" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 

112TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

NO. 3 

THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. MILITARY 

TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11 AND 

THE CONSEQUENCES OF 

DEFENSE SEQUESTRATION 

PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

OF THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on 

Armed Services of the House of Representatives 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

71–102 

" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 

112TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

NO. 3 

2011

THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. MILITARY 

TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11 AND 

THE CONSEQUENCES OF 

DEFENSE SEQUESTRATION 

PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

OF THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on 

Armed Services of the House of Representatives 
(ii) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 
(iii) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

NOTE FROM THE CHAIRMAN ..................................................................................... v 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE U.S. MILITARY TEN YEARS

AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES FROM FORMER CHAIRMEN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS

OF STAFF, SEPTEMBER 8, 2011 ............................................................................. 1 

General Richard B. Myers, USAF, Retired .................................................... 5 

General Peter Pace, USMC, Retired ............................................................... 7 

Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr., USN, Retired .................................. 9 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE U.S. MILITARY TEN YEARS

AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES FROM OUTSIDE EXPERTS, SEPTEMBER 13, 2011 .... 15 

Mr. Jim Thomas ............................................................................................... 19 

Dr. Michael E. O’Hanlon .................................................................................. 28 

Mr. Thomas Donnelly ....................................................................................... 33 

Mr. Max Boot .................................................................................................... 39 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE U.S. MILITARY TEN YEARS

AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES FROM FORMER SERVICE CHIEFS AND VICE

CHIEFS, OCTOBER 4, 2011 .................................................................................... 45 

General John P. Jumper, USAF, Retired ....................................................... 49 

General Richard A. Cody, USA, Retired ......................................................... 52 

Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, USA, Retired ...................................... 54 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE U.S. MILITARY TEN YEARS

AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES OF FORMER CHAIRMEN OF THE COMMITTEES ON

ARMED SERVICES, OCTOBER 12, 2011 .................................................................. 57 

The Honorable John W. Warner ..................................................................... 61 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter .................................................................. 63 

The Honorable Ike Skelton .............................................................................. 66 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE U.S. MILITARY TEN YEARS

AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LEON PANETTA AND

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, GENERAL MARTIN DEMPSEY, 

OCTOBER 13, 2011 ................................................................................................ 69 

The Honorable Leon E. Panetta ...................................................................... 73 

General Martin E. Dempsey, USA .................................................................. 76 

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DEFENSE SEQUESTRATION, OCTOBER 26, 2011 .... 79 

Dr. Martin Feldstein ........................................................................................ 83 

Dr. Stephen Fuller ............................................................................................ 87 

Dr. Peter Morici ................................................................................................ 92 

THE FUTURE OF THE MILITARY SERVICES AND CONSEQUENCES OF DEFENSE

SEQUESTRATION, NOVEMBER 2, 2011 ................................................................... 99 

General Raymond T. Odierno, USA ................................................................ 103 

Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, USN ............................................................ 105 

General Norton A. Schwartz, USAF ............................................................... 108 

General James F. Amos, USMC ...................................................................... 111 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS ................................................................................................... 121 

Additional Views ............................................................................................... 123 

Additional Views of Representative Roscoe G. Bartlett ................................ 125 

Additional Views of Representative Robert E. Andrews ............................... 128 

Additional Views of Representative Niki Tsongas ......................................... 130 

Additional Views of Representative John R. Garamendi .............................. 132 

Additional Views of Representative Hank Johnson ....................................... 159 

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................ 161 

(v) 

NOTE FROM THE CHAIRMAN 

As our Nation marked the 10-year anniversary of the September 

11, 2001, attacks on our country, the Committee on Armed Services 

embarked on a series of hearings to commemorate that day and reflect on the lessons learned from this generational struggle. We 

sought to remember the lives lost and to honor the sacrifices made 

every day by our military and their families—as our Armed Forces 

have taken the fight to the enemy to ensure our continued safety 

at home. 

Yet, we were also keenly aware that the current debate in Congress regarding the national deficit has significant implications for 

the military. As our service men and women return home from 

multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, they find a military with 

an uncertain future: Will our country sustain a force that continues 

to project power, deter aggression, defend the homeland and will 

we keep faith with veterans? These are questions that came into 

high relief when the President proposed $400 billion in cuts to national defense in April 2011 and Congress passed the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) on August 2, 2011. Therefore, the committee 

also sought to examine the future of the U.S. military, the consequences of further cuts in defense spending, and the enduring 

strategic implications of decisions political leaders will soon make 

about the future of our force and the strategic direction of the Nation’s defense. 

At the decade mark, our Nation finds itself at a strategic juncture—Osama bin Laden is dead; Al Qaeda is severely weakened as 

a global terror network, far less capable, but still functioning; the 

Taliban has lost strategic momentum in Afghanistan; key Al Qaeda 

propagandist Anwar Al-Awlaki has been killed in Yemen; and Iraq 

is an emerging democracy. We are winning this war; but just when 

our strategic goals are within reach, some would choose to cut military capabilities vital to this critical fight. Unfortunately, with our 

hard-won tactical success comes the danger of complacency. Faced 

with serious economic challenges, too many Americans are slipping 

back into the September 10th, 2001, mentality that presumes a 

solid defense can be dictated by budget choices, not the hard reality 

of our vital national interests and national security strategy. As 

Members of Congress, we will each be responsible for the votes we 

cast to balance the Federal budget and rein in the Federal deficit. 

Hard choices will have to be made among many Federal programs 

and priorities. But as Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, I fervently believe that the committee’s duty is to ensure that 
vi 

Members of Congress and the American public are informed about 

the threats our country faces and the cost to our Nation if we fail 

to provide the resources for a robust national defense. 

As pressure mounted in the summer of 2011 to pass legislation 

to raise the debt ceiling, many argued that Federal spending 

should be reduced across the board and that defense cuts should 

‘‘be on the table.’’ I agree that the military cannot be exempt from 

fiscal belt-tightening; in point of fact, defense has contributed more 

than half of the deficit reduction measures taken to date. The BCA 

cut nearly half a trillion dollars from the projected defense budget 

through 2021. In addition, title III of the BCA established a trigger 

mechanism that implements additional defense cuts, known as sequestration, should Congress fail to pass an additional $1.2 trillion 

in savings by December 23, 2011. In the worst-case scenario, national defense would be cut by $1.029 trillion from fiscal years 

2013–2021, should sequestration take effect. This represents not 

simply a cut to growth, but the lowest levels of defense funding, as 

a share of Federal budget authority, since before the Second World 

War. 

While the future budget picture remains uncertain, we are confident that further cuts are detrimental to our current and future 

national security capabilities. As the committee is well aware, the 

United States has sought a ‘‘peace dividend’’ following every major 

conflict our Nation has faced in the last century. In every instance, 

the prevailing wisdom has assumed that the threat environment 

was low and our enemies were contained. History tells us that it 

is difficult to predict where the next threat will originate, but that 

it will. We predictably fail to anticipate contingencies, leading to 

loss of blood and treasure. This is why we must remain vigilant 

and ready. 

The committee sought to better understand the tangible consequences of these cuts. Over the course of 2 months, the committee held six hearings to evaluate the lessons learned from the 

last 10 years of operations against violent extremists and apply 

those lessons learned to determine the impacts to our national security should sequestration occur. We received perspectives of 

former chairmen and vice-chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 

the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps; former service chiefs, 

vice chiefs, and commanders of the National Guard Bureau; former 

chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees; 

outside experts; the current Secretary of Defense and Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the four current service chiefs. The 

committee also held one hearing with a panel of economists to examine the economic consequences of defense sequestration, because 

although we do not invest in defense to create jobs, there will be 

significant impacts to the economy if the budget of the Nation’s 

largest employer is cut by nearly 20 percent. 

This committee print is a lasting record of what we learned. It 

contains the prepared statements of each of our 22 witnesses. Although much more was discussed during the hearings, these statements capture the sentiment shared by all who testified before 

us—further cuts to the Department of Defense (DOD) would create 

irrevocable harm to our military and be disastrous for our national 

security. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has stated that seques-
vii 

tration would lead to the smallest ground force since 1940, the 

smallest number of ships since 1915, the smallest Air Force in its 

history, and the smallest DOD civilian workforce ever. Every procurement and sustainment program would be affected, including 

our fighters, nuclear deterrent, space assets, rotorcraft, and ships. 

Our military has proven that the enemy cannot defeat us on the 

field of battle. But budgetary cuts of this magnitude could do what 

no army in history has been able to accomplish—break the U.S. 

military. We cannot forget that our military remains at war. As 

members of this committee travel throughout the country speaking 

to military families, we are often asked questions such as, ‘‘How 

can you consider cutting our benefits after we have sacrificed so 

much?’’ ‘‘How could you vote to shrink the equipment, leadership, 

and training that keep our spouses alive?’’ Or ‘‘Are our retirement 

and health benefits we’ve earned in danger of being eliminated?’’ 

We must keep the human side of national defense in mind as we 

slog our way through this budget debate. It seems like whenever 

the Nation has our back against the wall, whenever we are cornered, and whenever we look to be down for the count, a special 

class of citizens frees us from uncertainty and doubt. It happened 

during the Revolution. It happened during the Civil War and World 

War II, and it is happening today. The 9/11 Generation is this Nation’s great hope. They will lead the Nation forward—their energy 

and optimism are our salvation from the fatigue of war and our 

economic woes. As they hang up their uniforms, they will go into 

business, government, and other professions, bringing their selflessness, commitment to service, ingenuity, and integrity with 

them. We must not dishonor their service and sacrifice with further 

reductions to the training, tools, benefits and care they need to succeed in the great Nation they helped to defend. 

It must be noted, that balancing the books on the back of the 

military does not decrease the security challenges we face. In a 

networked and globalized world, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans 

are no longer adequate deterrents to keep America safe. September 

11, 2001, taught us that. But, the converse is also true. Military 

atrophy comes with an economic cost, as programs are eliminated 

and service members are involuntarily separated from duty. Currently, the unemployment rate for young veterans is over 20%. 

While it is true that our military power is derived from our economic power, we must recognize that this relationship is a symbiotic one. It is the military that protects the global commons, ensures free trade, and stabilizes every corner of the economy. 

Finally, paraphrasing one of our witnesses, Congress must answer the following fundamental questions before cutting defense 

further: 

1. Isn’t our primary constitutional duty to defend our Nation? 

2. Is the world suddenly safer today? 

3. Is the war against terrorism over? 

4. Have our vital national interests changed? 

The U.S. military is the modern era’s greatest champion of life, 

liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It is time we seek solutions 

to our fiscal woes from the driver of the debt, instead of the protector of our prosperity. 
viii 

It is with heartfelt gratitude that on behalf of the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, I thank our witnesses 

for participating in this hearing series. May God continue to bless 

the United States of America. 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, 

U.S. House of Representatives. 
(1) 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND 

THE U.S. MILITARY TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: 

PERSPECTIVES FROM FORMER CHAIRMEN 

OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

SEPTEMBER 8, 2011 

WITNESSES 

GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, RETIRED

15th Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

GENERAL PETER PACE, USMC, RETIRED

16th Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

ADMIRAL EDMUND P. GIAMBASTIANI, JR., USN, RETIRED

7th Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

PREPARED STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY WITNESSES 

SEPTEMBER 8, 2011 

(5) 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, 

RETIRED, 15TH CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Thank you Mr. Chairman and committee members for the opportunity to appear before you today. First, I would like to thank you 

for your unwavering support of our service men and women as they 

dedicate their lives to our freedom. 

This country has been at war for the last ten years. The burden 

of our conflicts and engagement around the world has fallen predominately upon the shoulders of our U.S. Military and their families. The resilience of our active duty and reserve troops has been 

remarkable; however, as our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan wind 

down and it presents the opportunity for fewer people forward deployed, now is not the time to lessen the support for our fighting 

force. The best thing we can do for our men and women in uniform 

as they strive to protect us is to provide them with good leadership, 

robust training, and world class equipment. For the last ten years 

we’ve done this. Given our fiscal concerns the question is, ‘‘what 

support is America willing to provide going forward?’’ 

Even though our forward deployed troops are predicted to be 

fewer in number in the near future, the threats to our security are 

still very great. Let me mention just three of these concerns. I believe that violent extremism continues to represent the biggest 

threat to our way of life. While al Qaida is badly wounded, they 

and their ilk are not finished in their quest for a different world— 

a world dominated by their extreme brand of Islam and little tolerance. Living as we do in a free society, we will always be at risk 

to those who wish us ill, who are willing to die for their cause, and 

who consider innocent men, women and children legitimate targets 

in their fight. The actions of the last ten years have made us safer 

than we were on 9/11, but we are not free from this scourge. It will 

take many years, a comprehensive multinational strategy, and the 

focus of all instruments of national power (including our military) 

to make this world safe from this threat. 

The nexus between violent extremism and the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction is another concern for our security. 

There is no question that if terrorists could obtain WMD, they 

would use them to maximum advantage for their cause. In this regard, Iran is particularly troubling. Iran’s quest for nuclear weapon 

capability is disturbing for several reasons. Chief among those is 

the proliferation threat from Iran’s newly acquired nuclear capability. If fissile material or a nuclear weapon were to fall into the 

hands of a terrorist group the impact could be much greater than 

the tragedy of 9/11. The fact that we have little apparent leverage 

over Iran’s actions makes this threat all the more concerning. And 

if Iran does develop a nuclear weapons capability, that would dramatically increase the potential for the development of nuclear 

weapons in the region. Obviously this would be destabilizing. Re-
6 

gardless of the solution to the Iranian problem, a strong military 

will be necessary for any successful outcome. 

Finally, the Asia-Pacific region has experienced unprecedented 

economic prosperity over the last several decades. As a Pacific nation, we must realize and remind ourselves that the prosperity of 

the Asia-Pacific nations contributes significantly to our prosperity. 

The U.S. military has played an important role in helping ensure 

the security and stability of this area. The forward stationing of 

our land, sea, and air forces has served us well, but our influence 

in the region is now being challenged by China. We will need highly capable sea, land, air, and space forces to deal with China’s antiaccess and area denial efforts in this region that’s so vital to our 

security and economic well being. 

In addition to these and many other security concerns, we must 

realize the impact that reductions in defense spending will have on 

our force structure. History tells us that during reductions in defense spending, despite our best intentions, the procurement and 

research and development accounts take a disproportional share of 

the cuts. This leaves our services without the modern equipment 

they need to replace old, outdated, and worn out equipment. As a 

nation we’ve always taken great pride in the fact that our military 

is the best equipped in the world. Deep budget cuts to defense 

would bring that fact into question. 

And finally, we must be able to provide world class care to those 

who have been wounded in our current conflicts. As you know well, 

some of these wounds are visible and some can’t be seen. Nevertheless, our obligation is to provide the best health care we can to 

those who have put their lives on the line for us. Health care is 

not cheap, but any reduction in health care resources would be 

breaking faith with those who willingly go in harm’s way. 

In my view, the world is a more dangerous and uncertain place 

today than it has been for decades. The three security concerns 

issues I’ve outlined above are all different in nature. However, they 

all will require a strong military to deal with them. Our historic 

lack of ability to predict where and when the next big threat to our 

security is coming from is well known, but we can be certain that 

a security surprise is in our future. What stands between these 

threats and our freedom is the U.S. military. 

Our fiscal difficulties are serious indeed. So are the potential security challenges facing us. We don’t need to be the world’s policeman, but we do need to provide leadership in this uncertain world. 

Our military must remain strong with the best leadership, superior 

training, and the best equipment. In doing so our men and women 

in uniform will help keep us free and provide the stability that ensures our prosperity. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the committee’s 

questions. 
(7) 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL PETER PACE, USMC, 

RETIRED, 16TH CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for this opportunity. 

I have appeared before this committee many times before, but 

every time in uniform. This is my first opportunity to be here as 

a private citizen. It is a uniquely different perspective, and I appreciate the opportunity. 

Although I don’t have the privilege of representing the incredible 

men and women who serve in our Armed Forces anymore, I do take 

pride and privilege in joining you in thanking them and their families for the sacrifice they have made in keeping us free. It has been 

a long 10 years, and they have really been taking good care of us. 

As you know, the economy and defense are two sides of the same 

coin. To the extent that you strengthen one, you strengthen the 

other. To the extent that you weaken one, you weaken the other. 

But I think we need to be very careful when we get into the budget 

discussions, which are necessary, that we do not look at defense 

from a dollar and cents perspective. It is a unique entity of what 

our government provides to its citizens, which is security. It should 

be strategy-based. What do you want your military to do for your 

country? Is it what we are doing today plus one other thing? What 

is it? 

If we know what the strategy is that we want our military to 

execute, then the folks across the river in the Pentagon who do this 

for a living can tell you how many planes, how many ships, how 

many troops they need to execute the combatant commander’s war 

plans. You can then apply budget numbers to that, and you will 

most likely come up with numbers that are bigger than we can afford. Fair enough. 

But once we have the strategy and we know what it would cost 

to implement that strategy, then we can talk about additional risk 

by spending a little bit less here, a little bit less there. So I would 

simply urge this committee to please insist on a strategy-based approach to how you fund your military. 

Next, there has been an incredible strain on our force. Less than 

1 percent of the Nation has been defending the other 99 percent 

for 10 years. There are volunteers to do it. God bless them. They 

are doing extremely well. They are not complaining. But we have 

got troops and their families who have sustained 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, or 

more deployments in the last 10 years. We have moms and dads 

who are deploying away from their families every year or every 

other year. As we look at how to balance the budget, the message 

that Congress sends to the military and how you determine pay, 

benefits and retirement will have significant impacts on the men 

and women who serve today. 
8 

Even today, as I walk through and I see active duty folks, the 

question they ask me, as they did when I was on active duty, is: 

are the American people behind us? And it has been the absolute 

belief that even though some of our fellow citizens prefer that we 

not be fighting where we are, almost all appreciate the fact that 

we have warriors who are willing to put themselves in harm’s way. 

That message has come across loud and clear, both from our fellow 

citizens in the way they have treated our returning soldiers and 

service members in airports around the country, and in the way 

that Congress has allocated resources. 

We need to be careful not to be premature in cutting back on the 

resources that we are allocating to our Armed Forces. This is 10 

years into a war where, unfortunately, our enemies have a war 

plan that calls for a 100-year war. That does not mean we need to 

be in Afghanistan or Iraq or doing that size operation for 100 

years, but it does mean that we have a tenacious enemy. And even 

though we have had great success, it can quickly be overturned if 

we are not vigilant. So the allocation of resources will be very important, not only to the standpoint of our troops and their families 

and their ability to fight, but also in how our industrial base is able 

to raise to the challenge. 

We don’t know where the next challenge is coming from, but we 

have always had the ability to bring all of our strength to bear, 

which includes our industrial base. As we start allocating fewer resources, the impact on our industrial base must be looked at very 

carefully. We are very, very thin as a Nation in some of our capabilities, some of which could literally disappear overnight if we are 

not careful. 

Lastly, the challenge of which I am most concerned is not one of 

another nation, where we might have to deploy forces. You can go 

around the globe and talk about all the hot spots, and I know that 

our military today, if told to go do something, is capable of doing 

it. It is simply a matter of deciding whether or not we want to 

apply what we know how to do, except in one area, and that area 

is cyber attack and cyber defense. 

The more anything is dependent on computers, the more vulnerable it is. And I know what we can do as a Nation as the attacker 

in cyber, and I know that we cannot defend against what we can 

do as a Nation. And therefore, as a military man, I have to presume that my enemies can either do the same thing, or they will 

be able to soon, or they may very well have something that we 

haven’t thought of yet. 

So as we look at the budget and we look at strategic places to 

apply it, certainly the growing concern of cyber must be taken into 

account. Cyber is having and will continue to have an impact on 

the relations between nations similar to that of the advent of nuclear weapons, the difference being that nuclear weapons have 

been used and thank God have not been used again. Cyber weapons are being used thousands of times a day every day, and we are 

uniquely vulnerable. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for listening, and I look forward to 

your questions. 
(9) 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL EDMUND P. GIAMBASTIANI, 

JR., USN, RETIRED, 7TH VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the 

committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. I would like 

to compliment you for holding these hearings. 

Not only are we here to remember the event that led to a pivotal 

change in our national security strategy ten years ago, we are here 

to undertake an important discussion of where we go from here. 

This discussion of our national security strategy is urgently needed—and has been sorely lacking in the recent debate about the 

greatest economic crisis our country has faced in the past eight decades. Our national security and economic health are inextricably 

linked and interdependent. They must be considered together and 

addressed as an integral whole. 

As you know, there are those who believe that drastic cuts 

should be made to our defense spending to help offset our nation’s 

debt. If the new Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction does 

not reach its targeted level of cuts, unprecedented automatic cuts 

to defense will be triggered. Huge cuts to defense spending, combined with little to no analysis of their impact to our overall national security, would have devastating consequences—something 

akin to performing brain surgery with a chainsaw. Further, I 

would characterize this debate as nothing less than determinative 

of what our role in the world will be in the future—will we continue to be a global superpower and force for good? Or will we 

allow ourselves to become one amongst many, forfeiting both the 

freedom of action and leadership role in the world which has done 

so much for our citizens and for free people everywhere? 

Providing for the national defense is the most fundamental responsibility of our federal government. There are certainly ways to 

be more cost effective and it is unrealistic that the Department of 

Defense will be spared from shared sacrifices, but it is critical that 

we analyze our spending levels in the proper context. Our national 

security is the one area for which our federal government is solely 

responsible. There is little room for error. 

Our national security strategy must drive any debate over the 

level of resources that the nation should devote to national defense. 

And the ability of the American economy to generate these resources must inform our strategic thinking. A failure to do either 

is likely to cost the United States more in the long run, in both dollars and lives. A lack of discussion and agreement about strategy 

will ensure that any cuts in our security budgets will be driven by 

at best arbitrary budget targets rather than reasoned strategic 

goals, rational operational concepts, and executable investment 

plans. 
10 

Objectives and Threats to Them 

Before discussing our strategy—that is, how we achieve our national objectives—we need to understand what those aims are. I 

also believe that in thinking about the future, we must study and 

learn from the past. For the better part of a century, the United 

States has pursued a consistent set of aims. These include protecting U.S. territory from attack, defending our allies against aggression, and preventing a single power from becoming so strong 

that it threatens to dominate the Eurasian continent. Beyond these 

core interests, the United States has repeatedly used force in the 

service of the common good, whether to alleviate suffering, provide 

relief from natural disasters or guarantee global public goods such 

as unfettered freedom of navigation on the high seas. 

For the foreseeable future, I believe we will face three primary 

challenges. The first is the ongoing war with Al Qaeda and its affiliates: a protracted conflict with irregular adversaries using unconventional means that spans the globe. The second is the threat 

that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—and especially nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems—by hostile 

regimes, such as North Korea today and prospectively Iran in the 

future, pose to the U.S., our allies and the stability of key regions. 

The third, and potentially the most consequential, challenge is the 

rise of China. Chinese military modernization, financed by a burgeoning Chinese economy, promises to reshape the balance of 

power in Asia. As that occurs, we need to ensure our ability to defend our territory, assure our allies, and maintain full and free access to the Western Pacific. 

Although each of these challenges is very different, meeting each 

successfully will require the United States to formulate and implement a long-term strategy. Further, each demands a comprehensive response. Military capabilities have a role to play in meeting 

each challenge, but so too do other instruments of statecraft and 

elements of national power. Nor should the United States meet 

these challenges alone. America’s allies, partners and friends can 

and should play an important role as well. 

In addition to these long-term challenges, the United States 

must be prepared to respond to any number of disruptive events 

that could destabilize the international system, ranging from the 

outbreak of a virulent pandemic, to the collapse of a strategic state, 

to the use of nuclear weapons. 

While successive administrations have framed these challenges 

differently or have ranked them differently in terms of likelihood 

and impact, I believe that there is a consensus spanning administrations that these are the challenges that we face today and are 

likely to face in the future. The adequacy of our forces needs to be 

measured against our ability to meet these challenges—specifically, 

to assure our allies and dissuade, deter and, if necessary, defeat 

our adversaries. 

Matching Ends and Means 

Each administration attempts to match ends and means within 

economic constraints. I have been involved in every such effort, at 

increasing levels of responsibility, since the fall of the Berlin Wall 
11 

in 1989 until the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The 

2010 QDR represents the most recent administration’s attempt to 

match ends and means. As a complement to this QDR, the 2010 

QDR Independent Panel, commissioned by Congress and co-chaired 

by former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry and former National Security Advisor Steve Hadley, identified a number of shortfalls in 

the ability of the United States to protect its interest against the 

threats that I have outlined. These included the need to counter 

anti-access capabilities, defend the homeland, and bolster our cyber 

capabilities. 

It is worth noting that neither the 2010 QDR nor the 2010 QDR 

Independent Panel anticipated the current budgetary environment. 

Both counted on real budget growth to be able to bridge the gap 

between our commitments and our capabilities. Yet, the current 

situation is such that the debate is not about how much growth 

there will be in security budgets, but rather how extreme the cuts 

will be to those budgets. 

Defense cuts, if too deep or too hasty, will open up further and 

perhaps unbridgeable gaps between our commitments and our capabilities. In this situation, the United States will, in theory, face 

two broad alternatives: either to reduce our commitments or accept 

greater risk. Such a choice is largely academic, however, because 

neither the President nor the Congress can determine U.S. commitments on their own in our ever more interconnected world. Moreover, reducing commitments is something that is easier said than 

done. In my view, for example, it would be extremely unwise to 

skimp on defending U.S. territory or maintaining the fundamentals 

of nuclear deterrence. It is also difficult for me to imagine, let alone 

recommend, that the United States abrogate any of our mutual defense treaties that commit us to the defense of allies across the 

globe. 

As a result, defense cuts will force us to accept greater risk. In 

concrete terms, that means a reduced readiness to wage war and, 

should we go to war, in conflicts that will go on longer and cost 

more American lives than would have been the case if we were better prepared. As terrible as the loss of any life is, our men and 

women in uniform face the lowest casualty rates in our nation’s— 

or the world’s—history. This is largely due to investments that 

have been made in precision weapons; intelligence, surveillance 

and reconnaissance; personal and vehicle protection; strategic airlift; and military medicine. Should Congress or the Defense Department make major cuts without thinking them through, I fear that 

we will face far higher casualties in the future. 

Reducing readiness and increasing risk applies to times of peace 

as well as war. It also amounts to a decreased ability to reassure 

allies, partners and friends and deter competitors. Our day-to-day 

military posture and global presence are responsible for more of 

our security and freedom than we know or consciously appreciate. 

When, beginning with the 2006 QDR, we began to portray seriously 

the demands of day-to-day operations on our forces, we realized 

that the demands of presence, engagement and responding to small 

scale contingency operations require considerable forces. This is a 

demand that will continue even as we draw down in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cutting back on our engagement with our allies, part-
12 

ners and friends threatens to undermine their confidence in us, 

and reducing our presence in key regions could tempt potential adversaries. 

In addition, we cannot always determine when and where we 

will be required to fight, and recent experience shows us that it is 

difficult to fix capability shortfalls rapidly. We all know the difficulties the Defense Department experienced in fielding up-armored 

Humvees and later MRAPs. In fact, the only armored Humvees 

that we had in the U.S. force posture ten years ago were few in 

number and were procured for example to protect our nuclear ballistic missile submarines and their nuclear weapons. 

The Defense Department and American industry cannot generate 

capabilities overnight. This is particularly true of naval and aerospace platforms, which often take more than a decade to field and 

are expected to last for decades. In these areas, stability in programs is extraordinarily important. Requirements need to be realistic, reasonable and stable over time to allow for effective acquisition strategies. And investment budgets must be stable and consistent. Swings in funding cause problems and often yield systems 

that take longer to acquire, cost more, and underperform. Even 

worse, instabilities in requirements, acquisition programs or procurement funds can lead to billions of dollars wasted on programs 

that never deliver any capabilities to our men and women in uniform. 

Generations to come will inherit the force structure that results 

from your deliberations, just as we inherited decisions made by 

those who came before us. It is worth remembering that many of 

the weapon systems that our men and women in uniform are using 

to fight today’s wars were the product of the defense buildup of the 

1980s. Many of these platforms are rapidly approaching the end of 

their lifespan, and failure to modernize the force will lead to significant shortfalls in the U.S. force posture. Our industrial base has 

been drawn down to such an extent that in a number of areas, such 

as shipbuilding, solid rocket motors and naval nuclear propulsion, 

we are down to the bare bones; marginal cuts may very well eliminate an entire defense industrial sector. As a result, any cuts need 

to be thought through very carefully indeed. 

Let me offer an anecdote to illustrate the need for patient long 

term investment to generate needed capabilities. In September 

2002, the senior civilian and military leadership identified as a top 

priority making the Defense Department an organization capable of 

tracking down and capturing or killing Al Qaeda leaders. This 

began a process of developing capabilities, some of them quite sensitive, which allowed us earlier this year to find and kill Usama 

Bin Laden. It didn’t happen overnight; it took time and required 

a lot of work. But it did have a big impact. 

In this regard, I would like to comment on a trend that I find 

particularly worrisome. The United States invests considerable 

sums in highly sensitive capabilities. In recent years, it has become 

all too common to reveal, for a variety of reasons whether advertent or inadvertent, some of these sensitive capabilities. As a submariner, I learned at an early age that exposure of sensitive U.S. 

operational capabilities squanders painstaking and often expensive 

work and jeopardizes American lives. 
13 

The Department of Defense should be credited with beginning 

the process of seeking greater efficiencies, and I believe that process can and should continue. Underperforming or unrealistic programs should be terminated. Excess infrastructure should be shed. 

Needless bureaucratic layers in the Pentagon and other defense organizations should be eliminated. I also believe that it is worthwhile to look at the area of military benefits, including retirement. 

Any such review should be conducted in a very careful, systematic 

and fair manner; one which recognizes the gratitude our Nation 

owes to those who sacrificed their lives or well-being in our defense. 

Before I end, I would like to re-emphasize what I said in the beginning, and that is that it is both urgent and vitally important to 

the nation that a discussion of strategy precede any attempt to institute major cuts in the defense budget. Accordingly, I would like 

to offer the following recommendations. 

First, that the Congress, working with the Administration, commission an independent, bipartisan panel of experts to examine our 

strategy, explore alternatives, and make recommendations for future strategic options. This panel could be modeled on the 2010 

QDR Independent Panel or the 1997 National Defense Panel. 

Second, I believe that Congress, working with the Administration, should stand up a panel to carefully examine military benefits, to include compensation, health care and retirement. As I 

noted previously, I believe that there is room to examine benefits. 

Such an examination should be comprehensive, thoughtful and employ significant grandfathering of provisions with the ultimate aim 

being to preserve the vitality and sustainability of the All Volunteer Force, a key American asymmetric advantage. As one who 

served both during the draft era and the All Volunteer Force, our 

military today is by far the best we’ve ever fielded. 

Third, I believe that any cuts to defense must preserve our ability to recapitalize our forces. We must make sure that we bequeath 

to future generations the world’s most capable, most effective military. Only that will allow us to ensure that we can protect our interests against threats we cannot even imagine today. 

Thank you again for giving me the opportunity to testify before 

you today. I will be happy to take your questions. 

(15) 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND 

THE U.S. MILITARY TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: 

PERSPECTIVES FROM OUTSIDE EXPERTS 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2011 

WITNESSES 

MR. JIM THOMAS

Vice President and Director of Studies 

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 

DR. MICHAEL E. O’HANLON

Director of Research and Senior Fellow 

The Brookings Institution 

MR. THOMAS DONNELLY

Director, Center for Defense Studies 

American Enterprise Institute 

MR. MAX BOOT

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies 

Council on Foreign Relations 

PREPARED STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY WITNESSES 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2011 

(19) 

STATEMENT OF MR. JIM THOMAS, VICE PRESIDENT AND 

DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND 

BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the 

Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. On September 11, 2001, I was working in the Pentagon as part of a small 

team drafting the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. The 9/11 attacks were a watershed event for me personally and for the Department of Defense. The attacks immediately reduced the peacetime 

bureaucratic processes of the day, including the QDR, to 

trivialities, as the Department—and the Nation—unified in their 

intent to vanquish the Islamist terrorists who perpetrated the attacks and to prevent future attacks on the United States. 

This week, it is appropriate that we remember those who were 

murdered by al Qaeda on that sunny Tuesday morning in New 

York, Washington, and Pennsylvania. We also remember those who 

serve in our intelligence and military services, and their families, 

and have made such extraordinary sacrifices in Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and other operations around the world. We honor especially the 

more than six thousand American Service Members who have died 

and more than 45,000 who have been wounded while fighting since 

9/11. While we are thankful that in a decade’s time al Qaeda has 

never succeeded in conducting another major terrorist attack on 

American soil, we also remember that America is not alone in facing al Qaeda and its affiliates’ indiscriminate acts of terror. Allies 

and friends around the world—nowhere more so than in the Muslim world—have also lost countless lives to al Qaeda’s acts of barbarity. 

In my testimony today, I will outline some of the pertinent lessons to be drawn from the past decade, the security and fiscal challenges we face looking ahead, and how we might reconcile them in 

the years ahead. 

Lessons Learned Since 9/11 

Looking ahead, it is important to draw the right lessons from our 

experiences over the past decade: 

First, we criticized ourselves in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks 

for ‘‘failing to connect the dots.’’ Although we have made significant 

improvements in our intelligence enterprise to prevent future attacks, we should not kid ourselves: Despite our best efforts to anticipate and prevent strategic surprises, we must also be prepared 

for future shocks and inevitable surprises. We must develop the resiliency to minimize them and the agility to adapt rapidly and respond appropriately. We should avoid the mistake of the 1990s, 

where we over-optimized U.S. general purpose forces for the wars 

we preferred to fight that resembled OPERATION DESERT 

STORM. Instead, we must ensure our future forces organize, train, 
20 

and equip themselves to fight in ways that defy our preferences: 

when our satellite communications are jammed; regional airfields 

are bombarded with rockets and missiles; ports are mined so that 

transport ships cannot enter their harbors; and anti-ship missiles 

force naval and amphibious forces to operate from greater distances. 

Second, over the past decade the U.S. military has come to embrace a modern version of what B.H. Liddell Hart called the strategy of the indirect approach. By enabling and working with and 

through allies and partner security forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

elsewhere in the world, the United States has been far more effective in defeating al Qaeda and other irregular forces than if we had 

fought them unilaterally. As we look ahead, the United States 

should continue to employ indirect approaches that leverage the 

advantages of others with whom we share common security interests. Especially in an age of austerity, we will need to encourage 

and enable our allies and friends around the world to do more for 

their own defense, while the United States maintains principal responsibility for securing the Global Commons of the high seas, the 

skies above, space, and cyberspace. 

Third, we have seen the enormous costs that a non-state adversary with limited means has been able to impose on the United 

States. For less than a million dollars, al Qaeda organized and executed the 9/11 attacks. Conservative estimates reckon the financial 

impact of the attacks and America’s response to be more than $1 

trillion. As we enter an age of austerity we must not only think 

about how we can save money and where we can take risk; we 

must also think more about how we adopt cost-imposing strategies 

to turn the tables on those who would pose threats to our security. 

Especially when resources are limited, we must think harder about 

increasing our competitors’ costs while minimizing our own. 

At the same time, we must avoid drawing the wrong lessons from 

the past decade. While it would be a mistake for the United States 

to turn its back on irregular warfare and all that we have relearned about counter-insurgency in the past decade, future wars 

may look very different. For example, we have seen the incredible 

impact that unmanned aerial vehicles have had in locating and targeting terrorists and insurgents and we have greatly expanded our 

fleets of non-stealthy Predator, Reaper, Shadow, FireScout, and 

Global Hawk UAVs. Future adversaries, however, may possess air 

defenses that limit the use of high-signature aircraft. Simply acquiring future capabilities based on their effectiveness in the past 

decade could leave U.S. forces less prepared and more vulnerable 

as they encounter more capable adversaries. 

Principal Security Challenges Ahead 

Ten years on from the 9/11 attacks, America finds its military 

forces still engaged in Iraq, Afghanistan, and conducting other combat and non-combat operations around the world. While al Qaeda 

has been greatly weakened over the decade and the United States 

has been successful in hunting down its leadership and keeping it 

on the run, it remains determined to visit violence on the United 

States, its friends, and allies. Consequently, the United States 

must remain vigilant. 
21 

At the same time, the United States simply does not have the 

luxury to focus only on the clear and present danger posed by al 

Qaeda. As a global power, and indeed as the free world’s security 

partner of choice, the United States faces a range of foreign 

threats. Even while we have checked the evil of al Qaeda, other 

dangers are growing. Three challenges in particular will require 

greater attention over the next several decades, and preparing for 

them represents the most prudent course of action to ensure the 

appropriate portfolio of military forces and capabilities to confer the 

flexibility and fungibility needed to deal with the widest range of 

inevitable surprises and unforeseen contingencies: 

The Rise of China. It is instructive that the United States 

planned for war with Great Britain up to the eve of World War II. 

The United States did not see Great Britain as the most likely 

threat, but the potential danger posed by the Royal Navy to hemispheric defense was the most consequential. Similarly, China today 

has the greatest potential to compete with the United States militarily. China is not an enemy, but the course that it will chart in 

the next several decades is far from clear. China’s spectacular economic growth over the past several decades has contributed positively to the global economy. Its thirst for overseas commodities 

and unsettled maritime claims, however, are cause for concern. 

Even more worrisome has been its sustained military build-up, including the development and fielding of so-called anti-access and 

area-denial capabilities that appear intended to take on the American military’s traditional approaches to transoceanic power projection and forward presence in distant geographic theaters. China’s 

A2/AD network includes growing inventories of medium- and intermediate-range missiles; state-of-the-art integrated air defenses; 

submarine forces; anti-satellite systems; and computer network attack capabilities. 

Regional Nuclear Powers. Nuclear threats are not new; the 

United States has lived with the threat of nuclear weapons in the 

hands of hostile powers since the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon in 1949. New nuclear powers, however, are emerging 

and threatening regional military balances. North Korea has not 

only tested its own nuclear weapon, but has proliferated nuclear 

and missile technology. It has brandished its nuclear capabilities 

vis-a`-vis South Korea and Japan, and in the event of an internal 

power struggle following the death of Kim Jong Il, its nuclear capabilities could be up for grabs. The most likely nuclear exchange scenario, however, may involve Pakistan and India. Should Islamist 

terrorists repeat a Mumbai-like attack against India, or if tensions 

should escalate resulting in the conventionally superior Indian 

Army making incursions into Pakistan, Pakistan could resort to 

the use of nuclear weapons. Increasing instability in Pakistan, 

moreover, holds the possibility of the army losing control over its 

dozens of distributed nuclear weapons and specter of them falling 

into the hands of Islamist terrorists. Finally, and perhaps most 

consequentially for the United States and its friends in the Middle 

East, Iran is continuing efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Should 

Iran acquire nuclear weapons, instability would characterize the 

strategic balance between Iran and Israel, with both sides potentially having incentives to pre-emptively attack the other. Iran’s 
22 

possession of nuclear weapons would also likely compel other regional states, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey, to acquire 

their own nuclear capabilities, further destabilizing an already unstable critical region of the world. 

Transnational Non-State Actors. Even after the killing of 

Osama Bin Laden by U.S. SEALs, al Qaeda and other non-state 

groups may continue to threaten U.S. security interests. While al 

Qaeda has weakened over the past several decades, affiliated 

groups have emerged in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and 

Southeast Asia. Other non-state actors including insurgent, terrorist, and criminal groups are continuing their attempts to destabilize fragile strategic states around the world. The lethality of violent extremist groups would increase dramatically should they acquire nuclear or biological weapons. Within our own hemisphere, 

narco-cartels continue to threaten the stability of key partners such 

as Mexico and Colombia. In the future, transnational non-state actors may grow in importance. The threats they pose will increase 

as great powers arm them with more sophisticated weaponry and 

employ them as proxies in peripheral contests to impose costs on 

their state rivals and bleed them, rather than opposing other great 

powers more directly. 

Cumulatively, these challenges suggest a more dangerous 

world—one in which traditional forms of American power projection will become prohibitively costly; nuclear dangers will become 

more common in distant theaters and as threats at home; and irregular warfare will remain an enduring feature of the security environment. 

The geographic nexus of these challenges is the Indo-Pacific region, stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca and 

up to the Sea of Japan. Although the U.S. military does not have 

the luxury of focusing on a single theater, the greatest tests our 

armed forces will face in the coming decades are likely to emanate 

from this region. Just as military planners focused their attention 

upon Europe and Northeast Asia as principal theaters during the 

Cold War, it is the Indo-Pacific region that will dominate the attention of planners over the next several decades as they wrestle with 

these challenges. 

In confronting these security challenges, the United States is 

also likely to face multi-dimensional access and operational problems. Future adversaries may: 

1. Deny the United States the ability to generate sorties from 

theater bases and aircraft carriers within range of their missiles, necessitating both carrier- and land-based air operations from far greater ranges; 

2. Possess more sophisticated air defense than recent adversaries in Libya, Iraq and Kosovo with mobile passive target 

acquisition radars that are more difficult to locate and 

longer-range surface-to-air missiles, resulting in the increased vulnerability of non-stealthy manned and unmanned 

aircraft; 

3. Employ systems to jam GPS signals and deny communications links to aircraft, requiring the United States to develop 

alternatives to GPS for positioning, navigation and timing, 

as well as local communications schemes such as airborne 
23 

line-of-sight relays if satellite communications are unavailable; 

4. Develop their own fifth generation fighter aircraft, challenging U.S. localized air superiority; 

5. Employ over-the-horizon maritime ISR, long-range anti-ship 

missiles, supercavitating torpedoes, and mines to hold off 

U.S. naval surface and amphibious ships; 

6. Threaten regional air and sea ports of debarkation with conventional, chemical, biological, or nuclear attacks to impede 

the insertion and staging of large ground forces in neighboring countries; 

7. Attack U.S. ISR, communications, or GPS satellites using 

radio-frequency interference, direct ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital anti-satellite weapons, or directed energy systems; 

8. Attack U.S. and allied military computer networks used for 

command and control, logistics and mission control, or civilian networks related to critical infrastructure; 

9. Target civilian populations in the United States or allied cities; and 

10. Exploit civilian populations to provide sanctuary from attacks. 

Overcoming these problems will require forces and capabilities 

that can respond to threats on a global basis rapidly; operate from 

range; carry sufficient payloads; evade detection, penetrate into denied areas and persist to strike elusive targets; operate in small, 

highly distributed formations autonomously; and survive and operate effectively in extreme WMD environments. 

America’s Fiscal Predicament 

Compounding these dangers, Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has justifiably characterized 

America’s fiscal predicament as a national security threat. Unlike 

previous periods in our history when the United States ran large 

deficits and increased its debt, it is unlikely simply to ‘‘grow’’ its 

way out of debt this time around. The rate of increase in the national debt is projected to exceed by a wide margin even the most 

optimistic estimates of U.S. economic growth rates. 

Given this reality, Congress faces difficult choices about raising 

taxes, curbing growth in entitlement programs, and/or cutting discretionary Federal spending, including National Defense. Should 

the Joint Committee fail to reach agreement on a deficit reduction 

plan as directed by the Budget Control Act, the sequestration trigger could result in an additional $500 billion reduction in defense 

spending beyond the $350 billion already envisaged over the next 

ten years. Such draconian cuts, especially if level-loaded across the 

ten-year period, would compel Defense programmers and budgeteers to identify ‘‘quick cuts’’ rather than ‘‘smart cuts,’’ thereby 

stretching procurement programs and reducing operations and 

maintenance spending to generate immediate savings. 

Some believe that it would be relatively easy and painless to cut 

$500–800 billion from defense over the next decade. Many cite the 

defense build-up since 9/11 and suggest that with the drawdowns 
24 

of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, we can reduce defense spending as we have after other major buildups in history. It is true that 

defense spending, including war costs, increased from slightly less 

than $400 billion in FY01 to around $700 billion in FY11 (in constant FY12 dollars). This build-up, however, is markedly different 

from defense build-ups of the past. In the aftermath of previous 

build-ups, budget cutters could count on reducing end-strength and 

paring back procurement. In the post-9/11 build-up, though, endstrength changed very little; Active Component end-strength has 

hovered around one-and-a-half million, while recapitalization and 

modernization plans for large parts of the forces were largely deferred, continuing the so-called ‘‘procurement holiday’’ of the previous decade. 

America cannot afford to balance the budget on the back of de- fense. Reductions beyond the $350 billion in cuts over ten years already anticipated will be difficult for the Department of Defense to 

make, especially while U.S. forces are still engaged in wars overseas. If the sequestration trigger were pulled, it could result in 

even more drastic reductions placing the United States at great 

peril. At the same time, it is increasingly unlikely that Defense will 

be spared from some reductions in the years ahead. The challenge 

will be in making adjustments to DoD to develop and maintain 

those forces and capabilities that are most relevant to the security 

challenges ahead and capable of operating in non-permissive conditions, while finding efficiencies and reducing those forces and capabilities that are least relevant and most dependent on relatively benign operating conditions. 

Making Changes to Meet Security Challenges in an 

Age of Austerity 

The security challenges we face in the decade ahead are greater 

than they have been at any time since the Cold War, while the resources to deal with them are becoming more constrained. Together, the dual imperatives of preparing for new security challenges and reducing defense spending are likely to drive changes 

in the military over the coming decade. Ideally, DoD should revise 

the Defense Strategy to explain how it will reconcile the changing 

security environment with reductions in defense spending. 

Akin to the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, a revised Defense Strategy 

might call on allies and partners to do more in their own defense, 

with the United States serving as a global enabler rather than a 

‘‘first responder’’ for regional crises. As part of a new bargain with 

its allies and close partners around the world, the United States 

might redouble its efforts to police the Global Commons—the high 

seas, air, space and cyberspace—beyond the sovereign control of 

other states for the benefit of all, while expecting its allies to do 

more at home. Just as the United States may find it more difficult 

to project power in the future, it might once again serve as an ‘‘Arsenal of Democracy’’ to arm allies and friendly states with their 

own anti-access and area-denial capabilities to defend their own 

sovereignty from regional hegemonic aspirants. 

Emulating President Eisenhower’s New Look strategy, a revised 

strategy might place emphasis on particular elements of the U.S. 

military to foster deterrence. Just as the New Look emphasized nu-
25 

clear weapons to deter aggression, the United States today might 

emphasize special operations forces and global strike capabilities— 

including cyber, conventional and nuclear—to deter aggression or 

coercion. In its divisions of labor with allies and friendly states 

around the world, special operations, and global surveillance and 

strike capabilities represent unique American military advantages 

that are beyond the means of most states and are thus complementary rather than duplicative. Special operations and global surveillance and strike capabilities, moreover, are among the most fungible capabilities in the U.S. arsenal as they can be applied across 

a range of theaters in a variety of military operations. Such capabilities may also be among the least vulnerable to anti-access/area 

denial threats. 

DoD should revise its force planning construct to move away 

from preparing to conduct concurrent large-scale land combat campaigns focused on conducting or repelling invasions. It should consider a wider range of contingencies, including the elimination of 

a hostile power’s WMD capabilities. At the same time, it should assume that the United States would conduct no more than one 

large-scale land combat campaign at any given time. To deal with 

opportunistic aggression by a third party if the United States is engaged in war, the United States should maintain sufficient global 

strike capabilities, including a deep magazine of precision-guided 

weapons, to halt invading forces and conduct heavy punitive attacks over extended periods of time. 

DoD should also reconsider military roles and missions. It should 

reduce duplication across the services, including in combat aircraft, 

armored forces, and cyber capabilities. Rather than having all 

Services equally prepared for all contingencies across the spectrum 

of conflict, it should explore greater differentiation between the 

Services. For example: 

1. The Marine Corps might reinvigorate its role providing forward presence and optimize itself as the Nation’s premiere oncall crisis response force on a day-to-day basis. In a state of 

general war, the Marine Corps might perform two main roles: 

first, small teams of highly distributed/highly mobile Marines 

could conduct low-signature amphibious landings and designate targets ashore for bombers and submarines as a vanguard force in the early stages of a blinding campaign; and 

second, Marines could play an instrumental role seizing key 

bases and maritime chokepoints, particularly in peripheral 

theaters, to enable follow-on operations of the joint force. 

2. The Army might focus on security force assistance to foreign 

security forces steady-state. In a general state of war, it 

should be prepared with a Corps-sized capability to conduct a 

large-scale WMD elimination campaign as its most stressing 

case. 

3. As the Army and Marine Corps expand their capacity for security force assistance and foreign internal defense in semipermissive environments, special operations forces could shift 

their emphasis toward unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, special reconnaissance, direct 

action, and special WMD elimination in denied environments. 
26 

4. The Air Force and Navy might reduce their forward presence 

while focusing more on delivering globally available capabilities to penetrate enemy anti-access/area-denial networks, providing persistent broad area surveillance and attack as well 

as mutually assured air and sea denial in contested zones, 

while maintaining control of the Global Commons. 

Beyond changes in the strategy and design of forces, we should 

explore ways to gain efficiencies in the institutional functions of the 

Department and reduce headquarters staffs. Over the past several 

decades almost all headquarters units in the Department have 

grown significantly while operating forces have remained level or 

declined. Large headquarters staffs, including the staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, do not improve military effectiveness and, arguably, reduce the Department’s agility to deal with 

lean adversaries such as al Qaeda. Congress might consider reducing legislative reporting requirements to facilitate staff reductions. 

We must also act to arrest personnel cost growth lest DoD follow 

the path of large American corporations that have run into trouble 

in recent years as their healthcare and pension costs have made 

them less competitive. U.S. military pay raises—in excess of the 

employment cost index (ECI)—and added or expanded benefits 

have increased the cost of military personnel on a per person basis 

by 46 percent in real terms since 9/11. Military healthcare is another significant contributor to the growth in personnel costs, having risen by 85 percent in real terms over the past decade. Congress should consider an overhaul of military compensation, 

healthcare, and retirement pensions to bring them more in line 

with private sector best practices. 

DoD should develop new operational concepts such as AirSea 

Battle that address the types of security challenges outlined earlier. Such concepts serve a vital function as the connective tissue 

between strategic objectives and the types of forces and capability 

investments that are needed. DoD should evaluate its R&D and 

procurement programs and prioritize them in light of its operational concepts. Capabilities that are fungible across theaters and 

combine multiple attributes described earlier—global responsiveness and range; payload; survivability; endurance; autonomy; and 

counter-WMD—should receive high priority. Those that lack such 

attributes or make only niche contributions should he accorded 

lower priority. 

Finally, DoD should draw a lesson from the past. Between the 

First and Second World Wars, the War and Navy Departments 

faced far graver budgetary austerity than anything currently being 

contemplated. Their forces were dramatically reduced following demobilization after World War I. Field-grade officers such as Dwight 

Eisenhower had trouble making ends meet and considered leaving 

the Service. But despite terrible funding conditions, the Army, 

Navy and Marine Corps protected their intellectual capital. They 

used their limited resources to experiment with new capabilities 

like the airplane, aircraft carrier, and the tank. They conducted a 

series of wargames, developed a wide range of Color Plans, and 

they developed operational concepts like Amphibious Warfare that 

would prove so crucial in the Second World War. Likewise, it would 
27 

be prudent to protect DoD’s intellectual capital in the current environment. 

Conclusion 

Despite the conventional wisdom that America is in decline, the 

United States continues to enjoy unrivalled strategic advantages. 

We are blessed with insular geography and friendly neighbors. 

America is rich in natural resources and fertile land. It enjoys deep 

and enduring alliances and access to a global portfolio of bases. It 

has a culture of assimilating immigrants and promoting innovation. The United States enjoys the most favorable position relative 

to all of the other great powers. With ample political will and 

shared sacrifice, I am confident the United States can get its economic house back in order, while safeguarding the country from 

those who would harm us. 
(28) 

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL E. O’HANLON, DIRECTOR 

OF RESEARCH AND SENIOR FELLOW, THE BROOKINGS 

INSTITUTION 

In a stunning change in American policy and politics, it now appears possible that the military budget may be cut by up to a trillion dollars over a decade. This would be far more than the $400 

billion in 12-year savings that President Obama had proposed in 

his April 13, 2011 speech that signaled the White House’s full engagement on the deficit issue. That is above and beyond savings 

that will result naturally, and indeed are already resulting, from 

troop drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

And these will be real cuts. The administration’s earlier plan, as 

seen in President Obama’s February 2011 budget proposal to Congress for Fiscal Year 2012, had already taken away most of the 

growth in the longer-term military budget, reducing it to around 1 

percent a year in inflation-adjusted terms. But most military costs 

rise about 2 percent a year above inflation. That is a well-established historical tendency due to the fact that many areas of defense activity—health care, environmental restoration, weapons 

purchases, pay for troops and full-time civilians—do tend to rise in 

cost slightly faster than the inflation rate. So it will be necessary 

[to] cut forces, weapons, and operations. 

Defense cuts are appropriate, even above and beyond the $150 

billion or so in annual spending that will naturally go away as 

forces come home from Iraq and Afghanistan. Our nation is in economic crisis, exacerbated to a large degree by a huge budget deficit 

and unhealthy level of accumulated debt. This dilemma also constitutes a national security challenge for the United States; no 

great power can remain great if the economic underpinnings of its 

strength erode, as history and common sense both counsel us. And 

to attack the deficit in a serious way, defense must be on the 

table—just as all other major elements of federal spending, as well 

as the tax code, must be. 

But before we ask the Pentagon to provide a disproportionate 

share of spending reductions, as some would counsel, we need to 

sit back and think. Issues of war and peace are too fundamental 

to our nation’s well-being to be guided by emotional reactions to an 

economic downturn that, however important, is nonetheless still a 

temporary phenomenon. We have spent decades building up the 

best military in the history of the planet and also helping establish 

an international system of alliances and other security relationships that has prevented another major power war for almost 70 

years. Care is required in changing it. Yes the defense budget is 

huge—at nearly $700 billion it is one-fifth of all government spending, and nearly the equal of all military spending by all other countries on Earth combined. But it is not particularly huge in historic 

terms as a percent of our economy; it clocks it at about 4.5 percent 
29 

of gross domestic product, in contrast to levels of 6 percent under 

President Reagan and 8 to 10 percent under Johnson, Kennedy, 

and Eisenhower. Nor is America currently a militarized society 

that needs to reorient its economy or culture. Even if one counts 

the National Guard and Reserves, only 1 percent of the population 

is in uniform, compared with more like 2 percent in the latter decades of the Cold War and even higher figures before that. Modern 

America is more notable for the distance between the average citizen and its all-volunteer armed forces than by any overmilitarization of its society. And the defense budget is a bargain if the alternative is a higher risk of war. 

Making national budgetary decisions with huge strategic impact 

cannot be done as an arithmetic exercise, or as part of a grand deficit bargain in which some parties trade away several chips’ worth 

of defense spending in exchange for so many tax cuts or entitlement cuts like bargaining chips in a poker game. While it is reasonable, and right, to rethink defense spending in light of our economic straits, we must also ask what is our military for, and what 

role do we as Americans want to play in the world of the 21st century? 

My bottom line is conditionally supportive of the idea of cutting 

$350 billion over the next decade—as has already been agreed in 

the first round of the August, 2011 debt deal between President 

Obama and the Congress. Cumulative reductions of $350 billion to 

perhaps $500 billion over that ten-year window can probably be 

achieved. Some can be found by eliminating pure waste. Some can 

be found by steps like asking non-deployed military personnel and 

non-wounded veterans to pay health care insurance premiums 

more in line with what the rest of the country considers standard, 

and to accept a new retirement system. The bulk of it will, however, have to be found by cutting real military capability and as a 

result accepting real additional risk to the country’s security. I detail my calculations in the long Brookings paper noted above (at 

www.brookings.edu) and will develop the arguments further in a 

forthcoming book. 

Some cuts are eminently reasonable, even on narrow national security grounds, given how much the deficit has become a risk to 

the nation’s long-term economic and military strength. But to 

argue that cuts of this magnitude can be made risk-free, as some 

purport, is not consistent with the realities of the situation. And to 

cut more than half a trillion dollars, relative to the earlier plan laid 

out by the President in his February 2011 plan, would be unwise. 

Unfortunately, there are budget plans that would do so. Most worrisome is the default plan. As part of the August deficit and debt 

deal, the new Fiscal ‘‘Supercommittee’’ is due to present a plan before Thanksgiving for an up-or-down vote by Congress before 

Christmas. If such a plan is not approved, defense and national security will automatically suffer another $500 billion or so in tenyear cuts, making for a grand total of about $900 billion. Such draconian cuts would jeopardize irreducible requirements in American 

defense policy—winding down current wars responsibly, deterring 

Iran, hedging against a rising China, protecting global sea lanes 

vital for commerce, attacking terrorists and checking state sponsors 
30 

1For a good discussion of democratic peace theory, see John M. Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal 

War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). 

of terror, and ensuring a strong all-volunteer military as well as a 

world-class defense scientific and industrial base. 

Behind these specific recommendations is a broader premise. Not 

only the United States, but the world in general, benefits from the 

current international order in which America is the strongest 

power and helps lead a broader alliance system involving most of 

the world’s other major powers. World peace would not be served 

by U.S. disarmament or even a trend towards the emergence of 

multiple, comparable power centers. I do not mean Americans 

should want to dominate others. Nor should the United States do 

other countries’ fighting for them. But if the United States were to 

stop playing a global leadership role, competition and conflict 

would be the likely result. In such a ‘‘multipolar’’ world, countries 

would often be less confident of their own security, and sometimes 

inclined to take matters into their own hands by engaging in arms 

races, building nuclear weapons, or even attacking their neighbors. 

We Americans get lots of things wrong, but we usually get 

around to the right policy after trying all others as Churchill famously remarked. In the end most peaceful democratic states do 

not fear us and want to ally with us. As such our power is stabilizing, and desirable. Perhaps someday a world made up just of democracies will, as ‘‘democratic peace theory’’ would predict, be inherently stable on its own, without a strong leader.1 But the world 

is not there yet. 

Put differently, we have to be careful about cutting defense so 

much that we have to give up some current overseas missions and 

responsibilities. It would be nice if some parts of the world had become less important, some missions that were previously very important obsolescent, some allies that had previously been too weak 

to carry much of the burden of maintaining international stability 

much stronger and more inclined to use their power in productive 

ways. But the world does not offer many such easy options. One 

place might be Russia; despite Moscow’s prickliness on many 

issues, it has become more security partner than adversary of the 

United States, and any threats it might pose to NATO are minimal. However, our force planning already downplays the possibility 

of scenarios involving Russia, as it should, so there are no big further savings to reap. Some might think that Korea would offer a 

more promising case where American security commitments could 

be reduced. And it is true that South Korea’s military is stronger 

than before, North Korea’s less strong. But the last time we tried 

to ignore the Korean threat, back in 1949 when Secretary of State 

Dean Acheson infamously declared it beyond America’s security perimeter of key overseas interests, what we got was an emboldened 

North Korea and a full-fledged war. Today, North Korea is ruled 

by the same fanatical regime as before, and while the conventional 

military balance on the peninsula now strongly favors the Republic 

of Korea and United States, North Korea now has nuclear weapons. 

For reasons I develop further in the pages that follow, we would 

be unwise to draw back from the world or take a big gamble on 
31 

simply deciding to forgo certain types of military responsibilities. 

To be sure, we may choose not to carry out the next ‘‘war of choice.’’ 

But we may not always have a choice about when and where to 

fight; in a world with proliferating nuclear arsenals, transnational 

terrorists, and other threats that can reach out and touch us even 

from far away, what happens in other regions can affect Americans 

much more directly than we might prefer. In his retirement ceremony speech of August 31, 2011, the greatest general of his generation, David Petraeus, warned us that as a nation we do not always 

get to choose the wars we fight, and it was good advice. Rather 

than retrench, our primary focus in cutting the defense budget 

should be to look for ways to be more innovative, cost-effective, and 

brutally efficient in how we prepare for most possible contingencies 

and maintain existing obligations. It is not the time for America to 

come home from the world. 

Military budget cuts should not be, and cannot be, our main means to reducing the deficit. Cutting $350 billion over 10 years, 

or perhaps up to $500 billion, would entail some risk to America’s 

global interests. As such, it can only be justified on national security grounds if the nation’s economy is strengthened substantially 

in the process. Nations with hollow economies cannot be secure indefinitely, so it is legitimate to view the debt as a national security 

threat, and economic renewal as a national security imperative. 

However, this idea only works if projected deficits are reduced 

enough to make a notable difference in America’s economic prognosis. And that is only possible if broad-based deficit reduction occurs. As big as the defense budget is, moreover, it is only one of 

five big components of the federal budget of roughly comparable 

size—the others being Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and the 

sum total of other domestic programs ranging from science research to infrastructure development to federal support for education. In short, big defense cuts are only sound policy if they are 

accompanied by entitlement revisions and tax reforms that reduces 

spending and increases revenue. 

There is no exact point at which defense cuts become excessive 

and unwise. But make no mistake about it: we will have to cut into 

muscle, and not just fat or waste, to achieve even the $350 billion 

to $500 billion ten-year cuts that are now being taken as a given. 

Such reductions would constitute almost 10 percent of planned 

spending, above and beyond reductions that will occur as the wars 

end. This book attempts to develop a plan for accomplishing such 

reductions without jeopardizing the country’s security interests. 

But I hope to show that even cuts of this size would be risky, and 

that deeper cuts would be too much. I reach this conclusion not as 

some superhawk or member of the ‘‘military-industrial complex’’ 

that Eisenhower warned us about, but as a Democrat, former Peace 

Corps volunteer, scientist by training, budget specialist by background, and independent scholar. And I agree with deficit hawks 

that we must look hard, in uncomfortable ways, for means of scaling back. But it is equally important not to be reckless in the effort. This book’s argument is equally passionate about two points— 

that the military budget must play a major role in deficit reduction, 

but also that the process must not go too far and must be grounded 

in a sound national security strategy for the United States. 
32 

There will be pain enough in carrying out the defense cuts already now mandated. My estimates are that the following kinds of 

changes would be needed: 

1. A return of the size of the ground forces to Clinton-era levels; 

2. Further reductions in some parts of the Navy and Air Force 

force structure, winding up for example with a Navy of about 

250 ships (but making greater use of crew rotations by airplane to keep ships on forward deployment longer and more 

efficiently); 

3. No large-scale replacement for the Army’s Future Combat 

System and a reduction in the size of the planned F–35 program by at least 40 percent; 

4. Serious consideration of eliminating one leg of the nuclear 

triad and taking one nuclear weapons lab out of that business; 

and 

5. Fundamental redesign of the military retirement system 

broadly in line with the recent suggestions of the Defense 

Business Board and perhaps an increase in Tricare premiums 

for middle-age retirees as well as serious consideration of the 

end of military commissaries and exchanges. 

Such changes will hurt. And they will pose certain strategic 

risks. They are in my judgment acceptable nonetheless given the 

nation’s economic plight, if done as part of broader federal deficit 

reduction and tax reform. But deeper cuts would not be. 
(33) 

STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS DONNELLY, DIRECTOR, 

CENTER FOR DEFENSE STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Smith, for the opportunity to 

testify today. I know we ‘‘outside experts’’ are an imperfect substitute for the former secretaries of defense who you had planned 

to hear from today, but given the gravity of the moment—I believe 

that the future health of the U.S. armed forces and the security of 

the United States may well be in the hands of the members of the 

‘‘Super Committee’’ and, generally, in the consideration of our government’s finances. 

That is not to say that I concur with Admiral Mike Mullen’s view 

that our deficits and debts are the greatest security challenge we 

face. Quite the opposite: I am worried that our future prosperity 

depends first and foremost on our future security. I cannot imagine 

that today’s global economy, itself a manifestation of American 

power and international leadership, will be nearly so fruitful absent the guarantees we provide. The fiscal problems of the federal 

government are neither the result of military spending, nor can 

they be cured by cutting military spending. And, of course, as a 

percentage of American wealth and federal spending, Pentagon 

budgets have been constantly cut since the 1980s. And during this 

administration, the Department of Defense has been the bill-payer 

of first and almost only choice, coughing up hundreds of billions of 

dollars while other agencies have been fed a diet rich in ‘‘stimulus.’’ 

But rather than focus on the finances or even the programmatic 

consequences of the cuts in prospect—which are severe and, should 

Super-Committee ‘‘sequestration’’ or the equivalent come to pass, 

debilitating to our armed forces—I would like to talk a bit about 

the likely strategic consequences. It has become fashionable to talk 

about American ‘‘decline’’ in the abstract, or to describe ‘‘strategic 

risk’’ in an anodyne fashion. And so I will take a quick tour of the 

strategic horizon, looking at particular global and regional balances 

of power that can only become more volatile with the diminished 

presence of American forces or the diminished capabilities that 

they may bring to bear. 

I derive the framework of this tour from the work of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, the bipartisan—nay, 

‘‘nonpartisan’’—effort that was essentially the creation of this committee. The panel quickly discovered that the formal process of defense strategy-making in the QDR had become bankrupt, and thus 

was thrown back upon its own long experience and knowledge 

about the persistent patterns and habits of U.S. security strategy; 

that is, not what we have said we would do, but what we actually 

have done in the course of the post-World War II decades, during 

the time where America has come to its position of global leadership. This I offer also as the most reliable benchmark about what 
34 

would be different about the world to come, the world without 

American leadership. 

The panel deduced four consistent U.S. national security interests: 

1. The defense of the American homeland; 

2. Assured access to the ‘‘commons’’ on the seas, in the air, in 

space and in ‘‘cyberspace’’; 

3. The preservation of a favorable balance of power across Eurasia that prevents authoritarian domination of that region; 

and 

4. Providing for the global ‘‘common good’’ through such actions 

as humanitarian aid, development assistance, and disaster relief. 

Carrying out the missions associated with securing these four 

fundamental interests have been the raison d’eˆtre of U.S. military 

forces under presidents of both parties in times of conflict, of ColdWar competition, and in moments [of] relative stability and peace. 

Taken together, they define America’s role in the world. I will consider how each might be affected by a loss of American military 

power. 

Defense of the American Homeland 

The tenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks, if nothing 

else, provided a reminder of the primacy of the mission of defending the American homeland. That there has been no repeat of those 

terrifying attacks is both a surprise—certainly I anticipated that 

there might be more to come—and a testament to the efforts made. 

The al Qaeda organization which conducted those attacks has been 

badly punished and our defenses vastly improved, indeed to the 

point where complacency, not ‘‘overreaction,’’ is as big a concern. 

The role of the Department of Defense has often been a supporting 

and secondary element in the immediate defense of the United 

States proper, but it nonetheless has brought immense capabilities 

to bear in that support; the military’s intelligence-gathering contributions amount to tens of billions of dollars annually. 

Second, the distinction between homeland defense and foreign 

operations is very slim in the case of international terrorist groups. 

Homeland defense must not begin at the borders, and, if it is to 

continue to be effective, must be tactically and operationally offensive, preventing and disrupting attacks, not merely responding to 

them. September 11 shattered our belief in ‘‘strategic depth,’’ that 

physical distance was sufficient to protect us against otherwise 

weak enemies. 

Lastly, we should not forget the full meaning of America’s ‘‘homeland.’’ The term traditionally is meant to incorporate all North 

America and the Caribbean Basin; it is something we share with 

our neighbors. Over the past decade, our neighborhood has become 

more dangerous, particularly to the south, where criminal gangs 

and criminal regimes are increasingly enveloped in a kind of syndicate—one that can include terrorist groups—that preys upon 

fragile democracies and which makes for violent acts even within 

the United States. 
35 

One measure of the consequences of defense cuts is likely to be 

that the Defense Department’s ‘‘homeland commands’’—Northern 

and Southern commands—are prime targets for reductions, consolidation, even elimination under various ‘‘reform’’ proposals that 

treat these headquarters, which are truly combatant commands, as 

‘‘overhead.’’ But NORTHCOM is still in its infancy while 

SOUTHCOM has constantly been a neglected child and a source of 

‘‘savings’’ in the post-Cold-War years. Yet these two commands reflect our oldest and most critical security interests. 

Access to the ‘‘Commons’’ 

Describing the maritime, air, space and cyberspace ‘‘realms’’ as 

‘‘international commons’’ is an imprecise term—there are, for example, sovereign waters and air space—but nonetheless these domains are critical components of international security and also 

commerce. And assured access, and in terms of war, dominance 

and supremacy, to these realms is a critical element of U.S. national security strategy. 

To observe that Americans are seafaring people or to describe the 

United States as a ‘‘maritime power’’ is hardly a controversial 

point. Even the most isolationist elements of the domestic political 

spectrum will support the power-projection posture of the U.S. 

Navy, despite its British imperial overtones. And the importance of 

secure sea lines of communication—particularly the shipping route 

that stretches from the Persian Gulf through the Red Sea, Indian 

Ocean to the Malacca Straits and South China Sea to Northeast 

Asia, which carries an immense and growing volume of the world’s 

trade—remains critical to international security. But a smaller 

Navy, even one with more-capable ships but fewer overseas bases, 

is less frequently present in places such as the South China Sea, 

where who ‘‘rules the waves’’ is open to doubt and a matter of potential conflict. Likewise, new technologies are allowing China and 

others to develop a range of ‘‘anti-access’’ and ‘‘area-denial’’ capabilities that are shifting the naval balance. The U.S. Navy is as 

small as it has been since World War I; force reductions would both 

encourage adversaries and discourage allies or would-be strategic 

partners. 

But the cardinal virtue of U.S. military power—and, in the age 

of the aircraft carrier, even of naval power—has been the quality 

of American air power. Two decades ago, in the aftermath of the 

first Gulf War, U.S. air supremacy reached its zenith, fabled not 

only for its firepower but its unprecedented precision; war from the 

air was a uniquely American way of war. At the core of this mystique was the ability to mass and synchronize large swarms of tactical aircraft. This method of operations built a mountain of effects 

out of a molehill of airplanes, relying on access to bases in the theater of operations. The same technologies that threaten surface 

ships now hold these air bases at risk—but also, the swarms of 

‘‘fourth generation’’ F–15s, F–16s and F/A–18s are aging and their 

numbers are shrinking. The cuts in view could result in a fighter 

force half the size of the ‘‘Desert Storm’’-era armada. And the generation-long failure to modernize is felt most directly in the tactical 

air forces: the F–22 program was stopped at 187 Raptors when 750 
36 

were once planned, and the F–35 would certainly be the prime target of future cuts. 

Access to space—which has long been ‘‘militarized’’ much to the 

advantage of the United States—is no longer a sure thing. And 

even where access might be retained, military dominance and supremacy are uncertain. This is a critical vulnerability for U.S. 

forces, whose weapons, operations, communications and more depend [on] it. As observed above, intelligence satellites are essential 

in even the smallest, most irregular operations against the tiniest 

terrorist groups, but the loss of larger networks in a conflict 

against a more sophisticated foe—and China is at the forefront in 

developing and recently testing anti-satellite systems—would be 

catastrophic. 

Strategic and operational thinking about ‘‘cyberspace’’ is still 

being developed, but the best analogies and precedents are to be 

found in regarding this realm as similar to the maritime domain. 

The Internet is indeed much more a venue for commerce and civilian communication than a military asset, though it is that; sharing 

information has been a key to the process of ‘‘transformation.’’ It 

has already been a domain for private ‘‘pirates’’ and used, notably 

by Russia, as a battlefield. No one is quite sure what it means to 

‘‘secure’’ cyberspace, but suffice it to observe that the failure to do 

so in a significant way would be a critical test of international politics and an easily imaginable provocation to war. 

In sum, even as the ‘‘common’’ realms where commerce, communication and security intersect are expanding and the burdens of 

‘‘securing the commons’’ or ‘‘assuring free access’’ to them appear 

to be growing, the U.S. military is already at full stretch. A fading 

of American power would inevitably result in a contest to control 

these commons. 

Continental Balances 

The corollary of the commonplace observation that America is a 

‘‘maritime power’’ is that U.S. strategic posture has been—and 

should return to—that of an ‘‘offshore balancer,’’ intervening only 

in conflicts across the Eurasian landmass to prevent a ‘‘hostile 

hegemon’’ from dominating Europe or the Middle East or East 

Asia. But, as quickly became clear to the members of the QDR 

Independent Panel, close attention to these continental balances 

has been the core of American strategy-making for decades. 

The most obvious example and most obvious success is to be 

found in Europe—a continent that has been intertwined with the 

American security since the discovery of the ‘‘New World.’’ The pursuit of a ‘‘Europe whole and free’’ was the central goal of the Cold 

War, but even that was a recognition that World War II left the 

situation across the continent dangerous and unstable. Conversely, 

the end of the Cold War appears to have put a punctuation mark 

on centuries of conflict; it is hard to imagine a large-scale war in 

Europe, and that is a direct result not only of American ‘‘offshore 

balancing’’ but American presence and alliance-building since 1945. 

U.S. military presence in Europe is a shadow of its former self, 

though it remains critical as a ‘‘lily pad’’ for deployments elsewhere—Libya is the most recent example but all the recent operations in the Middle East were enabled by Europe-based forces. 
37 

And the unprecedented peace of Europe is itself a great blessing 

that comes at low cost. 

Likewise, the American commitment to the ‘‘Middle East’’—a 

very loose term—has grown even as we have been able to draw 

down in Europe. In 1979, U.S. Central Command did not even 

exist; the Carter Administration cobbled together a ‘‘Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force’’ in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of 

Afghanistan that could neither deploy very rapidly nor bring much 

force to bear. Every president since then has found reason to take 

a larger hand in a very volatile but important region, from the 

1987 reflagging of oil tankers to Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. In 

particular, we have come to see the region as many theaters in one. 

The focus of most efforts of the last generation has been on the 

Arab world, but it is increasingly clear that South Asia is a problem unto itself; we walk away from Pakistan only at extreme peril. 

Finally, our engagement in East Asia, north and south, on Pacific 

islands and ashore, is as long-lasting and, over time, as large as 

that in Europe. But no event is of greater geopolitical import than 

the rise of China; how we respond to that—and the course of China 

itself—is the salient issue of the moment and for the future. We 

have treaty allies in Japan, South Korea and elsewhere, whose 

safety, prosperity and—perhaps surprisingly but assuredly—democracy depend upon our regional posture and our military power. 

What is not surprising is that China is lately making the most mischief in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia, where we were 

once constantly present and supremely powerful. Ironically, the one 

nation to resist U.S. force, Vietnam, is leading the call for [America] to return to the scene. 

The Global Good 

One of the supreme reasons why the American exercise of military power attracts even former adversaries is that, at least in contrast to others, we can and do use our forces not only to deter, punish and defeat but to relieve, aid and develop. Be it a response to 

a humanitarian crisis—a tsunami, a nuclear meltdown or a combination of the two—or an uncertain and open-ended attempt to replace what John Quincy Adams called ‘‘derelict’’ states with legitimate government, contributing to a common good beyond the strict 

national interest has been and ought to remain an important mission for the U.S. military. 

To protest that, especially in tough times, we must conserve our 

strength only for those occasions that demand ‘‘warfighting’’ capabilities or the kind of sophisticated operations and high technologies only possessed by our armed forces is, if experience counts 

for anything, to expect too much—or too little. Given the character 

of our political principles and the extent of our power, the kind of 

hard-nosed ‘‘realism’’ of the international relations professoriat is a 

theory that American strategic practice is unlikely to fulfill. It is 

not realistic to expect the United States to be like Bismarck’s Prussia. 

Moreover, the failure to act in pursuit of a global and common 

good would make the practice of harder power more difficult. The 

rest of the world sees how we behave—indeed, they spend most of 

their own strategy-making energy in first trying to figure out what 
38 

we will do—and behaves accordingly. If the United States falters 

in its attempts at making the world a better place, if we think we 

can ‘‘lead from behind,’’ we will find it harder to make it a very 

safe place. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the committee’s 

questions. 
(39) 

STATEMENT OF MR. MAX BOOT, JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK 

SENIOR FELLOW IN NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, 

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, members of the Committee: 

Thank you for inviting me here to talk about the future of the 

American armed services. That future is very much in doubt at the 

moment. The armed forces face the most formidable enemies they 

have encountered in decades. These enemies do not carry guns and 

they do not plant IEDs. Rather they wear green eyeshades and 

wield complex spreadsheets. But make no mistake: the impact of 

budget cuts has the potential to devastate our armed forces. It will, 

in fact, do more damage to their fighting capacity than the Taliban, 

Al Qaeda, or any other external foe could possibly inflict. 

Already this year the budget has been cut by approximately $478 

billion—$78 billion in cuts announced in January by the administration, and another $400 billion under the Budget Control Act this 

summer. Now we face the prospect of sequestration this fall— 

which could mean another $600 billion in cuts, or more, over the 

next decade. Hundreds of billions more will be lost assuming the 

disappearance of funding for Overseas Contingency Operations as 

we wind down operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Todd Harrison 

of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments estimates 

that in all the defense budget could decline by 31 percent over the 

next decade. That compares with cuts of 53 percent after the Korean War, 26 percent after the Vietnam War, and 34 percent after 

the end of the Cold War. 

Some might argue that there is nothing wrong with this—that 

we always downsize our military after the conclusion of hostilities. 

Leave aside the fact that hostilities have not yet ended—our troops 

are still in combat every day in Afghanistan and they still face the 

constant prospect of attack in Iraq. Moreover they continue to conduct military operations against Somalian pirates and Al Qaeda 

terrorists which put them in harm’s way on a regular basis. It is 

beyond bizarre that we are rushing to spend the peace dividend at 

a time when we are not actually at peace. But, again, leave that 

aside for a moment, and simply consider the consequences of past 

drawdowns (as I laid out in the Washington Post last year). 

After the American Revolution, our armed forces shrank from 

35,000 men in 1778 (plus tens of thousands of militiamen) to just 

10,000 by 1800. The result was that we were ill-prepared to fight 

the Whiskey Rebellion, the quasi-war with France, the Barbary 

wars and the War of 1812—all of which might have been averted 

if the new republic had had an army and a navy that commanded 

the respect of prospective enemies, foreign and domestic. 

After the Civil War, our armed forces shrank from more than a 

million men in 1865 to just 50,000 in 1870. This made the failure 
40 

of Reconstruction inevitable—there were simply too few federal 

troops left to enforce the rule of law in the South and to overcome 

the ruthless terrorist campaign waged by the Ku Klux Klan and 

other white supremacist groups. Segregation would remain a blot 

on U.S. history for another century. 

After World War I, our armed forces shrank from 2.9 million men 

in 1918 to 250,000 in 1928. The result? World War II became more 

likely and its early battles more costly. Imagine how Hitler might 

have acted in 1939 had several hundred thousand American troops 

been stationed in France and Poland. Under such circumstances, it 

is doubtful he would ever have launched his blitzkrieg. Likewise, 

Japanese leaders might have thought twice about attacking Pearl 

Harbor if their homeland had been in imminent danger of being 

pulverized by thousands of American bombers and their fleet sunk 

by dozens of American aircraft carriers. 

After World War II, our armed forces shrank from 12 million 

men in 1945 to 1.4 million in 1950. (The Army went from 8.3 million soldiers to 593,000.) The result was that ill-trained, ill-armed 

draftees were almost pushed off the Korean Peninsula by the North 

Korean invasion. The very first American ground force to encounter 

the invaders—Task Force Smith—was routed and decimated because it did not have enough ammunition to stop North Korean 

tanks. Kim Il Sung was probably emboldened to aggression in the 

first place by the rapid dissolution of America’s wartime strength 

and indications from parsimonious policymakers that South Korea 

was outside our ‘‘defense perimeter.’’ 

After the Korean War, our armed forces as a whole underwent 

a smaller decline—from 3.6 million men in 1952 to 2.5 million in 

1959—but the Army lost almost half its active-duty strength in 

those years. President Dwight Eisenhower’s New Look relied on 

relatively inexpensive nuclear weapons to deter the Soviet Union 

and its allies, rather than a large, costly standing army. As a result 

the Army that was sent to Vietnam was not prepared to fight guerrillas—an enemy that could not be defeated with a hand-held Davy 

Crockett nuclear launcher. 

After the Vietnam War, our armed forces shrank from 3.5 million 

personnel in 1969 to 2 million in 1979. This was the era of the ‘‘hollow army,’’ notorious for its inadequate equipment, discipline, 

training and morale. Our enemies were emboldened to aggression, 

ranging from the anti-American revolutions in Nicaragua and Iran 

to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We are still paying a heavy 

price for the Iranian Revolution, with Iran on the verge of going 

nuclear. 

After the end of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War, our 

armed forces shrank from 2.1 million personnel in 1989 to 1.3 million in 1999; the Army went from 769,000 soldiers to 479,000. The 

result: an Army desperately overstretched by its subsequent deployments. Part of the reason too few troops were sent to stabilize 

Iraq in 2003 was that senior officials thought there simply weren’t 

enough to go round. 

We are still suffering the consequences of the post-Cold War 

drawdown. The Navy, down from 546 ships in 1990 to 284 today 

(the lowest level since 1930), is finding it hard to fight Somali pirates, police the Persian Gulf and deter Chinese expansionism in 
41 

the Western Pacific. The Army and Marine Corps are forced to 

maintain a punishing operational tempo that drives out too many 

bright young officers and NCOs. The Air Force, which has been reduced from 82 fighter squadrons in 1990 to 39 today, has to fly decades-old aircraft until they are falling apart. The average age of 

our tanker aircraft is 47 years, of strategic bombers 34 years, and 

some older fighter aircraft are literally falling out of the sky. 

The bipartisan Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel 

led by Stephen Hadley and William Perry found last year ‘‘a growing gap between our interests and our military capability to protect 

those interests in the face of a complex and challenging security 

environment.’’ The panel further noted: 

‘‘There is increased operational tempo for a force that is much 

smaller than it was during the years of the Cold War. In addition, 

the age of major military systems has increased within all the services, and that age has been magnified by wear and tear through 

intensified use. . . . The Department of Defense now faces the urgent need to recapitalize large parts of the force. Although this is 

a long-standing problem, we believe the Department needs to come 

to grips with this requirement. The general trend has been to replace more with fewer more-capable systems. We are concerned 

that, beyond a certain point, quality cannot substitute for quantity.’’ 

The Hadley-Perry commission recommended that ‘‘as the force 

modernizes, we will need to replace inventory on at least a one-forone basis, with an upward adjustment in the number of naval vessels and certain air and space assets.’’ It also recommended maintaining the size of our current ground forces because ‘‘the increased 

capability of our ground forces has not reduced the need for boots 

on the ground in combat zones.’’ 

Both of those recommendations are absolutely right. And both 

are increasingly difficult to carry out given the magnitude of defense cuts already agreed upon. They will become an utter impossibility if sequestration occurs. You have heard the services say 

that they can deal with the current level of cuts but that’s only because they’re being good soldiers. In reality even the current cutbacks are already cutting into muscle; sequestration, if it were to 

occur, would be akin to lopping off entire limbs. In either case 

American power will not survive in its present form. 

Those who argue in favor of cuts point out that defense spending 

has doubled in real terms since 9/11. That’s true but much of the 

spending has gone to current operations, personnel costs, ballooning health care costs, and other necessities—it has not been 

used to recapitalize our aging inventory of weapons systems or to 

substantially expand a ground force that was cut by a third since 

the Cold War. 

Instead, even as we continue to fight in Afghanistan and Iraq, 

the Defense Department has been eliminating or reducing one system [after] another. Defense Secretary Bob Gates closed headquarters, eliminated general-officer slots, and even shut down the 

whole U.S. Joint Forces Command. He cancelled or capped 30 procurement programs that, if taken to completion, would have cost 

more than $300 billion. The cancellations included the Army’s Future Combat System, the Marines’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, 
42 

the VH–71 presidential helicopter, the Navy’s CG(X) next-generation cruiser, the Air Force’s F–22 fighter and C–17 cargo plane, and 

the Airborne Laser. Other programs, such as the Navy’s new aircraft carrier, were delayed, while the planned buy of F–35 fighters, 

Littoral Combat Ships, and other systems was reduced. 

And it’s not just weapons systems, we’re losing—it’s personnel. 

Before leaving office, Gates announced that he was whittling down 

Army and Marine end-strength by 47,000 personnel, reversing the 

increase in the size of the ground force that he had pushed through 

to deal with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Further cuts in endstrength are undoubtedly coming as a result of greater budget cuts, 

thus throwing out of work—at a time of already high unemployment—tens of thousands of men and women who have signed up 

to serve their country. 

That may make sense if you assume we will have no need of 

large numbers of ground combat forces in the future, but as Gates 

himself said earlier this year: ‘‘When it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, 

our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right, 

from the Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, 

Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and more—we had no idea a year before any 

of these missions that we would be so engaged.’’ That’s absolutely 

correct, and because the world is such an uncertain, dangerous 

place we need the deterrence and flexibility provided by a large 

ground force. But maintaining soldiers in an all-volunteer force is 

expensive, and you can bet that they will be sacrificed to achieve 

arbitrary budget targets. 

This points to a larger issue: What strategy are we following 

here? Is there any strategy at all? None is apparent from the outside—or, from what my friends in the Pentagon tell me, from the 

inside either. It has been said this is a budget in search of a strategy, but we will be hard-put to achieve all, or even most, of our 

strategic objectives with a third-less money. The Hadley-Perry commission identified four enduring security interests for the United 

States: ‘‘The defense of the American homeland; assured access to 

the sea, air, space, and cyberspace; the preservation of a favorable 

balance of power across Eurasia that prevents authoritarian domination of that region; providing for the global common good 

through such actions as humanitarian aid, development assistance, 

and disaster relief.’’ None of those interests will change no matter 

what budget decisions are made in Washington; all that will 

change will be our ability to defend those interests. 

Certainly there has not been—nor is there likely to be—a decreased demand for the armed forces. They are constantly having 

new missions thrown their way, from defending our nation’s computer networks to deposing a dictator in Libya and providing relief 

to Japanese tsunami survivors. Those who call for austerity in our 

defense budget do not suggest which missions, which specific operations, they will willingly forego. And when they do the suggestions 

are usually insufficient to achieve serious savings. For instance I 

have heard it suggested that we could save a lot of money by pulling our forces (currently 80,000 strong) out of Europe. But in fact, 

as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld discovered, that is simply 

a prescription for incurring higher short-term costs because we 
43 

have to recreate in the United States the base infrastructure that 

already exists in Europe. And of course troops based in the U.S. 

will be farther away from where they are likely to deploy: the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia. By not having them forward-deployed, we will lose significant strategic flexibility, political influence, and deterrence capacity. 

Don’t get me wrong. It is impossible to deny that there is waste, 

fraud and abuse in the defense budget. The problem is that, as you 

know, there is no line item for waste, fraud, and abuse, and hence 

no way to pare only wasteful spending. Indeed it is hard to agree 

about what constitutes wasteful spending since every defense program has its passionate defenders, especially here on the Hill, and 

it is possible to make compelling arguments in favor of them all. 

We all know that the procurement process is bloated, but I have 

never [heard] anyone suggest in a compelling or realistic way how 

to reform the procurement process so that we can buy substantially 

more with less. Indeed as we pare back our programs we increase 

unit costs and only heighten complaints about runaway acquisitions programs. At the end of the day, less money results in less 

capability. 

And less capability is something we cannot afford at a time when 

we face so many actual or potential threats: threats from a rising 

China, a nuclear North Korea, an Iran on the verge of going nuclear, a Pakistan that is threatened as never before by jihadists, 

and by numerous terrorist groups, ranging from the Afghan and 

Pakistani Taliban to the Shabab in Somalia and Al Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula, all of whom continue to pose a significant 

threat despite Osama bin Laden’s demise. These groups threaten 

not only vital U.S. interests abroad but also increasingly the American homeland itself, as seen from AQAP’s attempt to mail parcel 

bombs to the U.S. and from the Pakistani Taliban’s sponsorship of 

an attempt to set off a car bomb in Times Square. Both of those 

attempts are recent—they occurred last year. As the more recent 

frenzy over a possible terrorist attack on the 10th anniversary of 

9/11 makes clear, such threats are not going away, despite all of 

the counter-terrorism success we have enjoyed. 

China presents a particularly worrisome long-threat: It is in the 

midst of a rapid defense buildup which has allowed it to field a 

stealth fighter, an aircraft carrier, diesel submarines, cyberweapons, ‘‘carrier-killer’’ and satellite-killer ballistic missiles and 

numerous other missiles. Even as things stand China is increasingly able to contest the US Navy’s freedom of movement in the 

Western Pacific. As long ago as 2008, Rand predicted that by 2020 

the U.S. would not be able to defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack, and that was before the surprise unveiling of China’s J–20 

Stealth fighter or its new aircraft carrier; the timeline for American dominance being threatened is only accelerating. The safety of 

U.S. bases in Okinawa, Guam, and elsewhere in the region can no 

longer be assured, creating the potential for a 21st century Pearl 

Harbor. That trend will be exacerbated—leading to a potentially 

dangerous shift in the balance of power—unless we build up our 

shrinking fleet. But given the budget cuts being discussed here we 

will have trouble maintaining the current size of our fleet much 

less expanding it. 
44 

We have already cancelled the F–22 and cut back the procurement of the F–35. Is the F–35 to be cancelled altogether or cut 

back to such an extent that we will have no answer to the fifthgeneration fighters emanating from Russia and China? If that were 

to come to pass, it would signal the death knell for American power 

in the Pacific. If our power wanes, our allies will have to do what 

they need to do to ensure their own security. It’s easy to imagine, 

under such a scenario, states such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan acquiring their own nuclear weapons, thus setting off a dangerous and destabilizing nuclear arms race with China. 

Even given the dire consequences, it might still make sense to 

cut the defense budget—if it were bankrupting us and undermining 

our economic well-being which, we would all agree, is the foundation of our national security. But that’s not the case. Defense 

spending, including supplemental appropriations, is less than 5 

percent of gross domestic product and less than 20 percent of the 

federal budget. Both figures are much lower than the historic 

norm. That means our armed forces are much less costly in relative 

terms than they were throughout much of the 20th century. Even 

at roughly $550 billion, our core defense budget is eminently affordable. It is, in fact, a bargain considering the historic consequences of letting our guard down. 

The United States armed forces have been the greatest force for 

good the world has seen during the past century. They defeated 

Nazism and Japanese imperialism, deterred and defeated Communism, and stopped numerous lesser evils—from Slobodan 

Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing to the oppression perpetrated by Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan. I cannot 

imagine a world in which America is not the leading military 

power. It would be a brutal, Hobbesian place in which aggressors 

rule and the rule of law is trampled on. And yet Congress will be 

helping to usher in such a New World Disorder if it continues to 

slash defense spending at the currently contemplated rate. 
(45) 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND 

THE U.S. MILITARY TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: 

PERSPECTIVES FROM FORMER 

SERVICE CHIEFS AND VICE CHIEFS 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

OCTOBER 4, 2011 

WITNESSES 

GENERAL JOHN P. JUMPER, USAF, RETIRED

17th Chief of Staff, United States Air Force 

GENERAL RICHARD A. CODY, USA, RETIRED

31st Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL H. STEVEN BLUM, USA, RETIRED

25th Chief, National Guard Bureau 

PREPARED STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY WITNESSES 

OCTOBER 4, 2011 

(49) 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN P. JUMPER, USAF, RETIRED, 17TH CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR 

FORCE 

What threats to our homeland can we anticipate as we 

look forward? 

As we attempt to anticipate future threats it’s important to remember our track record on successful predictions. Any objective 

assessment must begin with the fact that we are lousy predictors. 

Before the first Gulf war (Desert Shield, Desert Storm) we had no 

idea how the likes of Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, or 

Osama bin Laden, would perpetrate aggressions and atrocities that 

dominated US policy and shaped military actions for the next 20 

years. 

We are safe in assuming two things. 

1. The terrorist threat will continue to pose the greatest threat 

inside our borders and to US forces and interests overseas. 

This danger becomes more serious as we consider that nuclear 

weapons get ever closer to the hands of irresponsible, rogue 

leaders throughout the world. 

2. We must be prepared for more than counterinsurgencies. As 

nations gain the power to resist US policy in ways that could 

include aggressive action, our ability to deter and then react 

rapidly with substantive capabilities is as important as ever. 

The argument is not whether aggressive foreign nations harbor 

ambitions of invading the US. I believe it’s more a matter of reacting to, or being dragged into, conflicts perpetrated by frictions or 

atrocities that compel us to react. In Bosnia and Kosovo we led a 

NATO force that reacted to ongoing genocide. What should we be 

prepared for if frictions arise that involve allies in Asia or South 

America? 

We have been able to react to the spectrum of conventional warfare (Iraq, Serbia) as well as counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan because the US military forces were equipped with needed capabilities, were able to modify or adapt existing technology, or 

were able to rapidly field necessary capabilities quickly. All the 

while we have maintained a nuclear deterrent and kept a watchful 

eye on nuclear proliferation and must continue to do so with focused attention on nuclear safety, reliability and security. 

What are appropriate roles and missions for the US Military? 

The roles and missions carved out for the military are time tested and well understood. I believe that a certain amount of overlap 

and redundancy is necessary for absolutely critical functions. In the 

field, you find the military services falling all over themselves to 

do what it takes to get the mission accomplished. Joint-minded operations are being carried out every day. Behind the scenes of any 
50 

major military operation you will find that very little is done by 

one service alone. 

We could do much more to allow the services to better define the 

limits of necessary overlap and to further interdependence on one 

another’s capabilities. There is absolutely no doubt that this could 

best be done by development of Joint Concepts of Operation that 

requires services to think through how we plan to deploy and fight 

in various situations, and to define and limit the areas of necessary 

overlap. This process would force new ways of deriving requirements and reshape the acquisition process by demanding that we 

describe how we are going to fight before we decide what we will 

buy to fight with. 

The lessons we are learning in this new age of warfare must be 

applied with due respect for lessons of the past. The key word is 

balance. As we build capabilities in counterinsurgency we must be 

respectful of the very traditional and conventional capabilities that 

are emerging from potential adversaries who have watched and 

learned from US military successes over the past 20 years. The 

common understanding of asymmetrical advantage is the use of 

low technology to defeat high technology. We easily forget that the 

asymmetrical advantage of the United States is our technology 

multiplied many-fold by the ingenuity of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines to rapidly shape our technological advantage in 

the course of battle. 

The military also has a role as responsible stewards of nuclear 

weapons. As we reduce our nuclear posture it must be with the full 

support of Congress to maintain funding for the safety, reliability 

and security of the weapons that remain; to include relentless attention to counter proliferation. 

As we enter the cyber age it will be necessary to do much more 

than to defend networks and data sources. We will need to develop 

the necessary weapons to fight back in a cyber-engagement. As the 

services and agencies develop the doctrine of cyber intelligence 

preparation; forensic and predictive analysis; and, doctrine of defense and offense, Congressional support for the weapons and tools 

of this new type of warfare will be critical. 

What are the consequences of further cuts to the military 

over the next decade and what choices do we have to make? 

It will be extremely difficult for the services to implement even 

the currently projected cuts. If the Joint Select Committee fails to 

reach consensus the resulting additional cuts to the defense budget 

would lead to dramatic loss of capability and the adverse impact 

on morale of a force that has served the nation so well for the decade of the war on terror. 

It is unfortunate that when the services are faced with large 

budget cuts the easiest targets are, in many ways, the most damaging. We tend to hit training, readiness and research & development first as we attempt to save force structure. If all of the projected cuts are implemented, all of these budget categories will be 

impacted. Thus, our ability to repair and reset the force; to recapitalize the force; to recover lost training; to have the spare parts to 

keep current systems operating; and, to retain our technology advantage through Research and Development would be simultaneously and severely impacted. 
51 

Indeed there is much that can be done to realize greater efficiency with current resources. If significant force reductions eventuate, they must be done with proper balance between Active Duty, 

National Guard and Reserve forces. All must share in eventual 

drawdowns and all must share responsibility for all assigned missions and the operational tempo demanded by these missions. This 

cannot be done without the support of the Congress as our military 

leadership makes difficult recommendations. 

I also believe that enormous savings are available in the logistics 

functions if the full power of best business practices and competition can be brought to bear. Again, the Congress must stand behind our military leaders as they struggle to find solutions. 

In any case our Nation’s Military Leadership will be asked to 

recommend reductions more severe than any I have seen in my career. They cannot do so alone. 

What are the impacts of reducing force structure and end 

strength? 

Reductions in end strength and force structure must be tied to 

a realistic strategy and deliberate policy decisions that can still be 

supported in the face of cuts. Our current policies of support to alliances, forward presence and stationing, rapid global response, credible deterrence and the ability to sustain operations will all be 

called into question. 

In many cases a proper balance for the United States may call 

for the redefinition of our alliances and reconsideration of our fair 

share of defense relationships. These decisions may permit prudent 

reductions in permanent commitments overseas. However, as an 

American and a former member of the world’s greatest military I 

believe it is our obligation to maintain a force able to react with 

authority to instabilities and atrocities in the world when so directed, and to be able to do so rapidly and effectively. 

What are the implications of changes in global force posture/increasing US isolationism? 

In a world that is on a slippery slope of instability, ungoverned 

pockets of terrorist growth, rogue leaders in control of nuclear 

weapons and growing disparity between the world’s richest and 

poorest, it is unreasonable that the world’s only great benign superpower should drift into isolationism. 

As stated earlier, the time is appropriate to reassess our alliances and our commitments to them, however, it does not seem 

reasonable to back away from nations who struggle to implement 

political structures that support self-determination and the liberties promoted by our own policies. 

There is no doubt that US military basing and presence has been 

a force for stability in the world. Even if redefined and deliberately 

reduced our forward partnerships are important pillars of our 

credibility and visible signs of our commitment and should not be 

abandoned. 
(52) 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL RICHARD A. CODY, USA, RETIRED, 31ST VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES 

ARMY 

On 8 April 2008 I testified before this Committee as the Vice 

Chief of Staff of the Army. Then, I was honored to represent the 

Nation’s one million plus Soldiers, nearly 600,000 of whom were 

serving on Active Duty and over 250,000 of whom were deployed 

worldwide, most on 15 month combat tours, as I testified on issues 

critical to the current and long term readiness of the U.S. Army. 

Today, I am again honored to testify before you as a private citizen, 

a retired Soldier, but one who continues to do what I can to support our outstanding Soldiers, Marines, Sailors and Airmen. 

Many things have changed since April 2008. The surge in Iraq 

has ended and the Army is on course to withdraw the remaining 

45,000 Soldiers by the end of the year; we have surged more forces 

into Afghanistan. The end strength growth of 65,000 additional Soldiers that we started in 2004 is complete, though now there is 

movement to reduce the Army’s active duty strength by significant 

numbers. The Army has completed the restructuring of the force 

and just finished the largest BRAC, MILCON and global repositioning of our Army since World War II; all while fighting in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. Today our U.S. economy is in crisis mode, and 

probably most importantly, we have now been at war for over 10 

years. 

That said, many things have not changed. In 2008 I reported to 

you that the world we live in is exceedingly dangerous. Recent 

events in Southwest Asia, the Pacific, and the Arab Spring only 

highlight this fact, in spite of courageous efforts of our service men 

and women. I also reported that our Army was out of balance, that 

repeated tours of 12 months in combat with only 13 months back 

before deploying again was putting tremendous stress on the All 

Volunteer Army and their Families. Today that stress is still there 

as the Army continues to deploy Soldiers on 12 month combat tours 

with less than 24 months between tours. I testified then that we 

were consuming our strategic readiness, people and equipment, 

with repeated tours in the harshest environments we have ever 

fought in. And most importantly, that our ability to man, equip and 

train for full spectrum operations somewhere else in the world, 

while fighting the current battles in Iraq and Afghanistan, was not 

possible. 

In 2008 I reported that the cumulative impact of 6 years of Continuing Resolutions was causing significant problems within the 

Services’ ability to run their programs, prepare our Soldiers for 

their next rotation and to reset the equipment; equipment that has 

been in combat for over 6 years. Today we enter another Fiscal 

Year with a CR while at war. It is one thing to have to deal with 

the uncertainty of our enemies and what new threat to prepare for. 
53 

But it is entirely another to have to deal with uncertainty of year 

to year budgets and what resources will be available to sustain today’s fight and reset an Army that has been at war for over 10 

years for the next fight. 

As Congress, the Pentagon and the Executive Branch wrestle 

with the budget reduction required by the Budget Control Act, the 

real questions with regard to the Services’ budget is simple: What 

missions do you want our military to continue to perform? What 

threats do you want our military to counter? What level of readiness do you want the military to sustain? History has taught us 

that we have not been very good at predicting where, when and 

against whom, the U.S. military will have to fight to protect the 

national interest and the security of this nation and its 315 million 

citizens. Simply put, when we size, scope and resource our military 

for the peaceful and U.S. friendly world we hope for, and not the 

dangerous, hostile and unpredictable world we live in, it is the 

American service men and women, and our nation, that we put at 

risk. 

During my six years in the Pentagon as the Army’s G–3 and as 

Vice Chief, the Congress has always responded to the critical needs 

of our force, especially during the early years of operation Enduring 

Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. It is well documented that we entered 

this Global War on terrorism woefully short of equipment, resulting 

from the defense budget cuts in the late 90’s after the first Gulf 

War, especially for our Guard and Reserve forces, and Congress responded. That spirit of support by this Congress is still needed 

today. 

Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions. 
(54) 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL H. STEVEN 

BLUM, USA, RETIRED, 25TH CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD 

BUREAU 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today before the House 

Armed Services Committee on the Future of National Defense and 

the U.S. Military Ten Years After 9/11. Throughout my 42 years 

of service in uniform to this nation, I have found that the House 

Armed Services Committee has always been able to provide outstanding non-partisan support. It has taken the often difficult, but 

always necessary, actions to ensure that our men and women in 

uniform have the resources and policies that make it possible for 

them to accomplish their myriad missions. 

Today, we face a security environment that may be the most 

complex and dangerous in our nation’s history. The international 

security landscape shifts literally every day. As a result, our nation 

requires more than ever of its armed forces. At the same time, fiscal realities force constraints on current and future defense budgets. To state the obvious and this challenge faces not just the military but every sector of our society—we must find ways to do more 

with less. To do this job right, we should establish the National Security Strategy independently of budget constraints. Strategy must 

come first. Only then can we make meaningful decisions, based on 

informed dialogue, to determine how best to accomplish our strategy within existing fiscal constraints. 

Let us recognize that today we have the most experienced, professional and capable military force ever to serve our nation. We 

must maintain this peerless military readiness and capacity to protect our nation against often uncertain and sometimes unpredicted 

threats. We also must avoid repeating past mistakes when numbers and parochial interests, rather than geopolitical realities, 

drove decisions and produced unexpected and undesirable second 

and third order effects. 

As this committee considers and deliberates the tough choices 

our nation faces, I ask you to consider the strategic approach being 

embraced today by many of the most successful for-profit corporations around the world. They are responding to difficult market 

conditions by sizing their fulltime professional work force to handle 

the lowest expected level of business activity. At the same time, 

they are building a part-time workforce designed to handle the 

largest expected surge requirements. With this strategy, these excellence-focused companies can focus deployment of capital on costeffective modernization, profit-enhancing expansion, and research 

and development. They avoid committing themselves to pay, benefits and entitlements commitments that inexorably diminish performance now and in the future. 

Does not this enlightened strategy argue for increased reliance 

on the National Guard and Reserves? History would suggest that 
55 

this task will fall to this body. When it inevitably does, remember 

this. 

The performance of the National Guard and Reserves in the decade following 9/11 has been nothing short of stellar. They have consistently met and exceeded all mission requirements both overseas 

and at home. Their truly exceptional service and sacrifice argues 

forcefully for consideration of an expansion of their role and significance in our National Security Strategy. I respectfully commend to 

the members of this committee a white paper entitled ‘‘The National Guard: A Great Value Today and In the Future’’ by General 

Craig R. McKinley, current Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 

published March 31, 2011. It is a work worthy of your time when 

considering cost versus force structure options. It is a fact that 

when you call out the Guard and Reserves, you indeed call out 

America. The value of such a powerful national capability? Priceless! 

Thank you for what you do for our nation, and for the opportunity to appear before this committee and hopefully contribute to 

resolving the very serious issues at hand. 

(57) 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND 

THE U.S. MILITARY TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: 

PERSPECTIVES OF FORMER CHAIRMEN OF 

THE COMMITTEES ON ARMED SERVICES 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

OCTOBER 12, 2011 

WITNESSES 

THE HONORABLE JOHN W. WARNER

Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services (1999–2001, 

2003–2007) 

THE HONORABLE DUNCAN L. HUNTER

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services (2002–2006) 

THE HONORABLE IKE SKELTON

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services (2007–2010) 

PREPARED STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY WITNESSES 

OCTOBER 12, 2011 

(61) 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN W. WARNER, 

CHAIRMAN, SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES (1999–2001, 2003–2007) 

I am deeply privileged to accept the Committee’s invitation to 

testify in this very important series of hearings regarding the future of our nation’s defense posture. 

I am joined today by two highly valued colleagues Duncan Hunter and Ike Skelton. It’s interesting to note that each of us had a 

very long period of service on our respective Armed Services Committees and each served, at various times, as a Chairman and as 

a Ranking Member. Likewise, we alternated over many years being 

the Chair of the House-Senate Conference Committees and never 

failed in getting an authorization bill—on behalf of the men and 

women of the armed forces—to be signed into law by a sequence 

of Presidents. 

Working with our Committee colleagues during our tenure, we 

strengthened the foundation of laws that today supports our nation’s defense posture and provides for the needs of our brave uniformed personnel and their families. 

Today, the citizens of our nation rank members of the armed 

forces at the very top of public esteem. 

That leads me to the first of several points I will offer today. 

The concept of an all-volunteer force had its origins during the 

period—1969 to 1974—when I was privileged to serve as Undersecretary, then Secretary of the U.S. Navy. A very serious, costly war 

was in progress to preserve freedom for the people of South Vietnam. There was substantial controversy among elements of our 

population; and, month by month, the controversy became more intense. I well remember appearing to testify, time and time again, 

before the Committees of Congress. 

This history you know well but out of this cauldron emerged the 

law, regarded by many, upon passage, a big ‘‘gamble’’ which Congress thrust onto the military. 

As you know well, the concept has worked exceptionally well; indeed well beyond any expectations. 

The challenge facing Congress today, is not just to preserve what 

we have, but make it even stronger. 

I say most respectfully, every action the Committee takes must 

keep that challenge in mind. 

My next concerns are the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and how rogue elements, and persons participating in violent extremism, can interact to threaten our way of life and that 

of other nations. 

As you make your programs and other budget decisions, place 

emphasis on how we can increase and support new ideas in the 

fields of intelligence and surveillance. In these areas spend wisely; 

and, accept a level of risk with new innovations. Our military will 
62 

always do their best, at whatever sacrifice; but every citizen must 

help in their own way. 

As you look to future programs I urge your support for innovations to come in the unmanned systems. About a decade, or more, 

ago I introduced legislation directing each of the services to place 

greater emphasis on such programs, with specific benchmarks and 

dates for each service to meet. There was strong opposition from 

all Department of Defense; but, with the strong support of the two 

House leaders sitting with me today the language survived in Conference and became law. Within but a few years thereafter each of 

the Services needed no inducement to move out way ahead of the 

benchmarks with the many systems operational today. Now it’s an 

international race and we must stay well ahead. 

As I closed out my 30 years in the Senate I worked again with 

the bipartisan team to write a new G.I. Bill. Again, the Authorizing 

Committees did it; and, wherever I go service persons step forward 

to thank us for including as beneficiaries families as alternates for 

the educational benefits earned by the uniformed member. 

May I share a personal story? I was privileged to speak just 

months ago at the Navy Post Graduate School at Monterey, California. As guests were filing past me to say good-bye a proud husband and wife stopped to say we are soon to be blessed with our 

first child, whereupon her hands dropped, and she said ‘‘you made 

it possible for this child to have my husband’s G.I. Bill.’’ Having advanced my career largely because of the old G.I. Bill, I shall always 

remember this young happy family. 

All of us who have had the good fortune to serve in Congress 

must remain ever mindful of the needs and hopes of others. 

I thank you for this opportunity. 
(63) 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DUNCAN L. HUNTER, 

CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

(2002–2006) 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, good morning. Thanks 

for allowing me to give my views on America’s security challenges 

and the adequacy of our present force structure, as well as that 

which is projected under the massive automatic cuts that would 

occur should the Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction deadlock or 

should the contingency plan requested of DOD by OMB, which requires 10% cuts, be carried out. 

Bluntly, these massive cuts disserve: 1) the present war against 

terrorists; 2) the difficult build-up of the Army and Marine Corps 

in which this committee has played such a significant role; and 

3) the constitutional obligation of this government to defend its citizens. 

In the last century, World War I, considered to be the ‘‘war to 

end all wars’’ was followed by a period of neglect for America’s defense apparatus. In 1941, jolted by the Axis Powers and particularly the attack on Pearl Harbor, we mobilized massively, aided by 

a robust industrial base and a secure homeland, and saved the 

world. Only a few years after World War II, America stacked arms 

to such a degree that a third-rate military power drove our defenders down the Korean Peninsula and almost into the ocean before 

we managed to hold the Pusan perimeter and push north, weathering a Chinese intervention and stalemating the communists into 

a divided Korea that continues to this day. 

After Vietnam, America’s defenses declined precipitously, resulting in the so-called ‘‘hollow army’’ of the late 1970’s, a period in 

which fewer than 50% of our tactical fighters were fully combat 

mission-capable and a time when more than 1,000 petty officers a 

month were leaving the Navy due to inadequate pay and support. 

In 1981 we commenced to rebuild defense, with President Ronald 

Reagan partnering with this committee to enhance our ground 

forces, build the Navy toward a goal of 600 ships, initiate a missile 

defense program, and increase airlift, sealift, and sustainability. 

With this new muscle we stood up to the Soviet Union, which, 

disassembled by American strength, released hundreds of millions 

of its people from its tyranny into the sunlight of freedom. 

The 1990s found the U.S. dominating the First Gulf War with an 

array of conventional weapons from the build-up of the 1980s. 

Then, in the mid-1990s defense was cut substantially. The Army 

was reduced from 18 to 10 divisions and only about fifty percent 

of our aging weapons systems were adequately replaced. Administration budget cutters went after defense. This committee lead the 

Congress in adding back over 40 billion dollars during this period. 

It wasn’t enough. 
64 

In 2001, spurred by the 9/11 terrorist attack, our nation went 

into a period of rebuilding aging systems, increasing end strength 

and moving ahead on missile defenses. While the build-up was not 

as robust as that of the Reagan years, we did fill many of the 

short-falls of the 1990s. 

Today the Iraq War is won, with Iraq’s elected government enduring and the military that we built from the ground-up holding. 

Iraq is now an ally thanks to the one million American volunteers 

who served in uniform in that war. The Afghanistan mission continues, complex, but winnable. 

China is emerging as a military super-power, stepping into the 

shoes of the former Soviet Union, developing high performance missiles, aircraft and ships, outproducing the U.S. in key areas such 

as attack submarines (5 to 1), and ballistic missiles. 

Iran, having failed to defeat America with its interference in the 

Iraq War, is continuing apace with its program aimed at producing 

a nuclear weapon. Its path over the past five years is littered with 

failed sanctions, imposed by the allies and blunted by China and 

Russia. Iran is following the model of its fellow nuclear weapons 

aspirant, North Korea which talked, wrangled and lied until it had 

produced a nuclear device. 

Russia, shorn of its captive nations, retains an immense strategic 

strike capability. 

This, Mr. Chairman, is the state of the world, the backdrop 

against which America is poised to massively cut defense. 

To assess the huge cuts that are projected, I use the committee’s 

calculation on the numbers: 1 trillion dollars cut from the Presidents FY 2012 FYDP, counting 465 billion dollars in cuts already 

enacted. 

The enormity of these cuts will almost certainly result in large 

reductions in the size of the Army and Marine Corps. 

A few years ago, we began correcting the downsizing of our land 

forces. Remember that we cut the Army almost in half during the 

1990s. 

During the height of the Iraq war our troops felt the pain of the 

downsizing as multiple deployments and 15 month tours stressed 

the force. We stressed the force. We policy makers swore ‘‘never 

again’’ and increased the Army to 569,400 and the USMC to 

202,000. 

Now we are poised to repeat the mistake of the 1990’s 

downsizing. 

People costs are ‘‘right now’’ expenditures the projected cuts cannot be carried out without slashing end strength. 

The cuts will also disserve the Navy in multiple ways. The 288 

ships will face an unprecedented threat in the near future. 

China has clearly moved to implement a new strategy to handle 

the U.S. Navy in a ‘‘Taiwan scenario.’’ They are building the capability to destroy American warships. Including carriers, at long 

ranges, before U.S. Naval projection can reach the straits. 

China’s ship killers are ballistic missiles, tipped with anti-ship 

precisely targetable warheads. 

Never before has the US Navy had such an immense survivability challenge. 
65 

The projected budget cuts will preclude the Navy from fielding 

missile defense systems of necessary robustness to defend against 

sustained anti-ship ballistic missile attacks. 

Also, the Navy’s ‘‘leverage weapon,’’ its fleet of attack submarines, will be reduced substantially. Meanwhile, China’s submarine program accelerates. 

Our heavy bomber force is already at its historical low point of 

135. A two war contingency involving heavy Armed Forces will require a ‘‘swinging’’ of bombers from one war to the other, with a 

risk that substantial casualties will be taken without the fist of immediate air power. 

Today, the U.S. has less than 70% of the airfields available 

worldwide that we had in the 1960’s. Yet our strategic and tactical 

airlift is comprised of only 651 aircraft. 

In this age of quick flare contingencies, tactical aircraft are high 

leverage. Today the Air Force has only 1990 fighters, half of what 

we had at the end of the Cold War. 

The questions this committee must ask the President and your 

colleagues are these: 

1. Is the world suddenly safer to the degree that we can let our 

guard down and cancel the insurance policy that a strong defense has given the U.S.? 

2. Is the war against terrorism over? 

3. Do we want to ‘‘unlearn’’ the lesser of the ‘‘too small’’ Army 

and Marine Corps, and reduce them again? 

4. Should we concede space competition to our potential adversaries? 

5. Does it still make sense to stop incoming missiles? 

6. Do we want our Navy to have fewer than 250 ships? 

7. Do we want to cede military dominance in this century to 

communist China? All these questions stage this greater question for every Member of Congress: 

8. Isn’t our primary duty to defend our nation? 

The defense cuts already made should be restored and any new 

reductions soundly rejected. 

These cuts, should they be attended, along with China’s military 

ascendance and growing industrial base, guarantee that China will 

become the world’s dominant military power in this century. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 
(66) 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE IKE SKELTON, CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES (2007– 

2010) 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, members of the 

Armed Services Committee, it is a signal honor to return to this 

chamber where I served three decades in support of our men and 

women in uniform to discuss a matter of great importance: whether 

the United States will continue to have the finest military force in 

history. I am deeply concerned with the prospect of cuts to our defense budget while our sons and daughters are still at war in Iraq 

and Afghanistan and still fighting Al Qaeda around the globe. Our 

pilots are often younger than the planes they fly, and our Navy is 

not growing even as China builds a fleet that may threaten our 

ability to preserve freedom of navigation in the Western Pacific. 

And yet significant cuts are being contemplated to our defense 

budget. 

In fact, the Budget Control Act could lead to defense cuts that 

would be downright devastating. I concur with the past statements 

of Admiral Mullen and Secretary Panetta that the cuts to the defense budget that could occur under sequestration would imperil 

our nation. Should sequestration cuts happen, in 10 years our 

country will be relegated to the sidelines of history. 

The Congress has the sole power to raise and maintain our military under Article 1, Section 8 of our Constitution. Thus, my message to the Congress is: don’t scuttle the American armed forces. 

Our military is the best ever. I implore the Congress to pursue cuts 

to the defense budget with the utmost care. I recommend to the 

committee the report ‘‘Hard Choices’’ released by the Center for a 

New American Security (or CNAS), where I serve on the Board of 

Advisors. CNAS’s report outlines some of the significant consequences of cuts on American combat capabilities. I echo the 

warning of this report that budget cuts beyond the $480 billion dollars already designated will endanger our national security. 

Cuts of this magnitude will jeopardize our ability to uphold our 

vital interests. Our future military must have the capacity to deter 

potential aggressors and quickly and decisively defeat any direct 

threats. This means maintaining a strong ground force that can defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan and then transfer security responsibility to our Afghan partners. Yet any responsible defense budget 

must also prioritize the Navy and the Air Force. This is especially 

important in South and East Asia where rising powers such as 

China and India increasingly serve as fulcrums of global economic 

and political power. They could serve to bolster, or challenge, the 

security of the global commons. 

For this reason the United States cannot degrade our naval and 

air capabilities. Cuts to the Navy and Air Force will limit our 

power projection capability, make our allies and partners question 
67 

our commitments to them, and give China a free hand in the Western Pacific. The Army and Marines are also critical for this theater. 

The ground forces must support our Asian allies, improving American ties with those countries and discouraging China from bullying them. 

The new strategic situation means that in the spirit of Goldwater-Nichols, which had its genesis in this Committee, we must 

embrace a joint vision for our future military. An interdependent 

military will more effectively protect our national interests through 

greater cooperation, thereby making more intelligent battlefield decisions. Already we have seen our past attempts at this policy bear 

fruit: the Navy and the Air Force have made major strides through 

their evolving ‘‘Air-Sea’’ Battle concept. Any future strategic concept must envision how a combined arms approach on Air, Sea, and 

Land will deter threats, and defeat them if deterrence fails. 

Significant defense cuts could also endanger the vitality of our 

services by compromising our ability to keep and train excellent officers, especially if personnel cuts degrade our officer training institutions. The strength of the U.S. military flows from the dedication 

and skill of our All-Volunteer Force. Indeed, the new defense budget must maintain our nation’s security by keeping the ‘‘Profession 

of Arms’’ professional. The American military’s most important 

edge over our adversaries comes from the unparalleled professionalism and training of our men and women. 

However, this edge is fragile: when just over fifty percent of service academy graduates remain in service after ten years, our military loses its best and brightest. We must combat this by 

incentivizing retention of officers in the military. The Quadrennial 

Defense Review Independent Panel last year recommended new bonuses for high-caliber soldiers, regardless of rank, and reforming 

the up-or-out system. By completing these imperative reforms, we 

will significantly improve the quality of our officer corps. 

We must complement these reforms by continuing our commitment to our professional military education; in the words of Admiral James Stavridis, we will prevail by ‘‘out-thinking the enemy.’’ 

Our military’s service academies and ROTC programs are the best 

in the world, yet learning must continue as soldiers remain in the 

service. Warriors matching the strength of a Spartan hoplite, the 

flexibility of a Roman legionnaire, and the brilliant tactical mind 

of a Hannibal or Scipio are commissioned every year. As we face 

new domains of warfare in space and in cyberspace, officers who 

understand the past and anticipate the future will be well prepared 

to adapt the world’s finest military to new ways of war. 

Deep defense cuts could endanger Professional Military Education programs needed to prepare our officers and enlisted personnel for this future. Indeed, if the military hopes to adapt to the 

ever-changing nature of warfare, we must commit to fully funding 

Professional Military Education and providing scholarships and 

support to those individuals pursuing higher education. Doing so 

will broaden the expertise of soldiers and prepare our men and 

women for the threats of the future. Doing otherwise will turn our 

military into a profoundly moribund organization. 

Any defense budget must also not break faith with the men, 

women, and families who comprise our All-Volunteer Force. We 
68 

must honor the sacrifices of our soldiers and their families by preserving their hard-earned medical, pay, and retirement benefits. 

We also must ensure that we provide the resources to confront a 

lethal crisis affecting our military: suicide. In light of rising suicides since 2001, especially amongst the Army and the Marines 

who have served so faithfully in Iraq and Afghanistan, we must 

continue to pursue innovative ways to ensure mental wellness in 

the armed services. 

I would like to conclude by emphasizing how important it is to 

get this right. It is no longer question of if, but when, the cuts will 

fall: already the Defense Department is looking at cuts of about 

$489 billion over the next ten years. Our future force must be able 

to quickly defeat threats all over the world and to respond properly 

to the growing importance of Asia. Our Congress must remain vigilant that budget cuts do not irreparably damage our military 

forces. It must fight to preserve the education, training, and health 

care that make our military the best in the world. We must not 

break faith with those who have sacrificed so much over the past 

decade. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to address this committee, 

Chairman McKeon. 
(69) 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND 

THE U.S. MILITARY TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: 

PERSPECTIVES OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

LEON PANETTA AND CHAIRMAN OF 

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 

GENERAL MARTIN DEMPSEY 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

OCTOBER 13, 2011 

WITNESSES 

THE HONORABLE LEON E. PANETTA

23rd Secretary of Defense 

GENERAL MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA 

18th Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

PREPARED STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY WITNESSES 

OCTOBER 13, 2011 

(73) 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LEON E. PANETTA, 

23RD SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, members of this committee, it is an honor for me to appear before you for the first time 

as Secretary of Defense. I’d also like to join you in recognizing General Dempsey, a brilliant soldier and leader who I’m delighted to 

have alongside me in his new capacity as Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. 

On behalf of the men and women of the Department of Defense, 

I want to thank the members of this committee for your determination to join me in doing everything possible to ensure that they succeed in their mission of protecting America. I really do believe that 

Congress must be a full partner in our efforts to protect the country. In that spirit, I’ve had the opportunity to consult with many 

of you about the challenges that the Department faces, and I will 

continue to do so. 

I’d also like to thank you for convening this series of hearings on 

‘‘The Future of National Defense and the U.S. Military Ten Years 

After 9/11,’’ and for giving me the opportunity to be here today to 

add my perspective to this discussion. 

September 11th was a defining moment for our country, and for 

the military. We have been at war for ten years, putting a heavy 

burden on our men and women in uniform to defend our nation 

and our interests. More than 6,200 have given their lives, and more 

than 46,000 have been wounded, in the wars since 9/11. The conflicts have brought untold stresses and strains on our service members, and on their families. But despite it all, we have built the finest, most-experienced, battle-hardened all-volunteer force in our 

nation’s history. 

These ten years of conflict have transformed the military, with 

our men and women in uniform showing their adaptability and 

versatility in the face of a new combination of threats and operating environments. Our forces have become more lethal, and more 

capable of conducting effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. New or enhanced capabilities, including the 

growth of special operations forces, unmanned aerial systems, 

counter-IED technologies, and the extraordinary fusion between 

military and intelligence, have provided the key tools we need to 

succeed on these 21st century battlefields. And make no mistake, 

we are succeeding. Ten years after 9/11, we have significantly 

rolled back al-Qaeda and are closer than ever to achieving our strategic objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq, although significant challenges remain to ensuring stability and security in these conflict 

zones. 

These conflicts are nearing a turning point—and so too is the 

military as a whole. As the current mission in Iraq ends, as we continue to transition security responsibility in Afghanistan, and as 
74 

we near our goal of dismantling al-Qaeda, the Department is also 

facing a new fiscal reality at home. As part of the debt ceiling 

agreement reached in August, the Department must find more 

than $450 billion in savings over the next decade. Our challenge 

is taking a force that has been involved in a decade of war, and 

ensuring that we build the military we need to defend our country 

for the next decade even at a time of fiscal austerity. 

We have a strong military, but one that has been stressed by a 

decade of fighting, squeezed by rising personnel costs, and is in 

need of modernization given the focus the past decade on capabilities for the current wars. Meanwhile, we face an international security environment that is growing in complexity and uncertainty. 

We continue to deal with the threat of violent extremism. States 

like Iran and North Korea continue to pursue nuclear capabilities. 

Rising powers are rapidly modernizing their militaries and investing in capabilities to deny our forces freedom of action in vital regions such as the Asia-Pacific. We also face the prospect of cyber 

attackers who could inflict great damage on our nation’s infrastructure while operating with relative anonymity and distance. 

We need to build a force that can confront this growing array of 

threats even as we meet our fiscal responsibilities. We should also 

recognize, however, that the military has to constantly adapt to 

meet changing security demands and threats—and that is what we 

will continue to do even in the face of serious budget constraints. 

That will require setting clear strategic priorities, and making 

tough decisions. Working closely with the Service Chiefs, Service 

Secretaries and Combatant Commanders, I intend to make these 

decisions based on the following guidelines. 

First, we must maintain the very best military in the world—a 

force capable of deterring conflict, projecting power, and winning 

wars. After all, America has a special role in the world—we are 

looked to for our leadership, values and strength. 

Second, we must avoid a hollow force and maintain a military 

that, even if smaller, will be ready, agile and deployable. 

Third, we must take a balanced approach and look to all areas 

of the budget for potential savings—from efficiencies that trim duplication and bureaucratic overhead, to improving competition and 

management in operating and investment programs, to tightening 

personnel costs, and re-evaluating modernization efforts. 

Finally, we cannot break faith with our men and women in uniform—the all volunteer force is central to a strong military and 

central to our nation’s future. 

If we follow these four principles, I’m confident that we can meet 

our national security responsibilities and do our part to help this 

country get its fiscal house in order. This will not be achieved without making difficult choices, but those choices are essential if we 

are not to hollow out the force and meet the threats we confront. 

To achieve the required budget savings, the Department also 

must work even harder to overhaul the way it does business, and 

an essential part of this effort will be improving the quality of financial information and moving towards auditable financial statements. Today DoD is one of only two major agencies that has never 

had a clean audit opinion on its financial statements. While the 

Department’s systems do tell us where we are spending taxpayer 
75 

funds, we do not yet have the details and controls necessary to pass 

an audit. This is inexcusable and must change. In order to achieve 

fiscal discipline, we need to have the strongest possible financial 

controls in place. 

The Department has made significant progress toward meeting 

the Congressional deadline for audit ready financial statements by 

2017, with a focus on first improving the categories of information 

that are most relevant to managing the budget. But I want us to 

do better—and we will. 

Today I am announcing that I have directed the Department to 

cut in half the time it will take to achieve audit readiness for the 

Statement of Budgetary Resources, so that in 2014 we will have 

the ability to conduct a full budget audit. This focused approach 

prioritizes the information that we use in managing the Department, and will give our financial managers the key tools they need 

to track spending, identify waste, and improve the way the Pentagon does business as soon as possible. 

I have also directed increased emphasis on accountability and a 

full review of the Department’s financial controls, with improvements put in place where needed. I have directed the DoD Comptroller to revise the current plan within 60 days to meet these new 

goals, and still achieve the requirement of overall audit readiness 

by 2017. We owe it to the taxpayers to be transparent and accountable for how we spend their dollars, and under this plan we will 

move closer to fulfilling that responsibility. 

The Department is changing the way it does business and taking 

on a significant share of our country’s efforts to achieve fiscal discipline. We will do so while building the agile, deployable force we 

need to confront the wide range of threats we face. But I want to 

close by cautioning strongly against further cuts to defense, particularly with the mechanism that’s been built into the debt ceiling 

agreement called sequester. This mechanism would force additional 

cuts to defense of about $500 billion, or roughly $1 trillion in 

total—cuts that in my view would do catastrophic damage to our 

military, hollowing out the force and degrading its ability to protect 

the country. I know you share my concern about both the extent 

of such cuts and the process of sequester. It is a blind formula that 

makes cuts across the board, hampers our ability to align resources 

with strategy, and risks hollowing out the force. 

I do not believe we have to make a choice between fiscal security 

and national security. But in order to succeed in this effort, I am 

going to need your support—to do everything possible to prevent 

further damaging cuts, and to help us implement a coherent strategy-driven program and budget that we will identify in the months 

ahead as critical to preserving the best military in the world. I 

pledge to continue to work with you closely as we confront these 

challenges and thank you once again for your tireless efforts to 

build a stronger military for our country. 
(76) 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, 

18TH CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, members of the 

Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the future 

of national defense and the U.S. military ten years after the attacks of September 11th. As this is my first time testifying before 

this committee in my new position as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, I want to note that I look forward to continued cooperation 

with you. I take seriously our shared responsibility of maintaining 

a military that provides our leaders with a wide range of options 

to counter the threats and crises we face and that preserves the 

trust placed in us by our citizens. I believe we can sustain this 

trust while also being good stewards of our nation’s resources. In 

that spirit, I thank the Committee for engaging in this important 

discussion of the future of our national defense. 

Last month marked the tenth anniversary of the September 11th 

attacks. It is appropriate to reflect on what we have achieved, what 

we have learned, and where we see ourselves going forward. 

In the past decade, over two million men and women have deployed overseas in support of operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 

elsewhere. Our Joint Force, along with our interagency and international partners, has remained resolute and resilient throughout 

a decade of hard combat in hard places. We have demonstrated initiative, we have demonstrated strength, and we have demonstrated 

resolve. We have met our sacred obligation to protect our nation 

and our fellow citizens. 

There remains work to be done in achieving our objectives in the 

conflicts in which we are currently engaged and against the threats 

we currently face, and we will get it done. 

Our military has learned and adapted to a shifting security landscape. Among the many lessons we have learned, a few stand out. 

First, we live in an increasingly competitive security environment. Military capabilities proliferate more quickly and are no 

longer the monopoly of nation states. The distinction between low 

and high intensity conflict is blurred. This requires us to prevail 

in the competitive learning environment—we must learn faster, understand more deeply, and adapt more quickly than our adversaries. Our systems and processes must be far more effective, efficient, and agile if we are to keep pace in this environment. 

Second, we must continue to value allies and partners. Coalitions 

and partnerships—with other countries and with other government 

agencies—add capability, capacity, and credibility to what are 

shared security responsibilities. As fiscal constraints become more 

binding, the importance of partnering will only grow. As a consequence, we are committed to expanding the envelope of cooperation at home and abroad. 
77 

Third, we must continue to value joint interdependence. Our 

Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard combine 

to field an unmatched team. We still need our Services to be masters of their core competencies and stewards of their cultures. But, 

modern conflict is fought across multiple domains. Operating as a 

single, cohesive team is the imperative. Therefore, we must continue to advance the interoperability of people and equipment. 

Fourth, we must value innovation even more than we have in the 

past. Our forces have expanded many of our previously low-density 

capabilities and fielded many new technologies. We have found 

ways to expand our special operations forces, our intelligence systems, and our cyber capabilities. And, our units have combined 

these capabilities in innovative ways to the great benefit of the 

mission, our troops, and non-combatants on the battlefield. 

Finally, we must always value leadership above all else. Leadership is the core of our military profession. It has been the key to 

our ability to learn, adapt, and achieve results over the past decade. Modern counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations 

drive us to push combat power and decision making to the edge of 

the battlefield. Continued development of adaptive leaders will be 

our nation’s decisive advantage in a competitive security environment. 

Even as we successfully transition today’s conflicts, we are preparing for tomorrow’s. The way we recover from combat and reconstitute our capabilities will shape our future military. We are building today the Joint Force we will have in 2020. Joint Force 2020 

must be powerful, responsive, resilient, versatile, and admired. It 

must have the capability and capacity to provide options to our national leadership. It must account for the capabilities we have now 

to include the relatively new capabilities we have grown. And, it 

must preserve our human capital. Above all, we must get the ‘‘people’’ right and keep faith with our Military Family. 

Developing the Joint Force our nation needs is complicated by 

known and potential fiscal constraints. Be assured, we understand 

that our nation needs us to be more affordable. We are fully committed to reducing costs without compromising the capabilities our 

nation also needs. But, becoming lean and efficient will only get us 

so far. We will have to make hard choices that balance risk across 

our global commitments and across time. We will have to consider 

reforming pay and benefits as well as reducing end strength. If we 

fail to put everything on the table, we risk hollowing the force by 

gutting modernization and readiness. Most importantly, we need to 

be precise. Indiscriminate, across the board cuts would wreak 

havoc on our plans and programs. Together, we need to avoid selfinflicted wounds to our nation’s security. 

I look forward to cooperating with the members of this Committee and the rest of Congress. We will need your help in making 

the tough choices and in supporting the service members we send 

into harm’s way. They deserve the future they sacrificed to secure. 

(79) 

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF 

DEFENSE SEQUESTRATION 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

OCTOBER 26, 2011 

WITNESSES 

DR. MARTIN FELDSTEIN

George F. Baker Professor of Economics 

Harvard University 

DR. STEPHEN FULLER

Director, Center for Regional Analysis 

School of Public Policy 

George Mason University 

DR. PETER MORICI

Professor of International Business 

Robert H. Smith School of Business 

University of Maryland 

PREPARED STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY WITNESSES 

OCTOBER 26, 2011 

(83) 

STATEMENT OF DR. MARTIN FELDSTEIN, GEORGE F. 

BAKER PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased to have the opportunity to testify to this Committee. Although I have testified to 

Congressional committees for more than 30 years, this is the first 

time that I have appeared before this important committee. 

In your invitation you asked me to comment on the effect that 

reductions in defense outlays will have on total economic activity, 

i.e., on the GDP of the United States. I am happy to do that but 

I want to begin with a few words about the larger subject of the 

national security consequences of reductions in defense spending. 

Defense Spending and National Security 

In considering the appropriate size of the defense budget, it is of 

course important to recognize the immediate threats to the United 

States and to our allies from Iran, from North Korea, from rogue 

states and from various terrorist groups. There is also the current 

challenge in cyberspace from espionage directed at industrial and 

national security targets and from the risk of cyber attacks on our 

basic infrastructure. 

But defense spending today must also relate to the more distant 

risk from China’s future military policy. China is now a poor country with per capita income less than one-fifth of our own. But since 

China has more than four times the U.S. population, China’s total 

GDP will equal that of the United States when its per capita income reaches only one-fourth of the U.S. level. Even if China’s 

growth rate slows significantly from its current level, its total GDP 

will exceed ours in less than 15 years. 

A country’s total GDP determines its potential military budget. 

The current Chinese political leadership is concentrating on promoting economic growth to raise the standard of living of its people 

and to deal with the very large inequality that exists between different groups within China. But China is also developing every aspect of its military capability. 

The quality of China’s military force is not currently up to U.S. 

standards. But China’s defense budget will grow with its GDP. It 

is important for the United States to recognize that future generations of Chinese leaders could use its larger GDP to pursue more 

aggressive policies. 

America’s defense policy and our defense budget should therefore 

focus on the future generations of Chinese civilian and military 

leaders and should recognize the virtual certainty of China’s growing economic power. The United States should maintain a military 

capability such that no future generation of Chinese leaders will 

consider a military challenge to the United States or consider using 

military force to intimidate the United States or our allies. 
84 

China’s future military spending and its weapons development 

will depend on China’s perception of what the United States is 

doing now and what we will do in the future. If we show a determination to remain invincible, China will not waste resources on 

trying to challenge us in an arms race. But if we keep cutting defense budgets, the Chinese will see this as an indication of U.S. 

weakness now and in the future. 

China is in many ways a resource-poor country that depends on 

imports of oil, iron, and other raw materials as well as on imports 

of food to feed its people. That is not likely to change. China is 

therefore now buying oil in the ground around the world and arable land in Africa to grow food for the Chinese people. Some countries in the past have used military force to gain secure access to 

such materials. China’s future leaders should not be tempted to follow that path. 

It is important that our allies and friends like Japan and Korea 

and Singapore and Australia see the commitment of the United 

States to remain strong and to remain present in Asia. Their relations with China and with us depend on what they can expect of 

America’s future military strength. 

The Navy has a particularly important role to play in this, including the Navy’s presence in international waters to enforce freedom of the seas, naval visits to Asian ports, and joint exercises 

with the navies of other governments. 

We cannot postpone implementing a policy of future military superiority until some future year. We have to work now to develop 

the weapon systems of the future. We have to maintain the industrial and technological capacity to produce those weapon systems. 

We have to make it clear by our budgets and by our actions that 

we are the global force now and will continue to be that in the 

future. 

While reducing fiscal deficits is very important, that task should 

not prevent the federal government from achieving its primary responsibility of defending this country and our global interests, both 

now and in the future. 

Defense Spending and GDP 

I will turn now to the narrower economic question of how cuts 

in defense spending affect U.S. GDP. 

Since government spending on defense is a component of GDP, 

the immediate direct effect of a one billion dollar reduction in domestic defense spending is to reduce our GDP by one billion dollars. The resulting reduction in pay to military personnel and in 

compensation to the employees of defense suppliers then cause 

their spending as consumers to decline. If defense suppliers expect 

the reduced level of defense spending to be sustained, the defense 

suppliers will also cut their demand for equipment. The total effect 

of the one billion dollar reduction in defense spending is to reduce 

GDP by more than a billion dollars, perhaps about two billion dollars. 

I based this calculation on a reduction in domestic defense spending. To the extent that some of the reduced defense spending is 

overseas and on locally purchased goods and services, the impact 

on U.S. GDP will be proportionately less. But since about 90 per-
85 

cent of defense spending is domestic, the calculation of a two dollar 

reduction in U.S. GDP for every dollar reduction in defense spending is probably a good estimate. 

Any reduction in future budget deficits and in the resulting level 

of the national debt will also raise the confidence of businesses and 

households, leading to increased consumer spending and business 

investment, thus raising current GDP. Since a similar effect would 

result from legislated reductions in future deficits achieved by cutting any form of government spending or by raising revenue, we 

can ignore this ‘‘confidence effect’’ in comparing the impact of reductions in defense spending with the effect of other spending cuts 

or tax increases that have the same effect on future deficits. 

The direct effect on GDP of changes in defense spending is larger 

than the corresponding effect of most other potential changes in 

government outlays. For example, outlays for unemployment benefits are not in themselves a component of GDP. They lead to increased GDP only by raising the consumer spending of the individuals who receive those benefits. While a high percentage of those 

cash benefits will be spent, it will certainly be less than a dollar 

of spending for every extra dollar of unemployment benefits. Some 

of the consumption purchased with the unemployment benefits 

would otherwise have been paid for out of reductions in household 

savings. And of course some of the consumer spending would be on 

imports, further reducing its effect on GDP. 

A change in unemployment benefits also affects GDP by altering 

the incentive to remain unemployed. Reducing the maximum number of weeks of unemployment benefits will induce some individuals to find work sooner, thereby raising GDP. The resulting increase in total employment is difficult to estimate at a time when 

total employment is limited by the weakness of aggregate demand. 

Some of those who are induced to find work because of reduced UI 

benefits may just prevent others from finding work. The overall effect on GDP of reducing UI benefits will be the net effect of the reduction in consumer spending and the increase in weeks worked. 

The direct impact on GDP of a one billion dollar reduction in unemployment benefits will certainly be less than the direct effect of a 

one billion dollar reduction in defense outlays. 

Transfers from the federal government to state and local governments are also not a component of GDP. Reducing such transfers 

only alters GDP to the extent that doing so causes those governments to reduce their spending or raise their taxes. If cutting a billion dollars in transfers to state governments causes them to cut 

their domestic spending by one billion dollars, the immediate effect 

on GDP would be the same as cutting one billion dollars of defense 

spending. But if the state governments offset some of the reduction 

in funds from Washington by using their ‘‘rainy day’’ funds or temporarily running a deficit, the effect on GDP would be less. Similarly, if the states raise taxes to pay for some of the outlays that 

had previously been financed by transfers from Washington, the effect on GDP would be smaller. 

My comments this morning about the effect on GDP of changes 

in defense spending and other forms of government outlays focus 

on the direct effects on demand for U.S. goods and services as 

measured by GDP. That is the appropriate focus in the short run 
86 

at a time when unemployment rates are high and we are far from 

full employment. Over time, the American economy will return to 

full employment, or, more technically, to the level of unemployment 

that can persist without causing a higher rate of inflation. Changes 

in defense spending in the context of full employment must be balanced by changes in other components of GDP. 

I hope that these remarks are helpful to you and your colleagues 

as you consider the important tasks of deficit reduction and of protecting our national security. 
(87) 

STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN FULLER, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR REGIONAL ANALYSIS, SCHOOL OF PUBLIC 

POLICY, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, members of the 

Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the potential economic consequences of reductions in Department of Defense 

spending as these impacts would affect the economies of states and 

regions across the United States. I have conducted research relating to this issue for the Commonwealth of Virginia that examined 

the economic and fiscal impacts of DOD spending. This research 

was undertaken in 2009 in response to early concerns regarding 

the Commonwealth’s economic vulnerability to changing DOD 

spending policies. More recently, I was asked by the Aerospace Industries Association to calculate the economic impacts of reductions 

in DOD outlays for military equipment on the U.S. economy and 

the states that represent the home base for major aerospace and 

military equipment manufacturers and suppliers. I am submitting 

both reports for the record as they contain findings relevant to your 

deliberations on this important topic. 

The economic impacts that occur at the state and regional levels 

are similar to those that have been reported at the national level 

and are evident in changes in economic activity—gross regional 

product (GRP), changes in employment, and changes in personal 

earnings. Collateral impacts also will occur in the local business 

base as the loss of sales for single-market businesses could result 

in the failure of these business establishments—the nature of their 

business (size and product line) may make these firms more vulnerable to changes in sales due to DOD spending reductions or reductions in civilian or uniform personnel. These latter effects are 

particularly evident around military installations as witnessed recently here in the District of Columbia among the retail and other 

commercial businesses having previous served the staff of and visitors to Walter Reed prior to its closing in September. These ‘‘BRAC 

effects,’’ where installations have closed or substantially downsized, 

provide a good measure of the potential ranges of economic impacts 

that may result from reductions in DOD spending. All too often 

these local effects are lost in the impersonal numbers that are used 

to measure the economic impacts of changes in public spending 

patterns. 

State-Level Economic Impacts of DOD Spending 

One approach to understanding the potential impacts of DOD 

spending reductions is to examine the importance of DOD spending 

to a local economy. An examination of DOD spending on the Commonwealth of Virginia economy provides a good measure of what 

could be the impact of reductions in these spending levels. 
88 

Spending by the Department of Defense in support of its activities—defense installations, uniform and civilian personnel, retirees, 

and federal contractors—represents a major source of jobs and income within the Commonwealth of Virginia and generates significant direct and indirect economic activities throughout all sectors 

of the State’s economy. Additionally, DOD spending and the jobs 

and payroll this spending supports generate a significant surplus 

of state-level revenues relative to the demands placed on statefunded services. These economic and fiscal impacts are summarized 

as follows. 

1. In FY 2008 DOD spending in the Commonwealth of Virginia 

contributed $57.4 billion to the State’s economy accounting for 

15.6 percent of the total value of the goods and services produced in the State—its gross state product; 

2. DOD spending and its re-spending within the State’s economy 

supported a total of 902,985 jobs (both directly funded and 

supported indirectly by the re-spending of DOD funds within 

the State) representing 18.9 percent of the state’s total job 

base; 

3. DOD spending generated $44.4 billion in personal earnings 

accounting for 17.4 percent of the total personal earnings of 

all workers residing within the State; 

4. The fiscal impacts of DOD spending and the workers it supported generated a significant net revenue benefit for the 

State in FY 2008. On average, for each job associated with 

DOD spending, the revenues generated exceeded the expenditure demand placed on the State’s budget by $1,848.52; that 

is, for each $1 in expenditure demand, $2.85 in state revenues 

were collected for each employee (including military retirees) 

and these employees related business spending. 

5. The total fiscal benefit accruing to the State from DOD-supported economic activities in the State in FY 2008 was $1.1 

billion. 

6. DOD spending in the Commonwealth totaled $54.5 billion in 

FY 2008 and ranked first among all states on a per capita 

basis ($6,713.06) representing a funding advantage of $4.26 to 

$1.00 compared to the U.S. average. 

This DOD spending is an important source of economic activities, 

personal earnings, jobs and fiscal benefits for the State. In the absence of this spending, the economy would be 15.6 percent smaller, 

support 18.9 percent fewer jobs and face a budget gap of $1.1 billion. 
89 

Summary of Economic and Fiscal Impacts 

DOD Spending in the Commonwealth of Virginia, FY 2008 

(in billions of 2008 $s) 

Source GSP(1) Personal 

Earnings(2) Jobs(3) 

Economic Impacts 

Direct Payroll $22.4 $19.3 339,941

Contracting 33.6 23.9 537,258

Construction 1.4 1.1 25,786

Totals* $57.4 $44.4 902,985

Sources: EMSI, GMU Center for Regional Analysis 

*sum of the individual values may not add to the totals due to rounding; $118 million in 

DOD grants were not included in this analysis. 

(1) Contribution to gross state product; (2) income accruing to workers residing in Virginia; 

(3) total direct and indirect jobs supported by type of DOD spending in the State; 

Fiscal Impact Revenues Expenditures Net Benefit 

Per Job (Actual $s) $2,849.22 $1,000.70 $1,848.52

Totals ($s in millions) $1,689.38 $593.34 $1,096.04

Sources: Urban Analytics, Inc.; GMU Center for Regional Analysis 

Economic Impacts of DOD Spending Reductions for Military 

Equipment Acquisition 

An analysis of DOD spending reductions for the acquisition of 

military equipment that has already been approved (BCA 1) totaling $19.324 billion for FY 2013 and the potential additional reduction of $25.686 billion in procurement of military equipment, also 

impacting FY 2013, illustrate the breadth of these effects on jobs, 

payroll and GDP as these effects cycle through the economy at the 

local level. This total reduction of $45.01 in DOD spending for the 

acquisition of military equipment in FY 2013 would have the following economic impacts: 

1. Lost sales throughout the supply chain and induce sales losses 

through the broader economy would total $164,059,027,945; 

that is, for each $1 in DOD spending reductions for military 

equipment, an additional $2.64 in sales losses will be experienced by other businesses; 

2. 71% of these lost sales would occur as a result of decreased 

consumer spending by workers directly and indirectly affected 

by these DOD spending reductions—workers having lost their 

jobs and/or experienced salary reductions—affecting local businesses serving local demand; 

3. The loss of 1,006,315 full-time, year-round equivalent jobs 

with only 124,428 of these jobs being lost directly or indirectly 

from the prime DOD contractors for this equipment and their 

suppliers while 881,887 jobs or 87.6% of all job losses would 

come from the induced spending effects across all sectors of 

the economy as a result of changes in payroll spending within 

the aerospace and military equipment industry; 
90 

4. This total job loss would add 0.6 percentage points to the current U.S. unemployment rate (raising today’s 9.1% rate to 

9.7%); 

5. Wage and salary would decrease by a total of $59.4 billion with $48.4 billion of these losses occurring among workers 

working in businesses outside of the military equipment manufacturing supply chain—retail, construction, professional and 

business services, health and education, leisure and hospitality construction, financial services and others; 

6. Lost non-wage income—spending for operations, capital in- vestment, retained earnings, profits—would decline by $27.05 

billion with 63.4% of this lost income being experienced by 

non-DOD prime contractors and their suppliers; and, 7. Reduced U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) growth of $86.456 

billion representing an amount equal to 25% of the projected 

annual increase in GDP for 2013; this loss would reduce currently projected growth for 2013 from 2.3% to 1.7% (IHS Global Insight September 2011 forecast). 

The State Level Impacts of DOD Spending Reductions 

While the economic impacts of DOD spending reductions would 

affect all 50 states, ten states would account for 58.5 percent of the 

job and income losses projected to occur in 2013 as a result from 

a $45.01 billion reduction in military equipment acquisitions. In 

total, these spending reductions would result in employment decreases of 588,700 jobs in these ten states and generate losses of 

$34.7 billion in personal income. These decreases in economic activity would reduce these states’ gross state product by a total of 

$50.6 billion in 2013. One-third of these impacts would occur in 

California, Virginia and Texas. 

Economic Impacts of DOD Spending Reductions 

for Military Equipment in FY 2013: Top Ten States 

(jobs in thousands, GSP in billions of 2013 $s) 

State Job Losses Lost Earnings Decrease GSP* 

California 125.8 $7.4 $10.8

Virginia 122.8 $7.3 $10.5

Texas 91.6 $5.4 $7.9

Florida 39.2 $2.3 $3.4

Massachusetts 38.2 $2.3 $3.3

Maryland 36.2 $2.1 $3.1

Pennsylvania 36.2 $2.1 $3.1

Connecticut 34.2 $2.0 $2.9

Arizona 33.2 $2.0 $2.9

Missouri 31.2 $1.8 $2.7

Totals-Top Ten 588.7 $34.7 $50.6

Sources: GMU Center for Regional Analysis, EMSI 

*gross state product 

Summary of Findings 

Reductions in DOD spending, whether it involves uniform or civilian personnel, the operations of military installations, the main-
91 

tenance or acquisition of military equipment or goods and services 

provided by private contractors, will have widespread impacts extending well beyond prime contractors and their direct and indirect 

suppliers. Each of these prime contractors and their suppliers (direct or indirect) employ large numbers of workers and also make 

substantial purchases of goods and services from suppliers to support their business operations and the loss of this payroll and business purchases (largely non-manufacturing suppliers) will spread 

the economic pain of these cutbacks to a far larger population and 

business base than generally appreciated. Each $1 decrease in DOD equipment purchases will generate an additional $2.64 in lost sales elsewhere in the economy with 71 percent of these losses resulting from decreased spending by workers 

having lost their jobs. The employment effect is even greater, with 

job losses associated with only a $45.01 billion reduction in DOD 

spending for military equipment acquisition generating a total loss 

of 1 million jobs of which 88 percent would be on ‘‘Main Street’’ and 

only 12 percent directly within the aerospace and military equipment industry. This job loss would add 0.6 percentage points to the 

U.S. unemployment rate. Beyond the loss of jobs there is the loss 

of earnings and spending that further would undermine state and 

local tax bases. 

Spending reductions have consequences and these consequences 

disproportionally impact workers and businesses that appear to 

have little connection to the target of the spending reduction. The 

breadth and reach of this collateral economic damage should be 

fully measured and assessed as decisions to reduce DOD spending 

are debated. Besides the impacts on the nation’s military readiness 

and ability to respond to international crises, the impacts of any 

proposed DOD spending reductions on local economies, their workers, their incomes, and on local businesses need to be fully assessed 

and their consequences understood and minimized or mitigated. 

Thank you. 
(92) 

STATEMENT OF DR. PETER MORICI, PROFESSOR OF 

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, ROBERT H. SMITH 

SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 

My name is Peter Morici, and I am an economist and professor 

of international business at the University of Maryland. Prior, I 

served as Director of Economics at the United States International 

Trade Commission. I thank you for this opportunity to testify on 

Economic Consequences of Defense Sequestration. 

Today, I would like to discuss with you the broader economic consequences of further cuts in U.S. defense spending, as opposed to 

specific industry or regional impacts. These are largely systemic. 

Should the United States fail to maintain military strength necessary to meet its international security responsibilities, as well as 

those that may be posed by a surging Chinese presence in the Pacific, the international economic institutions that define the rules 

of the game very likely will change in ways more hostile to American economic institutions, political culture and values, diminishing 

prospects for U.S. economic success and independence. 

The United States offers the world a clear prescription for economic prosperity and the protection of human rights—free markets 

and democracy. Yet, with the U.S. economy withering and the U.S. 

ability to project power prospectively diminished, U.S. prescriptions 

appear increasingly less efficacious abroad. 

China offers the world a very different model for economic development and personal security. Its autocratic government intervenes 

considerably in economic decisions to promote wide ranging development goals, and it limits personal freedoms to ensure domestic 

order and stability. ‘‘Occupy Wall Street’’ would almost certainly 

not be tolerated in China and would likely not be permitted to 

emerge with Beijing’s tight censorship of internal communications. 

Suppression of such movements supports its strategy for tight economic management, quite in addition to maintaining the Communist Party’s grip on political power. 

China openly flaunts the letter and spirit of international economic rules intended to foster free and open markets, and severely 

limits intellectual dissent. With its state-directed economy growing 

at breakneck speed and America struggling, a U.S. failure to maintain a military adequate to meet China in the Pacific will almost 

assuredly result in other emerging nations embracing, albeit reluctantly or enthusiastically and in varying measure, China’s model 

for economic development and governance. 

International institutions—like the WTO—are consensual, and 

interpret and make new rules by consensus. Perforce, those rules 

will follow the tide of sentiment among more successful nations, 

and the United States and its Atlantic allies will become more isolated and somewhat marginalized. History teaches power balances 
93 

do change, and often losers are preoccupied with internal squabbling and chaotic dysfunction, and ultimately surprised. 

Without a strong economy and military capable of meeting the 

emerging challenge posed by China in the Pacific, American values 

and the U.S. economy cannot succeed. 

Origins of Budget Challenges 

During the closing days of World War II the United States—in 

partnership with Britain, Canada and others—crafted an international economic system intended to promote democracy and economic globalization. The premise was clear—democracies, integrated by trade and investment, would be much less inclined to 

war. Military competition would be replaced by economic competition. 

On the economic side, the United States encouraged the formation of the European Community, which grew into the European 

Union, and promoted globalization through the WTO, IMF, World 

Bank, and regional and bilateral trade and investment agreements. 

The West—as defined by the OECD economies—is so intensely integrated today that the notion of armed conflict among those nations is absolutely absurd. 

On the political/security side, the United States became the de 

facto global defender of free markets and democracy by forcing the 

permanent disarmament of the third and fourth largest economies—Japan and Germany—leaving only stalwart foes—China and 

Russia—as potential challengers on the global stage. 

Victory in the Cold War—without comparable contributions from 

the Japanese and German economies—came at a heavy price. And 

now, dealing with global terrorism and a more muscular China 

poses new perils and costs that Americans, weary of leadership, 

seem unwilling and perhaps unable to bear. 

Successive rounds of GATT/WTO negotiations substantially liberalized trade among the OECD nations, and granted preferential 

market access in advanced industrialized countries to developing 

regions. Through special and differential treatment the latter 

economies have generally obtained open access to the United 

States, Canada and EU but are permitted to maintain high tariffs 

and administrative barriers to western exports, and subsidize domestic industries in endlessly imaginative ways. 

Through the 1990s, the North American and European economies were so much larger and stronger that they could afford to 

give away industrial activities and jobs, even when the dictates of 

sound economics and comparative advantage would indicate wiser 

choices, to promote development in less fortunate areas of the 

world. However, the emergence of China, and to a lesser extent 

India, Russia and Brazil, has changed all that. By virtue of China’s 

size and ambitions to exert greater influence in the Pacific and to 

change the rules of international competition, this calculation 

about the relationship between western and developing nations becomes patently false and foolish. 

China abuses the WTO system and flaunts free-market principles with high tariffs and domestic institutions that systematically block U.S. and EU exports, aggressive subsidizes for domestic 

industries, intervention in currency market to ensure an under-
94 

valued yuan and artificial cost advantages for its goods, and unfair 

rules for foreign firms that establish production in China to sell 

there. 

All of this has imposed a large and growing bilateral trade imbalance that destroys millions of U.S. manufacturing jobs, transfers 

valuable U.S. technology cheaply to China, greatly diminishes U.S. 

R&D, educational attainment and potential growth, and makes the 

United States less capable of maintaining defense capabilities necessary to meeting its security obligations and accomplishes its legitimate security goals. 

Successive Administrations have tried diplomacy to open Chinese 

markets and end currency manipulation and mercantilism more 

generally, but when rebuffed, they have cautioned Congress 

against concrete action, and pursued more ill-fated diplomacy. 

Large American multinationals, which have invested in China to 

serve the market, have become clients of Beijing’s protectionism. 

Invested in Middle Kingdom mercantilism, they council Presidents 

and Congressional leaders against taking concrete measures to 

counter China’s unfair practices—to the point of even denying 

members of Congress the opportunity to vote on such measures. 

Those actions of self-directed capitalism have broad consequences 

for the health and vitality of the U.S. economy and ultimately national security. 

On the global stage, failure to meaningfully confront Chinese 

mercantilism, after diplomacy has failed over and over again, 

makes the United States appear foolish, weak and inept, a civilization overtaken by one with a better economic model and a more 

competent government. 

Domestically, the United States has needlessly increased its dependence on expensive foreign oil by failing to develop abundant 

domestic resources and implement more effective conservation 

measures. Failure to develop domestic energy creates no environmental benefits. It merely shifts the drilling to the Persian Gulf 

and other unfriendly venues where environmental risks are no better managed, and helps finance global terrorism. It is a fool’s journey into the darkness. 

Economists agree: the U.S. economy can’t get out of its funk and 

grow robustly, not because Americans can’t make things cost effectively and well, but because demand for what they make is inadequate. 

There is no mystery about it. The trade deficit with China and 

on oil account for nearly the entire $550 billion U.S. trade deficit, 

this deficit poses a significant drain on the demand for U.S. products and is the single largest barrier to economic recovery. 

President Obama has said on more than one occasion China’s 

currency policy hurts the U.S. economy and slows its recovery. The 

reasoning is simple. Every dollar that goes abroad to purchase Chinese consumer goods that does not return here is lost purchasing 

power that could be creating jobs. The same applies to high priced 

oil. 

Cutting the trade deficit in half would jump start the U.S. economy, create up to 5 million jobs and lower the unemployment rate 

to about 6 percent. Without confronting Chinese currency manipulation and broader protectionism with concrete actions and without 
95 

raising domestic oil production from less than 6 million barrels a 

day to 10, the U.S. economy won’t grow fast enough, and taxes will 

be inadequate to finance an adequate defense and vital domestic 

services. 

Simply, the trade deficit—China and oil—is as much responsible 

for the U.S. budget crisis—through slow growth—as overspending 

and other cost issues. 

Cost Issues, Overspending and Popular Myths 

The U.S. economy and government faces cost issues too. The U.S. 

health care system is more expensive and provides less favorable 

outcomes than more cost effective private systems abroad, for example in Holland and Germany. Much the same may be said for 

U.S. education. 

Health care and education are hugely uncompetitive by global 

standards, and account for huge portions of combined U.S. federal, 

state and local spending. Most recently rising health care costs, 

coupled with a shrinking private sector and tax base, is now crowding out education spending. 

Together with rising Social Security outlays, mandated by an unrealistic retirement age fixed at 66, the outsized cost of health care 

and education have required curtailing basic government activities 

and targeting for cuts spending categories the United States simply 

must undertake to compete. 

Funds are lacking to adequately maintain roads, bridges and waterways, and to replace National Weather Service satellites essential to monitoring and forecasting severe weather. And, the United 

States has ceded manned space flight to China and Russia. 

Advocates of the burdensomely inefficient health care and educations systems have perpetuated the myth that too much defense 

spending is the problem—that is simply not the case. 

In 2007, with two wars raging and the Bush tax cuts in place, the deficit stood at $161 billion, while in 2011, it will be about 1.3 

trillion. Total government outlays are up about $847 billion, when 

no more than $62 billion are necessary to accommodate inflation. 

How can defense spending—with a baseline budget of $553 billion 

in 2011—be responsible? It only accounted for about 11 percent of 

the $847 billion increase. 

Moreover, if Congress would simply cut by half the additional spending since 2007, it would accomplish a total of more than $4 

trillion in budget reductions over ten years. 

The myth also persists that the United States spends too much 

on defense and winding down the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 

will create great dividends. It won’t. Congress may have appropriated funds for those wars, but it is clear those wars, as well as 

other conflicts, have been even more expensive than those budget 

outlays indicated. 

U.S. defense systems are aging and becoming less functional and 

effective. Examples have been cited of sons manning fighters once 

flown by their fathers. Ask yourself how effective your staffs would 

be with 15 year old computers and if you would want to fight a 

cyber attack with such antiquated hardware. 

And defense capabilities are thinner. The number of USAF fighters is down from 3602 in 2000 to 1990 today, and will be reduced 
96 

to 1739 at current funding levels. Navy ships are down from 316 

to 288, and will have to be reduced to 263 at current funding levels. Sequestration would require cutting these figures even further 

and reducing the number of Army maneuver battalions by 30 or 40 

percent. 

Changes in the nature of threats and the global economic power 

balance—who will have economic power—will require more not 

fewer resources to protect U.S. strategic interests and preserve the 

influence of U.S. values—democracy and free markets—in the 

world. 

Cyber warfare and arming China, which is building a blue water 

navy to challenge the United States in the Pacific, do not shift U.S. 

security challenges from one venue to another but rather add to 

those challenges. For example, U.S. and allied dependence on Middle East oil will continue for at least another generation—even 

with best efforts to develop domestic fossil fuels and alternative energy resources—and U.S. naval assets cannot be depleted in the 

Gulf Region to counter a Chinese buildup in the Pacific. Moreover, 

economic and political upheavals in Europe and North Africa will 

make the U.S. naval presence in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic even more vital. 

The myth persists that China will not be able to challenge the 

United States anytime soon. After all China’s reported military expenditures—at current exchange rates—is only about 17 percent of 

U.S. baseline outlays, but China does not have troops, aircraft and 

naval assets tied up around the world with established commitments. Moreover, China’s currency is widely acknowledged to be 

undervalued, making comparisons of spending at current exchange 

rates deceptive. 

Using IMF Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates, China’s reported military spending in 2011 becomes $148 billion or 27 percent of the U.S. base budget. Based on the growth of spending over 

the past two years, with sequestration, China’s military spending 

would be 37 and 43 percent of U.S. levels in 2013 and 2015, and 

66 percent in 2021. Without sequestration, it would still be 60 percent of U.S. levels in 2011 and could effectively match U.S. spending in the late 2020s. 

Also U.S. budget problems are much worse than Congress anticipates. The President’s February budget assumed economic growth 

in the range of 4 percent for 2011 to 2016. Even in the more 

euphoric days of 2010, private sector economists were not assuming 

those kinds of figures. 

Even if the Joint Select Committee reaches a consensus on budget cuts acceptable to both chambers, slow growth will compel another budget crisis after the 2012 election and then others further 

down the road. 

Hard Realities 

America must address the world as it finds it, not as intellectuals 

and advocates tell us it should be. 

Hard reality number one is the interactions between the health 

of the U.S. economy and these budget discussions are disquieting. 

The United States is not in a Greek spiral—at least not yet—but 

cuts in defense and nondefense spending will slow growth at a time 
97 

when demand for what the private economy produces is weak and 

a second recession that could thrust unemployment into the teens 

threatens. Most certainly, budget cuts will breed slower growth, 

lower tax revenues and the need for more cuts, until Washington 

finds ways to get the private economy growing. 

If Washington can’t find a way to instigate private sector 

growth—specifically, if it can’t muster to challenge Chinese mercantilism and unleash development of domestic energy resources— 

and the nation continues on the assumption that budget deficits 

can be tamed with large contributions from defense, real effective 

Chinese defense spending will surpass U.S. defense spending in the 

next decade. 

The United States has many established assets—ships, planes 

and such built in the past—that will continue numerical superiority in the ability to project power, but those will be increasingly 

old assets or the numerical superiority will decline more rapidly 

from retirements of assets. China’s assets will be newer and growing in number. 

The myth persists that China’s military will be technologically 

inferior for a long time. Don’t bet on that if the U.S. industry and 

R&D keeps moving to China through investments by GE and others, and the U.S. hollows out its defense industrial base through 

program cuts to meet unrealistic budget targets. 

Slashing defense spending because the Congress can’t agree to 

confront Chinese mercantilism and develop domestic energy to rekindle economic growth, and to cut and reform the domestic spending that has built up over the last four years, and the tables will 

turn in the Pacific sooner than you think. 

Then, China’s violation of the norms and rules of the economic 

system put in place by the United States and western powers after 

World War II will spread like an epidemic through the developing 

world, troubled places in Southern Europe, and so forth. 

China’s mercantilism, anti-democratic values and soft approach 

to civil and human rights making will be seen an attractive comprehensive package, necessary for ensuring economic prosperity 

and personal security. The rules of the game, as defined by international institutions, will follow those broader sentiments, and 

Americans and their values and institutions will become isolated 

and unable to compete. 

America will be more isolated and dramatically weakened. 

Marginalized, it will resemble Italy or Greece. Charming and 

quaint but hardly able to independently sustain its standard of living or ensure its own security, or worse bankrupt and at China’s 

doorstep for a bail out. 

(99) 

THE FUTURE OF THE MILITARY 

SERVICES AND CONSEQUENCES OF 

DEFENSE SEQUESTRATION 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

NOVEMBER 2, 2011 

WITNESSES 

GENERAL RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA 

38th Chief of Staff, United States Army 

ADMIRAL JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN 

30th Chief of Naval Operations 

GENERAL NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF 

19th Chief of Staff, United States Air Force 

GENERAL JAMES F. AMOS, USMC 

35th Commandant of the Marine Corps 

PREPARED STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY WITNESSES 

NOVEMBER 2, 2011 

(103) 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, 

38TH CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, and members of 

the committee. 

Since this is my first time to appear before you as the Chief of 

Staff of the Army, I want to start by telling you how much I appreciate your unwavering commitment to the Army and the Joint 

Force. I look forward to discussing the future of the Army and the 

potential impact of budget cuts on our future capabilities, readiness, and depth. Because of the sustained support of Congress and 

this committee, we are the best trained, best equipped, and best led 

land force in the world today. As we face an uncertain security environment and fiscal challenges, we know we will get smaller, but 

we must maintain our capabilities to be a decisive force—a force 

trusted by the American people to meet our future security needs. 

Over the past 10 years our Army—Active, Guard, and Reserve— 

has deployed over 1.1 million Soldiers to combat. Over 4,500 Soldiers have made the ultimate sacrifice. Over 32,000 Soldiers have 

been wounded—9,000 requiring long term care. In that time, our 

Soldiers have earned over 14,000 awards for valor to include 6 

Medals of Honor and 22 Distinguished Service Crosses. 

Our Army is and always will be about Soldiers and Families. 

Throughout it all, our Soldiers and leaders have displayed unparalleled ingenuity, mental and physical toughness, and courage under 

fire. I am proud to be part of this Army—to lead our Nation’s most 

precious treasure—our magnificent men and women. 

Today we face an estimated $450 billion plus in DOD budget 

cuts. We cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of previous reductions. I respectfully suggest that we make these decisions strategically, keeping in mind the realities of the risk they pose, and that 

we make these decisions together, unified, to ensure that when the 

plan is finally decided upon, all effort has been made to provide the 

Nation the best level of security and safety. 

Our Army must remain a key enabler in the Joint Force across 

a broad range of missions, responsive to the Combatant Commanders, and maintain trust with the American People. It is my 

challenge to balance the fundamental tension between maintaining 

security in an increasingly complicated and unpredictable world, 

and the requirements of a fiscally austere environment. The U.S. 

Army is committed to being a part of the solution in this very important effort. 

Accordingly, we must balance our force structure with appropriate modernization and sufficient readiness to sustain a smaller, 

but ready force. 

We will apply the lessons of ten years of war to ensure we have 

the right mix of forces. The right mix of heavy, medium, light, and 

Airborne forces; the right mix between the Active and Reserve 
104 

Components; the right mix of combat, combat support, and combat 

service support forces; the right mix of operating and generating 

forces; and the right mix of Soldiers, Civilians, and contractors. We 

must ensure that the forces we employ to meet our operational 

commitments are maintained, trained, and equipped to the appropriate level of readiness. 

As the Army gets smaller, it is the ‘‘How we reduce’’ that will be 

critical. While we downsize, we must do it at a pace that allows us 

to retain a high quality All-Volunteer Force that is lethal, agile, 

adaptable, versatile, and ready to deploy with the ability to expand 

as required. I am committed to this, as I am also committed to fostering continued commitment to the Army Profession, and adapting 

leader development to meet future challenges. 

Although Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding will 

be reduced, I cannot overstate how critical it is in ensuring our Soldiers have what they need while serving in harm’s way, as well as 

the vital role OCO funding plays in resetting our formations and 

equipment, a key aspect of our current and future readiness. Failing to sufficiently reset now would certainly incur higher future 

costs, potentially in lives. 

Along with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the 

Army, I share concern about the potential of sequestration, which 

would bring a total reduction of over a trillion dollars for DOD. 

Cuts of this magnitude would be catastrophic to the military and— 

in the case of the Army—would significantly reduce our capability 

and capacity to assure our partners abroad, respond to crises, and 

deter our potential adversaries, while threatening the readiness of 

our All-Volunteer Force. 

Sequestration would cause significant reductions in both Active 

and Reserve Component end strengths, impact the industrial base, 

and almost eliminate our modernization programs, denying the 

military superiority our Nation requires in today and tomorrow’s 

uncertain and challenging security environment. We would have to 

consider additional infrastructure efficiencies, including consolidations and closures, commensurate with force structure reductions, 

to maintain the Army’s critical capacity to train Soldiers and units, 

maintain equipment, and prepare the force to meet Combatant 

Commander requirements now and into the future. 

It would require us to completely revamp our National Security 

Strategy and reassess our ability to shape the global environment 

in order to protect the United States. 

With sequestration, my assessment is that the Nation would 

incur an unacceptable level of strategic and operational risk. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you again for 

allowing me the opportunity to appear before you. I also thank you 

for the support that you provide each and every day to our outstanding men and women of the United States Army, our Army Civilians and their Families. The strength of our Nation is our Army. 

The strength of our Army is our Soldiers. The strength of our Soldiers is our Families. This is what makes us Army Strong. I look 

forward to your questions. 
(105) 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JONATHAN W. GREENERT, 

USN, 30TH CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the 

Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the future 

of the military services and consequences of defense sequestration. 

This is my first time testifying before you as Chief of Naval Operations, and I am proud to represent more than 625,000 Sailors and 

Civilians serving their country in the United States Navy. It is 

through their courage and commitment to country that the Navy 

continues to be at the front line of our nation’s efforts in war and 

peace. I look forward to working with you to ensure our Navy remains the world’s preeminent maritime force—providing America 

offshore options to advance our national interests in an era of uncertainty. Through innovation, adaptation and judiciousness, I believe we can sustain our contribution to defense and be good stewards of our nation’s resources. 

As it has for more than 200 years, our Navy continues to deliver 

credible capability for deterrence, sea control and power projection 

to contain conflict and to fight and win our nation’s wars. We remain forward at the maritime crossroads to protect the interconnected systems of trade, information and security that enable 

our nation’s economic prosperity while ensuring operational access 

for the Joint force to the maritime domain and the littorals. 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Navy has 

been an integral part of our nation’s combat, counter-terrorism and 

crisis response operations. Currently, Navy’s aircraft carriers and 

air wings account for about 30 percent of the close air support for 

our troops on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, and an even 

larger share of the electronic support missions that ensure the safety of our troops against IED attack. Navy SEALs led a joint force 

to capture Osama bin Laden and also rescued the M/V ALABAMA’s 

crew. USS FLORIDA, a guided missile submarine, and the USS 

SCRANTON and USS PROVIDENCE, two attack submarines, 

launched over 100 Tomahawk land attack missiles at military targets in Libya at the outset of Operation ODYSSEY DAWN. Earlier 

this year, our aircraft carrier USS GEORGE WASHINGTON and 

several of our cruisers and destroyers aided the Japanese after a 

Tsunami decimated portions of Honshu Island. To conduct 

warfighting and be ready to respond to such crises, on any given 

day more than 40,000 sailors are at sea and about 40 percent of 

our ships are deployed away from home. 

Over the past 10 years we stretched our ships, aircraft and people to meet the growing needs of Combatant Commanders for Navy 

forces with a smaller Fleet. Since 2000, the number of ships in the 

Fleet decreased by about 10 percent. Yet, in the last four years 

alone, demand for carrier strike groups doubled, and requests for 

amphibious ready groups grew by 70 percent. As a result, each ship 
106 

is underway about 15 percent more per year than in 2000, lengthening deployments and making deployments more frequent. Because deployments now cut into the time available to conduct 

maintenance on ships and aircraft and to train our crews, we have 

to tailor the readiness of some units to only those missions they 

will likely be tasked to do instead of the whole (design) range of 

missions they might be tasked to do. Less time for maintenance decreases the service lives of our ships and aircraft and makes maintenance more expensive because it is now less efficient and more 

emergent. In turn, growing maintenance costs offset the funds 

available for procurement and modernization, making it that much 

more difficult to recapitalize the Fleet. 

Going forward, I expect the importance of Navy forces will grow 

as compared to today as we draw down ground forces in the Middle 

East and reset them. Nations like Iran and North Korea continue 

to pursue nuclear capabilities, while rising powers are rapidly modernizing their militaries and investing in capabilities to deny our 

forces freedom of action in vital regions such as the Asia-Pacific. 

To ensure we are prepared to meet our missions, I will continue to 

focus on my three priorities: 1) Be ready to fight and win today; 

2) Build the future force to fight and win tomorrow; and 3) Take 

care of our people and create a motivated, relevant and diverse 

force. Most importantly, I will work to ensure we do not create a 

‘‘hollow force’’ that is unable to do the mission due to shortfalls in 

maintenance, personnel, enablers or training. We will not erode the 

support we provide to our Sailors, Civilians, and their families that 

sustains our all-volunteer force. 

To pursue these priorities in a constrained fiscal environment, 

we will have to be effective and efficient. We will maintain our 

warfighting advantage against new threats using new technologies 

and operating concepts. We will use innovative ways to affordably 

operate forward, where we are most effective and can provide our 

nation options for influence and response. Additionally, we will be 

judicious with our resources (people, money and time) by more efficiently scheduling maintenance and adapting our Fleet Response 

Plan. 

We must remain the world’s preeminent maritime fighting force. 

In particular, our Navy will continue to dominate the undersea domain with sustained investment and effort in a network of platforms and sensors. The Joint force relies on us for assured access 

to deter conflict, fight wars, protect our allies and partners and advance our interests. We will sustain access below, on and above the 

water with new maritime and joint operational concepts such as 

Air-Sea Battle, and by operationalizing the electromagnetic spectrum and cyber domain. 

The budget reductions we are currently addressing as part of the 

2011 Budget Control Act will introduce additional risk in our ability to meet the future needs of Combatant Commanders, but we believe this risk is manageable. Some strategic changes will be required in the Department of Defense to posture our forces, prepare 

for conflicts, and conduct combat and stability operations. We are 

currently working through an emerging strategy as we complete 

the fiscal year 13 budget submission. 
107 

However, if the efforts of the Joint Select Committee on Deficit 

Reduction do not result in agreement and sequestration occurs, the 

Department of Defense and the Navy will have to rethink some 

fundamental aspects of what our military does. The current law 

does not allow the military to manage these reductions, but rather 

applies the cuts uniformly to each program, project and activity. 

Our readiness and procurement accounts would face a reduction of 

about 18 percent, rising to approximately 25 percent in the event 

military personnel funding is exempted from full sequestration. 

The size of these cuts would substantially impact our ability to resource the Combatant Commander’s operational plans and maintain our forward presence around the globe. 

Some of the actions we would need to take under sequestration 

could have a severe and irreversible impact on the Navy’s future. 

For instance, we may need to end procurement programs and begin 

laying off civilian personnel in fiscal year 2012 to ensure we are 

within control levels for January of 2013. As a capital-intensive 

force, we depend on consistent and reliable production from the 

shipbuilding and aviation industries to sustain our fleet capacity. 

If we end programs abruptly and some of these companies shut 

down, we will be hard-pressed to reconstitute them. And each ship 

we don’t build impacts the fleet for 20–50 years. 

I look forward to working in partnership with the Committee to 

ensure our Navy will remain able to deter aggression by operating 

forward and being ready to fight and win our nation’s wars. By 

maintaining our current course and judiciously applying our resources, I am confident we can come through this challenge and remain the world’s most lethal, flexible and capable maritime force. 

Thank you for this opportunity to speak with you on the Navy’s 

behalf. 
(108) 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF, 

19TH CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

Ten years after 9/11, Airmen and their Army, Navy, Marine, and 

Coast Guard teammates continue to serve the Nation with distinction, performing admirably across a broad spectrum of operations. 

In particular, our service members have honed their skills to a fine 

edge after more than a decade of effectively conducting counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. 

As we evaluate our strategy for the future, we must protect the 

progress that we have made by addressing the undeniable stresses 

and strains on our service members and their families, as well as 

the tremendous toll on our battle-worn equipment, resulting from 

more than a decade of sustained global operations. This is particularly true for the Air Force, which has been in sustained combat 

operations for more than two decades, dating back to Operation 

DESERT STORM. 

We also must recognize and prepare for the ongoing evolution of 

a highly dynamic, increasingly complex geostrategic environment 

in which the proliferation of technology is allowing more and more 

actors to exert influence and effect desired outcomes. In order to attain a full-spectrum portfolio of capabilities that is prepared to address wide-ranging security threats, we must internalize the hardfought, hard-learned lessons of the past decade of operations 

against primarily terrorist and insurgent elements, as we judiciously prepare for the possibility of future higher-end contingencies involving potential near-peer actors. 

Because our Nation’s debt crisis has a direct bearing on our national security, the U.S. military will also tighten its fiscal belt, 

and be a part of the solution to find our way back to a vibrant national economy. To this end, the Department of Defense began by 

identifying more than $100 billion in efficiencies, shifting the savings from overhead to operational and modernization requirements. 

In the Air Force alone, nearly $33 billion were reallocated to support required capabilities more directly. Moreover, we found an additional $10 billion in savings to contribute to deficit reduction as 

we completed work on the 2012 budget. The Air Force continues to 

review all areas of the budget—including force structure, operations and investment, and personnel—for further savings. 

But to sustain the military’s ability to protect the Nation against 

wide-ranging threats in a very dynamic strategic and fiscal environment, we will have to make extremely difficult decisions—for 

example, reducing investment in many areas, but also enhancing 

capabilities in others in order to compensate. These choices must 

be based on strategic considerations, not compelled solely by budget 

targets. A non-strategy-based approach that proposes cuts without 

correlation to national security priorities or core defense capabilities will lead to a hollowed-out force, similar to those that followed 
109 

every major conflict since World War I—a U.S. military with aging 

equipment, extremely stressed human resources, less-than-adequate training, and ultimately, declining readiness and effectiveness. We must avoid repeating this scenario by steering clear of illconceived, across-the-board cuts, which do not allow us to deliberately accept risks, to devise strategies to mitigate those risks, 

and to maintain a capable, if smaller, effective force. Instead, 

sweeping cuts of the sort in the Budget Control Act’s sequester provision would slash our investment accounts; raid our operations 

and maintenance accounts, forcing the curtailment of important 

daily operations and sustainment efforts; and inflict real damage to 

the effectiveness and well-being of our Airmen and their families. 

Ultimately, such a scenario gravely undermines our ability to protect the Nation. 

But beyond the manner in which potential budget cuts are executed, even the most thoroughly-deliberated strategy may not be 

able to overcome dire consequences if cuts go far beyond the $450 

billion-plus in anticipated national security budget reductions over 

the next 10 years. This is true whether the cuts are directed by sequestration or by Joint Select Committee proposal, and whether 

they are deliberately targeted or across-the-board. From the ongoing budget review, the Department is confident that further spending reductions beyond the more than $450 billion that are needed 

to comply with the Budget Control Act’s first round of cuts cannot 

be done without damaging our core military capabilities and therefore our national security. 

From the perspective of the Air Force, whose ‘‘real’’ total obligation authority is already only 20 percent of the Department of Defense top-line—the lowest of any military service since World War 

II—further cuts will amount to: 

1. Further reductions to our end strength, both civilian and military, despite the fact that the Air Force already is substantially smaller than it was ten years ago; 

2. Continued aging and reductions in the Air Force’s fleet of 

fighters, strategic bombers, airlifters, and tankers, as well as 

to associated bases and infrastructure; 

3. Adverse effects on training and readiness, which has seen a 

decline since 2003; and 

4. Diminished capacity to execute concurrent missions across the 

spectrum of operations and over vast distances on the globe. 

A smaller Air Force, as a result of anticipated budget cuts, still 

will remain an unmatched, superbly capable force, but as a matter 

of simple physical limitations, it will be able to accomplish fewer 

tasks in fewer places in any given period of time. Therefore, while 

the Nation has become accustomed to effective execution of wideranging operations in rapid succession or even simultaneously—for 

example, the Air Force’s concurrent response to crisis situations in 

Japan and Libya, which ranged more than 5,500 miles in distance 

and the operational spectrum from humanitarian relief to combat 

airpower, all the while maintaining operations in Afghanistan and 

Iraq—it will have to accept reduced coverage in future similar, concurrent scenarios if further large cuts to the national security 

budget are allowed to take effect. Also, our Airmen and their fami-
110 

lies, throughout the Total Force, would face intensified deployment 

schedules, and our equipment would become aged and worn more 

quickly, because fewer resources would be available to commit to 

the Nation’s emerging needs. 

As part of our strategy to mitigate the effects of decreased capacity, we will continue to strengthen our international partnerships, 

especially where common interests and shared security responsibilities are involved. More importantly, we will continue to promote 

efforts toward advancing Joint interdependence, as the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified before this committee last 

week. This will require each military service ‘‘to maintain and be 

the masters of their core competencies and their unique service cultures, but . . . [to] operate as a single cohesive team.’’ To meet the 

Chairman’s intent, the Air Force will continue to make vital contributions to the Joint team’s portfolio, integrating airpower’s four 

unique, enduring qualities: (1) domain control; (2) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; (3) air mobility; and (4) global strike. 

These four core contributions—plus our unparalleled ability to command and control air, space, and cyber systems—will sustain the 

Joint team’s advantage, and inform our analysis as we prioritize 

our efforts in each of the most critical dimensions: materiel, personnel, training, and readiness. 

Reducing any of these core contributions, in addition to potential 

diminished capacities as discussed earlier, will fundamentally alter 

the complexion of your Air Force. We therefore are focused on sustaining and strengthening these core functions. Moreover, specific 

systems such as the F–35A, the centerpiece of our future tactical 

air combat capability; KC–46A, the backbone of our worldwide 

power projection capability and thus our Nation’s global expeditionary posture; and the Long-Range Strike ‘‘family of systems,’’ all 

represent substantial elements of our overall suite of capabilities 

and thus must all be pursued through disciplined—and certainly 

efficient—modernization efforts. Even though we are responsibly 

drawing down in Afghanistan and Iraq, we know that historically, 

as U.S. forces withdraw from active combat, the relative requirement for airpower typically increases. By focusing on our core contributions, we are preserving the character of your Air Force— 

ready to continue responding effectively to the Nation’s airpower 

and global power projection needs. 

In short, Airmen remain fully committed to executing current 

missions effectively while building a future force according to operational risk, capability and capacity requirements, personnel and 

materiel needs, and prudent, if frugal, strategies for investment in 

modernization, recapitalization, and readiness. We do not have to 

forsake national security to achieve fiscal stability. If we undertake 

a strategy-based approach to necessary budget cuts, and keep those 

cuts to a reasonable level, we can assure our full-spectrum preparedness in providing our unique capabilities, affording a wider 

range of options for rapid, tailorable, and flexible power projection—Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power—on which our Nation’s 

security and strategic interests rely. 
(111) 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, 35TH 

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS 

In an increasingly dangerous and uncertain world, the Marine 

Corps continues to provide capabilities our Nation needs to retain 

its status as the only credible remaining superpower. As we face 

inevitable difficult resource decisions, we must also consider how 

we can best mitigate the inherent risk of a reduced defense capacity. Like an affordable insurance policy, the Marine Corps and the 

Navy’s amphibious forces represent a very efficient and effective 

hedge against the Nation’s most likely risks. 

The current fight. We will continue to provide the best trained 

and equipped Marine units to Afghanistan. This will not change. 

This will remain the top priority for as long as we have Marines 

in harm’s way. We have made great progress in Afghanistan; our 

fellow citizens expect no less of us for the duration of the war. We 

remain committed to achieving success. We will ensure that we 

draw down in Afghanistan in a way that responsibly transfers authority to our Afghan partners, and maintains pressure on the 

enemy. Our forward-deployed Marines have all that they need with 

regard to training, equipment, and leadership to accomplish the 

mission. The cost of ensuring that they have all that they need has 

been felt by those units back at home station. This fact impacts our 

ability to deal with another large scale contingency. 

Future Security Environment. Our Nation and world face an 

uncertain future; we cannot predict where and when events may 

occur that might require us to respond on short notice to protect 

our citizens and our interests. In the past, there have always been 

times when events have compelled the United States to become involved, even when such involvement wasn’t desired; there is no 

doubt that we will have do this again as we face an uncertain future. As we look ahead, we see a world of increasing instability and 

conflict, characterized by poverty, competition for resources, urbanization, overpopulation and extremism. Failed states, or those that 

cannot adequately govern their own territory can become safe havens for terrorist, insurgent and criminal groups that threaten the 

U.S. and our allies. 

Already pressurized by a lack of education and job opportunities, 

the marked increase of young men in underdeveloped countries are 

swelling the ranks of disaffected groups, providing a more pronounced distinction between the ‘‘haves’’ and ‘‘have-nots.’’ Over the 

last year we watched as the momentum of the Arab Spring toppled 

long-established governments, and re-shaped the political and military dynamics of an already troubled region. 

Increasing competition for scarce natural resources like fossil 

fuels, food and clean water continue to lead to tension, crisis and 

conflict. The rise of new powers and shifting geopolitical relationships will create greater potential for competition and friction. The 
112 

rapid proliferation of new technologies, cyber warfare and advanced 

precision weaponry will amplify the risks, thus empowering state 

and non-state actors as never before. These trends will exert a significant influence on the future security environment and, in turn, 

the ever-changing character of warfare. In the words of one of our 

former general officers, ‘‘two parallel worlds exist on this planet— 

a stable progressively growing, developing world and an unstable, 

disintegrating chaotic world. The two worlds are colliding.’’ This is 

the world in which your Marine Corps must operate. If we are to 

do our part to forestall future wars and conflicts we must remain 

engaged and involved. 

Crisis response. Like it or not, America must maintain the ability to respond to crises—especially in unexpected places at unexpected times. History has shown that crises usually come with little or no warning, and often in conditions of uncertainty, complexity, and chaos. A full understanding of what is occurring, and 

what the best response should be, takes time. There remains an 

imperative for a force that can respond to crisis situations immediately and create options and decision space for our Nation’s leaders. An on-scene force that can respond immediately reduces the 

risk that a situation will spin out of control as our nation’s leaders 

attempt to determine a way ahead. America’s ability to respond in 

the manner required is increasingly complicated by the fact that 

since the 1990s our nation has significantly reduced the number 

and size of our bases and stations around the world. 

Crisis response must sometimes be measured in hours, if not 

minutes. When Marine forces rescued the downed Air Force F–15 

pilot in Libya earlier this year, they did so from amphibious shipping in the Mediterranean, arriving and completing the rescue 

within 90 minutes of notification. Imagine how the dynamic in 

Libya might have changed if Quadafi had captured a US air crew. 

Within 20 hours of notification forward deployed Marine forces arrived in tsunami-devastated Japan and began to conduct search 

and rescue and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions—at times within the radioactive plume. Crisis response can’t 

be done from the United States. It takes too much time to get 

there. Even if adequate infrastructure is available near the crisis 

site to support deployment of a crisis response force by air, maintaining and sustaining such a force by air is extraordinarily difficult. 

It is imperative that our Nation retain a credible means of mitigating risk while we draw down both the capabilities and capacities of our forces. This is best done by forward deployed and positioned forces, trained to a high state of readiness, and on the scene. 

The Marine Corps was specifically directed by the 82nd Congress 

as the force intended to be ‘‘the most ready when the Nation is 

least ready.’’ This expectation exists because of the costly lessons 

our nation learned during the Korean War when a lack of preparedness in the beginning stages of the conflict very nearly resulted in defeat. Because our Nation cannot afford to hold the entire joint force at such a high state of readiness, it has chosen to 

keep the Marines ready, and has often used them to plug the gaps 

during international crises, to respond when no other options were 

available. 
113 

Forward presence. Although the world is continuing to change 

and budgets continue to fluctuate, America’s requirement to maintain a forward based force-in-readiness remains. Physical presence 

matters. It shows our economic and our military commitment to a 

particular region. It deters potential adversaries. It assures our 

friends. It permits response in a timely manner to crises. 

Our nation has already significantly reduced the number and 

size of our force presence, our bases and stations around the world. 

U.S. Forces based in the continental United States are challenged 

to respond quickly due to the tyranny of distance. The national 

blessing of being located between two great oceans bears the expense of having to traverse those oceans in order to respond to 

crisis in other parts of the world. If we are to maintain our status 

as a global power, we have a responsibility to respond to crises 

quickly. 

Speed enables swift and certain projection of power and influence. When we respond from a forward posture, our response time 

is almost immediate—often before an adversary can position its 

forces optimally, or accomplish his objectives. Only when we are positioned forward can we provide the backing to diplomatic efforts 

that give our nation’s leaders time to develop options and build coalitions. Often, U.S. citizens in other lands are put at risk if we are 

slow to respond or to evacuate them. 

Maintaining a presence helps provide stability to areas of strategic importance. We can build partner capacity through direct contact; increase our own awareness of dynamic developments and potential response options; control key objectives like ports, airfields, 

and chokepoints to ensure their safe and continued use should they 

become threatened; demonstrate resolve; assure our allies and 

partners; and provide relief and assistance quickly in the case of 

natural or man-made disasters. 

Your Marine Corps remains forward deployed—particularly in 

the critical Pacific region. It is widely acknowledged that the Pacific is the future of our country from both an economic and a military perspective. We also recognize that for many years to come we 

will have security challenges in the Central Command area of operations. But even as we agree on the importance of these two critical 

regions, we can’t ignore the rest of the world. History has shown 

that crises, conflicts, and challenges never occur where we want 

them to . . . we’re not very good at predicting the future. Right now, 

Marines are engaged in multiple regions around the world such as 

Eastern Europe, Latin and South America, Africa and the Pacific 

Rim, conducting theater security cooperation activities and building 

partner capacity with our allies and partners. The goal of our engagement activities is to minimize the conditions for conflict and 

enable host nation forces to effectively address instability as it occurs. Engagement activities also provide our Nation with a stance 

for crisis response and quick footing for action when the need 

arises. As we look ahead to times of reduced manning and restricted access to overseas basing, Marines must be forward deployed and engaged on a day-to-day basis, working closely with our 

joint and allied partners. When crises arise, these same Marines 

will respond—locally, regionally or globally—to accomplish whatever mission our Nation asks of us. 
114 

Our maritime role and amphibious and expeditionary operations. As we consider the future, we do so with the sure knowledge that America is first and foremost a maritime nation. Like so 

much of the world, we rely on the maritime commons for the exchange of commerce and ideas. The sea dominates the surface of 

our globe (70% of earth’s surface). 95% of the world’s commerce 

travels by ship. 49% of the world’s oil travels through six major 

choke points; on any given day 23,000 ships are underway around 

the world. 

Many depend on us to maintain freedom of movement on those 

commons; we continue to take that responsibility seriously. The 

world’s littoral regions—where the land and sea (and air) meet— 

are equally critical when securing freedom of movement. The 

littorals are where seaborne trade originates and enters its markets. The littorals include straits, most of the world’s population 

centers, and the areas of maximum growth. 

The Navy and Marine Corps team remain the solution set to fulfilling our global maritime responsibilities in these critical areas. 

Naval forces are not reliant on host nation support or permission; 

in the conduct of operations, they step lightly on our allies and host 

countries. With the increasing concentration of the world’s population in littoral areas, the ability to operate simultaneously on the 

sea, ashore, in the air, and to move seamlessly between these three 

domains is critical. The Marine Corps’ requirement to deploy and 

respond globally, engage regionally, and train locally necessitates 

that we leverage every form of strategic mobility—a combination of 

amphibious ships, high speed vessels, maritime preposition shipping, organic tactical aviation and strategic airlift. 

Amphibious forces, a combination of Marine air ground task 

forces and Navy amphibious ships, remain a uniquely critical and 

capable component of both crisis response and meeting our maritime responsibilities. Operating as a team, amphibious forces provide operational reach and agility, they ‘‘buy time’’ and decision 

space for our national leaders in time of crisis. They bolster diplomatic initiatives by means of their credible forward presence. Amphibious forces also provide the Nation with assured access for the 

joint force in a major contingency operation. That same force can 

quickly be reinforced to assure access anywhere in the world in the 

event of a major contingency; it can be dialed up or down like a 

rheostat to be relevant across the range of military operations. No 

other force possesses the flexibility to provide these capabilities and 

yet sustain itself logistically for significant periods of time, at a time 

and place of its choosing. There is a reason why every Combatant 

Commander wants the presence of forward deployed amphibious 

forces on a routine basis, and each of them ask for that. They know 

that such forces mitigate risk, and give them the capability to deal 

with the unknown. 

The inherent usefulness, capability, and flexibility of amphibious 

forces is not widely understood, as evidenced by the frequent, and 

incorrect, assumption that forcible entry capabilities alone define 

the requirement for amphibious forces. The same capabilities that 

allow an amphibious task force to deliver and support a landing 

force on a hostile shore enable it to support forward engagement 

and crisis response. In fact, the most frequent employment of am-
115 

phibious forces is for engagement and crisis response. The geographic Combatant Commanders have increased their demand for 

forward-postured amphibious forces capable of conducting security 

cooperation, regional deterrence and crisis response. In an era of 

declining access, this trend will likely markedly increase. Over the 

past year, amphibious forces have conducted humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts in Pakistan, they have supported 

combat operations in Afghanistan with ground forces and fixed 

wing aviation, they have responded to the piracy crisis on M.V. Magellan Star, they have supported operations in Libya, and assisted 

our allies in the Philippines and Japan. Modern amphibious assaults, when necessary, seek to avoid enemy strengths by exploiting gaps and weaknesses. An example is the TF–58 assault that 

seized key terrain south of Kandahar 450 miles inland in 2001 

shortly after the 9/11 attacks. 

The Marine Corps defines itself as an ‘‘expeditionary’’ force. ‘‘Expeditionary’’ means that we’re capable of operating in austere environments. When we deploy we bring the water, the fuel, the supplies that our Marines and sailors need to accomplish the mission. 

‘‘Expeditionary’’ is not a bumper sticker to us, or a concept, it is 

a state of conditioning that Marines work hard to maintain. 

Right-sizing in the face of new fiscal realities. The Marine 

Corps is fully aware of the fiscal challenges facing our Nation, and 

stands ready to further critically examine and streamline its force 

needs for the future. We continually strive to be good stewards of 

the public trust by maintaining the very best financial management 

practices. The Marine Corps remains the first and only military 

service whose financial statements have been deemed audit-ready. 

We are proud of our reputation for frugality, and we remain one 

of the best values for the defense dollar. During these times of constrained resources, we remain committed to refining operations, 

identifying efficiencies, and reinvesting savings to conserve scarce 

public funds. When the Nation pays the ‘‘sticker price’’ for its Marines, it buys the ability to remain forward deployed and forward 

engaged, to assure our partners, reinforce alliances, and build partner capacity. For 7.8% of the total DoD budget, our Nation gains 

the ability to respond to unexpected crises, from humanitarian disaster relief efforts, to non-combatant evacuation operations, to conduct counter-piracy operations, or full scale combat. 

As Congress, and this Committee, work hard to account for every 

dollar, the Marine Corps is working to make sure that every dollar 

is well spent. In the end we know we’re going to have to make cuts. 

As we provide our input we need to address three critical considerations—strategy, balance, and keeping faith. 

In an effort to ensure the Marine Corps was best organized for 

a challenging and dangerous future security environment, last fall 

we conducted a comprehensive and detailed force structure review 

to identify all dimensions of rebalance and posture for the future. 

The results of this effort have been shared with this Committee in 

the past. This effort incorporated the lessons learned from ten 

years of combat. We affirm the results of that strategy-driven initial effort, but we have also begun to readjust certain parameters 

of it based on the realities of spending cuts outlined in the Budget 

Control Act of 2011. 
116 

When we went through the force structure review effort, we built 

a force that can respond to only one major contingency at a time. 

It has been opined that one effect of sequestration might be to put 

a Marine Corps below the end strength level that’s necessary to 

support even one major contingency. At the potential end strength 

level resulting from the sequestration, we’re going to have to make 

some tough decisions and assume significantly more risk. We will 

not be able to do the things the Nation needs us to do to mitigate 

risk, or to meet the requirements of the Combatant Commanders. 

We won’t be there to reassure our potential friends, or to assure 

our allies. And we certainly won’t be there to contain small crises 

before they become major conflagrations. A Marine Corps end 

strength level that could result from the sequestration presents significant risk institutionally and for the Nation. Responsiveness to 

Combatant Commander requirements such as contingencies and 

crisis response will be significantly degraded. 

With regard to strategy, the Marine Corps is participating in the 

ongoing rewrite of national security strategy. Once this effort is 

concluded, we’ll evaluate the resources available against the mission, then build the most capable force possible. We’ll use what we 

learned during the force structure review effort as our point of departure, and make recommendations on how to best reshape the 

Marine Corps. 

We cannot make cuts in a manner that would ‘‘hollow’’ the force. 

We have learned this lesson before during previous draw downs. 

The term ‘‘hollow force’’ refers primarily to the lack of readiness of 

U.S. forces to accomplish their missions. Readiness is the aggregate 

of the investment in personnel, training, and equipment to ensure 

that units are prepared to perform missions at any given time. The 

Services have varying approaches to readiness. In order to manage 

investment and O&M costs, some Services judiciously reduce the 

readiness status of selected units during interim periods between 

scheduled deployments. This concept is referred to as ‘‘tiered readiness.’’ In this concept, resources are limited and non-deployed units 

pay the costs to ensure that deployed and next-to-deploy units have 

sufficient personnel, equipment, and training. Over time, non-deploying, or rarely-deploying units, may be held at reduced readiness levels for indeterminate periods of time. Given our mission to 

be America’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness, a tiered readiness 

concept is not compatible with the Marine Corps’ missions because 

its non-deployed units are often called upon to respond to unanticipated and varied crises on a moment’s notice. 

The Marine Corps strives to maintain a high state of unit readiness and logistical self-sustainment capability. Even when not deployed, Marine units maintain higher levels of readiness, so they 

can deploy on short notice. This readiness posture allows the Corps 

to: 

1. Maintain most of its operating force ready to respond quickly 

to crises and contingencies; 

2. Cycle battalions, squadrons and other units through rotations 

rapidly; 

3. Routinely build and deploy coherent, effective task forces 

without extensive work-ups; and, 
117 

4. Maintain significant amounts of equipment in theater vice rotating most of it with each unit, thus reducing the costs of 

doing our Nation’s bidding. 

Organic logistics capabilities are vital to this practice. Too often, 

service logistics units fall prey to cuts that forfeit their ability to 

respond to crises. Naval forces—in particular, amphibious ships— 

are also essential to readiness. We must continue to invest in this 

highly utilized capability. 

Finally, lower budget levels, end strength, and investment accounts will significantly affect contingency plans over time. Many 

of these plans depend on concurrent and/or sequential operations. 

Less capacity removes the capability for such operations. Operational plans, will necessarily be adjusted to accommodate the 

longer timelines required to achieve desired objectives. Longer time 

to accomplish objectives in war can easily translate into increased 

loss of personnel and materiel, and ultimately places mission accomplishment at risk. 

My promise to this Committee is that at the end of the day, we 

will build ‘‘the best Marine Corps’’ that our Nation is willing to afford. I intend to ‘‘keep faith’’ with our people. This term has deep 

meaning to the leadership of the Marine Corps. We expect much 

from those we recruit, and we remind them constantly of their obligations of honorable and faithful service. In return we must be 

faithful to the obligations we make to those who serve honorably. 

We must not break the chain of trust that exists. Precipitous personnel reductions are among the worst measures that can be employed to save money. Our all-volunteer system is built upon a reasonable opportunity for retention and advancement; wholesale cuts 

undermine the faith and confidence in service leadership and create long-term experience deficits with negative operational impacts. 

Such an approach cannot be quickly recovered from. 

Redundancy. In the interest of austerity, there are many who 

try to argue that the Marines provide capabilities that are redundant when compared with other Services. This is not the case. ‘‘Redundant’’ means that no replacement is required if something is 

discarded. This is not true of the Marine Corps capabilities sets or 

of the way we have adapted to the future security environment and 

modern warfare. If the Nation lost its amphibious capability, it 

would have to pay for another Service to provide it. In short order 

the Nation would require a sustainable air-ground force able to operate from the sea—to respond to crises and contingencies. A force 

that comes from the sea requires specialized equipment and training. No savings would be gained because there is no redundancy. 

The nation would have to pay—and likely pay a higher price—to 

gain back what had been given away. 

In any future defense strategy, the Marine Corps will fill a 

unique lane in the capability range of America’s armed forces. A 

Middleweight Force, we are lighter than the Army, and heavier 

than SOF. The Corps is not a second land army. The Army is purpose-built for land campaigns and carries a heavier punch when it 

arrives, whereas the Marine Corps is an expeditionary force focused on coming from the sea with integrated aviation and logistics 

capabilities. The Marine Corps maintains the ability to contribute 

to land campaigns by leveraging or rapidly aggregating its capabili-
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ties and capacities. Similarly, Marine Corps and SOF roles are 

complementary, rather than redundant. Special Operation Forces 

contribute to the counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism efforts 

of the Combatant Commanders in numerous and specialized ways, 

but they are not a substitute for conventional forces with a broader 

range of capability and sustainability. 

Marine air is similarly not redundant. The US Air Force cannot 

come from the sea; nor are most of its aircraft suitable for expeditionary missions. The Navy currently does not invest in sufficient 

capability to operate their aircraft ashore once deployed—a requirement that has risen often in the past in support of both naval and 

land campaigns. If Navy aviation were to buy the capability to deploy effectively to austere ashore bases from their ships, they 

would find it would cost as much, or more, than it costs them currently to do so on behalf of the Marine Corps. 

Reset and modernization. Reset is distinguishable from modernization. There will be a cost when the Marine Corps comes out 

of Afghanistan. It is necessary to reset the force by addressing 

equipment shortfalls, and to refresh equipment worn out or degraded by years of combat. We currently estimate that bill to be 

about $3 billion. A few years ago that bill was in excess of $15 billion. With the help of Congress we have been able to reset the force 

for some years now, even as we continued to support operations 

both in Iraq, and Afghanistan. As we look to the future, we must 

address our deficiencies and replace the equipment that is worn 

out from operations in Afghanistan. Secondly, we must continue to 

modernize to keep pace with the evolving world. 

The Marine Corps is currently undertaking several initiatives to 

modernize the Total Force. The programmatic priority for our 

ground forces is the seamless transition of Marines from the sea to 

conduct sustained operations ashore whether for training, humanitarian assistance, or for combat. Our ground combat and tactical 

vehicle strategy is focused on the right mix of assets, balancing 

performance, payload, survivability, fuel efficiency, transportability 

and cost. In particular, the Amphibious Combat Vehicle is important to our ability to conduct surface littoral maneuver and 

seamlessly project Marine units from sea to land in permissive, uncertain and hostile environments. We remain firmly partnered with 

the U.S. Army in fielding a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle that lives 

up to its name while also being affordable. 

Marine Corps Aviation, which is on the cusp of its centennial of 

service to our Nation, continues its modernization that began over 

a decade ago. The continued development and fielding of the short 

take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) F–35B Joint Strike Fighter 

remains the centerpiece of this effort. The capability inherent in a 

STOVL jet allows the Marine Corps to operate in harsh conditions 

and from remote locations where there often are few airfields available for conventional aircraft. It is also specifically designed to operate from amphibious ships—a capability that no other tactical 

aircraft possesses. The ability to employ a fifth-generation aircraft 

from amphibious shipping doubles the number of ‘‘carrier’’ platforms from which the United States can employ fixed wing aviation. Once fully fielded, the F–35B replaces three legacy aircraft— 
119 

F/A–18, EA–6B and AV–8B—saving the DoD approximately $1 billion per year in operations and maintenance costs. 

This program has been performing notably since January with 

more than 260 vertical landings completed and 98% of its key performance parameters met. It is ahead of schedule in most areas. 

The F–35B also recently completed a highly successful three-week, 

sea trial period aboard the amphibious assault warship USS Wasp 

(LHD–1). DoD has already purchased 32 of these aircraft. Delivery 

is on track, and we look forward to receiving them at Marine Corps 

Air Station Yuma just ten months from now. 

The MV–22B Osprey continues to be a success story for the Marine Corps and the Joint Force. To date, this revolutionary tiltrotor aircraft has changed the way Marines operate on the battlefield, giving American and Coalition forces the maneuver advantage and operational reach unmatched by any other tactical aircraft. Over the past four years since achieving Initial Operational 

Capability, the MV–22B has flown more than 18,000 hours in combat, carried more than 129,000 personnel, and 5.7 million pounds 

of cargo. The MV–22B has made multiple deployments to Iraq, four 

with MEUs at sea, and it is currently on its fourth deployment to 

Afghanistan. The unprecedented operational reach of an MV–22B, 

embarked aboard amphibious shipping in the Mediterranean, was 

the sole reason for the rescue of a downed American aviator in 

Libya. Our squadron fielding plan is well under way as we continue to replace our 44 year old, Vietnam-era CH–46 helicopters. 

We must procure all required quantities of the MV–22B in accordance with the program of record. Calls by some to reduce MV–22B 

procurement as a DoD cost savings measure are puzzling. Their arguments are ill-informed and rooted in anachronisms when measured against the proven record of performance and safety this force 

multiplier brings to today’s battlefields in support of Marines and 

the Joint Force. 

Conclusions. The American people continue to believe that 

when a crisis emerges Marines will be present and ‘‘invariably turn 

in a performance that is dramatically and decisively successful— 

not most of the time, but always.’’ They possess a heart-felt belief 

that the Marine Corps is good for the young men and women of our 

country. In their view, the Marines are extraordinarily adept at 

converting ‘‘un-oriented youths into proud, self-reliant stable citizens—citizens into whose hands the nation’s affairs may be safely 

entrusted.’’ An investment in the Marine Corps continues to be an 

investment in the character of the young people of our country. 

The Marine Corps will only ask for what it needs, not what it 

wants. As Congress and DoD move forward with tough decisions on 

the future of our Armed Forces relative to the Budget Control Act 

of 2011, the crisis response capabilities the Marine Corps affords 

our Nation must serve as the compass in determining its ultimate 

end strength, equipping and training needs. Through it all, the Marine Corps will make the hard decisions and redouble its commitment to its traditional culture of frugality. 

The Marine Corps has evolved over many years, many conflicts, 

and at a significant price in terms of both blood and treasure; we 

have served the Nation well time and time again. For a comparably 

small investment, the Marine Corps continues to provide the pro-
120 

tection our Nation needs in an increasingly dangerous and uncertain world, and to preserve our Nation’s ability to do what we must 

as the world’s only credible remaining superpower. 
ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

(123) 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

Over the past several months, the House Armed Services Committee embarked on a series of hearings designed to examine the 

future of the defense budget in light of our nation’s fiscal reality. 

We believe this action to have been fully appropriate—our committee members should understand the impact of the budget cuts 

contained in the Budget Control Act (BCA), particularly in light of 

the changing threat environment. As part of that discussion, we 

found these hearings useful. 

We also agree with the Chairman that sequestration would clearly and unquestionably threaten our ability to meet our current national security needs. Congress, through the BCA, has imposed 

spending caps on security spending that will force the Department 

to reduce its current budget plans by more than $450 Billion over 

ten years. These already-enacted cuts to planned spending present 

a significant challenge for the Department to implement, and further large, indiscriminate cuts, such as those that would be imposed by sequestration, would be nearly impossible for the Department to absorb without real and serious damage to our ability to 

protect our national security. This hearing series was helpful in 

building this case as well. 

National security is, however, defined by more than just the level 

of funding provided to the Department of Defense. Deficits matter. 

Our national debt matters. Over time, these have real and negative 

impacts on our national well-being. While Secretary Panetta and 

some of the other Administration witnesses discussed possible 

areas of savings, this extensive series of hearings offered little discussion on how to better spend defense dollars or how to spend 

less. As members of the House Armed Services Committee, and 

Congress, our responsibility is not to ensure that the Department 

of Defense spends as much money as possible, but rather to ensure 

that enough funds are provided for our national defense and that 

they are spent wisely and well. 

We were pleased to see the hearings provide a forum for the 

Committee to express its broadly-held concerns about sequestration. Unfortunately however, the Committee did not follow this expression with suggestions of how to responsibly cut the deficit sufficiently to avoid sequestration. Some members did take the opportunity to express their views on this subject—many of the signers 

of this document, for example, have expressed the belief that increased revenues have to be part of the solution. We were disappointed that our majority colleagues did not agree to put this on 

the table as a position of the Committee to avoid defense sequestration. 

Again, we found this hearing series to be useful in many ways. 

Ultimately however, the situation remains the same at the end of 

the series that it was at the beginning—we simply must find sav-
124 

ings in our national budgets, we must ensure that defense and nondefense dollars are spent well, and we must have a budget that 

makes sense by broadly balancing revenues with spending. Simply 

put, as members of the House Armed Services Committee, we must 

remember that our responsibility to national security is more than 

just our responsibility to the defense budget. 

ADAM SMITH. 

SILVESTRE REYES. 

LORETTA SANCHEZ. 

ROBERT A. BRADY. 

SUSAN A. DAVIS. 

RICK LARSEN. 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO. 

JOE COURTNEY. 

DAVID LOEBSACK. 

WILLIAM OWENS. 

MARK S. CRITZ. 

HANK JOHNSON. 
(125) 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT 

There are those who argue that with our current national strategy, additional deep cuts to our military, as would occur under sequester, would be catastrophic. We agree. But it seems clear to 

most that our financial plight and the realities of the world we live 

in require a new national strategy. Until we have completed that 

exercise we have no way of knowing how much more might be cut 

without risk to our national security. The thoughts contained herein address that decision making process. I am on the House Armed 

Services Committee and am deeply concerned that we continue to 

support a military adequate to the security needs of our country. 

But there must be a rationalization between the magnitude of our 

military might and the necessity to develop a financial policy that 

avoids bankruptcy of our country. With a debt that grows another 

$1 billion every six hours with no plateau in sight, this is a 

daunting challenge. These two demands, an adequate military and 

the avoidance of national bankruptcy, must share risks equitably. 

Our deficit is hundreds of billions of dollars larger than all of our 

discretionary spending. Thus, if we had no Department of Defense, 

no Department of Homeland Security, no CIA or FBI or any of the 

other myriads of government agencies and programs, we would still 

have a deficit of hundreds of billions of dollars. 

Defense is more than half of all discretionary spending. These 

numbers reflect two fundamental realities: First, we cannot balance our budget without controlling the explosive growth of entitlement programs. Second, if we’re ever going to balance the budget, 

we need to cut all discretionary spending programs including defense. 

But how can we cut further the defense budget without putting 

our nation at risk? 

In large measure, the factors that ultimately determine the size 

of the defense budget are beyond the practical control of the congressional defense committees and our military. Our foreign policy 

has our troops in more than 100 countries, driving up defense 

costs. Wars, and especially protracted wars like Iraq and Afghanistan, drive up the cost of defense. Nation-building projects—in 

which we depend on our troops to carry out functions related to the 

economic, social and political development of Afghanistan and Iraq 

that fall far outside of our military’s core mission—drive up defense 

costs. 

In addition, defense costs are driven skyward because there really is what President Eisenhower termed a ‘‘military-industrial complex’’ comprising a powerful trifecta—the military, the defense industry, and Congress. Congress supports increased spending because the defense industry intentionally spreads its industrial base 

over as many states as possible, in part to build a political machine 
126 

for procuring defense dollars, in partnership with the Congress. If 

all politics are local, then it is understandable that Congressmen 

and Senators will vote their districts interests, and convince themselves that they are voting for the national interest. And so the defense budget grows. 

Now that the Cold War is long over, is it really necessary for the 

United States to maintain a military presence in so many nations, 

and so many far-flung military bases over the globe, in order to 

support its role as ‘‘world policeman’’? The U.S. spends almost as 

much money on defense as all the rest of the world. We spend more 

on defense than the next eleven countries combined, and nine of 

those countries are allies of ours. Surely our national interest 

would be better served by policies that encourage our allies to bear 

the burden of their own defense so that they have the military capability to police their own neighborhoods. We are the first ‘‘empire’’ in history where imperialism operates in reverse—all of the 

economic benefits flow to our allies, or to nations we have defeated, 

emptying our coffers. 

We must learn to be more parsimonious with our wars, reserving 

military force as a last resort, and undertaking grave consideration 

of the human and financial costs that will be incurred before we 

begin the effort. We must recognize that the cost of wars does not 

end when the shooting stops. Recent history has shown that extraordinary costs continue at home with veteran services, and these 

expenses continue to empty our national treasuries long into the 

future. 

There are also cost savings to be found in baseline Department 

of Defense budgeting. Is it really necessary for the United States 

to procure costly new generations of weapons systems, mostly legacies from the Cold War, when existing weapons will suffice for the 

conflicts of today? Rather, our precious defense dollars should be 

invested in research and development so that America is ready to 

face modern threats. For example, an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) 

or cyber-attack could collapse the critical infrastructures that sustain the lives of millions of Americans. The Department of Defense 

should work cooperatively with the Department of Homeland Security to be ready for these kinds of unconventional threats. 

We also must recognize that some of the most fundamental dangers to our national security may fall beyond traditional military 

threats. Our dependence on fossil fuels makes us tremendously vulnerable. The worldwide demand for oil is increasing at such a rapid 

rate that it will eventually pass available oil production, resulting 

in sharp price spikes. From a national security perspective, it is 

time to cut our addiction to foreign oil, and to transition to domestic, cleaner and renewable energy sources. Some of the resources 

currently devoted to protecting the supply of oil must be redirected 

to advancing renewable and clean energy. 

The decline of America’s industrial base also undermines our national security. We must have national policies that create a ‘‘Make 

it in America’’ economy, producing state of the art transportation 

and clean energy systems. We have known for decades that the 

strongest manufacturing sector is the key to economic and military 

security. To keep our country safe and prosperous, we need to re-
127 

main on the cutting edge of technological innovation and production, ensuring our leadership in the global economy. 

With the right national strategy for the use of our military, we 

might significantly cut the defense budget without putting our nation at risk. Indeed, it is long overdue that we re-think some of the 

fundamentals driving our defense budget. We might find that we 

can significantly cut the defense budget and improve our national 

security with an appropriate national strategy for use of our military in the defense of our country. 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT. 
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ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS 

This committee print is the product of a months-long investigation by the committee into the future of the United States Military, 

ten years after the terrorist attacks of September 11th. We live in 

a far different world today, and I thank Chairman McKeon and 

Ranking Member Smith for holding these hearings. 

In his note, Chairman McKeon rightly acknowledges the pivotal 

strategic moment. 2011 alone has seen US forces kill Osama bin 

Laden and Anwar Al-Awlaki, greatly weakening Al Qaeda. In Afghanistan, the efforts and sacrifices of US and coalition forces have 

the Taliban on the run, and the Afghan people are beginning to 

stand up and defend themselves. And in Iraq, the country has been 

stabilized, and we are preparing to honor our commitment by withdrawing all troops by the end of calendar 2011. 

Admiral Mullen and others have correctly recognized the debt as 

our greatest threat to national security. Already, Congress has cut 

over $300 billion from the base defense budget over the next decade. Some have said that this is enough. Respectfully, I disagree. 

The entire Federal government should be forced to demonstrate 

that tax dollars with which it is entrusted are spent responsibly, 

and the DOD should not be exempted. 

Cuts should be made on the basis of what is needed to provide 

our brave men and women with the tools and training to do the 

job and get home safely. We should be focused on our strategic 

goals, not on arbitrary levels. I believe a targeted DOD cut of $600 

billion over 10 years can be achieved without jeopardizing America’s military might. Baseline military spending, not accounting for 

war costs, has nearly doubled over the past decade. It is time to 

reverse this trend. 

Accelerated withdrawal from Afghanistan can provide massive 

savings. With the death of Osama bin Laden, I believe we can depart Afghanistan by June 2013, consolidating our gains in the region and saving hundreds of billions of dollars. We should also 

close overseas military bases which once served to deter the Soviet 

Union, focusing instead on our current and future threats. 

Further savings can be found by ending the purchase of costly 

unnecessary weapons systems. One such example is MEADS, the 

Medium Extended Air Defense System, which costs billions and is 

redundant. The highly successful Patriots fill the same strategic 

role, and have been used by America and its allies since 1995. 

Cost overruns from repetitive R&D also cost the taxpayers billions. Incentivizing contractors to meet budget and testing requirements on time is a common-sense, market-based solution which 

will provide competition and produce dramatic savings. Lastly, I 

also believe the DOD can look at stateside bases for additional savings. Although BRAC has reduced the domestic footprint of the 
129 

DOD, facilities maintenance costs have not declined concurrently. 

Indeed, on a square footage basis, these costs have increased almost 20% over the past decade. 

I am confident that these and other common sense cuts to the 

defense budget can be made without harm to our national security 

and will produce a leaner, more efficient military. However, we 

cannot put our fiscal house in order solely with cuts to defense. All 

policy options must be considered, including increased revenue. We 

were elected to make difficult decisions. With the country at a 

budgetary and strategic crossroads, cutting the defense budget by 

prioritizing our actual needs is one such decision we can and 

should make. 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS. 
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ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE 

NIKI TSONGAS 

I want to thank Chairman McKeon and Ranking Member Smith 

for holding a series of hearings this fall that have allowed the Committee to reflect upon the challenges our nation has faced since the 

terrible attacks of September 11, 2001 and to confront the challenges we face moving forward. 

Testimony before this panel has rightly noted that our nation’s 

fiscal crisis represents a threat to our national security. As discussed during these hearings and as I stated earlier this year in 

a letter to the Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction, making the 

additional and severe cuts required by the Budget Control Act sequester has the potential to undermine our military in an uncertain world. In my letter I reaffirmed my support for the initial 

round of deep cuts made in the BCA to both defense and non-defense spending because I recognize the need to phase in cuts over 

the next ten years, but stated that ‘‘allowing the sequester to make 

far deeper cuts on top of those already enacted risks putting our 

economy and our people at great harm.’’ I believe this to be true 

but I also recognize that recent proposals to repeal the sequester 

and do nothing in its place to address our national debt are just 

as dangerous to our long-term survival. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates both noted 

last year, our rising debt has implications for both our influence 

around the world and our ability to project strength. 

In the words of one expert witness before this Committee, our 

nation cannot afford to ‘‘balance the budget on the back of defense’’ 

while we face ongoing threats from international terrorists and 

dangerous foreign regimes. But neither can we continue on the 

unsustainable path of responding to those threats without paying 

for our defense. The threats outlined by this Committee are very 

real, but for the last decade—and for the first time in our nation’s 

history—we have responded by cutting taxes on the wealthiest few 

and allowing multi-billion dollar corporations to shirk their social 

responsibilities even as they benefit from the global security our 

nation provides. 

Last August, this Congress made a commitment to the American people to reduce our annual deficits by an additional $1.2 trillion 

over ten years. Stepping away from that commitment risks a costly 

downgrade of our nation’s credit and undermines our ability to 

deter would-be aggressors. To protect our national security, we 

must use this next year to agree on a balanced deficit reduction 

plan that makes a real down payment on our national debt, prevents deep cuts from undermining our fragile economic recovery 

and harming our national security, incorporates broadly shared 

sacrifices, and protects the guarantees of Social Security, Medicare, 

and veterans’ benefits. This is both just and pragmatic. To return 
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our deficits to the surpluses we ran in the late 1990s and pay down 

our long-term debt will require a sustained commitment from the 

entire nation, a commitment that will only come if a deal is seen 

as fair. Finally, a balanced plan will ensure that we are all contributing to our nation’s defense. 

I look forward to working with the Committee on these issues in 

the year ahead. 

NIKI TSONGAS. 
(132) 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI 

The House Armed Services Committee rarely produces committee 

reports other than those accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act or other such legislation. The majority provided little advance notice to the members of the intent to produce this report. Furthermore, the report was not subjected to a markup. If 

this report were simply a compilation of the testimony provided by 

the witnesses, the only objection to widely distributing a hard-copy 

printing of information already available on the committee’s 

website would be the unnecessary cost in times of limited budgets. 

Unfortunately, the Chairman has elected to place a partisan and 

often hyperbolic statement from him at the beginning of the report, 

only including statements of other members as ‘‘additional or dissenting views’’ at the back of the report and making it appear as 

if the committee as a whole has endorsed his message. We have 

not. 

A primary responsibility of the House Armed Services Committee 

is to engage in serious analysis and debates about defense-related 

decisions that will impact our financial stability and our national 

security for decades to come. Viable alternatives for assuring our 

nation’s security and careful consideration of the costs of comparative strategies should be considered. Unfortunately, the series of 

hearings presented over the past months, which are reported in 

this document, have largely served to silence rather than stimulate 

debate about the critical challenges we face. Dissenting views were 

not genuinely considered and alternative options were not laid on 

the table. The result is the artificial ‘‘consensus’’ presented in this 

report, reflecting not bipartisan agreement, but rather a pre-ordained conclusion that nothing dare be touched in defense spending 

lest the safety and security of the American people be placed in 

peril. 

Yet, our nation faces serious financial challenges which also 

threaten our security, as indicated by several defense experts. Like 

it or not, spending for national defense will be reduced. It has to 

happen, and it can be done without reducing our security. This 

committee should have spent this time examining the options and 

developing strategies to do more with less. We ask that of all other 

levels of and components of government, and the same standard 

must also apply to defense. 

It is important to put the issue of defense budget in perspective. 

The Department of Defense baseline budget, excluding funding for 

the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, has increased by 48.5% in real 

numbers over the past decade, rising from $361 billion in FY2001 

to $536 billion in FY2011. War spending, paid for largely through 

supplemental budgets, has added an additional $1.2 trillion to 

these costs, resulting in a more than doubling of annual total de-
133 

fense spending over the last ten years. Even excluding war funding, defense spending has contributed more than twice as much to 

the deficit as non-defense discretionary spending over the past decade. While expenses have skyrocketed, revenues have fallen. The 

Bush tax cuts for the rich have allowed millionaires to avoid paying 

their share, meaning that rising defense budgets have been paid 

for with borrowed dollars. 

In the face of rising defense costs and pressures to reduce the 

federal budget deficit, some Members of Congress and defense 

budget experts have engaged in critical analysis to determine how 

to reduce defense expenditures while ensuring America’s national 

security and economic vitality. I asked my staff to prepare a matrix 

comparing six such defense savings plans, prepared by think-tanks, 

Members of Congress, and other entities whose positions span the 

political spectrum. The matrix identifies areas of consensus among 

the left, right and center, and it serves as a starting point for wellinformed analysis and debate leading to reasonable policies. I also 

continue to advocate for an approach to defense savings that is 

grounded in a forward-thinking strategy, such as that outlined in 

A National Strategic Narrative, prepared by respected members of 

our military. This document offers a nonpartisan blueprint for ensuring America’s security and prosperity in the unique environment of the 21st century. 

This kind of critical thinking was not represented in HASC hearings on defense cuts. On the contrary, in many cases the witnesses 

testifying before the committee had large, and undisclosed, conflicts 

of interest. Almost all of the retired military officers the committee 

heard from are employed by major defense companies, hedge funds, 

or holding companies with significant amounts of defense industry 

investment. Other non-military witnesses work for think tanks, 

lobbying groups, and other organizations whose major funding 

sources or clients are also major US defense companies. The witnesses quoted here have a direct financial interest in seeing defense budgets maintained at current levels or increase. 

These undisclosed conflicts of interest reveal the close links between incomes of former members of the national security establishment and the current Department of Defense budget, a concern 

that President Eisenhower raised in his 1960 speech: 

In the councils of government, we must guard against the 

acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or 

unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and 

will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We 

should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the 

huge industrial and military machinery of defense with 

our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together. 

America’s security is not limited to deterring and defeating military threats. The vitality of our economy, the solvency of our financial system, the health and education of our population, and the 

sustainability of our resources are all critical components for keep-
134 

ing America safe now and into the future. In determining how to 

decrease our budget deficit, we must adopt a whole of government 

approach to security, recognizing the interdependency of each of 

our federal agencies and the functions they serve. 

As we make difficult choices about how to prioritize our spending, another quote by President Eisenhower reminds us of the 

tradeoffs we face: 

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every 

rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those 

who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not 

clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. 

It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its 

scientists, the hopes of its children. This is not a way of 

life at all in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening 

war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron. 

As Chairman McKeon rightly notes, we find ourselves at a ‘‘strategic juncture’’ and we are responsible for the votes we cast. We are 

also responsible for engaging in the careful research, critical analysis, and open debate that will help us to make the best decisions 

for our nation. The series of hearings included in this report and 

the nontransparent and biased way in which the report was prepared hinder rather than help this deliberative process. I remain 

hopeful that as Members of Congress—and as Members of the 

Armed Services Committee in particular—we will fulfill our duty of 

engaging in meaningful, well-informed discussions about how to 

best utilize scarce resources to ensure America’s security. Our continued failure to do so would indeed be ‘‘disastrous.’’ 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI. 
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(159) 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE 

HANK JOHNSON 

This committee report includes testimony from seven hearings 

over the last several months. These hearings were convened to consider the potential impacts of large budget cuts on the ability of the 

U.S. military to meet the national security challenges faced by our 

nation. 

I agree with Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, Secretary Panetta, and many of the witnesses at recent hearings that 

the approximately $1 trillion in cuts to defense spending over nine 

fiscal years (2013–2021) imposed by the Budget Control Act could 

threaten U.S. national security. 

To contextualize these possible cuts, it is worth noting that the 

Department of Defense’s budget has grown from approximately 

$316 billion in 2001 to more than $680 billion in 2011 (of which 

roughly $159 billion are for Overseas Contingency Operations). 

Even if the full measure of sequestration is imposed through 2021, 

the Department of Defense’s annual base budget would remain 

larger than it was a decade ago. 

However, Secretary Panetta and others have expressed serious 

concerns regarding the potential impact of $1 trillion in cuts to the 

defense budget for fiscal years 2013 through 2021, and I share 

those concerns. We face an array of demands and challenges that 

require us to sustain serious investment in our armed forces: a 

worldwide counterterrorism mission, our obligations to service 

members, evolving security challenges in the Asia Pacific region 

and the Arctic, instability in the Middle East, the need to reset 

equipment after more than a decade of combat in harsh environments, the need to modernize our military and expand our naval 

and air forces, and a host of emerging threats. 

I cannot agree, however, with those who argue that there is no 

room in the budget of the Department of Defense for additional reductions over the next ten years, particularly as we complete our 

withdrawal from Iraq and draw down forces in Afghanistan. It will 

be the task of the department’s leadership and Congress to find additional savings by making hard choices with regard to military 

programs, eliminating waste, and making acquisition affordable. 

With or without cuts to the defense budget, the catastrophically 

flawed acquisition system at the Department of Defense is a strategic vulnerability and a key cause of waste. 

I fully agree with Ranking Member Smith when he states in his 

contribution to this volume, which I have co-signed, that ‘‘[a]s 

members of the House Armed Services Committee, and Congress, 

our responsibility is not to ensure that the Department of Defense 

spends as much money as possible, but rather to ensure that 

enough funds are provided for our national defense and that they 

are spent wisely and well.’’ I further agree with his contention that 
160 

any serious effort to address long-run fiscal imbalances without unwise cuts to defense requires a budget that sensibly balances revenues and spending. 

Finally, in response to Chairman McKeon’s preface to this volume, I will dissent from his characterization of the last ten years 

of military operations. 

The decade since September 11, 2001, has been marked not by 

a highly effective and strategically prudent application of the U.S. 

armed forces to defend the United States against violent extremists, as Chairman McKeon argues. The use of force in Iraq did not 

reduce the threat of terrorism and was a strategic error. Our campaign in Afghanistan—a war of self-defense—was deprived of resources while we focused on an elective expeditionary mission in 

Iraq. The result of this mismanagement was deteriorated Afghan 

security that threatened regional stability and jeopardized victory. 

In Iraq, our men and women in uniform performed their duties 

with characteristic professionalism and courage. Their effectiveness 

in the latter half of the decade has enabled us to bring our forces 

home. But the fact remains—and future generations of Americans 

will likely assess—that the Iraq War needlessly depleted our forces 

and was a distraction from the global counterterrorism mission and 

the mission in Afghanistan. 

In Afghanistan, not until President Obama’s inauguration in 

2009 did our effort receive the focus and attention necessary for 

victory in one of the least forgiving environments on earth. President Obama, former Secretary Gates, Secretary Panetta and their 

team have subsequently laid the foundations for gradual transfer 

of responsibility for security to Afghan National Security Forces 

and a responsible drawdown of the International Security Assistance Force scheduled to be completed by the end of 2014. 

Although this historical record is not the focus of this report or 

of recent hearings, in a document purporting to represent the views 

of the House Armed Services Committee I am compelled to present 

a more accurate account of recent history than that presented by 

Chairman McKeon in his preface. 

HANK JOHNSON. 
(161) 

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 

A2/AD Anti-access/area denial 

AQAP Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

BRAC Base closure and realignment 

CR Continuing resolution 

EU European Union 

FYDP Future Years Defense Program 

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

GDP Gross domestic product 

GPS Global Positioning System 

IED Improvised explosive device 

IMF International Monetary Fund 

ISR Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit 

M/V Merchant vessel 

MILCON Military construction 

MRAP Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NCO Noncommissioned officer 

NORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command 

O&M Operation and maintenance 

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 

R&D Research and development 

ROTC Reserve Officers’ Training Corps 

SEALs U.S. Navy Sea, Air and Land teams 

SOF Special Operations Forces 

SOUTHCOM U.S. Southern Command 

UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle 

USA United States Army 

USAF United States Air Force 

USMC United States Marine Corps 

USN United States Navy 

WMD Weapon of mass destruction 

WTO World Trade Organization 

Æ