PREPARING FOR AN ERA OF PERSISTENT CONFLICT MCWAR Papers 2010 SCHULTZ
PreParing for an era of

Persistent ConfliCt

MCWAR Papers 2010

Edited by

Tammy S. Schultz

Marine Corps University

Quantico, VA

2011
The terms Marine Corps War College and MCWAR are trademarks of the

United States Marine Corps; no unauthorized use without permission.

The views expressed in the MCWAR Papers are those of the authors and

do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Marine Corps War College,

the United States Marine Corps, or the Department of the Navy.

Reproduction and printing are subject to the Copyright Act of 1976, including amendments, and applicable treaties of the United States. This

document may be freely reproduced for academic or other noncommercial

uses; if doing so, it is requested that reproductions credit the author and

the MCWAR Papers series.

Marine Corps War College website: www.mcu.usmc.mil
Foreword

One of the great pleasures of being involved in education

is the satisfaction derived from contributing to the intellectual

growth of students. Further gratification occurs by witnessing

students’ contributions beyond the educational experience. The

Marine Corps War College’s faculty and staff are more than

blessed by interacting with students who have already proven

themselves as tremendous leaders. Each year, our seminars are

filled with top performers from all the services, government agencies, and international partners. Those students are prepared to

cross a threshold into the strategic realm and move into senior

leadership positions or senior advisory roles. It is the mission of

the War College to better prepare them to serve the country in

those positions by stimulating critical thought and by challenging

their previously held beliefs.

Our relatively small size compared to our fellow War Colleges allows unparalleled access, agility, and personal educational

opportunities. We have exceptional access to senior leaders and

leverage this access by fitting the entire student body into the

senior leader’s conference room where they engage in a free dialog

with that leader. Our students have recently met with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

Secretary of Homeland Defense, members of Congress, the Director of the FBI, and the National Security Advisor, among others. They also engage with non-governmental notables such as

the Council on Foreign Relations, JP Morgan, advertising giant J

Walter Thompson, traders on the New York Stock Exchange, and

a wide variety of media outlets, to name just a few. 

The students benefit from a first-rate faculty with whom

they interact on a daily basis on a close, professional level, creating unique learning opportunities. The War College is proud to

host guest professors, speakers, conferences, and exercises that

increase that diversity of thought. Many lessons are put into the

curricula specifically to challenge what would be considered mainstream thought. 

The Marine Corps War College promotes bold, innovative

thought and academic freedom. That philosophy is encouraged

and enabled by the leadership at Marine Corps University, which

provides an environment in which scholarly discourse—even reiii
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garding topics that might be unpopular or controversial—can

flourish in accordance with the precepts of academic freedom. In

fact, the War College welcomes controversy, for controversy sows

the seeds of creativity and exposes students to divergent opinions. The Marine Corps War College does everything in its power

to not only present differing points of view but cultivate innovative ideas.

Our faculty is also constantly evolving the curriculum to

ensure relevance while maintaining the use of enduring educational principles. The college strives to strike a balance between

current debates and timeless ideas. The study of war and its causes

is at its essence the study of human nature and human interaction.

Our curriculum and interactive teaching philosophies are specifically designed around metacognition, thinking about how you

think, and the impact thinking processes have on decision-making.

Rather than teaching what to think, we stress how to think. When

that evolution occurs, the faculty and staff of the Marine Corps

War College have fulfilled their mission. The essays that are included in this anthology are evidence of just that—bold ideas that

should spark debate as the United States enters this new era of persistent conflict.

Michael F. Belcher, Col USMC

Director, Marine Corps War College

Robert J. Mahoney, Ph.D.

Dean, Marine Corps War College
Preface

U.S. Army Chief of Staff George Casey coined the phrase

“era of persistent conflict” to describe the world we face in the 21st

century. Adjectives abound for the future environment in which

U.S forces, civilian and military, will operate in years to come: complex, uncertain, dynamic, and decentralized, to name a few. The

types of operations that the men and women of the U.S. government must be prepared to conduct run the gamut from major combat operations (MCO) to counterinsurgency (COIN) to

humanitarian operations. Although to some these debates and operations seem as if they have sprung from the cauldrons of

Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF]) and Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom [OIF]), they are anything but new.

From the 1980s through today, the names for these operations have changed: low intensity conflict (LIC); small-scale contingencies (SSC); military operations other than war (MOOTW),

operations other than war (OOTW); stability operations and support operations (SOSO, which an Army officer I interviewed several

years ago claimed “perfectly captured how the Army felt about the

mission”); stability and support operations (SASO); stability and

reconstruction operations (S&RO); and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTRO), the latest incarnation

thanks to Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, which mandates that stability operations become a core U.S. military mission.

Many of these terms prove dangerous for several reasons.

First, in the case of MOOTW and OOTW specifically, defining an

operation by what it is not provides little intellectual, let alone operational, clarity. Second, since these operations were not identified as war (i.e., the military’s core competency) they were

undervalued across the DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities) spectrum. Third,

as soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines soon discovered in OEF

and OIF, definitional differences between war and “other operations” become blurred on the ground. Fourth, one does not always

get to pick the operation type that will serve a particular national

end. The enemy, or host population, gets a vote.

More U.S. service personnel have lost their lives in SSTROs

than in strictly defined MCOs since the Korean War. To the soldier

on the ground, being in a MOOTW looked little different at times

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from being in an MCO, and certainly was as deadly. And as every

National Security Strategy since 9/11 correctly identified, existential threats could stem from mission failures beyond MCOs—the

inability to conduct successful SSTROs could result in failed states,

ungoverned territories, and terrorist havens. Planes crashing into

the Twin Towers, Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania demonstrated what may initiate from failed or failing states. In other

words, it is no longer a given that the U.S. military can afford to

screw up SSTROs so long as it gets the “big one” right.

The students who come to the Marine Corps War College

(MCWAR) have gracefully endured an operational tempo unprecedented in world history by an all volunteer force. A nation in two

hot wars and a global campaign against violent extremism should

be commended for providing its officers time for professional military education, and the country will reap huge dividends from its

investment. As many have said, this conflict will not be won with

bullets or the numbers killed in action. New solutions and ideas

warrant careful consideration.

This edited volume contains the type of ingenuity that the

United States needs at this critical juncture in its history. If we are

at the threshold of an era of persistent conflict, U.S. leaders must

consider unique capabilities, organizations, and missions to be successful. Even U.S. culture may need to adapt—if conflict is truly

persistent, we may need to foster more resiliency than currently

may exist in our culture. This volume takes a new look at capabilities, organizations, and missions in this era of persistent conflict,

and closes with an analysis of how ultimately the country’s fate

rests with its people, and the implications for that analysis.

This volume of papers begins with one of the central

strategic issues facing the country—the lack of operational, deployable civilians. Many studies on ideal solutions to grow civilian

capacity gather dust on credenzas. Until this utopian ideal is realized, however, the United States desperately needs to fill this gap

with civilians trained, organized, and equipped to operate in these

environments alongside their military counterparts, as Christie

LaPlume writes in chapter one, “Plugging the Gap: A Comparative

Review of Variables that Affect Civilian Deployment Capacity.”

LaPlume’s innovative research took her to seven civilian agencies

that currently deploy to war zones in an attempt to identify best

practices that can be immediately implemented. For her outstanding efforts, LaPlume received MCWAR’s 2010 best paper award. 

Chapter two by John C. Vara continues the exploration
of civilian capacity, specifically by assessing and proposing alternatives to the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for

Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The organizational

analysis continues with Doug M. Hammer’s call to establish a U.S.

Stability Operations Command in chapter three. Harvey R. Robinson and Matthew G. St. Clair then examine missions that have

new import yet historical roots in chapters four and five, on security force assistance and anti-piracy operations, respectively.

Fritz W. Pfeiffer’s chapter six uses Carl von Clausewitz’s trinity

(emotion, chance, reason) to look at strategic decision-making in

this era of persistent conflict, using the decision to go to war in

Iraq in 2003 as a case study. The book concludes with Roger R.

Laferriere’s call for a National Risk Communications Strategy that

would ultimately make the U.S. population more resilient to future attack in this era of persistent conflict. Laferriere’s groundbreaking analysis earned him MCWAR’s 2009 best paper award.

No silver bullet will end the wars in which the United

States is engaged, and none of these papers contain one. This

book is intended to initiate, rather than end, discussion. If any of

the ideas in these papers contribute to making the country better

able to navigate the next era, the U.S. government’s men and

women whose thoughts are contained herein will be, in part, the

beneficiaries, as will a grateful nation.

Spanning two academic years, the works in this anthology would not be possible without the unfailing support of the

Marine Corps University. Three successive University Presidents

supervised and supported the production of this anthology:

Major General (Retired) Donald R. Gardner, Lieutenant General

Robert B. Neller, and Major General Thomas M. Murray. Each, in

turn, championed critical and creative thought throughout the

University, thus perpetuating an educational environment which

demanded academic rigor while promoting academic freedom.

Thanks also to the librarians and staff of the University’s General

Alfred M. Gray Marine Corps Research Center, who so superbly

and selflessly assisted our students in their research. We are likewise eternally grateful to the U.S. Marine Corps History Division

and Marine Corps University Press, whose expertise and experience were essential in guiding this project from concept to completion. 

Special thanks also goes to MCWAR’s faculty who so conscientiously mentored the design, development, research, and

writing of these research projects. Recognizing that scholarly

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viii

knowledge only flourishes under the light of public scrutiny, the

faculty championed for the creation of a new venue to showcase

these works and expose them to a wider audience. They were the

intellectual midwives for the first edition of the MCWAR Papers

and the works contained herein. Behind the scenes, the Director,

Colonel Michael F. Belcher, and Dean of Academics, Dr. Robert J.

Mahoney, provided the vision, guidance, and encouragement required for this project to reach a successful conclusion. 

Lastly, our heartfelt gratitude is extended to The Basic

School, which provided junior officers to augment the College

staff and aid this project. Working with minimal guidance or supervision, Second Lieutenant Adam P. Backsmeier, with assistance from Warrant Officer One Aaron T. Hladik, edited this

volume. Displaying the utmost talent and tact, these officers

worked tireless with the authors and editor to bring organizational clarity and grammatical correctness to this work.

***

The views expressed in this book are those of the authors

and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, United States Marine Corps,

Marine Corps University, or the Marine Corps War College.

Dr. Tammy S. Schultz

Professor, Marine Corps War College
ix

Contents

foreword ......................................................................................iii

Preface............................................................................................v

Chapter one: Plugging in the Gap: A Comparative Review of Variables that Affect Civilian Deployment Capacity

Christie E. LaPlume .......................................................................1

Chapter two: National Security and the Interagency Enterprise:

A Critical Analysis

John C. Vara.................................................................................25

Chapter three: Establishing U.S. Stability Operations Command:

An Organization for the Critical National Security Missions of the

21st Century

Doug M. Hammer ........................................................................41

Chapter four: The Strategic Impact of the Security Assistance

Program in Contingency Operations

Harvey R. Robinson.....................................................................73

Chapter five: Piracy: A Local Threat with Global Impact

Matthew G. St. Clair ....................................................................97

Chapter six: Clausewitz’s Trinity and Strategic Decision-Making

Fritz W. Pfeiffer .........................................................................119

Chapter seven: The Case for a National Risk Communications

Strategy for Mitigating Terrorist Attacks

Roger R. Laferriere ....................................................................137

1

Plugging in the Gap:

a Comparative review of Variables that affect

Civilian Deployment Capacity

by Christie E. LaPlume

ABSTRACT

Focus beyond federal agencies that are normally thought

of as those involved in reconstruction and stability operations is

needed when it comes to legislation improving civilian deployment capacity. The variables that affect civilian deployment capacity to a war zone are shared by all federal agencies no matter

what mission is pursued. Seven federal agencies pursuing various

U.S. national security objectives in Afghanistan were chosen for

a comparative review. 

This comparative review was conducted to illustrate two

points. One, that good practices exist and if shared, are potentially applicable to all agencies for fixing short-term gaps in civilian deployment capacity and two, that discrepancies that erode

civilian deployment capacity exist beyond the scope officially explored to date. Civilian deployment protocols are compared and

contrasted, “best” practices are proposed, and suggestions for new

incentives are introduced. 

Emphasis is placed on the fact that discrepancies in benefits can erode civilian volunteerism to serve in war-zones. If legislation is to be considered and passed to benefit civilians and

civilian deployment capacity, more comprehensive studies on the

existing differences need to be conducted, to include studies on

the short- and long-term effects of war-zone deployment on civilians, their families, their mental health, and effects on retention

rates in federal government service. 

1
2 Chapter 1

A PERSONAL NOTE

The subject of this article was, in part, inspired by personal experience. As a civilian federal employee, I volunteered for

two tours to Afghanistan—one for a 12-month commitment in

Bagram in 2007-08, and another for a three-month commitment

at a remote base in the northern Konar/southern Nuristan areas

of operation in 2008-09. In both locations, I was exposed to various other U.S. Government agency employees who had also volunteered to work in Afghanistan to fulfill their respective agency

missions.

During brief periods of interaction—either when our

missions had cross-purpose or when we attended U.S. military

meetings upon request as interagency representatives – it was evident that there were varying degrees of exposure to and experience working with the U.S. military; varying degrees of continuity

in representation; varying degrees of Afghan-specific expertise;

and often times competing agency mission priorities. Most apparent was that we were all deployed for different lengths of time,

with different benefits and career goals, with a wide-variety of

professional experiences and backgrounds. It made me curious

about how each agency attracted its volunteers, how the preparation and processing were similar or different, and whether or

not the ground experience gained during deployment was used

to further each respective agency’s mission. 

With this context I decided to compare and contrast the

civilian deployment protocols of various agencies active in

Afghanistan. In order to sustain civilian deployment capacity for

the foreseeable future in Afghanistan, as well as to other venues

as required, it seemed prudent to look for variables that affect capacity for deployment as well as to identify and share between

the agencies any good practices that emerge. Good or best practices, once identified, can be used as models for all agencies faced

with a long-term civilian deployment requirement, ongoing or in

the future. 

Finding very little in terms of available printed material

on this subject, the research for this article required personal interviews with various points of contact within each agency compared. I soon learned that there was no single “expert” on
Plugging in the Gap 3

war-zone deployments within each department/agency; the variables that I chose to compare required talking to both administrative and operational components in each department/agency.

Unfortunately, I was unable to talk to all the contacts that I could

have or should have for the optimal comparative study. The term

“review” was substituted for “study” to convey that this article

just scratches the surface of the issues, and perhaps does not

cover the expanse of variables that affect civilian deployment capacity. As I quickly realized, there were a lot of nuances to be further explored that I was unable to pursue. As was concluded in a

Government Accounting Office study that was published in September 2009 (GAO-09-1019T), the variations in incentives, medical benefits, and tracking of civilian employees can affect morale

and long-term viability for deploying civilians to war zones. This

review tries to show that differences and discrepancies in benefits

exist over and beyond those studied by the GAO to date and any

legislation or permanent changes to civilian deployment incentives or benefits should be considered after comparing all federal

agencies, not just those involved in reconstruction and stabilization operations. 

The time given and hospitality shown to me by each and

every agency representative kind enough to give me insight into

their respective agency practices was much appreciated. These individuals should be applauded for their tireless efforts behind the

scenes to meet the challenge of deploying civilians to conflict

areas for without them, our civilian deployment capacity and our

ability to pursue our national security interests abroad would be

significantly limited.

THE CIVILIAN GAP

The U.S. military experience in the two contemporary

war-zones of Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted the need for quick

growth in civilian deployment capacity, specifically for conducting

reconstruction and stability operations. In 2005, the U.S. State

Department was designated to coordinate this effort, but after

five years the task remains daunting. In this context, numerous

government studies reviewed civilian pay incentives and medicalrelated benefits looking for ways to create and promote civilian

deployment capacity.1
4 Chapter 1

The latest study, conducted by the Government Accounting Office in 2009, compared six federal agencies involved in reconstruction and stability operations and concluded that

inequities in benefits would undermine civilians’ willingness to

volunteer for war-zone duty.2 Based on this conclusion, the Office

of Personnel Management was tasked to propose legislation standardizing some aspects of civilian compensation.3

Focus beyond federal agencies involved in reconstruction

and stability operations is needed when considering legislation

to improve civilian deployment capacity. The variables that affect

deployment capacity to a war-zone are shared by all federal agencies no matter what mission is pursued. Indeed, in complex operations, many missions are likely to be pursued simultaneously.

Seven federal agencies pursuing various U.S. national security objectives in Afghanistan were chosen for a comparative review. The

review was conducted to illustrate two points. One, that good

practices exist and, if shared, are potentially applicable to all agencies for enhancing civilian deployment capacity. Two, benefit discrepancies erode civilian will to volunteer for deployment

continue to exist beyond the scope officially studied to date. 

The seven agencies are introduced with a brief overview

of war-zone missions and general deployment protocols for baseline knowledge. Specific protocols for a set of variables associated

with civilian deployment are then compared and contrasted. Protocols of the most experienced of the seven agencies vary and are

relatively robust; they evolved over time based on respective

agency-specific experience and lessons learned. Protocols of relatively new federal agencies deploying civilians to war-zones are

still being tested. Practical solutions for managing civilian deployment are identified as potential “best practices” applicable to all

agencies. These “best practices” may help fill in short-term gaps

in civilian deployment capacity if and when they occur, now or in

the near future, until more permanent solutions are found. 

This comparative review highlights the need for a more

formal study of civilian-based deployment variables in order to

ensure long-term viability for civilian deployment. It also suggests the need to search for new and innovative incentives, proposing a few ideas in an attempt to create interest and

momentum on this critical subject. Finding solutions to filling in
Plugging in the Gap 5

civilian deployment gaps, whether short or long term, is vital to

ensuring a robust and whole-of-government ability to pursue U.S.

national security interests overseas. 

WAR ZONE MISSIONS AND GENERAL PROTOCOLS

FOR CIVILIAN DEPLOYMENT

Seven agencies with substantial experience in deploying

civilians overseas have both similarities and significant differences in how civilian employees are deployed to Afghanistan. References to a tour in Afghanistan vary from “war-zone” to

“unaccompanied tour” to “hardship post.” No matter the label,

each agency has successfully met and maintained their respective

civilian deployment requirements collectively for over nine years,

suggesting they have adopted successful deployment protocols

and policies within their own organizations. 

The Department of State (DOS) is the forerunner to all

agencies conducting overseas missions and hosts all U.S. Government (USG) agencies that operate overseas. Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) promote U.S. foreign policy and play a key role in

seeking conflict resolution through non-kinetic solutions to best

serve U.S. interests.4 FSOs serve at American Embassies abroad

for a standard tour of two years with accompanying family. These

tours are considered a permanent change-of-station (PCS). Where

living conditions and safety are compromised, PCS tours are unaccompanied and shortened to one year.5 Unaccompanied tour

vacancies are managed by respective regional components that

sponsor these types of tours and the “bidding process”6 for these

tours is held separately and prior to bidding for standard tours in

the attempt to fill them first. The Family Liaison Office (FLO) has

advocacy and support oversight for officers designated for all unaccompanied tours, war-zone or not. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) has deployed civilians

alongside U.S. Military (USMIL) personnel in combat throughout

its history.7 Today, despite functional differences in their mission

sets, DOD civilians, no matter for which agency they work, are

regulated under the same Departmental policies.8 Despite a universal approach, slight differences in personnel-related protocols

occur between DOD agencies pending mission and agency-specific requirements. Included in this review are three DOD agencies
6 Chapter 1

with relatively large numbers of deployed civilians to Afghanistan.

The National Security Agency “provide[s] direct support

to combat elements, [specifically] cryptological collection and

analysis for U.S. national defense and homeland security.”9 Deployed personnel include not only technical operators but also administrators, support, and logistics officers. Although war-zone

vacancies are sponsored by a variety of operational and administrative offices, oversight for selection and processing of deployment candidates is centralized under two entities: the Mission

Operations Center (MOC) and the Global Deployment Center

(GDC),10 both established in 2006. Most war-zone positions are

temporary duty (TDY), although PCS tours are growing.11

The National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) provides “direct combat support by developing imagery and mapbased intelligence solutions for U.S. national defense, homeland

security, and safety of navigation as well as...global support to Intelligence Community mission partners through NGA representatives stationed around the world.”12 War-zone vacancies are

integrated into an internal, general vacancy database but a centralized Deployment Review Board selects from applicants for deployment. Civilian deployment is limited to TDY tours only. Since

2006, advocacy and support oversight is consolidated under the

Expeditionary Operations Directorate.

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) officers are “major

producers and managers of foreign military intelligence that is

provided to war fighters, defense policymakers and force planners

in the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community,

in support of U.S. military planning and operations and weapons

systems acquisition.”13Deployment vacancies are advertised and

filled by each component that sponsors war-zone positions. Civilian deployments are limited to 179-day TDY tours. War-zone deployment efforts were standardized with the 2004 establishment

of the DIA/Readiness Center. 

Department of Justice law-enforcement representation

abroad spans a history of over six decades.14 The rise of global terrorism and crime in the 1990s15 increased the overseas presence

exponentially as liaison with foreign counterparts was established

to coordinate international leads and to exchange information.16

With its poppy production and history of harboring Al-Qai’da key
Plugging in the Gap 7

leaders, Afghanistan gives the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) ample

reason and purpose for extensive representation.

The FBI mission,17 war-zone or not, is “to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence

threats, uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States

and provide leadership and criminal justice service to federal,

state, municipal, and international agencies and partners.”18 The

Office of International Operations, International Fusion Cell

(IFC), established in 2004, manages personnel deploying to any

war-zone.19 Prior to 2004, various tactics to maintain deployment

capacity were used and found inadequate.20 Deployment candidate selection was an informal, very selective process based on

profiling agents with U.S. military experience. Today, war-zone

candidates compete as candidates for all field positions, in a transparent, rigorous, and competitive application process.21 Conversion of TDY positions in Afghanistan to one-year PCS

assignments is in process. 

The DEA steady state mission is “to enforce the controlled-substances laws and regulations of the United States and

to bring to justice organizations involved in the growing, manufacture or distribution of such substances,”22 amongst additional

related goals. War-zone deployments are managed by regional

components.23 War-zone vacancies are integrated into a general

vacancy database and candidates are chosen based on qualifications and experience. Typical PCS tours are three years; for

Afghanistan, tour length is two years with the option to extend

for a third year. The DEA was mandated to significantly increase

its presence in Afghanistan by late 2009 and had little difficulty

doing so.24 Additional personnel include permanent year-round

TDY billets for Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support Teams

(FASTs).25

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) mission, war-zone

or not, is to “provide national security intelligence to senior US

policymakers”26 by collecting and reporting human-derived intelligence (HUMINT), providing and disseminating all-source reporting and analysis, and providing overall intelligence support

to Ambassadors, U.S. military commanders, and other relevant

USG entities.27 War-zone vacancies are integrated with general
8 Chapter 1

vacancies in an in-house vacancy database. Selection and administrative processing of deployment candidates is conducted by the

area or functional component that sponsors the position. 

SPECIFIC DEPLOYMENT VARIABLES COMPARED AND CONTRASTED

Due to sensitivities of some agencies to disclose human

resourcing specifics, the below comparisons minimize agency

identifiers where possible, introducing some specific deployment

protocols in each of the categories below, with the ultimate goal

of identifying trends that affect civilian deployment capacity over

time without compromising USG agencies or departments.

Candidate Selection 

Most agencies integrate war-zone vacancies into general

vacancy databases. Volunteer opportunities thus require a comprehensive search, combing through vacancies for all regional and

functional components. A few agencies list war-zone vacancies

separately, making it relatively easier to find, and even compare,

war-zone volunteer opportunities. Most agencies advertise warzone vacancies year-round as positions come vacant, and selection

of candidates is made by the various regional and functional components that sponsor the war-zone positions. One agency, although selection is ultimately made by regional and functional

components, advertises war-zone vacancies ahead of standard vacancies in an effort to fill the war-zone vacancies first. This allows

the agency to prioritize and identify critical gaps and work to fill

them prior to filling more traditional vacancies.28 Differences in

how positions are advertised do not appear to impact the ability

of an agency to fill war-zone vacancies; no agency is experiencing

significant gaps in volunteer candidates.

With regard to strategies that have been used to temporarily fill gaps in volunteers, one agency announces internal

“surges” when needed, requiring offices who are least affected by

the requirement for volunteers to provide officers for lateral duty

to the offices and locations where volunteers are needed.29 Inhouse surges and influx of personnel allows those with appropriate expertise to deploy while “surged” personnel on a temporary

basis cover headquarters-centric duties. The surges create situations for identifying new, potentially willing, deployable officers.
Plugging in the Gap 9

Meanwhile, one agency maintains a “retired cadre”30 hired as independent contractors when needed to temporarily fill some warzone positions. These officers have a lifetime of agency-specific

experience and are an organic reserve capability if, or when,

needed.

No candidate selection process in this limited review definitively ensures that the right volunteers apply or get deployed.

All but one agency has a policy requiring minimum on-the-job experience as criteria for deployment. In general, intelligence agencies have shorter experience criteria than that required by law

enforcement agencies—one to two years minimum experience

compared to six to seven years minimum experience, respectively.

Meanwhile, intelligence agencies, on average, deploy a greater

number of employees to the war-zone than law enforcement

agencies. A correlation seems to occur between the number of positions and number of years of experience—the more civilians

needed to fulfill war-zone vacancies, the lower the general experience-level required. 

None of the compared agencies requires prior military

service or prior experience working with the U.S. military. Minimal practical experience, or lack of direct experience with USMIL

does not appear to have any effect on success and/or early return

from war-zone deployments.31 Short-of-tour issues, on average,

have been related to unanticipated domestic situations that required the presence of the employee back in the United States or

egregious behavior, not necessarily related to lack of skill-based

knowledge or technical experience.

Universally, younger, newer employees volunteer more

readily and more often. A general lack of commitment to location,

a mortgage, or family can explain this trend. One positive outcome of younger, newer employees deploying to war-zones is the

relatively low ratio of subordinates to managers. A close working

and living environment affords enhanced opportunities for new

officers to be mentored and to develop team-building skills. 

On the other hand, war-zone as a first work experience

can temper expectations and condition work habits that do not

correspond with respective agency cultural or professional standards after redeployment. The quick work tempo and pace of

learning work-related skills in a war-zone can have several effects,
10 Chapter 1

including exposure to greater responsibilities more quickly than

if working at a routine position at a respective Headquarters. Also,

due to the need for field-expedient solutions in a war-zone, cutting corners can undermine norms that were taught during training.32 These scenarios can have a demoralizing or ostracizing

affect for the relatively new employee upon re-integration.33 A

frustrating experience can also have a negative effect when considering the characteristics of “Gen-Xers” who are apt to change

careers more often than previous generations.34 There are no

studies on long-term effects on retention of employees whose

first experience is in a war zone.35

Motivations/Incentives

The top three motivators for federal civilians to deploy to

a war-zone are (in order): 1) financial entitlement; 2) a sense of

patriotism; and 3) potential for career enhancement.36 The aforementioned 2009 GAO study37 compared pay incentives of six federal agencies involved in civilian reconstruction and stability

operations and found inequities that would undermine long-term

willingness to deploy based on varying pay scales.38 Discrepancies

in bonus amounts offered by agencies also exist. 

Within the intelligence community (IC), deployment

bonuses vary significantly.39 One agency provides a flat rate of

$5,000 for every six months served in a war-zone while another

agency provides an $8,000 bonus for six months of service with

graduated amounts that increase as more time is served. Whereas

one agency provides $10,000 accumulatively for a one-year PCS

tour, some deployed civilians are collecting up to $20,000 during

a one-year period by completing multiple TDY tours. Within one

intelligence agency, bonuses differ pending skill sets—volunteers

with a particular skill set are less apt to volunteer and, therefore,

a larger bonus is offered as enticement; meanwhile, a subset of

employees with a different skill set and a larger volunteer pool receives a lower bonus.40

Civilian war zone veterans who responded to surveys expressed great job satisfaction and deemed personal sacrifices

made to serve their agency and country were worthwhile.41 Career

enhancement was less of a guarantee. The expectation for preferential consideration for future tours and promotions was of-
Plugging in the Gap 11

tentimes not met, although this was usually the result of timing

and not due to lack of trying by respective agencies.42 For one particular agency, serving in a war zone was an option to “buy” additional time toward career when otherwise the officer was on the

verge of forced resignation.43

No evidence suggested that recognition for war-zone

duty is expected by personnel who deploy, but most agencies present returnees with certificates and medals in formal acknowledgement of their service and anecdotally, the recognition is

appreciated.44 Most recently, the DOS established a medal for dependent children in recognition of the sacrifice that families make

during extended separations. 

Although ultimately there was no evidence of agencyhopping, or severe lack of volunteers based on discrepancies between agencies in deployment incentives and practices, the

potential for negative effects on morale due to lingering discrepancies is important when considering sustainment of civilian deployment capacity. 

Tour Lengths

The majority of agencies offer PCS tours. Only one

agency limits civilian deployments to TDY-only, although multiple TDY tours are permitted. Although TDY tours are easier to

fulfill in the short-term, keeping up capacity long-term poses a

challenge since TDY positions are not back-filled (i.e., no one

takes over the position while the individual is deployed). This may

be the reason that some agencies are aspiring to convert TDY

tours to PCS positions.45

Several agencies, based on anecdotal information, note

increased divorce rates related to prolonged deployment. It is unclear, however, as to whether or not divorce was due to the separation created by deployment or if deployment exacerbated

stresses and tendency toward divorce already in play prior to deployment.46 This trend has been examined and verified in studies

on U.S. military personnel.47 Adverse affects, however, on civilians

from prolonged deployments have not been studied.

Depending on the agency, tour length dictates the number of rest and recreation (R&R) entitlements, if any. Policies on

where R&Rs can be taken and how long they last differ amongst
12 Chapter 1

the seven agencies. In the end, variations in tour lengths and R&R

entitlements did not appear to affect ability to fill war zone vacancies although, like financial entitlements, discrepancies could

have a corrosive effect over time. 

Pre-Deployment Preparation and Training

All agencies require a physical exam for war-zone candidates; only a few require a mental health interview. All agencies

require area-familiarization training ranging from one to two

weeks. None have mandatory language requirements; none have

training related to working with translators. A few agencies rely

on the DOS or DOD pre-deployment courses although the majority have independent programs, tailored to their specific mission

and personnel. All agencies require varying levels of proficiency

on a variety of weapons using various in-house ranges, trainers,

and training schedules. One agency employs the use of a firearms

simulator, onsite, in the vicinity of its deployment center. Some

agencies require training in tactical driving skills as well as first

aid. 

Surveys noted that civilians from at least two agencies

felt they were well prepared for deployment.48 Clinical evidence

suggests that the more mentally-prepared an employee is with

the realities of living and working conditions in a particular situation, the more tolerable and successful that employee will be no

matter how adverse the conditions.49 If personnel are aware beforehand, for example, that they will be using communal facilities,

they are able to set their expectations appropriately. Getting to

their deployed location and finding out after the fact of the hardships involved can easily undermine morale and make one feel as

if they were “duped” into deploying. This, in turn, will undermine

deployment capacity in the long run. Most agencies have opportunities for sharing war-zone experiences peer-to-peer.50

Although the availability of any of the above training does

not, in itself, appear to affect civilian deployment capacity, it does

show that there is a large contract environment for providing warzone affiliated tactical training for civilians. Many of these civilians will serve side-by-side in the war zone, yet they are trained

by assorted instructors for varying lengths of training to different

proficiency levels at various locations. The inability to keep pace
Plugging in the Gap 13

of training with the number of deployment candidates for one

agency, at one time, caused a back-log of personnel in need of

training. This ultimately slowed down the flow of deployment,

causing gaps between when personnel departed the war-zone and

when their replacements arrived. In fact, no agency appears to

have insurmountable difficulties in finding suitable, deployable

personnel. Rather, managing the timing, availability, and completion of training of a selected candidate to match the rotation of a

pending vacant position is the challenge. 

Family Support

According to a report focused on the USMIL community,51 soldiers felt better if assured a good support system was

available to their families during their deployment, underscoring

the importance of strong family support programs. Taking this

as a cue, civilian agencies work hard to make personnel and family

support robust and accessible.52 DOD civilians often have access

to programs available to USMIL personnel, although eligibility

varies with different service policies.53 Universally, all agencies assess their programs routinely to improve family out-reach and

available support services. Web-sites, literature, and other resources on war-zone deployment are available for employees and

their families.54 A fact that was prominently noted by most federal

agency war-zone coordinators is the paucity of studies or empirical data on the effects to civilians exposed to war-zone environments—short or long term, making identification of needs and

provision of assistance problematic. 

One exclusive benefit to civilians allowing them to reconnect with their families is the number of opportunities to depart

the war-zone during a PCS assignment on R&R.55 R&R opportunities are evaluated as critical56 yet the policies related to R&R opportunities vary amongst the civilian agencies. 

Post-Deployment and Re-Integration

Many agencies require post-deployment physicals and at

least two agencies, a mandatory post-deployment mental health

interview. Some agencies attempt to gain feedback from returning officers, although only two have conducted significant surveys

on deployment experiences, and responses were voluntary. Only
14 Chapter 1

one agency has a clear cut way of gaining mandatory feedback.

Upon return from each and every deployment, officers are required to fill in a pre-determined questionnaire with space for optional feedback. This data is captured in a unique war-zone

database. All monetary benefits associated with the deployment

are held until the questionnaire and critical feedback are provided.

Re-integration is relatively easy for personnel filling TDY

tours; employees return to their positions which are not backfilled during their absence. Agencies that sponsor only TDY tours

create a challenge for themselves, however, because it is difficult

for employees to pursue multiple tours as their absence can create

a negative impact on the home office ability to conduct its mission. Additionally, Afghanistan-gained experience might be lost

if not applied upon re-integration. By all accounts, every agency

attempts to give preferential consideration for onward assignments for those who serve PCS in war-zones. Timing of rotation,

however, can affect availability and vacancy of onward “choice”

assignments. 

PROPOSED “BEST” PRACTICES

Candidate Selection

A centralized approach to both selection as well as processing of deployment candidates ensures consistency and synergy to the deployment experience, ultimately benefiting both

the deployed and their sponsors. Recruitment and selection of

best candidates is necessary for effective mission accomplishment. However, this can be especially challenging for war-zone

vacancies given the financial incentive that motivates some toward volunteering. Oversight for coordinating efforts between

disparate operational and functional offices that sponsor warzone vacancies, in theory, optimizes communication and maximizes a whole-of-agency effort to finding the best candidates for

deployment. Unlike agencies that deploy relatively large numbers

of personnel in a decentralized selection environment, the use of

a “clearing house,” in effect, keeps less suitable deployment candidates from eventually finding a position for which they might

get selected based solely on lack of candidates for that vacancy. 

A war zone-dedicated database where all vacancies as well
Plugging in the Gap 15

as other administrative tasks are centrally accessed and managed

provides an easy, one-stop-shopping experience for those who are

interested in volunteering. The centralized approach to processing

all candidates for the duration of their deployment—from pre-,

during, and post-deployment phases—is a proven method for

tracking personnel with war-zone experience and capturing important data associated with their experience. Positive experiences

foster positive attitudes and willingness to continue to volunteer.57

Incentives

Standardizing as many variables with regard to incentives

and benefits as possible decreases inequities associated with

shared experiences amongst federal agency civilians who deploy

and work side-by-side with USMIL, facing the same risks. Meanwhile, new and innovative incentives should be explored, such as:

offering low- or no-interest loans to civilian veterans for higher

educational purposes—for self or family members; allowing the

designation of leave donation to a spouse, child, or parent if all

are USG employees; centralizing USG medical processing or oversight for civilian veterans, perhaps taking advantage of existing

DOD facilities and capabilities; extending tax benefits to

civilians.58 Making these benefits equitable is not only the right

thing to do—it is the smart thing to do if this deployable capacity

is to grow, and be sustainable.

Tour Lengths

No clear-cut best practice emerged related to tour length

although anecdotally there is a one-year tolerance for the majority

of civilians who volunteer for high-stress work environments.59

One agency was the exception in establishing a longer PCS standard that might be reconsidered if maintenance of deployment

capacity or health issues specific to Afghanistan arises. 

R&R policies should be standardized in order to minimize

perceived inequities. Different approaches to tour lengths should

be considered. For example, a time-share approach to war-zone

positions might ease the burdens of separation for some members

of the general population. This concept involves two or three employees sharing a position between field and Headquarters on a

rotational basis, allowing maximum flexibility on timing and du-
16 Chapter 1

ration of stay in either venue with a schedule coordinated between the employees and the stakeholders of both positions. This

bifurcated approach to mission accomplishment allows for effective application of field experience and maximum pursuit of area

expertise.

Pre-Deployment Preparation and Training

Mental preparation for living and operating in a war-zone

is essential.60 A good practice is to promote the sharing of “war

stories” and experiences between “veterans” and deployment candidates.61 Many agencies do this through brown bag lunches and

round table seminars. Understanding the realities of living in a

war-zone sets expectations, exponentially increasing the probability of completing a successful full-term tour.62

Access to a firearms simulator provides opportunities to

practice and become more proficient on a skill that is required but

offered with limited exposure. Although a few agencies share

training opportunities, the majority of the firearms and tactical

training as well as area-familiarization are done in-house, by each

agency, for its respective deployment candidates. One potentially

good practice or change with regard to war-zone training would

be the consolidation of training centers and instructors. This

training could be standardized according to general mission set.

For instance, all intelligence entities could standardize area-familiarization training so that all intelligence personnel are working from the most comprehensive information available while all

law-enforcement entities could standardize and consolidate tactical and operational training. This suggestion is made due to the

number of civilian employees from different agencies who find

themselves working side-by-side, in the same locations, facing the

same risks with vastly different skill levels. Therefore, working

knowledge and training should be standardized.

There is potential to enhance and encourage inter-agency

coordination by exposing various agency officers to each other

prior to deploying, and possibly working together in the field, by

consolidating some of the training—offering weapons training

on the same weapons at the same location by the same instructors

to the same proficiency standards. Consolidating some of the

training is one way to possibly address the financial cost associ-
Plugging in the Gap 17

ated with civilian deployment and deployment capacity-building

as well. 

Family Support

All agencies are aware of the importance of providing support to families when civilian volunteers deploy for either TDY or

PCS tours. Inclusion of family members or significant others in

select pre-deployment seminars reinforce organizational commitment to families. Variations and extent of family outreach can

make a difference, but one of the most important aspects of family support is ensuring communication capability is available for

the deployed to communicate with family and friends. Another

is related to benefits, such as R&R, and health care being on par

with military counterparts. Presence of a war-zone advocate ensures agency-wide compliance and awareness of war-zone issues.

Post-Deployment and Reintegration

Several good practices are worth noting. Mandating a period of leave upon return from deployment allows for complex reacclimation to social and work norms.63 Inclusion of family

members in select post-deployment seminars encourages recognition that separation is a two-way experience, enhancing the

probability for a successful re-acclimation process. Public recognition through ceremonies and issuance of awards instill a sense

of organizational appreciation, as well as contextualizing the patriotic experience. Tying benefits to completion of mandatory

post-deployment protocols ensures compliance.64 Mandatory

medical and mental health interviews upon return will allow for

better collection of data and tracking of civilian employees if, or

when, health conditions are discovered. Lastly, offering awareness

training to managers on deployment-related trends to better empathize with and mentor war-zone veterans goes a long way in integrating civilian deployment capacity as a whole-of-agency

responsibility. 

PLUGGING IN FUTURE GAPS

This comparative review only scratches the surface of exploring similarities and differences amongst varying protocols

from a subset of federal agencies deploying civilians to war-zones.
18 Chapter 1

The GAO recommendation to address inequities in civilian incentives and benefits is a start in addressing discrepancies that can

undermine long-term civilian will to volunteer for war-zone

duty.65 An attempt to highlight “best practices” in order to mitigate future short-term gaps in civilian deployment capacity led

to other areas worth exploration. These include looking for new

and innovative incentives to broaden the pool of current civilian

volunteers, considering consolidation of weapons and orientation

training, as well as centralization of the monitoring and treatment of civilian physical and mental health issues. 

Unlike the U.S. military,66 there is insufficient study of

the effects on the mental health of civilian employees from warzone deployments. The U. S. military’s ability to universally track

soldiers and their medical data collected before and after deployments is robust. No equivalent process or effort exists for federal

civilian personnel. This is significant as U. S. military personnel

are conditioned for combat, yet are still experiencing high levels

of post-combat stress, whereas civilians are not trained for war

yet the effects on their mental health are unknown. The GAO has

looked at this issue in depth,67 but it is not clear that its recommendations are sufficient. Although “civilian combat veteran” is

a copyrighted term68 for commercial purposes, the concept is

worth exploring with regard to setting parameters that define

whether, and if so when, civilians are entitled to the same benefits

extended to U.S. service members. More thorough studies are

warranted if the United States intends to maintain, not to mention grow, civilian deployment capacity for the future. 

It is incumbent upon the U.S. Government to understand

all the variables that effect civilian deployment to war-zones in

order to build and maintain capacity for long-term deployments

in the future, potentially to multiple locations. Failing to do so

can eventually limit the ability to effectively pursue national security objectives and, ultimately, to protect U.S. national security

interests from abroad during times of conflict.
Plugging in the Gap 19

Notes

1

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Human Capital: Improved Tracking and

Additional Actions Needed to Ensure the Timely and Accurate Delivery of Compensation and Medical Benefits to Deployed Civilians,testimony, September 16, 2009,

before the U.S. House, Subcommittee on the Federal Workforce, Postal Service,

and the District of Columbia, Committee on Oversight and Government, (Washington DC: GAO, 2009). Also available online: http://www.gao.gov/new.items

/d091019t.pdf. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Deploying Federal Civilians to the Battlefield: Incentives, Benefits, and Medical Care, April 2008, U.S.

House, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed

Forces (Washington DC: GAO, 2008). Also available online: http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Reports/CiviliansonBattlefieldReport.pdf. U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Civilian Personnel: Medical Policies for Deployed

DOD Federal Civilians and Associated Compensation for Those Deployed, testimony,

September 18, 2007, before the U.S. House, Subcommittee on Oversight and

Investigations, Committee on Armed Forces (Washington DC: GAO, 2007). Also

available online: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071235t.pdf. U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Civilian Personnel: Greater Oversight and Quality

Assurance Needed to Ensure Force Health Protection and Surveillance for Those Deployed, September 2006, Report to Congressional Committees (Washington DC:

GAO, 2006). Also available online: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061085.pdf.

2

GAO, Human Capital, 10. 3

Ibid., 9. See also Allysa Rosenberg, “Agencies Seek to Standardize Pay and Benefits for Civilians Overseas,” Government Executive, April 14, 2010,

http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?filepath=/dailyfed/0410/041410ar2.

htm&oref=search.

4

“Foreign Service Officer,” U.S. State Department, http://careers.state.gov/officer/.

5

Unaccompanied Tour Support Officer (Family Liaison Office, Department of

State), interviewed by author, Washington DC, January 12, 2010. All interviews

for this chapter were conducted under anonymity and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. 

6

State Department officers go through a bidding process for positions; when

ready to rotate from one position to another, six bids for six separate positions

are submitted through an HR process. The offices that sponsor the vacancies

then consider and select officers for the position from the bids that are submitted.

7

“History: Civilians Supporting Our National Defense,” U.S. Army: Civilian Personnel On-Line (CPOL), April 1, 2009, http://acpol.army.mil/employment

/about_history.htm. 

8 David S. C. Chu, “Memorandum on Building Increased Civilian Deployment

Capacity,” Department of Defense Directives Program, February 12, 2008, (Washington DC: 2008). Also available online: http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/

corres/pdf/pr080212capacity.pdf; GAO, Deploying Federal Civilians, Appendix E.
20 Chapter 1

9

“About NSA,” National Security Agency, http://www.nsa.gov/about/index.shtml. 10Chief of Global Deployment Center (National Security Agency), interviewed

by author, Washington DC, January 27, 2010. Whereas the Global Deployment

Center facilitates administrative processing for deploying personnel the Mission

Operations Center represents the operational side of deployment, managing the

various operational components and their respective candidate selection

processes. This “one-stop-shopping” approach to processing personnel for deployment ensures consistency in applying deployment protocols, limiting variations and possible discrepancies from potentially divergent deployment

protocols of the many operational sponsors. 

11Ibid.

12“About,” National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,https://www1.nga.mil

/About/Pages/default.aspx.

13Chief of the Readiness Center (Defense Intelligence Agency), interviewed by

author, Washington DC, January 18, 2010. Due to difficulty in finding replacements, the Director of the DIA recently mandated that all personnel deployed

TDY remain in place until a designated replacement is identified and enroute;

this was intended to motivate all aspects of “the system”—the deployed, the

“losing office”, the “gaining office” and personnel officer—to continuously and

actively find TDY volunteers.

14“Legal Attache Offices: History,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, http://www2

.fbi.gov/contact/legat/history.htm.

15Ibid.

16Ibid.

17Special Agent (Federal Bureau of Investigation), interviewed by author. Per interview with senior FBI Special Agent who has served intermittently in

Afghanistan since 2003, the FBI’s mission in Afghanistan started out primarily

focused on counter-terrorism (CT) operations, interviewing captured enemy

combatants and foreign detainees, looking for evidence to bring certain terrorists to justice for their roles in past events that targeted U.S. personnel and property. Today, the FBI has a three-fold strategy in Afghanistan: the continuation

of its traditional CT mission; counter-intelligence and criminal investigations

within the expanded USG community; and, building indigenous capacity in domestic intelligence collection. The FBI provides mentorship in forensics and

other counter-crime and corruption methods and law enforcement issues. A

major focus, in this latter area, is training and mentoring of Afghan security

force officers assigned to the newly created Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF).

18“Other Agencies on Mission’s ‘Country Team,’” U.S. Diplomacy: An Online Exploration of Diplomatic History and Foreign Affairs, U.S. Diplomacy, http://www

.usdiplomacy.org/state/abroad/countryteam.php.

19Chief of an International Fusion Cell (Officer of International Operations, Federal Bureau of Investigation), interviewed by author, FBI Headquarters, Washington DC, March 12, 2010.

20Ibid. One such tactic was to assign deployment duty on a rotational basis to

various FBI domestic operational components. It was thought at the time that

strong teams would form from existing units, minimizing the timeframe needed
Plugging in the Gap 21

to acclimate to conditions in a hostile work environment. Although team members worked well amongst themselves their skill sets, training, and knowledgebase oftentimes did not match what was needed to fulfill FBI’s tactical and

strategic goals on a consistent basis in the war zone.

21Ibid.

22 “Mission’s ‘Country Team,’” U.S. Diplomacy.

23Acting Section Chief (Office of Global Enforcement) and Supervisory Special

Agent (Office of Global Enforcement at the Drug Enforcement Administration),

interviewed by author, DEA Headquarters, Arlington, VA, March 17, 2010. Personnel deployed to Afghanistan are processed by the regional component within

DEA that has Afghanistan and Pakistan in its purview while personnel deployed

to other hardship posts may be processed by other regional components (i.e.

Iraq is managed by the regional component that also has purview over Turkey).

24Ibid. Whereas the first deployment wave consisted of 13 DEA officers, the

numbers of required officers recently increased to 81 including special agents,

intelligence analysts, program specialists and diversion investigators. There were

approximately 100 applicants for the 52 special agent vacancies.

25DEA also has permanent TDY billets worldwide for their Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support Teams (FASTs) which deploy, depending on ops-tempo and

location, for 90-120 day durations on a constant rotational basis, to assist foreign partners in conducting counter-narcotics operations. For Afghanistan, the

establishment of a FAST rotation was mandated to commence as of September

30, 2009. There, FASTs work side-by-side with USMIL as well as Afghan security

forces and are deployed for 120-days. 

26“About CIA,” Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/about-cia

/index.html.

27Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Code 50 (2010), §403-4 and -4a. 28Department of State officers bid for positions, normally submitting six top

choices in order of preference. Bids for positions take place twice a year, during

normal rotation periods in the summer and in the winter. Bidding for unaccompanied tours, to include war-zones, take place prior to the two routine bidding

timeframes.

29Information provided during multiple interviews with personnel involved with

CIA deployment processing.

30Greg Miller, “Spy Agencies Outsourcing to Fill Key Jobs,” The Los Angeles Times,

September 17, 2006; Anthony R. Williams, “CIA Support to Enduring Freedom,”

Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, Oct-Dec 2002. Although not confirmed,

this practice is a good idea for not only filling war-zone vacancies on a temporary

basis but also for filling other staff employee gaps when needed.

31During interviews with all agency representatives, all noted few “short-of-tour”

issues.

32Discussed anecdotally between interviewer and several of the agency representatives interviewed. 

33As a result of successfully handling the pace and responsibilities gained in a

war-zone, the younger, less-experienced officers upon return to their headquarters tend to get promoted quicker (one form of preferential treatment); this can
22 Chapter 1

be demoralizing to an older cadre of officers to work for a younger, less-experienced officer, or it can be demoralizing to the new employee as expectations

might be inflated. Based on early promotion in career, expectation may be for

quick promotions in future.

34Penelope Trunk, “What Gen Y Really Wants,” Time Magazine, July 05, 2007,

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1640395,00.html#ixzz0jc

vXWnLF. Statistics on “Gen X”ers indicate the tendency to change careers, on

average, more than seven times during their lifetime.

35Rutzick, Karen, “Taxing Duty,” Government Executive, May 11, 2006,

http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?filepath=/dailyfed/0506/051106pb.h

tm&oref=search.

36Department of State 2007 Survey; a 2009 unpublished intelligence agency survey and supporting anecdotal feedback from all seven agency representatives

interviewed.

37GAO, Human Capital, 10. 38Ibid., 6-9; For example, some deployed civilians are paid on the Foreign Service

(FS) pay scale while others are paid on the General Schedule (GS) pay scale; different pay scales have different parameters dictating overtime, danger pay, and

other aspects of salary that can significantly differ. 

39Based on interviews with representatives of four intelligence agencies—CIA,

NSA, NGA, and DIA.

40Former PEMS officer, interviewed by author, March 9, 2010. 

412007 State Department survey.

42Ibid. and 2009 unpublished survey of an intelligence agency.

43Department of State has an “up or out” protocol for senior officers who do not

get promoted within a five year of making senior grade; if during the five year

period the officer bids for an unaccompanied, hardship tour, they are eligible to

extend that review period by the amount of time spent in that tour.

44Discussed during some of the interviews conducted with agency representatives on the subject of formal recognition for personnel following a war-zone

tour.

45FBI and DEA are converting many of their TDY positions in Afghanistan to

PCS positions. NSA is also increasing their number of PCS tours.

46Clinical psychiatrist, interviewed by author, March 18, 2010. Discussed during

dialogue with clinical psychiatrist involved with conducting pre- and post-deployment interviews of civilians associated with one particular agency. Also,

briefly touched upon with various interviewees who are familiar, through internal anecdotes within their agencies, related to divorce and deployments.

47American Psychological Association Presidential Task Force on Military Deployment Services for Youth, Families, and Service Members, The Psychological

Needs of U.S. Military Service Members and Their Families: A Preliminary Report,

(February 2007), 26.

482007 State Department survey; 2009 unpublished survey from an intelligence

agency.

49Psychiatrist, interview, March 18, 2010. The clinical psychologist was employed with an agency that required pre- and post-deployment mental health
Plugging in the Gap 23

interviews and who has interviewed many war-zone returnees in the course of

his responsibilities.

50During interviews with representatives from five of the seven agencies, several

practices were shared in which those seeking to volunteer in war-zones had opportunities to meet with those who had already served; many of the agencies

shared the same type of practice of conducting brown-bag lunches, open houses,

seminars, etc.

51Senior Advisor (Expeditionary Operations Directorate, National GeospatialIntelligence Agency), interviewed by author, NGA Headquarters, Reston, VA,

January 14, 2010.

52Agency representatives that were interviewed provided pamphlets and resource material that is available to deployment candidates and their families;

many provided many details associated with ways that their respective agencies

were improving ways to support family members.

53Ibid. For example, the U.S. Army allows 16 hrs of free drop-in childcare per

child, per family, per month at designated Family Childcare Centers during operating hours; families of civilians deployed with the U.S. Army are eligible to

participate. Meanwhile, the U.S. Air Force provides two-hour childcare on a

monthly basis, at a pre-determined time, date, and place for the families of deployed military personnel; civilian families are not eligible to participate.

54Currently, an informal attempt on a quarterly basis to share these resources

amongst inter-agency HR and war-zone representatives is hosted by DOS.

55Information provided anecdotally from several of the interviewees; visits not

only recharged their batteries but also they spent more quality time with family

and friends than prior to deployment. 

56Psychiatrist, interview, March 18, 2010. Anecdotal information suggests that

many civilians deployed to war-zones found R&Rs recharged their batteries making prolonged separation from families more tolerable; many commented on

more quality time with family compared to when they were at their CONUS jobs.

57Psychiatrist, interview, March 18, 2010. Also, conclusion of GAO, Human Capital supports this intuitive theory. 58Many senators have attempted to gain tax benefits for civilians but to no avail;

the issues that keep this legislation from passing should be studied/pursued;

blogs on this subject show great interest and passion with regard to this benefit.

59Psychiatrist, interview, March 18, 2010. 

60Ibid.

61Ibid.

62Ibid. and results from a 2009 unpublished survey of civilians conducted by one

federal agency with 50 percent respondent rate.

63APA, Psychological Needs, 30. 64Tying benefits to completion of protocols can also ensure tracking and accountability with regard to civilian physical and mental health issues, thorough collection of deployment statistics, and opportunity for providing invaluable

feedback loop. 

65GAO, Human Capital, 9-10.
24 Chapter 1

66APA, Psychological Needs, 23-25. 67GAO, Human Capital, 9-10. This source noted that civilians deployed to war

zones are eligible for treatment at USMIL medical facilities although this entitlement was not well communicated to all civilian agencies nor is well-understood amongst U.S. Military care givers. Recommendations included enhancing

communication for better understanding of the status quo entitlement.

68“Trademark Electronic Search System: Civilian Combat Veteran,” United States

Patent and Trademark Office, August 14, 2007, http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=4010:1s2nbn.2.1.
2

National Security and the Interagency Enterprise:

a Critical analysis

by John C. Vara

ABSTRACT

This chapter argues that the U.S. interagency foreign-service apparatus is flawed. The current concept of coordinating interagency operations under the State Department’s Office of the

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) cannot

work effectively because S/CRS does not have the required authority or operating framework to meet its coordination responsibilities across the interagency community. For any U.S.

government department or agency to effectively coordinate and

direct interagency operations, it must have a congressional mandate, authority, and funding through legislation. 

Two options are examined as possible solutions. First, the

State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction

and Stabilization (S/CRS) could work effectively as the interagency coordinator if it receives congressional authority similar to

what FEMA received through the Stafford Act. The United States

Agency for International Development (USAID) is also examined.

It too is deemed to be an effective candidate as the interagency

coordination hub. Like S/CRS, it would also need congressional

authorities and an operational framework derived from legislation. USAID has the advantage of a strong legacy in foreign assistance and an expeditionary culture. For these reasons and more,

USAID should be the primary candidate for coordinating and directing the interagency process in the context of foreign-service,

and foreign assistance and development. 

25
26 Chapter 2

INTRODUCTION

America’s interagency toolkit is a hodgepodge of jerry-rigged

arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes.

—Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, Speech at Nixon Center,

February 24, 2010.

Today’s international security environment requires an

interagency, whole-of-government approach in order to provide

security both at home and abroad.1 This whole-of-government

concept is often referred to simply as “the interagency” and implies that there is a homogenous organization channeling the capabilities of various government organizations toward a single

goal with unified effort. The fact is, however, there is no such organization and by its very nature, interagency activities do not

harmonize.2 Individual agencies have their own core missions

with their own agendas and requirements. There is no unity of

command, no clear delineation of authority or institutional incentive for effective cooperation, let alone collaboration.3 The current interagency apparatus lacks meaningful mechanisms to unify

its effort, learn lessons, build doctrine, or gain a common cultural

perspective.4 The net result is a failure to effectively “operationalize” the broad notion of the interagency at the practitioner level

and to build an effective bureaucratic system that can provide responsive, dependable, and repeatable services to support national

foreign policy interests and homeland security.5

Harnessing the whole of national power through interagency cooperation has challenged the United States for decades

and is strikingly similar to the challenges faced by the U.S. military as it wrestled with unification and then joint-service cooperation over the last 70 years.6 Despite the differences, one can

make useful comparisons between today’s interagency process

and the challenges faced by the U.S. military over the past

decades. Just like the military’s struggle with joint-service cooperation, the U.S. interagency apparatus will not realize its full potential until Congress provides clear legal authority, mandates a

functional and effective bureaucratic framework, and guarantees

adequate funding through legislation. Only then, with an authoritative organizational framework, will the United States be able
e Interagency Enterprise 27

to effectively administer interagency collaboration and project

the totality of its national powers.7

In building a case for a congressionally mandated and authoritative interagency apparatus, this chapter examines the current framework for interagency coordination and will draw

conclusions and make recommendations for a better way to operate. 

THE “INTERAGENCY”

The term “interagency” describes the collaborative effort

of various government agencies to merge their unique capabilities

and focus them toward a single goal in a unified effort. Over the

years the Defense Department (DOD), State Department (DOS)

and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have developed a habitual relationship and are best understood as partners. In contrast, domestic agencies have not developed any

habitual relationship with the defense and foreign services.8 The

term “whole-of-government” is often used to identify the collection of domestic government agencies that are called upon to assist the foreign-service and military with foreign assistance,

development and/or reconstruction and stabilization. This chapter uses the terms interagency and whole-of-government interchangeably. 

One could argue that a coherent interagency capability has

existed in the past. The Marshall Plan after World War II (WWII),

the U.S. International Cooperation Administration in the 1950s,

and later USAID in the 1960s all serve as historical examples.9 During Vietnam, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development

Support (CORDS) Program aimed to win hearts and minds while

today, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan

are engaged in building infrastructure, creating markets, generating commerce, and establishing governance.10 Additionally, one can

point to embassy country teams abroad or disaster relief efforts at

home (Hurricane Katrina) to make the case that the interagency

is alive and well—and is not a new concept. 

All that said, these examples actually support the thesis

that the interagency is at the very least inefficient, if not dysfunctional. While some of these programs had relative success, some

were near disasters. USAID, for example, has a long history and
28 Chapter 2

an impressive resume of accomplishments. But today, it is simply

a broker for foreign aid and currently operates with limited operating resources and manpower.11 The interagency response for

Hurricane Katrina, on the other hand, was notably bad and

sparked a congressional investigation to find out what went

wrong.12 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), civil-military

teams deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, have not fared much better, with a Congressional investigation revealing serious shortfalls.13 Embassy country teams, collections of personnel from

various U.S. government agencies, also come up short. Although

these teams fall under the ambassador’s (or chief of mission) supervision and bring a mix of capabilities and competencies together, country team members often pursue narrow agency

agendas. The ambassador charged with oversight may, or may

not, have any experience in leading such an operational team, a

problem compounded by the team’s wide charge that ranges from

market analysis and expansion, business development, law enforcement and intelligence gathering.14 In sum, the U.S. interagency experience is, at best, a mixed bag.

THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS

Interagency policy coordination for foreign assistance is

the responsibility of the National Security Council (NSC) with the

State Department acting as the lead cabinet department for coordination of action, namely through S/CRS and USAID.15 The 1947

National Security Act gave the National Security Council the statutory responsibility to coordinate interagency policy while the State

Department was designated the lead cabinet for coordinating stability operations by National Security Presidential Directive 44

(NSPD-44). Each will be briefly examined in turn.

In 1947 Congress reorganized the entire United States National Security Apparatus. During the time after World War II and

on the brink of the Cold War, both the executive and legislative

branches recognized that the United States needed to reform its

security posture. The 1947 National Security Act realigned the military establishment, consolidated the national intelligence effort

creating the Central Intelligence Agency and created the National

Security Council.16 The National Security Council is the President’s

principle advisory group for strategic policy and is not subject to
e Interagency Enterprise 29

Senate oversight. Each president issues an updated Presidential

Policy Directive-1 (PPD-1) which allows every President to tailor

the NSC role and responsibilities within his administration.17

National Security Council Organization – Joint Publication 3-08

pg II-4 18

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ORGANIZATION

office of the

secretary of

Defense

Joint staff Department of

state

other executive

Branch

national

security Council

Secretary of

Defense

Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs

of Staff

Secretary of

State

President, Vice President, Secretary of the

Treasury, Assistant to

the President for National Security Affairs,

Director of Central Intelligence, Chief of Staff to

the President, Assistant

to the President for Economic Policy, Attorney

General, Director OMB,

Counsel to the President

Principals

Committee

Secretary of

Defense

Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs

of Staff

Secretary of

State

Secretary of the Treasury, Director of Central

Intelligence, Chief of

Staff to the President,

Attorney General, Director OMB, Counsel to the

President, Chief of Staff

to the Vice President,

Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor,

and others as required

Deputies

Committee

Deputy Secretary of Defense

or Undersecretary for Policy

Vice Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs

of Staff

Deputy Secretary of StateAssistant to the President for National Security Affairs and other

deputies of Principals

POLICY COORDINATION COMMITTEES (PCCs)

PCCs–regional Europe and Eurasia Western Hemisphere

East Asia South Asia

Near East and North Africa Africa

PCCs–functional Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations

International Development and Humanitarian Assistance

Global Environment

International Finance

Transnational Economic Issues

Counterterrorism and National Preparedness

Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning

Arms Control

Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense

Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Records Access and Information Security
30 Chapter 2

In addition to its advisory role, the NSC also serves to integrate national security policy across domestic, foreign, military,

and intelligence domains. Together with supporting interagency

working groups, high-level steering groups, executive committees, and task forces, the NSC provides the foundation for interagency coordination.19 Although the council initiates the

development of national security policy, it does not normally implement policy. Rather, the NSC continually coordinates and

monitors the interagency policy process to ensure that the President always has appropriate policy options available and monitors the execution of the President’s policies. The nature and

degree of NSC involvement in this policy process depends on the

President’s desires.20

The U.S. national security policy starts with the National

Security Council drafting the National Security Strategy (NSS).22

Once signed by the President, the National Security Strategy

guides policy development, and integrates and coordinates all the

instruments of national power in order to accomplish national

objectives. 23 Within this strategic body, the Interagency Policy

Committees manage the day-to-day activities of interagency coordination of national security policy.24 Evaluating the U.S.

figure 121
e Interagency Enterprise 31

[strategic] interagency or “whole of government” apparatus starts

at the highest level of the government’s national security system. 

With the operation in Iraq coming unhinged in 2005, in December of that year, President Bush published National Security

Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), which specifically directed the

State Department to take the lead role in interagency coordination

and established S/CRS.25 NSPD-44 stated, “To achieve maximum effect, a focal point is needed (i) to coordinate and strengthen efforts

of the United States Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct

reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related activities in

a range of situations that require the response capabilities of multiple United States Government entities and (ii) to harmonize such

efforts with U.S. military plans and operations.”

Specifically, the State Department and S/CRS are tasked

with developing strategies for foreign assistance, planning and coordinating interagency response to foreign assistance needs, and

compliance with the policies set forth in the 1961 Foreign Assistance

Act.26

S/CRS’s Core Mission “is to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for

post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a

sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.”27

To accomplish this ambitious mission, S/CRS organizational plan

calls for 250 active officers, 2,000 government officers on standby,

an additional 2,000 in a reserve corps, and a requested [2010]

budget of $323.3 million to start building capacity.28 To give perspective, the Federal Air Marshal Service’s 2010 budget request was

$860.1 million—nearly 3 times the propose S/CRS budget request.29

That said, the creation S/CRS was a small step in the right

direction. It was an attempt to organize the agency-to-agency coordination in order to effectively turn foreign policy into action.

But despite its mandate under NSPD-44, it only has limited authority that is solely derived from the Secretary of State—it cannot

compel other agencies or departments to commit personnel or resources to its efforts.30 Thus, it has been slow to gain acceptance

within the interagency community and has even met some resistance within the State Department.31 S/CRS has also had difficulty

getting traction in the field, missing valuable opportunities in Iraq
32 Chapter 2

and in Haiti after the January 2010 earthquake disaster. In Iraq,

future reconstruction and development will be accomplished by

embassy teams, and the disaster relief mission in Haiti was led by

the USAID.32 Without congressional support and legislative authority, other departments and agencies will continue to view S/CRS

as an unfunded mandate without compulsory authority.33

Additionally, it can be argued that S/CRS duplicates many

functions that have historically resided within USAID.34 But unlike

USAID, S/CRS falls squarely within the bureaucratic structure of the

State Department. In contrast, USAID is a distinctly different and

separate organization. It has a semi-autonomous relationship with

the State and can be described as a partner rather than a subordinate.35 Although a noble idea and a start in the right direction, this

low cost approach is window dressing rather than a commitment to

the whole-of-government concept. Naming the State Department

as the lead for interagency operations may make sense considering

its primary role in diplomacy and international relations. State’s

bureaucratic reality, however, makes this option must less viable.

Even during the Marshall Plan in 1948, the conventional wisdom

was that the State Department was not capable of administering

the reconstruction of Europe; hence the Economic Cooperation Administration was created as a semi-autonomous executive agency.36

USAID was established as an autonomous agency for much the

same reason. In sum, although some changes have been made since

2001, the interagency process requires more far-reaching reform. 

INTERAGENCY PROCESS REFORM

The post conflict stability and reconstruction operations

in Iraq have sparked significant discussion in both academia and

within government about reforming the national security apparatus

as a whole, and the interagency process in particular. Since 2004,

there has been a broad body of work done on this subject. Various

studies have been conducted by notable think tanks, war colleges,

the Congressional Research Service, and the Government Accountability Office and Congress itself (congressional hearings and committee investigations) with testimony from senior government

officials and practitioners. 

The studies’ tenor is that coordination and collaboration

between departments and agencies within the U.S. government
e Interagency Enterprise 33

needs to be improved. Although there is no clear consensus on

what changes would enhance interagency cooperation, the scope

of suggestions include clarifying roles and responsibilities, changing agency organizational structures and culture, integrating

planning and execution, creating an over-arching interagency national security strategy, realigning distribution of resources, and

providing congressional oversight. 37

After a comprehensive review of the interagency process,

one can reasonably conclude that interagency coordination is

problematic but it is functional. Within the NSC, the Deputies

Committee and the Interagency Policy Committee are capable of

making timely policy decisions and managing the day-to-day coordination of interagency policy issues at the strategic level.38 The

process also appears to work at the tactical level with the practitioner in the field. The Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)

South, the State Department’s country teams, and the Provincial

Reconstruction Teams serve as examples of measured success in

the field.39 However, it is important to note that the examples

above took significant time to develop, mature, and produce positive results.40

The weakness within the interagency process is at the

agency level, specifically among the domestic agencies.41 At this

level, between the strategic and tactical, the individual agencies

are required to coordinate the details of resource allocation, funding, and roles and responsibilities in order to transform policy

into action. Effective control of interagency operations fades away

below the National Security Council and then reappears at the

tactical level through ingenuity and force of personality on the

ground. There is no coherent mechanism in the middle to consistently turn national security policy into effective actions in the

field. It is here, in the middle, where interagency coordination

and collaboration becomes difficult and can break down. 42 There

is a natural tension and even reluctance among agencies to provide personnel and resources to foreign-service missions that lie

outside the bounds of their core mission. Additionally, there is

no government-wide protocol for deploying domestic agency personnel.43 Each agency has its unique policies, regulations, and

procedures that must be reconciled before agencies take action.

Pre-deployment training, funding for temporary duty (TDY), and
34 Chapter 2

hazardous duty benefits all complicate coordination and collaboration. And although S/CRS provides pre-deployment training for

partner agency personnel, there is no common doctrine among

the various agencies to ensure unity of effort, unity of command,

or clear lines of funding.44 The problem lies in the middle, where

the allocation and integration of resources must take place. Without an organization designed to coordinate and harmonize activities as well as marshal and direct resources, the interagency effort

will be paralyzed by competing priorities. 

Interagency reform that would bring a whole-of-government approach resulting in agile and responsive smart power requires several baseline conditions. First, whoever is responsible

for interagency coordination must have authority that is commensurate with their mandate.45 Second, there must be an established framework that clearly establishes a common overarching

strategy, provides a unity of command, or at the very least unity

of effort, through clear delineation of roles and responsibilities,

providing an adequate funding scheme among the partnered

agencies.46 Third, there must be career incentives within the various domestic agencies that reward foreign interagency service.

This will ensure the right people actively seek participation within

the interagency foreign-service domain.47 None of these conditions can happen without a congressional mandate, legislative authority, and congressional oversight.48 Two viable options exist

for interagency reform. One, a reconceptualized S/CRS or, two, a

reinvigorated USAID.

To change S/CRS, policymakers could look to the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the best insight for

interagency cooperation. After severe criticism following Hurricane Katrina, FEMA was transformed into an action oriented, operationalized agency.49 The Stafford Act provided both the

framework and the authority to effectively coordinate and harmonize the interagency effort.50 S/CRS and FEMA share similar missions and mandates. They are both tasked to lead and coordinate

interagency activities. For FEMA, the focus is on domestic hazards, so it is geared to marshal interagency capacities to protect

against natural and man-made disasters at home.51 S/CRS, on the

other hand, is driven by foreign stability and reconstruction operations and aims to project the whole of government capacity to
e Interagency Enterprise 35

prevent conflict and/or assist nations that are recovering from

conflict or civil strife. In both cases the goal is essentially the same:

harmonize interagency collaboration in a unified effort.

The problem with S/CRS is that it falls under the weight

of the State Department bureaucracy. S/CRS’s authority is derived

from, and limited by, the Secretary of State’s authority. It is essentially an unfunded mandate without teeth or traction.52 If this first

course of interagency reform is chosen, S/CRS should be transformed into a semi-autonomous, self-contained, and fully funded

organization. It must have Congressionally granted legal authority, an organizational framework, and operating process. Revamping S/CRS in this fashion is not without historical precedent. 

As the Marshall Plan was built, debate emerged over who

would administer the reconstruction and recovery effort in postWWII Europe. The end result was the creation of the semi-autonomous Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). The ECA

led the European reconstruction and recovery effort by coordinating and directing various U.S. and coalition government agencies. The Marshall Plan and the ECA is perhaps the first and most

meaningful projection of soft power in U.S. history.

The Foreign Assistance Act and the creation of the U.S.

Agency for International Development (USAID) serve as other

historical examples. On September 4, 1961, Congress reorganized

and consolidated non-military U.S. foreign assistance programs

into a single independent organization. In compliance with this

legislation, President Kennedy established the U.S. Agency for International Development. USAID has since established a long history of implementing economic and technical assistance to

foreign countries, projecting U.S. soft power in support of national interests.53

Despite these examples, it is unlikely that the U.S. Congress would create another large, semi-autonomous bureaucratic

organization. Financial cost and essentially duplicating the bureaucracy that exists within USAID may not be practical. A viable

compromise may be to replicate FEMA’s model with legislation

similar to the Stafford Act which established both the legal authority and administrative framework (Emergency Response

Framework) for FEMA. This legislation “operationalized” FEMA

and made it an effective and responsive interagency broker.54 In
36 Chapter 2

this model, once an international crisis is identified by Presidential

declaration, S/CRS’s legal authorities would engage. The “Crisis

Response Framework” would be activated and S/CRS would then

have legal authority and funding to direct and compel partner

agencies to support the assigned foreign assistance mission (see

below). This assumes, of course, that the infrastructure and operational framework would already be established, and that a standing interagency reserve force (Civilian Response Corps) would be

trained, organized, and equipped to deploy on short notice. 

A second option is to reinforce and reform USAID, an organization with a long history of foreign assistance. USAID has

an existing legacy, culture, and organizational structure that supports foreign assistance and development missions. It has well

established and habitual relationships with both the Department

of State and the Department of Defense, two critical partners in

foreign affairs.55 Recent history has demonstrated that USAID is

the agency of choice, and perhaps the most capable of deploying

rapidly to trouble spots. It has been active in Iraq, Afghanistan,

and most recently in Haiti’s earthquake recovery. USAID may be

the “natural” answer to the interagency/foreign service question.

It makes sense to reform and reinforce an existing institution,

figure 2
e Interagency Enterprise 37

with all its organizational and bureaucratic trappings, rather than

to create an additional and perhaps duplicate bureaucracy from

scratch. Not only would bolstering USAID be less complicated and

more cost effective, it would also take less time.

However, one can glean from history that increasing

USAID’s capacity and adding to its responsibilities, even in the

margins, will meet with resistance. It stands to reason that if

USAID is tasked with coordinating the interagency enterprise

abroad, it will still need enhanced legislative authority, increased

funding and an operational framework based in legislation analogous to the FEMA model (see above). 

In any case, whatever organization is made responsible

for interagency coordination, there must be significant reform to

the national security and national strategy process. As outlined

in the 2005 CSIS report, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, the entire national security framework is in need of overhaul. Creating a new

statutory framework the spans the entire government will greatly

facilitate cooperation. This framework should include measures

that address: strategic and operational planning across the entire

government, agency roles and responsibilities with regard to nafigure 3
38 Chapter 2

tional security, creating an overarching national security strategy,

and providing oversight through a government-wide National Security Quadrennial Review. These radical steps will require an act

of Congress. Given the national security stakes, it is past time for

Congress to engage.

Notes

1

House Committee on Armed Services, Improving Interagency Coordination for

the Global War on Terror, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., April 4, 2006, (Washington DC:

GPO, 2007), 61. Also available at: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:32971.pdf.

2

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues

from Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing, September 2009, Congressional Committees,

(Washington DC: GAO, 2009), 4. Also available online at: http://www

.gao.gov/new.items/d09904sp.pdf.

3

Jay Bendes (Principal Interagency Management Officer, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization), interviewed by the author, March

16, 2010.

4

Ibid.

5

Ibid.

6

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S.

Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era (Washington D.C: July

2005), 6-21.

7

Bendes, interview, March 16, 2010.

8

Ibid.

9

Dale Andrade and James H. Willbanks, “CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency

Lessons from Vietnam for the Future,” Military Review, March-April 2006,

http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/willbanks.pdf (March 12, 2010).

10Jim Willbanks, January 9, 2009 (11:00 a.m.), “CGSC History Department: FM

3-07 and CORDS,” Combined Arms Center Blog Library, http://usacac.army

.mil/BLOG/blogs/hist/archive/2009/01/09/fm-3-07-and-cords.aspx (March 12,

2010).

11Ron Capps, “What’s the Story on Militarization?” Frontlines, November 2009,

http://www.usaid.gov/press/frontlines/fl_nov09/p02_capps091104.html

(March 12, 2010).

12Congressional Reports: H.rpt.109-377- A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the

Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, March 31, 2008, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports

/katrina.html (March 12, 2010).

13U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee

on Oversight & Investigations, Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We
e Interagency Enterprise 39

Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, 13-

16, http://armedservises.house.gov/pdfs/Reports/PRT_Report.pdf (March 12,

2010).

14“Other Agencies on Mission’s ‘Country Team,’” U.S. Diplomacy: An Online Exploration of Diplomatic History and Foreign Affairs, U.S. Diplomacy,

http://www.usdiplomacy.org/state/abroad/countryteam.php.

15George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD- 44 (Washington

DC: The White House, December 7, 2005), http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs

/nspd/nspd-44.html.

16National Security Act of 1947, U.S. Code 50 (1947), §401, http://intelligence

.senate.gov/nsaact1947.pdf (March 12, 2010).

17Barack Obama, Presidential Policy Directive-1, “Organization of the National

Security Council System” (Washington DC: The White House, February 13,

2009), http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-1.pdf (March 12, 2010).

18Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-08: Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

During Joint Operations Vol I, (Washington DC: GPO, March 17, 2006), II-4. 19Ibid., x

20Ibid.

21Gabriel Marcella, “National Security and the Interagency Process,” Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, 2nd Edition, J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed.,

http://faculty.nps.edu/dl/PFP/pages/04_process.html (March 12, 2010).

22Richard Doyle, “Developing Security Strategy: The U.S. Approach,” Office of

Continuous Learning at the Naval Postgraduate School, http://faculty.nps

.edu/dl/PFP/pages/04_process.html.

23JCS, Joint Publication 3-08, x. 24Obama, Directive-1. 25Bush, National Security. 26Ibid.

27“About Us,” U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/s/crs/about /index

.htm. 

28“Presidential FY 2010 Budget Request for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative,”

U.S. Department of State, http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=4QJW (March 12, 2010).

29U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Air Marshal Service: Actions

Taken to Fulfill Core Mission and Address Workforce Issue,testimony, July 23, 2009,

before the U.S. House, Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and

Oversight, Committee on Homeland Security, http://www.gao.gov/htext

/d09903t.html (March 12, 2010). 

30Bendes, interview, March 16, 2010.

31Ibid.

32Jonathan Benton (Principal Deputy Coordinator, Office of the Coordinator for

Reconstruction and Stabilization), interviewed by the author, March 12, 2010.

33Bendes, interview, March 16, 2010.

34Ibid.

35U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development,
40 Chapter 2

Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2007-2012, U.S. Agency for International Development,

May 7, 2007, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86291.pdf, 4-7.

36Charles M. Dobbs, Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 (Marshall Plan),

http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/ 1G2-3407400075.html (March 12, 2010).

37Congressional Research Service, Organizing the U.S. Government for National

Security: Overview of the Interagency Reform Debate, December 16, 2008,

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/104695.pdf, 3.

38Benton, interview, March 12, 2010.

39Ibid.

40Ibid.

41Bendes, interview, March 16, 2010.

42Ibid.

43Benton, interview, March 12, 2010.

44Ibid.

45Ibid.

46Ibid.

47Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Beyond GoldwaterNichols, 59. 48Ibid., 58-59.

49GPO, A Failure of Initiative. 50Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, U.S. Code 42

(1974), §5121. 

51Visit to Federal Management Agency, Marine Corps War College, Washington

DC, February 2010.

52Bendes, interview, March 16, 2010.

53“USAID: History,” U.S. Agency for International Development, April 3, 2009,

http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html.

54Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, U.S. Code 42. 55Bendes, interview, March 16, 2010.
3

Establishing U.S. Stability Operations Command: 

an organization for the Critical national security

Missions of the 21st Century

by Doug M. Hammer

ABSTRACT

The United States’ investment, in both blood and treasure, toward its national security has garnered a world in which it

has no peer competitor in the traditional warfare arena. As a result, those who wish to threaten U.S. security have been forced to

evolve their methods and now engage through indirect and unconventional means using failed or failing states as their base.

Consequently, modern conflicts are no longer resolved with quick

and decisive victories on the battlefield but rather with the stabilization of vulnerable states. 

To greatly simplify U.S. national defense strategy of the

past, when national security relied upon victory of the battlefield,

defense equated to traditional warfare. Given the success of that

strategy and evolution of irregular warfare, defense now equates

to stability operations. This shift in strategy has been codified in

both our national strategic framework documents as well as in

Department of Defense policy. Department of Defense Directive

(DODD) 3005.05, Stability Operations, states, “stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the DOD shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat

operations.” While U.S. national strategy has shifted to compensate for the changing threat, its supporting processes and organizational structures are still hindered by the historic mindset of

defense. The good news is that the very legal basis of the U.S.

41
42 Chapter 3

armed services, Title 10 of the U.S. Code, provides not only the

opportunity but the requirement to periodically review national

security threats and adjust the defense framework accordingly.

Additionally, history has provided the United States with case

studies where the threat and nature of conflict has shifted. 

With the advent of nuclear weapons, deterrence rather

than traditional combat operations became a major component

of U.S. national security. As a result the U.S. national security

leadership used the flexibility provided in Title 10, United States

Code to establish a functional combatant command to focus on

deterrence and thus U.S. Strategic Command was born. Once

again the United States finds itself faced with a new threat and

once again it must restructure its organizational framework to

meet the threat. The establishment of U.S. Stability Operations

Command will not only posture the military to execute current

national security policy and strategy but also provide a structure

to effectively leverage the capabilities of the interagency team. 

ORGANIZING FOR 21ST CENTURY SECURITY THREATS

AND OPPORTUNITIES

To better organize for critical national security missions

of the 21st century and successfully integrate interagency stabilization and reconstruction related activities, the Department of

Defense (DOD) should establish a single, functional combatant

command for stability operations. U.S. Stability Operations Command would not only improve DOD’s ability to plan, prepare for,

and execute stability operations, but would also provide the military’s organizational framework for all members of the interagency involved in this vital mission. With DOD’s planning and

logistics capabilities as the backbone of U.S. Stability Operations

Command, other resource challenged members of the interagency

team could focus their limited capacity on providing planning and

operational expertise to whole-of-government operations with a

single military point of contact. 

The United States has determined that weak and failing

states pose significant threats to its national security and is committed to helping countries prevent or emerge from conflict. In

the face of these threats, President Bush issued National Security

Presidential Directive 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Con-
U.S. Stability Operations 43

cerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, recognizing that the

United States has a significant stake in enhancing its capacity to

stabilize and reconstruct countries or regions. In support of

NSPD-44, the Secretary of Defense issued Department of Defense

Directive (DODD) 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security,

Transition, and Reconstruction Operations that provided policy and

assigned responsibility for planning, preparing for, and executing

stability operations. More importantly, DODD 3000.05 defined

stability operations as a core military mission on par with combat

operations. 

Since the signing of NSPD-44 in December 2005, a number of Departmental and Congressional level studies and reports

have concluded that the greatest challenge to the U.S. Government’s (USG’s) ability to conduct stability operations is the lack

of an integrated planning capability and the capacity of civilian

agencies with which the military must partner to achieve success.

While the DOD can fill some of these gaps in civilian capacity in

the short-term, strategic success will only be possible with a robust architecture for unified civil-military action. The continuing

challenge facing interagency leadership has become how to best

address the capacity, planning, and organizational framework

shortfalls within the currently flawed architecture. Fortunately,

the legal basis of the military provides national leaders the ability

to restructure commands and forces as required to meet changes

within the strategic environment. 

Title 10, U.S. Code, requires that the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) review combatant commands’ missions and responsibilities within the military every two years and

recommend to the President, through the Secretary of Defense,

any changes that may be necessary. The results of this review are

published in the form of the Unified Command Plan (UCP). An

examination of the UCP history illustrates that past national leaders have used this requirement, although grudgingly at times, to

adjust roles and missions as threats to U.S. national security have

evolved. In response to the current operating environment, the

most recent UCP, signed by President Bush in December 2008, assigned all combatant commanders responsibility for planning and

conducting military support to stability operations. While this

change has the potential to improve the military’s ability to con-
44 Chapter 3

duct stability operations, it does little to address the fundamental

challenge of interagency synchronization because other U.S. government agencies simply do not have the capacity to provide expertise to each of our combatant commands. This chapter seeks

to make the case for creating a U.S. Stability Operations Command by, first, laying out the strategic context. Then, the current

constructs and capabilities to address the operating environment

will be addressed, followed by an analysis of the proposal for a

U.S. Stability Operations Command. The chapter ends by identifying the way forward. 

STRATEGIC CONTEXT FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

To fully comprehend the challenges associated with conducting successful stability operations, it is necessary to examine

the strategic context. This examination starts by reviewing the

transformation of warfare and defining the concept of stability

operations along with its primary missions, tasks, and activities;

by assessing the U.S. experience with stability operations in order

to draw any conclusions which can be applied to future operations; and by reviewing the current national strategy for conducting stability operations in the form of U.S. policy and doctrine.

Only by understanding this strategic context can leaders devise

an effective architecture for conducting stability operations in

support of national interests. 

Traditional warfare is characterized as a confrontation

between nation-states or coalitions/alliances of nation-states.

This confrontation typically involves force-on-force military combat operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional military capabilities against each other.1 Past U.S.

investment, in both blood and treasure, toward its national security has resulted in a world which it currently has no peer competitor in the traditional warfare arena. As a result, those who

wish to threaten U.S. security have been forced to transform their

methods and engage through irregular means. The environment

of irregular warfare (IW) is marked by a violent struggle among

state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the

relevant population. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and

will. In IW, a less powerful adversary seeks to disrupt or negate
U.S. Stability Operations 45

the military capabilities and advantages of a more powerful, conventionally armed military force. IW typically manifests itself as

one or a combination of several possible forms, including insurgency, terrorism, disinformation, propaganda, or organized criminal activity. An adversary will vary the form of IW according to

its capabilities and objectives.

What makes IW “irregular” is the focus of its operations,

a relevant population, and its strategic purpose, to gain or maintain control or influence over, and the support of, that relevant

population through political, psychological, and economic methods. Warfare that has the population as its operational focus requires a different mindset and different capabilities than warfare

that focuses on defeating an adversary militarily.2 When engaged

in IW, an U.S. response should vary according to established objectives along with the specific type(s) of operation(s) required. 

An effective strategy in countering IW is to ensure potential adversaries cannot find a host state in which to conduct its

operations. Fragile states provide the fuel for adversaries to

spread its fire. Stabilizing these fragile states starves the flame of

its fuel, leaving it to die out. Consequently, the majority of modern conflicts are no longer resolved with quick and decisive victories on the battlefield, but rather with the stabilization of

vulnerable states. 

Joint Publication (JP) 3.07, defines stability operations

as, “encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities

conducted outside the United States in coordination with other

instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe

and secure environment, provide essential governmental services,

emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”

3 An examination of this definition provides insight into the

structures and planning required to execute the various activities

associated with stability operations. 

The phrase “encompassing various military missions,

tasks, and activities” indicates that stability operations are broad

in scope and not limited to traditional military activities. Likewise, actions to plan and prepare for stability operations are different from those of conventional combat operations. Including

the phrase “conducted . . . in coordination with other instruments

of national power” makes it clear that stability operations are part
46 Chapter 3

of a larger interagency effort which implies the need for a whole

of government, integrated planning capability. Finally, the JP 3-

07 definition lists four primary activities within stability operations: (1) maintaining/reestablishing a safe and secure

environment, (2) providing essential government services, (3)

providing emergency infrastructure, and (4) providing humanitarian relief. Although this definition may seem straightforward,

it becomes complex when being executed by dissimilar organizations across initial response, transformational, and long-term

sustainment activities.4 Designing a strategy to determine which

organization executes which tasks, and at what time, is largely

determined by the security level of the environment in which stability operations are conducted. In a non-permissive environment, the military will be the primary, if not sole, executor of

stability operations, at least in the field on the ground. Once the

task of maintaining a safe and secure environment is accomplished, the major factor in determining a strategy becomes the

organizational core competencies of those involved in the stability operation. As suggested by this expanded definition, stability

operations activities may be executed solely by the military or in

cooperation with Department of State (DOS), non-governmental

organizations (NGOs), or host nation institutions. 

Although defining stability operations and understanding its primary activities are important steps to addressing shortfalls in the current execution strategy, assessing the U.S.

experience with stability operations provides an opportunity to

draw conclusions that can be applied to a future organizational

framework, capacity, and planning shortfalls. In the more than

two centuries since its existence, U.S. forces have fought eleven

wars that were conventional in nature. Of those conflicts, four

were total wars (War of Independence, Civil War, and World Wars

I and II), in which the nation’s existence or its way of life was considered to be at stake, and in which few restrictions were placed

on the weapons employed or on the targets attacked in the military’s efforts to defeat the enemy. The remaining seven wars (War

of 1812, Mexican War, Spanish-American War, Korean and Vietnam wars, and two Gulf wars) were limited in that an imminent

threat to the country’s survival or way of life was not apparent,

thereby al lowing U.S. policy makers to accept or set limitations
U.S. Stability Operations 47

on the objectives, scope, and/or conduct of hostilities. Throughout its history, the U.S. military has focused the bulk of its attention on fighting, or preparing to fight, these kinds of conventional

wars, with circumstances dictating whether any given conflict

would be total or limited.5

As the Cold War ended, the world became more complex

and unstable as ethnic, religious, tribal, and other local and regional conflicts, repressed, ignored, or sponsored by the superpowers’ regional am bitions during the Cold War, would become

more prominent and increas ingly disruptive. In the decade of the

1990s, local conflicts emerged or reemerged on virtually every

continent, and as the U.S. military found itself gainfully employed

and de ployed throughout the world. Many of these efforts continued into the new century, and incursions into Afghanistan and

Iraq revealed an increasing trend throughout the world—the collapse of established governments, the rise of international criminal and terrorist networks, and a seemingly endless array of

humanitarian crises. The global implications of such destabilizing

forces have proved staggering. If the country’s armed forces have

fought fewer than a dozen major con ventional wars in over two

centuries, they have, during that same period, engaged in several

hundred military undertakings that would today be characterized

as stability operations.6 Therefore, contrary to widely accepted

beliefs, U.S. military history is dominated by stability operations,

interrupted by distinct instances of major combat. With such a

large number of case studies in the past, it is prudent to study

them in order to derive lessons that can be applied to the current

and future strategy of stability operations.

An historic assessment of U.S. stability operations over a

207-year period was published in The U.S. Military’s Experience in

Stability Operations, 1798-2005. Specific conclusions drawn from

that assessment that can be applied to future stability operations

included the following: (1) stability operations will be conducted

in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment; (2) the

U.S. military will play a critical role in stability operations; (3) the

U.S. military will bear some significant responsibility for plan ning

in the pre-execution phase of stability operations; and (4) the U.S.

military must be capable of conducting stability opera tions simultaneously with other military operations.7 These conclusions were
48 Chapter 3

validated by Secretary of Defense Gates: “We know that at least

in the early phases of any conflict, contingency, or natural disaster, the U.S. military—as has been the case throughout our history—will be responsible for security, reconstruction, and

providing basic sustenance and public services.”8 Based upon

these historical conclusions, it is clear that despite any desire or

design to the contrary, the military must remain a principal partner in conducting, and therefore planning, stability operations.

As the nation’s leaders have come to terms with this realization,

U.S. strategy for conducting stability operations has and must

continue to evolve. The U.S. National Security Strategy is based

on a distinct internationalist tone that reflects the interests and

values of the country. It clearly aims to make the world a safer

place where a community of nations lives in relative peace. To that

end, the National Security Strategy and subordinate supporting

strategies, focus on progress that promotes political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other nations, and universal respect for human dignity. 

The body of security strategy that shapes the conduct of

stability operations includes the National Security Strategy (NSS),

the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military

Strategy (NMS). Together with other supporting national policy,

strategy provides the broad direction necessary to conduct operations to support national interests. (See figure 1.) 

The National Security Strategy (NSS)9 outlines the President’s vision for enduring security for the American people in a

volatile, uncertain, and complex strategic environment. It sets a

course for statecraft, providing the broad national strategy for

applying the instruments of national power to further U.S. interests globally. History has shown that fragile states tend to attract

destabilizing forces, which poses a national security challenge unforeseen even a decade ago, yet central to today’s strategic environment. While the concept of fragile states is not new, the need

for a strategy to provide a stabilizing influence is more critical

than ever. At the heart of this strategy is the U.S. approach to stability operations: to help create a world of well-governed states

that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves

responsibly. This challenge is at the core of the current NSS. 

Signed by President Obama in May 2010, the most recent
U.S. Stability Operations 49

NSS outlines a strategy that includes an international order advanced by U.S. leadership, which promotes peace, security, and

opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges. Implementing this agenda will not be easy. To succeed,

the United States must balance and integrate all elements of national power and update its national security capacity for the 21st

century. Furthermore, the United States must maintain its military’s conventional superiority, while enhancing its capacity to

defeat asymmetric threats. Specifically, the United States must

continue to rebalance its military capabilities to excel at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and stability operations; meet increasingly sophisticated security threats; and ensure U.S. forces

are ready to address the full range of military operations—and

they must do all of this simultaneously. Although military participation in stability operations within a non-permissive environment may be obvious, what is not as clear is that continued

involvement across the full spectrum of conflict is necessary because the transitions between pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict are not always apparent or linear.

Reinforcing the direction of the NSS, the National Defense Strategy11 emphasizes national security threats posed by

fragile states’ inability to police themselves, or to work in coopfigure 1: stability operations strategy and policy references10
50 Chapter 3

eration with neighbor states to ensure long-term security. These

states often undermine regional stability, threatening broader

U.S. interests. The most recent NDS, published in June 2008, recognizes the need for building partner capacity in these states.

Built on the understanding that U.S. national security is closely

tied to security within the broader international system, the NDS

focuses on using programs to build partnerships that strengthen

the host nation’s ability to confront security challenges. 

The NDS also recognizes the need to foster interagency

coordination and integration in these efforts. Such efforts draw

a vital link between the DOD and DOS in the conduct of stability

operations. The NDS emphasizes the need to establish conditions

of enduring security to support stability operations that allows

the other instruments of national power to conduct their operations as well. Unless the security environment supports using

civilian agencies and organizations, military forces must be prepared to perform those nonmilitary tasks normally the responsibility of others. Thus, the NDS clearly establishes the intent of

the Secretary of Defense to focus efforts on tasks directly associated with establishing favorable long-term security conditions. 

Prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

the National Military Strategy12 is consistent with the NSS and

NDS. It specifies the ends, ways, and means necessary to ensure

national security and to pursue national interests at home and

abroad. It also describes and analyzes the strategic environment

as it affects military operations, and identifies the most significant threats in that environment. The most recent NMS, published in March 2005, stresses interagency integration,

emphasizing the role of interagency partners and NGOs in achieving lasting success in stability operations. It establishes the requirement for the joint force to retain the capability to conduct

full spectrum operations, combining offensive, defensive, and stability tasks simultaneously and to seamlessly transition between

them. Finally, it highlights the need to integrate conflict termination measures with other instruments of national power, ensuring unity of effort toward national objectives. 

In 2005, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44).13 NSPD-44 outlined the President’s vision for promoting security through improved
U.S. Stability Operations 51

coordination, planning, and implementation of reconstruction

and stabilization assistance. This policy was the Bush administration’s first attempt at defining national policy for interagency

integration. In addition, NSPD-44 formally acknowledged that

the stability of foreign states serves the broader national interests

and recognized stability operations as a necessary capability. 

NSPD-44 outlines the need for coordinated U.S. efforts

to achieve maximum effect within stability operations. Specifically, it asserts a focal point is required to coordinate and

strengthen efforts of the USG in preparation, planning, and conducting reconstruction and stabilization assistance activities in a

range of situations that require the response capabilities of multiple USG entities. Furthermore, NSPD-44 calls for harmonizing

other USG stabilization efforts with U.S. military plans and operations. To accomplish this goal, NSPD-44 assigns lead agency

responsibility to the DOS, directing the Secretary of State to coordinate and lead integrated USG efforts and activities. It also

mandates that DOS coordinate with the DOD to ensure the integration and synchronization of any planned or ongoing military

operations across the spectrum of conflict. Also in 2005, the Secretary of Defense signed DODD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations14

providing the military force with definitive guidance to conduct

stability operations, giving it the same level of importance as

combat operations. In September 2009, the Secretary of Defense

approved DODD 3000.05, Stability Operations that reissues

DODD 3000.05 as an instruction and assigns responsibility for

planning, preparing for, and executing stability operations. 

DODI 3000.05 reemphasized that stability operations are

a core U.S. military mission that the DOD shall be prepared to

conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations. Specifically, it stated DOD shall be prepared to: (1) conduct stability operations activities throughout all phases of conflict and across the

range of military operations, including in combat and non-combat environments; (2) support stability operations activities led

by other USG departments or agencies, foreign governments and

security forces, or international governmental organizations; and

(3) lead stability operations activities until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other USG agencies, for-
52 Chapter 3

eign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations. In such circumstances, DOD will operate

within USG and international structures for managing civil-military operations, and will seek to enable the utilization of the appropriate civilian capabilities. 

In addition to defining what actions various DOD components will accomplish, DODI 3000.05 recognizes that integrated civilian and military efforts are essential to the conduct of

successful stability operations. In support of that belief, it requires that DOD components will collaborate with and support

other USG agencies, NGOs, and private sector firms to plan, prepare for, and conduct stability operations. Furthermore, it

charged DOD to support the development, implementation, and

operations of civil-military teams and related efforts aimed at

unity of effort in executing reconstruction and stabilization efforts, as well as building indigenous capacity for such tasks. Finally, DODI 3000.05 charged DOD to integrate stability

operations-related concepts across doctrine, organization, training, and applicable exercises, strategies, and plans. 

NSPD-44 requires the Secretaries of State and Defense to

integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with

military contingency plans and develop a general framework for

fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and

military operations at all levels. This charge makes it clear that

the two primary USG departments involved in executing stability

operations are the DOS and the DOD. How these two departments interact in executing NSPD-44 is dependent upon their organizational structures as well as the roles and responsibilities

assigned within each. 

CURRENT CONSTRUCTS AND CAPABILITIES FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

To assist the Secretary of State, NSPD-44 called on an interagency office within the DOS specifically created to enhance

the nation’s institutional capacity to respond to crises involving

fragile states. Based on an April 2004 decision of the National Security Council principals committee, former Secretary of State

Colin Powell created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in July 2004. S/CRS was established to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize the USG civilian
U.S. Stability Operations 53

capacity for reconstruction and stabilization and conflict transformation. It is designed to create mechanisms, tools, and

processes to help reconstruct and stabilize societies in countries

at risk of, in, or in transition from violent conflict or civil strife

so that they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy.15 S/CRS is the first USG entity

specifically created to address stability operations. 

To establish a stable and lasting peace based on the fundamentals of conflict transformation, stability operations capitalize on coordination, cooperation, integration, and synchronization

among military and nonmilitary organizations. To that end, S/CRS

has developed three distinct capabilities that can be customized

in scale and scope. These capabilities include the Interagency Management System (IMS), the whole of government planning framework, and the Civilian Response Corps (CRC). 

The IMS is a management structure designed to assist

policymakers, chiefs of mission, and military commanders who

manage complex reconstruction and stabilization activities. This

structure assists them by ensuring coordination among all USG

stakeholders at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The

whole-of-government planning framework facilitates assessment

and planning for complex crises that require significant and complex security, reconstruction, governance, and economic efforts

utilizing all instruments of national power. The CRC stabilization

initiative provides a standing civilian response capability with the

training, equipment, and resources necessary for successful planning and the conduct of operations in the field. 

In addition to the reconstruction and stabilization structure within S/CRS, the Secretary of State also has the U.S. Agency

for International Development (USAID) as a leading organization

for stability operations. USAID is the first U.S. foreign assistance

organization whose primary emphasis is long-range economic

and social development assistance efforts. With respect to stability operations, USAID’s role is characterized as management and

oversight. It actually delivers virtually all of its development assistance through implementing partners—frequently NGOs

whom USAID either hires as contractors to accomplish specific

tasks or funds through cooperative agreements. NSPD-44 makes

it clear that DOD has a major role to play within the whole-of-
54 Chapter 3

government stability operations strategy. In response, DOD established policy and a framework that organizes its roles and responsibilities for stability operations. The defining policy is DODI

3000.05, and the three main organizational levels include the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),

and Combatant Commands (COCOMs). 

The primary function of OSD is the formulation of policy

for DOD, to include stability operations policy. Within OSD, the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and LowIntensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities

(ASD(SO/LIC&IC)) serves as the principal civilian advisor for stability operations, provides policy oversight to ensure that DOD

maintains the capability and capacity to conduct stability operations activities, and ensures those capabilities are compatible with

those of other USG agencies and partners. The Chairman of the

JCS serves as the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense for stability operations and, in coordination with the COCOMs, establishes priorities for the development of stability

operations capabilities for the U.S. military. The Joint Staff J5

Global Strategic Partnerships/Stability Operations Division works

closely with OSD to oversee DODI 3000.05 implementation. 

As specified in the December 2008 Unified Command

Plan (UCP), there are ten COCOMs; six have geographic responsibilities and four have functional responsibilities16with USSOCOM

being unique in that it performs certain Service-like functions.17

Each geographic COCOM is responsible to plan for and conduct

military support to stability operations, while each functional

COCOM is responsible for supporting the geographical COCOMs

in planning efforts.18 DOD provides strategic guidance on how to

accomplish this planning through the Guidance for Employment

of the Force (GEF). The GEF requires each geographic COCOM to

develop campaign plans in support of their theater strategies.

While COCOMs are given latitude in how these campaign plans

can be constructed, they are expected to include a comprehensive

integration of steady-state activities (security cooperation) with

shaping activities (military and interagency) performed to assure

or solidify relationships with friends or allies.

A critical element to this strategy-centric approach to

planning is the forcing mechanism to synchronize global cam-
U.S. Stability Operations 55

paign plans, accomplished by functional COCOMs, with theater

campaign plans. As the title implies, global campaign plans likely

impact multiple theaters; therefore, geographic COCOMs must

develop subordinate plans in support of the global campaign

plans. These subordinate plans are then embedded in the geographic COMCOMs’ theater campaign plan.19 The 2008 Unified

Command Plan calls for ten of these global campaign plans to include: Global Operations Against Terrorist Networks (USSOCOM); Homeland Defense; Defense Support to Civil Authorities;

Global Pandemic Influenza; (USNORTHCOM), Strategic Deterrence; Space Operations; Information Operations; Global Strike;

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; and Combating

Weapons of Mass Destruction (USSTRATCOM).20

To accomplish the integration of global and theater campaign plans, each COCOM is responsible for designating a Joint

Force Coordinating Authority for stability operations with the authority to identify stability operations requirements, and incorporating stability operations activities and concepts into training,

exercises, experimentation, and planning, including intelligence

campaign and support planning. COCOMs also are charged with

aligning their strategies and plans with complementary stability

operations-related capabilities, strategies, and plans of other USG

agencies, foreign government and security forces, and the private

sector. Furthermore, COCOMs identify stability operations-related capability, capacity, or compatibility shortfalls, as well as

gather lessons learned from stability operations and disseminate

them to the DOD Components and USG agencies.21

To provide for the COCOMs need for greater coordination and integrated operations with its mission partners, DOD

approved the concept of Joint and Interagency Coordination

Groups (JIACG) to improve interagency cooperation and improve

operational effectiveness. JIACGs are tailored to meet the requirements and challenges of each COCOM’s area of operation,

and may include representatives from a wide range of USG agencies, the intelligence community, as well as NGOs. The JIACG

concept seeks to establish operational connections between civilian and military departments, agencies, and services to improve

planning and coordination within the government. 

The JIACG is a multi-functional advisory element that
56 Chapter 3

represents civilian departments and agencies to facilitate information sharing across the interagency community. It provides

regular, timely, and collaborative day-to-day working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Members participate in deliberate, crisis, and transition planning, and

provide links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize operations with the efforts of civilian USG agencies and

departments. JIACGs are designed to strengthen USG interagency operational planning, increase effectiveness through more

integrated operational planning and tactical execution between

civilian and military agencies, and coordinate options involving

all elements of national power to key decision-makers.22

Despite all of these structures, interagency coordination

for stability operations remains ineffective at best and ineffectual

at worst. Both DOS and DOD have established organizational

frameworks to implement NSPD-44 requirements for stability

operations, yet both internal and independent reviews of the

USG’s ability to conduct stability operations continue to reveal

these frameworks are not effective in planning and executing stability operations. 

A plethora of studies on stability operations have come

out in the last decade.23 The conclusions drawn by these various

studies and reports have centered on its two main players’ inability to plan and prepare for stability operations. As the USG’s lead

for stability operations, the DOS has failed to implement an effective interagency planning system. Furthermore, DOS lacks adequate resources and influence to effectively lead the interagency

charge toward stability operations. Recognizing this fact, DOD has

been more than willing to step forward and tap into its extensive

expertise in crisis and deliberate planning to lead the USG charge.

However, a lack of civilian department and interagency capacity

leads to non-DOD organizations having a limited capacity to participate in DOD’s full range of planning activities at each COCOM.

Also, without a clear executive agent and advocate within DOD, it

has failed to incorporate lessons learned into the planning process

and has not adequately adjusted the balance between better training for stability operations and for traditional combat operations. 

The good news is DOD identified one of the nation’s key

strategic issues: “while [DOD] has the capability and capacity to
U.S. Stability Operations 57

fulfill most stability operations requirements in the short term,

long-term strategic success still requires a robust architecture

with appropriate capacity for integrated civil-military action and

substantially more resources devoted to increasing the operational and expeditionary capacity of civilian USG departments

and agencies.”24 What DOD has yet to realize is the limited effectiveness of its own current structure. No matter what level of

civilian capacity exists (or does not exist), DOD requires an organizational structure that has the power and responsibility on behalf of the U.S. military for stability operations. 

THE FUNCTIONAL COMBATANT COMMAND SOLUTION

According to most of the research, the USG’s ability to

plan and conduct stability operations still requires changes within

the interagency, specifically DOS and DOD. Fortunately, examination of history can provide a solution as this is not the first

time that a shift in the national security environment has resulted

in the need for transformation within DOD. In fact, the very legal

basis for our military, Title 10 USC, not only permits periodic reviews of the U.S. military organizational structure viewed against

current threats, it makes such reviews mandatory.25

In order to protect U.S. national security interests, the

military must be an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.

To this end, the President establishes unified commands to bring

about unity of effort among the services. The Unified Command

Plan (UCP) establishes COCOMs, identifies geographic areas of

responsibility, assigns primary tasks, defines authority of the

commanders, and gives guidance on the exercise of combatant

command. 

Unified Combatant Commands (or simply combatant

commands) were first described in the National Security Act of

1947 and the statutory definition has not changed since that

time. A COCOM is a command, with a broad continuing mission,

composed of significant components of two or more services

under a single commander. The two categories of COCOMs include geographic COCOMs and functional COCOMs. Geographic

COCOMs are established when a large geographic area requires a

single commander responsible for effective coordination of operations. Likewise, functional COCOMs are created for broad con-
58 Chapter 3

tinuing functional missions requiring single responsibility for effective coordination of related global operations.26

A COCOM is charged with giving authoritative direction

to subordinate commands and the forces necessary to carry out

assigned missions, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics; organizing and employing commands and forces within that command;

performing necessary campaign planning; and coordinating and

approving control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training.27 Simply stated, COCOMs are charged with

ensuring unified action of all subordinate commands and forces

in order to carry out assigned missions. Although a COCOM’s definition has not changed over time, the concept of unified action

has evolved. Unified action now extends beyond the Services and

includes the synchronization of activities with other governmental agencies and international governments, as well as with NGOs

and the private sector. 

The COCOM structure is designed to be flexible and

change as required, accommodating evolving U.S. national security requirements. To ensure this flexibility, Title 10 USC tasks

the CJCS to review the UCP not less often than every two years

and submit recommended changes to the President, through the

Secretary of Defense. Since President Truman’s approval of the

first UCP on 14 December 1946, this flexibility has been used on

no less than 36 occasions to adjust DOD’s structure to compensate for changes in the national security environment.28 Appendix

A, Dates Unified and Specified Commands Established Under the Unified Command Plan, provides a complete list of changes made to

the UCP since its inception.

Following the experience of World War II, DOD recognized the importance of unity of effort achieved through the unified command of U.S. forces and over the next 50 years, the UCP

adapted to the changing strategic environment.29 A review of the

history of three functional combatant commands (USTRANSCOM, USSOCOM, and USAFRICOM) provides valuable

insight into how the changing national security environment can

lead to successful changes in the overall organization of the

COCOM structure. World War II, the Berlin blockade, the Korean

War, and the war in Southeast Asia all demonstrated the need for
U.S. Stability Operations 59

the United States to maintain a capable and ready transportation

system for national security. In 1978, exercise Nifty Nugget exposed great gaps in understanding between military and civilian

participants and, as a result, mobilization and deployment plans

failed. Two major findings came out of Nifty Nugget. First, Transportation Operating Agencies (TOAs) need a direct reporting

chain to the JCS. Second, the JCS needs a single manager for deployment and execution. As a result, the JCS formed the Joint

Deployment Agency (JDA). 

Although the JDA had responsibility for integrating deployment procedures, it did not have authority to direct the TOAs

or Unified and Specified Commanders to take corrective actions.

According to several independent studies on transportation, the

DOD needed to consolidate transportation.30 Consequently, on

April 18, 1987, President Reagan ordered that DOD establish a

Unified Transportation Command (UTC), the forerunner to USTRANSCOM. This order, coming eight years after the JCS formed

the JDA, demonstrated how the UCP could be used to assist DOD

in compensating for a changing strategic environment. The idea

for a unified special operations command had its origins in the

aftermath of Operation Eagle Claw, the disastrous attempted rescue of hostages at the American embassy in Iran in 1980. The ensuing investigation, The Holloway Commission, cited lack of

command and control and interservice coordination as significant

factors in the failure of the mission. With concern mounting on

Capitol Hill, the DOD created the Joint Special Operations

Agency (JSOA) in 1984. This agency, however, had neither operational nor command authority over any special operations forces

(SOF). The JSOA was unable to improve SOF readiness, capabilities, or policies—not what Congress had in mind as a systemic

fix for SOF’s problems. 

At the same time, a few Capitol Hill visionaries were determined to overhaul SOF. They included Senators Sam Nunn (DGA) and William Cohen (R-ME), both members of the Senate

Armed Services Committee (SASC). Nunn and Cohen felt strongly

that DOD was not preparing adequately for future threats. Nunn

expressed a growing frustration with the services practice of reallocating monies appropriated for SOF modernization to nonSOF programs. Cohen agreed that the United States needed a
60 Chapter 3

clearer organizational focus and chain of command for special operations to deal with low-intensity conflicts. In October 1985, the

SASC published the results of its two-year review of the U.S. military structure.31

By spring 1986, SOF advocates had introduced reform

bills in both houses of Congress. On 15 May, Cohen introduced

the Senate bill, co-sponsored by Nunn and others, which called for

a joint military organization for SOF. The final bill, attached as a

rider to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act, amended the Goldwater-Nichols Act and was signed into law in October 1986. For

the first time, Congress mandated that the President create a unified combatant command. Congress clearly intended to force the

DOD and the administration to face up to the realities of past failures and emerging threats.32 Despite how it was stood up, since

its activation, USSOCOM has consistently proven its ability to successfully conduct a wide range of special operations, from foreign

internal defense missions during times of peace to counterterrorism direct action missions during times of conflict.33 A more recent example of reorganization comes from the U.S. approach to

Africa. On February 6, 2007, President Bush and Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced the creation of U.S. Africa Command

(USAFRICOM). The decision was the culmination of a 10-year

thought process within the DOD acknowledging the emerging

strategic importance of Africa and recognizing that peace and stability on the continent impacts not only Africans, but the interests

of the United States and international community as well. Yet, the

department’s regional command structure did not account for

Africa in a comprehensive way, with three different U.S. military

headquarters maintaining relationships with African countries.

The creation of USAFRICOM enables DOD to better focus its resources to support and enhance existing U.S. initiatives that help

African nations, the African Union, and the regional economic

communities succeed. It also provides African nations and regional organizations an integrated DOD coordination point to

help address security and related needs. 

USAFRICOM’s mission is to conduct sustained security

engagement through military-to-military programs, militarysponsored activities, and other military operations as directed and

in concert with other USG departments and agencies and inter-
U.S. Stability Operations 61

national partners to promote a stable and secure African environment. DOD engaged directly with other USG departments and

agencies to gain their support in assigning personnel to the

COCOM’s staff positions.34 The structure of the USAFRICOM

headquarters was designed to provide an appropriate mix of military and civilian personnel in order to facilitate a holistic USG interagency approach to stability in Africa. This interagency infused

structure ensures that the expertise, experience, and unique perspective of interagency personnel would permeate throughout all

directorates. Day-to-day interaction between DOD and interagency representatives was determined to be the best way to integrate the military and civilian elements. In this manner,

USAFRICOM plans, programs, and standard operating procedures

benefit from interagency peer review. At present, more than half

of the 1,304 approved billets at USAFRICOM are filled by civilians.

Although the vast majority of those civilian positions are DOD

personnel, the staff also includes 17 representatives from 12 USG

departments and agencies. The personnel and the skills they bring

add value to USAFRICOM’s programs as well as improve the synchronization and collaboration of other USG efforts in Africa.35

This examination of USTRANSCOM and USSOCOM makes it is

clear that changes in the national security environment can effectively be addressed with modifications to the COCOM structure.

While USAFRICOM is a good model for whole-of-government cooperation in support of stability operations, the interagency simply does not have the capacity to fully support this model across

the world in all geographic COCOMs. In fact, DOD officially requested that DOS fill 13 additional USAFRICOM positions; however, DOS officials will not likely be able to fill these positions due

to personnel shortfalls.36

Fast forward from the inception of USTRANSCOM and

USSOCOM to December 2005 and NSPD-44 where the President

formally acknowledges that the stability of foreign states serves

the broader national interests and recognizes stability operations

as a necessary capability. DOD responded by issuing new policy

and guidance in the form of DODD 3000.05, and later DODI

3000.05, but up until the publishing of the December 2008 UCP

did little to address its organizational structure for planning and

executing stability operations. As defined within the latest UCP,
62 Chapter 3

DOD’s solution for a structure was to assign all geographic combatant commanders the responsibility for planning and conducting military support to stability operations. While this change had

the potential to improve the DOD’s ability to plan and conduct

stability operations, it has proven ineffective in addressing the

fundamental challenge of interagency synchronization because

other U.S. government agencies do not have the capacity to provide expertise to each military COCOMs. An alternative that must

be given serious consideration is establishing a single functional

COCOM assigned the mission of stability operations. 

As already discussed, functional combatant commands

are created for broad continuing functional missions requiring single responsibility for effective coordination of global operations.

Stability operations are clearly broad in scope and global in nature,

not confining themselves to the boundaries of any specific geographic COCOM. Validating this point, the February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states that stability operations are

not niche challenges or the responsibility of a single military department, but rather require a collection of capabilities as well as

sufficient capacity from across the DOD and other agencies. The

QDR also recognizes that stability operations are not fleeting, and

as such the United States must expect that for the indefinite future, violent extremist groups will continue to incite instability

and challenge U.S. interests.37 The QDR makes it is clear that stability operations are broad, global, and an enduring mission, therefore justifying the establishment of a COCOM to oversee this vital

mission.

By creating a U.S. Stability Operations Command

(USSTABCOM) and assigning it traditional functional COCOM responsibilities, DOD would utilize the same model established for

planning and conducting other broad, global, and continuing missions such as operations against terrorist networks and strategic

deterrence. Furthermore, charged with developing an integrating

a global campaign plan for stability operations, USSTABCOM

could become the interagency focal point for a unity of effort for

planning stability operations. Faced with capacity challenges,

DOD’s interagency partners can focus their limited capabilities on

the staff of a single COCOM rather than attempting to staff all

COCOM’s Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG). 
U.S. Stability Operations 63

Modeled after USSOCOM, USSTABCOM would also accomplish certain Service-like functions to include organizing and

training general-purpose forces. The command would also develop strategy, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for

stability operations. Further following the USSOCOM model,

USSTABCOM would interact with geographic COCOMs through

a Regional Stability Operations Integration Cell (RSOIC). Utilizing the regional expertise and forward presence, the RSOIC would

be a force multiplier in conducting global stability operation campaigns. The RSOIC would also be the conduit between geographic

COCOMs and USSTABCOM enabling the flexibility needed for

command relationships. USSTABCOM would address the challenges identified within USG’s stability operations capability, providing interagency partners and NGOs with an organizational

structure, a global campaign planning process, and the logistical

infrastructure to synergize stability operations. 

One possible course of action in establishing a functional

combatant command to focus on stability operations would be to

transform an existing command. Through an updated UCP, USJFCOM can be re-missioned and reorganized to focus on stability

operations. USJFCOM’s current mission of “providing missionready joint-capable forces and supporting the development and

integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities

to meet the present and future operational needs of the joint

force” is well suited for this new mission. Furthermore, USJFCOM already has a primary goal to make irregular warfare a core

competency. To achieve this objective, JFCOM’s leadership professed, “We must move swiftly to make irregular warfare a core

competency of the U.S. military. We must develop a mastery of

irregular warfare comparable to that which we possess in conventional and nuclear warfare, leveraging our conventional dominance to asymmetrically improve in irregular war.” They further

state, “We must urgently adapt our expeditionary and general

purpose forces to fight the irregular and hybrid wars we will likely

face for the foreseeable future.”38 Based upon their mission and

goals, USJFCOM already has the basic organization (to include

interagency liaisons) to execute the stability operations mission. 

Re-missioned as U.S. Stability Operations Command,

USJFCOM could be modeled after USSOCOM and given the dual
64 Chapter 3

responsibility to organize, train, and equip assigned forces to include budgetary authority. U.S. Stability Operations Command

(USSTABCOM) will be DOD’s lead functional combatant command

providing interagency partners and NGOs with an organizational

structure, a deliberate and crisis action planning process, and the

logistical infrastructure to synergize stability operations. Further,

following the USSOCOM model, USSTABCOM would interact with

geographic combatant commands through a Theater Stability Operations Command (TSOC). Utilizing the regional expertise and

forward presence the TSOC will be a force multiplier in conducting

global stability operation campaigns. The TSOC will be the conduit

between USSTABCOM and the geographic combatant command

enabling the flexibility to achieve the proper command relationship. 

Retasking USJFCOM with such a huge mission would undoubtedly impact its current mission set, which includes: (1) force

provider, (2) joint trainer, (3) joint command and control/capability development, and (4) joint concept development and experimentation. These important missions would be reassigned to an

expanded Joint Staff. 

THE IMPERATIVE FOR CHANGE

It has been five years since S/CRS was established and four

years since President Bush signed NSPD-44 charging DOS with coordinating and leading integrated USG efforts to prepare, plan for,

and conduct stabilization activities. The reality is that numerous

studies have established that DOS does not have the capacity to

effectively execute its responsibilities, and DOD’s current structure

exacerbates the civilian capacity gap. Even if civilian capacity is increased, which would take Congressional and Executive branch

support, those resources would still take time to put in place. A less

optimistic outlook would indicate that building the necessary capacity within DOS is not just a matter of resources, but of many

other factors including organizational culture, and may therefore

not be possible at all. Unfortunately, these missions are so critical,

and the United States does not have the luxury of time. 

Independent of civilian capacity challenge, DOD will be

the lead for conducting stability operations in non-permissive environments. As such, DOD must maintain a capability to prepare,
U.S. Stability Operations 65

plan for, and conduct stability operations. In fact, the 2010 QDR

identifies increasing stability operations capacity in General Purpose Forces (GPFs) as a major initiative.39 The framework used by

DOD to improve its own capability should be used as the structure

for the rest of the interagency to better use the civilian capacity

that does exist. Using the flexibility provided by Title 10 USC, DOD

can take a page from its own history and modify the UCP to address changes to the national security environment. Establishing

USSTABCOM would provide a focal point for developing global

campaign plans; training of general purpose force; and collecting

and incorporating lessons learned into future stability operations

missions. More importantly USSTABCOM would provide the focal

point to leverage the limited interagency capacity, thus ensuring

the United States is prepared to effectively execute the critical national security missions of the 21st century. 

aPPenDiX i

Dates Unified and specified Commands established

Under the Unified Command Plan

SAC Strategic Air Command (SAC) Dec 1946

A specified command. President Truman’s approval of the first Unified Command Plan on 14 Dec 1946 recognized the already existing SAC and brought it

under JCS control. 

Disestablished 1 Jun 1992; most functions assumed by

USSTRATCOM.

_________________________________________________________________

PACOM Pacific Command (PACOM) Jan 1947

Re-designated:

USPACOM US Pacific Command (USPACOM) Oct 1983

_________________________________________________________________

FECOM Far East Command (FECOM) Jan 1947

Disestablished Jul 1957; functions assumed by USPACOM

ALCOM Alaskan Command (ALCOM) Jan 1947

Disestablished Jun 1975.

_________________________________________________________________
66 Chapter 3

EUCOM European Command (EUCOM) Mar 1947

Nominally a unified command, but almost wholly of Army composition. 

_________________________________________________________________

USEUCOM US European Command (EUCOM) Aug 1952

_________________________________________________________________

NELM US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic Nov 1947

Mediterranean (NELM)

A specified command. From Aug 1952 to Feb 1960, also the Navy component

of USEUCOM. Thereafter, CINCNELM had the concurrent title of CINCUSNAVEUR as the Navy component of USEUCOM. Disestablished Dec 1963.

_________________________________________________________________

CARIBCOM Caribbean Command (CARIBCOM) Nov 1947

Re-designated:

USSOUTHCOM US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Jun 1963

Assumed USACOM’s geographic responsibilities for the 

Jun 1996

waters adjoining Central and South America.

Assumed USACOM’s geographic responsibilities for the Jun 1997

Caribbean Basin.

_________________________________________________________________

LANTCOM Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) Dec 1947

Re-designated:

USLANTCOM US Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) Oct 1983

Re-designated:

USACOM US Atlantic Command (USACOM) Oct 1993

Expanded responsibilities, including all CONUS-based Army and Air Force combat units.

Re-designated:

USJFCOM US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Sep 1999

Focus became transforming US military forces. Oct 2002

Transferred geographic responsibilities to USEUCOM and USNORTHCOM.

Per the Secretary of Defense, USJFCOM will be disestablished by the end of August 2011.

_________________________________________________________________

USNEC US Northeast Command (USNEC) Oct 1950

Disestablished Sep 1956.

_________________________________________________________________
U.S. Stability Operations 67

USAFE US Air Forces, Europe (USAFE) Jan 1951

A specified command. From Aug 1952 onward, also the Air Force component of

USEUCOM.

Specified command status terminated Jul 1956.

_________________________________________________________________

CONAD Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) Sep 1954

Originally designated a joint command; made a unified command in Sep 1958.

With Canada, the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) was established Sep 1957. CINCONAD also designated CINCNORAD. Disestablished Jun

1975; functions assumed by ADCOM.

_________________________________________________________________

USSTRICOM US Strike Command (USSTRICOM) Jan 1962

Assumed additional responsibilities, Dec 1963, under

added designation USCINCMEAFSA (Middle East, 

Africa south of the Sahara, and South Asia).

Disestablished Dec 1971; original functions passed

to USREDCOM.

_________________________________________________________________

USREDCOM US Readiness Command (USREDCOM) Jan 1972

Disestablished on Sep 1987.

_________________________________________________________________

ADCOM Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM) Jul 1975

A specified command. NORAD continued, with CINCAD

also designated CINCNORAD.

Disestablished Dec 86; functions assumed by USSPACECOM.

_________________________________________________________________

MAC Military Airlift Command (MAC) Feb 1977

Designated a specified command for airlift.

Terminated as a specified command Sep 1988.

_________________________________________________________________

USCENTCOM US Central Command (USCENTCOM) Jan 1983

Replaced the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, established Mar 1980.

USSPACECOM US Space Command (USSPACECOM) Sep 1985

Disestablished Oct 2002; functions assumed by USSTRATCOM

_________________________________________________________________
68 Chapter 3

USSOCOM US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Apr 1987

_________________________________________________________________

USTRANSCOM US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) Jul 1987

_________________________________________________________________

FORSCOM Forces Command (FORSCOM) Jul 1987

Designated a specified command. Specified command status terminated Oct

1993; 

then became the Army component of USACOM

_________________________________________________________________

USSTRATCOM US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Jun 1992

Assumed missions of USSPACECOM Oct 2002

_________________________________________________________________

USNORTHCOM US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) Oct 2002

Assumed USJFCOM’s homeland defense functions. Also assumed Bahamas, Dec 2008

Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands from USSOUTHCOM

_________________________________________________________________

USAFRICOM US African Command (USAFRICOM) Oct 2008

Assumed responsibility for most of Africa from USEUCOM with the Horn of

Africa and Sudan transferred from USCENTCOM and the islands of Madagascar,

Comoros, Seychelles and Mauritius transferred from USPACOM. Egypt remains

under USCENTCOM.

_________________________________________________________________

Notes

1

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed

Forces of the United States, (Washington DC: GPO, March 20, 2009), I-6. 2

Ibid., I-7.

3

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-07: Stability Operations

(Washington DC: GPO, November 25, 2009), I-2.

4

Ibid., I-2.

5

Lawrence A. Yates, The US Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1798-

2005, OP 15 of the Global War on Terrorism Occasional Papers (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 1.

6

Ibid., 2.

7

Ibid., 40.
U.S. Stability Operations 69

8

Robert M. Gates (speech, U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, Washington DC,

July 15, 2008).

9

Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Operations 3-07: Stability Operations (Washington DC: Department of the Army, October 6, 2008), 1-11. 10Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, (Washington DC: The White House,

May 2010). Information presented is a summary and analysis of the 2010 National Security Strategy.

11Robert M. Gates, National Defense Strategy (Washington DC: GPO, June 2008).

Information presented is a summary and analysis of the 2008 National Defense

Strategy.

12Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the

United States of America: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow (Washington

DC: GPO, March 2005). Information presented is a summary and analysis of

the 2005 National Military Strategy.

13Barack Obama, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction

and Stabilization (Washington DC: The White House, December 7, 2005). Information presented is a summary and analysis of NSPD-44.

14Michele Flournoy, Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, September

16, 2009. Information presented is a summary and analysis of DODI 3000.05.

15“Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization,” U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/s/crs. 16George W. Bush, Unified Command Plan, (Washington DC: The White House,

December 17, 2008), Table of Contents. The geographic COCOMs include: U.S.

Africa Command (USAFRICOM), U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S.

European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM),

U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). The functional COCOMs include: U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), U.S. Strategic Command

(USSTRATCOM), and U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

17Joint Publication 1, III-10 to III-12. USSOCOM performs the service-like functions including the following: (1) Organize, train, equip, and provide combatready special operations forces (SOF) to the other combatant commands and,

when directed, conduct selected special operations, usually in coordination with

the geographic combatant commands in whose area of responsibility the special

operations will be conducted; (2) develop strategy, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures for SOF; and (3) prepare and submit recommendations

and budget proposals for SOF.

18Unified Command Plan, 7, 9, 11, 13, 17, 20, 21, 24, 27, 32. 19U.S. Naval War College, A Primer for: Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF),

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the Adaptive Planning and Execution

(APEX) System, and Global Force Management (GFM), (Newport, RI: Naval War

College Press, March 24, 2009), 6-7.

20Unified Command Plan, 14-15, 24-25, 27-30. 21Flournoy, DODI 3000.05, 14-15. 22“USJFCOM Fact Sheet,” Joint Interagency Coordination Group, http://www

.jfcom.mil/about/fact_jiacg.htm. JIACG actions include participating in crisis
70 Chapter 3

planning and assessments; advising on civilian agency campaign planning; providing civilian agency perspectives during military operational planning activities; presenting unique civilian agency approaches, capabilities and limitations

to military campaign planners; and arranging interfaces for a civilian agency crisis planning activities. 

23George W. Bush, Presidential Report to Congress on Improving Interagency Support

for United States 21st Century National Security Missions and Interagency Operations in Support of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations

(Washington DC: The White House, June 2007); U.S. Government Accountability Office, Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps

(Washington DC: GAO, November 2007); Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams.

“Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource

Allocation,” MIT Security Studies Program Occasional Paper, June 2008 (Cambridge: MIT Security Studies Program, June 2008); U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Stability

Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning (Washington DC: GAO,

May 2007); August 2006 Interim Progress Report on DODD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations; the April

2007 Report to Congress on the Implementation of DODD 3000.05, Military Support

for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations; and the May 2009

Report to Congress on the Integration of Interagency Capabilities into Department

of Defense Planning for Stability Operations. 24Integration of Interagency Capabilities, 15. 25Armed Forces, U.S. Code 10 (2007), § 161. 26Joint Publication 1, I-14. 27Ronald H. Cole et al., The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993

(Washington DC: Joint History Office, 1995), information presented is an updated version of Appendix I, 127-129.

28Ibid., xv.

29Ibid., 1.

30Ibid., 101-104.

31C. Lincoln Hoewing, “Defense Organization: The Need for Change,” Public Administration Review, 46, 1986, 185-188, http://www.jstor.org/stable/976172. 32United States Special Operations Command History and Research Office, History: United States Special Operations Command History, 6th Edition, (MacDill AFB,

FL: March 2008), 5-7. 33U.S. Government Printing Office, Assessing U.S. Special Operations Command’s

Missions and Roles, hearing, June 29, 2006, before the U.S. House, Terrorism,

Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, Committee on Armed

Services (Washington DC: GPO, June 29, 2006), 33.

34“About U.S. Africa Command,” U.S. Africa Command, http://www.africom

.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp.

35Integration of Interagency Capabilities, 10-11. 36U.S. Government Accountability Office. Defense Management: Actions Needed

to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine
U.S. Stability Operations 71

Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa Command, U.S. House, Subcommittee on

National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, (Washington DC: GAO, February 2009), 5.

37Robert Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington DC: Department of Defense, February 2010), 20.

38“Command Mission and Strategic Goals,” United States Joint Forces Command,

http://www.jfcom.mil/about/priorities.htm.

39Gates, Review Report, viii.

73

4

the strategic impact of the security assistance

Program in Contingency operations

by Harvey R. Robinson

ABSTRACT

The Security Assistance Program is vital to building partnership capacity and supporting the National Security Strategy.

Likewise, the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is a major pillar within the Security Assistance Program. FMS is used to provide

the necessary resources to help strengthen the defense capabilities

of United States’ allies. However, the current FMS system was designed to support a Cold War adversary, not contingency operations. Following 9/11, the national foreign policy of the United

States shifted to combating global terrorism. This policy shift resulted in the United States’ involvement in contingency operations in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. The involvement in

contingency operations also changed the focus to accelerating the

FMS program to support the combatant commander during

wartime. Therefore, the FMS system must be flexible and responsive to meet the increased demands from two simultaneous wars.

It is inevitable that the United States will continue to face counterinsurgency operations; therefore, there needs to be an institutionalized mechanism for expediting the FMS process to achieve

the United States national security objectives.

INTRODUCTION

We cannot do it alone in this world. We need friends and partners with

the right capabilities to take care of their own security, to contribute
74 Chapter 4

to regional security, and through that relationship have the ability

when it is appropriate... to join us in operations against common

threats and enemies.1

—Mr. Bruce Lemkin, Deputy Undersecretary of the U.S. Air

Force, International Affairs

The United States has been involved in counterinsurgency

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq for almost nine and seven

years respectively. As of June 2010, the war in Afghanistan superseded the Vietnam War as the longest war in the history of the

United States. Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups employ terrorism as a tactic with an overarching objective of undermining

democracy in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Preventing the rise of

global terrorism requires the United States to use all elements of

national power to build partnerships and promote stability. The

Security Cooperation Program is one program to help build partnership with foreign allies in order to strengthen alliances. Most

importantly, the Security Cooperation Program is instrumental in

supporting the objectives of the President’s National Security

Strategy. 

Beneath the umbrella of the Security Cooperation Program is the Security Assistance Program. This program provides

“the means through which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to eligible foreign governments or international organizations by grant,

loan, credit, or cash sales to further the United States’ national

policies and objectives.”2 According to a senior civil servant from

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy), “the Security Assistance Program is the foundation for the Security Cooperation

Program.”3 Furthermore, the Security Assistant Program has

strategic implications because according to the Security Assistance

Management Manual (SAMM), “it serves as a fundamental instrument for achieving United States foreign policy objectives, and

any assistance furnished under the program must strengthen

United States national security and promote world peace.”4 In

whatever capacity this vital program is used to strengthen alliances, the United States’ laws, as well as national and foreign policy objectives, will determine how and when the Security

Assistance Program is implemented. Every president since Harry
e Security Assistance Program 75

Truman has used Security Assistance Programs to further U.S. national interests.5

Yet, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have exposed some

capability gaps in the programs’ ability to effectively support contingency operations. The challenges of increasing the size of the

host nation security forces in these wars prompted a request from

the Central Command (CENTCOM) commander to accelerate the

security assistance program, in particular the Foreign Military

Sales (FMS) process. FMS is one of the six major components of

the Security Assistance Program and it “provides the necessary

equipment and training needed to sustain or influence a country.”6 The request to accelerate getting equipment and training to

Afghanistan and Iraq simultaneously, as well as supporting the

United States security objectives with its other allies, has put a

strain on the Security Assistance Program. The problem is the Security Assistance Program was designed to build long-term relationships to help protect against a Cold War adversary—not to

support contingency operations where units are engaging in combat operations. 

Above all, the United States is at war and the security cooperation community must ensure that the FMS process is responsive enough to meet the increased demands to support the

host nation in contingency operations. Legacy metrics must be

revised to create conditions to make the system more responsive

and less bureaucratic. Furthermore, the lack of interagency communication, insufficient training, and a Cold War mentality also

is a source of friction within the security cooperation community.

While all of these factors may influence how the FMS system operates, this chapter will specifically address the importance of the

Security Assistance Program, and propose streamlining the case

development and contracting segments of the Army FMS process

to effectively support contingency operations. 

THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Understanding the history of the Security Assistance Program is important to understanding the challenges the security

cooperation community faces today. The beginning of Security

Assistance can be traced to the Lend-Lease Program of World War

II, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt pushed for the creation
76 Chapter 4

of the Lend-Lease Act. When the Act became law in March of

1941, it allowed for “the lend-lease or disposal of supplies needed

by any country whose security was vital to the defense of the

United States.”7 This new law provided the official means by

which allies of the United States, such as Great Britain, the Soviet

Union, and other countries, were supplied during the duration of

the war. After World War II, the United States sought a new national strategy that did not involve actual military combat. A

change, however, in U.S./Soviet relations meant a tougher U.S.

line against Soviet expansionism.8

The focus on containment of communism led to the Truman Doctrine which was adopted in response to communist

threats to Greece and Turkey. In a 1947 address, President Truman recommended providing aid to Greece and Turkey. He stated,

“I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by

armed minorities or by outside pressures.”9 The Truman Doctrine

committed the United States to offer assistance to another country if it was in the best interest of the United States. Also, in an

effort to repel the advancement of communism, the Marshall

Plan was used to rebuild Europe, specifically Germany. The Marshall Plan’s economic aid ended in 1952, returning every participating country to pre-war economic status, if not improving their

economic status.10

Furthermore, with the focus still on the containment of

communism and foreign relations, President Truman used his

1949 inaugural primarily to address foreign policy, and to “initiate

the development of several programs, which we now collectively

call security assistance.”11 The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of

1949 (MDAA) also shaped what conditions aid could be dispersed

to allies in the quest to deter and resist Soviet expansion. 

President Truman’s administration used the MDAA to

create a Military Assistance Program (MAP), with a budget of

$1.3 billion directed primarily to NATO countries. This was the

first truly global postwar military aid that allowed the president

to sell military equipment, training and technical assistance, military construction projects, and military equipment transferred

on a reimbursable basis to formal allies of the United States. The

MAP provided the initial legal foundation for major security as-
e Security Assistance Program 77

sistance programs that continued, in some form, throughout the

Cold War and beyond.12

The outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950 led to

President Truman’s approval of the National Security Council 68

report (NSC-68) in September 1950. One of NSC-68’s major objectives was to assist U.S. allies to improve their militaries.

The Korean War, with its new “boots on the ground” philosophy, began a new era of how the United States would react to

communist aggression. Also during this time the use of security

assistance gradually shifted from Europe to Asia. The Security Assistance Program provided the aid needed to improve the defense

capabilities of the United States’ allies. As a result, less U.S. troops

needed to be committed to support allies.13 As Dr. James Lindsay,

a U.S. foreign policy expert at the Council on Foreign Relations

said, “it is cheaper to deploy a foreign soldier than an American

soldier.”14 Following the Korean War, the United States reassessed

the containment policy and eventually included non-allied but

friendly nations in the roles of those who received U.S. foreign

aid.15 Throughout the Cold War, the United States continued to

focus on containing communism, with security assistance remaining an integral part of its foreign policy. Since the support

to U.S. allies during the Cold War was a long-term commitment,

the process used to get the necessary equipment and training

could take months, or even years. This long-term Cold War mentality existed well into the post-Cold War era within the security

cooperation community. 

The collapse of the Soviet Union eroded the original core

rationale for the Security Assistance Program, but the Clinton administration and the following Bush administration continued to

justify security assistance with three central arguments. First, security assistance helps friendly countries defend themselves

against external and internal threats. Second, the programs

strengthen the economies of friendly nations and advance U.S.

economic interests. Third, security assistance promotes regional

stability and maintains the cohesion of U.S. alliances, as well as

being a tool for democracy promotion.16

After the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the

United States shifted its focus and resources to fighting a war

against terrorism. On December 11, 2001, President Bush said,
78 Chapter 4

“the need for military transformation was clear before the conflict

in Afghanistan, and before September the 11th. What is different

today is our sense of urgency—the need to build this future force

while fighting a present war. It’s like overhauling an engine while

you are going at 80 miles an hour. Yet we have no other choice.”17

This sense of urgency is still important for all agencies supporting

contingency operations. The agencies must remain flexible and

adapt to the increased requirements needed to prevail in the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Unlike the Cold War, time is

now a crucial factor in getting the necessary resources to support

the combatant commander in a wartime environment. Yet the security assistance programs at disposal of policymakers remain

those forged in the Cold War crucible where timeframes sometimes encompassed years. The United States strategy of increasing indigenous Afghan and Iraqi security forces requires an

acceleration of the Security Assistance Program, specifically FMS. 

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES IN TODAY’S OPERATIONS

It is important to ensure that the United States and Allied

forces have the right equipment and training needed to conduct

contingency operations. With the hard power assets of the United

States stretched between two wars, humanitarian relief efforts,

and supporting contingency operations, a multi-dimensional approach is needed to be successful. This approach includes partnering with legitimate host nation government forces because a

unified approach is needed to meet the strategic objectives for the

United States. 

The Security Assistance Program is a force enabler for the

combatant commander because it speeds the transition of friendly

and allied countries to greater national self-reliance. Building partnership with allies helps protect the U.S. national interest. The use

of the security assistance program to build partnership capacity

also supports two objectives of the 2008 National Defense Strategy, which are to “promote security and deter conflict.”18 FMS contractors help reduce military footprint for logistics and training,

and is a procurement strategy that allows a country to obtain defense articles using the U.S. Defense Acquisition System. The FMS

program provides equipment and services needed to train and sup-
e Security Assistance Program 79

ply the Afghan and Iraqi security forces to aid in protecting their

own population against both internal and external threats. Aside

from providing equipment and training, the United States is looking for Afghanistan and Iraq to assume the primary responsibility

of providing the manpower for its defense. For example, on December 1, 2009, President Obama unveiled his Afghanistan and

Pakistan strategy at his first address to the Nation at the West

Point Military Academy in New York. He made it clear that the

United States strategy is “to train competent Afghan Security

Forces, and to partner with them so more Afghans can get into the

fight. And they will help create the conditions for the United States

to transfer responsibility to the Afghans.”19 The same can be said

for the strategy in Iraq. 

The shift toward increasing security forces in Afghanistan

and Iraq and the simultaneous long-term sustainment of U.S.

forces and allies has placed tremendous emphasis on accelerating

the FMS process. Iraq became eligible to receive foreign military

sales and assistance in 2004, and Afghanistan in 2002. Vice Admiral Jeffrey Wieringa, head of the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), confirmed President Obama’s

commitment to building partnerships, saying, “We sell stuff to

build relationships, noting that United States partners needed the

right equipment and training to carry out their security missions.”20 The intent is to transition security to a legitimate host nation government so that international troops can redeploy faster

to insure that the host nation government’s legitimacy is not undermined. As the Afghan and Iraqi security forces get stronger, the

rate of American withdrawal can become greater. The efficacy of

security assistance programs, therefore, will prove the lynchpin in

U.S. success or failure in both these operations, and those to come.

FMS is also crucial to U.S. national security interests. FMS

sales started at very low levels in 1950 and gradually increased to

a multi-billion dollar program. Figure 1 shows the increase of resources in Afghanistan. The FMS sales in the table includes FMS

cases paid by the host country and money allocated by the U.S.

Government (USG) to purchase equipment for these countries, but

excludes military construction cases. Pakistan is included to show

the United States commitment to partner with them to help fight

the war against terror in the region.
80 Chapter 4

figure 1: army fMs for afghanistan, iraq, and Pakistan21

RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE

All branches of the United States Government (USG) have

a role in the Security Assistance Programs; however, the Department

of State (DOS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) are the two

principal agencies. DOS is responsible for the oversight of support

to foreign countries because “they are the lead agency in formulating

and implementing the United States’ foreign policy and diplomatic

relations.”22 The DOD “establishes military requirements and implements programs to transfer defense articles and services to eligible

foreign countries and international organizations.”23 The Security

Assistance Program is vital in “furnishing countries with the equipment, services, and training to defend them from aggression and

enable them to operate alongside United State forces in a multinational effort.”24 Since two different agencies are central to the

process, interagency communication is paramount in establishing

an efficient and responsive system.

The Security Assistance Program is governed by the Foreign

Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended and the Arms Export

Control Act of 1976 (AECA), as amended. In addition to legislation,

DSCA develops and implements policy guidelines and Congress provides oversight. The FAA is an “Act to promote the foreign policy,

security, and general welfare of the United States by assisting peoples of the world in their efforts toward economic development and

internal and external security, and for other purposes.”25 The FAA

gives the Secretary of State the authority to “determine whether

there shall be a security assistance program and the value of the program.”26 The transfer of defense articles, services, and training to alCountries sales (5M)

fY 06 fY 07 fY 08 fY 09

afghanistan $1,360.2 $2,065.0 $3,447.9 $3,480.9

iraq $343.8 $1,173.3 $1,337.6 $1,303.3

Pakistan $55.8 $98.5 $229.3 $190.2

total $1,759.8 $3,336.8 $5,014.8 $4,974.3
e Security Assistance Program 81

lies increases interoperability, but the USG limits access to the most

sensitive equipment, software, and technology. This limited access

is governed by the AECA which “authorizes the President to control

the import and export of defense articles and services, to designate

such items as constituting the U.S. munitions list, and promulgate

implementing regulations.”27 Security assistance can be a double

edged sword if not wielded carefully as a foreign policy tool.

FMS is a multi-billion dollar program and, according to a

senior DSCA civil servant representative, “there have been no major

changes to the FMS process during the post Cold War era.”28 Furthermore, the last major legislative change to security assistance

was in 1976. While the system essentially remains unchanged, DSCA

and other agencies has established and led several Lean Six Sigma

initiatives and integrated process teams (IPTs) to improve the efficiency of the FMS process from case development to delivery, five

of which are pertinent to this chapter. First, DSCA established a Case

Writing Division (CWD) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in

March 2007 based on a recommendation by the Business Efficiencies and Action Team (BEAT). The team estimated that it cost over

$3M annually to write 4,500 Letters of Offer and Acceptance

(LOAs), Amendments, and Modifications, but they could save $1.2M

per year if the case writing functions were consolidated from twenty

different locations into a single DOD group led by DSCA.29 The intent was to save resources without compromising service. In an effort to continue to improve the efficiency of the CWD, a DSCA policy

letter 09-03, dated October 8, 2009, highlighted the primary responsibilities of the CWD and the Implementing Agencies (IA) in the case

development process.

Second, the United States Security Assistance Command

(USASAC) established an Intensive Management Office (IMO) in

February 2007.30 USASAC is the “Army’s focal point for the development and execution of FMS for material and services. USASAC

supports 140 allied countries, friendly nations and multinational

organizations.”31 The IMO is designed to manage and push critical

FMS cases for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan through the existing

FMS process. An IMO was also established at each one of the Life

Cycle Management Commands (LCMC) within the Army Materiel

Command to ensure this benefit rippled throughout the Army’s

process. 
82 Chapter 4

Third, DSCA created the Security Cooperation Management

Suite (SCMS) to provide better visibility and more complete information to a wide variety of U.S. agencies and war fighters. The SCMS

provides the community a vertical-Theater, DSCA, service, Commodity Command, Geographic Combatant Command, Office of Secretary of Defense, and Joint Staff interactive, web-based

collaborative tool to ensure that the FMS process, service contracting and defense transportation systems are effectively bundled into

a flexible and responsive solution for requirements generated by

real-time Stability, Reconstruction, and Contingency Operations.32

Fourth, the Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon

(PAIL) Task Force was created and according to COL Dave Dornblaser, USASAC, IMO Director for Afghanistan and Pakistan, this is

an initiative chaired by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Policy

(OSD-Policy). The PAIL Task Force was organized to embrace all the

current issues in these countries. This initiative involves members

from various agencies and provides a forum to discuss any issues or

concerns which can help improve interagency communication and

improve the efficiency of FMS.

Fifth, Army Contracting Command (ACC), formally the

Army Contracting Agency (ACA), was reorganized in October 2008.

The once decentralized contracting centers within the Army Materiel Command (AMC) Life Cycle Management Commands

(LCMCs) are now under one command. The ACC Commander “has

directive authority over all Army contracting capabilities and provides a single focal point for status and readiness of the Army-wide

contracting workforce.”33 A common theme running through many

of these improvements, including the ACC, is consolidating individual nodes within the process. These improvements, while welcome,

do not go far enough in a process of enormous complexity. In order

to appreciate both the problem and what needs to be done, one must

have a basic understanding of the FMS process. 

KEY SEGMENTS OF THE FMS PROCESS

The security cooperation community is working on options to accelerate the FMS process and make it more efficient and

responsive to the Combatant Commander during wartime. However, due to the complexity of the system, the FMS process is still

not as efficient and responsive as it can be. Even though knowledge
e Security Assistance Program 83

and training is not a direct function of the FMS process, there is

evidence from surveys and interviews that indicate the lack of

knowledge and training could impede the case development

process. Each segment will be briefly discussed, but the focus is on

the case development and contracting segments because modifications in these two areas will help accelerate the FMS process. The

Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) case development is the first

step in the FMS process. This is a complex process because each

FMS case must pass through several agencies before the case can

be written and offered to the country. However, it begins when an

eligible foreign country makes a request usually in the form of a

Letter of Request (LOR) or for Afghanistan it is a Memorandum of

Request (MOR) to the USG on items or services being considered

for purchase. The LOR or MOR is used to develop the LOA. 

The LOA is a contractual sales agreement between the

United States Government and the foreign government or international organization, and it is the foundation of any United States

government-sponsored sale of defense articles or services. The

LOA is written by a U.S. Military Department (MILDEP) or other

United States government implementing agency (IA), based on applicable regulations and the specifications the purchaser has set

forth in its LOR.34

Before March 1, 2001, the case development process from

LOR to LOA was 60 days. In a step backwards, however, this metric

was changed from 60 days to 120 days.35 According to the DSCA

policy letter dated February 15, 2001, “this new measure analyzes

a much broader scope including implementing agency, customer,

DSCA and Security Assistance Officer (SAO) processing times.”36

The attempt to accelerate the FMS process to get equipment to the

Afghan and Iraqi security forces faster drew attention to the 120

day metric, since the LOA is the first step in getting the necessary

equipment and training needed to build these security forces. 

During the case development process, both the Afghan

and Iraqi Ministries should be involved because according to the

Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), the purchaser

should be involved early in the LOA development process to ensure

requirements are clear and understood prior to offering the case

for acceptance. The [implementing agency] should provide sufficient details in the LOA to allow U.S. contracting officers to nego-
84 Chapter 4

tiate and award contracts without requiring foreign country representation or direct involvement in the formal negotiation

process.37

Another related key to success is a well defined requirement. A poorly defined requirement results in the country not getting the right equipment, or a delay in getting the equipment,

because time is wasted going back-and-forth between the purchaser and the Life Cycle Management Commands identifying the

proper technical specifications for the requested item. At the end

of the day, FMS is about providing the right capabilities at the right

time to the host nation to improve its capacity. 

Constitutional separation of powers ultimately means that

Congress is responsible for legislative and oversight of the Security

Assistance Program. This oversight can come in the form of reports

or actual notification before a sale can occur if certain thresholds

are triggered. For example, “Congressional notification is required

for Major Defense Equipment (MDE) $14 Million or greater, nonMDE $50 Million or greater, and for construction $200 Million or

greater.”38 Congressional notification is governed by the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and any case requiring notification must

be reviewed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the

State Department before going to Congress. Subsequently, Congress

has fifty days to approve or disapprove the FMS case, and the LOA

cannot be offered to the country without Congressional approval.

Interagency checks and balances occur at all levels of the

FMS process starting with the implementing agency. Each FMS

case passes through several agencies during the LOA development

process. Consequently this requires interagency unity of effort and

prioritization due to the number of competing requirements. However, achieving unity of effort requires an institutionalized approach so everyone is working within the same strategic

framework. 

To accelerate the FMS process, the security cooperation

community reduced the amount of time each agency has to review

the FMS case and implemented temporary procedures that are resource and management intensive. For example, USASAC has two

days for Iraq and one day for Afghanistan instead of fifteen days

to complete the LOR technical review. However, whether a requesting country will need a waiver, additional documentation such as
e Security Assistance Program 85

a country team assessment or Congressional notification, depends

on the type of equipment being requested, the value of equipment,

and if United States taxpayers’ money is used to fund the requested

equipment or training. These checks and balances are designed to

protect U.S. national interests. However, when time is precious to

win over the host nation population and build partner capacity,

these checks and balances should occur at a pace that does not impede the case development process. 

The security cooperation community is focused on the

case development process, but contracting and production is another important part of the FMS process. Ultimately, the contracting process plays a huge role in expediting the FMS cases because

it is the longest part in the process. There is no separate procurement process for FMS and, according to a USASAC representative,

“the Army does not have a warehouse full of major end-items;

therefore, most of the defense articles purchased through FMS

must be procured.”39 During wartime, the focus needs to shift to

identifying urgent operational needs, finding ways to fill them, and

moving the process along as quickly as possible. However, the use

of FMS is significant because goods and services for foreign countries can be purchased through an already established acquisition

program using Foreign Military Funds or USG Funds. In contracting, everything cannot be urgent, but there needs to be a system

where senior leaders in DOD or the State Department can determine which requests are urgent, which could then fast track those

requests into a separate process. 

The security cooperation community needs to look at the

rapid acquisition process and see if there are measures or policies

that can be incorporated to accelerate the FMS process. For instance, procurement experts told the House Armed Services Committee Defense Acquisition Reform panel on October 8, 2009, that

the following three DOD strategies could apply to many situations

in which the department needs to buy systems quickly: 1. At the

start of a rapid acquisition, officials must assess the immediate

need, determine minimum requirements, and agree on a plan and

stick to it, and not interrupt the acquisition and production

processes to make changes, according to Thomas Dee, director of

the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell at the Office of the Undersecretary

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. 2. Stay with
86 Chapter 4

the familiar proven technologies instead of testing new ones and

according to Brigadier General Michael Brogan, commander of the

Marine Corps Systems Command, this kept them from having to

deal with requirements creep. 3. Relieve vendors of some of the

work, if possible such as government adding the final pieces of

equipment, such as radios. This will help get the equipment to the

battlefield more quickly, according to Michael Sullivan, director of

acquisition and sourcing management at the Government Accountability Office.40

In addition to these suggestions, establishing more indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts based on common types of equipment used in Afghanistan and Iraq will help

accelerate the contracting process. An IDIQ contract allows the

government to negotiate in advance for an indefinite quantity of

services during a fixed period of time. Another advantage of IDIQ

contracts is that the process of defining the requirement is eliminated, and the long bidding process has already been completed.

IDIQs do require planning to establish, a process that can take four

to six months, but once established, they can greatly speed up the

process. A similar tool, contracting can use is blanket purchase

agreements (BPA) that can fill requirements for recurring needs

for supplies and services.

At the strategic level, the defense industry is an integral

part of contracting because there is no warehouse full of major defense equipment waiting to be issued; therefore, everything must

go through the procurement process. According to COL Dornblaser, USASAC, IMO Director, production is another area that

slows down the FMS process because one has to “consider competition with United States forces versus competition with commercial customers.”41 In addition to FMS being good for the U.S.

defense industry, however, FMS can also bolster the U.S. economy

by keeping production lines open longer that will help ensure job

stability. 

Another piece of the FMS puzzle with strategic implications is transportation—moving the FMS equipment from the

point of origin to the final destination. FMS for Afghanistan and

Iraq travels through the Defense Transportation System, managed

by the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).42 During an average week, “USTRANSCOM con-
e Security Assistance Program 87

ducts more than 1,900 air missions, with 25 ships underway and

10,000 ground shipments operating in 75 percent of the world’s

countries.”43 However, FMS accounts for only around ten percent

of USTRANSCOM’s missions and shipments.44 With technological

advances, the combatant commander is capable of getting near

real-time in-transit visibility of equipment enroute to his area of

responsibility which can be factored into his operational plan.

However, according to a USTRANSCOM liaison officer, “it is imperative that the CENTCOM staff provide USTRANSCOM with a

training and fielding plan to ensure the equipment arrives in-time

to conduct security training missions.”45 Undoubtedly, this recommendation could apply to other combatant commands.

The need for training touches more than just the transportation portion of FMS. There is a small community that understands FMS and how it functions at all levels. Lack of training has

been identified throughout the security cooperation community

as an area that needs improvement. Cross training and communication among the various agencies needs to be encouraged

throughout the FMS program. U.S. civilian and military personnel

who rotate into Afghanistan and Iraq must be trained on the FMS

process. According to a senior civil servant at OSD Policy, “Security

assistance is not a career promoting field...maybe people need to

have a career path.”46 When operating in a foreign country, overcoming language barriers and proper training are vital to the success. The same holds true for Security Assistance that has its own

language and processes that require proper training and expertise.

The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

(DISAM) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, has been sending

mobile training teams to Afghanistan and Iraq to bridge the FMS

knowledge gap. Since it is imperative that the Security Assistance

advisors understand the FMS process, the DISAM model may be

worth expanding. 

IMPROVING THE FMS PROCESS

There are a number of agencies and organizations within

the State Department, Department of Defense, and Congress involved in the FMS process. There are checks and balances at all

levels of the FMS process to ensure a country is eligible to receive

aid and to control the export of sensitive technology. While these
88 Chapter 4

checks and balances are important, the FMS process must still be

responsive enough to support the combatant commander in

wartime. Therefore, a survey consisting of thirteen questions was

sent to the USASAC liaison officers in Afghanistan and Iraq, the

Contracting Command, and officials at various levels of the State

Department and DOD (see Appendix A for survey questions). Also

personal and telephone interviews were conducted. All participants are/were involved in processing FMS cases for Iraq,

Afghanistan, or both. 

Although they do not receive media attention commensurate with their importance, Foreign Military Sales are a critical

component to building host nation capacity in Operation Iraqi

Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. The United States is

approaching the transition phase in Afghanistan and Iraq. The intent is not to abandon Afghanistan or Iraq, but work to get these

two countries to a suitable level especially militarily. Even though

there have been drastic improvements in the Iraqi security forces,

there is still a demand to accelerate the FMS process. Throughout

the security cooperation community, however, FMS is still viewed

as a long-term process. A culture change of being more responsive

is needed when working FMS cases for 21st century operations.

According to the surveys, the accelerated FMS requests in

Iraq are causing frustration throughout the security cooperation

community because the expedited FMS LOAs are not being signed

and implemented in a timely manner. The LOA must be signed

and implemented before it can go to contracting because according

to a DSCA official, “FMS cases are legally required to be selffunded,” meaning that these sales cannot make or lose money.47

One concern consistently raised was that the 120 day

metric for the case development process was too long for these

counterinsurgency operations. Based on the surveys, 54 percent

agreed that 120 days is an acceptable metric. However, according

to the surveys, those who agreed with the 120 day metric also

made comments similar to COL Chris Oliver, former Army Team

Chief in Iraq, who claimed, “there should always be a method to

get the equipment faster, but as the situation stabilizes, then 120

days is good enough.”48 In an effort to support the combatant

commander, the security cooperation community has established

a revised goal of completing 80 percent of LOAs and Amendments
e Security Assistance Program 89

within 45 days for Afghanistan and 65 days for Iraq. This shows

that the security cooperation community is trying to be responsive. On the other hand, expedited LOAs should not remain in

country for months waiting on signature and implementation. According to a senior USASAC representative, “expedited LOA

should not take more than 7-14 days to obtain the necessary signature and implementation.”49 Also, shifting from a linear process

to a concurrent process is effective in expediting case development

in the existing FMS structure. For example, cases requiring Congressional notifications are being prepared early in the case development process to prevent any delays on preparing the LOA.

Feedback from the surveys and interviews revealed that

poorly defined requirements were a key factor in slowing the FMS

case development process. This finding points to the lack of training and not having the right people involved in defining the requirements. However, this issue can be resolved. According to a

senior civil servant at the United States Army TACOM Life Cycle

Management Command (LCMC), involving a contracting officer

early in the case development process, using in-country DOD Acquisition personnel, direct communication with the LCMC should

mitigate this problem.50 Just as much focus should be on contracting because streamlining the contracting segment will definitely

accelerate the FMS process. The Afghan and Iraqi Ministries must

also be involved early in the LOR process, even if doing so lengthens the time or negotiation involved in the front part of the

process—host nation involvement and capacity building more

than makes up for those tradeoffs. 

There were mixed reviews on the surveys and interviews

as to whether the Congressional notification process slows case

development. However, Congressional notification should not

slow case development if Congress is in session, and DSCA and

the State Department continue working together to get the FMS

case to Congress early in the case development process. Of particular note are IDIQ contracts, which in some cases are being allowed to expire. After they expire, it takes four to six months to

renegotiate the contract. By the interagency partners working together, these USG departments can make the most of Congressional time when the Congress is in session. 

The FMS process requires an institutionalized systemic
90 Chapter 4

change that is less bureaucratic or a separate FMS process for urgent operational requirements. The current Case Development

metric of 45 days for Afghanistan and 65 days for Iraq must not

be a temporary fix—other complex operations surely await the

United States in the days to come, and they will require a more

agile approach to FMS. Contracting must be involved early in the

case development process, especially when defining the requirement. The FMS process must be responsive to the Combatant

Commander, especially during wartime, and establishing more

IDIQ contracts and using more blanket purchase agreements are

ways to increase the responsiveness. However, combatant commanders must be informed that equipment or services that are

not already on contract or cannot be diverted from stock may take

a little longer to get. Both the FMS process, and those who use it,

must become more realistic.

During the initial planning phase of a contingency operation, the interagency organizations can establish a Contingency

Action Planning Team that includes representatives from DOS,

DOD, MILDEPs, contracting, legal, finance and input from the

combatant commander’s planning team to discuss the best ways

to accelerate the FMS process before a conflict starts. This group

could also discuss funding streams, existing contracts, estimate

the type of equipment and training needed based on historical

data from Afghanistan and Iraq, or other operations. The contingency list of equipment and training based on historical data can

be vetted through the various agencies as well as the combatant

commander’s planning team, and then contracts can be established in anticipation of conflict.

Fighting two wars without a nation at war is difficult. According to Mr. Bert Liptak, TACOM LCMC, “some vendors are not

willing to surge to meet FMS demands.”51 Without a full mobilization of the industrial base, the acquisition community must use

the industrial bases that are available. Given that the United States

is involved in two simultaneous conflicts, the IDIQ contracts could

be set-up using non-standard equipment (which keeps them from

competing against equipment requests from the U.S. military).

Then, there should be IDIQ contracts established for parts supply

for this non-standard equipment. The use of standard equipment

is good for standardization and interoperability with the U.S. al-
e Security Assistance Program 91

lies. This arrangement would be good for the U.S. and its partners: 

The use of nonstandard defense equipment or supplies of American firms, previously used by the Department of Defense but no

longer in inventory may be encouraged, when these equipment and

supplies are more suitable to the mutual security interests of the

United States and the foreign governments.52

All of these changes require a concentrated effort. Continued emphasis from the senior civilian and military leadership

on FMS is needed to institute change in the FMS process.

It is inevitable that the United States will continue to face

counterinsurgency operations in the 21st century; therefore, there

needs to be an institutionalized mechanism for expediting the

FMS process. The system must be flexible in order to remain relevant to meet the increased demands from combatant commanders, yet still allow for Congressional oversight. The system must

be less bureaucratic, and still have the necessary checks and balances to protect the United States national interests. Streamlining

the FMS process will benefit the customer, but most importantly

it will quickly enhance the capability of the combatant commander

in a wartime environment.

Security assistance has been the cornerstone of the U.S.

foreign policy since President Franklin D. Roosevelt pushed for

the Lend-Lease Act, and if history is an indicator, it will continue

to be an integral part of U.S. foreign and national security policy.

Securing the homeland is a matter of national security, and assisting in building stronger allied defense capabilities will reduce the

chance of conflicts which eventually could threaten U.S. interests.

Therefore, the focus on accelerating the FMS program is vital to

getting the right equipment and training to support complex operations in a timely manner. The Afghan and Iraqi security forces

must be strong enough to defend their country once the United

States withdraws, a goal that can only be achieved, at least in part,

through FMS. Institutional changes within FMS, as well as

changes within the case development and contracting process,

must occur so that the lessons from the first decade of the 21st

century are institutionalized. As the security assistance program

changes through presidential administrations, the overall objective remains the same–to strengthen alliances in support of U.S.

national security objectives. 
92 Chapter 4

aPPenDiX a (survey Questions)

1.a. Describe a successful/productive experience when you interacted with the FMS process? 

1.b. What made the interaction successful/productive in your

opinion?

1.c. Describe an unsuccessful/unproductive experience when you

interacted with the FMS process?

1.d. What made the interaction unsuccessful/unproductive in

your opinion?

2.a. In your opinion, is the 120 day processing time from Letter

of Memorandum to Letter of Offer and Acceptance still acceptable to meet the needs for Afghanistan? Explain. 

2.b. In your opinion, is the 120 day processing time from Letter

of Request to Letter of Offer and Acceptance still acceptable to

meet the needs for Iraq? Explain. 

3. Does Congressional Notification slow down the case development process? Explain.

4.a. Do you think the Afghan Ministries should be involved in

defining the requirements for the LOR? Explain your answer.

4.b. Do you think the Iraqi Ministries should be involved in defining the requirements for the LOR? Explain your answer.

5. In your opinion, what can be done to make defining requirements easier?

6. Other than a well define requirement, what can be done to improve the acquisition process to get the equipment to the customer faster?

7.a. In your opinion, does the Afghan Ministries approve of the

FMS process? If yes, explain why and provide an example; if no,

explain why not and provide an example?

7.b. In your opinion, does the Iraqi Ministries approve of the FMS

process? If yes, explain why and provide an example; if no, explain

why not and provide an example?

8.a. In your experience, on average, how long does it take to get a

Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) signed and implemented

in Afghanistan?
e Security Assistance Program 93

8.b. In your experience, on average, how long does it take to get

a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) signed and implemented

in Iraq?

9. Tell me about an instance when a long production lead time for

equipment affected operational objectives. 

10.a. In your opinion, will Direct Commercial Sales work better

than the FMS process in Afghanistan? Explain

10.b. In your opinion, will Direct Commercial Sales work better

than the FMS process in Iraq? Explain

11. Tell me about an instance where the lack of knowledgeable

FMS personnel caused a delay in the case development process?

12.a. Does FMS support to other countries impact the support to

Afghanistan? Explain.

12.b. Does FMS support to other countries impact the support

to Iraq? Explain.

13. Tell me three concerns or perceptions you have with the FMS

process?

Notes

1

Bruce Lemkin (Deputy Undersecretary of the United States Air Force, International Affairs), interview with Reuters, “U.S. Arms Sales Topping $40 Billion,”

June 17, 2009, ww.reuters.com/article/idUSN1744179620090617.

2

Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Operations 3-07: Stability Operations (Washington DC: Department of the Army, October 6, 2008), 5-1. 3

Jason Colosky (Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, Office of the

Secretary of Defense for Policy), interview with author, January 15, 2009, Pentagon, Arlington, VA.

4

Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) DOD 5105.38-M, 22nd Edition, 151.

5

Duncan L. Clarke et al., Send Guns and Money: Security Assistance and U.S. Foreign

Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 1. 6

David Dornblaser (Chief of Intensive Management Office, United States Army

Security Assistance Office), interview with author, January 12, 2010, Fort

Belvoir, VA.

7

“Lend-Lease Act (1941),” Our Documents, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc

.php?doc=71.

8

SAMM, 2.

9

Aimee Sexton, “Student Activity: Harry Truman and the Truman Doctrine,”
94 Chapter 4

Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/teacher/doctrine.htm.

10Barry Eichengreen, The European Economy Since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism

and Beyond (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 57. 11SAMM, 1.

12Send Guns and Money, 34. 13Ibid., 7.

14Dr. James M. Lindsay (Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice

R. Greenberg Chair), lecture, October 28, 2009, New York City, NY. Quotation

used with Dr. Lindsay’s permission.

15SAMM, 29.

16Send Guns and Money, 2. 17George W. Bush (speech, Citadel, Charleston, SC, December 1, 2001).

18Secretary of Defense, National Defense Strategy (Washington DC: Department

of Defense, June 2008).

19Barack Obama (speech, Washington DC, December 1, 2009).

20Andrea Shalal-Esa, “U.S. arms sales seen topping $40 billion,” Reuters, June

17, 2009, www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1744179620090617.

21Keith Schaffner (United States Security Assistance Command), telephone interview with author, February 21, 2010. Graph information received.

22Government Printing Office, “Department of State and International Assistance Program,” www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy03/pdf/bud20.pdf, 231.

23Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Chapter 2: Responsibilities and Relationships,” http://www.dsca.mil/samm/Chapter%2002%20-%20Responsibilities%20and%20Relationships.pdf, 45.

24Stability Operations, 5-1. 25U.S. Government Printing Office, Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2002

(Washington DC: GPO, July 2003), http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/faa.pdf,

18.

26DSCA, “Chapter 2,” 45.

27SAMM, 504.

28Joe Lontos (Iraq Country Program Director, DSCA), telephone interview with

author, January 12, 2010, Crystal City, VA. It should be noted that Mr. Jason

Colosky, Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, Office of the Secretary

of Defense (Policy), stated, “there have been some Title 10 changes” in a January

15, 2009, interview at the Pentagon, Arlington, VA.

29DSCA, “Policy Letter 06-16,” February 28, 2006.

30Jerome Barrett (former Deputy of the Intensive Management Office), interview with author, Fort Belvoir, VA.

31U.S. Army, “U.S. Army Assistance Command,” www.USASAC.army.mil.

32Journal of International Security Assistance Management(Wright-Paterson, AFB:

November 2009), Vol 31 Iss. 3, 14.

33“Army contracting command created,” Army Logistician, May-June 2008,

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PAI/is_3_40/ai_n27907764/.

34SAMM, 177.

35DSCA, “Policy Letter 01-06: New Metric to Measure LOA Processing Time Line
e Security Assistance Program 95

Performance,” February 15, 2001.

36Ibid.

37Journal of International Security Assistance Management, 207. 38“Foreign Military Sales Case Development,” SAMM, http://www.dsca.mil

/samm/Chapter%2005%20-%20FMS%20Case%20Development.pdf, 236-238.

39Representative (U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC)), interview with author, December 26, 2009.

40Matthew Weigelt, “4 lessons in Rapid Acquisition Learned from DOD’s New

ATVs,” October 15, 2009, http://fcw.com/articles/2009/10/19/acq-rapid-acquisition.aspx.

41Representative (USASAC), interviewed by author, December 13, 2009.

42USTRANSCOM provides strategic air and sea lift capabilities and it consists

of the following commands: The Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, The Air Mobility Command (AMC), and The Military Sealift Command

(MSC). 

43“Mission,” U.S. Transportation Command, www.ustranscom.mil. 44Barry Johnson (USTRANSCOM TCJ3 LNO), interview with author, March 18,

2010.

45Ibid.

46Colosky, interview, January 15, 2009.

47Lontos, telephone interview, January 12, 2010.

48Chris Oliver (Former U.S. Army Team Chief in Iraq), survey, January 18, 2010.

49Dornblaser, interview, January 12, 2010.

50Bert Liptak (Director of Security Assistance Management, U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command Life Cycle Management Command), telephone interview with author, January 12, 2009.

51Ibid.

52SAMM, 144.

97

5

Piracy:

a local threat with global impact

by Matthew G. St. Clair

ABSTRACT

This study analyzes the global impact of Somali pirates

and how non-state actors can flourish under the conditions of a

failed state. The global economy depends on maritime trade and

transport. Approximately 80 percent of world trade is conducted

over sea lanes and 75 percent of oil tankers pass through strategic

chokepoints. 

Somalia is strategically located to the main Sea Lanes of

Communication connecting Europe and Asia. Approximately

22,000 vessels sail through the Suez Canal, Red Sea, Strait of Bab

el-Mandab, Gulf of Aden, and Arabian Sea annually. In 2008 Somali pirates collected over $30 million in ransom for vessels hijacked in territorial and international waters, caused nation-states

to commit valuable naval and surveillance capabilities to patrol the

Gulf of Aden, and provided over $1.5 million received as ransom

to Al-Shabab, an Islamic fundamentalist group in Somalia with ties

to al-Qaeda.

The goal of this study is to address some of the more important issues associated with piracy originating from Somalia and

the threat of their potential cooperation with terrorist groups. Unless the international community acts in concert to address piracy,

these non-state actors will continue to undermine the security of

the global commons at will.
98 Chapter 5

INTRODUCTION

Piracy and incidents of maritime crime tend to be concentrated

in areas of heavy commercial maritime activity, especially where there

is significant political and economic instability, or in regions with little

or no maritime law enforcement capacity. Today’s pirates and criminals

are usually well organized and well equipped with advanced communications, weapons, and high speed craft. The capabilities to board and

commandeer large underway vessels—demonstrated in numerous

piracy incidents—could also be employed to facilitate terrorist acts.

—The National Strategy for Maritime Security, September

2005

In 2008, Somali pirates collected over $30 million in ransom for vessels hijacked in territorial and international waters,

caused nation states to commit valuable naval and surveillance capabilities to patrol the Gulf of Aden, and provided over $1.5 million received as ransom to Al-Shabab, an Islamic fundamentalist

group in Somalia. Somalia’s continued status as a failed state, the

inability of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to deter

or prevent piracy operations, and the presence of terrorist groups

already in Somalia, create ideal conditions supporting a possible

nexus between Somali pirates and other non-state actors, specifically terrorists.1

Studying piracy is important as it is a transnational threat

conducted by non-state actors that adversely affects the world

economy and challenges political and security stability of nation

states throughout the world.2 The global economy depends on

maritime trade and transport. Approximately 80 percent of the

world trade is conducted over sea lanes and 75 percent of oil

tankers pass through strategic chokepoints. “The sea is still the

most practical and economic (sometimes the only) means of transporting large volumes of cargo, particularly those in bulk such as

oil and other raw materials,” notes one expert.3

The modern pirate is little different than the pirates who

sailed the high seas in the 18th century during the golden age of

piracy. Pirates are criminals preying on commercial and civilian

mariners with the intent of hijacking vessels and stealing cargo.

They challenge the authority of nation states and established international laws protecting the freedom of navigation on the mar-
Piracy: A Local reat 99

itime domain. Unlike the pirates of the past, modern pirates demand significant ransoms for returning hijacked vessels and crews. 

Defining piracy today is not an easy task, however, in part

because there are two internationally recognized definitions for

piracy. The first definition is provided by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the sanctioned agent of the United Nations (UN) to address law of the sea issues: 

(a) Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of

depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(i) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or

against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

(ii) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place

outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a

ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate

ship or aircraft;

(c) Any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).4

The major problem with this definition is that it does not

address acts of piracy committed within a nation’s territorial waters where most acts of piracy occur. The IMO definition leaves jurisdiction for acts of piracy within territorial waters to be

adjudicated by the nation state, which has enormous consequences

when applied to a failed state such as Somalia. The weak and corrupt Transitional Federal Government of Somalia does not have

the capability, and arguably the will, to capture Somali pirates, let

alone hold them accountable in a court of law. Accordingly, Somali

pirates operate freely within the territorial waters of Somalia.

The second commonly referred to definition of piracy is

from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which defines piracy as “an

act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent

intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent

intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of the act.”5 This

definition is broader in scope, and does not delineate between acts

of piracy conducted in territorial waters and those acts of piracy

conducted in international waters. Although the United States and
100 Chapter 5

the majority of the international community observe the inadequate IMO definition for piracy, the IMB definition provides more

flexibility to the international community to address all acts of

piracy.6

The threat posed by Somali pirates extends beyond Somalia’s territorial waters and the Horn of Africa. The criminal activities of Somali pirates have direct impact on the global market.

Somali pirates threaten the very security of a major economic artery connecting Eastern and Western markets, all while operating

in waters patrolled by warships of many of the world’s major powers, to include the United States. These well organized, highly sophisticated gangs are fueling an already global financial crisis. If

the shipping industry avoids transiting the Suez Canal to by-pass

pirate infested waters, how will the world market respond to a significant delay in the supply and demand life cycle? What would

the impact be on Egypt without the $5 billion in annual income

from fees collected from maritime traffic transiting the Suez

Canal?7 These questions are not theoretical as Somali pirates ignore the rule of law of nation states, and are an example of the

consequences for the world’s acceptance of a failed state. 

Somalia has remained a failed state since 1991, providing

a sanctuary for criminals and terrorists while serving as an enabler

for piracy. The potential for monetary reward is the root cause of

piracy. The TFG is ineffective and does not have the leadership and

resources to affectively address piracy. Therefore, Somali pirates

operate at will, threatening the security and freedom of movement

through international waters. 

Somali pirates challenge international law without fear of

reprisal from the TFG. On 8 April 2009, Somali pirates attempted

to hijack the Maersk Alabama, a U.S. flagged vessel with a crew of

twenty U.S. citizens. This was the first act of piracy directed toward

the United States in over 200 years. This incident set the stage for

a dramatic in extremis hostage rescue by U.S. Special Forces of the

ship’s captain who gave himself up as a hostage to the pirates in

order to free his crew. Although the United States captured one pirate involved in the Maersk Alabama incident, few Somali pirates

have been captured or brought to trial in accordance with the 1988

United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts

Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention).8
Piracy: A Local reat 101

These conditions have “emboldened them to strike further from

the shore and move northwards into the Gulf of Aden, which links

the Red Sea and Suez Canal to the Arabian Sea.”9 The capability to

operate beyond Somalia’s territorial waters is significant as it provides the pirates opportunities to hijack maritime vessels (MV) of

strategic importance, such as oil tankers, and demand substantially higher ransoms. 

Attacking the shipping industry is a lucrative business for

Somali pirates and is also an ideal, yet unexploited, soft target for

terrorist organizations. Global security has tightened due to Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) led by the United States, and

it is exceedingly more difficult for terrorists to attack traditional

targets, forcing them instead to look for easier prey.10 The threat

to the shipping industry’s security from Somali pirates and terrorists is significant as “nonstate actors—especially those whose actions defy the norms and values of the international

community—will play an increasingly significant role. Nonstate

actors undermine law and order, and...create conditions conducive

to instability and conflict. For commercial traffic through chokepoints and SLOCs [Sea Lanes of Communication], pirates and maritime terrorists are the primary concerns.”11 A rapidly innovative

enemy will exploit the operating environment to his advantage,

which is exactly what is happening in the sea.

Although pirates and terrorists have different goals, the

potential benefits from forming a nexus also increase the potential

security risk of piracy. On 25 September 2008, Somali pirates hijacked the MV Faina, a Ukrainian owned vessel, transporting 33

Russian made T-72 tanks, small arms, and an assortment of ammunition. Although unlikely that the pirates would be able to

move the tanks off the ship, they could remove the other weapon

systems and ammunition selling them to the highest biding terrorist organization. The pirates desire financial gain while terrorist

require weapons, ammunition, and safe havens from which to operate. That said, this cooperation would be a risky undertaking for

the Somali pirates, adding a layer of complexity to their operations,

inserting the influence of outside leadership, and gaining considerably more attention from the international community—arguably something that is not good for the pirates’ business model.

The next section examines Somalia as a failed state and
102 Chapter 5

assesses the scope and influence of Somali pirates. Then, the chapter addresses how a nexus between Somali pirates and terrorist

groups might occur and the global impact of such a merger. This

study concludes with an analysis of the challenges piracy poses to

U.S. foreign policy, and provides recommendations for consideration in the on-going fight to combat piracy in Somalia.

SOMALIA AS A FAILED STATE

The seeds for Somali pirates were sown in 1991 when Somalia’s government collapsed. War lords and clan leaders fought

fierce battles to assert their dominance, but no single group

emerged the victor. Fisherman from Europe and other African nations took advantage of Somalia’s inability to patrol the coastline

and began fishing in Somalia’s abundant territorial waters. Groups

of Somali fisherman armed themselves to protect their way of life

and began attacking the foreign fishermen.12 The Somalis eventually began to expand their operations to attack merchant vessels

sailing through Somalia’s territorial waters. The golden age of Somali pirates had begun while Somalia plunged further into chaos. 

In 2004, the Somali Transitional Federal Government

(TFG) formed in Kenya and was recognized as Somalia’s legitimate

government by many nation states, including the United States.

However by 2006, a group of Somali Islamic fundamentalists,

known as the Somali Council of Islamic Courts (CIC), began to

wield considerable influence and controlled a significant portion

of Somalia. The CIC established a judicial system based on Sharia

law and provided police forces, receiving support from numerous

clan leaders. The CIC actually reduced piracy operations by declaring it un-Islamic and shut down pirate base camps, something that

no other group has accomplished since.13 Somalis accused of engaging in piracy were tried in courts established by the CIC. 

With the assistance of U.S. airpower, the TFG was able to

eliminate the threat posed to their fragile government by the CIC.

This was short lived, however, and the authority of the TFG was

challenged by yet another Islamic fundamentalist group. Since

early 2007, the leadership of Al Shabab has succeeded in establishing their authority throughout Somalia, but unlike the CIC, Al

Shabab supports piracy. By all counts of good governance, the TFG

has failed miserably, and on 20 December 2008, the TFG president,
Piracy: A Local reat 103

Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, officially resigned. This creates favorable

conditions for the Islamic jihadists of Al Shabab to assert its growing dominance in Somalia while continuing its support of Somali

pirates.

Corruption runs deep within the TFG. Many officials, to

include the president, received payments and kickbacks from pirates and traffickers to “look the other way” supporting Somali instability.14 The hands of Somalia’s ineffective law enforcement

forces reach deep into the pockets of Somali pirates. Real power

within Somalia continues to be exercised by clan leadership, Islamic militants, pirates, and other criminal organizations. Within

their territory, or “turf,” these groups control the rule of law and

illicit trade, determining how monies are distributed and how they

should be used.15 Without a government with the will and capacity

to stop piracy, piracy will continue to flourish, further threatening

the security of the global market and freedom of navigation.

SCOPE AND INFLUENCE OF SOMALI PIRATES

Somalia is strategically located to the main SLOC connecting Europe and Asia. Approximately 22,000 vessels sail through the

Suez Canal, Red Sea, Strait of Bab el-Mandab, Gulf of Aden, and

Arabian Sea annually (See Figure 1). One-fifth of the world’s oil

tankers, one-third of containerized cargo, and one-half of the

world’s bulk cargo use the Gulf of Aden Sea lane supporting global

commerce.16 Somalia’s 1,800 mile coastline provides Somali pirates

with an ideal safe haven from which to plan and conduct operations.

Somalia is also within proximity to Yemen which is a known juncture for al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.17 The uninhibited access Somali pirates have to this strategic commercial sea lane

leaves the shipping industry with few options. Maritime vessels

must either continue to use the Gulf of Aden sea lane or make a significant deviation and sail around the southern tip of Africa and

the Cape of Good Hope into the South Atlantic Ocean (See Figure

2). Such a deviation would come with a tremendous financial impact

on the global market, shipping industry, and world consumers.18

Utilizing a sea lane around the Cape of Good Hope would increase

the time required to move seaborne commerce from Asia to Europe

and the United States by five days, and an additional ten days from

the Middle East. The shipping industry would experience an aver-
104 Chapter 5

age increase of $30,000 in the daily operating cost of each commercial vessel.19 Lloyd’s of London, a major underwriter of marine insurance policies, “declared the Gulf of Aden a war-risk zone subject

to a premium of tens of thousands of dollars per day.”20 Acts of

piracy originating from Somalia’s shores threaten more than the

mariners operating the ships—these acts challenge the very security of the global market. 

In general, there are three levels of piracy. Lower-level atfigure 1: Map of somalia

Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook /maps

/maptemplate_so.html

Base 802850AI (C00298) 1-02
Piracy: A Local reat 105

tacks are directed at vessels anchored in a harbor where port security in many countries is relaxed. The objective of lower level attacks

is to steal cash and high value items. Mid-level attacks occur on vessels sailing in territorial waters or on the high seas where pirates

seize the cargo of the ship. The highest level of attacks involves the

hijacking of a vessel and its crew for the purpose of obtaining ransom money or selling the hijacked ship.21 Somali pirates execute the

figure 2: Map of africa

Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/reference_maps/africa.html

Base 803459AI (G00392) 6-10
106 Chapter 5

latter two types of attacks, and more often than not are successful.

During the first nine months of 2008, the IMB reported

199 worldwide acts of piracy, with one-third of those attacks executed by Somali pirates. Currently Somalia is the leading piracy danger zone. Somali pirates conducted 63 attacks, 51 within the Gulf

of Aden and 12 within Somali territorial waters.22 During the period

of November 10–16, 2008, Somali pirates conducted 11 attacks

with three successful hijackings. As of June 17, 2010, Somali pirates

were holding 17 vessels for ransom along with approximately 350

crew members as hostages.23

Somali pirates are highly organized and well equipped with

Global Positioning System (GPS), speedboats, rocket propelled

grenades, AK-47s, and machineguns. Attacks are either launched

from the shore or from a “mother ship.” The mother ship serves as

a staging platform at sea from which to launch attacks by swarming

the target vessel in small skiffs or speedboats. The mother ship allows pirates to attack vessels well beyond Somalia’s territorial waters and into the strategic shipping lanes of the Gulf of Aden that

feed the global market. Attacks are completed within 15 minutes,

making it virtually impossible for international Navies patrolling

the Gulf of Aden to respond in a timely manner. 

Somali pirates do not coordinate their efforts nor is there a

centralized leader or chain of command. They act independently and

are legitimized by clan and tribal leaders supporting Al Shabab.

These leaders, not the TFG, have the ability to influence the behavior of Somali pirates as most pirates acknowledge clan and tribal authority. Pirates provide income to build schools, mosques, and play

grounds in their villages as well as inject life back into the local economy, something the TFG has failed to accomplish. The contributions

of Somali pirates to the local economy replicate those of the Islamic

Palestinian fundamentalist group Hamas in the Gaza Strip of Israel,

and both groups enjoy widespread popular support within their respected communities. As long as pirates infuse money into their

communities, those with authority to stop them will likely encourage more aggressive operations. However, it is unclear whether the

clan and tribal leaders would approve of pirates cooperating with

terrorist groups as this would bring increased international attention on the fishing communities for aiding terrorists.

Somali pirates are far from amateurs—they are extremely
Piracy: A Local reat 107

skilled and knowledgeable mariners. Their maritime expertise and

unhindered access to one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes

offer terrorists an option that may warrant further evaluation on

how to exploit. Today there is significant evidence showing considerable links between terrorist groups and criminal organizations making their ideals and motivations increasingly difficult to

differentiate.24 In the case of Somali pirates being courted by terrorists, the possibility exists since there are potential benefits for

each group. 

The November 18, 2008, hijacking of the MV Sirius Star,

a Saudi Arabian oil tanker carrying over two million barrels of oil

worth in excess of $100 million, was hijacked over 400 miles from

the Somali coast. This hijacking caused the Organization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to immediately raise the

price of a barrel of crude oil over one dollar to $58, demonstrating

the global influence of Somali pirates.25 The second and third order

affects of piracy to the shipping industry are increases in insurance

premiums and shipping rates, costing the industry anywhere from

$500 million to in excess of one billion dollars annually.26

How would OPEC react if the MV Sirius Star was destroyed by explosives emplaced by a non-state actor such as alQaeda or other terrorist organization? Would Somali pirates, after

receiving ransom payment from the company owning the vessel,

allow members of a terrorist organization to board the MV Sirius

Star and prepare it to be a seaborne improvised explosive device?

Although unlikely, it is certainly within the realm of possibility

that Somali pirates, for a price, would cooperate with non-state actors. This very real threat has “informed the perceptions of governments, international organizations, and major shipping

interests around the world.”27 Given that al-Qaeda will target anything that would weaken its enemies, the global economy, in its

eyes, is fair game.

No sanctions or international economic tariffs can stop

this business. Globalization has placed greater demand on the

shipping industry to ensure the strategic flow of resources supporting the global economy. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), over the past three

decades, world seaborne trade experienced an average growth rate

of approximately 3.1 percent.28 In 2007 alone, world seaborne
108 Chapter 5

trade increased by 4.8 percent from 2006 with an estimated 8.02

billion tons of goods shipped.29 An increased volume of maritime

trade provides Somali pirates with more lucrative targets and,

thus, more potential income and incentive to expand their operations. Although attacks from Somali pirates have increased, their

overall impact on annual maritime commerce that exceeds $7 trillion is rather insignificant.30 A more significant economic impact

may occur if the shipping industry determines it necessary to avoid

the Somali pirate threat and instead navigates around the Cape of

Good Hope. Several companies such as the Norwegian shipping

company Odfjell SE and the American shipping company Maersk,

one of the world’s largest shipping companies, have already begun

using this alternate route.31

The long arm of Somali pirates touches the world, and the

pirates can largely act with impunity. Somali pirates are the symptom of continuous anarchy within a failed state and the lure of a

lucrative illicit economy. They serve as a constant reminder of the

power and influence yielded by a non-state actor on the international stage. 

Piracy fuels the illicit economy of Somalia. It provides employment to the young, restless, military aged males who have no

other opportunities that provide similar economic rewards as

piracy. There are literally hundreds of pirates from the various

coastal fishing villages, and this number will likely continue to increase as long as the opportunity of financial gain exists. Pirates

are seen as heroes in most villages and are supported by clan leadership. The success enjoyed by Somali pirates over the past several

years has caused villages and towns once living in poverty to now

thrive with shops, restaurants, and even luxury cars, all through

the monies obtained from piracy.32 As long as the pirates are able

to flourish under these conditions, there is no incentive for them

to cease operations or cooperate with the TFG. 

INFLUENCE OF TERRORIST GROUPS IN SOMALIA

Somalia offers the ideal sanctuary for non-state actors,

specifically terrorist groups. It provides terrorists requiring “areas

that combine rugged terrain, weak governance, room to hide or

receive supplies, and low population density with a town or city

near enough to allow necessary interaction with the outside
Piracy: A Local reat 109

world.”33 Osama Bin Laden created the Islamic Army Shura to enable him to coordinate with various terrorist groups with whom

he was seeking alliances, and Somalia was one of twelve countries

belonging to this organization.34

Al-Qaeda established a strong presence in Somalia and, in

1992, Bin Laden issued a fatwa demanding removal of all U.S.

forces in Somalia supporting humanitarian relief efforts. As conditions in Somalia deteriorated, al-Qaeda provided training and

resources to the warlords and Islamic militants that led to the

deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers and the downing of two Blackhawk helicopters.35 President Clinton began the withdrawal of U.S forces

out of Somalia and reduced diplomatic engagement in Somalia,

contributing to the U.S. foreign policy void that exists today. 

In 1998, Bin Laden stated “that he and his followers had

been preparing in Somalia for another long struggle.”36 According

to the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, senior

leadership within Al Shabab has close ties with al-Qaeda and encourages terrorists to come to Somalia.37 Al Shabab controls most

of Southern Somalia and sections of Mogadishu. Should Al Shabab

assume control of Somalia given the inability of the TFG to establish rule of law and effective governance, al-Qaeda and its affiliates

may try to broaden the existing relationship with Al Shabab in

order to use Somalia as a safe haven from which to launch future

terrorist attacks. 

The threat to the security of the Gulf of Aden shipping

lanes becomes magnified if Somali pirates extend their services to

these terrorist groups in order to increase pirate cash flow. Cooperation between Somali pirates and the Al Shabab/al-Qaeda partnership may be in the best interest of the pirates in order to

continue operations under the rule of Islamic fundamentalists. A

potential drawback for pirates cooperating with Al Shabab and alQaeda is that the pirates would receive considerably more attention from the United States and its allies in the prosecution of

OCO which would significantly disrupt pirate operations. The

short term monetary gains to be achieved by Somali pirates from

cooperating with terrorists may, or may not, be worth the risk of

being categorized as terrorists by the international community. 

The U.S. led OCO have caused terrorist groups to significantly change their operational practices. Heightened security
110 Chapter 5

measures in most countries caused terrorist groups to establish

relationships with other non-state actors, opening new doors of

opportunity and “changes to the financing of many terrorist

groups over the past couple of decades have brought about some

convergence between insurgents and terrorist groups and organized crime networks, creating a potential indirect link between terrorism and organized piracy.”38 Al-Qaeda, for example, has long

been interested in exploiting the soft targets of the maritime domain in order to disrupt the global market and use maritime trade

routes for attacks.39 Abdul Rahim Mohammed, al-Qaeda Chief of

Naval Operations, captured by the United States in Yemen in 2002,

stated that al-Qaeda intended to increase terrorist attacks against

shipping.40 Given the successful al-Qaeda attack on the USS Cole

in Yemen Harbor in 2002, this threat should be taken seriously. 

As Al Shabab and Islamic militants continue to gain

strength in Somalia, increased cooperation with al-Qaeda appears

plausible as it could extend the global reach of jihadists. Somali pirates already cooperate with Al Shabab, providing cuts from ransom money so Al Shabab can purchase weapons and finance

operations as it pursues its goal of controlling Somalia. A significant difference between the ideology of Al Shabab and that of the

CIC is Al Shabab supports terrorism and piracy and the CIC did

not. In fact, the CIC sent two letters to the U.S. Government (USG)

promising to be a responsible actor in the international community and would ensure Somalia did not become a safe haven or

transit point for terrorists.41 Therefore, it may be in the best interest of Somali pirates to continue cooperation with Al Shabab

and exploit financial opportunities with other non-state actors,

such as al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups.

Somali pirates can provide training to terrorist groups on

the use of small boats, navigation at sea, and the tactics, techniques, and procedures used to hijack a large vessel. Somali pirates

can also help terrorists in transporting weapons and munitions

using a tactic demonstrated by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 2001. The PLO placed weapons, rockets, and munitions in water tight bags and packed them in barrels. The barrels

were tied together and loaded onto a fishing vessel. Once at sea,

the barrels were unloaded into the sea and then were picked up by

smaller boats and transported into Gaza in Israel.42 Somali pirates
Piracy: A Local reat 111

are well equipped to execute this technique to facilitate al-Qaeda

or other terrorist groups in getting weapons into Somalia and

other African nations for use in global terror operations. 

Direct cooperation with terrorist groups is risky for Somali

pirates as it will bring even greater international attention to their

operations and they could then be identified as terrorists. Since

the United States currently treats terrorism as a military vice law

enforcement problem, the United States could then conceivably

target Somali pirates like any other combatant.43 Cooperation between Somali pirates and terrorists would allow the United States

to address Somali pirates under OCO, committing significant resources to deter this threat. This may be a risk Somali pirates are

willing to take if the financial gains outweigh the potential losses.

However, formal cooperation is not required between pirates and

terrorist groups for a relationship to be maintained. 

Piracy and terrorist operations conducted simultaneously

from Somalia can be used as a diversion and attempt to confuse

international legal and military efforts to combat both activities.

When the “multiple layers of criminal activity are in operation simultaneously in an underworld environment that is difficult for

an outsider to penetrate, they can confuse the intelligence picture

and make terror activities even harder to discern.”44 Al-Qaeda

would benefit a great deal from this increased Clausewitzian fog

as it is an organization without state sponsorship and requires

conditions to reduce the signature of its operations. This mutually

supporting indirect relationship would have less of an adverse affect on Somali pirates and allow them to practice business as usual.

Under this scenario, it would be difficult to prove a linkage between the pirates and a terrorist organization, and the Somali pirates would keep their international status as criminals vice

terrorists.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The solution to defeating Somali pirates starts ashore. The

first step in preventing or deterring Somali pirates is to transform

the Somali society and political architecture, and eliminate the conditions fueling piracy. Such transformation must come from Somali

people themselves; however, it is clear that the TFG is incapable of

providing the strategic leadership to transform this failed state.
112 Chapter 5

This transformation will likely occur through the application of international elements of national power. The USG will need to define

its strategic leadership role in this effort of securing a vital artery

in the global economy. 

The time has come for the USG to step out from behind the

ghosts of the 18 U.S. soldiers killed in Task Force Ranger and the

failed U.S. foreign policy in Somalia. A USG policy should address

the conditions contributing to Somalia as a failed state and compliment efforts of the international community to stabilize the country. Piracy will continue to flourish as long as the Somali

government cannot enforce rule of law, provide essential services,

and increase economic opportunities to the population. 

The security of world commerce passing through the Gulf

of Aden is of national interest to the USG since the continued attacks on maritime commerce in this region have real potential to

disrupt the global economy. Somali piracy is one part of a larger

global piracy problem requiring a coordinated international effort

to address the complex political, economic, and social issues enabling piracy.45 Rather than adopt a policy specific to Somali pirates,

the USG should pursue an integrated, international policy toward

global piracy, taking into consideration local conditions that enable

piracy such as geography, culture, governance, and economic development, to ensure consistency within the international community.

The USG and international community must be able to effectively

deal with failed states for if they are ignored “then their problems,

whether they involve piracy, smuggling or terrorism, will affect

their neighbors and the ships that pass their coasts.”46

The USG, through an interagency approach, will have to

continue to work with the leadership of the TFG, the African Union

(AU), and the UN to help establish the conditions for Somalia’s reform. The international goal should be to achieve an effective and

legitimate government with appropriate law enforcement and security apparatus, and an infusion of targeted economic resources

providing opportunities that will eventually persuade pirates to put

down their weapons.47 Implementation of the Djibouti Agreement

should be used as a starting point. In absence of achieving this

agreement, the USG should continue to support UN efforts to stabilize conditions in Somalia and maintain formal relations with the

TFG.
Piracy: A Local reat 113

Another complex issue facing the USG is the likelihood

that the TFG will collapse, allowing the Islamic jihadists of Al

Shabab to control Somalia and exercise a conservative form of

Sharia Law mirroring that of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. This same

form of Sharia Law was exercised by the CIC in 2006, and although

denounced by human rights groups throughout the world, the CIC

authority significantly reduced piracy operations with a zero tolerance policy. If Al Shabab controls Somalia and has the means to

prevent piracy, would the USG be willing to acknowledge Al

Shabab’s legitimacy, provided Al Shabab denounced terrorism? As

long as a Somali government comprised of Islamic fundamentalists did not support regional or transnational terrorism, then acknowledging the legitimacy of that government may be a plausible

and acceptable solution to ending Somalia’s status as a failed state. 

The collective actions of nation states in combating Somali

pirates are more likely to succeed than individual actions. The actions of the USG, AU, European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO), and UN must be coordinated to ensure the

collective efforts are mutually supporting and establish conditions

for long-term success. One of the first issues the international

community needs to address is the regulation of fishing in the territorial waters of Somalia and outlying international waters. Fishing vessels from Europe and Asia continue to fish within Somalia’s

territorial waters, making it difficult for Somali fisherman to prosper. This continues to influence many Somali fisherman to resort

to piracy as an alternate, and arguably more lucrative, income.

The U.S Department of State (DOS) and U.S. Agency for

International Development (USAID) will need to work closely with

U.S. African Command (USAFRICOM) and lead USG efforts. The

USG cannot view Somalia only through a military lens because

doing so would ignore the social, political, and economic issues enabling piracy to flourish. Recent dialogue of the USG with the UN,

requesting that the UN Security Council pass a resolution allowing

nation states to pursue Somali pirates ashore, will only yield shortterm success. Somalia’s transformation will take a holistic USG approach in order to assist in rebuilding the political, economic, and

security infrastructure needed in a nation state. This will become

increasingly difficult due to resource limitations and continued requirements to support OCO, including USG efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, as well as the current global economic crisis. Taking

action now, however, could save the United States resources and

lives in the future.

As long as the TFG is recognized as the legitimate government of Somalia, AFRICOM will need to pursue an aggressive security engagement program with the TFG to bolster the

effectiveness of Somali law enforcement and security forces. Mobile training teams in law enforcement and maritime security are

needed to properly train Somali law enforcement in combating

piracy operations. AFRICOM’s efforts must be linked to and support overall USG objectives in Somalia as defined by the DOS. 

Combined Task Force-150 (CTF-150), a coalition naval

Task Force led by U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) 5th Fleet,

provides limited security to commercial maritime traffic sailing

the shipping lanes through the Gulf of Aden. The focus of CTF150 is supporting the GWOT. However, CTF-150 does not have

enough resources to address piracy operations full-time. CENTCOM recently established an additional coalition naval Task Force,

CTF-151, to specifically conduct counter-piracy operations in the

Gulf of Aden, allowing CTF-150 to focus on OCO operations. The

standup of CTF-151 received broad support from NATO and the

EU. An EU Task Force is also conducting counter-piracy operations

under Operation Atlanta. In order for CTF-151 and the EU Task

Force to be a viable deterrent against Somali pirates, governments

providing resources to the Task Force need to be prepared to support until the conditions ashore enabling piracy are eliminated. 

Commercial maritime traffic should be restricted to the

Maritime Security Area established by CENTCOM and patrolled

by CTF-151. Due to the vast expanse of the Gulf of Aden, it is impossible to completely eliminate piracy. Restricting the routes used

by maritime traffic, however, will significantly reduce the chances

for successful pirate attacks. The shipping industry must take

stronger measures in training mariners to make crews less vulnerable to pirate attacks. Somali pirates avoid confrontation and have

been repelled by crews using high pressure water hoses, small arms

fire, and increasing ship speed.48

The international shipping industry should strongly consider contracting private security firms to provide armed security

for vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden. Security personnel should

114 Chapter 5
Piracy: A Local reat 115

be equipped with both lethal and non-lethal capabilities to defend

against pirate attacks. This should be supported by the UN Security Council with universal Rules of Engagement approved. The

UN would also need to address and establish guidelines governing

jurisdictional issues of pirates apprehended by private security

firms during attacks. The SUA Convention is a good starting point. 

Finally, considering the strategic location of Somalia to

one of the world’s major shipping routes and the inability of the

Somali government to secure its territorial waters from pirates,

the UN should consider modifying the language defining piracy

contained in the UNCLOS and adopt language similar to the IMB

definition of piracy. This provides greater flexibility to the international community to respond to acts of piracy, especially within

the territorial waters of a failed state as in the case of Somalia. UN

Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1846 of December 3, 2008,

allowed governments cooperating with the TFG to enter Somalia’s

territorial waters, for a period of 12 months, and use all means

necessary in order to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery.49

The temporary authorities authorized by UNSCR 1846 became

permanent with the approval of UNSCR 1851 on December 16,

2008.50 However, these resolutions are only applicable to Somalia

and do not address the global nature of piracy.

All nations relying on maritime commerce through the

Gulf of Aden should be concerned about the impunity with which

Somali pirates operate. The pirates threaten the daily security of

the world economy and the global reliance on maritime commerce

to supply it. Furthermore, cooperation between terrorist organizations and Somali pirates is a potential threat not to be overlooked. Somali pirates will continue operations as long as the

international community fails to establish measures for the “pirates to be apprehended, tried, and convicted, and punished for

their crimes.”51 Somali pirates ushered in a new golden age of

piracy. Unless the international community acts in concert to address piracy, these non-state actors will continue to undermine the

security of the global commons at will. Edward “Black Beard” Teach

would surely smile in approval. 
Notes

1

Although piracy is prevalent throughout the world, this study is limited to Somali pirates due to Somalia’s strategic location to one of the world’s busiest commercial shipping lanes and the conditions existing in Somalia as a failed state

that enable piracy. 

2

Kimberly L. Thachuk and Sam J. Tangredi, “Transnational Threats and Maritime Responses,” in Globalization and Maritime Power, ed. Sam J. Tangredi,

(Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2002), 57.

3

Joshua Sinai, “Future Trends in Worldwide Maritime Terrorism,” The Quarterly

Journal Vol. III, No. 1 (March 2004): 49 and 63. 4

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, Article 101, 61,

http://www.un.org//depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.

pdf. Although the United States has not ratified this convention due to disagreement over Article 11 and provisions for deep sea mining, the United States does

accept all other articles of the convention as binding customary international

law. Secretary of State Clinton has indicated she will make ratifying the convention a priority.

5

ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships:

Report for the Period 1 January–30 June 2008, London, July 2008, 4. 6

Reconciling the numerous international definitions used to define piracy and

terrorism is outside the scope of this study. 

7

Jeffrey Fleishman, “Egypt and Other Red Sea Nations Target Pirates,” Los Angeles Times, November 21, 2008. 8

1988 UN Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety

of Maritime Navigation, http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp

?topic_id=259&doc_id=686. Allows UN member state parties to the convention,

in cooperation with the UN Secretary-General and IMO, to build judicial capacity

for the successful prosecution of persons suspected of piracy or armed robbery

at sea off. UN parties to this convention have authority to create criminal offenses, establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery of persons responsible for or

suspected of piracy. The United States ratified the convention in 1994. The convention is applicable to persons suspected of maritime terrorism. 

9

Michael Richardson, “Somali Pirates Running Rampant: Vigilance at Sea,” Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, October 4, 2008, http://www.iseas.edu.sg/viewpoint/mr4OCT08.pdf. 

10Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, (New York, NY:

Random House, 2002), 323.

11Donna J. Nincic, “Sea Lane Security and U.S. Maritime Trade: Chokepoints as

Scarce Resources” in Globalization and Maritime Power, ed. Sam J. Tangredi, 143-

170 (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2002), 158. This concern is also echoed by Captain Pottengal Mukundan, Director International

Maritime Bureau, stating that the heightened level of violence and frequency

of pirate attacks are the primary concerns of the shipping industry. 

12Martin N. Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to

116 Chapter 5
Piracy: A Local reat 117

International Security, (London: Routledge, 2007), 31. 13Stephanie Hanson and Eben Kaplan, “Somalia’s Transitional Government,”

Council on Foreign Relations, May 12, 2008, 2, http://www.cfr.org/publication

/12475/.

14Moises Naim, “It’s the Illicit Economy, Stupid,” Foreign Policy, Nov/Dec 2005,

95.

15Moises Naim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are Hijacking the

Global Economy (New York: Doubleday, 2005), 264. 16Ellen Knichmeyer, “On A Vital Route, A Boom in Piracy,” Washington Post, September 27, 2008.

17Joshua Sinai, “Future Trends in Worldwide Maritime Terrorism,” The Quarterly

Journal Vol. III, No. 1 (March 2004), 61. 18Roger Middleton, Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local

Wars, October 2008, 2, http://www.chatthamhouse.org.uk/files/12203_1008

piracysomalia.pdf.

19International Maritime Organization, http://www.imo.org. 20John W. Miller, “Piracy Spurs Threats to Shipping Costs,” The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2008. 21Peter Chalk, The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy,

and Challenges for the United States, (Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation, 2008),

5-6.

22“Unprecedented Rise in Piratical Attacks,” International Maritime Bureau, October 24, 2008, http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view

=article&id=306:unprecedented-rise-in-piratical-attacks&catid=60:news

&Itemid=51.

23US Central Command Daily Operations Brief on June 17, 2010.

24Kimberly L. Thachuk and Sam J. Tangredi, “Transnational Threats and Maritime Responses,” in Globalization and Maritime Power, ed. Sam J. Tangredi, 57-

78 (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2002), 59.

25Raissa Kasolowsky and Simon Webb, “Somali Pirates Seize Saudi Tanker Carrying $100 Million in Oil,” The Washington Post, November 18, 2008. 26Martin N. Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to

International Security (London: Routledge, August 17, 2007), 19-20. 27Peter Chalk, The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy,

and Challenges for the United States, (Washington DC: Rand Project Air Force,

2008), xiv.

28United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime

Transport 2008, Geneva, 2008, 9, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2008ch1

_en.pdf. 

29Ibid., 6.

30Murphy, Contemporary Piracy, 20. 31John W. Miller, “Piracy Spurs Threats to Shipping Costs,” The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2008 and Sayyid Azim, “Pirate Attacks Drive Up The Cost Of

Shipping,” April 12, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30180080.

32Mohamed Olad Hassan and Elizabeth Kennedy, “Somali Pirates Riches Turn

Villages Into Boomtowns,” The Huffington Post, November 20, 2008, 3,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/11/19/somali-pirates-richestur_n_144942.html.

33National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11

Commission Report, (Baton Rouge, LA: Claitor’s Publishing Division, 2004), 366. 34Ibid., 58.

35Ibid., 97.

36Ibid., 48.

37Peter Clottey, “United States Designates Somalia’s Al Shabab As A Terrorist

Group,” Voice of America News, March 19, 2008. 38Murphy, Contemporary Piracy, 40. 39Michael Richardson, “A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime Related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” ISEAS, February 2004, 2,

http://www.iseas.edu.sg/viewpoint/mricsumfeb04.pdf.

40Ibid., 8.

41Michael A. Weinstein, “The Islamic Courts Union Opens a New Chapter In Somalia’s Political History, Power and Interest News Report” June 19 2006,

http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=512.

42Joshua Sinai, “Future Trends in Worldwide Maritime Terrorism,” The Quarterly

Journal, Vol. III, No. I (March 2004): 54. 43During the administration of President Clinton, the United States viewed terrorism under the lens of law enforcement. It remains to be seen whether President Obama will revert to the law enforcement model or not. However, the law

enforcement model is more consistent with the European perspective and may

receive more international support.

44Murphy, Contemporary Piracy, 85. 45Ian O. Lesser et al., Countering the New Terrorism, (Washington DC: Rand,

1999), 142.

46Murphy, Contemporary Piracy, 87. 47Ibid., 128.

48Jack A. Gottschalk and Brian P. Flanagan, Jolly Roger With An Uzi, (Annapolis,

MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 132.

49UN Security Council Resolution 1846. The UN Security Council first authorized this extraordinary measure in June 2008 as UN Security Council Resolution

1814 for a period of six months. http://www.un.org/news/pres/docs/2008/

sc9514.doc.htm.

50UN Security Council Resolution 1851. http:www.un.org/news/press/docs

/2008/sc9541.doc.htm.

51Donna J. Nincic, “Sea Lane Security and U.S. Maritime Trade: Chokepoints as

Scarce Resources,” in Globalization and Maritime Power, ed. Sam J. Tangredi, 143-

170 (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2002), 166.

118 Chapter 5
119

6

Clausewitz’s trinity and strategic Decision-Making

by Fritz W. Pfeiffer

ABSTRACT

Clausewitz’s “trinity” has provided a coherent means to

understand war since 1832. This chapter argues that Clausewitz’s

trinity is also an applicable and useful means to understand

strategic decision-making because it illustrates the influential role

of emotion and chance on the process. Such an understanding

promises to help leaders frame strategic choices in the future

more completely. 

This chapter first presents the theoretical background of

Clausewitz’s trinity along with an analysis of the concept. The

chapter then uses the concept as a means to analyze and better

understand the U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003. 

This analysis does not offer a simple explanation for the

2003 invasion decision, but it does sharpen an understanding of

the range of influences which framed and influenced it. It indicates that the most influential factors on this decision process

may have been those which decision-makers had the least control

over. Chief among these were the attacks of 9/11. Framed by a

complex interaction of emotion and chance in the wake of 9/11,

U.S. leadership, as well as a majority of Congress and the U.S. public, ultimately came to see invasion as a strategically viable option. 

INTRODUCTION

A foundational concept in On War, Carl von Clausewitz’s

“trinity” has provided a complex yet coherent means to under-
stand war that has inspired much analysis, interpretation, and

debate since 1832 when it was posthumously published. Some

scholars have argued that the trinity is representative of Clausewitz’s most mature and enduring thought on the subject of war.1

Others, however, have argued that the concept lacks the universality needed to capture war’s varying characteristics over history,

or its appearance in an increasingly technologically-advanced

world.2

Al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, seemingly mark a new characteristic of war. In

a new, spectacular, and horrific way, extremists used the instruments of a modern society to successfully kill U.S. civilians, destroy U.S. symbols, and inspire unfamiliar feelings of insecurity

and uncertainty in significant portions of the U.S. population.

The possibility of such attacks in the future, perhaps with

weapons of mass destruction, has become the pressing security

concern in the United States. These attacks impacted the perspective and approach of U.S. strategic leadership, leading to a change

in the national defense strategy, a re-allocation of national resources, a change to the organization of the government, and adjustments to certain laws. They also influenced rationales for war,

as witnessed by the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. 

The possibility of significant terror attacks within the

United States promises to influence the nation’s security decision-making for the foreseeable future. Nine years after the fall

of the towers, the leaders of the major U.S. intelligence agencies

have stated that another attack is “certain” and clear evidence of

foiled or botched attacks within the United States certainly seems

to support this unsettling prediction.3 Making high-quality strategic decisions in this ambiguous, complex, and potentially emotional environment promises to be extremely challenging. It is

also vitally important. This chapter argues that Clausewitz’s trinity is an applicable and useful means to understand strategic decision-making in this environment because it illustrates the

influential role of emotion and chance on the process. Such an

understanding promises to help leaders frame strategic choices

in the future more completely. 

The following approach will be used in this argument.

First, the theoretical background of Clausewitz’s trinity will be

120 Chapter 6
presented. Next, the chapter will examine the U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Employing Clausewitz’s concept as a means to

frame this strategic choice, the case study will analyze how the

United States, when confronted with terror attacks, chose to invade a state not specifically responsible for them. Implications

and recommendations for policy makers and strategic leaders will

conclude this chapter.

CLAUSEWITZ’S TRINITY EXPLAINED

In Book One, Chapter One of On War, Clausewitz outlined his unique conception of war as: a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which are to be

regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its

element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which

makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already

be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of the courage

and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the

army; but the political aims are the business of government

alone.4

In the first paragraph, Clausewitz described a first trio of

influences: 1) violence, hatred, and enmity, 2) chance and probability, and 3) reason and policy. In the following paragraph, he inferred a secondary trio of components, consisting of generalized

elements of a state: 1) the people, 2) the commander and his army,

and 3) the government. 

In their well-known study of this passage, Christopher

Bassford and Edward Villacres have correctly indentified the first

trio of influences as what Clausewitz meant as his “trinity.” Distilling Clausewitz’s original meaning into the terms “emotion,”

“chance,” and “policy,” they have insightfully observed that the

three influences can also be generally categorized into the “irrational,” “non-rational,” and “rational” forces that inform war’s nature.5 Because these terms and categories are faithful

formulations of Clausewitz’s trinity, they will be used throughout

Clausewitz’s Trinity 121
this chapter in addition to Clausewitz’s original words. 

Clausewitz’s secondary trio of components is a social

reification of his actual trinity with each secondary component

generally associated with a particular primary influence. Antulio

Echevarria has noted that while Clausewitz saw his primary trinity as objective and universal, the secondary trio, which Echevarria refers to as the “secondary trinity,” was subjective,

representing elements of a political body which may or may not

be part of war at all times and contexts.6 The term secondary trinity will be used to refer specifically to Clausewitz’s secondary trio

of components: the people, the commander and his army, and the

government. 

Clausewitz saw his trinity neither as a static concept, nor

a geometric construct, implying fixed relationships and strength.

For him, the existence, relative strength, and interaction of the

primary influences were the keys to a better understanding of

war’s variety and complexity. First, each of the primary influences

was at play in some amount and at any point in time. Second,

their relative strength to one another would also impact war’s

process and appearance.7 Highlighting this point, Clausewitz described the pull of his three primary influences on war’s process

like an “object suspended between three magnets.”8 This description clearly conveyed his emphasis on the constantly changing interaction between the primary influences with the phenomenon

of war moving in response. Significant enmity and emotion would

likely support significant war policy; ambitious war policy goals

would likely require substantial emotion to sustain them. Minor

emotional stirrings might support only minor war policy aims;

limited war policy aims might demand correspondingly limited

passions.9

While in his trinity Clausewitz’s separates enmity and

emotion from policy and reason, his emphasis on their interaction

reveals that clearly separating them is difficult in reality. Investigating this aspect further, Ulrike Kleemeier has persuasively argued that Clausewitz saw human emotion in war not as

subordinate to reason but rather as helping to form the foundations for being able to reason to some extent in a challenging, uncertain environment.10 By emphasizing the interaction of the

influences of his trinity, Clausewitz clearly reserved a significant

122 Chapter 6
place for the pull of emotion and enmity on the dictates of reason

and policy. 

Clausewitz’s trinity also captured his philosophical view

of war as a complex, specifically human, phenomenon. This supports its use in not only understanding war’s nature, but also in

helping to understand the human decisions made within war at

varying levels of scale. The primary influences act on and through

individual agents: a soldier, his commander, a strategic policymaker, or a citizen of a state. These influences aggregate through

the organizations, governments, or states of which individuals

are part. For Clausewitz, any human organization within the environment of war, state-centered or otherwise, would be subject

to the interactive influence of emotion, chance, and reason. 

Importantly, reason is located within the war process and

environment, not outside of it. In this manner, Clausewitz’s trinity

offers a theoretical means to understand how emotion and chance

influence war decision-making and policy. The concept offers a

glimpse into how individuals and organizations make meaning of

their environment and, therefore, casts light onto the range of influences that may impact the way strategic decisions are both

framed and made. Never intended to provide the answer in war,

the trinity instead offers a better understanding of the environment in which possible answers in war will be crafted, implemented, or adjusted.

A written depiction of Clausewitz’s trinity, including the

variety of references used thus far to capture the influences, can

be seen in Figure 1. The subsequent case study will use these

terms to refer to the various influences of the trinity as appropriate. The first terms in each box are Clausewitz’s own; the terms

beneath them are the Bassford and Villacres formulations. 

THE TRINITY APPLIED: CASE STUDY OF 2003 U.S. IRAQ

INVASION DECISION

On March 19, 2003, the United States led a coalition to invade Iraq. President George W. Bush’s address to the nation provided his rationale for the decision—to remove Saddam Hussein’s

regime and prevent him from threatening the United States, its allies, and Iraq’s neighbors, with weapons of mass destruction.11 This

case study will draw on the primary influences of Clausewitz’s trinClausewitz’s Trinity 123
ity to analyze and frame this strategic decision. 

These primary influences may be observed using the following methodology. Reason and policy will be tracked through official U.S. policy at the time, along with content analysis of

pertinent official, public statements of key U.S. leaders. Chance

and probability will be detected in two different ways. The first will

include those events and factors forming the context of the decision which were largely or completely outside the control of the

U.S. government, including the actions of other agents. The second

trace of this influence will consist of the actions of the U.S. military—the commander and his army in Clausewitz’s terms—as it

relates to forming the context of the overall decision. Enmity and

emotion, the irrational influences, will be analyzed through public

opinion polls, as well as other data that help to understand the

mood and feeling of both the U.S. public, as well as key U.S. leaders. 

Because Clausewitz saw the influences of the trinity as interactive and changing in time and space, this case study is structured to reflect this characteristic.12 Instead of describing the

influences individually across a wide range of time, their makeup

and interaction will be presented and analyzed in two time periods.

The first will be from the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War to the

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; the second will be from

the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks to the 2003 invasion of Iraq itself. 

Herald/Emmity emotion/

irrational

e People

Reason/Policy

rational

Chance/Probability

non-rational

WAR

figure 1: Clausewitz’s trinity. Clausewitz’s terms are in italics; regular text

terms are Bassford’s and Villacres’. 

124 Chapter 6
FROM THE PERSIAN GULF WAR TO 9/11

REASON / POLICY / THE GOVERNMENT

After the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991

and throughout the rest of that decade, U.S. policy toward Iraq

was marked by general hostility and relatively consistent confrontation. Following the war, a cease fire was established and the

U.S. policy was to essentially contain Iraq. This policy was followed through the means of “no-fly” zones, U.N. sanctions, and

occasional air strikes aimed at key Iraqi facilities. In 1998, amid

concerns about Saddam’s failure to comply with U.N. resolutions,

the terms of the 1991 ceasefire, and his demonstrated abuse of

his own citizens, the U.S. Congress passed the “Iraq Liberation

Act” by a wide margin. This act formally codified U.S. policy toward Iraq as “to support efforts to remove the regime headed by

Saddam Hussein from power ... and to promote the emergence of

a democratic government to replace that regime.”13

CHANCE / SKILL / THE COMMANDER AND HIS ARMY

Military operations toward Iraq reflected the general U.S.

policy of containment even after the 1998 policy change. Designed to enforce the no-fly zones established after the 1991 war,

Operation SOUTHERN WATCH constituted the significant, ongoing U.S. military involvement in the area. From 1992 to early

2001, pilots flew into the no-fly zone more than 150,000 times

without casualty, and were engaged by either Iraqi radar systems

or actual anti-aircraft weapons 500 times.14 At certain points, and

in response to specific or perceived Iraqi actions, military air engagement intensified. Following exposure of a plan to kill former

President George H. W. Bush in 1993, U.S. forces struck Iraqi Intelligence Service facilities with tomahawk missiles. On the heels

of the 1998 Iraqi Liberation Act, the U.S. government ordered a

short, concerted air strike campaign against key Iraqi facilities

named Operation DESERT FOX.15

Several significant terror attacks within the United States

or against its interests abroad occurred during this period which

are important to consider as part of this influence. The 1993

bombing of the World Trade Center, the 1995 Oklahoma City

bombing, the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers, the 1998 bombClausewitz’s Trinity 125
126 Chapter 6

ing of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and the 2000 attack

against the USS Cole were the most significant. While the Oklahoma City bombing was attributed to U.S. extremists, all other

attacks were tied to extremist cells operating in and around the

Middle East. None of these attacks or the groups deemed responsible, however, was tied officially to Saddam Hussein during this

period. 

ENMITY / EMOTION/ THE PEOPLE

American public opinion reflected a feeling of relatively

consistent hostility toward Saddam Hussein’s Iraq throughout

this period. In 1992, 55 percent of the American public favored

sending U.S. ground forces to the area in order to remove Hussein

from power. In 1993, this percentage spiked to 70 percent in the

wake of the missile strike in response to the Iraqi Security Service’s plot to assassinate former President George H. W. Bush. In

February 2001, six months before the 9/11 attacks, this support

percentage was back down to 52 percent.16

Despite the terror attacks mentioned above and any

threat Saddam Hussein and his regime may have posed, the U.S.

public had generally positive feelings about the course of their nation throughout this decade. During a time of economic prosperity, a record numbers of Americans felt secure and positive about

state of the country and the direction it was going at the close of

the 20th century.17

ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

The influences of Clausewitz’s trinity which could have

supported significant ground action to force regime change in

Iraq were present to some degree during this particular period.

There was a government policy which could have directed such

action; there was a level of enmity in the American public supporting military ground action; and there were events such as significant, publicized terror attacks and constant U.S. military

operations that might have driven regime change. Yet the means

the United States used to pursue its Iraq policy remained limited. 

An understanding as to why may be drawn from considering the interaction and relative strength of the influences, not

just their existence. While enmity toward Saddam’s regime clearly
existed, strategic leaders decided it was either insufficient for a

more aggressive pursuit of policy, or that such a strategic choice

was not a legitimate option in spite of the enmity that existed. It

is also possible that, despite the multiple terror attacks during

this period, none were of sufficient magnitude, impact, or clear

attribution to Saddam’s regime to dictate or inspire more aggressive action. In sum, the influences of the trinity did not lead U.S.

decision-makers to frame the strategic environment in a manner

where invasion occurred. 

FROM 9/11 TO THE 2003 INVASION

On September 11, 2001, 19 extremists, supported by alQaeda, hijacked four commercial airliners and used them to kill

nearly 3,000 people on America’s home soil. Less than two years

later, the United States invaded Iraq, even though Saddam Hussein’s regime was not directly connected to this attack. An analysis of Clausewitz’s influences and their interaction following the

9/11 attacks helps to better understand this result. 

REASON / POLICY / THE GOVERNMENT

While the stated policy toward Iraq contained in the 1998

Iraq Liberation Act did not change in the wake of the 9/11 attacks,

the degree and means by which it was pursued by the U.S. government altered significantly. In his first joint session address to

Congress following the attacks on September 20, 2001, President

Bush stated any nation harboring or supporting terrorism would

be considered “hostile,” and that the United States had a new bias

for action in addressing security threats: “Either you are with us

or with the terrorists” became de-facto government policy.18

Of note, Saddam Hussein and Iraq were not specifically

mentioned in this address. Inside the government and outside of

the public eye, however, the possibility of using a ground invasion

in Iraq as a part of a larger strategy to protect the country was

being considered almost immediately following the 9/11 attacks.19 Following the military retreat of the Taliban from the

major cities in Afghanistan in December 2001, the President did

include Iraq publicly as a member of an “axis of evil” in his January 2002 State of the Union address and continued his argument

for being more proactive in protecting the country.20 This speech

Clausewitz’s Trinity 127
128 Chapter 6

was viewed as “nothing short of a declaration of war” against Saddam Hussein’s government.21

The U.S. government continued to stress its rationale for

a possible invasion with Iraq, building upon these first policy

statements. Published in July, the 2002 National Security Strategy presented a rationale for using military pre-emption to protect the country from regimes seeking weapons of mass

destruction.22 On September 12, 2002, the President argued for

concrete and effective international action, stating that an Iraq

led by Saddam Hussein was a “grave and gathering threat.”23 In

the months leading up to the invasion itself, senior members of

the administration continued to make the case that an invasion

of Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein might be necessary to prevent

weapons of mass destruction from being used to threaten the

United States and the world.24

CHANCE / SKILL / THE COMMANDER AND HIS ARMY

Several events had significant impact on the strategic environment during this period that should be considered under

this influence of the trinity. The most significant were the 9/11

attacks. Whether considered chance (an event beyond U.S. control), or enemy skill (operational success of al-Qaeda), these attacks demonstrated that the United States could be attacked in a

significant, spectacular manner within its own borders and with

great effect. With the country still trying to make sense of these

attacks, and to determine its response, multiple letters carrying

anthrax were mailed to several media centers and government office buildings. Five people were killed, precipitating the closure of

U.S. Senate Office buildings and an adjustment of U.S. mail handling procedures.25 In the space of just a few months, the U.S. public, heretofore feeling relatively positive about their country’s

well-being and security, experienced one spectacular attack that

killed thousands, as well as another involving a biological agent

delivered through their own mail system. 

In response to the 9/11 attacks, U.S. military operations

against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan commenced in

early October 2001. By the end of November 2001, Northern Alliance forces, supported by U.S. military personnel, were in control of the major Afghan cities with Taliban forces retreating into
the surrounding mountains. The skill and resources of U.S. and

Northern Alliance forces, in combination with the quality of Taliban forces and a certain amount of luck, produced a quick and

visible military success. This low-casualty success in Afghanistan,

heretofore the “graveyard of Empires,” contributed to the environment in which subsequent U.S. decisions about Iraq would be

framed. 

The role of intelligence, specifically the chance of its accuracy or inaccuracy, was another influence which framed U.S. decision-making during this period. Direct attribution for the 9/11

attacks was relatively straightforward. Other information was less

clear, including responsibility for the anthrax mailings which remained an open case until 2010.26 Intelligence connecting Saddam Hussein’s regime to the 9/11 attackers surfaced, but a later

Presidential Commission found no evidence to support this connection.27 Intelligence widely believed to be accurate at the time

indicating Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction program was presented to U.S. leaders, the public, and the international community, but this information was later determined

wrong as well.28 Examining why intelligence can be wrong is beyond the scope of this study, but recognizing that the United

States might frame strategic decisions on faulty intelligence is important. 

ENMITY / EMOTION / THE PEOPLE

While there had been terrorist attacks within the United

States before, none came close to registering with the same psychological impact on the U.S. public as the 9/11 attacks.29 The

sheer spectacle and horror of the attack, carried to every household with a television, changed the way many in the United

States viewed the world and made them feel vulnerable and insecure within their own country. The real possibility of another

attack loomed in the minds of both private citizens as well as policy makers.30 The anthrax mailings immediately following added

to this impact. Such feelings translated into action: statistics

showed a significant increase in gun and ammunition sales in the

three months following 9/11.31

U.S. public opinion polls reflected a sharp increase in enmity toward Saddam Hussein’s regime in the immediate wake of

Clausewitz’s Trinity 129
the attacks as well. Polls taken in November 2001 showed that

U.S. public support for a military ground operation to remove

Saddam spiked to 74%—over 20% higher than just nine months

prior.32 This high level of support did not sustain itself, however.

A year after the 9/11 attacks, it had moved back down to the high

50’s where it stayed to a large extent all the way until the actual

invasion itself. According to several polls, the next time support

for military ground operations would be as high as it was immediately after 9/11 was actually after the invasion occurred.33

The U.S. House of Representatives reflected its constituencies’ heightened enmity toward Saddam Hussein’s regime

as well. On October 16, 2002, the House passed the “Authorization for Use of Force Against Iraq Resolution” with strong majority of 68%, actually exceeding the percentage of general public

support for this option at the time by a considerable margin.34

The 9/11 attacks and the environment of insecurity following them inspired a level of enmity and emotion directed toward Saddam Hussein in the minds of individual strategic leaders

as well. President Bush acknowledged that the attacks changed

his personal view of the world, and his view of the threat of Saddam Hussein, in rational as well as emotional ways.35 The rhetorical wording of the 2002 State of the Union, as well as other

public statements, further reflected the President’s personal enmity toward not only those responsible for terror, but Saddam

Hussein himself. The Vice President also held significant and

passionate feelings about the threat of Saddam following the attacks.36 In his autobiography, American Soldier, General Tommy

Franks recalled that upon hearing about the anthrax attacks in

October 2001, he immediately thought of the significant threat

that Saddam posed to the United States and the world.37 When

asked about doubts as to Saddam’s possession of weapons of

mass destruction, National Security Advisor Rice may have accurately captured the feelings of many in U.S. leadership circles

saying, “We don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom

cloud.”38 Her statement at the same time expressed a genuine and

passionate concern by some within the Bush administration for

the threat posed by Saddam Hussein after 9/11 to U.S. national

security. 

130 Chapter 6
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

Some analysts have argued that the decision to invade

Iraq in 2003 was a result of being led to war by a few members of

the U.S. government.39 Other scholars have maintained that the

government used rhetoric to inspire unprecedented public support for the Iraq invasion by connecting Saddam with 9/11 in public statements.40 While such arguments have some basis, this

analysis using the trinity indicates they may also be over-simplifying and not accounting for a wider range of influences which

framed and informed the environment. The war process required

more than just government leadership; it required significant

emotion and enmity as well. U.S. public support for ground operations to remove Saddam spiked at its highest level in the months

immediately following 9/11, prior to any significant levels of government rhetoric drawing a public connection between 9/11 and

Saddam. In other words, there was a significant outpouring of enmity in the U.S. public, born out of the attack by al-Qaeda, yet also

directed toward Saddam Hussein without much involvement by

the government at all. 

This analysis strongly indicates that the most influential

aspects of Clausewitz’s trinity on this decision process may have

been those which were not easily averted or controlled. Chief

among these were the 9/11 attacks. These attacks, in conjunction

with the anthrax attacks, significantly increased feelings of insecurity and emotion in the minds of the U.S. public and its national

leaders. While this heightened enmity was certainly directed toward the perpetrators and supporters of these attacks, it also

transferred measurably and immediately toward Saddam Hussein’s regime as well. Pushed by heightened emotion and the press

of uncertainty following 9/11, strategic leaders, as well as the U.S.

public, began to see a compelling reason for a more aggressive policy toward Iraq. Quick, low-cost military success in Afghanistan,

uncertainty about U.S. domestic security, and contemporary certainty of the accuracy of crucial intelligence, continued to feed the

interaction of emotion and reason. This injected more uncertainty,

more emotion, and a stronger bias for action into an already

volatile environment. 

The attacks of 9/11 spawned significant emotional stirClausewitz’s Trinity 131
rings in the minds of many, leading them to view an invasion of

Iraq as an increasingly viable strategic option. Framed by a continuing interaction of emotion and chance in the wake of 9/11,

many U.S. leaders, as well as a majority of Congress and the U.S.

public, came to see this option as the only one. 

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This use of Clausewitz’s trinity to better understand the

U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003 does not offer a simple explanation, a definitive answer, or a clear future strategic course. It

does, however, illuminate how an interaction of emotion and

chance served to frame strategic choice. There are several important implications for U.S. strategic leaders which can be derived

from this conclusion. 

The Strategy of Terror: Know the Enemy. This analysis indicates that agents can use spectacular, high-casualty, terrorist attacks within the United States to provoke significant U.S. military

action against entities not necessarily responsible for them. By

provoking enmity and emotion, users of terror can seek to leverage the irrational influences of the trinity to inform and guide reason, thereby influencing U.S. national policy and strategy. While

terrorists attacks may be thought of as targeting public opinion

to produce results, this study indicates that such an attack could

be effectively used to influence a senior strategic leader’s decisionmaking process. 

The Effect of Terror on U. S. Institutions: Know Your State.

While some have expressed concerns about a democratic public’s

inability to control its passions, thus leading to poor, collective decisions, this analysis indicates this concern may not be entirely accurate. Significant terror attacks, like those of 9/11, will clearly

and immediately impact the emotions and the decision-making

tendencies of individuals. But when aggregated into larger groups,

like the components of the state, this impact tended to attenuate

rather than build in this case study. While strategic leaders may

feel compelled to respond quickly and decisively to match the

short-term emotions and opinions of the larger public, this analysis indicates that there is time in which to make decisions. 

The Strategic Leader: Know Yourself. This study strongly

indicates that effective strategic decision-making is at root a de132 Chapter 6
liberative act of self-control: an internal effort to recognize the

power of emotion in thought, identify its cause, and place it in

proper balance. In an environment of crisis, this is especially difficult. It is also the time when it is most important. Terrorist attacks target the decision-making of individuals by leveraging

emotional influences to goad one’s reason to follow a particular

course of action. Deliberative efforts to recognize this play on

emotion and mitigate it must be part of the strategic leader’s decision-making process, just as they might seek to recognize other

types of bias in their thought. 

The potential impact of emotion on decision-making in

such a moment of crisis underscores the need for strategic leaders

to show policy restraint immediately following such an attack. Attribution for the attacks promises to be difficult, even inconclusive

or conflicting. Initial restraint recognizes this characteristic of the

environment and allows room for more options and alternative

strategies in the future. Such restraint is not a sign of weakness

or passivity, although such charges should be anticipated. It instead reflects first an awareness of self, an awareness of the nation’s characteristics, and an awareness of the potential designs

of some adversaries. 

Finally, this analysis illustrates that Clausewitz’s trinity

can help one better understand the environment in which strategic problems are framed, as well as how strategic decisions are

made. Clausewitz’s thought has long been part of the curriculum

at U.S. Professional Military Education (PME) institutions as a

means to understand war. This chapter illustrates that it has specific utility as a means to understand how strategic leaders view

the challenges facing them. U.S. PME schools should present his

concept, not only as a foundational means to understand war, but

also specifically as a means to understand strategic decision-making within conflict. In this way, the aggregate chance of emotion

sustaining pragmatic decision-making, rather than unconsciously

guiding it, can be increased. 

THE PLAY OF EMOTION, CHANCE, AND REASON ON

STRATEGIC DECISIONS

This chapter used Clausewitz’s trinity as a means to better understand the U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003, hoping

Clausewitz’s Trinity 133
to gather useful insight and support future strategic decisionmaking. Seeking to reflect the basic objectivity of the trinity itself,

it has deliberately tried to avoid evaluating whether the decision

was “good” or “bad,” “just” or “unjust.” Instead, it has illustrated

that the decision was a process, influenced and framed by a complex interaction of emotion, chance, and reason at varying levels.

It has also highlighted the inherent difficulties of clearly separating emotion from reason in the strategic decision-making process

due to the complexity and fluidity of their interaction. In war, as

well as in war-decisions, emotion and reason are intertwined and

conflated in a manner which makes it difficult to consider them

in isolation from one another. Clausewitz’s trinity offers not only

a thorough means for U.S. strategic leaders to understand war’s

nature, but also a useful way to better understand how they may

view problems and then make decisions. In an increasingly complex and uncertain strategic environment, such an understanding

is critically important.

Notes

1

Bassford (2007) and Echevarria (2007). 

2

Martin Van Crevald (1991) and John Keegan (1993). 

3

“Intelligence Chiefs Say Another Terror Attempt in U.S. is ‘Certain’”, CNN, February 3, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/02/02/us.terror.attacks

/index.html (February 10, 2010). 

4

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans.

Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

1976), 89.

5

Christopher Bassford and Edward J. Villacres, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian

Trinity,” Parameters 25, no. 3, (Autumn 1995): 16. 6

Antulio J. Echevarria II, Clausewitz and Contemporary War (New York: Oxford

University Press 2007), 73. 

7

Clausewitz, 88. 

8

Ibid., 89. 

9

Ibid., 88.

10Ulrike Kleemeier, “Moral Forces in War” in Clausewitz in the 21st Century, ed.

by Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (New York: Oxford University

Press, 2007), 108. 

11George W. Bush, “Address to the American People,” CNN, March 19, 2003,

http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/19/sprj.irq.int.bush.transcript (January 5,

2010). 

134 Chapter 6
12Because the three variables of the concept are highly correlated to one another,

any analysis using Clausewitz’s trinity poses an unavoidable challenge of multicollinearity. This makes definitively identifying causality difficult. This characteristic makes clearly attributing data like public statements of U.S. officials

to only one influence equally difficult. For example, public statements by key

U.S. leaders could be thought of as influenced by both the emotion of the moment as well as by more reasoned estimation. In the end, this challenge is unavoidable and should encourage the reader to consider the complexity and

insightfulness of Clausewitz’s trinity as a whole, rather than as separate parts. 

13Iraq Liberation Act, H.R. 4655, 105th Cong., (1998). 14 “Operation Southern Watch,” Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org

/military/ops/southern_watch.htm (January 12, 2010).

15See “Operation DESERT FOX,” Department of Defense, http://www .defense

.gove/specials/desert_fox.

16Gallup Poll 1633, “Iraq,” Gallup, http:www.gallup.com/pol/1633/Iraq.aspx

(January 10, 2010).

17Gallup Poll 124787, “The Decade in Review: Four Key Trends”, Gallup, December 29, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/124787/decade-review-four-keytrends.aspx (January 9, 2010). 

18George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American

People,” The White House, September 20, 2001, http://georgebush-whitehouse

.archives.gov (January 4, 2010).

19Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War

on Terrorism (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), 66-67. 20George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” The White House, January 29,

2002, http://georgebush-whitehouse.archives.gov (January 4, 2010).

21Charles Krauthammer, “Redefining the War,” The Washington Post, February

1, 2002.

22“The National Security Strategy of the United States 2002,” The White House,

September 17, 2002, http://georgebush-whitehouse.archives.gov (January 10,

2010). 

23George W. Bush, “Address to the United Nations”, CNN, September 12, 2002,

http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/09/12/bush.transcript (January 10, 2010). 

24Feith (2008) argues that a 9/11 - Saddam Hussein connection was not necessary to justify invasion and clouded what he saw as the true rationale for such

military action: self-defense (see pages 234, 262, 323). He clearly acknowledges

that 9/11 made concerns about defending the country from Saddam Hussein

more pressing and that given the potential impacts of future attacks with WMD,

it would be irresponsible to leave him in power (see pages 233, 238, 504). 

25“Amerithax Fact Sheet,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 2006,

http:///fbi.gov/anthrax/amerithaxlinks.htm (January 13, 2010). 

26“FBI Concludes Investigation in 2001 Anthrax Mailings,” CNN, February 19,

2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/02/19/fbi.anthrax.report/index.html

(March 17, 2010). 

27Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United

States (Washington DC: GPO, 2004), 66.

Clausewitz’s Trinity 135
28“Transcript of Powell’s U.N. Presentation,” CNN, February 6, 2003,

http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.transcript (February 19,

2010). See also The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States

Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington DC: GPO, 2002), 3. 29Howard J. Stein, “Days of Awe: September 11, 2001 and its Cultural Psychodynamics”, Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society, 8, no.2 (Fall

2003): 187-188.

30Gallup Poll 4909, “Terrorism in the United States” where upwards of 80-90%

of the public believed another attack inside America was at least “somewhat

likely” for sustained periods of time. Also Feith, 121.

31Al Baker, “A Nation Challenged: Steep Rise in Gun Sales Reflects Post-Attack

Fears”, New York Times, December 16, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12

/16/nyregion/nation-challenged-personal-security-steep-rise-gun-sales-reflects-post-attack.html?pagewanted=3 (January 10, 2010).

32Gallup Poll 1633.

33Ibid.

34Authorization for Use of Force Against Iraq Resolution, Public Law 107-243-

Oct.16, 2002, http://www.c-span.org/Content/PDF/hjres114.pdf (January 17,

2010). 

35Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 24-27. 36Woodward, 3, 175, 292. 

37Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), 268. 38“Top Bush Officials Push Case Against Saddam”, CNN, September 8, 2002,

http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/09/08/iraq.debate (January 4,

2010). 

39See Haas (2009), Woodward (2003). 

40Amy Gershkoff and Shana Kushner, “Shaping Public Opinion: The 9/11- Iraq

Connection in the Bush Administration’s Rhetoric,” Perspectives on Politics 3, no

3 (September 2005): 525, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3689022. 

136 Chapter 6
7

the Case for a national risk Communications strategy

for Mitigating terrorist attacks

by Roger R. Laferriere

ABSTRACT

This chapter argues for a National Risk Communication

Strategy to reduce the indirect consequences of a terrorist attack.

Death, injuries, and/or illnesses are among the obvious direct consequences of a terrorist event. There are also direct economic costs,

such as the loss of property. These direct consequences are difficult

to minimize because terrorist attacks are normally sudden and unexpected.

There are also many indirect, or secondary, consequences

as a result of an attack, such as regional and/or national economic

impacts. The 9/11 attacks are an excellent example of these second-order effects. Negative changes in social behavior occurred in

the wake of this tragic event, such as the public’s heightened fear

of flying, which resulted in increased traffic fatalities as millions

took to the highways instead of the air. In addition, there was general increased anxiety across the United States that resulted in additional substantial medical costs. These secondary consequences

are more manageable because there is time to address them. It is

in the government’s and the people’s best interest to minimize the

impact and severity of these secondary consequences. This can be

accomplished by ensuring that the government and people react

appropriately to actual, rather than imagined, risks. Effective risk

communications is the means to accomplish this end.

Additionally, community resilience following a terrorist at137
tack is important for enabling residents to continue their way of

life and minimize secondary consequences. A community that rapidly recovers also sends a message to the terrorists that it will not

submit to fear. However, communities will not resume their normal way of life unless they understand the risks and how to safeguard against them. Therefore, risk communications is enormously

important in building and sustaining community resilience.

The evidence is very strong that proper risk communications reduces the negative consequences of any event, terrorism or

otherwise. While risk communications plans exist at a handful of

agencies, the federal government has not adopted a governmentwide national risk communications approach to terrorist attacks.

Instead, its communication approach during an incident has tended

to be one-way: from the government to the people, leaving little in

the way of collaboration and trust between the two. Additionally,

those government agencies with risk communication programs do

not coordinate amongst themselves or down to state and local levels, therefore risking the potential for communicating conflicting

messages during a real incident. Such a poor approach has and will

continue to add unintended consequences, inhibit community resilience, and impose enormous unnecessary costs on society. 

What is needed now from the national leadership is to institutionalize risk communications throughout the country. This

is best accomplished by developing a National Risk Communications Strategy for terrorist events. If the government leadership

does not effectively communicate risks to the public, prior to, during, and following a terrorist attack, they are likely to dramatically

exacerbate unintended consequences. In essence, they will be aiding the terrorists in accomplishing their goals. 

138 Chapter 7
I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of society but

the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened

enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the

remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion

by education. This is the true corrective of abuses of constitutional

power.

—Thomas Jefferson in a letter to William Charles

Jarvis, September 28, 1820

THE PROBLEM WITH IGNORING THE BOTTOM OF THE ICEBERG

The goal of a terrorist, according to the U.S. Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI), is to commit “a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the criminal laws of the United

States, or of any state, to intimidate or coerce a government, the

civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”1 Coercion and intimidation are accomplished by creating fear through horrific acts of violence, such as

mass murder, assassination, and kidnapping. Fear is the terrorist’s

force multiplier; it can create increased anxiety, panic, and depression, as well as exacerbate the immediate consequences of a terrorist attack. These immediate consequences include death, injury,

illness, fire, explosion, and pollution, among others. The secondary

consequences of a terrorist attack, many of which are generated by

fear, include psychological injury and economic damage not directly caused by the attack itself. These secondary consequences

can be prolonged, affect a much broader segment of the population

and, in some cases, result in much higher costs (primarily economic) than those stemming from an event’s immediate impact.

In any terrorist attack, the immediate costs are just the tip of the

iceberg. Below the surface lies the behemoth of secondary costs.

To minimize secondary costs, strong community resilience

must be built. Community resilience is the community’s ability to

recover from a terrorist attack. Quick recovery means resuming a

community’s way of life rapidly, thus minimizing secondary consequences and thwarting a key aim of terrorism. The best way to

avoid severe secondary consequences and promote community resilience is to inform the public of the post-incident risks and how

to safeguard against them. The process of communicating risks is

called risk communications. 

National Risk Communications Strategy 139
Unfortunately, U.S. risk communication (RISKCOMMS)

programs are currently being implemented only in a handful of

government agencies, mostly at the federal level. Moreover, little

or no coordination has occurred between these agencies and

those below them at the state and local levels, making the potential for conflicting messages and a loss of government credibility

not just possible, but probable. Given this potentially dangerous

situation, the Obama administration should prioritize the creation of a National Risk Communications Strategy for all levels

of government to promote strong community resilience and reduce the secondary consequences of a terrorist attack. A National

Risk Communications Strategy should take the form of a national

document similar to the National Homeland Security Strategy or

National Information Strategy signed by President G. W. Bush

during his administration.2 Developing and implementing such a

strategy will greatly enhance the U.S. government’s effectiveness

in defeating the terrorists’ goal of manipulation by fear. 

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF RISK COMMUNICATIONS

There is no universally agreed upon definition of risk communications. For the purposes of this chapter, however, the following definition, adapted from the National Resource Council, is

used: “Risk Communication is an interactive process of exchanging

risk information between governments, private institutions, and

the public to achieve the mutual goal of minimizing adverse consequences to human health and welfare.”3 The key words here are

“interactive” and “mutual,” which point to the important roles

played by all elements of society—government, the private sector

and the general public—in effective risk communications. Dr. Vincent Covello, an expert on RISKCOMMS and founder of the Center

for Risk Communications in New York, argues that the collaborative and participatory nature of RISKCOMMS is what distinguishes

it from normal public relations.4 RISKCOMMS, therefore, is as

much about building relationships as it is about communications.

RISKCOMMS was developed in the 1970s when it became

clear that governments and private institutions were finding it extremely difficult to convey pollution and health risks to the general

public in terms they could readily understand. Soon, experts like

Covello, as well as Dr. Baruch Fischoff, Professor of Social and De140 Chapter 7
cision Sciences and Engineering and Public Policy at Howard Heinz

University, and Dr. Peter Sandman, a preeminent RISKCOMMS

consultant, began to refine and improve RISKCOMMS processes.

Their improvements ensured a public understanding of pollution

and health risks, which avoided unnecessary secondary costs derived from public misperception. 

In the last 40 years, the Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) has conducted 40,187 environmental assessments for major

pollution threats to the United States, and has successfully employed RISKCOMMS to engage the public and, when appropriate,

allay concern.5 Like all good RISKCOMM programs, EPA collaborated with local environmental and public health authorities, as

well as conducted regular public meetings to convey RISKCOMMS

messages and, more importantly, to form a partnership of trust

with local communities. The agency has a team of community outreach specialists that can augment the responding pollution remediation teams. This successful employment of effective

RISKCOMMS has generated a substantial following both in academia and within other agencies. 

The study of RISKCOMMS has grown considerably since

its inception. For instance, several major universities, including

Harvard, Yale, and King’s College in London now teach

RISKCOMMS. The National Center for Biotechnology Information

of the U.S. National Institute of Health records over 1,300 academic papers on RISKCOMMS just for carcinogenic products,

which suggests a strong interest in RISKCOMMS within academia.6

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss

RISKCOMMS processes in detail, but the basic model is focused

on creating messages from a team of experts, and then testing

those messages in a scientific manner on a cross-section of a specific target audience. The messages are then used in exercises,

drills, and real situations, and are constantly reevaluated for their

effectiveness. Although a tremendous oversimplification, this description generally captures how the process works. Having the

right team of experts, as well as the right target audience, is paramount. For example, Fischoff recommends a team composed of

subject matter experts, risk analysis experts, behavioral scientists,

and public affairs specialists.7

As terrorism catapulted to the forefront of public concern

National Risk Communications Strategy 141
after 9/11, the same challenge of communicating complex scientific risks to the general public was faced by federal government

agencies, many unused to RISKCOMMS processes. These agencies fell into the same trap of their environmental predecessors

before the advent of RISKCOMMS. They relied on ineffective

public affairs communication techniques. Indeed, contradictory

government messages created confusion, anxiety, and doubt resulting in significant secondary costs. 

THE SECONDARY CONSEQUENCES OF INEFFECTIVE

COMMUNICATIONS

In general, the failure of good risk communications can

have serious deleterious consequences, four of which Covello

identifies: 1) the diversion of resources from other important

problems; 2) the overshadowing of real risks by perceived risks;

3) unnecessary anxiety and worry; and 4) feelings of apathy and

hopelessness.8 Wiser and Balicer determined that the public’s

concern about risk can be exacerbated by unfamiliarity, the potential for damage, the sense of a loss of control, and general uncertainty, not to mention a lack of trust in government

authorities.9 When the public’s concern over risk increases, there

is a much greater likelihood that risk misperception will increase

as well, which can generate greater secondary consequences. Unfortunately, Wiser and Balicer’s factors are all inherent characteristics of the aftermath of a terrorist attack, which is why the

effective use of RISKCOMMS by the government is absolutely

necessary.

All of Covello’s negative effects, as well as Wiser and Balicer’s triggers for increased public concern, occurred in the wake

of the 9/11 attacks and the incident at Three-Mile Island. Millions

in public health funding, an example of Covello’s first effect, were

diverted after 9/11 from more common infectious disease programs to bioterrorism, even though millions more have died from

the former.10 And in the three months following the attacks,

1,018 more traffic fatalities occurred when people decided that

driving was safer than flying—Covello’s second effect of real risks

taking a back seat to perceived risks.11 An example of Covello’s

third effect (unnecessary anxiety and worry) is illustrated in the

Three-Mile Island nuclear plant emergency of 1979. This is also

142 Chapter 7
a good example of how secondary consequences can be more psychological than physical. One study of that incident found evidence of an “evacuation shadow,” where individuals evacuated

miles outside the risk zone.12 The study attributed this to conflicting messages from government authorities, which confused

the public. The result was traffic congestion and delays in evacuating those in the risk zone, a reprise of which could be costly during a biological terrorist attack where preventing the spread of

the agent is critical. 

Covello’s fourth effect (apathy and hopelessness) was evident following the 9/11 attacks. A nationwide survey of 3,496

adults (78 percent participation) was conducted on September

23rd, days after the 9/11 attacks. Two additional surveys were

conducted two and then six months after the first one. The researchers found that a large number of those surveyed, living well

outside New York, experienced disturbing levels of trauma-related symptoms, which required hospitalization and therapy.13

Another study reported psychological trauma after 9/11 as far

away as Italy, India, and Belgium.14 A third reported panic attacks

in 11 percent of New York City adults, amounting to over 700,000

people.15 All these can be related to the phenomenon of “clinical

hysteria,” where people in distress in essence make themselves

sick. This phenomenon is psychologically contagious, and has the

same symptoms as a biological, chemical, and radiological agent:

headache, vomiting, gastrointestinal distress, dizziness, and anxiety. This clinical hysteria can cause more health havoc than a disease itself, especially when it is difficult for health officials to

determine if the symptoms are causes by a WMD agent, or from

clinical hysteria. Effective RISKCOMMS is an excellent remedy

for reducing the number of clinical hysteria cases.16

Because the public has the least understanding and perhaps the most misconceptions about chemical, biological, and radioactive agents, the secondary consequences from these types of

events can be quite severe. During the Tokyo Sarin Subway Attacks

of 1995, 5,510 people sought unnecessary medical care when only

12 persons died and 17 were critically injured.17 An example of

public overreaction to a radiation event occurred in Goiania, Brazil

in 1987. Two people found a source of radioactive material in an

abandoned medical building. As a result of the material’s spread,

National Risk Communications Strategy 143
four people died and 249 were contaminated. An astounding

112,000 people, however, reported for unnecessary medical treatment.18 No evidence was found of any risk communications during

these events. The National Council of Radiation Protection and

Measurements, charted by Congress in 1964 to provide public information on radiation, produced a report on managing terrorist

events one month after 9/11. The report asserted that the number

one problem with a radiological attack is the psychological aspect

of the event, with thousands of citizens unnecessarily streaming

to hospitals, overwhelming hospital capacity.19

The best example of poor RISKCOMMS during a biological attack within the United States was the anthrax attacks of

2001. Those attacks claimed the lives of five people over a threemonth period and contaminated 20 others.20 The avoidable secondary consequences were staggering: over 30,000 people

obtained unneeded prophylaxis.21 Because the government was

ineffective in communicating in a timely manner, the media was

forced to find its own sources and, consequently, reported incorrect information. When the media incorrectly reported nasal

swabbing as the preferred method of detection, thousands of concerned citizens requested this unnecessary procedure.22 When

ciproflaxin was reported as the drug of choice, the public requested this treatment even though the alternative, dioxycline,

had a lower risk of side effects and cost less.23 Additionally, over

120,000 lab samples were taken from the public, which quickly

overwhelmed the nation’s laboratory capacity.24 The public overloaded government agencies with inquiries on the risks posed by

anthrax; in one week alone during the event, 2,817 calls were

made across nine states.25

During the anthrax incident, the U.S. government did not

communicate uniformly—different agencies and government officials offered conflicting messages. For example, President Bush

advised Americans to continue with their normal routines at the

same time that the CDC was issuing statements on necessary precautions to take.26 A U.S. Army expert on biological weapons reported that the anthrax was “weaponized” without any

clarification. The public perceived this as suggesting that the attack originated from a foreign terrorist source. The Army then

retracted its statement and declared that the anthrax was “pro144 Chapter 7
fessionally” made and “energized.”27 This increased public confusion and reduced government credibility. Meanwhile, the Secretary of Human Health and Services (DHHS) commented that the

first victim likely contracted the anthrax from a stream, which

was grossly incorrect.28 And the Attorney General speculated that

the anthrax might be part of a terrorist attack.29 Speculation is a

bad technique for communicating risks. In all fairness to CDC and

DHHS, they have made great strides in improving RISKCOMMS

within their agencies since then. When considering all other federal agencies, however, they are the exception rather than the

rule, and at the end of the day, the individual agencies’

RISKCOMMS need to be coordinated to be effective. 

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT/PUBLIC TRUST AND RISK

COMMUNICATIONS

RISKCOMM analysts have identified community resilience as a key element in defeating terrorist aims. The Gilmore

commission, an advisory panel setup by the Bush Administration

to assess domestic capabilities for terrorism involving WMD attacks, rightly points out that “communities defeat terrorism, not

governments.”30 Effective RISKCOMMS can play a vital role in

building community resilience, and community resilience is about

creating a effective partnership between the government and the

public.31 Many argue that this partnership is paramount and must

be one of the top priorities following a terrorist incident.32

RISKCOMMS plays a critical role in engendering trust between

the government and the public, another argument for instituting

it nationally. The U.S. public’s trust in the federal government during an emergency will quickly dissolve if the government is not effective in communicating risk. Unfortunately, many government

authorities tend to degrade rather than build public trust, largely

because the public is viewed as a major part of the incident rather

than a partner.33 By prescribing to this notion, governments erode

confidence and undervalue the public’s potential contributions. 

RISKCOMM experts, however, take the opposite view—

that during a major crisis, the public tends to be more cooperative

and helpful than a hindrance.34 During the Tokyo Subway Sarin

Attacks of 1995 and the Bali Bombings of 2002, for example, the

public was first on-scene and assisted injured members to the

National Risk Communications Strategy 145
hospital.35 Following the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina in

2006, the U.S. citizens converged to both incidents in the thousands with the best intentions of helping out. Rather than ignoring or preventing this natural inclination, the government should

engage the public to leverage their support and, more importantly, to ensure their safety from incident hazards. 

During a major pandemic event, terrorist introduced or

otherwise, close cooperation between the government and the

public is absolutely necessary to prevent the spread of the disease.

The government must effectively communicate quarantine, personal hygiene, and prophylaxis precautions to avoid population

devastation. The 1918 Flu Pandemic cost over 500,000 American

deaths.36 In modern times, where populations are much denser and

public interaction much greater, a pandemic outbreak could be catastrophic unless government and public cooperation is effective. 

Confidence in the government’s management of an incident or crisis can quickly decline if the government mishandles

its communications. The communication confusion during the

anthrax attacks of 2001 is an excellent example. Despite the fact

that the president was riding an enormously high approval rating

following the 9/11 attacks (92 percent), the American public’s

confidence in the government’s management of the anthrax attacks of 2001 suffered a severe blow.37 Two separate polls conducted over the period of the event showed significant decreases

in confidence (6-16 percent), in the government’s management

of the event.38 Ironically, the president’s own approval rating did

not drop significantly, indicating lost confidence in the federal

government but not in the President. Historically, the U.S. public

turns first to Congress as the scapegoat for the nation’s troubles,

which is one reason why their approval ratings are generally lower

than that of the president.39 Good RISKCOMMS could have bolstered citizen confidence for both the Congress and the President. 

During an incident, governments tend to withhold information to avoid creating undue alarm, which weakens trust between government and the public. By “restraining information

about risk, they [governments] fail to recognize that they are undermining their own credibility,” contends one researcher.40 Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano

stated that the Obama administration understands that the im146 Chapter 7
portance of the private-public partnership: “For too long we’ve

treated the public as a liability to be protected rather than an asset

in our nation’s collective security. And this approach, unfortunately, has allowed confusion, anxiety and fear to linger.”41 That

said, governments must also be careful about the timing and frequency of their communications. Governments that warn excessively will be the victim of the “boy who cried wolf” syndrome,

while those that do not ring the alarm enough will be declared

negligent.42 This is why communications must be deliberate,

planned, and continuously monitored for effectiveness. 

RISK COMMUNICATIONS IN EXISTING NATIONAL STRATEGY

DOCUMENTS, PLANS, AND ORGANIZATIONS

Despite the efficacy of RISKCOMMS in minimizing secondary consequences and facilitating community resilience, the

United States has not implemented a government-wide, national

risk communications strategy. Current U.S. national security

strategy documents suggest that the government would like to

build capacity in order to better respond to a terrorist attack. For

instance, President George W. Bush’s National Security Strategy

for Combating Terrorism discusses improving “public safety

emergency communications,” and providing “the public timely

and accurate risk communication during a public health emergency.”43 President Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy calls

for “strengthening our preparedness and resilience,” identifying

the nation’s “best defenses against this threat are well informed

and equipped families, local communities, and institutions.” The

National Security Strategy continues, “And the Federal Government, drawing on the expertise and resources from all relevant

agencies, will clearly communicate our policies and intentions,

listening to local concerns, tailoring policies to address regional

concerns, and making clear that our diversity is part of our

strength—not a source of division or insecurity.”44

On October 18, 2008, President Bush signed Homeland

Security Presidential Directive 21, focused on improving public

health and medical preparedness.45 The document has strong

overtones of RISKCOMMS: one of the four components under

the community resilience section concentrates on educating civic

leaders, citizens, and families on terrorist threats to ensure they

National Risk Communications Strategy 147
“are empowered to mitigate their own risk.”46 In sum, U.S. government policy shows glimmers of understanding the importance

of RISKCOMMS, but strategy formulation lags behind this appreciation. 

The DHS-drafted National Response Framework (NRF)

is a national document that provides principles, roles and structures

that organize the way the United States responds to an incident.47

It is not a plan, but a guidance document for responding to incidents of national significance for all executive agencies. More detailed response plans are written using the NRF as a guide.

Although there is no specific mention of RISKCOMMS, there are

some principles that facilitate good RISKCOMMS. For example,

there are provisions for unified messaging, rapid information dissemination, and a solid chain of command from the federal to the

local government levels. The NRF also recommends the use of an

interagency Joint Information Center (JIC) to communicate to

the public that can be used to support message consistency. Additionally, the framework mentions a single electronic network,

the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) that could

be used to ensure consistent RISKCOMMS messaging and dissemination. The DHS Office of Public Affairs (OPA) has responsibility for communicating back-and-forth to the Homeland

Security Council, which in turn communicates with the President.

This demonstrates a fairly well established command and control

structure to facilitate the execution of RISKCOMMS if and when

needed. 

A critical principle missing from the NRF framework is

the government/public partnership. The NRF’s communication

principles reflect a one-way communication system from the government to the people. There is no feedback loop or process to

allow for the public to obtain answers needed from the thousands

and potentially millions (think pandemic) of inquiries made following a catastrophic terrorist attack. Additionally, the government/public partnership and risk communication messages must

be forged before an incident happens. The JIC previously mentioned is only stood up when an incident occurs and is disestablished when an incident is over. It is important for the

government/public relationship to exist before and after the incident so it is a living continuous partnership. Pre- and post-in148 Chapter 7
cident communication programs are beyond the scope of the NRF. 

At the federal agency level, there are about a dozen organizations that have RISKCOMMS programs.48 The most prominent for a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosives

attack are CDC, the Agency for Toxic Disease Registry (ATSDR),

the Department of Defense (DOD), and the EPA. EPA, CDC and

ATSDR have done a commendable job of instituting

RISKCOMMS, with the latter two agencies improving primarily

as a result of lessons learned from the anthrax 2001 incident. All

have developed manuals, handbooks, and on-line courses. CDC

and ATSDR’s parent organization, the Department of Human

Health and Services (DHHS), has a Bioterrorism Command Center and sponsors a National Association of County and City

Health Officials, which has the responsibility of finding ways to

improve RISKCOMMS.49 The CDC has developed pre-scripted

RISKCOMMS messages to be used by federal, state, and local responders in the event of a terrorist incident. These were developed in concert with four universities and 55 focus groups from

across the United States.50 Other agencies have also made a concerted effort to develop a RISKCOMMS program. DHS, for example, has sponsored a national university consortium for

improving community resilience and the U.S. Army Center for

Health Promotion and Preventative Medicine website manages

all DOD RISKCOMMS training and outreach for DOD units.51

The efforts of these agencies are commendable, but serious problems remain. A terrorist event is likely to be an incident

of national significance, with ramifications touching nearly all

federal agencies. It is hard to imagine any executive agency not

involved in the response to the aftermath of a nuclear weapons

attack, for example. Such an event would surely demand a “whole

of government” response. 

The first problem with extant RISKCOMMS programs is

the lack of central coordination between involved federal agencies

to ensure message consistency. The difficulties created by message

inconsistency were demonstrated in the earlier 2001 anthrax example. Although CDC has developed a decent library of

RISKCOMMS messages, there is no evidence that other agencies

have such a library, or have a policy to adopt CDC’s library as the

certified collection of default messages. Secondly, several other

National Risk Communications Strategy 149
departments and agencies likely to get involved in a terrorist event

do not have RISKCOMMS programs. Examples include all agencies

of the Department of Justice, (FBI, U.S. Marshals, U.S. Attorney),

Department of Transportation, and the U.S. Congress, just to

name a few. Third, programs are disseminated in a one-way fashion via the internet with no confirmation of their use by local response organizations, likely to be at the spear-point of a terrorist

event. In other words, federal programs suffer from fragmentation, inconsistency, and a lack of integration both horizontally and

vertically (with state and local governments). A National Strategy

of Risk Communications promulgated by the President would ensure that all executive agencies followed the same RISKCOMMS

doctrine and protocols and eliminate these problems. 

RISK COMMUNICATION ABROAD

A review of RISKCOMMS outside the United States reveals some lessons supporting the development of a national

RISKCOMMS strategy here in the United States. Previous British

and Israel examples have shown the benefits of RISKCOMMS to

community resilience, with Canada, Singapore, and the EU also

making advances. 

Israel has suffered a tremendous number of terrorist attacks and provides a useful model to examine further. One study,

for example, indicated that over 50 percent of adolescent Israeli

citizens have been exposed to terrorism, with 20 percent losing a

relative.52 Continued exposure to terrorist events has forced the

government to adopt RISKCOMMS principles. In essence, the Israel Government had adopted an informal but effective program

as a matter of community survival. The nation has set up Community Stress Prevention Centers (CSPC) that provide psychological and social support, including RISKCOMMS, to victims of

terrorist events. The CSPCs have provided over 9,000 hours of

training, much of which includes RISKCOMMS.53 Teachers are

taught RISKCOMMS to help their students cope. Israeli leaders

are experts in RISKCOMMS; some, like Nachman Shai, founder

of the first television network in Israel and Israel Defense Forces

spokesperson, have been called the “valium of the nation.”54

Dr. Peter Sandman argues that terrorism is intrinsically

communication: “communication is the event.”55 He compliments

150 Chapter 7
Israel for its effective risk communications program and for placing terrorism in the proper context of risk: “People are more likely

to die of car accidents than terrorist events and the culture understands this.”56 He explains that terrorism’s goal is to disrupt a

society’s way of life—its normal routine. Israel, he contends, does

a remarkable job of defeating this nefarious goal through rapid

recovery and reconstitution. For example, if a suicide bomber attacks a major business, police, army, religious, and municipal leaders converge to the site and begin the process of rebuilding and

restoring the damaged building as soon as possible.57 According

to Sandman, “This act in itself is a non-verbal form of risk communication.”58 One might also describe it as an act of defiance

against the terrorists.

The United Kingdom (UK), familiar with terrorist attacks

from its conflict with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and having

survived Nazi aerial bombings in WWII, also merits review. After

the 9/11 attacks, Britain passed the Civil Contingencies Act of

2004, which specifically mentions RISKCOMMS and requires

public participation in defining and prioritizing risks, accomplished through local government public meetings.59

RISKCOMMS experts in Great Britain elaborate on the

country’s approach to terrorist events. Dr. Ragnar E. Lofstedt,

the Director of the King’s Centre of Risk Management at King’s

College in London, contends that British citizens understand the

importance of resuming their lives following a terrorist attack,

which was clearly demonstrated following the July 7, 2005, attacks on London’s subway system. For the most part, citizens resumed use of the transit system within a few days after repair.

This remarkable display of resilience, he contends, was due to

constant, appropriate use of RISKCOMMS by the government.60

Sir Ian Blain, Metropolitan Police Commissioner, quickly got on

the air and advised all citizens to “Go in, Stay in, Tune in.”61 This

simple but effective RISKCOMMS message was already pre-designed by the government and included as part of local response

plans. Additionally, the police share a pager alert system with

many large and small businesses, which they used to keep the private sector informed of developments.62

Despite their excellent efforts, in its after action report,

the Greater London Authority recommended the development of

National Risk Communications Strategy 151
and adherence to more rigid hourly time schedules to keep the

public informed.63 This is not an indictment of the response’s success, but rather evidence of Britain’s conscientious effort to continually improve RISKCOMMS. One might argue that Israel and

Great Britain have experienced a much greater number of terrorist incidents, which accounts for their more informed and responsive publics, but it would be a mistake to discount the important

role of RISKCOMMS in these two countries’ approach to dealing

with national crises or terror-related events.64

Great Britain and Israel have had the most success with

RISKCOMMS, yet other nations are moving forward in developing

national programs. During the SARS outbreak of July 2003,

Canada experienced significant RISKCOMMS challenges, and

made errors similar to the ones the United States made during the

anthrax attacks. Unlike their U.S. counterparts, the Canadians responded by developing a national crisis communication program

that centralizes all government RISKCOMMS and mandates rapid

dissemination of RISKCOMMS messages for public safety.65 In

Singapore, the Ministry of Defense has adopted “psychological defense” as one of five total Defense Systems of the Nation.66 Psychological defense is Singapore’s way of referring to community

resilience, but on a national level. They have identified community

resilience as a national priority, and RISKCOMMS is an important

part of their strategy.67 Following the U.S. anthrax attacks of 2001,

the European Union established Anthrax-Euronet, an electronic

communication system to rapidly disseminate RISKCOMMS messages and other information.68 Additionally, the World Health Organization (WHO) has published a RISKCOMMS handbook

available on-line for all nations to use.69 Unfortunately, the WHO

has yet to prove its RISKCOMMS effectiveness; its mishandling

of the SARS disease did nothing to properly categorize the risk

against many more common fatal diseases.70

In summary, some countries have made great strides in

incorporating RISKCOMMS into their response policies as part of

their national strategy. Both the Israeli and British programs have

been developed out of necessity and, although informal, remain

largely effective. Israel and the United Kingdom have developed a

“culture” of RISKCOMMS horizontally across their government

agencies and vertically down to the lowest municipality. 

152 Chapter 7
In the United States, the RISKCOMMS culture is found

only in a handful of federal agencies and is centered only on the

government aspect of the RISKCOMMS partnership. Fortunately,

the United States has not been forced to develop RISKCOMMS

out of necessity, but the RISKCOMMS culture must be created

within the United States to achieve the successes of Britain and

Israel. Governments by their nature make up for the absence of a

necessity driver by institutionalizing new behavior through law

or policy. This is another important reason why a National Risk

Communications Strategy is necessary—to create a culture of

RISKCOMMS within the United States. 

KEY ELEMENTS OF A NATIONAL RISK COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY

Political scientists and military strategists describe strategy by ends, ways, and means. The ends are the objectives, the

ways are the methods for achieving the ends, and the means are

the resources required to execute the strategy. This chapter focuses on the ends and ways primarily and only touches slightly

on the means (resource issues). Establishing the means for a National Risk Communications Strategy is a subject for further

study. 

The RISKCOMMS national strategy should identify three

primary ends: first, to minimize secondary consequences to avoid

unnecessary costs in human lives, health and welfare, the economy, and the environment. The second end is to maximize community resilience to ensure rapid recovery from a terrorist attack.

The third end is to strengthen government and public partnerships to improve the nation’s preparedness, response, and recovery efforts to defeat terrorist aims. All of these can fall under a

single overarching strategic objective best described by General

Larry Welch (U.S. Air Force (retired)) in testimony before DHS on

community resilience: “Preservation of the American Way of

Life.”71

The remaining key elements can be placed within two

major categories: planning and programs. Planning is the effort

to prepare in advance of a terrorist incident to achieve the strategy

ends. Programs are the tools that are employed before, during,

and after a terrorist incident to also meet the ends. Each will be

examined in turn.

National Risk Communications Strategy 153
Former DHS Secretary Chertoff emphasized the importance of planning in a 2008 speech: “If there is one lesson that 7

years since 9/11 should have taught, it is that advance planning

is the only way to respond to a major threat.”72 Planning provides

an opportunity for government and the public to work closely together. A National Risk Communications Strategy (NRCS) document would require a new Federal Risk Communication Plan

consistent with the NRF. It would mandate that all current state

and local emergency response plans to be amended (attached) or

augmented (separate plan) with a RISKCOMMS plan. The NRCS

must emphasize the importance of government and public partnership occurring during all phases of planning from concept, development, testing, and approval. In order to address all

subdivisions within a community, local emergency management

planners must include grassroots members of the community:

civil and ethnic leaders, volunteer organizations, business associations, churches, and other citizen groups.73

The NRCS must list the critical components of federal,

state, and local plans. An example of key components includes:

s a library of pre-scripted advance RISKCOMMS messages, tailored to all subgroups in a community;

s a list of national, regional, and local authorities on

terrorism and WMD agents;

s a list of pre-designated trained representatives for

conveying RISKCOMMS messages;

s a list of RISKCOMMS message development teams

for pre-incident, incident, and post-incident deployment; 

s a system for the rapid dissemination of RISKCOMMS

messages from all levels of government to the public; and

s a program for continuous review and improvement

of RISKCOMMS messages and programs.

On the federal level, the NRCS document should require

an update of the National Response Framework (NRF), specifically, the Public Affairs and ESF 15 Annexes. Since the NRF’s main

focus is the incident and not pre/post incident programs, the Annexes must be revised to address RISKCOMMS during an event

and therefore include those elements of RISKCOMMS for incident

response from the NRCS (see programs below). Additionally, pro154 Chapter 7
visions need to be added to the NRF that focus on bolstering

rather than subsuming local capability. Allowing local and state

communities to manage an incident on their own, to the fullest

extent possible, improves local community bonds and strengthens resilience while correspondingly decreasing feelings of vulnerability.74 In addition to the planning components list above,

the NRCS must require consistency between the NRF and all federal, state, and local RISKCOMMS plans. This model already exists in the provisions of the National Contingency Plan

regulations (Title 40, U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Part 300),

where oil and chemical pollution response plans must be aligned

from federal to local levels. RISKCOMMS plans must be exercised

regularly, like oil and chemical plans.75 This should also be prescribed by the NRCS document. 

The NRCS document should require all agencies involved

in a terrorist event to contribute to the development and continuous modification of the Federal Risk Communications Plan. The

overall lead agency for this effort must be DHS since they have

primary responsibility for coordinating the nation’s response to

a terrorist event. The Homeland Security Council must be briefed

on the RISKCOMMS sections of the plan routinely. The Council

must also have the plan ready during an emergency to access key

RISKCOMMS messages as early as possible in order to assist the

President in a timely fashion to address national public concerns. 

In addition to formulating plans, the NRCS document

should prescribe a number of programs (tools) to help facilitate

RISKCOMMS during and after an incident. One program that is

absolutely necessary is the revision of the Homeland Security

Alert System. The current system is insufficient for one main reason: it does not require the public to take any action; therefore,

it does not foster government and public cooperation, and simply

increases fear. DOD has specific procedures for increased terrorist

threats (THREATCON), which actively engages subordinate commands and the DOD community to protect themselves and DOD

installations.76 A national program like THREATCON would be

more effective than the existing alert system. 

Another key program in an effective NRCS document is

public education. Compared to Israel and Britain, the United

States program is severely lacking. Using these two countries as

National Risk Communications Strategy 155
excellent examples, the United States should use RISKCOMMS

to rally the nation around a message of resilience.77 The current

U.S. system is indirect, using the internet medium, which requires

the public to “pull” information. RISKCOMMS messages need to

be pushed as well so there is reasonable assurance the message is

received. The United States appears to be reluctant to push information for fear of unnecessarily raising public anxiety. Experts

like Dr. Sandman and others have demonstrated that “precautionary advocacy” results in substantial avoidance of psychological impacts during and following an attack.78 RISKCOMMS

messages should be provided through television, public service

messages, radio, and mass mailings to homes. Schools can teach

children drills, issue school assignments, and hold discussion

groups to increase awareness.79 The Citizen Corps, launched by

President Bush in 2002 for the purposes of strengthening a community’s response to terrorism, is an excellent resource for integrating and promoting RISKCOMMS education.80 Currently, the

Citizen Corps has no concrete incentive to provide public education, let alone promote a RISKCOMMS program.

The NRCS strategy should require a Federal Risk Communications Center (FRCC). The FRCC would have the sole function of coordinating RISKCOMMS for the entire federal

government, centralizing and coordinating public risk communications for a terrorist event. The FRCC should be collocated with

the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), which is responsible for coordinating federal government operations in response to a national incident.81 Both centers need to be joined at

the hip with the National Joint Information Center (NJIC) identified in the NRF. The difference between the NJIC and the F RCC

is that the former deals exclusively with the media regarding facts

and data specific to the incident while the latter is primarily concerned with communicating risk. The FRCC develops the

RISKCOMMS messages and monitors their effectiveness while

the NJIC is responsible for communicating the messages to the

media and the public. When not responding to an event, the

FRCC can be the prime provider of government-approved terrorist RISKCOMMS messages through the various mediums discussed above. It can produce the single authoritative website for

the information consumer, and can be the prime venue for

156 Chapter 7
RISKCOMMS conferences, seminars, and training. 

The FRCC could fall under the primary direction of the

DHS Office of Public Affairs, which has direct links with the President’s Homeland Security Council.82 RISKCOMMS experts, public affairs experts from government, industry and academia,

social scientists, and terrorist experts should staff the FRCC. The

FRCC can also house deployable expert RISKCOMMS teams to

support local responders. The FRCC must also be staffed with a

massive public answering service, consisting of hundreds of individuals who can surge into the center to answer the thousands

of phone inquiries expected during a major event. Here the FRCC

can be most helpful to the local responders by removing this burden and allowing them to focus on resolving the incident. 

Although these steps would not require a tremendous

amount of government resources, especially when compared to

other line items in the government’s budget, they would pay great

dividends. When the NRCS planning and program elements are

in place, the U.S. government will be in the best position it has

ever been to preserve U.S. national integrity in the face of a terrorist attack.

RISK COMMUNICATION: ESSENTIAL FOR NATIONAL PRESERVATION

The goal of risk communications in a terrorist attack is

the preservation of the American Way of Life, the means are the

government and the people, and the way is through the development and implementation of an effective National Risk Communication Strategy. The first step requires leadership. The

President and Congress must acknowledge that a partnership between the government and the public is long overdue. The nation’s leaders must take the initiative and forge a covenant with

the public to be communicative, helpful, and a trusted partner in

times of a terrorist event. Such a strategy allows the United States

to bolster the collective resolve of its government and people, as

well as communicate back to the terrorist “that government of

the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the

earth.”83

National Risk Communications Strategy 157
Notes

1

Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division, Terrorism 2002-2005

(Washington DC: FBI, 2006), v.

2

National Security Council, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, (Washington DC: The White House, September 2006), http://www.whitehouse .gov/nsc

/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf; National Security Council, National Strategy for Information Sharing, (Washington DC: The White House, October 2007), http://www

.whitehouse.gov/nsc/infosharing /index .html.

3

National Research Council, Improving Risk Communication (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1989), 21. The National Research Council definition is

“Risk communication is an interactive process of exchange of information and

opinion among individuals, groups and institutions.” This definition is considered incomplete for the purposes of this chapter because of the lack of ‘risk’ mentioned in the definition and what risk communications is intended to achieve. 

4

Ibid., 4.

5

“Environmental Progress,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA, February 12, 2009. http://www.epa.gov/earthday/history.htm (February 12, 2009).

6

“PMC Results,” National Center for Biotechnology Information, http://www.ncbi

.nlm.nih.gov/pmc?term=carcinogenic%20risk%20communication.

7

Baruch Fischoff, letter to Chairman of the Homeland Security Science and Technology Committee, June 16, 2006, 2.

8

Vincent T. Covello, et al., Effective Risk Communication: The Role and Responsibility

of Government and Non-Government Organizations (New York: Plenum Press,

1989), 73.

9

Itay Wiser and Ran D. Balicer, “Introduction to Bioterrorism Risks,” Risk Assessment and Risk Communication Strategies in Bioterrorism Preparedness, ed. Manfred

S. Green et al., (Dodrecht, the Netherlands: Springer, 2007), 105.

10Amanda J. Ozin et al., “Anthrax-Euronet and Beyond–Research on High Risk

Agents,” Risk Assessment and Risk Communication Strategies in Bioterrorism Preparedness, ed. Manfred S. Green et al., (Dodrecht, the Netherlands: Springer,

2007), 125.

11B. D. DeGroat, Roadway Deaths Up After 911 Due Largely to Local Driving, (The

University Record Online, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, November

2004), 1.

12Kathleen J. Tierney et al., eds., Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and

Response in the United States (Washington D.C: John Henry Press, 2001), 188. 13Roxanne Cohen Silver et al., “Nationwide Longitudinal Study of Psychological

Responses to September 11,” Journal of the American Medical Association 288, no.

10 (2002): 1235.

14Anne Speckhard, “Prevention Strategies and Promoting Psychological Resilience to Bioterrorism Through Communication,” Risk Assessment and Risk Communication Strategies in Bioterrorism Preparedness, eds. Manfred S. Green et al.,

(Dodrecht, the Netherlands: Springer 2007), 146.

15J. A. Boscarino et al., “Mental Health Service Use 1 Year after the World Trade

158 Chapter 7
Center Disaster, Implications for Mental Health Care,” General Hospital Psychiatry

26 (2004), 356.

16Speckhard, “Prevention Strategies,” 144.

17Yamashina S. Ohbu and A. N. Takasu, “Sarin Poisoning on Tokyo Subway,”

South Medical Journal 90, (1997): 587. 18The International Atomic Energy Agency, The Radiological Accident in Goiania,

(Vienna, 1988), 11, 46.

19John W. Poston et al., NCRP Report No. 138–Management of Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Material, (Bethseda, MD: National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, 2001) 151-152.

20C. Chess and L. Clarke, “Facilitation of Risk Communication During the Anthrax

Attacks of 2001: The Organizational Backstory,” American Journal of Public Health

97, no. 9, (2007): 1579.

21Ibid.

22Government Accountability Office, Report to the Ranking Minority Member Committee on Government Affairs, U.S. Senate. Better Guidance is Needed to Improve

Communication Should Anthrax Contamination Occur in the Future, (Washington

DC GAO Report GAO-3-316, 2003), 17.

23Ibid.

24Ibid., 27.

25Ibid., 18.

26Lee Clarke et al., “Speaking with One Voice: Risk Communication Lessons from

the U.S. Anthrax Attacks,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 14,

no. 3, (2006), 161.

27Mathew Weinstock, “Senators want Better Guidelines for Responding to Bioterrorism,” Government Executive, 2001, http://www.govexec.com/story

_page.cfm?filepath=/dailyfed/1001/103101w2.htm.

28Clarke, “One Voice,” 162.

29Ibid.

30James S. Gilmore, The Fifth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of

the Advisory Panel to Assess the Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation, 2003), 108. 31Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Joint

Forces Command, Human Behavior and WMD Crisis/Risk Communication Workshop: Final Report, (Washington DC: DTRA, 2001), 10. 32Bill Durodie, “Terrorism and Community Resilience–A UK Perspective,”

ISP/NSC Briefing Paper 05/01, (Chatham House, July 2005): 4. 33Monica Scoch-Spana, “Strategies to Remedy Panic in a Pandemic: Lessons from

Biodefense,” The Threat of Pandemic Influenza: Are We Ready?, eds. Stacy L. Knobler et al., (Washington D.C: National Academy Press, 2005), 348.

34Durodie, “Terrorism,” 5.

35Ibid.

36Erik Auf der Heide, “Disasters: Panic, the ‘Disaster Syndrome,’ and Looting,”

The First 72 Hours: A Community Approach to Disaster Preparedness, ed. M. O’Leary

(Lincoln, Nebraska: iUniverse Publishing, 2004), 343.

37“President Bush: Job Ratings,” PollingReport.com, January 16, 2009,

National Risk Communications Strategy 159
http://www.pollingreport.com/BushJob1.htm (February 12, 2009).

38Jessica Reaves, “Time/CNN Poll: Americans Concerned, but not Panicked,”

Time, November 9, 2001. http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599

,183881,00.html (February 12, 2009); “USA Today/CNN/Gallop Poll Results,”

USA Today, November 5, 2001. http://www.usatoday.com /news/poll001.htm

(February 12, 2009).

39Jeffrey M. Jones, “Republicans in Congress less Popular than Bush,” Gallup, December 16, 2008, http://www.gallup.com/poll/113449/Republicans-CongressLess-Popular-Than-Bush.aspx (March 11, 2009).

40Ben Sheppard G. et al., “Terrorism and the Myth of a Panic Prone Public,” Public

Health Policy 27, no. 3 (2006): 220. 41Janet Napolitano, “Common Threat, Collective Response: Protecting Against

Terrorist Attacks in a Networked World,” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, July 29, 2009). 

42Lawrence Freedman, “The Politics of Warning: Terrorism and Risk Communication,” Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 3 (2005): 379. 43Ibid., 55-56. Note: the author also reviewed the National Strategy for Information Sharing developed by the National Security Council. One would expect some

mention of RISKCOMMS; however, the document is primarily directed at improving intelligence sharing between government agencies–not sharing information with the public. National Security Council, National Strategy for

Information Sharing, (Washington DC 2007) 1. 44The National Security Council, The National Security Strategy, (Washington DC,

2010) 18-19.

45This directive is still in use by the Obama administration. See the Department

of Homeland Security Website: http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_12192

63961449.shtm.

46Barack Obama, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21, The White House,

2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/10 /20071018-10.html,

1.

47Federal Emergency Management Agency,National Response Framework, (Washington DC: GPO, January 2008) Pub-1, ESF-15, http://www .fema.gov/pdf

/emergency/nrf/about_nrf.pdf.

48See Covello, et al., Effective Risk Communication, 161. Additionally, the author

conducted informal research on the internet and was able to find additional programs sponsored by other agencies such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Many other agencies, like the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,

have excellent Public Affairs programs that closely approximate an RC program,

but are missing some key elements. 

49Kim A. O’Connell, “Pounds of Cure,” The American City and County, 118, no. 6

(June 2003): 8-9.

50Marsha L. Vanderford, “Breaking New Ground in WMD Risk Communication:

The Pre-event Message Development Project,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice and Science 2, no. 3 (2004): 95. 51“National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism,”

University of Maryland, 2010, http://www.start.umd.edu/start/.

160 Chapter 7
52K. U. Menon, “National Resilience: From Bouncing Back to Prevention,” Ethos

(Great Britain, March 2005): 17.

53Community Stress Prevention Center, http://icspc.telhai.ac.il/main.html. 54Speckhard, “Prevention Strategies,” 150.

55Peter Sandman, telephone interview with author, November, 10, 2008.

56Ibid.

57Menon, “National Resilience,”17.

58Sandman, interview, November, 10, 2008.

59Geoffrey O’Brien and Paul Read, “Future UK Emergency Management: New

Wine, Old Skin?” Disaster Prevention and Management 14, no. 3 (2005), 354. 60Ragnar Lofstedt, telephone interview with author, January 8, 2009.

61Greater London Authority. Report of the July 7th Review Committee, (London,

June 2006): 78.

62Ibid.

63Ibid., 81.

64Speckhard makes a strong case for Israel’s resiliency due to excellent communications. See Speckhard, “Prevention Strategies and Promoting Psychological

Resilience,” 147.

65Health Canada, Crisis/Emergency Communication Guidelines, (Health Canada,

Communications Marketing and Consultation Branch, September 2005) 7.

66Menon, “National Resilience,” 17.

67Ibid.

68Ozin, “Anthrax-Euronet and Beyond,” 123.

69Randall N. Hyer and Vincent T. Covello, Effective Media Communication during

Public Health Emergencies. A World Health Organization Handbook (Geneva, 2005). 70Cleto DiGiovanni Jr. et al., “Factors Influencing Compliance with Quarantine

in Toronto During the 2003 SARS Outbreak,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice and Science, 2, no. 4 (2004): 5. 71Minutes of the November 8, 2005 Open Session of the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee (November 2005),

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Minutes_Nov_8_05 .pdf.

72Michael Chertoff, “Confronting Biological Threats to the Homeland,” Joint Force

Quarterly 51, (2008): 10. 73Scoch-Spana, “Strategies to Remedy Panic,” 332; Tierney, Facing the Unexpected,

259.

74Alan Kirschenbaum, “Does Terror Terrorize? Community Resilience in Israel,”

Gazette Magazine, 69, no. 3 (November 2007), 114-115. 75That said, obviously there is much to be learned for oil plans given the 2010

Gulf oil spill, but that is outside the scope of this chapter.

76“Appendix J: Threatcon System,” Federation of American Scientists, November

13, 1996, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/app-J_THREATCON.htm.

77“Defense Threat Reduction Agency,” Human Behavior and WMD, 10. 78Sandman, interview, November 10, 2008. 

79George Gray and David P. Ropeik, “The Role of Risk Communication,” Health

Affairs, 21, no. 6 (December 2002): 108. 80Michael T. Kindt, “Building Population Resilience to Terror Attacks: Unlearned

National Risk Communications Strategy 161
Lessons from Civilian and Military Experiences,” Counterproliferation Papers, no.

36 (November 2006): 22.

81“National Response Framework,”Department of Homeland Security (Washington

DC: GPO, January 2008) http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/about

_nrf.pdf.

82Members of the Homeland Security Council include: the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and

Human Services, the Secretary of Transportation, the Director of the Office of

Management and Budget, the Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, the

Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff to the Vice President. 

83Abraham Lincoln (speech, “The Gettysburg Address,” Gettysburg, PA, November 19, 1863).

162 Chapter 7