RENDERED: APRIL 9, 2021; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2019-CA-1874-DG

ARIEL CHILLERS APPELLANT 

v. 

ON REVIEW FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE ANGELA MCCORMICK BISIG, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 19-XX-000004 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION

REVERSING AND REMANDING

**   **  **

BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON, AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES.

ACREE, JUDGE: Ariel Chillers appeals the Jefferson Circuit Court’s order 

affirming the Jefferson District Court’s restitution order. She believes both the 

circuit court and the district court erred by ordering her to pay restitution for stolen 

items when she only pleaded guilty to criminal trespass. We find the circuit court 

and the district court abused their discretion and reverse and remand for findings 

consistent with this Opinion. 
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BACKGROUND

Alexander Jones is the homeowner of 8211 Candleglow Lane. While 

renovating the house, Jones left the house vacant. On March 16, 2018, he was 

working on the house, but left around 4:00 p.m. He returned the next day around 

noon to find the doors boarded up. Jones had to enter his house via a window. 

Once inside, he found an air mattress, human waste in a bucket, and missing tools. 

Early the next morning, Jones returned with a security guard to find Ariel Chillers 

and Trenton Baucom in his home. When the police arrived, Chillers and Baucom 

were arrested for second-degree burglary. 

Officer Livers, the officer on scene, testified at the probable cause 

hearing. He stated he searched both Chillers and Baucom but did not find anything 

on them. He went on to say, “I had no proof that they took any of the tools, so I 

told [Jones] that he could contact our tool report system and get a report through 

them for the other items because we didn’t know who took those.” (Video Record 

12/19/2018, 1:34:25-1:34:37). Ultimately, the trial court found probable cause for 

third-degree burglary and referred the case to the grand jury. However, the grand 

jury did not indict on burglary. Instead, it returned the case to the trial court for 

first-degree criminal trespass and third-degree criminal mischief. No theft charges 

were added. 
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Both Chillers and Baucom pleaded guilty to the new charges. In 

exchange for Chillers’ testimony, she received a sentence of one year, 

conditionally discharged for two years. Her case file noted “restitution reserved.” 

Two months later, over Chillers’ objection, the Commonwealth moved for a 

restitution hearing. 

At the restitution hearing, Jones testified and sought restitution for ten 

items that were stolen from his property, as well as some door trim damage. Both 

Chillers and Baucom denied stealing Jones’ property. Upon close of evidence, the 

trial court found Jones’ testimony credible and ordered Chillers and Baucom to pay 

restitution for nine of the ten items Jones claimed were stolen. 

Chillers appealed to the circuit court which affirmed the trial court 

stating, “while the Court understands Chillers’ argument that property damage 

does not necessarily flow from a guilty plea to a criminal trespass, the trial judge 

listened to evidence and in its discretion found that the alleged damages were the 

result of the defendant’s conduct.” This Court then granted Chillers’ request for 

discretionary review. 

ANALYSIS

The issue before this Court is whether a trial court can order 

restitution for damages not incurred as a direct result of the specific criminal act of 

which a defendant has been convicted. Specifically, in this case we must 
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determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Chillers to 

reimburse Jones for stolen items when the only crime to which she pleaded guilty 

was criminal trespass. “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s 

decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal 

principles.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky.

2000) (citing Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)). Insofar 

as this case requires this Court to construe statutory provisions, we do so de novo. 

Bob Hook Chevrolet Isuzu, Inc. v. Commonwealth Transp. Cabinet, 983 S.W.2d 

488, 490-91 (Ky. 1998).

There are two statutory provisions relevant to this discussion. First, 

KRS1 533.030 discusses when a trial court is required to order restitution and 

provides, in pertinent part:

When imposing a sentence of probation or conditional 

discharge in a case where a victim of a crime has suffered 

monetary damage as a result of the crime due to his 

property having been converted, stolen, or unlawfully 

obtained, or its value substantially decreased as a result of 

the crime, or where the victim suffered actual medical 

expenses, direct out-of-pocket losses, or loss of earning as 

a direct result of the crime . . . the court shall order the 

defendant to make restitution in addition to any other 

penalty provided for the commission of the offense.

KRS 533.030(3) (emphasis added).

 

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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Second, KRS 532.350(1)(a) defines “[r]estitution” as “any form of 

compensation paid by a convicted person to a victim for counseling, medical 

expenses, lost wages due to injury, or property damage and other expenses suffered 

by a victim because of a criminal act[.]” Because restitution provisions are 

remedial in nature, they “should be liberally construed in favor of their remedial 

purpose.” Workforce Dev. Cabinet v. Gaines, 276 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Ky. 2008) 

(citing Kentucky Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Jeffers ex rel. Jeffers, 13 S.W.3d 606, 611 

(Ky. 2000)).

Strictly construing the restitution provisions recited above would only 

require a trial court to order restitution for losses incurred from a defendant’s 

illegal conduct for which he was adjudicated guilty. In this case, Chillers was

adjudicated guilty of criminal trespass. Thus, strictly construed, the restitution 

provisions would not permit the trial court to order restitution for proceeds flowing 

from missing personal property, the loss of which has not been adjudicated as 

attributable to the criminal trespass. However, restitution for damage done to the 

property flowing from criminal trespass would be recoverable. 

Therefore, we must reverse and remand to the trial court to evaluate 

what property damage was done to Jones’ house because of criminal trespass. 

Only damage done from Chillers’ criminal trespass conduct may be recovered in 

restitution.
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ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Joshua M. Reho

Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

David A. Sexton

Assistant Attorney General

Louisville, Kentucky