NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JOHN HYRAM THOMPSON, JR., Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 19-0154 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. V1300CR201680567

The Honorable Michael R. Bluff, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Michael O’Toole

Counsel for Appellee

The Zickerman Law Office, PLLC, Flagstaff

By Adam Zickerman

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 5-12-2020
STATE v. THOMPSON

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1 John Hyram Thompson, Jr. appeals his convictions and 

sentences for several felonies. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Daniel received several frantic text messages from his exgirlfriend, Melissa, who beckoned for help, warning she was being held 

captive at a particular address in Clarkdale and would “be dead by 

tomorrow.” Daniel reported Melissa’s troubling messages to Clarkdale 

Police. He was then connected by cell phone to a patrol officer and 

confirmed the text messages. Daniel relayed Melissa’s phone number to 

police and said he last heard from Melissa “a couple seconds ago.” Melissa 

did not answer calls from Daniel or the police.

¶3 Police responded to the reported address, where Thompson 

lived in his trailer, which was surrounded by surveillance cameras, a 

perimeter, chain-link fence and “Private Property” and “No Trespassing” 

signs. A vehicle registered to Thompson was visible from the street. 

Thompson was known to Clarkdale Police after “previous aggressive or 

angry encounters with law enforcement,” and officers were warned to call 

for “backup” in future encounters. Daniel again called the police officers 

as they surveyed the property, reiterating his report and providing a 

physical description of Melissa. One of the officers had seen a woman 

matching Melissa’s description at Thompson’s place only days before. 

¶4 The police officers entered the front gate, which was 

unlocked, and knocked on the front door. Thompson eventually answered 

and walked onto the porch. The officers explained they were performing a 

welfare check and asked whether anyone else was inside the trailer.

Thompson insisted “three or four times” that nobody was inside and

refused permission to search the trailer. He seemed “nervous” and could 

not initially locate his identification. 
STATE v. THOMPSON

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 The police chief scrambled to the scene as questioning 

continued because officers had made no progress with Thompson despite 

the emergent circumstances. The chief immediately approached Thompson

to determine whether “somebody inside [his] trailer [was] being held 

against their will,” explaining that officers would not leave until their 

concerns were dispelled, and adding that “provisions [of the law] allow us 

to do that.” Thompson then admitted his “girlfriend” was in the trailer, 

which “absolutely” raised “red flags” for the officers. Thompson offered to 

retrieve his girlfriend, but the police chief refused, now concerned about 

the safety of his officers if Thompson left his sight. The chief therefore 

yelled for Melissa from the front door. She did not respond, heightening 

his concern. Officers entered the trailer and found Melissa half-asleep in 

the bedroom.

¶6 Melissa was escorted from the trailer by police officers who 

described her as “groggy” and “disoriented.” She had a “fresh needle 

mark” on her arm and conceded injecting heroin the previous night.

Melissa later confirmed she sent text messages to Daniel for help. She also 

described her brief relationship with Thompson. According to Melissa, the 

relationship turned violent after the first night, when Thompson began 

restricting her movement and twice “chok[ing] her out to the point of 

unconsciousness.” Melissa was afraid that Thompson was “digging [her] 

grave” outside. Melissa added that Thompson had black-tar heroin and 

high-powered guns in his trailer. Thompson was arrested. 

¶7 Police secured a warrant to search Thompson’s trailer based 

on information collected from Melissa and the department’s internal 

knowledge of Thompson. The search yielded over 32 grams of heroin, a 

digital scale with “brownish” residue, methamphetamine, psilocybin 

mushrooms, radio scanners and a list of frequencies used by police,

ammunition and nine firearms, including an AR-15 style rifle. Officers also 

found unused syringes, syringes filled with black fluid, and used pipes with 

“white residue.” 

¶8 Thompson was indicted on 18 felonies, including possession 

of narcotic drugs for sale, possession or use of dangerous drugs and 

possession of drug paraphernalia, misconduct involving weapons and 

theft.

¶9 Thompson moved to suppress all evidence recovered from 

the search of his trailer, arguing the search warrant was supported, in part, 

with information obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The 

court held a hearing and denied the motion. Thompson also objected to the 
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Decision of the Court

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prosecutor’s opening and closing statements as unfairly prejudicial. Both 

objections were overruled. The jury found Thompson guilty of 15 felony 

counts, including one count of possession of narcotic drugs, two counts of 

possession of dangerous drugs, nine counts of misconduct involving 

weapons, and three counts of possession of drug paraphernalia. 

¶10 Thompson timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-

120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and -4032(6).

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Suppress

¶11 Thompson first argues the superior court should have 

suppressed all evidence seized from his trailer because the search warrant 

was based on information provided by a person (Melissa) found during a 

prior warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The State 

counters that police officers lawfully entered Thompson’s yard and trailer 

under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement because 

they reasonably believed that a person within the residence needed

immediate aid or assistance.

¶12 We review the superior court’s ruling on a motion to suppress 

evidence for a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 284 

(1996). “We look only to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, 

and we view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the trial 

court’s ruling.” State v. Moore, 183 Ariz. 183, 186 (App. 1995). “[W]e defer 

to the trial court’s factual findings, including findings on credibility and 

[on] the reasonableness of the inferences drawn by the officer, but we 

review de novo mixed questions of law and fact and the trial court’s 

ultimate legal conclusion[]” whether a search was lawful. State v. Teagle, 

217 Ariz. 17, 22, ¶ 19 (App. 2007).

¶13 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. 

Const. amend. IV; State v. Wilson, 237 Ariz. 296, 298, ¶ 7 (2015). A 

warrantless search is reasonable only if it falls under an exception to the 

warrant requirement. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014). At issue 

here is the emergency aid exception, which applies “when (1) the police 

have reasonable grounds to believe an emergency exists that requires their 

immediate assistance to protect life or property and (2) a reasonable basis 
STATE v. THOMPSON

Decision of the Court

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exists to associate the emergency with the place to be searched.” State v. 

Bennett, 237 Ariz. 356, 359, ¶ 9 (App. 2015).

¶14 We find no abuse of discretion. Police officers received 

specific and credible information that a particular person (Melissa) was 

being held against her will at a particular address; indeed, the threatened 

person had reached out for help and expressed a fear for her life. The 

reporter (Daniel) confirmed this information multiple times. Moreover, one 

police officer had recently seen a woman on Thompson’s property who 

matched Melissa’s description. Then, Thompson lied several times to 

police officers who responded—denying that anyone else was inside the 

trailer—until conceding the opposite after he was confronted by a 

determined police chief. The officers reasonably described the about-face 

as a “red flag.” Even then, police only entered the trailer after Melissa did 

not answer their calls from the front door. The officers acted reasonably 

under the circumstance. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (the

touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness”).

¶15 Thompson’s arguments are not persuasive. He first describes 

Daniel’s reports as “confused,” “incoherent” and “stale,” but Daniel

contacted police with specific information (name, address, physical 

description) about a specific threat, which he repeated three different times, 

including “[a] couple seconds” after his last contact with Melissa. 

Thompson then argues he had revoked the public’s limited license to 

approach the curtilage of his home, citing State v. Lohse, 245 Ariz. 536, 540-

41, ¶¶ 10-13 (App. 2018), but that argument ignores the emergency aid

exception, Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403. We affirm the court’s denial of 

Thompson’s motion to suppress.1

1 Because we find that the emergency-aid exception applies, we do not 

address whether Melissa’s post-rescue statements should not have been 

included in the warrant affidavit under the fruit of the poisonous tree 

doctrine. See State v. Price, 27 Ariz. App. 673, 677 (1976) (“We fail to see how 

the purpose of deterring unlawful police conduct would be furthered by 

suppressing the testimony of known victims of the armed robberies.”); see 

also United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 274-75 (1978) (noting that “the 

exclusionary rule should be invoked with much greater reluctance where 

the claim is based on a causal relationship between a constitutional 

violation and the discovery of a live witness than when a similar claim is 

advanced to support suppression of an inanimate object”); State v. Doughty, 

472 N.W.2d 299, 307 (Minn. 1991) (stating that under Ceccolini the question 
STATE v. THOMPSON

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II. Thompson’s Motions for Mistrial

¶16 Thompson next claims the court should have declared a 

mistrial based on improper remarks by the prosecutor in opening and 

closing statements. We review the superior court’s denial of a motion for 

mistrial for an abuse of discretion, State v. Sanders, 245 Ariz. 113, 128, ¶ 61 

(2018), reversing only if defendant shows a reasonable likelihood that 

comments could have affected the jury’s verdict, State v. Gallardo, 225 Ariz. 

560, 569, ¶ 40 (2010), and affording great deference to the superior court,

State v. Lamar, 205 Ariz. 431, 439, ¶ 40 (2003).

¶17 Thompson argues for a mistrial because the prosecutor 

referred to an ongoing investigation in his opening statement and alluded 

to mass shootings in his closing argument. But Thompson makes almost 

no effort to show a reasonable likelihood that the statements affected the 

trial. Furthermore, the superior court twice instructed the jury that opening 

and closing statements are not considered evidence. We presume the jurors 

followed their instructions. State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 403, ¶ 68 (2006). 

We find no error.

CONCLUSION

¶18 We affirm. 

is “whether the victim or witness is testifying of her own free will rather 

than at the compulsion of the state resulting from the discovery of her name 

through illegal means”).