Filed 11/16/23 Marriage of Turner CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re Marriage of CARRIE 

LYNN and TYLER SAMPSON 

TURNER.

2d Civil No. B327782

(Super. Ct. No. D398339)

(Ventura County)

CARRIE LYNN TURNER,

 Respondent,

v.

TYLER SAMPSON TURNER,

 Appellant.

Tyler Sampson Turner appeals from the judgment

approving the dissolution of his marriage to Carrie Lynn Turner. 

Tyler1 contends the trial court erred when it found that he 

1 We use the parties’ first names to avoid confusion. No 

disrespect is intended.
2

electronically signed an agreement dividing his assets with 

Carrie. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Tyler and Carrie married in 2006. Carrie petitioned to 

dissolve the marriage in 2020. In May 2022, Carrie and Tyler 

agreed to settle the issues remaining after the dissolution of their 

marriage. Tyler’s attorney prepared a “deal memo” 

memorializing the terms of the settlement. 

The deal memo required Tyler to pay Carrie $250,000, half 

of which was due within 90 days of the memo’s execution. Tyler’s 

attorney emailed Carrie’s attorney a copy of the memo bearing 

his and Tyler’s signatures. Carrie and her attorney

countersigned the memo and circulated fully executed copies. 

In July, Tyler’s attorney sent Carrie’s attorney a proposed 

judgment. Carrie’s attorney sent proposed revisions, but then 

heard nothing for several weeks. When asked when they could 

expect to receive any additional revisions, Tyler’s attorney said 

that Tyler had not yet approved the judgment. 

At an August hearing, Carrie’s attorney told the trial court 

that Tyler and Carrie had reached the terms of a settlement, but 

that Tyler had not authorized revisions to the judgment. Tyler 

said that he had relieved his attorney and requested more time to 

review the matter with a new attorney. 

Three weeks later, Tyler sent Carrie a check for $125,000, 

as required by the deal memo. He later put a stop payment on 

the check and was “backing away” from the deal memo. 

Carrie requested an order to enforce the terms of the deal 

memo pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. During 

the hearing on Carrie’s request, the trial court found that the 

memo had been signed by the parties and their attorneys. It 
3

based that finding on communications between the attorneys and 

Tyler’s delivery of the $125,000 check per the memo’s terms. The 

court granted Carrie’s request, and incorporated the memo’s 

terms into the judgment. 

DISCUSSION

Tyler contends the trial court erred when it concluded that 

he electronically signed the deal memo. We disagree.

Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 permits a trial court 

to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement. (Osumi v. Sutton

(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360.) When doing so, it is that 

court’s duty to “determine in the first instance whether the 

parties have entered into an enforceable settlement.” (Ibid.) “In 

making that determination, ‘the . . . court acts as the trier of 

fact.’ ” (Ibid.) We will not disturb the court’s factual findings if 

supported by substantial evidence. (Ibid.)

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that 

Tyler and Carrie entered into an enforceable settlement. Tyler’s 

attorney emailed Carrie’s attorney a copy of the deal memo 

bearing his and Tyler’s signatures. Carrie and her attorney also 

signed the memo, creating an enforceable settlement. 

Tyler complains that the trial court accepted his signature 

without ensuring that it complied with the Uniform Electronic 

Transactions Act (Civ. Code, § 1633.1 et seq.; UETA). But Tyler 

did not raise this issue during the proceedings below. He cannot 

do so for the first time on appeal. (Sea & Sage Audubon Society,

Inc. v. Planning Com. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 412, 417.)

Tyler’s complaint also lacks merit. Pursuant to the UETA, 

an “electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the 

act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any 

manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security 
4

procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic 

record or electronic signature was attributable.” (Civ. Code, 

§ 1633.9, subd. (a), italics added.) Here, the trial court 

determined that the electronic signature on the deal memo was 

the act of Tyler based on his attorney’s representation and him

complying with the terms of the memo by sending Carrie a 

$125,000 check. It is not the province of this court to second 

guess that determination. (Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC

(2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 545.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Carrie Lynn Turner shall 

recover her costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

CODY, J.
Rocky J. Baio, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

David Ingram Law and David L. Ingram for Appellant. 

Ferguson Case Orr Paterson and Joshua S. Hopstone for 

Respondent.