Filed 4/4/16 Commercial Loan Solutions v. Yu CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

COMMERCIAL LOAN SOLUTIONS III, 

LLC,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL S. YU,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B262047

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC504114)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.

Michael Linfield, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Egbase & Associates, Gerald O. Egbase; Law Offices of J. Grant 

Kennedy, J. Grant Kennedy for Defendant and Appellant.

Wagenseller Law Firm, Laine T. Wagenseller for Plaintiff and Respondent.

___________________________________________________
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Defendant and appellant Michael Yu contends that the trial court wrongly denied a 

continuance of trial and, at trial, improperly admitted a document under the business 

records exception to the hearsay rule. Because Yu fails to demonstrate reversible error, 

we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff and respondent Commercial Loan Solutions III, LLC (CLS), filed suit 

against Yu in March 2013 for breach of guaranty. In its complaint, CLS alleged that in 

September 2007, Yu’s law corporation executed a promissory note for a commercial loan 

in the principal sum of $1,196,500, with Bank of the West (BOW) as lender, to purchase 

real property secured by a deed of trust in favor of BOW. To further secure the 

promissory note obligations, Yu, as an individual, executed a guaranty in favor of BOW 

for all amounts owed on the promissory note. In May 2012, the promissory note and 

guaranty were sold by BOW to CLS. In November 2012, the property was sold in a 

nonjudicial foreclosure to CLS for a credit bid of $880,000. The complaint alleged Yu

owed the remaining balance on the loan pursuant to the guaranty. 

The trial court initially set a trial date of September 24, 2014. Yu substituted 

attorneys in May 2014. On August 11, 2014, he substituted attorneys again. On 

August 19, 2014, Yu brought an ex parte application to continue the trial date, arguing, 

among other things, that discovery had “barely begun” and no depositions had been 

taken, and that his new counsel would not have adequate time to prepare for trial. CLS 

opposed the ex parte application. The trial court granted the application and continued 

the trial date to November 7, 2014. 

On October 31, 2014, Yu’s third set of attorneys filed an ex parte application to be 

relieved as counsel, noting that Yu “is an attorney with his own law firm and would not 

suffer prejudice if counsel is allowed to withdraw.” In addition to withdrawal as counsel, 

the application sought a continuance of trial. CLS did not oppose the withdrawal but 

opposed a continuance. After conducting an in camera hearing, the trial court granted the 

application for relief but denied Yu’s request “to continue the trial for six months.” The 
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court did continue the trial for a week, however, resetting the trial date for November 14, 

2014.

New counsel substituted in for Yu on November 5, 2014. On November 7, 2014, 

at the final status conference, Yu’s new attorney filed another ex parte application to 

continue the trial, seeking a new trial date of December 12, 2014, and arguing that there 

was insufficient time to prepare for a November 14 trial. The trial court denied the 

application.

Following another request to continue the trial, a one-day bench trial was held on 

November 14, 2014. At the conclusion of the trial, the court found in favor of CLS, 

noting that it found much of Yu’s testimony (in which he spoke about not reviewing or 

understanding the loan documents) not credible. The trial court entered judgment in 

favor of CLS for a principal amount of $340,911.14 and interest of $87,804.51. 

DISCUSSION

I. The request for a continuance was properly denied

On appeal, Yu contends that the trial court committed error by denying his 

November 7, 2014, request to continue the trial. We review the trial court’s order 

denying a continuance for an abuse of discretion. (Thurman v. Bayshore Transit 

Management, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1126.) 

When a trial date is set, the date is considered firm and continuances are 

disfavored. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(a), (c).) A continuance may be granted 

only upon a showing of good cause. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c).) Substitution 

of trial counsel, the ground upon which Yu brought his request, is a circumstance that 

may indicate good cause. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c)(4).) In ruling upon a 

request for a continuance, however, the trial court “must consider all the facts and 

circumstances that are relevant to the determination,” including, among other 

circumstances, the proximity of the trial date and whether there were previous 

continuances. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(d)(1), (2).)

Given the facts that, as of November 7, 2014, trial was only one week away and 

Yu had already requested and obtained two prior continuances of the trial date, the trial 
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court had ample basis to deny Yu’s request for another continuance. The reason Yu gave 

for seeking a continuance on November 7, 2014—substitution of counsel—was the same 

reason Yu provided in a prior successful application for a continuance. “‘[If] a [trial] 

must be continued . . . every time an attorney withdraws from the case, there would be no 

end to the matter.’” (County of San Bernardino v. Doria Mining & Engineering Corp.

(1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 776, 784.) 

Yu argues on appeal that the trial court’s denial, besides hindering his new 

attorney’s preparation for trial, also prevented the attorney from bringing in witnesses 

from BOW who could have testified that CLS concocted a scheme to foreclose on the 

property. Yu fails to explain, however, why a continuance was required to procure the 

witnesses’ attendance. The case was filed in March 2013, and Yu was represented by 

counsel for nearly the entirety of the case. There is no apparent reason why none of Yu’s 

numerous former attorneys could have subpoenaed the witnesses or otherwise ensured 

their presence at trial.

When presented with the November 7 request to continue the trial, the trial court 

was faced with an imminent trial date and a record of already granting two continuances. 

Under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying another 

continuance.

II. The exhibit was properly admitted

Yu further argues that the trial court erred by allowing the admission of a loan 

worksheet at trial stating the principal balance and other amounts owing on Yu’s loan. 

He contends that the document was hearsay and there were no grounds to admit the 

document under the business records exception.

We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. (Public 

Employees’ Retirement System v. Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 

643, 683.) We do not overturn an evidentiary ruling unless “‘the trial court exceeded the 

bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered.’” (Ibid.)

The business records exception to the hearsay rule is codified in Evidence Code 

section 1271, which states: “Evidence of a writing made as a record of an act, condition, 
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or event is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered to prove the act, 

condition, or event if: [¶] (a) The writing was made in the regular course of a business; 

[¶] (b) The writing was made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event; [¶] (c) 

The custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its 

preparation; and [¶] (d) The sources of information and method and time of preparation 

were such as to indicate its trustworthiness.” 

At trial, Iliana Payano, the loan officer for Yu’s loan, testified on behalf of CLS 

regarding the loan worksheet. Payano stated that she maintained Yu’s loan file, that any 

documents created by CLS relating to the loan come to her, and that she was familiar 

with the documents created and maintained pertaining to the loan. She further testified 

she recognized the loan worksheet, that the document showed a payoff balance for the 

loan as of the specific date listed on the worksheet, November 1, 2012, that the 

accounting department prepares loan worksheets for loan officers, and that the worksheet 

was kept in the regular course of business. When a loan officer makes a request for a 

payoff statement, the worksheet is created “right then and there.”

We find the record sufficiently shows the loan worksheet was admissible as a 

business record. As the loan officer responsible for keeping the documents pertaining to 

Yu’s loan, including the loan worksheet, Payano was qualified to testify regarding the 

manner in which the document was prepared, kept, and used. “The witness need not have 

been present at every transaction to establish the business records exception; he or she 

need only be familiar with the procedures followed . . . .” (Jazayeri v. Mao (2009) 174 

Cal.App.4th 301, 322.) 

On appeal, Yu argues that Payano did not specifically testify as to the date the loan 

worksheet was generated by the accounting department. Yu did not object on this basis 

at trial, however. He only objected that Payano did not have personal knowledge of how 

the document was prepared, and the objection was overruled. A failure to make a clear, 

specific ground of objection forfeits the argument on appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. 

(a).) If Yu had objected at trial that Payano did not testify regarding the date of 

preparation, CLS could have attempted to elicit testimony regarding this specific point. 
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But since Yu objected on another ground and the trial court overruled the objection and 

admitted the document, there was no need for further testimony supporting the admission 

of the loan worksheet. Thus, Yu cannot show the trial court abused its discretion by 

admitting the document.

In any event, even if Yu could show the trial court abused its discretion by 

admitting the loan worksheet, reversal would not be warranted. A judgment will not be 

reversed unless an error in admitting evidence resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Evid. 

Code, § 353, subd. (b).) At trial, Payano testified regarding another admitted document, 

entitled “trustee’s deed upon sale.” That document was used to calculate the amount 

remaining owed by Yu. The loan worksheet, therefore, was merely cumulative, and not a 

necessary component of CLS’s case. CLS sufficiently proved by other evidence that Yu 

owed a specific sum of money under the guaranty.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

BOREN, P.J.

We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

HOFFSTADT, J.