J

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NON
- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION
- SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

C C OMMONWEALTH OF P ENNSYLVANIA

v.

J J UAN RIVERA

Appellant :
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1192 MDA 2017 Appeal from the PCRA Order June 30, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

- 35

- CR

- 0000472

- 2012, CP

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- CR

- 0000476

- 2012

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JANUARY 26, 2018
Juan Rivera appeals from the trial court’s order d enying his petition filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541

- 9546.
For the reasons that follow, we quash the appeal.
In July 2012 , a jury convicted Rivera of three counts of rape of a child,

two counts of rape, seven counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,
one count of aggravated indecent assault of a child, two counts of aggravated
indecent assault of a child less than 16 years old, three counts of indecent
assault of a person less than 13 years of age, two count s of unlawful contact
with a minor, two count s of corruption of minors, and two c ount s of
endangering the welfare of a child. The charges were based on Rivera’s sexual
abuse of his two minor stepdaughters. On December 18, 2012, the cour t
determined Rivera to be a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) under thisJ

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Commonwealth’s version of Megan’s Law, 1 and sentenced him to 108

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year s ’ incarceration, plus 10 years of special probation.
Rivera filed a direct appeal; our Court affirmed his judgment of

sentence. See Commonwealth v. Rivera , 140 MDA 2013 (Pa. Super. f iled
March 26, 2014). On J anuary 5, 2015, Rivera filed a pro se PCRA petition
alleging ineffective assistance of trial counse l for the failure to raise issues on
direct appeal in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and for the failure to argue

the merits of the issues raised in the Rule 1925(b) statement. PCRA counsel
was appointed; on February 3, 2016 , PCRA c ounsel filed a petitio n to withdraw

pursuant to Turner

/ Finley 2 and furnished Rivera with a copy of his no

- merit

letter. On February 22, 2017, the trial court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice
of its intent to dismiss Rivera’s petition and advis ed him of his right to respond

wit hin 20 days. On March 16, 2017, Rivera filed an untimely response to the
court’s Rule 907 notice, again referencing trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. On
June 30, 2017, the court denied Rivera’s petition and granted counsel’s
petition to withdraw. Rivera filed a timely notice of appeal and court

- ordered

Rule 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal.

Because of the deficiencies in Rivera’s appellate brief, we are unable to

discern what issues he wish es to raise or the arguments he wish es to pres ent
to this Court. To begin, we refer Rivera to the general rule that requires that

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

1 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1.

2 Commonwealth v. Turner , 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley , 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).J

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briefs conform to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 2101

states:
Briefs and reproduced records shall conform in all material respects with the requireme nts of these rules as nearly as the circumstances of the particular case will admit, otherwise they may be suppressed, and, if the defects are in the brief or reproduced record of the appellant and are substantial, the appeal or other matter may be quashed or dismissed.
Pa.R.A.P. 2101. We also bring Rule 2111 to Rivera’s attention, which
provides:

Rule 2111. Brief of the Appellant (a) General rule. The brief of the appellant, except as otherwise prescribed by these rules, shall consist of the following matte r, separately and distinctly entitled and in the following order: (1) Statement of jurisdiction. (2) Order or other determination in question. (3) Statement of both the scope of review and the standard of review. (4) Statement of the questions involved. (5) Statement of the c ase. (6) Summary of argument. (7) Argument for appellant. (8) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. (9) The opinions and pleadings specified in Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule. (10) In the Superior Court, a copy of the statement of the matters complained of on appeal filed with the trial court pursuant to Rule 1925(b), or an averment that no order requiring a Rule 1925(b) statement was entered.

(b) Opinions below. There shall be appended to the brief a copy of any opinions delivered by any court or other government unit below relating to the order or other determination under review, if pertinent to the questions involved[.]J

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Pa.R.A.P. 2111. Rivera’s brief complet ely omits all designated portions of Rule

2111.
Although Rivera lists several issues in his pro se Rule 1925(b)
statement, none of those issues are presented or argued in his brief.

Moreover, no ne of the sections of his brief contain references to the record or

to case law. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(4) and Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b).

Our review of Rivera’s brief evidences a complete failure to abide by the
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 2116, which is entitled

“Sta tement of Questions Involved” provides in pertinent part that:

The statement of the questions involved must state the question or questions in the briefest and most general terms, without names, dates, amounts or particulars of any kind. It should not ord inarily exceed 15 lines, must never exceed one page, and must always be on a separate page, without any other matter appearing thereon. This rule is to be considered in the highest degree mandatory, admitting of no exception: ordinarily no point will be considered which is not set forth in the statement of questions involved or suggested thereby

. Pa.R.A.P. 2116 (emphasis added).
Recognizing that Rivera has ignored the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate
Procedure, we conclude that we are unable to conduct a meaningful review.
Moreover, the fact that Rivera is pro se 3 on appeal does not entitle him to a

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3 We note that on November 28, 2017, the trial court granted Rivera in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(G) (“ W hen a defendant satisfies the judge that the defendant is unable to pay the costs of the post

conviction collateral proceedings, the judge shall order that the defendant be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis .”). On appe al, verified IFP status will rel ieve the appellant from paying the required filing fees in the appellate court.J

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more lax application of the rules of procedure. In Commonwealth v. Rivera , 685 A.2d 1011 (Pa. Super. 1996), we stated:

While this court is willing to liberal ly construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, we note that appellant is not entitled to any particular advantage because she lacks legal training. As our supreme court has explained, any layperson choosing to represent [herself] in a legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that [her] lack of expertise and legal training will prove [her] undoing.

Id. at 1013 (quoting O’Neill v. Checker Motors Corp. , 567 A.2d 680, 682
(Pa. Super. 1989)). The Rivera court concluded that “we decl ine to become
the appellant’s counsel. When issues are not properly raised and developed
in briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for
review[,] a Court will not consider the merits thereof.” Id. (quoting

Commonwealth v. Sanford , 445 A.2d 149, 150 (Pa. Super. 1982)).
Similarly, we are compelled to quash this appeal due to the numerous

defects in Rivera’s brief, which we conclude prevent us from conducting a
meaningful review.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______ See Pa.R.A.P. 2701. Moreover an IFP appellant shall not be required to reproduce the record. See Pa.R.A.P. 2151(b). Finally, a party who has been permitted to proceed IFP sh all file 7 copies of each definitive brief with the Superior Court and one copy of each definitive brief on every other party separately represented. See Pa.R.A.P. 2187(c)(iii). IFP status, however, does not relax the rules regarding the content or form of the appellant’s brief on appeal.J

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Appeal quashed. 4

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 1/26/2018

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

4 We note that to the extent Rivera raises issues in his Re ply Brief, we remind him that he is not permitted to raise issues on appeal for the first time in a reply brief. See Commonwealth v. Otera , 860 A.2d 1052 (Pa. Super. 2004); see also Filoon v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n , 684 A.2d 1339 (Pa. Commw. 1994) (appellate court refused to address any issue raised by petitioner in reply brief that were not already raised in initial brief under Pa.R.A.P. 2113).