This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 J. RON MARTINEZ and 2 JILL MARTINEZ, 3 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 4

v. NO. 32,249 5 DONNA JONES, 6 Defendant-Appellee. 7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 8 Beatrice J. Brickhouse, District Judge 9 Chavez Law Offices, P.A. 10 Gene N. Chavez 11 Albuquerque, NM 12 for Appellants 13 Briones Business Law Consulting, P.C. 14 Thomas R. Briones 15 Albuquerque, NM 16 for Appellant 17 MEMORANDUM OPINION 18 VANZI, Judge. 192 Plaintiffs appeal from an order denying their motion for relief from a previously 1 entered judgment pursuant to Rule 1-060(B) NMRA. We issued a notice of proposed 2 summary disposition, proposing to uphold the district court’s determin ation. Plaintiffs 3 have filed a memorandum in opposition. After due consideration, we remain 4 unpersuaded that the district court erred. We therefore affirm. 5 As described at greater length in th e notice of proposed summary disposition, 6 Plaintiffs’ motion appears to have been based on mistake, inadvertence, excusable 7 neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, mi srepresentation, and/or other misconduct 8 of an adverse party, such that it falls with in the parameters of Rule 1-060(B)(1), (2), 9 and/or (3). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ failure to file within the applicable one-year 10 limitations period is a fatal deficiency. See Marinchek v. Paige , 108 N.M. 349, 351, 11 772 P.2d 879, 881 (1989). 12 In their memorandum in opposition, Plaintiffs continue to argue that their 13 motion is based on fraud upon the court, su ch that Rule 1-060(B)(6) should apply. 14 [MIO 1-2] “Fraud upon the court embraces only that species of fraud which does or 15 attempts to defile the court itself or which is perpetrated by officers of the court so that 16 the judicial system cannot perform in a usual manner.” Moya v. Catholic Archdiocese 17 of N.M. , 107 N.M. 245, 247, 755 P.2d 583, 585 ( 1988). “Fraud upon the court occurs 18 where there is a deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme to defraud the 19 court, not simply a judgment obtained with the aid of a witness whose perjury is 203 revealed by after-discovered evidence.” Id. Defendant’s alleged misconduct, 1 including fabricating a preapproval letter and misreprese nting her ability or inability 2 to obtain financing, does not fall within this narrow category. Unlike the conduct at 3 issue in Jemez Properties, Inc. v. Lucero , 94 N.M. 181, 184, 608 P.2d 157, 160 (Ct. 4 App. 1979), Defendant neither presented to the court forged documents nor tampered 5 with public records. Moreover, there is no suggestion of “bribery of judges, 6 employment of counsel to ‘influence’ the court, bribery of the jury, . . . the 7 involvement of an attorney in the perpetration of the fraud[,]” or anything analogous. 8 Id. at 184 n.1, 608 P.2d at 160 n.1 (describing examples of the type of egregious 9 conduct which may be said to rise to the level of fraud upon the court). We therefore 10 remain of the opinion that Defendant’s alleged misconduct is classifiable as “fraud 11 between the parties,” ratherthan fraud upon the court. See generally Sanders v. Estate 12 of Sanders , 1996-NMCA-102, ¶ 25, 122 N.M. 468, 927 P.2d 23 (stating that “fraud 13 between the parties, without mo re, is not fraud upon the court”). 14 In their memorandum in opposition, Plainti ffs urge this Court to reverse and 15 allow the underlying matter to proceed on grounds that Defendant will otherwise be 16 rewarded for her misconduct. [M IO 2-4] We find this argument to be unpersuasive for 17 a couple of reasons. 18 First, while the enforcement of the one-year limitation period associated with 19 Rule 1-060(B)(1)-(3) may have the effect of barring legitimate claims, like any 204 limitations period it represents a balance of public policy goals. See generally In re 1 Estates of Hayes , 1998-NMCA-136, ¶ 23, 125 N.M. 820, 965 P.2d 939 (discussing 2 the public policy goals associated with limitations periods). We are in no position to 3 second guess that determination. Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiffs invite this 4 Court to disregard the applicable limitations period, we decline to do so. 5 Second, we note that Plaintiffs’ asserti ons with respect to Defendant’s conduct 6 remain allegations only; whether De fendant forged a preapproval letter or 7 misrepresented her ability to obtain financ ing has not been definitively established. 8 See generally Guidry v. Petty Concrete Co. , 77 N.M. 531, 534, 424 P.2d 806, 808 9 (1967) (“With a dispute as to the facts, and with no findings by the trial court, we have 10 no facts before us. As an appellate court, we will not originally determine the 11 questions of fact.”). As such, we will notpresume that the application of our well12 established jurisprudence is inequitable. 13 Accordingly, for the reasons statedabove and in the notice of proposed 14 summary disposition, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16

__________________________________ 17 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 18

WE CONCUR: 195 _________________________________ 1 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 2

_________________________________ 3 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 4