20034 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 69 / Monday, April 11, 2011 / Notices 

1The Order also alleged that Respondent’s 

Registration does not expire until April 30, 2012. 

Show Cause Order at 1. Because Respondent does 

not dispute this, I find that he has a current 

registration. 

2Therein, Respondent also requested that the 

Administrative Law Judge ‘‘issue a writ of Habeas 

Corpus to allow [him] to have a personal hearing 

in Springfield, Virginia in the interest of true 

[j]ustice.’’ Response to Order to Show Cause, at 2. 

0.100(b) and 0.104, I hereby grant the 

Government’s motion to terminate the 

proceeding. I further order that the 

Order to Show Cause and Immediate 

Suspension of Registration issued to 

Robert Charles Ley, D.O, be, and it 

hereby is, dismissed. 

Dated: April 1, 2011. 

Michele M. Leonhart, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2011–8544 Filed 4–8–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

[Docket No. 10–28] 

Louisiana All Snax, Inc.; Dismissal of 

Proceeding 

On January 21, 2010, the Deputy 

Assistant Administrator, Office of 

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement 

Administration, issued an Order To 

Show Cause to Louisiana All Snax, Inc. 

(Respondent), of Baton Rouge, 

Louisiana. The Show Cause Order 

proposed the revocation of Respondent 

DEA’s Certificate of Registration, which 

authorized it to distribute the list I 

chemicals ephedrine and 

pseudoephedrine, on the ground that, 

effective August 15, 2009, the State of 

Louisiana made both chemicals 

Schedule V controlled substances; that 

those persons who distribute these 

substances ‘‘must possess a license 

issued by the Louisiana Board of 

Pharmacy’’; that Respondent ‘‘does not 

possess’’ the necessary license; and that 

DEA must therefore revoke its 

registration. Show Cause Order at 1 

(citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), La. Rev. Stat. 

Ann. §§ 40:973 & 40:1049.1). 

On February 18, 2010, Respondent 

requested a hearing on the allegations. 

In his letter, Respondent’s owner stated 

that it had ‘‘stopped distributing 

ephedrine products prior to August 15, 

2009 and do[es] not plan to distribute 

any as long as Act 314 * * * is in effect. 

My registration certificate will expire in 

March 2010 and we do not plan to 

renew it because we can not distribute 

legally.’’ Letter of Robert Howerter to 

Hearing Clerk (Jan. 28, 2010). Mr. 

Howerter further wrote: ‘‘We do not 

understand why the DEA is revoking a 

certificate we can not use and will 

expire in a little over a month especially 

since we do not plan to renew it.’’ Id. 

‘‘As a token of [his] good faith,’’ Mr. 

Howerter ‘‘attached [his] certificate to 

[his] letter.’’ Id. 

The matter was then placed on the 

docket of the DEA Office of 

Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), and 

on February 22, 2010, the ALJ ordered 

the Government to determine whether 

Respondent had filed a timely renewal 

application and to provide evidence 

supporting its allegation that 

Respondent lacked the requisite State 

authority. Order Directing the 

Government To Provide Proof That 

Respondent Lacks State Authority To 

Handle Controlled Substances and 

Briefing Schedule, at 1. 

Two days later, the Government 

moved for summary disposition or to 

dismiss on the grounds of mootness. 

Therein, the Government noted that it 

had determined that Respondent’s 

registration ‘‘expires on March 31, 2010’’ 

and that, ‘‘[a]s of the date of this filing, 

Respondent has not filed an application 

for renewal of its registration, and in its 

request for a hearing Respondent 

admitted that it does not plan to renew 

its DEA registration.’’ Motion for Summ. 

Disp., at 2. While the Government also 

provided a copy of a letter from the 

Louisiana Board of Pharmacy to a 

Diversion Investigator stating that 

Respondent does not hold a Louisiana 

Controlled Dangerous Substances 

License and argued that ‘‘DEA must 

therefore revoke Respondent’s DEA 

registration,’’ the Government also 

observed that ‘‘[d]ismissal of this matter 

will also be appropriate * * * after 

March 31, 2010, on grounds of 

mootness, if Respondent does not apply 

for renewal of its registration.’’ Id. at 3– 

4. 

Respondent did not file a response to 

the Government’s motion. ALJ Dec. at 2. 

On March 8, 2010, the ALJ granted the 

Government’s motion for summary 

disposition based on Respondent’s lack 

of authority under State law to handle 

listed chemicals. Id. at 5–6. However, 

the ALJ also noted that under Agency 

precedent, ‘‘‘[i]f a registrant has not 

submitted a timely renewal application 

prior to the expiration date, then the 

registration expires and there is nothing 

to revoke.’ ’’ Id. at 2 (quoting David L. 

Wood, M.D., 72 FR 54936, 54937 (2007) 

(quoting Ronald J. Riegel, D.V.M., 63 FR 

67132, 67133 (1998))). Noting that the 

Agency’s regulation imposes a 25-day 

period to allow the parties to file 

exceptions prior to the ALJ’s forwarding 

of the record to my Office for final 

agency action, the ALJ observed that by 

the time a decision is issued ‘‘on the 

proposed revocation * * * there will be 

nothing to revoke and the issue will be 

moot.’’ Id. at n.2. The ALJ thus 

explained that ‘‘dismissal of this 

proceeding on mootness grounds * * * 

will be required when the matter is 

transmitted to’’ me. Id. at 2. 

Having taken Official Notice of the 

registration records of the Agency, I find 

that Respondent’s registration expired 

on March 31, 2010, and that Mr. 

Howerter was true to his word that 

Respondent did ‘‘not plan to renew it.’’ 

Because Respondent’s registration has 

now expired and there is no pending 

renewal application, there is neither a 

registration, nor an application, to act 

upon. Accordingly, the case is now 

moot. See, e.g., Riegel, 63 FR at 67133. 

Order 

Pursuant to the authority vested in me 

by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a), as well 

as 28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.104, I order 

that the Order To Show Cause issued to 

Louisiana All Snax, Inc., be, and it 

hereby is, dismissed. This order is 

effective immediately. 

Dated: April 1, 2011. 

Michelle M. Leonhart, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2011–8541 Filed 4–8–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

[Docket No. 10–25] 

Calvin Ramsey, M.D.; Revocation of 

Registration 

On December 18, 2009, the Deputy 

Assistant Administrator, Office of 

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement 

Administration, issued an Order to 

Show Cause to Calvin Ramsey, M.D. 

(Respondent), of Millington, Tennessee. 

The Show Cause Order proposed the 

revocation of Respondent’s DEA 

Certificate of Registration, AR7086689, 

as a practitioner, and the denial of any 

pending application to renew or modify 

the registration, on the ground that he 

does not ‘‘have authority to practice 

medicine or handle controlled 

substances in the State of Mississippi,’’ 

the State in which he is registered with 

DEA.1 Show Cause Order at 1 (citing 21 

U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a)(4)). 

On January 8, 2010, Respondent, who 

is currently incarcerated at the Federal 

Correctional Institute Memphis Satellite 

Camp in Millington, Tennessee, 

requested a hearing on the allegations 2


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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 69 / Monday, April 11, 2011 / Notices 20035 

In his Order Directing the Government to File 

Evidence, the ALJ noted that Respondent’s ‘‘request 

is beyond the jurisdiction of this tribunal.’’ Order 

Directing Gov. to File Evidence Regarding Status of 

Resp.’s State Authority, at 1 n.1. 

3Apparently, the ALJ initially mistook 

Respondent’s February 16 motion requesting that 

his request for a writ of habeas corpus be 

transferred to an Article III judge as his pleading 

responding to the Government’s summary judgment 

motion and issued a recommended decision on 

February 17. At some point thereafter, the ALJ 

concluded that the pleading Respondent filed on 

February 17 was, in fact, intended to be his 

response to the Government’s summary disposition 

motion although he maintained that he ‘‘cannot 

reply to the Government’s response, [because] to do 

so, allows the assumption that he is acting Pro Se, 

without legal representation in this proceeding.’’ 

Respondent’s Resp. to ALJ’s Order, at 2. The ALJ 

therefore considered the arguments contained 

therein and issued an amended decision. 

3 In his Amended Order, the ALJ did not address 

any of the contentions raised by Respondent in his 

March 11, 2010 ‘‘Inter-Agency Appeal for 

Reconsideration of Administrative Law Judge’s 

Decision and Request for Stay of ALJ’s Final 

Judgement [sic].’’ Amended Order Granting 

Summary Disposition, at 3 n.4. 

5The ALJ explained that had a hearing been 

necessary, he would have taken ‘‘all reasonable 

steps’’ to provide a hearing, ‘‘notwithstanding his 

incarcerated status.’’ ALJ Amended Order at 5 n.5. 

and the matter was placed on the docket 

of the Agency’s Administrative Law 

Judges (ALJs). Thereafter, on January 27, 

the ALJ ordered the Government ‘‘to 

provide evidence to support its 

allegation that Respondent lacks 

authority in the state in which he is 

registered with DEA’’ and set February 

3, 2010 as the due date for any motion 

for summary disposition and a due date 

of February 17 for Respondent to file a 

reply. Order Directing Gov. to File 

Evidence Regarding Status of Resp.’s 

State Authority, at 1–2. 

On January 29, 2010, the Government 

moved for summary disposition. Mot. 

for Summ. Disp. Therein, the 

Government noted that the State of 

Mississippi had suspended 

Respondent’s state medical license 

effective May 4, 2009, id. at 2, and that 

Respondent did not dispute that the 

Mississippi State Board of Medical 

Licensure (Mississippi Board) had taken 

‘‘adverse actions against’’ him. Id. at 5 

(quoting Respondent’s Resp. to Order to 

Show Cause, at 1). As support for its 

motion, the Government attached a copy 

of a Consent Order which Respondent 

entered into with the Mississippi Board. 

The Consent Order noted that on or 

about October 16, 2008, Respondent had 

been convicted by the U.S. District 

Court for the Southern District of 

Mississippi of two counts of Filing a 

False Tax Return in violation of 26 

U.S.C. 7201(1). Consent Order at 1. The 

Consent Order further noted that under 

Mississippi law, ‘‘conviction of a felony 

or misdemeanor involving moral 

turpitude’’ is ground for the suspension 

or revocation of a state medical license 

and that Respondent had ‘‘consent[ed] to 

the indefinite suspension of his license 

to begin on May 4, 2009, the date he was 

ordered by the District Court to 

surrender and commence serving his 

sentence. Id. at 1–2. Based on the 

Agency’s longstanding rules that (1) a 

practitioner must be currently 

authorized to handle controlled 

substances in the State in which he 

practices in order to hold a DEA 

registration in that State, and (2) where 

a registrant loses his state authority, he 

is not entitled to maintain his DEA 

registration, the Government moved for 

summary disposition. Mot. for Summ. 

Disp., at 3. 

On February 16, 2010, Respondent 

filed a motion which requested that the 

ALJ transfer his request for a writ of 

habeas corpus to an Article III judge. 

The motion was premised on 

Respondent’s contention that he has a 

right to ‘‘a personal hearing at DEA 

headquarters’’ under the Due Process 

Clause and 21 U.S.C. 824(c). Resp. 

Motion Req. Transfer of Req. for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus, at 1–2. 

The next day, Respondent filed his 

response to the Government’s motion 

for summary disposition. Respondent’s 

Resp., at 1. Therein, Respondent 

asserted that ‘‘[d]ue process dictates that 

this Court must ensure that legal 

representation is obtained for’’ him and 

that ‘‘[h]e had a right to be present at the 

formal hearing as indicated in [the] 

Show Cause Order.’’ Id. at 2. Respondent 

further stated that he ‘‘cannot reply to 

the Government’s response, [as] to do 

so, allows the assumption that he is 

acting Pro Se, without legal 

representation in this proceeding.’’ Id. 

Continuing, Respondent contended that 

‘‘it is incumbent that this Court secure 

the assistance of an Article III [j]udge’’ 

to issue a writ of habeas corpus. Id. 

Respondent thus requested that the 

proceeding be stayed pending resolution 

of the issue. Id. 

On March 16, the ALJ issued an 

Amended Order granting the 

Government’s Motion for summary 

disposition.3 Amended Order Granting 

Summary Disposition, at 5. Therein, the 

ALJ noted that ‘‘no genuine dispute 

exists over the material fact that 

Respondent currently lacks state 

authority to handle controlled 

substances in Mississippi, his state of 

registration with the DEA, since his 

state license was indefinitely suspended 

on May 4, 2009.’’ Id. at 4. The ALJ thus 

applied the Agency’s settled rules that 

‘‘a practitioner must be currently 

authorized to handle controlled 

substances in ‘the jurisdiction in which 

he practices’ in order to maintain a DEA 

registration,’’ and ‘‘because ‘possessing 

authority under state law to handle 

controlled substances is an essential 

condition for holding a DEA registration 

* * * the CSA requires the revocation 

of a registration issued to a practitioner 

who lacks [such authority].’ ’’ Id. at 3 

(quoting Roy Chi Lung, 74 FR 20346, 

20347 (2009) (other citations omitted)). 

The ALJ further noted that revocation is 

warranted even ‘‘ ‘when a state license 

has been suspended, but with the 

possibility of future reinstatement,’ ’’ id. 

(quoting Roger A. Rodriguez, 70 FR 

33206, 33207 (2005)), ‘‘and even where 

there is a judicial challenge to the state 

medical board action actively pending 

in the state courts.’’ Id. at 4 (citing 

Michael G. Dolin, 65 FR 5661, 5662 

(2000)). The ALJ thus granted the 

Government’s motion for summary 

disposition and recommended that 

Respondent’s registration be revoked 

and that any pending applications be 

denied.4 Id. at 5. 

On March 11, 2010, following the 

ALJ’s initial order granting summary 

disposition, Respondent filed a pleading 

he entitled as ‘‘Inter-Agency Appeal For 

Reconsideration of Administrative Law 

Judge’s Decision and Request For Stay 

of ALJ’s Final Judgement [sic].’’ For the 

purpose of this decision, this pleading 

will be deemed to be Respondent’s 

Exceptions to the ALJ’s recommended 

decision. 

On April 12, 2010, the ALJ forward 

the record to me for final agency action. 

Having considered the entire record, I 

reject each of the arguments raised in 

Respondent’s Exceptions and adopt the 

ALJ’s decision in its entirety. 

In his Exceptions, Respondent raises 

three primary arguments. First, he 

contends that the ALJ erred by failing to 

either appoint counsel to represent him 

or alternatively, by failing to refer his 

request for a writ of habeas corpus to an 

Article III judge, who would presumably 

order the Government to allow him to 

personally attend the hearing. As for the 

first part of his contention, there is no 

constitutional right to appointed 

counsel in a proceeding under 21 U.S.C. 

824(a). See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 

254, 270 (1970). Nor does Respondent 

cite any authority for his contention that 

the ALJ was required to transfer his 

request for a writ of habeas corpus to an 

Article III judge, which Respondent 

could have filed in the appropriate 

federal district court.5

Next, Respondent contends that the 

ALJ’s grant of summary disposition was 

‘‘arbitrary and capricious’’ because there 

were disputed issues of material fact. 

According to Respondent, he did not 


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20036 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 69 / Monday, April 11, 2011 / Notices 

6 In his Exceptions, Respondent cites two cases 

which he contends the ALJ ‘‘failed to consider’’ as 

cases where physicians had lost their state licenses 

and yet ‘‘no revocation of [the] physician’s DEA 

license occurred. Exceptions at 8 (citing Barry H. 

Brooks, M.D., 66 FR 18305 (2001); Vincent J. 

Scolaro, 67 FR 42060 (2002)). Neither of these case 

support Respondent because in both of them, the 

physician’s state authority had been restored at the 

time of the proceeding. See Brooks, 66 FR at 18308; 

Scolaro, 67 FR at 42065. 

7 In the event the State Board restores 

Respondent’s medical license at some point in the 

future, he can then apply for a new registration. 

1The correct citation is Va. Code Ann. § 54.1– 

111.A(4). 

‘‘knowingly and intelligently’’ waive his 

right to a hearing before the Mississippi 

Board, id. at 12; his ‘‘waiver [was] 

obtained through misrepresentation and 

under extreme duress,’’ id. at 8; and he 

is currently challenging the validity of 

his waiver in the Mississippi State 

Courts. Id. at 12. 

This argument, however, takes 

Respondent nowhere because ‘‘DEA has 

repeatedly held ‘that a registrant cannot 

collaterally attack the results of a state 

criminal or administrative proceeding in 

a proceeding under section 304 [21 

U.S.C. § 824] of the CSA.’ ’’ Hicham K. 

Riba, 73 FR 75773, 75774 (2008) 

(quoting Brenton D. Glisson, 72 FR 

54296, 54297 (2007) (other citation 

omitted)). See also Shahid Musud 

Siddiqui, 61 FR 14818 (1996); Robert A. 

Leslie, 60 FR 14004 (1995). 

Respondent’s various contentions 

regarding the validity of the Consent 

Order are therefore not material to this 

Agency’s resolution of whether he is 

entitled to maintain his DEA 

registration. 

Because 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) authorizes 

the revocation of a registration ‘‘upon a 

finding that the registrant * * * has had 

his State license suspended [or] revoked 

* * * and is no longer authorized by 

State law to engage in the * * * 

distribution [or] dispensing of 

controlled substance,’’ the only fact 

material to resolving this dispute is 

whether Respondent holds a State 

license. There being no dispute that 

Respondent lacks the requisite state 

authority, there was no need for an 

evidentiary hearing, as summary 

judgment has been used for more than 

100 years to resolve legal ‘‘actions in 

which there is no genuine issue as to 

any material fact’’ and has never been 

deemed to violate Due Process. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56 (Advisory Committee 

Notes—1937 Adoption). Cf. Codd v. 

Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977). 

Nor was Respondent entitled to an inperson hearing to challenge the sanction 

which the ALJ recommended. Cf. 

Anderson v. Recore, 446 F.3d 324, 330– 

31 (2d Cir. 2006). Under DEA’s 

longstanding interpretation of the CSA, 

revocation is warranted whenever a 

practitioner’s state authority has been 

revoked because, under the plain terms 

of the statute, possessing such authority 

is an essential condition for holding a 

DEA registration. See 21 U.S.C. 802(21) 

(‘‘[t]he term ‘practitioner’ means a 

physician * * * licensed, registered, or 

otherwise permitted, by * * * the 

jurisdiction in which he practices * * * 

to distribute, dispense, [or] administer 

* * * a controlled substance in the 

course of professional practice’’). See 

also id. § 823(f) (‘‘The Attorney General 

shall register practitioners * * * if the 

applicant is authorized to dispense 

* * * controlled substances under the 

laws of the State in which he 

practices.’’). 

Accordingly, DEA has repeatedly held 

that the CSA requires the revocation of 

a registration issued to a practitioner 

whose state license has been suspended 

or revoked. David W. Wang, 72 FR 

54297, 54298 (2007); Sheran Arden 

Yeates, 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); 

Dominick A. Ricci, 58 FR 51104, 51105 

(1993); Bobby Watts, 53 FR 11919, 

11920 (1988).6 This is so even where a 

state board has suspended (as opposed 

to revoked) a practitioner’s authority 

with the possibility that the authority 

may be restored at some point in the 

future, Rodriguez, 70 FR at 33207, as 

well as where, as here, a practitioner has 

sought judicial review of the state board 

proceeding. Dolin, 65 FR at 5662. 

Because Respondent currently lacks 

authority to dispense controlled 

substances in Mississippi, the State in 

which he holds his DEA registration, his 

registration will be revoked and any 

pending applications will be denied.7

Order 

Pursuant to the authority vested in me 

by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) & 824(a), as well as 

28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.104, I order that 

DEA Certificate of Registration, 

AR7086689, issued to Calvin Ramsey, 

M.D., be, and it hereby is, revoked. I 

further order that any pending 

application of Calvin Ramsey, M.D., to 

renew or modify his registration, be, and 

it hereby is, denied. This Order is 

effective May 11, 2011. 

Dated: April 1, 2011. 

Michele M. Leonhart, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2011–8533 Filed 4–8–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Clifton D. Burt, M.D.; Revocation of 

Registration 

On April 6, 2010, the Deputy 

Assistant Administrator, Office of 

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement 

Administration, issued an Order to 

Show Cause to Clifton D. Burt 

(Registrant) of Richmond, Virginia and 

Union, New Jersey. The Show Cause 

Order proposed the revocation of 

Registrant’s DEA Certificates of 

Registration, FB0575499 and 

FB1499587, on the ground that his 

‘‘continued registrations are inconsistent 

with the public interest as that term is 

defined in 21 U.S.C. 823(f).’’ Show 

Cause Order, at 1. 

The Show Cause Order alleged that 

from ‘‘May 2008 to October 2008,’’ 

Registrant ‘‘prescribed controlled 

substances to individuals via the 

Internet based on online questionnaires, 

submissions of unverifiable medical 

records, and telephone consultations’’ 

such that the prescriptions ‘‘were for 

other than a legitimate medical purpose 

or outside the usual course of 

professional practice in contravention of 

21 CFR 1306.04(a).’’ Id. at 2. The Order 

further alleged that Registrant ‘‘failed to 

establish a valid physician-patient 

relationship as required by the laws of 

Virginia.’’ Id. (citing, inter alia, Va. Code 

Ann. §§ 54.1–2915.A(3), (13), (16) & 

(17)). The Order next alleged that 

‘‘[f]rom October 2008 to March 2009,’’ 

Registrant ‘‘directly dispensed control 

substances to patients in Schedules IV 

and V without possessing a controlled 

substance certificate in violation of the 

laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia.’’ 

Id. (citing, inter alia, Va. Code Ann. 

§§ 54.1–2914.A., 54.1–2915.A(17) & 

(18), 54–1–111.A(4),1 and 54.1– 

3303(A)). The Order also informed 

Registrant of his right to request a 

hearing or to submit a written statement 

in lieu of a hearing, the applicable 

procedures for doing so, and the 

consequence if he failed to do either. Id. 

at 2–3. 

On April 9, 2010, the Show Cause 

Order was served on Registrant by 

registered mail addressed to him at both 

of his registered locations. Since that 

time, thirty days have now passed, and 

neither Registrant, nor anyone 

purporting to representing him, has 

either requested a hearing or submitted 

a written statement. I therefore find that 

Registrant has waived his rights under 

21 CFR 1301.43(b) and (c) and therefore 


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