Rel: August 2, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 

Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, 

Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections 

may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

SPECIAL TERM, 2024

________________________

CL-2024-0048

________________________

Nathan Wayne Jones

v. 

Martha Dale Jones

Appeal from Etowah Circuit Court

(DR-23-900039)

MOORE, Presiding Judge.

Nathan Wayne Jones ("the husband") appeals from a judgment 

entered by the Etowah Circuit Court ("the trial court") divorcing him 

from Martha Dale Jones ("the wife"). We reverse the trial court's 

judgment and remand the case for the trial court to make those findings 

necessary to comply with Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57(b).
CL-2024-0048

2

The parties married on February 22, 2010. The husband filed a 

complaint for a divorce on February 16, 2023. The wife filed an answer 

and a counterclaim for a divorce on March 8, 2023. On October 4, 2023, 

the trial court conducted a bench trial, and, on December 7, 2023, the 

trial court entered a judgment of divorce. In the divorce judgment, the 

trial court, among other things, awarded the wife $1,250 per month in 

periodic alimony. The divorce judgment provides, in pertinent part:

"After considering the length of the parties' marriage, the age 

and the health of each party, the ability of each party to be 

self-supporting, the income of both parties, and the standard 

of living during the marriage, the [c]ourt hereby Orders [the 

husband] to pay to [the wife] the amount of $1,250.00 each 

month as periodic alimony." 

On December 22, 2023, the husband filed a postjudgment motion in 

which he argued, among other things, that the periodic-alimony award 

violated Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57. On January 3, 2024, the trial court 

denied the husband's postjudgment motion. The husband timely 

appealed the divorce judgment to this court on January 19, 2024. 

On appeal, the husband reiterates the arguments that he made in 

his postjudgment motion. He first maintains that, pursuant to § 30-2-
CL-2024-0048

3

57(b)(1), the trial court could not have properly awarded the wife periodic 

alimony without expressly determining that rehabilitative alimony was 

not feasible. Alternatively, the husband contends that, if the trial court 

properly awarded the wife periodic alimony, it erroneously failed to limit 

the duration of the award in compliance with Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57(g) 

("Except upon a finding by the court that a deviation from the time limits 

of this section is equitably required, a person shall be eligible for periodic 

alimony for a period not to exceed the length of the marriage, as of the 

date of the filing of the complaint, with the exception that if a party is 

married for 20 years or longer, there shall be no time limit as to his or 

her eligibility."). We consider the first issue to be dispositive of this 

appeal. 

Section 30-2-57(a) provides:

"Upon granting a divorce or legal separation, the court shall 

award either rehabilitative or periodic alimony as provided in 

subsection (b), if the court expressly finds all of the following:

"(1) A party lacks a separate estate or his or 

her separate estate is insufficient to enable the 

party to acquire the ability to preserve, to the 

extent possible, the economic status quo of the 

parties as it existed during the marriage.
CL-2024-0048

4

"(2) The other party has the ability to supply 

those means without undue economic hardship.

"(3) The circumstances of the case make it 

equitable."1

Section 30-2-57(b) provides:

"If a party has met the requirements of subsection (a) [of § 30-

2-57], the court shall award alimony in the following priority:

"(1) Unless the court expressly finds that 

rehabilitative alimony is not feasible, the court 

shall award rehabilitative alimony to the party for 

a limited duration, not to exceed five years, absent 

extraordinary circumstances, of an amount to 

enable the party to acquire the ability to preserve, 

to the extent possible, the economic status quo of 

the parties as it existed during the marriage.

"(2) In cases in which the court expressly 

finds that rehabilitation is not feasible, a goodfaith attempt at rehabilitation fails, or good-faith 

rehabilitation only enables the party to partially 

1In his appellate brief, the husband argues that the evidence would 

not support a determination that the wife proved a need for alimony as 

required by Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57(a)(1) however, that issue was not 

raised to the trial court and has not been properly preserved for appellate 

review. See Rieger v. Rieger, 147 So. 3d 421, 429 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013). 

In his postjudgment motion, the husband did not challenge the 

sufficiency of the evidence proving that the wife lacked a sufficient estate 

to maintain the marital standard of living, which would have allowed this 

court to raise the noncompliance with § 30-2-57(a)(1) ex mero motu. See

Merrick v. Merrick, 352 So. 3d 770, 775 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021).
CL-2024-0048

5

acquire the ability to preserve, to the extent 

possible, the economic status quo of the parties as 

it existed during the marriage, the court shall 

award the party periodic installments of alimony 

for a duration and an amount to allow the party to 

preserve, to the extent possible, the economic 

status quo of the parties as it existed during the 

marriage ...."

Section 30-2-57(b)(1) provides that, after making those findings 

required by § 30-2-57(a), a trial court should award the recipient spouse 

rehabilitative alimony "[u]nless the court expressly finds that 

rehabilitative alimony is not feasible." "Rehabilitative alimony" refers to 

"'temporary financial support for a former spouse while the former 

spouse undergoes vocational rehabilitation in order to restore or improve 

his or her earning capacity and become self-supporting.'" Prakash v. 

Pandey, 331 So. 3d 1158, 1172 n.15 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021) (quoting

Seymour v. Seymour, 241 So. 3d 733, 741 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017)). An 

award of rehabilitative alimony may not be feasible when the former 

spouse cannot be rehabilitated, a good-faith attempt at rehabilitation has 

failed, or vocational rehabilitation cannot fully enable the former spouse 

to maintain the marital standard of living. See § 30-2-57(b)(2). A trial 
CL-2024-0048

6

court may award periodic alimony only if it expressly finds that 

rehabilitative alimony is not feasible for one or more of those reasons. Id.

As this court recently explained in White v. Jones, [Ms. CL-2023-

0511, Feb. 16, 2024] ___ So. 3d___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024), when a court

violates § 30-2-57(b) by awarding periodic alimony without making an 

express finding that rehabilitative alimony is not feasible, the judgment 

must be reversed. "The general purpose of making specific findings of 

fact is to allow the trial court 'to carefully review the evidence and to 

perfect the issues for review on appeal.'" Id. at ___ (quoting Ex parte 

Vaughn, 495 So. 2d 83, 87 (Ala. 1986)). The legislature enacted § 30-2-

57(b) to assure that a trial court would not award periodic alimony 

without carefully considering and rejecting rehabilitative alimony as a 

feasible remedy and to clearly apprise the appellate courts of its decision. 

When a trial court fails to comply with § 30-2-57(b), this court cannot 

assume that it considered and rejected the feasibility of rehabilitative 

alimony; instead, this court must reverse the judgment and remand the 

case to the trial court for it to make the necessary written 

determinations.
CL-2024-0048

7

In this case, the trial court violated § 30-2-57(b). In the judgment 

of divorce, the trial court stated that it had considered the length of the 

parties' marriage, the age and health of the parties, the ability of each 

party to be self-supporting, the incomes of both parties, and the standard 

of living of the parties during the marriage, which are some of the 

statutory factors relevant to an alimony determination, see § 30-2-57(d) 

and (f), but the trial court did not specifically find that rehabilitative 

alimony was not feasible, as required by § 30-2-57(b). By omitting that 

finding, we can conclude only that the trial court improperly failed to 

consider awarding the wife rehabilitative alimony.

We therefore reverse the judgment insofar as it awarded the wife 

periodic alimony and remand the case to the trial court to fulfill its 

statutory duty under § 30-2-57(b). On remand, the trial court shall 

determine from its weighing of the evidence in the record the appropriate 

form of alimony that the wife shall be awarded, shall make the required 

findings of fact in support of its determination, and shall take any and 

all other actions and conduct such further proceedings as are necessary 

to comply with this opinion Because the trial court may determine on 
CL-2024-0048

8

remand that the wife should be awarded rehabilitative alimony for a 

limited duration, it would be premature for this court to address the 

husband's alternative argument that the trial court erred in awarding 

the wife periodic alimony for an indefinite period.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Edwards, Hanson, Fridy, and Lewis, JJ., concur.