About the Report

This report, part of a series of U.S. Institute of Peace reports on 

state building in South Sudan, focuses on how the new state 

will manage its cultural diversity with a view to bringing all its 

ethnic nationalities together, forming a national identity that 

can reduce the level of suspicion and ethnicity-based political 

rivalry. The information and analysis in this report have their 

roots in the author ’s academic research and interests, as well 

as his background as a civil servant in the government of 

South Sudan. Much of the information was generated through 

interviews and group discussions over a long period in the 

context of other studies and evaluations. Many of the opinions 

expressed here are a combination of newspaper editorials, news 

coverage in the local media, debates on Internet discussion 

forums, public lectures and debates, government policy briefs, 

and a host of other government documents pertaining to its 

vision, development plans, and programs aimed at addressing 

the myriad security challenges that confront South Sudan.

About the Author

Jok Madut Jok is currently a Jennings Randolph senior fellow 

at USIP. In 2010 and 2011 he served as undersecretary in the 

government of South Sudan’s Ministry of Culture and Heritage. 

He is also a fellow of the Rift Valley Institute and a professor 

of African studies in the department of history at Loyola 

Marymount University.

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 287 October 2011

© 2011 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Jok Madut Jok

Diversity, Unity, and 

Nation Building in 

South Sudan

Summary

•	 The government of South Sudan and its development partners appear to be heavily focused 

on state building and less so on nation building: the question of how to turn the young 

state into a nation in which all South Sudanese can see themselves represented.

•	 Whatever projects a new country conceives, it has to view nation and state as inseparable 

components of the same project, not focusing too much on one without investing in 

the other. 

•	 Most South Sudanese interviewed for this project assert that the most obvious impediment 

to national cohesion is exclusion from the national platform, especially exclusion along 

ethnic lines. Corruption, nepotism, and exclusion from access to government jobs were 

also raised as issues that the government will need to address directly for citizens to have 

pride in their nation.

•	 There is a widespread sense of worry about the viability of South Sudan as a nation due 

to insecurity, especially insecurity rooted in the current ethnic conflicts occurring in seven 

out of the ten states.

•	 Both political leaders and ordinary citizens recognize the importance of national unity and 

the equitable display and celebration of cultural diversity as a national asset; representation 

of all ethnic nationalities and creation of a broad-based government is central to South 

Sudan’s transition to nationhood. The immediate challenge involves creating programs 

that promote citizenship in the nation over ethnic citizenship. The opaque climate of the 

transitional constitutional review process has not earned the government much trust from 

all sectors of society, and this has made for a bad start toward national consensus.

•	 As a multiethnic society, South Sudan also is confronted with the question of a language 

policy. To speed up the process of nation building, the government will need to transform 

current discussions on language into practical decisions regarding the development of a 

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Contents

Cultural Diversity and Nationhood 2

History as National Identity 7

The New South and the Rise of a Nation 9

The Referendum and the Growing National Sentiment 10

Toward a National Cultural Project 12

Conclusion 14
2

national language. Identifying five national languages that represent the three greater 

regions of the country would be one way to approach it.

•	 Ultimately, a viable South Sudan has to stand on four strong pillars: political unity, a disciplined military, quick and equitable service delivery, and a vibrant civil society.

South Sudan is coming into existence after long wars of liberation, inheriting poor infrastructure, a volatile political climate, limited capacity for governance, weak state institutions, a 

financial crises, violent ethnic divisions, and an uncertain regional and international political 

atmosphere. For some time, it thus likely will be driven more by the euphoria of independence 

from Sudan, the political pronouncements of its leadership, and the history of an extremely 

violent conflict with the north than by its practical abilities as a nation-state.

At the moment, South Sudan is only slightly more than a geographical expression. It contains 

more than sixty cultural and linguistic groups, each of which have a stronger sense of citizenship 

in their tribes than in the nation. The main glue that binds the country’s multiple ethnicities 

together is the history of their struggle for freedom and collective opposition to the north. The 

most recent phase of this struggle—long and hard, under the leadership of the Sudan Peoples’ 

Liberation Movement (SPLM)—was an experience that transcended ethnic boundaries, emphasizing unity of purpose during the war. This accelerated the concept of and conviction about 

separate nationhood from the north, especially leading up to the 2011 referendum on selfdetermination, as the dream of independence was turning into reality. Despite violent discord 

within the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA) and the creation of ethnic militias that fought 

bitter wars against it, the undeniable fact is that all South Sudanese remained focused on the 

need for unity of purpose and ranks in their struggle for self-determination. 

However, South Sudan’s unity remains undefined: At independence, the country has found 

itself with only a hazy notion of a collective national identity beyond its unified opposition 

to the north, making its viability as a nation a matter of speculation. Given the history of 

internal political rivalries along ethnic lines, the state’s inability to immediately provide the 

highly anticipated peace dividends and fruits of independence, as well as the violence and 

insecurity that is likely to accompany the mechanics of separation, there have been predictions 

of possible disintegration.1 There have been presumptions that ethnic squabbles within South 

Sudan will increase over the allocation of state resources and services, which could dissipate 

the vague sense of national unity among the people of the new country.2 Such rivalries, if not 

managed in the most tolerant and inclusive manner possible, could easily thwart the nationbuilding project. In response to these predictions, the South Sudanese political leadership, 

while acknowledging the challenges of building a nation from scratch, has discounted talk of 

failure and collapse; it has given assurances that it will deliver to the people their long-denied 

state services, address peoples’ expectations for what independence holds, deal with corruption and insecurity, and establish a stable and unified country. But however strong the government’s conviction regarding its ability to cater to its people, South Sudan will have an arduous 

journey to nationhood. Its development projects will need a strong foundation of security 

and stability, which the new state is currently short of. Will there be a need for a kind of new 

north—that is, an external factor that South Sudanese will need to galvanize against? Or do 

the South Sudanese have enough historical connections to feed the new fervor for national 

belonging, no matter the country’s internal ethnic, political, and class differences? 

Cultural Diversity and Nationhood: A South Sudanese Debate and Worry

In early June 2011—a month before South Sudan declared itself an independent republic, 

and despite the violence engulfing its people from within and from without—there was 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

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About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy •

George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor of 

Practice, The George Washington University • Judy Ansley,

Former Assistant to the President and Deputy Security 

Adviser under President George W. Bush • Anne H. Cahn,

Former Scholar in Residence, American University 

• Chester A. Crocker, James R. Schlesinger Professor of 

Strategic Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown 

University • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy 

Center for Justice and Human Rights • Ikram U. Khan,

President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC • Stephen D. Krasner,

Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, 

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Director of the National Council on Independent Living 

• Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor, George Mason School of Law 

• Judy Van Rest, Executive Vice President, International 

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President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

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Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
3

bustle in the capital, Juba, and throughout the country in preparation for independence 

celebrations on July 9. In May, Sudanese armed forces had attacked and occupied Abyei 

town, a hotly contested region on the north-south border, and there were rebel militia 

attacks in three states and numerous tribal conflicts in seven states—all causing renewed 

uncertainties among many observers about independence. But the main preoccupation of 

political debate in Juba was not just the anticipated independent statehood, but how to 

turn South Sudan into a viable nation: that is, how to turn its ethnic and cultural diversity 

into a useful asset, forming the colorful and unified country that everyone had yearned for 

since the 1940s, long before Sudan’s independence from British colonialism.3

In the referendum in January 2011, South Sudanese had demonstrated their ability to 

unite around a single purpose, all other disagreements notwithstanding: A full 98 percent 

voted in favor of separation, rejecting a unified Sudan, a country that had been suffering from the woes of forced unity for over fifty years. The vote, which was part of the 

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the second round of Sudan’s prolonged 

wars, turned a page in the long history of southern struggle for freedom and the destructive northern counterinsurgency. However, five months later—even before the nation was 

officially born—the euphoria after the referendum results had given way to disappointment. South Sudanese wanted an opportunity to communicate with their government on 

the concept of nationhood. The media were embroiled in discussions about deficiencies in 

the government’s ability to deliver security, basic services, and above all, a sense of unity—

some of the most highly anticipated peace dividends and rewards for independence. Claims 

of corruption, nepotism, exclusion, and domination of government and business by some 

ethnic groups all seemed to erode the public’s enthusiasm for the upcoming transition, 

despite the initial excitement.

The sense of disappointment is more related to the perceived behavior of the top political class than to the national security issues that threaten the young state’s sovereignty. 

Undoubtedly, the security of individual and property is a major concern for people: Many 

who were interviewed for this report spoke of it as the single most important expected 

peace dividend and have been most disappointed by its failure to materialize. The activities 

of the Khartoum government on the borders—and the invasion by its armed forces—are 

certainly worrying and have undoubtedly dampened the independence mood throughout 

South Sudan. But people believe that internal insecurity problems, especially those caused 

by local militias, rebel movements, and tribal warfare, are a greater threat to the new nation. 

These threats relate to the South Sudan government’s ability to address the concerns of 

individual citizens: To the extent that the government indulges in exclusionary practices 

that allow ethnic backgrounds, rather than national policy interests, to influence decisionmaking processes, it jeopardizes South Sudan’s future stability, unity, and development.4 

The forces that South Sudanese often say will threaten the transformation to nationhood 

are tribalism; nepotism; corruption; exclusion on ethnic, age, or gender bases; lack of 

meritocracy in hiring; and lack of a respectable constitution that spells out a clear social 

contract between government and citizens. South Sudanese realize that the current ethnic 

composition of the country could be a liability if it is not carefully managed, especially as it 

influences everyday governance. How far this worry runs through all sectors of the population, including top political leadership, will depend on how future national policies address 

diversity and the behavior of public officials.

Exemplifying how worried people are about South Sudan’s transition to statehood was 

the large crowd that attended a series of lectures held at Juba University, organized by Rift 

Valley Institute and the university’s Center for Peace and Development Studies, on the topic 

of culture and nation in South Sudan. The lectures raised the questions of whether South 

The main preoccupation of 

political debate in Juba was 

. . . how to turn its ethnic and 

cultural diversity into a useful 

asset, forming the colorful and 

unified country that everyone 

had yearned for.
4

Sudan is ready for and capable of nationhood, and what it will take for the statehood process 

to happen smoothly. Other questions in this debate concerned the role of cultural diversity 

in development. Various institutions have organized many similar events throughout South 

Sudan since the January referendum, garnering much attention from ordinary citizens, 

government officials, and international development partners. 

The discussions have made two things clear. First, most people are aware of the distinction 

between nation building and state building, understanding that they are related but different projects, and second, the idea of nation building is a concern of everyone throughout 

South Sudan. On the one hand, state building focuses on economic development, upgrading 

the capacity of human resources, an effective security apparatus, responsible fiscal policy, 

efficient service delivery, and general infrastructure. It also entails policies aimed at encouraging the growth of the private sector, including foreign investment. When people talk about 

nation building, on the other hand, they are often referring to a national political project 

that would produce a sense of national unity and collective national identity with an eye to 

preventing discord along ethnic lines, especially as tribal violence and its ongoing destructive legacies remain part of a collective memory among South Sudanese. Any government 

actions that citizens recognize as insensitive to the history of ethnic discord will automatically project ethnic bias. So a nation-building program needs to focus on citizens themselves, 

seeking to cultivate a strong sense of national over tribal membership. Such a program would 

emanate from a conviction that nations are made, not born—nor can accidents of history 

and geography necessarily result in a unified nation, at least not in the sense of fostering 

citizens’ feelings of belonging and loyalty. Creating such a nation, especially in an age where 

no country can avoid the global limelight, requires a vision, a plan, and honest and participatory actions, not just the pronouncements of politicians and the wishes of a few dedicated 

nationalists. Interviewees suggest that the government and its development partners seem 

heavily focused on state building and less so on nation building. This represents a missed 

opportunity: Though they are conceptually distinct, in practice, state and nation building 

can be mutually reinforcing. Providing services, improving living standards, and strengthening security allows citizens to be proud of their country, just as pride in one’s nation is the 

foundation for stability, producing an environment in which services can be provided. So 

whatever projects a new country conceives, it has to view nation and state as separate but 

inseparable components of the same project. The government cannot focus too much on one 

without investing in the other. 

Now that South Sudan has become a state, it also needs to become a nation. Citizens’ 

sense of exclusion from the national platform—as in key decision making positions in the 

executive branch of government—media, government programs, and access to services 

cannot be allowed to grow. The euphoria of independence will be accompanied by the challenges of building a new nation, a project that will have to go beyond the usual temptation 

of focusing on material and infrastructure development as well as delivery of basic social 

services. These are all important and expected dividends of independence, but it will be 

near impossible to meet citizens’ expectations if South Sudan fails to become a nation. So 

far, the struggle for freedom from the grip of the Khartoum government has been the most 

unifying force for South Sudanese. Now that this struggle has borne fruit and there is no 

more north to blame, what will unite South Sudanese is the desire to build a nation with 

a shared identity. Such a collective identity will need to be politically constructed, and it 

is the task of its leadership, government, civil society, and private enterprise to do it by 

turning South Sudan’s cultural diversity into a national asset. 

Under normal circumstances, diversity is celebrated as a source of strength and enrichment of the human endeavor; such an approach in South Sudan will signify a discourse 

of hope and togetherness. Anything short of this will reflect a discourse of hegemony, 

Now that . . . there is no more 

north to blame, what will unite 

South Sudanese is the desire 

to build a nation with a 

shared identity. 
5

exclusion, and assumptions of homogeneity. To go in for the latter is to make diversity a 

liability and a hazard, creating a discourse of discord. In the worst circumstances, it can be a 

discourse of rejection. To view diversity as a threat, as the Islamist government in Khartoum 

did regarding southerners, is to condemn difference and position otherness as a rationale 

for stigmatization.

The current discourse found in the South Sudan government’s policies is inclusive and 

broad-based, and at least as a matter of policy, there has been a collective agreement 

to begin constructing the nation’s identity. This agreement emanates from an apparent 

conviction that the lack of unifying symbols in the face of ethnic and cultural diversity is 

an impediment to national unity. Historically, and given the strong ethnic loyalties within 

South Sudan, the most significant enemy of the country’s cohesion, national loyalty, and 

citizen pride will be the currently widespread suspicion of ethnicity-based exclusion from 

the national platform and other aspects of South Sudanese national life. This same sense of 

exclusion is one of the most important factors in South Sudan leaving Sudan, and authorities are keen not to practice the same policies. 

At the same time, however, some government officials have tended to engage in exclusionary practices—or at least the public perceives that they do—and these have in the 

past been based on ethnic differences. If these practices continue in the new South Sudan, 

any citizen who feels excluded will never develop that important sense of pride in nation. 

A starting point to addressing the feeling of exclusion is for the government to state the 

obvious: that South Sudan belongs to all South Sudanese, and not to any ethnic, religious, 

or political group. Putting this simple fact into action in distributing the nation’s resources 

and in governance generally, the government has gone on record to state that the whole 

country must address itself to identifying, documenting, preserving, displaying, promoting, 

and celebrating the cultural practices that are common to all South Sudanese. According to 

this policy commitment, the religious practices, dancing arts, marriage systems, indigenous 

languages, natural environment, and unique ecological zones inhabited by dozens of South 

Sudanese ethnic nationalities must be celebrated as a mix of symbols that bind together the 

people of South Sudan, making it unique and yet similar to the rest of black Africa.

Culturally diverse countries also confront the challenge of finding symbols for their people 

to rally around that transcend their ethnic, linguistic, and political differences. Right now, 

South Sudan seems most divided by its lack of an indigenous national language, and the 

government is discussing this rather urgently. South Sudan might follow the experiences 

of other, similarly diverse countries in developing a national language, whether it creates a 

hybrid of a number of local languages, drawing from the Indonesian model, or adopts English 

as the language of government, business, and education. Others have suggested that five 

languages should be selected from the three main regions of the country. In each of these 

regions, the majority of the people speak languages that could be elevated to the national 

level. In Upper Nile, Nuer is the language of the majority and could be one of the national 

languages from that region. Dinka is the majority language in greater Bahr el-Ghazal, as are 

Bari, Latuka, and Zande, which are spoken by the majority of people in the region of Equatoria. But developing these national languages does not mean that the small languages would 

be allowed to die off; their use at a local level would be encouraged. The project of selecting 

national-level languages will require open dialogue with all South Sudanese communities, 

perhaps by commissioning a survey to solicit ideas from a cross-section of communities. 

Linking the language policy to the educational curriculum, all indigenous languages could be 

taught in primary school up to, say, the third grade, after which English could take over as 

the medium of instruction. This would result in the majority of people, especially the urban 

and educated population, being trilingual—in the national language, English, and a special 

version of Arabic that has already began to function as a lingua franca across South Sudan.

A starting point to addressing 

the feeling of exclusion is for 

the government to state the 

obvious: that South Sudan 

belongs to all South Sudanese, 

and not to any ethnic, religious, 

or political group. 
6

Lack of a unifying language does not mean that South Sudan cannot develop as a unified 

nation, but failure to address the issue will surely slow down the speed of its development. 

Having a national language would lessen feelings of exclusion and domination by one or 

few ethnic groups—not to mention that people could communicate across ethnic boundaries more easily, easing conflict and alleviating suspicions of domination and favoritism. 

Consider what might happen in government offices when two officials from one ethnic 

background speak to each other in their native tongue in the presence of members of other 

ethnic groups; it can be quite upsetting for those who do not understand that particular 

language, and the use of tribal language might suggest that the officials are conspiring 

about something they do not want the others to understand. How to deal with this issue 

is currently one of the debates in government circles—that is, whether there might be a 

need for legislation that prohibits conducting official business in a language other than the 

official language of government.

Another major obstacle to realizing the dream of nationhood is ethnic conflict, which has 

some of its roots in the above mentioned feelings of exclusion or domination of the state 

by some ethnic groups. The people of South Sudan have lived with internal conflict for some 

time, but in recent decades the strife has become more gruesome due to a combination of 

feelings of exclusion, diminishing resources, and the long hands of the powers to the north. 

A country seeking unity, collective national identity, and stability must have a clear policy 

to combat this violence. When the people of South Sudan have historically competed for 

resources—especially pastoral peoples—these purely economic conflicts have been easily 

reconcilable through traditional mechanisms. To foster these types of reconciliation practices and rebuild relations of mutual interest, attempts are under way to highlight significant events in history that celebrate South Sudan’s mechanisms of indigenous justice. The 

Ministry of Culture and Heritage has deemed it important to chronicle, preserve, and display 

how spiritual leaders have used religious practices and rituals to stem violence. Some of the 

ministry’s activities include establishing a museum of prophecy, to be erected at the prophet 

Ngun Deng’s shrine in Jonglei state. This museum will move Ngun Deng’s ideas to the center 

stage, showing that they had much in common with other similar Nilotic prophets, such 

as Ariathdit in Gogrial or Lirpiu in Bor. This emphasis on religious heritage underscores the 

power of spiritual leaders as moral compasses for South Sudanese communities, on par with 

Christianity or any other religion. 

Another strategy may be to review and develop the national educational curriculum for 

primary through secondary school so that Christianity or any other religion of the book is 

taught side by side with local spiritual ideas. This could prevent the younger generation of 

South Sudanese from shunning the spiritual beliefs of their ancestors as signs of backwardness, as some have already begun to do. For such a program to take hold, it will need to be a 

collaborative endeavor between the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Culture and Heritage, 

local authorities, and civil society groups. The traditional spiritual beliefs do not compete 

with other religions but are tolerant and accommodating, and South Sudanese can learn a 

great deal from them in their efforts to coexist. The current government has made a commitment to the idea that its history, including traditional beliefs, has to be imparted to its 

younger generations if they are to become proud citizens of the new country. Most of the 

leading figures in South Sudan’s political class have pronounced that a nation that does not 

commemorate and celebrate its past surely cannot know where it is headed.5

In attempting to address regional and ethnic diversity through governance, however, 

the leadership finds itself in a dilemma. The leaders who created the system of governance 

thought best to decentralize South Sudan’s political system, dividing the country into ten 

states. The purpose of this system had to do with state building—that is, having equitable 

administration of each of the ten states, as services and power could be shared and brought 

Having a national language 

would lessen feelings of 

exclusion and domination by 

one or few ethnic groups.
7

nearer to the people. But in such a diverse country, the system works at cross purposes with 

nation building: It is difficult to see how it ensures integration, as states might feel isolated 

from one another and each one could pursue its own course. This requires the institution of 

national bodies that link the states together, functioning as a platform for communication 

and interaction.

History as National Identity

Ever since the country we now know as Sudan came into existence, the people living in its 

southern half have had more commonalities between them than differences, and they are 

different from the northern population in several significant ways. The similarities among 

southern ethnic groups have included modes of production and livelihood, religious traditions, and culture in general. They also include important shared historical experiences—

especially regarding contact with the outside world and the effects of slavery, the colonial 

order, and the protracted wars between north and south. For South Sudanese, the struggle 

that culminated in independence is now officially recognized as a nearly 200-year struggle 

against foreign occupation and domination. State medals will now carry the official historical timeline between 1821, when Muhammad Ali, the viceroy of the Ottoman Sultan in 

Egypt, sent an expedition to invade Sudan in search of slaves and ivory, and 2011, the year 

South Sudan gained independence. Professional historians will go on debating whether or 

not the Turkiyya (1820–81), the Mahdiyya (1881–98), the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 

(1898–1956), and the state of independent Sudan (1956–2011) had interconnected policies 

of oppression that would make the people of South Sudan view them as one continuum of 

colonization. But this narrative is now South Sudan’s state history; there is an official historical conclusion that the new country, united or not, was a colony of all these powers, and 

has just now ended foreign rule to emerge independent and united by its history of struggle. 

This official line is intended to shape the historical experience with a view to asserting 

the claim to oneness of all South Sudanese. “We are one people, if not by genealogy, then 

by lived experienced,” remarked Vincent, a social researcher from Western Equatoria in an 

interview. The policy is meant to preempt and offset any claims that a country as diverse as 

South Sudan would have no foundation upon which to build a sense of nationhood.

That said, unity among South Sudanese historically has been based more on how different they are from northerners than on the commonalities among them. These differences have been cultural, religious, linguistic, ethnic, and racial. The official policy of the 

Khartoum government, starting at the end of British colonialism, attempted to homogenize 

Sudan and create an Arab country. Many South Sudanese have remarked that these policies 

aimed at doing away with diversity altogether, as it proved a stumbling block to the Arabization project. For their part, many Khartoum officials have remarked that, since various 

South Sudanese ethnic nations use Arabic to communicate across linguistic boundaries, 

Arabic should become the only national language. This may be true, but it does not necessarily follow that South Sudanese are Arabs. “We also speak English, but we have never 

claimed that we are English people,” suggested Manyang, a journalist, in an interview. The 

story well known to most learned South Sudanese is that all successive governments took 

Khartoum and the areas around it as the center of the country in every sense of the word, 

and with this view, the Khartoum-based state was built on policies of exclusion from cultural 

representation, resources, and political power. Khartoum sought coercive unity, using both 

outright violence and more underhanded tactics, such as the propagation of Arab culture 

in state media. 

Thus South Sudan’s official history is a history from the perspective of victimhood, politically refashioned over time to make a case for dissent by aggrieved areas peripheral to the 

The similarities among southern 

ethnic groups have included 

modes of production and 

livelihood, religious traditions, 

and culture in general. They 

also include important shared 

historical experiences.
8

central region. In addition to concentrating development and basic services in Sudan’s central 

area, the Khartoum government actively promoted Arab and Islamic culture at the expense 

of the various cultural practices that the rest of the country was made of. The result was that 

South Sudan and other peripheries of the country increasingly felt that this cultural, ethnic, 

or racial exclusion was the basis for exclusion from the distribution of the national pie, basic 

services, and political power. The people of the south, or southerners, as they increasingly 

came to be referred to and self-identified, found themselves needing to forge a unity of 

convenience—that is, a unity driven by the need for a collective effort to deal with the negative experiences imposed on them by the Arab-dominated Khartoum governments. 

The need and opportunity for unity existed even during the colonial period. The scourge of 

slavery, because it affected all southerners regardless of their ethnic affiliation, forced them 

to create a unified front and disregard the differences among them. When the Anglo-Egyptian 

Condominium, the colonial power of the time, began to fight the slave trade at the turn of 

the twentieth century, southerners were also brought together by the various colonial policies deemed antagonistic to their well-being. Southerners responded to colonialism as people 

affected by the colonial order in ways that differed from the northerners. The popular perception was that British colonial authorities and northerners had a common goal to suppress the 

south and do away with the fabric of its core cultures. Religion and race, regardless of the 

definitions one applied, were central not only to demarcating the lines separating northern 

and southern identities, but also to reducing the differences among southerners. Such a sense 

of political unity was necessary in efforts against British colonialism, which was then seen 

as favoring the Arabs, Sudanese, and Egyptians.6 A history of victimization remained a very 

effective force for unity.

At the end of the colonial era in 1956, southerners again found another unifying force: 

the view held by their political leaders regarding how independence should tackle the many 

matters of discord between north and south that dated back to the conception of Sudan 

as a political entity in the nineteenth century. The idea of two countries emerging out of 

the colony of Sudan had been raised then, since the south had been neglected during the 

colonial period.7 Southern leaders felt that the independence of Sudan as one country would 

mean that the south became yet again a colony—this time of the north, as an Arab power 

asserted itself over Africans. Thus united, southerners argued collectively for the British 

to either delay independence until the south was ready to compete with the north on an 

equal footing, or set up two separate countries. As the British hastily exited Sudan without 

rectifying their wrongs, however, southerners had to choose between remaining with the 

north and being second-class citizens in their own country or fighting for a better arrangement that would transform the old exploitative Sudan into a modern state where citizenship 

implied rights for all. That lived history is one of the experiences that the current population 

of South Sudan point to as a foundation for their new nation. With Sudan’s independence 

failing to reassure southerners, a protracted and violent conflict raged between north and 

south for seventeen years. This postcolonial experience united southerners yet again and set 

them on a collision course with the north. Despite many disagreements among southerners, 

which were sometimes very violent, the experience of the war, including Khartoum’s counterinsurgency tactics against civilians in the south, convinced large swaths of the southern 

population that the north was a common enemy and that all southerners should set aside 

their differences and unite. 

South Sudan’s history of struggle against oppression is one that every learned South 

Sudanese today understands as being shared by all. It is echoed in the words of Lual Diing, a 

veteran politician from Aweil, who said that “we suffered together because our enemies saw 

our various identities as one and the same, and so we should turn that shared painful past 

into a positive outcome and say that we are indeed one.”8 In the wake of independence, it 
9

is hoped that such messages will be heeded to stem violence among people in the south, 

now that they are freed from their common oppressor.

The event most closely related to the emergence of what one might describe as a South 

Sudanese identity—that is, the sentiment that they are one people—was the second round 

of the north-south war (1983–2005). When the fighting started, southern grievances included 

a protest against then-President Nimeiri’s application of sharia, the redrawing of north-south 

borders in an attempt to annex some newly discovered oil-rich areas to the north, the question of an oil refinery proposed to be built in Port Sudan instead of in areas of production 

in the south, and the plan to divide the then-autonomous south into three weaker regions, 

clearly abrogating the Addis Ababa Agreement that had ended the first civil war. All these 

shared grievances allowed the south to speak with one voice against Khartoum, and the 

war that was triggered by these policies and the SPLA/M’s popular support was regarded by 

people in South Sudan as testament to the south’s unity of purpose. Some southern Sudanese 

supported Khartoum, but it was unmistakable that the south had taken another step toward 

unity. Most supporters of the “re-division”9 of the south came to regret their actions later, 

when they realized that it was a mechanism northerners supported to weaken the south. They 

later joined the SPLA en masse. The Khartoum government responded with counterinsurgency 

tactics that targeted civilians in urban centers, accusing nearly all southerners of supporting 

the opposition. Collective punishment became the norm, pushing more and more people 

into rebellion and swelling the ranks of the opposition. In the late 1980s and throughout 

the 1990s, the south witnessed gruesome atrocities involving air bombardment and ground 

attacks on villages and SPLA-controlled towns. These tactics resulted in displacement and 

destruction not seen anywhere since World War II. Two and half million people are believed 

to have died, and most South Sudanese are still convinced that a genocidal campaign was 

carried out while the world watched. With that came increased negative sentiment toward 

the north and the south’s greatest determination in the history of the struggle to achieve 

separation. The treatment of internally displaced persons in the north, the extrajudicial killings in government-controlled garrison towns in the south, and the whole idea that all the 

country’s political problems and the periphery-center problems should be solved through 

military might, all cemented southerners’ resolve to stand together, at least until the main 

goal was achieved.10 The SPLA/M’s concept of a New Sudan—that is, making all Sudan democratic and secular instead of attempting to secede from it—seductive as it was, began to 

wane among ordinary fighters. The continued horrific conflict, the abductions, the maiming 

of abductees, and the aerial bombings all convinced southerners that they could not share a 

nation with northerners. South Sudanese political humor is currently awash with jokes about 

John Garang’s vision of New Sudan, how it had always been a geopolitical tactic, how doubtful it is that he genuinely meant what he preached, and how he had frustratingly remarked 

that “anyone not convinced about the liberation of the whole Sudan can stop when we reach 

Kosti and leave me to march to Khartoum alone if I so choose.”11

History demonstrates the gradual emergence of the ingredients that created South 

Sudan’s sense of a collective national identity, internally muddled as it may be. These experiences helped form a concept of southernness, the idea that being a South Sudanese was 

not only a matter of geography, but of cultural, ethnic, and racial connections, juxtaposed 

against the historical injustices done by colonial powers and the Khartoum government. But 

is this history enough to be the foundation for a new nation?

The New South and the Rise of a Nation

South Sudan’s independence carries the question of whether the historical experiences that 

have long united the old south will endure in the new south, enabling the young country to 
10

become a unified political, cultural, and social entity—in short, a nation. So far, the unity 

of purpose that kept the south together as a political entity has been, in a sense, a negative unity, driven by opposition to the north. If there is no war between Sudan and South 

Sudan after separation, there is a chance that the old ethnic discord within the country 

will rear its ugly head once again. There are already many signs of this, as the relative calm 

that has prevailed since the 2005 truce between north and south has started to run out of 

steam, revealed by the many rebellions against the Juba government. These rebellions are 

rooted in rivalries among top military officers, triggered by perceptions that political power 

in Juba has been heavily dominated by a few ethnic groups. These episodes quickly take on 

an ethnic character, as their leaders play the ethnic card to attract fighters into the rebellion. Ethnic relations in the city of Juba have been extremely volatile due to accusations 

that the Dinka, South Sudan’s largest ethnic group, have dominated the government; claims 

of violence by Nuer and Dinka–dominated army personnel; and suspicions of land grabbing 

by people who are not indigenous residents of the town. The Bari—the ethnic group more 

autochthonous to Juba—blame the presence of a large population of SPLA soldiers for the 

election of Clement Wani, who is from the Mandari ethnic group, as governor of Central 

Equatoria in the April 2010 elections, implying that the Dinka and Nuer are helping impose 

an unwanted governor on the Bari. 

None of the above bodes well for the future unity of the country. Some Equatorians claim 

that the presence of the national capital in their town has only led to their marginalization 

in their own territory. Non-Equatorians are demanding that either the capital be moved to 

another town if the Equatorians continue their rhetoric or a national land policy be issued 

to declare the national capital a multiethnic arena that reflects the diversity of the nation. 

“If we say that Juba is to become a national capital, then we are recognizing the benefits 

that accrue from it, and we are also agreeing that any citizen of this country has the right 

to choose the capital as his place of residence. . . . We can’t have it both ways, to want the 

benefits that the capital city provides and to desire to keep out all other citizens,” remarked 

a citizen from Jonglei state in an interview. If the question of land is not politically and 

constitutionally addressed for the capital city and across the country in general, there will 

undoubtedly be a major crisis, which could trigger ethnic violence.

The Referendum and the Growing National Sentiment

Most South Sudanese, if not all, are quick to declare their citizenship in the south, and there 

is no doubt that they would work and fight for it. It is unclear whether they are all speaking 

about the same south, however, or a different south as envisioned by each ethnic group. 

When the peace process that ended the war in 2005 was being negotiated, self-determination 

for the south was the centerpiece of that process. The entire southern population had hung 

their aspirations for a better future on this right: Most southerners wanted it at any cost, and 

eventually, it became the single issue on which every southerner was unwilling to compromise. Any political leader who had different opinions about it could only voice them to his or 

her own detriment. The negotiators, reading the mood of their people, were ready to grant 

concessions and lose many things in exchange for self-determination. But with the creation 

of a new state, will South Sudan transform this popular demand for independence into the 

nation South Sudanese expect? The question is all the more acute due to the challenges that 

the new nation faces in attempting to address the aspirations of the people, who fought in a 

long and testing struggle, voted overwhelmingly for independence, and expected an immediate independence dividend. Will independence prove to be the panacea for the problems that 

have confronted South Sudan for over a half century? Or will the people’s expectations be so 

great as to result in disappointment and make the country ungovernable?

When the peace process that 

ended the war in 2005 was being 

negotiated, self-determination 

for the south was the centerpiece 

of that process. Most southerners 

wanted it at any cost.
11

In the course of research for this paper, the policy frameworks for many of the new government’s ministries were reviewed to examine what the Juba government is doing to tackle 

the difficulties it faces. From what is stated on these policy frameworks and the ministries’ 

constitutional mandates, South Sudan’s government envisions the new nation as standing on four pillars needed to hold up the country: political unity, a strong and disciplined 

military, a strong economy and services delivery, and a vibrant civil society. In interviews 

with people in many sectors of South Sudanese society, there is clear agreement between 

government and citizen on this vision. The outstanding question is that of its implementation, as the citizen is expecting the government to uphold its side of the promise and the 

government is hoping that its actions will inspire citizens to take up their national duties. 

In short, the pillars of the nation are rather wobbly. 

Political Unity

As stated earlier, South Sudan and the idea of southernness has always been imagined 

and practiced in opposition to the north. The struggle against the Khartoum government’s 

counterinsurgency practices, the memories of the war atrocities, and the politics of exclusion and marginalization of the peripheries in Sudan’s development process all helped to 

forge both political unity and a sense of collective southern identity. The momentum for 

the unity of purpose was sped up by the events that followed the signing of the CPA in 2005 

that ended the quarter-century civil war. These events include the claims that Khartoum 

was not forthright regarding wealth sharing, especially the oil proceeds that the south feels 

cheated out of. They also involve suspicions that Khartoum continued to engage in activities 

aimed at destabilizing the south, as in the violence it fomented in the contested region of 

Abyei. But the most important event was the southern referendum on unity or separation, 

in which southerners demonstrated an unprecedented convergence of purpose and voted 

in favor of independence. The calmness of the voting period was almost shocking, given 

the violence that had plagued the country for over thirty years. But the uncharacteristic 

peace was quickly disrupted by rebellions in seven of the south’s ten states—some of which 

are still raging—with tragic consequences for national unity, human life, and development 

programs. This has particularly weakened political unity among the top leaders, especially 

in competition for public office.

Furthermore, there is currently a divide between those who physically fought in the 

liberation struggle and seem to feel a sense of entitlement to government privileges, and 

those who have contributed to the struggle in a variety of other ways and now feel excluded 

because they did not fight. This is natural for a young nation that has seen so much destruction, losing millions of precious lives in the course of two protracted wars. It is also to be 

expected of a people who have experienced abject poverty due to oppression of one kind 

or another for over 191 years. The history of exclusion, which is the source of South Sudan’s 

hope for unity, also can provoke competing viewpoints among southerners.12 These viewpoints, however, should not be allowed to derail the national project.

A Disciplined Military

South Sudan’s current defense force is composed of the SPLA, the rebel movement that liberated the country; various militia forces that had opposed the SPLA during the war but were 

absorbed into it after the 2005 peace agreement; and a large number of military personnel 

that were part of the northern Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), but who were also absorbed into 

the SPLA. This composition has made for a very volatile relationship among the senior command officers. But the SPLA’s most significant challenge is corruption. Many soldiers have 

abandoned the service because they feel their leaders are not serious about their national 

The calmness of the voting 

period was . . . quickly 

disrupted by rebellions in seven 

of the south’s ten states—some 

of which are still raging—with 

tragic consequences for 

national unity, human life, 

and development programs. 
12

duties. Most senior officers are accused of misappropriating army funds. There is widespread 

talk about forces at war fronts and those serving far away from Juba who go for months 

without receiving their salaries because senior officers have drawn from the defense budget 

for themselves. As the army takes 40 percent of the national budget, people expect better 

things from the SPLA—not the dilapidated barracks, absence of a true military college, 

shoddy training (the likes of which was reported by the Small Arms Survey) and poor state 

of its hardware.13

Basic Service Delivery as Independence Dividend

South Sudan is almost the size of Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, and Burundi combined, but a 

quarter century of war has left the country with a legacy of destruction that manifests itself 

in some of the worst human development indicators in the world. The country needs a road 

network—currently, it has only forty miles of paved roads—and extension of electricity to 

all corners, along with a host of other services. The expectations of the country’s people 

are high. Balancing all this against the government’s corruption and weak institutional 

capacity, as well as an annual government budget of $2 billion, it is easy to see a future of 

disappointment and instability.

A Vibrant Civil Society

The government seems convinced that civil society is a partner rather than an adversary 

in governance. This attitude derives from the days of the war, when South Sudan had an 

active civil society that mainly chronicled and reported both the atrocities of the Khartoum 

government and the abuses of their own opposition army, and campaigned for a peaceful 

solution to Sudan’s conflicts. As there was no political power worth fighting over during the war, South Sudan’s activist groups had no conflict with the liberation movement, 

especially because civil society was also involved in delivering services to make up for the 

state’s absence in the lives of most southerners. After the 2005 peace agreement, most of 

the important civil society leaders joined the newly established South Sudan government. 

However, there is no parliamentary bill defining the rights and responsibilities of activists, 

leaving civil society open to government suppression if the sting of criticism becomes too 

strong. At the moment, there is still something of an environment for civil society to grow, 

but the experiences of other countries, such as Eritrea, show that the lack of a definite law 

leaves room for the government to invent laws along the way that hamper independent 

speech and open criticism. It is very likely that political space will shrink in the future if 

the government of South Sudan loses confidence in its ability to withstand criticism, and 

officials might use the absence of a clear law to suppress civil society. 

Toward a National Cultural Project

How historical memory shapes ethnic conflict can be forgotten in the immediacy of the 

moment. Nation building is not just about physical reconstruction, service provision, or material wealth. It is also about using the country’s shared customs to prevent further escalation of 

conflict, as well as upholding values, customs, and traditional practices that can be enshrined 

in national identity. In other words, a nation is not the sum of its material possessions. Rather, 

people are the most important assets; they are the nation, and how each citizen behaves 

becomes the face and reflection of the nation’s character. A new nation cannot afford to relax 

its self-criticism and reflection. The philosophy of developing a good image, as found in policy 

statements and remarked on by interviewees for this study, suggests that the best way for 

the nation to hold itself to its own standards is to teach its values to its youngest citizens, 
13

to remind everyone of who they are as a people. The current attitude of openness to criticism 

will enable the people of South Sudan to be their own best judge and critic. 

But if individuals do not reflect the national moral outlook, it will not be long before 

the nation begins to ignore its own standards; these standards have to be self-imposed. 

And such morality cannot be instilled in people through laws and constitutions alone; these 

documents cannot teach people how to avoid violating their rules. Rather, each citizen 

needs to internalize the national moral standards, through parents, schoolteachers, religious 

leaders, and above all, exemplary political leaders who uphold teachings of equality and 

mutual respect. Currently, accusations of corruption, nepotism, and abuse of the justice 

system and law enforcement are common. A change in government behavior will go a long 

way in easing citizens’ worries for their country.

To join a community of sovereign nations, South Sudan also will need to identify its own 

homegrown philosophy of development, democracy, and open participatory system of governance. To be strong and respected, it must build itself on the four pillars mentioned above 

and develop symbols of nationhood around which to rally the public. In addition to creating a national anthem and flag, naming the country, founding a currency, and establishing 

sports teams, the building of national symbols should include honoring the memory of the 

struggle and celebrating the country’s diverse culture through cultural centers, museums of 

heritage, and national archives.

Commemorating the Revolution

South Sudan’s struggle has been long and hard, and individuals and communities have competing claims of nationalism. It is commonly believed that South Sudan’s fight for independence 

began in earnest with the Torit mutiny by the southern officer corps in 1955. Despite professional historians’ qualms with it, South Sudan has officially marked this as the date when the 

first north-south war began. To prevent a rift within citizens’ ranks, a specific project that 

some people are calling the South Sudan History and Documentation Project is being developed. This project will record the recent past and history of the struggle as ordinary people 

witnessed it. It will tone down the unnecessary hierarchy of contributions made by different 

people, especially any references to which ethnic groups have made the greatest contribution and the conclusion that they must be rewarded for it. This important history has to be 

recorded, exhibited, celebrated, and taught in schools. It has stamped itself on human bodies 

and could be commemorated with symbols of these bodies. A war memorial at the bottom 

of Jebel Kujur or on the face of Jebel Lado, or on the island of Gondokoro, might serve this 

purpose. The project could also celebrate the heroes and heroines of the liberation struggle 

through memorials and statues, street names, and war museums to be erected in different 

states and towns across South Sudan, such as the Dr. John Garang Mausoleum in Juba, which 

the Ministry of Culture and Heritage has led in developing into a national symbol to show the 

price that South Sudanese have paid for their freedom. The new country ought to recognize 

all its struggle leaders, from Any-nya to Any-nya II to the SPLA. There is now a program to 

erect monuments in honor of such prominent heroes as Samuel Gaitut, Majier Gai, Akuot Atem, 

Joseph Uduhu, William Nyuon Bany, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, and General Tafeng, just to mention 

a few, in public squares of various towns, which will become a source of pride for all citizens. 

The current government envisions these monuments being done in a way that is unique to how 

Africans commemorate history, which is more performative than static. 

Cultural Centers

Many South Sudanese suggest that one factor contributing to conflict in a nation is a 

lack of a deep collective psyche. The opportunity to become a nation comes partly from 

This important history has to be 

recorded, exhibited, celebrated, 

and taught in schools. 
14

observing a shared history, culture, and identity, all displayed together in cultural centers. 

To this end, two types of activities are immediately needed. The first involves constructing 

a national archive to preserve important historical records, research, and teaching about 

the past. All were shocked when the national government turned a blind eye to the actions 

of the government of Central Equatoria state in displacing its archive to a tent. That these 

documents—a collective history, a foundation of the nation—are now being destroyed by 

exposure to the elements is a shame to the nation. The same goes for the only national 

cultural center, called Nyakuron, which the government of the autonomous Southern Region 

built in the 1970s. The government of Central Equatoria state then leased the center to a 

private party, depriving the nation of an important institution and venue for celebrating its 

diverse cultural wealth. A nation aspiring to put its cultures on display will have to take this 

institution back or build a separate, more comprehensive national center, with performing 

arts and theatrical stages, to enable all South Sudan’s ethnic nations to stage their dances 

and music so that all can appreciate the arts and cultures of others. This is part of what 

would produce a cohesive nation. 

National Museum of Heritage

A national museum of heritage would celebrate South Sudan’s everyday cultural existence, 

including healing practices and religions; dwellings and architecture; language, music, and 

dance; marriage and bride wealth; cooking utensils and the types of food indigenous to the 

country; bedding and headrests; war and weapons; photographs displaying the different 

faces of ethnic nations; systems of traditional governance; and clothing, trades, and crafts. 

It might be called the Museum of Ethnography, or simply the National Museum of Culture. 

Educating for Unity

Educational systems can be a major driver of unity in a variety of ways, and the government has a plan to “take education to the villages,” as stated by the ministry of education. 

The more literacy spreads, the more likely people will adopt common cultural practices and 

leave aside other practices that have outlived their usefulness, such as the scarification 

of the forehead and removal of lower teeth commonly practiced among the Nilotics. When 

children attend school, literacy becomes an attack on some of these customs. Furthermore, 

when students get to high school, a long-term program of national integration begins. In 

the 1960s and 1970s, there used to be a program of national boarding high schools where 

children from across the country could study and learn about the diverse cultures of Sudan 

and thus develop appreciation for difference. Graduates from such schools then attended 

national universities, further interacting with even greater numbers of people from other 

ethnic nationalities and returning to their home areas with a national perspective. Such 

boarding high schools could be revived in the new South Sudan.

Conclusion

Many factors work against a project to develop a national identity in South Sudan. An 

endeavor to create one depends on the commitment of the entire government. Ideas about 

possible external funding sources for such a project need to be fine tuned, based on national 

priorities that South Sudanese set according to a homegrown philosophy of development, 

rather than the usual development policies that donors dictate. Such policies, if they address 

the priorities of the nation, have to be generated from the input and advice of experts 

across the whole of South Sudanese society. With such an approach, South Sudan could 

embark right away on the mission of involving every citizen in the business of participa-
15

tory governance. The Ministry of Culture and Heritage has already kicked off this effort by 

creating a policy framework that envisions a collective effort with other branches of the 

government, independent artists, and cultural communities to set a policy for constructing 

the nation’s identity.

With the conviction that all nations are made, not born, South Sudanese expect their 

government to lead the way in forging national symbols and a program of national unity. 

Before becoming unified, stable, and developed, all nations as we know them today had 

to go through prolonged periods of struggle to forge their sense of collective existence. 

Coexistence in South Sudan is not just a nice thing to say or a rhetoric of political correctness. It is a matter of the survival of the whole. No one gains from exclusionary practices 

or from citizenship in and primary loyalty to each one’s own specific cultural groups. All 

can gain from promoting an inclusive sense of national belonging, rallying around national 

symbols, practicing citizen-centered national policies, and building a citizenry devoted to 

the concept of citizenship in the nation.

Notes

1. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Negotiating Sudan’s North-South Future,” CSIS, Washington, 

DC, 2010. A host of other think tanks from the United States, Europe, and Africa, as well as many publications, 

including The Economist and The New York Times, have all pointed to the possibilities of a rough future for the 

young country. 

2. “Sudan’s Split: A Northern Attack on a Disputed Town Complicates Southern Independence,” The Economist, May 

26, 2011, and “The Birth of South Sudan: Managing Expectations,” The Economist, July 8, 2011.

3. One of the events commonly considered to be South Sudan’s earliest collective effort regarding its future is the 

1947 Juba Conference, in which the few southern intellectuals of that time and tribal chiefs had gathered to 

demand that South Sudan was different from the north and that the British must create two separate countries 

at the time of independence. It is one of the few historical actions by southerners for which written records can 

be found.

4. The Dinka comprise 35 percent of South Sudan’s population, followed by the Nuer, and the two are often accused 

of monopolizing political and military power. Ethnic groups in Greater Equatoria often complain that the Dinka 

are running an exclusionary government.

5. From interviews with the author.

6. The perception in South Sudan at the moment is that the British were the root cause of Sudan’s political ills, 

in that they forced together parts of the country that could never become one nation. Most learned South 

Sudanese believe that the British could have easily pulled the north and south out of the quagmire regarding 

the contested border. 

7. See Douglas Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Oxford: James Currey, 2003); Jok Madut Jok, Sudan: 

Race, Religion and Violence (Oxford: One World Publications, 2007).

8. Lual Diing was a member of the SPLA’s military command council when he made this remark at a political rally 

in Wanjok, a town in Aweil East County on June 18, 2002.

9. Re-division was the term used to refer to the policies of Nimeiri, then dictator of Sudan, to divide the southern 

region into three weaker provinces, in contravention of the Addis Ababa Accord, which had given Southern Sudan 

an autonomous status as a unified block. This division was demanded by some Equatorian leaders in registering 

their complaint against what they termed Dinka domination of the government. 

10. Heart-wrenching stories of abduction, rape, disappearance, and murder of men, women, and young girls abound 

in Juba. These actions, carried out by Khartoum’s army in the South’s garrison towns, are being told and retold 

and are part of Southerners’ quest for independence from the north and unity of the south.

11. As reported to the author by ex-combatants who heard Garang speak.

12. For further details on the history and politics of liberation, see Peter Adwak Nyaba, The Politics of Liberation in 

South Sudan: An Insider’s Viewpoint (Kampala: Fountain Press, 2001).

13. Richard Rands, “In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond,” Small Arms Survey, 

Geneva, 2010.
Of Related Interest

•	 Toward a New Republic of Sudan by Jon Temin and Theodore Murphy (Special Report, 

June 2011)

•	 Oil and State Building in South Sudan by Jill Shankleman (Special Report, July 2011)

•	 Secession and Precedent in Sudan and Africa by Jon Temin (Peace Brief, November 2010)

•	 Local Justice in Southern Sudan by Cherry Leonardi, Leben Nelson Moro, Martina Santschi, 

and Deborah H. Isser (Peaceworks, September 2010)

•	 Scenarios for Sudan’s Future, Revisited by Jon Temin and Jaïr van der Lijn (Peace Brief, 

August 2010)

•	 Negotiating Sudan’s Post-Referendum Arrangements by Jon Temin (Peace Brief, January 2010)

•	 Six Important Issues for Sudan and Its Future by Jon Temin (Peace Brief, September 2009)

•	 Scenarios for Sudan: Avoiding Political Violence Through 2011 by Alan Schwartz (Special 

Report, August 2009)

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Washington, DC 20037

www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.