State’s Motion Granted; Appellant’s Motion Denied; Appeal Dismissed and 

Memorandum Opinion filed February 6, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00647-CR

EX PARTE TIMOTHY RAY BRADSHAW, Appellant

On Appeal from the 232nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1385423

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Timothy Ray Bradshaw appeals from the trial court’s order 

denying his pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus.

Appellant was indicted for failure to comply with civil commitment 

requirements. He filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus challenging 

the constitutionality of the charges against him and Texas Health and Safety Code 

sections 841.082, 841.085, and 841.141. On January 24, 2014, the trial court 
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granted the State’s motion to dismiss the underlying charge of failure to comply 

with a civil commitment order.

Appellant filed a motion to proceed on the merits of the case, or in the 

alternative, motion to abate for a hearing to determine whether his claim warrants 

an exception to the mootness doctrine. The State responded to appellant’s motion 

by filing a motion to dismiss on mootness grounds.

The mootness doctrine limits courts to deciding cases in which an actual 

controversy exists. Ex parte Flores, 130 S.W.3d 100, 104–05 (Tex. App.—El Paso 

2003, pet. ref’d). When there has ceased to be a controversy between the litigating 

parties, which is due to events occurring after judgment has been rendered by the 

trial court, the decision of an appellate court would be a mere academic exercise 

and the court may not decide the appeal. Id. A case that is moot is normally not 

justiciable. Pharris v. State, 165 S.W.3d 681, 687–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 

One of the exceptions to the general rule is when a claim is “capable of 

repetition, yet evading review.” The United States Supreme Court has said that 

“the ‘capable of repetition but evading review’ doctrine [is] limited to the situation 

where two elements combine: (1) the challenged action was in its duration too 

short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a 

reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the 

same action again.” Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975). The Texas 

Court of Criminal Appeals has adopted and applied this doctrine. See Pharris, 165 

S.W.3d at 688.

Assuming arguendo that the challenged action here was too short in duration 

to be fully litigated prior to the State’s dismissal of the charges, appellant cannot 

show that he would be subjected to the same action again because the State 

dismissed all criminal charges that were filed against him in this case. Cf. id. at 
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688–89 (holding Pharris would be likely subjected to same no bond condition 

again because State had filed multiple charges against him and represented that it 

would be filing more charges against him in that case). We conclude the capable of 

repetition but evading review exception does not apply to this case.

We deny appellant’s motion to proceed on the merits or motion to abate, and 

grant the State’s motion to dismiss.

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Christopher, and Brown.

Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).