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U.S. POLICY TOWARD LEBANON

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 28, 2016

Serial No. 114–229

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Gerald M. Feierstein, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, 

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State ............................. 7

Andrew Exum, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East 

Policy, U.S. Department of Defense ................................................................... 19

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Gerald M. Feierstein: Prepared statement .................................. 10

Andrew Exum, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 22

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 42

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 43

Written responses from the Honorable Gerald M. Feierstein to questions 

submitted for the record by the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa .............................................. 44

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: Questions submitted for the record to 

Andrew Exum, Ph.D. ........................................................................................... 46

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD LEBANON 

THURSDAY, APRIL 28, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 2138 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and my friend, Ranking Member Ted 

Deutch, for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I will then 

recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 minute each. 

We will then hear from our witnesses. Without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements will be made a part of the record. 

Members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions for 

the record subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. Two years ago 

this month, this subcommittee held a hearing on security challenges and U.S. interests in Lebanon with an administration panel 

represented by State’s NEA Bureau and DoD’s Middle East Policy 

Bureau. 

I opened that hearing by stating that Lebanon is a country that 

is seemingly perpetually in a state of conflict or on the verge of 

breaking out into a conflict at any moment. 

The same can be said about the country’s political stability. Lebanon is a country that is seemingly perpetually in a state of political crisis or on the verge of breaking out in a political crisis at any 

moment. 

We’re now 2 years deeper into the political deadlock that has 

gripped Beirut. The presidency has remained unfilled for nearly 2 

years while long-overdue legislative elections have been pushed 

even further back to 2017 at the very earliest. The more things 

change the more they stay the same in Lebanon. 

Two years ago, Lebanon was struggling to cope with the economic strain of hosting over 1 million Syrian refugees who had fled 

to their neighbor, seeking refuge from the fighting between Assad, 

Hezbollah, ISIS and other terror entities. 

These refugees would be the equivalent of roughly one-quarter of 

the Lebanese population. Estimates suggest that over 3.3 million 

people in Lebanon are now in need of assistance. 

As has been the case throughout the region in response to the 

Syrian humanitarian crisis, the U.S. has stepped up and to date 

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has provided over $1.1 billion in humanitarian assistance for Lebanon to help it cope with the strain of its refugee influx. 

However, as has also been the case throughout the region in response to the Syrian humanitarian crisis, appeals for assistance to 

Lebanon have gone drastically underfunded and many of our partners and allies have failed to step up as needed. 

The American people are generous. They understand there is a 

real need to support some of these nations struggling to cope with 

this large influx of refugees. But their generosity and understanding is not unlimited. 

The administration must do more to press other responsible nations to increase their contributions so that we don’t bear the full 

brunt of the cost. Two years ago, Lebanon’s stability was a great 

concern for the United States. 

Hezbollah was fighting alongside Assad in Syria and the Syrian 

conflict threatened to spill over into Lebanon. Again, the more 

things change the more they stay the same for Lebanon’s security 

instability. 

However, now Lebanon has taken on an even greater strategic 

importance for the United States and for the entire region. This 

small country, trapped in a political stalemate for nearly 2 years 

now, has an increased significance and is one of the battlegrounds 

in the proxy battle between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 

In the absence of any consensus on a way forward in the political 

deadlock, Hezbollah, aided and abetted by the Iranian regime, has 

moved to fill the leadership vacuum and increase its presence and 

influence in Lebanon. 

In the aftermath of the weak and dangerous Iranian nuclear deal 

and even during the negotiations, Iran has increased its support to 

Hezbollah. Indeed, key to Iran’s strategic objectives in supporting 

Assad in Syria was maintaining the supply route from Damascus 

to Lebanon, which they have successfully managed and reports 

even suggest that they may have accelerated the transfer of weapons including strategic weapons systems to Hezbollah through 

Syria. 

More troubling still, it is apparent that Hezbollah has managed 

to gain sufficient influence in Lebanon to hinder its relationship 

with its Arab neighbors. 

In fact, in February of this year the Lebanese justice minister resigned, explicitly citing Hezbollah’s undue influence and the harm 

it was causing to Lebanon’s relationships. 

This same month—that same month, Saudi Arabia led the Gulf 

Corporation Council nations to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist 

organization with the Arab League shortly following suit. 

The Saudis, taking aim at Hezbollah and Iran again, also announced they were halting $3 billion in military assistance to Lebanon. No doubt the Saudis recognize that it is not just in the political sphere that Iran and Hezbollah have gained undue influence. 

Hezbollah has increased its presence within and partnership 

with the Lebanese Armed Forces. This synergy between the Lebanese Armed Forces and Hezbollah should really call into question 

then the administration’s continued support for the LAF and the 

President’s budget request that doubles the foreign military financing assistance we provide to Lebanon. 

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It is also worrisome that the commander of the Lebanese Armed 

Forces is now currently in Moscow and will meet with Russian 

military officials to discuss coordination on anti-terror operations. 

A senior Russian official was quoted as saying that Moscow and 

Beirut are true partners in combating terrorism worldwide. This is 

on the heels of the Czech Republic recently releasing, after refusing 

an extradition request by the U.S., two members of Hezbollah 

wanted in America on charges of planning to murder U.S. Government officials and drugs and arms trafficking. 

At least one of these individuals is known to have had close ties 

to a notorious Russian arms dealer and is Russia’s link to 

Hezbollah. 

So I’m interested in hearing the administration’s assessment of 

the relationship between Iran and Lebanon and, more specifically, 

Hezbollah and the LAF as well as Lebanon’s relations with its 

Arab neighbors, the nexus between Russia, Hezbollah and the LAF 

as well as the prospects for Lebanon’s future stability. 

I’ll also like to hear how the administration’s policy toward Lebanon fits in a larger picture with the fight against ISIS and the 

conflict in Syria, the Syrian humanitarian crisis and how we plan 

on ensuring that the spillover from Lebanon does not threaten our 

friend and ally, the democratic Jewish state of Israel. 

And with that, I’m pleased to yield to the ranking member, my 

friend, Ted Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thanks for calling 

this hearing. Thanks to our witnesses for appearing today. Welcome back, Ambassador Feierstein. 

We are delighted to see you again before you retire and I am 

sure there is no place you’d rather be to celebrate your birthday 

than appearing before our committee. So happy birthday to you. 

And Dr. Exum, it’s a pleasure to welcome you to the committee 

as well. You’re welcome to celebrate your birthdays here. It’s a 

standing offer we make. 

We tend to look at Lebanon in pieces in the context of other regional actors and conflicts. But today is going to give us the opportunity to look at the range of challenges facing Lebanon and how 

U.S. policy can best address those challenges. 

Lebanon has been locked in a political stalemate that has all but 

frozen the country’s ability to effectively govern its diverse population. 

The Parliament has been unable to agree on a consensus President since 2014, struggled to face down its number-one internal 

threat, Hezbollah, while outside pressures from the Syrian conflict 

continue to mount. 

Divisions within Lebanese society have long made it susceptible 

to outside influence. The ouster of the Syrian military 11 years ago 

yesterday unfortunately did not free the country from those looking 

to exploit it. 

Iran has only sought to strengthen Hezbollah’s grip on Lebanon. 

Moving weapons and money to the group to carry out its attacks 

on Israel and other targets worldwide, Iran turned Hezbollah into 

its own proxy terrorist organization. 

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This culminated in the deployment of somewhere between 6,000 

and 8,000 Hezbollah fighters into Syria to fight alongside Assad’s 

troops as Iran is desperate to save its Syrian lifeline to Hezbollah. 

Conflict in Syria has devastated Lebanon’s economy. Nearly a 

quarter of the population are now refugees. This has only intensified the economic turmoil already plaguing Lebanon and drawn 

deeper divisions between Sunnis and Shi’ites. 

Hezbollah’s power grip on Lebanon towns in the south remains 

tight as the group provides everything from protection to paychecks 

to basic social services. Hezbollah in effect functions as a state 

within a state. 

And despite the government’s desire to remain neutral in the 

Syrian conflict, it has unfortunately been unable to avoid attacks 

from Hezbollah’s continued involvement on the ground. Bombings 

in Beirut in November 2015 by alleged ISIS recruiters unfortunately killed 43. 

U.S. policy toward Lebanon has long sought to counter Hezbollah 

by focusing on building up the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed 

Forces to act as the sole legitimate guarantor of security in the 

country. 

But despite gains made in counter terrorism and border control, 

gaps exist in the LAF’s ability to control the security of its country. 

Particularly concerning is the LAF’s ability to control the flow of 

weapons in and out of its territory. 

In recent years, the U.S. has consistently increased assistance 

and cooperation to the LAF to counter both the threats emanating 

from Syria and Hezbollah. Dr. Exum, I look to you today to provide 

us with an updated assessment of LAF’s capabilities. 

Further, how significant will the effect be of the withdrawal of $4 billion in aid from Saudi Arabia to the LAF and can we count 

on other like-minded partners who have an interest in seeing Lebanon succeed fill that gap. 

Of great concern to many of us in Congress is the enforcement 

of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, which, by all accounts, 

has been a dismal failure. With no one to enforce the resolution, 

Hezbollah has rebuilt its arsenal of rockets and now possesses over 

100,000 capable of reaching every corner of Israel. 

Fear over the transfer of advanced weaponry from Assad’s stockpiles to Hezbollah has prompted numerous strikes on weapons convoys by Israel and with the prospect of additional weapons coming 

from Iran and Hezbollah, it’s now more important than ever that 

Israel’s qualitative military edge be strengthened. 

And as talks over the new memorandum of understanding continue with Israel, every consideration must be given to the strength 

of Hezbollah’s arsenal. As Lebanon grapples with its tenuous security situation, its state institutions, unfortunately, grow weaker. 

Deputy Secretary Blinken said on his most recent visit to Lebanon unless and until a President is chosen, he said, the erosion 

of Lebanon’s political institutions will only deepen. 

To that end, the United States must continue to support Lebanon’s legitimate state institutions and work with elements in the 

government to help prevent an economic crisis. 

I am pleased to see the Lebanese banking sector working with 

the United States to implement the provisions of the Hezbollah 

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International Financing Prevention Act, which will help wall off 

Lebanese banks from Hezbollah’s illicit activities. 

If we want to see success and stability for the people of Lebanon 

we must focus attention on those communities hosting an extraordinary number of refugees. With no U.N.-run refugee camps in the 

country, many Syrians have sought shelter in parking garages and 

abandoned buildings. 

The international community must provide Lebanon with the resources needed to expand access to education and health care for 

the hundreds of thousands of Syrian children there, and as I have 

mentioned many times in this subcommittee, I applaud the humanitarian efforts of the United States and I implore the department, 

Ambassador Feierstein, to remind our allies and friends around the 

world that they must meet this crisis head on. Contributing to the 

humanitarian crisis also contributes to security. 

Madam Chairman, like all of us, the people of Lebanon deserve 

to live in peace and security free from the grip of terrorism. Lebanon is a tinderbox and U.S. policy must focus on continuing to 

prevent it from sparking. 

Again, I thank the witnesses for appearing today and look forward to a productive discussion. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Congressman Deutch. 

And now I would like to recognize members for their opening 

statements and we will begin with Mr. Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair, and as far as I’m concerned Lebanon is one of the key countries—one of the most important countries in the Middle East. 

Regional powers have a long history of fighting for influence in 

Lebanon and unfortunately it continues to be the subject of coercive forces outside its borders. I’m deeply concerned that the tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia may further exacerbate the 

looming instability in Lebanon. 

This is particularly troubling considering the Lebanese economy 

is facing serious strains caused by, among other things, hosting 

over 1 million Syrian refugees which now make up about a quarter 

of the population in Lebanon. 

And while Lebanon has made some positive democratic shifts 

over the years, the fact remains there are still armed nonstate 

groups in Lebanon and this is reason enough to pay special attention to the situation there. 

A long-term breakdown in leadership and governance in Lebanon 

would leave it susceptible to the same chaos that we’ve seen elsewhere in the region and that absolutely must not happen. 

Finally, not only is Hezbollah hostile toward our traditional ally, 

Israel, but we are now hearing some argue that Hezbollah’s political participation in the Lebanese Government is resulting in even 

greater strain of tensions between Lebanon and the other Arab nations. 

And further breakdowns in diplomatic relations in the region 

could have a significant negative impact. So we appreciate the witnesses and look forward to hearing them today and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island. 

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Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking 

Member Deutch, for calling this hearing on U.S. policy toward Lebanon and thank you to our witnesses. 

I look forward to hearing from you about the geostrategic importance of Lebanon, particularly in the context of the ongoing Syrian 

conflict and its related refugee crisis, the undue influence of 

Hezbollah and the threat of ISIL and other terrorist groups in the 

region and beyond. 

Given sustained U.S. interests and support to Lebanon over the 

years, our strategic objective of supporting a viable, independent, 

sovereign and democratic Lebanon that is at peace with its neighbors is more important than ever. 

It’s imperative that we continue to support these goals and I 

want to ensure that U.S. resources are applied in the best and 

most effective way possible. 

We cannot afford to let Lebanon slide into further disarray and 

Lebanon must help itself by providing good governance and security for its people. 

I look forward to the witnesses’ testimony today and to working 

with the administration and my colleagues to further strengthen 

our important relationship with Lebanon. 

And I thank you, Madam Chair, and yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. 

And Mr. Meadows of North Carolina. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you for 

your vision and your undying, unyielding effort to make sure that 

we address this issue. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The gentleman can have 2 more minutes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I want to thank the witnesses for being here. For 

me, this is one that is not only a complex question but certainly 

one that we need to show resolve and make sure that those that 

are our friends, and by that I mean the Lebanese people, that they 

understand clearly what we stand for and what we won’t stand for, 

and by addressing Hezbollah in a meaningful way through the 

tools that have been given the Department of Treasury and other 

areas. 

We need to make sure that we do that. I think there are times 

that we are ambiguous about that, and having a communications 

director who is part Lebanese, having someone who cuts my hair 

every 4 weeks who is full Lebanese, I can assure you I’m going to 

follow up on it. 

And with that, I’ll yield back, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. More information than 

we cared for. And I’ll turn to another sharing kind of guy, Mr. 

Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Madam Chair, if you could just tell the time—

I just want to remind you I gave you chocolate. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You did, and dark chocolate—the best. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And secondly, I didn’t realize Dr. Exum gives 

haircuts. At any rate, thank you, Madam Chairman, and, you 

know, I first went to Lebanon with my friend, who’s in the room, 

and it was a really revealing kind of trip that Graham exposed to 

me and I just got to say we can talk about Hezbollah as if it someVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:22 Nov 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\042816\99950 SHIRL
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how was created sui generis within Lebanon—who knows how or 

why. 

But the dysfunction within Lebanon is what created Hezbollah, 

created a receptive climate for Hezbollah. And, you know, I’m a 

local government kind of guy. 

When you can’t even pick up the trash for 8 months it leads to 

mass riots. It leads to mass disaffection with the government and 

I think that, plus the government legislative paralysis, the inability 

to elect a President and so forth, I think has persuaded most Lebanese that it’s terminally dysfunctional as a country. And that ought 

to concern us as well as the fact that we got 1.1 million refugees, 

the equivalent of 25 percent of the population. I think that would 

be, like, 70 million here in the United States, comparable. 

So those two things are destabilizing in the extreme and I think 

we cannot afford to ignore them. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

And seeing no further requests for time, I am pleased to introduce our excellent panel of experts. 

First, it’s our pleasure to welcome back Ambassador Gerald 

Feierstein, who is the principal deputy assistant secretary for the 

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. 

Previously, he served as our Ambassador to Yemen—yikes—from 

2010 to 2013, has served in several different postings throughout 

the world including deputy chief of mission in Islamabad—another 

yikes—and deputy council general in Jerusalem—yeah. Thank you 

for your service. We look forward to your testimony, and as Mr. 

Deutch had pointed out, for those members who were not here, this 

is two special banner days for Ambassador Feierstein. 

Number one, it’s his birthday and, as Ted pointed out, he can 

think of no funner way for him to celebrate his birthday than to 

appear before a congressional panel, and number two, it is his last 

testimony in his position because he’s going to retire in 4 weeks. 

So we wish you nothing but the best, Ambassador. 

And next, we welcome for the first time Dr. Andrew Exum, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East policy. He is the 

principal advisor to the secretary of defense and under secretary of 

defense for policy on international security strategy and policy for 

the Middle East. 

In addition to his current service with the Defense Department, 

Dr. Exum has served our nation with distinction in both Afghanistan and Iraq as an officer in the U.S. Army. We thank you for 

your service there as well, and what is that lapel pin of service? 

Mr. EXUM. This would be the Combat Scroll of the 1st Ranger 

Battalion. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Not bad. All right. 

Thank you. We welcome both of you and Mr. Ambassador, we 

will begin with you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GERALD M. FEIERSTEIN, 

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF 

NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman and Ranking Member Deutch, and before I say anything else 

8

let me just say, if this is indeed the last time that I come up here, 

at least in this capacity, I want to thank all of you—all of the members of the committee for the many opportunities that we’ve had, 

as well as with your staff, to come up and discuss these issues, and 

to say that I’ve always found my experiences here to be rewarding 

and enjoyable even. 

So thank you, and thank you for inviting me to discuss U.S. policy toward Lebanon today. I would like to request that my full 

opening statement——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN [continuing]. Be submitted for the 

record. 

Promoting a Lebanon that is independent, sovereign, stable, 

prosperous and religiously diverse is crucial to advancing a range 

of U.S. interests in the Middle East. 

Lebanon today faces three critical challenges. First are the spillover effects of the ongoing Syrian conflict, second are the activities 

of Hezbollah and third is the political crisis that has nearly paralyzed government decision making for nearly 2 years. 

We are grateful to the Congress for passing the Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act signed into law last December. 

This law provides us with critical new tools to dismantle 

Hezbollah’s global financial network. 

Our strategy for helping Lebanon address these three challenges 

is simple. To ensure that the Lebanese security forces have the 

tools that they need to prevent ISIL from destabilizing the country 

while helping build legitimate state institutions in order to deny 

Hezbollah what it seeks to avoid—a strong central government capable of providing services for the entire country. 

The conflict in Syria has severely tested Lebanon’s resilience. 

Our assistance to refugees from Syria and to the Lebanese communities that have graciously hosted them for nearly 5 years has 

helped alleviate the economic burden on the Lebanese people. 

Lebanon faces a real threat from ISIL and the Nusra Front. This 

is why we support Lebanon’s legitimate state security institutions 

and particularly the Lebanese Armed Forces and see that as a 

down payment on a long-term investment in regional stability. 

Just today an LAF raid in the town of Arsal in Lebanon resulted 

in the death of a key ISIL operative. My Pentagon colleague, Dr. 

Exum, will discuss our relationship with Lebanon’s security institutions in greater depth. 

Our cooperation is not limited to counter terrorism. Combating 

trafficking in persons is one of our highest priorities. Lebanon has 

made important gains in targeting human traffickers, the slave 

traders of today. 

In late March, the internal security forces raided a human trafficking ring, arresting 16 traffickers and rescuing 75 victims. 

On the second challenge that threatens Lebanon and one I know 

that this committee tracks closely, Hezbollah. When Hezbollah first 

intervened in the Syrian civil war to prop up the Assad regime, the 

group showed its true colors to anyone who still doubted that 

Hezbollah put its own interests and those of its foreign backers 

ahead of those of the Lebanese people. When Hezbollah conducts 

terrorist activities abroad or drags Lebanon into the war in neighVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:22 Nov 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\042816\99950 SHIRL
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boring Syria, it is ordinary Lebanese people who are paying the 

price. 

The U.S. Government is actively implementing the Hezbollah 

International Financing Prevention Act. The Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control issued new HIFPA regulations 

on April 15th. We will use our full authority under HIFPA to target foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate significant transactions or engage in money laundering activities or other 

activities related to Hezbollah. When we have evidence we will 

build a case and we will take action. Before the passage of HIFPA 

we were already targeting the nodes of Hezbollah’s international financing by designating over 100 Hezbollah-affiliated individuals 

and entities. 

The third major challenge Lebanon faces is restoring effective 

government. We commend Prime Minister Tammam Salam for his 

courage and perseverance in addressing Lebanon’s most pressing 

challenges. But he cannot do the job alone. 

Next month will mark 2 years the Lebanese people have been 

without a President. Lebanon’s leaders, particularly those who are 

blocking a quorum from convening in Parliament, must put the interests of the Lebanese people first by electing a President and restoring a fully functioning government. 

Madam Chairman, in these and many other ways we are contributing to the stability, independence and security of Lebanon, which 

is as much a U.S. interest as it is a Lebanese one. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the subcommittee. 

I welcome the opportunity to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Feierstein follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Dr. Exum. 

STATEMENT OF ANDREW EXUM, PH.D, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. EXUM. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting 

me to discuss U.S. policy toward Lebanon. 

I have taken note of the questions that the various members 

asked in their opening statements and I’ve also made a note for my 

staff about the dark chocolate. I will be better prepared for the next 

subcommittee appearance. 

Ambassador Feierstein highlighted the array of interlocking challenges that Lebanon confronts and gave an overview of our comprehensive strategy in Lebanon. My own experience in Lebanon is 

personal as well as professional. I lived in Lebanon for 2 years 

while attending the American University of Beirut, of which I’m a 

proud graduate, and I returned to Lebanon for another 8 months 

in 2008 to conduct research for my doctoral dissertation. 

If you had told me 5 years ago that Lebanon would be flooded 

with over 1 million refugees from a brutal sectarian civil war in 

Syria but would somehow remain an oasis of relative calm in the 

Middle East, I would not have believed you. 

I would have explained probably with some academic condescension that I was an expert on Lebanon and that what you were describing to me was impossible given Lebanon’s own difficult history 

of sectarian conflict. 

Yet, I would have been wrong. So, so much for all that grad 

school. I would have undervalued the drivers of stability in Lebanon, choosing to focus on the more obvious drivers of instability, 

and I would have, most importantly, underestimated the role the 

Lebanese Armed Forces has played in keeping Lebanon cohesive 

and at peace with its neighbors and itself. 

I’ll focus my comments on our military cooperation with the LAF, 

which is the core pillar of our policy in Lebanon and something 

that we can all, from our taxpayers to our special operations soldiers to our policy makers, be proud of. 

Amidst all the challenges that Lebanon confronts, the LAF remains the country’s only highly functioning national institution. 

Our support has enabled the LAF to beat back the advances of the 

Islamic State and other extremist groups such as the Nusra Front, 

although not without some high degree of sacrifice from our Lebanese partners. 

Strengthening the LAF also advances a range of U.S. interests 

in the Middle East and that includes not only countering the 

spread of ISIL and other violent extremists but also stemming the 

influence of Iran and Hezbollah in the region. 

Since 2006, the United States has provided Lebanon more than 

$1.2 billion in military assistance that aims to build a LAF that, 

one, is capable of maintaining internal stability and security, two, 

is capable of securing Lebanon’s borders and preventing ISIL and 

other foreign extremists from destabilizing the country, and three, 

is the preeminent military force in Lebanon, undermining the 

20

claims of Hezbollah and other militias from maintaining their arms 

as well as the claim of Hezbollah to be acting in the defense of Lebanon’s interests. 

In October, the President announced that the United States 

would intensify its security assistance to Lebanon as part of the 

campaign to counter ISIL. 

To execute the President’s guidance, Lebanon will likely continue 

to be one of the Department of Defense’s priority countries for our 

counter terrorism partnership funding in Fiscal Year 2016 to continue to bolster the LAF capability to counter ISIL and other extremists. 

This week, I had the opportunity to meet with a delegation of 

senior general officers from the LAF during the DoD’s annual U.S.-

Lebanon Joint Staff talks. 

Some of these general officers I’ve known for years, dating back 

to when I served as the desk officer for Lebanon at DoD and they 

are among our closest partners in the region. 

But don’t take my word for it. Ask any one of the hundreds of 

special operators who have served in Lebanon over the past 5 

years. They will tell you the Lebanese are among the best partners 

we have in the region to work with. They train hard and they fight 

hard. We couldn’t ask for more in a partner. 

The LAF has taken a variety of bold measures to maintain stability in Lebanon and counter the destabilizing effects of the Syrian 

conflict. The LAF has increased its operational tempo and reinforced Lebanon’s borders with additional border and special operations forces. 

These forces have been highly active, engaging militants on a 

weekly basis by launching artillery and air strikes, by executing 

clearing operations in extremist-associated neighborhoods and conducting raids and arrests. 

High-profile arrests by the LAF and other security services include the apprehension of radical Salafist cleric Ahmed al-Asir, 

ISIL operative Omar Miqati and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing 

suspect Ahmed al-Mughassil. 

The effectiveness of U.S. assistance and the LAF’s willingness to 

exercise its role as the sole legitimate defense force in Lebanon was 

further underscored in March when the LAF executed the daring 

operation in Ras Baalbek that killed over a dozen ISIL fighters and 

destroyed ISIL vehicles, a command post and a safe house. 

And as Ambassador Feierstein noted just today, an ISIL operative was killed in Arsal, the emir Abou Fouz was killed by Lebanese special operations forces just today. 

In the face of these rising challenges the LAF has demonstrated 

considerable unity, fortitude and professionalism. The LAF has organized itself effectively to maintain a tremendously high operational tempo for many of its units and has demonstrated the ability to make appropriate requests for and use of the equipment 

we’ve given it as well as unity and professionalism in numerous operations. 

Although the LAF has prevented ISIL from destabilizing the 

country to date, the stakes for LAF’s failure are extremely high. 

If the LAF falters in its fight against extremists, Hezbollah or 

even long-demilitarized Christian militias could decide to seek or 

21

take direct military actions to protect their communities, resulting 

in an outbreak of sectarian fighting that could undermine the stability of Lebanon. 

A LAF defeat, combined with a Hezbollah victory over extremists 

forces, risks strengthening Hezbollah and Iran inside of Lebanon 

and therefore undermining U.S. policy efforts to bolster Lebanese 

state institutions’ ability to exert sovereign authority throughout 

Lebanon. 

As the United States faces a strategic environment in the Middle 

East that is the most unstable it’s been in 40 years, our positive 

relationship with and continued support to Lebanon and the LAF 

are more important than ever. 

The LAF remains a critical pillar of Lebanon’s stability and its 

commitment to curtailing sectarian fighting and terrorism has been 

a significant factor in preventing Lebanon from descending into 

greater violence and instability. 

Madam Chairman and Representative Deutch, I thank you and 

other distinguished members of the subcommittee for calling this 

hearing and drawing attention to Lebanon’s security challenges 

and the U.S. security interests in supporting Lebanon during this 

critical time. 

With that, I’m open to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Exum follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Job well done. Thank you so much. In the interest of time, because we will have votes shortly, I would like to 

give my time to Congressman Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Earlier this week, we heard that Hassan Nasrallah and a handful of senior members of Hezbollah met with both Iran’s Vice President and Iran’s Ambassador to Lebanon. 

How concerned is the administration over Iran’s influence in Lebanon? I have a very important part of my district that has the 

same name—it’s Lebanon. We love you both. So how concerned is 

the administration about Iranian influence and what efforts are 

being made to counter Iran’s influence there? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. 

I would say, of course, we’re extremely concerned for a variety 

of reasons. The most specific, currently, is the extent to which Iran 

is encouraging and pressing Hezbollah to interfere in the election 

of a new President and effectively to paralyze the Government of 

Lebanon. 

And so this has been an issue and a concern for us for, in fact, 

many years that Iran has supported Hezbollah to the detriment, in 

our view, of the overall security and stability of the country. 

In order to address it, of course, we have been extremely, heavily 

engaged in a variety of activities that we have laid out. So everything from trying to help counter Iranian influence and ensure that 

there is an election and ensure that the Government of Lebanon 

can function and can perform its duties and provide services to its 

people. 

The support that we’re providing to the LAF and the internal security forces in order to allow the security forces to maintain control over Lebanon’s borders as well as the sovereignty of its territory—all of these are factors in pushing back against Iranian exploitation of the vulnerabilities in that society. 

And, of course, the other part is what we’re trying to do in order 

to build a broad international coalition of support for all of the activities that we are talking about, whether it’s refugees, humanitarian relief or these other political and economic areas that we’re 

working in. All of them will limit Iran’s influence in Lebanon. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Mr. Ambassador, according to the Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015, the President is due to provide 

Congress with a number of reports including reports on countries 

that support Hezbollah, an assessment of whether a country’s government is taking adequate measures to disrupt Hezbollah’s networks and activities within that country, and methods that 

Hezbollah utilizes to raise or transfer funds. As of today, I don’t believe we’ve received those reports. Can you please update us on the 

status of those reports and when we can expect to receive them? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Yes, Mr. Chabot. I’m pleased to say 

that the State Department did submit the required reports several 

weeks ago. The other reports are in the hands of ODNI and I’ll be 

happy to go back and seek from them some further information 

about when they might be prepared to submit those reports. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Dr. Exum, let me go to you. We always—as I know you’re well aware—I’ve met with the Lebanese 

31

Armed Forces generals over the years, and they’re always making 

obvious requests for funding and the support they need and I’m inclined to support them. That being said, I, and I think a lot of my 

colleagues in Congress, are always concerned that some of those 

dollars don’t end up in the hands of Hezbollah in some manner. 

Would you, once again, and I know you mentioned before the good 

things the LAF has been doing—could you make us more—tell me 

why I can be satisfied that that money isn’t going where it 

shouldn’t be going? 

Mr. EXUM. Thank you for the opportunity to answer that question. I feel very proud to announce that the Lebanese Armed 

Forces—as you know when we provide weapons, especially when 

they’re sensitive weapons, like night vision goggles and things like 

that, we have end use monitoring requirements. And the Lebanese 

Armed Forces have consistently had the best end use monitoring 

reporting of any military that we work with. Meaning that the 

equipment that we provide to the Lebanese Armed Forces, we can 

account for it at any given time. We have a pretty large OMC in 

the Embassy in the Lebanon as well as a forward presence there. 

So we feel pretty confident—we feel highly confident—given their 

end use monitoring rate that we can account for the equipment, 

Congressman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks, Madam Chairman. I’d like to talk about 

the end of the Syrian conflict in light of the news reports just 

today, it’s impossible right now to imagine. But, we spend a lot of 

time talking about what role, if any, Assad will play, but I’d like 

you both to focus on what results might lead to a weakening of 

Hezbollah that would in turn potentially lead to a strengthening of 

the government in Lebanon. 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Thank you Mr. Deutch. And of course 

all of this is highly speculative because we can’t really see the 

shape of an outcome that would bring peace to Syria. But if we 

were able to achieve that in a way that provided for a political 

transition that brought in all of the elements of Syrian society that 

gave the Sunnis and the other minority groups inside of Syria full 

voice, that we believe, in and of itself, would weaken Hezbollah and 

certainly weaken the linkages between Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and 

Lebanon. And so the kind of discussions—negotiations—that are 

going on now to fulfill the commitments that were made at Geneva 

I to allow for political transition would be in fact the end game, the 

end state that we believe achieve our broader regional objectives. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Dr. Exum do you have thoughts on that? 

Mr. EXUM. Congressman I think I’d approach this a couple of different ways. First off, you raised the interesting question about 

how this conflict in Syria has affected Hezbollah and in a different 

format and perhaps in a closed hearing of this subcommittee we 

could talk about the effect that conflict in Syria has had on 

Hezbollah for the positive and negative ways. I think what this 

conflict has done in the positive way, it has allowed the Lebanese 

Armed Forces to prove itself to the population and has certainly allowed the Lebanese Armed Forces to prove that it can defend Lebanon and that there is less of a need for these other armed groups. 

32

If you remember, Hezbollah was allowed to keep its arms under 

the Taif accords that ended the Lebanese Civil War. But that was 

based on, you know, a threat against Israel. 

I think that the Lebanese Armed Forces has been able to show 

that it’s been quite effective in terms of fighting these nonstate actors and it has given us more time to build up these forces. 

I think the question I have, Congressman, and I’ll speak quite 

bluntly, is what happens when Hezbollah comes home—how do 

they see their role in Lebanon. Do they want to turn their attentions toward the instability of—or toward conflict with Israel? 

My biggest fear, for all that we’ve accomplished in Lebanon, is 

that Hezbollah drags Lebanon and Israel into another war that’s 

not in the interests of the Lebanese people, the Israeli people, or 

certainly the United States either. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And just continuing that thought, what are the 

practical implications of the LAF without Saudi funding and is it 

going to be made up elsewhere? What does it mean? 

Mr. EXUM. And thanks for raising that because I was just in the 

Gulf with Secretary Carter last week. He met with all the Gulf’s 

defense ministers. 

I also had the opportunity to meet bilaterally with Mohammad 

bin Salman and in Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Zayed. I think 

there are two levels that this affects us. There’s the pragmatic kind 

of immediate acquisitions level. This means that the Lebanese 

Armed Forces likely won’t be able to acquire some of the weapons 

systems that we feel are necessary for them to me more effective 

against groups like Daesh and Nusra. 

These include close air support platforms as well as kind of protected mobility, so advanced, you know, armored personnel carriers. That’s the practical aspect. 

The political aspect, and this is something that Secretary 

Carter—well, this is something that our department has certainly—I don’t want to speak for him, but certainly our department 

has advanced is that, you know, in places like Baghdad and places 

like Beirut we need our Gulf partners to be on the ground with us. 

We need them to be engaged because when they’re not engaged it 

cedes the ground to Iran. 

So I think I worry that with the withdrawal—the apparent withdrawal of Saudi Arabia from Lebanon—I hope this is just a monetary thing because, quite frankly, we need our Gulf partners to be 

there. Otherwise, I fear that it only increases Iranian influence in 

Beirut just as the absence of a Gulf engagement in Baghdad increases Iranian influence there. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Great. Thank you very much, Dr. Exum and Ambassador Feierstein. I just want to also add my best wishes for a 

peaceful and enjoyable retirement and thank you for your service. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Not in Yemen, not in Islamabad but Jerusalem maybe. 

Mr. Weber. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And Ambassador, let me add my word of congratulations too but 

I must caution you that they say that retirement is not all that it’s 

cracked up to be. The hours are long and the pay is low. So congratulations to you. 

33

Dr. Exum, you said that the withdrawal of other—in regard to 

Congressman Deutch’s question about the withdrawal of the 

Saudis—you said that we needed our other Gulf partners. Such as 

who? 

Mr. EXUM. Such as the United Arab Emirates, in particular. On 

the one hand, we applaud the GCC countries for their strong stand 

against Hezbollah. It’s aligned with ours. The designation of 

Hezbollah as a foreign terrorist organization—that’s directly in line 

with us. 

However, as we’ve just laid out, our strategy for Lebanon—our 

policy—is based around strengthening Lebanese national institutions and we need the Saudis, we need the Emiratis and the Kuwaitis to be with us in those efforts. 

Mr. WEBER. Is there any indication that the Emiratis—well, the 

Saudis, obviously—or the Kuwaitis and others, are they going to 

withdraw their support? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Mr. Weber, if I may, first of all, let me 

just say that we understand and appreciate the concerns that the 

Saudis had that led them to make this decision, that the Government of Lebanon, unlike nearly every other country in the international community including our own, was unwilling to condemn 

a purposeless attack on Saudi diplomatic facilities in Iran. So we 

don’t want to suggest that we disagree or that we don’t appreciate 

the rationale behind the Saudi position. 

Having said that, we agree entirely with the view—the perception that Dr. Exum outlined—and that is that we all need to be 

working together in order to support Lebanese institutions, including more specifically the LAF, in order to stabilize the country and 

provide security. 

When Secretary Kerry was in Hafr al Batin a few weeks ago, he 

did have conversations also with the Saudis and urged them to 

limit the extent of their actions against the Government of Lebanon and to look for ways to move back into a position where they 

would be more solidly supportive and be more consistent with the 

approach that we’ve taken and I believe that we’ve heard from the 

Saudi leadership that they are prepared to do that. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, there’s three really interesting things here—

well, more than three but three that I’ll ask about. In our notes 

here, in one of the comments, it says most of the Syrian refugees 

are housed actually in Lebanese neighborhoods. How do they do 

that? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. This is actually true throughout the region. It’s true in Jordan and in Turkey as well and that is that 

most of the Syrians, when they came across, were able to find 

apartments. 

Many of them, of course, have relatives who live in Lebanon and 

they were able to simply move in with their relatives. Many of the 

refugees when they first came across had savings and other kinds 

of financial ability. 

Mr. WEBER. That makes sense. And then Dr. Exum, you said, 

you know, what was it, 3 years ago maybe—I forget your timing—

that if someone had said this would be happening in Lebanon you’d 

puff up your academic chest, as it were, and say no way. 

34

And our notes say that there are drivers of stability. What are 

those drivers of stability, in your opinion? 

Mr. EXUM. So Congressman, I think, like I said, first and foremost the Lebanese Armed Forces. I’m very proud——

Mr. WEBER. But let me—let me give you my third question then 

because it ties in with this. And Doctor, pardon the interruption 

but——

Mr. EXUM. No, no. 

Mr. WEBER [continuing]. One of our notes says that we had a 

witness in HFAC in March 2016, I think it was, who actually said 

that there are so many Hezbollah now in LAF that LAF has become an extension of the Hezbollah movement. I don’t know if 

you’re aware of that. Would you agree with that? 

Mr. EXUM. I would not agree with that assessment. I think that 

the relationship between the Lebanese Armed Forces and 

Hezbollah is one that, obviously, we carefully study. 

I believe Madam Chairman described it as a partnership or synergy. I think we’d describe it as deconfliction. 

If there was ever a partnership or even cooperation between the 

two organizations that would be highly problematic, of course, for 

this department, especially since we have U.S. personnel who are 

working with the Lebanese Armed Forces. 

Mr. WEBER. You said that the Lebanese Armed Forces are the 

number-one stabilizing influence in Lebanon. 

Mr. EXUM. I think that would be the first among several drivers 

of stability. Others, Congressman, is bear in mind that for better 

or for worse much of Lebanon’s political class lived through and 

were leaders during the Lebanese civil war. 

So they remember what the abyss looks like and I think at times 

when we’ve seen sectarian tensions almost spiral out of control 

there’s been a conscious step back and I think that has to do with, 

unfortunately, the difficult memories of Lebanon’s own civil war. 

Mr. WEBER. I got you. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you very much. 

Thank you again for your testimony. I’m particularly interested 

to know whether the Arab League’s recent designation of Hezbollah 

as a terrorist group is impacting Hezbollah’s ability to operate in 

the region and as a follow-on, considering Hezbollah’s exacerbation 

of the humanitarian crisis and the significant loss of life, is there 

any sense that you have that there’s growing support within the 

European community to fully designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Mr. Cicilline, in regard to your first 

question, we do believe that the designation by the GCC and by the 

Arab League of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization is an important step in the right direction and we are moving to try to help 

build practical steps on the basis of that designation to increase the 

cooperation that we have. 

So for example, Department of State, Treasury and Justice recently held a law enforcement coordination group meeting in Bahrain to try to increase the way that we can work together to limit 

Hezbollah’s capacity to operate in the region. 

35

We think that this is an important step and we’ll continue to 

move forward on that. As for the Europeans, we believe that the 

level of cooperation that we’re getting from Europe is very good, 

that in fact, the designation by the EU of the military wing of 

Hezbollah in 2013 was an important step in the right direction. 

We are working with Europol and with others, again, in very 

close coordination to try to address the Hezbollah threat as it applies globally. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And do the Gulf countries have the capabilities to 

enforce this designation and the willingness? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. We believe that GCC capabilities have 

grown over time. We are working with them as part of the President’s Camp David summit with GCC leaders last year. We agreed 

that we are going to increase our cooperation and coordination with 

them on issues like terror finance, specifically applying to 

Hezbollah, and to look at other areas where we could increase our 

cooperation. 

So the trend line is positive. Their capabilities are growing and 

we’ll continue to work with them very closely to try to increase 

that. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Ambassador. I too wish you well on 

your retirement and thank you for your extraordinary service to 

our country. 

Dr. Exum, you mentioned the apparent withdrawal of Saudi Arabia from its military assistance to Lebanon. So I’m, first, interested 

to know why you used the word apparent and whether or not it’s 

more than it appears to us. 

And also, the United States, obviously the U.K., the European 

Union and France have reaffirmed and in many cases increased 

their defense cooperation with Lebanon. 

At the same time, Iran has also offered to fill in the funding gap 

and my question is really how has the Lebanese Government responded to this—what do you think the long-term effect of that is 

and if you could just discuss kind of the apparent withdrawal. 

Mr. EXUM. Right. Congressman, first off, the donation itself was 

always somewhat ambiguous. It had been announced quite some 

time ago and maybe Mr. Ambassador——

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. We’re talking about the Saudis, not the 

Iranians. 

Mr. EXUM. Exactly, the Saudi—right. 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. You know, of course we have been 

working very closely with the Saudis and they were cooperating 

with us on the purchase of some U.S. articles, also with the French 

on the purchase of French articles. 

That financing has been withdrawn. But we certainly do hope 

that the Saudis over time will restore much of that and will be able 

to continue. 

Mr. EXUM. While we were in the discussions about that for that 

donation—it was ambiguous as far as where we stood in terms of 

that money actually landing in a bank account where it could be 

used. 

So now that the announcement has been made we hope to continue to engage with our Saudi partners to reinvest in the Lebanese Armed Forces. 

36

With respect to the—to any potential Iranian investment—I 

would defer to my State Department colleagues. But I will say that 

our British colleagues have been quite good partners, especially 

with Lebanon’s border security program and we’ve partnered quite 

closely in terms of the border and regiments that we have trained 

and in terms of the checkpoints that we have created along Lebanon’s border with Syria, and in terms of individual fighting positions that we’ve constructed. So the British have been tremendous 

partners for us in Lebanon. 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Right. And as for the Iranian offer, I 

think that the Government of Lebanon saw it for exactly what it 

was, which was a propaganda play and they said that they had no 

interest. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Great. Thank you so much. I yield back, Madam 

Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Cicilline. 

Dr. Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I appreciate you being here. What is the current assessment of rockets and missiles in Lebanon, Dr. Exum? 

Mr. EXUM. Are you referring to Hezbollah’s arsenal? 

Mr. YOHO. Yes. 

Mr. EXUM. I think I could say that in this hearing that they have 

reconstituted at the very least their rocket arsenal from 2006. I 

think to go into greater detail I’d be happy to arrange for a briefing 

from one of our intelligence——

Mr. YOHO. Yes, I’d like to get that because I have here in my 

notes that it says the Israelis’ current assessment is 150,000 missiles and rockets. I would be curious to see where we are from 

there. 

And then we’ve also heard with the Iran nuclear deal that Iran 

has said they were going to help retrofit these with smart bomb 

technology. 

Do we have any indication that that’s going on? 

Mr. EXUM. Again, I will refer those——

Mr. YOHO. Okay. 

Mr. EXUM [continuing]. The specific questions to our intelligence 

community. Let me just say, though, Congressman, that as you 

know we have partnered with the Israelis I think over the past 5 

years. The Department of Defense has spent an average of $500 

million over the past 5 years alone—an average annually—of $500 

million to partner with the Israelis on their missile defense technology and we’ve had several key successes both with the development of the Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 systems, the David sling system—these are for more long-range ballistic missiles—but most importantly, the Iron Dome program that the United States has codeveloped with Israel has saved countless Israeli lives. This has all 

been since 2006. 

Mr. YOHO. No, and that’s great. 

Mr. EXUM. So we take this threat very seriously, Congressman. 

Mr. YOHO. Well, and let me ask both of you. With the—again, 

trying to assess the aftermath of the Iran nuclear deal—do you see 

Iran inserting and influencing that region more, getting more hegemony in that area and taking, you know, just more leadership 

37

in that area? Are we seeing that more since the Iran nuclear deal 

or since some of the sanctions have been released or money been 

released? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Mr. Yoho, this is, of course, something 

that we watch very carefully and was a subject of most of the conversation that the President had with the GCC leadership when he 

was in Riyadh just 2 weeks ago. 

We do believe that in the period since the JCPOA was signed 

that the Government of Iran has tried to expand its influence, its 

presence in the region—that they are going to continue to try to at 

least portray an image of an Iran that is becoming more and more 

active, more and more powerful in the region. 

Some of this is, of course, overstated and is designed really to 

create a certain image of Iran of perhaps more than is real. 

But there are also elements of it that are well worth watching 

and therefore, the strategy that we are pursuing, which is to build 

up the capabilities of our allies and partners in the region—the 

GCC, Government of Israel—to confront these Iranian efforts. Also 

as Dr. Exum said, whether you’re looking at Baghdad or at Beirut 

or at Sana’a to increase the ability of those societies to resist Iranian expansion, to resist Iranian exploitation of vulnerabilities, to 

work with our Gulf allies to do that. 

Mr. YOHO. And that’s—the important thing that we want to do 

is make sure that the unintended consequences doesn’t embolden 

Iran that has more of a destabilizing effect, if that’s possible, in 

that region. 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Absolutely. 

Mr. YOHO. That we want to make sure that if they are having 

an influence it’s a positive influence, which time will tell on that. 

As far as Russia’s involvement in Syria, along the Israeli border 

with Syria, are we seeing any influence with Russia’s presence 

there as far as a stabilizing in that area or have you assessed anything? Is it a positive effect or negative or no change at all? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. In terms of the Israeli-Syrian border? 

Mr. YOHO. Yes. 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Well, I think that if you look at the evidence, there’s a dialogue going on between the Israelis and the 

Russians in order to try to deconflict and, of course, the Government of Israel has said that they had an understanding with the 

Russians that they would continue to carry out their defensive operations inside of Syria in order to ensure that the Iranians or others couldn’t exploit the political chaos in that region. So that part 

has been positive. But overall, the Russian presence has not contributed to stability on the border. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. I’m out of time and I thank you——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Dr. Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO [continuing]. For your time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and Mr. 

Feierstein, I want to be real clear. You hold an appointment in this 

administration and I want to make very clear what you did or did 

not say to Mr. Yoho on the record. 

Is there any evidence that because of JCPOA, or related to it in 

some fashion, Iran has changed or expanded its activity with reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:22 Nov 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\042816\99950 SHIRL
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spect to Hezbollah in Lebanon specifically and in other places in 

the region because of the free-up of funds? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. No, sir. There is no direct evidence 

linking the two. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. Right. And in fact, the evidence is, despite 

all of this PR about the funds, almost all of those funds have been 

used, in fact, for domestic investment because they ran down their 

reserves and they’ve got some serious reinvestment they need to 

make in order to pump up the oil production as well. Is that a fair 

statement? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. This is absolutely the assessment that 

we made. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. Just want to clear that up for the 

record. 

You know, when my friend, Graham Beneman, who’s here 

today—by the way, he worked for the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. All the good people came. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You know, we’re everywhere. We’re everywhere, 

still. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Congressman Deutch, do you remember 

that? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. But we went to Lebanon well over 30 years ago 

and, you know, there were problems about Lebanese stability then 

and it only got worse in the ’80s when we were there, right, because the civil war had ended—we thought that was the worst. 

But certainly U.S. suffered terrible losses and, by the way, 

Democrats didn’t exploit those problems of Ronald Reagan. So the 

Embassy got blown up not once but twice. The MAU—the Marine 

amphibious unit—at the Beirut Airport was blown up by terrorists 

and we lost 240 young men—240—241, thank you. 

Graham and I lost a friend, Bill McIntyre, in the first bombing 

of the Embassy. He worked for USAID at that time. And we had 

a series of assassinations of Lebanese leaders, most of it attributed 

to Syrian activity and because Syria wanted to keep control over 

Lebanon and certainly had, as I recall, troops in the Beqaa. 

But now when we look at Lebanon, and this is the question I 

want to ask you, are we looking now really at a fundamentally 

failed state and can we ever find the formula to sort of put Humpty 

Dumpty back together again and, I mean, and not necessarily with 

the status quo ante but with something more democratic, more reflective of the demographics—the actual demographics—and a state 

that’s going to function and work and provide services and security 

for its citizens and to make sure it has secure borders with its 

neighbors like Israel. Go for it. 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Mr. Connolly, we would absolutely not 

suggest that Lebanon is a failed state or anything close to being 

a failed state. 

As Dr. Exum said, there are drivers of stability there, that there 

is a resilience that has been demonstrated over these past years 

that in many ways is quite remarkable. 

The fact that Lebanon has been able to absorb over a third of its 

population in the form of refugees without creating huge social or 

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political disintegration or dysfunction is a remarkable achievement 

on their part. 

The performance of the LAF and the internal security forces in 

holding the security together and addressing some fairly serious 

challenges both externally from spillover from the Syrian conflict 

into the Beqaa Valley but also in terms of preventing the rise of 

extremism from within Syria and the performance within Lebanon, 

the performance of the ISF and the OAF, for example, in Tripoli 

in maintaining stability there even though there were extremist 

forces operating. 

So all of these things are very positive. There are challenges. 

There are serious challenges on the political front, the need to resolve this 2-year vacancy in the presidency and to allow the government to function—the challenge of Hezbollah——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Close to as bad as leaving a Supreme Court seat 

vacant for 9 months. 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Yes, sir. All of these things are challenges. But I don’t think that we have ever been at a point where 

we were not confident that the Lebanese would be able to pull this 

together and create a strong and stable society. 

Mr. EXUM. No, I would just concur with that. I think that we 

have seen examples where we have been able build up effective national institutions and I would concur. I think, you know, again, 

like I said at the beginning, if I were to go back 5 years and think 

that Lebanon would somehow be relatively stable I would not have 

believed it. 

But I think Lebanon has proven a lot of us wrong the past several years, given the resiliency of not only its people but also the 

institutions it does have either at the national or communal level. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Just a couple 

of questions. We have a vote. 

So just the Lebanese Armed Forces, for both of you, is—what 

percentage of their force is made up of the Shi’a population? 

Mr. EXUM. Yes, I have the precise demographics here. It’s, roughly, it’s about a third Christian, a third Sunni Muslim and about a 

third Shi’a Muslim with about 6 percent Druze population in there. 

I can go into greater detail if you’d like, sir. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Does the Lebanese Armed Forces—are they viewed 

as being more effective than Hezbollah as a fighting force? 

Mr. EXUM. They’re not, I would say. I would think that the Lebanese Armed Forces are still a work in progress and it’s largely uneven. 

We’ve done some great work with the Lebanese special operations forces. I think everybody, to include the Lebanese Armed 

Forces and our own military, believes that we’ve got a lot more 

work to do with the so-called conventional units within the Lebanese Armed Forces—the intervention brigades, the border regiment 

forces—and I think there is still a perception, which we are working to counter quite actively, that Hezbollah is a more effective 

actor on the battlefield. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Externally, with the Saudi pull back of $4 billion 

to support the Lebanese Armed Forces, is there a concern that—

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internally in the country—that the Lebanese Armed Forces loses 

its street cred, if you will, among the Shi’a population as the institution that is in place to protect all of Lebanon? 

Mr. EXUM. So and here, Congressman, I’ve taken off my DoD 

hat. I’ve got my analyst hat on now and I’ve never really worried 

about the credibility of the Lebanese Armed Forces within the Shi’a 

population or within the Christian population. 

It’s in large part the Sunni population that I’ve worried about in 

part because so many of the operations that the Lebanese Armed 

Forces carry out are against Sunni extremists, against—and often 

they operate in largely Sunni communities like Arsal, like Tripoli 

in the north, like Sidon in the south. And I worry that there’s a 

perception among some in Lebanon’s Sunni community, which I believe has been increasingly radicalized, in places, due to the conflict 

in Syria and broader waves of sectarianism that have swept the region over the past 10 years, I worry about not their credibility but 

the way they are perceived within that specific community. 

I will say, overall, the Lebanese Armed Forces have never been 

more popular and never been more respected within Lebanon overall and that’s highly encouraging, Congressman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. HIGGINS. I’m sorry. Okay. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And Mr. Higgins, we really do have 3 minutes to get to our vote. But thank you so much and I’m sorry. 

Mr. HIGGINS. It’s okay. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And with that, our subcommittee is adjourned. 

Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you to the audience. 

[Whereupon, at 4:36 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

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[NOTE: State Department officials did not provide responses to all questions prior 

to printing. Any additional responses received will be made available at:

http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=104873.]

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[NOTE: Department of Defense officials did not provide responses for the official 

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http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=104873.]

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