[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ 

No. 12-10956 

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-01769-CAP

GREGORY C. KAPORDELIS, 

llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

EDWARD CARNES,

GERALD B. TJOFLAT,

J.L. EDMONDSON,

STANLEY F. BIRCH, JR.,

JOSEPH M. HOOD,llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll

 Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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(July 24, 2012)

Before BARKETT, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM:

Gregory Kapordelis, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se from the district 

court’s dismissal of his Bivens action brought against five defendants, all appellate 

judges, as frivolous on absolute immunity grounds. On appeal, Kapordelis argues 

that the district court erred by: (1) extending judicial immunity to his suit seeking 

only declaratory relief; and (2) failing, upon his motion, to recuse the district and 

magistrate judges from considering the case. After review, we affirm.

I.

We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint for frivolity 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for abuse of discretion. Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 

1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011). A claim is frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis 

either in law or in fact.” Id. We will not disturb a district court’s decision on 

abuse of discretion review if its decision falls within a range of permissible 

choices, and it is not influenced by a mistake of law. Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 

479, 483 (11th Cir. 2006). 

Here, Kapordelis has alleged that two separate appellate panels abused 

judicial process in deciding his appeals. The first panel affirmed his criminal 

convictions for child pornography. He argues that the panel denied him due 

process when it declined to consider key facts. He also alleges that the panel was 

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motivated by a desire to protect the U.S. Attorney’s Office. The second panel 

decided his appeal from a dismissal of a separate Bivens action. 

This Court has indicated that, in a Bivens action, a federal judge retains 

absolute immunity against injunctive relief, and § 1983 “limit[s] the relief 

available to plaintiffs to declaratory relief.” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 

1241-42 (11th Cir. 2000). We need not reach this issue, however, because 

Kapordelis is not entitled to declaratory relief, as he possesses an adequate remedy 

at law: Kapordelis may pursue Supreme Court review of the challenged decisions. 

See Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1242-43 (“plaintiffs are not entitled to declaratory relief 

[when] there is an adequate remedy at law”). Furthermore, Kapordelis’s 

conclusory allegations of bias against the circuit judges and visiting district judge 

who heard his prior appeals are insufficient to make out a constitutional violation. 

Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kapordelis’s 

Bivens claim as frivolous. 

II.

We review a judge’s failure to recuse himself for an abuse of discretion. 

McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990). When 

reviewing a failure to recuse under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), the test is whether an 

“objective, disinterested, lay observer . . . would entertain a significant doubt about 

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the judge’s impartiality.” McWhorter, 906 F.2d at 678 (quotation omitted). A 

judge’s rulings in the same or a related case generally may not serve as the basis 

for recusal, absent a showing of “pervasive bias and prejudice.” McWhorter, 906 

F.2d at 678. 

Here, pervasive bias has not been shown. Kapordelis’s arguments that 

recusal was required are based solely on decisions rendered in a previous case. 

Further, his allegations of prejudice are wholly conclusory. The conclusory 

allegations fail to meet the objective standards for recusal under either 28 U.S.C. 

§ 144 or § 455(a). McWhorter, 906 F.2d at 678. It was therefore not an abuse 

of discretion for the district court to deny the recusal motion. 

AFFIRMED.

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