Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 71 / Wednesday, April 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 20501 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2011–0325; Directorate 

Identifier 2010–NM–278–AD; Amendment 

39–16652; AD 2011–08–02] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Fokker 

Services B.V. Model F.27 Mark 050 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD results 

from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

[T]he Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) has published Special Federal 

Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and the Joint 

Aviation Authorities (JAA) has published 

Interim Policy INT/POL/25/12. The design 

review conducted by Fokker Services on the 

Fokker 50 and Fokker 60 in response to these 

regulations revealed that, if chafing occurs 

between the Fuel Quantity Probe (FQP) and 

the probe wiring, with additional factors, this 

may result in an ignition source in the wing 

tank vapour space. 

This condition, if not corrected, in 

combination with flammable fuel vapours, 

could result in a wing fuel tank explosion 

and consequent loss of the aeroplane. 

This AD requires actions that are 

intended to address the unsafe 

condition described in the MCAI. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective April 

28, 2011. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in the AD 

as of April 28, 2011. 

We must receive comments on this 

AD by May 31, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–40, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The street address for 

the Docket Operations office (phone: 

800–647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES

section. Comments will be available in 

the AD docket shortly after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tom 

Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone: 

425–227–1137; fax: 425–227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

The European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Community, has issued EASA 

Airworthiness Directive 2010–0157, 

dated August 3, 2010 (referred to after 

this as ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct an unsafe 

condition for the specified products. 

The MCAI states: 

[T]he Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) has published Special Federal 

Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and the Joint 

Aviation Authorities (JAA) has published 

Interim Policy INT/POL/25/12. The design 

review conducted by Fokker Services on the 

Fokker 50 and Fokker 60 in response to these 

regulations revealed that, if chafing occurs 

between the Fuel Quantity Probe (FQP) and 

the probe wiring, with additional factors, this 

may result in an ignition source in the wing 

tank vapour space. 

This condition, if not corrected, in 

combination with flammable fuel vapours, 

could result in a wing fuel tank explosion 

and consequent loss of the aeroplane. 

For the reasons described above, this AD 

requires a one-time [general visual] 

inspection to check for the presence of a 

rubber sleeve and cable tie near each FQP in 

both wing tanks and, depending on findings, 

the installation of a sleeve and cable tie. 

You may obtain further information by 

examining the MCAI in the AD docket. 

The FAA has examined the 

underlying safety issues involved in fuel 

tank explosions on several large 

transport airplanes, including the 

adequacy of existing regulations, the 

service history of airplanes subject to 

those regulations, and existing 

maintenance practices for fuel tank 

systems. As a result of those findings, 

we issued a regulation titled ‘‘Transport 

Airplane Fuel Tank System Design 

Review, Flammability Reduction and 

Maintenance and Inspection 

Requirements’’ (66 FR 23086, May 7, 

2001). In addition to new airworthiness 

standards for transport airplanes and 

new maintenance requirements, this 

rule included Special Federal Aviation 

Regulation No. 88 (‘‘SFAR 88,’’ 

Amendment 21–78, and subsequent 

Amendments 21–82 and 21–83). 

Among other actions, SFAR 88 

requires certain type design (i.e., type 

certificate (TC) and supplemental type 

certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate 

that their fuel tank systems can prevent 

ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This 

requirement applies to type design 

holders for large turbine-powered 

transport airplanes and for subsequent 

modifications to those airplanes. It 

requires them to perform design reviews 

and to develop design changes and 

maintenance procedures if their designs 

do not meet the new fuel tank safety 

standards. As explained in the preamble 

to the rule, we intended to adopt 

airworthiness directives to mandate any 

changes found necessary to address 

unsafe conditions identified as a result 

of these reviews. 

In evaluating these design reviews, we 

have established four criteria intended 

to define the unsafe conditions 

associated with fuel tank systems that 

require corrective actions. The 

percentage of operating time during 

which fuel tanks are exposed to 

flammable conditions is one of these 

criteria. The other three criteria address 

the failure types under evaluation: 

single failures, single failures in 

combination with a latent condition(s), 

and in-service failure experience. For all 

four criteria, the evaluations included 

consideration of previous actions taken 

that may mitigate the need for further 

action. 

The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) 

has issued a regulation that is similar to 

SFAR 88. (The JAA is an associated 

body of the European Civil Aviation 

Conference (ECAC) representing the 

civil aviation regulatory authorities of a 

number of European States who have 

agreed to co-operate in developing and 

implementing common safety regulatory 

standards and procedures.) Under this 

regulation, the JAA stated that all 

members of the ECAC that hold type 

certificates for transport category 

airplanes are required to conduct a 

design review against explosion risks. 

We have determined that the actions 

identified in this AD are necessary to 

reduce the potential of ignition sources 


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20502 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 71 / Wednesday, April 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 

inside fuel tanks, which, in combination 

with flammable fuel vapors, could result 

in fuel tank explosions and consequent 

loss of the airplane. 

Relevant Service Information 

Fokker Services B.V. has issued 

Fokker Service Bulletin SBF50–28–027, 

Revision 1, dated August 20, 2010. The 

actions described in this service 

information are intended to correct the 

unsafe condition identified in the 

MCAI. 

FAA’s Determination and Requirements 

of This AD 

This product has been approved by 

the aviation authority of another 

country, and is approved for operation 

in the United States. Pursuant to our 

bilateral agreement with the State of 

Design Authority, we have been notified 

of the unsafe condition described in the 

MCAI and service information 

referenced above. We are issuing this 

AD because we evaluated all pertinent 

information and determined the unsafe 

condition exists and is likely to exist or 

develop on other products of the same 

type design. 

There are no products of this type 

currently registered in the United States. 

However, this rule is necessary to 

ensure that the described unsafe 

condition is addressed if any of these 

products are placed on the U.S. Register 

in the future. 

Differences Between the AD and the 

MCAI or Service Information 

We have reviewed the MCAI and 

related service information and, in 

general, agree with their substance. But 

we might have found it necessary to use 

different words from those in the MCAI 

to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. 

operators and is enforceable. In making 

these changes, we do not intend to differ 

substantively from the information 

provided in the MCAI and related 

service information. 

We might also have required different 

actions in this AD from those in the 

MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. 

Any such differences are highlighted in 

a NOTE within the AD. 

FAA’s Determination of the Effective 

Date 

Since there are currently no domestic 

operators of this product, notice and 

opportunity for public comment before 

issuing this AD are unnecessary. 

Comments Invited 

This AD is a final rule that involves 

requirements affecting flight safety, and 

we did not precede it by notice and 

opportunity for public comment. We 

invite you to send any written relevant 

data, views, or arguments about this AD. 

Send your comments to an address 

listed under the ADDRESSES section. 

Include ‘‘Docket No. FAA–2011–0325; 

Directorate Identifier 2010–NM–278– 

AD’’ at the beginning of your comments. 

We specifically invite comments on the 

overall regulatory, economic, 

environmental, and energy aspects of 

this AD. We will consider all comments 

received by the closing date and may 

amend this AD because of those 

comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. We 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this AD. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this AD will not 

have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this AD: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

3. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a regulatory evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this AD and placed it in the AD docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

2011–08–02 Fokker Services B.V.: 

Amendment 39–16652. Docket No. 

FAA–2011–0325; Directorate Identifier 

2010–NM–278–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) 

becomes effective April 28, 2011. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to Fokker Services B.V. 

Model F.27 Mark 050 airplanes; certificated 

in any category; all serial numbers. 

Note 1: This AD requires revisions to 

certain operator maintenance documents to 

include new actions (e.g., inspections) and/ 

or critical design configuration control 

limitations (CDCCLs). Compliance with these 

actions and/or CDCCLs is required by 14 CFR 

91.403(c). For airplanes that have been 

previously modified, altered, or repaired in 

the areas addressed by this AD, the operator 

may not be able to accomplish the actions 

described in the revisions. In this situation, 

to comply with 14 CFR 91.403(c), the 

operator must request approval of an 

alternative method of compliance (AMOC) 

according to paragraph (l) of this AD. The 

request should include a description of 

changes to the required actions that will 

ensure the continued operational safety of 

the airplane. 

Subject 

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 28: Fuel. 

Reason 

(e) The mandatory continued airworthiness 

information (MCAI) states: 

[T]he Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) has published Special Federal 

Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and the Joint 

Aviation Authorities (JAA) has published 

Interim Policy INT/POL/25/12. The design 


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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 71 / Wednesday, April 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 20503 

review conducted by Fokker Services on the 

Fokker 50 and Fokker 60 in response to these 

regulations revealed that, if chafing occurs 

between the Fuel Quantity Probe (FQP) and 

the probe wiring, with additional factors, this 

may result in an ignition source in the wing 

tank vapour space. 

This condition, if not corrected, in 

combination with flammable fuel vapours, 

could result in a wing fuel tank explosion 

and consequent loss of the aeroplane. 

Compliance 

(f) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Inspection and Installation 

(g) At a scheduled opening of the fuel 

tanks, but not later than 13 years after the 

effective date of this AD, do a general visual 

inspection for the presence of the rubber 

sleeve and cable tie on the cables of each 

FQP, in accordance with Part 1 of the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker 

Service Bulletin SBF50–28–027, Revision 1, 

dated August 20, 2010. 

(h) If, during the inspection required by 

paragraph (g) of this AD, an FQP does not 

have the rubber sleeve or cable tie installed: 

Before further flight, install the rubber sleeve 

and cable tie on the affected FQP and wiring, 

in accordance with Part 2 of the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker 

Service Bulletin SBF50–28–027, Revision 1, 

dated August 20, 2010. 

Maintenance Program Revision To Add Fuel 

Airworthiness Limitation 

(i) Before further flight after accomplishing 

the inspection required by paragraph (g) of 

this AD: Revise the airplane maintenance 

program by incorporating the CDCCL 

specified in paragraph 1.L.(1)(c) of Fokker 

Service Bulletin SBF50–28–027, Revision 1, 

dated August 20, 2010. 

No Alternative Actions, Intervals, and/or 

CDCCLs 

(j) After accomplishing the revision 

required by paragraph (i) of this AD, no 

alternative actions (e.g., inspection, interval) 

and/or CDCCLs may be used unless the 

actions, intervals, and/or CDCCLs are 

approved as an AMOC in accordance with 

the procedures specified in paragraph (l) of 

this AD. 

Credit for Actions Accomplished in 

Accordance With Previous Service 

Information 

(k) Actions accomplished before the 

effective date of this AD according to Fokker 

Service Bulletin SBF50–28–027, dated May 

27, 2010, are considered acceptable for 

compliance with the corresponding action 

specified in this AD. 

FAA AD Differences 

Note 1: This AD differs from the MCAI 

and/or service information as follows: 

Although EASA Airworthiness Directive 

2010–0157, dated August 3, 2010, specifies 

both revising the maintenance program to 

include airworthiness limitations, and doing 

certain repetitive actions (e.g., inspections) 

and/or maintaining CDCCLs, this AD only 

requires the revision. Requiring a revision of 

the maintenance program, rather than 

requiring individual repetitive actions and/or 

maintaining CDCCLs, requires operators to 

record AD compliance only at the time the 

revision is made. Repetitive actions and/or 

maintaining CDCCLs specified in the 

airworthiness limitations must be complied 

with in accordance with 14 CFR 91.403(c). 

Other FAA AD Provisions 

(l) The following provisions also apply to 

this AD: 

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs): The Manager, International 

Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, FAA, has the authority to 

approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your 

request to your principal inspector or local 

Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the International Branch, send it to ATTN: 

Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, FAA 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057– 

3356; phone: 425–227–1137; fax: 425–227– 

1149. Information may be e-mailed to: 9- 

ANM-116-AMOC-REQUESTS@faa.gov. 

Before using any approved AMOC, notify 

your appropriate principal inspector, or 

lacking a principal inspector, the manager of 

the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. The AMOC 

approval letter must specifically reference 

this AD. 

(2) Airworthy Product: For any 

requirement in this AD to obtain corrective 

actions from a manufacturer or other source, 

use these actions if they are FAA-approved. 

Corrective actions are considered FAAapproved if they are approved by the State 

of Design Authority (or their delegated 

agent). You are required to assure the product 

is airworthy before it is returned to service. 

Related Information 

(m) Refer to MCAI EASA Airworthiness 

Directive 2010–0157, dated August 3, 2010; 

and Fokker Service Bulletin SBF50–28–027, 

Revision 1, dated August 20, 2010; for related 

information. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(n) You must use Fokker Service Bulletin 

SBF50–28–027, Revision 1, dated August 20, 

2010, to do the actions required by this AD, 

unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Fokker Services B.V., 

Technical Services Dept., P.O. Box 231, 2150 

AE Nieuw-Vennep, the Netherlands; 

telephone: +31 (0)252–627–350; fax: +31 

(0)252–627–211; e-mail: technicalservices.

fokkerservices@stork.com; Internet: http:// 

www.myfokkerfleet.com. 

(3) You may review copies of the service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

425–227–1221. 

(4) You may also review copies of the 

service information that is incorporated by 

reference at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go 

to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/

code_of_federal_regulations/

ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 

25, 2011. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2011–8065 Filed 4–12–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2010–1161; Directorate 

Identifier 2010–NM–152–AD; Amendment 

39–16658; AD 2011–08–08] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Empresa 

Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. 

(EMBRAER) Model ERJ 170 and ERJ 

190 Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD results 

from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

It has been found occurrence of screw units 

manufactured with metallographic nonconformity that may increase their 

susceptibility to brittle fracture. The screw 

failure may result in loss of the related 

balance washer causing a possible ram air 

turbine (RAT) imbalance event, which may 

result in RAT structural failure, which 

associated with an electrical emergency 

situation, could result in loss of power to 

airplane flight controls hydraulic back-up 

system. 

* * * * * 

Loss of power to the hydraulic back-up 

system for airplane flight controls could 

reduce the ability of the flightcrew to 

maintain the safe flight and landing of 

the airplane. We are issuing this AD to 

require actions to correct the unsafe 

condition on these products. 


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