U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 

112TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

COMMITTEE

2011 

PRINT 112–B 

BOKO HARAM 

Emerging Threat to the U.S. 

Homeland 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

December 2011 

FIRST SESSION 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

VACANCY

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director & Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

BOKO HARAM 

EMERGING THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND

I. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1 

II. Findings ............................................................................................................... 3 

III. Recommendations ............................................................................................. 3 

IV. Origins and History ........................................................................................... 5 

Uprising ................................................................................................................ 5 

Radical Reemergence ........................................................................................... 5 

V. From ‘‘Aspiration’’ to the U.S. Homeland ......................................................... 6 

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) ...................................................... 7 

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) ........................................................................ 9 

VI. Evolution and Collaboration ............................................................................. 11 

Changing Tactics and Targets: Suicide Bombers and Western Targets .......... 11 

Collaboration with AQIM and al Shabaab ......................................................... 12 

A General’s Warning ............................................................................................ 14 

Potential Future Targets: Energy and Aviation Sectors ................................... 15 

VII. Communications and Media ............................................................................ 17 

Martyrdom Videos ................................................................................................ 17 

Internet Forums ................................................................................................... 18 

VIII. Options for U.S. Engagement ........................................................................ 20 

Military and Intelligence Support ...................................................................... 20 

Diplomatic Engagement ...................................................................................... 22 

Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Designation .......................................... 23 

IX. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 24 

(1) 

1 ‘‘Nigeria UN bomb: Video of ‘Boko Haram’ bomber released,’’ BBC News, September 18, 

2011. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14964554. 2 ‘‘Islamist attacks in Nigeria: A taste of the Taliban,’’ The Economist, July 31, 2009. Available 

at: http://www.economist.com/node/14156107?storylid=14156107. 3 BBC News, supra note 1. 

4 Al Qaeda-linked group finds fertile territory in Nigeria as killings escalate,’’ Paul 

Cruickshank and Tom Lister, CNN, November 18, 2011, pg. 2. Available at: http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-18/africa/worldlafricalnigeria-militantsl1lboko-haram-maidugurinigerian-state/2?ls=PM:AFRICA. 5 Ibid., 3. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

On August 26, 2011, a suicide bomber drove a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) into the United Nations (U.N.) 

headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria, killing 23 people and injuring more 

than 80 others.1 Responsibility for the bombing, one of the deadliest in the United Nations’ history, was claimed by Boko Haram, 

an Islamist religious sect turned insurgent group based in the predominantly Muslim northern Nigeria. While this attack occurred 

inside Nigerian borders, it was the first time Boko Haram had targeted an international, non-Nigerian entity. 

The attack marked a significant shift in the targeting and goals 

of the group, largely unknown to the U.S. Intelligence Community, 

and capped off an evolution in the capabilities of Boko Haram, beginning in the mid-2000s, from attacks with poisoned arrows and 

machetes to sophisticated car bombings.2 In a video that surfaced 

in Nigeria in the weeks following the U.N. bombing, the perpetrator of the attack described the United Nations as a forum for 

‘‘all global evil’’ and stated the attacks were designed to ‘‘send a 

message to the U.S. President and ‘other infidels.’ ’’3

According to Ambassador Anthony Holmes, Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA) of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), members of Boko Haram are being 

trained by Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).4

They are also believed to have ties to the Somalian militant group 

al Shabaab.5 This cooperation, combined with the increased sophistication of attacks executed by Boko Haram, have led to concerns 

from the U.S. Intelligence Community over the sect’s intent and capability to strike Western targets in Nigeria, throughout Africa, 

and most importantly, the U.S. homeland. 

Historically, Boko Haram has been focused on Nigerian government targets. Until recently, Western intelligence services did not 

widely view Boko Haram as a potential threat. Even after the U.N. 

attack, Nigerian experts remain skeptical about Boko Haram’s intent and capability to strike U.S. interests and the homeland. 

However, in the recent past, the U.S. Intelligence Community 

has underestimated the intent and capability of other terrorist 

groups to launch attacks against the U.S. homeland. The most notable recent examples include al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

(AQAP), and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the 
2 

Pakistani Taliban. The U.S. Intelligence Community and outside 

counterterrorism and intelligence experts assessed that AQAP and 

TTP were regionally-based groups with a target set limited to 

Western supported governments or, at worst, American interests in 

the Middle East and South Asia. These assessments and general 

assumptions nearly proved fatal when a series of attempted attacks 

planned, directed, and executed by these two groups were thwarted 

on Christmas Day 2009 on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 over Detroit, and in May 2010 in New York City’s Times Square. Given the 

ability of these other groups to become operational with apparently 

meager resources, it would be prudent for the U.S. Government to 

thoroughly and carefully examine the extent of the threat from 

Boko Haram to the U.S. homeland. 

As Chairman and Ranking Member of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on 

Counterterrorism and Intelligence, it is our duty to examine all 

threats to the U.S. homeland. Boko Haram’s recent escalation has 

prompted us to examine the group’s potential, intent, and capability to attack United States interests and the U.S. homeland. 

This report will discuss the evolution of Boko Haram, its goals, and 

potential to commit acts of terrorism against U.S. interests and the 

U.S. homeland. This report will further discuss Nigerian counterterrorism capabilities, current U.S. diplomatic efforts, and future 

U.S. engagement and assistance options to assist the Nigerian government in countering the threat posed by Boko Haram. It is our 

hope that the conclusions in this report will raise awareness about 

the emerging threat posed by Boko Haram. 

This report is based on open source information and extensive 

unclassified briefings from Government and non-Government entities. However, it should be noted that because of the speed with 

which Boko Haram has evolved as a terrorist group, little is known 

about the sect. Information is murky and academic research is limited. This report attempts to shed light on Boko Haram and the 

emerging threat it poses to U.S. interests and the homeland. To the 

extent this report spurs additional scholarship and intelligence collection, the U.S. Government will benefit and the American people 

will be safer. 

Patrick Meehan 

Chairman 

Jackie Speier 

Ranking Member 
3 

II. FINDINGS 

1. Boko Haram has quickly evolved and poses an emerging threat 

to U.S. interests and the U.S. homeland. 

2. Boko Haram has the intent and may be developing capability 

to coordinate on a rhetorical and operational level with al 

Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al 

Shabaab. 

3. Boko Haram’s evolution in targeting and tactics closely tracks 

that of other al-Qaeda affiliates that have targeted the U.S. 

homeland, most notably Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

(AQAP) and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). 

4. The U.S. Intelligence Community largely underestimated the 

potential for al-Qaeda affiliate groups to target the U.S. homeland, wrongly assessing they had only regional ambitions and 

threats against the U.S. homeland were merely ‘‘aspirational.’’ 

5. The United States should work with the Government of Nigeria 

to build counterterrorism and intelligence capability to effectively counter Boko Haram. 

III. RECOMMENDATIONS 

1. Do Not Underestimate Boko Haram’s Intent and Capability to 

Attack the U.S. Homeland.—As this report makes clear, the U.S. 

Intelligence Community has recently underestimated the intent 

and capability of terrorist groups to strike the homeland, most notably Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Tehrik-iTaliban Pakistan (TTP). These underestimations had near-deadly 

consequences on Christmas Day 2009 over Detroit and in May 2010 

in Times Square. 

3. Determine Whether Boko Haram Should be Designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).—The Secretary of State should 

conduct an investigation into whether Boko Haram should be designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization, in accordance with Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. Following the Boko Haram attack on the United Nations (U.N.) 

headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria, we wrote to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton calling for an investigation to determine whether FTO 

designation was necessary. In light of Boko Haram’s continued escalation, FTO designation may be required to provide our intelligence and law enforcement communities the tools necessary to ensure Boko Haram does not attack U.S. interests and the U.S. 

homeland. 

3. Increase U.S. Intelligence Community Collection on Boko 

Haram.—The U.S. Intelligence Community must increase its intelligence collection on Boko Haram, including human intelligence 

(HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT). It must also enhance 

its liaison relationship with Nigerian security services and help 

build their capacity to combat the threat posed by Boko Haram to 

Nigerian and U.S. interests. 

4. Conduct Outreach with Nigerian Diaspora Communities in the 

United States.—The U.S. Government should develop relationships 

with Nigerian diaspora communities in the United States to learn 

more about Boko Haram and the factors driving its evolution, intent, capability, and targeting. Through familial and personal rela-
4 

tionships, diaspora communities in the United States provide a 

unique and invaluable perspective on their home country. 

5. Increase U.S. Government Support for Nigerian Counterterrorism and Intelligence Programs.—The U.S. Government should 

increase its support for programs that enhance the ability of Nigerian security forces to more effectively target Boko Haram and 

counter its evolution. The U.S. and Nigerian governments should 

also work more closely to increase intelligence collection. 
5 

6 ‘‘Boko Haram,’’ Toni Johnson, Council on Foreign Relations, November 7, 2011. Available at: 

http://www.cfr.org/africa/boko-haram/p25739. 7 ‘‘Boko Haram: History, ideas, and revolt [2].’’ Shehu Sani, The Guardian, July 8, 2011. Available at: http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/index.php?option=comlcontent&view=article&- 

id=53730:boko-haramhistory-ideas-and-revolt-2&catid=72:focus&Itemid=598. 8 ‘‘Boko Haram: History, ideas, and revolt [4].’’ Shehu Sani, Vanguard, July 8, 2011. Available 

at: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/07/boko-haram-history-ideas-and-revolt-4/. 

9 ‘‘Boko Haram: History, ideas, and revolt [5].’’ Shehu Sani, Vanguard, July 7, 2011. Available 

at: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/07/boko-haram-history-ideas-and-revolt-5/. 

10 ‘‘Nigeria Conflict Assessment,’’ USAID, August 2011, pg. 39. 

IV. ORIGINS AND HISTORY 

UPRISING

‘‘Boko Haram,’’ which in the local Hausa language means ‘‘Western education is forbidden,’’ officially calls itself ‘‘Jama’atul Alhul 

Sunnah Lidda’wati wal Jihad,’’ which means ‘‘people committed to 

the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and jihad.’’6 Though the 

origins of Boko Haram are murky, the group was not founded as 

a violent insurgency bent on overthrowing the Nigerian government. Founded in the mid-1990s as a religious study group, Boko 

Haram did not begin to transform into the insurgent group it is 

today until a young and charismatic Nigerian civil service employee named Mohammed Yusuf assumed control. Calling themselves the Nigerian Taliban, Boko Haram adopted a ‘‘live-off-the 

land’’ lifestyle and established a camp in a remote area of northeast Nigeria, which the group dubbed ‘‘Afghanistan.’’7

From 2002–2009, Boko Haram engaged in low-level conflict with 

local police forces and non-compliant villagers. In 2009, a crackdown on Boko Haram members from Nigerian police forces in 

Borno state erupted into fighting. On July 26, 2009, sect members 

launched an attack against a police station in Bauchi state, resulting in the death of 39 Boko Haram members, two police officers, 

and one soldier.8 This ignited a 5-day stand-off between Boko 

Haram and security personnel that saw violent attacks and battles 

spread across four northern Nigerian states: Bauchi, Kano, and 

Yobe, culminating in a final battle in the city of Maiduguri in 

Borno state. 

On July 30, 2009, the battle of Maiduguri ended when Nigerian 

security forces captured and killed Boko Haram’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf, in what human rights groups have deemed an 

extrajudicial killing. Yusuf’s execution was videotaped by soldiers 

and later broadcast on television.9 In total, nearly 700 people were 

killed in the uprising. The death of Yusuf marked a turning point 

for the Boko Haram. It was forced underground and many of its 

leaders reportedly fled to other parts of Nigeria, including Bauchi 

state, as well as neighboring countries.10

RADICAL REEMERGENCE

In 2010, Boko Haram re-emerged radically more violent and determined to seek vengeance against the Nigerian state for executing its leader. Under the leadership of Imam Abubakar Shekau, 

who claimed to have assumed control of the sect following the 

death of Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram militants carried out violent operations against government targets in the north. The most 

notable include an assault on a Maiduguri prison that resulted in 
6 

11 ‘‘In Nigeria’s northeast, some sympathy for Islamists,’’ Joe Brock, Reuters, November 14, 

2011. Available at: http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/11/14/idINIndia-60515120111114. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Johnson, supra note 6. 15 Ibid. 

the release of 700 prisoners, including Boko Haram members, and 

a bombing in the city of Jos that killed more than 80 people. Significantly, the targeting of the Nigerian capital city of Abuja represented an evolving target set outside of Northern Nigeria. In 

June 2011, Boko Haram militants bombed the police headquarters 

in Abuja, and finally, carried out the suicide attack against the 

Abuja U.N. headquarters 2 months later. 

A number of factors have been attributed to fueling Boko 

Haram’s violence and fanaticism, including a feeling of alienation 

from the wealthier, Christian, oil-producing, southern Nigeria, pervasive poverty, rampant government corruption, heavy-handed security measures, and the belief that relations with the West are a 

corrupting influence. These grievances have led to sympathy among 

the local Muslim population despite Boko Haram’s violent tactics.11

Residents in northern Nigeria live in extreme poverty. In 

Maiduguri, most residents live on less than $2 a day.12 Shettima 

Khalifa Dikwa, chairman of the Voters Forum at the University of 

Maiduguri, blamed the government and heavy security practices 

for the growing public sympathy toward Boko Haram. ‘‘If it escalates it is the fault of the government and JTF (Joint Task Force). 

You can’t have JTF searching your house, invading your privacy, 

mistreating people without you having sympathy for Boko 

Haram.’’13 These grievances and the failure of the government to 

effectively address them serve as a key recruiting tool for Boko 

Haram. 

Boko Haram’s desire to rid northern Nigeria of these problems 

serves as the primary motives behind their stated ambition to implement Sharia Law and establish an Islamic state.14 Sharia Law 

currently exists in 12 out of 36 Nigerian states as the result of a 

grassroots movement that coincided with Nigeria’s transition to democracy in 1999.15

A consistent lack of reliable reporting on Boko Haram has contributed to the difficulty in assessing its size, makeup, and goals. 

Boko Haram operates out of Maiduguri, the capital city of Borno 

state in northeast Nigeria bordered by Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. 

The group’s membership is elusive. Some describe the ‘‘core Boko 

Haram’’ as the immediate followers of the late sect leader Mohammed Yusuf. However, others consider Boko Haram to be more of a 

‘‘grassroots insurrection,’’ or an ‘‘amorphous cloud’’ that has 

emerged from the larger context of Muslim grievances and frustration with the government. 

V. FROM ‘‘ASPIRATION’’ TO THE U.S. HOMELAND 

Boko Haram’s activities over the last 2 years mark an escalation 

in the frequency and violence of its attacks. On February 10, 2011, 

Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper delivered 

the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community and stated that Boko Haram was ‘‘focused on local issues. 
7 

16 ‘‘Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment for the U.S. Intelligence 

Community,’’ James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, February 10, 2011, pg. 18. 

Available at: http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20110210ltestimonylclapper.pdf. 17 ‘‘Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula,’’ National Counterterrorism Center website. Available 

at: http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqap.html. 

18 ‘‘Fort Hood Suspect Yells Nidal Hasan’s Name in Court,’’ Pierre Thomas, Martha Raddatz, 

Rhonda Scwartz, Jason Ryan, ABC News, July 29, 2011. Available at: http://abcnews.go.com/ 

Blotter/fort-hoodsuspect-nabbed-al-qaeda-inspire-magazine/story?id=14187568#.TtS7YLJFuso. 19 Ibid. Anwar al-Awlaki was an American-born Muslim cleric of Yemeni descent. He was an 

imam at mosques in San Diego, CA and Falls Church, VA where it was suspected that he had 

ties to three of the 9/11 hijackers. After 9/11, he denounced the attacks and emerged as a voice 

of moderation within the Muslim community. This changed in 2002 when he left the United 

Continued 

[and] may be pursuing interests it shares with AQIM.’’16 Boko 

Haram’s activities since then mark an escalation in the frequency 

and violence of its attacks and an emboldened Boko Haram should 

warrant enhanced scrutiny from the U.S. Intelligence Community. 

In order to properly gauge the true threat Boko Haram will pose 

to U.S. interests and potentially the U.S. homeland in the future, 

it may be useful to examine two other groups whose rapid expansion in capabilities and apparent evolution in targeting and goals 

took the United States by surprise. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), both newly 

formed groups, were viewed by the U.S. Intelligence Community 

and outside experts as regionally focused and content to launch 

strikes against their home governments and Western interests in 

the region. In both cases, the Intelligence Community—and the 

country—were caught off guard when attacks were launched by 

AQAP and TTP against the U.S. homeland. The rapid evolution of 

Boko Haram as a threat shares certain characteristics with AQAP 

and TTP; an examination of the rise of these two groups may be 

useful in projecting the future threat of Boko Haram. 

AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA (AQAP) 

In January 2009, the al-Qaeda branches in Saudi Arabia and 

Yemen merged into Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.17 The creation of AQAP concerned U.S. intelligence officials, but the widelyheld assessment was that AQAP intended to target the Saudi Arabian monarchy, the Yemeni government, and U.S. interests in the 

Gulf region. Twice in the months prior to the merger that created 

AQAP, the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a was attacked. Still, the U.S. Intelligence Community did not assess there was serious intent nor 

capability to launch attacks on American soil. 

In August 2009, a suicide bomber detonated an explosive device 

hidden inside his body in an attempt to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Assistant Interior Minister Muhammad bin Nayef. It was a 

brazen plot that came close to killing a top U.S. terrorism ally, and 

represented AQAP’s boldest terrorist attempt since the merger. It 

also signaled a quick evolution in sophistication of targeting and 

bomb-making. 

On November 5, 2009, U.S. Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan 

opened fire on fellow soldiers at the Fort Hood Army base in Texas, 

killing 13 and wounding more than 30.18 In the subsequent investigation, it was revealed that before the attack, Major Hasan corresponded via email with the future operational leader of AQAP, 

American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.19 Major Hasan’s contact 
8 

States for London and eventually Yemen, where he became a proponent of militant Islam and 

encouraged attacks against Americans. He came to be viewed by many in the U.S. Intelligence 

Community as a greater threat to the United States than Osama bin Laden. On September 30, 

2011, al-Awlaki was killed by a CIA drone strike in Yemen, after a 2-year manhunt. 20 ‘‘The Radicalization of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.’’ Mark Hosenball, Newsweek, January 

1, 2010. Available at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/01/01/the-radicalizationof-umar-faroukabdulmutallab.html. 21 ‘‘Al-Qaeda link investigated as clues emerge in foiled terror attack,’’ CNN, December 28, 

2009, pg. 2. Available at: http://articles.cnn.com/2009-12-28/justice/airline.terror.attemptl1lal-qaeda-explosive-deviceyemeni/2?ls=PM:CRIME. 22 ‘‘Underwear Bomber: New video of Training, Martyrdom Statements,’’ Matthew Cole, Brian 

Ross, and Nasser Atta, April 26, 2010. Available at: http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/underwearbomber-videotraining-martyrdom-statements/story?id=10479470#.TtS9K7JFuso. 23 ‘‘Press Briefing by Napolitano, Brennan, and Gibbs on the attempted December 25, 2009 

terrorist attack,’’ Council on Foreign Relations, January 7, 2010. Available at: http:// 

www.cfr.org/terrorism/pressbriefing-napolitano-brennan-gibbs-december-25-2009-attempted-terrorist-attack/p21154. 

with al-Awlaki served as an inspiration for the Fort Hood terrorist 

attack. This became the first incident in which an AQAP and alAwlaki inspired attack took place on U.S. soil. 

A little over 1 month later, on Christmas Day 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian Muslim and the son of a prominent Nigerian government official, attempted to detonate a bomb 

on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 destined for Detroit. As the Airbus A330 with 289 people on board approached Detroit, 

Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate a bomb hidden in his underwear. When he failed to successfully detonate the explosive, passengers and flight crew quickly subdued him.20 AQAP quickly 

claimed responsibility for the attack and promised that more attacks would follow.21

Similar to the Fort Hood case, the subsequent investigation revealed that Abdulmutallab had direct ties to AQAP, travelling to 

Yemen for instruction and deployment at a terrorist training 

camp.22 The attack caught the U.S. Intelligence Community off 

guard as they did not believe AQAP had neither the intent nor capability to deploy militants to the United States to strike the U.S. 

homeland. During a press conference following the Flight 253 

bombing attempt, John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for 

Homeland Security and Counterterrorism stated: ‘‘The fact that 

they [AQAP] had moved forward to try to execute this attack 

against the homeland I think demonstrated to us—and this is what 

the review sort of uncovered—that we had a strategic sense of sort 

of where they were going, but we didn’t know they had progressed 

to the point of actually launching individuals here.’’23

When Mr. Brennan was asked when it had become known that 

AQAP intended to attack the United States, he explained: 

‘‘In the intelligence that we have acquired, over the past 

several years it’s been rather aspirational. It has said 

things, it has promoted a certain view as far as bringing 

the fight to us, but all of their activities, at least that we 

were focused on, were happening in Yemen. They carried 

attacks against Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in Saudi Arabia, against Saudi targets, inside of Yemen, against Yemeni as well as against U.S. targets. So it was aspirational. 

We saw that there was this mounting sort of drumbeat of 

interest in trying to get individuals to carry out attacks. 

That was the fragmentary information. 
9 

24 Ibid. 25 ‘‘Designations of Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Senior Leaders,’’ Philip J. 

Crowley, U.S. Department of State Press Release, January 19, 2010. 26 ‘‘Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP).’’ National Counterterrorism Center profile. Available at: 

http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/ttp.html. 27 Ibid. 28See footnotes 29 and 30. ‘‘The Taliban’s Threats,’’ and ‘‘From Strategy to Implementation: 

The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship.’’ Available at: Available at: http:// 

foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/49547.pdf. 29 ‘‘The Taliban’s Threats,’’ Mark Hosenball, The Daily Beast, March 31, 2009. Available at: 

http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/03/31/the-taliban-s-threats.html. 

‘‘And so in hindsight now—and 20/20 hindsight always 

gives you much better opportunity to see it—we saw the 

plot was developing, but at the time we did not know in 

fact that they were talking about sending Mr. 

Abdulmutallab to the United States. 

‘‘Now, remember, Mr. Abdulmutallab was a much different 

story in terms of a Nigerian who traveled to Yemen and 

then came over here. But what it clearly indicates is that 

there is a seriousness of purpose on the part of al Qaeda 

in the Arabian Peninsula to carry out attacks here in the 

United States—whether they’re reaching people through 

the Internet, or whether or not, in fact, they are sending 

people abroad.’’24

On January 19, 2010, 3 weeks after the Christmas Day attempted 

attack, the Department of State officially declared AQAP as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO).25

TEHRIK-I-TALIBAN PAKISTAN (TTP) 

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, more commonly referred to as TTP or 

the Pakistani Taliban, was formed in 2007 as an alliance of militant groups dedicated to waging jihad against the Pakistani military and government and fighting to expel U.S. and NATO forces 

from Afghanistan.26 They carried out numerous large-scale attacks 

in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and are reportedly tied to the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December 

2007.27The TTP actively targets U.S. interests in Pakistan, including NATO supply lines, and has conducted multiple assaults on the 

U.S. consulate in Peshawar, among other American targets. 

Despite their aggressive targeting of U.S. and NATO troops and 

facilities, the U.S. Intelligence Community assessed that TTP was 

a regional—and not a homeland—threat. 28 While the evolution of 

tactics by TTP did evoke concern among U.S. counterterrorism officials, the notion that the TTP would strike the homeland was dismissed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Even after 

TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud made threats against the White 

House in 2009, the FBI said in an emailed statement: 

‘‘The FBI is aware of the claims made by Baitullah 

Mehsud. He has made similar threats to the U.S. in the 

past and we deem these new statements as aspirational 

. . . ’’29

On May 5, 2009, the State Department Special Representative 

for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the late Ambassador Richard 
10 

30 ‘‘From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship,’’ U.S. 

House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing, May 5, 2009. 31 ‘‘Profile: Faisal Shahzad,’’ BBC News, October 5, 2010. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 

news/world-us-canada-11475789. 32 ‘‘Pakistani Taliban helped Faisal Shahzad, it’s not on U.S. list of terrorists?’’ Liam Stack, 

The Christian Science Monitor, June 23, 2010. Available at: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/ 

terrorism-security/2010/0623/Pakistani-Taliban-helped-Faisal-Shahzad-it-s-not-on-US-list-ofterrorists. 33 ‘‘Pakistan Taliban given FTO designation,’’ UPI.com Special Reports, September 2, 2010. 

Available at: http://www.upi.com/ToplNews/Special/2010/09/02/Pakistani-Taliban-givenFTO-designation/UPI-22681283446480/. 34 ‘‘U.S. Weighs Official ‘Terrorist Organization’ Status for the Pakistani Taliban,’’ Michael 

Isikoff, The Daily Beast, Newsweek, May 11, 2010. Available at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/ 

newsweek/blogs/declassified/2010/05/11/u-s-weighs-official-terrorist-organization-status-forthe-pakistani-taliban.html. 

Holbrooke, reiterated this belief in response to a question during 

testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: 

‘‘In regard to al Qaeda, I think it is very well-described in 

an article in this morning’s New York Times where a 

Taliban spokesman said we do the local war against the 

Americans, al Qaeda does the global war.’’30

On May 1, 2010, Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistan-born naturalized 

U.S. citizen, drove a 1993 Nissan Pathfinder 4x4 loaded with propane, gasoline, and fertilizer into New York City’s Times Square.31

Shahzad failed to successfully detonate the explosives before a 

street vendor alerted the New York Police Department (NYPD) 

about the abandoned, smoking vehicle. Following an intense manhunt by Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, 

Shahzad was caught 2 days later attempting to flee at John F. 

Kennedy International Airport onboard a departing flight to Dubai. 

In the subsequent Federal investigation, it was discovered that 

Shahzad had purchased the car and explosive materials through 

funding provided to him by the TTP. He received a total of $12,000 

in two separate cash payments through hawalas in Massachusetts 

and New York, which was sent from a TTP militant in Pakistan 

to carry out the attack. During questioning following his arrest, 

Shahzad confessed to traveling to Waziristan, Pakistan in December 2009 to receive explosives training from members of the TTP 

at a terrorist training camp, after which he received an additional 

$4,000.32

Notably, the State Department did not designate the TTP as a 

FTO until September 2010, 4 months after the attempted Times 

Square attack.33 In summarizing the explanation given by an 

unnamed senior counterterrorism official as to why the TTP was 

not labeled a FTO sooner, Newsweek magazine wrote: ‘‘Until relatively recently, the TTP was thought to be targeting the Pakistani 

government exclusively—not the United States—and State Department officials were reluctant to intrude on what was largely regarded as an internal Pakistani problem.’’34

In the aftermath of the AQAP and TTP attempted attacks, the 

U.S. Intelligence Community admitted to underestimating the potential of these two groups to launch attacks against the homeland. 

The United States cannot afford to miscalculate Boko Haram’s intent and capability to strike the homeland. The evolution of Boko 

Haram clearly illustrates it is a group with fast-growing ambitions. 

It is important for the U.S. Intelligence Community to stay ahead 
11 

35 ‘‘The Rising Threat from Nigeria’s Boko Haram Militant Group,’’ Scott Stewart, STRATFOR 

Global Intelligence, November 10, 2011. Available at: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/ 

20111109-rising-threatnigerias-boko-haram-militant-group. 36 ‘‘The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria,’’ David Cook, CTC Sentinel, September 2011, pg. 4. 37 Ibid. 38Stewart, supra note 35. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 

of Boko Haram in an effort to thwart a potential attack against the 

homeland. 

VI. EVOLUTION AND COLLABORATION 

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the rise of Boko Haram in 

Nigeria is the reports of increasing collaboration between the group 

and al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al 

Shabaab. The rapid evolution of Boko Haram may point to the 

sharing of weapons and expertise among various terrorist organizations across the African continent. 

CHANGING TACTICS AND TARGETS: SUICIDE BOMBERS AND WESTERN

TARGETS

There has been a significant shift in Boko Haram’s targets, tactics, and geographic reach, particularly in the last year. The use of 

a suicide VBIED on the Abuja police barracks in June 2011 marked 

the first time on record a suicide attack was carried out in Nigeria. 

The bomb used was large enough to destroy 40 other vehicles in 

the parking lot, and it demonstrated the sect’s ability to launch attacks outside of its traditional area of operations in the north, proving that they were now capable of targeting the capital.35

Boko Haram’s traditional targets had been those affiliated with 

the Nigerian state. Past targets include police stations, army barracks, banks, churches, markets, teachers, and universities. Boko 

Haram has also attacked beer drinkers, card players, and those engaging in activities that they deem as un-Islamic.36 The sect has 

also conducted targeted assassinations against religious and political leaders, particularly those individuals who have challenged or 

spoken out against the group or allied themselves with the government of Christian President Goodluck Jonathan. Before their recent bombing campaign, Boko Haram’s signature tactic was driveby shootings and bombings from motorbikes.37

The suicide attack launched against the U.N. headquarters in 

Abuja appears to be Boko Haram’s first non-Nigerian, international 

target. The driver rammed the car into an exit gate and then drove 

into a parking garage before detonating the VBIED.38 This is significant because ‘‘ . . . the U.N. compound was located in the diplomatic district of Abuja, where numerous high-profile facilities are 

located, demonstrating that Boko Haram possessed the ability to 

spot a soft target amid harder targets like foreign embassies and 

government buildings.’’39 The group also managed to successfully 

find and exploit the security gap at the exit gate. This indicates 

that some type of surveillance may have been conducted before the 

attack was launched.40

Some have described the attack on the U.N. headquarters as an 

attack driven against an entity that cooperates with the Nigerian 
12 

41 Cook, supra note 36, at 5. 42 USAID, supra note 10. 43 ‘‘Bin Laden and Nigeria,’’ Paul Ohia, This Day Live, May 3, 2011. Available at: http:// 

www.thisdaylive.com/articles/bin-laden-and-nigeria/90683/. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 ‘‘Osama bin Laden Largely Discredited Among Muslim Publics in Recent Years,’’ Pew Global 

Attitudes Project, May 2, 2011. Available at: http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1977/poll-osama-binladen-death-confidence-muslim-publics-al-qaeda-favorability. 

government, and is by extension only targeting the Nigerian state. 

However, suicide attacks against Western targets working with the 

host government have in many instances marked the beginning of 

a new and advanced stage of insurgency. According to David Cook, 

writing for the West Point Combating Terrorism Center’s CTC Sentinel, ‘‘While the attack on the police General Headquarters can be 

seen as a continuation of Boko Haram’s fixation upon the Nigerian 

police and army, the United Nations attack is much more in line 

with other [global terrorist] organizations, and is strongly reminiscent of the suicide attack in Baghdad against the United Nations 

in August 2003, which was one of the opening blows of the Iraqi 

insurgency.’’41

COLLABORATION WITH AQIM AND AL SHABAAB

Boko Haram’s evolving tactics and targeting may be the result 

of ties between AQIM in North Africa and al Shabaab in Somalia. 

Such cross-pollination of weapons, tactics, and bomb-making expertise can quickly increase the capabilities of terrorist groups, as seen 

in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, and may 

have been a contributing factor to Boko Haram’s advances. The 

Boko Haram leadership exile from Nigeria following the 2009 security forces crackdown may have also contributed. Members of Boko 

Haram appear to have connections in Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and 

Sudan, and it is believed that the sect has also purchased weapons 

in some of these countries.42 These connections highlight the mobility and transnational nature of Boko Haram’s operations. 

Al-Qaeda militants operating in Nigeria is not unprecedented. In 

2004, the Nigerian government charged Mohammed Ashafa, a Nigerian national claiming to be operating an al-Qaeda cell.43 These 

charges included receiving money from al-Qaeda operatives in 

Pakistan for the purposes of recruiting and training terrorists to 

attack Americans in Nigeria.44 In 2008, former police inspectorgeneral, Mike Okiro, claimed that he had recovered evidence revealing a plot by bin Laden to conduct a bombing within Nigeria.45

The rise of Boko Haram as a terrorist group in Nigeria may serve 

as a means by which al-Qaeda can infiltrate Nigeria. Moreover, a 

recent poll conducted by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Projects on Muslim favorability toward bin Laden showed Nigerian Muslims as uniquely favorable to bin Laden and al-Qaeda. 

Throughout the past decade, Muslim populations have discredited 

bin Laden and al-Qaeda. However, unlike their counterparts elsewhere in the world, just under half—49 percent—of all Nigerian 

Muslims polled expressed more favorable views toward bin Laden 

and al-Qaeda in 2010.46

Over the past year, in response to successful counterterrorism 

crackdowns by North African governments, AQIM has reportedly 
13 

47 ‘‘Al-Qaeda’s North African Franchise Moves South,’’ Dr. J. Peter Pham, The Atlantic Council, August 5, 2011. Available at: http://www.acus.org/newlatlanticist/al-qaeda%E2%80%99snorth-african-franchise-moves-south. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 ‘‘Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Armed Services 

Committee,’’ J. Michael McConnell, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 27, 

2008, pg. 6. Available at: http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20080227ltestimony.pdf. 51 ‘‘Algeria says Nigeria’s Boko Haram tied to al Qaeda,’’ Reuters, MSNBC, November 13, 

2011. Available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45277821/ns/worldlnews-africa/#. 52 Ibid. 

been extending its operations into Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, 

among other places. Evidence has surfaced suggesting that AQIM 

is making a focused attempt to extend its area of operations and 

sphere of influence into the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa. In August 2011, a video surfaced showing two Westerners who were kidnapped for ransom in Nigeria by AQIM. While kidnappings for ransom are not a new strategy for AQIM, extending their reach into 

Nigeria represents a marked expansion of geographic reach in kidnapping operations.47

As AQIM has moved south, it has reportedly become involved in 

drug trafficking and cultivated alliances with criminal organizations in the Sahel to expand its reach and enhance its operational 

capacity. According to Dr. J. Peter Pham, this strategy is, in effect, 

the ‘‘subcontracting’’ of operations to local militant groups.48 As 

Mohammed Mokaddem, an Algerian journalist and author of a recent book about AQIM stated: ‘‘[AQIM] has never hidden its ambition to bring in the Islamists of Nigeria in particular at the very 

moment when sectarian strife and conflict between Muslims and 

Christians is on the rise.’’49 U.S. intelligence officials have also suspected that AQIM operatives were extending their reach southward. Three years ago, in the 2008 Annual Threat Assessment 

from the U.S. Intelligence Community, AQIM’s reach into Nigeria 

was clear: ‘‘AQIM traditionally has operated in Algeria and northern Mali and has recruited and trained an unknown, but probably 

small, number of extremists from Tunisia, Morocco, Nigeria, Mauritania, Libya, and other countries.’’50

African governments have been open about their concerns regarding Boko Haram and AQIM collaboration. In November 2011, 

the Algerian Deputy Foreign Minister, Abdelkader Messahel, 

issued a public warning that Algerian intelligence found evidence 

of cooperation between Boko Haram and AQIM. ‘‘We have no 

doubts that coordination exists between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda. 

The way both groups operate and intelligence reports show there 

is cooperation.’’51 Algeria’s public acknowledgement of cooperation 

between Boko Haram and AQIM is significant. Algeria currently 

serves as AQIM’s base of operations and the Algerian government 

conducts the largest intelligence-gathering operation on AQIM of 

any country in Africa.52

Boko Haram has also been reportedly collaborating with al 

Shabaab, an al-Qaeda linked militant Islamist group in Somalia 

and a U.S. State Department designated FTO. It has been reported 

that some members of Boko Haram have trained in Somalia as al 

Shabaab has made an effort in recent years to recruit outsiders in 

both Africa and the United States. Despite being involved in a civil 

war, al Shabaab has launched attacks outside of Somalia, most no-
14 

53 ‘‘Al-Shabaab,’’ National Counterterrorism Center profile. Available at: http://www.nctc.gov/ 

site/groups/allshabaab.html. 54 USAID, supra note 10. 55 ‘‘From Somalia to Nigeria: Jihad,’’ Katherine Zimmerman, The Weekly Standard, June 18, 

2011. Available at: http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/somalia-nigeria-jihadl574838.html. 56 ‘‘Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Al-Qaeda’s New Friend in Africa?’’ Karen Leigh, TIME Magazine. 

August 17, 2011. Available at: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/ 

0,8599,2091137,00.html. 57Stewart, supra note 35. 58Stewart, supra note 35. 59 ‘‘Nigeria says Boko Haram, al Qaeda link behind U.N. attack,’’ Camillus Eboh, Reuters, August 31, 2011. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/31/us-nigeria-bombinvestigationidUSTRE77U3BM20110831. 

tably twin suicide nightclub bombings during the World Cup in 

Kampala, Uganda on July 11, 2010.53

Skeptics of Boko Haram’s ties to al Shabaab cite the fact that 

both groups are concerned mainly with their respective countries. 

Somalia and Nigeria are on opposite ends of the continent, making 

the long distance between them a hindrance to cooperation. However, members of Boko Haram’s leadership have studied in Saudi 

Arabia and desire to build relationships with other extremists outside Nigeria. 54 Most importantly, however, Boko Haram has admitted to establishing links in Somalia. A statement allegedly released by the sect read, ‘‘Very soon, we will wage jihad . . . We 

want to make it known that our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria 

from Somalia where they received real training on warfare from 

our brethren who made that country ungovernable... This time 

round, our attacks will be fiercer and wider than they have 

been.’’55

A GENERAL’S WARNING

On August 17, 2011, U.S. Army General Carter F. Ham, Commander of AFRICOM called attention to Boko Haram’s expanding 

ambitions, telling the Associated Press that intelligence indicated 

Boko Haram had made contact with operatives from both AQIM 

and al Shabaab: 

‘‘What is most worrying at present is, at least in my view, 

a clearly stated intent by Boko Haram and by al Qaeda in 

the Islamic Maghreb to coordinate and synchronize their 

efforts. I’m not so sure they’re able to do that just yet, but 

it’s clear to me they have the desire and intent to do 

that.’’56

On June 14, 2010, AQIM leader Abu Musab Abd al-Wadoud, also 

known as Abdelmalik Droukdel, told al-Jazeera that his group 

would provide Boko Haram with weapons, support, and training.57

Since those comments, there have been public reports that Boko 

Haram fighters have been seen training in AQIM camps.58

In August 2011, one week before the U.N. bombing in August, 

Nigerian authorities arrested two Boko Haram militants. The detainees, who were still in custody after the U.N. bombing, allegedly 

told Nigerian investigators that another Boko Haram member, 

Mamman Nur, had led the attack. Nur reportedly has links to alQaeda and had recently returned from Somalia.59

In September 2011, European Union Counterterrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove warned of collaboration between the two 

groups: ‘‘There is still nothing structural. There are efforts at con-
15 

60 ‘‘EU official warns of spreading al-Qaida offshoot,’’ Jorge Benitez, NATO Source Alliance 

News Blog, The Atlantic Council, September 9, 2011. Available at: http://www.acus.org/ 

natosource/eu-official-warnsspreading-al-qaida-offshoot. 61Leigh, supra note 56. 62 ‘‘African Islamist group seen as U.S. threat—general,’’ David Alexander, Reuters, September 

15, 2011. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/15/us-usa-defense-africaidUSTRE78E13920110915. 63 ‘‘Boko Haram claims al-Qaeda links,’’ News24, November 24, 2011. Available at: http:// 

m.news24.com/news24/Africa/News/Boko-Haram-claims-al-Qaeda-links-20111124. 64 ‘‘Why Nigeria Matters,’’ Dr. J. Peter Pham, New Atlanticist Blog, The Atlantic Council, 

April 4, 2011. Available at: http://www.acus.org/newlatlanticist/why-nigeria-matters-0. 65 ‘‘Crude Oil and Total Petroleum Imports Top 15 Countries,’’ U.S. Energy Information Administration, August 2011 data. Available at: http://www.eia.gov/pub/oillgas/petroleum/ 

datalpublications/companyllevellimports/current/import.html. 

tacts, and small transfers of money. It seems that some members 

of Boko Haram and al Shabaab were trained by AQIM.’’60 The increasing sophistication of the attacks seems to support Mr. de 

Kerchove’s belief that Boko Haram militants have received training 

and weapons from AQIM. Moreover, purported leaders of the sect 

have publically praised Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Some reports suggest the bombing may have been a message from Boko 

Haram to AQIM signaling its desire to cooperate in terrorist operations.61

Greater than the threat of any two of these groups collaborating 

would be the threat of all three collaborating together. AFRICOM 

Commander General Ham warned that while he doubts the ability 

of Boko Haram, AQIM, and al Shabaab to carry out attacks against 

the United States directly at the moment, he does not doubt their 

intent to do so. General Ham has warned about the potential for 

a transnational terrorist network to develop in Africa if the rising 

threat potential of these three groups is left unchecked: 

‘‘Each of those three independently, I think, presents a significant threat not only in the nations in which they primarily operate but regionally and . . . to the United 

States. Those three organizations have very explicitly and 

publicly voiced an intent to target Westerners and the U.S. 

specifically. . . . If left unaddressed, then you could have 

a network that ranges from East Africa through the center 

and into the Sahel and Maghreb, and I think that would 

be very, very worrying.’’62

Recently, a statement from a purported spokesman for Boko 

Haram, Abul Qaqa, appeared to validate the concerns of General 

Ham and others. On November 24, 2011, Abul Qaqa admitted that 

the sect does receive assistance from al-Qaeda, presumably AQIM, 

stating: ‘‘It is true that we have links with al Qaeda. They assist 

us and we assist them.’’63

POTENTIAL FUTURE TARGETS: ENERGY AND AVIATION SECTOR

Nigeria has proven reserves of up to 36 billion barrels of oil, the 

10th largest in the world.64 It is the largest oil producer in Africa 

and the fourth-largest supplier of oil to the United States. As of 

August 2011, the United States was importing 854,000 barrels of 

oil per day from Nigeria.65 In 2010, this amounted to 43 percent 

of Nigeria’s total petroleum exports and 8 percent of total U.S. pe-
16 

66 U.S. Energy Information Administration Nigeria Analysis. Available at: http:// 

www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=NI. 67Pham, supra note 64. 68 In the past, Boko Haram has carried out armed bank robberies and has distributed whatever money it has stolen to the general population rather than keeping it. While Niger Delta 

militants may rely on the theft of oil for their primary means of financing, Boko Haram’s financing comes from different sources and would be less inclined to be concerned with the affects 

of production being completely shut down. 69 ‘‘Nigerian Oil Production Falls After a Pipeline Hub is Overrun,’’ Lydia Polgreen, The New 

York Times, May 16, 2007. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/16/business/ 

worldbusiness/16oil.html. 70 Ibid. 71 ‘‘Boko Haram in the Niger Delta,’’ John Campbell, Africa in Transition blog, September 19, 

2011. Available at: http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2011/09/19/boko-haram-in-the-niger-delta/. 72 ‘‘Boko Haram: N-Delta militants volunteer to join forces with army,’’ Emma Amaize, Sweet 

Crude Reports, September 20, 2011. Available at: http://sweetcrudereports.com/2011/09/21/ 

boko-haram-n-deltamilitants-volunteer-to-join-forces-with-army/. 

troleum imports.66 Nigeria also exports a mostly sulfur-free sweet 

crude, which U.S. refineries prefer to the heavier oil imported from 

Persian Gulf and Caribbean sources.67 As a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Nigeria has 

proven that it can flex its economic muscle and impact global oil 

production. In short, disruptions to Nigerian oil production can impact domestic refining in the United States and affect global oil 

markets. 

The Niger Delta, where most Nigerian oil production takes place, 

has a long history of instability and violence. Kidnappings, bombings, and attacks on oil facilities are routinely carried out by militant groups who feel disenfranchised and left out of the wealth that 

oil production generates. While these groups have been hesitant to 

inflict truly crippling damage against these facilities because they 

have some economic stake in them, Boko Haram, which is believed 

to have no financial interest in the plants, has no such reservations.68 Niger Delta militants have in the past cut Nigerian oil production significantly through sustained attacks on oil facilities. 

In May 2007, protestors from the Ogoni tribe in the Niger Delta 

overran an oil pipeline, cutting Nigerian oil production by 30 percent.69 That same month, militants from the Movement for the 

Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), bombed three pipelines, 

decreasing oil production by 100,000 barrels a day for the Italian 

oil company Eni. This disruption caused oil prices to rise by 71 

cents a barrel in New York.70 A well-coordinated attack by Boko 

Haram could result in far worse damage, completely cutting off Nigerian oil production in a worst-case scenario. If that occurred, 8 

percent of U.S. oil imports would be cut off, which could result in 

a spike in oil prices worldwide and soaring domestic gas prices. 

While Boko Haram is based in the north, recent reports indicate 

that Nigerian security services were searching for Boko Haram 

members who had allegedly infiltrated southern territory.71 Niger 

Delta militants also released a statement warning Boko Haram 

against any incursions into the Delta territory, vowing to join with 

security forces to drive them out if necessary.72 Given the vulnerability of Niger Delta oil facilities, and the potential powder keg of 

multiple militant factions squaring off against each other, Boko 

Haram’s infiltration into this area should be closely monitored by 

the United States and allies. 

As discussed previously, Boko Haram has already adopted many 

of al-Qaeda’s targeting tactics. If Boko Haram continues this trend, 
17 

73 ‘‘The Impact of the Abqaiq Attack on Saudi Energy Security,’’ Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, Center 

for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), February 27, 2006, pg. 2. Available at: http:// 

csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060227labqaiqattack.pdf. 74 Ibid. 75 ‘‘Bomb scare disrupts Lagos airport road activities,’’ Emmanuel Chidiogo, DailyTimesNG, 

September 24, 2011. Available at: http://dailytimes.com.ng/article/bomb-scare-disrupt-lagosairport-road-activities. 76 ‘‘Nigeria,’’ Encyclopedia of the Nations. Available at: http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/ 

economies/Africa/Nigeria.html. The full text of the agreement, formally titled ‘‘Air Transport 

Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 

the Federal Republic of Nigeria,’’ can be accessed on the Department of State’s website: http:// 

www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ata/n/ni/114137.htm. 77 ‘‘U.S. scanners went unused at Nigeria airport,’’ Associated Press, MSNBC, December 31, 

2009. Available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34645445/ns/uslnews-airlinerlsecurity/ 

t/us-scanners-went-unused-nigeria-airport/#.TsQzi1ZBU8k. 

Nigerian oil facilities will be in thecrosshairs. In 2006, al-Qaeda 

struck the Abqaiq oil facility in eastern Saudi Arabia. Abqaiq is 

one of the largest oil fields in the world with a capacity of 7 million 

barrels per day.73 According to open source intelligence, on February 24, 2006, two suicide bombers attempted to drive two cars 

loaded with explosives into the compound. This operation—and 

many others—mirror recently adopted Boko Haram tactics, including the use of suicide bombers and multiple VBIED attacks.74

In September 2011, threats made by Boko Haram to bomb Lagos 

Airport prompted security officials to search all vehicles approaching the airport, causing major disruptions.75 Although aviation has 

not yet been a Boko Haram target, it is worth noting that Nigeria 

is a major destination for Western travelers. On August 26, 2000, 

the United States and Nigeria signed an open skies agreement to 

expand commercial aviation between them. This agreement established a direct flight from Lagos to John F. Kennedy International 

Airport in New York City, easing air travel to and from Nigeria76

It is conceivable that Boko Haram may seek to take advantage of 

the tremendous volume of Western passenger traffic coming 

through Nigeria and the security vulnerabilities that volume creates. 

Following the attempted Christmas Day attack in 2009, investigations revealed that four full-body scanners given to Nigeria by 

the United States in 2008 had gone unused; top officials were 

found to have been unaware of their placement in Nigeria’s four 

main airports.77 Nigerian airports began to use body scanners actively in 2010. The United States can assist Nigeria in improving 

security at its major airports through efforts such as providing fullbody scanners and security training. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) can 

train Nigerian immigration officials in how to more effectively identify individuals who can pose a threat to homeland security, process and admit foreign travelers, and share passenger name record 

information (PNR) to prevent another incident similar to 2009. 

VII. COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA 

MARTYRDOM VIDEOS

On September 18, 2011, BBC News reported that Agence France 

Presse (AFP) news agency obtained two videos, each 25 minutes in 

length, of the Boko Haram U.N. bomber that had surfaced in Nigeria. Pictured holding an AK–47 rifle with two other people standing 
18 

78 BBC News, supra note 1. 79 Ibid. 80 ‘‘Analysis—Nigeria UN bomb: Video of ‘Boko Haram’ bomber released,’’ Jonah Fisher, BBC 

News, September 18, 2011. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14964554. 81 ‘‘Suicide bomber hits UN office in Nigerian capital,’’ Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, August 26, 2011. Available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/11/ 

bokolharamlkillslsco.php. 82 ‘‘Boko Haram Representative Solicits Guidance and Assistance on Jihadist Forums,’’ Rita 

Katz and Margaret Foster, SITE Intelligence Group, September 28, 2011, pg 1. 83 Ibid., 2 & 3. 

against a wall, the suicide bomber asked his family to understand 

his decision and explained that the bombing was designed to send 

a message to the ‘‘U.S. President and ‘other infidels.’ ’’78 The man, 

whom an alleged Boko Haram spokesman identified as Mohammed 

Abul Barra from Maiduguri, also referred to the United Nations as 

a ‘‘forum for all global evil’’ and praised Osama bin Laden.79

A BBC correspondent, Jonah Fischer, based in Nigeria, wrote in 

a brief analysis that the existence of these videos signals an elevation in the sophistication of Boko Haram’s methods of communication. ‘‘They show an organization which is far different from 

the local group fighting a tit-for-tat battle with the army and police 

in northern Nigeria,’’ said Fischer. ‘‘This is another indication that 

this is now another beast, more international in its ambitions.’’80

The correspondent also suggested that the sophistication of the 

U.N. attack and the use of more advanced communication methods 

may signal the support of outside help. 

INTERNET FORUMS

Even more indicative of the growing sophistication and threat potential of Boko Haram is the group’s increased use of internet forums. In July 2010, the alleged leader of Boko Haram, Imam 

Abubakar Shekau, issued an online statement praising al-Qaeda in 

Iraq (AQI), and offered condolences for the recent killing of AQI 

members. In this statement, Shekau warned the United States, 

‘‘Don’t think jihad is over. Rather, jihad has just begun. O America, 

die with your fury.’’81 This statement coincided with an online presence the group developed in 2010. 

According to a September 28, 2011 report published by the SITE 

Intelligence Group, Boko Haram had developed an increased online 

presence that ‘‘seems to have contributed to the rapid increase in 

their strength.’’82 According to the report, a representative of Boko 

Haram who went by the name ‘‘Abu Sabaya’’ began posting requests for help on the prominent jihadi forum Ansar al-Mijahideen 

English Forum (AMEF) in March 2010. He has solicited advice on 

fundraising and Arabic translation programs and has sought information on how to hinder the operations of security services monitoring the sect. 

The forums have provided fertile ground for raising interest in 

Boko Haram’s cause, and providing possible fundraising and recruitment opportunities. One member, ‘‘Aydan,’’ predicted that Nigeria would become a new front in the global jihad, writing, ‘‘I 

guess a new front is about to open.’’83 Abu Sabaya continued to 

post calls for help with the development of Boko Haram. In one 

post, he described the sect’s efforts to build its propaganda and 

media capacity, stating: ‘‘As for the media productions . . . we are 
19 

84 Ibid., 4. 85 Ibid., 5. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid., 6. 88 Ibid. 

rigorously working on them . . . we lack vibrant media experts in 

video production.’’84 AMEF member Abu Hafs al-Gharib replied, 

suggesting that Boko Haram build links with an official jihadi 

media center, such as the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) or 

the al-Fajr Media Center. Linking with one or both of these centers 

would provide Boko Haram with much needed technical assistance 

and would also increase its legitimacy among the jihadi community. Linking with the official media centers was also the strategy 

al Shabaab adopted before it became a mainstream terror organization. In other posts written on 6 October and 27 October, Abu 

Sabaya requested fundraising advice and sought guidance on enhancing organizational structure and management. 

Encouraged by Abu Sabaya’s posts, other AMEF members began 

calling for jihad in Nigeria. In response to one post, a member who 

goes by ‘‘TheRealTruth’’ stressed the need for fighters to travel to 

Nigeria now, because security services have not yet been effective 

in securing borders, writing: ‘‘Sounds like a call! Where are the 

jealous sons of Islam to answer it! Right now its east [sic] to go to 

Nigeria, but may not be in the future . . . and another opportunity 

may slip us by!’’85 Echoing warnings by General Ham, forum member Abu Hafs al-Gharib responded by outlining a regional insurgency, stating: ‘‘Inshallah (Allah willing), Mujahideen from West 

Africa would be join with the brothers in Nigeria... jihad [will] 

spread out from North Africa, East Africa, West Africa and soon 

Central Africa . . . ’’.86

Not only is Boko Haram soliciting advice from AMEF members, 

but its posts appear to verify growing links between the sect and 

AQIM. One member, ‘‘Ansar AQIM,’’ is an administrator and highly-regarded member of the forum. His posting history indicates 

that he has ties to AQIM. In an October 2010 post, he described 

links between Boko Haram and AQIM, claiming that AQIM commanders had arrived in Nigeria to train Boko Haram fighters. His 

full post read: 

‘‘The assistance from the commanders of Al-Qaida in the 

Islamic Maghreb has reached Nigeria. I can’t give any 

numbers of how many brothers from the Sahel region 

moved back to Nigeria to train the youth of the 

tawheed.’’87

According to the report, Abu Sabaya’s updates during the spring 

and summer of 2011 ‘‘described a much-emboldened group.’’88 On 

July 25, 2011, he announced in a post that the sect had successfully recruited defectors from the Nigerian security forces after 

they were sent to subdue Boko Haram fighters. The frequency of 

Abu Sabaya’s statements also increased, as he began to claim responsibility for attacks, showcasing the sect’s increased activity 

and capabilities during the summer of 2011. 
20 

89 ‘‘General Carter F. Ham, Commander, U.S. Africa Command,’’ Center for Strategic and 

International Studies Military Strategy Forum, October 4, 2011. Available at: http://csis.org/ 

event/military-strategy-forum-general-carter-f-ham-commander-us-africa-command. 90 ‘‘Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress,’’ Lauren Ploch, Congressional Research Service, 

May 17, 2011, pg. 1. Available at: http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33964l20110401.pdf. 91Ploch, supra note 90, at 30. 92 Center for Strategic and International Studies, supra note 89. 

VIII. OPTIONS FOR U.S. ENGAGEMENT 

The rise of the potential threat of Boko Haram poses a new challenge to United States interests in a region where significant 

threats to U.S. National security already exist. However, the 

United States has also been presented with a unique window of opportunity. If the United States acts quickly on the military, intelligence, and diplomatic fronts, it can ensure the relative protection 

of U.S. interests while assisting the Nigerian government in containing Boko Haram. 

Nigeria has a population of over 150 million people, making it 

Africa’s most populous country. Nigeria also enjoys the continent’s 

second-largest economy and has become a major regional player 

since transitioning from military to democratic rule in 1999. Nigeria’s contributions to regional stability have not gone unnoticed in 

the United States. Speaking at an event in October 2011, General 

Ham noted, ‘‘Nigeria is the leading country for most activities in 

West Africa, in the Gulf of Guinea. They lead a number of other 

missions in a variety of places.’’89 Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, has 

played a major role in resolving regional disputes. It is the fourthlargest troop contributor to U.N. peacekeeping missions in the 

world.90

Unfortunately, the deteriorating security situation in Nigeria is 

a cause for concern, especially as Boko Haram’s attacks become 

more sophisticated, coordinated, and deadly. Boko Haram and 

other terrorist groups such as AQIM—which is looking to expand 

its reach across Africa—would likely feel encouraged to exploit a 

destabilized Nigeria. Moreover, further instability could force Nigeria to pull out of various peacekeeping missions in order to increase 

manpower at home. If Nigeria were to collapse and become a failed 

state or descend into civil war, it could have negative implications 

for the United States and its allies. 

In short, the rising threat of Boko Haram presents the United 

States with an opportunity to expand diplomatic and military engagement with both Abuja and Nigerian Muslims in the north. 

MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

U.S. security assistance to Nigeria was suspended briefly from 

2003–2006 while the State Department restarted its International 

Military Education and Training Program.91 Since then, U.S. security assistance to Nigeria has steadily increased. According to General Ham, the U.S. military currently enjoys ‘‘a very longstanding, 

and very helpful, very useful naval and air military relationship 

[with Nigeria].’’92 In 2007, the U.S. Navy started the African Partnership Station as part of a larger effort to enhance security in the 

Gulf of Guinea. This program has included visits to Nigerian ports 

and regional naval exercises with Nigerian and European counterparts. The United States also provides military training with an 
21 

93Ploch, supra note 90, at 30. 94 Ibid., 31. 95 Center for Strategic and International Studies, supra note 89. 

emphasis on respect for human rights and civilian authority. The 

State Department, which has also engaged Nigeria through its African Coastal and Border Security (ACBS) program, has focused its 

assistance on peacekeeping support, training, border and maritime 

security, and increasing military professionalization.93

Cooperation exists to a lesser extent between the U.S. and Nigerian armies. Nigeria is a participant in the National Guard State 

Partnership Program and coordinates activities specifically with 

the California National Guard. The Nigerian Army has also received counterterrorism funding from the Department of Defense: 

$2.2 million for the development of a counterterrorism infantry 

unit, and another $6.2 million designated to the tactical communications and interoperability within its counterterrorism unit.94

General Ham has reported that cooperation between the two armies is steadily increasing and has noted that the U.S.-Nigerian 

military relationship is in part being shaped by the rise of Boko 

Haram: 

‘‘ . . . in my visit to Abuja I had a great meeting with the 

chief of the army staff following President Jonathan’s visit 

here with President Obama. And I think, we’re now starting to find ways in which we can cooperate more closely. 

Very clearly Boko Haram has altered that relationship 

somewhat. And so we’re looking for ways in which we can 

help, ways that Nigeria would like us to give help in developing their counterterrorist capabilities . . . ’’95

General Ham proposed that the development of Nigeria’s counterterrorism capabilities could include providing non-lethal equipment 

and training, and helping security forces to be more precise in their 

use of force. 

Despite General Ham’s positive reviews of U.S.-Nigerian military 

cooperation, Nigerian capacity to combat Boko Haram in the north 

is limited. According to sources following the attacks, soldiers deployed in northern Nigeria have been deserting due to a lack of 

pay. Morale has been reported to be generally low among security 

forces based in the north. Residents feel that the security situation 

will continue to deteriorate, in part due to the fact that senior commanders still do not appear to take the threat posed by Boko 

Haram seriously. The inability of the government to pay its soldiers and the lack of urgency among senior commanders regarding 

the increasingly violent attacks waged by Boko Haram underscore 

the challenges the Nigerian state faces in to confronting this problem. 

It is critical that the United States work more closely with Nigerian security forces to develop greater domestic intelligence collection and sharing with the U.S. Intelligence Community. Military 

cooperation is vital to a successful counterterrorism strategy. A 

possible model includes Yemen, with whom the United States built 

an effective intelligence sharing partnership following the Christmas Day 2009 attempted attack to hunt suspected militants. While 
22 

96 ‘‘France to help Nigeria with Boko Haram militants,’’ defenceWeb, November 14, 2011. 

Available at: http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=comlcontent&view=article&id=- 

21097:france-to-helpnigeria-with-boko-haram-militants&catid=56:diplomacy-a-peace&-Itemid=- 

111. 97 Ibid. 98Ploch, supra note 90, at 30. 99 ‘‘The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership,’’ U.S. Africa Command website, http:// 

www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp. TSCTP partners include Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Chad, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. 100Ploch, supra note 90, at 29. 101 Ibid. 

this relationship continues to pose challenges, it has had notable 

success, highlighted by the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki. 

In a recent display of growing international concern surrounding 

the rise of Boko Haram, France has offered military support to Nigeria. Meeting in Abuja with his Nigerian counterpart, Olugbenga 

Ashira, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe stated: ‘‘We shall 

fight against this phenomenon. We are ready to share any information. We are ready to coordinate our intelligence services. We are 

ready also to give our help in training cooperation . . . France is 

directly concerned with the question of terrorism. It goes against 

our interest in the region and so we are in complete solidarity with 

the countries of the region around the sub Sahara and around the 

Sahel . . . ’’96 Lieutenant General Azubuike Ihejirika, the Nigerian 

Army Chief of Staff, said that in addition to the United States and 

France, Pakistan and Britain have also offered to assist with 

counterterrorism training.97

DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT

The United States has begun to engage Nigerian Muslims, primarily through two U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) programs in the northern states of Bauchi and Sokoto.98

Moreover, Nigeria serves as a minor partner in the Trans-Sahara 

Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a State Department initiative aimed at helping a number of African countries in the TransSahara and Sahel regions combat terrorist organizations.99

Active public outreach to Nigerian Muslims plays a critical role 

in containing Boko Haram. Boko Haram has so far rejected negotiations with the Nigerian government, and has attacked and killed 

Muslim leaders who supported the election of President Jonathan. 

The United States has begun to take steps to promote government 

action on the numerous grievances that plague the north and 

hinder the prospect of talks between Boko Haram and the Nigerian 

government. 

The United States is one of the largest providers of non-military 

aid to Nigeria.100 In 2010, Abuja received roughly $614 million in 

aid from the United States. This aid is focused on programs in 

democratic governance, economic reform, security service reform 

and professionalization, and education and health care services. 

However, the majority of the aid goes to HIV/AIDS programs.101 In 

2010, the Obama Administration established the U.S.-Nigeria Bilateral Commission to encourage dialogue on issues ranging from 

security and energy to anti-corruption as requested by Congress in 

H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2010 and 2011. The Commission is composed of four working 

groups that meet on a regular basis: Good Governance, Trans-
23 

102 Ibid., 28. 103 Ibid., 30. 104 ‘‘To Battle Nigeria’s Boko Haram, Put Down Your Guns,’’ John Campbell, Foreign Affairs, 

September 9, 2011. Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68249/john-campbell/ 

to-battle-nigerias-boko-haram-put-down-your-guns. 105 Complete information regarding legal criteria for FTO designation can be found at the 

website of the U.S. Department of State, Office of Coordinator for Counterterrorism. Available 

at: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 

parency and Integrity; Food Security and Agriculture; Energy and 

Investment; and Niger Delta and Security Cooperation.102

The United States has begun to publicly pressure the government to tackle corruption, encourage greater investment in the 

north, address poverty and joblessness, and promote government 

accountability and transparency. Recent statements by U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria Terence P. McCulley pressuring the government to address these problems are a significant starting point, 

and such pressure should continue. Additionally, a USAID program 

called Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy, and Development 

(LEAD), is assisting northern governments build partnerships between state and local governments and the private sector. The goal 

of this program is to improve accountability, governance, and the 

delivery of essential services.103 Former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, John Campbell, suggests the United States could also support 

efforts to ‘‘make modern education more palatable to an Islamic 

population.’’104

In addition to increasing government transparency and accountability, concerns regarding airport security, the economy, and education must also be addressed. The Nigerian government has taken 

steps to improve airport security after the attempted Christmas 

Day airline bombing over Detroit, but the government has been 

less effective in addressing the economic and educational issues 

that plague the north. In these areas, the United States has begun 

to implement programs to assist local and state governments. 

FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION (FTO) DESIGNATION

According to the U.S. State Department, ‘‘the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the State Department (S/CT) continually monitors the activities of terrorist groups active around 

the world to identify potential targets for designation. When reviewing targets of specific groups, S/CT looks not only at the actual 

terrorist attacks that a group has carried out, but also at whether 

the group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible 

future acts of terrorism or retains the capability and intent to carry 

out such acts.’’105

The legal criteria for FTO designation includes the following: 

1. It must be a foreign organization. 

2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 

1182(a)(3)(B)),* or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) 

of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 

1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)),** or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism. 
24 

106 ‘‘Emergency Message for American Citizens,’’ United States Diplomatic Mission to Nigeria, 

November 5, 2011. Available at: http://nigeria.usembassy.gov/emacl2011.html. 107 U.S. Department of State, supra note 105. 

3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must 

threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States. 

Based on Boko Haram’s evolution and recent public warnings by 

the U.S. State Department to U.S. citizens in Nigeria, Boko Haram 

may meet the legal criteria for State Department FTO designation.106 Such designations are subject to a rigorous statutory process and through investigation, which the State Department needs 

to initiate. If Boko Haram were to be designated an FTO, it would 

support U.S. Intelligence Community efforts to curb the group’s financing, stigmatize and isolate it internationally, heighten public 

awareness and knowledge, and signal to other governments the 

United States takes the threat from Boko Haram seriously.107

IX. CONCLUSION 

Boko Haram’s attacks are occurring at their greatest frequency 

since the sect emerged from hiding in 2010. The sophistication of 

its tactics, use of the internet, and its recent attack on the U.N. 

headquarters in Abuja all point to a dangerously evolving organization. 

Debate exists regarding Boko Haram. Some believe it is little 

more than a grassroots insurrection with no defined leader or 

structure. Others believe that core Boko Haram, as it is understood, is a very small group of individuals who simply consider 

themselves to be the followers of their slain leader Mohammed 

Yusuf. Despite our lack of understanding of Boko Haram, the 

movement appears to have significant sympathy among many Nigerian Muslims. Coupled with the grievances that plague the 

north, the environment is ripe for recruitment. Recent evidence alludes to the sect’s potential desire to join the ranks of international 

jihadist organizations. American, Nigerian, other African, and European officials have all expressed concern over the sect’s communication with AQIM and al Shabaab. An alliance, or at the very 

least cooperation between the groups, can prove costly for the stability of Africa, the Sahel, and American interests. 

Perhaps most striking is how little is known about Boko Haram. 

The sect remained relatively off the radar screen of the U.S. Intelligence Community until the U.N. headquarters attack, its first 

non-Nigerian, international target. Similar attacks have signaled 

the beginning of new phases for other extremist groups such as 

AQIM in the past. 

The U.S. Intelligence Community has underestimated the threat 

potential of terrorist organizations in the recent past, most notably 

AQAP in Yemen and TTP, the Pakistani Taliban. Both of these 

groups were believed to be focusing on regional targets in the Arabian Peninsula and South Asia. The attempted bombing of a U.S. 

passenger jet over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009 by a Nigerian 

Muslim trained by AQAP, and the attempted bombing of New 

York’s Times Square by a Pakistani American trained by TTP left 
25 

many in the Intelligence Community caught off guard. This report 

seeks to avoid another intelligence lapse by calling attention to the 

potential threat Boko Haram can pose to U.S. interests abroad and 

in the homeland. At this time, the risk of an attack by Boko Haram 

on the U.S. homeland may be low, but it is advisable to take the 

threat seriously and prepare accordingly. 

Æ