Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Marque Medicos Archer, LLC v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,

2018 IL App (1st) 163350

Appellate Court 

Caption

MARQUE MEDICOS ARCHER, LLC, and MEDICOS PAIN & 

SURGICAL SPECIALISTS, S.C., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. 

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and MORSE 

AUTOMOTIVE CORPORATION, Defendants-Appellees.

District & No. First District, Second Division

Docket No. 1-16-3350

Filed June 26, 2018

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 13-L-13456; the 

Hon. Patrick J. Sherlock, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Alan J. Mandel and Antonio D. Flores, of Alan J. Mandel, Ltd., of 

Skokie, for appellants.

John F. Boyle and Cathleen M. Hobson, of Law Offices of Meachum, 

Boyle & Trafman, of Chicago, for appellees.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE MASON delivered the judgment of the court, 

with opinion.

Justices Pucinski and Hyman concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 This case arises out of defendant-appellant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company’s (Liberty) 

alleged failure to fully pay plaintiffs-appellees, Marque Medicos Archer, LLC, and Medicos 

Pain & Surgical Specialists, S.C. (collectively, the providers), for services they rendered to an 

injured employee of codefendant-appellant, Morse Automotive Corporation (Morse 

Automotive).1The trial court dismissed with prejudice the providers’ claims for breach of 

contract and violation of section 8.2(d)(3) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 

305/8.2(d)(3) (West 2012)) against Liberty and violation of the Consumer Fraud and 

Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 

2012)) against both defendants, and the providers appeal. Because we conclude that the 

providers have no direct cause of action against Liberty for its delay in paying medical bills, 

we affirm. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 The providers first filed suit against Liberty and Morse Automotive on November 15, 

2013. In their second amended complaint, at issue here, they alleged that between August 29, 

2009, and November 17, 2011, they treated Ernesto Martinez for injuries he suffered while 

employed by Morse Automotive. At the outset of Martinez’s treatment, he authorized payment 

to be made directly to the providers for insurance benefits payable to him. The providers billed 

Morse Automotive for the services they rendered to Martinez by submitting claims to Liberty, 

who issued Morse Automotive’s workers’ compensation insurance policy. The medical 

providers alleged that Liberty was the disclosed agent for Morse Automotive. 

¶ 4 The providers alleged that all workers’ compensation policies issued in Illinois include a 

promise by the insurer to pay “promptly” the benefits required of the employer under the Act 

as well as “interest on a judgment as required by law until [the insurer] offer[s] the amount due 

under this insurance.” All policies further include a provision that the insurer is “directly and 

primarily liable to any person entitled to the benefits payable by this insurance,” and those 

persons “may enforce our duties *** against us or against [the employer] and us.” 

¶ 5 Notwithstanding this policy language, the complaint alleged that Liberty failed to promptly 

pay bills for medical services rendered to Martinez or, to a large extent, at all. The providers 

alleged that a market conduct examination conducted by the Illinois Department of Insurance 

in 2013 of Liberty’s claim payment history between July 1, 2011, to June 30, 2012, found that 

Liberty failed to pay interest on adequately documented medical provider bills not paid within 

30 days of receipt and was in violation of section 8.2(d)(3) of the Act. 

¶ 6 As a result of the market conduct examination, on December 12, 2013, Liberty entered into 

a stipulation and consent order in which it warranted to the Department of Insurance in relevant 

part that it would “[i]nstitute and maintain procedures whereby [Liberty] pays interest on 

 

1This case is related to Marque Medicos Farnsworth, LLC v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 2018 

IL App (1st) 163351, also decided today, in which Marque Medicos Farnsworth and Medicos Pain & 

Surgical Specialists, S.C., alleged that Liberty failed to fully pay for services the providers rendered to 

an injured employee of a different corporation. Because the causes of action asserted by the providers 

and dismissed by the trial court are not identical and because the parties did not move to consolidate the 

cases, we decide them separately. 
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adequately documented health care provider bills not paid within thirty (30) days of receipt as 

required by 820 ILCS 305/8.2(d)(3).”

¶ 7 In the meantime, in September 2009, Martinez timely filed a claim before the Illinois 

Workers’ Compensation Commission (IWCC) for disability benefits and medical expenses. A 

little over two years later, on December 14, 2011, Martinez entered into a settlement agreement 

with Morse Automotive. The settlement agreement names Martinez as petitioner, Morse 

Automotive as respondent, and Liberty as “[r]espondent’s insurance or service company.” The 

terms of the settlement provided that respondent would pay petitioner $163,000 in a lump sum 

for “full and final settlement of all claims for benefits past, present and future based on injuries 

arising out of an accident on or about August 4, 2009”; the lump sum included $41,751 for 

future medical expenses. The settlement further provided “[r]espondent will pay all necessary 

and related medical expenses pursuant to the fee schedule or negotiated rate, whichever is less, 

that have been submitted to [r]espondent prior to contract approval and that contain all the 

required data elements necessary to adjudicate the bills pursuant to Section 8.2(d).” The 

settlement agreement was silent on the amount of medical bills outstanding as of the date of its 

execution. The complaint did not allege, and the record does not disclose, that prior to the 

settlement, Liberty ever took the position that all or any portion of the medical expenses 

reflected in the bills sent to it were not necessary or related to Martinez’s injuries or that the 

documentation in the bills was insufficient. 

¶ 8 As of the date of the settlement agreement, neither Morse nor Liberty had paid any of the 

providers’ bills, but approximately six months after the settlement was approved by the IWCC, 

Liberty made partial payments to the providers for bills it received between 2009 and 2011. 

Approximately $39,000 in bills is still outstanding. And as of the date of the complaint, over 

$36,000 of interest had accrued on the unpaid bills as well as the bills paid after the statutory 

grace period had elapsed. 

¶ 9 On June 5, 2014, Martinez executed a specific assignment in favor of the providers to 

pursue any and all of his rights and claims arising out of the settlement agreement. 

¶ 10 Based on these allegations, the second amended complaint alleged four counts against both 

defendants: (1) breach of contract (based on the settlement agreement), (2) breach of contract 

implied in fact (in the alternative), (3) violation of section 8.2(d)(3) of the Act (820 ILCS 

305/8.2(d)(3) (West 2012)), and (4) violation of the Consumer Fraud Act (815 ILCS 505/1 

et seq. (West 2012)); one count was alleged only against Liberty, namely, violation of section 

155 of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/155 (West 2012)). 

¶ 11 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the 

Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2012)). Ultimately, the trial court dismissed 

with prejudice the providers’ claims for (1) breach of contract against Liberty based on the fact 

that the providers failed to allege that Liberty was a party to the settlement agreement, (2) 

violation of section 8.2(d) of the Act against Liberty only, and (3) violation of the Consumer 

Fraud Act against both defendants. The providers voluntarily dismissed their remaining claims 

(with leave to reinstate) to pursue this appeal. 

¶ 12 ANALYSIS 

¶ 13 A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint 

based on defects apparent on its face. Simpkins v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 2012 IL 110662, 

¶ 13. We must construe the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
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plaintiff and determine whether they state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. 

Bogenberger v. Pi Kappa Alpha Corp., 2018 IL 120051, ¶ 23. In making this determination, all 

well-pleaded facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, are taken as true. 

Ferris, Thompson & Zweig, Ltd. v. Esposito, 2017 IL 121297, ¶ 5. Dismissal is appropriate 

only where it is apparent that no set of facts can be proven that would permit the plaintiff to 

recover. Cochran v. Securitas Security Services, USA, Inc., 2017 IL 121200, ¶ 11. We review a 

trial court’s dismissal under section 2-615 de novo. Id.

¶ 14 Turning first to the breach of contract theory, the providers allege that they are intended 

third-party beneficiaries of the settlement agreement and that Liberty and Morse Automotive’s 

failure to pay them the amount due amounted to a breach of that settlement agreement. The 

trial court agreed that the providers were third-party beneficiaries of the agreement and found 

that the complaint stated a cause of action against Morse Automotive but dismissed this count 

against Liberty based on its finding that the latter was not a party to the settlement agreement. 

¶ 15 We agree that the providers failed to allege that Liberty was a party to the settlement 

agreement in the first instance. On its face, the agreement (attached as an exhibit to the 

complaint), names Martinez as the petitioner and Morse Automotive as the respondent. In their 

opening brief, the providers claim that the agreement was signed by an attorney for Liberty 

rather than for Morse Automotive, but this allegation is not found in the complaint. Likewise, 

the providers allege on appeal that the workers’ compensation policy “expressly prohibits” 

Morse Automotive from making payments under the Act but again fail to make this allegation 

in the complaint, nor do they attach the policy to the complaint, which prohibits us from 

considering it. See Lake Point Tower Condominium Ass’n v. Waller, 2017 IL App (1st) 

162072, ¶ 10 (“[C]ourts may not rely on matters outside the complaint in considering a section 

2-615 motion.”).

¶ 16 To be sure, the agreement names Liberty as “respondent’s insurance or service company” 

and Liberty—not respondent—made partial payments to the providers. The providers argue 

that the payments are particularly significant, citing Yellow Book Sales & Distribution Co. v. 

Feldman, 2012 IL App (1st) 120069, ¶¶ 38-39, for the proposition that a disclosed agent’s 

demonstration of its willingness to pay the principal’s obligation renders it directly liable for 

those obligations. But Yellow Book does not so hold. There, the agent executed the contract on 

behalf of the disclosed principal but argued that he was not personally liable. Id. ¶ 34. This 

court noted that an intent to be personally liable need not be expressed, but can be inferred 

from the facts in evidence. Id. ¶¶ 38-39. Here, there is no allegation in the complaint that 

Liberty signed the settlement agreement on behalf of Morse Automotive, thus distinguishing 

this case from Yellow Book. Ultimately, there are insufficient allegations to establish that 

Liberty is a party to the agreement. And without these allegations, we agree with the trial court 

that the providers have not stated a cause of action against Liberty for breach of contract. 

¶ 17 The providers next challenge the dismissal of count III, which alleges a violation of section 

8.2(d)(3) of the Act, requiring an employer who fails to pay a provider within 30 days of 

receipt of a bill that contains substantially all of the necessary requirements to adjudicate it to 

pay interest of 1% per month to that provider. 820 ILCS 305/8.2(d)(3) (West 2012). The 

providers do not dispute that this section does not expressly provide for a private right of action 

but argue that a private right of action is implied. We rejected this identical argument in 

Marque Medicos Fullerton, LLC v. Zurich American Insurance Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 

160756, ¶¶ 56-61, and we decline to depart from this decision today. 
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¶ 18 In order to determine whether a statute implies a private right of action, we must consider 

whether (1) the plaintiff is a member of the class that the statute is intended to benefit, (2) the 

plaintiff’s injury is one the statute was designed to prevent, (3) a private right of action is 

consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute, and (4) implying a private right of action 

is necessary to provide an adequate remedy for statutory violations. Fisher v. Lexington Health 

Care, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 455, 460 (1999). With regard to the first factor, the providers argue that 

because the payment obligation in section 8.2(d)(3) is to providers alone, they are members of 

the class the statute is intended to benefit. But the court in Zurich disagreed, relying in part on 

Fisher (Zurich, 2017 IL App (1st) 160756, ¶ 59 (citing Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 462-63)), which 

we find dispositive. 

¶ 19 In Fisher, two nursing home employees who had cooperated with an investigation into the 

death of a nursing home resident sought to imply a private right of action for retaliatory 

conduct under section 3-608 of the Nursing Home Care Act (210 ILCS 45/3-608 (West 1996)). 

Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 456-58. Section 3-608 prohibits a nursing home facility or its agents from 

discharging or retaliating against a resident, resident’s representative, or an employee who 

testifies or reports misconduct under certain sections of that statute. 210 ILCS 45/3-608 (West 

1996). The supreme court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that this section implied a private 

right of action, explicitly holding that, as nursing home employees, they were not part of the 

class the statute was designed to protect. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 463. In reaching this conclusion, 

the court did not consider section 3-608 standing alone, but read the statute as a whole. Id. at 

462-63. And as a whole, the court found the Nursing Home Care Act was not designed to 

protect nursing home employees from retaliation for reporting misconduct. Id. at 463. Rather, 

the statute’s “central purpose” was to protect nursing home residents, and section 3-608 

merely served to advance that purpose. Id. 

¶ 20 The same analysis governs here. The “fundamental purpose” of the Act is to “afford 

protection to employees by providing them with prompt and equitable compensation for their 

injuries.” (Emphasis added.) Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 180-81 (1978). As Zurich

noted, the interest required to be paid to providers under section 8.2(d)(3) merely encourages 

this prompt payment by penalizing delays in compensation. Zurich, 2017 IL App (1st) 160756, 

¶ 60. In other words, the benefit to providers is incidental to the Act’s central purpose. Id.

Accordingly, we conclude that the providers are not members of the class the Act was intended 

to benefit and, as such, are not entitled to pursue a private right of action under section 

8.2(d)(3). See Abbasi v. Paraskevoulakos, 187 Ill. 2d 386, 393 (1999) (declining to analyze all 

four factors where the plaintiff failed to satisfy one factor of the analysis). 

¶ 21 The medical providers attempt to distinguish Zurich on the basis that this case involves a 

settlement agreement and a market conduct examination that disclosed Liberty’s practice of 

not paying interest on medical bills. But we fail to understand how these extraneous materials 

bear on the question of whether section 8.2(d)(3) implies a private right of action. This is a 

matter of statutory interpretation for which we cannot consider matters outside the statute. 

¶ 22 Finally, we address the sufficiency of the providers’ claim under the Consumer Fraud Act. 

This claim is premised on the validity of Martinez’s assignment of all his “right, title and 

interest” in the settlement contract to the medical providers. Liberty argues that the Act forbids 

this assignment, and we agree. 

¶ 23 Section 21 of the Act provides: 
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“No payment, claim, award or decision under this Act shall be assignable or subject to 

any lien, attachment or garnishment, or be held liable in any way for any lien, debt, 

penalty or damages, except the beneficiary or beneficiaries of a deceased employee 

who was a member or annuitant under Article 14 of the ‘Illinois Pension Code’ may 

assign any benefits payable under this Act to the State Employees’ Retirement 

System.” 820 ILCS 305/21 (West 2012). 

¶ 24 The medical providers do not dispute that the plain language of the Act prohibits 

assignment of awards or decisions but maintain that the purpose of this prohibition is to protect 

an injured worker from his creditors and not to prevent the injured worker from tasking a third 

party with enforcing his rights to payment of benefits. In other words, the providers urge us to 

find an implicit exception to the prohibition on assignment. But the rules of statutory 

construction prohibit us from accepting the providers’ invitation.

¶ 25 Our supreme court has cautioned that we cannot construe a statute to add an exception 

when none otherwise exists. In re Michael D., 2015 IL 119178, ¶ 9 (“It is never proper to 

depart from plain language by reading into a statute exceptions *** which conflict with the 

clearly expressed legislative intent.”). And it is a well-established canon of statutory 

construction that where the statutory language expresses certain exceptions, it is construed as 

an exclusion of any other exceptions. State v. Mikusch, 138 Ill. 2d 242, 250 (1990). This is the 

case here. The Act excepts from its general prohibition against assignment those assignments 

made by beneficiaries of certain deceased employees. It does not include an exception for an 

injured worker to assign the enforcement of his rights to a third party. 

¶ 26 But even assuming that the Act could be read to allow Martinez’s assignment of his rights 

under the settlement contract, we nevertheless agree that the providers have not stated a claim 

under the Consumer Fraud Act, which requires a plaintiff to plead (1) a deceptive act or 

practice by the defendant, (2) the defendant’s intent that the plaintiff rely on the deception, and 

(3) the occurrence of the deception during a course of conduct involving trade or commerce. 

Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 201 Ill. 2d 403, 417 (2002). 

¶ 27 Significantly, a deceptive act or practice “involves more than the mere fact that a defendant 

promised something and then failed to do it,” given that this type of “deception” occurs every 

time a defendant breaches a contract. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Avery v. State Farm 

Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100, 169 (2005). Indeed, “[w]ere *** courts to 

accept plaintiff’s assertion that promises that go unfulfilled are actionable under the Consumer 

Fraud Act, consumer plaintiffs could convert any suit for breach of contract into a consumer 

fraud action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Stated differently, a breach of contract is 

not tantamount to a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act, and we reject the providers’ attempt 

to supplement their breach of contract claim with this “redundant remedy.” (Internal quotation 

marks omitted.) Id.

¶ 28 The conclusion we reach today should not be construed to mean that we condone Liberty’s 

conduct in failing to pay outstanding medical bills and interest as it is obligated to do under 

both the Act and its insurance policy. Accepting the well-pleaded allegations of the providers’ 

complaint as true, Liberty’s conduct in (i) accepting Morse Automotive’s premiums under a 

policy of insurance that renders it “directly and primarily liable” for benefits payable under the 

Act, (ii) authorizing a settlement agreement that plainly contemplates payment of those 

benefits, and (iii) claiming after the fact that no benefits are payable threatens the stability and 

predictability of benefits the Act is designed to provide. See McMahan v. Industrial Comm’n, 
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183 Ill. 2d 499, 514 (1998) (“The refusal of an employer to pay for an injured employee’s 

medical expenses is as contrary to the purposes of the [Act] as an employer’s refusal to 

compensate the employee for lost earnings. *** Indeed, to the extent that nonpayment of 

medical expenses may imperil the employee’s ability to obtain future treatment, the 

consequences of the employer’s actions may actually be far worse.”). Many employees, like 

Martinez, accept a lump sum settlement to cover not only past medical care but also medical 

care reasonably anticipated to be necessary in the future. But if a workers’ compensation 

carrier can authorize a settlement whereby the employer undertakes to pay past due bills and 

then fail to remit policy proceeds to cover that obligation, the pool of medical providers willing 

to render services to patients suffering work-related injuries will necessarily diminish. 

¶ 29 During oral argument, counsel for Liberty took the position that Morse Automotive’s 

commitment in the settlement agreement “to pay all necessary and related medical expenses” 

was essentially illusory. This is because Liberty, to whom all of the medical bills had been 

submitted and who was obligated to “promptly” pay those bills, had not agreed that the 

medical expenses incurred by Martinez were “necessary and related.” In other words, Liberty’s 

position is that it may remain silent when medical bills are submitted directly to it, authorize its 

policyholder to enter into a settlement whereby the policyholder undertakes to pay those 

outstanding bills, and then leave both its policyholder and the injured worker on the hook for 

unpaid bills after the fact. 

¶ 30 We do not read the Act as giving Liberty the option to refrain from raising any issues 

regarding the reasonableness of bills submitted to it until after its policyholder has, with its 

approval, committed to pay them. Rather, the Act contemplates that when an insurer receives 

bills allegedly relating to a work-related injury, the insurer will promptly raise any issues 

regarding whether the services rendered were reasonable and related to the employee’s injury 

or whether the detail in the bills is insufficient to make that determination. 820 ILCS 

305/8.2(d) (West 2012). As far as the record here discloses, Liberty never raised any such 

issues after receipt of bills from Marque Medicos. 

¶ 31 Accepting the complaint’s allegations as true, as we must, such conduct appears to be a 

textbook example of “vexatious and unreasonable” claims handling practices under section 

155 of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/155 (West 2012)). And the Director of 

Insurance should pay close attention to whether Liberty is, in fact, living up to its obligations 

under the stipulation and consent order. To that end, we are directing the clerk of the court to 

send a copy of the opinion to the Director of Insurance. 

¶ 32 But as egregious as Liberty’s conduct appears to be, it does not translate into recognition of 

a direct action by providers against Liberty. Rather, when the legislature enacted section 8.2 of 

the Act by amendment in 2011, it simultaneously created a remedy for its violation. In 

particular, section 8.2(e-20) provides that after a final award by the IWCC, a provider may 

resume efforts to collect unpaid bills from the employee and “the employee shall be 

responsible for payment of any outstanding bills *** as well as the interest awarded under 

subsection (d) of this Section.” 820 ILCS 305/8.2(e-20) (West 2012). At first blush, the ability 

to pursue the injured employee for payment of outstanding medical bills appears to run counter 

to the overarching purpose of the Act to protect the interests of injured workers. But the 

legislature may well have assumed that an employee who receives an award from the IWCC is 

the party responsible for paying outstanding medical bills from the award. When, as here, that 
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is not the case, the methods of enforcing a workers’ compensation carrier’s obligation to pay 

outstanding medical bills are varied and somewhat circuitous. 

¶ 33 Under the Act, the IWCC lacks authority to enforce its own awards and decisions. 

Millennium Knickerbocker Hotel v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2017 IL App 

(1st) 161027WC, ¶ 21 (citing Smith v. Gen Co., 11 Ill. App. 3d 106, 110 (1973)). Therefore, in 

order to enforce an employer’s obligation to pay an award, the employee must look elsewhere. 

¶ 34 One possible scenario is that when the providers pursue payment of outstanding bills from 

the employee, the employee, in an effort to enforce the IWCC award, can present a certified 

copy of the award to the circuit court under section 19(g) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(g) 

(West 2012)) in order to reduce the award to judgment. The employer, upon whom the 

obligation to pay is imposed under the award (and the judgment entered on the award), can, in 

turn, pursue a third-party action against its insurer for breach of the workers’ compensation 

insurance policy and, presumably, for a violation of section 155 of the Insurance Code (215 

ILCS 5/155 (West 2012)). If the circuit court finds that there has been a failure to pay the 

employee in accordance with the IWCC award, section 19(g) further mandates an award of 

attorney fees and costs incurred by the employee not only in the circuit court action, but also in 

the proceedings before the IWCC. 

“In a case where the employer refuses to pay compensation according to such final 

award or such final decision upon which such judgment is entered the court shall in 

entering judgment thereon, tax as costs *** the reasonable costs and attorney fees in the 

arbitration proceedings and in the court entering the judgment for the person in whose 

favor the judgment is entered ***.” (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 

2012).

And the fees and costs recovered by the employee as well as the employers’ own attorney fees 

and costs would be compensable damages proximately caused by the insurer’s breach of 

contract. In the end, the recalcitrant insurer would end up paying its own, its insured’s, and the 

employee’s attorney fees and costs, plus whatever sums the court deemed appropriate under 

section 155. 215 ILCS 5/155(1) (West 2012) (providing for an award of up to $60,000 in 

addition to attorney fees and costs). Accordingly, the price of an insurer’s decision to stonewall 

payment of benefits due under an IWCC award is, indeed, steep. 

¶ 35 Alternatively, there are two provisions of the Act that provide for the award by the IWCC 

of additional compensation to the employee in the case of nonpayment of benefits. First, 

section 19(k) of the Act authorizes the employee to seek and the IWCC to award additional 

compensation equal to 50% of the amount otherwise payable to the employee if the employer 

vexatiously delays in paying benefits due under the Act. 820 ILCS 305/19(k) (West 2012). In 

the event the IWCC determines that a penalty is appropriate under section 19(k), section 16 of 

the Act further authorizes an award of attorney fees and costs “against such employer and his 

or her insurance carrier.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 16. Second, section 19(l) contemplates that 

an employee may file a written demand for payment of benefits for necessary medical care 

payable under section 8(a). Id. § 19(l) In the event of such written demand, the employer must 

respond within 30 days, articulating in writing the reason for the delay. Section 19(l) further 

provides: 

“In case the employer or his or her insurance carrier shall without good and just cause 

fail, neglect, refuse, or unreasonably delay the payment of benefits under Section 8(a) 

***, the Arbitrator or the Commission shall allow to the employee additional 
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compensation in the sum of $30 per day for each day that the benefits under Section 

8(a) *** have been so withheld or refused, not to exceed $10,000.” (Emphasis added.) 

Id. 

¶ 36 What is common to all of these alternative courses of action is that they must be undertaken 

by the employee for whose benefit these provisions were enacted. Which brings us to another, 

less circuitous means of avoiding this problem in the future. Attorneys handling workers’ 

compensation cases on behalf of claimants must be cognizant of their clients’ potential 

post-award exposure to claims by medical providers for unpaid bills. As noted, if, as happened 

here (and apparently in a number of other cases involving Liberty), the employer does not 

fulfill its undertaking to pay outstanding medical bills, providers are permitted to pursue 

payment from the injured employee. With that in mind, competent counsel should insist that 

any settlement agreement contain a sum certain that the employer has agreed to pay for 

outstanding medical bills and also contain a representation that the employer has consulted 

with its insurance carrier and secured the carrier’s commitment to pay that amount upon 

execution of the settlement. The settlement here contained no such detail and merely provided 

that Morse Automotive “will pay all necessary and related medical expenses *** that have 

been submitted prior to contract approval and that contain all the required data elements.” This 

lack of specificity permitted Liberty to “lay in the weeds” to the employee’s, the providers’ 

and, ultimately, its own policyholder’s detriment.

¶ 37 CONCLUSION

¶ 38 We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the providers’ claims for breach of contract, 

violation of section 8.2(d)(3) of the Act against Liberty, and violation of the Consumer Fraud 

Act against both defendants. We further order the clerk of the court to send a copy of this 

opinion to the Director of Insurance. 

¶ 39 Affirmed.