years. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. Um-hum. 

32 

Mr. ROSEKIND. So even many of the statutes that are out there 

that only go to 10 are surpassed by the vehicles that are on the 

road now. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. So—I mean, obviously people who buy a vehicle expect their airbag to last as long as their vehicle lasts, but, as far 

as we know, there is not a routine kind of maintenance or check? 

It is hard to—I mean, it is one of those things it is a destructive 

test then to check your airbag, and you move forward. 

I have a question. Since December 3, the hearing that we had 

in 2014, how many additional fatalities and injuries? You might 

have answered that, but I am not sure I heard that when you were 

speaking. 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Specifically we are aware of six worldwide, people 

that have lost their lives, and at least 100 injured. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. And also, Mr. Friedman, you weren’t here, testified 

in December that you were going to hire an expert in propellant 

and bag production—airbag production within a week of the last 

hearing. Has that—that has taken place, hasn’t it? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Yes, it has, and I have tried to identify—we have 

at least four people on staff that know airbags quite well—— 

Mr. GUTHRIE. Um-hum. 

Mr. ROSEKIND [continuing]. But now we have someone with particular expertise in the areas we are looking at that has been on 

staff. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. These four people that know airbags, are they part 

of the eight that you were describing, so they are also looking at 

the other—as well? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. We have three or four staff people that have the 

expertise, as well as a consultant that is outside that has been 

added. And the three or four staff people are part of the eight that 

we—— 

Mr. GUTHRIE. That you were describing? Well—and—so has 

there ever been an airbag consultant before on—this is new, I 

guess, due to this issue? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And this individual was picked specifically because of their expertise on the propellant side. Because, even with 

the inflator, if you think about design and all the other elements, 

we are really focused on the chemistry in the propellant. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. Well, thank you, and I appreciate you being here. 

I know we are all here trying to find an answer because of the— 

even since December 6, and the hundreds of injuries, and we need 

to get to the bottom of it, and thank you for being here today. And 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURGESS. Gentleman yields back. Chair thanks the gentleman. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Ms. 

Clarke, 5 minutes for your questions, please. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank our 

Ranking Member. Dr. Rosekind, thank you for all of your work and 

testimony here today. NHTSA first asked Takata to conduct a national recall in November of 2014. Takata responded by questioning 

NHTSA’s authority to order the company to undertake the national 

recall. In a December hearing held by this subcommittee, Takata 

reiterated its belief that a national recall was unwarranted, alVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:50 Nov 09, 2016 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\114THCONGRESS\114X49TAKATAAIRBAGSPETEROKPRINT\114X49TAKATAAIRBAGS
33 

though. I should note that many of the auto manufacturers extended the recalls anyway. 

Nearly 6 months to the day since the last hearing, we are in a 

much different place, but also 6 months behind where we should 

be in getting these dangers airbags out of our cars. Dr. Rosekind, 

in today’s world goods and services cross State lines without a second thought. Our cars have an average lifetime of 11 years on the 

road, and frequently spend time in all corners of the country during their lifetimes. Given the realities of the world in which we live 

today, is it possible for NHTSA to guarantee that a regional recall 

will be sufficient? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Our approach has been—my approach has been 

to make sure we focus on national recalls, and that was part of the 

challenge previously, was Takata’s denial that there was even a defect. And even though manufacturers stepped up, there was a wide 

range of patchwork, basically. Service campaigns, some recalls, 

some regional, some national, it was all over the place. May 19 

NHTSA took the driver’s seat, and quarter rated—our coordinated 

remedy will change all of that. 

Ms. CLARKE. Yes, I don’t think so either. H.R. 1181, the Vehicle 

Safety Improvement Act, would eliminate the farce of regional recalls by making clear that all safety recalls of motor vehicles and 

replacement parts must be carried out on a national basis. The bill 

will also allow NHTSA to prioritize certain parts of the country 

when the quantity of replacement parts is limited. 

Dr. Rosekind, in the past NHTSA has supported regional recalls. 

Earlier in this hearing you said that, from your perspective, recalls 

are national. Can I then assume you support this provision of the 

Vehicle Safety Act? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. We are interested in safety for everybody, so we 

start with a national recall. 

Ms. CLARKE. Very well. Takada’s written testimony explains that 

for two of the Takata airbags being recalled, the recall will be regional, and NHTSA will have to order Takada to expand the recalls 

nationally. Will you commit to expanding all of the Takata recalls 

nationally now? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And I think it has been interesting to watch peoples’ response to those two. Those two passenger airbag inflators 

are the most problematic, and so that, basically, is trying to ensure 

that the people at the highest risk get their fix as quickly as possible. If you read those defect reports, it expected that those will 

be national. 

Ms. CLARKE. So that means that we are looking to have a national recall now? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. With—yes, with a very specific focus to make 

sure in those problematic ones we get those high risk people covered as quickly as possible. 

Ms. CLARKE. The recalls of Takata airbags began as safety improvement campaigns, and regional recalls in all—only certain 

parts of the country with high absolute humidity. As NHTSA, 

Takata and care—car manufacturers learn more about the defect, 

and as inflator ruptures occurred outside those high humidity 

areas, the air—automakers each responded differently. Some exVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:50 Nov 09, 2016 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\114THCONGRESS\114X49TAKATAAIRBAGSPETEROKPRINT\114X49TAKATAAIRBAGS
34 

panded their recalls to additional States, others expanded recalls 

nationally, and the information for consumers was hard to find. 

It seems to me that the regional recalls in this case only added 

to consumer confusion. I believe that conducting national recalls 

from the start, with an allowance for prioritization of placement 

parts to our most vulnerable geographic areas first would have 

lessened the consumer confusion in this case. 

Dr. Rosekind, do you agree that that rollout of the recalls could 

have been handled better from the very beginning? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. What I am going to do is focus, which Chairman 

Burgess already said, I think you beat me by a month or so, being 

in the chairs, and so I can speak to the last 5 months, that we are 

going after national recalls for these to make sure every American 

gets a safe airbag in their vehicle. 

Ms. CLARKE. I just want to make sure that we learn from this 

lesson. 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Absolutely. 

Ms. CLARKE. You know, it is very interesting that, you know, we 

are trying to reorganize how we do things. If we know from the 

very outset, then we can administer best practices going forward. 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Absolutely. 

Ms. CLARKE. Very well. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentlelady, gentlelady yields 

back. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from the high humidity city of Houston, Texas, 5 minutes for your questions, please. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome Dr. 

Rosekind. Before my questions, I want to put a human face—victim 

of a defective Takata airbag. His name was Carlos Saliz. He was 

35 years old, lived in Spring, Texas, went to Spring High School, 

loved working with his brothers at Progressive Pumps. He bought 

a used 2002 Honda Accord, was involved in a minor crash on January 18 of this year. His airbag deployed, supposed to save his life, 

and took his life. He left behind a wife, Nicole, and three kids, 

Devon, Alyssa, and Angelina. 

His vehicle had a recall notice put out in 2011. He bought the 

car in 2014. He had no clue that the vehicle may be defective. He 

fell through the cracks. My question is, how can NHTSA make sure 

Carlos never happens again? How can we track the ownership of 

the vehicle with recall notices? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. First, thank you for recounting that. Everyone at 

NHTSA can give you a number. In 2013 there were 32,719 lives 

lost on our roadways. We know the exact number. Thank you, because you gave—to the six people that have lost their lives worldwide, you gave a name and a face to one of those victims. And I 

think the concern which has been raised here earlier is that was 

a person that had a used car that had a recall notice out. And so 

people are buying used cars, or renting cars that have recalls and 

defects, acknowledged defects, that are not being fixed beforehand. 

So we are looking for, through Grow America, the Improvement Act 

that has been introduced, ways of trying to fix that gap. 

Mr. OLSON. Well—as Mr. Case—Kennedy said, make sure that 

the ownership of the car follows recall notices, because Carlos had 

no clue that his car was defective. He was driving what he thought 

35 

a great vehicle, had been out there since 2002, and gets in a minor 

accident and dies because his airbag killed him. 

I want to talk about—Deputy Administrator Friedman came here 

in December, and he stated that NHTSA would look into the safety 

of replacement airbags, the ones replacing. And he said that 

NHTSA was examining the airbag manufacturers that use the 

same propellant. My question is, what is the status of those investigations, the new devices and the propellant? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Thank you, because this allows me to highlight 

the Consent Order that has been signed will allow us to direct testing. Previously that was almost exclusively on root cause. Now we 

will have an ability to make sure the testing goes to the adequacy 

of the remedy, right to your question, which is there are a variety 

of possible solutions, and we need to make sure that testing goes 

on to examine those, and make sure that the replacements will be 

effective long term. 

Mr. OLSON. Are there other inflators that need to be examined 

from different models of vehicles? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And thank you. I think, you know, one of the concerns is we do not know the root cause at this point. On the other 

hand, we do know that there are plenty of inflators that are functioning successfully. In 2013, 611,000 crashes where airbags deployed, so we know they can function, and we know that there are 

even different versions of Takata airbags that are not rupturing. So 

that is the good news, is we have other models or examples that 

can be pursued to understand what to change now. 

Mr. OLSON. Final question about fatigue of recalls. I mean, last 

year the American people have been—with GM ignition switch recalls, massive recalls, Takata airbags out there, all the recalls— 

with them. I mean, heck, this past year I got a new pickup truck, 

got a notification from GM that there would be some sort of defect 

in some sort of sensor, so I had that taken out at the dealership. 

My question is, do you think there is recall fatigue, and how can 

we fight the fact that recall, after recall, after recall are hitting the 

American public, and finally they just say, I am tired of this, I am 

driving my car, it is fine. So how can we fight recall fatigue? Any 

ideas? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. First of all, I think it absolutely exists, and we 

held an event in April called retooling recalls, one to readjust. 75 

percent may be good, but we have readjusted the target to be 100 

completion. And then it was actually fantastic to see the number 

of manufacturers that are coming up with creative ways. Some 

manufacturers are actually taking their creative team to help them 

sell vehicles, and now applying them to the recall. 

So they are having special hours, they are having weekends with, 

you know, things for the kids. Private investigators are going to 

home to locate these people. A whole list of new ideas, and we are 

going to try and find a way to make sure everybody in the industry 

has excess to those—access to those ideas, and actually are following up to take action. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you. About out of time. On behalf of Carlos 

Saliz, thank you. Yield back. 

36 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentleman, gentleman yields 

back. Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, 5 minutes for questions, please. 

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First let 

me thank you, Chairman Burgess, for holding today’s hearing. I 

think this is a very important hearing, and hopefully we can get 

some good information into the record that can have a bearing directly on the issue that we are talking about. 

This is an important issue. I am somewhat surprised, Mr. Chairman, to learn that the Takata airbag malfunctions have been 

linked to areas of high humidity. I am not sure that I really knew 

that. If I knew it, I didn’t fully appreciate it until recently. I represent a very humid district down in North Carolina. Maybe not as 

humid as the districts are down in Texas, Mr. Chairman, but we 

are indeed a region that is very humid from time to time. 

Though North Carolina is outside the designated high absolute 

humidity area, one of these airbag malfunctions occurred in my 

State, causing me a great a deal of worry about the safety and efficacy of airbags manufactured by Takata, and the potential for my 

constituents to be seriously harmed, or even worse. I also have concerns about what practical impact this recall, and any recall, will 

have on the rental car market, so I will be concentrating on this 

aspect during my question time today. 

The U.S. rental market is huge, we all acknowledge that. In fact, 

one study estimates that there were nearly 2.1 million rental cars 

in service last year. However, despite the scale of the market, Federal law does not require rental car companies to remedy defects 

in rental cars before renting them to consumers. So a company 

could rent a car subject to this recall without an airbag that has 

yet to be replaced. 

So, Dr. Rosekind, again, thank you for your testimony. Do you 

believe that rental car companies should be prohibited from renting 

a car unless all known recalls and effects—defects have been repaired? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. If a defect has been identified, used cars and recalls should be fixed before they are allowed to put keys in consumers’ hands. 

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. That is just clear as it can be. Do you think 

that most consumers would assume that a rental car, which may 

be newer than their own vehicle, is a safe vehicle? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And that is the problem. While we can have this 

hearing, and talk about getting people for Takata to go to safergov 

dot—safercar.gov, almost nobody who rents a car or buys a used 

one will probably ever do that. And that is a gap we have to fill. 

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Yes. Well, I drive a 1995 Toyota and a 2000 

Ford Explorer, and all of the rental cars that I rent are much better than my personal vehicles. 

Dr. Rosekind, do you think consumers have a right to free loaner 

cars while their cars are getting repaired? Regardless if consumers 

are given loaner cars, should there be a requirement that those 

loaners themselves, before being loaned, have no outstanding recalls? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. So thank you for raising that question. It comes 

up often what people should do, and we are telling people, if there 

37 

is concern about their Takata inflator, they should talk to their 

dealer or manufacturer about a loaner or rental car. 

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Recently Congresswoman Capps and myself 

introduced a bill that would prohibit a rental car that receives a 

notification about any defect or non-compliance with Federal motor 

vehicle safety standards to rent or sell the vehicle unless the defect 

is remedied. Dr. Rosekind, NHTSA has, in the past, supported 

similar legislation that prohibits rental car companies from renting 

vehicles subject to a recall, unless the defect is remedied. As the 

new NHTSA administrator, do you continue to support this type of 

legislation? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And the Administration, and Secretary Fox, have 

done that as well through Grow America, which specifically has 

both used car and rental car defect issues covered just that way. 

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. All right. You are very clear in your responses, 

and I thank you for the manner in which you responded. Thank 

you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentleman, gentleman yields 

back. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, 

5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate. And 

thank you, Dr. Rosekind, for testifying today. It is my opinion that 

the Takata SPI inflator rupture may have been—it is my understanding, anyway, that the—it may have been caused by high humidity. What is the minimum exposure period before an inflator is 

considered by Takata to be at risk in a high humidity area? And 

if you have an opinion as to whether it was caused by high humidity, I would like to hear it as well. 

Mr. ROSEKIND. I am going to put my NTSB hat on and just say 

I would be very cautious about saying probable cause at this point, 

because there is no root cause. But to your question, there is no— 

there is absolutely data that shows humidity, because of the moisture, can have an effect on the inflator. And we could get into the 

chemistry, but your main question is what we have seen in the 

data. Somewhere between 7 1⁄2 to about 12.3 years is where we are 

seeing that inflator can rupture. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. All right. Next question is, I understand that NHTSA is helping prioritize the most urgently needed 

replacements to various parts of the country that need it most. In 

theory, this approach would help manage a finite supply, and ensure that the consumers who are most in danger are protected 

more quickly. But this phased approach does not appear to match 

with NHTSA’s rollout in May 19, which grabbed headlines by covering 34 million vehicles. 

My constituents are in a high humidity area, I represent Florida, 

but it is unclear whether they can now obtain replacement parts, 

and if not, at which point can they obtain replacement parts in the 

future? I would like for you to answer that question. Are replacement parts available now in Florida, but maybe not available in 

New Jersey, and other parts of the country? And, again, are there 

enough replacement parts available, period? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. So first I would say safercar.gov is going to let 

them know, if they are checking that. They say recall for their vehicle, they need to call their dealer, because they will tell them if 

38 

the part is available. For the second part, there is no question that 

one of the issues that we have with our coordinated remedy program is to make sure that sufficient supply of inflators are available across the country. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much, and Representative Clarke 

covered the additional questions. So I appreciate it very much, and 

I yield back. 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentleman, gentleman yields 

back. Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Indiana, Ms. Brooks, 5 

minutes for your questions, please. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have to say, when you 

have testified, Dr. Rosekind, that NHTSA was working hard, or 

you have testified that—working hard to stamp up some testing facilities of your own so you can verity the work that Takata is doing, 

it was in your written testimony, can you give us a status update 

on those validation activities? And is there a new NHTSA testing 

facility for these airbag inflators? Can you just share with us what 

is happening with that progress? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And thank you for asking about that, because 

previously what NHTSA did was arrange to have data available to 

us, but his now provides us another resource to actually verify the 

testing, and any testing. So whether it is Takata’s, or the independent coalition, we will be able to look at all that. 

So we have a facility in Ohio that allows us to do some testing, 

but because of the inflator rupture, we are talking about ballistic 

testing. You have got to blow them up and have them rupture. So 

Batel is helping us do that, and we basically have a plan already 

outlined. So, as of May 19, that plan is underway. How many have 

actually been tested by this point, I can’t say, but we have our own 

independent testing being done by an outside laboratory to help us 

do that. 

Mrs. BROOKS. So you are now using—because it required a different kind of testing than you had capabilities for, you are now 

using an outside tester? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Correct. 

Mrs. BROOKS. And do you have any idea how long the testing has 

been going on, and how is it going? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. I will get you specifics. I know the contract with 

Batel was signed a while ago, and the most important thing was 

to get a plan, which, as I have tried to emphasize, is not just, you 

know, we have tried to not just look at the root cause, which is 

what everyone else—we are now also trying to focus on the remedy. 

So I can get you information about when that contract was signed, 

what the plan is, and basically that should tell you what the calendar expectations are as well. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Thank you. And—so you have mentioned several 

times in your testimony today that we may never know the root 

cause, and the root cause is a problem. And so problems associated 

with the beta inflators have persisted for years, and it feels as if 

we are not making any progress in determining the root cause. So, 

given that, how will we know—how will—be satisfied that you have 

enough data to determine the adequacy of the proposed remedy if 

we don’t know the original root cause? 

39 

Mr. ROSEKIND. So I have often—around NHTSA, even though 

they wonder why I keep bringing this up, but while I was at the 

NTSB is when we investigated the 787 Dreamliner Boeing lithium 

ion battery fire. That was a year investigation, and some people 

would question whether the root cause was ever discovered. The 

entire fleet was grounded. And so that required Boeing coming up 

with a solution without fully knowing the root cause, which was 

identifying all the potential failure points, engineering a solution to 

that, testing it, and now they are flying again very quickly. 

So we have that possibility, including the fact there are all kinds 

of airbags, including Takata inflators, that are out there that are 

not rupturing. So, between those two things, there is an opportunity, without root cause, to still get a solution. 

Mrs. BROOKS. So essentially taking your experience form NTSB, 

and how that would be the proposal that you will use going forward with Takata? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Yes, and let me just add, because I haven’t had 

chance to say this, but you have just raised one of the core questions we have been asking, at least since I have been there in January, is how long do you wait? 

Mrs. BROOKS. Um-hum. 

Mr. ROSEKIND. So I had been at the NTSB—we couldn’t wait a 

year to come up with an answer or not come up with an answer. 

So that is part of why we have pushed to basically take the driver’s 

seat to get a focus on the remedy, and the supply, and all the other 

factors that will make a difference to get that safe airbag in 

everybody’s vehicle. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Thank you, and thank you for your work on this. 

You are right, we can’t wait, and so—encourage your persistence 

in fighting for this. Thank you. 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentlelady, gentlelady yields 

back. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Kinzinger, 

5 minutes for your questions, please. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, sir, thank you 

for being here and answering our questions. Most of them have 

been asked. I just have a couple of ones, so I probably won’t take 

all of my 5 minutes. 

But you talk about the coordinated remedy program, what is 

going to be involved, and when will you have a plan for acting as 

the central coordinator for the coordinated remedy program? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. So—thanks, because that gives me a chance to 

really focus on the endgame here. I keep talking about NHTSA sitting in the driver’s seat, because, up until this point, it was really 

unclear how this was all going to happen. And so now we have a 

plan to be meeting with the manufacturers. We have already made 

contact with them. We will be meeting with suppliers. We will have 

joint meetings. And our intent, once that plan is together, is to 

have a public meeting, so there is transparency to the entire plan 

and schedule. We are hoping for that hearing to occur in the early 

fall. 

Mr. KINZINGER. OK. All right. And who within NHTSA with recall logistics expertise will be leading this coordination, or is this 

something that you are doing to need to probably contract out? 

40 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Actually, right now there is an internal team at 

NHTSA that is overseeing this, so I have people from the defect/ 

engineering group, a group that is dealing with the legal enforcement issues, and communications. So those three groups have come 

together to basically provide oversight for the process. 

Mr. KINZINGER. And do you believe that they have enough expertise to carry out this process, enough recall logistics expertise? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. At this point yes, and I think during our development of a future plan, if we find other resources are needed, I will 

be the first one to let everybody know to make sure—— 

Mr. KINZINGER. OK. 

Mr. ROSEKIND [continuing]. That we get this done right. 

Mr. KINZINGER. So if you don’t have it, you would be willing to 

look at, you know, outside, or whatever you need to get this done 

right? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Yes. 

Mr. KINZINGER. OK. Well, you have answered pretty much all 

the questions I have, so, with that, I will yield back the 3 minutes 

remaining. 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentleman. Will you yield your 

remaining time to me? 

Mr. KINZINGER. Yes, I will yield it to you. 

Mr. BURGESS. I thank the gentleman for that. Mr. Rosekind, as 

you are probably aware, last night in the Rules Committee we did 

the rule for the Transportation Appropriations bill that will be on 

the floor either this week or next week. So, recognizing we were 

having this hearing today, I asked the Transportation Subcommittee in Appropriations if they would share with me the 

spending plan submitted to their subcommittee by NHTSA. Every 

agency and department is required to submit a spending plan to 

the Appropriations Committee, or appropriate Appropriations Subcommittee, as they do their work, and build the appropriations bills 

that we will then vote on. 

So, I have got to say, what I was given is pretty sparse, so I am 

going to give you the benefit of the doubt, and if you would like 

to provide me with the spending plan that you provided to the Appropriations Subcommittee, I would be happy to review it, and review it with you, if you would like. Chairman Upton said—he made 

reference to the fact that we need to make sure the appropriations 

are in line. Ms. Schakowsky has talked about that. So, again, I will 

make this available to you, if it is as written, and that is fine. If 

you think there is a different spending plan that I should be looking at, I will be happy to do that. And, again, I will be happy to 

follow up with you. And I do want to stress, you have always been 

very good about keeping me, as the chairman of the subcommittee, 

informed about what you are doing, and for that I am very grateful. 

I am filibustering just a little bit because Mr. Engel is allegedly 

on his way here. So let me just ask—— 

Mr. ROSEKIND. And can I—— 

Mr. BURGESS. Yes, please. 

Mr. ROSEKIND. I want to thank you for that opportunity, because 

when we—the President’s budget has much detail about new—— 

Mr. BURGESS. Mr. Rosekind, I have got to interrupt you there. 

41 

Mr. ROSEKIND. OK. 

Mr. BURGESS. The President’s budget never gets a single vote. 

Republican Senate—— 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BURGESS [continuing]. Or House, Senate, Republican or 

Democrat, no one would even offer the President’s budget up for a 

vote this year. So that is, you know, I mean, the President—and 

this is not unique to the Obama administration. President Bush’s 

budgets, when I was here in the majority earlier, frequently those 

would not pass on the floor of the House and the Senate. 

So, sure, the President sends up a wish list that balances never, 

and, yes, it has got everything funded to a level that would be 

great, if we lived in a world of unlimited resources, but you are the 

Administrator. And I have run a business. You understand that, as 

the Administrator, sometimes you have to prioritize spending, and 

that is what we really are looking for you to do. That is what we 

want you to do, just as the same as the director of NIH, just the 

same as Dr. Frieden at the CDC. We want you to prioritize and 

spend appropriately. But, again, I will give you the benefit of the 

doubt. This looks pretty thin to me. I just welcome the chance to 

go through the spending plan with you. 

And then, finally, last year, on a bipartisan basis, this committee 

requested that the Government Accountability Office review 

NHTSA’s internal structure and procedures to assess the agency’s 

ability to keep pace with advancements in vehicle technology. At 

the committee’s hearing in December, Deputy Administrator Friedman committed to cooperating with the Government Accountability 

Office’s review. Will you reaffirm this commitment to cooperate 

with GAO in this review? 

Mr. ROSEKIND. Absolutely, and we already are. 

Mr. BURGESS. I appreciate that very much. Do you have any— 

OK. At this point we are going to have to forego questions by Mr. 

Engel, and I apologize. We will get his questions to you in writing, 

and any member of the committee may have further questions. 

But, seeing there are no further members wishing to ask questions 

for this panel, I do want to thank Administrator Rosekind for being 

here today. 

This will conclude our first panel. We will take a brief recess to 

set up the second panel. Thank you, sir. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. BURGESS. I will call the subcommittee back to order. Thanks 

to everyone for their patience, and for taking time to be here today. 

We will move into the second panel for today’s hearing. We are 

going to follow the same format as the first panel. Each witness 

will be given 5 minutes to summarize their opening statement, followed by questions from the members. 

For our second panel, we want to welcome the following witnesses: Mr. Kevin Kennedy, the Executive Vice President of North 

America Takata; Mr. David Kelly, Project Director, Independent 

Testing Coalition; Mr. Mitch Bainwol, President and CEO of the 

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers; and Mr. John Bozzella, the 

Chief Executive Officer of Global Automakers. 

We will begin our second panel with Mr. Kennedy. Sir, you are 

recognized for 5 minutes for your opening statement, please. 

42 

STATEMENTS OF KEVIN M. KENNEDY, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, NORTH AMERICA, TAKATA; DAVID KELLY, PROJECT 

DIRECTOR, INDEPENDENT TESTING COALITION; MITCH 

BAINWOL, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS; AND JOHN 

BOZZELLA, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, 

ASSOCIATION OF GLOBAL AUTOMAKERS 

STATEMENT OF KEVIN M. KENNEDY 

Mr. KENNEDY. Chairman Burgess, Ranking Member Schakowsky, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am 

honored to be here on behalf of Takata, and our employees 

throughout the United States. For Takata, safety is the core of who 

we are and what we do. We are proud that Takata airbags have 

saved thousands of lives, and prevented serious injuries in hundreds of thousands of accidents. It is unacceptable to us for even 

one of our products to fail to perform as intended. We deeply regret 

each instance in which someone has been injured or killed. 

We are committed to doing everything in our power to address 

the safety concerns raised by airbag ruptures. Our chairman has 

made that commitment personally to Administrator Rosekind, so 

let me tell you what we are doing. After months of testing, and extensive analysis, we have agreed with NHTSA to take broad actions, in conjunction with automakers, to respond to your concerns, 

and those of the public. We have recommended dramatically expanded recalls, including national recalls, that go well beyond what 

is suggested by the science and testing. 

Most of the ruptures on the road, and all of the fatalities in the 

U.S., have involved older Takata driver airbag inflators with batwing shaped propellants—propellant wafers, pardon me, that were 

originally subjected to previous recalls, and most of those have occurred in the regions of the country with high heat and absolute 

humidity. Nevertheless, we are proposing expanded national recalls 

to replace all of these batwing driver inflators, from the start of 

production through the end of production, in any vehicle registered 

anywhere in the United States. The recommended recalls will proceed in stages. The final stage will include the replacement of all 

batwing driver inflators previously installed as remedy parts. 

Takata will cease producing the batwing driver inflators altogether. 

There have been far fewer field ruptures involving passenger airbags. Nevertheless, our agreement with NHTSA also contemplates 

significantly expanded recalls for passenger airbag inflators, including a nationwide recall for one type of inflator. The recalls for 

the other passenger inflators will cover specific vehicle models ever 

registered in the high absolute humidity States, but with the potential, excuse me, for the recalls to expand to other States, if ordered by NHTSA. We will continue to test inflators beyond the 

scope of the recalls to determine whether further action is appropriate. 

For both driver and passenger airbags, all analysis to date indicates that the potentials for rupturing is limited to an extremely 

small fraction of older inflators. That is not meant to minimize the 

issue. One rupture is too many. It does explain, however, why 

Takata’s filings state that a safety-related defect may arise in some 

43 

of the inflators. Not all of the inflators covered by the proposed recalls are defective. 

Based on 50,000 tests to date, and research involving leading experts from around the world, our best current judgment is that the 

potential for rupture is related to long term exposure over many 

years to persistent conditions of high heat and high absolute humidity, as well as other potential factors, including possible manufacturing and vehicle specific issues. Nonetheless, we have proposed a broader remedy program. NHTSA will play a central role 

in overseeing this remedy program. Takata will prepare a plan for 

NHTSA, outlining steps to help determine the safety and expected 

service life of the remedy parts. We will also work with NHTSA 

and our customers to get the word out to consumers to help maximize recall completion rates. 

In addition to increasing our own testing, we are actively supporting the testing work of the automakers and NHTSA. We also 

continue to support the work of the Independent Quality Assurance 

Panel, led by former Secretary of Transportation Sam Skinner, and 

we are continually ramping up our production of replacement kits. 

In December we were producing approximately 350,000 kits per 

month. We are now producing more than 700,000, and by September we expect our monthly production to reach one million 

units. 

Half of the replacement kits we shipped last month contained inflators made by other suppliers, and by the end of the year we expect that to reach 70 percent. We have confidence in the inflators 

we are making today, the integrity of our engineering and manufacturing, and we believe that, properly made and installed, these 

inflators will work as designed to save lives. We will continue to 

do everything we can to ensure uncompromised safety, and the success of the recall efforts, and we will keep Congress, NHTSA, and 

the public updated on our progress. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:] 

44 


TAKATA 

TESTIMONY OF 

KEVIN M. KENNEDY 

EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT OF NORTH AMERICA 

TK HOLDINGS INC. {"TAKATA") 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, MANUFACTURING, AND TRADE 

HEARING ON 

"AN UPDATE ON THE TAKATA AIRBAG RUPTURES AND RECALLS" 

JUNE2,2015 
45 


TESTIMONY OF 

KEVIN M. KENNEDY 

EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT OF NORTH AMERICA 

TK HOLDINGS INC. ("TAKATA") 

Chairman Burgess, Ranking Member Schakowsky, and distinguished Members of 

the Subcommittee, I am honored to be here today on behalf of Takata and our employees 

in Michigan, Texas, across the United States, and around the world who are dedicated to 

making products that save lives. 

For Takata, safety is more than an obligation; it is the core of who we are and what 

we do. We are proud that millions of Takata airbags have inflated properly, preventing 

thousands of deaths and avoiding serious injuries in hundreds of thousands of accidents. 

We are also proud of our seatbelts that save lives, the spacesuit materials we make to 

protect our astronauts, and all the other high-quality products Takata manufactures. 

It is unacceptable to us and incompatible with our safety mission for even one of 

our products to fail to perform as intended and to put people at risk. We deeply regret 

each instance in which a Takata airbag inflator has ruptured, especially in those cases 

where someone has been injured or killed. 

We understand how important it is to the driving public, Congress, the National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), and our automaker partners to 

address and resolve the safety concerns raised by the airbag ruptures, and we are 

committed to doing everything in our power to help achieve that goal. 

So let me tell you what we are doing. 

TAKATA'S AGREEMENT WITH NHTSA 

After months of testing and analysis of returned inflators and extensive 

discussions and collaboration, we voluntarily agreed with NHTSA to take broad actions, 

in conjunction with the automakers, to respond to the public safety concerns. 

This agreement contemplates dramatically expanded recalls-including in several 

instances nationwide recalls-encompassing various types of airbag inflators. 

The proposed recalls and the related commitments we have made go well beyond 

the scope of the safety risk suggested by the current science and testing data. 

There are two categories of airbags designed to protect vehicle occupants against 

front-end collisions: driver airbags, located in the center of the steering wheel, and 

passenger airbags, located in the dashboard. The agreement we reached with NHTSA 
46 


contemplates actions to replace several types of both driver and passenger airbag 

inflators. 

I will describe how the agreement addresses each in tum. 

Driver Airbag Inflators. 

Most of the ruptures that have occurred in vehicles on the road have involved 

older versions of our driver airbag inflators. These are the driver inflators with the 

original "batwing-shaped" propellant wafers. 

Our proposal is to replace all of these inflators through a national recalL 

To date, there have been a total of 67 reported instances in the U.S. of such "field 

ruptures" involving these "batwing" driver inflators. Fifty-eight (58) of those ruptures 

occurred in vehicles that were already subject to previous recalls involving identified 

issues with the pressing of the propellant wafers in some of these inflators. 

All of the fatalities and most of the injuries that have occurred in accidents with 

ruptured airbag inflators in the United States have involved batwing inflators. 

To put these incidents in perspective, the 67 reported cases of field ruptures 

involving the older batwing driver inflators represent approximately 0.0087 percent of 

estimated total deployments of these airbags, or fewer than 9 failures out of every 

100,000 deployments. In addition, most of these field ruptures occurred in regions of the 

country with high heat and high levels of absolute humidity. 

In the past several months, Takata has conducted ballistic tests of more than 

12,500 of these driver inflators, and 9 of them have ruptured during testing, or 

approximately 0.07 percent of the tested inflators. The inflators selected for this ballistic 

testing include a disproportionate number of older inflators returned from areas of high 

absolute humidity, so the percentage of failures seen in the testing results is likely to 

overstate the overall potential for rupture. 

Whatever the precise probabilities, these figures show that the fraction of these 

inflators likely to experience a problem is extremely small. That is not meant in any way 

to minimize the issue. Even one rupture is too many. And six of the reported field 

ruptures of these driver inflators have involved fatalities. But these figures do help to put 

in perspective why Takata's Defect Information Reports ("DIRs") state that a safetyrelated defect "may arise" in "some" of these inflators. It is not the case that all of the 

inflators covered by the DIRs are "defective." 

The pattern of ruptures in areas of high heat and humidity is also consistent with 

the findings of the scientists that have spent years studying these issues. Takata has 

2 
47 


engaged world-renowned experts in energetic systems from Germany's Fraunhofer 

Institute to conduct research into the root cause of the inflator ruptures and has also 

consulted with various engineering experts in the United States. We have shared all of 

that research with NHTSA and the automakers. 

Based on this research and our ongoing testing and analysis of returned inflators, 

Takata's best current judgment is that the potential for rupture is related to long-term 

exposure, over a period of several years, to persistent conditions of high heat and high 

absolute humidity. In certain circumstances, these conditions can result in an alteration 

in the propellant wafers in the inflators that could potentially lead to over-aggressive 

combustion. 

The research of our experts suggests that the potential for this long-term 

phenomenon to occur was not within the scope of the testing specifications prescribed by 

automakers or comprehended within the industry's inflator validation practice when the 

inflators were originally made. 

The potential for rupturing may also be influenced by other factors, including the 

possibility of manufacturing issues, like those identified in earlier recalls. 

Notwithstanding the science and testing data suggesting that the problem is 

focused on a small number of older inflators that have spent years in regions of high heat 

and absolute humidity, Takata has taken broader action. We have recommended that all 

of the batwing driver inflators in any vehicle registered anywhere in the United States 

be replaced in national recalls to be conducted by the affected automakers. 

The national recalls recommended for these driver inflators will proceed in four 

stages. In order to prioritize the replacement of inflators where the safety need is 

greatest, the first stage will target older vehicles that have ever been registered in the 

Southern States, Hawaii, and territories where the levels of absolute humidity are higher 

than anywhere else in the country. 

But the recalls will not stop there. Subsequent stages of the recalls will target the 

driver inflators manufactured in later years and vehicles registered in other States outside 

the areas of high humidity. The recalls will continue until we have replaced all of these 

driver inflators, from start of production to end of production, and they will include 

vehicles manufactured by five different automakers-Honda, BMW, Chrysler, Ford, and 

Mazda. The final stage of the recalls will include the replacement of batwing driver 

inflators that were previously installed as remedy parts in prior recalls. 

Takata has also committed to cease producing these types of driver inflators. And 

we are working with our automaker partners to transition to newer versions of driver 

3 
48 


inflators in our replacement kits or inflators made by other suppliers that do not contain 

ammonium nitrate propellant. 

Passenger Airbag Inflators. 

There have been far fewer field ruptures involving passenger airbags: 21 total 

reported instances in the U.S. to date (of which most occurred in vehicles subject to prior 

recalls), and none has involved a fatality. Nevertheless, our agreement with NHTSA also 

contemplates significantly expanded recalls covering several types of passenger airbag 

inflators. 

One of these proposed recalls will be nationwide in scope. The other two will 

focus initially on high humidity States, but with the potential to expand to a nationwide 

recall if ordered by NHTSA after consideration of additional testing and consultations 

with Takata and the affected automakers. Specifically: 

For one type of passenger inflator, we have recommended a nationwide recall that 

will proceed in four stages, according to the year the inflator was made. This recall will 

encompass all of the inflators of this type from start of production through vehicle model 

year 2008, and it will involve vehicles manufactured by eight different automakers. 

The root cause assessment for the potential issue with these inflators includes the 

long-term exposure to high heat and absolute humidity discussed above, but it also 

includes the possibility of a manufacturing issue. 

This type of passenger inflator has been involved in eight (8) reported field 

ruptures in the U.S., which represents approximately 0.004 percent of estimated 

deployments. While it has ruptured at a higher rate in Takata's ballistic testing 

(approximately 0. 9 percent out of more than 5,900 tested), all but two of the test ruptures 

to date have involved inflators returned from high absolute humidity States. The two 

exceptions were inflators manufactured on the same day, which suggests the possibility 

of a discrete manufacturing issue. 

Takata has committed to continue testing this type of inflator from later model 

years and to share this test data with NHTSA, in order to monitor whether additional 

action may be appropriate. 

For two other types of passenger inflators, Takata has recommended recalls 

focused on particular models and model years of vehicles manufactured by certain 

automakers. The recalls will initially cover the relevant makes and models of these 

vehicles in Florida, Texas, and the other high absolute humidity States and territories. 

But there will be the potential for these recalls to expand later to other States and 

4 
49 


potentially nationwide if NHTSA finds that the results of further testing show the need 

for an expansion, after consultation with Takata and the affected automakers. 

The scope of the recalls recommended for these last two types of passenger 

inflators tracks the results of Takata's testing and analysis. While there have been 13 

reported field ruptures of these inflators, representing approximately 0.0055 percent of 

estimated deployments, all have involved vehicles of the specific makes and models 

covered by our DIR and all were in vehicles that had spent years in the areas of high 

absolute humidity. 

In addition, Takata's ballistic testing of these two inflator types has shown 

elevated rates of test ruptures for these inflators when returned from the areas of high 

absolute humidity and from the particular models covered in the DIR, and no test 

ruptures for the same types of inflators in other circumstances. These results show the 

clear importance of long-term exposure to an environment of high heat and absolute 

humidity. But they also indicate that something about the particular makes and models of 

these cars appears to be correlated with the potential for these inflators to rupture. 

Takata has committed to NHTSA that we will continue to test these types of 

passenger inflators from other vehicles and from other States to help determine whether 

the scope of these recalls should be expanded. 

IMPLEMENTING THE RECALLS 

The Consent Order that we have agreed to with NHTSA makes clear that NHTSA 

will play a central role in overseeing the organization and implementation of these 

proposed recalls. NHTSA will convene meetings involving Takata and all of the affected 

automakers to organize and coordinate the staging of the recalls, so as to ensure that the 

remedy is appropriately prioritized to those vehicles where the public safety need is most 

immediate. 

The Consent Order also requires Takata, after consulting with the automakers, to 

prepare a plan for NHTSA's approval that outlines the steps Takata will take, both on its 

own and in conjunction with the affected automakers, to maximize recall completion 

rates and to carry out further testing of inflators to help determine the safety and 

appropriate service life of the remedy inflators. 

Because the recalls will only succeed if consumers bring their cars in for repair, 

we have committed to working with NHTSA and our customers to help inform 

consumers about the risks associated with some inflators, and to urge them to respond in 

a timely fashion to the recalls that are being implemented. 

5 
50 


To this end, we are in the process of developing a proactive advertising campaign 

for NHTSA's approval that would be designed for implementation in conjunction with 

the auto makers, in order to reach greater numbers of vehicle owners and help to ensure 

that the recall fulfillment rates will be as high as possible. 

ADDITIONAL MEASURES 

Let me say a bit more about Takata's extensive testing program and our ramped up 

production of replacement kits to address the needs of these recalls. 

Since the hearing in December, we have continued to advance our investigation 

into the root cause factors associated with the inflator ruptures. We have performed 

ballistic tests on close to 50,000 inflators since September of last year, and that testing 

and analysis is ongoing. We also have performed live dissections, propellant analysis for 

moisture, chemical analysis, leak testing, and CT scanning. 

We continue to fully support efforts by David Kelly and the automakers to do 

additional testing and analysis. And we welcome NHTSA's decision to do its own 

testing, as well as to coordinate with us on our testing. 

In addition to supporting these ongoing testing efforts, we are continuing to 

support the work of the independent Quality Assurance Panel, led by former Secretary of 

Transportation Samuel K. Skinner, to ensure that best practices are in place for the 

production of safe inflators. We are committed to adopting the recommendations his 

panel puts forth, and sharing the findings of the report with you and with the public. 

Since December, we also have substantially ramped up our production of 

replacement kits to fulfill automaker orders. In December, we were producing 

approximately 350,000 kits per month. In May, we produced approximately 700,000 

units. By September, we expect to be producing 1 million per month. That is the 

capacity that is primarily directed to production for the U.S. market. 

And we continue to work with other inflator suppliers to further increase 

production of replacement inflators to meet anticipated demand. In fact, half of the 

replacement kits we shipped to our automaker customers in May contained inflators made 

by our competitors. By the end of the year, we expect that number to reach 

approximately 70 percent. As of today, only one driver airbag replacement kit is on back 

order, and we will have that remedied in two weeks. 

CONCLUSION 

In closing, I want to emphasize that we have confidence in the inflators we are 

producing today. We have confidence in the integrity of our engineering and our current 

6 
51 


manufacturing processes. We believe that, properly manufactured and installed, these 

inflators will work as designed to save lives. 

Of course, we know that the proof is in the data, and that is why we have enlisted 

the assistance of the Quality Assurance Panel and why we have agreed with NHTSA to 

conduct ongoing testing, including of our remedy parts. 

We will continue to do everything we can to ensure uncompromised safety for our 

customers and the success of the recall efforts, and we will keep Congress, NHTSA, and 

the public updated on our progress. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

# # # 

7 
52 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentleman. Mr. Kelly, recognized 

for 5 minutes for your opening statement, please. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID KELLY 

Mr. KELLY. Chairman Burgess, Ranking Member Schakowsky, 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you to discuss the activities of the Independent Testing 

Coalition. The ITC is comprised of 10 automakers that have Takata 

airbags in their passenger vehicles, and is committed to an independent and comprehensive investigation of the technical issues associated with Takata airbag inflators, and look forward to the results of this process as we focus on the safety, security, and peace 

of mind of all motorists. Our primary goal is to find the root cause 

of this problem. 

As we have started to look at this issue of energetic disassembling, it is apparent that there is no silver bullet or easy solution 

to be found. The public needs to understand that experts have been 

studying this problem for years. If this was anything but the complex project that it is, a root cause would have been identified by 

now. Unfortunately, that is not the case, and a final determination 

is not imminent. 

We have devised a detailed testing plan that, when completed, 

will examine every identified aspect of this problem. We will conduct more—we will conduct tens of thousands of chemical tests 

alone. This will be supplemented by a similar number of non-destructive tests, and many thousands of advanced computer simulation runs. In addition, there will be a significant amount of data 

generated from our tests that then must be analyzed. This issue is 

too important for any stone to be left unturned. 

I do want to stress that we intend to conduct our investigation 

in an independent manner. We will work with Takata, we will 

work with NHTSA, we will work with all the affected parties, but 

we will conduct this investigation in an independent manner. We 

very much appreciate any input and suggestion from all the parties, but we will do our own analysis of others’ data and testing 

procedures. When we finish our investigation, we do intend to 

make our findings public. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly follows:] 

53 


Testimony of David Kelly, Project Director 

Independent Testing Coalition 

House Energy and Commerce Committee 

Commerce, Manufacturing and Trade Subcommittee 

June 2, 2015 

Thank you for the invitation to appear before the committee to discuss the activities of the 

Independent Testing Coalition (ITC). The ITC is comprised of the 10 automakers that have 

Takata airbags in their passenger vehicles- BMW, Chrysler/Fiat, Honda, Ford, GM, Mitsubishi, 

Mazda, Nissan, Subaru and Toyota. The ITC is committed to an independent and comprehensive 

investigation of the technical issues associated with Takata airbag inflators and look forward to 

the results of this process as we focus on the safety, security and peace of mind of all motorists. 

Our goal is to find the root cause of this problem. ITC members support a scientific, engineering 

analysis, and will not pre-judge the process or its outcomes. While it is important to identify the 

root cause of issues with Takata airbag inflators as quickly as possible, it is more important to get 

the answer right. 

The ITC has engaged Orbital ATK to conduct the engineering analysis for this project. 

OATK is a renowned firm with expertise in propellants and significant experience with rocket 

launchers and NASA. This review is underway. They are not your traditional industry firm or 

consultant and do not have a pre-conceived notion as to a final outcome. The staff at Orbital 

A TK has extensive investigatory experience and is the right team to conduct this investigation. 

As we have started looking at this issue of energetic disassembly, it is apparent that there is 

no silver bullet or easy solution to be found. The public needs to understand that experts have 

been studying this problem for years. If this was anything but the complex project that it is, a 

root cause would have been identified by now. Unfortunately, that is not the case and a final 

determination is not imminent. 

We have devised a detailed testing plan that, when completed, will examine every identified 

aspect of the problem. We will conduct more than 10,000 chemical tests alone. That will be 

supplemented by a similar number of non-destructive tests and many thousands of advanced 

computer simulation runs. In addition, there will be a significant amount of data generated from 

our tests that then must be analyzed. This issue is too important for any stone to be left unturned. 

We have had a very open and honest dialogue with both NHTSA and Takata during the past 

few months. As we get further into this process, it is imperative that we continue that relationship 

and share data and information. However, I want to stress that we will conduct our investigation 

in an independent manner. We very much appreciate any input and suggestions from all parties, 

but rest assured, we will do our own analysis of others data and testing procedures. When we 

finish our investigation, we will make our findings public. 

I would like to conclude by stressing that we should not let the safety benefits of airbags get 

lost in this discussion. As Administrator Rosekind said recently, airbags save lives. Motorists 

affected by the recall should continue to drive their cars until they can be fixed and that 

consumers should get their cars fixed as soon as possible. 
54 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentleman. Chair recognize Mr. 

Bainwol, 5 minutes for your testimony, please. 

STATEMENT OF MITCH BAINWOL 

Mr. BAINWOL. Chairman Burgess, Ranking Member Schakowsky, 

members of the subcommittee, thanks for this opportunity. On behalf of the 12 leading global—on behalf of 12 leading global OEMs, 

including the U.S. companies, and nine European and Japanesebased companies, I appreciate this opportunity to testify. I would 

like to make four summary points. First, your hearing today is 

timely and welcomed, and we are fully committed to doing our part 

to successfully complete this recall, while continuing to build on the 

very significant safety advances of recent years. The magnitude of 

the Takata airbag recall is unprecedented and global. There are no 

easy answers, or quick fixes. That is why we support Administrator 

Rosekind’s decision to use NHTSA authority to organize and 

prioritize affected manufacturers remedy programs. We all want a 

clear, unified approach. We share this committee’s frustration. It is 

very difficult for us to be able to tell our customers, your constituents, how long this will take to be fully resolved. 

Second, though the logistics in a global economy with about 80 

million units sold each year around the world are highly complex, 

and there are legal impediments to the industry-led coordination, 

the key challenge of most recalls is more basic, and that is getting 

consumers to take advantage of the free fix, especially in order vehicles. The average consumer participation rate for light vehicle recalls after about a year and a half is 83 percent for newer vehicles, 

but falls to 44 percent for vehicles 5 to 10 years old, and falls further to 15 percent for vehicles older than 10 years. 

Because of these concerns, our members have tasked the alliance 

to conduct the most intensive public opinion research ever on recalls to learn what motivates some consumers to respond, and why 

others don’t, what motivates consumers to go into the dealership 

and get it done, what messages work, and what messengers are 

most effective. Work is underway now, and we will share the results with NHTSA and you to help forge a multi-pronged effort to 

strengthen consumer participation. 

Third—context. Recall policy is vitally important, and we are 

committed to strengthening the process for resolving defects. That 

said, it is just one piece of the safety equation, and, as a share of 

fatalities on the road, a relatively fractional one. Most fatalities, 

certainly 90 percent plus, result from human error, principally impaired driving, and failure to sue seat belts. While we are seeing 

profound gains in safety over the last 50 years, and especially over 

the last decade, technology does offer the promise of even greater 

advances as we build on crashworthiness, and introduce the idea 

of crash avoidance functionality. All the new jargon we hear, driver 

assist, V to V, V to X, and ultimately self-driving vehicles, are part 

of a continuum that thankfully will save thousands of lives by helping to compensate for driver error. This isn’t speculation. This is 

our emerging reality. 

Fourth, and finally, let me state the obvious. OEMs are passionately committed to improving safety, and we are very proud of the 

results we have achieved, both because it is the right thing to do, 

55 

and because it is good business. Safety innovation is critical to the 

competitive landscape. Auto companies are investing about 100 billion, billion with a B, every year in research and development to 

comply and to compete, to comply with a various—with various 

public policy requirements in the U.S. and elsewhere, and to compete in the globally dynamic marketplace. That investment is paying off, and our polling shows that your consumers, that your customers, your constituents, do see the progress. Relative to 10 years 

ago, your constituents say cars are safer by 86 to 5 percent, they 

get better fuel economy by 89 to 3 percent, and they are of higher 

quality by 79 to 12 percent, so the progress is being recognized, and 

that is terrific. 

Thanks for the opportunity to share our thinking. We stand 

ready to work with you, and your staffs, to make our roads as safe 

as possible. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bainwol follows:] 

56 


AUTO ALLIANCE 

DRIVING INNOVATION~ 

STATEMENT 

OF 

THE ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS 

BEFORE THE: 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, MANUFACTURING AND TRADE 

OF THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

"AN UPDATE ON THE TAKATA AIRBAG RUPTURES AND RECALLS" 

JUNE 2, 201S 

PRESENTED BY: 

MITCH BAINWOL 

PRESIDENT & CEO 
57 


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

On May 19, 2015, Takata announced that a defect exists in some of its airbag inflators and 

agreed to a national recall of certain types of frontal driver and passenger side air bag inflators 

used in 11 manufacturers' vehicles. The action expands the number of vehicles to be recalled 

for defective Takata inflators to nearly 34 million. The manufacturers were provided with a list 

of affected inflators after the announcement and are working to identify precisely which 

vehicles will be included in the recall. 

Federal Coordination of the Takata Airbag Recall is Appropriate. The Takata recall is 

unprecedented in size and scope. US antitrust laws may hinder multiple manufacturers from 

developing common approaches to many of the issues critical to an efficient recall and remedy. 

A clear, unified approach to the recall and remedy process is the most effective way to 

minimize owner confusion and improve participation rates for this recall. It is also important 

that NHTSA continue to have a prominent voice among its international counterparts, given the 

global nature of this recall. 

Alliance Members Are Committed to Improving Consumer Participation in Recalls. The 

Alliance has initiated a multi-faceted research initiative that marks the first collective effort by 

the automotive industry to understand what motivates consumers to participate in a recall and 

get their recalled vehicles repaired. We anticipate completing all of our work by this fall but will 

release data in the interim if it identifies ways to help improve the current recall completion 

rate. 

Auto Manufacturers Remain Focused on the Big Picture. Cars and trucks have never been 

safer. Over the last decade, total traffic deaths have fallen by roughly 25%, and deaths in 

passenger vehicles in that same timeframe have fallen by about 32%. Alliance members are 

focused on the future of automotive safety, developing new technologies to reduce impaired 

driving and allow vehicles to communicate with each other to help prevent crashes. 
58 


TESTIMONY 

Thank you for inviting me to testify on behalf of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers 

(Alliance), and particularly, the Alliance member companies working to remedy their 

customers' cars and trucks affected by the Takata airbag inflator recalls. Alliance members are 

committed to remedying safety defects, and we appreciate the public leadership Administrator 

Rose kind is taking to coordinate efforts to complete the Takata airbag recall campaign. It is 

clear that a comprehensive response is needed to help ensure this recall is implemented 

effectively. Alliance members are actively engaged in finding ways to increase consumer 

participation in recall campaigns generally, including commissioning the most comprehensive 

analysis to date of consumer motivations and responses to recalls. Moreover, Alliance 

members continue to be focused on next-generation safety technologies that promise to 

improve upon the dramatic reductions in passenger vehicle deaths in the last decade. 

Federal Coordination of the Takata Airbag Recall is Appropriate 

As this recall moves forward, NHTSA and automakers must work together on behalf of 

consumers. Auto manufacturers have been concerned from the outset that the Takata recall 

may erode public confidence in a proven technology that has saved thousands of lives over the 

years. The May 19 announcement generated enormous consumer interest, and it would have 

been most helpful for manufacturers to have been able to tell vehicle owners whether their 

vehicles were included in the expanded recall. Ideally, we should be in a position to provide 

consumers with timely information when the news of a recall is fresh in their minds. 

At the same time, Administrator Rosekind should be recognized for the leadership role the 

agency is taking to coordinate what was already a massive task, and is now even larger. The 

challenges of a recall spanning multiple manufacturers were already evident at this 

Committee's hearing last December. Unfortunately, antitrust laws may hinder affected 

manufacturers from developing common approaches to many of the issues that Congress and 

NHTSA have rightly identified as critical to an efficient recall and remedy of affected vehicles 

when a defect spans so many manufacturers. For example, the issues of parts allocation and 

prioritization of repairs in a constrained marketplace raise antitrust risks that are difficult for 

manufacturers to address on their own under existing law. 

Thus, Alliance members believe that NHTSA's decision to use its authority to "organize and 

prioritize" affected manufacturers' remedy programs is appropriate in this particular instance. 

Affected Alliance members are committed to working cooperatively with NHTSA as it addresses 

a number of issues- including sourcing, production, allocation, delivery, installation, and 

adequacy of the remedy -as identified in the Federal Register notice the agency published on 
59 


May 22. A clear, unified approach is the most effective way to minimize owner confusion and 

improve consumer participation rates for this recall. 

It is also reassuring to see strong and effective US leadership, given that Takata airbags are 

being recalled on a global basis. The reality is that the competition for parts and the 

prioritization of airbag repairs is happening globally- not only for vehicles in the US. It is 

important that NHTSA continue to have a prominent voice among its international 

counterparts. 

Alliance Members Are Committed to Improving Consumer Participation in Recalls 

Motor vehicle safety is a shared responsibility. Auto manufacturers are required by law to 

identify safety defects and implement recalls under NHTSA's supervision. But ultimately, 

individual vehicle owners decide whether or not to get their vehicles repaired. 

According to NHTSA, the average consumer participation rate for light vehicle recalls after one 

and a half years of reporting is 75 percent (75%). That means approximately 25 percent (25%) 

of owners are not promptly participating in the recall even though they are entitled to the free 

remedy offered. However, that rate varies markedly based on the age of the vehicle involved in 

the recall. For newer vehicles, the participation rate averages 83 percent (83%); for vehicles 5 

tolO years old, that rate drops nearly in half, to 44 percent (44%); and for vehicles older than 10 

years old, the participation rate drops by another two-thirds, to 15 percent (15%). While we 

know that participation rates vary by vehicle age, we don't have a good understanding of why 

vehicle owners don't respond to-in many instances- multiple notices that their vehicle needs 

free repairs to fix a safety-related defect. 

That is why the Alliance has initiated a multi-faceted research initiative that marks the first 

collective effort by the automotive industry to understand what motivates consumers to 

participate in a recall, and get their recalled vehicles remedied. The qualitative and quantitative 

research is commissioned by the Alliance and is being conducted by Public Opinion Strategies, 

one of the nation's leading public opinion research firms. A series of methods are being 

employed to explore consumer motivations, including reaching out to consumers who have 

repaired their recalled vehicles as well as seeking out consumers who own vehicles still 

requiring a recall remedy, and trying to learn more about consumers' attitudes to recall notices. 

Our research includes: 

A large-scale national online survey of vehicle owners to test awareness and 

reasons for consumer behavior. 
60 


An online forum of non-responders to vehicle recall notices to delve deeper into 

non-responder behavior through an online community session lasting several 

days. 

Focus groups with dealership service managers to learn more about real-world 

consumer responses as well as efforts proven effective in increasing participation 

rates. 

Consumer retail research into the decision-making and values of both 

responders and non-responders at locales where consumers would have VINs in 

hand and the researcher could use the NHTSA VIN lookup to see if there is an 

open recall. 

In-depth research with non-responders to test ideas, tactics, language, 

messages and spokespersons that might increase participation rates. 

An online quantitative survey to test a range of approaches and further refine 

new communication material. 

• A national panel test online survey of vehicle owners who report receiving a 

recall notice to demonstrate in a quantifiable way how segments of nonresponders react to test concepts across audiences. 

We anticipate completing all of our work by this fall but will release data in the interim if it 

identifies ways to help improve the current recall completion rate. 

Auto Manufacturers Remain Focused on the Big Picture 

While it is absolutely critical that we increase consumers' participation in recalls, it should be 

noted that the overall picture of motor vehicle safety is the best that it has ever been in history. 

Over the last decade, total traffic deaths have fallen by roughly 25%, and deaths in passenger 

vehicles in that same timeframe have fallen by about 32%, due in part to new safety 

technologies auto manufacturers are constantly adding to new models. We are experiencing 

record low traffic deaths even as the number of licensed drivers and the number of vehicle 

miles driven continues to grow. 

Alliance members are committed to accelerating this trend by developing new safety 

technologies that will help drivers avoid crashes in the first place. They are focused on the 

future of automotive safety, including working jointly with NHTSA on technologies to reduce 

impaired driving, allowing vehicles to communicate with each other and improving 

transportation infrastructure to help prevent accidents from ever happening in the first place. 
61 


What once only existed in the imaginations of science fiction writers is now being developed 

and tested by carmakers in laboratories and on roadways across the globe. Today's leading 

automakers are developing cars that park themselves, brake automatically and stay in lanes 

without driver assistance. 

As automated functions in vehicles become more common, the possibility of achieving fully 

driverless cars becomes closer to reality. Today's emerging technology- sensors able to read 

road signs and traffic signals, while also employing vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-toinfrastructure (V21) systems to navigate roadways, traffic and pedestrian hazards- will be 

widely available in the future. 

In closing, the Takata airbag inflator recall is unprecedented in size, scope and the number of 

affected manufacturers. It requires ongoing and coordinated attention from NHTSA. On 

average, the industry successfully conducts more than 600 recalls each year and Alliance 

members are committed to increasing consumers' participation in these vehicle recalls. We 

look forward to sharing the findings from our study with Congress and NHTSA, and believe the 

study will provide a better understanding of what drives consumers to participate in recalls. 

Finally, while we appreciate the significance of the Takata recall and the challenges ahead, we 

must remain focused on the technologies that will make it possible to build on our current 

success. We look forward to working with you and your colleagues on initiatives to help speed 

the wide-spread introduction of life-saving new vehicle technologies into consumers' hands. 
62 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentleman. Chair recognize Mr. 

Bozzella, 5 minutes for your statement, please. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN BOZZELLA 

Mr. BOZZELLA. Chairman Burgess, Ranking Member Schakowsky, members of the committee, I really appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. Global Automakers represents 

international automotive manufacturers that design, build, and sell 

cars and light trucks in the United States. Our members sold 43 

percent of new vehicles purchased in the U.S. last year, and produced 40 percent of all vehicles built here. Individually and jointly, 

our member companies are committed to working toward a future 

in which there are zero highway fatalities. The safety of Americans 

traveling on our roadways remains a priority. 

Mr. Chairman, this hearing presents an opportunity to further 

this important discussion on improving auto safety. The Takata recall is an unprecedented situation. The number of manufacturers, 

and the number and age of affected vehicles involved, along with 

the sophistication and complexity of the technology, makes this 

unique. As such, affected automakers are taking extraordinary 

measures to locate and communicate recall information to vehicle 

owners so that they know to take their vehicles in for repair. 

Our members have gone far beyond what the law requires. They 

are—multiple rounds of recall notices. They are sending Express 

Mail to ensure that the notifications are not discarded. They are 

using multiple platforms, such as advertising, social media, and 

electronic communications. They are working closely with their 

dealer networks to ensure that dealers have the capacity to service 

vehicles with open recalls. Additionally, they created the ITC to 

conduct independent testing of recalled parts, as led by David 

Kelly. 

Of course, recall campaigns are only one component of creating 

a safer driving environment. The Takata recall highlights the complex nature of the industry and the challenges we face today. All 

stakeholders must work together in the effort to improve vehicle 

and highway safety. Critical areas of focus include proper oversight 

of existing safety systems, the development and introduction of new 

technologies, and driver and passenger behavior. This committee, 

through its authorship of the TREAD Act, has given NHTSA the 

ability to require reporting and tracking of safety-related data that 

better allows us to identify problems in the existing fleet of vehicles, and to address and solve them. 

In part, the number of recalls that have occurred in recent years 

is evidence that the requirements of the TREAD Act, NHTSA’s ongoing vigilance, and the commitment of the manufacturers, are advancing the goal of improved vehicle safety. Automakers are now 

deploying advanced technologies which will accelerate the move 

from crash survival to crash avoidance, including forward collision 

warning and braking, and soon vehicle to vehicle and vehicle to infrastructure communications. According to the DOT, vehicle to vehicle communications, when fully deployed, could address 80 percent of crashes involving unimpaired drivers. 

A holistic approach to vehicle and highway safety must include 

human behavior, which plays a role in a voluntary recall system. 

63 

For newer vehicles, the recall completion rate is upwards of 80 percent. The completion rate falls dramatically as vehicles age. This 

is a key challenge in resolving the Takata recall, and raises an important question, are there limits to the success of a voluntary system? Global automakers and our members are exploring ways the 

industry can achieve better outcomes. We are working with 

NHTSA officials, and are happy to talk with you about new methods for getting useful, effective, and actionable recall information to 

our customers, such as including recall notifications and annual vehicle registration processes. 

Mr. Chairman, it is important to keep in mind that highway 

safety is improving. This past December, NHTSA announced that 

traffic fatalities decreased by 3.1 percent over the previous year, 

and by nearly 25 percent since 2004. However, there is clearly 

more work to be done. Regarding the Takata recall, the most important thing we can do right now is to make sure people are 

aware of the status of their vehicle. Every vehicle owner should go 

to safercar.gov and enter their VIN, the Vehicle Identification 

Number, to determine whether additional action is needed. This 

needs to be done now, and it needs to be done several weeks from 

now, when manufacturers will have posted the specific VINs of the 

vehicles that have just been added to the recall list. Personally, I 

did this myself for my vehicle and my children’s vehicle, and it 

gave me the peace of mind to knowing where we are at. 

Global automakers and our members will continue to work toward our mutual goal of 100 percent recall completion, and zero 

traffic fatalities. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bozzella follows:] 

64 


Statement of John Bozzella 

President and CEO 

Association of Global Automakers 

Before the 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing and Trade 

House Committee on Energy and Commerce 

June 2, 2015 

"An Update on the Takata Airbag Ruptures and Recalls" 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. 

Global Automakers represents international automobile manufacturers that design, build and sell 

cars and light trucks in the United States. Our members sold 43 percent of the new vehicles 

purchased in the United States last year, and produced 40 percent of all vehicles built here. 

Individually and jointly our member companies are committed to working toward a future in 

which there are zero highway fatalities. The safety of Americans traveling on our roadways 

remains a priority. 

Mr. Chairman, this hearing presents an opportunity to further this important discussion on 

improving auto safety. The Takata recall is an unprecedented situation. The number and age of 

affected vehicles and number of manufacturers involved, along with the sophistication and 

complexity of the technology, makes this unique. As such, affected automakers are taking 

extraordinary measures to locate and communicate recall information to vehicle owners so that 

they know to take their vehicles in for repair. 

Our members have gone far beyond what the law requires. They are distributing multiple rounds 

of recall notices. They are sending express mail to ensure that the notifications are not discarded. 

They are using multiple platforms such as advertising, social media, and electronic 

communications. Importantly, they are working closely with their dealer networks to ensure that 

dealers have the capacity to service vehicles with open recalls. 

1 
65 


Of course, recall campaigns are only one component of creating a safer driving environment. 

The Takata recall highlights the complex nature of the industry and the challenges we face today. 

In addition to recalls, the auto industry, this Committee, regulators, engineers and other experts 

in the field have been working diligently to improve vehicle and highway safety. Critical areas 

of focus include proper oversight of existing safety systems, the development and introduction of 

new technologies, and driver and passenger behavior. 

This Committee, through its authorship of the TREAD Act, has given the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) the ability to require reporting and tracking of safetyrelated data that better allows us to identify problems in the existing fleet of vehicles, and to 

address and solve them. In part, the number of recalls that have occurred in recent years is 

evidence that the requirements of the TREAD Act, NHTSA's ongoing vigilance, and 

manufacturers' commitment to safety are advancing the goal of improved vehicle safety. 

Automakers are now deploying advanced technologies which will accelerate the move from 

crash survival to crash avoidance- including forward collision warning and braking, and soon, 

vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communications. According to the Department 

of Transportation, vehicle-to-vehicle communications, when fully deployed, could address 80 

percent of crashes involving unimpaired drivers. 

A holistic approach to vehicle and highway safety must include driver and passenger behavior. 

This requires addressing the issues of impaired driving, driver distraction, and driver error 

through technologies such as warning systems and also through education and enforcement. 

Human behavior also plays an important role in a voluntary recall system. 

For newer vehicles, the recall completion rate is upwards of 80 percent. The completion rate falls 

dramatically as vehicles age. This is a key challenge in resolving the Takata recall and raises an 

important question: are there limits to the success of a voluntary system? 

2 
66 


Global Automakers and our members are exploring ways the industry can achieve better 

outcomes. We are working with NHTSA officials and are happy to talk with you about new 

methods for getting useful, effective and actionable recall information to our customers, such as 

including recall notifications in annual vehicle registration processes. 

Mr. Chairman, it is important to keep in mind that highway safety is improving. This past 

December, NHTSA announced that traffic fatalities decreased by 3.1 percent over the previous 

year, and by nearly 25 percent since 2004. 

However, there is clearly more work to be done. 

Regarding the Takata recall, the most important thing we can do right now is to make sure 

people are aware of the status of their vehicle. Every vehicle owner should go to safercar.gov and 

enter the YIN- vehicle identification number- to determine whether any additional action is 

needed. This needs to be done now - and it needs to be done several weeks from now when 

manufacturers will have posted the specific VINs of the vehicles that have just been added to the 

recall list. 

Global Automakers and our members will continue to work toward our mutual goal of I 00 

percent recall completion and zero traffic fatalities. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

### 

3 
67 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentleman. Chair thanks the entire panel for their testimony today. We will move into the question 

portion of the hearing, and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes for 

questions. 

I have got a couple of questions that relate to the propellant in 

the inflator. And, Mr. Kennedy, I am primarily going to ask you, 

but, Mr. Kelly, if you have information, because of your independent testing role, please feel free to add. Is—Mr. Kennedy, is 

Takata the only airbag manufacturer that uses sodium nitrate in 

its airbags? 

Mr. KENNEDY. It is ammonium nitrate, sir—— 

Mr. BURGESS. I am sorry, ammonium. 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. And I believe we are the only one 

that uses it as a main propellant. There are other manufacturers 

that use it as a supplemental propellant. 

Mr. BURGESS. Is there any other airbag, other than those manufactured by Takata, that has been—experienced this energetic disruption, I think you called it, Mr. Kelly? 

Mr. KELLY. I can’t really speak to all—recalls for the other suppliers, Chairman Burgess. I really don’t know the answer to that. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, it is just that we have had, you know, this 

is the second hearing that I have been involved in of—on this issue, 

and ammonium nitrate just keeps coming up. I mean, it is a pretty 

powerful compound, and it just begs the question, is there a linear 

relationship between the ammonium nitrate used as an inflator 

and these accidents that are happening? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, the studies that we have done, and the research that we have from some of the leading experts in the world, 

seem to indicate that ammonium nitrate is certainly a factor in the 

inflator ruptures. There are many, many other factors. I think you 

heard Dr. Rosekind talk about some of them. You have heard Mr. 

Kelly talk about some of them. The—takes a long time. As Dr. 

Rosekind said, 7 to 12 years. It takes high absolute humidity, it 

takes high heat. 

But what is difficult about the situation is you can put two inflators in that situation, one of them is fine, and one of them is not. 

So that is really what the struggle has been with getting to the 

root cause. But ammonium nitrate appears to be one of the factors 

that contributes. 

Mr. BURGESS. So it is—high humidity is an issue. My understanding is some of these are manufactured with a desiccant to absorb humidity—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. 

Mr. BURGESS [continuing]. Which would then go along with a 7- 

to-12-year timeframe of—presumably the desiccant is going to get 

completely used up over some period of time. Is that correct? 

Mr. KENNEDY. I don’t know that it would get complete used up, 

sir. It depends on the amount of moisture that is in a particular 

inflator, and the amount of desiccant. Many of our later generation 

inflators do contain desiccant, along with ammonium nitrate. We 

have not seen this issue with those inflators in the field, so we 

know that that is a factor that contributes to the life of the inflator. 

68 

Mr. BURGESS. Does Takata manufacture any airbag that is used 

in any make or model of vehicle that uses sodium—I mean, I am 

sorry, ammonium nitrate without a desiccant? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. Some of our—some—all of these inflators 

that are involved in these issues that we are talking about are all 

ammonium nitrate without desiccant. 

Mr. BURGESS. And are you still manufacturing ammonium nitrate without a desiccant as the propellant? 

Mr. KENNEDY. For a few platforms that we have not transitioned 

out of yet, but we are working to transition out of them as quickly 

as possible. 

Mr. BURGESS. So, I am sorry, you go out and buy a brand new 

car off the showroom floor, and it could have one of these instruments in it? 

Mr. KENNEDY. It could have an ammonium nitrate-based inflator 

that does not have desiccant, that is correct. 

Mr. BURGESS. Is there any obligation to warn the consumer that 

they are buying something that may be problematic? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, the recalls that are in process at this point 

are for certain timeframes, certain vehicles, certain technologies. 

Those would not be involved in a brand new vehicle at this point, 

but that is why we are continuing, as part of the Consent Order, 

to test outside of the boundaries of what is involved in the recall 

to really understand what this—what the total scope is. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, I am sorry, you are not providing me much 

reassurance with that answer. Let me just ask you this. You said 

that by September you will be up to a million units a month—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, and then we will continue to go up after that 

as well. 

Mr. BURGESS. But under—just simple math, it is—for 34 million 

vehicles, I mean, it is almost 3 years as a timeframe. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, it is about—I mean, roughly—the exact 

numbers are in the DIRs, but the additional due to these DIRs is 

about 16, 17. I don’t mean to minimize it. It is obviously a huge 

number whichever way you look at it. But previously there had 

been about 18 million of that 34 that have already been under recall. We have supplied over four million kits already since January 

of last year, and now, as I said, we are up to 750,000 a month, 

going to a million a month—— 

Mr. BURGESS. OK. Let me just—— 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. Going beyond that. 

Mr. BURGESS. Let me just ask you this. I don’t mean to interrupt, 

but my time is up. 

Mr. KENNEDY. That is OK. 

Mr. BURGESS. Are any of the replacement modules that you are 

putting—reinstalling in vehicles that are brought in to have their 

airbag system changed out, are any of those ammonium nitrate 

propellants without desiccants? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Some of them are. As I said, we have gotten about 

50 percent with outside inflators that are nonammonium nitrate. 

On the driver’s side, where we have had most of the issues, as I 

mentioned in my opening remarks, we are completely transitioning 

out of the batwings, and we will be using either a desiccated inflator without batwings, or we will be using a competitor’s inflator. 

69 

Mr. BURGESS. All right, thank you. My time has expired. Ms. 

Schakowsky, 5 minutes for questions, please. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I want to follow up on the chairman’s question. You have talked about what are the possible reasons, including ammonium nitrate perhaps being part of the cause, and you 

are saying, if I understand you correctly, that you are providing replacement bags that have—that are—have ammonium nitrate 

without a desiccant? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, ma’am, that is correct. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. So—I don’t understand that. What is under recall right now? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Certain model years, certain designs, on certain 

vehicles. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. But why, if ammonium nitrate may be a problem, would you, and why would I buy, a—put in—why would you 

put it in a car, why would I buy a car that has a potentially dangerous airbag? I am not understand. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, we are working to move away from those as 

quickly as we can, but to—in a vehicle, it is not as easy as just 

changing the color of the car, or changing a bolt. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. No, you are—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. It is very, very—— 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. No, I am talking about replacements now, not 

even the—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY [continuing]. New cars. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. So the replacement could be as dangerous as 

the current, why would you even replace it? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, as I said, without really exactly understanding the root cause, and continuing to test outside of the 

bounds of what we have already recalled, we are trying to determine that. We are trying to understand exactly what are the factors that lead to this, and should we do something different than 

what we are doing right now? 

We know it does—as you heard Dr. Rosekind say, it takes 7 1⁄2

to 12 years, so putting in a brand new part is a huge improvement 

in safety. And as we continue to test, if it shows that we need to 

take additional actions, we will take additional actions. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. So does the recall affect cars that are over 10 

years old? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, some of them—I think—well, the original recalls did. These new ones announced, I would have to look at the 

DIRs and see, because of that overlap that I talked about. But 

some of them go back to as early as I think 2000, 2001—— 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. OK. 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. Were the first ones involved. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. My understanding is that you are doing that 

of older cars, but you are not required to do so. So I wanted to ask 

you if Takada has taken a position on the Vehicle Safety Improvement Act, H.R. 1181? 

Mr. KENNEDY. No, we have not publicly. I am aware of the bill. 

I am not aware of all the particulars in the bill. But we certainly 

70 

support any effort that would help improve the return rate on recalls. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. So let me give you some of the items in the 

bill, and see if you would support that. H.R. 1181 would increase 

the quantity and quality if information shared by auto manufacturers with NHTSA, the public, and Congress, specifically requires 

manufacturers to include in their quarterly submissions to NHTSA 

additional information on fatal incidents possibly caused by a defect, and assess why the incident may have occurred, and removes 

the limitation on the number of model years that should be reported. Is this something that sounds supportable to you? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, it is a little disingenuous for me, because it 

is not a requirement for our company to comment on it. But it 

would seem like that would be a good idea in order to increase the 

visibility on some of these issues that have been going on in the 

field. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Do you think it would be a good idea to not 

limit to 10 years the number of mandatory—of recalls, asking that 

cars older than 10 years be part of the required recall? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Quite frankly, I didn’t know there was a limit of 

10 years, because, as I said, some of these vehicles are 15 years 

old. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Would you think that it is a good idea for 

NHTSA to have new imminent hazard authority to expedite recalls 

related to dangerous defects? 

Mr. KENNEDY. That is, again, a difficult one for a supplier, I 

think, to answer. But I think anything that improves the safety on 

the road is certainly a step in the right direction. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Do you think there is any reason to support 

regional recalls, as opposed to national recalls? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, you know, obviously ours started off as a regional recall. And the reason that it was doing—a couple of reasons 

it was doing that. Number one was because that is what the 

science and data showed where the issues were. And there are 

going to be some cases where, I think, that is probably correct. And 

it also helps—— 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. But people do drive their cars to other places. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, that is true, but—the other thing I was going 

to say, it also helps with getting parts into the priority areas as 

quickly as possible, which is part of the four DIRs that we came 

to agreement with NHTSA on in the last couple of weeks. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Kennedy, can I work with you as well, obviously, primarily with the members, but talk to you about the legislation? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Absolutely. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. KENNEDY. You are welcome. 

Mr. BURGESS. The Chair thanks the gentlelady. Chair recognizes 

the gentlelady from Tennessee, 5 minutes for your questions, 

please. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kennedy, I am 

going to stay right with you. Did you drive a car that has a Takata 

airbag? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, I do. 

71 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. You do? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, I do. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. What about your family? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, every one of them. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Are you concerned—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. No, I am not. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN [continuing]. The safety of those? OK. I was listening to your statement, and I think I must have missed something here, because you talked about manufacturing the—stopping 

the manufacture of the batwing airbags, but you never mentioned 

the ammonium nitrate. You kind of left the propellant—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Correct. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN [continuing]. Out of the mix, and then addressed it with Mr. Burgess a little bit. I want to ask if you agree 

with this statement. This is from an explosives expert at Missouri 

University of Science and Technology, and he said the following 

about ammonium nitrate, it shouldn’t be used in airbags, but it is 

cheap, unbelievably cheap. Do you agree with that statement? 

Mr. KENNEDY. That it is unbelievably cheap, or that it shouldn’t 

be used? Are you—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Both. 

Mr. KENNEDY. I wouldn’t say that it is unbelievably cheap. I 

would say it is competitive with some of the other propellant formulations that are out there, like guanidine nitrate, which some of 

our competitors use, and which we use in some other inflators. I 

don’t think—I mean, it is a blanket statement that says it should 

not be used. No, I don’t agree with that, because obviously we use 

it. We have had some issues with some of our ammonium nitrate 

inflators, but many of them have performed very well. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Are you an explosives expert? 

Mr. KENNEDY. No, ma’am, I am not. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. You are not? 

Mr. KENNEDY. I am an engineer, but I am not a—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. OK. 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. I am not a chemist, I am not an explosives expert. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. All right. Then let us go to what Ms. Schakowsky was saying. You are still using this, so isn’t it true that 

ammonium nitrate is a dangerous substance to be used in airbag 

inflators? 

Mr. KENNEDY. No, I don’t believe it is a dangerous substance to 

be used in airbag inflators. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. OK, you do not believe—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. We use phase stabilized ammonium nitrate. Most 

of the issues that you hear about ammonium nitrate are it losing 

its phase stabilization. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. All right. Then isn’t it true that ammonium nitrate is cheaper than other compounds, such as tetrazole? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Probably—maybe tetrazole, but at the time when 

we started to use ammonium nitrate, there—the competing material out there was guanidine nitrate. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. OK. 

Mr. KENNEDY. And those two are very similar in cost. There is 

not a huge—— 

72 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. OK. 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. Difference between those. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. You are an engineer, and isn’t it true that your 

own engineers at Takata warned you about using ammonium nitrate? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, from some of the newspaper articles I have 

read, I assume you are referring to Mr. Lillie’s comments, is that 

correct? 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Mr. Britton and Mr. Lillie. 

Mr. KENNEDY. OK. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Yes. 

Mr. KENNEDY. And what I can tell you is this. Every development program, every product that any supplier every makes, there 

is always a spirited debate about what are the right components, 

what is the right design, what—and there are tradeoffs on all of 

those things. The previous materials that we used for propellant 

was sodium azide. Sodium azide was extremely toxic. It also had 

the unwanted effect that, when it was deployed, it did not burn 

very cleanly, and there was a lot of effluent that were put into the 

vehicle, and a lot of people that had respiratory issues were bothered by those. 

So we, you know, every propellant, every design, there is always 

a spirited debate—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. OK. 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. And you can probably find people—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. All right. 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. Always on one side—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. I get that. I want—— 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. And not on—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN [continuing]. To move on—— 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. The other. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN [continuing]. Because I am about to run—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. OK. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN [continuing]. Out of time here. OK. Given that 

you are recalling cars that may have already been repaired, have 

there been any field incidents reported in inflators that were installed as parts, any of the remedy situations? Have you had any 

occurrences with those? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Not that I am aware of, ma’am. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. So all of the replacement parts have performed 

100 percent satisfactorily in the cars in which they have been installed? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, what I said was I am not aware of any of 

the replacement parts—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Would you double check that and get back to 

us—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, ma’am, I will. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN [continuing]. And let us know? What does 

Takata believe we know from testing today that we didn’t know a 

year ago? 

Mr. KENNEDY. We know a lot, and not just from our testing. I 

know I heard some of the gentlemen refer to the Fraunhofer report 

which was released. We brought Dr. Noits from the Fraunhofer InVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:50 Nov 09, 2016 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\114THCONGRESS\114X49TAKATAAIRBAGSPETEROKPRINT\114X49TAKATAAIRBAGS
73 

stitute into our facility in February. We brought a team from 

NHTSA in. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. What kind of changes are you making with 

that information, then, if you are still using the propellant that is 

a problem? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, as I said, we do have later designs to use 

desiccant. That is one of the things that has been proven to improve the situation. We also have alternate propellants now with 

guanidine nitrate that we have—we started production a year or 2 

ago, and we are continuing to ramp those up. I think overall you 

will see our production of ammonium nitrate go down rapidly. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. I yield back. 

Mr. BURGESS. Gentlelady yields back. Chair thanks the 

gentlelady, and the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, 5 minutes for your questions, please. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Thank you, Chairman. Thank 

you to the witnesses for being here. I apologize, I had to step out, 

but glad to come back. Mr. Kennedy, you indicted that you expect 

that the use of ammonium nitrate would decrease. Why—in your— 

in the future. Why is that? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, it is certainly got a bad reputation through 

all of this, and it—as I said, it is one of the contributing factors 

that everyone believes is involved in this issue. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Can you—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Sorry. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Can you, sir, signify that—or 

guarantee that as long as ammonium nitrate is used in those products, the products are safe? 

Mr. KENNEDY. I am sorry? 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Can you guarantee that as 

long as ammonium nitrate is used in those products, that the products are safe? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, we believe properly manufactured and designed ammonium nitrate, phase stabilized ammonium nitrate, can 

be done properly. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. So the—I guess—you indicated in your testimony—your written testimony a little while ago 

that, in certain circumstances, these conditions can result in an alternation in the propellant wafers in the inflators that could potentially lead to overaggressive combustion. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Right. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. And so it is—your statement, 

though, is that if it is properly manufactured, and then under the 

right circumstances, those conditions would not exist? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, we have seen those in very rare cases, and 

that is—goes back to the root cause discussion we were having a 

little bit earlier. We do not have the definitive root cause. We know 

a lot, and we know a lot more than we did in December, based on 

all the testing that we have done, and all the testing that our outside experts have done. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. So the testing that you have 

done has indicated that, if I understand you correctly, and please 

correct me if I don’t, but—is the ammonium nitrate, or the substances used in the production of these wafers, and—then, under 

74 

certain conditions of humidity and heat over time could lead to a 

malfunction—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Could lead to—— 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS [continuing]. In a crash? 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. Correct. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Could lead to? And that you 

are going to—your plans are to phase out the use of ammonium nitrate in your products? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, we have been phasing that down, and phasing later propellants, but a lot of them, even some of the ammonium nitrate ones, were with desiccant. We had gone from non-desiccated ammonium nitrate to desiccated ammonium nitrate, and 

now we are moving to a—what is called a guanidine nitrate. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. And the guanidine nitrate you 

said is a similar cost? 

Mr. KENNEDY. A similar cost, yes. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. So then why not adopt it earlier? 

Mr. KENNEDY. You know, it was—we made investments in order 

to process ammonium nitrate. We were having good success with 

ammonium nitrate. It was competitive. As I said, it had a number 

of these other advantages to it that our customers enjoyed, so it 

was not something that, until some of these recent issues, really 

thought, and gave us a reason to re-think it. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Some fairly significant disadvantages of late, though, yes? 

Mr. KENNEDY. I am sorry? 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Some fairly significant disadvantages of late, though, I would—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. And then, sir, I think you 

tried to touch on this, but forgive me if I am still a little bit confused, I—in an article in the New York Times yesterday, indicated 

that—the headline, I believe, says, ‘‘Takada says it will no longer 

make side-inflator linked to airbag defect.’’ 

Mr. KENNEDY. I am sorry, what did that say? 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. ‘‘Takata says it will no longer 

make side-inflator linked to airbag defect,’’ and basically says that 

you—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. I—— 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS [continuing]. Will not be using 

ammonium nitrate. There was another piece in another newspaper 

I saw today saying that ammonium nitrate still would be manufactured. And a piece in Reuters that I think said that it wasn’t going 

to be in, then the piece was withdrawn. So can you try to clarify 

for me, is ammonium—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS [continuing]. Nitrate still 

being used in the products, and should people—what should people 

do? Do they have—can they have confidence in the airbag product 

that is going into the cars—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. I am glad you asked that question. There was 

a lot of confusion yesterday once our written testimony was released. 

75 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Both cited your rest—written 

testimony. One said that you are, and one said you are not—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS [continuing]. So—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, yes, it—— 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. I appreciate the clarification. 

Mr. KENNEDY. It is a long story. We have had people working on 

that since it came out. As I think I mentioned earlier, we are continuing to use ammonium nitrate in our propellants, phase stabilized ammonium nitrate, both with and without desiccant, but 

we—there are not many without desiccant that are still out there. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. OK. 

Mr. KENNEDY. What we did say we were going to quit making 

were these batwing shaped inflators, because that seemed to be, 

again, one of the issues that we have seen from all the testing that 

we have done. It is more prevalent in the batwing propellant wafers. 

Mr. KENNEDY OF MASSACHUSETTS. OK. Given that, I only have 

about 30 seconds left. I will stop going forward, and, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. Thank you. Thank you to the witness. 

Mr. KENNEDY. You are welcome. 

Mr. BURGESS. The gentleman yields back. The Chair thanks the 

gentleman. Recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Lance, 

5 minutes for your questions, please. 

Mr. LANCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon to you all, 

gentlemen. I was at the hearing in December. I was the vice chair 

then, as I am now. Mr. Terry was in the chair in December. 

I quote from the transcript, Mr. Kennedy, directly from the transcript of the December hearing on this matter. I had asked your 

colleague, Mr. Shimizu, about this whole matter, and I had stated, 

‘‘Takata’s current view, based upon reliable information, does not 

support a nationwide determination of a safety defect in all vehicles equipped with the subject driver side inflators. This is not the 

view of the agency at the Federal Government’’—obviously 

NHTSA—‘‘that protects the American people, and so you are dramatically and diametrically in opposition to the view of NHTSA. Is 

that accurate?’’ 

And then Mr. Shimizu discussed this with his colleagues, there 

was a translation problem, but he then answered the question, and 

he said, quote, and this is direct quote from the transcript, ‘‘Yes, 

correct, that is our statement.’’ And then I went on to say, ’’In conclusion, and we will be asking this of NHTSA later in the hearing, 

on November 26 NHTSA demanded a national recall’’—and, of 

course, that was not the view of Takata at that time. What has 

changed, Mr. Kennedy, between then and now? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Much has changed, much. At that—— 

Mr. LANCE. There has been one additional death. 

Mr. KENNEDY. There was the one additional death that we are 

aware of—— 

Mr. LANCE. That certainly has changed. 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. In Texas. That was, as I think was 

also mentioned, was a vehicle that had been recalled 4 years ago, 

unfortunately. 

Mr. LANCE. But not to the owner. This was a subsequent owner. 

76 

Mr. KENNEDY. I know, and that is—— 

Mr. LANCE. That is an important factor for the American people 

to know, Mr.—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. It is a very important factor. A very important 

factor, I agree with you. But back to your original question of what 

has changed, at that time we had, I think, 8,000 tests done. Now 

we have got 50,000 tests done. We have seen some patterns start 

to emerge in some of the testing and the data that we have accumulated. That is what has led us—and all of the other testing and 

analysis has been done by outside experts. We have hired experts— 

I think you have seen the Fraunhofer report now. 

Mr. LANCE. Yes. I was the person who quoted. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. 

Mr. LANCE. Moving on, the issue of ruptures was first known by 

Takata in 2004, and the first six deaths I believe occurred approximately in 2009, and so this has been an ongoing problem of great 

significance. In the last 6 months how much have you been fined? 

I believe it is $14,000 a day. How much in total have you been 

fined, Mr. Kennedy? 

Mr. KENNEDY. I think Dr. Rosekind answered that. I think it 

was—— 

Mr. LANCE. I am asking for your answer, Mr. Kennedy. 

Mr. KENNEDY. I believe it totals up to about $1.2 million. 

Mr. LANCE. And have you paid that? 

Mr. KENNEDY. To my knowledge, no. 

Mr. LANCE. And why is that? 

Mr. KENNEDY. That is part of the discussion and negotiation with 

NHTSA. They have agreed to suspend it as part of the Consent 

Order, but they have reserved the right to incur further penalties 

as they see fit. 

Mr. LANCE. Now, based upon your testimony to the chairman 

and to the ranking member, is it possible that replacement airbags 

will continue to have ammonium nitrate in them? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, sir, they will. Some of them will. 

Mr. LANCE. And you are confident that they will be safe for some 

period of time, or an extended period of time? 

Mr. KENNEDY. We feel that they are safe, and that is why as— 

again, as part of the Consent Order, we are continuing to test outside of the scope of the recalls, and we are continuing to test to 

make sure that the remedy parts are safe. 

Mr. LANCE. Should those who are having an airbag replaced ask 

whether or not their new airbag will contain ammonium nitrate, 

and perhaps ask for a different replacement airbag? 

Mr. KENNEDY. I am—I have—not really sure how to answer that, 

sir. 

Mr. LANCE. And are there new automobiles fresh off the assembly line that contain ammonium nitrate airbags? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, there are. 

Mr. LANCE. Thank you. 

Mr. KENNEDY. You are welcome. 

Mr. LANCE. Mr. Bozzella, you indicate that the rate of compliance 

with recalls drops dramatically. And did I hear you right that it is 

15 percent for older vehicles, and could you explain exactly the 

years involved where it would be as low as 15 percent? 

77 

Mr. BOZZELLA. Yes. I don’t know that I mentioned exactly the 

numbers—— 

Mr. LANCE. Perhaps you did. 

Mr. BOZZELLA [continuing]. But you are exactly right, Congressman. The trend is that further out into the ownership—— 

Mr. LANCE. Yes. 

Mr. BOZZELLA [continuing]. Of a vehicle, the recall completion 

rate is lower. 

Mr. LANCE. Um-hum. 

Mr. BOZZELLA. If the question is why is that, second and third 

owners—— 

Mr. LANCE. Yes. 

Mr. BOZZELLA [continuing]. These vehicles are often owned by 

second and—— 

Mr. LANCE. Yes. 

Mr. BOZZELLA [continuing]. Third owners—— 

Mr. LANCE. Yes. 

Mr. BOZZELLA [continuing]. They are difficult—— 

Mr. LANCE. Yes. 

Mr. BOZZELLA [continuing]. To find, and so the manufacturers 

are doing everything they can right now, working very hard to increase those completion—— 

Mr. LANCE. Thank you. In conclusion, because my time has expired, I am concerned about those who have vehicles that they 

have purchased not new. This would be people who might not be 

aware, necessarily, to the greatest extent of someone who has purchased a new automobile. We want to protect all of the American 

people, and this is of great concern. And I want to work with you 

and others, and the committee, to make sure that all Americans 

are protected. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentleman, gentleman yields 

back. Chair recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Ms. Clarke, 

5 minutes for your questions, please. 

Ms. CLARKE. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank our 

panelists. The day before the subcommittee’s hearing in December, 

Takata sent a letter to NHTSA in which the company rejected a 

national recall. Part of the stated reason for rejecting the national 

recall was Takata’s contention that it was not required by law to 

make a good faith determination of whether its product contained 

a safety-related defect or to conduct a recall because Takata is not 

a manufacturer of motor vehicles, or of replacement equipment. 

Mr. Kennedy, this question was asked of Mr. Shimizu in December, but I want to hear from you now, do you agree with that statement made by your company in December? 

Mr. KENNEDY. It sounds like a lot of legal talk to me. I am certainly not a lawyer. 

Ms. CLARKE. It is not legal. It is very simple. It says here that 

it is your contention that you are not required by law to make a 

good-faith determination of whether a product contained a safetyrelated defect, or to conduct a recall because Takata is not a manufacturer of motor vehicles, or of replacement equipment. 

Mr. KENNEDY. I really don’t know the answer to that. I would 

have to do a little bit of research and get back with you on—— 

78 

Ms. CLARKE. All right, very well. By entering into the Consent 

Order with NHTSA, it is my understanding that Takata has submitted to NHTSA’s jurisdiction. Is that correct? 

Mr. KENNEDY. I believe that would probably be the proper term. 

Ms. CLARKE. That is correct? 

Mr. KENNEDY. We have come to an agreement with NHTSA. 

Ms. CLARKE. So that is correct? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. 

Ms. CLARKE. Very well. Do you now agree that Takata is subject 

to the jurisdiction of NHTSA, at least as to the laws and regulations related to safety-related defects? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Again, it is an area of the—you are asking me a 

law question that I am not really properly qualified to answer. I 

could certainly look into it and get back with you. I mean—but certainly we recognize NHTSA’s authority, if that is really the question that you are asking, and we have worked very hard with 

NHTSA, especially over the past 3 or 4 months, to come to the 

agreement on the consent agreement, the preservation order, the 

DIRs—— 

Ms. CLARKE. So let me ask you this: Do you now agree that 

Takata is required to decide in good faith whether your products 

contain a safety-related defect? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, we clearly did say, in the DIRs, that a defect 

may arise in some of the subject parts. So I guess the answer to 

that question would be yes. 

Ms. CLARKE. Mr. Kennedy, is Takata paying for all of the replacement airbags? 

Mr. KENNEDY. I am not sure what you mean by—are we—— 

Ms. CLARKE. Yes. 

Mr. KENNEDY. We are selling them. 

Ms. CLARKE. Well, there are airbags that now need to be replaced—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Correct. 

Ms. CLARKE [continuing]. Right? Are you paying for them? 

Mr. KENNEDY. We are working with each one of the OEM—each 

one of our automaker customers to discuss financial responsibility, 

and we are—— 

Ms. CLARKE. What does that mean? 

Mr. KENNEDY. That means that we are having discussions with 

each one of the—— 

Ms. CLARKE. So you are not paying for them? 

Mr. KENNEDY. I wouldn’t say that we are paying 100 percent for 

everything with every automaker. 

Ms. CLARKE. So you are negotiating what you will pay and what 

you won’t? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Which is a normal course of business 

on—— 

Ms. CLARKE. I am just asking. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. It is a normal course of business in the automotive—— 

Ms. CLARKE. A New York Times article from May 20 stated that 

Takata said automakers shared the blame for this massive recall 

because ‘‘testing specifications prescribed by the vehicle manufacturers failed to uncover faults.’’ Is that correct? 

79 

Mr. KENNEDY. That was one of the conclusions from the 

Fraunhofer report that was—— 

Ms. CLARKE. But is that correct? 

Mr. KENNEDY. We believe that is correct. 

Ms. CLARKE. OK. Can you explain that statement a little bit 

more? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. What it means is, whenever a supplier provides a product to an automaker, there is a specification that you 

are required to meet. There is a certain set of tests that you have 

to run, a certain quantity of tests that you have to run, and we do 

that. And as a general rule, you know, we do that with every new 

product, we review it with the OEM, and they sign off on it and 

say, yes, we accept this, or no, we don’t. And these products went 

through that process. 

So what we are—what the report was trying to say is that the 

specifications that were out there at the time don’t—did not capture the issues that we are seeing in the field today. 

Ms. CLARKE. So you are saying the manufacturers failed to uncover the faults, so—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. What we are saying is the specifications that we 

tested to, and provided parts to, did not encompass the scope of 

this problem. 

Ms. CLARKE. And so they—because—you are saying that they 

failed to uncover these faults? 

Mr. KENNEDY. I am not—I am maybe not going to quibble about 

the wording, but that is exactly—I mean, that is what—— 

Ms. CLARKE. So you are not taking any responsibility—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. No, ma’am, that is not what I said at all. 

Ms. CLARKE. OK. 

Mr. KENNEDY. That is not what I said at all. 

Ms. CLARKE. OK. So you are saying they share the blame because they should have uncovered the faults during this—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, I am—— 

Ms. CLARKE [continuing]. Testing of specifications? That is—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. What I am saying is that, in the automotive industry, products are developed to meet specifications. Typically, if 

you meet the specification, you provided a part that is acceptable. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you, Mr. Kennedy. 

Mr. KENNEDY. You are welcome. 

Ms. CLARKE. Yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURGESS. Gentlelady, Mr. Bainwol was trying to provide an 

answer for you as well. 

Ms. CLARKE. OK. 

Mr. BURGESS. With unanimous consent, Mr. Bainwol be allowed 

to answer. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BAINWOL. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman, and I say this 

not as a lawyer, or an engineer, or someone who negotiates these 

contracts, but the specs that are let out when a contract like this 

is negotiated relate to performance specifications, and do not relate 

to the fundamental notion that the product should be safe. You 

know, this is about the form of the deployment, and items like that, 

in terms of which cars it is going to be appropriately fitted for, but 

there is an understanding that the supplier will provide a product 

80 

that complies with FMBSS. And part of that is making sure that 

the controlled explosion is a controlled explosion. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURGESS. Gentlelady yields back. The Chair thanks the 

gentlelady. Chair thanks Mr. Bainwol. Mr. Guthrie, you are recognized for 5 minutes for questions, please. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. Thank you very much. Mr. Kennedy, I guess I will 

direct this at you as well. I guess I am understanding—if you really 

don’t know the root cause, then you really don’t know if the product 

that failed was manufactured to specification. Now, the tests might 

have met specification, but you really—I mean, you—was it manufactured to specification, and it failed anyway, so therefore the 

specification came from the OEM was the issue, or—I mean, if you 

don’t know the root cause, you don’t really know the answer then, 

I guess, yes? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, that is part of the difficulty that we have 

with this issue. And I think you have heard Mr. Kelly talk about, 

you have heard Dr. Rosekind talk about it. It is a very multifaceted, very complex issue as to what is going on. And there are 

different types of inflators. You heard I think Dr. Rosekind say 10 

different inflator types involved in this. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. Um-hum. 

Mr. KENNEDY. And one of them, and the parts that we have gotten back in the past few months, we have seen what looks like a 

manufacturing defect that we think allowed moisture into the inflator. That is on one of those. The other ones, we haven’t been able 

to make that determination. 

So, I mean, we have expended a lot of effort with a lot of experts—— 

Mr. GUTHRIE. Yes, sir, that is—— 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. To try to get to that, but, unfortunately, we have not yet got to a definitive root cause across every 

one of these inflators. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. And that leads—I understand. I am in the automotive—that is what my background is, automotive industry. So 

you get the product specifications, the blueprint, and you meet to 

that—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Right. 

Mr. GUTHRIE [continuing]. And you ship to that. And if they fell 

within the specification, then that is an engineering issue. If you 

didn’t manufacture to the specification, that is your issue. And—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Right. 

Mr. GUTHRIE [continuing]. Seems like you don’t know exactly 

where that is. But, following on what my friend from Tennessee, 

Ms. Blackburn, was talking about, I mean, if you don’t know the 

root cause, and this is a question I don’t know if we got a good answer to, how do you know the replacement parts or—that they 

bring in for the recall are not going to fail? I mean, how—what is 

the surety of that? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well—— 

Mr. GUTHRIE. And I think Mr. Lance actually asked—tried to get 

to that as well. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, and that is a very good question. Many of the 

replacement parts that we are using are different designs now. EvVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:50 Nov 09, 2016 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\114THCONGRESS\114X49TAKATAAIRBAGSPETEROKPRINT\114X49TAKATAAIRBAGS
81 

erything on the driver’s side will be a completely different design. 

As I said, about 50 percent of what we shipped last month were 

with our competitor’s inflators, that do not use ammonium nitrate, 

and have not demonstrated issues in the field, to my knowledge. 

That will go up to 70 percent here in the next month or so. And 

so we are looking to change to different inflator designs, or alternate designs for the replacement parts as quickly as—— 

Mr. GUTHRIE. But you are already sending replacement parts 

now, right? 

Mr. KENNEDY. We are sending—yes, and we have been sending 

replacement—— 

Mr. GUTHRIE. So, I mean, how do you know those are—if you are 

going to bring in a car for a recall to replace, how do you know 

those aren’t—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, that is the reason that the Consent Order 

is written the way that it is, in order to require that we continue 

to test the remedy parts, and we continue to test outside of the 

scope of the recalls, in order to make that judgment. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. But you tested before you shipped the first product. 

Mr. KENNEDY. We did, yes. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. And they passed the tests? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. And there could be a manufacturing defect that 

you did that made them fail, so how do you—so we don’t know? I 

mean, you don’t—until you know the recalls, you don’t know that 

these replacement parts are not going to have the same—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. We have confidence in the ones we are making. 

The process has changed a bit over the years. And, as I said, a lot 

of them we are using alternate designs that really have never experienced issued, to our knowledge. But there is a percentage of 

them, and that is exactly why the Consent Order is written the 

way that it is, and why we are continuing to do the testing and the 

analysis that we are doing. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. OK. And I think you said earlier you are shipping—I think I wrote down about 700,000 replacement kits? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. We shipped 740,000 in May. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. And up to a million—and how much are you shipping daily? I guess you ship daily to the—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Multiple—every day. And we get multiple trucks 

back every day with parts back from the field. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. And how are you prioritizing who gets—is it regional? You are prioritizing—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. You know, up to this point, we have been able to 

keep up with demand for replacement parts. There are a couple of 

part numbers that are on back order right now. We expect to have 

that back order completed in the next 2 weeks. 

Now, obviously, it is going to expand with this expansion when 

the letters start going out to the consumers, but that is why we are 

adding additional capacity both internally—we have got seven new 

inflator lines coming in over the next 6 to 12 months. We have got 

additional inflator lines going in at our competitor’s. We have got 

additional kit lines going in in our manufacturing facility. So we 

are continuing to ramp up—— 

82 

Mr. GUTHRIE. And you also have to maintain current production 

at the same time, right? 

Mr. KENNEDY. We also have to maintain current production. 

That is a very good point. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. I have a question with the other, since we have— 

just—would you all talk about the replacement part, if it is in 

your—if you would like to comment on the replacement kit process 

that is going on. Is that anything you guys would like to comment 

on, or—is that within your purview? 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Congressman. Yes, we will be looking at 

the replacement parts, and the efficacy of the replacement parts, 

as part of our investigation. 

Mr. BAINWOL. And I would simply note that the complexity of 

this one is enormous. It is not just the 30, 34 million units in the 

U.S. There are global issues as well. And so production, allocation, 

prioritization are all hugely significant issues. And that is why we 

think that, in this instance, NHTSA was appropriate to assert its 

coordination capacity. And there is no other way to solve this in a 

fashion that guarantees fairness, and guarantees as expeditious a 

response as possible, so that is why we have done that. 

Mr. BOZZELLA. I would just add, Congressman, that the manufacturers are doing what they need to do to take care of their customers, knowing what they know now. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. Thanks a lot, and I appreciate it. And, you know, 

I have worked in manufacturing. We didn’t have any what we 

would call inverted diamond, or safety issues in our product, but 

trying to find the root cause—and when you can recreate the problem, that is when you know you found the root cause. And we are 

all anxious to get to that point, so thank you for—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. And that has been one of the most difficult 

parts of this whole thing, is—as I said, any one failure is unacceptable to us. But, in the analysis, the failure rate is so low it is hard 

to, you know, as you—— 

Mr. GUTHRIE. Recreate the problem. 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. Know, turn it on and turn it off. We 

just—we haven’t been able to do that. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. Once you can do that, you know what is turning 

it on and turning it off. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Then we just want to turn it off, yes. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. Well, we are looking forward to getting to the bottom of it. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. I am out of time. 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentlemen, gentleman yields 

back. Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, 5 minutes 

for your questions, please. 

Mr. PALLONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have been hearing 

conflicting reports on whether the—this is for Mr. Kennedy. We 

have been hearing conflicting reports on whether the replacement 

parts are different than the defective inflators. Some news reports 

have talked about a change in the chemical composition and shape 

of the propellant used in the inflators. At the December hearing 

Mr.—I guess it is Shimizu—of Takata talked about improvements 

made to the manufacturing process in recent years that said the 

83 

inflators were the same. So I just wanted to understand this issue 

a little better, Mr. Kennedy. Is there any difference between the replacement inflators and the original defective inflators? 

Mr. KENNEDY. It depends on each one of the different inflators 

that you are talking about. As I mentioned, about 50 percent of 

what we have been sent last month was outside inflators. Those 

are obviously completely different than our original inflators. On 

the driver’s side we will be using either alternate Takata designs 

or alternate outside for everything. And the driver’s side is the one 

that has had the most issues, and the most severe issues. 

On the passenger sides, right now there are a percentage of those 

that are outside inflators, but there is still a percentage that are 

the same design inflator that was in the original modules, but, obviously, manufactured at a later time. 

Mr. PALLONE. All right. In Takata’s defect information report to 

NHTSA regarding PSDI–4 inflators, Takata notes that, and I 

quote, ‘‘Continues’’—‘‘It continues to produce a small number of 

PSDI–4 inflators for use as remedy parts. Takata intends to cease 

production of the subject inflators, including for use as remedy 

parts.’’ So, again, when does Takata intend to stop producing the 

PSDI–4 inflators as replacements? 

Mr. KENNEDY. We have a couple of carmakers with some older 

vehicles that have not qualified a new inflator yet. We are working—and they have been working very hard to do that with us, and 

with our competitor. And what the plan is in that DIR is—I think 

they call it phase four. The phase four would be to go out and get 

all of the remedy parts that we supplied that were of that design, 

the PSDI–4. 

Mr. PALLONE. But then when that happens, then they stop producing these PSDI–4 inflators as replacement, what will Takata 

use to replace the old ones? 

Mr. KENNEDY. We have—it depends on the vehicle and the manufacturer. Some of them are our competitor’s inflators. We are buying inflators primarily, I think, on driver’s side for—from TRW and 

Autoleve, and we also have a later generation Takata inflator 

called PSDI–X with desiccant in it that has proven to be very robust, and some of them will be in PSDI–X. 

Mr. PALLONE. But then are we are to assume that the reason 

Takata is stopping its production of these PSDI inflators is because 

they are unsafe? 

Mr. KENNEDY. The PSDI—the batwing propellant geometry was 

one of the factors that was called out in some of the testing and 

the analysis that we have done, and some of our outside experts 

have done, as a factor. So, in order to just eliminate that factor 

completely, we said we would quit making that—— 

Mr. PALLONE. So you—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. We don’t make it for production any longer. 

Mr. PALLONE. You are not sure—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. It was only for a replacement part. 

Mr. PALLONE [continuing]. But you suspect there could be a problem? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Correct. 

Mr. PALLONE. OK. Now, you say you are going to replace the inflators in four stages. You mentioned, I guess, that the fourth stage 

84 

will include subject inflators previously installed as remedy parts, 

right? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PALLONE. Well, will the people that had their original PSDI– 

4 inflators replaced with the new PSDI inflators, say, for example, 

in December 2014, will they have to have them replaced again? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Anyone that had an inflator replaced with a 

PSDI–4 inflator would have to have that replaced again, yes, that 

is correct. 

Mr. PALLONE. So I imagine that someone who has already had 

their inflator replaced as part of this recall may not realize that 

they have had—that that have to have it replaced again. So how 

do you plan to communicate that to the consumer? 

Mr. KENNEDY. You know, that is another great question, sir, and 

that is another part of the Consent Order and agreement we have 

with NHTSA. We are going to work with NHTSA, and the automakers, to do a proactive safety campaign. We have been working 

with a professional media firm that has done these kind of things 

in the past. We know that Honda, last year, had initiated kind of 

a media campaign where, like, on your cell phone, if you called up 

Google, there would be a banner at the bottom that said ‘‘check 

your airbag.’’ We have talked to Honda. We know what worked, 

what didn’t work. 

So we have 60 days from the Consent Order signing on May 19 

to come back with this plan to NHTSA, and work with the OEMs 

in order to help increase that visibility, and get that message out 

to people whose cars need to come back in. 

Mr. PALLONE. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. You are welcome. 

Mr. PALLONE [continuing]. Chairman. 

Mr. BURGESS. Gentleman yields back. Chair thanks the gentleman. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Houston, 5 minutes 

for your questions, please. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our witnesses. My first questions are for you, Mr. Kennedy. One theme 

that has come through loud and clear at this hearing from Dr. 

Rosekind and all of you all is the lack of—we still don’t know about 

the root cause of these defects. We have ties to humidity, heat, 

desiccants, batwings, all sorts of things, but no root cause, and that 

bothers me. 

The plane I flew in the United States Navy was a P–3 Orion. It 

was a modified version of the Lockheed L–10 L–182 Electra. That 

plane had a bad defect. It was called roll mode. That meant the 

wings fell off the plane. That was the root cause of two crashes. It 

is hard to find because those planes were torn up when they hit 

the ground. They didn’t know what happened, but yet we found out 

what happened, found the root cause, and those planes have been 

flying for 60 years in our navy. 

And so I have heard you say that you know that the—there is 

heat, humidity, desiccants, propellants. You have mentioned there 

is a tie with—you have some propellants out there without 

desiccants, correct? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Correct. 

Mr. OLSON. How many of those, sir, are out there right now? 

85 

Mr. KENNEDY. I would have to check and get back with you, sir, 

but it is a significant number. 

Mr. OLSON. If I am in my home in Houston, Texas, because we 

are 95—95 percent humidity and 95 degrees, so we are ground zero 

for these problems. How about there? Do I tell my people back 

home, guys, they are all here, 100,000 cars, 50,000 cars? Any idea? 

Mr. KENNEDY. No, I do not know the number, sir. 

Mr. OLSON. What is the problem, then, with finding these cars 

and putting desiccant in there, replacing it with a desiccant? Make 

sure—if that is some factor, how about take that out of the equation? Put that in it right now? 

Mr. KENNEDY. That is—well, that is exactly what we are doing 

with every one of those PSDI, PSDI–4, PSDI–4K inflators. 

Mr. OLSON. OK. So—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. That is exactly what the first DIR is. 

Mr. OLSON. So by the end of this year there will be no bags out 

there without some sort of desiccant with their propellant, correct? 

With that ammonium nitrate, is that right? 

Mr. KENNEDY. No, that is not what I am saying, sir. 

Mr. OLSON. But that is a problem. You said that is one of the 

problems. We don’t know what going out there. I think it is safe, 

to me—that is—it is a propellant having some sort of problem with 

the humidity and the heat, how about putting a desiccant with all 

the propellants? Make sure that goes out of the equation, maybe 

find the root cause? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Or an alternate inflator. That is the plan with the 

ones that have shown to be issues in the field, which are these— 

what we have referred to as PSDI, PSDI–4s. That is what we are 

doing. The later inflators that we are replacing those with will either have desiccant, or they will be from one of our competitors. 

Mr. OLSON. OK. My questions now are for the gentlemen here 

from the manufacturers. There will be big costs with these recalls. 

Who is going to pay for that? Will it be Takata, the manufacturers, 

the dealers? I mean, who is going to pay for all this recall? Mr. 

Bainwol, any idea, sir? 

Mr. BAINWOL. I can tell you that consumers do not pay. So that 

is the critical point. My hunch is there may be some debate about 

who actually bears the costs. I think our perspective on where that 

should end up is pretty clear. 

Mr. OLSON. Mr. Bozzella? 

Mr. BOZZELLA. Yes, I would agree with Mr. Bainwol. I think the 

consumer will not pay. We need to do—we need to take care of the 

customer. Manufacturers need to take care of the customer, working with the dealers, the suppliers, and with the regulator to do so. 

Mr. OLSON. How about the dealers? What are you hearing about 

them about the costs? Because, for example, my truck had a little 

small recall notice, and I got that taken care of when I replaced 

the oil. So I went there to have, like, 5 minutes done. I probably 

was there for about an hour having something fixed. Any reply 

from those guys how this is hurting their business, spending more 

time on recalls than actually selling cars and fixing cars they 

would normally have to maintain? 

86 

Mr. BAINWOL. Well, the dealers come out whole. They are—they 

are reimbursed for the recall. And it is oftentimes governed by 

State franchise rules, but they are made whole. 

Mr. OLSON. And one final question for you, Mr. Bainwol and Mr. 

Bozzella. Remember in the first panel I talked about the last victim 

of these airbags, a guy named Carlos Saliz from Spring, Texas. As 

you know, he bought a used car, a 2002 Accord, and defect came 

out, the recall notice came out in 2011. He got in a crash this year, 

never knew that his car was defective. How can you guys help 

make sure we track those cars from recall to actual owner so there 

is not—sort of gap? Because he had no chance to have that recall 

notice. He had no idea his car was defective. 

Mr. BAINWOL. It is an important point, and it is one we are very 

sensitive too. The fundamental notion with safety is that it is a 

shared responsibility. 

Mr. OLSON. Yes. 

Mr. BAINWOL. We have a piece of it, consumers have a piece of 

it, the dealers do. Certainly NHTSA, and certainly the States. And 

so we have all got to do a better job of tracing the ownership so 

that we can communicate. And that is one of the reasons why we 

have gone through this exercise, as I mentioned in my opening 

statement, about conducting research to figure out what makes 

people go in and get the job done. We have got to find a way to 

turn that trigger so they go in and get the work done. 

Mr. BOZZELLA. It is a great question, and I would simply add to 

that that is, as I mentioned in my testimony, that we ought to consider looking at the point at which an owner registers or re-registers his or her car as a point for further notification. In the case 

of the incident that you mentioned, had that approach or procedure 

been in place, the—that owner may have been notified at the point 

of registering that used car that there was an open recall. So we 

think that merits some—that is worthy of merit. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you. I am out of time. I yield back. 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentleman, gentleman yields 

back. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, 

5 minutes for your—— 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you—— 

Mr. BURGESS [continuing]. Questions, please. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS [continuing]. Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it so very 

much, and thank the panel for their testimony. 

Mr. Kennedy, can you verify that some cars that were previously 

recalled, and supposedly fixed, will have to be recalled again for a 

second airbag replacement? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Yes. Do you have any initial numbers on how 

many consumers are affected? If not, when will you know, and how 

will the consumers be notified? 

Mr. KENNEDY. You mean consumers that would have had to 

bring their cars in twice? 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Correct. 

Mr. KENNEDY. I don’t have that information yet, sir. As I think 

Dr. Rosekind said, a lot of the OEM, a lot of the automakers, are 

still entering their VINs, and getting the quantities, and the exact 

vehicles. So, after that, it would be easier—— 

87 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. How do you plan to notify the consumers? 

Mr. KENNEDY. We are still working on that plan. As part of the 

consent, there was—we were given 60 days to develop this plan, 

and we certainly want to do it in conjunction with the automakers. 

We don’t want to do something that is going to be at odds with the 

automakers. So we have, as I mentioned, a media firm that is familiar with these types of activities. We have some ideas on paper 

we are working, and we will certainly be reviewing those with 

NHTSA, and having NHTSA’s involvement, as well as the automakers. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. So why weren’t these issues dealt with the first 

time they were recalled? In other words, why—I don’t—there is 

just no excuse. It is inexcusable, as far as I am concerned, but give 

me an answer. 

Mr. KENNEDY. It is—— 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Why weren’t these issues dealt with the first 

time? 

Mr. KENNEDY. It is a fair question, sir, and it is a difficult question. I think you have heard from a lot of different people today, 

it is an extremely complex issues. There are—when we first started 

seeing some issues back in 2005, we did national recalls on a large 

number of parts. And we thought we had identified root causes, we 

thought we had gotten everything from the field, we thought we 

are doing all the right things. And then we started seeing these 

sporadic issues in the field, and that is what led to the action that 

started last year. 

So it has been very elusive to us, and it has been very, very difficult to get a consistent pattern that would tell us exactly what 

the root cause is—— 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. OK, Mr. Kennedy, let me—I have a couple more 

questions. 

Mr. KENNEDY. OK. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. How can you possibly assure consumers, my constituents, the second replacement will be effective, and a third replacement will not be necessary? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, on most—— 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Could you assure my constituents that will be the 

case? 

Mr. KENNEDY. I mean, on most of the replacement parts, as I 

said, they are going to be later designs, or from our competitors, 

when we are putting those in. There are still a few, and that is 

why, as part of the Consent Order, we are still testing the remedy 

parts to make sure that those are going to be sufficient for the life 

of the vehicle, and why we are continuing to test outside of the 

ranges of the recalls that were in the DIRs that were announced 

a couple of weeks ago. 

So we are trying to cover that. I can’t tell you right now that everything is done, but we are—we have anticipated that problem, 

and we have an agreement with NHTSA that allows us to continue 

to look at that. And if actions are required, we will take actions. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. OK. Since the first airbag inflator ruptured in 

2004, it is true that Takada tested roughly 128 airbags from 2004 

in—is that correct? 

Mr. KENNEDY. I am not familiar—— 

88 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. From 2004 to 2008, is that correct? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. I am not familiar with that number, sir. I can 

double check and—— 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Please get—— 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. Get back with you. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS [continuing]. Back to me on that. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, I will. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Do you believe that enough was done to investigate this issue and bring awareness to consumers on the potential 

risk and threat of defective airbags? Was enough done? 

Mr. KENNEDY. On—you mean on those original ones? 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Yes, the original—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS [continuing]. One. 

Mr. KENNEDY. We were able to identify what we thought, and 

what our automaker customers thought, was a very solid root 

cause. We had manufacturing data, we had test data. We were able 

to recreate the problem. But, clearly, there was something else 

going on—— 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Could more have been done? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Again, I—you could probably always say more 

could be done, but what we did, we thought, and our automaker 

customers thought, was sufficient to get to root cause, and to take 

action, and that is what we did. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Well, Mr. Bainwol—one last question, Mr. Chairman. Have any companies requested that Takata remove ammonium nitrate from the propellant formula used in the airbag inflators? 

Mr. BAINWOL. That is an answer I don’t know the answer to— 

question, and I will find out and report back. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Please get back to us. Thank you very much. I 

yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentleman, gentleman yields 

back. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Mullin, 

5 minutes for your question, please. 

Mr. MULLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kennedy, you 

have—I have actually sat here and enjoyed watching you. You are 

very skillful on the way you approach the answers. I could probably 

take a lesson or two from that. But, at the same time, we just don’t 

seem to be getting the answers. I mean, you can tell the frustration 

that this panel is getting. We have got a young lady that is sitting 

over your shoulder that is bearing the scars of a mistake that was 

made, and we are still not getting the answers. I mean, I am a 

business owner. I understand when we fell. I understand when we 

make a mistake. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Um-hum. 

Mr. MULLIN. But now what? What the solution was is we did a 

recall, and we replaced them with other things that were still 

faulty? There is no excuse for that. Zero. Maybe this panel is just 

looking to hear you say, we screwed up. But I know that is—cause 

legal issues for you all. But a screw up is a screw up. Taking blame 

is just that. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, we—— 

89 

Mr. MULLIN. Hey, we messed up. I mean, we heard just a while 

ago, who is going to be responsible for this. I don’t know. What do 

you mean we don’t know? Who made the product? Whose product 

was it? Whose name was on it? That is who should pay for it. I 

just wonder—I—I am sitting here thinking, well, OK, maybe that 

is why we haven’t been moving very fast, because you haven’t 

taken ownership of it. 

At the same time, we have got—not telling how many vehicles 

are out there. More young ladies, or young men, are going to bear 

the scars again. Or worse than that, someone is going to not be 

able to finish out their life. What is that worth to you? How do you 

put a dollar amount on that? What if that was your daughter? I 

have got three at home. I can tell you what it is worth. Do you 

have a daughter? 

Mr. KENNEDY. I have a daughter and a son. 

Mr. MULLIN. And a son. Wouldn’t you be pretty passionate about 

it? Wouldn’t you want—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Absolutely. 

Mr. MULLIN [continuing]. The owner to be owning up to it, and 

say, we are going to do whatever it takes, we will take the responsibility for it? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, and we believe we—— 

Mr. MULLIN. But, you know—but, sir, you are still making 

what—we believe. 2004, we are in 2015. How long have you been 

making airbags? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Since, I believe, 1987. 

Mr. MULLIN. How many more studies do you need to have? 

Mr. KENNEDY. As I said, and I think—I am not trying to be evasive. I mean, you have heard it from other people that have been 

involved in this, they are very smart people too. It is—— 

Mr. MULLIN. Evasive? 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. A very multifaceted issue that we do 

not—— 

Mr. MULLIN. Multifaceted. That is a great term to use. We use 

political terms here all the time. We know how to talk a little bit 

around in circles. We are looking for ownership. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, we—— 

Mr. MULLIN. I understand it is complex. The product you make 

is very complex. I have been hit in the face with a few of them. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Me, too. 

Mr. MULLIN. Yes. Fortunately, I have survived. I understand the 

issue about—from impact to stopping you, the safety behind it, this 

can be complex, but a problem is a problem. It is not that complex. 

You do what it takes. You know, you have to figure out, OK, what 

is a life worth? Put a dollar amount on it? I don’t know how you 

can. 

Mr. KENNEDY. I don’t know how you can either, sir—— 

Mr. MULLIN. You get it replaced. 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. And we certainly do not. 

Mr. MULLIN. Instead you said that the complexity of it, we don’t 

really know the makeup of it, but our competitors are finding out 

a product to replace. Your competitors? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, we—— 

90 

Mr. MULLIN. You guys—it sounds like, to me, you are willing to 

do anything but take ownership. Your competitors? I can’t imagine 

sitting up here and saying, my competitor is going to fix my problem. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, we were doing that in order to get parts in 

the field faster. Some of our competitors have products that—— 

Mr. MULLIN. You have known about it since 2004. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Not to the level that we have here, sir. 2004—— 

Mr. MULLIN. You—in 2004 you identified there was a problem. 

You said that you could recreate the problem. You knew there was 

a problem. 

Mr. KENNEDY. And we thought we had a root cause at that time 

too. We thought the—— 

Mr. MULLIN. Did you replace them? 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. Issue was closed. Yes. We initiated—— 

Mr. MULLIN. How did you track them down? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Pardon me? 

Mr. MULLIN. How did you track them down? 

Mr. KENNEDY. We worked with the automakers that were involved. 

Mr. MULLIN. But we still haven’t got people notified. 

Mr. KENNEDY. And that is a problem. 

Mr. MULLIN. I mean, I—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. That is a huge problem. 

Mr. MULLIN. I raise cattle, and if my cow, for some reason, I sell, 

and it ends up in California, and somehow ends up with mad cow 

disease, it is not born with a birth certificate, or a serial number, 

or—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Right. 

Mr. MULLIN [continuing]. Or a bar code, but yet we are able to 

track it all the way back to my farm. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Right. 

Mr. MULLIN. And we can’t do that with an airbag? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, we can tell you exactly what airbag we sent, 

and the OEMs—the automakers can tell you what vehicle it is in. 

The issue, for the most part, has been getting that recall rate back 

up. 

Mr. MULLIN. No, it is the cost. I believe we already found the 

root of the problem. It is the cost. 

Mr. KENNEDY. No, sir, I—— 

Mr. MULLIN. No one wants—— 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. Disagree with that. 

Mr. MULLIN [continuing]. To bear the cost. 

Mr. KENNEDY. I disagree with that. 

Mr. MULLIN. If we wanted to find the problem, you cannot convince me we couldn’t find a solution. Except—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. We—— 

Mr. MULLIN [continuing]. We haven’t even agreed on the panel 

that is in front of me who is going to pay for it. I think that is the 

root of the problem. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. BURGESS. Chair thanks the gentlemen, gentleman yields 

back. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. 

Kinzinger, 5 minutes for questions, please. 

91 

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and for the four 

of you, thank you for being here, and thanks for being willing to 

talk with us about these very important issues. 

You know, at a December haring I asked our panel, which included BMW, Toyota, and Honda, if they agreed that sharing OEM 

part numbers and other identifiable information with the automotive recycling industry would help increase safety. They agreed, 

and expressed support for the efforts to improve methods to identify parts, and to share part numbers with recyclers. Earlier this 

year, in February, Transportation Secretary Fox stated that he also 

supports auto manufacturers providing part numbers to recyclers, 

and that, furthermore, manufacturers should provide this information in an easy to use format. The key here is that this approach 

would not require the creation of any new Government program or 

bureaucracy, but it is something that the industry should tackle on 

its own. 

To Mr. Bozzella and Mr. Bainwol, it appears that we have a 

unique instance where regulators and industry seem to agree on an 

approach to address a problem in large part because everyone understands that sharing this information will improve safety. My 

question is this, if you know the answer, when and how do your 

members plan on making this information available to recyclers, 

and are you aware of any discussions in the industry to help share 

this information to improve safety? Mr. Bozzella? Yes, if you could 

go first? 

Mr. BOZZELLA. Congressman, I am—I don’t know the answer to 

your question. I will certainly go back to our members that were 

on the panel and get back to you. 

Mr. KINZINGER. OK. And, Mr. Bainwol, do you have any—— 

Mr. BAINWOL. Likewise. 

Mr. KINZINGER. OK. So, yes, if you guys could—because I understand that you may be unaware of the issue, if you could maybe 

get that information and follow up with my office, that would be 

helpful, as we continue to explore this issue going forward. I will 

ask you this, what can your organizations do to kind of help facilitate this, and to make something like this happen? 

Mr. BOZZELLA. I will get—we will have a conversation within our 

association, and we will be able to get back to you after that point. 

Mr. KINZINGER. OK, great. 

Mr. BAINWOL. So I would simply note that this question of resolving, and getting expeditious recalls done, is an important priority 

for everybody, and we do view this as, as I said earlier, a shared 

responsibility, and we are willing to work with anybody to make 

sure we can get this job done as quickly as humanly possible. 

Mr. KINZINGER. OK, great. Mr. Chairman, that is all the questions I have. If you would like my time, I can yield it to you, or 

I can yield back. 

Mr. BURGESS. Will accept you yielding back—— 

Mr. KINZINGER. I yield back. 

Mr. BURGESS [continuing]. And I thank the gentleman. The gentleman yields back. Chair recognizes Ms. Clarke. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to request 

unanimous consent to submit a written statement of the American 

92 

Car Rental Association and the Consumers for Auto Reliability and 

Safety into the record. 

Mr. BURGESS. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.] 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BURGESS. I will recognize myself just for one follow up. And 

I dwelled a lot on the ammonium nitrate as a propellant, and this 

question really is for anyone. My prior life, I was a physician. I did 

work some in emergency rooms, and I remember airbag deployments with sodium azide, and I remember burns, and eye injuries, 

forearm burns, knee burns when the bag went off. But I also recall 

that there were environmental concerns about sodium azide, and 

Mr. Kinzinger brought up about salvage yards, and there was concern about this sodium azide just eventually getting into the environment. 

So are there any other propellants that are being worked on? Is 

there, like, a—purely a gas propellant, carbon dioxide or something 

that can—or nitrogen, something that wouldn’t have the characteristics—the explosive characteristics of ammonium nitrate, or the 

toxic characteristics of a sodium azide? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, sir, there are a wide variety of inflators out 

there. We call them cold gas inflators. They are just a cylinder that 

is filled with gas under high pressure, and you have a small ignitor 

that hits a little burst disc, and the gas comes out. There are some 

that we call hybrids that have gas, and then have a little bit of propellant that kind of heats it up. Usually it is not ammonium nitrate in most of them. Then there are alternate solid fuels out 

there, primarily guanidine nitrate is what most of the industry 

uses now, and what we are transitioning to. 

We can provide all kinds of information, if you would like to take 

a look at—and some—— 

Mr. BURGESS. Well—— 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. Are better in other applications than 

others. 

Mr. BURGESS. What is the barrier for getting something that is 

less explosive than ammonium nitrate, and less toxic than sodium 

azide? 

Mr. KENNEDY. You know, it really goes back to some of the tradeoffs that I was talking about earlier, size, weight, performance. 

Mr. BURGESS. Cost? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, and cost is certainly one of them too, yes. 

I mean, some of those gas inflators are bigger, so you—it is harder 

to get them in a steering wheel, for instance. So there are those 

kind of tradeoffs. But we can certainly provide any kind of information that you are interested in seeing. 

Ms. CLARKE. I would appreciate you making that available to the 

subcommittee. I think that would be helpful to us. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Very well, Chairman Burgess. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, seeing there are no further members wishing 

to ask questions, I do want to thank all of our witnesses for their 

participation in today’s hearing. It has been a long one. Pursuant 

to committee rules, I remind members they have 10 business days 

to submit additional questions for the record. I ask the witnesses 

93 

submit their response within 10 business days upon receipt of 

those questions. And, without objection, subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:16 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:] 

94 


June 2, 2015 

The Honorable Frank Pallone, Jr. 

Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and 

Commerce 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20150 

The Honorable Jan Schakowsky 

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Commerce, 

Manufacturing and Trade 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

Dear Ranking Member Pallone and Ranking Member Schakowsky: 

As representatives of the nation's leading consumer, public health, and safety organizations, we are writing 

in support oflegislation you have introduced, the Vehicle Safety Improvement Act of2015, H.R. 1181. This 

bill will give the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) needed authority and additional 

resources to better fulfill its safety mission. It addresses critical gaps in our auto safety defects and 

enforcement system identified in Congressional hearings and by the media and exemplified by the recall of 

millions of vehicles for serious safety defects. For example, 2.6 million vehicles have been recalled due to 

the General Motors (GM) ignition switch defect, which has resulted in at least I 09 deaths and 208 injuries, 

and 34 million vehicles recalled due to the Takata airbag derect responsible for at least six deaths and 

hundreds of injuries. Inadequate government oversight as well as corporate cover-ups by automakers and 

auto suppliers will continue to occur again and again unless NHTSA is given appropriate financial resources 

and statutory authorities to effectively protect the public as provided in H.R. 1181. 

This bill would, among other things: give NHTSA the power to act quickly when a vehicle defect or noncompliance poses an imminent hazard; prohibit auto dealers from selling or leasing recalled used cars that 

have not been repaired; improve the transparency and quality of the information submitted to the NHTSA 

Early Warning Reporting Database, as well as its SaferCar.gov database; increase NHTSA's enforcement 

power by increasing the civil penalties cap; and, provide the agency sufficient funding commensurate with 

its vital work. Additionally, the bill eliminates regional recalls to protect all motorists throughout the 

country; requires NHTSA to establish standards for cars to reduce the number of injuries and fatalities 

suffered by pedestrians, bicyclists and other non-occupants of cars; and, requires that purchasers of used cars 

are provided information about the vehicle's damage and recall repair history. We commend your leadership 

on these issues and look forward to working with you to enact this critically important and overdue 

legislation. 

Revelations about the failures ofGM and Takata to identifY and report deadly vehicle safety defects and 

conduct timely recalls brought a spotlight on inadequacies with NHTSA's investigation and recall process, 

consumer information, corporate and agency transparency, and paltry penalties to deter intentional coverups. In 2007, legislation with similar provisions was introduced in the aftermath of the Toyota sudden 

acceleration fiasco. Eight years have now passed without these serious problems being adequately addressed. 

We have the solutions and they are included in this bill. We urge the leaders of the House Energy and 

Commerce Committee to convene a hearing on this bill and advance this legislation to prevent needless 

deaths and injuries, to ensure corporate responsibility and to protect the safety of our families. 

NHTSA's safety mission is one of the most important throughout government. Approximately 94 percent of 

transportation-related fatalities and 99 percent of transportation injuries occur on our streets and highways 

and yet, NHTSA receives only about one percent of the overall U.S. Department of Transportation budget. 

Additionally, since 1960, more than 610,000 lives have been saved by laws and programs that NHTSA 
95 


carries out. It is imperative that this small agency be given sufficient funds to effectively do its job. This 

legislation provides the revenues and resources for NHTSA to advance its safety mission. 

The tragedies caused by the GM ignition switch defect and Takata defective airbags have once again 

sounded the alarm on lapses in procedures for identifYing and disclosing safety detects and laws to deter 

corporate actions that result in deaths and injuries. Now is the time to enact The Vehicle Safety 

Improvement Act of20!5, H.R. 1181. When commonsense and cost-effective solutions are at hand, there are 

no acceptable excuses for delaying any longer the adoption of lifesaving laws, consumer protections, 

increased penalties for corporate misbehavior, strengthening NHTSA's authority and resources, and 

improved vehicle safety standards that can save lives and reduce injuries. 

Sincerely, 

Jacqueline Gillan, President 

Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety 

Andrew McGuire, Executive Director 

Trauma Foundation 

Jack Gillis, Director of Public Affairs 

Consumer Federation of America 

Clarence M. Ditlow, Executive Director 

Center for Auto Safety 

John Lannen, Executive Director 

Truck Safety Coalition 

Rosemary Shahan, President 

Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety 

Joan Claybrook, President Emeritus, 

Public Citizen and 

Former NHTSA Administrator 

Janette Fennell, Founder and President 

KidsAndCars.org 

Stephen W. Hargarten, MD, MPH 

Society for the Advancement of Violence and 

Injury Research 

Sally Greenberg, Executive Director 

National Consumers League 

William Wallace, Policy Analyst 

Consumers Union 

Jennifer Tierney, Board Member 

Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways 
96 


SUBMITTED WRITTEN STATEMENT 

OF THE 

AMERICAN CAR RENTAL ASSOCIATION 

AND 

CONSUMERS FOR AUTO RELIABILITY AND SAFETY 

AT THE 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COMMERCE, MANUFACTURING & TRADE 

HEARING ENTITLED 

"AN UPDATE ON THE TAKATAAIRBAG RUPTURES AND RECALLS" 

June 2, 2015 

Introduction 

Good afternoon, Chainnan Burgess, Ranking Member Schakowsky and Members ofthe Subcommittee 

on Commerce, Manufacturing & Trade. The American Car Rental Association (ACRA) and Consumers 

for Auto Reliability and Safety (CARS) respectfully submit this joint written statement as part of the 

Subcommittee's hearing entitled "An Update on the Takata Airbag Ruptures and Recalls." ACRA and 

CARS ask that this statement be made a part of the official record of the hearing. 

ACRA is the national representative for over 98% of our nation's car rental industry. ACRA's 

membership is comprised of more than 300 car rental companies, including all of the brands you would 

recognize such as Alamo, Avis, Budget, Dollar, Enterprise, Hertz, National and Thrifty. ACRA also has 

as members many mid-size, regional car rental companies as well as smaller, "Mom & Pop" operators. 

ACRA members have over two million registered vehicles in service, with fleets ranging in size from 

one million cars to ten cars. 

CARS, based in Sacramento, California, is a national award-winning non-profit auto safety and 

consumer advocacy organization dedicated to preventing motor vehicle-related injuries, fatalities and 

economic losses. CARS has spearheaded promulgation of several federal motor vehicle safety 

standards, and successfully advocated for numerous landmark bills signed into law by Governors from 

both major parties. CARS has been working to enact safe rental car legislation in close collaboration 

with Cally Houck, whose two daughters were killed in a crash caused by a safety defect in an 

unrepaired rental vehicle that was under a safety recall. 

I 
97 


ACRA and CARS applaud this Subcommittee for its interest in the Takata airbag and other recent 

automobile recalls. We have come together in an unusual partnership of an industry trade group and a 

consumer safety organization to urge Congress to pass the "Raechel and Jacqueline Houck Safe Rental 

Car Act," which was recently introduced as bipartisan legislation in the House and Senate and has been 

referred to this Subcommittee. We believe that passing this bipartisan bill is one important step that 

Congress can and should take immediately to help get unsafe recalled vehicles off the roads. 

The Car Rental Industry and Consumer Safety 

In 2004, Raechel and Jacqueline Houck were killed by a rental car that had been recalled due to a 

defective steering component that was prone to causing an under-hood fire and a loss of steering. The 

car had been rented to them prior to being repaired. The legislation named in their memory, the 

"Raechel and Jacqueline Houck Safe Rental Car Act" (H.R. 2198/S. 1173), was introduced in the 

House and the Senate on May I, 2015. The House bill is sponsored by Reps. Lois Capps (D-CA), 

Walter Jones (R-NC), O.K. Butterfield (D-NC) and Jan Schakowsky (D-IL). The Senate bill is 

sponsored by Sens. Charles Schumer (D-NY), Barbara Boxer (D-CA), Claire McCaskill (D-MO), and 

Bill Nelson (D-FL). 

The Safe Rental Car Act would prohibit rental companies from renting or selling cars subject to a 

federal safety recall unless they have been repaired. The only exception to this rule would be if the 

manufacturer identified an interim measure that could be taken while the permanent repair was being 

developed that would eliminate the risk. Once the permanent repair becomes available, however, the 

car must be grounded until the repair is made. 

ACRA and CARS worked very hard to develop a legislative proposal that is supported by consumer 

safety organizations and the rental car industry. The bill fairly balances the public's interest in safety 

with the rental car industry's business model. It represents a reasoned, rational compromise that is 

effective, and also workable, given the realities of the auto rental marketplace. 

From the industry's point of view, properly maintained vehicles in the rental industry are paramount. 

It's about trust between customers and the individual businesses of ACRA members. Customers 

should have confidence that their rental is not the subject of a recall and the legislation provides that 

confidence. 

From a consumer safety point of view, it is just common sense that rental cars subject to safety recalls 

should be repaired before they are put into the hands of consumers and their families. People who are 

renting vehicles need them right away, for a business trip, vacation or sometimes in an emergency. 

There is no time to take a rental car to get repaired. And consumers expect that the car they are renting 

is safe. Most people are shocked to learn that it isn't already illegal, under federal law, to rent out an 

unrepaired recalled vehicle. 

2 
98 


Important Safety Provisions of S. S. 1173/H.R. 2198 

• Timing of Notice and Grounding 

S. 1173/H.R. 2198 define the timeframe in which rental companies need to ground the vehicles 

after receiving the safety recall notice. There is a period of time the companies need in order to 

receive the notice and successfully lock down the appropriate vehicles. The bills call for the 

vehicles to be grounded within 24 hours of receiving the safety recall notice. In the situation of 

a particularly large recall -one that affects more than 5,000 vehicles for one company, the lock 

down timeframe is 48 hours. 

• Interim Remedy 

The only exception under S. 1173/H.R. 2198 to the "do not rent" requirement is when the 

manufacturer has issued a safety recall and has not developed the permanent repair, but offers a 

temporary fix - or interim remedy - that eliminates the safety risk. If the rental car company 

performs the interim remedy, then the car may continue to be rented. Once the permanent repair 

is offered by the manufacturer, the vehicle must be pulled from service and permanently 

repaired before being re-rented. 

• Car Sales From Rental Fleets 

The American car rental industry is the largest single purchaser of cars from domestic and 

foreign car manufacturers every year. The industry, in tum, sells a large number of cars each 

year through retail and wholesale channels. S. 1173/H.R. 2198 require that rental car 

companies permanently repair any safety recall to any vehicle prior to selling that vehicle -

either through retail or wholesale markets. The only exception to this requirement is when a 

vehicle has been so severely damaged that it will only be sold for parts, the rental company does 

not need to perform the recall work. 

Federal versus State Role 

This is a critical national issue and deserves a national solution. The motor vehicle safety recall 

process is overseen by the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA) and has its 

origins in the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act, originally enacted in 1966. Therefore, ACRA and 

CARS believe strongly that major changes to rental vehicle safety recall procedures should be made by 

Congress, rather than individual states. Rental cars are an integral part of interstate commerce and car 

rental customers cross state borders in rental vehicles at will and with the blessing of the renting 

companies. 

CARS agreed with the rental car companies to join together in support of this legislation in order to 

create a uniform federal standard, rather than pursuing legislation on a state-by-state basis. California 

3 
99 


Senator Bill Monning, who represents the district where the tragic crash occurred that claimed the lives 

of Raechel and Jacqueline Houck, agreed to forestall pursuit of state legislation he authored beginning 

in 20 I 0, in order to allow Congress time to address the problem nationally. 

As attention to vehicle safety recalls remains squarely in the public spotlight, policy makers at the 

local, state and federal level are understandably eager to address safety concerns. There have been 

several initiatives at various levels of government to particularly address safety recalls concerning the 

rental industry. No two proposals are the same. ACRA and CARS believe a patchwork of state and 

local laws would be disruptive to consumers and the car rental industry since rental cars regularly are 

rented in one state and driven and left in another. In addition, these state and local proposals create 

challenges because each attempts to address a regulatory process that is controlled and overseen by a 

federal agency (NHTSA). ACRA and CARS are united in our conviction that rental car safety should 

be addressed on the federal level. 

Conclusion 

As the supporters of S. 1173 and H.R. 2198 continue to talk to members of Congress and their staff in 

support of this legislation, ACRA members are often asked why the car rental industry is willing to 

accept new federal regulation of the industry's practices. The response to that is easy. After listening to 

customers, ACRA engaged and became part of the process. The end result is a proposal that will 

provide car rental customers additional assurance that the vehicles they rent are safe and provides the 

car rental industry with a uniform federal standard across the country. 

ACRA and CARS urge Congress to enact this bill, named for Raechel and Jacqueline. It is beyond your 

power to bring them back to life, but the fate of others who rent vehicles to visit their parents, take a 

vacation, or go on a business trip -- or share the roads with them - rests squarely in your hands. 

As a first step toward enactment, we respectfully request that this Subcommittee hold a hearing on the 

Raechel and Jacqueline Houck Safe Rental Car Act, to hear first-hand from the stakeholders why now 

is the time to pass this critical safety legislation. 

Thank you for providing ACRA and CARS with the opportunity to submit this statement. 

4 
100 


May2004 

Summer2004 

June 2005 

May ·August 2007 

Mid to late 2007 

2007 

Late 2007 to 

September 2008 

September 2008 

November 2008 

May 27,2009 

June 9, 2009 

June 23, 2009 

November 2, 2009 

December 24, 2009 

TAKATA AIRBAG INFLATOR RUPTURES: TIM ELINE OF EVENTS 

A driver's airbag inflator ruptured in Alabama in a 2001 Honda Accord. 

Takata conducted an "urgent experiment" on airbags at its Auburn Hills, Michigan 

facility at the request of NHTSA to investigate an incident involving an airbag cushion 

tear. Takata claimed that the incident was unrelated to an inflator rupture and 

instead involved an abrasion on the inside cover of the cushion that required 

additional fabric to fix. In late 2004, Honda notified NHTSA that it would conduct a 

recall to address the issue. 

Takata received photographs depicting the 2004 ruptured airbag inflator incident. A 

visual inspection of the photographs determined that the rupture was an anomaly. 

Takata did not perform any physical tests on inflators at that time. 

Honda reported three accident reports to Takata involving driver side airbag inflator 

ruptures. 

Takata began testing approximately 42 inflators acquired from the field to find a root 

cause of the ruptures. No problems were detected. Takata found that all inflators 

were designed within specification and performed properly. 

Takata experimented with "specially fabricated prototypes" to try alternative inflator 

designs. Experiments were unsuccessful and resulted in broken inflators. These 

experiments were eventually shut down. 

Takata tested approximately 86 more airbag inflators. 

Takata verified that a pressing operation problem at its Moses Lake, Washington 

facility produced potentially defective propellant. Takata determined that the 

defective propellant was produced from 2000- 2002. 

Honda launched a safety recall (OSV-593) for 4,000 vehicles globally (3,940 in the U.S.) 

equipped with potentially defective propellant in driver's airbag inflators. 

A driver side airbag inflator ruptured in a 2001 Honda Accord in Oklahoma. The death 

of the driver was linked to the rupture. 

Honda was notified of another driver's airbag inflator rupture. 

Honda initiated another safety recall (09V-259) to expand the VIN range for vehicles 

recalled in November 2008 following notice from Takata that more inflators in driver 

side airbags were potentially defective. Honda recalled 510,000 vehicles globally 

(440,000 in the U.S.). 

NHTSA opened an investigation (RQ09-004) to evaluate the scope and timeliness of 

Honda's two recalls. 

An airbag inflator exploded in a 2001 Honda Accord in Richmond, Virginia. The death 

of the driver was linked to the rupture. 
101 


February 9, 2010 

May 6, 2010 

April 21, 2011 

Mid to Late 2011 

December 1, 2011 

October 2012 

November 2012 

February -March 

2013 

AprilS, 2013 

Aprilll, 2013 

Honda initiated another recall (10V-041) due to lingering uncertainty about the 

manufacturing processes of the inflator propellant and uncertainty about which 

vehicles may have received potentially defective replacement parts in driver side 

airbags. Honda recalled 437,000 vehicles globally (379,000 in the U.S.). 

NHTSA closed its investigation into Honda, finding that there was "insufficient 

information" to determine that Honda failed to make timely defect decisions in its 

OSV-593 and 09V-259 recalls. 

Honda launched a safety recall (11 V-260) to capture approximately 2,430 defective 

replacement service part inflators that could have been installed in driver side airbags 

in vehicles covered in prior recall expansions. Honda recalled 896,000 vehicles 

globally (833,277 vehicles were recalled in the U.S.). 

Takata was notified of airbag inflator ruptures occurring in scrapyards in Japan by 

salvage operations conducting "end-of-life" recycling processes on expired vehicles. 

Honda expanded recallllV-260 due to an inflator manufacturing record discrepancy. 

This recall included 273,419 vehicles in the United States. Outside ofthe U.S. 

approximately 304,000 vehicles were recalled to find defective driver side airbag 

inflators installed as replacement parts. 

Takata's ongoing testing of returned inflators showed that inadequate compression of 

the propellant wafers, exposure to uncontrolled environmental conditions, and the 

aging of the propellant were possible causes to the ruptures. 

Takata had been notified of three additional accidents involving ruptured airbag 

inflators in the U.S.- two in Puerto Rico and one in Maryland. The Maryland vehicle 

had previously been operated in Florida for eight years. 

Takata confirmed that inadequate compression of the propellant wafers and the 

inflator's exposure to certain environmental conditions could cause the passenger 

side airbag inflator to rupture upon airbag deployment. The compression problem 

stemmed from improper operation of the "auto-reject" feature on a machine at its 

Moses Lake, WA facility. This feature failed to identify and reject propellant wafers 

with inadequate compression. The exposure to uncontrolled environmental 

conditions stemmed from improper storage of the propellant wafers at a Takata 

facility in Monclova, Mexico. 

Takata acknowledged being aware of six total incidents involving ruptured inflators. 

Takata submitted a Defect Information Report to NHTSA notifying the agency of a 

potential defect in certain passenger side airbag inflators. 

Mazda initiated a national safety recall (13V-130) due to defects in passenger side 

airbag inflators as reported by Takata. Mazda recalled approximately 149 vehicles. 

Honda initiated a national safety recall (BV-132) due to defects in passenger side 

airbag inflators as reported by Takata. Honda recalled approximately 561,422 

vehicles. 

2 
102 


Toyota initiated a national safety recall (13V-133) due to defects in passenger side 

airbag inflators as reported by Takata. Toyota recalled approximately 844,277 

vehicles. 

Nissan initiated a national safety recall (13V-136) due to defects in passenger side 

airbag inflators as reported by Takata. Nissan recalled approximately 438,302 

vehicles. 

BMW initiated a safety recall (13V-172) due to defects in passenger side airbag 

May 5, 2013 inflators as reported by Takata. BMW recalled approximately 220,000 vehicles 

globally (42,080 were recalled in the U.S.). 

September 3, 2013 A reported airbag inflator rupture in California in a 2002 Acura TL was linked to the 

death of the driver. 

January 2014 Takata and Honda met with NHTSA to discuss prior recalls related to the defective 

airbag inflators. 

Following reports of six ruptures occurring in Puerto Rico and Miami, Florida in both 

May 2014 passenger and driver frontal airbags, Takata met with NHTSA to discuss the issue 

further. Given the geographic location of the incidents, humidity was thought to be a 

factor. 

Beginning of June 

2014 

June 10, 2014 

June 11, 2014 

June 13, 2014 

June 19, 2014 

NHTSA called Takata requesting its support for a regional field action to collect, 

inspect, test and investigate both passenger side and driver side airbag inflators from 

high absolute humidity regions to determine the root cause of the ruptures. The 

regional field action targeted Gulf Coast regions including Florida, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, 

and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Separately, Takata found that its production records and 

its methodology used to determine the recall range of cars recalled in 2013(for 

passenger side airbag inflators) due to improper manufacturing processes may have 

been inadequate or incomplete. 

Toyota launched a safety recall (14V-312) (a reissued recall of vehicles it recalled in 

2013) to fully replace, rather than inspect, all passenger airbag inflators in 844,277 

U.S. vehicles due to Takata's disclosure that its records were inadequate and/or 

incomplete. Globally, Toyota recalled 2.27 million vehicles. 

Takata issued a letter to NHTSA stating its support for the requested regional field 

action. NHTSA also opened a formal Preliminary Evaluation into airbag inflator 

ruptures (PE14-016). 

NHTSA held a conference call with vehicle manufacturers requesting their 

participation in the regional field action. 

Nissan launched a Regional Safety Improvement Campaign (SIC) (14V-340) at the 

request of NHTSA to collect passenger inflator parts from Gulf regions (FL, HI, PR, VI) 

to determine the root cause of the ruptures and whether humidity was a contributing 

factor. Approximately 29,998 Nissan vehicles were subject to this campaign. 

Ford launched a Regional SIC (14V-343) per NHTSA's request to collect both driver and 

passenger inflator parts from Gulf regions (FL, HI, PR, VI). Approximately 58,669 Ford 

vehicles were subject to this campaign. 

3 
103 


June 20, 2014 

June 24, 2014 

July 7, 2014 

Mazda launched a Regional SIC (14V-344) per NHTSA's request to collect both driver 

and passenger inflator parts from Gulf regions (Fl, HI, PR). Approximately 47,188 

Mazda vehicles were subject to this campaign. 

BMW launched a Regional SIC (14V-348) per NHTSA's request to collect driver inflator 

parts from Gulf regions (Fl, HI, PR, VI). Approximately 11,600 BMW vehicles were 

subject to this campaign. 

Honda launched a national safety recall (14V-349), expanding its 2013 recall to 

capture additional vehicles that may have a defective passenger side inflator 

following Takata's disclosure earlier in the month that its records were inadequate 

and/or incomplete in determining the VIN range of vehicles affected by the poorly 

manufactured inflator propellant. Approximately 988,440 vehicles were recalled in 

this campaign. 

Toyota launched a Regional SIC (14V-3SO) per NHTSA's request to collect passenger 

inflator parts from Gulf regions (FL, HI, PR, VI). At the time of the launch, Toyota did 

not know how many vehicles were affected by this campaign because it was awaiting 

airbag module serial numbers from Takata. 

Honda launched a Regional SIC (14V-351) per NHTSA's request to collect driver 

inflator parts from Gulf regions and other high absolute humidity climates (including 

FL, HI, PR, VI, Al, GA, LA, MS, SC, TX). Approximately 2,803,214 Honda vehicles were 

subject to this campaign. 

Honda launched another Regional SIC (14V-353) per NHTSA's request to collect 

passenger inflator parts from Gulf regions and other high absolute humidity climates 

(FL, HI, PR, VI, AL, GA, LA, MS, SC, TX). Approximately 698,288 Honda vehicles were 

subject to this campaign. 

Chrysler launched a Regional SIC (14V-354) per NHTSA's request to collect both driver 

and passenger inflator parts from Gulf regions (FL, HI, PR, VI). Approximately 371,309 

vehicles were subject to this campaign. 

Mazda launched a national safety recall (14V-362), expanding its 2013 recall to 

capture additional vehicles that may have defective passenger side inflators following 

Takata's disclosure earlier in the month that its records were inadequate and/or 

incomplete in determining the VIN range of vehicles affected by poorly manufactured 

inflator propellant. Mazda identified 18,050 potentially affected vehicles in this 

expanded recall. 

Nissan launched a national safety recall (14V-361), expanding its 2013 recall to 

capture additional vehicles that may have defective passenger side inflators following 

Takata's disclosure earlier in the month that its records were inadequate and/or 

incomplete in determining the VIN range of vehicles affected by poorly manufactured 

inflator propellant. Nissan identified 226,326 potentially affected vehicles in this 

expanded recall. 

Subaru launched a national safety recall {14V-399) for cars equipped with defective 

passenger side inflators caused by inadequate compaction force of the propellant and 

possible moisture exposure during inflator production. Subaru recalled 8,557 

vehicles. 

4 
104 


July 11, 2014 

July 16, 2014 

August 1, 2014 

August 2014 

October 2, 2014 

October 20, 2014 

October 30, 2014 

November 3, 2014 

November 4, 2014 

November 6, 2014 

November 12, 2014 

November 13, 2014 

Mitsubishi launched a Regional SIC (14V-421) per NHTSA's request to collect 

passenger side inflator parts from Gulf regions (Fl, HI, PR, VI). Approximately 11,985 

Mitsubishi vehicles were subject to this campaign. 

BMW launched a national safety recall (14V-428), expanding its 2013 recall to capture 

additional vehicles that may have defective passenger side inflators following Takata's 

disclosure in June that its records were inadequate and/or incomplete in determining 

the VIN range of vehicles affected by poorly manufactured inflator propellant. BMW 

recalled 573,935 in the U.S. and 1.6 million vehicles worldwide. 

Subaru launched a Regional SIC (14V-471) per NHTSA's request to collect passenger 

side inflator parts from Gulf regions (FL, HI, PR, VI). Approximately 8,959 Subaru 

vehicles were subject to this campaign. 

A driver side airbag inflator rupture occurred in a 2007 Ford Mustang in North 

Carolina- outside of the designated high absolute humidity region. 

An airbag inflator ruptured in a 2001 Honda Accord in Orlando, FL and was linked to 

the driver's death. 

Toyota launched a Regional SIC (14V-655) per NHTSA's request to collect passenger's 

inflator parts from Gulf regions (FL, HI, PR, VI). There were 247,0001 Toyota vehicles 

subject to this campaign. 

Nissan re-launched a Regional SIC (14V-701) per NHTSA's request to collect passenger 

side inflator parts from Gulf regions (PR, VI, Guam, Saipan, FL, Southern GA, AL, LA, 

MS, TX) 

NHTSA issued a Special Order requiring Takata to provide documents and answer 

questions about the agency's ongoing investigation into Takata airbags. 

NHTSA orders Honda to provide documents and answer questions about the agency's 

ongoing investigation into Takata airbags. 

Honda launches a Regional Safety Recall (14V-700) superseding its Regional SIC 14V353. Approximately 807,599 vehicles were subject to this campaign. 

The New York Times reported that Takata destroyed the results of tests showing 

cracked inflators. Takata refuted this claim. 

Takata told Reuters it modified the chemical composition of its propellant but 

acknowledged that it was still using ammonium nitrate. 

A fifth reported death that occurred on July 27'" in Malaysia is linked to an airbag 

inflator rupture in a Honda City compact car. Honda subsequently recalled 170,000 

vehicles in Asia and Europe. 

1 This includes approximately 98,000 GM vehicles that are designed by Toyota and sold by GM. 

5 
105 


November 18, 2014 

November 24, 2014 

November 25, 2014 

November 26, 2014 

December 2, 2014 

December 3, 2014 

December 5, 2014 

December 12, 2014 

December 19, 2014 

December 24, 2014 

December 2014 

NHTSA called for a National Safety Recall of certain vehicles (Honda, Ford, Mazda, 

BMW, and Chrysler) with potentially defective driver's airbag inflators produced prior 

to 2008 due to the inflator rupture that occurred in a 2007 Ford Mustang in North 

Carolina -outside of the designated high absolute humidity area. NHTSA also issued a 

Special Order to Takata demanding information about the propellant composition in 

the inflators. It also issued a General Order to automakers impacted by the Takata 

recalls demanding information about the methods and results of testing on Takata 

inflators outside of the regional recall areas. 

Honda submitted a response to NHTSA's November 3'd Special Order acknowledging 

its failure to notify the agency about 1,729 claims of injuries and deaths related to 

accidents in its vehicles, including those with Takata airbags. 

Mitsubishi launched a Regional Safety Recall (14V-700) superseding its Regional SIC 

14V-421. Approximately 22,259 vehicles were subject to this recall. 

NHTSA sent a Recall Request letter to Takata formally demanding that it acknowledge 

the existence of a defect and issue a national recall for driver's side airbag inflators 

Takata responds to NHTSA's Recall Request letter refusing to conduct a national recall 

and determine the existence of a safety defect in driver side inflators because the 

current information available did not support a nationwide determination of a safety 

defect. 

Chrysler (FCA) launched a Regional Safety Recall (14V-770) superseding its Regional 

SIC (14V-354). Approximately 420,564 vehicles were subject to this recall. 

Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade Subcommittee held an oversight hearing with 

witnesses from Takata Corporation, Toyota, Honda North America, BMW of America, 

and NHTSA. 

Reponses to NHTSA's Special Order to Takata and General Order to the OEMs dated 

November 18, 2014 were due. 

Ford launched a Regional Safety Recall (14V-787) expanding its Regional SIC 14V-343. 

Approximately 40,952 vehicles were subject to this recall. 

Ford launched a National Safety Recall (14V-802) partially superseding its Regional SIC 

14V-343. Approximately 462,911 vehicles were subject to this recall. 

Chrysler (FCA) launched a National Safety Recall (14V-817) expanding its Regional SIC 

14V-354. Approximately 2,908,790 vehicles were subject to this recall. 

A group of OEMs led by Honda, Toyota and Ford created the Independent Testing 

Coalition (lTC) and later contracted with Orbital ATK to test the defective inflators 

separate from the testing that Takata is preforming at its facilities. The lTC selected 

former NHTSA Acting Administrator David Kelly to lead the investigation. As of May 

2015, the lTC had not tested any inflators. 

6 
106 


January 8, 2015 

January 18, 2015 

February 20, 2015 

February 24, 2015 

February 25, 2015 

March 16, 2015 

April17, 2015 

April 23, 2015 

May 15,2015 

May 18,2015 

May 19,2015 

NHTSA fines Honda $70 million for failing to report deaths, injuries and certain 

warranty claims to NHTSA, which was in violation of the TREAD Act. 

A sixth reported death occurred in Houston, TX that is linked to a driver side airbag 

inflator rupture in a 2002 Honda Accord. The vehicle was covered under a 2011 recall 

for driver side inflators but had not been fixed. 

NHTSA imposed a civil penalty of $14,000 per day against Takata for failure to meet 

the obligations required under the October 30, 2014 and November 18, 2014 Special 

Orders. 

NHTSA updated its preliminary investigation to an "Engineering Evaluation." 

Takata agreed to a Preservation Order imposed by NHTSA that requires Takata to 

preserve certain information related to the inspection, testing, and analysis of 

returned or recalled inflators. Takata also agreed to submit a written protocol 

detailing how it would execute the requirements of the Preservation Order. 

Honda launched a National Safety Recall (15V-153) expanding its Regional SIC 14V351. Approximately 88,549 vehicles were subject to this recall. 

Nissan launched a Regional Safety Recall (15V-226) expanding its previous Regional 

Safety Recaii14V-701. Approximately 45,000 vehicles were subject to this recall. 

Takata's written protocol detailing how it will comply with the Preservation Order is 

published by NHTSA. 

Nissan launched a National Recall (15V-287) expanding two previous recalls -14V701, launched October 30, 2014, and lSV-226, launched April17, 2015. 

Approximately 263,692 vehicles were subject to this recall. 

Takata filed four Defect Information Reports (15E-043, 15E-042, lSE-041, and 15E040) acknowledging a defect exists in certain models of frontal driver side air bag 

inflators (PSDI, PSDI-4, PSDI-4K) and passenger side airbag inflators (SPI, PSPI, and 

PSPI-L). Takata identified a total of 17.6 million driver side inflators installed in 

vehicles in the U.S. as defective. It identified 16.2 million defective passenger side 

inflators installed in vehicles in the United States. 

NHTSA announced Takata's acknowledgment of a defect in certain airbag inflators and 

the corresponding Consent Order that requires Takata to cooperate with all future 

regulatory actions that NHTSA undertakes. This Consent Order ended the $14,000 per 

day fines that NHTSA imposed on Takata in February. NHTSA's VIN lookup tool on its 

website does not have the newly recalled vehicles listed. 

7 
107 


May 22,2015 

May27, 2015 

May 28,2015 

May29,2015 

June 2, 2015 

NHTSA publishes a notice of intent to open a coordinated remedy program 

proceeding for the replacement of defective Takata airbag inflators with BMW, 

Chrysler, Daimler, Ford, GM, Honda, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Subaru, and Toyota. 

This is the first coordinated remedy program undertaken by NHTSA.2 

Chrysler (FCA) launched a voluntary safety recall (15V-312) expanding a previous recall 

related to Takata passenger side SPI inflators. Approximately 438,156 vehicles are 

subject to this recall. 

Chrysler (FCA) launched an expanded voluntary safety recall (15V-313) for defective 

driver-side PSDI-4 inflators. Approximately 4,066, 732 vehicles are subject to this 

recall. 

BMW converts its national improvement campaign (14V-348) to a voluntary national 

recall (15V-318) for vehicles containing defective driver side PSDI-4 inflators. This 

increased BMW's affected vehicle population from 140,696 to 420,661. 

Ford launched a voluntary safety recall (15V-322) for vehicles equipped with defective 

passenger side SPI inflators. Approximately 361,523 vehicles are subject to this 

action. This expands on a previous recall, 14V-787. 

Mitsubishi launched a voluntary safety recall (lSV-321) expanding on a previous recall 

(14V-752) for vehicles equipped with defective passenger side SPI inflators. 

Approximately 82,784 vehicles are subject to this recall. 

Subaru launched a National Safety Recall (15V-323) for defective SPI passenger side 

inflators. Approximately 81,100 vehicles were subject to this recall. 

GM launched a National Safety Recall (lSV-324) for defective SPI passenger side 

inflators. Approximately 330,198 vehicles were subject to this recall. 

Nissan submitted a notification letter to NHTSA stating that all Nissan vehicles 

equipped with defective SPI inflators are subject to ongoing recalls and that no 

additional vehicles were impacted by Takata's defect acknowledgement. 

Consequently, no further action is required by Nissan. 

Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade Subcommittee held a second oversight hearing 

on the Takata inflator recalls with witnesses from NHTSA, Takata, Global Automakers, 

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, and the lTC. 

' 80 FR 29791, https:Uwww. federalregister.gov I articles/2015/05/22/2015-12449/notice-of-intent -to-open-acoordinated-remedy-program-proceeding-for-the-replacement-of-certain. 

8 
108 


FRED UPTON, MICHIGAN 

CHAIRMAN 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., NEW JERSEY 

RANKING MEMBER 

(!tongrr~~ of tbr Wnttrb ~tate~ 

J>ourst of l\eprersentatibers 

COMMITIEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

2125 RAYBURN HousE OFFICE BuiLDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6115 Major1ty (202)225-2927 

Minority !202)225-3641 

June 22,2015 

The Honorable Mark Rosekind 

Administrator 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. 

Washington, D.C. 20590 

Dear Administrator Rosekind, 

Thank you for appearing before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufactnring, and Trade on 

Tuesday, June 2, 2015, to testify at the hearing entitled "An Update on the Takata Airbag Ruptures and 

Recalls." 

Pursuant to the Rules of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the hearing record remains 

open for ten business days to permit Members to submit additional questions for the record, which are 

attached. The format of your responses to these questions should be as follows: (I) the name of the 

Member whose question you are addressing, (2) the complete text of the question you are addressing in 

bold, and (3) your answer to that question in plain text. 

To facilitate the printing of the hearing record, please respond to these questions by the close of 

business on Monday, July 6, 2015. Your responses should bee-mailed to the Legislative Clerk in Word 

format at Kirby.Howard@mail.house.gov and mailed to Kirby Howard, Legislative Clerk, Committee 

on Energy and Commerce, 2125 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515. 

Thank you again for your time and effort preparing and delivering testimony before the 

Subcommittee. 

~l'c~-- .... /" 

/Michael 

Chairman 

Subcommittee 

C. Burge~ 

on Commerce, 

_.-~ 

Manufacturing, and Trade 

cc: Jan Schakowsky, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade 

Attachment 
109 


U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade 

June 2, 2015 Hearing: 

"An Update on the Takata Airbag Ruptures and Recalls" 

NHTSA Administrator Mark R. Rosekind, Ph.D. 

Additional Questions for the Record 

The Honorable Michael C. Burgess 

I. Are all the YIN numbers of affected vehicles subjected to the Takata airbag inflator defects 

announced May 19'h now publically accessible on NHTSA's safercar.gov website? If not, 

when can we expect all the information to be posted? What vehicle manufacturers have not 

yet provided this information to NHTSA? What is NHTSA doing to expedite the collection 

of this information? 

RESPONSE: Yes, all vehicle identification numbers (YIN) for currently affected vehicles 

with Takata air bag inflators are publicly accessible through NHTSA's YIN lookup tool on 

safercar.gov. The auto manufacturers have loaded the Y!Ns of the affected vehicles into 

their recall system databases and consumers can use NHTSA's YIN lookup tool to search 

those databases. 

2. Dr. Rosekind, you testified that "clarity for consumers is critical." Why did NHTSA 

publically announce the recall before it collected the YIN numbers from automakers of the 

affected vehicle population? What could NHTSA do differently so consumers could have 

more information when such a big headline is created? 

RESPONSE: Takata reported the inflator defect to NHTSA on Monday, May 18 and 

NHTSA announced Takata's defect declaration publicly on Tuesday, May 19. This 

important safety information could not be withheld from the public knowing that they were at 

risk. NHTSA simultaneously announced Takata's defect declaration publicly, and launched 

a consumer-oriented Takata microsite on safercar.gov that is updated in real time to provide 

consumers with information as soon as NHTSA receives it. Manufacturers gathered the 

needed YIN numbers within a few weeks and NHTSA ensured the information was available 

to consumers as soon as it was provided. 

a. Is there anything that prevents NHTSA from making its announcement at a time 

when consumers can know if they are impacted? 

RESPONSE: Over I 5 million consumers had vehicles already subject to Takata air 

bag recalls at the time that Takata declared a defect. NHTSA's May 19 

announcement addressed these known vehicles, and millions more that contained a 

potentially fatal safety-critical element. The health and safety of the American public 

demanded that NHTSA tell the public what was known as soon as possible, and 

without undue delay. 
110 


2 

3. Please explain in detail the type of oversight NHTSA is or will be conducting over Takata's 

testing. Please also provide the names of the individuals at NHTSA (or those who have been 

independently contracted) who will be conducting this oversight. When will the oversight 

begin? 

RESPONSE: Prior to the May 19 announcement of the Consent Order, NHTSA had access 

to testing data from Takata, the Independent Testing Consortium, and other testing being 

conducted by auto manufacturers. All of this testing had been focused primarily on 

determining the root cause of ruptures. NHTSA reviewed findings, made unscheduled visits 

to test facilities to review data and procedures, and was collecting results from all testing 

sources. After the May 19 announcement and under the terms of the Consent Order, Takata 

was required to propose a plan to provide NHTSA with test data regarding the service life 

and safety of the remedy inflators no later than July 17, 2015. Takata must also continue to 

provide NHTSA all test results and data relating to the recalled inflators. The Consent Order 

gives NHTSA the ability to direct Takata's testing to focus on both the recalled inflators and 

those being used as remedy parts. NHTSA is evaluating the Takata testing data that has been 

provided to date, and will determine what additional testing Takata must undertake. 

NHTSA's Office of Vehicle Safety will oversee Takata's testing with assistance from 

individuals across the agency and an expert consultant with many years of experience 

designing and testing inflators. Additionally, NHTSA has begun its own testing regime 

whose first objective is to verify Takata's findings. 

4. Has NHTSA begun coordinating the prioritization of replacement parts? If not, when will it 

begin? 

RESPONSE: Yes, NHTSA has begun coordinating the prioritization of replacement parts. 

a. In the interim, what is happening with the replacement parts produced by Takata as 

NHTSA prepares to serve as coordinator? Are they being distributed to automakers? 

RESPONSE: NHTSA is coordinating the recall of the defective Takata airbags to 

ensure that those consumers most at risk will receive replacement parts first. 

Although we do not yet know the root cause behind the Takata air bag ruptures, we 

do know that the defect is a product of time and exposure to high absolute humidity. 

NHTSA's goal is to ensure that those vehicles that have been exposed to high 

absolute humidity for longer periods of time receive a replacement part as quickly as 

possible. While some of Takata's replacement parts will have to be replaced at a later 

date, they provide a better interim remedy until a permanent replacement part 

becomes available. Each affected automaker has been obtaining replacement parts 

from one or more suppliers. Some automakers are utilizing Takata replacement parts, 

a portion of which will require a further replacement at a later time; others are 

utilizing replacement parts produced by suppliers other than Takata. 

b. When will NHTSA be able to produce a time line that shows public outreach 

campaigns and replacement part availability for the nation? 
111 


3 

RESPONSE: NHTSA has already started meeting with manufacturers and suppliers 

and will continue to do so throughout July and August to determine the availability of 

replacement parts for prioritized areas and vehicles that are most at risk. 

Additionally, pursuant to the Consent Order, Takata is required to submit a plan to 

maximize recall completion rates for all recalls involving Takata air bag inflators no 

later than July 17. Takata will prepare a plan for each of the affected vehicle 

manufacturers without regard to the supplier of the remedy parts. Assuming the 

affected manufacturers and suppliers provide the information requested by NHTSA 

through July and August that will be used to develop the replacement plan, NHTSA 

will hold a hearing or other event in the early Fall to outline the replacement 

campaign. 

5. Dr. Rosekind, you testified that some of the replacement parts are only an interim remedy. Is 

NHTSA encouraging automakers to tell dealers to warn customers that some of the 

replacement parts are only an interim remedy? 

RESPONSE: Yes, NHTSA has encouraged automakers to inform both their dealers and their 

customers of the interim nature of the replacement parts where applicable and to take 

proactive steps to ensure that they maintain contact with those owners and that the owners 

know how to stay informed and when to return for a final remedy. 

6. What conversations is NHTSA having with automakers about the continued use of these 

types of ammonium nitrate inflators? 

RESPONSE: NHTSA has exchanged and will continue to exchange information with 

automakers and tier one suppliers regarding the current and planned design and manufacture 

of replacement inflators as part of its coordinated remedy process. These discussions are 

ongoing and the Consent Order now provides a mechanism to be sure testing also focuses on 

the effectiveness of the remedy. 

7. Are vehicle manufacturers providing completion rate data to NHTSA on recalls related to 

Takata airbag inflator defects? If not, has NHTSA requested that information from vehicle 

manufacturers? 

RESPONSE: Yes, manufacturers are providing completion rate data to NHTSA on recalls 

related to Takata air bag inflator defects; and NHTSA will continue tracking these data 

closely. 

8. Dr. Rosckind, you testified that at least 29 different things, including process improvements 

and other changes, have been made since December 2014 to improve the internal processes 

at NHTSA. Please list the changes you have made and what measurable difference has been 

observed from those adjustments or what you expect to sec. 

RESPONSE: NHTSA continuously seeks to enhance our processes and procedures, as 

demonstrated by the attached list of process improvements and our recently published Path 
112 


Forward report. The list of process improvements continues to grow and now includes 45 

distinct actions implemented and initiated. Also, the recently formed Risk Control and 

Innovations Program leaders will apply the process improvements agency-wide. The 

measurable difference falls into the following general categories: 

• Improved Oversight; 

• Enhanced Training; 

• Improved Tracking and Documentation; 

• Improved Information Collection; 

• Collaboration and Assessment; 

• Tougher Enforcement; 

• Improved Outreach to Customers. 

9. Prior to the Consent Order, did NHTSA conduct any direct oversight ofTakata's testing 

and/or examine the adequacy of the remedy Takata and affected vehicle manufacturers were 

proposing? If so, what were NHTSA's observations of the testing and adequacy of the 

remedy? If not, why did it not conduct oversight of the testing or evaluate the adequacy of 

the remedy? 

4 

RESPONSE: Prior to the Consent Order, NHTSA received Takata test results for returned 

inflators on a monthly basis and worked to determine risk level based on inflator type and 

geographic location. NHTSA also visited a Takata testing facility on multiple occasions, 

including unannounced visits. However, all of this testing had been focused primarily on 

determining the root cause of ruptures. That changed under the terms of the Consent Order. 

Now, NHTSA has the ability to direct Takata's testing to focus on both the recalled inflators 

and those being used as remedy parts. Takata must continue to provide NHTSA all test 

results and data relating to the recalled inflators, but must also propose a plan to provide 

NHTSA with test data regarding the service life and safety of the remedy inflators no later 

than July 17, 2015. 

10. Dr. Rosekind, you testified that NHTSA had identified "meaningful pieces" of information in 

an ongoing review of the 2.4 million documents Takata submitted to the agency. What are 

those "meaningful pieces" of information? 

RESPONSE: Takata has submitted 3.3 million documents to date. NHTSA is reviewing 

each of these documents carefully for information that will help determine whether Takata's 

actions, or inactions, constitute violations of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety 

Act. The information NHTSA is extrapolating from these documents will enable us to 

determine what Takata knew about the use of ammonium nitrate in their air bag inflators, 

when they knew it, and when Takata determined that there was a safety-related defect. 

II. Dr. Rosekind, you testified that due to the Consent Order, NHTSA will be in the "driver's 

seat" to direct testing. What deficiencies or gaps have you identified in testing to date? 

RESPONSE: Prior to the Consent Order, the focus of testing was determining the root cause 

of ruptures and not on adequacy of the remedy. The Consent Order changed all that 

NHTSA is now focusing the inquiry on the solution. Under the terms of the Consent Order, 
113 


5 

Takata must propose a plan to provide NHTSA with test data regarding the service life and 

safety of the remedy inflators no later than July 17. NHTSA is reviewing all currently 

available data and information, and will critically evaluate both Takata's and our own testing 

plans. 

a. What new or different tests will NHTSA be performing? 

RESPONSE: NHTSA is evaluating a different non-destructive technique to measure 

inflators. This technique may shorten the preliminary screening process and yield a 

higher throughput for ballistic testing. More testing is planned once the initial phase 

is completed. 

b. How many inflators will be tested? 

RESPONSE: Currently NHTSA has 400 inflators planned for Phase One testing. 

Results of this testing will further assist NHTSA in verifying the work that Takata has 

conducted. 

c. When will the testing be completed? 

RESPONSE: Phase One testing will be completed by the end of July 2015. NHTSA 

is reviewing all currently available data and information, including Takata's testing 

plan and our own testing plan, to identify deficiencies and gaps that may require 

further testing. 

d. Who will be conducting the tests? 

RESPONSE: NHTSA has a subcontract with Battelle, through the Transportation 

Research Center, to conduct testing. 

12. Does NHTSA have any reports on record of airbags inflators rupturing in the field in the 

1990s that contained ammonium nitrate? 

RESPONSE: NHTSA is unaware of any reports alleging a 1990s vintage ammonium nitrate 

based inflator rupture. 

13. Is NHTSA aware of any other Takata inflator type, beyond those listed in the Consent Order, 

that has been the basis for a safety recall in the last 5 years due to the inflator's susceptibility 

to moisture intrusion, which could lead to an abnormal airbag deployment? If so, please 

provide the inflator type and the recall ID number. 

RESPONSE: All Takata inflator types that NHTSA is aware of that could lead to an 

abnormal air bag deployment from moisture intrusion are listed in the Consent Order. 

14. Dr. Rosekind, you testified that the recalls affecting two passenger inflators (PSPI and PSPIL) are expected to be national. When will that nationwide recall expansion occur? 
114 


6 

RESPONSE: All Takata air bag recalls are already national. 

a. In Takata's DIRs, it indicated that the expansion will be based on further testing and 

analysis. Has that further testing and analysis already been conducted to support the 

expectation that a national recall will happen? If so, what did the testing and analysis 

show? When was it conducted? 

RESPONSE: All Takata air bag recalls are already national recalls. 

15. When can consumers expect to get a replacement inflator on the passenger side that is not 

subject to deterioration over time? 

RESPONSE: NHTSA will examine remedy launch estimates and timing as part of the 

coordinated remedy process, and we will inform atTected consumers once that information is 

known. It is unlikely that all passenger side inflator replacements tor the millions of vehicles 

under recall will be available at the same time, therefore phasing (possibly by vehicle age, 

inflator type and/or vehicle residency) may be necessary. 

16. Please provide an outline of the coordinated remedy program plan detailing when NHTSA 

plans to meet with suppliers, what suppliers NHTSA will be meeting with, when the joint 

meetings with suppliers and automakers will take place, and when the public meeting will 

happen in the fall. 

RESPONSE: NHTSA reached out to the atTected manufacturers and suppliers to set up 

group and individual meetings, and the first of these meetings took place on July 1. NHTSA 

has contacted six suppliers: ARC, Autoliv, Daicel, Key Safety, Toyoda Gosei, and TRW. 

Assuming the affected manufacturers and suppliers provide the information requested by 

NHTSA through July and August that will be used to develop the replacement plan, NHTSA 

will hold a hearing or other event in the early Fall to outline the replacement campaign. 

17. Please provide the names of all the individuals in the group overseeing the logistics of the 

coordinated remedy program. 

RESPONSE: I personally plan to oversee the coordinated remedy program with assistance 

from members ofNHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation, Office of the Chief Counsel, and 

other individuals across the agency. 

18. When was the contract signed with Bate! to conduct testing? What is the testing plan that 

was agreed to? When will the testing be completed? How many tests will be conducted? 

RESPONSE: NHTSA awarded a testing contract to Transportation Research Center (TRC) 

on May 4, 2015. TRC has a subcontract with Battelle to conduct the tests. We initiated a 

multi-phase approach to develop and verify test procedures for non-destructive inspection 

and ballistic testing. In the first phase, Battelle is conducting non-destructive inspection and 

ballistic testing of 400 inflators from Takata. We plan to complete this effort in late July 

2015. We will determine additional phases of testing after data analysis. 
115 


7 

19. When a potential defect in a vehicle has been called to the attention of either the Office of 

Defect or the Office of Special Crash Investigations, what steps are made by NHTSA to seek 

out the root cause of the potential defect if one has not been identified? 

RESPONSE: In addition to obtaining information from the affected vehicle manufacturer or 

supplier, NHTSA also employs field inspections, testing, consumer surveys, statistical 

analyses, peer comparisons, and other methods of determining root cause. 

a. Does NHTSA rely solely on information and data received by the maker of the 

potentially defective part or does NHTSA conduct its own separate analysis to 

confirm or disprove the existence of a defect? 

RESPONSE: No, NHTSA conducts its own analysis, including collecting additional 

information and verifying information from manufacturers. 

b. Please explain the process by which NHTSA determines the existence of a motor 

vehicle safety defect and requires the affected original equipment manufacturers to 

conduct a safety recall. Please explain how NHTSA used this process with respect to 

the defective Takata airbag inflators. 

RESPONSE: Most safety defect decisions are made by vehicle and equipment 

manufacturers without NHTSA's influence. However, over the last 10 years, 

NHTSA has conducted 1,060 defect investigations that influenced 1,889 safety 

recalls. As NHTSA does not have imminent hazard authority, it relies on its defect 

investigation process to build a body of evidence to support a defect determination 

decision. 

With respect to defective Takata inflators affected by long term exposure to high 

absolute humidity, NHTSA opened an investigation (PE14-016) on June 11,2014 

after identifying 6 incidents of inflator rupture, 3 of which were in NHTSA's databas< 

and 3 that were provided by Takata and Toyota. This investigation was upgraded to 

an Engineering Analysis (EAlS-001) and is still open. NHTSA's investigation will 

remain open until the agency has evaluated the full spectrum of Takata inflators 

containing ammonium nitrate-based propellant, including current Takata replacement 

inflators. Please see the enclosed copies of the investigation resumes that contain 

further explanation. 

The Honorable Mike Pompeo 

1. Given recent interest in flame retardants in juvenile products and studies showing they have 

no utility, have you given any thoughts to exempting car seats from having to meet FVMSS 

213 since the car is already treated with extensive FR? Does this need to be done 

legislatively or can it be done through regulation? 
116 


RESPONSE: Requiring car seats to be flame resistant serves a safety need. In 2013, 

NHTSA extensively reviewed the safety and health effects of its flammability requirements 

for child car seats. NHTSA's review supported continued application of this safety standard. 

8 

About 194,000 vehicle fires occur annually in the U.S., resulting in 300 fatalities and I ,250 

injuries. Of these, 20 fatalities and 25 injuries involve children 0-5 years old. Most vehicle 

fire incidents do not result in death or injury. This is partly due to materials in the vehicle, 

such as seat cushions and upholstery, being required to meet FMVSS 302, slowing the spread 

of a fire and affording occupants critical time to exit the vehicle. FMVSS 302 is the Federal 

Motor Vehicle Safety Standard that establishes the flammability resistance requirements, and 

the child car seat standard (FMVSS 213) incorporates the requirements ofFMVSS 302. 

NHTSA continues to monitor this issue. If a change to existing requirements is merited, 

NHTSA can address it in a rulemaking. 

The Honorable Jan Schakowsky 

I. In November 2014, Honda released the results of an independent audit showing that the 

company failed to report more than 1,700 claims or notices concerning injuries or deaths, 

including eight claims involving Takata airbag ruptures. Honda attributed the underreporting 

to coding errors and an overly narrow interpretation of the Early Warning Reporting (EWR) 

requirements. In 2004-2005, GM received-but shelved-consumer complaints and field 

reports about keys being turned during operation and vehicles losing power. 

The Vehicle Safety Improvement Act (VSIA) would strengthen early warning reporting by 

requiring manufacturers to submit all consumer complaints that might result from defects. 

The bill would also require manufacturers to include information about fatalities possibly 

caused by defects, including an assessment of why each incident may have occurred. 

a. In its report, reviewing its actions regarding OM's ignition switch failure, NHTSA 

discussed improving EWR reporting, is that correct? 

RESPONSE: Yes, NHTSA identified methods to improve reporting in our Path 

Forward document. Additionally, the Inspector General made 17 recommendations 

in its June 18, 2015 report, 9 ofwhich relate to EWR. NHTSA has concurred with all 

17 OIG recommendations and is committed to addressing each one by June 30,2016. 

b. In what specific ways can the current EWR requirements be strengthened? Under the 

VSIA, NHTSA would get more information and more information would be made 

public. Is that what you mean? 

c. What specific steps is NHTSA taking, independent of Congressional action, to 

improve Early Warning Reporting? 

RESPONSE 1 band lc: VSIA, if enacted as currently drafted, would result in more 

information coming to NHTSA and being made publicly accessible. NHTSA is 

already taking steps to improve our early warning reporting (EWR) program; we 

conducted a candid self-assessment of the EWR program and identified areas of 

improvement in the Path Forward document, including the 9 Inspector General 
117 


recommendations related to EWR. NHTSA will provide more clarity to 

manufacturers about the EWR requirements, and will assist manufacturers as they 

implement best practices to comply with their obligations. 

2. You have spoken before about NHTSA's need for additional resources to fulfill its auto 

safety mission. IfNHTSA had additional resources, exactly how those resources would be 

used? In which divisions would you increase staff and budget allocation? How would 

additional resources affect consumer safety? 

9 

RESPONSE: NHTSA has provided the following technical assistance to Committee staff on 

our FY 2016 budget request for increased funding needs for the safety defects investigations 

program: 

Additional FTE for Safety Defects Investigation 

NHTSA needs an additional $4.446 million more to fund an additional 28.5 FTE for the 

Office of Satety Defects Investigation (001). The 001 has 8 defect screeners and 4 Early 

Warning Reporting (EWR) data analysts to identify potential safety defects, and 16 

investigators to conduct formal investigations. The additional FTE would be used to process 

and analyze additional data collected from consumer complaints. Use of data mining 

software will increase the volume and quality of the information ODI receives, and 001 

needs additional FTE to analyze the data. This funding would also support the technical 

training needs of the office. 

ODI would apply the additional28.5 FTE for the following programs (note that each new 

employee is counted as y, FTE for this purpose): 

• Trend Analysis This is a new office. NHTSA would use an additional 2 FTE as 

follows: 2 statisticians and 2 data analysts with experience in standard data analysis 

and statistical software. This new division would be responsible for overarching, 

macro trend analysis of all ODI data, other NHTSA databases, and external data 

sources, with special attention to input from NHTSA's Office of Vehicle Safety 

Research to identify near term and potential future risk associated with emerging 

technology. This division would also provide data analysis support to the 

investigative divisions allowing them to maintain focus on their primary mission. 

• Field Investigation and Testing- This is a new office. NHTSA would use an 

additional4 FTE as follows: 4 engineers and 4 field investigators. The staff would 

be cross-trained in ODI basic procedures to act as supplemental staff when needed for 

surges in demand. This request responds to a recommendation of the OlG. This new 

division would be responsible for conducting field investigation of specific vehicles 

involved in a crash, fire, or some other consequence of an alleged defect. 

• Certified Project Manager- This is a new position. NHTSA would use an 

additional 0.5 FTE for a newly created position. This position would provide, develop 

and implement a project management approach to ODJ investigations, act as the ODI 

lead for conducting internal, triennial program assessments to capture lessons learned 

and best practices both internal and external, and apply them where appropriate. The 

new position would also serve as the information technology system project manager 
118 


for ARTEMIS, ClF and any other systems investment that serves ODilines of 

business. 

10 

• Early Warning Reporting (EWR)- There are currently 4 staff in the EWR Office. 

NHTSA would use an additional 3.5 FTE as follows: 1 mathematical statistician to 

perfonn statistical analyses ofEWR aggregate data and to perform complex queries 

on an ad hoc basis as needed; 2 data analysts to perform EWR reporting compliance 

audits and support data analysis requests in support of open investigations; and 4 

safety defect specialists to query all of the EWR looking for potential defect trends 

including conducting inquiries on I 00 percent of all death claims. 

• Vehicle Control- There are currently 6 staff in the Vehicle Control Office. NHTSA 

would use an additional 3.5 FTE as follows: 6 engineers to conduct investigations; 1 

investigation coordinator to assist with investigation content control, complainant 

follow up, public file integrity, and to act as a liaison with the FOIA and 

Communications office, and other coordination functions. 

• Vehicle Integrity- There are currently 7 staff in the Vehicle Integrity Office. 

NHTSA would use an additional 3.5 FTE as follows: 6 engineers to conduct 

investigations; 1 investigation coordinator to assist with investigation content control, 

complainant follow up, public file integrity, and to act as a liaison with the FOIA and 

Communications office, and other coordination functions. 

• Defects Assessment- There are currently 9 staff in the Defects Assessment Office. 

NHTSA would use an additional 4 FTE as follows: I field investigator primarily 

responsible for conducting local vehicle inspections and dealer site visits, 3 engineers, 

I tire specialist, 1 child passenger safety specialist, and 2 safety defects specialists 

trained to query and analyze consumer complaints and all available data sources to 

identify potential safety defect. 

• Recall Management- There are currently 8 staff in the Recall Management Office. 

NHTSA would use an additional 3 FTE as follows: 3 program analysts to improve 

throughput of the growing number of safety recalls and quarterly reports; 2 engineers 

to conduct recall query investigations concerning scope and remedy adequacy; and I 

safety defects specialist to conduct audits of manufacturers' recall administration. 

• Medium and Heavy Duty Vehicle and Motorcycle- There are currently 8 staff in 

the Medium and Heavy Duty Vehicle and Motorcycle Office. NHTSA would use an 

additional 1 FTE as follows: 1 engineer with experience in crash avoidance 

technologies to address new and emerging technologies; 1 safety defects specialist 

with experience in motorcycle design and operation. 

• Correspondence Research -There are currently 6 staff in the Correspondence 

Research Office. NHTSA would use an additional 3.5 FTE as follows: 3 writers to 

prepare responses to incoming correspondence and 1 technical editor with automotive 

expertise. NHTSA also seeks to add a new branch with 3 staff to address Data 

Integrity and Records Management shortcomings identified by power users of our 

public website, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), and the National Archives 

and Records Administration. 
119 


II 

Safety Defects Investigation Program 

NHTSA needs $31.26 million for ODI program costs. This is $21.56 million more than the 

FY 2015 enacted funding level. The requested increase would enable ODI to improve its 

effectiveness in identifying safety defects quickly, ensuring remedies are implemented 

promptly, and informing the public of critical information in an effective manner. 

In FY 2016 the Safety Defects Investigation program expects to undertake consumer 

awareness and outreach campaigns, and continue to improve its public interfaces. A large 

portion of the data that NHTSA receives about defects in vehicles comes directly from the 

consumer. 

The Safety Defects Investigation program needs to improve its public messaging so that this 

important source of safety data-consumer input-can be used more effectively. With the 

additional resources requested, NHTSA would develop and implement a consumer 

awareness campaign similar to some ofNHTSA's better-known safety campaigns addressing 

seat belts and drunk driving. We expect this campaign to increase the number and quality of 

safety defect complaints, and increase awareness and responsiveness to recalls. At the same 

time, the Safety Defects Investigation program would continue to make progress in 

improving the look, feel and utility of the NHTSA consumer website. The FY 2016 request 

would enable NHTSA 's defects investigation program to improve consumer access to safety 

information and to further simplify the process for filing defect complaints. 

3. The massive scale of the Takata recall has left consumers confused-and manufacturers 

unsure as to whether Takata can produce replacement parts quickly and safely enough to 

satisfy demand. In addition, given NHTSA's plan to prioritize repairs in certain parts of the 

country where the risk of injury or death from the defects is higher, some consumers likely 

will be unable to have inflators remedied right away. 

a. Do you agree that auto dealers should not be able to loan out cars that are under an 

existing safety recall without first remedying the defect or non-compliance? 

b. Do you agree that it is not the consumer's responsibility to ensure that a loaner 

vehicle is safe and not subject to a recall? 

c. Would you support legislation prohibiting auto dealers from providing loaner vehicles 

with an open safety recall until the defect or non-compliance is remedied? 

RESPONSE 4a. band c: Yes. Rental and used car dealerships should have the same 

recall remedy obligations as new car dealers. The GROW AMERICA Act would 

provide NHTSA with statutory authority to require rental car companies and dealers 

selling, leasing or renting new and used motor vehicles to remedy defective and 

noncompliant vehicles before they can make them available for rental, sale or lease to 

the general public. 

d. Has NHTSA done an analysis and determined that it is safer to drive a car with an 

airbag subject to a recall than to have the airbag turned off until a replacement airbag 

is available and if so, is the determination the same for all recalled cars whether the 

recall is for a driver, passenger, or both airbags? 
120 


12 

RESPONSE 4d: Disabling an air bag increases risk for the consumer. Disabling the 

passenger side air bag is only acceptable if no one will sit in the front passenger seat 

while the air bag remains disabled. The risk to consumers of disabling their air bags 

increases because now there is zero protection. Air bags save lives. In 2013, 2388 

lives were saved from frontal air bags and from 1987 to 2013, 39,8861ives were 

saved from frontal air bags. 
121 

[Mr. Kennedy’s answers to submitted questions have been retained in committee files and also are available at http:// 

docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20150602/103546/HHRG-114- 

IF17-Wstate-KennedyK-20150602-SD005.pdf.] 


FRED UPTON, MICHIGAN 

CHAIRMAN 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., NEW JERSEY 

RANKING MEMBER 

((ongre~~ of tbe Wniteb ~tate~ 

J![lou!ie of l\tprt1ientattbe1i 

COMMITIEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

2125 RAYBURN HousE OFFICE BuiLDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6115 (202)225-2927 

(202)225--3641 

June 22,2015 

Mr. Kevin M. Kennedy 

Executive Vice President ofNorth America 

Takata Holdings Incorporated 

2500 Takata Drive 

Auburn Hills, Ml 48326 

Dear Mr. Kennedy, 

Thank you for appearing before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade on 

Tuesday, June 2, 2015, to testify at the hearing entitled "An Update on the Takata Airbag Ruptures and 

Recalls." 

Pursuant to the Rules of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the hearing record remains 

open for ten business days to permit Members to submit additional questions for the record, which are 

attached. The format of your responses to these questions should be as follows:(!) the name of the 

Member whose question you are addressing, (2) the complete text of the question you are addressing in 

bold, and (3) your answer to that question in plain text. · 

To facilitate the printing of the hearing record, please respond to these questions by the close of 

business on Monday, July 6, 2015. Your responses should bee-mailed to the Legislative Clerk in Word 

format at Kirby.Howard@mail.house.gov and mailed to Kirby Howard, Legislative Clerk, Committee 

on Energy and Commerce, 2125 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515. 

Thank you again for your time and effort preparing and delivering testimony before the 

Subcommittee. 

Subcommittee on Commerce, 

Manufacturing, and Trade 

cc: Jan Schakowsky, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade 

Attachment 
122 

[Mr. Kelly did not answer submitted questions for the record by 

the time of printing.] 


FRED UPTON, MICHIGAN 

CHAIRMAN 

Mr. David Kelly 

Project Director 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., NEW JERSEY 

RANKING MEMBER 

(!Congress of tbt Wnittb ~Matts 

~oul3e of l\eprcl3entati!Jel3 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

2125 RAYBURN HousE OFFICE BuiLDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6115 

June 22, 2015 

Independent Testing Coalition 

P.O. Box 523172 

Springfield, VA 22152 

Dear Mr. Kelly, 

Thank you for appearing before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade on 

Tuesday, June 2, 2015, to testify at the hearing entitled "An Update on the Takata Airbag Ruptures and 

Recalls." 

Pursuant to the Rules of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the hearing record remains 

open for ten business days to permit Members to submit additional questions for the record, which are 

attached. The format of your responses to these questions should be as follows: ( 1) the name of the 

Member whose question you are addressing, (2) the complete text of the question you are addressing in 

bold, and (3) your answer to that question in plain text. 

To facilitate the printing of the hearing record, please respond to these questions by the close of 

business on Monday, July 6, 2015. Your responses should bee-mailed to the Legislative Clerk in Word 

format at Kirby.Howard@mail.bouse.gov and mailed to Kirby Howard, Legislative Clerk, Committee 

on Energy and Commerce, 2125 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515. 

Thank you again for your time and effort preparing and delivering testimony before the 

Subcommittee. 

Subcommittee on Commerce, 

Manufacturing, and Trade 

cc: Jan Schakowsky, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade 

Attachment 
123 

[Mr. Bainwol did not answer submitted questions for the record 

by the time of printing.] 


FRED UPTON, MICHIGAN 

CHAIRMAN 

Mr. Mitch Bainwol 

President and CEO 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FRANK PALLONE, JR .. NEW JERSEY 

RANKING MEMBER 

<!ongre~~ of tf)e Wntteb $tate~ 

1!,Jom1e of l\epresentattlleil 

COMMITIEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

2125 RAYBURN HousE OFFICE BuiLDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6115 \202)225-<'927 

!202)225-3641 

June 22, 2015 

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers 

803 7th Street, N.W., Suite 300 

Washington, D.C. 20001 

Dear Mr. Bainwol, 

Thank you for appearing before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade on 

Tuesday, June 2, 2015, to testify at the hearing entitled "An Update on the Takata Airbag Ruptures and 

Recalls.'~ 

Pursuant to the Rules of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the hearing record remains 

open for ten business days to permit Members to submit additional questions for the record, which are 

attached. The format of your responses to these questions should be as follows: (I) the name of the 

Member whose question you are addressing, (2) the complete text of the question you are addressing in 

bold, and (3) your answer to that question in plain text. 

To facilitate the printing of the hearing record, please respond to these questions by the close of 

business on Monday, July 6, 2015. Your responses should bee-mailed to the Legislative Clerk in Word 

format at Kirby.Howard@mail.house.gov and mailed to Kirby Howard, Legislative Clerk, Committee 

on Energy and Commerce, 2125 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515. 

Thank you again for your time and effort preparing and delivering testimony before the 

Subcommittee. 

cc: Jan Schakowsky, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade 

Attachment 
124 


FRED UPTON, MICHIGAN 

CHAIRMAN 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., NEW JERSEY 

RANKING MEMBER 

ltt:ongress of tbt Wnittb ~tatts 

~ou~e of i\epre~entatibt~ 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

2125 RAYBURN House OFFICE BuiLDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6115 {202)225-2927 

{202) 225-3641 

June 22,2015 

Mr. John Bozzella 

Chief Executive Officer 

Global Automakers 

1050 K Street, N.W., Suite 650 

Washington, D.C. 20001 

Dear Mr. Bozzella, 

Thank you for appearing before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade on 

Tuesday, June 2, 2015, to testify at the hearing entitled "An Update on the Takata Airhag Ruptures and 

Recalls." 

Pursuant to the Rules of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the hearing record remains 

open for ten business days to permit Members to submit additional questions for the record, which are 

attached. The format of your responses to these questions should be as follows: {I) the name of the 

Member whose question you are addressing, (2) the complete text ofthe question you are addressing in 

bold, and (3) your answer to that question in plain text. 

To facilitate the printing of the hearing record, please respond to these questions by the close of 

business on Monday, July 6, 2015. Your responses should bee-mailed to the Legislative Clerk in Word 

format at Kirby.Howard@mail.house.gov and mailed to Kirby Howard, Legislative Clerk, Committee 

on Energy and Commerce, 2125 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515. 

Thank you again for your time and effort preparing and delivering testimony before the 

Subcommittee. 

Subcommittee on Commerce, 

Manufacturing, and Trade 

cc: Jan Schakowsky, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade 

Attachment 
125 


GlobaiAutomakers 0 

July6, 2015 

The Honorable Michael C. Burgess 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Commerce, 

Manufacturing, and Trade 

2125 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 20515-6115 

Dear Chairman Burgess: 

Aston Martin o Ferrari ., Honda ., Hyundai ., Isuzu o Kia 

Maserati o McLaren o Nissan o Subaru '" Suzuki o Toyota 

Thank you for your June 22, 2015letter and questions on issues related to the Commerce, 

Manufacturing and Trade Subcommittee hearing on the recall of Takata airbag inflators. 

I appreciated the invitation to appear as a witness during this June 2, 2015 hearing as well as the 

opportunity to respond to these additional questions for the record of that hearing from you and 

Ranking Member Schakowsky. 

Should you have any further questions, please contact my staff directly. Paul Ryan, Senior Director 

of Government Affairs, can be reached by phone at (202) 650-5554 or by email at 

pryan@&lobalautomakers.org. 

Thank you for your leadership on this and other issues before the Commerce, Manufacturing, and 

Trade Subcommittee. I and my staff are happy to assist you and your colleagues whenever you 

think we may be helpful. 

Sincerely, 

John Bozzella 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

cc: Jan Schakowsky, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade 

Attachment 

Association. of Global Automaken,lne. 1050 I< Street, NW, Suite 650 'Washington, DC 20001 TH 202,650-5555 GLOSAlA\.ITOMAKERS. ORG 
126 


Additional Questions for the Record 

The Honorable Michael C. Burgess 

1. What kind of inspection do automakers conduct on supplier parts incorporated into 

vehicles as original equipment? 

All of our members have rigorous quality control processes and mechanisms. Global 

Automakers is not in a position to discuss individual inspection practices of manufacturers and 

their suppliers. 

2. When will your member companies stop allowing inflators of a similar chemical 

composition into their cars? 

To this date, no root cause has been determined with regard to the defective Takata airbags. 

The affected auto manufacturers have joined together to form the Independent Testing 

Coalition (lTC) to conduct an independent and comprehensive investigation of the technical 

issues associated with Takata airbag inflators. The affected manufacturers will use results from 

this effort along with other available data to make decisions about airbag system designs for 

their vehicles. 

3. Takata has repeatedly emphasized that this long-term phenomenon of exposure to high 

absolute humidity was outside the scope of testing prescribed by the vehicle 

manufacturers. Are manufacturers now including this phenomenon as a specification in 

the validation process? 

Global Automakers does not have access to internal supply specifications and other 

manufacturer-specific proprietary information related to air bag components. 

4. From the automakers perspective, how long will it take for all cars to be remedied? Are 

automakers recommending that consumers disable affected passenger side airbags until 

replacement parts are available? 

Our members are working diligently to make sure all recalled airbags are removed from 

vehicles as quickly as possible. They are working with alternative suppliers to Takata. They 

are taking actions well beyond their statutory requirements to contact consumers affected by 

the recall. Currently Global Automakers knows of no companies that are recommending air 

bag disablement. 
127 


5. It's been several months and no root cause has been identified. At what point do vehicle 

manufacturers think they should stop using Takata airbags altogether and use parts from 

another supplier if a root cause is not (and potentially cannot) be identified? 

NHTSA, Takata, individual manufacturers and the Independent Testing Coalition (lTC) are all 

involved in analyses to determine a root cause. As such, the affected manufacturers will 

continue to review the data as it becomes available and make individual decisions based upon 

the facts. 

6. Is it normal practice for NHTSA to announce a recall to the public before notifying 

affected automakers? 

The majority of recalls are initiated voluntarily by manufacturers, and NHTSA often makes 

announcements that a manufacturer is initiating a recall. In the case of a NHTSA determined 

recall, there is a regulatory process that the agency follows that includes making an Initial 

Decision about the basis for a proposed recall, notifying the manufacturer about the Initial 

Decision to allow manufacturer input, and then, if appropriate, making a Final Determination. 

The Honorable Jan Schakowsky 

1. For the current recall, testing conducted by NHTSA, Takata, and automakers has shown 

that it often takes 7-12 years for the inflator defects to manifest. Takata has stated 

numerous times that it has not yet determined the root cause of its airbag inflator 

ruptures. As a result, Takata is replacing some inflators with newer versions of the same, 

potentially defective, model. 

a. If some or all replacement inflators prove defective or it is unclear whether the 

replacements are safe, will your member companies commit to conducting 

another recall, regardless of Takata's actions? 

Our companies are committed to removing any airbag inflators, including 

replacements, if the replacements are determined to have a safety-related defect. 

b. Have any of your member companies specifically requested replacement inflators 

manufactured by other suppliers? If so, which companies and for which make, 

model, and year? 

Several affected companies have made public announcements that they are using 

other suppliers in addition to or instead of Takata to replace recalled airbag inflators. 

Global Automakers is not in a position to discuss individual relationships between 

manufacturers and their suppliers. 

c. Have any of your member companies chosen to use other suppliers' products to 

replace defective Takata inflators? If so, which companies, and for which make, 

model, and year? 

Several affected companies have made public announcements that they are using 

other suppliers in addition to or instead of Takata to replace recalled airbag inflators. 

Global Automakers is not in a position to discuss individual relationships between 

manufacturers and their suppliers. 

2 
128 


d. Have any of your member companies insisted that replacement inflators contain 

a propellant other than ammonium nitrate? If so, which companies and what 

chemical is being requested? 

Global Automakers does not have access to internal supply specifications and other 

manufacturer-specific proprietary information related to particular propellants. 

e. Are any of your member companies willing to provide a replacement inflator from 

a supplier other than Takata if a consumer requests it? If so, which companies? 

Our member companies are committed to ensuring the safety of consumers, and the top 

priority for the auto manufacturers is removing and replacing the recalled airbag 

inflators. Several companies have made public announcements that they are using 

other suppliers in addition to or instead of Takata to replace recalled airbags. 

f. Have any of your member companies received reports of malfunctioning 

replacement parts? If so, please list the company that received the reports and 

the make and model of the vehicles and types of inflators that were the subject of 

the reports. 

Global Automakers is not aware of any such reports or malfunctions. We believe the 

affected companies are reporting regularly to NHTSA and would be providing this 

information to the agency if they learned about any new reports regarding 

malfunctioning replacement airbags. 

g. Have any of your members issued "do not drive" warnings regarding any vehicles 

with defective Takata airbags? If not, why not? 

Global Automakers does not have specific knowledge of facts underlying the reasons 

companies do or do not issue "do not drive" warnings; each company's decision is 

based on individual analysis of the specific situation and the best information available. 

h. Is it your position that rental car companies should be allowed to rent recalled 

cars to the public before the defect or noncompliance is remedied unless the 

manufacturer has Issued a "do not drive" warning? 

The members of Global Automakers all recognize the importance of remedying 

defects - those in the hands of fleets and in the hands of individuals -as soon as 

possible. 

2. The current Takata recall now involves nearly 34 million cars made by 11 automakers, 

making It the largest and most complex auto recall ever conducted. The sheer volume of 

vehicles, the complexity of handling a recall across 11 manufacturers, and the multiple 

rounds of regional recalls leading up to this point have led to substantial consumer 

confusion. 

a. What specific steps are your member companies taking to address consumer 

confusion relating to the multiple rounds of Takata recalls? 

3 
129 


Member companies are taking extraordinary, unprecedented measures to communicate 

with their customers. They are distributing multiple rounds of recall notices. They are 

using multiple platforms such as special company websites, express mail, advertising, 

social media, or electronic communications. They are working in coordination with 

NHTSA to make sure all information released regarding the Takata recalls is accurate 

and consistent. 

b. Are your member companies reporting any difficulties in acquiring up-to-date or 

accurate information from Takata? Please explain. 

Global Automakers does not have access to manufacturer-specific information related 

to communications with Takata. 

c. What specific steps are your member companies taking to ensure auto dealers 

have up-to-date information and are able to answer consumers' questions? 

Our members are working closely with their dealer networks to ensure that dealers have 

the knowledge and capacity to service vehicles with open recalls. Most importantly, 

manufacturers provide dealers with the capability to review YIN-specific information 

that allows dealers to communicate with customers about recalls that may affect their 

vehicles. 

d. How do your member companies plan to reach consumers who have already 

replaced their airbags but may need to do so again? 

In addition to meeting or exceeding federal recall notification requirements, our 

members will continue to use the measures outlined above to reach all consumers and 

potential affected vehicle owners. 

e. At the hearing, Takata explained that there are new cars being sold today with 

the soon-to-be-discontinued PSDI inflators. Is it possible for a consumer to know 

at the time of purchase of new or used cars which type of inflator is in a car? The 

consumer would then be on the lookout for the recall notice. Will your member 

companies make that information available at the time of purchase? 

Global Automakers is not in a position to discuss individual practices of the affected 

companies. 

3. Following the December hearing, a number of automakers agreed on the record that 

sharing identifying information about recalled parts with the automotive recycling 

industry would help increase safety. A number of automakers noted that information 

about recalled defective parts are available via subscription with service bulletins and 

other service information. 

a. Are the subscription services that include service bulletins and other service 

information available free of charge or must a parts recycler pay a fee to subscribe 

or otherwise access that information? 

Manufacturer service/technical communications and repair procedures concerning 

recalls, including information about affected parts (when a recall involves a specific 

4 
130 


part) are provided to NHTSA and placed on the agency's recall page for each individual 

recall. This information is readily available and free of charge. Manufacturers also 

provide access, with some charging a nominal fee, for additional service and repair 

information to owners and the aftermarket on their service websites. 

b. If such information is not available free of charge, why not? 

This information is already available to the public free of charge under the current 

system. 

c. Do you support the establishment of a system to ensure that this information is 

made available to the public free of charge? 

This information is already available to the public free of charge under the current 

system. 

d. If a consumer goes to a junk yard to buy a part to fix his or her car, bow will she 

know if that part is subject to recall if the junkyard owner does not have that 

information? 

To ensure the safety of all drivers and passengers, salvaged airbags and airbag 

components should never be used as replacement parts, regardless of whether the 

parts have been subject to a recall or not. This is because there is no valid data 

demonstrating that salvaged airbags and components will or can be made to work 

properly in a subsequent collision. Numerous factors can compromise the ability of a 

salvaged airbag or salvaged airbag component extracted from a "total loss" or other 

vehicle to operate properly. The salvaged airbags, regardless of outward appearance, 

may have been subject to excessive water exposure, such as flood damage, or 

improperly extracted, handled or stored. It is also possible that the salvaged airbag or 

component may not be appropriate for the particular vehicle- for example the coupe 

and sedan versions of a certain model may appear the same, but have differences in 

the design of similar components. These differences in design can affect the 

operation of the airbag. In sum, proper performance cannot be assured when 

salvaged airbags and airbag components are re-installed in other vehicles. With the 

exception of actual deployment of the airbag module, there currently is no test to 

confirm that a salvaged airbag will deploy as intended to provide the occupant the 

necessary protection in a crash. 

With regard to the sale of other recycled parts, it should be noted that the majority of 

vehicle parts do not contain specific part numbers stamped on them and may not have 

other specific identifying information. In addition, NHTSA's vehicle recall system is 

based on Vehicle Identification Numbers (VINs). Using a vehicle's YIN, it is 

possible to identify whether the vehicle is subject to any outstanding recalls by using 

either the lookup tool on NHTSA's Safercar.gov website, or consulting the 

manufacturer's website. This provides a means for a salvage yard owner to obtain 

information on whether or not the product is subject to recall, and they should provide 

that information to their customers. 

4. A June 8, 2015, article In the Detroit News cited a joint letter sent by the Alliance of 

Automobile Manufacturers and Association of Global Automakers to NHTSA, asking 

5 
131 


the agency to initiate "intensive public awareness campaign about the importance of 

recall participation by consumers." Please submit that letter as well as any additional 

supporting information. 

The letter is attached. 

5. The massive scale of the Takata recall has left consumers confused-and manufacturers 

unsure as to whether Takata can produce replacement parts quickly and safely enough 

to satisfy demand. In addition, given NHTSA's plan to prioritize repairs in certain parts 

of the country where the risk of injury or death from the defects is higher, some 

consumers likely will be unable to have inflators remedied right away. 

a. Will your member companies make 'loaner cars' available to owners of recalled 

cars when there are not enough replacement kits available and will they be free of 

charge? 

Global Automakers is not in a position to discuss individual practices of the affected 

companies. It has been publicly reported that affected companies are making loaner 

cars available based on the needs of the vehicle owner .. 

b. Will your member companies notify customers that the loaner car they are driving 

may be subject to a safety recall? 

Global Automakers is not in a position to discuss individual practices of the affected 

companies. Manufacturers do not provide loaner cars directly to customers; this is 

done through dealerships, which are independent businesses. 

c. Can you commit that your member automakers will not loan out cars subject to 

this recall without first having those loaner cars repaired to ensure that the loaner 

cars will be safe and not susceptible to the same inflator risks? 

Global Automakers is not in a position to discuss individual practices of the affected 

companies. Manufacturers do not provide loaner cars directly to customers; this is done 

through dealers. However, manufacturers request that dealers make necessary recall 

repairs prior to making them available to customers .. 

d. Do you agree that auto dealers should not be able to loaner out cars that are under 

an existing safety recall without first remedying the defect or non-compliance? 

Global Automakers is not in a position to discuss individual practices of the affected 

companies. Manufacturers do not provide loaner cars directly to customers; this is 

done through dealers. However, manufacturers request that dealers make necessary 

recall repairs prior to making them available to customers. 

e. What steps do your member companies take to ensure that their dealers do not 

provide consumers with loaner cars that are subject to a safety recall? 

Global Automakers is not in a position to discuss individual practices of the affected 

companies. Manufacturers do not provide loan cars directly to customers; this is done 

through dealers. However, manufacturers request that dealers make necessary recall 

repairs prior to making them available to customers. 

6 
132 


Do you agree that it is not the consumer's responsibility to ensure that a loaner 

vehicle is safe and not subject to a recall? 

Global Automakers is not in a position to discuss individual practices of the affected 

companies. Manufacturers do not provide loaner cars directly to customers; this is 

done through dealers. We believe that manufacturers request dealers to make 

necessary recall repairs prior to making them available to customers. 

f. Would you support legislation prohibiting auto dealers from providing loaner 

vehicles with an open safety recall until the defect or non-compliance is remedied? 

We are happy to work with the committee to determine if such legislation is necessary 

and appropriate. 

7 
133 


AUTO ALLIANCE 

DRIVING INNOVATION* 

GlobalAutomakers 

May29, 2015 

The Honorable Mark Rosekind, Ph.D. 

Administrator 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. 

Washington, D.C. 20590 

RE: Retooling Recalls 

NHTSA Docket 2015-0038 

Dear Administrator Rosekind: 

The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, lnc.1 ("Alliance") and the Association of 

Global Automakers, Inc? ("Global Automakers') are pleased to have thts opportunity to provide 

comments to the docket you have established to collect suggestions and information about 

how we can collectively improve the participation rates on safety-related recalls. Your call for 

public comments artses from the public workshop sponsored by NHTSA on April28, 2015 that 

brought together auto makers, auto dealers, safety advocates, researchers and others to discuss 

how to improve recall participation rates. 

At the outset, the Alliance and Global Automakers wish to commend you for convening 

this workshop and for bringing a spotlight onto the problem of recall participation rates, 

particularly for older model vehicles. As you know, the national average recall participation rate 

is about 75%, where it has been for the last several decades. However, the rate varies 

considerably with the age of the vehicle at the time of the recall. For relatively new vehicles, the 

participation rate averages 83%, while that rate falls almost in half to 44% for vehicles 5-10 years 

old. The participation rate drops again to 15% for vehicles older than 10 years. 

The Alliance and Global Automakers support your call for suggestions for reasonable 

efforts to improve safety recall participation rates. Our members want all recalled vehicles to be 

remedied, and we welcome your call for a national discussion on how to achieve that goal 

However, we believe that the discussion must include the many stakeholders who will need to 

1 The Alliance ts a trade association whose members are: BMW Group, Fiat Chrysler LLC, Ford Motor Company, 

General Motors Company, Jaguar Land Rover, Mazda, Mercedes· Benz USA, Mitsubishi Motors, Porsche Cars North 

America, Toyota, Volkswagen Group of America and Volvo Cars of North America. 2 Global Automakers is a trade association whose members are: American Honda Motor Co., Aston Martin lagonda of 

North America, Inc., Ferrari North America, Inc., Hyundai Motor America, lsuzu Motors America, Inc., Kia Motors 

America, Inc .. Maserati North America, Inc., Mclaren Automotive ltd., Nissan North America, Inc., Subaru of America, 

Inc., Suzuki Motor of America, Inc., and Toyota Motor North America, Inc. 
134 


The Honorable Mark Rosekind, Ph.D. 2 May29, 2015 

be part of the solution, including vehicle owners, authorized dealers, independent service 

providers, auto insurance companies, as well as our members, NHTSA and others. 

To better understand and help improve the consumer participation rate in vehicle recalls, 

the Alliance has begun a nationwide, multi-dimensional research initiative designed to identify 

issues leading to non-participation and possible approaches to improve participation. Through 

a variety of research techniques, including both qualitative and quantitative tools, along with 

traditional and cutting-edge methodologies, researchers will explore the issue of motor vehicle 

recalls and consumer compliance to provide findings and recommendations by fall2015. 

At the recent recall participation rates workshop, numerous suggestions and strategies 

were discussed. Some of them warrant attention in these comments. 

First, the Alliance and Global Automakers wish to comment on the concept that was 

raised during the workshop that "salvaged parts" might be a solution for recall part shortages. 

Vehicle manufacturers strongly disagree that salvaged parts are ever an appropriate solution for 

recall part shortages, but particularly when the part at issue is as complicated as an airbag. 

There is simply no way to know whether a salvaged part has been through trauma (such as a 

flood) that might have compromised its performance. Unless and until salvage part suppliers 

are held responsible for the performance of the parts they supply, we cannot agree that 

salvaged parts would ever be appropriate as a solution for recall part shortages. 

Second, there was extensive discussion at the workshop about the concept that vehicle 

re-registrations should be linked to evidence of recall participation. The Alliance and Global 

Automakers see promise in this approach as one possible means for increasing recall 

participation rates. However, there are several factors that must be taken into account before 

implementing a system that makes registration contingent on recall participation. Most likely, 

any requirement linking vehicle registrations to participation in open recalls would require state 

legislation in each of the 50 states and other jurisdictions (such as the District of Columbia and 

Puerto Rico). One factor that requires consideration is the availability of remedy parts in those 

recalls that are phased over time or geography. Owners should not be denied re-registration 

for failing to participate in a recall for which they cannot yet obtain parts. Also to be considered 

are the implications for the state Departments of Motor Vehicles ("DMVs") such as the need for 

changes to their registration process and computer systems, as well as procedures for 

addressing customer service issues. As an interim step, while these factors are being considered 

by stakeholders, state DMVs should consider notifying vehicle owners of open recalls (based on 

information in NHTSA's VIN lookup database) when they contact owners about re-registration. 

Third, there was discussion at the workshop of the possibility of encouraging 

independent repair shops or vehicle service providers (such as oil change service providers) to 

look up the recall completion status of vehicles that come through their facilities for service. 

NHTSA's VIN lookup tool would facilitate this, and we believe that consumers would find this to 

be a valuable added benefit. We also witt reach out to other entities that interact with vehicle 
135 


The Honorable Mark Rosekind, Ph.D. 3 May 29,2015 

owners (such as auto insurance companies) to explore ways that they might be able to work 

with available information to notify vehicle owners about open recalls when contacting them for 

other reasons. 

Fourth, we are aware of the proposal by NADA and others to permit batch processing of 

VIN information against the information available on NHTSA's VIN lookup tooL The Alliance 

and Global Automakers have reached out to NADA to better understand this issue and to see if 

we could support a solution that addresses their concerns wh\le continuing to ensure the data 

security and appropriate uses for bulk VIN data. 

Fifth, there was discussion at the workshop of the possibility of ranking recalls by 

severity of the risk in order to encourage consumers to participate at least in those campaigns 

that involve more serious hazards. The Alliance and Global Automakers caution that any such 

ranking system may have the unintended effect of reducing participation in recalls that are 

ranked as presenting less serious safety consequences. For this reason, any such ranking system 

would need to be carefully considered before deciding whether to implement it. 

Sixth, we believe that NHTSA could contribute to improved consumer recall awareness 

by notifying consumers who file VOQs with VIN information whether there are any open recalls 

on their vehicle. NHTSA could run the consumer's VIN against the VIN look-up tool to obtain 

this information and advise the consumer of the results. Because NHTSA does not provide auto 

manufacturers with the full VINs for VOQs that are filed with NHTSA in the absence of an open 

ODI investigation, this is not a service that the auto makers can offer at this time. 

Seventh, we recognize that some remedies involving software updating could potentially 

be "pushed" to vehicles over the air via cellular data networks, avoiding the need for the 

consumer to visit a dealership for the work. However, this option raises other issues, including 

how to obtain and record the consent of the vehicle owner to accept the pushed remedy, 

particularly in the case of a second or third owner of the vehicle, and how to address privacy 

concerns. Certain other challenges to the use of over-the-air remedies were raised at the 

workshop, including cyber-security concerns. These issues will require further work before this 

technological solution can be implemented more broadly. 

Another issue for consideration is whether NHTSA's rule requiring notice to owners 

within 60 days of notifying NHTSA of the presence of a safety-related defect even when remedy 

parts are not yet available may, in fact, be deterring consumers from participating in the recall 

when the parts later become available. We recognize that the rule was motivated by a concern 

that consumers should be informed within a reasonable period of time after a safety-related 

defect has been determined to exist in their vehicles, so that they can be apprised of a condition 

associated with their vehicle while awaiting the remedy. However, an unintended consequence 

of this rule may have been to overload consumers with recall information such that they do not 

pay attention when the notice of remedy availability 
136 

Æ 


The Honorable Mark Rosekind, Ph.D. 4 May 29,2015 

arrives. Or, consumers may become complacent if they drive their vehicles for a period of time 

after receiving the 60-day notice, and they do not experience the harm. This is an issue that 

warrants additional consideration. 

Finally, the Alliance and Global Automakers recommend that NHTSA develop an 

intensive public awareness campaign about the importance of recall participation by consumers. 

A campaign that is modeled on "Click It or Ticket,• or ·over the Limit- Under Arrest• could raise 

public awareness of the importance of participating in safety recall campaigns. The NHTSA 

campaign should include promotion of the VIN-lookup tool and other NHTSA initiatives to 

promote recall awareness. Our members pledge to build on a NHTSA-sponsored public 

awareness campaign to leverage the branding and expand public exposure to the message 

through new and traditional media. 

The Alliance and Global Automakers appreciates this opportunity to contribute to 

this important dialogue about improving recall participation rates, and we look forward to 

working with you and your staff to implement those changes that hold promise for improving 

recall participation in the future. 

Sincerely, 

INC. ASSOCIATION OF GLOBAL AUTOMAKERS, INC. 

Michael X. Cammisa 

Senior Director 

Safety