UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CARNIE NORRIS, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; PHILLIP  No. 01-8075 MCCLOUD, Warden of Peery

Correctional Institution; CHARLES M.

CONDON, Attorney General of the

State of South Carolina,

Respondents-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.

David C. Norton, District Judge.

(CA-00-2333-2-18)

Submitted: April 29, 2002

Decided: May 17, 2002

Before MICHAEL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Carnie Norris, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Chief Deputy

Attorney General, Jeffrey Alan Jacobs, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Carnie Norris seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying

relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 &

Supp. 2001). In his federal habeas petition, Norris raised ten claims,

three of which he first raised in his petition for post-conviction relief

before a circuit court in South Carolina ("PCR petition"), and seven

he raised for the first time in a pro se filing supplementing his petition

for a writ of certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court, filed pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Johnson v.

State, 364 S.E.2d 201 (1988).* For the following reasons, we deny a

certificate of appealability and dismiss. 

With respect to the first set of three claims, which were initially

raised in Norris’ PCR petition, we have reviewed the record and the

district court’s opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal as to those claims on

the reasoning of the district court. See Norris v. South Carolina, No.

CA-00-2333-2-18 (D.S.C. Nov. 6, 2001). To the extent Norris contends he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to those claims,

each of which relates to the validity of his guilty plea to common law

robbery, Norris’ factual allegations are insufficient to overcome the

strong presumption of correctness accorded state courts factual determinations, see § 2254(e)(1), and the formidable barrier Norris’ sworn

statements at his plea hearing pose in any subsequent collateral proceedings. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977).

Accordingly, we find no error in regard to the district court’s resolution of those claims without a hearing. 

*Johnson reaffirms South Carolina’s authorization of Anders appeals

from post-conviction proceedings, despite the Supreme Court’s earlier

holding in Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), that such

appeals were not required. 

2 NORRIS v. STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
With respect to the seven claims the district court dismissed as procedurally barred based upon the report and recommendation of the

magistrate judge, we conclude that although they are not procedurally

barred, the claims are meritless. The district court concluded that

because Norris raised these issues for the first time in his petition for

a writ of certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court, filed pursuant to Johnson, Norris’ claims were both unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. While we conclude the claims were not procedurally

barred, see O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 847 (1999) (citing

Re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal & Post-Conviction

Relief Cases, 471 S.E.2d 454 (S.C. 1990)); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S.

255, 265 n.11 (1989); State v. McKennedy, 559 S.E.2d 850, 854 (S.C.

2002), they were nevertheless properly subject to dismissal. Claims

3, 4, 7, 9, and 10 allege errors of state law, and as such do not constitute a basis for federal habeas corpus review. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497

U.S. 764, 780 (1990). Furthermore, Norris’ claim that his postconviction attorney failed to appeal denial of his state habeas petition

is meritless, as ineffective assistance of counsel during state postconviction proceedings is not cognizable under § 2254. See § 2254(i).

Nor does Norris’ final allegation, that despite his sworn statements to

the contrary at his guilty plea hearing he did not actually commit the

crime for which he pled guilty, support his claim for habeas corpus

relief. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977); see also

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 

Finally, we find no merit to Norris’ allegation that the district court

abused its discretion in failing to sanction the Appellees. Accordingly,

we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss this appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

NORRIS v. STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 3