J-S06029-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

 

v.

RAMEL ANDERSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 345 EDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order January 30, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0607951-2004

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED MARCH 26, 2018

Appellant Ramel Anderson appeals pro se from the order of the PCRA 

court dismissing his second petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

The underlying facts are not relevant to our disposition. In short, 

Anderson was convicted in 2006 of second-degree murder, robbery, and 

burglary, and was sentenced to life imprisonment.2 We affirmed the 

judgement of sentence, and in May 2009, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

denied Anderson’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal. See Commonwealth v. 

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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541-46.

2 Appellant was convicted of violating 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 3701, and 

3502(a), following the 1998 murder of George Volz inside his home.
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Anderson, 965 A.2d 286 (Pa.Super. 2008) (unpublished memorandum), 

appeal denied, 972 A.2d 519 (Pa. 2009).

In May 2010, Anderson filed his first PCRA petition, pro se. Anderson

was appointed counsel, who subsequently filed a Petition to Withdraw 

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en 

banc). The PCRA court granted counsel leave to withdraw and dismissed 

Anderson’s PCRA Petition, and we affirmed; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

denied allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 87 A.3d 876 

(Pa.Super. 2013) (unpublished memorandum), review denied, 87 A.3d 814 

(Pa. 2014).

On October 8, 2013, Anderson filed a second PCRA petition, which gave 

rise to this appeal. In the Petition, Anderson claimed that he received a copy 

of his criminal docket on September 17, 2013, at which time he discovered

that the Commonwealth did not file a criminal complaint against him until July 

1, 2004, even though he was arrested on March 13, 2004, and held without 

bail. See PCRA Petition, filed August 8, 2013, at 4.

The PCRA court took no action on Anderson’s second petition until May 

19, 2014, when counsel was appointed to represent Anderson.

3 On May 13, 

2016, counsel filed a Finley letter. The PCRA court dismissed Anderson’s 

second PCRA petition as untimely on January 6, 2017, and permitted counsel 

to withdraw. 

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3 For reasons that do not appear in the record, new counsel was appointed for 

Appellant on September 17, 2015.
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Anderson filed a notice of appeal on January 10, 2017. However, on 

January 30, 2017, the PCRA court vacated its order of January 6, 2017, and 

issued a new order, again dismissing Anderson’s second PCRA petition and 

permitting counsel to withdraw. It appears that the January 6, 2017 order of 

the PCRA court permitted the wrong attorney to withdraw, spurring the 

January 30, 2017 correction.

Anderson presents the following issues:

1. Is the Defendant entitled to a new trial because the trial 

counsel failed to investigate time limits and exclusions under 

the Speedy Trial Rule where the Commonwealth failed to file

charges against the Defendant within a proper time limit?

2. Is the Defendant entitled to a new trial because of [sic] the 

Prosecutor’s closing remarks violated the Defendant’s 

Constitutional rights?

3. Is the Defendant entitled to a new trial because trial counsel 

failed to investigate and to seek out an expert witness to 

rebut the medical examiner[’]s finding that could prove that 

the decedent could have died other than [by] homicide?

4. Is the Defendant entitled to a new trial because the 

Philadelphia Police’s search of the Defendant’s home was 

unconstitutional and illegal because they were only allowed 

to do a protective sweep and not search because they did 

not have a search warrant so any evidence after that point 

is suppose[d] to be thrown out because of fruit from a 

poisonous tree?

Anderson’s Br. at 3 (answers below omitted).

“[I]n reviewing the propriety of an order granting or denying PCRA relief, 

this Court is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the 
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determination of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error.”

Commonwealth v. Grove, 170 A.3d 1127, 1136 (Pa.Super. 2017).

We first consider whether Anderson’s Notice of Appeal was filed 

prematurely, as the PCRA court vacated the January 6 order under appeal and 

entered a subsequent final order on January 30, and Anderson filed no new 

notice of appeal. Because the January 6 order was appealable at the time it 

was entered, and because the January 30 order merely corrected a patent 

error in the January 6 order, we will not quash the appeal as premature. See

Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (“A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 

determination but before the entry of an appealable order shall be treated as 

filed after such entry and on the day thereof”).

We do not reach the merits of Anderson’s issues on appeal because the 

PCRA court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction. The PCRA court 

explained in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion that the PCRA’s timeliness 

requirements are jurisdictional, and that under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1), all 

PCRA petitions must be filed within one year of the date on which the 

petitioner’s judgement of sentence becomes final, unless the petition meets 

one of three exceptions. See PCRA Court Opinion, filed June 9, 2017, at 7-8. 

The PCRA court found that although Anderson claimed the exception in 

subsection 9545 (b)(1)(ii) (that “the facts upon which the claim is predicated 

were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 
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excellence of due diligence”), Anderson presented no newly discovered 

evidence to validate his untimely petition. Id. at 8.

We agree with the PCRA court’s assessment. Anderson’s judgment of 

sentence became final on August 26, 2009, 90 days after the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court denied Anderson’s petition for direct review, as Anderson did 

not seek review in the United States Supreme Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(3) (stating that a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct 

review, or the expiration of time for seeking direct review); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 

13 (allowing 90 days to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United 

States Supreme Court); Commonwealth v. Crews, 863 A.2d 498, 501 n.1 

(Pa. 2004). Anderson then had one year, until August 26, 2010, to file a timely 

PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Anderson’s petition, filed in 

2013, is therefore patently untimely.

Anderson claims that his petition is timely under the after discovered 

facts exception because the copy of the court docket he obtained in 2013 

alerted him to the date of his arrest and the date the filing of the criminal 

complaint. However, the after-discovered facts exception “requires [a] 

petitioner to allege and prove that there were facts that were unknown to him 

and that he could not have ascertained those facts by the exercise of due 

diligence.” Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 720 (Pa. 2008) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). “The focus of the exception is on the 

newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source for 
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previously known facts.” Id. (quotation marks, citation, brackets, and 

footnote omitted). The dates of Anderson’s arrest and the filing of the criminal 

complaint in 2004 could have been ascertained by Anderson’s due diligence

at least at the time of his first PCRA petition, and therefore his 2013 receipt 

of a copy of his court docket does not meet the after-discovered facts 

exception. Thus, we affirm the PCRA court’s dismissal of Anderson’s untimely 

petition.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/26/18