RENDERED: FEBRUARY 11, 2022, 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2021-CA-0234-MR

JONATHAN HARDIN APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE MARY M. SHAW, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 19-CI-000858

LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY 

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT 

AND LOUISVILLE METRO POLICE 

MERIT BOARD APPELLEES 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, CETRULO, AND JONES, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Jonathan Hardin (“Hardin”) appeals the decision of the 

Jefferson Circuit Court upholding the Louisville Metro Police Merit Board (“Merit 

Board”) action of approving the termination of his employment as a police officer 

by the chief of police, Steve Conrad (“Chief Conrad”). 
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Chief Conrad had terminated Hardin after allegations of Hardin’s 

failure to follow proper police procedures were investigated and substantiated to 

the Chief Conrad’s satisfaction. Hardin appealed his termination to the Merit 

Board. The Merit Board held a four-day hearing into the termination decision and 

upheld the decision to terminate Hardin.

Hardin appealed his termination to the Jefferson Circuit Court for 

administrative review pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 

67C.323(3)(a).

1

 In the circuit court, Hardin alleged that since related criminal 

records were ultimately expunged, the Merit Board erred when it did not grant his 

motion that all materials contained in the criminal case file not be admitted at the 

hearing. He also argued he was denied the right to confront witnesses at the 

hearing when their transcribed testimony from the investigation of the allegations 

was presented rather than live testimony. 

1 KRS 67C.323(3)(a) states:

Every action of a dismissal, suspension, or demotion made by the 

board shall be final, except that any person aggrieved may, within 

thirty (30) days after the action, appeal to the Circuit Court of the 

county in which the board meets. The board shall be named 

respondent as the consolidated local government police force merit 

board, and service shall be had on the chairman of the board.

Notice of the appeal shall be given to the chief or the officer if not 

already a party to the appeal as real parties in interest. The appeal 

taken to the Circuit Court shall be docketed by the clerk as a civil 

action with appropriate judicial review of an administrative action 

or decision.
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The circuit court affirmed the Merit Board. After reviewing the 

record, the circuit court decision, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the circuit 

court.

FACTS

In 2015, Appellant Jonathan Hardin was a Louisville Metro Police 

Officer assigned as a student resource officer at Olmstead Academy North, a 

public middle school in Jefferson County. He had been an officer for six years at 

the time of this assignment. 

On January 22, 2015, Hardin was in the cafeteria during the lunch 

period speaking with a school employee when a student attempted to cut the lunch 

line. The school employee directed the student to the back of the line, but the 

student ignored the employee’s direction. Hardin then intervened and repeated the 

employee’s instruction that the student go to the back of the line. In response, the 

thirteen-year-old student balled his hands into fists and refused to move. Hardin 

pushed the student and then punched him in the face, with a closed fist. Hardin

then pinned the student on the ground and threatened to utilize his taser on the 

student if the student continued to resist. The student relented, was handcuffed, 

and was transported to the hospital for treatment of injuries he sustained. After 

treatment, the student was released to his parent and was criminally charged with 

menacing and resisting arrest.
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Several days later, on January 27, 2015, Hardin was in a hallway of 

the school when a student took a step towards him and mimed shooting a 

basketball over Hardin’s head. Another student simultaneously pushed Hardin, 

and while Hardin was admonishing the second student, a third student pushed 

Hardin very hard, causing him to fall to the floor. Hardin got up from the floor and 

approached the third student from the back, grabbing him around the chest and 

lifting him off the floor. Hardin held the student in the air for approximately

twelve seconds while the student tapped Hardin’s arms and swung his feet, fighting 

for air before going limp. Hardin then lowered the student and laid him on the

floor. The student regained consciousness soon thereafter and was handcuffed by 

Hardin for a short time. 

Instead of charging the student with a criminal offense, Hardin took 

the student outside to exercise and then took him into the auditorium to play piano 

for the student, hoping to calm him. Finally, Hardin drove the child home to his 

parent after the principal approved him doing so. 

Both incidents were captured on video tape. The January 22 incident 

was reported by Hardin to his supervising officer in accordance with standard 

police policy. His supervisor completed an administrative incident report, 

necessary any time an officer or an arrestee is injured during an arrest. The 

January 27 incident was not reported by Hardin to his superior officer, but rather to 
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the student resource officer commander. Hardin told the commander it was not 

necessary to file an administrative incident report because no injuries occurred. 

However, after viewing the video of the January 27 incident, the commander chose 

to report it, which report resulted in an investigation of the incident.

After internal reviews of both incidents, Hardin was criminally 

charged on February 3, 2015, with assault in the fourthdegree, official misconduct 

in the first degree, and false swearing in relation to the January 22 incident. The 

charges were eventually dismissed and were the subject of an expungement order 

issued on January 19, 2016. 

In relation to the January 27 incident, Hardin was charged with 

official misconduct in the first degree (eventually amended to official misconduct 

in the second degree), assault in the first degree (eventually amended to assault in 

the fourth degree), and wanton endangerment. He was tried by a jury in June of 

2018, and was found not guilty of the amended charges.

Hardin also faced disciplinary action after the internal investigations 

of both incidents were completed. On March 20, 2015, Chief Conrad terminated 

Hardin for violations of Louisville Metro Police Department (“LMPD”) Standard 

Operating Procedures (“SOP”). Chief Conrad articulated in the letter of 

termination that he found that Hardin had violated SOP 9.1.4, Use of Physical 

Force, in both instances; SOP 10.7.2, Taking Juveniles into Custody, for the 
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January 22 incident; and SOP 5.1.2, Obedience to Rules and Regulations, for the 

criminal charges brought against Hardin flowing from both incidents. 

Hardin appealed his termination by Chief Conrad to the Merit Board. 

The Merit Board is vested with authority to review personnel decisions concerning 

sworn officers by KRS 67C.323. Hardin requested that the Merit Board hearing be 

delayed until after the criminal proceedings were completed, which was granted. 

The Merit Board did not begin the proceedings until 2018, after the criminal cases 

were concluded and the expungement order entered. 

At the Merit Board hearing, testimony from Hardin, the lead Public 

Integrity Unit (“PIU”) investigator, the commander to whom Hardin reported the 

January 27 incident, the Professional Standards Unit (“PSU”) commander, the lead 

PSU investigator, and Chief Conrad were all presented by LMPD in support of the 

termination. Hardin called as witnesses several school employees, as well as his 

supervising officer to whom he reported the January 22 incident, and the PSU 

Investigator. 

Following the hearing, during which the members of the Merit Board 

reviewed the video footage of the incidents multiple times, the Board voted to 

uphold Hardin’s termination, finding that Hardin violated SOP 9.1.4, Use of 

Physical Force, and SOP 10.7.2, Taking Juveniles into Custody, but finding no 
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violation of SOP 5.1.2, Obedience to Rules and Regulations. The Board’s findings

of fact and conclusions of law were issued January 15, 2019. 

Hardin then appealed the decision of the Merit Board to the Jefferson 

Circuit Court, which has jurisdiction to review the Board’s decisions via KRS

67C.323(3)(a). Hardin argued that the Board had reviewed evidence that had been 

included in the file of the expunged case, which he argued was improper. He also 

forwarded that his rights pursuant to the confrontation clause were violated by the 

introduction of witness statements rather than live testimony. The circuit court 

reviewed the determination of the Merit Board and found substantial evidence 

supported its conclusion that Chief Conrad’s termination of Hardin be upheld. 

In the opinion and order issued in February of 2021, the circuit 

court found that the same evidence was used both in the criminal prosecution and 

in the personnel matter and the expungement of the criminal case did not act to 

prevent the use of the evidence in the personnel action. As to the witness 

statements, the circuit court held that the Board did not mention the statements in 

its findings of fact and conclusion of law, but rather relied upon the testimony of 

the live witnesses, satisfying the standard that the decision was supported by 

substantial evidence. 
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Hardin now appeals the decision of the circuit court to this Court. 

Having reviewed the court’s opinion, the briefs of the parties and the record, we 

affirm. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

KRS 67C.323(1) provides a framework for the Merit Board’s review 

of a decision of the chief of police to terminate the employment of a nonprobationary officer. Any person aggrieved by the Board’s decision following 

such a review has a right to appeal the Merit Board’s determination to the circuit 

court. KRS 67C.323(3)(a). The circuit court’s judgment in review of such matters 

is subject to review by this Court. KRS 67C.323(3)(b).

The circuit court reviews the decision of the Merit Board for 

arbitrariness. “Basically, judicial review of administrative action is concerned with 

the question of arbitrariness.” Am. Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville & Jefferson 

Cty. Plan. & Zoning Comm’n, 379 S.W.2d 450, 456 (Ky. 1964) (emphasis in 

original). If an administrative action is not supported by substantial evidence, it is 

arbitrary. Id. “Substantial evidence has been defined as evidence which ‘has 

sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men.’” 

Runner v. Commonwealth, 323 S.W.3d 7, 10 (Ky. App. 2010) (quoting Kentucky 

State Racing Comm’n v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298 (Ky. 1972)). In reviewing for 

arbitrariness, the reviewing court must observe whether the questioned exercise of 
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authority might be infirm as an “(1) action in excess of granted powers, (2) lack of 

procedural due process, and (3) lack of substantial evidentiary support[.]” Am.

Beauty Homes Corp., 379 S.W.2d at 456. 

Our review of the circuit court determination is only for clear error. 

The standard guiding [the Court of Appeals] on the 

appeal from the circuit court is the “clearly erroneous” 

rule as promulgated in [Kentucky Rules of Civil 

Procedure] CR 52.01. [The Court of Appeals] cannot 

disturb the trial court’s determination unless it acted 

clearly erroneously in the sense that its determinations 

were not supported by substantial evidence.

Stallins v. City of Madisonville, 707 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Ky. App. 1986). 

If we find the circuit court’s decision was not clearly erroneous, it should be 

affirmed. However, any appellate review of questions of law is de novo. Huxol v. 

Daviess County Fiscal Court, 507 S.W.3d 574, 578 (Ky. App. 2016). 

ANALYSIS

Hardin had two main complaints to the circuit court concerning the 

Merit Board’s actions. The first complaint was that the Merit Board erred in 

considering materials contained in the files of the criminal case which was 

expunged, maintaining that the expungement prevented any use of those materials. 

The second complaint was that his procedural due process rights were violated 

when the Merit Board considered witness statements, leaving him unable to cross-
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examine those witnesses. We will review the circuit court’s decision as to each for 

clear error. 

1. The Expunged Materials

During the Merit Board proceedings, counsel for Hardin objected to 

the introduction of certain documents by LMPD because they had been used or 

relied upon in the criminal proceedings which had been expunged. Hardin argued 

that any documents used in the expunged proceedings are themselves subject to the 

expungement order, rendering them incapable of being introduced in any other 

proceeding like the Merit Board hearing. 

The circuit court found that the police investigations of Hardin’s 

actions were undertaken by both the PIU and the PSU. Arguably, the court found, 

since the PIU reviews officer behavior for possible criminal charges, materials in 

the PIU file were subject to the expungement order. But it found that the contents 

of the PSU file were not subject to the expungement order, as the investigation by 

the PSU is into violations of the SOPs, and would not likely support a criminal 

charge. 

The relevant sections of KRS 431.076 provide: 

(4) An order of expungement pursuant to this section 

shall expunge all criminal records in the custody of the 

court and any criminal records in the custody of any 

other agency or official, including law enforcement 

records, but no order of expungement pursuant to this 

section shall expunge records in the custody of the 
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Department for Community Based Services. The court 

shall order the expunging on a form provided by the 

Administrative Office of the Courts. Every agency, with 

records relating to the arrest, charge, or other matters 

arising out of the arrest or charge, that is ordered to 

expunge records, shall certify to the court within sixty 

(60) days of the entry of the expungement order, that the 

required expunging action has been completed. All 

orders enforcing the expungement procedure shall also be 

expunged.

. . .

(6) After the expungement, the proceedings in the matter 

shall be deemed never to have occurred. The court and 

other agencies shall delete or remove the records from 

their computer systems so that any official stateperformed background check will indicate that the 

records do not exist. The court and other agencies shall 

reply to any inquiry that no record exists on the matter. 

The person whose record is expunged shall not have to 

disclose the fact of the record or any matter relating 

thereto on an application for employment, credit, or other 

type of application.

Hardin insists that the circuit court erred. He argues that the statute 

requires that an expungement order necessitates the purging of all documentary 

evidence which had been presented in the expunged proceeding, even if those 

materials were available from other sources. The Merit Board points to the 

language of KRS 431.079(3):

For the purposes of this section, KRS 431.073, 431.076, 

and 431.078, “expungement” means the removal or 

deletion of records by the court and other agencies which 

prevents the matter from appearing on official stateperformed background checks.
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The Merit Board insisted to the circuit court that it was only the 

documents generated in the expunged court proceeding itself that were required to 

be deleted or removed. Therefore, any evidence adduced from another source and 

introduced during the conduct of the now-expunged proceeding is not touched by 

the expungement order. The circuit court agreed with the Merit Board. We find 

that this determination was proper and not clearly erroneous. 

We determine that the statute clearly delineates those “records” which 

must be expunged. In discerning the meaning of a statute, we must look to the 

common, plain meaning of the words chosen by the legislature. 

It is this Court’s duty when interpreting statutes to give 

effect to the General Assembly’s intent, but “no rule of 

interpretation . . . require[s] us to utterly ignore the plain 

. . . meaning of words in a statute.” In fact, “[t]he plain 

meaning of the statutory language is presumed to be what 

the legislature intended, and if the meaning is plain, then 

the court cannot base its interpretation on any other 

method or source.” We “ascertain the intention of the 

legislature from words used in enacting statutes rather 

than surmising what may have been intended but was not 

expressed.” In other words, we assume that the 

“[Legislature] meant exactly what it said, and said 

exactly what it meant.” Only “when [it] would produce 

an injustice or ridiculous result” should we ignore the 

plain meaning of a statute.

Revenue Cabinet v. O’Daniel, 153 S.W.3d 815, 819 (Ky. 2005) (citations omitted). 

The language of this statute is clear. The expungement statute speaks 

of the records of the court or other agencies which might appear “on official state-
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performed background checks.” This does not contemplate all of the documents 

Hardin complains of having been considered by the Merit Board. Many of the 

documents were not generated through the criminal prosecution, but rather during 

the PSU investigation.

During the multiple investigations of Hardin’s actions on January 22 

and January 27, several files were created. Within LMPD, two investigations were 

ongoing: one by the PIU and the other by the PSU. The PIU investigates 

allegations of criminal activity by officers. When the allegation against an officer 

concerns a failure to follow departmental policy, the PSU conducts the 

investigation. The two units can conduct concurrent investigations, which 

occurred when the allegations against Hardin arose. It is the introduction of 

materials from both of these investigations to which Hardin objected at the Merit 

Board hearing. His argument is that as some of the materials were introduced 

during the expunged court proceedings as evidence, they were subject to the 

expungement order and therefore could not be introduced, even though they arose 

from a source independent of the expunged proceedings. 

Hardin’s interpretation of the statute is not reasonable and requires us 

to interpret a statute such as to reach an absurd result. KRS 431.076(4) clearly 

delineates that the only records which are required to be eliminated from all 

records are those “relating to the arrest, charge, or other matters arising out of the 
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arrest or charge[.]” Nothing in the PSU file could possibly qualify as falling under 

this definition as nothing in the PSU file, relating to violation of policy, would 

relate to an arrest or charge. But the PIU file might contain materials which were 

presented as evidence in the criminal case, which would be relating to the arrest or 

charge. The circuit court made this delineation, expressly finding that PSU files 

could not possibly relate to the arrest or charge, but that the PIU files possibly 

could.

The circuit court noted that the PIU file was incorporated into the PSU 

file prior to the expungement order. The court, having found that only the PIU 

files could possibly contain materials subject to the expungement order, then 

conducted a harmlessness review to determine if any harm might have occurred by 

the inclusion of any of the PIU files in the PSU.

We hold that best practice would be for any of the materials subject to 

an expungement order be redacted from any file, such as the PIU file, prior to 

presentation to an administrative hearing body, such as the Merit Board. Even so, 

the court found that the only charge before the Merit Board to which any of the 

PIU specific contents were relevant was the violation of SOP 5.1.2, and that charge 

was determined to be meritless by the Board. Thus, to the extent that the Merit 

Board utilized materials subject to the expungement order, that error was harmless, 

and we find that the circuit court properly so found. 
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2. The Witness Statements

Hardin argued to the circuit court that the witness statements were not 

properly before the Merit Board and the use of those statements at the hearing 

violated his due process rights. The circuit court held that because the witness 

statements were of “minimal assistance” to the Board, and because unpublished 

caselaw supported a finding that the use of the statements was not improper, the 

actions of the Merit Board were proper.

2

 We do not find that holding to be 

erroneous.

Hardin asserted to the circuit court that his right to confront his 

accusers was violated when the Merit Board relied upon witness statements in 

reviewing Chief Conrad’s termination decision, rather than requiring live 

testimony so Hardin could effectively cross-examine the witnesses. The circuit 

court held that Hardin’s rights to due process were not violated, as hearsay is

admissible in administrative proceedings.3 Further, the court reasoned, the Merit 

2 Ca’Mel v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov’t Police Dep’t, No. 2013-CA-001988-MR, 

2015 WL 226088 (Ky. App. Jan. 16, 2015), and Shaw v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro 

Gov’t Police Dep’t, No. 2017-CA-000867-MR, 2018 WL 3954278 (Ky. App. Aug. 17, 2018). 

3 Hearsay evidence may be admissible, if it is the type of evidence that reasonable and prudent 

persons would rely on in their daily affairs, but it shall not be sufficient in itself to support an 

agency’s findings of facts unless it would be admissible over objections in civil actions. KRS 

13B.090(1).
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Board did not cite the witness statements in its findings and the statements were of 

only minimal assistance to the Board. 

We find no clear error with the circuit court’s reasoning. The 

confrontation clause promises only that those facing criminal accusations have a 

right to confront those who provide testimony against him or her. 

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 

made applicable to the States via the Fourteenth 

Amendment, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S.

Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965), provides that “[i]n all 

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 

. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” In 

Crawford,

[4]

after reviewing the Clause’s historical 

underpinnings, we held that it guarantees a defendant’s 

right to confront those “who ‘bear testimony’” against 

him. 541 U.S., at 51, 124 S. Ct. 1354.

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531, 174 L. 

Ed. 2d 314 (2009).

However, we do note that KRS 67C.325 does guarantee an officer “an 

opportunity to confront his or her accusers[.]” Had the circuit court not found any 

admission of the statements to be harmless, our review might end differently. The 

circuit court made clear in its ruling that the Merit Board made no notation to the 

statements in its findings, and that the officers specifically noted as having 

4 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004).
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provided evidence in the findings provided live testimony and were subject to 

cross-examination. 

The circuit court gave due consideration to the argument of Hardin

concerning whether the admission of the witness statements violated his due 

process rights. It gave due consideration to the import of the witness statements to 

the Merit Board, found them to have been of little consequence, and therefore its 

determination that Hardin’s due process rights were not violated was not clearly in 

error.

CONCLUSION

The “residuum rule” establishes that the “findings of an administrative 

agency will be upheld despite its partial reliance upon incompetent evidence if it 

also had before it competent evidence which by itself would have been legally 

sufficient to support the findings.” Haste v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. 

Comm’n, 673 S.W.2d 740, 740-41 (Ky. App. 1984) (citing Big Sandy Community 

Action Program v. Chaffins, 502 S.W.2d 526, 530 (Ky. 1973)).

We find that the Jefferson Circuit Court thoroughly reviewed the 

record before it and its ruling was supported by substantial evidence and thus not 

clearly erroneous. We affirm the decision upholding the Merit Board’s 

determination to terminate Hardin’s employment as a Louisville Metro Police 

officer. 
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ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

David Leightty

Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE

LOUISVILLE METRO POLICE 

MERIT BOARD:

Mark W. Dobbins

Kathleen M.W. Schoen

Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE

LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON 

COUNTY METROPOLITAN 

GOVERNMENT:

Mitchel T. Denham

Erin M. Shaughnessy

Olivia Oney

Louisville, Kentucky