Filed 11 / 16 / 23 Marriage of Turner CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115( b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re Marriage of CARRIE LYNN and TYLER SAMPSON TURNE R. 2d Civil No. B327782 (Super. Ct. No. D398339) (Ventura County)

CARRIE LYNN TURNER,

Respondent,

v.

TYLER SAMPSON TURNER,

Appellant.

Tyler Sampson Turner appeals from the judgment approving the dissolution of his marriage to Carrie Lynn Turner. Tyler 1 contends the trial court erred when it found that he

1 We use the parties’ first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended.2

electronically s ign ed an agreement divid ing his assets with

Carrie. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Tyler and Carrie married in 2006. Carrie petitioned to

dissolve the marria ge in 2020. In May 2022, Carrie and Tyler agreed to settle the issues remaining after the dissolution of their marriage . Tyler’s attorney prepared a “deal memo” memorializing the terms of the settlement.

The deal memo required Tyler to pay Carrie $250,0 00, half of which was due within 90 days of the memo’s execution. Tyler’s

attorney emailed Carrie’s attorney a copy of the memo bearing his and Tyler’s signatures. Carrie and her attorney

counter sign ed the memo and circulated fully executed cop ies

. In July, Tyler’s attorney sent Carrie’s attorney a proposed judgment. Carrie’s attorney sent proposed revisions, but then heard nothing for several weeks. When asked when they could expect to receive any additional revisions, Tyler’s attorney said that Tyle r had not yet approved the judgment. At an August hearing, Carrie’s attorney told the trial court that Tyler and Carrie had reached the terms of a settlement, but that Tyler had not authorized revisions to the judgment. Tyler

said that he had relieved hi s attorney and requested more time to

review the matter with a new attorney

. Three weeks later, Tyler sent Carrie a check for $125,000, as required by the deal memo. He later put a stop payment on the check and was “backing away” from the deal memo.

Ca rrie r equest ed an o rder to enforce the terms of the d eal

m emo pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6

. During the hearing on Carrie’s request, the trial court found that the memo had been signed by the parties and their attorneys. It3

based that finding on communications between the attorneys and Tyler’s delivery of the $125,000 check per the memo’s terms

. The court granted Carrie’s request, and incorporated the memo ’s

terms into the judgment.

DISCUSSION Tyler contends the trial court erred whe n it concluded that he electronically signed the deal memo. We disagree.

Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 permits a trial court

to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement. ( Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360 .) When doing so, it i s that court’s duty to “ determine in the first instance whether the parties have entered into an enforceable settlement. ” ( Ibid. ) “ In making that determination, ‘ the

. . . court acts as the trier of

fact. ’ ” ( Ibid. ) We will not disturb the court’s fact ual findings if supported by substantial evidence. ( Ibid. ) Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Tyler and Carrie entered into an enforceable settlement. Tyler’s attorney emailed Carrie’s attorney a copy of the deal memo bearing h is and Tyler’s signature s

. Carrie and her attorney also signed the memo, creating an enforceable settlement. Tyler complains that the trial court accepted his signature without ensuring that it complied with the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act ( Civ. Code, § 1633.1 et seq

. ; UETA). But Tyler did not raise this issue during the proceedings below. He cannot do so for the first time on appeal. ( Sea & Sage Audubon Society,

Inc. v. Planning Com. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 412, 417.) Tyler’s complaint also lacks me rit. Pursuant to the UETA,

an “ electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any

manner , including a showing of the efficacy of any security4

procedure applied to determine the pers on to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.” (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a) , italics added .) Here, the trial court determined that the electronic signature on the deal memo was the act of Tyler based on his attorney’s rep resentation and him complying with the terms of the memo by sending Carrie a $125,000 check. It is not the province of this court to second guess that determination. ( Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 545.)

DISPOSITION

The jud gment is affirmed. Carrie Lynn Turner shall recover her costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

CODY, J.Rocky J. Baio, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

David Ingram Law and David L. Ingram for Appellant. Ferguson Case Orr Paterson and Joshua S. Hopstone for Respondent.