About the Report

This report reviews the design and implementation of 

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) in 

Afghanistan, assessing the extent to which the DDR program 

met its goals and the effect this had on security sector reform 

(SSR). The report also focuses on the international community’s 

failure to include DDR as part of the initial power-sharing 

settlement embodied in the Bonn Agreement, the implications 

this posed for rival groups’ security, and the effects this had 

on both DDR and SSR. This report is one of a series focusing 

on DDR and SSR organized by the United States Institute of 

Peace’s Security Sector Governance Center. 

About the Author

Caroline A. Hartzell is a 2010–11 Jennings Randolph Fellow at 

the United States Institute of Peace and a professor of political 

science at Gettysburg College. She is currently conducting 

research on the effects that the terms of civil war settlements 

have on postconflict economic development and has 

previously worked on how power-sharing arrangements affect 

the stability of the peace. 

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 270 April 2011

© 2011 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Caroline A. Hartzell

Missed Opportunities

The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan

Summary

•	 Afghanistan’s disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program sought to 

enable the Afghan government to establish a monopoly on the use of force by helping 

break the linkages between former Afghan Military Forces (AMF) commanders and their 

troops, helping former combatants make the transition from military to civilian life, and 

collecting weapons in the possession of the AMF. Although Afghanistan presented an 

extremely challenging environment in which to implement DDR, a window for carrying out 

this task arguably existed for a couple of years after the signing of the Bonn Agreement. 

During this time the security situation throughout much of the country was relatively calm, 

the population generally supported efforts to establish peace, and the politicization of the 

security sector that began in the wake of the agreement was not yet entrenched.

•	 Unfortunately, the failure to include DDR in the Bonn settlement was the first in a series of 

missteps that limited the program’s contributions to security sector reform. Delays in the 

design and initiation of a DDR process, combined with the international community’s initial 

decision to leave only a light footprint in Afghanistan, left armed Afghan actors to contend 

with the type of security dilemma that has proven detrimental to other efforts to stabilize 

the peace. Competing militias’ efforts to provide security as well as some groups’ attempts 

to gain control of the security sector apparatus generated mistrust among the militias and 

reinforced the power of commanders and warlords. This situation was exacerbated by the 

coalition’s reluctance to check the growing factionalization of the DDR process and a civilian-implemented DDR program that lacked the coercive capacity to contend with spoilers. 

•	 DDR provisions should be part of a peace settlement. If armed groups prove unwilling to 

agree to such measures, their commitment to the settlement and to a durable peace must 

be considered suspect. Once such settlement measures have been agreed to, third-party 

actors—international or regional peacekeeping forces, third-party armies—should commit 

to providing security before, during, and after DDR; this sends a message to civilians and 

combatants that DDR will not endanger their safety.

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Contents

Armed Conflict in Afghanistan 2

Developing a Framework for SSR and DDR 

in Afghanistan 3

The ANBP and DDR 4

Assessing the Effect of DDR on SSR 8

Conclusions and Recommendations 10
2

Establishing national security in Afghanistan is a fundamental precondition for fostering 

development. While various security programs have been initiated in Afghanistan in the 

wake of the December 2001 Bonn Agreement, this report focuses specifically on the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program undertaken from February 2003 

to July 2006.1 DDR, a core part of Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Program (ANBP), a United 

Nations Development Programme (UNDP) initiative responsible for security sector reform 

(SSR), had three objectives: to break the “historic patriarchal chain of command” between 

former commanders and their troops; to assist former armed members of the Afghan military 

forces (AMF) in making the transition from military to civilian life, particularly by equipping 

them to find alternative sources of gainful employment; and to collect, store, and deactivate 

weapons in AMF possession.2

Achieving the DDR program’s goals was an integral part of enabling the Afghan government to establish a monopoly on the use of force, a crucial step in its efforts to protect 

citizens from threats and uphold the rule of law. A successful DDR program could contribute 

to this outcome in a variety of ways. First, breaking the links between commanders and 

militiamen could help to weaken the power of groups competing with the government for 

control of the state. Second, the DDR program could limit armed challenges to the state by 

providing nonstate armed actors with incentives to enter civilian life. Finally, DDR could help 

reconstitute statutory forces responsible for security, as formally trained ex-combatants find 

employment in the new security sector. 

Postwar reform of a security sector is always a complicated process, but particularly so in 

Afghanistan, which has yet to make the transition to a postconflict environment. Convincing 

armed actors to give up their arms and dismantle their forces while an insurgency is ongoing 

is an enormously challenging task.3 Nevertheless, there was an opportunity to do so in the 

two years after the Bonn Agreement was signed. During that time the security situation 

in the country was relatively stable, the population supported efforts to establish peace, 

and the politicization of the security sector that began once the agreement was signed had 

not yet become fully entrenched. Unfortunately, this opportunity was not seized, and the 

international community’s failure to engage fully with the DDR process limited the positive 

effect of DDR on SSR, as well as generating problems for the state-building process. 

Armed Conflict in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has experienced armed conflict almost continuously since December 1979 when 

the Soviet Union invaded the country. The Soviets, who intervened in support of the Peoples’ 

Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a radical leftist party, were met with a decadelong armed resistance in the form of major Islamist factions—the mujahidin—backed by 

countries including the United States, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Following the Soviet 

withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the collapse of the Najibullah regime in 1992, civil 

war broke out. The country split into a number of semiautonomous regions, mainly along 

ethnic lines, with different factions fighting for control of Kabul. The Taliban formed in 

reaction to the prevailing anarchy, particularly in the rural regions of the country. Although 

the Pashtun-dominated Taliban controlled some 90 percent of Afghanistan by 1998, fighting 

continued throughout the country between them and other ethnic factions.4

The next major phase of armed conflict in Afghanistan began in response to al-Qaeda’s 

attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. A U.S.-led 

intervention in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, was launched in October 2001 

with the goal of overthrowing the Taliban regime and clearing the country of al-Qaeda. 

Coalition forces attacking from the air were supported on the ground by the Northern Alliance, a group of militias opposed to Taliban rule. Although President George W. Bush had 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor 

of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, 

D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American 

University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, James R. 

Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. • Kerry 

Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and 

Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Ikram U. Khan, President, 

Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. 

Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of 

Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA • Judy Van Rest, 

Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute, 

Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, 

Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C. 

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy •

Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
3

asked the Northern Alliance specifically not to occupy Kabul until elements of the Pashtun 

resistance or a United Nations peacekeeping force joined them—a request to which it 

agreed—the Northern Alliance, numbering some 50,000 forces at the time, entered the city 

in November 2001 following its desertion by Taliban forces.5 As a result, the Northern Alliance, dominated by Shura-i Nazar-affiliated militias from the Panjshir Valley, was positioned 

to lead the shaping of the Afghan security sector as it came to dominate key security organs, 

including the military, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Interior, and the 

National Directorate of Security.6

Following the Taliban’s collapse in 2002, militias that had collaborated with coalition 

forces assumed local and regional power. At the national level, the loosely linked commanders of the anti-Taliban coalition and the Northern Alliance were formally integrated 

into the government of Afghanistan through the creation of the eight-corps AMF. This had 

two effects. First, the integration converted a disparate collection of local militias into a 

formal military structure by process of decree rather than rational reform. Second, the AMF 

“effectively legitimized many commanders and private militias by association,” regardless 

of what their previous affiliations had been.7

The security situation in Afghanistan remained relatively stable for nearly three years 

after the December 2001 Bonn Agreement.8 During this time coalition forces focused on 

continuing combat operations in the southern, southeastern, and eastern parts of the 

country against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces while the International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) helped to maintain security in Kabul. Perhaps because the relatively low levels 

of conflict fostered a sense of complacency in the international community, comparatively 

few resources were dedicated to helping promote security in the country during this period; 

Operation Enduring Freedom reached a peak level of 20,000 troops and ISAF of 6,000 troops 

in early 2004.9 Whatever the source of the international community’s initially tepid engagement, it was crucial to shaping security-sector reform in Afghanistan. 

Developing a Framework for SSR and DDR in Afghanistan

Afghanistan’s DDR program and security sector reforms were developed in fits and starts 

over more than five years. The first step in the process took place in 2001 with the international conference that produced the Bonn Agreement. The agreement, in turn, established 

the Afghan Interim Authority, the leadership of which would play a role in choosing a successor regime after six months and organizing national elections.10 The Bonn Agreement 

only indirectly addressed SSR and did not contain any agreement on DDR. Chapter V notes 

that “all mujahidin, Afghan armed forces and armed groups in the country shall come under 

the command and control of the Interim Authority, and be reorganized according to the 

requirements of the new Afghan security and armed forces,” while Annex III calls for “the 

United Nations and the international community, in recognition of the heroic role played by 

the mujahidin in protecting the independence of Afghanistan and the dignity of its people, 

to take the necessary measures, in coordination with the Interim Authority, to assist in the 

reintegration of the mujahidin into the new Afghan security and armed forces.”11

The SSR process received more sustained attention at the Group of Eight (G8) security 

donors’ meeting in Geneva in spring 2002. The Geneva conference set the agenda for SSR 

and established a framework for donor support. Conceiving of the reform process as having 

five pillars, donor nations were assigned responsibility for different SSR tasks. The United 

States was to lead military reform, which called for creating the Afghan National Army (ANA). 

Germany took the lead on reforming the national police force. The United Kingdom agreed to 

design a counternarcotics campaign and Italy to oversee judicial reform. Japan took responsibility for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants.12

The Bonn Agreement only 

indirectly addressed SSR and 

did not contain any agreement 

on DDR.
4

Although there were logical connections among the five pillars of SSR, the donor nations 

initially set about implementing reforms in their assigned arenas without much coordination 

or joint planning. Not until the December 2002 conference of foreign ministers in Germany 

were the two pillars of military reform and the DDR process connected. Recognizing that 

armed groups in the country must be disarmed if a sovereign, government-controlled army 

was to be built, and that the new army had to be created in tandem with disarmament to 

address the potential security vacuum that the disarmament process would produce, the 

Petersberg Decree established the creation of an “ethnically balanced” ANA to consist of 

70,000 soldiers and a DDR program.13

The next step in establishing the infrastructure for the DDR process came in January 2003 

when President Karzai appointed four defense commissions. Created to establish Afghan 

ownership of the DDR process as well as to facilitate coordination among the many actors 

tasked with its implementation, the commissions consisted of the National Disarmament 

Commission (NDC), the Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, the Officer Recruiting and Training Commission, and the Soldier Recruiting and Training Commission. However, 

problems with the NDC stemming from efforts by factions within the Ministry of Defense to 

use the commission to advance their own security-related interests soon prompted a transition to an internationally led DDR process, the ANBP, proposed by President Hamid Karzai at 

a donor conference in Tokyo in February 2003.

The ANBP was to be implemented by UNDP on behalf of the Afghan government,14 with 

assistance from the disarmament commission and the demobilization and reintegration 

commission. Eight donor governments would contribute to the ANBP, with the Japanese 

government in the lead position. With the framework for DDR now in place, the work of 

disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating the AMF was ready to begin, almost two years 

after the collapse of the Taliban regime.

The ANBP and DDR

The DDR program in Afghanistan involved unilateral disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the professional and jihadi personnel that made up the AMF.15 Initial estimates 

of the number of combatants eligible to participate in the program ranged from 50,000 to 

250,000.16 Because no comprehensive needs assessment was conducted to inform the program’s design, ANBP officials had to rely on figures from the Afghan Ministry of Defense. A 

compromise figure of 100,000 participants was initially settled on. The ANBP later lowered 

this figure to 50,000, recognizing that AMF commanders had overstated the number of combatants in order to collect salaries from the ministry. The lower number also accounted for 

the spontaneous demobilization of many militia members after the Taliban’s defeat.17

Even with the DDR program’s formal framework in place, the process started slowly. Some 

of the delays in implementing the program stemmed from the donor community. Japan, 

which was responsible for nearly two-thirds of the ANBP budget, called for comprehensive 

reforms of the Ministry of Defense before DDR activities began, resulting in a delay of four 

months. During this time the ministry failed to make all the personnel changes that had 

been called for as part of a process of ethnic balancing within the military. Nevertheless, 

“donors decided to forgo the outstanding reforms as they would have caused additional, 

serious delays.”18

Other factors making it difficult to initiate the DDR process were growing levels of insecurity, a lack of commitment on the part of key commanders, and inadequate support from 

the Ministry of Defense. Only in the autumn of 2004, when two political factors came into 

play, did the DDR process begin to achieve perceptible results. The first of these stemmed 

from President Karzai’s approval of the Political Parties Law on October 11, 2004. The law, 

Even with the DDR program’s 

formal framework in place, the 

process started slowly. Some 

of the delays in implementing 

the program stemmed from the 

donor community. 
5

which prohibited political parties from possessing military organizations or being affiliated with armed forces, “provided a powerful incentive for armed factions with political 

ambitions to comply with the program.”19 Additionally, the United States, which sought 

to provide additional support for Karzai’s candidacy before the October 2004 presidential 

elections, became more engaged in the DDR process, pressuring stubborn commanders to 

comply with the program.20

Phases and Components of DDR

The ANBP was initially established as a three-year program. The disarmament and demobilization process lasted from October 2003 to November 2005, when UNDP deemed AMF forces 

to have been completely disbanded. The ANBP concluded the reintegration component of 

DDR on July 1, 2006, “in time and within costs.”21 DDR was implemented through an initial 

pilot phase and four successive phases (see table 1).

Disarmament

DDR in Afghanistan differed from traditional DDR processes in that it was implemented 

without encampment. Between the war’s end and the program’s initiation, many AMF 

combatants had become part-time soldiers and officers with family homes and strong ties 

to their local communities. In addition, only a small proportion of former combatants had 

been displaced from their homes during the fighting. Thus cantonment sites were not 

employed. Instead, mobile disarmament units (MDUs) met with the combatants at regional 

sites throughout the country.22

Disarmament began with the Ministry of Defense giving lists of AMF volunteers to the 

ANBP. These lists were originally submitted by commanders who paired the combatants with 

small arms or heavy weapons. Working under the supervision of an international observer 

group consisting of representatives of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) 

and donor countries, a regional verification committee verified the volunteers, who were 

then confirmed by an MDU. To enter the program, combatants needed at least eight months 

of military service and a working weapon they could hand over. An official disarmament ceremony was held at regional headquarters, during which combatants were awarded a medal 

for distinguished service and a certificate of honorable discharge.23 The regional MDUs later 

sent the weapons to a central collection point. 

Demobilization

Demobilization of ex-combatants began the day after disarmament was completed and lasted one day. Individuals were directed to a caseworker for demobilization at an ANBP regional 

Table 1. Phases of DDR in Afghanistan

Phase Start date End date Total disarmed Total demobilized

Pilot phase October 1, 2003 May 31, 2004 6,271 7,550

Main phase I June 1, 2004 August 30, 2004 8,551 7,257

Main phase II September 1, 2004 October 30, 2004 7,169 3,733

Main phase III November 1, 2004 March 31, 2005 22,440 20,375

Main phase IV April 1, 2005 July 31, 2005 18,949 23,461

Total 22 months 63,380 62,376

Source: United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Centre, “Country Programme: 

Afghanistan,” http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=121 (accessed March 23, 2011).

DDR in Afghanistan differed 

from traditional DDR processes 

in that it was implemented 

without encampment.... 

Instead, mobile disarmament 

units (MDUs) met with the 

combatants at regional sites 

throughout the country.
6

office, where they were briefed on the demobilization and integration process. Electronic 

fingerprints and photos were taken to physically identify ex-combatants and individuals 

were registered for elections. Using a pre-established set of questions, each former fighter 

was asked about his demographic and skills backgrounds as well as his career preferences 

and aspirations. Each received an introduction to reintegration choices.24

Ex-combatants were requested to take an oath of conduct stating that they would not 

bear arms for illegitimate purposes. Upon completing the process, each individual received 

a shalwar kameze (traditional Afghan clothing) and a food package. In the early stages of 

the program, the ANBP paid each ex-soldier in two cash installments of $100. This was 

discontinued when it was found that some commanders were extorting the money from 

their soldiers, often violently. The ANBP then redirected the payments into ex-combatants’ 

reintegration packages.25

Reintegration

The reintegration phase of the ANBP’s DDR program was characterized by three components.26 One consisted of literacy assistance, emergency employment, and food aid. Literacy classes that taught the Dari or Pashto alphabet and developed reading comprehension 

skills were offered when it was found that more than 80 percent of all demobilized soldiers 

were illiterate. Beginning in August 2004, emergency employment was provided through the 

National Emergency Employment Program (NEEP), funded by Japan and administered by the 

World Bank. Additional assistance in winter food packages was made available to vulnerable 

families of ex-soldiers. 

A second component of the reintegration process consisted of reintegration assistance 

and job training for ex-combatants, which began two to three weeks after disarmament 

and initial demobilization. Ex-combatants returned to the ANBP regional offices, where 

caseworkers classified each individual based on his experience and grade in combat and 

provided career counseling, attempting to match his goal with the reintegration packages 

(see table 2) that ANBP and the implementing partners offered.27 ANBP’s caseworkers then 

tracked the ex-combatants’ progress through the reintegration process. 

The third component of the reintegration process, the Senior Commanders’ Incentive 

Programme (CIP), did not begin until the end of 2004. Even though one of the central 

objectives of DDR was to sever the chain of command between former commanders and 

their troops, there had been no effort to engage commanders in the DDR process until 

the behavior of a number of the AMF commanders proved problematic. They engaged in 

fraudulent activity involving ANBP identification cards and the regional distribution of DDR 

benefits, withheld stockpiles of working armaments, and pilfered reintegration assistance.28

The ANBP launched the CIP in response.

The central component of the CIP was a financial redundancy package, which provided 

senior commanders with a monthly cash stipend of $550 to $650 for two years in exchange 

for their cooperation with the ANBP. Other options for commanders included overseas travel 

(pilgrimage umra haj or haj visits and trips to observe countries with democratic systems 

of government), business management training, and access to advanced medical or clinical 

treatment. The two-year, $5 million program, funded by Japan, ended in September 2007. 

By the program’s end, 809 commanders had benefited from it. Of those, 463—140 Ministry 

of Defense officers and 323 commanders—received the financial redundancy package, 335 

attended the business management training, and 11 went on an overseas trip to Japan.29

A second component of the 

reintegration process consisted 

of reintegration assistance and 

job training for ex-combatants, 

which began two to three weeks 

after disarmament and initial 

demobilization.
7

Military Reintegration 

Because Afghanistan’s DDR plan explicitly linked decommissioning AMF units to establishing the new ANA, it is worth taking a separate look at some of the issues surrounding the 

reintegration of ex-combatants into the ANA. As table 2 makes clear, entering the ANA was 

one of the reintegration options for former AMF members. Relatively few ex-combatants did 

so, however. One reason for this was that U.S. plans to create the new national army allowed 

for only 10 to 20 percent of all recruits to come from the ranks of the DDR-ed militias.30 Age 

requirements (18–28) for recruits also prevented many from joining the ANA. Finally, some 

former combatants were simply war weary.

Problems surrounding military reintegration appear to have been more pronounced 

among officers, as employment in the ANA was the first choice for almost all of them. As 

Paul George, ANBP senior program advisor, has noted, “Many want their old jobs back, but 

99 percent of these officers can’t get a job in the ANA because there aren’t enough slots in 

either the army or officer training.”31 Of the 7,530 officers registered for reintegration into 

the ANA, only 193 were reintegrated through implementing partners. The remaining 7,337 

were asked to take an exam prepared by the Ministry of Defense. All told, 898 officers were 

reintegrated into the ANA.32

With a low number of AMF officers able to enter the ANA, the ANBP agreed to provide 

reintegration packages for 5,899 former officers. Registration for the officers’ reintegration 

program ran from July 1 to September 30, 2006. In cooperation with the Ministry of Defense, 

Table 2. Reintegration Options

Option Description Participants Percent

Agriculture Standard agricultural packages were developed 

in consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture 

and Animal Husbandry. Varying from region to 

region, they included the following options: 

nursery development, beekeeping, fisheries, 

cattle raising, or a package of seeds, tools, and 

fertilizer.

24,160 43.3

Vocational training and job 

placement

Carpentry, masonry, computer training, auto 

mechanic, tailoring, and metal work.

13,253 23.7

Small business Training courses, small subsidies, and continued 

assistance with undertaking.

14,687 26.3

De-mining Community-based de-mining program. After 

completing de-mining training under United 

Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan 

(UNMACA), ex-combatants were referred to 

de-mining agencies for employment.

1,102 1.4

Afghan National Army (ANA) 

or Police (ANP)

Officers and soldiers wishing to join the ANA or 

ANP were directed to the appropriate recruiting 

centers. Former soldiers wishing to join the ANA 

Officer Corps had to pass an officer’s exam and 

demonstrate an adequate level of literacy.

ANA: 761

ANP: 105

1.4

0.2

Contracting teams Assistance in creating teams of building 

contractors.

501 0.9

Teacher training Up to 600 officers who had completed twelfth 

grade were eligible to take teacher training 

courses in Kabul.

462 0.8

Other 773 1.4

Not participating 2,659 4.8

Total 55,804

Source: United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Centre, “Country Programme: 

Afghanistan,” http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=121 (accessed March 23, 2011).
8

the ANBP and UNDP proposed a small-business training program, which was to include 

reintegration workshops, technical assistance, and staggered cash payments to support 

the start-up costs of a new business. The officers’ association rejected this proposal and 

demanded full cash payouts to officers without any ties to training or skills development. 

Because the ANBP/UNDP could not agree to such a condition and donors to the DDR program 

expressed reservations, the proposal was ultimately withdrawn.33

Assessing the Effect of DDR on SSR 

Any assessment of the effort to reform Afghanistan’s security sector must begin by acknowledging the enormous challenges involved in the process. National institutions effectively 

were destroyed by three decades of war. Simultaneously (re)building all military and civilian 

institutions involved in providing security in an environment still mired in conflict was 

demanding; doing so to create “a safe and secure society that enjoys good governance and 

operates under the rule of law” in a country where such conditions arguably had never held 

was highly ambitious.34

How successful was Afghanistan’s DDR program in contributing to reform of the country’s security sector? Evaluations of the program have tended to focus on its outputs, with 

some reports claiming significant achievements.35 The disarmament process netted 106,510 

weapons: 38,099 light weapons and 12,248 heavy munitions were handed over to the Afghan 

Ministry of Defense and 56,163 weapons were destroyed.36 A total of 63,380 ex-combatants 

completed the disarmament process. The ANBP demobilized 62,376 former soldiers and 260 

AMF units were formally decommissioned. Of the ex-combatants who entered reintegration, 

97 percent completed the process, making this “one of the highest reintegration success 

rates among DDR programmes worldwide.”37

A more meaningful way to evaluate the DDR program, however, would be to consider the 

extent to which it met its objectives of deactivating AMF weapons, assisting AMF members 

to make the transition into civilian life, and breaking the chain of command between militia 

leaders and their troops. By these measures, the program has had more limited success. 

Although large numbers of weapons were collected, some militias either held on to caches 

of weapons or disarmed more slowly than others, generating suspicion of the DDR process. 

Shortcomings associated with the reintegration process as well as the weak Afghan economy 

have posed difficulties for ex-combatants seeking to make the transition back into their 

communities. Perhaps most critically, political factors associated with the manner of DDR 

implementation reinforced the patron-client relations between commanders and their followers that the program was meant to break. In addition, the politics of disarmament and 

demobilization, at least initially, compromised the legitimacy of security sector institutions 

such as the Ministry of Defense and the ANA. 

The Politics of Disarmament and Demobilization in Afghanistan

Security sector reform, and by extension DDR, are political and highly contested processes. 

Efforts to disarm and dismantle armed groups and reconstitute the state’s security forces 

alter the balance of power among groups in states emerging from conflict. Where survival 

and the exercise of power have been associated with key actors’ control of men with guns, 

before initiating a DDR process it is imperative to make plans regarding how best to provide 

for the security of competing groups and contend with powerbrokers’ expectations. The 

failure initially to engage with these issues in Afghanistan limited what could be achieved 

in disarmament and demobilization and opened the door to the factionalization and ethnicization of the SSR process.38

Political factors associated 

with the manner of DDR 

implementation reinforced the 

patron-client relations between 

commanders and their followers 

that the program was 

meant to break.
9

The initial decision by the U.S.-led coalition and the ISAF to operate with a “light footprint” in post-Taliban Afghanistan led to inadequate levels of security within the country. 

That the institutions normally responsible for providing security—the ANA and the Afghan 

National Police—were being created at the same time as the DDR process was underway 

exacerbated the situation. Not surprisingly, the resulting security vacuum reinforced communities’ reliance on militias to provide safety, effectively legitimating the role of militia 

commanders.39

Militia leaders who sought to consolidate their power quickly took advantage of the 

security void. Meeting little resistance from the United States and other coalition actors, 

who relied on militia commanders in their military operations against al-Qaeda and the 

Taliban, leaders of the Panjshiri-led militias of the Northern Alliance took control of the 

main organs of the security sector, using these to advance their own parochial interests. 

This was facilitated by the Bonn Agreement’s failure to engage with DDR and the piecemeal 

fashion in which SSR was implemented. With the positions of minister of defense, minister 

of the interior, and the director of the National Directorate of Security initially occupied by 

Shura-i Nazar militia members, many Afghans grew to mistrust SSR, as it became increasingly 

politicized along communal lines.40

The Ministry of Defense exercised control over key parts of the DDR process, including 

the ability to decide which ex-combatants would be disarmed and demobilized. Northern 

Alliance leaders clearly used this power to their advantage. According to one report, 80 

percent of participants in the disarmament and demobilization phases of the DDR program 

in the center region of the country were not legitimate candidates for demobilization, as 

they had not served as full-time fighters for the required eight months; rather, they were 

members of self-defense groups selected to participate in the process by commanders who 

sought to retain control of seasoned troops. Shura-i Nazar-affiliated units also disarmed and 

demobilized at a much slower rate than did AMF formations in other regions of the country, 

further feeding the perception that certain commanders sought to enhance their power and 

suppress their competitors.41

The politicization of the disarmament and demobilization processes carried over into the 

formation of the ANA. One source reports that “although U.S. plans for the creation of a new 

national army allowed for only 10 to 20 percent of all recruits to come from the ranks of 

the DDR-ed militias, the Ministry of Defense managed to allocate that reduced quota almost 

entirely to Shura-i Nazar’s militias.”42 Although international stakeholders have pushed to 

construct a more ethnically diverse army, discrepancies that fuel factionalism and deepen 

patronage networks continue to exist. An analysis of data from an Afghan official in January 

2010 finds that Pashtuns represented 42.6 percent of the army, Tajiks 40.98 percent, Hazaras 

7.68 percent, Uzbeks 4.05 percent, and other minorities 4.68 percent, and concludes that 

while the presence of Pashtuns at all levels of the military corresponds to their proportion 

of the general population, Tajiks continue to dominate the officer and noncommissioned 

officer ranks.43

Stinting on Reintegration

The reintegration component of the DDR program was arguably much less politicized than 

were disarmament and demobilization, possibly reflecting a sense on the part of militia commanders and politicians that the modality of reintegration was likely to have little effect on 

either security or their power bases.44 Despite the apparent latitude this provided for those 

involved in implementing reintegration, the program had limited success in assisting former 

combatants to make the transition from military to civilian life and in dissolving the ties of 

authority between former commanders and their troops. These results can be attributed to 

Although international 

stakeholders have pushed to 

construct a more ethnically 

diverse army, discrepancies that 

fuel factionalism and deepen 

patronage networks continue 

to exist. 
10

failures of planning, resource inadequacy, and the short time frame dedicated to this phase 

of the process. All these problems indicate the low prominence the international community 

gave to reintegration in Afghanistan.

Planning for reintegration suffered from several deficiencies. One was the failure to gather baseline data on participant needs as well as information on conditions and resources 

in local communities. Without such an assessment, one saw groups of men migrating from 

their communities in search of work because they had all been trained in the same skill; disarmed soldiers from one area chose the same agricultural package, flooding the local market 

with identical products. Reintegration planning for militia commanders also was inadequate. 

The CIP was not initiated until late in 2004, and no incentive program was funded—or, for 

that matter, designed—for low- and mid-level commanders; they were offered the same 

reintegration packages as their soldiers. As the subsequent involvement of many of these 

commanders in smuggling and the drug trade suggest, treating the needs and expectations 

of soldiers and commanders in the same fashion was short-sighted.45 One report concluded 

that “the Commanders who are now causing the greatest local problems are these low level 

commanders” and that the “lack of ability to deal with the most destabilizing forces in the 

AMF has opened the way for these Commanders to revert back to their informal power structures.”46 According to one estimate, it would have cost only an additional $20 million to 

create a program for these commanders that could have prevented them from doing this.47

Resources clearly affected reintegration efforts in Afghanistan. One important problem 

stems from the type of support provided to ex-combatants. The sectorally focused reintegration packages frequently required former fighters to adapt their livelihood strategies to 

the packages they received rather than supporting their efforts to reinsert themselves into 

the local economy.48 Many ex-combatants expressed their lack of satisfaction with this: 

2,900 of the ex-soldiers replying to the ANBP’s 2005 client satisfaction survey—71 percent 

of respondents—noted that the agricultural packages they were provided were “mediocre,” 

while 3,302 respondents—81 percent—felt the same about the package they received as 

support for starting a small business.49 Without any other viable economic options, many 

former combatants relied on the patronage system that reinforced the relationships with 

local commanders the DDR program had sought to end. Resource inadequacies also extended 

to the amount of funding committed to reintegration.50

Finally, the time frame devised for the DDR program clearly limited what could be 

achieved during the reintegration phase. Donor guidelines stipulated that DDR had to be 

completed in three years. Less than half that time was available for reintegration efforts 

given that “it took 18 months to establish the ANBP, recruit staff, purchase vehicles, visit 

AMF units, and plan and negotiate the DDR process.”51 The time allotted to reintegrate 

ex-combatants was clearly inadequate, particularly given the complex environment; when it 

found that 56 percent of the demobilized forces earned less than one dollar per day, UNDP 

eventually created a reintegration support project for ex-combatants extending the reintegration phase to more than 35,000 demobilized combatants for an additional twenty-three 

months.52

Conclusions and Recommendations

Four and one-half years after the ANBP concluded the reintegration phase of DDR in Afghanistan, many of the goals associated with the program have yet to be secured, and some of 

the gains that were made have been undermined. Widespread rearmament has occurred 

across the country.53 There is some evidence that faction leaders—particularly the leaders 

of northern minorities who fear increased Taliban influence as a result of Karzai-initiated 

reconciliation efforts with the latter—may be seeking to revive disbanded militias. InterReintegration packages 

frequently required former 

fighters to adapt their 

livelihood strategies to the 

packages they received rather 

than supporting their efforts to 

reinsert themselves into 

the local economy.
11

views with ex-combatants suggest that commanders’ power expanded in the wake of DDR. 

Taliban insurgents have been able to regroup and in some instances have seen their numbers 

grow as unemployed DDR-ed ex-combatants join their ranks.54 These outcomes are not the 

product of DDR itself, but of the manner in which it was implemented and the slow progress 

in other areas of SSR. 

The Taliban regrouped in the security vacuum created as factions jockeyed for position 

and delayed implementing DDR for two years. Delays in rebuilding the ANA, prompted in 

part by disagreements between Defense Minister Mohammed Qasim Fahim and U.S. officials 

regarding the integration of former militia into the army, exacerbated this situation.55

Perhaps most worrisome, the continued abuse of local communities by commanders whose 

influence in some instances increased following DDR generated a popular perception that 

the DDR process was “unfair.”56 As long as that belief holds, the experience of DDR in 

Afghanistan cannot be construed as having contributed to building a legitimate Afghan 

government able to protect its citizens and uphold the rule of law.

Every DDR program will differ because each is (ideally) designed to address a unique 

context and set of conflict-related conditions. But Afghanistan’s DDR program provides some 

valuable insights the architects and implementers of future DDR programs would do well to 

keep in mind.

•	 Make DDR an integral part of a peace settlement. Because DDR can shift the balance of 

power among competing groups it must be understood as a political process. Accordingly, 

mediators and political stakeholders in the international community should ensure that 

groups address this at the settlement table and that details regarding the goals and nature 

of the program are specified as elements of peace agreements. Powerbrokers are unlikely to 

be willing to engage in meaningful SSR unless they have a sense of the process’s effect on 

the strategic and political interests of all groups involved. If some will have to be compensated to convince them to engage in reform, then that should be spelled out as part of the 

agreement. If in the course of peace negotiations and the design of a settlement, armed 

groups prove unwilling to agree to these measures, it likely indicates a lack of political will 

to implement DDR, and perhaps to commit to the peace. 

Circumventing the issue of DDR may have been necessary to conclude the Bonn 

Agreement but it generated serious problems in the long run, as it allowed some groups to 

manipulate reforms to increase their share of power. The lack of U.S. willingness to pressure 

Northern Alliance representatives to include military power-sharing measures as part of the 

Bonn Agreement appears to have stemmed from its desire not to weaken its erstwhile ally 

in the fight against al-Qaeda and remaining Taliban forces, as well as the Bush administration’s antipathy to “nation building.”57 Regardless of the source of its reluctance, the 

United States missed an important opportunity at Bonn to pressure Afghan participants 

to arrive at an agreement that would account for the long-term security interests of rival 

groups. 

•	 To address the security concerns of competing groups, have outside actors provide 

security. Including DDR as part of a peace settlement can help to ameliorate the security 

problems groups face when they are asked to give up their guns and disband. Including 

mutually reinforcing forms of power sharing can also help to minimize groups’ security concerns and stabilize the peace.58 These measures are unlikely to suffice to reassure adversaries, however, particularly in conflicts such as Afghanistan’s, where the fighting has dragged 

on for years, destroying virtually the entire security sector apparatus. In such instances, 

outside actors—international or regional peacekeeping forces, third-party armies—must 

commit to providing security before, during, and even after DDR is implemented. Only if 

The Taliban regrouped in the 

security vacuum created as 

factions jockeyed for position 

and delayed implementing DDR 

for two years.

Including DDR as part of a 

peace settlement can help to 

ameliorate the security problems 

groups face when they are 

asked to give up their guns 

and disband.
12

groups can be assured that DDR does not risk their lives or other vital interests will they 

be likely fully to engage in the process.

•	 Initiate DDR promptly. Negotiating parties may interpret delays in initiating the DDR 

process as signaling the international community’s lack of commitment to the peace process. Delays may also lead to frustrations among combatants who wish to reintegrate into 

their communities but cannot do so without DDR. Prompt initiation of the DDR process 

can also prevent maneuvering of the nature engaged in by Northern Coalition factions in 

Afghanistan. 

•	 Provide adequate resources. The resources for DDR should be ample enough to accomplish 

the task at hand. Resources may be required to help augment the power of some groups in 

order to ensure that DDR does not produce an imbalance of power among adversaries. At 

the individual level, since combatants are not likely to constitute a homogeneous group, 

funds should be available to provide the level of benefits necessary to persuade different 

groups—such as mid- and low-level commanders in Afghanistan—to comply with DDR. 
13

Notes

1. This report does not cover the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) project, initiated in January 2005 

as part of the ANBP and slated to run through March 2011. The DIAG program seeks to help the government 

improve human security by disarming and disbanding approximately 2,000 non-AMF groups that were classified 

as illegal in July 2004.

2. Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, “DDR in Afghanistan: When State-Building and 

Insecurity Collide,” in Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 

294.

3. See C. Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, “Securing Afghanistan: Getting on Track,” working paper, United States 

Institute of Peace, 2009, http://www.usip.org/publications/securing-afghanistan-getting-track (accessed February 

23, 2011). They note that virtually all successful disarmament programs have taken place after war ends.

4. International Crisis Group, “A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army,” Asia Report no. 190, 

Brussels, May 21, 2010.

5. James F. Dobbins, After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2008).

6. International Crisis Group, “A Force in Fragments.”

7. Michael Vinay Bhatia and Robert Muggah. “The Politics of Demobilization in Afghanistan,” in Robert Muggah, 

ed., Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War (London: Routledge, 

2009), 129. See also Small Arms Survey 2009.

8. The first major surge in violence during this time centered on the 2004 presidential elections and was followed 

by another surge of violence during the 2005 elections for the lower house of the National Assembly and the 

provincial councils. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Afghanistan’s Security Environment,” GAO-10-

613R, May 5, 2010, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAC053.pdf (accessed February 23, 2011).

9. Michael Bhatia, Kevin Lanigan, and Philip Wilkinson, “Minimal Investments, Minimal Results: The Failure of 

Security Policy in Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) briefing paper, Kabul, June 

2004.

10. Dobbins, After the Taliban.

11. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government 

Institutions, http://www.afghanembassyjp.com/pdf/Bonn_Agreement_on_Afghanistan.pdf (accessed February 23, 

2011).

12. Mark Sedra, “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The Slide towards Expediency,” International Peacekeeping,

vol. 13, no. 1 (2006), 94–110.

13. Sedra, “Security Sector Reform;” Peter Dahl Thruelsen, “From Soldier to Civilian: Disarmament Demobilisation 

Reintegration in Afghanistan,” Report 2006:7, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 2006.

14. Small Arms Survey 2009. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), established by the UN 

Security Council on March 28, 2002 to support Afghanistan’s reconstruction and provide assistance with the DDR 

program, proposed a DDR plan in conjunction with UNDP, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World 

Bank, the transitional Afghan government, and the International Organization for Migration in May 2002. This 

initial program, developed during 2003, was assigned to UNDP and the ANBP. See Lorenzo Striuli and Fernando 

Termentini, “Afghanistan: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” report, ARGO: Osservatorio sull’ Asia 

minore, central e meridionale, Florence, 2008, http://www.argoriente.it/arc/paesi/afghanistan/afghanistan-otsDDR-ENG.pdf (accessed February 23, 2011).

15. The ANBP’s work actually encompassed three related projects: DDR; DIAG, which was slated to be undertaken 

after DDR was completed; and anti-personnel mine and ammunition stockpile destruction (APMASD). A fourth 

project, heavy weapons cantonment, was added later. The focus of this report is on the DDR component of the 

ANBP’s work.

16. International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track,” Asia Briefing no. 35, Kabul/

Brussels, February 23, 2005.

17. Sedra, “Security Sector Reform;” Small Arms Survey 2009.

18. Small Arms Survey 2009, 294.

19. Sedra, “Security Sector Reform,” 101; International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan.”

20. Sedra, “Security Sector Reform;” Small Arms Survey 2009.

21. UNDP, “DDR: Reintegration Has Been Completed in Time and within Costs,” July 1, 2006, http://undp.org.af/

News/2006/2006_07_01_DDR.htm (accessed February 23, 2011).

22. Small Arms Survey 2009; A. Caramés and E. Sanz, DDR 2009: Analysis of the World’s Disarmament, Demobilization, 

and Reintegration (DDR) Programs in 2008 (Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace, 2009); United Nations 

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Centre, “Country Programme: Afghanistan,” http://

www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=121 (accessed February 23, 2011).

23. Small Arms Survey 2009. Regional offices were established in Kunduz, Kabul/Parwan, Gardez, Mazar-e-Sharif, 

Kandahar, Bamyan, Jalalabad, and Hera. A central office was located in Kabul.

24. Carames and Sanz, DDR 2009; Simonetta Rossi and Antonio Giustozzi, “Disarmament, Demobilisation and 

Reintegration of Ex-combatants (DDR) in Afghanistan: Constraints and Limited Capabilities,” Working Paper no. 

2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 2006.

25. United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Centre, “Afghanistan.”

26. See Bhatia and Muggah, “Politics of Demobilization,” for a discussion of the program’s threefold approach to 

reintegration.

27. ANBP contracted implementing partners to provide the training and materials offered in integration packages, 

including international and national NGOs, government ministries, and UN agencies. 

28. Small Arms Survey 2009; Rossi and Giustozzi, “Disarmament.”

29. Michael Bhatia and Mark Sedra, Afghanistan, Arms and Conflict: Armed Groups, Disarmament, and Security in a 

Post-War Society (Oxon: Routledge, 2008); Robin-Edward Poulton, Javid Ahmadi, Jayaseeli Bonnet, and Chimene 

Mandakovic, “Report of the Evaluation of DDR and CIP in Afghanistan: Collecting One Gun at a Time Makes Peace,” 

EPES Mandala Consulting, 2007, erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/downloaddocument.html?docid=1700 (accessed 
14

March 22, 2011). As this evaluation of the CIP makes clear, many commanders never heard about some of the 

options open to them through the CIP and many of the promised options never materialized.

30. Rossi and Giustozzi, “Disarmament.”

31. International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track,” Asia Briefing no. 35, February 23, 

2005, 8.

32. Poulton, Ahmadi, Bonnet, and Mandakovic, “Evaluation of DDR and CIP,” 6.

33. Poulton, Ahmadi, Bonnet, and Mandakovic, “Evaluation of DDR and CIP.”

34. Sean McFate, “Securing the Future: A Primer on Security Sector Reform in Conflict Countries,” Special Report no. 

209, United States Institute of Peace, September 2008.

35. See, e.g., Caramés and Sanz, DDR 2009; see also UNDP Afghanistan—Disarmament, Demobilisation, and 

Reintegration (DDR), June 2003–June 2006, Annual Project Report 2006 (New York: UNDP, 2006). A number 

of assessments have deemed DDR the most successful aspect of Afghanistan’s security sector reform. See, e.g., 

Poulton, Ahmadi, Bonnet, and Mandakovic, “Evaluation of DDR and CIP.”

36. Bhatia and Muggah, “Politics of Demobilization.”

37. UNDP Afghanistan, Annual Project Report 2006.

38. Michael Bhatia, “Violence in Afghanistan: An Overview,” in Michael Bhatia and Mark Sedra, eds., Afghanistan, 

Arms, and Conflict: Armed Groups, Disarmament, and Security in a Post-War Society (London: Routledge, 2008). 

39. Barnett R. Rubin and Humayun Hamidzada, “From Bonn to London: Governance Challenges and the Future of 

Statebuilding in Afghanistan,” International Peacekeeping 14, no. 1 (2007), 8–25; Small Arms Survey 2009.

40. Qasim Fahim, who was appointed defense minister at Bonn, staffed his ministry with other commanders from 

the Shura-i Nazar faction, with which he was associated. Originally a military coordination council established 

by Ahmad Shah Massoud, Shura-i Nazar is now used to refer to a network of largely Tajik military and political 

figures. International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan.”

41. Christian Dennys, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Rearmament? The Effects of Disarmament in Afghanistan,” 

published through the Japan Afghan NGO Network (JANN), June 6, 2005; International Crisis Group, 

“Afghanistan.” 

42. Rossi and Giustozzi, “Disarmament,” 6.

43. International Crisis Group, “A Force in Fragments,” 19.

44. Rossi and Giustozzi, “Disarmament.” 

45. Rossi and Giustozzi, “Disarmament.” As a review of DDR programs makes clear, a number of DDR programs have 

suffered from inadequate planning. See Leontine Specker, “The R-Phase of DDR Processes: An Overview of Key 

Lessons Learned and Practical Experiences,” Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Conflict 

Research Unit, The Hague, 2008, http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2008/20080900_cru_report_specker.

pdf (accessed February 23, 2011). Another survey of DDR programs concludes that “disregard for mid- and 

low-level commanders may make DDR programmes less efficient.” Tatjana Stankovic and Stina Torjesen, “Fresh 

Insights on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: A Survey for Practitioners,” Norwegian Institute of 

International Affairs, Oslo, 2010, http://english.nupi.no/Publications/Books-and-reports/2010/Fresh-Insightson-Disarmament-Demobilization-and-Reintegration (accessed February 23, 2011), 10.

46. Dennys, “Disarmament,” 3.

47. Rossi and Giustozzi, “Disarmament.”

48. Ibid.; Dennys, “Disarmament.”

49. Ali Ahmad, “Client Satisfaction Survey: Comparative Analysis,” report, Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Program, 

2005, erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/downloaddocument.html?docid=1064 (accessed March 22, 2011). 

50. The DDR budget was US$140,930,315. See UNDP, “Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme (ANBP).”

51. Small Arms Survey 2009, 294

52. Carames and Sanz, DDR 2009. 

53. Rates of rearmament are estimated to “range between 2–20 percent depending on the source of information and 

the area discussed.” Dennys, “Disarmament,” 7.

54. Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research 

Service RL30588, November 19, 2010, http://www.fas.org/sgp/row/RL30588.pdf (accessed February 23, 2011); 

Dennys, “Disarmament;” Bhatia and Muggah, “Politics of Demobilization;” Tribal Analysis Center, “Starfish, 

Spiders, and the Jellyfish: Pashtun Cultural Factors Limiting Warlord Development,” Williamsburg, VA, 2008, 

http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-TAC/Pashtun%20Cultural%20Factors%20Limiting%20Warlord%20

Development.pdf (accessed February 23, 2011).

55. International Crisis Group, “A Force in Fragments.” The Regional Command South, one of the areas of the country 

where the Taliban has been most successful in regrouping, saw the initial replacement of several thousand 

members of the Second Afghan Militia force who were DDR-ed by only two companies of ANA troops. Tribal 

Analysis Center, “Starfish.”

56. Arne Strand, “Fighting for Peace? Former Combatants and the Afghan Peace Process,” in Stephen Baranyi, ed., 

The Paradoxes of Peacebuilding Post-9/11 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).

57. Dobbins, After the Taliban.

58. Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement 

of Civil Wars (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2007).

United States 

Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

Of Related Interest

•	 Making Peace in Afghanistan by Minna Jarvenpaa (Special Report, February 2011)

•	 The Link Between DDR and SSR in Conflict-Affected Countries by Sean McFate (Special Report, 

May 2010)

•	 Afghan High Peace Fails to Reflect Afghan Civil Society by Patricia Gossman (Peace Brief, 

January 2011)

•	 Dangerous Liaisons with the Afghan Taliban by Matt Waldman (Special Report, October 

2010)

•	 The Civil Society-Military Relationship in Afghanistan by Lisa Schirch (Peace Brief, September 

2010)

•	 The Future of Afghanistan edited by J. Alexander Their (January 2009)

•	 Consilidating Disarmament: Lessons from Colombia’s Reintegration Program for Demobilized 

Paramilitaries by Jonathan Morganstein (Special Report, November 2008)