National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

Kennedy Space Center. Florida

32899

NASAlTP--2011-216300R

Evaluation of Cable Harness

Post-Installation Testing: Part B

M.S. King

Marshall Space Flight Center, Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama

C.J. Iannello

Kennedy Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, Florida

May 2011
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NASAITP--2011-216300R

Evaluation of Cable Harness

Post-Installation Testing: Part B

M.S. King

Marshall Space Flight Center, Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama

C.J. Iannello

Kennedy Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, Florida

National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

Kennedy Space Center· KSC, Florida 32899

May 2011

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Ares I Avionics and Software Chief Engineer and the Avionics Integration and Vehicle

Systems Test Work Breakdown Structure CWB51 Manager in the Vehicle Integration Office were

issued a joint action by the Ares Project Control Board IPCBl to develop the leanest set of practices for design· manufacturing' installation· and testing of electrical cable harnesses- The action was

driven by a disagreement between the Ares I-X programmatic and technical communities regarding

testing of electrical harnesses after they had been installed on the vehicle- The testing' which was

advocated by the technical community' was eventually rescoped to a subset of the Ares I-X harnesses

per the recommendation of the Ares I-X Mission Management Office and the decision of the Constellation Program Manager- An approach of how to close the action was developed and approved

by the Ares PCB on May 19. 2009_ The method chosen was a study of historical practices· lessons

learned from Ares I-X. and benchmarking of commercial and other relevant industriesHistorically· post-installation cable harness testing has been used since the Apollo program

via engineering drawing callouts· circa 1964_ For the Space Shuttle· the tests began with a requirement in the Johnson Space Center IJSO Design and Procedural Standard JPR-8080. JSC Design

and Procedural Standard Requirement E-14. which has evolved to the current NASA-STD-8739.4.

"Crimping' Interconnecting Cables· Harnesses· and Wiring'" most recently dated November 24. 2009_

For the Shuttle Program the orbiter and propulsion elements are subject to post-installation testingFor expendable launch vehicles· one major contractor performs the tests and the other does notFor Ares I-X· the reason post-installation testing became an issue was because it was unplanned

land therefore unsequencedl work in the integration and checkout of the vehicle- Originally'

post-installation testing was a requirement on the project· but the requirement was subsequently

removed- This requirement was removed prior to the Critical Design Review ICDR> to make it

consistent with the processes used on the Atlas V This requirement was relieved on the avionics

Integrated Product Team qPTl but not on the other IPTs- This meant that the ordering of longlead parts such as mating connectors and the development of test procedures did not occur- Adding

the requirement back late in the development life cycle would have had a significant impact to the

Ares I-X launch dateFor this assessment· benchmarking was accomplished by developing a survey and performing

either a site visit or mail-in response through the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAEl Subcommittee AE-8A· Electrical Wiring Systems Installation· a group whose focus is on aerospace wiring

installation issues- Responses were received from government and private sector launch vehicle developers· military and commercial aircraft· spacecraft developers· and harness vendors- Results varied

widely' as demonstrated in appendix A; however· the crewed launch vehicles and military aircraft

consistently perform the post-installation tests'

iii

-----------------------------------
Key findings were that the existing test requirements do identify manufacturing- and installation-induced damage- While the number of failures discovered by post-installation testing may be

statistically insignificant- the fact is that the discovery of even one failure in a Criticality 1 circuit

justifies retaining the requirement for human-rated vehicles- The team found no data supporting the

claim that post-installation testing damages the harness insulation system When properly planned

in the production floW' there is relatively low overhead associated with the testingThe recommendation is for the Ares projects to retain the value-added practice of

postiabrication and post-installation cable harness testing- including insulation resistance qRl and

dielectric withstanding voltage (DWV> tests- Human factors should be emphasized in harness design

including ease of access- harness routing- interfacing structures- and routing near obstructions in an

effort to eliminate the manipulation required to install and test these harnesses· To ensure the lowest life-cycle cost- several preparation steps should be taken- These steps include ensuring that the

electrical integration deliverables to NASA <harness diagrams and wiring tables> are in an electronic

format compatible with commercial automated test equipment and ensuring that the production

contractor is required to produce and deliver cable mating adapters- NASA should also ensure that

proper test and verification requirements are in place to ensure that the production and operations

contractors derive the proper work instructions and workflows'

The authorization- signature page- and team memberships for the original Ares Cable

Harness Post-Installation Testing Report document are presented in Appendix Biv
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION .

2. ASSESSMENT PLAN 2

3. DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION AND APPROACH 3

3.1 Action Description 3

3.2 Action Approach 3

3.3 Background and Status of Current Requirements 5

4. DATA ANALYSIS 7

4.1 Ares I First Stage Concept of Operations 19

4.2 Ares I Upper Stage Concept of Operations 19

4.3 Shuttle Concept of Operations 20

5. FINDINGS, OBSERVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 21

5.1 Findings 21

5.2 Team Observations 21

5.3 Recommendations 22

6. ALTERNATE VIEWPOINTS :....... 23

7. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 25

APPENDIX A-SURVEY RESPONSE SUMMARY/INTERPRETATION MATRIX 26

APPENDIX B-STUDY AUTHORIZATIONS AND TEAM MEMBERS 27

B.l Approval and Document Revision History 27

B.2 Authorization and Notification 27

B.3 Team Members 27

B.4 Signature Page 28

APPENDIX C-SURVEY RESPONSES 29

APPENDIX D-PROBLEM REPORTING AND CORRECTIVE ACTION DATA

AND ASSESSMENT OF ARES AVIONICS

AND SOFTWARE CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER 30

v

-----------------------------------~~
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

APPENDIX E-ELECTRICAL HARNESS TEST DATA 31

APPENDIX F-ORION PROJECT REQUIREMENT EXCERPT

ON POST-INSTALLATION CABLE TESTING 32

APPENDIX G-ARES I-X PRELIMINARY LESSONS LEARNED

ON POST-INSTALLATION CABLE TESTING 33

APPENDIX H-SCIENCE ANDTECHNOLOGYTECHNICAL INTERCHANGE

MEETING NASA ELECTRICAL PRESENTATION 34

APPENDIX 1-FINAL ARES PROJECT CONTROL BOARD PRESENTATION 35

vi
LIST OF FIGURES

1. Closure plan 3

2. Shuttle (Orbiter) wiring problem reports and flight rate from 1979-2000........................... 10

3. Orbiter wiring problem breakdown 11

4. Ares I-X cable harness test configuration 14

5. Apollo I fire (crew, capsule, and damage) 15

6. Apollo 13 16

7. Orbiter wiring damage 17

8. Closeup of Orbiter wiring damage 17

9. Closeup of Orbiter wiring damage 18

10. Closeup of Orbiter teleprinter short 18

11. 5T5-93 AC Bus short to structure 18

12. 5T5-97 N51 cable failure 19

13. 5T5-97 failure location 19

vii
LIST OFTABLES

1. Benchmarking result 9

2. MSFC/Shuttle PRACA search results 12

3. Approval and document revision history 26

4. List of team members 26

viii
AC

AC-l

AF

AST

CDR

CSO

DWV

ET

FAA

FOR

GSFC

HDBK

IPC

IPT

IR

IUA

JCM

JPL

JPR

JSC

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND SYMBOLS

alternating current

alternating current bus-l

Air Force

Avionics and Software Team

Critical Design Review

Chief Safety Officer

dielectric withstanding voltage

external tank

Federal Aviation Administration

Findings, Observations, and Recommendations

Goddard Space Flight Center

handbook

Institute of Printed Circuits

Integrated Product Team

insulation resistance

instrument unit assembly

Johnson Space Center Manual

Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Johnson Space Center Procedural Requirements

Johnson Space Center

ix
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND SYMBOLS (Continued)

KSC Kennedy Space Center

LM Lockheed Martin

MAF Michoud Assembly Facility

MDA Missile Defense Agency

MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center

NOT NASA Design Team

NESC NASA Engineering and Safety Center

NHB NASA Handbook

NPD NASA Policy Directive

NSI NASA Standard Initiator

NSTS National Space Transportation System

NWTC NASA Workmanship Technical Committee

OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer

OMB Office of Management and Budget

PCB Project Control Board

PR Problem Report

PRACA Problem Reporting and Corrective Action

S&MA Safety and Mission Assurance

SAE Society of Automotive Engineers

SMDC Space and Missile Defense Command

SRB solid rocket booster

x
SSME

START

STS

TBD

TIM

TVRO

ULA

USA

USP

VAB

VCS

WBS

WHMA

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND SYMBOLS (Continued)

Space Shuttle Main Engine

Standards and Technical Assistant Research Tool

Space Transportation System

To Be Determined

Technical Interchange Meeting

Test and Verification Requirements Operation

United Launch Alliance

United Space Alliance

upper stage production

Vehicle Assembly Building

Voluntary Consensus Standard

Work Breakdown Structure

Wire Harness Manufacturers Association

xi
TECHNICAL PUBLICATION

EVALUATION OF CABLE HARNESS

POST-INSTALLATION TESTING: PART B

1. INTRODUCTION

The Ares Project Control Board (PCB) issued an action to develop the leanest set of practices for design· manufacturing· installation· and testing of electrical cable harnesses· To address the

action item· a plan was developed that consisted of a review of historical practices· lessons learned

from Ares l-X and benchmarking of commercial and other relevant industries· From this information· Findings and Observations were documented· and Recommendations for the design and operation of the crew launch vehicle were developed and presented for consideration by the Ares PCB.
2. ASSESSMENT PLAN

A plan was developed by Chris Iannello and Mark King and was endorsed by the Harness

Team members· The assessment method chosen was a study of historical practices- lessons learned

from Ares ,-x. and benchmarking of commercial and other relevant industries· The original plan is

shown in figure 1.

Note: Due to time constraints- many of the sites originally planned for benchmarking

were not visited· A mail-in survey was used to collect additional information' Appendices A and C

contain some of the responses of the mail-in surveys·

Cable/Harness Action Item Plan

Ales eatlIeJHamelS ActIon Assigned

Review NASA-5TD-8739.4 (Mandatory St.ndard)

Review Ants 1-X Harness Lessons Learned (M. Bangham matefial)

KSClOps experience for Shuttle, ELV., Gtound ProcelSing (Shuttle,

Solicit team members

First team meeting

Revi_ of MSFC (or NASA) Cable Inst.llatlon HDBK

Assess Orion approach

Inlerim brief at AST

Recommendation for study approach (trade. bend1mark, etc)

DeYelo:P Survey Questlon8inl

STUDY APPROACH TO PCB

Develop Report Ou~ine

NESC Wiring & Connector Discipline Input to Study

Boeing - Della benchmark (Delta IV· Decatur)

LOCkheed Martln - Alias bend1mark

Air Foree - Coionldo

Robolic Space (JPllGSFC)

SpaceX • Falcon benchmark

Air Foree Space & Mialls Systems Center - Los Angeles

Car mfr (TBD) benchmark

Dept of Defense (MDA, AF, and/or SMOC) benchmark

Write lIUmmary report of observations.

Review baseline mfr, 8$5y, tes~ and checkout process.

Incorporate observations Into Aras mfr, any, lesL and checkout via

SChedule Reserve

Action Item Complete

3/24109

3/25109

3130109

~15109

~1109

~14109

~14109

4I22J09

~30109

4/27109

5I6Ill9

5/18109

5/21109

5/5109

5126109

8125109

6130109

7123109

7127109

7/30109

8/4109

8/10109

8/17109

917109

9121109

1015109

10I30IO

3/24109

~8109

5/29109

4/17109

5/15109

4/14109

5/29109

5/29109

4I30I09

5/15109

5122109

5/18109

5129109

5/29109

5/28109

8129109

712109

7127109

7129109

8IJI09

817109

8/13109

9/4109

9/18109

10l2I09

1012910

101301ll

o

'--_-;!:=J

o

o

o

111_

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

c:::::J

101300

2

Figure 1. Closure plan.
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION AND APPROACH

3.1 Action Description

3.1.1 Action From Ares Project

In light of the recent issues on Ares I'X related to cable11arness installation and testing' Ares

must develop its own lean approach to the manufacture· installation· test· and checkout of cables!

harnesses across the integrated launch vehicle stack- The team must assess the Ares I'X for on'going

lessons being learned· conduct an endto'end assessment (cable manufacture to flight) of current

cable11arness practices and standards in NASA and the commercial launch industry and any other

relevant industries- and develop a recommended set of practices for Ares that will result in the lowest

Iife'cycle cost with a high reliability approach· The goal should be to develop the leanest set of practices for Ares designers· assemblers· and operators to use in laying out· manufacturing' installing'

and testing cableS'harnesses for Ares I and V rather than relying on NASA-STD'8739.4. The team

should include project· engineering' Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MAl, original equipment

manufacturers (OEMs)· and operators'

3.2 Action Approach

In order to complete this action' the team decomposed the action given into several smaller

and more manageable activities that are listed below Beneath each item the team has listed the

activities performed to address this portion of the action· Actions taken to assess lessons learned

from Ares I'X are as follows:

• Assess lessons learned from Ares IX

- Interviewed participants, collected lessons learned, and assessed testing regime during site visit-

• Conduct an assessment of cable11arness practices in NASA· commercial launch industry· and

other relevant industries·

- Performed benchmarking site visits of NASA and commercial space industry' surveyed broader

industries' and interviewed SAE subcommittee with wide cross section of industrial

participants'

• Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACN

• Develop a recommended set of practices for Ares I and V resulting in a balance of lowest life'cycle

cost with high reliability'

- Provided as findings· observations· recommendations· and lessons learned in the subsequent

report3
• Integrate these practices in Ares I and V design· manufacturing· assemblyt1nstallation· test· and

operations-

- Implementation of recommendations by Ares ElementsThe activities are further described below3.2.1 Ares I-X Assessment

The team reviewed Ares I-X summary reports related to the issues with post-installation cable

testing- In addition' Mike Bangham a team member on this assessment· was an active participant

representing the Ares I-X project during the team's assessment of the testing- Ares I-X summaries and their proposed lessons learned with respect to cable testing are included in the appendicesExperience from Ares I-X points to the need to consider this kind of posbnstallation testing during

design and during productiorvintegration flow planning- In particular· with regard to design· Ares

I-X suggests design rules to avoid installation-induced problems· effectively designing for operations

(j-e-' How can the cable and harness designs best accommodate operations?)- In addition· I-X points

to the need for a reevaluation of how harnesses are routed- The team points out that consideration

for how to develop a test to avoid damage is also an important step3.2.2 Benchmarking Activities

The Ares project action included the action to ".. .conduct an end-to-end assessment (cable

manufacture to flight) of current cablEYharness practices and standards in NASA and the commercial launch industry and any other relevant industries..." To accomplish this· the team used several

methods to benchmark other's activities with respect to cable testing- These included the following:

Benchmarking field facility visitsEmailed surveysOpen discussiorvinterviews with technical committees on pertinent standardsTo further expand on the team's benchmarking activities' the team visited several facilities

including the United Launch Alliance (ULA) facility producing Delta Ilt1V (and future home of

Atlas) in Decatur· AL; a prominent commercial space contractor's production facility; Shuttle's Wire

and Test Facility (Kennedy Space Center (KS(l. FLJ; and the Interplanetary Rover Cable Facilities

(Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)· Pasadena· CA)- For facilities that the team was unable to visit due

to time or access constraints· an emailed survey was used- In total· although relatively few emailed

responses were received on the survey «'0). those responses offered an interesting and pertinent

cross section of the aircraft manufacturers and added a new perspective to the dataset In addition

to these activities· the members of the SAE Subcommittee AE-8A were also interviewed at their

Portland· OR meeting in October 2009_ Participants in the SAE AE-8A committee included OEMs·

airframe manufacturers· airline and other aircraft operators' systems suppliers· the military' NASA·

government agencies (e-g-' the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA»· component manufacturers·

consulting firms· and academia- The participants represented a diverse cross section of industries

and· hence· perspectives on posbnstallation cable testing varied4
3.2.3 Problem Reporting and Corrective Action and Significant Problem Searches

PRACA and significant problem searches were conducted (see Appendix DJ· In addition to

the original planned actions, the PCB also requested lAres PCB 80, Oct 2009) that the team collect

known failures and determine if the testing in question would be capable of screening for such failures· To that end, three main data collection activities ensued· The first was a collection of significant

wiring related anomalies in NASA history that resulted in a list of high-profile failures attributed

to wire latent defects or induced damage to wire by handling' Second, previously compiled studies

of Orbiter Wiring Problem Reports were reviewed and pertinent data were excerpted for this report

Finally, the Ares Avionics and Software Chief Safety Officer (CSO) commissioned a data collection activity in order to find any instances where the post-installation cable testing was able to catch

failures with the potential for a critical failure (j'e" loss of life or loss of mission)'

3.3 Background and Status of Current Requirements

3.3.1 Background

Document searches using the NASA Standards and Technical Assistant Research Tool

(STARr found that the earliest reference to post-installation requirements for harnesses is in JSC

Design and Procedural Standard 133, dated July 27, 1970, cited in National Space Transportation

System INSTSl 08080-1, Manned Spacecraft Criteria and Standards· The Space Shuttle Program

released a similar document' JSC Manual IJCMJ 8080 on April 01, 1991, which has evolved into JSC

Procedural Requirements (JPR) 8080.5, JSC Design and Procedural Standards· The applicable test

requirement is found in Standard Number E-14, dated April Ol, 1991, and reaffirmed on March 08,

2005.

The earliest Agency-wide document citing post-installation requirements for harnesses is May

1996 in NASA Handbook INHBJ 5300.4(3G-1J, Workmanship Standard for Interconnecting Cables'

Harnesses' and Wiring' paragraph 3G140l.8. This document has evolved into NASA-STD-8739.4,

where the post-installation test requirement is in paragraph 18.2.8 and was reaffirmed in the latest

release dated November 24, 2009.

Post-installation tests were imposed on the Apollo via engineering drawings dated circa 1964.

Various military standards had requirements for testing' but the responsibility for document

ing specifications for the types and frequencies of tests was assigned to the individual programs·

3.3.2 Current Status

Per NASA Policy Directive INPDJ 8730.5, NASA Quality Assurance Program Policy, NASASTD-8739.4 (Change 4) is the current workmanship standard that is to be imposed on programs

fabricating space flight or mission critical ground support cables and harnesses· NASA-STD-8739.4

is maintained by the NASA Workmanship Technical Committee INWTO

5
A separate task of the NWTC is to support NASA's responsibility to comply with Office of

Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-119. This Circular directs government agencies to use

voluntary consensus standards lVCSSl in lieu of government-unique standards except where inconsistent with law or otherwise impractical· To meet that goal· the NWTC participates in several organizations that maintain VCSs'

For electronics fabrication· the predominant VCS organization is the Institute of Printed Cir

cuits qpCl. Association Connecting Electronics Industries· IPCWire Harness Manufacturer's Association (WHMAl A-62°A· Requirements and Acceptance for Cable and Wire Harness Assemblies

is considered the primary industry standard for cables and harnesses· Along with many electronics

manufacturing companies (many of which are large NASA and Department of Defense suppliers)· the NWTC supports the committee that maintains this standard and a subcommittee that is

generating IPC A-62°AS· Space Applications Hardware Addendum to IPCWHMA A-620A The

scope of the space addendum is to "provide additional requirements over those published in IPC!

WHMA A-62°A to ensure the performance of cable and wire harness assemblies that must survive

the vibration and thermal cyclic environments getting to and operating in space'" The NWTC plans

to recommend Agency adoption of this document to replace NASA-STD-8739.4 upon the release

of the space addendum and its associated training program- This is expected to occur before the end

of calendar year 2010.

The electrical test requirements in IPCWHMA A-62°A require post-installation tests of

cable and harness assemblies· It is not expected that the space addendum subcommittee will change

that requirement for the space addendum6
4. DATA ANALYSIS

The results of the benchmarking activities described above are summarized to the entries

listed in table 1. Company names are generalized to their respective industries to protect proprietary

contractor data'

The columns represent different industries and are generally the result of a single representative respondent in order to maintain the. intent of this chart to provide a summary of the benchmarking activity' The rows represent electrical tests grouped by productiorvfnstallation phase· Specifically,

after the harness is manufactured, the postfabrication testing occurs after a supplier or a respondent's in-house fabrication facility fabricates the cable· Preinstallation at system integration refers to

the process by which a subset of respondents assemble all the electronics (avionics) and operation

harnesses as a preliminary testing opportunity before final installation into the structure/chassis'

Finally' the post-installation rows refer to testing after the cable harness is fully integrated in the

vehicle or structure' Tests across the rows include the testing required by NASA-STD-8739.4, which

includes continuity' DWV, IR' and other pertinent testing such as functional tests or safe-to-mate

testing' In some cases, these other pertinent tests are listed because the respondent cited them as

alternatives that mitigate or lessen the need for a NASA-STD-8739.4 test not being performed' As

an example, the safeto-mate test, a test performed by JPL as a channelization test, also verifies

expected electrical parameters done as a precursor to mate' Notes on the bottom of the table explain

key aspects of the data· Note 1refers to interview responses from cable engineering at JPL and their

concern that DWV testing has the potential to cause latent damage to the cable system As a result·

JPL intentionally does no DWV testing' It should be noted that studies performed by the Marshall

Space Flight Center (MSF(l and KSC on the effects of DWV show no adverse effects on the insulation systems (see Appendix El. Notes 3and 4speak to the relatively new practice of cable testing

and cable test facilities at the commercial space contractor' This vendor is just getting up to speed

on how to incorporate the full test regime required by NASA-STD-8739.4 but· at the time of the

team's visit, had not done so· Notes 5 and 6refer to the team's initial contact with the Orion project

on the NASA and contractor sides· The initial response was that Orion would follow the policy of

no post-installation IR or DWV once avionics are installed· However' this response was revised by

NASA engineering supporting the Orion Project' who will hold the contractor to their contractual

requirement to perform such testing'

The Orion project documentation calls for post"installation DWV in CEVT<l31212 CEV

Subsystem Requirements Specification Crew Module and Service Module'Spacecraft Adapter

Wiring Subsystem under WIRE·0684 (jncluded as Appendix Fl·

Data collection on this activity began by evaluating NASA's own experience on wiring

anomalies and practice of postinstallation cable testing within its major programs·

7
co Table 1. Benchmarking result.

Commercial

Aircraft

Maker

".!l-~· ~i'~ (:.

.t:I'f.,~ ,I,'" -.

Military

Aircraft Harness

Maker Manufacturer

,- )i' ....... ., .~~- .~:~ .: i.;

~.' .....

n ,-, t~.i "n I,'@ t:j t=

(i') .'"

Shuttle I Shuttle IShuttle I I EELV IEELV I Commercial I JPL

Cable Test I Orbiter Payload SRB ELV 1 2 Space Co. Interplanetary I Orion

Functional

Post-fabrication

Continuity :-;I.

Insulation Resistance (Megger) :.'. t-. .:. '; ,.~:

Dielectric Withstand Voltage (Hi-Pot) (4) (1) < ....

Continuity >. • '~....... ,

--+--+----llllilo"~........--:O;;;;,;.,,;,;.,+---+-_+_--_+--__1~

Insulation Resistance (Megger) (3)

Dielectric Withstand Voltage (Hi-Pot) (3)

Functional ~::: .. l'~ :,:\; '.~~.'. '.,,~ _...

Continuity .:'•. c':. .,._,.:~;. .... ., ." '.

Post-installation Insulation Resistance (Megger) (3) (8)

wi Avionics Boxes Dielectric Withstand Voltage (Hi-Pot) I~\.' . IR\

Installed Safe to Mate (3) I I2t

Preinstallation at

System Integration

(1) JPL does no OW testing whatsoever.

(2) Achannelization test that also verifies expected electrical parameters is done as precurser to mate.

(3) Commercial Space Co. does no cable testing once installed.

(4) Commercial Space Co. is working to get DWV testing incorporated post-fabrication.

(5) The contractor does not do Megger with electronics installed in spacecraft regardless of whether hamesses are mated or not.

(6) Orion project documents do require the contractor to do full suite of post install cable testing regardless of avionics installed.

(7) When manufactured hamess gets integrated into Next HigherAssembly by harness manufacturer.

(8) Rarely perform OW or IR post-fabrication unless functional failure occurs.

I j Test Not Performed

Test Performed

NIA
A first step was a review of the databases and anomaly logs of the major manned programs

including the Shuttle's PRACA Database· KSC's Shuttle Problem Report Tallies- and a review of

significant wiring anomalies in the Shuttle and Apollo'

Figure 2 shows the relationship between the number of wire problem reports (PRs) per year

and flights per year· Note that the flight rate data are erroneously shifted to the right one year· From

the data· there is no indication that wiring PRs decrease with vehicle maturity in the case of the

Orbiter (although Ares' single-use- ship-and-shoot strategy makes this not directly comparable to

Ares)' Also- per the Orbiter electrical team there are two major reasons that Orbiter wiring PRs

increase during low flight-rate years· First- inspections of wiring go up during those years· Second· as

the flight rate decreases- there is more traffic in the ship resulting in an increase in collateral damage'

Number of Problem Reports on Orbiter Wiring from 1979 to 2007

88gggggg

NNNNNNNN

3,000

2,500

C

0

0 2,000

1::

0

Do

CI>

0::: 1,500 E

CI>

:is

E

c.. 1,000 ]i

{!!.

500

0

Columbia First Flight 1981 I 1

21,198 I I

STS-93 AC Engine i"'- 272!

Challenger First Flight 1983 • Problem Reports Controller Short Discovery First Flight 1984 _ r--,.. 1979 to Late 2007

Atlantis First Flight 1985

I·~. ·f

Endeavour First Flight 1992

Columbia_~ • • •

FirstOMM 6. .d I I I I 6

I I

•

158 4 5

STS-6 Humidity

Separator Short\ I ST~-281_ 1 19~ 21( ·4 Teleprinter Short

·3 760 827 764 .~ f-

.~ 635 2569 614 646

2'

286 1 f1611 7.n18 14 I 1 I m 0 a; N .,.., '" <D ...... ex:> m 0 a; N .,.., '" <D ...... ex:> m ...... ex:> ex:> ex:> ex:> ex:> ex:> ex:> ex:> m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m

_ Problem Reports Per Year Year

• Flights Per Year

10

9

8

7

6 ::!!

cO'

in

5 "tl

!!:

4 t:-

3

2

0

Figure 2. Shuttle (Orbiter) wiring problem reports and flight rate from 1979-2000.

Figure 3 shows a breakdown of the types of wire-related problems encountered in the Orbiter

fleet· Note that some of the most significant categories include damaged conductor and exposed

conductor·

Clearly- handling-induced damage or damage resulting from work in close proximity is a primary source of wiring anomalies· The question is: Of the total set of wiring problems- how manyif any- can the post-installation testing in question screen? To answer this question- the team took

a different approach on data collection· The idea was to generate a very narrow search criteria with

the intent of finding instances where the post-installation testing described in this report uncovered

9
5,500

5,000

4,500

4,000

r- - 3,500 I-- -

3,000 II-- =1 r- 2,500 r- f- f-- -

2,000 I • I: f-- - -

1,500 .. -=1 I-- - '- f1,000 r---~ f- I-- I--

I

,..--1 ;;~i~· r- r- -i 500 I f- f-- f--

0 r-i = c:I ii Ii I:!!:l - I~ L.... '-

105 105J2 105 103 103 103 103 av- 103 104 104 104 104 103 104 105 avUMP Slnd- STS- STS- STS- STS- 103 J3 Stnd- UMP STS- RTF Stnd- Grand Grand Grand 102

Total Own! 120 116 121 114 Ownl STS- 115 (ECLSS) Ownl Total Total Total J3

Subs Subs 117 Subs

Total 340 2,400 1,053 72 47 150 750 1,628 1,677 163 2,442 49 1,844 4,324 4,498 3,793 2,666

o Chafe Protection 80 344 155 9 3 41 124 60 161 7 425 25 915 398 1,372 579 954

• Kaplon Damage 75 423 261 7 3 10 53 185 300 57 256 2 687 558 1,002 759 654

o Jacket Damage 81 997 285 28 28 47 362 760 298 44 1,162 11 566 1,523 1,783 1,363 483

o Shield Damage 21 106 53 5 4 6 63 114 53 6 165 8 344 245 523 180 168

• Exposed Conductor 45 367 236 10 4 34 90 364 168 42 258 0 153 670 453 648 293

• Conductor Damage 38 162 63 13 5 12 58 145 95 7 176 3 187 328 373 263 114

Figure 3. Orbiter wiring problem breakdown.

failures that' had they gone unnoticed, had the potential to result in a critical effect· To this end, a

keyword search was generated on the MSFC Shuttle PRACA Reportable database on keywords

"POST" "INSTALLATION," "DWV," "IR" "MEGGER" "HI-POT" and "CONTINUITY"

The results were further screened to ensure all the resulting entries were, in fact' instances where

post-installation testing caught a potential problem- PRACA search results for the MSF05huttle

are presented in table 2.

The 11 entries found suggest that this sort of testing does uncover potential issues' but the

number of entries suggest that these types of significant finds are rare· In fact' each survey and inter

view respondent indicated uncovered failure rates of less than 1-2%

As such, the team's conclusion here was even though IR and DWV usually uncover a low

failure rate (often less than 1%), the data presented herein show cable testing of this sort does identify cable damage that could result in loss of life or loss of mission' albeit rare, and that data alone is

sufficient justification to conduct this testing'

10

- ------
Table 2. MSFClShuttle PRACA search results.

MSFC Functional Hardware Test

Report. Problem Title Element System Criticality Criticality Operation Fail Mode Cause FMEA' Fail Date NCAPart.

A16814 0.1. CABLE X21W5R PIN A(switch 51) failed SRB E&l 1R - A EL UK 50-04-X21/B05 3/25/1996 10400-00SO-501

DIINtest.

A17039 IW20 harness failed megger check post test SSME Harnesses 1R 1R D EL ETE H120-o1 2f7/1997 R0018420-51

904297.

A17040 IW16 harness failed megger check post test SSME Harnesses 1R 1R D EL ETE H116-o1 2f7/1997 RS008116-101

904297.

A17271 Wire harness failed post-installation DIIN ET Electrical 1R 1 A EL ES 3.12.7.2 4/25/1998 80931003714-229

test.

A17395 AFT SRB/orbiter wire harness (303W04) ET Electrical 1R - A EL M 3.12.4.2 4/20/1999 80931003714-160

failed dielectric withstand voltage (1,500) test.

A17537 Wire harness (303W07) failed post-installation ET Electrical 1R - A EL MM 3.12.7.2 12120/1999 80931003714-229

TM04 dielectric withstand voltage (1,500 V)

test.

A17616 Wire harness 303W07 did not pass TM04 ET Electrical 1R 1 A EL MAW 3.12.7.2 9/14/2000 80931003714-179

dielectric withstand voltage test (1 ,SOO V) at

MAF.

A17632 FASCOS Cable FID/ln-family. SSME Harnesses 3 3 Q Mf ET H150-o1 11/1/2000 R0014030-201

A18030 Harness failed continuity check. SSME Harnesses 1R 1 Q EN DHA H102-o1 2f7/2005 RS0081 02-041

A18080 BIPOD WEB ternperature sensor harness ET Electrical 3 3 AI EL MW 3.8.14.2 4/27/2005 80931023704-099

311W09P1 failed post-installation isolation

resistance test.

A18544 THE 303W01 wire harness failed the ET Electrical 1R 1R AS EL MW 3.12.1.2 7/16/2008 80931003714-209

post~nstallation TM04 dielectric withstand

voltage (1 ,SOO V) test on ET-129 at MAF.
....------------------------------------

The team also wanted to understand what strategies could be employed to reduce the over

head associated with these tests' To that end· the team referred to Ares I-X lessons learned· the

returned surveys· and the interview responses to questions related to testing overhead·

Ares I-X lessons learned are included in Appendix G· These lessons can be summarized as

follows:

Risk to your avionics when doing DWV

Design for accessibility'

Preplan for testing'

On Ares I-X. the lessons learned underscore design for accessibility and preplanning for

postinstallation testing' On the Ares I-X solid rocket booster (SRB) (first stage) structure' harness

failures· in general· have occurred in the last 12 inches or so of the harness· The team makes the

following two observations on this:

First· most manipulation to install these harnesses occurs near the end·

Second· many of the installations have the smallest bend radii at the box connection point

On testing the harnesses· the requirement is that the harnesses be tested after installation· So

when does installation end? The team maintains that it ends when the harnesses are either installed

at the end plate or very near it Today on the SRB program testers must take the harness end and

bend it to allow connection to the test harness· In some cases· the harness is then completely out

of the installation area· This is done very carefully and the harness is supported (usually by ropes)·

but there is manipulation of the harness to get it into a test configuration and then back into the

installation configuration'

In figure 4. the harnesses are draped over the cylinder to allow the technicians to connect to

the harness· Given most of the failures have occurred in the last 12 inches· and those last 12 inches

are being manipulated after the test· in addition to when the cables are finally mated· this design is

not optimal with respect to cable testing'

Suggestions for improvement include improving the ways tests are set up and performed from

a design perspective' These include the following:

Selecting easily matedldemated connectors'

Designing for special test connectors that allow technicians to leave the harness in the near final

location for testing'

Considering a common connector'

Developing a common method to hold the test connectors and harness in place during the testing

process'

12
Figure 4. Ares I-X cable harness test configuration.

The team concurred with all of the Ares I-X lessons learned· Lessons learned are incorporated in section 5. Findings· Observations· and Recommendations (FOR)· with the exception of the

first concern related to performing OWV testing with avionics installed (cables/connectors dematedl

.

Even though OWV testing of harnesses requires disconnecting them from their associated

avionics boxes pretest· Ares I-X brought forward a concern that modern avionics should be assessed

against possible damage when cables under OWV test fault to chassis' The question raised was that

projects should ensure that the avionics box can withstand any variations in its chassis voltage should

a harness under test short to the chassis nearby· The team did not share this Ares I-X concern for a

number of reasons· First· with proper bonding and grounding it is virtually impossible to develop

any potential difference across the avionics box chassis' Further· modern test equipment is designed

to protect the device under test to the greatest extent possible' This includes current limiting features

and incremental voltage test regimes- It is likely that these are the reasons the team could find no

documented cases of testing-induced damageWith regard to the survey and interview responses' in all cases where the vendor was performing testing comparable to the postinstallation testing in NASA-STO-8739.4, each vendor indicated

that such testing was low overhead· In each of these cases' it was noteworthy that these organizations

had well-developed test procedures- The wire harness pin outs were in an electronic format consumable by their particular brand of cable tester; they had racks of cable adapters for each flight or

vehicle harness suitable for interconnect with the tester' and the test was planned into the assembly

workflow so as to minimize effort- These responses were developed into the recommendations found

in section 5.3.

13
Finally' it should be noted that a number of high-profile failures in NASA history have listed

wiring faults and handling-induced damage as related causes· Included in these are the Apollo 1

and Apollo 13 incidents and a number of Shuttle anomalies· The Apollo 1 fire shown in figure 5 (as

excerpted from The Apollo 204 Report) occurred during a full-up launch simulation on January 28,

1967. A momentary increase in alternating current (AC) Bus 2 voltage on all three phases was noted

at ::::;9 seconds before the report of fire, and at the same time telemetry data from equipment powered

from AC Bus 2 showed abnormalities· All communications were lost 18 seconds later· The rapid

spread of fire within the pure oxygen atmosphere caused an increase in pressure and temperature

that resulted in rupture of the Command Module and creation of a toxic atmosphere· Death of the

crew was from asphyxia due to inhalation of toxic gases due to fire·

Figure 5. Apollo I fire (crew, capsule, and damage).

Listed in the Apollo 1 findings was that it is most probable that the fire was initiated by an

electric arc and was most probably brought about by some minor malfunction or failure of equipment or wire insulation· Components of the Environmental Control System installed in Command

Module 012 had a history of many removals and of technical difficulties that included regulator

failures· line failures· and environmental control unit failures· The design and installation features of

the environmental control unit made removal or repair difficult· In addition' deficiencies in design·

manufacture· installation, rework· and quality control existed in the Teflon~ electrical wiring· The

report conclusion included a recommendation that rigid inspection at all stages of wiring design,

manufacture' and installation be enforced·

Similarly' on Apollo 13 (fig· 6). as excerpted from the Apollo 13 Review Board Cortright

Commission's report· the No· 2 oxygen tank had been previously installed in the service module

of Apollo 10. but was removed for modification (and was damaged in the process of removap· At

55 hours' 55 minutes. oxygen tank No· 2 exploded· causing No· 1 tank also to fail· The Apollo 13 command module's normal supply of electricity, light· and water was lost· at a distance of 200,000 miles

from Earth· Subsequent investigation of the accident determined the cause of the combustion was

most probably the ignition of Teflon wire insulation on the fan motors' wires· caused by electric arcs

in this wiring· In both cases· handling-induced damage and wire insulation failure were contributors·

14
Figure 6. Apollo 13.

Other examples of notable failures within the Space Shuttle Program are depicted in figures 7

through 10. Figure 7shows damage to Orbiter wiring caused by work in close proximity to the wire

bundle shown· Note that the outer color coating is damaged in several areas' exposing the Kaptonlil

insulation layer' Also note that in several areas' the outer Kapton layer has also been damaged· This

type of damage can exist undetected with no outward indication that the system function can be

compromised· In these cases· ascent thermal ancVor vibration environments can move the harness·

increasing the potential for bare conductor to short to chassis or other exposed wires· Figures 8and

9show a closeup of the insulation damage and figure 10 shows a closeup of the teleprinter short

During Space Transportation System (STSl-28. a short circuit occurred between the +28V

and return wire segments inside a power cable for a teleprinter (fig' 10). Suspect Cause: Kapton wir

ing was subjected to a severe bend over the top of the straight backshell when routed during use· The

design was changed to incorporate the use ofTeflon wiring and a 90-degree backshell·

During STS-93. an electrical short circuit on AC Bus-1 (AC11. Phase-A (fig' 11). resulted in

loss of the primary controller for Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSMEH and the secondary controller

for SSME-3. The suspected cause was that a torque set screw head with burred edges likely damaged

the wire insulation before launch· resulting in the exposed conductor· which made contact during the

vibration environment of launch· resulting in the short

Another anomaly occurred during STS-97 that· after postflight analysis· drove a rollback of

STS-98 for assessment The anomaly was that System "A" NASA Standard Initiator (NSP Pressure

Cartridge in the left aft lower strut did not fire· resulting in a Criticality lR failure of the SRB separation system shown in figures 12 and 13. The assessment team confirmed that the Orbiter and external tank (E"P cabling performed nominally as did the pyrotechnic NSI· The failure was attributed

to the watertight reusable strut ordnance cable· Gross shield damage was noted· The most probable

cause was identified as handling damage unique to the ET attach-ring strut reusable strut cables·

15
16

Figure 7. Orbiter wiring damage.

Figure 8. Closeup of Orbiter wiring damage.
Figure 9. Closeup of Orbiter wiring damage.

Exposed EvidenceConductor

ofArching

with 1

r.....od ConducIlIr

Figure 10. Closeup of Orbiter teleprinter short. Figure 11. STS-93 AC Bus short to structure.

17
Lower Strut

STS·97 Failed Cable

..~_-- Orbiter

Diagonal Strut

Figure 12. 5T5-97 N51 cable failure.

5T5-97 IFA Cable Investigation

View Looking Forward

RoberlWright

18

ET

Diagonal Strut

SRB

ET Attach Ring

Location of Suspect

Reusable Cable

Connector

Location of Unfired NSI

Figure 13. 5T5-97 failure location.
Technicians performed x'ray inspection and electrical tests of the STS-98 reusable strut ordnance cables and replaced one suspect upper strut reusable ordnance cable and also reterminated

one suspect lower strut reusable ordnance cable· The team replaced one suspect forward separation

bolt ordnance cable' An effort was also kicked off to perform x-ray inspections and electrical tests of

additional cables from inventory' The x-ray inspection and electrical tests of 223 flight cables from

inventory was completed and four cables were identified with a break in a conductor· Analyses concluded conductor breaks were not recent occurrences· Corrective actions were implemented for the

STS-98 mission· which entailed rollback to the Vehicle Assembly Building 'VAB) for inspection and

testing of system tunnel cables· The team completed x-ray inspections and electrical tests of 36 of the

38 system tunnel cables with no anomalies noted· This anomaly shows the impact that problems like

these can have when discovered late in the floW"

4.1 Ares I First Stage Concept of Operations

The first stage will actually be integrated as a stage in the KSC VAB· similar to how the

Space Shuttle SRBs are stacked today' The KSC contractor' working under Constellation Program's

Ground Operations Project· will develop the assembly and checkout procedures from the information

provided by the Ares I first stage' This information is in the form of Test &Verification Requirements

Operations lTVROs)· which are being developed for the first stage CDR Presently' the heritage

Shuttle SRB and Ares I-X are being used as a starting point forTVRO development·

4.2 Ares I Upper Stage Concept of Operations

The upper stage will be fully integrated and checked out at the Michoud Assembly Facility

(MAP before shipment to KSC In the current concept of operations production flow the instrument unit structure is handed over from the upper stage production (USpl contractor to the instrument unit assembly qUAl contractor for integration and checkout, and then the IUA is handed

back to the USP for integration onto the rest of the upper stage' The upper stage manufacturing and

assembly subsystem team is responsible for overall stage integration'

The USP contractor is responsible for development of the in-process work instructions· which

contain the details of how the stage is assembled and checked out- The prime driver to the work

instructions is the upper stage assembly drawings'

Work instruction development has begun for a ground vibration test article, but this test

article does not need the full suite of flight unit work instructions· Per the master schedule· no instrument unit work instructions are being developed· Once development begins· the NASA Design

Team (NOT! will be responsible for ensuring that the appropriate Ares I requirements and processes

are captured,

19
4.3 Shuttle Concept of Operations

Shuttle production flow differs for each of the three elements· For Orbiter' although complete post-installation cable testing was performed after all harness installations, it is rarely repeated

onboard the Orbiter after individual wiring anomalies are identified· For the SRB and ET since each

are built up each flow- a number of post-installation cable tests are performed· For the ET these tests

are performed at MAF as each cable is installed into the ET For the SRB, since the segments are

integrated in the VAB and system tunnel cables installed there' a post-installation test is performed

byKSC

20
5. FINDINGS, OBSERVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Findings

The following team findings were identified:

F-l. Data show that the testing regime required by existing Ares cable harness testing requirements is capable of identifying typical cable system manufacturing defects and installation-induced

damage'

F-2. In NASA programs· the number of failures identified by harness testing is relatively low in both

the build and installation processes'

F-3. The incidence of testing-induced failures is extremely low

F-4. The Ares I-X production flow was designed without the requirement for post-installation

cable testing and· as a result· did not account for all the necessary preplanning to facilitate

post-installation cable testing' which is the root cause of the issues on Ares I-X with respect to cable

testingF-5- NASA programs that do incorporate the full suite of NASA-STD-8739.4 required testing demonstrate a value-added step in their production flow with relatively low overhead associated with the

testingF-6. The effort to perform cable testing is strongly a function test preparation including the formulation of cable pin-out tables· the compatibility of the electronic format of these tables with the

automated tester' and the availability of tester mating adapter cables·

5.2 Team Observations

The following team observations were identified:

0-1. There is a perception within some NASA programs and program contractors that high-voltage

cable testing can result in damage to the cable's insulation system but this assertion is not supported

by MSFC and KSC testing' which show no measureable adverse effects0-2

. The degree to which NASA programs follow NASA-STD-8739.4 varies when it comes to cable

testing and· in particular· post-installation cable testing0-3

- Cable testing practices vary in NASA programs and in industry based on a number of factors

that include the reliability required in the application, the maturity of the operation· the nature of

the assembly process' and the cultural heritage of the workforce21
5.3 Recommendations

The following team recommendations were identified:

R-t The Ares project should retain the value-added practice of postfabrication and post"installation

cable testing including IR testing and DWV testing·

R-2. The Ares project should emphasize human factors in cable harness design including redesigning

the harness routing' interfacing structures' routing near obstructions' etc' in an effort to eliminate the

manipulation required to install these harnesses·

R-3. The Ares project should ensure the lowest life-cycle cost to implement recurring cable testing by

incorporating the following necessary preparation steps into the production contractor's workflow:

Ensure the electrical integration deliverables to NASA from the production contractor include

harness diagrams and wiring tables in an electronic format compatible with commercial automated cable testers (such as Cirrus)'

Ensure the production contractor is required to produce and deliver cable mating adapters suitable for interconnecting each Ares cable harness to the automated cable tester for

postfabrication and post-installation testing'

The selection of the cable tester's mating connector, which makes up one end of each and every

adapter cable' should be chosen such that it is standard, easily obtainable' of necessary contact

density, and consistently employed on each adapter cable·

Ensure documentation that initiates the creation of post-installation test procedures is adequately

addressed during workflow development

Ensure the assembly sequence accounts for planned post-installation cable testing' This is

particularly true for areas with difficult access·

22
6. ALTERNATE VIEWPOINTS

The review team offered no dissenting opinions· The team is in concurrence with all findingsobservations- and recommendations·

23
7. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A Science and Technology Technical Interchange Meeting criMI pdf is found in Appendix H

and the NASA Electrical Presentation Final Ares PCB Presentation is presented in Appendix I·

25
APPENDIX A-SURVEY RESPONSE SUMMARY/INTERPRETATION MATRIX

Information for this appendix is classified SBU and can be found in Part A of this Tp· Information needed to access Part A of this TP can be obtained on the NASA Technical Reports Server

(NTR$l using <http:?htrs·nasa·gov/searchjsp>·

26
APPENDIX B-STUDY AUTHORIZATIONS AND TEAM MEMBERS

8.1 Approval and Document Revision History

Table 3. Approval and document revision history.

Version Description of Revision Author Effective Date

1.0 Initial Release Mark S. King,

Chris Iannello

8.2 Authorization and Notification

This report was generated as the result of an action item assigned by the Ares Project Manager at the March 24. 2009. Ares Project Control Board <PCB)· Authorization for the action closure

plan· which is included this report was sanctioned at the May 19. 2009. Ares PCB·

B.3 Team Members

Table 4. List of team members.

Name Function

MarkS. King Lead for WBS 5.2.6/Avionics Integration &Vehicle Systems Test

Chris Iannello Lead for Avionics &Software Chief Engineer

Garry McGuire Electrical Integration, Workmanship

Andy Gamble S&MNAres Avionics &Software Chief Safety Officer

Mike Bangham Ares I-X Consultant/Advisor

William (Art) Davis Harness Design &First Stage Representative

Joe Schuh Ares IAirborne &Orbiter Electrical Engineering

Ronald (Ron) Hodge EEE Parts Engineering

Tammy Owens Technical Editing and Coordination

In addition to the team members listed above· a host of others were significant contributors

to the data provided and conclusions derived in this report- These individuals· although not formally

listed as team members· supported the activity extensively by providing consultation services· facilitating demonstrations· supporting data collection· and in many cases helping write this report- The

team leads would also like to thank Hung Nguyen· NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC); Angel

Garnica· NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory <JPLl; Pat Dillon· NASA JPL; and George Slenski·

NESC consultant· for their expert advice and dedicated support to this action' Finally' data provided

in this report was collected with the help of a variety of sources including the NASA Johnson Space

Center (JS(l. Boeing' and United Space Alliance (USA) Shuttle wiring teams'

27
8.4 Signature Page

and Vehicle Systems Test

{hJ:-A-- 8(q/10

Chris Iannello, Date

Lead for Avionics and Software

Chief Engineer

Date Date

)tiIL4~tft/¢;

Mike Bangham, 7 Date

Ares I-X Consultant/Advisor

William

W~Q.~f/rt: (Art) Davis, ate

Harness Design and First Stage

Representative

15 gj ~-3...;JOf() J6?Schuh, Date

Ares I Airborne and Orbiter Electrical

Engineering

xcnJJl JJJi 8/5/20/0

Ronald Hodge Date

EEE Parts Engineering

Tammy Owen Date

Technical Editing & Coordination

28
APPENDIX C-SURVEY RESPONSES

Information for this appendix is classified SBU and can be found in Part A of this Tp· Infor

mation needed to access Part A of this TP can be obtained on the NTRS using <http:Uhtrs·nasa·gov/

search-jsp>-

29
APPENDIX D-PROBLEM REPORTING AND CORRECTIVE ACTION DATA

AND ASSESSMENT OF ARES AVIONICS AND SOFTWARE

CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER

Information for this appendix is classified SBU and can be found in Part A of this Tp· Information needed to access Part A of this TP can be obtained on the NTRS using <httpthtrs·nasa'gov/

search-jsp>'

30
APPENDIX E-ELECTRICAL HARNESS TEST DATA

Information for this appendix is classified SBU and can be found in Part A of this TP- Information needed to access Part A of this TP can be obtained on the NTRS using <http;f'htrs-nasa-gov/

searchjsp>-

31
APPENDIX F-ORION PROJECT REQUIREMENT EXCERPT

ON POST-I NSTALLATION CABLE TESTI NG

Information for this appendix is classified SBU and can be found in Part A of this Tp· Infor

mation needed to access Part A of this TP can be obtained on the NTRS using <httpuihtrs"nasa"gov/

searchjsp>"

32
APPENDIX G-ARES I-X PRELIMINARY LESSONS LEARNED

ON POST-INSTALLATION CABLE TESTING

Information for this appendix is classified SBU and can be found in Part A of this TP- Infor

mation needed to access Part A of this TP can be obtained on the NTRS using <http;fhtrs-nasa-gov/

searchjsp>-

33
APPENDIX H-SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TECHNICAL INTERCHANGE

MEETING NASA ELECTRICAL PRESENTATION

Information for this appendix is classified SBU and can be found in Part A of this Tp· Infor

mation needed to access Part A of this TP can be obtained on the NTRS using <hUp;fhtrs·nasa'gov/

searchjsp>'

34
APPENDIX 1-FINAL ARES PROJECT CONTROL BOARD PRESENTATION

Information for this appendix is classified SBU and can be found in Part A of this Tp· Infor

mation needed to Part A of this TP can be obtained on the NTRS using <http:fhtrs·nasa·gov/

search-jsp>-

35
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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Sa. CONTRACT NUMBER

Evaluation of Cable Harness Post-Installation Testing: Part B 5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

M.S. King and c.J. lannello* 5e. TASK NUMBER

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14. ABSTRACT

The Cable Harness Post-Installation Testing Report was written in response to an action issued by the Ares Project Control Board (PCB).

The action for the Ares I Avionics & Software Chief Engineer and the Avionics Integration and Vehicle Systems Test Work Breakdown

Structure (WBS) Manager in the Vehicle Integration Office was to develop a set of guidelines for electrical cable harnesses. Research showed

that post-installation tests have been done since the Apollo era. For Ares I-X, the requirement for post-installation testing was removed

to make it consistent with the avionics processes used on the Atlas V expendable launch vehicle. Further research for the report involved

surveying government and private sector launch vehicle developers, military and commercial aircraft, spacecraft developers, and harness

vendors. Responses indicated crewed launch vehicles and military aircraft perform post-installation tests. Key findings in the report were as

follows: Test requirements identify damage, human-rated vehicles should be tested despite the identification of statistically few failures, data

does not support the claim that post-installation testing damages the harness insulation system, and proper planning can reduce overhead

associated with testing. The primary recommendation of the report is for the Ares projects to retain the practice of post-fabrication and

post-installation cable harness testing.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

electrical cable harnesses, post-installation testing, test requirements, crew launch vehicle, megger, hi-pot

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT 18. NUMBER OF 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE PAGES STI Help Desk at email: help@sti.nasa.gov

U U U UU 48 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (/nc/ude area code)

STI Help Desk at: 443-757-5802

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