## In the



# U n ited S ta tes Co urt o f Ap p ea ls

F o rth eS e v e n th C ir cu it

N o. 10

- 3849 A DR I ANN A B R OWN , et al., P la intif fs-A pp ella nts, v. C OLU MBI A S USSEX C OR PO RA T I ON, et a l. D efend a nts-A pp ellees.

A pp eal from the United S t ates Di strictC our t fo r the N o rthernDi stricto f Indian a, H amm ond D ivisi on. No . 2:08- cv-00107

—Phi li p P. Si mon, Chief Judge.
A RG UE D S EP TE MBE R 22, 2011

—D ECI DE D D ECE MBE R 15, 2011

B efore P OSNER, F LA UM, a nd S YKES, C ircu it Judges. F LA UM , Cir cu i tJudg e . T h e u n d er lyin g litig at ion in th is c as e c on c er n s a h os t o f p lain tiffs -ap p ella n ts ’ civ il ri ghts and bre ach o fco ntra ct c l ai m s a gai nst defendantsappell ees

—the o w ners o fBaton Rouge M ar ri ottand an i nd i vi du alem plo yee o fthe M ar ri ott( col l ecti vel y, “M ar riot t” ) . T h ro u gh ou t t h e p r e - t ria l d isc ov er y of t h is l i ti gat i on, 22 4 o fthe 268 pla i nti ff s conti nuall y m i sse d both2 N o. 10

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D es pite the num eros ity ofthe plai nti f f s, no cl aim s w ere 1 bro ughtas a c l as s ac t i on. Ori gi nal l y, al l 22 4 o fthe di s m i s s ed pl ai nt i f f s were par t ofthe 2 appe a l c ur r e nt l y be f or e thi s c ou r t
. W hi l e the a ppe a l was pen di ng, ho wever, appel l ant s ’ couns el f i l ed a m ot i on t o vol untar il y d is m is s 171 ofthe app el lant s afterdisc overing that t he y s houl d notha ve bee n a par tofthe c as e t o be gi n wi t h. f or m aland i nfo rm aldeadl i nes. A s a r esul t, al l but 4 4 of 1 th e p l ai nti ff s had the i r cl ai m s di sm i sse d by the di str i ct c ou rtas a d isc ov er y s an c tio n p u rs u an t t o Fe d .R .C iv.P . Ru le 37 ( b)

. Appel l an ts c o ns ti tu te 5 3 o fthe 2 24 una tt en ti ve pl ainti ff s. F orthe re aso ns set f or th be l ow, w e a ffi rm the dist ri ct 2 cour t’ s di sm i ssa l o fappel l ants’ cl ai m s.

I . B a c kg r o und For20 ye ar s, appel l ant J am e s P i gge e a nd hi s o rg ani zati on Givi ng Edu cati on M eani ngful Subst ance ( “G. E.M
. S. ”) has been tak i ng g ro up s o fA f ri can Am er i can hi gh sc hool stud en ts on t ours o fhi sto ri cal l y b l ack unive rs i ti es to m ake them m or e a w ar e o fthei r academ i c o pp or tuni ti es. I n A pri l 20 08, Pi gge e pl anned a tr i p to Louis i ana a nd Texas f ora gr oup ofso m ew here betw een 1 49 a n d 2 68 students. I n prepar ati on f ort h at tr i p, Pi gge e r ese rv ed 41 ro om s a t the M ar ri otti n Baton Rouge
. A day or two l ate r, M ar ri ott can celed th e res ervation
. A p p ell an ts all ege th at M arriott’s deci si on t o c ancelwas ra ci al l y m oti vate d. A s a r esul t o f the c ancel l ati on, appe llan ts did nothave a pla ce t o sta y i n Bat o n Ro ug e a nd ha d t o dr i v e thr o ugh the ni g htto th eir n ex t d es tin at ion in T ex as .N o. 10

- 3849 3 Bas ed o n the se a l l eg at i o ns , Pi g g ee fi l ed su i t i n the N o r th ern Di st r i cto fI ndi an a f o r hi m se l f, th e stude nt s, a nd th e c h ap er on es th at a t t en d ed th e A p ril 20 08 trip . In D ecem ber 2009 , M a r riott served exte ns ive discov ery re quests on a l l 26 8 pl ai nti ff s, i ncl ud i ng r equests f or the producti on ofd ocum ents, r esponse s t o i nter ro gat or i es, and res ponses to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 36 r equests f oradm i ssio n . In Jan u ar y 2 01 0, ap p ella n ts as ke d for t h eir fi rs t e xtensi on. They ini ti al l y a ske d M ar ri ottf ora 45- day extensi on, but bef or e r ecei vi ng a re sponse, theyr equeste d a 6 0- day exten sio n fro m the cour t, wh i ch w as gr anted w i thout obj ecti on. The new d eadl i ne o fM ar ch 29, 20 10 cam e a n d w ent without a ny pro du cti on o r re sponse f ro m appel l ants. On A pri l 6th , M ar ri ottwrote a l ett er to appell ants’ co uns el aski ng wh en to expect a r esponse to th e d isc ov er y re q u es ts , bu t re c eiv ed n o a n sw er . A pp el l ee se nta no th erl et te r r eque sti ng p r o duct i o n o n Apr i l 1 3th, and i n re spon se t o thi s s eco nd l ett er, appel l ants em ai l ed M ar ri ottr equesting an extensi on unti l M ay 31, 20 10. The thi rd deadl i ne o nce a gai n passed w ith no re sponse f ro m appel l ant. O n Jun e 16, 2010 , fi ve m ont hs after th e origi na l d iscovery deadli ne, M ar ri ottfi l ed a m oti on t o com pel a re sponse to disc ove ry . The di strict cour t g ra nted the m oti on with r e s p e c t t o th e i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s a n d d o c u me n t r e q u e s t s , b ut note d that req uests f oradm i ssi on ca nnot be co m pel l ed as these r equests ar e deem ed a dm i tte d after30 days of no r es po ns e. The c o ur t o r der ed th ata ppel l an ts resp o nd to disc ove ryr eq uests by J uly16 , 20 10. On the date o f the fourth deadli ne, appel l ant s fi l ed a M oti on f orExtensi on o fTi m e, s ee k i ngan ext en si o n t o J ul y 2 3, 2 01 0. The4 N o. 10

- 3849

Sh or tly a fter filing their m o t i on f or sanc tion s, M arr iott also 3 fi l ed a m ot i on f or s um m ar y j udgm en tbas ed o n the r eques t s f or adm is si on, w hich w ere deem ed adm it ted du e t o app el lant s’ l ack ofa re s pons e. W he n the d i s t ri c tcour td i s m i s s ed th e c l ai m s ofthe appe l l ant s be f or e t hi s c our t, i tal s o gr ant ed a m ot i on t o wi t hdra w def aul t adm i s s i ons by t he pl ai nt i f f s whos e c l ai m s wer e not dism is se d b y t h e court ( and are ther ef ore not befor e this court on appe al )

. Due t o th e withdra wal ofthe d ef aul tadm i s s i ons , the sum m ary jud g m en t m otio n w as ren d ered m oo t. cour t di d not g ra nt the m oti on be cause ofte c h n ical probl em s w i th appell ants’ m oti on. Thu s, f or a f ourt h ti m e, appell ants did notm eet thei r deadli ne. A s a r esul t, M ar ri ottfi l ed a m oti on f orsa n c tio n s a nd co ntem pt, se eki ng di sm i ssa l and paym ent forM ar ri ott ’ s e xpe n se s, i n c luding att or ney’ s fees . The co urt decl i ned to dism i ss, 3 but g ra nted M ar ri ott ’ s r equest f orexpenses as a sa n c tio n ag ain st ap p ella n ts . Th e c ou rtals o gr an te d ap p ell an ts ’ s ec ond M o ti o n f o r Ext en si o n o fTi m e, g i ving th em un tilA ug us t 1 7 t h to com p ly w ith th e cou rt’s ord er. T his ex ten sion w as gran ted i n p art bec au se of plaintiffcou ns el’ s rep resen tati ons that he w as a sole prac titi one r, th athe on ly ha d o ne a dm i ni st r at i ve a ss i st an t, tha t he ha d b ee n wo r k i ngr o und- th e- cl o ckt o c o m pl y wi ththe cour t’ s o r der s, an d th at he ha d i nt er vi ewe d a l aw f irm to h elp w ith th e d isc ov er y re q u es ts . In g ra n tin g a p p ell an ts ’ mot i o n, the di st r i ct co ur t m ade cl ea r tha t th i s was the “fi nal exte ns ion ” that would be gr anted, and that further re q u e s t s w ou ld be “v iew ed w ith d isfa vo r.” In ad d itio n, a m agi s t r a t e j udge’ s F i nd i ngs, Repor t, and Recom m endati on regard ing M arriott’s m otion for san ctions l isted the cou rt’sN o. 10

- 3849 5 sancti oni ng o pti ons i fa p p el l ant f ai l ed to r espond to disc ove ry . These opti ons i ncl ud ed the possibi l i ty of d ism iss al. Fo r th e fift h an d fina l tim e, ap p ella n ts faile d to m ee t t h eir di s c o v e r y de a dl i ne . OnAugus t2 0 , 2 0 1 0 , Mar r i o t tfi l ed anothe r m oti on f or co ntem pt and sancti ons, nam i ng o ver 200 pla i nti ff s that had n ot yetr esponded to the a pp el l ees ’ disc ove ryr equests
. I n pla in tiff

- counsel ’ s S eptem ber27 th resp ons e to this m otion, he i nd icated that 60 plaintiff s ha d r es po nded to the di sc o ve r y r eque st s an d tha t he had not r ece ive d a re sponse f ro m the othe rs . H e a l so soughtcl ass cer ti fi cati on due to the unm anage ability o f the di sco ver y r equests
. Duri ng o ra l ar gum ents f orthat m ot ion , p lain tiff-c ou n se l ac kn ow led ge d th at h e ha d on ly com m unica ted with ro ughl y 75 t o 100 ofthe pla in ti ff s, w hi ch l ed the dist ri ct cour t to concl ud ed that the m aj or i ty o ft h e p l a i n t i ff s ma y n o th a v e e v e n b e e n a wa r e th a tt he su it had been fil ed on th eir beh alf

. On N ove m ber10 , 2010, in it s rul i ng on M ar ri ott ’ s m oti on f o r s an ct i o ns , the di st r i ctc o ur t co nc l ude d tha t th e Fe d .R .C iv.P . 37(b ) sa n c tio n of d ism iss al w as n ec es sa ry in the f ace ofappel l ants’ wil l fu l d elayand avo i dance of M a r r io t t’s requ ests for discove ry. Th e d istri ct cou rt ba se d thi s dec i sion o n a ppel l an ts ’ pa tt ern o fde l aya nd no n- co m pl i an ce , whi chi nc l ude d the f o l l o wi nga ctions or om issi ons : 1) ap p ell an ts’ disregard of tw o of th e cou rt’s or ders to com pel disc ove ry ; 2) appell ant’ s l ack ofr esponse when f ac ed wi ththe l es s se ve r e sa nc ti on o fpa y m en t of defen d an ts’ exp en ses ; 3 ) ap p ell an ts’ l ack of a showing that add itional sa ncti ons w oul d be e ff ecti ve6 N o. 10

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S e c t i on 1 2 9 1 s t a t e s , “ Th e c ou r t s of a ppe a l s . . . s ha l l hav e 4 j uris dicti on of app eal s f rom al l final decis ions ofthe dist ri ct co u rt s o f th e U n ite d St a te s.” R u le 54 (b) states that if an actio n con tain s m or e tha n one claim 5 f or re li ef

—t hr ough ei t he r m ul t i pl e c l ai m s from on e par t y, m u ltiple p arties to a claim , or b oth

— "the courtm ay d ir ectent ry o fa fi n a l j u d g me n ta s t o o n e o r mo r e , b u tf e w e r t h a n a l l , c l a i ms or par t i es onl y i fthe c our te xpr es s l y de t er m i ne s thatthe re i s no just rea son f or d elay .” Fed

. R
. C iv
. P
. 54 (b). R u le 58 (d) allow s a par t y t o r equ est thata Rule 54 ( b) j udgm en tbe s etouti n a se p a ra te d o cu m en t. F ed . R . C iv . P . 58 (d ). i n f or ci ng the m to co m plywith t h e cour t’ s o rder s; 4) pl aint i ff

- co uns el ’ s l ac ko fc o m m uni ca ti o n w ith th e m aj or i ty ofthe pla i nti ff s; and 5) pl ai nti ff

- counsel ’ s l ack ofse cured co

- counsel, wh i ch, th e c ou rtnot ed, would be a d i ffi c u l tt a s kg i v e n th e p o s t u r e o fth e c a s e atth e t i me of d ism iss al. On D ecem ber10 , 20 10, appel l ants fi l ed th ei r noti ce o f ap p ea l from th e d ist r i c t c ou rt ’s d ec isio n to d ism iss th eir cl ai m s. Our p rel i m i naryr evi ew o fappel l ants’ appeal i nd i cate d that the di str i ct c ourt ’ s o rderm ay not have been a final j u d g m e n t un d er 28 U
. S. C

. § 1291 ( “§ 129 1”), 4 an d on D ec em b e r 2 1 , 20 10 , w e o rd er ed ap p ella n ts to file a J uri sdic tional M em or andu m , due on J anuary4, 20 11. One day bef or e the deadl i ne, appel l ants re turned t o th e d istri ct cou rt a nd fil ed a m otion requ esting an entry of fi nal j ud gm ent pu rs uant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 54 (b) an d 58 ( d). The next day

—the du e da t e f o r the J ur i s di c-

5 ti o na l M emor an dum

—appell ants fi l ed a m oti on e nti tl ed “Routi ne M oti on F or A n Ex tensi on of Tim e t o Fi l e J uri sdic

-N o. 10

- 3849 7 ti onalM em or andu m , ” whic h w as gr anted. On J anuary7, 2011 , the dist ri ct cour t gr anted appell ants’ Rule 54 (b) m oti on, fi nd i ng t hat a pp el l ants’ cl ai m s a re se parat e fro m the c l ai m s o fthe re m ai ni ng p l ai nti ff s, the deci si on di sm i ssi ng ap pe l l a nt s ’ c l a i ms i s fi na l, a nd the r e i s n o j us tr eas on f o r de l a y . A fi na l j ud g men twa s the r e f o r e e nt e r e d. A pp ell ants subsequentl y fi l ed thei r J uri sdic ti onal M em oran d u m w it h th is court, w hich ad vised the cou rt o fthe c as e’s pro ce dur alhi st o r y a nd c o nc l ude d tha t th e d istr i ct c ourt ’ s Rul e 5 4( b) m oti on r endered the j uri sdic

ti onalquesti on m oo t. The next day, this c ourti ssued a n o r de r s t a t i ng, “ Onc o ns i de r a t i o n o fthe ‘ J URI S DI CTI ON A L ST A TE M EN T’ fi l ed by pla i nti ff s- appell ants o n J a n u ar y 1 1, 20 11 , I T IS O R D E R E D th at br iefin g w ill p ro c ee d .”

I I . Discussi on A . J uri sdict i on B efore w e t u rn to th e relati vely straight forw ard m att erof the propri etyo fappel l ants’ di sm i ssa l, we m ust add re ss M ar ri ott ’ s a sse rt i on that we l ack j uri sd i cti on t o d e c i d e th i s a p p e a l i n th e fi r s tp l a c e . Wh e th e r we have j uri sdic ti on depends on the i nter acti on be tw een thre e s tatutor y r ule s: C on gr ess ’ co nfe rr alo fj uri sdic ti on on thi s co urt und er§ 1291 , R ule 54( b) of the F edera l Rule s o fCi vi l Pr o ce dur e ( “Rul e 54 ( b) ”) , a nd R ule 4( a) o fthe Fed eral R ules of A p p ell ate P roced ure ( “R ule 4(a)”). To st ar t, § 1291 ge nera l l y l i m i ts our j uri sdictio n to the r evi ew o fo nl y “ fi nal deci si ons” ofth e federa l di str i ct8 N o. 10

- 3849

c ou rt s. Se eLa c Cour t eO reil l e s Band of La keSu pe r i or C h ip pewa Indians v. Wis consin , 7 6 0 F
. 2 d 1 7 7, 1 8 0 ( 7th ci r. 19 85) ; 28 U .S.C . § 12 91. Deci si ons ar e fi nal wh en they “end[] the l i ti gat i on a nd l eave [ ] nothi ng to be deci ded i n the dist ri ct c ou rt
. ” U ni t e d S t at e s v. Ett r i ckWood P rods. , Inc. 9 16 F. 2d 1211 , 12 16 ( 7th Ci r. 19 90)

. Genera l l y, i fa n a ct i o n i nv o l ve s ei th er m ul ti pl e par ti es o r o ne par tywi thmul ti pl e cl ai m s, the dism iss alo fs o m e but not al l o fthe parti es orcl ai m s i s no t i m m ed iat ely appea l ab l e; the pa r ti es o r c l ai m s th ats ti l l e xi stpr ev en t the or der f ro m bei n g “ final

. ” Id

. a t 12 16

- 17; F ed. R. Ci v. P. Rule 54(b)

. Rule 54 ( b) , however, em pow er s a di strict cour t t o “dir ect entr y o fa fi nal j ud gm ent a s to one or m or e, bu t fe w er th an all, cla im s o r p ar tie s,” bu t o n ly if the c ourt“e xpressl y dete rm i nes that t h ere i s no j ust re as on for d ela y,” Fe d .R .C iv.P . 54(b ), a p ro c es s c om m on ly re fer re d to as “cer ti fi cati on. ” S e e, e . g . , Pa r i s h v . Ci ty of E l kha rt, 6 1 4 F
. 3 d 6 7 7, 6 7 9 n . 2 ( 7 th Ci r . 2 0 1 0) . The Suprem e Cour t has es tabl i shed that i n additi on t o the absence o fany re aso n f ordel ay, a cer ti fi abl e cl ai m m ust be s eparabl e fro m the re m ai ni ng cl ai m s i n the l i ti gat i on an d the deci si o n ent er ed a s t o tho se c l ai m s m us t m ee t th e defini ti on o ffi nal i ty und er§ 1291

—m ea n in g t h er e is no th i ngl eft to b e d ecid ed by the di st r i ctc o ur t as t o the c e r t i f i e d c l a i ms

—i n or der f ora Rule 54(b) r uling to be p ro p er . SeeO D CCo m m unica tions Co rp. v. Wenr uth Invest

m ents , 82 6 F
. 2d 509, 51 1- 12 ( 7th C ir. 1987) ( ci ti ng C urtissWr ightCorp. v. Ge ne r al Ele c. Co. , 446 U .S. 1, 7-8 (19 80 )). M arriott argues th at § 1291 and Ru le 54(b), i n con cert w i th the r equi re m ents ofFe d.R. A pp . P. Ru le 4( a) ( 1) ( “Rule 4( a) ( 1) ”) , cl ear l y preve nt thi s cour t f ro m exer ci s-N o. 10

- 3849 9 i ng j uri sdic ti on o verthi s a pp eal

. R ule 4( a) ( 1) r equi re s that an appel l ant fi l e a not i ce o fappealwithi n 30 days ofthe j ud gm ent fro m wh i ch that party i s a pp eal i ng. M arriott correctly asserts th at w he n th e d istri ct cou rt di s mi s s e d a pp e l l a nt s ’ c l a i ms o n No v e mbe r 1 0 , 20 09, th e ent ire case w as no t term inated , since th ere w ere r emai ni ngpl aint i ff s l i ti g at i ngthe i r c l ai m s. Tho se pl ainti ff s co nti nue to l i ti gat e to thi s day. Thus, the dist ri ct cour t’ s Novem ber10th deci si on, wh i ch w as not acco m pani ed by a Rul e 5 4( b) j ud gm ent, was not a final j ud gm ent under § 1 291 and w as not i m m edi ate l y a pp eal abl e. See E ttrickWo o d P rod s., 916 F. 2d at 121 7 (“ A bsent proper entr y o fj ud gme ntunder Rul e 5 4( b) , an o rder that deter m i nes o ne cla im in a m ult i

- cl ai m cas e, o r d isp os es of all cla im s a ga in s t on e o r m or e p ar tie s in a m u lti-p ar ty ca se , i s n ot fina l an d ap p ea lab le.” ). A p p ella nt s’ Dec em ber 10th notice of app eal w as th erefore p r e ma t u r e , s i n c e i twa s fi l e d a s a c h a l l e n g e t o th e N o v e mb er 10 th n on fin al or d er . Th e d ist ric t c ou rtev en tu ally gr anted appel l ants’ m oti on requesting a Rule 54(b) j ud gm ent on J anuary7, 20 11, m aki ng the appel l ants’ di sm iss al b ot h fina l an d ap p ea lab le u n d er § 12 91 , bu t a p p ell an ts di d no t fi l e a ne w n o ti ce o f appe al f r o m th e Janu ary 7th o rder

. I nstea d, they reste d on thei r Decem ber10 th not ice ofap p eal from the N ovem ber 10th non fi na l order. The question , then, i s whether appell ants’ o ri gi nal noti ce o fappeal sa ti sf i es the f eder a l appel l ate noti ce re quir em ents und er Rule 4( a) ( 1) despit e th e fa ct th a ta pp e l l a nt s t e c hn i c a l l y a pp e a l e d fr o m a n o nfi nal deci si on r ather than the Rul e 5 4( b) fi nal j ud gm ent e nter ed on Jan u ar y 7 th

.10 N o. 10

- 3849 A p p ella n ts arg u e t h at th is c o u r t ’ s jur isd ict ion is s a v e d un de r F e d. R. App. P. Ru l e 4 ( a ) ( 2 )

. Ru l e 4 ( a ) ( 2 ) pro vi des , “ A not i ce o fap pea l fi l ed afte r the c o ur t an noun ces a deci si on o r or der

— but be f or e the ent ryo f the j ud gm ent o r or der

—i s t re ate d as fi l ed on th e d ate o f an d a ft e r the en try.” A p p ell an t argu es th at, for the p urposes o fRule 4( a) ( 2) , the dist ri c t courtannounced i ts deci sion to di sm i ss appell ants’ cl ai m s o n N ove m ber 10, 20 10

—th e dat e th e co ur t r uled on M ar r i o tt ’ s se co nd m o ti o n f o r s an ct i o ns

— but thati ts j ud gm en t was not enter ed unti l J anuary7, 20 11

—the date the cour t r ule d on appell ants’ Rule 54 ( b) m oti on f orentr y of fi nal j ud gm en t. T he ap p ell an ts’ notice of app ea l sh ou ld th erefore be c onsi dered as havi ng be en co nstr ucti vel y fi l ed on J anuary7, 20 11 p ursuant to Rule 4( a) ( 2) , o r so they ar gue. M ar ri ott ar gues that Rule 4( a) ( 2) does notr esur re ct no ti c e s o fa p p e a l th a twe r e ma d e p r e ma t u r e l y i n t he con tex t of a belated R ule 54(b) m otion. T his is m ad e clear, th ey ar g ue , by th e S upr eme Cou r t’ s dec i si o n in FirsTier M o rtga ge C o . v. Investo rs M o rtga ge In s. C o ., 498 U
. S. 26 9 (19 91 ). I n FirsTier, the pla i nti ffbr ought cl ai m s a gai nst an i nsurance com pany f orr efus ing to pay cl ai m s s ubm i tte d b y t h e p l a i n tiff. Id. at 270. The defendant fi l ed a m oti on f o r s um m ar y judgment, a nd a fte r o r al l y g r an ting th e defen dan t’ s m o ti on, the c o ur t as k ed th e defen dan t to subm i t pr opose d find i ngs o ff act and concl usi ons of law , to w h ich th e p lain tiff h ad a rig h t t o ob j ec t. Id. at 271
. Bef or e the cou rt acc epted the defe nd ant’ s pro posed fi ndi ng s an d c o nc l us i o ns

—an d thu s b e fo r e a fi na l j udg m en t w as techni cal l y e nter ed

—the pl ai nti fffi l ed i ts noti ceN o. 10

- 3849 11 ofappeal. Id. a t2 7 2
. R e l y i n go n R u l e 4 ( a ) ( 2 ) , th e S u p r e me Court hel d that the defendant’s n ot i ce o fappeal w as ti m el y, despi te the f act that i t was te chnic al l y pr em atu re . Id. at 277
. Th e Co ur ti nt e r pr e t e d Rul e 4 ( a ) ( 2) as “perm i t[ i ng] a noti ce of appeal f ro m a nonfi nal d ec isi on to op erate as a noti ce o fappealfro m the fi nal j ud gm ent o nl y when a di stri ct c ourtannounces a deci si on that w ould beap peal abl e i fi m m edi ate l y f ol l owed by th e e n tr y of ju d gm en t .” 4 9 8 U .S. at 2 76 (em p h as is in or i gi nal )

. The re aso ni ng und er l yi ng thi s inter preta ti on i s that “ Rule 4( a) ( 2) was i ntended to prot ect the unsk i l l ed l i ti gant w ho fi l es a no ti ce of ap p ea l fro m a deci si on that h e rea sonab l y b ut m i sta kenl y b el i eve s t o be a fi nal j ud gm ent. ” Id. Rule 4( a) ( 2) does not, however, per m i t “ a noti ce o fappealfro m a cl ear l y inter l ocuto rydeci s i on

—such as a di sco ver y r uling o r a s ancti on o rderunder R ule 11 of th e Fed eral R ules of C ivil P r o c ed ure

—to ser ve as a noti ce o fappealfro m the fi nal j u d gm ent. ” Id . In FirsTier, Ru le 4 (a)( 2) s av ed the pla inti ff’ s p re m at u re ap p ea l, sinc e th e be nc h rul i nga nno unc ed a dec i si o n “ pur po r ting to di spo se o fa l l of F i r sT i er ’ s cl ai m s, ” an d thus the no ti ce o fa ppea l was de emed fi l ed o n the da te th atthe fin al jud gm en t w as ac tu ally en te re d

. Id. at27 7. M ar ri ottar gues that i n thi s ca se, un li k e i n FirsTier, th e en tr y o fj ud gm ent was notal l thatst oo d i n the w ay of app ell an ts’ dism issal bec om ing ap p ealable. Rat he r, th e d ist ric t c ou rtw ou ld h av e h ad to co n d u c t a R u le 54 (b ) an aly sis or d is p os e o f th e re m ain in g p ar tie s in or der f orthe dism i ssa l to bec om e fi nal and appeal abl e. Thus , u nd erM ar r i o tt ’ s su g g es te d fr amewor k, the ord er dism issi ng ap p ell an ts’ clai m s w as a clearly interl o cu-12 N o. 10

- 3849

T h e e x c e p t i o n t o th i s r u l e c a n b e f o u n d i n F e d. R. App. P. 6 4(a)( 4)(B), w hich to lls an ap p eal d u ring the p en d en cy of certain post-j ud gm ent m oti ons i fa l it igant’ s noti ce ofap peal i s fil ed aft er a fi nal j udgm en tha s be en re nder ed but bef or e atl ea s ton e q ua l i fyi ng po s t
-j udg m e ntm ot i onh a s be e n gr a nt e d o r de ni e d. W hile w e reco g niz e tha t ou r inter p reta tion is in co nflict w ith 7 the T hird C ircu it’ s p r e c e d e n t, see L az y O il, 166 F. 3d at 587, we (co n tin u ed ...) tory ord er, an d un d er FirsTier, an appe alf r o m an int er l o cutor y o r de r c a nn o t b e s a v e d b y Ru l e 4 ( a ) ( 2 )

. Gi v en that it has been m or e t ha n 30 da ys since th e d istri ct cou rt’s J an ua r y 7, 2 0 1 1 o r de r g r a nt i ng a pp e l l a nt s ’ mot i on t o enterfi nal ju d gm ent, M ar ri ottcl ai m s that a ny not i ce o fa pp e a l n o w fi l e d b y a pp e l l a ntwo ul d b e t i me-b a r r e d. I n li gh t of FirsTier, we agr ee w ith t hose Ci rcui ts that have hel d th at, ge nera l l y s peaki ng, pre m atur e no ti ces 6 o fa ppea l i n c i vi l c as es c ano nly ripenwhenunde r the a u s p i c e s o fR u l e 4( a ) ( 2 ) , a s d e fi n e d b y th e S u p r e me Cou r t i n FirsTier

. See, e . g., O utlaw v. A ir tech Air C o nd itio nin g an d Heat i n g, In c., 4 1 2 F
. 3 d 1 5 6 , 1 6 0 ( D. C. C ir. 20 05 ); U nited St a t e s v . C o o per, 13 5 F
. 3d 960, 96 3 ( 5th Cir

. 19 98) ( i nter preting F ed. R. A pp .P. Rule 4(b) , wh i ch i s th e equi va l en t o fRul e 4( a) ( 2) f o r c r i m i na l c as es , a nd is in te rp re te d as su c h ); Se r i nev. Pe t e rs on , 98 9 F
. 2d 371, 37 2- 73 (9t h C ir. 19 93 ). B ut see La z y O i l C o . v. Witco C o rp., 166 F. 3d 581, 587 (3rd Cir

. 19 99) ( “[ FirsTier ] di d not hol d that the r ule 4( a) ( 2) si tuati on

—an nou nc em en t of a fi nal deci si on f ol l owed by not i ce o fappeala n d then en tr y o fthe j udg m en t

—i s the only si tu at i o n i n whi cha p rem atu re not ice of ap p eal w il l ripen at a late r da te.”). 7N o. 10

- 3849 13

(

. . . c on t i nu e d) 7 b el ie v e t h a t th e T h ir d C ir c u i t ’s re a d in g o f F i rsTier ren d ers its ho ld ing a v irtu al nu llity, and thu s w e d ecline to follow it. Th us , we mus tde t e r mi ne whe the r R ul e 4 ( a ) ( 2 ) a nd FirsTier per m i t a pr ematur e no ti ce o fa ppea l t o r i penupo n a b ela te d R u le 5 4(b ) ce rt ifica tio n . Inth e c on te x t o f a c as e w ith m u l t i p le, se p ar ab le claim s, th e hold ing of FirsTier coul d take o n two m eani ngs. T h e Su p re m e C ou rt ’s w ar n in g th at R u le 4(a)(2 ) s h ou ld onl y app l y w hen a deci si on w oul d be a pp eal abl e i fi m m ed iat ely foll o w e d b y th e e n tr y of ju d gm en t, id. at 276, co ul d b e i nt er pr et ed to meantha t no th i ngc ans ta nd b et w een the deci si on r endered and the appeal abi l i ty of th a td e c i s i o n b u tth e mi n i s t e r i a l t a s ko fa c t u a l l y e n te r i ng j ud gm en t o n the docket

. Thi s i s the i nter preta ti on th at M ar riot t a d va n c es . Ifw e w er e t o a c c ep t th is str i ct re ad i ng, a prem atur e a pp ealfro m the dism i ssa l of on e c laim in a m u lti-c laim su it, or o n e p ar ty in a m u ltip arty su it, cou ld not be saved by R ule 4(a)( 2), sin c e th e re i s m or e f orthe cour t to do beyo nd the m er e m i ni ste ri alta sk of e n te rin g jud gm en t. Sp ec ific a lly, th e c ou rtw ou ld ei therhave to di spose o fth e r em ai ni ng cl ai m s o r conduct a Rul e 54(b) exam i nati on, i n w hi ch the cour t would have to m ake speci fi c fi nd i ngs o ffi nal i ty, separ abi l i ty, and a l ack of jus t c au se for d ela y. A lte rn at ive ly, FirsTier can be r ead to hold that Ru le 4( a)(2) w il l save a prem atu re n o tice i f, rega rdin g th e claim beingap pea led, th e en tr y o fj ud g m en t i s al l tha t i s l eft f o r the co ur t to do

. Under th i s m o r e l en i en t re ad in g, th e d ism iss al of a sin gle cla im or p ar ty in a m u lti-14 N o. 10

- 3849 cl ai m cas e w o uld be an i m m ed iate l y a pp eal abl e deci si on h ad th e e n tr y of ju d gm en t d ire c tly follow ed th e d ism iss al. The si tuati on w ou l d requi re a Rule 54(b) m oti on t o enter that j ud gm ent, but the entr y of j ud gm ent w oul d nonethel e s s b e a l l th a t w a s r e q u i r e d f o r th e d e c i s i o n t o b e c o me ap p ea lab le. W e hav e not d i re ctl y conf ro nted the questi on o fwh ether a belated Ru le 54(b) j ud gm en t can sa ve a p rem atu re not ice ofap p eal after FirsTier, but w e hav e had the chance to i nter pret FirsTier, and i t i s cl earthat w e h av e deci ded that the m or e l eni ent inter preta ti on is the cor re ct o ne. I n G a rw o od P acka ging, Inc. v. Alle n & Co
. , Inc, we f o und that Rule 4( a) ( 2) ga ve us j uri sdic ti on o veran a pp eal f ro m a gr anted sum m ar y j ud gm ent despi te the f act that one ofthe defe nd ants sti l l h ad cl ai m s pendingag ai nst i t, g i v e n tha t a l l o f the cl ai m s were f i nal i zed bef or e w e d eci ded the appeal

. 37 8 F
. 3d 698, 70 0- 01 ( 7th Cir

. 20 04)

. Ci ti ng FirsTier, w e r eas oned that“o nce [ a] deci si on is announced, a prem atur e no ti ce o fappeal l i nger s unti l the fi nal deci si on i s e nter ed. ” Id. at70 1 ( ci ti ng FirsTier, 498 U .S. 2 69)

. Thus, i ffi nal i ty i s s ubsequ en tl y a chi eve d thro ugh the dispos alo fal l o ther c l a i ms , R u l e 4 ( a ) ( 2 ) c a n s a v e a p r e ma t u r e a p p e a l fr o m a j u d gm en t t h at d id n ot d isp os e o f all th e p ar tie s in a s ui t. S ee G a rw o o d P a ck agin g, Inc ., 378 F. 3d at 700- 01. Inth e c as e b efo re u s, w e s ee n o re as on w h y w e s h ou ld not re ach the sa m e co ncl usi on wh er e fi n alityi s r eached thro ugh a Rul e 5 4( b) cer ti fi cati on r ather than the di sposal of a ll cla im s. Acc or d In reBrys on , 40 6 F
. 3d 28 4, 288 (4 t h C ir. 20 05 ); Swopev. Col um b i an Che m i ca l s Co. , 28 1 F.3d 185 , 191-92 (5th C ir. 2002); Cl au s e n v. S e a- 3, Inc. ,N o. 10

- 3849 15 21 F
. 3d 11 81 , 1 18 7 ( 1s t Ci r . 1 994). I n e i th erc as e, the dist ri ct c ourt ’ s deci si on re prese n te d the end ofthe l i ti gati on f ora cer tain c laim o r cer tai n cl ai m s, and al l that w as n eeded f ortho se cl ai m s t o be a pp eal abl e was f o r j udg m en t to be f o r m al l y en te r ed, th us pr o vi di ng t r ue fin alit y . W e t h er efo re h old th at, in th e c on te x t o f a m u ltiparty o r m ult i

- cl ai m sui t, a prem atur e no ti ce o f appeal fro m the dism i ssa l o fa partyo r cl ai m w i l l r i pen up on t he e nt r y o fa b e l a t e d Rul e 5 4 ( b ) j ud g men tu nd er Ru l e 4 ( a ) ( 2 ) a nd FirsTier

. 49 8 U.S

. at27 5. W e co nc l ude tha t th i s ho l di ngco m po r ts w i ththe t ea ch

ing of FirsTier . I t is rea so n ab le, w e th in k, for a n u n so p h ist icate d l iti gan t to beli eve th at he cou ld ap p eal a court’s deci si on t o thro w o ut hi s o nl y claim despi te the e xi ste nc e o fo th erc l ai m s st i l l pe ndi ng . A s was the ca se i n FirsTier, the di s t r i c tc o ur ti n thi s c a s e “ pu r po r t [ e d] to d isp os e o fa l l of [ap p ella n ts ’] cla im s.” 498 U
. S. at 277. A l so si m i l arto FirsTieri s the l ac ko fa ny pr ej udice to M ar riott . At no poi nt since appel l ants’ o ri gi nal n o t i c e o fap p ea l w as it u n c lea r th at th ey w er e a p p ea ling the district cou rt’s dism issal of their claim s. M oreover, th e Ru le 54(b) j ud gm en t ent ered by the d istrict cou rt in n o w ay c h a n g e d th e n at u re of ap p ella n ts ’ d ism iss al; it m er ely m a d e t h at d ism iss al a p p ea lab le. N oton ly w as M ar ri ott sa ti sf acto ri l y abl e t o bri efthe i ssues ofthi s ca se, but as i s cl earbel ow, thei r defe nse o fthe distr ict co u rt ’s d ism iss al w as su c c es sfu l. Th i s i s no t t o s a y tha t a l l de c i s i o ns mad e b y a cour t ca n be pr em atur el y a pp eal ed and subsequentl y r evi ved by Rule 4( a) ( 2)

. A s FirsTier c a u t i o ns , an a p p e a l fr o m a16 N o. 10

- 3849 cl ear l y inter l ocuto rydecis ion w i l l notbe save d by R u le 4 (a)( 2). FirsTier, 49 8 U.S. at 276. But a deci si on that fu n c tio n ally e n d s t h e litig at ion for a p ar ty ca n h ar d ly be c onsi dered “c l ear l y inter l ocuto ry . ” In thi s co ntext, the FirsTierl ine oug ht to be dra w n a t w he th er a deci si on e nd s the l i ti gat ion fora parti cul arparty o r f ora separ abl e claim , and thus i s the pote nti alsubj ect of a R u le 5 4(b ) j u d gm en t, w h et h er or n ot th at R u le 5 4 ( b ) j ud g men ti s e v e r a c t ua l l y e nt e r e d. Acc or d Outl aw , 412 F. 3d at 161- 62 ( basi ng i ts j uri sdic tion o n t he f act that the di str i ct c ourt co uld ha ve en te r ed j udg m ent on th e a p p ea led from cla im s u sin g R u le 5 4(b )). Befo re m ovi ng to the m er i ts, i t i s worth noti ng tha t the di str i ct c ourtco uld have ente re d i ts Rule 54(b) j ud gm ent nunc pro tunc, m aki ng the N ove m ber10 , 20 10 dism i ssa l co nstr ucti vel y app eal abl e a s of N o vem ber 10th, 20 10, th u s a vo id in g t h e n ee d f o r R u le 4 (a)( 2). See Lo ca l-1 71 , Am a lga m a ted M eat C ut t e r s an d B utc her Wo rkm en o f No r t h A me r i c a v . Th o mp s o n F a r ms C o. , 64 2 F
. 2d 1065 , 1073 ( 7th Ci r. 1981)

. The f act that a f ai l ure by the di str i ct c ourtto add a Lati n ad dend um to i ts R ule 54 ( b) j ud gm ent c oul d have be en f atalto ap p ell ants’ appeali l l ustr ate s the i l l ogi caland o verl y t echni cal re sul ts that w oul d fl ow fr om to o str i ct a r eadi ng o f R ule 4(a)( 2).

B. D ism issal of S u it s A p p el l ants ar gue that the di str i ct c ourtabuse d i ts d iscretion in dism issi ng ap p ell an ts’ clai m s as a d isc o veryN o. 10

- 3849 17 sancti on f ortwo r eas ons. F i rs t, appel l ants cl ai m that thei r disc ove ry vi ol ati ons w er e not w i l l ful, w er e not i n bad f ai th, and did noti nvol ve f aul t, and thus di sm i ssalwas to o seve re a sancti on un der o ur pre cedent. S e c o n d , ap p ella n ts arg u e t h at th ey w er e n ot ad eq u at ely war ne d t ha t the i r c l ai m s woul d b e di smi ss ed, whi ch, they ass er t, i s al so re quir ed by our prece dent. A di str i ct cour t’ s e ntryo fsa ncti ons i s r evi ew ed f orabuse o fdi scr etion, w hile f actu al find ings are review ed f o r clear error. In re: Tho m a s C o nso lid a ted In du stries , 45 6 F
. 3d 719, 72 4 (7t h C ir. 20 06 ). The dis m i ssa l o fa case as a Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 37 dis cover y s an c tio n sh ou ld be u p h eld as l o n g a s a rea so n ab le j uri st coul d have co ncl ud ed th at the s ancti on was approp ria te
. Lo n g v . Steepro , 213 F.3d 983 , 986 (7th C ir. 20 00 ). G ive n th e s ev e r i t y o f th e s an c tio n , th is cour t has warned that i t w i l lbe vi gi l ant in i ts re vi ew o f R u le 3 7 d ism iss als

. M ayna r d v

. Nygren , 3 32 F. 3d 462, 467 (7th Cir. 2003). Despit e the f act that th e di str i ct cour t di sm i sse d app el l ants’ cl ai m s as a di sco ver y s ancti on und erRule 37, bo th parties ci te case s di scussing di sm i ssal s under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 41 ( b) ’ s f ai l ure to pros ecute provi si on. The st andards fo r dism i ssa l under Rul es 41(b ) and 37 ( b) o ver l ap, but ther e a re di ff er ences b etween the tw o. U nd erRule 41 ( b) , a case sho uld on ly be di sm i sse d w h en “ th er e i s a cl earr eco rd o fdel ay or co ntum ac i o us c o nduc t, o r wheno th erl es s drastic sa nc t i o ns h a v e p r o v e n un a v a i l i ng . ” M a yn a rd, 33 2 F
. 3d at 467 ( quoti ng Wil lia m s v. C hicago B d. of Ed uc. , 15 5 F
. 3d 8 5 3 , 8 5 7 ( 7 th C i r . 1 9 9 8 ) )

. R u l e 3 7, o n th e o th e r h a nd , re quir es a fi nd i ng o fwil l fulne ss, bad f ai th o r f aul t o n18 N o. 10

- 3849

The re ha s be ens om e d isc us s i on as t o whe t he r a fi ndi ng o f 8 wil l ful ne s s m u stbe bas ed o n c l ea r and c onvi nc i ng e vi denc e or m er el y a p re p o n d er a n c e o f th e e v id en ce . SeeWatki ns v. N i el sen , 40 5 F ed. Appx. 42 , 46 ( 7th Ci r. 20 10 ) ( c i t i ng M ayn ard , 3 32 F. 3d at 468)

. This dist inct ion i s unim portant t o thi s cas e, as t he f a c t s wou l d mee te i t he r s t a nd a r d. th e p ar t o f th e d efa u ltin g p ar ty
. Id ; s e eal so B ol anows ki v. G M RI, Inc, 17 8 F ed. A pp x. 57 9, 58 1 ( 7th Ci r. 20 06) ( “Rule 37(b) ( 2) ’ s sta nd ar d i s wil l fulne ss, bad f ai th o r f aul t, w hi l e Rul e 4 1( b) ’ s r equi re s a cl earr ec or d ofdel ay or contum aci ous c on du ct. ”)

. The di ff er ence between thes e t wo s t a n d a r d s h a s c a u s e d s o me c o n fu s i o n, b u t we h av e m ad e c lea r th at th e R u le 4 1 ( b ) s ta n d ar d is ac tu ally a s tr ict er st an d ar d th an th e R u le 3 7(b ) st an d ar d , In re P a nsier, 4 1 7F e d

. Ap p x . 5 65 , 56 9 ( 7 th C i r . 2 0 1 1 ) , a n d we have i nti m ate d that a fi nd i ng o fwil l fulne ss, bad f ai th o r f a ul ti s o nl y n e c e s s a r y i fR ule 41 ( b ) ’ s “ c l e a r r e c o r d” ofdel ay i s no t pr esen t. S e e M a yn a rd, 33 2 F
. 3d at 468 ( “[ E] ve n wi th o uta c l ea r r ec o r d o fde l ay, c o ntum ac i o us c on d u c t o r p rior failed sa n c tio n s, a c ou rtca n ap p ly the s ancti on o fdi sm i ssa l f orRule 37 vi ol ati ons w i th a fi nd i ng o fwil l fulne ss, bad f ai th, o r f aul t. ” ( inter nal q u ot at ion m ar ks om itt ed )). I n the c ase at ha nd , the di st r i ctc o ur t m ade a fi ndi ng th ata ppel l an ts di spl ay ed a pattern of“ wi l l fulde l aya nd av oid an c e,” th u s m ee tin g th e Ru le 3 7 s ta n d ar d of w illfu l- 8 ness, bad f ai th, o r f aul t. A co m pari son to re l evantcas e l aw cle ar l y i l l ustr ate s that thi s fi nd i ng was not er ro neous.N o. 10

- 3849 19

The court hel d that a dism is sal on ei ther R ule 41(b) or Ru le 37 9 w o u ld h a v e b ee n ap p ro p ri a te
. Aur a L a mp , 325 F. 3d at 907. I n Aur a L am p & Light i ng, Inc . v . Int e r nat i onal Tr adi ng Corp
. , f ori nstance , w e d id notfi nd an abuse o fdi scr eti on w he n a R ule 37 d ism issal w a s b ased on a p lai nt iff’ s 9 re peated f ai l ures to m eetco urt- or dered deadl i nes despi te s e v e r a l e x t e n s i o n s , i n c l u d i n g“ o n e fi n a l e x t e n s i o n ” a nd a warni ng tha t di sm i ssa l w as i m pend i ng. 325 F. 3d 903, 90 4- 906. W hi l e the co urt consi dered the f act that the a tto rney hand l i ng the appel l ant’ s ca se w as a s ol e pr acti ti oner and w as ove rwhelm ed by the a m ount o fdi sco ver y, it fou n d th at h is re q u es t t o fin d so m eo n e e lse to h an d le th e c a s e w as to o lat e a t t h e t im e o f d ism iss al. Id. at90 8. S i m i l ar l y, i n Wa tk ins v . N ielsen , th is c o u r t h eld that a pl ai nti ff’ s f ai l ure to m eetdeadl i nes despi te seve ra l ex te n sio n s, failu re to h ee d a w ar n in g of d ism iss al, and subm i ssi on o fi ncom ple te i nter ro gat or i es w ar ra nted dism i ssa l under Ru le 37 ( b)

. 40 5 F ed. A pp x. 42 , 43 (7t h C ir. 20 10 ). Con ve r se l y, thi s co ur t f o und tha t th e pl aint i ffi n Lon g did notactwith wil l fulne ss, bad f ai th, o r f aul t when he m i sse d a singl e co urt- or dered deadlin e be cause of the m i sta ken b el i efthata sum m ar y j ud gm ent m oti on su sp en d ed all ot h er p ro c ee d in gs . Lon g, 213 F. 3d at 98 5- 87. I n re achi n g thi s deci si on, the cour t e xplai ned that th e “f au l t” po r ti o n o fthe Rul e 37s ta nd ard is di ff er en t th an th e “ w illfu ln es s” an d “b ad fait h ” p o rt ion s in th at fault d oes not requ ire inten tional or reckless beh avior, bu t cou ns eled th at fault “su ggests un reason able beh avior”20 N o. 10

- 3849

an d i t “d oes not i nc lud e con d u c t t h at w e w ou ld classify as a m er e m i sta ke. ” Id. at98 7. The appell ants’ di sco ver y v i ol ati ons i n thi s ca se ar e unde ni ab l y mor e co m par ab l e to the pl aint i ff s i n A ura L a mp a nd Wat ki ns th a n th e p l a i n t i ffi n Lo ng . U nl i ke th e pl aint i ffi n Lo ng, ap p ella n ts d id n ot m ak e a sin gle d iscovery error, and their repea te d m isst ep s w ere n ot ex p lain ab le b y a rea so n ab le m isu n d er st an d in g. A p p ell ants m i sse d fi ve d isco ver y deadl i nes a nd vi ol ate d tw o cour t o rder s. They c om ple tel y f ai l ed to r espond to num er ous inter ro gator ies

—a vi ol ati on e ven m or e g ra ve than the i n c ompl e te i nt er r o g at o r i es f o und in Wat ki ns . Li k e th e at to r ne y i n A u r a L a mp , ap p ella n ts ’ c o u n s e l d id not have th e r eso urces to handle a case o fthi s nature, ye t h e fa iled to eit h er d ec lin e t h e c as e o r e n l i s t t h e h elp o fo u t s i d e c o u n s e l a ta r e a s o n a b l e p o i n ti n th e l i t i g a t i o n. Perhaps m ostte l lin g w as counsel ’ s i nabi l i ty to eve n s pe a kwi th the maj o r i t y o fthe p l a i nt i ff s tha th e was supp ose d to be r epres en tin g. The dis m i ssa l i s further supp or ted bythe f act that the di str i ct c ourtfi rs t a tte m pted to use the l ess s ev er e s ancti on o fpai d expenses t o com pel co m pli ance fro m the appell ants, but to no av ail. Se eLo we v. Ci ty of

Eas tChi cago, Ind. , 8 97 F. 2d 272, 274 ( 7th. Ci r 1990 ) ( “The dis tr i ct c ourtsh ou l d consi der l e s s s e v e r e s a n c t i o n s th a n d i s mi s s a l f o r a p a r t y ’ s n o n c o mpli ance with cour t ord er s or f ai l ure to pros ecute hi s o r he r clai m exp ed iti ou sly, un less there ex ists a clear record o fde l a y o r c o ntuma c i o us c o nd uct o rw h e n less d r a s t i cs a n c t i o n s h a v ep r o v e n i n e f f e c t i ve . ” ( e mpha s i s a dde d) (i nt erna l qu otation m arks om itted ))

.N o. 10

- 3849 21 I t i s e vi dent that the dist ri ct cour t w as w i thi n i ts disc re t i o n t o fi nd tha t the a pp e l l a nt s a c t e d wi l l ful l y, i n bad fait h, or w ith fau lt. A pp el l ants al so ar gue that the dist ri ct court fa i l ed to adequatel y w ar n them that thei r cl ai m s could be di sm iss ed . Th ey as se rtth at th is is a req u ire m en t fo r a R u le 37 dism i ssa l, and th e co urt ther ef or e abused i ts disc re ti on. A pp el l ants ar e cor re ct that w e encour age d ist ri ct cour ts to provi de an expl i c it w ar ni ng be f or e a Rule 37 or R u le 4 1 d ism iss al is o rd er ed

. S e e, e . g. , B a l l v. Ci ty of Ch i c ago , 2 F. 3d 752, 76 0 ( 7th Ci r. 19 93) ( “[ T]her e m ust be an ex p licitw ar n in g b efo re th e c as e i s d i sm iss ed [on R u le 41(b) gr ounds]. ”)

. M or e r ecentcas e law , however, has cl ar i fi ed that an expl i ci t w ar n ing i s no t abso l utel y nec essa r y ; r athe r, the l an g ua g e i n B all s h oul d be t ake n as a guidel i ne fo r dis tr i ct courtj ud ges and should be tr eat ed as a sa fe h ar b or rat h er th an a re q u ire m en t. Fisc her v. Ci ngu l arWi r e l e s s , LL C, 446 F .3 d 6 6 3, 665 (7th Cir. 2006). Further, a w ar n in g o fdi sm i ssa l need notco m e fro m th e jud ge . Id. a t 66 6. I n Fisc her, forexam ple, the f act that th e defen dan t r eque st ed di smi ssal if th e pl aint i ffc o nti nued to vio l ate d i sco ver y or ders w as deem ed to co ntribu te to th e p lain tiff’s w ar n in g th at d ism iss al w as a p os sib ility
. Id

. I n ac a s e in v o l vinga s m an y r epe at ed di sc o ve r y v i o l at i o ns a s thi s , a wa r ningm a y n o te v e n b e n e c e s s a r y, b utr e g a r dl ess , the dist ri ct c ourtand M ar riottsuffi ci entl y warned ap p el l an ts o fthe po ss ibi l i tyo fdi smi ss al

. As in Fi s ch er, ap p ell ees fi led m ore tha n on e m otion aski n g t h e cou rt to dism i ss appell ants’ cl ai m s due to t h eir i nabi l i ty to22 N o. 10

- 3849

m eetes tabl i shed dis coverydeadl i nes. The co urt al so w arned app el l ants that the e xtensi on t o A ugust 2 010 w as thei r “fi nal extensi on” and that a notherr equest f oran extensi on would notbe l oo ked u p on with f avo r. Final l y, the m agi str ate j u d ge ’s F in d in gs , Re p or t, an d R eco m m endati o n i nc l ude d di smi ss ala s a po ss ibl e sa nc ti o n, pr o vi di ng fu rt h er w ar n in g. G ive n th e n at u re an d vo lu m e of ap p ell ants’ di sco ver y v i ol ati ons, al ong w i th the warni ngs o f dism i ssa l thatwere i ssued, the dist ri ct c ourtdi d not abuse i ts disc re ti on i n gr anti ng a Rule 37 m oti on to di sm i ss w i thout havi ng expl i c itly w ar ned app el l ants of that possibi l i ty.

I I I . Concl usio n For th e fo re going r eas ons, we A FFIRM the j ud gm ent o f the l ower co urt.

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