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THREATS TO THE AMERICAN HOMELAND AFTER 

KILLING BIN LADEN: AN ASSESSMENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 25, 2011 

Serial No. 112–25 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

VACANCY

VACANCY

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security .................... 1 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 2 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

WITNESSES

Mr. Lee Hamilton, Bipartisan Policy Center: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Ms. Frances F. Townsend, Senior Vice President, Worldwide Government, 

Legal and Business Affairs, MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. ................. 15 

Mr. Peter Bergen, Director, National Security Studies Program, New America 

Foundation: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 20 

Mr. Evan F. Kohlmann, Flashpoint Global Partners: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 27 

Prepared Statement with Laith Alkhouri .......................................................... 30 

APPENDIX I 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Information Submitted for the Record ............................................................... 49 

The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas: 

Charts ................................................................................................................... 57 

(1) 

THREATS TO THE AMERICAN HOMELAND 

AFTER KILLING BIN LADEN: AN ASSESSMENT 

Wednesday, May 25, 2011 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:33 a.m., in Room 311, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King [Chairman of 

the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives King, Smith, Lungren, Rogers, McCaul, 

Broun, Miller, Walberg, Cravaack, Walsh, Meehan, Rigell, Duncan, 

Marino, Farenthold, Brooks, Thompson, Jackson Lee, Cuellar, 

Clarke of New York, Richardson, Davis, Speier, Richmond, Clarke 

of Michigan and Keating. 

Chairman KING. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland Security will come to order. 

The committee is meeting today to examine the near-term and 

long-term consequences and benefits to the security of our homeland resulting from the successful killing of Osama bin Laden. I 

now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

First of all, let me welcome everyone here this morning. Let me 

especially thank our witnesses. We have an outstanding panel of 

witnesses, and I truly look forward to their testimony. I want to 

thank the Ranking Member, as always, for his assistance in this 

hearing. My remarks will be brief this morning. 

I believe this hearing is absolutely essential for a number of reasons. One, all of us can take great satisfaction and pride, quite 

frankly, in the killing of Osama bin Laden. I give the President tremendous credit for having done it. It took courage. It took basically 

ice water in his veins at the last moment to make that decision, 

and I give him tremendous credit for it. 

The only concern I have is that too many, I think, of the American people somehow feel that now with bin Laden dead, as great 

a victory as this was, and we can discuss how great it was, how 

significant it was, what the implications are, the fact is I believe 

too many people think that with bin Laden dead, somehow the war 

against terrorism is over, or the terrorist war against us is over; 

that this will significantly impact the war against us; and somehow 

maybe we should step back and let our guard down, maybe we can 

relax, maybe start cutting back in some of the programs that have 

kept us safe over the last 10 years. 

My own belief is that in the short run, the threat is probably 

greater than it was. Long term, there is no doubt that the death 

of bin Laden is extremely positive for so many different reasons. 
2 

But in the short run in particular, I think it is very likely to assume—and just looking at al-Qaeda’s own language—the fact is 

that they feel they have to not just avenge this, but they have to 

show the rest of the world, the rest of the Muslim world, the rest 

of the terror world, that they are viable, that they are vibrant as 

before, that they have not been taken down, and they have to have 

a dramatic showing. That, to me, would involve obviously an attack 

by al-Qaeda or one of its franchise operations. 

My belief is that because of the many programs that have been 

instituted over the last 9, 10 years, it would be very difficult for 

al-Qaeda to carry out another 9/11-type attack, attack from overseas into the United States, certainly not on the dimensions of the 

September 11 attacks. But at the same time, starting several years 

ago, al-Qaeda did begin recruiting in this country people under the 

radar screen. In addition to that, we have had those who are selfradicalized, those who are radicalized through the internet. We 

have seen a series of cases, for instance, just in New York, 

Najibullah Zazi, the subway bomber, who was totally under the 

radar screen, who was taken to Afghanistan for training and came 

back to this country and came within hours of carrying out a massive attack on the New York City subway system. 

We had Major Hasan, who was in a way self-radicalized through 

his dealings with Awlaki over the internet, and what he carried out 

at Fort Hood in the fall of the 2009. Then we had Shahzad, the 

Times Square bomber, again, under the radar screen, an American 

citizen trained by the Pakistani Taliban, who came, again, very 

close to a successful attack in Times Square. 

So with all of this, I look forward to the witnesses telling us exactly what they see both in the long term and the short term, what 

it means that bin Laden is no longer here, what it means as far 

as our defenses, where we should be looking to for the next attack, 

the type of attack it could be, the dimensions of that attack. Also, 

as far as the power structure in al-Qaeda, who is going to take 

over? Is there anyone who has the capability of having the type of 

evil magnetism that bin Laden had where he could hold the various ethnic groups together and keep al-Qaeda unified? Is there 

anyone who can step up to that? Will it be Zawahiri; will it be 

someone else? What is the role of someone like Awlaki, who is outside the traditional al-Qaeda structure? 

So these are all the questions that I look forward to hearing the 

answers to. I look forward to the insights of the members of our 

panel, all of whom have long records of expertise and experience. 

I, again, thank all of the witnesses for being here. I thank the 

Members for having such a large turnout this morning. 

With that, I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi, the Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I join you in welcoming our panel of witnesses. 

Before we consider the risk of a terrorist attack following the 

death of bin Laden, I want to publicly add my voice to the many 

who have commended the President, the National security team, 

and our uniformed forces for successfully completing a mission that 

began over 10 years ago. The success of this mission was made pos-
3 

sible by the administration’s efforts with reliable intelligence and 

the surgical use of force. 

For many, the killing of bin Laden has always been the ultimate 

goal of the war on terror. As the mastermind of the terrorist attacks on September 11, he became the central focus of our policies. 

Bin Laden became the personification of terrorism for us. We went 

to war in Afghanistan to eliminate bin Laden’s training camps and 

base of operation. We went to war in Iraq because we were told 

that Saddam Hussein had some connection with bin Laden. In the 

last 10 years, many of our policies at home and abroad have been 

based on forecasts and predictions about bin Laden. For many, the 

elimination of bin Laden will require a dramatic shift in thinking 

about and analyzing the terrorist threat. 

In the last 10 years, we have seen the migration and mutation 

of the terrorist network and the terrorist threat. The threat network has moved beyond borders, and operatives have become decentralized. At the time of his death, bin Laden remained a dangerous, charismatic figure, but his control was not absolute, and 

his authority was not singular. We cannot ignore the new challenges presented by his death. In every group, the death of a leader 

causes disarray and confusion among the followers. These periods 

of transition can last for weeks or years. 

When we consider the safety of our country, the question that 

matters most is what will we do while the terrorists are in the 

throes of transition? For fiscal year 2012, the answer is not encouraging. The DHS appropriations bill recently approved by the Republican-controlled Appropriations Committee cut the Department’s budget by more than $1 billion. Since bin Laden’s death, we 

have learned that al-Qaeda was targeting our cities and critical infrastructure. I am glad to see that our Chairman acknowledged the 

cutting back of some of those desperately needed funds, and I look 

forward to at some point, Mr. Chairman, working with you on getting many of those funds restored based on this treasure trove of 

information that was collected at the site of the killing of bin 

Laden. 

Last week the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda-allied groups 

struck an American armored vehicle transporting American Government personnel. They claimed the attack was in retaliation for 

bin Laden’s death. At a time when our adversaries are seeking opportunities to attack us, cuts in homeland security funding puts us 

in harm’s way. Bin Laden’s death does not end the threat to this 

Nation. In many ways, the picture has become more complex. Our 

focus must remain steady. Our funding must match our focus. 

I look forward to this hearing and to hearing from our witnesses 

today about the dynamic threat environment we now face. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The information follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

MAY 25, 2011 

Before we consider the risk of terrorist attack following the death of bin Laden, 

I want to publicly add my voice to the many who have commended the President, 

the National security team and our uniformed forces for successfully completing a 

mission that began 10 years ago. 
4 

The success of this mission was made possible by this administration’s efforts, reliable intelligence and the surgical use of force. 

For many, the killing of bin Laden has always been the ultimate goal of the war 

on terror. 

As the mastermind of the terrorist attacks on September 11, he became the central focus of our policies. 

Bin Laden became the personification of terrorism for us. 

We went to war in Afghanistan to eliminate bin Laden’s training camps and base 

of operations. 

We went to war in Iraq because we were told that Saddam Hussein had some 

connection with bin Laden. 

In the last 10 years, many of our policies at home and abroad have been based 

on forecasts and predictions about bin Laden. 

For many, the elimination of bin Laden will require a dramatic shift in thinking 

about and analyzing the terrorist threat. 

In the last 10 years, we have seen the migration and mutation of the terrorist 

network and the terrorist threat. 

The terrorist network has moved beyond familiar borders and operatives have become decentralized. 

At the time of his death, Bin Laden remained a dangerous charismatic figure, but 

his control was not absolute and his authority was not singular. 

We cannot ignore the new challenge presented by his death. 

In every group, the death of a leader causes disarray and confusion among the 

followers. These periods of transition can last for weeks or years. 

When we consider the safety of our country, the question that matters most is— 

what will we do while the terrorist are in the throes of transition? 

For fiscal year 2012, the answer is not encouraging. 

The DHS appropriations bill, recently approved by the Republican-controlled Appropriations Committee, cuts the Department’s budget by more than $1 billion. 

Since bin Laden’s death, we have learned that al-Qaeda was targeting our cities 

and critical infrastructure. 

We also know that AQAP is actively targeting our aviation sector. 

Last week, the Pakistani Taliban, an al-Qaeda-allied group struck an American 

armored vehicle transporting American Government personnel. They claimed the attack was in retaliation for bin Laden’s death. 

At a time when our adversaries are seeking opportunities to attack us, cuts to 

homeland security funding put us in harm’s way. 

Bin Laden’s death does not end the threat to this Nation. 

In many ways, the picture has become more complex. Our focus must remain 

steady. And our funding must match our focus. 

Chairman KING. Thank you, Congressman Thompson. 

[The statement of Hon. Richardson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LAURA RICHARDSON

MAY 24, 2011 

I would like to thank Chairman King and Ranking Member Thompson for convening this hearing today focused on the current state of terror threats to the American Homeland in light of the death of Osama bin Laden. While the death of bin 

Laden has been a significant victory in the war on terror for America as well as 

the rest of the world, the implications of this victory need to be addressed. Thus, 

I would like to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses for appearing before the 

committee today to discuss these very important issues that lay before us. 

The death of bin Laden marks the most significant turning point to date in our 

Nation’s efforts to combat and eliminate al-Qaeda and its worldwide affiliates. As 

the figurehead and symbol of global terrorism, he inspired thousands of militants 

and extremists to wage war against the West and commit unspeakable acts of violence. 

While it is clear that his death has marked a significant blow to al-Qaeda and 

its affiliates, most experts agree that bin Laden’s death alone is not likely to end 

the war on terror. In fact, as some of the recent events in Pakistan have indicated, 

many terrorist groups are not deterred by the recent death of bin Laden and are 

likely to continue to plot attacks from safe havens world-wide. 

As al-Qaeda attempts to regroup and reorganize after the death of bin Laden, 

their leader, it is important that the United States assess the new threat dynamic 

in order to ensure our National security efforts remain strong and do not become 
5 

complacent in the wake of bin Laden’s death. This means continuing to focus on alQaeda and its affiliates, supporting the message of democracy that is now spreading 

across the Middle East, and providing our counterterrorism officials with the tools 

they need in order to build an effective capacity to combat these world-wide threats. 

Unfortunately, the fiscal year 2012 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations bill that was recently approved by the House Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee, will make these efforts considerably more difficult with 

a decrease in funding of $1.1 billion—or 2.6%—below last year’s level and $3 billion—or 7%—below the President’s request. These proposed cuts represent an unacceptable blow to our National security and could undoubtedly jeopardize future 

counterterrorism efforts. 

As the representative of the 37th district of California, I understand the importance of giving law enforcement officials the resources they need to efficiently and 

effectively protect our local communities. My Congressional district abuts the Nation’s largest ports, contains oil refineries that produce more than 1 million barrels 

per day, and is home to a number of gas treatment and petrochemical facilities that 

present a target-rich environment for those seeking to do us harm. 

Thus, it is imperative that we continue to provide counterterrorism officials with 

the resources necessary to sustain their efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat alQaeda and strengthen the resilience of our Nation against acts of terrorism. 

Thank you again Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Thompson for convening 

this very important hearing today. I look forward to hearing from our distinguished 

panel of witnesses on these issues. I yield back my time. 

Chairman KING. Our first witness this morning is former Congressman Lee Hamilton. I had the privilege of serving on the 

House Foreign Affairs Committee with Congressman Hamilton 

during his extraordinary career. He was chairman of the House 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and everyone in the country knows of his 

outstanding service as Vice Chair of the 9/11 Commission with 

Governor Kean. He served on the U.S. Homeland Security Advisory 

Council and led the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 

Scholars. He currently serves as co-chair of the Bipartisan Policy 

Center’s National Security Preparedness Group. It has always been 

a privilege of mine to consider Lee Hamilton a friend and colleague. I certainly welcome you here for your testimony this morning. 

Thank you, Chairman Hamilton. 

STATEMENT OF LEE HAMILTON, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER 

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Chairman King and Ranking Member Thompson, and, of course, the other Members of the committee. 

I am very pleased to have the opportunity to be with you today. 

I have really appreciated the leadership that the Chairman and the 

other Members of this committee have shown on the whole question of the terrorist threat confronting the country. I am deeply 

grateful for the sustained support coming from this committee in 

reforming our National security institutions. 

As the Chairman mentioned, I am appearing today as the cochair of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group, and very pleased indeed to be joined by two distinguished members of that group, Fran Townsend and Peter Bergen, 

here at the witness table. 

Significant progress has been made, of course, since 9/11 in protecting the homeland, and our country is undoubtedly more safer 

and more secure. But it also remains the fact that a number of our 

key recommendations of the Commission have not yet been implemented. 
6 

The attacks on 9/11 demonstrated the teamwork and collaboration and effective communications at the site are critical. We have 

made some movement towards establishing the unity of command. 

One person has to be in charge when you have a disaster strike. 

They have to make thousands of decisions very quickly. I have 

heard simply from too many community leaders and first responders across the Nation that many communities, many regions still 

have not solved the problem of a unified command structure in the 

event of a disaster. 

Likewise, there has been some, but not sufficient progress in establishing interoperable communications for first responders. I 

know the Chairman and others on this committee have been very, 

very good in calling the attention of the country to that. This is a 

no-brainer. The people at the site of a disaster—the chief players, 

the police, the first aid people, the experts—all have to be able to 

communicate with one another, and the Government has to allocate 

an additional 10 megahertz of the radio spectrum to public safety 

to enhance the ability to communicate in a disaster. 

There have been improvements in transportation and security 

and border security, but transportation security technology still 

lags in its capability to screen passengers and baggage for concealed weapons and explosives. Several attempted attacks over the 

past few years perpetrated by terrorists who could have been detected by the U.S. immigration system demonstrate that a more 

streamlined terrorist watch-listing capability and improved information sharing among the intelligence agencies and immigration 

authorities still have to be improved. 

One area of significant progress is the deployment of the biometric entry system, known as US–VISIT. But a biometric exit component to determine which foreign nationals have left the United 

States has not yet been deployed. I think if law enforcement and 

intelligence officials had known for certain in August 2001, prior to 

the attack, that two of the 9/11 hijackers remained in the United 

States, the search for them could have taken on a greater urgency. 

With respect to intelligence reform, the Director of National Intelligence has certainly made progress in several areas, including 

increased information sharing and improved cooperation among the 

various agencies. But it is not clear that the DNI is the driving 

force of the intelligence community that the 9/11 Commission envisioned. Some ambiguity still appears in the basic statutory structure over the DNI’s authority with regard to budget and personnel. 

Strengthening his position in these areas would advance the unity 

of effort in intelligence, whether that be done through legislation 

or declarations from the President. 

A major disappointment for all of us on the 9/11 Commission has 

been the failure of the administration to empanel the Privacy and 

Civil Liberties Oversight Board. This was a major recommendation 

of the Commission, easily agreed to unanimously by all members 

of the Commission. My information at this time is that the President has only nominated two members to serve on the five-member 

Board, and neither has been confirmed by the Senate. I thank 

Ranking Member Thompson and other Members of the committee 

for the letter that was sent to the administration about the Board’s 
7 

vacancies. I encourage the committee to push that in the months 

ahead. 

Another disappointment, of course, is the failure of this Congress 

to reform oversight of the intelligence community and the Department of Homeland Security. This committee is well aware, better 

than almost anybody else, of the fractured oversight of DHS. I need 

not give the statistics to you. It is an inefficient allocation of limited resources needed to secure our Nation. The massive Department of the DHS will be much better integrated if there is integrated oversight. I know Members of this committee have been 

helpful on this. I have some understanding of the difficulties of the 

problem and working it out, but it is really a high priority and a 

National security interest that the oversight of Homeland Security 

be much more focused. 

The capture and death of Osama bin Laden is the most significant achievement to date in our efforts to defeat al-Qaeda. That 

hard work, the cooperation, vigilance, the tenacity over a period of 

years, as both of you in your opening statements have acknowledged, has been critical. There is no question that his capture and 

death came about as a result of reforms that have recently been 

enacted in the Federal Government that yielded much closer collaboration and information sharing. 

Of course, we now have a major new source of information that 

the intelligence community can analyze in great detail. I think it 

is likely that the information that we get is even more important 

than the death of Osama bin Laden himself. 

Whether his death is a turning point in our fight against terrorism remains to be seen. You can kill a man. You cannot kill a 

symbol. Osama bin Laden is dead. Al-Qaeda is not. It is a network, 

not a hierarchy, as others have said. Over a period of years, it has 

been adaptive, it has been resilient, and his death is certainly a 

setback for al-Qaeda, but likely not its demise. Its affiliates and alQaeda itself will almost certainly attempt to avenge his death; 

however, that attack will not necessarily occur soon. 

Al-Qaeda’s capabilities, as the Chairman noted, and its ability to 

implement large-scale attacks are less formidable that they were 

10 years ago, but there isn’t any doubt at all about al-Qaeda’s intent. They want to kill more Americans. 

Al-Qaeda has been marked by rapid decentralization. The most 

significant threats to American security come from affiliates of core 

al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda elsewhere. 

Its influence, which is on the rise in South Asia, continues to extend to failing states like Yemen and Somalia. 

In assessing threats to the homeland security, senior U.S. 

counterterrorism officials now call attention to al-Qaeda’s strategy 

of diversification. Mounting attacks involving a wide variety of perpetrators of different national and ethnic background make it very 

difficult to profile threats. Most troubling is the pattern of increasing terrorist recruitment of American citizens and residents to act 

as lone wolves. There were two such attacks in just last year or 2, 

and it is very distressing that Americans seem to be playing an increasingly prominent role in al-Qaeda’s movements. 

We know that individuals in the United States are engaging in 

self-radicalization, which is an alarming development. This process 
8 

is often influenced by blogs and other on-line content advocating 

violent extremism. While there are methods to monitor some of this 

activity, it is simply impossible to know the inner thinking of every 

at-risk person. Thus, self-radicalization poses, I believe, a grave 

threat to the United States. 

The National Security Preparedness Group will soon release a report with recommendations for improving our defenses to 

radicalization. That report has not yet been submitted to the full 

group, but it will be done soon, and I hope it will be helpful to you 

as you look at this problem. 

Because al-Qaeda and its affiliates will not give up, we cannot 

let our guard down. We will see new attempts and likely successful 

attacks. We must constantly assess our vulnerabilities and anticipate new lines of attack; not become complacent, but remain vigilant and resolute. We have done a lot. We have done much. We 

have had a great deal of progress. But there is an awful lot more 

to do. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify to this committee. Most importantly, thank you for the long-standing leadership of this committee on homeland security matters. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Hamilton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LEE HAMILTON

MAY 25, 2011 

I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thompson, Members of the committee: I am 

pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today. This committee has 

been at the center of defending the country from the terrorist threat we face. I am 

deeply grateful to you for your sustained support of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations and leadership in reforming our National security institutions. You 

have done a great deal to ensure we are taking the difficult steps necessary to confront this determined enemy and protect Americans, our allies, and people throughout the world. 

Today, I am appearing in my capacity as a co-chair of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group (NSPG), a successor to the 9/11 Commission. Drawing on a strong roster of National security professionals, the NSPG 

works as an independent, bipartisan group to monitor the implementation of the 

9/11 Commission’s recommendations and address other emerging National security 

issues. 

I join in testifying today with two National security experts who also happen to 

be members of the NSPG, Fran Townsend and Peter Bergen. In addition to them, 

the NSPG is composed of: 

• Governor Tom Kean: Former Governor of New Jersey; Chairman of the 9/11 

Commission; and Co-Chair of the National Security Preparedness Group; 

• The Honorable E. Spencer Abraham: Former U.S. Secretary of Energy and U.S. 

Senator from Michigan, The Abraham Group; 

• Dr. Stephen Flynn: President, Center for National Policy; 

• Dr. John Gannon: BAE Systems, former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, 

Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, and U.S. House Homeland Security Staff Director; 

• The Honorable Dan Glickman: Former Secretary of Agriculture and U.S. Congressman; 

• Dr. Bruce Hoffman: Georgetown University terrorism specialist; 

• The Honorable Dave McCurdy: Former Congressman from Oklahoma and 

Chairman of the U.S. House Intelligence Committee, President of the American 

Gas Association; 

• The Honorable Edwin Meese III: Former U.S. Attorney General, Ronald Reagan 

Distinguished Fellow in Public Policy and Chairman of the Center for Legal and 

Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation; 
9 

• The Honorable Tom Ridge: Former Governor of Pennsylvania and U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, Senior Advisor at Deloitte Global LLP, Ridge 

Global; 

• The Honorable Richard L. Thornburgh: Former U.S. Attorney General, Of 

Counsel at K&L Gates; and 

• The Honorable Jim Turner: Former Congressman from Texas and Ranking 

Member of the U.S. House Homeland Security Committee, Arnold and Porter, 

LLP. 

In recent months, our group has sponsored the following events: 

• BPC Domestic Intelligence Conference featuring FBI Director Mueller and DNI 

Director Clapper—October 2010. 

• Bridge-Builder Breakfast: Addressing America’s Intelligence Challenges in a Bipartisan Way with House Intelligence Committee Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger—March 2011. 

• Press conference marking the release of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National 

Security Preparedness Group report, Assessing the Terrorist Threat—September 2010. 

We will soon release another report with recommendations for improving initiatives to prevent violent radicalization in the United States. 

We believe the depth of this group’s experience on National security issues can 

be of assistance to you and the Executive branch and we look forward to continuing 

to work with you. 

II. SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN ADDRESSING THREATS TO THE AMERICAN

HOMELAND SINCE 9/11, YET IMPORTANT 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS REMAIN

UNFULFILLED

Effect of the 9/11 Attacks 

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had a profoundly dramatic impact on 

Government, the private sector, and our daily lives. The suddenness of the attacks 

on American soil and the loss of so many lives, made us feel vulnerable in our 

homes and caused us to question whether our Government was properly organized 

to protect us from this lethal threat. The economic damage resulting from the attacks was severe. In short order, we shifted from a ‘‘peace dividend’’ at the end of 

the Cold War to the expenditure of massive amounts of taxpayer dollars on new security measures. 

The consequences of the attacks for the private sector have been striking. More 

than 80% of our Nation’s critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector, and 

protecting it from terrorist operations has become an urgent priority. Working together, the Government and private sector have improved their information sharing 

and thus our security posture. 

Businesses in all sectors have adapted to this new reality. They have focused on 

how best to protect personnel and our food and water supplies; prepared continuity 

plans in preparation for possible disruptions; and altered how buildings are constructed, adopting innovative safety features. U.S. importers, working with the Department of Homeland Security, have pioneered new ways to ensure the integrity 

of shipping containers that bring goods into the country. The insurance industry’s 

risk analysis has evolved to reflect new realities. These necessary innovations have 

increased the costs of doing business. Future innovations responding to the evolving 

threat may raise costs higher. 

The Government’s Response 

Over the past 10 years, our Government’s response to the challenge of 

transnational terrorism has been equally dramatic. Legal, policy, and cultural barriers between agencies created serious impediments to information sharing before 

the 9/11 attacks. The 9/11 Commission made a number of specific recommendations 

to improve information sharing across our Government, and many of these have 

been accepted and implemented, in whole or in part. 

Information sharing within the Federal Government, and among Federal, State, 

local, and Tribal authorities, and with allies, while not perfect, has been considerably improved since 9/11. The level of cooperation among all levels of Government 

is higher than ever. The CIA, FBI, and the broader intelligence community have implemented significant reforms. In 2004, Congress created the Office of the Director 

of National Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism Center to ensure unity 

of effort in the intelligence community. This was a major step toward improved information sharing. 

State and local officials have a far greater understanding not only of the threat 

and how to respond to it, but also, their communities and those who may be at risk 
10 

of radicalization. There are now 105 Joint Terrorism Task Forces throughout the 

Nation, and 72 Fusion Centers in which Federal, State, local, and Tribal authorities 

investigate terrorism leads and share information. Since 2004, DHS has provided 

more than $340 million in funding to the Fusion Centers. Information sharing with 

the private sector has also become routine and is an important part of our defenses. 

An enormous amount of intelligence information constantly pours into our National security system. And as evidence that there is still room for improvement in 

handling this information, we saw missed opportunities to stop the Christmas day 

bomber from boarding Northwest Flight 253, as well as opportunities to intervene 

before the Fort Hood shootings. But as a result of reforms in the last decade, many 

plots have been disrupted and many terrorist operatives, including Osama bin 

Laden, have been brought to justice. 

Unfulfilled 9/11 Commission Recommendations 

Despite the progress in information sharing and in other areas, important 9/11 

Commission recommendations remain unfulfilled. The 9/11 attacks demonstrated 

that teamwork, collaboration, and effective communications at the site of a disaster 

are critical. Movement has been made toward establishing a unity of command with 

one person in charge of directing the efforts of multiple agencies. I have heard, however, from too many community leaders and first responders that many regions still 

have not solved the problem of having a unified command structure. 

There also has been inadequate progress in establishing interoperable communications for first responders. That is why it is vital that the Government allocate 

an additional 10 megahertz of radio spectrum to public safety that will enhance 

their ability to communicate during a disaster. I want to recognize the leadership 

that Chairman King and Ranking Member Thompson and many Members of this 

committee have shown in supporting a bill that will achieve this goal. 

There have been improvements in transportation security and border security. 

However, transportation security technology still lags in its capability to screen passengers and baggage for concealed weapons and explosives. And several attempted 

attacks over the past 2 years perpetrated by terrorists who could have been detected 

by the U.S. immigration system demonstrate that a more streamlined terrorist 

watchlisting capability and improved information sharing between intelligence agencies and immigration authorities must be implemented. 

One area of significant progress is the deployment of the biometric entry system 

known as US–VISIT. But a biometric exit component of US–VISIT to determine 

which foreign nationals have left the United States has not yet been deployed. If 

law enforcement and intelligence officials had known for certain in August and September 2001 that two of the 9/11 hijackers remained in the United States, the 

search for them might have taken on greater urgency. 

With respect to intelligence reform, the Director of National Intelligence has made 

progress in several areas: Increased information sharing, better analysis of intelligence, improved cooperation among agencies, and sharpened collection priorities. 

But it still is not clear that the DNI is the driving force for intelligence community 

integration that the Commission envisioned. Some ambiguity appears to remain 

with respect to the DNI’s authority over budget and personnel. Strengthening the 

DNI’s position in these areas would advance the unity of effort in intelligence, 

whether through legislation or with repeated declarations from the President that 

the DNI is the unequivocal leader of the intelligence community. 

I also want to recognize that the FBI has gone through dramatic change and has 

had strong leadership under Director Mueller. It continues to move in a positive direction from a focus strictly on law enforcement to preventing terrorism. This is a 

significant cultural change that can be furthered by placing the status of intelligence analysts on par with special agents, who have traditionally risen to management at the Bureau. 

The CIA has improved its intelligence analysis and removed barriers between its 

analysts and operations officers. But recruiting well-placed sources remains difficult 

and the CIA has had difficulty recruiting officers qualified with the language skills 

where there is the greatest need. Congress can help in the language area by supporting programs that teach young people proficiency in foreign languages. 

A major disappointment has been the failure of the administration to empanel the 

Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. This was a major 9/11 Commission recommendation that was strongly supported by all Commissioners. At this time, the 

President has only nominated two members to serve on the five-member Board, and 

neither of them has been confirmed by the Senate. I commend Ranking Member 

Thompson and other Members of the committee for the letter that they sent to the 

administration about the Board’s vacancies and encourage this committee to continue to push the administration on this issue. 
11 

Another disappointment is the failure of Congress to reform oversight of the intelligence community and the Department of Homeland Security. The Commission recommended that Congress create a Joint Committee for Intelligence or create House 

and Senate Committees with the combined authorizing and appropriation powers. 

While these changes have not been implemented, a positive step was the House Intelligence Committee Chairman’s commitment to include three Members of the 

House Appropriations Committee in Intelligence Committee hearings and briefings. 

As this committee is well aware, oversight of the Department of Homeland Security remains fractured. In 2009 alone, DHS officials answered 11,680 letters, provided 2,058 briefings, and sent 232 witnesses to 166 hearings. This amounted to 

about 66 work years responding to questions from Congress, at a cost to taxpayers 

of about $10 million. This is an inefficient allocation of limited resources needed to 

secure our Nation. Moreover, the massive Department will be better integrated if 

there is integrated oversight. 

III. THE CAPTURE OF OSAMA BIN LADEN AND THE THREAT PICTURE AFTER HIS DEATH

The Bin Laden Operation 

The capture of Osama bin Laden is a significant achievement of the United States 

intelligence and military forces—the most significant achievement to date in our efforts to defeat al-Qaeda. The raid took hard work, cooperation, vigilance, and tenacity, over a period of years. It involved surveillance, analysis of many bits of information, interceptions, and the extraordinary skills of our Special Operations Forces. 

The CIA and the military worked together seamlessly. The raid was a culmination 

of intense and tireless efforts on the part of many dedicated National security personnel over a period of many years. 

It was a highly complex, innovative, and clandestine operation that led us to 

Osama bin Laden. We would get a bit of intelligence from one source, carefully analyze it, and then use it to drive further efforts and operations. A simple intercepted 

phone call proved critically important when the response to the caller said, ‘‘I’m 

back with the people I was with before’’—that is, he had returned to Osama bin 

Laden. 

It used the full range of our capabilities, both in collecting intelligence from 

human and technical sources, and subjecting it to very rigorous analysis by our Government’s leading experts on bin Laden and his organization. There is no question 

that his capture came about as a result of reforms that have recently been enacted 

in the Federal Government that yielded much closer collaboration and sharing of 

information among intelligence components and the military. That cooperation paid 

dividends that assisted in locating bin Laden’s hiding place. 

And we now have a major source of new information that the intelligence community will analyze in very great detail. The trove of information—the captured hard 

drive and documents—recovered from his compound may eventually be even more 

important than his death. 

Bin Laden’s Death 

Osama bin Laden was the most infamous terrorist of our time. He was also the 

most successful. He brought together terrorist elements under one movement, alQaeda. Most remarkably, as the mastermind of 9/11, he persuaded 19 young men 

to go to their deaths for a cause. He also directed the attacks on the American embassies in East Africa. 

There is some difference of opinion on his role at his death. My personal view is 

that for the last decade, Osama bin Laden has been a figurehead more than a mastermind. I do not think that a man without a telephone or access to the internet, 

relying on couriers, could have been a prime mover in more recent terrorist operations. There can be no doubt about his symbolic importance. 

The single act of his death does not change everything—nothing ever changes everything—it does not, for example, resolve two messy wars. We should receive some 

satisfaction from his death, but not exaltation. Men die, symbols do not. In his 

death, he can still inspire terrorist attacks. But it is worth noting that in the Middle 

East, news of his death was greeted with ambivalence, and even indifference. 

Future of al-Qaeda 

Whether it is a turning point in our fight against terrorism remains to be seen. 

Although Osama bin Laden is dead, al-Qaeda is not—it is a network, not a hierarchy. Over a period of years, al-Qaeda has been very adaptive and resilient. Bin 

Laden’s death is certainly a setback for al-Qaeda but likely not its demise. 

Al-Qaeda will be searching for an effective leader. Its likely next leader, Ayman 

al-Zawahiri, will almost certainly struggle to keep al-Qaeda relevant. He is likely 

to be the last man standing in the struggle for leadership. We should not underesti-
12 

mate Zawahiri. He is extremely pious, ruthless; he is not a lightweight; he has been 

instrumental in al-Qaeda’s strategy, development, and evolution over a period of 

years. 

Al-Qaeda’s capabilities to implement large-scale attacks are less formidable than 

they were 10 years ago, but al-Qaeda continues to have the intent and reach to kill 

dozens, or even hundreds, of Americans in a single attack. The war against terror 

is not won. The work is not done. It is not time to declare victory. 

Al-Qaeda and its affiliates will almost certainly attempt to avenge him. They will 

not necessarily attack soon. The threat from al-Qaeda is more diverse and more 

complex than ever—although less severe than the catastrophic proportions of the 

9/11 attacks. It continues to hope to inflict mass casualties in the United States 

Al-Qaeda has been marked by rapid decentralization. The most significant threats 

to American National security come from the affiliates of core al-Qaeda—like alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula under U.S.-born Anwar al-Awlaki’s leadership. AlQaeda’s influence is also on the rise in South Asia and continues to extend into failing or failed states such as Yemen and Somalia. 

In assessing terrorist threats to the American homeland, senior U.S. counterterrorism officials now call attention to al-Qaeda’s strategy of ‘‘diversification’’—mounting attacks involving a wide variety of perpetrators of different National and ethnic 

backgrounds that cannot easily be ‘‘profiled’’ as threats. Lone wolves, who are not 

connected to formal terrorist organizations, are the most difficult to detect, in part 

because they do not fit any particular ethnic, economic, educational, or social profile. 

Most troubling, we have seen a pattern of increasing terrorist recruitment of 

American citizens and residents. In 2009, there were two actual terrorist attacks on 

our soil. The Fort Hood shooting, claimed the lives of 13 people, and a U.S. military 

recruiter was killed in Little Rock, Arkansas. Indeed, many counterterrorism experts consider 2010 the ‘‘year of the homegrown terrorist.’’ Last year, 10 MuslimAmericans plotted against domestic targets, and 5 actually carried out their plots. 

Today, we know that Americans are playing increasingly prominent roles in alQaeda’s movement. And Muslim-American youth are being recruited in Somali communities in Minneapolis and Portland, Oregon, in some respects moving the front 

lines to the interior of our country. 

Moreover, we know that individuals in the U.S. are engaging in ‘‘selfradicalization,’’ which is an alarming development. This process is often influenced 

by blogs and other on-line content advocating violent Islamist extremism. While 

there are methods to monitor some of this activity, it is simply impossible to know 

the inner thinking of every at-risk person. Thus, self-radicalization poses a grave 

threat in the United States, and as I noted earlier, our National Security Preparedness Group will soon release a report with recommendations for improving our defenses to radicalization. 

Because al-Qaeda and its affiliates will not give up, we cannot let our guard down. 

We must not become complacent, but remain vigilant and resolute. 

Evolving Mechanisms for Attacking the United States 

Our enemy continues to probe our vulnerabilities and design innovative ways to 

attack us. Such innovation is best exemplified by the discovery in October 2010 of 

explosives packed in toner cartridges, addressed to synagogues in Chicago, and 

shipped on Fed Ex and UPS cargo flights from Yemen. This plot constituted an assault on our international transportation and commerce delivery systems. And it 

was done without the terrorists ever having to set foot within the United States. 

Although it failed, terrorists will not abandon efforts to develop new ways to inflict 

great harm on us. 

Another way that terrorists can attack without ever physically crossing our borders is through a cyber attack. Successive DNIs have warned that the cyber threat 

to critical infrastructure systems—to electrical, financial, water, energy, food supply, 

military, and telecommunications networks—is grave. Earlier this month, senior 

DHS officials described a ‘‘nightmare scenario’’ of a terrorist group hacking into 

United States computer systems and disrupting our electric grid, shutting down 

power to large swathes of the country, perhaps for as long as several weeks. As the 

current crisis in Japan demonstrates, disruption of power grids and basic infrastructure can have devastating effects on society. 

This is not science fiction. It is possible to take down cyber systems and trigger 

cascading side effects. Defending the United States against such attacks must be 

an urgent priority. 

IV. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The capture and removal of Osama bin Laden raises many urgent questions. 

Among them are the following: 
13 

What is the future of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship? The discovery of bin Laden 

in a large compound adjacent to a Pakistani Army cantonment, just a 2-hour drive 

from the Pakistani capital, and about a mile from Pakistan’s West Point—not in a 

remote area over which the government has limited control—requires answers from 

the Pakistani government about whether its intelligence service, military, or other 

officials were aware of bin Laden’s whereabouts for some time, possibly even providing support. It is difficult to imagine that bin Laden would have chosen to live 

in Abbottabad unless he had some assurance of protection from Pakistan military 

and intelligence officials. There is intense debate over how hard to press Pakistan 

for answers about bin Laden and what Pakistani officials knew. 

While Pakistan has cooperated with U.S. counterterrorism efforts, relations with 

Pakistan have been strained in recent years. The United States has provided large 

amounts of aid to Pakistan in return for its assistance in hunting down al-Qaeda 

leaders, but Pakistan has been known to look both ways—helping the United States 

and the Taliban as well. 

Pakistan has been less than a full partner in our counterterrorism efforts and in 

Afghanistan. Pakistan’s government has long been internally divided about terrorism. Parts of its government are sympathetic to terrorism, parts are unwilling 

to act aggressively against it, and other parts are either incompetent or playing a 

double game with and against terrorism. U.S. officials are now openly skeptical 

about Pakistan’s commitment to countering terrorist activity within their borders, 

and they question whether Pakistan will be a better partner in identifying and apprehending terrorists in the future. 

For its part, Pakistan will likely continue to demand that the United States stop 

encroachments upon its sovereignty in counterterrorism operations. Thus, the death 

of Osama bin Laden may very well, in the short run, strengthen the extremists. 

This difficult and complex relationship with Pakistan must be managed, not dissolved, in order to advance our shared interests in countering terrorism and ending 

the war in Afghanistan. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is central to the interests 

of both countries. The United States needs cooperation with Pakistan in its fight 

against terrorism in Afghanistan and ending the war there. Pakistan provides a 

vital transit link for goods destined for U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and its collapse, 

with internal terrorist groups and nuclear weapons, could be catastrophic. This is 

already one of the most difficult bilateral relationships in the world, which has been 

made worse by recent events. We can only manage it, we cannot resolve all the tensions. 

After many demands to cut aid to Pakistan, extensive efforts are now underway 

to ease tensions between the two countries. In the end, the United States will need 

to be committed to working with Pakistan despite the lingering questions. Of this 

we can be sure: More tense times lie ahead in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Our 

focus must be on long-term interests, not short-term frustration. We need a healthy 

Pakistan that fights extremism and terror, and that means we should help democratic forces within Pakistan. 

Another question is Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden’s death creates new opportunities to begin real negotiations to end the conflict. The situation there is not good. 

The United States can clear and hold any area—but only for as long as we stay 

there. The Taliban have been pushed back, but they are not close to being defeated. 

Our gains are fragile and reversible. And the corruption and incompetence of the 

Karzai government is well-known. 

With bin Laden’s death, U.S. policymakers may be in a position to consider 

whether a political deal can be cut with the Taliban, which, from our view would 

require: (1) The Taliban to turn over al-Qaeda leaders, (2) maintaining progress that 

has been made in Afghanistan towards a more open society, and (3) bringing an end 

to the war. We can get to that deal by more fighting. Or we can get to a deal by 

negotiating a political settlement. Success in Afghanistan is not easy to define, but 

it includes establishing an Afghan government that, in time, can hold off the 

Taliban with a modest amount of American support and help. 

A third issue is whether and how recent events in the Middle East—the so-called 

Arab Spring—may counter the violent extremist agenda of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Al-Qaeda has been unsuccessful in its attempts to destabilize Arab governments and replace them with a Muslim Caliphate that stretches across the region. 

It has not been relevant to the revolutionary waves sweeping the Middle East. 

Where al-Qaeda failed, peaceful protesters have succeeded through their grassroots 

uprisings in achieving regime change and dramatic political reforms. What is erupting today in the Middle East is profoundly important—a quest for freedom, for personal dignity, for justice, for a better life. These demands are not going to fade 

away. 
14 

But these revolutions are not without risks. It is by no means clear that they will 

succeed. If they falter and fail to destroy repressive governments and to build a new 

democratic world, al-Qaeda and other violent extremist groups could emerge again. 

In any event, we are headed for a more uncertain Arab world. 

Today Muslim people have a chance, with real elections, constitutions, and political parties. If the people want and demand democratic change and accountable governments, no government will be able to resist. None of us can predict the outcome, 

but we of course can hope for, and support, more democratic regimes. 

The United States must seize the opportunity provided by the Arab Spring, welcome the changes toward self-determination and opportunity, oppose violence and 

repression, promote reform toward democracy, and support economic development 

for the nations moving in a democratic direction. 

Public diplomacy (and nontraditional diplomacy more broadly) may also be a useful tool in facilitating the change sweeping through the region. We should seek to 

foster reform, forestall gross human rights violations, and work closely with the 

international community, while avoiding putting the American imprimatur on the 

protests. 

The key will be to engage pragmatically with the governments of the region to 

help them build stable institutions and provide immediate economic improvement 

to their people. We should support an agenda of opportunity for the Islamic world. 

People-to-people exchanges—between legislators, businesspeople, students, academics, civil servants, trade unions, lawyers, scientists, and other groups—could be 

very productive here. In the 9/11 Commission Report, we recommended that the 

United States ‘‘rebuild the scholarship, exchange, and library programs that reach 

out to young people and offer them knowledge and hope.’’ A significant exchange 

program for emerging Middle East and North Africa democracies should be a relatively easy lift for Congress, and would be a tangible way of signaling U.S. friendship to the new democracies, on the basis of mutual respect and without seeming 

to meddle or to seek control. 

The United States and European Union should also work together to use trade 

and aid policies to give a quick economic assist, in terms of market access, to the 

new democratic governments (once they emerge). Such an initiative would be much 

more effective if done in concert with the European Union. 

V. CONCLUSION

Significant progress has been made since 9/11, and our country is undoubtedly 

safer and more secure. We have damaged our enemy, but the ideology of violent 

Islamist extremism is alive and attracting new adherents, including right here in 

our own country. Close cooperation with American Muslim communities is the key 

to preventing the domestic radicalization that has troubled some of our European 

allies. Positive outreach and efforts to foster mutual understanding are the best way 

to prevent radicalization and sustain collaborative relationships. 

Our terrorist adversaries and the tactics and techniques they employ are evolving 

rapidly. We will see new attempts, and likely successful attacks. One of our major 

deficiencies before the 9/11 attacks was that our National security agencies were not 

changing at the accelerated rate required by a new and different kind of enemy. We 

must not make that mistake again. 

The terrorist threat will be with us far into the future, demanding that we be ever 

vigilant. Our National security departments require strong leadership and attentive 

management at every level to ensure that all parts are working well together, that 

there is innovation and imagination. Our agencies and their dedicated workforces 

have gone through much change and we commend them for their achievements in 

protecting the American people. But there is a tendency toward inertia in all bureaucracies. Vigorous Congressional oversight is imperative to ensure that they remain vigilant and continue to pursue needed reforms. 

Our task is difficult. We must constantly assess our vulnerabilities and anticipate 

new lines of attack. We have done much, but there is much more to do. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify, and for this committee’s long-standing leadership on these critical issues. 

Chairman KING. Thank you, Chairman Hamilton. 

Our next witness is a long-time friend, fellow New Yorker, whose 

mother is a constituent of mine. So I figured I would be very polite 

to you today, which I would be anyway, especially with your mother watching. 
15 

Very seriously, Fran Townsend is a career Federal prosecutor 

with a very distinguished record in the field of counterterrorism in 

several administrations, not just in the Justice Department, but in 

the Coast Guard and in the White House as President George 

Bush’s principal counterterrorism advisor. She is currently senior 

vice president at MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, is a National security contributor and analyst, and she serves on the President’s 

Intelligence Advisory Board. 

Fran, it is great to have you here today, and thank you for all 

your service. I certainly look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF FRANCES F. TOWNSEND, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, WORLDWIDE GOVERNMENT, LEGAL AND BUSINESS 

AFFAIRS, MACANDREWS & FORBES HOLDINGS, INC. 

Ms. TOWNSEND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Thompson, and Members of the committee. Thank you very much 

for inviting me here today. 

Before I begin to address the topic at hand, it seems to me that 

though we are discussing today threats to the United States from 

terror, the impact of natural disasters like that in Missouri have 

captured our hearts and prayers. I know that we all, I think, pray 

for the victims, families, and the missing. 

I have to say it is a special privilege for me to be here with you 

all today. Like many who devoted a substantial part of their professional lives in the hunt for bin Laden and to bring him to justice, 

it is especially satisfying to be with you to consider now the threats 

we face in a world rid of him. In discussing the threat we face, we 

must consider the role bin Laden played. Bin Laden was at the 

heart of what counterterrorism professionals refer to as the alQaeda core. Bin Laden was the father, the founder, and ideological 

author. He was, as the name of the organization suggests, the base. 

Our understanding of bin Laden’s role was imperfect and evolved 

over time. While he was always viewed as a charismatic inspirational figure, key to recruitment, fundraising, ideology, and leadership, the U.S. view of his operational role was unclear. Bin Laden 

inspired loyalty from affiliates like al-Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, who swore allegiance, or bayat, to him. He had a direct hand in cases like the 

1998 East Africa embassy bombings and September 11. 

For years after 9/11, it was believed he played a less active role 

until, of course, last year, when he seemed to have had a more direct role in the summer 2010 threat in Europe. Since the raid on 

the bin Laden compound in Abbottabad, public reports indicate bin 

Laden has played a more active operational role, encouraging attacks against the United States and targeting Americans worldwide. There have been warnings about attack plans against railways, reports of a potential attack against oil tankers, and we 

should expect more such warnings from the Government in the 

coming days. 

But we should understand many of these targets were aspirational. They were being considered. There had been past attacks 

against rail in London and Madrid, and, of course, the al-Qaeda attack against the MV Limburg, so that such plans were being considered and discussed is not surprising. That bin Laden played an 
16 

active operational role makes his sudden absence from al-Qaeda 

more devastating for them. We know now that bin Laden was focused on attacking the United States, so his death is not only justice for the victims of September 11, the USS Cole, and East Africa 

bombings, America is safer because he is dead. 

So the question is, what remains? I break it down basically into 

two categories: Who is a threat to us; and, second, where does that 

threat emanate from? 

First, the who. There are three main categories, in my mind, of 

who directly threatens the United States. First, there are the remnants of the al-Qaeda core; second, the al-Qaeda affiliates; and 

then last, the other extremist groups. 

First, what remains of the al-Qaeda core? Ayman al-Zawahiri, 

bin Laden’s deputy; recently we have heard again of Saif al-Adel, 

who has resurfaced. But al-Qaeda has failed to name a new leader 

because there is an internal power struggle. There was no agreedupon succession plan. There is no one of bin Laden’s stature to inspire and guide operations and quell disputes. The al-Qaeda core 

without bin Laden is badly weakened. The chaos at the top of alQaeda is an important targeting opportunity for the United States. 

The second category of ‘‘who’’ is perhaps more immediately dangerous to the United States. The second ‘‘who’’ are the al-Qaeda affiliates and, most importantly, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, 

headed by the American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. Intelligence 

and counterterrorism officials have rightly described al-Qaeda in 

the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, as the most immediate threat to 

the United States homeland. AQAP has both the intent to attack 

and had demonstrated some capability. AQAP was behind the 

Nidal Hasan Fort Hood event, the attempted Christmas day underwear bomber, and the recent computer cartridges attempt. 

Awlaki is a serious threat. Unlike Zawahiri, he is a charismatic 

and inspirational leader. He uses the internet and taped lectures 

to recruit and radicalize world-wide. There are other affiliates that 

I won’t go into in depth, one in North Africa, those in Somalia, and 

Asia, but AQAP poses the most immediate threat. 

The third category of ‘‘who’’ are other extremist groups: The 

Pakistan Taliban, which was responsible for the training of the 

Times Square bomber. Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shura remain 

our enemy and a direct threat. We must be careful not to write off 

radical groups that appear only regionally or locally focused, as 

was the initial belief of the Pakistan Taliban. Lashkar-e-Taiba, 

LET, which was behind the Mumbai attack, is currently the subject 

of the trial in Chicago right now. The Haqqani network in the 

Pakistan tribal areas continues to target and kill coalition forces in 

Afghanistan. 

Last among these other groups, we must not forget Hezbollah. 

Although a Shiite extremist group, they remain bankrolled by Iran, 

and prior to September 11 were responsible for killing more Americans than any other terror group. They are armed, militarily capable, deployed world-wide, and remain a significant threat. 

The next category that I mentioned is the ‘‘where’’ the threat 

emanates from. Again, I will talk about three concerns: First, 

ungoverned or weakly governed states or places; threats inside the 

United States; and, third, complacency. 
17 

First, ungoverned or weakly governed states and places. That 

was Afghanistan of the 1990s, where al-Qaeda planned and 

trained. Today we see hotspots in Somalia along the Mali-Mauritania border, in Yemen, and in Pakistan. I know from my own experience both Yemen and Pakistan are frustrating and at times 

duplicitous partners, but events this week require that I raise a 

note of caution. The sophisticated Pakistan Taliban attack on the 

Karachi Naval Air Base suggests a weaker and more humiliated 

Pakistan military than was previously thought. We must remember 

that Pakistan has a nuclear arsenal, and, as both President Obama 

and President Bush have said, the greatest threat to our security 

is a terrorist group like the Pakistan Taliban with a nuclear weapon. 

While it is right that we reevaluate our bilateral relationship 

with Pakistan, especially given the testimony this week in the Chicago case that shows a link between the Pakistani Intelligence 

Service and the LET terror group, we must carefully consider what 

are the alternatives and consequences to the partnership with 

Pakistan. 

There is another weakly-governed space I must mention, though 

it is not a traditional geographic space. You cannot find it on a 

map. That is cyberspace and the internet. For all the enormous 

good of the internet, al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups have 

learned to use it to their advantage to recruit, to train, to 

radicalize, and to fundraise. Every plot we uncovered during my 

time in Government, computers were used. Just by way of example, 

al Awlaki communicated via the internet with the Fort Hood shooter, and bin Laden had the computers in his compound. 

The United States has tremendous capability, and a lot of important work has been done in this area across both the Bush and 

Obama administrations. Our soldiers and counterterrorism professionals know this is a new 21st-Century battlefield just as any 

other geography where we fight. It is important the Congress and 

the American people understand we are fighting there to. 

The second ‘‘where’’ is here inside the United States. As the 

United States has strengthened its border screening, al-Qaeda has 

made it a priority to recruit Americans and permanent residents 

who more easily cross our borders. This threats manifests itself 

with single individuals who attempt attacks, again, like Fort Hood, 

Times Square, and Christmas day attacks, or in small groups like 

the Najibullah Zazi case against the New York City subway with 

backpack bombs. 

The last, ‘‘where’’ does the threat come from, doesn’t fit easily 

into any of these categories, but it is equally pernicious and dangerous, and that is the threat of complacency. Killing bin Laden 

was a difficult and courageous decision by President Obama and an 

enormous success for the Nation, but the global war on terror is 

by no means over. Regardless of what you call it, the fight continues because our enemies continue. We won an important and decisive battle, but the threat remains. We have seized the momentum, but we must not think this means we can reduce the investments that produced this success. Our intelligence, military, and 

law enforcement agencies need the budget and legal authorities to 

succeed. 
18 

There is an important vote today in the Senate extending the 

PATRIOT Act, and while I believe it should have been permanently 

extended, it must be extended for the next 4 years. The IDENT 

database should be properly funded. We must prevent terrorists 

from getting nuclear or other biological weapons, and that means 

we must ensure we have the ability to respond by maintaining the 

Strategic National Stockpile and our other unique operational capabilities. 

In this time of continued financial crisis, there will be pressure 

to find cuts. My caution to you is that all cuts are not equal. Capability is built over time. What we found in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 is that it cannot be quickly reacquired in a crisis. 

President Obama’s courageous decision to authorize the bin Laden 

raid was enabled by an intelligence community whose budget and 

capability was doubled over the last decade, and this mission was 

executed by warriors better resourced and trained over the last 10 

years. You get what you pay for, and to use the phrase from the 

MasterCard commercial, the killing of bin Laden was priceless. It 

was the accomplishment of a Nation and a moment of National 

pride. We unequivocally told the world: No matter how difficult the 

task nor how long the journey, we will never forget. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the privilege to testify today. I 

thank the American people for the privilege of serving them for 

more than 20 years. 

Chairman KING. Thank you. 

Our next witness is Peter Bergen, who I assume is the only one 

in this room that has actually was face-to-face with bin Laden. I 

think you were the first Western broadcast journalist to interview 

him. You wrote the book ‘‘The Osama bin Laden I Know’’ and also 

‘‘The Longest War’’. Obviously, you have a tremendous depth of insight, knowledge, and a career of expertise. I look forward to your 

testimony today, as always, and thank you for once again being 

back before the committee. 

STATEMENT OF PETER BERGEN, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 

SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION 

Mr. BERGEN. Thank you, Chairman King, thank you, Ranking 

Member Thompson, thank you to the Members of the committee, 

for the privilege of testifying here. 

The death of Osama bin Laden is hard to undervalue, as Representative Hamilton and Fran Townsend have already made clear. 

But just to amplify what they said, when you join al-Qaeda, you 

don’t swear an oath of allegiance to al-Qaeda or al Qaedism. You 

swear a personal oath of allegiance to bin Laden himself. 

There are many differences between al-Qaeda and the Nazi 

Party, but there is one similarity. When you join the Nazi Party, 

you didn’t swear an oath of allegiance to nazism. You swore a personal oath to Adolph Hitler. When Adolph Hitler died, nazism essentially died with him. Now, I am not going to make the claim 

that al-Qaeda is going to die with the death of bin Laden or alQaedism or bin Ladenism or whatever you want to call it, but you 

cannot underestimate how important this is. 

In 1988, bin Laden and about a dozen other guys founded alQaeda. It was, of course, bin Laden’s idea to attack the United 
19 

States on 9/11. He has been the founder of this group throughout 

its history, he has been the leader of the group through its history, 

and he is the intellectual author of the 9/11 attacks. It was, after 

all, against a lot of internal advice and dissent he pushed the idea 

of attacking the United States. 

We now know from documents recovered and from Representative Hamilton’s work on the 9/11 Commission that there were plenty of people in al-Qaeda who said actually attacking the United 

States is going to be pretty counterproductive, and it turned out to 

be very counterproductive. Yet bin Laden, was able—because he 

enjoyed what Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the operational commander of 9/11, called—in testimony he put in the Zacarias 

Moussaoui trial, he pointed out that when bin Laden decided something and 98 percent of the Shura Council of al-Qaeda was against 

him, it was bin Laden’s way or the highway. So take this guy out 

of the equation, this is very damaging for al-Qaeda core. 

Who can replace him? Representative King suggested we talk a 

little bit about that. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No. 2, is, of course, his 

deputy. But as Fran Townsend pointed out, there is no official succession plan. According to reporting that I did for CNN, there is an 

interim leader of al-Qaeda—Fran also mentioned him—Saif alAdel. He is a former colonel in the Egyptian Special Forces. AlQaeda recognizes that it is kind of embarrassing that they haven’t 

appointed a succession leader, and so there was an interim person 

to take over, perhaps to grease the skids for Ayman al-Zawahiri, 

who is also an Egyptian, to take over the organization. But, in a 

way, the best thing that could happen for the United States and 

for the civilized world is for Ayman al-Zawahiri to take over alQaeda because he would run what remains of the organization into 

the ground. 

If you remember Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s death in 2006, the people who replaced him heading al-Qaeda in Iraq were nowhere near 

as potent in al-Qaeda in Iraq, which basically ceased being an effective insurgent organization while retaining some capabilities 

today. 

So the death of bin Laden, we just want to underline how important it is. 

A second point which hasn’t been mentioned hitherto is in the 

Arab Spring, because if al-Qaeda was a huge nail in the coffin of 

al-Qaeda the organization, the Arab Spring is a massive nail in the 

coffin of al-Qaeda ideology. Al-Qaeda, the ideology, was already losing steam before the Arab Spring; support for bin Laden, al-Qaeda, 

and suicide bombings being cratering around the Muslim world for 

the very good reason that Muslims have noticed that most of the 

victims of al-Qaeda or allies have been Muslims themselves, which 

is not impressive for groups that position themselves as the defender of Islam. But the Arab Spring underlines this losing the war 

of ideas in the Muslim world that has been going on for some period of time. 

One very striking thing to me is we haven’t seen a single picture 

of bin Laden carried by the protesters in Cairo or Benghazi or any 

other city in the Middle East. We haven’t seen a single American 

flag burning, which was so pro forma in that part of the world. We 

haven’t seen a single Israeli flag burning. Al-Qaeda’s foot soldiers’ 
20 

ideas and their hope for outcomes are just not part of the conversation. 

That said—and these are all very, very good pieces of news that 

we shouldn’t look the gift horse in the face, in a sense—threats do 

remain. I think that Fran has already mentioned al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula. I am not going to go over that same territory. 

But I think the death of bin Laden doesn’t really affect the operations of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. I don’t think it really 

affects the operations of al Shabab. I don’t think it really affects 

the operations of al-Qaeda in Iraq. I don’t think it really affects the 

operations al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. These groups don’t 

have—most of them, absent al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula— 

don’t have huge capabilities. Al Shabab has been able to attack in 

Uganda and also in Denmark, so it has shown some ability of outer 

barrier operations. Al-Qaeda in Iraq had some role, it looks like, in 

the Glasgow airport attack and also the attacks on the Americanowned hotels in Jordan in 2005. But the point is these groups have 

been constrained in their ability to attack the American homeland. 

My final point, because I have run out of time, the New America 

Foundation and Maxwell School at Syracuse University have 

looked at the 180 jihadist terrorist attacks in the United States 

since 9/11, and there is some really strikingly good news and some 

bad news in this analysis. Only 17 Americans have been killed by 

a jihadist terrorist since 9/11, which is a pretty striking number, 

given the kind of fears we had after 9/11. Not one of the cases we 

looked at involved chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 

weapons, also kind of a strikingly good finding, given the fears we 

had of that after 9/11. That said, we have had some pretty serious 

near misses. The Chairman mentioned Najibullah Zazi. We had 

Faisal Shahzad. We had Abdulmutallab. So these groups retained 

some capabilities. 

One final point on all this. The cases we looked at really spiked 

in 2009 and 2010. We found 76 cases out of the 180. Just to end 

on a sort of optimistic note, in the first half of 2011, there has been 

a rather dramatic dip in the number of cases. So we have only had 

six this year. So the question before the committee and, in fact, before the Nation is: Was 2009 and 2010 sort of an outlier, or was 

it part of a pattern? I think that is still very much an open question, but we have seen some good news this year. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman KING. Thank you, Mr. Bergen. 

[The statement of Mr. Bergen follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER BERGEN

MAY 25, 2011 

Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity today to testify today about threats to the 

American homeland after the death of Osama bin Laden. 

The death of bin Laden is devastating to ‘‘core’’ al-Qaeda, but arguably just as important to undermining the terrorist organization is the large amount of information 

that was recovered at the compound where he was killed in northern Pakistan on 

May 2, 2011. That information is already being exploited for leads. Between the 

‘‘Arab Spring’’ and the death of bin Laden, both al-Qaeda’s ideology and organization 

are under assault. That said, jihadist terrorism isn’t going away. Regional affiliates 

such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula remain threatening and there is a con-
21 

1Osama bin Laden, tape released November 1, 2004, http://articles.cnn.com/2004-11-01/ 

world/binladen.tapel1lal-jazeera-qaeda-bin?ls=PM:WORLD. 2 IntelCenter, a U.S. Government contractor that tracks jihadist publications, says bin Laden 

released 33 tapes in the 8 years between 9/11 and January 2010. IntelCenter Breakout of asSahab audio/video, 2002–26 February 2010. Email from Ben Venzke, February 26, 2010. 

tinued low-level threat posed by ‘‘homegrown’’ jihadist militants inspired by bin 

Laden’s ideas. 

Such militants might successfully carry out bombings against symbolic targets 

that would kill dozens, such as against subways in Manhattan, as was the plan in 

September 2009 of Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan-American al-Qaeda recruit, or they 

might blow up an American passenger jet, as was the intention 3 months later of 

the Nigerian Umar Farouq Abdulmutallab, who had been recruited by al-Qaeda in 

the Arabian Peninsula. Had that bombing attempt succeeded, it would have killed 

hundreds. This level of threat is likely to persist for years to come. However, alQaeda no longer poses a National security threat to the American homeland of the 

type that could result in a mass-casualty attack anywhere close to the scale of 

9/11. 

Indeed, a survey of the 180 individuals indicted or convicted in Islamist terrorism 

cases in the United States since the 9/11 attacks by the Maxwell School at Syracuse 

University and the New America Foundation found that none of the cases involved 

the use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, while only four of 

the homegrown plots since 9/11 progressed to an actual attack in the United States, 

attacks that resulted in a total of 17 deaths. The most notable was the 2009 shootings at Ft. Hood, Texas by Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, who killed 13. By way of comparison, according to the FBI, between 2001 and 2009, 73 people were killed in hate 

crimes in the United States. 

The number of jihadist terrorism cases involving U.S. citizens or residents has 

markedly spiked in the past 2 years. In 2009 and 2010 there were 76, almost half 

of the total since 9/11, but in the first half of 2011 the number of such cases has 

subsided rather dramatically. This year there have been a total of just six jihadist 

terrorism cases by the date of this hearing. 

American officials and the wider public should realize that by the law of averages 

al-Qaeda or an affiliate will succeed in getting some kind of attack through in the 

next years, and the best response to that would be to demonstrate that we as a society are resilient and are not be intimidated by such actions because our overreactions can play into the hands of the jihadist groups. When al-Qaeda or affiliated 

groups can provoke overwrought media coverage based on attacks that don’t even 

succeed—such as the near-miss on Christmas day 2009 when Abdulmutallab tried 

to blow up Northwest Flight 253 over Detroit—we are doing their work for them. 

The person who best understood the benefits of American overreaction was bin 

Laden himself, who in 2004 said on a tape that aired on Al Jazeera: ‘‘All that we 

have to do is to send two mujahedeen to the furthest point east to raise a piece of 

cloth on which is written al-Qaeda, in order to make generals race there to cause 

America to suffer human, economic, and political losses.’’1 Let us not give bin Laden 

any more such victories now that he is dead. 

This testimony focuses on the threat from al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and those motivated by its ideas, while recognizing that these are not the only sources of terrorism 

directed against the United States. 

The testimony will attempt to answer four questions: 

• What effect will the killing of bin Laden have on U.S. security interests, and 

on core al-Qaeda’s goals and capabilities? 

• What threats emanate from Pakistan-based militant groups other than alQaeda? 

• What threats emanate from al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates? 

• What threats emanate from domestic militants motivated by jihadist terrorist 

ideas? 

1. What effect will the killing of bin Laden have on U.S. security interests, and on 

core al-Qaeda’s goals and capabilities? 

After the fall of the Taliban in the winter of 2001 bin Laden didn’t, of course, continue to exert day-to-day control over al-Qaeda, but statements from him have always been the most reliable guide to the future actions of jihadist movements 

around the world and this remained the case even while he was on the run. In the 

past decade bin Laden issued more than 30 video- and audiotapes.2 Those messages 

reached untold millions worldwide via television, the internet, and newspapers. The 

tapes not only instructed al-Qaeda’s followers to continue to kill Westerners and 

Jews; some also carried specific instructions that militant cells then acted on. In 
22 

3 ‘‘Istanbul rocked by double bombing,’’ BBC News, November 20, 2003, http:// 

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3222608.stm; Craig Whitlock and Susan Glasser, ‘‘On tape, bin 

Laden tries new approach,’’ Washington Post, December 17, 2004. http:// 

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3927-2004Dec16.html; Joel Roberts, ‘‘Al-Qaeda 

threatens more oil attacks,’’ CBS News, February 25, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 

2006/02/27/world/main1346541lpage2.shtml; ‘‘Bin Laden tape encourages Pakistanis to 

rebel,’’ Associated Press, September 20, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-09- 

20-al-Qaeda-videolN.htm. 4Substitution for the testimony of KSM, trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, http:// 

en.wikisource.org/wiki/SubstitutionlforlthelTestimonyloflKSM. 5 Jean Sasson and Omar and Najwa bin Laden, Growing Up Bin Laden (St. Martin’s Press: 

New York, NY, 2009), p. 161 and 213. 6Mark Mazzetti and Scott Shane, ‘‘Data show bin Laden plots,’’ New York Times, May 5, 2011, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/world/asia/06intel.html. 7 Jamal Ismail, interview by author, July 29, 2004, Islamabad, Pakistan. 

8Peter Bergen, ‘‘Egyptian Saif al-Adel now acting leader of al-Qaeda,’’ CNN.com, May 17, 

2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-17/world/mideast.al.qaeda.appointeel1lal-adel-alqaeda-libyan-islamic-fighting-group?ls=PM:WORLD. 

2003, bin Laden called for attacks against members of the coalition in Iraq; subsequently terrorists bombed commuters on their way to work in Madrid and London. 

Bin Laden also called for attacks on the Pakistani state in 2007, which is one of 

the reasons that Pakistan had more than 50 suicide attacks that year.3 In March 

2008 bin Laden denounced the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed 

in a Danish newspaper, which he said would soon be avenged. Three months later, 

an al-Qaeda suicide attacker bombed the Danish Embassy in Islamabad, killing six. 

Bin Laden exercised near-total control over al-Qaeda, whose members had to 

swear a religious oath personally to bin Laden, so ensuring blind loyalty to him. 

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the operational commander of the 9/11 attacks, outlined 

the dictatorial powers that bin Laden exercised over his organization: ‘‘If the Shura 

council at al-Qaeda, the highest authority in the organization, had a majority of 98 

percent on a resolution and it is opposed by bin Laden, he has the right to cancel 

the resolution.’’4 Bin Laden’s son Omar recalls that the men who worked for alQaeda had a habit of requesting permission before they spoke with their leader, saying, ‘‘Dear prince: May I speak?’’5

Materials recovered from the Abbottabad compound in northern Pakistan where 

bin Laden was killed paint a picture of a leader deeply involved in tactical, operational, and strategic planning for al-Qaeda, and in communication with other leaders of the group and even the organization’s affiliates overseas.6 The death of bin 

Laden eliminates the founder of al-Qaeda, which has only enjoyed one leader since 

its founding in 1988, and it also eliminates the one man who provided broad, largely 

unquestioned strategic goals to the wider jihadist movement. Around the world, 

those who joined al-Qaeda in the past two decades have sworn baya, a religious oath 

of allegiance to bin Laden, rather than to the organization itself, in the same way 

that Nazi party members swore an oath of fealty to Hitler, rather than to Nazism. 

That baya must now be transferred to whomever the new leader of al-Qaeda is 

going to be. 

Of course, even as the al-Qaeda organization withers there are pretenders to bin 

Laden’s throne. The first is the dour Egyptian surgeon, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is 

the deputy leader of al-Qaeda, and therefore technically bin Laden’s successor. But 

Zawahiri is not regarded as a natural leader and even among his fellow Egyptian 

militants Zawahiri is seen as a divisive force and so he is unlikely to be able to step 

into the role of the paramount leader of al-Qaeda and of the global jihadist movement that was occupied by bin Laden.7 There is scant evidence that Zawahiri has 

the charisma of bin Laden, nor that he commands the respect bordering on love that 

was accorded to bin Laden by members of al-Qaeda. 

Another possible leader of al-Qaeda is Saif al-Adel, also an Egyptian, who has 

played a role as a military commander of the terrorist group, and since 9/11 has 

spent many years living in Iran under some form of house arrest. Adel has been 

appointed the ‘‘caretaker’’ leader of the terrorist organization, according to Noman 

Benotman, a former leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, a militant organization that was once aligned with al-Qaeda, but has in recent years has renounced 

al-Qaeda’s ideology.8

Benotman, who has known the leaders of al-Qaeda for more than two decades and 

has long been a reliable source of information about the inner workings of the terrorist group, says that based on his personal communications with militants and 

discussions on jihadist forums, Adel has emerged as the interim leader of al-Qaeda 

as it reels from the death of its founder and eventually transitions, presumably, to 

the uncharismatic Zawahiri. 
23 

9Douglas Farah and Dana Priest, ‘‘Bin Laden son plays key role in al-Qaeda,’’ Washington 

Post, October 14, 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/20/ 

AR2007082000980.html. 10 Reza Sayah, ‘‘Blasts kill at least 70 in northwest Pakistan,’’ CNN.com, May 12, 2011, 

http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-12/world/pakistan.explosionsl1ldrone-strikes-northwaziristan-militants?ls=PM:WORLD. 11 Anwar al-Awlaki, ‘‘Tsunami of change,’’ Inspire, March 2011, http:// 

info.publicintelligence.net/InspireMarch2011.pdf. 

A wild card is that one of bin Laden’s dozen or so sons—endowed with an iconic 

family name—could eventually rise to take over the terrorist group. Already Saad 

bin Laden, one of the oldest sons, has played a middle management role in alQaeda.9

One of the key issues that any future leader of al-Qaeda has to reckon with now 

is dealing with the fallout from the large quantities of sensitive information that 

were recovered by U.S. forces at the compound in Abbottabad where bin Laden was 

killed. That information is likely to prove quite damaging to al-Qaeda’s operations. 

Jihadist terrorism will not, of course, disappear because of the death of bin Laden. 

Indeed, the Pakistan Taliban have already mounted attacks in Pakistan that they 

said were revenge for bin Laden’s death,10 but it is hard to imagine two more final 

endings to the ‘‘War on Terror’’ than the popular revolts against the authoritarian 

regimes in the Middle East and the death of bin Laden. No protestors in the streets 

of Cairo or Benghazi carried placards of bin Laden’s face, and very few demanded 

the imposition of Taliban-like rule, al-Qaeda’s preferred end-state for the countries 

in the region. 

If the Arab Spring was a large nail in the coffin of al-Qaeda’s ideology, the death 

of bin Laden was an equally large nail in the coffin of al-Qaeda the organization. 

Media stories asserting that al-Qaeda has played no role in the revolts in the Middle East provoked a furious response from the Yemeni-American cleric Anwar alAwlaki, a leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In his group’s Inspire magazine, a slick Web-based publication, heavy on photographs and graphics that, unusually for a jihadist organ, is written in colloquial English, Awlaki penned an essay 

titled ‘‘The Tsunami of Change.’’ In the article, Awlaki made the uncontroversial 

point that the regimes based on fear were ending in the Arab world because of the 

revolutions and protests from Egypt to Bahrain. But he went on to assert that, contrary to commentators who had written that the Arab revolts represented a total 

repudiation of al-Qaeda’s founding ideology, the world should ‘‘know very well that 

the opposite is the case.’’11

Awlaki also turned to this analyst, writing, ‘‘for a so-called ‘terrorism expert’ such 

as Peter Bergen, it is interesting to see how even he doesn’t get it right this time. 

For him to think that because a Taliban-style regime is not going to take over following the revolutions, is a too short-term way of viewing the unfolding events.’’ In 

other words: Just you wait—Taliban-type theocracies will be coming to the Middle 

East as the revolutions there unfold further. Awlaki also wrote that it was wrong 

to say that al-Qaeda viewed the revolutions in the Middle East with ‘‘despair.’’ Instead, he claimed that ‘‘the Mujahedeen (holy warriors) around the world are going 

through a moment of elation and I wonder whether the West is aware of the upsurge in Mujahedeen activity in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Arabia, Algeria and 

Morocco?’’ 

We do not, of course, know the final outcome of the Arab revolutions, but there 

is very little chance that al-Qaeda or other extremist groups will be able to grab 

the reins of power as the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East crumble. But 

while al-Qaeda and its allies cannot take power anywhere in the Muslim world, 

these groups do thrive on chaos and civil war. And the whole point of revolutions 

is that they are inherently unpredictable even to the people who are leading them, 

so anything could happen in the coming years in Libya and Yemen, and much is 

unpredictable in Egypt, and even in Saudi Arabia. 

2. What threats emanate from Pakistan-based militant groups other than al-Qaeda? 

One of bin Laden’s most toxic legacies is that even terrorist groups that don’t call 

themselves ‘‘al-Qaeda’’ have adopted his ideology and a number of South Asian 

groups now threaten the West. According to Spanish prosecutors, the late leader of 

the Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud sent a team of would-be suicide bombers 

to Barcelona to attack the subway system there in January 2008. A Pakistani 

Taliban spokesman confirmed this in a videotaped interview in which he said that 
24 

12Fernando Reinares, ‘‘A case study of the January 2008 suicide bomb plot in Barcelona,’’ 

Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, January 15, 2009, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/acase-study-of-the-january-2008-suicide-bomb-plot-in-barcelona. 13 Benjamin Weiser and Colin Moynihan, ‘‘Guilty plea in Times Square bomb plot,’’ New York 

Times, June 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/nyregion/22terror.html. 14Paul Cruickshank, ‘‘The Militant Pipeline,’’ New America Foundation, February 2010, 

http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/cruickshank.pdf. 15 ‘‘Four jailed over plot to attack U.S. bases,’’ Associated Press, March 4, 2010, http:// 

www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35702791/ns/worldlnews-europe/t/four-jailed-over-plot-attack-usbases/. 16 USA v. David Coleman Headley, U.S. District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern 

Division Case No. 09 CR 830. 17Sebastian Rotella, ‘‘Pakistan’s terror connections,’’ ProPublica, http://www.propublica.org/ 

topic/mumbai-terror-attacks/. 18 Reza Sayah, ‘‘Blasts kill at least 70 in northwest Pakistan,’’ CNN.com, May 12, 2011, 

http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-12/world/pakistan.explosionsl1ldrone-strikes-northwaziristan-militants?ls=PM:WORLD. 

those suicide bombers ‘‘were under pledge to Baitullah Mehsud’’ and were sent because of the Spanish military presence in Afghanistan.12

In 2009 the Pakistani Taliban trained an American recruit for an attack in New 

York. Faisal Shahzad, who had once worked as a financial analyst in the accounting 

department at the Elizabeth Arden cosmetics company in Stamford, Connecticut, 

travelled to Pakistan where he received 5 days of bomb-making training from the 

Taliban in the tribal region of Waziristan. Armed with this training and $12,000 

in cash, Shahzad returned to Connecticut where he purchased a Nissan Pathfinder. 

He placed a bomb in the SUV and detonated it in Times Square on May 1, 2010 

around 6 p.m. when the sidewalks were thick with tourists and theatergoers. The 

bomb, which was designed to act as a fuel-air explosive, luckily was a dud and 

Shahzad was arrested 2 days later as he tried to leave JFK airport for Dubai.13

Also based in the Pakistani tribal regions are a number of other jihadist groups 

allied to both the Taliban and al-Qaeda such as the such as the Islamic Movement 

of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union that have trained dozens of Germans 

for attacks in Europe. Two Germans and a Turkish resident in Germany, for instance, trained in the tribal regions and then planned to bomb the massive U.S. 

Ramstein airbase in Germany in 2007.14 Before their arrests, the men had obtained 

1,600 pounds of industrial strength hydrogen peroxide, enough to make a number 

of large bombs.15

The Mumbai attacks of 2008 showed that bin Laden’s ideas about attacking Western and Jewish targets had also spread to Pakistani militant groups such as 

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which had previously focused only on Indian targets. Over 

a 3-day period in late November 2008 LeT carried out multiple attacks in Mumbai 

targeting five-star hotels housing Westerners and a Jewish-American community 

center. The Pakistani-American David Headley played a key role in LeT’s massacre 

in Mumbai traveling to the Indian financial capital on five extended trips in the 2 

years before the attacks. There Headley made videotapes of the key locations attacked by the ten LeT gunmen including the Taj Mahal and Oberoi hotels and 

Chabad House, the Jewish community center.16

Sometime in 2008, Headley hatched a plan to attack the Danish newspaper 

Jyllands-Posten, which 3 years earlier had published cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed that were deemed to be offensive by many Muslims. In January 2009 

Headley traveled to Copenhagen, where he reconnoitered the Jyllands-Posten newspaper on the pretext that he ran an immigration business that was looking to place 

some advertising in the paper. Following his trip to Denmark, Headley met with 

Ilyas Kashmiri in the Pakistani tribal regions to brief him on his findings. Kashmiri 

ran a terrorist organization, Harakat-ul-Jihad Islami, closely tied to al-Qaeda. 

Headley returned to Chicago in mid-June 2009 and was arrested there 3 months 

later as he was preparing to leave for Pakistan again. He told investigators that 

he was planning to kill the Jyllands-Posten’s cultural editor who had first commissioned the cartoons as well as the cartoonist Kurt Westergaard who had drawn the 

cartoon he found most offensive; the Prophet Mohammed with a bomb concealed in 

his turban.17

The Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harakat-ul-Jihad Islami, the Islamic 

Jihad Union and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan are all based or have a significant presence in Pakistan’s tribal regions and have track records of trying to attack Western and/or American targets and should therefore all be considered 

threats to American interests. The Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba and 

Harakat-ul-Jihad Islami have also been able to attract American recruits. Already 

the Pakistani Taliban has carried out attacks in response to bin Laden’s death.18
25 

19 Brian Ross, ‘‘Major Hasan’s email: ‘I can’t wait to join you’ in the afterlife,’’ ABC, November 

19, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/major-hasans-mail-wait-join-afterlife/ 

story?id=9130339. 20Scott Shane, ‘‘U.S. hunts for more suspicious packages,’’ New York Times, October 30, 2010, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/31/us/31plane.html. 21 Agence France Presse, ‘‘Somalia’s al-Shabab proclaims allegiance to al-Qaeda chief,’’ September 23, 2009. 22Osama bin Laden, ‘‘Fight on, champions of Somalia,’’ March 19, 2009, http:// 

www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefaubl0309-2.pdf. 23 BBC News, ‘‘Somalia: government captures al-Shabab militia bases,’’ March 5, 2011, http:// 

www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12657466. 24Sudarsan Raghavan, ‘‘Islamic militant group al-Shabab claims Uganda bombing,’’ Washington Post, July 12, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/ 

12/AR2010071200476.html. 25 BBC News, ‘‘Danish police shoot intruder at cartoonist’s home,’’ January 2, 2010, http:// 

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8437433.stm. 

3. WHAT THREATS EMANATE FROM AL-QAEDA’S REGIONAL AFFILIATES?

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 

Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born cleric living in Yemen has increasingly taken 

an operational role in ‘‘al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,’’ (AQAP) which was responsible for attempting to bring down Northwest Flight 253 over Detroit on Christmas day 2009 with a bomb secreted in the underwear of Umar Farouk 

Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian recruit. If Abdulmutallab had succeeded in bringing 

down the passenger jet, the bombing not only would have killed hundreds but would 

also have had a large effect on the U.S. economy already reeling from the effect of 

the worst recession since the Great Depression, and would have devastated the critical aviation and tourism businesses. 

President Obama regards Awlaki as so dangerous that he has authorized, seemingly for the first time in American history, the assassination of a U.S. citizen. 

Awlaki’s command of English and internet savvy helped to radicalize militants such 

as Major Nidal Hasan who killed 13 of his fellow soldiers at Ft. Hood Texas in 2009. 

That attack happened after a series of email exchanges between Hasan and Awlaki 

in which the cleric said it was religiously sanctioned for Hasan to kill fellow soldiers.19

In October 2010 AQAP hid bombs in toner cartridges on planes bound for Chicago 

that were only discovered at the last moment at East Midlands Airport and in 

Dubai.20 The skillful AQAP bomb-maker who made those bombs is still at large, according to U.S. officials and will continue to attempt to smuggle hard-to-detect 

bombs on to American or other Western planes. 

While carrying out bin Laden’s overall strategy of attacking the United States, 

AQAP was operating largely independent of him and so will not be much affected 

by bin Laden’s death. 

Al Shabab 

In September 2009, the Somali Islamist insurgent group Al Shabab (‘‘the youth’’ 

in Arabic) formally pledged allegiance to bin Laden following a 2-year period in 

which it had recruited Somali-Americans and other U.S. Muslims to fight in the war 

in Somalia.21 Six months earlier bin Laden had given his imprimatur to the Somali 

jihad in an audiotape released titled ‘‘Fight On, Champions of Somalia.’’22 After it 

announced its fealty to bin Laden, Shabab was able to recruit larger numbers of foreign fighters, by one estimate up to 1,200 were working with the group by 2010. 

Today, Shabab controls much of southern Somalia.23 Worrisomely, Shabab has 

shown an ability to send its operatives outside of Somalia, killing dozens in suicide 

attacks in Uganda last year 24 and dispatching an assassin to Denmark to kill Kurt 

Westergaard, the Danish cartoonist who had drawn the cartoons of the Prophet 

Mohamed that were deemed to be offensive. The cartoonist only survived the assault 

because he had taken the precaution of installing a safe room in his house.25

Shabab has managed to plant al-Qaeda-like ideas into the heads of even its American recruits. Shirwa Ahmed, an ethnic Somali, graduated from high school in Minneapolis in 2003, and then worked pushing passengers in wheelchairs at Minneapolis Airport. In late 2007 Ahmed traveled to Somalia and a year later, on October 29, 2008, Ahmed drove a truck loaded with explosives towards a government 

compound in Puntland, northern Somalia, blowing himself up and killing about 20 

people. The FBI matched Ahmed’s finger, recovered at the scene of the bombing, to 
26 

26Spencer Hsu and Carrie Johnson, ‘‘Somali Americans recruited by extremists,’’ Washington 

Post, March 11, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/10/ 

AR2009031003901.html; ‘‘Joining the fight in Somalia,’’ New York Times, interactive timeline, 

July 12, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/07/12/us/20090712-somaliatimeline.html. 27Lee Keath, ‘‘Al Qaeda is close to defeat in Iraq, U.S. ambassador says,’’ Associated Press, 

May 25, 2008, http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2008/05/25/ 

allqaedalislcloseltoldefeatlinliraqluslambassadorlsays/?comments=all. 28 BBC News, ‘‘Al-Qaeda claims Jordan attacks,’’ November 10, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 

2/hi/4423714.stm. 29 Raymond Bonner, Jane Perlez, and Eric Schmitt, ‘‘British inquiry of jailed plot points to 

Iraq’s Qaeda group,’’ New York Times, December 14, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/ 

14/world/europe/14london.html. 31Quoted in Peter Bergen, ‘‘Where you bin?’’ The New Republic, January 29, 2006. 32Peter Bergen, Andrew Lebovich, Matthew Reed, Laura Hohnsbeen, Nicole Salter, and 

Sophie Schmidt at the New America Foundation, and Professor William Banks, Alyssa Procopio, 

Jason Cherish, Joseph Robertson, Matthew Michaelis, Richard Lim, Laura Adams, and Drew 

Dickinson from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University all worked on creating this database, 

which is available at http://homegrown.newamerica.net. 33 Note: From our count we excluded post-9/11 cases in the United States involving either 

Hezbollah or Hamas as neither group has targeted Americans since 9/11. We did include groups 

fingerprints already on file for him. Ahmed was the first American suicide attacker 

anywhere.26

Given the high death rate for the Americans fighting in Somalia, as well as the 

considerable attention this group has received from the FBI, it is unlikely that the 

couple of dozen American veterans of the Somali war pose much of a threat to the 

United States itself. It is however, plausible now that Shabab had declared itself 

to be an al-Qaeda affiliate, that U.S. citizens in the group might be recruited to engage in anti-American operations overseas. 

Shabab has operated independently of al-Qaeda ‘‘core’’ and so will not be much 

affected by bin Laden’s death. 

Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 

In 2008 there was a sense that al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was on the verge of defeat. 

The American ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker said, ‘‘You are not going to hear 

me say that al-Qaeda is defeated, but they’ve never been closer to defeat than they 

are now.’’27 Certainly AQI has lost its ability to control large swaths of the country 

and a good chunk of the Sunni population as it did in 2006, but the group has proven surprisingly resilient as demonstrated by the fact that it pulled off large-scale 

bombings in central Baghdad in 2010 and 2011. AQI has also shown some ability 

to carry out operations outside Iraq as well: It attacked three American hotels in 

Amman, Jordan in 2005 28 and it had some sort of role in the attacks on Glasgow 

Airport 2 years later.29 As U.S. forces pull down in Iraq, AQI may be tempted to 

mount other out-of-country attacks against American or Western targets. 

The death of bin Laden is unlikely to affect AQI much. 

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 

In September 2006 the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat’s leader 

Abu Musab Abdul Wadud, explained that al-Qaeda ‘‘is the only organization qualified to gather together the mujahideen.’’ Subsequently taking the name ‘‘al-Qaeda 

in the Islamic Maghreb’’ (AQIM), the group, which had traditionally focused only 

on Algerian targets, conducted a range of operations: Bombing the United Nations 

building in Algiers; attacking the Israeli embassy in Mauritania; and murdering 

French and British hostages. AQIM has hitherto not been able to carry out attacks 

in the West and is one of the weakest of al-Qaeda’s affiliates, only having the capacity for infrequent attacks in North Africa.30

4. WHAT THREATS EMANATE FROM DOMESTIC MILITANTS MOTIVATED BY JIHADIST

TERRORIST IDEAS?

The New America Foundation and Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Public 

Policy examined the 180 post-9/11 cases of Americans or U.S. residents convicted 

or charged of some form of jihadist terrorist activity directed against the United 

States, as well as the cases of those American citizens who have traveled overseas 

to join a jihadist terrorist group.32 None of the cases we investigated involved individuals plotting with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Given all 

the post-9/11 concerns about terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction this 

is one of our more positive findings. 

The number of jihadist terrorism cases involving U.S. citizens or residents has 

spiked in the past 2 years.33 In 2009 and 2010 there were 76, almost half of the 
27 

allied to al-Qaeda such as the Somali group Al-Shabab, or that are influenced by al-Qaeda’s ideology such as the Pakistani group Lashkar-e-Taiba, which sought out and killed Americans in 

the Mumbai attacks of 2008. We also included individuals motivated by al-Qaeda’s ideology of 

violence directed at the United States. 34 USA v Daniel Patrick Boyd et al. Indictment in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 

of North Carolina, filed 7/22/09 http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/caseldocs/ 

1029.pdf; and the superseding indictment in the same case dated September 24, 2009. http:// 

www.investigativeproject.org/documents/caseldocs/1075.pdf. 

total since 9/11. This increase was driven, in part, by plots that could have killed 

dozens, such as the Pakistani-American Faisal Shahzad’s attempt to bomb Times 

Square in May 2010, but also by the 31 people who were charged with fundraising, 

recruiting, or traveling abroad to fight for the Somali terrorist group, Al-Shabab. 

In 2002 there were 16 jihadist terrorism cases, in 2003 there were 23, in 2004 

there were 8, in 2005 there were 12, in 2006 there were 18, in 2007 there were 16, 

in 2008 there were 5, in 2009 there were a record 43, in 2010 there were 33, and 

in 2011 the number of such cases has subsided rather dramatically: There were 6. 

The total number of deaths from jihadist-terrorist attacks in the United States 

after 9/11 totals 17. Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan is accused of opening fire at a readiness center at Fort Hood, Texas in 2009, killing 13; Hesham Mohamed Hadayat 

killed two people at the El Al counter at Los Angeles International Airport in 2002 

before being shot dead by an El Al security guard; Naveed Haq was found guilty 

of killing one person at a Jewish center in Seattle in 2006; and Carlos Bledsoe (aka 

Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammed) is accused of killing one soldier and wounding 

another at a U.S. Army recruiting center in Arkansas in 2009. 

The U.S. military, fighting wars of various kinds in five Muslim countries, is firmly in the crosshairs of homegrown jihadist militants. Around one in three of the 

cases examined by the Maxwell School and New America involved a U.S. military 

target, ranging from Quantico Marine Base in Virginia to American soldiers serving 

overseas. We found 57 individuals who were targeting U.S. military facilities or personnel both at home and abroad; 35% of the cases. Bryant Neal Vinas, for instance, 

a Long Island native admitted in 2009 to taking part in a rocket attack on a U.S. 

base in Afghanistan, while in North Carolina Daniel Boyd, a charismatic convert to 

Islam who had fought in the jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviets, had some 

kind of plan to attack American soldiers. Boyd obtained maps of Quantico Marine 

Base in Virginia, which he cased for a possible attack on June 12, 2009.34

Rather than being the uneducated, young Arab-American immigrants of popular 

imagination, the homegrown militants do not fit any particular socio-economic or 

ethnic profile. Their average age is 30. Of the cases for which ethnicity could be determined, only a quarter are of Arab descent, while 10% are African-American, 13% 

are Caucasian, 18% are South Asian, 20% are of Somali descent, and the rest are 

either mixed race or of other ethnicities. About half the cases involved a U.S-born 

American citizen, while another third were naturalized citizens. And of the 94 cases 

where education could be ascertained, two-thirds pursued at least some college 

courses, and 1 in 10 had completed a Masters, PhD, or doctoral equivalent. 

Chairman KING. Our next witness is Evan Kohlmann. He has 

served as an expert witness on al-Qaeda for the Department of Defense in the military commission proceedings. He is an international terrorism consultant. He has authored ‘‘Al Qaeda’s Jihad 

in Europe’’. He is the founder and senior partner at Flashpoint 

Global Partners, a New York-based security consulting firm, and 

appears on television as a terrorism analyst. 

Mr. Kohlmann, I welcome you to the committee for the first time 

and look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF EVAN F. KOHLMANN, FLASHPOINT GLOBAL 

PARTNERS 

Mr. KOHLMANN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you also, Ranking Member Thompson and the rest of the committee, for having me here today. 

I would like to start off with kind of beginning at the very beginning. Over the last decade, one of the central pillars of U.S. 

counterterrorism policy has been to aggressively target al-Qaeda 
28 

leadership—as you can see right there—in their long-time sanctuary regions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As President Obama 

explained on television in 2009, this is the heart of it. This is where 

bin Laden is. It is from here you see attacks launched not just 

against the United States, but against London, against Bali, 

against a whole host of countries. 

On May 1, that mission culminated in the now successful killing 

of bin Laden at a hideout in Abbottabad. Were we still stuck in October 2001, this might be the end of the narrative; however, much 

has changed in the world since those early days of the battle 

against al-Qaeda. The gaps in al-Qaeda’s central leadership created 

by the deaths of former al-Qaeda military chief Abu Hafs al-Masri 

and other luminaries have been filled by new, younger figures. 

With the blessings of bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, regional 

al-Qaeda leaderships have emerged in critical locations such as 

Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and North Africa. Meanwhile, a new 

generation of home-grown lone wolf-style jihadists has emerged, including many U.S. and European nationals who may lack the military skills to plan the next 9/11, but whose passion for violence and 

bloodshed can nonetheless have deadly consequences. 

To understand what the future of al-Qaeda will now be, one must 

first assess the immediate reactions to the death of their revered 

former leader among its most diehard supporters, and what becomes obvious from the internal discussions taking place right now 

is that the sudden word of bin Laden’s death came as a nasty shock 

to his followers. One of the most disturbing parts of all this was 

the wealth of intelligence that was recovered from bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad. One of the most credible and respected users 

on al-Qaeda’s top-tier ‘‘Shamukh’’ discussion forum, Yaman 

Mukhadab, posted a warning advising that these are ‘‘the most 

dangerous 72 hours in the struggle of al-Qaeda with the Zionists 

and Crusaders in the history of the jihadi struggle.’’ He cautioned, 

‘‘It is possible that America has infiltrated Mujahideen communications and will seek to unveil the masterminds behind big terrorist 

operations.’’ 

As far as I see it, any group of Mujahideen that are assigned to 

an operation should go forward and execute it without hesitation 

or delay and to avoid completely attempting to communicate with 

anyone. 

Unfortunately, the sense of melancholy and panic that was brewing in the hearts of al-Qaeda supporters and followers was soon 

swamped by a tidal wave of rage, especially after images of crowds 

of jubilant Americans were televised around the world as they celebrated at Ground Zero and outside of the White House. 

One user on another al-Qaeda web forum, Ta’er Muhajir, posted 

an open message addressed to ‘‘You who danced in front of the 

White House, we, too, will start to dance the next time we hear 

about a massacre that befalls you, just as we danced when your 

corpses were spread across the Pentagon and the World Trade Center.’’ 

In another message titled, ‘‘Advice and Guidance for the Lions 

Launching Attacks in the Land of America.’’ Another user, 

Azmarai, explained, ‘‘We aren’t merely seeking to kill a soldier or 

an American civilian here or there, as this doesn’t change any-
29 

thing. Our goal is bigger than that. Like our Sheikh Osama ordered us in his messages, it is critical to continue jihadi operations 

both against the United States military and economy. Their economic destruction is on-going, but it requires more attacks and for 

the young men to strike at the strategic points of the American 

economy.’’ 

I now turn to the issue of al-Qaeda’s remaining central leadership figures. You will see a chart up there of those who are still 

left post the death of bin Laden. Of course, with bin Laden now 

gone, the question naturally turns to who will be selected to replace his now vacant position as the overall commander of alQaeda. Though the identity of that leader—that new leader—remains still uncertain, the far most likely candidate, as indicated on 

the chart here, is al-Qaeda’s present deputy commander, Dr. 

Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Zawahiri, who merged his Egyptian Islamic 

Jihad faction with al-Qaeda in 1998, has long stood alongside bin 

Laden as his closest adviser. Al-Zawahiri has both played a key 

role in operationally organizing and overseeing international terrorist attacks and has also simultaneously spearheaded al-Qaeda 

media efforts. 

As far as supporters chatting on top-tier al-Qaeda web forums, 

there simply has been no serious discussion of any potential bin 

Laden successors other than Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Qaeda’s 

on-line constituents are so taken with the idea that al-Zawahiri 

will be the next leader of al-Qaeda that they have taken to casually 

referring to the group as Jund Ayman, or the Soldiers of Ayman. 

Forum user Muheb Ruyat al-Rahman insisted, our Sheikh Mohammad, may Allah have mercy on him, is our Sheikh Ayman. Our 

Sheikh Ayman is our Sheikh Osama. 

There is also the question of al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates faced 

with the resounding defeat on the peaks of Tora Bora in late 2001. 

A group of high-ranking al-Qaeda commanders decided to embrace 

the development of a more diffuse and self-sufficient network of 

international operatives. Al-Qaeda’s beneficial website acknowledged that it was time for a new phase in evolution. ‘‘The al-Qaeda 

organization has adopted a strategy in its war with the Americans 

based on expanding the battlefield and exhausting the enemy. The 

more diversified and distant the areas in which the operations take 

place, the more exhausting it becomes for the enemy, the more he 

needs to stretch his resources, and the more he becomes terrified.’’ 

By mid-2004, nascent al-Qaeda franchise organizations were already well ensconced in both Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Today similar 

al-Qaeda franchises have expanded their reach even farther, into 

Indonesia, Yemen, Algeria, Somalia, Lebanon, and the Palestinian 

territories. These upstart regional branches are capable of operating basically independently of al-Qaeda’s central leadership in 

Afghanistan. The growing affiliate factions often have more expansive ambitions or just as grandiose as those of bin Laden himself. 

While al-Qaeda’s regional efforts in Iraq and Saudi Arabia may 

have suffered debilitating setbacks in recent years, that is not the 

case in Yemen, where a growing al-Qaeda branch, known as alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, has demonstrated its ability to 

launch repeated and sophisticated attacks targeting U.S. soil. 
30 

Perhaps the most disturbing aspects of launching attacks against 

the United States is their obsession with conceiving plots aimed at 

causing catastrophic damage to the American economy. In early 

2008, AQAP published an approving interview with a most wanted 

al-Qaeda suspect, who endorsed the idea of striking at oil resources, petroleum resources. He explained if the enemy’s interests 

in the Arabian Peninsula were stricken, and a supply of oil was cut 

off, and the oil refineries were out of order, this would cause the 

enemy to collapse, and he won’t merely withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan, but he would face total collapse. If he were struck hard 

from various places, then he would scatter and turn around and 

flee forlornly from the land of the Muslims. 

Given the high-profile role that AQAP has played in masterminding not only the underwear bomber, Omar Abdulmutallab, but 

also most recently a cargo bomb plot aimed at the United States, 

AQAP’s passionate interest in launching strategic attacks aimed at 

devastating the U.S. economy can be ignored only at our own peril. 

It is also a telling reminder of how, thanks to the new affiliate network of global franchises, the underlying al-Qaeda terrorist threat 

to the U.S. homeland is in some ways unchanged by the death of 

Osama bin Laden. 

Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Kohlmann follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EVAN F. KOHLMANN WITH LAITH ALKHOURI

MAY 25, 2011 

(I) INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade, one of the central pillars of U.S. counterterrorism policy has 

been to aggressively target al-Qaeda’s senior leadership in their long-time sanctuary 

in regions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The prevailing wisdom behind this strategy 

is quite simple: By mounting direct pressure on Osama bin Laden, Ayman alZawahiri, and others within the highest echelons, al-Qaeda will presumably lack the 

time, resources, and opportunity to conceive complex international terrorist plots 

threatening U.S. homeland security. As President Obama explained in 2009 during 

a televised interview, ‘‘This is the heart of it. This is where bin Laden is. This is 

where [his] allies are. It’s from here that you see attacks launched not just against 

the United States, but against London, against Bali, against a whole host of countries.’’ Indeed, the American government has invested billions of dollars and tens 

of thousands of U.S. soldiers in order to carry out this mission and deny al-Qaeda 

the use of a central base in South Asia. On May 1, the mission culminated in the 

successful killing of Osama bin Laden at a hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan by a 

team of U.S. Navy SEALs. Evidence recovered by the SEALs reportedly shows that 

bin Laden continued to play a direct operational role in conceiving and micro-managing terrorist plots against the United States. 

Were we still stuck in October 2001, this might be the end of the narrative for 

bin Laden’s jihadi movement. However, much has indeed changed in the world since 

those early days of the battle against al-Qaeda. The gaps in al-Qaeda’s central leadership created by the deaths of former luminaries like Abu Hafs al-Masri and Abu 

Laith al-Liby have been filled by new younger figures like Abu Yahya al-Liby. With 

the blessings of bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, regional al-Qaeda leaderships 

have emerged in critical locations such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and North 

Africa. Meanwhile, a new generation of homegrown ‘‘lone wolf’’-style jihadists has 

emerged (including many U.S. and European nationals) who may lack the military 

skills to plan the next 9/11, but whose passion for violence and bloodshed can nonetheless have deadly consequences. 

(II) REACTION TO THE DEATH OF BIN LADEN

To understand what the future of al-Qaeda will now be, one must first assess the 

immediate reactions to the death of their revered former leader among its most die-
31 

1http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=108210. May 6, 2011. 2http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=107305. May 3, 2011. 3http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=107305. May 3, 2011. 4http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=107232. May 2, 2011. 5http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=107132. May 2, 2011. 6http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=107100&page=4. May 2, 2011 

hard supporters. Late on the evening of May 1, al-Qaeda’s on-line social networking 

forums were shaken awake in a spasm of activity as jihadi militants from around 

the globe rushed to log in and discover for themselves if reports of the killing of 

bin Laden were really true. With al-Qaeda’s remaining leaders still hiding quietly 

out of sight for the time being, these on-line forums provide one of the most compelling available windows into the thinking of Bin Laden’s cadre as they mourn his 

passing. 

At first, the response was largely one of chaotic disbelief. Stunned forum participants insisted that the announcement had to be part of a new scheme devised by 

the CIA to trick and demoralize bin Laden’s diehard supporters. With their patience 

quickly exhausted by the deluge of anxious incoming inquiries, ill-tempered forum 

administrators began threatening to permanently ban anyone who even dared to express sorrow based on ‘‘unverified crusader rumors’’ of bin Laden’s demise. Finally, 

on May 6, al-Qaeda’s central leadership issued a formal communique ́ acknowledging 

bin Laden’s ‘‘martyrdom.’’ The message defiantly insisted, ‘‘Shaykh Usama didn’t 

build an organization to die with it and go away with it... The university of 

faith, Quran, and jihad that was founded by Sheikh Usama bin Laden has not and 

will not close its doors... those of us from the al-Qaedat ul-Jihad network vow 

to Allah to continue on the path of jihad taken by our leaders, headed by Sheikh 

Usama, without hesitation or question, and we will not deviate or lean from that.’’1

What first becomes obvious from the discussions taking place on al-Qaeda’s online chat forums is that—no matter what the organization’s leadership may claim 

in retrospect—the sudden word of bin Laden’s death came as a nasty shock to his 

followers, and was undoubtedly a staggering blow. In the hours immediately following news of bin Laden’s violent demise, al-Qaeda forum users and administrators 

were also preoccupied with another gnawing concern: The state of their own personal security. By the morning after the raid, media sources were reporting that 

U.S. Navy SEALs had seized an intelligence jackpot of hard drives, flash data disks, 

and other records of electronic communications from the bin Laden compound in 

Abbottabad. One of the most credible and respected users on al-Qaeda’s top-tier 

‘‘Shamukh’’ web forum, ‘‘Yaman Mukhadab’’, posted a warning to fellow jihadists advising that these were ‘‘the most dangerous 72 hours in the struggle of al-Qaeda 

with the Zionists and Crusaders . . . in the history of the jihad struggle.’’2 He cautioned, ‘‘it is possible that America has infiltrated mujahideen communications and 

will seek to unveil the masterminds behind big [terrorist] operations.’’ He further 

urged, ‘‘As far as I see it, any group of mujahideen that are assigned to an operation 

should go forward and execute it... without hesitation or delay, and to completely avoid trying to communicate with anyone . . . or to seek new 

orders... Stopping and delaying while awaiting something new will not achieve 

anything, and it won’t change what has already taken place.’’3

The palpable sense of melancholy and panic brewing in the hearts of al-Qaeda’s 

supporters on the web was soon swamped by a tidal wave of raw, unbridled rage, 

especially after televised images of crowds of jubilant Americans celebrating outside 

the White House and at Ground Zero were broadcast around the world. One user, 

‘‘Ta’er Muhajir’’, posted an open message on al-Qaeda’s web forums addressed to 

‘‘you who danced in front of the White House... We, too, will start to dance the 

next time we hear about a massacre that befalls you, just as we danced when your 

rotten corpses were spread across the Pentagon and the World Trade Center.’’4 Another forum user, ‘‘Mukhadab ad-Dima’’ (a nickname which translates to ‘‘Drenched 

in Blood’’), pointed to the ‘‘big crowds in front of the White House’’ and demanded, 

‘‘who will be the hero who will turn their night into day and their morning into hell, 

and who will renew the September glories—who will follow next in the list of our 

heroes: Arid Uka, Faisal Shahzad, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, Nidal 

Hassan . . . ?’’5 Echoing this sentiment, jihadi forum user ‘‘Jaish al-Islam’’ scoffed, 

‘‘they are celebrating the martyrdom of Shaykh Usama, but what they don’t realize 

is that we are all Usama.’’6

Even as he acknowledged his ‘‘sadness over the loss of our Shaykh Usama Bin 

Laden’’, jihadi forum user ‘‘Abu al-Qassam al-Maqdisi’’ vowed to ‘‘continue on this 

path.’’ Openly addressing U.S. President Barack Obama, he mocked, ‘‘if you think 

that by killing Shaykh Abu Abdullah you have finished off al-Qaeda, then you are 

totally delusional... the martyrdom of Shaykh Usama didn’t weaken us and 
32 

7http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=107175. May 2, 2011. 8http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=107288. May 2, 2011. 9http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=107288. May 2, 2011. 10http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=109881. May 13, 2011. 11http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=109164. May 9, 2011. 12http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=109164. May 9, 2011. 

didn’t disappoint us—it just gave us more passion to stay steadfast on this path. 

And if you have killed Usama, then we are all Usama.’’7 These repeated declarations of defiance inevitably turned to the question of how best to avenge the ‘‘martyrdom’’ of bin Laden. Another registered user, ‘‘Abu Musab al-Maqdisi’’, complained, ‘‘unfortunately, the only thing I see is men who are crying over 

nothing . . . It would have been better to see the knife of Zarqawi being sharpened 

to the point that I can behold its shine from here.’’8 He urged fellow bin Laden supporters, ‘‘Beware, and get ready. And I don’t know if there is time to say goodbye 

to your fathers, mothers, wives, children, brothers and neighbors, as time can’t wait 

and the Shaykh can’t wait, and now the battle has begun to eradicate the state of 

infidels, America, and anyone who stands alongside it from within the Muslim 

lands. It’s only a matter of hours. Ohhh, hours are too many, just minutes, and even 

too much... secondssss... I’m now sharpening my sword so you should be 

sharpening yours.’’9

Jihadi forum users have also been tendering their own unsolicited suggestions 

and insights to al-Qaeda’s remaining leadership. In a message titled ‘‘Advice and 

Guidance for the Lions Launching Attacks in the Land of the Enemy, America’’, 

user ‘‘Azmarai’’ addressed ‘‘those who will be planning in the coming days, weeks, 

and months to carry out operations in the United States’’: ‘‘we aren’t merely seeking 

to kill a soldier or an American civilian here or there, as this doesn’t change 

anything... Our goal is bigger than that... Like our Shaykh Usama ordered 

us in his messages, it is critical to continue jihadi operations both against the U.S. 

military and economy... Their economic destruction is on-going, but it requires 

more attacks and for the young men to strike at the strategic points of the American 

economy.’’ Towards the end of causing catastrophic damage to the U.S. economy, 

user ‘‘Azmarai’’ suggested a range of possible targets, including targeting hydroelectric dams, ‘‘major electricity-producing plants’’, nuclear power plants, oil refineries, ‘‘Federal Reserve Banks and major financial centers’’, and water-purification 

facilities. ‘‘Azmarai’’ was equally insistent on the need for al-Qaeda and its supporters to specifically ‘‘target the major companies that contribute technologically in 

supporting the U.S. army with information and technology, like the headquarters 

of DARPA... Killing America’s scientists and those who participate in advancing 

military research is very important... Also target the headquarters of the big 

weapon manufacturing companies, and specifically targeting their main headquarters that include engineers and experts.’’10

Equally of note is a formal communique ́ issued in response to bin Laden’s death 

by the official team of on-line couriers responsible for distributing al-Qaeda’s digital 

propaganda. The so-called ‘‘Fajr Media Center’’ included a direct ‘‘Message to the 

American People’’: 

‘‘We say to you: killing the Shaykh was a big mistake, and a great sin, and a deed 

that will bring catastrophes upon you that will sink your joy. Obama has sacrificed 

your blood to remain in his position of power... Obama is not different from his 

predecessor Bush in anything, as the wars Bush started Obama continued and he 

didn’t do anything to stop them . . . Do not blame us after today; you elected him 

and you will pay the price! Armies may protect Obama, but who protects you from 

our reach?’’11

Fajr Media Center also offered their own message of advice ‘‘for the Mujahideen’’, 

urging al-Qaeda supporters to exact a heavy price in revenge for the ‘‘martyrdom’’ 

of bin Laden—‘‘the kind of revenge that will make America forget her present euphoria and instead scream with pain.’’ Echoing the popular sentiments among jihadi 

forum users, the group advocated ‘‘every Muslim mujahid’’ should ‘‘focus on making 

suitable preparations for any operation against the infidels, and we encourage that 

the operations be unique, and terribly devastating to the enemy . . . If the chance 

comes up, do not waste it, and do not consult anyone in killing the Americans and 

destroying their economy. The land of Allah is wide and their interests are 

widespread . . . We encourage you to launch individual terrorist operations that 

reap major results but which require only basic preparations.’’12
33 

13http://www.al-faloja.info/vb/showthread.php?t=127650. July 30, 2010. 14http://as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?t=37762. May 2, 2011. 15http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=110085. May 16, 2011. 16http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=110085. May 16, 2011. 17http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=110085. May 16, 2011. 

(III) AL-QAEDA’S REMAINING CENTRAL LEADERSHIP FIGURES

It is perhaps inevitable that the killing of Osama bin Laden would serve as a 

rather dramatic blow to al-Qaeda popular morale. However, bin Laden’s passing has 

been particularly difficult to accept for jihadi supporters in light of the litany of 

other losses the group has endured over the past 3 years. The list of top-tier casualties suffered by al-Qaeda includes, among others: Senior military field commander 

Abu Laith al-Liby, al-Qaeda Shura Council member Abu al-Hasan al-Masri, senior 

al-Qaeda explosives expert Abu Khabab al-Masri, senior al-Qaeda operational leader 

and spokesman Abu Mansour as-Shami, and al-Qaeda Shura Council member and 

presumed No. 3 in command of the group Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (a.k.a. Shaykh 

Saeed). Al-Yazid’s death alone provoked the release of at least two different audiorecorded messages from al-Qaeda, including a confession from Dr. Ayman alZawahiri that he was ‘‘deeply saddened at the loss.’’13 The killing of bin Laden has 

only managed to create an even larger gaping hole in al-Qaeda’s already unsteady 

central hierarchy. In the wake of initial news reports about bin Laden’s passing, one 

jihadi chat forum user ‘‘Abu Zubaydah’’ posted a message offering his deepest respects ‘‘to the family of the martyr... and also Shaykh Ayman Zawahiri, who in 

a single year lost Shaykh Saeed and now his other companion on the path . . . By 

Allah, it is a year of sorrow.’’14

With bin Laden now gone, the question naturally turns to who will be selected 

to replace his now vacant position as the overall commander of al-Qaeda. Media 

speculation in recent days has ranged wildly—from fugitive Yemeni-American cleric 

Anwar al-Awlaki to a relatively obscure Pakistani jihadi militant named Mohammed Ilyas Kashmiri. Though the identity of al-Qaeda’s new top leader still remains 

uncertain, the far most likely candidate is al-Qaeda’s present Deputy Commander 

Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Zawahiri, who merged his own Egyptian Islamic Jihad 

faction with al-Qaeda in 1998, has long stood alongside Osama bin Laden as his 

closest advisor. The former Egyptian pediatrician has both played a key operational 

role in organizing and overseeing international terrorist attacks, and has also simultaneously spearheaded al-Qaeda media efforts—personally appearing in dozens of 

audio and video recordings released by al-Qaeda’s official media wing (in fact, far 

more often than bin Laden himself). With bin Laden gone, Ayman al-Zawahiri is 

by far the most recognizable face from among al-Qaeda’s remaining central leadership. He is one of a dwindling number of commanders who can claim to be one of 

the original founders and Shura Council members of al-Qaeda. His essential credibility as an early pioneer of the jihadi movement in Egypt and Afghanistan would 

be quite difficult to match by any potential challenger vying for control of al-Qaeda. 

As far as supporters chatting on top-tier al-Qaeda web forums, there simply has 

been no serious discussion of any potential bin Laden successors other than Dr. 

Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Qaeda’s on-line constituents are so taken with the idea that 

al-Zawahiri will be the next leader of al-Qaeda that they have taken to casually referring to the group as ‘‘Jund Ayman’’ (‘‘The Soldiers of Ayman’’). Forum users have 

also taken it upon themselves to vigorously contest snarky comments from al-Qaeda 

critics that ‘‘Shaykh Usama made a mistake by merging al-Qaeda with Shaykh 

Ayman.’’15 User ‘‘Muheb Ruyat al-Rahman’’ dismissed these prevalent critiques as 

‘‘poison’’ from those ‘‘pretending to be sympathizers’’: ‘‘Do you really think our 

Shaykh Usama couldn’t distinguish the worthless from the valuable, or the beautiful from the ugly? Do you think... that he was somehow tricked by Shaykh 

Ayman? Do you really believe that [bin Laden]... who refused to surrender his 

faith in jihad would simply give up on what he judged to be truthful and correct 

merely in order to satisfy Shaykh Ayman?’’16 Al-Rahman insisted, ‘‘Our Shaykh 

Usama, may Allah have mercy on him, is our Shaykh Ayman, and our Shaykh 

Ayman is our Shaykh Usama.’’17

Nevertheless, this is not to say that the ascension of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri to 

the top of al-Qaeda’s hierarchy is by any means guaranteed, nor is it necessarily 

a fortunate development for the organization. Since beginning his career as a jihadi 

activist in Egypt, al-Zawahiri has acquired a notorious reputation as arrogant, selfserving, and unconscionably ruthless. As early as 1990, at al-Qaeda’s own guesthouses in the Pakistani city of Peshawar, mujahideen fighters began to loudly grumble that too many Egyptians—primarily al-Zawahiri’s cronies—were being appointed 

to senior positions in al-Qaeda. Accusations of preferential treatment and corruption 
34 

18 United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS). United States District 

Court, Southern District of New York. Trial Transcript, February 6, 2001. Page 322. 19 United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS). United States District 

Court, Southern District of New York. Trial Transcript, February 6, 2001. Page 322. 20 ‘‘Interview with Sayyid Imam al-Sharif.’’ Al-Hayat. December 8–10, 2007. 21 ‘‘Industry of Death: Abu Yahya al-Liby.’’ Al-Arabiya. July 4, 2009. 22 ‘‘Industry of Death: Abu Yahya al-Liby.’’ Al-Arabiya. July 4, 2009. 

began to fly back and forth. Former al-Qaeda lieutenant Jamal al-Fadl later recalled 

during testimony in U.S. Federal court when he finally confronted Osama bin Laden 

to complain that ‘‘the camp was being run by Egyptian people and the guesthouse— 

the emir from the guesthouse—is Egyptian and everything [is] Egyptian people and 

[everyone is] from [the Egyptian] jihad group, and we have people from Nigeria, 

from Tunisia, from Siberia, [so] why is Egyptian people got more chance than other 

people run everything?’’18 Some of the dissidents within al-Qaeda felt too ‘‘embarrassed’’ to say this to bin Laden’s face, while others—such as a Libyan fighter 

named Abu Tamim—were much more vocal with their concerns: ‘‘He say, why everything run by Egyptian people?’’19

During an interview in 2007 with the London-based newspaper Al-Hayat, Sayyid 

Imam al-Sharif (a.k.a. ‘‘Dr. Fadl’’)—once a ‘‘leading figure’’ in Dr. Ayman alZawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) movement and a founding member of alQaeda’s own governing Shura Council—personally accused al-Zawahiri of being a 

‘‘liar’’, a ‘‘gangster’’, and a ‘‘bandit.’’ According to al-Sharif, ‘‘Ayman is a charlatan 

who used secrecy as a pretext . . . I can’t think of anyone in Islamic history who 

has committed such deceit, fraud, falsification, and betrayal of trust . . . no one before Ayman al-Zawahiri.’’20 When I raised the subject of al-Zawahiri’s status of authority within al-Qaeda in a discussion with former Arab-Afghan mujahid Abdullah 

Anas, he sighed for a moment and chuckled to himself. ‘‘Can you imagine a great 

religion represented by al-Zawahiri?’’ he asked me. ‘‘It’s a catastrophe.’’ 

In light of al-Zawahiri’s obvious shortcomings, and the likelihood that he will one 

day meet an end analogous to that of bin Laden, it behooves us to examine the other 

potential leadership candidates among the top tier of al-Qaeda’s inner sanctum. 

Those candidates include: 

Abu Yahya al-Liby (a.k.a. Hassan Qaid) 

Though he has undoubtedly far slimmer credentials than Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, 

Shaykh Abu Yahya al-Liby has nonetheless also become a strikingly influential figure in the international jihadist movement ever since his stunning escape in July 

2005 from a high-security U.S. prison at Bagram air base (near Kabul). At the time 

of his initial capture in Karachi, Pakistan in the wake of the events of 9/11, Abu 

Yahya was at most a mid-ranking lieutenant within a faction of the Libyan Islamic 

Fighting Group (LIFG) directly allied with al-Qaeda. At the time, he was best 

known as an expert in computer media and Islamic jurisprudence. According to fellow former LIFG commander Noman Benotman, Abu Yahya ‘‘was a member of the 

Shariah committee of the LIFG, and he was known within the framework of the 

LIFG, and joined it relatively early on... almost in 1991 . . . He was there at 

the end of the Afghan Jihad, meaning with the LIFG... But he wasn’t from 

amongst the top leadership.’’21

However, the combination of Abu Yahya’s public speaking abilities, his natural 

charisma, and the compelling personal credential of having brazenly slipped out of 

America’s highest-security prison in Afghanistan proved to be a powerful cocktail. 

Less than 6 months after fleeing Bagram, Abu Yahya began to appear in video recordings produced by al-Qaeda’s official ‘‘As-Sahab Media Foundation’’—so often, in 

fact, that his face has become virtually synonymous with As-Sahab. Over the last 

5 years, Abu Yahya has been the principle featured spokesman for al-Qaeda in dozens of audio and video recordings released by As-Sahab—appearing more often than 

either Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri. Abu Yahya’s recorded sermons are 

highly influential, and are recycled and often re-published by other likeminded terrorist organizations like Shabaab al-Mujahideen in Somalia. Though Abu Yahya has 

never been granted an official title in al-Qaeda’s leadership to match that of bin 

Laden, al-Zawahiri, or Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, he is widely considered to be within 

the very top echelons of the organization—possibly even the new ‘‘No. 3’’ in the 

wake of al-Yazid’s demise last year. Yet, as far as his former comrade Noman 

Benotman is concerned, Abu Yahya ‘‘was never, and I doubt will ever be, a military 

commander.’’22

Shaykh Atiyallah al-Liby (a.k.a. Atiyah Abd al-Rahman) 

Shaykh Atiyallah al-Liby is another Libyan national within the top ranks of alQaeda who hails from the now-besieged coastal town of Misrata. According to the 
35 

23http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/index.cfm?page=atiyahlabd. 24http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/index.cfm?page=atiyahlabd. 25http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/index.cfm?page=atiyahlabd. 26http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/index.cfm?page=atiyahlabd. 27 Atiyatullah, Louis. ‘‘The Badr Al-Riyadh Tape: A Well Organized al-Qaeda’s Media Strategy 

Revealed.’’ The Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF). 2004. Page 2. 28http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=99893. March 18, 2011. 29http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=99893. March 18, 2011. 30http://www.islamhouse.com/ip/288149. May 2011. 31 ‘‘Industry of Death: Who is Khalid al-Hussainan?’’ Al-Arabiya. October 30, 2010. 32http://www.al-faloja.info/vb/showthread.php?t=77715. August 7, 2009. 33http://www.islamhouse.com/ip/288149. 

U.S. State Department, Atiyallah first joined bin Laden in Afghanistan ‘‘as a teenager in the 1980s. Since then, he has gained considerable stature in al-Qa’ida as 

an explosives expert and Islamic scholar.’’23 While in Afghanistan during the late 

1990s, the Libyan also forged a relationship with a young Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 

in the western Afghan city of Herat.24 He also joined bin Laden and his coterie of 

top aides as they fled under fire to the mountainous redoubt of Tora Bora late in 

the fall of 2001.25

Following the battle of Tora Bora, Shaykh Atiyallah publicly emerged as a key 

ideologue and spokesman on behalf of al-Qaeda’s senior leadership. As part of that 

role, according to the U.S. Government, Atiyallah ‘‘recruits and facilitates talks with 

other Islamic groups to operate under al-Qaida’’ and ‘‘has been in regular contact 

with senior ranking al-Qaida leaders.’’26 In fact, the Libyan al-Qaeda leader has 

been a major proponent of decentralizing al-Qaeda’s network into an autonomous 

web of franchise affiliates. According to an essay written Atiyallah in 2004, the advantage of such a strategy is that ‘‘collective organized work is not affected by the 

loss of individuals, because individuals are easily replaced with others. The organization exists not on any individual; rather it operates as number of distributed responsibilities where the loss of individuals is redundant. This is one of the secrets 

of the effectiveness of al-Qaeda and their success in group operations.’’27

Since the death of Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, Shaykh Atiyallah has been making an 

increasingly frequent number of cameos in al-Qaeda audio and video recordings released by the As-Sahab Media Foundation. In his last appearance in a video released on March 18, 2011, he urged Libyan rebels to adopt an Islamist methodology 

and ‘‘avoid allying with the enemies of Allah.’’28 He also sternly warned ‘‘the enemies of Allah, whether America or others, to even think about acts of aggression 

or interference in the country [of Libya]. Otherwise, the Army of Allah and the chivalrous men of Islam will make them forget the tragedies they faced previously.’’29

Abu Zaid al-Kuwaiti (a.k.a. Khaled al-Hussainan) 

Though Shaykh Khaled al-Hussainan is a relatively new arrival to the jihad in 

Afghanistan, he is far older than most of al-Qaeda’s new up-and-coming generation 

of leaders. Likewise, while he has had no major military experiences to speak of, 

al-Hussainan has other credentials that offer him a leg up within al-Qaeda’s hierarchy—namely, that he was once a respected cleric at the Al-Albani mosque in Kuwait and a former state-sponsored lecturer at the Kuwaiti Ministry of Religious Endowments.30 Al-Hussainan also reportedly worked as a preacher at the Saad alAbdullah Academy, which is responsible for training Kuwaiti military officers. By 

1996, Khaled al-Hussainan encountered his first brush with the law when he faced 

criminal charges in Kuwait in connection with what became known the ‘‘Desert 

Flogging’’ Case. Though he was later found innocent, al-Hussainan had been accused of joining with a group of radical Islamists in forcibly abducting two women 

and assaulting them with a whip in a remote location as punishment for ‘‘what they 

considered to be a shameful act.’’31 In 2007, without any warning, al-Hussainan suddenly disappeared from his pulpit in Kuwait and traveled to Afghanistan, reportedly 

by crossing through Iranian territory. Less than 2 years later, in August 2009, alHussainan was first publicly identified by al-Qaeda’s media wing as a prominent 

leader and spokesman for the group.32

That al-Hussainan is one of al-Qaeda’s few remaining top-tier originally from the 

Arabian Peninsula (and a graduate of the Imam Muhammad bin Saud University 

in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) is hugely significant.33 First of all, al-Qaeda’s traditional wealthy financial donors based in the Gulf region are generally predisposed 

towards channeling their generous assistance to mujahideen organizations with 

prominent Saudi or Kuwaiti leaders with whom they feel most comfortable. Second, 

in countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan, the fact that al-Hussainan can say that 

he is from the same sacred soil as the holy city of Mecca and the Prophet Mohammed plays uniquely well among local Islamists. In video messages released by al- 
36 

34http://www.al-faloja.info/vb/showthread.php?t=82666. September 7, 2009. 35http://www.al-faloja.info/vb/showthread.php?t=82666. September 7, 2009. 36http://www.al-faloja.info/vb/showthread.php?t=82666. September 7, 2009. 37 United States v. Osama bin Laden, et al. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS). United States District 

Court, Southern District of New York. Trial Transcript, February 6, 2001. Page 244. 38http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/binladen/usbinladen-1a.pdf. 39 ‘‘Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.’’ United States v. Zacarias 

Moussaoui. Eastern District of Virginia (EDVA). Cr. No. 01–455–A. Defense Exhibit 941. 40http://www.bkufus.com/images/img/indexe.php?subject=2&rec=14&tit=tit&pa=0. January 

2003. 41http://www.bkufus.com/images/img/indexe.php?subject=2&rec=15&tit=tit&pa=0. January 

2003. 42Priest, Dana and Susan Schmidt. ‘‘Al Qaeda Figure Tied To Riyadh Bombings; U.S. Officials 

Say Leader Is In Iran With Other Terrorists.’’ Washington Post. May 18, 2003. Page A24. 

Qaeda, al-Hussainan has boasted of ‘‘traveling in Afghanistan from village to village 

and from city to city and from province to province, and praise Allah, I speak in 

the mosques and encourage the Afghan people to perform Jihad and encourage them 

to stand by the Mujahideen and encourage them to expel the Crusaders who have 

corrupted the people and land.’’34

Though his background is exclusively clerical, Khaled al-Hussainan has claimed 

to be participating in actual armed combat with Afghan and coalition military 

forces. In August 2009, he issued an open message to U.S. President Barack Obama, 

boasting, ‘‘your soldiers besieged me. I was besieged by your soldiers for 10 hours. 

I was besieged by 30 tanks accompanied by helicopters and warplanes.’’35 According 

to al-Hussainan, ‘‘We came to Afghanistan to be killed as martyrs in Allah’s path. 

We came to Afghanistan for the hereafter. This is the fact which I want you to understand, Obama . . . We came to Afghanistan for Islam to dominate, not be dominated.’’36

Saif al-Adel (a.k.a. Mohammed al-Makkawi) 

Saif al-Adel (sometimes also known as ‘‘Mohammed al-Makkawi’’) is a former 

Egyptian military officer who went on to become a top leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and a founding member of al-Qaeda’s Shura Council. From early on, 

al-Adel served a critical role as al-Qaeda’s security chief, and as a manager of its 

covert overseas operations. According to former al-Qaeda lieutenant Jamal al-Fadl, 

al-Adel earned a reputation as ‘‘one of the members very good with 

explosives . . . He trained people for explosives.’’37 By the late 1990s, al-Adel’s nefarious activities were well-known to U.S. law enforcement and he was indicted 

along with Osama bin Laden in the Southern District of New York (SDNY) for his 

role in the August 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa.38 According 

to the mastermind of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, 

Khalid Shaykh Mohammed, Saif al-Adel was also ‘‘involved in the 9/11 attack’’ and 

‘‘knew the identity of the pilots who had been chosen when the Hamburg cell was 

picked in early 2000.’’39

Like other senior al-Qaeda leaders, in late 2001, al-Adel gathered his family and 

fled with bin Laden to their rallying point in the Tora Bora mountains. In a later 

treatise published by al-Qaeda, al-Adel recalled how the group had dwindled to ‘‘at 

best’’ 1,900 men, with at least 350 ‘‘heroes’’ lying dead on the battlefield. Facing potential annihilation, al-Qaeda divided their ranks: ‘‘some of them returned to their 

countries, whereas the rest stayed to take revenge from Americans and their allies.’’40 Despite the capture of his wife and children in Tora Bora, Saif al-Adel managed to escape and continue in his role overseeing operations targeting coalition 

forces in southern Afghanistan. After a battle with U.S. forces in Kandahar in 2002, 

al-Adel insisted that ‘‘the Americans are not up to ground battles... They will 

not consider another experience in Kandahar, especially that the military force 

based in Kandahar has, by the grace of Allah, a level of the expertise that will make 

the U.S. a running joke for centuries to come.’’41

Facing a renewed hunt by the U.S. military, Saif al-Adel allegedly fled once 

again—this time to neighboring Iran, where he was reportedly detailed and placed 

under house arrest. Al-Adel’s exact status in Iran has always been somewhat 

murky. Though some reports paint him as under the strict custody of Iranian intelligence agents, other information suggests that al-Adel may have continued playing 

an operational role in al-Qaeda from the open sanctuary of Iran. In May 2003, U.S. 

National security officials accused al-Adel of ‘‘giving the go-ahead’’ for a dramatic 

wave of suicide bombing attacks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia that killed at least 34 people. According to one ‘‘senior administration’’ source quoted by the Washington Post, 

‘‘there are some senior members of al Qaeda in Iran... who might have had a 

hand in this.’’42
37 

43http://myhesbah.com/v/showthread?t=174676. April 2, 2008. 44http://myhesbah.com/v/showthread?t=174676. April 2, 2008. 45http://www.defenselink.mil/news/transcriptlISN10024.pdf. Page 17. 46 As-Sahab Media Foundation. ‘‘The State of the Ummah’’ (a.k.a. ‘‘The Destruction of the 

U.S.S. Cole’’). Released: 2001. 47 As-Sahab Media Foundation. ‘‘A Message to the People of the West from the fighting brother Azzam the American on the Fourth Anniversary of the Battles of New York and Washington.’’ 

http://www.as-sahaab.com. MPEG Video; 12 minutes in length. November 6, 2005. 

The controversial idea that a senior Sunni Muslim extremist like Saif al-Adel 

would choose to hide out in a fundamentalist Shiite state like Iran has not escaped 

the attention of al-Qaeda’s sectarian followers. In 2008, when Dr. Ayman alZawahiri agreed to participate in an open Q&A session with al-Qaeda’s supporters 

on the web, he was peppered with inquiries about Saif al-Adel. One questioner explained, ‘‘I want to be rid of this doubt: why is Shaykh Saif al-Adel present in Iran, 

which murders our sons, keeps our women prisoner, and has perverted our religion 

and Quran—and yet he suffers no harm from them?... His presence causes many 

question and exclamation marks. I ask you by Allah to clarify to us, O’ our noble 

Shaykh.’’43 Though al-Zawahiri acknowledged receiving these numerous questions 

about al-Adel, he refused to give any further explanation. ‘‘As for his question about 

the location of Saif al-Adel,’’ al-Zawahiri replied dryly, ‘‘it is something I am unable 

to tell him.’’44

Despite recent reports indicating that al-Adel has finally left Iran and has returned to the Pakistani-Afghan border region, there are compelling reasons to believe that he will not be appointed as bin Laden’s replacement in charge of alQaeda. Al-Adel has never served a public role in al-Qaeda, and has deliberately 

avoided taking any sort of political role within the organization or even being shown 

on camera. In fact, al-Adel has based his entire career in al-Qaeda in serving critical 

but low-key roles within the upper echelon of bin Laden’s operational arm. Assuming that al-Adel has indeed rejoined al-Qaeda’s central leadership in AFPAK, the 

question remains if someone with as many lingering question marks as Saif al-Adel 

could possibly jump the hierarchy of al-Qaeda and supersede others figures like 

Ayman al-Zawahiri or Abu Yahya al-Liby who already have much more established 

profiles among al-Qaeda’s contemporary base. 

Azzam al-Amriki (a.k.a. Adam Gadahn) 

Adam Yehiye Gadahn is a convert to Islam originally from northern California. 

Raised on an isolated goat farm, Gadahn eventually moved south to Los Angeles to 

live with his grandmother. While in Los Angeles, Gadahn came into contact with 

a cell of computer-savvy al-Qaeda militants planning to aid Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. In 1998, Gadahn moved to Pakistan and married an Afghani refugee. 

Shortly thereafter, Gadahn was allegedly recruited by 9/11 mastermind Khalid 

Shaykh Mohammed to assist in al-Qaeda’s on-going media efforts.45 In 2001, 

Gadahn made his first public appearance on behalf of al-Qaeda, when he lent his 

voice to help narrate an English-subtitled version of al-Qaeda’s first official propaganda video, ‘‘The Destruction of the U.S.S. Cole.’’46

Since 2004, Adam Gadahn has appeared in dozens of video-recorded messages released by al-Qaeda. In 2005, in a video marking the fourth anniversary of 9/11, 

Gadahn explained in English the role of As-Sahab’s multimedia in recruiting new 

al-Qaeda members: 

‘‘Allah is our witness that the numerous audio and videotapes issued by Shaykh 

Usama Bin Laden, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, and other leaders of the jihad have not 

been released merely to dispel rumors of their death—or, as the Americans once ridiculously claimed, to send coded messages to their followers. No, these 

communique ́s have been released to explain and propound the nature and goals of 

the worldwide jihad against America and the crusaders, and to convey our legitimate demands to friend and foe alike, so that the former may join us on this honorable and blessed path . . . ’’.47

Fingering an automatic weapon, Gadahn also added the following comments, 

swearing revenge on his own former hometown: ‘‘Yesterday, London and Madrid. Tomorrow, Los Angeles and Melbourne [Australia], God-willing . . . We love peace, 

but when the enemy violates that peace or prevents us from achieving it, then we 

love nothing better than the heat of battle, the echo of explosions, and [slitting] the 

throats of the infidels. When it comes to defending our religion, our freedom, and 
38 

48 As-Sahab Media Foundation. ‘‘A Message to the People of the West from the fighting brother Azzam the American on the Fourth Anniversary of the Battles of New York and Washington.’’ 

http://www.as-sahaab.com. MPEG Video; 12 minutes in length. November 6, 2005. 49Muhammad, Basil. Al-Ansaru l’Arab fi Afghanistan. The Committee for Islamic Benevolence 

Publications; ©1991. Page 199. 50Muhammad, Basil. Al-Ansaru l’Arab fi Afghanistan. The Committee for Islamic Benevolence 

Publications; ©1991. Page 196. 51 Azzam, Abdullah. The Lofty Mountain. Azzam Publications. London; UK. ©2003. Page 136. 52The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. July 22, 2004. Page 338. 

our brothers in faith, every one of us is Mohammed Atta. Every one of us is Jamal 

Lindsey, and every one of us is Mohammed Boieri.’’48

Of all the individuals discussed herein, Adam Gadahn likely has the slimmest 

chance of ever ascending the ranks much farther beyond his current position as a 

spokesman and media advisor. He has no formal clerical or military credentials to 

speak of, and while his proficiency in speaking Arabic is improving, it is still quite 

poor. Like Ayman al-Zawahiri, Gadahn appears to be obsessed with his own celebrity, spewing an endless train of childish threats for the benefit of television cameras. Even with his conversion to Islam and the dramatic destruction of his own 

U.S. passport, the fact that Gadahn is a Caucasian American with Jewish (and even 

Zionist) roots would be difficult for many Islamists to swallow. Gadahn may serve 

at times as a useful propaganda tool for al-Qaeda to harass the White House and 

the American public, but he hardly stands out as the most capable figure to actually 

lead a terrorist organization based in South Asia. 

(IV) THE QUESTION OF AL-QAEDA’S REGIONAL AFFILIATES

Prior to 9/11, Osama bin Laden’s principle obsession was on building a single 

armed force on a ‘‘Solid Foundation’’ with a centralized leadership under his control. 

According to founding al-Qaeda Shura Council member Mamdouh Mahmud Salim 

(a.k.a. Abu Hajer al-Iraqi), ‘‘Abu Abdullah [bin Laden] had tendency to favor a policy of centralization... and felt obligated to assemble the Arabs in one location, 

train and prepare them to be a single mobilized fighting brigade.’’49 However, bin 

Laden had apparently overestimated the importance of group centralization, neglecting the substantial benefits afforded by al-Qaeda’s loose, amalgamated infrastructure. Already by the late 1980s, those around bin Laden warned him that their 

attempts to create strict administration and hierarchy within al-Qaeda were ending 

in disaster. Mamdouh Salim—appointed by bin Laden to assist him in the regimentation of the Arabs in Afghanistan—admitted in mujahideen memoirs, ‘‘we tried our 

best to correct the brothers, but I should admit that . . . I was mistaken about the 

task of management. I thought of people what I had read about them in books— 

if you were to say to someone, ‘Fear Allah’, then that’s fine, he would fear 

Allah! . . . I believed that just like I could flip a switch to make a light turn on 

and off, I could also similarly handle people!’’50

For al-Qaeda, the real turning point came in December 2001, when groups of 

hardened al-Qaeda fighters attempted to make a dramatic last stand against U.S.- 

backed Afghan militiamen at a cave complex in the Tora Bora mountains, near the 

Pakistani border. The cream of al-Qaeda’s leadership, including bin Laden himself, 

had gathered in Tora Bora for what seemed like a fool’s errand: To fight a mismatched conventional military battle against an adversary with total air dominance 

and far more sophisticated battlefield weapons. U.S. tactical airstrikes smothered 

hundreds of fighters to dust: ‘‘there was no difference between the night and the 

day: the sky was raining fire and the Earth was erupting volcanoes.’’51 Abortive attempts at regrouping and retreating caused the deaths of possibly hundreds of fleeing al-Qaeda fighters caught underneath a hail of cluster bombs. As a result of the 

defeats at Tora Bora and 3 months later at Shah-i-Kot, ‘‘almost all remaining alQaeda forces’’ fled across the border with Pakistan seeking refuge in the remote, 

mountainous, and ‘‘lightly governed’’ frontier provinces.52

Faced with a resounding defeat on the peaks of Tora Bora, a group of high-ranking al-Qaeda commanders decided to fundamentally re-think Osama bin Laden’s 

military campaign against the West and to embrace the development of a more diffuse and self-sufficient network of international operatives. In 2002 and 2003, alQaeda’s shift in strategy became noticeable following a series of dramatic kamikaze 

bombing attacks targeting Westerners in a host of countries, from Indonesia to Morocco. Al-Qaeda’s then-official website—the Al-Neda Center for Islamic Studies and 

Research—acknowledged that these attacks marked a new phase in evolution: ‘‘the 

al-Qaeda Organization has adopted a strategy in its war with the Americans based 

on expanding the battlefield and exhausting the enemy, who spread his interests 
39 

53 Al-Neda Center for Islamic Studies and Research. ‘‘The Operation of 11 Rabi al-Awwal: The 

East Riyadh Operation and Our War With the United States and its Agents.’’ http:// 

www.faroq.org/news/news.php?id. August 2003. 54http://www.alboraq.info/showthread?t=33995. October 5, 2007. 55http://www.alboraq.info/showthread?t=33995. October 5, 2007. 56http://www.alboraq.info/showthread?t=33728. October 2, 2007. 57http://myhesbah.com/v/showthread?t=174676. April 2, 2008. 58http://myhesbah.com/v/showthread?t=174676. April 2, 2008. 

over the globe, with successive and varied blows... Expanding the battlefield has 

invaluable benefits. The enemy, who needed to protect his country only, realized 

that he needed to protect his huge interests in every country. The more diversified 

and distant the areas in which operations take place, the more exhausting it becomes for the enemy, the more he needs to stretch his resources, and the more he 

becomes terrified.’’53 By mid-2004, nascent al-Qaeda franchise organizations were 

already well ensconced inside both Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Today, similar al-Qaeda 

franchises have expanded their reach even further into Indonesia, Yemen, Algeria, 

Somalia, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. These upstart regional branches 

are capable of operating independently of al-Qaeda’s central leadership in Afghanistan—and though the immediate purpose of forming these branches was to ramp 

up local activity in particular countries of interest—the growing affiliate factions 

often have expansive ambitions just as grandiose as those of Osama bin Laden himself. 

Al-Qaeda’s decision to branch out and form semi-autonomous regional affiliates 

has not been without its drawbacks. In Iraq, even as al-Qaeda’s local leader Abu 

Musab al-Zarqawi drew international media attention (rivaling that paid to bin 

Laden) for his unrelenting campaign of suicide bombings and beheadings, alZarqawi’s stubborn insistence on doing things in his own particular style caused 

countless problems for al-Qaeda and other Sunni insurgent groups. According to fellow insurgents (including some acknowledged former Zarqawi allies), al-Qaeda fighters are responsible for adopting arrogant, totalitarian measures in Iraq that have 

acutely undermined their popular image in the Islamic community as ‘‘chivalrous 

knights’’ working to safeguard justice and the innocent. In October 2007, one such 

estranged insurgent partner, the ‘‘Iraqi Jihad Union’’ (IJU), issued an open call to 

al-Qaeda’s leaders: ‘‘What is happening out in the field is indeed a disaster and we 

hope that you have merely been misinformed about [these events]. However, it will 

be an even greater disaster if you are, in fact, well-informed about these matters.’’54

The IJU fingered al-Qaeda fighters as the guilty culprits behind the slaughter and 

mutilation of their own Sunni Muslim comrades: ‘‘To make things worse, they dug 

up their bodies from the graves, further mutilated them, beheaded them, and 

showed them off from their vehicles while driving through the towns. They even 

killed our men’s wives and children.’’55 Yet another armed faction—‘‘Hamas alIraq’’—scoffed in a separate statement to its supporters, ‘‘the al-Qaeda network has 

actually made people here think that the occupation forces are merciful and humane 

by comparison.’’56

Only 2 years after bragging that al-Qaeda had ‘‘broken the back’’ of America with 

a barrage of suicide bombings in Iraq, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri was forced to reappear in April 2008 in order to defend Zarqawi’s cruel methodology in the face of 

sharp criticism from fellow Muslims. During a public Arabic-language Q&A session 

sponsored by al-Qaeda, one anonymous participant (who scornfully introduced himself as ‘‘Your Geography Teacher’’) jeered at al-Zawahiri, ‘‘Do you consider the killing of women and children to be Jihad? I challenge you and your organization to 

do that in Tel Aviv . . . Or is it easier to kill Muslims in the markets? Maybe it 

is necessary [for you] to take some geography lessons, because your maps only show 

the Muslims’ states.’’57 With a touch of anger building in his voice, Dr. al-Zawahiri 

insisted, ‘‘We haven’t killed the innocents, not in Baghdad, nor in Morocco, nor in 

Algeria, nor anywhere else.’’ After a moment of reflection, he added, ‘‘And if there 

is any innocent who was killed in the Mujahideen’s operations, then it was either 

an unintentional error, or out of necessity as in cases of... the taking of human 

shields by the enemy.’’58

Nor have things gone especially well for al-Qaeda in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where the group’s local leadership was forced to flee the country or else be 

wiped out in a dragnet by security forces. During a 2006 interview in London, the 

prominent Saudi Islamist dissident Dr. Saad al-Faqih suggested that the problem 

stemmed from a critical shortage of locally-based skilled commanders following the 

death of the founder of the Saudi al-Qaeda branch, Yusuf al-Ayyiri: ‘‘AlAyyiri... was appointed by Bin Laden... probably before [9/11]. He is capable, 

you know. You know that this man is capable, right? [Al-Ayyiri] is a learned scholar, 
40 

59 Author’s interview with Dr. Saad al-Faqih at his residence in London; U.K. February 2006. 60 Author’s interview with Dr. Saad al-Faqih at his residence in London; U.K. February 2006. 61 Author’s interview with Dr. Saad al-Faqih at his residence in London; U.K. February 2006. 62 Author’s interview with Dr. Saad al-Faqih at his residence in London; U.K. February 2006. 63 Author’s interview with Dr. Saad al-Faqih at his residence in London; U.K. February 2006. 64 Author’s interview with Dr. Saad al-Faqih at his residence in London; U.K. February 2006. 65 Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). ‘‘Statement Claiming Responsibility for the Assassination Attempt on the Tyrant Mohammed bin Nayif al-Saud.’’ August 29, 2009. 

highly professional as a fighter, he is powerful in his articulation, has a dominating 

personality, he is a strategist. He knows what he is doing.’’59 However, in the absence of al-Ayyiri, al-Qaeda’s strategy in Saudi Arabia turned ‘‘hopeless’’: ‘‘Their 

strategy in Saudi Arabia is in shambles . . . I see it as, in their own standards, 

very stupid strategy... Bin Laden was not fortunate to have an intelligent, capable person after al-Ayyiri. All the persons who came after al-Ayyiri were good military leaders but very bad strategists, very bad tacticians.’’60

In listing their various shortcomings, Dr. al-Faqih particularly noted the inexplicable failure of Saudi al-Qaeda leaders to conduct their activities in a way that 

might possibly have some popular appeal among ordinary Saudis. Al-Faqih scoffed, 

‘‘when you confront them with the question, ‘why do you go to foreigners and leave 

[Prince] Nayif?’, they can’t answer. They answer very stupid answers. Sloganistic 

answers... This is a very naive literal interpretation of the prophet’s teaching.’’61 As a result, not only has the ‘‘cadre from before the Iraqi war been hit very 

hard by the regime’’, but moreover, ‘‘people who had some sort of intention to join 

al-Qaeda inside the country changed their mind. They also lost in terms of sympathy and understanding.’’62 According to Dr. al-Faqih, ‘‘al-Qaeda did not lose because of the technology of the Saudi government, did not lose because of the effective, the ‘effective’ media, cultural, and security campaign, it did not lose because 

of the support from the Americans and others. It lost because of its own mistakes.’’63

After a heavy sigh, he confessed, ‘‘I cannot understand why they planned it this 

way.’’64

While al-Qaeda’s regional efforts in Iraq and Saudi Arabia may have suffered debilitating setbacks in recent years, the picture could not be any more different in 

nearby Yemen—where a growing al-Qaeda branch (known simply as ‘‘al-Qaeda in 

the Arabian Peninsula’’) not only has threatened to undermine the stability of the 

central government in Sanaa, but moreover, has demonstrated its ability to launch 

repeated and sophisticated international terrorist attacks targeting the U.S. homeland. Without doubt, the defining event for al-Qaeda’s network in Yemen came in 

2008 with the unexpected arrival of numerous Saudi Arabian al-Qaeda operatives 

who had recently been freed after years of detention in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. An 

influential partnership was formed between the remnants of al-Qaeda’s Saudi 

branch and loyal Yemeni disciples of Osama bin Laden—including his former personal secretary, Abu Basir al-Wahishi, and a graduate of Bin Laden’s notorious AlFarouq training camp near Kandahar, Qassim al-Rimi. In total, at least 11 former 

Gitmo detainees from Saudi Arabia returned to al-Qaeda, most of them by fleeing 

political rehabilitation centers and crossing the Saudi border into Yemen. 

Throughout 2009, a slew of latent warnings emerged indicating that AQAP was 

developing advanced bomb-making skills, including the ability to circumvent heightened security measures at airports and other sensitive installations. Over the space 

of several months, al-Qaeda’s network in Yemen released successive video recordings showing the fabrication of elaborate explosive devices, including bombs carefully hidden in picture frames and video cassette boxes. Then, in August 2009, 

AQAP claimed responsibility for its most sophisticated operation yet: The attempted 

assassination of the Saudi Deputy Interior Minister by a ‘‘surrendering’’ al-Qaeda 

member with a bomb hidden in his underwear. In an official communique ́ released 

days later by AQAP, the group trumpeted the ‘‘first-of-its-kind’’ suicide operation by 

the baby-faced Abdullah Asseri who ‘‘was able to enter the palace... get past his 

bodyguards, and ignited his explosive device... after he already managed to pass 

through all the security checkpoints at the airports in Najran and Jeddah.’’65

In a video testimonial produced by AQAP and first broadcast in September 2009, 

Asseri bragged about the impressive technical innovations of locally-based al-Qaeda 

bombmakers: 

‘‘This is my ammunition... Allah has made this available to the 

mujahideen... The idol-worshipping tyrants of the Saudi family thought that 

they closed the doors on the face of the mujahideen, by banning all explosive substances from the markets. But Allah made available to us something they cannot 

handle... Allah willing, we will come to you with only 50, 100 or 200 grams. 

Allah willing, our brothers in the explosives department will release some instruc-
41 

66 Al-Malahem Media Wing; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). ‘‘The Progeny of Mohammed bin Maslamah.’’ Released on August 29, 2009. 67 Al-Malahem Media Wing; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). ‘‘America and the 

Final Trap.’’ Released on May 26, 2010. 68 Al-Malahem Media Wing; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). ‘‘Secrets of the Manufactured Device.’’ Sada al-Malahem Magazine. Issue No. 12; Released on February 14, 2010. 69 Al-Awlaki, Anwar. ‘‘The Army of Yemen Confronts the Mujahideen.’’ August 1, 2009. Posted 

on: http://www.anwar-alawlaki.com. 

tive videos about how you can blow up the enemies of Allah with simple ingredients 

available to all which they cannot ban, except if they kill everyone or close all the 

stores. Sometimes you will be amazed that explosives can be made with things we 

even eat.’’66

On Christmas day 2009, Nigerian national Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab—armed 

with a remarkably similar explosive device provided to him by AQAP and concealed 

in his underwear—attempted to bring down a civilian airliner packed with holiday 

travelers en route from Amsterdam to Detroit. 

In the months since the failed airline bombing over Detroit, AQAP has expressed 

particular pride in the fact that their recruit Umar Abdulmutallab was so successful 

in evading strict international airline security procedures. During a propaganda 

video produced by al-Qaeda’s network in Yemen, an unseen narrator smugly insists, 

‘‘security and military solutions won’t help providing security for the Americans and 

their allies, as after 8 years of big and continuous spending for the cause of advancing the security abilities, the mujahideen were able, with the grace of Allah, to infiltrate all the boundaries; the brother Umar Farouk—may Allah release him—took 

off and passed through five international airports, including the Dutch airport in 

Amsterdam, and neither their technology nor machines were able to uncover the 

manufactured device.’’67 The leadership of al-Qaeda even published an eye-catching 

article on this subject in the official AQAP on-line magazine, titled, ‘‘Secrets of the 

Manufactured Device’’: 

‘‘Among the secrets of the device is that it included the study of the [currently] used 

scanning machines inside airports and other places, whether the security side or the 

technical side in America and Europe... studying all these gaps took place, and 

with the grace of Allah what we wished for has occurred; the intended martyr brother crossed four continents—Asia, then African, then Europe, then America—and he 

passed through four international airports that have strict procedures... The 

mujahideen have [also] acquired a highly-explosive material with power that exceeds the classic high explosives like ‘PETN’ and ‘TNT’ and ‘RDX’ and others, and 

it is being prepared and tested.’’68

Until quite recently, the notion of such complex planning for transnational terrorist activities taking place outside the narrow confines of Osama bin Laden’s inner 

circle in Afghanistan would have seemed baffling and radically controversial to most 

observers. 

The re-organized al-Qaeda network based in Yemen has also benefited from the 

contributions of Yemeni-American cleric Shaykh Anwar al-Awlaki, a charismatic, 

English-speaking missionary who had evolved from a mainstream ‘‘moderate’’ voice 

into one of the most passionate global advocates for violent jihad in any language. 

On his internet blog—popular among British, Canadian, and American Muslims— 

al-Awlaki openly applauded al-Qaeda attacks on Yemeni security forces: ‘‘May this 

be the beginning of the greatest jihad, the jihad of the Arabian Peninsula that 

would free the heart of the Islamic world from the tyrants who are deceiving the 

Ummah and standing between us and victory.’’69 Al-Awlaki has been publicly fingered by U.S. officials as the responsible party in turning Umar Abdulmutallab towards al-Qaeda. Speaking in a video interview produced by AQAP, al-Awlaki enthused that the Christmas day airline bomb plot had ‘‘accomplished goals for the 

mujahideen and it is considered a reply and terrorizing operation to the Americans, 

and this operation showed the gaps in the American security instruments whether 

it be intelligence-wise or in the security. In the American airports they spend more 

than 40 million dollars and yet the Mujahid Umar Farouk was able to pass these 

security instruments. And also the intelligence admits that it had put him under 

surveillance and in spite of that he was able to reach the heart of America to Detroit. So the operation accomplished great successes though it did not kill even one 

person, in spite of that it accomplished great successes.’’ After a pause, al-Awlaki 

added, ‘‘About the brother Umar Farouk, he is also from my students, and also I 
42 

70 Al-Malahem Media Wing; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). ‘‘A Premiere and Exclusive Interview with the Islamic Preacher Sheikh Anwar Al-Awlaki.’’ Released on May 22, 

2010. 71 Al-Neda Center for Islamic Studies and Research. ‘‘Statement from the al-Qaeda Organization Regarding the Explosion Targeting the Christian Oil Tanker in Yemen.’’ Al-neda.com. October 13, 2002. 72 Al-Bassam, Adeeb. ‘‘Bin Laden and the Oil Weapon.’’ Sawt al-Jihad (‘‘Voice of Jihad’’) Magazine; Issue No. 30. Al-Qaeda’s Committee in the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia). Published: 

February 8, 2007. 73 ‘‘A Meeting With One of the Most Wanted.’’ Al-Malahem Media Wing; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Sada al-Malahem Magazine. Issue No. 1; January 12, 2008. 

am very proud that the likes of Umar Farouk are from my students and I support 

what he did.’’70

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of AQAP’s interest in launching international 

terrorist attacks on the United States is their long-running obsession with conceiving plots aimed at causing ‘‘catastrophic’’ damage to the American economy. In 

October 2002, following a suicide bomb attack on a French supertanker off the coast 

of Yemen, al-Qaeda’s Politburo lost no time in formally praising the operation for 

‘‘revealing the true danger the mujahideen pose to the strategic, commercial, and 

military interests of the enemy’’: 

‘‘If a boat that once cost us less than $1,000 managed to ruin a destroyer worth over 

$1 billion (its symbolic value beyond measure), and a similar boat managed to devastate an oil tanker of such great magnitude, imagine the extent of the danger that 

threatens the West’s commercial lifeline which is petrol. This region sits on the largest [oil] reserves, owns the largest quantities and contains [the industry’s] most important passages and lanes. The operation that struck the French oil tanker is not 

merely an attack against a tanker—it is an attack against international oil transport lines and all its various connotations.’’71

When it was still based in Saudi Arabia, AQAP published a treatise titled, ‘‘Bin 

Laden and the Oil Weapon’’, in which the affiliate group argued that because ‘‘the 

United States will remain dependent on the Middle East in the near future, its oil 

will continue to be an easy target for all the enemies of the United States . . . It 

is imperative that we strike petroleum interests in all regions that the United 

States benefits from, and not only in the Middle East. The goal is to cut off its imports or reduce them by all means. The targeting of oil interests includes oil production wells, export pipelines, loading platforms, tankers—and anything else that will 

deprive the United States of oil, force it to make decisions that it has avoided having to make for a long time, disrupt and stifle its economy, and threaten its economic and political future.’’72

In early 2008, after al-Qaeda moved its local operations from Saudi Arabia to 

Yemen, the reconstituted AQAP published an approving interview with a most 

wanted Saudi al-Qaeda suspect Nayef Bin Mohammed al-Qahtani (a.k.a. Abu 

Humam al-Qahtani). Again endorsing the concept of striking at petroleum resources, al-Qahtani reasoned, ‘‘if the enemy’s interests in the Arabian Peninsula 

were stricken, and his supply of oil was cut off, and the oil refineries were out of 

order, this would cause the enemy to collapse—and he won’t merely withdraw from 

Iraq and Afghanistan, but would face total collapse. If he were to be struck hard 

from various places, then he would scatter and turn around and flee forlornly from 

the land of the Muslims.’’73

Given the high-profile role that AQAP has played in masterminding not only the 

‘‘Underwear’’ bomber Abdulmutallab, but also more recently, a plot to smuggle explosive devices into U.S.-bound aircraft via UPS cargo shipments, AQAP’s passionate interest in launching ‘‘strategic’’ attacks aimed at devastating the U.S. economy can be ignored only at our own peril. It is also a telling reminder of how, 

thanks to the new affiliate network of global franchises, the underlying al-Qaeda 

terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland is, in some ways, unchanged by the death of 

Osama bin Laden. 

(V) THE ‘‘HOMEGROWNS’’: AL-QAEDA AS AN IDEOLOGY

Even further beyond al-Qaeda’s existence as an organization and then as a franchise model is al-Qaeda as a political ideology. Given his obsession with group centralization, for many years, bin Laden failed to fully grasp how the relative ‘‘openness’’ of his movement and the perceived lack of hierarchy appealed to young 

jihadist recruits. In the world of al-Qaeda and the Arab-Afghans, even the most junior of operatives could potentially gain high status within the movement by either 

demonstrating useful skills, or else by volunteering to sacrifice themselves on behalf 
43 

74Government Exhibit GX–6 (Interview of Mohammed Sadiq Odeh by FBI Agent John 

Anticev). U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden, et al. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS). United States District Court, 

Southern District of New York. 75 Al-Neda Center for Islamic Studies and Research. ‘‘The Operation of 11 Rabi al-Awwal: The 

East Riyadh Operation and Our War With the United States and its Agents.’’ http:// 

www.faroq.org/news/news.php?id. August 2003. 76Shaykh Anwar Al Awlaki. ‘‘Constants on the Path of Jihad’’ (‘‘Thawaabit Ala’ Darb AlJihad.’’) Audio recording transcribed at http://sabiluna.sitesled.com/ 

Constants%20on%20The%20Path%20of%20Jihad.pdf. 77Shaykh Anwar Al Awlaki. ‘‘Constants on the Path of Jihad’’ (‘‘Thawaabit Ala’ Darb AlJihad.’’) Audio recording transcribed at http://sabiluna.sitesled.com/ 

Constants%20on%20The%20Path%20of%20Jihad.pdf. 

of the mission. In other words, al-Qaeda offered an equal opportunity at fame and 

recognition to nearly any sympathetic soul willing to risk death or imprisonment. 

When agents from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) apprehended a 

junior al-Qaeda operative who helped build the suicide truck bombs used to attack 

two U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, he boasted of his own role in the plot 

and explained that he ‘‘was attracted to Usama Bin Ladin and the group Al Qaeda 

because it did not matter what nationality you were’’ and because al-Qaeda members did not explicitly follow ‘‘orders from a chain of command’’ in the same way 

as more traditional terrorist organizations.74

In retrospect, it now appears that it was not bin Laden, but rather his younger 

and more web-savvy lieutenants who truly championed the idea of spreading alQaeda as an ideology, including among homegrown extremists living in non-Muslim 

countries. One of those lieutenants was the founder of al-Qaeda’s franchise affiliate 

in Saudi Arabia, Yusuf al-Ayyiri. Addressing those who had criticized al-Qaeda for 

killing innocent Arab civilians during the May 2003 attacks in Riyadh, al-Ayyiri 

scoffed, ‘‘Whoever asks why in [Saudi Arabia] should ask himself—if he was honest—why in Chechnya, why in Kabul, why in Jerusalem, why in Bali, and why in 

Mombassa. These countries are ruled by agent Karzai-type rulers and occupied by 

Americans or Jews who are considered infidels and untrustworthy in Allah’s book.’’ 

Moreover, according to al-Ayyiri, ‘‘this war is based on a strategy to widen the battlefield. The entire world has become a battlefield in practice and not in theory.’’75

Al-Ayyiri’s strategy for developing a global ‘‘homegrown’’ terrorist movement has 

had an astonishing impact in motivating new faces to try and join al-Qaeda’s 

cause—if not directly, then indirectly. Among both Arabic and English-speaking alQaeda supporters, one of al-Ayyiri’s books has been particularly popular and enduring: ‘‘Constants on the Path of Jihad’’ (‘‘Thawabit ala Darb al-Jihad’’). The book attracted so much attention that fugitive AQAP cleric Shaykh Anwar al-Awlaki dedicated an entire lecture series to explaining al-Ayyiri’s underlying message in ‘‘Constants on the Path of Jihad’’ to an English-speaking audience: 

‘‘Jihad does not end with the disappearance of a person. Jihad must continue regardless because it does not depend on any particular leader or 

individual... Jihad does not depend on any particular land. It is global. When 

the Muslim is in his land, he performs jihad . . . No borders or barriers stop it. 

The message cannot be conveyed without jihad. If a particular people or nation is 

classified as... ‘the people of war’ in the Shariah, that classification applies to 

them all over the earth. Islam cannot be customized to suit the conditions where 

you are, for instance Europe.’’76

According to Awlaki, al-Ayyiri also instructed that ‘‘victory’’ cannot be limited to 

mere ‘‘military victories’’ alone, and should also include ‘‘sacrifice. The Mujahid sacrificing ‘his self’ and his wealth is victory. Victory of your idea, your religion. If you 

die for your religion, your death will spread the da‘wa... Allah chooses Shuhada 

(martyrs) from amongst the believers. This is a victory.’’77

By early 2003, jihadi recruiters in Europe who had previously encouraged others 

to travel to training camps in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Chechnya 

began radically changing their message. Just as with al-Ayyiri and al-Awlaki, their 

new philosophy emphasized the individual nature and responsibility of jihad. At a 

conference in Leicester organized by the radical Al-Muhajiroun faction in October 

2002, Abu Hamza al-Masri (a.k.a. Mustafa Kamel) admonished his audience, ‘‘We 

need to resist, we need to fight, even alone. And you can’t go now to learn in Afghanistan or Eritrea as before. Now, a war zone is a war zone. There is no need 

for camping, there is no facilities for camping . . . A lot of the skills you need for 

the frontline, you can learn from here... Where are you? What can you do in 
44 

78Speech given at ‘‘Iraq Today Mecca Tomorrow.’’ National Conference held in Leicester, 

United Kingdom; organized by Al-Muhajiroun, P.O. Box 349 London N9 7RR. October 27, 2002. 79Speech given at ‘‘Iraq Today Mecca Tomorrow.’’ National Conference held in Leicester, 

United Kingdom; organized by Al-Muhajiroun, P.O. Box 349 London N9 7RR. October 27, 2002. 80 ‘‘Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.’’ Inspire Magazine. Al-Malahem Media Wing; 

al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Issue No. 1; Released on July 11, 2010. 81 Inspire Magazine. Al-Malahem Media Wing; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 

Issue No. 2; Released on October 11, 2010. Page 24. 82 Inspire Magazine. Al-Malahem Media Wing; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 

Issue No. 2; Released on October 11, 2010. Page 24. 83 Inspire Magazine. Al-Malahem Media Wing; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 

Issue No. 2; Released on October 11, 2010. Page 24. 

your area?’’78 Al-Muhajiroun leader Shaykh Omar Bakri Mohammed echoed these 

comments and added, ‘‘the Ummah [should] know it is obligatory upon them to engage in... preparation and to engage in the jihad. And each one must find their 

own way. There is no need yourself to contact somebody here or there. You find your 

own way! Sincerely, you will get it. You do not want to put someone else in trouble. 

You, look for yourself!... Seek it! You will get it!’’79

Surprisingly, rather than al-Qaeda’s central leadership, it is arguably al-Qaeda’s 

local affiliate in Yemen that has actually expended the greatest amount of entrepreneurial efforts in trying to mobilize homegrown jihadists and inciting them into action. Six months after the botched ‘‘Underwear’’ bomb plot involving Umar 

Abdulmutallab, AQAP released the first issue of a new English-language propaganda magazine titled ‘‘Inspire.’’ An article from the first issue, ‘‘Make a Bomb in 

the Kitchen of Your Mom’’, explains: 

‘‘There are many Muslims who have the zeal to defend the ummah but their vision 

is unclear. They believe that in order to defend the ummah they need to travel and 

join the mujahideen elsewhere and they must train in their camps. But we tell the 

Muslims in America and Europe: There is a better choice and easier one to give support to your ummah. That is individual work inside the West such as the operations 

of [Fort Hood shooter] Nidal Hassan and [failed Times Square bomber] Faisal 

Shahzad . . . My Muslim brother, who wants to support the religion of Allah: do 

not make too many calculations and forecasting of the results and consequences. It 

is true that Umar Farouk and his brothers Nidal Hassan and Shahzad were imprisoned, but they have become heroes and icons that are examples to be 

followed . . . My Muslim brother: we are conveying to you our military training 

right into your kitchen to relieve you of the difficulty of traveling to us. If you are 

sincere in your intentions to serve the religion of Allah, then all what you have to 

do is enter your kitchen and make an explosive device that would damage the 

enemy.’’80

The second issue of AQAP’s ‘‘Inspire’’ Magazine once again returned to the subject 

of individual jihad. Suggested tips included in the magazine urged would-be alQaeda recruits ‘‘coming from the West’’, ‘‘you might be asked by the mujahidin why 

you didn’t partake in the jihad inside your country... Many will tell you that attacking the enemy in their backyard is one of the best ways to help the 

jihad... Put yourself in the shoes of the leadership for a moment. They have with 

them an individual who is not wanted by the intelligence services and they could 

use that person to further the Islamic cause. That person is you. I strongly recommend all the brothers and sisters coming from the West to consider attacking the 

West in its own backyard... These types of individual attacks are nearly impossible for them to contain.’’81 The same magazine also featured plans for ‘‘the ultimate mowing machine’’, an ‘‘idea to use a pickup truck as a mowing machine, not 

to mow grass but mow down the enemies of Allah.’’82 Above all, however, the magazine urged that ‘‘the best operation . . . is the one where you come up with an innovative idea that the authorities have not yet turned their attention to, and that 

leads to maximum casualties or—equally important—maximum economic losses.’’83

The identity of the reputed ‘‘genius’’ behind AQAP’s latest propaganda coup is 

symbolic of the evolving terrorist threat posed by self-selecting ‘‘lone wolf’’ extremists. U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies believe that ‘‘Inspire’’ Magazine 

was created on behalf of AQAP by an American citizen and former resident of Charlotte, North Carolina, Samir Khan. In 2004, at the age of 18, Khan acquired a widespread reputation for his brash militancy on his well-traveled English-language 

blog, ‘‘InshallahShaheed’’ (Martyrdom God-willing). The blog routinely extolled the 

virtues of bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders, along with terrorist attacks in Iraq 

and elsewhere. Yet, for all his threats and internet tough talk, in real life, Khan 

looked far more the part of hapless computer nerd than deadly assassin. Nonetheless, in October 2009, 2 months before Umar Abdulmutallab boarded a flight headed 
45 

84Gendar, Alison. ‘‘Former New Yorker Samir Khan behind graphics of new Al Qaeda recruiting magazine.’’ New York Daily News. July 18, 2010. 85 ‘‘The Ultimate Mowing Machine.’’ Inspire Magazine. Al-Malahem Media Wing; al-Qaeda in 

the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Issue No. 2; Released on October 11, 2010. 86http://www.ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=21859. May 3, 2010. 87http://www.alqimmah.net/showthread.php?p=17492. June 1, 2010. 88http://www.ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=22963. June 3, 2010. 89 ‘‘Natrona Heights man accused of biting FBI agents.’’ Pittsburgh Tribune-Review. January 

6, 2011. 90http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7yiHkuud8Yw. May 2011. 

to the United States, the aspiring suburban warrior Samir Khan left his own home 

in America and traveled to Yemen, where he promptly disappeared and presumably 

joined al-Qaeda.84 In a letter published recently in ‘‘Inspire’’, Khan has since confessed his surprise at being allowed by U.S. Federal authorities to join AQAP 

unhindered: ‘‘I was quite open about my beliefs on-line and it didn’t take a rocket 

scientist to figure out that I was al Qaeda to the core.’’85

Nor is Samir Khan alone. Internet chat forums run by al-Qaeda and likeminded 

jihadi movements have become beacons for a variety of extremists searching for a 

path to infamy in the guiding hands of al-Qaeda. In April 2010, when the Pakistani 

Taliban claimed responsibility for an attempted bomb plot in New York’s Times 

Square, they chose to release their claim via an exclusive English-language alQaeda chat forum. One of the forum administrators—a mysterious ‘‘lone wolf’’ militant calling himself ‘‘Asadullah al-Shishani’’ (‘‘the Lion of Allah from Chechnya’’)— 

immediately replied congratulating the Pakistani Taliban on their operation, and 

further offering to provide ‘‘help’’ in distributing their on-line propaganda.86

Two months later, user ‘‘Asadullah al-Shishani’’ posted his own homemade song 

on al-Qaeda’s top-tier forums in honor of al-Qaeda’s slain ‘‘No. 3’’ leader Mustafa 

Abu al-Yazid. The lyrics to the English-language song included the lines, ‘‘You are 

a real hero, O’ Mustafa Abu Yazid. You spent your whole life fighting, Until you 

fell down Shaheed. You are a real terror, Against America. You sent their soldiers 

running, With shots of your Pee-Ka... Asadullah Alshishani salutes you. And he 

prays for the day, That he meets you in Jannah And is killed as a Fidaye. And I 

pray for the day, O that day, When I’m killed as a Fidaye.’’87 This was quickly followed by the web release of yet another song performed in English by al-Shishani 

titled, ‘‘When the Jew’s Blood Reds my Knife, then my Life is Free from Strife’’: 

‘‘Hiding behind rocks and trees, I’ll find them with greatest ease. Make them get 

down on their knees, Slaughter them despite their pleas. Throw them in the ovens 

hot, Soap and lampshades sold and bought, Made of the Jews that we shot. Mercy’s 

something I have not. With the bomb and machinegun, Blast at them and watch 

them run. We will have a lot of fun, Shoot and kill Jews one by one.’’88

Given the picture that emerges of ‘‘Asadullah al-Shishani’’—a hardcore fanatic 

volunteering as a manager on elite jihadi web forums, who seeks to assist the Pakistani Taliban in launching attacks on the United States, and who sings gaily about 

murdering innocent people—one might imagine his real identity is that of a highranking al-Qaeda terrorist in Iraq or Afghanistan. In fact, nothing could be further 

from the case—‘‘Asadullah al-Shishani’’ is actually 21-year old Penn State college 

student Emerson Begolly, a native of Pittsburgh. In January 2011, FBI agents finally moved in on Begolly as he sat in a vehicle outside a fast food restaurant in 

New Bethlehem. When he noticed agents approaching him, Begolly attempted to resist arrest and ‘‘allegedly bit the agents, drawing blood.’’ Upon subduing and searching their suspect, the agents recovered a loaded 9mm handgun.89 Further searches 

at Begolly’s primary residence turned up homemade video recordings of Begolly 

dressed in camouflage and jihadi gear, armed to the teeth, and apparently practicing would-be military maneuvers.90

Curiously, Begolly is neither Chechen, nor did he ever actually visit local mosques 

or Islamic centers in Pennsylvania. In fact, as far as the Muslim community in 

Pittsburgh is concerned, Emerson Begolly never existed. His entire indoctrination 

and radicalization process evidently took place on-line, exclusively via al-Qaeda social networking forums. No amount of eavesdropping or inside sources recruited 

from within a mosque would have led investigators to Begolly—only his violent 

ramblings posted on the internet. This is the biggest challenge facing U.S. law enforcement in the coming years. While Begolly might not be capable of launching the 

next 9/11 all by himself, al-Qaeda doesn’t need to achieve that level of success in 

order to stay relevant. Rather, as pointed out to me by jihadi veteran Abdullah 

Anas, ‘‘in order to spoil things and to stay on the front page of the news and the 

satellite channels, they don’t need much. Just one, from one thousand. If you have 

one in the list to wear the jacket with the TNT, that is enough.’’ 
46 

(VI) CONCLUSIONS

Looking back on the tumultuous career of the late Osama bin Laden, it is truly 

striking how far al-Qaeda has evolved from its humble origins as a tightly-knit 

cabal largely based in Pashtun regions of Afghanistan into a multi-national enterprise with associate branches across the Muslim world—not to mention a blossoming ideological appeal which propels seemingly-random individuals into taking 

this battle upon themselves in their own backyard. The killing of Osama bin Laden 

delivered a striking blow to the morale of this al-Qaeda enterprise, and it has provided perhaps a brief interruption in their operational planning. The substantial intelligence gathered from bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad may yet lead us to 

the hideouts of further high-ranking al-Qaeda leaders. Moreover, bin Laden’s successor—be it Ayman al-Zawahiri or someone else—could prove to be a far less capable leader than Osama. But, ultimately, the terrorist threat faced by America today 

is multi-faceted and no longer the exclusive product of bin Laden and a handful of 

dusty terrorist training camps perched along the Afghan-Pakistani border. Thus, 

whether we speak of al-Qaeda as a centralized organization, a globally-franchised 

web of affiliates, or simply as an organizing principle guiding homespun radical extremists, it seems quite clear that al-Qaeda will continue to present a serious and 

undeniable threat to the U.S. homeland for the foreseeable future. 
47 

Chairman KING. I thank all the witnesses for their testimony. 

I will start off the questioning, I guess Mr. Bergen and Mr. 

Kohlmann first. Both of you have mentioned al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. They are the one franchise which has shown the 

most interest in attacking the United States, attacking the homeland. We also have al Shabab, which has recruited at least three 

dozen Americans. I have heard reports, and can you confirm it at 

all, that the possibility of a linkup between AQAP and al Shabab 

and using those combined facilities to attack the mainland, attack 

the homeland. 

Mr. KOHLMANN. Yes. We do have evidence that both al-Qaeda in 

the Arabian Peninsula and Shabab al-Mujahideen in Somalia are 

in communication with each other. The communications in fact are 

not necessarily even secret. About a year and a half ago, Sheik 

Anwar al-Awlaki, the infamous fugitive Yemeni American cleric 

who is serving as a spiritual adviser to AQAP-engaged in an open 

exchange of letters over the web with Shabab al-Mujahideen endorsing their struggle, offering advice and support. 

The other thing is that if you pay attention to propaganda put 

out by AQAP in Yemen, you will notice that a disturbing number 

of articles and interviews published in their magazine, be it in 

English or Arabic or other languages, are actually about Somalia, 

are about Shabab, are about the need to link up. What they have 

discussed is the idea of actually taking control of the straits leading 

into the Red Sea, controlling the straits on the Horn of Africa side 

in the hands of Shabab, and the other side controlled by AQAP, 

and shutting off shipping through the channel. That may be a 

grandiose objective, but it gives you an idea of them working together in a partnership in the future. 

Chairman KING. The fact that you would have American citizens 

in al Shabab, it would also give them, I believe, more of an entree 

to the United States. 

Mr. KOHLMANN. That is correct. There are numerous Americans 

now in both groups. There is Samir Khan, a former resident of 

Charlotte, North Carolina, and of New York, New York, who is currently serving as a media advisor to al-Qaeda in Yemen, who is the 

editor behind their infamous Inspire magazine. In Somalia, you 

have individuals such as Omar Hammami, the former Alabama native who has gone over and not only is providing advice to Shabab, 

but is actually a leader of Shabab; in fact, appeared on camera in 

the past few days at a Shabab really entitled ‘‘We Are All Osama,’’ 

giving a speech in English indicating that Shabab would be at the 

forefront of trying to carry out vengeance attacks in the name of 

bin Laden against the United States. 

Chairman KING. Mr. Bergen. 

Mr. BERGEN. I would give a minor caveat to that. The Americans 

who have gone to Somalia to fight, a lot of them have died. It is 

very dangerous over there. 

Second, they are very well-known to the American Government, 

and some of the gentlemen that Mr. Kohlmann just mentioned are 

very well-known. I think it is quite unlikely that they come to the 

United States. 

What is much more plausible is they might mount an operation 

on an American target overseas, say, in Kenya. A lot easier to do. 
48 

You don’t have the same set of problems of their coming in the nofly list and all the other things you face in this country. 

Chairman KING. A question for Congressman Hamilton and also 

Ms. Townsend. On the treasure trove of intelligence that has been 

gathered, we are an instant gratification society, and virtually the 

day after the intelligence was found, people were asking, what did 

we find, what did we learn? 

Based your experience at the 9/11 Commission and, Fran, your 

experience in the White House, how long do you think it will take 

us to have a real analysis of the intelligence that was gathered, 

considering I think it is well over a million pieces? How long that 

will it take to get a real analysis of that, and where would that 

lead? 

Ms. TOWNSEND. Mr. Chairman, first you have got to look at what 

is the total amount of material. Let us take out any analysis related to the pornography that was found. By the way, not a surprising find, not unique to seizures against raids of Taliban and alQaeda hideouts in Afghanistan. So it was not at all shocking to me, 

but it will take up a lot of space in terms of the material. 

When you look at then what is remaining, they have got a 

24/7, my understanding, capability of sort of triaging it, if you will. 

You are already seeing some of the things. What they are going to 

look for are, first and foremost, potential plots, and they will act 

against those immediately, not waiting to complete the analysis; 

second, locational data for high-value targets to take advantage of 

what may be in there, but perishable; and then sort of a broader 

understanding of the organization, how they communicate and how 

they operate. 

This is going to be an on-going process. I think the one thing we 

ought to take confidence in is they won’t wait to complete it to act 

on it. They will act on it as they reveal the material. 

Chairman KING. Chairman Hamilton. 

Mr. HAMILTON. I think by all odds the most important thing is 

to identify imminent threats to the United States and our allies. 

So you want to go through the material quickly to see if you can 

identify immediate threats. I suspect that process has been pretty 

well completed. 

Beyond that, of course, intelligence is a very tedious business, 

and you look for bits of information from thousands of sources and 

try to put that information together. That does take time; not just 

a matter of hours or days, but it takes months and even years to 

do it. So it is an extremely difficult process, and, of course, all of 

this is in foreign language and all the rest of it. 

I can’t predict for you how long it will be before we get benefits 

from the information that we have. You have to keep in mind that 

all of the information you want is never in a single source; that is, 

you have to take this information and compare it with information 

from other sources, and that takes time, too. 

So it is a trove. It is an enormous treasure for us. Will it benefit 

us? Almost certainly the answer to that is yes. How quickly? I have 

no idea how quickly it would be. But I think it is a great find and 

kind of a benefit that perhaps we did not anticipate when we went 

in to get Osama bin Laden. 

Chairman KING. Thank you, Chairman Hamilton. 
49 

I recognize the Ranking Member Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like unanimous consent to enter into the record the 2011 

Grant Program Funding Summary for the House Homeland Security Committee. 

Chairman KING. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. 

THOMPSON

FISCAL YEAR 2011 GRANT PROGRAM FUNDING SUMMARY

Below is a summary of the funding allocations for each program which is compared to fiscal year 2010 funding levels. 

• $526 million—State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSG) will receive a 

cut of $315 million, which would result in reduced funding for highest risk 

States due to the mandatory minimums for States in Sec. 2004 of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. Each State or territory allocation will be cut between 22 

to 50% and the new minimum allocation reduced to $5.1 million, down from 

$6.6 million in fiscal year 2010. 

Additional ‘‘carve-outs’’ within the SHSG program received the following allotments: 

• Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS).—$39.3 million—a cut of $4.4 

million for fiscal year 2010. 

• Citizen Corp Program (CCP).—$12.4 million—a cut of $2.5 million. 

• Operation Stonegarden (OPSG).—$60 million—a cut of $5.1 million. 

• Driver’s License Security Grant Program (DLSGP).—$48 million—a cut of $3 

million. 

• $10 million—Tribal Homeland Security Grant Program (THSGP) was the only 

grant program not cut from fiscal year 2010 allocations: 

• $681 million—Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) would receive a cut of 

$169 million, which would reduce the number of Tier 2 urban areas receiving 

funding under the UASI program from 64 in fiscal year 2010 to 31 in fiscal year 

2011. Tier 1 urban areas represent the top 11 at-risk and will receive level 

funding from fiscal year 2010. San Diego was moved up to Tier 1. Please see 

Appendix B for the list of localities funded and those eliminated from the UASI 

program. 

One additional ‘‘carve-out’’ is within the UASI program: 

• UASI Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NGSP).—$19 million—a cut of 

$38,000 from fiscal year 2010. 

• $14.1 million—Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Grant Program receives a 

75% cut from its fiscal year 2010 allotment of $57.6 million; 

• $14.1 million—Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (RCPGP) 

would receive a cut of $19.4 million; 

• $329 million—Emergency Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG) 

receives on [sic] minor cut of 0.2% or $659,000 for its fiscal year 2010 enacted 

levels; 

• $235 million—Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) would receive a cut of 

$32.9 million; 

Additional ‘‘carve-outs’’ within the TSGP program received the following allotments: 

• Freight Rail Security Grant Program (FRGSP).—$10 million—a cut of $4.5 

million. 

• Intercity Passenger Rail (Amtrak).—$19.9 million—a minor cut of $40,000. 

• Intercity Bus Security Grant Program (IBSGP).—$4.9 million—a $6.5 million 

reduction. IBSGP is a new carve-out in fiscal year 2011. 

• $235 million—Port Security Grant Program would receive a cut of $52.9 million. 

Please Note.—The Buffer Zone Protection Plan (BZPP) grant which assists State 

and locals to build security and risk-management capabilities and Interoperable 

Emergency Communications Grant Programs were defunded. 
50 

APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE RELEASES FISCAL YEAR 2012 HOMELAND SECURITY

APPROPRIATIONS BILL

MAY 12, 2011 

Washington, DC.—The House Appropriations Committee today released its proposed fiscal year 2012 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations bill. 

The legislation will be marked-up in subcommittee tomorrow, and is among the first 

Appropriations bills to move to subcommittee this year. 

Given the importance of providing adequate funding for the safety and security 

of the Nation, as well as the urgent need to reduce spending to rein in the Nation’s 

unprecedented deficits and debt, the legislation makes serious strides to focus funding in areas where it’s most needed, while significantly trimming spending elsewhere. Overall, the fiscal year 2012 Homeland Security Appropriations bill provides 

$40.6 billion in total non-emergency funding for the various programs and agencies 

within DHS. This is a decrease of $1.1 billion—or 2.6%—below last year’s level and 

$3 billion—or 7%—below the President’s request. 

Appropriations Chairman Hal Rogers made the following statement on the legislation: 

‘‘To address our historic deficit crisis, we must make the most of our limited resources and rein in unnecessary and wasteful spending in virtually every area of 

Government—including homeland security. The Department’s budget has grown at 

a rapid rate—over 42% since 9/11—and while it is critical that we maintain crucial 

measures to keep our Nation safe, we must also protect our country from the very 

real dangers of uncontrolled deficits and debt. This legislation will prioritize funding 

for frontline operations and programs to uphold the highest level of National security, while trimming back budgets in less essential areas,’’ Chairman Rogers said. 

Homeland Security Subcommittee Chairman Robert Aderholt also commented on 

his bill: 

‘‘Homeland security and fiscal discipline are National priorities and the fiscal year 

2012 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill addresses both,’’ said 

Chairman Aderholt. ‘‘The recent storms that swept the Southeast and the death of 

Osama bin Laden serve as sobering reminders of our Nation’s continued need for 

robust National security and disaster recovery. The bill recognizes the critical importance of the homeland security mission—fully funding all intelligence and watch 

listing functions, as well as all frontline personnel. The bill also reflects the unquestioned need for fiscal restraint, reduces spending wherever possible, and prioritizes 

taxpayers’ limited dollars toward the vital security programs that will have an immediate impact on our Nation’s safety and security.’’ 

Bill Highlights 

Savings and Oversight.—The misleading and inadequate budget request from the 

President for DHS overtly underfunded known disaster relief costs of more than 

$4.9 billion (requesting only $1.8 billion), relied on $650 million in increased revenue from fees that Congress has not approved, and included undefined and unspecified ‘‘administrative savings’’ of more than $803 million. In contrast, the committee’s legislation ignores these accounting gimmicks and provides real budget savings, better efficiency, and stringent oversight of DHS spending while prioritizing 

disaster response and the frontline operations that most directly and immediately 

enhance our National security. 

The legislation includes major cuts to programs that have underperformed, been 

ill-managed, or not proven beneficial for the cost. Also, the bill requires numerous 

expenditure plans from DHS in order to improve its budget justifications and better 

align funding to tangible security results. 

FEMA State and Local Grant Reform.—The bill includes long-overdue reform of 

the State and Local Grant program under the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA), which has been plagued by inefficiency and has been unable to 

demonstrate a measurable return on taxpayer investments. These grants often remain in Federal coffers for many years—including a current backlog of over $13 billion in unspent funds. To address these challenges, the bill reduces the total grant 

funding by $2.1 billion, requires increased measurement, reporting, and oversight 

of existing funds, and permits the Secretary of DHS to issue grants in a competitive, 

merit-based process to prioritize areas with the highest risk and greatest need—getting the most out of each and every tax dollar. 

Critical Security Operations and Programs.—The committee’s legislation 

prioritizes funding for frontline security operations, including personnel, intelligence 
51 

activities, and the acquisition of selected essential tactical resources. This includes 

increasing staffing levels of the Border Patrol, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

field operations, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Coast Guard, Secret 

Service, and other essential security personnel. In addition, the bill fully funds all 

requested increases for intelligence gathering activities, including ‘‘watch listing’’ 

and threat identification. 

Earmarks.—This bill contains no earmarks, as defined by clause 9(e) of Rule XXI 

of the House Rules. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection.—The bill contains $11.8 billion for Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP)—an increase of $443 million over last year’s level. This 

funding provides for a total of 21,370 border patrol agents and 21,186 CBP officers, 

additional training and canine units at ports of entry, $149 million for Inspection 

and Detection Technology, and $500 million for Air and Marine operations and procurement. The bill increases funding for CBP’s targeting systems by $15 million to 

enhance the identification of known and suspected terrorists and criminals, and contains a total of $500 million for border security fencing, infrastructure, and technology. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement.—The bill provides $5.8 billion for Immi- gration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which is $35 million above last year’s 

level. This includes $1.7 billion for domestic investigation programs, $147 million for 

international enforcement programs, $81 million for the Office of Intelligence, $32.5 

million for the Visa Security Program, and an additional $64 million for continued 

expansion of the Secure Communities program. In addition, the legislation includes 

$2.7 billion—an increase of $27 million above the President’s request—for ICE detention bed spaces, raising the total number of beds to 34,000, the largest detention 

capacity in ICE’s history. 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA).—The bill includes $7.8 billion for 

the TSA, an increase of $125 million over last year’s level, and $293 million below 

the President’s request. These funds will be used to sustain the current cap level 

of 46,000 full-time screening personnel, and for explosive detection systems, security 

enforcement, cargo inspections, Federal Air Marshals, and other TSA activities. The 

bill also includes an additional $10 million to address air cargo threats. However, 

the bill does not provide $76 million requested by the President for 275 additional 

advanced inspection technology (AIT) scanners nor the 535 staff requested to operate them. 

Coast Guard.—The bill contains $10 billion for the U.S. Coast Guard, which is 

$196 million below last year’s level, and provides funding for maritime safety and 

security activities, counternarcotics enforcement, facilities and equipment maintenance, and overseas contingency operations including operations in the Persian 

Gulf. Within the total, the legislation fully sustains military pay and allowances, 

and provides targeted increases above the budget request for communications, tactical training, and acquisition of critical operations assets such as small boats and 

replacement helicopters. 

Secret Service.—The bill includes $1.7 billion for the U.S. Secret Service—an increase of $155 million over last year’s level. This includes $113 million for protective 

activities related to the 2012 Presidential Election, and $43 million for information 

technology improvements including cybersecurity and threat assessment capabilities. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency.—The bill includes $5.3 billion for 

FEMA—a decrease of $1.9 billion from last year’s level. This total includes a cut 

of $2.1 billion to State and Local grants (as noted above), and an increase of $850 

million to the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). The bill provides $1 billion for FEMA’s 

State and Local Programs, and includes increased oversight, better prioritization of 

funding to address critical needs and high-risk areas, and a report on the expenditure of the current $13 billion in backlogged, unexpended grant funds leftover from 

previous years. The bill fully funds Emergency Management Performance Grants at 

$350 million and provides $350 million for firefighting grants. To better address the 

costs of both known and expected disasters, the legislation also includes a total of 

$2.65 billion for the DRF. 

Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility and Detainees.—The legislation includes a 

provision prohibiting funds to transfer, release, or assist in the transfer or release 

of Guantanamo detainees to or within the United States or its territories. The provision also prohibits immigration benefits to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or any other 

detainee. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Again, we have tremendous experience. I would 

like to kind of put a softball question on you and see how you come 

back with it. 
52 

Given what you know about the threat we face since the death 

of bin Laden, as well as before, are there some things that you 

think we as Members of Congress ought to do that we are not 

doing to keep the threat to the homeland to a minimum? 

I will start with you, Congressman. 

Mr. HAMILTON. You always have to be careful when somebody 

says they are throwing you a softball question. It almost invariably 

means it is going to be hard to answer. 

Well, I go back to the basics here. I don’t think the homeland security agenda is radically changed because of Osama bin Laden’s 

death. We still have items that we know we must deal with in 

homeland security that we have not dealt with, and they have been 

on the agenda for 10 years. I have mentioned the radio spectrum 

issue, the ability to communicate, and the ability to have unity of 

command. 

But Congress has to get its act together in both intelligence and 

homeland security. You folks are part of the problem because you 

haven’t put your act together with regard to homeland security 

oversight and with your intelligence oversight. 

So rather than looking far away at a lot of things and trying to 

come up with new ideas as a result of this dramatic success, I 

think you have to kind of go back to the basics that have been on 

the agenda for quite a long period of time. I think what the Chairman said in his opening statement, and I think several of the witnesses mentioned, for 10 years now after 9/11, the American people 

have moved on to all kinds of other interests and focuses, and so 

there is a kind of complacency and lack of urgency that sets in. 

What can Members of Congress do? I think Members of Congress 

can emphasize to their constituents again and again that this is 

still a very serious threat to the United States, and we must not 

become complacent. These people will find a way to attack us. I 

have very little doubt that we will be attacked again in the future. 

We hope not. We have been very fortunate; maybe more than fortunate. We have been very good protecting ourselves. But the threat 

is still there. So what can you do? You can keep people reminded 

of the fact that this threat is still alive. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Ms. Townsend. 

Ms. TOWNSEND. Congressman, I appreciate the question, and I 

am going to give you three specific things that I think are available 

for you all to really help with. They are not new, but we haven’t 

adequately addressed them. 

What do we know about al-Qaeda’s targeting? They are obsessed 

with the transportation sector of our infrastructure. We have not 

done enough when it comes to rail security. We still don’t have 100 

percent of cargo screening despite this threat with the computer 

cartridges. So renewed emphasis and investment on transportation 

security, including rail and cargo and infrastructure generally, is 

very important. 

Second, it is about technology. You heard me talk about the need 

for both the Government investigators and intelligence to have the 

resources, the capability that they need to not to keep up with the 

bad guys, but to be ahead of them. Oftentimes, even when they 

have the technology, the legal authority to actually use it effec-
53 

tively lags behind. Of course, Congress can help with that. I would 

reemphasize, Congressman Hamilton, the need for bandwith for 

first responders. 

Last is the only people who can really effectively address what 

we call the low-probability, high-consequence event—radiological, 

nuclear, biological—is the Federal Government. I worry, because 

we have talked about it but not seen an attack, that we haven’t 

done enough. This is one of these we don’t want to think about it 

because of the horrible consequences, but, in fact, we know from 

their own statements they are committed to an anthrax capability, 

they are committed to obtaining nuclear. I worry 10 years after 

9/11 that the resources and commitment, whether it is the Strategic National Stockpile or other such programs that help prevent, 

detect, or respond to such things, are inadequate. 

Mr. BERGEN. I would just say that I think it is important for the 

committee to communicate to the American people that the threat 

is not just coming from al-Qaeda. When I say the threat, I mean 

the threat to the domestic American homeland. Pakistani Taliban 

recruited and trained Faisal Shehzad. The Islamic Jihad unit, 

which is sort of an Uzbek group, recruited guys to attack Ramstein 

Air Force Base in 2007. They accumulated 1,600 pounds of hydrogen. That are now operating in an al-Qaeda-like manner. 

Mr. KOHLMANN. Thank you, sir. I think that law enforcement in 

this country has made tremendous leaps and bounds in terms of 

their evolution since 9/11. But the FBI and Department of Justice 

are still grappling with some issues relating to virtual sanctuaries. 

We have gone after al-Qaeda in their physical sanctuaries in places 

like Afghanistan and Pakistan, but right now there are virtual 

sanctuaries for al-Qaeda on the internet where al-Qaeda is able to 

put bomb-making instructions, recruit people, communicate with 

each other out of the view of the American public. 

What most people wouldn’t realize is that top-tier al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan on the frontline are chatting with each other 

over social networking forums that are hosted in western countries 

by major corporations. That can’t go on. So I think one of the roles 

that the U.S. Congress can play is, No. 1, to put pressure on law 

enforcement to continue to reform itself, to continue to acquire 

high-tech tools, which will put the FBI one step ahead of cyber 

jihadists. I think also, very importantly, is to put pressure on the 

private corporations that are serving as the unwitting hosts for this 

material. Obviously, YouTube and Facebook don’t want to have 

anything to do with al-Qaeda. But I think it is time that both of 

these companies, along with hosts of others that are responsible for 

hosting al-Qaeda material, make more of an effort than simply try 

to rely on volunteer efforts by people who are opposed to the message of al-Qaeda, which is what they are doing right now. It is time 

that these companies take the responsibility of making sure that 

their resources are not being misused to recruit people like Faisal 

Shahzad, like Umar Abdulmutallab and push them to join alQaeda. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. You hit the softball. 

I would like, Mr. Chairman, unanimous consent that Mr. Green, 

former Member of the committee, be allowed to sit for this hearing. 
54 

Chairman KING. Mr. Thompson, obviously I will not object. But 

we are considering charging Mr. Green rent for all the time he 

spends with us. 

Recognize the gentleman from Texas, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight, Mr. McCaul. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to first 

take this moment just to publicly commend the Navy SEALs, the 

intelligence community, particularly the analysts in both NSA and 

CIA for a job well done in bringing him to justice. They are really 

the unsung heroes whose names and faces the American people 

may never know. 

With that, this hearing that for us is the impact of al-Qaeda after 

the killing of Osama bin Laden. There was a debate going on as 

to where he was located. Was he in a cave? Was he operational? 

Was he just a figurehead? Most people thought he was more of an 

inspirational figurehead. From what I have seen, that debate may 

be changing somewhat. 

There were 27 terror plots over the last 2 years. I think my first 

question is, of those 27, how many of those do you believe may 

have been inspired by those like al-Awlaki who inspired Major 

Hasan just north of my district in Fort Hood, and other franchise 

operations, versus the bin Laden operation? We know with the 

predator drones that the command and control structure was greatly decentralized and damaged. 

So with that, to me, that goes to the core of the question: If you 

analyze the last 2-year terror plots, how many of those do you believe were actually inspired or motivated by Osama bin Laden? 

Mr. KOHLMANN. I would just say this: I work as a consultant on 

behalf of the FBI, and I evaluate evidence and I serve as an expert 

witness in terrorism trials here in the United States. I have yet to 

see a single homegrown terrorism case in the United States that 

did not include at least some material by Anwar al-Awlaki. His recordings pop up in basically every single homegrown terrorism case 

that is litigated by the Department of Justice in this country; and, 

frankly, it appears in every single case outside of this country as 

well. 

That doesn’t mean that bin Laden isn’t influential, either. His 

materials show up, too. The difference between bin Laden and alAwlaki is that al-Awlaki may not have military credentials, but he 

speaks fluent English, he is extremely charismatic, he is a good 

speaker, and he has religious credentials which I guess take the 

place of the military ones. He won’t ever replace bin Laden, but he 

is a tremendously influential figure. There is absolutely no doubt 

that he continues to radicalize people. People right now, at this 

very moment, are being arrested in the United States with connections to al-Awlaki, have tried reaching out to al-Awlaki. Very dangerous people. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Most of these were homegrown radicalization cases 

inspired by al-Awlaki. Does anybody else on the panel have any 

comments on that? 

Mr. BERGEN. In the U.S. military, there is a document called 

Commander’s Intent, which means that General Petraeus doesn’t 

have to tell a soldier in Kandahar what to do, and bin Laden was 

in charge of Commander’s Intent. So al-Awlaki, the reason he is 
55 

important in these cases is because he speaks English. It is that 

simple. If he was speaking in Arabic, he wouldn’t be that important. It is not that he is a significant religious figure, or as Mr. 

Kohlmann said, a significant military figure. It is that he is communicating in colloquial English. 

Al-Awlaki is no Osama bin Laden. He can’t change the strategic 

intent of al-Qaeda. At the end of the day, al-Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula is a branch of al-Qaeda Central, operating to fulfill bin 

Laden’s strategic guidance. 

If the new leader of al-Qaeda came along and said we are not 

going to attack the United States anymore, you know, al-Awlaki 

would still be out there and he may take a different view. But at 

the end of the day, al-Awlaki is not in charge of this movement. 

He is a number—you know, not insignificant leader of a branch of 

the larger mother ship. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I agree with that assessment. I always said the 

death of bin Laden marked the beginning of the end. Because we 

couldn’t truly win the war on terror until we killed bin Laden. So 

that is why I believe this is so significant. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. McCaul, if I may say so. I don’t have a detailed analysis of the 27 that you mentioned, but my answer to the 

question of how many were inspired by Osama bin Laden would be 

all of them. He was a symbolic figure, he was an icon, and he had 

enormous influence here. I can’t imagine any of these terrorists 

striking without paying some homage and allegiance to him. This 

man was extraordinarily charismatic. 

Sitting in the 9/11 Commission listening to testimony, I kept asking myself, how in the world could a man persuade 19 young men 

to go to their deaths? Now, you talk about persuasive powers. That 

is persuasive power. I know it is a different environment, a different religion and all the rest of it, but the instinct for self-preservation is pretty strong. He persuaded 19 people to kill themselves. 

That is the kind of authority and charisma he had, in a very evil 

way of course. He inspired all of them. 

Chairman KING. I will go to another gentleman from Texas, Mr. 

Cuellar. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

thank the witnesses for being here with us. 

You know, when somebody comes into the United States, Border 

Patrol will classify them as Mexicans or OTMs. That is, other than 

Mexicans. The large number of folks who are coming into the 

United States are Mexicans coming in for economic reasons. Then 

after that you have Central Americans, and then you have other 

folks. Traditionally, that is what the numbers have been with the 

Border Patrol. 

There was a CRS report that said that—and I am quoting: ‘‘The 

sheer increase of non-Mexicans, the OTMs, coming across the border makes it more difficult for United States Border Patrol agents 

to readily identify and process each OTM, thereby increasing the 

chance that a potential terrorist could slip into the system. Moreover, there is no reliable data concerning how many OTMs may 

evade apprehension and successfully enter the country legally 

across the country.’’ 
56 

Then CRS raises a couple of potential issues. One potential issue 

for Congress is whether to increase in OTM apprehensions poses 

a threat to National security. Then another potential threat, according to the CRS, for Congress, is the indication that hundreds 

of people that come from countries known to harbor terrorists or 

to promote terrorism are caught trying to enter into the United 

States illegally across the land border. 

If you look at the handout out there, and this is OTMs, the OTM 

members, you should have a handout before you. This is not Mexicans. This is OTMs. The large number of them are coming in from 

Central America, 22,360. This is for fiscal year 2011. Then you 

have India, and then you have South America. By South America, 

you are talking about all the countries of South America. Then 

China. Then Romania. 

The second handout deals with just focusing not on the Mexicans 

or the Central Americans, but this is the rest of the OTMs. India 

in the fiscal year 2011 had 1,662, more than the 1,660, which includes all of South America. Every country put together came in 

from there. Then you have China, and then you have Romania. 

Now, my question is, what sort of issues does this bring up? 

Keep in mind, I think you might be familiar, India and Guatemala, I think it was back in 2009, entered into some sort of agreement where they have a non-visa, or waiver of visas, going into 

Guatemala. So maybe that is a pipeline that just gets them coming 

in, like Brazil did some years ago. 

But my question is, when you have folks coming in from, let’s 

say, India and the area that they come, what sort of potential 

issues does this bring when we talk about threats to the United 

States, if any? To any of the panelists. 

Ms. TOWNSEND. Seeing no one else step up to this one. Congressman, this has been, as I am sure you know, during my time in the 

Bush administration, I was a vocal advocate for comprehensive immigration reform. I view comprehensive immigration reform as a 

necessary, fundamentally necessary thing to protect our National 

security. 

During my time in the Government, there had been some intelligence to suggest that al-Qaeda looked at this pipeline coming 

across the U.S.-Mexican border. I will leave the politics to those of 

you for whom it is a profession, and say to you that I believe that 

the lack of comprehensive immigration reform is a vulnerability. I 

would prefer to see, as it was true in my time in Government, to 

have the Border Patrol and the Immigration Service focus their resources on people who are going to do us harm. 

That does not mean I think we don’t have to address the phenomenon of illegal immigration in a fundamentally fair and basic 

dignified way, but I believe that we need comprehensive reform. 

Mr. HAMILTON. May I just add my word in support of comprehensive immigration reform. We have to begin to look at immigration 

through the prisms of both the National economy. We need a lot 

of people at the top of the skill level and at the bottom. We have 

to begin to look at immigration as a National security matter as 

well. That means quite a change of perspective on immigration for 

what we have had in years past. 
57 

At the border, you would know more than I, but I think we have 

increased our manpower doubling it over a period of a few years, 

the number of Border Patrol agents. I think we have made substantial progress in letting illegal people into the country. Obviously, we have to continue that for a long time to come. We have 

still got to deploy a lot better technology. We have got to get better 

on this US–VISIT exit system that I mentioned in my testimony 

today. So there are a lot of things that I think still need to be done. 

But I very much agree with Fran’s observation about comprehensive reform. You cannot deal with immigration on a piecemeal 

basis. You cannot do it. 

Chairman KING. The time of the gentleman expired. Would the 

gentleman ask unanimous consent to have his exhibits placed into 

the record? 

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes, I do. Thank you. 

Chairman KING. Without objection. 

[The information follows:] 
58 

Chairman KING. Also, before I recognize the next questioner, I 

think we ought to acknowledge the fact that Mr. Long is not here 

today; that he represents Joplin, Missouri, where they lost so many 

lives and so much property. So all of our thoughts and prayers are 

with Congressman Long today. 

With that, I recognize for 5 minutes the distinguished gentleman, 

Dr. Broun, from Georgia. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This morning on ‘‘Washington Journal’’ on C–SPAN, I had referred to this hearing as a huddle between decisionmakers and the 

experts so that we can come up with a game plan of where we go 

from here. I appreciate you all being here. I appreciate your valuable testimony. I agree with the Chairman, it is absolutely essential that the American public not become complacent. I think we 

have, Mr. Chairman, become complacent in very many ways. 

I had a number of callers talk about various things that and even 

just dismissed the potential of al-Qaeda or other entities being a 

danger to this country. I think it is absolutely critical that the 

American public understand that we have a clear and present danger. So I appreciate you all being here to talk about that. 

Now, I worry about the line of succession that the elimination of 

bin Laden has put in place. Also, the current climate within alQaeda poses numerous concerns, most regarding the internal 

power struggle not only within al-Qaeda, but the associated groups. 

Mr. Kohlmann talked about some of the al-Qaeda central people 

and al-Zawahiri as possibly being the successor to bin Laden. I 

would like to hear from the other members of the panel about who 

you all think might replace bin Laden as being the central figure, 
59 

and also whether the associated groups, AQAP and the leadership 

there and the other entities, how do you all see this sorting out? 

What can we do as Members of Congress and what can Government do as we see this power struggle within the al-Qaeda and alQaeda AP and other associated groups? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Dr. Broun, I believe that al-Qaeda is now searching for another leader. I think the most likely leader, so far as I 

know, and I yield to other members of the panel here who may 

know more about it than I. But I think the most likely is Zawahiri 

is probably going to be the last man standing in the struggle. I 

think there are internal differences within al-Qaeda. I don’t think 

we should underestimate him. He is ruthless, he is a religious zealot much like Osama bin Laden. He is not a lightweight. He has 

been instrumental in al-Qaeda’s strategy, its development, its evolution over a period of time. I think it would be a very grave mistake to think that, with the removal of Osama bin Laden, they will 

be led by a feckless leader. 

So I think if the American intelligence community now will be 

spending an enormous time trying to answer your question as to 

who emerges. But from where I sit, he is the most likely guy to 

emerge, and we must not underestimate him. 

Ms. TOWNSEND. Congressman, I agree with that. I think one of 

the key things to watch, there has always been a tension about 

leadership residing with the Egyptians because of just historical 

differences that I will leave to Peter to discuss. But the fact that 

Zawahiri and Saif al-Adel, the interim leaders, are both Egyptians 

suggests that there will continue to be this tension, this struggle 

between the Egyptian members and the Gulf Arab members. So 

what that posits is continuing tension between, or some increasing 

tension, between al-Qaeda central and their affiliates, the strongest 

of which you have heard us talk about today, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. 

It reminds me of the tension we saw between al-Qaeda core when 

that was bin Laden, and another affiliate, al-Qaeda in Iraq, which 

was Zarqawi. Intelligence was replete with examples of an on-going 

tension about vision. Zarqawi was a very strong personality. He 

pushed back on al-Qaeda central. It was a bonanza of targeting opportunity, and we all know Zarqawi wound up targeted and killed 

as a result of it. 

One would hope that al-Awlaki, feeling an opportunity here to 

push back, that there will be this increasing tension between 

Zawahiri and what remains of the al-Qaeda core and the affiliate 

al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Because if that tension increases, it provides a tremendous opportunity for the U.S. Government. 

Mr. BERGEN. I totally agree with what Representative Hamilton 

and Fran Townsend have just said, and I would add one minor additional note. 

Bin Laden was from Saudi Arabia. As you know, his family is 

from Yemen. For religiously zealot people inside of al-Qaeda, that 

is very significant because of the Holy Land, and they want—the 

reason it is controversial to have an Egyptian is not simply because 

there are disputes about strategy and targeting; at the end of the 

day, the Egyptians really want to just have kind of a Taliban-style 
60 

government in Egypt. They are less interested in attacking the 

United States. It is also about the idea of having somebody from 

the Holy Land. 

So I think there actually, as Fran has outlined, some real opportunities for the intelligence community and the U.S. Government 

to kind of be aware of the fractures that are going to develop, and 

perhaps even exploit them if there are opportunities. 

Mr. KOHLMANN. If I might quickly add. Towards your second 

question about AQAP, about what can be done about AQAP, I 

think the answer to that goes back to a comment that was made 

by Anwar al-Awlaki, of all people, recently. 

Al-Awlaki pointed to the current wave of instability in Yemen. 

He laughed and he said, of course this is going to accrue to our 

benefit. Of course this is going to accrue to al-Qaeda’s benefit. 

I think that gives you the answer, which is that if you want to 

damage AQAP, the answer is not just drone strikes, it is not just 

U.S. special forces operations. A large part of this is contingent 

upon stability returning to Yemen. Political stability and stability 

that involves the tribes. Because right now it is the tribes that are 

providing protection to people like Anwar al-Awlaki, Qassim alRimi, the leaders of AQAP. They are being hidden by Yemenis, and 

you have got to convince them that it is not in their interests to 

work with al-Qaeda. Right now there are large swaths of central 

Yemen that are outside of government control. It is the exact nightmare scenario that we have been trying to avoid in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan, and it is writ-large in the heart of the Middle East. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back. 

Chairman KING. I would advise the Members, I understand that 

Chairman Hamilton will have to leave at 11:45 and Ms. Townsend 

at 12 noon. So I would ask Members to try to keep it within 5 minutes or phrase their question in a way that allows for a 5-minute 

answer. 

The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. To all 

of the witnesses, let me thank you for your service. I might want 

to join you, Ms. Townsend, in offering our deepest sympathy to our 

friends and neighbors and fellow Americans. It seems that it is an 

unending attack of tornados in the Midwest. But our deepest sympathy to them. 

Again, in Homeland Security, thank all of you for confirming the 

significance of the demise of Osama bin Laden as well as the intelligence. 

I want to thank my Chairman, and I hope that will allow me to 

be able to get 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 minutes after the red light comes 

on. 

Chairman KING. As much as I would love to do that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I want to thank him. He has been consistent, 

along with my Ranking Member, on the focus, Mr. Hamilton, 

Chairman Hamilton, as that you said. We have got to get our act 

together. We have got to synergize, integrate the oversight of 

Homeland Security with all the other agencies that are doing so. 

So I might mention to my Chairman that I have introduced H.R. 

1900, the Surface Transportation and Mass Transit Security Act. 

We did it last year with bipartisan support. I frankly, if I might, 
61 

I was getting ready to say, I might, stay up nights because I serve 

as the Ranking Member on the Transportation Security about the 

vulnerabilities of our rail system, Federal air marshals and utilization of them on many of our flights, and the whole issue of air traffic controllers, though they may have challenges sleeping, if you 

will, that is part of our security. Many people don’t remember how 

air traffic controllers were so intimately involved on 9/11. 

So let me just pose these questions which are related but yet not. 

That is, help us understand this fascination with transportation, 

but also rail. In fact, I just want to stick on rail. Most of the times 

we hear our communities saying I don’t want hazardous materials 

coming through, their fear of various incidents that may impact 

them, explosions, et cetera. But our rail system, both what it transports along with people I believe is a serious concern. I would appreciate comment about us really focusing on rail security as the 

9/11 Commission suggested. 

Then finally, my second question is, I co-chair the Pakistan Caucus, have gone to Pakistan on a number of occasions. Pierce into 

the Taliban, the Taliban of Afghanistan, the Taliban of Pakistan. 

Do they leap to the United States? Do they continue to terrorize 

the Pakistani people? You are right, I am amazed at the attack on 

police and the ability to get on rank-and-file but as well the hierarchy of the Pakistani military. Do we give them the money? Do 

we give them the social justice money? Where will they take their 

terror? Will it come to the United States? Chairman Hamilton, if 

you can go down. Hopefully I will get to all of you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I think on the first point the fascination 

with rail transportation goes back to the fundamental intent of alQaeda. 

Look, they are very sophisticated people. They understand symbolic targets. They understand where Americans congregate. They 

understand how best to disrupt. The transportation of the United 

States has enormous vulnerabilities. Rail, certainly. But other 

forms, too. 

So I attribute their fascination with it to, No. 1, their skill, I 

guess, in analyzing our vulnerabilities; and, No. 2, their desire to 

kill as many Americans as possible and to disrupt American life as 

much as possible. 

On the second question, you were raising the question about 

Pakistan? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, do the Taliban translate to attack on the 

United States? 

Mr. HAMILTON. I think I will yield to the others on that question. 

Ms. TOWNSEND. Yes, ma’am. Look, the obsession with transportation, as you pointed out, is writ-large. We saw the tragedy of 

using aircraft. But trains represent a real opportunity for them. By 

the way, also ferries. I mention that, because as the Chairman 

knows, ferries are very big in terms of transportation into Manhattan in the morning at rush hour. 

But back to rail. We saw the attacks in London and Madrid. We 

know that they continue, if nothing else, because of the Zazi 

Najibullah case against the New York City subways. They are not 

going to stop. It represents, because it is an open system—of 
62 

course, if you close it, it loses its effectiveness in a place like an 

urban area like New York. But its open system represents its vulnerability. The New York City Police Department has done a tremendous job with sort of unpredictable presence in different subways. None of that is 100 percent. But I really think this goes back 

to when we talk about the grant program—and I have not always 

been a huge fan of the Homeland Security grant program. But this 

is a place where we can actually incentivize State and local authorities to take ownership of this issue and spend their money in 

a place that really matters not just in the locality but writ-large. 

Evan Kohlmann mentioned the priority of attacking our economy. What better way than to attack our transportation system? 

The Pakistan Taliban does represent a direct threat to the 

United States. We saw the Times Square attempted bombing, and 

they made threats. I think we have got to learn to take these terrorist groups at face value. They may not have tremendous capability, but they have enough to come here and kill Americans. 

Mr. BERGEN. Just to add to that point. A canary in the mine on 

the Pakistani Taliban is they sent suicide bombers to Barcelona in 

January 2008, and that is according to both themselves and Spanish prosecutors. We should have taken, as Fran—sometimes when 

people say that, we should take these threats seriously. They, of 

course, also did a joint operation in Khost that killed the 7 CIA employees and contractors. 

What to do about Pakistan is obviously an enormous question before many of the Members here. It is a very complex relationship, 

and it would be very tempting perhaps to say, well, we are just 

going to cut off aid. This would be psychologically satisfying for 

about a week. At the end of the day, they are the fifth-largest country in the world, about to be, with nuclear weapons, headquarters 

of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and we need them. 

Just one final point on this. More Pakistani soldiers have died 

fighting the Taliban than U.S. and NATO soldiers combined, and 

this is just something that is very important for us to recognize 

and understand when we talk to them and when we think about 

how to deal with them. 

Mr. HAMILTON. I might just add that if you are getting into the 

U.S.-Pakistan relationship, this is already one of the most difficult 

bilateral relationships in the world. We are not going to solve the 

problems in this relationship. We just have to manage them. There 

are so many voices I have heard coming out of Capitol Hill to cut 

aid to Pakistan. I would be very, very careful about that. 

We have enormous interests in Pakistan. We have referred to 

them already here this morning: The nuclear weapons. We use 

Pakistan to transit much of our materials and people going into Afghanistan. The nuclear weapons, of course, are huge. 

In the end, we have to focus on the long-term interests of the 

United States and not our short-term frustration. There are plenty 

of reasons to be frustrated with the relationship now, but that longterm relationship remains very valuable to us. I think it remains 

valuable to the Pakistanis as well. All kinds of problems in it, all 

kinds of questions arise. Sometimes I think Admiral Mullen, the 

chairman of the Chief of Staff, has been commuting to Pakistan. 

He goes over there so frequently to try to work out these problems. 
63 

It just indicates the delicate nature of the relationship. It is a very 

difficult one, but we have got to work through it. 

Mr. KOHLMANN. If I can just very quickly comment about the 

Pakistani Taliban. My company has an office in Pakistan. One of 

the subjects we spend most time on is the Pakistani Taliban. We 

have been interviewing them in recent days. We have been polling 

them in their opinions. 

I can tell you this: No. 1, the Pakistani Taliban is far more sophisticated than people give them credit for. They are recruiting 

people right now, Americans, using YouTube. They have not done 

this once, they have done this multiple times. They are recruiting 

people using Facebook. They are deliberately trying to come up 

with terrorist plots targeting the United States. They are aggressively trying to target the United States. Perhaps most disturbingly, unlike the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban are forging 

very close relationships with al-Qaeda, with Arab Afghan al-Qaeda 

militants, to the point where as has just been suggested by Peter 

Bergen and I believe others, that the Camp Chapman attack that 

took place in 2009, there is a substantial degree of evidence indicating both the Pakistani Taliban and the Haqqani network played 

a direct role in that attack. 

It raises a lot of questions. It raises questions both about the 

Pakistani Taliban and their reach into the United States. It also 

reaches the inevitable question about what is the relationship between the Pakistani Taliban, the Haqqani network, and the ISI, 

the Pakistani Intelligence Service. Those questions have yet to be 

fully resolved. But as long as you have terrorist attacks being directed at U.S. targets, including U.S. civilians, by a group that 

might have ties to the Pakistani Intelligence Service, I think it is 

worthy to look into those questions and resolve them. Because as 

much as Pakistan is a critical partner, I don’t think we can allow 

terrorist groups to establish bases with the say-so of the ISI. 

Chairman KING. The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Cravaack, 

is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much 

for being here today. This has been quite enlightening. So thank 

you for your comments. 

First off, being a retired Navy captain, if you focus on the current 

war, you are missing it altogether. We need to focus on the next 

war. What we are seeing now, as Mr. Kohlmann—cyber jihadists, 

I truly feel the previous notion of asymmetric warfare, we have 

gone way beyond that into something, a new realm, a new difference of what we are actually seeing today. 

Ms. Townsend, also we are at a war without borders, and I very 

much appreciate your comments regarding the lone wolf. In quickly 

reviewing your background, I would like you to comment a little bit 

on that, because one of the votes we will be taking very soon is regarding three components of the PATRIOT Act. I was wondering 

if you could comment on that, if you believe that these are necessary vehicles to make sure that we can protect Americans within 

the United States without jeopardizing any Constitutional rights 

that American citizens would have. 

Ms. TOWNSEND. As you know, Congressman, the lone wolf represents the greatest challenge to Federal investigators and local 
64 

authorities. It is unpredictable, it is difficult to identify in advance, 

unlike an organization where people have got to talk to one another and plan. So I believe that those provisions in the Patriot Act 

are essential to the FBI’s continued ability to effectively do these 

investigations and identify the threats. 

To the extent—I can tell you during my time in the White House 

when there was the initial renewal of the PATRIOT Act. To the extent there are concerns, there are procedural mechanisms for oversight and reporting that ought to give people the confidence and 

the courage to vote to extend the PATRIOT Act. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Mr. Hamilton. 

Mr. HAMILTON. I support the provisions in the PATRIOT Act as 

well, and I think they should be extended. Now, obviously, what 

has happened since 9/11 is the power of the Government has expanded dramatically in terms of intrusion into the lives of people. 

For necessary reasons, I think all of us have supported that expansion of power. These provisions, I think, Fran, I am correct in saying, just kind of bring you up to date in terms of your ability to 

keep track of these bad guys. 

Having said all of that, may I also put in a plug for the Privacy 

and Oversight Board, because I think that what you have had over 

the period of the last decade is this environment in which the security people win every argument, and for obvious reasons, because 

we are very deeply concerned about our security. But there is not 

a sufficient pushback on the side of the civil liberties and privacy. 

That voice needs to be strengthened, I think, within Government 

across the board, and especially with regard to the intelligence 

agencies. 

So I want a strong PATRIOT Act, but I also want a counterbalance to that with a Privacy and Oversight Board, and I want 

the President to get that thing up and moving. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it. 

Mr. Bergen, in your testimony, you stated that Pakistan Taliban 

in the tribal regions has been successful in attempts to attract 

Western and American recruits and poses a threat to Americans. 

Obviously, how much cooperation of the Pakistani ISI are you seeing? Do you think that the relationships can be salvaged moving 

forward? 

Mr. BERGEN. I think, Representative Hamilton, I was surprised 

when he said one of the wisest things possible about this, which 

is: We are not going to solve our relationship with Pakistan; we are 

going to have to manage it. 

As a point of information, four ISI buildings have been attacked 

by the Taliban. So the ISI has a very complex relationship with the 

Taliban. 

Are we getting what we want from them? No. Is the Pakistan 

government doing quite a lot? Yes. Serious military operation in 

Southern Waziristan in 2009 unlike previous operations, serious 

operation in SWAT in 2009 as well. 

So the enemy of the perfect is not the reasonably okay. What we 

are seeing right now is I think overall reasonably okay. Could it 

be better? Yes. Will it get better? I am not sure. 
65 

Mr. CRAVAACK. I appreciate your comments and the amount of 

soldiers that have been killed in action against the Taliban. That 

was quite telling. 

Sir, I have 21 seconds left. So I yield back. 

Chairman KING. I thank the gentleman for his prudence. With 

that, I am pleased to recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. 

Clarke. 

Mr. CLARKE of Michigan. I appreciate all of your collective testimony. It is apparent that Osama bin Laden was a key figure in 

global terrorism. His death has dealt a severe blow to al-Qaeda. 

But the terrorist threat to our country still remains, but it increasingly is coming from within the United States. 

I represent metropolitan Detroit, the Detroit sector border. Many 

times our first responders, local police, and fire still can’t communicate with their Federal counterparts or their Canadian counterparts. Many of you have mentioned the issue of interoperable communications and how that is going to be important for us to be able 

to help address this terrorist threat. We currently have a situation 

where our radios can’t talk to each other. 

Now, I do thank the Department for releasing prior allocated 

money, $4 million to Wayne County recently. That will help us upgrade our radio system. But even still, our State and local authorities don’t have the revenue to provide their resources and equipment for our first responders. Even in the proposed 2012 budget for 

this very Department, it is the Homeland Security grants that have 

been proposed to be cut by, I believe, $2.1 billion compared to 2011 

levels. 

So all of this begs this question then: How do we best prepare 

ourselves to deal with the threat of terrorism that comes from 

within the United States? Where do we get the money? Many have 

raised that the death of bin Laden poses the opportunity to reassess our National security goals. My point and my question is this: 

That the assessment could also involve reevaluating our mission in 

Afghanistan to redirect a part of our military aid that is currently 

going to Afghanistan, a total of over $100 billion this current year, 

and to redirect some of that back to the United States to homeland 

security to protect ourselves from the threat that is increasingly 

coming from within the United States. If any of you have any comments on how we can best do that. Reassess our mission in Afghanistan. Use some of the money that we are, I was going to say 

spending, but it is more accurate that we are borrowing, to invest 

in the military operations in Afghanistan, and to better invest a 

small portion of that to this budget, the homeland security budget, 

as a way of better protecting the American people at home by investing those funds right here at home. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Congressman, I believe your priority is the correct one. That is to say, we have got to get the ability to communicate at the scene of the disaster. That is so fundamental and so 

basic. I don’t see how it can be argued against. 

Now, your question relates to, where do you get the money to do 

it? I am not an expert on the Federal budget. It involves a lot of 

questions, what money is in the pipeline that is not being used, for 

example, that might be available. 
66 

You raised the question of Afghanistan. My own personal view 

with regard to that is that the American people are putting Afghanistan and Iraq in the rearview mirror, and they have already 

made up their mind pretty much that the United States should 

begin to withdraw. I don’t think the question today is whether or 

not you should pack up and leave. That is not going to happen nor 

should it. I don’t think the question is whether you are going to 

achieve victory in Afghanistan. Victory is very hard to define and 

I don’t think that is in the cards. I think American policy increasingly will focus on the question of: What pace do we withdraw from 

Afghanistan? That will create some funds obviously there. But it is 

not clear that you can take those funds and immediately put it in 

some domestic priority. 

The question also is that as we withdraw our forces there—this 

may sound contradictory, but I don’t think it is—how can we continue to help Afghanistan to achieve some of the goals that we 

have a stable Afghanistan obviously is more in our interest than 

one that is chaotic. 

So I think there is a renewed interest in this, and I think the 

operational question on policy is really the pace of withdrawal at 

this point. Will it create some funds? Yes, I think it will. That is 

probably a good thing. But that doesn’t necessarily mean you can 

take those funds and put it into the question of communication. 

The question of communication at the scene of the disaster is a 

highest priority. If you cannot communicate at the scene of the disaster, people lose their lives as happened in New York, as happened in Katrina. This is a priority concern. This is money that has 

to be found in order to solve this problem. It is frustrating to me 

beyond measure that 10 years after 9/11 this obvious priority has 

not been fully met. I know some progress has been made, I know 

some money has been made available. But we are still not at the 

point where you can get a seamless communication at the scene of 

the disaster, which is absolutely what is necessary. 

Ms. TOWNSEND. Let me only add, I agree wholeheartedly and enthusiastically with what Congressman Hamilton said. Certainly, if 

he is not an expert in the Federal budget, I am far behind him. 

So, one, I think we can precipitously withdraw from Afghanistan, 

as the Congressman said. I think as we begin to withdraw down, 

you are going to find there are additional funds available. 

Let me make what I think is an unpopular observation. The responsibility, while heavy on the Federal Government, to solve this 

problem, and as the Congressman said, it should have been solved 

by now, it is not unique to the Federal Government. My concern— 

I mentioned earlier about grant programs. My concern about grant 

programs is that what happens is the States then abrogate their 

own responsibility to set aside funds, to make investments in these 

sorts of things because they rely heavily on the Federal Government. 

Frankly, it is clear across the country during this time of fiscal 

stress that States have not responsibly managed their own budgets. Frankly, I do think that this has got to be a priority not only 

for the Federal Government but with governors when they are 

looking at their own State budgets. 
67 

Mr. HAMILTON. The homeland security program ought not to be 

a revenue-sharing program. We recommend that you are not just 

handing out money to State and local governments. They need 

money for all kinds of things, some of which are valid and some 

of which are not. But I think one of the positive things is that in 

the appropriators’ bill, they award grants without regard to the 

minimum allocations to lower-risk areas. In other words, they followed through on one of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, which is to allocate funds on the basis of risk, not just hand 

out the money everywhere. There are certain areas of the country. 

New York City is one, but there are others, that are far—Detroit, 

far higher risk than rural Indiana where I come from. So you have 

got to make sure that there is enough discretion in the Federal to 

allocate funds on the basis of risk. This is not a revenue-sharing 

program. 

Chairman KING. The time of the gentleman is expired. I now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, former United States Attorney, Mr. Meehan. 

Mr. MEEHAN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to this very 

distinguished panel for your preparation and your testimony here 

today. 

I am going to ask Ms. Townsend and Mr. Bergen, both of you 

had commented on something I would like to follow up a little bit 

on. Ms. Townsend, my experience as a former Federal prosecutor, 

there is almost a counterintuitive sense that when you take down 

an organization, either organized crime or even a violent drug 

gang, it is in the aftermath of that that you see some of the greatest—it is not just a succession thing, but some of the greatest disarray as they reassemble themselves often in terms of violence. 

You both looked at this as almost a point of opportunity. 

What should we be looking for and what opportunities do they 

actually present in the aftermath of the taking down of Osama bin 

Laden and the subsequent attempts to try to reorganize? 

Ms. TOWNSEND. This is a critical time. I mentioned in my testimony the targeting opportunities. While we won’t know publicly 

what was in the compound, this is a time when they will have to 

talk to one another. There was reports in the Pakistani media 

about this meeting that led to the interim leader being appointed 

the head of the Taliban, Saif al-Adel. How can such a meeting take 

place when our Pakistani allies are not providing us with targeting 

information? That would have been a gold mine opportunity to 

have taken advantage of. But that is what our military and intelligence community are focused on right now. 

They are in disarray. They will have to have discussions, meetings in order to resolve their chaos. So all those represent tremendous opportunities, and that is where you want to focus your immediate military resources. 

Now, it will be interesting to see whether or not this chaos then 

permeates out into the affiliates, because right now they represent, 

as far as I am concerned, the most immediate deadly threat to us, 

particularly al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. But we need 

strong allies. Make no mistake. We have a world-class intelligence 

community and military capability, but they need real partners. 
68 

We have not had very good partners—a real partner in Yemen in 

President Saleh, and we have a very uncertain partner in Pakistan. 

We need to look at ways to how do we—you know, the Congressman said manage the Pakistan relationship. That is right. But they 

need to produce. It is not that we can walk away from them. They 

need to produce like a partner produces in terms of targeting capability. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Bergen. 

Mr. BERGEN. I don’t have anything to add to that. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you. Congressman Hamilton, I, as many in 

this Nation, am tremendously appreciative for the work that you 

have put into this effort since September 11. You have looked at 

a lot of different elements. But I noticed twice today in your testimony you focused on this issue of the VISIT exit system. Can you 

tell me a little bit more about why that is important to you and 

why you think that is relevant to our protection of the homeland? 

Mr. HAMILTON. You just have to keep track of these people when 

they come into the country. I think the easy thing to do—we lose 

track of it. It is a difficult thing to do. Seeking a biometric exit system I understand is expensive and has a lot of problems in it, but 

I think we have just put it off far too long. 

It is not just a question of catching these people and stopping it 

at the border. Some of these people are going to get in. Once you 

have people in here illegally, or even legally under restricted time 

limits, you have to be able to keep track of them. That is why you 

need an exit system as well as an entry system. So it is a real vulnerability in our system to say, okay, we are going to catch these 

people at the border. Everybody is for that. We don’t want the bad 

guys coming in; but if they do get in just forget about them. You 

can’t do that. You have got to keep track of them. That is what the 

exit system is all about. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Kohlmann, thank you for your testimony. You 

identified the world on the internet and the communications that 

are taking place there. In a free society, it is difficult to try to limit 

activity on that, but you have given some thought to this. How can 

we take advantage? In light of both Ms. Townsend testified to 

about the current moment in which wouldn’t we want to be able 

to have them operating in such a way that we would be able to at 

least have access to the platform that they are using for communications as a means to have a potential ability to influence their 

activities? 

Mr. KOHLMANN. Yes. I have often said that terrorist websites are 

like the spy satellite that we never launched. If we are diligent 

about it, these websites, these forums allow us to monitor the communications taking place at a ground level amongst both alQaeda’s lieutenants, its supporters, its would-be supporters, people 

in the West. Increasingly we are seeing individuals who are popping up who were not recruited by any individual or any individual 

cleric or any individual mosque. They are being motivated purely 

by what they see on the web. I think, though, I think you are right. 

I think part of it is we have to keep our eyes on this. 

The concern right now is that we are allowing these websites to 

operate. It is not entirely clear that all elements of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies are aware of what is going on in 
69 

there. I can tell you only this through personal experience and 

through the fact that we have an instance where we can point to 

directly, Fort Hood, where we had a known individual who was infamous as being a recruiter for al-Qaeda and extremist groups, 

Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki, who was in open communication with an 

individual who was a U.S. military serviceman. Those communications, from what I understand, were not entirely innocent or benign. 

That is a warning sign. It is a warning sign that as much as this 

information can provide tremendous clues, if we allow this to proliferate unmonitored, we are giving these folks virtual sanctuary to 

do whatever the hell they want. That is very worrying. 

So it is fine to keep these websites and these forums on-line as 

long as we are closely monitoring them and tracking the people 

that are using them, obviously without violating freedom of speech. 

But the folks that are on the there are dangerous. It is not just 

computer nerds. The people that are on these forums include bomb 

makers, include top-ranking Yemeni al-Qaeda operatives, include 

recruiters for Pakistani Taliban. So we really have to make sure 

that the FBI and other Government agencies are really watching 

what is taking place. 

Chairman KING. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentlelady from New York, Ms. Clarke, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. CLARKE of Michigan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 

and thank you Ranking Member Thompson. To the panelists, great 

insight and illumination of the challenges we face. 

I am pleased with the discourse of this hearing, because it is important to point out that we must harden our posture of vigilance 

in keeping our Nation safe in the fight against al-Qaeda and other 

declared and undeclared terrorist organizations and individuals. 

On behalf of the people of the 11th Congressional District of New 

York, we are really grateful to the Obama administration’s leadership, the U.S. military, the CIA intelligence and counterterrorism 

professionals who carried out that heroic operation to get bin 

Laden. I would like to say that, as a Member of the committee, it 

is important to point out that we must continue to remain vigilant. 

As New Yorkers, I think, unlike maybe other parts of the Nation, 

are very sensitive, extremely sensitive. I think we are doing very 

well in terms of our posture of vigilance and awareness in the public. But I think that perhaps one of the things that we can do is 

get some public service announcements rolling that is aired Nationally, to get people into the understanding of see something, say 

something, which is something we live with in New York City. So 

again, I want to thank you for your insightful discussion today. 

Bin Laden was an iconic figure of global terrorism. He has inspired militants across the world to commit acts of violence. I wanted to ask, just generally speaking, there is some concern that perhaps at the end of the 40-day mourning period, that many or some 

Muslims practice that maybe we might see an uptick. 

Is there any indication of that? Does 40 days mean anything? I 

think it is important that if there is mythology out there, we try 

to get so many plain understanding. I believe we can be hit at any 

moment. But for those out there who are looking for an indication, 

would you shed some light on that? 
70 

Ms. TOWNSEND. I am happy to take the first shot at this. 

Congresswoman, let’s be clear. As you know, al-Qaeda and those 

who subscribe to the ideology are not observant Muslims. These are 

not real Muslims. So we have already seen what have been called 

retribution attacks inside Pakistan, whether it is against their 

military, their police. So those people in the Pakistan Taliban, for 

example, are not observing any 40-day mourning period. 

This is my experience with al-Qaeda, has been they attack when 

they have the capability and they are positioned to do it, and they 

will not be, I suspect, constrained by any religious observance. 

Mr. KOHLMANN. I would echo. I think it is mythology. I think alQaeda will strike when they have the capability to do so. I believe 

they will try to carry out some kind of revenge attack for the death 

of bin Laden. But I think it is more likely in the short term that 

we see something like that against U.S. interests in Pakistan as 

opposed to inside the United States. 

Ms. CLARKE of Michigan. I am glad that you pointed that out. I 

don’t want people to have a false sense of, well, timing. Right? It 

is important that we are vigilant every moment of every day. 

Mr. Kohlmann, I wanted to ask you about threats to water facilities. You know, last Congress the House approved legislation to 

regulate water and wastewater facilities for security. In your testimony, you described the on-line chatter of various extremists after 

bin Laden’s death and how some of them openly discuss targeted 

hydroelectric dams, nuclear water plants, and water purification facilities to cause damage to the U.S. economy. Can you elaborate on 

the threat to critical infrastructure? More specifically, can you articulate what concerns, if any, you have about the terrorist threat 

to U.S. water facilities, especially given how essential these facilities are to our communities? 

Mr. KOHLMANN. In fact, the particular section that you are referring to in my report, the individual specified saying it is not even 

necessary to poison the water supplies because potentially there 

are other Islamists out there who might drink this and die. The 

idea is to create panic, to create terror, to create an urban environment where people are afraid to consume water whether or not 

there is actually anything wrong with it. 

That is the point here, is al-Qaeda is not looking just—again, 

they are not looking just to kill one American here or there. That 

is fine to keep them in the headlines. Ultimately, these folks, 

whether you are talking about the central leadership, the affiliates 

or the homegrown guys, they are looking for very simple tactics 

where they can cause mass panic and mass terror and upset the 

U.S. economy. Now, the weak points they are looking at are major 

U.S. cities and infrastructure. Whether that is rail, airports, water 

facilities, hydroelectric trends, anything that will stun the U.S. 

economy. 

They perceive right now that we are under the gun in terms of 

economic pressures, and that any small push in the wrong direction will cause catastrophe for us. That is their game plan. They 

are trying to push the United States out of the Middle East. They 

are trying to create a new world order. You don’t do that by killing 

a few soldiers at Fort Hood. You don’t do that by shooting a few 

soldiers outside an airport in Germany. You do that by creating 
71 

mass panic in a city like New York or Los Angeles or Detroit. That 

is what they are gunning for. They may not achieve it, but that is 

what they are gunning for. 

Chairman KING. The time of the gentlelady has expired. The 

gentleman from South Carolina. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me thank you for your diligence on keeping our 

homeland security safe. This is one of the most informative hearings that we have had. I thank the panelists for providing their 

testimony today. I want to thank Congressman Hamilton for your 

service to this Nation and also the 9/11 Commission. Interesting, 

I have been one that has talked about this numerous times, but the 

9/11 Commission detailed a lot of different terms that seem to have 

disappeared from the lexicon of the intelligence agencies, whether 

FBI, counterterrorism, National intelligence strategy, even the report protecting the force lessons from Fort Hood. 

In the 9/11 Commission report, they mentioned jihad 126 times. 

They mention the Muslim Brotherhood five times. They mention 

Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda numerous times, but now that seems 

to have disappeared. I am very alarmed that our administration is 

not identifying who our enemy is. I think you have clearly got to 

identify and focus on the threat to this country, and you guys have 

very articulately expressed those threats today. 

One thing about being a junior Member of this committee, freshman Member, is all the great questions got asked before it gets to 

me. So what I would like to do is just delve into something that 

is interesting to me, and that is the threats on our Southern border. I understand that al-Qaeda and Hezbollah and al Shabab have 

a presence and influence in Latin America, particularly the tri-border region. 

So I am going to address this to Mr. Kohlmann. Do you believe 

the United States may see increasing threats from these groups so 

close to our Southern border? 

Mr. KOHLMANN. It is true that there is a presence below the border of a number of different groups, most prominently Hezbollah 

and Hamas, not necessarily so much al-Qaeda. I think some of 

those threats have been blown up, but I think there is a reality 

that right now we put a tremendous amount of attention on the 

Northern border. Ever since the days of the Ahmed Ressam, the Algerian who tried crossing over in 1999 in Bellingham, Washington, 

there has been a lot of focus on the Canadian border. There has 

been less focus on terrorists crossing the Southern border. Terrorists are aware of this. There are indications of groups like Shabab 

placing people in Mexico who are able to get folks across the border. 

Now, the reality is that a lot of the people they are smuggling 

across are probably just illegal immigrants, but it is very easy to 

sneak someone in that group. It is not the most overwhelming 

issue we have. Really, al-Qaeda would rather recruit someone who 

is already inside the United States who has a U.S. passport. But 

these groups are trying to get people in however they can, however 

it works best. So if they find that they can’t recruit someone directly in the United States, I think it is very plausible that they 

will go for the Southern border. 
72 

Mr. DUNCAN. Do you see them working in tandem with the Mexican drug cartel at all? We see some evidence of that, and that is 

our untalked-about third war possibly. 

Mr. KOHLMANN. I think when it comes to groups like Hamas and 

Hezbollah, there is a potential of individuals doing that. With an 

ideological group like al-Qaeda, it is much less. Al-Qaeda doesn’t 

seem to like to work with thieves, with drug runners—not publicly 

anyway. For instance, Shabab al-Mujahideen in Somalia has greatly distanced itself from the pirates, the big problem with piracy in 

northern Somalia, and they argued simply they don’t want to be 

associated with that, that that is not jihad; that is just thievery. 

So as of right now, I don’t think you see those connections. The 

problem is that there are individuals who are in Venezuela and 

elsewhere who have connections to Hamas and Hezbollah and also 

connections to the drug-trafficking rings. The issue is can someone 

like that be marshaled by a terrorist group to serve as an intermediary to get someone into the country? It is possible. But I still 

think it is relatively far-fetched. The groups really, al-Qaeda, 

Shabab, they are looking to recruit people who are already within 

U.S. borders, who already have U.S. passports, who can walk to the 

middle of Times Square and say, I am a terrorist, and nothing can 

be done. That is the kind of recruitment. 

Mr. DUNCAN. There is a lot of focus on the lone wolf provisions 

in the PATRIOT Act coming up and sleeper cells. What can we do 

more—you talked about the marketing, the internet, Inspire, and 

other things targeting those groups. What can we do more than 

maybe some of the things you alluded to earlier? 

Mr. KOHLMANN. I think one of the issues is that the United 

States has not been engaged in an effective deradicalization campaign, a counterradicalization campaign. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The Chairman has. 

Mr. KOHLMANN. So far the U.S. Government has been content 

with simply saying al-Qaeda is bad, al-Qaeda is wrong. But the reality is that there are plenty of voices from within al-Qaeda, from 

within the Muslim community itself, who will stand forward and 

will say that these folks are completely on the wrong path, that 

they are insane, and that the things they are doing are wrong not 

just from an American perspective, but from a Muslim perspective; 

from any perspective, from a humanist perspective. 

I think it is important that we try to galvanize those resources 

and engage in an effective deradicalization campaign. So far a lot 

of the efforts that we have made have fallen on deaf ears, whether 

it comes through sponsoring television stations and radio stations 

in Iraq that nobody watches, that nobody listens to, at least not our 

enemies; or whether it comes to simply broadcasting messages that 

have no impact. 

We also have to realize the effects of negative publicity. Right 

now we talked about jihadi message forums. What a lot of people 

don’t realize is that even on the top-tier al-Qaeda forums, there is 

as much argument and nasty back-biting as there is agreement 

about attacking America. These folks fight with each other on a 

daily basis. They say nasty things about each other. After the 

death of bin Laden, a whole bunch of people got their accounts removed from al-Qaeda’s top-tier web forums because they dared to 
73 

‘‘crusade’’ their claims about the death of bin Laden. These are people expressing sorrow about the death of bin Laden who were removed, kicked off. 

I think it is important that the United States take note of the 

social networking dynamics that are taking place within al-Qaeda 

and try to exploit those differences. If there are people that don’t 

like Ayman Zawahiri, start pumping information about how terrible Ayman al-Zawahiri is. Trying to sell the United States as a 

good actor might never work, but explaining the negative things 

about al-Qaeda and about the people that lead it, you could go on 

forever. You could write a thousand-page encyclopedia about that. 

Chairman KING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, excuse me for extending this. 

Chairman KING. How can I say no to you? 

Mr. HAMILTON. The National Security Preparedness Group now 

has in draft form a report on preventing violent radicalization in 

America. It is the most comprehensive thing I have seen—and it 

is not yet final—dealing with this problem. It makes all kinds of 

recommendations as to how the government—local, State, National 

governments—ought to respond to the problem you are raising and 

which Mr. Kohlmann has talked about. 

We consider that a very important report. We will make it available to you as soon as it is ready. It should be ready in the next 

few months. I think you will find it helpful. 

Chairman KING. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Massachusetts Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just one quick question, because Mr. Kohlmann just touched on 

this. Social networking. What if many of the very sophisticated devices, deep packet kind of technology, that is involved in—really 

getting involved in using—potentially using social networking as a 

weapon, the fact that this kind of technology can detect who is involved and not only filter it, but can actually use that to get information to crack down on people themselves—is it conceivable to 

you that that kind of sophisticated technology that is available in 

other countries right now—one of the companies even in the United 

States that are dealing with this—what is the potential of them 

gaining access to that kind of technology and using that to crack 

down on the very people that you and I both agree can serve a very 

positive role in fighting this? 

Mr. KOHLMANN. Well, deep packet inspection rates has a lot of 

privacy concerns, particularly among groups like EFF; the Electronic Frontier Foundation. I think those fears are grounded except 

the fact that what you are saying is true is that one of the few 

ways you can actually find out where someone is located, despite 

them using proxies or obfuscation techniques, is with deep packet 

inspection. However, the good news is that that is not the only 

way. There are other ways, including ways that don’t violate U.S. 

law and don’t require us to increasingly impinge upon personal privacy. 

One of the good points about this is that al-Qaeda makes mistakes. The folks that create these websites make mistakes. A year 

and a half ago, my company was able to get the entire database 

from one of the top-tier al-Qaeda websites, including all their pri-
74 

vate messages, their IP addresses, everything else like that. We did 

it without hacking. We did it without deep packet inspection. We 

did it without infiltration. We just did it using our heads. 

So I think as much as having deep packet inspection would be 

a wonderful tool for law enforcement to have, and it would certainly alleviate a lot of the problems that they are currently facing 

tracking people, that is not the only way. So if there really are significant privacy concerns, I think the point is just making sure that 

the Bureau and that other law enforcement agencies and Government agencies have the technological tools to be able to do the job, 

whether it is deep packet inspection or something else. 

I would say right now they are still struggling with this. One of 

the reasons is because of the legal loopholes that allow foreign law 

enforcement to use this technique, but not so much for U.S. law enforcement. 

Mr. KEATING. Specifically, what about the terrorist organizations 

themselves being able to obtain that technology? 

Mr. KOHLMANN. I think that is relatively far-fetched. I think that 

is the good news. The good news is that most of the people right 

now that populate al-Qaeda’s social networking web are more interested in blowing themselves up than they are hacking websites. 

That might change. That probably will change. There are people 

that are increasingly showing the kind of capabilities you would expect from someone working for the NSA. 

I hope that doesn’t happen, but I think it is a reminder that the 

United States needs to be concerned about not just monitoring the 

communications that are taking place in social networking forums, 

but making sure our own cybersecurity is up to snuff, because 

whereas China or Russia may not have hackers who are going to 

seek to deliberately cause economic catastrophe in the United 

States, al-Qaeda is a different story. So once they develop those 

kind of capabilities, it is a serious concern. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. 

Chairman KING. The gentleman from Michigan Mr. Walberg is 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

witnesses today for giving us insights that are both encouraging 

and challenging as well. 

In kind-of going back to previous questioning and talking about 

the impact of trying to grow homegrown terrorists here in the 

United States, and showing an alternative to the message that 

they are putting out, I have had a lot of contacts in my district 

from Assyrians and others concerned with what is going on in 

Syria, in Libya, and other places. I guess my question would be 

what impact, if there is—what impact could our actions or inactions in Libya or Syria have in growing al-Qaeda efforts in recruitment of terrorists and terrorist action against the United States? 

Chairman KING. If I can just interject. I understand Chairman 

Hamilton has to leave at 11:45. Whenever you feel you have to 

leave. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. I will leave to my colleagues to answer these simple 

questions that have been asked. 
75 

Mr. WALBERG. That is as simple as I can be, I guess. 

Mr. BERGEN. I just don’t think that is really a relevant question 

right now for the discussion we are having. Somehow the war actions in Libya—and Evan can correct me if I am wrong on this 

issue—I don’t think are something that is really of great interest 

to the jihadist community, partly because they know very well that 

the whole point of their exercise was to overthrow these dictators 

like Qadhafi. That was the point of these groups. So it would be 

very dissonant for them to say, well, now America is involved in 

actually producing the very thing that we tried to do in the first 

place. So they are kind of ignoring it. 

One of the things that was very interesting to me is bin Laden 

really never replied to the Arab Spring because what was he going 

to say; at last it was happening. Belatedly we have a minor tape 

from him. But he was commenting on even the most minor news 

events before his death. This enormous seismic shift in the Middle 

East he didn’t really acknowledge publicly before his death. So I 

think that this is not going to be a problem. 

But on the issue of the Muslim American community, we are 

never going to be able to take down these jihadi websites. The 

internet doesn’t work like that. What the Chairman and the Members of the committee and, I think, Lee Hamilton and his group, 

what we need to be thinking about with the Muslim American community is counternarratives. There are plenty of people in the Muslim community that want to get out there and put out a counternarrative to bin Laden and others. One of the problems they face 

is they are not necessarily that computer literate. They don’t understand Google bombing or these kinds of issues, ways to make 

their messages more attractive. 

So that is the way forward. It is not taking down objectionable 

websites. They are only going to pop up again. It is about creating 

a counternarrative. At the end of the day, that is the Muslim 

American community, not the U.S. Government. But that is the 

way forward. 

Mr. KOHLMANN. I think I agree with Peter. I would just say this. 

It is not clear exactly what is going to fall out of Libya, but there 

are indications that al-Qaeda supporters and its leadership are getting very frustrated by the fact that the Libyan rebels seem more 

intent upon courting crusader support than they are al-Qaeda support. 

A few months ago a group of foreign fighters from Egypt went 

to Libya, and they later wrote about their experiences. They 

showed up, and what they found was: (A) Chaos; (B) as soon as 

they identified who they were, the Libyan rebels said, we don’t 

want you here, go away. Then they basically went out to the front 

anyway, and they discovered it was chaos there, too. They came 

back and said, these guys don’t know what they are doing, they 

don’t like us, and they are not fighting under a banner of Islam. 

It was deeply demoralizing for them. 

I think if you read between the lines in the last couple of speeches that have been given by Ayman al-Zawahiri and other senior alQaeda leaders, you do kind of hear desperation in their voice, saying to the Libyans, don’t work with NATO, don’t work with NATO. 

It is wrong. It is wrong. It is wrong. 
76 

Mr. WALBERG. Is there a similar response in Syria as well? 

Mr. KOHLMANN. Syria, unfortunately, is a much different picture. 

I think part of the problem is that it is not clear in Syria what exactly Syrian demonstrators want. Some want democracy, that is for 

sure. But the Syrians are not necessarily being mobilized and have 

the same concerns as the Libyans do. I think that is part of the 

issue. 

One of the major concerns with Syria is that the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Syria is far more conservative and I think you 

can say far more radical than in other States, particularly in 

Egypt. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, numerous members have 

joined al-Qaeda. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is obviously 100 

percent opposed to the existence of the State of Israel. It is 100 percent opposed to the idea of peace with the Israelis. If you have the 

Brotherhood start influencing major impact on Syrian policy, I 

think as a starting point you can say forget about it to Middle East 

peace. 

I think this is really what we are talking about. Syria is in a different location. It is far more strategically located. The political dynamics there are far more complicated than Libya. I don’t think 

you are going to see John McCain visiting Syria anytime soon. 

Also, you have the additional factor of Iran. Libya, Muammar Qadhafi really doesn’t have any allies to speak of other than Hugo 

Chavez. Right. Syria has Iran. Though Iran, I think, is worried 

about what it is seeing there right now, the Iranians, I think, will 

back Bashar al-Assad to the hilt. 

Chairman KING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and the 

Ranking Member for allowing me to continue to interlope. I thank 

you also for conducting and having this hearing today. 

I would like to say to the panelists as sort of a predicate for my 

eventual question, I believe in America, and I believe that if the 

world did not have the United States of America, we would have 

to create it. It may not be the glue that holds the world together; 

I do believe, however, that it is an indispensable ingredient in that 

glue that holds the world together. 

I am finding more and more that I am hearing the notion that 

we are interlopers; that we should not concern ourselves with 

Hezbollah and Nasrallah in Lebanon. We should not concern ourselves with the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and in Egypt. We 

should not concern ourselves with Hamas in Palestine. We should 

not concern ourselves with the vituperative comments of Mahmoud 

Ahmadinejad with reference to what he thinks of another country 

and how he doesn’t see the existence of that country. 

This notion that we should remove our assets, bring our resources home, seems to be gaining some degree of credibility. I 

would ask each of you to just explain whether this would bring 

about the peace within that some seem to think is available to us 

if we would but only withdraw our assets. 

I will start with Ms. Townsend, please. Thank you. 

Ms. TOWNSEND. Thank you, Congressman. 

The most recent, let me say historical, example was we waited 

far too long to exert our leadership in Afghanistan, and look what 
77 

happened. It was an ungoverned space that al-Qaeda used to plan 

and to train to attack the United States on September 11, but before that. We can’t abrogate our sense of leadership without jeopardizing our own security. That does not mean that we need to lead 

alone. It does not mean that we don’t have allies and build coalitions, all of which is right and appropriate. But we are going to 

have to lead because it is—there has been a discussion now about 

Syria and Hezbollah. Hezbollah remains an incredibly strong 

threat to us because they are a client of Iran’s, and they are a destabilizing force not only in Syria, but throughout the Middle East 

and to the peace and security of Israel. 

I agree with you wholeheartedly that we need to continue to engage and not—my fear is that as we begin to engage less, we engage more rhetorically and are unwilling to put ourselves at risk. 

I think it is incredibly important. If we care about the outcome in 

Libya, we need to more than just answer rhetorically, and we need 

to be willing to put our assets against a real and very credible 

problem there. 

Chairman KING. If the witnesses can keep their answer to 1 

minute. 

Mr. BERGEN. I want to take an opportunity about Afghanistan, 

because obviously many Members of the committee are going to 

have to think about this pretty carefully. We are spending $118 billion there. 

First of all, 68 percent of Afghans have a favorable view of international forces. This is an astonishing number for a Muslim country. That is a BBC poll taken in December. 

Second, we are not there because of al-Qaeda; we are there because every Islamic terrorist or insurgent group in the world was 

headquartered or based there before 9/11, and they have migrated 

across the border to Pakistan, where they are now being guests of 

the Pakistani Taliban. 

Third, when we overthrow a government, we have somewhat of 

a responsibility, I think, and I think many others would share this, 

to kind of leave the place in a somewhat stable condition. 

Fourth, the most likely place in the world for a nuclear war is 

between Pakistan and India. An unstable Afghanistan leads to an 

unstable Pakistan. We have already seen that. 

Fifth, the Taliban are the Taliban. We have seen what they have 

done just recently in Pakistan. This is not a bunch of Henry Kissingers in waiting. You know who they are. Just to amplify something 

that Fran just said, we have already run this experiment twice before in Afghanistan. We closed our embassy in 1989, zeroed out aid 

in the 1990s, and we did it again in 2002. We got what we paid 

for. We did it on the cheap. So we were attacked from Afghanistan, 

as you know. 

So we need to be very careful about how we are going to pull out 

obviously over time. The Afghans were freaking out at the idea we 

were leaving this year in July, as we said, or seemed to say. So we 

need to think very carefully about how we manage that withdrawal 

over time. 

Mr. KOHLMANN. I wish I could say that I thought that U.S. forces 

could be withdrawn from Afghanistan by and large and that everything would be peachy, but I don’t think that is the reality. As 
78 

much as I wish U.S. forces could come home right away, I do remember what it was like before 9/11, meeting with folks at the 

NSC at the White House, talking about the issue of Afghanistan 

as a sanctuary, and their frustration with the fact that the U.S. 

Government was doing nothing about it. 

So whenever I think about withdrawing, I think back to those 

days and back to the idea that the last thing we need right now 

is for Afghanistan to once again become a sanctuary for al-Qaeda 

after all of the effort we put in to try to prevent it from becoming 

so. 

Chairman KING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The former attorney general of California, Mr. Lungren. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry 

to the panelists that I had to leave for a while to Chair another 

committee, so I hope I am not repeating what has been asked of 

you before. 

First of all, just a comment. We talked about the necessity for 

a deradicalization program, a counterradicalization program. In 

order for us to get that support for such a program, we have to 

admit there is radicalization going on. The Chairman held a hearing on that, and the message that we thought we were going to get 

out about the radicalization of youth in the Muslim communities in 

America, with testimony by a parent and an uncle of two that had 

been so radicalized, was lost in the coverage, and, frankly, the 

Chairman was attacked because we dared to deal with the issue. 

So I appreciate the fact you recognize that we have to do something 

about a deep radicalization or counterradicalization program, but 

first you have to assume there is a radicalization by putting that 

on the record. 

Second, I would like to ask the three of you this: We started out 

this hearing by talking about the treasure trove of intelligence that 

we got from the successful mission executed against Osama bin 

Laden. I was asked this question when I was home recently at a 

town hall meeting. They said, what possible benefit was given to 

us by our releasing the fact that we had gotten this treasure trove 

of intelligence; and, second, by giving out some parts of that intelligence; and third, by revealing the manner and means by which 

we obtained the intelligence when we executed the mission? 

Frankly, I was at a loss to try and answer that with my constituents. My only answer was perhaps there was a judgment that this 

would put them on notice that we were after them. But at the 

same time, that is certainly not what we did during World War II 

and every other thing. We thought the utilization of intelligence 

was enhanced by the fact that the enemy didn’t know we had it. 

Could the three of you have help me in that regard? 

Chairman KING. I know Ms. Townsend is supposed to leave at 

noon. We should be finished with the hearing by about 12:05. 

Ms. TOWNSEND. Thank you, Chairman. I am good. Thanks. 

Let me say, you mentioned the radicalization issue. Quickly, this 

is a fact. Quite frankly, whether or not there is radicalization of 

youth here in the United States is not a political issue open to debate. So people just need to suck up and get over that. It is a fact. 

It is happening. We have credible instances of it. So it should not 

be an issue of debate. 
79 

On the treasure trove, I will say to you, having served in the 

White House, when you have a successful disruption, I can tell you 

that I have suffered under the sort of excruciating pressure from 

the press to get some details out to inform the American people. 

You do want, because it goes to the complacency issue. If you can 

explain to the American people a successful disruption, you can get 

their support for further operations. So there is this balance. 

Let me quickly add that releasing the fact that there was a trove, 

the details of the operation, and the manner and means in which 

it was executed are terribly harmful. I feel that releasing those details—we are going to have to have future operations, and we are 

going to have to put men and women in harm’s way. Releasing 

those details, we know that al-Qaeda monitors what we call opensource material, news reports. We found them in the caves of Afghanistan. So have no doubt that the details that we release will 

be used against men and women in future operations. So, on balance, I would not have released the level of detail that was released. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Bergen. 

Mr. BERGEN. I think there is a certain utility in letting al-Qaeda 

know that we have found the Rosetta Stone, for the following reason. They are in a kind of Catch-22. They can communicate with 

each other and, therefore, open themselves to being detected, or not 

communicate forever, in which case they are sort of out of business. 

What did we really release in terms of actual details of the information trove? I think we said that the plans were in New York, 

and Washington, and Chicago, and Los Angeles. Well, I think we 

knew that. 

So I think there is—Fran has explained, as she was really there 

for many, many years, what the pressures are. Let us see what 

comes out of this. But there might be a certain utility in letting alQaeda know this. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Kohlmann. 

Mr. KOHLMANN. I appreciate the idea of sending a chilled fear 

down al-Qaeda’s spine, and I understand that potentially this also 

could be simply a way of trying to get al-Qaeda operatives to start 

moving around out of fear and see where people are moving to, who 

is moving. There was a convoy attacked in the last few days. 

Mullah Omar. Perhaps he was afraid that his hiding place had 

been discovered, and he decided to high-tail it. 

So I understand that there is a utility to this, but I, too, recognize the fact that al-Qaeda has a dramatic interest in open-source 

intelligence. AQAP has an entire section of their Inspire magazine 

dedicated to open-source intelligence. They are parsing through 

every single statement put out by the White House, they are parsing through every single news conference. They are watching very 

carefully for every detail they can glean, and they will use it 

against us. They have in the past, and they will in the future. That 

is a concern. 

I think there were certain things that probably could have been 

stated about the raid, but some things that were released I am not 

sure provide any benefit. The releasing of the videos of bin Laden, 

I think, would have been a tremendously amount more effective 

had there been sound, because right now all we have are the de-
80 

scription of U.S. officials saying, well, he is mumbling here. Well, 

that is not what we are seeing. When we see the video of bin Laden 

wrapped in a shawl watching TV, it is 5 seconds long. There is no 

context to it. 

So I think some of this information was released with the right 

intent, but I am not sure the execution was there. 

Chairman KING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Walsh. 

Mr. WALSH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been a long morning, so let us close. 

Ms. Townsend, you have given me my best takeaway line of the 

hearing: It is a fact, radicalization here at home. Just your overview thoughts on this topic. 

It is a fact, but we know politically it is also a debate in this 

country. Why is it still a debate? Fort Hood, you referenced that 

we saw warning signs. Why weren’t they heeded, and what needs 

to be done to make sure they are heeded again? It is a fact, but 

why doesn’t the whole country seem to understand that? 

Ms. TOWNSEND. I will take a stab at this. I think part of it is 

it is a fact. If you can point to cases and examples, the conversation 

tends to stay reasonably rational, in my experience. 

So you point to Nidal Hasan. There is no question he was an 

American soldier who was radicalized, and that is part of a pattern 

that we know of Anwar al-Awlaki. But I think we also have to acknowledge that there are Muslim Americans, while they don’t often 

wish to be named publicly, who have cooperated with law enforcement agencies like the FBI, like the Department of Homeland Security. These aren’t either/or issues. Both facts happen to be true. 

There are many Muslim Americans who abhor al-Qaeda, who 

abhor the ideals and ideologue of al-Qaeda, wish to be helpful. This 

is not a single ‘‘ummah’’ of the Muslim world who subscribe to this. 

But to Congressman Lungren’s point, until people accept the fact 

of radicalization of American youth, we can’t effectively combat it. 

So what we need to do is, frankly, the best way to fight it is this 

whole notion of a counternarrative. We need to employ, encourage, 

and recruit Muslim Americans to participate in that counternarrative. 

Mr. BERGEN. Fran used the helpful phrase ‘‘it is not an either/ 

or.’’ I think there is another either/or which is part of this, which 

is, as I mentioned earlier, 17 Americans have been killed in 

jihadist American attacks since 9/11. In the same time, 73 Americans were killed in hate crimes, according to the FBI, which have 

different motivations. So jihadist terrorism is obviously a National 

security problem of the United States, but there are other problems. It is not the only one. 

So I think part of the controversy around the hearing, Mr. Chairman, was the idea that this was the only or the most important 

problem. I think the Muslim American community felt there were 

other issues that were important as well. 

Chairman KING. If I can just address that. Obviously it is the 

most important homeland security issue. There are other issues in 

the Judiciary Committee and other committees, but the Department of Homeland Security was set up to counter the attacks of 

September 11. Other issues we have had before, and they are cer-
81 

tainly appropriate for other committees to discuss, but I felt this 

issue in particular was essential for this committee. 

Mr. WALSH. Just to leapfrog on that for a second, it is my fear 

that that sensitive attitude we might have might continue us down 

this path—and, Mr. Kohlmann, you can close this whole thing— 

with us not heeding the warning signs of another potential Fort 

Hood because we are afraid of whatever. 

Mr. KOHLMANN. I feel tremendous sympathy for the Muslim community in this country and around the world. I understand that 

the vast majority of Muslims have no interest in terrorism or alQaeda. I understand why they are sensitive about this. It is very 

difficult when it seems like your faith is under attack, especially 

in the context of Koran burnings and the whole thing about the 

Ground Zero mosque. It is understandable that people get sensitive 

about this. 

I agree with Fran. I don’t think it is a question, it is not a political question. There is radicalization going on. I think it is in the 

interests of the Muslim community above all else to be at the forefront of making sure that we deal with this problem because it is 

their children who are being recruited to go off and join foreign terrorist organizations. It is their children who are watching videos of 

people being beheaded on the internet and think that is a good 

thing. It is not their fault, but it is an issue that needs to be addressed. I think one thing that Muslims should understand is that 

this is not just an attack on Islam, it is not an attack on mosques. 

In my written testimony I describe an individual who was 

radicalized inside this country in Pennsylvania, who never attended a mosque, who never went to an Islamic center, who wasn’t 

really a Muslim. 

Again, I understand their sensitivity, but this is not about them. 

It is about terrorism, it is about terrorists, and it is about how all 

Americans can try to prevent radicalization and people being 

pushed to join extremist causes. 

Mr. WALSH. Thank you. Go get lunch. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman KING. Thank you, Mr. Walsh. 

First of all, let me thank all the witnesses. This has been a great, 

great panel, great hearing, and speaking for the Ranking Member, 

it was extremely illuminating and informative. 

Members of the committee may have additional questions for the 

witnesses. I will ask you to respond to them in writing. The record 

will be kept open for 10 days. 

Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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